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Congress passed the Air Carrier Access Act (ACAA) in 1986, with several goals. First, Congress intended to address the "unique difficulties" faced by individuals with disabilities, who often had no way to predict the extent of a given airline or flight crew's accommodation. Second, Congress intended the ACAA to overrule a Supreme Court case, Department of Transportation v. Paralyzed Veterans of America (PVA) , in which the Court held that certain nondiscrimination regulations then in effect could not be enforced against commercial airlines. Finally, Congress also intended to balance protecting individuals with disabilities from discrimination, on one hand, and the need to ensure general passenger safety, on the other. The inquiry regarding the extent of protections under the ACAA is timely given public concern in 2007 about a man infected with XDR-TB who traveled on several passenger airplanes before he was placed in isolation and public concern in 2009 about the influenza A(H1N1) outbreak. This report discusses ACAA requirements and regulations, including regulations regarding airplane passengers with communicable diseases. It will also briefly discuss S. 2554 , 110 th Congress, and H.R. 5129 , 110 th Congress, which proposed to amend the ACAA to provide aggrieved individuals with a private right of action, attorneys' fees, expert fees, and the costs of the action. The ACAA prohibits discrimination by air carriers against "otherwise qualified individual[s]" on the basis of disability. The statutory language regarding the scope of "disability" was the same under the ACAA as under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) prior to the enactment of the Americans with Disabilities Amendment Act on September 25, 2008. Specifically, a person is an "individual with a disability" under the ACAA if the individual (1) "has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities," (2) "has a record of such an impairment," or (3) "is regarded as having such an impairment." Under the regulations, such individuals are "qualified" individuals with disabilities if they (1) take steps to avail themselves of services offered by air carriers, (2) make good faith efforts to obtain tickets for air transportation, or (3) purchase or possess valid tickets for air transportation and meet reasonable contracts of carriage. Prior to enactment of the ADA Amendments Act, courts typically found that individuals met this "qualified" requirement if they also satisfied the "individual with a disability" requirement. The ACAA's statutory language is brief, leaving implementation to the Department of Transportation (DOT). The department originally promulgated regulations to implement the ACAA on March 6, 1990. Under the regulatory framework, air carriers violate the ACAA's nondiscrimination provision if they discriminate against an individual with a disability, "by reason of such disability, in the provision of air transportation." Additionally, air carriers may not require passengers to accept special services. DOT's goal for this provision was to ensure that individuals with disabilities are not treated differently than other passengers. In Deterra v. America West Airlines , a federal district court noted that asking a person utilizing a wheelchair to advance to the front of a ticket line when he had not requested special service could constitute discriminatory conduct under the regulations. The regulations provide two major exceptions to the general nondiscrimination requirement. First, carriers may refuse to serve individuals with disabilities "on the basis of safety." Second, carriers may refuse to serve individuals with disabilities when doing so would violate "FAA [Federal Aviation Administration] or TSA [Transportation Security Administration] requirements or applicable requirements of a foreign government." If a carrier denies service to an individual with a disability under either of these exceptions, it must specify its reason in writing. The ACAA impacts nearly all air carriers that transport passengers. Air carriers are defined as "U.S. ... or foreign citizen[s] ... [that undertake], directly or indirectly, or by a lease or any other arrangement, to engage in air transportation." It is clear from the ACAA's legislative history that the ACAA applies to both government and commercial air carriers. Additionally, in Bower v. FedEx , the Sixth Circuit held that the ACAA applied to a company that routinely allowed employees to ride as passengers in its cargo planes. The original version of the ACCA exempted foreign air carriers. However, in 2000, Congress passed a law amending the ACAA such that it now applies to foreign air carriers. On May 13, 2008, the regulations were revised to include foreign air carriers, and the new provisions went into effect on May 13, 2009. Foreign air carriers now are required to comply with the ACAA for flights "that begin or end at a U.S. airport." The ACAA contains no statutory reference to communicable diseases, but the regulatory text specifically addresses them. Additionally, the regulatory definition of "individual with a disability" appears to include individuals with communicable diseases. Similarly, courts generally accept communicable diseases as falling within the scope of "disability" under the ADA if the diseases meet the same parameters that other physical or mental impairments must satisfy. Although no federal court has reached the issue, it follows that courts would likely reach similar conclusions under the ACAA. The regulations prohibit various actions by carriers against individuals with communicable diseases. Namely, a carrier may not "(1) [r]efuse to provide transportation to the passenger; (2) [d]elay the passenger's transportation ... ; (3) [i]mpose on the passenger any condition, restriction, or requirement not imposed on other passengers; or (4) [r]equire the passenger to provide a medical certificate." However, an exception applies when "the passenger's condition poses a direct threat." The regulations define "direct threat" as "a significant risk to the health or safety of others that cannot be eliminated by a modification of policies, practices, or procedures, or by the provision of auxiliary aids or services." Carriers have discretion in determining whether a given passenger poses a "direct threat." The carrier must make an "individualized assessment, based on reasonable judgment ... to ascertain: (i) [t]he nature, duration, and severity of the risk; (ii) [t]he probability that the potential harm to the health and safety of others will actually occur; and (iii) [w]hether reasonable modifications of policies, practices, or procedures will mitigate the risk." However, note that within the scope of their discretion, carriers must choose the "least restrictive response" from the passenger's point of view. For example, a carrier should not "refuse transportation to the passenger if ... [it] can protect the health and safety of others by means short of a refusal." The Department of Transportation regulations require most air carriers to take specific actions in order to fulfill the ACAA's broad nondiscrimination requirement. Note that these requirements are minimum standards only. Aircraft must conform to multiple accessibility requirements under the regulations. First, "aircraft with 30 or more passenger seats on which passenger aisle seats have armrests" must be "equipped with movable aisle armrests on at least one-half of the aisle seats in rows in which passengers with mobility impairments are permitted to sit under FAA or applicable foreign government safety rules." Second, each aircraft with 100 or more passenger seats must offer priority space in its cabin for storing at least one folding wheelchair. Third, aircraft with "more than one aisle in which lavatories are provided shall include at least one accessible lavatory." Finally, aircraft with more than 60 passenger seats providing one or more accessible lavatories must provide an "on-board wheelchair" for passengers' use. Generally, air carriers may not require that an individual with a disability travel with an attendant. However, a carrier may require that an individual travel with an attendant if one of the following applies and the carrier determines that an attendant's assistance is "essential for safety": (1) the passenger will travel in a stretcher or incubator; (2) the passenger is unable to comprehend or respond appropriately to safety instructions; (3) the passenger has a "mobility impairment so severe that the person is unable to physically assist in his or her own evacuation of the aircraft"; or (4) the passenger has both severe hearing and vision impairments and "cannot establish some means of communication with carrier personnel." Air carriers must allow individuals with disabilities to travel with service animals. In addition, carriers must "permit the service animal to accompany the passenger with a disability at any seat in which the person sits, unless the animal obstructs an aisle or other area that must remain unobstructed to facilitate an emergency evacuation." Also, carriers must accept service animal identification cards, tags, and even "credible verbal assurances" from qualified individuals as proof that a given animal is a "service animal." Similarly, airlines must allow qualified individuals with disabilities to bring ventilator or respirator equipment into the airplane cabin and use those devices during flights "operated on aircraft originally designed to have a maximum passenger capacity of more than 19 seats." Additionally, airlines must permit qualified individuals to stow assistive devices "in designated priority storage areas or in overhead compartments or under seats," including "(1) [m]anual wheelchairs ... ; (2) [o]ther mobility aides, such as canes ... , crutches, and walkers; and (3) [o]ther assistive devices for stowage or use within the cabin." These devices must be "consistent with FAA, PHMSA [Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration], TSA, or applicable foreign government requirements concerning security, safety, and hazardous materials with respect to the stowage of carry-on items," and a carrier "must not count assistive devices ... toward a limit on carry-on baggage." The regulations require all carriers to assist individuals with disabilities with boarding and deplaning if either the individual has requested such service or the carrier has offered such service and the individual agreed to receive it. Also, carriers may not require individuals with disabilities to sit in particular seats or refuse to seat them in any seat on the basis of disability. However, a narrow exception applies when refusing to accommodate a passenger in a particular seat is necessary in order for the carrier to comply "with FAA or applicable foreign government safety requirements." Carriers generally may not require individuals with disabilities to provide advance notice of the fact that they are flying. However, various exceptions apply. Specifically, a carrier may require up to 48 hours of advance notice of a passenger's disability if that passenger plans to carry or utilize certain equipment on the flight or seeks certain accommodations enumerated in the regulations. The regulations require that individuals with disabilities be required to undergo no more security screening procedures than individuals without disabilities. Likewise, security personnel must conduct screening of individuals with disabilities in the same manner in which they conduct screening of individuals without disabilities. However, they may examine an assistive device that might, "in their judgment," conceal a weapon or other prohibited item. In the most recent cases, two federal circuits have held that private individuals have no ability to sue airlines for discrimination under the ACAA. Instead, those courts have suggested that the ACAA merely gives individuals the ability to complain to the Department of Transportation (DOT) and then to file petitions for review with federal circuit courts if DOT fails to investigate individual complaints. These holdings limit individuals' ability to enforce the ACAA through the federal courts. Instead, individuals often must rely on DOT to enforce complaints against air carriers. Furthermore, some experts have argued that DOT's enforcement ability is relatively weak, in part because it handles enforcement through its enforcement office rather than through its office of civil rights. DOT has indicated that it has investigated numerous ACAA complaints, sometimes seeking millions of dollars in civil penalties as a result of ACAA violations. The Civil Rights Act of 2008, S. 2554 and H.R. 5129 , was introduced in the 110 th Congress and proposed, in part, to amend the ACAA to provide for a private right of action. As noted previously, judicial decisions under the act have held that individuals have no ability to sue the airlines individually but must rely on the DOT to enforce complaints. The bills indicated that Congress disagreed with the judicial interpretations and noted that "[t]he absence of a private right of action leaves enforcement of the ACAA solely in the hands of the Department of Transportation, which is overburdened and lacks the resources to investigate, prosecute violators for, and remediate all of the violations of the rights of travelers who are individuals with disabilities." Although both S. 2554 and H.R. 5129 were referred to committee, the 110 th Congress did not enact this legislation. As of the date of this report, the 111 th Congress has not introduced any similar legislation.

The Air Carrier Access Act (ACAA), 49 U.S.C. SS 41705, prohibits discrimination by air carriers against individuals with disabilities. Public attention regarding an airplane passenger who traveled while infected with Extensively Drug Resistant Tuberculosis (XDR-TB) in 2007 raised questions regarding the ACAA's requirements and guarantees. Additionally, public concern about the 2009 influenza A(H1N1) outbreak may increase congressional interest in air travel regulations. This report briefly discusses the ACAA's statutory provisions, accompanying regulations, relevant judicial opinions, and legislation in the 110th Congress.

The United States maintains a range of economic sanctions on the Government of Sudan. The United States generally restricts foreign aid because Sudan has been found, by the Secretary of State, to be a supporter of acts of international terrorism, is operating under a military dictatorship, and has fallen into arrears in its debt repayment. The United States has also suspended bilateral preferential trade treatment, restricted commercial exports and imports, denied the export of defense articles and defense services, and refused to support requests from Sudan for funding or program support in the international financial institutions for reasons related to terrorism, regional stability, and human rights--including religious freedom, worker rights, and trafficking in persons. As a member state of the United Nations, the United States, is also required to cease the sale or supply of arms and related materiel--transactions the U.S. government already blocks--to non-government entities and individuals operating in Sudan, deny visas or passage through the United States to those cited by the United Nations as those committing human rights atrocities in Darfur, and freeze the assets of those cited. On September 9, 2004, Secretary of State Powell testified before the Committee on Foreign Relations to report his assessment of the current crisis in Darfur, in Sudan's western region bordering Chad. Secretary Powell reported that the U.S. State Department had "concluded that genocide has been committed in Darfur and that the Government of Sudan and the jinjaweid bear responsibility--and genocide may still be occurring." The Congress, also in mid-2004, declared "that the atrocities unfolding in Darfur, Sudan, are genocide. In January 2005, however, an International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary General concluded that the Government of the Sudan has not pursued a policy of genocide. This report outlines actions taken by the United Nations and the economic sanctions currently imposed on Sudan by the United States--describing what is restricted, the statutory basis for the sanctions, and where the authority lies to ease or strengthen those restrictions. On July 30, 2004, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) adopted Resolution 1556 to condemn "acts of violence and violations of human rights and international humanitarian law by all parties to the crisis" in the Darfur region of western Sudan, and to single out the Government of Sudan for its primary responsibility to respect human rights, maintain law and order, and protect the population of the region. In doing so, the Security Council cited its authority, under chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, to address threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression. By issuing UNSC Resolution 1556, the Security Council calls on the Government of Sudan to facilitate international relief of the humanitarian disaster, investigate human rights violations, establish credible security conditions for the civilian population and those attempting to assist them, and resume peace talks with all factions. The Security Council, furthermore, endorses the African Union's deployment of international monitors to Darfur, and urges U.N. member states to materially support the African Union effort. UNSC Resolution 1556 also requires U.N. member states to prevent the sale or supply of arms and related materiel to non-government entities and individuals operating in Sudan. The U.N. Security Council has demanded that the Government of Sudan "fulfill its commitments to disarm the Janjaweed militias and apprehend and bring to justice Janjaweed leaders and their associates who have incited and carried out human rights and international humanitarian law violations and other atrocities." The Security Council requested that Secretary General Kofi Annan report in 30 days, and monthly thereafter, on any progress of the Government of Sudan to fulfill its commitments, and made it clear that it intends to take further steps against the Government of Sudan "in the event of non-compliance." According to press reports, Secretary General Annan's appointed envoy to Sudan, Jan Pronk of the Netherlands, in his briefing to the Security Council that constituted Secretary General Annan's first required monthly report, concluded that "there is no recent evidence linking Khartoum to Arab militias rampaging through black African villages in Darfur." The United States publicly criticized the conclusions, citing a report prepared by African Union monitors that contradicted Mr. Pronk's assessment, and urged the mobilization of more observers to the region. In his testimony before the Committee on Foreign Relations on September, 9, 2004, Secretary of State Powell announced that the State Department identified genocide in the events of Darfur, and would return to the United Nations to call for immediate action. He declared: the United States will call for a "full-blown and unfettered investigation" by the United Nations to "confirm the true nature, scope and totality of the crimes our evidence reveals." It was acknowledged at the time, however, that adoption of sanctions in the United Nations would be a hard won accomplishment, as China, Pakistan, Russia, Britain, and others had stated that they were unlikely to support punitive measures at this time. On September 18, 2004, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1564 to request Secretary General Annan to establish an international commission of inquiry empowered to investigate "reports of violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law in Darfur by all parties, to determine also whether or not acts of genocide have occurred, and to identify the perpetrators of such violations with a view to ensuring that those responsible are held accountable...." UNSC Resolution 1564 also declares the United Nations' support of the African Union's efforts to expand and enhance its monitoring efforts that grew out of North/South cease-fire negotiations, and encourages member states to provide material support for the AU efforts, to fulfill their earlier pledges for humanitarian contributions, and to provide sustained support to humanitarian efforts in Darfur and neighboring Chad. UNSC Resolution 1564 declares the Security Council's intent to impose restrictions on Sudan's oil industry, and travel and asset restrictions targeting individual members of the Government of Sudan, if Sudan fails to meet the requirement and intent of UNSC Resolutions 1556 and 1564. No timeframe for further imposition of sanctions is stated, however. Pursuant to Resolution 1564, in October 2004, the Secretary General appointed a five-member International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, and requested it report within three months. On January 25, 2005, the International Commission reported its findings in four categories: (1) violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law in Darfur by all parties; (2) whether or not acts of genocide have occurred; (3) the identification of perpetrators of violations; and (4) recommendations on how to hold those perpetrators accountable. The International Commission "established that the Government of the Sudan and the Janjaweed are responsible for serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian law amounting to crimes under international law" and, in particular, found that: ... Government forces and militias conducted indiscriminate attacks, including killing of civilians, torture, enforced disappearances, destruction of villages, rape and other forms of sexual violence, pillaging and forced displacement, throughout Darfur. These acts were conducted on a widespread and systematic basis, and therefore may amount to crimes against humanity. The extensive destruction and displacement have resulted in a loss of livelihood and means of survival for countless women, men and children. In addition to the large scale attacks, many people have been arrested and detained, and many have been held incommunicado for prolonged periods and tortured. The vast majority of the victims of all of these violations have been from the Fur, Zaghawa, Massalit, Jebel, Aranga and other so-called "African" tribes. The International Commission of Inquiry, at the same time, however: ... concluded that the Government of the Sudan has not pursued a policy of genocide ... the crucial element of genocidal intent appears to be missing, at least as far as the central Government authorities are concerned.... The Commission does recognize that in some instances individuals, including Government officials, may commit acts with genocidal intent. Whether this was the case in Darfur, however, is a determination that only a competent court can make on a case by case basis. [emphasis added] The report of the International Commission of Inquiry, ambiguous in its findings of no genocide, lack of "genocidal intent," but acts possibly committed with "genocidal intent," and its call for a "competent court" to evaluate the evidence, led to a flurry of international debate and diplomatic maneuvering. The United States called on the United Nations either to establish a new "accountability tribunal" or refer criminal investigations to the special tribunal in Tanzania that oversaw cases related to the 1994 massacres in Rwanda, deploy peacekeepers and impose economic sanctions that would have an impact on Sudan's oil exports. Most other U.N. Security Council members supported the International Commission of Inquiry's recommendation to have the International Criminal Court in The Hague oversee any prosecution. And the Government of Sudan insisted that any prosecution of war crimes in Darfur should be pursued in Sudan's own courts. On March 29, 2005, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1591 to require member states to "prevent entry into or transit through their territories of all persons," identified by a newly formed Committee of the Security Council, who "impede the peace process, constitute a threat to the stability in Darfur and the region, commit violations of international humanitarian or human rights law or other atrocities," or violate the arms embargo stated in Resolution 1556. Resolution 1591 also requires member states to "freeze all funds, financial assets and economic resources" of those identified by the Committee. The Resolution delayed the imposition of these two sanctions for 30 days, however, leaving enough time for the removal and relocation of most assets held by an individual or entity subject to the sanction. Two days later, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1593 to refer the situation in Darfur to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court. Sudan has been denied U.S. foreign aid under the law since 1988, when it defaulted on servicing its external debt. Subsequent developments--the military overthrow of a democratically elected government in 1989, and support of acts of international terrorism, as determined by the Secretary of State in 1993--also require that the United States deny foreign assistance to Sudan. Humanitarian aid and food aid are exempted from the restrictions, however, and from 1988 to 2001, such assistance to Sudan averaged more than $48 million each year, primarily in food aid (see Table 1 , below). This stands in contrast to 1987 and earlier, when Sudan averaged more than $216 million per year, and aid ran the gamut from food aid, development assistance, Economic Support Funds, military assistance and International Military Education and Training (IMET). Today, the United States is the largest donor of humanitarian assistance to Darfur. From February 2003 through September 2005, the United States provided nearly $768 million to nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) working in Darfur and on the Chad/Sudan border. The United States has also provided funding to support the African Union's deployment of cease-fire observers and human rights monitors to the region. The United Nations has called for an expansion of the African Union forces to 7,700, with possible supplement up to 12,000, with airlift and logistical help from NATO (including the United States), the European Union, and Ukraine (a party to neither NATO nor the EU). In December 1988, Sudan fell more than one year in arrears in servicing its debt to the United States. This debt was accumulated in the form of non-grant U.S. foreign and military aid. As a result, since 1988, Sudan has been denied most foreign assistance pursuant to sections in both authorization and appropriations legislation. The President may waive the restriction if he finds it in the U.S. national interest to do so. Most recently, Sudan's debt arrearage--along with its support of international terrorism and its military dictatorship--was also cited by the State Department and the Millennium Challenge Corporation as cause for ineligibility for assistance under the terms of the Millennium Challenge Account. On June 30, 1989, Sudan's democratically elected government, led by Prime Minister Sadiq al Mahdi, was overthrown by that country's military forces. As a result, Sudan is denied most foreign assistance pursuant to the annual foreign operations appropriations. On February 28, 1990, President George H.W. Bush invoked this section of law to announce that aid, other than humanitarian assistance, would be denied Sudan. This prohibition continues until the President can determine and certify to Congress that democracy has returned to Sudan on the national level. Sudan is also deemed ineligible for Millennium Challenge Account funding because of its military dictatorship. Since FY1989, the annual foreign operations appropriations act has explicitly prohibited Sudan from receiving aid under the Foreign Military Financing Program. FY2005's foreign operations appropriations act specifically denies Sudan eligibility for U.S. debt restructuring programs "unless the Secretary of the Treasury determines and notifies the Committees on Appropriations that a democratically elected government has taken office." The debt restructuring program includes debt accrued through the International Affairs Budget Function 150 account, P.L. 480 agricultural loans, the Export-Import Bank, and certain debt reduction programs enacted in prior years. Sudan is also denied any assistance under the current foreign operations appropriations "except as provided through the regular notification procedures of the Committees on Appropriations." The foreign operations appropriations measure to fund programs through FY2006, currently under consideration in the 109 th Congress, seeks to continue the restrictions on aid to Sudan related to democracy, foreign military financing, and regular notification procedures. Restrictions on aid imposed because of military regimes or debt arrearage, though not explicitly directed at Sudan, are also continued. The proposal also makes available not less than $112.35 million in bilateral economic assistance to Sudan for disease control programs and debt reduction. None of those funds will be provided to the Government of Sudan, however, unless the Secretary of State can determine and certify to Congress that (1) the Government of Sudan has disarmed and disbanded government-supported militia groups operating in Darfur; (2) the Government of Sudan and related militia groups are honoring the cease-fire agreement of April 2004; and (3) the Government of Sudan allows international humanitarian and human rights groups access to Darfur. In August 1993, the Secretary of State determined that the Government of Sudan had "repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism." As a result, Sudan is subject to a long list of economic restrictions and a withdrawal of U.S. foreign aid. U.S. exporters are required to obtain validated licenses for the export of goods or technology to Sudan, and generally there is a presumption that the Departments of Commerce (for dual-use goods) or State (for defense articles and defense services) will deny the issuance of those licenses. As a U.S.-designated supporter of international terrorism, Sudan is generally denied foreign assistance, Millennium Challenge Account funding, agricultural aid, Peace Corps programs, support through the Export-Import Bank, support in the international financial institutions, opposition to loans or credits from the International Monetary Fund, and withholding of trade preferences under the Generalized System of Preferences. In April 1999, at the height of debate in Congress over the effectiveness--and unintended consequences--of economic sanctions, the Clinton administration announced that it would remove food and medicine from its sanctions policies in future applications, and it would issue new regulations for some countries--Iran, Libya, and Sudan--denied access to U.S. agricultural and medical exports. Congress later enacted the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 to place in permanent law the exemption of food and medicine exports in sanctions regimes. For state sponsors of terrorism, including Sudan, the export of agricultural commodities, medicine, or medical devices requires a license from the Department of Commerce. U.S. government financing of commercial exports to state sponsors of terrorism, including Sudan, is prohibited unless the President determines and certifies to Congress that such financing is in the United States' national security interest, or should be provided for humanitarian reasons. Typically, as it is the case with Sudan, economic and diplomatic prohibitions are multilayered, incrementally denying access to funds needed to legitimize a targeted government. United States condemnation for Sudan's military dictatorship in 1989 denied the country many forms of U.S. foreign aid. In 1991 President George H.W. Bush suspended trade preferences afforded Sudan under the Generalized System of Preferences. He cited the Government of Sudan's failure to promote and protect internationally recognized standards of worker rights. In 1993, the State Department added Sudan to the list of countries found to be supporting acts of international terrorism. In 1997, President Clinton invoked the most powerful economic authority available to his office to prohibit nearly all trade and transactions between the United States and Sudan. In each case, it is left to the President to determine that improved conditions warrant a restoration of bilateral relations and resumption of aid, trade, support in the banks, and transactions. On November 3, 1997, President Clinton invoked authority under the National Emergencies Act and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act to declare that a national emergency existed because of the Government of Sudan's "continued support of international terrorism; ongoing efforts to destabilize neighboring governments; and the prevalence of human rights violations, including slavery and the denial of religious freedom...." He issued Executive Order 13067 to block property and assets held by the Government of Sudan in the United States, and to prohibit most transactions with Sudan. Executive Order 13067 prohibits a U.S. person from engaging in any of the following: import into the United States of any goods or services of Sudanese origin, other than information or informational materials; export or reexport to Sudan of any goods, technology, or services from the United States, except for donations of articles intended to relieve human suffering, such as food, clothing, and medicine; facilitation of exports to or imports from Sudan; performance of a contract in support of an industrial, commercial, public utility or governmental project in Sudan; grant or extension of credits or loans to the Government of Sudan; transactions related to transportation of cargo to or from Sudan, or actual transportation to or from Sudan, including intermediate stops in the country; and any other transaction that is committed with the intention of evading or avoiding the other prohibitions. In November 2000, Congress adopted legislation to require the Secretary of the Treasury to consider approving licenses for the import of gum arabic from Sudan. Gum arabic, a resin-based substance widely used in the manufacture of inks, adhesives, soft drinks, confections, and medicines, is one of Sudan's chief exports. While U.S. manufacturers were denied gum arabic from Sudan, European competitors could trade in the commodity freely. Congress found that Sudan held a "virtual monopoly on the world's supply of the highest grade of gum arabic" and a prohibition on its importation under Executive Order 13067 was devastating to the U.S. gum arabic processing industry. Gum arabic became the exception to the comprehensive trade restrictions imposed by the Executive Branch. Any executive order issued under the authority of the National Emergencies Act and International Emergency Economic Powers Act requires annual renewal from the President, and only the President may revoke such an order. On September 9, 2003, President George W. Bush imposed economic sanctions on Sudan--one among a half dozen countries--for having failed to meet the minimum human rights standards and obligations set forth in the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000. The President noted that, as Sudan received no nonhumanitarian, nontrade-related foreign assistance from the United States, he was limited to denying funding for participation by Sudanese officials or employees in educational and cultural exchange programs until Sudan complied with minimum standards or make significant efforts to bring itself into compliance with the law. In September 2005, however, the President moved Sudan from Tier 3 (sanctionable), as it was so designated by the Secretary of State in June 2005, to Tier 2 (watchlist) status, because of significant steps the government had taken to fight trafficking. The State Department's Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons reported, for those countries so elevated: These countries took concrete actions to prosecute traffickers, protect victims, and to prevent the crime of trafficking. They increased efforts to identify and rescue trafficking victims, crafted new anti-trafficking legislation and procedures among other significant measures. In several instances, these actions were taken by countries facing resource constraints and/or significant internal political challenges. This demonstrates what can be accomplished when the commitment exists to combat trafficking in persons. We commend these governments for their actions. Sudan was reassessed based in large part on the government's commitment to implement a plan of action to end sexual violence against women in Darfur. We will look to the Sudanese government to ensure quick and effective implementation of the plan. In fine-tuning the imposition of economic sanctions on Sudan, Congress made an effort to distinguish between the Government of Sudan, the people of Sudan, and areas of the country outside of control of the government, to make aid and commerce available to the general population, with enactment of the following in the Assistance for International Malaria Control Act: Sec. 501. Assistance Efforts in Sudan. (a) Additional Authorities.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the President is authorized to undertake appropriate programs using Federal agencies, contractual arrangements, or direct support of indigenous groups, agencies, or organizations in areas outside of control of the Government of Sudan in an effort to provide emergency relief, promote economic self-sufficiency, build civil authority, provide education, enhance rule of law and the development of judicial and legal frameworks, support people-to-people reconciliation efforts, or implement any program in support of any viable peace agreement at the local, regional, or national level in Sudan. (b) Exception to Export Prohibitions.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the prohibition set forth with respect to Sudan in Executive Order 13067 of November 3, 1997 (62 Fed. Register 59989) shall not apply to any export from an area in Sudan outside of control of the Government of Sudan, or to any necessary transaction directly related to that export, if the President determines that the export or related transaction, as the case may be, would directly benefit the economic development of that area and its people. The Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2005, further limits the implementation of economic sanctions to only those parts of the country under control of the Government of Sudan. Thus, despite fairly comprehensive and longstanding restrictions on foreign aid imposed under various statutes for terrorism, debt arrearage, or military dictatorship, language in the Assistance for International Malaria Control Act, and subsequent acts, authorizes the President to override those restrictions as they might apply to large portions of Sudan's population. Congress also singled out the National Democratic Alliance of Sudan as exempt from economic sanctions restricting foreign aid in the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2005. Economic Support Funds may be made available to that group "to strengthen its ability to protect civilians from attacks, slave raids, and aerial bombardment by the Sudanese Government forces and its militia allies..." though such funding is "subject to the regular notification procedures of the Committees on Appropriations." The Sudan Peace Act, as originally enacted, requires the President to determine and certify to Congress, on a semi-annual basis, whether "the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement are negotiating in good faith and that negotiations should continue." Since its enactment, on October 21, 2002, the President regularly made a positive determination, most recently on April 24, 2004. If the President found himself unable to make this determination, he was required to: instruct U.S. executive directors in the international financial institutions to continue to vote against loans, credits, guarantees, or extension of any of these, to the Government of Sudan; consider downgrading diplomatic relations; take all steps, unilateral and multilateral, to deny the Government of Sudan access to oil revenues; and seek a U.N. Security Council Resolution to impose an arms embargo on the Government of Sudan. If these economic and diplomatic sanctions are imposed, the President could certify at any time that good faith negotiations had resumed, and lift the sanctions. The Sudan Peace Act also instructs the President to consider "downgrading or suspending diplomatic relations between the United States and the Government of Sudan...," though this is not mandatory. The act also: (1) authorizes the President "to provide increased assistance to the areas of Sudan that are not controlled by the Government of Sudan to prepare the population for peace and democratic governance, including support for civil administration, communications infrastructure, education, health, and agriculture"; (2) requires the President to suspend assistance for the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), except for aid related to health, education, and humanitarian assistance, if he finds that the SPLM "has not engaged in good faith negotiations or has failed to honor the agreements signed"; and (3) requires the President to suspend foreign aid to the Government of Sudan if he finds that it has resumed objectionable human rights behavior after he certifies to its cessation. The Comprehensive Peace in Sudan Act of 2004, however, also amended the Sudan Peace Act to authorize the President to provide $100 million for FY2005 and unspecified amounts for the subsequent two years, notwithstanding any other provision of law , "to support the implementation of a comprehensive peace agreement that applies to all regions of Sudan, including the Darfur region." The amended Act also authorizes the President to use $200 million in FY2005 "to address the humanitarian and human rights crisis in the Darfur region and eastern Chad, including to support the African Union mission in the Darfur region, provided that no assistance may be made available to the Government of Sudan." The Comprehensive Peace in Sudan Act of 2004 requires the President to impose the economic and diplomatic sanctions stated in the Sudan Peace Act (and outlined above, relating to international financial institutions, oil revenues, diplomatic relations, and an arms embargo)) as well as freeze U.S.-based assets of senior officials of the Government of Sudan, within 30 days of enactment (which occurred December 23, 2004). The President is authorized to waive implementation if he finds it in the national interest to do so. The Comprehensive Peace in Sudan Act of 2004 also continues restrictions imposed on foreign aid in the foreign assistance appropriations Act, 2004, unless the President finds that the following conditions, stated in the Sudan Peace Act, as amended, are met, namely: that the Government of Sudan has taken demonstrable steps to-- (A) ensure that the armed forces of Sudan and any associated militias are not committing atrocities or obstructing human rights monitors or the provision of humanitarian assistance; (B) demobilize and disarm militias supported or created by the Government of Sudan; (C) allow full and unfettered humanitarian assistance to all regions of Sudan, including the Darfur region; (D) allow an international commission of inquiry to conduct an investigation of atrocities in the Darfur region, in a manner consistent with United National Security Council Resolution 1564 (September 18, 2004), to investigate reports of violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law in the Darfur region by all parties, to determine also whether or not acts of genocide have occurred and to identify the perpetrators of such violations with a view to ensuring that those responsible are held accountable; (E) cooperate fully with the African Union, the United Nations, and all other observer, monitoring, and protection missions mandated to operate in Sudan; (F) permit the safe and voluntary return of displaced persons and refugees to their homes and rebuild the communities destroyed in the violence; and (G) implement the final agreements reached in the Naivasha peace process and install a new coalition government based on the Nairobi Declaration on the Final Phase of Peace in the Sudan signed on June 5, 2004.

The United States maintains a range of economic sanctions on the Government of Sudan. The United States generally restricts foreign aid because Sudan has been found, by the Secretary of State, to be a supporter of acts of international terrorism, is operating under a military dictatorship, and has fallen into arrears in its debt repayment. The United States has also suspended bilateral preferential trade treatment, restricted commercial exports and imports, denied the export of defense articles and defense services, and refused to support requests from Sudan for funding or program support in the international financial institutions for reasons related to terrorism, regional stability, and human rights--including religious freedom, worker rights, and trafficking in persons. Notwithstanding the restrictions, the Congress has made an effort to hone the economic sanctions imposed against Sudan to distinguish between the Government of Sudan and the people of the country, to relieve the latter from sanctions' sting. In 2000, legislation was enacted to allow foreign aid to Sudan if it would be applied to nongovernmental efforts "to provide emergency relief, promote economic self-sufficiency, build civil authority, provide education, enhance rule of law and the development of judicial and legal frameworks, support people-to-people reconciliation efforts, or implement any program in support of any viable peace agreement...." [SS 501 of the Assistance for International Malaria Control Act]. With Secretary of State Powell's assessment that genocide has been committed in the Darfur region of west Sudan, stated before the Committee on Foreign Relations on September 9, 2004, and with continuing reports of extreme violence committed against the civilian population of Darfur, and against those who have fled that region to take up shelter in refugee camps along the Sudan/Chad border, the United States must consider its relationship with Sudan, the effectiveness and impact of economic assistance to Sudan, the appropriateness and impact of economic sanctions, and the nexus of the two. Especially as it states the case of genocide before the United Nations, which has not found the condition of "genocidal intent" among the perpetrators of the violence, a new assessment of the use of economic sanctions might be timely. This report describes U.N. actions and U.S. economic sanctions currently in place on Sudan, and the exceptions to those sanctions. It will be updated as events warrant.

Over the past decade, global health has become a priority in U.S. foreign policy, and U.S. appropriations for global health-related efforts have more than tripled. Neglected tropical diseases (NTDs) have become an important part of these efforts. Congressional appropriations for NTDs have grown from $15 million in FY2006 to $100 million in FY2014. The Administration requested $86.5 million to support NTD programs in FY2015. Heightened congressional interest in combating NTDs has been reflected not only in higher appropriation levels but also in the development of caucuses on these issues. In October 2009, the House Malaria Caucus expanded its purview to include NTDs, and in September 2012, the Senate Malaria Caucus did the same. Tropical diseases encompass all diseases that occur solely, or principally, in the tropics. Of these, the World Health Organization (WHO) describes 17 as "neglected," since resources for curing, controlling, and researching improved treatments for these were limited until recently. The 17 NTDs are found mostly among the poorest people in 149 countries and territories ( Figure 1 ), primarily where access to clean water, sanitation, and health services is limited. Some NTDs are transmitted by people; others are spread by vectors like snails, flies, or mosquitoes; and several others proliferate in soil or water. Among the 17 NTDs, 7 account for roughly 90% of the global NTD burden ( Table 1 ). These are the three soil-transmitted helminths (intestinal worms), schistosomiasis (snail fever), lymphatic filariasis (elephantiasis), trachoma, and onchocerciasis (river blindness). Intestinal worms, or STH, account for roughly 80% of the seven most common NTDs ( Figure 2 ). NTD control efforts are grouped into two categories: those that require individual treatment and those that can be addressed by mass drug administration (MDA). Several NTDs can be addressed through MDA, when an entire community with known cases is treated irrespective of individual disease status. Of the 17 NTDs, 8 can be treated with MDA. These include the seven most common NTDs as well as foodborne trematode infections. Although the seven most common NTDs can be treated with MDA, complex transmission cycles complicate efforts to eliminate or eradicate them. STH, for example, is contracted through contact with or ingestion of worm eggs that lie in soil. The eggs are deposited in the soil through fecal matter and can remain there for several years. Access to adequate sanitation facilities is a critical component of interrupting the STH transmission cycle, as the STH medicines kill the adult worms, but not the eggs. Due to the limitations of drugs, WHO recommends a five-pronged strategy: mass drug administration innovative and intensified disease-management; vector control and pesticide management; safe-drinking water, basic sanitation and hygiene services, and education; and veterinary public-health services. Since WHO coined the phrase "neglected tropical diseases" in 2003, global efforts to address these ailments have accelerated. In 2007, WHO released the Global Plan to Combat Neglected Tropical Diseases , which outlined several goals and targets to reach by 2015 for global control, elimination, and eradication of NTDs ( Figure 3 ). In 2012, WHO released a report, widely known as the Roadmap , which highlighted progress in reaching the 2015 goals and established new ones for 2020. One year later, it released a report outlining progress in achieving the 2020 goals, as described in the Roadmap . According to the reports, guinea worm disease has been nearly eliminated and was endemic in only four countries by 2012: Chad, Ethiopia, Mali, and South Sudan. Nearly 97% of the 542 cases identified in 2012 occurred in South Sudan, where instability remains a key threat to eradication. Since the 2012 report was released, WHO has noted further progress in addressing guinea worm disease, with 148 cases reported in 2013 and only 10 cases reported from January 1, through April 30, 2014. WHO has also since noted progress in other areas. Annual sleeping sickness cases, for example, fell by more than 70% from 1995 through 2012 ( Figure 4 ). In January 2012, representatives from endemic countries, the private sector, and donor nations convened in London, England, to affirm their commitment to combatting NTDs. Participants signed the London Declaration on Neglected Tropical Diseases , which highlighted the role each signatory would play in reaching the 2020 goals outlined in the Roadmap . Appendix A lists donor commitments. These pledges included the following: $785 million (includes preexisting commitments) to strengthen drug distribution and program implementation; 1.4 billion drug treatments annually; access to drug compound libraries to identify new treatments; increased financial support for NTD programs (some of which amended previous commitments to ongoing efforts), such as: commitments by the governments of Bangladesh, Brazil, Mozambique, and Tanzania to devote political and financial resources to combat endemic NTDs. Annual donations of NTD treatments have continued to grow ( Figure 5 ). In 2013, donors provided nearly 1.35 billion NTD treatments, up from 995 million in 2011. Nonetheless, these treatments are expected to reach only 36% of those who need them, with some 1.4 billion people lacking access. Treatment access rates vary per disease and region. For example, roughly 37% of children with STH in need of deworming received treatment in 2012 ( Figure 6 ). Regional treatment rates ranged from 7% in the Middle East to 47% in Southeast Asia. Pharmaceutical companies have donated sufficient supplies of medicines for most NTDs, yet a $1.4 billion funding gap persists. Health analysts assert that an additional $200 million is needed annually between 2014 and 2020 to deliver the donated drugs and meet other programming costs. The $1.4 billion does not include additional resources needed for research and development (R&D) of new treatments, vaccines, and testing supplies. NTD experts maintain R&D is vital. Some observers are troubled by emerging evidence that hookworm, one of the STHs (that comprise 80% of all NTDs), may be developing resistance to existing medication. In addition, the international community cannot meet 2020 goals with existing tools ( Figure 7 ). There is an urgent need for additional drug treatments and vaccines for those NTDs that are difficult to treat, are costly to manage, and can have severe clinical outcomes if left untreated. These are Buruli ulcer, Chagas disease, human African trypanosomiasis, the leishmaniases, leprosy and yaws. Given the complexity of these diseases, patients must be seen at well-equipped health facilities by well-trained, specialized technicians; these types of facilities may not be available in many of the affected countries. Additionally, exposed populations need to be systematically screened because these diseases are generally asymptomatic during the periods when treatments would be most effective and carry the least dangerous side-effects. In addition to the above-mentioned diseases, dengue has become a growing global health problem. Dengue is the leading cause of serious illness and death among children in some Asian and Latin American countries. More than 2.5 billion people are now at risk of infection, close to 40% of the world's population. Of these, between 50 million and 100 million contract the disease annually. Before 1970, only nine countries had experienced severe dengue epidemics. The disease is now endemic in more than 100 countries. Dengue has been detected in a number of U.S. states and territories, including Florida, Texas, and Puerto Rico. There is no specific treatment or vaccine for dengue, which can lead to death if left untreated. Early detection and proper care can reduce fatality rates from about 20% to less than 1%. Congress has taken steps to encourage drug development for certain diseases; some NTDs are among them. Two pieces of legislation established a framework for incentivizing drugs for rare diseases or disorders: The Orphan Drug Act of 1983, P.L. 97-414 , followed by the Rare Diseases Act of 2002, P.L. 107-280 . These acts defined rare diseases or disorders as those that affect fewer than 200,000 individuals in the United States. This definition includes NTDs and other rare or orphan conditions. Through these programs, 26 drugs received a new drug approval (NDA) or a biologic license application in 2012. The FDA Amendments Act of 2007 ( P.L. 110-85 ) created a priority review voucher (PRV) to incentivize the development of drugs and biologic products for tropical diseases. The applicant would receive a voucher at the time of approval of certain tropical disease products that "offer major advances in treatment where no adequate therapy exists." This voucher would allow the applicant a priority review of another drug product. This voucher could be transferred (sold) to one other sponsor. The draft guidance issued by the FDA describes the diseases and conditions covered by the PRV. The act also permits the Secretary to designate other diseases by regulation, which could include "any infectious disease for which there is no significant market in developed nations and that disproportionately affects poor and marginalized populations.... " The list includes tropical diseases beyond the 17 NTDs, namely cholera, malaria, and tuberculosis (TB). At the same time, the act excludes some NTDs listed by WHO, including rabies, cysticercosis/taeniasis, and Chagas disease. A variety of U.S.-based institutions support global efforts to control NTDs. These institutions include the federal government, pharmaceutical companies, philanthropic organizations, and NGOs. Key U.S. government players include the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), National Institutes of Health (NIH), and Department of Defense (DOD). NGOs include groups like the Carter Center and RTI International; philanthropic organizations include the Gates Foundation and the Sabin Vaccine Institute; and private companies include Merck, Johnson & Johnson and Pfizer. While each of these plays an important role in combating NTDs, this section focuses exclusively on the USAID-managed NTD Program. In 2006, the Bush Administration launched the Neglected Tropical Disease Control Program, the first U.S. effort to address a group of NTDs. The program was created in response to language in the FY2006 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act, which made available up to $15 million "to support an integrated response to the control of neglected diseases including intestinal parasites [STH], schistosomiasis, lymphatic filariasis, onchocerciasis, trachoma and leprosy." The language signaled congressional support for calls to integrate and expand access to drugs for the seven most common NTDs. Until that time, most countries and their implementing partners focused on tackling a single NTD. The NTD Program sought to document the feasibility of integrating treatment for several NTDs and expanding this strategy. At the outset, the NTD program aimed to support the provision of 160 million NTD treatments to 40 million people in 15 countries. In 2008, President George W. Bush reaffirmed his commitment to the program and proposed spending $350 million over six years (from FY2008 through FY2013) on expanding the program to 30 countries. During his first term, President Barack Obama named the NTD Program a priority. The Obama Administration announced several goals for addressing NTDs, including administer 1 billion NTD treatments, halve the prevalence of the seven most common NTDs by 2013, eliminate leprosy in all endemic countries and onchocerciasis in Latin America by 2016, and eliminate lymphatic filariasis globally by 2017. On May 8, 2014, the Obama Administration announced that it had administered its one billionth NTD treatment, reaching 465 million people and surpassing one of its goals. From FY2007 through FY2013, USAID spent more than $370 million on global NTD programs ( Figure 8 ). In FY2014, Congress appropriated $100 million for NTD programs and the Administration requests $86.5 million for NTD programs in FY2015. A map of the countries receiving USAID support for combating NTDs is in Appendix B . The international community has made substantial progress in combating select neglected tropical diseases. Some NTDs have been tackled more effectively than others. Guinea worm disease, for example, is on the cusp of eradication and with expanding mass drug administration campaigns, the prevalence of several NTDs is declining, particularly in Latin America. Despite these advancements, WHO cautions in the 2020 Roadmap that these diseases cannot be banished without expanding global access to clean water and sanitation, improving hygiene practices, strengthening local health capacity (veterinary as well as human), and intensifying case detection and management. The United States has played an important role in combating NTDs and will likely be a central player in global efforts to advance the 2020 NTD goals. The section below discusses a range of issues U.S. and international organizations may face as they attempt to reach the WHO 2020 goals, as well as those set by the Administration (see " U.S. Efforts to Tackle NTDs "). Some of the discussion includes an analysis of steps the 113 th Congress might consider. Transmission of most NTDs is facilitated by insufficient access to clean water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH). An estimated 880 million children are carrying soil-transmitted helminths, for example, which are spread primarily through openly defecating on the ground. Eggs of these intestinal worms, which account for roughly 80% of NTDs, can persist in the environment for many years. Experts at the CDC assert that WASH should be a central component of any effective and sustainable approach to controlling NTDs. One estimate indicates that improved sanitation and water safety can reduce the prevalence rates of other NTDs as well, including schistosomiasis and blinding trachoma. Water and sanitation improvement are particularly important when addressing pathogens that cannot be eliminated by drugs alone, such as STH and schistosomiasis. Several experts urge greater investments in water and sanitation and see attainment of global water and sanitation goals as an important step towards eliminating NTDs. Through the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), the international community sought to halve the share of people without access to clean water and basic sanitation by 2015. WHO estimated that between 2005 and 2015, it would cost $72 billion annually to implement and maintain enough water and sanitation schemes to meet global water and sanitation targets, of which $54 billion would need to be spent on maintaining the systems. In 2010, members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) committed $7.8 billion towards improving global access to clean drinking water and sanitation. U.S. and global investments in sanitation would need to increase significantly to meet this funding gap. Investments in WASH are considered important, as mass drug administration campaigns cannot be used in isolation to eliminate NTDs. The process of combating diseases by combining responses by practitioners across sectors, particularly those related to health, agriculture, water, construction, and waste disposal, is known as integrated vector management. Indeed, the United States was unable to control hookworm (an STH) within its own borders until the early 1900s, when an integrated vector management (IVM) approach was applied. Documents by the Administration maintain the NTD Program is part of a complete package of services the United States provides to improve the health of women and children across sectors. The Administration intends, for example, to expand the provision of drugs that treat STH in children within USAID-supported education programs. Similarly, the Obama Administration underscores the intersection between water and sanitation and categorizes it as a "cross-cutting area" under global health. Nonetheless, in reports to Congress on progress towards advancing global health (through congressional budget justifications, for example) the Administration provides little information about how water and sanitation programs advance global health efforts or how they are integrated within global health projects. The structure of the FY2013 Foreign Operations budgetary request suggests some separation between these activities. Requests for water programs are made across a variety of accounts, primarily Development Assistance (DA) and Economic Support Fund (ESF). In FY2013, for example, the Administration requested only 12% of water and sanitation funds through the Global Health Programs account and 76% through the DA and ESF accounts. These two accounts support a wide range of governance and economic development activities, which do not typically focus on health objectives. Despite the limitations of mass drug administration, the U.S. NTD Program focuses almost exclusively on MDA. Administration officials recognize the importance of a comprehensive NTD Program, but maintain that "the directive from Congress was to focus on mass drug administration. [G]iven the limited resources, [MDA] is the most efficient and cost-effective way to control [and] eliminate these diseases." The 113 th Congress might debate the merits of applying an intersectoral approach to the NTD Program. Broadening the U.S. approach may not necessarily entail raising spending, but could involve improving the integration of U.S. health and development programs. The 113 th Congress could, for example, request information on how key leaders at USAID (e.g., the Deputy of the Global Health Initiative and the Water Coordinator) coordinate their programs. Although pharmaceutical companies have donated sufficient supplies of NTD medicines, more than 60% of those in need of NTD treatment lack access to the drugs. Broader issues associated with weak health systems within endemic countries can affect the delivery of drugs and the effectiveness of NTD programs. Since many endemic countries are largely responsible for disseminating the donated medicines, human resource constraints and supply chain deficiencies inhibit supply of the drugs and leave many without access to treatment. Streamlining and simplifying treatments are becoming increasingly important. The international community is increasingly integrating treatments and services, particularly for multiple diseases that can be treated with one pill. Lymphatic filariasis and the three most common intestinal worms, for example, can be treated with the same medication. Health providers are partnering with schools to couple LF and STH treatment with school feeding programs. Some are concerned, however, that deworming treatment rates are declining among children who are not yet old enough to attend school ( Figure B-2 ). Weak veterinary and public health systems limit the ability of several affected countries to enhance NTD programs or maintain them after international support wanes. Many critics of "vertical" or "disease-specific" programs see the poor conditions of health systems in several developing countries as an outcome of the burgeoning investments in vertical disease programs. One argument is that disease-specific efforts divert investments from the very public health systems that are needed to support vertical programs. Supporters of disease-specific initiatives argue, on the other hand, that such activities facilitate dramatic, measurable progress. Advocates of this approach point to dramatic reductions in recent years of deaths associated with HIV/AIDS and malaria. The merits of vertical disease programs have been long debated in the global health community and evidence supports both sides of the debate. Despite support by health analysts and scientists for increasing drug and vaccines for NTDs, funding for pharmaceutical R&D is considered by many to be insufficient. To date, efforts to encourage private development of NTD vaccines and drugs have met tepid responses, due in part to the belief that there is no viable commercial market for these products. It is widely understood that NTDs affect primarily the poorest in developing countries, most of whom lack resources to afford drugs. Without guarantees of cost recovery, drug manufacturers appear reluctant to initiate the lengthy, and potentially costly, discovery process. Estimates indicate that the average time for a drug to reach approval in the United States ranges from 6 to 10 years. Some analysts question whether the PRV provides sufficient financial incentives for NTD products. To date, only two companies have received the voucher, Novartis (for the drug Coartem, which treats malaria) and Johnson and Johnson (for the drug Sirturo, which treats drug-resistant TB). Novartis failed to see any market return on its voucher as it used the voucher for a product whose new drug application failed to win FDA approval. Johnson & Johnson has not yet used its voucher, which it earned in 2012. Some market analysts believe that the utility of the voucher will remain uncertain until a PRV is sold and has a clear market value. It remains to be seen whether the PRV, on its own, will provide a strong enough incentive to encourage drug development. For example, in the development of Sirturo, Johnson and Johnson applied for a PRV as well as two other FDA development incentives. Congressional interest in this issue may focus on the strategic investments that could spur added drug treatments, vaccines, and diagnostic tools. For example, some might prioritize NTDs with serious clinical outcomes that are difficult to treat and manage (e.g., Buruli ulcer, Chagas disease, human African trypanosomiasis, the leishmaniases, leprosy and yaws). Others might focus on diseases that lack any drug treatment, such as dengue, or diseases that affect the greatest number of individuals, such as STH. Vaccines do not exist for NTDs except for rabies, and diagnostic measures are limited, so that vaccines could be prioritized. There is a case for developing diagnostic tools for diseases that are difficult to detect, such as Buruli ulcer. Finally, another potential investment could advance promising treatments that are already in development, such as a vaccine for certain filarial infections (onchocerciasis and lymphatic filariasis ). Appendix A. London Declaration: Table of Donor Commitments Appendix B. Map of USAID NTD Program

The term "neglected tropical diseases" (NTDs) was coined by the World Health Organization (WHO) in 2003 to describe a set of diseases that are ancient, worsen poverty, and typically impair health and productivity while carrying low death rates. While the use of the term "NTDs" has helped to raise awareness about these long-standing health challenges, its use risks simplifying a complicated health challenge. Some of the diseases are treatable with drugs that can be administered by lay health workers irrespective of disease status, while others require diagnosis and can be treated only by trained health professionals who have access to appropriate equipment, electrical power, and refrigeration (to store the temperature-sensitive therapies). Neglected tropical diseases primarily plague the poorest people in developing countries. Changes in the environment and population flows, however, make industrialized countries, including the United States, increasingly vulnerable to some NTDs, particularly dengue haemorrhagic fever, which can cause death and has no cure. Health interventions to address the array of NTDs vary, but a common factor to an enduring solution to these illnesses is economic development. Industrialized countries, including the United States, have controlled these diseases in their territories by combining drug treatment with the construction and use of improved sanitation, modernization of agricultural practices, and utilization of improved water systems. The international community has made substantial progress in combating select NTDs, though some have been tackled more effectively than others. Guinea worm disease, for example, is on the cusp of eradication. More generally, expanding access to mass drug administration is contributing to decreases in prevalence of several NTDs, particularly across Latin America. Despite these advances, WHO cautions that these diseases cannot be banished without improving global access to clean water and sanitation, strengthening local health capacity (veterinary as well as human), and intensifying case detection and management. Making improvements in these areas will require long-term investments that are complex and may entail facing thorny issues such as addressing corruption, transferring ownership of health programs from donors to recipient countries, and evaluating the impact of political and economic policies on health programs (e.g., international lending requirements). The United States has played an important role in combating NTDs. Congressional interest in NTDs has been growing. Appropriations for NTD programs have steadily increased from $15 million in FY2006 to $100 million in FY2014. In May 2014, President Barack Obama announced that the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) had supported the delivery of the one billionth NTD treatment and had reached nearly half a billion people. The Administration requested $86.5 million to support NTD programs in FY2015. Between FY2006 and FY2012, U.S. funding has supported the delivery of nearly 585 NTD treatments, reaching 258 million people. This report discusses the prevalence of NTDs, U.S. and global actions to address them, and options the 113th Congress might consider. For additional background on NTDs, including photographs and discussions about transmission of NTDs, descriptions of activities to combat NTDs by other agencies, and additional policy issues, see CRS Report R41607, Neglected Tropical Diseases: Background, Responses, and Issues for Congress.

Pressure to reduce the federal budget deficit required Congress to consider reductions in spending on USDA programs. The 109 th Congress has addressed USDA spending levels on two fronts: in budget reconciliation and in the annual agriculture appropriations bill. The Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 ( P.L. 109-171 , enacted February 8, 2006) contains net reductions in USDA mandatory spending of $2.7 billion over five years. Nearly half of this reduction was achieved through a change in the timing of farm commodity payments, and most of the balance consists of cuts to conservation, rural development, and research spending. Separately, the full House has passed and the Senate Appropriations Committee has reported their respective versions of the FY2007 Agriculture appropriations bill ( H.R. 5384 ), which will provide annual funding for nearly all USDA agencies and programs. (See CRS Report RS22086, Agriculture and FY2006 Budget Reconciliation , by [author name scrubbed]; and CRS Report RL33412, Agriculture and Related Agencies: FY2007 Appropriations , coordinated by [author name scrubbed].) Several major weather events in 2005 and 2006, particularly Hurricanes Katrina and Rita and a widespread drought, have caused the 109 th Congress to consider emergency disaster assistance for farmers this year. In response to the 2005 hurricanes, Congress so far has provided about $1.6 billion in agricultural assistance in two emergency supplemental acts ( P.L. 109-148 and P.L. 109-234 ). To date, Congress has not authorized any emergency crop or livestock payments for 2005 or 2006 production losses outside of the Gulf states. However, the Senate-reported version of the FY2006 agriculture appropriations bill ( H.R. 5384 ) contains $4.0 billion in various forms of farm assistance, including payments for major crop and livestock losses caused by any 2005 disaster. Similar provisions for non-hurricane states were contained in the Senate-passed version of an FY2006 supplemental bill ( H.R. 4939 ), but were deleted in conference because of a threatened Administration veto of the measure. (See CRS Report RS21212, Agricultural Disaster Assistance , by [author name scrubbed].) Farm income and price support programs are dictated primarily by Title I of the 2002 farm bill ( P.L. 107-171 ), which expires in 2007. The House and Senate Agriculture Committee are conducting field hearings this year, with more intensive deliberations and markup expected in both committees in 2007. At issue is whether Congress will extend the current farm support policy, or if the pressures of tight federal spending constraints, concerns about the distribution of farm program benefits, and the threat of potential World Trade Organization (WTO) challenges to farm price and income support spending will compel Congress to consider significant changes to existing farm policy. (See CRS Report RL33037, Previewing a 2007 Farm Bill , coordinated by [author name scrubbed] , and CRS Report RL34594, Farm Commodity Programs in the 2008 Farm Bill , by [author name scrubbed].) Most crop payments are subject to annual per-person limits. Past legislative efforts to reduce the maximum amount of payments that producers can receive have been thwarted by strong opposition from southern cotton and rice growers. In the 109 th Congress, S. 385 and H.R. 1590 would reduce payment limits to a total of $250,000 and count commodity certificates and loan forfeiture toward the limits. A Senate floor amendment to add payment limits to the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 ( P.L. 109-171 ) failed by a procedural vote of 46-53. The Administration's FY2007 budget request contains a legislative proposal that would tighten crop payment limits. (See CRS Report RL34594, Farm Commodity Programs in the 2008 Farm Bill , by [author name scrubbed].) The Milk Income Loss Contract (MILC) program provides payments to dairy farmers when farm milk prices are below a specified target level. A provision in the FY2006 budget reconciliation act ( P.L. 109-171 ) extended MILC program authority for two years, through September 30, 2007, but prohibits any MILC payments beyond August 31, 2007. Consequently, under current budget rules, the program will have no baseline budget spending allocated to it beyond its expiration date. A provision in the House-reported version of the FY2007 Agriculture appropriations bill ( H.R. 5384 ) would have allowed payments in September 2007 and preserved the program's budget baseline for the next farm bill debate in 2007. Because of its budget implications, the provision was deleted on the House floor. Separately, Congress also completed action on a measure ( P.L. 109-215 , S. 2120 ) that requires the regulation of a certain large dairy operation in the West that was previously exempt from paying federally mandated minimum farm milk prices. (See CRS Report RL34036, Dairy Policy and the 2008 Farm Bill , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed].) In March 2005, a WTO appellate panel ruled against the United States in a dispute settlement case brought by Brazil, stating that elements of the U.S. cotton program are not consistent with U.S. trade commitments. In response, Congress included a provision in the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 ( P.L. 109-171 ) authorizing the elimination of the Step-2 cotton program on August 1, 2006. Following the indefinite suspension of the WTO Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations in July 2006, Brazil has pressed for further reductions in U.S. cotton support in response to the panel ruling. On September 28, 2006, the WTO established a compliance panel in response to a request by Brazil to determine whether current U.S. actions are sufficient to comply with the original WTO rulings and recommendations. As a result, additional permanent modifications to U.S. farm programs may still be needed to fully comply with the "actionable subsidies" portion of the WTO ruling. Such changes ultimately would be decided by Congress, most likely in the context of the 2007 farm bill. (See CRS Report RS22187, Brazil ' s WTO Case Against the U.S. Cotton Program: A Brief Overview , by [author name scrubbed].) Spending for conservation programs, which help producers protect and improve natural resources on some farmed land and retire other land from production, have grown rapidly since the 2002 farm bill, reaching a total of more than $5.2 billion in FY2005. This growth in spending reflects the expanded reach of conservation programs, which now involve many more landowners and types of rural lands. Budget pressures forced the 109 th Congress to weigh the benefits of these programs against growing costs. The Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 ( P.L. 109-171 ) reduced spending on several mandatory conservation programs by a combined $934 million over five years. Another topic that continues to attract congressional interest is implementation of the Conservation Security Program, enacted in 2002. Some stakeholders have questioned why USDA has implemented the program in only a few watersheds, and why Congress has limited funding even though the program was enacted as a true entitlement. The environmental, conservation, and agriculture communities have started to identify conservation policy options that might be considered in the next farm bill. The House and Senate Agriculture Committees have started to examine selected conservation issues in recent hearings. (See CRS Report RL33556, Soil and Water Conservation: An Overview , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed].) Although not as energy-intensive as some industries, agriculture is a major consumer of energy--directly, as fuel or electricity, and indirectly, as fertilizers and chemicals. In early September 2005, energy prices jumped to record levels in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. By raising the overall price structure of production agriculture, sustained high energy prices could result in significantly lower farm and rural incomes in 2006, and are generating considerable concern about longer-term impacts on farm profitability. Agriculture also is viewed as a potentially important producer of renewable fuels such as ethanol and biodiesel, although farm-based energy production remains small relative to total U.S. energy needs. The energy bill ( P.L. 109-58 ) enacted in July 2005 includes a renewable fuels standard (RFS) for biofuels that grows from 4 billion gallons in 2006 to 7.5 billion gallons in 2012. The RFS, along with tax credit incentives, is expected to encourage significant increases in U.S. ethanol production. (See CRS Report RL32667, Federal Management and Protection of Paleontological (Fossil) Resources Located on Federal Lands: Current Status and Legal Issues , by [author name scrubbed] (pdf); and CRS Report RL32712, Agriculture-Based Renewable Energy Production , by [author name scrubbed].) U.S. trade policy seeks to improve market access for U.S. agricultural products through multilateral, regional, and bilateral trade agreements. U.S. officials also seek to hold countries to commitments made under existing agreements, and to resolve disputes impeding farm exports. The Administration is participating in the current Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations, which have focused on the so-called three pillars of agricultural trade liberalization: trade-distorting domestic subsidies, market access, and export competition. Negotiators have been unable to reach a compromise agreement on reducing subsidies or expanding market access for agricultural products. The expiration of Trade Promotion Authority for fast-track consideration of trade agreements next year makes the end of 2006 the effective deadline for getting an agreement ready for congressional consideration. The United States has insisted that it will not improve its offer on domestic subsidy reduction unless the EU improves its market access offer and the G-20 countries show a willingness to open their markets not only to agricultural products but to industrial products and services as well. (See CRS Report RL33144, WTO Doha Round: The Agricultural Negotiations , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed].) The 109 th Congress passed legislation ( P.L. 109-53 ) to implement the Dominican Republic-Central America-U.S. free trade agreement (DR-CAFTA) despite strong opposition from the U.S. sugar industry, which fears those countries would gain increased access to the U.S. market. Separately, and also negotiating new free trade agreements with Panama, the Andean countries, Thailand, and the Southern African Customs Union, among others. (See CRS Report RL32110, Agriculture in the U.S.-Dominican Republic-Central American Free Trade Agreement (DR-CAFTA) , by [author name scrubbed].) Other ongoing issues of interest to Congress include rules of trade for the products of agricultural biotechnology (see CRS Report RL32809, Agricultural Biotechnology: Background and Recent Issues , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]); the scope of restrictions that should apply to agricultural sales to Cuba (see CRS Report RL33499, Exempting Food and Agriculture Products from U.S. Economic Sanctions: Status and Implementation , by [author name scrubbed]); and funding for U.S. agricultural export and food aid programs (see CRS Report RL33553, Agricultural Export and Food Aid Programs , by [author name scrubbed]). The potential of terrorist attacks against agricultural targets (agroterrorism) is increasingly recognized as a national security threat. "Food defense"--hardening the critical infrastructure against possible attack--has received increased attention since 2001. Through increased appropriations, laboratory and response capacities are being upgraded. National response plans now incorporate agroterrorism. Yet some in Congress want additional laws or oversight to increase the level of food defense, particularly regarding interagency coordination, response and recovery leadership, and ensuring adequate border inspections. (See CRS Report RL32521, Agroterrorism: Threats and Preparedness , by [author name scrubbed] . ) Approximately 76 million people get sick and 5,000 die from food-related illnesses in the United States each year, it is estimated. Congress frequently conducts oversight and periodically considers legislation on food safety and could do so again. Some Members continue to be interested in the control of animal diseases that also threaten human health; the regulation of bioengineered foods, human antimicrobial resistance (which some link partly to misuse of antibiotics in animal feed), and the safety of fresh produce. In the 109 th Congress, for example, S. 729 and H.R. 1507 propose to consolidate U.S. food safety oversight under an independent U.S. agency. H.R. 3160 and S. 1357 clarify USDA's authority in prescribing performance standards for the reduction of pathogens in meat and poultry products. (See CRS Report RL31853, Food Safety Issues in the 109 th Congress , by [author name scrubbed]; and CRS Report RL32922, Meat and Poultry Inspection: Background and Selected Issues , by [author name scrubbed].) Bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE or "mad cow disease") continues to attract interest, with eleven native North American cases (three in the United States) confirmed through early October 2006. Authorities characterize the risk to human health from these cases as extremely low. However, the beef industry has suffered economically due to foreign borders being closed to U.S. beef. The appearance of BSE in North America in 2003 raised meat safety concerns and disrupted trade for cattle and beef producers. A major issue for Congress has been how to rebuild foreign markets for U.S. beef. Other issues include whether additional measures are needed to further protect cattle and the public, and concerns over the relative costs and benefits of such measures for consumers, taxpayers, and industry. (See CRS Report RS22345, BSE ( " Mad Cow Disease " ): A Brief Overview , by [author name scrubbed].) Since 2003, highly pathogenic avian influenza (H5N1) has spread from Asia into Europe, the Middle East, and Africa; however, no cases of H5N1 have been found yet in the United States. Because avian flu is highly contagious in domestic poultry and can be carried by wild birds, on-farm biosecurity is important. Controlling avian flu in poultry is seen as the best way to prevent a human pandemic from developing. Congress responded to the threat by providing an emergency FY2006 supplemental appropriation (in P.L. 109-148 ) to combat avian flu, including $91 million for USDA operations. This supplements the regular funding of $28 million for FY2006, which includes $15 million in unused funds from prior years. For FY2007, USDA requests $82 million for avian flu. (See CRS Report RL33795, Avian Influenza in Poultry and Wild Birds , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed].) Mandatory COOL for fresh meats, produce, and peanuts was scheduled to take effect September 30, 2006. However, the FY2006 Agriculture Appropriations Act ( P.L. 109-97 ) again postponed mandatory COOL for two additional years. Some Members continue to support mandatory COOL, and a few of them would prefer that it take effect sooner ( S. 1331 ) or be expanded to processed meats ( S. 135 ). Others have sought to replace mandatory COOL with voluntary labeling programs. A bill ( H.R. 2068 ) sponsored by the chairman of the House Agriculture Committee (and an identical Senate bill, S. 1333 ) would make COOL labeling voluntary for fresh meats. S. 1300 would make COOL voluntary for meat, fish, and produce. (See CRS Report RS22955, Country-of-Origin Labeling for Foods , by [author name scrubbed].) Both the Senate- and House-passed versions of the FY2006 agriculture appropriation bill ( H.R. 2744 ) barred use of appropriated funds to pay for ante-mortem inspection of horses for food. The enacted version ( P.L. 109-97 ) makes the funding ban effective only for approximately the last six months of FY2006; during this time the three foreign-owned plants in the U.S. that currently slaughter horses, primarily for European and Japanese consumers, are paying user fees for such inspection. Free-standing legislation to ban horse slaughter includes H.R. 503 (which passed the full House by a vote of 263-146 on September 7, 2006) and S. 1915 . Among other pending farm animal welfare related-bills are S. 1779 and H.R. 3931 , to prohibit nonambulatory livestock (also called "downers") from being used for human food; and H.R. 5557 , to require the federal government to purchase only food and fiber products that were raised in compliance with prescribed humane standards. (See CRS Report RS21842, Horse Slaughter Prevention Bills and Issues , by [author name scrubbed]; and CRS Report RS21978, Humane Treatment of Farm Animals: Overview and Issues , by [author name scrubbed].) The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) is an independent federal regulatory agency that regulates the futures trading industry. The CFTC is subject to periodic reauthorization; current authority expired on September 30, 2005. Congress traditionally uses the reauthorization process to consider amendments to the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA), which provides the basis for federal regulation of commodity futures trading. The House and Senate Agriculture Committees, with jurisdiction over CFTC, conducted hearings on CFTC reauthorization in March 2005. The full House passed its version of CFTC reauthorization ( H.R. 4473 ) on December 14, 2005. Floor action on a Senate-reported measure ( S. 1566 ) is pending. Among the issues in the debate are (1) regulation of energy derivatives markets, where some see excessive price volatility and a lack of effective regulation; (2) the market in security futures, or futures contracts based on single stocks, where cumbersome and duplicative regulation is blamed for low trading volumes; (3) the regulatory status of foreign futures exchanges selling contracts in the United States; and (4) the legality of futures-like contracts based on foreign currency prices offered to retail investors. (See CRS Report RS22028, CFTC Reauthorization , by [author name scrubbed].) Hired farmworkers are an important component of agricultural production. Many of these laborers are under guest worker programs, which are meant to assure employers (e.g., fruit, vegetable, and horticulture growers) of an adequate supply of labor when and where it is needed while not adding permanent residents to the U.S. population. The connection between farm labor and immigration policies is a longstanding one, particularly with regard to U.S. employers' use of workers from Mexico. The 109 th Congress is taking up the issue as part of a larger debate over initiation of a broad-based guest worker program, increased border enforcement, and employer sanctions to curb the flow of unauthorized workers into the United States. House and Senate immigration reform measures ( H.R. 4437 and S. 2454 ) currently being debated have important implications for hired farm labor. Other bills ( H.R. 884 / S. 359 and H.R. 3857 ) introduced in the 109 th Congress specifically address agricultural labor issues. (See CRS Report RL33125, Immigration Legislation and Issues in the 109th Congress , coordinated by [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report 95-712, The Effects on U.S. Farm Workers of an Agricultural Guest Worker Program , by [author name scrubbed]; and CRS Report RL30395, Farm Labor Shortages and Immigration Policy , by [author name scrubbed].)

A number of issues affecting U.S. agriculture have been or are being addressed by the 109 th Congress. The Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 ( P.L. 109-171 ), enacted in February 2006, included a net reduction in spending on U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) mandatory programs of $2.7 billion over five years, and the reauthorization of a dairy income support program. Other issues of importance to agriculture during the second session of the 109 th Congress include the consideration of emergency farm disaster assistance; multilateral and bilateral trade negotiations; concerns about agroterrorism, food safety, and animal and plant diseases (e.g., "mad cow" disease and avian flu); high energy costs; environmental issues; agricultural marketing matters; the reauthorization of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission; and farm labor issues.

94-459 -- The U.S. Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934 May 26, 1994 In the early twentieth century, Haiti suffered from a tumultuous political life and from chronic financial mismanagement. Eighty percent of the Haitian budget went to debt service, and U.S. government officials wereconcernedthat financial obligations to its own citizens might not be met. There was greater fear, also, that one among thewarring European countries -- especially France or Germany -- might establish a position of influence in the country,leading to naval bases that could endanger access to the newly constructed Panama Canal. These concerns wereheightened after the outbreak of World War I, when Haitian authority collapsed into bloody factional struggles inthesummer of 1915; the Administration of Woodrow Wilson determined to take action. In July 1915, Admiral WilliamB. Caperton, then embarked on the battleship Washington , was directed to land forces to establish orderandassume responsibility for administering the customhouses. With virtually no resistance, a landing party of some 330 sailors and marines took control of the capital within a few hours. (There were only two U.S. fatalities, and these may have resulted from friendly fire; Haitian fatalitieswere also minimal.) Admiral Caperton called upon additional U.S. forces to take control of other coastal areas;resistance by guerrilla bands in the more mountainous areas of the country was temporarily put down, ending withthecapture of Fort Riviere in mid-November. By the end of 1915, the marine presence was reduced to 100officers and some 1,600 enlisted men. Although the Marine Brigade was extensively deployed to help put downresurgentguerrilla activity in 1918-1920, for most of the rest of the occupation, the 1,200-1,400 marines were assignedgarrison duty, with some patrolling of the countryside. Once firmly established in the major population centers, U.S. officials quickly ensured the election by the Haitian National Assembly of an amenable president, Philippe Sudre Dartiguenave, who had served as the presidentof theHaitian Senate. As a result of continuing unrest, Admiral Caperton also established censorship and promulgatedmartial law. These emergency measures were not rescinded for over ten years. In another move to ensure an orderlygovernment, the United States presented the Haitians with a treaty that permitted a U.S.-nominated official to collecttaxes and make debt repayments and other disbursements. The treaty, (1) ratified by Haiti in November 1915 andby the U.S. Senate the following February, also created a constabulary (or gendarmerie) composed of native Haitiansunder American direction to serve both as Haiti's military and police force. The treaty was to remain in force forten years and could be extended for another ten "if the purpose of this treaty has not been fully accomplished." InMarch 1917, the duration of the 1915 treaty was officially extended to twenty years. Despite the treaty, the Haitian National Assembly was uncooperative in its relationship with U.S. officials. The State Department drafted a new Haitian Constitution which would have validated the occupation and allowedforeigners to own property in Haiti. The assembly, unwilling to ratify the document, was dissolved when Lt. Col.Smedley D. Butler, a U.S. Marine officer serving with the Haitian Gendarmerie, entered the capitol in June 1917,toread a dissolution order that Dartiguenave had been pressured to sign. Unwilling to risk the election of anotherAssembly, U.S. authorities effected the approval of the new constitution by plebiscite (only 769 votes out of 100,000were negative) in June, 1918. The new constitution created a Council of State, whose members were appointed bythe Haitian president, to perform all legislative functions until an Assembly could be reconstituted at a time to bedetermined. Although the United States occupied the principal towns of the country, guerrilla bands remained in the mountainous interior of the country. Known as cacos (named after a Haitian bird of prey), these bandshad long played asignificant role in Haitian politics, fighting at times on behalf of one or more factions within the dominantfrancophone elite. Renewed attacks by guerrillas commenced in October 1918, and persisted for a number ofmonths(including a raid on Port-au-Prince in October 1919), until the marines and the Gendarmerie were able to neutralizethem by frequent patrolling, paying bounties for weapons turned in, and by eliminating their leaders. After 1920,there were only occasional outbreaks of caco violence. The Gendarmerie, whose name was changed in 1928 to the Garde d'Haiti, became an essential part of the administrative structure of the country. Officered at first by Americans -- largely enlisted marines -- who were paidboth by theU.S. Marine Corps and by Haiti, the Gendarmerie, numbering 2,000-2,600 members, was deployed throughout thecountry and became largely responsible for maintaining law and order, settling disputes, and supporting publicworksprojects. It also served as Haiti's military force. Gradually, U.S. officers were replaced by Haitians, a process thatwas accelerated after 1929. Historians, otherwise critical of the occupation, acknowledge that Haitians had moresecurity intheir persons and property than they had ever previously known and that the Gendarmerie, during the occupation,functioned as an effective and impartial agency. (After U.S. forces departed in 1934, Haitian officers would becomemuchmore involved in political activities.) Throughout the occupation, U.S. forces suffered minimal casualties, totaling 10 killed and 26 wounded (with 172 other casualties). Complaints of brutality against native Haitians led the U.S. Congress to conduct hearings onHaiti and theDominican Republic in 1922. (2) The specialcommittee rejected the more serious charges and concluded that most of the abuses occurred during the effort to putdown the caco insurrection in 1918-1919. The counterinsurgency effortresulted in the deaths, by some estimates, of over 2,000 cacos . (3) Although affirming that cruelty was not officially countenanced, the committeenoted that there were at least ten instances of illegal executions by Americans. Once the caco rebellion was suppressed, there were virtually no physical attacks by Haitians on U.S. marines or civilians. After the 1922 congressional investigation criticized lack of coordination among U.S. officials in Haiti, U.S. civilian and military authority was consolidated. The senior U.S. representative from 1922 to 1930, General JohnH. Russell,USMC, served both as the senior marine in Haiti and as the U.S. High Commissioner, responsible to the StateDepartment. Reporting to him were U.S. officials (technically appointed by the President of Haiti) dealing withfinance, publicworks, sanitation, and agriculture, as well as the chief of the Gendarmerie. General Russell, described as aconscientious and somewhat imperious officer, became the most powerful figure in the country. He was laterappointedCommandant of the U.S. Marine Corps. The onset of the Great Depression and declining markets for Haitian products, especially coffee, produced economic hardships and contributed to increased unrest among a population long denied a political role. December1929 riots inLes Cayes threatened to spread throughout the country. A detachment from the Marine Brigade in Port-au-Princewas sent to restore order, but a confrontation led to the deaths of at least 12 Haitians. Subsequent incidents wereendedwithout loss of life, but the Hoover Administration was concerned that it might become involved in hostilities thatU.S. public opinion would not support. In early 1930, President Hoover appointed a bipartisan commission headed by W. Cameron Forbes, formerly the Governor General of the Philippines, to investigate conditions in Haiti. (4) After several weeks in the country during whichtestimony was taken from all sectors of the society, the commission submitted a report that argued that the UnitedStates could not relinquish its responsibilities for ensuring the financial stability of Haiti, but made several proposalsforchanges, especially the separation of civil and military responsibilities, increasing the number of Haitians in thegovernment, and, in general, for less intervention in Haitian domestic affairs. (5) In November, General Russell was replaced bya State Department official, Dana G. Munro, who was appointed Minister rather than High Commissioner. AnExecutive Agreement was negotiated in 1932 providing for the complete Haitianization of the Garde by October1934 and forthe withdrawal of the Marine Brigade, two years prior to the expiration of the extended 1915 Treaty. Washington was nonetheless determined to pull out of Haiti at an earlier date. Arrangements were made for the election of a temporary Haitian president and the subsequent holding of national elections in October 1930 thatreturned astrongly nationalistic majority. The complete Haitianization of the Garde was completed. President FranklinRoosevelt paid an official visit to Cap-Haitien in July 1934 and the last marines departed the following month. Nonetheless, aU.S. financial adviser would remain until 1941 to oversee payments on the Haitian debt. The U.S. occupation in large measure accomplished its goals of stabilizing Haitian finances. Security for investors was a key concern of the U.S. Government and to a large extent became the justification for the occupationonce thepotential threat of European intervention disappeared with the conclusion of World War I. A $16-million U.S. loanwas negotiated in 1922 to consolidate Haiti's outstanding foreign debts. Efficient collection of duties and prompt,evenadvance, payment of debts owed to U.S. banks soon restored the country's financial standing. Eventually, some 60% of Haitian revenues were expended under U.S. supervision, the greatest percentage going to debt repayment. Some critics, including the Forbes Commission, argued that monies used for advance repaymentof debtscould have been more usefully allocated to domestic projects. There is consensus, however, that Haitian financeswere honestly handled during the occupation and that steps were taken to insure that foreign interests did not takeadvantageof the country. (6) In the 1920s, annual Haitiangovernment revenues of $8-10 million were double that of the pre-occupation period; coffee production and smallbusinesses grew significantly, but little progress was made in establishing asound permanently economic base for the country. The occupation also resulted in the completion of a significant number of public works projects, mostly after 1920. Most important was the construction of roads and bridges throughout the country (some of which wascompleted through ahighly unpopular system of forced labor or corvee ). Although most of the 800 miles of roadswere not hard-surfaced, they greatly facilitated transportation between coastal areas and the rural uplands at a timewhen automobiles and truckswere being introduced into Haiti in significant numbers. A number of port facilities were erected, lighthouses wereconstructed, and a number of harbors were dredged. Efforts to improve agricultural productivity were complicatedby thesmall size of land holdings and a lack of accurate legal titles. The United States undertook a major effort to provide access to modern health care to the mass of the Haitian population that in some cases had never come into contact with trained doctors and nurses. A National PublicHealth Servicewas created with a network of some 153 rural clinics and 11 hospitals supervised by U.S. Navy doctors, and effortswere made to provide basic medical instruction to the population. This effort was financed by the Haitiangovernment atU.S. encouragement. The United States did not assume a responsibility to "build democracy," and U.S. officials did not devote significant efforts towards the encouragement of local self-government. Prior to the occupation, the Haitiangovernment had beenlargely the province of a narrow elite consisting of about 5 percent of the population. The Haitian presidents whoserved during most of the occupation, Dartiguenave (1915-1922), Louis Borno (1922-1930), and Eugene Roy, whoserved astemporary President from May-November 1930, were elected by the Council of State at the instigation of U.S.authorities. They, in turn, appointed members of the Council of State. There were no national elections held untilOctober1930, and local elections that produced unsuitable winners were invalidated. Newspapers were censored, andoffending editors jailed. Inattention to efforts to promote democracy stemmed, in part, from a knowledge that any election might produce results hostile to U.S. interests and probably from racial attitudes that considered Haitians unsuited forself-government. Theyears of the Haitian occupation coincided with widespread racial segregation in the United States and oppositionby a majority of U.S. whites to a political role for blacks. These attitudes, brought to Haiti by the occupation, ledto social aswell as political discrimination against Haitians, even the educated and politically active elite, that was bitterlyresented and undercut well-intentioned development projects. To a large extent, U.S. racial attitudes ensured thatthere was nosignificant element of the Haitian populace that supported the U.S. presence. (7) Education was also largely neglected during the occupation. Schooling in Haiti had been traditionally divided between francophone instruction for the elite and a very few rudimentary elementary schools for others. Little effortto changethis situation was undertaken. The mass of the population remained illiterate, and the elite continued to seek aneducation that did not lead to careers in commerce and industry. Efforts to provide technical training to developtheagricultural and industrial potential of the country (the Service Technique ) were not warmly receivedand did not reach a large number of students.

In 1915, the United States undertook a military occupation of Haiti to preempt anyEuropean intervention, to establish order out of civil strife, and to stabilize Haitian finances. Duringthe nineteen-year occupation, U.S. military and civilian officials, numbering less than 2,500 for the most part,supervised the collection of taxes and the disbursement of revenues, maintained public order, and initiated a programofpublic works. The Haitian government remained in place, but was subject to U.S. guidance. The Haitian peoplebenefitted from the end of endemic political violence and from the construction of roads, bridges, and ports as wellas from improved access to health care. The U.S. occupation was, nonetheless, deeply resented throughout Haitiansociety, and many of its accomplishments did not long endure its termination in 1934.

The estate and gift tax debate focuses on issues of equity and long-term economic efficiency. Many observers opposed to the estate tax on grounds of equity suggest that taxing the assets of decedents is unfair because the decedent has already paid taxes on the assets as they accumulated value. There is also a perceived need to provide heirs of family farms and businesses a tax preference for family assets that are transferred at death. Opponents of the estate tax on economic efficiency grounds cite research that suggests the estate tax is a tax on saving and investment, which, like other taxes on capital, would tend to impede long-term economic growth. Those in favor of retaining some type of estate tax counter that many estates include assets with accumulated capital gains that have not been subject to income taxes. For example, publicly traded stock transferred at death would avoid taxation on the increased value from the time of purchase to the date of transfer. Estate tax proponents maintain that other assets, such as family business assets and family farm assets, should not be afforded special preferences in the tax code. Repeal or modification of the estate and gift tax for all estates would achieve the policy objective of tax relief for farm and small-business estates. However, farm assets and business assets represent a relatively small share of total taxable estate value, approximately 17.1% of gross taxable estate value in 2009. Thus, repeal or modification of the estate tax would benefit more estates with a variety of different asset types. Examining the asset distribution of estates that paid at least some estate tax more closely will provide some guidance for policy makers about the current impact of estate taxes on business-type assets and farms. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) annually publishes data on the distribution of assets in estate tax returns filed in a tax year. This report uses data for returns filed in 2009 and 2010. The 2009 data are more representative of the estate tax burden in 2012 than the 2010 data. The estate tax was repealed for those who died in 2010, thus the data for the returns filed in 2010 do not reflect the impact of the tax. The 2010 data are provided as an Appendix to this report. These data are from estates from decedents who died before 2010 and those estates that chose to file using the pre-EGTRRA law. Data from returns filed in 2009 include the returns of many decedents who died in 2008. The biggest difference between 2008 and 2009 is the exemption amount, which was $2 million in 2008 and rose to $3.5 million in 2009. For 2011 and 2012, the exemption amount is $5 million ($10 million for married decedents). On December 17, 2010, the Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010 ( P.L. 111-312 ) reinstated the estate tax beginning with 2010 decedents and sunsets after 2012. Executors of estates of decedents who died in 2010, however, may also choose to file under the EGTRRA laws in place before passage of P.L. 111-312 . The new law sets the estate tax exemption level at $5 million per decedent in 2010 (indexed for inflation) and establishes a top marginal tax rate of 35%. Any unused exemption amount is transferrable to a surviving spouse, yielding an effective exemption amount of $10 million for married decedents. The Joint Committee on Taxation estimates the temporary estate tax modifications to reduce revenue by approximately $136.7 billion over 10 years. The number of decedents that will be affected by the estate tax will rise significantly in 2013, as the law will return to the pre-EGTRRA parameters. The estate and gift tax minimum filing requirement is $5,120,000 for deaths occurring in 2012. Generally, estates valued below the threshold are not required to file a return. Estates valued over the threshold amount calculate their tax liability based upon the entire (or gross) value of the estate inclusive of the $5,120,000. Deductions from the gross estate value, such as bequests to a surviving spouse (the marital deduction), state estate and inheritance taxes, and donations to charitable organizations, are then subtracted from the gross estate value. The tentative tax liability is determined by the progressive rate schedule provided for in the tax code. The next step in the calculation of estate tax liability, and perhaps the most important, is the applicable credit. The applicable credit is set such that an estate has the equivalent of a $5,120,000 exemption (for deaths occurring in 2012 the amount is $1,772,800, see Table 1 below). In many cases, the marital deduction combined with the deduction for charitable contributions can eliminate all estate tax liability. Before 2005, estates were allowed to claim a credit for state death taxes paid. EGTRRA, however, gradually repealed the credit for state death taxes, eliminating it in 2005 and replacing it with a deduction for taxes paid. Many states have relied on the federal credit for their estate tax and will need to modify their tax laws to continue collecting their estate and inheritance taxes. According to a January 2012 evaluation of state laws by the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, "Some 22 states--continue to collect either an estate or inheritance tax." The data utilized in this report are from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), Statistics of Income (SOI) Division. The SOI data report the assets held by estates by gross estate value classes. For this report, farm returns are defined as estates reporting farm assets. Business returns are defined as those estates that include assets typically held by businesses: "closely held stock," "limited partnerships," "real estate partnerships," and "other non-corporate business assets." Estates reporting one or more of the four assets were termed business returns. This methodology is imperfect and likely double counts many estates. As a result, the number of business estates would be significantly overstated by this estimate. Of the approximately 2.43 million deaths in 2008 of people 25 years old and over, 0.6% incurred estate and gift tax liability. Further, in 2009 only 1,846 decedents with taxable estates included farm assets (0.08% of all deaths), and 8,055 taxable estates listed assets of the type typically held by businesses (0.34% of all deaths). The primary reason for the low number of filers relative to the number of deaths in 2008 is the high gross estate value filing threshold. In tax year 2008, only estates valued at greater than $2 million were required to file an estate and gift tax return. (The 2008 decedents would likely file returns in 2009.) This makes the estate tax a relatively progressive tax source. Table 2 suggests the progressivity of the estate and gift tax in 2009. Taxable estates worth over $10 million accounted for 11.2% of the total taxable estates, yet 61.0% of all estate tax revenue. The 4,296 estates (29.2% of taxable estates) larger than $5 million generated over 81.9% of total estate tax revenue. Recall that only 0.7% of deaths generated any estate tax liability. The SOI data do not distinguish estate tax returns by detailed occupation of the decedent, such as farmer or business person. However, the data do provide significant detail on the distribution of the decedent's assets. Table 4 summarizes estate tax return asset data from the returns filed in 2009. Generally, assets that represent more of the taxable estate shoulder a greater share of the tax burden. The value of taxable estates is concentrated in the following asset categories: publicly traded stock, cash assets, state and local bonds, other real estate, and closely held stock. These five assets represent 66.2% of total taxable estate value in 2009. Thus, eliminating the estate tax will reduce the tax burden chiefly on these assets. Table 3 reports that the value of total farm assets is approximately 3.25% of total taxable gross estate value. The business assets in Table 3 represent approximately $14.1 billion of total taxable estate value (or 13.9%). The largest is closely held stock, worth approximately $7.2 billion. However, total business assets as reported do not explicitly indicate the portion of those assets held in small businesses. Though farm and business decedents may have other taxable assets--such as equities and cash--the burden on farm and business assets alone is quite small relative to other assets. Thus, removing the estate and gift tax or lowering the rates in general will have a much greater effect on non-farm and non-business assets. Table 4 presents detailed data on farm and business assets by gross estate value. Relatively large farm estates, those valued between $2 million and $3.5 million, comprise a relatively larger share of total estate value for that estate size category. Overall, however, farm estates appear to be evenly distributed across the estate size categories. Note that farm assets account for approximately 3.25% of total taxable estate value. In contrast to farm estates, assets typically associated with non-farm businesses are concentrated in estates valued over $10 million. In fact, of the $14.1 billion in total business assets in estates, over $11.0 billion (77.7%) is held in those estates valued over $10 million. As a consequence, smaller-business taxable estates, those valued at less than $10 million, contribute very little to the estate and gift tax base. In summary, repeal of the estate and gift tax would clearly achieve the policy objective of relief for estates composed of farm and small-business assets. Farm assets and business assets, however, represent a relatively small share of total taxable estate value, approximately 17.1% at the most.

This report provides data on the distribution of assets in estates as reported on estate tax returns filed in 2009 and 2010. The data for 2010 are unique, as the estate tax was repealed for those who died in calendar year 2010. Thus, the 2010 data are presented as an appendix to this report. Based on the 2009 data, this report finds that farm and business assets represent a small share of the total value of taxable estates that filed tax returns in 2009 (3.25% and 13.86%, respectively). That share is concentrated in estates valued over $10 million. For an overview of the estate tax, see CRS Report RL30600, Estate and Gift Taxes: Economic Issues, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. This report will be updated as new data become available.

Earmark disclosure rules in both the House and Senate were implemented with the stated intention of bringing more transparency to congressionally directed spending. The administrative responsibilities associated with these new rules vary by chamber. This report outlines the major administrative responsibilities of Senators and committees of the Senate associated with the chamber's earmark disclosure rules. Senate Rule XLIV prohibits a vote on a motion to proceed to consider a measure or a vote on adoption of a conference report, unless the chair of the committee or the majority leader (or designee) certifies that a complete list of earmarks and the name of each Senator requesting each earmark is available on a publicly accessible congressional website in a searchable form at least 48 hours before the vote. If a Senator proposes a floor amendment containing an additional earmark, those items must be printed in the Congressional Record as soon as "practicable." Rule XLIV, paragraph 5, explicitly defines congressionally directed spending item, limited tax benefit, and limited tariff benefit as follows: Congressionally directed spending item - a provision or report language included primarily at the request of a Senator providing, authorizing or recommending a specific amount of discretionary budget authority, credit authority, or other spending authority for a contract, loan, loan guarantee, grant, loan authority, or other expenditure with or to an entity, or targeted to a specific State, locality or congressional district, other than through a statutory or administrative formula driven or competitive award process. Limited tax benefit - any revenue provision that (A) provides a federal tax deduction, credit, exclusion, or preference to a particular beneficiary or limited group of beneficiaries under the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, and (B) contains eligibility criteria that are not uniform in application with respect to potential beneficiaries of such provision. Limited tariff benefit - a provision modifying the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States in a manner that benefits 10 or fewer entities. If the earmark certification requirements have not been met, a point of order may lie against consideration of the measure or vote on the conference report. A point of order would not apply to floor amendments. Senate earmark disclosure rules apply to any congressional earmark included in either the text of the bill or the committee report accompanying the bill, as well as the conference report and joint explanatory statement. The disclosure requirements apply to items in authorizing legislation, appropriations legislation, and tax measures. Furthermore, they apply not only to measures reported by committees but also to unreported measures, amendments, House bills, and conference reports. Under Senate Rule XLIV, paragraph 6, a Senator requesting that a congressional earmark be included in a measure is required to provide a written statement to the chair and ranking minority member of the committee of jurisdiction that includes the Senator's name; the name and address of the intended earmark recipient (if there is no specific recipient, the location of the intended activity should be included); in the case of a limited tax or tariff benefit, identification of the individual or entities reasonably anticipated to benefit to the extent known to the Senator; the purpose of the earmark; and a certification that neither the Senator nor the Senator's immediate family has a financial interest in such an earmark. It is important to note that, when submitting earmark requests, individual committees and subcommittees often have their own additional administrative requirements beyond those required by Senate rules (e.g., prioritizing requests or submitting request forms electronically). The Senate Appropriations Committee, for example, has stated that it will require Members requesting earmarks to post information regarding their earmark requests on their personal website. This information must be posted at the time of the request and must include the purpose of the earmark and why it is a valuable use of taxpayer funds. The committees may also establish relevant policy requirements (e.g., requiring matching funds for earmark requests) or restrictions (e.g., not considering earmark requests for certain appropriations accounts or disallowing multi-year funding requests). In addition, committees and subcommittees often have deadlines, especially for earmark requests in appropriations legislation. For this reason, it is important to check with individual committees and subcommittees to learn of any supplemental earmark request requirements or restrictions. The committee of jurisdiction is responsible for identifying earmarks in the legislative text and any accompanying reports. Therefore, when it is not clear whether a senatorial request constitutes an earmark, the committee of jurisdiction may be able to provide guidance. When submitting an earmark request, it may be relevant whether the Senator wants the earmark to be included in the text of the bill or the committee report accompanying the bill. Committees may make an administrative distinction between these two categories in terms of the submission of earmark requests, and there may be policy implications of an earmark's placement in either the bill text or the committee report. For example, under Executive Order 13457, issued in January 2008, executive agencies are directed not to commit, obligate, or expend funds that were the result of an earmark included in non-statutory language, such as a committee report. If, during consideration of a measure, a Senator proposes an amendment that contains an additional earmark, the Senator shall ensure that a list of earmarks (and the name of any other Senator who submitted a request for each earmark included) is printed in the Congressional Record as soon as "practicable." Under the Senate rule, earmark disclosure responsibilities of Senate committees and conference committees fall into three major categories: (1) determining if a spending provision is an earmark; (2) compiling earmark requests for presentation, and (3) certifying that requirements under Rule XLIV have been met. Committees of jurisdiction may use their discretion to decide what constitutes an earmark. Definitions in Senate rules, as well as past earmark designations during the 110 th Congress, may provide guidance in determining if a certain provision constitutes an earmark. Senate Rule XLIV states that before consideration is in order on a measure or conference report, a list of included earmarks and their sponsors must be identified through lists, charts, or some means and made available on a publicly accessible congressional website for at least 48 hours. The Senate Appropriations Committee has stated that it will make earmark disclosure tables publicly available the same day that a subcommittee reports the bill. In the case of measures, the list of earmarks (and Senate sponsors) on the congressional website must be "searchable." Lists associated with conference reports should also be in a searchable format but only to the extent it is technically feasible. Senate rules state that a committee report containing a list of earmarks (and their sponsors) that is available online satisfies the disclosure requirement. The rule also requires the applicable committee to make the certifications of no financial interest available online. The rule does not specify how long after consideration any of these required materials must be maintained. The rule states that consideration of a measure or conference report is not in order until the applicable committee chair or the majority leader (or designee) "certifies" that the requirements stated above have been met. While the rule does not state what constitutes certification, it has been the practice of the committee chair to make a statement on the Senate floor or submit a written statement to be printed in the Congressional Record confirming compliance with Rule XLIV's disclosure requirements. An example of a certification letter is provided below.

Earmark disclosure rules in both the House and the Senate establish certain administrative responsibilities that vary by chamber. Under Senate rules, a Senator requesting that an earmark be included in legislation is responsible for providing specific written information, such as the purpose and recipient of the earmark, to the committee of jurisdiction. Further, Senate committees are responsible for compiling and presenting such information in accord with Senate rules. In the Senate, disclosure rules apply to any congressional earmark, limited tax benefit, or limited tariff benefit included in either the text of a bill or any report accompanying the measure, including a conference report and joint explanatory statement. The disclosure requirements apply to earmarks in appropriations legislation, authorizing legislation, and tax measures. Furthermore, they apply not only to measures reported by committees but also to measures not reported by committees, floor amendments, and conference reports. This report will be updated as needed.

Ports handle more than 35% (by value) of the Nation's imports and exports, and the role of water transport in the national economy is growing as trade policies increase the quantity of goods transported. A recent assessment of the U.S. marine transportation system by the Department of Transportation predicts that the total tonnage of U.S. domestic and international marine trade will more than double by 2020. Ocean carriers are deploying larger ships with deeper drafts to handle the robust growth in maritime trade. The Harbor Maintenance Tax (HMT) was instituted by the Water Resources Development Act of 1986 (WRDA 1986, P.L. 99-662 ) to pay for routine maintenance and operations costs of harbors. The funds are deposited in the Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund (HMTF). Numerous legal challenges to the HMT raise questions about its future and possible legislative changes. Harbor maintenance dredging requirements are expected to increase in the near-term due to current channel deepening projects at many ports. This report reviews recent developments in harbor maintenance legislation and the current status of harbor maintenance funding. Recent trends in container shipping and their impact on port dredging requirements are discussed. The report also describes alternative funding proposals that have been considered. The last section examines the impact these and other funding alternatives may have on the geography of U.S. maritime commerce. The decision on how best to finance harbor dredging requires balancing national economic efficiency concerns with local port economic development concerns. Two points of clarification are helpful in a discussion about the HMT. The first is the distinction between harbor maintenance and harbor-deepening projects. These projects are approved under different procedures and are funded from separate appropriations accounts. Harbor maintenance refers to the routine dredging of harbor channels to their existing depth. Funds in the HMTF are used to pay the federal portion of routine dredging which Congress makes available through Energy and Water Development Appropriations. Harbor-deepening (or widening) projects are new projects that increase the authorized depth/width of harbor channels. Congress authorizes new channel depths through the biennial Water Resources Development Act. Funds for the federal share of harbor-deepening projects are provided from U.S. Treasury general funds. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers has the responsibility for both the maintenance and deepening of federal waterway channels. Funding for dredging harbor berths, the waterside area along the wharf where a vessel is docked, is the responsibility of state or local port authorities. A second useful point of clarification is the distinction between "shipper" and "carrier". In everyday usage, the term "shipper" can refer to both the cargo owner and the transporter of goods. In the transportation industry, the term "shipper" is used to identify the owner of the cargo in motion, e.g. the party that pays the freight bill. The term "carrier" is defined as the party providing the transportation service. In a maritime context, the carrier would be the shipowner or operator. Under the current HMT scheme, the shipper is liable for payment of the tax resultant from cargo vessel movements. For passenger vessels, the carrier is liable for the tax. Prior to 1986, U.S. Treasury general funds were used to pay the federal share for operation and maintenance (O&M) of harbors and for the deepening of channels. In 1986, Congress enacted cost-share requirements for harbor deepening and maintenance (as shown in Table 1 below). The HMT was devised to provide stable federal funding for this purpose. The tax was originally applied on an ad valorem basis on commercial cargo for any use of federally-maintained ports (e.g., the loading of exports and unloading of imports, domestic as well as international cargo). In 1986, the HMT was established at 0.04% of the cargo value. This revenue was intended to pay for 40% of O&M costs incurred by the Army Corps of Engineers and 100% of O&M costs of the St. Lawrence Seaway. Section 11214 of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 ( P.L. 101-508 ) increased the HMT from 0.04% to 0.125% in order to recover 100% of the Corps' port O&M expenditures. In March 1998, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down the application of the HMT with respect to exports, finding that it violated Article I, Section 9, Clause 5 of the Constitution which states that, "No tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported from any state." Exports generated about a third of the fund's revenues. Other court decisions (including decisions by the U.S. Court of International Trade (CIT), the U.S. Court of Appeals, and the U.S. Supreme Court) have established that HMT is constitutional as applied to domestic shipments and the embarkation of cruise line passengers. Cases regarding the constitutionality of the HMT on imports remain in litigation. The federal government is statutorily required to continue collecting the HMT from non-export cargo and passenger categories. The European Union sees the application of the HMT to imports as a discriminatory import tariff that violates U.S. obligations under the World Trade Organization (WTO). Approximately 80% of HMT collections in FY 1999 were derived from imports, with the remaining revenue coming from collections on domestic cargo (11%), foreign trade zone cargo (8%), and cruise ship passengers (1%). In February 1998, the European Union requested WTO consultations on the issue. A first round of consultations took place in March 1998. Second round negotiations, which included Japan, Norway, and Canada, took place in June 1998. The European Union indicated that if satisfactory legislation was not passed by January 1, 2000, it would ask for a dispute resolution panel. As of December 2003, however, the European Union has not requested a panel. The revenues collected from the HMT are deposited into the HMTF. Much uncertainty about the future of the HMTF exists because of the various legal challenges. The HMTF balance was $1.85 billion at the end of FY2002, as shown in Table 2 . Currently, revenue deposited into the HMTF exceeds transfers out of the fund. The HMTF balance increased in FY 1999 as a result of the Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act of FY 1999 ( P.L. 105-245 ), which did not require the recovery of Corps of Engineers O&M expenditures from the fund for that year. The current HMTF balance, in conjunction with the revenue stream from the remaining HMT collections and interest payments, are considered sufficient to recover expenditures for the foreseeable future. However, the results of the aforementioned legal and trade challenges could reduce or halt incoming revenue. Should that occur, the fund could quickly be depleted at which point policymakers would have to decide whether the federal government would continue to fund harbor maintenance and if affirmative, would have to develop a mechanism to do so. There are a number of significant channel deepening (or widening) projects nearing completion, under way, or in the planning stage. An obvious concern is the effect these deepening projects will have on future harbor maintenance costs. The DOT expects maintenance costs will likely increase, at least in the near term: Overall, however, the Nation's future dredging requirements can be expected to grow above recent highs following the completion of current and future deepening projects and the ongoing maintenance requirements associated with these deeper channels.... Upon completion of justified deepening work, an initial increase in maintenance dredging requirements can be expected until the hydrodynamics of the deeper channels begin to stabilize to the new dimensions. The long-term impacts of deeper channels on annual maintenance dredging is somewhat more uncertain, with dredging needs highly specific to each project location and subject to a complex set of variables involving the natural coastal and river processes that affect sediment movement. In addition to the total amount of material dredged, total expenditures may increase due to an increase in the per unit cost of dredged material. The port industry cites U.S. Army Corps of Engineers' figures which show that over the last 30 years, the total cost of dredging has increased while the volume of material dredged has actually decreased. A review of the Corps O&M budget on dredging for fiscal years 1990 to 1999 shows a steady increase in total expenditures from $370 million in 1990 to $684 million in 1999. The yearly amount of material dredged for maintenance over this same period fluctuates around an average of 236 million cubic yards. Complicating the dredging process is the fact that ports are often located in or near environmentally sensitive areas such as wetlands, estuaries, and fisheries. A growing concern is a shortage of disposal sites and a lack of disposal options. The volume of sediments classified as contaminated has increased but this may be due to new testing requirements. In the early 1980s, deep draft colliers (coal ships) fueled debate over U.S. port dredging needs. Today, however, ever-larger containerships are the primary driving force behind current dredging activity. Although oil tankers are among the largest vessels in the world fleet, their size peaked in the 1970s and 1980s. A supertanker often transfers its cargo at sea rather than in port. Typically, a supertanker stays at sea for extended periods, loading at offshore platforms or single-point moorings and discharging at designated "lightering" zones offshore where a supertanker transfers part of its cargo to a smaller shuttle tanker. The shuttle tanker delivers the crude oil to the refinery on shore. Dry bulk vessels (ships that carry grain, soybean, ore, or coal) have also grown in size since World War II but at present there does not appear to be a trend towards larger vessels in this category. In the container ship category, however, "the 1990s ushered in a wave of vessel size increases that seems to have no limit." As the volume of containerized cargo increases, the liner industry is replacing smaller vessels with drafts of 38-40 feet with larger ships requiring drafts of 45-50+ feet. The larger ships can carry 2,000 to 3,000 additional containers saving the carrier an estimated $25 per container on voyage costs. The economic advantage of these mega-ships derives from the principle of economies of scale as ship costs do not increase as fast as capacity. Ship size in the past was restricted by the dimensions of the Panama Canal. The development of a double-stack train (DST) network that began in the early 1980s allowed shipping lines to move containers efficiently across the continent by rail, reducing the need to move traffic through the Canal. By forming alliances or merging, carriers are better able to absorb the risk of mega-ship investment. In addition to getting bigger, container ships are expected to be more prevalent in the near future. Today, 55% of general cargo in international marine trade is being moved in containers. By 2010, it is expected that containerized market share will increase to 90%. Differences in service patterns between container and liquid or dry bulk carriers also account for the greater need of container ships for deeper access channels. Bulk tankers are usually chartered per voyage and therefore have more flexibility in waiting for tidal action to ease their passage in port. Container ships, however, operate in a more time-sensitive environment, calling various ports on a rigid and advertized schedule. Tidal restrictions would severely disrupt their service performance. In its decision the U.S. Supreme Court stated that a user fee based on the value of service provided to a marine carrier would not violate the Constitution. In August 1998, the Clinton Administration proposed a new revenue generating system using a Harbor Services User Fee (106 th Congress, H.R. 1947 ). The payment of the Harbor Services User Fee (HSUF) would be placed on the carrier, rather than the shipper (who pays the current HMT). The HSUF was based on a vessel's capacity, as measured by vessel capacity units, which are a volumetric measurement of ship size based on net tonnage or gross tonnage as appropriate, and its frequency of port use per voyage. Revenues from the fee would be deposited into the Harbor Services Fund, which would fund both routine maintenance and harbor-deepening projects. The proposal was aimed at satisfying the Supreme Court ruling by establishing a close link between the revenue collection and the service provided, while being consistent with trade obligations. Industry observers have noted that shifting the tax burden from shippers to shipowners concentrates the tax burden. With the HMT, a large number of shippers pay a relatively small fee, but with a HSUF, because there are many more shippers than there are shipowners, a few (shipowners) would pay a relatively large fee. This reality has political implications. Ports and carriers opposed having the federal contribution for deepening projects taken from an industry-supported fund, rather than from general revenue. Another criticism raised of the Clinton Administration's proposal was that a user fee would place U.S. ports at a competitive disadvantage to foreign ports and that bulk commodities, such as grain and coal, would be disproportionately affected. The European Union has indicated that it considered the Clinton Administration's proposed fee to be an unfair trade practice. The 106 th Congress did not pursue the Clinton Administration's proposal nor other proposals, such as a return to funding maintenance and dredging from general revenues ( H.R. 1260 ). Supporters of H.R. 1260 claimed that general revenues were the only option because no user-fee system could equitably raise revenues from the users of navigation facilities. Citing GAO figures, they also maintain that waterborne trade is already heavily taxed by 11 federal agencies collecting124 fees. U.S. Customs collects over $20 billion annually in assessments on the commercial maritime industry, most of which are import duties. The revenues that U.S. Customs generates are deposited directly into the general fund of the U.S. Treasury. Some have proposed designating a portion of these revenues to fund harbor maintenance. Opponents of this plan assert that since most Customs duties are collected from importers, exporters would not be contributing their share for harbor maintenance. In its decision the Supreme Court stated, "This does not mean that exporters are exempt from any and all user fees designed to defray the cost of harbor maintenance. It does mean, however, that such a fee must fairly match the exporters' use of port services and facilities." There are a number of policy questions that are intertwined with the question of how to finance harbor maintenance in a manner that is both constitutional and not in violation of trade agreements. The fundamental question is who should pay for dredging: port users or taxpayers? If it is decided that port users should pay, which users in particular: shippers or carriers? Whether the federal government or local port authorities should administer the fee and whether a nationally uniform fee or a port-specific fee is more equitable and efficient are also key questions. In addition to these issues, policymakers may revisit the cost sharing arrangement between federal and non-federal sources. Answering these questions involves a trade-off between maximizing the overall efficiency of the U.S. maritime transportation system and the economic development of specific coastal cities. While economic analysis provides a framework for evaluating financing options, the answer to each of these questions is inherently a political choice. As one study on dredging explains, "The conflict over funding is a conflict of values and goals, a conflict about who pays and who benefits. Those conflicts can only be resolved in the political process with political compromises." One option is to maintain the status quo--that is, to continue funding harbor dredging through a cargo-value-based tax. Some observers view the present system as at least one step more efficient than funding from general revenues. If port users are required to pay at least part of the cost of dredging, they argue, it promotes a more efficient use of resources because the users are not likely to pay more in fees than they hope to save in shipping costs. Also, if port users are required to pay for dredging, they are likely to require that the government spend their resources on the most worthwhile projects. Conversely, they argue, if general taxpayer revenue is used to pay the full cost of dredging, funds will more likely be wasted on unjustified or marginally useful projects. Others contend that the present funding system is broken and must be overhauled because the original intent of Congress was to have both exporters and importers paying the tax. They argue that it is unfair that importers are essentially paying for the dredging needs of exporters. Some also contend that the legal and trade challenges to the HMT make it an unstable funding source. Some economists believe a user fee system could be re-structured in such a way as to promote better use of the nation's marine transportation system. Advocates of a port-specific, carrier-based fee argue that, from an economic efficiency point of view, the user fee model would be superior to other funding models. They argue that (1) the shipowners rather than the shippers should pay the fee and (2) the fee be port-specific rather than nationally uniform. This funding scheme would, they claim, optimize transportation efficiency because it would allow market forces to allocate cargo to the most efficient ports. The rationale for their argument is as follows. They argue that the present HMT funding scheme inflates the supply of larger ships. Although larger ships save money on the ocean leg, they increase costs at port because, among other things, they require deeper channels and berths. However, shipowners do not fully calculate these costs in their decision to build larger ships because dredging costs are borne by others, namely port authorities, shippers, and taxpayers. To the extent that dredging costs are external to a shipowner's cost-benefit analysis, their decisions regarding fleet investment will be biased in favor of larger ships. On the other hand, if these costs were internalized by the shipowners through payment of a dredging fee based on ship size, ship investment decisions would more accurately reflect the true cost of bigger ships. Supporters of a carrier-based fee ask why U.S. taxpayers should finance deeper channels only to help (mostly foreign) container carriers realize marginal cost efficiencies on the ocean leg of their voyages. They also argue that the present scheme, which creates a national pool of funds for channel dredging, results in naturally deep harbors subsidizing shallower ports. Naturally deep harbors, they argue, should be allowed to reflect their lower dredging costs in the rate structure they offer ocean carriers. Carriers would be attracted to those ports that require the least amount of dredging because the user fees at those ports would be less. The present system, they say, levels the playing field among ports with different dredging requirements. It draws traffic away from more efficient ports to less efficient ports, thereby raising the Nation's overall cost of moving goods through the marine transportation system. In general, East Coast and Gulf Coast ports are shallower and require more dredging than West Coast ports which tend to have naturally deeper channels. In addition, since exporters currently are not paying the HMT, ports with traffic profiles heavily skewed toward imports contribute more to the fund than do ports that primarily rely on export cargo. Cross-subsidies among ports would be eliminated if funds generated at a particular port were reserved solely for that port's local dredging needs rather than becoming part of a system-wide fund. Some observers defend cross-subsidies among ports asserting that the HMT facilitates the development of a maritime network that is national in scope. They note that the Highway Trust Fund also redistributes gas tax monies from heavily populated states to sparsely populated states. This redistribution is justified on the grounds that populated states share an interest with rural states in developing and maintaining an interstate highway system that provides national inter-connectivity. Other observers argue that while the trust fund mechanism may be suitable for developing a national highway system it is not suitable for seaport development. A Transportation Research Board report presents the following view: Arguments for cross-subsidies based on scale economies, whatever their validity for highways, do not apply to ports. U.S. seaports do not constitute a network that is analogous to the highway system, since the value of a port does not depend on the existence of other ports in the same way that the value of a road increases if its connectivity to other roads increases. Therefore the highway program cannot be used as a model for justifying the use of revenues generated at high-volume ports to subsidize maintenance and improvements at low-volume ports. Supporters of a carrier-based, port-specific user fee believe there is sufficient competition among ports to allow for a market solution to the problem. Since ports compete with one another on their population base, intermodal connections, and labor costs, these observers ask why ports should not compete on the costs of dredging their harbors as well. The intermodal facility of containerized cargo and the development of a double-stack train network in much of the country has generated competition not only between nearby rival ports, but even ports on opposite coasts. The term "discretionary cargo" refers to freight that can be routed economically through more than one port, typically cargo originating or destined for the interior of the country or the far coast. Port rationalization by the liner carriers, which consolidates cargo at fewer ports, has also intensified competition between ports. Based on the competitive climate ports face today, some believe the market provides enough incentive for ports to invest in dredging without federal involvement. Advocates of a port-specific, carrier-based fee argue that this replacement fee is the most appropriate scheme for ensuring adequate harbor depths while at the same time preventing excess dredging. While the replacement fee described above may be an economic prescription for financing port dredging, it does raise distributional issues. Harbor communities generally view their ports as engines of economic development for the city and surrounding region. While containerization has reduced the number of jobs onsite, ports still generate jobs offsite with the many businesses that serve the ports, such as freight forwarders, custom house brokers, warehouses, trucking firms, etc. In addition, there are the importers and exporters that choose to locate near a port to save on shipping costs. However, a port-specific funding system is likely to favor large ports over small ports. With more ship traffic, large ports would not have to charge as much per ship or shipment to recover dredging costs as smaller ports. Some small ports might either have to close or service only small ships. Economic development is a significant public policy goal with respect to ports and, in fact, was a rationale for the creation of port authorities in the late 1800s and early 1900s. At that time, marine terminals were largely owned and controlled by private railroads. As railroads merged, each railroad acquired additional port terminals as nodes in their track network. Rather than develop infrastructure at each port, railroads found it advantageous to consolidate their investment at only selected ports. Not unexpectedly, port communities with neglected harbor facilities were dissatisfied with railroad control over local port development. Therefore, they created a central public authority to ensure that port development would be more in line with the public interest. The railroads' strategy of concentrating cargo flow through fewer ports is not unlike the strategy container carriers have adopted today. As carriers deploy larger ships to achieve economies of scale on the high seas, these ships are calling fewer ports because there are dis-economies of scale while the ship is in port. Some industry observers note the emergence of a "hub and spoke" system consisting of load center ports where the largest ships call and a system of feeder ports serviced either by smaller coastal ships or, more likely in the United States, by railroads. If the maritime industry is moving towards a market-oriented selection process of large ports and feeder ports, a port-specific funding scheme is likely to compliment or even accelerate this trend while a system wide fee is likely to impede it, to the extent that it levels the playing field among ports. The issue of harbor maintenance funding, therefore, appears to involve a trade-off between a national interest in economic efficiency and the local interests of some harbor communities not to be relegated to feeder port status. As can be gleaned from the above discussion, much of the debate regarding harbor maintenance funding revolves around the issue of how it would affect the geography of U.S. maritime commerce. In addition to inter-port competition among U.S. ports, however, there is also the issue of competition with ports in Canada, Mexico, or in the Carribean. With regard to the present funding mechanism, the HMT, U.S. ports near the Canadian and Mexican borders claim that it diverts cargo to nearby ports across the border. WRDA 1986, which established the HMT, required the DOT to submit an annual report quantifying the amount of U.S. cargo transhipped through Canada. The report shows that since the late 1980s, when the report was first published, 4% to 6% of U.S. liner trade has been transhipped through Canadian ports on a yearly basis. The report also notes that Canadian cargo is transhipped through U.S. ports. However, cargo diversion may be attributable to other factors that outweigh any influence of the HMT. Regions in northern New England may determine that routing cargo through Montreal, which is closer than New York or Boston, is the most economic choice. Carriers (and exporters) may prefer to route European bound cargo from particular U.S. origins through Halifax because it offers a later sailing date (and cargo cut-off time) than New York or Boston. In addition to these considerations, rail rates, trucking costs, or port throughput rates may be cheaper via Canada for particular U.S. cities or towns. Some observers argue that while diversion of cargo through ports of an adjacent country may be lost business for a particular U.S. port, the Nation as a whole, and U.S. shippers in particular, may benefit from routing cargo in this manner. If importers and exporters in the upper Midwest, for instance, can move cargo more economically to and from Europe through the ports of Montreal or Halifax, one could argue that they have benefitted from importing the transportation services of Canada. As with a cargo-value-based tax, policymakers might consider what effect a carrier-based fee would have on cargo flow through domestic ports. As a ports expert has asserted, a fee based on ship capacity may have a very different effect on cargo flow than a tax based on cargo value. A fee that is based on vessel size might induce carriers to avoid the tax by diverting their largest ships to a nearby foreign port, such as Vancouver, Halifax, or Freeport, in the Bahamas. By transhipping U.S. bound cargo from large ships to smaller, feeder vessels at these foreign ports, carriers could save a substantial amount in harbor user fees. Transhipment at these foreign ports would not necessarily mean less cargo for U.S. ports. The same amount of cargo might arrive but on smaller, coastal feeder ships. Paradoxically, if the fee reduced the size of ships calling at U.S. ports, there would be less need for deeper channels. Carriers contend that a carrier-based fee could be roughly equivalent to a container ship's daily operating cost and would thus significantly influence their port rotation decisions. However, there are additional cost considerations that may limit transshipments. The cost of load and discharge handling at an additional port is significant. Transhipment could also increase transit time due to missed connections or increase the risk of cargo damage due to additional handling. Ports with a large local population base, such as New York, would presumably still attract vessel calls with or without a user fee. No matter which party a dredging fee is levied upon (carriers or shippers), and regardless of how it is administered (at the port level or federal level), the ultimate payers of the fee or tax are import consumers and export producers. However, how the tax is levied and administered does make a difference politically. With regard to shipper groups, one can say that shippers of high-value, low volume commodities are likely to prefer a tax based on cargo tonnage rather than cargo value. Conversely, high-volume, low-value shippers are likely to prefer a tax based on cargo value rather than cargo tonnage. It is also worth noting that shifting the user fee from shippers to shipowners would concentrate the tax because there are many more shippers and shipments than there are shipowners and vessel port calls. Concentrating the tax may influence the decision making process because, as some observers maintain, a small group that has more to lose may have more incentive to organize, and make themselves felt politically, than a larger, more diverse group that has less at stake individually. According to some, this political dynamic partly explains the failure of the HSUF proposed during the Clinton Administration. With regard to ports, one could expect that low-volume ports with high-cost dredging requirements would prefer a system-wide, uniform fee while high-volume ports with low-cost dredging needs would prefer a port-specific fee. Those who view ports as a public good, generating nationwide benefits, believe port maintenance and improvement should be financed through general revenues. Ports argue that they are a vital component of the nation's economy. To the extent that deeper ship channels lower transportation costs, they argue, they reduce the cost of commodities, making imported inputs less expensive and making exports more price competitive. The maritime industry also does not like the fact that the HMT is running a surplus--that more money is collected by the tax than is used to pay for dredging. Some economists argue that, while federal aid may be justified in the early stage of an industry's development, shipping is now a mature industry and therefore should be self-supporting. They argue that returning financing of harbor dredging to general revenues amounts to a corporate subsidy and leads to overcapacity in port facilities. The strong demand for channel deepening has been characterized by critics as "a race to the bottom." They argue that overcapacity puts downward pressure on port revenues leading to unhealthy port facilities requiring more public assistance. Some analysts contend that not every port needs to become a super-port. It is less likely that U.S. taxpayers will squander money on unnecessary dredging, they argue, if greater market discipline is brought to the process of examining investment risk in port infrastructure. Some believe that the cost-share requirements of WRDA 1986 are out of date due to the growing prevalence of larger containerships. They believe the federal government should increase its investment in harbor dredging by eliminating the 45-foot threshold, essentially revising the three-tier cost share formula to a two-tier formula. In other words, the non-federal cost-share would decrease from 60% to 35% for deepening projects and from 50% to 0% for maintenance projects with harbor depths between 45 feet and 53 feet. The Water Resources Development Act of 2003 ( H.R. 2557 , sec. 2003), which passed the House, would authorize this change in cost share arrangements. In 1986, when the cost-sharing formula was established, vessels requiring more than 45-foot draft were considered highly specialized ships. While container ships were increasing in size during the 1980s as well, it was believed that the dimensions of the Panama Canal would limit the draft requirements of most of the container fleet to under 40 feet. The emergence of double-stack container trains in the mid-1980s made transcontinental transport by rail more competitive as compared with the all-water route through the Panama Canal. The size restrictions of the Panama Canal, therefore, became less of a limiting factor and carriers began deploying "post-Panamax" ships--ships too big to fit through the Panama Canal. Opponents of reducing the local cost share argue that it is only at the "first in" or "last out" port of call that container ships are likely to be fully loaded. When container ships call at ports in between the first and last ports of call, they are usually not fully loaded and therefore do not require their full draft. They caution that lowering the local cost share requirement will level the competitive field between ports, impeding the market's natural selection process of allocating cargo to the most efficient ports. Coastal shipping interests also seek to return financing of harbor dredging to general funds. They believe more containerized cargo could be taken off congested highways, such as I-95 along the eastern seaboard, and moved by barges or fast-speed ferries along the coast. They believe a fee system, whether paid by carriers or shippers, is an impediment to coastal shipping because it raises the price of coastal shipping relative to truck and rail alternatives. Others disagree, noting that trucks contribute to the cost of their infrastructure by paying fuel and other taxes into the Highway Trust Fund and railroads pay for their infrastructure primarily by themselves. Some believe charging port users for harbor infrastructure promotes equity among competing modes and reduces price distortions in modal choice.

The Harbor Maintenance Tax (HMT) was instituted by the Water Resources Development Act (WRDA) of 1986 (P.L. 99-662) to pay for the routine maintenance and operations costs of harbors. Numerous legal challenges to the HMT raise questions about its future and the issue of possible legislative changes. In March 1998, the Supreme Court struck down the application of the HMT with respect to exports, finding that it violated the Constitution's ban on export taxes. Cases regarding the constitutionality of the HMT on imports remain in litigation. The European Union sees the application of the HMT to imports as a discriminatory import tariff that violates the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The current Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund balance, in conjunction with the revenue stream from the remaining HMT collections and interest payments, are considered sufficient to cover expenditures for the foreseeable future. However, the results of the legal and trade challenges could reduce or halt incoming revenue. Harbor maintenance dredging requirements are expected to increase in the near-term over recent levels due to current deepening projects at many ports. Larger containerships appear to be the primary driving force behind current dredging activity. Issues for the 108th Congress include how to finance harbor maintenance in a manner that is both constitutional and not in violation of trade agreements, and how to finance the federal portion of harbor-deepening projects. Key policy questions include: Should the federal government return to using the general fund to finance harbor maintenance? Should a new user fee be established to pay for harbor maintenance? The larger issue that may need to be resolved before a funding solution can be found is: what should the role of the federal government be in port maintenance and dredging? The Water Resources Development Act of 2003 (H.R. 2557), which passed the House, would increase the role of the federal government by increasing its share of the cost in harbor deepening and maintenance projects. This report will be updated as warranted.

According to the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), the U.S. economy was in a recession for 18 months from December 2007 to June 2009. It was the longest and deepest recession of the post-World War II era. This report provides information on the patterns found across past recessions since World War II to gauge whether and how this recession might be different. There is no simple, rule-of-thumb measure to determine when recessions begin or end. Recessions are officially declared by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), a non-profit research organization. The NBER defines a recession as a "significant decline in economic activity spread across the economy, lasting more than a few months" based on a number of economic indicators, with an emphasis on trends in employment and income. It is unlikely that all of those indicators will begin declining or rising simultaneously. Thus, when comparing historical episodes, some of the symptoms associated with a recession may occur before or after the recession has officially begun or ended. In the recent episode, gross domestic product (GDP) began to fall (in the fourth quarter of 2007) before employment (in January 2008), and both deteriorated significantly in the third quarter of 2008. The economy began to grow again in the third quarter of 2009, but employment continued to fall through December 2009. Recessions are not uncommon--2008 marked the 11 t h since World War II. In recent years, recessions have been less frequent--from 1982 to 2001, there were only two recessions--but the length between the recent one and the prior one, 73 months, was comparable to the frequency of recessions from 1945 to 1981. As can be seen from Table 1 , the recent recession was 18 months long, making it the longest of the post-war period. It was almost twice as long as the median length of post-war recessions (9.5 months). Recessions end because of monetary and fiscal stimulus--both were employed in the recent episode --and because markets automatically adjust. Recessions affect economic well-being by their length and depth. When considering depth, the recent recession can be separated into two distinct phases. During the first phase, which lasted for the first two quarters of 2008, the recession was not deep as measured by the change in GDP or unemployment. It deepened in the third quarter of 2008, however, and remained deep through the first quarter of 2009. After a slight further decline in the second quarter, the economy returned to expansion in the third quarter of 2009. The fall in GDP during the recent recession, a cumulative 4.1%, was the deepest of the post-war period. By contrast, output fell by 1.4% in the 1990-1991 recession and 0.3% in the 2001 recession. The decline in output after the second quarter of 2008 was even larger than over the entire recession. Most of the decline occurred from the third quarter of 2008 to the first quarter of 2009. The 1981 recession was the last recession to feature consecutive quarters of steep declines in GDP. The 1973 and 1981 recessions were also unusually long and deep, in terms of lost output. During the recession beginning in 1973, GDP fell by a cumulative 3%. During the recession beginning in 1981, GDP fell by a cumulative 2.9%, and this recession came on the heels of a 2.2% decline in GDP in a separate recession one year earlier. Economists often attribute the unusual length and depth of the 1973 and 1981 recessions in part to the Federal Reserve's decision to keep interest rates high. The rate targeted by the Fed, the federal funds rate, peaked at 12.9% in July 1974 and 19% in July 1981. (After adjusting for inflation, these rates were not nearly as high as they appear because inflation was so much higher at the time.) The Fed had raised rates that high in order to reduce inflation, which, as measured in the GDP accounts, peaked at an annualized rate of 12.8% in the third quarter of 1974 and 11.1% in the fourth quarter of 1980. For that reason, some economists have described these recessions as "made in Washington"--had the Fed not raised rates so high, they argue, the recessions would presumably have been shorter and milder (although inflationary problems might have worsened). This dynamic has not been important in the recent recession, as the federal funds rate's recent peak was 5.25% and was reduced before the recession had begun, eventually falling to almost zero. Rising inflation was initially a concern in the current episode, but has never come close to the rates of the 1970s and 1980s--it peaked at 4.2% in the first quarter of 2007. Rising energy and commodity prices were temporarily pushing inflation up in the first half of 2008. Since then, declines in those prices temporarily led to deflation (falling prices) at the end of 2008, with very low inflation since. As the economy gradually recovers, views are divided on the outlook for inflation. Some commentators point to a federal funds rate of zero and the unprecedented scale of the Fed's intervention in financial markets as policies that will ultimately push inflation higher. Through direct lending and asset purchases, the Fed's outstanding support to the financial sector has, at times, exceeded $1 trillion, compared with less than $1 billion before the financial crisis began. In normal times, such interest rate and lending policies would be expected to be highly inflationary. But as the recession drove down aggregate demand, it put downward pressure on inflation. Other commentators fear that the recession was severe enough that deflation is a greater threat than inflation. They argue that the Fed's intervention in financial markets was necessary to avoid a "liquidity trap," where lower interest rates no longer stimulate interest-sensitive spending. Although the Fed has brought the federal funds rate down to near zero, because it was only 5.25% when the Fed began reducing rates, the Fed's scope for easing monetary policy through traditional methods was somewhat limited. By contrast, the federal funds rate, although high, was reduced (peak to trough) by 6.8 percentage points in the 1973 recession and by 10.5 percentage points in the 1981 recession. Table 2 shows the rise in unemployment in all 11 post-war recessions. Unsurprisingly, the recessions with the deepest declines in output also featured the largest increases in unemployment. From the expansion peak to post-recession high, the 1973 recession saw an increase in the unemployment rate of 4.2 percentage points, and the 1981 recession saw an increase of 3.6 percentage points (or 4.8 percentage points compared with the expansion that ended in 1980). Unemployment peaked at 10.1% in October 2009, a 5.1 percentage point increase compared with the previous expansion peak. The 1981-1982 recession was the only other recession in the post-war period in which unemployment topped 10%. Most of the increase in unemployment in the recent recession occurred after the first six months of the recession, underlining the initial mildness of the recession. The rise in the unemployment rate during this recession was comparable to the recessions since 1960 for the first 10 months following the recession's onset. Beginning in the 11 th month, however, it followed a pattern similar but even more severe than the two "deep and long" recessions of 1973 and 1980. (Unemployment leveled off after about a year in the other four recessions since 1960.) The recent recession eventually featured the largest increase in unemployment in the post-war period. Unemployment rose for 22 months, the longest period of rising unemployment since World War II. The 1973 and 1981 recessions were the only other two in the post-war period where unemployment continued to rise after about a year; in the 1973 recession, it rose for 19 months. The previous two recessions, in 1991 and 2001, were mild and brief as measured by the decline in GDP, and had some of the smallest increases in unemployment in the post-war period. This is not the whole story, however, because, in both cases, unemployment continued to rise for over a year after the recession had ended. (In every other post-war recession, with the exception of the one beginning in November 1970, unemployment began falling within six months of the recession's end.) These two episodes have therefore been called "jobless recoveries." If the rise in unemployment in the jobless recovery were included, the episode beginning in 1991 would have featured an above average rise in unemployment; but the episode beginning in 2001 would still remain below average. It is unclear whether the economy has changed in some fundamental way that makes jobless recoveries more likely from now on, or if it was simply a coincidence that the previous two recessions ended in this way. Job growth following the recent recession was more typical in that employment began rising in January 2010, seven months after the recession officially ended. Less typically, subsequent employment growth has been weak. The recent recession has also featured the largest decrease in consumption and private fixed investment spending of any post-war recession. There are a few commonalities found across all previous post-war recessions. First, in all cases, consumption spending did not weaken as much as GDP, as shown in Table 1 . In fact, in five out of 11 recessions, consumption continued to grow while GDP fell. To the extent that households can adjust their saving and borrowing levels, they are thought to generally prefer to "smooth" consumption over time, avoiding sudden increases and decreases. In the recent recession, consumption declined relatively rapidly in the third and fourth quarters of 2008, with small positive and negative changes in the other quarters. Consistent with the historical pattern, consumption has fallen by proportionately less than output cumulatively. Second, in all recessions, fixed investment spending fell more sharply than GDP. This evidence casts doubt on a popular explanation that recessions are caused by declines in consumption. It suggests to some that the primary driver of the business cycle is cyclical changes in investment demand. Investment demand is separated into two categories--business investment (in plant and equipment) and residential investment (home building). Cyclical changes in business investment could be driven by changes in business conditions, confidence, or credit conditions. Residential investment is driven by changes in housing demand and credit conditions. Changes in credit conditions are heavily influenced by monetary policy. Both business investment and residential investment fell in each of the post-war recessions. In eight out of 10 recessions, there was a larger percentage decline in residential investment than in business investment. The percentage decline in residential investment was much larger in the recent recession--beginning in the second quarter of 2006, residential investment fell by more than an annualized rate of 10% for thirteen straight quarters, while business investment fell by more than 10% in only two quarters. Further, in nine out of 10 past recessions, the decline in residential investment preceded the decline in GDP growth. This pattern held in the recent recession as well. Many economists have argued that the housing crash was a root cause of the recent recession. The fact that the decline in residential investment preceded the decline in GDP is not necessarily evidence that housing crashes have also caused other post-war recessions. It may be that recessions are caused by a tightening in credit conditions, and residential investment is the sector that is first and most affected by tighter credit conditions. For example, the deep decline in residential investment in the early 1980s is usually attributed to the Fed's decision to push the federal funds rate as high as 19%. While residential investment has fallen in all other post-war recessions, national house prices had not (since the major data series were first collected), until now. In the recent recession, national house prices fell 15% peak to trough, and residential investment fell by more than half from peak to trough. Unlike many other post-war recessions, housing may be a cause, rather than a symptom, of the recent recession. Another commonality between the recent recession and past recessions is the behavior of oil prices. The recessions of 1973 and the early 1980s are remembered for their oil shocks, and this pattern is not uncommon. In a well-known article, economist James Hamilton identified disruptions to oil supply before all but one of the post-war recessions--a pattern that has continued in every recession since his article was published, including the latest. Crude oil prices rose from $51 per barrel in January 2007 to a peak of $129 per barrel in July 2008. The average price in 2009 was about half the 2008 peak price, which should eventually offset much of the contractionary effects of the previous price increase on GDP. Evidence against attributing the economic downturn to rising oil prices would be the fact that oil prices rose significantly in the previous expansion without any noticeable effect on GDP growth. For example, prices rose from $37 per barrel in December 2004 to $69 per barrel in July 2006. As a result of the current global nature of the financial turmoil, the recent recession was widespread throughout the world. In 2009, world GDP growth was -0.6% overall and -3.2% in developed economies, contracting in all of the G-7 economies. A widespread recession is not historically unusual. For example, between 1980 and 1982, all of the G-7 countries except France and Japan experienced a contraction in GDP for at least one year (and growth was close to zero in France in 1981). Likewise, between 1991 and 1993, all of the G-7 countries except Japan experienced a contraction in GDP for at least one year (and growth was close to zero in Japan in 1992 and 1993). The global nature of the recession could potentially prolong and deepen it because there would be less demand abroad for a country's exports. In a study of historical recessions in industrial countries, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) found that recessions that were highly synchronized internationally lasted an average of four months longer and GDP fell an average of 1% more than in other recessions. A primary reason that the recent recession was longer and deeper than normal is the severity of the financial downturn that began in August 2007 and worsened dramatically in September 2008. As noted above, the recession was initially mild, and the decline in GDP accelerated markedly after the financial downturn worsened. Although a diminished investor appetite for risk and a stock market decline before or during a recession is common, the recent recession has featured a breakdown in activity in certain financial markets, such as the markets for asset-backed securities, commercial paper, and interbank lending, and the failure (or government rescue to avoid failure) of several large, established financial firms. Since then, financial conditions have improved but have not completely returned to normal. Beginning in the fourth quarter of 2008, disruptions in financial markets resulted in significant declines in business investment. Given the lag between changes in financial conditions and economic activity, it is less surprising that the recession was so much longer than average. In a study of historical recessions in industrial countries, the IMF found that recessions associated with financial crises lasted an average of seven months longer, although the decline in GDP was not statistically significant from other recessions. Some commentators have suggested that the financial crisis of the recent recession makes the Great Depression a more relevant comparison than the other post-war recessions. While the current financial downturn has been the most severe in the post-war period by many measures, there are many differences between the recent situation and the Great Depression. Although the stock market crash of 1929 played a role in setting the economic downturn in motion, there is a consensus among economists that policy errors caused the downturn to become the Great Depression. Among the most important errors were the Fed's failure to counteract the contraction in the money supply, which caused overall prices to fall a cumulative 25%, and bank runs, which caused thousands of banks to fail. (The money supply fell primarily in order to maintain the gold standard, and the economic growth rate was high after the United States abandoned the gold standard.) By contrast, policymakers have responded aggressively and unconventionally to attempt to contain the current crisis. The Fed has reduced short-term interest rates to nearly zero. Direct Fed assistance outstanding to the financial system has exceeded $1 trillion, and Congress authorized Treasury to provide an additional $700 billion to the financial system through the Troubled Assets Relief Program. Widespread bank runs have not occurred since the introduction of deposit insurance in the 1930s, and similar runs on money market mutual funds in 2008 were circumvented when Treasury temporarily guaranteed their principal. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) also temporarily guaranteed certain bank debt to ensure that banks would not lose access to borrowing markets. During the Great Depression, policymakers were also reluctant to stimulate the economy through fiscal expansion (a larger structural budget deficit). By contrast, the budget deficit increased as a share of GDP from 1.2% in 2007 to 10% in 2009. There was also a belief among some policymakers at the time that recessions were healthy processes that purged the economy of inefficiently allocated resources--a view that fell out of favor as the Depression worsened, and was eventually replaced by the view that prudent policy changes could avoid the needless waste of resources laid idle by recessions. The Great Depression included two recessions, with the first lasting 3 1/2 years and the second, beginning four years later, lasting another year. As deep as the recent recession was, it was mild compared with the first contraction of the Great Depression, as shown in Table 3 . The changes in GDP, prices, and unemployment in the recent recession were much closer to those experienced in other post-war recessions than the Great Depression.

According to the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), the U.S. economy was in a recession for 18 months from December 2007 to June 2009. It was the longest and deepest recession of the post-World War II era. The recession can be separated into two distinct phases. During the first phase, which lasted for the first half of 2008, the recession was not deep as measured by the decline in gross domestic product (GDP) or the rise in unemployment. It then deepened from the third quarter of 2008 to the first quarter of 2009. The economy continued to contract slightly in the second quarter of 2009, before returning to expansion in the third quarter. The recent recession features the largest decline in output, consumption, and investment, and the largest increase in unemployment, of any post-war recession. Previously, the longest and deepest of the post-war recessions were those beginning in 1973 and 1981. Both of those recessions took place in a context of high inflation that made the Federal Reserve (Fed) hesitant to aggressively reduce interest rates to stimulate economic activity. The Fed has not shown a similar reluctance in the recent recession, bringing short-term rates down to almost zero. Although inflation exceeded the Fed's "comfort zone" in 2007 and 2008, it was not nearly as high as it was in the 1970s or 1980s recessions. The economy briefly experienced deflation (falling prices) at the end of 2008, and inflation has generally remained very low since. Deflation may be a bigger threat to the economy in the near term, although some economists are fearful that the Fed's actions will cause inflationary problems once the economy returns to full employment. Both the 1973 and 1981 recessions also featured large spikes in oil prices near the beginning of the recession--as did the recent one. Disruptions to oil markets and recessions have gone hand in hand throughout the post-war period. The previous two recessions (beginning in 1991 and 2001) were unusually mild and brief, but subsequently featured long "jobless recoveries" where growth was sluggish and unemployment continued to rise. The recent recession did not feature a jobless recovery longer than the norm, but employment growth has been weak in 2010. A decline in residential investment (house building) during a recession is not unusual, and it is not uncommon for residential investment to decline more sharply than business investment and to begin declining before the recession. The recent contraction in residential investment was unusually severe, however, as indicated by the atypical decline in national house prices. One unique characteristic of the recent recession was the severe disruption to financial markets. Financial conditions began to deteriorate in August 2007, but became more severe in September 2008. While financial downturns commonly accompany economic downturns, financial markets have continued to function smoothly in previous recessions. This difference has led some commentators to instead compare the recent recession to the Great Depression. While the onset of both crises bear some similarities, the effects on the broader economy have little in common. In the first contraction of the Great Depression, lasting from 1929 to 1933, GDP fell by almost 27%, prices fell by more than 25%, and unemployment rose from 3.2% to 25.2%. The changes in GDP, prices, and unemployment in the recent recession were much closer to those experienced in other post-war recessions than the Great Depression. Most economists blame the severity of the Great Depression on policy errors--notably, the decision to allow the money supply to contract and thousands of banks to fail. By contrast, in the recent recession policymakers have aggressively intervened to stimulate the economy and provide direct assistance to the financial sector.

The U.S.-Singapore Free Trade Agreement ( P.L. 108-78 ) went into effect on January 1, 2004. This report provides an overview of the major trade and economic developments following the FTA over the five years ending in January 2010. It also includes selected information on key provisions of the agreement. As the United States and Singapore adjust to the provisions of the FTA, it becomes increasingly difficult to separate out the effects of the FTA from that which has occurred because of other economic forces. The effects of the global financial crisis and recession of 2008-2009 have had a major downward effect on trade flows, but some general conclusions still can be drawn. The U.S.-Singapore FTA has taken on new importance in trade policy because the United States is engaged in negotiations to join the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). The TPP negotiations are the first major market-opening initiative of the Obama Administration. On December 14, 2009, United States Trade Representative Ron Kirk notified Congress of the intent to enter into the TPP negotiations. The objective is to shape a high-standard, broad-based regional free trade agreement with Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Chile, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, and Vietnam. The first round of negotiations began March 15, 2010, in Sydney, Australia. Singapore, Chile, Brunei, and New Zealand are the original members of the pact. The United States, Australia, Peru, and Vietnam are seeking to join. The United States already has FTAs with Singapore, Chile, Australia, and Peru. The TPP could become the basis for a Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific over the long term. The U.S.-Singapore FTA essentially eliminated tariffs on all goods traded between the two countries. It also included market access measures and other provisions related to trade in services, investment, rules of origin, intellectual property rights, government procurement, licensing of professionals, telecommunications, worker rights, the environment, capital controls, and dispute settlement. The FTA has provided greater access for U.S. companies, has been instrumental in increasing bilateral trade, and has provided reassurance to Singaporeans of U.S. interest in the country at a time when many in the region perceived that the United States had been focused on the Middle East and "neglecting" Asia. The FTA seems to have benefitted overall bilateral relations. The FTA has provided certain advantages to American businesses, but since Singapore has FTAs with many other nations, those advantages often are extended to other nations as well. As a city-state, Singapore operates as an entrepot and shipping center and basically has free trade with almost all countries. It imposes import restrictions on only a handful of goods. Under the FTA, Singapore made concessions that dealt mainly with providing greater access for American service providers (particularly financial services) and with strengthening the business environment in areas such as the protection of intellectual property rights and access to government procurement. In 2009, the United States ran a $6.6 billion surplus in its balance of merchandise trade with Singapore, up from $1.4 billion in 2003, but down from the $12.0 billion in 2008. U.S. exports of goods to Singapore surged from $16.6 billion in 2003 to a peak of $27.9 billion in 2008 before declining to $22.3 billion in 2009. Major U.S. exports to Singapore include machinery, electrical machinery, aircraft, optical and medical instruments, plastic, and mineral fuel oil. U.S. trade with Singapore has increased faster than anticipated before the FTA. Even with this rapid increase in U.S. exports to Singapore, however, the U.S. share of Singapore's imports has declined from 16% in 2003 to 12% in 2009. The main reason for this is that Singapore's overall trade is booming. Still, Singapore imports more from the United States ($28.5 billion) than from China ($26.0 billion). Malaysia is Singapore's top source of imports, while the United States is second, and China is third. Imports from China, however, have been rising rapidly, and China has passed Japan as a source of imports. The U.S. balance of trade in services with Singapore declined from a surplus of $4.0 billion in 2001 to $1.2 billion in 2005 but rose to $4.2 billion in 2008. While U.S. receipts of royalties and license fees ($3.2 billion) and exports of other private services ($4.2 billion) have increased, so have U.S. payments for other private services ($2.1 billion) and for travel and transportation ($1.3 billion). A significant increase has been in income from U.S. direct investments in Singapore. U.S. access to the Singaporean market for multinational corporations seems to have been enhanced considerably under the FTA. U.S. income from assets in Singapore rose from $6.7 billion in 2003 to $21.1 billion by 2008. As an example of U.S. service providers in Singapore under the FTA, Citibank has been able to expand its operations there (it has 50% of the credit card market), offer innovative products (such as biometric identification for bill paying), and partner with the subway system to issue credit cards that double as subway fare cards and to locate branches and ATM terminals in and around subway stations. On the U.S. import side (Singapore's exports), a noteworthy development is that U.S. imports of pharmaceuticals from Singapore have risen dramatically from $0.09 billion in 2003 to $3.0 billion in 2007 before declining to $2.0 billion in 2008. In 2008, Singapore was the seventh largest supplier of pharmaceuticals to the United States. The FTA did not lower the U.S. tariff rate for pharmaceuticals, since such products already enter the United States duty free. What appears to have occurred has been the development of Singapore as a regional center for multinational pharmaceutical companies. This apparently was partly triggered by provisions in the FTA that required Singapore to strengthen its intellectual property protection. The Singaporean government also has provided incentives for multinational biomedical companies to locate research and production in the country. Most of the major pharmaceutical companies of the world have established subsidiaries in Singapore and are exporting part of their production. Singapore has relatively high labor standards. It ratified the International Labor Organization's Minimum Age Convention in 2005. This brought the number of ILO Conventions the country has ratified to more than 20, including Core Conventions that cover child labor, forced labor, collective bargaining, and equal remuneration. As a city state with 3.4 million people and an area roughly the size of the Washington, DC, area inside the Beltway, Singapore's environmental challenges relate primarily to industrial pollution (strictly regulated), urbanization, and preservation of natural areas. The country touts itself as a garden city. It recycles all waste water, appears clean, and uses variable tolls to alleviate traffic congestion. The United States has not formally raised environmental or labor issues with Singapore under the FTA. For details on the content of the FTA, see CRS Report RL31789, The U.S.-Singapore Free Trade Agreement , by [author name scrubbed]. Since the U.S.-Singapore FTA came into effect in January 2004, U.S. trade with Singapore has boomed. As shown in Figure 1 , U.S. exports of merchandise to Singapore rose by 68% from $16.6 billion in 2003 to a peak of $27.9 billion in 2008 before the global financial crisis depressed world trade in 2009. In 2009, U.S. exports to Singapore were at $22.3 billion. U.S. imports from Singapore increased by a lesser 22% to go from $15.1 billion in 2003 to a peak of $18.4 billion in 2007 before declining to $15.7 billion in 2009 or approximately the same level as prior to the FTA. The U.S. trade surplus with Singapore rose from $1.4 billion in 2003 to a peak of $12.0 billion in 2008 before declining to $6.6 billion in 2009. Major U.S. exports to Singapore include machinery, electrical machinery, aircraft/spacecraft, mineral fuel and oil, optical and medical instruments, plastic, and organic chemicals. As shown in Figure 2 , U.S. exports of each of these products have risen since the U.S.-Singapore FTA took effect in January 2004, although they declined in 2009 because of the global financial crisis. The highly developed nature of the city-state's economy can be seen in the major U.S. exports there. They consist primarily of industrial and scientific machinery and materials. The rising surplus in merchandise trade with Singapore, however, masks other underlying trends that do not bode as well for the United States. Although Singapore's share of U.S. exports to the world has remained at about 2.3% to 2.1%, Singapore's imports from the United States have been declining relative to those from many other countries of the world. As shown in Table 1 , in 2001, the United States accounted for 16.4% of Singapore's imports. By 2009, that share had fallen to 12%, despite the rapid growth in U.S. exports there. Still, Singapore imports more from the United States ($28.5 billion) than from China ($26.0 billion). Malaysia is Singapore's top source of imports, while the United States is second, and China is third. Imports from China, however, have been rising rapidly, and China has passed Japan as a source of imports. The surplus in the U.S. balance of merchandise trade with Singapore runs contrary to a commonly held perception that free trade agreements lead to larger U.S. deficits in trade. The perception seems to be generated mostly by U.S. trade with its immediate neighbors, Canada and Mexico. As shown in Figure 3 , in 2009, the United States ran trade surpluses with Australia, Singapore, Chile, the Dominican Republic, Morocco, and seven other FTA countries, while it ran deficits with Mexico, Canada, Israel, Costa Rica, and Nicaragua. During the FTA talks with Singapore, negotiations were intense over that country's import restrictions on a few products. Even though Singapore is largely a free-trade nation, it has restrictions on imports of specific controlled items (including chewing gum) and has import duties on beer, stout, and a local beverage called samsu . Under the FTA, Singapore allowed imports from the United States of chewing gum with "therapeutic value" (excluding nicotine gum) to be sold in pharmacies. The country also dropped all duties on beer, stout, and samsu from the United States. Under the FTA, U.S. exports of beer (made from malt, Harmonized System code 2203) rose from $0.352 million in 2003 to $0.648 million in 2005 but was at $0.505 million in 2009. As a share of Singapore's total imports of beer, however, in 2009, the United States accounted for about 0.5% of the total and ranked 18 th among all sources of beer imports. The top six sources were Malaysia, Mexico, Belgium, the Netherlands, Thailand, and South Korea. Among these countries, only Thailand and South Korea have free trade agreements with Singapore. With respect to chewing gum, the data on Singaporean imports do not show appreciable imports from the United States. In 2009, out of a total of $850,309 in chewing gum imports (HS 170410), none came from the United States. $627,016 in chewing gum came from Indonesia and $112,907 that came from South Korea. As for imports from the United States in previous years, in 2005, Singapore imported $1,298 and 2006, $246 worth of American chewing gum. U.S. business interests point out that the greatest potential effect of the U.S.-Singapore FTA is likely to be increased access by U.S. companies to Singapore's market in services. Services are provided in two ways: in cross-border transactions and from subsidiaries in the trading partner's economy. Services such as insurance, shipping, provision of intellectual property, and travel often are sold across borders and are counted as exports and imports. Other services, such as accounting, legal services, and banking often are provided directly to the consumer through overseas subsidiaries of U.S. companies. These transactions usually do not appear as exports or imports, although the repatriation of profits from such activity is counted as an income flow. The United States has traditionally run a surplus in its balance of services trade with Singapore. This is shown in Figure 4 . Under the FTA, this balance declined from $4.0 billion in 2001 to $2.6 billion in 2006 but has risen to $4.2 billion in 2009. Among the four components of trade in services, the United States ran surpluses in two and deficits in two. In royalties and license fees, the U.S. surplus increased from $2.5 billion in 2001 to $3.1 billion in 2008. Some of this rise in fees for intellectual property likely can be attributed to strengthened intellectual property protection in Singapore resulting from the FTA. In other private services, the U.S. surplus has fluctuated with a fall from $1.9 billion in 2001 to $0.7 billion in 2006 but a rise to $2.2 billion in 2008. In military and government transactions, the trade balance varies from year to year. It was -$0.04 billion in 2001, -$0.2 billion in 2006, and -$0.6 billion in 2008. In travel and transportation, the balance trends toward an increasingly large U.S. deficit. Most of this is in transportation, particularly shipping, as well as in passenger fares and travel. This negative balance grew from -$0.3 billion in 2001 to -$1.0 billion in 2006 but diminished to -$0.4 billion as the global financial crisis curtailed shipping and tourism. Increased market access in services under an FTA, therefore, may or may not result in an improvement in the U.S. bilateral trade balance in services. It depends on what kind of service is being traded and the relative comparative advantage of each country. U.S. service providers, moreover, may find it more advantageous under the increased access and strengthened intellectual property regime engendered by an FTA to locate a subsidiary in the FTA partner country. This may reduce U.S. exports of private services but also may increase royalties and payments from use of intellectual property and earnings from operations in the host country. In the Singapore case, U.S. income from assets owned in Singapore increased from $3.9 billion in 2001 to $6.7 billion in 2003, and after the FTA jumped to $14.3 billion in 2006 and $21.1 billion in 2008. In 2008, Singaporean investors earned $6.3 billion on their assets in the United States for a $14.8 billion surplus for the United States. This is more than triple the U.S. surplus in trade in services. In financial services, Singapore made several key concessions under the FTA. In 2007, the government lifted the ban on new licenses for full-service and wholesale American banks. Licensed full-service banks from the United States (two as of 2007) are now able to offer all their services at an unlimited number of locations. Under the first two years of the FTA, U.S.-licensed full-service banks were able to operate at up to 30 customer service locations (branches or off-premise ATMs). Non-U.S. full-service foreign banks have been allowed to operate at a combined 25 locations. Locally incorporated subsidiaries of U.S. banks are able to apply for access to the local automated teller machine (ATM) network on commercial terms, and branches of U.S. banks were to obtain access to the ATM network by 2008. Citibank, in particular, has been expanding its presence in Singapore. From four branches in 2004, it now has eleven full-service branches and more planned. It was the first in Singapore to introduce a biometric payment system that allows payments without credit cards based on fingerprint identification. It also has joined with the Singapore MRT subway system to provide credit cards that double as subway tickets and to locate ATMs and branches in and around subway stations. Citibank has a 50% share of the Singapore credit card market. As of mid-2006, Citibank along with the other major foreign banks had created their own ATM network rather than join that of the local banks. American banks are allowed under the FTA to enter the domestic ATM network if financial considerations warrant such a move. In general, foreigners in Singapore cannot practice Singapore law (without local credentials), employ Singapore lawyers to practice Singapore law, or litigate in local courts. Since June 2004, however, U.S. and other foreign lawyers have been allowed to represent parties in arbitration in Singapore without the need for a Singapore attorney to be present. U.S. law firms can provide legal services with respect to Singapore law only through a joint venture or formal alliance with a Singapore law firm. Under the FTA, Singapore has recognized law degrees from Harvard University, Columbia University, New York University, and the University of Michigan for the purpose of admission to practice law in Singapore. Also, since October 2006, graduates of these universities who are ranked among the top 70% of their graduating class may be admitted to the Singapore bar. The FTA contains state-of-the-art provisions on electronic commerce, including national treatment and most-favored-nation obligations for products delivered electronically, affirmation that services disciplines cover all services delivered electronically, and permanent duty-free status of products delivered electronically. The FTA provided the impetus for the Singapore government to amend its laws to create one of the strongest IPR regimes in Asia. In July 2004, amendments to the Trademarks Act, the Patents Act, the Layout Designs of Integrated Circuits Act, Registered Designs Act, a new Plant Varieties Protection Act, and a new Manufacture of Optical Discs Act came into effect. This was followed in 2005 by an amended Copyright Act and Broadcasting Act. Singapore also has implemented or ratified various international conventions or treaties dealing with IPRs. Singaporean officials have indicated that the provisions in the FTA that strengthened IPR protection in Singapore have attracted foreign business investments. Recently, Microsoft, Pfizer, ISIS Pharmaceuticals, Motorola, Genentech, and Lucas Films have made new investments in operations in Singapore. In January 2010, the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) of the United Nation established an office in Singapore to handle some of WIPO's dispute resolution activities. The Singapore office is to administer and facilitate hearings in cases conducted under WIPO arbitration rules and to provide training and advice on procedures such as arbitration, mediation and expert determination. The Singapore Office of WIPO aims to cater to regional needs and to make WIPO's experience and expertise in intellectual property alternative dispute resolution more accessible in the Asia-Pacific Region. The U.S.-Singapore FTA provides for national and most-favored nation treatment for foreign investors. Investors have the right to make financial transfers freely and without delay. The FTA also provides for disciplines on performance requirements, for international law standards in the case of expropriation, and for access to binding international arbitration. In 2006, Singapore was the third largest destination for U.S. foreign direct investment in the Asia Pacific. U.S. direct investment (cumulative position) in Singapore was $40.8 billion in 2001, $51.1 billion in 2003, $81.9 billion in 2006, and $106.5 billion in 2008. By comparison, in 2008, it was $88.5 billion in Australia, $79.2 billion in Japan, $51.5 billion in Hong Kong, and $45.7 billion in China. According to the U.S. Department of Commerce, in 2004 and 2005, one of the strongest increases in the value added of overseas affiliates of U.S. multinational corporations was in manufacturing operations in Singapore. The attractiveness of the country as a "manufacturing base for the Asia-Pacific region was heightened by the enactment of the United States-Singapore Free Trade Agreement, which facilitates the shipment of inputs to production from the United States." In 2005, U.S. affiliates in Singapore accounted for 15% of Singapore's GDP, up from 13.2% in 2004 and second only to the share in GDP of U.S. affiliates in Ireland (18.5%). In 2005, U.S. non-bank affiliates in Singapore employed 123,600 persons, held assets of $150.7 billion, had sales of $162.7 billion, and generated net income of $18.7 billion. This net income in Singapore exceed that by U.S. non-bank affiliates in Japan ($15.0 billion), Australia ($13.0 billion), or China ($7.9 billion) for the same year. Just as U.S. exports to Singapore have increased since the U.S.-Singapore FTA came into effect in 2004, so also have U.S. imports from Singapore. After the FTA, Imports rose by 22% from $15.1 billion in 2003 to $18.4 billion in 2007 (not adjusted for inflation) but as the global financial crisis curtailed international trade, imports from Singapore declined to $15.7 billion in 2008 and $15.7 in 2009. Since the FTA, therefore, U.S. exports have increased considerably more than U.S. imports. By sector, the growth rates for imports vary considerably. Figure 5 shows the average annual growth rates for the four years prior to and for the five years after the FTA was implemented for the top 40 products (by 2-digit Harmonized System code) imported from Singapore. In 2009, the value of these products ranged from a low of $3.9 million for nickel to $4,639.6 million for machinery. Imports from Singapore are concentrated in the top six categories each with amounts exceeding $1 billion. Together these six accounted for 91% of the total imports from Singapore in 2009. One of the concerns expressed during consideration of the FTA was that it would increase significantly imports of textiles and apparel from Singapore. This has not occurred. In 2009, there were no imports of knitted or crocheted fabrics. Since 2003, imports of woven apparel fell by 39% per year from $38 million to $3 million in 2009, and imports of knit apparel likewise fell by 22% per year from $233 million to $68 million. The most significant gains have been in U.S. imports of pharmaceuticals from Singapore. Imports of such products jumped from $0.09 billion in 2003 to $3.0 billion in 2007, although they declined to $2.0 billion in 2009. Singapore is the ninth largest supplier of pharmaceuticals to the United States, behind Belgium, Israel, and Switzerland, but ahead of Italy, Japan, and India. The vast majority (95%) of these imports ($1.9 billion) were cardiovascular medicaments (HS 3004909120). The increase in imports of pharmaceuticals from Singapore cannot be attributed to a reduction in U.S. tariffs under the FTA. Pharmaceuticals already enter the United States duty free. Rather what appears to have occurred is the development of Singapore as a regional center for multinational pharmaceutical companies--both for manufacturing and for research and development. Two major factors have contributed to this. The first is the strengthening of intellectual property protection and new or revised laws in Singapore. The second is the development of a biomedical industrial park (Tuas Medical Park) for pharmaceutical companies to locate production and other facilities plus a research complex called Biopolis that houses biomedical research institutes, councils, and related organizations. Multinational companies have come to dominate the manufacture of pharmaceuticals in Singapore. These include Merck Sharp and Dohme, Aventis, GlaxoSmithKline, Pfizer, Schering-Plough, Wyeth, and Eli Lilly. Singapore is increasingly becoming a base for both regional and global pharmaceutical production for a growing number of multinational companies. The government goal is to have at least ten multinational pharmaceutical manufacturing facilities operational in Singapore by 2010. Much of the production is for export, particularly to North America and Europe. Exports from other Asian countries also flow into Singapore for re-export. The country exports more pharmaceuticals than any other "Asian Tiger" economy (Hong Kong, Taiwan, and South Korea). Before the FTA, a sizable proportion of Singapore's pharmaceutical exports were transshipments from other countries. While such re-exports continue to increase, exports of domestic production now dominate. Figure 6 shows Singapore's global exports of pharmaceuticals and the rapid increase in domestic exports relative to re-exports. From 2002 to 2006, the re-export share of all pharmaceutical exports dropped from 60% to 11%. In the modern globalized economy, much trade is intra-industry. The old economic model of trade in which each country specializes in certain products and exchanges them for others in which it has a comparative disadvantage only remotely resembles trade between industrialized economies populated by multinational enterprises. In many cases, the United States both imports and exports products in the same sector. Some of this trade may occur within a manufacturer's supply chain that may straddle several countries. For example, an electronic product may be designed and marketed in the United States, but final assembly may be in Singapore using components from the United States as well as from other economies in the region. The U.S. balance of trade in goods with Singapore is shown in Figure 7 by two-digit Harmonized System codes. The balance of trade by sectors also indicates how trade with Singapore may be affecting sectoral employment in the United States. The first observation is that the U.S. aerospace products, mineral fuel and oil, and electrical machinery producers are doing well in Singapore. The U.S. trade surplus in each exceeds $2.3 billion. The largest U.S. sectoral deficits in trade are in organic chemicals (-$2.7 billion) and pharmaceutical products (-$1.9 billion). Most other sectors are experiencing either small surpluses or small deficits in bilateral trade--less than $1 billion. (The sectors not shown in Figure 7 had balances with an absolute value of less than $60 million.) In the U.S.-Singapore FTA, labor obligations are part of the core text of the trade agreement. Both parties were to reaffirm their obligations as members of the International Labor Organization, and they are to strive to ensure that their domestic laws provide for labor standards consistent with internationally recognized labor principles. The agreement also contains language that it is inappropriate to weaken or reduce domestic labor protections to encourage trade or investment. The agreement further requires parties to effectively enforce their own domestic labor laws. This obligation is to be enforceable through the agreement's dispute settlement procedures. Singapore has ratified 24 ILO Conventions (20 in force), including five Core Conventions that cover child labor (ratified in 2001); forced labor; collective bargaining, and equal remuneration (ratified in 2002). The country ratified the Minimum Age Convention in November 2005 after the FTA went into effect. Unless otherwise indicated, the other conventions were ratified in 1965. (The United States has ratified 14 ILO Conventions [12 in force] including 2 [Forced Labor and Child Labor] of the five Core Conventions.) In 2009 Singapore's national labor force was made up of approximately 2.99 million workers of which about 500,000 were unionized and represented by 68 unions. Almost all of the unions (which represent virtually all of the union members) were affiliated with the National Trade Union Congress (NTUC), an umbrella organization with a close relationship with the government. In a 2009 study of the U.S.-Singapore FTA, the Government Accountability Office concluded the following: Singapore generally had strong protections for workers going into the FTA and has since improved them. As a high-income economy, Singapore provides good working conditions and a broad range of social benefits for most of its workers, and U.S. officials involved in the negotiations said changes in Singapore's labor laws were not needed to conclude the FTA. The International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC) reports that there are some restrictions on unions in Singapore's labor laws, but many of the restrictions are not applied in practice. U.S. FTA negotiators were initially concerned by Singapore's lack of a minimum wage law, but these concerns were allayed by an understanding of Singapore's unique system for determining wage increases through the annual recommendations of a National Wages Council that is composed of government, trade union, and employer representatives. U.S. embassy officials said Singapore has made changes in its laws to improve worker protections since the FTA took force. The embassy officials stated that, for example, a workplace safety and health act was enacted to provide safety protections to a broader range of workers. State's 2008 human rights report indicates that Singapore's Ministry of Manpower effectively enforced its laws and regulations on working conditions, safety and health standards, and child labor. (p. 37) No U.S. activity or assistance on labor has been provided since the FTA went into effect, according to ILAB (U.S. Bureau of International Labor Affairs) officials. Singapore has high labor standards and relatively few labor problems, as indicated in the FTA labor rights report. U.S. officials told us that because Singapore's labor laws and enforcement systems were good, they did not see a need for extensive cooperation and, furthermore, Singapore had not requested it.... Despite the provisions in the labor cooperation annex and the expectations of negotiators in both countries, neither U.S. nor Singapore government officials were aware of any technical cooperation activities concerning labor since the FTA was implemented. However, Singaporean officials told us they were cooperating on labor issues with other trade partners, such as the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership that also includes Chile, New Zealand, and Brunei Darussalam. (p. 44) In the U.S.-Singapore FTA, both parties agreed to ensure that their domestic environmental laws provide for high levels of environmental protection and that they are to strive to continue to improve such laws. They are not to weaken or reduce domestic environmental protections to encourage trade or investment. The agreement also requires that parties effectively enforce their own domestic environmental laws. This obligation is to be enforceable through the agreement's dispute settlement procedures. Since Singapore is an island (3.4 million population) the size of the Washington, DC, area inside the Beltway, it has virtually no natural resources. Its environmental issues are characteristic of a highly urbanized city. It has no problems associated with mining, forestry, or large-scale agriculture. Singapore touts itself as the "garden city of the East." It is relatively clean, ordered, and well-planned. Waste water is purified and recycled. The restricted space available in the country raises issues pertaining to industrial pollution (tightly regulated), urbanization, and the protection of the few natural areas still existing. Vehicular traffic is alleviated by charging special tolls to travel into the inner city during rush hours and by levying taxes and other fees on new or used cars. The closer economic links established under the FTA appear to have assisted in areas such as cargo security. In December 2007, Singapore announced that it was to conduct a six-month trial project under the Secure Freight Initiative. Under this initiative, 100% of U.S.-bound shipping containers are to be scanned for nuclear or radiological materials before being loaded on ships. Singapore is to be one of seven ports participating in the trial. The Ports Command in Singapore already had been cooperating with the United States in various security initiatives. It now scans about 15% of the 24 million cargo containers that pass through its ports, and it is able to scan an incoming container truck in less than one minute. In March 2003, Singapore was the first country to sign on to the U.S.-sponsored Cargo Security Initiative. The U.S.-Singapore FTA also generated non-economic effects. At a time when many in Southeast Asia perceive that the United States is distracted by events in the Middle East and not paying enough attention to Asia, the FTA provided some degree of reassurance of U.S. interest in the region. It also created a bandwagon effect as Malaysia, Thailand, and South Korea soon followed with negotiations of their own for an FTA with the United States. Singapore has supported the U.S.-backed proposal to create a Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific under the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum. It also has aggressively been concluding other FTAs that eventually could form the basis for this proposed free trade area. In addition, the closer economic ties under the U.S.-Singapore FTA contributed to more diplomatic and military cooperation with Singapore. In July 2005, the United States and Singapore signed a Strategic Framework Agreement that extended bilateral cooperation to defense and security. Located in the midst of several secular Muslim nations, Singapore has been active in cooperating with the United States in political and security cooperation in the global counterterrorism campaign. Singapore has been at the forefront of cooperating with neighboring countries and the United States to enhance maritime security in nearby waters, especially in the Strait of Malacca where terrorist threats and piracy have been problems. Singapore also has cooperated extensively to ensure the security of cargo bound for the United States. Singapore also continues to welcome port visits by the U.S. Navy and allows U.S. aircraft carriers to use the special pier at its naval base built especially to accommodate such large ships. In 2007, when Buddhist-led demonstrations erupted in Burma, Singapore held the Chair of ASEAN, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, of which Burma/Myanmar is a member. Despite the tradition of non-interference in domestic affairs of the member states, Singapore supported investigation of the protests in Burma by the Special U.N. Envoy to Myanmar Ibrahim Gambari. Singapore also continued its bilateral and multilateral intelligence and law enforcement cooperation to investigate terrorist groups with a focus on Jemaah Islamiya, a group that had plotted to carry out attacks in Singapore in the past.

The U.S.-Singapore Free Trade Agreement (FTA) (P.L. 108-78) went into effect on January 1, 2004. This report provides an overview of the major trade and economic effects of the FTA over the three years ending in 2006. It also includes detailed information on key provisions of the agreement and legislative action. The U.S.-Singapore FTA has taken on new importance in trade policy because the United States is engaged in negotiations to join the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). The TPP negotiations are the first major market-opening initiative of the Obama Administration. On December 14, 2009, United States Trade Representative Ron Kirk notified Congress of the intent to enter into the TPP negotiations. The objective is to shape a high-standard, broad-based regional free trade agreement with Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Chile, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, and Vietnam. The first round of negotiations began March 15, 2010, in Sydney, Australia. The U.S.-Singapore FTA has provided greater access for U.S. companies, has been instrumental in increasing bilateral trade, and has provided reassurance to Singaporeans of U.S. interest in the country. As a city-state, Singapore operates as an entrepot with essentially free trade. Under the FTA, concessions dealt mainly with providing greater access for American service providers and with strengthening the business environment in areas such as the protection of intellectual property rights and access to government procurement. In 2009, the United States ran a $6.6 billion surplus in its balance of merchandise trade with Singapore, up from $1.4 billion in 2003, but down from the $12.0 billion in 2008. U.S. exports of goods to Singapore surged from $16.6 billion in 2003 to a peak of $27.9 billion in 2008 before declining to $22.3 billion in 2009. Even with this rapid increase in U.S. exports to Singapore, the U.S. share of Singapore's imports has declined from 16% in 2003 to 12% in 2009. The main reason for this is that Singapore's overall trade is booming. Still, Singapore imports more from the United States ($28.5 billion) than from China ($26.0 billion).The U.S. balance of trade in services with Singapore declined from a surplus of $4.0 billion in 2001 to $1.2 billion 2005 but has risen to $4.2 billion in 2008. A significant increase has been in income from U.S. direct investments in Singapore. U.S. access to the Singaporean market for multinational corporations seems to have been enhanced considerably under the FTA. U.S. income from assets in Singapore rose from $6.7 billion in 2003 to $21.1 billion by 2008. On the U.S. import side (Singapore's exports), a noteworthy development is that U.S. imports of pharmaceuticals from Singapore have risen from $0.09 billion in 2003 to $3.0 billion in 2007 before declining to $2.0 billion in 2008. Singapore has developed as a regional center for multinational pharmaceutical companies. This apparently was partly triggered by provisions in the FTA that required Singapore to strengthen its intellectual property protection. Negotiations for the U.S.-Singapore Free Trade Agreement were launched under the Clinton Administration in December 2000. The FTA became the fifth such agreement the United States has signed and the first with an Asian country. This report will be updated as circumstances warrant.

In 2009, approximately 4 trillion kilowatt hours of electricity were generated by the U.S. power sector. By 2035 electricity generation is expected to rise to more than 5 trillion kilowatt hours, a roughly 25% increase from 2009 levels. The fuel mix for U.S. electricity generation includes four primary categories: (1) coal, (2) natural gas, (3) renewables, and (4) nuclear. As illustrated in Figure 1 , coal is the largest electricity generation fuel source for both actual (2009) and projected (2035) generation. However, EIA projects that natural gas and renewables are the only fuel sources that would experience growth, in terms of percentage of the electricity generation mix, over the projection period. During his January 25, 2011 State of the Union speech, President Obama proposed a Clean Energy Standard (CES) policy framework that would result in 80% of U.S. electricity generation coming from "clean energy" sources by 2035. "Clean energy," as described by President Obama, would include renewables, nuclear power, and partial credits for clean coal and efficient natural gas. While there is no official definition, a federal Clean Energy Standard might be defined as a requirement to generate a percentage of electricity from certain energy sources. It is a policy designed to encourage U.S. electricity generation from "clean" or "cleaner" energy sources within a certain time period. Many CES proposals require individual utility companies to comply with a federal CES, although some utilities may be exempt from CES requirements based on their total amount of annual electricity sales. Generally, utilities can comply with CES requirements through a combination of (1) electricity generation from qualified clean energy sources, (2) purchasing clean energy credits, and (3) making alternative compliance payments (ACPs). Each of these will be discussed below. Previous CES proposals have addressed multiple policy design parameters, including (1) technologies that qualify, (2) base quantities of electricity, (3) goals and requirements, (4) alternative compliance payments. Understanding the implications and inter-relationships of these parameters is an important element of CES policy design and will assist Congress with considering if overall objectives such as increasing clean energy generation, minimizing rate payer impacts, and job creation are likely to be achieved. This report evaluates design elements of previous CES proposals, summarizes the Administration's CES policy framework, provides state-level baseline CES compliance analysis, and presents several policy options that Congress might consider as part of a CES debate. During the 111 th Congress several Clean/Renewable Energy Standard policies were proposed, although none became law. In order to provide background on previously proposed CES legislation, four proposals were analyzed and compared against multiple design parameters (See Table 1 ). A more detailed analysis of these proposals is presented in a side-by-side comparison matrix that can be found in Appendix A . All proposals were compared in order to assess areas of commonality and divergence. While not an all-inclusive or exhaustive list, following is a brief overview and discussion of the design elements considered for this analysis. The base quantity of electricity is a critical Clean Energy Standard design element as it establishes the amount of electricity, typically measured in kilowatt-hours, that applies to CES goals and requirements. Proposals analyzed have base quantity definitions that range from 100% of utility power sales to sales less the amount of power generated by hydro-electricity and municipal solid waste (MSW) incineration. A hypothetical example of how different utilities might derive their respective CES base quantities in the latter case is provided in Table 2 . Clean Energy Standard targets and goals set the percentage of electricity that must be generated from clean energy sources by a certain date. The percentage articulated in a CES proposal is applied to the base quantity of electricity to calculate the number of kilowatt-hours that must be generated from clean energy sources in order to achieve compliance by a certain date. Examples of CES targets/goals include (1) 50% of base quantity by 2050, (2) 15% of base quantity by 2039, and (3) 15% of base quantity by 2020. Defining and determining which energy sources will qualify under a CES proposal could be a design element worthy of consideration. A clear definition of qualifying sources is important as it allows a utility company to determine which electricity generation options are available for compliance. Each of the four proposals analyzed in this paper include typical renewable energy as qualified sources. All four proposals also include coal-mine methane and landfill gas as qualifying sources. Differences among the proposals, generally, are associated with the inclusion and definition of qualified hydropower and incremental geothermal as well as the inclusion/definition of waste-to-energy, qualified nuclear, advanced coal/fossil with carbon capture and storage, and re-powering/co-firing biomass at existing coal generation facilities. Energy efficiency/savings typically refers to reductions in electricity consumption at end-use consumer facilities that are served by an electric utility company as well as reductions in distribution system losses. Some proposals also include output from combined heat and power systems as energy efficiency/savings. In order to qualify for energy efficiency/savings credits, utility companies may have to institute programs that result in consumer demand reductions. One example of such a program might be subsidies for high efficiency air conditioning systems. All four proposals analyzed allow for energy efficiency/savings credits, although some proposals place limits on how much energy efficiency/savings credits can be used to comply with a broader Clean Energy Standard. For example, one proposal allows utility companies to use energy efficiency credits to satisfy up to 25% of the CES target. Therefore, 75% of a utility company's CES target must be met by generating electricity from qualified sources, purchasing CES credits, or making alternative compliance payments. One challenge associated with energy efficiency/savings credits might be determining a baseline for calculating energy efficiency and therefore the number of credits that result from various energy efficiency programs. Alternative compliance payments (ACPs) can be paid by utility companies in lieu of generating qualified clean energy or purchasing clean energy credits. Typically expressed in cents per kilowatt-hour, ACPs provide utility companies with some degree of flexibility associated with meeting the targets/goals of a Clean Energy Standard. From a policy perspective, determining the value of ACPs can be somewhat complicated. Setting the ACP too low could potentially result in minimal development of "clean" electricity generation because some companies might choose to pay the ACP instead of generating or purchasing qualified clean energy. At the same time rate payer costs may increase as utility companies seek to recover their compliance costs. However, setting the ACP value too high might result in relatively large electricity rate increases in areas/regions that lack clean energy resources. Nevertheless, ACPs are basically a cost containment mechanism that effectively place a cap on the value of clean energy credits. Determining the value of ACPs will likely involve comparing the cost of generation from all qualified sources to the lowest generation cost from any fuel (e.g., coal, natural gas, nuclear, renewable) source. Some proposals suggest that funds generated through receipt of ACPs will be used to provide grants in support of new "clean energy" electricity generation projects. Under most of the four Clean Energy Standard proposals, utilities would be awarded credits for each kilowatt-hour of electricity generated from qualified clean energy sources. Utility companies can submit clean energy credits as a means of compliance with annual CES requirements. If a utility has more CES credits than are required for a given year, the utility may either "bank" the excess clean energy credits for a certain period of time or the utility can trade the excess credits, in exchange for cash, to other utilities. For those proposals that allow energy efficiency to count towards CES compliance, energy efficiency credits are typically handled in a similar manner. Details regarding the mechanics of how CES credit trading may work are not clearly defined in the four proposals analyzed and responsibility for establishing trading programs is delegated to the Secretary of Energy. Three of the four CES proposals analyzed include provisions for double and triple credits. Multiple credits could be an approach that further incentivizes certain types of clean energy projects or the development of projects in certain locations. Some examples of projects that might receive multiple credits include (1) projects on Indian lands, (2) on-site electricity generation, (3) first five advanced coal facilities that sequester 1 million tons per year of carbon dioxide (CO 2 ), among others. Some CES proposals include provisions that allow demonstration projects to receive clean energy credits. For example, S. 20 would provide clean energy credits for advanced coal demonstration projects, based on the amount of CO 2 that is captured and sequestered. Providing credits for demonstration projects might be viewed as an incentive to develop, deploy, and commercialize emerging clean technologies. Most CES proposals include a civil penalty for utilities that fail to comply with CES requirements. Civil penalties are typically computed by multiplying the annual kilowatt-hour target shortfall times a multiple of the alternative compliance payment (e.g., 200% of the ACP--inflation adjusted). In some cases, CES proposals may exempt certain utility companies from compliance. Two of the four proposals analyzed exempt utilities that sell less than 4 million megawatt -hours of electricity in the preceding year. All utility companies in Hawaii are also exempt. Some CES proposals empower the Secretary of Energy to make loans to support the development of qualified clean energy projects. The purpose of the loans is to assist with CES compliance and reduce cost impacts to utilities and retail consumers. On January 25, 2011, during the State of the Union address, President Obama announced a clean energy goal for the country: "By 2035, 80% of America's electricity will come from clean energy sources." On February 3, 2011, the White House released a document titled "President Obama's Plan to Win the Future by Producing More Electricity Through Clean Energy," which summarizes the goals of the President's plan. Primary objectives of the Administration's plan include: Double the share of clean electricity in 25 years Draw on a wide range of clean energy sources Deploy capital investment to sustain and create jobs Drive innovation in clean energy technologies Complement the clean energy research and development agenda Furthermore, President Obama's plan described five core principles for the Clean Energy Standard proposal. These principles are summarized in the following text box. As discussed and presented in the following sections, baseline compliance with President Obama's CES proposal differs among the states and several policy considerations may warrant further evaluation as the CES policy debate evolves. President Obama's Clean Energy Standard proposal states that 40% of electricity currently generated nationwide comes from "clean energy" sources. However, each state and each utility required to comply with a federal Clean Energy Standard has a unique electricity generation mix. The following figure shows how each state would currently comply with the CES proposal based on existing electricity generation from qualified "clean energy" sources. Data sources and the calculation methodology used to generate Figure 2 and Figure 3 are described in Appendix B . As indicated in Figure 2 , some states may be better positioned than others to comply with a Clean Energy Standard, with some states already exceeding the 80% goal for 2035 and other states generating a relatively small percentage of electricity from qualified clean energy sources. Previously proposed CES legislation has typically applied to electric utilities and has been based on the amount of electricity sold to consumers. The same data used to create Figure 2 were used to create the map shown in Figure 3 . This map illustrates potential regional differences associated with CES compliance, based on existing electricity generation sources. This map does not provide utility-level percentages, which could be the basis for CES implementation. Information provided in this report does not provide specifics at the utility level and does not represent the total amount of electricity sales to consumers. Such level of analysis is beyond the scope of this report. Nevertheless, the information presented here does illustrate generation profile differences among the U.S. states and may be useful as a baseline assessment of state and regional differences associated with CES legislation. In evaluating possible Clean Energy Standard legislation, policy considerations might include the following. President Obama's CES proposal states that 40% of U.S. electricity is generated from "clean energy" sources. However, as illustrated in Figure 2 and Figure 3 , each state has a different generation mix that results in a wide range of initial baseline compliance levels. Allowing existing "clean energy" generation to count toward the standard would enable each state to receive credit for its respective "clean energy" capacity. However, allowing existing generation to count toward a CES puts some states in a better position when compared to other states, as indicated in Figure 3 . Under this scenario, and depending on specifics of the proposed legislation, some states may experience some degree of wealth transfer as a result of purchasing CES credits from states with an excess of qualified "clean energy" electricity generation. Alternatively, Congress might decide to only allow incremental generation capacity added after the policy is enacted to count towards CES compliance. If such a policy were adopted, Congress may choose to structure the CES in a different manner than that proposed by President Obama. For instance, President Obama's 80% of total electricity generation by 2035 would be much more difficult to achieve if existing qualified generation sources are not eligible. As discussed earlier, alternative compliance payments (ACPs) provide utility companies with some degree of flexibility associated with CES compliance. In essence, ACPs act as a cost ceiling for complying with a Clean Energy Standard. Setting the value of ACPs can be complicated by factors such as the cost of electricity generation, transmission availability, regional "clean energy" resources, and finance costs for advanced technology. As a result, setting a single ACP that encourages "clean energy" electricity generation for the entire country can be difficult and challenging. An ACP set too low may simply raise rate payer electricity costs and encourage minimum amount of "clean energy" generation. In contrast, an ACP set too high may not be acceptable for states that are not endowed with "clean energy" resources. Evaluating the levelized cost of electricity (LCOE) of qualified "clean energy" generation options may be a way to begin estimating an ACP. However, since each region's "clean energy" resource base varies (solar in the southwest versus the northeast) and each technology may have different financial requirements due to real or perceived levels of technology risk, an LCOE-based analysis of ACP levels may, at best, only produce a reasonable range for the ACP. Setting a single, absolute ACP value that will be perceived as fair and equitable for all regions, and for all technologies, may be a challenging endeavor. Three of the four legislative proposals analyzed for this paper exempt certain utilities from complying with the respectively proposed Clean/Renewable Energy Standard. Two proposals exempt utilities that sell less than 4 million megawatt hours and one proposal exempts utilities that sell less than 1 million megawatt hours. If Congress were to choose to exempt certain utilities from compliance with the proposed standard, an analysis of how much electricity generation is represented by exempt utilities as a percentage of total U.S. electricity generation may be useful. CRS analyzed EIA data to estimate two items: (1) the number of utility companies that would be required to comply with a CES, and (2) the amount of electricity sales represented by non-exempt utility companies. The analysis assumed that utility companies selling less than 4 million megawatt-hours per year are exempt. Results from this analysis are provided in Figure 4 . According to the analysis summary in Figure 4 , 149 of more than 3,000 utility companies would have to comply with the CES based on the assumed exemption criteria. These 149 utility companies represent 77% of annual U.S. electricity sales. Including an exemption as part of a CES policy may prompt consideration how to effectively achieve a CES target given that a portion of U.S. electricity might be exempted from compliance. Based on the above analysis, non-exempt utilities could be required to generate more (greater than 80% by 2035 for example) electricity from "clean energy" sources in order to meet an 80%-by-2035 goal, assuming that was a goal established through legislation. All four proposals from the 111 th Congress include interim targets for CES implementation. These interim milestones serve as a means to phase in "clean energy" over a period of time. Figure 5 illustrates three possible phase-in approaches. First, the linear approach, which might consist of annual increases, may be advantageous to renewable energy and natural gas generation since development timelines for these sources are relatively short. However, nuclear and "clean coal" may be at a disadvantage under this scenario due to long development timelines (nuclear) and technology maturity/commercialization ("clean coal"). Second, the back-end loaded approach, where targets are low in the beginning years of a policy and then increase steeply in later years, may be beneficial for nuclear and "clean-coal" generation as it allows more time for development and commercialization. However, under this scenario if beginning year targets are too low some may argue that this approach does not result in demand large enough to incentivize investment in new renewable and natural gas projects. Finally, the stepped approach might include targets and goals that increase every three to five years (example: 45% by 2015, 50% by 2020, etc.). This approach offers an alternative phase-in option but may result in flurried periods of project development followed by periods of stagnant, or non-existent, market growth. Manufacturing and job sustainability may be challenged under a stepped scenario. President Obama's proposal allows a number of "clean energy" generation sources to qualify for CES compliance. This approach provides utility companies with some degree of flexibility when choosing among "clean energy" generation alternatives and it allows nuclear, coal generation with carbon capture and storage, and natural gas to compete directly with renewable (wind, solar, geothermal, etc.) generation. Some may advocate a preference for renewable energy in the form of a specific percentage of generation dedicated to renewable energy or through a multi-tiered CES credit approach that provides more credit value for electricity generated from renewable sources. Others may argue that a CES should include a broad array of qualified electricity generation sources and state/regional markets should determine the generation mix selected for CES compliance. Qualified "clean energy" sources described in President Obama's CES proposal include (1) renewable electricity, (2) nuclear power, and (3) partial credits for clean coal and efficient natural gas. The proposal indicates that "clean coal" refers to coal-based electricity generation that includes carbon capture and sequestration and "efficient natural gas" refers to natural gas combined cycle (NGCC) electricity generation. Based on the choices of qualified sources, it appears that a "clean energy" objective is to encourage the development of low-carbon power sources. If this is the case, some may argue that supercritical and ultra-supercritical pulverized coal generation should qualify for partial credits since the carbon dioxide emissions profile is less than conventional subcritical pulverized coal generation. Sorting out qualified "clean energy" sources and determining the amount of whole and partial credits awarded for various electricity generation types could warrant further analysis in consideration of a federal Clean Energy Standard. Other policy considerations may acquire increased levels of importance warranting further analysis and evaluation. Such issues include: 1. Transmission requirements and how to allocate associated costs? 2. Which federal agency should have responsibility for implementing and managing a federal CES? 3. What should be the guidelines for credit trading under a CES policy? 4. How might a federal CES affect other economic sectors, such as coal and coal electricity generation? 5. How should energy efficiency be treated under a federal CES? 6. How might a CES align and interact with renewable portfolio standards currently established in 29 states, DC, and Puerto Rico? On March 21, 2011, the Senate Energy and Natural Resources committee released a Clean Energy Standard white paper. This white paper solicits feedback on 6 broad policy design questions along with 36 clarifying questions. The six broad design questions listed in the white paper are (1) What should be the threshold for inclusion in the new program? (2) What resources should qualify as "clean energy"? (3) How should the crediting system and timetables be designed? (4) How will a CES affect deployment of specific technologies? (5) How should Alternative Compliance Payments, regional costs, and consumer protections be addressed? (6) How would a CES interact with other policies? Appendix A. Comparative Analysis of Selected Clean Energy Standards Proposed During the 111 th Congress Appendix B. State-Level Baseline Compliance Calculation Methodology Data Sources Two EIA data sources were used to perform the baseline CES compliance assessment: 1. Electric Power Annual 2009--Data Tables: 1990-2009 Net Generation by State by Type of Producer by Energy Source (EPA 2009). 2. 2009: EIA-923 January-December Final, Nonutility Energy Balance and Annual Environmental Information Data (EIA-923). Methodology Calculating the generation mix for each state started with data from EPA 2009, which provides information regarding state-by-state electricity generation. A pivot table was created to organize electricity generation data by state and by fuel source. However, the EPA 2009 data do not provide the detail necessary to distinguish between natural gas combined cycle (NGCC) generation and other natural gas generation technologies. As a result, EIA-923 data were used to extract NGCC generation figures. With electricity generation from NGCC power plants now available, the pivot table from the EPA 2009 was modified to include NGCC generation and "Other Natural Gas" generation. To be consistent with President Obama's Clean Energy Standard proposal, electricity generation sources were categorized as either "Clean Energy Generation" or "Other Generation." Energy sources categorized as "Clean Energy Generation" include: Geothermal Hydroelectric Conventional Natural Gas Combined Cycle (50% of generation) Nuclear Biomass Pumped Storage Solar Thermal and Photovoltaic Wind Wood and Wood-derived fuels Energy sources categorized as "Other Generation" include: Coal Natural Gas Combined Cycle (50% of generation) Natural Gas Other Other Gases Petroleum Other In order to calculate the percent of generation from sources that qualify as "clean energy," the sum of "Clean Energy Generation" was divided by the total amount of generation. The same calculation was performed for "Other Generation." The pivot tables allowed this calculation to be done for the entire country as well as for each state.

During his State of the Union speech on January 25, 2011, President Obama announced an energy goal for the country: "By 2035, 80% of America's electricity will come from clean energy sources." The White House, on February 3, 2011, released a Clean Energy Standard (CES) framework focused on U.S. electricity generation. The framework describes the fundamental goals and objectives of such a policy to include doubling clean electricity, sustaining and creating jobs, and driving clean energy innovation. Congress, if it chooses to take up CES legislation, will likely sort through and evaluate a number of policy options that might be considered during the formulation of a federal Clean Energy Standard policy. Understanding previous CES proposals, the Administration's CES policy framework, state-level baseline CES compliance, and policy considerations might assist a CES debate during the 112th Congress. These areas are the focus of this report. CES and related concepts have been debated for more than a decade and several Clean/Renewable Energy Standard proposals were offered during the 111th Congress, although none became law. The scope of this report includes a comparative analysis of four proposals of the 111th Congress: S. 20, Clean Energy Standard Act of 2010; S. 3464, Practical Energy and Climate Plan Act of 2010; S. 3813, Renewable Electricity Promotion Act of 2010; and a substitute amendment offered for H.R. 2454, American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009. This analysis, which illustrates commonality and key differences among the legislative proposals, includes an assessment of each bill based on a uniform set of design elements. While the proposals considered generally agree on the definition of "renewable energy" (wind, solar, geothermal, etc.), they differ on certain policy aspects including (1) base quantities of electricity, (2) target/goal for the standard, and (3) alternative compliance payments, among others. The Administration's proposal states that 40% of delivered electricity is generated from "clean energy" sources today and 80% should be generated from clean energy sources by 2035. Clean energy sources are defined to include (1) renewable energy, (2) nuclear power, and (3) partial credits for clean coal and efficient natural gas. However, the amount of partial credits received by clean coal and efficient natural gas generation is not explicitly defined. CRS analysis of 2009 electricity generation data from the Energy Information Administration (EIA) also suggested that 40% of electricity generated could be considered clean energy if renewable energy, nuclear power, and 50% of electricity generated from natural gas combined cycle (NGCC) power plants are classified as clean energy. Further analysis of EIA data assessed the amount of clean energy generation in each state. This work revealed differences among the states regarding existing clean energy generation, with some states currently generating more than 80% of electricity from such clean energy sources and other states generating less than 5%. Finally, the Clean Energy Standard debate involves several policy design options that Congress might consider, including (1) Should the policy credit existing and/or incremental clean energy generation? (2) What should be the value of alternative compliance payments? (3) Should utility companies of a certain size be exempt? (4) Should preference be given to renewable energy generation? and (5) Which generation sources would qualify as clean energy? These, and other, policy options are presented and discussed in this report.

Congress has been interested in the use of year-round schools for several decades. In April 1972, the House of Representatives, General Subcommittee on Education of the Committee on Education and Labor held a hearing on the "year-round school concept." Since that time, various bills have been introduced to support the use of year-round schools. This report provides background information about year-round schools, specifically what they are, how prevalent they are today, state policies on year-round schooling, what recent research says about year-round schooling, and the arguments for and against this approach. In general, year-round schools are schools that reorganize a traditional school year without allowing for any extended breaks in instruction (e.g., 10 week summer vacation). Rather, the days usually included in summer break are redistributed to create regular breaks throughout the year. This is sometimes referred to as operating on a "balanced calendar." According to the National Association for Year-Round Education (NAYRE), schools primarily offer year-round education on a single track or multi-track. Schools using a single track approach to year-round education provide a balanced calendar for instruction in which summer vacation is shortened with additional vacation days added throughout the school year to create breaks from instruction, which are sometimes referred to as "intersessions." Intersessions may be used by the school to provide remediation or enrichment activities for students. Schools using a single track approach to year-round education often structure their school calendar in one of three ways: 1. 45-15 calendar: 45 days (9 weeks) of instruction, followed by 15 days (3 weeks) of vacation/intersession; 2. 60-20 calendar: 60 days (12 weeks) of instruction, followed by 20 days (4 weeks) of vacation/intercession; or 3. 45-10 calendar: 45 days (9 weeks) of instruction, followed by 10 days (2 weeks) of vacation/intersession. Multi-track year-round education is often used to assist schools that are dealing with capacity issues. By establishing a multi-track system, a school district may be able to avoid having to build a new school or temporary structures (e.g., portable classrooms). A multi-track system is implemented by dividing teachers and students into tracks or groups of similar sizes that each has its own schedule. Students and teachers in a given track follow the same schedule, are in school at the same time, and are on vacation at the same time. Common multi-track calendars include 4 tracks operating on a 45-15 calendar (45 days of instruction, 15 days of vacation/intersession), 60-20 calendar, or 90-30 calendar. A 60-15 calendar is generally used in schools with 5 tracks. For example, if a school that could accommodate 750 students had 1,000 students enrolled, it could divide the students into tracks or groups of 250 students (i.e., 4 tracks). The school could then have three tracks at school at any given time and one track on vacation or intersession. This could enable the school to meet student demand without necessitating expansion of the school facility. While year-round schools have existed in some form since the early 1900s, there was substantial growth in the number of year-round schools from the mid-1980s to 2000. In 1985, there were 410 year-round public schools, serving about 350,000 students. By 2000, the number of year-round public schools had grown to 3,059 schools, serving almost 2.2 million students in 45 states. The number of year-round public schools dropped to 2,936 public schools, serving 2.1 million students, by the 2006-2007 school year. Based on data available from the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) for the 2011-2012 school year (most recent data available), over the last several years there has again been growth in the number of public schools operating as year-round schools. During the 2011-2012 school year, there were 3,700 public schools across the nation operating on a year-round calendar cycle. This accounted for 4.1% of all public schools in the country. The highest concentration of schools operating on a year-round calendar cycle was in the South (40.5%), followed by the West (24.3%) with equal proportions of these schools in the Northeast and Midwest (16.2% in each region). The majority of schools operating on a year-round calendar cycle are traditional public schools (3,300 schools) compared with 400 charter schools operating on a year-round calendar cycle. In terms of school level, over half (57%, 2,100 schools) of all schools operating on a year-round calendar cycle are elementary schools, 900 are secondary schools, and 600 are combined elementary and secondary schools. Most schools operating on a year-round calendar schedule enroll 200 or more students. In addition, 47% of all schools operating on a year-round calendar schedule had 75% or more of their students eligible for free or reduced-price lunch. Nearly 60% of schools operating on a year-round calendar schedule had at least 50% of their students eligible for free or reduced-price lunch. In 2011, most states required public schools to provide 180 days of instruction each school year. The average number of instructional days per school year for schools with year-round calendar cycles was 189 days during the 2011-2012 school year. This number varied by region of the country, type of school (traditional or charter), school level, and enrollment. The most recent data on state policies on year-round schools were compiled by the Council of Chief State School Officers (CCSSO) for the 2008 school year. Of the states for which information was available, 17 states had a policy on year-round schools. In addition, 30 states reported that they had school districts in their states with year-round schools. Some states specified the number of districts within the state that had year-round schools operating. Of the states reporting a specific number of districts, most reported that five or fewer school districts had year-round schools. However, in some states, the number of school districts with year-round schools constituted a majority of the school districts in the state (e.g., Delaware). As part of their survey responses, some states provided their definitions of year-round schools. These definitions are varied as illustrated below. Arkansas: A year-round school must meet the state requirement for the minimum number of school days between July 1 and June 30 of each school year and have no vacation, including summer vacation, last more than six weeks. Oklahoma: A year-round school must offer at least 10 months of 4 weeks during which the school is in session and instruction is offered for not less than 180 days. Texas: A year-round school must operate during the "greater part" of 10 months and up to 12 calendar months of the year. The research on the extent to which year-round schools affect student achievement has generally been found to be inconclusive and lacking in methodological rigor. For example, in reviewing the literature on the effects of year-round schooling on student achievement, Cooper et al. concluded that "a truly credible study of modified calendar effects has yet to be conducted." Wu and Stone reached similar conclusions and noted that while "there is a general consensus that [year-round school] has no effect or a small positive effect on student performance, the methodology of many studies had left copious room for more rigorous verification." Their own study of whether year-round schools in California had an effect upon the outcome and growth of schools' Academic Performance Index (API) scores used more sophisticated statistical analyses than prior studies and found that year-round schools failed to affect either measure. Cooper et al. in their meta-analysis of studies on year-round school found that the "cumulative results of past studies is so close to a chance outcome that the argument that poor designs have led to random findings remain plausible." They also note, however, that there is some evidence that suggests that year-round schools may improve academic achievement for economically disadvantaged students. A second aspect of year-round education that researchers have sought to examine is whether year-round schools affect the cost of education. Based on a review of the literature conducted by the Education Commission of the States (ECS), schools operating on multi-tracks experience reduced capital expenditures (i.e., facility costs), but do not tend to achieve savings with respect to operating expenditures (e.g., personnel costs, electricity). However, the savings from capital expenditures outweigh any increases in operating expenditures. It is less clear, however, whether schools operating on a single-track experience cost savings. A more recent study of year-round schools in one setting, Clark County, NV, generally supports the conclusions noted by ECS, finding significant cost savings as a result of the implementation of multitrack year-round schools. The researchers concluded that savings were largest with respect to real estate and operations. Based on reviews of the literature conducted by Cooper et al., Wu and Stone, and ECS, as well as arguments put forth by proponents of year-round education, including NAYRE, and opponents of year-round education, including the Coalition for the Traditional School Year and Summer Matters, this section provides an overview of some of the arguments made in favor of or against year-round education. The use of year-round schools can prevent the loss of learning over the summer, which may be a particular problem for children with special educational needs (e.g., English learners) and addresses the uneven effects of the summer break on students based on socioeconomic status. Using a modified school calendar creates opportunities to provide remediation and enrichment activities to students during the school year rather than waiting to provide these activities during summer school. Proponents of year-round education often argue that the use of a balanced calendar increases student achievement, but as previously discussed, the research in this area is inconclusive. There may be cost savings realized when operating multitrack year-round schools, particularly with respect to capital expenditures. The use of a balanced calendar could help to prevent staff burnout by providing more frequent breaks for staff. In addition, teachers could choose to substitute teach during breaks to earn additional money while providing students with a teacher with greater knowledge of the curriculum than a substitute teacher that did not regularly work at the school. The initial implementation of a year-round school program may be costly due to a variety of factors including preparing a facility to serve students for more months during a calendar year. Opponents of year-round education note that while year-round schools may not have a negative effect on education, the data on its positive effects are inconclusive. Instead of changing school calendars, they argue that the focus should be on issues such as effective teaching and parent involvement. Operating on a year-round schedule may require paying more staff (e.g., administrative staff and maintenance workers) on 12-month contracts instead of 9-month contracts, thereby increasing operational costs. In addition, staff may experience burnout, particularly principals who are managing buildings that are now occupied by students for the entire calendar year. Families may find it difficult to have their children on different schedules if year-round schooling is not offered districtwide or if their children end up on different tracks in a multitrack school. There may be a lack of opportunities for older students to have summer jobs, and there may be complications related to student participation in extracurricular activities over breaks. Concerns are also raised about year-round schooling by organizations (e.g., amusement parks, campgrounds) that could potentially be adversely affected economically by a change in the school calendar. It may be difficult to conduct large maintenance projects and may require doing routine maintenance at night or on the weekends, which may incur overtime costs. Several disadvantages related specifically to multitrack year-round schools are cited, including possible difficulties in offering remediation if space is an issue, lack of convenience for teachers who may not have a regular classroom in which to keep their teaching materials, and disrupted communication and training among staff as a portion of the staff is always out of the school.

In general, year-round schools are schools that reorganize a traditional school year without allowing for any extended breaks in instruction (e.g., 10-week summer vacation). Rather, the days usually included in summer break are redistributed to create regular breaks throughout the year. While year-round schools have existed to some extent since the early 1900s, there was substantial growth in the number of year-round schools from the mid-1980s to 2000. In 1985, there were 410 year-round public schools, serving about 350,000 students. By 2000, the number of year-round public schools had grown to 3,059 schools, serving almost 2.2 million students in 45 states. During the 2011-2012 school year, there were 3,700 public schools across the nation operating on a year-round calendar cycle. The research on the extent to which year-round schools affect student achievement has generally been found to be inconclusive and lacking in methodological rigor. There is some consensus that year-round schooling has no effect or a small positive effect on student performance; however, the quality of the studies that led to these findings has been questioned. There are various pros and cons raised in relation to year-round schools. Among the arguments in favor of this calendar approach are stemming the loss of learning over the summer, creating opportunities during the school year to provide remediation and enrichment activities, and cost savings. Among the arguments against the year-round school approach are the costs associated with the initial implementation of a year-round school, the greater need to focus instead on other aspects of education (e.g., effective teaching and parent involvement), scheduling difficulties for families if year-round schools are not implemented districtwide or if their children end up on different schedules within the same school; the lack of opportunities for older students to have summer jobs; and issues related to student participation in extracurricular activities while on breaks.

RS21868 -- U.S.-Dominican Republic Free-Trade Agreement Updated January 3, 2005 On August 5, 2004, representatives of the United States, the Dominican Republic, and five Central American countries signed a regional free-trade agreement(DR-CAFTA) among their countries. The United States first had concluded a free-trade agreement with the CentralAmerican countries (CAFTA) in January2004. Later, on March 15, 2004, the United States and the Dominican Republic announced that they had concludeda bilateral trade agreement that from theoutset of negotiations was intended to be integrated into (or "docked onto") CAFTA. (8) The USTR described the outcome at the time: "With its integration intothe CAFTA, the Dominican Republic has assumed the same set of obligations and commitments as Costa Rica,Honduras, El Salvador, Guatemala, andNicaragua. As with the Central American countries, individual market access schedules were negotiated with theDominican Republic for goods, agriculture,services, investment and government procurement." (9) Under the agreement reached with the Dominican Republic FTA, 80% of U.S. exports of non-agricultural products would become duty-free immediately, withremaining duties phased out over 10 years. (10) U.S.sectors that would have immediate duty-free access include information technology products, agriculturaland construction equipment, paper products, wood, pharmaceuticals, and medical and scientific equipment. U.S.autos and auto parts would be able to enterduty-free after five years. More than half of U.S. agricultural exports would receive duty-free treatment immediately, including corn, cotton, wheat, soybeans, many fruits and vegetables,and processed food products. Tariffs would be phased out on most agricultural products within 15 years and on allagricultural products by 20 years. Beef,pork, poultry, rice, and dairy products would become duty-free under tariff-rate quotas. Most U.S. agriculturalproducers support the agreement. For example,the U.S. Grains Council announced that, in partnership with the National Grain Sorghum Producers and the NationalCorn Growers Association, it"...applaud[s] the successful negotiations..." of the FTA. (11) An official with the Grocery Manufacturers of America said the Dominican Republic "'...is a greatmarket for food, agriculture, and beverage products,'...[and] an excellent potential market for U.S. beer, snack foods,pet food, nuts, and breakfast cereals." (12) The sugar provisions in the agreement with the Dominican Republic do not seem as controversial as those reached with the Central American countries. Thecontinuing precedent of market-opening, however, worries the U.S. sugar industry. The tariff-rate quota (TRQ) onsugar for the Dominican Republic wouldincrease by 10,000 metric tons the first year, increase by 2% annually for years 2-15, then increase by a smalleramount in perpetuity. The tariff on above-quotaimports would not change. Dale Hathaway, a senior fellow at the National Center for Food and Agriculture Policy,said the increase in the DominicanRepublic's cap on sugar was "not significant." (13) The U.S. Sugar Industry Group argued, however, that more imports from the Dominican Republic couldjeopardize the stability of domestic prices, which would help neither country. (14) Textiles and apparel from the Dominican Republic would become duty-free and quota-free immediately, if they met the agreement's rules of origin, whichinclude general rules for all signatories and specific rules for each country. As with the other CAFTA parties, theDominican Republic would be allowed to useinputs also from Mexico or Canada to meet cumulation requirements for apparel or clothing. The American TextileManufacturers Institute, which representsU.S. textile producers, said that CAFTA could lead to reduced U.S. employment in the textile industry. (15) The American Apparel and Footwear Association(AAFA), which represents the North American apparel industry and its suppliers, said however, "...because manyU.S. companies maintain production-sharingrelationships with the [Dominican Republic], swift implementation of the [FTA] will likely have a positiveeconomic impact in the United States...." (16) An unresolved issue would be apparel made under co-production arrangements with Haiti. CBTPA benefits expire the earlier of: (1) September 30, 2008; or(2) the date on which the FTAA or another FTA as specified enters into force between the United States and aCBTPA beneficiary country ( P.L. 106-200 ,Section 211). Thus, if the FTA between the Dominican Republic and the United States enters into force, articlesco-produced by Haiti and the DominicanRepublic might no longer qualify under CBTPA. The Administration said it would work with the Congress so thatHaiti could continue to be eligible underCBTPA for apparel with inputs from the Dominican Republic. (17) The Dominican Republic signed on to the principles and standards under CAFTA's chapter on intellectual property rights with its own transition periods formeeting certain obligations. In late 2003, the International Intellectual Property Alliance (IIPA), a coalition of tradeassociations representing copyrightindustries, called broadcast piracy in the Dominican Republic "...the worst in the entire hemisphere." (18) As part of the bilateral FTA, the DominicanRepublicsigned two side documents committing it to act against broadcast or cable piracy. U.S. industry advisors want theU.S. Government to monitor vigilantly theimplementation of the side documents and the agreement. (19) The USTR also expressed uncertainty, saying the FTA "...will require the Dominican Republic toupgrade considerably the level of intellectual property protection...." (20) On government procurement, cross-border trade in services, financial services, and investment, the Dominican Republic signed on to the general principles ofeach CAFTA chapter but negotiated its own list of specific concessions. For example, in the chapter on governmentprocurement, all signatories, including theDominican Republic, would accept general principles such as national treatment and transparency, but eachsignatory would observe these principles only withrespect to its own negotiated list of agencies and its own thresholds for contract amounts covered by the chapter. Similarly, the chapters on cross-border tradein services, financial services, and investment include general principles such as nondiscriminatory treatment, butthey have their own negotiated lists ofservices that are exempt from the general principles. The Dominican Republic acceded to almost all of the other provisions concluded in the CAFTA, including the chapters on labor and the environment. Underthose chapters, CAFTA parties agreed they would enforce their domestic labor and environmental laws but wouldretain the right to exercise discretionregarding investigations and related matters. They recognized that it is inappropriate to weaken labor andenvironmental laws to encourage trade, and agreed toensure access to judicial proceedings. The text would establish governmental labor and environmental committeesto oversee implementation, and other bodieswould do further cooperative work. The labor and environment chapters link to a dispute process under which, ifa party wins a labor or environmentalcomplaint, the losing party could be assessed monetary damages. The U.S. Trade Representative says that the FTA with the Dominican Republic "...will ensure effective enforcement of domestic labor laws, establish acooperative program to improve labor laws and enforcement, and build the capacity of the Dominican Republic tomonitor and enforce labor rights." (21) TheU.S. Department of State, however, has recognized that there have been widespread problems with putting workerrights into practice, even though theConstitution of the Dominican Republic and its 1992 Labor Code provide for broad worker rights. (22) Representatives of the AFL-CIO and theDominican laborgroup Consejo Nacional de Unidad Sindical (CNUS) have called for further reform of Dominican laws, effectiveenforcement provisions that allow for tradesanctions, and protection against trade law violations. (23) Human Rights Watch reports that women "...who become pregnant are routinely fired from jobsandshut out of employment in the Dominican Republic's export-processing sector," and such abuse of workers wouldbe allowed to continue, because CAFTAdoes not prohibit workplace discrimination. (24) Workers' groups also fear the loss of protections under current U.S. unilateral trade programs such as CBI. (25) The Dominican Republic also acceded to other chapters of CAFTA, including dispute settlement, trade remedies, electronic commerce, andtelecommunications. These chapters would establish a process for resolving disputes, set out rules for safeguards,keep transmission of digital productsduty-free, and ensure certain standards affecting suppliers of telecommunications services. There are also chapterson customs administration, technical barriersto trade, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, and transparency of laws and regulations. The Agreement wouldestablish a Committee on Trade CapacityBuilding. In the last months of 2004, a newly passed tax in the Dominican Republic made that country's participation in the FTA tenuous. In September 2004, theDominican Republic enacted a revenue measure to meet conditions for a loan by the International Monetary Fund. The revenue measure included a 25%increase in the tax on soft drinks with high-fructose corn syrup. U.S. trade officials warned that the 25% taxthreatened the FTA that the two countries justsigned. Senate Finance Committee Chairman Grassley warned that the tax would jeopardize Senate support for theagreement. (26) Representative Rangel,Ranking Member on the House Ways and Means Committee, however, called the Administration's threat to dropthe Dominican Republic from the tradeagreement "inappropriate and unfortunate." (27) TheDominican Republic responded to the opposition by repealing the 25% tax in the last days of 2004. It is uncertain when the Administration might submit implementing legislation for DR-CAFTA to the Congress. Regardless of when legislation might beintroduced, it is expected to be controversial.

On March 15, 2004, the United States and the Dominican Republic concluded a draftfree-trade agreement tointegrate the Dominican Republic into the earlier signed Central American Free-Trade Agreement (CAFTA). Thefinal agreement (DR-CAFTA) was signed byall parties on August 5, 2004. The Dominican Republic would have its own market access provisions, but wouldaccept the rest of the CAFTA framework. Legislation to implement DR-CAFTA might be considered in the 109th Congress. This report willbe updated as developments occur.

Congress has expressed interest in federal programs and activities addressing tsunami detection, warning, research, education, and outreach because of the tsunami hazard to the United States, particularly to Pacific Northwest, Northern California, Alaska, and Hawaii, as well as regions of the Caribbean and Atlantic coastline. The Japanese tsunami of March 11, 2011, illustrated the potential for damage and loss of life posed by a potential tsunami in the Pacific. A fault system off the northwestern United States, called the Cascadia Subduction Zone, is similar to the fault system responsible for the 2011 Japanese tsunami disaster. Oregon, Washington, Northern California, Hawaii, and Alaska all face some risk if the Cascadia fault ruptures. Congress passed the Tsunami Warning, Education, and Research Act of 2017 as Title V of P.L. 115-25 , on April 4, 2017; President Trump signed the bill into law as P.L. 115-25 on April 18, 2017. Title V of P.L. 115-25 amends P.L. 109-479 , Title VIII, the Tsunami Warning and Education Act, which was enacted on January 12, 2007. The new law does not make fundamental changes to the federal government's tsunami activities, which include tsunami forecasting and warning, mitigation, and research, as well as other tsunami-related activities. However, it does broaden the purposes of the federal activities, increasing focus on tsunami research, promoting community resilience to tsunami hazards, and refining requirements for standards and guidelines to improve education and outreach activities and tsunami mapping and modeling. The new law authorizes appropriations of $25.8 million per year for FY2016 through FY2021. An ongoing question for the U.S. tsunami program and related activities is whether Congress will appropriate funds matching the amounts authorized in P.L. 115-25 to carry out the existing program as well as the new activities and priorities in the law. Another challenge is how Congress should evaluate the effectiveness of the program. A perennial issue for NOAA is keeping its constellation of Deep-Ocean Assessment and Reporting of Tsunami (DART) buoys operational, and the new law specifies a goal of keeping at least 80% of the buoy system operational at all times. More generally, because Title V of P.L. 115-25 adds an emphasis on research throughout the program, a future question is how well research results are incorporated into tsunami resilience, education, warning, and other activities. Also, damaging tsunami events are relatively rare for the United States, so it is difficult to assess the overall effect of tsunami program activities on an annual basis. If a large and damaging tsunami were to strike the United States, an additional challenge for Congress would be to sort out how effective the program was at reducing the amount of damage and the number of injuries and fatalities. In addition, the bill repeals P.L. 109-424 , the Tsunami Warning and Education Act, also passed by the 109 th Congress. P.L. 109-424 was signed into law by President George W. Bush on December 20, 2006, and is nearly identical to P.L. 109-479 . P.L. 115-25 removes any potential for ambiguity by repealing one of the existing laws. This report provides a section-by-section comparison of text quoted from P.L. 115-25 and P.L. 109-479 , shown in Table 1 , with some brief comments from the Congressional Research Service (CRS) pointing out selected changes and how those changes affect P.L. 109-479 and the tsunami activities it authorized (far right column of Table 1 ). The table is organized so that the same or most similar sections, and parts of sections, are in the same row or rows. The CRS comments generally address the sections or parts of sections in the same row of the table.

The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's (NOAA's) National Weather Service (NWS) manages two tsunami warning centers, which monitor, detect, and issue warnings for tsunamis. The NWS operates the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center (PTWC) at Ford Island, HI, and the National Tsunami Warning Center (NTWC) at Palmer, AK. The tsunami warning centers monitor and evaluate data from seismic networks and determine if a tsunami is likely based on the location, magnitude, and depth of an earthquake. The centers monitor relevant water-level data, typically with tide-level gauges, and data from NOAA's network of Deep-Ocean Assessment and Reporting of Tsunami (DART) detection buoys to confirm that a tsunami has been generated or to cancel any warnings if no tsunami is detected. In the 114th Congress, the House passed legislation amending U.S. tsunami activities (H.R. 34) and the Senate passed similar legislation (Title V of H.R. 1561). However, the 114th Congress did not enact a final version of the legislation. The 115th Congress passed the Tsunami Warning, Education, and Research Act of 2017 as Title V of P.L. 115-25 on April 4, 2017. The bill was signed into law on April 18, 2017. Title V of P.L. 115-25 amended P.L. 109-479, Title VIII, the Tsunami Warning and Education Act, which was enacted on January 12, 2007. The new law does not make fundamental changes to the federal government's tsunami activities, which include tsunami forecasting and warning, mitigation, and research, as well as other tsunami-related activities. However, it does broaden the purposes of the federal activities, increasing focus on tsunami research, promoting community resilience to tsunami hazards, and refining requirements for standards and guidelines to improve education and outreach activities as well as tsunami mapping and modeling. The new law authorizes appropriations of $25.8 million per year from FY2016 through FY2021. An ongoing question for the U.S. tsunami program and related activities is whether Congress will appropriate funds matching the amounts authorized in P.L. 115-25 for NOAA to carry out the tsunami program. Another challenge is how Congress should evaluate the effectiveness of the program. Because Title V of P.L. 115-25 adds an emphasis on research, a future question is how well research results are incorporated into tsunami resilience, education, warning, and other activities. More generally, if a large and damaging tsunami were to strike the United States, an additional challenge for Congress would be to sort out how effective the program was at reducing the amount of damage and the number of injuries and fatalities. This report compares the enacted legislation text with P.L. 109-479, Title VIII, section by section, with brief comments on selected comparisons about how changes in P.L. 115-25, Title V, affect P.L. 109-479, Title VIII, and the authorized tsunami activities.

T hree agencies in the Department of the Interior (DOI) share responsibility for managing the nation's ocean energy resources, which cover approximately 1.7 billion acres on the U.S. outer continental shelf (OCS). The Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM) administers offshore energy leasing; the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE) oversees offshore operational safety and environmental responsibility; and the Office of Natural Resources Revenue (ONRR) manages public revenues from federally regulated offshore and onshore energy projects. BOEM, BSEE, and ONRR receive appropriations in the annual Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies appropriations bill. Aggregate and program-level appropriations shape the resources available to the agencies for conventional and renewable energy leasing, inspections, spill preparedness, environmental enforcement, planning, research, and revenue collection and disbursement, among others. This report discusses FY2017 appropriations for the three agencies, including the Obama Administration's funding request for each agency and subsequent congressional action. The 114 th Congress did not enact full-year Interior appropriations for FY2017. Continuing funds were provided through April 28, 2017, by two continuing resolutions (CRs; P.L. 114-223 and P.L. 114-254 ). The CRs generally provide funding at the FY2016 level, minus an across-the-board reduction of less than 1%. The 115 th Congress is faced with addressing the ocean energy agencies' appropriations for the remainder of FY2017. BOEM manages U.S. offshore oil and gas leasing, renewable energy development, and marine mineral leasing, with a mission to balance national interests in energy supply and environmental protection. BOEM's responsibilities include developing a five-year offshore oil and gas leasing program, managing oil and gas lease sales and marine mineral agreements, reviewing exploration and development plans, facilitating renewable energy development on the OCS, conducting resource evaluations and economic analysis, and performing environmental reviews, among others. BOEM's operations are funded both by discretionary appropriations under the agency's Ocean Energy Management account and by the authority to expend offsetting collections derived from a portion of OCS rental receipts and cost recovery fees. The initial discretionary appropriation for each fiscal year is reduced by the amount of eligible receipts and fees that are collected, so that the final amount appropriated to BOEM is the net of those collections. For FY2017, the Obama Administration requested total appropriations of $175.1 million for BOEM, of which $94.9 million would be derived from offsetting collections, for a net appropriation of $80.2 million ( Table 1 ). BOEM's total available funding under the request would be $4.3 million higher (+2.5%) than the FY2016 total. This reflects an increase of $6.0 million (+8.0%) in BOEM's net requested appropriation from Congress, along with BOEM's estimate of fewer offsetting collections than in FY2016 (1.7% less in offsetting collections). On July 14, 2016, the House passed its Interior appropriations bill, H.R. 5538 , with total appropriations of $169.3 million for BOEM, offset by the rental receipt and fee collections described above, for a net appropriation of $74.4 million. The House's total appropriation was $1.6 million less than the FY2016 enacted total and $5.8 million less than the Obama Administration's request. Comparing the net appropriations after offsets, the House's amount was $0.1 million more than the FY2016 enacted net appropriation and $5.8 million less than the request. On June 16, 2016, the Senate Appropriations Committee reported its Interior appropriations bill, S. 3068 . The Senate committee bill contained total appropriations of $169.6 million for BOEM, offset by the rental receipt and fee collections described above, for a net appropriation of $74.6 million. The total appropriation was $1.3 million less than the FY2016 enacted total and $5.6 million less than the Obama Administration's request. Comparing the net appropriations after offsets, the Senate committee amount was $0.4 million more than the FY2016 enacted net appropriation and $5.6 million less than the request. The 114 th Congress did not enact full-year Interior appropriations for FY2017, and continuing funds were provided through April 28, 2017, under the CRs ( P.L. 114-223 and P.L. 114-254 ). The CRs generally provide funding at the FY2016 level, minus an across-the-board reduction of less than 1%. BOEM's appropriations are contained in a single budget account, titled Ocean Energy Management. Within this account, the Conventional Energy budget activity funds development and administration of the agency's oil and gas leasing program, including the development of forward-looking five-year leasing plans. In November 2016, BOEM published its oil and gas leasing program for 2017-2022, which includes 1 lease sale in the Alaska region and 10 sales in the Gulf of Mexico. Appropriations for the Conventional Energy activity also go toward BOEM's administration of lease sales under the current oil and gas leasing program for 2012-2017. Other BOEM Conventional Energy activities include managing existing leases, reviewing exploration and development/production plans, administering risk management and financial responsibility programs, evaluating ocean resources, mapping the OCS, and administering the Marine Minerals Program, among others. A different budget activity under the Ocean Energy Management account, the Renewable Energy activity, supports BOEM's management of renewable ocean energy resources under Section 388 of P.L. 109-58 , the Energy Policy Act of 2005. Under this activity, BOEM has planned and conducted wind energy lease sales in the Atlantic and has issued 12 commercial wind energy leases offshore (in Delaware, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, and Virginia). The Block Island Wind Farm off of Rhode Island began regular operations in December 2016, marking the first commercial wind production in U.S. waters. BOEM has identified wind, wave, and ocean current energy as offering the greatest potential among renewables for OCS development in the foreseeable future, and it has issued research leases and grants for hydrokinetic energy research and testing projects under the Renewable Energy activity. Other responsibilities include data collection and stakeholder engagement related to renewable energy efforts. BOEM's Environmental Assessment budget activity (referred to in agency budget documents as Environmental Programs) supports BOEM's responsibilities for assessing the environmental impacts of ocean energy activities and providing environmental safeguards. BOEM coordinates with BSEE in managing OCS environmental programs. Under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), as well as the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA) and other statutes, BOEM must conduct environmental assessments of proposed ocean activities such as geological and geophysical (G&G) exploration, five-year leasing programs, lease sales, exploration plans, and development and production plans. For example, BOEM studied the environmental impacts of G&G seismic surveys in the Atlantic Ocean and approved such surveys in summer 2014. This budget activity also supports BOEM's collaboration with other research agencies to develop scientific knowledge of the OCS. BOEM's Executive Direction budget activity covers the agency's executive offices, such as the Office of the Director, the Office of Congressional Affairs, and others. The Obama Administration's FY2017 budget request for BOEM proposed funding changes in several areas. Some of the changes related to the agency's offsetting collections, which consist of a portion of OCS rental receipts and cost recovery fees that the agency is authorized to spend. BOEM anticipated an 11% ($4.5 million) decline in its offsetting rental receipts for FY2017, as compared with FY2016. BOEM attributed the anticipated decline to multiple factors, including a reduction in the number of leases being sold in the Gulf of Mexico because the area is maturing and because of the decline in world oil prices, as well as changes in lease terms and a resulting increase in lease relinquishments. Because "this decline in rental receipts is not meaningfully correlated to BOEM's workload," the agency requested that Congress provide direct appropriations of $4.1 million to offset the reduced rental receipts. BOEM further stated that "the projected decline in offsetting rental receipts is expected to continue to present a significant fiscal challenge in the coming years." In addition to requesting direct appropriations from Congress to make up for the projected reduction, the Obama Administration proposed to change the proportion of offsetting rental receipts that go to BOEM and BSEE. Whereas in earlier years BOEM received 65% of the offsetting rental receipts and BSEE 35%, the proposal for FY2017 was for BOEM to receive 70% and BSEE 30%. Separately, BOEM also anticipated a net reduction of $99,000 in its existing cost recovery fees for FY2017. However, BOEM proposed a new cost recovery fee for costs associated with the agency's Risk Management Program. BOEM estimated that this new fee would bring in revenues of $2.9 million for FY2017, so that the agency would have an overall gain of $2.8 million in cost recovery fees. The monies from the new fee would be used to fund continued implementation of the Risk Management Program, including adding staff with specializations in risk assessment and management. Both the House-passed and the Senate committee-reported bills reflected BOEM's anticipated changes to its offsetting collections, including BOEM's estimated reductions in rental receipts and cost recovery fees, its proposed new fee associated with the Risk Management Program, and the change in the proportion of offsetting rental receipts that would go to BOEM and BSEE. However, neither bill provided the level of direct appropriations that the agency had requested to make up for the reduction in offsetting collections. Apart from the changes to offsetting collections, BOEM proposed a number of other funding changes for FY2017: An increase of $1.6 million in the Conventional Energy budget activity to fund special pay authority to attract and retain skilled geophysicists, geologists, and petroleum engineers. The pay rates would accord with special salary rate tables issued for these positions by the Office of Personnel Management (OPM). An increase of $0.9 million across two budget activities (Conventional Energy and Environmental Assessment) for additional staffing. The agency stated that staffing increase was needed to accommodate a growth in the number of deepwater drilling plans BOEM must review and regulatory changes that add to the workload of the plan review process. An increase of $0.2 million across all activities for fixed costs, which are non-programmatic, mandatory costs such as those for employee pay and benefits, workers' compensation, and rent to the General Services Administration. A decrease of $0.4 million in funding for methane hydrate research under the Conventional Energy budget activity to accommodate the higher pay for skilled positions described above. A decrease of $0.4 million for data collection and outreach under the Renewable Energy budget activity, also to accommodate the higher pay for skilled positions described above. The House-passed and Senate committee-reported bills would have provided BOEM with less money in direct appropriations than the agency had requested. The House bill contained lower-than-requested totals for all of four of BOEM's budget activities (Renewable Energy, Conventional Energy, Environmental Assessment, and Executive Direction). The House Appropriations Committee did not specify in its report on the bill whether the specific requested increases were to be funded out of available totals. The Senate committee bill contained BOEM's requested amount for one budget activity--Renewable Energy--and less than requested for the other activities. For the Conventional Energy budget activity, the committee report stated that "the Committee concurs with the agency proposed reductions" but did not comment on the agency's requested increases. BSEE provides oversight of oil and gas exploration, development, and production on the OCS. Its mission is to promote safety, protect the environment, and conserve resources offshore through regulatory oversight and enforcement. BSEE's functions include issuing permits for oil and gas operations, inspecting facilities, developing regulations and standards, conducting research and collecting data on offshore safety, assessing technology, and overseeing industry oil spill prevention and readiness activities, among other responsibilities. Similar to BOEM, BSEE's operations are funded both by discretionary appropriations under the agency's Offshore Safety and Environmental Enforcement and Oil Spill Research accounts and by a portion of OCS rental receipts, cost recovery fees, and inspection fees, which are treated as offsetting collections in the BSEE budget. For FY2017, the Obama Administration requested total appropriations of $204.9 million for BSEE, of which $108.5 million would be derived from offsetting collections of OCS rental receipts, cost recovery fees, and inspection fees, for a net appropriation of $96.3 million (see Table 2 ). The total request was nearly level with the FY2016 enacted total, but because of an estimated drop in offsetting collections, the requested net appropriation was $7.9 million higher (+8.9%) than the FY2016 enacted net amount of $88.5 million. The House Interior appropriations bill, H.R. 5538 , contained total appropriations of $204.9 million for BSEE, offset by rental receipt and fee collections of $96.5 million. The bill also included a rescission of $20.0 million in unobligated balances, which functions as an offset to the total, yielding a net appropriation of $88.3 million. The House's total appropriation for BSEE was $0.2 million more than the FY2016 enacted total and the same as the Obama Administration's FY2016 request. Although the House's total BSEE appropriation was the same as the request, because of different estimations of offsets, its net appropriation was $8.0 million less th an the agency's request and $0.1 million less than the FY2016 enacted net appropriation. The Senate Appropriations Committee's Interior appropriations bill, S. 3068 , contained total appropriations of $204.7 million for BSEE, offset by rental receipt and fee collections of $96.5 million, as well as a $25 million rescission of unobligated balances, for a net appropriation of $83.1 million. The Senate Committee's total appropriation was the same as the FY2016 enacted total and $0.2 million less than the Obama Administration's request. The committee's net appropriation, after offsets, was $5.3 million less than the FY2016 enacted net appropriation and $13.2 million less than the request, reflecting different estimations of offsetting collections. The 114 th Congress did not enact full-year Interior appropriations for FY2017, and continuing funds were provided through April 28, 2017, under the CRs ( P.L. 114-223 and P.L. 114-254 ). The CRs generally provide funding at the FY2016 level, minus an across-the-board reduction of less than 1%. BSEE's funding is appropriated under two budget accounts, Offshore Safety and Environmental Enforcement (OSEE) and Oil Spill Research. Under the OSEE account, the Operations, Safety, and Regulation (OSR) activity supports the agency's development of regulations and safety standards, review and approval of OCS operating permits, inspections of facilities and equipment, oversight of operators' Safety and Environmental Management Systems (SEMS) programs, real-time monitoring of oil and gas drilling, and evaluation of emerging technologies, among other activities. Under this activity, BSEE in July 2016 coordinated with BOEM to issue final safety regulations for Arctic exploratory drilling, and in April 2016, BSEE issued final regulations for blowout prevention systems and well control. Also under the OSEE account, the Environmental Enforcement activity supports BSEE's own compliance with NEPA and other environmental statutes, as well as the agency's oversight and enforcement of environmental compliance by operators on the OCS. The program has pursued more than 200 cases of environmental violations since late 2011. The activities for Administrative Operations and Executive Direction, which are also within the OSEE account, support a range of administrative services as well as BSEE's executive offices. A separate BSEE budget account is for Oil Spill Research. This account funds research and planning for oil spill responses, as well as oversight of operators' spill response plans. It also supports Ohmsett, the National Oil Spill Response Research and Renewable Energy Test Facility. Like BOEM, BSEE anticipated changes to its offsetting collections for FY2017. The agency estimated a drop of $11.5 million in rental receipts for FY2017 as compared to the previous year's collections. BSEE estimated lower cost recovery fees as well (-$2.2 million). The agency estimated an increase of $6.0 million in anticipated inspection fees, based on its proposal for legislative changes to authorize the agency to charge additional fees for repeat visits to certain OCS facilities. However, neither the House nor the Senate Appropriations Committee included this new authorization in its bill, and the committees estimated $12.0 million less in FY2017 inspection fee collections for BSEE than the agency had suggested. Neither bill provided the level of direct appropriations requested by BSEE to address the estimated shortfall in offsetting collections. Both bills included rescissions of unobligated prior-year balances, which function as offsets to the funding in the Interior appropriations bill for the fiscal year in which they are enacted, as discussed above. Separate from the estimated changes to offsetting collections, BSEE proposed other funding changes in its OSEE account, including the following: An increase of $0.5 million across four budget activities (Environmental Enforcement, OSR, Administrative Operations, and Executive Direction) for projected growth in fixed costs such as rent, salaries, and information technology. A decrease of $0.3 million across four budget activities (Environmental Enforcement, OSR, Administrative Operations, and Executive Direction), to be achieved through administrative savings efforts and implementation of new program management models. BSEE, like BOEM, proposed to increase pay levels for certain skilled professionals, as authorized in August 2015 changes to OPM special salary tables. BSEE stated that base funding would be used to support the revised pay rates, resulting in no change to the OSR appropriation from the FY2016 enacted level. The House-passed and Senate committee-reported bills for the most part reflected BSEE's proposed changes, except for those concerning offsetting collections, as discussed above. Additionally, the Senate bill did not reflect BSEE's proposed changes for the OSR account and instead would have provided the same as the FY2016 enacted level. ONRR was established under the DOI Office of the Assistant Secretary for Policy, Management, and Budget to collect, account for, analyze, audit, and disburse revenues from energy and mineral leases on the OCS as well as on federal onshore and American Indian lands. With regard to its disbursement function, in FY2016 ONRR disbursed $6.3 billion in revenues from mineral leases on federal and Indian lands, down from $9.9 billion in FY2015 and $13.4 billion in FY2014. Of the FY2016 total, approximately $2.8 billion came from leasing and production activity on the OCS. The revenue amounts disbursed fluctuate annually, based primarily on the prices of oil and natural gas, and have averaged about $10 billion per year for onshore and offshore production combined over the last five years (FY2012-FY2016). Sources of ONRR receipts include royalties, bonus bids, and rents for all leasable minerals including oil, natural gas, coal, and others. ONRR distributes revenues under various authorities. Revenues from onshore leases are disbursed to the states in which they were collected, the General Fund of the U.S. Treasury, and the Reclamation Fund based on various statutory formulas. Revenues from offshore leases are allocated among coastal states, the Land and Water Conservation Fund, the Historic Preservation Fund, and the Treasury. ONRR receives and processes approximately 49,000 royalty and production reports monthly. It annually collects royalties on some 32,000 offshore and onshore producing leases and rents on some 29,000 nonproducing leases. ONRR uses an automated liquid verification system and gas verification system to ensure the accuracy of reported offshore production information. The Obama Administration submitted an FY2017 total funding request of $129.3 million for ONRR. There are no offsetting collections proposed for ONRR as there are for BOEM and BSEE. See Table 3 for the FY2017 funding request and ONRR appropriations. ONRR identified three major areas of importance that support its mission to collect, disburse, and verify federal and Indian energy and other natural resource revenue: (1) Financial and Production Management, (2) Audit and Compliance Management, and (3) Coordination, Enforcement, Valuation, and Appeals. The FY2017 request reflected resources proposed for ONRR to assume trust responsibility for the Osage Nation as it does for all other tribes receiving mineral revenue. The Osage Nation is a federally recognized tribe located in Oklahoma. After a 2011 settlement ($380 million), DOI and the Osage Nation agreed to implement programs to strengthen management and improve communication. To date, the Osage oil and gas leasing program operates with support only from DOI's Bureau of Indian Affairs (thus, with no support from the Bureau of Land Management or ONRR). The addition of Osage to ONRR's portfolio would increase the amount of Indian leases under ONRR's management by 82%, or an additional 5,000 new leases and 30,000 producing wells. The Obama Administration's FY2017 request sought $968,000 to fully fund the Osage Trust Accounting program. The Osage Trust Accounting Program received $2.6 million in FY2016. The Obama Administration requested $1.0 million in FY2017 for geospatial information systems (GIS) to improve the effectiveness of ONRR and to better understand the relationship between leases and transportation lines, among other things. The Administration also requested $1.2 million to improve ONRR's audit and compliance function. ONRR's strategic goals include revenue management and royalty reform using ONRR-wide compliance measures. ONRR would like to improve its newly implemented compliance measures to fully reflect all of ONRR's compliance work. A major challenge confronting ONRR is to ensure that its audit and compliance program is consistently effective. Critics contend that less auditing and more focus on compliance review has led to a less rigorous royalty collection system and thus a loss of revenue to the federal Treasury. DOI's Inspector General and the Government Accountability Office (GAO) have made recommendations to strengthen and improve administrative controls of the compliance and asset management program, including adoption of a risk-based compliance approach. In FY2015, ONRR, along with its state and tribal audit partners, closed 110 audits and 667 compliance reviews. Tribes can conduct mineral royalty audits on their tribal land, and states can do so on federal leases within their state boundaries. ONRR has agreements with 10 states and 6 tribes to conduct leasing-compliance activities in their jurisdictions. The House-passed FY2017 Interior appropriations bill, H.R. 5538 , would have supported ONRR's programs at $126.5 million, $2.8 million below the Obama Administration's request and $1.0 million above last year's appropriation. The Senate committee-reported bill, S. 3068 , would have provided $121.8 million for ONRR, $7.6 million below the Administration's request and $3.8 million below the FY2016 appropriation. The 114 th Congress did not enact full-year Interior appropriations for FY2017, and continuing funds were provided through April 28, 2017, under the CRs ( P.L. 114-223 and P.L. 114-254 ). The CRs generally provide funding at the FY2016 level, minus an across-the-board reduction of less than 1%. H.R. 5538 and S. 3068 contained general provisions related to offshore energy. Section 107 of both bills directed the ocean energy agencies to collect nonrefundable inspection fees in FY2017 to be deposited into BSEE's OSEE account and specified fee amounts. Section 108 of both bills authorized the Secretary of the Interior to transfer funds among and between BSEE, BOEM, and ONRR in accordance with reprogramming guidelines related to the earlier departmental reorganization. Both of these provisions are similar to those in previous years' Interior appropriations laws. Section 124 of the House bill would have prohibited the use of funds in FY2017 or any other fiscal year to implement new regulations pertaining to drilling margins or static downhole mud weight in offshore wells. The provision referred to regulatory changes contained in BSEE's April 2016 final rule on offshore well control. The Obama Administration included as part of its DOI budget some legislative proposals that pertained to the ocean energy agencies. One DOI proposal, concerning offshore revenue-sharing payments under P.L. 109-432 , the Gulf of Mexico Energy Security Act of 2006, sought to redirect the payments from their current recipients--the states of Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas--to broad federal natural resource and conservation programs. More than half of the funding would be redirected to a new Coastal Climate Resilience Program for at-risk coastal states, local governments, and communities to prepare for and adapt to climate change. A separate proposed package of federal oil and gas legislation for both offshore and onshore activities included changes such as evaluating minimum royalty rates, adjusting the onshore royalty rate, repealing legislatively mandated royalty relief, providing for shorter primary lease terms, instituting a new fee on nonproducing leases, and making certain changes in revenue collections, among other elements. Congressional action, if any, on such proposals could take place outside of the appropriations process.

This report discusses FY2017 appropriations for the Department of the Interior's (DOI's) Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM), Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE), and Office of Natural Resources Revenue (ONRR). The three agencies collectively administer federal ocean energy resources covering more than 1.7 billion acres on the U.S. outer continental shelf (OCS). BOEM administers offshore energy leasing, BSEE oversees offshore operational safety and environmental responsibility, and ONRR manages public revenues from federally regulated offshore and onshore energy projects. BOEM, BSEE, and ONRR receive appropriations in the annual Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies appropriations bill. The 114th Congress did not enact full-year Interior appropriations for FY2017. Continuing funds for the ocean energy agencies were provided through April 28, 2017, by two continuing resolutions (CRs; P.L. 114-223 and P.L. 114-254). The CRs generally provide funding at the FY2016 level, minus an across-the-board reduction of less than 1%. The 115th Congress is faced with addressing these agencies' appropriations for the remainder of FY2017. BOEM's and BSEE's operations are funded both by discretionary appropriations from general funds of the Treasury and by the authority to expend offsetting collections derived from a portion of OCS rental receipts and cost recovery fees (and, for BSEE, inspection fees). The initial discretionary appropriation for each fiscal year to each agency is reduced by the amount of eligible receipts and fees that are collected, so that the final amount appropriated to BOEM and BSEE is the net of those collections. ONRR does not receive funding through offsetting collections. For FY2017, the Obama Administration requested total appropriations of $175.1 million for BOEM, $204.9 million for BSEE, and $129.3 million for ONRR. The BOEM total included an estimated $94.9 million in offsetting collections, for a net appropriation of $80.2 million. The BSEE total included an estimated $108.5 million in offsetting collections, for a net appropriation of $96.3 million. The requests for all three agencies represented increases from enacted FY2016 appropriations--a requested increase of 8.0% for BOEM (for the net appropriation after offsets), 8.9% for BSEE (for the net appropriation after offsets), and 3.0% for ONRR. On July 14, 2016, the House passed H.R. 5538, the Department of the Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies appropriations bill for FY2017. On June 16, 2016, the Senate Appropriations Committee reported its version of the bill, S. 3068. Neither bill was enacted. For BOEM, H.R. 5538 recommended total appropriations of $169.3 million, with $94.9 million derived from offsetting collections, for a net appropriation of $74.4 million. S. 3068 recommended total appropriations of $169.6 million for BOEM, with $94.9 million derived from offsetting collections, for a net appropriation of $74.6 million. For BSEE, H.R. 5538 recommended total appropriations of $204.9 million, with $96.5 million derived from offsetting collections, along with a rescission of $20.0 million--resulting in a net appropriation for BSEE of $88.3 million. S. 3068 recommended total appropriations of $204.7 million for BSEE, with $96.5 million derived from offsetting collections and a rescission of $25.0 million, for a net appropriation of $83.1 million. For ONRR, H.R. 5538 contained appropriations of $126.5 million and S. 3068 contained appropriations of $121.8 million.

As Congress continues to deliberate whether and how to address climate change, a key question has been the degree to which humans and natural factors have influenced observed global climate change. Members of Congress sometimes stress that policies or actions "must be based on sound science." Officials in the Trump Administration have expressed uncertainty about the human influence, and some have called for public debate on the topic. To help inform policymaking, researchers and major scientific assessment processes have analyzed the attribution of observed climate change to various possible causes. Scientific assessments of both climate change and the extent to which humans have influenced it have varied in expressed confidence over time but have achieved greater scientific consensus. The latest major U.S. assessment, the Climate Science Special Report (CSSR), was released in October 2017 by the U.S. Global Change Research Program (USGCRP). It stated It is extremely likely [>95% likelihood] that human influence has been the dominant cause of the observed warming since the mid-20 th Century. For the warming over the last century, there is no convincing alternative explanation supported by the extent of the observational evidence. This CRS report provides context for the CSSR's statement by tracing the evolution of scientific understanding and confidence regarding the drivers of recent global climate change. Climate change science can be traced back to the early 1800s. Through the 20 th century, academic institutions, federal and state agencies, foreign governments, and other entities invested significant time and billions of dollars in climate research. This investment has led to substantial advances in empirical observations, atmospheric and ocean physics and chemistry, climate and economic simulation models, statistical methods, and other achievements. As a result, scientists have increased their confidence in their detection and understanding of climate change and attribution of observed changes to their causes. There is now high scientific confidence that the global climate is warming, primarily as a result of increased human-related greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and other activities . This confidence has evolved from nearly two centuries of research and assessments. This report describes a chronology (in the Appendix ) of 200 years of major scientific statements, selected to represent views at each time, regarding the human and natural contributions to global climate change. The chronology demonstrates how scientific views and confidence in those views evolved over time. That GHGs, including carbon dioxide (CO 2 ), water vapor, and other gases, warm the Earth's climate is not a recent concept. The greenhouse effect, as it is sometimes called, was deduced as early as 1827 with relatively little dispute since the 19 th century among scientists about the role of GHGs: Some level of GHGs in the atmosphere is necessary for maintaining a temperate climate on Earth. Instead, the debate that unfolded involved whether the climate had been warming overall and, if so, to what the changes may be attributable (such as industrial releases of GHGs, volcanoes, solar activity, or other natural variations). (See text box, Human and Natural Influences on Climate .) As indicated by the information presented in Table A-1 , scientists have noted, dating back to early in the 19 th century, both human and natural factors potentially influencing climate. As one scholar observed, "by 1900, most of the chief theories of climate change had been proposed, if not yet fully explored." There were a number of contending theories--including changes in solar energy, the Earth's orbital geometry, volcanoes, the geography of continents, and changes in GHGs--in the late 1800s as the quotations in Table A-1 indicate. Well into the 1900s, the state of the science relating CO 2 concentrations in the atmosphere to the Earth's temperature was primarily theoretical inference. Scientists debated whether increases in CO 2 in the atmosphere due to increasing emissions from fossil fuels would lead to further warming. Since then, a number of factors--including better measurement technologies; development of physics- and empirically based simulation models; more research, review, and revision; and longer series of observations--have improved the foundations of climate science. As a result, scientists have improved quantification of the relationships between observed conditions: 1. Natural and human-related GHG emissions (the latter mostly from fossil-fuel-based energy) to the atmosphere; 2. Increasing GHG concentrations in the atmosphere and changes in other influences on climate (e.g., changes in solar and volcanic activity); 3. Rising global average surface temperature; and 4. Other observed changes in the spatial and temporal patterns of climate. The magnitudes of factors, and therefore their influences on climate, vary over time. With acceleration of human population growth and industrialization since the 19 th century, the factors related to human activities have increased relative to those of natural processes. Increased scientific capacity has made climate change increasingly detectable and attributable to the varying influences over the past two centuries. In the late 1930s, Guy Callendar compiled existing data on atmospheric CO 2 concentrations and regional temperatures. Through imprecise calculations, he showed a correlation between observed increases in both over time. Some scientists considered the correlation merely coincidence. Callendar's calculations provided early quantitative indications of a climate warming as a result of human activity. At the time, however, the relative contribution of human activity compared with natural factors could not be determined. David Keeling later established more consistent and repeatable measurements of atmospheric CO 2 in the 1950s. Keeling's precise measurements provided strong evidence of a connection between increasing human-related CO 2 emissions and the increasing CO 2 concentrations in the atmosphere. The measurements established a quantitative benchmark for later studies examining the linkage between increasing CO 2 concentrations and rising global temperatures. Keeling's concentration data facilitated additional research on the global carbon cycle, the oceans, and the effects of human activities. In the middle of the 20 th century, scientists (and many in the public) recognized that a general warming of the climate had occurred ( Table A-1 ). This was followed by a 30-year period of relatively flat or decreasing global average temperatures from around 1946 to 1977 ( Figure 1 ). Arguably, the apparent change in trajectory heightened scientific uncertainty about the direction of future climate changes and any human influence on them. It coincided with concerns about "global dimming," at least in part attributed to sulfur and particulate pollution, which increased rapidly during that period before leveling off around 1980. Current assessments indicate that the mid-20 th century warming hiatus may have been due to a combination of human (GHG, pollution) and natural influences (solar variability, volcanoes). As temperatures began to rise again in the late 1970s, authoritative scientific assessments performed by various governmental and nongovernmental institutions, supported by an expanding body of peer-reviewed published research, pointed to an emerging consensus regarding a probable human contribution to climate change, primarily due to increasing GHG emissions. The relative role of human versus natural influences became more clear in the early 2000s. Longer series of improved observations (e.g., solar radiation, clouds, land cover change), statistical methods, and computational models enabled more robust analyses and comparisons of research methods and results. Major, collaborative, authoritative assessments--U.S. and international--were established to compile, debate, and consider the strengths or weaknesses of scientific analysis regarding climate change in order to inform policymakers. Table A-2 contains the relevant conclusions regarding human and natural influences on climate change from the major assessments conducted, with those of NAS beginning in 1977, IPCC beginning in 1990, and the USGCRP beginning in 2001. These inclusive assessments underpinned growing scientific confidence that human activities were likely the major cause of the observed global warming since the mid-20 th century. Many factors have contributed to increased scientific confidence in quantifying the human and natural contributions to climate change. Longer records of observational data have provided more evidence of the concordance between higher GHG levels and temperature increases. Satellites have provided important observations of temperatures; atmospheric pollution; and land, snow, and ice cover beginning in the late 1970s. Additionally, improved scientific understanding of atmospheric physics, together with vastly more powerful computers, has led to climate models that better simulate atmospheric and oceanic conditions. Uncertainties in the models remain on how they simulate the effects of clouds, for example, and the model simulations are at smaller scales of space and time. Despite these uncertainties, current climate scientific assessment states high confidence (extremely likely) that human influence is the dominant cause of the observed warming over the past half-century. While the near consensus has developed relatively recently, it has evolved based on increasing confidence through research on scientific concepts established as early as 200 years ago. Future climate outcomes depend on many additional factors, such as the future rates and character of socio-economic development and efforts to curtail the growth of GHG emissions. This appendix contains bibliographic references and quotations regarding scientific understanding of global climate change and the influence of CO 2 , other GHGs, and natural factors on observed and prospective global climate. Because the capacities and methods of science have changed markedly over the past 200 years, the references appear in two tables representing selected scientific literature and national or international scientific assessments. Table A-1 presents representative statements excerpted from key scientific literature from 1827 to 1987 regarding human-related and other contributions to climate change. Sources include selected, widely cited academic papers, government reports, and NAS reports. The table's selections largely precede the establishment of broadly inclusive scientific assessments to compile and assess the weight of scientific evidence. For the period up to 1987, CRS selected key academic scientific papers and reports that were influential to scientific contemporaries during and after their respective times. Scientific assessments began in the mid-20 th century to more systematically and inclusively evaluate the full body of scientific literature on specific topics. Table A-2 compiles the conclusions pertinent to this report from major U.S. and international scientific assessments, beginning in 1977, that address the human contribution to global climate change. The assessments have been produced by the USGCRP, NAS, and IPCC. REVISED

This CRS report provides context for the Administration's Climate Science Special Report (October 2017) by tracing the evolution of scientific understanding and confidence regarding the drivers of recent global climate change.

Generally, federal lands may not be taxed by state or local governments unless the governments are authorized to do so by Congress. Because local governments often are financed by property or sales taxes, this inability to tax the property values or products derived from the federal lands may affect local tax bases, sometimes significantly. If the federal government controls a significant share of a county's property, then the revenue-raising capacity of that county may be compromised. Instead of authorizing taxation, Congress usually has chosen to create various payment programs designed to compensate for lost tax revenue. These programs take various forms. Many pertain to the lands of a particular agency (e.g., the National Forest System [NFS] or the National Wildlife Refuge System [NWRS]). The most wide-ranging payment program is called Payments in Lieu of Taxes (PILT). It is administered by the Department of the Interior (DOI) and affects most acreage under federal ownership. Eligible lands consist of those in the National Park System (NPS), NFS, or Bureau of Land Management (BLM); certain lands in the NWRS if they are withdrawn from the public domain; lands dedicated to the use of federal water resources development projects; dredge disposal areas under the jurisdiction of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers; lands located in the vicinity of Purgatory River Canyon and Pinon Canyon, Colorado, that were acquired after December 31, 1981, to expand the Fort Carson military reservation; lands on which are located semi-active or inactive Army installations used for mobilization and for reserve component training; and certain lands acquired by DOI or the Department of Agriculture under the Southern Nevada Public Land Management Act ( P.L. 105-263 ). However, most military lands, lands under the Department of Energy (which have their own smaller payment program), lands of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and lands of the Department of Homeland Security are not eligible for payments under PILT. In FY2016, the PILT program covered 606.9 million acres, or about 94% of all federal land. The Payments in Lieu of Taxes Act of 1976 ( P.L. 94-565 , as amended; 31 U.S.C. SSSS6901-6907) was passed at a time when U.S. policy was shifting from one of disposal of federal lands to one of retention. The policy meant the retained lands would no longer be expected to enter the local tax base at some later date. Because of that shift, Congress agreed with recommendations of a federal commission that if these federal lands were never to become part of the local tax base, some compensation should be offered to local governments (generally counties) to make up for the presence of nontaxable land within their jurisdictions. Moreover, there was a long-standing concern that some federal lands produced large revenues for local governments, whereas other federal lands produced little or none. Many Members, especially those from western states with a high percentage of federal lands, felt the imbalance needed to be addressed. The resulting law authorizes federal PILT payments to local governments. The payments may be used for any governmental purpose. In addition to the overall structure of the program, specific issues that have been included are payments for Indian or other categories of lands, and tax equivalency, especially for eligible urban lands. Critics of PILT cite examples of what they view as its idiosyncrasies: A few counties that receive very large payments from other federal revenue-sharing programs (because of valuable timber, mining, recreation, and other land uses) also are authorized to receive a minimum payment ($0.37 per acre) from PILT. Although there is no distinction between acquired and public domain lands for other categories of eligible lands, acquired lands of the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) are not eligible for PILT. This provision works to the detriment of many counties in the East and Midwest, where nearly all FWS lands are acquired lands. Payments under the Secure Rural Schools (SRS) program require an offset in the following year's PILT payment for certain lands under the jurisdiction of the Forest Service (FS). However, if the eligible lands are under the jurisdiction of the BLM, there is no reduction in the next year's PILT payment. Certain BLM lands (called the Oregon and California Grant Lands) receive payments that do not require an offset in the following year's PILT payment. Some of the "units of general local government" (counties) that receive large payments have other substantial sources of revenue, and some of the counties that receive small payments are relatively poor. In some counties the PILT payment greatly exceeds the amount the county would receive if the land were taxed at fair market value, whereas in others it is much less. Given such issues, and the complexity of federal land management policies, consensus on substantive change in the PILT law has been elusive. Many of the broader issues of federal compensation to counties that were addressed when PILT was created have reemerged over the years. One such issue is the appropriate payment level, which is complicated by erosion of the payments' purchasing power due to inflation. Until about 1994, the full amount authorized under the law's formula generally had been appropriated, with a few exceptions such as sequestration under the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act (Title II of P.L. 99-177 ). For many of PILT's first 15 years, counties held that payments effectively were declining because of inflation. A 1994 amendment ( P.L. 103-397 ) was focused on increasing the total payments, building in inflation protection, and making certain additional categories of land eligible. The authorized payment level continued to be subject to annual appropriations. Figure 1 shows a major increase in both the actual and the inflation-adjusted dollars appropriated for PILT from FY1993 to FY2017. The increase in the authorization from the 1990s to the 2000s was not accompanied by a commensurate increase in appropriations. (See Figure 2 .) The growing discrepancy between appropriations and the rising authorization levels led to even greater levels of frustration among many local governments and prompted intense interest among some Members in increasing appropriations. From the first PILT payment in FY1977 to FY2007, payments were provided through annual appropriations. Starting with the FY2008 payment, however, Congress enacted a series of changes to PILT payment funding, including approval of mandatory spending for the payments (see Table 1 ). The 110 th Congress enacted several changes in PILT funding. First, the Continuing Appropriations Act, 2009 ( P.L. 110-329 ), provided funding at the FY2008 level ($228.9 million) through March 6, 2009. This figure would have constituted roughly 61% of the figure estimated for full payment of the FY2009 authorized level. Subsequently, the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 provided for mandatory spending of the full authorized level for five years--FY2008-FY2012. (See Figure 2 .) Next, the Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21 st Century Act ( P.L. 112-141 , SS100111) extended mandatory spending for PILT to FY2013, without making any other changes to the law. Under the Budget Control Act ( P.L. 112-25 ), PILT was categorized as a nonexempt, nondefense mandatory spending program. As such, it was subject to a 5.1% sequestration of the payments scheduled for FY2013, or $21.5 million from an authorized payment of $421.7 million. For the FY2014 appropriations cycle, Congress faced two basic choices for FY2104 funding: continue the program through an appropriations act, which is constrained by procedural and statutory limits on discretionary spending; or provide funding through some measure other than an appropriations act, which would be treated as mandatory spending. With this choice, funding would be subject to certain budget rules that generally require such spending to be offset. In either case, failure to find an offset would lead to certain procedural hurdles, such as points of order, although Congress sometimes sets aside or waives such points of order. The option for funding through an appropriations act was rejected when PILT funding was not included in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014 ( P.L. 113-76 ), although the Appropriations Committee members expressed support for the program in general. Instead, funding for the program was included in the Agricultural Act of 2014 ( P.L. 113-79 , SS12312; H.Rept. 113-333 ; also called the 2014 farm bill), which extended mandatory spending for one year. The bill was a net reduction in mandatory spending and therefore offset the increase due to PILT payments. The PILT provision provided county governments with the full formula amount in summer 2014. The FY2015 payment was paid in June 2015. The Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015 ( P.L. 113-235 , SS11), provided $372 million in discretionary spending. The Carl Levin and Howard P. "Buck" McKeon National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA; P.L. 113-291 ) included a provision (SS3096) for $70 million in mandatory spending for PILT. Of this amount, $33 million was made available in FY2015; the remaining $37 million was to be made available after the start of FY2016 on October 1, 2015, leaving some doubt as to whether the amount should be considered a late payment for FY2015 or an early payment for FY2016. The Continuing Appropriations Act of 2016 ( P.L. 114-53 ) included a provision (SS138) clarifying that the October payment was to be considered a supplement for the FY2015 payment. Through sequestration, the additional $37 million was reduced by 6.8%, to $34.5 million. That amount bought the FY2015 total to $439.5 million, or 97.3% of the full formula amount. For FY2016, PILT payments were included in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, FY2016 ( P.L. 114-113 , Division G). The measure provided $452.0 million for PILT, an amount sufficient to provide 98.3% of the full payment of $459.5 million. For FY2017, PILT payments were included in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, FY2017 ( P.L. 115-31 ), which provided $465.0 million for PILT, an amount sufficient to provide 99.7% of the full payment of $465.9 million. These payments were disbursed in June 2017. Calculating a particular county's PILT payment first requires answering several questions: How many acres of eligible lands are in the county? What is the population of the county? What were the previous year's payments, if any, for all of the eligible lands under the other payment programs of federal agencies? Does the state have any laws requiring the payments from other federal agencies to be passed through to other local government entities, such as school districts, rather than staying with the county government? What was the increase in the Consumer Price Index for the 12 months ending the preceding June 30? Each of these questions is discussed below, and the following section describes how the questions are used in the computation of each county's payment. Nine categories of federal lands are identified in the law as eligible for PILT payments: 1. Lands in the National Park System 2. Lands in the National Forest System 3. Lands administered by BLM 4. Lands in the National Wildlife Refuge System (NWRS) that are withdrawn from the public domain 5. Lands dedicated to the use of federal water resources development projects 6. Dredge disposal areas under the jurisdiction of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 7. Lands located in the vicinity of Purgatory River Canyon and Pinon Canyon, Colorado, that were acquired after December 31, 1981, to expand the Fort Carson military reservation 8. Lands on which are located semi-active or inactive Army installations used for mobilization and for reserve component training 9. Certain lands acquired by DOI or the Department of Agriculture under the Southern Nevada Public Land Management Act ( P.L. 105-263 ) In addition, if any lands in the above categories were exempt from real estate taxes at the time they were acquired by the United States, those lands are not eligible for PILT, except in three circumstances: 1. Lands received by the state or county from a private party for donation to the federal government within eight years of the original donation 2. Lands acquired by the state or county in exchange for land that was eligible for PILT 3. Lands in Utah acquired by the United States if the lands were eligible for a payment in lieu of taxes program from the state of Utah Only the nine categories of lands (plus the three exceptions) on this list are eligible for PILT payments; other federal lands--such as military bases, post offices, federal office buildings, and the like--are not eligible for payments under this statute. The exclusion of lands in the NWRS that are acquired is an interesting anomaly, and it may reflect nothing more than the fact that the House and Senate committees with jurisdiction over most federal lands did not have jurisdiction over the NWRS as a whole at the time P.L. 94-565 was enacted. The law restricts the payment that a county may receive based on population by establishing a ceiling payment that rises with increasing population. (See Figure 3 .) Counties are paid at a rate that varies with population; counties with low populations are eligible for payment totals at a higher rate per person and populous counties are paid less per person. For example, for FY2017, a county with a population of 1,000 people could not receive a PILT payment of more than $179.15 per person ($179,150 in total); a jurisdiction with a population of 30,000 could not receive a payment over $2.69 million (30,000 people x $89.61 per person). And no county can be credited with a population of more than 50,000, even if its actual population is many times larger. For example, in FY2017, at the authorized payment level of $71.67 per person, a county with a population of 1,000,000 could not receive a PILT payment over $3.58 million (50,000 people x $71.67 per person). Figure 3 shows the relationship between the population of a county and the maximum PILT payment. Federal land varies greatly in revenue production. Some lands have a large volume of timber sales or recreation concessions such as ski resorts, and others generate no revenue at all. Some federal lands have payment programs for state or local governments, and these payments may vary markedly from year to year. To even out the payments among counties and prevent grossly disparate payments, Congress provided that the previous year's payments on eligible federal lands from specific payment programs to counties would be subtracted from the PILT payment of the following year. So for a hypothetical county with three categories of eligible federal land, one paying the county $1,000, the second $2,000, and the third $3,000, then $6,000 would be subtracted from the following year's PILT payment. Most counties are paid under this offset provision, which is called the standard rate . In Figure 4 , the standard rate is shown by the left, sloping portion of the line, indicating that as the sum of the payment rates from other agencies increases, the PILT payment rate declines on a dollar-for-dollar basis. At the same time, Congress wanted to ensure that each county with eligible lands got some PILT payment, however small, even if the eligible lands produced substantial county payments from other agencies. If the county had payments from three federal payment programs of $1,000, $2,000, and $1 million, for instance, subtracting $1.003 million from a small PILT payment would produce a negative number--meaning no PILT payment to the county at all. In that case, a minimum rate applies, which does not deduct the other agencies' payments. In Figure 4 , the flat portion to the right shows that, after the other agencies' payments reach a certain level (over $2.29 per acre in FY2017), the rate of the PILT payment remains fixed (at $0.37 per acre in FY2017). The payments made in prior years that count against future PILT payments are specified in law. Any other payment programs beyond those specified would not affect later PILT payments. These specified payments are shown in Table A-3 . Eligible lands under some agencies (e.g., National Park Service and Army Corps of Engineers) have no payment programs that affect later PILT payments. Counties may receive payments above the calculated amount described above, depending on state law. Specifically, states may require that the payments from federal land agencies pass through the county government to some other entity (typically a local school district) rather than accrue to the county government itself. When counties in a pass-through state are paid under the formula that deducts their prior-year payments from other agencies (e.g., from the Refuge Revenue Sharing Fund [RRSF; 16 U.S.C. SS715s] of FWS or the Forest Service [FS] Payments to States program [16 U.S.C. SS500]), the amount paid to the other entity is not deducted from the county's PILT payments in the following year. According to DOI: Only the amount of Federal land payments actually received by units of government in the prior fiscal year is deducted. If a unit receives a Federal land payment, but is required by State law to pass all or part of it to financially and politically independent school districts, or any other single or special purpose district, payments are considered to have not been received by the unit of local government and are not deducted from the Section 6902 payment. For example, if a state requires all counties to pass along some or all of their RRSF payments from FWS to the local school boards, the amount passed along is not deducted from the counties' PILT payments for the following year. Or if two counties of equal population in two states each received $2,000 under the FS Payments to States program, and State #1 pays that amount directly to the local school board but State #2 does not, then under this provision the PILT payment to the county in State #1 will not be reduced in the following year but that of the county in State #2 will drop by $2,000. State #1 will have increased the total revenue coming to the state and to each county by taking advantage of this feature. Consequently, the feature of PILT that apparently was intended to even out payments among counties (at least of equal population size) may not have that result if a state takes advantage of this pass-through feature. Each governor is required to report annually to the Secretary of the Interior with a statement of the amounts actually paid to each county government under the relevant federal payment laws. DOI also cross-checks each governor's report against the records of the payment programs of federal agencies. In addition, there is a pass-through option for the PILT payment itself. A state may require that the PILT payment go to a smaller unit of government, contained within the county (typically a school district). In this case, one check is sent by the federal government to the state for distribution by the state to these smaller units of government. The distribution must occur within 30 days. To date, Wisconsin is the only state to have elected to pass through PILT payments. A provision in the 1994 amendments to PILT adjusted the authorization levels for inflation. The standard and minimum rates, as well as the payment ceilings, are adjusted each year. The PILT statute requires that "the Secretary of the Interior shall adjust each dollar amount specified in subsections (b) and (c) to reflect changes in the Consumer Price Index published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the Department of Labor, for the 12 months ending the preceding June 30." This is an unusual degree of inflation adjustment; no other federal land agency's payment program has this feature. But as will be shown below, increases in authorization do not necessarily lead to a commensurate increase in the funds received by the counties. With answers to these questions, the authorized payment level for a county can be calculated. ( Figure 5 shows a flow chart of the steps in these comparisons.) Two options are possible; both must be determined for each county, and the payment is the higher of the two alternatives. Alternative A. Which is less : the county's eligible acreage multiplied by $2.66 per acre or the county's ceiling payment based on its population? Pick the lesser of these two numbers. From it, subtract the previous year's total payments for these eligible lands under specific payment or revenue-sharing programs of the federal agencies that control the eligible land. The amount to be deducted is based on an annual report from the governor of each state to DOI. This option is called the standard rate . Alternative B. Which is less : the county's eligible acreage multiplied by $0.37 per acre or the county's ceiling payment based on its population? Pick the lesser of these two. This option is called the minimum provision and is used in counties that received relatively large payments (more than $2.29 per acre for FY2017) from other federal agencies in the previous year. The county is authorized to receive whichever of the above calculations--(A) or (B)--is greater . This calculation must be made for all counties individually to determine the national authorization level. If appropriations are insufficient for full funding, each county receives a pro rata share of the appropriation. For FY2017, the PILT appropriation of $465.0 million was 99.7% of the authorized level of $465.9. Thus, counties received 99.7% of the full formula amount. The standard rate, with its offset between agency-specific payments and PILT payments, still does not guarantee a constant level of federal payments to counties because of the time lag in determining PILT payments. Federal payments for a given fiscal year generally are based on the receipts of the prior year. PILT payments of the following fiscal year are offset by these payments. The combination of specific payments and PILT in the standard rate means that reductions (or increases) in those other payments in the previous year could be offset exactly by increases (or reductions) in PILT payments. However, provided the county's population is not so low as to affect the outcome, PILT payments could not fall below $0.37 per acre for FY2017 (see Alternative B, above), so the full offset occurs only when the other federal payments in the previous year total less than $2.29 per acre (i.e., the maximum payment of $2.64 per acre minus the $0.37 per acre minimum payment from PILT). To illustrate, consider a county whose only eligible federal lands are under FS jurisdiction. If the federal receipts on the FS lands dropped in FY2014 (compared with FY2013), authorized FS payments in FY2015 would fall. Authorized PILT payments will therefore increase to offset the drop--in FY2016. (This example assumes the PILT payment is calculated under the standard rate.) The counties will be authorized to receive at least $2.64 per acre from FS payments and PILT payments combined, but the two payments would not come in the same year. Consequently, if FS payments are falling from year to year, the combined payments in the given year would be less than $2.64 per acre, but if FS payments are rising, the authorized combined payment in the given year would be more than $2.64 per acre. Because of the need for annual data, a precise dollar figure cannot be given in advance for each year's PILT authorization level. Information from all 2,227 counties with eligible land in FY2016 was needed before an aggregate figure for the nation could be calculated for the most recent payment. The FY2016 appropriation contained in P.L. 114-113 was based on an estimate of the authorized amount, and ultimately provided 98.3% of full payment to each county. Although the enactment of six years of mandatory spending put the issue of full funding to rest for a time, county governments show strong support for continuing the mandatory spending feature for PILT. This question of mandatory spending was the biggest issue facing the program from the 112 th through the 114 th Congresses. At the same time, with congressional debate over spending levels in general, support for greater or mandatory spending for PILT in the future may compete with proposals to modify or even eliminate PILT as a means of reducing federal deficits. Congressional interest, after the 1994 revisions to PILT, has focused on the three areas cited above: whether to approve mandatory spending (either temporary or permanent) at the full amount or some fixed level; whether to reduce the program, either through lower discretionary appropriations or by changing the PILT formula; and whether to add or subtract lands from the list of those now eligible for PILT payments. For a relatively small fraction of the federal or even departmental budget, PILT garners considerable attention, especially from local governments: (1) 2,227 counties had lands eligible for PILT payments in FY2016; (2) the average payment per county (many of which are sparsely populated) was $202,784; (3) although some counties with eligible lands received no payment (because they have very few federal lands and PILT makes no payments of less than $100), many received over $1 million and 25 counties received over $3 million. The resulting impact on budgets of local governments helps generate interest despite the small size of the PILT program compared to the federal budget as a whole. As PILT funding reverts to discretionary spending, counties with large federal land holdings may face more fiscal uncertainty. Several more specific issues also are being debated in Congress or within county governments. Among them are the inclusion of Indian or other categories of lands; tax equivalency, especially for eligible urban lands; and payments affecting the NWRS. The inclusion of other lands (e.g., military lands generally or those of specific agencies such as the National Aeronautics and Space Administration) under the PILT program has been mentioned from time to time, and some counties with many acres of nontaxable Indian lands within their boundaries have long supported adding Indian lands to the list of lands eligible for PILT. Their primary arguments are that these lands receive benefits from the county, such as road networks, but Indian residents do not pay for these benefits with property taxes. However, the federal government does not actually own these lands. The complexity of the PILT formula makes it very difficult to calculate the consequences of such a move, either for authorization levels or appropriation levels. Additionally, Congress would have to decide what sorts of Indian lands would be eligible for such payments and a variety of other complex issues. If some categories of Indian lands were to be added to those lands already eligible for PILT, Congress might wish to limit payments to counties with more than some minimum percentage of Indian lands within their borders. Regardless, even a very restrictive definition of Indian lands seems likely to add many millions of acres to those already eligible for PILT. Even if the criteria for eligibility were determined, it still would be difficult to anticipate the effect on authorization levels. To paint an extreme example, if all of the eligible Indian lands were in counties whose PILT payments already were capped due to the population ceiling, inclusion of Indian lands would have no effect on PILT authorization levels. If mandatory spending of the full formula amount were in place, appropriations would go up to fund the newly eligible lands. If PILT payments are discretionary and annual appropriations are less than the authorized level, each county would receive a pro rata share of the authorized full payment level. Individual counties whose eligible acres had jumped markedly with the inclusion of Indian lands might receive substantially more than in the past. Other counties (particularly those with few or no eligible Indian acres) would receive a smaller fraction of the authorized amount as limited dollars would be distributed among more lands. Some observers have wondered whether urban federal lands are included in the PILT program. The response is that urban lands are not excluded from PILT under the current law. For example, in FY2016, the counties in which Sacramento, Chicago, and Cleveland are found, as well as the District of Columbia, all received PILT payments (see Table 2 ), although the property tax on similar nonfederal lands likely would have been substantially greater. Eastern counties, which tend to be small, rarely have both large populations and large eligible acreage in the same county. By contrast, western counties tend to be very large and may have many eligible acres, and some, like Sacramento, may have large populations as well. Furthermore, as the cases of Arlington County and the District of Columbia illustrate, PILT payments are by no means acting as an equivalent to property tax payments. If the 8,482 acres in the District of Columbia or the 27 acres in Arlington County were owned by taxable entities, those acres would result in much more than $22,007 or $0, respectively, in property taxes. Because the formula in PILT does not reflect property taxes, counties such as these might support a revised formula that would approach property tax payments. As noted above, NWRS lands that were withdrawn from the public domain are eligible for PILT, and those that were acquired are not. In addition, the National Wildlife Refuge Fund (NWRF, also called the Refuge Revenue-Sharing Fund, or RRSF) relies on annual appropriations for full funding. For FY2016, payments for NWRF were approximately 23% of the authorized level. For refuge lands eligible for PILT, some or perhaps all of the NWRF payment will be made up for in the following year's PILT payment, but this will not occur for acquired lands because they are not eligible for PILT. Congress may consider making all refuge lands eligible for PILT and/or providing mandatory spending for NWRF, as it has for PILT. Eastern counties could be the largest beneficiaries of such a change, although some western states also may have many NWRS acres that currently are not eligible for PILT. (See Table 3 for selected state examples.) Adding the 9.8 million acres of NWRS lands under the primary jurisdiction of FWS but currently ineligible for PILT would increase PILT lands by about 1.6%. The PILT program, when it was a mandatory spending program, provided a relatively certain flow of funds to recipient jurisdictions. Some observers and policymakers are concerned that using discretionary spending for PILT or the elimination of the program could destabilize the fiscal structure of some jurisdictions receiving PILT payments. Nationally, the relative size of the PILT payments would seem to mitigate the impact and PILT reductions would not seem to have a measurable fiscal impact on most county budgets that receive PILT transfers. Locally, however, the impacts may be greater--in some jurisdictions, perhaps substantially. Reliance on property taxes is important for most counties. Nationwide, in FY2013, local property taxes (for counties, cities, and special districts) comprised roughly 46.8% of own-source revenue or just over $452 billion in total revenues. However, in the same year, the PILT program was very much smaller: the appropriated $400.2 million in PILT payments was less than 0.1% of property tax revenue nationally. For the 25 counties that received over $3 million in FY2016, the government services provided by the county could be adversely affected in the near term (although restructuring the property tax or raising other local fees or taxes could likely compensate for the reduced federal payment). Smaller payments also would be important in low-property-value, low-population counties with relatively greater shares of federally owned land. The first two tables below show the data presented in Figure 1 and Figure 2 . The third shows the agency payments that offset payments under PILT in the following year.

Under federal law, local governments (usually counties) are compensated through various programs for reductions to their property tax bases due to the presence of most federally owned land. Federal lands cannot be taxed but may create a demand for services such as fire protection, police cooperation, or longer roads to skirt the federal property. Some compensation programs are run by a specific agency and apply only to that agency's land. This report addresses only the most widely applicable program, which is called Payments in Lieu of Taxes (PILT; 31 U.S.C. SSSS6901-6907) and is administered by the Department of the Interior (DOI); in FY2016, there were 2,227 counties with lands eligible for PILT payments. Eligible lands consist of those in the National Park System (NPS), National Forest System (NFS), or Bureau of Land Management (BLM); certain lands in the National Wildlife Refuge System (NWRS); and several other specified federal lands. Congress has repeatedly debated the level of PILT funding. The authorized level of PILT payments is calculated using a complex formula. No precise dollar figure can be given in advance for each year's PILT authorized level. Five factors affect the calculation of a payment to a given county: (1) the number of acres eligible for PILT payments, (2) the county's population, (3) payments in prior years from other specified federal land payment programs, (4) state laws directing payments to a particular government purpose, and (5) the Consumer Price Index as calculated by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. If the appropriation for PILT funding is less than the full authorized amount, each county receives a prorated payment. Before 2008, PILT was funded through the annual appropriations process. From FY2008 to FY2014, however, Congress approved mandatory spending for PILT at the full formula amount. The FY2015 PILT payment was funded through both discretionary and mandatory appropriations, and the FY2016 PILT payment and FY2017 PILT payment were each funded entirely through discretionary appropriations. In all three of those years, the appropriation for the PILT payment was less than the authorized full funding level, so each county received a prorated payment in those years. Most recently in FY2017, each county received a prorated amount (99.7%) of the full authorized amount. The mechanism for PILT funding thus presents two fundamental options for Congress to consider: provide funding through the annual discretionary appropriations process or through mandatory spending for the full formula amount, whether indefinitely or for a specified period. Discretionary appropriations are constrained by procedural and statutory spending limits and are subject to annual fluctuations that may or may not result in PILT being fully funded. Among other potential impacts, annual appropriations could introduce uncertainty and unpredictability for the counties receiving PILT payments. Approval of mandatory spending for PILT at the full formula amount could ensure a consistent and predictable payment for those counties, at least through the duration of the authorization. However, the legislation still would be subject to certain budget rules that generally require such spending be offset. Since the creation of PILT in 1976, various other changes in the law have been proposed. One proposal has been to include additional lands under the PILT program, particularly Indian lands. Other lands also have been mentioned for inclusion, such as those of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security. Some counties would like to revisit the compensation formula to emphasize a payment rate more similar to property tax rates. Finally, some have argued that all lands in the NWRS should be eligible for PILT, rather than limiting PILT payments to lands reserved from the public domain while excluding acquired lands from PILT payments.

The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the federal government's lead public health agency, has identified teen pregnancy as a major public health issue because of its high cost for families of teenage parents and society more broadly. In addition, teen pregnancy disproportionately affects certain minority communities and selected states and territories. The teen birth rate has been in decline; however, given the consequences associated with teen births, Congress has continued to authorize, and the executive branch has administered, programs to delay sexual activity and prevent pregnancies among teenagers. Four current programs have an exclusive focus on teenage pregnancy prevention education: the Teen Pregnancy Prevention (TPP) program, which is authorized under appropriations law; the Personal Responsibility Education Program (PREP), which is authorized under Title V of the Social Security Act; the Sexual Risk Avoidance Education program, which is authorized under Title V of the Social Security Act (and formerly known as the Title V Abstinence Education Grant program); and the Sexual Risk Avoidance Education program, which is authorized under appropriations law. This report will refer to the latter two programs as the Title V Sexual Risk Avoidance Education program and the Sexual Risk Avoidance Education program, respectively, to avoid confusion. The four programs are administered by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). This report begins with a brief discussion of recent developments in funding for the four teen pregnancy prevention programs. It then provides background on the role of Congress and the executive branch in preventing teen pregnancy. The remainder of the report focuses on the four programs, examining the types of grants they provide as well as related funding, requirements, and research activities. Table A-1 in Appendix A summarizes key programmatic information and allows for comparisons across the programs. Table A-2 in Appendix A describes the changes made by the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (BBA of 2018, P.L. 115-123 ), enacted on February 9, 2018, to Section 510 of the Social Security Act. The BBA of 2018 renamed the Title V Abstinence Education Grant program as the Title V Sexual Risk Avoidance Education program and made other programmatic changes, retroactively effective October 1, 2017. Appendix B includes a table that indicates whether the states and territories, or entities within those jurisdictions, receive funding under each of the four programs. This report accompanies CRS Report R45184, Teen Birth Trends: In Brief . The federal government has long played a role in educating teens and the public generally about preventing pregnancy and sexually transmitted infections (STIs). This has involved public awareness campaigns; providing public health services, including information and access to contraceptives; publishing materials about STIs; and funding organizations to provide sexual education. The federal approach to teen pregnancy prevention has often reflected prevailing public views about sexuality and the role that the federal government should play in the private lives of its citizens. Since the early 1980s, the federal government has supported programs that have an exclusive focus on preventing teen pregnancy. Discussion about these programs has often focused on the type of approaches to pregnancy prevention they should take. Some policymakers and other stakeholders in the teen pregnancy prevention field have contended that teens should not engage in sex before marriage to avoid unplanned pregnancies and protect against STIs. Further, they support the idea that teenagers need to hear a single, unambiguous message that sex outside of marriage is harmful to their physical and emotional health. This approach is sometimes referred to as "abstinence-only," and more recently as "sexual risk avoidance." Other stakeholders have prioritized an approach that provides broad information to teenagers to help them make informed decisions about whether to engage in sex, and about using contraceptives if they do. They contend that such an approach allows young people to make choices regarding abstinence, gives them the information they need to set relationship limits and resist peer pressure, and provides them with information on the use of contraceptives and the prevention of STIs. Congress has authorized and provided funding for programs that take one or both of these approaches to preventing teen pregnancy. Of the current programs, the Title V Sexual Risk Avoidance Education and the Sexual Risk Avoidance Education programs focus exclusively on abstaining from premarital sex. The PREP program requires most grantees to place "substantial emphasis on both abstinence and contraception for the prevention of pregnancy among youth and sexually transmitted infections." The TPP program does not necessarily focus on any one approach, and some grantees use multiple program models to meet the various needs of youth. For example, a TPP program grantee in South Carolina uses an evidence-based model that provides abstinence-only education and other evidence-based models that have broader approaches. The general public appears to support educating teenagers about both abstinence and contraception. A nationally representative telephone survey conducted in 2017 for Power to Decide, an organization focused on preventing unplanned pregnancy, found that about 8 out of 10 adults believe teens should receive more information about abstinence and birth control and protection from sexually transmitted infections. Two of the current teen pregnancy programs, TPP and PREP, reflect government-wide efforts beginning in the George W. Bush Administration and extending into the Obama Administration to expand social programs that work and eliminate those that do not. The two programs use a "tiered evidence" approach: some grantees employ teen pregnancy prevention models that are effective based on rigorous evaluation while other grantees develop and rigorously evaluate new or innovative approaches to reducing teen pregnancy. HHS has identified which teen pregnancy prevention program models meet selected criteria for being considered "evidence-based." Multiple HHS offices worked together to establish the Teen Pregnancy Prevention (TPP) Evidence Review process following enactment of the FY2010 omnibus appropriations law ( P.L. 111-117 ). P.L. 111-117 also authorized the TPP program and required it to use models that are proven effective through rigorous evaluation in reducing teen pregnancy and related outcomes. Despite the connection to the TPP program, the review is intended to more broadly inform the teen pregnancy prevention field. The TPP Evidence Review seeks to identify which teen pregnancy prevention models have been shown to be effective based on studies from the past 20 years. The review team prioritizes studies of programs based on whether they include youth ages 19 and younger and are intended to address teen pregnancy outcomes through some combination of educational, skill-building, or psycho-social interventions. The first review covered research released from 1989 through January 2010. Subsequent reviews have since been conducted on an annual or biannual basis to incorporate new research, including newly available evidence for programs that were previously reviewed. These studies must have one statistically significant impact on at least one of five areas: (1) sexual activity, (2) number of sexual partners, (3) contraceptive use, (4) STIs or HIV, and (5) pregnancies. In addition, the studies must examine impacts of programs using randomized controlled trials (RCTs) and quasi-experimental impact study designs. For the studies that meet these initial criteria, reviewers assign each one a rating of high, moderate, or low quality based on whether it uses RCTs and quasi-experimental design, has relatively low attrition, controls for differences between the treatment and comparison groups, and meets certain other criteria. After its latest round of studies, the TPP Evidence Review includes 41 evidence-based program models. Evidence-based teen pregnancy prevention programs are varied and approach the problem from different frameworks. HHS categorizes the evidence-based models based on certain key features. For example, three of the models use an abstinence-only approach and some of the models incorporate information about abstinence. Other models focus on sexual health education, youth development, clinic-based services, and/or youth with certain histories (e.g., youth who are incarcerated). Programs differ based on their outcomes, settings (e.g., schools, clinics, homes, afterschool programs), session length and duration over time, and target population (e.g., males, females, African American youth, Hispanic youth, low-income youth, rural youth). HHS has taken additional steps to develop research on teen pregnancy prevention interventions. These efforts have been funded through annual appropriations of approximately $4.5 million to $6.8 million in each of FY2011 through FY2018 for Section 241 of the Public Health Services Act (PHSA). Section 241 provides authority for HHS to conduct evaluations of the implementation and effectiveness of public health programs. The funding has been used to support federal evaluations on teen pregnancy, including evaluation of TPP grantees; technical assistance about using rigorous program evaluation for TPP program grantees and unrelated grantees funded through the CDC; the TPP Evidence Review; and measuring performance data for the TPP program and Pregnancy Assistance Fund (PAF) grantees. The PAF provides competitive funding to state and tribal agencies to support pregnant and parenting teens and adults in school-based and community-based settings. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, FY2010 ( P.L. 111-117 ) established and provided annual funding for the Teen Pregnancy Prevention (TPP) program. The TPP program has been funded via the appropriations process in subsequent years, including through FY2018. Funding has ranged from approximately $98 million to $110 million annually. The program primarily provides funds to public and private entities for evidence-based or promising programs that reduce teen pregnancy, including those that focus on sexual risk avoidance and/or use of contraceptives. However, HHS is in the process of discontinuing funding for the current cohort of TPP program grantees. See "Recent Developments" at the beginning of this report for further detail about the status of current funding. Generally, the appropriations laws have specified that no more than 10% of TPP funding is for training and technical assistance, outreach, and other program support. Of the remaining amount, the appropriations laws have further stated the following: 75% is for grants to replicate programs that have been proven through rigorous evaluation to be effective in reducing teenage pregnancy, behavioral factors underlying teen pregnancy, or other related risk factors. HHS refers to these as "Tier 1" grants. 25% is for research and demonstration grants to develop, replicate, and refine additional models and innovative strategies for reducing teenage pregnancy. HHS refers to these as "Tier 2" grants. Appropriation laws generally have not included additional guidance on how the program is to be administered. HHS has established eligibility and other requirements via funding announcements and other publications. Funding recipients must ensure they provide "age appropriate" and "medically accurate" information to their teen clients, as these terms have been defined in program funding announcements. The HHS Office of Adolescent Health (OAH), which administers the program, must approve the materials used by grantees for this purpose. A range of public and private entities have been eligible to apply for TPP funding. Such entities include nonprofit and for-profit organizations, universities and colleges, faith- and community-based organizations, hospitals, and research institutions, among other entities. The TPP grants have supported two cohorts of Tier 1 grantees. This first cohort, from FY2010-FY2014, included 75 grantees in 37 states and the District of Columbia. The current round of Tier 1 funding began with FY2015, and is in the process of being discontinued. The second cohort includes 58 grantees in 28 states, the District of Columbia, and the Marshall Islands. The second round of funds has been used to support two types of grants. Tier 1A grantees are intermediary organizations that are providing capacity-building assistance (CBA) to youth-serving organizations to replicate evidence-based teen pregnancy prevention programs in areas with higher-than-average teen birth rates. CBA refers to the "transmission of knowledge and building of skills to enhance the ability of organizations to implement, evaluate, and sustain evidence-based TPP programs." Tier 1B grantees are entities that are replicating evidence-based programs to scale in communities with populations in the greatest need. Grantees are expected to develop and implement a plan to prevent teen pregnancy, engage in planning and piloting the programs, and then implement the programs. In general, HHS requires Tier 1 grantees to use evidence-based approaches that the department has determined to be effective as part of its TPP Evidence Review. Grantees must implement their models consistent with the original evidence-based model and have minimal adaptations (e.g., changing names or details in a role play). In addition, HHS has emphasized the importance of Tier 1 grantees in the second cohort replicating programs that have the strongest evidence and that evaluations have shown to be effective in multiple sites, in different settings, and with different populations. As with Tier 1 grantees, HHS has funded two cohorts of Tier 2 grants from FY2010-FY2014 and FY2015-FY2019. The first cohort included 18 grantees in 10 states and the District of Columbia, and the second cohort includes 26 grantees in 11 states, the District of Columbia, and the Marshall Islands. HHS is currently (FY2015-FY2019) funding three types of Tier 2 grants in the second cohort, though as noted, these grants are in the process of being discontinued. The grants include the following: Supporting and enabling early innovation to advance adolescent health and prevent teen pregnancy (Tier 2A grants): these grants are intended to establish independent intermediaries that select, fund, and support a portfolio of innovators across the country to design, test, and refine interventions for advancing adolescent health and preventing teen pregnancy. Rigorous evaluation of new or innovative approaches to prevent teen pregnancy (Tier 2B grants): these grants are intended to increase the number of evidence-based teen pregnancy prevention interventions by rigorously evaluating new or innovative approaches for preventing teen pregnancy and related risk behaviors. Effectiveness of teen pregnancy prevention programs designed specifically for young m ales (Tier 2C grants ) : these grants are intended to rigorously evaluate innovative interventions designed for young men ages 15 to 24 to reduce their risk of fathering a teen pregnancy. These interventions are to be feasibly implemented in target settings such as clinics and schools. This grant is administered by the CDC, in partnership with the OAH. HHS supported 41 program evaluations of the first cohort of TPP grants (FY2010-FY2015). This included 19 Tier 1 evaluations of 10 evidence-based models identified as part of the TPP Evidence Review. The evaluations also included 22 studies of Tier 2 grantees, which were expected to implement new or innovative models to improve teen pregnancy-related outcomes. HHS provided detailed findings from these evaluations in a special supplement of the American Journal of Public Health in September 2016. Of the 41 evaluations, 12 showed a positive impact in at least one teen pregnancy-related outcome. Another 16 had no impacts (one of these also had a negative impact), and 13 had inconclusive results. Some of the evaluations were inconclusive because of high attrition, of weak contrasts between the treatment and control groups, or they did not meet HHS's research standards, or for other reasons. PREP is a broad approach to teen pregnancy prevention that seeks to educate adolescents ages 10 through 19 and pregnant and parenting youth under age 21 on both abstinence and contraceptives to prevent pregnancy and STIs. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA, P.L. 111-148 ) established PREP, appropriating $75 million annually in mandatory spending for FY2010 through FY2014. PREP authorization has been extended three times ( P.L. 113-93 , P.L. 114-10 , and P.L. 115-123 ) with mandatory funding of $75 million for each of FY2015 through FY2019. PREP funds states and other entities to carry out sexual education programs that places "substantial emphasis on both abstinence and contraception." Recipients of PREP funds must fulfill requirements outlined in the law, including that they must implement programs that provide youth with information on at least three of six specified adulthood preparation subjects (healthy relationships, adolescent development, financial literacy, parent-child communication, educational and career success, and healthy life skills); are "medically-accurate and complete"; include activities to educate youth who are sexually active regarding responsible sexual behavior with respect to both abstinence and the use of contraception; and provide age-appropriate information and activities, while ensuring these are delivered in the most appropriate cultural context for the individuals served in the program. As with the TPP program, PREP uses a tier-evidence approach. Some grantees replicate evidence-based effective programs that have been proven to delay sexual activity, increase condom or contraceptive use for sexually active youth, or reduce pregnancy among youth. Other grantees substantially incorporate elements of effective programs that have been proven to change behavior. PREP includes four types of grants: (1) State PREP grants, (2) Competitive PREP grants, (3) Tribal PREP, and (4) Personal Responsibility Education Innovative Strategies (PREIS). Most of the PREP appropriation is allocated to states and territories via the State PREP grant. Funding for states and territories that did not apply for this grant is available to local entities under Competitive PREP grants. The law specifies certain levels of funding for the other components, including $10 million for the PREIS grants. After this set-aside, HHS must reserve 5% for grants to Indian tribes and tribal organizations (Tribal PREP) and 10% for training, technical assistance, and evaluation. Total FY2017 funding for the four grants was $63.7 million (the most recent information available). Of this amount, $40.5 million was for State PREP, $10.3 million was for Competitive PREP, $3.3 million was for Tribal PREP, and $9.6 million was for PREIS. The 50 states, District of Columbia, and territories are eligible for State PREP funding. Funds are allocated by a formula that is based on the proportion of youth ages 10 through 19 in each jurisdiction relative to other jurisdictions. State PREP funds do not require a match. A total of 50 jurisdictions applied for and received FY2017 PREP funding. This included 44 states, the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, the Republic of Palau, the Virgin Islands, and the Federated States of Micronesia. States and territories can administer the project directly or through sub-awards to public or private entities. If a state or territory did not submit an application for formula funding in FY2010 or later years, it is ineligible to apply for funding for each of FY2010 through FY2019. Organizations in such a state or territory are eligible to apply competitively for funding, which is to be awarded as a three-year grant. In practice, Competitive PREP applicants can include county or city governments, public institutions of higher education, and for-profit and nonprofit organizations, among other entities. Ten states and territories did not apply for State PREP funding: Florida, Indiana, Kansas, North Dakota, Texas, Virginia, American Samoa, Northern Mariana Islands, Marshall Islands, and Palau. HHS awarded Competitive PREP funding for FY2012 through FY2014 to organizations in states that did not apply for funding in FY2010 or FY2011, and awarded Competitive PREP funding for FY2015 through FY2017 to organizations in states that did not apply for funding in FY2016 and FY2017. For each of FY2015 through FY2017, Competitive PREP funded 21 grantees. These grantees are in the states that did not receive PREP funds, except Kansas. Entities in Kansas did not apply for Competitive PREP funds. The Bipartisan Budget Act ( P.L. 115-123 ), the law that most recently reauthorized the PREP program, specified that the Competitive grants that were awarded for any of FY2015 through FY2017 are to be extended for an additional two years, through FY2019. Each State PREP and Competitive PREP applicant must include a description of its plan for using the allotment to achieve its goals related to reducing pregnancy rates and birth rates for youth populations. Applicants are required to specify the populations they will serve, and such populations must be the most high-risk or vulnerable for pregnancies or otherwise have special circumstances. As specified in the law, this includes youth who are ages 10 to 20 and in foster care, are homeless, live with HIV/AIDS, or reside in areas with high birth rates for youth, among other populations; pregnant youth who are under age 21; and mothers who are under age 21. States, territories, and entities that apply for State PREP or Competitive PREP funds must replicate evidence-based teen pregnancy prevention programs or substantially incorporate elements of effective programs. Grantees are referred to the TPP Evidence Review, though they are not required to adopt the models identified in the review. A 2014 review of PREP grantees in 44 states and the District of Columbia, found that more than 90% of them expected to implement such evidence-based models. Tribal PREP grants are intended to support projects that educate American Indian and Alaska Native youth ages 10 to 20 and pregnant and parenting youth under age 21 on abstinence and contraception for the prevention of pregnancy, STIs, and HIV/AIDS. Specifically, grantees must support the design, implementation, and sustainability of culturally and linguistically appropriate teen pregnancy programs. Such programs must replicate evidence-based models, sustainably incorporate elements of effective models, or include promising practices within tribal communities. Although Tribal PREP grantees are referred to HHS's TPP Evidence Review, the review has not identified teen pregnancy prevention programs specifically for tribal youth. Indian tribes and tribal organizations, as these terms are defined in the Indian Health Care Improvement Act, are eligible to apply for Tribal PREP funding. The first cohort of 15 grantees received funding from FY2011 through FY2015. The project period for the second cohort of eight grantees is from FY2016 through FY2020. PREIS grants are intended to build evidence for promising teen pregnancy prevention programs serving high-risk youth populations. The grants are awarded on a competitive basis to public and private entities to implement and evaluate innovative youth pregnancy prevention strategies that have not been rigorously evaluated and/or to participate in a federal evaluation of their program strategies if selected. According to the most recent program funding announcement, innovative strategies could include those that are technology-based and/or computer-based, use social media, or are implemented in non-traditional classroom settings. Such strategies must be targeted to high-risk, vulnerable, and culturally under-represented youth populations. The law specifies that this includes youth ages 10 to 20 in or aging out of foster care; homeless youth; youth with HIV/AIDS; pregnant and parenting women who are under age 21 and their partners; young people residing in areas with high birth rates for youth; and victims of human trafficking. HHS also lists selected other youth populations in the program funding announcement: youth who have been trafficked, runaway and homeless youth, and rural youth. PREIS funds are awarded as five-year cooperative agreements. The first cohort of PREIS grantees (FY2011 through FY2015) included 11 organizations. The second cohort of grantees (FY2016 through FY2020) includes 13 organizations in 10 states and the District of Columbia. The PREP authorizing law directs HHS to evaluate PREP programs and activities. In fulfilling this requirement, HHS is conducting an evaluation of four State PREP grantees--California, Maine, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina--to learn how PREP-funded programs are implemented and to assess their effectiveness in reducing teen pregnancies, STIs, and sexual risk behaviors. According to an early report on implementation of the program, the four states have developed similar approaches to supporting evidence-based strategies. The impact evaluation is underway, and is expected to be completed in 2018. Separate from these evaluation efforts, PREIS and Tribal PREP direct grantees to carry out evaluation activities. PREIS grantees must contract with independent third-party evaluators to conduct RCT or quasi-experimental research to determine whether grantees' interventions led to reduced pregnancies, births, and STIs. Tribal PREP grantees must partner with a university or other organization not associated with the grantee to conduct an evaluation (known as a "local evaluation") that is either descriptive (without treatment and comparison groups) or examines impacts using treatment and comparison groups. State PREP and Competitive PREP grantees may choose to conduct such evaluations. The 1996 welfare reform law ( P.L. 104-193 ) established the "Separate Program for Abstinence Education" under Section 510 in Title V of the Social Security Act. The program had long been known as the Title V Abstinence Education Grant program. The BBA of 2018 ( P.L. 115-123 ) replaced Section 510, thereby changing the name of the program to the Sexual Risk Avoidance Education program; revising the program purpose areas; and adding new requirements on financial allotments, educational elements, research and data, and evaluation. Table A-2 in Appendix A includes a side-by-side comparison of the statutory changes made by the BBA, which went into effect on October 1, 2017. The overall purpose of the program remains essentially the same, which is to provide youth ages 10 through 19 with education that focuses on refraining from sexual activity before marriage. The Title V Sexual Risk Avoidance Education program is funded through mandatory spending. P.L. 104-193 provided $50 million per year for five years (FY1998-FY2002). The program was subsequently funded through June 30, 2009, by various legislative extensions. The ACA reauthorized the program, providing $50 million for each of FY2010 through FY2014. Three subsequent laws extended the program: The Protecting Access to Medicare Act of 2014 ( P.L. 113-93 ), which provided $50 million in FY2015; the Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2015 ( P.L. 114-10 ), which provided $75 million per year for FY2016 and FY2017; and the BBA of 2018, which provides $75 million for each of FY2018 and FY2019. States are eligible to request mandatory Title V Sexual Risk Avoidance Education funds for FY2018 and FY2019 if they submit an application for Maternal and Child Health (MCH) Block Grant funds for those same fiscal years. The MCH Block Grant, authorized under Title V of the Social Security Act, is a flexible source of funds that states use to support maternal and child health programs. Title V Sexual Risk Avoidance Education funds are allocated to each jurisdiction based on two factors: (1) the amount provided to the program minus any reservations (up to 20%) made by HHS for administering it, and (2) states' relative proportion of low-income children nationally. The law does not require states to provide a match. HHS may competitively award FY2018 and FY2019 funds to one or more entities within a state/territory that had not previously applied for its share of funding. The entity or entities would receive the amount that would have been otherwise allotted to that state. (The law does not define the entities that would be eligible.) The HHS Secretary is required to publish a notice to solicit grant applications for the remaining competitive funds. The solicitation must to be published within 30 days after the deadline for states to apply for MCH Services Block Grant funds. Eligible states are required to apply for the Title V Sexual Risk Avoidance Education funds no later than 120 days after the deadline closed for states to apply for MCH Services Block Grant funds. The 50 states, the District of Columbia, and the territories (Puerto Rico, U.S. Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, and Republic of Palau) are eligible to apply. In FY2017, 37 states and two territories (Puerto Rico and the Federated States of Micronesia) applied for and received funding (under the Title V Abstinence Education Grant program). States/territories or other entities are required to implement sexual risk avoidance education that is medically accurate and complete, age-appropriate, and based on adolescent learning and developmental theories for the age group receiving the education. The education must also be culturally appropriate, recognizing the experiences of youth from diverse communities, backgrounds, and situations. As described in the previous text box, sexual risk avoidance education must address six topics. If sexual risk avoidance education includes any information about contraception, such information must be medically accurate and ensure that students understand that contraception reduces physical risk but does not eliminate risk. In addition, sexual risk avoidance education may not include demonstration, simulations, or distribution of such contraceptive devices. A state or other entity that receives Title V Sexual Risk Avoidance Education funding must, as specified by the HHS Secretary, collect information on the programs and activities funded through their allotments and submit reports to HHS on the data collected from such programs and activities. Under the Title V Abstinence Education Grant program, HHS has required all jurisdictions to measure the success of their abstinence programs through at least two outcome measures, one of which must be abstinence as a means for preventing teen pregnancy, births, and/or STIs. Additionally, HHS has encouraged jurisdictions to identify programs that have demonstrated effectiveness in delaying the initiation of sexual activity or promoting abstinence from sexual activity. HHS has directed grantees to the TPP Evidence Review, though has not require grantees to use the models identified in the review. A state or other entity receiving funding under the Title V Sexual Risk Avoidance Education program may use up to 20% of its allotment to build the evidence base for sexual risk avoidance education by conducting or supporting research. Any such research must be rigorous, evidence-based, and designed and conducted by independent researchers who have experience in conducting and publishing research in peer-reviewed outlets. Separately, HHS is required to conduct one or more rigorous evaluations of the education (and associated data) funded through the Title V Sexual Risk Avoidance Education program. This evaluation is to be conducted in consultation with "appropriate State and local agencies." HHS is to consult with relevant stakeholders and evaluation experts about the evaluation(s). HHS must submit a report to Congress on the results of the evaluation(s). The report must also include a summary of the information collected and reported by states and other entities on their Sexual Risk Avoidance Education programs and activities. The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 ( P.L. 105-133 ) directed HHS to conduct evaluation activities of the prior Title V Abstinence Education Grant program. In response, HHS undertook a multi-year evaluation that included a study of how grantees in four states implemented abstinence education programs and a separate study that rigorously evaluated whether grantees' programs had impacts on teen sexual abstinence and related outcomes. The programs targeted youth in elementary and middle school and engaged them as part of the school setting, including in afterschool programming. Each youth participated for more than 50 hours. The study tracked outcomes for youth four and six years after they were enrolled in it. The impact evaluation found that youth who received abstinence education under the program did not have different outcomes than youth in the control group. They were no more likely than their peers in the study to have abstained from sex. As noted, federal funding has supported abstinence-only education through the Community-Based Abstinence Education program (FY2001 through FY2009) and the Competitive Abstinence-Only program (FY2012 through FY2015). In each of FY2016 through FY2018, annual omnibus appropriations laws provided funding to support abstinence-only education through the Sexual Risk Avoidance Education program. Funding was $5 million in FY2016, $15 million in FY2017, and $25 million in FY2018. The appropriations laws have specified that Sexual Risk Avoidance Education grants are to be awarded by HHS on a competitive basis; use medically accurate information; "implement an evidence-based approach integrating research findings with practical implementation that aligns with the needs and desired outcomes for the intended audience;" and "teach the benefits associated with self-regulation, success sequencing for poverty prevention, healthy relationships, goal setting, and resisting sexual coercion, dating violence, and other youth risk behaviors such as underage drinking or illicit drug use without normalizing teen sexual activity." The appropriations law provided that up to 10% of the funding for sexual risk avoidance can be made available for technical assistance and administrative costs. Through the grant application process for the Sexual Risk Avoidance Education program, HHS has identified multiple types of entities that are eligible for funding, including states, territories, and localities (county, city, township, special districts); school districts; public and state-controlled institutions of higher education; federally recognized tribal governments; Native American tribal organizations; public and Indian housing authorities; nonprofit organizations other than institutions of higher education; private institutions of higher education; small business; and for-profit organizations other than small businesses. ACF awarded 10 grants in FY2015, 21 grants in FY2016, and 27 grants in FY2017. As specified in the funding announcement, grantees must incorporate an evidence-based program and/or effective strategies that have demonstrated impacts on delaying the initiation of sexual activity. HHS advises Sexual Risk Avoidance Education grantees to review evidence-based program models that are included as part of the TPP Evidence Review. In addition, grantees must link program participants to services with community agencies that support the health, safety, and well-being of participants. Appropriations law and program funding announcements do not direct HHS or grantees to carry out evaluation activities. HHS tracks Sexual Risk Avoidance Education grantee performance--related to youth served, fidelity to curriculum, implementation, outcome measures, and community data--for monitoring purposes, not to measure the impacts of the program. Appendix A. Federal Teen Pregnancy Prevention Programs Appendix B. Grantees Funded Under the Federal Teen Pregnancy Prevention Programs, by State

Congress has an interest in preventing pregnancy among teenagers because of the long-term consequences for the families of teen parents and society more generally. Since the 1980s, Congress has authorized--and the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has administered--programs with a focus on teen pregnancy prevention. This report intends to assist Congress with tracking developments in four teen pregnancy prevention programs that are currently funded. The report provides detailed information about each program and includes a table that can illustrate the ways in which the programs are both similar and different. The four current programs are the Teen Pregnancy Prevention (TPP) program, the Personal Responsibility Education Program (PREP), the Title V Sexual Risk Avoidance Education program, and the Sexual Risk Avoidance Education program. Despite their similar names and purposes, the latter two programs have different authorizing laws and funding mechanisms. Generally, the four programs serve vulnerable young people in schools, afterschool programs, community centers, and other settings. Grantees include states, nonprofits, and other entities. The TPP program was established and funded by the FY2010 omnibus appropriations law (P.L. 111-117). Subsequent appropriations laws have also provided discretionary funding. As required in appropriations law, the majority of TPP program grants (Tier 1) must use evidence-based education models that have been shown to be effective in reducing teen pregnancy and related risk behaviors. A smaller share of funds is available for research and demonstration grants (Tier 2) that implement innovative strategies to prevent teenage pregnancy. FY2018 funding for the TPP program is $101 million. HHS has taken steps to discontinue the current cohort of grants. PREP was established under Section 513 of the Social Security Act by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA, P.L. 111-148) in 2010. The program receives mandatory funding and is designed to educate adolescents on both abstinence and contraception for preventing pregnancy and sexually transmitted infections, and on selected adult preparation subjects. The PREP authorizing law requires most grantees to replicate evidence-based programs that are proven to change behavior related to teen pregnancy. FY2018 funding for the program is $75 million. The Title V Sexual Risk Avoidance Education program is authorized at Section 510 (Title V) of the Social Security Act. It was formerly known as the Title V Abstinence Education Grant program, which was authorized by the 1996 welfare reform law (P.L. 104-193). The Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-123) renamed the program and made other changes. The program focuses on implementing sexual risk avoidance, meaning voluntarily refraining from sex before marriage. Grantees may set aside some of their funding to conduct rigorous and evidence-based research on sexual risk avoidance. FY2018 funding for the program is $75 million. The Sexual Risk Avoidance Education program (not to be confused with the Title V program of the same name) was established and funded by the FY2016 omnibus appropriations law (P.L. 114-113). Other appropriations laws have since provided discretionary funding. Grantees are to use funding for education on voluntarily refraining from non-marital sexual activity, and they are encouraged to implement evidence-based approaches that teach the benefits associated with resisting risk behaviors. FY2018 funding for the program is $25 million. Multiple HHS offices worked together to establish the Teen Pregnancy Prevention (TPP) Evidence Review process following enactment of the FY2010 omnibus appropriations law (P.L. 111-117). The review is intended to inform the teen pregnancy prevention field about which prevention models have been shown to be effective based on studies from the past 20 years. TPP Tier 1 grantees must use models identified in the review. HHS encourages grantees for the other teen pregnancy prevention programs to use models identified in the review as well.

Casework in a congressional office refers to the response or services that Members of Congress provide to constituents who request assistance. Casework appears to be one of the more enduring representational activities; Members of Congress have been providing such service since the early years of the American republic. In contemporary times, thousands of constituents seek assistance annually from Members of Congress, with requests ranging from the simple to the complex. Members and their staffs help individual constituents deal with administrative agencies by acting as facilitators, ombudsmen, and, in some cases, advocates. Typical casework requests include the following: tracking a misdirected benefits payment; filling out a government form; applying for Social Security, veterans', education, and other federal benefits; explaining government activities or decisions; applying to a military service academy; seeking relief from a federal administrative decision; and seeking assistance for those immigrating to the United States or applying for U.S. citizenship. In addition to providing services to individual constituents, some congressional offices also consider their liaison activities between the federal government and local governments or businesses concerned about the effects of federal legislation or regulation to be casework. Other congressional offices may include interactions with communities and nonprofit organizations seeking federal grants or other assistance as casework. All congressional offices carry out some type of casework. As part of the process of determining how to carry out their congressional duties, Members of Congress determine the scope of their constituent service activities. As a consequence, the level and intensity of congressional casework may vary among Member offices. Casework is conducted for various reasons, including constituent demand and a broadly held understanding among Members and their staff that casework is integral to the representational duties of a Member of Congress. Others believe that casework activities can be part of an outreach strategy to build political support among constituents. Casework might also be seen by some as an evaluative stage of the legislative process. Some observers suggest that casework inquiries can provide Members of Congress with a micro-level view of executive agency activities, affording Members the opportunity to evaluate whether a program is functioning as Congress intended. Constituent inquiries about specific policies, programs, or benefits may also suggest areas in which programmatic or policy changes require additional institutional oversight, or further legislative consideration. One challenge to congressional casework is the widely held public perception that Members of Congress can initiate a broad array of actions resulting in a speedy, favorable outcome. The rules of the House and Senate, and laws and regulations governing federal executive agency activities, however, closely limit the extent of an intervention made on behalf of a constituent. When conducting casework, congressional staff cannot force an agency to expedite a case or act in favor of a constituent. Congressional staff may intervene to facilitate the appropriate administrative processes involved, encourage an agency to give a case consideration, and sometimes advocate for a favorable outcome. Subsequent sections of this report discuss House and Senate rules and guidelines, laws, and regulations affecting congressional casework, as well as the role of caseworkers. This report also provides sample outlines and document templates for establishing and managing congressional casework. Further casework materials are available at the CRS Casework Resources web page at http://crs.gov/resources/Pages/CS-Casework.aspx . Each chamber has rules and guidelines regarding its Members' casework activities. House rules regarding casework services are discussed in the House Ethics Manual . Senate Rule XLIII and the Senate Ethics Manual establish parameters for casework services in that chamber. In each chamber, at the request of a constituent or petitioner for assistance, a Member of Congress may do the following: request information or a status report; urge prompt consideration; arrange for interviews or appointments; express judgments; call for reconsideration of an administrative response that the Member believes is not reasonably supported by statutes, regulations, or considerations of equity or public policy; or perform any other service of a similar nature consistent with the provisions of the rules of the House or Senate. Senate Rule XLIII (3) prohibits the provision of casework assistance on the basis of contributions or services to organizations in which the Senator has a political, personal, or financial interest. Guidelines in the House Ethics Manual say that when contacting a federal agency on behalf of a constituent, a Member, officer, or employee of the House should not make prohibited, off the record comments, receive things of value for providing casework assistance, or improperly pressure agency officials. Finally, federal statute prohibits Members of Congress, chamber officers, and congressional staff from representing anyone before the federal government, except in the performance of their official duties. Casework is generally not something that draws Members of Congress or their staff, acting in their official capacity, into a proceeding before the courts. The Senate Ethics Manual describes constituent service as something that occurs in the executive branch and is silent on service before the courts. Guidelines in the House Ethics Manual provide a range of options to Members who might choose to participate in judicial proceedings. Decisions regarding staff employment in congressional offices rest with each Member of Congress, subject to applicable law and chamber rules. Some chamber administrative materials, such as the Member's Handbook (for the House) or the U.S. Senate Handbook (for the Senate), provide guidelines regarding what procedures must be followed to provide compensation, credentials, and general benefits such as health care and retirement programs to House or Senate employees. Those documents provide no guidance on how a congressional hiring entity might determine the necessity of, or criteria for, a position, or the fitness of an applicant for employment. Experienced congressional staff and other observers suggest that a successful congressional caseworker is primarily a problem solver. One study of congressional staff states that a "constituent services representative/caseworker" typically carries out the following duties: responds to casework inquiries from constituents; acts as a liaison with federal, state, and/or local agencies on behalf of constituents; acts as the grassroots representative for the Member within assigned areas of responsibility; and monitors and updates the Member and district director on district and local issues. To carry out their duties, congressional caseworkers typically communicate clearly with constituents about what can and cannot be done on their behalf; learn the laws and regulations affecting a constituent's case; build relationships with federal agency personnel; and serve as a neutral facilitator between the constituent and agency. No specialized training is required to become a congressional caseworker. Individuals who work as caseworkers come from a variety of backgrounds, including recently completed study or work experience in education, law, teaching, social work, political campaigns, government service, and the private sector. Observers suggest that most caseworkers enjoy working with people and have an interest in public service, but also note that the work can be challenging. Caseworkers typically learn the policies and procedures through which agencies operate to provide services or benefits, and work with constituents whose requests are sometimes made with a high level of personal and emotional engagement. Matters regarding the management of casework activities are at the discretion of individual congressional offices, subject to the rules of their respective chambers, relevant law, and the priorities of that office. Two laws, the Privacy Act of 1974 and the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), affect casework. The Privacy Act affects all constituents with casework inquiries that require interaction with a federal agency. HIPAA may affect constituents with casework inquiries that involve medical or other health-care information. These laws prevent a federal agency from sharing an individual's personally identifiable information with a congressional office without the individual's express permission. Each congressional office establishes its own policies and procedures regarding the provision of casework services. These are typically based on a number of factors, which may be weighed differently in each congressional office, and include the demands or needs of constituents for casework services; the type and nature of cases; the manner in which an office defines casework; office strategy for outreach, including decisions regarding the solicitation of casework; and Member priorities. Under the Privacy Act, each executive branch agency that maintains records containing an individual's personally identifiable information must have a release from that individual to share information with any other entity. In general, agencies cannot reply to a congressional inquiry without a Privacy Act release signed by the constituent requesting assistance. Most agencies will accept any signed document from a constituent stating that the constituent grants a Member of Congress access to any record held by an agency that will help resolve the constituent's inquiry. (Sample authorizations are included below.) Some agencies, however, issue their own forms and might prefer to have that form filed with them when a congressional office initiates a case inquiry. For example, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) typically requests that congressional caseworkers ask constituents to return a signed copy of IRS form 8821, Tax Information Authorization. Constituent correspondence sent to a Member's office does not fall under the protections provided by the Privacy Act or any other statute safeguarding personally identifiable records. Nevertheless, due to the high probability of an expectation of privacy concerning these communications, and Member interest in maintaining the confidentiality of office activities, many congressional offices develop a policy for safeguarding the privacy of casework-related documents. Such a policy could include safeguarding casework correspondence and documentation in the office's physical and electronic files; securing electronic files through password protection and automatic backup procedures; and limiting access to casework correspondence files, including working drafts of correspondence, to office personnel. Rules promulgated under HIPAA give patients the right of access to their medical information and prohibit health plans and health-care providers from using or disclosing identifiable information to most individuals or entities without a patient's written authorization. Examples of constituent inquiries that might involve medical information include claims for benefits under the following programs: Social Security disability; veterans' programs; Medicare; disaster relief; medical services to military members injured on active duty, or to military members, their dependents, and retirees through TRICARE; workmens' compensation; and immigration. Some agencies have determined that congressional requests for medical information related to casework inquiries require a HIPAA release. HIPAA rules also require health plans and providers to give individuals the opportunity to object to the disclosure. Procedures for securing patient consent to release information or to provide information to third parties may vary from agency to agency. When medical or other health-care information must be released for a casework inquiry, the agency involved might accept a signed request from the constituent to the Member as a sufficient release, or it might forward a formal release form of its own design to the congressional office for endorsement by the constituent. Based on the priorities identified in individual congressional offices, many offices compile documentation to clarify policies related to casework. Such documentation could specify casework goals, management procedures, and expectations of staff. Having a manual or established protocol can help offices ensure consistency in their casework practices. This type of document is not required, and there is no congressional standard regarding its format or contents. All decisions regarding activities and operations in a Member's office are within the discretion of the Member, subject to chamber rules and relevant statute. Procedures are typically developed by modifying standardized outlines and protocols to a particular office, based on the priorities and goals of that office and the preferences and needs of the Member's constituents. The outline below suggests questions to help develop an office casework manual addressing those demands. Sample documents, which may be used in whole or in part, are also provided. This section of the manual could be where congressional offices explain their approach to constituent service. Information might include a consideration of the role of representation, casework as micro-level oversight, and political issues related to casework. This section could also explain the role of casework in relation to broader office goals and the caseworker's role in meeting those goals. Questions that might be addressed in this section include the following: What are the goals of the office? How does casework support or facilitate the achievement of those goals? Where does casework fit in terms of office priorities? This section could provide an overview of office organization and operations. Questions that might be addressed in this section include the following: What do caseworkers do? Will caseworkers work on specific agency/issue areas or will they all be generalists? Are caseworkers liaisons between the constituent and agency, or are they advocates for the constituent? Who supervises caseworkers? What is the extent of that supervision? To whom does that supervisor report? Where does casework fit in the office organization? This section could incorporate the rules and guidelines regarding casework of the House or Senate, as appropriate. Such documents could include Senate Rule XLIII and the Senate Ethics Manual , Chapter 8, "Constituent Services," available at http://ethics.senate.gov/downloads/pdffiles/manual.pdf , and the Ethics Manual for Members, Officers, and Employees of the U.S. House of Representatives ( House Ethics Manual ), Chapter 8, "Casework," available at http://ethics.house.gov/Media/PDF/2008_House_Ethics_Manual.pdf . In addition, this section could detail rules or procedures specific to the particular congressional office. Questions that might be addressed in this section include how to contact the Senate Ethics Committee or the House Ethics Committee, as appropriate; practices for storing casework records (paper-based and/or digital); a review of office security and personal safety procedures; and strategies for dealing with people who may be uncooperative, scared, angry, etc. Intake describes the process by which constituents request casework services and a congressional office prepares to respond. Intake procedures could define the information and materials needed from constituents, including the release of personal information under the Privacy Act of 1974 (sample forms below) and HIPAA, if necessary. Questions that might be addressed in developing procedures for the intake process include the following: Who is responsible in your office for intake (caseworkers, outreach or reception staff, everyone)? What training or protocols are necessary so that everyone charged with intake can do the job effectively? Will the office open a case file on the basis of a phone call, email, or a constituent visit to an office? How will case requests made during outreach and other public events be incorporated into the casework system? Does the office establish verification procedures to positively identify constituents? If so, what constitutes acceptable identification? What procedures must be established if constituents cannot produce appropriate documentation of their identity? What procedures might be necessary to obtain a privacy release from constituents who cannot read English or sign their own name? Will the office open a case on behalf of constituents represented by family members or other individuals who hold a power of attorney, or are legally appointed as a guardian to act on their behalf? Will the office open a case on behalf of a constituent represented by an attorney or other paid representative? If so, will the office work with the attorney, the constituent, or both? What procedures need to be in place to address potentially high-profile cases? How much time will the office allow between a constituent inquiry and a response by the office, such as an acknowledgment or a request for more information? How much time will the office allow for a constituent to reply to follow up? After that time has elapsed, will the office send a reminder letter or close the case file? How long will incomplete case files due to missing privacy release or other documentation from constituent remain active? What sort of casework/constituent correspondence management system (CMS) will be used? (Although a CMS likely has been chosen by the office, explain how it will be integrated, if at all, with casework management.) Who has access to the CMS for reviewing cases, updating records, and closing and archiving files? Following the intake process, it is generally necessary to determine the scope of the constituent's case and to set expectations between the caseworker and the constituent. Questions that might be addressed in developing procedures for working with constituents include the following: Will the office take original documents from constituents, or are copies sufficient? How will the office communicate with constituents? How will nonwritten contact be documented? How frequently will the office communicate with constituents to provide updates, status checks, or other information? How will the office communicate these expectations to the constituent? (See the samples below.) At the end of the intake process, it is necessary to identify and contact the appropriate agency to address the constituent's concerns. Many congressional offices maintain lists of the executive branch agencies they work with. If such lists are not available, preliminary information on agencies with congressional liaison offices can be obtained from Congressional Liaison Offices , at http://www.crs.gov/resources/liaisonoffices/ . Questions that might be addressed in developing procedures for working with executive branch agencies include the following: How much time will the office allow between establishing complete constituent information and contact with the agency? How much time will the office allow between initial agency contact and subsequent follow up? How much time will the office allow between receiving the agency's response and communicating the response to the constituent? What types of contacts (phone, email, written, face-to-face) are acceptable to make inquiries from the office and to receive responses from the agencies? Will individual caseworkers, a coordinator, or a supervisor maintain lists of agency contacts? In the event that the person responsible for maintaining those lists of contacts is not available, how will other staff contact the agencies? Is it necessary to establish specific protocols for working with individual agencies? (A list of agencies for which protocols might be developed is provided below.) A common concern regarding casework records is their maintenance while cases are open, and their disposition when cases are concluded. The House and Senate consider the records generated in a Member's office to be the personal property of the Member. As a consequence, policies regarding casework records are at the discretion of individual Member offices. The House Records Management Manual for Members notes that to "safeguard personal information, most Members will not transfer case files to a repository." The Manual notes that offices could keep permanently "reports summarizing the types of casework generated by the office as long as they contain no personal information about constituents (e.g., names or Social Security numbers)." When individual casework files are removed from office files, they "should be destroyed in a secure manner." In the Senate, records management guidelines suggest that all documents pertaining to a case should be kept together. Routine cases could be kept in the office as long as they are open, and for two years after they are closed, after which they may be destroyed. Cases that might be kept permanently include those with bearing on agency oversight or matters of interest to the Senator or state. Those records could be retained in the office as long as they are open, and for one year after they are closed, after which they may be transferred to an archival repository. Office casework manual. Chamber-appropriate ethics manual chapter on casework. Congressional Liaison Offices , at http://www.crs.gov/resources/liaisonoffices . Casework manuals and constituent services guides issued by the agencies for which the caseworker is responsible. Office-developed contact lists. Casework intake protocols. Instructions for accessing casework materials in physical or electronic files. Caseworker contact information. General agency contact information. 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In a congressional office, the term casework refers to the response or services that Members of Congress provide to constituents who request assistance. Each year, thousands of constituents turn to Members of Congress with a wide range of requests, from the simple to the complex. Members and their staffs help constituents deal with administrative agencies by acting as facilitators, ombudsmen, and, in some cases, advocates. In addition to serving individual constituents, some congressional offices also consider as casework liaison activities between the federal government and local governments, businesses, communities, and nonprofit organizations. Members of Congress determine the scope of their constituent service activities. Casework is conducted for various reasons, including a broadly held understanding among Members and staff that casework is integral to the representational duties of a Member of Congress. Casework activities may also be viewed as part of an outreach strategy to build political support, or as an evaluative stage of the legislative process. Constituent inquiries about specific policies, programs, or benefits may suggest areas where government programs or policies require institutional oversight or legislative consideration. One challenge to congressional casework is the widely held public perception that Members of Congress can initiate a broad array of actions resulting in a speedy, favorable outcome. The rules of the House and Senate, and laws and regulations governing federal executive agency activities, however, closely limit interventions made on the behalf of constituents. When performing casework, congressional staff cannot force an agency to expedite a case or act in favor of a constituent. However, congressional staff can intervene to facilitate the appropriate administrative processes, encourage an agency to give a case consideration, and sometimes advocate for a favorable outcome. This report discusses House and Senate rules and guidelines, laws, and regulations affecting congressional casework, as well as the role of caseworkers. It also provides sample outlines and document templates for implementing and managing congressional casework. Further casework materials are available at the CRS Casework Resources web page at http://crs.gov/resources/Pages/CS-Casework.aspx.

Estimates of the number of Muslims in Europe vary widely, depending on the methodology and definitions used, and the geographical limits imposed. Excluding Turkey and the Balkans, researchers estimate that as many as 15 to 20 million Muslims live on the European continent. Muslims are the largest religious minority in Europe, and Islam is the continent's fastest growing religion. Substantial Muslim populations exist in Western European countries, including France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Spain, Italy, the Netherlands, and Belgium. Most Nordic and Central European countries have smaller Muslim communities. Europe's Muslim population is ethnically and linguistically diverse; Muslim immigrants hail from Middle Eastern, African, and Asian countries, as well as Turkey. Many Muslim communities have their roots in Western European labor shortages and immigration policies of the 1950s and 1960s that attracted large numbers of North Africans, Turks, and Pakistanis especially. In recent years, there have been influxes of Muslim migrants and political refugees from other regions and countries, including the Balkans, Iraq, Somalia, and the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Historically, European countries have pursued somewhat different policies with respect to managing their immigrant and minority populations. However, none has been completely successful. A disproportionately large number of Muslims in Europe are poor, unemployed, or imprisoned, and many feel a sense of cultural alienation and discrimination. For decades, countries such as Germany, Austria, and Switzerland viewed Muslim immigrants as temporary "guest workers." As a result, little effort was made at integration, and parallel societies developed. Britain and the Netherlands embraced the notion of multiculturalism--integration while maintaining identity--but in practice, this concept helped entrench discrete Muslim communities, functioning apart from the culture of the host country. Nor has France's assimilation policy prevented the segregation of its Muslim communities, as seen most vividly in the riots that erupted throughout France in the fall of 2005 in working class suburbs populated largely by North Africans. The protests in several European cities in early 2006 sparked by the publication in European newspapers of cartoons of the prophet Muhammad also highlight the disaffection and alienation that many European Muslims feel. Although the vast majority of Muslims in Europe are not involved in radical activities, Islamist extremists and fringe communities that advocate terrorism exist and reportedly have provided cover for terrorist cells. Europe's largely open borders and previously non-existent or lax terrorism laws have also allowed some Islamist terrorists to move around freely. Following the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States, Germany and Spain were identified as key planning bases; numerous terrorist arrests were also made in Belgium, France, Italy, and the UK. The March 11, 2004, bombings of commuter trains in Madrid, Spain that killed 191 people were carried out by an Al Qaeda-inspired group of North Africans, mostly Moroccans resident in Spain. Even before terrorists struck London's mass transport system in July 2005, many analysts believed that the UK had become a breeding ground for Islamist extremists. Radical mosques in London apparently indoctrinated Richard Reid, the airplane "shoe bomber," and Zacarias Moussaoui, the "20 th " September 11 hijacker. UK authorities have named four young British Muslims as the perpetrators of the July 7, 2005 London attacks that killed 52 people, plus the four bombers, and injured over 700. Three of the alleged bombers were of Pakistani descent and had recently traveled to Pakistan, where some suspect they received terrorist training from remaining Al Qaeda operatives. On July 21, 2005, four Muslim immigrants tried but failed to set off four other explosions on London's metro and bus lines; no casualties resulted. And in August 2006, British police arrested several British Muslims suspected of involvement in a plot to detonate liquid explosives on airliners flying from the UK to the United States. Nationals aligning their beliefs with Al Qaeda or radical Islam are not unique to Europe. The United States has captured or identified several U.S. citizens with similar views in the course of the fight against terrorism. However, some assert that the failure of European governments to fully integrate Muslim communities into mainstream society leaves some European Muslims more vulnerable to extremist ideologies. Many experts say that some European Muslim youth, many of whom are second or third generation Europeans, feel disenfranchised in a society that does not fully accept them; they appear to turn to Islam as a badge of cultural identity, and are then radicalized by extremist Muslim clerics. Traditionally liberal asylum and immigration laws in Western Europe, as well as strong free speech and privacy protections, have attracted numerous such clerics and Middle Eastern dissidents. Some experts also believe that the recent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have radicalized more European Muslims, and strengthened terrorist recruitment efforts. Many European Muslims claim common cause with suffering brethren in the Israeli-occupied Palestinian territories, as well as in Iraq, Chechnya, and elsewhere. They tend to view the "war on terrorism" as a war on Islam, and perceive an unjust double standard at work in the foreign policies of many European governments, especially those that supported the U.S.-led war in Iraq. Before being captured in September 2005, Al Qaeda training camp manager Abu Musab al-Suri noted in a communique that he had overseen the training of both Arab and non-Arab Muslims, including some individuals born or raised in Britain, the United States, and other Western countries. Al-Suri called upon the mujahideen in Europe to act quickly and strike the UK, the Netherlands, Italy, Denmark, Germany, France, and other countries with a military presence in Iraq, Afghanistan, or on the Arabian peninsula. Media reports indicate instances of French Muslim teenagers being recruited to fight in Iraq; German, Italian, and Spanish law enforcement authorities also report that they have disrupted efforts by Islamist extremists to recruit European youths for Iraq. In November 2005, a Belgian woman and convert to Islam blew herself up in an attempted suicide attack on U.S. forces in Iraq. Some analysts suggest that religious converts to Islam may be more susceptible to radicalization as a result of a mistaken desire to prove themselves in their new faith. Others note that Europe's physical location--within a few days driving distance to Iraq or Chechnya--makes it vulnerable to fighters returning from conflict zones who have either European roots or are unable to return to their countries of origin. Press reports suggest that Iraqis and others tied to the insurgency have been active in Europe. In December 2004, German authorities arrested three Iraqis suspected of plotting to assassinate the interim Iraqi prime minister during a visit to Berlin; the three Iraqis allegedly belong to Ansar al-Islam, which has organized strikes against U.S. troops and others in Iraq. In January 2006, a German court convicted an Iraqi man of both recruiting young men for the Iraqi insurgency and smuggling extremists from Iraq into Germany, Britain, and other European countries. Central and Eastern Europe has not been reported to be as important a haven for Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups; most countries in the region have not attracted significant numbers of Muslim immigrants. However, concerns have been raised about several countries in Southeastern Europe with large Muslim populations (e.g., Bosnia-Herzegovina). One legacy of the 1992-1995 war in Bosnia is the presence of Islamist fighters from other countries who stayed behind and became Bosnian citizens. Some Islamic charities that proliferated during and after the war reportedly served as Al Qaeda money-laundering fronts. Terrorist groups have also operated from Albania. At the same time, opposition to terrorism among indigenous Muslims in the Balkans has been strong. Most view themselves as part of Europe and are grateful for the U.S. role in defending them against Serbian aggression in the 1990s. U.S. officials say that efforts by Islamist extremists to recruit local Muslims have met with limited success, and they praise these countries' anti-terrorism efforts, especially after September 11. Nevertheless, some experts assert that Central and Southeastern Europe may pose a more significant threat than often acknowledged. The region's weak governing institutions and problems with organized crime and corruption may make it vulnerable to infiltration by terrorist groups. Observers caution that the Balkans in particular may play a role as a transit point for terrorists, a target area for recruitment, and a potential source of weapons or explosives. The November 2004 murder of Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh brought the issue of Islamist extremism in Europe to the forefront of European political debate. Van Gogh, an outspoken critic of the treatment of women in Islam, was killed by a 27-year-old Dutch citizen of Moroccan descent and a follower of radical Islam. Since the murder, many European officials and social commentators have proclaimed that multiculturalism in Europe has failed, and called for greater integration of Muslims and other immigrants into mainstream European society. They believe that Muslims and others must embrace the native cultures of their new countries, including secularism. Some European governments have been pursuing initiatives aimed at fostering integration and promoting secularism for several years. The French government, for example, has banned "conspicuous" religious symbols in public schools, including headscarves for Muslim girls, yarmulkes, and large crucifixes. Moderate Muslim groups in France supported the ban as a means to reduce tensions in the school system and in broader society. The UK is introducing new citizenship classes to ensure that immigrants can speak English and understand British history and culture. Other analysts say that countries such as Spain, Italy, and Germany need to do more to encourage Muslim immigrants to become citizens. Some European governments are trying to encourage moderate Muslim political voices and promote a greater role for them. Commentators note, for example, that there are few Muslim representatives in European parliaments. In 2003, Paris established an elected French Council of the Muslim Faith, an official advisory body that acts as the Muslim community's representative in dealings with the French government. French and British officials are also looking at ways to foster "homegrown imams" to minister to the needs of their Muslim communities, rather than relying on foreign imams whom they claim are often unfamiliar with the West or beholden to foreign interests. The Netherlands has reportedly created an "imam buddy system" that links foreign imams with Dutch volunteers to promote a better understanding among these imams of Dutch culture and society. Others argue that greater focus should be placed on addressing the lack of jobs and educational opportunities for Muslims, as well as racism. They say that racial violence against Muslims is on the rise in some European countries, such as the Netherlands, but governments have failed to acknowledge the scale of the problem. Several analysts suggest that mainstreaming Muslims into European society would not necessarily translate into an embrace of European ideals; some even question whether Islam itself is compatible with European political principles and values. They point out, for example, that two British Muslim suicide bombers in Israel in April 2003 were from comfortable middle-class, Westernized suburbs. Some Muslim groups in Europe say that certain efforts toward integration, such as the French headscarf ban, are counterproductive and only serve to increase the sense of discrimination among Muslims. In the wake of the London bombings, the UK government is consulting with British Muslims on how to best tackle extremism. Some Muslim leaders argue that Muslim communities must be more vocal against extremism, and actively counter rather than tolerate radical preachers. European governments have also sought to contain Islamist extremists and counter terrorists by tightening security measures and reforming immigration and asylum laws. UK and French security services have reportedly increased their monitoring of mosques; Germany has changed its laws to allow authorities to investigate religious groups; and France and Italy have expelled some Muslim clerics for hate crimes. Following the London attacks in 2005, the British government has sought to make it easier to exclude or deport foreign individuals who incite hatred. Also notable are European Union (EU) efforts to boost police and judicial cooperation, enhance intelligence-sharing, and strengthen external EU border controls. Security and border control services in new EU members in Central and Eastern Europe, although not quite as effective as their Western counterparts, are also improving as they seek to meet EU standards. In addition, the EU has been working to encourage good integration practices among its 27 member states and prevent radicalization. Law enforcement challenges remain throughout Europe, as elsewhere. Long-standing traditions against intelligence-sharing, rivalries among the various local and national security services, and different national laws continue to impede more robust EU cooperation. For example, full implementation of the EU-wide arrest warrant has been slowed in Poland and Cyprus because of court rulings that found the warrant incompatible with constitutional bans on extraditing their own nationals. European governments are also struggling with balancing their efforts to curtail Islamist extremists against well-established civil liberty protections, strong privacy rights, and democratic ideals. U.S. officials have expressed concerns since the 2001 terrorist attacks that Europe might be a launching point for future attacks on the United States and U.S. interests abroad. The Bush Administration and Members of Congress have welcomed European initiatives to curtail Islamist extremism and improve U.S.-EU counterterrorism cooperation in the hopes that such efforts will ultimately help root out terrorist cells in Europe and beyond. The United States and the EU have been placing increasing emphasis on cooperation in the areas of intelligence-sharing, border control, and transport security. Among other initiatives, the two sides have concluded agreements to improve container security and exchange airline passenger information. Nevertheless, some challenges remain; for example, differences persist in U.S.-EU data protection regimes and, at times, have complicated closer cooperation on travel security. Some terrorism experts and Members of Congress remain concerned about the U.S. Visa Waiver Program (VWP), despite steps taken to tighten passport requirements for participating countries. The VWP allows more than 15 million people a year short-term visa-free travel to the United States from 27 countries, most of which are in Europe. The VWP has become a sticking point in U.S.-EU relations; the EU would like the VWP to be extended to all EU members (currently 12 are excluded due to problems meeting U.S. immigration laws). Some Members of Congress oppose expanding or even continuing the VWP, noting that Islamist terrorists who hold European citizenship have entered the United States on the VWP (UK-born Richard Reid and French citizen Zacarias Moussaoui being two notable examples). Also, stolen passports from VWP countries are prized travel documents among terrorists, criminals, and immigration law violators, creating an additional risk. Other Members are more supportive of extending the VWP to new EU members, mostly in central and eastern Europe, given their roles as U.S. allies in NATO and in the fight against terrorism. Some experts also caution that eliminating or curtailing the VWP could impede transatlantic tourism and commerce. Some analysts contend that the presence of large Muslim communities in Europe may also be influencing the policy preferences of some European governments on contentious Middle East issues and contributing to U.S.-European divisions. They argue that Europe's growing Muslim population has made some European officials more cautious about supporting U.S. policies that risk inflaming their own "Muslim streets." They suggest that this is one reason why countries such as France and Germany opposed the U.S.-led war in Iraq. Meanwhile, Europe's struggle with its own identity as it grapples with integrating Muslims into European society has called into question Turkey's long-term EU prospects. Washington has long advocated EU membership for Turkey, a country of 70 million Muslims, as a way to anchor this strategic ally firmly in the West and debunk the notion of a clash of civilizations between Islam and the West.

Although the vast majority of Muslims in Europe are not involved in radical activities, Islamist extremists and vocal fringe communities that advocate terrorism exist and reportedly have provided cover for terrorist cells. Germany and Spain were identified as key logistical and planning bases for the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States. The March 2004 terrorist bombings in Madrid have been attributed to an Al Qaeda-inspired group of North Africans. UK authorities have named four British Muslims as the perpetrators of the July 2005 terrorist attacks on London; in August 2006, British law enforcement arrested several British Muslims suspected of plotting to blow up airliners flying from the UK to the United States. This report provides an overview of Islamist extremism in Europe, possible terrorist links, European responses, and implications for the United States. It will be updated as needed. See also CRS Report RL31612, European Counterterrorist Efforts: Political Will and Diverse Responses in the First Year After September 11, by [author name scrubbed] (pdf), and CRS Report RL33166, Muslims in Europe: Integration in Selected Countries, by [author name scrubbed] et al.

A gricultural exports are important to both farmers and the U.S. economy. In 2016, U.S. agricultural exports totaled nearly $135 billion. Major U.S. agricultural exports, by value, were oilseeds and grains, meat and animal products, tree nuts, and fruit and vegetable products ( Figure 1 ). As U.S. agricultural production has grown faster than domestic demand, farmers and agriculturally oriented firms rely heavily on export markets to sustain prices and revenue. Accordingly, the 2014 farm bill (Agricultural Act of 2014, P.L. 113-79 ) authorizes a number of programs to promote farm exports. These programs are administered by the Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS) of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). This report also discusses how these programs comply with international trade rules under the World Trade Organization (WTO). Other federal agencies also play a role in supporting agricultural exports through various finance, insurance, and loan programs. Following an overview of USDA's export promotion programs, this report describes available research and analysis of the effectiveness of these programs, highlighting advocacy positions both for and against USDA's programs. These programs could become an issue for Congress in the next farm bill debate: Legislation introduced in both the House and the Senate seeks to double available annual funding for some of these programs, while others in Congress who have long opposed these programs have called for reduced funding and/or program elimination. Figure 1. USDA Agricultural Exports, 1989-2016Source: CRS from USDA trade (https://apps.fas.usda.gov/gats/default.aspx). USDA's FAS administers a series of programs to develop export markets for U.S. agricultural products. These programs are authorized in periodic omnibus farm bills. USDA administers two types of agricultural trade and export promotion programs: 1. Export market development programs assist U.S. industry efforts to build, maintain, and expand overseas markets for U.S. agricultural products. USDA administers five programs: the Market Access Program (MAP), the Foreign Market Development Program (FMDP), the Emerging Markets Program (EMP), the Quality Samples Program (QSP), and the Technical Assistance for Specialty Crops (TASC) program. In general, these programs provide matching funds to U.S. organizations to conduct a wide range of activities, including information and market research, consumer promotion, counseling and assistance, trade servicing, capacity building, and market access support to potential U.S. exporters of agricultural products. 2. Export financing assistance programs , such as the Export Credit Guarantee Program (GSM-102) and the Facility Guarantee Program (FGP), provide payment guarantees on commercial financing to facilitate U.S. agricultural exports. These programs provide loan guarantees to lower the cost of borrowing to foreign countries to buy U.S. agricultural products. GSM-102 guarantees repayment of commercial financing by approved foreign banks, mainly of developing countries, for up to two years for the purchase of U.S. farm and food products. FGP guarantees financing of goods and services exported from the United States to improve or establish agriculture-related facilities in emerging markets. Table 1 and Table 2 and provides additional information on these programs. The 2014 farm bill reauthorized many of these programs and extended their funding through FY2018. Funding for USDA's market development and export assistance programs is mandatory through the borrowing authority of the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) and therefore is not subject to annual appropriations. Annual mandatory CCC funding for USDA's export market promotion programs is authorized at approximately $255 million (not including reductions due to sequestration). MAP and FMDP account for more than 90% of authorized funding for USDA's export market promotion programs. In recent years, as reported by USDA, annual funding allocations for these two programs have averaged about $200 million (FY2014-FY217), reflecting sequestration reductions and other reductions. However, both MAP and FMDP require some type of contribution or (in some cases) matching funds by USDA's industry partners. Contributions by industry partners have been increasing, accounting for more than 70% of total MAP and FDMP funding in 2014. Estimated total available funds for these two programs (of combined public and private funding) was roughly $680 million (based on USDA-reported data for 2014) ( Figure 2 ). USDA reports program administration costs for MAP and FMDP at between $6.3 million and $7.0 million. USDA's GSM-102 export credit guarantee program facilitates commercial bank financing of up to $5.5 billion of U.S. agricultural exports annually. The program's total guarantee value has been reported at $2.1 billion in FY2016 and about $3.5 billion in FY2017. Under the program, CCC does not provide financing per se but guarantees payments due from foreign banks and buyers--usually guaranteeing 98% of the principal payment due and interest rates based on a percentage of the one-year Treasury rate. Given that the program's repayment terms (from nine to 18 months), budgetary outlays are mostly associated with administrative expenses totaling about $7 million annually. As a member of the WTO, the United States has committed to abide by WTO rules and disciplines, including those that govern the use of and funding for export subsidies as well as domestic farm support measures. Both export subsidies and domestic farm support measures were subject to reduction commitments under WTO's Agreement on Agriculture (AoA), which entered into force in 1995. AoA also requires that member countries notify the WTO Committee on Agriculture annually with respect to export subsidies and other forms of agricultural domestic support measures. USDA's market development and export assistance programs, however, were not subject to commitment reductions, nor are they notified to the WTO under rules governing notification of export subsidies or domestic farm support measures. Under WTO rules, market research and promotion services are generally considered to be "green box" policies and not subject to commitment reductions. Such services mostly provide information and technical assistance, involve public-private partnerships, and (unlike export subsidies) do not lower prices to foreign buyers. As a justification for exemption from WTO rules, some also continue to cite a provision initially included in the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement, Article 8). The provision (now lapsed) identified certain "Non-Actionable Subsidies" to include generic research and promotion. By contrast, some export subsidies are considered "amber box" and are subject to limits under WTO rules. Export subsidies include direct subsidies (e.g., "payments-in-kind, to a firm, to an industry, to producers of an agricultural product, to a cooperative or other association of such producers, or to a marketing board, contingent on export performance"); the sale or disposal for export by governments of agricultural products at below-market prices; payments financed from the proceeds of government taxes imposed on an agricultural product; subsidies to reduce the costs of marketing exports of agricultural products; and internal transport and freight charges on export shipments, among other types of subsidies. The SCM Agreement's Annex I (Illustrative List of Export Subsidies) item (j) further lists among other types of export subsidies [t]he provision by governments (or special institutions controlled by governments) of export credit guarantee or insurance programs, of insurance or guarantee programs against increases in the cost of exported products or of exchange risk programs, at premium rates which are inadequate to cover the long term operating costs and losses of the programs. Export subsidies were further addressed as part of both the WTO's Bali Ministerial Decision (December 2013) and the Nairobi Ministerial Decision (December 2015). Member countries agreed to exercise "utmost restraint" with regard to the use of export subsidies and other forms of "export competition" policies that have the effect of subsidizing exports in international markets. "Export competition" policies include direct export subsidies, export credits, export credit guarantees or insurance programs, international food aid, and agricultural exporting state trading enterprises. The Nairobi Ministerial Decision also specified certain terms and conditions for conformity regarding export financing support: Maximum repayment terms should be no more than 18 months, and such support should be self-financing (via fees or contract premiums charged). To obtain a guarantee, an exporter has to pay premium rates (i.e., fees) charged to program beneficiaries and should adequately cover the long-term operating costs of the program, thus avoiding imparting an implicit subsidy benefit. Fees are generally calculated on the basis of guaranteed value, according to a schedule of rates applicable to different credit terms and repayment intervals. U.S. trade officials have long argued that the U.S. export credit guarantee programs are consistent with WTO obligations and not subject to reduction commitments. Furthermore, the United States has asserted that the AoA (Article 10.2) reflects the deferral of disciplines on export credit guarantee programs until the next WTO multilateral negotiating round (Doha Round). The United States' most recent U.S. notification to the WTO concerning its export subsidy commitments covers 2014 and shows zero outlays and zero quantities of subsidized agricultural products for the year. Nevertheless, as part of the 2014 farm bill ( P.L. 113-79 , SS3101), Congress shortened the loan term on which export credit guarantees would be made available from 36 months to 24 months in order to conform to U.S. WTO commitments. In practice, USDA currently limits the term of loan guarantees under GSM-102 to a maximum of 18 months. Congress also authorized USDA to make other changes to the GSM-102 program to meet the terms and conditions of the 2010 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between Brazil and the United States related to the WTO cotton dispute. (See text box on next page for more information on the dispute.) USDA implemented subsequent changes to the program in 2014, further addressing repayment terms and guarantee fees, among other changes. In general, the United States abides by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits (OECD Arrangement) in its export credit financing activities involving other federal agencies. The OECD Arrangement establishes minimum interest rates, maximum repayment terms, guidelines for classifying risks, and other terms and conditions for government-backed export financing. Export credit financing that is covered by the OECD Arrangement is generally exempt from the WTO SCM Agreement. The SCM Agreement has been interpreted to indicate that, for non-agricultural products, an export credit practice in conformity with the OECD Arrangement on export credits shall not be considered as an export subsidy prohibited by the SCM Agreement. USDA has commissioned a number of economic studies to assess the effects of USDA's export market development programs on U.S. agricultural exports, export revenue, and other economy-wide effects, including impacts on the farm economy, macroeconomic output, and full-time U.S. civilian jobs. These studies utilize various approaches, including computable general equilibrium models, IMPLAN (IMpact Analysis for PLANning) input-output models, and benefit-cost ratios, among other types of methodological approaches. These studies often yield widely differing results. Similar studies have not been conducted to assess the effectiveness of USDA's export credit programs. Most studies measure the "economic return ratio," or the ratio of the estimated returns compared to the estimated costs. Economic return estimates from these studies range from $24 to $37 for each dollar spent on FAS's market development programs (generally focused on MAP and FMDP). A summary of these studies is posted at https://www.agexportscount.com/resources/ . USDA's most recent commissioned study suggests that MAP and FMDP return $28 for each dollar spent on these programs. This updates a 2010 USDA-commissioned study that estimated that U.S. food and agricultural exports increased by $35 for every additional $1 spent by government and industry on market development. Other estimates by USDA indicate that FAS market development programs return $37 for each dollar spent on the programs. The National Association of State Departments of Agriculture (NASDA) finds that the return on investment from MAP is $24 for every $1 spent in foreign market development. These studies make additional claims regarding the broader economy-wide returns in terms of farm revenue, economic output, and full-time U.S. jobs. USDA's most recently commissioned study states that spending on MAP and FMDP resulted in increased export volumes, higher prices, and greater farm income levels. These studies regularly include other estimates such as changes in economic output, gross domestic product, labor income, and U.S. economic welfare. Specifically, USDA's most recent study concludes that from 2002 to 2014, MAP and FMDP added $12.5 billion to export value and added $1 billion to $2 billion to farm income on average annually (depending on the modeling approach used). The study also concludes that MAP and FMDP added up to 240,000 full- and part-time jobs across the entire U.S. economy over the 2002-2014 period. Because the estimated benefits of USDA's programs are large relative to the cost of these programs, some contend that the programs are vastly underfunded from an economic optimization standpoint. Over the years, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) has raised many questions regarding USDA's export promotion programs. These reports have generally been critical of USDA-reported estimates of the economic effects of its export market development programs on U.S. agricultural exports, export revenue, and other economy-wide effects. The most recent of these reports, in 2013, expressed ongoing concerns about USDA's assessment methodologies for estimating program effectiveness, citing the need for improved methods and cost-benefit analysis. Regarding the study USDA commissioned in 2010, GAO concluded that methodological limitations may affect the accuracy and magnitude of USDA's estimated benefits. GAO criticized this study because "the model used to estimate changes in market share omitted important variables and, second, a sensitivity analysis of key assumptions was not conducted for that and another model that the study used," among other types of concerns. These criticisms may have prompted USDA's more recent 2016 commissioned study. GAO's report further highlighted that USDA's program funding has been spent on a consistent set of participants and in a consistent group of countries. It also confirmed that industry contributions often exceed matching contribution requirements ( Figure 2 ). GAO also noted the potential (despite management efforts) for duplication risks and cited the need to improve reporting requirements for program participants. Previously, in a 1997 report, GAO concluded that "no conclusive evidence exists that these programs have measurably expanded aggregate employment and output or reduced the trade and budget deficits." GAO also concluded that there is "limited evidence" of benefits to the U.S. agricultural sector in terms of farm income and employment. GAO identified a "lack of transparency" in participant reporting as contributing to the limitations in USDA's analysis. GAO further noted that "there are widely divergent views about the amount of leverage these programs provided in the past." GAO's recommendations focused on the need for USDA to develop more systematic information on the potential strategic value of USDA's export assistance programs. In its 1997 review, GAO also noted that other economic factors are often more important in influencing export markets, such as expanding global markets and rising demand for U.S. products, making it difficult to determine how USDA's export assistance programs may be influencing U.S. export markets. Other economic studies reviewed as part of GAO's 1997 review indicate that evidence is mixed regarding the relevance of export assistance program, especially in terms of impacts to the overall economy, the U.S. agricultural sectors, and specific products. A 1999 GAO review further concluded that "few studies show an unambiguously positive effect of government promotional activities on exports." Other studies GAO reviewed found "no evidence that advertising and promotion expenditures had an expansionary effect" on foreign demand for some agricultural products. Other GAO assessments of USDA's export assistance programs have been similarly critical. During the 1990s, GAO testified and made recommendations to Congress on a range of issues regarding USDA's export programs, including the need for USDA to improve its agricultural trade office operations and program management and strategic planning, as well as the need to assess the benefits of these programs and provide assurances that public funds are being spent effectively. USDA's Office of Inspector General (OIG) also conducted a review of USDA's export market development programs to determine whether these programs foster expanded trade activities in the exporting of U.S. agricultural products. The review focused on data and information collection under MAP. OIG recommended that USDA "identify those areas where tracking and analyzing specific data would be useful to the agency's efforts to expand exports of U.S. agricultural products, and based on this documented analysis, implement a formal system to track this information." This included implementing "methodologies to ensure participants conduct periodic program evaluations to effectively measure their accomplishments with MAP funding" in addition to implementing standard reporting requirements. OIG also recommended that USDA conduct more outreach and provide information on foreign trade constraints and business opportunities. The Coalition to Promote U.S. Agricultural Exports consists of more than 75 organizations representing farmers, ranchers, fishermen, forest product producers, cooperatives, small businesses, regional trade organizations, and the state departments of agriculture that are actively supporting the continuation and expansion of USDA's export market development programs. (Other sponsor groups include the Coalition to Promote Agricultural Exports, the Agribusiness Coalition for Foreign Market Development, and the U.S. Agricultural Export Development Council). The coalition continues to express its support for MAP and other USDA export programs, building on its efforts in prior years. In anticipation of the next farm bill debate, legislation introduced in both the House and Senate (Cultivating Revitalization by Expanding American Agricultural Trade and Exports Act, or CREAATE Act, H.R. 2321 / S. 1839 ) would double annual funding for MAP and FMDP to $400 million and $69 million, respectively, by 2023. The coalition supports doubling funding for MAP and FMDP. NASDA also supports doubling annual MAP funding. Researchers point out that government intervention is warranted in the case of market promotion to address market failure and to avoid the "free rider" problem. For example, in this case, if no single exporter has an incentive to spend his/her own resources on export market promotion, this could result in underinvestment in the market. Researchers also note that, alternatively, if someone were to invest in export market promotion, others would not see the need to contribute and instead would "free ride" (i.e., benefit from market promotion efforts without paying for it). Others cite the need to proactively promote U.S. exports to communicate to foreign buyers what differentiates U.S. farm products from those of other global suppliers and to offset subsidies offered by some U.S. competitors, such as in the European Union. Some in Congress have long opposed some of USDA's export and market promotion programs, especially MAP, and have called for their elimination and/or reduced program funding. President Trump's FY2018 budget also proposes to eliminate both MAP and FMDP. MAP has also been targeted by outside groups, including the Heritage Foundation, Citizens Against Government Waste, Taxpayers for Common Sense, and National Taxpayers Union (NTU). Previous legislation has sought to limit federal spending on some export promotion programs through the appropriations process. For example, an amendment (S.Amdt. 3323, Flake) to the FY2015 Agricultural Appropriations minibus bill ( H.R. 4660 , 113 th Congress) would have prohibited USDA from spending money to fund QSP. The amendment was not agreed to. Another amendment ( H.Amdt. 480 , Flake) to the FY2012 Agricultural Appropriations House bill ( H.R. 2112 , 112 th Congress) would have prohibited USDA from using available funds to carry out MAP. That amendment was also not agreed to. Other Members of Congress have proposed legislative changes to MAP as well. During the 2014 farm bill debate, an amendment (S.Amdt. 1007, McCain/Coburn) to the Senate farm bill ( S. 954 , 113 th Congress) would have (1) reduced MAP funding by 20%, (2) prohibited the use of funding for certain activities (including animal spa products; reality television shows; cat or dog food or other pet food; wine, beer and spirits tastings, festivals, or other related activities; and cheese award shows and contests); and (3) required USDA to disclose annually all MAP-related travel-related expenses. No vote was taken on the amendment. Some contend that MAP funding is corporate welfare that subsidizes overseas advertising. These critics point to funding provided to some large companies--including Welch Food, Sunkist Growers, Blue Diamond Growers, Sunsweet, Sun-Maid, Cal-Pure Pistachios, and Ocean Spray--as well as other large producer groups such as the California Wine Institute, Brewers Association, Cotton Council International, and the Pet Food Institute. GAO reported that, in 2011, about 85% of MAP funding was spent on overseas promotion of generic commodities while the remaining 15% was spent to promote branded products. In addition to USDA's export financing assistance through GSM-102 and FGP, other federal agencies also provide assistance to U.S. agricultural exporters such as the Export-Import Bank (Ex-Im Bank) and the Small Business Administration (SBA). These agencies provide support to both agricultural and non-farm exporting companies. However, data and information are not publicly available to indicate the extent to which these agencies have provided support to agricultural exporters. Ex-Im Bank, a wholly owned U.S. government corporation, finances and insures U.S. exports of goods and services in order to support U.S. jobs. It aims to do so when the private sector is unwilling or unable to finance exports alone at commercially viable terms and/or to counter financing offered by foreign countries through their counterparts to Ex-Im Bank. Ex-Im Bank takes the lead in financing and insuring non-agricultural U.S. exports but also plays a role in supporting agricultural exports through its finance and insurance programs. Structurally, agricultural export support through Ex-Im Bank and USDA takes place through separate operations. However, by statute, Ex-Im Bank's agricultural export support is influenced by USDA's programs and positions. Specifically, Ex-Im Bank's charter states that it must supplement, but not compete with, private capital or the CCC agricultural commodity programs. In addition, the charter requires Ex-Im Bank, in carrying out its agricultural export support, to (1) consult with the Secretary of Agriculture, (2) take into consideration any recommendations that the Secretary of Agriculture makes against Ex-Im Bank financing the export of a particular agricultural commodity, and (3) consider the importance of agriculture commodity exports to the U.S. export market and the nation's trade balance in deciding whether or not to provide agricultural export support. Ex-Im Bank's charter also requires the bank, when providing agricultural export support, to seek to minimize competition in government-backed export financing. It is further required to cooperate with other U.S. government agencies to seek international agreements to reduce what it refers to as government-subsidized export financing. The United States has negotiated with other OECD members on agreed disciplines for government-backed export credit financing. In terms of agriculture, historically, the view was that Ex-Im Bank focused on export financing of agricultural equipment and inputs, while USDA focused on export financing of agricultural commodities. However, Ex-Im Bank's role in supporting agricultural exports appears to have evolved to include agricultural commodities and consumables (e.g., grain, soil additives) through its short-term insurance program; livestock through its short- or medium-term programs; the export of agricultural equipment (various machinery, such as seeders and combines), through its medium-term financing; and the export of goods and services for agricultural projects (e.g., meat processing facilities) through project financing. Ex-Im Bank's short-term export credit insurance programs are comparable to USDA's GSM-102 program in their availability to support U.S. agricultural commodity exports. Ex-Im Bank's direct loan, loan guarantee, and insurance programs have been characterized as comparable to USDA's FGP in their availability to support U.S. agricultural capital goods exports. Support for agricultural goods and services by Ex-Im Bank constitutes a small share of Ex-Im Bank's total authorizations and estimated total U.S. exports supported. In addition, it is significantly less than the amount that USDA directs to agricultural export financing. For instance, in FY2016, Ex-Im Bank authorized over $190 million (out of $5 billion in total authorizations) to support nearly $520 million of U.S. agricultural exports (out of $8 billion in total U.S. exports estimated to be supported by Ex-Im Bank). In comparison, GSM-102 program's total guarantee value was $2.1 billion in FY2016 and $3.5 billion in FY2017. Other differences between USDA and Ex-Im programs vary also in terms of mission, eligibility, repayment terms, and specific program requirements. Given that Ex-Im Bank and USDA both support U.S. agricultural exports through similar tools, policymakers have periodically raised questions about whether their activities are duplicative. On one hand, the agencies have different missions and have fashioned their programs accordingly to serve different constituencies. As such, the programs have different features. For example, if USDA-supported export financing is unavailable due to program restrictions or the sales contract terms proposed by the foreign buyer, Ex-Im Bank support may be an alternative. On the other hand, the diffusion of agricultural export financing services across two agencies may cause confusion for U.S. businesses and raise inefficiencies in the provision of government services. SBA administers several types of programs to support small businesses, including loan guarantee and venture capital programs to enhance small business access to capital; contracting programs to increase small business opportunities in federal contracting; direct loan programs for businesses, homeowners, and renters to assist their recovery from natural disasters; and small business management and technical assistance training programs to assist business formation and expansion. With respect to international trade, SBA provides financial assistance, technical assistance, and grants to states for the purposes of supporting small businesses (generally defined as firms with fewer than 500 employees) involved in international trade. SBA serves all businesses defined as "small" by the agency, and it makes no distinction among exporters in different industries for the purposes of its trade and export promotion programs. SBA has three variations of its broader financing programs that are targeted to exporters: 1. The Export Express loan program, which provides working capital or fixed asset financing for small businesses that will begin or expand exporting, 2. The Export Working Capital loan program, which provides financing to support export orders or the export transaction cycle from purchase order to final payment, and 3. The International Trade loan program, which provides long-term financing to support small businesses that are expanding because of growing export sales or have been adversely affected by imports and need to modernize to meet foreign competition. All of SBA's loan guarantee programs require personal guarantees from borrowers and share the risk of default with lenders by making the guarantee less than 100%. Compared to its more general purpose business loan guarantees, though, SBA provides a higher rate of guarantee on the principal value of loans issued through its export financing programs (ranging from 75% to 90% in the trade loans, depending on the purpose and size of the loan, compared to 50% to 85% in the more general business loan guarantee programs). SBA provides loan guarantees for small businesses that cannot obtain credit elsewhere. In FY2016, SBA guaranteed $1.55 billion in loans to 1,550 small business exporters. In terms of technical assistance, SBA's Office of International Trade works in coordination with SBA district offices, resource partners (such as Small Business Development Centers), and U.S. Export Assistance Centers to provide technical assistance to small businesses that are looking to start exporting or already export. SBA also awards grants to states through its State Trade Expansion Program (STEP) for various activities intended to increase the number and volume of small business exports, such as participation in foreign trade missions, trade show exhibitions, or export training workshops. SBA's most recent round of STEP awards for FY2017 totaled $18 million.

Agricultural exports are important to both farmers and the U.S. economy. With the productivity of U.S. agriculture growing faster than domestic demand, farmers and agriculturally oriented firms rely heavily on export markets to sustain prices and revenue. The 2014 farm bill (Agricultural Act of 2014, P.L. 113-79) authorizes a number of programs to promote farm exports that are administered by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). There are two main types of agricultural trade and export promotion programs: 1. Export market development programs assist efforts to build, maintain, and expand overseas markets for U.S. agricultural products. Programs include the Market Access Program (MAP), the Foreign Market Development Program (FMDP), the Emerging Markets Program (EMP), the Quality Samples Program (QSP), and the Technical Assistance for Specialty Crops Program (TASC). 2. Export financing assistance programs provide payment guarantees on commercial financing to facilitate U.S. agricultural exports. Programs include the Export Credit Guarantee Program (GSM-102) and the Facility Guarantee Program (FGP). Annual funding for USDA's export market promotion programs is authorized at about $255 million (not including reductions due to sequestration). In addition, USDA's export credit guarantee programs provide commercial bank financing of up to $5.5 billion of U.S. agricultural exports annually. Funding for USDA's programs is mandatory through the Commodity Credit Corporation and is not subject to annual appropriations. USDA has commissioned a number of economic studies to assess the effects of its export market development programs on U.S. agricultural exports, export revenue, and other economy-wide effects. Most studies measure the "economic return ratio" or the ratio of the estimated returns compared to the estimated costs. USDA's most recently commissioned study claims that MAP and FMDP return $28 for each dollar spent. USDA's studies also claim broader economy-wide returns in terms of farm revenue, economic output, and full-time jobs. However, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) has raised many questions regarding USDA's export promotion programs. GAO's reports have generally been critical of USDA-reported estimates of the economic effects of USDA's programs on U.S. agricultural exports, export revenue, and other economy-wide effects. The most recent GAO report expressed ongoing concerns about USDA's assessment methodologies for estimating program effectiveness, citing the need for improved methods and cost-benefit analysis. USDA's Office of Inspector General (OIG) also conducted a review of its export market development programs and recommended certain changes with regard to data and information collection by program participants. In anticipation of the next farm bill debate, legislation introduced in both the House and Senate (Cultivating Revitalization by Expanding American Agricultural Trade and Exports Act or CREAATE Act, H.R. 2321/S. 1839) would progressively double annual funding for MAP and FMDP to $400 million and $69 million, respectively, by 2023. The Coalition to Promote U.S. Agricultural Exports and the National Association of State Departments of Agriculture also support doubling funding for MAP and FMDP. However, some in Congress have long opposed USDA's export and market promotion programs, especially MAP, calling for its elimination and/or reduced program funding. President Trump's FY2018 budget proposes to eliminate both MAP and FMDP.

Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 prohibits discrimination against people with disabilities in programs or activities receiving federal financial assistance or under any program or activity conducted by an executive agency or the U.S. Postal Service. The core requirement of Section 504 is articulated in subsection (a), which states: No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States, as defined in section 705(20), shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance or under any program or activity conducted by any Executive agency or by the United States Postal Service.... The purpose of the Rehabilitation Act is to ensure that individuals with disabilities can be independent and fully participate in society. The act seeks to empower individuals with disabilities by maximizing "employment, economic self-sufficiency, independence, and inclusion and integration into society, through ... the guarantee of equal opportunity." However, tension may arise between giving full effect to these statutory objectives and ensuring that Section 504 compliance remains practicable for federal agencies and grantees. To prove a violation of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, a plaintiff must show that (1) the program or activity is carried out by a federal executive agency or with federal funds; (2) the plaintiff is disabled within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act; (3) he is otherwise qualified; and (4) he was excluded from, denied the benefit of, or subject to discrimination under the program or activity. A defendant in a Section 504 suit may assert as an affirmative defense to liability that accommodating the plaintiff's disability would constitute an "undue burden." In 1985, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Alexander v. Choate that a federal agency or grantee who denies an otherwise qualified plaintiff "meaningful access" to the program or benefit it provides has excluded the plaintiff from the program, denied the plaintiff its benefits, and/or discriminated against the plaintiff within the meaning of Section 504. Moreover, the Court stated that to afford meaningful access to people with disabilities, a federal agency or grantee might be required to make "reasonable accommodations." Although Choate was the first case to construe the nondiscrimination prong of Section 504 as requiring meaningful access, the Court ruled against the plaintiffs in Choate . The plaintiffs argued that Tennessee's decision to reduce the number of days of inpatient care paid for by Medicaid denied Medicaid recipients with disabilities meaningful access to Medicaid and hospital services because they spent, on average, more days receiving inpatient care than their nondisabled peers. The Court found that despite Tennessee's change in policy, Tennessee continued to provide people with and without disabilities "identical" access to Medicaid covered inpatient care. Accordingly, while Choate remains the source of the meaningful access standard, the case illustrates that practices or policies with a disparate impact on people with disabilities do not, ipso facto , violate Section 504. The Court in Choate also noted that Section 504 does not require federal agencies and grantees to provide people with disabilities meaningful access to their programs and activities at the expense of their programs' integrity. The Court quoted its holding in Southeastern Community College v. Davis , which established that Section 504 does not require a federal grantee "to make 'fundamental' or 'substantial' modifications to accommodate the handicapped, [but] it may be required to make 'reasonable' ones." As a reflection of this jurisprudence, Department of Treasury regulations state that the department is not required to take actions to comply with Section 504 when doing so would result in a fundamental alteration of a program or in undue financial and administrative burdens. A 1995 National Research Council study concluded that more than 3.7 million Americans experience low vision and, as a result, have difficulty identifying U.S. banknotes due to their virtually uniform size, color, and general design. This difficulty, the study found, prevented visually impaired individuals from fully participating in society because they cannot "conveniently and confidentially exchange currency in everyday transactions," such as those required to use public transportation or make purchases. Relying in part on the findings of that study, the American Council of the Blind and two individuals with visual impairments (collectively "the Council") sued the Secretary of the Treasury of the United States, Henry Paulson, in U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia in 2002. The Council alleged that the Department of Treasury violated Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act by issuing banknotes that were not readily identifiable for people with visual disabilities. It sought declaratory and injunctive relief to prohibit the Department of Treasury from continuing to manufacture notes greater than $1 in their present format and to require the Treasury Department to create and implement a corrective action plan. The department acknowledged that the physical design of U.S. dollars made it difficult for blind and visually impaired individuals to independently identify denominations. However, it also contended that these individuals were not denied the benefit of meaningful access to U.S. currency and, even if they were, requiring the Treasury to make modifications would unduly burden the department. These were the only two issues contested. Both the plaintiffs and the Department of Treasury moved for summary judgment. The U.S. district court concluded that (1) the Council met its burden to show that the visually impaired are denied meaningful access to U.S. paper currency; and (2) the Department of Treasury had failed to meet its burden to demonstrate that no effective accommodation could be implemented without imposing an undue burden on the department. Accordingly, the district court granted the Council's motion for summary judgment in part and denied Treasury's motion. However, the court did not order the Treasury Department to follow a particular plan or design change to achieve compliance with the Rehabilitation Act. Instead, the court ordered a status conference with both parties for the purpose of discussing the appropriate remedy. Before a final remedy was ordered, the Department of Treasury appealed the ruling to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. The Council opposed the petition for interlocutory appeal, arguing that the Treasury Department's contentions regarding the burden of accommodating the plaintiffs were purely hypothetical in the absence of a determined remedy. However, the D.C. Court of Appeals accepted the appeal, reasoning that reviewing the case before injunctive relief was issued would prevent both the court system and the Department of Treasury from expending resources unnecessarily. For the reasons discussed below, the D.C. Circuit Court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment and remanded the case for the district court to address the Council's request for injunctive relief. The D.C. Circuit first considered whether the lower court was correct to hold that the Department of Treasury discriminated against people with visual impairments in violation of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Because the Treasury Department conceded three of the four elements of Section 504 liability, the D.C. Circuit focused on the fourth prong--that is, whether visually impaired individuals are denied meaningful access to U.S. paper currency. Choate established that Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act requires federal agencies and grantees to provide "an otherwise qualified handicapped individual ... with meaningful access to the benefit that the grantee offers." When meaningful access is denied, a federally funded program might be required to make "reasonable accommodations," but there is no denial of meaningful access when people both with and without disabilities have "identical and effective" access to the benefit or services provided. Since Choate , courts have determined whether a federal agency or grantee provides an otherwise qualified individual with meaningful access to the benefit or program at issue on a case-by-case basis. On appeal to the D.C. Circuit, the Treasury Department argued that people with visual impairments are denied meaningful access to the benefits of U.S. currency only if they are unable in all circumstances to accurately identify paper money without assistance. The court disagreed, stating that this construction of Choate 's meaningful access test lacked a "legal foundation." The court cited precedent in which plaintiffs with disabilities were denied meaningful access to government programs because they were forced to take extreme measures, such as crawling, to access government services. These cases, the D.C. Circuit wrote, suggest that the plaintiffs are denied meaningful access to U.S. currency if their access to U.S. banknotes is impeded. The court also rejected the Treasury Department's assertion that individuals with visual impairments have meaningful access to U.S. banknotes. The department advanced two theories in support of this argument. First, it claimed that in the absence of evidence that visually impaired individuals are "frequently defrauded," the court should presume that they have meaningful access to U.S. paper currency. However, the court dismissed this contention as "astounding" on its face. The department's second theory was that people with visual impairments have meaningful access to cash transactions because they can use certain techniques and technology to identify U.S. banknotes. For example, the Treasury Department claimed that people with visual impairments could identify dollar denominations effectively by asking sighted persons for assistance during transactions, using portable electronic readers to identify bills, keeping differing denominations folded in distinct ways, and/or using methods of cashless payments (i.e., credit and/or debit cards). The court disagreed. Dependence on third parties, it wrote, "is anathema to the stated purpose of the Rehabilitation Act and places the visually impaired at a distinct disadvantage ... they are compelled to rely on the honesty and carefulness of sighted individuals." Similarly, the court reasoned that conditioning access to paper currency on a person's ability to spend substantial sums of money on technological devices amounted to a denial of meaningful access. For support, the court cited a Second Circuit decision rejecting a defendant's argument that, in the absence of American Sign Language interpreters, deaf parents had meaningful access to school activities because they could pay for their own interpreters. Finally, the court wrote that credit cards do not provide the plaintiffs with meaningful access to paper currency because they are not universally accepted substitutes for cash. Even if credit cards became universally accepted, the court found that they would not provide visually impaired individuals with access to transactions in which they, perhaps as store employees, received cash from another person. The court concluded that the plaintiffs did not enjoy meaningful access to U.S. currency. Having determined that the Department of Treasury violated the nondiscrimination provision of the Rehabilitation Act, the D.C. Circuit turned to the one issue remaining: whether Treasury's noncompliance was justified because effectively accommodating the plaintiffs' disabilities would impose an undue burden on the department. Compliance with Section 504 is deemed unduly burdensome if, given the defendant's resources, the costs associated with compliance outweigh its benefits. The Treasury Department argued that, by granting the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, the district court had categorically validated the Council's proposed accommodations without assessing whether any one of those accommodations would impose an undue burden on the department. It contended that the court should have analyzed each of the accommodations that was recommended and found, at the least, that the most expensive of those accommodations constituted an undue burden. However, the D.C. Circuit described this assertion as a misstatement of the law: "liability under Section 504," the court wrote, "requires only that the least burdensome accommodation not be unduly burdensome." The D.C. Circuit also found that the Department of Treasury had invited the lower court's categorical approach by failing to present evidence rebutting the reasonableness of each of the accommodations that the Council proposed. The department had opted to present evidence in the lower court that suggested that implementing any accommodation would impose an undue burden on Treasury. The district court found this evidence deficient for a variety of reasons, and the department did not challenge that finding on appeal. The Department of Treasury did not appeal the D.C. Circuit's decision in American Council of the Blind . On remand, the district court granted the Council's request for injunctive relief. Pursuant to the terms of the district court's October 3, 2008, injunction order, Treasury is required to complete changes to each denomination no later than the date when the Secretary next approves a redesign for that denomination. On May 20, 2010, the Bureau of Engraving and Printing (BEP) within the Department of Treasury published a notice of proposed action identifying the accommodations that it is considering in the wake of American Council of the Blind . BEP stated that it will (1) develop and deploy a raised tactile feature as part of the next currency redesign; (2) continue its practice of adding large, high-contrast numerals and different and distinct color schemes to each denomination; and (3) implement a "Supplemental Currency Reader Program" to provide electronic currency readers to people with visual impairments. Comments on BEP's proposals were due no later than August 18, 2010. The American Council of the Blind submitted comments expressing overall satisfaction with BEP's plan, particularly with its proposal to incorporate raised tactile features into U.S. currency. However, the Council had concerns with the substance of--and eligibility requirements for--the currency reader distribution program. The Council contended that interim measures, such as the proposed reader program, have a history of becoming permanent substitutes for the originally envisioned program, and, should this happen with the reader program, the Treasury would fail to make U.S. currency meaningfully accessible to visually impaired individuals. The Council listed several reasons why distributing currency readers will not make currency denominations readily distinguishable to people with visual impairments. For one, currency readers must be operated with both hands, which, the Council wrote, prevents users from being able to keep their wallet safely in their hands while denominating. In addition, bills must be fed into the devices one at a time, which can place users in the uncomfortable situation of having to publicly reveal how much money is on their person while also holding up the line behind them. A third concern is that if a person's currency reader is damaged, lost, stolen, or experiencing a technological glitch, the user has no means of identifying currency denominations. In light of these concerns, the Council urged BEP to provide specific details about the timelines for implementing the accessible features on the currency itself and establish performance specifications for devices that are distributed through the currency reader program. The Council also strongly opposed BEP's suggested eligibility requirements for the currency reader program. BEP proposed to distribute readers to people who provide documentation verifying that they need a reader to accurately identify the denomination of U.S. banknotes. This verification must be provided by a "competent authority," namely a registered nurse, licensed practical nurse, or doctor of medicine, osteopathy, or optometry. The Council asserted that this proposed definition of "competent authority" is too limiting. It urged BEP to use the definition of "competent authority" that the Library of Congress uses to determine who is qualified to benefit from its program for loaning Library materials to the blind. If BEP adopts the Library of Congress's definition of competent authority, applicants for currency readers could obtain verification from a broader range of sources, including, inter alia , therapists, social workers, case workers, and rehabilitation teachers.

In May 2008, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia issued a decision in The American Council of the Blind v. Paulson. The D.C. Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's holding that the U.S. Department of the Treasury violated Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 by issuing paper currency in denominations that people with visual impairments cannot readily identify. Specifically, the court ruled that the current design of U.S. banknotes denies people with visual impairments meaningful access to the benefits of using U.S. currency. Furthermore, the Treasury Department was not exempted from liability on the grounds that accommodating the plaintiffs' disabilities would impose an undue burden. The court found that Treasury failed to substantiate its claims about the financial cost of achieving Section 504 compliance and the poor durability of certain proposed remedial tactile features. The Department of Treasury did not appeal the circuit court's decision. The case was remanded for consideration of an appropriate remedy, and, on October 3, 2008, the district court issued an injunction order. The injunction order required the Department of Treasury to make changes to accommodate people with visual impairments by the time the next currency redesign is approved. On May 20, 2010, the Bureau of Engraving and Printing (BEP) within the Department of Treasury published a notice of proposed action in the Federal Register. The notice identifies changes that BEP proposes to make to U.S. currency to accommodate people who are visually impaired. These changes are (1) developing and deploying a raised tactile feature as part of the next currency redesign; (2) adding large, high-contrast numerals and different and distinct color schemes to each denomination; and (3) implementing a "Supplemental Currency Reader Program" to provide electronic currency readers to people with visual impairments. In comments submitted to BEP, the American Council of the Blind expressed concern over the institution of the Supplemental Currency Reader Program. The Council urged BEP, inter alia, to provide specific details about the timelines for implementing the accessible features on the currency itself and establish performance specifications for readers that are distributed through the program. The Council also strongly opposed BEP's proposed eligibility requirements for the reader program, contending that they unnecessarily restricted the types of professionals who could verify a person's eligibility for a currency reader. Under the proposed regulation, only certain nurses and doctors would be authorized to verify a person's eligibility for a currency reader. The Council would like a variety of other professionals to be authorized as well, including social workers and professional staff at hospitals and other institutions.

This report provides brief answers to frequently asked questions about selected campaign finance provisions in the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015 ( H.R. 83 ; P.L. 113-235 ). The House passed the measure (219 - 206) on December 11, 2014. The Senate did so (56-40) on December 13, 2014. The President signed the bill into law on December 16. Although other provisions address topics such as contractor disclosure, increased limits for contributions to national party committees have been the subject of most debate. Those increases, particularly for individual contributions, are the subject of this brief overview. The relevant language in P.L. 113-235 increased contribution limits to national political party committees. Most prominently, these party committees include the Democratic National Committee (DNC), Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC), Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee (DSCC), Republican National Committee (RNC), National Republican Congressional Committee (NRCC), and the National Republican Senatorial Committee (NRSC). These committees may also establish new accounts, each with separate contribution limits, to support party conventions, facilities, and recounts or other legal matters. In practice, it appears that an individual's contributions to a national party could increase from at least $97,200 annually to at least $777,600. For a two-year election cycle, an individual could give twice that amount, or more than $1.5 million. Under inflation adjustments announced in February 2015, it appears that an individual may contribute at least $801,600 to a national party committee in 2015. Although this report emphasizes increases in individual contribution limits, political action committees (PACs) may also make larger contributions to parties. For multicandidate PACs--the most common type of PAC--contributions to a national party appear to have increased from $45,000 to at least $360,000 annually. Unlike limits for individual contributions, those for PACs are not adjusted for inflation. Ultimately, the impact of the proposed language will depend on a combination of agency implementation and political practice. The Federal Election Commission (FEC) is responsible for administering the increased limits. The agency's rulemaking, advisory opinions, or enforcement activities could further clarify how the provisions will affect donors and elections. On December 17, 2014, the FEC briefly stated that it was "assessing" the language and would issue guidance "as soon as practicable." Similarly, donor and party decisions will determine how or whether fundraising practices change. In particular, it is unclear how many donors have the ability or desire to make the larger contributions now permitted. As of this writing, how the FEC intends to interpret the contribution limits and how the parties intend to alter fundraising practices, if at all, remains to be seen. The report has been prepared in response to evolving questions concerning ongoing legislative debate. Some implications remain unclear at this time, and the analysis below could change with additional information. This report will be updated as additional information becomes available. Before P.L. 113-235 was enacted, the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) permitted an individual to contribute $32,400 annually to national party committees (reflecting 2014 limits, subsequently increased for inflation, as discussed below). P.L. 113-235 increased the limits as discussed below. These limits apply separately to the six political committees around which the two major parties are organized. For both parties, these include a headquarters committee (e.g., the Democratic National Committee), a House campaign committee (e.g., the National Republican Congressional Committee), and a Senate campaign committee (e.g., the National Republican Senatorial Committee). Previously, an individual could contribute no more than $97,200 annually to a typically organized national party. In addition, an October 2014 FEC advisory opinion (AO) determined that, following the recent repeal of public funding for presidential nominating conventions, separate contribution limits apply to convention funds. Therefore, it appears that a "maxed out" donor could have contributed $129,600 to a national party when counting all three traditional committees plus a convention committee. Division N, Section 101 of P.L. 113-235 increased limits for individuals making contributions to national party committees. These provisions, which are effective "on or after" the enactment date, permitted parties to establish new, segregated accounts and accept additional funds to support party conventions, facilities, and recounts or other legal matters. Specifically, the language permitted the national parties to establish up to three additional accounts for each purpose. Overall, it appears that maximum individual contributions increased from $97,200 (or $129,600 if following the FEC AO noted above) for a typical party with three major committees to $777,600. During a two-year election cycle, it appears that an individual could, therefore, contribute up to $1,555,200 to a national party's typical committees. These limits were annual amounts for 2014--when the law was enacted. The original versions of this report showed those amounts in Table 1 below. The current version of the table reflects inflation adjustments announced in February 2015. As the table shows, the 2015 base limit for individual contributions increased to $33,400 (from $32,400 in 2014). Although this report emphasizes proposed changes to the individual contribution limits, the language also increases limits for political action committees (PACs) as shown in Table 2 and Table 3 below. Although there are differences between the increased limits for multicandidate PACs and non-multicandidate PACs, it is unclear how consequential they might be in practice. Given the higher limits for non-multicandidate PACs, it appears that there could be an advantage to a PAC not achieving multicandidate status, although such PACs are rare and it is perhaps unlikely that a committee could practically prevent itself from achieving multicandidate status. In practice, therefore, it appears that the increased limits in Table 3 will be more consequential than those in Table 2 . FECA does not permit inflation adjustments for multicandidate PAC contributions ( Table 3 ). Six committees appear to be most relevant. The two major parties each have three main national political committees that perform similar functions and are organized similarly. On the Democratic side, these include the DNC, DCCC, and DSCC. Republican counterpart committees include the RNC, NRCC, and NRSC. The new law appears to be relevant for all national party committees, including third parties. The provisions do not appear to affect other fundraising or spending provisions in elections per se. It is possible that with additional freedom to make comparatively large contributions to political parties, some donors who would have previously given money to super PACs or other "outside" groups would instead redirect those funds to parties. It is also possible that increased party-funding limits will provide another outlet for donors but not necessarily redirect existing funds. As of this writing, the FEC has not yet announced regulations or formal guidance surrounding how it plans to interpret the new limits--including how the "base" contribution amounts might interact with the limits for the three new accounts, if at all. Similarly, the parties have yet to make widespread use of the new limits. Those supporting the increased limits have reportedly suggested that the proposed contributions would be more transparent than those given to groups such as politically active tax-exempt organizations (e.g., 501(c)(4) social welfare groups), and would provide parties with more funds to compete in an environment increasingly dominated by nonparty groups. Opponents counter that the proposed changes have not been subject to substantial consideration and would represent a return to the "soft money" era that existed before Congress enacted the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA), when parties could accept unlimited contributions for generic "party-building" activities. The precise implications of the proposed new limits remain to be seen.

This report provides brief answers to frequently asked questions about increased campaign contribution limits in the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015 (H.R. 83; P.L. 113-235), enacted and signed into law in December 2014. The relevant language increases certain contribution limits to national political party committees. This language changes the amounts the two major parties may solicit and collect. Most notably, three units within each of the national Democratic and Republican parties could be affected. These include a headquarters committee (e.g., the Democratic National Committee), a House campaign committee (e.g., the National Republican Congressional Committee), and a Senate campaign committee (e.g., the National Republican Senatorial Committee). The language permits all six of these national party committees to establish additional accounts, with higher contribution limits than previously permitted. In practice, it appears that maximum individual contributions to a national party have increased from at least $97,200 (or $129,600 if following a recent Federal Election Commission (FEC) advisory opinion) annually to at least $777,600. Inflation adjustments announced in February 2015 bring the individual total to at least $801,600 for 2015. Other national parties, such as third parties, would also be eligible for larger contributions. Although this report emphasizes individual contribution limits, political action committees (PACs) may also increase their party contributions under the bill, to a total of $360,000 for multicandidate PACs--the most common form of PAC. This updated report is based on information available as of this writing. The FEC has not yet issued regulations or definitive guidance about how the limits will be interpreted. Similarly, political parties have yet to adopt widespread fundraising practices under the new limits. This report will be updated as additional information becomes available.

Legislative interest in the patent system has been evidenced by substantial discussion of omnibus reform bills. Some of the reforms considered in the 110 th Congress, but ultimately not enacted, would have impacted the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). Among these proposals are the adoption of patent opposition proceedings, changes to the rules governing the publication of pending patent applications, and third party submission of information to the USPTO that may be pertinent to the decisions whether to allow a patent to issue or not. Alongside these congressional proposals, the USPTO itself has engaged in a substantial rulemaking effort in recent years. This process culminated in new rules that would make several significant changes to the patent acquisition process. First, the rules would limit the number of "claims" that can be filed in a particular patent application, unless the applicant supplies the USPTO with an "Examination Support Document" in furtherance of that application. Second, the rules would limit the number of "continued applications" that could be filed, absent a petition and showing by the patent applicant of the need for such applications. In addition, the USPTO has proposed reforms that would impose additional applicant disclosure obligations with respect to "Information Disclosure Statements" filed in support of a particular patent application. The USPTO rules concerning claims and continued applications are controversial. Some patent professionals are concerned that the rules would make the process of patent acquisition more costly, impede the ability of innovators to protect their inventions adequately, and ultimately harm innovation. Some have also opined that the rules are inconsistent with the provisions of the governing patent legislation, the Patent Act of 1952. On the other hand, other observers believe that current claiming and continued application practices are subject to abuses that can potentially place undue burdens upon the USPTO during its examination tasks, be harmful to competitive industry, and at times work against the public interest. These observers favor reforms that would limit what they see as applicant abuses of the current system. Criticisms of the USPTO rules have led to legal challenges before the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. The result was the April 1, 2008 decision in Tafas v. Dudas . There, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia concluded that the USPTO claims and continued application rules were substantive in nature. Because Congress has not granted general substantive rulemaking power to the USPTO, the District Court declared that the rules were void and therefore unenforceable. The USPTO has appealed this judgment. At the time of the publication of this report, this outcome of this appeal is not yet available. Congressional response to the claims and continuing application rules has thus far been limited. In the 110 th Congress, H.R. 1908 would have expressly provided the USPTO with regulatory authority to specify the circumstances under which a patent applicant may file a continuing application. That bill passed the House on September 7, 2007, as the "Patent Reform Act of 2007." No other legislation in the 110 th Congress--including S. 1145 , the Senate legislation also titled the "Patent Reform Act of 2007"--addressed the new USPTO rules. This report reviews the USPTO rules that would restrict claims and continuing applications. It begins by offering a summary of the patent system and the role of patents in innovation policy. The context, details, and legal challenges to the new USPTO rules are then explained. The report then offers both the policy justifications for the new rules, as well as concerns that patent professionals and other observers have expressed over their effectiveness and impact. The report closes by identifying congressional issues and options. The U.S. Constitution provides Congress with the power "To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to ... Inventors the exclusive Right to their ... Discoveries.... " In accordance with the Patent Act of 1952 (the "Patent Act"), an inventor may seek the grant of a patent by preparing and submitting an application to the USPTO. USPTO officials known as examiners then determine whether the invention disclosed in the application merits the award of a patent. In determining whether to approve a patent application, a USPTO examiner will consider whether the submitted application fully discloses and distinctly claims the invention. In particular, the application must enable persons skilled in the art to make and use the invention without undue experimentation. In addition, the application must disclose the "best mode," or preferred way, that the applicant knows to practice the invention. The examiner will also determine whether the invention itself fulfills certain substantive standards set by the patent statute. To be patentable, an invention must meet four primary requirements. First, the invention must fall within at least one category of patentable subject matter. According to the Patent Act, an invention which is a "process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter" is eligible for patenting. Second, the invention must be useful, a requirement that is satisfied if the invention is operable and provides a tangible benefit. Third, the invention must be novel, or different, from subject matter disclosed by an earlier patent, publication, or other state-of-the-art knowledge. Finally, an invention is not patentable if "the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains." This requirement of "nonobviousness" prevents the issuance of patents claiming subject matter that a skilled artisan would have been able to implement in view of the knowledge of the state of the art. If the USPTO allows the patent to issue, its owner obtains the right to exclude others from making, using, selling, offering to sell or importing into the United States the patented invention. Those who engage in those acts without the permission of the patentee during the term of the patent can be held liable for infringement. Adjudicated infringers may be enjoined from further infringing acts. The patent statute also provides for an award of damages "adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer." The maximum term of patent protection is ordinarily set at 20 years from the date the application is filed. At the end of that period, others may employ that invention without regard to the expired patent. Patent rights do not enforce themselves. Patent proprietors who wish to compel others to respect their rights must commence enforcement proceedings, which most commonly consist of litigation in the federal courts. Although issued patents enjoy a presumption of validity, accused infringers may assert that a patent is invalid or unenforceable on a number of grounds. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit) possesses nationwide jurisdiction over most patent appeals from the district courts. The Supreme Court enjoys discretionary authority to review cases decided by the Federal Circuit. Patent ownership is perceived to encourage innovation, which in turn leads to industry advancement and economic growth. One characteristic of the new knowledge that results from innovation is that it is a "public good." Public goods are non-rivalrous and non-excludable, for use of the good by one individual does not limit the amount of the good available for consumption by others, and no one can be prevented from using that good. The lack of excludability in particular is believed to result in an environment where too few inventions would be made. Absent a patent system, "free riders" could easily duplicate and exploit the inventions of others. Further, because they incurred no cost to develop and perfect the technology involved, copyists could undersell the original inventor. Aware that they would be unable to capitalize upon their inventions, individuals might be discouraged from innovating in the first instance. The patent system corrects this market failure problem by providing innovators with an exclusive interest in their inventions, thereby allowing them to capture their marketplace value. The patent system purportedly serves other goals as well. The patent law encourages the disclosure of new products and processes, for each issued patent must include a description sufficient to enable skilled artisans to practice the patented invention. At the close of the patent's twenty-year term, others may employ the claimed invention without regard to the expired patent. In this manner the patent system ultimately contributes to the growth of the public domain. Even during their term, issued patents may encourage others to "invent around" the patentee's proprietary interest. A patentee may point the way to new products, markets, economies of production and even entire industries. Others can build upon the disclosure of a patent instrument to produce their own technologies that fall outside the exclusive rights associated with the patent. The regime of patents has also been identified as a facilitator of markets. Absent patent rights, an inventor may have scant tangible assets to sell or license. In addition, an inventor might otherwise be unable to police the conduct of a contracting party. Any technology or know-how that has been disclosed to a prospective licensee might be appropriated without compensation to the inventor. The availability of patent protection decreases the ability of contracting parties to engage in opportunistic behavior. By lowering such transaction costs, the patent system may make transactions concerning information goods more feasible. Through these mechanisms, the patent system can act in a more socially desirable way than its chief legal alternative, trade secret protection. Trade secrecy guards against the improper appropriation of valuable, commercially useful and secret information. In contrast to patenting, trade secret protection does not result in the disclosure of publicly available information. That is because an enterprise must take reasonable measures to keep secret the information for which trade secret protection is sought. Taking the steps necessary to maintain secrecy, such as implementing physical security measures, also imposes costs that may ultimately be unproductive for society. The patent system has long been subject to criticism, however. Some observers have asserted that the patent system is unnecessary due to market forces that already suffice to create an optimal level of innovation. The desire to obtain a lead time advantage over competitors, as well as the recognition that passive firms may lose out to their more innovative rivals, may provide sufficient inducement to invent without the need for further incentives. Other commentators believe that the patent system encourages industry concentration and presents a barrier to entry in some markets. Because the relationship between the rate of innovation and the availability of patent rights is not well-understood, we lack rigorous analytical methods for studying the impact of the patent system upon the economy as a whole. As a result, current economic and policy tools do not allow us to calibrate the patent system precisely in order to produce an optimal level of investment in innovation. Thus, each of these arguments for and against the patent system remain open to challenge by those who are unpersuaded by their internal logic. The Patent Act allows inventors to file "continued applications." Stated generally, a continued application is one that has been "re-filed" at the USPTO, commonly following the rejection of some or all of its claims. Continued patent applications allow inventors to extend the period of examination at the USPTO in order to negotiate further with a patent examiner, amend claims, submit new claims, and gain additional time to prepare evidence to be submitted to the USPTO in support of their applications, among other potential benefits. Under current patent practice, several different types of continued applications exist. A "continuation" application discloses the same subject matter as the original application. A "continuation-in-part" application, or CIP, adds some additional subject matter to the original application. Finally, a "request for continued application," or RCE, allows applicants to request additional examination of an application without the need to file a continuation application. A simple example illustrates continuation practice. Suppose that an inventor files a patent application on January 1, 2000. After the USPTO examiner subsequently issues a "final rejection" of that application, the inventor files a continuation application on February 1, 2004. The continuation application includes the same disclosure as the 2000 application. By filing it, the inventor may continue to assert to the USPTO that a patent should issue on that invention. If the USPTO approves the continuation application, it will issue as a patent that expires on January 1, 2020--twenty years from the date of filing of the original or "parent" application. Section 120 of the Patent Act imposes several technical requirements that must be met with respect to continuation applications. First, the continuation application must be filed prior to the patenting, abandonment, or termination of proceedings of its predecessor application. Second, the predecessor and continuation application must have at least one inventor in common. Third, the continuation application must expressly identify the predecessor application. Finally, to be entitled to the benefit of the predecessor application, claims within the continuation application must be fully supported by the technical disclosure found within the predecessor application. Claims that reference "new matter" found in the continued application, but not in the predecessor application, are entitled only to the actual filing date of the continued application. As noted earlier, such an application is termed a "continuation-in-part," or CIP. It should be appreciated that an applicant may file a continuation application even though the "parent" application has resulted in an issued patent itself. Even in circumstances where the USPTO examiner has allowed all of the claims of a patent application to issue, the inventor may nonetheless file a continuation application. He may do so in order to obtain broader claims, to obtain claims that more closely track his competitor's products, or for any other reason. Continued applications are widely used in modern patent practice. In 2006, about 29.4% of the applications filed at the USPTO were continued applications, as compared to approximately 18.9% in 1990 and approximately 11.4% in 1980. Furthermore, the relevant provisions of the Patent Act place no numerical limits upon the number of continued applications that may be filed. Many existing U.S. patents have relied upon a chain of four, five, or even greater number of continuations, CIPs, and RCEs. As part of its rules announcement of August 21, 2007, the USPTO imposed some limitations upon the number of continued applications that could be filed absent a petition by the applicant. In particular, the USPTO rules stipulate that applicants may file only two continuations or CIPs, plus one RCE, with respect to an original application as a matter of right. In order to file additional continued applications, the applicant must submit a petition showing an amendment, argument, or evidence that could not have been previously submitted. The USPTO issued the rules on August 21, 2007, and followed them with an additional "clarification" memorandum on October 10, 2007. The rules were to apply to applications filed after November 1, 2007. In addition, the rules were to apply to applications that had been filed at the USPTO prior to November 1, 2007, provided that they had not yet been reviewed by the USPTO. The USPTO rationalized its rule in part on the basis of administrative efficiency. As explained by the USPTO: The volume of continued examination filings ... is having a crippling effect on the Office's ability to examine "new" (i.e., non-continuing) applications.... The cumulative effect of these continued examination filings is too often to divert patent examining resources from the examination of new applications disclosing new technology and innovations, to the examination of applications that are a repetition of prior applications that have already been examined and have either issued or become abandoned. The USPTO has also explained that the public interest lies in knowledge of the scope of patent claims. According to the USPTO, the filing of a sequence of continued applications leaves the public "with an uncertainty as to what the set of patents resulting from the initial application will cover." Academics have also criticized continued application practice. Mark Lemley and Kimberly Moore, then members of the Berkeley and George Mason law school faculties respectively, stated that continued application practice has introduced a number of deleterious consequences into the patent law: First, at a minimum, continuation practice introduces substantial delay and uncertainty into the lives of a patentee's competitors, who cannot know whether a patent application is pending in most circumstances. Second, the structure of the PTO suggests that continuations may well succeed in "wearing down" the examiner, so that the applicant obtains a broad patent not because he deserves one, but because the examiner has neither incentive nor will to hold out any longer. Third, continuation practice can be--and has been--used strategically to gain advantages over competitors by waiting to see what product the competitor will make, and then drafting patent claims specifically designed to cover that product. Finally, some patentees have used continuation practice to delay the issuance of their patent precisely in order to surprise a mature industry, a process known as "submarine patenting." On the other hand, critics of the USPTO rules explain that continuation practice has a number of beneficial attributes. First, some observers believe that continued application practice allows inventors to pursue a cautious, deliberate strategy before the USPTO, allowing them to obtain robust patent rights. This tactic may be appropriate in view of recent judicial opinions that have emphasized the doctrine of "prosecution history estoppel." Broadly stated, this principle allows courts to consider negotiations between the applicant and the examiner when determining the scope of rights associated with a particular patent. In view of these judicial developments, some patent practitioners believe that it is unwise to make certain concessions to the examiner during the course of prosecution. The ability to file a continued application supports this strategy by allowing additional opportunities for discourse between the applicant and examiner. Second, critics of the USPTO rules state that continued applications allow innovative firms to procure patent claims that relate to the products that they will ultimately market. For example, a pharmaceutical and biotechnology firm may file a patent application incorporating claims directed towards a broad category of compounds. At the time of the initial filing, however, that firm may not have conducted the extensive testing and research that is often needed to identify the particular member of that category that will be brought to market. Under current law, once that particular compound has been identified, the firm may file a continuation application specifically claiming it. Should administrative rulemaking impose limitations upon continuing applications, some observers believe that pharmaceutical and biotechnology firms in particular may potentially be unable to obtain claims that both cover their marketed products and be able to withstand validity challenges on a reliable basis. This tendency could potentially diminish the effectiveness of patent protection within industries where the patent system is widely acknowledged as crucial to innovation. Third, critics of the USPTO rules have asserted that some examiners at times do not understand the invention presented to them in particular applications. The use of continued applications is, in their view, necessary to obtain a competent examination. In addition, some observers believe that certain examiners have encouraged the filing of continued applications in order to inflate statistics pertaining to their workplace productivity. In addition to addressing continued applications, the USPTO Rules also announced changes to claiming practice. As noted previously, the Patent Act requires each patent to include "one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention." The claims set forth the proprietary rights that the patent owner asserts for itself. In particular, the words of a patent's claims are compared to the physical features of an accused product to determine whether infringement has occurred. As well, the teachings of earlier publications, patents, and other relevant "prior art" is compared to a patent's claims in order to decide whether the patented invention has been anticipated or would have been obvious. Claims may be drafted in either "independent" or "dependent" format. A dependent claim references an earlier claim, but then provides additional limitations upon the scope of that claim. Claims 1 and 2 of U.S. Patent No. 4,161,079, which relate to traps for mice and other pests, provides an example of independent and dependent claims: 1. A trap for rodents or like pests comprising: an enclosure for the pest to enter; means for ensnaring the pest in the enclosure; a charge of separately covered bait material mounted to the enclosure; means for uncovering said covered bait material within the enclosure, said means for uncovering being operable externally of said enclosure; whereby covered bait material may be stored for a long period of time and yet easily released when desired. 2. The invention of claim 1 wherein: said enclosure includes a window through which a user may look to see if a mouse or like pest is entrapped therein. The use of dependent claims is largely a drafting convenience for patent applicants. In the mouse trap example, rather than reciting each of the features of claim 1 once more, claim 2 merely references them but also incorporates an additional limitation. In practice, most patents contain multiple claims. Each claim is ordinarily viewed as presenting a separate statement of the patented invention. It is possible that the patent proprietor's competitor may infringe some of the patent's claims, but not others, depending upon the precise wording of the claim. Similarly, a court may declare that some of the patent's claims are invalid, but uphold other claims, in view of novelty, nonobviousness, or other legal requirements to obtain a patent. For the most part, then, each claim in a patent affords the patent owner separate proprietary rights that must be judged on its individual merits. Determinations as to the precise number of claims that a particular patent contains falls largely within the discretion of the individual who drafted the patent. As Paul Janicke, a member of the University of Houston law faculty, has explained: No limit is placed on the number of claims that can be included in an application. Most good patent attorneys write many of them of varying scope, in case the broadest turn out to be invalid because they cover some unknown piece of prior art, and in case the narrowest fail to provide commercially effective scope because they are easily designed around. Each claim is judged for validity and infringement as though it were a sort of mini-patent unto itself. To win an infringement case, the patentee need only establish infringement of one claim that the defendant is unable to invalidate. Such a system encourages the most diverse possible claiming. It is a good system for protecting inventions. The USPTO fee schedule provides some financial incentives to limit the number of claims in a particular patent. The basic filing fee for patent applications is currently $310. For each independent claim in excess of three, the USPTO imposes a surcharge of $210. In addition, for each claim in excess of 20, whether dependent or independent, the USPTO imposes a surcharge of $50. As a result, incorporating large numbers of claims within a patent may lead to a substantial increase in the official fees associated with its acquisition. Empirical studies have arrived at varying results on the average number of claims per patent, depending on the sampling technique employed and the time frame under consideration. Patent lawyer Peter L. Giunta reported an average of 3.09 independent claims and 18.15 total claims per patent issued in 2003. John Allison and Mark Lemley, members of the faculties of the University of Texas and Stanford University respectively, sampled 1,000 patents issued between 1976 and 1978, and another 1,000 patents issued between 1996 and 1998. Allison and Lemley reported an average of 9.94 claims per patent for the 1970's patents, and 14.87 claims per patent for the 1990's patents. Both the Giunta and Allison-Lemley studies agreed that the average number of claims per patent has increased over time. It should be appreciated, however, that some patents incorporate considerably more claims than average. For example, in the well-known patent litigation involving the BlackBerry®️ mobile communications device, the patent proprietor asserted charges of infringement based upon five patents. The first of these patents to issue incorporated 89 claims; the remaining four included 276, 223, 341, and 665 claims respectively. As a general matter, one empirical study has concluded that patents of greater value to their owners tend to have a larger number of claims than average. Following issuance of notice and a period of public commentary, the USPTO promulgated rules that would impose an obligation upon inventors who file patent applications that have more than five independent claims, or more than 25 total claims (dependent or independent). That obligation consists of the duty to prepare and file an Examination Support Document, or ESD. The ESD contains information about the claimed inventions that may assist the USPTO in conducting its examination tasks. In order to prepare the ESD, the applicant must conduct a search of databases of patents and the scientific literature. The applicant must then provide a detailed explanation of why the submitted claims are patentable over the prior art discovered during the search, as well as provide additional information pertinent to the patentability determination. The USPTO is concerned that applicants might attempt to file multiple applications directed toward the same or similar inventions in order to avoid the obligation to submit an ESD. The USPTO rules therefore require applicants to disclose all applications that are commonly owned and have at least one inventor in common. If the examiner determines that the applications have "substantially overlapping disclosures," the examiner may presume that the claims are not "patentably distinct" and will apply the 5/25 claim limitation to the total number of claims in the relevant applications. The USPTO further "cautioned" applicants from attempting to avoid this rule by filing separate applications outside the two-month window. On the other hand, the USPTO has recognized that applicants may permissibly file continued applications in order to obtain additional claims without the filing of an ESD. As the new continuation rules allow applicants to file two continuation applications and one RCE without special justification, applicants may potentially obtain 15 independent claims, and 75 total claims without the filing of an ESD. As with the rules with respect to continued applications, the claiming practice rules were to apply to applications filed after November 1, 2007. In addition, the rules were to apply to applications that had been filed at the USPTO prior to November 1, 2007, provided that they had not yet been reviewed by the USPTO. The USPTO justified these restrictions upon claiming practice on a number of grounds. One rationale was that these reforms would lead to a "better focused and effective examination process" that would allow examiners to concentrate upon a smaller number of claims, or in the alternative be assisted by an ESD. According to the USPTO, the result would be a reduction in "the large and growing backlog of unexamined applications," while "the quality of issued patents" would be maintained or possibly improved. The USPTO also expressed concerns that, absent rule changes, the public would face difficulty in analyzing numerous claims in issued patents that were directed towards "patentably indistinct inventions." Patents are often complex, technical instruments that may prove difficult to parse. It is not uncommon for jurists who frequently adjudicate disputes concerning patents to disagree on their appropriate construction. The transaction costs and uncertainty surrounding determinations of patent scope may be further exaggerated if the patent includes a large number of claims. These circumstances may not favor the ability of others to innovate themselves, and also to compete in the marketplace. Although the USPTO rules place no absolute restrictions upon the number of claims that may be incorporated within a particular application, they were subject to negative commentary by many patent professionals. In particular, some observers viewed the filing of an ESD as a costly, time-consuming, and potentially risky endeavor. Patent attorneys John Pegram and Ronald Lundquist opined that preparing an ESD may require more technical and legal effort than drafting its associated patent application. Submitting an ESD might therefore significantly increase the costs of procuring patent rights in the United States. In addition, some observers believe that ESDs will commonly incorporate statements and disclosures that might potentially be viewed as admissions. An ESD might therefore limit the scope of protection and enforceability of any patent that resulted from its application. Other observers believed that the claim rules would negatively impact patent rights without meaningfully serving the goals identified by the USPTO. As explained by patent attorneys John R. Harris and Daniel E. Sineway: For the USPTO to claim that an ESD will "improve examination quality" seems disingenuous--the improvement in quality will likely result not from any greater scrutiny or effort by the patent examiner, but from patent applicants providing the examiner with the ammunition to reject the application. The ESD will give examiners the information and reasoning needed to deny a patent, and/or force the applicant to fill the file history with information that helps infringers avoid liability in later litigation. As a result, patent attorney Kevin Noonan opined that "an applicant should avoid filing an ESD under any circumstances." If inventors widely subscribe to this view, then they will be practically limited in the number of claims that they can obtain from the USPTO. This effect may limit the extent of patent protection an inventor may effectively procure, particularly in view of a number of judicial opinions that have stressed that inventors possess the ability to draft claims using words of their own choosing. Courts have further observed that a patent's claims are intended to provide notice to third parties of its owner's proprietary rights. If the claims do not match the accused infringer's product or process literally, then courts may be reluctant to employ equitable principles such as the "doctrine of equivalents" to reach a finding of infringement. As the Federal Circuit explained, "as between the patentee who had a clear opportunity to negotiate broader claims but did not do so, and the public at large, it is the patentee who must bear the cost of its failure to seek protection for [a] forseeable alteration of its claimed [invention]." Some observers believe that the combination of judicial stress upon precise claim drafting and administrative limitations upon claims will make the patent system less attractive, thereby decreasing investment in R&D, diminishing innovation, and encouraging use of trade secret law. Criticisms over the propriety of the claims and continued application rules led to litigation against the USPTO in federal court. Legal challenges to the rules resulted in the April 1, 2008 decision in Tafas v. Dudas . There, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia concluded that the USPTO claims and continued application rules were substantive in nature. Because Congress has not granted general substantive rulemaking power to the USPTO, the District Court declared that the rules were void and therefore unenforceable. The Tafas v. Dudas ruling arose from lawsuits filed by two separate plaintiffs: (1) individual inventor Triantafyllos Tafas, and (2) the multinational pharmaceutical enterprise organized as Smithkline Beecham Corp. and Glaxo Group Limited. The plaintiffs requested a permanent injunction that would prevent the USPTO from implementing the claims and continued application rules. Although a number of arguments were before the District Court, Judge Cacheris confined his ruling to the issue of whether the USPTO claims and continued application rules were substantive or not. He concluded that the rules were indeed substantive because they would "affect[] individual rights and obligations." In particular, Judge Cacheris observed that the Patent Act placed no strict limitations upon the number of claims or continuing applications that an inventor could pursue. Because the rules would deprive inventors of these rights, they were substantive in nature and thus beyond the ability of the USPTO to enact. In keeping with its opinion, the District Court issued an order permanently enjoining the USPTO from implementing its claims and continued application rules. The USPTO has appealed this judgment to the Federal Circuit, where the appeal remains pending at the time of the publication of this report. Although patent professionals have focused attention upon the claims and continued application rules, the USPTO has proposed additional reforms as well. One of these reforms relates to the so-called Information Disclosure Statement, or IDS. An IDS is a document submitted to the USPTO that discloses all journal articles, patents, and other "prior art" of which a patent applicant is aware. The USPTO has expressed concerns that applicants too frequently include numerous "irrelevant or marginally relevant" prior art reference that not only fail to bring the most relevant material to the attention of examiners, but also require them to sort through dozens or hundreds of documents that are not pertinent to the question of patentability. As a result, the USPTO has proposed rules that would impose additional applicant responsibilities with respect to IDS filings. In particular, the USPTO proposes that if more than 20 documents are disclosed in an IDS, the applicant must provide an explanation of each cited document. That explanation consists of "an identification of a portion of a document that caused it to be cited, and an explanation of how the specific feature, showing, or teaching of the document correlates with language in one or more claims." If an IDS contains fewer than 20 documents, the applicant would be required to provide an explanation only for documents not published in English, or for English-language documents over 25 pages in length. Critics of the proposed IDS rules assert that "their practical effect will be to dramatically increase the cost of obtaining patent protection" and "make it much more difficult for inventors and innovators to protect their legitimate intellectual property rights . . .." At present time, the USPTO has not taken final action with respect to the proposed IDS rules. Should Congress conclude that the current situation with respect to the USPTO rulemaking is satisfactory, then no action need be taken. If Congress wishes to intervene, however, a number of options present themselves. In the 110 th Congress, H.R. 1908 would have expressly provided the USPTO with regulatory authority to specify the circumstances under which a patent applicant may file a continued application. That bill passed the House on September 7, 2007, as the "Patent Reform Act of 2007," and was referred to the Senate. No other legislation that was before the 110 th Congress--including S. 1145 , the Senate legislation also titled the "Patent Reform Act of 2007"--addresses the subject matter of the claims or continuation rules. One possibility would be to provide the USPTO with substantive rulemaking authority. In the 110 th Congress, an earlier verison of H.R. 1908 would have granted the USPTO Director the authority to "promulgate such rules, regulations, and orders that the Director determines appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title or any other law applicable to the United States Patent and Trademark Office." This provision was ultimately removed from the bill in favor of a more narrow grant of authority with respect to continued applications. More specific legislative amendments provide another option. Amendments to the relevant provisions of the Patent Act could confirm that no limitations should be imposed upon the number of claims or continuations that applicants may file. They could also address IDS filing requirements or other aspects of USPTO procedures. Alternatively, amended statutory provisions could impose such limitations, or grant the USPTO the authority to do so. Patent administration has becoming increasingly difficult as the USPTO faces both a rising number of filings and more technologically complex applications. On the other hand, many patent professionals have viewed both judicial and legislative developments as emphasizing well-crafted applications. Limitations upon claims and continued application practice have been widely viewed as constraining the ability of patent professionals to achieve this goal. Establishing the appropriate balance of rights and responsibilities between applicants and the USPTO forms an important consideration in maintaining a fair and efficient patent system.

Congressional interest in the patent system has been evidenced by discussion of substantial reform bills in previous sessions. Alongside these congressional proposals, the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) has engaged in a significant rulemaking effort in recent years. This process culminated in new rules that would make several significant changes to the patent acquisition process. First, the rules would limit the number of "continued applications" that could be filed, absent a petition and showing by the patent applicant of the need for such applications. Stated generally, a continued application is one that has been re-filed at the USPTO, commonly following an examiner's rejection. The USPTO has justified this limitation on the basis that the increasing number of continued examination filings is hampering its ability to review new applications. Second, the rules would limit the number of "claims" that can be filed in a particular patent application, unless the applicant supplies the USPTO with an "Examination Support Document" in furtherance of that application. The USPTO asserts that these rules would lead to a more effective examination process. Critics of the new rules contend that they will negatively impact the ability of innovators to obtain effective proprietary rights. Legal challenges to the rules resulted in the April 1, 2008 decision in Tafas v. Dudas. There, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia concluded that the USPTO claims and continued application rules were substantive in nature. Because Congress has not granted general substantive rulemaking power to the USPTO, the District Court declared that the rules were void and therefore unenforceable. The USPTO has appealed that judgment. At the time of the publication of this report, this outcome of this appeal is not yet available. In addition, the USPTO has proposed reforms that would impose additional applicant disclosure obligations with respect to "Information Disclosure Statements" filed in support of a particular patent application. The USPTO has not yet taken action concerning this rule. Should Congress conclude that the current situation with respect to claims and continued application practice at the USPTO is satisfactory, then no action need be taken. If Congress wishes to intervene, however, a number of options present themselves. Congress could expressly provide the USPTO with regulatory authority to specify the circumstances under which a patent applicant may file a continued application. Other possibilities include providing the USPTO with substantive rulemaking authority and more specific reforms directed to the relevant substantive provisions of the Patent Act.

On July 13, 2000, after nearly five years of bargaining, the U.S. and Vietnam announced theyhad signed a bilateral trade agreement (BTA). (1) OnJune 8, 2001, President Bush submitted theagreement, which requires congressional approval, to Congress. Following President Bush'stransmission, joint resolutions ( H.J.Res. 51 and S.J.Res. 16 ) wereintroduced in both chambers, and referred to the House Ways and Means Committee and the SenateFinance Committee. On September 6, 2001, the House approved the agreement by voice vote. TheSenate passed the agreement, by a vote of 88-12, on October 3, 2001 (Roll Call 291). On October16, 2001, President Bush signed the agreement into law ( P.L. 107-52 ). Vietnam's NationalAssembly ratified the BTA on November 28, 2001, by a vote of 278-85, and Vietnamese PresidentTran Duc Luong signed the agreement into law on December 7. It entered into force on December10, 2001 when the two countries formally exchanged notices of acceptance. The BTA is a major step toward fully normalizing U.S.-Vietnam commercial relations, as it restores reciprocal most-favored-nation (MFN, also known as normal trade relations [NTR])treatment between the two countries, and commits Vietnam to undertake a wide range ofmarket-oriented economic reforms. (2) Extending MFNtreatment to Vietnam will significantly reduceU.S. tariffs on most imports from Vietnam. Following the victory of communist North Vietnam over U.S.-backed South Vietnam in 1975,the United States ended virtually all economic interchange with unified Vietnam. The commercialrestrictions included not only those that previously had been imposed only on North Vietnam (seethe following section), but also a halt to bilateral humanitarian aid, opposition to financial aid frominternational financial institutions (such as the World Bank), a ban on U.S. travel to Vietnam, andan embargo on bilateral trade. Washington and Hanoi gradually began to normalize relations in the early 1990s, followingimprovements on the issues of Vietnam's activities in Cambodia and American prisoners of war(POWs) and missing-in-action (MIA) personnel in Vietnam. (4) In 1994, President Clinton orderedthe lifting of the trade embargo against Vietnam. The following year, the two countries establishedambassadorial-level diplomatic relations. In 1998, President Clinton granted Vietnam its first waiverfrom the requirements of the so-called Jackson-Vanik amendment (contained in the Trade Actof1974, Title IV, section 402), which prohibit the President from normalizing commercial relationswith selected socialist and formerly socialist countries if they do not meet certain requirementsregarding freedom of emigration. Presidential waivers were also granted to Vietnam in 1999, 2000,2001, and 2002. Congress may reject the annual waiver by passing a joint disapproval resolution. Each time waivers have been granted to Vietnam, the House has defeated disapproval resolutions. (See Figure 1 ), most recently on July 23, 2002, by a vote of 338-91 (roll call #329). As explainedbelow, after the BTA went into effect in December 2001, the Jackson-Vanik waiver grantedVietnam MFN status and allowed the U.S. Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) and theU.S. Export-Import Bank to support U.S. businesses exporting to and/or operating in Vietnam. Restoration of Temporary MFN Status to Vietnam. The U.S. denied MFN treatment to communist-controlled areas ofVietnam in August of 1951. At that time, under Section 5 of the Trade Agreements Extension Actof 1951, MFN tariff rates were suspended for all countries of the Sino-Soviet bloc. (5) Whencommunist North Vietnamese forces unified the country in 1975, MFN status was suspended for theentire country. In 1974, the U.S. issued strict conditions for restoring MFN status to those non-market economies (NMEs) subject to Section 5 suspension (in practice, the new conditions applied to allcountries of the former Sino-Soviet bloc). Under Title IV of the Trade Act of 1974, MFN treatmentmay be restored to NME countries after two requirements have been met: a) The President issues a determination that the country is not in violation of the freedom-of-emigration requirements of the Jackson-Vanik amendment. (6) To date, Vietnamhas not been found to be in full compliance with Jackson-Vanik requirements.Alternatively, subject to certain conditions, the President may waive full compliance withthese requirements, as Presidents Clinton and Bush have done since 1998. Jackson-Vanikwaivers must be renewed annually, and Congress may reject them by passing a jointdisapproval resolution. b) The completion of a bilateral trade agreement that contains certain required provisions, including a reciprocal MFN clause. (7) Such anagreement requires approval by the Congress(and by the Vietnamese National Assembly). The approval of the BTA allows thePresident to extend temporary MFN tariff treatment to Vietnam. The MFN treatment istemporary because it is contingent upon Vietnam meeting the requirements described inthe previous paragraphs - i.e. either obtaining a Presidential determination or aPresidential waiver, both of which are subject to annual congressional review anddisapproval. (8) Congressional Procedures for Considering a U.S.-Vietnam BTA. (9) To go into effect, Title IV bilateraltrade agreements must be approved bya joint resolution of Congress. Once the President transmits the agreement to Congress, a jointresolution must be introduced in both Houses. The resolutions are subject to special expeditedprocedures, under which amendments are not permitted in either chamber. Additionally, there are deadlines of 45 session-days for committee consideration (by the House Ways and Means and the Senate Finance Committees), and 15 session-days for floor debate in bothchambers. Because the approval resolutions are revenue measures, the Senate must vote on aHouse-passed resolution, and Congress would have a maximum of 90 session-days to act on theresolution: 45 days for consideration by the House Ways and Means Committee; followed by 15 daysfor floor debate in the House; followed by 15 days for consideration of the House-passed resolutionin the Senate Finance Committee; followed by 15 days for floor debate in the Senate. As with most trade agreements with non-market economies, the U.S.-Vietnam BTA will remain in effect for a 3-year period and will be extended automatically unless renounced by either party. Additionally, each extension will require a presidential determination that Vietnam is satisfactorilyextending reciprocal MFN treatment to U.S. exports. After the BTA: Extending Permanent MFN Treatment to Vietnam. Following the BTA, the next step toward normalizing U.S.-Vietnamcommercial ties is restoring permanent MFN status (also known as permanent NTR or PNTR status)to Vietnam. This process that will require Congress to terminate the application of the relevant TitleIV provisions to Vietnam, as has been done for several countries, including China, Albania, andGeorgia. Vietnam and the World Trade Organization (WTO). Vietnam applied to join the WTO in 1995. Many observers believe thatVietnam is a number of years away from meeting the requirements for WTO membership. In March2001, Vietnam's Trade Minister expressed his government's goal of acceding to the WTO by 2004. Countries seeking to enter the WTO must negotiate bilateral agreements with current WTOmembers. Provisions of such agreements are then consolidated into the acceding country's protocolof accession and, because of the WTO's mandatory MFN requirement, apply to all WTO members. In other words, any concessions obtained by one country in a bilateral accession agreement wouldbe enjoyed by all WTO members. Typically, the bilateral accession negotiations focus on tariffconcessions and other market access issues that will govern bilateral trade relations after theapplicant becomes a member. Thus, at some point in the future, Vietnam and the U.S. are likely toengage in another set of negotiations about the changes Vietnam must make to its trade regimebefore the U.S. will support Vietnam's application for WTO membership. Upon completion of thisagreement, it is likely that the U.S. president will ask Congress to extend permanent MFN treatmentto Vietnam, much as President Clinton did after completing WTO accession negotiations with Chinain November 1999. (10) Table 1. Vietnam's Path to Commercial Normalization with the United States U.S. Interests in a Bilateral BTA. U.S.-Vietnamtrade and investment flows are extremely low. Although Vietnam is the world's 13th most populouscountry, with nearly 80 million people, for the past several years annual U.S. exports have hoveredin the $200-$400 million range (see Table 2 below), a figure roughly equivalent to three days' worthof exports to Japan, and roughly one-fifth the amount the U.S. exported to South Vietnam in 1970. (12) Major U.S. exports to Vietnam include aircraft, fertilizer, telecommunications equipment, andgeneral machinery. Cumulative foreign direct investment (FDI) by U.S. companies in Vietnam isalso low, valued at about $1 billion, making the United States the ninth-largest source of investmentin Vietnam. To boost U.S. exports and investment, U.S. negotiators demanded that Vietnam provide more comprehensive and detailed concessions in the areas of services, investment, and market access thanhad been obtained in previous bilateral trade pacts with other Jackson-Vanik countries. As discussedin the following section, it appears the U.S. successfully obtained most of these negotiatingobjectives. Following the signing of the agreement, Clinton Administration officials and business representatives were careful not to argue that the BTA will significantly boost U.S. exports andinvestment to Vietnam in the short term. Rather, they stressed that U.S. exporters and investors willbenefit most in the medium to long-term, as Vietnam continues market-oriented reforms, becomesmore developed and integrated into the global economy, and as Vietnam phases in more and moreof the BTA's requirements. Moreover, exports to and investment in Vietnam are expected toincrease as Hanoi and other members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) - a10-country, 500-million person market - follow through on commitments to reduce trade barriersby 2006. Ultimately, U.S. trade and investment opportunities in the future will depend on a) Hanoi'simplementation of the BTA; b) Vietnam's progress on moving toward a more market-orientedeconomy; and c) Vietnam's rate of economic growth. Table 2. U.S.-Vietnam Trade, 1994-2002 (millions of dollars) Source: U.S. International Trade Commission. Data are for merchandise trade on a customsbasis. In the short- to medium-term, the BTA will require Vietnam to improve the climate for foreign investors. U.S. businesses in Vietnam will receive legal protections that are unavailable today. Moresectors will be open to U.S. multinationals. Additionally, the BTA will help make the Vietnamesebusiness environment more predictable and transparent. Currently, a frequent complaint fromforeign executives in Vietnam is the lengthy delay in obtaining investment licenses from thegovernment. To make matters more difficult, foreign investors often are not aware of all theregulatory requirements for obtaining licenses, leading to complaints of arbitrary treatment by localand central government authorities. Many of the agreement's proponents also contended that the bilateral trade pact will nudge Vietnam toward a more democratic society by committing the government to enact market-orientedreforms, weakening the government's tight political controls, solidifying the rule of law, integratingVietnamese enterprises more fully into the global economy, and economically empoweringindividuals. BTA proponents also pointed out that the agreement will help to bring Vietnam closerto compliance with WTO rules, facilitating Hanoi's eventual WTO accession. Once Vietnam joinsthe WTO, its trade policies will be subject to even greater international scrutiny and disciplines. Strategically, BTA backers argued that the U.S.-Vietnam BTA, together with BTAs recentlycompleted with Cambodia and Laos, will promote regional stability by smoothing the integration ofIndochina into the regional and global community. (13) Arguments Against the BTA. The agreement's critics argued that Vietnam's government is likely to fall short on implementing the agreementand/or is likely to erect new, hidden barriers to imports and foreign investment, while low-costVietnamese exports - particularly textiles - to the U.S. will increase. Some U.S. trade unionscriticized the pact's lack of provisions on minimum labor standards and environmental protection. Vowing to fight the agreement in Congress, AFL-CIO President John Sweeney in July 2000 arguedthat "it [the BTA] is missing what we've been championing - core labor standards, human rights andenvironmental protection." Textile manufacturers and other groups said they would lobby Congressand the Administration for changes to safeguard their industries from low-priced Vietnameseimports. (14) Many observers, including laborgroups, also opposed the pact on human rights grounds,arguing that human rights considerations should take priority over trade ties and/or that Hanoi'sruling elite would capture most of the gains from increased globalization. Indeed, on the same daythe House approved the BTA, it also passed the Vietnam Human Rights Act, ( H.R. 2833 , by a vote of 410 - 1), which would ban increases (over FY2001 levels) in non-humanitarianaid to the Vietnamese government if the President does not certify that Vietnam is making"substantial progress" in human rights. The act allows the President to waive the cap on aidincreases. In its most recent annual review of Vietnam's human rights situation, the U.S. StateDepartment reported that Hanoi continues "to repress basic political and some religious freedomsand to commit numerous abuses," notably "not tolerating most types of public dissent." (15) Vietnam's Interests in a BTA. After recording impressive growth for much of the 1990s following Hanoi's launch of the doi moi (economicrenovation) reforms, Vietnam's economy has slowed since the 1997-99 Asian financial crisis, whichoriginated in nearby Thailand. Annual economic growth declined from a peak of 9.5% in 1995 to4.8% in 1999 and 6% in 2000. Foreign direct investment - a major stimulus for the country's growth- dwindled from over $8 billion in 1996 to $600 million in 1999, the lowest level since 1992. (16) It is likely that the deterioration in Vietnam's economic fortunes played a major role in jump-starting the BTA talks with the U.S. in the spring of 1999, as a significant portion of Vietnam'sleadership came to see increased U.S. investment and MFN access to the U.S. market as major waysfor Vietnam to reverse its declining growth rates. As of December 2000, the United States was onlythe ninth largest source of foreign investment in Vietnam and absorbed less than 5% of Vietnam'sexports. The bilateral trade agreement presumably will increase these levels considerably byconferring to Vietnamese exporters the same tariff rates that are applied to other MFN-recipientcountries. The World Bank has estimated that Vietnam's exports to the U.S. will rise to $1.3 billion- more than 60% over 2000 levels - in the first year of MFN status, as U.S. tariff rates onVietnamese exports would fall from their non-MFN average of 40% to less than 3%. (17) Obtaining MFN status is likely to dramatically transform the product mix of Vietnam's exports to the U.S. Since the trade embargo was lifted in 1994, most of Vietnam's exports to the U.S. havebeen in items that either receive duty-free treatment (zero tariffs) or that have identical tariffs forMFN and non-MFN countries. In the short term, the BTA is likely to increase Vietnam's exportsof labor-intensive manufacturing with large differences between the MFN and non-MFN tariff rates. Judging by Vietnam's leading exports to the European Union and Japan (see Figure 2 below),exports of the following items are likely to increase substantially: garments, leather products,footwear, household plastic products and processed foods. (18) Vietnam's Clothing Exports. In particular, Vietnam's clothing exports are expected to increase dramatically. Vietnam currently exports fewapparel products to the U.S. - less than $40 million in 1999 - because of the higher, non-MFN, tariffrates it faces. In contrast, Vietnamese garment exports to Japan and the 15 countries of the EuropeanUnion in 1999 totaled more than $500 million and $640 million, respectively (see Figure 2 ). Basedon the experience of Cambodia, which was granted MFN status by the United States in 1996, theWorld Bank estimates Vietnamese apparel exports will increase nearly tenfold - to $384 million -in the first year after receiving MFN status. (19) The BTA agreement contains no provisions on Vietnamese textile exports to the U.S., but the safeguard provision would allow the U.S. to impose quotas on textile imports in the event of a surgeof imports. In private, U.S. and Vietnamese officials have said they expect to begin negotiating abilateral textile agreement, which presumably would set quotas for Vietnamese textile exports, soonafter a Congressional vote on the BTA. Some Members of Congress have called for the BushAdministration to publicly commit to negotiating a textile agreement, and have pressed for acommitment that such an agreement would include provisions that would link the size of Vietnam'squotas to progress in its labor rights. (20) Passing a trade agreement would also bring Vietnam one step closer to receiving U.S. trade benefits under the generalized system of preferences (GSP), which allows many imports fromless-developed countries to enter the U.S. market duty-free. (21) Furthermore, Vietnamese officials seethe bilateral trade agreement as an important stepping stone to joining the WTO, providing themwith non-discriminatory access to all WTO members. Not only do they regard the BTA as necessaryto obtaining U.S. support for Vietnam's application for WTO membership, but they also see theprocesses of negotiating and implementing the agreement as useful for raising Vietnam's legal,regulatory, and economic systems to the WTO's standards. Source: The trade agreement consists of four parts: market access, trade in services, intellectual propertyrights, and investment. Vietnam has agreed to take the following steps to open its markets: guarantee most-favored-nation (MFN) treatment to U.S. goods; treat imports the same as domestically produced products (also known as"national treatment"); eliminate quotas on all imports over a period of 3 to 7 years; make its government procurement process more transparent; allow for the first time all Vietnamese enterprises to trade all products; allow for the first time U.S. companies and U.S.-invested companies to importand export most products (to be phased in 3-6 years). (Presently, foreign companies have to rely onlicensed Vietnamese importers, most of which are state-owned enterprises.) ensure that state enterprises comply with WTO rules; adhere to WTO rules in applying customs, import licensing, technicalstandards, and sanitary and phytosanitary measures Tariff Concessions. The U.S.-Vietnam BTA is unique in that, in contrast to previously negotiated Title IV bilateral trade agreements between theU.S. and Jackson-Vanik countries, it includes specific commitments by Vietnam to reduce tariffs onapproximately 250 products, about four-fifths of which are agricultural goods. Typically, the cutsrange from 33% to 50% and are to be phased in over a three-year period. Vietnam's tariffs are notconsidered to be extremely high for a developing country (the U.S. Foreign Commercial Serviceestimates that Vietnam's average tariff line is 15%-20%). Also in the area of market access, the agreement includes a safeguard provision that will alloweither side to raise tariffs temporarily if it encounters a surge of imports. Vietnam has pledged to phase in the World Trade Organization Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) over 18 months. The bilateral TRIPs agreement goes above andbeyond the WTO's TRIPs agreement by including Vietnamese commitments to protect satellitesignals within 30 months. In the area of services, Vietnam has committed to uphold WTO rules such as MFN, national treatment, and disciplines on domestic regulation. Additionally, Vietnam has agreed to allow U.S.companies and individuals to invest in markets in a wide range of service sectors, includingaccounting, advertising, banking, computer, distribution, education, insurance, legal andtelecommunications. Most sector-specific commitments are phased in over three to five years. Vietnam's commitments in three of the largest U.S. service sectors - banking, insurance, andtelecommunications - are highlighted below. Banking Services. Vietnam agreed to the following liberalization measures: For the first nine years after the agreement goes into effect, U.S.banks may form joint ventures with Vietnamese partners, with U.S. equity between 30% and 49%. After nine years, 100% subsidiaries are permitted. Insurance. Under the BTA, for "mandatory" insurance sectors (such as automobile and construction-related insurance), after three years Vietnamwill allow U.S. companies to form joint ventures, with no limit on the U.S. equity share. After sixyears, 100% subsidiaries are permitted. For life insurance and other "non-mandatory" insurancesectors, after three years joint ventures are permitted, with a limit of 50% U.S. equity. After fiveyears, 100% subsidiaries are allowed. Telecommunications. Under the BTA, for higher-end telecommunications services (such as Internet, e-mail, and voice mail services), Vietnamwill permit joint ventures after two years, with a 50% cap on U.S. equity participation. Internetservices have a three-year phase in period. For basic telecommunications services (such as facsimile,cellular mobile, and satellite services), joint ventures are permitted after four years, with U.S.companies limited to a 49% stake. For local, long distance, and international voice telephoneservices, joint ventures are permitted after six years, with a 49% cap on U.S. ownership. Vietnamagreed that it will consider increasing the U.S. equity limits when the agreement is reviewed in threeyears. Regarding investment , the U.S.-Vietnam trade agreement includes guarantees of MFN treatment, national treatment, transparency, and protection against expropriation. Additionally,Vietnam pledged to implement the following changes in its investment regime: Investment screening: Currently, foreign businesses must obtain government approval to invest in Vietnam. Under the BTA, investment screening will be phased out for mostsectors within two, six, or nine years, depending on the sector involved. Profit repatriation: Presently, Vietnamese enterprises have greater freedom than foreign multinationals to convert their Vietnam-earned profits into hard currency. The StateBank of Vietnam must approve the conversion of currency on behalf of foreign businesses, and theBank does not give permission to convert currency to foreign-invested companies. (23) Under the BTA,foreign multinationals will receive the same rights for profit repatriation as Vietnamese firms;however, Vietnam's currency is still not fully convertible. Capital contribution floors: Currently, the U.S. stake in a joint venture must be at least 30%. This requirement will be eliminated in three years. Personnel requirements for joint ventures: Presently, Vietnam requires that certain board members of joint ventures be Vietnamese and requires that certain types of decisionsbe made by consensus (thereby granting veto power to the Vietnamese board members). Under theBTA, within three years Vietnam will allow U.S. multinationals to select top executives withoutregard to nationality. Trade-related investment measures (TRIMs): Vietnam has agreed to eliminate within five years all TRIMs that are inconsistent with the WTO, such as local content requirements. Vietnam has agreed to adopt a fully transparent commercial regime by allowing comment on draft laws and regulations by ensuring that advance public notice is given for all such laws andregulations; by publishing these documents; and by allowing U.S. citizens and corporations the rightto appeal rulings. It is an open question whether the Vietnamese government has the will or the wherewithal to implement the pervasive reforms required by the U.S.-Vietnam bilateral trade agreement. Implementing the agreement will require cooperation at the local government level, where centralcontrol often is weak and corruption is rampant. An unprecedented level of cooperation amonggovernmental ministries will also be required. Powerful vested interests - particularly thestate-owned enterprises and the Vietnamese People's Army - undoubtedly will put pressure on localand central government officials to erect new barriers to foreign competition. Most of Vietnam's concessions in the BTA are due to be phased in within three to five years. However, a number of reforms took effect upon the BTA's entry into force in December 2001. These include according national treatment (i.e. not discriminating between foreign and domesticenterprises) business activities, allowing all enterprises to import and export, eliminating mostnon-tariff barriers, streamlining the process for foreign investors to obtain licenses and approval, andpublicizing laws, regulations and administrative procedures pertaining to any matter covered by theTrade Agreement. Thus far, according to one group monitoring the situation, Hanoi appears to havetaken steps to implement nearly all of these initial commitments. (24) In May 2002, senior officialsfrom Washington and Hanoi launched a Joint Committee on Development of Economic and TradeRelations, a consultative body called for in the BTA. In July 1999 the U.S. and Vietnam announced an "agreement in principle" on a BTA, but for nearly a year Vietnam delayed finalizing the deal because of intense divisions among the VietnameseCommunist Party (VCP) leadership (see the following section for an analysis of the reasons forVietnam's hesitation). The Clinton Administration did not release the full terms of the July 1999agreement in principle. According to one negotiator, the only significant differences between thefinal BTA and the 1999 agreement lie in the area of trade in services (Chapter III and Annex G),specifically in the area of telecommunications. (25) Telecommunications. In general, the 1999 agreement in principle would have allowed U.S. companies the right to obtain a majority (51%)stake in certain Vietnamese telecommunications sectors after a certain number of years (oftenreferred to as the "phase-in" period). Following the November 1999 U.S.-China agreement onChina's WTO accession - which granted U.S. companies the right to a 49% maximum stake inChinese telecommunications enterprises - the Vietnamese negotiators demanded that they receivesimilar equity caps. The U.S. agreed to this concession, but in exchange received significantlyshorter phase-in periods. Vietnam also agreed to consider increasing the U.S. equity limits when theagreement is reviewed in three years. Two telecommunications sectors, wireless and basic voice services, illustrate the differences between the 1999 and 2000 documents. In wireless telecommunications, under the 1999 agreementVietnam would have allowed U.S. companies the right to set up joint ventures after three years, witha 51% maximum stake for U.S. companies. Under the 2000 BTA, Vietnam is to grant U.S.companies the right to set up wireless joint ventures after two years (three years for internetservices), with a 50% cap on U.S. equity participation. In the area of basic voice telecommunication services (local, long distance and international phone service), press reports indicate that the 1999 agreement would have phased-in a right to investafter 11 years, with a 51% maximum stake for U.S. companies. Under the 2000 BTA, Vietnam isto allow U.S. companies to set up joint ventures after six years, with a 49% cap on U.S. ownership. Insurance. According to press reports, under the 1999 agreement Vietnam would have permitted U.S. companies to invest in its insurance sector intwo to six years. The phase-in period varied by insurance sector. Details are unavailable on foreignequity caps. (26) Under the July 2000 BTA, Vietnamis to grant U.S. companies the right to set up50-50 joint ventures in its insurance sector after three years, and wholly owned (100% stake)ventures after five years. Market Access. The final BTA includes commitments by Vietnam to reduce tariffs on approximately 250 products, about four-fifths of whichare agricultural goods. 1999 press reports implied that the agreement in principle contained 330tariff items scheduled for tariff reduction. A U.S. official involved in negotiating the agreement,however, has argued that this number is incorrect, stating that the tariff changes in Annex E of thefinal BTA are essentially the same as those agreed upon in 1999. In negotiating bilateral trade deals with Jackson-Vanik countries, U.S. negotiators generally have tried to break new ground with each successive agreement. As one indication of that policy,the 1979 agreement China was less than 10 pages, while the far more comprehensive U.S.-VietnamBTA is more than ten times that length. The Vietnam-U.S. BTA goes beyond past agreements inits more detailed commitments in the areas of services and investment. Furthermore, Vietnam'stariff concessions represent a new development. Previous Jackson-Vanik BTAs contained few orno market access commitments because in those negotiations the U.S. proposed to carry out tariffdiscussions at a future date, not as part of the final BTA itself. (27) Though the U.S. and Vietnam reached an agreement in principle on the BTA in July 1999, fornearly a year Vietnam delayed signing the deal. What were the reasons for Vietnam's hesitancy? Consensus-Based Decision-Making. Vietnam's official reason for the delay was that it needed time to vet the agreement among decision-makers inVietnam. Vietnam's consensus-style of decision-making and the weakness of the country's currentleadership probably extended this vetting process: The BTA is the most extensive agreementVietnam has ever negotiated, and the assent of virtually all officials involved in implementing thedeal was required before Hanoi would take such a radical step. Furthermore, the weakness of thecountry's current top leaders - VCP General Secretary Le Kha Phieu, Prime Minister Phan VanKhai, and President Tran Duc Luong - made it difficult for them to forge a consensus on such acontroversial issue. (28) Questions from Vietnamese Conservatives. Ever since the Vietnamese Communist Party's (VCP) 8th Party Congress in 1996, disagreements betweenreformers and conservatives in Vietnam's 19-member Politburo - the country's supreme ruling body- have paralyzed economic decision-making. As the bilateral trade agreement with the U.S. requiresVietnam to jump-start its reforms and deepen its integration into the global economy, it is notsurprising that the Politburo also has been divided over whether to finalize the deal. The conservatives fear that economic reform will undermine the "socialist foundations" of the country's economic and political systems, and thereby erode the VCP's legitimacy and monopolyon power. They also fear that Vietnam's sovereignty will be eroded by increasing Vietnam'seconomic dependence on the West and by increasing Vietnam's vulnerability to regional economicdownturns such as the 1997-99 Asian financial crisis. Among their specific concerns, conservativesworry that shifting to a more market-oriented economy will force the Politburo to curtail subsidiesto the country's state-owned enterprises, the backbone of the socialist economic system. Manyconservatives are understandably worried that further rationalization will raise unemployment rates,which already exceed 10%, according to some estimates. Social and political pressures on the Partyhave already been heightened in recent years by peasant uprisings and widespread accusations ofgovernment corruption. High level U.S. pressure on Vietnam for its human rights record, appliedduring Secretary of State Madeleine Albright's September 1999 trip to Vietnam, is said to havefurther rankled conservative forces opposed to the trade agreement. In January 2000, a group of reform-minded leaders were transferred to key economic and political posts. These moves, combined with the BTA signing, the unveiling of a new EnterpriseLaw, the passage of new amendments to the Foreign Investment Law, and the opening of Vietnam'sfirst stock market on July 20, 2000, may be signs that Hanoi's policy logjam is breaking up in thereformers' favor. Opposition from Vested Interests. Parochial interests also may have played a role in Vietnam's deliberations. According to many sources,Vietnam's military leaders have been among the staunchest opponents of the BTA. Many argue thatthe military - known as the People's Army of Vietnam - is worried that the trade deal will threatenits vast commercial interests. According to one estimate, the business enterprises of the People'sArmy of Vietnam generated over $600 million in revenue in 1998, a figure equivalent to nearly 60%of the entire military budget. (29) Evidence of themilitary's influence can be seen in Vietnam'sbargaining position on telecommunications liberalization during the BTA negotiations. Hanoidemanded an eleven-year phase-in period for FDI liberalization in cable communications, a sectorin which the People's Army has invested heavily since 1995. In contrast, Vietnam's negotiatorswere willing to accept a four-year phase in for cellular communications, an area in which theMinistry of Defense has few investments. (30) Yet another hypothesis is that Hanoi was concerned that a trade deal with the United States would antagonize China. Beijing and Hanoi recently have strengthened their ties, and conservativeelements in Hanoi may be wary of upsetting Beijing by appearing too closely aligned with the U.S. In particular, the Vietnamese leadership may have wished to avoid jeopardizing negotiations withChina over a land-border treaty, negotiations that were not concluded until December 1999. Thereare also reports that Chinese leaders warned the Vietnamese not to conclude the BTA before Beijinghad finalized its own WTO accession negotiations with the U.S., talks that were concluded inNovember 1999. However, some analysts and Administration officials reject this reasoning as astalling tactic by the Vietnamese, who are said to often use the Chinese as an excuse for delayingforeign policy moves about which they are uncertain. As one observer has pointed out, Chineseopposition did not prevent Vietnam from joining the Association of Southeast Asian Nations(ASEAN) in 1995. (31) Most observers agree that, apart from the issue of unsubstantiated Chinese pressure, the China factor played a positive role in spurring the Vietnamese to move forward, due to Hanoi's fears ofincreased economic competition with Beijing following China's accession to the WTO.

On July 13, 2000, U.S. and Vietnamese negotiators signed a sweeping bilateral trade agreement (BTA). Following affirmative votes in Congress and the Vietnamese National Assembly, the BTAentered in into force on December 10, 2001, when the two countries formally exchanged lettersimplementing the agreement. Under the deal, the U.S. will extend temporary most-favored nation(MFN, also known as normal trade relations [NTR] status) status to Vietnam, a step that willsignificantly reduce U.S. tariffs on most imports from Vietnam. The World Bank has estimated thatVietnam's exports to the U.S. will rise to $1.3 billion - 60% higher than 2000 levels - in the firstyear of MFN status, as U.S. tariff rates on Vietnamese exports will fall from their non-MFN averageof 40% to less than 3%. In particular, Vietnamese garment exports are expected to record a tenfoldincrease in the first year after receiving MFN treatment. In return, Hanoi agreed to undertake a wide range of market-liberalization measures, including extending MFN treatment to U.S. exports, reducing tariffs on goods, easing barriers to U.S. services(such as banking and telecommunications), committing to protect certain intellectual property rights,and providing additional inducements and protections for inward foreign direct investment. Vietnamis the world's 13th most populous country, with 78 million inhabitants, roughly equal to thepopulation of Germany. The U.S. and Vietnam reached an agreement in principle in July 1999, butfor nearly a year Vietnam delayed finalizing the deal because of intense divisions among theVietnamese Communist Party (VCP) leadership. Under the requirements of Title IV of the Trade Act of 1974 - Section 402 of which is commonly referred to as the "Jackson-Vanik amendment" - signing a bilateral trade agreement isa necessary step for the U.S. to restore MFN treatment to certain socialist countries, includingVietnam. Congressional approval of the BTA will allow the President to extend MFN treatment toVietnam. Such MFN status will be conditional because - as with all Title IV BTAs - it will requireannual Presidential extensions, which Congress could disapprove. This report outlines the terms of the BTA, identifies U.S. and Vietnamese motivations for entering into the deal, analyzes the reasons for Vietnam's delay in signing the agreement, andexplains Congress' role in the process of restoring normal trade relations treatment to Vietnam. This report will be updated periodically. Further information on U.S.-Vietnam relations is available inCRS Issue Brief IB98033, Vietnam-U.S. Relations . Further information on the legislative and legalprocedures for handling the BTA is available in CRS Report RS20717 , Vietnam Trade Agreement:Approval and Implementing Procedure .

Experts believe that terrorist use of chemical agents is an event with low probability, but potentially high consequences. While terrorist groups may or may not have an increased interest in chemical agent acquisition and use, the domestic vulnerability of the United States to chemical attack remains an issue. Both the United States and Russia have signed and ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and are reducing, and eventually eliminating, their chemical weapon stockpiles. The possibility that terrorist groups might obtain insecure chemical weapons led to increased scrutiny of declared Libyan chemical weapon stockpiles following the fall of the Qadhafi regime. Experts have expressed similar concerns regarding the security of Syrian chemical weapons, reportedly including stocks of nerve (sarin, VX) and blister (mustard gas) agents, and their potential use. For analysis of chemical weapons possession and use in Syria, see CRS Report R42848, Syria's Chemical Weapons: Issues for Congress , coordinated by [author name scrubbed]. Policy approaches to reducing chemical agent vulnerability have generally treated them as a group, rather than addressing specific agents. Additionally, military and civilian chemical agent detection has developed with little coordination, so that civilian toxic industrial chemical kits and military chemical weapons detectors have varying sensitivities and detection capabilities. Treatments for chemical exposure vary on a chemical by chemical basis. Because comparatively few individuals have been exposed to modern chemical weapons, health care providers have limited practical experience in treatment of chemical casualties, especially among civilians. While national efforts to reduce vulnerability to terrorist chemical agent use continue, it is not clear whether these efforts address the risks from those specific agents that pose the greatest danger. This report describes the different types of chemical weapons and toxic industrial chemicals, their availability, treatment, and detection. Chemical agents are, for the purpose of this report, chemicals posing exceptional lethality and danger to humans. Some chemical agents are toxic industrial chemicals used for commercial purposes, while others are chemicals developed predominantly as weapons. Different chemical weapons cause different symptoms in and injuries to their victims. Because of this range of potential effects, identifying the chemical agent is a key step to determining the most effective treatment. Also, chemical weapons may produce their effects by multiple different exposure routes, for example by skin contact or by inhalation. As a consequence, depending on the encountered chemical, those affected must employ different protective equipment and approaches; for example, a gas mask alone does not provide sufficient protection against chemicals that can damage through skin contact. Military planners generally categorize chemical agents into at least four classes: nerve, blister, choking, and blood agents. This method organizes chemical agents by their biological effects. Modern militaries have generally focused on nerve and blister agents as weapons. Several choking and blood agents are chemicals widely used in industrial processes. Chemicals categorized as nerve agents disrupt normal functioning of the nervous system. Nerve agents do not occur naturally. Rather, they are manmade compounds that require manufacture and isolation for high purity and toxicity. Most nerve agents belong to a group of chemicals called organophosphates. Organophosphates have a wide range of toxicity. Some insecticides contain organophosphates, though these are significantly less toxic compounds than those developed as chemical weapons. Nerve agents are mainly liquids. The first nerve agent, tabun or GA, was made in Germany in the 1930s. Following this discovery, a series of nerve agents similar to tabun were developed. This series, known as the G-series, includes the weapons sarin (GB) and soman (GD). In the late 1940s, another series of nerve agents, the V-series, was invented in England. This series includes the chemical weapon VX. Historically, multiple countries, including the United States and the Soviet Union, manufactured and maintained stockpiles of nerve agents. As signatories to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), both the United States and Russia are reducing, and eventually eliminating, their nerve agent stockpiles. Military and terrorist use of nerve agents has been rare. Public intelligence assessments issued by the United Kingdom and the United States on August 29 and August 30, 2013, respectively, stated that the Syrian government used a nerve agent on August 21, 2013, against opposition forces outside of Damascus, Syria. During the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war, Iraq used nerve agents against Iranian troops and later against members of its Kurdish population in northern Iraq. In 1995, the Japanese apocalyptic cult Aum Shinrikyo used sarin on the Tokyo subway and reportedly carried out an attack in the city of Matsumoto as well. National chemical weapons programs have produced nerve agents for decades. A terrorist group might overcome technological barriers to synthesize these agents by using commercially available equipment, though the extreme toxicity of these compounds would pose appreciable danger to the manufacturer. Nerve agent production requires the use of toxic chemicals during synthesis and specialized equipment to contain the nerve agents produced. Of the nerve agents, VX is the most difficult to manufacture. An alternative to the direct manufacture of nerve agents is to manufacture certain chemicals that, when mixed, react to form the desired nerve agent. These chemical combinations are called binary chemical weapons. Binary chemical weapons have certain advantages and disadvantages when compared with the actual nerve agent. The chemicals comprising a binary chemical weapon are much less toxic than the actual nerve agent and thus are less dangerous to manufacture, transport, and handle. The nerve agent obtained through the use of a binary chemical weapon may be less pure or effective than directly manufactured nerve agent, since the conditions under which the nerve agent is manufactured are less controlled. Nerve agents are extremely dangerous and can enter the body through the lungs or by skin contact. For the G-series nerve agents, such as sarin, the inhalation toxicity is significantly greater than the dermal toxicity. Of the nerve agents, VX is the most deadly and tabun is the least deadly, though all are exceedingly toxic. Nerve agents interfere with the nervous system, causing overstimulation of muscles. Victims may suffer nausea and weakness and possibly convulsions and spasms. At higher concentration, loss of muscle control, nervous system irregularities, and death may occur. The action of nerve agents can be irreversible if victims are not quickly treated. Treatment for nerve agent exposure relies on two drugs, atropine and pralidoxime chloride, as antidotes. Atropine prevents muscle spasm and allows the body time to clear the nerve agent. Pralidoxime chloride limits the effects of nerve agents by reversing the agent's action. U.S. troops during the Persian Gulf War received both of these drugs in the form of an antidote kit. Anticonvulsants, such as Diazepam (Valium), may reduce convulsions and seizures brought on by exposure to nerve agents. The treatment window for nerve agent exposure is agent-dependent. Some agents quickly and irreversibly act within the body, while others require a much longer time. The most effective treatment occurs before or immediately after exposure to the nerve agents has taken place. For example, treatment of soman must begin within minutes to be effective, while tabun treatment can occur up to several hours after exposure. Prophylactic use of some compounds, such as pyridostigmine bromide, may allow effective treatments for some nerve agents to occur with longer delay. Chemicals categorized as blister agents, also known as vesicants, cause painful blistering of the skin. Such blistering is not generally lethal. Militarily, blister agents produce casualties and reduce the combat effectiveness of opposing troops by requiring them to wear bulky protective equipment. The most common blister agents are called mustard agents, due to their odor. Mustard agents are oily liquids that range in color from very pale yellow to dark brown, depending on the type and purity, and have a faint odor of mustard, onion, or garlic. These liquids evaporate quickly, and their vapors are also injurious. Blister agents are not naturally occurring compounds. Mustard agents, for example, were first developed in the late 1800s. During World War I, both sides in the conflict used these weapons against their enemies. Mustard-type blister agents produced the greatest number of chemical casualties during World War I, though fewer than 5% of these casualties died. Countries have stockpiled blister agents in their chemical weapon inventories. Mustard agent was also used by both sides in the Iran-Iraq war. As a signatory to the CWC, the United States is in the process of destroying its stockpile of blister agents. Production of blister agents is less complicated than that of nerve agents. Similar to manufacture of nerve agents, it requires the use of toxic chemicals and specialized equipment to contain the agent produced. The most common blister agents have many different methods for their production published in the open literature. Blister agents can enter the body by inhalation or contact with the skin or eyes. Some agents can penetrate through normal clothing material, causing burns even in cloth-covered areas. While blister agents react quickly upon skin contact, their symptoms may be delayed. In the case of mustard agent, damage occurs within one to two minutes of exposure, but symptoms do not manifest for several hours. As even low concentrations of vaporized blister agents quickly cause damage, it is unlikely that exposed individuals can remove these agents from the skin prior to injury. The initial symptoms of blister agent exposure are a reddening of the skin, resembling sunburn, combined with pain in the affected area. Swollen skin, blisters, and lesions may then develop, depending on the degree of exposure. Systemic symptoms, such as malaise, vomiting, and fever, may also develop in extreme cases. Exposure to large amounts of liquid mustard agent may prove fatal. The eyes are also very sensitive to blister agents. Following exposure to high concentration vapor, great pain, corneal damage, and scarring may occur. Liquid agent often causes the most severe eye damage. This may come from contact with airborne droplets or by self-contamination of the eyes from contaminated clothing or body parts. Victims inhaling blister agents may suffer damage to their lungs. While a single, low-level exposure may produce only temporary impairment, high concentrations or repeated exposures may cause permanent damage. Inhalation victims may have symptoms ranging from mild bronchitis to blistering of the lungs. Damage from blister agent exposure, lesions and other skin irritations, is symptomatically treated. Hospitalization may be required for respiratory tract injuries. Victims who suffer severe lung damage may require mechanical ventilation. Exposure to large amounts of mustard agent may weaken the whole immune system, requiring special precautions to avoid opportunistic infections during recovery. Chemicals categorized as choking agents act on the lungs, causing difficulty in breathing and, potentially, permanent lung damage. Examples of choking agents include chlorine, ammonia, and phosgene. Choking agents are generally gases, have marked odors, and may color the surrounding air. Choking agents were manufactured for wartime use, and were extensively used during World War I. The first major, successful, chemical attack of the war used chlorine gas at Ypres in 1915. Chlorine gas was later supplemented by phosgene use, which caused greater casualties. More recently, Iraqi insurgents attempted to use chlorine gas as part of improvised explosive devices in 2006 and 2007. Choking agents are encountered during industrial accidents. Many choking agents no longer have a military purpose, and instead industrial users predominantly employ them. Commercial applications use chlorine and ammonia in large quantities for water disinfection and food refrigeration. Methods for producing choking agents are well-known, but may be technically challenging. Choking agents require specialized equipment to produce, compress, and contain them. Choking agents injure their victims through inhalation and have a comparatively mild effect on the skin. Exposure to low chemical concentrations causes chest discomfort or shortness of breath, irritation of nose and throat, and tearing eyes. High agent concentrations may quickly cause swelling of the lungs, respiratory failure, and possibly death. Symptoms of lung damage can occur up to 48 hours after inhalation of moderate concentrations, and may not manifest themselves until physical effort aggravates the lungs. Victims of choking agents are generally treated symptomatically. Because exercise may exacerbate lung damage, victims are kept at rest until the danger of fluid in the lungs is past. Symptoms such as tightness of the chest and coughing are treated with immediate rest and comfort. Shallow breathing and insufficient oxygen may require supplemental oxygen. Swelling and accumulation of fluids in the lungs are likely after exposure to a high dose of choking agent. Administration of corticosteroids has been recommended in cases of fluid accumulation, but their beneficial effects have not been proven. Rest, warmth, sedation, and oxygen are still the primary treatments, even in the case of marked edema. Chemicals categorized as blood agents interfere with oxygen utilization at the cellular level. This category includes hydrogen cyanide and cyanide salts. Hydrogen cyanide is a very volatile gas, smelling of almonds, while cyanide salts are odorless solids. Militaries have considered hydrogen cyanide for use as a chemical warfare agent, but it has rare use in military situations because it quickly disperses. France manufactured hydrogen cyanide as a military agent during World War I. Hydrogen cyanide was used in other situations though; the principle agent used to kill individuals in German World War II concentration camps, Zyklon B, used hydrogen cyanide as its active agent. Hydrogen cyanide use was attributed to both sides during the Iran-Iraq war. Hydrogen cyanide and cyanide salts have industrial applications in the chemical, electroplating, and mining industries. As with choking agents, methods for producing blood agents are relatively well-known. However, the gaseous nature of hydrogen cyanide complicates production and storage. Blood agents act through inhalation or ingestion and impair cellular oxygen use. The central nervous system is especially susceptible to this effect. The symptoms of blood agent exposure depend upon the agent concentration and duration of exposure. In mild cases, headache, dizziness, and nausea may occur for several hours, followed by complete spontaneous recovery. Higher concentration or longer exposure may cause convulsions and coma. Very high concentrations may lead to powerful gasping for breath, violent convulsions, and cardiac failure within a few minutes. Treatment with specific antidotes, amyl or sodium nitrite combined with sodium thiosulfate, may reverse the effects of blood agents. The combination of these two chemicals removes cyanide, the active compound in blood agents, from the body. When convulsion or depressed breathing are present, treatment includes ventilation with oxygen and administration of anticonvulsant. Cyanide is metabolized more readily than most chemical weapons; with prompt treatment, victims may recover from otherwise-fatal doses. Protection against chemical agents is predominantly physical, rather than medicinal, in nature. Physical protections limit exposure by protecting the eyes, lungs, and/or skin from chemical contact. Physical protection against chemical agents includes gas masks and special protective clothing. Gas mask filters equipped with chemical filters are effective against inhaled chemical agents but may not provide sufficient protection against chemical agents active on skin contact, such as VX or mustard agents, or high concentrations of other nerve agents. Gas mask filters contain layers of activated charcoal and fine porous material to remove particles and chemicals from the airstream. The activated charcoal binds chemicals, preventing them from being inhaled. Each gas mask filter has a finite capacity, proportional to the amount of unbound activated charcoal remaining, and so has a limited lifetime once put into operation. A protective garment protects against those chemical weapons that cause effect upon skin contact. These garments range in complexity and protective ability. Hazardous materials suits are typically suits made of layered rubber containing activated charcoal. In comparison, military battle dress over-garments designed to protect against chemical weapons in the battlefield are generally cloth, sometimes treated to resist absorbing liquids, containing a layer of charcoal-impregnated foam. The rubber in protective equipment is impermeable to most chemical agents, while the activated charcoal acts in a manner similar to a gas mask filter. The combination of properly fitted and worn mask and suit should provide full protection against most chemical exposures. Few examples of medical prophylaxis against chemical weapons exist. Unlike against biological weapons, vaccines do not provide immunity from the effects of chemical weapons. However, pre-exposure use of pyridostigmine bromide provides some protection against the nerve agent soman. Pyridostigmine bromide acts to supplement post-exposure administration of the nerve agent antidotes atropine and pralidoxime chloride. Use of pyridostigmine bromide prevents permanent binding of nerve agents within the nervous system. Pyridostigmine bromide use is recommended only when there is a high imminent threat of chemical weapon use, as it has noticeable side effects. The U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Chemical Defense developed as an added protection against skin contact, a chemical resistant topical skin cream. The Skin Exposure Reduction Paste Against Chemical Warfare Agents, also known as SERPACWA, aims to complement chemical protective equipment provided to soldiers in the field. Decontamination, where chemicals are removed from the victims, usually through washing the eyes and skin with water and (against some chemical agents) a dilute bleach solution, is an essential protection against secondary chemical exposure. In addition to stopping the victim's exposure to the chemical agent, this procedure prevents those treating the victim from becoming victims themselves, and avoids contamination of treatment facilities. Decontamination is especially important in those cases where victims have encountered liquid chemical agents, and may have significant amounts of chemical agent trapped in their garments. In events with gaseous agents, decontamination may be less critical. Treatment of the victims with general care or agent-specific antidotes occurs following decontamination. Chemical weapons detection has been predominantly an area of concern for military planners, although the manufacture of some of these agents for commercial use requires detection capabilities at manufacturing plants and by first responders trained to handle hazardous materials. While some military units have equipment for chemical weapon detection, civilian first responders use a variety of commercial equipment to detect and identify a wide range of chemicals, generally in a hazardous material context. Because of the wide spectrum of potential chemical agents, the development of a portable, integrated instrument that quickly detects all chemical agents remains an area of research and development. The Department of Defense employs a series of technologies to detect and identify chemical agents, including personal sensors, automated atmospheric sampling, and laboratory methods adapted for battlefield use. Detection of chemical agents can serve multiple purposes. One is to provide warning of a chemical attack, allowing additional time to react to potential exposure. Another is to identify the chemical agent used in an attack. This might provide for better treatment and more effective response. Finally, determining when an area is clear of chemical agents after an attack requires sensitive post-event detection. Some techniques for detecting chemical agents, such as detection paper, tickets, and tubes, rely on sampling the local environment. Detection paper is absorbent paper impregnated with special dyes. When the paper absorbs a drop of chemical agent, one of the pigments dissolves, causing the paper to change color. Detection tickets are similar to detection paper. The ticket is waved in the air or used with a hand pump to determine if chemical agents are present. Detection tubes use a similar technology, but rely on a hand pump to draw air samples through the tube, which discolors in the presence of an agent. A disadvantage to these techniques is that other substances can also dissolve these pigments, causing false positives. The pigments involved can be specific to a type of agent, so an array of papers, tickets, or tubes may be required to identify the exact agent encountered. Handheld detectors, such as the Chemical Agent Monitor (CAM), are able to detect some chemical agents, namely mustard agents and nerve agents. Automatic sampling devices, such as the Automatic Chemical Agent Detector/Alarm (ACADA), are also employed to provide automated, constant atmospheric sampling. These devices sometimes use a technique called ion mobility spectroscopy to detect the presence of chemical agents. Much of the above equipment is commercially available, and hazardous material response teams could use it to assess a chemical release. Typically, hazardous material response teams possess detection paper, tickets, or tubes, but these teams may not have standardized equipment across jurisdictions. To aid first responders in choosing the best or most appropriate system for their use, the Department of Homeland Security has provided guidelines to assess various types of detectors. Another way of detecting a chemical terrorism event would be through the public health system. The sudden arrival of chemical casualties in local hospitals will quickly alert health care professionals. Since September 11, 2001, increases in public health networking have improved information sharing between localities. This may increase the likelihood of identifying, for example, a covert release of blister agents through identification of symptoms. Public health monitoring also may aid in forensic investigations following a covert event, especially if symptoms are delayed. Such public health monitoring may also provide opportunities to identify terrorists who may have self-inflicted chemical weapon injuries. Additionally, the Laboratory Response Network has been established, which links together diagnostic laboratories for the identification of chemical agents, as well as disease outbreaks. In February 2012, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency identified that "terrorist organizations are working to acquire and employ chemical, biological, and radiological materials." Many experts believe that it would be difficult for terrorist groups to use chemical agents as weapons of mass destruction. In 1993, the Office of Technology Assessment estimated that VX, the most lethal of nerve agents, spread uniformly and efficiently would require tons of material to kill 50% of the people in a 100 km 2 area. On the other hand, chemical agents might be effectively used as weapons of terror in situations where limited or enclosed space might decrease the required amounts of chemical. That is, the use of the weapon itself, even if casualties are few, could cause fear that would magnify the attack's effect beyond what would be expected based solely on the number of casualties. Few examples exist of successful chemical terror attacks. In 1995, Aum Shinrikyo, a Japanese apocalyptic cult, used sarin on the Tokyo subway. The attack killed 12 people and sent more than 5,000 to the hospital with some degree of injury. This same cult reportedly carried out an attack in Matsumoto as well, where 7 people were killed and over 200 injured. Both of these attacks used G-series nerve agents, which are more toxic through inhalation than by contact. V-series agents employed in a similar manner might have caused greater fatalities. In comparison, blister agents would likely be less lethal, but more injurious, if used in a similar manner. Blister agents are dermally active, so contact with the agent would cause injury. Additionally, since mustard agent vapor penetrates most fabrics, victims near the point of release might suffer grievously. Blister agents, while not likely to cause mass destruction, might cause mass terror and injury. Military planners no longer consider choking agents as useful military weapons, since chemical suits and masks provide high protection. However, according the Director of National Intelligence, the 2006-2007 attacks in Iraq using conventional explosives combined with chlorine gas "highlighted terrorist interest in using commercial and easily available toxic industrial chemicals as weapons." As a weapon of mass destruction used against civilians, the comparatively low lethality of choking agents complicates their use as a weapon of mass destruction, since very large volumes would be needed. On the other hand, the industrial availability of some choking agents provides opportunities for acquisition and subsequent use of potentially very large volumes of such agents. For example, the United States produces approximately 1 billion pounds of chlorine a year for use in water treatment facilities. Experts have noted the potential vulnerabilities of chlorine-filled rail tank cars, its primary transport method. Terrorist attack on industrial stores at chemical or water treatment facilities or during shipment is another potential source of concern. In order to address the concern of security at chemical facilities with large amounts of hazardous chemicals, Congress provided DHS with statutory authority to regulate these facilities for security purposes. In 2007, DHS issued regulations, called chemical facility anti-terrorism standards (CFATS), but compliance with these regulations is incomplete. The 113 th Congress has held oversight hearings on CFATS and considered its reauthorization. Terrorists may find blood agents difficult to employ as weapons of mass destruction for many of the same reasons that apply to choking agents. The quick dispersal of blood agents, combined with the large amounts necessary to cause mass casualties, make such agents difficult to use on a mass scale. Some industrially manufactured blood agents are used on-site without being shipped. However, terrorist groups continue their interest in these agents, perhaps because of a belief that they may cause mass casualties.

The potential for terrorist use of chemical agents is a noted concern highlighted by the Tokyo sarin gas attacks of 1995. The events of September 11, 2001, increased congressional attention towards reducing the vulnerability of the United States to such unconventional attacks. The possibility that terrorist groups might obtain insecure chemical weapons led to increased scrutiny of declared Libyan chemical weapon stockpiles following the fall of the Qadhafi regime. Experts have expressed similar concerns regarding the security and use of Syrian chemical weapons, reportedly including stocks of nerve (sarin, VX) and blister (mustard gas) agents. For analysis of chemical weapons in Syria, see CRS Report R42848, Syria's Chemical Weapons: Issues for Congress, coordinated by [author name scrubbed]. Military planners generally organize chemical agents, such as chemical weapons and toxic industrial chemicals, into four groups: nerve agents (such as sarin and VX), blister agents (such as mustard gas), choking agents (such as chlorine and phosgene), and blood agents (such as hydrogen cyanide). While the relative military threat posed by the various chemical types has varied over time, terrorist use of these chemicals against civilian targets is viewed as a low probability, high consequence event. Chemical weapons and toxic industrial chemicals cause a variety of symptoms in their victims. These symptoms depend on the chemical agent used, and a victim of chemical exposure may exhibit a combination of symptoms. Some chemical agents cause death by interfering with the nervous system. Some chemical agents inhibit breathing and lead to asphyxiation. Other chemical agents have caustic effects on contact. As a result, effective chemical attack treatment depends on identifying at least the type of chemical agent used. Additionally, chemical agents trapped on the body or clothes of victims may place first responders and medical professionals at risk. Civilian protection from and detection of chemical agents is an area of federal concern. Whether terrorist groups are capable of using chemical agents as weapons of mass destruction is unclear. Some experts have asserted that the volumes of chemicals required to cause mass casualties makes that scenario unlikely. They claim that chemical terrorism is more likely to be small in scale. Other experts have suggested that there has been an increase in terrorist interest regarding chemical agents, and that this interest could lead to their use in terrorist attacks. Some experts assert that insecure stockpiles of military-grade chemical agents would lower the barrier to terrorist acquisition of chemical agents and thus increase the possibility that terrorists might use them. The change of regimes in Libya and Egypt and recent events in Syria have increased concern that such military-grade chemical agents might transition into terrorist hands and then be used to attack U.S. sites either domestically or abroad.

In response to the sustained period of high unemployment during the last recession, which began in December 2007 and ended in June 2009, Congress enacted several temporary laws to extend Unemployment Ins urance (UI) benefits. For instance, from July 2008 through December 2013, the now-expired Emergency Unemployment Compensation (EUC08) program provided federally financed UI benefits in addition to state-financed, regular benefits available through the permanent-law Unemployment Compensation (UC) program. This temporary extension of UI benefits took place at a time when the federal government and the states faced serious budgetary pressures. In recent years, various proposals have been offered to reduce the large and growing federal budget deficits, as well as to make various reforms to the UI system, including measures to alleviate state UI financing stress and to improve the solvency of the UI trust fund. In this context of increased spending on UI benefits amidst ongoing concerns about the level of federal budget deficits, proposals to restrict the receipt of unemployment benefits by high-income individuals emerged. For example, in the 112 th Congress, the House-passed version of H.R. 3630 , the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act, included a provision that would have imposed an income tax on unemployment benefits for high-income individuals. Using a scaled approach, the percentage of unemployment benefits subject to tax would have increased with an individual's Adjusted Gross Income (AGI)--beginning with AGI of $750,000 for a single tax filer and $1.5 million for a married couple filing a joint return. Under this proposal, unemployment benefits would have been taxed at 100% for a single tax filer with AGI of $1 million and for a married couple filing a joint return with AGI of $2 million. The final version of H.R. 3630 enacted by Congress and signed into law by President Obama ( P.L. 112-96 , signed on February 22, 2012) extended UI benefits, among other provisions. It did not, however, include the provision in the House-passed version of the bill that would have restricted unemployment benefit receipt based on income. While the debate in Congress commonly refers to a proposed policy of restricting the receipt of unemployment benefits by "millionaires," various proposals have specified different income thresholds. For example, one proposal would have placed restrictions on unemployment benefit income for a single tax filer with AGI of at least $750,000 (or at least $1.5 million for a married couple filing a joint return). Another proposal would have placed restrictions on unemployment benefit income for a single tax filer with AGI of at least $500,000 (or at least $1 million for a married couple filing jointly). Although the proposals varied in how they define high-income individuals, each would have restricted individuals and households with incomes above a specified threshold from receiving unemployment benefits. This report addresses many of the questions that have arisen regarding such proposals, including the potential number of people who would be affected and the potential savings to federal and state governments. To place these proposals into context, the report provides a brief overview of the UI system and explains why receipt of UI benefits is not restricted based on income under current law. It then presents Internal Revenue Service (IRS) data on the distribution of household income and unemployment benefits for two tax years: 2010, when UI receipt was at a recent peak, and 2014, the most recently available data, to shed light on the size of the group potentially affected by such proposals. The report raises policy considerations such as the potential impact of such proposals on federal expenditures, given the joint federal-state nature of unemployment programs. Finally, it summarizes relevant, recent legislation. A variety of benefits are available to involuntarily unemployed workers to provide them with income support during their spell of unemployment. These benefits include the Unemployment Compensation (UC) program and the Extended Benefit (EB) program. UC is a joint federal-state program financed by federal taxes under the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) and by state payroll taxes under the State Unemployment Tax Acts (SUTA). The federal taxes fund federal and state UC program administration, the federal share of EB payments, and federal loans to insolvent state UC programs. State taxes fund the UC payments and the state share of EB payments. Most states provide for up to 26 weeks of UC benefits to eligible workers who become unemployed through no fault of their own, and meet certain other eligibility requirements. The EB program may provide additional benefits after UC program benefits have been exhausted. Within broad federal guidelines, states determine many of the substantive aspects of their UC program, including the level of payment, duration, and eligibility. This authority for the states to decide on program matters effectively results in 53 different UC programs that are financed by the 50 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. Currently, states may not restrict UI benefits by income level other than those income sources deemed related to their unemployment. This requirement is based upon a 1964 U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) decision that precludes states from means-testing to determine UC eligibility. The U.S. Labor Secretary expanded the restriction on means-testing to severely limit the factors states may use to determine UC entitlement. Under this interpretation, federal law requires entitlement to compensation to be determined from facts or causes related to the individual's state of unemployment. Thus, the DOL requires that states pay compensation for unemployment to all eligible beneficiaries regardless of their income level because individual or household income would not be considered to impact the fact or cause of unemployment. Table 1 shows the number of tax filers that received unemployment benefit income by categories of AGI for tax years 2010 (a recent peak in UI receipt) and 2014 (most recent year available). For income tax purposes, unemployment benefits include more than regular UC. They include any amounts received under the unemployment compensation laws of the United States or of a state; state unemployment insurance benefits and benefits paid to an individual by a state or the District of Columbia from the Federal Unemployment Trust Fund; and railroad unemployment compensation benefits, disability benefits paid as a substitute for unemployment compensation, Trade Adjustment Assistance, and Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance. Unemployment benefits do not include workers compensation. Among tax filers with AGI of $1 million or more, 3,171 reported receipt of unemployment benefit income in 2010. This represents 0.02% of all tax filers that reported receiving unemployment benefit income in each year. In tax year 2014, however, there were no tax filers with an AGI of $1 million or more who reported UI benefit income. There is a difference between the number of tax filers, the number of persons (or individuals), and the number of households. Households, which consist of one or more persons, may contain more than one tax filer. For example, a married couple may file separate tax returns or a joint tax return. This may impact the number of beneficiaries counted in Table 1 if both persons in a married couple receive unemployment compensation, and the couple files a single joint return, the number of tax filers receiving unemployment compensation would be equal to one. If they file separate tax returns, then they would be counted as two. Note that the tax filing data shown here somewhat understate the total number receiving unemployment benefit income. If an individual or married couple's total income from taxable sources is below the filing threshold, he or she is not required to file a tax return and therefore may not be included in the data for tax years 2010 and 2014. This would particularly understate the number of tax filers in the lower AGI categories. Table 2 shows the amount of unemployment benefit income received by tax filers by AGI category for tax years 2010 and 2014, where incomes are not adjusted for inflation. As shown in the table, the amount of unemployment benefit income received by tax filers with AGI of $1 million or more is relatively small. For tax year 2010, tax filers with at least $1 million in AGI reported receiving $40 million in unemployment benefit income, which represents 0.03% of total reported unemployment benefit income. For tax year 2014, however, there were no tax filers with at least $1 million in AGI who received unemployment benefits; therefore, there was $0 in reported unemployment benefit in come for this group. This section addresses some of the policy considerations associated with proposals to restrict the payment of UI benefits to those with high incomes. These include the potential effect on federal expenditures given the joint federal-state nature of unemployment programs and the potential increase in administrative costs associated with such proposals. Under permanent law, most UI benefit outlays are state funded (i.e., most UI benefits are funded with state taxes and paid by the states). This in turn implies that any savings under permanent law would mostly accrue to the states. States largely fund the primary program, the UC program, by collecting taxes from employers. The EB program is funded 50% by the federal government and 50% by the states under permanent law. However, until recently there were several temporary laws that provided 100% federal funding for (now-expired) EUC08 and EB benefits. For instance, P.L. 111-5 , as amended, temporarily provided for 100% federal funding of the EB program through December 31, 2013. The EUC08 program, which was 100% federally funded, was authorized under the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 ( P.L. 112-240 ) until the week ending on or before January 1, 2014 (i.e., December 28, 2013, in all states except New York State, in which the program ends December 29, 2013). Given the small amount of unemployment benefit income paid to "millionaires" and in the absence of further legislative action to extend the now-expired federal laws, potential savings to the federal government diminished at the end of calendar year 2013. The amount of savings associated with such proposals would depend on the income threshold at which UI benefit receipt is restricted (the higher the income threshold, the lower the savings). If only millionaires were restricted from receiving UI benefits, there would be a small amount of savings. The savings estimate for a provision in the House-passed version of the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012 ( H.R. 3630 ) serves as a guide. A provision in the House-passed bill would have taxed unemployment benefit income at 100% for single tax filers with AGI of $1 million (or for married couples filing a joint return with AGI of $2 million). The provision would have taxed unemployment benefit income at a lower percentage for single tax filers with AGI beginning at $750,000 (or for married couples filing jointly with AGI beginning at $1.5 million). The Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT), in conjunction with the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), estimated that this provision would have reduced federal outlays by $20 million over 10 years (2012-2021). This estimate excluded any increase in administrative costs because administrative costs are considered a discretionary item. Any additional funding for the administration of this provision of the bill (i.e., over and above the current funding for administration of the tax and UI systems) would have had to be written explicitly in the bill and passed into law. Lowering the proposed income threshold at which the proposed restriction is applied would make more people unable to receive UI benefit income and result in greater savings. However, determining the level at which to set the income threshold may depend upon the goals of the program. For example, making large numbers of people ineligible for UI benefits based on income to achieve greater savings may be perceived as unfair and may further compromise the objective of providing insurance against involuntary unemployment for all workers. The potential administrative costs could outweigh the potential savings. Although lawmakers could choose among different ways to administer the provision, one of the more cost effective ways may be to recoup UI benefits through the tax system rather than make high-income groups ineligible for benefits. For example, H.R. 3630 , S. 1931 , and S. 1944 of the 112 th Congress, which are summarized briefly in the " Legislation " section, would have imposed an income tax rate (of up to 100% in the case of H.R. 3630 and S. 1931 ) on unemployment benefit income for tax filers with AGI above a specified threshold. This approach would allow the federal government to recoup the value of UI benefits paid to certain individuals when they file their income tax returns. Taking advantage of the existing tax system to administer the provision may be more cost effective than other approaches because the tax system already requires individuals to report their unemployment benefits and other sources of income and it has a mechanism in place for individuals to pay back the value of UI benefits with a check to the federal government. Although administering the provision through the tax system may be a relatively cost effective approach, there are some potential disadvantages. Adding a separate tax rate for UI benefits may further complicate an already complicated tax form. Among the alternatives, one could restrict UI benefits for those who have or are expected to have at least $1 million in earnings . For example, states collect information on earnings for each job covered under the UI system. UI benefits could be denied to those with more than $333,333 of earnings in a four-month period. This would be a cost effective approach in that the UI database, which contains data collected by the states, could be used to identify such individuals. However, the UI database would not identify those who have at least $1 million in total income when other sources of income (such as stocks) are taken into account. Moreover, it would not identify all married couples or households that have at least $1 million in earnings or total income. Proposals to restrict the payment of UI benefits to those with high incomes may pose administrative issues for the states as well. This would be the case, for example, if the provision were to be administered by making modifications to the UI system, rather than by recouping benefits already paid through the tax system. Some of the potential administrative issues from the perspective of the states are described below. State UI administrators currently do not have the infrastructure needed to restrict UI benefits based on income. UI program administrators do not collect comprehensive income information. Earnings are used to calculate UI benefit amounts, but state UI administrators may not collect information on capital gains, interest, or other sources of income. In addition, income information for spouses and other family members is not collected for purposes of UC and other UI programs. This implies that any restriction based on household income would require states to collect additional data. Setting up such a system may prove expensive in comparison to the cost savings derived from restricting UI benefit payments to certain individuals. Some of the costs associated with establishing a system to administer the provision may be related to setting up new administrative procedures, setting up software programs, creating databases, and automating ways to validate income statements. In this case, the costs may be largely one-time setup costs. As the savings derived from restricting UI benefit payments to certain individuals accrue over time, they may eventually offset the one-time setup costs. However, the ongoing year-to-year administrative costs (related to working with applicants to collect the proper income statements, etc.) could prove to be large relative to the benefit savings. A policy of restricting UI benefit receipt based on income may discourage some eligible individuals from applying for benefits. For example, if the tax system were used to recoup some or all of the value of UI benefits paid to certain high-income individuals, some eligible unemployed workers may choose not to apply for UI benefits if they consider the time and other costs associated with applying for benefits to outweigh the additional funds. There may be other reasons why an eligible individual may not apply for UI benefits. For example, a person who becomes unemployed early in the year may expect (erroneously) to have income over the course of the year above the applicable threshold, and therefore may choose not to apply for benefits based on an expectation that those benefits would only be recaptured later through the tax system. Alternatively, if a restriction on the payment of UI benefits to certain high-income individuals were administered through the UI system, all applicants for UI benefits would be required to complete additional forms for the purpose of reporting income from various sources. (In addition to his or her own income, the applicant may be required to report the income of others in the household, such as a spouse.) Adding this complexity to the application process for UI benefits could discourage some eligible individuals from applying for benefits. An eligible individual may have trouble filling out the forms, expect little in UI benefits, and decide not to apply for benefits (e.g., new immigrants with language barriers). In the 112 th and 113 th Congresses, a number of proposals were introduced that would restrict or highly tax the unemployment benefit income of unemployed workers with high incomes. These bills are summarized below. As of the date of this report, no bills have been introduced in the 114 th Congress to restrict UI receipt based on income. H.R. 3630 . On December 9, 2011, Representative Camp introduced H.R. 3630 , the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2011. Among other provisions, House-passed version of H.R. 3630 would have taxed unemployment benefit income at 100% for single tax filers with AGI of $1 million (or for married couples filing a joint return with AGI of $2 million). The measure would have taxed unemployment benefit income at a lower percentage for single tax filers with AGI beginning at $750,000 (or for married couples filing jointly with AGI beginning at $1.5 million). (The unemployment benefit income would have continued to be counted in the calculation of AGI and thus subject to "regular" federal income tax.) S. 1944 . On December 5, 2011, Senator Casey introduced S. 1944 , the Middle Class Tax Cut Act of 2011. Among other provisions, S. 1944 would have created a new income tax on unemployment benefit income for a single tax filer with AGI of at least $500,000 (or at least $1 million for a married couple filing a joint return). The tax rate for unemployment benefit income would be 55% in tax years 2011 and 2012 and 50% for tax years after 2012. (The unemployment benefit income would continue to be counted in the calculation of AGI and thus subject to "regular" federal income tax.) S. 1931 . On November 30, 2011, Senator Heller introduced S. 1931 , the Temporary Tax Holiday and Government Reduction Act. Among other provisions, S. 1931 would have taxed the unemployment benefit income of certain high-income tax filers. The provision in this bill is the same as the one in H.R. 3630 (described above). H.R. 235 . On January 7, 2011, Representative Brady introduced H.R. 235 , the Cut Unsustainable and Top-Heavy Spending Act of 2011. Among other provisions, H.R. 235 would have prohibited the use of federal funds--from the EUC08 and EB programs--to pay unemployment benefits to an individual with resources of at least $1 million in the preceding year. An individual's resources would have been determined in the same way as the resource test for the Medicare Part D drug benefit subsidy (for purposes of the drug benefit subsidy, resources are defined by the individual states and include savings and investments but do not include the value of a primary residence or the value of a car). This provision would be effective for any weeks of unemployment benefits beginning on or after January 1, 2011. S. 310 . On February 8, 2011, Senator Coburn introduced S. 310 , the Ending Unemployment Payments to Jobless Millionaires Act of 2011 (see also companion bill H.R. 569 introduced by Representative Lankford). The bill would have prohibited any EUC08 or EB benefit payments to an individual with resources in the preceding year of at least $1 million, as determined through the resource test for the Medicare Part D drug benefit subsidy. For the purposes of the drug benefit subsidy, resources are defined by the individual states and include savings and investments but do not include the value of a primary residence or the value of a car. Unlike H.R. 235 , this provision in S. 310 would have been effective on Table 1 or after the date of enactment of this legislation. S. 18 . On February 27, 2013, Senator Ayotte introduced S. 18 , the Sequester Replacement and Spending Reduction Act of 2013. Section 401 of S. 18 would have prohibited any individual reporting more than $1 million in AGI in the preceding year from receiving federal unemployment compensation, including EB and (now-expired) EUC08 payments. The effective date for this provision would have been the day after enactment. The CBO estimated that there would be no measurable savings from this proposal. H.R. 2448 . On June 20, 2013, Representative Lankford introduced H.R. 2448 , the Ending Unemployment Payment to Millionaires Act of 2013. Like S. 310 and H.R. 569 in the 112 th Congress, this bill would have prohibited any EUC08 or EB benefit payments to an individual with resources in the preceding year of at least $1 million, as determined through the resource test for the Medicare Part D drug benefit subsidy. This bill would have been effective for weeks of unemployment beginning on or after enactment. H.R. 3979 . On January 31, 2014, Representative Barletta introduced H.R. 3979 , the Emergency Unemployment Compensation Extension Act of 2014. Section 7 of H.R. 3979 would have prohibited any individual reporting more than $1 million in AGI in the preceding year from receiving any (now-expired) EUC08 payments. This provision would have been effective for weeks of unemployment beginning on or after enactment. S.Amdt. 2714 . On February 4, 2014, Senator Reid (for Senator Reed) proposed S.Amdt. 2714 to S. 1845 , the Emergency Unemployment Compensation Extension Act. Section 7 of S.Amdt. 2714 would have prohibited any individual reporting more than $1 million in AGI in the preceding year from receiving federal unemployment compensation, including EB and (now-expired) EUC08 payments. The effective date for this provision would have been the day after enactment. This bill would have been effective for weeks of unemployment beginning on or after enactment. S. 2097 . On March 6, 2014, Senator Heller introduced S. 2097 , the Responsible Unemployment Compensation Extension Act of 2014. Section 9 of S. 2097 would have prohibited any individual reporting more than $1 million in AGI in the preceding year from receiving federal unemployment compensation, including EB and (now-expired) EUC08 payments, effective for weeks of unemployment beginning on or after enactment. S. 2148 and S. 2149 . On March 13, 2014, Senator Reed introduced S. 2148 , the Emergency Unemployment Compensation Extension Act of 2014. On March 24, 2014, Senator Reed introduced S. 2149 , a technical correction to S. 2149 . Section 7 of both S. 2148 and S. 2149 would have prohibited any individual reporting more than $1 million in AGI in the preceding year from receiving any (now-expired) EUC08 payments, effective for weeks of unemployment beginning on or after enactment. S. 2532 . On June 25, 2014, Senator Reed introduced S. 2532 , the Emergency Unemployment Compensation Extension Act of 2014. Like H.R. 3979 , S. 2148 , and S. 2149 , Section 7 of S. 2532 would have prohibited any individual reporting more than $1 million in AGI in the preceding year from receiving any (now-expired) EUC08 payments. This provision would have been effective for weeks of unemployment beginning on or after enactment. H.R. 4415 . On April 7, 2014, Representative Kildee introduced H.R. 4415 , the Emergency Unemployment Compensation Extension Act of 2014. Like H.R. 3979 , S. 2148 , S. 2149 , and S. 2532 , Section 7 of H.R. 4415 would have prohibited any individual reporting more than $1 million in AGI in the preceding year from receiving any (now-expired) EUC08 payments. This provision would have been effective for weeks of unemployment beginning on or after enactment. H.R. 4550 . On May 1, 2014, Representative Fitzpatrick introduced H.R. 4550 , the Emergency Unemployment Compensation Extension Act of 2014. Like H.R. 3979 , H.R. 4415 , S. 2148 , S. 2149 , and S. 2532 , Section 106 of H.R. 4550 would have prohibited any individual reporting more than $1 million in AGI in the preceding year from receiving any (now-expired) EUC08 payments, effective for weeks of unemployment beginning on or after enactment. H.R. 4970 . On June 25, 2014, Representative LoBiondo introduced H.R. 4970 , the Emergency Unemployment Compensation Extension Act of 2014. Like H.R. 3979 , H.R. 4415 , H.R. 4550 , S. 2148 , S. 2149 , and S. 2532 , Section 7 of H.R. 4970 would have prohibited any individual reporting more than $1 million in AGI in the preceding year from receiving any (now-expired) EUC08 payments, effective for weeks of unemployment beginning on or after enactment. As of the date of this report, no bills have been introduced in the 114 th Congress to restrict UI receipt based on income.

Under the federal-state Unemployment Insurance (UI) system, there is currently no prohibition on the receipt of UI benefits by high-income unemployed workers. States, which determine many of the eligibility requirements for UI benefits, may not restrict eligibility based on individual or household income. Recent Congresses, however, have considered proposals to restrict the payment of unemployment benefits to high-income individuals. These proposals define high income in a variety of ways--often prohibiting UI benefits for "millionaires." For instance, in the 112th Congress, the House-passed version of H.R. 3630 (the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act) included a provision that would have imposed an income tax on unemployment benefits for high-income individuals. Based on a scaled approach, the tax would have increased to 100% for a single tax filer with Adjusted Gross Income (AGI) of $1 million (or AGI of $2 million for a married couple filing a joint return). The provision, however, was not included in the final version of the legislation that became P.L. 112-96. Several other bills introduced in the 112th Congress would have restricted unemployment benefit receipt based on income (i.e., they would change the current requirement to provide unemployment benefits to all workers without income restrictions): S. 1944, H.R. 235, and S. 310. A number of bills in the 113th Congress would also have imposed income restrictions for the purposes of UI benefits: S. 18, H.R. 2448, H.R. 3979, H.R. 4415, H.R. 4550, H.R. 4970, S.Amdt. 2714, S. 2097, S. 2148, S. 2149, and S. 2532. As of the date of this report, no bills have been introduced in the 114th Congress to restrict UI receipt based on income. To inform the ongoing policy debate, this report provides information relevant to proposals that would restrict the payment of unemployment benefits to individuals with high incomes. Three primary areas that may be of interest to lawmakers are addressed: (1) the current U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) opinion on means-testing UI benefits; (2) the potential number of people who would be affected by such proposals; and (3) policy considerations such as the potential savings associated with such proposals, particularly in terms of federal expenditures. The latter two issues are discussed because a small percentage of tax filers who receive unemployment benefit income have an AGI of $1 million or more. For example, in tax year 2010, when UI receipt was at a recent peak, approximately 0.02% of tax filers had an AGI of at least $1 million, based on Internal Revenue Service (IRS) data. In tax year 2014 (most recent data available), however, there were no tax filers with AGI of $1 million who received UI benefits, according to IRS data.

Internal Revenue Code (IRC) SS 4121 imposes an excise tax on domestically-mined coal when it is sold by the producer to the first purchaser. The producer is liable for the tax, but may pass it along to others through an increase in the coal's purchase price; thus, it is possible that the producer does not actually bear the burden of the tax. The Constitution's Export Clause states that "No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any State." Nonetheless, the coal excise tax was imposed on coal destined for export. In 1998, a federal district court held that the tax on such coal clearly violated the Export Clause. In 2000, the IRS acquiesced and stopped imposing the tax on coal that was in the stream of export when sold by the producer and actually exported. The IRC provides a process by which taxpayers who paid the unconstitutional tax may file for a refund from the IRS. The claim must be made within three years from the time the excise tax return was filed or two years from the time the tax was paid, whichever is later. The producer that paid the tax has first claim to any refund. Exporters may claim refunds only "if the person who paid such tax [i.e., the producer] waives his claim to such amount." A taxpayer filing a refund claim must establish that it: (1) did not include the tax in the coal's purchase price or otherwise collect the tax from the purchaser; (2) has repaid, in the event the tax burden was shifted, the amount of tax to the ultimate purchaser; or (3) has filed the ultimate purchaser's written consent for the refund with the IRS. Taxpayers seeking a refund in court must first file a timely refund claim with the IRS and then wait six months, unless the IRS makes a determination prior to that date, before bringing suit. Some coal producers and exporters brought suits under the Export Clause seeking damages from the United States in the amount of unconstitutional coal excise taxes they paid. They brought the suits in the Court of Federal Claims, arguing that it had jurisdiction to hear them under the Tucker Act. That act grants the court jurisdiction over "any claim against the United States founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort." Taxpayers used these suits as a way to bypass two limitations in the IRC refund process. First, the Tucker Act has a longer statute of limitations--six years from the time the tax is paid --than the IRC. This allowed taxpayers to seek damages for taxes paid in the several years preceding the years for which they could receive IRC refunds. Second, the Tucker Act, unlike the IRC, does not give priority to producers' claims. Thus, it potentially allowed parties farther down the supply chain (e.g., exporters) to bring claims alleging they deserved damages because they bore the economic burden of the tax. A threshold issue has been whether the Court of Federal Claims could hear these suits. The Tucker Act only confers jurisdiction--it "does not create any substantive right enforceable against the United States for money damages." Thus, the substantive right must be found in another source of law. One question has been whether the Export Clause provides a right to monetary damages when the government violates it. If the answer is yes, a related question has been whether such a claim could be made independently of an IRC refund claim. If not, then taxpayers would need to meet the IRC's more stringent requirements. In Cyprus Amax Coal Co. v. United States , the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit addressed the jurisdictional question. The court's holding had two components. The first was that the Export Clause was a money-mandating provision, as required for Tucker Act jurisdiction. The second was that a cause of action founded in a violation of the Export Clause was self-executing. This meant the Clause provided a separate cause of action so that a taxpayer could bring a suit for damages independent of an IRC administrative refund claim. In a later case, the court clarified that the Export Clause was not a money-mandating provision for all parties seeking coal excise tax refunds. In that case, the court held that the Tucker Act did not provide jurisdiction to hear the claim of an ultimate purchaser who alleged it had paid the tax through higher coal prices but did not directly pay the tax to the government. After the Cyprus Amax decision answered the question of its jurisdiction under the Tucker Act, the Court of Federal Claims heard several cases brought by coal brokers and ultimate purchasers that it dismissed due to lack of constitutional standing. To have standing, "[a] plaintiff must allege personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief." The parties alleged that they were injured by the government's unconstitutional imposition of the coal excise tax because the burden of the tax was shifted to them by coal producers charging higher prices for coal. The Court of Federal Claims found the requisite causal relationship between this injury and the government's action to be lacking. This was because it was the independent actions of the producers that determined whether the parties paid any amount of the unconstitutional tax. As noted, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals also raised a barrier to claims by non-producer parties by holding there was no Tucker Act jurisdiction to hear the claim of an ultimate purchaser who did not actually pay the tax to the government. In a 2008 decision, United States v. Clintwood Elkhorn Mining Co. , the Supreme Court held that taxpayers seeking refunds for the unconstitutionally-imposed coal excise tax must comply with the IRC refund process. The taxpayers in that case had filed administrative refund claims for the three tax years open under the IRC's statute of limitations and filed suit in the Court of Federal Claims seeking the amount of taxes paid for the three previous years that were open only under the Tucker Act's longer limitations period. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit had allowed their suit and denied the government's request to reverse its Cyprus Amax holding. The appeals court said that the issue of whether taxpayers could bring suit under the Export Clause without complying with the IRC refund scheme had been "fully aired" in Cyprus Amax and it could "discern no basis for reopening this question." The Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision, held that the plain language of the relevant IRC provisions, SS 7422 and SS 6511, clearly required that the taxpayers file a timely refund claim with the IRS before bringing suit. The Court stated that it had basically decided the issue in a 1941 case where it had reasoned that the Tucker Act's statute of limitations was simply "'an outside limit'" which Congress could shorten in situations requiring "'special considerations,'" such as tax refunds because "'suits against the United States for the recovery of taxes impeded effective administration of the revenue laws.'" The Court noted that it had explained in that case that the IRC's refund provisions would have "'no meaning whatever'" if taxpayers who did not comply with those provisions could still bring refund suits under the Tucker Act. The Court did not address whether the Export Clause provided a cause of action that could be brought under the Tucker Act, finding that the IRC refund provisions would apply regardless of the answer to that question. Noting that it was clear from its past cases that unconstitutionally-collected taxes could be subject to the same administrative requirements as other taxes, the Court rejected the taxpayers' argument that something unique about the Export Clause required different treatment. The Court explained that while the government may not impose unconstitutional taxes, it may create an administrative process to refund such taxes because of its "'exceedingly strong interest in financial stability,'" regardless of whether the tax violated the Export Clause or some other provision of the Constitution. The Court also rejected the taxpayers' claim that the IRC refund scheme could not apply to facially unconstitutional taxes, finding the plain language of IRC SS 7422 clearly included such taxes. There appear to be two primary impacts of the Court's decision in Clintwood Elkhorn . The first is that taxpayers seeking refunds for the unconstitutionally-imposed coal excise tax must file refund claims with the IRS, subject to the IRC's limitations. Thus, taxpayers are subject to the shorter statute of limitations and non-producer parties may only seek a refund if the producer who paid the tax has waived its right to the refund. Second, the Court's analysis seems broadly applicable to refund claims in general, including those based on violations of other constitutional provisions. The Senate-passed version of H.R. 6049 , SS 114 (Energy Improvement and Extension Act of 2008) and H.R. 7060 , SS 114 (Renewable Energy and Job Creation Tax Act of 2008), passed by the House on September 26, 2008, would provide an alternative administrative procedure for refunding the unconstitutionally-imposed coal excise tax. In order to claim a refund, a coal producer would have to establish that it, or a related party, exported coal produced by it to a foreign country or shipped it to a U.S. possession, or caused such export or shipment, through means other than by an exporter that met the proposal's requirements to file a claim. A producer with a favorable court judgment related to the excise tax's constitutionality would be deemed to meet this requirement. An "exporter" would have to establish that it exported coal to a foreign country or shipped it to a U.S. possession, or caused such export or shipment. Additionally, the producer or exporter would need to (1) have filed a return between October 1, 1990, and the date of the act's enactment, and (2) file a claim for the refund within 30 days of the enactment. The Treasury Secretary would have to determine whether the refund requirements were met within 180 days of a claim being filed and pay any refund owed (with interest) within 180 days of that determination. Refunds to producers would equal the amount of coal excise tax paid on the exported or shipped coal (minus any amount paid pursuant to a favorable court judgment mentioned above). Refunds to exporters would equal $0.825 per ton of exported or shipped coal. Refund claims could only be made for coal exported or shipped between October 1, 1990, and the date of the act's enactment. No refund would be allowed if one had already been made to any taxpayer or there was a final settlement between the government and producer, party related to the producer, or exporter. The Senate bill states it would not give producers or exporters standing to commence or intervene in each other's judicial or administrative refund claim proceedings; the House bill does not include such a provision. It appears the bills' proposed refund process would have three significant impacts. First, taxpayers would be able to seek refunds for taxes paid in years not open under current law. The Supreme Court's holding in Clintwood Elkhorn makes clear that current law requires that a refund claim be filed within three years from the time the excise tax return was filed or two years from the time the tax was paid, whichever is later. The bills would allow refunds relating to coal exported or shipped as early as October 1990 so long as the taxpayer filed a refund claim within 30 days of the provision's enactment and met the other requirements. Second, the bills could expand the opportunity for exporters to claim refunds beyond that available under current law, so long as they are able to meet the requirements. Third, the bills would impose short time limits for the taxpayers and IRS to act on the refund claims. Thus, they would encourage quick resolution of the claims, although administrative issues could arise due to the requirement that refunds not be paid twice on the same coal and their silence on the issue of contestability.

In 1998, a U.S. district court held that the imposition of the coal excise tax, or black lung excise tax, on exported coal was unconstitutional. Refunding the tax has been controversial. This is because some coal producers and exporters attempted to bypass the limitations in the Internal Revenue Code's refund scheme by bringing suit under the Export Clause in the Court of Federal Claims, seeking damages from the United States in the amount of coal excise taxes paid. The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals held there was Tucker Act jurisdiction to hear some of the suits and allowed them as an alternative to the Code's refund process. However, in a 2008 decision, United States v. Clintwood Elkhorn Mining Co., the Supreme Court held that taxpayers must comply with the Code's refund process. Meanwhile, several bills would provide an alternative method for coal excise tax refunds, including the amended version of H.R. 6049 (Energy Improvement and Extension Act of 2008) that was passed by the Senate on September 23, 2008, and H.R. 7060 (Renewable Energy and Job Creation Tax Act of 2008), which was passed by the House on September 26, 2008.

House Rule X, clause 5(c)(2), adopted in 1995 limited committee (and subcommittee) chairs to three terms of consecutive service. Service for less than a full session in a Congress is disregarded. A rules change adopted on January 7, 2003, pursuant to H.Res. 5 , exempted the Intelligence Committee chair from the limit. A rules change adopted on January 4, 2005, pursuant to H.Res. 5 , exempted the Rules Committee chair from the limit. In 2009, the Democratic majority removed term limits from House rules. The rules adopted on January 3, 2013, reinstituted term limits for all committee chairs, but continued the exemption for the Rules Committee chair. Republican Conference rules delineate procedures for the selection of standing committee chairs and ranking minority members. The Speaker, with the Republicans in the majority, has the authority to nominate the chairs of the House Administration Committee and Rules Committee. In the minority, these appointments are made by the minority leader. The Speaker's or minority leader's nominations for these two positions are submitted directly to the full Republican Conference for ratification. If the conference rejects the leader's nominee, the Speaker or minority leader has the authority to submit another name to the conference. All other standing committee chairs or ranking minority members are nominated by the Republican Steering Committee and ratified by the full Republican Conference. Pursuant to conference rules, the Member nominated to be chair or ranking minority member does not need to be the Member with the longest continuous service on the committee. In recent Congresses, the Steering Committee "interviewed" prospective candidates for chair or ranking slots. Some of the new chairs and ranking members have been the most senior members of the committee, others were not. The Steering Committee is composed of party leaders, selected committee leaders, class leaders, and regional representatives. The Steering Committee is reconstituted each Congress. Regions are restructured to reflect as closely as possible an equal number of Republican Members from each region. Each region elects its Steering Committee member. If Steering Committee members are elected from states that have four or more Republican Members, a "small state" group is triggered to also elect a member to the Steering Committee; the small state group is composed of states that have three or fewer Republican Members. On November, 19, 2015, the House Republican Conference adopted a conference resolution redesigning the composition of the Steering Committee. The chairs of the Committees on Appropriations, Budget, Energy and Commerce, Financial Services, Rules, and Ways and Means were removed, except when the Steering Committee is considering members for election to one of those specific committees. If, for example, a member is elected to the Ways and Means Committee, that committee's chair would join the Steering Committee to deliberate and vote on the new member. Six members are to be elected by the conference as at-large members. The Speaker has the authority to appoint one at-large designee. The Speaker, who previously had five votes, will have four votes. The conference resolution stated that elections for the at-large members would be held not later than 30 calendar days after the resolution was adopted. The six members receiving the greatest number of votes would be elected. The Republican Conference elected the six members on December 10, 2015. It is anticipated that the number of regions and the regional allocation will be reviewed in the near future. Table 1 depicts the membership of the reconstituted Republican Steering Committee as of July 1, 2017. Democratic Caucus rules address selecting committee chairs and ranking minority members. The Democratic leader nominates a chair and ranking member for the Committees on Rules and House Administration, who must be approved by the entire Democratic Caucus. The Budget Committee chair and ranking member are selected from among members choosing to run for the position. Other chair and ranking Member nominations are made by the Democratic Steering and Policy Committee and voted on by the entire Democratic Caucus. In making selections, the Steering Committee considers, pursuant to caucus rules, "merit, length of service on the committee and degree of commitment to the Democratic agenda of the nominee, and the diversity of the Caucus." The Steering Committee is reconstituted each Congress, and regions can be restructured to reflect equal Democratic representation among regions. The number of appointments made by the party leader can also change. Table 2 depicts the Democratic Steering and Policy Committee as constituted as of July 1, 2017.

House rules, Republican Conference rules, and Democratic Caucus rules each detail aspects of the procedures followed in selecting standing committee chairs and ranking minority members. The Republican Steering Committee and the Democratic Steering and Policy Committee are constituted during the early organization meetings traditionally held in November and December to determine most committee chairs and ranking minority members and to make committee assignments for most committees. Their recommendations are then forwarded to the full Republican Conference and Democratic Caucus for approval. Although structured slightly differently, both the Republican Steering Committee and the Democratic Steering and Policy Committee are composed of elected party leaders, regional members, class representatives, and other party officials. This report will be updated if rules or procedures change.

This report describes how the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Trade Organization (WTO) deal with the issue of currency manipulation. It also discusses apparent discrepancies in their charters and ways those differences might be addressed. The IMF is the leading international organization in the area of monetary policy. With the end of the cold war, its membership is now nearly universal. Only North Korea, the Vatican, and four other mini-countries in Europe--none having its own currency--are not members of the Fund. The IMF makes loans to countries undergoing financial or balance of payments crises; provides technical assistance to governments on monetary, banking and exchange rate questions; does research and analysis on monetary and economic issues; and it provides a forum where countries can discuss international finance issues and seek common ground on which they can address common problems. Although the IMF is a monetary institution, the promotion of world growth and balanced international trade are also among its basic goals. Article I of its Articles of Agreement says, among other things, that the IMF was created in order to "facilitate the expansion and balanced growth of international trade, and to contribute thereby to the promotion and maintenance of high levels of employment and real income and to the development of the productive resources of all members as primary objectives of economic policy." It was also created to "assist in the establishment of a multilateral system of payments in respect to current transactions between members and in the elimination of foreign exchange restrictions which hamper the growth of world trade." Between 1946 and 1971, the IMF supervised a fixed parity exchange rate system, in which the value of all currencies was defined in terms of the U.S. dollar and the dollar was defined in terms of a set quantity of gold. Countries could not change their exchange rates from the level recognized by the IMF by more than 10% without the Fund's consent. Moreover, said the original language of the IMF Articles, "A member shall not propose a change in the par value of its currency except to correct fundamental disequilibrium." This system broke down in 1971 when the United States devalued the dollar twice without any consultation with the IMF. After a period of turmoil in world currency markets, an amendment to the IMF Articles was adopted in 1978. It said that countries could use whatever exchange rate system they wished--fixed or floating--so long as they followed certain guidelines and they did not use gold as the basis for their currencies. The new language of Article IV, which went into effect in 1978, said that countries should seek, in their foreign exchange and monetary policies, to promote orderly economic growth and financial stability and they should avoid manipulation of exchange rates or the international monetary system to prevent effective balance of payments adjustment or to gain unfair competitive advantage over other members . Some countries claim that their exchange rate policies are not in violation of Article IV because they are not seeking to gain competitive advantage (though this may be the result of their actions) but rather to stabilize the value of their currency in order to prevent disruption to their domestic economic system. To date, the IMF has not publicly challenged this statement of their objective. The Fund was required by Article IV to "exercise firm surveillance over the exchange rate policies of all members and [to] adopt specific principles for the guidance of all members with respect to those policies." The IMF adopted the requisite standards in 1977 (before the Amendment went into effect) and it updated them in 2007. The 1977 agreement said that, among other things, "protracted large-scale intervention in one direction in exchange markets" might be evidence that a country was inappropriately manipulating the value of its currency. The 2007 agreement added a requirement that "A member should avoid exchange rate policies that result in external instability." When a country's current account (balance of payments) is not in equilibrium, the IMF said in its explanation of the new provision, the exchange rate is "fundamentally misaligned" and should be corrected. The IMF can exercise "firm surveillance" but it cannot compel a country to change its exchange rate. Nor can it order commercial foreign exchange dealers to change the prices at which they trade currencies. It can offer economic advice and discuss how changes in countries' exchange rates might be in their own interest. It can also provide a forum, such as its new multilateral consultation mechanism or discussion on the IMF executive board, where other countries can urge a country to change its exchange rate procedures. However, in the end, the authority to make the change resides with the country alone. The WTO is the central organization in the world trade system. When the WTO was created in 1995, countries were required to accept as a condition of WTO membership the existing trade rules embodied in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). They also had to accept new rules governing other areas of international commerce, such as services and trade-related international property rights. The agreement establishing the WTO says that the members recognize "that their relations in the field of trade and economic endeavor should be conducted with a view to raising standards of living, ensuring full employment and a steady growing volume of real income and effective demand, and expanding the production of and trade in goods and services" and to do this in a manner "consistent with their respective needs and concerns at different levels of economic development." Unique among the major international trade and finance organizations, the WTO has a mechanism for enforcing its rules. If a country believes another country has violated WTO rules, to its detriment, it may request the appointment of a dispute settlement panel to hear its complaint. The other country cannot veto the establishment of a panel or adoption of a WTO decision by WTO members. The panel reviews the arguments in the case and renders judgment based on the facts and WTO rules. If the losing party does not comply with the ruling within a reasonable period of time, the WTO may, if requested by the complaining party, authorize it to impose retaliatory measures (usually increased customs duties) against the offending country or to take other appropriate retaliatory measures against that country's trade. Whether currency disputes fall under the WTO's jurisdiction is a debatable issue. The WTO rules specify that countries may not provide subsidies to help promote their national exports. Most analysts agree that an undervalued currency lowers a firm's cost of production relative to world prices and therefore helps to encourage exports. It is less clear, however, whether intentional undervaluation of a country's currency is an export subsidy under the WTO's current definition of the term. Countries are entitled, under WTO rules, to levy countervailing duties on imported products that receive subsidies from their national government. The term "subsidy" has a precise definition in the WTO. It requires that there must be a financial contribution by a government to the exporter or some other form of income or price support. Government financial support can take a variety of forms, such as direct payments to the exporter, the waiver of tax payments or special government purchases or the provision of low-cost goods or services (other than general infrastructure) that lowers the cost of production. Currency manipulation would not appear to qualify under the WTO definitions. In addition, an export subsidy is a subsidy that is "contingent on export performance." They must also be "specific to an industry" and not provided generally to all producers. In the past, most legal analysts have found that intentional undervaluation of a currency is not a subsidy that is "contingent on export performance" and not "industry specific" because everyone who exchanges currency gets the same rate even if they are not exporting. More recently, other analysts have asserted, based on an interpretation of the findings in a WTO dispute settlement case, that a subsidy may still be export contingent, even if it is available in some circumstances that do not involve exportation. Thus, they believe, subsidies provided through currency misalignment would be a prohibited subsidy under WTO rules even if non-exporters benefit from the exchange rate. Until the world financial system frayed in the 1970s, the IMF exercised strict control over exchange rates. It was inconceivable that a country could persistently value its currency at a level below that approved by the IMF. When the IMF's rules were changed in 1978, so that it no longer governed world exchange rates, the GATT rules were not adjusted to reflect the new reality of international finance. When the WTO was created in 1995, it adopted the existing GATT rules as its own without significant change and without acknowledging that the international system of exchange rates had changed substantially since the GATT was formed. The WTO and IMF both have major institutional responsibilities in the area of international trade. The WTO, and its predecessor organization, the GATT, were created specifically to facilitate the negotiation of multilateral trade agreements. One of the corresponding purposes of the IMF is to "facilitate the expansion and balanced growth of international trade" in order to facilitate high levels of employment, economic growth, and development in all its member countries." The WTO seeks to expand international trade through the reduction or elimination of tariffs or other barriers to trade. The IMF pursues this goal mainly through efforts to promote international monetary and exchange rate stability. It also has standards, which it has been reluctant to employ, for determining whether currencies are being manipulated and whether they are valued properly relative to other currencies. Trade policy issues may feature prominently in the IMF's surveillance activities, relative to its member countries, and steps to reduce barriers to trade are often included in its policy advice and its loan conditionality. IMF surveillance reports often provide important contributions for the WTO's own Trade Policy Reviews, which assess its member countries' trade policies. The IMF and GATT signed an agreement aimed at facilitating inter-agency cooperation soon after the trade organization was formed in 1947. The IMF and WTO adopted a revised and updated version of that agreement in 1996, shortly after the WTO came into being. The two organizations agreed (in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the agreement) that they "shall consult with each other in the discharge of their respective mandates," with a view towards "achieving greater coherence in global economic policymaking." Article XV of the GATT agreement says that the GATT (now WTO) shall cooperate with the IMF in order to "pursue a coordinated policy with regards to exchange questions that are within the jurisdiction of the Fund." The WTO and IMF also agreed in 1996 (in paragraph 8) that they would communicate with each other about "matters of mutual interest." WTO dispute settlement panels are specifically excluded from this agreement to communicate, but the agreement says that the IMF shall inform the WTO (specifically including its dispute settlement panels) when the WTO is "considering exchange measures within the Fund's jurisdiction [in order to determine] whether such measures are consistent with the Articles of Agreement of the Fund." Earlier (in paragraphs 3 and 4), the IMF agreed that it would inform the WTO about any decisions it had made approving any restrictions a country might impose on international payments, discriminatory currency practices, or other measures aimed at preventing a large or sustained outflow of capital. The IMF also agreed, in 1996, that it would participate in any WTO discussion of any such measures countries may have taken to safeguard their balance of payments. A number of countries have been suspected or accused in recent years of manipulating the value of their currency for the purpose of gaining unfair trade advantage. The George W. Bush and Barak Obama Administrations have had many conversations with China about exchange rate issues. Nonetheless, their officials were careful never to say publicly that China was manipulating its currency in violation of IMF rules. During his confirmation hearing on January 23, 2009, then Treasury Secretary-designate Timothy Geithner reported that "President Obama, backed by the conclusions of a broad range of economists, believes that China is manipulating its currency." The Obama Administration has not pursued this line of thought, however, in its subsequent public statements on the issue. If the Treasury Department were to find, in its semi-annual reports to Congress on the topic, that China or any other country were manipulating its currency in order to gain unfair trade advantage, certain provisions of the 1988 trade act would be triggered. TheSecretary would have to "to initiate negotiations with such foreign countries on an expedited basis, in the International Monetary Fund or bilaterally, for the purpose ofensuring that such countries regularly and promptly adjust the rate of exchange between their currencies and the United States dollar to permit effective balance of payments adjustments and to eliminate the unfair advantage." The country in question is not required, however, to meet with U.S. officials or to take any corresponding action. U.S. efforts to press China or other countries to revalue their currencies would likely be routed through the IMF, in order to secure its good offices and to mobilize international support on this issue. The 1988 trade act does not require the Administration to take this complaint about currency manipulation to the WTO in order to seek remedies through its procedures. As noted before, the IMF Articles of Agreement prohibit this currency manipulation for the purpose of gaining unfair trade advantage, but the Fund has no capacity to enforce that prohibition. By contrast, the WTO has the capacity to adjudicate trade disputes, but to date it has done nothing to suggest that trade issues linked to currency manipulation are within its zone of responsibility. If policymakers want to address this situation, several options might be considered. One option might be changes in the IMF's Articles of Agreement that would give the Fund more authority over international exchange rates and more authority to require that countries comply with its rules. This would restore, to some degree, the power the IMF exercised over exchange rates from 1946 to 1971. Two objections might be raised, however. First, an 85% majority vote of the IMF member countries is necessary if any change in the IMF Articles is to become effective. Most countries seem to believe that the present system of floating and fixed exchange rates is working reasonably well and there seems to be little desire, on the part of the members, to amend the IMF's current rules. Second, few countries want the IMF to have the kinds of power over their economies that it would need to compel violators comply with its rules. For example, if the IMF had the power to declare that China's currency was undervalued and to require adjustments, it would also have the power to declare the U.S. dollar or the euro were overvalued and to require the United States or the eurozone countries to make changes in their domestic policies that would bring down the relative value of their currencies. Another possibility might be a formal change in the WTO agreements that would define currency manipulation as a prohibited form of export subsidy. It is not easy to amend WTO agreements, however, since the process basically requires the unanimous consent of all Members. Countries that manipulate their currencies could easily block the approval of the amendment. However, they might argue that currency manipulation is an acceptable trade practice notwithstanding the language of the IMF's Article IV. It seems more likely that any such change in the WTO rules will be the result of discussions during multilateral trade negotiations, in which restrictions on currency manipulation will be balanced by other changes desired by the countries that believe currency manipulation is an acceptable trade practice. Recently, the Administration has indicated that it will be raising the issue of misaligned currencies and their impact on international trade at international meetings involving world leaders. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner has told Congress on several occasions that the Administration is working through multilateral channels, such as the G-20 meeting of world leaders, the Asia-Pacific Cooperation (APEC) forum, and the IMF to obtain international support for the effort to press China to revalue its currency. It is also seeking discussion about the international financial imbalances and steps that might be taken to address that concern. The Administration has been talking regularly with the Chinese about this and other related topics for several years. Arguably, resolving the U.S.- China disagreement about exchange rates is a desirable objective. However, one might argue, a bilateral settlement of this dispute would be of only limited value. Unless the agreement among world leaders also includes measures that would make WTO and IMF treatment of these issues more consistent, the question whether undervalued currencies provide improper export subsidies is likely to arise again in the future. A bilateral agreement with China would not preclude other countries from undervaluing their currencies in order to undercut China and get better access to its former export markets. One way for the issue to be resolved could be through WTO adjudication of disputes involving the United States and other countries. In the past, currency issues have not been pursued via the WTO dispute settlement process. The United States might seek WTO adjudication of this issue by taking China or other countries to a dispute resolution panel, on the basis of a claim that China's currency policy improperly subsidizes Chinese exports. Alternatively, the United States could take action under its domestic trade laws to address the problem and let other countries decide what they will do about the issue. Congress is considering legislation ( H.R. 2378 , reported by the House Ways and Means Committee on September 24, 2010) which would seek to address the question of undervalued exchange rates in a way that the sponsors believe is consistent with WTO rules. It provides that countervailing duties may be imposed to address possible subsidies that might result when other countries' currencies are fundamentally undervalued. It says that these subsidies may be treated as being "contingent upon export performance" (a key element of the WTO definition) even if others not exporting also benefit from the subsidy. If this legislation is enacted into law and duties are levied on Chinese imports, some analysts believe that China will assert that it is inconsistent with WTO rules and will seek remedies through the WTO dispute settlement process. There may be a role for the IMF in this adjudication process, if world leaders decide that it should be involved . Article II of the GATT agreement says that the valuations used in countries' tariff schedules shall be "expressed in the appropriate currency at the par value accepted or provisionally recognized" by the IMF. Though the par value exchange system is gone, this language might be construed as giving the IMF some role in determining whether the exchange rates used in trade agreements and schedules are appropriate. Currency values may be adjusted, it says, as long as this "will not impair the value of the concessions provided" in trade agreements. This language, as well as similar language in Article VII, dates from before the adoption of the present floating exchange rate system. However, the effect of inappropriate exchange rates on trade agreements seems to be a continuing concern. Article XV says that, when disputes between signatory countries involve questions about balances of payments, foreign exchange reserves or exchange arrangements, GATT countries shall "consult fully with the International Monetary Fund" and shall accept the IMF's determination as to matters of fact and as to whether a country's exchange arrangements are consistent its obligations under the IMF Articles of Agreement. GATT Article XV also says that countries "shall not, by exchange action, frustrate the provisions of this agreement nor, by trade action, the intent of the provisions" of the IMF Articles of Agreement. Traditionally, these references to "exchange arrangements" have been seen as referring (as they did when the GATT was created in 1947) to currency controls, exchange licenses, transaction taxes and other official actions that limit a potential purchaser's ability to get the foreign exchange needed to purchase goods from abroad. The GATT allows countries to impose temporary import restrictions when they face balance of payments difficulties (Article XII) or when they are at risk for a serious decline in their foreign exchange reserves (Article XVIII). In recent decades, however, the term "exchange arrangements" has expanded to reflect new developments in the world economy. The language of Article IV, adopted by the IMF in 1978, says (section 2) that each member country shall notify the IMF of the exchange arrangements it intends to apply--in other words, whether its currency will float in value or be pegged to another currency. It says the IMF shall oversee the international monetary system to ensure that each country's exchange arrangements are compatible with its obligations under Article IV. IMF Article IV also says that, in its oversight of countries' exchange arrangements, the Fund shall exercise firm surveillance over the exchange rate policies of its member countries. In effect, a case can be made that the term "exchange arrangements" arguably has become synonymous with the concept "exchange rate regime" and "exchange rate policies." As it is used in GATT Article XV, the term "exchange arrangement" refers to issues that are the sole province of the IMF. Thus, one could argue that the meaning of the term in the GATT should reflect its current meaning at the IMF and not the meaning prevalent in 1947. An undervalued currency encourages exports by reducing their cost and it discourages imports by making them more expensive than they might be otherwise. Consequently, one might argue that countries with this type of exchange arrangement are engaging in "exchange action" that may have the effect of frustrating "the provisions of the [GATT] agreement." There has never been a definitive ruling by the GATT or WTO on the meaning of Article XV, including how provisions of the GATT agreement might be frustrated by exchange action. Some might argue that currency undervaluation raises the price of imports in a way that unilaterally rescinds tariff concessions approved during multilateral trade talks. Accordingly, a case could be made that the WTO should use the broader meaning of the term "exchange arrangements" and take currency valuation arrangements into account in its dispute settlement process. There has also been increased interest, in recent years, in the issue of currency manipulation and its impact on world trade and financial relationships. It could be argued, therefore, that this might be an appropriate and perhaps auspicious moment for issues relating to the trade impact of currency manipulation to be raised in the WTO dispute adjudication process. The final option for rectifying the disconnect between WTO and IMF treatment of currency manipulation issues might involve some change or reinterpretation of the WTO-IMF inter-agency agreement. As noted above, the agreement states they will "cooperate in the discharge of their respective mandates" in order to achieve "greater coherence in global economic policymaking." Arguably, the different ways in which they approach the issue of currency manipulation and its impact on international trade does not further or facilitate such "greater coherence." The member countries of the two institutions might encourage them to identify other occasions where their rules and procedures are not consistent or mutually supportive. Changes in the existing inter-agency agreement can be adopted by a majority vote of each institution's governing board. However, it is not clear that changes in the text of the agreement are needed to promote greater cooperation between the two institutions. Paragraph 14 of the agreement says that the "Director-General of the WTO and the managing Director of the Fund shall be responsible for the implementation of this Agreement and, to that effect, shall make such arrangements as they deem appropriate." The GATT Agreement and the WTO-IMF inter-agency agreement both give the IMF a role in WTO dispute settlement procedures. A more up-to-date interpretation of those agreements, which take into account changes that have taken place during the intervening years in IMF operations and procedures, might help address some of the concerns discussed above. The IMF no longer determines par values for national currencies. Nevertheless, it does have standards and procedures for determining whether currencies are appropriately valued or whether they are being manipulated inappropriately. Consequently, the language in Articles II and IV of the GATT Agreement, in which currency values and exchange rate procedures must be consistent with the Articles of the IMF, would seem to give the IMF some role in any WTO discussions about whether currency manipulation "impairs the value of the concessions provided" in trade agreements. Likewise, as Article XV of the GATT Agreement seems to give the IMF plenary authority to determine whether the "exchange arrangements" used by the parties to the dispute are consistent with IMF requirements. The way the GATT now interprets the term "exchange arrangements" appears to be antiquated and it seems to predate the meaning which the IMF now gives to that term. Agreement by the leaders of the two institutions that they will use a consistent meaning of the term might help diminish some of the apparent inconsistencies in their operations. Even if the meaning of the inter-agency agreement is adjusted, as discussed above, to reflect the contemporary functions of the IMF, however, the IMF can play a role advising the WTO about exchange and currency manipulation issues only if it takes an official position on the question in hand. To date, the IMF has consulted with China behind the scenes and it has used its good offices to facilitate multilateral discussions, involving China, the United States, and several other relevant countries, as regards the appropriate valuation of China's currency. No official action has been taken by the IMF on this issue. As noted previously, the IMF has no way of enforcing decisions it might make as to whether countries are complying with the exchange rate provisions of Article IV. The IMF has adopted standards which make the requirements of Article IV operational, but it has not used those standards officially to assess the activities of particular countries. Perhaps the IMF's member countries are concerned that its prestige might be injured if the IMF Executive Board made an official determination that a country was manipulating its currency, in violation of its obligations in the IMF, and nothing happened as a result. A decision of this sort could be more meaningful, however, if it were to be the basis of information the IMF could provide to the WTO about the currency exchange aspects of disagreements that were being examined by a dispute settlement panel. Adjusting the terms of the inter-agency agreement between the IMF and WTO, or re-interpreting the meaning of that agreement in the light of current practices, might be one option policy makers could use to address the trade implications of currency manipulation.

Congress has been concerned, for many years, with the possible impact that currency manipulation has on international trade. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has jurisdiction for exchange rate questions. The World Trade Organization (WTO) is responsible for the rules governing international trade. The two organizations approach the issue of "currency manipulation" differently. The IMF Articles of Agreement prohibit countries from manipulating their currency for the purpose of gaining unfair trade advantage, but the IMF cannot force a country to change its exchange rate policies. The WTO has rules against subsidies, but these are very narrow and specific and do not seem to encompass currency manipulation. Recently, some have argued that an earlier ruling by a WTO dispute resolution panel might be a way that currency issues could be included in the WTO prohibition against export subsidies. Congress is currently considering legislation to amend U.S. countervailing duty law, based on this precedent, that the proponents believe is consistent with WTO rules. Others disagree as to whether the previous case is a sufficient precedent. Several options might be considered for addressing this matter in the future, if policymakers deem this a wise course of action. The Articles of Agreement of the IMF or the WTO Agreements could be amended in order to make their treatment of currency manipulation more consistent. Negotiations might be pursued, on a multilateral as well as a bilateral basis, to resolve currency manipulation disputes on a country-by-country basis without changing the IMF or WTO treatment of this concern. Some countries might argue that the actions of another violate WTO rules and seek a favorable decision by a WTO dispute resolution panel. Finally, the IMF and WTO could use their interagency agreement to promote better coordination in their treatment of this concern. .

Growing recognition of the crucial role that technological innovation plays in the U.S economy has led to increased congressional activity with respect to the intellectual property laws. As evidenced by patent reform proposals currently before the 112 th Congress, the operation of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) is among the subjects of legislative interest. Stakeholders have expressed concerns over a number of issues, including the USPTO's backlog of filed but unexamined applications, as well as the quality of the patents issued by the agency. Some knowledgeable observers have expressed concern that the USPTO does not possess the capability to process the large number of patent applications that it receives. The growing backlog of applications awaiting examiner review could potentially lead to long delays in the time the USPTO requires to grant patents. Extended USPTO delays in reviewing applications may increase industrial uncertainty about whether a patent will cover a particular technology or not. Lengthy approval delays may also decrease the usefulness of the patent system for industries subject to a brisk pace of technological change, as a patent on an invention that is rapidly becoming obsolete has limited value. The USPTO has long strived to approve only those patent applications that meet the statutory requirements for obtaining a patent. Because they meet all the requirements imposed by the Patent Act, quality patents may be dependably enforced in court and employed as a technology transfer tool. In contrast, improvidently granted patents may require firms to spend considerable resources either obtaining a license or mounting a legal challenge to the patent. Some commentators believe that within an era of increasingly complex, fast-moving technology, the task of issuing quality patents on a consistent basis presents a considerable challenge to the USPTO. The USPTO has actively engaged in efforts to address its application backlog and concerns over patent quality, and more generally to improve contemporary patent administration. A number of USPTO initiatives have responded to perceived concerns about the patenting process. Among them are The Patent Application Backlog Reduction Stimulus Plan, which allows an individual who has filed multiple pending applications to receive expedited review of one patent application when he agrees to withdraw another, unexamined application. The Patent Prosecution Highway (PPH), which potentially applies to inventors who have filed patent applications in multiple countries. If the inventor receives a favorable ruling from the patent office of the country where he filed first, he may request expedited review in other patent offices participating in the PPH. The Enhanced First Action Interview Pilot Program, which allows participants to conduct an interview with the patent examiner early in the application review process. The "Three-Track Initiative," under which applications would be placed into one of three queues: prioritized examination, traditional examination, or delayed examination. The Adoption of Metrics for the Enhancement of Patent Quality, which endeavors to improve USPTO mechanisms for measuring the quality of patent examination. This report reviews a number of recent USPTO initiatives designed to enhance the patent application review process. It begins by offering a brief review of patent acquisition proceedings as well as challenges faced by the USPTO. This report then reviews the innovation policy issues that are implicated by patent administration policies. Recent USPTO initiatives are then discussed. The report closes by reviewing possible congressional options. The U.S. Constitution provides Congress with the power "To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to ... Inventors the exclusive Right to their ... Discoveries...." In accordance with the Patent Act of 1952 (the "Patent Act"), an inventor may seek the grant of a patent by preparing and submitting an application to the USPTO. Under current law, each application is then placed into queue for eventual review by officials known as examiners. The USPTO publishes most, but not all, pending patent applications "promptly after the expiration of a period of 18 months" from the filing date. Among the applications that are not published prior to grant are those that the applicant represents will not be the subject of patent protection abroad. In particular, if an applicant certifies that the invention disclosed in the U.S. application will not be the subject of a patent application in another country that requires publication of applications 18 months after filing, then the USPTO will not publish the application. USPTO officials known as examiners then determine whether the invention disclosed in the application merits the award of a patent. The USPTO examiner will consider a number of legal requirements, including whether the submitted application fully discloses and distinctly claims the invention. In particular, the application must enable persons skilled in the art to make and use the invention without undue experimentation. In addition, the application must disclose the "best mode," or preferred way, that the applicant knows to practice the invention. The examiner will also determine whether the invention itself fulfills certain substantive standards set by the patent statute. To be patentable, an invention must meet four primary requirements. First, the invention must fall within at least one category of patentable subject matter. According to the Patent Act, an invention that is a "process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter" is eligible for patenting. Second, the invention must be useful, a requirement that is satisfied if the invention is operable and provides a tangible benefit. Third, the invention must be novel, or different, from subject matter disclosed by an earlier patent, publication, or other state-of-the-art knowledge. Finally, an invention is not patentable if "the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains." This requirement of "nonobviousness" prevents the issuance of patents claiming subject matter that a skilled artisan would have been able to implement in view of the knowledge of the state of the art. If the USPTO allows the patent to issue, its owner obtains the right to exclude others from making, using, selling, offering to sell or importing into the United States the patented invention. Those who engage in those acts without the permission of the patentee during the term of the patent can be held liable for infringement. Adjudicated infringers may be enjoined from further infringing acts. The patent statute also provides for an award of damages "adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer." The maximum term of patent protection is ordinarily set at 20 years from the date the application is filed. At the end of that period, others may employ that invention without regard to the expired patent. Although patent term is based upon the filing date, the patentee gains no enforceable legal rights until the USPTO allows the application to issue as a granted patent. A number of Patent Act provisions may modify the basic 20-year term, including examination delays at the USPTO and delays in obtaining marketing approval for the patented invention from other federal agencies. Like most rights, those provided by a patent are not self-enforcing. Patent owners who wish to compel others to respect their proprietary interests must commence enforcement proceedings, which most commonly consist of litigation in the federal courts. Although issued patents enjoy a presumption of validity, accused infringers may assert that a patent is invalid or unenforceable on a number of grounds. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit) possesses nationwide jurisdiction over most patent appeals from the district courts. The Supreme Court enjoys discretionary authority to review cases decided by the Federal Circuit. The growing popularity of the patent system has placed strains upon the resources of the USPTO. During 2010, the USPTO received 520,277 applications--an increase of 7.8% from the 482,871 applications it received during the 2009 fiscal year. The increase in filings is substantial when viewed over a longer time frame. For example, the number of applications filed in 2005 was 417,508; and 293,244 applications were filed at the USPTO in 2000. The USPTO has candidly admitted that "the volume of patent applications continues to outpace our capacity to examine them." As a consequence, the USPTO reportedly holds an inventory in excess of 1.2 million patent applications that have yet to be reviewed by an examiner. In addition, a USPTO examiner in 2009 would not review a patent application until, on average, 25.8 months after it was filed. The "first action pendency" during 2000 was 13.6 months. Many observers believe that if current conditions continue, the backlog and delay are likely to grow at the USPTO in coming years. Long delays for patent approvals may negatively impact high technology industries by increasing uncertainty about the availability and scope of patent rights. For market segments that feature a rapid pace of innovation and short product cycles, such as consumer electronics, lengthy USPTO delays may also significantly devalue the patent right. Put simply, by the time a patent issues, the entire industry might have moved on to more advanced technologies. Commerce Secretary Gary Locke reportedly described the length of time the USPTO requires to issue patents as "unacceptable," explaining that "[t]his delay causes uncertainty for inventors and entrepreneurs and impedes our economic recovery." USPTO Director David Kappos recently opined that "[e]very quality patent application that sits on the shelf represents jobs not created." In addition, under current law, USPTO delays may qualify certain patents for an extension of term. For example, if the UPSTO does not respond to an application within 14 months of the day it is filed, the term of a patent that results from that application is extended by one day for each day of delay. Given that the average first action pendency is now almost 26 months, this rule of "Patent Term Adjustment" may cause many U.S. patents to have a term that exceeds 20 years. A patent with a longer term may be of greater value to its proprietor, but also may impact the ability of others to develop competing products. Many observers believe that the USPTO should only issue patents on inventions that meet each of the statutory criteria. Quality patents are said to enhance predictability within the marketplace by clarifying the ownership and scope of private rights associated with particular inventions. When inventors, investors, managers, and other stakeholders possess confidence that patents are reliably enforceable, they are said to have increased incentives to innovate, to finance research and development, and to bring new technologies into the marketplace. In contrast, poor patent quality may encourage activity that is not socially productive. Private parties may be required to engage in extensive due diligence efforts in order to determine whether individual issued patents would be enforced by a court or not. Entrepreneurial speculators may find it easy to obtain patents that can then be enforced against manufacturers and service providers. Patent owners and investors may also be negatively impacted. A patentee may make managerial decisions, such as building production facilities or hiring workers, based upon their expectation of exclusive rights in a particular invention. If a patent is declared invalid by a court, the patent owner--along with his financial backers--is stripped of this intellectual property right without compensation. The goal of consistently high levels of patent quality may pose a considerable challenge for the USPTO. Increasingly complex technologies appear to have resulted in patent applications that are both lengthy and potentially more difficult for examiners to parse. In addition, technological innovation is today a global phenomenon that is occurring at an increasingly rapid pace. As compared to previous years, USPTO examiners may face more difficulty in locating the most pertinent documents that describe the state of the art. Of course, the increasing number of patent applications--along with a large backlog of unexamined applications--also potentially impacts the ability of the USPTO to maintain high levels of patent quality. The USPTO has developed a number of initiatives in order to address modern challenges of patent administration. The agency has hired many new examiners, including 1,193 in 2006; 1,215 in 2007; and 1,211 in 2008. The significance of this hiring rate should be assessed in view of the fact that in 2009, the total size of the patent examining corps was 6,242. The recent economic downturn has caused the USPTO to limit new hiring, however. As the title of recent congressional testimony of the Government Accountability Office indicates--"Hiring Efforts Are Not Sufficient to Reduce the Patent Application" --many observers are of the view that "[d]ue to both monetary and infrastructure constraints, the USPTO cannot simply hire examiners to stem the tide of applications." The USPTO also proposed rules with respect to claims and so-called continuing applications that were designed to reduce its examination burdens. These rules would have limited the number of claims that could be filed in a particular patent application, unless the applicant supplied the USPTO with an "Examination Support Document" in furtherance of that application. They would have also limited the ability of applicants to re-file their applications--an opportunity more technically termed a "continuing application"--absent a petition and showing by the patent applicant of the need for such an application. These rules never came into effect due to a temporary court ruling enjoining their implementation. In the face of considerable opposition to these rules by many members of the patent bar and innovative firms, the USPTO announced on October 8, 2009, that it was rescinding the rules package entirely. The USPTO has continued to press forward with a number of additional initiatives. The remainder of this report reviews several of these programs. In November, 2009, the USPTO announced a "Patent Application Backlog Reduction Stimulus Plan." Under that program, an applicant may choose to abandon a previously filed application that the USPTO has not yet reviewed. If the applicant does so, he may select another application to be examined on an expedited basis. According to the agency, the Plan "allows applicants having multiple applications currently pending before the USPTO to have greater control over the priority with which their applications are examined while also stimulating a reduction of the backlog of unexamined patent applications pending before the USPTO." For its supporters, the advantage to the USPTO of the Patent Application Backlog Reduction Stimulus Plan is straightforward--the voluntary removal of unexamined applications from its backlog. Inventors might also benefit from obtaining more prompt review of a particular patent application. For example, an inventor may believe that one application relates to a technology that is particularly significant to his business plans, while the marketplace outlook of the invention claimed in another application is poor. In that circumstance, he may be well-served by expediting consideration of the former application while abandoning the latter. The Patent Application Backlog Reduction Stimulus Plan was originally restricted to applicants that qualified as "small entities"--a category that generally consists of individuals, small business concerns, and nonprofit organizations. The USPTO subsequently allowed any applicant to participate in the Plan. All applicants are limited to 15 individual uses of the Plan--that is to say, the abandonment of 15 unexamined applications in exchange for expedited review of 15 other applications. The USPTO will continue to operate the Patent Application Backlog Reduction Stimulus Plan until December 31, 2011, or until 10,000 applications have received expedited review. The USPTO retains the option of further extending the Plan, however. In view of applicant use of the Plan, the limitation of 10,000 applications may not be significant. Reportedly the Plan has thus far been the subject of only limited participation. It should be appreciated, however, that the Plan remains a relatively recent initiative and that innovative industry may make greater use of it in the future. There is no uniform, global patent system. Patents issued by the USPTO have no effect in other countries. Conversely, patents issued by foreign patent offices are not legally operative in the United States. For the most part, patents must be obtained on a nation-by-nation basis. An individual or firm that develops a new technology, and that seeks protection in more than one country, must therefore file multiple patent applications claiming the same invention. In turn, the patent offices of different nations must commit significant effort towards examining applications that are identical or similar to those filed elsewhere. The Patent Prosecution Highway (PPH) is an initiative intended to rationalize and expedite multinational patent acquisition in light of these legal realities. The PPH consists of a series of bilateral arrangements between the patent offices of a number of nations. In broad outline, the PPH designates one national office as the Office of First Filing (OFF) and the other as the Office of Second Filing (OSF). If the OFF approves of at least one claim, then the applicant may request that the OSF "fast track" the examination of corresponding claims in an application filed before that agency. Consider, for example, the PPH arrangement between the USPTO and Canadian Intellectual Property Office (CIPO). Suppose that a pharmaceutical firm initially files an application at the USPTO, and then subsequently files at the CIPO, claiming the same chemical compound. The USPTO subsequently issues an "Office Action" approving the U.S. application. The firm may then contact the CIPO and request expedited review of the Canadian application. The PPH potentially allows inventors to obtain patents more promptly and efficiently. Each participating patent office may also potentially benefit from the work previously done by another office. For example, examiners in the OSF may be able to take advantage of work done by examiners in the OFF--including searches of the relative technical literature and analysis of the applicant's invention--when conducting their own review of the application. Although this worksharing benefit is potentially substantial, the various PPH initiatives by no means guarantee that a favorable result at the USPTO will be followed elsewhere. Differences in the patent laws of different nations, or simply a differing assessment of the merits of the case by a foreign patent examiner, may potentially lead to rejections overseas even though a U.S. patent was granted. Nonetheless, the allowance rate of some foreign applications that have been previously approved in the United States is reportedly higher than average. The USPTO has currently entered into PPH arrangements with over a dozen foreign patent offices, including the European Patent Office and the patent offices of Australia, Canada, Germany, Japan, Korea, and the United Kingdom. A number of bilateral PPH arrangements exist between two foreign patent offices as well. For example, the European and Japanese Patent Offices currently operate a PPH between them. Certain of these programs have been established as pilot programs and could potentially be discontinued in the future. Patent applicants generally interact with the USPTO through the exchange of formal correspondence with an examiner. At times, applicants may wish to discuss their application with the examiner in person, telephonically, or even through the exchange of email. In patent parlance, each of these less formal exchanges is termed an "interview." Agency policy stipulates that an interview will generally not be held prior to the initial written communication by the examiner to the applicant (the "First Office Action"). The USPTO has explored an alternative to this longstanding procedure though an "Enhanced First Action Interview Pilot Program." Applicants that choose to participate receive a Pre-Interview Communication providing the results of a technical literature search conducted by the examiner. The applicant may then conduct an interview with the examiner with the hope of expediting approval of the application. This program originally applied only to certain divisions of the USPTO, but was recently extended to cover the entire agency under the title "Full First Action Interview Pilot Program." The USPTO reports that this pilot program has yielded several benefits to participants, including the ability to advance prosecution of an application, resolve issues one-on-one with the examiner, and potentially facilitate early allowance. The program has been operated on a provisional basis, and was recently extended through May 16, 2012, with future extensions possible. The USPTO recently announced a "Three-Track Initiative" that would place each patent application into one of three separate queues. Through this mechanism, inventors could pay a surcharge to obtain more prompt review of their applications; or alternatively delay examination and the payment of corresponding fees for those services. According to the White House report "A Strategy for American Innovation: Securing Our Economic Growth and Prosperity," the Three-Track Initiative "will allow applicants to prioritize applications, enabling the most valuable patents to come to market within 12 months." Under current procedures, the USTPO dockets each patent application in the order it was received. Some regulatory exceptions to this general practice allow inventors to both expedite and delay review of their applications, however. Inventors must ordinarily petition the USPTO to obtain this distinct treatment. An inventor may currently expedite USPTO review of his application by filing a "petition to make special" under the agency's accelerated examination program. This program aspires to complete examination of applications within 12 months of the filing date. A patent application must have no more than 20 claims to participate in the program. In addition, applicants must submit a "support document" reporting the results of a preexamination search for prior art references and explaining why their invention is patentable over these references. A fee of $130 applies, although the USPTO waives the fee if the invention will enhance the quality of the environment, relates to the development or conservation of energy resources, or contributes to counterterrorism. The USPTO will also expedite review of the application for applicants 65 years or older, or for those in poor health such that they might not be able to assist in the prosecution of their applications if that procedure ran its normal course. The USPTO also operates a "Green Technology Pilot Program" that allows applications relating to clean technologies, such as environmental quality, energy conservation, development of renewable energy resources, and greenhouse gas emission reductions. This program is set to expire on December 31, 2011, although it may be extended further in the future. No fee or support document is required under either of these programs. The USPTO also allows inventors to delay review of their applications. In order to defer, the applicant must pay an additional $130 processing fee and, at the outset, choose the number of months of deferral. The maximum period of deferral is 36 months. Applicants have reportedly used this procedure infrequently. As noted, the USPTO is contemplating a Three-Track Initiative that would provide additional mechanisms for governing the review of patent applications. Under this system, the USPTO would place all applications into one of three distinct separate queues: an accelerated Track One; traditional examination in Track Two; and a deferral of examination in Track Three. Entering Track One would require a prioritized examination fee of $4,000. The application would then be placed within a docket designed to provide a final disposition of the application within twelve months of the prioritized status grant. A Track One application must have no more than four independent claims and thirty claims total. Prioritized status is forfeited if the applicant ever requests an extension of time to respond to a USPTO communication. In contrast, if an inventor requests that a particular application be deferred, it is placed in Track Three. The inventor must request that the application be examined within 30 months from the filing date. Upon receipt of such a request, the USPTO will place the application into queue for review by an examiner. The remaining option, Track Two, includes applications that have been neither prioritized nor deferred. Track Two applications would be docketed immediately and will be reviewed by an examiner in the order in which they are received. The Three-Track Initiative would also significantly change USPTO procedures with respect to applications that were first filed outside the United States--for example, at the European Patent Office or the Japanese Patent Office. The USPTO currently does not consider the national origin of the application when it is placed into queue for examination. Under the proposal, an application will only be placed into one of the three tracks if it was originally filed in the United States. Applications that were originally filed abroad would not be docketed for examination at all. The USPTO would take no action on a foreign-origin application until it received copies of (1) the prior art search conducted by the foreign office, (2) the initial communication of the foreign office to the USPTO, and (3) the applicant's reply to that communication. An example illustrates the working of this procedure. Suppose that a German inventor filed an application at the European Patent Office on December 1, 2011. On December 1, 2012, the inventor then files the same application at the USPTO. Under the Three-Track Initiative, the USPTO would not consider the application until the European Patent Office had conducted a search of the literature, communicated its initial review of the European application to the applicant, and received a reply from the applicant. In contrast, an application that was first filed in the USPTO--by a U.S. or foreign citizen--would be placed on one of the three tracks immediately. The USPTO initially planned to implement Track One of the Three-Track Initiative as of May 4, 2011. However, on April 29, 2011, the USPTO announced that it would delay implementation of the program due to reduced spending authority in the Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act of 2011. According to USPTO Director David Kappos, "[w]ithout the resources to hire a sufficient number of examiners to implement Track One, we must postpone the effective date of the program until we are in a position to implement it successfully while ensuring there will be no adverse impact on non-prioritized examination applications." According to the USPTO, the Three-Track Initiative "recognizes that the traditional 'one-size-fits-all' examination timing may not provide applicants much opportunity to choose the examination timing they need." The Three-Track Initiative has nonetheless attracted controversy. Some observers believed that the program might favor larger or wealthier firms over start-ups or smaller enterprises. Others were concerned that if industry made significant use of Track One, the ability of the USPTO to review Track Two applications might be diminished. The disparate treatment of applications based on the office of first filing has also aroused controversy. According to the USPTO, this "proposal would increase the efficiency of examination of [foreign] applications by avoiding or reducing duplication of efforts by the office of first filing and the USPTO." The USPTO also noted that "major patent filing jurisdictions like the Japanese and European patent office[s] have already adopted office-drive systems in which they address the applications for which they are the office of first filing." The United States is a signatory to the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property and also a member state of the World Trade Organization. Article 2 of the Paris Convention and Article 3 of the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement) requires that nationals of foreign signatory states be treated as well as U.S. citizens. Even if the Three-Track Initiative may be justified under these measures, some observers have expressed concerns that "placing foreign nationals at a distinct disadvantage in their pursuit of patent rights in the U.S. ... could trigger, among other things, the imposition of new barriers for U.S. inventors to obtain patent rights in foreign jurisdictions." The USPTO has for many years maintained an internal quality control group that monitors the quality of the patent examination process by reviewing a sample of approved patents. In 2011, the USPTO endeavored to increase the effectiveness and transparency of its quality review procedure through the implementation of new metrics that measure patent quality. These metrics were designed to "reveal the presence of quality issues during examination" and "aid in identification of their sources so that problems may be remedied by training...." The USPTO identified seven individual metrics that are then tallied to produce a composite score. The seven metrics are: (1) the correctness of the final decision on the application (i.e., whether the examiner properly allowed or rejected the application), (2) the propriety of the examiner's actions taken during the course of the examination, (3) the degree to which the examiner's initial search of the technical literature comports with best agency practices, (4) the extent to which the examiner's initial review of the application follows best agency practices, (5) whether global USPTO data indicates compact, robust prosecution, (6) an external survey of patent applicants and practitioners, and (7) an internal survey of patent examiners. The USPTO displays the seven individual metrics, as well as the calculated composite metric, on the "Data Visualization Center" or "dashboard" portion of its website. The new USPTO metrics have, for the most part, been positively received by the patent bar. As explained by Douglas K. Norman, President of the Intellectual Property Owners Association, "metrics for measurement of appropriate indicia of patent quality, as well as their collection, reporting, review and analysis, are fundamental to evaluating the success of patent systems in issuing quality patents." However, some commentators believe that certain of the metrics may not always reflect an accurate and efficient review of a patent application and have suggested that other metrics--such as the outcomes of patent litigation--might also be introduced. At the same time the USPTO has engaged in changes to its administrative practices in order to address concerns over its backlog of unexamined applications and to improve patent quality, the 112 th Congress is engaged in extensive patent reform discussions. Two bills, H.R. 1249 and S. 23 , each titled the American Invents Act, would make a number of changes to current patent law. Reform proposals within these bills bear upon the ability of the USPTO to develop and implement new initiatives. In particular, both H.R. 1249 and S. 23 propose that the USPTO be given the authority to "set or adjust by rule any fee established or charged by the Office." Any fees set must, in the aggregate, cover the estimated costs of the agency's services. Under H.R. 1249 , USPTO authority to set fees terminates six years following the enactment of the statute; S. 23 does not include a sunset provision. This proposal would provide the USPTO with greater flexibility to adjust its fee schedule absent congressional intervention. This capacity may provide the agency with heightened capability to develop new initiatives without need for congressional activity. The statutory authority of the USPTO to promulgate regulations pertaining to patent law procedures and substantive law also bears upon current patent administration reform efforts. Current law provides the USPTO with the ability, among others, to establish regulations that "govern the conduct of proceedings" before it. However, it should be appreciated that "Congress has not vested the [USPTO] with any general substantive rulemaking power...." Certain of the predecessor versions of the America Invents Act would have enhanced the USPTO's regulatory authority. For example, in the 110 th Congress, H.R. 1908 would have allowed the USPTO to "promulgate regulations to ensure the quality and timeliness of applications and their examination...." However, in the 112 th Congress, neither H.R. 1249 nor S. 23 includes such a provision. USPTO experience with current and future initiatives may provide Congress with guidance over the most appropriate scope of that agency's regulatory authority. New realities within the intellectual property environment, including a growing number of patent applications, increasingly complex technologies, and heightened user demand for prompt and accurate patent services have encouraged the USPTO to innovate in recent years. Reforms to longstanding patent examination practices were introduced in an effort to maintain high levels of patent quality and to reduce the backlog of applications awaiting review by the examiner corps. Along with judicial opinions and potential legislative reforms, the recent USPTO initiatives form a notable part of the changing patent landscape within the United States.

Congressional interest in the operation of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) has been demonstrated by extensive discussion of patent reform proposals that would impact that agency. An increasing number of patent applications filed each year, the growing complexity of cutting edge technology, and heightened user demands for prompt and accurate patent services are among the challenges faced by the USPTO. Stakeholders have expressed concern over the agency's large backlog of patent applications that have been filed but have yet to receive examiner review. Others have expressed concerns about the agency's accuracy in approving applications only on those inventions that fulfill the statutory requirements to receive a patent. Even as discussion of patent reform has continued in Congress, the USPTO has actively engaged in efforts to address its application backlog, maintain high levels of patent quality, and more generally improve contemporary patent administration. The agency has launched a number of initiatives in recent years to address perceived concerns over the patent-granting process, including The Patent Application Backlog Stimulus Reduction Plan, which allows an individual who has filed multiple applications to receive expedited review of one patent application when he agrees to withdraw another, unexamined application. The Patent Prosecution Highway, which allows certain inventors who have received a favorable ruling from the USPTO to receive expedited review from foreign patent offices. The Enhanced First Action Interview Pilot Program, which allows applicants to conduct an interview with patent examiners early in the review process. The "Three-Track Initiative," under which an application would be placed into one of three queues: prioritized examination, traditional examination, or delayed examination. The Adoption of Metrics for the Enhancement of Patent Quality, which endeavors to improve USPTO mechanisms for measuring the quality of patent examination. A number of patent reform issues under consideration by the 112th Congress would potentially impact upon the ability of the USPTO to respond to changing circumstances in the intellectual property environment. In particular, two bills before the 112th Congress, H.R. 1249 and S. 23, would grant the USPTO the ability to set its own fees, potentially allowing the agency to act in a more flexible manner. In addition, discussion persists over whether the USPTO should have greater ability to engage in substantive rulemaking.

Transnational organized crime groups flourish in Burma, trafficking contraband that includes drugs, humans, guns, wildlife, gems, and timber. Transnational crime is highly profitable, reportedly generating roughly several billion dollars each year. The country's extra-legal economy, both black market and illicit border trade, is reportedly so large that an accurate assessment of the size and structure of the country's economy is unavailable. Contraband trafficking also remains a low-risk enterprise, as corruption among officials in Burma's ruling military junta, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), appears to facilitate trafficking and effectively provide the criminal underground immunity from law enforcement and judicial action. Synergistic links connect various forms of contraband trafficking; smugglers use the same routes for many forms of trafficking, following paths of least resistance, where corruption and lax law enforcement prevail. The continued presence of transnational crime in Burma and the illicit trafficking routes across Burma's borders share many features of so-called "ungoverned spaces"--regions of the world where governments have difficulty establishing control or are complicit in the corruption of the rule of law. Among the commonalities that Burma's border regions share with other ungoverned spaces is physical terrain that is difficult to control. Burma's long borders, through which much smuggled contraband passes, stretch across vast trackless hills and mountains that are poorly patrolled. In addition, continuing ethnic tensions with some ethnic armed rebel groups hamper government control in some regions of the country, which is another common feature of ungoverned spaces. Recent cease-fire agreements in other border regions have not markedly improved the situation; instead, these cease-fires have provided groups known for their activity in transnational crime with near autonomy, essentially placing these areas beyond the reach of Burmese law. Congress has long been active in U.S. policy toward Burma for a variety of reasons, including on issues related to transnational crime. Because the State Department lists Burma as a major drug-producing state, the country is barred access from U.S. foreign assistance under several long-standing legislative provisions. Congress also authorizes sanctions against countries that the State Department deems in non-compliance with the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking in persons, which includes Burma. The 110 th Congress sought to strengthen unilateral sanctions against Burma. In response to the Burmese government's forced suppression of anti-regime protests in August and September of 2007, as well as its internationally criticized humanitarian response to destruction resulting from tropical cyclone Nargis in May 2008, Congress passed P.L. 110-286 , the Tom Lantos Block Burmese JADE Act of 2008 (signed by the President on July 29, 2008). This law imposes further sanctions on SPDC officials and prohibits the indirect import of Burmese gems, among other actions. H.Rept. 110-418 , which accompanies H.R. 3890 , also cites "Burma's rampant drug trade" and "its role as a source for international trafficking in persons and illicit goods" as additional reasons for these new sanctions. The 111 th Congress may choose to continue its interest in oversight of U.S. policy toward Burma, including the country's role in criminal activity. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced in February 2009 the beginning of a review of U.S.-Burma relations. In September 2009, the conclusions of this policy review were released, noting in particular the beginning of direct dialogue with Burmese authorities on international crime-related issues, including compliance with U.N. arms sanctions and counternarcotics. Already in the first session of the 111 th Congress, both the Senate and the House have held hearings in which crime issues related to Burma have been addressed. The United Wa State Army (UWSA), Shan State Army-South (SSA-S), Shan State Army-North (SSA-N), Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DBKA), ethnic Chinese criminal groups (including the Triads), and other armed groups have criminal networks that stretch from India to Malaysia and up into China. Many of the transnational criminal elements along Burma's border are linked to past or ongoing ethnic insurgencies. While not necessarily a threat to SPDC control, they continue to constitute a transnational security threat for Burma and the region. The State Department states that the UWSA is the largest of the organized criminal groups in the region and operates freely along the China and Thailand borders, controlling much of the Shan State with a militia estimated to have 16,000 to 20,000 members. Other criminal groups, including the 14K Triad, reportedly operate in the north of the country and in major population centers. According to the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), these criminal organizations remain nearly immune from SPDC interference, because of widespread collusion with junta military, police, and political officials. Many analysts agree that much of this apparent collusion is part of concerted SPDC efforts to coopt ethnic groups and avoid hostilities with them. One possible consequence of this policy is that the influence of organized crime in Burma and the region could remain virtually impossible to reduce. The U.S. State Department and other observers indicate that corruption is common among the bureaucracy and military in Burma. Burmese officials, especially army and police personnel in the border areas, are widely believed to be involved in the smuggling of goods and drugs, money laundering, and corruption. Burma has no laws on record specifically related to corruption and has signed but not ratified the U.N. Convention against Corruption. The 2006 EIU country report on Burma states that "corruption and cronyism" are widespread "throughout all levels of the government, the military, the bureaucracy and business communities." Burma is reported to be the third-most corrupt country in the world according to Transparency International's 2009 Corruption Perceptions Index , after Somalia and Afghanistan. In addition, the State Department states that Burma's weak implementation of anti-money laundering controls remains at the root of the continued use by narcotics traffickers and other criminal elements of Burmese financial institutions. Burma has signed, but not ratified, the United Nations Convention against Corruption, which entered into force in December 2005. Although there is little direct evidence of top-level regime members' involvement in trafficking-related corruption, there is evidence that high-level officials and Burmese military officers have benefitted financially from the earnings of transnational crime organizations. In the case of the drug trade, reports indicate Burmese military officials at various levels have several means to gain substantial shares of narcotics trafficking earnings. Some reports indicate that the Burmese armed forces, or Tatmadaw , may be directly involved in opium poppy cultivation in Burma's Shan state. Some local Tatmadaw units and their families reportedly work the poppy fields and collect high taxes from the traffickers, as well as fees for military protection and transportation assistance. According to the State Department, Burma has not indicted any military official above the rank of colonel for drug-related corruption. The SPDC also reportedly allows and encourages traffickers to invest in an array of domestic businesses, including infrastructure and transportation enterprises, receiving start-up fees and taxes from these enterprises in the process. The traffickers usually deposit the earnings from these enterprises into banks controlled by the military, and military officers reportedly deposit much of their crime-related money in foreign bank accounts in places like Bangkok and Singapore. In 2003, the Secretary of the Treasury reported that some Burmese financial institutions were controlled by, or used to facilitate money laundering for, organized drug trafficking organizations. In the same report, the Secretary of the Treasury also stated that Burmese government officials were suspected of being involved in the counterfeiting of U.S. currency. Possible links between drug trafficking operations and official corruption have been raised recently in the context of SPDC reconstruction contracts in the aftermath of cyclone Nargis. Specifically, some reports have pointed to SPDC's reconstruction contract with Asia World Company Ltd., a firm managed by Steven Law (Tun Myint Naing), as a possible indication of continued links between drug traffickers and official corruption. Steven Law, against whom the U.S. government has maintained financial sanctions since February 2008, allegedly provides material support to the Burmese junta, receives business concessions from the junta, facilitates the movement of illicit narcotics, and launders drug profits through his firms, including Asia World Company Ltd. The most frequent destinations for much of Burmese contraband--opium, methamphetamine, illegal timber, endangered wildlife, and trafficked humans--are China and Thailand. Other destinations include India, Laos, Bangladesh, Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei Darussalam, South Korea, and Cambodia. Demand for Burma's contraband reaches beyond the region, including the United States. The U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), for example, reports that Burmese-trafficked methamphetamine pills have been confiscated within the United States. The United States is also reputed to be among the world's largest importers of illegal wildlife; no concrete data exist, however, to link such transnational ties with Burma. Ready recruits for organized crime activities can be found in both urban ghettos and impoverished rural areas. According to the Asian Development Bank, 27% of Burma's population live below the poverty line, making the country one of the poorest in Southeast Asia. Many analysts state that peasant farmers, rural hunters, and other poor often serve at the base of Burma's international crime network, growing opium poppy crops, poaching exotic and endangered species in Burma's lush forests, and serving as couriers and mules for contraband. In addition, the State Department and other observers have found that many victims of transnational crime in Burma are the poor, becoming commodities themselves as they are trafficked to be child soldiers for the junta or slaves for sexual exploitation. Burma is party to all three major United Nations international drug control treaties--the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, as amended; the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances; and the 1988 Convention against the Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. Burma's official strategy to combat drugs aims to end all production and trafficking of illegal drugs by 2014, a goal that parallels the region's ambition to be drug free by 2015. Many analysts, however, consider the goal of achieving a drug-free Burma as unlikely. In September 2007, the Administration once again included Burma on the list of major drug transit or major illicit drug producing countries. Located at the heart of the "Golden Triangle" of narcotics trafficking, Burma is among the world's top producers of opium, heroin, and methamphetamine. Illicit narcotics reportedly generate between $1 billion and $2 billion annually in exports. In addition, Burma's drug trafficking activities appear to be linked to the recent spread of HIV and AIDS in the region, as drug users along Burma's trafficking routes share contaminated drug injection needles. Some analysts warn that clashes between the government of Burma, rebel groups in the border areas of Burma, and neighboring countries could be possible. For example, should the SPDC begin to combat the drug trade more vigorously, current cease-fire groups may choose to break their agreements with the SPDC in order to protect their drug trade territories. Several cease-fire groups, including the UWSA, have chosen not to heed calls by the SPDC to disarm and reportedly use illicit drug proceeds to equip and maintain their paramilitary forces. Beginning in June 2009 through at least late August 2009, the Burmese Army initiated a military campaign against several ethnic minority groups, including the Karen and the Kokang. Thai counterdrug officials report a concurrent spike in heroin and methamphetamine sales in the region. It appears that various ethnic rebels are selling off their stockpiles of drugs in order to expand their weapons arsenals and prepare for the possibility of active conflict. Further, some suggest that the continued flow of illicit drugs from Burma to Thailand may be a source of tension between the two countries--especially in the face of Thailand's renewed war on drugs. The most recent campaign to combat illegal drugs, which began in April 2009, is a reprise of a 2003 campaign. Though media reports indicate that the current Thai war on drugs appears to be more restrained than the 2003 version, which resulted in the deaths of several thousand people over a three-month period, human rights activists remain on alert. Burma is the world's second-largest producer of illicit opium, behind Afghanistan. Further, the DEA reports that Burma accounts for 80% of all heroin produced in Southeast Asia and is a source of heroin for the United States. Although poppy cultivation has declined significantly in the past decade, prices have increased significantly in recent years, reflecting ongoing demand despite production declines since a decade ago (see Table 1 ). Some suggest that future dynamics of the opiate market in Burma may be dependent on developments in other opium-producing regions, particularly Afghanistan, which replaced Burma as the primary opium producer in the world. Much of the decline in recent years has been attributed to UWSA's 2005 public commitment to stop its activity in the opium and heroin markets, after prolonged international pressure to do so. However, recent reports suggest that the UWSA's self-imposed ban may be short-lived. The UWSA has reportedly warned that alternative livelihood sources will be necessary in order to sustain its ban against opium poppy cultivation--a point with which many international observers agree. Most analysts acknowledge that opium production in certain parts of Burma is one of the few viable means for small-scale peasant farmers to compensate for structural food security shortages. A 2009 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) study supports this, finding that households in former poppy-growing villages were unable to find sufficient substitutes for their lost income from opium. According to the same UNODC study, the average annual cash income of a household involved in opium poppy cultivation was approximately $700, while the annual income of a household not involved in opium poppy cultivation was approximately $750. In Burma's Shan State in 2009, known for its pockets of opium production, 28% of poppy growing households (versus 22% of non-poppy growing households) reported food insecurity due to a shortage of rice. In the meantime, reports indicate that opium poppy production is shifting to areas controlled by other cease-fire ethnic groups, and to areas apparently administered by Burma's armed forces, the Tatmadaw, who tax the farmers and traders for a portion of the farmgate value. The UWSA may also be organizing Wa poppy farmers to seasonally migrate to nearby provinces, where the UWSA did not commit to a ban, in order to continue their cultivation. In addition to producing heroin and opium, Burma is reportedly the largest producer of methamphetamine in the world and a significant producer of other synthetic drugs. Methamphetamine is produced in small, mobile labs in insurgent-controlled border areas, mainly in eastern Burma (for export mainly to Thailand) and sometimes co-located with heroin refineries. Burma's rise to prominence in the global synthetic drug trade is in part the consequence of UWSA's commitment to ban opium poppy cultivation. According to some, UWSA leadership may be intentionally replacing opium cultivation with the manufacturing and trafficking of amphetamine-type stimulants. As a result, Burma has emerged as one of the world's largest producers of methamphetamine and other amphetamine-type stimulants. The State Department states that this sharp increase in methamphetamine trafficking is "threatening to turn the Golden Triangle into an 'Ice Triangle.'" A July 2008 media report indicates that international assistance for relief from the cyclone Nargis may have been used as a cover to smuggle illegal drugs into Burma. According to the Irrawaddy , an independent Burmese newspaper, several customs officials were suspected of involvement in a scheme to smuggle ecstasy pills into Burma as part of shipments of relief aid from Burmese communities abroad. Burma is a party to the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and its protocol on migrant smuggling and trafficking in persons. However, Burma has been designated as a "Tier 3" state in every Trafficking in Persons (TIP) Report ever published by the State Department. Tier 3 is the worst designation in the TIP Report, indicating that the country does not comply with minimum standards for combating human trafficking under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, as amended (Division A of P.L. 106-386 , 22 U.S.C. 7101, et seq.). As the TIP reports explain, laws to criminally prohibit sex and labor trafficking, as well as military recruitment of children, exist in Burma--and the penalties prescribed by these laws for those convicted of breaking these laws are "sufficiently stringent." Nevertheless, the State Department continues to report that these laws are arbitrarily enforced by the SPDC and that cases involving high-level officials or well-connected individuals are not fully investigated. Victims are trafficked internally and regionally, and junta officials are directly involved in trafficking for forced labor and the unlawful conscription of child soldiers, according to several reports. Women and girls, especially those of ethnic minority groups and those among the thousands of refugees along Burma's borders, are reportedly trafficked for sexual exploitation. Victims are reportedly trafficked from rural villages to urban centers and commerce nodes, such as truck stops, border towns, and mining and military camps. One incident in early 2008 revealed the risks associated with migrant smuggling from Burma to Thailand, when 54 Burmese migrants were found dead in the back of a seafood truck headed to Thailand after the truck's air conditioning failed. Based on media accounts, 67 migrants survived, including at least 14 minors. In September 2009, the U.S. Department of Labor released a report and initial list of goods produced by child labor or forced labor. This is a congressionally mandated report, pursuant to the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Acts of 2005 and 2008, which required that the Department of Labor's Bureau of International Labor Affairs (DOL/ILAB) develop and publish a list of goods from countries in which ILAB had "reason to believe" were produced as a result of child or forced labor. Burma is listed among the 58 countries described in the ILAB report, with 14 separate production sectors implicated. Burma is rich in natural resources, including extensive forests, high biodiversity, and deposits of minerals and gemstones. Illegal trafficking of these resources is reportedly flowing to the same destination states and along the same trafficking routes as other forms of trafficking. Global Witness, a London-based non-governmental organization, estimates that 98% of Burma's timber exports to China, from 2001 to 2004, were illegally logged, amounting to an average of $200 million worth of illegal exports each year. Many analysts also claim that the region's illegal timber trade is characterized by complex patronage and corruption systems. Wild Asiatic black bears, clouded leopards, Asian elephants, and a plethora of reptiles, turtles, and other unusual animals reportedly are sold in various forms--whole or in parts, stuffed, ground, or, sometimes, alive--in open-air markets in lawless border towns. Growing demand in countries such as China and Thailand has increased regional prices for exotic wildlife; for example, a tiger's skin can be worth up to $20,000, according to media reports. One report suggests that valuable wildlife is used as currency in exchange for drugs and in the laundering of other contraband proceeds. Rubies, sapphires, jade, and other gems have also been used as non-cash currency equivalents for transborder smuggling. The legal sale of Burmese gems is among the country's most significant foreign currency earners--$297 million during the 2006-2007 fiscal year, according to Burma's customs department; more may be traded through illicit channels. Some observers claim that the junta is heavily involved in both the legal and illegal trade of gemstones, as the regime controls most mining operations and the sale of gems through official auctions and private sales reportedly arranged by senior military officers. Congress has also accused the Burmese regime of attempting to evade U.S. sanctions against the import of Burmese gemstones by concealing the gems' origin from potential buyers. Congress estimates that while 90% of the world's rubies originate from Burma, only 3% of those entering the United States are claimed to have originated there. AK-47s, B-40 rocket launchers, and other small arms are reportedly smuggled into Burma along the Thai-Burmese border. These weapons reportedly go to the Karen guerrillas, who continue to fight a decades-long insurgency against the Burmese junta. Another report implicates the Shan State Army in trafficking in military hardware. Although analysts say it is unlikely that the ruling junta benefits from the criminal profits of small arms trafficking, reports indicate that the government distributes such weapons to its cadre of child soldiers. Other less high-profile markets for contraband reportedly exist, including trafficking in cigarettes, cars, CDs, pornography, antiques, religious items, fertilizer, and counterfeit documents--many of which are believed to involve at least the complicity of some Burmese government officials. In April 2008, Japan's public broadcaster NHK reported that Burma has been importing multiple-launch rockets from North Korea, raising international concerns and speculation about why Burma would seek out such weapons in violation of U.N. sanctions imposed on North Korea after its nuclear test in October 2006. Some observers speculate that the Burmese military has been seeking to upgrade its artillery to improve the country's protection against potential external threats. Burma and North Korea are thought to have been involved in conventional weapons trade in violation of U.N. sanctions since spring 2007, when North Korea and Burma resumed diplomatic relations with each other. Observers further claim that "Western intelligence officials have suspected for several years that the regime has had an interest in following the model of North Korea and achieving military autarky by developing ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons." The State Department reports in 2008 that Burma is a money laundering risk because of its underdeveloped financial sector and large volume of informal trade. In 2001, the international Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF) designated Burma as a Non-Cooperative Country or Territory (NCCT) for deficient anti-money laundering provisions and weak oversight of its banking sector. A year later in 2002, the U.S. Department of Treasury's Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) issued an advisory to U.S. financial institutions to give enhanced scrutiny to any financial transaction related to Burma. In 2003, two of Burma's largest private banks--Myanmar Mayflower Bank and Asia Wealth Bank--were implicated by FATF as involved in laundering illicit narcotics proceeds and counterfeiting. The Secretary of the Treasury in 2003 listed Burma as a "major money laundering country of primary concern" and in 2004 imposed additional countermeasures. Burma has since revoked the operating licenses of the two banks implicated in 2003. However, the U.S. government and international bodies, such as FATF, continue to monitor the widespread use of informal money transfer networks, sometimes also referred to as "hundi" or "hawala." Monies sent through these informal systems are usually legitimate remittances from relatives abroad. The lack of transparency and regulation of these money transfers remain issues of concern for the United States. In other parts of the world, hawala or hawala-like techniques have been used, or are suspected of being used, to launder proceeds derived from narcotics trafficking, terrorism, alien smuggling, and other criminal activities. Burma is subject to a broad sanctions regime that addresses issues of U.S. interest, which include democracy, human rights, and international crime. Specifically in response to the extent of transnational crime occurring in Burma, the President has taken additional actions against the country under several different legislative authorities. Burma is listed as a major drug-producing state, and because of its insufficient effort to combat the narcotics trade, the country is barred access to some U.S. foreign assistance. As an uncooperative, major drug-producing state, Burma is also subject to trade sanctions. In 2005, the Department of Justice indicted eight Burmese individuals identified in 2003 by the U.S. Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) for their alleged role in drug trafficking and money laundering. On November 13, 2008, OFAC named 26 individuals and 17 companies tied to Burma's Wei Hsueh Kang and the UWSA as Specially Designated Narcotics Traffickers pursuant to the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act (21 U.S.C. 1901-1908). Burma is characterized by the State Department's 2009 Trafficking in Persons report as a Tier 3 state engaged in the most severe forms of trafficking in persons; as such, Burma is subject to sanctions, barring the country from non-humanitarian, non-trade-related U.S. assistance and loss of U.S. support for loans from international financial institutions. As a major money laundering country--defined by Section 481(e)(7) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, as one "whose financial institutions engage in currency transactions including significant amounts of proceeds from international narcotics trafficking"--Burma is subject to several "special measures" to regulate and monitor financial flows. These include Department of Treasury advisories for enhanced scrutiny over financial transactions, as well as five special measures listed under 31 U.S.C. 5318A. The United States does not apply sanctions against Burma in specific response to its activity in other illicit trades, including wildlife. The Block Burmese JADE (Junta's Anti-Democratic Efforts) Act of 2007 ( H.R. 3890 ), however, would prohibit the importation of gems and hardwoods from Burma, among other restrictions. After more than a decade of applying sanctions against Burma, however, many analysts have concluded that the sanctions have done little to change the situation. The effectiveness of U.S. sanctions is limited by several factors. These include (1) unevenly applied sanctions against Burma by other countries and international organizations, including the European Union and Japan; (2) a booming natural gas production and export industry that provides the SPDC with significant revenue; (3) continued unwillingness of Burma's fellow members in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to impose economic sanctions against Burma; (4) Burma's historical isolation from the global economy; and (5) China's continued economic and military assistance to Burma. In addition, some analysts suggest that sanctions are, in part, culpable for the flourishing black markets in Burma, including trafficking in humans, gems, and drugs, because legal exports are barred. Several analysts indicate that many Burmese women who lost their jobs in the textile industry as a result of Western sanctions are among the victims of trafficking for sexual exploitation. The United States is assisting neighboring countries with stemming the flow of trafficked contraband from Burma into their territories. Although most U.S. assistance to combat transnational crime in Burma remains in suspension, the United States is working to train law enforcement and border control officials in neighboring countries through anti-crime assistance programs. Currently, the bulk of funding to Burma's neighbors remains concentrated in counter-narcotics and anti-human trafficking projects; no funding is allocated to the State Department for combating "organized and gang-related crime" in the region. Overall funding to combat trafficking has been in decline for several years; the Administration's FY2008 appropriations request for Foreign Operations in the region represents a 24.2% decrease from FY2006 actual funding. Despite Burma's recent progress in reducing opium poppy cultivation, most experts believe U.S. policies have not yielded substantial leverage in combating transnational crime emanating from Burma. In light of the most recent displays of junta violence against political demonstrators in September 2007, however, there are indications of increasing political interest in re-evaluating U.S. policy toward Burma. Among the considerations that policy makers have recently raised are (1) whether the United States should increase the amount of humanitarian aid sent to Burma; (2) what role ASEAN and other multilateral vehicles for dialogue could play in increasing political pressure on the junta regime; (3) what role the United States sees India, as the world's largest democracy and Burma's neighbor, playing in ensuring that Burma does not become a source of regional instability; and (4) how the United States can further work with China and Thailand, as the largest destinations of trafficked goods from Burma, to address transnational crime along Burma's borders.

Transnational organized crime groups in Burma (Myanmar) operate a multi-billion dollar criminal industry that stretches across Southeast Asia. Trafficked drugs, humans, wildlife, gems, timber, and other contraband flow through Burma, supporting the illicit demands of the region and beyond. Widespread collusion between traffickers and Burma's ruling military junta, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), allows organized crime groups to function with impunity. Transnational crime in Burma bears upon U.S. interests as it threatens regional security in Southeast Asia and bolsters a regime that fosters a culture of corruption and disrespect for the rule of law and human rights. Congress has been active in U.S. policy toward Burma for a variety of reasons, including combating Burma's transnational crime situation. At times, it has imposed sanctions on Burmese imports, suspended foreign assistance and loans, and ensured that U.S. funds remain out of the regime's reach. The 110th Congress passed P.L. 110-286, the Tom Lantos Block Burmese JADE Act of 2008 (signed by the President on July 29, 2008), which imposes further sanctions on SPDC officials and prohibits the indirect importation of Burmese gems, among other actions. On the same day, the President directed the U.S. Department of Treasury to impose financial sanctions against 10 Burmese companies, including companies involved in the gem-mining industry, pursuant to Executive Order 13464 of April 30, 2008. The second session of the 111th Congress may choose to conduct oversight of U.S. policy toward Burma, including the country's role in criminal activity. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced in February 2009 the beginning of a review of U.S.-Burma relations. In September 2009, the conclusions of this policy review were released, noting in particular the beginning of direct dialogue with Burmese authorities on international crime-related issues, including compliance with U.N. arms sanctions and counternarcotics. Already in the first session of the 111th Congress, both the Senate and the House have held hearings in which crime issues related to Burma have been addressed. This report analyzes the primary actors driving transnational crime in Burma, the forms of transnational crime occurring, and current U.S. policy in combating these crimes. This report will be updated as events warrant. For further analysis of U.S. policy to Burma, see CRS Report RL33479, Burma-U.S. Relations, by [author name scrubbed].

The Gulf Opportunity Zone Act of 2005 ( H.R. 4440 ) provides tax relief to businesses and individuals affected by Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma. The House passed the act on December 7, 2005, by a vote of 415 to 4. The Senate passed an amended version by unanimous consent on December 16, 2005, and the House agreed to the Senate Amendment later that day. President Bush signed the bill into law, P.L. 109-135 , on December 22, 2005. The act's provisions distinguish between the "Hurricane Katrina disaster area," which is the presidentially-declared disaster area, and the "Gulf Opportunity Zone" (GO Zone), which is the portion of the Hurricane Katrina disaster area determined by President Bush to warrant individual or individual and public assistance under the Stafford Act. The same distinction is made between the "Hurricane Rita disaster area" and the "Rita GO Zone," and the "Hurricane Wilma disaster area" and the "Wilma GO Zone." The act allows Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi to issue tax-exempt GO Zone bonds between the date of the section's enactment and January 1, 2011. The bonds must be issued either to (1) use at least 95% of the proceeds for the cost of qualified GO Zone residential rental projects or the acquisition, construction, reconstruction and renovation of GO Zone nonresidential real property or public utility property or (2) finance below-market rate mortgages for low and moderate-income homebuyers under IRC SS 142, with modifications. The maximum amount of bonds that each state may issue is $2,500 multiplied by the portion of the state's population in the GO Zone as determined prior to August 28, 2005. None of the bond issue's proceeds may be used to finance private and commercial golf courses, country clubs, massage parlors, hot tub and suntan facilities, racetracks and other gambling facilities and stores with the principal business of selling alcoholic beverages for consumption off premises. The act allows one additional advance refunding of qualifying bonds that were issued by those states and were outstanding on August 28, 2005. Additionally, while bonds issued to advance refund private activity bonds are generally not tax-exempt, the act allows one advance refunding for bonds used to finance airports, docks, and wharves. The refundings must occur between the date of the act's enactment and January 1, 2011, and each state is capped in the amount of bonds it may refund. The refunding provisions do not apply if any of the bond issue's proceeds are used to provide property that does not qualify for GO Zone bond financing, as discussed above. The act creates a special rule for applying IRC SS 142(d), which allows residential rental projects for low-income tenants to qualify for tax-exempt bond financing. The act allows project operators who rent to individuals displaced by Hurricane Katrina to rely on those individuals' representations that their income is under the income limits so long as the tenancy begins within six months of the displacement. The low-income housing tax credit in IRC SS 42 allows owners of qualified residential rental property to claim a credit for ten years that is a percentage of the costs of constructing, rehabilitating, or acquiring the building that is attributable to low-income units. Owners may claim a credit based on 130% of the project's costs if the housing is in a low-income or difficult development area. Owners must be allocated the credit by a state. Each state is limited in the amount of credits it may allocate to the greater of $2,000,000 or $1.75 times the state's population (both are adjusted for inflation and are currently $2,125,000 and $1.85), with adjustments. For 2006, 2007, and 2008, the act increases the credits available to Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi for use in the GO Zone by up to $18.00 multiplied by the portion of the state's population in the GO Zone prior to August 28, 2005. It also increases the credits available to Florida and Texas in 2006 by $3,500,000 for each state. For 2006, 2007, and 2008, the act treats the GO Zone, Rita GO Zone and Wilma Go Zone as difficult development areas and uses an alternate test for determining whether certain GO Zone projects qualify as low-income housing. The act increases the depreciation deduction otherwise allowed under IRC SS 167 for qualified GO Zone property. The increase equals 50% of the taxpayer's adjusted basis in the property and is claimed the year the property is placed in service. Among other requirements, the property's original use in the GO Zone must commence with the taxpayer after August 27, 2005, and the property must be placed in service prior to January 1, 2008 (January 1, 2009, for nonresidential real and residential rental property). Qualified property does not include (1) property used in connection with private and commercial golf courses, country clubs, massage parlors, hot tub and suntan facilities, racetracks and other gambling facilities, and stores whose principal business is selling alcoholic beverages for consumption off premises or (2) gambling and animal property, which is the equipment, furniture, software and other property used directly in connection with gambling, the racing of animals, or the on-site viewing of such activity, and any portion of at least 100 square feet of real property dedicated to those activities. Under IRC SS 172, net operating losses (NOL) may generally be carried back for two years. The act allows GO Zone NOL to be carried back for five years. The GO Zone loss is the lesser of (a) the year's NOL with adjustment or (b) the deductions used in computing the year's NOL for GO Zone casualty losses, employment-related moving expenses due to Hurricane Katrina, temporarily housing employees, depreciation of GO Zone property, and hurricane-related repair expenses. Property that is disqualified under the depreciation provision discussed above does not qualify as GO Zone property or its loss as a GO Zone casualty loss. In general, capital expenditures must be added to the property's basis rather than being expensed (i.e., deducted in the current year). IRC SS 179 provides an exception so that a business may expense the costs of certain property in the year it is placed in service. The total cost of the property that the business elects to treat as section 179 property cannot exceed $100,000. Additionally, for every dollar that the total cost of all property that the business places in service in the year exceeds $400,000, the maximum deduction is decreased by one dollar. Both limitations are adjusted for inflation, and are $105,000 and $450,000 in 2005. IRC SS 198 contains another exception to the rule against expensing capital expenditures. It allows taxpayers to expense environmental remediation costs from the abatement or control of hazardous substances at a qualified contaminated site. It does not apply to costs paid after December 31, 2005. The act increases the $100,000 limitation in IRC SS 179 by up to $100,000 and the $400,000 limitation by up to $600,000 for qualified GO Zone property. Qualified property does not include the property that is disqualified from the depreciation and NOL provisions discussed above. The act amends IRC SS 198 for sites in the GO Zone by extending the current deadline to December 31, 2007, and treating petroleum products as a hazardous substance. It also allows taxpayers to expense 50% of qualified clean-up costs paid or incurred between August 27, 2005, and January 1, 2008, for the removal of debris or the demolition of structures on business real property in the GO Zone. Under IRC SS 47, taxpayers may claim a credit equal to 10% of the qualifying expenditures to rehabilitate a qualified building or 20% of such expenditures for a certified historic structure. The act increases these amounts to 13% and 26% for building and structures in the GO Zone for expenditures between August 27, 2005, and January 1, 2009. The act creates two special rules for timber producers with less than 501 acres of timber property. Under IRC SS 194, taxpayers may expense up to $10,000 of qualifying reforestation expenditures. The act increases that limit by up to $10,000 for expenditures made for qualified timber property in the GO Zone, Rita GO Zone, or Wilma GO Zone. Under IRC SS 172, the general rule is that taxpayers may carry net operating losses back for two years. The act increases this to five years for certain losses attributable to timber property in any of the three zones. Under IRC SS 172, certain net operating losses, called specified liability losses, may be carried back for 10 years. The act treats GO Zone public utility casualty losses as such a loss. Under IRC SS 165(i), certain disaster losses may be deducted in the year prior to the disaster. The act allows GO Zone public utility disaster losses to be deducted in the fifth taxable year preceding the disaster. The act allows holders of gulf tax credit bonds to claim a credit based on the credit rate on the date the bonds were sold and their outstanding face amount. The bonds may be issued by Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi to pay the principal, interest, or premiums on qualified governmental bonds or to make loans to political subdivisions to make such payments. Qualified bonds do not include those used to finance private and commercial golf courses, country clubs, massage parlors, hot tub and suntan facilities, racetracks and other gambling facilities, and stores with the principal business of selling alcoholic beverages for consumption off premises. The gulf tax credit bonds must be issued between December 31, 2005, and January 1, 2007, and may not have a maturity date beyond two years. Each state is capped in the amount of bonds it may issue. The new markets tax credit in IRC SS 45D is capped at $2 billion for 2005 and $3.5 billion for 2006 and 2007. The act increases the cap by $300,000,000 for 2005 and 2006 and by $400,000,000 for 2007, and allocates these amounts to entities making low-income community investments in the GO Zone. Under IRC SS 25A, individuals with eligible tuition and related expenses may claim the Hope Scholarship or Lifetime Learning credit. The maximum Hope credit is 100% of the first $1,000 of eligible expenses and 50% of the next $1,000 of eligible expenses. The maximum Lifetime Learning credit is 20% of up to $10,000 of eligible expenses. For individuals attending school in the GO Zone for 2005 and 2006, the act allows any qualified higher education expenses to qualify for the credits, doubles the $1,000 limitations in the Hope credit to $2,000, and increases the 20% limitation in the Lifetime Learning credit to 40%. The act excludes the value of certain employer-provided housing, limited to $600 per month, from the employee's income and allows the employer to claim a credit equal to 30% of that amount. The employee must have had a principal residence in the GO Zone on August 28, 2005, and perform substantially all employment services for that employer in the GO Zone. The employer must have a trade or business in the GO Zone and the lodging must be provided during the first six months after the act's enactment. IRC SS 168(k) provides a bonus depreciation deduction that is similar to the act's depreciation provision discussed above in that it allows taxpayers to claim an increased depreciation deduction during the year qualifying property is placed in service. Certain types of property must be placed in service prior to January 1, 2006. The act grants the Treasury Secretary the authority to suspend this deadline, on a case-by-case basis, by up to one year for taxpayers affected by the hurricanes. The act states it is the sense of Congress that the Treasury Secretary designate at least one series of bonds as Gulf Coast Recovery Bonds. The act repeals several provisions that were enacted in KETRA to assist individuals affected by Hurricane Katrina and then reenacts them to also apply to individuals affected by Hurricanes Rita and Wilma. For certain post-hurricane retirement plan distributions, the act waives the 10% penalty tax in IRC SS 72(t) that would otherwise apply on early withdrawals. The recipient must have had a principal place of abode in the Hurricane Katrina disaster area on August 28, 2005, the Hurricane Rita disaster area on September 23, 2005, or the Hurricane Wilma disaster area on October 23, 2005, and sustained an economic loss due to a hurricane. The distributions must be made before January 1, 2007, and the most that may be withdrawn without penalty is $100,000. Funds may be re-contributed to a qualified plan over a three-year period and receive tax-free rollover treatment. Additionally, with respect to the taxable portion of the distribution, the individual may include one third of such amount in his or her income for three years rather than the entire amount in the year of distribution. The act increases the amount that these individuals may borrow from their plans without immediate tax consequences. Under IRC SS 72(p), the maximum amount that may be borrowed without being treated as a taxable distribution is the lesser of (a) $50,000, reduced by certain outstanding loans or (b) the greater of $10,000 or 50% of the present value of the employee's nonforfeitable accrued benefits. For loans made during the applicable period, the act increases this to the lesser of (1) $100,000, reduced by certain outstanding loans, or (2) the greater of $10,000 or 100% of the present value of the employee's nonforfeitable accrued benefits. The applicable period is between September 23, 2005, and January 1, 2007, for Katrina individuals and between the date of enactment and January 1, 2007, for Rita and Wilma individuals. The act also extends loan repayment due dates by one year if the original date falls between a certain date and January 1, 2007. The date is August 25, 2005, for Katrina individuals, September 23, 2005, for Rita individuals, and October 23, 2005, for Wilma individuals. The act also allows individuals to re-contribute without tax consequences distributions that were made to purchase or construct a principal residence in one of the disaster areas but were not used because of the hurricanes. The distribution must have been received after February 28, 2005, and before either August 29, 2005 (Katrina), September 24, 2005 (Rita), or October 24, 2005 (Wilma). The contributions must be made after August 24, 2005 (Katrina), September 22, 2005 (Rita), or October 22, 2005 (Wilma), and before March 1, 2006. The act includes a retention credit for hurricane-damaged businesses that continue to pay their employees' wages, regardless of whether they perform services. Eligible employers are those with an active business in the GO Zone on August 28, 2005, the Rita GO Zone on September 23, 2005, or the Wilma GO Zone on October 23, 2005, and whose business was rendered inoperable due to hurricane damage for any day prior to January 1, 2006. Eligible employees are those whose principal place of employment at the time of the hurricane was with the eligible employer in the appropriate zone. The credit equals 40% of the employee's first $6,000 in wages paid between the date the business became inoperable and the date it resumes significant operations there, but no later than December 31, 2005. Under IRC SS 170, individuals may not claim a charitable deduction that exceeds 50% of their contribution base (adjusted gross income with adjustment) and corporations may not claim a deduction that exceeds 10% of their taxable income with adjustment. The act suspends the 50% and 10% limitations for cash contributions made between August 27, 2005, and January 1, 2006. For individuals, the deduction may not exceed the amount that the contribution base exceeds other charitable contributions. For corporations, the deduction is only allowed for contributions used for hurricane relief efforts and may not exceed the amount that taxable income exceeds other contributions. The act also suspends the overall limitation on itemized deductions. Under IRC SS 165, taxpayers may deduct unreimbursed losses of property not connected to a trade or business when the losses are from a casualty, such as a hurricane. In addition to losses from the actual damage caused by the casualty, a taxpayer in a presidentially-declared disaster area has a casualty loss if ordered, within 120 days of the area's designation, by the state to demolish or relocate his or her home. The loss is the lesser of (1) the decrease in the property's fair market value due to the casualty or (2) the taxpayer's adjusted basis in the property. The deduction may only be claimed to the extent that the loss exceeds $100 plus the sum of 10% of the taxpayer's adjusted gross income and any taxable gains from property involuntarily converted due to the casualty. The act waives the $100 and 10% floors for casualty losses from Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma. KETRA instructed the Treasury Secretary to extend certain tax-related deadlines for Hurricane Katrina victims until February 28, 2006. The act extends this relief to victims of Hurricanes Rita and Wilma. The act allows hurricane victims to use last year's earned income for computing the child tax credit [IRC SS 24] and the earned income tax credit [IRC SS 32] instead of this year's income. Eligible individuals are those whose principal place of abode was (a) in the GO Zone, Rita GO Zone, or Wilma Go Zone or (b) in one of the disaster areas and who were displaced by the hurricanes. The act allows the Treasury Secretary to make adjustments in the application of the tax laws for 2005 and 2006 so that taxpayers do not lose deductions or credits or have a change of filing status due to temporary relocations from the hurricanes. Under IRC SS 143, tax-exempt mortgage revenue bonds finance below-market rate mortgages for low and moderate-income homebuyers who have not owned a home for the past three years. The act removes the three-year requirement if the home was in the GO Zone, Rita GO Zone, or Wilma Go Zone and financing was provided before January 1, 2011. It also increases the limitation on qualified home improvement loans from $15,000 to $150,000 for loans to repair damage to homes in the zones.

The Gulf Opportunity Zone Act of 2005 (H.R. 4440) was signed into law on December 22, 2005 (P.L. 109-135). The act provides tax benefits to assist in the recovery from Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma. Some of its provisions expand several sections of the Katrina Emergency Tax Relief Act (KETRA, P.L. 109-73) to apply to victims of Hurricanes Rita and Wilma. This report summarizes the act's provisions dealing with hurricane relief. For more information on P.L. 109-73, see CRS Report RS22269, Katrina Emergency Tax Relief Act of 2005, by [author name scrubbed].

The first section of this report provides an overview of the consideration of FY2017 judiciary appropriations, with subsections covering each major action, including the initial submission of the request on February 9, 2016; hearings held by the House and Senate Financial Services Subcommittees; the House subcommittee markup on May 25, 2016; the House Appropriations Committee markup on June 9, 2016; the Senate subcommittee markup on June 15, 2016; the Senate Appropriations Committee markup on June 16, 2016; House floor consideration of H.R. 5485 on July 5, July 6, and July 7, 2016; and the continuing resolutions and the enactment of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017, on May 5, 2017. The status is summarized in Table 1 . This overview is followed by a section on prior-year actions and funding. The report then provides an overview of judiciary accounts. The Budget for Fiscal Year 2017 was submitted on February 9, 2016. It contains a request for $7.58 billion in new budget authority for judicial branch activities, including $6.99 billion in discretionary funds and $0.59 billion in mandatory funding for judges' salaries and benefits. By law, the judicial branch request is submitted to the President and included in the budget submission without change. Neither the House nor Senate Appropriations Subcommittees on Financial Services held hearings on the FY2017 judicial branch budget request. The House subcommittee announced that it would accept programmatic and language submissions from Members through March 17, 2016. On May 25, the House Appropriations Committee Subcommittee on Financial Services and General Government held a markup of the FY2017 Financial Services and General Government (FSGG) bill. The subcommittee recommended $7.55 billion in funds for the judiciary, including mandatory funds for judges' salaries and benefits as required under current law. On June 9, 2016, the House Appropriations Committee held a markup of the FY2017 FSGG bill. The committee recommended $7.55 billion in funds for the judiciary, including mandatory funds for judges' salaries and benefits as required under current law. The bill was ordered reported by a vote of 30-18 ( H.R. 5485 , H.Rept. 114-624 ). No amendments were offered related to the judiciary. On June 15, the Senate Appropriations Committee Subcommittee on Financial Services and General Government held a markup of the FY2017 FSGG bill. The subcommittee recommended $7.58 billion in funds for the judiciary, including mandatory funds for judges' salaries and benefits as required under current law. On June 16, 2016, the Senate Appropriations Committee held a markup of the FY2017 FSGG bill. The committee recommended $7.58 billion in funds for the judiciary, including mandatory funds for judges' salaries and benefits as required under current law. The bill was ordered reported by a vote of 30-0 ( S. 3067 , S.Rept. 114-280 ). No amendments were offered related to the judiciary. On July 5, the House agreed to a structured rule ( H.Res. 794 , H.Rept. 114-639 ) for consideration of the Financial Services and General Government bill ( H.R. 5485 ). One amendment (#60) related to the judiciary was made in order. The amendment would reduce funding to the Salaries and Expenses Account under the Courts of Appeals, District Courts, and other Judicial Services heading by $1 million. On July 7, amendment #60 was offered as part of en bloc amendment ( H.Amdt. 1246 ), and was passed by voice vote. H.R. 5485 , as amended, was agreed to on July 7, with a vote of 239-185 (Roll no. 398). No further action was taken on H.R. 5485 or S. 3067 prior to the start of FY2017 on October 1, 2016. Judicial branch activities were funded through continuing appropriations resolutions ( P.L. 114-223 , P.L. 114-254 , and P.L. 115-30 ) until the enactment of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017 ( P.L. 115-31 ). Division E of this act provides $7.5 billion for the judiciary, an increase of $176.2 million (2.4%) from FY2016 and $63.0 million (-0.8%) less than the request. FY2016 judiciary funding was provided in Division E, Title 3, of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 ( P.L. 114-113 ), which was enacted on December 18, 2015. The $7.344 billion provided by the act represented an increase of $73.9 million (1.0%) from FY2015 and was $184.1 million (-2.5%) less than the judiciary's request. FY2015 judiciary funding was provided in Division E, Title 3, of the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015 ( P.L. 113-235 ), which was enacted on December 16, 2014. The $7.261 billion provided by the act represented an increase of $221.9 million (3.2%) from FY2014 and was $37.9 million (-0.5%) less than the judiciary's request. Neither a Financial Services and General Government Appropriations bill nor a continuing appropriations resolution (CR) containing FY2014 funding was enacted prior to the beginning of the fiscal year on October 1, 2013. A funding gap, which resulted in a partial government shutdown, ensued for 16 days. The funding gap was terminated by the enactment of a CR ( P.L. 113-46 ) on October 17, 2013. The CR provided funding through January 15, 2014. Following enactment of a temporary continuing resolution on January 15, 2014 ( P.L. 113-73 ), a consolidated appropriations bill was enacted on January 17 ( P.L. 113-76 ), providing $7.039 billion for the judiciary for FY2014. Appropriations for the judiciary comprise approximately 0.2% of total budget authority. Two accounts that fund the Supreme Court (the salaries and expenses of the Court and the expenditures for the care of its building and grounds, which are the responsibility of the Architect of the Capitol) together total approximately 1% of the total judiciary budget. The rest of the judiciary's budget provides funding for the lower federal courts and related judicial services. The largest account, approximately 72% of the total FY2017 enacted level, is the Salaries and Expenses account for the U.S. Courts of Appeals, District Courts, and Other Judicial Services. This covers the "salaries of circuit and district judges (including judges of the territorial courts of the United States), justices and judges retired from office or from regular active service, judges of the U.S. Court of Federal Claims, bankruptcy judges, magistrate judges, and all other officers and employees of the federal judiciary not otherwise specifically provided for," and "necessary expenses of the courts." Two other large accounts provide funds for Defender Services (13.9%) and Court Security (7.5%). The remaining judiciary budget is divided among the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (0.4% of FY2016 enacted), U.S. Court of International Trade (0.3%), Fees of Jurors and Commissioners (0.5%), Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (1.2%), Federal Judicial Center (0.4%), U.S. Sentencing Commission (0.2%), and Judicial Retirement Funds (2.1%). Three specialized courts within the federal court system are not funded under the judiciary budget: the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (funded in the Department of Defense appropriations bill), the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (funded in the Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies appropriations bill), and the U.S. Tax Court (funded under Independent Agencies, Title V, of the FSGG bill). Federal courthouse construction is funded within the General Services Administration account under Independent Agencies, Title V, of the FSGG bill. The judiciary uses non-appropriated funds to help offset its funding requirements. The majority of these non-appropriated funds are from fee collections, primarily court filing fees. These monies are used to offset expenses within the Salaries and Expenses accounts of Courts of Appeals, District Courts, and Other Judicial Services. Some of these funds may be carried forward from one year to the next. These funds are considered "unencumbered" because they result from savings from the judiciary's financial plan in areas where budgeted costs did not materialize. According to the judiciary, such savings are usually not under its control (e.g., the judiciary has no control over the confirmation rate of Article III judges and must make its best estimate on the needed funds to budget for judgeships, rent costs, and technology funding for certain programs). The budget request and appropriations figures presented here reflect the net resources for the judiciary, and do not include these offsetting non-appropriated funds. The judiciary also has "encumbered" funds--no-year authority funds appropriated for specific purposes. These are used when planned expenses are delayed, from one year to the next (e.g., costs associated with office space delivery, and certain technology needs and projects). The judiciary continues its cost-containment efforts begun over a decade ago. Specific areas of focus include office space rental, personnel expenses, information technology, and operating costs. In a press release accompanying the submission of the FY2017 budget, Judge Julia S. Gibbons, chair of the Budget Committee of the Judicial Conference of the United States, stressed the results and ongoing efforts of the judiciary's formal cost-containment initiatives, which began in 2004. "Our budget request is reflective of the cost-containment policies we have put in place and reducing cost growth in the Judiciary's budget continues to be a top priority," said Judge Gibbons. Current efforts focus on implementation of shared administrative services among various courts, as well as reducing the judiciary's space footprint. In response to a November 2015 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report on judicial branch cost savings (GAO-16-97), the judiciary is reevaluating its methodologies and reporting practices for cost savings accounting. In 2015, Judge Gibbons reported that the judiciary has achieved a cost reduction of "nearly $1.5 billion relative to [the] projected requirements" over the past 10 years. In 2013, the Judicial Conference set a goal of a 3% reduction in total space. According to Judge Gibbons, as of March 2015, 30% of that goal has been reached, resulting in $5.8 million in rent savings, and the judiciary "is on track to accomplish the full three percent reduction by the end of fiscal year 2018." The safe conduct of court proceedings and the security of judges in courtrooms and off-site has been a concern in recent years. Efforts to improve judicial security have been spurred by the double homicide of family members of a federal judge in Chicago in 2005; the Atlanta killings, in 2005, of a state judge, a court reporter, and a sheriff's deputy at a courthouse; the sniper shooting of a state judge in his Reno office in 2006; and the wounding of a deputy U.S. marshal and killing of a court security officer at the Lloyd D. George U.S. Courthouse and Federal Building in Las Vegas in 2010. An FY2005 supplemental appropriations act included a provision that provided intrusion detection systems for judges in their homes, and the Court Security Improvement Act of 2007 aimed to enhance security for judges and court personnel, as well as courtroom safety for the public. The judiciary has been working closely with the U.S. Marshals Service (USMS) to ensure that adequate protective policies, procedures, and practices are in place. The FY2017 appropriation continued a pilot program for the USMS to assume responsibility for perimeter security at selected courthouses that were previously the responsibility of the Federal Protective Service (FPS). This pilot was first authorized in FY2009 as a result of the judiciary's stated concerns that FPS was not providing adequate perimeter security. After the initial planning phase, USMS implemented the pilot program on January 5, 2009, and assumed primary responsibility for security functions at seven courthouses located in Chicago, Detroit, Phoenix, New York, Tucson, and Baton Rouge (location of two of the seven courthouses). The judiciary and USMS have been evaluating the program and identifying areas for improvement. The judiciary reimburses USMS for the protective services. Following its biennial evaluation and review of judgeship needs, the Judicial Conference of the United States, in March 2017, recommended Congress create 57 new federal judgeships: 5 in the courts of appeals and 52 in the district courts. Several bills have been introduced in recent Congresses to create one or more new judgeships; no action beyond committee referral has occurred on any of the bills. The Conference made a similar request in the 114 th Congress, recommending a total of 73 new judgeships. Subsequent legislation was introduced in both the House and Senate to address this request, but no final action was taken before the 114 th Congress adjourned. Since the enactment of an omnibus judgeship bill in 1990 ( P.L. 101-650 ), according to the Judicial Conference, the number of appellate judgeships has remained at 179 while appellate court case filings have increased by 40%. During this same time period, Congress enacted legislation that increased the number of district judgeships by 5% (from 645 to 677) while district court case filings increased by 38%. The FY2017 judiciary budget request totals $7.53 billion. Table 2 lists the amounts enacted for FY2016, the President's FY2017 request, the House-passed level in H.R. 5485 , the committee-reported level in the Senate, and the FY2017 enacted level. The total FY2017 request for the Supreme Court, $94.5 million, is contained in two accounts: (1) Salaries and Expenses of $79.3 million and (2) Care of the Building and Grounds of $14.9 million. The total represents a 7.0% increase over the FY2016 enacted level. The House-passed and Senate committee-reported bills provided the full request, as does P.L. 115-31 . This court, consisting of 12 judges, has jurisdiction over and review of among other things, certain lower court rulings on patents and trademarks, international trade, and federal claims cases. The FY2017 budget request is $33.1 million, a decrease of 2.1% over the FY2016 enacted level. The House-passed and Senate committee-reported bills provided the full request, as does P.L. 115-31 . This court has exclusive nationwide jurisdiction over the civil actions against the United States, its agencies and officers, and certain civil actions brought by the United States arising out of import transactions and the administration as well as enforcement of federal customs and international trade laws. The FY2017 request of $20.50 million is an increase of 1.7% over the FY2016 enacted level. The House-passed and Senate committee-reported bills provided the full request. P.L. 115-31 provides $20.46 million. The total FY2017 funding request of $7,141.5 million covers 12 of the 13 courts of appeals and 94 district judicial courts located in the 50 states, District of Columbia, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, and the territories of Guam and the U.S. Virgin Islands. The account is divided among salaries and expenses, the Vaccine Injury Compensation Trust Fund, court security, defender services, and fees of jurors and commissioners. The House-passed bill provided $7,104.7 million and the Senate committee-reported bill provided $7,135.8 million. P.L. 115-31 provides $7,076.9 million. The FY2017 request for this account is $5,469.8 million, an increase of 2.8% over the FY2016 enacted level. The House-passed bill provided $5,433.0 million and the Senate committee-reported bill provided $5,476.0 million. P.L. 115-31 provides $5,420.4 million. Established to address a perceived crisis in vaccine tort liability claims, the Vaccine Injury Compensation Program funds a federal no-fault program that protects the availability of vaccines in the nation by diverting a substantial number of claims from the tort arena. The FY2017 request is $6.3 million, a 3.5% increase over the FY2016 enacted level. The House-passed and Senate committee-reported bills provided the full request. P.L. 115-31 provides $6.5 million. This account provides for protective services, security systems, and equipment needs in courthouses and other federal facilities to ensure the safety of judicial officers, employees, and visitors. Under this account, the majority of funding for court security is transferred to the U.S. Marshals Service to pay for court security officers under the Judicial Facility Security Program. The FY2017 request is $565.4 million, an increase of 5.1% over the FY2016 enacted level. The House-passed and Senate committee-reported bills provided the full request, as does P.L. 115-31 . This account funds the operations of the federal public defender and community defender organizations, and compensation, reimbursements, and expenses of private practice panel attorneys appointed by federal courts to serve as defense counsel to indigent individuals. The cost for this account is driven by the number and type of prosecutions brought by U.S. attorneys. The FY2017 request is $1,056.3 million, an increase of 5.1% over the FY2016 enacted level. The House-passed bill provided the full request, while the Senate committee-reported bill provided $1,054.5 million. P.L. 115-31 provides $1,044.6 million. This account funds the fees and allowances provided to grand and petit jurors, and compensation for jury and land commissioners. The FY2017 request is $43.7 million, a decrease of 1.1% over the FY2016 enacted level. The House-passed bill provided the full request, while the Senate committee-reported bill provided $39.9 million. P.L. 115-31 provides $39.9 million. As the central support entity for the judiciary, the AOUSC provides a wide range of administrative, management, program, and information technology services to the U.S. courts. AOUSC also provides support to the Judicial Conference of the United States, and implements conference policies and applicable federal statutes and regulations. The FY2017 request for AOUSC is $87.7 million, an increase of 2.4% over the FY2016 enacted level. The House-passed bill provided $87.5 million, while the Senate committee-reported bill provided the full request. P.L. 115-31 provides $87.5 million. As the judiciary's research and education entity, the Federal Judicial Center undertakes research and evaluation of judicial operations for the Judicial Conference committees and the courts. In addition, the center provides judges, court staff, and others with orientation and continuing education and training. The center's FY2017 request is $28.3 million, an increase of 2.2% over the FY2016 enacted level. The House-passed bill provided $28.2 million and the Senate committee-reported bill provided the full request. P.L. 115-31 provides the full request. The commission promulgates sentencing policies, practices, and guidelines for the federal criminal justice system. The FY2017 request is $18.2 million, an increase of 3.3% over the FY2016 enacted level. The House-passed bill provided $18.0 million and the Senate committee-reported bill provided $18.2 million. P.L. 115-31 provides $18.1 million. This mandatory account provides for three trust funds that finance payments to retired bankruptcy and magistrate judges, retired Court of Federal Claims judges, and the spouses and dependent children of deceased judicial officers. The required funding for the account fluctuates with the periodic revisions of the estimated costs of retirement benefits. The FY2017 request is for $161.0 million. The House-passed and Senate committee-reported bills provided the full request, as does P.L. 115-31 . P.L. 115-31 contains provisions related to (1) salaries and expenses for employment of experts and consultant services; (2) transfers between judiciary appropriations accounts of up to 5%; (3) a limitation of $11,000 for official reception and representation expenses incurred by the Judicial Conference of the United States; (4) language enabling the judiciary to contract for repairs under $100,000; (5) the continuation of a court security pilot program; (6) a one-year extension of the authorization of certain temporary judgeships.

Funds for the judicial branch are included annually in the Financial Services and General Government (FSGG) Appropriations bill. The bill provides funding for the Supreme Court; the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit; the U.S. Court of International Trade; the U.S. Courts of Appeals and District Courts; Defender Services; Court Security; Fees of Jurors and Commissioners; the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts; the Federal Judicial Center; the U.S. Sentencing Commission; and Judicial Retirement Funds. The judiciary's FY2017 budget request of $7.58 billion was submitted on February 9, 2016. By law, the President includes the requests submitted by the judiciary in the annual budget submission without change. The FY2017 budget request represents a 3.3% increase over the FY2016 enacted level of $7.34 billion provided in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 (P.L. 114-113), Division E, Title III, enacted December 18, 2015. The House Appropriations Committee held a markup (H.R. 5485) on June 9, 2016, and recommended a total of $7.55 billion. The Senate Appropriations Committee held a markup (S. 3067) on June 16, 2016, and recommended a total of $7.58 billion. On July 5, the House agreed to a structured rule (H.Res. 794) for consideration of the Financial Services and General Government bill (H.R. 5485). One amendment (#60) related to the judiciary was made in order, and subsequently passed by voice vote. H.R. 5485 was agreed to on July 7, with a vote of 239-185 (Roll no. 398). No further action was taken on H.R. 5485 or S. 3067 prior to the start of FY2017 on October 1, 2016, and judicial branch activities were funded through continuing appropriations resolutions (P.L. 114-223, P.L. 114-254, and P.L. 115-30) until the enactment of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017 (P.L. 115-31). Division E of this act provides $7.5 billion for the judiciary, an increase of $176.2 million (2.4%) from FY2016 and $63.0 million (-0.8%) less than the request. Appropriations for the judiciary comprise approximately 0.2% of total budget authority. This report will be updated as events warrant.

This report provides summary information on supplemental appropriations legislation enacted since FY2000 after significant large-scale disasters. It includes funds appropriated to various departments and agencies. The funds cited in this report were provided by Congress in response to major disasters declared under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (P.L. 92-288, hereinafter the Stafford Act) and include appropriations for disaster relief, repair of federal facilities, and hazard mitigation activities directed at reducing the impact of future disasters. Disaster assistance provided for agricultural disasters, counterterrorism, law enforcement, and national security appropriations are generally authorized by an authority separate from the Stafford Act and are not included in this report. In addition, in some cases it is difficult to discern the specific purposes for the funds. Unless otherwise noted, this report does not take into account rescissions or transfers after Congress appropriated the funds for disaster assistance. When a state is overwhelmed by an emergency or disaster, the governor may request assistance from the federal government. Federal assistance is contingent on whether the President issues an emergency or major disaster declaration. Once the declaration has been issued, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) provides disaster relief through its Disaster Relief Fund (DRF). Funds from the DRF are used to pay for ongoing recovery projects from disasters occurring in previous fiscal years, meet current emergency requirements, and as a reserve to pay for future incidents. In addition, FEMA often uses what are known as "Mission Assignments" to task and reimburse other federal entities that provide direct assistance during emergencies and major disasters. The DRF is funded annually and is a "no-year" account, meaning that unused funds from the previous fiscal year (if available) are carried over to the next fiscal year. In general, when the balance of the DRF becomes low, Congress has provided additional funding through both annual and supplemental appropriations to replenish the account. When a catastrophic incident threatens to deplete the DRF, the President typically submits a request to Congress for a supplemental appropriation (see Table 1 ). Historically, FEMA is the second-largest recipient of supplemental appropriations. In addition to the funds provided to the DRF to reimburse Mission Assignments, Congress often provides direct funding to various agencies such as the Small Business Administration (SBA), or the Department of Agriculture (USDA) for disaster assistance. This is particularly true for supplemental appropriations for large-scale incidents such as Hurricanes Katrina and Sandy. It is useful to note that a low DRF balance is not necessarily needed to spur congressional efforts to provide additional assistance. As previously mentioned, most supplemental appropriations originate with a request from the Administration for additional funds. However, Congress has initiated supplemental appropriations without a formal request from the Administration. For example, in 2007, Congress provided additional assistance for Hurricanes Katrina and Rita ( P.L. 110-28 ). In 2008, Congress added DRF supplemental funding ( P.L. 110-329 ) to the FY2009 Department of Homeland Security Appropriations bill on its own initiative, in response to the Midwest Flooding and Hurricanes Ike and Gustav. While there were no formal requests from the Administration for additional funds, the amount of funding for the supplemental appropriation was based on estimates provided to Congress by FEMA and other federal entities that were involved in response and recovery efforts. Supplemental appropriations often have an "emergency designation." Congress uses emergency designations to exempt a provision in legislation from the budgetary effects of certain enforcement procedures. As a result of the concern over the size of the federal deficit and debt, Congress has implemented measures to limit federal spending. For example, the Budget Control Act ( P.L. 112-25 , hereinafter the BCA), includes measures to limit spending. The BCA placed caps on discretionary spending for the next ten years, beginning with FY2012. If these caps are exceeded, an automatic rescission--known as sequestration--takes place across most discretionary budget accounts to reduce the effective level of spending to the level of the cap. The BCA, however, includes special accommodations to address the unpredictable nature of disaster assistance. First, it redefined "disaster relief" as being federal government assistance provided pursuant to a major disaster declared under the Stafford Act, rather than assistance provided through the DRF. Second, funding designated as disaster relief would now be "paid for" by adjusting upward the discretionary spending caps (also referred to as an allowable adjustment). The allowable adjustment for disaster relief is limited, however, to an amount based on the 10-year rolling average (excluding the highest and lowest years) of what has been spent by the federal government on relief for major disasters. The BCA requires OMB to annually calculate the adjusted 10-year rolling average of disaster relief spending that sets the allowable cap adjustment for disaster relief. These calculations are included in the final sequestration report and sequestration update report issued under Section 254 of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 as amended (BBEDCA). In recent years, Congress has provided more funding for the DRF through annual appropriations than in the past. Many policy experts believe that the BCA's cap adjustments have led Congress to rely more on annual appropriations to fund disaster assistance than in the past. The influence of the BCA on disaster assistance is discussed further in-depth in " The Debate over the Use of Supplemental Appropriations for Disaster Assistance " section of this report. It is worth noting that the cap is calculated in nominal dollars and does not adjust for inflation. This may become more significant over time if inflation rises, and if the allowable adjustment begins to decrease as projected in 2016. This section provides summary information on emergency supplemental appropriations legislation enacted since 2000. The funds cited include both supplemental appropriations and loan authority to certain federal agencies that undertook disaster relief, repair of federal facilities, and hazard mitigation activities directed at reducing the impact of future disasters. Funds used for activities such as research, oversight, or administrative costs have been omitted from this analysis in an attempt to focus solely on disaster relief and assistance. Moreover, counterterrorism, law enforcement, and national security appropriations are not included in this compilation. Unless otherwise noted, this report does not take into account rescissions approved by Congress after funds have been appropriated for disaster assistance. As reflected in Table 1 , supplemental appropriations have generally been enacted as stand-alone legislation. In some instances, however, disaster assistance funding has been enacted as part of regular appropriations measures, continuing appropriations acts (continuing resolutions), or as a part of omnibus appropriations legislation. Also, while the need for additional funds has historically been tied to a single, large-scale major disaster such as Hurricanes Katrina or Sandy, in recent years the need for assistance has increasingly been caused by a string of incidents. For example, legislation passed in FY2010 and FY2012 provided disaster relief for several incidents rather than a single, large scale disaster. Supplemental appropriations for disaster relief provide funding to a wide array of federal agencies depending on the unique needs of each disaster. In general, agencies, such as FEMA or the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), are consistently included in supplemental appropriations for disaster relief. On the other hand, many smaller agencies or programs have received funding for certain disasters and not others. Figure 1 and Figure 2 below outline the total funding that has been given to each agency since FY2000. Of the total amount provided for all agencies ($265 billion), nearly 50%, or $122 billion, has gone to FEMA. Overall, eight agencies account for 96% of the total appropriation during this time. During the 113 th Congress, P.L. 113-2 , the Disaster Relief Appropriations Act, provided $50.3 billion in disaster assistance through numerous federal agencies and entities in response to Hurricane Sandy. The bill provided $11.5 billion for the DRF, $5.3 billion for the Army Corps of Engineers, and $13.0 billion for the Department of Transportation. Enacted during the 112 th Congress, P.L. 112-77 , the Disaster Relief Appropriations Act, 2012, provided an additional $8.1 billion in disaster assistance including $6.4 billion for the DRF and roughly $1.7 billion for the Army Corps of Engineers to repair damages to federal projects resulting from major disasters, operations and expenses, and other projects to prepare for floods, hurricanes, and other natural disasters. During the 111 th Congress, P.L. 111-212 , the Disaster Relief and Summer Jobs Act of 2010, provided $5.5 billion for disaster relief. The bill included $5.1 billion for the DRF. During consideration, the underlying bill ( H.R. 4899 ) became a vehicle for additional non-disaster funding, including $33 billion for the Department of Defense, and funding for court case relief for veterans, Native Americans, and minority farmers. During the 110 th Congress, President George W. Bush signed into law four measures ( P.L. 110-28 , P.L. 110-116 , P.L. 110-252 , and P.L. 110-329 ) that provided roughly $44.0 billion in supplemental appropriations for disaster relief and recovery (most of it for the DRF). P.L. 110-28 , signed on May 25, 2007, included an appropriation of $7.7 billion for disaster assistance, $6.9 billion of which was classified for Hurricane Katrina recovery. P.L. 110-116 , signed into law on November 13, 2007, provided a total of $6.4 billion for continued recovery efforts related to Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma, and for other declared major disasters or emergencies. Specifically, $500 million of these funds were included for firefighting expenses related to the 2007 California wildfires. P.L. 110-252 , signed into law June 30, 2008, provided $8.4 billion in disaster assistance, most of which was directed at continuing recovery needs resulting from the 2005 hurricane season. P.L. 110-329 , signed into law on September 30, 2008, included an appropriation for emergency and disaster relief of $21.6 billion This amount included funds for both continued disaster relief from the 2005 hurricane season as well as funds for a string of disasters that occurred in 2008, including Hurricanes Gustav and Ike, wildfires in California, and the Midwest floods. One of the largest funding components in P.L. 110-329 was designated for the Department of Housing and Urban Development's (HUD's) Community Development Fund, which received $6.5 billion specifically for disaster relief, long-term recovery, and economic revitalization for areas affected by the 2008 disasters. Other funding in the law included $910 million for wildfire suppression, and a $100 million direct appropriation to the American Red Cross for reimbursement of disaster relief and recovery expenditures associated with emergencies and disasters that took place in 2008. There have been some questions raised in Congress concerning the rising costs of, and continued reliance on, supplemental appropriations for disaster assistance. Some have argued that the amount of funding provided to states and localities for emergency and disaster assistance should be curtailed primarily given concerns about the federal deficit and debt. As concern over the size of federal budget deficit and national debt has grown, so has the amount of congressional attention to both the amount of funding the federal government provides to states and localities for disaster assistance and the processes the federal government uses to provide that assistance. Although funds have been reallocated at times from one account to another to provide for disaster-related assistance, disaster relief funding has historically not been fully offset. Some have argued that supplemental funding is used too often to meet disaster needs. Table 3 indicates the number and amount of supplemental appropriations for disaster assistance from FY2000 to FY2013. In six of those years, Congress passed more than one supplemental appropriation (in addition to regular appropriations) to meet disaster needs. The allowable adjustment provision in the BCA may have reduced the need for supplemental appropriations for disaster assistance by encouraging larger annual appropriations for the DRF. In the past, the Administration's budget request for the DRF was based, in part, on a five-year rolling average of disaster spending. It appears that t he 10-year rolling average used to calculate the allowable adjustment is now being used to formulate the Administration's budget request for the DRF. The 10-year calculation may help generate a more accurate (and higher) estimate for disaster costs than the previous budgeting model. As shown in Table 3 , there were no supplemental appropriations for disaster assistance in FY2011; one was provided in FY2012 and one in FY2013. This may be an indication that fewer supplemental appropriations are needed. However, because the BCA was passed fairly recently, it may be too early to determine whether and to what extent the BCA has influenced the need for supplemental appropriations. Arguments against relying on supplemental appropriations for disaster assistance include supplemental appropriations for disasters often are designated as an emergency expenditure, which under congressional budgetary procedures can exceed discretionary spending limits--creating an opportunity for lawmakers to circumvent budgetary enforcement mechanisms by purposefully underfunding disaster assistance through annual appropriations to make room for other spending; supplemental appropriations for disasters often move through Congress on an expedited basis, limiting the amount of time available to assess actual disaster needs and scrutinize spending to ensure that the spending is appropriately targeted and that adequate safeguards are in place to address the potential for waste, fraud, and abuse. In addition, supplemental appropriations for disasters may result in unnecessarily high funding levels, as early damage estimates may overstate actual needs; and supplemental appropriations for disasters provide a vehicle for spending or other provisions in the legislation unrelated to the incident that may not pass on their own if they were not attached to disaster legislation. Conversely, the unrelated provision may make the appropriation legislation contentious, thus slowing down the delivery of federal disaster assistance. Arguments in favor of the use of supplemental disaster assistance include the timing and severity of disasters cannot be anticipated and appropriating a relatively large sum of funds through annual appropriations may require Congress to reduce funding for other programs to pay for an unknown, and possibly non-existent, future event; the President is authorized to unilaterally determine when federal assistance is made available after a major disaster incident. Congress retains authority to control federal spending by voting on supplemental appropriations. In essence, the use of supplemental appropriations for disasters enables Congress to express its own preferences in disaster assistance; large DRF balances may be subject to a transfer or rescission to meet other needs, which may have negative consequences if a large disaster were to take place after the funds have been withdrawn. For example, if a large scale disaster were to happen after the transfer, another transfer or supplemental appropriation might be needed to address disaster needs; and supplemental appropriations for disasters can be sized according to the needs of the actual incident. Those who oppose relying on supplemental appropriations to fund disaster assistance often suggest the following policy alternatives to reduce the need for supplemental appropriations for disaster assistance. Some have proposed that supplemental funding should be "offset." Appropriations legislation that is fully offset has no overall net cost in budget authority or outlays. Offsets can be achieved by cutting budget authority from one account and providing it to another account, or transferring budget authority from other programs. In recent years, the debate over the use of offsets for disaster relief or assistance has intensified due to the growing size of the federal budget deficit and national debt. There have been legislative attempts to offset the costs of disaster assistance. For example, Title VI of the House-reported version of H.R. 2017 , the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2012, would have provided $1 billion of additional funding to the DRF by transferring resources from the Department of Energy. The provision reads as follows: Sec. 601. Effective on the date of the enactment of this Act, of the unobligated balances remaining available to the Department of Energy pursuant to section 129 of the Continuing Appropriations Resolution, 2009 (division A of P.L. 110-329 ), $500,000,000 is rescinded and $1,000,000,000 is hereby transferred to and merged with 'Department of Homeland Security--Federal Emergency Management Agency--Disaster Relief': Provided, That the amount transferred by this section is designated as an emergency pursuant to section 3(c)(1) of H.Res. 5 (112 th Congress). Another example is the proposed amendment, H.Amdt. 4 , to the Disaster Relief Appropriations Act, 2013 in the 113 th Congress which would have provided an offset of the $17 billion in emergency funding to address the immediate needs for victims and communities affected by Hurricane Sandy. The offset would have been achieved by an across-the-board rescission of 1.63% to all discretionary appropriations for FY2013. The amendment was not adopted. Proponents of offsets argue that they provide a mechanism to control spending and offset the costs of disaster assistance. Opponents argue that offsets politicize disaster assistance because the program selected for the offset may have been selected because it is politically unpopular rather than being based on a sound policy basis. They also argue that the debate over the use of offsets may unnecessarily slow the delivery of needed assistance. One potential argument against the sole reliance on offsets to limit federal spending on disaster assistance is that it fails to address the significant amount of funding that would be needed to fully offset a very large-scale disaster. The Gulf Coast hurricanes of 2005 and 2008 and Hurricane Sandy cost the federal government $120 billion and $50.3 billion respectively. As such, critics might argue that the sheer size of the offset might have a very negative impact on other parts of the federal budget. The Stafford Act authorizes the President to issue major disaster declarations that provide states and localities with a range of federal assistance in response to natural and man-made incidents. Under a major disaster declaration, state, local, and tribal governments and certain nonprofit organizations are eligible (if so designated) for assistance for the repair or restoration of public infrastructure, such as roads and buildings. A major disaster declaration may also include additional programs beyond temporary housing such as disaster unemployment assistance and crisis counseling, and other recovery programs, such as community disaster loans . There is a direct relationship between the number of major disasters declared and federal spending for disaster assistance--an increase in declarations typically leads to an increase in federal expendi tures for disaster assistance. The number of m ajor disaster declarations has increased steadily since they were first declared in 1953. Initially, there was an average of 13 major disaster declarations per year from 1953 to 1959. T his average has steadily increased over time . A n average of 54 major disaster declarations was issued from 1990 to 2013 (see Figure 2 ) . Ninety-nine incidents were declared major disasters in 2011 alone. Although there was a decrease in the number of declared major disasters in 2012, that year may be considered an outlier given the number of declared disasters in 2010, 2011, and 2013. Critics may argue that too many of these major disaster declarations were for marginal incidents. The term "marginal incidents" refers to incidents that could arguably be handled by the state without federal aid. They argue that the amount of funding the federal government provides for disaster assistance could be reduced by reforming the declaration process to limit the number of declarations; adjusting the federal share for assistance; converting some, or all federal disaster assistance into a loan program; or shifting some of the responsibility for paying for recovery to the state and/or the private sector. Others argue that providing relief to disaster victims is an essential role of the federal government. In their view, while the concern over costs is understandable given the potential impact of disaster assistance on the national budget, the number of declarations being issued each year and their associated costs are justified given the immediate and long-term needs created by incidents. They argue that providing assistance to disaster-stricken areas is needed to help a state and region's economy recover from an incident that it otherwise may not be able to recover from on its own. In addition, they argue that the costs of disasters should be expected given changes in severe weather patterns, as well as increases in population and development. The following section discusses some potential changes to the Stafford Act that have been proposed to limit the number of declarations issued each year, and thus reduce federal expenditures on disaster assistance. Section 320 of the Stafford Act restricts the use of an arithmetic or sliding scale to determine when federal assistance can be provided. Repealing Section 320 would allow formulas that establish certain thresholds that states would have to meet to qualify for assistance. This might make declarations less discretionary and more predictable. Section 404 of the Stafford Act authorizes the President to contribute up to 15% of the cost of an incident toward mitigation measures that reduce the risk of future damage, loss of life, and suffering. Section 404 could be amended to make mitigation assistance contingent on state codes being in place prior to an event. For example, states that have met certain mitigation standards could remain eligible for the 75% federal cost-share for hazard mitigation grants. States that do not meet the standards would be eligible for a smaller share, such as 50% federal cost-share. The amendment may incentivize mitigation work on behalf of the state and possibly help reduce damages to the extent that a request for assistance is not needed, or the cost of the federal share may be lessened. The amendment could be set to take effect over a specified time, giving states time to adjust to the change. Other amendments to the Stafford Act could either limit the number of declarations being issued, or the amount of assistance provided to the state by the federal government. The Stafford Act could be amended so that federal assistance would only be available for states with corollary programs (such as Public Assistance, Individual Assistance, and housing assistance). Establishing these programs at the state level may increase state capacity to handle some incidents without federal assistance. The amendment could be designed to take effect over a specified time, giving states time to adjust to the change. The Stafford Act could be amended to discontinue all assistance for snow removal unless directed by Congress. The amendment could be designed to take effect over a specified time to provide states and localities an opportunity to adjust to the change over a specified time. Under the Stafford Act, the federal share for assistance paid out of the DRF is typically 75% and state and local governments provide 25% of disaster costs. Some contend that federal disaster expenditures could be reduced by shifting more of the costs to the state and local levels by increasing the state share of 25% to a higher percentage. Another option would be to make the cost-share arrangement not subject to administrative adjustment. Instead, the cost-share could only be adjusted upward through congressional action. Adjusting the federal cost-share could reduce federal disaster costs. Others argue that doing so would be burdensome to states and localities. For example, the Gulf Coast states would have had to pay over $50 billion if a 50% matching requirement were in place for hurricane damages in 2005 and 2008. As mentioned previously, federal assistance provided for emergency declarations could be provided through loans. For example, some or all of the assistance provided to the state after a major disaster could be converted to low-interest or no-interest loans through FEMA's Community Disaster Loan (CDL) program. Loans for disaster recovery could also be incentivized. For instance, states that undertook certain pre-established preparedness and/or mitigation measures could qualify for a larger federal share or a lower interest rate. Since the 1950s, the level of financial assistance given to states for disaster relief by the federal government has steadily increased. In light of stated concern with the federal deficit and debt, the increased federal involvement in disaster relief has raised policymaking questions concerning whether the federal government is providing too much assistance to states and localities, or not enough. To some, the state's fiscal capability to respond to an incident is not being adequately factored or tied into federal disaster assistance. Another concern is whether disaster assistance should be subject to certain thresholds and maximums. For example, federal law could be changed to require an emergency or major disaster costs to reach a certain level before federal funding is made available. Also, the current system uses a per capita amount in estimated eligible disaster costs to determine that level when federal disaster assistance can be provided. As another example, the total amount of federal relief for an event could be capped at a certain amount. After this level has been reached, the state would then be responsible to pay for the rest of recovery. Others oppose all of these policy options. Finally, some have questioned whether federal assistance to states and localities unintentionally creates a disincentive for states and localities to prepare for emergencies and major disasters. They argue that federal funding for disaster assistance has become entrenched to the point that it has contributed to what is referred to as a "moral hazard," where it is in the interest of states and localities to underfund mitigation measures. For example, it has been argued that some states do not properly fund mitigation measures because there is a presumption that federal funding is virtually guaranteed should an incident occur. Others claim the function of the federal government is to help states and localities in their time of crisis. Withholding or limiting the amount of funding a state could receive for an incident might not only result in economic hardships for that region and state, but could also have negative consequences for the national economy.

The federal government has provided a significant amount of money through supplemental appropriations to state, local, and tribal governments to help them repair, rebuild, and recover from catastrophic incidents. For example, Congress provided roughly $120 billion for the 2005 and 2008 Gulf Coast hurricane seasons and $50 billion for Hurricane Sandy recovery. Congressional interest in disaster assistance has always been high given the associated costs. Additional issues associated with disaster assistance have been contentious. These issues include increasing disagreements over the appropriate role of the federal government in providing assistance including whether some of the federal burden for disaster assistance should be shifted to states and localities, the appropriate use of supplemental appropriations to pay for disaster relief, reducing federal costs by eliminating unrelated spending in disaster funding bills, creating alternative funding methods such as a rainy-day fund or a contingency fund, the use of offsets for disaster assistance, altering policies that would limit the number of declarations issued each year, and converting some or all disaster assistance to disaster loans. This report provides summary information on supplemental appropriations legislation enacted since FY2000 after significant large-scale disasters. It includes funds appropriated to various departments and agencies. The funds cited in this report were provided by Congress in response to major disasters declared under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act and include appropriations and loan authority for disaster relief, repair of federal facilities, and hazard mitigation activities directed at reducing the impact of future disasters. Disaster assistance provided for agricultural disasters, counterterrorism, law enforcement, and national security appropriations are generally authorized by an authority separate from the Stafford Act and are not included in this report. Unless otherwise noted, this report does not take into account rescissions or transfers after Congress appropriated the funds for disaster assistance. As demonstrated in Table 2, since FY2000, Congress has appropriated roughly $265 billion to various federal agencies to help states and localities recover from various large-scale disasters, repair federal facilities, and pay for hazard mitigation projects. In addition to the summary information on supplemental appropriations, this report also examines the influence the Budget Control Act has on disaster assistance. Additionally, this report frames the debate policymakers have had over the years concerning supplemental disaster assistance. Some argue that the current method of relying primarily on supplemental appropriations to fund disaster response and recovery to large scale events is functioning well and should not be changed. Others argue that the federal government should increase the amount of funding provided to states, tribal governments, and localities for major disasters. Still others argue that policy options that reduce federal costs for major disasters or reduce the number of supplemental appropriations needed (or both) should be pursued. This report concludes with policy questions that may help frame future discussions concerning supplemental funding for disaster assistance. This report will be updated as events warrant.

Reporters have covered Congress since its earliest sessions. Press coverage of Congress and other government institutions helps inform citizens about public policy, the legislative process, and representation. It is also thought to improve government accountability. As the number of reporters and news outlets covering Congress increased during the 1800s, the House and Senate established formal press galleries, resources, and administrative rules to help manage the Capitol press corps while preserving its access and independence. The first congressional reporters mainly transcribed the floor debates and provided more detailed accounts of congressional proceedings than what was available in the official records maintained in the House Journal and the Senate Journal . This information, sometimes provided by Members of Congress themselves, would be sent as correspondence to newspaper publishers outside the capital area. Known correspondents were often permitted on the chamber floors so that they could better hear the proceedings, but correspondents were sometimes restricted to the public galleries. By the middle of the 1800s, each chamber had established its own designated reporters' gallery space. In 1877, the House and Senate decided to create a committee of correspondents to oversee press gallery membership and administration. The Official C ongressional Directory first published a list of 86 correspondents entitled to admission to the reporters' galleries in 1880 and published press gallery rules in 1888. Separate galleries and correspondents' committees now exist for the daily printed press, periodical press, radio and television press, and press photographers. Correspondents' committees, often upon request of gallery members, may propose changes to their gallery rules, subject to the approval of the Speaker of the House and the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration. Today, the congressional press galleries provide services both for journalists and for Members of Congress. For the media format and chamber it represents, each press gallery is typically responsible for credentialing journalists, maintaining Capitol workspace for correspondents, and coordinating coverage for news conferences, hearings, and other congressional events. The press galleries also distribute press releases; provide the press with information on floor proceedings, upcoming rules, amendments, and legislation; provide information on committee hearings, witness testimony, and mark-ups; and deliver messages or facilitate Member communications with journalists. In addition to these regular responsibilities, the House and Senate press galleries take on additional roles during presidential elections, overseeing arrangements and credentialing for daily press at the national political conventions and presidential inaugurations. The degree of autonomy granted to each press gallery and correspondents' committee results from responsibilities bestowed upon them by the Speaker of the House and the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration. Many rules and practices are similar across the different galleries and correspondents' committees. Additional House and Senate chamber rules that apply generally to photography, use of electronic equipment, and audio and video recording or broadcasting in the Capitol may also affect how members of the press cover Congress. Due to the similarities across galleries, this report first presents the general rules and authorities that affect the press galleries and media coverage of Congress, followed by the credentialing requirements that the galleries typically share. Key distinctions between the daily press galleries, periodical press galleries, radio and television galleries, and press photographers' gallery are then discussed. To highlight some of the changes in gallery composition over time, data are provided comparing the number of gallery members and news outlets represented in 10-year intervals between the 94 th Congress (1975-1976) and the 114 th Congress (2015-2016). The report concludes with a brief discussion of some of the considerations that commonly underlie the galleries' practices and some current developments in news production and distribution that may affect the congressional press galleries. The House and Senate press galleries have historically operated under a unified set of governing rules, approved by the Speaker of the House and the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration. The rules established for each press gallery type, and the names of gallery members, are published in the Official Congressional Directory . Because the galleries are creations of each chamber, separate House and Senate authorities are responsible for their own galleries, and each chamber hires its own administrative gallery staff. In practice, however, the galleries may often coordinate with one another on a number of matters. The sections below provide more details on press gallery rules and authorities for the House and for the Senate. A third section addresses the shared delegation of responsibilities from the chambers to the correspondents' committees, which began in 1877. Media access to the House of Representatives is subject to the discretion and control of the Speaker of the House. This tradition was first established by a House resolution in 1838 enabling the Speaker to admit press representatives to the floor. When the new House chamber was completed in 1857, a designated press space was created in the gallery above the Speaker's chair, and the rules of the House were amended to allow the Speaker to grant press gallery access. The press gallery was outfitted by the superintendent of the House with "desks and seats, and conveniences for taking notes," and a room was also reserved for the use of telegraph companies and reporters. In 1939, language was added to the House rules designating a portion of the gallery for radio, wireless, and similar correspondents, who were subject to rules similar to those that applied to print reporters. Today, the Speaker's role in regulating gallery admission and floor access for daily print and periodical journalists is found in Rule VI, clause 2, of the Rules of the House of Representatives . This clause also states that the Standing Committee of Correspondents will supervise the daily press gallery and designate its employees, and that the Executive Committee of Correspondents for the Periodical Press Gallery will perform those same functions for the periodical gallery. The Speaker's role in regulating gallery admission and any floor access for radio and television journalists is found in Rule VI, clause 3, which also delegates radio/TV gallery supervision and designation of its employees to the Executive Committee of Radio and Television Correspondents' Galleries. The professional staff who operate the House press galleries report to the Chief Administrative Officer and Committee on House Administration. Records indicate that in 1838, the Senate adopted rules granting floor privileges to local newspaper reporters, and in 1839, the Senate Committee on the Contingent Fund recommended that gallery seats be reserved for reporters. Initially, the vice president oversaw the Senate press gallery. On March 12, 1873, the Senate agreed to a resolution that gave the Rules Committee jurisdiction over the Senate press gallery and authorized that the committee provide no more than one gallery seat to each newspaper. Additionally, a seat on the floor could be reserved for Associated Press reporters. In 1939, the Senate amended its existing rules to include reporters transmitting news via radio, wire, wireless, and similar media. Under the current Standing Rules of the Senate , Rule XXV, paragraph 1(n)(1), provides the Committee on Rules and Administration with the general authority to make rules and regulations for the Senate floor and galleries. Further directives providing the Committee on Rules and Administration with authority to make rules and regulations for the reporters' galleries and related press facilities on the Senate side of the Capitol are found in Rule XXXIII, paragraph 2. Rule VI of the Rules for Regulation of the Senate Wing provides additional details on admission to and administration of each of the Senate press galleries, and notes that the Sergeant at Arms is responsible for maintaining order in the galleries. The professional staff who operate the galleries report to the Senate Sergeant at Arms and the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration. Since 1877, the Speaker of the House and the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration have provided for the correspondents' committees to make many of the decisions related to the operation of the galleries. One correspondents' committee exists per gallery type, which helps ensure that gallery practices are consistent between the chambers, even as the House and Senate maintain separate gallery facilities. Four correspondents' committees exist today: one for the House and Senate daily press galleries; one for the House and Senate periodical press galleries; one for the House and Senate radio/TV galleries; and one for the Senate press photographers' gallery. A main responsibility of each correspondents' committee is determining which journalists receive congressional press credentials. Press credentials may be offered on a temporary or permanent basis, and they entitle journalists admission to a particular gallery type in both the House and the Senate, along with access to the resources provided by the gallery's office. Changes to press gallery rules or credentialing requirements may be suggested by the correspondents' committees on behalf of gallery members, but are subject to the approval of the Speaker of the House and the Committee on Rules and Administration. Correspondents' committee members must be members in good standing of the gallery they oversee. They are selected by fellow gallery members in accordance with the rules set by that gallery. This system is thought to help preserve the independence of the press corps by removing it from direct congressional influence. It is also thought to help maintain journalistic integrity in the congressional press corps, as the rules agreed upon by gallery members reflect commonly held professional norms and standards of the news industry. As gallery members themselves, correspondents' committee members must remain primarily employed as journalists. The day-to-day management of the gallery facilities is instead tasked to professional, nonpartisan staff members hired by the House and Senate to operate the press facilities for each media type. Press gallery staff for each chamber report to the Chief Administrative Officer and the Committee on House Administration or the Senate Sergeant at Arms and the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration. In addition to the House and Senate rules that directly address the operation of the press galleries, other provisions in each chamber's rules affect media coverage of Congress. For more information on these topics, see CRS Report R44665, Video Broadcasting of Congressional Proceedings , by Sarah J. Eckman. Many of these provisions address photography or the broadcasting or recording of audio and video. The press gallery rules regulate these activities for credentialed correspondents, yet handheld electronic devices, like smartphones, have made it technologically possible for individuals who are not reporters to capture and transmit visual and/or audio materials. Some of these rules prohibit certain activities to preserve decorum in the chamber, like photographing or broadcasting proceedings, or prohibit use of particular electronic devices on which these activities might occur. In the House and Senate galleries, for example, use of cameras and electronic devices is generally prohibited. These provisions apply to any individual, including accredited journalists. The widespread ability to report news from smartphones and other handheld Internet-connected devices may be a relevant consideration for broader chamber rules and policies like these regarding photography, broadcasting, or use of electronic devices. Other rules enable the House, the Senate, and committees within each chamber to broadcast their own proceedings. Live audio and video feeds and past recordings of floor proceedings have been produced by the House since 1977, and by the Senate since 1986. Employees of the House Recording Studio and the Senate Recording Studio are responsible for operating the recording equipment for each chamber. Accredited radio/TV correspondents may request access to these audio or video feeds to rebroadcast, as long as the footage is used for news or public affairs programs, not for commercial or political purposes. The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 enabled the House and Senate to allow photographic, radio, and television coverage of proceedings, subject to additional rules established by each committee. Today, the House and Senate also provide live and archived video of floor proceedings on their websites, enabling anyone with an Internet connection to access these official video feeds. Beginning in 2010, the House made floor videos available under the direction of the Clerk of the House. The Senate began providing floor videos on its website in January 2012 under the direction of the Sergeant at Arms. Press credentialing requirements are published in each edition of the Official C ongressional Directory , and are often available on the press gallery websites. Press credentials admit individual journalists to the congressional press galleries and allow journalists access to the resources provided for their medium, like workspace in the Capitol. The Official C ongressional Directory also lists the names of the individuals who hold current permanent credentials for each gallery and the news organizations represented. Each correspondents' committee administers its own credentialing requirements at the start of every Congress, subject to the approval of the Speaker of the House and the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration. Journalists seeking press credentials must submit a new application at the start of every Congress to continue their gallery membership. Temporary credentials may be available to journalists who do not meet all of the gallery's regular requirements. These requirements are typically similar across the galleries and have been consistent over time. Generally, to receive a press credential from a congressional gallery, an individual must be a correspondent for that medium, in good standing at a reputable employing organization; must be primarily employed as a journalist; cannot pursue any claim before Congress or another department of government; cannot be employed by the U.S. government or a foreign government; and cannot engage in direct or indirect lobbying activity. Every four years, each correspondents' committee is also responsible for providing press credentials for the presidential nominating conventions and inauguration. Beyond these basic parameters, each gallery may set additional credentialing requirements. The original House and Senate press galleries were established in the 1800s for members of the daily printed press, which today includes newspapers, wire services, and electronic news organizations. Correspondents seeking daily press credentials must work for a publication that either (1) publishes daily and holds general publication periodicals mailing privileges from the U.S. Postal Service; or (2) has been in publication continuously for 18 months and has as its principal business "the daily dissemination of original news and opinion of interest to a broad segment of the public." The daily press galleries are overseen by the Standing Committee of Correspondents. The Standing Committee of Correspondents is comprised of members of the daily press gallery who are elected to two-year terms. Day-to-day operations of the daily press galleries are managed by professional staff members from each chamber. The House press gallery offices are located in H-315 - H-319 and employ four professional staff. The Senate press gallery offices are located in S-316 and employ seven professional staff. Although the Standing Committee of Correspondents is responsible for accreditation decisions, the Senate press gallery office serves as a liaison between the committee and the journalists, receiving applications, supporting materials, or fees submitted by journalists. In addition to other credentialing requirements, journalists in the daily press galleries must reside in the Washington, DC, area. The periodical press galleries of the House and Senate include correspondents working for magazines, newsletters, and non-daily newspapers or online publications. These periodicals must "regularly publish a substantial volume of news material of either general, economic, industrial, technical, cultural, or trade character" and "require Washington coverage on a regular basis." The periodical press galleries are overseen by the Executive Committee of Correspondents, which is comprised of seven periodical press correspondents. The Executive Committee of Correspondents is elected by periodical press gallery members every two years, coinciding with the start of a new Congress. Credentialing responsibilities rotate between the administrative staff of the House and Senate periodical galleries every four years. The House periodical press gallery offices are located in H-304 and employ four professional staff. The Senate periodical press gallery offices are located in S-320 and employ three professional staff. The radio and television galleries provide credentials for members of broadcast media outlets. The Senate radio/TV gallery coordinates the application process, but credentialing decisions are made by the Executive Committee of the Radio and Television Correspondents' Galleries. The Executive Committee is comprised of seven members. Electronic recording or broadcasting equipment is generally prohibited in the chamber galleries, but radio/TV gallery credentials enable journalists to rebroadcast the floor audio and video footage produced by the House and the Senate. The radio/TV galleries also maintain broadcast and recording studio spaces, which can be used by any correspondent with congressional credentials. In addition to the services provided to journalists, the radio/TV galleries also provide assistance to Members of Congress. The radio/TV galleries manage reservations from Members and congressional staff seeking to hold press conferences in various locations around the Capitol Complex. The radio/TV galleries can also assist Members with media logistics and security for these events. The House radio and television gallery is located in H-320 and employs seven professional staff. The House radio/TV gallery manages reservation requests for Members' press conferences at the "House Triangle," and provides information about other press conference locations suitable for radio or television coverage. Upon the invitation of an accredited journalist, and subject to other gallery rules, Members may host press conferences in the House radio/TV gallery's Capitol Visitor Center (CVC) studios. Any of the three House studios may be used by journalists seeking exclusive interviews with Members, subject to gallery rules. Other locations throughout the Capitol may be used by Members for broadcast media events, but are not managed by the House radio and television gallery. Committee rooms, for example, may be available by contacting the committee of jurisdiction; events in HC rooms on the House-side of the Capitol may be available by contacting the Speaker's Office. Gallery staff can assist Members with logistics for events in these locations. The Senate radio and television gallery is located in S-325 and employs six professional staff. The Senate radio/TV gallery manages reservation requests for Senators' press conferences outside the Capitol building at the "Senate Swamp," and provides information about other press conference locations suitable for radio or television coverage. Upon the invitation of an accredited journalist, and subject to other gallery rules, Senators may host press conferences in the Senate radio/TV gallery's Capitol Visitor Center (CVC) studio. The Senate studio may also be used by journalists seeking exclusive interviews with Senators. Senators may use other locations in the Capitol for broadcast media events that are not managed by the Senate radio and television gallery. Committee rooms, for example, may be available by contacting the relevant committee. Rooms in the CVC, including SVC-200/201 may be available from the Committee on Rules and Administration; S-211 may be available from the Secretary of the Senate; and S-207 may be available from the Sergeant-at-Arms. Gallery staff can assist Members with logistics for events in these locations. The Press Photographers' Gallery provides credentials for news photographers and assists in facilitating photographic coverage of the House and the Senate. The photo gallery offices are located on the Senate side of the Capitol, in S-317, and employ three professional staff. There is no separate House photo gallery facility. The press photographers' photo studio is located in 151 Dirksen. Requirements for press photography credentials are found in Senate Rule XXXIII. The Standing Committee of Press Photographers is a six-member board that is responsible for the administration of the photographers' gallery. Members of the photo gallery elect standing committee members each year, no later than March 31. The Press Photographers' Gallery rules also state that the standing committee must include one member from Associated Press Photos; Reuters News Pictures or AFP Photos; a magazine; a local newspaper; and an agency or freelance photographer. No organization may have more than one representative on the standing committee at any time. The news media environment has changed in a number of ways over the last several decades, and some of these changes are reflected by the composition of the congressional press galleries. Data regarding press gallery membership was collected from the Official Co ngressional Directory for 10-year intervals representing Congresses between 1975 and 2015. The changes in gallery membership and the current composition of the galleries may be relevant to consideration of the rules governing the press galleries or the resources allocated across different galleries. Table 1 provides the number of credentialed congressional correspondents in selected years, subdivided by gallery type. Credentials provide correspondents with access to the galleries and associated offices, but at any one time, it is unlikely that all eligible correspondents would be working from the Capitol. Between the 94 th and the 114 th Congresses, the overall number of accredited congressional journalists more than doubled, growing from 2,588 credentialed correspondents in 1975 to 6,016 in 2015. These findings suggest that, consistent with other measures to increase congressional transparency since the 1970s, more journalists have access to Congress today than in the past. Table 2 provides the number of credentialed news outlets in selected years, subdivided by gallery type. Correspondents may be credentialed as representatives of multiple news outlets, and although the number of accredited correspondents has increased, the number of media outlets they represent has diminished by more than half, decreasing from 1,272 in 1975 to 581 in 2015. This may reflect broader trends in the news industry, including the consolidation of smaller media outlets into larger entities. Figure 1 and Figure 2 illustrate how the proportion of journalists and outlets holding credentials from the daily press, periodical press, radio/TV, and press photographers galleries compare between the 94 th Congress (1975-1976) and the 114 th Congress (2015-2016). The number of accredited correspondents increased for all the press galleries during this time period, but the number of radio/TV correspondents grew most substantially, as shown in Figure 1 . In the 114 th Congress, a majority of the congressional correspondents (58%) held radio/TV credentials, whereas only 28% of correspondents held radio/TV credentials in the 94 th Congress. This change likely reflects the growth of video-based cable and satellite news that occurred during the same time period. The same dynamic may also be reflected in the larger proportion of credentialed radio/TV news outlets, relative to outlets in other gallery types, as shown in Figure 2 . The basic operating structure of the House and Senate press galleries has remained relatively unchanged over the years. This system is comprised of independent correspondents' committees, which establish gallery rules and credentialing requirements; professional nonpartisan administrative staff who manage day-to-day gallery operations; and the House Speaker and Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, which retain authority over the galleries' operations. This division of responsibilities, along with the longstanding gallery rules, has generally addressed potential concerns regarding conflicts of interest or infringements on press freedom. Occasionally, the congressional press galleries have adapted to significant changes in the news media environment; one key example was the establishment of the radio and television galleries in 1939. Although the Speaker of the House and the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration must formally approve of gallery rules and are responsible for oversight, the galleries themselves run fairly autonomously. Nonpartisan, professional personnel operate the galleries on a daily basis, and the correspondents' committees are responsible for many decisions, including accreditation of journalists. The independence of the correspondents' committees from Congress is an important feature of how the press galleries operate, helping to maintain a boundary between the two. Prior to the 1877 establishment of the first correspondents' committee, observers were concerned that, at times, Members seemed too close to the press, and at other times, were somewhat antagonistic to the press. Some observers continue to voice similar concerns, but generally, this separation is thought to improve media accountability and ensure that press access to Congress is not contingent on favorable coverage. Independence of correspondents' committees is also thought to relieve concerns about government infringements on the freedom of the press, since the press--and not any agent of the House or Senate--is largely responsible for formulating and enforcing its own rules. The system of press credentialing requirements and associated gallery rules can be viewed as ways to establish and maintain certain journalistic standards for congressional reporters. Many of the current rules can be traced back to the first rules created in the late 1800s. Press credentialing requirements originated, in part, as a way to ensure legitimate news reporters had access to Members of Congress while preventing lobbyists--who sometimes posed as reporters--from gaining similar access to advance their own agendas. In these early years, congressional staff sometimes also served as newspaper correspondents, leading to concerns about conflicts of interest and occasional speculation that staff might be responsible for the publication of unreleased information. The rules of the galleries continue to prohibit accredited journalists from participating in lobbying, paid advocacy, or advertising activity on behalf of any individual, corporation, organization, political party, or federal government agency. Credentialed correspondents must also be primarily employed as journalists, as concerns have been raised that additional sources of income may affect correspondents' impartiality. Occasional questions have also been raised about whether the disclosure requirements are sufficient and achieve their intended aims, or if enforcement of the rules by independent correspondents' committees introduces the risk that committee members may, at times, be somewhat permissive regarding their peers' activities. In addition to these individual-level restrictions, the media outlets that employ congressional correspondents must be editorially independent of any entity that lobbies the federal government. By excluding individuals and organizations that have a clear connection to policy advocacy, these rules help assure Members of Congress that congressional correspondents are primarily interested in reporting the news and are not seeking access in the interest of promoting their own policy objectives. Changes in how news is produced and distributed have sometimes led the House, Senate, and correspondents' committees to revisit the existing rules, facilities, and administration related to the congressional press. Once radio became a popular news format, for example, the House and Senate rules were amended to include radio reporters, and the chambers created the radio and television galleries. Since the addition of the radio/TV galleries, the overall structure of the congressional press galleries has remained fairly unchanged. Within that structure, new facilities for the existing galleries became available in 2008 upon the completion of the Capitol Visitor Center (CVC). Those who study the news industry have observed several trends in recent decades that may affect the composition of congressional press gallery membership and may be relevant to consideration of congressional rules or resources related to the galleries. Television, for example, has become the predominant news source for most Americans and many prefer to watch cable networks, which can include more editorializing than the broadcast networks. If it appears that journalists representing these outlets are advocating for particular interests, this might contradict the spirit of the longstanding lobbying and advocacy prohibitions in the press gallery rules. Media consolidation trends sometimes raise similar concerns, if a large corporation owns news outlets along with other holdings that may be affected by federal policies or regulations. Internet-based news represents another important development in news production and consumption that may receive additional consideration. Currently, Internet-based journalists apply to the gallery that best matches how they report the news and must meet similar employment and parent publication rules as traditional media journalists. Because websites can provide text, photographs, audio, video, or a combination of these formats, it may be more difficult to draw distinctions between media types for these outlets. Publication can also occur immediately and may obscure differences between daily and periodical publications. The low cost to self-publish on the Internet could also present challenges to the gallery requirements that journalists must be primarily employed by a news outlet. Non-journalists may also be able to effectively report news from the Capitol with handheld Internet-connected devices, like smartphones, and the ubiquity of social media publishing and broadcasting applications. These considerations may be relevant for the congressional press galleries, or for broader chamber rules and policies regarding photography, broadcasting, or use of electronic devices. Since the 1800s, a number of changes have occurred in how news is produced and distributed. The basic structure of the congressional press galleries, however, has remained fairly consistent. Credentialing requirements originated as a way to facilitate professional news reporting from Congress, preventing congressional staff from doubling as reporters and lobbyists from posing as reporters to gain access. Today, the accreditation process continues as a measure to provide access to Congress for credible journalists and news outlets. The system of having an independent correspondents' committee, comprised of gallery members, as the gatekeepers for congressional press credentials for that gallery, generally addresses potential concerns that Congress might infringe upon the rights of a free press or only allow for favorable news coverage. Although the Speaker of the House and the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration must approve any gallery rules, the substance of the rules often reflect measures initiated by the correspondents' committees and gallery members. Designated administrative staff in each gallery further help to insulate the press galleries from possible political pressure. The level of administrative resources granted to the galleries has increased since their creation, but the number of credentialed correspondents has also continued to grow, particularly in the radio/TV galleries. This may be relevant to the consideration of what resources are allocated to the galleries, or how these resources are distributed across each chamber's galleries. Previously clear distinctions between media types and publication schedules, which form the basis of the current gallery divisions, may become increasingly blurred, and this may be relevant as Congress considers how to accommodate multimedia journalists and Internet-based news.

The House and Senate press galleries provide services both for journalists and for Members of Congress. The news media helps Members communicate with the public, and enables the public to learn about policy initiatives, understand the legislative process, and observe elected officials representing their constituents. In the earliest Congresses, news reports commonly provided the most comprehensive record of congressional proceedings, even for Members themselves, because few official documents were kept. To accommodate the press, and in response to its growth through the mid-19th century, the House and Senate established formal press galleries in 1877, providing resources and organization for journalists reporting from the Capitol. This report provides information about the rules and authorities that affect media coverage of Congress, current practices among the press galleries, and selected data on gallery membership since the 94th Congress. It also provides a brief discussion of considerations that commonly underlie the galleries' practices or may affect gallery operations and congressional media rules. Although they are separate entities, the House and Senate press galleries have traditionally operated under the same governing rules, approved by the Speaker of the House and the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration. Additionally, chamber rules addressing use of electronic devices, photography, and recording or broadcasting of audio and video, also affect journalists covering Congress. Increasingly, non-journalists may also be able to effectively report news from the Capitol with handheld Internet-connected devices. Many elements of the original press gallery rules have persisted over time, and include provisions to preserve journalistic independence from encroachment by Congress. One key feature that helps preserve this independence is the delegation of many gallery responsibilities to correspondents' committees, comprised of gallery members, and to nonpartisan House and Senate staff. Requirements for press credentials, along with other gallery practices, also reflect a balance between ensuring congressional access for professional reporters while managing the limited space and resources available in the Capitol. Today, four correspondents' committees exist to oversee the seven congressional press galleries: one for the House and Senate daily press galleries; one for the House and Senate periodical press galleries; one for the House and Senate radio/television galleries; and one for the Senate press photographers' gallery. Credentials from a correspondents' committee provide journalists with access to the relevant House and Senate galleries and office resources. Each committee's credentialing requirements, along with other gallery rules and the names of accredited journalists and news outlets, are published in the Official Congressional Directory. The congressional press galleries also provide services for Members of Congress and staff. This can include distributing press releases or helping to facilitate Member communications with journalists. Members can use a number of sites around the Capitol Complex for press conferences or interviews. Some of these locations need to be reserved through a particular press gallery. Press gallery staff can also assist Members with media logistics and security for certain events. Although the press galleries have retained similar structures and practices over the years, changes in gallery membership and broader trends in how news is produced and distributed may be relevant as the House, Senate, and correspondents' committees consider the existing rules related to media coverage of Congress and the press galleries. Since the 94th Congress, for example, the number of credentialed correspondents has grown, particularly for the radio/television galleries, but the number of outlets they represent has decreased. Cable and satellite television and the Internet allow for smaller, more specialized news outlets to exist, yet many news outlets are consolidated under larger parent companies. Additionally, journalists making use of the multimedia capacities of Internet-based journalism may find it difficult to categorize themselves under the current gallery structure.

The Navy previously organized itself into aircraft carrier battle groups (CVBGs) and Amphibious Ready Groups (ARGs). An ARG typically included 3 amphibious ships that together were capable of embarking a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), which is a force of about 2,200 Marines, their ground-combat equipment, and an aircraft detachment. ARGs traditionally operated overseas in the company of CVBGs. Navy officials more recently decided that the CVBG/ARG combination offered insufficient flexibility for deploying significant naval capability in several locations around the world at the same time. They also decided that with the increasing capabilities of Navy ships, naval formations other than the large CVBG/ARG combination could now be sufficient to perform certain missions. As a result, the Navy has implemented a new Global Concept of Operations (CONOPS) that reorganized the Navy into a larger number of independently deployable, strike-capable formations. The most significant change was the conversion of ARGs into independently deployable formations called Expeditionary Strike Groups (ESGs). An ESG is an ARG that has been reinforced with 3 surface combatants, an attack submarine carrying Tomahawk cruise missiles, and perhaps a land-based P-3 Orion long-range maritime patrol aircraft. The Global CONOPS also created independently deployable surface strike groups (SSGs), each consisting of a few surface combatants (most or all Tomahawk-armed), and independent operations by 4 Trident SSGN submarines that have been converted to carry Tomahawks and special operations forces. CVBGs under the Global CONOPS plan were redesignated Carrier Strike Groups (CSGs). Implementing the Global CONOPS changed the Navy from a fleet with 11 independently deployable CVBG/ARG formations into one with 20 major independently deployable strike groups (11 CSGs and 9 ESGs) and additional independently deployable capabilities in the form of SSGs and Trident SSGNs. The Navy's traditional means of maintaining forward-deployed presence had been the standard six-month deployment. Although the six-month limit on deployment length and the predictability of the rotational deployment schedule were considered key to the Navy's ability to maintain its forward deployments while meeting its personnel recruiting and retention goals, Navy officials concluded that the deterrent value of forward-deployed naval forces might be enhanced by making naval forward deployments more flexible and less predictable. Navy officials also concluded that orienting Navy readiness toward maintaining standard six-month deployments resulted in a fleet that offered insufficient flexibility for surging large numbers of naval forces in a short time to respond to major regional contingencies. As a result, although six-month (and now seven-month) deployments will still take place, the Navy has put more flexibility into its deployment plans by deploying some CSGs and ESGs for less than or more than six or seven months, as operational needs dictate. The Navy has implemented an initiative called the Fleet Response Plan (FRP) that is intended to increase the Navy's ability to surge multiple formations in response to emergencies. Under the FRP, CSGs and ESGs that have just returned from deployments will be kept, for a time, on alert for potential short-notice redeployment if needed, and CSGs and ESGs that are approaching their next scheduled deployment will be maintained in a higher readiness status so that they, too, could be deployed on short notice, prior to their scheduled deployment dates. Implementing the FRP with 11 CSGs, the Navy says, permits the Navy to deploy up to 6 CSGs within 30 days, and an additional CSG within another 60 days after that. For this reason, the FRP is also referred to as "6+1." A February 2008 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report stated: The Navy has taken several positive steps toward implementing a sound management approach for FRP, but has not developed implementation goals, fully developed performance measures, or comprehensively assessed and identified the resources required to achieve FRP goals. GAO's prior work has shown that key elements of a sound management approach include: defining clear missions and desired outcomes, establishing implementation goals, measuring performance, and aligning activities with resources. The Navy has made progress in implementing FRP since GAO's prior reports. For example, it has established a goal of having three carrier strike groups deployed, three ready to deploy within 30 days of being ordered to do so, and one more within 90 days (referred to as 3+3+1). The Navy also has established a framework to set implementation goals for all forces, established some performance measures that are linked to the FRP phases, and begun efforts to identify needed resources. However, the Navy has not yet established a specific implementation goal for expeditionary strike groups and other forces. In addition, the Navy has not fully developed performance measures to enable it to assess whether carrier strike groups have achieved adequate readiness levels to deploy in support of the 3+3+1 goal. Moreover, the Navy has not fully identified the resources required to achieve FRP goals. Until the Navy's management approach fully incorporates the key elements, the Navy may not be able to measure how well FRP is achieving its goals or develop budget requests based on the resources needed to achieve expected readiness levels. The Navy has not fully considered the long-term risks and tradeoffs associated with the changes made as FRP has been implemented, such as carrier operational and maintenance cycles and force structure. The Navy has extended the intervals between carrier dry-dock maintenance periods from 6 years to 8 years and begun a test program that will extend some carrier dry-dock intervals to as much as 12 years, and it has lengthened operational cycles for carriers and their airwings to 32 months. GAO previously advocated that the Department of Defense adopt a risk management approach to aid in its decision making that includes assessing the risks of various courses of action. However, the Navy has not fully considered the long-term risks and tradeoffs of these recent changes because it has not performed a comprehensive assessment of how the changes, taken as a whole, might affect its ability to meet FRP goals and perform its missions. In addition, while the Navy has developed force structure plans that include two upcoming periods when the number of available aircraft carriers temporarily drops from 11 to 10, the plans included optimistic assumptions about the length of the gaps and the availability of existing carriers and did not fully analyze how the Navy would continue to meet FRP goals with fewer carriers. Until the Navy develops plans that use realistic assumptions and accurately identify the levels of risk the Navy is willing to accept during these gap periods, senior Navy leadership may not have the information it needs to make informed tradeoff decisions. Homeporting Navy ships in overseas locations, called forward homeporting, can reduce transit times between home port and operating area and thus permit the Navy to provide a larger number of ship days on station in overseas operating areas. The U.S. Navy's principal forward homeporting location is Japan, where the Navy since the early 1970s has forward homeported a CVBG (now a CSG) and an ARG (now the core of an ESG). The Navy traditionally has also forward-homeported a small number of other ships, such as fleet command ships and repair ships, in forward locations such as Italy and the U.S. territory of Guam. The Navy in recent years has forward-homeported four mine warfare ships at Bahrain in the Persian Gulf and three attack submarines at Guam. Increasing the number of ships forward-homeported in the Pacific can improve the Navy's ability to respond to contingencies in locations such as the Korean Peninsula or the Taiwan Strait. A March 2002 CBO report presented an option for homeporting as many as 11 attack submarines at Guam. The final report of the 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) directed the Navy to provide at least six aircraft carriers and 60% of its submarines in the Pacific. The Navy is implementing these two measures, which do not necessarily require additional forward homeporting. (They can be accomplished, for example, by moving ships from Atlantic Fleet home ports to San Diego or the Puget Sound area.) The Navy in recent years has experimented with the concept of long-duration deployments with crew rotation. This concept, which the Navy calls Sea Swap, is another way to reduce the amount of time that deployed ships spend transiting to and from operating areas. Sea Swap involves deploying Navy ships overseas for periods such as 12, 18, or 24 months rather than 6 or 7 months, and rotating successive crews out to the ships for 6-month periods of duty. Sea Swap can reduce the number of ships the Navy needs to have in its inventory to maintain one such ship on station in an overseas operating area by 20% or more. Potential disadvantages of Sea Swap include extensive wear and tear on the deployed ship due to lengthy periods of time at sea, a reduced sense of crew "ownership" of a given ship (which might reduce a crew's incentive to keep the ship in good condition), and reduced opportunities for transit port calls (which have diplomatic value and are beneficial for recruiting and retention). The Navy in recent years has conducted Sea Swap experiments with surface combatants and mine warfare ships that Navy officials have characterized as successful in terms of ship days on station, total costs, ship maintenance and material condition, and crew re-enlistment rates during deployment. In 2004, it was reported that a review of the Sea Swap experiment conducted by the Center for Naval Analyses found that although Sea Swap was successful in these terms, crew members participating in the experiment who were surveyed viewed the concept negatively and indicated they would be less likely to stay in the Navy if all deployments were conducted this way. The Navy made changes in later Sea Swap experiments to address issues that led to crew dissatisfaction, including lost liberty calls and increased training and work. In 2005, Navy officials testified that applying Sea Swap somewhat widely throughout the fleet could help permit the fleet to be reduced from a then-planned range of 290 to 375 ships down to a range of 260 to 325 ships. More recently, Navy officials have expressed less enthusiasm for extending Sea Swap beyond surface combatants. A July 2006 press article reported that the Navy may limit Sea Swap in the surface fleet to smaller combatants such as patrol craft, Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs), and frigates. The Navy plans to use Sea Swap to keep two of its four SSGNs continuously deployed. A May 2008 GAO report stated: Rotational crewing represents a transformational cultural change for the Navy. While the Navy has provided leadership in some rotational crewing programs, the Navy has not fully established a comprehensive management approach to coordinate and integrate rotational crewing efforts across the department and among various types of ships.... The Navy has not assigned clear leadership and accountability for rotational crewing or designated an implementation team to ensure that rotational crewing receives the attention necessary to be effective. Without a comprehensive management approach, the Navy may not be able to lead a successful transformation of its crewing culture. The Navy has promulgated crew exchange instructions for some types of ships that have provided some specific guidance and increased accountability. However, the Navy has not developed an overarching instruction that provides high-level guidance for rotational crewing initiatives and it has not consistently addressed rotational crewing in individual ship-class concepts of operations.... The Navy has conducted some analyses of rotational crewing; however, it has not developed a systematic method for analyzing, assessing and reporting findings on the potential for rotational crewing on current and future ships. Despite using a comprehensive data-collection and analysis plan in the Atlantic Fleet Guided Missile Destroyer Sea Swap, the Navy has not developed a standardized data-collection plan that would be used to analyze all types of rotational crewing, and life-cycle costs of rotational crewing alternatives have not been evaluated. The Navy has also not adequately assessed rotational crewing options for future ships. As new ships are in development, DOD guidance requires that an analysis of alternatives be completed. These analyses generally include an evaluation of the operational effectiveness and estimated costs of alternatives. In recent surface ship acquisitions, the Navy has not consistently assessed rotational crewing options. In the absence of this, cost-effective force structure assessments are incomplete and the Navy does not have a complete picture of the number of ships it needs to acquire. The Navy has collected and disseminated lessons learned from some rotational crewing experiences; however, some ship communities have relied on informal processes. The Atlantic Sea Swap initiative used a systematic process to capture lessons learned. However, in other ship communities the actions were not systematic and did not use the Navy Lessons Learned System. By not systematically recording and sharing lessons learned from rotational crewing efforts, the Navy risks repeating mistakes and could miss opportunities to more effectively implement crew rotations. Another strategy for increasing the percentage of time that Navy ships can be deployed is multiple crewing, which involves maintaining an average of more than one crew for each Navy ship. Potential versions include having two crews for each ship (dual crewing), 3 crews for every 2 ships, 4 crews for every 3 ships, 5 crews for every 4 ships, or other combinations, such as 8 crews for every 5 ships. The most basic version of Sea Swap maintains an average of one crew for each ship in inventory, but Sea Swap could be combined with multiple crewing. For many years, the Navy's nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) have been operated successfully with dual crews. The above-mentioned March 2002 CBO report presented the option of applying multiple crewing to the attack submarine fleet. Potential disadvantages of multiple crewing include the costs of recruiting, training, and retaining additional crews, the difficulty of achieving fully realistic training using land-based simulators (whose use would be more necessary because a given crew would not always have access to a ship for training), a reduced sense of crew "ownership" of a given ship, and increased wear and tear on the ship due to more intensive use of the ship at sea (which can reduce ship life). The Navy plans to use dual crewing for its first few LCSs, and then switch the LCS fleet to a "4-3-1" crewing strategy when the total number of LCSs grows to a larger number. Under the 4-3-1 plan, four crews would be used for every three LCSs to keep one of those three LCSs continuously deployed. The Navy is experimenting with a concept, first announced in 2006, called global fleet stations, or GFSs. The core of a GFS is an amphibious ship or high-speed sealift ship that is forward deployed to a region of interest. Smaller Navy ships, such as LCSs, might then operate in conjunction with this core ship to perform various missions. The Navy in 2007 is conducting six-month pilot GFS in the Caribbean built around the high-speed sealift ship Swift, and plans to follow this in late 2007 with a second, year-long, GFS in the Gulf of Guinea, off the western coast of Africa, that is to be built around an amphibious ship. The Navy states that the GFS concept offers a means to increase regional maritime security through the cooperative efforts of joint, inter-agency, and multinational partners, as well as Non-Governmental Organizations.... From its sea base, each GFS would serve as a self-contained headquarters for regional operations with the capacity to repair and service all ships, small craft, and aircraft assigned. Additionally, the GFS might provide classroom space, limited medical facilities, an information fusion center, and some combat service support capability. The GFS concept provides a leveraged, high-yield sea based option that achieves a persistent presence in support of national objectives. Additionally, it complements more traditional CSG/ESG training and deployment cycles. Potential oversight issues for Congress include the following: How might the changes discussed above affected the planned size and structure of the fleet? For what kinds of ships should Navy use Sea Swap or multiple crewing? How will FRP and the forward-homeporting of additional ships affect the distribution of Navy ship overhaul and repair work? How many additional ships, of what types, should the Navy forward homeport in the Pacific, and precisely where?

The Navy has implemented new kinds of naval formations, more flexible forward-deployment schedules, and a ship readiness plan (called the Fleet Response Plan, or FRP) for surge-deploying several aircraft carriers in a short period of time to respond to contingencies. The Navy has also forward-homeported additional ships, experimented with long-duration deployments with crew rotation (which the Navy calls Sea Swap), investigated multiple-crewing of ships, and is experimenting with a new forward-deployment concept called global fleet stations, or GFSs. These actions raise several potential issues for Congress. This report will be updated as events warrant.

I n 1964, the Wilderness Act established a national system of congressionally designated areas to be preserved in a wilderness condition: "where the earth and its community of life are untrammeled by man, where man himself is a visitor who does not remain." The National Wilderness Preservation System (the Wilderness System) was originally created with 9 million acres of Forest Service lands. Congress has since added approximately 100 million more acres to the Wilderness System (see Table 1 ) among some 608.9 million acres of land managed by the federal land management agencies--the Forest Service in the Department of Agriculture, and the National Park Service (NPS), Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), and Bureau of Land Management (BLM) in the Department of the Interior. Federal agencies, Members of Congress, and interest groups have recommended additional lands for inclusion in the Wilderness System. Furthermore, at the direction of Congress, agencies have studied, or are studying, the wilderness potential of their lands. This report provides a brief history of wilderness, describes what wilderness is, identifies permitted and prohibited uses in wilderness areas, and provides data on the 109.9 million acres of designated wilderness areas as of April 15, 2016. For information on current wilderness legislation, see CRS Report R41610, Wilderness: Issues and Legislation . As the United States was formed, the federal government acquired 1.8 billion acres of land through purchases, treaties, and other agreements. Initial federal policy was generally to transfer land to states and private ownership, but Congress also provided for reserving certain lands for federal purposes. Over time, Congress has reserved or withdrawn increasing acreage for national parks, national forests, wildlife refuges, etc. The general policy of land disposal was formally changed to a policy of retaining the remaining lands in the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA). The early national forests were managed for conservation--protecting and developing the lands for sustained use. It did not take long for some Forest Service leaders to recognize the need to preserve some areas in a natural state. Acting at its own discretion, and at the behest of an employee named Aldo Leopold, the Forest Service created the first wilderness area in the Gila National Forest in New Mexico in 1924. In the succeeding decades, the agency's system of wilderness, wild, and primitive areas grew to 14.6 million acres. However, in the 1950s, increasing timber harvests and recreational use of the national forests led to public concerns about the permanence of this purely administrative system. The Forest Service had relied on its administrative authority in making wilderness designations, but there was no law to prevent a future change to those designations. In response, Congress enacted the Wilderness Act in 1964. The act described the attributes and characteristics of wilderness, and it prohibited or restricted certain activities in wilderness areas to preserve and protect the designated areas, while permitting other activities to occur. The act reserves to Congress the authority to designate areas as part of the National Wilderness Preservation System. The Wilderness System began with the 9.1 million acres of national forest lands that had been identified administratively as wilderness areas or wild areas. The Wilderness Act directed the Secretary of Agriculture to review the agency's 5.5 million acres of primitive areas, and the Secretary of the Interior to evaluate the wilderness potential of National Park System and National Wildlife Refuge System lands. The Secretaries were to report their recommendations to the President and to Congress within 10 years (i.e., by 1974). Separate recommendations were made for each area, and many areas recommended for wilderness were later designated, although some of the recommendations are still pending. In 1976, FLPMA directed the Secretary of the Interior to conduct a similar review of the public lands administered by BLM within 15 years (i.e., by 1991). BLM submitted its recommendations to the President, and presidential recommendations were submitted to Congress (see " BLM Wilderness Review and Wilderness Study Areas "). The 90 th Congress began expanding the Wilderness System in 1968, as shown in Table 1 . Five laws were enacted, creating five new wilderness areas with 792,750 acres in four states. Wilderness designations generally increased in each succeeding Congress, rising to a peak of 60.8 million acres designated during the 96 th Congress (1979-1980), the largest amount designated by any Congress. This figure included the largest single designation of 56.4 million acres of wilderness through the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act. The 98 th Congress enacted more wilderness laws (21) and designated more acres (8.5 million acres in 21 states) outside of Alaska than any Congress since the Wilderness System was created. The 112 th Congress was the first Congress to designate no additional wilderness acres. Including the Wilderness Act, Congress has enacted more than 100 laws designating new wilderness areas or adding to existing ones, as shown in Table 1 . To date, the 114 th Congress has designated three new wilderness areas. The Wilderness System now contains 765 wilderness areas, with approximately 109.9 million acres in 44 states and Puerto Rico, managed by the four federal land-management agencies, as shown in Table 2 . The agencies have recommended that additional lands be added to the Wilderness System; these lands are generally managed to protect their wilderness character while Congress considers adding them to the Wilderness System (see " Wilderness Review, Study, and Release "). The agencies are studying additional lands to determine if these lands should be added to the Wilderness System. However, comprehensive data on the lands recommended and being reviewed for wilderness potential are not available. The Wilderness Act described wilderness as an area of generally undisturbed federal land. Specifically, Section 2(c) defined wilderness as A wilderness, in contrast with those areas where man and his works dominate the landscape, is hereby recognized as an area where the earth and its community of life are untrammeled by man, where man himself is a visitor who does not remain. An area of wilderness is further defined to mean ... an area of undeveloped Federal land retaining its primeval character and influence, without permanent improvements or human habitation, which is protected and managed so as to preserve its natural conditions and which (1) generally appears to have been affected primarily by the forces of nature, with the imprint of man's work substantially unnoticeable; (2) has outstanding opportunities for solitude or a primitive and unconfined type of recreation; (3) has at least five thousand acres of land or is of sufficient size as to make practicable its preservation and use in an unimpaired condition; and (4) may also contain ecological, geological, or other features of scientific, educational, scenic, or historical value. This definition provides some general guidelines for determining which areas should, or should not, be designated wilderness, but the law contains no specific criteria. The phrases "untrammeled by man," "retaining its primeval character," and "man's work substantially unnoticeable" are far from precise. Even the numerical standard (5,000 acres) is not absolute; smaller areas can be designated if they can be protected, and the smallest wilderness area--Wisconsin Islands Wilderness in the Green Bay National Wildlife Refuge--is only 2 acres. These imprecise criteria stem in part from differing perceptions of what constitutes wilderness. To some, wilderness is an area where there is absolutely no sign of human presence: no traffic can be heard (including aircraft); no roads, structures, or litter can be seen. To others, sleeping in a camper in a 400-site campground in Yellowstone National Park is a wilderness experience. Complicating these differing perceptions is the wide range of ability to "get away from it all" in various settings. In a densely wooded area, isolation might be measured in yards; in mountainous or desert terrain, human developments can sometimes be seen for miles. Section 2 of the Wilderness Act also identified the purposes of wilderness. Specifically, Section 2(a) stated that the act's purpose was to create wilderness lands "administered for the use and enjoyment of the American people in such manner as will leave them unimpaired for future use and enjoyment as wilderness, and so as to provide for the protection of these areas, the preservation of their wilderness character, and for the gathering and dissemination of information regarding their use and enjoyment as wilderness." These criteria also contain degrees of imprecision, sometimes leading to different perceptions about how to manage wilderness. Thus, there are contrasting views about what constitutes wilderness and how wilderness should be managed. In an attempt to accommodate contrasting views of wilderness, the Wilderness Act provided certain exemptions and delayed implementation of restrictions for wilderness areas, as will be discussed below. At times, Congress has also responded to the conflicting demands of various interest groups by allowing additional exemptions for certain uses (especially for existing activities) in particular wilderness designations. The subsequent wilderness statutes have not designated wilderness areas by amending the Wilderness Act. Instead, they are independent statutes. Although nearly all of these statutes direct management in accordance with the Wilderness Act, many also provide unique management guidance for their designated areas. Ultimately, wilderness areas are whatever Congress designates as wilderness, regardless of developments or activities that some might argue conflict with the act's definition of wilderness. The Wilderness Act and subsequent wilderness laws contain several provisions addressing management of wilderness areas. These laws designate wilderness areas as part of and within existing units of federal land, and the management provisions applicable to those units of federal land, particularly those governing management direction and restricting activities, also apply. For example, hunting is prohibited in most NPS units but not on most Forest Service or BLM lands. Thus, hunting would be prohibited for the wilderness areas in those NPS units but would be permitted in Forest Service or BLM wilderness areas, absent specific statutory language. In addition to the management requirements applicable to the underlying federal land, most of the subsequent wilderness statutes direct management of the designated areas in accordance with or consistent with the Wilderness Act, although some management provisions have been expanded or clarified. S tate Fish and Wildlife Jurisdiction and Responsibilities. The Wilderness Act explicitly directed that wilderness designations had no effect on state jurisdiction or responsibilities over fish and wildlife jurisdiction (Section 4(d)(8)). Comparable language, sometimes only referring to state jurisdiction (not responsibilities) has been included in many of the wilderness statutes. Jurisdiction and Authorities of Other Agencies . Several wilderness statutes have directed that other agencies' specific authorities, jurisdiction, and related activities be allowed to continue. For example, some wilderness statutes specify that the wilderness designation has no effect on law enforcement, generally, or on U.S.-Mexico border relations, drug interdiction, or military training. Water Rights . Wilderness statutes have provided different directions concerning federal reserved water rights associated with the designated wilderness areas. The Wilderness Act expressly states that it does not claim or deny a reserved water right (Section 4(d)(7)), whereas some wilderness statutes have expressly reserved, or denied, claims to federal water rights. Wilderness statutes frequently provide that state law dictates regulation of water allocation and use. Buffer Z ones . The Wilderness Act is silent on the issue of buffer zones around wilderness areas to protect the designated areas. However, in response to concern that designating wilderness areas would restrict management of adjoining federal lands, language in many subsequent wilderness bills has prohibited buffer zones that would limit uses and activities on federal lands around the wilderness areas. Land and Rights Acquisition and Future Designations . The Wilderness Act authorizes the acquisition of land within designated wilderness areas (called inholdings ), including through donation or exchange for other federal land (Section 5(a-c)), subject to appropriations. Congress has also enacted several wilderness statutes with intended or potential wilderness that are within or adjoining designated wilderness areas. These areas are to become wilderness when certain conditions have been met, such as acquisition, as specified in the statute. Wilderness Study, Review, and Release . Many of the wilderness statutes have directed the agencies to review the wilderness potential of certain lands and present recommendations regarding wilderness designations to the President and to Congress. (See the " Wilderness Review, Study, and Release " section, below.) However, the Wilderness Act and most of the initial statutory wilderness review provisions were silent on the management of the areas during and after the review, leading to concerns about how to manage areas not recommended for wilderness designation. A legislative provision, called release language , was developed to address this concern. Release language provides direction on the timing of future wilderness review and of the management of areas not designated as wilderness until the next review. The Wilderness Act, and subsequent statutes, authorized some uses to continue, particularly if the uses were authorized at the time of designation. For example, the Wilderness Act specifically directs that "the grazing of livestock, where established prior to the effective date of this Act, shall be permitted to continue subject to such reasonable regulations as are deemed necessary by the Secretary of Agriculture" (Section 4(d)(4)(2)). Congress expanded on this language by providing additional guidance on continuing livestock grazing at historic levels in designated wilderness areas (H. Rept. 96-617, which accompanied P.L. 96-560 , and Appendix A--Grazing Guidelines--in H.Rept. 101-405, which accompanied P.L. 101-628 ). Many of the subsequent wilderness statutes also expressly directed continued livestock grazing in conformance with the Wilderness Act and the committee reports. The Wilderness Act extended the mining and mineral leasing laws for wilderness areas in national forests for 20 years, through 1983. Until midnight on December 31, 1983, new mining claims and mineral leases were permitted for those wilderness areas and exploration and development were authorized, "subject, however, to such reasonable regulations governing ingress and egress as may be prescribed by the Secretary of Agriculture." On January 1, 1984, the Wilderness Act withdrew the specified national forest wilderness areas from all forms of appropriation under the mining laws. Some subsequent wilderness statutes have specifically withdrawn the designated areas from availability under the mining and mineral laws, whereas others have directed continued mineral development and extraction or otherwise allowed historical use of an existing mine to continue within designated areas. The Wilderness Act, directly and by cross-reference in virtually all subsequent wilderness statutes, generally prohibits commercial activities; motorized uses; and roads, structures, and facilities in designated wilderness areas. Specifically, Section 4(c) states: Except as specifically provided for in this Act, and subject to existing private rights, there shall be no commercial enterprise and no permanent road within any wilderness area designated by this Act and, except as necessary to meet minimum requirements for the administration of the area for the purpose of this Act (including measures required in emergencies involving the health and safety of persons within the area), there shall be no temporary road, no use of motor vehicles, motorized equipment or motorboats, no landing of aircraft, no other form of mechanical transport, and no structure or installation within any such area. Thus, most businesses and commercial resource development--such as timber harvesting--are prohibited, except "for activities which are proper for realizing the recreational or other wilderness purposes of the areas" (SS4(d)(6)). The use of motorized or mechanized equipment--such as cars, trucks, off-road vehicles, bicycles, aircraft, or motorboats--is also prohibited, except in emergencies and specified circumstances. Human infrastructure--such as roads, buildings, dams and pipelines--is likewise prohibited in wilderness areas. However, the Wilderness Act is silent on the treatment of infrastructure in place at the time of the designation, although many of the wilderness statutes do address it through " Nonconforming Permitted Uses " provisions. Many wilderness statutes have authorized closing certain wilderness areas (or parts thereof) to public access. In addition, many statutes have withdrawn the designated areas from the public land disposal laws and the mining and mineral leasing and disposal laws, although valid existing rights are not terminated and can be developed under reasonable regulations. The Wilderness Act and many subsequent wilderness statutes have allowed various nonconforming uses and conditions, especially if such uses were in place at the time of designation. Motorized access has generally been permitted for management requirements and emergencies; for nonfederal inholdings; and for fire, insect, and disease control. Continued motorized access and livestock grazing have also generally been permitted where they had been occurring prior to the area's designation as wilderness, as discussed above. In addition, construction, operations, and maintenance--and associated motorized access--have been permitted for water infrastructure and for other infrastructure in many instances. Motorized access for state agencies for fish and wildlife management activities has sometimes been explicitly allowed. Several statutes have expressly permitted low-level military overflights of wilderness areas, although the Wilderness Act does not prohibit overflights. Access for minerals activities has been authorized in some specific areas and for valid existing rights. Finally, several statutes have allowed access for other specific activities, such as access to cemeteries within designated areas or for tribal activities. Congress directed the four land-management agencies to review the wilderness potential of their lands and make recommendations regarding the lands' suitability for wilderness designation. Congress acted upon many of those recommendations, by either designating lands as wilderness or by releasing lands from further wilderness consideration. However, some recommendations remain pending. Questions and discussions persist over the protection and management of these areas, which some believe should be designated as wilderness and others believe should be available for development. This debate has been particularly controversial for Forest Service inventoried roadless areas and BLM wilderness study areas. The Wilderness Act directed the Secretary of Agriculture to review the wilderness potential of primitive areas identified by the Forest Service and to make wilderness recommendations for those lands within 10 years (i.e., by 1974). In 1970, the Forest Service expanded its review of potential wilderness areas to include lands that had not been previously identified as primitive areas. This Roadless Area Review and Evaluation (RARE) was conducted under the newly enacted National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). The Forest Service issued the final environmental impact statement in 1973 and was sued for not properly following the NEPA process in identifying potential wilderness areas. It chose not to present the recommendations to Congress. In 1977, the Forest Service began a second review (RARE II) of the 62 million acres of national forest roadless areas, to accelerate part of the land-management planning process mandated by the Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources Planning Act of 1974 and the National Forest Management Act of 1976 (NFMA). The RARE II final environmental impact statement was issued in January 1979, recommending more than 15 million acres (24% of the study area) for addition to the Wilderness System. In addition, nearly 11 million acres (17%) were to be studied further in the ongoing Forest Service planning process under NFMA. The remaining 36 million acres (58% of the RARE II area) were to be available for other uses--such as logging, energy and mineral developments, and motorized recreation--that might be incompatible with preserving wilderness characteristics. In April 1979, President Jimmy Carter presented the recommendations to Congress with minor changes. In 1980, the state of California successfully challenged the Forest Service RARE II recommendations for 44 areas allocated to non-wilderness uses, with the court decision substantially upheld on appeal in 1982. The Reagan Administration responded in 1983 by directing a reevaluation of all RARE II recommendations. Tensions between Congress and the Administration, and among interest groups, led to a particularly intense debate during the 98 th Congress (1983-1984). Many statewide wilderness laws were subsequently enacted, each containing language releasing some lands in that state from potential wilderness designations ( release language ). The completion of RARE II and subsequent enactment of bills designating national forest wilderness areas has not ended the debate, and the Forest Service has other directives to consider the wilderness values or the undisturbed condition of national forest lands (e.g., NFMA). Further, there are extensive roadless areas within the National Forest System that have not been designated wilderness. To address the management and protection of the 58.5 million acres of inventoried roadless areas (primarily RARE II areas not designated as wilderness), the Clinton Administration developed regulations that would keep all roadless areas free from most development (the Roadless Rule). More than a decade of litigation followed, with the Clinton Administration's rule being enjoined twice and the Bush Administration promulgating a rule that also was enjoined. The courts deciding the cases upheld the Clinton Administration's rule, and in October 2012, the Supreme Court refused to review the issue. Currently, under the Clinton policy, road construction, reconstruction, and timber harvesting are prohibited on most of the inventoried roadless areas within the National Forest System, with some exceptions. Congress directed BLM to consider wilderness as a use of its public lands in the 1976 enactment of FLPMA. FLPMA required BLM to make an inventory of roadless areas greater than 5,000 acres and to recommend the suitability for designation of those areas to the President within 15 years of October 21, 1976, and the President then had two years to submit wilderness recommendations to Congress. BLM presented its recommendations by October 21, 1991, and Presidents George H. W. Bush and William Clinton submitted wilderness recommendations to Congress. Although these areas have been reviewed and Congress has enacted several statutes designating BLM wilderness areas, many of the wilderness recommendations for BLM lands remain pending. There are two continuing issues for potential BLM wilderness: protection of the wilderness study areas and whether BLM has a continuing obligation under FLPMA to conduct wilderness reviews. From 1977 through 1979, BLM identified suitable wilderness study areas (WSAs) from roadless areas identified in its initial resource inventory under FLPMA Section 201. Section 603(c) of FLPMA directs the agency to manage those lands "until Congress has determined otherwise ... in a manner so as not to impair the suitability of such areas for preservation as wilderness." Thus, BLM must protect the WSAs as if they were wilderness until Congress enacts legislation that releases BLM from that responsibility. This responsibility is sometimes referred to as a non - impairment obligation or standard. WSAs have been subject to litigation challenging BLM's protection. In the early 2000s, BLM was sued for not adequately preventing impairment of WSAs from increased off-road vehicle use. In Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance , the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the non-impairment obligation was not enforceable by court challenge. The Court held that although WSA protection was mandatory, it was a broad programmatic duty and not a discrete agency obligation. The Court also concluded that the relevant FLPMA land use plans (which indicated that WSAs would be monitored) constituted only management goals that might be modified by agency priorities and available funding and were not a basis for enforcement under the Administrative Procedure Act. Therefore, it appears that although BLM actions that would harm WSAs could be enjoined, as with any agency enforcement obligation, forcing BLM to take protective action would be difficult at best. Despite BLM's continuing obligation under FLPMA Section 201 to identify the resources on its lands, giving priority to areas of critical environmental concern, it is unclear whether BLM is required to review its lands specifically for wilderness potential after expiration of the reviews required by Section 603. In contrast to the Forest Service, which must revise its land and resource management plans at least every 15 years, BLM is not required to revise its plans on a specified cycle; rather, it must revise its land and resource management plans "when appropriate." Furthermore, while NFMA includes wilderness in the planning process, both directly and by reference to the Multiple Use-Sustained Yield Act of 1960, FLPMA is silent on wilderness in the definitions of multiple use and sustained yield and in the guidance for the BLM planning process. Thus, future BLM wilderness reviews are less certain than future Forest Service wilderness reviews. With each Administration, DOI has changed its policy regarding how it administers areas with wilderness potential. In September 2003, then-DOI secretary Gale Norton settled litigation challenging a 1996 policy identifying large amounts of wilderness-suitable lands. Following the settlement, the BLM assistant director issued guidance (known as Instruction Memorandum 2003-274) prohibiting further reviews and limiting the term wilderness study areas and the non-impairment standard to areas already designated for the original Section 603 reviews of the 1970s and 1980s. The guidance advised, in part, that because the Section 603 authority expired, "there is no general legal authority for the BLM to designate lands as WSAs for management pursuant to the non-impairment standard prescribed by Congress for Section 603 WSAs." On December 22, 2010, then-DOI secretary Ken Salazar issued Order No. 3310, known as the Wild Lands Policy, addressing how BLM would manage wilderness. This order indirectly modified the 2003 wilderness guidance without actually overturning the direction (or even acknowledging it). The order relied on the authority in FLPMA Section 201 to inventory lands with wilderness characteristics that are "outside of the areas designated as Wilderness Study Areas and that are pending before Congress" and designated these lands as "Wild Lands." It also directed BLM to consider the wilderness characteristics in land use plans and project decisions, "avoiding impairment of such wilderness characteristics" unless alternative management is deemed appropriate. Whereas Instruction Memorandum 2003-274 indicated that, except for extant Section 603 WSAs, the non-impairment standard did not apply, Order No. 3310 appeared to require an affirmative decision that impairment is appropriate in a Section 201 wilderness resource area. Otherwise, under Order No. 3310, impairment must be avoided. After Congress withheld funding, Secretary Salazar revoked the order in June 2011 and stated that BLM would not designate any wild lands. Despite the order being formally revoked, Congress has continued to withhold funding in annual appropriations acts. The wilderness statistics presented in Table 2 are the most recent acreage estimates for wilderness areas that have been designated by Congress as compiled by the agencies. Acreages are estimates, since few (if any) of the areas have been precisely surveyed. In addition, the agencies have recommended areas for addition to the National Wilderness Preservation System, and continue to review the wilderness potential of other lands under their jurisdiction, both of congressionally designated wilderness study areas and under congressionally directed land management planning efforts. However, statistics on acreage in pending recommendations and being studied, particularly in the planning efforts, are unavailable. As of April 15, 2016, Congress has designated 109.9 million acres of federal land in units of the National Wilderness Preservation System, as shown in Table 2 and Figure 1 . Wilderness areas have been designated in 44 states plus Puerto Rico; only Connecticut, Delaware, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, and Rhode Island have no federal lands designated as wilderness. Figure 2 shows the regional distribution of lands designated as wilderness. Just over half (52%) of this land--57.4 million acres--is in Alaska, and includes most of the wilderness areas managed by NPS (75%), FWS (90%), and FS (16%). California has the next-largest wilderness acreage, with 15.0 million acres designated in the state. However, Washington is the state with the largest percentage of federal land designated wilderness, with the 4.5 million acres of wilderness accounting for 38% of the federal land within the state. NPS manages the most wilderness acreage (43.9 million acres, 40% of the Wilderness System), followed by the Forest Service, which manages 36.6 million acres (33%). FWS manages 20.7 million acres (19%), and BLM manages the least wilderness acreage, 8.7 million acres (8%).

Congress enacted the Wilderness Act in 1964. This act created the National Wilderness Preservation System, reserved to Congress the authority to designate wilderness areas, and directed the Secretaries of Agriculture and of the Interior to review certain lands for their wilderness potential. The act also designated 54 wilderness areas with 9 million acres of federal land. Congress began expanding the Wilderness System in 1968, and today, there are 765 wilderness areas, totaling nearly 110 million acres, in 44 states. Numerous bills to designate additional areas and to expand existing ones have been introduced and considered in every Congress. The Wilderness Act defined wilderness as an area of undeveloped federal land, among other criteria, but due to differing perceptions of wilderness and its purpose, it did not establish criteria or standards to determine whether an area should be designated. In general, wilderness areas are undeveloped, and commercial activities, motorized access, and roads, structures, and facilities are prohibited in wilderness areas. In response to conflicting demands, however, Congress has granted both general exemptions and specific exceptions to the general standards and prohibitions. Questions also persist over the frequency and extent to which federal agencies must review the wilderness potential of their lands, and how those lands should be managed. Wilderness designation can be controversial. Because the designation generally prohibits commercial activities, motorized access, and human infrastructure from wilderness areas, opponents see such designations as preventing certain uses and potential economic development in rural areas where such opportunities are relatively limited. Advocates propose wilderness designations to preserve the generally undeveloped conditions of the areas. The federal government owns about 28% of the land in the United States, although the proportion in each state varies widely. Four federal agencies--the Bureau of Land Management, National Park Service, and Fish and Wildlife Service in the Department of the Interior; and the Forest Service in the Department of Agriculture--manage most of the 110 million acres of designated wilderness, as well as many other lands. They also protect certain other lands as possible additions to the Wilderness System, and review the wilderness potential of lands. In total, nearly 18% of federal land administered by the four major federal land management agencies, and nearly 5% of all land in the United States, has been designated as wilderness, largely in Alaska. Alaska, because of its size and relatively pristine condition, dominates wilderness statistics--more than 52% of designated wilderness is in Alaska (57.4 million acres). In total, nearly 16% of the entire state of Alaska has been designated as wilderness. In contrast, 3% of all land in the United States outside Alaska has been designated as wilderness.

Climate change is a global issue; however, greenhouse gas emissions data on a global basis are incomplete. Some developing countries have no institutions for monitoring greenhouse gas emissions and have never reported such emissions to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). In a similar vein, data on individual greenhouse gases, sources, and land-use patterns vary greatly in quality. Despite shortcomings in the data, the emerging picture of emissions has implications for considering alternative policies for controlling emissions. First, the picture outlines the estimated contributions of individual countries. Second, evaluating those emissions in terms of socio-economic characteristics (e.g., population and economic activity) provides insights on the potentially divergent interests of differing groups of nations--especially concerning developed nations versus developing ones. The World Resources Institute (WRI) has compiled greenhouse gas emissions and related data from a variety of sources into a database that is available for analysis. Covering 185 nations (plus a separate entry combining the members of the European Union), the database includes total emissions, per capita emissions, and greenhouse gas (or carbon) intensity; selected socio-economic indicators; and other measures. Emissions data for all six greenhouse gases identified by the UNFCCC are available for 1990, 1995, 2000, and 2005 for both developed and non-Annex I nations. Data for carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) are available back to 1850 and up to 2006 for both developed and non-Annex I nations. Data on the effects of land use change and forestry on CO 2 emissions are only available from 1990 to 2005, and only for a subset of nations. This report uses the data compiled by WRI to examine a pivotal and long-running issue surrounding U.S. climate change policy: the appropriate roles of developed and developing countries in addressing climate change. The UNFCCC states as its first principle in Article 3: The Parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of present and future generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. Accordingly, the developed country Parties should take the lead in combating climate change and the adverse effects thereof. U.S. policymakers have struggled with the "common but differentiated responsibilities" of all nations and with the pledge for the developed countries to "take the lead in combating climate change." Under the UNFCCC and the subsequent Kyoto Protocol, common actions include the responsibility to monitor and report emissions; differentiated actions include the commitment to reduce emissions for designated developed nations (including the United States), listed on Annex I to the UNFCCC (and hence known as Annex I nations). The original UNFCC commitment was voluntary, and many Annex I nations, notably including the United States, failed to meet the objective of reducing 2000 emissions to a 1990 baseline. Thus the Kyoto Protocol made mandatory individual Annex I nations' commitments of percentage reductions for 2008-2012, but meeting them has proved difficult--and the United States refused to join the commitment. Under both the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, non-Annex I nations would be exempt from these specified control requirements--although they could voluntarily join in. This split in responsibilities--with the consequent lack of greenhouse gas control requirements for major emitting non-Annex I countries--played a key role in the United States' refusal to agree to the Kyoto Protocol. Two key issues emerged from the UNFCC and Kyoto commitments to reduce emissions by developed nations: first, meeting the commitments is proving to be both technically and politically difficult; and second, it has become increasing evident that any reductions achieved by Annex I nations could be nullified by increases in emissions from non-Annex I nations like China and India that have been undergoing rapid economic growth and emitting increasingly large amounts of greenhouse gases--such that by 2005 China passed the United States to become the number one emitter of greenhouse gases in the world. Justifications for the differential treatment of the developed, Annex I nations compared to the developing nations are both environmentally and economically based. Environmentally, the developed, Annex I nations have dominated emissions. Cumulatively, from 1850 to 2006, Annex I nations had emitted approximately 74% of energy-related CO 2 , while non-Annex I nations had contributed 24%. In 1990, when the UNFCCC was being conceived, Annex I nations accounted for 60% of emissions of all six greenhouse gases, while the non-Annex I nations accounted for 40%. By 2005, however, non-Annex I nations dominated, accounting for 51% of total emissions, while Annex I nations accounting for approximately 47%. Thus, while Annex I nations still dominate cumulative emissions, the fact that non-Annex I nations are now contributing more than half the emissions confounds the assignment of future obligations. Economically, as the UNFCCC explicitly recognizes, the economic development being pursued by the non-Annex I nations depends importantly on expanded use of energy, including fossil fuels, which are the main source of carbon dioxide, the dominant greenhouse gas. From this perspective, a logic for the differing treatment of the two groups is that the developed, Annex I countries can afford to control emissions because they have achieved a relatively high standard of living, while the developing nations have the right and should have the opportunity to expand energy use as necessary for their economic development. This distinguishing of the responsibilities of the Annex I and non-Annex I nations generates crucial and interrelated tensions: First, this approach means that Annex I nations bear the preponderance of the direct economic costs for addressing global climate change; Second, non-Annex I nations retain the opportunity to develop their economies using least-cost energy regardless of greenhouse gas emissions; this in turn means that from the perspective of the Annex I nations, at least some developing nations--which may be competing in certain economic sectors--appear to be getting a free ride; And third, despite investments in controls and resulting tensions between competing economies, actual global emissions will continue to rise if the increase in emissions from non-Annex I nations exceeds any decrease in emissions achieved by Annex I ones. The crux of the Copenhagen Conference, to plot a post-Kyoto course for addressing climate change, was how to engage the two largest emitters, the United States and China--the former having rejected Kyoto in part because developing nations were not obligated to curtail emissions; and the latter having become the world's largest emitter of greenhouse gases. Politically, while George W. Bush administration had been a reluctant partner in the UNFCC process, including early negotiations pointing toward Copenhagen, President Obama has been a vigorous proponent of engagement. At the Copenhagen Conference, he met twice with Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao in an effort to move the negotiations forward. The Copenhagen outcome showed both some progress in bridging the gap between the developed and developing nations, and continuing difficulties in finding common ground on how to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The accord did not mandate specific reductions, but set a goal of reducing global emissions "so as to hold the increase in global temperature below 2 degrees C, and take action to meet this objective consistent with science and on the basis of equity." Annex I nations commit to implement "quantified economy-wide emissions targets for 2020" and non-Annex I nations commit to implement "mitigation actions." Both sets of nations commit to reporting and verification procedures "in accordance with guidelines adopted by the Conference of the Parties." (Monitoring, reporting, and verification were a key demand of the United States of developing nations.) Also, the accord contained the promise of $100 billion a year by 2020 "to address the needs of developing countries." To clarify how nations' emissions levels intersect with social and economic contexts, this paper focuses on the 20 individual nations that emitted the most greenhouse gases in 2005 (see Appendix A , Appendix B , and Appendix C ). In 2005, not taking into account emissions implications of land use and forestry, the top 20 represented about 75% of global greenhouse gas emissions--up slightly from about 73% in 1990 (latest available data from CAIT for all six greenhouse gases). In addition, data for the 27-member European Union are included, as the Kyoto Protocol allows the EU to address its greenhouse gas emission obligations collectively. In 2005, the 27-nation EU was the third-largest emitter of greenhouse gases, after China and the United States. A compelling fact to emerge from the database is that a few countries account for most of the emissions. Appendix A , Appendix B , and Appendix C present data concerning the top 20 greenhouse gas-emitting nations in 2005. They accounted for 75.3% of global emissions. Excluding land use data, by CAIT's accounting, China led in emitting greenhouse gases (1,974 million metric tons of carbon equivalent, MMTCE) at 19.1% of the total, followed by the United States (1,892 MMTCE) at 18.3%. No other country reached 6% of total emissions (although the collective 27-member EU accounted for 13.4%); overall, only eight countries emitted 2% or more. These top eight emitters accounted for 58.3% of global emissions and the next 13 top emitters accounted for another 17% of emissions. Thus one implication of these data is that greenhouse gas control in the short term depends mainly on the actions of a relatively few nations; if the top 20 emitters (or even the top eight) all acted effectively, the actions of the remaining 160-plus nations would be of relatively little import, at least for years. A second compelling fact about those top emitters is that they are highly diverse and represent very different situations. The top 20 nations include: Developed (Annex I) nations whose emissions grew between 1990 and 2005: the United States, Japan, Canada, Italy, Australia, France, Spain, and Turkey (ranked 2, 5, 8, 13, 14, 16, 18, and 20, respectively). These eight nations accounted for 30.5% of global greenhouse gas emissions in 2005. Developed (Annex I) nations whose emissions declined between 1990 and 2005, largely as a result of the collapse of the Eastern European and USSR socialist economies during the 1990s: Russian Federation, Germany, and Ukraine, (ranked 3, 7, and 17, respectively). These three nations accounted for 9.0% of global greenhouse gas emissions in 2005. Developed (Annex I) nations with free-market economies whose emissions declined between 1990 and 2005, largely because of a combination of low population growth, modest economic growth, and the displacement of high-emitting fuels (coal) with alternatives: the United Kingdom (ranked 9), is the only member of this category. It accounted for 1.7% of global greenhouse gas emissions in 2005. Developing (non-Annex I) nations, all of whose emissions rose during the period: China, India, Brazil, Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea, Iran, and South Africa (ranked 1, 4, 6, 10, 11, 12, 15, and 19, respectively). These eight nations accounted for 34.1% of global greenhouse gas emissions in 2000. For the year 2005, then, 12 of the top 20 countries were Annex I countries, including 6 of the top 10 emitters. In 2005, the top 20 Annex I countries accounted for about 55% of the top 20 group's greenhouse emissions, compared with 45% for the developing, non-Annex I countries; in 1990, the relative shares were 69% and 31%, respectively, so the developing countries have been proportionately increasing their share. Highlighting the tension between Annex I and non-Annex I perspectives, the number-one emitters of each group were the top two emitters overall: At the top were the leading developing, non-Annex I country, China; and the leading developed, free-market economy, the United States. Combined, these two countries alone accounted for 37.4% of total global emissions. The impact of emissions on climate change is believed to be cumulative over decades and even centuries. Thus a longer-term examination of data provides an important perspective, and is one reason for the differing treatments of the Annex I and non-Annex I nations. Available data give emissions estimates of energy-related CO 2 emissions back from1850 to 2006 (see Appendix A and Appendix C ). This longer-term view of emissions underscores the contribution of the Annex I nations: For all nations, excluding land use changes and forestry practices, Annex I countries' share of energy-related CO 2 emissions over the period 1850-2005 is 74%; non-Annex I countries' share is 24% (see also Table 1 ). The relative rankings of several developing countries, including Brazil, South Korea, Indonesia, and Iran, drop substantially using a longer historical baseline for emissions: from the 2005 rank to the 1850-2005 cumulative rank for CO 2 , from 6 th to 21 st , 15 th to 20 th , 11 th to 25 th , and 12 th to 23 rd , respectively. Greenhouse gas emissions, particularly energy-related emissions, are closely tied to industrialization. As "developed" is considered by many to be synonymous with "industrialized," it is not surprising that the developed countries dominate cumulative emissions, while developing ones are increasing their current annual share. Changes in land use can significantly affect net levels of emissions. In general, deforestation increases CO 2 emissions and afforestation decreases them. Certain agricultural practices can increase emissions of methane or nitrous oxide; other agricultural processes can sequester carbon. However, data on the effects on emissions of land use changes and forestry practices, and their conversion into equivalent units of greenhouse gas emissions, are both less available and less robust than data on emissions. Therefore, this discussion is at best illustrative (see Appendix A and Appendix C ; note that numerous countries lack data on land use and forestry). Including land use in the calculations for 2005 focuses discussion on certain developing countries. Land use changes and forestry practices in certain developing countries, notably Brazil and Indonesia, are having the effect of substantially upping their relative emissions ranks. Counting land use, Brazil's emissions in 2005 rise from 276 MMTCE to 776 MMTCE (+181%), and Indonesia's rise from 159 to 557 (+250%). This ups their rankings of total emissions in 2005 from 6 th to 3 rd , and 11 th to 4 th , respectively. Compared to Brazil and Indonesia, the impact of accounting for land use on other top 20 emitters is much less. The next biggest adjustment is for Mexico, whose emissions rise 6% when land use is accounted for. For the United States, net emissions drop by 32 MMTCE (-1.7%); its relative rank (as number 2 in 2005) does not change when land use is taken into account. Historic land use and forestry data are not available. Evaluating the impact of land use and forestry at any one time directs attention to those few countries undergoing particular points in the development cycle. For many countries, land-clearing and agricultural development occurred long ago: the Western developed nations and China and India, for example, have long-established agricultural practices; in contrast, Brazil and Indonesia have over the past few decades been clearing large regions of forest and jungle for timber and/or conversion to agriculture, releasing greenhouse gases (or removing sinks). In terms of the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, and potentially the Copenhagen Accord, including land use in the equation for controlling emissions disadvantages certain countries whose exploitation of resources and development of agriculture are occurring at a particular moment in history, while for other countries the effects of past changes in land use and forestry practices are embedded in their baseline emissions. The data on greenhouse gas emissions highlight issues of both effectiveness and fairness in the effort to address global climate change. Differentiating responsibilities between Annex I and non-Annex I nations, as the UNFCCC has, does not focus efforts on all of the largest emitters. As Table 1 shows, the emissions dominance of Annex I nations that existed in 1990 has ended: in 2005 non-Annex I nations' global greenhouse gas emissions definitively surpass those of Annex I nations, by a margin of 15% when taking land use and forestry into account. On the other hand, on the basis of energy-related CO 2 emissions, cumulative from 1850-2006, Annex I nations still dominate by margin of 3 to 1. Moreover, contradictory issues of fairness arise. For Annex I countries, the present scheme of controlling greenhouse gases requires them to bear essentially all the direct economic costs. For non-Annex I countries, to the extent that development is linked to increasing greenhouse gas emissions, imposing controls on them could slow their development and hold down their standards of living vis-a-vis the developed nations. Finally, the focus on emissions levels at specific times (e.g., a baseline of 1990) has differential and arbitrary impacts on individual nations. Looking at the industrialization process, to the extent that fossil fuel use is a necessary ingredient of economic development, as acknowledged by the UNFCCC, the emergence of the global climate change issue at this time effectively determines the distinction between the developed, Annex I nations and the developing, non-Annex I nations. For Annex I nations, that energy exploitation has been incorporated into their economies and is part of their baseline for considering any controls on greenhouse gases. For developing, non-Annex I nations, however, economic development will require expanded energy use, of which fossil fuels can be the least costly. Thus imposing limits on fossil energy use at this time could result in developing countries being relegated to a lower standard of living than those nations that developed earlier. Similarly, certain land-use activities, such as clearing land for agriculture and exploiting timber, affect net greenhouse gas emissions. Nations that are currently exploiting their resource endowments, such as Brazil and Indonesia, could find themselves singled out as targets for controls. Yet developed nations, like the United States and most European countries, which exploited such resources in the past, have those greenhouse gas implications embedded in their baselines. Also, the focus on 1990 as a baseline means that the Eastern European and former Soviet Union nations have the advantage of reductions in emissions from their subsequent economic contractions, which will allow them room for growth. Likewise, the discovery and exploitation of North Sea gas has allowed Great Britain to back out coal and thereby reduce emissions since the baseline. In all these cases, the time frame adopted for defining the climate change issue and for taking actions to address greenhouse gas emissions has differential impacts on individual nations, as a result of their individual resource endowments and stage of economic development. The differential impacts give rise to perceived inequities. Thus the effort to find a metric for addressing greenhouse gas emissions baselines and targets that will be perceived as equitable is challenging. The problems raised above prompt the question: What alternatives to controls derived from historically based emissions levels are available? Alternative metrics for taking into account greenhouse gas emissions and economic development include per capita emissions and economic intensity of emissions. The socioeconomic differences between the developed, Annex I nations and the developing nations lead to considerations about emissions other than simply their absolute amounts. One alternative is to consider per capita emissions: All else equal, populous nations would emit more greenhouse gases than less populated ones. On this basis, the difference between developed, Annex I countries and non-Annex I ones is apparent. Appendix A and Appendix B show that of the top 20 emitters in 2005, the highest ranked by per capita greenhouse gas emissions are developed countries (Australia, United States, and Canada, ranked 6, 9, and 10, respectively). Their per capita emissions (7.5, 6.4, and 6.2 tons per person, respectively) are nearly double the emissions of the highest-ranked developing country in the top 20 (South Korea, at 3.2), and over four times that of China (1.5). The rankings for the non-Annex I countries in the top 20 emitters range from 29 (South Korea) to 148 (India), with China ranked 81. In contrast, Annex I countries range from 6 (Australia) to 51 (France), with the United States at 9. Reasons the United States, Australia, and Canada are so high on this measure include their dependence on energy-intensive transport to move people and goods around countries of large size and relatively low population density, the use of coal for power generation, and the energy requirements for resource extraction industries. Thus, if one were considering how to control greenhouse gas emissions, one way of trying to bridge the different interests of the developed, Annex I nations and the developing ones would be to focus on per capita emissions as a way of giving each nation an equitable share of energy use. For the United States compared to the developing world, this metric could imply constraints, depending on the compliance time frame and future technological advancements. Likewise, this approach could permit most less-developed countries to increase their emissions to accommodate expanding economies. Another alternative for evaluating a nation's contribution to greenhouse gas emissions is to consider how efficiently that nation uses energy (and conducts other greenhouse gas-emitting activities) in producing goods and services. This concept is captured by greenhouse gas intensity--or carbon intensity --measured as the amount of greenhouse gases emitted per million dollars of gross domestic product, measured in international dollars (parity purchasing power) (see Appendix A and Appendix C ). Carbon intensity as a greenhouse gas indicator has received considerable attention since President Bush decided to use it as a benchmark for his voluntary climate change program. Also, the World Resources Institute has advocated its use as an appropriate index for developing, non-Annex I nations. A nation's greenhouse gas intensity reflects both its resource endowment and the energy-intensiveness of its economy. In terms of energy resources, countries with rich resources in coal would tend to be higher emitters, while countries with rich resources in hydropower or natural gas would tend to be lower emitters. In terms of economic activity, countries with major heavy industry, major extractive industries, and extensive transportation systems tend to be higher emitters, while countries without these and/or dominated by service industries would tend to be lower emitters. As noted in terms of emissions, taking into account land use sharply increases the greenhouse gas intensity of Brazil and Indonesia. The top 20 emitters in 2005 (see Appendix A and Appendix C ) range widely in greenhouse gas intensity: from 512 tons per million international $GDP (Ukraine, which relies heavily on coal) to 80 tons/million international $GDP (France, which relies heavily on nuclear power for generating electricity). (The larger the intensity number, the more GHGs emitted per dollar of GDP: from a climate change perspective, the lower the intensity the better.) These are both Annex I nations; non-Annex I nations have a narrower range, from the 136 tons/million international $GDP (Mexico) to 372 tons/million international $GDP (China). Taking into account land use, however, would dramatically raise the intensity of Brazil and Indonesia: in 2005 it jumped Brazil by 182%, to 490 tons/million international $GDP and Indonesia by 250%, to 790 tons/million international $GDP; the next largest increase from land use change was Mexico at 6%. As a metric for considering how to control greenhouse gas emissions, intensity has an inherent political appeal: for most nations, intensity is declining. For the world, greenhouse gas intensity declined at a rate of -1.6% annually from 1990 to 2005. Causes of this decline in intensity are cost efficiencies that focus attention on the efficient use of energy, policies promoting the use of alternatives to fossil fuels generally and to coal in particular, and substitutions for perfluoro- and hydrofluorocarbons. A consequence of focusing on intensity, however, is that even with declining intensity, actual emissions can rise as a result of population growth and economic growth. For greenhouse gas intensity, in 2005 the United States ranked number 122 in the world, making this a more favorable metric than absolute emissions (the United States ranked number 2 in the world) and per capita emissions (the United States ranked number 9). Of the indicators examined here, the United States gets the most favorable results from this one. Nevertheless, in absolute terms, the United States is relatively less efficient with respect to intensity compared with Western European countries (the EU-27 would have ranked 154) and Japan ranked 166. In addition, the United States is less efficient than non-Annex I emitters South Korea and Mexico, but it is more efficient than China, India, Brazil, South Africa, Indonesia, and Iran. In its positioning for the Copenhagen meeting, China pledged that it would cut its carbon intensity 40-45% by 2020 from a 2005 baseline. China's greenhouse gas intensity in 2005 ranked 34, indicating that its economy was comparatively GHG-inefficient, and suggesting that intensity reductions should be relatively easy to achieve. But in fact, based on CAIT data, this commitment simply reflects China's historical trend for intensity: for the 15-year period 1990 to 2005, China's carbon intensity, based on CO 2 emissions only, declined by 43% (its carbon-equivalent intensity, based on all six greenhouse gases, declined by 53%). As stated above, the data on greenhouse gas emissions highlight issues of both effectiveness and fairness with respect to current efforts to address global climate change. Differentiating responsibilities between Annex I and non-Annex I countries fails to focus efforts on all the largest emitters. In addition, contradictory issues of fairness arise, as Annex I countries bear essentially all the direct economic costs of reducing emissions, and non-Annex I countries are granted the right to increase emissions to meet developmental needs. Finally, the focus on historical emissions as a baseline for regulation has differential and arbitrary impacts on individual nations. The result of the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol's setting emissions targets for only developed nations and focusing on returning their emissions to a specific baseline is twofold: (1) the current regime has had little effect on global emissions, and will have little effect in the near future; and (2) the largest emitters, the United States and China, have not found it in their interests to join in the international effort to a significant degree. Indeed, the United States pulled completely out of the Kyoto process under the George W. Bush administration. This process has continued to be difficult, as the recent Copenhagen meetings illustrate. This history of the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol raises serious questions about how to develop greenhouse gas targets, time frames, and implementation strategies. With respect to targets, the UNFCCC recognized the right of developing countries to develop and the responsibility of all countries to protect the global climate. These goals of the UNFCCC suggest that if there is to be any permanent response to climate change that involves controlling greenhouse gases, then a regime that combines some measure reflecting the right of developing countries to develop, such as per capita emissions, and some measure reflecting the need to be efficient, such as carbon intensity, may be necessary to move the world toward a workable and effective climate change framework. As shown above a global target focused on per capita emissions generally rewards developing nations, providing them room for economic growth; the target's balance between limiting emissions and permitting growth determines the individual winners and losers. For example, based on Appendix B , a target of 3 tons carbon per person would allow all the developing nations in the top 20 emitters except South Korea growth room (South Korea is at 3.1 tons per capita), while five developed nations (United States, Russian Federation, Germany, Canada, and Australia) would have to make cuts. In contrast, a target focused on greenhouse gas intensity would have more diverse implications for developing nations. Several major developing nations produce considerably higher greenhouse gas emissions per million dollars of GDP than some developed nations. For example, in 2005 China's carbon intensity (372 tons/million international $GDP) was about four times that of the United Kingdom's (91) and Italy's (93). Thus a greenhouse gas intensity goal could be a counterforce to the economic development process for some countries, meaning that the winners and losers of a regime combining per capita and carbon intensity measures could be highly dynamic and contentious. Adding land-use implications would further complicate the regime, and selectively affect certain nations, especially those just now at the point of exploiting forests (notably Indonesia and Brazil). For the United States, a regime containing some mix of per capita and greenhouse gas intensity measures would likely imply a need to constrain emissions over some time frame. The U.S. greenhouse gas intensity is declining, as is the case with most nations, but the decrease currently does not completely offset increased emissions resulting from the growth of population and of the economy. The extent to which targets could translate into economic costs would depend on the other two features of the regulatory scheme: (1) time frame (specifically, whether it would accommodate technological advances in less-carbon-intensive technology or accelerated commercialization of existing low-carbon technologies such as nuclear power); (2) implementation strategy (specifically, whether it encourages least-cost solutions and development of advanced technologies). With respect to time frame, the data indicate two things: (1) most countries that achieved a significant reduction during the 1990s did so as a result of either an economic downturn or a substantial realignment in energy policy; (2) many countries have not been able to stabilize their emissions despite the UNFCCC's voluntary goal, much less reduce them. That failure was the impetus for the Kyoto Agreement's prescribed reductions and of the Copenhagen meeting. Using economic contraction as an emission reduction strategy can scarcely be considered an option. Instead, the substantial development and/or deployment of less-carbon-intensive technology, improved land-management strategies, and other actions would be necessary to achieve stabilized emissions. As noted above, greenhouse gas emissions are closely tied to industrialization--a synonym for "developed." With few exceptions, improvement in efficiency has been gradual. A permanent transformation of the global economy necessary to ensure a long-term stabilization of greenhouse gas emissions may involve a multi-stage, long-term time frame. The difficulty in implementing the UNFCCC suggests implementation and compliance are still an open issue. The United States submitted climate action plans during the 1990s indicating it would achieve the UNFCCC goal of returning emissions to 1990 levels. It did not. There were no sanctions. Likewise, some Kyoto signatories may not achieve their reduction targets in 2008-2012. The sanctions are unclear. Now, for the Copenhagen Accord, nations are asked to voluntarily commit to reductions. Given the wide range of situations illustrated by the data, a flexible strategy that permits each country to play to its strengths may make it easier for diverse countries like the United States and China to reach some acceptable agreement. The extent of flexibility would depend on the balance between emission reductions and economic cost designed into the targets, time frame, and implementation strategy. Market-based mechanisms to reduce emissions focus on specifying either the acceptable emissions level (quantity), or compliance costs (price), and allowing the marketplace to determine the economically efficient solution for the other variable. For example, a tradeable permit program sets the amount of emissions allowable under the program (i.e., the number of permits available caps allowable emissions), while permitting the marketplace to determine what each permit will be worth. Conversely, a carbon tax sets the maximum unit (per ton of CO 2 ) cost that one should pay for reducing emissions, while the marketplace determines how much actually gets reduced. Hence, a major implementation question is whether one is more concerned about the possible economic cost of the program and therefore willing to accept some uncertainty about the amount of reduction received (i.e., carbon taxes), or one is more concerned about achieving a specific emission reduction level with costs handled efficiently, but not capped (i.e., tradeable permits). Of course, combinations of these approaches are possible, depending on the flexibility desired. The data presented here portray a very wide range of situations and conditions among the 20 top countries that represent over 70% of total emissions. Significant flexibility may not only be desirable but necessary for them to reach any significant agreement. Appendix A. Relative Ranking of 20 Top Emitters (Plus EU-27) of Greenhouse Gases Based on 2005 Greenhouse Gas Emissions Appendix B. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Other Climate Change-Related Indicators for 2005 Top 20 Emitting Countries (Excludes Land Use Change & Forestry) Appendix C. Additional Emissions and Other Climate Change-Related Indicators for 2005 Top 20 Emitters

Using the World Resources Institute (WRI) database on greenhouse gas emissions and related data, this report examines two issues. The first issue is the separate treatment of developed and developing nations under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the Kyoto Protocol, and the Copenhagen Accord. This distinction has been a pivotal issue affecting U.S. climate change policy. The second issue is the difficulty of addressing climate change through limiting greenhouse gas emissions to a specified percentage of baseline emissions (typically 1990). The data permit examination of alternative approaches, such as focusing on per capita emissions or the greenhouse gas emission intensity (measured as emissions per unit of economic activity). Key findings include: A few countries account for most greenhouse gas emissions: in 2005, China led by emitting 19% of the world total, followed closely by the United States with 18%; no other country reached 6%; the top eight emitters (those emitting 2% or more of total emissions) accounted for 58% of the 185 nations' emissions. Land-use effects (e.g., deforestation) on emissions are negligible for most nations, but they cause emissions to rise sharply for certain developing nations, most notably Brazil and Indonesia. While countries whose economies are dominated by oil and gas production have the highest per capita greenhouse gas emissions, in general developed nations rank high in per capita emissions (in 2005, Australia, the United States, and Canada ranked 6, 9, and 10, respectively, in the world), while developing nations tend to rank low (China, Brazil, Indonesia, and India ranked 81, 84, 117, and 148, respectively). The greenhouse intensity of the economy--the metric by which the George W. Bush Administration addressed climate change, and by which China has proposed to set its objectives under the Copenhagen Accord--varies substantially among developed countries (in 2005, not accounting for land use, Ukraine emitted 512 tons/million international $GDP, while France emitted 80 tons/million $GDP, with the United States at 153 tons/million $GDP; developing nations range from the 136 (Mexico) to 372 (China). The time frame adopted for defining the climate change issue and for taking actions to address greenhouse gas emissions has differential impacts on individual nations, as a result of individual resource endowments (e.g., coal versus natural gas and hydropower) and stage of economic development (e.g., conversion of forest land to agriculture occurring before or after the baseline). Differentiating responsibilities between developed and developing nations--as the UNFCCC does--has failed to engage some of the largest emitters effectively. Moreover, many developed countries have not achieved stabilization of their emissions despite the UNFCCC. Given the wide range of situations illustrated by the data, a flexible strategy that allows each country to play to its strengths may be necessary if diverse countries like the United States and China are ever to reach agreement. The difficulty in finding a common strategy was evidenced by the outcome of the Copenhagen meeting, which set a climate change objective of holding global warming to less than 2 degrees C but then left up to each country the choice of how to address emissions.

Livestock grazing on federal lands primarily occurs on public lands managed by the Bureau of Land Management (BLM, in the Department of the Interior) and on National Forest System lands managed by the Forest Service (FS, in the Department of Agriculture). Both agencies operate under statutory principles of multiple use and sustained yield, with livestock grazing among generally authorized uses. Both agencies also charge fees for grazing on agency lands under a fee formula established in the Public Rangelands Improvement Act of 1978 and continued administratively. However, the agencies administer livestock grazing on their lands through somewhat different processes. The other two major federal land management agencies, the National Park Service and the Fish and Wildlife Service, have limited authorities allowing livestock grazing on their lands. Accordingly, this report provides information for BLM and FS only. The extent to which BLM and FS lands are protected and available for various land uses and activities is of perennial interest to Congress. Current congressional issues related to livestock grazing pertain to the fee level, terms and conditions of permits, and amount of grazing authorized, among other topics. This report provides data on the extent of livestock grazing in recent years to assist with congressional deliberations on uses of federal lands generally and availability of lands for livestock grazing in particular. It identifies factors that may have contributed to changes in the amount of livestock grazing over the past 15 years. However, it does not discuss the relative likelihood of any one of these factors to affect grazing trends at national, regional, or local levels. This report generally provides data on livestock grazing for BLM and FS from FY2002 to FY2016. It reflects four livestock data categories that can indicate the amount of grazing on federal land. However, for two of the four categories, data for FS are provided only for FY2006-FY2016 because the accuracy of available data for FY2002-FY2005 for those two categories could not be confirmed. The four categories roughly correspond with the number of livestock operators, the number of grazing permits and leases held by these operators, how much grazing could have been authorized for use, and how much grazing was actually used. The four categories are somewhat similar between the agencies, but the categories and terminology are not identical. For instance, whereas FS administers grazing through permits only, BLM authorizes grazing through both permits and leases. Also, both agencies authorize and bill for grazing in terms of livestock use and occupancy of the range for one month, under similar though not identical processes. The BLM measurement is referred to as animal unit months (AUMs), whereas FS uses the term head months (HD-MOs). As another example, those authorized to conduct grazing on BLM land--including individuals, groups, associations, or corporations--are referred to as livestock operators ; on FS lands, they are referred to as permittees . Such differences are reflected in the titles of the data categories presented. The four categories presented here do not reflect all potential indicators of livestock grazing that might be helpful in assessing changes over the specified time range, such as annual acreage of land available and used for livestock grazing. Although acreage statistics over time are not readily available, in recent years BLM has had more land available and used for livestock grazing than FS. For instance, in FY2015, BLM managed a total of 248.3 million acres, of which 154.8 million (62.3%) were available for livestock grazing and 138.8 million (55.9%) were used for grazing. By comparison, in FY2015, FS managed a total of 192.9 million acres, of which more than 95.0 million (49.2%) were available for grazing and 77.3 million (40.1%) were used for grazing. Table 1 , Figure 1 , and Figure 2 provide data for BLM. In Table 1 , the first column essentially reflects the number of individuals or entities authorized to graze livestock on BLM lands. However, operators with multiple permits or leases for the same kind of livestock may be counted multiple times, thus overrepresenting the number of operators. The second column shows the number of grazing permits and leases held by these operators; some operators hold more than one permit or lease. The third column, on AUMs in force, reflects the number of AUMs that could have been authorized for use. The fourth column, AUMs authorized, reflects the number of AUMs actually used and billed for. Table 2 , Figure 3 , and Figure 4 provide data for FS. In Table 2 , the first column reflects the number of individuals or entities that had active grazing permits and could have been authorized to graze. The second column reflects the number of permits held by these permittees. The third column shows the permitted HD-MOs of grazing that could have been authorized for use. The fourth column reflects the number of HD-MOs authorized to graze and billed for. For both agencies, the tables and figures show increases in grazing used over the period examined, as measured by the amount of time livestock spent on the range. For the other three categories of data, livestock grazing on BLM land was the same or somewhat less in FY2016 than in FY2002. FS had relatively larger declines over the years examined for the other three categories of livestock grazing. BLM livestock grazing data across all four categories examined remained relatively constant between FY2002 and FY2016. As shown in Table 1 , column 1, the number of operators authorized to graze livestock on BLM land was nearly identical in FY2002 and FY2016, the first and last years of the period examined. The average number of operators annually was 15,755. During the 15-year period, the highest number of operators was 16,416 in FY2006, the only year in which the figure exceeded 16,000. There was a difference of 954 between this high year and the lowest level of 15,462 in FY2005. As shown in Table 1 , column 2, the number of permits and leases held by livestock operators was 1.7% lower in FY2016 than in FY2002. During the 15-year period, the greatest number of permits and leases was 18,142 in FY2002. There was a difference of 448 between that high year and the lowest year during the period--FY2011--when there were 17,694 permits and leases. The average number of permits and leases was 17,852 annually. Figure 1 illustrates the changes in the numbers of BLM livestock operators and grazing permits and leases from FY2002 to FY2016. During the first 10 years (FY2002-FY2011), permits and leases declined fairly steadily and by 2.5% overall, as noted. They rose by 0.6% during the last five years (FY2012-FY2016). BLM authorizes grazing permits and leases in terms of AUMs, as noted above. Columns 3 and 4 of Table 1 provide data on AUMs. Figure 2 illustrates the changes in the numbers of AUMs in force and AUMs authorized for BLM lands. As shown in column 3 of the table, AUMs of grazing in force--reflecting AUMs that could have been authorized for use--have gradually decreased and were 2.6% less in FY2016 than in FY2002. The highest level of AUMs in force was 12.7 million in FY2005, for a difference of 337,475 between this year and the low of 12.4 million in FY2016. The average AUMS in force over the 15 years was 12.5 million. In each of the first seven years (FY2002-FY2008), AUMs in force ranged between approximately 12.5 million and 12.7 million annually. Since then, the annual totals have dropped to between 12.3 million and 12.5 million. As shown in column 4 of Table 1 , the number of AUMs that were actually authorized and billed for has varied over time and was 5.2% higher in FY2016 than in FY2002. This was the largest percentage difference of all four BLM data categories examined. AUMs authorized reached a high of nearly 9.0 million in FY2011. There was a difference of 1.5 million between this high and the period low of 7.5 million in FY2003. Over the 15 years, the average AUMs authorized each year was 8.4 million. As shown in Figure 2 , authorized AUMs were lowest during the first four years (FY2002-FY2006), when they were below 8.3 million each year. Since then, the figures have fluctuated between 8.3 million and 9.0 million annually. As noted above, FS data are provided for 15 years for two categories of livestock data but for 11 years for two other categories due to uncertainty about the reliability of earlier data. As shown in Table 2 , column 1, the number of livestock permit holders allowed to graze commercial livestock on FS land was 12.4% lower in FY2016 than in FY2006. In fact, in FY2006, the most permittees were allowed to graze--6,598--whereas in FY2016 the fewest were allowed to graze--5,779. There was a difference of 819 between these high and low years. The average number of permittees throughout the 11 years was 6,146 annually. Figure 3 illustrates the changes in the numbers of FS livestock permittees and active permits from FY2006 to FY2016. As shown in Figure 3 , the number of permittees declined steadily throughout the 11-year period. From FY2006 to FY2016, the number of active permits showed trends similar to those for the number of permit holders (see Table 2 , column 2). For instance, the number of active permits was 12.5% lower in FY2016 than in FY2006. In addition, the highest level was reached in FY2006, when there were 7,095 active permits, and the lowest level occurred in FY2016, when there were 6,211. There was a difference of 884 between these high and low years. The number of active permits averaged 6,601. As with the number of permittees, the number of active permits decreased steadily over the 11-year period, as shown in Figure 3 . As noted above, FS administers grazing in terms of HD-MOs, defined as the time in months that livestock spend on FS land. Columns 3 and 4 of Table 2 provide data on HD-MOs. Figure 4 illustrates the changes in the numbers of HD-MOs under permit and HD-MOs authorized from FY2002 to FY2016. As shown in column 3 of Table 2 , the number of HD-MOs under permit--the maximum number that could have been authorized for use--was 18.4% less in FY2016 than in FY2002. This was the largest change in the FS data categories examined. There was a high of 10.1 million HD-MOs under permit in FY2002 and a low of 8.2 million in FY2006, a difference of nearly 1.9 million. The average number of HD-MOs under permit was 8.7 million annually. There was significant annual variation in the data, particularly during the first four years of the 15-year period, as shown in Figure 4 . The number of HD-MOs that were actually authorized and billed for was 1.1% higher in FY2016 than in FY2002 (see column 4 of Table 2 ). Over the 15 years, HD-MOs ranged from a high of 7.3 million in FY2010 to a low of 5.1 million in FY2009, a difference of 2.2 million. Although the average was 6.5 million per year, the number of HD-MOs authorized varied widely over the period, as shown in Figure 4 . During the first several years (FY2002-FY2009), the figures averaged 6.1 million annually. Since FY2010, the average has increased to 6.9 million annually. There are similarities in the BLM and FS livestock data over the 15-year period examined. For instance, both agencies had more grazing permits than livestock operators or permittees, because some operators and permittees held more than one permit. Also, both agencies had considerably higher levels of grazing that could have been authorized for use than were actually used. The AUMs and HD-MOs actually used for grazing were likely less than the potential maximum due to voluntary nonuse for economic and other reasons, resource-protection needs, and forage depletion caused by drought and fire, among other reasons. In other ways, BLM and FS livestock grazing differed. As an example, BLM had higher levels of livestock grazing than FS in all four data categories. This difference is in part because BLM manages more acres of land generally and more acres of land for livestock grazing specifically than FS, as noted above. During the period of analysis, the agencies also experienced different patterns and amounts of change in the four categories of data. The amount of grazing used increased for both agencies from FY2002 to FY2016, but the increase was higher for BLM (5.2%) than for FS (1.1%). Grazing use was based on the amount of time livestock spent on the range, as measured in AUMs or HD-MOs. For the other three categories of data, there were either no changes or relatively small declines for BLM, whereas FS saw relatively larger decreases. With regard to the number of livestock operators, BLM started and ended the FY2002-FY2016 period with nearly the same level, with some fluctuation in between; by contrast, FS livestock permittees decreased steadily from FY2006 to FY2016 and ended the period down 12.4%. With regard to BLM permits and leases, there was a decrease over several years followed by a slight increase, with a 1.7% overall decline over the 15-year period. By contrast, FS active permits decreased steadily from FY2006 to FY2016 and by a larger amount--12.5% overall. With regard to the amount of grazing that could have been used, the BLM's AUMs declined between FY2002 and FY2016 by 2.6%, whereas FS's HD-MOs ended the same period down by 18.4%. The size of the change in livestock grazing on BLM and FS lands depends in part on the length of the period examined. For example, although AUMs used on BLM lands increased by 5.2% over the last 15 years, over the past several decades they declined significantly--about 52.2% from the 1954 level of 18.2 million AUMs. The size of the change also depends on the particular start and end years chosen. For instance, since FY2002, the HD-MOs that could have been authorized on FS lands have declined by 18.4%. However, since FY2006, they have increased by 0.5%. Changes in grazing on BLM and FS land nationally reflect a variety of different conditions on rangelands in diverse locations. No analysis was made for this report as to the extent of variation on particular rangelands in specific states or regions. Similarly, no examination was made of the effect of change in particular areas on the national levels reflected in this report. The specific factors that influenced each annual change in grazing nationally were not analyzed for this report. However, national grazing changes identified herein can be attributed to a variety of factors, including amendments to agency land use plans to accommodate other land uses, such as increased recreation. Resource protection needs, typically for water and wildlife resources, also can affect the timing and the amount of grazing. Forage depletion caused by drought or fire can reduce the amount of grazing, and significant rainfall can augment the availability of forage. More generally, matching forage production with livestock production for the long-term health of the rangeland is a factor affecting grazing in some areas. Another factor is voluntary nonuse by ranchers for a variety of reasons, including market, lifestyle, conservation, and others, as in the case of ranchers who use or sell their land for other purposes. Development of nearby private land also can influence grazing on federal land, for example, by impacting the free flow of livestock between ownerships.

Livestock grazing on federal lands primarily occurs on lands of the Bureau of Land Management (BLM, in the Department of the Interior) and the Forest Service (FS, in the Department of Agriculture). Both agencies manage lands under sustained-yield and multiple-use principles, with livestock grazing among generally authorized uses. Congress continues to be interested in the extent to which BLM and FS lands are protected and used for a variety of activities, including livestock grazing. This report provides data on the extent of livestock grazing in recent years to assist with congressional deliberations on uses of federal lands generally and decisionmaking on the availability of lands for livestock grazing in particular. This report generally provides data for 15 years, from FY2002 to FY2016, for four categories of livestock data. The four categories of data are similar but not identical between the agencies. The categories roughly correspond with the number of livestock operators, the number of grazing permits and leases held by these operators, how much grazing could have been authorized for use, and how much grazing was actually used. Both agencies saw increases over the period in the amount of grazing used, based on the time livestock spent on the range. This time is measured in animal unit months (AUMs) for BLM and head months (HD-MOs) for FS. The increase in the amount of grazing was higher for BLM (5.2%) than for FS (1.1%). For the other three categories of data, livestock grazing on BLM land was the same or somewhat less in FY2016 than in FY2002. FS saw relatively larger declines than BLM for these other three categories of livestock grazing. With regard to livestock operators, BLM started and ended the FY2002-FY2016 period with nearly the same number, with some fluctuation in between, whereas the number of FS livestock permittees decreased steadily from FY2006 to FY2016 and ended the period down 12.4%. Regarding the number of BLM permits and leases, there was a relatively small overall decline of 1.7% from FY2002 to FY2016. By contrast, the number of FS active permits decreased steadily from FY2006 to FY2016 and by a larger amount--12.5% overall. As for the amount of grazing that could have been used, BLM's AUMs declined by 2.6% between FY2002 and FY2016, whereas FS's HD-MOs declined by 18.4% over the same period. The size of the change in livestock grazing on BLM and FS lands depends on the length of the period examined and the particular years of analysis. For instance, although AUMs used on BLM lands increased by 5.2% over the last 15 years, since 1954 there has been a 52.2% reduction in the number of AUMs--from 18.2 million to about 8.7 million. Changes in grazing on BLM and FS lands nationally reflect a variety of different conditions on rangelands in diverse locations. The national changes can be attributed to various factors, including amendments to agency land use plans, resource protection needs and the long-term health of rangelands, the effect of weather (e.g., rain/drought) and fire on forage, voluntary nonuse by permit holders for a variety of reasons, and development on nearby private lands. The relative extent to which any one of these factors contributed to any national, regional, or local changes in grazing on federal lands is beyond the scope of this report.

The Weather Research and Forecasting Innovation Act of 2017 ( P.L. 115-25 ) addresses a broad range of National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) activities in five titles: Titles I through IV primarily address weather-related programs, policies, and activities, and Title V amends the Tsunami Warning and Education Act (Title VIII of P.L. 109-479 ). This report discusses Titles I through IV; Title V of P.L. 115-25 is addressed in CRS Report R44834, The U.S. Tsunami Program Reauthorization in P.L. 115-25: Section-by-Section Comparison to P.L. 109-479, Title VIII . In P.L. 115-25 , Congress provides direction to NOAA regarding the agency's research and development (R&D) activities, with the broad goal of improving weather forecasting, warnings, and communication to recipients and users of weather information. Congress has held hearings and introduced legislation in the past two Congresses on topics that are incorporated into P.L. 115-25 . Thus the law reflects many of the priorities and issues of interest to Members of Congress regarding improving forecasts, coordination, and communication in the weather enterprise; incorporating commercially available weather data into forecasts and warnings; and enhancing the research-to-operations pathway so that new scientific and technological advances can be incorporated more rapidly into forecasts and warnings, among other topics. In addition to emphasizing the transfer of R&D advances to operations at the National Weather Service (NWS), Title I of P.L. 115-25 includes a sense of Congress that not less than 30% of funding for weather R&D at NOAA's Office of Oceanic and Atmospheric Research (OAR) should be made available to the nonfederal weather research community, which includes academia, private-sector entities, and nongovernmental organizations. Title II of P.L. 115-25 centers on improving NWS forecasts, specifically subseasonal and seasonal forecasts, defined in the law as forecasts of two weeks to three months and forecasts of three months to two years, respectively. Title III focuses on weather satellites, including microsatellite constellations, and future needs of the weather satellite observing systems. Title III also includes direction on the acquisition of commercial weather data; it requires NOAA to evaluate whether commercial weather data from satellites could meet some or all of NOAA's future needs. Title IV directs NOAA to coordinate weather data and observations; improve the exchange of expertise between R&D and operational activities; enhance communication of watches and warnings of hazardous weather events; improve outreach to the weather enterprise; and study gaps in the national NEXRAD coverage, among other topics. This report discusses each title briefly by summarizing selected sections. Furthermore, the report identifies where NOAA is required to report to Congress on its progress in fulfilling the legislation's requirements. The summaries of each title in this report include information on these required studies and reports to Congress as well as on other new activities due prior to the adjournment of the 115 th Congress. Congress may exert its oversight capacity to evaluate NOAA's success in fulfilling congressional direction provided in the legislation. Title I of P.L. 115-25 focuses on authorizing R&D efforts at NOAA, mostly led by the OAR, primarily to improve forecasts and warnings of potentially damaging weather events. Title I addresses a broad array of activities authorized in the legislation that would, if implemented, range from conducting basic R&D on weather to enhancing the observing systems to improve the data used for forecasts and warnings. Title I also requires NOAA to address the issue of how to improve the incorporation of research findings into NWS operations. The research-to-operations challenge also is addressed in other titles of P.L. 115-25 . Section 101 states that the priorities for the R&D efforts shall be the protection of life and property and the enhancement of the national economy. Section 102 authorizes a broad portfolio of R&D activities to address the priorities in Section 101, such as improving the fundamental understanding of weather; enhancing the understanding of how the public receives, interprets and responds to dangerous weather; and facilitating the transfer of knowledge, technologies, and applications to NWS. Sections 103 and 104 focus on tornadoes and hurricanes, respectively. The goal of Section 103 is to reduce loss of life and economic damage from tornadoes by improving tornado forecasts, predictions, and warnings. The act requires NOAA to create a tornado warning improvement and extension program plan to achieve its goal and to submit to Congress a proposed budget for its tornado program plan activities each year. The goal of Section 104 is to improve hurricane forecasting to reduce loss of life, injuries, and economic damage. The section requires NOAA to maintain a project to improve hurricane forecasting, and to develop a plan to implement the hurricane project. The tornado plan and the hurricane plan are due within 180 days and one year of enactment, respectively (i.e., by October 2017 and April 2018). Section 105 requires an R&D and research-to-operations plan within one year of enactment (i.e., by April 2018), with the goal of restoring and maintaining U.S. leadership in numerical weather forecasting and prediction. The section also requires NOAA to consult with the National Science Foundation, the U.S. weather industry, and academic partners to identify research necessary to enhance the integration of social science research into weather forecasts and warnings. Sections 106-109 deal with observation systems; observing system simulation experiments; computer resources; and activities to help operationalize R&D so that it can used by NWS for forecasts and warnings. Title I would authorize $111.52 million per year for FY2017 and FY2018 for OAR R&D and an additional $20 million per year for the technology transfer initiative authorized in Section 102. Section 201 of Title II of P.L. 115-25 amends P.L. 99-198 (15 U.S.C. 313 note) to add eight subsections (c through j) with the primary goal of improving temperature and precipitation forecasts in subseasonal forecasts (forecasts of two weeks to three months) and seasonal forecasts (forecasts of three months to two years). This section of Title II amends the part of the U.S. C ode that declares it is in the public interest that the federal government be involved in providing weather and climate information useful for agriculture and silviculture. Improving forecasts during the time spans defined as subseasonal and seasonal aligns with improving the forecasts needed by agricultural and silvicultural interests. The subsections summarized below expand on functions and requirements for these forecasts more broadly. Subsection 201(c) requires that the Director of NWS collect and use information to make subseasonal and seasonal forecasts; use existing models and research to improve those forecasts; determine how those forecasted conditions will affect severe weather and other weather-related natural hazards; and develop an Internet clearinghouse to share the forecasts and accompanying information. Subsection 201(d) requires the NWS director to provide the forecasts and accompanying information to the public. Subsection 201(e) requires NOAA to designate research and monitoring required for the subseasonal and seasonal forecasts as a priority in one or more of the solicitations of the Cooperative Institutes of Oceanic and Atmospheric Research; to contribute to the interagency Earth System Prediction Capability; and to consult with the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Homeland Security to determine the highest priorities for their departments regarding subseasonal and seasonal forecasts. Subsection 201(f) requires NOAA to foster communication, understanding, and use of the forecasts by the intended users. It gives NOAA discretion to provide assistance to states for individuals who would be designated "forecast communication coordinators," who would serve as liaisons among federal agencies and other entities of the weather enterprise and who would receive and disseminate the subseasonal and seasonal forecasts. NOAA support would be limited to $100,000 per year per state and would require a 50% match (from the state, a university, a nongovernmental organization, a trade association, or the private sector). Subsection 201(g) requires other federal agencies to cooperate with NOAA. Subsection 201(h) requires a report to Congress on implementation of the subseasonal and seasonal forecasts, due within 18 months of enactment (October 2018). Subsection 201(i) defines terms used in Section 201. Subsection 201(j) authorizes appropriations of $26.5 million per year to carry out these activities in FY2017 and FY2018. Title III of P.L. 115-25 addresses two main issues: (1) weather satellites and (2) commercial weather data. The topics are interrelated. Title III provides direction for NOAA regarding current and future weather satellite data needs and authorizes NOAA to consider how commercially provided weather satellite data could enhance and improve observations, leading to better forecasts and warnings in the future. Section 301 of Title III of P.L. 115-25 addresses microsatellites, integration of data from the ocean observing system, and a study and report on future satellite data needs. Subsection 301(a) requires NOAA to complete and operationalize the microsatellite project called the Constellation Observing System for Meteorology, Ionosphere, and Climate (COSMIC-1 and COSMIC-2). NOAA is to deploy microsatellites in polar and equatorial orbits, integrate the satellite data into operational and research weather forecast models, and make the data free and available to everyone. The COSMIC satellite system makes use of a technique called radio occultation, using radio signals from global positioning satellites (GPS), which allows high-precision measurements of the global atmosphere. The data from the COSMIC mission, combined with other atmospheric data, likely would improve the precision and accuracy of weather forecasts and warnings. Subsection 301(a) also requires the NWS director to integrate data collected by the Integrated Ocean Observing System into regional weather forecasts and to support the development of real-time data-sharing products and forecast products. It requires NOAA to identify where monitoring and observing systems have degraded and may have reduced the quality of weather forecasts. Subsection 301(a) requires NOAA to follow report recommendations, authorized under Subsection 301(b), on specifications for weather satellite systems. Subsection 301(b) requires NOAA to enter into an agreement with the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) to conduct a study on future weather satellite needs. The resulting report is due within two years of entering into the agreement for the study. If an agreement cannot be achieved with NAS, Subsection 301(b) would allow NOAA to enter into an agreement with another nonfederal government entity with expertise and objectivity comparable to NAS. The legislation authorizes $1 million total for the study and report during FY2018 and FY2019. Subsection 302(a) authorizes NOAA to purchase weather data from commercial sources and to place NOAA weather satellites on government or private-sector payloads for launch into orbit. Subsection 302(b) directs NOAA, within 180 days of enactment (October 2017), to submit to Congress a strategic plan for procuring commercial weather data. Congress has expressed interest in expanding NOAA's use of commercially available weather data for at least the previous two Congresses. Outstanding issues include whether and how commercially available data meet the requirements and specifications for use in NOAA's forecasts and warnings. Subsection 302(c) authorizes NOAA to address some of these issues. The subsection requires NOAA to publish data and metadata standards and specifications for space-based commercial weather data within 30 days of enactment (i.e., due by May 2017). It also requires NOAA to publish standards and specifications for geostationary hyperspectral sounder data as soon as possible. Subsection 302(c) requires NOAA to conduct at least one pilot program by contracting with one or more private-sector data providers that can meet the standards and specifications that NOAA would develop and publish. Within three years of the pilot project contract agreement, Subsection 302(c) requires NOAA to submit a report to Congress on the pilot program's progress toward meeting the criteria developed and published earlier. The law authorizes appropriations of $6 million annually for FY2017 through FY2020. Subsection 302(d) requires NOAA to obtain commercial weather data from the private sector, depending on whether the pilot program is deemed successful. The subsection also requires NOAA to determine whether a government meteorological space system is required, if NOAA finds that commercial data sources can meet any or all of the observational requirements of such a system. This provision implies that if commercial vendors can provide data that meet all the requirements developed by NOAA, then NOAA would determine if a federal government weather satellite system is in the national interest. The legislation requires NOAA to report to Congress on its determination. Subsection 302(e) requires that NOAA continue to meet its existing international meteorological agreements, including practices set forth in World Meteorological Organization Resolution 40. Section 303 requires NOAA to avoid unnecessary duplication between private and public sources of data. Title IV of P.L. 115-25 contains 14 sections that deal with a wide range of NOAA activities, most of which address coordination, communication, and issues related to data sharing and exchanges of personnel to foster better interaction between research scientists and practitioners. Some of the authorized activities focus on improving NWS outreach to user communities, and other sections address specific issues that Congress previously has identified as possible weaknesses in the weather enterprise, namely possible gaps in ground-based radar coverage by NEXRAD systems. Section 401 instructs NOAA to maintain its Environmental Services Working Group to provide advice for prioritizing weather research and for existing and emerging technologies, to identify opportunities to improve communications between all entities within the weather enterprise, and to advise on other issues. Section 401 requires the working group to be composed of at least 15 members, experts in all fields relevant to weather, and requires the working group to submit an annual report on NOAA's progress in implementing working group recommendations. Section 402 requires the director of the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy to establish an Interagency Committee for Advancing Weather Services. The committee is charged with coordinating weather research and innovation activities across the federal government. The Federal Coordinator for Meteorology will serve as co-chair of the committee. Section 403 allows the directors of OAR and NWS to detail up to 10 personnel from one office to the other in an exchange program to allow OAR scientists and NWS operational staff to interact. Section 404 allows the NWS director to host postdoctoral fellows and academic researchers--for up to one year--at any of the NOAA National Centers for Environmental Prediction, to allow forecasters and academic researchers to interact directly and to foster innovation at NWS. Section 405 requires the NWS director to designate at least one warning coordination meteorologist at each weather forecast office to increase impact-based decision support services. The legislation requires that each warning coordination meteorologist (1) provide service to the geographic area covered by the weather forecast office; (2) work with all users of NWS products and services to evaluate their utility; (3) collaborate with state, local, and tribal agencies to improve products and services for those entities; (4) maintain severe weather call lists, severe weather policy and procedures, and severe weather dissemination methodologies and strategies; and (5) work with state, local, and tribal emergency managers to ensure better preparedness and response. The NWS director may assign other responsibilities in addition to the five required above. The NWS director also may place a warning coordination meteorologist with a state or local emergency manager. Section 406 requires NOAA to assess its system for issuing hazardous weather and water event watches and warnings within two years of enactment (i.e., by April 2019) and to submit the resulting report to Congress. The assessment's focus is to include how best to communicate risks that would improve mitigation, enhance broad and rapid communication to the public, preserve benefits of the existing system, and maintain the system's utility for government and commercial users. The legislation requires NOAA to consult with a wide variety of individuals and entities within the weather enterprise and to make use of NAS, if practicable. The legislation also requires NOAA to make recommendations to Congress to improve the system, based on the results of the study. Section 407 authorizes the NWS director to establish the NOAA Weather Ready All Hazards Award Program, which would provide annual awards to individuals or organizations that use or provide NOAA Weather Radio receivers or transmitters to save lives and protect property. Individuals and organizations that employ tools other than NOAA Weather Radios for early warnings also may qualify for the award. Section 408 requires NOAA to submit a report to Congress within 60 days of enactment (i.e., by June 2017) that analyzes the impact of the U.S. Air Force withdrawal from the U.S. Weather Research and Forecasting Model. Section 409 requires NOAA to continue its contract with an external organization to conduct a baseline analysis of NWS operations and workforce. Section 410 requires NOAA to submit a report to Congress within 180 days of enactment (October 2017) on the use of contractors at NWS for the FY2017 fiscal year. The section also requires that NOAA include eight different types of information in this report and make that information publicly available each year within 180 days after the end of the fiscal year. Section 411 requires the NWS director to review the service's research, products, and services regarding modeling and forecasting in the urban environment and to submit a report to Congress on the findings. Section 412 authorizes NOAA to establish outreach mechanisms to the weather enterprise by assessing the agency's forecasts and forecast products and by determining the highest forecast needs of the weather-enterprise community. Section 413 requires NOAA to acquire backup capabilities for its WP-3D Orion and G-IV hurricane hunter aircraft. Section 414 requires the Secretary of Commerce to complete a study within 180 days of enactment (October 2017) on gaps in coverage of NEXRAD. The section requires the Secretary to identify areas that have limited or no NEXRAD coverage for which no or insufficient warnings were given for hazardous weather events or for which degraded forecasts resulted in deaths, injuries, or substantial property damage. It also requires the Secretary to submit a report on the study's findings to Congress and to submit within 90 days of the study's completion (i.e., by January 2018) the Secretary's recommendations for improving hazardous weather detection and forecasting in the areas identified as having limited or no NEXRAD coverage. Congress provides broad and far-ranging direction regarding weather-related activities for NOAA and NWS in the first four titles of P.L. 115-25 . Some might argue that this law may represent the most widely varied set of provisions addressing weather issues at NOAA in a single bill since NOAA was first organized. Throughout P.L. 115-25 , Congress requires reports on progress in meeting its authorizations over time frames from 30 days to several years. The reports will allow Congress to track NOAA's progress in implementing the specific requirements outlined in the law over the short term. The law's long-term goal is to improve weather forecasts and warnings to reduce damage to property and decrease the number of injuries and fatalities from severe weather events. Some of the issues Congress might consider in the short term include whether the level of enacted appropriations for activities authorized in P.L. 115-25 is commensurate with the scale and scope of those activities. Over the long term, Congress may choose to assess whether the law's research-to-operations focus is resulting in improved forecasts and warnings. In addition, congressional interest in the use of commercially provided weather data has spurred NOAA to examine the viability of commercial data sources. The new law aims to give Congress more information to help evaluate the potential for commercial data sources to represent an increasingly greater share of data useful for improving forecasts and warnings. Conversely, the activities authorized under P.L. 115-25 also may indicate the limitations for using commercial data in producing better forecasts and warnings, whether those limitations arise for financial, data-quality, availability, or other reasons. Title IV of P.L. 115-25 addresses more than a dozen different weather-related issues, most of which pertain to improving coordination and communication between NOAA and the weather enterprise. In the future, Congress could conduct hearings and other activities related to its oversight responsibilities, to seek information from stakeholders outside the federal government to help gauge the effectiveness of NOAA's implementation of activities authorized in Title IV. The test of whether congressional direction in P.L. 115-25 is effective ultimately will be gauged by how improvements in forecasts and warnings ameliorate the amount of damage from severe weather and reduce the numbers of injuries and fatalities from dangerous storms.

Congress provides direction on a broad range of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's (NOAA's) weather-related activities in Titles I through IV of P.L. 115-25, the Weather Research and Forecasting Innovation Act of 2017, signed into law on April 18, 2017. The legislation aims to improve NOAA's weather forecasts and warnings, both for the protection of lives and property and for the enhancement of the national economy. The act also covers topics such as future weather satellite data needs, gaps in the Next Generation Weather Radar (NEXRAD) coverage, and improvements in the transfer of advances in research and development to National Weather Service (NWS) operations. Title V of P.L. 115-25 covers NOAA's tsunami program activities and is addressed in CRS Report R44834, The U.S. Tsunami Program Reauthorization in P.L. 115-25: Section-by-Section Comparison to P.L. 109-479, Title VIII. Congress began holding hearings on many of the issues addressed in P.L. 115-25 nearly four years ago, and the final law incorporates components of various bills introduced in the House and Senate since the 113th Congress. For example, the issue of improving seasonal forecasts, reflected in Title II of P.L. 115-25, was introduced in S. 1331 in the 114th Congress. Congress also has held hearings on how NOAA could use commercially provided satellite weather data, and NOAA has responded by initiating a preliminary program on the use of commercial data. P.L. 115-25 codifies NOAA's authority to purchase commercial weather data and requires the agency to deliver a strategic plan for commercial data acquisition within 180 days of enactment. Members also have expressed interest in improving coordination and communication throughout the weather enterprise, topics both addressed in Title IV of P.L. 115-25. This report provides an overview of each title in P.L. 115-25. Among other topics, Title I addresses the transfer of research and development (R&D) advances from NOAA's Office of Oceanic and Atmospheric Research (OAR) to operations at NWS. Title I also includes a sense of Congress that not less than 30% of the funding for weather R&D at NOAA should be made available to the nonfederal weather research community; Title II focuses on improving forecasts at NWS; Title III addresses the future of weather satellites and NOAA's use of commercially provided weather data ; and Title IV provides congressional direction to NOAA on coordinating weather data and observations; improving the exchange of expertise among NOAA entities; enhancing communication of watches and warnings of hazardous weather events; and conducting outreach to the nonfederal and federal entities in the broader weather enterprise, among other topics. P.L. 115-25 also includes requirements for various reports to Congress and other goals and deliverables, many of which are due during the 115th Congress. As a result, Congress is expected to have many opportunities to track NOAA's progress in implementing P.L. 115-25. Ongoing questions include if appropriated amounts will be sufficient to meet authorized activities and priorities expressed in the law and to what degree NOAA will implement the activities and priorities provided in P.L. 115-25.

In January 2016, Senator Orrin Hatch, chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, announced plans for a tax reform that would explore corporate integration. Corporate integration involves the elimination or reduction of additional taxes on corporate equity investment that arise because corporate income is taxed twice. The corporation pays corporate tax (at 35% for large corporations) on its taxable income. Individuals pay individual income taxes on dividends and capital gains (which arise from corporate retained earnings) when realized. This system produces differential tax burdens, potentially discouraging the realization of gains on the sale of corporate stock and favoring noncorporate equity investment over corporate investment, debt finance over equity finance, and retained earnings over dividends. One goal of corporate integration is to reduce or eliminate these distortions. The focus on corporate tax integration differs from the approach in some recent tax reform plans that have proposed broadening the base of the corporate tax, reducing the corporate tax rate, and revising the tax treatment of foreign source income. This report provides an overview of CRS Report R44638, Corporate Tax Integration and Tax Reform , by [author name scrubbed], which contains a detailed analysis of corporate tax integration issues, data sources, and documentation. Corporate tax integration was the focus of a 1992 Treasury study, which recommended approaches to integration that reduced or eliminated taxes at the shareholder level while retaining taxes at the corporate level, including an exclusion of dividends for shareholders. Over the years, taxes on shareholders have been reduced. Dividends and capital gains are typically taxed at rates of 15% or 20% (whereas the top ordinary income tax rate is 39.6%), plus, for some high-income taxpayers, an additional 3.8% tax that applies to passive investment income in general. Several important factors in considering proposals have changed since 1992, aside from the lower shareholder taxes. One is the increased importance of a global economy and multinational firms with investments and activities in many countries. These firms' choices about the location of investment and profits are affected by firm-level rather than shareholder-level taxes. A second is that the fraction of shareholders who are not subject to U.S. shareholder taxes has increased. Currently only about a quarter of the corporate stock of U.S. firms is estimated to be owned by shareholders subject to U.S. individual tax (compared with about half in 1992). Inflation has declined, affecting tax rates. Tax-favored intangible assets, which are more important in the corporate sector, have also grown in importance. The United States has a "classical" corporate tax system, modified by lower taxes on dividends and capital gains. Corporate taxable profits are subject to a 35% rate for large corporations. Firms distribute after-tax profits as dividends or retain earnings for investment; the latter increases the firm's value, creating capital gains. If all profits were taxed at the statutory rate, distributed as a dividend, and then taxed at ordinary rates to a shareholder in the 35% bracket, the total tax on a corporate investment would be 58% (a 35% corporate tax and an additional 35% on the remaining 65% of profit) compared with a tax rate of 35% on noncorporate investment, for a 23 percentage point difference. Those effects, however, are smaller because of favorable treatment of dividends and capital gains (the top rate is 23.8%); options to invest stock through tax-exempt accounts, such as retirement plans, that pay no shareholder-level tax; and tax preferences that lower the effective corporate tax rate more than the effective noncorporate rate. Tax treatment at the shareholder level depends on the type of shareholder. As noted above, most stock is held in forms not subject to U.S. individual income tax. Shareholders are treated differently if they are (1) U.S. individuals (a 25% share), paying an estimated tax rate of 13.7%; (2) U.S. tax-exempt entities and tax deferred entities (a 50% share) paying no tax, or (3) foreign shareholders (a 25% share) paying a 3.2% estimated U.S. tax rate. The tax rates at the shareholder level are paid on income net of the corporate effective tax rate (estimated to be about 20% overall for new investment). The data on shareholder distribution do not include U.S. subsidiaries of foreign firms, whose holdings are estimated at 79% of the holdings of foreign shareholders in U.S. parented firms. Income of pass-through (referred to as noncorporate) businesses is subject only to the individual tax, with income allocated to each owner. These firms include sole proprietorships, partnerships (including limited liability corporations), and Subchapter S firms that are corporations but elect to be taxed as pass-throughs. The overall statutory tax rate is estimated to be 28% (although the effective rate is lower). In determining the effect of the business tax system and in designing integration proposals, an important issue is that of tax preferences: provisions that cause the effective tax rate to be less than the statutory rate. The most important tax preference that affects burdens on domestic investment is accelerated depreciation, which allows deductions for costs to be recovered faster than is justified by the economic decline in the value of the asset (including an immediate deduction for investment in intangibles). Other preferences are the production activities deduction, which allows a deduction for domestic production in certain industries, and the tax credit for intangible investment in research. Foreign source income is also taxed at a lower rate. If firms borrow to finance investments, the interest is deducted. The deduction of interest goes beyond eliminating the corporate tax on profits attributable to debt finance, because the rate at which profit is effectively taxed is lower than the rate at which interest is deducted due to tax preferences and inflation. Interest income, including the inflation portion of the nominal interest rate, is subject to tax by creditors, but the tax rates are lower than the corporate rate (estimated at 24%). In addition, only a small fraction of that interest, 19%, is estimated to be subject to tax. Interest paid to foreign persons is subject to a negligible withholding tax. The growth in the importance of foreign source income has changed the way corporate integration is viewed, compared with the focus in 1992. The U.S. corporate level tax is largely imposed on a source basis, reflecting the taxes in the jurisdiction where the activity takes place. Thus, a lower corporate tax generally encourages more equity (although not necessarily debt-financed) investment in the United States as compared with foreign countries. The shareholder and creditor taxes are imposed on a residence basis and apply regardless of investment location. The corporate tax is technically imposed on worldwide income, but tax is not paid on the earnings of foreign subsidiaries in most cases until and if income is repatriated (or paid as a dividend to the U.S. parent). Because a fraction of profits is reinvested permanently (as plant and equipment), some share of this income is never taxed. In addition, foreign source income is eligible for credits against U.S. tax liability for taxes paid to foreign governments. Because excess credits from higher-tax countries can be used to offset U.S. tax liability from low-tax countries, the U.S. effective tax rate is small. Overall, the average tax rate paid on foreign source income is estimated at 17.4%, 14.1% paid in foreign taxes and a residual tax of 3.3% paid to the United States. One objective of corporate tax integration is to reduce the distortions caused by the current tax treatment. The estimated magnitude of the distortions arising from the corporate tax and other elements of the tax system can be shown through effective tax rates on the returns to new investment at the margin. Estimates presented are the effective corporate tax alone (the firm-level tax), an effective total corporate tax including shareholder or creditor taxes, and an effective tax rate on unincorporated businesses including all taxes. Table 1 shows the effective tax rates using the basic assumptions about shareholder and noncorporate average statutory tax rates and the Congressional Budget Office's (CBO's) alternative set of assumptions of these statutory tax rates. For domestic equity investments, the overall effective tax rate at the firm level is estimated at 19.7%, or only 56% of the statutory rate of 35%. Across groups of assets, tax rates range from -63.3% for intangible investments in research to 30.8% for nonresidential structures. These rates compare to estimated marginal rates on foreign investment of 13%. Additional shareholder taxes add less than three percentage points. The total corporate tax rate is estimated at 22.4%, only slightly above the rate on unincorporated business of 21.1%. Returns on debt-financed investment in the corporate sector are subject to firm level negative effective tax rates of -53.5%; shareholder tax rates lower the negative tax (or subsidy) to -44%. The return on investment by unincorporated business is estimated to have a negative tax rate of -20.6%. A weighted average of debt and equity has a firm-level tax of 5.7%, an overall corporate tax rate of 7.8% and a rate on unincorporated business of 11.8%. These estimated rates show a small difference in tax burden overall between equity invested in the corporate versus the noncorporate sector, but show large differences across assets and large differences between debt and equity. Under current law, the incentive to retain earnings because part of capital gains (estimated at half) generated by those earnings escapes tax is small, both because of the low rates and the significant share of stock held by nontaxable entities. For individuals subject to the income tax, the estimated tax rate is 17% and half of that rate is 8.5%. For foreign shareholders, dividends are taxed at 5.9% on average and capital gains are not taxed, so the differential is 5.9%. Weighted for all taxpayers the difference between the tax on dividends and capital gains is 3.6%. Similarly, the incentive not to realize gain on stocks is likely small because of the low rate of 17% is paid by only a quarter of shareholders, for a weighted average of 4.25%. A number of approaches to integration are possible. These approaches can be divided into three basic types: (1) full integration; (2) partial integration, which addresses only dividends; and (3) proposals that also address the treatment of interest. They also depend on many other features, including the pass-through of preferences, which are addressed in more detail in CRS Report R44638, Corporate Tax Integration and Tax Reform . Full integration would eliminate one of the levels of taxation and apply both to dividends and retained earnings. Some approaches include taxing only at the shareholder level, some include taxing only at the corporate level, and some include a combination of both. A modified partnership treatment would impute corporate taxable income to shareholders based on who receives dividends. The income would be taxed at ordinary rates. Tax preferences would be passed through to shareholders. The corporation would collect a withholding tax that could then be credited to shareholders. The tax could be made refundable, so that tax-exempt investors would pay no tax, or it would be nonrefundable, so that foreigners and tax-exempt shareholders would pay the corporate level tax, and taxable individuals would pay tax at the individual rate. For administrative reasons, and because shareholders may face taxes larger than their distributions, a standard partnership treatment is not generally believed to be feasible. Mark to Market would repeal the corporate tax for publicly traded firms, tax dividends and capital gains at ordinary rates, and mark the value of stock to market--that is, tax capital gains on the stock regardless of whether it was sold. This approach would eliminate preferences. Privately traded firms would receive pass-through treatment. Mark-to-market would impose a tax on tax-exempt shareholders at any level (although a tax could be imposed on them directly). One issue with this approach is that shareholders would be taxed on income not received. An alternative to taxing shareholders and eliminating the corporate level tax is to impose the corporate level tax and eliminate taxes on dividends and on capital gains from corporate stock. This approach would lose some revenue, but would simplify the tax system. Probably the major objection to this approach is that the firm level tax determines the allocation of investment for multinational firms, and this approach would not reduce that tax. The current reduced rates on dividends and capital gains have taken a step in this direction. The final full integration proposal would tax dividends to shareholders by allowing a corporate dividend deduction, while eliminating capital gains tax on corporate stock. This treatment is identical to the partial integration dividend deduction proposals, with the added effect of eliminating capital gains taxes. The second major category of proposals removes the double tax on corporate income only for dividends. As with full integration, the alternative is to tax at the firm level or individual level. One approach would allow a dividend deduction with a withholding tax. Shareholders would pay tax on dividends plus the withholding tax and receive credits for the withholding tax (which could be refundable or nonrefundable). Dividend relief proposals often limit the relief to dividends paid out of taxable income. There are indications that Chairman Hatch is considering this approach. This approach would allow dividends to be excluded from shareholders' income and thus only the corporate tax would apply. As with the dividend deduction, preferences could be dealt with by allowing excluded dividends paid out of taxable income. This approach was proposed in 1992 although currently it may be less attractive because of global concerns. Some integration proposals have also encompassed debt. In 1992, one Treasury proposal was to disallow interest deductions for both corporate firms and unincorporated businesses. Disallowing interest deductions could be combined with integration approaches, except for mark-to-market. Three basic issues that relate to corporate integration policy are the revenue impacts, the administrative concerns, and the economic efficiency effects. Revenue impacts are an important consideration in any tax reform proposal. Table 2 provides estimates for the proposals (in the form of effective average tax rates), which show the cost as a percentage of current corporate tax revenues. These estimates suggest that allowing refundable credits or mark to market do not appear feasible if revenue neutrality is an objective. Although the other proposals lose revenues, offsetting them with restrictions on debt or other base-broadening provisions would be possible. Mark to market could also be feasible if taxes are imposed directly on exempt or largely exempt firms. Some proposals face considerable administrative barriers, especially mark to market, which would require tax payment when income is not realized. Most proposals would add complications for shareholders, but mark to market would simplify at the corporate level. Providing tax credits to creditors if interest is subject to a withholding tax might be difficult because of the tracing of interest payments. Efficiency gains reflecting the traditional goals of integration are limited, with the exception of reducing the debt-equity distortion and potentially eliminating distortion across assets within the corporate sector under mark to market. Similarly, most proposals would not have significant effects on the international allocation of capital, repatriation, profit-shifting and inversions. Disallowing deductions for interest would eliminate some methods of profit shifting and make inversions less attractive. Mark to market would create a residence-based tax, which would provide efficiency gains in all areas: allocation of capital, repatriation, profit-shifting, and inversions.

In January 2016, Senator Orrin Hatch, chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, announced plans for a tax reform that would explore corporate integration. Corporate integration involves the elimination or reduction of additional taxes on corporate equity investment that arise because corporate income is taxed twice, once at the corporate level and once at the individual level. Traditional concerns are that this system of taxation is inefficient because it (1) favors noncorporate equity investment over corporate investment, (2) favors debt finance over equity finance, (3) favors retained earnings over dividends, and (4) discourages the realization of gains on the sale of corporate stock. Increasingly, international concerns such as allocation of investment across countries, repatriation of profits earned abroad, shifting profits out of the United States and into tax havens, and inversions (U.S. firms using mergers to shift headquarters to a foreign country) have become issues in any tax reform, corporate integration included. This report summarizes findings in CRS Report R44638, Corporate Tax Integration and Tax Reform, by [author name scrubbed]. That report examines the effects of different tax treatment of the corporate and noncorporate sectors, the effect of tax preferences, the treatment of debt finance, and the treatment of foreign source income. Estimates suggest that there is little overall difference between corporate and noncorporate investment. A larger share of corporate assets benefits from tax preferences. Only a quarter of shares in U.S. firms is held by taxable individuals; the remainder is held by tax-exempt and largely tax-exempt pension and retirement accounts, nonprofits, and foreigners. Additionally, tax rates on individual dividends and capital gains are lower than ordinary rates. Effective tax rates across assets differ markedly, with intangible assets most favored and structures least favored. Debt is treated favorably in both the corporate and noncorporate sectors, with large differences and in many cases negative tax rates. Differences in taxes affecting dividend payout choices or realization of capital gains on stock appear to be small because of low tax rates. The report outlines several approaches to integration. Full integration would address both dividends and retained earnings. Tax could be imposed at the shareholder level with allocation of income and withholding (a modified partnership treatment). Credits for withheld taxes would be provided to shareholders, and credits could be made nonrefundable for tax-exempt and foreign shareholders. A different full integration approach would eliminate shareholder taxes and tax only at the firm level. A third would tax at the shareholder level and not the firm by imposing ordinary rates and taxing not only dividends and realized capital gains but also unrealized gains by marking shares to market prices (i.e., mark-to-market). Partial integration focuses on dividends and could provide either a dividend deduction by the firm (with a withholding tax and credits) or a dividend exclusion to the shareholder. Disallowing interest deductions in full or in part could be combined with most proposals. The report compares these proposals with respect to impact on revenue, administrative feasibility, and effects on both traditional and international tax choices. Shareholder allocation or dividend deductions with refundable credits produce relatively large revenue losses, as does mark-to-market. Nonrefundability and making modifications in mark-to-market can substantially reduce these revenue losses. Most proposals would have modest efficiency gains or losses. Mark-to-market would tax economic income and potentially produce a number of efficiency gains but may not be feasible on administrative grounds. Disallowing or restricting deductions for interest would lead to efficiency gains on a number of margins and provide revenue to help achieve revenue-neutral reforms.

No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law . [U.S. Constitution, Article I, SS9] Over the years Congress has devised complex procedures for appropriations and authorization, but the pattern has been to separate the authorization and appropriation process and to establish separate committees to address the separate functions. Although intelligence spending has historically been shrouded in secrecy, the Constitution, statutory law, and legislative branch procedures apply to intelligence agencies as they do for all government departments and agencies. It is the purpose of this report to discuss the effects of the absence of intelligence authorization legislation subsequent to FY2005 and comment on the substantial but limited effects of recent intelligence authorization acts. It is recognized that the statutory requirements have been met by the catchall provisions in appropriations acts. The report will not focus on the reasons why Congress did not pass intelligence authorization; it is sufficient to note that Members did not choose to compromise either among themselves or with the White House on issues they considered important. In the absence of authorization legislation, intelligence activities continue to be carried out, and expensive and complex intelligence systems continue to be approved; but the process is somewhat different from that intended when the intelligence committees were established in the late 1970s and there are significant implications for congressional oversight of intelligence activities and, arguably, for the nation's intelligence effort as a whole. To carry out the constitutional duty of funding government activities, Congress has established a two-step process. First, it authorizes an agency or program. Secondly, Congress appropriates funds for the authorized agency or program. The separation of authorization and appropriations legislation provides Congress with an opportunity to permit one set of committees (authorizing committees) to address the needs of programs in their jurisdictions while another set of committees (appropriations committees) is designed to consider the finances of the federal government as a whole and guard against excess spending. In general, authorizing committees and their staffs develop extensive expertise in their agencies. Appropriations committees focus on allocating funds within an overall budget total. Appropriations committees are generally more limited in staff and often do not delve into the detailed activities of government departments. Authorization committees, however, have staff to undertake more detailed evaluations of agency programs and monitor implementation of congressional guidance. Appropriations bills (or continuing resolutions) must be enacted every year, but agencies and activities may be authorized on a standing basis. Such authorizations are provided to most agencies that carry out their designated responsibilities year after year. Some important agencies and programs, however, are authorized on an annual basis. In the 1960s, the size and complexity of defense programs led to a congressional determination to authorize the nation's defense effort on an annual basis and, since that time, the scope of national defense authorization acts has been expanded to include specific policy directions for all types of military activities and programs, ranging from personnel to procurement of major weapons systems. Defense authorization bills became a main focus of legislative interest and have guaranteed that congressional concerns are continuously addressed by the Defense Department. In the 1970s similar procedures would be established for intelligence agencies. A standing authorization for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was provided by the National Security Act of 1947 (P.L. 80-235), and this was thought to be adequate. There was no perceived need for annual authorizations for CIA for over a quarter century, and the activities of other intelligence agencies were authorized as part of their parent departments' authorizations. In the mid-1970s, however, Congress, concerned about intelligence agencies operating behind a wall of secrecy, and at times engaged in questionable activities, created the two intelligence committees to provide oversight. The respective rules that established the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) provided that "no funds would be expended by national intelligence agencies unless such funds shall have been previously authorized by a bill or joint resolution passed by the Senate [House] during the same or preceding fiscal year to carry out such activity for such fiscal year." (Both resolutions provided an exception for continuing appropriations bills or resolutions.) In 1985, Section 504 of the National Security Act was tightened to require that appropriated funds available to an intelligence agency could be obligated or expended for an intelligence or intelligence-related activity only if "those funds were specifically authorized by the Congress for use for such activities." After the establishment of the two intelligence committees, the appropriations committees came to defer more to them; one senior member of the House Appropriations Committees has been quoted as explaining in 1983, "Our subcommittee has backed off and done less as [HPSCI] has become more important. My own view is if you've got a committee dealing day in and day out with intelligence, that's the way it should be." Today, the intelligence committees have extensive staffs--approximately 40 each for SSCI and HPSCI. The House committee has subcommittees devoted to terrorism, human intelligence, analysis, and counterintelligence; intelligence community management; technical and tactical intelligence; and oversight and investigations. The Senate committee is not divided into subcommittees. Both committees annually conduct numerous classified hearings and a few unclassified hearings relating to intelligence activities and programs. Most intelligence spending is appropriated by the defense appropriations legislation prepared by the defense appropriations subcommittees, which each have approximately 15-20 staff members. The first intelligence authorization bill that became law was that for FY1979 ( P.L. 95-370 ); the Senate had passed an authorization bill the year before, but the House, not then having its own intelligence committee, took no action on the bill. From FY1979 to FY2005, annual intelligence authorization bills were enacted, although on many occasions the intelligence authorization acts were not signed until well into the fiscal year for which they authorized funds. When appropriations legislation has passed prior to enactment of intelligence authorization bills, Congress has met the requirement for specific authorization of intelligence activities through the use of a "catchall" provision in defense appropriations acts. For example, Section 8080 of the Consolidated Security, Disaster, and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2009 ( P.L. 110-329 ), enacted on September 30, 2008, states, "Funds appropriated by this Act, or made available by the transfer of funds in this Act, for intelligence activities are deemed to be specifically authorized by the Congress for purposes of Section 504 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 414) during fiscal year 2009 until the enactment of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009." This provision meets the requirements of the National Security Act while acknowledging the potential for subsequent passage of an intelligence authorization act. Similar provisions have been included in other defense appropriation acts and in various supplementary appropriations bills since, almost always, appropriation bills have been enacted prior to intelligence authorization bills. A section of some 60 words has thus been routinely substituted for authorizing bills that, along with their accompanying reports (with classified annexes), normally run to hundreds of pages. Undoubtedly, the executive branch gives consideration to congressional concerns, even those expressed informally, but the report language and guidance contained in an intelligence authorization bill undoubtedly does not have the prescriptive effects of enacted legislation. After the enactment of P.L. 108-487 , the Intelligence Authorization Act for FY2005, on December 23, 2004, until September 2010, the two intelligence committees reported authorization bills (of which some have been passed by the respective chambers and one of which--that for FY2008--passed by both houses only to be vetoed by the President). Each of these bills was accompanied by a report that provided extensive guidance for intelligence agencies and addressed a number of issues that the committees considered important. Such issues included a requirement for Senate confirmation of the Deputy CIA Director as well as the directors of the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), and the National Security Agency (NSA); the establishment of a Space Intelligence Center; and providing additional authorities to the DNI along with a provision that requires reports when acquisition costs for intelligence systems pass certain cost growth thresholds. Important to some Members was the inclusion of provisions establishing an Inspector General for the entire intelligence community. The Senate bill for FY2009, S. 2996 , sought to provide the DNI greater flexibility to coordinate the intelligence community response to an emerging threat that "should not depend on the budget cycle and should not be constrained by general limitations in appropriations law (e.g., 31 U.S.C. 1346) or other prohibitions on interagency financing of boards, commissions, councils, committees, or similar groups." These bills did not become law and intelligence programs were instead authorized by defense appropriations legislation between December 2004 and October 2010. In 2009, both the House and Senate intelligence committees reported intelligence authorization bills for FY2010 ( H.R. 2701 and S. 1494 , respectively). Each contained provisions that would require Senate confirmation of additional intelligence leaders and establish a statutory inspector general for the entire intelligence community. However, provisions in H.R. 2701 that would require more extensive notifications of covert actions drew strong objections from the Administration. S. 1494 passed the Senate on September 16, 2009, by a voice vote, but floor consideration of the House bill did not occur. FY2010 intelligence authorization legislation did become law, albeit without specific authorization of intelligence programs; it is discussed below. The need for closer integration of the nation's intelligence effort was a principal finding of the various assessments of the performance of the intelligence community prior to the 9/11 attacks and Operation Iraqi Freedom. The assessments concluded that intelligence agencies had not effectively coordinated the acquisition and dissemination of available intelligence. In response, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 ( P.L. 108-458 ) established the position of DNI (and the Office of the DNI (ODNI)) with wide-ranging authorities over all intelligence agencies. The provisions included responsibility for preparing and ensuring the effective execution of the National Intelligence Program (NIP), which includes acquisition for major intelligence systems. The intent was to provide the DNI with significantly broader coordinative responsibilities and authorities than had been exercised by the former Director of Central Intelligence (DCI). The DCIs had not only responsibilities for the entire intelligence community but were also in direct charge of the CIA; the Intelligence Reform Act created a separate position of CIA Director, leaving DNIs responsible for coordinating the interagency intelligence effort. The NIP includes funding for the largest intelligence agencies--the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the National Security Agency (NSA), the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA). The Military Intelligence Program (MIP)--which is separate from the NIP--consists of the intelligence efforts that are designed (and funded) to support the needs of the Department of Defense (DOD) and its components. Most of the major intelligence agencies serve both national and military consumers, and the largest agencies, except the CIA, are part of DOD. After the DNI prepares a consolidated NIP and it is approved by the White House, it is forwarded to Congress as part of the Administration's overall annual budget submission along with relevant Congressional Budget Justification Books (CBJBs). The two intelligence committees review the NIP, holding hearings and preparing intelligence authorization legislation and accompanying committee reports. The two armed services committees also review national intelligence programs that are undertaken by DOD agencies (which constitute the bulk of the NIP largely due to the costs involved in satellite and signals intelligence systems). To facilitate and encourage cooperation between armed services and intelligence committees, the rules that established the intelligence committees provided that some Members (at least one on HPSCI and two on SSCI) serve on both committees. Although there is considerable overlap between the oversight responsibilities of armed services and intelligence committees, intelligence authorization bills provide Congress with a means to address the entire intelligence effort from a perspective broader than that of the Defense Department. A central challenge in overseeing intelligence activities is that budgeting and acquisition procedures were designed during the Cold War era when there were sharp distinctions between national and tactical intelligence and national-level consumers were largely limited to senior Washington policymakers. Today, in many cases, intelligence agencies serve an increasingly diverse variety of consumers throughout the government. Systems designed and operated to support policymakers in multiple agencies, such as reconnaissance satellites, are known as "national-level" systems. In many cases, however, they also produce information of direct interest to military commanders and a variety of other federal offices and, especially in regard to terrorist threats, even to state and local level officials. On the other hand, tactical military intelligence is designed (and funded) to be used by a single military service. Today, this information may also be of direct interest to national-level policymakers, especially in crisis situations. Although the original lines of demarcation between national and tactical intelligence have long since lost much of their importance for consumers of intelligence products, these categories are embedded in law and regulations and serve as the basis for acquisition and budgeting efforts. The cost of intelligence activities for national-level consumers was $53.9 billion for FY2012; military intelligence, which primarily supports military operations, easily adds billions more, although exact figures remain classified. Both intelligence committees review the NIP, but responsibilities differ in regard to oversight of defense-wide and tactical intelligence systems. The House intelligence committee is responsible for authorizing "intelligence and intelligence-related activities of all ... departments and agencies of the Government, including the tactical intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the Department of Defense." The Senate intelligence committee is not assigned responsibility for tactical intelligence and intelligence-related activities, which remain under the purview of the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC). As a result, conference committees on intelligence authorization bills have always included members of the SASC. The goal of the post-9/11 reform effort has been to encourage transformation from the agency-centric practices of the past to "a true Intelligence enterprise established on a collaborative foundation of shared services, mission-centric operations, and integrated mission management." In addition to well-known threats from terrorist groups and hostile regional powers, the intelligence community should be organized to confront "a growing array of emerging missions that expands the list of national security (and hence, intelligence) concerns to include infectious diseases, science and technology surprises, financial contagions, economic competition, environmental issues, energy interdependence and security, cyber attacks, threats to global commerce and transnational crime." Such a configuration of the intelligence community, if achieved, will involve systems and capabilities that extend well beyond DOD. The future evolution of the nation's intelligence effort lies beyond the scope of this report, but most observers believe that its focus should not be on strictly military concerns and that the range of collection efforts and of "customers" is much wider than in previous decades. Some observers suggest that the absence of intelligence authorization legislation since FY2005 has had especially significant budgetary implications for overhead collection systems. For the national intelligence agencies in DOD--NSA, NGA, and the NRO--technical collection and processing systems are very expensive. Satellites, in particular, often cost over $1 billion each. Based on comments made by senior members of the Senate Intelligence Committee, there have been major disputes over some programs with substantial budgets. In 2004 media reports indicated that one classified satellite program originally opposed by the Senate intelligence committee, but supported by appropriations committees and HPSCI, almost doubled in cost from $5 billion to nearly $9.5 billion. In 2007 SSCI's report on the FY2008 authorization bill sharply criticized the space radar program (that apparently included both intelligence and non-intelligence components) and directed that no NIP funds be spent on the program. Although that bill was not enacted, the program was eventually terminated in March 2008. An October 2008 HPSCI report concluded: "there is no comprehensive space architecture or strategic plan that accommodates current and future national security priorities." Further, "the intelligence community and DOD seem at odds with each other over satellite program requirements. Without adequately defining the requirements of the combatant commanders, the Air Force and Intelligence Community are forced to hit an ever-moving or invisible target in managing overhead program requirements." Although some believe that "DOD needs its own space architecture to meet the needs of the war fighter ... executive branch [spokesmen have] stated several times that it is not in the best interest of the country to pursue separate national and military space architectures." HPSCI's report criticizes satellite programs that include funding by both the NIP and the Military Intelligence Program. The NIP is controlled by the DNI and SSCI, and HPSCI have oversight responsibilities for it. The MIP, on the other hand, is controlled by the Secretary of Defense and the two armed services committees (with HPSCI having shared oversight of the MIP). HPSCI's report indicates that there are also differences within DOD over some satellite surveillance programs that reflect different perspectives of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (who also reports to the DNI as well as the Secretary of Defense) and the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, who is responsible for DOD acquisitions efforts. Although the USD(I) advocates for intelligence, the USD(I) does not have acquisition decision authority within the DOD. The USD(AT&L) decides all acquisition matters. The inability of the USD(I) to control the final acquisition decision for a program can lead to decisions over jointly funded programs that do not equally benefit the national and military customer. The reported difficulties in achieving consensus in DOD and the executive branch have been reflected in different organizational proposals made by different congressional oversight committees. For instance, the FY2007 Defense Authorization Act ( P.L. 109-364 ) included a provision for the establishment of an operationally responsive space program office, separate from the NRO, that would develop space systems for combatant commanders to address concerns that some systems may be viewed in isolation from others without adequate concern for the implications of a specific decision for the entire interlinked effort. Arguably, it is the intelligence committees that have the mandate to ensure the coherence of the intelligence acquisition effort throughout the federal government and that the primary vehicles for ensuring coherence are annual authorization bills. Skeptics might see proposals for operationally responsive space systems as potentially duplicative of intelligence community programs. HPSCI also noted that within DOD there may be differences in approaches between the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)), who is the principal DOD point of contact with the DNI, and the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, who may be more responsive to service needs. Taking a different approach, the Senate-passed version of S. 3001 , the FY2009 Defense Authorization Act, provided that the USD(I) may not establish or maintain "a capability to execute programs of technology or systems development or acquisition." The Administration objected to this provision, arguing that such provisions would prevent the USD(I) for carrying out the activities for which it was created, and it was deleted from the final version of the bill. The FY2009 act, P.L. 110-417 , requires instead that DOD produce a consolidated position: "the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, shall establish a policy and an acquisition strategy for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance payloads and ground stations for manned and unmanned aerial vehicle systems. The policy and acquisition strategy shall be applicable throughout the Department of Defense and shall achieve integrated research, development, test, and evaluation, and procurement commonality." The DOD report is to be provided both to the armed services and intelligence committees. In addition, P.L. 110-417 also included a requirement for the DNI and Secretary of Defense to conduct a comprehensive review of the nation's space policy including a description of current and planned space acquisition programs. This report was to be submitted to the armed services and intelligence committees by December 2009, but preparation was reportedly delayed for several months. If the executive branch prepares a comprehensive space architecture the two intelligence committees would have major responsibilities to review it and to weigh its recommendations in an effort to authorize necessary programs and personnel with whatever modifications Congress finds appropriate. Other committees--especially the armed services and appropriations committees--would also have responsibilities to review such architectures. Congress returned to the issue in FY2011 Defense Authorization legislation. Section 911 of P.L. 111-383 provides that the Secretary of Defense and the DNI shall develop an integrated process for national security space architecture planning, development, coordination, and analysis. Concerns about the effectiveness of congressional intelligence oversight have been expressed both by Members and by outside observers for some time. The 9/11 Commission was especially critical on this point: So long as oversight is governed by current congressional rules and resolutions, we believe the American people will not get the security they want or need. The United States needs a strong, stable and capable congressional committee structure to give America's national intelligence agencies oversight, support, and leadership.... Tinkering with the existing structure is not sufficient. Either Congress should create a joint committee for intelligence, using the Joint Atomic Energy Committee as its model, or it should create House and Senate committees with combined authorizing and appropriations powers. In response to the 9/11 Commission's recommendations, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 ( P.L. 108-458 ) established the position of DNI (and the Office of the DNI (ODNI)) with wide-ranging authorities over all intelligence agencies. Many recommendations of the 9/11 Commission were eventually adopted by Congress and the Bush Administration, including several that pertained to intelligence oversight, but Congress neither established a joint intelligence committee nor has it moved to create a committee with both authorizing and appropriating authorities. In November 2007, the Senate Intelligence Committee held a hearing to examine congressional oversight of U.S. intelligence activities, which indicated strong disquiet about prevailing procedures for addressing intelligence budgets. At the hearing former Members of Congress Lee Hamilton and Timothy Roemer, who had both served on the 9/11 Commission, reiterated their concerns with the current oversight process. Mr. Hamilton concluded that "the Senate of the United States and the House of the United States is not doing its job. And because you're not doing the job, the country is not as safe as it ought to be, because one of my premises is that robust oversight is necessary for a stronger intelligence committee." The 9/11 Commission's key oversight proposals have not been adopted by Congress. Instead, the House and the Senate attempted to strengthen oversight by establishing, within their respective appropriations committees, subcommittees on intelligence that would include members of the intelligence committees. First, in 2004 the Senate adopted S.Res. 445 (of the 108 th Congress), which called for an Appropriations Subcommittee on Intelligence with "jurisdiction over funding for intelligence matters, as determined by the Senate Committee on Appropriations." This subcommittee, however, has never been established. The House of Representatives in the 110 th Congress established a Select Intelligence Oversight Panel within the House Appropriations Committee. This subcommittee was then eliminated in H.Res. 5 of the 112 th Congress. Congress has also made changes to the existing oversight structure by, among other things, increasing the auditing authority of the Government Accountability Office and adding offices of inspector general to elements of the intelligence community. However, the overall structure of intelligence oversight is largely unchanged from the pre-9/11 structure criticized by the Commission. With that as context, if Congress plans to strengthen its oversight, the current annual intelligence authorization process, and the corresponding briefings and hearings related to intelligence activities and programs, represents one of the most important opportunities for Congress to exercise its oversight role. For a complete treatment of intelligence oversight structures, see CRS Report RL32525, Congressional Oversight of Intelligence: Current Structure and Alternatives . During the 111 th Congress it was evident that there was persistent interest in the enactment of intelligence authorization legislation, but it was also evident that there existed significant issues on which agreement would be difficult. A House bill ( H.R. 2701 ) was reported by the House Intelligence Committee in June 2009. A Senate version ( S. 1494 ) was reported in July 2009 and passed by the Senate in September 2009. It was sent to the House, but was held at the Speaker's desk. H.R. 2701 was given floor consideration in February 2010 and was passed by the House. Neither the House nor the Senate version was supported by the Administration, and after extensive discussions, another Senate intelligence authorization bill ( S. 3611 ) was reported in July 2010 and passed by the Senate in August 2010. This version was then incorporated into H.R. 2701 and passed the Senate in September 2010. It was subsequently accepted by the House just before the end of FY2010. It was ultimately signed by the President on October 7, 2010, and became P.L. 111-259 . According to media accounts, the issues that prevented earlier consideration of the legislation were the appropriate notification of Members of Congress of covert actions and other sensitive activities--whether the practice of notifying just the chairmen and ranking Members of the intelligence committees along with other congressional leaders was adequate. Some provisions provoked veto threats from the Administration and views of Members and senior executive branch officials were reconciled only after extensive discussions in the spring of 2010. Also difficult were provisions that affected parallel authorities of the DNI and the Secretary of Defense and the intelligence oversight role of the Government Accountability Office (GAO). Congressional efforts to oversee detention and interrogation practices after the 9/11 attacks and to establish specific penalties for intelligence personnel using certain interrogation techniques were major subjects of disagreement (although some of these were addressed in the Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2010, P.L. 111-212 ). Inasmuch as the new fiscal year would begin prior to the enactment of P.L. 111-259 , the act did not contain a classified annex for FY2010 similar to those that previous intelligence authorization acts incorporated to set spending levels for specific programs. The act addressed the issue of notification of covert actions in a way that avoided a veto and established the position of Inspector General for the intelligence community. Several provisions of the final FY2010 bill addressed DNI authorities. These included Section 401, which gave the DNI authority to conduct accountability reviews of elements of the intelligence community; Section 321, which required the DNI to conduct vulnerability assessments of every major system in the NIP; and Section 302, which extended the amount of time a member of the intelligence community may be detailed to another member of the community. The final bill also included a somewhat diluted provision related to GAO audit authority. The original Senate language reaffirmed GAO's authority to conduct audits of the Administration and management of the intelligence community and granted GAO the authority to conduct audits of sources and methods upon request from one of the congressional intelligence committees. However, the final bill left the scope of GAO access at the discretion of the DNI: "The Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Comptroller General of the United States, shall issue a written directive governing the access of the Comptroller General to information in the possession of an element of the intelligence community." In the 112 th Congress there was renewed determination to pass intelligence authorization legislation, and H.R. 754 , the intelligence authorization bill for FY2011, was passed by the House in May 2011. Subsequently, it was accepted by the Senate with a voice vote and was signed by the President on June 8, 2011, becoming P.L. 112-18 . The bill provided, in addition to a classified schedule of authorizations, only a few provisions relating to efforts to identify counterintelligence concerns, a report on the recruitment and retention of racial and ethnic minorities, and a provision commending members of the intelligence community for their role in the mission that killed Osama Bin Laden on May 1, 2011. By December 2011 both the House and Senate passed an intelligence authorization bill for FY2012. The bill, H.R. 1892 , passed the House on September 9 by a 384-14 vote, but was amended by the Senate by a voice vote and returned to the House on December 14. The House agreed with the Senate amendment on December 16. The President signed H.R. 1892 into law on January 3, 2012 ( P.L. 112-87 ). This FY2012 authorization contains a classified schedule of authorizations and included a number of provisions providing burial allowances for civilian employees of intelligence agencies who die while engaged in operations involving substantial elements of risk. The legislation also includes a provision permitting the establishment of accounts into which funds appropriated for Defense intelligence efforts could be transferred. The DNI could also transfer funds into these accounts. This provision was designed to improve the management of intelligence appropriations that are provided both to DOD and to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. The 112 th Congress passed its last intelligence authorization bill during the last week of 2012. The process began in May 2012, when the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence completed the markup of H.R. 5743 , its intelligence authorization bill for FY2013, passing the legislation by a unanimous vote of 19-0. On May 31, 2012, the House of Representatives passed H.R. 5743 by a vote of 386-28. According to the May 17 press release of the Intelligence Committee, the bill includes $300 million of new initiatives and $400 million of intelligence enhancements. According to the committee's report, H.R. 5743 : Increases funding for counterintelligence. Authorizes the new Defense Clandestine Service. Enhances counterterrorism efforts against Al Qaeda and its affiliates around the world. Increases oversight on the spending of domestic intelligence agencies. Supports global coverage initiatives of the intelligence committee to ensure the U.S. is postured to address emerging issues and threats around the world. On July 24, 2012, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence agreed to the text of S. 3454 , the Intelligence Authorization Act for FY2013, passing the legislation by a vote of 14-1, and the bill was reported to the Senate on July 30, 2012. Among other things, S. 3454 as passed by the committee: Prohibits persons possessing an active security clearance from entering into contracts with the media to provide analysis about classified intelligence activities. Prohibits the same personnel from entering into such contracts for a period of one year after they leave government service. Designates only the Director or Deputy Director of intelligence community elements and their designated public affairs staff may provide background or off-the-record information regarding intelligence activities to the media. Requests that DNI publish specific requirements for personnel with access to classified information, to include non-disclosure agreements, prepublication review, and disciplinary actions. Requires the Attorney General to report back to the committee on the effectiveness of and improvements for investigating and prosecuting unauthorized disclosures and to report on potential improvements. Requires the intelligence community to develop a comprehensive insider threat program management plan. Denies a current or future federal pension to an individual who has violated a non-disclosure agreement. Prohibits individuals with security clearances from retaining their clearance if they knowingly disclose classified information concerning a classified covert action. The "Committee Comments" in the report focused on the unauthorized disclosure of classified information, stating their "grave concern" with "both the quantity and substance" of the disclosures. These concerns were driven in part by a series of disclosures, such as one describing U.S. involvement with the Stuxnet computer virus that reportedly damaged Iran's nuclear program. Another high-profile incident in spring 2012 allegedly disclosed classified details of a joint Saudi/CIA operation that foiled an Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula plot. Senator Wyden (D-OR), cast the only "no" vote for S. 3454 on the committee. Senator Wyden objected to Section 511, allowing the DNI and heads of the intelligence community to deny current or future federal pensions to individuals who have violated their non-disclosure agreement. Senator Wyden's concerns are the broad authority given to the intelligence agencies without explanation of the due process by which they would take away pensions. Director of National Intelligence James Clapper, in his April 12, 2011, response to the committee, stated similar concerns and asked the committee to remove this section. In December 2012 the House and Senate passed S. 3454 , the Intelligence Authorization for FY2013, which was signed into law by the President on January 14, 2013 ( P.L. 112-277 ). Of note, in order to secure passage, most of the provisions pertaining to unauthorized disclosure of classified information were dropped from the final bill. In recent years the U.S. intelligence community has begun a transformation from the agency-centric practices to "a true Intelligence enterprise established on a collaborative foundation of shared services, mission-centric operations, and integrated mission management." In addition to well-known threats from terrorist groups and hostile regional powers, the intelligence community also confronts "a growing array of emerging missions that expands the list of national security (and hence, intelligence) concerns to include infectious diseases, science and technology surprises, financial contagions, economic competition, environmental issues, energy interdependence and security, cyber attacks, threats to global commerce and transnational crime." Such a configuration of the intelligence community, if achieved, will involve systems and capabilities that extend well beyond DOD. A major challenge for Congress, not just in oversight of the intelligence community but of many other agencies, is the synergism (or lack thereof) that results from the collaborative efforts of various agencies. Congressional oversight and funding responsibilities are divided agency-by-agency and committee-by-committee. Oversight and appropriations committees are challenged to assess the interagency efforts; making tradeoffs and adjustments to Administration plans and proposals can be very difficult. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention of 2004 created an "intelligence community" that spans multiple jurisdictions and that does not map well onto the traditional committee structures of the House and Senate. While that 2004 act addressed many of the 9/11 Commission's recommendations, Congress has not agreed to the two key oversight proposals--creating a joint committee for intelligence or creating separate House and Senate committees with authorizing and appropriations powers. The challenge for the 113 th Congress will be to work within its existing structure to help shape intelligence priorities while a more integrated intelligence community adjusts to new budget realities. DNI James Clapper addressed this issue in a speech in October 2011, stating that "We've experienced 10 years of growth ... now we're going to be in a much different mode." In March 2013 before the Senate Intelligence Committee, Mr. Clapper noted that cuts to the National Intelligence Program would be spread across six Cabinet departments and two independent agencies. He warned of "another damaging downward spiral" similar to that which he said occurred in the 1990s, and asked for the committee's support for his efforts to reprogram funds to mitigate the effect of budget cuts. Congress has an important role in the oversight of this altered intelligence environment, and the annual authorization process represents one of the most important opportunities to exercise this role. Intelligence authorization legislation does not guarantee effective interagency intelligence efforts, but proponents maintain that authorization acts are the best lever that Congress has in addressing the interagency effort. The two intelligence committees are positioned to have the most comprehensive information on intelligence activities broadly defined, including those conducted by agencies wholly independent of DOD. In the absence of intelligence authorization legislation, critics maintain that Congress does not exercise its option to adjust funding in accordance with a comprehensive assessment of the interrelationships of intelligence agencies. Some observers argue that this practice results in imbalances and weakens the overall intelligence effort; others maintain that the executive branch can efficiently adjust appropriated funds without unnecessary congressional micromanagement. In the 112 th Congress, intelligence authorization bills were passed and enacted for FY2011, FY2012, and FY2013; there appears to be a consensus that the need continues for intelligence authorization legislation.

Since President Bush signed the FY2005 Intelligence Authorization Act (P.L. 108-487) in December 2004, no subsequent intelligence authorization legislation was enacted until the FY2010 bill was signed by President Obama in October 2010 (after the end of FY2010), becoming P.L. 111-259. Although the National Security Act requires intelligence activities to be specifically authorized, this requirement had been satisfied in previous years by one-sentence catchall provisions in defense appropriations acts authorizing intelligence activities. This procedure meets the statutory requirement but has, according to some observers, weakened the ability of Congress to oversee intelligence activities. Over the last two years, Congress has met its statutory requirement by passing three intelligence authorization bills that included classified schedules of authorizations and that were signed into law. Most recently, in December 2012, the House and Senate passed S. 3454, the intelligence authorization for FY2013, which was signed into law by the President on January 14, 2013 (P.L. 112-277). Key issues debated during the passage of these bills included the adequacy of Director of National Intelligence (DNI) authorities, Government Accountability Office (GAO) audit authority over the intelligence community, and measures to combat national security leaks. These three bills appear to reflect a determination to underscore the continuing need for specific annual intelligence authorization legislation. Annual intelligence authorization acts were first passed in 1978 after the establishment of the two congressional intelligence committees and were enacted every year until 2005. These acts provided specific authorizations of intelligence activities and were accompanied by reports that provided detailed guidance to the nation's intelligence agencies. The recent absence of intelligence authorization acts has meant that key intelligence issues have been addressed in defense authorization acts and defense appropriations acts that focus primarily on the activities of the Department of Defense (DOD). Several Members have maintained that this procedure has been characterized by misplaced priorities and wasteful spending estimates that could run into billions. One example is the eventual cancellation of a highly classified and very costly overhead surveillance system that had been approved without support from the two intelligence committees. The challenge for the 113th Congress will be to help shape intelligence priorities while the intelligence community shifts from a decade of growth to a time of shrinking budgets. Reforms since 9/11 have attempted to create a more collaborative, integrated community. Reflecting that reality, intelligence priorities, and corresponding budget cuts, will be spread across six Cabinet departments and two independent agencies. The two intelligence committees are positioned to have the most comprehensive information on intelligence activities broadly defined, including those conducted by agencies and those within DOD. Congress has an important role in intelligence oversight and in helping the community to avoid what DNI James Clapper in March 2013 called "another damaging downward spiral" similar to that which he said occurred after budget cuts in the 1990s. The annual intelligence authorization bill will be one of its most valuable legislative tools.

Since assuming office in 2001, President Bush has been a strong supporter of free trade and trade liberalization. In numerous statements, he has touted the virtues of trade expansion. As he explained: "Our goal is to ignite a new era of economic growth through a world trading system that is dramatically more open and free." The President has promoted trade liberalization on multiple fronts: globally, regionally, and bilaterally. By pursuing multiple free trade initiatives, the Administration has tried to create "competition in liberalization" and more options. As explained by Robert Zoellick, President Bush's first U.S. Trade Representative, if free trade progress becomes stalled globally, then we can move ahead regionally and bilaterally. Globally, the Administration is now working to reach an agreement in the so-called Doha Round of multilateral trade talks being held among the 148 members of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Regionally, the administration is pursuing agreements with the countries of the Southern African Customs Union, Andean countries, and 34 countries of the Western Hemisphere to create a Free Trade Area of the Americas. Bilaterally, it is currently negotiating FTA's with Thailand, Panama, and the United Arab Emirates. The administration signed an FTA with Bahrain in 2004 and with Oman in 2005, and it is contemplating starting negotiations with a number of other countries. Possible new negotiating partners include Egypt, Malaysia, India and South Korea. The Bush Administration argues that these negotiations promote a host of U.S. domestic and foreign interests, both economic and political. At home, it views trade liberalization as providing substantial gains to American consumers and companies. Cuts in U.S. trade barriers can help American families to pay less for consumer goods and U.S. companies to lower their operating costs as a result of access to cheaper imported components. Increased competition in domestic markets also promotes innovation, increases in labor productivity, and long-term growth. Better access to foreign markets facilitates increases in U.S. exports, thereby increasing employment in sectors that may pay higher than average wages. U.S. investors can also benefit through rule changes and obligations that assure more dependable treatment by the host country. Trade liberalizing agreements, particularly FTAs, also promote the U.S. trade agenda and foreign interests in a number of ways. Some FTAs establish precedents or models that serve as catalysts for wider trade agreements. Many FTAs reward and support market reforms being undertaken by the negotiating partner. And still others help to strengthen U.S. ties with various countries and regions of the world. For example, by forging stronger economic ties with countries in the Middle East, such as Morocco, Jordan, and Bahrain, the U.S. hopes to strengthen its strategic position vis-a-vis all countries in the region by promoting economic prosperity and opportunity. At the same time, trade liberalizing agreements may carry economic and political costs. Increased foreign competition can lead to plant closings and job losses concentrated in certain regions and industries. Critics note that it may contribute to increased anxiety and wage pressures, as well as rising income inequality. Some of these concerns were central to the divisive debate in Congress this year over CAFTA--an agreement that became a proxy, in part, for more generalized concerns about America's standing in an increasingly globalized world economy. While CAFTA was approved by narrow margins in both houses, it is not clear how the outcome will affect the Administration's future free trade agreement program. The CAFTA was the most controversial free trade agreement vote taken by Congress since the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) implementing legislation was passed in 1993. The Senate passed the CAFTA implementing legislation on June 30, 2005 by a vote of 54 to 45 and House passed the legislation on July 28, 2005 by 217 to 215. Besides being the lowest margin of victory for any modern FTA agreement, the votes, particularly in the House, were highly partisan. Over 92% of House Democrats voted against the agreement, while over 88% of House Republicans voted in favor. In both the Senate and House debates, many proponents stressed a combination of economic and political arguments. Those in favor argued that, while imports from the CAFTA countries enter the U.S. virtually duty free, the agreement will level the playing field for U.S. commercial interests by eliminating 80% of the tariffs CAFTA countries impose on U.S. exports. As a result, they maintained the U.S. goes from one-way free trade toward a more reciprocal trading relationship that will increase U.S. exports and jobs. Others emphasized that the agreement would contribute to bolstering more market-oriented and democratic governments in the region, longstanding U.S. foreign policy interests. Many lawmakers who opposed the agreement cited provisions dealing with the treatment of labor and sensitive industries (sugar and textiles). In addition, the agreement clearly triggered more generalized anxieties concerning globalization's impact on the American economy and labor force. Future congressional consideration of similar trade accords are likely to raise similar controversies and challenges, thereby prompting the administration to address these issues as part of its trade liberalizing agenda. Labor issues in the agreement were controversial and may have been a major reason the vote divided largely along party lines. Disagreement revolved around whether the CAFTA countries had laws that complied with the U.S. or International Labor Organization (ILO) similar list of five internationally recognized worker rights (e.g. the right to organize unions and bargain collectively). Such standards have not been required by CAFTA, by trade promotion authority legislation outlining requirements for trade agreements, or by any other bilateral trade agreement. However, they have been required for decades by U.S. trade preference laws, which typically prohibit preferential treatment to countries which are not affording their workers internationally recognized worker rights. Therefore, these FTAs continue to be seen by may Democrats as a step backward from longstanding U.S. trade policy. Many Republicans argue that the agreement encourages these countries to improve their laws and enforcement as well. Moreover, they argued that the administration's commitment to earmark $40 million in appropriations for capacity building and enforcement over a four-year period would go a long way in strengthening these provisions. Further exacerbating partisan tensions was a long history over this issue. Some Democrats expressed clear annoyance that their support for stronger labor provisions was characterized by Bush Administration trade officials as being "economic isolationism." At the same time, many Republicans were upset that they were given little credit by the other side for the compromises they had made over the years in accommodating Democratic concerns. Partisan tensions were further exacerbated by different views on whether the process in producing the agreement and the implementing legislation was inclusive and consistent with consultation requirements provided under the Trade Promotion Authority statute. Following the CAFTA vote, U.S. Trade Representative Rob Portman has worked to narrow the gap on the divisive labor issue in both the Bahrain and Andean FTAs. House Democrats reportedly have been pleased by the Administration's efforts to obtain higher labor commitments and enforcement standards in the Bahrain agreement. But other reports suggest that the Administration and House Democrats remain far apart on how to handle the labor provisions in the Andean FTA. Thus, it remains unclear whether the FTA labor provisions will become a less divisive and partisan issue. A second contentious issue involved liberalization of U.S. restrictions in two industries--textiles and apparel, and sugar--that still benefit from protective barriers. The agreement as signed by the Bush Administration provided some small additional opening of these two still protected markets. These changes, in turn, were opposed vigorously by segments of both industries and by both Republicans and Democrats that had important constituent interests to defend. To gain support for the agreement, the Bush Administration made some commitments that, on balance, will reduce the commercial benefits of the agreement to CAFTA countries as originally negotiated. Some analysts believe that this action may send a very negative signal to future negotiating partners about U.S. willingness to negotiate reciprocal trade concessions. An underlying problem for the administration may be that the partisan divide in Congress over trade issues, particularly labor standards, provides defenders of protected industries with greater power than in previous eras. As one scholar opined, a partisan divide "renders the basic support margin narrow, making trade policy hostage to any protectionist interests that hold the decisive, marginal votes." This partisan divide could become a major hurdle for completing agreements that require the reduction and eventual removal of U.S. barriers to imports. In cases where liberalization of protected U.S. industries is necessary to get other countries to reduce their own barriers to U.S. exports, the Bush Administration may have two options. First, it can work to bridge the partisan divide that arguably provides these industries with heightened leverage. Second, it can alter the way it promotes the benefits of trade liberalization. Traditionally, trade liberalization has been pursued by focusing attention on gains associated with export expansion through a reduction of foreign trade barriers with little discussion of the gains that reduction of U.S. trade barriers can provide to U.S. companies and consumers. But by highlighting more the two-way gains from trade (both exports and imports), some analysts believe that greater political support can be built for the kinds of actions that are necessary to sustain a trade liberalization policy. The CAFTA debate in Congress also served as a proxy for public concerns and anxieties about the effects of trade and globalization on the American economy. Record U.S. trade deficits, the rise of China as a world manufacturing power, and India's growing attractiveness as a source for outsourcing of white collar jobs all raised questions about the effects of trade agreements on U.S. workers. Some Democrats, in part, may have opposed CAFTA because they believe that working class Americans suffer most from attempts to accelerate economic integration. Their opposition may have been buttressed by public opinion polls showing that more that 50% of U.S. households may oppose these trade initiatives if they are not given the tools and training to compete with workers from all around the world. To ease the anxieties of the American public on globalization and trade agreements that accelerate economic integration, some policymakers are calling for more robust programs that will help American workers obtain the skills that are necessary to compete in the global economy. While the longstanding Trade Adjustment Assistance Program provides retraining and income support for workers displaced by import competition, some argue that a more comprehensive program that would cover not only workers displaced by trade competition but also by technological change and foreign outsourcing is needed to deal with broad distributional costs of globalization and the rise of economic insecurity among American workers. Proponents argue that such a plan could include meaningful retraining, wage and health insurance, and job search aid. Two obstacles are often cited to moving in this direction--cost and ideology. One estimate of a comprehensive program that extends trade adjustment to all workers, provides a general two-year wage insurance program and adds on business tax incentives comes to $20 billion a year. While this cost could be considered modest compared to an estimated $1 trillion in benefits the U.S. economy gains from globalization (international openness) every year, it also could be considered very costly in the context of an economy experiencing record budget deficits, prompting calls for reductions in government spending. In addition, the fact that some policymakers take a dim view of the ability of these kinds of programs to achieve the intended results, combined with some sense that a growing market economy is the best antidote to adjustment, provide another hurdle. The Bush Administration is now actively negotiating a large number of trade liberalizing agreements. The broadest and most ambitious initiative being negotiated is the Doha Round of multilateral negotiations. Negotiations are also taking place with Panama, Thailand, three Andean countries (Colombia, Peru, and Ecuador), and the United Emirates. Assuming that the divisions over labor issues, industry protection, and globalization anxieties that were imbedded in the CAFTA debate persist, these potential agreements could encounter differential obstacles. An ambitious Doha agreement is the administration's highest priority. With 148 countries involved in the negotiation, this trade negotiation provides the largest potential benefits for U.S. firms, farmers, and consumers. Some analysts maintain that large gains or benefits accruing to a broad spectrum of American stakeholders are necessary to help mobilize political support to eliminate or reduce remaining U.S. restrictions on politically sensitive industries and products. This is based on a belief that an ambitious agreement would require large concessions from trading partners that open substantially new market access opportunities for U.S. companies, and that these potential gains would be too tempting for U.S. industry not to support strongly. While labor issues are not part of the Doha negotiations, any big commercial agreement would likely trigger globalization anxieties among some segments of the body politic. Whether an ambitious agreement that provides large economic benefits to the U.S. economy might provide some impetus and support for devising a comprehensive adjustment program remains problematic. In the past, implementing legislation for multilateral agreements has included the creation or expansion of adjustment programs. The FTA's being negotiated with Thailand, Panama, and the Andean countries might encounter some or all the obstacles raised in the CAFTA debate. Thailand's labor conditions and exports of import sensitive products such as sugar and rice could prove contentious. Given that Thailand is a larger trading partner than the five CAFTA countries combined, globalization anxieties could also play a role in this agreement as well. In the case of Panama and the Andean countries, their labor laws and exports of sugar could raise concerns among some Members of Congress. But given that they are both very small trading partners, globalization anxieties are less likely to play a key role. To date, CAFTA-related controversies appear to be playing a small role in the FTAs concluded with countries of the Middle East--Jordan, Morocco, Bahrain and Oman. These four agreements have received broad bipartisan support not only because they are viewed favorably for advancing U.S. security interests, but also because the countries in commercial terms provide little competitive threat to U.S. producers and workers.

Since taking office in January 2001, President Bush has supported trade liberalization through negotiations on multiple fronts: globally, regionally, and bilaterally. During this period, Congress has approved five free trade agreements (FTAs) that the Bush Administration has negotiated and signed. The FTAs are designed to promote broad economic and political objectives, both domestic and foreign. However, the debate in Congress over the last FTA approved--the Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA)--was contentious, sparking concerns about how Congress might consider future trade liberalizing agreements. This report analyses some of the challenges that became apparent in the aftermath of a divisive trade debate and how they could affect consideration of future trade agreements. This report will not be updated.

RS20837 -- Distribution of Child Support Collections Updated March 4, 2003 P.L. 104-193 , the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (enacted August 22, 1996), replaced theAid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) entitlement program with a Temporary Assistance for NeedyFamilies (TANF)block grant and made major changes to the Child Support Enforcement (CSE) program. The rules governing howchild supportcollections are distributed among families, the state, and the federal government have changed substantially. In part,CSE distributionrules were changed to acknowledge the fact that child support would be significant, if not critical, to helpingsingle-parent familiesexit welfare and maintain self-sufficiency. Since the CSE program's inception, the rules determining who actually gets the child support arrearage payments have been complex,but not nearly as complicated as they are currently. It is helpful to think of the rules in two categories. First, thereare rules in bothfederal and state law that stipulate who has a legal claim on the payments owed by the noncustodial parent. Theseare calledassignment rules. Second, there are rules that determine the order in which child support collections are paid inaccordance with theassignment rules. These are called distribution rules. When a family leaves TANF, (1) the order of distribution of any child support collection depends on (1) when the arrearages accrued(pre-assistance, during-assistance, or post-assistance); (2) when the child support was assigned to the state (beforeOctober 1997,between October 1997 and October 2000, or after October 2000); (3) how the child support arrearages werecollected (through thefederal income tax refund offset program or by some other means); (4) the amount of the unreimbursed welfarebalance; and (5) whenthe arrearages were collected (before October 1997, between October 1997 and October 2000, or after October2000). Some of thecomplexity of the distribution rules ceased on October 1, 2000 when the rules were completely phased-in, but theconfusion withregard to the six categories of arrearages (mentioned below) remains. As a condition of TANF eligibility, the custodial parent must assign to the state the right to collect both current child supportpayments and past-due child support obligations (i.e., arrearages) which accrue while the family is on the TANFrolls (these are calledpermanently-assigned arrearages (2) ). The assignmentrequirement for TANF applicants and recipients also includes arrearagepayments that accumulated before the family enrolled in TANF (these are called pre-assistancearrearages). Pre-assistance arrearagesare temporarily assigned to the state while the family is receiving TANF assistance, with the exception of thefollowing. Pre-assistance arrearages which were assigned to the state before October 1, 1997 are consideredpermanently-assigned arrearages. While the family receives TANF benefits, the state is permitted to retain any current support and any assignedarrearages it collects upto the cumulative amount of TANF benefits which has been paid to the family . Under old law (pre-1996) states were required to pass through the first $50 of current monthly child support payments collected onbehalf of an AFDC family and to disregard it as income to the family so that it did not affect the family's AFDCeligibility or benefitpayment. The remaining amount of current child support collected was divided between the state and federalgovernments accordingto the state's AFDC federal matching rate. (3) The 1996 welfare reform law repealed the required $50 pass through and gives states the choice to decide how much, if any, of thestate share (some, all, none) of child support collected on behalf of a TANF family to send the family. If a stateelects thepass-through option, it still must pay the federal share of the collection to the federal government, regardless of howmuch childsupport is passed through to the family. The state can then do what it wants with its share. It can give all, a portion,or none of itsshare to families. If a state passes through all of its share to families, it may count that as income to the family or it may disregard all or some of thechild support collection so that it does not decrease the TANF payment of the family, but instead enables that familyto increase itstotal income by the child support amount without it affecting the family's TANF eligibility status or benefit amount. Some statessend the family two checks, one reflecting the TANF benefit and another reflecting the child support paymentreceived from thenoncustodial parent. States also have the option to pass their share of arrearage collections to former TANFrecipients (if thearrearage occurred while the family was a cash welfare recipient). Under prior law, once a family went off AFDC, child support arrearage payments generally were divided between the state andfederal governments to reimburse them for AFDC; if any money remained, it was given to the family. In contrast,under P.L.104-193 , payments to families who leave TANF are more generous. Under P.L. 104-193 , arrearages are to be paidto the family first,unless they are collected through the federal income tax refund offset (in which case reimbursing the federal andstate governmentsare to be given first priority). For collections made before October 1, 1997. If a custodial parent assigned her orhis child support rights to the state before October 1, 1997, the parent had to assign all support rights for supportpayments (bothcurrent and past-due) that accrued to the family during the period of AFDC receipt, as well as payments that hadaccrued before theirapplication for AFDC benefits. Moreover, these families had to permanently assign their rights to pre-assistancearrearages to thestate. This means that once these families go off welfare, any pre-assistance arrearages that are collected on theirbehalf go to thestate (and the federal government) as reimbursement for AFDC aid paid to the family. (4) For collections made on or after October 1, 1997 and before October 1, 2000. If acustodial parent assigned her or his child support rights to the state on or after October 1, 1997 and before October1, 2000, the parenthad to assign all support rights for both current and past-due payments accrued while the family is receiving TANFbenefits. Unlikepre-1997 assignments, the TANF applicant or recipient only had to temporarily (rather than permanently) assignto the state all rightsto support that accrued to the family before it began receiving TANF benefits. This temporaryassignment lasts until October 1, 2000or the date on which the family stops receiving TANF benefits, whichever is later. These temporarily-assigned arrearages become conditionally-assigned arrearages when the family leaves the TANF rolls (or onOctober 1, 2000, whichever date is later). They are considered conditionally-assigned because if they are collectedvia the federalincome tax refund offset program they are to be paid to the state (and federal government) rather than the family. Ifconditionally-assigned arrearages are collected through a method other than the federal income tax refund offset,they belong to thefamily. Since October 1, 1997, states have been required to distribute to former TANF families current child support and child supportarrearages that accrue after the family leaves TANF (these arrearages are called never-assignedarrearages) before the state and thefederal government are reimbursed for TANF payments to families. (However, arrearages that accrued before thefamily beganreceiving TANF benefits did not have to be distributed to the family first if the pre-assistance arrearages werecollected by the CSEagency before October 1, 2000.) As mentioned above, an exception to the distribution requirement occurs when the child support is collected via the federal incometax refund offset program. In federal income tax refund offset cases, the child support arrearage payment (up to thecumulativeamount of TANF benefits which has been paid to the family) is retained by the state (and federal government) ifsuch arrearages wereassigned to the state either temporarily or conditionally. Thus, if child support arrearages are collected via thefederal income taxrefund offset program, the family does not have first claim on the arrearage payments. For collections made on or after October 1, 2000 (5). If a custodial parent assignsher or his child support rights to the state on or after October 1, 2000, the parent has to assign all support rights thataccrue while thefamily is receiving TANF benefits. In addition, the TANF applicant must temporarily assign to the state all rightsto support thataccrued to the family before it began receiving TANF benefits. This temporary assignment lasts until the familystops receivingTANF benefits. For child support collections made after October 1, 2000 (unless the sum is collected through the federal income tax offset program),the state is required to first distribute to the former welfare family the amount collected to satisfy the currentmonthly child supportobligation. If any money remains, it is to be paid to the family to satisfy never-assigned arrearages, which are childsupport arrearagesthat accrued after the family went off welfare or arrearages owed to families that never received welfare. If thereis money remaining,it is to be paid to the family to satisfy unassigned pre-assistance arrearages (i.e., all previously assignedarrearages which exceed thecumulative amount of unreimbursed assistance when the family leaves welfare and which accrued before the familybegan receivingwelfare) and conditionally-assigned arrearages (described earlier). If there is still money remaining, it is to be usedto reimburse thestate and federal government for TANF benefits paid to the family; the state shall retain its share of the amount andpay to the federalgovernment the federal share of the collection (to the extent necessary to reimburse amounts paid to the family ascash assistance (6) ). If any money remains, it is to be paid to the family. These distribution rules do not apply to child support collections obtained by intercepting federal income tax refunds. Child supportarrearages collected through the federal income tax offset program are to be paid to the state (and the state is to paythe federal shareof the collection to the federal government). The state may only retain arrearages that have been assigned to thestate and only up tothe amount necessary to reimburse amounts paid to the family as cash assistance. If the amount collected throughthe tax offset exceeds the amount retained, the state must distribute the excess to the family. To reiterate, effective October 1, 2000, the state must treat any support arrearages collected on behalf of a former welfare family,except for those collected through the federal income tax offset program, as accruing in the following order: (1)to the period after thefamily stopped receiving cash assistance, (2) to the period before the family received cash assistance, and (3) to theperiod while thefamily was receiving cash assistance. The result of these child support distribution changes is that states are nowrequired to pay ahigher fraction of child support collections on arrearages to families that have left welfare by making these paymentsto families first(before the state and federal government). (7) Custodial parents and noncustodial parents alike are dissatisfied with the current child support distribution system. Custodial parentsare frustrated because they view child support arrearages as belonging to them. They argue that they had to rely onfamily and friendsfor financial assistance during periods when the noncustodial parent failed to pay child support that occurred beforethey went onwelfare. They contend that they (and not the state) are entitled to any pre-welfare arrearage payments that arecollected on theirbehalf. Noncustodial parents are annoyed because once they start paying child support they want to see that theirmoney actuallyhelps their children; explanations that welfare benefits are in effect child support paid by taxpayers have not satisfiedthem. Moreover, advocates point out that while promising families priority in collecting arrearages owed to them as aninducement toencourage them to move off welfare as soon as possible, the states and the federal government keep for themselvescollections madevia the federal income tax refund offset program-the most lucrative form of arrearage collection. (In tax year 2001,$1.6 billion inoverdue support was collected via federal income tax refunds.) In contrast, some observers maintain that the seemingly dual mission of the CSE program, on the one hand to pay back the state forwelfare costs and on the other to keep families off welfare has contributed to the complexity of the distributionsystem which mostagree was complicated from the program's beginning in 1975. They note that the states' share of retained childsupport collectionsgenerally amount to only 10% of all states' expenditures on the TANF program, and argue that for families currentlyreceiving TANFpayments, the states should continue to retain this declining source of funding to help improve their CSE programs. (See CRS Report RL30488, Analysis of Federal State Financing of the Child Support Enforcement Program .) During the 107th Congress, many Members favored a child support distribution approach that simply paid former welfare families allthe arrearages collected on their behalf (including federal income tax refund offsets) before reimbursing the stateor federalgovernment for any owed arrearages. On May 16, 2002, the House passed H.R. 4737 (the welfarereauthorization bill),which would have provided incentives to states to distribute more child support collections to ex-welfare familiesand permitted statesto give a portion of child support collections to TANF families without having to repay the federal government itsshare of the money. In addition, H.R. 4737 would have simplified child support assignment and distribution rules, and made manyotherchanges. In the 108th Congress, H.R. 4 , a welfare reauthorization bill almost identical in substance to H.R. 4737 , wasintroduced on February 4, 2003. H.R. 4 was passed by the House on February 13, 2003. It includes childsupportassignment and distribution rules identical to those in H.R. 4737 as passed by the House in the107th Congress.

P.L. 104-193, the 1996 welfare reform law, substantively changed the rules governinghow child support collections are distributed among families, states, and the federal government. The general rulesin effect as ofOctober 1, 2000 are that child support collected during the time a family receives cash welfare belongs to the state;current childsupport and arrearages (past-due payments) that are owed to a family that is no longer receiving welfare belongsto the family; andchild support owed to a family that never received welfare belongs to the family. This is referred to as the "familiesfirst" childsupport distribution policy. (These "families first" distribution rules do not apply to child support collections madeby interceptingfederal income tax refunds.) Many policymakers contend that Congress should simplify the child supportdistribution system whichcurrently requires the tracking of six categories of arrearage payments to properly pay custodial parents. Legislationthat includedprovisions to simplify child support distribution procedures and provide more of the child support collected tocustodial parents(rather than the government) was passed by the House in the 106th and 107th Congresses, but not by the Senate. Similar legislation hasbeen reintroduced as part of the welfare reauthorization measure in the 108th Congress. This reportwill be updated as needed toreflect legislative activity.

UNRWA was established in 1949 to provide relief assistance and programs for Palestinian refugees. With the continuation of conflict between Israelis and Palestinians, UNRWA's mandate has been renewed annually ever since it began operations in May 1950 and is currently extended to June 2005. In keeping with its mission, it provides relief and social services, including food, housing, clothing, and basic health and education to over 4.1 million registered Palestine refugees living mostly in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, but also in Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria. Currently, UNRWA operates approximately 900 facilities. It also manages a microfinance and microenterprise program and infrastructure projects to address the living conditions of refugees. Not all UNRWA-registered refugees receive all the benefits available. Only one third of registered Palestine refugees are living in camps. UNRWA typically provides services directly to its beneficiaries in coordination with public services provided by the host authorities. While it continues to conduct emergency and relief operations, over time it has also developed a broader human development program to address the continuing needs of Palestine refugees. UNRWA's role as provider to one group of refugees over 50 years is unique and continues to be seen as important in the evolving situation in the Middle East. UNRWA is a subsidiary organ of the United Nations; its chief officer, the Commissioner General, reports directly to the General Assembly. It is governed by a 10-member Advisory Commission of which the United States is a member. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) is an observer on the Commission, which also includes other representatives of the Agency's major donors and host governments. Like the other members on the Commission, the United States participates in a semi-annual review of the UNRWA program and its budget. These meetings are typically held in May and September. Ninety-five percent of the UNRWA budget is funded through voluntary contributions from governments and the European Union. Most of these funds are in cash; approximately 7% is made up of in-kind donations. Another 4% comes largely from the U.N. regular budget and covers international staff costs. There are also voluntary cash contributions earmarked for specific projects. UNRWA funds are distributed among various programs including, education, health, relief and social services, and operational and common services. Refugees also make contributions where appropriate or possible in the form of co-payments, self help projects, or voluntary contributions. The UNRWA's regular budget for calendar year (CY) 2003 is $344 million. More than half of its budget is spent on educational and health programs. The project budget comprises mostly non-recurrent costs specifically earmarked by donors. UNRWA has recently made internal changes to improve its management and administration of resources, for example over the last several years, it has developed a new financial system, refined its budget presentations, and expanded its auditing procedures. The Department of State, Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM), deals with problems of refugees worldwide, conflict victims, and populations of concern to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Assistance includes a range of services from basic needs to community services to tolerance building and dialogue initiatives. Key programs include refugee protection (asylum issues, identification, returns, tracing activities) and quick impact, small community projects. Refugee emergencies lasting more than a year are funded from the regular Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA) account through PRM. The MRA includes four major components: Overseas Refugee Assistance, Refugee Admissions, Humanitarian Migrants to Israel, and Administration. UNRWA receives funding under Overseas Refugee Assistance, where aid to refugees consists almost entirely of contributions to international organizations and to private voluntary organizations working under the direction of such organizations in caring for refugees outside the United States. A small amount, approximately 3%, is provided directly to private voluntary organizations or to governments of first asylum countries. The primary international agencies include UNHCR and UNRWA. U.S. contributions to UNRWA come from the regular MRA account and also through the Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance (ERMA) account, which is made available for refugee emergencies. The chart below summarizes these contributions for recent years. For FY2003, it is anticipated that the overall spending for UNRWA will be similar to FY2002. The State Department does not provide a line item in its MRA budget request by country or specific organization. For FY2004, the overall request for the MRA account is $760.2 million slightly less than the $787 million appropriated for FY2003. Of the total for next year, $555.95 million is requested for Overseas Refugee Assistance, and of that, $102.32 million is requested for the Near East. The U.S. contribution to UNRWA usually covers 22-25% of the UNRWA total budget. See the table below for a historical summary of U.S. contributions to UNRWA. For information about other U.S. government funding to the Palestinians, see CRS Report RS22370, U.S. Foreign Aid to the Palestinians , by [author name scrubbed]. P.L. 87-510, the Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1962, as amended, is the permanent legislative authority under which U.S. refugee relief programs operate. Annual MRA funding is authorized in Department of State authorizing bills and appropriated in the Foreign Operations Appropriations acts. Language describing UNRWA assistance appears in the State Department Budget in Brief for FY2004. In CY2001, over 50 countries contributed to UNRWA. UNRWA appeals to donor nations for additional contributions are often used to cover emergency expenses. UNRWA continues to emphasize the critical importance of consistent and growing contributions to its regular budget. According to UNRWA, a number of factors affect its current operations. The volatile situation in Gaza and the West Bank, along with the Israeli response, have placed extra demands on UNRWA's emergency and refugee assistance. The increasing intensity of violence since February 2002 has disrupted and delayed humanitarian deliveries and affected the security and movement of UNRWA staff. The escalation of hostilities has also directly resulted in damage and destruction to housing and infrastructure. The UNRWA budget, which is funded almost entirely by voluntary contributions, fluctuates according to timing, amounts contributed, and exchange rates for foreign currencies. With increased use of UNRWA services, greater demands are being placed on the funding available. Deteriorating socio-economic conditions have had an enormous impact in terms of increasing unemployment and diminishing job security. A decline in the business sector has only aggravated the problem, placing extra demand on UNRWA's services. UNRWA reports that there is a mounting humanitarian crisis in the occupied Palestinian territory seen in deteriorating health conditions, rising poverty, and displacement of Palestinians. As the most vulnerable element of the population, refugees have been particularly affected. There is some concern that no effort has been made to settle the refugees permanently. Some in Congress have also questioned whether refugee rolls are inflated. While UNRWA periodically updates the rolls to try to eliminate duplication, its mandate covers relief and social services, but not resettlement. Although the refugee camps were meant to be temporary to provide some relief to the Palestinians, more than fifty years later, some are asking whether the UNHCR might be better placed to provide ongoing assistance. UNHCR would likely pursue a durable, long-term solution for the refugees. However, others have maintained that approach cannot work until there is a settlement between the Palestinians and Israelis. While the Palestinians argue that U.N. General Assembly Resolution 194 calls for a return to their homes or compensation, the Israelis say that because they did not cause the displacement, the international community is responsible for finding a solution. At present, UNRWA is still considered by many a unique organization that is better left in place until a way forward on the peace process can be found. For many years, Congress has raised concerns about how to ensure that UNRWA funds are used for the programs it supports and not for anything inappropriate, such as terrorist activities. In the past, some in Congress have been concerned that refugee camps were being used as military training grounds. The camps are not controlled or policed by UNRWA, but by the host countries. The FY2003 Foreign Operations appropriations requires that the GAO review efforts of UNRWA to ensure that its programs comply with Section 301(c) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and report to Congress no later than November 1, 2003. GAO responded to this mandate and was prepared to conduct a briefing by the agreed upon deadline. In addition, although not enacted into law, in the House Report on the FY2003 Foreign Operations appropriations bill ( H.Rept. 107-663 ), the conference committee agreed that the Secretary of State should comply with a requirement in the House-passed legislation to report to Congress on procedures that have been put in place to ensure that section 301(c) is enforced to the fullest degree possible. Concerns have been expressed about the content of textbooks and educational materials used by UNRWA with claims that they promote anti-Semitism and exacerbate tensions between Israelis and Palestinians. The host country, not UNRWA, provides the textbooks because students must take exams in host country degree programs. In House debate, amendment 15 offered by Representative Jarold Nadler to the FY2004 Foreign Operations appropriation recommended withholding the obligation of one third of the amount made available to UNRWA by the United States until these materials and textbooks had been replaced. It also called for UNRWA to establish a refugee resettlement program. The Nadler amendment failed on a point of order.

Since 1950, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) has provided relief and social services to registered Palestine refugees living mostly in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, but also in Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria. Ninety-five percent of the UNRWA budget is funded through voluntary contributions from governments and the European Union. U.S. contributions to UNRWA come from the regular Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA) account and also through the Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance (ERMA) account. The U.S. contribution to UNRWA usually covers 22-25% of the UNRWA total budget. The current cycle of violence in the Middle East presents particular challenges to UNRWA, including security, funding, and the impact of deteriorating socio-economic conditions. Recent congressional attention has focused on the issues concerning the progress of refugee resettlement, use of UNRWA funds, and the content of educational materials. This report will be updated as developments warrant.

In 2002, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps) announced a reg ulation which redefined two key terms, "fill material" and "discharge of fill material," that identify the scope of certain activities subject to regulation under Section 404 of the Clean Water Act. The 2002 final rule completed a rulemaking begun in 2000 by the Clinton Administration. Its proposal had generated support from the mining industry and other regulated groups, and opposition from environmental groups. Their relative positions in support and opposition did not change when the final rule was issued, because it is substantially similar to the earlier proposal. The agencies received over 17,000 comments on the proposed rule. The revised rule was specifically intended to clarify the regulatory definition of fill material under Section 404 by replacing two separate and inconsistent definitions with a single, common definition. In terms of the types of regulated filling activities, it expanded the types of discharge activities that are subject to Section 404 permit requirements specifically to include construction or maintenance of the infrastructure associated with solid waste landfills and mining overburden. Further, the revised rule removed regulatory language which previously excluded "waste" discharges from Section 404 jurisdiction, a change that some argue allows the use of 404 permits to authorize certain discharges that could harm the aquatic environment. This part of the rule conforms with positions taken by the Clinton Administration and endorsed by the Bush Administration in litigation brought by environmental groups which challenged regulation of surface coal mining practices in Appalachia. The Administration's position supported industry's view concerning the proper Clean Water Act mechanism for regulating coal mining. However, that position was opposed by environmental groups, who believe that disposal of coal mining and other waste should be regulated more stringently under other provisions of the Clean Water Act, not Section 404. Thus, at issue was whether the rule change was largely procedural, as proponents argued, or whether it allowed weaker regulatory practices to apply to coal mining, as opponents argued. Under the Clean Water Act (CWA), it is unlawful to discharge any pollutant into waters of the United States without a permit issued in accordance with that act. The CWA contains two different permitting regimes: (1) Section 402 permits (called the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System, or NPDES, permit program) address the discharge of most pollutants, and (2) Section 404 permits address the discharge of dredged or fill material into navigable waters of the United States at specified sites. The NPDES permit program is administered by EPA. The Corps and EPA have complementary roles under Section 404. Landowners seeking to discharge dredged or fill material must obtain a permit to do so from the Corps. EPA provides environmental guidance on Section 404 permitting and can veto a Corps permit, based on environmental impacts of the proposed discharge activity. The act's two separate permit programs differ in nature and approach. The NPDES program focuses primarily on the effects of discharges from industrial facilities and municipal sewage treatment plants on water quality and evaluates whether the discharge will adversely affect the chemical, physical, or biological integrity of the water. Under that program, pollutant discharges are controlled through the imposition of effluent limitations which restrict the quantities, rates, and concentrations of discharged constituents. Section 402 permits include limitations that reflect treatment with available pollution control technology, either to meet national minimum standards established by EPA, or more stringent treatment levels where needed to meet state-established water quality standards. The standard for issuance of a 402 permit is compliance with the effluent limitation and toxic pollutant control provisions of the act. EPA is authorized to issue NPDES permits; the agency has delegated this responsibility to 45 states, and EPA is the permitting authority in the remaining states. The Section 404 program focuses on discharges of two materials: dredged material and fill material. As described in the April 2000 proposal, "Fill material differs fundamentally from the types of pollutants covered by section 402 because the principal environmental concern is the loss of a portion of the water body itself." In contrast to the NPDES program's specific focus on water quality, the Section 404 program has a broader focus on effects of the discharge on the aquatic ecosystem as a whole, including wetlands. It requires evaluation of alternatives to the discharge and of measures to minimize and compensate for unavoidable adverse effects. Discharges that would have significant adverse effects on aquatic ecosystems are not allowed, and discharges also are not allowed if there are practicable alternatives with less adverse effects on the aquatic ecosystem. The standard for issuance of a 404 permit is consideration of the full public interest by balancing the favorable impacts against the detrimental impacts of a proposed activity to reflect the national concerns for both the protection and utilization of important resources. The Corps and EPA have complementary roles and regulations for the Section 404 program. The Corps' regulations (at 33 C.F.R. Parts 320-330) describe general regulatory policies, permit procedures and processing, and program definitions. EPA's regulations (at 40 C.F.R. Parts 230-232) provide the environmental guidelines for specifying disposal sites for dredged or fill material, procedures for a possible EPA veto of a permit, and definitions. Among the definitions of key terms contained both in the Corps' and EPA's regulations are two closely related definitions, "fill material" and "discharge of fill material." Neither term is defined in the Clean Water Act, leaving it to the administrative agencies to do so. Both the 404 and the NPDES programs regulate the "discharge of a pollutant," which the act defines as including, among others, dredged spoil, solid waste, chemical wastes, biological materials, rock, sand, and cellar dirt discharged into water. The determination of what is "fill material" is important, since fill material is subject to 404 permit requirements, while discharge of non-fill material is subject to NPDES permit requirements. EPA's and the Corps' definitions of "discharge of fill material" previously were identical and remain so in the revised definitions to mean "the addition of fill material into waters of the United States." They list, by way of example, activities typically related to construction for site development, roadways, erosion protection, etc., where the filling in of a waterbody occurs as a necessary element of the project. (40 C.F.R. SS232.2 and 33 C.F.R. SS323.2(f)) While before 2002 the two agencies defined "discharge of fill material" in identical terms, they had different regulatory definitions for the related term "fill material." The Corps' definition, at 33 C.F.R. SS323.2(e), which was adopted in 1977, stated: The term "fill material" means any material used for the primary purpose of replacing an aquatic area with dry land or of changing the bottom elevation of an [sic] water body. The term does not include any pollutant discharged into the water primarily to dispose of waste, as that activity is regulated under section 402 of the Clean Water Act. While the Corps' definition centered on evaluating what is the primary purpose of a prospective discharge to determine whether it would be regulated by Section 404 or Section 402, EPA's definition, at 40 C.F.R. SS232.2, focused on the effect of the material. EPA's definition had remained unchanged since it was adopted in 1988. It stated: Fill material means "any pollutant" which replaces portions of the "waters of the United States" with dry land or which changes the bottom elevation of a water body for any purpose. A central purpose of changing the agencies' rules was to conform the Corps' purpose-based definition of "fill material" with EPA's effects-based definition. This change was widely supported in public comments on the proposed rule. In the proposal and the final rule, the two agencies acknowledged that the different definitions and the "primary purposes" basis of the Corps' separate definition had caused confusion for some time, and had led to extensive litigation, as well. For example, the primary purpose test in the Corps' definition appeared to require the Corps to make a subjective determination about the primary purpose of a prospective discharge, and it also allowed a project proponent to seek to affect which regulatory regime would apply (Section 404 or Section 402) by simply asserting a purported purpose. Thus, in the May 2002 revision, the agencies said that they were adopting an identical definition of "fill material" that is more consistent with EPA's previous rule. It now states [T]he term fill material means material placed in waters of the United States where the material has the effect of: (i) Replacing any portion of a water of the United States with dry land; or (ii) Changing the bottom elevation of any portion of a water of the United States. In addition, however, the 2002 revised definition of fill material eliminated language contained in the Corps' previous regulation which had excluded "any pollutant discharged into the water primarily to dispose of waste" from Section 404 authorization. This change reflected the agencies' view that an exclusion for all waste is inappropriate, a view supported in industry comments but opposed by environmental groups. Simply because a material is disposed of for purposes of waste disposal does not, in our view, justify excluding it categorically from the definition of fill. Some waste (e.g., mine overburden) consists of material such as soil, rock and earth, that is similar to "traditional" fill material used for purposes of creating fast land for development. The agencies explained that, while trash or garbage discharges are "generally excluded" from Section 404 because of environmental and health concerns, such discharges may be permissible in some circumstances. "An example would be where recycled porcelain fixtures are cleaned and placed in waters of the U.S. to create environmentally beneficial artificial reefs. Such material would not be considered trash or garbage and thus would not be subject to the exclusion." EPA and the Corps believe that this is appropriate, and even environmentally beneficial, in situations where the otherwise excluded materials are being discharged in a manner consistent with traditional uses of fill material and where the review of the discharges under Section 404 can effectively ensure that the material will not cause or contribute to adverse environmental impacts. The final rule clarified the term "discharge of fill material" (previously identical for both agencies) by adding two additional examples of 404-regulated activities when these discharges have the effect of fill. First, it added "placement of fill material for construction or maintenance of any liner, berm, or other infrastructure associated with solid waste landfills" to distinguish fill material used for construction of solid waste landfills from discharges of leachate from landfills into waters of the U.S. which are subject to CWA Section 402. Second, the final rule's language concerning "mine overburden" expanded language in the 2000 proposal, which specified "placement of coal mining overburden." Based on comments that this language created confusion concerning whether under the proposal overburden or similar materials from other mining processes might not be covered, the agencies amended the definition in the final rule to include the phrase "placement of overburden, slurry, or tailings or similar mining-related materials" in the regulatory definition. The agencies' revised rules define certain types of discharges as specifically outside of the requirements of Section 404 and, conversely, define others as specifically subject to Section 404, thus not to Section 402. First, as discussed above, the final rule narrowed the regulatory definition of fill material: "The term fill material does not include trash or garbage." Second, the final rule included specific examples of materials that, according to EPA and the Corps, often constitute fill and thus should be subject to Section 404 requirements, not Section 402. The agencies added the following new text as further explanation of "fill material:" Examples of such material include, but are not limited to: rock, sand, soil, clay, plastics, construction debris, wood chips, overburden from mining or other excavation activities, and materials used to create any structure or infrastructure in the waters of the United States. (revised 33 CFR SS323.2(e)(2) and revised 40 CFR SS232.2(2)) In summary, EPA and the Corps did not de-list or remove from Section 404 coverage any of the types of construction-related activities previously defined as fill material but did narrow it to exclude trash or garbage. They modified their definitions by adding examples of several additional specific types of materials which will be considered as fill material, and thus are subject to Section 404 permitting. The most controversial aspect of the final rule was elimination of the waste exclusion previously contained in the Corps' definition of fill material, coupled with the specific inclusion of mining overburden to be regulated under Section 404. In some parts of the country, particularly in Appalachia, waste material that results from coal surface mining operations is deposited or discharged into waters of the United States as part of the overall mining activity. Historically, the Corps has regulated this type of discharge as fill, on the basis that such discharges result in the placement of rock and other material in such a way as to replace portions of a water body with dry land. The Corps believes that this practice is the most effective way to regulate activities associated with coal mining which involve discharge of pollutants into waters of the United States. However, some persons contend that the placement of such material is more a polluting activity than a filling activity, since the characteristics and quantities of material can alter the chemical, physical, or biological integrity of a waterbody, and thus, they argue, should be regulated by EPA as waste under CWA Section 402. This latter argument has been made by plaintiffs in several lawsuits. The first was brought in West Virginia in 1998 by a citizens group, the West Virginia Highlands Conservancy, challenging regulation of "mountaintop removal" surface coal mining practices in that state. Mountaintop mining involves removing large portions of a mountain in order to expose coal seams and depositing the dirt and rock into nearby valleys and streams. An October 1999 Opinion and Order by the U.S. District Court in that case stated, in dicta, that the "primary purpose" of the mountaintop mining refuse discharge is waste disposal, which is subject to Section 402, and, therefore, that the Corps lacks authority to regulate mountaintop removal under Section 404. In appealing the ruling, industry groups and labor unions said the court decision threatened the economy in West Virginia, because more stringent regulation would render mountaintop mining infeasible, while environmental and citizen groups supported the decision and argued that it should be upheld. Following the district court's ruling, the Clinton Administration sided with the industry in disagreeing with the court's finding that mountaintop mining must be regulated as waste under CWA Section 402, but it concurred with the court's related finding, supported by environmentalists, that the activity violates stream buffer zone requirements under the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act. On appeal, the 4 th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the ruling, but did so on grounds of jurisdiction and state sovereignty, not the merits of the case. The court held that the regulation at issue was, in fact, a matter of state law, not federal law and, thus, the case should not have been brought in federal court. The Supreme Court declined to review the 4 th Circuit's decision. Subsequently, environmental groups filed legal challenges to several other individually permitted mountaintop removal permits. A federal district court granted judgment in favor of the plaintiffs in 2007, rescinding the permits at issue, and remanding the permits to the Corps for further proceedings. The district court found that the probable impacts of the valley fills would be significant and adverse under both the CWA and the National Environmental Policy Act and that the Corps had inadequately evaluated the cumulative impacts of the projects. However, in 2009, the 4 th Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed the lower court's ruling and found that the Corps had acted properly within the scope of its authority in determining the necessary scope of analysis in reviewing the permits and assessing the cumulative impacts of the proposed valley fills. The appeals court reversed and vacated the district court's opinion and order and injunction against the Corps, thus allowing the Corps to issue permits for mountain removal mining without requiring more extensive environmental review. Environmental groups have continued to pursue lawsuits to halt or restrict mountaintop mining operations in Appalachia. Other legal challenges to mountaintop mining practices have occurred, including challenges to mountaintop mining operations authorized by the Corps under its nationwide general permit program, specifically nationwide permit 21 (in contrast to individual permits challenged in the proceedings described above). In several different cases, environmental groups have argued that the impact of valley fills under nationwide permit 21 (NWP 21) violates the CWA, which authorizes general permits only for activities that individually and cumulatively will cause only minimal adverse environmental effect. Federal district courts have ruled in support of the plaintiffs in several of these cases, but the rulings have subsequently been reversed on appeal. As part of Administration efforts to strengthen regulatory controls over surface mining activities in Appalachia, in 2010, the Corps suspended use of NWP 21 in the Appalachian region. In 2012, the Corps reissued all of the existing nationwide permits, with modification of a number of them, including NWP 21. The previous version of NWP 21, issued in 2007, did not have any acreage or linear foot limits and relied on permit conditions and pre-construction notification reviews to reduce adverse impacts on the aquatic environment. The Corps determined that this approach had not adequately protected against loss of aquatic resources; thus the reissued permit added a 1/2-acre and 300-linear foot limit for the loss of stream beds when NWP 21 is used. Further, the reissued permit strictly prohibited use of NWP 21 to authorize discharges of dredged or fill material into U.S. waters to construct valley fills associated with surface coal mining. Projects no longer eligible under NWP 21 could seek authorization under a Section 404 individual permit, which can be issued for longer periods of time than a nationwide permit. The effective date of the reissued NWPs was March 19, 2012; they will expire on March 18, 2017. In June 2016, in advance of the March 2017 expiration date, the Corps proposed to reissue the existing nationwide permits. Regarding NWP 21, the proposal would delete the 2012 provision that provided a transition to limits in the permit; as a result, going forward, permittees are to be subject to a 1/2-acre and 300-linear foot limit for the loss of stream beds when NWP 21 is used. The Clinton Administration's position in the Bragg litigation was that the most appropriate and effective regulation of coal mining refuse, consistent with existing practice, is as fill under Section 404. Thus, the April 2000 proposal to amend EPA's and the Corps' regulations to include coal mining overburden in the definition of "discharge of fill material" was intended to conform those regulations with the historical practice, which both the Clinton and Bush Administrations contended is lawful, and the Administrations' position in that lawsuit. EPA's and the Corps' justification of the revised rule was that the changes were necessary to conform the agencies' rules and to bring those rules in line with long-standing practice, i.e., of treating mining overburden as fill to be regulated under Section 404. The coal mining industry supports the practice of regulating mountaintop mining discharges under Section 404 and thus supported the redefinition. Industry groups such as the National Mining Association contend that Section 404 is the appropriate regulatory mechanism for addressing activities that convert waters to dry land, but requiring Section 402 permits would effectively prohibit a broad range of mining activities which have been allowed by long-standing current practice. As described above, the types of materials associated with surface mining activities (e.g., rock and sand) are defined in the Clean Water Act as pollutants when discharged into U.S. waters. If such materials are subject to the act's Section 402 NPDES requirements, they are evaluated on the basis of whether they alter the chemical, physical, or biological integrity of the water. That standard is more stringent than evaluation under Section 404, which authorizes permits for fill discharges for constructive or useful purposes. Environmental groups strongly criticized the agencies' regulatory action to define coal mining overburden and other waste material as fill material. More generally, the environmental community opposed any proposal to allow additional discharges of waste into any waters of the United States. Thus, environmentalists opposed eliminating language in the Corps' previous regulation which had excluded waste discharges from Section 404. They argued that the prior waste exclusion language in 33 C.F.R. SS323.2(e) correctly barred the Corps from issuing a 404 permit for waste disposal activities. Eliminating the waste exclusion, in their view, blurs the distinction between authority to regulate discharges for waste disposal (given to EPA under Section 402) and authority to regulate discharges of dredged or fill material (given to the Corps under Section 404). According to these groups, the changes contained in the May 2002 final rule codified a practice which is contrary to the Clean Water Act. They contend that under the revised definition, the Corps has the discretion to interpret the term "fill" broadly and to authorize any waste discharges--including those detailed in the final rule and others, such as coal ash refuse--so long as the effect of the discharge is to convert waters of the United States to dry land or change the bottom elevation, but irrespective of the impact on water quality or possible destruction of the waterbody. One analyst observed that the result of the 2002 rule revisions was to change the baseline of what is regulated by the 404 program, compared with the NPDES program. Under the Corps' previous regulation, the disposal of waste was solely subject to Section 402. Now, where the waste has the effect of fill, the government believes that regulation under Section 404 is appropriate. Thus, fill material now defines the extent of the NPDES program, because only pollutants subject to effluent limitations are excluded from regulation as fill. According to this view, the Section 404 permitting program has been expanded at the expense of EPA's NPDES program. Some congressional interest in these issues has been evident. Some Members of Congress criticized the 2000 proposal by the Clinton Administration, and several House and Senate Members also requested that the Bush Administration delay the final rule until Congress could review it. In 2002, following issuance of the revised regulations by the Corps and EPA, the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee held an oversight hearing to examine the rule, receiving testimony from Administration, mining industry, and public witnesses. Legislation intended to reverse the revised regulations was introduced in the 111 th Congress ( H.R. 1310 , the Clean Water Protection Act). It proposed to add a definition of "fill material" to the Clean Water Act similar to EPA's regulatory definition that was in effect before 2002 (see page 4, in " Redefinition of Key Terms "), plus a statement that the term does not include "any pollutant discharged into the water primarily to dispose of waste." This provision would allow pollutant discharges that replace portions of the waters of the United States with dry land or which change the bottom elevation of a water body for any purpose to be considered fill material. But it would reject the view reflected in the 2002 rule that some discharges for purposes of waste disposal (including mine overburden) should be allowable within the definition of fill. A somewhat narrower legislative approach was contained in another bill in the 111 th Congress, the Appalachia Restoration Act ( S. 696 ). It was similar to H.R. 1310 in that it proposed to define fill material to include pollutant discharges that replace portions of the waters of the United States with dry land or which change the bottom elevation of a water body for any purpose. But it would have excluded the disposal of excess spoil material from coal surface mining and reclamation activities, as described in Section 515(b)(22) of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, in waters of the United States. This provision appeared to allow discharges from some mining practices to be considered fill material, such as hardrock mining or mining of other minerals such as sand and gravel (thus qualifying for a 404 permit), while excluding discharges from surface coal mining activities. The significance of both bills is that discharges of materials that are not eligible for a Section 404 permit are regulated under CWA Section 402. As discussed in this report, because Section 402 discharge requirements are more restrictive than those for Section 404, some discharges that could be permitted under Section 404 cannot be authorized under Section 402. In 2009, the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works Subcommittee on Water and Wildlife held a hearing on the impacts of mountaintop removal mining on water quality in Appalachia. No further action occurred on either proposal in the 111 th Congress. The Clean Water Protection Act was re-introduced in the 112 th and 113 th Congresses ( H.R. 1375 and H.R. 1837 , respectively). It was re-introduced in the 114 th Congress as H.R. 6411 . Reflecting a different approach, other legislation was introduced in the 113 th Congress to codify the current regulatory definition of fill material in the CWA ( H.R. 5077 ). Also in the 113 th Congress, the Consolidated and Further Appropriations Act, 2015 ( H.R. 83 / P.L. 113-235 ), enacted in December 2014, included a provision (Division D, Title I, Section 109) barring the Corps from developing, adopting, implementing, or enforcing revised regulations concerning definitions of "fill material" or "discharge of fill material," although the Corps had not--and still has not--indicated intention to do so. A similar provision was included in FY2016 appropriations legislation ( P.L. 114-113 ). Another court ruling that could affect interest in these issues is a 2009 Supreme Court decision in Coeur Alaska Inc. v. Southeast Alaska Conservation Council . The case dealt with the discharge of gold mining waste, or slurry, into a lake in southeast Alaska. In a 6-3 decision, the Court reversed a ruling by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit that had found that discharges from the gold mine are subject to regulation under CWA Section 402. The Supreme Court ruled that the mining discharges qualified as fill material regulated under Section 404, and that stricter requirements under Section 402 did not apply. Environmental advocates criticized the Court's ruling and urged that, in order to preclude similar rulings in the future, either Congress or the Administration should change the expansive definition of "fill material" adopted by the Corps and EPA in 2002.

In May 2002, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps) announced a regulation redefining two key terms, "fill material" and "discharge of fill material," in rules that implement Section 404 of the Clean Water Act. This report discusses the 2002 rule, focusing on how it changes which material and types of activities are regulated under Section 404 and the significance of these issues, especially for the mining industry. The Clean Water Act contains two different permitting regimes: (1) Section 402 permits (called the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System, or NPDES, permit program) address the discharge of most pollutants, and (2) Section 404 permits address the discharge of dredged or fill material into navigable waters of the United States at specified sites. These permit programs differ in nature and approach. The NPDES program focuses on the effects of pollutant discharges on water quality. The 404 program considers effects on the aquatic ecosystem and other national and resource interests. The Corps and EPA have complementary roles under Section 404. Landowners seeking to discharge dredged or fill material must obtain a permit from the Corps under Section 404. EPA provides environmental guidance on 404 permitting. The determination of what is "fill material" is important, since fill material is subject to 404 permit requirements, while discharge of non-fill material is regulated by EPA under the Section 402 NPDES permit program. The revised rule was intended to clarify the regulatory definition of fill material by replacing two separate and inconsistent definitions with a single, common definition. It expanded the types of discharge activities that are subject to Section 404 specifically to include construction or maintenance of the infrastructure associated with solid waste landfills and mining overburden. Further, the revised rule removed regulatory language which previously excluded "waste" discharges from Section 404 jurisdiction, a change that some argue allows the use of 404 permits to authorize certain discharges that harm the aquatic environment. The final rule completed a rulemaking begun in April 2000 by the Clinton Administration. Its proposal had generated support from the mining industry and other regulated groups, and considerable opposition from environmental groups. The final rule is substantially similar to the earlier proposal. Environmental groups say the rule allows for inadequate regulation of certain disposal activities, including disposal of coal mining waste. The Clinton and Bush Administrations said that the regulatory changes were intended to conform Corps and EPA regulations to existing lawful practice, but opponents contend that those practices violate the Clean Water Act (CWA). Legislation to reverse the revised regulations was introduced in the 114th Congress (H.R. 6411, the Clean Water Protection Act). Similar legislation was introduced in previous Congresses, but has not advanced.

Congress enacted the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act of 1968 (WSRA) as part of a myriad of environmental conservation legislation enacted in the 1960s and 1970s. The act provides protection to certain rivers within the United States in order to balance the tendency toward development of the nation's rivers for industry or recreation. The act declares it to be the policy of the United States that certain rivers that possess "outstandingly remarkable scenic, recreational, geologic, fish and wildlife, historic, cultural, or other similar values, shall be preserved in free-flowing condition." The act further provides that "the established national policy of dam and other construction be complemented by a policy that would preserve other selected rivers ... in their free-flowing condition to protect the water quality of such rivers and to fulfill other vital national conservation purposes." In order to protect rivers according to the purpose of the act, the WSRA uses water rights to maintain flows and restrictions on development of federal projects to preserve the natural path of the rivers. This report analyzes the federal government's authority under the WSRA to maintain and preserve designated rivers. It examines the use of federal water rights under the act to ensure instream flows and the prohibitions on development of rivers for federal projects. Congress has continually made additions to the list of protected rivers under the WSRA. The 112 th Congress may consider legislation involving designation of certain river segments as well. Furthermore, congressional interest in the protections offered by the WSRA may arise from other legislative proposals, such as energy development projects that may conflict with the purposes of the WSRA. The WSRA created a national wild and scenic rivers system comprised of rivers meeting certain criteria outlined by the act. Eligibility for inclusion in the system depends on the nature of the river itself, although other bodies of water may be protected by the act. The WSRA defines river as "a flowing body of water or estuary or section, portion, or tributary thereof, including rivers, streams, creeks, runs, kills, rills, and small lakes." The act permits a river area to be included in the wild and scenic rivers system if it is a free-flowing stream and the related adjacent land area possesses one or more of the following values: scenic, recreational, geologic, fish and wildlife, historic, cultural, or other similar values. A river is "free-flowing" if it exists or flows "in natural condition without impoundment, diversion, straightening, rip-rapping, or other modification of the waterway." A river may be included even if it had previously been developed beyond its free-flowing condition upon restoration to such condition. A river may be included in the wild and scenic rivers system even if minor structures such as low dams or diversion works already exist along the section of the river proposed for inclusion, but the act specifically states that future construction of such structures is not condoned by the act. The WSRA intended for each river included in the national wild and scenic rivers system to be classified in one of three categories: wild, scenic, or recreational. A river will be classified as one of these categories depending on its characteristics and values at the time of designation and the desired level of protection. Although many designations in the statute specify two categories or do not specify any category, the act provides that rivers: if included, shall be classified, designated, and administered as one of the following: (1) Wild river areas--Those rivers or sections of rivers that are free of impoundments and generally inaccessible except by trail, with watersheds or shorelines essentially primitive and waters unpolluted. These represent vestiges of primitive America. (2) Scenic river areas--Those rivers or sections of rivers that are free of impoundments, with shorelines or watersheds still largely primitive and shorelines largely undeveloped, but accessible in places by roads. (3) Recreational river areas--Those rivers or sections of rivers that are readily accessible by road or railroad, that may have some development along their shorelines, and that may have undergone some impoundment or diversion in the past. Rivers may be designated by Congress, or, in some instances, be nominated by a governor and approved by the Secretary of the Interior. Designation provides certain protections from development and from the adverse effects of water resources projects for both the designated segment of the river and the adjacent land. Generally, designations identify the particular river, provide boundaries for the segment to be protected, and indicate what federal agency is responsible for administering the designated segment. Congress may also designate rivers for potential addition to the wild and scenic rivers system. After doing so, the Secretary of the Interior or the Secretary of Agriculture (if national forest lands are involved) is directed to study and submit reports on the suitability of the segments for inclusion to the President, who then makes recommendations to Congress regarding those segments. The boundaries of potential additions are generally defined to "comprise that area measured within one-quarter mile from the ordinary high water mark on each side of the river." Rivers in the wild and scenic rivers system are managed by various federal agencies, but typically are assigned to be administered by either the Secretary of Agriculture or the Secretary of the Interior. The WSRA requires the agency charged with administration of each segment to "establish detailed boundaries therefor (which boundaries shall include an average of not more than 320 acres of land per mile measured from the ordinary high water mark on both sides of the river)" and determine the most appropriate classification of the segment. Until this boundary determination is made, the default boundary of a designated river is "that area measured within one-quarter mile from the ordinary high water mark on each side of the river." The agency is also directed "to prepare a comprehensive management plan for such river segment to provide for the protection of the river values" and address issues of resource protection, development of lands and facilities, user capacities, and other management practices. The purpose of the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act is to preserve rivers "in free-flowing condition to protect the water quality of such rivers and to fulfill other vital national conservation purposes." To protect the flow of the river, the act provides for the assumption or creation of federal water rights sufficient to carry out the purposes of the act. Although Congress has repeatedly deferred to state law in the area of regulation of water use, Congress nonetheless has authority to "reserve" a federal water right if necessary. This authority is derived from the Winters doctrine of federal reserved water rights, announced by the U.S. Supreme Court in a decision regarding a reservation for tribal lands. Under the Winters doctrine, when Congress reserves some property for a federal purpose, it also reserves enough water to fulfill the purpose of the reservation. Courts are likely to be cautious in concluding that a federal water right is created, but may find such a right if Congress intended that such rights be created. Congress's intent may be indicated either by express language or by implication from a congressional purpose, reservation, or directive for which water is necessary. The WSRA implies a reserved right under a provision that prohibits any reservation that exceeds the amount necessary to achieve the goals of the act. The provision states that "[d]esignation of any stream or portion thereof as a national wild, scenic or recreational river area shall not be construed as a reservation of the waters of such streams for purposes other than those specified in this [act], or in quantities greater than necessary to accomplish these purposes." This provision indicates that the act would permit the reservation of a federal water right to some or all of the instream flows for the purposes that are specified in the act and up to the quantity necessary to achieve those purposes. The quantity of the federal right is often controversial under the WSRA. The Supreme Court has held that the federal government may reserve unappropriated water (water not subject to a right vested under state law) for federal purposes from federal "public domain" lands. The act provides that the right secures "the quantity necessary" to achieve the act's purposes, but that is not always a clear guideline. It is arguable what quantity is sufficient in each instance, and the protected amount may not be the full flow of the river. The WSRA protects rivers in their free-flowing condition, and the definition of free-flowing may seem to suggest that the full unappropriated flow as of the time of designation (i.e., subject to those existing uses and diversions that do not impair the purposes for which the river is being protected) is protected under the act. On the other hand, the act's reference to "necessary" water may indicate that the amount of the federal right may be less than the full amount of water available. In a river that is subject to heavy spring flows, for example, the argument might be made that some peak water flows could be impounded or diverted upstream as long as sufficient flow was released to the protected segment to maintain the values for which it was protected. The effect of designations and federal reservations under the WSRA also raises questions regarding the effect of the legislation on state laws. The limitation imposed to permit only the reservation of unappropriated waters reflects the WSRA's preservation of state law and jurisdiction over the waters of designated rivers. The WSRA states that the jurisdiction of the states over designated rivers "shall be unaffected by this [act] to the extent that such jurisdiction may be exercised without impairing the purposes of this [act] or its administration." Thus, it seems that the act would not affect existing water rights under state law and that subsequent appropriations under state law would be permissible so long as they did not adversely affect the designated rivers. Another question that arises related to the reservation of a federal right is the priority that right has among other water rights. The federal right vests and typically has a priority date as of the date of the reservation, whether or not the water is put to immediate use. Hence, the federal right is junior to rights existing on the date of the establishment of the federal right but senior to all rights vesting after that date. In some cases of federal reservations of water, the priority date may be the date of enactment of the legislation designating the river, or the legislation may provide for some other date of priority. It is of interest to note that, although federal reserved water rights would be available under the WSRA, they have not always been claimed. According to agency materials, in instances where another underlying federal right (e.g., national forest reserves) exists and appears adequate to provide sufficient water, a WSRA federal right might not be asserted. Similarly, if a right to adequate instream flows is available under state law, the United States has applied for necessary water by that route. Adequate flows may also be obtained under a specific state statute, through cooperative agreements, by filing defensive protests objecting to possibly harmful water right applications by others, or through purchase of necessary water from willing sellers. Although permitted by the WSRA, the United States has never condemned water rights for WSRA purposes to CRS's knowledge. Since the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act was enacted in 1968, dozens of rivers have been added to the list of protected waterways and some include multiple bodies of water. Designating a river under the act is not intended to change the flow of a river, but simply to protect the river from future changes. However, the lack of specificity in water rights protection under the act, and an unclear priority date for the rivers, have led some to include water rights protections within subsequent legislation designating specific rivers, especially in the arid West. The vast majority of wild and scenic river legislation does not address water rights. The few designations that do reference water rights, and their different forms, are discussed here. Generally, concerns have been raised as to the appropriate nature of water rights under WSRA designations. Upstream landowners and development interests, including state and local governments, may be concerned about whether new downstream wild and scenic segments may limit their water use and future water diversions. Conversely, downstream landowners and others may fear that upstream designations will limit their future water development options. Several factors may be considered when evaluating the water rights for a proposed river. One consideration is the type of designation of the river--wild, scenic, or recreational. The amount of water needed to protect the values of each section may vary depending upon the type of designation and its placement in the watershed. For example, water usage related to a protected waterway presumably would be most restricted if the river were designated as wild . Development or water usage near wild rivers cannot change the essential characteristics of primitive watersheds and shorelines, and unpolluted waters. A recreational river would have the fewest restrictions of the three types, as that designation applies to rivers that already have some access by roads, some development along their shorelines, and some impoundment or diversion of waters in the past. However, future restrictions on development, including on water resource projects, apply even to recreational rivers. Another key factor is the type of land through which the river flows. National parks, national forests, and wilderness areas have established water rights for waters within their boundaries to protect their resources. In each of these areas, the rivers themselves are an important resource. The implied water rights conferred by the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act for a specific river designated inside one of these land areas would be an overlay to those existing rights, that is, a second layer of rights reserving water to the extent needed to accomplish the purpose of the designation. In many areas, protection of wild and scenic values may be accomplished with the original reserved water right. However, the implied priority date created with the designation of the federal land may create a conflict when a river designation includes a specific priority date. Arguably, the more specific priority date could supersede the more general implied priority date, effectively eliminating the more senior priority right the river once enjoyed. This conflict has not been tested in the courts. Water rights provisions can address different purposes. One goal may be to quantify the extent of the new water right under state law. Another goal may be to establish a priority date for any new water rights created by the designation. For example, the enacting legislation for the Clarks Fork Wild and Scenic River in Wyoming, which is designated as a wild river, has this language about water rights: The Secretary of Agriculture is directed to apply for the quantification of the water right reserved by the inclusion of a portion of the Clarks Fork in the Wild and Scenic Rivers System in accordance with the procedural requirements of the laws of the State of Wyoming: Provided , That, notwithstanding any provision of the laws of the State of Wyoming otherwise applicable to the granting and exercise of water rights, the purposes for which the Clarks Fork is designated, as set forth in this chapter and this paragraph, are declared to be beneficial uses and the priority date of such right shall be November 28, 1990. This provision has the benefit of clearly establishing a priority right, as well as the date and quantity of that priority. The Clarks Fork River is in a national forest. It is not clear whether this water rights designation provides a second, albeit junior, water right, or whether it has the effect of thwarting the existing water rights that exist due to the land designation, giving the water rights created by the designation a lower priority than if the statute had been silent. A water rights provision might also establish that the river designation does not interfere with established water rights. An example of this type of water rights language is found in the statute protecting the Cache la Poudre River in Colorado. This wild river is in both a national park and a national forest. Its water rights language is as follows: Inclusion of the designated portions of the Cache la Poudre River... shall not interfere with the exercise of existing decreed water rights to water which has heretofore been stored or diverted ... as of the date of enactment of this title.... The reservation of water established by the inclusion of portions of the Cache la Poudre River in the Wild and Scenic Rivers System shall be subject to the provisions of this title, shall be adjudicated in Colorado Water court, and shall have a priority date as of the date of enactment of this title. This water right provision recognizes existing water rights for stored and diverted water. It also establishes a priority date as of the date of the act for each river segment within the designation. Additionally, it establishes jurisdiction for any disputes over water. However, the section preserving existing water rights refers only to those waters "stored or diverted." As noted above, it could be argued that this provision undercuts the existing priority of water rights created by designation of the Cache la Poudre segments in Rocky Mountain National Park and Roosevelt National Forest and gives those segments a more junior priority as of the date of the act. It could also be claimed the language creates an overlay. The legislative history of the clause could be read as indicating that the House of Representatives believed it was providing a priority right for the first time for the river. In any event, when a priority is specifically created within a designation, any existing priorities should also be addressed to avoid ambiguity as to their status. Only one example was found where the existing priority rights of the designated water body were acknowledged. That language is found in the proposed legislation to change Black Canyon of the Gunnison National Monument into a national park and make the Gunnison River a wild and scenic river. It states: "No water rights or the reservation of water which would expand on the existing reserved water right for the Black Canyon of the Gunnison National Monument, shall be created by this designation." This language appeared to address the Gunnison River's water rights adequately, and likely would have assuaged concerns from upstream and downstream owners that their water usage would not be changed or limited by the designation, even if not expressly stated. Other water rights provisions would focus on protecting existing rights, rather than establishing a priority date. For example, the proposed legislation for Northern Rockies ecosystem protection included this language: "Nothing in this Act may be construed as a relinquishment or reduction of any water rights reserved, appropriated, or otherwise secured by the United States in the State of Idaho, Montana, Wyoming, Oregon, or Washington on or before the date of enactment of this Act." This language would appear to protect any water rights that existed at the time of the designation, including any water rights that the designated rivers may have. A different version of water rights language clarifies that a river's designation as recreational will not interfere with adjacent landowners' water supply. The Missouri River segments protected under the act have this language regarding water rights: "In administering such river, the Secretary shall ... permit access for such pumping and associated pipelines as may be necessary to assure an adequate supply of water for owners of land adjacent to such segment and for fish, wildlife, and recreational uses outside the river corridor established pursuant to this paragraph." To the extent a water rights provision is needed, it could simply address existing water rights, including those of the designated water body, and state that no modification of those rights would occur as a result of the designation. In addition to using reserved water rights to protect the flows of designated rivers, the WSRA provides protection for a designated river by limiting the licensing of dams, reservoirs and other water project works on, or adversely affecting, protected segments. The WSRA prohibits the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) from licensing "the construction of any dam, water conduit, reservoir, powerhouse, transmission line, or other project works under the Federal Power Act ... on or directly affecting any river" designated as part of the national wild and scenic rivers system. Likewise, no other federal agency may "assist by loan, grant, license, or otherwise in the construction of any water resources project that would have a direct and adverse effect on the values for which [a designated] river was established." The prohibitions on water and power projects are very broad in the WSRA. The prohibitions generally limit federal agencies from recommending authorization of such projects, or appropriations to begin construction on such projects, that would have an adverse affect on the purpose of the designation. The restrictions placed on FERC and other federal agencies regarding rivers designated under the WSRA extend to rivers designated as potential additions to the wild and scenic rivers system, at least to some degree. The same prohibition on licenses for construction or assistance for construction applies for a period of three complete fiscal years following any congressional action that designates a river as a potential addition. However, if, during that period, the relevant administering agency determines that the river should not be included in the wild and scenic rivers system and provides appropriate notice to Congress, the project agency may proceed with project plans. The act does not prohibit "licensing of, or assistance to, developments below or above a wild, scenic or recreational river area or on any stream tributary thereto which will not invade the area or unreasonably diminish the scenic, recreational, and fish and wildlife values present in the area on the date of designation" as an addition or potential addition to the wild and scenic rivers system.

Congress enacted the WSRA as part of a myriad of environmental conservation legislation enacted in the 1960s and 1970s. The act provides protection to certain rivers within the United States in order to balance the tendency toward development of the nation's rivers for industry or recreation. The act declares it to be the policy of the United States that certain rivers that possess "outstandingly remarkable scenic, recreational, geologic, fish and wildlife, historic, cultural, or other similar values, shall be preserved in free-flowing condition." The act further provides that "the established national policy of dam and other construction be complemented by a policy that would preserve other selected rivers ... in their free-flowing condition to protect the water quality of such rivers and to fulfill other vital national conservation purposes." Under the act, rivers meeting certain criteria may be designated for inclusion in a national rivers system and classified for specific protections. A river may be classified as wild (the most primitive rivers with the most restrictive protections), scenic (rivers with some access with intermediate protections), or recreational (rivers with some development with the most lenient protections). Designated federal agencies issue comprehensive management plans to ensure the protected values of the river. In order to accomplish the goals of the act, the WSRA uses two main methods of protection: water rights to maintain flows and restrictions on development for federal projects to preserve the natural path of the rivers. This report analyzes the federal government's authority under the WSRA to maintain and preserve designated rivers. It provides an overview of the WSRA and the process by which rivers are designated and administered under the act. It also examines the use of federal water rights under the act to ensure instream flows and the prohibitions on development of rivers for federal projects.

C riminal prosecutions involving classified information inherently create a tension between the government's legitimate interest in protecting sensitive national security information and a criminal defendant's rights under the United States Constitution and federal law. In many cases, the executive branch may resolve this tension before any charges are formally brought by simply forgoing prosecution in order to safeguard overriding national security concerns. "Graymail" colloquially refers to situations where a defendant may seek to introduce tangentially related classified information solely to force the prosecution to dismiss the charges against him. However, in other cases, classified information may actually be material to the defense and excluding it would violate the defendant's constitutional rights. This tension was the primary factor leading to the 1980 enactment of the Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA), which "provides pretrial procedures that will permit the trial judge to rule on questions of admissibility involving classified information before the introduction of the evidence in open court." These procedures are intended to provide a means for the court to distinguish instances of graymail from cases in which classified information is actually material to the defense. Courts have generally agreed that CIPA does not create any new privilege against the disclosure of classified information, but merely establishes uniform procedures to determine the materiality of classified information to the defense in a criminal proceeding. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (Second Circuit) has held that CIPA "presupposes a governmental privilege against disclosing classified information" in criminal matters. Therefore, before discussing the specifics of the Classified Information Procedures Act in criminal prosecutions, this report will first provide a general overview of the government's ability to restrict disclosures in civil litigation by asserting the state secrets privilege. The state secrets privilege is a judicially created evidentiary privilege that allows the government to resist court-ordered disclosure of information during civil litigation if there is a reasonable danger that such disclosure would harm the national security of the United States. Although the common law privilege has a long history, the Supreme Court first described the modern analytical framework of the state secrets privilege in the 1953 case of United States v. Reynolds. If the state secrets privilege is appropriately invoked to cover protected information in civil litigation, it is absolute; the disclosure of the underlying information cannot be compelled by the court. Still, a valid invocation of the privilege does not necessarily require dismissal of the lawsuit. In Reynolds , for instance, the Supreme Court did not dismiss the plaintiffs' claims, but rather remanded the case to determine whether the claims could proceed absent the privileged evidence. Controversy has arisen with respect to the question of how a case may proceed in light of a successful claim of privilege. Courts have varied greatly in their willingness to either grant government motions to dismiss a claim in its entirety or allow a case to proceed "with no consequences save those resulting from the loss of evidence." Whether the assertion of the state secrets privilege is fatal to a particular suit, or merely excludes privileged evidence from further litigation, is a question that is highly dependent upon the specific facts of the case. Prosecutions implicating classified information can vary factually, but an important distinction that may be made among such prosecutions regards whether the defendant already has access to the classified information in question. In cases where the defendant is accused of leaking classified information, she may already be privy to such information, and the government may be seeking to prevent further disclosure to the general public. However, in the case of terrorism prosecutions, the more typical concern is likely to be how classified information can be used as part of the prosecution's case against the defendant. In these cases, protective orders preventing disclosure to the defendant, as well as to the public, may be sought by the government. Constitutional issues related to withholding classified information from a criminal defendant arise during two distinct phases of criminal litigation. First, issues may arise during the discovery phase, when the defendant requests and is entitled to classified information in the possession of the prosecution. Secondly, issues may arise during the trial phase, when classified information is sought to be presented to the trier-of-fact as evidence of the defendant's guilt. The issues implicated during both of these phases are discussed below. CIPA contains a number of provisions that are intended to create opportunities to resolve issues related to the use of classified information in advance of trial in a secure setting. For example, at any time after charges have been filed against a defendant, any party may request a pretrial conference to discuss issues related to the potential disclosure of classified information. Among the issues that may be discussed are schedules for discovery requests and hearings to determine the relevance, admissibility, and materiality of classified information. CIPA also requires a defendant to notify the court and the prosecution of any classified information that he reasonably expects to disclose or cause the disclosure of. If a defendant fails to provide such notice, he may be penalized by being precluded from using such evidence at trial. In order to ensure that the disclosure of classified information is not premature, the government may also take an interlocutory appeal of any CIPA ruling, rather than waiting until a trial has concluded. In this way, the government does not have to risk disclosure of classified information that would later have been determined by a reviewing court to be protected. Such appeals will be expedited by the court of appeals. In order to safeguard classified information that is disclosed, CIPA authorizes courts to issue protective orders prohibiting or restricting the disclosure of such classified information. In some cases, protective orders may limit disclosure to individuals or attorneys, even from those who have received security clearances from the government. However, some defendants may be ineligible for the necessary security clearances. In these cases, courts may issue protective orders prohibiting cleared counsel from sharing any classified information with the defendant. In the event that the defendant's attorneys are also unable to obtain the necessary security clearances, courts have appointed counsel with the necessary security clearance to represent the defendant in matters where disclosure of classified information may be necessary. However, in some cases, cleared counsel have been prohibited from disclosing the classified information to the uncleared defendant or uncleared defense counsel. For example, in In re Terrorist Bombings of United States Embassies in East Africa , the court entered a protective order limiting disclosure of classified material to certain persons who had obtained sufficient security clearances. The defendant's attorneys were able to obtain security clearances, but the defendant was not. Because of this, the defendant's attorneys were unable to share with their client all the information they learned from the classified documents. Other facts deemed by the court to be relevant to the defendant's case were declassified or stipulated by the government. The defendant in this case argued that this restriction on communication violated his Sixth Amendment right to have the assistance of counsel. The Second Circuit rejected this claim, noting that the right to the assistance of counsel does not preclude every restriction on communication between defense counsel and the defendant. In this instance, the court believed that the restrictions were justified because the disclosure of the classified information "might constitute a particularly disastrous security breach--one that, perhaps, might place lives in danger." Furthermore, the Second Circuit found that the restrictions were limited and carefully tailored because they permitted cleared defense counsel to discuss the "relevant facts" with the defendant. The mechanics of discovery in federal criminal litigation are governed primarily by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. These rules provide the means by which defendants may request information and evidence in the possession of the prosecution, in many cases prior to trial, including classified information. CIPA authorizes a court to permit the government to propose redactions to classified information provided to the defendant as part of discovery, but "does not give rise to an independent right to discovery" of classified information. Alternatively, a court may permit the government to summarize the classified information, or to admit relevant facts in lieu of providing discovery. In support of such procedures, the government may submit an affidavit written statement explaining why the defendant is not entitled to the redacted information. The statement may be viewed by the court ex parte and in camera . Under federal law, there are certain classes of information that the prosecution must provide if requested by the defendant. For example, Brady material, named after the seminal Supreme Court case Brady v. Maryland , refers to information in the prosecution's possession which is exculpatory or tends to prove the innocence of the defendant. This may encompass statements by witnesses that contradict, or are inconsistent with, the prosecution's theory of the case. Such information must be provided to the defense, even if the prosecution does not intend to call those witnesses. Prosecutors are considered to have possession of information that is in the control of agencies that are "closely aligned with the prosecution," but whether information held exclusively by elements of the intelligence community could fall within this category does not appear to have been addressed by the courts. Additionally, Jencks material refers to written statements made by a prosecution witness, who has testified or may testify. For example, this would include a report made by a witness called to testify against the defendant. In the Supreme Court's opinion in Jencks v. United States , the Court noted the high impeachment value a witness's prior statements may have, to show either inconsistency or incompleteness of the in-court testimony. Subsequently, this requirement was codified by the Jencks Act. Classified information that is also Jencks or Brady material is still subject to CIPA and may be provided in a redacted or substituted form, but the operation of Jencks and Brady may differ in this context. For example, under Section 4 of CIPA, which deals with disclosure of discoverable classified information, the prosecution may request to submit either a redacted version or a substitute of the classified information in order to prevent harm to national security. While the court may reject the redacted version or substitute as an insufficient proxy for the original, this decision is made ex parte without the defendant's input. In some cases, the issue may not be the disclosure of a document or statement, but whether to grant the defendant pre-trial access to government witnesses. In United States v. Moussaoui , one issue raised was the ability of the defendant to depose "enemy combatant" witnesses who were, at the time the deposition was ordered, considered intelligence assets by the United States. Under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, a defendant may request a deposition in order to preserve testimony at trial. In Moussaoui , the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit (Fourth Circuit) had determined that a deposition of the witnesses by the defendant was warranted because the witnesses had information that could have been exculpatory or could have disqualified the defendant for the death penalty. However, the government refused to produce the deponents, citing national security concerns. In light of this refusal, the Fourth Circuit, noting the conflict between the government's duty to comply with the court's discovery orders and the need to protect national security, considered whether the defendant could be provided with an adequate substitute for the depositions, such as summaries of the witnesses' statements. The court also noted that substitutes would necessarily be different from depositions, and that these differences should not automatically render the substitutes inadequate. Instead, the appropriate standard was whether the substitutes put the defendant in substantially the same position he would have been absent the government's national security concerns. Here, the Fourth Circuit seemed to indicate that government-produced summaries of the witnesses' statements, with some procedural modifications, could be adequate substitutes for depositions. CIPA provides the government with an opportunity to request a hearing to determine the use, relevance, or admissibility of any classified information that may be disclosed at trial. This hearing may be conducted in camera if the Attorney General certifies that a public proceeding might result in disclosure of classified information. Before the hearing, the government may be required to give the defendant notice of the classified information at issue and its relevancy to the charges against the defendant. If the information in question is held to be material to the defense, but the government still objects to its disclosure, the court is required to accept that assertion without scrutiny and impose nondisclosure orders upon the defendant. However, in such cases the court is also empowered to dismiss the indictment against the defendant or impose other sanctions that are appropriate. Therefore, once classified information has been determined through the procedures under CIPA to be material, it falls to the government to elect between permitting the disclosure of that information or the sanctions the court may impose, including dismissal of charges against the defendant. If the court concludes that classified information is admissible and authorizes its disclosure at trial, CIPA establishes a framework by which the government may petition the court to permit certain alterations to evidence in order to introduce the relevant information in an alternative form. These substitutions may occur during discovery or at trial. During discovery, a court may, "upon a sufficient showing," permit the government to "delete specified items of classified information," "substitute a summary of the information," or "substitute a statement admitting relevant facts that the classified information would tend to prove." Prior to the introduction of evidence at trial, a court may likewise permit the government to redact, summarize, or substitute classified information, but only so long as the substitution "provide[s] the defendant with substantially the same ability to make his defense as would disclosure of the specific classified information." If the substitute is rejected by the court, disclosure of classified information may still be prohibited if the Attorney General files an affidavit with the court objecting to disclosure. However, if the Attorney General files such an objection, the court may dismiss the indictment; find against the government on any pertinent issue; strike testimony; or take any other action as may be appropriate in the interests of justice. Two recent CIPA cases, both of which involved federal prosecutions of former intelligence officials for allegedly disclosing classified information, provide insight into the scope of a court's authority to permit evidentiary substitutions. In United States v. Drake , a federal district court approved the government's request to submit evidentiary substitutions for unclassified , but otherwise protected, information. In United States v. Sterling , the court permitted the prosecution to use evidentiary substitutions for evidence introduced in its own case-in-chief, as opposed to merely providing substitutes for evidence introduced by the defendant. Both of these rulings are discussed in more detail in the following sections. Section 6(c) of CIPA specifically provides the government with the authority to make evidentiary substitutions for classified information during a criminal prosecution. However, in some cases prosecutors have also sought to submit substitutions for unclassified information that the government believes would threaten national security if disclosed as part of the evidentiary record. For example, in U nited S tates v. Drake , the government sought to make substitutions for evidence that, though not classified, was protected under a separate statutory evidentiary privilege expressly applicable to the National Security Agency (NSA). The Drake case involved an unauthorized disclosure prosecution against a former NSA employee under the Espionage Act. Drake was accused of leaking classified information relating to the NSA Inspector General investigation that found that the agency had inefficiently used resources in developing a specific secret program. After a series of CIPA hearings in which the court determined which classified information sought by the defense was relevant and admissible, the government provided the court with proposed evidentiary substitutions for admissible evidence that included substitutions and redactions for both classified and unclassified evidence. As to the substitutions of unclassified evidence, the government argued that though not classified, the evidence was "protected material" under 50 U.S.C. Section 402--a statutory privilege that protects against the "disclosure of the organization or any function of the National Security Agency, or any information with respect to the activities thereof." In short, the government asserted that admissibility decisions under CIPA, including determinations of the adequacy of a substitution, remained subject to statutory, military, and other traditional common law privileges, as CIPA had never altered "the existing law governing the admissibility of evidence." In addition, the government argued that courts retain "inherent authority outside of CIPA to resolve the legal and evidentiary issues relating to the protected information through the use of substitutions." The defense objected to the government's proposed use of substitutions for unclassified evidence--arguing that CIPA provided the exclusive basis upon which a court could permit substitutions for evidence in a criminal case. As CIPA, by its terms, applied only to classified information, the court, according to the defendant, had no grounds to permit substitutions, redactions, or summaries with respect to unclassified information. Even if the court had authority to permit substitutions for unclassified information protected by a valid privilege, the defense asserted that the NSA privilege, which had previously only been asserted in civil cases, had no application in a criminal trial. The federal district court held that the government was permitted to submit substitutions for unclassified information protected under the NSA's statutory privilege, as CIPA does not "foreclose the consideration of substitutions for information based upon an assertion" of an otherwise applicable government privilege. Relying on the Fourth Circuit's decision in U nited S tates v. Moussaoui , the district court determined that federal courts have the inherent "authority to allow or reject substitutions for unclassified information that is protected by a Government privilege." In Moussaoui , the defense had requested access to a witness for use at trial. The government objected, noting that the witness in question was an enemy combatant, a national security asset, and, therefore, unavailable. The Fourth Circuit accepted the government's position, holding that although CIPA was inapplicable to the unclassified testimony in question, the statute provided a "useful framework" for considering the appropriateness of substitutions. Thus, rather than providing the defense with unfettered access to the witness, the Fourth Circuit permitted the witness to be deposed with specific precautions. Drawing an analogy to Moussaoui , the Drake court held that as long as the NSA privilege was applicable, the court was not prohibited from allowing adequate substitutions for protected evidence. Specifically, for the Drake court CIPA did not represent the exclusive means by which a court could permit evidentiary substitutions. The court next turned to whether the NSA privilege was applicable in a criminal prosecution. As no court had yet held that the NSA statutory privilege applied in criminal cases, the district court looked to the analogous state secrets privilege--generally considered a common law evidentiary privilege with application primarily in the civil context--to inform its decision. Citing a case from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (Second Circuit), in which it was determined that the state secrets privilege was applicable to criminal cases, the district court determined, by analogy, that the NSA privilege would similarly apply in the criminal context. Accordingly, as the NSA had asserted an applicable government privilege, the agency was free to submit substitutions for unclassified evidence protected under 50 U.S.C. SS 402. A second dispute that has arisen in the context of allowing substituted evidence in criminal leak prosecutions has been whether CIPA permits the government to submit substitutions for its own evidence. Typically in CIPA cases, the defense will submit a 5(a) notice, which provides the court and the prosecution with notice of any classified information that the defense reasonably expects to disclose or cause to be disclosed at trial. Following this submission, the court will generally hold CIPA hearings in which the court makes "all determinations concerning the use, relevance, or admissibility of classified information that would otherwise be made during the trial or pretrial proceedings." After the court determines what evidentiary items are relevant and admissible, the government will generally propose any necessary substitutions for that evidence. Thus, substitutions generally are submitted in place of classified information that the defense expects to use in its own case. However, in U nited S tates v. Sterling , the government gave notice to the court that it also sought to submit substitutions for classified information it wished to introduce itself for use in its case-in-chief. Sterling involves a former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) officer who was convicted of disclosing classified information to author James Risen. During preliminary hearings in the case, the defense objected to the prosecution's use of substitutions for its own evidence. CIPA, the defense asserted, permitted the court to grant a request to use substituted evidence in only two scenarios: (1) under Section 4, in complying with the prosecution's discovery obligations, and (2) under Section 5 and Section 6, for use "in lieu of classified information that the defense intends to use in any pretrial or trial proceeding." "Notably absent," argued the defense, "is any statutory provision allowing for the Government to use substitutions or redactions for information it seeks to introduce into evidence at trial." Although unable to cite to any previous cases that had interpreted CIPA as distinguishing between evidence introduced by the defense and evidence introduced by the prosecution, or any express language within the statute that clearly made such a distinction, the defense relied upon the history and primary purposes of CIPA as the basis for its argument. First, the defense argued, the statute was "intended to implement procedures that allow for the defense to gain access to classified information so as not to impede a defendant's right to a fair trial." Second, the defendant argued that CIPA was enacted to combat the practice of "graymail," where a "criminal defendant threatens to reveal classified information during the course of his trial in the hope of forcing the government to drop the charge against him." Neither concern, the defense argued, was triggered where the government is permitted to substitute evidence it seeks to present in its own case-in-chief. In response, the government argued that nothing in the text of CIPA distinguished between evidence submitted by the prosecution and evidence submitted by the defense. In the view of the government, CIPA authorizes the government to propose substitutions "upon any determination by the court authorizing the disclosure of specific classified information." The government relies on the text of CIPA, noting that neither Section 4, 6, nor 8 of CIPA states that the provided substitution authority only applies to defense evidence. Additionally, contrary to the defense's reading of the legislative history, the government argued that while "graymail" was undoubtedly a concern behind CIPA, the legislative history suggests that Congress was also concerned with the disclosure of any classified evidence at trial, regardless of which party introduced the evidence. The government contended that CIPA, when read as a whole, was enacted to establish procedures for use in criminal prosecutions involving classified information that prevents "the disclosure in the course of trial of the very information the laws seek to protect." The substitution provisions of CIPA that exist to protect classified information, would, according to the government, therefore apply to any classified information that arises during trial, not simply classified information that the defense seeks to introduce. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia rejected the defense's interpretation of CIPA. Instead, based on "reasons stated on the record during a sealed hearing," the court held that the government "will be permitted to use limited substitutions and redactions in exhibits subject to the court's determination that the exhibits are relevant, not cumulative, and not shown by the defense to be unfairly prejudicial." While the sealed nature of the opinion makes it unclear what the basis was for the court's ruling, the fact that it ruled for the government suggests that the court found the government's arguments to be persuasive. Together, the Drake and Sterling cases reinforce that CIPA does not represent the exclusive means by which a court can prevent disclosure of sensitive or classified information within criminal proceedings. CIPA is not intended to alter the rules of evidence, and therefore does not affect traditional powers of the judiciary to craft certain methods for safeguarding protected information. Thus, rather than imposing procedural limitations on the court, CIPA may be more accurately characterized as supplementing judicial authority to resolve evidentiary disputes in criminal cases involving classified information. Additionally, the statute has not been read by the courts as simply establishing a procedure by which defendants are provided with access to classified information necessary to their defense; rather, the statute also serves the broader purpose of protecting the disclosure of classified information generally by providing the government with procedures for carrying out prosecutions without risking the disclosure of protected information. In some cases, the use of CIPA procedures can also implicate constitutional concerns. As described above, there may be instances where disclosure of classified information to the defendant would be damaging to national security. In these instances, the prosecution may seek to present evidence at trial in a manner that does not result in disclosure to the defendant. One proposed scenario might be the physical exclusion of the defendant from those portions of the trial, while allowing the defendant's counsel to remain present. However, such proceedings could be viewed as unconstitutionally infringing upon the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. Similar confrontation issues may be raised by use of the "silent witness rule," a procedure that may be offered by the government as a substitution for classified information that would be otherwise admissible in a criminal defendant's trial. Under this procedure, a witness whose testimony may include classified information will respond to questions by making references to particular portions of a classified document. The classified document may be made available to the parties, the court, and members of the jury. However, it is not made available to members of the public that may be in the gallery of the court. In this way, the witness may testify without disclosing classified information to members of the public at large. If the defendant is not allowed to personally review classified information in the same manner that it is made available to the jury, the use of the silent witness rule may violate the defendant's right to confront the evidence used against him. For example, in United States v. Abu Ali , the trial court permitted the prosecution to use the silent witness rule, while only providing the defendant and uncleared counsel with a redacted version of the document. In contrast, the members of the jury were allowed to hear the testimony using an unredacted version of the same document. The Fourth Circuit subsequently held this procedure to be unconstitutional, stating: If the government does not want the defendant to be privy to information that is classified, it may either declassify the document, seek approval of an effective substitute, or forego its use altogether. What the government cannot do is hide the evidence from the defendant, but give it to the jury. Such plainly violates the Confrontation Clause. The use of the silent witness rule for selected pieces of classified evidence has been approved by courts under CIPA when its use has not raised Confrontation Clause issues. For example, in Sterling , the government sought an interlocutory appeal from a district court order permitting government witnesses to testify using pseudonyms from behind physical screens, but allowing the jury and defense to have a key to the witnesses' true names. Specifically, the government sought to preclude the jury and defense from knowing the witnesses' true identities. Sterling had argued that such exclusions would violate his right to have a public trial and to confront witnesses against him. Sterling also argued that, in his particular case, the use of such security measures was "unduly suggestive," as the jury may confuse the purposes of the secrecy measures used in the witnesses' testimony and make inferences about the sensitive nature of the information he had allegedly disclosed. Sterling argued that these inferences would be prejudicial because the actual sensitivity of such information was a contested issue in his trial. The Fourth Circuit held that the district court had correctly allowed the defense to access the witnesses' true identities, noting that "Sterling knows, or may know, some of the witnesses at issue, and depriving him of the ability to build his defense in this regard could impinge on his Confrontation Clause rights." However, the court reversed that part of the district court's order allowing the jury to know the witnesses' true names, finding the witnesses' identities to be clearly sensitive information that would not provide any benefit to the jury's deliberations. The Fourth Circuit also held that any concerns about the undue influence of the security measures could be cured by instructing the jury that "Sterling's guilt cannot be inferred from the use of security measures in the courtroom."

A criminal prosecution involving classified information may cause tension between the government's interest in protecting classified information and the criminal defendant's right to a constitutionally valid trial. In some cases, a defendant may threaten to disclose classified information in an effort to gain leverage. Concerns about this practice, referred to as "graymail," led the 96th Congress to enact the Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA) to provide uniform procedures for prosecutions involving classified information. Examples of recent cases implicating CIPA have arisen in the context of prosecutions against alleged terrorists, as well as prosecutions involving the unauthorized disclosure of classified information by former intelligence officials. CIPA provides procedures that permit a trial judge to rule on the relevance or admissibility of classified information in a secure setting. The Act requires a defendant to notify the prosecution and the court of any classified information that the defendant may seek to discover or disclose during trial. During the discovery phase, CIPA authorizes courts to issue protective orders limiting disclosure to members of the defense team that have obtained adequate security clearances and to permit the government to use unclassified redactions or summaries of classified information that the defendant would normally be entitled to receive. If classified information is to be introduced at trial, the court may allow substitutes of classified information to be used, so long as they provide the defendant with substantially the same ability to present a defense and do not otherwise violate his constitutional rights. Among the rights that may be implicated by the application of CIPA in a criminal prosecution are the defendant's right to have a public trial, to be confronted with the witnesses against him, and to have the assistance of counsel. Application of CIPA may also be implicated by the obligation of the prosecution to provide the defendant, under Brady v. Maryland, with exculpatory information in its possession and the separate obligation to provide the defendant with government witnesses' prior written statements pursuant to the Jencks Act.

The "Foreign Service Overseas Pay Equity Act of 2008," H.R. 3202 , as amended, would eliminate, over three years, the pay difference between those Foreign Service personnel serving in Washington, D.C. and those serving abroad who are not eligible for a locality pay adjustment. This bill was referred to both the House Committee on Foreign Affairs (HCFA) and the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform (HOGR). On July 16, 2008, HCFA favorably reported the bill by voice vote. On August 1, 2008, an identical companion bill was introduced in the Senate, S. 3426 , and referred to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (SFRC). On September 23, SFRC considered and reported S. 3426 , without amendments. On July 16, 2008, the Senate Committee on Appropriations reported its FY2009 Department of State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs appropriations bill, S. 3288 . In its bill, the Senate Appropriations Committee met the Administration's request for funding needed to eliminate the existing 20.89% pay differential over two years. At a time when 55% of U.S. Foreign Service personnel are serving at a hardship and/or danger post, the 110 th Congress, in its closing days, may choose whether and how to address an issue that both the Department of State and the Foreign Service consider to be a high priority personnel issue--the elimination of a 20.89% pay difference between service in the Washington, D.C. and service abroad for the vast majority of the members of the Foreign Service below the Senior Foreign Service level. The pay difference is the result of federal locality pay laws not covering the salary of federal employees posted abroad. While opponents question the need for a change in the compensation system because of the other allowances and benefits that Foreign Service often get when serving abroad, proponents for the elimination of the pay difference contend that the disparity has negative implications on the morale of the Foreign Service, considerations about overseas assignments, and possibly eventually on retention. Both the Department of State and the American Foreign Service Association (AFSA), the professional association and the recognized bargaining agent for the Foreign Service, said the elimination of this pay disparity is very important to them. During the 109 th Congress, Republican and Democratic leadership of both the House Committee on International Relations and the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations worked to resolve this pay differential issue by developing a proposal called the Foreign Service Compensation Reform. The Administration had agreed to the creation of a new Foreign Service pay compensation system if it were performance-based. This proposal--developed through negotiations among the House and Senate committees, the Administration, and AFSA--would have (1) placed the Foreign Service compensation system on a pay-for-performance (PFP) basis with pay adjustments made only on the basis of performance and not longevity, and (2) eliminated the current pay difference by creating a new worldwide pay structure at the Washington, D.C., salary level over two years. However, reportedly due to concerns among the House floor managers as to whether there was sufficient support for passage, this proposal was not included in the final version of H.R. 6060 , the Department of State Authorities Act of 2006, which was originally intended to carry the Foreign Service Compensation Reform proposal and a few other provisions. H.R. 6060 was passed by the House and Senate, and enacted as P.L. 109-472 . For the 110 th Congress, the Administration, in its FY2009 budget request, urged the enactment of legislation creating a new performance-based compensation system for the Foreign Service along the lines of the 109 th Congress PFP compromise, and requested the appropriation of $35.9 million to implement the first of two phases of the new compensation system. On July 16, 2008, the Senate Appropriations Committee reported its FY2009 State Department/Foreign Operations and related programs appropriations legislation, S. 3288 . This bill provided sufficient funding levels to meet the Administration's request. On the same day, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs (HCFA) favorably reported the "Foreign Service Overseas Pay Equity Act of 2008," H.R. 3202 , as amended, which, without providing for a performance-based pay system, would eliminate the pay disparity over three years. This bill, which was introduced by Representative Chris Smith and has 29 cosponsors, was referred to both HCFA and HOGR. On August 1, 2008, Senator John Kerry, with five cosponsors, introduced an identical companion bill, S. 3426 , which was referred to the SFRC. On September 23, 2008, the SFRC considered and reported S. 3426 without amendments. The Foreign Service personnel system, like the Civil Service system, has salary ranges associated with various ranks, and within those ranges there are "step increases" in salary that a person can receive over time, even without a promotion. While the Administration is seeking changes to the personnel system to make it performance-based, Foreign Service personnel believe that its personnel system is already a performance-based system. Members of the Foreign Service point to elements of their personnel system, such as annual promotion reviews by independent promotion panels instead of by one's supervisor, an "up-or-out" system with specific time limits for promotions, and a mandatory five percent low ranking requirement that can lead to separation from the Service that, they believe, makes it performance-based. Former AFSA President, Ambassador J. Anthony Holmes, said, "The reality is that the present FS personnel system, with its rank-in-person, not in-job, annual evaluations, and competitive up-or-out system is inherently PFP already." The Foreign Service personnel system, which is separate and quite different from the Civil Service system, was created under the authorities provided by the Foreign Service Act of 1980 ( P.L. 96-465 ; 22 U.S.C. 3901 et seq.). In 2008, there are currently about 11,500 State Department Foreign Service Officers and Specialists, with two-thirds of them serving abroad at over 260 posts and missions at any one time. The remaining third is generally posted in Washington, D.C. Typically, members of the Foreign Service spend two-thirds of their careers abroad, serving at each post for one to three years before being assigned elsewhere in the world. Currently, about 55% of Foreign Service personnel are serving in posts designated as hardship and/or danger posts. Members of the Foreign Service cannot spend more than six years at a time serving in domestic assignments. The Director General of the Foreign Service, on a case-by-case basis, may provide a waiver of up to two years if a member of the Service seeks to extend his or her stay in the continental United States beyond six years. Foreign Service personnel carry their rank-in-person as opposed to rank-in-position as the Civil Service generally does. Thus a member of the Foreign Service can advance in rank on the merits of his or her performance, while a member of the Civil Service often can only advance beyond the rank designated for a position by successfully competing for an open position at a higher rank. Grades or ranks within the Foreign Service are divided into two major categories: the Senior Foreign Service (SFS), of which there are about 600 individuals, and the regular Service which is comprised of about 10,500 Officers and Specialists. The SFS is divided into five pay categories and, like the Civil Service Senior Executive Service (SES), requires a presidential appointment into the senior service. The regular Foreign Service is divided into nine ranks or grades with the 01 level the highest. Most Foreign Service Officers enter the Foreign Service at the 05 or 06 levels while some Specialists may enter at lower grades. Generally entering Officers serve for four to five years before being tenured and fully commissioned as Foreign Service Officers, usually at the 04 rank. Generalist Foreign Service Officers are assigned to one of five cones upon entry into the Foreign Service--Political, Economic, Public Diplomacy, Management, and Consular. However, during their career, they will do assignments outside of their cone. The personnel system for the Foreign Service is basically an "up-or-out" system that reviews the members of the Foreign Service annually for promotion unless they have been promoted within the previous year. Promotion panels, each usually consisting of four or five higher grade officers and a public panelist, are formed each year to consider the members of the Foreign Service at ranks of 04 and above for promotion. Those Foreign Service personnel below the 04 rank, who are neither tenured nor commissioned, receive Administrative Promotions at the discretion of the Director General. Promotion panels are generally organized to compare individuals in the same rank and cone. For instance, one promotion panel reviewed 02 political officers and management officers--160 Management and 240 Political Officers. Criteria or precepts for promotion are negotiated between the Department and the American Foreign Service Association (AFSA), currently the recognized bargaining agent for the Foreign Service. Promotion panels begin by reviewing the Employee Evaluation Report files, which can go back five years or to the previous promotion. In most cases, there are fewer available open positions than there are individuals determined to be promotable by the panel. The panel then rank orders those promotable to fill the slots accordingly. After making its promotion decisions, the panel makes its recommendations to the Secretary of State who reviews and forwards them to the Senate. The Senate has the responsibility of approving the promotion lists developed by the promotion panels and recommended by the Secretary of State. Promotion panels are also required to "low-rank" five percent of those reviewed for promotion. The panel then recommends to the Secretary of State whether those individuals should be referred to the Performance Standards Review Board for possible separation from the Service or should be provided a letter for the individual's file, instructing the individual to take career counseling. The personnel system has a promotion-required Time-in-Class (TIC) limitation of no more than 10 to 15 years at one grade without a promotion for FS-01 through 04 depending upon the grade, and a seven years limitation at each senior rank for members of the SFS. There is also a Time-in-Service (TIS) limitation of 27 years for appointments to the Senior Foreign Service. If a person exceeds these TIC and TIS limitations, the individual is separated from the Foreign Service. Because of this system, most members of the Foreign Service leave the Service in their mid-50s at an 01 or 02 rank after a full and distinguished career. The Federal Pay Comparability Act of 1990 excludes federal employees posted outside the continental United States from receiving locality pay adjustments. Locality pay is designed to create pay comparability between federal employees and non-federal workers doing the same levels of work within a specific geographic locality in the continental United States. There is no basis for comparison of Foreign Service personnel posted abroad to non-federal workers in the United States. As a result, Foreign Service personnel, who spend about two-thirds of their careers posted abroad, receive less salary when they are posted abroad and less of a career total than their Civil Service counterparts who spend a career in the United States. Each year since 1990, the difference has increased every year, and by 2008, an individual's salary was 20.89% higher if he/she served in Washington, D.C., as opposed to serving abroad. Proponents of revision to the Foreign Service system indicated that the gap impacts negatively on morale and the assignments system by providing disincentives for overseas tours. They assert that the intent of pay adjustments such as the hardship and danger pay differentials are nullified when locality pay is not counted. They point out that if a person were to go to a 15% hardship post from a Washington, D.C. assignment, he/she would experience a 5.89% decrease in salary. Both the Administration and the Foreign Service seek to remove the pay difference issue, but they are also motivated by different considerations. According to a 2008 AFSA survey, the top legislative issue for members of the Foreign Service is the elimination of the pay disparity that exists between service abroad and service in Washington, D.C., which is where most Foreign Service personnel are domestically assigned. From the perspective of many in the Foreign Service, it is a matter of equity and of a recognition of their work as they serve abroad often in difficult and dangerous conditions. In 2005, as members of the Senior Foreign Service were reaching retirement, statistics showed they were trying to serve in assignments in the continental United States instead of serving abroad and suffering the loss of pay which could affect their retirement savings. Thus, in 2005, the pay difference was eliminated for those in the Senior Foreign Service. The compensation system for the Senior Foreign Service changed to a formalized pay-for-performance system with adjustments to salary based solely on performance, and the pay levels were brought to the Washington, D.C. salary level regardless of where they were posted. Supporters of changing the pay system to cover the entire Foreign Service and the Administration both argue that the pay disparity "created an increasing pay disincentive to overseas service,." as it did for the Senior Foreign Service prior to 2005. Further, even among the Foreign Service serving at the same post, only mid- and junior-ranked personnel would suffer the pay gap while those in the Senior Foreign Service and those detailed to an embassy would not because the pay difference exists for only those Foreign Service personnel posted abroad who are at the rank of 01 and below. A 2006 Government Accountability Office (GAO) study discussing obstacles to attracting mid-level officers to hardship posts also noted the impact of the pay difference as a deterrent to bidding for hardship assignments: [O]fficers and State personnel we interviewed both at hardship posts and in Washington, D.C. consistently cited the lack of locality pay as a deterrent to bidding at hardship positions. In 2002, we reported that the differences in the statutes governing domestic locality pay and differential pay for overseas service had created a gap in compensation penalizing overseas employees. This gap grows every year, as domestic locality pay rates increase, creating an ever-increasing financial disincentive for overseas employees to bid on hardship posts. After accounting for domestic locality pay for Washington, D.C., a 25 percent hardship post differential is eroded to approximately 8 percent. As estimated in our 2002 report, differential pay incentives for the 15 percent differential hardship posts are now less than the locality pay for Washington, D.C., which is currently 17 percent and can be expected to soon surpass the 20 percent differential hardship posts. The George W. Bush Administration, in its FY2009 budget, requested $35.9 million for the Department of State to fund the first step of transition to a performance-based system and a global rate of pay for Foreign Service personnel at grades of 01 and below. The Administration seeks to have these changes made in a manner agreed upon during the 109 th Congress, the "Foreign Service Compensation Reform" proposal. The Administration has made such funding requests since FY2007 "to eliminate longevity-based pay increases and institute a strictly pay-for-performance system similar to that instituted for the Senior Foreign Service in P.L. 108-447 ." The proposal would equalize the proposed global rate with equivalent salary levels in Washington, D.C., which includes locality pay. Over the past few years, the Bush Administration contended that the current GS pay framework is a "failure." It maintained that the "one size fits all" approach of the GS pay schedule can mask dramatic disparities in the market value of different federal jobs, and uses on-the-job longevity as a substitute for performance. The Administration had once proposed repealing the current GS Schedule by 2010, and replacing it with "a system of occupational pay groups, pay bands within those groups and pay for performance across the federal government. The new system would be a pay-for-performance system." At the request of the Administration, Congress developed new structures for civilians working for the Departments of Defense (DOD) and Homeland Security (DHS). These personnel systems were challenged in the courts by federal employee unions, and now the changes are currently being made in only parts of the DOD. Thus, while agreeing that the Foreign Service pay difference should be eliminated, the Administration continues to urge that these changes should be made in the context of a pay-for-performance basis that would replace the current longevity-based system. Because of the changes in the Congress following the 2006 elections, the drive to move the Civil Service System and the Foreign Service System to being performance-based as envisioned by the Administration, did not achieve majority support in the Congress. Both H.R. 3202 , as amended in the House Foreign Affairs Committee, and S. 3426 are identical in language. "Foreign Service Overseas Pay Equity Act of 2008." This section adjusts the Foreign Service salary level for ranks of 01 and below who are serving abroad, but not in a non-foreign area, to be comparable to the Washington, D.C. salary level with locality pay. The new salary level with locality pay would be treated in the same manner in terms of taxes and retirement and other benefits as if the individual were serving in Washington, D.C. To reach the full Washington, D.C. salary level with locality pay, the section provides that it shall be accomplished over three years with a one-third increase in each of those three years. Once the overseas salary level is comparable to the Washington, D.C. level with locality pay, the section states that the salary levels shall remain comparable. Through the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003, Congress established a system of computing the annuity of Foreign Service personnel serving abroad to be as if he/she were serving in Washington, D.C. This system, commonly referred to as "Virtual Locality Pay," was developed so that the individual would not be negatively affected in the annuity computation because of a lower salary that did not include locality pay. However, because the individual serving overseas would have the those years computed as if he/she were serving in Washington, that individual's contribution to the Foreign Service retirement system also would have to be at a level as if the individual were serving in Washington. The Conforming Amendments of Section 2 make adjustments to the Foreign Service retirement systems by eliminating the "Virtual Locality Pay" system. When the Foreign Service overseas salary level reached the Washington, D.C. level with locality pay, the "Virtual Locality Pay" system would not be required. The "Virtual Locality Pay" system was instituted because, as the locality pay disparity became larger, it created an incentive for Foreign Service personnel approaching retirement to seek assignment to Washington, D.C. as opposed to going abroad. As a person approached retirement, the lower salary levels received because of the pay disparity for service abroad, would negatively affect annuity computations at a time when a person would want to have the highest salary levels possible. For the Foreign Service, these levels would be achieved by serving in Washington, D.C. An examination of assignment bids among those approaching retirement at that time showed that this was in fact happening. The Conference Report accompanying the legislation explains: Foreign Service Officers serving overseas do not receive locality pay. Thus, as they near retirement, they have a significant financial incentive to seek assignment to Washington, D.C. This often deprives overseas posts of the more experienced officers. Under this section, an officer, while serving overseas, will have his or her annuity calculated as if he or she were actually receiving locality pay. The Foreign Service Act of 1980 currently authorizes the Secretary of State to provide, at the Secretary's discretion, a death gratuity to the survivors of any Foreign Service employee who dies as a result of injuries sustained in the performance of the employee's duty abroad. The amount of the death gratuity is equal to the employee's annual salary at the time of death. This section amends the current death gratuity provision in two ways: The death gratuity is increased for Foreign Service employees who die as a result of injuries sustained in the performance of his/her duty from the equivalent of one year's salary to the salary of a level II of the Executive Schedule. A death gratuity is authorized for employees compensated under local compensation plans. The amount of the death gratuity for the individual is equal to the greater of one year's salary at the time of death, or one year's salary at the highest step of the highest grade on the local compensation plan that the employee was under at the time of death. On September 17, 2008, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) issued a cost estimate for the Foreign Service Overseas Pay Equity Act of 2008, H.R. 3202 / S. 3426 . The Administration, in its February 2008 budget, requested funds to eliminate the pay disparity in two steps, instead of three as proposed by H.R. 3202 and S. 3426 . The Administration estimates that it would cost about $35.9 million in the first year and $152.9 million (Budget Authority [BA]) to fully eliminate the pay difference. The CBO estimates that the direct cost of adjusting the pay difference as proposed by H.R. 3202 / S. 3426 would be $148 million in BA or $126 million in Outlays (O). Because the adjustment would be accomplished over three years, the estimated cost for FY2009 would be $49 million (BA) or $42 million (O), which is one-third of the estimated total cost. The CBO also estimated that the increase in the salary of Foreign Service personnel posted abroad would also "lead to an increase in other benefits paid to FSOs, such as life insurance, health insurance, hardship pay, and danger pay." CBO estimates that in FY2009, this would come to a total cost of $84 million (BA) or $72 million (O). Over a five-year period form FY2009 to FY2013, the total cost of both the salary adjustment and the increase in other benefits paid would be $1.4 billion (BA) or $1.3 billion (O). The CBO also estimated that the Section 3 Death Gratuities provision would, based on historical data, be paid less than five times a year. This would be $588,235 BA or $500,000 (O) in a year, or a total of $1 million (O) over five years. For the past several years, both the Bush Administration and the members of the Foreign Service, through AFSA, have sought to change the compensation system of the regular non-Senior Foreign Service personnel to eliminate the pay disparity between service abroad and service in Washington, D.C. Some members, congressional staff, and others engaged in this discussion also are aware that Foreign Service personnel serving abroad often get allowances and benefits for being abroad. For example, if a member of the Foreign Service were to serve in Mexico City, Mexico, the person would receive a Hardship Differential of 15% of base salary; 20% Cost of Living Allowance (20% of an amount determined by a Mexico City "shopping basket"); an annual Education Allowance for each child; and a Quarters Allowance to cover rent and utilities (the amount for the allowance is based upon the grade of the Foreign Service member). These allowances and benefits can change from post-to-post even within the same country. Further, if the member of the Foreign Service, for personal reasons, goes to the post by him/herself, the family will receive a Separate Maintenance Allowance. These economic questions as well as the questions of equity, recognition of the work of the Foreign Service, impact upon the morale, assignments process, and possibly retention are often weighed against each other as members and their staff consider this issue. Many view this proposed compensation system as a "pay raise" for the Foreign Service and ask why salaries should be increased when Foreign Service personnel already receive so many benefits. Supporters for the change state that this is not a pay raise, but rather a correction of 14 years of unintended inequity that is growing every year in the overseas compensation for the Foreign Service. They argue that ending this pay difference would help validate the work the Foreign Service does, including the significant efforts and sacrifices that they and their families make in service to the United States. In many posts abroad, Foreign Service personnel receive a post/hardship differential of 5--35% of base pay, a cost-of-living allowance, an education allowance for their children, and a housing allowance. These can add significantly to the base salary level. Providing locality pay for those serving abroad would increase the compensation levels. The lack of locality pay is no longer a matter of retirement benefits because the virtual locality pay for retirement computation in current law already takes care of the impact on an annuity. Those who question the need for this change argue that the Foreign Service is already well taken care of when they serve abroad. Those who support eliminating the pay differential contend that the allowances exist to address specific costs and hardships unique to working for long years overseas: Danger pay compensates for the extreme risks of living in a country wracked by war, terrorism, political violence or endemic lawlessness. Education allowances make it possible for Foreign Service members to cover their children's education when no viable public schools are available. Cost-of-living allowances help defray the cost of food and other daily needs of life in countries where those things are vastly more expensive than in the United States. These were never meant to obviate the need for the basic locality pay adjustment that all other federal employees get. Because one of the biggest benefits that members of the Foreign Service receive is free housing when posted abroad, many believe that this should compensate for any loss derived from the lack of locality pay. These critics point out that if Foreign Service personnel own a home in the United States, they would be able to rent it out while they are gone, and build equity while the government takes care of their living quarters for free. They ask if the locality pay adjustment is really necessary. Supporters of the change in the Foreign Service compensation system explain that while the housing abroad is free, members of the Foreign Service are not reaping a financial windfall even when they own a home in the United States. These supporters explain: "Most of our members own a home in the U.S. on which they have to pay a mortgage, upkeep, insurance and property taxes--and renting it out (often impossible) rarely covers all of these expenses and is itself a costly proposition." These supporters for eliminating the pay difference also point out that there are often hidden costs to serving overseas that do offset any gain from free housing. Among these is the fact that it is often impossible for the spouse to get employment and a salary equivalent to what could be earned in the United States. Also there are numerous out-of-pocket costs for being overseas. These include travel not covered by authorized visitation basis from distant economically developing nations. This type of travel may include attending the funeral of a family member, going to a family member's wedding, or graduation, or seeing a family member who is suffering from a life-threatening illness. Critics of the current death gratuity provisions believe the official status of a U.S. government employee working at an embassy should not matter in terms of a death gratuity. The Civil Service employee detailed to an embassy and the Foreign Service member posted to the embassy should both receive the same death gratuity, particularly if either or both died in a similar manner such as the bombing of an embassy. They were both serving the United States. Supporters of the Foreign Service personnel-only death gratuity provision in the legislation state that there is a difference between the Civil Service employee and the Foreign Service member who dies while detailed at an embassy. For the Civil Service employee, it was a matter of choice. For the Foreign Service Officer, service abroad is a condition of employment. Foreign Service personnel are expected to be "Worldwide Available," and expected to spend the larger proportion of their career abroad--that is why there are limits on the number of years a member of the Foreign Service can stay continuously in the United States, and why generally a member of the Service spends about two-thirds of his/her career abroad. They point out that when a member of the Foreign Service dies abroad, after a long career outside the United States, the family often does not have the same support structure to help them when they return to the United States as they would have had if they had lived continuously in a community. The death gratuity is intended to help the family transition into a new life.

Proponents of revisions in the Foreign Service compensation system point out that as increasing numbers of Foreign Service personnel are going to posts of increased hardship and danger, Foreign Service personnel serving abroad receive 20.89% less than their colleagues who are posted in Washington, D.C. due to the loss of locality pay when serving abroad. These proponents of revision maintain that this difference negatively impacts morale and assignment considerations, and eventually retention also. Both the 109th and 110th Congresses have considered proposals to eliminate this pay difference. The American Foreign Service Association (AFSA) has been working for several years with congressional supporters to change the compensation system. Since FY2007, the George W. Bush Administration has requested funds to create a new performance-based compensation system for the Foreign Service and eliminate the pay differential. For FY2009, the Administration requested $34.7 million for the first stage of a transition to pay equity. The Senate Appropriations Committee provided sufficient funding to meet the Administration's request in its appropriations bill, S. 3288, reported on July 18, 2008. The "Foreign Service Overseas Pay Equity Act of 2008," H.R. 3202, as amended, would eliminate the pay differences over three years. This bill was referred to both the House Committee on Foreign Affairs (HCFA) and the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform (HOGR). HCFA reported the bill on July 16, 2008. An identical bill was introduced in the Senate, S. 3426, on August 1, 2008, and was referred to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (SFRC). The SFRC reported the bill, without amendments, on September 23, 2008. The major difference between the Administration's proposal and the current legislation is that the Administration, while proposing to eliminate the pay difference over two years, also seeks to develop a new performance-based worldwide compensation system for the Foreign Service. H.R. 3202 and S. 3426 would eliminate the pay differences over three years without reference to developing a new performance-based system. AFSA states that the Foreign Service personnel system is already performance-based, and the pay adjustment proposals eliminate an unintended inequity. Others with concerns about the legislation, however, state this is basically a pay increase for the Foreign Service and question whether increases are needed because of the benefits and allowances Foreign Service personnel generally receive when posted abroad. This report discusses (1) the legislative background leading to a proposal to change the compensation system, (2) the current Foreign Service personnel system and why the Foreign Service views it as already performance-based, (3) an examination of why the Foreign Service and the Administration are both requesting that Congress change the compensation system, (4) an examination of H.R. 3202 and S. 3426, the "Foreign Service Overseas Pay Equity Act of 2008," and (5) some issues that Congress might be asked to consider. This report may be updated.

Over the last several years, both the Supreme Court and Congress have actively considered the scope of class action lawsuits. For the 2015 term, the Court accepted three cases with implications for these suits. In Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez , the Court held that a defendant's offer to provide complete relief to settle a plaintiff's individual claims did not moot a class action filed by that individual. In Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo , the Court decided that each person joined in a class action suit need not prove, individually, that she was harmed by the claimed misconduct, if statistical models can be used to show such harm. In Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins , the Court will consider whether a class action meets the standing requirements of Article III if the plaintiff suffered a statutory injury from a violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act but no actual damages. Finally, in January 2016, the House passed H.R. 1927 , the Fairness in Class Action Litigation and Furthering Asbestos Claim Transparency Act of 2016, which would provide that class action suits could be certified only if proposed class members had suffered injuries of the same type and scope. T he class action suit is a procedural device for joining numerous parties in a civil lawsuit when the "issues involved are common to the class as a whole" and when the issues "turn on questions of law applicable in the same manner to each member of the class." The suit is "an exception to the usual rule that litigation is conducted by and on behalf of the individual named parties only." Class actions "save[] the resources of both the courts and the parties by permitting an issue potentially affecting every [class member] to be lit igated in an economical fashion .... " The class action also affords aggrieved parties a remedy when it is not economically feasible to obtain relie f, such as where each claim involves only a small dollar amount. The modern class action appears to be derived from the Bill of Peace, an equitable proceeding developed by the English Court of Chancery, which enabled an equity court to hear an action by or against representatives of a group if the plaintiff could establish that the number of people involved was so large as to make traditional joinder impossible or impracticable. If the court allowed the suit to proceed on a representative basis, the resulting judgment would bind all members of the group, whether they were present during the action or not. The advantage of the representative suit was that it was cheaper and more convenient to bring a single proceeding in equity rather than to adjudicate multiple actions at law. Class suits have long been a part of American jurisprudence, starting with their authorization by federal courts under equity rules. These rules gradually became codified at the state and federal level, but were generally restricted to cases where the class shared a common or general interest and where the parties were too numerous for the cases to be combined traditionally under joinder. With the increasing complexity and interconnectedness of modern society, the class action has taken on a more prominent role. Federal class action suits are currently brought under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Rule 23). Rule 23(a) provides that a member of a class may sue or be sued on behalf of all members only if all of the following four elements are present: (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable [("numerosity") ]; (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class [("commonality")]; (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class [("typicality") ]; and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class [("adequacy") ]. Rule 23(b) further requires that one of the following elements be proven by the party seeking to bring the action: (1) prosecuting separate actions by or against individual class members would create a risk of: (A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual class members that would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the class; or (B) adjudications with respect to individual class members that, as a practical matter, would be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the individual adjudications or would substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests; (2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole; or (3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy. The matters pertinent to these findings include: (A) the class members' interests in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already begun by or against class members; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; and (D) the likely difficulties in managing a class action. For purposes of this report, Rule 23(b)(1) will be referred to as the "inconsistency test," Rule 23(b)(2) will be referred to as the "general applicability test," and Rule 23(b)(3) will be referred to as the "predominance test." For many years, federal courts stated that Rule 23 should be given a liberal rather than a restrictive interpretation, meaning that the rule should be interpreted and applied to favor certification of class actions. The Supreme Court had also indicated that a court should not inquire into the merits of the plaintiffs' claims while performing a Rule 23 analysis. The Court, however, had more recently determined that a court should grant class certification only after it has performed a "rigorous analysis" to determine whether the prerequisites of Rule 23 have been satisfied. This seeming conflict was clarified by the Court's decision in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes which held that, in some cases, an inquiry into the merits of a case is required. In Wal- M art, the Court reversed a decision certifying a class of Wal-Mart employees who alleged sex discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and sought equitable relief, a declaratory judgment, and backpay. The Court in Wal-Mart found that the "commonality" required by Rule 23(a)(2) not only requires that class members "have suffered the same injury," but also that their claims involve a "common contention" as to how the law was violated. The Court initially determined that there was no proof that the company "operated under a general policy of discrimination." The only company-wide policy that the plaintiffs' submitted as evidence of discrimination was Wal-Mart's policy of allowing discretion by local supervisors over employment matters. While the Court has recognized that giving discretion to lower-level supervisors can be the basis for liability under Title VII, the Court found that the disparate nature of the claims that would arise in such a situation would be unlikely to give rise to a common question of liability or damages. The Court held that "Rule 23 does not set forth a mere pleading standard," but it requires a plaintiff to "affirmatively demonstrate his compliance with the Rule--that is, he must be prepared to prove that there are in fact sufficiently numerous parties, common questions of law or fact, etc." "What matters ... [is] the capacity of a classwide proceeding to generate common answers apt to drive the resolution of the litigation." The class members' claims "must depend upon a common contention ... of such a nature that it is capable of classwide resolution--which means that determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke." Although such a rigorous analysis will frequently overlap with an inquiry into the merits, the Court stated "[t]hat cannot be helped." The plaintiffs offered statistical evidence to establish gender discrimination by comparing the number of women promoted to management positions nationwide with the number of women in the available pool of hourly workers. The Court rejected the sufficiency of such evidence to establish the required proof of commonality, finding that the plaintiffs were additionally required to establish that there was a challenged employment practice common to each claim. The Court also rejected anecdotal evidence of discrimination, noting that the 120 affidavits filed addressing discrimination claims represented a small percentage of the thousands of class members participating in the case. The Court concluded that the commonality requirement needed for class certification was not met where Wal-Mart did not have a uniform classwide discriminatory employment practice, but instead allowed employment decisions to be made by low-level employees. The Court in Wal- M art also addressed the issue of how damages for backpay might be calculated for the class, if gender discrimination were established. The Court overruled the Ninth Circuit's holding that such damages could be determined in a "Trial by Formula." Under this statistical approach, a sample set of class members who had been the subject of gender discrimination would be selected, and a special master, using depositions, would evaluate the backpay owed. The percentage of claims determined to be valid would then be applied to the entire remaining class, and the number of (presumptively) valid claims thus derived would be multiplied by the average backpay award in the sample set to arrive at the entire class recovery. The Court rejected such a statistical method of establishing injury for the class and held that Wal-Mart was entitled to individualized determinations of each employee's eligibility for backpay. In the subsequent case of Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Retirement Plans & Trust Funds , however, the Court indicated that the holdings of Wal-Mart should not be interpreted too broadly. In Amgen , the Court considered whether, in a private securities-fraud action alleging reliance on a material misrepresentation or omission, "questions of law or fact common to class members predominate[d]," thus satisfying the predominance requirement for class certification. The plaintiffs' case relied on the "fraud-on-the-market" theory, which permits certain securities-fraud plaintiffs to invoke a rebuttable presumption of reliance on material misrepresentations aired to the general public. The Court in Amgen held that the while the plaintiffs must prove the materiality of misrepresentations to prevail on the merits, that such proof was not a prerequisite to class certification. The Court stated that "Rule 23(b)(3) requires a showing that questions common to the class predominate, not that those questions will be answered, on the merits, in favor of the class. Because materiality is judged according to an objective standard [under the 'fraud-on-the-market' theory], the materiality of Amgen's alleged misrepresentations and omissions is a question common to all members of the class Connecticut Retirement would represent." "... Rule 23 grants courts no license to engage in free-ranging merits inquiries at the certification stage. Merits questions may be considered to the extent--but only to the extent--that they are relevant to determining whether the Rule 23 prerequisites for class certification are satisfied." Yet, in the more recent Comcast Corp. v. Behrend , the Court indicated a willingness to evaluate as part of class certification whether classwide damages would be ascertainable in the merits case. Comcast considered the certification of a class by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit (Third Circuit) of more than 2 million current and former Comcast subscribers who alleged violation of the federal antitrust laws by "clustering," i.e., the purchase of competing cable systems in selected regions and the swapping to competitors of systems outside those regions. As in Amgen, the plaintiffs sought certification under the "predominance test." In order to meet this test, plaintiffs needed to show that the injury to each individual was "capable of proof at trial through evidence that [was] common to the class rather than individual to its members"; and (2) that the damages resulting from that injury were measurable "on a class-wide basis" through use of a "common methodology." The plaintiffs had sought certification under four theories of antitrust impact. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (District Court), however, certified a class on only one of these theories: that "clustering" limited competition by reducing the number of "overbuilders," that is, cable companies competing in the market where Comcast operates. The District Court held that an antitrust impact could be shown on a classwide basis based on a proffered economic model, even though this model did not isolate damages resulting from the "overbuilders" theory from the three other theories. The District Court held that the exact calculation of such injury should be addressed during the merits of the case, and the Third Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, determining that a "plaintiff's damages case must be consistent with its liability case, particularly with respect to the alleged anticompetitive effect of the violation," and that the economic model proposed by the plaintiffs could not analyze the individual impact on class members of the economic damages that were the subject of the class certification. While the District Court and the Third Circuit had not considered a damage analysis to be relevant for purposes of class certification, the Supreme Court stated that the District Court's holding "flatly contradicts our cases requiring a determination that Rule 23 is satisfied, even when that requires inquiry into the merits of the claim." In the 2015 Supreme Court term, the Court agreed to consider three cases which involved class action lawsuits: Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gome z , Tyson Foods , Inc. v. Bouaphakeo , and Spokeo , Inc. v. Robins . These cases address important issues that have the potential to reshape jurisprudence concerning certification of class actions. In Campbell-Ewald Co v. Gomez , the Court held that an unaccepted offer of complete relief to a named plaintiff's claim did not render that case moot. Campbell-Ewald arose from alleged violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), which prohibits any person, absent the prior express consent of a telephone recipient, from "mak[ing] any call ... using any automatic telephone dialing system ... to any telephone number assigned to a paging service [or] cellular telephone service." The TCPA authorizes a private right of action for a violation of this prohibition, and a plaintiff may recover "actual monetary loss" or $500 for each violation, whichever is greater. In 2006, the Campbell-Ewald Company (Campbell), a nationwide advertising and marketing company, transmitted text messages regarding U.S. Navy recruitment to over 100,000 recipients. One of these recipients was the petitioner in this case, Jose Gomez, who alleged that he had not provided prior express consent to receive the solicitation. Gomez filed a class action suit on behalf of himself and a nationwide class of individuals who had received, but had not consented to the receipt of, the text message. Gomez sought statutory damages, costs, attorney's fees, and an injunction against unsolicited messages. Prior to Gomez's having filed a motion in the case for class certification, Campbell offered to settle Gomez's individual claim and filed an offer of judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68 (Rule 68). Campbell then moved to dismiss the case, arguing that its offer mooted Gomez's individual claim by providing him with complete relief. Because Gomez had not yet moved for class certification, Campbell argued that the class action claims were also moot. The question before the Supreme Court was whether an unaccepted offer can moot a plaintiff's claim, thereby depriving federal courts of Article III jurisdiction. The Court held that the plaintiff's claim was not rendered moot by an unaccepted offer. The Court has previously held that a case becomes moot "only when it is impossible for a court to grant any effectual relief whatever to the prevailing party." In Campbell-Ewald, the Court noted that, under principles of contract law, a settlement offer, absent acceptance, is not binding on either party. Further, under Rule 68, an unaccepted offer is "considered withdrawn" if not accepted within specified time limits. "In short, with no settlement offer still operative, the parties remained adverse; both retained the same stake in the litigation they had at the outset." The Court did, however, reserve the question whether the result would be different "if a defendant deposits the full amount of the plaintiff's individual claim in an account payable to the plaintiff, and the court then enters judgment for the plaintiff in that amount." While this decision does not appear to disturb existing case law, it addresses an important issue--whether plaintiffs in class action cases can be compelled to accept a settlement offer before class certification. If a plaintiff were to accept a settlement offer before class certification, the case would be dismissed, and the defendant would avoid the necessity of defending itself against a class action with a potentially large numbers of plaintiffs. While another plaintiff could bring a similar action, the defendant would have a similar opportunity to compel settlement. While the Court rejected the argument that a settlement offer by itself was sufficient to render a case moot, it did not "decide whether the result would be different if a defendant deposits the full amount of the plaintiff's individual claim in an account payable to the plaintiff, and the court then enters judgment for the plaintiff in that amount." If this latter mechanism were found to render a case moot, it might become a tool for defendants to avoid class action cases. In Tyson Foods , Inc. v. Bouaphakeo , the Supreme Court upheld a $2.9 million award against Tyson Foods, Inc. (Tyson) for violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FSLA). The named plaintiffs were current and former employees of Tyson at a meat-processing facility in Storm Lake, Iowa, who sought class certification under the "predominance test." The employees claimed that Tyson failed to pay overtime under the FSLA for donning (putting on) and doffing (taking off) personal protective equipment before work, during lunch, and after production, and for transporting the items from lockers to the production floor. Tyson calculated compensated work time based on "gang time," which is the time that employees are at their working stations and the production line is moving. Although Tyson did not record the amount of time that it took for employees to perform donning and doffing of personal protective equipment as worktime, it did add a uniform number of minutes of compensated time per day ("K-Code time") for the donning and doffing of items "unique" to the meat-processing industry for employees who worked in a department where knives are used, and for walking time required of the employees. Although the FLSA does not require compensation for time in transit to work or to preliminary or postliminary activities, it does require compensation for activities that are an "integral and indispensable part of the principle activities." The employees sued, claiming that the K-Code time was insufficient to cover compensable pre- and post-production line activities. The employees were granted "class certification" under the FLSA, which allows named plaintiffs to sue "for and in behalf of ... themselves and other employees similarly situated." In order to prove liability and damages, the plaintiffs relied on individual timesheets, along with average donning, doffing, and walking times calculated from 744 observations of employees at work. A jury returned a verdict for the plaintiffs, and a final judgment totaling $5,785,757.40 was awarded. The defendants in Tyson Foods , relying on Wal - M art , argued to the Supreme Court that the use of the 744 observations as "representative evidence" made class certification improper. As discussed previously, the Wal-Mart Court rejected the use of a sample set of class members who had been the subject of gender discrimination to extrapolate the backpay owed to the class, holding that Wal-Mart had the right to litigate statutory defenses to individual claims. In Tyson Foods , however, the Supreme Court rejected this comparison with the "Trial by Formula" that had been at issue in Wal-Mart . The Court in Tyson Foods held that Wal-Mart could be distinguished because the employees seeking backpay in Wal-Mart were not similarly situated, so that depositions which detailed the ways in which other employees were discriminated against by their particular store managers could not have been used in individual gender discrimination suits. In contrast, the statistical evidence introduced in Tyson Foods did not prove liability only for a sample set of class members, but rather was intended to prove liability for all members of the class. While the plaintiffs did rely on inference to extrapolate the average time for donning, doffing, and walking, these inferences applied to each class member individually. The Court found that, in many cases, the use of representative samples is "the only practicable means to collect and present relevant data" to establish liability, and that the use of the 744 samples here was permissible under the circumstances of the case. The Court declined, however, to establish categorical rules for when inferences from representative data would be admissible as "just and reasonable," noting that "[w]hether a representative sample may be used to establish classwide liability will depend on the purpose for which the sample is being introduced and on the underlying cause of action." The Court's decision in Tyson Foods addressed an important issue in class certification--what methods plaintiffs can use to establish, as required by the predominance test, that there are questions of law and fact common to a class. While the use of statistical evidence to establish a class was found insufficient in the Wal-Mart case because the plaintiffs' claims were too diverse, the use of statistical evidence in Tyson Foods was upheld because it applied to the liability of defendants to claims from similarly situated plaintiffs. Although the Court declined to articulate all the situations in which statistical evidence could be introduced to establish class certification, it left open the possibility that statistical evidence could be used in a number of future cases. In Spokeo , Inc. v. Robins , the Court has been asked to determine whether an individual plaintiff has Article III standing to sue a website under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) for publishing inaccurate personal information about him to potential employers. In Spokeo , the issue to be considered by the Court is whether a plaintiff who suffers no concrete harm may nonetheless have standing based on a bare violation of a federal statute. Although the plaintiff's request for class certification has not yet been reached in this case, the establishment of Article III standing by the plaintiff would raise the possibility that class action lawsuits could be brought based on statutory damage claims alone, arguably reducing the importance of establishing individualized injuries as part of the class certification process. Spokeo, Inc. operates a website that provides users with personal information about individuals, including contact data, marital status, age, occupation, and wealth level. The plaintiff sued Spokeo for a willful violation of the FCRA by providing false information about him, specifically that he had a graduate degree, was employed, was in the top 10% nationwide for wealth, was in his 50s, was married, and had children. The report also included a photograph purporting to be the plaintiff, which it was not. The plaintiff, who was unemployed, claimed that the information caused harm to his employment prospects, and that this had caused "anxiety, stress, concern, and/or worry about his diminished employment prospects." The plaintiff also alleged a failure by the company to comply with various notice requirements associated with providing consumer information. Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution requires that, for a court to exercise federal judicial authority, there must be a "case or controversy," and one of the components of a "case or controversy" is standing. The three components of standing are: (1) the plaintiff has suffered an "injury in fact" that is: (a) concrete and particularized (b) and actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant; and (3) it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. In Spokeo , however, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (Ninth Circuit) held that the violation of a statutory right is sufficient to confer standing, even absent a showing of actual harm. The Ninth Circuit found that the interests protected by the FCRA are sufficiently concrete and particularized to satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement of Article III. The defendant in the case has argued in its merits brief to the Supreme Court that, historically, a violation of a statutory right could not, absent further injury, serve as the basis for Article III standing. The defendant has also argued that the collection of statutory damages by parties who only suffered violation of a statutory right more closely resembles a fine than recovery for damages. The defendant has added that allowing self-interested private parties, as opposed to public prosecutors, to enforce laws in the absence of concrete harm threatens violation of separation-of-powers principles, as it intrudes on the executive branch's duty under the Take Care Clause to decide which cases warrant prosecution. The defendant also has contended that the practical impact of allowing suits based on injuries to a statutory right would be amplified in the context of a Rule 23 class action. Specifically, "[o]nce concrete harm is no longer an element of the plaintiff's case, the named plaintiff will argue that issues of injury and causation have been transformed from individualized matters to issues susceptible to common proof because, under an 'injury-in-law' regime, the actual impact of the alleged legal violation is no longer relevant." The plaintiff, on the other hand, has argued that English common law and early American law allow for a right of action for the invasion of a private legal right without any further showing of harm. The plaintiff further has asserted that, when no evidence is given of the amount of loss, courts have long awarded either nominal damages or statutory damages. While admitting that he must have more than an injury common to all members of the public, the plaintiff has argued that an invasion of a legally protected interest is sufficient to establish standing as long as the invasion is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical. The plaintiff also has cited examples of prior Supreme Court cases where a statutory right conferred standing even absent cognizable injury, arguing that his right to statutory damages presents a real dispute regarding injury, and asserting that the right not to have false information regarding oneself provided to others is an extension of the common law doctrine of defamation. In oral argument, a number of Justices asked questions about whether the alleged injury that is the basis for the suit is "concrete" enough to sustain the lawsuit. Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy suggested that an "injury in fact" (not an "injury in law") is needed to establish standing, with Justice Scalia stating that the requirement of "injury in fact" is contemplated within the term "concrete." Justice Sotomayor, however, suggested that the application of the term "concrete" to legally created rights is not required under long-standing case law. Justice Kagan, in turn, expressed the view that Congress might be better at identifying concrete harm than the Court, and observed that Congress had identified the dissemination of inaccurate information as harming persons individually. The Court's decision in this case is pending as of the date of this report's publication. The implications of this case for class actions are significant. If Congress can establish a statutory claim that meets the requirements of Article III standing without a showing of actual injury to a plaintiff, this would raise the possibility that class action lawsuits could be brought based on the violation of statutory claims alone. If this is the case, class actions brought under those claims might be more easily certified than class actions where proof of injury may vary from plaintiff to plaintiff. H.R. 1927 , the Fairness in Class Action Litigation and Furthering Asbestos Claim Transparency Act of 2016, passed the House on January 8, 2016. The bill provides that "[n]o Federal court shall certify any proposed class seeking monetary relief for personal injury or economic loss unless the party seeking to maintain such a class action affirmatively demonstrates that each proposed class member suffered the same type and scope of injury as the named class representative or representatives." The bill also requires that this determination shall be made based on a "rigorous analysis of the evidence presented.... " The House Judiciary Committee report on H.R. 1927 (House Report) notes that class action rules require that the claims and defenses of representative parties are "typical" of a class, but suggest that in some cases, courts have allowed class certification without showing that all members of the class share a common injury of the same type and comparable scope. For instance, the House Report states that in certain class action suits, class certification has been permitted for defective products, even though the majority of absent class members experience no damages due to this defect. The House Report states that the bill would allow class members who experience de minimis or nonexistent damages to bring separate class actions from people who are injured more significantly. Dissenting Members on the Committee, however, assert in the House Report that the proposed bill would increase the difficulty of bringing class actions, as it would require class action plaintiffs to prove the merits of their case at the preliminary stage of class certification. These Members also stated that in many cases--including civil rights, antitrust, and privacy cases--it would be "virtually impossible" to prove that class members suffered the same "type" or "scope" of injury at the certification stage. These members also assert that proponents of the bill consider "benefit of the bargain" cases (where the injury of a defective product is that it is of less value than a non-defective product) to be examples of "no-injury" class actions, even though an economic injury has been suffered. While the Supreme Court has accepted a variety of cases over recent years regarding class action lawsuits, the impact of these cases on the availability of class actions have been mixed. In Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes , the Court has limited the ability of plaintiffs who are not similarly situated from bringing class action suits, which may result in smaller class sizes. The Court in Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez declined to find that a defendant's offer to provide complete relief to settle a plaintiff's individual claims would moot a class action lawsuit before certification, which might have made it more difficult for a particular individual to bring a class action. The Court, however, left open the possibility that such an action might be rendered moot by the defendant putting funds in an account payable to the plaintiff. In Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo , the Court held that each person joined in a class action suit need not prove, individually, that she was harmed by the claimed misconduct, if statistical models can show such harm. Although the Court declined to articulate all the situations in which statistical evidence could be introduced, it left open the possibility that such evidence could be used in a number of future class action cases. In Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins , the Court is still considering whether a class action meets the standing requirements of Article III if the plaintiff suffered a statutory injury but no actual damages. If the Court finds that a statutory injury is sufficient to satisfy Article III, class actions brought under those claims might be more easily certified than class actions where proof of injury may vary from plaintiff to plaintiff. In January 2016, the House passed H.R. 1927 , the Fairness in Class Action Litigation and Furthering Asbestos Claim Transparency Act of 2016. This legislation, if enacted into law, would arguably limit the size of some class action suits by limiting class action suits to class members who have suffered injuries of the same type and scope.

The class action suit is a procedural device for joining numerous parties in a civil lawsuit when the issues involved are common to the class as a whole and when the issues turn on questions of law applicable in the same manner to each member of the class. Class actions are intended to save the resources of both the courts and the parties by permitting an issue potentially affecting every class member to be litigated together in an economical fashion. The class action is also intended to allow parties to pursue a legal remedy when it is not economically feasible to obtain relief, such as where each claim involves only a small dollar amount. The modern class action appears to be derived from the Bill of Peace, an equitable proceeding developed by the English Court of Chancery, which enabled an equity court to hear an action by or against representatives of a group, if the plaintiff could establish that the number of people involved was so large as to make joinder impossible or impracticable. Class suits have long been a part of American jurisprudence, starting with their authorization by federal courts under equity rules. These rules gradually became codified at the state and federal level, but were generally restricted to cases where the class shared a common or general interest and where the parties were too numerous for the cases to be combined under traditional rules of joinder. With the increasing complexity and interconnectedness of modern society, the class action has taken on a more prominent role. Over the last several years, both the Supreme Court and Congress have actively considered the scope of class action lawsuits. In Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, decided in 2011, the Court has limited the ability of plaintiffs who are not similarly situated from bringing class action suits, which may result in smaller class sizes. During the 2015 term, the Court in Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez declined to find that a defendant's offer to provide complete relief to settle a plaintiff's individual claims would moot a class action lawsuit before certification, which might have made it more difficult for a particular individual to bring a class action. The Court, however, left open the possibility that such an action might be rendered moot by the defendant putting funds in an account payable to the plaintiff. In Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, also decided during the 2015 term, the Court held that each person joined in a class action suit need not prove, individually, that she was harmed by the claimed misconduct, if statistical models can show such harm. Although the Court declined to articulate all the situations in which statistical evidence could be introduced, it left open the possibility that such evidence could be used in a number of future class action cases. In Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, the Court has been asked to consider whether a class action meets the standing requirements of Article III if the plaintiff suffered a statutory injury but no actual damages. If the Court finds that a statutory injury is sufficient to satisfy Article III, class actions brought under those claims might be more easily certified than class actions where proof of injury may vary from plaintiff to plaintiff. In January 2016, the House passed H.R. 1927, the Fairness in Class Action Litigation and Furthering Asbestos Claim Transparency Act of 2016. This legislation, if enacted into law, would arguably limit the size of some class action suits by limiting class action suits to class members who have suffered injuries of the same type and scope.

Censure is a reprimand adopted by one or both chambers of Congress against a Member of Congress, President, federal judge, or other government official. While the censure of a sitting Member of Congress is considered a formal disciplinary action, non -Member censure is simply used to highlight conduct deemed by the House or Senate to be inappropriate or unauthorized. There is no uniform language used to censure non-Members. This complicates efforts to identify all attempts to censure the President. The presidential censure resolutions listed in this report contain variations of the words or phrases: censure, condemn, unconstitutional, usurp, unauthorized, abuse of power, violation, or disapproval. Early resolutions of censure (Andrew Jackson, 1834; Abraham Lincoln, 1864) criticized the President for acting in "derogation" of the Constitution. More recent resolutions, including the most recent censure resolution submitted, ( H.Res. 700 , 115 th Congress), have used the words "censure and condemn" to reprimand the President. There are two types of censure resolutions: those that target Members of Congress and those that target executive or judicial branch officials. Article 1, Section 5, of the Constitution grants each chamber the ability to "punish its Members for disorderly Behaviour." Resolutions censuring a Senator or Representative are based on this power. In contrast, Congress has no disciplinary authority over the President except through impeachment. Thus, presidential censure resolutions express the "sense of" the House and/or Senate without additional legal implications. Both Member and non-Member censure resolutions are usually simple resolutions. As such, they do not have the force of law and are not signed by the President. However, the House and Senate treat the two types of censure resolutions differently in a parliamentary sense. Simple resolutions that censure a Member of Congress for "disorderly behavior"--that is, resolutions carrying out the function of disciplining a Member under the Constitution--are privileged for consideration in both the House and Senate. In the House, privileged resolutions have precedence over the regular order of business; they can be called up on the floor when the House is not considering another matter. In the Senate, the motions to proceed to privileged resolutions are not debatable." House censure resolutions generally qualify as questions of the privileges of the House under Rule IX. In this context, the censure of a Representative would occur through a formal vote of the House on a resolution disapproving of the Member's conduct. Such resolutions include the requirement that the offending Member stand in the well of the House as the resolution of censure is read aloud by the Speaker. (If the resolution reprimands a Member of the House without using the term censure, this step is not taken.) The most recent instance of a Representative being formally censured in this way by the House occurred in 2010. In the Senate, the Select Committee on Ethics may recommend disciplinary action against a Senator, including "censure, expulsion, or recommendation to the appropriate party conference regarding such Member's seniority or positions of responsibility." The last time a Senator was formally censured by such a privileged resolution was in 1990. While resolutions censuring a Member of Congress are privileged in the respective chamber, resolutions that censure, condemn, disapprove of, or express a loss of confidence in an executive or judicial branch official are not privileged and do not enjoy a special parliamentary status. Non-Member censure resolutions express the formal opinion of the House or Senate. Thus, they are considered under the regular parliamentary mechanisms used to process "sense of" legislation. The last presidential censure resolution to receive congressional floor consideration occurred in the Senate in 1912 (William Howard Taft). All subsequent resolutions have been referred to House or Senate committees without further action. Nevertheless, the following parliamentary scenarios are possible when considering non-Member censure resolutions. Should a House committee report a non-Member censure resolution, the full House may consider it by unanimous consent, under the Suspension of the Rules procedure, or under the terms of a special rule reported by the Committee on Rules and adopted by the House. If widespread support exists for the censure resolution, unanimous consent or the Suspension of the Rules procedure may be used. Otherwise, the resolution could be brought to the floor under a special rule reported by the Committee on Rules. All three of these parliamentary mechanisms require, at a minimum, the support of the majority party leadership in order to be entertained. If the censure resolution was not supported by the House majority party leadership, obtaining floor consideration would likely be difficult. Members could try to employ the House discharge rule (Rule XV, clause 2) to bring a censure resolution (or a special rule providing for its consideration) to the chamber floor. In the Senate, a Member could make a unanimous consent request to consider a censure resolution at the time it was submitted. If any Senator objected to this procedure, consideration of the resolution would effectively be blocked. A Senator might instead submit the resolution for it to be referred to committee in the usual way. The Senate committee might then report the censure resolution, allowing the measure to be called up on the floor by unanimous consent or by debatable motion. In either case, the resolution and any preamble therein would each be separately debatable and amendable, including by non-germane amendment. If a Senator introduces an amendment that contains censorious language or attempts to alter a resolution of censure, that amendment would also be subject to debate. As a result, without unanimous consent, one or more cloture processes, requiring supermajority vote thresholds, might be necessary in order to reach a final vote on censure language in the Senate. As stated earlier, there is no uniform language of censure. Therefore, the designation of censure is somewhat subjective. The censure resolutions identified in this report either contained the word "censure" or explicitly cited an alleged abuse of presidential power. Using these criteria, CRS identified 13 former Presidents who were the subject of censure attempts while in office: 11 by resolutions of censure, one via a House committee report, and another through an amendment to an unrelated resolution. On four occasions, the House or Senate adopted resolutions that, in their original form, charged the President with abuse of power. Otherwise, presidential censure resolutions have remained in committee without further consideration or were not adopted in a floor vote. The following sections provide additional information on each censure attempt. The measures are also listed in Table 1 . The four adopted censure-related resolutions were all simple resolutions. As such, they expressed the "sense of" the respective chamber but did not have the force of law or contain any disciplinary authority. In two cases identified (Presidents Lincoln and Taft), the resolutions were amended on the chamber floor so that they no longer clearly censured the President. In another case (President Buchanan), the resolution's language may have intended a lesser rebuke than censure. The fourth case, President Andrew Jackson, remains the clearest case of presidential censure by resolution, although his censure was subsequently expunged. The Jackson case stemmed from a dispute over the Second Bank of the United States. In 1832, Jackson vetoed legislation to renew the Bank's charter and began removing the government's deposits. The following year, some Members of Congress launched an investigation, during which Jackson refused to provide a requested document. In response, on December 26, 1833, Senator Henry Clay of Kentucky (Anti-Jacksonian Party) submitted a resolution of censure. As modified by Clay, the measure resolved, "That the President, in the late Executive proceedings in relation to the public revenue, has assumed upon himself authority and power not conferred by the Constitution and laws, but in derogation of both." On March 28, 1834, after three months of intense debate, the Senate agreed to the censure resolution. That April, Jackson submitted an "Executive protest," which argued that the Senate's censure of a non-Senator was "wholly unauthorized by the Constitution, and in derogation of its entire spirit." The Senate countered, on May 7, with resolutions that called the President's protest itself, "a breach of the privileges of the Senate," which could not be recognized or "entered on the Journals." By early 1837, however, pro-Jackson Democrats had gained the Senate majority, and they voted to remove the censure from chamber records. On January 16, the Secretary of the Senate drew black lines around the original resolution in the Senate Journal , adding the words, "Expunged by order of the Senate." On June 11, 1860, Representative Robert Hatton of Tennessee (Opposition Party) reported five resolutions on behalf of the Committee on the Expenditures in the Navy Department, a select committee appointed during the previous 35 th Congress. All five resolutions charged the Secretary of the Navy, Isaac Toucey, with ethical violations related to military contracts. The fourth resolution also reprimanded the President, alleging that the President and the Secretary awarded contracts based on "party relations" and the "pending elections." By doing so, the resolution stated, "they have set an example dangerous to the public safety, and deserving the reproof of this House." However, the fifth resolution, targeting just Toucey, used the word censured to condemn the Secretary's appointment of an engineer with financial interests in Navy projects. Thus, it could be argued that the House chose a weaker reprimand for the President. On June 13, the House voted to adopt all five resolutions. The fourth resolution, targeting the President and Secretary of the Navy, passed in a 106-61 vote. On May 11, 1864, Senator Garret Davis of Kentucky (Unionist Party) introduced a resolution reprimanding President Lincoln for allowing two generals to return to military service after they won election to the House. Senator Davis' original measure resolved, "That the arrangement aforesaid, made by the President and the Secretary of War with Generals Schenck and Blair, to receive from them temporarily their commissions of major general, with discretion, on their part, at any time during this session of Congress to resume them, was in derogation of the Constitution of the United States, and not within the power of the President and the Secretary of War, or either of them, to make." The Senate referred the resolution to the Judiciary Committee. On June 15, the committee reported, and the Senate approved, an amended version of the resolution. The new language affirmed that an officer must be re-appointed "in the manner provided by the Constitution," but no longer overtly censured the President. On July 15, 1912, Senator Joseph Bailey of Texas (Democratic Party) introduced S.Res. 357 after President Taft was accused of trying to influence a disputed Senate election. The original text resolved, "That any attempt on the part of the President of the United States to exercise the powers and influence of his great office for the purpose of controlling the vote of any Senator upon a question involving the right to a seat in the Senate violates the spirit, if not the letter, of the Constitution, invades the rights of the Senate, and ought to be severely condemned." In debate, Senator Bailey stated that his resolution targeted a "particular circumstance" involving the current President. Still, he was open to amending his own resolution in order to gain supporters. On July 16, in a 35-23 vote, the Senate adopted the amended version of the resolution. The new text substituted "violates" to "would violate" and removed the final phrase, "and ought to be severely condemned." Thus, as amended, the resolution referred to potential presidential actions without specifically censuring Taft's past behavior. Between 1800 and 1952, at least three Presidents were the subject of critical resolutions that were not adopted. In addition, one President (Polk) had his actions condemned by an amendment to a resolution, while another (Tyler) received criticism in a House committee report. Richard Nixon's years in office (1969-1974) marked a new period in presidential censures. Since 1972, several Presidents have been subject to multiple censure attempts. Most resolutions have used variations of the phrase "censure and condemn" or, in reference to Presidents Nixon and Clinton, called for the President's resignation. In all cases, these resolutions (1972-2016) have been referred to committee with no further action. Information on resolutions dated 1973-present is available from Congress.gov. On February 20, 1800, Representative Edward Livingston of New York (Jeffersonian Republican Party) introduced three resolutions accusing the President of judicial interference. The text described the case of a "fugitive" accused of crimes aboard a British ship. According to the first two resolutions, the President advised a federal judge to release the man into British custody, even though the fugitive claimed to be an American citizen acting in self-defense. The third resolution condemned the President, stating: "his advice and request to the Judge of the District Court ... are a dangerous interference of the Executive with Judicial decisions; and that the compliance with such advice and request on the part of the Judge of the District Court of South Carolina, is a sacrifice of the Constitutional independence of the Judicial power, and exposes the administration thereof to suspicion and reproach." On March 8, the full House voted (61-35) in concurrence with the Committee of the Whole's decision to defeat the three resolutions. The Tyler case followed the unexpected death of President William Henry Harrison early in his term of office. Once John Tyler assumed the presidency, he vetoed a number of bills, angering several Members of Congress. On August 10, 1842, the former President, Representative John Quincy Adams of Massachusetts (Whig Party), moved to form a select committee to consider the President's latest veto message and "report thereon." The following week, Representative Adams submitted the committee's report, which recommended a constitutional amendment to lower the threshold to overturn presidential vetoes from a two-thirds vote to a simple majority. The report itself issued criticism of the President's actions, including his "continual and unrelenting exercise of executive legislation, by the alternate gross abuse of constitutional power and bold assumption of powers never vested in him by any law." On August 17, the House voted (100-80) to approve the report, but did not have the necessary two-thirds support required to adopt the resolution amending the Constitution. In this case, the House did not approve a censure resolution. Still, the report itself may be considered a form of presidential censure. In response to the criticism, Tyler submitted an official protest, but the House refused to recognize it. On January 3, 1848, the House considered a resolution congratulating Generals Zachary Taylor and Winfield Scott for their military service during the Mexican-American War. Representative George Ashmun of Massachusetts (Whig Party) offered an amendment to a motion to refer the resolution to the Committee on Military Affairs. The amendment instructed the committee to add the phrase, "in a war unnecessarily and unconstitutionally begun by the President" to the resolution. In an 85-81 vote, the House approved the amendment. However, the underlying resolution was never adopted. Instead, both chambers passed a joint resolution in praise of the generals, and this one included no criticism of Polk or the war. The Grant case followed months of acrimony between the President and Senator Charles Sumner of Massachusetts (Republican Party), who previously served as chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee. As chairman, Senator Sumner led efforts to defeat the President's treaty to annex the Dominican Republic. However, the conflict subsequently led to Sumner's replacement as chairman at the start of the 42 nd Congress (March 4, 1871). On March 24, Senator Sumner introduced an eight-part resolution that addressed the President's recent deployment of ships along the Dominican coast. Section five of the resolution called the action, without the authority of Congress, "an infraction of the Constitution of the United States and a usurpation of power not conferred upon the President." On March 27, Senator Sumner modified his own resolution to insert additional text: this "belligerent intervention ... [was] unauthorized violence, utterly without support in law or reason, and proceeding directly from that kingly prerogative which is disowned by the Constitution of the United States." Two days later, the Senate voted 39-16 to table the resolution. During the Korean War, steel workers were scheduled to strike on April 9, 1952. However, hours before the scheduled walkout, President Truman issued an executive order directing the Department of Commerce to seize control of steel mills associated with the United Steelworkers of America. In response, Representative Burr Powell Harrison of Virginia (Democratic Party) introduced H.Con.Res. 207, condemning the seizure as "without authority in law." The measure marked the first known attempt to reprimand a President with a concurrent resolution. Such measures require the agreement of both houses of Congress. However, on April 9, the resolution was referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary and received no further consideration. Beginning in 1972, President Nixon was the subject of several House resolutions (simple and concurrent) that either sought his censure or called for his resignation. Introduced on January 18, 1972, H.Con.Res. 500 (92 nd Congress) addressed the President's conduct during the Vietnam War. It was referred to the House Foreign Affairs Committee. All other resolutions pertained to the President's conduct related to the Watergate break-in (June 17, 1972) and were referred to the House Judiciary Committee. The first group of Watergate resolutions, submitted between October 23, 1973, and December 4, 1973, followed the firing of special prosecutor Archibald Cox on October 20. The second set, H.Res. 1288 and H.Con.Res. 589 (August 2 and 8, 1974), were submitted after the Judiciary Committee adopted articles of impeachment (July 27-30, 1974). Three resolutions, H.Res. 684 , H.Con.Res. 376 , and H.Res. 734 , stated that the President "should resign" but did not cite a specific abuse of power. Thus, they arguably could be considered "no confidence" resolutions, not measures explicitly expressing censure. Nixon resigned on August 9, 1974, one day after the last censure resolution, H.Con.Res. 589 , was submitted. The Clinton resolutions concerned the President's testimony before a grand jury in August 1998. The testimony was alleged to contradict an earlier deposition that the President had given in January. In response, some Members of Congress considered either censuring or impeaching the President for perjury and obstruction of justice. Introduced between September 1998 and February 1999, five resolutions considered alternatives to impeachment proceedings. H.Res. 531 (September 11, 1998) called for the President's immediate resignation. The resolution, however, also stated that he "abused the office." Therefore, the measure might be considered both a resolution of "no confidence" and one of censure. All other resolutions used variations of the phrase, "censure and condemn," in reference to the President's conduct. H.J.Res. 139 and H.J.Res. 140 were introduced on December 17, 1998, two days before the House approved two articles of impeachment, while H.J.Res. 12 (January 6, 1999) was introduced one day before the start of the President's Senate impeachment trial. The final resolution, S.Res. 44 , was introduced on February 12, 1999, the same day that the Senate voted to acquit the President of all charges. Note that H.J.Res. 139 , H.J.Res. 140 , and H.J.Res. 12 were joint resolutions. Unlike simple and concurrent resolutions, final approval of joint resolutions requires passage by both houses of Congress, and then the President must sign them or allow them to become law without his signature. These specific joint resolutions also mandated that the President, by his signature, agree to the following conditions: acknowledge censure and condemnation, donate $500,000 to the Treasury, not deliver in person any State of the Union address, not involve himself in Democratic Party or campaign activities, and not serve in public office after his term as President concluded. The joint resolutions' procedural and policy requirements made them the most controversial of the Clinton censure resolutions. However, like the other censure resolutions, H.Res. 531 and S.Res. 44 , the joint resolutions were referred to committee without further consideration. The George W. Bush resolutions addressed the Administration's response to the September 11, 2001, attack on the United States and its prosecution of the global war on terrorism. S.Res. 398 charged the "unlawful authorization of wiretaps of Americans." S.Res. 303 and H.Res. 626 targeted President Bush and Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales; both measures resolved to censure and condemn them for "disregarding statutes, treaties, and the Constitution." The remaining four resolutions, H.Res. 636 , , S.Res. 302 , and H.Res. 625 sought to censure either President Bush alone, or in addition to Vice President Richard Cheney, for actions related to the war in Iraq. S.Res. 302 was referred to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The other resolutions were referred to either the House or Senate Judiciary Committees. While no resolutions were reported out of committee, the Senate Judiciary Committee, on March 31, 2006, held hearings on S.Res. 398 . The five Obama censure resolutions contained a variety of charges. H.Res. 425 (November 20, 2013) charged a failure to execute laws, as well as the "usurpation of the legislative power of Congress." H.Res. 652 (June 26, 2014) charged "actions beyond the laws of the United States." H.Res. 582 (January 7, 2016) cited usurpation of Congress, while H.Res. 588 (January 13, 2016) stated that the President failed to fulfill the duties of Commander in Chief. The final resolution, H.Res. 607 (February 4, 2016), again charged actions beyond the laws and usurpation of Congress. All measures were simple House resolutions, which were referred to the Judiciary Committee, and subsequently by the committee to its Subcommittee on the Constitution and Civil Justice. The resolutions received no action. Notes: * Entries marked with an asterisk called for the President's resignation. If the resolution did not include additional language reprimanding the President or his conduct, it is arguably not a resolution of censure. H.Res. 531 (105 th Congress) is both a resolution of "no confidence" and a resolution of censure because it included the phrase, "abused the office."

Censure is a reprimand adopted by one or both chambers of Congress against a Member of Congress, President, federal judge, or other government official. While Member censure is a disciplinary measure that is sanctioned by the Constitution (Article 1, Section 5), non-Member censure is not. Rather, it is a formal expression or "sense of" one or both houses of Congress. As such, censure resolutions targeting non-Members use a variety of statements to highlight conduct deemed by the resolutions' sponsors to be inappropriate or unauthorized. Resolutions that attempt to censure the President for abuse of power, ethics violations, or other behavior, are usually simple resolutions. These resolutions are not privileged for consideration in the House or Senate. They are, instead, considered under the regular parliamentary mechanisms used to process "sense of" legislation. Since 1800, Members of the House and Senate have introduced resolutions of censure against at least 12 sitting Presidents. Two additional Presidents received criticism via alternative means (a House committee report and an amendment to a resolution). The clearest instance of a successful presidential censure is Andrew Jackson. A resolution of censure was approved in 1834. On three other occasions, critical resolutions were adopted, but their final language, as amended, obscured the original intention to censure the President. In the remaining cases, resolutions remained in committee, without further consideration, or were not adopted in a floor vote. Nevertheless, presidential censure attempts have become more frequent since the Richard Nixon era. This report summarizes the procedures that may be used to consider resolutions of censure and the history of attempts to censure the President (1st-114th Congresses). It also provides citations to additional reading material on the subject.

The President is responsible for appointing individuals to positions throughout the federal government. In some instances, the President makes these appointments using authorities granted to the President alone. Other appointments are made with the advice and consent of the Senate via the nomination and confirmation of appointees. Presidential appointments with Senate confirmation are often referred to with the abbreviation PAS. This report identifies, for the 112 th Congress, all nominations to full-time positions requiring Senate confirmation in 40 organizations in the executive branch (27 independent agencies, 6 agencies in the Executive Office of the President [EOP], and 7 multilateral organizations) and 4 agencies in the legislative branch. It excludes appointments to executive departments and to regulatory and other boards and commissions. A pair of tables presents information for each agency in this report. The first table in each pair provides information on full-time positions requiring Senate confirmation as of the end of the 112 th Congress and the pay levels of those positions. The second table for each agency tracks appointment activity within the 112 th Congress by the Senate (confirmations, rejections, returns to the President, and elapsed time between nomination and confirmation) as well as further related presidential activity (including withdrawals and recess appointments). In some instances, no appointment action occurred within an agency during the 112 th Congress. Information for this report was compiled using the Senate nominations database of the Legislative Information System (LIS) at http://www.lis.gov/nomis/ , the Congressional Record (daily edition), the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents , telephone discussions with agency officials, agency websites, the United States Code , and the 2012 Plum Book ( United States Government Policy and Supporting Positions ). Related Congressional Research Service (CRS) reports regarding the presidential appointments process, nomination activity for other executive branch positions, recess appointments, and other appointments-related matters may be found at http://www.crs.gov . During the 112 th Congress, President Barack Obama submitted 34 nominations to the Senate for full-time positions in independent agencies, agencies in the EOP, multilateral agencies, and legislative branch agencies. Of these nominations, 27 were confirmed, 6 were returned to the President, and 1 was withdrawn. The President made one recess appointment during this period to a position in organizations covered in this report. Table 1 summarizes the appointment activity. The length of time a given nomination may be pending in the Senate varies widely. Some nominations are confirmed within a few days, others are not confirmed for several months, and some are never confirmed. For each nomination covered by this report and confirmed in the 112 th Congress, the report provides the number of days between nomination and confirmation ("days to confirm"). The mean (average) number of days elapsed between nomination and confirmation was 142.7. The median number of days elapsed was 112.0. Agency profiles in this report are organized in two parts: a table listing the organization's full-time PAS positions as of the end of the 112 th Congress and a table listing appointment action for vacant positions during the 112 th Congress. Data for these tables were collected from several authoritative sources. As noted, some agencies had no nomination activity during this time. In each agency profile, the first of the two tables identifies, as of the end of the 112 th Congress, each full-time PAS position in the organization and its pay level. For most presidentially appointed positions requiring Senate confirmation, the pay levels fall under the Executive Schedule, which, as of January 2013, ranged from level I ($199,700) for Cabinet-level offices to level V ($145,700) for lower-ranked positions. The second table, the appointment action table, provides, in chronological order, information concerning each nomination. It shows the name of the nominee, position involved, date of nomination, date of confirmation, and number of days between receipt of a nomination and confirmation. It also notes actions other than confirmation (i.e., nominations returned to or withdrawn by the President). The appointment action tables with more than one nominee to a position also list statistics on the length of time between nomination and confirmation. Each nomination action table provides the average "days to confirm" in two ways: mean and median. Although the mean is a more familiar measure, it may be influenced by outliers in the data. The median, by contrast, does not tend to be influenced by outliers. In other words, a nomination that took an extraordinarily long time might cause a significant change in the mean, but the median would be unaffected. Examining both numbers offers more information with which to assess the central tendency of the data. Appendix A provides two tables. Table A-1 relists all appointment action identified in this report and is organized alphabetically by the appointee's last name. Table entries identify the agency to which each individual was appointed, position title, nomination date, date confirmed or other final action, and duration count for confirmed nominations. In the final two rows, the table also includes the mean and median values for the days to confirm column. Table A-2 provides summary data on the appointments identified in this report and is organized by agency type, including independent executive agencies, agencies in the EOP, multilateral organizations, and agencies in the legislative branch. The table summarizes the number of positions, nominations submitted, individual nominees, confirmations, nominations returned, and nominations withdrawn for each agency grouping. It also includes mean and median values for the number of days taken to confirm nominations in each category. During the 112 th Congress, the Presidential Appointments Streamlining and Efficiency Act ( P.L. 112-166 ) was enacted, which eliminated the requirement for the Senate's advice and consent for 163 positions in federal agencies. A number of those positions, listed in Appendix B , have been included in previous versions of this tracking report. This report notes each agency and position affected. Appendix C provides a list of department abbreviations. Appendix A. Summary of All Nominations and Appointments to Independent and Other Agencies Appendix B. Positions Affected by P.L. 112-166 Appendix C. Agency Abbreviations

The President makes appointments to positions within the federal government, either using the authorities granted to the President alone or with the advice and consent of the Senate. This report identifies all nominations that were submitted to the Senate for full-time positions in 40 organizations in the executive branch (27 independent agencies, 6 agencies in the Executive Office of the President [EOP], and 7 multilateral organizations) and 4 agencies in the legislative branch. It excludes appointments to executive departments and to regulatory and other boards and commissions, which are covered in other reports. Information for each agency is presented in tables. The tables include full-time positions confirmed by the Senate, pay levels for these positions, and appointment action within each independent agency. Additional summary information across all agencies covered in the report appears in the appendix. During the 112th Congress, the President submitted 34 nominations to the Senate for full-time positions in independent agencies, agencies in the EOP, multilateral agencies, and legislative branch agencies. Of these 34 nominations, 27 were confirmed, 1 was withdrawn, and 6 were returned to him in accordance with Senate rules. For those nominations that were confirmed, a mean (average) of 142.7 days elapsed between nomination and confirmation. The median number of days elapsed was 112.0. The President made one recess appointment to a full-time position in an independent agency during the 112th Congress. Information for this report was compiled using the Senate nominations database of the Legislative Information System (LIS) at http://www.lis.gov/nomis/, the Congressional Record (daily edition), the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, telephone discussions with agency officials, agency websites, the United States Code, and the 2012 Plum Book (United States Government Policy and Supporting Positions). This report will not be updated.

Noncitizen eligibility varies among the needs-based housing programs administered by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). Two laws govern noncitizen treatment in housing programs: Title IV of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA) and Section 214 of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1980, as a mended. There is uncertainty surrounding how the eligibility requirements of PRWORA and Section 214 interact, leading to conflicting interpretations of the categories of noncitizens eligible for certain housing programs. Also, the documentation requirements for establishing eligible immigration status reflect the differing eligibility rules and are dependent on (1) the housing program, (2) the citizenship status of the applicant, and (3) the age of the applicant. In 1996, Congress passed the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA) which established new restrictions on the eligibility of noncitizens for public benefits. PRWORA explicitly states that aliens, unless they are qualified aliens, are not eligible for "federal public benefits," a term defined in the law to include public and assisted housing. However, PRWORA did not make those who had been receiving housing benefits before the date of enactment (August 22, 1996) ineligible for housing benefits. Likewise, PRWORA exempted certain types of programs that are usually thought of as emergency programs from the eligibility restrictions. In addition, although no HUD program is considered a "federal means-tested public benefit" (FMTPB), PRWORA also included more stringent eligibility requirements for FMTPBs (discussed later in this report). PRWORA created the term "qualified alien," a term which did not previously exist in immigration law, to encompass the different categories of noncitizens who are not prohibited by PRWORA from receiving federal public benefits. Qualified aliens are defined as Legal Permanent Residents (an alien admitted for lawful permanent residence (LPR)); refugees (an alien who is admitted to the United States under SS207 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)); asylees (an alien who is granted asylum under INA SS208); an alien who is paroled into the United States (under INA SS212(d)(5)) for a period of at least one year; an alien whose deportation is being withheld on the basis of prospective persecution (under INA SS243(h) or SS241(b)(3)); an alien granted conditional entry pursuant to INA SS203(a)(7) as in effect prior to April 1, 1980; and Cuban/Haitian entrants (as defined by P.L. 96-422 ). Additionally, under PRWORA, certain battered aliens are eligible for federal public benefits if they can demonstrate (in the opinion of the agency providing such benefits) "[that] there is a substantial connection between such battery or cruelty and the need for the benefits to be provided." Nonimmigrants (i.e., aliens in the United States for a temporary period of time such as foreign students and agricultural workers) and unauthorized (illegal) aliens are not considered qualified aliens. In addition, aliens who have been granted deferred action are not considered qualified aliens. Although PRWORA explicitly states that aliens, unless they are qualified aliens, are not eligible for "federal public benefits," certain aliens--including aliens who are not qualified aliens--are exempt from this eligibility restriction. Specifically, any alien who was receiving assistance from programs for housing or community development assistance or financial assistance administered by the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, any program under Title V of the Housing Act of 1949, or any assistance under Section 306C of the Consolidated Farm and Rural Development Act, on the date of the enactment of PRWORA (August 22, 1996) is exempt from PRWORA's eligibility restrictions. PRWORA also exempts types of programs , usually thought of as emergency programs, from alien eligibility requirements including Programs, services, or assistance (such as soup kitchens, crisis counseling and intervention, and short-term shelter) specified by the Attorney General, in the Attorney General's sole and unreviewable discretion after consultation with appropriate federal agencies and departments, which (i) deliver in-kind services at the community level, including through public or private nonprofit agencies; (ii) do not condition the provision of assistance, the amount of assistance provided, or the cost of assistance provided on the individual recipient's income or resources; and (iii) are necessary for the protection of life or safety. Thus, nonimmigrants and unauthorized aliens (i.e., aliens who do not meet the definition of qualified aliens) are eligible for emergency programs. A week after the enactment of PRWORA, former Attorney General Janet Reno published a notice specifying what types of programs, services and assistance were exempt from alien eligibility limitations. According to the notice, services or assistance necessary for the protection of life and safety include short-term shelter or housing assistance for the homeless, for victims of domestic violence, or for runaway, abused or abandoned children; and programs, services or assistance to help individuals during periods of heat, cold or other adverse weather conditions. Although PRWORA includes "public or assisted housing" in the definition of federal public benefits, HUD has released few regulations interpreting PRWORA or its impact on alien eligibility for the housing programs administered by HUD. Part of HUD's failure to issue regulations regarding the impact of PRWORA on housing programs reportedly stems from an ongoing discussion of how to classify HUD's homeless programs and which, if any, fit the definition of "necessary for the protection of life and safety" as defined in the notice. HUD published a regulation in 2000 which stated that no HUD program was a "federal means-tested public benefit" (FMTPB). FMTPBs have stricter eligibility requirements than federal public benefits including five-year ban for qualified aliens entering after the date of enactment (August 22, 1996); "deeming" which means that the sponsor's resources (and those of the sponsor's spouse) are used in calculating the financial eligibility of a qualified alien until the noncitizen becomes naturalized or has accumulated 40 quarters (10 years) of documented work; and authority of the government to seek reimbursement from the alien's sponsor for the cost of FMTPB provided to the sponsored alien. Since HUD programs are not considered FMTPBs, none of the more stringent eligibility requirements apply to any HUD program. Subsequent to the enactment of PRWORA, Congress enacted legislation which made victims of trafficking eligible for public benefits. This law did not amend PRWORA to include trafficking victims as eligible for public benefits; rather, it stated that victims of trafficking shall be eligible for benefits and services "under any Federal or State program" to the same extent as refugees. Thus, victims of trafficking are eligible for housing programs to the same extent that refugees are eligible for these programs. Section 214 of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1980, as amended, states that only certain categories of noncitizens are eligible for benefits under specified housing programs. HUD programs covered under Section 214 include the programs under the U.S. Housing Act of 1937 (Public Housing and Section 8 tenant-based vouchers and project-based rental assistance), Section 235 Homeownership Assistance, Section 236 Rental Assistance and Section 101 Rental Supplements. These programs provide direct rental or homeownership assistance to low-income families. Public Housing and Section 8 tenant-based vouchers are administered by quasi-governmental, local public housing authorities (PHAs); the other programs are primarily administered by private property owners under contract with HUD. Section 214 predates PRWORA. Under Section 214, the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development may not make financial assistance available to an alien unless the alien both is a resident of the United States and is an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence as an immigrant ... excluding, among others, alien visitors, tourists, diplomats, and students who enter the United States temporarily with no intention of abandoning their residence in a foreign country; an alien who ... is deemed to be lawfully admitted for permanent residence [under the registry provisions of the INA]; an alien who has qualified ... [as a refugee or asylee]; an alien who is lawfully present in the United States as a result of an exercise [of the Attorney General's parole authority] ...; an alien within the United States as to whom the Attorney General has withheld deportation [on the basis of prospective persecution] ...; or an alien lawfully admitted for temporary or permanent residence under Section 245A of the Immigration and Nationality Act. Unauthorized aliens are not eligible for financial assistance under Section 214-covered programs. Many households that include U.S. citizens or qualified aliens also include ineligible aliens (e.g., unauthorized aliens). Section 214 of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1980, as amended, requires HUD and local public housing authorities to provide prorated assistance to families in which at least one member has eligible immigration status. A prorated housing benefit is calculated by reducing the benefit due to the family by the proportion of nonqualified aliens in the household. The aliens eligible for housing assistance under Section 214 are similar to those eligible for federal public benefits under PRWORA (i.e., those who are not prohibited from eligibility), with some exceptions. Both statutes allow LPRs, asylees, refugees, and those on the registry to be eligible for assistance. Both statutes allow parolees eligibility, but PRWORA states that the alien must be paroled into the U.S. for a period of one year, while no time-limit is specified in SS214. Both statutes extend eligibility to aliens whose deportation is being withheld on the basis of prospective persecution, but SS214 only references those whose deportation is withheld on the basis of prospective persecution post-1996, while PRWORA includes anyone whose deportation is withheld pre- or post-1996. Only PRWORA specifically allows eligibility for Cuban/Haitian entrants. Only PRWORA allows battered immigrants who can show a substantial connection between the battery and the need for benefits to be eligible. Both PWORA and Section 214 do not make nonimmigrants and unauthorized aliens eligible for benefits. In addition, neither section makes those with deferred action eligible for benefits. It is also important to note that while Section 214 applies only to those programs covered by Section 214 (primarily the direct rental assistance programs), PRWORA applies to all programs providing federal public benefits. As noted earlier, HUD has not published guidance as to which of its programs are considered as providing federal public benefits. In the 108 th Congress, Senator Christopher (Kit) Bond offered S.Amdt. 224 which was passed by a voice-vote and added to the Senate version of H.J.Res. 2 , a FY2003 omnibus appropriations bill, but it was not included in the final version of the bill. The amendment would have added the category "qualified alien" to the categories of noncitizens eligible for housing benefits under Section 214 of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1980, bringing Section 214 into conformity with PRWORA. The amendment would have effectively made Cuban/Haitian entrants, aliens whose deportation was being withheld on the basis of prospective persecution prior to 1996, and certain battered aliens statutorily eligible for housing benefits. Due to the complicated nature of the interaction of the housing law and PRWORA there was confusion over the purpose of the amendment. While some viewed the amendment as a technical correction, others were concerned that it would have broadened noncitizens' eligibility for housing programs, and still others were concerned that it might have restricted eligibility. While the Bond amendment was not included in the conference agreement, the conference report directed the Department [of Housing and Urban Development] to work with the Department of Justice to develop any necessary technical corrections to applicable housing statutes with respect to qualified aliens who are victims of domestic violence and Cuban and Haitian immigrants to ensure that such statutes are consistent with the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1996 and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Personal Responsibility Act of 1996 ( H.Rept. 108-10 ). There are several potentially conflicting interpretations of the interaction of Section 214 and PRWORA and uncertainty regarding HUD's interpretation of the noncitizen eligibility restrictions. Under one possible interpretation, to be eligible for Section 214 programs, a class of noncitizens cannot be prohibited from receiving benefits under PRWORA and must be listed as an eligible class under Section 214. For example, parolees who have been in the United States for less than one year would be ineligible for Section 214 programs because, although they are eligible under Section 214, they are prohibited under PRWORA. On the other hand, battered immigrants would be ineligible for Section 214 programs because, although they are not ineligible for benefits under PRWORA, they are not listed as eligible under Section 214. Interestingly, under this interpretation, the interaction between Section 214 and PRWORA make the alien eligibility requirements for Section 214 housing programs more restrictive than the requirements for other federal public benefits, although by itself Section 214 is not necessarily more restrictive than the provisions in PRWORA. A second possible interpretation depends on whether or not PRWORA makes qualified aliens affirmatively eligible for benefits. PRWORA states "[n]otwithstanding any other provision in the law ... an alien who is not a qualified alien ... is not eligible for any federal public benefits." It could be asserted that by not prohibiting qualified aliens from federal public benefits, PRWORA grants eligibility to qualified aliens for federal public benefits. Since PRWORA effectively supercedes Section 214 (given the "notwithstanding" clause), under this interpretation, all noncitizens who are qualified aliens would be eligible for Section 214-covered housing programs. Despite statutory and regulatory arguments, this second interpretation may, in fact, reflect what is happening in practice. Prior to the enactment of PRWORA, HUD released regulations based on Section 214 that established a standard for verifying an applicant's immigration status. To verify eligibility, PHAs and property owners use the Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements (SAVE) program, which enables federal, state, and local governmental agencies to obtain immigration status information to determine eligibility for public benefits. The SAVE system is also used to determine noncitizen eligibility for other benefits including Medicaid, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), and food assistance which use the noncitizen eligibility restrictions outlined in PRWORA. As a result, it is possible that some housing authorities are using the noncitizen eligibility requirements specified in PRWORA, without regard to Section 214. As noted earlier, mixed families are eligible to receive prorated assistance from Section 214-covered programs. HUD's homeless programs include the Shelter Plus Care (S+C) program, the Supportive Housing Program (SHP), the Single Room Occupancy (SRO) program, and the Emergency Shelter Grants (ESG) program, all of which are funded under the Homeless Assistance Grants account, as well as the Housing for Persons with AIDS (HOPWA) program. One of the programs funded through the Homeless Assistance Grants is a Section 214-covered program: the SRO program. Housing units for homeless individuals provided through the SRO program are developed through the Section 8 Moderate Rehabilitation program and receive Section 8 rental assistance. As a result, nonqualified aliens (e.g., nonimmigrants and unauthorized aliens) as defined by Section 214 are ineligible for the SRO program. However, HOPWA and the remaining homeless programs--S+C, SHP, and ESG--are not covered by Section 214. Although PRWORA lists "housing assistance" as a federal public benefit governed by the statute, HUD has not issued regulations to clarify whether HUD homeless assistance programs are considered "federal public benefits," and therefore subject to PRWORA's noncitizen eligibility restrictions. Assuming the homeless assistance programs (S+C, SHP, ESG, and HOPWA) are governed by PRWORA, citizens and qualified aliens are effectively eligible for benefits from all homeless assistance programs if they meet need standards. The status of nonqualified aliens is less clear, as the assistance provided through some of HUD's homeless programs could fit the PRWORA exception allowing nonqualified aliens access to emergency programs. The exception applies if the benefit provided meets three requirements: 1. it is an in-kind benefit provided through public or private nonprofit organizations, 2. the benefit is not conditioned on a client's income or resources, and 3. the benefit is necessary for the protection of life and safety. Temporary emergency shelter provided through the ESG program could fulfill the requirements of this exception. However, some transitional and all permanent housing may not meet the second requirement. Formerly homeless individuals who reside in permanent supportive housing provided through S+C or SHP pay a portion of their income toward rent. The same is true for some transitional housing provided through SHP. HUD has not published guidance indicating which, if any, of its programs are considered to meet the three requirements for exception from PRWORA as emergency programs. Another portion of PRWORA that could be relevant for homeless assistance programs is a provision that exempts "nonprofit charitable organizations" that provide federal public benefits from having to verify the eligibility of program participants. To the extent that administrators of HUD's homeless assistance programs are nonprofit organizations, which many of them are, they are not required under the terms of PRWORA to verify their clients' citizenship status. Thus, nonqualified aliens may be receiving services from these organizations, regardless of their eligibility status. Furthermore, HUD has not published guidance regarding the verification of immigration status for homeless programs that are not governed by Section 214, whether or not they are administered by a charitable organization, making it even more unclear whether or not, in practice, nonqualified aliens receive benefits. (See discussion under " Documentation and Verification " later in this report.) Mixed families are not separately dealt with in regulations for HUD homeless assistance programs and, given their ambiguous eligibility status and the lack of verification guidance, it is unclear how they are treated. The other needs-based housing programs administered by HUD are significantly different from the Section 214-covered programs in that they primarily provide funding to nonprofits, states, and units of local governments to provide a variety of forms of assistance to low-income individuals, families, and communities. Examples of other HUD needs-based housing programs include the Section 202 Housing for the Elderly program, the Section 811 Housing for the Disabled program, the Community Development Block Grant program and the HOME Investment Partnerships program. The Section 202 and 811 programs are similar to the Section 8 project-based rental assistance program (which is a Section 214-covered program), but they are administered by nonprofits rather than PHAs. HOME and CDBG are block grants administered by units of state and local government, who generally award the funds to nonprofit partners. HOME funds housing activities; CDBG funds community development-related activities. Presumably, the PRWORA restrictions on noncitizen eligibility apply to the other HUD needs-based housing programs; however, the assistance provided through these programs may or may not be considered "federal public benefits." HUD has not issued guidance defining which types of assistance under the other needs-based housing programs are "federal public benefits" and subject to PRWORA's noncitizen eligibility restrictions. Further, HUD has not issued guidance as to how participating entities should implement the PRWORA restrictions. Assuming the PRWORA restrictions apply to these programs, and since they are not covered by Section 214, it can be interpreted that citizens and qualified aliens are effectively eligible for benefits from all other HUD needs-based programs, if they meet need standards. Nonqualified aliens (e.g., unauthorized aliens), as a result of PRWORA, are not legally eligible for any housing benefits from other HUD needs-based programs. However, it is important to note that, unlike Section 214-covered programs, there are no regulations requiring the verification of beneficiaries' citizenship for other HUD needs-based programs, so it is possible that nonqualified aliens may be receiving housing benefits, regardless of their eligibility. (See discussion under " Documentation and Verification " later in this report.) Further, much of the assistance provided by the other needs-based housing programs is administered through nonprofits, which, as noted earlier in this report, are not required to verify immigration status. As a result, while certain nonqualified aliens may be ineligible for assistance under the other HUD needs-based programs, to the extent that assistance is provided by charitable organizations, their status is not required to be verified, so they may be receiving assistance. Mixed families are not separately dealt with in regulations for other HUD needs-based housing programs and, given their ambiguous eligibility status and the lack of verification guidance, it is unclear how they are treated. As discussed above, noncitizen eligibility varies among HUD's needs-based housing programs, and is governed by both PRWORA and Section 214. An important component of any policy discussion on eligibility is the mechanism by which eligibility is determined. The following section discusses the documentation requirements for citizens and noncitizens to demonstrate eligibility for housing assistance. For the Section 214-covered programs, which include the largest housing assistance programs (Public Housing and the Section 8 tenant-based voucher and project-based rental assistance programs), PHAs and private property owners are required to verify the eligibility of each person in a household. Every applicant must declare in writing under threat of perjury that he or she is a citizen, an eligible noncitizen, or is choosing not to provide documentation (and is therefore ineligible for assistance). Citizens are not required to provide documentation of their citizenship status, although PHAs may adopt a policy requiring documentation, such as a U.S. passport. Also, household members over the age of 6 must provide their Social Security numbers and/or certify that they have not received a Social Security number in order to receive housing assistance. It is important to note, however, that Social Security numbers do not prove citizenship or eligible immigration status. Noncitizens age 62 or older are required to provide a signed declaration under threat of perjury of their eligible immigration status and proof of their age. PHAs and property owners are not required to further verify their immigration status. Other eligible noncitizens/qualified aliens must provide a signed declaration under threat of perjury of their eligible immigration status, documentation from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and a signed verification consent form relating to communications between DHS and HUD. A PHA or property owner may provide an extension of up to 30 days if a family certifies that the required evidence is temporarily unavailable and they need more time to locate the required documents. Once the documents have been submitted, a PHA or property owner must verify the documents using the SAVE system (discussed earlier in this report). If the alien thinks that the information returned through the SAVE system is inaccurate, the alien may appeal to DHS. A PHA or property owner may provide assistance temporarily while the alien's status is being verified. Other noncitizens who are members of households that include eligible noncitizens/qualified aliens may choose not to contend that they have eligible immigration status. In the case of these mixed-status families, eligible noncitizen/qualified alien members of the families may receive pro-rated benefits; however, the family must identify in writing to the PHA or property owner any family members who will be living in the household but have elected not to contend that they have eligible immigration status. As discussed above, HUD has not issued guidance defining which programs or types of assistance under the other needs-based housing programs are subject to PRWORA's noncitizen eligibility restrictions. Further, HUD has not issued guidance as to how participating entities should implement the PRWORA restrictions. As a result, the documentation requirements for these programs are unknown. Therefore, it is unclear how, and the extent to which, the entities that administer other needs-based housing assistance are verifying eligible immigration status for noncitizen beneficiaries. Additionally, much of the funding provided through HUD's other needs-based housing programs is administered through charitable organizations. As noted earlier, PRWORA included language permitting nonprofit charitable organizations to choose not to verify noncitizen eligibility for federal public benefits.

The issue of noncitizen eligibility for federally funded programs, including needs-based housing programs, is a perennial issue in Congress. Noncitizen eligibility varies among the needs-based housing programs administered by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), such as Public Housing, Section 8 vouchers and project-based rental assistance, homeless assistance programs, housing for the elderly (SS202) and the disabled (SS811), the HOME program, and the Community Development Block Grants (CDBG) program. Two laws govern noncitizen eligibility for housing programs: Title IV of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (Welfare Reform) and Section 214 of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1980, as amended. The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA) explicitly states that aliens, unless they are qualified aliens, are not eligible for "federal public benefits," a term defined in the law to include public and assisted housing. Under the statute, unauthorized (illegal) aliens do not meet the definition of qualified aliens, and as a result, they are ineligible for "federal public benefits." However, PRWORA did not make those who had been receiving housing benefits before the date of enactment (August 22, 1996) ineligible for housing benefits. Likewise, PRWORA exempts certain types of programs that are usually thought of as emergency programs from the alien eligibility restrictions. HUD has not issued guidance implementing the PRWORA provisions. Section 214 of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1980 states that only certain categories of noncitizens are eligible for benefits under the housing programs covered by Section 214. Unauthorized aliens are not eligible for benefits under Section 214. The aliens eligible for housing assistance under Section 214 are similar to those eligible for federal public benefits under PRWORA, with some exceptions. There is uncertainty surrounding how the eligibility requirements of PRWORA and Section 214 interact, leading to conflicting interpretations of the categories of noncitizens eligible for housing programs. A provision addressing this issue was considered during the FY2003 appropriations debate, but not included in the final bill. There has been congressional interest regarding the implementation of the eligibility requirements for housing programs. Specifically, questions have been raised as to the documentation requirements placed on both citizens and noncitizens in determining eligibility for housing programs. The documentation requirements are dependent on (1) the housing program, (2) the citizenship status of the applicant, and (3) the age of the applicant.

The Logan Act, designed to cover relations between private citizens of the United States and foreign governments, has prompted much controversy as to its scope and effect in its more than 200 years. Described as either a "paper dragon or sleeping giant" by one commentator, proclaimed to be possibly unconstitutional by others, it represents a combination of legal and policy factors in both domestic and international concerns. As amended, the act states: Any citizen of the United States, wherever he may be, who, without authority of the United States, directly or indirectly commences or carries on any correspondence or intercourse with any foreign government or any officer or agent thereof, in relation to any disputes or controversies with the United States, or to defeat the measures of the United States, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than three years, or both. This section shall not abridge the right of a citizen to apply, himself or his agent, to any foreign government or the agents thereof for redress of any injury which he may have sustained from such government or any of its agents or subjects. In 1994 the fine was changed from $5,000 to "under this title." Otherwise, there do not appear to have been any substantial changes in the act since its original enactment on January 30, 1799, as 1 Stat. 613. After the French Revolution, difficulties developed between the Federalist Administration of the United States and the various revolutionary governments of France. Because the United States had not assisted the French revolutionaries to their satisfaction and because the United States had ratified the Jay Treaty with Great Britain, the French government authorized plunderings of American merchant ships. In 1797 President Adams sent John Marshall, Charles C. Pinckney, and Elbridge Gerry as special envoys to France to negotiate and settle claims and causes of differences which existed between the French Directory and the United States. This mission resulted in the XYZ letters controversy, and its failure led to such strong anti-France feelings in the United States that preparations for war were begun by the Congress. After the unsuccessful envoys returned from France, Dr. George Logan, a Philadelphia Quaker, a doctor, and a Republican, decided to attempt on his own to settle the controversies. Bearing a private certificate of citizenship from his friend, Thomas Jefferson, who at the time was Vice President, Logan sailed for France on June 12, 1798. In France he was hailed by the newspapers as the envoy of peace and was received by Talleyrand. The French Directory, having concluded that it was politically wise to relax tensions with the United States, issued a decree raising the embargo on American merchant ships and freed American ships and seamen. Logan, however, received a less friendly response from the United States after he returned. Secretary of State Timothy Pickering told him that the French decree was illusory. General Washington expressed his disapproval of Logan's actions. President Adams recommended that Congress take action to stop the "temerity and impertinence of individuals affecting to interfere in public affairs between France and the United States." Representative Roger Griswold of Connecticut introduced a resolution in Congress to prevent actions similar to Logan's: Resolved , That a committee be appointed to inquire into the expediency of amending the act entitled "An act in addition to the act for the punishment of certain crimes against the United States," so far as to extend the penalties, if need be, to all persons, citizens of the United States, who shall usurp the Executive authority of this Government, by commencing or carrying on any correspondence with the Governments of any foreign prince or state, relating to controversies or disputes which do or shall exist between such prince or state, and the United States. The resolution was passed, and the committee was appointed. On January 7, 1799, Griswold introduced in the House a bill based on the resolution: Be it enacted, etc. , that if any person, being a citizen of the United States, or in any foreign country, shall, without the permission or authority of the Government of the United States, directly or indirectly, commence or carry on any verbal or written correspondence or intercourse with any foreign Government, or any officer or agent thereof, relating to any dispute or controversy between any foreign Government and the United States, with an intent to influence the measures or conduct of the Government having disputes or controversies with the United States, as aforesaid; or of any person, being a citizen of or resident within, the United States, and not duly authorized shall counsel, advise, aid or assist, in any such correspondence with intent as aforesaid, he or they shall be deemed guilty of a high misdemeanor; and, on conviction before any court of the United States having jurisdiction thereof, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding--thousand dollars, and by imprisonment during a term not less than--months, not exceeding--years. The bill was debated at length, and various amendments were proposed, some of which passed and some of which did not. The House of Representatives passed the bill on January 17, 1799, and the Senate passed it on January 25, 1799. It was signed and became a law on January 30, 1799. There appear to have been few indictments under the Logan Act. The one indictment found occurred in 1803 when a grand jury indicted Francis Flournoy, a Kentucky farmer, who wrote an article in the Frankfort Guardian of Freedom under the pen name of "A Western American." Flournoy advocated in the article a separate Western nation allied to France. The United States Attorney for Kentucky, an Adams appointee and brother-in-law of Chief Justice Marshall, went no further than procuring the indictment of Flournoy, and the purchase of the Louisiana Territory later that year appeared to cause the separatism issue to become obsolete. So far as can be determined, there have been no prosecutions under the Logan Act. However, there have been a number of judicial references to the act, among which are the following. Judge Sprague of the Circuit Court for the District of Massachusetts mentioned the Logan Act in two charges that he made to grand juries during the Civil War. On October 18, 1861, he said: There are other defenses to which our attention is called by the present condition of our country. A few months since a member of the British parliament declared, in the most public manner, that he had received many letters from the Northern states of America urging parliament to acknowledge the independence of the Southern confederacy. Such an announcement ought to arrest the attention of grand juries; for if any such communication has been made by a citizen of the United States, it is a high misdemeanor. St. 1799, c. 1. (1 Stat. 613) was especially designed to prevent such unwarrantable interference with the diplomacy and purposes of our government. In the second grand jury charge referring to the Logan Act, made in 1863, Judge Sprague stated: We have seen it stated in such form as to arrest attention, that unauthorized individuals have entered into communication with members of parliament and foreign ministers and officers in order to influence their conduct, in controversies with the United States, or to defeat the measures of our government. It ought to be known that such acts have been long prohibited by law. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co . referred to the Logan Act as follows: No doubt in regions subject to no sovereign, like the high seas, or to no law that civilized countries would recognize as adequate, such countries may treat some relations between their citizens as governed by their own law and keep to some extent the old notion of personal sovereignty alive [citations omitted]. They go further, at times, and declare that they will punish anyone, subject or not, who shall do certain things if they can catch him, as in the case of pirates on the high seas. In cases immediately affecting national interests they may go further still and may make, and, if they get the chance, execute similar threats as to acts done within another recognized jurisdiction. An illustration from our statutes is found with regard to criminal correspondence with foreign governments. Rev. Stat., SS 5335. Burke v. Monumental Division, No. 52 was a case charging a union member with betraying the interests of his union at the time of negotiation between the union and a railroad during a labor dispute. The court compared the union's reaction toward the act of its member with Congress's feelings at the time of enactment of the Logan Act. [T]he plaintiff's conduct is characterized as "traitorous," and it is said that he has committed "moral perjury." This is strong language; but there is no reason to question that it is really meant, and that those responsible for its use believe it to be fully justified. The truth doubtless is that to them the Brotherhood and the roads appear to be almost distinct sovereignties. At a time when it is at grip with the companies, for a member to let one of the latter sue in his name, for the purpose of preventing the use by it of one of its most efficient means of warfare, does to them seem treasonable. Within the limits of their power, they are determined to punish any such proceeding. They feel about it as did Congress when in 1799 it enacted the so-called Logan Act ... making it a crime for any citizen to have intercourse with a foreign government with intent to defeat the measures of his own. United States v. Bryan refers to 18 U.S.C. SS 5, which is the predecessor of 18 U.S.C. SS 953: That the subject of un-American and subversive activities is within the investigating power of the Congress is obvious. Conceivably, information in this field may aid the Congress in legislating concerning any one of many matters, such as correspondence with foreign governments.... United States v. Peace Information Center held that Congress had the power to enact the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938 under its inherent power to regulate external affairs as well as under its constitutional power to legislate concerning national defense and that the act is not subject to any constitutional infirmity. The court mentioned similarities between the Logan Act and the Foreign Agents Registration Act, and the language used appears to indicate that the court believed that the Logan Act, like the Foreign Agents Registration Act, is constitutional. Citizens of the United States are forbidden to carry on correspondence or intercourse with any foreign government with an intent to influence its measures or conduct in relation to any disputes or controversies with the United States. The Act under scrutiny in this case represents the converse of the last mentioned statute. The former deals with citizens of the United States who attempt to conduct correspondence with foreign governments. The latter affects agents of foreign principals who carry on certain specified activities in the United States. Both matters are equally within the field of external affairs of this country, and, therefore, within the inherent regulatory power of the Congress. In Martin v. Young , which concerned a petition for habeas corpus by a serviceman awaiting trial by a general court martial, the principal issue was whether the petitioner could be tried in a civil court for the offense charged against him by the Army. A part of the specification stated: [That petitioner while interned in a North Korean prisoner of war camp, did] without proper authority, wrongfully, unlawfully, and knowingly collaborate, communicate and hold intercourse, directly and indirectly, with the enemy by joining with, participating in, and leading discussion groups and classes conducted by the enemy reflecting views and opinions that the United Nations and the United States were illegal aggressors in the Korean conflict.... The court stated that the conduct described in the specification violated at least three criminal statutes under which the petitioner could be tried in a civil court, one of which was the Logan Act, and granted the petition. However, the Department of Justice did not prosecute Martin under the Logan Act. Pennsylvania v. Nelson held that the Smith Act, which prohibits the knowing advocacy of the overthrow of the United States Government by force and violence, supersedes the enforceability of the Pennsylvania Sedition Act, which proscribes the same conduct. The reason given for the pre-emption is that the federal statutes touch a field in which the federal interest is so dominant that the federal system must be assured to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject. The Court mentioned that "[s]tates are barred by the Constitution from entering into treaties and by 18 U.S.C. SS 953 from correspondence or intercourse with foreign governments with relation to their disputes or controversies with this Nation." Briehl v. Dulles upheld certain Department of State regulations which provided that no passport shall be issued to members of the Communist Party. The court referred to other valid federal statutes which restrict persons in the area of foreign relations: We have statutes dealing with persons who act as agents of a foreign government, or those who have "correspondence" with a foreign government with intent to influence its measures in relation to disputes or controversies with our Government or to defeat the measures of the United States. In Waldron v. British Petroleum Co . the plaintiff sued for triple damages under the Clayton Act for alleged conspiracy of the defendants to prevent the importation and sale by the plaintiff of Iranian oil. The defendants asserted that the plaintiff had obtained his contract through a series of violations of criminal statutes including the Logan Act. The court held that, in order to maintain this defense, the defendants would have to show that the plaintiff sought to thwart some clearly and unequivocally asserted policy measures of the United States instead of merely statements of opinion, attitude, and belief of government officials. The defendants were unable to show this. Further, the court noted that: Another infirmity in defendants' claim that plaintiff violated the Logan Act is the existence of a doubtful question with regard to the constitutionality of that statute [Logan Act] under the Sixth Amendment. That doubt is engendered by the statute's use of the vague and indefinite terms, "defeat" and "measures" [citation omitted]. Neither of these words is an abstraction of common certainty or possesses a definite statutory or judicial definition. Since, however, there are other grounds for disposing of this motion, it is not necessary to decide the constitutional question. Furthermore, any "ambiguity should be resolved in favor of lenity" [citation omitted]. The court also indicates that, although Congress should perhaps eliminate the vagueness of the Logan Act, the act remains valid despite the lack of prosecutions under it. The Court finds no merit in plaintiff's argument that the Logan Act has been abrogated by desuetude. From the absence of reported cases, one may deduce that the statute has not been called into play because no factual situation requiring its invocation has been presented to the courts. Cf. Shakespeare, Measure for Measure, Act II, Scene ii ("The law hath not been dead, though it hath slept.") It may, however, be appropriate for the Court (Canons of Judicial Ethics, Judicial Canon 23) to invite Congressional attention to the possible need for amendment of Title 18 U.S.C. SS 953 to eliminate this problem by using more precise words than "defeat" and "measures" and, at the same time, using language paralleling that now in SS 954. United States v. Elliot also refers to the Logan Act and reaffirms the statute as it is discussed in Waldron : Pertinent, too, is Waldron v. British Petroleum Co. , [citation omitted] wherein this court held vital a previously unenforced section of the Logan Act (18 U.S.C. SS 953) promulgated in 1799. In Agee v. Muskie suit was brought to revoke Agee's passport on the basis that his activities abroad were causing serious damage to the national security or foreign policy of the United States. In the Appendix to the case there are comments on various specific laws which Agee had allegedly violated. One of these was the Logan Act. Agee is quoted as stating that "in recent weeks" prior to December 23, 1979 he proposed to the "militants" in Iran (who obviously under 18 U.S.C. SS 11 are a "faction and body of insurgents" constituting a "foreign government") that they should compel the United States to "exchange ... the C.I.A.'s files on its operations in Iran since 1950 for the Captive Americans" [citation omitted]. Such conduct violates 18 U.S.C. SS 953 which prohibits any citizen of the United States from carrying on correspondence or intercourse with any foreign government (the Iranian terrorist faction) "with intent to influence [its] measures or conduct or [that] of any ... agent thereof [footnote omitted]. Agee's violation of this act with the Terrorists is self evident from his own uncontradicted statement. In ITT World Communications, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission the court found that the lower court had misread ITT's complaint concerning violation of the Logan Act. Under the Administrative Procedure Act, a party has standing to secure judicial review of any "agency action" that causes a "legal wrong" [footnote omitted]. The district court held that ITT has not suffered a legal wrong, reading its complaint solely to allege a violation of the Logan Act's prohibition of unauthorized negotiation with foreign governments [footnote omitted]. Because only the Department of State is aggrieved by violations of that criminal statute, the court reasoned, ITT's alleged injury is not legally cognizable. We respectfully conclude that the district court misread ITT's complaint. The gravamen of ITT's allegation is quite specific: "The activities of the FCC ... are unlawful and ultra vires , and in excess of the authority conferred on the Commission by the Communications Act " [footnote omitted]. Whether the complaint's two references to the Logan Act [footnote omitted] should be construed as an attempt to state a separate cause of action (as the Commission insists) or as mere illustrative matter not intended to assert a claim (as ITT argues), a cause of action under the Communications Act has clearly been alleged. In Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Arabian American Oil Co. , suit was brought to determine whether Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 applied extraterritorially to regulate employment practices of United States employers who employed United States citizens abroad. The Court, in its holding that there was not sufficient evidence to indicate that the act was intended to apply abroad, stated: Congress' awareness of the need to make a clear statement that a statute applies overseas is amply demonstrated by the numerous occasions on which it has expressly legislated the extraterritorial application of a statute. See, e.g. , ... the Logan Act, 18 U.S.C. SS 953 (applying Act to "any citizen ... wherever he may be ... "). United States v. DeLeon concerned whether 8 U.S.C. Section 1326, which makes it a crime for an alien who has been previously deported to enter, attempt to enter, or be found in the United States unless certain conditions are met, applies to conduct occurring outside the United States. In holding that the statute does apply to conduct occurring outside the United States, the court stated: More important, assuming that the Convention [Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone] also provides or ratifies a power to regulate certain conduct within the contiguous zone, that has a substantial adverse effect within the United States. That power was assumed to exist well before the Convention, e.g., Logan Act.... In a series of reviews of a general court-martial, styled United States v. Murphy, the appellant, who was charged with committing crimes abroad, urged the Logan Act as a basis for his being denied effective assistance of counsel. The appellant contends that he was denied effective assistance of counsel at a critical stage of the proceedings due to an erroneous interpretation of the Logan Act.... The Logan Act prohibits unauthorized negotiation with a foreign government.... In appellant's case, the Federal Republic of Germany declined to exercise criminal jurisdiction, in accordance with existing Status of Forces Agreements [footnote omitted]. The appellant's counsel decided, after personal research and consultation with other military lawyers, that he was prohibited from attempting to persuade the German authorities to exercise jurisdiction. The appellant now argues that his trial defense counsel's failure to negotiate with the Federal Republic of Germany, which does not allow capital punishment, denied him effective assistance of counsel. We disagree.... In a 2010 case, Strunk v. New York Province of the Society of Jesus , the plaintiff brought suit against New York City, New York State, and federal officials, asserting that government officials and agencies violated the Logan Act by acting as agents of a foreign government (presumably, the Vatican) in association with or under the direction of the Roman Catholic Church, the Society of Jesus, and the Sovereign Military Order of Malta. The plaintiff alleged that these circumstances caused him and the citizens of New York unspecified "collective spiritual and individual temporal injuries" and demanded a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief to enjoin the entities from conducting unspecified activities. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and plaintiff's lack of standing, stating: The Court concludes that plaintiff cannot establish an injury in fact, that he is without standing to bring his claims, and that this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear this matter. The court stated that only the U.S. Department of State is aggrieved by a violation of the Logan Act and that only the U.S. Attorney General has the constitutional authority to conduct criminal litigation on behalf of the federal government. A search of statements issued by the State Department concerning the Logan Act from 1975 onward has found at least two opinions. In these instances the department did not consider the activities in question to be inconsistent with the Logan Act. One opinion concerned the questioning of certain activities of Senators John Sparkman and George McGovern with respect to the government of Cuba. The department stated: The clear intent of this provision [Logan Act] is to prohibit unauthorized persons from intervening in disputes between the United States and foreign governments. Nothing in section 953, however, would appear to restrict members of the Congress from engaging in discussions with foreign officials in pursuance of their legislative duties under the Constitution. In the case of Senators McGovern and Sparkman the executive branch, although it did not in any way encourage the Senators to go to Cuba, was fully informed of the nature and purpose of their visit, and had validated their passports for travel to that country. Senator McGovern's report of his discussions with Cuban officials states: "I made it clear that I had no authority to negotiate on behalf of the United States--that I had come to listen and learn...." (Cuban Realities: May 1975, 94 th Cong., 1 st Sess., August 1975). Senator Sparkman's contacts with Cuban officials were conducted on a similar basis. The specific issues raised by the Senators (e.g., the Southern Airways case; Luis Tiant's desire to have his parents visit the United States) would, in any event, appear to fall within the second paragraph of Section 953. Accordingly, the Department does not consider the activities of Senators Sparkman and McGovern to be inconsistent with the stipulations of Section 953. A 1976 statement by the Department of State concerned a letter written by Ambassador Robert J. McCloskey, Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations, to Senator John V. Tunney in reply to a constituent's inquiry about a visit of former President Nixon to the People's Republic of China. The letter stated: Mr. Nixon's visit to the People's Republic of China was undertaken entirely in his capacity as a private United States citizen. In accordance with the expressed wishes of the Government of the People's Republic of China and as a normal matter of comity between governments, the U.S. Government permitted an aircraft from the People's Republic of China to land in California in connection with the visit. Aside from activities related to the Chinese special flights (including provision of an escort crew to insure safety of operations in U.S. airspace), the U.S. Government's role in the visit was limited to the provision by the Secret Service of personal protective services, as required by law, to the former President.... It is the responsibility of the Department of Justice to make determinations of whether criminal statutes of this sort have been transgressed and whether individuals should be prosecuted under them. However, the Department of State is unaware of any basis for believing that Mr. Nixon acted with the intent prohibited by the Logan Act. In this connection, it should be noted that no one has ever been prosecuted under the Logan Act.... In a number of instances, people have been alleged, often by political opponents, to have violated the Logan Act. For example, critics have suggested that Ross Perot's efforts to find missing American servicemen in Southeast Asia have violated the Logan Act. Critics alleged that former House Speaker Jim Wright violated the Logan Act in his relations with the Sandinista government. In 1984 while campaigning for the Democratic nomination for President, Reverend Jesse Jackson went to Syria to help in the release of a captured American military flyer and to Cuba and Nicaragua. The trips by Reverend Jackson occasioned comments from a number of people, most notably from President Reagan, that Reverend Jackson had violated the Logan Act. Other private citizens, such as Jane Fonda, have made trips which have been criticized as violative of the Logan Act. One of the most recent allegations involving a possible Logan Act violation focuses on a letter signed by 47 U.S. Senators to Iran suggesting that an agreement between the President and the Iranian leadership would be an executive agreement that another President or Congress would be able to abrogate. There have apparently been no official sanctions taken in any of these instances. Commenters have raised questions about various issues associated with a 2015 letter signed by 47 U.S. Senators to Iran suggesting that negotiations about a nuclear deal between the President and the Iranian leadership would be an executive agreement that another President or Congress could abrogate. Three of these issues involve the constitutionality of the act, its application in this situation to Members of Congress, and its current viability. With respect to the act's constitutionality, there is the above-discussed case, United States v. Peace Information Center , in which the court seemed to suggest that, because of similarities between the Logan Act and the Foreign Agents Registration Act, both acts are constitutional in that they "are equally within the field of external affairs of this country, and, therefore, within the inherent regulatory power of the Congress." Yet, there are commenters who continue to discuss whether the Logan Act is constitutional. For example, in a 1987 Emory Law Journal article, there is discussion about whether the act may infringe on rights involving freedom of speech and right to travel. The application of the act to Members of Congress is also a topic of discussion. In the above-discussed State Department statement concerning the questioning of Senators Sparkman and McGovern with respect to the government of Cuba, the department found that their activities did not violate the act and emphasized that nothing in the act "would appear to restrict members of the Congress in pursuance of their legislative duties under the Constitution." The State Department did not state that there is a general exemption from the act for Members of Congress; rather, it focused on the particular activities of these two Senators. Some commenters appear to believe that the 47 Senators signing the letter to Iran were acting outside permissible "pursuance of their legislative duties." Others, however, believe that: [I]t could be argued that the letter's signatories do wield official U.S. authority and are federal officers in their capacity as U.S. senators. But even if they don't...a Logan Act prosecution would fall apart because of subsequent federal free speech cases that have taken a dim view of attempts to criminalize speech. The discussion of whether the act is currently viable may hinge on the fact that, despite its having been law for more than 200 years, no one has been prosecuted for violating it. Its viability may also involve constitutional issues, such as freedom of speech and right to travel, mentioned above, since these constitutional issues appear not to have been litigated with respect to the Logan Act. However, the act still remains law, and its viability should likely not be summarily dismissed. Although it appears that there has never been a prosecution under the Logan Act, there have been several judicial references to it, indicating that the act has not been forgotten and that it is at least a potential point of challenge that has been used against anyone who without authority allegedly interferes in the foreign relations of the United States. There have been efforts to repeal the act, one of the most significant occurring in the late 1970s. For example, Senator Edward Kennedy proposed in the 95 th Congress to delete the Logan Act from the bill to amend the United States criminal code. Senator James Allen insisted on reenacting the act in exchange for promising not to prolong debate over the bill, and Senator Kennedy agreed to this. However, since the House was unable to consider the criminal reform bill in the 95 th Congress, the possibility of deleting the act in a conference committee was eliminated. In early 2015, renewed interest in the act resulted from a letter sent to Iran by 47 U.S. Senators. It is possible that this interest will result in congressional consideration of whether the act should be repealed or retained.

The Logan Act, codified at 18 U.S.C. SS 953, states: Any citizen of the United States, wherever he may be, who, without authority of the United States, directly or indirectly commences or carries on any correspondence or intercourse with any foreign government or any officer or agent thereof, in relation to any disputes or controversies with the United States, or to defeat the measures of the United States, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than three years, or both. This section shall not abridge the right of a citizen to apply, himself or his agent, to any foreign government or the agents thereof for redress of any injury which he may have sustained from such government or any of its agents or subjects. The Logan Act was intended to prohibit United States citizens without authority from interfering in relations between the United States and foreign governments. There appear to have been no prosecutions under the act in its more than 200-year history. However, there have been a number of judicial references to the act, and it is not uncommon for it to be used as a point of challenge concerning dealings with foreign officials There has been renewed interest in the Logan Act in 2015 as the result of a letter signed by 47 U.S. Senators to Iran suggesting that negotiations about a nuclear deal between the President and the Iranian leadership would be an executive agreement that another President or Congress would be able to abrogate. Some have raised questions about the constitutionality of the act, whether it applies to Members of Congress, and its current viability. Commenters have provided arguments that both support and oppose the legality of the Senators' letter. Although attempts have been made to repeal the act, it remains law and at least a potential sanction which could be used against anyone who without authority interferes in the foreign relations of the United States.

Multilateral development banks (MDBs) are international institutions that provide financial assistance, typically in the form of loans and grants, to developing countries in order to promote economic and social development. The United States is a member and significant donor to five major MDBs. These include the World Bank and four smaller regional development banks: the African Development Bank (AfDB); the Asian Development Bank (AsDB); the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD); and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). Congress plays a critical role in shaping U.S. policy at the MDBs through funding and oversight of U.S. participation in the institutions. This report provides an overview of the MDBs and highlights major issues for Congress. The first section discusses how the MDBs operate, including the history of the MDBs, their operations and organizational structure, and the effectiveness of MDB financial assistance. The second section discusses the role of Congress in the MDBs, including congressional legislation authorizing and appropriating U.S. contributions to the MDBs and congressional oversight of U.S. participation in the MDBs. The third section discusses broad policy debates about the MDBs, including their effectiveness, the trade-offs between providing aid on a multilateral or bilateral basis, the changing landscape of multilateral aid, and U.S. commercial interests in the MDBs. MDBs provide financial assistance to developing countries, typically in the form of loans and grants, for investment projects and policy-based loans. Project loans include large infrastructure projects, such as highways, power plants, port facilities, and dams, as well as social projects, including health and education initiatives. Policy-based loans provide governments with financing in exchange for agreement by the borrower country government that it will undertake particular policy reforms, such as the privatization of state-owned industries or reform in agriculture or electricity sector policies. Policy-based loans can also provide budgetary support to developing country governments. In order for the disbursement of a policy-based loan to continue, the borrower must implement the specified economic or financial policies. Some have expressed concern over the increasing budgetary support provided to developing countries by the MDBs. Traditionally, this type of support has been provided by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Most of the MDBs have two major funds, often called lending windows or lending facilities. One type of lending window is primarily used to provide financial assistance on market-based terms, typically in the form of loans, but also through equity investments and loan guarantees. Non-concessional assistance is, depending on the MDB, extended to middle-income governments, some creditworthy low-income governments, and private-sector firms in developing countries. The other type of lending window is used to provide financial assistance at below market-based terms (concessional assistance), typically in the form of loans at below-market interest rates and grants, to governments of low-income countries. In recent years, two MDBs (the AsDB and the IDB) have transferred concessional lending to their main, non-concessional lending facilities to increase their lending capacities. The World Bank is the oldest and largest of the MDBs. The World Bank Group comprises three subinstitutions that make loans and grants to developing countries: the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the International Development Association (IDA), and the International Finance Corporation (IFC). The 1944 Bretton Woods Conference led to the establishment of the World Bank, the IMF, and the institution that would eventually become the World Trade Organization (WTO). The IBRD was the first World Bank affiliate created, when its Articles of Agreement became effective in 1945 with the signatures of 28 member governments. Today, the IBRD has near universal membership with 189 member nations. Only Cuba and North Korea, and a few microstates such as the Vatican, Monaco, and Andorra, are nonmembers. The IBRD lends mainly to the governments of middle-income countries at market-based interest rates. In 1960, at the suggestion of the United States, IDA was created to make concessional loans (with low interest rates and long repayment periods) to the poorest countries. IDA also now provides grants to these countries. The IFC was created in 1955 to extend loans and equity investments to private firms in developing countries. The World Bank initially focused on providing financing for large infrastructure projects. Over time, this has broadened to also include social projects and policy-based loans. The IDB was created in 1959 in response to a strong desire by Latin American countries for a bank that would be attentive to their needs, as well as U.S. concerns about the spread of communism in Latin America. Consequently, the IDB has tended to focus more on social projects than large infrastructure projects, although the IDB began lending for infrastructure projects as well in the 1970s. From its founding, the IDB has had both non-concessional and concessional lending windows. The IDB's concessional lending window was called the Fund for Special Operations (FSO), whose assets were largely transferred to the IDB in 2016. The IDB Group also includes the Inter-American Investment Corporation (IIC) and the Multilateral Investment Fund (MIF), which extend loans to private-sector firms in developing countries, much like the World Bank's IFC. The AfDB was created in 1964 and was for nearly two decades an African-only institution, reflecting the desire of African governments to promote stronger unity and cooperation among the countries of their region. In 1973, the AfDB created a concessional lending window, the African Development Fund (AfDF), to which non-regional countries could become members and contribute. The United States joined the AfDF in 1976. In 1982, membership in the AfDB non-concessional lending window was officially opened to non-regional members. The AfDB makes loans to private-sector firms through its non-concessional window and does not have a separate fund specifically for financing private-sector projects with a development focus in the region. The AsDB was created in 1966 to promote regional cooperation. Similar to the World Bank, and unlike the IDB, the AsDB's original mandate focused on large infrastructure projects, rather than social projects or direct poverty alleviation. The AsDB's concessional lending facility, the Asian Development Fund (AsDF), was created in 1973. In 2017, concessional lending was transferred from the AsDF to the AsDB, although the AsDF still provides grants to low-income countries. Like the AfDF, the AsDB does not have a separate fund specifically for financing private-sector projects, and makes loans to private-sector firms in the region through its non-concessional window. The EBRD is the youngest MDB, founded in 1991. The motivation for creating the EBRD was to ease the transition of the former communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and the former Soviet Union from planned economies to free-market economies. The EBRD differs from the other regional banks in two fundamental ways. First, the EBRD has an explicitly political mandate: to support democracy-building activities. Second, the EBRD does not have a concessional loan window. The EBRD's financial assistance is heavily targeted on the private sector, although the EBRD does also extend some loans to governments in CEE and the former Soviet Union. Table 1 summarizes the different lending windows for the MDBs, noting what types of financial assistance they provide, who they lend to, when they were founded, and how much financial assistance they committed to developing countries in 2017. The World Bank Group accounted for half of total MDB financial assistance commitments to developing countries in 2017. Also, about three-quarters of the financial assistance provided by the MDBs to developing countries was on non-concessional terms. Figure 1 shows MDB financial commitments to developing countries since 2000 financed from their ordinary capital resources (OCR), the lending facility traditionally focused on non-concessional financial assistance. As a whole, financial assistance funded out of OCR resources was relatively stable in nominal terms until the global financial crisis prompted major member countries to press for increased financial assistance. In response to the financial crisis and at the urging of its major member countries, the IBRD dramatically increased lending between FY2008 and FY2009. Regional development banks also had upticks in lending between 2008 and 2009. MDB non-concessional assistance, particularly by the IBRD, fell to pre-crisis levels as the financial crisis stabilized, but has been rising again in the past few years. Figure 2 shows concessional financial assistance provided by the MDBs to developing countries since 2000. The World Bank's concessional lending arm, IDA, has grown steadily over the decade in nominal terms, although it has decreased over the past two years, while the regional development bank concessional lending facilities, by contrast, have remained relatively stable in nominal terms. Figure 3 lists the top recipients of MDB financial assistance in 2017. It shows that several large, emerging economies, such as Brazil, India, China, and Turkey, receive a steady flow of financial assistance from the MDBs. Figure 3 also shows the top recipients of concessional financial assistance. In 2017, Nigeria and Vietnam were top recipients of financial assistance from IDA, and Nepal and Afghanistan were top recipients of financial assistance from the AsDF. MDBs are able to extend financial assistance to developing countries due to the financial commitments of their more prosperous member countries. This support takes several forms, depending on the type of assistance provided. The MDBs use money contributed or "subscribed" by their member countries to support their assistance programs. They fund their operating costs from money earned on non-concessional loans to borrower countries. Some of the MDBs transfer a portion of their surplus net income annually to help fund their concessional aid programs. To offer non-concessional loans, the MDBs borrow money from international capital markets and then relend the money to developing countries. MDBs are able to borrow from international capital markets because they are backed by the guarantees of their member governments. This backing is provided through the ownership shares that countries subscribe as a consequence of their membership in each bank. Only a small portion (typically less than 5%-10%) of the value of these capital shares is actually paid to the MDB ("paid-in capital"). The bulk of these shares are a guarantee that the donor stands ready to provide to the bank if needed. This is called "callable capital," because the money is not actually transferred from the donor to the MDB unless the bank needs to call on its members' callable subscriptions. Banks may call upon their members' callable subscriptions only if their resources are exhausted and they still need funds to repay bondholders. To date, no MDB has ever had to draw on its callable capital. In recent decades, the MDBs have not used their paid-in capital to fund loans. Rather it has been put in financial reserves to strengthen the institutions' financial base. Due to the financial backing of their member country governments, the MDBs are able to borrow money in world capital markets at the lowest available market rates, generally the same rates at which developed country governments borrow funds inside their own borders. The banks are able to relend this money to their borrowers at much lower interest rates than the borrowers would generally have to pay for commercial loans, if, indeed, such loans were available to them. As such, the MDBs' non-concessional lending windows are self-financing and even generate net income. Periodically, when donors agree that future demand for loans from an MDB is likely to expand, they increase their capital subscriptions to an MDB's non-concessional lending window in order to allow the MDB to increase its level of lending. This usually occurs because the economy of the world or the region has grown in size and the needs of their borrowing countries have grown accordingly, or in response to a financial crisis. An across-the-board increase in all members' shares is called a "general capital increase" (GCI). This is in contrast to a "selective capital increase" (SCI), which is typically small and used to alter the voting shares of member countries. The voting power of member countries in the MDB is determined largely by the amount of capital contributed and through selective capital increases; some countries subscribe a larger share of the new capital stock than others to increase their voting power in the institutions. GCIs happen infrequently. Quite unusually, all the MDBs had GCIs following the global financial crisis of 2008-2009; simultaneous capital increases for all the MDBs had not occurred since the mid-1970s. Figure 4 summarizes current U.S. capital subscriptions to the MDB non-concessional lending windows. Currently, the largest U.S. share of subscribed MDB capital is with the IDB at 30%, while its smallest share among the MDBs is with the AfDB at 6.6%. Figure 5 lists the top donors to the MDBs's non-concessional facilities. The United States is the largest donor to the non-concessional lending windows to the IBRD, the IFC, the EBRD, and the IDB. The United States is tied with Japan for the largest financial commitment to the AsDB and is the second-largest donor to the AfDB. Other top donor states include Western European countries, Japan, and Canada. Additionally, several regional members have large financial stakes in the regional banks. For example, among the regional members, China and India are large contributors to the AsDB; Nigeria, Egypt, South Africa, and Algeria are major contributors to the AfDB; Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela are large contributors to the IDB; and Russia is a large contributor to the EBRD. Concessional lending windows do not issue bonds; their funds are contributed directly from the financial contributions of their member countries. Most of the money comes from the more prosperous countries, while the contributions from borrowing countries are generally more symbolic than substantive. The MDBs have also transferred some of the net income from their non-concessional windows to their concessional lending windows in order to help fund concessional loans and grants. As the MDB extends concessional loans and grants to low-income countries, the window's resources become depleted. The donor countries meet together periodically to replenish those resources. Thus, these increases in resources are called replenishments, and most occur on a planned schedule ranging from three to five years. If these facilities are not replenished on time, they will run out of lendable resources and have to reduce their levels of aid to poor countries. Figure 6 summarizes cumulative U.S. contributions to the MDB concessional lending windows. The United States has made the largest financial commitment to IDA over time, relative to the other concessional lending facilities. Figure 7 shows the top donor countries to the MDB concessional facilities. The United States is been the largest donor to IDA and is a major donor to the AsDF and the AsDB. Other top donor states include the more prosperous member countries, including Japan, Canada, and those in Western Europe. The World Bank is a specialized agency of the United Nations. However, it is autonomous in its decisionmaking procedures and its sources of funds. It also has autonomous control over its administration and budget. The regional development banks are independent international agencies and are not affiliated with the United Nations system. All the MDBs must comply with directives (for example, economic sanctions) agreed to (by vote) by the U.N. Security Council. However, they are not subject to decisions by the U.N. General Assembly or other U.N. agencies. The MDBs have similar internal organizational structures. Run by their own management and staffed by international civil servants, each MDB is supervised by a Board of Governors and a Board of Executive Directors. The Board of Governors is the highest decisionmaking authority, and each member country has its own governor. Countries are usually represented by their Secretary of the Treasury, Minister of Finance, or Central Bank Governor. The United States is represented by the Treasury Secretary. The Board of Governors meets annually, though it may act more frequently through mail-in votes on key decisions. While the Boards of Governors in each of the banks retain power over major policy decisions, such as amending the founding documents of the organization, they have delegated day-to-day authority over operational policy, lending, and other matters to their institutions' Board of Executive Directors. The Board of Executive Directors in each institution is smaller than the Board of Governors. There are 24 members on the World Bank's Board of Executive Directors, and fewer for some of the regional development banks. Some major donors, including the United States, are represented by their own Executive Director. Other Executive Directors represent groups of member countries. Each MDB Executive Board has its own schedule, but they generally meet at least weekly to consider MDB loan and policy proposals and oversee bank activities. Decisions are reached in the MDBs through voting. Each member country's voting share is weighted on the basis of its cumulative financial contributions and commitments to the organization. Figure 8 shows the current U.S. voting power in each institution. The voting power of the United States is large enough to veto major policy decisions at the World Bank and the IDB. However, the United States cannot unilaterally veto more day-to-day decisions, such as individual loans. Congress plays an important role in authorizing and appropriating U.S. contributions to the MDBs and exercising oversight of U.S. participation in these institutions. For more details on U.S. policymaking at the MDBs, see CRS Report R41537, Multilateral Development Banks: How the United States Makes and Implements Policy , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. Authorizing and appropriations legislation is required for U.S. contributions to the MDBs. The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the House Committee on Financial Services are responsible for managing MDB authorization legislation. During the past several decades, authorization legislation for the MDBs has not passed as freestanding legislation. Instead, it has been included through other legislative vehicles, such as the annual foreign operations appropriations act, a larger omnibus appropriations act, or a budget reconciliation bill. The Foreign Operations Subcommittees of the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations manage the relevant appropriations legislation. MDB appropriations are included in the annual foreign operations appropriations act or a larger omnibus appropriations act. In recent years, the Administration's budget request for the MDBs has included three major components: funds to replenish the concessional lending windows, funds to increase the size of the non-concessional lending windows (the "general capital increases"), and funds for more targeted funds administered by the MDBs, particularly those focused on climate change and food security. Replenishments of the MDB concessional windows happen regularly, while capital increases for the MDB non-concessional windows occur much more infrequently. Quite unusually, all the MDBs increased their non-concessional windows in response to the global financial crisis of 2008-2009 and the resulting increased demand for financing. As international organizations, the MDBs are generally exempt from U.S. law. The President has delegated the authority to manage and instruct U.S. participation in the MDBs to the Secretary of the Treasury. Within the Treasury Department, the Office of International Affairs has the lead role in managing day-to-day U.S. participation in the MDBs. The President appoints the U.S. Governors and Executive Directors, and their alternates, with the advice and consent of the Senate. Thus, the Senate can exercise oversight through the confirmation process. Over the years, Congress has played a major role in U.S. policy toward the MDBs. In addition to congressional hearings on the MDBs, Congress has enacted a substantial number of legislative mandates that oversee and regulate U.S. participation in the MDBs. These mandates generally fall into one of four major types. More than one type of mandate may be used on a given issue area. First, some legislative mandates direct how the U.S. representatives at the MDBs can vote on various policies. Examples include mandates that require the U.S. Executive Directors to oppose (a) financial assistance to specific countries, such as Burma, until sufficient progress is made on human rights and implementing a democratic government; (b) financial assistance to broad categories of countries, such as major producers of illicit drugs; and (c) financial assistance for specific projects, such as the production of palm oil, sugar, or citrus crops for export if the financial assistance would cause injury to United States producers. Some legislative mandates require the U.S. Executive Directors to support, rather than oppose, financial assistance. For example, a current mandate allows the Treasury Secretary to instruct the U.S. Executive Directors to vote in favor of financial assistance to countries that have contributed to U.S. efforts to deter and prevent international terrorism. Second, legislative mandates direct the U.S. representatives at the MDBs to advocate for policies within the MDBs. One example is a mandate that instructs the U.S. Executive Director to urge the IBRD to support an increase in loans that support population, health, and nutrition programs. Another example is a mandate that requires the U.S. Executive Directors to take all possible steps to communicate potential procurement opportunities for U.S. firms to the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Commerce, and the business community. Mandates that call for the U.S. Executive Director to both vote and advocate for a particular policy are often called "voice and vote" mandates. Third, Congress has also passed legislation requiring the Treasury Secretary to submit reports on various MDB issues (reporting requirements). Some legislative mandates call for one-off reports; other mandates call for reports on a regular basis, typically annually. For example, current legislation requires the Treasury Secretary to submit an annual report to the appropriate congressional committees on the actions taken by countries that have borrowed from the MDBs to strengthen governance and reduce the opportunity for bribery and corruption. Fourth, Congress has also attempted to influence policies at the MDBs through "power of the purse," that is, withholding funding from the MDBs or attaching stipulations on the MDBs' use of funds. For example, the FY2010 Consolidated Appropriations Act stipulates that 10% of the funds appropriated to the AsDF will be withheld until the Treasury Secretary can verify that the AsDB has taken steps to implement specific reforms aimed at combating corruption. The United States has historically played a strong leadership role at the MDBs, including key roles in creating the institutions and shaping their policies and lending to developing countries. Under a number of Administrations, the MDBs have been viewed as critical to promoting U.S. foreign policy , economic interests, and national security interests abroad, although various Administrations have had different views on the appropriate level of U.S. funding for the MDBs and policy reforms to improve the effectiveness of the MDBs. There are a number of MDB policy issues that Congress may consider during the 115 th Congress, particularly as it considers U.S. funding levels for the MDBs and confirmations for U.S. Governors and Executive Directors at the MDBs. Some of these issues are discussed below. U.S. funding for the MDBs may shift under President Trump, who campaigned on an "America First" platform and has signaled a reorientation of U.S. foreign policy. In March 2017, the Trump Administration proposed cutting $650 million over three years compared to the commitments made under the Obama Administration. In the FY2019 budget request, the Trump Administration requested a 20% cut ($354 million) from Treasury's international programs, which includes the multilateral development banks, compared to the amount enacted in FY2017. The bulk of the Treasury international programs request (over 90%) would fund U.S. commitments to concessional lending facilities at the MDBs. The request would provide $1.1 billion to IDA, compared to $1.2 billion in FY2017. It would also provide funding $47 million to the AsDF and $171 million to the AfDF, among other funding initiatives. In April 2018, the World Bank members, including the United States, endorsed a capital increase for the IBRD, which would require congressional legislation and appropriations to implement. This commitment is not reflected in the FY2019 budget request, but would require appropriations and authorization to implement. Congress sets U.S. fundi ng for the MDBs as part of the State and Foreign O perations authorization and appropriations process. There is a broad debate about the effectiveness of foreign aid, including the aid provided by the MDBs. Many studies of foreign aid effectiveness examine the effects of total foreign aid provided to developing countries, including both aid given directly by governments to developing countries (bilateral aid) and aid pooled by a multilateral institution from multiple donor countries and provided to developing countries (multilateral aid). The results of these studies are mixed, with conclusions ranging from (a) aid is ineffective at promoting economic growth; (b) aid is effective at promoting economic growth; and (c) aid is effective at promoting growth in some countries under specific circumstances (such as when developing-country policies are strong). The divergent results of these academic studies make it difficult to reach firm conclusions about the overall effectiveness of aid. Critics of the MDBs argue that they are international bureaucracies focused on getting money "out the door" to developing countries, rather than on delivering results in developing countries; that the MDBs emphasize short-term outputs like reports and frameworks but do not engage in long-term activities like the evaluation of projects after they are completed; and that they put enormous administrative demands on developing-country governments. Many of the MDBs were also created when developing countries had little access to private capital markets. With the globalization and the integration of capital markets across countries, some analysts have expressed concerns that MDB financing might "crowd out" private-sector financing, which developing countries now generally have readily accessible. Some analysts have also raised questions about whether there is a clear division of labor among the MDBs. Proponents of the MDBs argue that, despite some flaws, such aid at its core serves vital economic and political functions. With about 767 million people living on less than $1.90 a day in 2013 (most recent estimate available), they argue that not providing assistance is simply not an option; they argue it is the "right" thing to do and part of "the world's shared commitments to human dignity and survival." These proponents typically point to the use of foreign aid to provide basic necessities, such as food supplements, vaccines, nurses, and access to education, to the world's poorest countries, which may not otherwise be financed by private investors. Additionally, proponents of foreign aid argue that, even if foreign aid has not been effective at raising overall levels of economic growth, foreign aid has been successful in dramatically improving health and education in developing countries over the past four decades. Some analysts have also highlighted a number of reforms that they believe could increase the effectiveness of the MDBs. For example, it has been proposed that the MDBs adopt more flexible financing arrangements, for example to allow crisis lending or lending at the subnational level, and more flexibility in providing concessional assistance to address poverty in middle-income countries. There are also arguments that, as countries continue to develop, there need to be clearer guidelines on when countries should "graduate" from receiving concessional and/or non-concessional financial assistance from the MDBs. There has been debate about whether U.S. policymakers should prioritize bilateral or multilateral aid. Bilateral aid gives donors more control over where the money goes and how the money is spent. For example, donor countries may have more flexibility to allocate funds to countries that are of geopolitical strategic importance, but not facing the greatest development needs, than might be possible by providing aid through a multilateral organization. By building a clear link between the donor country and the recipient country, bilateral aid may also garner more goodwill from the recipient country toward the donor than if the funds had been provided through a multilateral organization. Providing aid through multilateral organizations offers different benefits for donor countries. By pooling the resources of several donors, multilateral organizations allow donors to share the cost of development projects (often called burden-sharing). Additionally, donor countries may find it politically sensitive to attach policy reforms to loans or to enforce these policy reforms. Multilateral organizations can usefully serve as a scapegoat for imposing and enforcing conditionality that may be politically sensitive to attach to bilateral loans. Additionally, because MDBs can provide aid on a larger scale than many bilateral agencies, they can generate economies of scale in knowledge and lending. Data from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) show that in 2017, 14% of U.S. foreign aid disbursed to developing countries with the purpose of promoting economic and social development was provided through multilateral institutions, while 86% was provided bilaterally. In recent years, several countries have taken steps to launch two new multilateral development banks. First, Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (the BRICS countries) signed an agreement in July 2014 to establish the New Development Bank (NDB), often referred to as the "BRICS Bank." The agreement outlines the bylaws of the bank and a commitment to a capital base of $100 billion. Headquartered in Shanghai, the NDB was formally launched in July 2015. The BRICS leaders have emphasized that the bank's mission is to mobilize resources for infrastructure and sustainable development projects in BRICS and other emerging and developing economies. Second, China has led the creation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). Launched in October 2014, the AIIB focuses on the development of infrastructure and other sectors in Asia, including energy and power, transportation and telecommunications, rural infrastructure and agriculture development, water supply and sanitation, environmental protection, urban development, and logistics. The AIIB currently has 66 members, and 21 prospective members. Members include several advanced European and Asian economies, such as France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, and South Korea. The United States and Japan are not members. The AIIB's initial total capital is expected to be $100 billion. These two institutions are the first major MDBs to be created in decades, and there is debate about how they will fit in with existing international financial institutions. Proponents of the new MDBs argue that the infrastructure and financing needs of developing countries are beyond what can be met by existing MDBs and private capital markets, and that new institutions to meet the financing needs of developing institutions should be welcomed. Proponents also argue that the new MDBs address the long-held frustrations of many emerging markets and developing countries that the governance of existing institutions, including the World Bank and the IMF, has not been reformed to reflect their growing importance in the global economy. For example, the NDB has stressed that, unlike the World Bank and the IMF, each participant country will have equivalent voting rates and none of the countries will have veto power. Other analysts and policymakers have been more concerned about what the new MDBs could mean for the existing institutions and whether they will diminish the influence of existing institutions, where the United States for decades has held a powerful leadership. They point to an already crowded landscape of MDBs, and express concerns that new MDBs could exacerbate existing concerns about mission creep and lack of clear division of labor among the MDBs. Some analysts have also raised questions about whether the new institutions will adopt the best practices on transparency, procurement, and environmental and social safeguards of the existing MDBs that have been developed over the past several decades. Some analysts have also raised questions about why many emerging markets are top recipients of non-concessional financial assistance from the World Bank and regional development banks, if they have the resources to capitalize new MDBs. The Obama Administration initially lobbied several key allies to refrain from joining the AIIB. Ultimately, these lobbying efforts were largely unsuccessful, as several key allies in Europe and Asia, including the United Kingdom and South Korea, joined. The tone of the Obama Administration shifted, most notably during Chinese President Xi's visit to Washington in September 2015 when the White House emphasized that "the United States welcomes China's growing contributions to financing development and infrastructure in Asia and beyond." During the visit, Xi also reportedly committed that the AIIB would abide by the highest international environmental and governance standards. Xi also pledged to increase China's financial contributions to the World Bank and regional development banks, signaling its continuing commitment to existing institutions. Congress may want to exercise oversight of the Trump Administration's policy on and engagement with these new MDBs. Billions of dollars of contracts are awarded to private firms each year in order to acquire the goods and services necessary to implement projects financed by the MDBs. MDB contracts are awarded through international competitive bidding processes, although most MDBs allow the borrowing country to give some preference to domestic firms in awarding contracts for MDB-financed projects in order to help spur development. U.S. commercial interest in the MDBs has been and may continue to be a subject of congressional attention, particularly if the banks expand their lending capacity for infrastructure projects through the GCIs. One area of focus may be the Foreign Commercial Service (FCS) representatives to the MDBs, who are responsible for protecting and promoting American commercial interests at the MDBs. Some in the business community are concerned about the impacts of possible budget cuts to the U.S. FCS, particularly if other countries are taking a stronger role in helping their businesses bid on projects financed by the MDBs.

Multilateral development banks (MDBs) provide financial assistance to developing countries in order to promote economic and social development. The United States is a member, and donor, to five major MDBs: the World Bank and four regional development banks, including the African Development Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the Inter-American Development Bank. The MDBs primarily fund large infrastructure and other development projects and provide loans tied to policy reforms by the government. The MDBs provide non-concessional financial assistance to middle-income countries and some creditworthy low-income countries on market-based terms. They also provide concessional assistance, including grants and loans at below-market rate interest rates, to low-income countries. The Role of Congress in U.S. Policy at the MDBs Congress plays a critical role in U.S. participation in the MDBs through funding and oversight. Congressional legislation is required for the United States to make financial contributions to the banks. Appropriations for the concessional windows occur regularly, while appropriations for the non-concessional windows are less frequent. Congress exercises oversight over U.S. participation in the MDBs, managed by the Treasury Department, through confirmations of U.S. representatives at the MDBs, hearings, and legislative mandates. For example, legislative mandates direct the U.S. Executive Directors to the MDBs to advocate certain policies and how to vote on various issues at the MDBs. Congress also has issued reporting requirements for the Treasury Department on issues related to MDB activities, and tied MDB funding to specific institutional reforms. Selected Issues for Congress U.S. Funding for the MDBs. U.S. funding for the MDBs may shift under President Trump. In March 2017, the Trump Administration proposed cutting $650 million over three years compared to the commitments made under the Obama Administration. However, in the spring of 2018, the Trump Administration pledged to support an expansion of the World Bank's non-concessional lending facility, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD). Congress sets U.S. funding for the MDBs as part of the annual state and foreign operations authorization and appropriations process. Effectiveness of MDBs. Critics argue that the MDBs focus more on "getting money out the door" than delivering results, are not transparent, and lack a clear division of labor. They also argue that providing aid multilaterally relinquishes U.S. control over where and how the money is spent. Proponents argue that providing assistance to developing countries is the "right" thing to do and has been successful in helping developing countries make strides in health and education over the past four decades. They also argue that the MDBs leverage funds from other donors, promote policy reforms in developing countries, and enhance U.S. leadership. Changing Landscape of the MDBs. Emerging markets have launched two new multilateral development banks: the Chinese-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the New Development Bank. The first major MDBs created in decades, questions have been raised how they will fit in with existing MDBs.

Environmental issues have received growing attention in trade liberalization debates as trade agreements have broadened in scope, from primarily involving negotiations to reduce tariffs, to including negotiations on nontariff trade barriers. Congressional interest in addressing environmental concerns in trade agreements has extended to the debate over renewing the President's trade promotion authority (TPA). Trade promotion authority, also referred to as "fast-track" negotiating authority, provides that Congress will consider trade agreements within mandatory deadlines, with limited debate, and without amendment. To maintain its influence on the content of agreements negotiated by the President under TPA, Congress generally includes objectives in such legislation to establish priorities for negotiators and places congressional consultation requirements on the Executive Branch. Congress last provided TPA under the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 (OTCA, P.L. 100-418 ). In OTCA, environmental concerns were addressed only in negotiating objectives regarding trade in services and foreign direct investment. These provisions directed U.S. negotiators, in pursuing stated objectives, to take into account legitimate United States domestic objectives including, but not limited to, the protection of legitimate health or safety, essential security, environmental, consumer or employment opportunity interests and the law and regulations related thereto (19 U.S.C. SSSS 2901(b)(9), (11)). Agreements entered into under this authority are the NAFTA and the 1994 Uruguay Round Agreements which included the establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Although OTCA lacked specific environmental objectives, some environmental concerns were addressed in the NAFTA, its environmental side agreement, and certain Uruguay Round Agreements and Ministerial Decisions. This authority expired in 1994. Congressional consideration of the relationship between trade and environment has continued to grow. Efforts to renew TPA in the 104 th , 105 th and 106 th Congresses failed in large part because of disagreement over the inclusion of environmental and labor issues. The 107 th Congress gave unprecedented consideration to these issues, as the successful passage of TPA legislation became dependent in part on the treatment of environmental and labor issues. (For more information, see CRS Issue Brief 10084, Trade Promotion Authority (Fast-track Authority for Trade Agreements): Background and Developments in the 107 th Congress. ) The Trade Act of 2002 ( P.L. 107-210 , Title XXI) renews the President's Trade Promotion Authority. The Act covers trade agreements reached by June 1, 2005, with a two-year extension possible. The law lists overall and principal objectives in trade negotiations and priorities the President must promote to maintain U.S. competitiveness. Under provisions of the Act, agreements would have to make progress in meeting the negotiating objectives, and the President would have to satisfy the consultation and assessment requirements. The Trade Act also establishes a new congressional advisory body on trade negotiations called the Congressional Oversight Group. The 2002 Trade Act contains several environmental objectives and related provisions, and, overall, gives substantially greater consideration to environmental matters than did the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, under which fast-track procedures were last approved. The environment-related negotiating objectives and priorities included in the new law are discussed below. The law includes two overall negotiating objectives on environment. The first objective is "to ensure that trade and environmental policies are mutually supportive and to seek to protect and preserve the environment and enhance the international means of doing so, while optimizing the use of the world's resources." The second overall negotiating objective is to seek provisions in agreements under which parties "strive to ensure that they do not weaken or reduce the protections afforded in domestic environmental and labor laws as an encouragement for trade"(Sections 2102(a)(5) and (7)). This objective parallels language in the U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement (FTA) and NAFTA (Chapter 11, Investment). Both of these trade agreements assert that it is inappropriate to encourage trade by relaxing domestic environmental laws and generally state that a party should not waive or otherwise derogate from such measures to attract investment. NAFTA, Article 1114, further provides that a party may request consultations if it considers that another party has done so. Environmental advocates had argued for such a trade negotiating objective to deter countries from weakening their environmental standards to promote a trade advantage. They further called for making such actions subject to dispute settlement procedures. Those who opposed this proposal expressed concern that, if this approach were taken, legitimate changes in domestic environmental measures could be subject to challenge by U.S. trading partners. Under the Trade Act, the overall negotiating objectives are not subject to dispute settlement procedures. The 2002 Trade Act also includes several principal negotiating objectives on environment (Section 2102(b)(11)). In contrast to the overall negotiating objectives, the principal negotiating objectives are subject to dispute settlement procedures. Perhaps most notably, the new law states that it is a principal negotiating objective "to ensure that a party to a trade agreement with the United States does not fail to effectively enforce its environmental or labor laws, through a sustained or recurring course of action or inaction, in a manner affecting trade between the United States and that party ... ." A related objective is to recognize that parties retain the right to exercise discretion with respect to prosecutorial, regulatory and compliance matters and to make decisions regarding the allocation of resources to enforcement with respect to other environmental matters determined to have higher priorities. These two negotiating objectives mirror provisions contained in the U.S.-Jordan FTA and the NAFTA environmental side agreement. However, this latter objective goes further than the U.S.-Jordan FTA to clarify the rights of a government to establish its own levels of environmental protection by adding, "no retaliation may be authorized based on the exercise of these rights or the right to establish domestic labor standards and levels of environmental protection." Other principal negotiating objectives on environment contained in both bills and the final law include: (1) strengthening trading partners' capacity to protect the environment through the promotion of sustainable development; (2) reducing or eliminating government practices or policies that unduly threaten sustainable development; (3) seeking market access for U.S. environmental technologies, goods, and services; and (4) ensuring that environmental, health or safety policies or practices of the parties do not arbitrarily discriminate against U.S. exports or serve as disguised barriers to trade. The 2002 Trade Act sets forth other principal negotiating objectives that have implications for environmental laws and related disputes under trade agreements. These include the objectives on dispute settlement, foreign investment, transparency, and regulatory practices. The effectiveness of trade agreement obligations is related to the strength of an agreement's dispute settlement process. Environmental interests argued that environmental obligations should be included within trade agreements and that disputes involving these obligations should be treated the same as commercial disputes, including using the same remedies. Business interests and others favored flexibility in addressing various kinds of disputes. The Act parallels the U.S.-Jordan FTA and goes beyond NAFTA by calling for the inclusion within the texts of trade agreements of an obligation for parties to enforce their environmental laws. The dispute settlement objectives (Section 2102(b)(12)) direct negotiators to seek provisions that treat all U.S. principal negotiating objectives equally with respect to the ability to resort to dispute settlement, and to have available equivalent dispute settlement procedures and remedies. Thus, the law seeks to make all disputes equally subject to dispute settlement, but it provides flexibility in procedures and remedies. Investment provisions have become an environmental issue because of the types of claims that have been brought under the NAFTA investment provisions allowing foreign investors to arbitrate disputes with NAFTA parties. In some cases, foreign investors have sought compensation for the negative impacts of government environmental regulations, claiming that the government action is a form of "indirect expropriation" or is "tantamount to expropriation." NAFTA provides that compensation must be equal to the fair market value of the expropriated investment. These NAFTA provisions and related claims have prompted concerns by states and environmental groups that this language may dampen the enforcement of environmental regulations in signatory countries, and that foreign investors may have greater rights under the NAFTA with respect to expropriations by federal, state, or local government in the United States than domestic investors have under the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause. The new TPA provisions appear to address this concern to some degree. The principal negotiating objectives for investment (Section 2102(b)(3)) seek to reduce: trade-distorting barriers to foreign investment, while ensuring that foreign investors in the United States are not accorded greater substantive rights with respect to investment protections than United States investors in the United States, and to secure for investors important rights comparable to those that would be available under United States legal principles and practice. The investment objective calls for achieving these goals by seeking the establishment of "standards for expropriation and compensation for expropriation, consistent with United States legal principles and practice" and by "seeking to establish standards for fair and equitable treatment consistent with United States legal principles and practice, including the principle of due process." The Trade Act further calls for negotiators to seek to improve mechanisms used to resolve disputes between an investor and a government through: mechanisms to eliminate frivolous claims; procedures to enhance opportunities for public input into the formulation of government positions; and the establishment of an appellate body to "provide coherence to the interpretations of investment provisions in trade agreements." It calls for negotiators to ensure the "fullest measure of transparency" in investment disputes by: ensuring that requests for dispute settlement are made public promptly, ensuring that proceedings, submissions, findings and decisions are made public; and establishing a mechanism for accepting amicus curiae submissions from businesses, unions, and nongovernmental organizations. A provision in the Senate-passed bill, that was dropped in conference, would have directed the President to negotiate an amendment to Chapter 11 of the NAFTA to increase the transparency of Chapter 11 proceedings in specified ways, and would have required the U.S. Trade Representative to certify to the Congress within one year of enactment that the President has fulfilled these requirements. Environmental groups favored adding language in the investment objectives that would direct negotiators to seek provisions in trade agreements to limit expropriation provisions and otherwise protect legitimate environmental measures from challenge by foreign investors. Other stakeholders wanted to ensure checks are maintained against the potential for disguised or unfair barriers to foreign investment. Neither the House nor Senate bill called for negotiators to seek exceptions for environmental measures in the investment-related obligations of trade agreements. An amendment was offered in the Senate to require agreements to limit expropriation provisions, "including by ensuring that payment of compensation is not required for regulatory measures that cause a mere diminution in the value of private property" and to provide that environmental and health protection measures are generally consistent with an agreement. The failure of this and related proposals resulted in reduced support for the Trade Act by some in Congress. Various interests, including the Administration, environmental groups and others, have put a priority on increasing transparency (i.e., openness) in trade matters and increasing public access to the dispute resolution process. Environmental and business interests agree that greater openness would allow increased awareness of the possible impacts of trade decisions relevant to their concerns. The House and Senate bills contained identical provisions to increase public participation in trade matters, compared to current practice. Section 2102(b)(5) provides that a principal negotiating objective is to obtain wider application of the principle of transparency through: increased and more timely public access to information on trade issues and activities of international trade institutions; increased openness in the WTO and other trade fora, including with regard to dispute settlement and investment; and increased and more timely public access to all notifications and supporting documentation submitted by WTO parties. The law contains additional transparency provisions for the principal negotiating objective on investment. Further, with respect to transparency, the Trade Act includes a principal negotiating objective on regulatory practices, addressing the use of government practices to provide a competitive advantage for domestic producers, service providers, or investors. The goal of this provision is to lessen the use of regulations for the purpose of reducing market access for U.S. goods, services or investments. This objective calls for U.S. negotiators "to achieve increased transparency and opportunity for the participation of affected parties in the development of regulations" (Section 2102(b)(8)). Such an approach seemingly would benefit both environmental interests and U.S. business. Additionally, the objective is "to require that proposed regulations be based on sound science, cost-benefit analyses, risk assessment, or other objective evidence." The inclusion of this objective drew some criticism from environmental groups that called for language that would protect the ability of federal, state, and local governments to take precautionary measures against risks in cases where scientific or other knowledge may be suggestive but incomplete. However, proponents of the objective argued that, on the other hand, without such disciplines, regulations can too easily be used to create barriers to trade. In addition to negotiating objectives, the Trade Act requires the President to promote certain priorities "in order to address and maintain U.S. competitiveness in the global economy" (Section 2102(c)). The Senate Finance Committee report accompanying H.R. 3005 ( S.Rept. 107-139 ), explained that the priorities are not negotiating objectives themselves, but that they "should inform trade negotiations or be pursued parallel to trade negotiations." Among these priorities, the Act contains several environment-relevant provisions. Specifically, the President must: (1) seek to establish consultative mechanisms to strengthen U.S. trading partners' capacity to develop and implement standards for protecting the environment and human health based on sound science, and to report to the House Committee on Ways and Means and the Senate Committee on Finance; (2) conduct environmental reviews of trade and investment agreements, consistent with Executive Order 13141, and report to the House Committee on Ways and Means and the Senate Committee on Finance; (3) take into account other legitimate U.S. domestic objectives including the protection of legitimate health or safety interests and related laws and regulations; and (4) continue to promote consideration of multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) and consult with parties to MEAs regarding the consistency of an MEA containing trade measures with existing environmental exceptions under the GATT. In general, the trade negotiating authority provided under the 2002 Trade Act addresses environmental concerns to an unprecedented degree, reflecting the evolving attention to the potential interconnections between trade liberalization and environmental quality and protection efforts. Nonetheless, the Act falls short of the environmental objectives that some Members and interest groups sought. While it is uncertain how the new environment-related objectives may inform trade negotiations during the next several years, it seems likely that the debate on how to address environmental issues in trade negotiations and TPA legislation will continue. Outcomes of investor-state disputes involving challenges to environmental measures may be particularly informative for future TPA deliberations.

During the past decade, environmental issues have received increased attention in trade liberalization negotiations, and the question of how to address such concerns in trade agreements became a key issue in the debate over renewing the President's trade promotion authority (TPA). Under this authority, Congress agrees to consider trade agreements using expedited procedures and to vote up or down, with no amendments. With the Trade Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-210), Congress renewed the President's trade promotion authority. The Act includes more environment-related provisions than previous TPA legislation, and generally follows language contained in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), its environmental side agreement, and the U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement. The Act includes negotiating objectives that call for negotiators to ensure that parties do not fail to effectively enforce their environmental laws in a manner affecting trade, and to make such failures subject to dispute settlement. Another objective seeks language in trade agreements committing parties not to weaken environmental laws to attract trade. The Act also calls for greater openness in proceedings related to trade disputes. It does not include an objective to protect environmental measures from challenge by foreign investors, and consequently, the Act lost some support in Congress and from environmental groups. This report discusses the environment-related provisions of the new law. It will be updated as events warrant.

Credit unions engage in financial intermediation , or facilitating transfers of funds back and forth between savers (via accepting deposits) and borrowers (via loans). Although other institutions (e.g., depository banks, insurance companies, pension funds, hedge funds) also engage in the financial intermediation matching process, this report focuses on issues facing the credit union industry. The original concept of a credit union was of a membership-owned cooperative organization formed for the purpose of promoting thrift among its members and providing them with a low-cost source of credit. Congress passed the Federal Credit Union Act of 1934 (FCU Act; 48 Stat. 1216) to create a class of federally chartered financial institutions for the purpose of "promoting thrift among its members and creating a source of credit for provident or productive purposes." Given the numerous bank failures and runs that occurred during the Great Depression, Congress wanted to enhance the ability of these cooperative organizations to meet the credit needs of their memberships, who were unable to obtain bank credit. The credit union industry has evolved with marketplace changes so that many of the financial services that credit unions provide are similar to those offered by banks and savings associations. Credit union charters are granted by federal or state governments on the basis of a "common bond." There are three types of charters: (1) a single common bond (occupation or association based); (2) multiple common bonds (more than one group each having a common bond of occupation or association); and (3) a community-based (geographically defined) common bond. Individual credit unions are owned by their memberships. The members of a credit union elect a board of directors from their institution's membership (one member, one vote). Given that credit unions are financial cooperatives that return profits to their memberships, members' savings are referred to as "shares" that earn "dividends" instead of interest. Credit union loan and investment powers are more restricted than those of commercial banks. Credit unions can only make loans to their members, to other credit unions, and to credit union organizations. The investment authority of federal credit unions is limited by statute to loans, government securities, deposits in other financial institutions, and certain other limited investments. The National Credit Union Administration (NCUA), an independent federal agency, is the federal regulator and share deposit insurer for credit unions. Typically, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) charters and supervises national depository (commercial) banks; the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) provides deposit insurance and liquidates failed banks; and the Federal Reserve provides lender-of-last-resort liquidity to solvent banks via its discount window. The NCUA, by comparison, serves all three functions for federally regulated credit unions. The NCUA also manages the National Credit Union Share Insurance Fund (NCUSIF), which is the federal deposit insurance fund for credit unions. Numerous financial entities experienced distress during the 2007-2009 recession, including the credit union system. In response, the NCUA has adopted enhanced capital requirements for credit unions, which is intended to increase the resiliency of the credit union system to insolvency (failure) risk and to minimize possible losses to the NCUSIF and ultimately taxpayers. Some credit unions may need to curtail lending until they fully adjust to the increased requirements. In addition, Congress is considering legislation (e.g., H.R. 1188 and S. 2028 , the Credit Union Small Business Jobs Creation Act; H.R. 989 , the Capital Access for Small Business and Jobs Act) to enhance the lending ability of the credit union industry as part of its efforts to spur economic growth. H.R. 1422 and S. 1440 , the Credit Union Residential Credit Union Loan Parity Act, would amend the FCU Act to revise the statutory definition of member business loans, further enhancing the capacity of credit unions (satisfying the net worth capitalization requirements) to make more member business and commercial loans. These policies are discussed in this report. The balance sheet terminology defined in the box below will be used throughout this discussion. The credit union system, which largely facilitates residential and consumer lending, inherently faces financial risks, some of which were realized in the recent financial crisis. For example, the NCUA reported that the corporate credit unions faced liquidity pressures and placed five of them into conservatorship in 2008. Corporate credit unions operate as wholesale credit unions, meaning that they provide financing, investment, and clearing services for natural person (retail) credit unions, which interface directly with customers. The corporates accept deposits from, as well as provide liquidity and correspondent lending services to, retail credit unions. This reduces the costs that smaller institutions would bear individually to perform various financial transactions for members. Given that retail credit unions are cooperative owners of corporate credit unions, they are also federally insured by the NCUA. The NCUA chairman reported that the five corporates under conservatorship had represented approximately 70% of the entire corporate system's assets and 98.6% of the investment losses within the system at that time. A Temporary Corporate Credit Union Stabilization Fund (TCCUSF) was established by Congress in May 2009 to accrue and recover losses from the corporate credit unions. The TCCUSF borrowed from Treasury to help cover the costs of conservatorship, and the NCUA also raised assessments on all federally insured credit unions, including those that did not avail themselves of corporate credit union services. Credit unions, like all financial institutions, are susceptible to the usual risks associated with lending or the financial intermediation process. Safety and soundness regulation includes the requirement to hold sufficient capital reserves, which is intended to reduce the insolvency (failure) risk of financial institutions. Although higher capital requirements may not prevent adverse financial risk events from occurring, more capital enhances the ability of financial firms to absorb greater losses associated with potential loan defaults. The enhanced absorption capacity may strengthen public confidence in the soundness of these financial institutions and increase their ability to function during periods of financial stress. In May 2012, the NCUA issued a Supervisory Letter regarding large concentrations of 30-year traditional fixed rate mortgage loans held in portfolio by some credit unions, which could develop into an adverse financial event in the future. Credit unions that made large amounts of mortgage loans during the current low interest rate environment could find themselves receiving lower amounts of revenue relative to what may be necessary to pay share depositors if interest rates increase in the future. Furthermore, the interest rate risk may grow into a systemically important crisis or "too many to fail" event if numerous credit unions simultaneously became insolvent. The NCUA guidance requires vulnerable credit unions to submit plans outlining the measures that will be taken to reduce or manage interest rate risks. On January 23, 2014, the NCUA announced increases in capital requirements for a subset of natural person credit unions that will be designated as complex . A complex credit union was initially defined by NCUA to have at least $50 million in assets. On January 27, 2015, the NCUA revised the initial proposed rule, amending the definition of a complex credit union as having at least $100 million in assets. On October 29, 2015, the NCUA finalized the risk-based capital rule. Some of the specific requirements of the rule include the following: A new asset risk-weighting system is introduced and would apply to complex credit unions, and it will be more consistent with the methodology used for U.S. federally insured banking institutions. A new risk-based capital ratio (defined using the narrower risk-based capital measure in the numerator and total risk-weighted assets, which are computed using the new risk-weighting system, in the denominator) of 10% is now required for complex credit unions to be well-capitalized under the prompt corrective action supervisory framework. The risk-based capital ratio is designed to be more consistent with the capital adequacy requirements commonly applied to depository (banking) institutions worldwide. Complex credit unions must comply with the risk-based capital ratio requirements as well as the existing statutory 7% net-worth asset net worth ratio by January 1, 2019, to avoid NCUA supervisory enforcement actions. Non-complex credit unions with assets below $100 million would not be required to comply with the new risk-weighting system, and they would no longer be required to risk-weight their assets. Instead, non-complex credit unions must comply with the existing statutory 7% net-worth asset ratio. According to the NCUA, 1,455 credit unions (or 22% of all credit unions) reported having at least $100 million in total assets as of December 31, 2013, representing 89% of all assets held in the credit union system; 19 of those institutions would need to raise capital to avoid being undercapitalized. The ability of undercapitalized credit unions to continue lending would arguably be constrained until they become compliant with the higher capital buffer requirements. There was no commercial lending cap on the amount of member business loans that credit unions could make until 1998. In response to a Supreme Court decision, Congress passed the Credit Union Membership Access Act of 1998 (CUMAA; P.L. 105-219 ), which among other provisions, established a commercial lending cap. First, the CUMAA codified the definition of a credit union member business loan (MBL). An MBL is any loan, line of credit, or letter of credit used for an agricultural purpose or for a commercial, corporate, or other business investment property or venture. Second, the CUMAA limited the aggregate amount of outstanding business loans to one member or group of associated members to a maximum of 15% of the credit union's net worth or $100,000, whichever is greater. Third, the CUMAA limited the aggregate amount of MBLs made by a credit union to the lesser of 1.75 times the credit union's actual net worth or 1.75 times the minimum net worth amount required to be well-capitalized under the prompt corrective action supervisory framework. Finally, three exceptions to the credit union aggregate MBL limit were authorized for (1) credit unions that have low-income designations or participate in the Community Development Financial Institutions program; (2) credit unions chartered for the purpose of making business loans (as determined by the NCUA); and (3) credit unions with a history of primarily making such loans (as determined by the NCUA). Legislation has been introduced in the 114 th Congress that would allow credit unions to enhance their member business lending activities. H.R. 1188 , the Credit Union Small Business Jobs Creation Act, was introduced on March 2, 2015; the companion bill, S. 2028 , was introduced on September 10, 2015. H.R. 1188 and S. 2028 , would amend the Federal Credit Union Act (particularly 12 U.S.C. 1757) to gradually increase the current business lending cap to 27.5% of the total assets of the credit union from the current 1.75 times of the actual net worth or 12.25% of the total assets, whichever is less. The bills would also require credit unions that make MBLs to have net worth and risk-based capital ratios that satisfy the requirements to be well capitalized . In addition, a credit union would need to demonstrate a minimum of five years of experience of sound underwriting and servicing of member business loans. Although the volume of credit union member business lending has increased over time, member business loans continue to account for a small share of lending in the credit union system. In other words, the total amount of MBLs provided by the credit union system may be constrained by the current cap. Credit unions collectively provided a total of $43.42 billion of MBLs in 2013, which equaled 4.08% of total credit union assets; approximately 85% of MBLs were secured by real estate, with some credit unions heavily concentrated in agricultural loans. If the MBL cap were raised, smaller credit unions attempting to originate and increase their holdings of MBLs in portfolio would have to increase their net worth holdings substantially, which arguably would be challenging if the membership base is small. Small credit unions typically offer a limited range of services, such as a few savings products and specialized consumer lending products such as (subprime) personal and automobile loans. These credit unions would be unlikely to increase their presence in the commercial lending market substantially because it would not be cost effective for them to invest in the necessary underwriting systems for the volume of commercial lending that they would feasibly be able to do. Hence, credit unions with assets under $10 million would be less likely to become more substantial providers of MBLs. By contrast, increasing the MBL cap would benefit credit unions that already enjoy a presence in the commercial lending market or a sufficiently large asset base. Lifting the MBL cap would allow credit unions already operating close to the current statutory limit to increase their presence in the commercial lending market. These credit unions may also already have the capacity to offer a broader range of consumer financial products and services. Some of the larger credit unions, therefore, could become more important competitors with small community banks as well as some midsize and regional banks. Although the ability to originate and keep large loans in portfolio until fully repaid is highly dependent upon the size of a credit union, the credit union system as a whole can support increased member business lending by increasing its use of participation (syndicated) loans . Loan participations are used by financial institutions to provide credit jointly. A loan originator, who often structures the loan participation arrangement, typically retains the largest share of the loan and sells smaller portions to other institutions. This practice allows the originator to maintain control of the customer relationship (including the loan servicing) and overcome funding limitations. In addition, all of the institutions involved in the participation loan use their individual portions of the loan to diversify their asset (loan) portfolios, which can be a cost-effective financial risk management tool. Only credit unions with MBL programs are allowed to enter into MBL loan participations given that all participants must have the ability to and are responsible for performing underwriting due diligence. Since 2007, the number of credit unions purchasing loan participations increased 15%, and the dollar value of loan participations on credit unions' balance sheets grew by more than 40%. If the MBL cap is raised, then both small and large institutions may purchase portions of these loans and distribute the risk throughout the system, similar in practice to how the banking industry distributes its risks. The credit union system could, therefore, become a more prominent competitor with the banking system in commercial lending markets. Proceeds from the National Credit Union Share Insurance Fund are used to pay share depositors if member institutions fail. In the event of many simultaneous credit union failures, the risk of insolvency of the NCUSIF increases and may require congressional action to replenish the fund. Credit unions can be particularly vulnerable to failure, given that their membership affiliations are restricted to a particular industry or geographical area that could be disproportionately affected by an adverse economic event. For example, an increase in unemployment that is concentrated in a particular industry or geographical location may trigger numerous loan defaults if such an event adversely affects the majority of a credit union's membership. Increasing the lending cap arguably may allow the credit union system to increase its MBL holdings, possibly resulting in more diversification. If, however, participation lending were to become a more customary practice used to finance MBLs, then losses on loan participations could also pose a "too many (small institutions) to fail" risk to the NCUSIF, given that multiple credit unions are involved in the lending arrangements. The NCUA also reported that participation loan charge-offs increased by more than 160% over the same period that credit unions increased their purchases of participation loans. The NCUA has subsequently provided more rules for participation loans to mitigate risks to the NCUSIF while still attempting to maintain the viability of this diversification tool for individual credit unions. On July 1, 2015, the NCUA proposed updates to the MBL rules to remove "prescriptive" requirements and adopt "principles" based approach. The prescriptive approach required credit unions that wanted to originate MBLs to submit waivers to NCUA for approval, among other requirements. The NCUA reported that the prescriptive approach took significant time and resources from both credit unions and NCUA, resulting in delays in processing MBL applications. The principles approach, by contrast, is intended to streamline the MBL underwriting process by granting credit unions more flexibility and individual autonomy. Credit unions are still expected to comply with prudential underwriting practices and commensurate net worth requirements. Furthermore, credit unions with a concentration in commercial lending in access of 50% of their total assets will be required to hold higher amounts of net worth to abate the higher levels of concentration risk. In light of the greater autonomy associated with the principles based approach, the NCUA also provided more detailed guidance for distinguishing between commercial loans and MBLs to help credit unions better determine which loans to count toward the MBL cap. Despite the distinguishing features, the net worth requirements for both commercial and MBLs would still be identical. H.R. 1422 and S. 1440 , the Credit Union Residential Credit Union Loan Parity Act, would amend the FCU Act to revise the statutory definition of MBLs, further enhancing the capacity of credit unions (satisfying the net worth capitalization requirements) to make more MBLs and commercial loans. The MBL cap is not the only policy tool that can be used to influence the lending ability of the credit union industry. From an economics perspective, a lending cap imposes an arbitrary limit that may be too high for some credit unions and too low for others, thus resulting in MBL shortages in the latter situations. For those credit unions that provide very few or no MBLs, a cap is irrelevant. Those credit unions facing an active MBL market must abruptly cease this type of lending when the volume of activity reaches the cap, which some may argue is set "too low," given that they can no longer satisfy the financial needs of their memberships. Hence, a lending cap is arguably a blunt instrument to the extent that it imposes the same requirement on all institutions without taking into account differences in asset size and market purview. Policy tools with a greater focus on the costs to originate MBLs would still impose restraints on credit unions without directly capping their lending ability. For example, increasing the asset risk weights for MBLs imposes costs without resulting in an abrupt discontinuation of this activity for those credit unions approaching the cap. As previously discussed, the NCUA has narrowed the definition of net worth and introduced a risk-weighting system, which is more consistent with the capital adequacy requirements used by the banking system. Another policy tool having a similar effect would subject the net income derived from member business lending activities (particularly for credit unions over a certain asset size) to unrelated business income tax (UBIT) for tax-exempt organizations. In short, policy tools that operate through cost disincentives instead of quantity restrictions (at a fixed level) may still allow those credit unions with a presence in this market to increase their member business lending activity. In addition to revising policies associated with member business lending, other legislative actions have been introduced in the 114 th Congress to facilitate credit union lending, discussed below. Because credit unions do not issue common stock equity, they do not have access to capital sources beyond retained earnings. Hence, if alternative sources of capital, referred to as supplemental capital, can be used in addition to retained earnings (net worth), then credit unions would be able to increase their lending while remaining in compliance with their safety and soundness net worth requirements. An NCUA working group has developed three general sources of supplemental capital, all of which would be repaid in the event of the liquidation of an insolvent credit union and after reimbursement of the NCUSIF. Credit unions could raise voluntary patronage capital (VPC) if (non-institutional) members of a credit union were to purchase "equity shares" in the organization. VPC equity shares would pay dividends; however, a VPC investor would not obtain any additional voting rights, and no investment would be allowed to exceed 5% of a credit union's net worth. mandatory membership capital (MMC) if a member pays what may be conceptually analogous to a membership fee. MMC capital would still be considered equity for the credit union but, unlike VPC, it would not accrue any dividends. subordinate debt (SD) from external and institutional investors. SD investors would have no voting rights or involvement in the management affairs of a credit union. SD would function as a hybrid debt-equity instrument, meaning that the investor would simply be a creditor with no equity share in the credit union while it is solvent and would not be repaid principal or interest should the credit union become insolvent. SD investors must make a minimum five-year investment with no option for early redemption. Net worth for credit unions is defined in statute; therefore, Congress would need to take legislative action to permit other forms of supplemental capital to count toward their net worth requirements. H.R. 989 , the Capital Access for Small Business and Jobs Act, referred to the House Committee on Financial Services on February 13, 2015, would redefine net worth for credit unions to include additional sources of supplemental capital in a manner consistent with the three forms discussed in the NCUA white paper. H.R. 989 may arguably complement bills H.R. 1188 and S. 2028 , but these bills are not dependent upon concurrent enactment. H.R. 989 would allow credit unions to increase all types of lending (including MBLs) as long as overall net worth, which would then be able to include supplemental capital, grows proportionately. The Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB) System provides secured loans to banks, credit unions, and insurance companies engaged in housing finance as well as in agricultural and small business lending. Membership in the FLHB System generally requires institutions to hold at least 10% of their total assets in mortgage-related assets. Co mmunity financial institutions , however, are exempt from this eligibility requirement. According to the Federal Home Loan Bank Act (FHLB Act; P.L. 72-304, 47 Stat.128), community financial institutions are defined as having less than $1 billion in assets and deposits insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). This definition allows for some small banks, particularly those designated by the U.S. Treasury as Community Development Financial Institutions (CDFI), to qualify for the exemption; but it excludes NCUA-insured credit unions. H.R. 2642 and its companion, S. 1491 , the Community Lender Regulatory Relief and Consumer Protection Act of 2015, along with H.R. 299 , the Capital Access for Small Community Financial Institutions Act of 2015, would amend the FHLB Act to require the treatment of a state-chartered credit unions as insured depository institutions, among other things; thus making it possible to harmonize FHLB membership requirements for small banks and credit unions. In addition, H.R. 2473 , Preserving Capital Access and Mortgage Liquidity Act of 2015, would redefine community financial institution to include either a federal or state credit union. The House passed H.R. 299 on April 13, 2015, and its language was included in an amendment to H.R. 22 , the Surface Transportation Reauthorization and Reform Act of 2015, which was passed in the House on November 5, 2015. S. 1484 , the Financial Regulatory Improvement Act of 2015, and S. 1910 , the Financial Services and General Government Appropriations Act, 2016, also contain language similar to H.R. 299 . Community banks, which are commonly defined as financial institutions that hold less than $1 billion in assets, are arguably similar to credit unions with respect to their business models. For example, community banks and credit unions engage in "relationship banking," which involves developing close familiarity with their respective customer bases. Community banks typically provide financial services within a circumscribed geographical area. The development of close relationships helps community banks understand idiosyncratic lending risks in their local areas that may not be easily understood using a computerized underwriting methodology. Similarly, credit unions provide financial services to their restricted memberships. The development of close relationships helps credit unions tailor product offerings to their unique memberships. Both credit unions and community banks also rely primarily upon deposits to fund their assets (loans). In other words, community banks and credit unions borrow primarily from their depositors to obtain the funds necessary to provide customer loans rather than from the short-term financial markets that the larger banking institutions access more frequently. This section discusses some similarities among and differences between credit unions and community banks. Both industries serve similar types of consumer markets, and larger institutions appear to enjoy some advantages relative to their smaller counterparts. There are some regulatory differences in fair lending and taxation between credit unions and banks. These differences may be less important for small credit unions and small banks that operate in very narrowly defined markets, as discussed below. By contrast, both the credit union and banking industries are experiencing similar consolidation trends. Membership size and the ability to offer a full range of financial services may ultimately explain any comparative advantages that large credit unions (and large banks) enjoy relative to small credit unions and small banks. These issues are examined below. Differences in Fair Lending Requirements Congress enacted the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 (CRA; P.L. 95-128 ) in reaction to perceptions that banks were not sufficiently addressing the credit needs of low- and moderate-income (LMI) neighborhoods. The CRA requires that federal banking regulatory agencies evaluate how regulated institutions meet the credit needs of their entire communities. No statutorily set rules are imposed; banking institutions, however, typically receive CRA credits after providing LMI loans (subject to existing federal prudential regulations for safety and soundness) or other financial retail services in their communities. CRA credits become important when a bank seeks permission from its regulator to move offices or to merge with another financial institution. Credit unions are not subject to the CRA. Given that banks may accept deposits from all individuals in a community, CRA provides them with a reciprocal obligation to meet credit needs, as much as possible, of their communities at large. CRA credits are useful to banks when they apply for charters, branches, mergers, acquisitions, and other applications that require approval from their regulators. By contrast, credit unions are not awarded credits that would allow them to expand beyond the common bonds defined in their membership charters. Instead, a credit union may add an underserved area in its field of membership and provide financial services in that designated area. If, however, the CRA did apply to credit unions, some of them may enjoy a competitive advantage in terms of achieving its policy goals, particularly if their membership consists predominately of minority groups and the credit unions' financial services can be tailored to these groups. Not-for-profit institutions generally may enjoy a cost advantage providing higher risk, unsecured loans at lower rates and fees relative to for-profit banks. In other words, credit unions seek to make enough money to continue operating their organizations, but they are not necessarily incentivized to make a return for equity investors. For example, a credit union affiliated with a faith-based organization that specializes in small-dollar lending may find it less costly (relative to banks or larger credit unions) to devote resources to monitor the repayment patterns of a small group of borrowers that might otherwise remain unbanked or underbanked. Low-cost payday lending to individuals and micro-business lending, which is the granting of small loans between $500 and $35,000 to small businesses with 5 or fewer employees, have been viable businesses for some credit unions. Thus, smaller financial institutions generally may enjoy cost advantages to provide services to riskier consumer markets, and such advantages may be even greater for small not-for-profit credit unions. As of 2012, there were 180 banking institutions with minority ownership; 150 of them would be considered community banks with assets less than $1 billion. In contrast, there were 809 credit unions with over 50% minority membership as of 2012. Differences in Tax Treatment Given that credit unions are not-for-profit financial cooperatives, the institutions are exempt from federal income tax. Share deposit holders pay taxes at individual tax rates when they receive interest (referred to as "dividends") on their share deposits, as do bank equity shareholders; but the credit union does not pay taxes at the corporate level. Some credit unions, however, may still pay unrelated business income tax (UBIT) for tax-exempt organizations. For example, if a credit union were to provide financial services (e.g., check-cashing) to non-members, any revenue generated from those activities would be subject to UBIT. Community banks are for-profit financial institutions that may accept deposits and provide lending services without any restrictions on their customer base. Community banks generally are publicly owned and issue common equity shares, so their depositors do not necessarily have to be equity shareholders. Community banks generally pay taxes at the corporate level and the shareholders pay taxes on their equity dividends at the individual tax rates; thus, the corporate profits are taxed twice. In 1997, however, small banks meeting eligibility requirements were allowed to become "S corporations," meaning that their income is taxed only once (at the individual income tax rates). As of 2013, the FDIC reported that 2,210 insured banking institutions were organized as S corporations; thus, these institutions are taxed in a manner similar to credit unions. Small banks organized as S corporations would not experience a tax disadvantage relative to credit unions. The difficulty of converting to an S corporation increases for larger banks if much of their equity is held in Individual Retirement Accounts, which are not allowed to hold equity in S corporations. The difference in tax treatments of credit unions and banks that are not organized as S corporations would need to be determined on a case-by-case basis. As previously noted, a necessary first step would be to determine the nature of competition. For example, the difference in the tax treatment of a faith-based credit union offering a very limited range of financial services is likely to have a negligible impact on the activities of a nearby community bank. A large credit union able to offer a full range of financial services to a regional or national market, however, may arguably benefit from the difference in tax treatment relative to banking institutions of similar sizes that serve similar markets. The nature of competition in terms of size and market, therefore, determines whether a cost advantage exists. Similarities in Consolidation Trends Using data from the NCUA, Figure 1 illustrates the total number and total asset holdings of U.S. credit unions over the 2003 to 2012 period. Total credit union assets have risen while the total number of credit unions has been shrinking over time. Credit union assets increased from $610.1 billion in 2003 to $1,021.7 billion by 2012. The total number of credit unions, however, declined from 9,369 to 6,819 over the same period. Furthermore, industry assets are not evenly distributed. The largest 197 credit unions with over $1 billion in assets held 51.2% of total industry assets in 2012 compared with the 29.4% share held in 2003. Loan and membership growth rates were positive for credit unions with assets exceeding $100 million; the highest growth rates were observed for institutions with $500 million or more in assets. By contrast, institutions with $100 million or less in assets saw negative loan growth; institutions with less than $10 million in assets also saw negative membership growth. These trends are similar to the consolidation trends observed in the depository banking system. For the sake of comparison, Figure 1 also includes the total number and assets of community banks. As of 2012, there were approximately the same number of community banks and credit unions, 6,421 and 6,819, respectively. The community banks, however, collectively had approximately $400 billion or 37.3% more in assets than the credit union industry. When compared with credit unions of similar size (less than $1 billion in total assets), community banks collectively have approximately $904 billion or 181.7% more in assets. Hence, the assets of most credit unions are on average much less than the assets of most community banks. Although community banks collectively have more aggregate assets relative to the entire credit union industry, total credit union assets in Figure 1 appear to have slightly greater trend growth relative to the total assets of community banks. This trend is driven by growth of the large credit unions, which are holding a greater share of industry assets over time. On November 5, 2011, which became known as Bank Transfer Day, thousands of consumers moved their (deposit) accounts to credit unions due to their frustration with large bank fees. Based upon the trends in asset and membership growth, the migration of customers from (large) banks appears to have benefitted larger credit unions able to offer more financial services relative to small credit unions or small banks (with less than $1 billion in assets). Regulatory differences that are unrelated to safety and soundness may also present comparative advantages, particularly for smaller institutions. For example, recent restrictions placed on the amount of debit interchange fees that can be collected by large banks and credit unions may reduce revenues that could be used to cross subsidize some of the costs associated with providing other financial services, thus creating a competitive advantage for institutions not covered by the regulation. Differences in the reporting requirements related to consumer protection regulations may create cost advantages for smaller financial institutions, especially those that provide services to financially riskier customers. By contrast, compliance with various or a multitude of regulations may place a higher cost burden on small institutions relative to those with size and transaction volume advantages, which generate substantial fee revenue for larger institutions. Hence, regulations that provide cost advantages for one set of financial firms may be offset by cost advantages generated by other regulations that favor another set of financial institutions.

Credit unions make loans to their members, to other credit unions, and to corporate credit unions that provide financial services to individual credit unions. There are statutory restrictions on their business lending activities, which the credit union industry has long advocated should be lifted. Specific restrictions on business lending include an aggregate limit on an individual credit union's member business loan balances and on the amount that can be loaned to one member. Industry spokespersons have argued that easing the restrictions on member business lending could increase the available pool of credit for small businesses. Credit unions also lack sources of capital beyond retained earnings, and alternative supplemental capital sources would allow them to increase their lending while remaining in compliance with safety and soundness regulatory requirements. Community bankers, who often compete with credit unions, argue that policies such as raising the business lending cap would allow credit unions to expand beyond their congressionally mandated mission and could pose a threat to financial stability. Members of the 114th Congress have introduced legislation that would allow credit unions to expand their lending activities. H.R. 989, the Capital Access for Small Business and Jobs Act, was introduced and referred to the House Committee on Financial Services on February 13, 2015. H.R. 989 would redefine net worth for credit unions to include additional sources of supplemental capital. In addition, H.R. 1188 and its companion bill, S. 2028, the Credit Union Small Business Jobs Creation Act, would raise the current member business lending cap. H.R. 1422 and S. 1440, the Credit Union Residential Credit Union Loan Parity Act, would amend the FCU Act to revise the statutory definition of member business loans, further enhancing the capacity of credit unions (satisfying the net worth capitalization requirements) to make more member business and commercial loans. On April 13, 2015, the House-passed H.R. 299, the Capital Access for Small Community Financial Institutions Act of 2015, would amend the Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB) Act to require the treatment of state-chartered credit unions as insured depository institutions, among other things; thus making it possible to harmonize FHLB-membership requirements for small banks and credit unions. The House included the language of H.R. 299 in an amendment to H.R. 22, the Surface Transportation Reauthorization and Reform Act of 2015, as passed on November 5, 2015. S. 1484, the Financial Regulatory Improvement Act of 2015, and S. 1910, the Financial Services and General Government Appropriations Act, 2016, also contain language similar to H.R. 299. Small memberships limit the range of financial services that small credit unions can offer as well as their ability to accumulate enough retained earnings (capital) to substantially increase their commercial lending activities. Thus, the benefits to credit unions from legislative actions to enhance their lending ability may be greater for larger institutions. Larger credit unions, with the resources to offer a wide array of financial services to members, would also be expected to become more significant competitors with community banks operating in similar lending markets. Competition between credit unions and commercial banks, particularly those with over $1 billion in assets, would be expected to intensify. Although total assets and membership in the credit union industry have risen over the past decade, the total number of credit unions has declined. The industry's assets are not evenly distributed. Some differences in credit union and bank regulation are unlikely to account for the competitive advantages that large credit unions enjoy relative to their smaller counterparts. These observations mirror the consolidation trends observed in the depository banking industry and are discussed in greater detail in the Appendix.

A patent is an intellectual property right granted by the federal government to an inventor to exclude others from making, using, or selling the invention for a limited time, in exchange for public disclosure of the invention. Article I, Section 8, clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution grants Congress the authority to offer this protection to patent holders. Patent infringement is the unauthorized making, using, offering for sale, selling, and importing of a patented invention. The patent provides the patent holder with the right to protect against such infringement by suing for relief in the appropriate federal court. Such relief may include an injunction to halt the patent infringement or an award of damages to compensate for any harm. Because patents are exclusively governed by federal law, federal district courts have original jurisdiction in all civil cases relating to patents. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has jurisdiction over appeals from district court decisions. The amount of patent infringement litigation has substantially increased during the last decade. Some commentators believe that the possibility of a large financial award together with the minimal information required to bring a patent infringement claim has encouraged abuses of the patent system in courts by "patent trolls." However, others believe that the information required by the patent infringement complaint is sufficient to provide notice to the defendant of the pending claims, reserving the disclosure of more detailed information for the discovery stage of litigation. Recently introduced patent reform legislation seeks to minimize abuses with, among other provisions, changes to pleading requirements for a patent infringement claim. This report will discuss the rules and procedure for initiating a patent infringement claim in federal court. The discussion will focus on the level of detail necessary for a patent infringement complaint. The report will then conclude with several legislative proposals during the 112 th and 113 th Congresses addressing patent infringement pleadings and litigation by "patent trolls." Patent infringement cases begin with the filing of a complaint by a party seeking relief in federal court. Federal courts follow the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which dictate the different steps parties must complete in order to move through the litigation process. Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a complaint to contain a statement showing a claim for relief and the grounds for the court's jurisdiction. The complaint must also contain sufficient information to satisfy Rule 12(b)(6). This rule permits defendants to make a motion to dismiss a case if the plaintiff has failed to state a claim, for which relief could be granted, in the complaint. Because litigation is a costly and lengthy process, courts need the ability, in the beginning of the process, to dismiss any frivolous claims that do not have the possibility of resulting in any relief for either party. For assistance in satisfying these rules, attorneys often rely on the sample forms provided in the appendix of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as models for their complaints. Form 18 provides a model for a "Complaint of Patent Infringement." According to this form, a complaint for patent infringement must include four statements asserting jurisdiction, patent ownership, patent infringement by the defendant, and demand for relief. Form 18 does not demand a specific level of particularity for these statements. Courts have interpreted Rule 8 to require complaints to include only "'a short and plain statement of the claim' that will give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests" rather than fully developed allegations at this stage of the pleadings. This approach is described as the "notice pleading" standard, emphasizing the primary purpose of complaints as notifying parties of the general issues of the case. In 2007 and 2009 decisions, the U.S. Supreme Court articulated a higher standard of particularity for complaints: the plausibility standard. In Bell Atlantic Corporation v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal , the U.S. Supreme Court held that federal courts must evaluate the "plausibility of claims" made at the pleading stage when determining whether a civil complaint should survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. In Bell Atlantic Corporation v. Twombly, the plaintiffs' complaint alleged that the defendants violated the Sherman Antitrust Act. The complaint included only circumstantial evidence from which anti-competitive behavior could be inferred but not any details supporting an actual conspiracy in violation of the act. The defendants brought a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' complaint for failure to state a claim. The defendants alleged that the facts in the complaint addressed only one piece of evidence and not the entire claim of violating Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act. The U.S. Supreme Court held that an antitrust complaint must provide "enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest that an agreement was made" in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act. This holding introduced a plausibility standard, for at least antitrust complaints, requiring the complaint to allege sufficient facts so that the claim appears "plausible." After Twombly , lower federal courts disagreed as to whether this decision applied the heightened pleading standard, the plausibility standard, to all complaints. However, the U.S. Supreme Court in a 2009 decision, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, clarified and affirmed that the plausibility standard applied to all civil complaints. In this case, the defendants also made a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the claim. The plaintiff's complaint outlined facts intending to show unlawful discrimination by high-ranking government officers. However, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the plaintiff failed to plead sufficient facts to state a claim for unlawful discrimination as a recitation of the facts does not show that the defendants' policy was plausibly discriminatory. In its opinion, the U.S. Supreme Court reasserted the heightened "plausibility" pleading. According to the Court, "to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.'" Despite the Twombly and Iqbal holdings, the level of particularity regarding information in the patent complaint, specifically Form 18, is a frequent issue before the courts. Some courts and commentators have assumed that that the heightened plausibility pleading standard applies to all federal civil cases. However, others have argued that the heightened pleading standard does not apply to patent infringement claims. Defendants in patent infringement cases can file a motion to dismiss the entire case by alleging that the complaint does not provide sufficient information to state a valid claim for patent infringement. However, two recent Federal Circuit cases have held that Form 18 requires sufficient information to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. In McZeal v. Spring Nextel Corp., the defendant argued that the patent infringement complaint failed to explain how its product infringed the plaintiff's patent. The complaint named the patent and the allegedly infringing defendant's device but did not explain how that device operated to infringe the patent. The Federal Circuit, however, found that a patent infringement complaint is not required to describe the relationship between each element of the claim and the infringing device. Specific information such as this "is something to be determined through discovery." In a more recent case, K-Tech Telecommunications v. Time Warner Cable, the defendants moved to dismiss the patent infringement complaint on the grounds that it did not sufficiently state a claim under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Twombly and Iqbal standards. The defendants claimed that the plaintiff failed to identify the allegedly infringing device used by the defendant and to connect any allegedly infringing activity to the patents. The Federal Circuit again held that the information required by Form 18 alone is sufficient for pleading a patent infringement claim as the form states a plausible claim and places the alleged infringer on notice. Form 18 also does not require a plaintiff to identify the accused device. Moreover, the court added that Form 18 controls to the extent that any conflict exists between the Twombly plausibility standard and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure forms. A "patent troll" is a pejorative term for a "non-practicing entity" (NPE) or a "patent assertion entity" (PAE). These entities are people or companies that do not develop, manufacture, or sell any product covered by the patents they own. The business model of a PAE instead focuses on buying and asserting patents against companies that have already begun using and developing the patent, often without knowledge of the PAE's ownership of the patent. Critics of PAEs argue that these patent-holders extort the patent system through litigation by extracting licensing fees or damage awards from companies that cannot afford the cost of litigation. Critics also argue that "patent trolling" deters innovation and discourages companies from seeking patents, and thus delivering new products to the market. However, defendants of PAEs view this practice as encouraging investment in undercapitalized projects. Commentators have linked PAEs together with the current patent pleading requirements for a patent infringement claim. They argue that the minimal information required in a patent infringement complaint encourages PAEs to initiate "frivolous" lawsuits that otherwise would not survive the initial pleading stage under a more stringent standard. Even though many of the PAE infringement lawsuits are ultimately unsuccessful, the costly discovery stages of the lawsuit contribute to the financial burden carried by the defendants of these claims. Moreover, with the threat of costly litigation, defendants are more likely to settle or to enter into an agreement to pay licensing fees. The 112 th Congress passed the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act of 2011 (AIA), which sought to address the proliferation of PAEs. The debate leading to the AIA demonstrated growing congressional concern over the high costs of litigation patent disputes initiated by PAEs and their enforcement of patents. The AIA does not include specific reforms relating to patent pleadings and PAEs. However, Section 34 of the AIA instructs the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to study the costs, benefits, and consequences of litigation by "non-practicing entities" and "patent assertion entities." The GAO report, released in August 2013, analyzes the trends in patent infringement litigation and recommends changes to discovery, such as an e-discovery model to reduce costs, and additional oversight by the U.S. Patent Office in gathering data about patent enforcement. During the 113 th Congress, Congress has introduced several different legislative proposals relating to patent reform. The following bills specifically target patent troll litigation to curb their prevalence in court. The Saving High-Tech Innovators from Egregious Legal Disputes (SHIELD) Act of 2013, H.R. 845 , proposes a financial deterrence to PAEs from filing patent infringement complaints. The SHIELD Act would require a court, in an action involving infringement of a patent, to award full litigation costs including attorney's fees to the prevailing party asserting that the patent is not infringed. The court would award these fees if it determines that the party alleging infringement does not meet one or more of the following conditions: 1. The party is the inventor, joint inventor, or the original assignee of the patent; 2. The party can provide evidence of substantial investment made by the party in the exploitation of the patent through production or sale of an item covered by the patent; or 3. The party is an institution of higher education or is a technology transfer organization whose primary purpose is to facilitate commercialization of technology developed by such institution. These conditions mirror a "negative definition" of a PAE. Therefore, a party that does not satisfy any one of the conditions listed above (i.e., is a "PAE") would be liable to the alleged infringer for full litigation costs, if the PAE loses the lawsuit. Representative Chaffetz, who introduced the bill, explained that this legislation "will curb future abuse by requiring trolls to bear the financial responsibility for failed claims." However, some have criticized that the SHIELD Act's description of the conditions is too broad and thus does not sufficiently curb PAE patent infringement litigation. One commentator notes that a PAE could try to meet any of the conditions to avoid paying litigation costs by becoming a distributor of products. The Innovation Act of 2013, H.R. 3309 , proposes changes to the patent pleading requirements specifically. The co-sponsors intend the bill to "eliminate the abuses of our patent system [and] discourage frivolous patent litigation" by providing heightened initial pleading requirements for an infringement claim. Under these new requirements, the complaint of a patent infringement would need to: identify each patent allegedly infringed; identify each claim of each patent that is allegedly infringed; identify the accused instrumentality that is allegedly infringing with specific name or model number; describe where each element of each claim is identified within the accused instrumentality and how it corresponds to the functionality of the accused instrumentality; and describe the direct infringement, person(s) involved, and the acts of that person(s) involved in inducing that infringement. These proposed requirements would demand more specific information from the plaintiff than Form 18. Instead of simply identifying the patent and stating a claim of relief, these proposed changes would require the plaintiff to scrutinize and show the relationship between the elements of the patent and the accused instrumentality to demonstrate infringement. This heightened standard would require the plaintiff to research and provide more information of the alleged infringement that otherwise would have occurred later in the litigation process. The act also proposes a limitation on discovery beyond the core documents needed for evidence. These changes would shift the costs to the requesting party as a measure to limit the high costs of discovery for patent infringement claims. Co-sponsors of the bill hope that the heightened pleading requirements would force a plaintiff to consider the alleged infringing instrumentality more carefully and decide whether infringement has occurred before filing the suit. The changes would also allow courts to dismiss suits prior to expensive discovery. However, some commentators believe that the heightened pleading requirements would render patent enforcement impractical. The plaintiff may not have this information available at this stage of litigation as the discovery process typically reveals the information necessary to build a successful infringement claim. The Patent Abuse Reduction Act of 2013, S. 1013 , proposes changes to pleading requirements in patent infringement cases. This bill also intends to deter patent infringement litigation by PAEs with heightened pleading requirements in addition to awarding costs and expenses to the prevailing party. The bill seeks to curb patent litigation abuse by "deter[ring] patent litigation abusers without prejudicing the rights of responsible intellectual property holders." The proposed pleading changes are very similar to those outlined in the Innovation Act. However, the Patent Abuse Reduction Act also would direct the U.S. Supreme Court to review and amend Form 18 to ensure that it is consistent with the proposed pleading requirements. The U.S. Constitution provides Congress with the authority to reform the patent system. The Constitution also specifically grants Congress the power to create federal courts, other than the Supreme Court, and to determine their jurisdiction. Pursuant to this power, Congress has the authority to enact changes to judicial processes and procedures. Congress has delegated this authority through such legislation as the Rules Enabling Act of 1934. This act authorizes the U.S. Supreme Court to promulgate rules of procedure, including the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for federal courts. However, Congress still retains the authority to make any changes to judicial procedural rules such as patent infringement pleadings. However, members of the judicial branch have raised objections to the patent pleading reforms and have suggested potential separation of powers issues triggered by these proposed changes. Federal Circuit Judge Kathleen O'Malley has stated that the patent reform bills "go way beyond where anyone should want Congress to tread" by "breaking down the division between the branches of government." In a letter to Representative Conyers, the Judicial Conference objected to the proposed reforms in the Innovation Act as undermining "the development of sound rules and practices." Because of Congress's constitutional authority to change judicial rules, these objections reveal more prudential concerns about Congress bypassing the "deliberative process Congress established in the Rules Enabling Act" and the Judicial Conference's involvement in the process. Representative Goodlatte responded to these objections in an Innovation Act hearing by emphasizing congressional authority to legislate rules of judicial procedure. He stressed that the "Constitution grants Congress the power to create federal courts," therefore congressional authority includes "the prescription of court procedure," including the Innovation Act's heightened pleading standards.

Patent infringement is the unauthorized making, using, offering for sale, selling, and importing of a patented invention. The patent provides the patent holder with the right to protect against such infringement by suing for relief in the appropriate federal court. Litigation of a patent infringement claim begins with the filing of a complaint in federal court. Form 18 in the appendix of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides a model for a patent infringement complaint. This form requires four statements asserting jurisdiction, patent ownership, patent infringement by the defendant, and demand for relief. Commentators, legal practitioners, and patent holders disagree as to whether Form 18 requires a sufficient level of detail in the patent infringement complaint to meet the standards outlined in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and by the U.S. Supreme Court. Despite two recent Supreme Court rulings concerning the appropriate pleading standard, the level of particularity regarding information in the patent complaint, specifically Form 18, is a frequent issue before the courts. Patent infringement litigation has increased over the last decade. Commentators have linked the current patent pleading requirements and the minimal level of information required to patent assertion entities (PAE), colloquially known as "patent trolls." According to "patent troll" critics, the minimal information required in a patent infringement complaint encourages PAEs to initiate frivolous lawsuits that otherwise would not survive the initial pleading stage under a more stringent standard. Congress has recently proposed several bills offering patent reform in this area. The recently introduced Innovation Act, H.R. 3309, and the Patent Abuse Reduction Act, S. 1013, both offer changes to the patent pleading system. These bills would provide for, among other things, heightened initial pleading requirements demanding more specific information in the complaint than required by Form 18 alone. Sponsors of the bills intend these more rigorous pleading requirements to deter "patent trolls" from filing what they deem as frivolous lawsuits. However, some commentators believe that the heightened pleading requirements would render patent enforcement impractical. Additionally, some members of the judicial branch have commented that these proposed changes trigger constitutional issues by potentially violating the separation of powers doctrine.

Preventing the domestic workforce from being undermined by the employment of foreign workers and protecting foreign workers from exploitation have shaped federal law governing the hiring and employment of foreign workers by U.S. employers. In the United States, there are three main sources of labor protections for foreign workers: (1) the conditions imposed on employers hiring foreign workers through the DOL labor certification/attestation and DHS petition process; (2) federal labor laws stipulating that employers adhere to certain requirements governing wages and other conditions; and (3) private causes of action that foreign workers may have under state and local laws regarding labor, contracts, and torts. With a view towards clarifying the framework for foreign workers protections under federal laws, this report will briefly survey current federal laws related to foreign workers' rights, including immigration-related labor conditions and federal labor laws. In addition, this report will take note of private causes of action that foreign workers may have under various state and local laws. Finally, this report will examine immigration-related legislative proposals S. 744 , H.R. 2131 , and H.R. 1773 pending before the 113 th Congress. Protections for foreign workers are generally provided pursuant to the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and are strongest for nonimmigrant (i.e., temporary) workers in visa categories generally associated with lower-skilled occupations, such as H-2A agricultural workers and H-2B forestry/logging workers, since such workers are perceived as more vulnerable to exploitation and less likely to have sufficient resources to enforce their rights effectively. In particular, nonimmigrant foreign workers may find themselves subject to deportation in the event of a job loss. Foreign workers who are admitted into the United States as immigrants or adjusted to lawful permanent resident status come within the statutory definition of U nited States worker and are not vulnerable to losing their immigration status in the event of a job termination by a specific employer. Employers who desire to hire foreign workers who are not already authorized to work in the United States, in either immigrant or nonimmigrant employment-based visa classes, must follow a two-step process. First, the employer must acquire from the DOL a labor certification or attestation that certain labor conditions required to hire foreign workers have been satisfied. In the second step, the employer must petition the DHS for nonimmigrant workers and submit to DHS the DOL labor certification or attestation. Under the first step, the employer generally must show that there are not enough qualified U.S. workers available to meet the employer's needs and that the employment of foreign workers will not adversely affect the working conditions of U.S. workers. The former may be shown by the employer's recruitment efforts or by the DOL classifying the occupation as having a labor shortage. Depending on the visa category, the latter may be shown by the employer adhering to certain wage requirements or job offer or contract content requirements. The labor conditions that must be satisfied are established by the INA and DOL regulations and differ according to the nonimmigrant worker or employment-based immigration classification. Generally, temporary agricultural guest workers have received the strongest protections through explicit statutory provisions that are implemented by DOL through its regulations. Under the two-step process, the DOL and the DHS have jurisdiction over the labor certification and the visa petition, respectively, and related enforcement responsibilities. Both agencies have authority to impose civil penalties on and/or debar employers who violate labor conditions for foreign workers, at either the labor certification/attestation stage or the worker petition stage. Debarment is notification to an employer who has substantially violated obligations under a nonimmigrant worker program that DOL and the DHS will not accept or will deny any labor certification applications and/or visa petitions submitted by the employer. These agency actions are the sole avenue to enforce the labor condition requirements linked to certain employment-based immigrant or guest worker nonimmigrant programs. Individual workers do not have private causes of action under federal immigration laws against employers who violate conditions of the labor certification or attestation. However, as discussed below, such remedies may be available and constitute a significant enforcement mechanism under some federal labor laws and state labor, contract, or tort laws. Responsible for administering and approving labor certification applications/attestations submitted by employers, the DOL generally has authority over non-compliance with labor certifications. The Office of Foreign Labor Certification (OFLC) of the Employment and Training Administration (ETA) in the DOL administers the labor certification program, which includes processing certification applications and auditing certifications, for the various employment-based visas. The OFLC bases its non-compliance actions on investigations conducted by the Wage and Hour Division (WHD) in the Employment Standards Administration (ESA) of the DOL. The WHD is responsible for ensuring compliance with laws governing wages and working conditions, including the employment eligibility provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) as well as labor standards laws, and for investigating violations of such laws. The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) within the DOL, which is responsible for investigating fraud in DOL programs, may become involved in alleged labor certifications/attestation violations if there is an element of fraud. In addition, according to the DOL regulations, it appears that allegations of fraud may, in some instances, be referred to DHS rather than OIG. Where investigative responsibilities overlap, federal agencies may cooperate in joint investigations. Within the DHS, the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) is responsible for adjudicating the visa petition submitted by the employer with the labor certification received from the DOL. The U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) within the DHS has jurisdiction over non-compliance with other conditions (i.e., conditions other than labor certification conditions) of temporary work visas that have been granted to aliens who are in the United States. For example, ICE may investigate whether aliens have violated their visa status by terminating employment for which the visa was granted and remaining in the United States. ICE is also responsible for investigating violations of immigration laws related to unlawful employment of aliens. For example, ICE conducts traditional worksite enforcement by investigating and bringing criminal charges against employers that intentionally violate the law and knowingly hire illegal aliens. In 1984, the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) protects undocumented workers and their right to organize and engage in collective bargaining. Since the Court's decision in Sure-Tan, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board , the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) has also been construed to apply to undocumented workers. In general, courts have premised their decisions on the NLRA and FLSA's broad definitions of the term "employee." For example, because the FLSA defines an employee simply as "any individual employed by an employer," courts have declined to limit the term to American workers and those who are certified for employment in the United States. In Sure-Tan , a group of undocumented workers were terminated after they voted in a union election that was opposed by their employer, a leather processing company. Following the election, Sure-Tan asked the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), the precursor to the DHS immigration divisions, to investigate the immigration status of some of the employees who voted in the election. After an INS investigation of all of Sure-Tan's Spanish-speaking workers, five employees accepted the agency's grant of voluntary departure. The Acting Regional Director for the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) later alleged that Sure-Tan's actions constituted an unfair labor practice in violation of the NLRA. The Supreme Court found that the NLRA's terms and policies support the statute's application to undocumented workers. The NLRA indicates that "[t]he term 'employee' shall include any employee," subject only to certain specified exceptions. Noting that undocumented aliens are not among the groups of workers expressly exempted, the Court reasoned that "they plainly come within the broad statutory definition of 'employee.'" The Court further maintained that the coverage of undocumented workers by the NLRA is consistent with the statute's "avowed purpose of encouraging and protecting the collective-bargaining process." If undocumented workers could not participate in union activities, a subclass of workers would be created. The Court believed that this subclass would erode the unity of all employees and impede effective collective bargaining because the group would not have a comparable stake in the collective goals of their co-workers. Although the Sure-Tan Court determined that the company violated the NLRA, it nevertheless reversed a remedial order for six months of backpay for each of the affected employees. The Court maintained that the backpay award was not sufficiently tailored to the actual, compensable injuries suffered by the discharged workers. The Court explained that the imposition of the award without regard to the workers' circumstances "constitute[d] pure speculation and [did] not comport with the general reparative policies of the NLRA." In particular, the Court noted that the relevant employees should have been "deemed 'unavailable' for work ... during any period when they were not lawfully entitled to be present and employed in the United States." An award of six months of backpay did not reflect the employees' actual economic losses or legal availability for work. The Court revisited the issue of backpay awards in Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board , a 2002 case involving the termination of undocumented workers who supported a union organizing campaign. In Hoffman , the Court held that the NLRB's ability to award backpay to an undocumented worker is foreclosed by federal immigration policy, as expressed in the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA). The Court explained that the employee verification system established by IRCA made combating the employment of undocumented aliens central to the policy of immigration law. If an employer unknowingly hires an undocumented alien or an alien becomes unauthorized while employed, the employer is required by IRCA to terminate the worker or be subject to civil penalties. According to the Court, a backpay award to an undocumented alien would run counter to the policies established by the IRCA. The Court maintained: "[A]warding backpay in a case like this not only trivializes the immigration laws, it also condones and encourages future violations." The Hoffman Court insisted that other sanctions were available to remedy the company's unfair labor practices. The Court cited the NLRB's issuance of cease and desist orders against Hoffman, and the agency's requirement that the company post a notice identifying the rights provided by the NLRA. The Court noted that such "traditional remedies" are "sufficient to effectuate national labor policy regardless of whether the 'spur and catalyst' of backpay accompanies them." Whether the FLSA protects undocumented workers was considered by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in 1988. In Patel v. Quality Inn South , a hotel employee alleged violations of the FLSA and sought unpaid wage payments. The defendants argued that the employee was not protected by the statute because he was an undocumented alien. Based on the text of the FLSA and its legislative history, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that undocumented workers are covered by the statute. Like the NLRA, the FLSA broadly defines the term "employee" to mean "any individual employed by an employer." Although specific exceptions to this broad definition are identified, undocumented workers are not among them. The Eleventh Circuit observed: This definitional framework--a broad general definition followed by several specific exceptions--strongly suggests that Congress intended an all encompassing definition of the term "employee" that would include all workers not specifically excepted. The legislative history of the FLSA confirmed that a broad definition was intended by the measure's chief sponsor in the Senate. Unlike the Supreme Court, which viewed the awarding of backpay for NLRA violations as inconsistent with the IRCA, the Eleventh Circuit concluded in Patel that the FLSA's full range of remedies should be available without regard to immigration status. The Eleventh Circuit distinguished Patel from the workers in Sure-Tan , noting that Patel was seeking to recover wages for work already performed: Patel is not attempting to recover back pay for being unlawfully deprived of a job. Rather he simply seeks to recover unpaid minimum wages and overtime for work already performed. Under these circumstances the rationale the Supreme Court used in Sure-Tan to limit the availability of back pay under the NLRA to periods when the employee was lawfully present in the United States is inapplicable. It would make little sense to consider Patel "unavailable" for work during a period of time when he was actually working. Patel has been followed by other courts. In Lucas v. Jerusalem Cafe , the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit maintained that the "FLSA's sweeping definitions of 'employer' and 'employee' unambiguously encompass unauthorized aliens." Moreover, the Eighth Circuit found that allowing undocumented workers to recover damages for work actually performed is consistent with the IRCA. The Eighth Circuit noted that the FLSA and the IRCA "together promote dignified employment conditions for those working in the country, regardless of immigration status, while firmly discouraging the employment of individuals who lack work authorization." In a 2008 fact sheet, the WHD of the DOL emphasized that it would continue to enforce the FLSA without regard to whether an employee is undocumented. The WHD sought to distinguish the Court's decision in Hoffman from actions brought by undocumented workers under the FLSA. The WHD maintained that claims brought under the FLSA seek backpay for hours actually worked, and that the Supreme Court's concern with awarding backpay under the NLRA did not apply to work actually performed. Although the INA and the NLRA rely on enforcement by federal administrative agencies or bodies, private remedies are available under the FLSA and some state laws. Unlike the FLSA, the Migrant Seasonal and Agricultural Workers Protection Act (MSAWPA) excludes H-2A agricultural workers from its coverage, but it does not exclude other categories of nonimmigrant workers who may be performing some types of agricultural work. As a consequence, H-2B forestry workers have brought claims under the MSAWPA private cause of action. Also, foreign guest workers have sued employers for claims under state laws regarding tort and breach of contract in addition to state labor laws paralleling federal laws on wages and other working conditions. Some breach of contract claims are based on violations of federal immigration laws establishing worker conditions that must be included in a job contract/offer. Generally, Legal Services Corporation (LSC), an independent corporation created by Congress to provide access to legal services for low-income Americans by awarding grants to legal services providers, is governed by federal laws that have not permitted it to provide legal representation to nonimmigrant workers, except to H-2A nonimmigrant agricultural workers to litigate employer violations of contracts or labor conditions/certifications for the purpose of preserving the integrity of the H-2A program. A recent proposed rulemaking would revise the LSC rules to extend services to H-2B forestry workers to implement recent statutory changes. Legislation in the 113 th Congress would reform foreign guest worker visa categories to strengthen worker protections while increasing flexibility and responsiveness to employer needs. S. 744 , Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act, among other things, would reverse the effect of Hoffman by permitting all workplace remedies to apply regardless of immigration status and would thereby make reinstatement available for those authorized to work; create new nonimmigrant worker categories, including two that would replace the H-2A category; establish whistleblower protections; and extend coverage of the MSAWPA to include all nonimmigrant agricultural workers. H.R. 2131 , the Supplying Knowledge-based Immigrants and Lifting Levels of STEM Visas Act or SKILLS Visa Act, among other things, would specify employment protections, such as wages, working conditions, contract requirements, for various high-skilled, professional visa categories that currently do not have such protections; require verification of foreign degrees; increase H-1B numerical limits; authorize streamlined certification procedures for employers filing multiple petitions for workers in certain visa categories; and authorize the Secretary of Labor to subpoena employers of H-1B, H-1B1, and E-3 nonimmigrant workers. H.R. 1773 would establish a new H-2C agricultural worker visa category, which, however, would be excluded from coverage by the MSAWPA.

One challenge of immigration law has been to balance the interests of the domestic workforce with employer interests in hiring foreign workers who are not already authorized to work in the United States while preventing the exploitation of foreign workers. There are three main sources of labor protections for foreign workers in the United States: (1) the conditions imposed on employers hiring foreign workers through the Department of Labor (DOL) labor certification/attestation and DHS petition process; (2) federal labor laws stipulating that employers adhere to certain requirements governing wages and other conditions; and (3) worker rights under state and local laws regarding labor, contracts, and torts. Streamlining and easing certain labor and immigration requirements that are perceived as unnecessarily onerous and insufficiently flexible may benefit certain employers with immediate labor needs. On the other hand, stronger protections for foreign workers may not only guard those workers from exploitation and abuse but may also serve to protect the interests of the domestic workforce by reducing to some employers the attractiveness of hiring foreign workers who are not already authorized to work in the United States. Legislative proposals to reform employment-based visa programs in the current Congress reflect some of these tensions. This report will discuss the DOL labor certification/attestation and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) petition process as well as aspects of the applicability of federal labor laws to foreign workers. It will also briefly address state and local laws regarding labor, contract, and torts that sometimes provide foreign workers with additional rights. Federal labor laws that apply regardless of immigration status, including those concerning health and safety and employment discrimination, as well as state occupational certification and licensing requirements are outside the scope of this report. For a comprehensive look at employment-based immigration and related federal labor policies and programs, see CRS Report RL33977, Immigration of Foreign Workers: Labor Market Tests and Protections, by [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report RL32044, Immigration: Policy Considerations Related to Guest Worker Programs, by [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report R42434, Immigration of Temporary Lower-Skilled Workers: Current Policy and Related Issues, by [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report R43161, Agricultural Guest Workers: Legislative Activity in the 113th Congress, by [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report RL34739, Temporary Farm Labor: The H-2A Program and the U.S. Department of Labor's Proposed Changes in the Adverse Effect Wage Rate (AEWR), by [author name scrubbed]; and CRS Report RS21186, Hoffman Plastic Compounds v. NLRB and Backpay Awards to Undocumented Aliens, by [author name scrubbed]. (pdf)

T he official unemployment rate has been in decline over the past several years, peaking at 10% shortly after the 2007-2009 recession before falling to 5% in January 2016. A falling unemployment rate is gene rally a cause for celebration as more individuals are able to find jobs; however, the current low unemployment rate has been increasingly cited as a reason to begin rolling back expansionary monetary and fiscal policy. After citing "considerable improvement in labor market conditions," in December 2015 for the first time in seven years, the Federal Reserve increased its federal funds target rate, reducing the expansionary power of its monetary policy. Labor market conditions have certainly improved since the depths of the financial crisis and 2007-2009 recession, but an unemployment rate of around 5% means that nearly 8 million people are still searching for jobs and are unable to find them. So why is the Federal Reserve reducing the amount of stimulus entering the economy when so many people are still looking for work? The answer involves the relationship between the two parts of the Federal Reserve's dual mandate--maximum employment and stable prices. In general, economists have observed an inverse relationship between the unemployment rate and the inflation rate, i.e., the rate at which prices rise. This trade-off between unemployment and inflation become particularly pronounced (i.e., small changes in unemployment result in relatively large price swings) when the unemployment rate drops below a certain level, referred to by economists as the "natural unemployment rate." Alternatively, when the unemployment rate rises above the natural rate, inflation will tend to decelerate. In response to the financial crisis and subsequent recession, the Federal Reserve began employing expansionary monetary policy to spur economic growth and improve labor market conditions. Recently, the unemployment rate has fallen to a level consistent with many estimates of the natural rate of unemployment, between 4.6% and 5.0%. If the unemployment rate were to continue falling, it would likely fall below the natural rate of unemployment and cause accelerating inflation, violating the Federal Reserve's mandate of stable prices. This report discusses the relationship between unemployment and inflation, the general economic theory surrounding this topic, the relationship since the financial crisis, and its use in policymaking. A relationship between the unemployment rate and prices was first prominently established in the late 1950s. This early research focused on the relationship between the unemployment rate and the rate of wage inflation. Economist A. W. Phillips found that between 1861 and 1957, there was a negative relationship between the unemployment rate and the rate of change in wages in the United Kingdom, showing wages tended to grow faster when the unemployment rate was lower, and vice versa. His work was then replicated using U.S. data between 1934 and 1958, discovering a similar negative relationship between unemployment and wage growth. Economists reasoned that this relationship existed due to simple supply and demand within the labor market. As the unemployment rate decreases, the supply of unemployed workers decreases, thus employers must offer higher wages to attract additional employees from other firms. This body of research was expanded, shifting the focus from wage growth to changes in the price level more generally. The negative relationship between unemployment and inflation was dubbed the Phillips curve, due to Phillips's seminal work on the issue. Many interpreted the early research around the Phillips curve to mean that a stable relationship existed between unemployment and inflation. This suggested that policymakers could choose among a schedule of unemployment and inflation rates; in other words, policymakers could achieve and maintain a lower unemployment rate if they were willing to accept a higher inflation rate and vice versa. This rationale was prominent in the 1960s, and both the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations considered this framework when designing economic policy. During the 1960s, economists began challenging the Phillips curve concept, suggesting that the model was too simplistic and the relationship would break down in the presence of persistent positive inflation. These critics claimed that the static relationship between the unemployment rate and inflation could only persist if individuals never adjusted their expectations around inflation, which would be at odds with the fundamental economic principle that individuals act rationally. But, if individuals adjusted their expectations around inflation, any effort to maintain an unemployment rate below the natural rate of unemployment would result in continually rising inflation, rather than a one-time increase in the inflation rate. This rebuttal to the original Phillips curve model is now commonly known as the natural rate model. The natural rate model suggests that there is a certain level of unemployment that is consistent with a stable inflation rate, known as the natural rate of unemployment. The natural rate of unemployment is often referred to as the non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment (NAIRU). When the unemployment rate falls below the natural rate of unemployment, referred to as a negative unemployment gap, the inflation rate is expected to accelerate. When the unemployment rate exceeds the natural rate of unemployment, referred to as a positive unemployment gap, inflation is expected to decelerate. The natural rate model gained support as 1970s' events showed that the stable tradeoff between unemployment and inflation as suggested by the Phillips curve appeared to break down. A series of negative oil supply shocks in the 1970s resulted in high unemployment and high inflation, known as stagflation, with core inflation and the unemployment rate both rising above 9% in 1975. The economy's ability to produce goods and services, or potential output, is dependent on three main factors in the long run: (1) the amount of capital (machines, factories, etc.), (2) the number and quality of workers, and (3) the level of technology. Although these factors largely govern the economy's potential output, the economy's actual output is largely governed by demand for goods and services, which can rise above or below potential output. The economy is most stable when actual output equals potential output; the economy is said to be in equilibrium because the demand for goods and services is matched by the economy's ability to supply those goods and services. In other words, certain characteristics and features of the economy (capital, labor, and technology) determine how much the economy can sustainably produce at a given time, but demand for goods and services is what actually determines how much is produced in the economy. As actual output diverges from potential output, inflation will tend to become less stable. All else equal, when actual output exceeds the economy's potential output, a positive output gap is created, and inflation will tend to accelerate. When actual output is below potential output, a negative output gap is generated, and inflation will tend to decelerate. Within the natural rate model, the natural rate of unemployment is the level of unemployment consistent with actual output equaling potential output, and therefore stable inflation. During an economic expansion, total demand for goods and services within the economy can grow to exceed the economy's potential output, and a positive output gap is created. As demand grows, firms rush to increase their output to meet this new demand. In the short term though, firms have limited options to increase their output. It often takes too long to build a new factory, or order and install additional machinery, so instead firms hire additional employees. As the number of available workers decreases, workers can bargain for higher wages, and firms are willing to pay higher wages to capitalize on the increased demand for their goods and services. However, as wages increase, upward pressure is placed on the price of all goods and services because labor costs make up a large portion of the total cost of goods and services. Over time, the average price of goods and services rises to reflect the increased cost of wages. The opposite tends to occur when actual output within the economy is lower than the economy's potential output, and a negative output gap is created. During an economic downturn, total demand within the economy shrinks. In response to decreased demand, firms reduce hiring, or lay off employees, and the unemployment rate rises. As the unemployment rate rises, workers have less bargaining power when seeking higher wages because they become easier to replace. Firms can hold off on increasing prices as the cost of one of their major inputs--wages--becomes less expensive. This results in a decrease in the rate of inflation. The natural rate of unemployment is not constant. As discussed earlier, the natural rate of unemployment is the rate that is consistent with sustainable economic growth, or when actual output is equal to potential output. It is therefore expected that changes within the economy can change the natural unemployment rate. Four main features of the economy affect the natural unemployment rate: 1. Labor market composition, 2. Labor market institutions and public policy, 3. Productivity growth, and 4. Long-term--that is, longer than 26 weeks--unemployment rates. As the characteristics of the labor force change--for example, with respect to age, educational attainment, and work experience--and alter the productive capacity of the economy, the natural rate is also expected to shift. Individual worker's characteristics affect the likelihood that a worker will become unemployed and the speed (or ease) at which he or she can find work. For example, younger workers tend to have less experience and therefore have higher levels of unemployment on average. Consequently, if young workers form a significant portion of the labor force, the natural rate of unemployment will be higher. Alternatively, individuals with higher levels of educational attainment generally find it easier to find work; therefore, as the average level of educational attainment of workers rises, the natural rate of unemployment will tend to decrease. Labor market institutions and public policies in place within an economy can also impact the natural rate of unemployment by improving individuals' ability to find and obtain work. For example, apprenticeship programs provide individuals additional work experience and help them find work faster, which can decrease the natural rate of unemployment. Alternatively, ample unemployment insurance benefits may increase the natural rate of unemployment, as unemployed individuals will spend longer periods looking for work. The rate of productivity growth also impacts the natural unemployment rate. According to economic theory, employee compensation can grow at the same speed as productivity without increasing inflation. Individuals become accustomed to compensation growth at this speed and come to expect similar increases in their compensation year over year based on the previous growth in productivity. A decrease in the rate of productivity growth would eventually result in a decrease in the growth of compensation; however, workers are likely to resist this decrease in the pace of wage growth and bargain for compensation growth above the growth rate of productivity. This above average compensation growth will erode firms' profits and they will begin to lay off employees to cut down on costs, leading to a higher natural rate of unemployment. The opposite occurs with an increase in productivity growth, businesses are able to increase their profits and hire additional workers simultaneously, resulting in a lower natural rate of unemployment. Lastly, the contemporaneous and previous level of long-term unemployment in an economy can shift the natural rate of unemployment. Individuals who are unemployed for longer periods of time tend to forget certain skills and become less productive, and are therefore less attractive to employers. In addition, some employers may interpret long breaks from employment as a signal of low labor market commitment or worker quality, further reducing job offers to this group. As the proportion of long-term unemployed individuals increases, the natural rate of unemployment will also increase. Understanding the relationship between the current unemployment rate and the natural rate is important when designing economic policy, and the fact that the natural rate can shift over time further complicates the design of economic policy. As shown in Figure 1 , the estimated natural rate of unemployment has been relatively stable over time, shifting from a high of 6.3% in the late 1970s to about 4.8% in 2016, a spread of only 1.5 percentage points. The major inflection points seen in the natural rate over time are largely the result of changes in the makeup of the labor force and changes in productivity growth over time. As shown in Figure 1 , the estimated natural rate slowly increased in the late 1950s, 1960s and the early 1970s. Several economists have suggested that much of this increase in the natural rate, from about 5.4% to close to 6.3%, was due to the large number of inexperienced workers entering the labor force as members of the baby-boomer generation began looking for their first jobs. The natural rate began to decrease in the 1980s, with a period of relatively rapid decline in the early 1990s (see Figure 1 ). A portion of this decrease in the 1980s is likely due to baby boomers becoming more experienced and productive workers. The sharp decrease in the 1990s has been largely explained by an increase in the rate of productivity growth in the economy. Productivity growth, total output per hour of labor, was about 1.5% between 1975 and 1989, but rose to about 2.2% between 1990 and 2000 largely due to the rise of computers and the Internet. Beginning in 2008, the natural rate began to increase sharply, as shown in Figure 1 . The rapid increase in the natural rate after 2007 can largely be explained by changes in the makeup of the labor force and changes in government policy. As shown in Figure 4 , the number of individuals who were unemployed for more than 26 weeks increased dramatically after the 2007-2009 recession. Individuals who are unemployed for longer durations tend to have more difficulty finding new jobs, and after the recession, the long-term unemployed made up a significant portion of the labor force, which increased the natural rate of unemployment. In addition, some research has suggested the extension of unemployment benefits may also increase the natural rate of unemployment. Additionally, some portion of the increase in the natural unemployment rate may be due to the decrease in productivity, as productivity growth fell to 0.7% between the third quarter of 2009 and the second quarter of 2016. The rate of inflation is not determined exclusively by the unemployment gap. Two prominent factors that also impact the rate of inflation are (1) expected inflation and (2) supply shocks. Individuals and businesses form expectations about the expected rate of inflation in the future, and make economic choices based on these expectations. For example, if individuals expect 2% inflation over the next year, they will seek a 2% increase in their nominal salary to preserve their real purchasing power. Firms will also incorporate inflation expectations when setting prices to keep the real price of their goods constant. An increase in the expected rate of inflation will be translated into an actual increase in the rate of inflation as wages and prices are set by individuals within the economy. Economic events that impact the supply of goods or services within the economy, known as supply shocks, can also impact the rate of inflation. The classic example of a supply shock is a reduction in the supply of available oil. As the supply of oil decreases, the price of oil, and any good that uses oil in its production process, increases. This leads to a spike in the overall price level in the economy, namely, inflation. Policymakers generally focus on negative supply shocks, which reduce the supply of a good or service, but positive supply shocks, which increase the supply of a good or service, can also occur. Positive supply shocks generally reduce inflation. Events following the 2007-2009 recession have again called into question how well economists understand the relationship between the unemployment gap and inflation. As a result of the global financial crisis and the U.S. 2007-2009 recession, the unemployment rate rose above 10% and remained significantly elevated compared with estimates of the natural rate of unemployment for multiple years, as shown in Figure 1 . The natural rate model suggests that this significant and prolonged unemployment gap should have resulted in decelerating inflation during that period. Actual inflation did decline modestly during that period, decreasing from an average rate of about 2% between 2003 and 2007 to about 1.4% on average between 2008 and mid-2015. However, based on previous experience with unemployment gaps of this size and inflation forecasts based on the natural rate model, many economists anticipated a more drastic decrease in the inflation rate, with some predicting negative inflation (or deflation) rates reaching 4% during that period. The movements of the unemployment rate and inflation rate after the financial crisis are displayed in Figure 2 . Numerous competing hypotheses exist for why a significant decrease in the inflation rate failed to materialize. The following sections describe the prominent hypotheses and discuss the available evidence for these hypotheses. Over the previous several decades, the U.S. economy has become more integrated with the global economy as trade has become a larger portion of economic activity. Economists have suggested that as economies increase their openness to the global economy, global economic forces will begin to play a larger role in domestic inflation dynamics. This suggests that inflation may be determined by labor market slack and the output gap (the difference between actual output and potential output) on a global level rather than a domestic level. Since the 1980s, trade (as measured by the sum of imports and exports) has expanded significantly in the United States, increasing from less than 20% of GDP to more than 30% of GDP between 2011 and 2013. According to the International Monetary Fund, the average output gap following the 2007-2009 recession among all advanced economies was smaller than the output gap in the United States, as shown in Table 1 . In 2009, the actual output among all advanced economies was about 4% below potential output, whereas the actual output in the United States was about 5% below potential output. If increased trade openness has subdued the impact of the domestic output gap on inflation in favor of the global output gap, the smaller output gap among other advanced economies may help to explain the unexpectedly modest decrease in inflation after the 2007-2009 recession. The empirical evidence surrounding the growing impact of the global output gap on domestic inflation, which focused on the time period before the 2007-2009, is mixed. A number of researchers have found that the global output gap has some impact on domestic inflation dynamics; however, others have found no relationship between the global output gap and domestic inflation. Researchers who contend that the global output gap is influential with respect to domestic inflation have then attempted to determine if the strength of this influence has grown alongside increases in trade openness. When the global output gap influences domestic inflation, however, the strength of this impact seems to be unrelated to changes in trade openness. Based on this evidence, it appears unlikely that changes in trade openness over recent decades and the smaller output gap abroad resulted in the unexpectedly modest decrease in inflation after the 2007-2009 recession. Alternative explanations for the lack of deflation after the 2007-2009 recession cite the global financial crisis and decreased access to external financing for businesses. Typically, during a recession, as demand for goods and services decreases, the price of those goods and services also tends to decrease. However, some economists have argued that the financial crisis decreased the supply of external financing (i.e., equity issues, bank loans) available for businesses, which increased borrowing costs. In the face of increased borrowing costs, some businesses, especially liquidity constrained businesses with so-called sticky customer bases, would have opted to raise prices to remain solvent until the costs of borrowing decreased as the financial sector recovered. Limited empirical work has found evidence of this behavior by businesses during the 2007-2009 recession, and therefore may help to explain the unexpectedly modest decrease in inflation following the recession. Changes in how individuals form inflation expectations, as a result of broad changes in how the Federal Reserve conducts monetary policy, may also help to explain the unexpectedly moderate decrease in the rate of inflation after the 2007-2009 recession. After the high inflation of the late 1970s and 1980s, the Federal Reserve became more concerned with maintaining a stable rate of inflation in the face of economic shocks. Previously, the Federal Reserve accommodated changes in inflation that resulted from economic shocks. Under the previous policy regime, an economic shock that raised inflation would also increase inflation expectations, which would further increase inflation. As seen in Figure 3 , before the 1980s, the fluctuations in inflation were more volatile, with a spread of multiple percentage points from year to year. However, under the new policy regime, economic actors were less likely to shift inflation expectations as a result of an economic shock because they believed the Federal Reserve would stabilize any changes in inflation due to economic shocks. This change in how economic actors formed inflation expectations is thought to have reduced the volatility of changes in the rate of inflation during economic shocks. The decreased volatility can be seen in Figure 3 as the spread seen in core inflation decreases significantly after the early 1980s. Beginning in the 1990s, the Federal Reserve appeared to make another change in how it was conducting monetary policy. Not only was the Federal Reserve working to stabilize changes in inflation that resulted from economic shocks, but it appeared to be targeting a specific inflation rate of 2.5% core inflation per year. Economists suggested that if the Federal Reserve maintained a consistent inflation target over time then economic actors' inflation expectations would become anchored at the Federal Reserve's target inflation rate. A number of researchers have found that inflation expectations have indeed become anchored around the Federal Reserve's inflation target, and that the strength of this anchoring effect has increased since the 1990s. The increase inflation anchoring can be seen in Figure 3 , as core inflation begins hovering around 2% beginning shortly after the early 1990s. As discussed earlier, actual inflation is heavily influenced by inflation expectations. As inflation expectations become anchored at a specific rate, these expectations place pressure on actual inflation to remain at that specific rate, acting as a positive feedback loop, which pushes actual inflation back to the inflation anchor after any shock pushes actual inflation away from the anchored rate. The increased level of inflation anchoring helps to explain the lack of deflationary pressure after the 2007-2009 recession. An increase in the degree to which inflation becomes anchored may have important implications for future policymaking. As expected inflation becomes more anchored, policymakers may be able to use monetary and fiscal policy more generously without impacting the actual inflation rate. However, if individuals begin to lose confidence in the Federal Reserve's ability to maintain their target inflation rate because the Federal Reserve pursues policies incompatible with price stability, inflation expectations can become unanchored resulting in a more volatile inflation rate as a result of shifting inflation expectations. The global financial crisis and subsequent recession in the United States was unique in many ways, including the outsized increase in the proportion of individuals who were unemployed for longer than 26 weeks. As shown in Figure 4 , the percentage of unemployed individuals who had been jobless for more than 26 weeks rose to over 45% after the 2007-2008 recession, significantly higher than during any other period in the post-WWII era. The sharp rise of the long-term unemployed has been offered as another potential explanation for the missing deflation after the 2007-2009 recession. Some economists argue that inflation dynamics are driven specifically by the short-term unemployment rate, rather than the total unemployment rate (which includes short-term and long-term unemployment). Employers tend to favor the short-term unemployed so strongly over the long-term unemployed that the long-term unemployed are essentially removed from contention for employment opportunities. Employers tend to avoid hiring the long-term unemployed for a number of reasons, as discussed in the " Time Varying Natural Rate of Unemployment " section. Because the long-term unemployed are essentially removed from the labor pool, from the perspective of employers, the numbers of long-term unemployed individuals have very little impact on wage-setting decisions compared with the short-term unemployed. As a result, the long-term unemployed impact inflation to a lesser degree than the short-term unemployed. The total unemployment rate remained elevated above estimates of the NAIRU for about seven and a half years following the 2007-2009 recession, but this was largely due to the unprecedented increase in the level of long-term unemployed. The short-term unemployment rate spiked, but fell to pre-recession levels relatively quickly after the end of the recession compared with long-term unemployment, as shown in Figure 5 . Compared with the persistent unemployment gap for total unemployment after the 2007-2009 recession, the unemployment gap for the short-term unemployed dissipated much faster and therefore would have resulted in a more moderate decrease in the inflation rate. Using the short-term unemployment gap rather than the total unemployment gap to forecast inflation following the 2007-2009 recession, recent research has produced significantly more accurate inflation forecasts and has accounted for much of the missing deflation forecasted by others. Results of this research suggest that when considering the effects of monetary or fiscal policy on inflation, policymakers would benefit from using a measure of the unemployment gap that weights the unemployment rate for the short-term unemployed more heavily than the long-term unemployed. Still others have suggested that the failure of natural rate model to accurately estimate inflation following the financial crisis is evidence that the natural rate model may be incorrect or inadequate for forecasting inflation. In response to the perceived failure of the model, some researchers are searching for other potential indicators that can better explain and predict changes in inflation. The unemployment gap is used as a measure of overall economic slack to help explain changes in inflation; however, it may not be the best measure currently. One recent article has suggested that an alternative measure of economic slack based on recent minimum unemployment rates may offer an improved measure for forecasting inflation. The new measure consists of the difference between the current unemployment rate and the minimum unemployment rate seen over the current and previous 11 quarters. As the current unemployment rate rises above the minimum unemployment seen in previous quarters, inflation tends to decrease, and vice versa. This relationship appears to be relatively stable over time and, more importantly, improves on some other inflation forecasts for periods during and shortly after the 2007-2009 recession. After the 2007-2009 recession, actual unemployment rose above CBO's estimated natural rate of unemployment for 31 consecutive quarters. Average core inflation declined, as predicted, but only modestly, from about 2.0% per year between 2003 and 2007 to about 1.4% per year between 2008 and mid-2015. This modest decrease in the rate of inflation called into question the validity of the natural rate model. In response, researchers began investigating potential reasons for the unexpectedly mild decrease in inflation. A number of explanations have been offered to explain the missing deflation, ranging from increased financing costs due to crippled financial markets following the global financial crisis, to changes in the formation of inflation expectations since the 1990s, to the unprecedented level of long-term unemployment that resulted from the recession. Researchers have found a degree of empirical evidence to support all of these claims, suggesting it may have been a confluence of factors that resulted in the unexpectedly modest inflation after the recession. The natural rate model has implications for the design and implementation of economic policy, specifically limitations to fiscal and monetary policies and alternative policies to affect economic growth without potentially accelerating inflation. The natural rate model suggests that government's ability to spur higher employment through fiscal and monetary policies is limited in important ways. Expansionary fiscal and monetary policies can be used to boost gross domestic product (GDP) growth and reduce unemployment, by increasing demand for goods and services, but doing so comes at a cost. According to the natural rate model, if government attempts to maintain an unemployment rate below the natural rate of unemployment, inflation will increase and continuously rise until unemployment returns to its natural rate. As a result, growth will be more volatile than if policymakers had attempted to maintain the unemployment rate at the natural rate of unemployment. As higher levels of inflation tend to hurt economic growth, expansionary economic policy can actually end up limiting economic growth in the long run by causing accelerating inflation. The impact of inflation on economic growth is discussed in the " Inflation's Impact on Economic Growth " section below. As discussed earlier, the relationship of unemployment to the natural rate of unemployment is used as a benchmark to determine when there is either a positive or negative output gap (i.e., actual output differs from potential output). Alternative measures could be used to indicate an output gap, however, the literature surrounding this topic has largely found using the unemployment gap to be a reliable measure of the overall output gap. In general, policymakers avoid pursuing an unemployment target below the natural rate of unemployment because accelerating inflation imposes costs on businesses, individuals, and the economy as a whole. Inflation tends to interfere with pricing mechanisms in the economy, resulting in individuals and businesses making less than optimal spending, saving, and investment decisions. Additionally, economic actors (e.g., workers, firms, and investors) often take action to protect themselves from the negative impacts of inflation, but in doing so divert resources from other more productive activities. For example, to guard against inflation firms will shy from long-term investments, favoring short-term investments even if they offer a lower rate of return. Inflation's impact on economic growth is especially pronounced at higher levels of inflation than the United States has experienced in recent decades. Ultimately these inefficient decisions reduce incomes, economic growth, and living standards. For these reasons, it is generally accepted that inflation should be kept low to minimize these distortions in the economy. Some would argue that an inflation rate of zero is optimal; however, a target of zero inflation makes a period of accidental deflation more likely, and deflation is thought to be even more costly than inflation. Deflation is thought to be especially damaging as decreasing prices provide a strong incentive for consumers to abstain from purchasing goods and services, as their dollars will be worth more in the future, decreasing aggregate demand. In an effort to balance these two risks, policymakers, including the Federal Reserve, often target a positive, but low, inflation rate, generally around 2%, which reduces inefficiencies within the economy while protecting against deflation. The unexpectedly mild decrease in the rate of inflation following the sustained unemployment gap after the 2007-2009 recession suggested a weakening of the relationship between the unemployment gap and inflation, and evidence of a weakened relationship persists several years into the current economic expansion. Expansionary monetary and fiscal policies have been in place for the better part of a decade. The unemployment rate is approximating estimates of the natural rate of unemployment, and yet the inflation rate has yet to rise to the Federal Reserve's long-term target of 2% per year. The current state of the economy suggests that either the subdued relationship seen between the unemployment gap and inflation during the depths of the economic downturn appears to be persisting even as economic conditions improve, or the unemployment gap may no longer act as an accurate measure of the output gap. If the relationship between inflation and the unemployment rate has indeed weakened, it would have important implications for economic policy. On the one hand, it may allow policymakers to employ fiscal and monetary policies more aggressively without accelerating inflation at the same rate as would have been previously expected. On the other hand, however, a weakened relationship would also suggest that if inflation were to begin accelerating, a larger and more sustained period of elevated unemployment may be necessary to stabilize inflation than otherwise anticipated. Further research and time is necessary to determine if the weakened relationship seen after the recession is a temporary phenomenon specific to the financial crisis and subsequent events, or if it is a more enduring shift in the strength of the dynamic between unemployment and inflation. Alternatively, the Federal Reserve's inability to meet their inflation target despite the unemployment rate falling to levels consistent with the natural rate of unemployment, may suggest that the unemployment gap is no longer an accurate proxy for the output gap. In the second quarter of 2016, the unemployment rate was about 4.9%, consistent with estimates of the natural rate of unemployment (4.6%-5.0%), but the CBO still estimated an output gap of about 2% during the same period. The difference between the unemployment gap and output gap may be due to persistent slack in the labor market as a result of the 2007-2009 recession, which is not captured by the official unemployment rate. Alternative measures of labor market underutilization show that some of the weakness in labor markets that resulted from the recession still persists. For example, following the recession, the labor force participation rate decreased from about 66% to less than 63%. Some of this decrease is due to an aging population but some is due to individuals giving up on finding work due to poor economic conditions. The unemployment rate does not account for individuals who stopped looking for work, and therefore may understate the actual amount of slack left in the economy. This could help explain why the CBO estimates a current output gap, while the unemployment gap seems to have disappeared. Following the significant damage to the labor market as a result of the 2007-2009 recession, it is likely beneficial to use multiple measures of labor market underutilization in addition to the official unemployment rate to judge the potential size of the unemployment and output gap. In addition to fiscal and monetary policies, alternative economic policies could be used to target higher economic output without the risk of accelerating inflation by lowering the natural rate of unemployment. As discussed in the " Time Varying Natural Rate of Unemployment " section, four main factors determine the natural rate of unemployment, (1) the makeup of the labor force, (2) labor market institutions and public policy, (3) growth in productivity, and (4) contemporaneous and previous levels of long-term unemployment. Policies to improve the labor force, by either making employees more desirable to employers or improving the efficiency of the matching process between employees and employers, would drive down the natural rate of unemployment. In addition, changes to labor market institutions and public policy that ease the process of finding and hiring qualified employees, such as increased job training or apprenticeship programs, could also help lower the natural unemployment rate. A wide range of policies have been suggested that may increase the growth rate of productivity and therefore decrease the natural rate of unemployment, such as increasing government investment in infrastructure, reducing government regulation of industry, and increasing incentives for research and development. In addition, more aggressive policy interventions to help individuals find work during economic downturns may help to prevent spikes in long-term unemployment and avoid increases in the natural rate of unemployment.

The unemployment rate is a vital measure of economic performance. A falling unemployment rate generally occurs alongside rising gross domestic product (GDP), higher wages, and higher industrial production. The government can generally achieve a lower unemployment rate using expansionary fiscal or monetary policy, so it might be assumed that policymakers would consistently target a lower unemployment rate using these policies. Part of the reason policymakers do not revolves around the relationship between the unemployment rate and the inflation rate. In general, economists have found that when the unemployment rate drops below a certain level, referred to as the natural rate, the inflation rate will tend to increase and continue to rise until the unemployment rate returns to its natural rate. Alternatively, when the unemployment rate rises above the natural rate, the inflation rate will tend to decelerate. The natural rate of unemployment is the level of unemployment consistent with sustainable economic growth. An unemployment rate below the natural rate suggests that the economy is growing faster than its maximum sustainable rate, which places upward pressure on wages and prices in general leading to increased inflation. The opposite is true if the unemployment rate rises above the natural rate, downward pressure is placed on wages and prices in general leading to decreased inflation. Wages make up a significant portion of the costs of goods and services, therefore upward or downward pressure on wages pushes average prices in the same direction. Two other sources of variation in the rate of inflation are inflation expectations and unexpected changes in the supply of goods and services. Inflation expectations play a significant role in the actual level of inflation, because individuals incorporate their inflation expectations when making price-setting decisions or when bargaining for wages. A change in the availability of goods and services used as inputs in the production process (e.g., oil) generally impacts the final price of goods and services in the economy, and therefore changing the rate of inflation. The natural rate of unemployment is not immutable and fluctuates alongside changes within the economy. For example, the natural rate of unemployment is affected by changes in the demographics, educational attainment, and work experience of the labor force; institutions (e.g., apprenticeship programs) and public policies (e.g., unemployment insurance); changes in productivity growth; and contemporaneous and previous level of long-term unemployment. Following the 2007-2009 recession, the actual unemployment rate remained significantly elevated compared with estimates of the natural rate of unemployment for multiple years. However, the average inflation rate decreased by less than one percentage point during this period despite predictions of negative inflation rates based on the natural rate model. Likewise, inflation has recently shown no sign of accelerating as unemployment has approached the natural rate. Some economists have used this as evidence to abandon the concept of a natural rate of unemployment in favor of other alternative indicators to explain fluctuations in inflation. Some researchers have largely upheld the natural rate model while looking at broader changes in the economy and the specific consequences of the 2007-2009 recession to explain the modest decrease in inflation after the recession. One potential explanation involves the limited supply of financing available to businesses after the breakdown of the financial sector. Another explanation cites changes in how inflation expectations are formed following changes in how the Federal Reserve responds to economic shocks and the establishment of an unofficial inflation target. Others researchers have cited the unprecedented increase in long-term unemployment that followed the recession, which significantly decreased bargaining power among workers.

The Consumer Price Index (CPI) is probably the most widely used measure of inflation. A number of federal government programs, such as Social Security benefits and civil service retirement, are tied to increases in the CPI. In addition, the personal income tax rate schedule is indexed to the CPI. Economists use the CPI to calculate constant-dollar estimates of other economic indicators, such as retail sales and hourly earnings, which allow analysis of changes in these variables excluding the effect of changes in the price level. Each year, the CPI is used to update the income levels that determine the poverty rate. Periodic increases in many union wage and other contracts are also tied to increases in the CPI. Thus, the behavior of the CPI has major consequences for a significant portion of the population; but many may be unfamiliar with the details of its calculation. The CPI is published by the Department of Labor's Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). There is no specific legislation authorizing or requiring BLS to calculate and publish the CPI. Neither has legislation ever been enacted to require BLS to adopt any particular methodology in calculating the CPI. When the Bureau of Labor was first created in 1888, its task was, among other duties, to "acquire and diffuse among the people of the United States useful information on subjects connected with labor, in the most general and comprehensive sense of the word.... " In 1913, the Bureau of Labor was transferred to the newly created Department of Labor and renamed the Bureau of Labor Statistics. BLS was given slightly more specific instructions: The Bureau of Labor Statistics, under the direction of the Secretary of Labor, shall collect, collate, and report at least once each year, or oftener if necessary, full and complete statistics of the conditions of labor and the products and distribution of the products of the same ... and said Secretary of Labor may collate, arrange, and publish such statistical information so obtained in such manner as to him may seem wise. Two CPIs are published by the BLS, the Consumer Price Index for Urban Wage Earners and Clerical Workers (CPI-W), and the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (CPI-U). The CPI-W is based on the purchasing patterns of only those in the population who earn more than half of their income from clerical or wage occupations, and were employed at least 37 weeks in the previous year. The CPI-W population makes up about 32% of the total population. Prior to 1978, the CPI-W was the only CPI published. Beginning in 1978, the CPI-U was introduced so that a broader share of the population would be represented in estimates of changes in the price level. The CPI-U is based on the expenditure patterns of all urban consumers and covers about 87% of the population. The CPI-U is usually the more publicized of the two price indexes. Although the CPI-U and CPI-W are slightly different indexes, the numerical difference between the two measures is typically small. Between 1989 and 2009, the CPI-U increased, overall, by 73.0% compared with an increase of 71.0% for the CPI-W. Over the same period, that translates into an average annual rate of change of 2.8% for the CPI-U and 2.7% for the CPI-W. Both the CPI-W and the CPI-U are used for inflation indexing by the federal government. One advantage to using the CPI in indexing is that the CPI is rarely revised. Definitions, the index base year, the goods and services accounted for, and the methodology used to calculate the CPI may change from time to time, but, once published, the actual index number is final. Using other measures of the price level, such as one of the price indexes associated with Gross Domestic Product, for indexing purposes poses the problem of which number to use, the preliminary estimate or one of many subsequent revisions. Since the release of January 2007 data, the CPI and all of its component indexes have been published rounded to three decimal places rather than one. The change was not meant to imply any increase in the accuracy of the CPI. Instead it is being done to maintain precision in published estimates of percentage changes. Prior to 2007, when BLS published the CPI rounded to only one decimal place, it based published figures of percentage change in the CPI on those rounded numbers so that they could be replicated by users of published CPI data. But doing that meant that some precision in the published percent change data was lost. The effect of the change was expected to be small. Both CPIs are based on retail market prices. These prices, for more than 80,000 separate items, are collected in 87 urban areas across the country from thousands of outlets, such as grocery and department stores, gasoline service stations, and hospitals, among others. BLS selects these retail establishments based on a survey showing where people do their shopping. Actual prices (except those for food) are not published because they are collected on a confidential basis. Price indexes are available in considerable detail. Examples of items for which CPI data are available include white bread, men's shirts, automobile tires, haircuts, funerals, automobile repair, and bedroom furniture. The "all-items" CPI is the index most often referred to and it is a composite index, a weighted average, based on the indexes for all of the goods and services whose prices are collected. The all-items CPI measures the price change of a fixed market basket of goods and services over time. The mix of goods and services making up the market basket is based on spending patterns established by the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CES). Based on the CES, weights are assigned to each of the goods and services that make up the market basket. These weights determine how much the price change for a given good will affect the all-items measure. For any given interval, the total price change, as measured by the all-items CPI, is the weighted average of the price changes of all of the components. With the release of data for January 2010, the CPI market basket is based on purchasing patterns described by the CES in 2007 and 2008. BLS updates the expenditure weights every two years. Table 1 shows the major expenditure categories included in the CPI and their relative importance in the CPI-U as of December 2009. Relative importance reflects both the expenditure weights and changes in relative prices. Either a larger expenditure weight, or an increase in the price of a good relative to prices for other goods may cause the relative importance to increase, and vice versa. Based on the measures of relative importance shown here, some might be concerned that medical care costs have too small a weight in the all-items index. In particular, the elderly typically spend a relatively larger share of their outlays on medical care. In calculating the CPI, however, the share of the market basket accounted for by medical care is based on "out-of-pocket" costs. This includes direct out-of pocket costs for medical care as well as indirect out-of-pocket costs for health insurance. An increasing share of medical costs are paid for by employers and government, so that out-of-pocket expenses on medical care are not as great as total outlays on medical care. It is also important to appreciate that there is considerable variation among consumers (and among elderly consumers as well) in the demand for medical care, and the relative importance of medical care in the CPI is based on an average. No single price index can accurately describe the inflation experience of every single person. Different population groups (e.g., the elderly) tend to have different purchasing patterns, and individuals' purchases vary significantly within those groups. Although many elderly may spend more on medical care than is taken into account in the CPI, there are also some elderly who spend less. For those who spend less, if medical care costs rise more rapidly than do the prices of other goods and services, the CPI will tend to overstate increases in the cost of living, other things being equal. BLS is currently investigating the behavior of an experimental CPI for the elderly population. This experimental CPI for Americans aged 62 and older rose by an average of 2.9% per year between December 1989 and December 2009. During the same period, both the CPI-U and CPI-W rose at an annual rate of 2.7%. Considerable effort is made to ensure that the CPI is a meaningful, reliable measure of changes in the price level. But it does not necessarily reflect the inflation experience of each individual consumer. To the extent that individuals spend relatively more on those goods and services whose prices are rising faster than average, they may experience a higher inflation rate than that measured by the CPI. Similarly, those who spend relatively less on goods and services whose prices are rising faster than average, may experience a lower inflation rate than that measured by the CPI. If purchasing patterns change significantly, then in the short run the CPI may tend to overstate the inflation rate. The CPI is a fixed-weight index and does not immediately take into account changes in spending patterns due to changes in relative prices. There may also be a tendency for the CPI to overstate the inflation rate because some price increases reflect improvements in the quality of goods and services. Taking quality changes into account in a price index is difficult, but BLS does attempt to make some adjustments to the CPI for quality improvements in a number of areas, including automobiles, apparel, and a number of consumer electronic goods, personal computers in particular. Home ownership costs in the CPI are treated in a special way. Prior to 1983, the home ownership component of the CPI measured changes in the cost of purchasing a new home. Since 1983 for the CPI-U and 1985 for the CPI-W, changes in the cost of home ownership have been based on the concept of "rental equivalence." Rather than measuring changes in the cost of buying a house in each period, which would include finance charges, the CPI attempts to estimate the rental value of owner-occupied housing. Thus, the CPI measures changes in the consumption aspect of housing costs and not changes in the investment value of owner-occupied housing. In addition to the all-items CPIs, BLS also publishes an index which excludes the effects of both food and energy prices. Increases in the CPI less food and energy are also referred to as the "core" inflation rate. The reason for excluding food and energy prices is that, at times, they may be more volatile than other prices and thus mask the underlying trend rate of inflation. That can be useful for policymakers to whom inflation is an important variable. The "core" rate is often mentioned prominently in press reports covering the monthly releases of CPI data. This seems to be an occasional source of confusion, leading some to conclude that food and energy prices are not taken into account in calculating Social Security cost-of-living adjustments. In fact, food and energy prices are taken into account. The all-items CPI is used to make cost-of-living adjustments, not the core index. In December 1996, a special commission chaired by economist Michael Boskin reported to the Senate Finance Committee that the CPI tended to overstate the actual rate of inflation by about 1.1% per year. Although a number of specific recommendations were made in the report, Congress took no legislative steps to require any changes in the way BLS calculates the CPI. But the methodology of calculating the CPI has changed much since it was first published and is likely to continue to do so. BLS continues to look at methods that might lead to a more accurate measure of the cost of living. As part of that process, with the release of data for July 2002, BLS introduced an alternative CPI that makes use of "chain-weights." This index is referred to as the C-CPI-U. The expenditure weights for the C-CPI-U are updated more frequently than either the CPI-U or the CPI-W, and the index itself is subject to revision. The C-CPI-U has not replaced either the CPI-U or the CPI-W, and they will continue to be used for indexing. The CPI is currently published for 26 metropolitan areas. For most of these cities, however, indexes are not published on a monthly basis. These metropolitan area indexes are only intended to compare inflation rates between cities. The metropolitan area CPIs may not be used to compare the actual cost of living between cities. Table 2 shows the metropolitan areas for which the CPI is published as well as the publication frequency. BLS has set up an Internet home page for the CPI where visitors can get a copy of the most recent CPI press release, as well as up-to-date information regarding the CPI program. The Internet address for this page is http://www.bls.gov/cpi/ . Detailed CPI data are also readily available. BLS has set up a number of ways on their website, http://www.bls.gov/cpi/#data , to obtain CPI data. By making selections from each of a succession of menus, users of BLS's website may specify the particular data they want. There is also a link to an "inflation calculator," allowing users to make their own inflation adjustments to dollar amounts. BLS has published estimates of the CPI going back as far as 1800, which makes it the longest, continuous price index series available. These data are shown in Table 3 . Data for 1800 through 1912 were derived by splicing price indexes collected in three separate, nongovernmental, studies. Prior to 1978, there was only one CPI available. For 1978 and after, the data in Table 3 correspond to the CPI-U. Given that the accuracy of the CPI remains a topic of discussion, the data for the early years of this series should be considered to be fairly crude estimates. The long series allows a noteworthy observation. Between 1800 and 1945, there was no long-term trend in the price level. During that period prices tended to fall as often as they rose. Since 1945, however, there has been a decided upward trend in the level of prices with the price level having fallen in only a few years. The decline in 2009 was the first since 1955. The figures in Table 3 show year-over-year changes in the CPI, and the index numbers for each year are the average of the monthly data for that year. Changes in the CPI are sometimes published on a December-over-December basis. That number can vary significantly from the year-over-year number depending on how the monthly changes are distributed over the period. In 2009, for example, the year-over-year change was -0.4% whereas the change from December 2008 to December 2009 was 2.7%. The CPI is an indicator of changes in the price level. At present, those changes are expressed relative to the average level of prices in the years 1982, 1983, and 1984. Thus, the average of all of the monthly CPI numbers for those three years is equal to 100. Determining the change in consumer prices between any two years is a simple percent change calculation using the formula: percentage change in the CPI = (( CPI 2 / CPI 1 ) - 1 ) x 100. For example, in 2009, the CPI-U was 214.537, and in 1989 the CPI-U was 124.0. The total percentage change in the CPI-U between 1989 and 2009 was: (( 214.537 / 124.0 ) - 1 ) x 100 = 73.0 percent. Calculating the percentage change between any two years at an annual rate is slightly more complicated, and requires the formula: annual rate of change in the CPI = (( CPI 2 / CPI 1 ) 1/n - 1 ) x 100, where n is the number of years covered in the interval. To calculate the average annual rate of change in the CPI-U between 1989 and 2009, we use an n of 20 and the same CPI-U values as in the previous example. The average annual rate of change in the CPI-U between 1989 and 2009 was: (( 214.537 / 124.0 ) 1/20 - 1 ) x 100 = 2.8 percent. Another common use of the CPI is to adjust dollar amounts for inflation, so that amounts from different years can be compared in terms of dollars of the same purchasing power. Suppose the question is how much money would have been required in 2009 to buy the same quantity of goods and services as $100 bought in 1989. To get such an estimate, the 1989 dollar value needs to be adjusted to account for the increase in consumer prices between 1989 and 2009. That requires the formula: equivalent purchasing power in period 2 = ( CPI 2 / CPI 1 ) x dollar amount in period 1. For example, using the same CPI values as in the above examples, the equivalent purchasing power in 2009 of $100 in 1989 is: ( 214.537 / 124.0 ) x $100 = $173.01. This same calculation can be reversed to find the purchasing power in an earlier period of a dollar amount of a more recent vintage. To do this use the formula: equivalent purchasing power in period 1 = ( CPI 1 / CPI 2 ) x dollar amount in period 2. For example, using the same CPI values as in the above examples, the equivalent purchasing power in 1989 of $100 in 2009 is: ( 124.0 / 214.537 ) x $100 = $57.80. Using these formulae, dollar values of constant purchasing power can be compared for any two periods for which CPI data are available. Constant dollar values are always compared in terms of the dollar's purchasing power in a particular year, known as the base year. When comparing dollars of constant purchasing power, it is important to specify the base year.

The Consumer Price Index (CPI) is perhaps the most widely reported measure of inflation. A number of federal government programs are regularly adjusted to account for changes in the CPI, such as Social Security benefits and the personal income tax rate schedule. Thus, the behavior of the CPI has important consequences for a large number of people. Many, however, may be unfamiliar with how the CPI is estimated. For Congress, the CPI is of particular interest because of its significant effect on the federal budget. Changes in the CPI can have substantial effects on both revenues and outlays, and those changes may either reflect underlying economic conditions or result from methodological changes in the way the CPI is calculated. The CPI is based on a number of sample surveys. One of these surveys estimates the purchasing patterns of the "typical" household to determine how that household spends its money. Another survey determines where those households shop, and a third survey collects prices on the goods and services purchased by those households. The CPI measures the price level relative to a particular period. Currently, the CPI number for each month is a measure of the price level relative to what it was between 1982 and 1984. The CPI is available for a number of metropolitan areas but it does not allow comparisons of the cost of living in different cities.

The U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy and the Pew Oceans Commission have made numerous recommendations for changing U.S. ocean policy and management. To address the findings and recommendations of the ocean commissions and the President's response, Congress may consider comprehensive bills encompassing a broad array of cross-cutting concerns, including federal organization and administrative structure, regional approaches to ecosystem management, and funding strategies. On the other hand, Congress may continue to act on specific issues, as it has for fisheries, ocean exploration, ocean mapping, marine debris, ocean acidification, and others. Congress has shown interest in ocean affairs in recent decades, examining components of the federal ocean programs, enacting legislation creating new ocean programs, and taking steps to define a national ocean policy. The Marine Resources and Engineering Development Act of 1966 (P.L. 89-454) established a National Council on Marine Resources and Engineering Development in the White House and initiated work by a presidential bipartisan Commission on Marine Science, Engineering, and Resources. Dr. Julius Stratton, then recently retired president of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and, at the time, Chairman of the Board of the Ford Foundation, was appointed commission chairman by President Lyndon Johnson. The commission, composed of 15 members, was often referred to as the Stratton Commission. In 1969, the commission completed its final report, Our Nation and the Sea: A Plan for National Action , and its more than 120 formal recommendations provided what many considered to be the most comprehensive statement of federal policy for exploration and development of ocean resources. The study was instrumental in defining the structure, if not all the substance, of what a national ocean policy could or should look like. Furthermore, new ocean-oriented programs were initiated and existing ones were strengthened in the years following the commission's report, through a number of laws enacted by Congress. Recommendations of the Stratton Commission led directly, within the following decade, to forming the National Sea Grant College Program, to creating the National Advisory Committee on Oceans and Atmosphere (NACOA), and to reorganizing federal ocean programs under the newly established National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). Subsequent legislation on estuarine reserves, national marine sanctuaries, marine mammal protection, coastal zone management, fishery conservation and management, ocean pollution, and seabed mining also reflected commission recommendations. Efforts sprang up within the federal government and among various interagency and federal advisory committees to flesh out how best to implement a truly comprehensive and forward-looking national ocean policy, most notably articulated in the 1978 Department of Commerce report U.S. Ocean Policy in the 1970s: Status and Issues . Since 1980, with concerns about limiting federal expenditures and streamlining government, there have been fewer ocean initiatives, and a number of ocean programs, particularly those of NOAA, have been consolidated and reduced. However, the programs begun in the 1970s generally have been reauthorized and have matured. By the late 1980s, there appeared to be a broad consensus among those conversant in ocean affairs that a need existed to redefine or, at the very least, better define national ocean policy. Two stimuli for this renewed interest were the 1983 proclamation by President Reagan establishing a 200-nautical-mile U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and the 1988 extension of the U.S. territorial sea from 3 to 12 nautical miles, both of which came in the aftermath of the President's decision that the United States would not sign the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea. Legislation creating an oceans commission and/or a national ocean council to review U.S. ocean policy was introduced and hearings were held in the 98 th , 99 th , 100 th , and 105 th Congresses. Legislation did pass the House in October 1983, September 1987, and again in October 1988, but was not acted on by the Senate in any of those instances. In the 105 th Congress, legislation creating both a national ocean council and a commission on ocean policy passed the Senate in November 1997, and in 1998 the House passed a bill creating a commission on ocean policy. However, Congress adjourned in 1998 before differences between these two measures could be reconciled. It was not until the 106 th Congress in 2000 that legislation was enacted to establish a 16-member U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy ( P.L. 106-256 ). The commission's charge was to make recommendations for a coordinated and comprehensive national ocean policy for a broad range of ocean issues. The enactment rode a crest of interest generated largely by a National Ocean Conference convened by the White House in June 1998, in Monterey, CA, and attended by President Clinton and Vice President Gore, against a background of media and public attention surrounding the declaration by the United Nations of 1998 as the International Year of the Ocean. Momentum was added by the September 1999 release of a post-Monterey conference report, ordered by the President and prepared by members of his Cabinet, entitled Turning to the Sea: America ' s Ocean Future , in which recommendations were offered for a coordinated, disciplined, long-term federal ocean policy. Also in 2000, partially in response to that rekindled interest and partially in response to congressional legislation having failed final passage in 1998, the Pew Charitable Trusts established the Pew Oceans Commission, an independent group of 18 American experts in their respective fields. The Pew Commission's charge was to conduct a national dialogue on the policies needed to restore and protect living marine resources in U.S. waters. Pew proceeded with their effort after failing to persuade key Members of Congress to introduce legislation to establish a public/private, nongovernmental oceans commission. The Oceans Act of 2000 ( P.L. 106-256 ) mandated a U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy. Appointed by the President, the commission was required to issue findings and make recommendations to the President and Congress for a coordinated and comprehensive national ocean policy. The new policy was to address a broad range of issues, from the stewardship of marine resources and pollution prevention to enhancement and support of marine science, commerce, and transportation. The 16 members of the commission were appointed by President Bush on July 3, 2001. Those appointments were based on a process that included nominations by Congress and appointment by the President. The commission convened its inaugural meeting on September 17-18, 2001, in Washington, DC, and commissioners selected Admiral James D. Watkins, U.S. Navy (retired) as chair. Through several sessions, the commission established four working groups to address issues in the areas of (1) governance; (2) research, education, and marine operations; (3) stewardship; and (4) investment and implementation. The working groups were charged with reviewing and analyzing issues within their specific areas of focus and reporting their findings to the full commission. The Oceans Act of 2000 specifically directed the commission to establish a Science Advisory Panel to assist in preparing the report and to ensure that the scientific information considered by the commission and each of its working groups was the best available. The composition of the Science Advisory Panel was determined by the commissioners; members were recruited in consultation with the Ocean Studies Board of the National Research Council at the National Academy of Sciences and reflected the breadth of issues before the commission. The commission divided the members of the Science Advisory Panel into four working groups, consistent with the full commission's structure. The commission began its work by launching a series of public meetings to gather information about the most pressing issues that the Nation faced regarding the use and stewardship of the oceans. The working groups played an important role in determining the effectiveness of the regional public meetings and in identifying key issues to be addressed by the commission. In each region visited, the commission heard presentations on a wide-ranging set of topics judged to be necessary to ultimately address the requirements in the Oceans Act of 2000. Based on the information gathered at the public meetings, the working groups identified and reviewed key issues, outlined options for addressing those issues, and determined the need for white papers providing more detailed information on specific topics. The deliberations of each working group were shared with the other groups throughout the process to better coordinate development of the final commission report and recommendations. After hearing 440 presenters at 15 public meetings in 10 cities during 11 months and conducting 17 additional site visits around the country, the commission completed its information-gathering phase in October 2002. The commission began deliberations in November 2002, and the last meeting dedicated to open public discussion of policy options--the sixteenth public commission meeting--was held April 2-3, 2003, in Washington, DC. Examples of supporting documents, working papers, and publications either produced for or generated by the commission include Draft Policy Option Documents , Working Table of Contents , Governing the Oceans , Elements Document , and Law of the Sea Resolution . These documents are available in pdf format on the commission's website at http://www.oceancommission.gov/documents/welcome.html . The commission published its final report in two stages. First, on April 20, 2004, the commission released a Preliminary Report , which was available for a 30-day period of review and comment by the nation's governors and interested stakeholders. That Preliminary Report was built on information presented at the public meetings and site visits, combined with scientific and technical information on oceans and coasts from hundreds of experts. The findings and policy recommendations in the Preliminary Report reflected a consensus of commission members and presented what the commissioners believed to be a balanced approach to protecting the ocean environment while sustaining the vital role oceans and coasts play in the national economy. After the public comment period closed, stage two of the process commenced when the commission began reviewing the comments and modifying the preliminary report in response to gubernatorial or other stakeholder input. At its 17 th public meeting on July 22, 2004, the U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy approved changes to its Preliminary Report and directed staff to prepare the final report, bearing the official title An Ocean Blueprint for the 21 st Century. That report, with its recommendations on a coordinated and comprehensive national ocean policy, was delivered to the President and Congress on September 20, 2004, in ceremonies at the White House and on Capitol Hill. The commission presented 212 recommendations throughout An Ocean Blueprint ; of these recommendations, 13 "critical" actions recommended by the commission can be summarized as follows: 1. Establish a National Ocean Council in the Executive Office of the President, chaired by an Assistant to the President. 2. Create a President's Council of Advisors on Ocean Policy. 3. Strengthen NOAA and improve the federal agency structure. 4. Develop a flexible and voluntary process for creating regional ocean councils, facilitated and supported by the National Ocean Council. 5. Double the nation's investment in ocean research. 6. Implement the national Integrated Ocean Observing System. 7. Increase attention to ocean education through coordinated and effective formal and informal programs. 8. Strengthen the link between coastal and watershed management. 9. Create a coordinated management regime for federal waters. 10. Create measurable water pollution reduction goals, particularly for nonpoint sources, and strengthen incentives, technical assistance, and other management tools to reach those goals. 11. Reform fisheries management by separating assessment and allocation, improving the Regional Fishery Management Council system, and exploring the use of dedicated access privileges. 12. Accede to the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea. 13. Establish an Ocean Policy Trust Fund based on revenue from offshore oil and gas development and other new and emerging offshore uses to pay for implementing the recommendations. At its meeting on July 22, 2004, the commission unanimously approved numerous changes to the recommendations and text in the commission's Preliminary Report , which were included in the final report, An Ocean Blueprint . Those modifications were based on more than 600 pages of comments from 37 governors and 5 tribal leaders; responses from more than 800 public commenters, stakeholders, and other experts and advisers; as well as technical corrections provided by federal agencies. There were, however, no changes to the 13 critical actions listed above. A detailed summary of specific changes appearing in An Ocean Blueprint is available on the commission's website. Changes of an overall general nature in the final report include the following: The report was revised to further emphasize the important role of states, and to clarify that the commission favors a balanced, not a "top down," approach of shared responsibility for ocean and coastal issues; The report clarified the commission's intent to embrace all coastal areas and decision-makers, including the Great Lakes, U.S. territories, and tribes; Many sections of the report were revised to address the issue of climate change and its impacts on the oceans and coasts; The importance of cultural heritage in connection with the ocean was more fully recognized and addressed; and Discussions about the funding needed to implement recommendations were consolidated into an expanded Chapter 30 ("Funding Needs and Possible Sources"). The governors' and tribal leaders' comments on the commission's Preliminary Report were generally favorable. Most of the 37 governors and 5 tribal leaders highlighted the report's comprehensive treatment of ocean and coastal issues, the economic importance of oceans and coasts, and the need to take immediate action to protect and enhance the health of these resources. Their primary concerns related to funding issues; the participation of states, territories, and tribes in national policy development; and the need for flexibility in the implementation of such policies. Public comments were received from private citizens (including school children), non-governmental organizations, trade associations, governmental and quasi-governmental organizations (e.g., regional fishery management councils), academicians, scientists, and lawyers. The vast majority of public commenters praised the report as comprehensive and balanced, and voiced their support for implementation of the recommendations. Although many supported the report's major themes and recommendations, a significant number of commenters highlighted areas of particular concern, including national and regional governance, federal organization, offshore management regimes, funding for science and research and for implementation of commission recommendations, ecosystem-based management, regulation and enforcement, and living marine resources. Furthermore, there were numerous additional comments on a suite of issues, including cruise ships, climate change, atmospheric deposition, invasive species, bottom-trawling, bycatch, wind energy, coastal development, international ocean policy, and seafood safety. Soon after the release of the commission's preliminary report, several Members of Congress commented on the report and its recommendations. These members generally supported the basic thrust of the report, but specific issues such as the level of proposed funding increases, creation of a specific oceans structure in the White House, and the transfer of other agencies' functions to NOAA were questioned. Articles and editorials in regional media generally focused on selected local issues, while interest groups highlighted specific issues. Some states made their comments publically available. Some commenters criticized the report and its recommendations as further contributing to excessive government control. The Pew Oceans Commission, an independent group of 18 authorities in ocean-related issues and government, was established in April 2000 and funded by a $5.5 million grant from the Pew Charitable Trusts to conduct a national dialogue on the policies needed to restore and protect living marine resources in U.S. waters. This commission released its final report, America ' s Living Oceans: Charting a Course for Sea Change , on June 4, 2003, outlining a national agenda for protecting and restoring the oceans. In addition, during this process, nine "science reports" were prepared and released. The commission's 26 recommendations, organized within six categories, are summarized in the final report as follows: A. Governance for Sustainable Seas 1. Enact a National Ocean Policy Act to protect, maintain, and restore the health, integrity, resilience, and productivity of the ocean. 2. Establish regional ocean ecosystem councils to develop and implement enforceable regional ocean governance plans. 3. Establish a national system of fully protected marine reserves. 4. Establish an independent national oceans agency. 5. Establish a permanent federal interagency oceans council. B. Restoring America's Fisheries 6. Redefine the principal objective of American marine fishery policy to protect marine ecosystems. 7. Separate conservation and allocation decisions. 8. Implement ecosystem-based planning and marine zoning. 9. Regulate the use of fishing gear that is destructive to marine habitats. 10. Require bycatch monitoring and management plans as a condition of fishing. 11. Require comprehensive access and allocation planning as a condition of fishing. 12. Establish a permanent fishery conservation and management trust fund. C. Preserving Our Coasts 13. Develop an action plan to address non-point source pollution and protect water quality on a watershed basis. 14. Identify and protect from development habitat critical for the functioning of coastal ecosystems. 15. Institute effective mechanisms at all levels of government to manage development and minimize its impact on coastal ecosystems. 16. Redirect government programs and subsidies away from harmful coastal development and toward beneficial activities, including restoration. D. Cleaning Coastal Waters 17. Revise, strengthen, and expand pollution laws to focus on non-point source pollution. 18. Address unabated point sources of pollution, such as concentrated animal feeding operations and cruise ships. 19. Create a flexible framework to address emerging and nontraditional sources of pollution, such as invasive species and noise. 20. Strengthen control over toxic pollution. E. Guiding Sustainable Marine Aquaculture 21. Implement a new national marine aquaculture policy based on sound conservation principles and standards. 22. Set a standard, and provide international leadership, for ecologically sound marine aquaculture practices. F. Science, Education, and Funding 23. Develop and implement a comprehensive national ocean research and monitoring strategy. 24. Double funding for basic ocean science and research. 25. Improve the use of existing scientific information by creating a mechanism or institution that regularly provides independent scientific oversight of ocean and coastal management. 26. Broaden ocean education and awareness through a commitment to teach and learn about the world ocean, at all levels of society. Comments on the commission's work ranged from dismissive to laudatory. Some were concerned that the commission's work was not objective, being overly influenced by the "environmental agenda" of the Pew Charitable Trusts. They perceived the report as an attack on commercial seafood harvesting that ignored other significant issues such as the damaging effects of oil spills in the marine environment. Representative Richard Pombo, then Chair of the House Committee on Resources, issued a press release on June 4, 2003, critical of the Pew Commission report, concluding "we cannot expect such a group to issue non-biased recommendations." Praise for the report came from commission members, who saw the report as a long overdue update of antiquated U.S. ocean policy, offering practical solutions to reverse declining trends. John Flicker, the President of the Audubon Society, referred to this report as a wake-up call to all Americans that the oceans and coastal areas are in real trouble, offering a blueprint for action to protect ecosystems at risk. The Pew Commission report covered only a portion of ocean issues with concentration on the environment, compared with the U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy, which covered a broader cross-section of issues. Beyond the House Resources Committee press release, Congress did not immediately react to the release of the Pew Oceans Commission report. Pew commissioners, including Chairman Leon E. Panetta, testified before the U.S. Commission on several occasions. Within 120 days after receiving the U.S. Ocean Commission's report, the President was required to submit to Congress a statement of proposals to implement or respond to the commission's recommendations for a national policy on ocean and coastal resources. In doing so, the President was directed to consult with state and local governments and non-federal organizations and individuals involved in ocean and coastal activities. On December 17, 2004, President Bush submitted to Congress a U.S. Ocean Action Plan , his formal response to the recommendations of the U.S. Commission. Also on December 17, the President signed Executive Order 13366 establishing, as part of the Council on Environmental Quality, a Committee on Ocean Policy, to be led by the chair of the Council on Environmental Quality. On January 26, 2007, the Committee on Ocean Policy released the U.S. Ocean Action Plan Implementation Update . The original action plan and the update covered progress in six general subject areas: enhancing ocean leadership and coordination; advancing our understanding of the oceans, coasts, and Great Lakes; enhancing the use and conservation of ocean, coastal, and Great Lakes resources; managing coasts and their watersheds; supporting marine transportation; and advancing international ocean policy and science. To support this effort, the Committee on Ocean Policy established an ocean governance structure composed of subsidiary bodies to coordinate existing management: the Interagency Committee on Ocean Science and Resource Management Integration (ICOSRMI) and two subcommittees, established by the National Science and Technology Council (NSTC), the Joint Subcommittee on Ocean Science and Technology (JSOST) and the Subcommittee on Integrated Management of Ocean Resources (SIMOR). In January 2008, the ICOSRMI released the Federal Ocean and Coastal Activities Report to Congress for CY 2006 and 2007 . The report provides an overview of select activities and accomplishments of Ocean Action Plan implementation. On June 12, 2009, President Obama issued a memorandum to the heads of executive departments and agencies to establish an Interagency Ocean Policy Task Force (IOPTF). The IOPTF is composed of senior policy-level officials from executive departments, agencies, and offices represented on the Committee on Ocean Policy and is led by the chair of the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ). The IOPTF was charged with developing recommendations for a national ocean policy and a framework for coastal and marine spatial planning. On July 19, 2010, the CEQ released the Final Recommendations of the Ocean Pol icy Task Forc e. The recommendations are divided into four main sections that focus on the following areas: a national policy for the ocean, the coasts, and the Great Lakes; a governance structure to provide sustained, high-level, and coordinated attention to ocean, coastal, and Great Lakes issues; a targeted implementation strategy that identifies and prioritizes nine categories for action; and a framework for coastal and marine spatial planning. The IOPTF identified three general policy areas: healthy and resilient ocean, coasts, and Great Lakes; safe and productive ocean, coasts, and Great Lakes; and understood and treasured ocean, coasts, and Great Lakes. The policies would be guided by nine stewardship principles outlined in the framework. Departments and agencies are instructed to identify budgetary, administrative, regulatory, and legislative requirements to implement these elements. The coordination framework and participating agencies would be similar to the committees established under the Bush Administration. The National Ocean Council (NOC) would assume overall responsibility for implementing the national ocean policy. The NOC would be co-chaired by the chair of CEQ and the director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy. The Ocean Resource Management Interagency Policy Committee (ORM-IPC) is the successor to the current SIMOR, and the National Science and Technology Council's JSOST would serve as the Ocean Science and Technology Interagency Policy Committee (OST-IPC). The ORM-IPC would function as the ocean resource management body of the NOC with emphasis on implementing the national policy and priorities defined by the NOC. The OST-IPC would function as the ocean science and technology body of the NOC. The governance structure would also include a steering committee, a governance advisory committee, and an ocean research and resources advisory panel. The third section of the recommendations covers the implementation strategy and proposed national priority objectives. The IOPTF identified four basic areas related to "how we do business" as ways in which the federal government must operate differently to improve stewardship of the ocean, coastal areas, and the Great Lakes. These areas include: ecosystem-based management; coastal and marine spatial planning; informed decisions and improved understanding; and coordination and support. The implementation strategy also includes five areas of special emphasis which represent substantive areas of importance to achieving the national policy. These areas include: resiliency and adaptation to climate change and ocean acidification; regional ecosystem protection and restoration; water quality and sustainable practices on land; changing conditions in the Arctic; and ocean, coastal, and Great Lakes observations and infrastructure. The final main section is the Framework for Effective Coastal and Marine Spatial Planning. The framework defines coastal and marine spatial planning (CMSP) as a comprehensive, adaptive, integrated, ecosystem-based, and transparent spatial planning process based on sound science, for analyzing current and anticipated uses of ocean, coastal, and Great Lakes areas. The framework also provides national CMSP goals and guiding principles, and describes development and implementation of CMSP. On July 19, President Obama also signed an executive order to establish a national policy for stewardship of the oceans, the coasts, and the Great Lakes. The executive order adopts the recommendations of the IOPTF to establish a National Ocean Council and provides for the development of coastal and marine spatial plans. This executive order revokes E.O. 13366, signed by President Bush in 2004. The National Ocean Council plans to hold its first meeting later this summer to begin implementing the national policy. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) was agreed to in 1982, but the United States never became a signatory nation. On May 15, 2007, President Bush issued a statement in which he "urged the Senate to act favorably on U.S. accession to UNCLOS during this session [110 th ] of Congress." UNCLOS was reported on December 19, 2007, by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (S.Exec.Rept. 110-9), but the Senate did not consider the treaty. In the 111 th Congress, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, at her confirmation hearing before the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs on January 13, 2009, acknowledged that U.S. accession to the LOS Convention would be an Obama Administration priority. The final recommendations of the IOPTF included unanimous support for U.S. accession to UNCLOS. The U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy and the Pew Oceans Commission identified complementary recommendations for a number of key areas in their respective reports. A collaborative Joint Ocean Commission Initiative was initiated in early 2005 to maintain the momentum generated by the two commissions. This initiative is guided by a ten-member task force, five of whom served on each commission, and is led by former commission chairs Admiral James D. Watkins and the Honorable Leon E. Panetta. The main objective of the initiative is to maintain progress on ocean policy reform with core priorities that include the need for ecosystem management, ocean governance reforms, improved fisheries management, increased reliance on science in management decisions, and more funding for ocean and coastal programs. On March 16, 2006, a bipartisan group of 10 Senators requested that the Joint Ocean Commission Initiative report on the top 10 steps Congress should take to address the most pressing challenges, the highest funding priorities, and the most important changes to federal laws and the budget process to establish a more effective and integrated ocean policy. In response on June 13, 2006, a national ocean policy action plan for Congress, From Sea to Shining Sea: Priorities for Ocean Policy Reform--A Report to the United States Senate , was delivered to Congress by the Joint Ocean Commission Initiative and was intended to serve as a guide for developing legislation and funding high-priority programs. This action plan responded to the Senators' request to identify the most urgent priorities for congressional action to protect, restore, and maintain the marine ecosystem. According to the plan, the 10 steps are: adopt a statement of national ocean policy; pass an organic act to establish NOAA in law and work with the Administration to identify and act upon opportunities to improve federal agency coordination on ocean and coastal issues; foster ecosystem-based regional governance; reauthorize an improved Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act; enact legislation to support innovation and competition in ocean-related research and education consistent with key initiatives in the Bush Administration's Ocean Research Priorities Plan and Implementation Strategy (discussed in the following section on "Administration Response and Implementation"); enact legislation to authorize and fund the Integrated Ocean Observing System (IOOS); accede to the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea; establish an Ocean Trust Fund in the U.S. Treasury as a dedicated source of funds for improved management and understanding of ocean and coastal resources by federal and state governments; increase base funding for core ocean and coastal programs and direct development of an integrated ocean budget; and enact ocean and coastal legislation that progressed significantly in the 109 th Congress. The Joint Ocean Commission Initiative remains active in promoting ocean policy reform through reports, press releases, letters to and testimony before Congress, and public speaking engagements. In April 2009, it released its most recent report, titled Changing Oceans, Changing World: Ocean Priorities for the Obama Administration and Congress . The Joint Ocean Commission has expressed support and provided comments for the two IOPTF reports. Additional information about the Joint Ocean Commission Initiative may be found at http://www.jointoceancommission.org/ . The 111 th Congress will continue to consider whether and how to respond to the findings and recommendations of the Pew Oceans Commission report, America ' s Living Oceans: Charting a Course for Sea Change , and the report of the U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy, An Ocean Blueprint for the 21 st Century . Over five years after the release of the U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy's report and more than six years after the release of the Pew Oceans Commission report, some progress on ocean policy reform has been made. However, hundreds of recommendations suggested by the two commissions have not been addressed. The 109 th Congress reauthorized the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (MSFCMA) ( P.L. 109-479 ), incorporating provisions reflecting many recommendations made by both commissions. These provisions address a broad array of topics, including dedicated access privileges, overfishing, and fish stock rebuilding as well as issues of concern to specific fisheries and regions. After its passage, the Joint Ocean Commission Initiative highlighted provisions related to enhancing the role of science, establishing sustainable harvest levels, authorizing the use of market-based approaches, and setting a clear deadline for ending overfishing. The Administration also emphasized provisions authorizing market-based limited access privilege programs, as well as language strengthening fisheries enforcement, developing ecosystem pilot programs, establishing community-based restoration programs, and creating a regionally-based registry for recreational fishermen. The 109 th Congress also considered bills on specific ocean topics, including ocean exploration; ocean and coastal observing systems; marine debris research, prevention, and reduction; and ocean and coastal mapping integration. Related issues considered whether to (1) provide additional funds for ocean-related research; (2) replace a fragmented administrative structure with a more coherent federal organization; or (3) adopt new approaches for managing marine resources, such as setting aside large reserves from some or all uses. Only one bill was enacted, the Marine Debris Research, Prevention, and Reduction Act ( P.L. 109-449 ). This legislation established a program within NOAA and the U.S. Coast Guard to help identify, determine sources of, assess, reduce, and prevent marine debris and its damage to the marine environment and navigation safety, in coordination with non-federal entities. A variety of legislation has been introduced during the 111 th Congress and bills related to specific topics have been enacted. The Omnibus Public Land Management Act of 2009 ( P.L. 111-11 ) included several ocean-related bills that were considered during previous Congresses. Title XII includes sections that address ocean exploration, ocean and coastal mapping, ocean and coastal integrated observation, ocean acidification research and monitoring, and coastal and estuarine land conservation. Early in the 111 th Congress, H.R. 21 , the Oceans, Conservation, Education, and National Strategy for the 21 st Century Act, and a similar bill, S. 858 , the National Oceans Protection Act of 2009, were introduced. H.R. 21 , first introduced in the 108 th Congress, would implement many recommendations of the Pew and U.S. Commission reports, by establishing a comprehensive national ocean policy for the management of U.S. coasts, oceans, and Great Lakes. The legislation would: establish a national ocean policy with emphasis on conservation of marine ecosystems; authorize NOAA; strengthen and formalize regional coordination by promoting a regional governance structure; and create an Ocean and Great Lakes Trust Fund. On June 18, 2009, the House Natural Resources Subcommittee in Insular Affairs, Oceans, and Wildlife held a hearing on H.R. 21 . Supporters of these bills have pointed to the need to improve ocean conservation because of damage to marine ecosystems caused by pollution, habitat destruction, invasive species, and overfishing. They believe that a defined ocean policy, better coordination among agencies, and more investment are needed to reflect the importance of oceans to our economy and well-being. However, others are concerned that H.R. 21 would increase the ocean-related bureaucracy by establishing numerous layers of additional laws, regulations, advisors, committees, and partnerships. At a hearing during the 110 th Congress, a coalition of Alaska fishing industry groups expressed concerns that H.R. 21 would duplicate efforts, lead to more bureaucracy, conflict with other legal mandates, and result in confusion and litigation. They would rather see greater focus on funding and implementation of current laws, such as the MSFCMA. It remains an open question whether the 111 th Congress will act on this comprehensive approach to ocean policy or concentrate on specific subjects or issues. On November 4, 2009, the Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee's Subcommittee on Oceans, Atmosphere, Fisheries, and Coast Guard held a hearing concerning the future of ocean governance that focused on IOPTF activities. In addition to comprehensive ocean approaches, over 70 bills related to ocean and Great Lakes management, climate change, fisheries, coastal conservation, marine animals, marine sanctuaries, research, education, and transportation have been introduced. For example, on September 24, 2009, the Ocean, Coastal, and Watershed Education Act ( H.R. 3644 ) was introduced, and on January 19, 2010, it was passed by the House. This bill would direct NOAA to further develop regional education and watershed programs and to establish a competitive national grant program to advance environmental literacy. Administration action, or inaction, is likely to continue to receive congressional oversight during the 111 th Congress.

In 2003 and 2004, the U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy and the Pew Oceans Commission made numerous recommendations for changing U.S. ocean policy and management. The 109th Congress reauthorized the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (P.L. 109-479), incorporating provisions recommended by both commissions, and authorized the Marine Debris Research, Prevention, and Reduction Act (P.L. 109-449). Several bills encompassing a broad array of cross-cutting concerns such as ocean exploration; ocean and coastal observing systems; federal organization and administrative structure; and ocean and coastal mapping were considered, but not acted on during the 110th Congress. Identification of the need for a comprehensive national ocean policy can be traced back to 1966, when a presidential Commission on Marine Science, Engineering, and Resources was established (called the Stratton Commission). In 1969, the commission provided recommendations that led to reorganizing federal ocean programs and establishing the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). By the late 1980s, a number of influential voices had concluded that U.S. ocean management remained fragmented and was characterized by a confusing array of laws, regulations, and practices. After repeated attempts, the 106th Congress enacted legislation to establish a U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy (P.L. 106-256). Earlier in 2000, the Pew Oceans Commission, an independent group, was established by the Pew Charitable Trusts to conduct a national dialogue on restoring and protecting living marine resources in U.S. waters. In June 2003, the Pew Commission released its final report, America's Living Oceans: Charting a Course for Sea Change, outlining a national agenda for protecting and restoring the oceans. In September 2004, the U.S. Commission published, An Ocean Blueprint for the 21st Century, its final report with 212 recommendations on a coordinated and comprehensive national ocean policy. On December 17, 2004, the Bush Administration submitted to Congress the U.S. Ocean Action Plan, its formal response to the recommendations of the U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy. The U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy and the Pew Oceans Commission established the Joint Ocean Commission Initiative in early 2005 to collaborate on a number of key recommendations of both reports. The Joint Ocean Commission has remained active in advancing these recommendations to Congress and the Administration. In June 2009, the Obama Administration established an Ocean Policy Task Force to develop a national ocean policy. On September 10, 2009, the task force released the Interim Report of the Interagency Ocean Policy Task Force, which includes national ocean policy priorities, a governance structure for interagency coordination, and an implementation strategy. On December 9, 2009, the task force released the Interim Framework for Effective Coastal and Marine Spatial Planning, which recommends a regional approach to marine spatial planning. The 111th Congress is continuing to consider ocean policy and management recommendations of the two commission reports. Comprehensive changes in ocean governance and administrative structure are proposed in the Oceans Conservation, Education, and National Strategy for the 21st Century Act (H.R. 21) and the National Oceans Protection Act of 2009 (S. 858). However, most congressional activity has focused on specific topics. Title XII of the Omnibus Public Land Management Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-11) included subtitles that address ocean exploration, ocean and coastal mapping, ocean and coastal integrated observation, ocean acidification research and monitoring, and coastal and estuarine land conservation.

The Supreme Court in recent years has accepted for argument only about 70 to 80 cases each term, so it is a matter of some note when several of them fall into a single area. Such was the situation in the Court's 2006-2007 term, with the Court accepting for oral argument five environmental cases out of 72 altogether. This interest in environmental cases continues a pattern of several years' duration; indeed, the Court also decided five environmental cases in its 2003-2004 term. The five environmental cases in the 2006-2007 term were a varied lot: two involving the Clean Air Act, one the Superfund Act, one the relationship between the Clean Water Act and Endangered Species Act, and one the federal constitutional limits on local solid-waste "flow control." The Court's decisions in these cases were equally varied, ranging from two unanimous decisions ( Duke Energy and Atlantic Research ) to two that were 5-4 ( Massachusetts and National Association of Home Builders ). In both of the 5-4 decisions, Justice Kennedy was the decisive fifth vote. Massachusetts v. EPA , 127 S. Ct. 1438 (Apr. 2, 2007) This case marks the debut of global warming in the Supreme Court. It arose from a petition asking EPA to regulate emissions from new motor vehicles under the Clean Air Act (CAA) on a novel ground: their status as greenhouse gases (GHGs) promoting global warming. In 2003, EPA denied the petition, arguing principally that CAA section 202 does not authorize EPA to regulate vehicle emissions on that basis. Twelve states and several environmental groups then challenged the denial in the D.C. Circuit. In 2005, the D.C. Circuit rejected 2-1 the challenge to EPA's denial. The two judges voting to reject did so for different reasons, however. One judge agreed with EPA that the section 202 phrase "in his judgment" allows the agency to inject policy considerations into its decision whether to regulate vehicle emissions--for example, the Administration's preference for economic incentives over regulatory mandates. The other judge held that petitioners had not suffered the injury requisite for federal-court standing, a ubiquitous issue in global warming litigation. The Supreme Court decided 5-4 in favor of the petitioner states and environmental groups, reversing the court below. At the outset, the majority opinion by Justice Stevens held that petitioners had standing, explaining that the required "injury in fact" for standing was provided by Massachusetts's loss of shoreland through global-warming-induced sea level rise, and that states seeking to establish standing in federal court are entitled to "special solicitude." On the merits, the Court held that CAA section 202 empowers EPA to regulate emissions from new motor vehicles based on their global warming impacts, the statute being "unambiguous" on this score. Also, EPA may not inject policy considerations into its decision to reject regulating such emissions, as the agency had done. The section 202 phrase "in his judgment" was not "a roving license to ignore the statutory text"; EPA's judgment must relate to whether an air pollutant might endanger public health and welfare. In two four-justice dissents, Chief Justice Roberts rejected standing and Justice Scalia denied that EPA had the requisite authority under the CAA. The Court's ruling is likely to have several effects. Most obviously, EPA may find it difficult to avoid regulating GHGs from new vehicles. According to the Court, "EPA can avoid taking further action only if it determines that greenhouse gases do not contribute to climate change or if it provides some reasonable explanation as to why it cannot or will not exercise its discretion." Section 202 says that once EPA makes the "judgment" that a pollutant might endanger public health or welfare, it must issue regulations. Beyond the implications for new vehicles, the Court's decision pressures EPA to move against GHG emissions from stationary sources, under Title I of the CAA. (Indeed, a lawsuit seeking to compel just that was stayed by the D.C. Circuit pending the Supreme Court's decision in Massachusetts v. EPA .) The decision also could influence Congress to act on global warming, partly because the default regulatory structure of the CAA does not easily accommodate a global phenomenon like climate change. In the courts, the decision could affect many GHG-related cases now pending, as by supporting a finding of standing, and could encourage new suits to be brought. Environmental Defense v. Duke Energy Corp ., 127 S. Ct. 1423 (Apr. 2, 2007) This case arises from a CAA enforcement action brought by EPA against Duke Energy, charging it with carrying out 29 "modifications" to its coal-fired power plants without obtaining Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) permits required for "new sources" under the act. Environmental groups, including Environmental Defense, intervened as plaintiffs. The dispute centers on how to measure the emissions from a stationary source of emissions so as to determine whether a physical or operational change in that source "increases the amount," in the CAA's words, of emissions. The existence of such an emissions increase is pivotal, since it brands the physical or operational change as a "modification" and the modified source, in turn, as a "new source" requiring a PSD permit and state-of-the-art pollution controls. In the district court, the United States argued that Duke's refurbishment of its aging plants would allow them to operate more of the time, resulting in increases in annual emissions and triggering, under EPA's PSD regulations, new source requirements. However, the district court held that those regulations impose an hourly standard. Under an hourly standard, a project modification allowing a plant to operate for more hours but without increasing emissions per hour, as Duke Energy had done, would not count as an increase in emissions, and so would not trigger new source requirements. The Fourth Circuit affirmed, explaining that since the CAA states that "modification" for PSD purposes means the same as for New Source Performance Standards (NSPS) purposes, EPA regulations elaborating on the statutory definitions also had to be the same. Thus, it read the agency's PSD regulations as turning on hourly emissions, just as the earlier-promulgated NSPS regulations had done. Environmental Defense--but not EPA--filed a petition for certiorari. Indeed, the United States opposed the petition, presumably because EPA had adopted the hourly standard in the Fourth Circuit ruling in its new PSD regulations (70 Fed. Reg . 61081). Then, too, the Bush Administration had long been unenthusiastic about the PSD enforcement effort against utilities set in motion in the prior administration. In any event, the Supreme Court took the case over the United States' opposition, one of the very few times the Court has accepted a case solely at the request of an environmental group. As with its global warming decision handed down the same day, the Supreme Court ruled for the "environmental" side--this time unanimously. The Court concluded that just because the CAA states that "modification" under PSD means the same as under NSPS does not require that EPA regulations , in elaborating on the statutory definition, also have to be identical. Thus the Fourth Circuit's effort to stretch the meaning of the PSD rules to conform them with the earlier NSPS rule was misguided. The wording of the PSD rule, said the Supreme Court, does not support an hourly-rate reading. Accordingly, the Court vacated the Fourth Circuit decision and remanded the case to the Circuit. United States v. Atlantic Research Corp. , 127 S. Ct. 2331 (June 11, 2007) The Superfund Act--more formally, the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA)--imposes liability for cleanup costs on a wide range of persons connected with a contaminated site. Two scenarios may occur. In the first scenario, there is government compulsion : a liable party (such as the site owner) waits for EPA to clean up the site and then demand reimbursement, or EPA orders the liable party to do the cleanup itself. In either case, the liable party, if made to pay more than its fair share, may turn around and sue other parties made liable by CERCLA in a "contribution" action. In the second scenario, the liable party cleans up voluntarily --that is, without waiting for a government cleanup order or cost-recovery effort--and then seeks reimbursement from other CERCLA-liable parties. Two CERCLA provisions authorize, or arguably authorize, such actions, and their relationship has been heavily litigated. CERCLA section 113(f)(1) authorizes liable parties to seek contribution from other liable parties "during or following" an EPA action seeking a cleanup or reimbursement order. CERCLA section 107(a)(B) makes liable parties responsible for necessary costs of response incurred by private entities. The majority view in the lower-court decisions is that liable parties may invoke only section 113(f)(1), while innocent parties must use section 107(a)(B). In Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc ., 543 U.S. 157 (2004), the Supreme Court held that contribution actions by liable parties under section 113(f)(1) may be brought only once EPA has filed a civil action against the liable party (ordering cleanup or seeking reimbursement) . However, the Court expressly reserved the question of whether a liable party, such as one barred from using 113(f)(1), may sue instead under section 107(a)(B). The question is fundamental to the Superfund program: obviously owners of contaminated sites are more willing to clean up without waiting for EPA attention if they can get reimbursement for cleanup costs they incur beyond their fair share. Because it is typical that a contaminated site never receives EPA attention, given the large number of such sites, this point is particularly important. The Eighth Circuit decision held that a private party that voluntarily undertakes a cleanup for which it may be held liable under CERCLA, thus barring it from seeking contribution under section 113(f)(1), may seek contribution from another liable party under section 107(a)(B). In an opinion by Justice Thomas, the Supreme Court unanimously affirmed. The availability of section 107(a)(B) actions to liable parties, said the Court, is dictated by the provision's lack of any express qualifiers to its reach. Nor does making section 107(a)(B) available to liable parties render section 113(f) redundant (courts avoid readings of statutory language that make other statutory language "mere surplusage"). Rather, said the Court, the two remedies complement each other: "Section 113(f)(1) authorizes a contribution action to [liable parties] with common liability stemming from an [EPA] action instituted under SS106 or SS107(a). And SS107(a) permits cost recovery (as distinct from contribution) by a private party that has itself incurred cleanup costs." National Association of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife , 2007 Westlaw 1801745 (U.S. June 25, 2007) (No. 06-340) This case arises from the conflict between the literal commands of Clean Water Act (CWA) section 402(b) and the later-enacted Endangered Species Act (ESA) section 7(a)(2). CWA section 402 is the heart of the CWA: it imposes a permit requirement for point-source discharges into waters of the United States. This permit program is initially administered within a state by EPA, until EPA, on the state's request, approves delegation of the program to the state. Section 402(b) states that EPA "shall approve" such delegation if the state satisfies nine criteria, which generally seek to establish that the state has the legal authority in place to administer as effective a program as EPA's. At the same time, however, ESA section 7(a)(2) requires "[e]ach Federal agency" to consult with the Fish and Wildlife Service (or, for marine species, NOAA Fisheries) in order to insure that any agency action is not likely to jeopardize endangered and threatened species or adversely affect designated critical habitat. The question is, does the ESA consultation requirement act as a tenth precondition for permit-program delegation, even though CWA section 402(b) on its face mandates delegation if the nine criteria stated there are met. This case arose from EPA's ultimate position, in connection with Arizona's request for delegation of the permit program, that EPA's decision was not subject to ESA consultation. The immediate concern is whether an Arizona permitting program, and state permitting programs generally, are as effective in protecting federally designated endangered and threatened species as the EPA-administered permit program, given that only EPA-issued permits are subject to ESA consultation. More broadly, how much contraction in the scope of ESA consultation would occur if other federal programs using nondiscretionary language are exempt from ESA consultation? The Ninth Circuit held that ESA section 7(a)(2) stated an independent criterion that had to be met. 420 F.3d 946 (9 th Cir. 2005). By 5-4, the Supreme Court reversed. Justice Alito, writing for the majority, recognized that in CWA section 402(b) and ESA section 7(a)(2), the Court faced "a clash of seemingly categorical--and at first glance, irreconcilable--legislative commands." To set up ESA section 7(a)(2) as an independent criterion for permit-program delegations, however, would be to countenance a repeal by implication of the mandatory "shall" in CWA section 402(b). Repeals by implication are disfavored by courts. Moreover, the agencies charged with implementing the ESA--again, the Fish and Wildlife Service and NOAA Fisheries--had resolved the tension between the two statutes through a regulation stating that section 7(a)(2) "appl[ies] to all actions in which there is discretionary Federal involvement or control." (Emphasis added.) Because the conflicting commands of sections 7(a)(2) and 402(b) create a genuine ambiguity, said the Court, and because the regulation's limitation to discretionary acts is a reasonable resolution, it is entitled to deference. Thus, concluded the Court, EPA may approve state delegations of section 404 permitting authority without ESA consultation. We are now likely to see federal government briefs filed in litigation over other nondiscretionary federal authorities, arguing that on the basis of National Association of Home Builders , no ESA consultation is required. United Haulers Ass ' n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Management Authority , 127 S. Ct. 1786 (Apr. 30, 2007) State and local restrictions on the interstate flow of municipal solid waste have long interested the courts, which have repeatedly struck them down as incompatible with the "dormant commerce clause." The dormant commerce clause, held to be implicit in the Constitution's Commerce Clause (Art. I, sec. 8, cl. 3), addresses state and local laws that either (a) expressly discriminate against interstate commerce, which are tested under a "strict scrutiny" test and almost always struck down; or (b) burden interstate commerce in a nondiscriminatory fashion, which are tested under a lenient, balancing test and often sustained. The interstate-waste court decisions, including five from the Supreme Court, have applied strict scrutiny to invalidate state and local restrictions on both import of solid waste from other states and export of waste to other states--the latter called "flow control." Flow control ordinances typically require that all waste generated within a locality be taken to a locally designated transfer or disposal facility. United Haulers concerns flow control. The case arose against the backdrop of a 1994 Supreme Court decision striking down a town flow control ordinance, applying the strict scrutiny test. C&A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown , 511 U.S. 383 (1994). The designated transfer facility in Carbone was privately owned, while the designated facilities in United Haulers were public. The question was, does this public-private distinction make a difference to the dormant commerce clause analysis? The district court found the county flow control laws at issue here unconstitutional under Carbone , reading that decision to require strict scrutiny and reject nearly all flow control laws. The Second Circuit reversed, finding the public-private distinction to be dispositive--thus allowing flow control in this case. By 6-3, the Supreme Court affirmed. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Roberts pronounced that flow control ordinances benefitting public facilities, while treating all private companies the same, do not discriminate against interstate commerce for purposes of the dormant commerce clause--and thus do not trigger strict scrutiny. Treating public and private facilities differently under the clause makes sense, the majority explained, for several reasons. First, public and private facilities have very different objectives--only government has a duty to protect the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens. Given this difference, laws favoring local government facilities are less likely to be motivated by economic protectionism than those favoring private entities. Second, treating public facilities the same as private ones under the dormant commerce clause would lead to "unbounded interference by the courts with local government." And third, waste disposal has long been a traditional function of local government, suggesting that federal courts should be "particularly hesitant" to interfere. Since strict scrutiny did not apply, the Court moved on to the lenient, balancing test for nondiscriminatory burdens on interstate commerce, and found the test satisfied. Thus, the flow control ordinances were upheld.

The Supreme Court decided five environmental cases during its 2006-2007 term, a significant proportion of the 72 cases it heard. Two decisions involve the Clean Air Act: one ruling that the act allows the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to regulate vehicle emissions based on their global warming impacts; the other, that EPA regulations validly impose an annual, as opposed to hourly, emissions change test in determining whether a modification of a stationary source makes it a "new source" requiring a permit. A Superfund Act decision held that liable parties who incur cleanup costs beyond their fair share may sue for reimbursement, despite another provision in the act restricting contribution actions. Another case dealt with the relationship between the Clean Water Act and Endangered Species Act, holding that the former's mandate that EPA "shall" delegate a permitting program to a state when statutory criteria are met is not subject to the equally unqualified command in the latter that consultation with federal wildlife-protection agencies occur. The remaining case involves a constitutional issue. It held that two counties' "flow control" laws, requiring that solid waste generated within the counties be taken to processing facilities within the counties, did not offend the Constitution's "dormant commerce clause" because the facilities were publicly owned.

Representative Frederick Richmond reportedly began forming what became the Congressional Arts Caucus in response to proposals by the Reagan Administration to eliminate funding for the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA) and the National Endowment for the Humanities (NEH), and the defeat of other prominent arts advocates in Congress. Within days, 77 Members of the House of Representatives had joined the caucus, and by the start of the 98 th Congress (January 1983), House membership had grown to 166 Members--reportedly one of the largest caucuses on Capitol Hill at that time. Representative Richmond served as the first chairman and Representative Jim Jeffords as the first vice-chairman. (See Table C-1 for a list of the chairs.) In July 1981, on behalf of the Congressional Arts Caucus, Representative Richmond proposed to the Speaker of the House, Representative Thomas P. O'Neill Jr., a program for encouraging nationwide artistic creativity by high school students through art exhibits in the tunnels connecting the Capitol to the House Office Buildings. In October 1981, Speaker O'Neill, in his role as chair of the House Office Building Commission, indicated no objection to an exhibit as long as it was conducted at no expense to the government. The Speaker further required that the Arts Caucus work with the House Office Building Commission and the Architect of the Capitol (AOC) on the details and to ensure that a jury of qualified people approves the final selection of student art for the exhibit. A detailed proposal for the manner of display of the artwork was also requested. (See Figure A-1 , letter from Speaker O'Neill to Representative Richmond.) In February 1982, the AOC sent a letter to the chairman of the House Office Building Commission in which he submitted the proposal for the National Art Competition program as prepared by the Arts Caucus. In the letter, the AOC expressed his approval and recommended that the House Office Building Commission do the same. (See Figure A-2 , letter from AOC George M. White to Chairman O'Neill.) The letter includes the signatures of all three of the House Office Building Commission members. Subsequently, on February 9, 1982, Speaker O'Neill and several members of the Arts Caucus announced the first annual Congressional Art Competition. Representative Richmond said, about the competition, that "members of Congress would conduct the contest among high school students in their districts. The winning art will line a corridor in the Capitol." No legislation has been introduced to authorize, sanction, or otherwise make permanent the Congressional Art Competition. On July 23, 1991, H.Res. 201 (102 nd Congress, first session) was introduced by the Congressional Art Competition co-chair, Representative Ted Weiss, to recognize the 10 th anniversary of the competition. On November 18, 1991, the resolution was agreed to by voice vote. The only other piece of legislation was H.Res. 1453 (111 th Congress, second session) introduced by the Congressional Art Competition co-chair, Representative Steve Driehaus, to celebrate the 29 th anniversary of the competition. This resolution was introduced on June 17, 2010, and referred to the Committee on House Administration with no further action. Throughout the competition's history, reportedly, a few submitted artworks have been removed as part of a controversy or otherwise. In 2012, an entry submitted to the Illinois Fourth Congressional District for the Congressional Art Competition was the subject of a controversy before being selected as the district winner. A Chicago high school student entered a city-wide competition to determine the next city vehicle sticker. Days before the city was to print 1.2 million new stickers, allegations surfaced on a number of police blogs claiming the design displayed gang signs and other symbols of the Maniac Latin Disciples street gang. The city decided not to use the artwork. It was subsequently entered into the Congressional Art Competition for the IL-04 congressional district. The artwork won the district competition and hung in the Cannon Tunnel for a full year without objection. Prior to the 2016-2017 Congressional Art Competition, the federal government, in a court filing, identified only one other occasion when a piece of art was removed after it was put on display as part of the competition; the work appeared to be a copy of a photograph that had appeared that year in Vogue magazine. In two other identified instances prior to the 2016-2017 competition, when suitability questions arose and the AOC reached out to the sponsoring Member of Congress, the Member agreed to submit another piece. During the 2016-2017 competition, an AOC-convened panel reviewed submissions and identified two works that raised suitability concerns, one titled "Recollection," which depicts a young man with apparent bullet holes in his back, and the other depicting marijuana use by Bob Marley. Consistent with its usual practice, AOC staff contacted the sponsoring Member'' offices regarding these works, and the Members indicated they supported the works' display. Both of these works were displayed. . Artwork for the 2016 Congressional Art Competition went on public exhibit in May 2016. In early December 2016, letters from Members of Congress and the Capitol Police requesting the removal of the winning entry from Missouri's 1 st Congressional District were sent to Speaker Paul Ryan and AOC Stephen T. Ayres. The artwork was viewed by some as violating suitability guidelines in the rules for the competition, as it depicted law enforcement officers as animals abusing protesters. Subsequently, the artwork was repeatedly removed and re-hung in the Cannon Tunnel to the Capitol by various Members of Congress. An administrative decision to prohibit the painting was made by Architect Ayers, which triggered the filing of an injunction in U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia on behalf of the artist, claiming violation of First Amendment rights. In April 2017, a judge in the District Court for the District of Columbia denied the plaintiffs' injunction, ruling that due to the public location of the artwork in a tunnel connecting the U.S. Capitol to a House office building, the art was government speech and that Members of Congress who objected to the content had a right to remove it. The artwork continued to be banned from display until May 2017 when all artwork from that competition year was removed. The House Ethics Manual addresses the issue of the appropriateness of congressional involvement in the Art Competition in the section on "Official and Outside Organizations." House ethics rules generally prohibit endeavors jointly supported by a combination of private resources and official funds. For example, House Rule 24 prohibits the use of private resources for the operation of both congressional Member organizations (CMOs) and Member advisory groups. Yet, the House Ethics Manual goes on to explain that, "Nevertheless, the giving of advice by informal advisory groups to a Member does not constitute the type of private contribution of funds, goods, or in-kind services to the support of congressional operations that is prohibited by House Rule 24." Later the Ethics Manual specifically addresses the Congressional Art Competition in the following: "One instance when cooperation with private groups has been explicitly recognized is the annual competition among high school students in each congressional district to select a work of art to hang in the Capitol, referred to as the Congressional Art Competition. Members may announce their support for the competition in official letters and news releases, staff may provide administrative assistance, a local arts organization or ad hoc committee may select the winner, and a corporation may underwrite costs such as prizes and flying the winner to Washington, D.C. Private involvement with the Congressional Art Competition in this manner is not viewed as a subsidy of normal operations of the congressional office. Members may not solicit on behalf of the arts competition in their district without Standards Committee [now Committee on Ethics] permission unless the organization to which the donation will be directed is qualified under SS 170(c) of the Internal Revenue Code." The general guidelines concerning Member solicitations is stated in the Ethics Manual , and solicitation guidelines as related to the Art Competition are addressed in the " Ethics Guidance " document for the 2018 Congressional Art Competition. In their earliest years, the Congressional Arts Caucus and Congressional Art Competition were financially supported by a $300 contribution from the allowances of members of the caucus. The funds were used to pay the salaries of two full-time staff and other operational costs. During the period 1982 to 1994, the caucus used its staff and interns to manage administrative duties related to the competition, such as announcements, guidelines, deadlines, the receipt of completed forms and art, and recordkeeping. These individuals also coordinated the art competition's awards program and reception to honor the winning artists. After 1995, many administrative tasks were undertaken by two Member offices--typically the offices of the co-chairs of the Arts Caucus. From the competition's inception, the AOC curator and the House superintendent have assisted with the moving, arranging, labeling, and hanging of the art works, as well as returning the art to participating Members' offices at the end of a competition--this is done in May of each year just prior to the commencement of a new competition. The curator also arranges the winning artwork alphabetically by state, maintains a tracking system, works with the House carpenters to have the artwork hung in the Cannon House Office Building tunnel, and prepares and attaches the accompanying descriptive labels. In 2005, General Motors, which had provided financial and logistical support to the Art Competition since 1982, asked the Public Governance Institute to assist with logistical support. In 2009, the Congressional Institute, Inc. took over from the Public Governance Institute, providing both advice and logistical support for the competition. According to its website, the Congressional Institute was founded in 1987 and "is a not-for-profit corporation dedicated to helping Members of Congress better serve their constituents and helping their constituents better understand the operations of the national legislature." Currently, each participating House Member solicits entries from high school students for the event and establishes his or her own method of judging the submissions. There is no entry fee for the competition and previous entrants (including winners) may re-enter as long as they are high school students. The winning artwork must conform to strict guidelines and meet all deadlines. By mid-February of each year, the Art Competition guidelines and forms to accompany the submitted art are available to the public on the House of Representatives website at https://www.house.gov/content/educate/art_competition . It is the prerogative of the co-chairs, the House Office Building Commission, the AOC curator, or the Congressional Institute, Inc., to modify the guidelines from year to year. Two sets of guidelines are available: The "2018 Rules and Regulations for Congressional Offices" (shown as Figure B-1 , unavailable electronically). The "2018 Rules and Regulations for Students and Teachers" can be found on the House of Representatives public website at https://www.house.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/documents/2018Rulesfor StudentsandTeachers.pdf (s hown as Figure B-2 ) . The "Student Information & Release Form" is available at https://www.house.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/documents/2018StudentReleaseForm.pdf (shown as Figure B-3 ), and a "2018 Art Submission Checklist" is shown as Figure B-4 (unavailable electronically) . Since 2009, the Congressional Institute, Inc. has assisted and advised Member offices on how to run the competition. The institute responds to questions from participants, collects district winner information, prepares the list of winners, organizes the receipt of the artwork, and shares coordination of the reception honoring the district winners. The institute also photographs the artwork and provides a digital record of each annual competition to the House of Representatives for posting on its public website. It has been the practice for the Congressional Institute to mail the invitations, print the programs, and provide food for the annual reception. The reception, transportation, name tags, T-shirts, photography, event website, and program printing have always been privately sponsored. Recent corporate sponsors have included General Motors and Southwest Airlines. Members of Congress may also obtain the services of local sponsors to assist with transportation and local awards. At the culmination of the annual Art Competition, the winning entries from participating congressional districts are available on the House of Representatives website. The names of the 2018 winners and their artwork are available at https://www.conginst.org/art-competition/?compYear=2018&state=all . The Congressional Art Competition co-chairs generally invite an artist from their respective congressional districts to address the student winners at the reception. Since it began in 1982, "over 650,000 high school students nationwide have been involved with the nation-wide competition." There are no required procedures for selecting the winning entries for participating congressional districts. Any entry that conforms to the general specifications stated in the "Guidelines for Students and Teachers" is eligible to represent a congressional district. Members of Congress may have local art teachers, art gallery owners, civic leaders, local businesses, or Member office staff assist with the judging to select their district winner. Members of Congress may also enlist the participation of businesses in the congressional district to donate plaques, savings bonds, and other prizes, or to sponsor a reception or event to announce the competition's district winner. For example, since 2004, the Savannah College of Art and Design (SCAD) in Savannah, GA, has offered scholarship opportunities to the first-place winners of the district competitions as long as funding is available, according to school sources. The $3,000 scholarship may be renewed annually. Other scholarships are targeted for winning entrants from a specific congressional district. In recent years, these have included scholarships to the High School Summer Institute at Chicago's Columbia College and the Art Institute of Phoenix. Georgia's 13 th congressional district winner may receive a scholarship to the Art Institute of Atlanta, in Pennsylvania, the 15 th congressional district winner is eligible for a full-year scholarship to the Baum School of Art in Allentown, and Tennessee 3 rd congressional district participants are eligible for a $3,000 scholarship to Tennessee Wesleyan University in Athens, TN. Additional prizes that have been awarded include roundtrip airfare to Washington, DC, for the opening of the annual exhibition, gift certificates to local art supply stores, family memberships for a year to an art museum, and cash. Although no congressional or taxpayer funds may be used for prizes or scholarships, corporate sponsorship is allowed. As in past years, Southwest Airlines is providing two roundtrip tickets to winning entrants from any city with scheduled Southwest service to Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport or Baltimore-Washington's Thurgood Marshall International Airport (BWI). Tickets will be issued to a parent or guardian as ePasses and are to be used within the period of two weeks before and two weeks after the Washington, DC, Congressional Art Competition ceremony. Southwest Airlines does not provide hotel accommodations or hotel discounts. Appendix A. Letters Establishing the Congressional Art Competition Appendix B. Congressional Art Competition Sample Forms Appendix C. Congressional Art Competition Leadership

Sponsored by the Congressional Arts Caucus, and known in recent years as "An Artistic Discovery," the Congressional Art Competition is open to high school students nationwide. Begun in 1982, the competition, based in congressional districts, provides the opportunity for Members of Congress to encourage and recognize the artistic talents of their young constituents. Since its inception, more than 650,000 high school students nationwide have been involved in the program. Each year, the art of one student per participating congressional district is selected to represent the district. The culmination of the competition is the yearlong display of winning artwork in the Cannon House Office Building tunnel as well as on the House of Representatives' website. This report provides a brief history of the Congressional Arts Caucus and the Congressional Art Competition. It also provides a history of sponsorship and support for the caucus and the annual competition. The report includes copies of the original correspondence establishing the competition, a sample competition announcement, sample guidelines and required forms for the competition, and a chronological list of congressional co-chairs.

The United States has grave concerns about the proliferation threat posed by Iran's pursuit of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, ballistic missiles, and advanced conventional weapons. The United States has passed laws and used sanctions to deter countries such as Russia, China, and North Korea from providing related technologies to Iran. The Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000 (INA, P.L. 106-178 ) added two new provisions to the existing laws: it widened some of the sanctions applicable to foreign persons, and, in Section 6, contained a ban on U.S. government payments to Russia in connection with the International Space Station unless the U.S. president makes a determination that Russia is taking steps to prevent proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and ballistic and cruise missiles, to Iran. This provision raised difficulties regarding U.S. access to the International Space Station when President Bush in 2001 cancelled NASA's planned Crew Return Vehicle (CRV), which was to act as a "lifeboat" for the astronauts on the ISS, leaving them dependent on the Soyuz. The President's announcement in 2004 that the space shuttle fleet would be retired in 2010 further increased that dependence. The International Space Station (ISS) is a research laboratory in space being built as a U.S.-led international partnership. Long-duration "Expedition" crews composed of Russian and American astronauts have occupied the ISS since November 2000, rotating on 4-6 month schedules. Europe, Canada, and Japan became partners in NASA's space station program in 1988. The United States invited Russia to join in 1993, motivated in part by nonproliferation concerns. Through the "Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission," the Clinton Administration sought to encourage Russia to abide by the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) to stop sales of ballistic missile technology. On September 2, 1993, Vice President Gore announced that Russia would join the space station program and that Russia had agreed to abide by the MTCR (which it would join formally in 1995). The United States agreed to pay Russia $400 million for space station cooperation. On October 6, 2003, White House Science Adviser John Gibbons told a congressional subcommittee that the initiative "fits into the context of a much larger partnership with Russia," adding that the negotiations "produced a key understanding that Russia is committed to adhere to the guidelines" of the MTCR. Clinton Administration officials reiterated this linkage during the mid-to-late 1990s. While U.S. cooperative programs with Russia were expanding, it also became clear that Russia was a source of sensitive technology to Iran. In 1995, Russia signed an agreement with Iran to finish construction of the Bushehr nuclear power reactor, a transaction worth $800 million or more. In 1996, reports surfaced of Russian entities providing ballistic missile assistance to Iran, including training; testing and laser equipment; materials; guidance, rocket engine, and fuel technology; machine tools; and maintenance manuals. Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet testified to the Senate Intelligence Committee in early 1998 that Iran was further along in its ballistic missile program than previously estimated because of Russian help. The "Rumsfeld Commission" on the ballistic missile threat concluded in 1998 that "Russian assistance has greatly accelerated Iran's ballistic missile program." The report estimated that Iran could have an ICBM capability within five years of a decision to proceed. The 105 th Congress responded with H.R. 2709 , the Iran Missile Proliferation Sanctions Act. Passed by overwhelming margins, the bill required the United States to impose sanctions against countries that proliferated ballistic missile technology to Iran. President Clinton vetoed the bill on June 23, 1998, objecting to low evidentiary thresholds and mandatory sanctions. He forestalled an attempt to override his veto by imposing sanctions on seven Russian entities that Moscow began to investigate in mid-July for alleged illegal exports to Iran. The sanctions were imposed under Executive Order 13094, which expanded the President's authority to ban U.S. trade with, aid to, and procurement from foreign entities assisting WMD programs in Iran or elsewhere. Iran conducted the first test flight of its medium-range Shahab-3 missile that summer, however, and reports of Russian assistance persisted. On May 20, 1999, House International Relations Committee Chairman Gilman introduced H.R. 1883 , the Iran Nonproliferation Act, covering ballistic missiles, WMD, and advanced conventional weapons. According to the committee's report, the bill was "designed to give the Administration additional tools with which to address the problem and the countries that are transferring dangerous weapons technology to Iran powerful new reasons to stop proliferating.... In addition, it seeks to create new incentives for the Russian Space Agency to cooperate in efforts to stem the proliferation of weapons technology to Iran." The bill allowed sanctions, but they were not mandatory as in the previous legislation. The House and Senate each passed the INA unanimously, and it was signed into law on March 14, 2000 ( P.L. 106-178 ). Section 6 of the INA concerns payments by the U.S. Government to Russia in connection with the ISS. On July 29, 1999, during markup of Section 6 by the House Science Committee's Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics, Science Committee Chairman James Sensenbrenner explained that "Earlier this year, there were publications of the fact that entities of the Russian Space Agency were violating the MTCR. That's why there is Section 6 in this bill." From 1994 to 1998, NASA had paid Russia approximately $800 million through several contracts for space station-related activities. Those payments ended because Section 6 prohibits the U.S. government from making payments in connection with ISS to the Russian space agency, organizations or entities under its control, or any other element of the Russian government, after January 1, 1999. Exceptions are made for payments needed to prevent imminent loss of life by or grievous injury to individuals aboard ISS (the "crew safety" exception), and for various other payments. The prohibition may be lifted if the President makes a determination that Russia's policy was to oppose proliferation to Iran, that Russia was demonstrating a sustained commitment to seek out and prevent the transfer of WMD and missile systems to Iran, and that neither the Russian space agency nor any entity reporting to it had made such transfers for at least one year prior to such determination. Neither President Clinton nor President Bush has made such a determination. On January 14, 2004, President Bush made a major space policy address directing NASA to focus its activities on returning humans to the Moon and eventually sending them to Mars. Inspired in part by the destruction of the space shuttle Columbia the previous year, his "Vision for Space Exploration" included retiring the space shuttle in 2010. The President said the United States would fulfill its commitments to its space station partners to finish construction of the ISS, for which the shuttle was the only vehicle capable. At the time President Bush made his "Vision" speech, the space shuttle fleet was shut down, while a review of the Columbia disaster determined the cause and necessary safety measures to be taken. Transporting astronauts to and from the ISS was carried out only in Russian Soyuz space vehicles until the shuttle Discovery returned to flight in July 2005. In addition, the cancellation of NASA's planned CRV left the ISS dependent on the Soyuz as a "lifeboat" for return of crew members in case of an emergency, since the shuttle could not be permanently attached to the ISS because of power demands. Russia expected to be paid for the Soyuz lifeboat service beginning in 2006. Retirement of the shuttle in 2010 would leave the United States without capability to transport astronauts to the ISS until a new vehicle is developed (as contemplated for the Moon/Mars mission). Transport to and from the ISS will again have to rely on Soyuz in the interim. Because of these developments, NASA applied to the Congress for an exemption from the INA that would allow it to contract with Russian space entities for use of the Soyuz for ISS missions. The response was the Iran Nonproliferation Amendments Act of 2005 ( P.L. 109-112 ). Since the President had not made the required determination under Section 6(b) of the INA, an amendment was needed to continue American access to the ISS. Senator Lugar introduced the amendment as S. 1713 , the Iran Nonproliferation Amendments Act of 2005. A debate in Congress ensued, with critics questioning whether exempting payments for the ISS would encourage Russia to continue alleged proliferation activity. Supporters of the amendment argued that the exemption was strict enough to only allow for ISS-related expenses for a temporary period of time and would not impact nonproliferation policy. P.L. 109-112 , passed on November 22, 2005, gives an exemption to the nonproliferation certification requirement for U.S. government payments made prior to January 1, 2012, related to the ISS. As part of the amendment, the House applied the nonproliferation penalties to such trade with Syria as well as Iran, and the act was renamed the Iran and Syria Nonproliferation Act. This addition was reportedly to strengthen and extend the nonproliferation aspects of the law to counterbalance the weakening of the nonproliferation provisions vis a vis Russia. The Amendment directs the President to submit to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House International Relations Committee a report that identifies each Russian entity or person to whom the United States has, since the enactment of the INA in 2005, made a cash or in-kind payment under the Agreement Concerning Cooperation on the Civil International Space Station, and specifies the content of the report. A further amendment, P.L. 109-353 of October 13, 2006, added North Korea to the act. The act is now known as the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act (INKSNA). Following President Bush's "Vision" plan, NASA has begun designing spacecraft for resuming flights to the Moon, and has indicated that such vehicles would also be available for missions to the ISS. It has also continued flights of the space shuttle to the ISS, and plans enough flights to finish the ISS before the shuttle is retired in 2010. Under the exemption provided in P.L. 109-112 , NASA has also contracted with Russian space entities to continue astronaut flights to and from the ISS. However, the exemption runs out in 2012. On April 11, 2008, NASA Administrator Michael Griffin submitted a proposed amendment to INKSNA that would extend the exemption for Soyuz flights for the life of the ISS, or until the Moon flight vehicle, or a commercial crew transport vehicle, is fully operational. The exemption would not be extended for the Russian Progress cargo vehicle. In a letter to Chairman Udall of the Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics, Committee on Science and Technology, and to Senator Biden, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Griffin said that fabrication of Soyuz vehicles requires 36 months, so that NASA must contract with Russian entities in 2008 for vehicles to be available in 2012. Extension of the INKSNA exemptions would have to be enacted before such contracting could take place. On June 9, Senator Biden introduced by request S. 3103 , the International Space Station Payments Act of 2008, incorporating the measures requested by NASA. On September 23, the bill was reported out of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. On July 24 the House Foreign Affairs and Science and Technology Committees reported by voice vote H.R. 6574 , the United States-Russian Federation Nuclear Cooperation Agreement Act of 2008. Title III of H.R. 6574 , as reported, would extend exemption of payments until July 1, 2016, or until a U.S. flight vehicle is operational. Like S. 3103 , it would not have extended payments for Progress vehicles. The U.S.-Russian civilian nuclear cooperation agreement was withdrawn from congressional consideration by the President on September 8, 2008. On September 25, Representative Tom Feeney introduced bill H.R. 7062 , which was referred to the House Foreign Affairs and House Science and Technology Committees. This bill contains provisions that authorize extraordinary payments to the Russian space agency for use of the Soyuz before July 1, 2016, notwithstanding the INKSNA restrictions. The waiver provisions are included in H.R. 2638 , The Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2009 ( P.L. 110-329 ). Section 125 of the Act amends P.L. 106-178 to set the date of expiration for waiver authority to July 1, 2016. Continued flights of the space shuttle have been necessary to transport a number of massive components to complete construction of the ISS. The shuttle has also been the main means of carrying and returning astronauts to and from the ISS, although the Russian Soyuz craft has also transported some "Expedition Team" members. In addition, a Soyuz has been attached continuously to the ISS as a "lifeboat" to return ISS astronauts in case of an emergency in the space station. This is a function that the space shuttle cannot fulfil even while it is still operating, because it can only stay aloft for a limited time because of power needs. After the shuttle retires, only the Soyuz will be available for transporting astronauts to and from the ISS until NASA develops new crew and cargo vessels as part of the "Vision" to return to the Moon, now scheduled for 2015 or 2016. In addition to crews, supplies and replacements for ISS components will need transport after the shuttle is retired. The Russian Progress vehicle has been used in the past, and would remain available, but the amendment requested by NASA would not include contracting for the Progress in the exemption extension. NASA has been investing in efforts by private industry to develop and produce transport vehicles that can take equipment and eventually crews to and from the ISS. This Commercial Orbital Transportation Services (COTS) program is still under development. Another option under development is the European Space Agency's Automated Transfer Vehicle (ATV), the first of which was launched March 9, 2008, and carried out docking demonstrations with the ISS in April. Four more ATV's are planned for construction. Japan expects to follow in 2009 with launch of its H-II Transfer Vehicle (HTV). Unlike the space shuttle, but like Soyuz and Progress , neither the ATV or the HTV is a reusable vehicle. Depending on the development of these options, some use of the Russian Progress vehicle may be necessary for transporting U.S. equipment and supplies to the ISS. Contracting such services would also probably require exemption from the INKSNA. As in 2005, an amendment would be needed before payments could be made to Russia since the President has not made a determination pursuant to Section 6(b) of the INKSNA regarding Russian nonproliferation policy or proliferation activities to Iran, North Korea or Syria. This is widely believed to be because the President would be unable to certify an absence of proliferation activities by Russian entities to these countries. The 2006 Director of National Intelligence report to Congress on WMD Acquisition says that "Russian entities have supplied a variety of ballistic missile-related goods and technical know-how to China, Iran, India, and North Korea. Iran's earlier success in gaining technology and materials from Russian entities and continuing assistance by such entities, probably supports Iranian efforts to develop new longer-range missiles and increases Tehran's self-sufficiency in missile production." In the past five years, after details about Iran's clandestine nuclear activities came to light, Russia has stepped up cooperation with the United States and other countries negotiating over Iran's nuclear program. Russia has insisted on IAEA safeguards on any transfers to Iran's civilian nuclear reactor at Bushehr and has delivered fuel to Bushehr beginning in December 2007, on condition that the resulting spent fuel will be returned to Russia. Russia has also invited Iran to participate in its newly established international uranium enrichment center at Angarsk, as an alternative to an indigenous Iranian enrichment capability. The Bush administration has supported this approach and since 2006 no longer objects to Russia's building the Bushehr nuclear power plant in Iran. President Bush, most recently at the April 2008 summit in Sochi, has praised Russian President Putin for his "leadership" in offering a solution to the Iranian nuclear negotiations. Russia has been only reluctantly supportive of U.N. Security Council resolutions imposing penalties, preferring a primarily diplomatic solution to the crisis.

The Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000 (INA) was enacted to help stop foreign transfers to Iran of weapons of mass destruction, missile technology, and advanced conventional weapons technology, particularly from Russia. Section 6 of the INA banned U.S. payments to Russia in connection with the International Space Station (ISS) unless the U.S. President determined that Russia was taking steps to prevent such proliferation. When the President in 2004 announced that the Space Shuttle would be retired in 2010, the Russian Soyuz became the only vehicle available after that date to transport astronauts to and from the ISS. In 2005 Congress amended INA to exempt Soyuz flights to the ISS from the Section 6 ban through 2011. It also extended the provisions to Syria and North Korea, and renamed it the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act (INKSNA). NASA has asked Congress in 2008 to extend the exemption for the life of the ISS, or until U.S. crew transport vehicles become operational. As in 2005, an exemption would be needed before payments could be made to Russia since the President has not made a determination pursuant to Section 6(b) of the INKSNA regarding Russian nonproliferation policy or proliferation activities to Iran, North Korea or Syria. Since 2005, Russia has stepped up cooperation with the United States and countries over Iran's nuclear program. President Bush has praised Russian President Putin for his "leadership" in offering a solution to the Iranian nuclear negotiations. However, Russian military actions in the Republic of Georgia in August 2008 put into question congressional support to waive the INKSNA requirement. The waiver authority was nevertheless extended until July 1, 2016, in H.R. 2638, The Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act of 2009. This bill was passed by the House and Senate and signed by the President on September 30 (P.L. 110-329).

Under the McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1945, insurance regulation is generally left to the individual states. For several years prior to the recent financial crisis, some Members of Congress had introduced legislation to federalize insurance regulation along the lines of the regulation of the banking sector, although none of this legislation reached the committee markup stage. Various other pieces of legislation have also been introduced to reform insurance regulation in more narrow ways. The debate around federal involvement in insurance regulation had traditionally focused on the negative and positive aspects of the state-centered approach compared to increased federal government involvement. The recent financial crisis, particularly the involvement of insurance giant American International Group (AIG) and the smaller bond insurers, changed the tenor of the debate around insurance regulation. The crisis grew largely from sectors of the financial industry that had previously been perceived as presenting little systemic risk. Many see the crisis as resulting from failures or gaps in the financial regulatory structure, particularly a lack of oversight for the system as a whole and a lack of coordinated oversight for the largest actors in the system. This increased urgency in calls for overall regulatory changes, such as the implementation of increased systemic risk regulation and federal oversight of insurance, particularly of larger insurance firms. Generally good performance of insurers through the crisis, however, has also provided additional arguments for those seeking to retain the state-based insurance system. Although insurers in general appear to have weathered the financial crisis reasonably well, the insurance industry saw two significant failures, one general and one specific. The first failure involved financial guarantee or "monoline" bond insurers. Before the crisis, there were only about a dozen bond insurers in total, with four large insurers dominating the business. This type of insurance originated in the 1970s to cover municipal bonds, but the insurers expanded their businesses since the 1990s to include significant amounts of mortgage-backed securities. In late 2007 and early 2008, strains appeared due to exposure to mortgage-backed securities. Ultimately some smaller bond insurers failed and the larger insurers saw their previously triple-A credit ratings downgraded significantly. These downgrades rippled throughout the municipal bond markets, causing unexpected difficulties for both individual investors and municipalities who might have thought they were relatively insulated from problems stemming from rising mortgage defaults. The second failure in the insurance industry was that of a specific company, AIG. AIG had been a global giant of the industry, but it essentially failed in mid-September 2008. To avoid bankruptcy in September and October 2008, AIG was forced to seek more than $100 billion in assistance from, and give 79.9% of the equity in the company to, the Federal Reserve. Multiple restructurings of the assistance have followed, including up to $69.8 billion through the U.S. Treasury's Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). AIG is currently in the process of selling off parts of its business to pay back assistance that it has received from the government; how much value will be left in the 79.9% government stake in the company at the end of the process remains an open question. The near collapse of the bond insurers and AIG could be construed as regulatory failures. One of the responsibilities of an insurance regulator is to ensure that insurers remain solvent and are able to pay future claims. Because the states are the primary insurance regulators, some may go further and argue that these cases specifically demonstrate the need for increased federal involvement in insurance. The case of AIG, however, is complicated. AIG was primarily made up of state-chartered insurance subsidiaries, but the state insurance regulators did not oversee the entire company. At the holding company level, AIG was a federally regulated thrift holding company and thus overseen by the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS). The immediate losses that caused AIG's failure came from both derivatives operations overseen by OTS and from securities lending operations that originated with securities from state-chartered insurance companies. OTS claimed that it had sufficient regulatory authority and competence to oversee a complicated holding company such as AIG. Others, particularly the Federal Reserve, disputed this claim and argued that a single body is needed to oversee systemic risk and large financial holding companies. The Dodd-Frank Act was passed in the House on June 30, 2010, by vote of 237-192, and in the Senate, on July 15, 2010, by a vote of 60-39. President Obama signed the legislation, now P.L. 111-203 , on July 21, 2010. Title V, Subtitle A of the Dodd-Frank Act creates a Federal Insurance Office (FIO) inside of the Department of the Treasury. A similar office was previously proposed in a 2008 Treasury "Blueprint for a Modernized Financial Regulatory Structure," in H.R. 5840 in the 110 th Congress, and in H.R. 2609 in the 111 th Congress. FIO is to monitor all aspects of the insurance industry and coordinate and develop policy relating to international agreements. It has the authority to preempt state laws and regulations when these conflict with international agreements. This preemption authority is somewhat limited. It can only apply when the state measure (1) results in less favorable treatment of a non-U.S. insurer compared with a U.S. insurer, and (2) is inconsistent with a written international agreement regarding prudential measures. Such an agreement must achieve a level of consumer protection that is "substantially equivalent" to the level afforded under state law. FIO preemption authority does not extend to state measures governing rates, premiums, underwriting, or sales practices, nor does it apply to state coverage requirements or state antitrust laws. FIO preemption decisions are also subject to de novo judicial review under the Administrative Procedures Act. The monitoring function of FIO includes information gathering from both public and private sources. This is backed by subpoena power if the director issues a written finding that the information being sought is necessary and that the office has coordinated with other state or federal regulators that may have the information. Title X of the Dodd-Frank Act creates a Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection within the Federal Reserve. This bureau enjoys significant budgetary independence, and the director is to be appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. Consumer protection issues relating to the business of insurance, however, do not fall under the oversight of the bureau, but would remain within the purview of the states. Consumer protection issues that relate to insurance products that are also considered securities continue to be addressed by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Although insurance products are generally under state regulation, there are some products, particularly variable annuities, that are considered securities products under federal law and jointly overseen by the SEC. In 2008, the SEC adopted new rules, generally known as "Rule 151A," that would have expanded SEC oversight to include some fixed indexed annuities that previously had solely been overseen by the states as insurance products. This rule provoked controversy, with Representative Gregory Meeks and Senator Benjamin Nelson introducing the Fixed Indexed Annuities and Insurance Products Classification Act of 2009 ( H.R. 2733 / S. 1389 ) to overturn Rule 151A. H.R. 4173 included no provisions addressing Rule 151A as it moved through consideration in the House, and neither did S. 3217 in the Senate. Senator Tom Harkin proposed S.Amdt. 3920 , which would have added the text of H.R. 2733 / S. 1389 to S. 3217 ; but the amendment was not considered on the floor of the Senate. The conference committee agreed to an amendment by Senator Harkin, contained in Section 989J of the act, that did not insert the previous language specifically nullifying Rule 151A, but is broadly aimed at returning indexed annuities solely to state oversight. The exemption from SEC oversight in Section 989J depends in part on either the states or the companies meeting certain consumer protection standards. Depending on future regulatory action by the SEC, this exemption language may require court action before the full impact of Section 989J is known. In addition to the language on annuities, Section 913 of the act may affect some insurance producers who also sell security products. This section authorizes the SEC to establish a fiduciary duty for broker-dealers who give personalized investment advice. SEC-registered investment advisers are already subject to a fiduciary duty, which requires them to act in their customers' best interests. Broker-dealer recommendations, on the other hand, must be suitable for customers; the act directs the SEC to harmonize the standards applicable to broker-dealers and investment advisers. This provision is of interest to the insurance industry because agents who sell securities products, such as mutual funds or variable annuities, have been required to register as broker-dealers, but not generally as investment advisers. If the SEC issues rules creating a fiduciary duty, such agents will have to meet the best-interests standard that applies to advisers. The Dodd-Frank Act provides for systemic risk provisions that affect the insurance industry primarily through oversight of firms deemed systemically significant and through specific financial resolution authority. Financial companies, including insurers, judged to be systemically significant by the Financial Stability Oversight Council are to be subject to Federal Reserve oversight and higher prudential standards. The council includes a presidential appointee who is to be familiar with insurance issues, a state insurance commissioner, and the director of the Federal Insurance Office with the latter two being non-voting members. Section 619 of the Dodd-Frank Act includes restrictions on proprietary trading by banking entities, a provision commonly known as the "Volcker Rule." Insurers that have banking subsidiaries or who are under a holding company structure with other banking subsidiaries would be subject to these restrictions, potentially affecting the investment strategies of these insurers. The language, however, includes an exemption for trading done "by a regulated insurance company directly engaged in the business of insurance for the general account of the company by any affiliate of such regulated insurance company, provided that such activities by any affiliate are solely for the general account of the regulated insurance company." The transactions must also comply with applicable law, regulation, or guidance; and there must be no determination by the regulators that a relevant law, regulation, or guidance is insufficient to protect the safety and soundness of the banking entity or the financial stability of the United States. A financial company could be subject to the act's special resolution regime based on a finding that its failure would cause systemic risk. Any insurance subsidiaries of such a financial company, however, would not be subject to this regime. Instead, the resolution of insurance companies would continue to be conducted in accordance with the applicable state insurance resolution system. With regard to funding for the resolution of systemically significant financial firms, there is no pre-funded resolution mechanism under the act. Instead, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) is to impose assessments on financial companies with more than $50 billion in assets, as well as other financial firms that are overseen by the Federal Reserve, to fund the resolution of a systemically significant firm in the event the assets of the failed firm are insufficient to do so. The FDIC is to impose such assessments on a risk-adjusted basis. When imposing such assessments on an insurance company, the FDIC is to take into account the insurers' contributions to the state insurance resolution regimes. Title V, Subtitle B of the Dodd-Frank Act is entitled the Nonadmitted and Reinsurance Reform Act of 2010 and includes essentially the same language as H.R. 2571 / S. 1361 . Similarly titled bills were introduced in the 109 th and 110 th Congresses and passed the House, but were not considered by the Senate. This language addresses a relatively narrow set of insurance regulatory issues pre-dating the financial crisis. In the area of nonadmitted (or "surplus lines") insurance, the act harmonizes, and in some cases reduces, regulation and taxation of this insurance by vesting the "home state" of the insured with the sole authority to regulate and collect the taxes on a surplus lines transaction. Those taxes that would be collected may be distributed according to a future interstate compact, but absent such a compact their distribution would be within the authority of the home state. It also preempts any state laws on surplus lines eligibility that conflict with the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) model law and implements "streamlined" federal standards allowing a commercial purchaser to access surplus lines insurance. For reinsurance transactions, it vests the home state of the insurer purchasing the reinsurance with the authority over the transaction while vesting the home state of the reinsurer with the sole authority to regulate the solvency of the reinsurer.

In the aftermath of the recent financial crisis, broad financial regulatory reform legislation was advanced by the Obama Administration and by various Members of Congress. Ultimately Congress passed, and the President signed, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (P.L. 111-203). The Dodd-Frank Act largely responded to the financial crisis that peaked in September 2008, but other efforts at revising the state-based system of insurance regulation also pre-date this crisis. Members of Congress previously introduced both broad legislation to federalize insurance regulation along the lines of the regulation of the banking sector, as well as more narrowly tailored bills addressing specific perceived flaws in the state-based system. The financial crisis, particularly the role of insurance giant American International Group (AIG) and the smaller bond insurers, changed the tenor of the existing debate around insurance regulation, with increased emphasis on the systemic importance of some insurance companies. Although it could be argued that insurer involvement in the financial crisis suggested a need for full-scale federal regulation of insurance, the Dodd-Frank Act did not implement such a federal regulatory system for insurance. Title V of the Dodd-Frank Act addressed specifically insurance, with a subtitle creating a Federal Insurance Office (similar to language originally contained in H.R. 2609) and a subtitle streamlining the existing state regulation of surplus lines and reinsurance (similar to language originally contained in H.R. 2572/S. 1363). The Federal Insurance Office is to monitor all aspects of the insurance industry and coordinate and develop policy relating to international agreements. It also has limited authority to preempt state laws and regulations when these conflict with international agreements. The act harmonizes, and in some cases reduces, regulation and taxation of surplus lines insurance by vesting the "home state" of the insured with the sole authority to regulate and collect the taxes on a surplus lines transaction. For reinsurance transactions, the act vests the home state of the insurer purchasing the reinsurance with the authority over the transaction while vesting the home state of the reinsurer with the sole authority to regulate the solvency of the reinsurer. In addition to Title V's specific insurance provisions, various other parts of the act may affect insurers and the insurance industry, including provisions addressing systemic risk, consumer protection, investor protection, and securities regulation. This report explains how insurance markets were affected by the financial crisis and summarizes the provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act that pertain to insurance. It will not be updated.

Several states are experiencing varying degrees of drought, with several western states experiencing severe to exceptional drought conditions. Drought conditions persist in all counties in California, with a majority classified as in either extreme or exceptional drought. Notwithstanding recent rains, California is experiencing its third consecutive dry year, which has resulted in abnormally low reservoir levels, as well as low surface and groundwater levels. Current drought conditions in California and much of the West have fueled congressional interest in drought and its effects on water supplies, agriculture, and ecosystems. Several bills have been introduced in the 113 th Congress to address different aspects of drought in California and other regions. This report focuses on S. 2198 , the "Emergency Drought Relief Act," which was introduced April 2, 2014, and may proceed quickly to the Senate floor under an expedited rule, Senate Rule XIV. S. 2198 is largely a revision of a previous drought bill, S. 2016 , the "California Emergency Drought Relief Act." Some provisions in S. 2198 have been broadened to apply to states outside of California; however, certain provisions in Title I remain focused on California water project development, management, and operation. Additionally, S. 2016 contained numerous direct spending provisions that are not included in S. 2198 . Overall, S. 2198 directs the Secretary of the Interior, the Secretary of Commerce, and the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), to undertake numerous actions that would address emergency drought impacts in California and other states, by aiming to increase water supplies for California water users, expanding purposes of program funding for drought mitigation activities, streamlining environmental reviews, providing drought planning assistance, addressing Colorado River water supplies, addressing Klamath River Basin water issues, and expanding the availability of federal emergency disaster assistance. The bill also would reauthorize and modify several water resource management programs. S. 2198 includes two titles: Title I , "Emergency Drought Relief," contains 14 provisions ranging from mandating maximization of California water supplies--consistent with laws and regulations--through specific project development, management, and operations directives and addressing project environmental reviews, to reauthorizing several water resources management laws (CALFED, P.L. 108-361 ; the Reclamation States Emergency Drought Relief Act, P.L. 102-250 , 106 Stat. 53, as amended ; and the Secure Water Act, P.L. 111-11 , Subtitle F ). Title II , "Federal Disaster Assistance," expands the assistance potentially available under an emergency declaration for drought (or other emergency) pursuant to the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, as amended, and discusses in congressional findings the application of the act to drought. The scope of S. 2198 is fairly broad, as it would address certain drought-related assistance for states that are experiencing drought, as well as specific issues related to water infrastructure and conveyance in California. In relation to projects and operations that would address drought in California, S. 2198 would direct federal agencies to maximize water supplies and streamline environmental reviews while remaining "consistent" with law and regulations. This policy approach is aimed at addressing drought, and in doing so, touches upon many long-standing and controversial issues associated with operations of the federal Central Valley Project (CVP), managed by the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation (hereinafter referred to as Reclamation), and the State Water Project (SWP), managed by the California Department of Water Resources. Proposed provisions related to these projects and operations raise several questions that are noted throughout the analysis of Title I below. Title I of S. 2198 includes numerous sections related to emergency drought relief. As noted above, these sections range widely. While Section 103 of the bill focuses on specific actions related to California water supply management, other sections apply to any state during the time for which a state emergency drought declaration is in effect or a U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) natural or agricultural disaster declaration is in effect. S. 2198 also would change, or in some cases modify, implementation procedures or financial assistance for several water resource and water quality programs. These include the Reclamation States Emergency Drought Relief Act of 1991 (43 U.S.C. 2201 et seq.), the Secure Water Act of 2009 (42 U.S.C. 10361 et seq.), and State Revolving Funds (SRFs) administered by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) under the federal Clean Water Act (33 U.S.C. 1231 et seq.) and the Safe Drinking Water Act (42 U.S.C. 300j-12). One such provision would direct the Secretary of the Interior to fund or participate in pilot projects to increase water supplies in Colorado River Storage Project reservoirs. Title I of S. 2198 also would authorize federal drought planning assistance, including hydrologic forecasting and other planning or technical assistance, upon the request of CVP or Klamath Project contractors or other Reclamation project contractors in California. Title I would reauthorize funding for CALFED activities through 2018 and the Reclamation States Emergency Drought Relief Act through 2019, and increase the funding ceiling for the Secure Water Act. The bill also would expand the Secure Water Act to include the state of Hawaii. Title I provisions related to California water flow, infrastructure development and operations, and environmental permitting have one overarching theme: maximization of water supplies available for general agricultural and municipal and industrial demand while an emergency drought declaration is in effect--consistent with existing law and regulations. Other provisions under Title I would largely modify, expand, or reauthorize existing program authorizations. Section 103(a) would direct the Secretary of the Interior, the Secretary of Commerce, and the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (together defined as "the Secretaries" under the act) to provide the maximum quantity of water supplies possible to CVP and Klamath Project agricultural, municipal and industrial (M&I), and refuge service and repayment contractors; SWP contractors; and any other locality or municipality in the state of California, by approving, consistent with applicable laws and regulations, the following types of projects and operations: any project or operations to provide additional water supplies "if there is any possible way whatsoever that the Secretaries can do so," unless the project or operations result in a highly inefficient way of providing additional supplies; any project or operations "as quickly as possible" to address emergency conditions. This provision provides broad authority to the Secretaries to approve "any" project or operational change that would provide additional water supplies (unless the action is highly inefficient or inconsistent with "applicable" laws). This could include, for example, projects ranging from relatively small conservation or efficiency projects to large projects expanding storage or conveyance facilities to provide additional water to users throughout different seasons, as well as to adjusting operations at reservoirs or in the Delta to increase water supplies. Additionally, this section would create the authority necessary for federal participation in state-driven projects to address the drought. California recently passed a law providing $687.4 million to address the drought. The intent of this section, according to some sponsors of the bill, is to provide flexibility to increase water supplies and allow federal agencies to use water supplies during periods of increased precipitation. There are several questions or issues that might arise from this section. A brief summary of each is listed below. Section 103(a) raises the question as to how agencies are to provide the maximum amount of water supplies and, relatedly, how they would determine what constitutes maximization of water supplies consistent with laws and regulations. Implementation of the provision could be difficult and possibly contentious. For example, the effects of providing maximum water supplies on species viability and water quality may not be apparent, quantifiable, or known for several years into the future. Conversely, agencies and water users may not agree that particular actions are providing maximum water quantities. Some observers already believe the agencies are maximizing water supplies to the detriment of species; while others are advocating relaxation of some laws and regulations. Projects or operations authorized under this section are to provide maximum quantities of water by approving projects and operations to provide "additional water supplies"; however, there is no definition for additional water supplies in S. 2198 . The lack of specificity raises the question of whether the language is meant to apply to water supplies during parts of the year, the entire year, or several years. The broad variety of potential projects that could be authorized under this section are tempered by language stating that projects and actions must be consistent with applicable law and should not be a "highly inefficient way of providing additional water supplies." The term "highly inefficient" is not defined and a determination would presumably be subject to the discretion or judgment of the Secretaries. Whether the term "highly inefficient" relates to cost efficiency, water supply efficiency, procedural efficiency, or perhaps all of these, is not specified. Projects and operational changes would have to be consistent with state and federal endangered species laws and regulations, as well as with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA; 42 U.S.C. SS4321, et seq.), California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), and water quality laws and regulations, among other laws and regulations. This provision raises the question of how the term "consistent with the law" might be interpreted as opposed to "pursuant to" or "in compliance with" applicable laws. Some might question if the phrase "consistent with law" would allow for more agency discretion or flexibility than other phrases. Ultimately, determining what is or is not consistent with laws and regulations may be left to the courts. The authority in this section would also be limited by the duration of the drought emergency declaration. Specifically, Section 112 states that the authority for this section of the bill would expire when the governor suspends the state drought emergency declaration. It is unclear; however, if a project started under this authority would enjoy permanent authorization or how it would be funded after the emergency funding under Section 104 of S. 2198 expires. The provision also would mandate that projects or operations be implemented as quickly as possible. It appears this provision could provide additional authority for agencies to streamline permit processes or feasibility studies for implementing projects, as long as such actions were consistent with existing laws and regulations. Although streamlining or shortening these processes would arguably lower the time it takes for operations and projects to become operational, and would therefore have a more immediate effect on reducing drought impacts, it is not clear whether such action would be helpful in the long run, for example, if full effects on species were not accounted for and species declined at a rapid pace. Section 103(b) of S. 2198 contains 12 subsections that would direct the Secretaries to implement several specific project-related and operational actions in California for carrying out Section 103(a). As with Section 103(a), Section 103(b) states that all actions are to be accomplished consistent with applicable laws and regulations. Project water deliveries from the CVP and SWP are sometimes limited due to federal and state endangered species regulations, as well as state water quality regulations. Such regulations may limit how much and when water is released from reservoirs and pumped from the Bay-Delta. These reductions are controversial and are at the crux of management disputes among water contractors, environmental groups, fisheries interests, and others. Several subsections of Section 103(b) address specific projects and project operations that may have an effect on project water deliveries, as well as species viability and water quality. Some selected actions directed by Section 103(b) include the following: modifying the operations of water conveyance infrastructure to maximize supplies for water users; modifying water flows to increase water supplies; establishing a deadline for the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) and Reclamation to meet NEPA and ESA requirements for certain decisions involving land fallowing; addressing water transfers so that maximum water supplies are available; addressing the effects of actions authorized under Section 103(b) on species viability and implementing projects to offset any effects; using scientific tools to assess if any changes to water conveyance and flow operations could result in additional water supplies. Several of these specified actions are focused on increasing water supplies (or minimizing reductions to water supplies); however, their effectiveness in achieving their objectives will be tempered by the condition that they are to be implemented consistent with applicable laws and regulations. Further, the actions specified in this section are only in effect until the governor of the state suspends the state of drought emergency declaration. This section generates similar questions and potential issues to those discussed in relation to Section 103(a). This section also generates some potentially broad questions, discussed below. Some might question how the projects and operations specified in this section will differ from existing actions if they are to be consistent with the law and regulations. For example, the section raises the question as to whether or not agencies are already maximizing water supplies or have any flexibility to do more than they are currently doing under existing laws and regulations. Some may respond that agency actions specified under this section will be directed to maximize water supplies as a priority over other considerations if the bill is enacted. On the other hand, others might argue that such would not be consistent with exiting law and regulations. Agencies would have to balance the new directives with parameters prescribed in existing law and regulations, thus making it difficult to estimate what affect the provision would have on projects and project operations. Some might question if the actions in this section and the direction to maximize water supplies for users might have unintended or long-term consequences for species in or migrating through the Bay-Delta. Some of the provisions under Section 103(b) contain directions to monitor the effects of actions on species and, in some cases, recommend changes to regulations. However, these actions appear to cover short-term effects, such as entrainment of species at project pumps, and might not address or contemplate long-term effects on species. Section 103(c) states that the provisions of Section 103 shall apply to all federal agencies that have a role in approving projects in Sections 103(a) and 103(b) of this bill. Thus, although not specifically mentioned, if the Corps of Engineers or another agency has a permitting or approval role in one of the projects that could be implemented under Section 103, the provisions of Section 103 would also apply to that agency. Section 103(d)(1) directs federal agencies, upon request of the state of California, to use "expedited procedures under this subsection" to make final decisions related to federal projects or operations that would provide additional water or address emergency drought conditions under Sections 103(a) and 103(b). Pursuant to Section 103(d)(2), after receiving a request from the state, the head of an agency referred to in Section103(a), or the head of another federal agency responsible for reviewing a project, the Secretary of the Interior would be required to convene a "final project decision meeting" with the heads of all relevant federal agencies "to decide whether to approve a project to provide emergency water supplies." After receiving a request for resolution, the Secretary would be required to notify the heads of all relevant agencies of the request for resolution, the project to be reviewed, and the date of the meeting. The meeting must be convened within seven days of the request for resolution. Not later than 10 days after that meeting, S. 2198 would require the head of the relevant federal agency to issue a final decision on the project. The Secretary (presumably the Secretary of the Interior) is authorized to convene a final project decision meeting at any time, regardless of whether a request for resolution is requested by the state. The accelerated project decision and elevation provisions would not mandate federal agency approval of a project. Instead, they would establish procedures to expedite the federal agency process for deciding whether to approve a project. As discussed above, provisions in Section 103(b) specify that projects carried out shall be consistent with current laws and regulations. As a result, it would appear that agencies could decide not to approve a project. This subsection appears to apply to a broad set of projects and operations, as long as such are requested by the state or agency heads for final approval. Specifically, it appears that this subsection might supersede regular processes for final project decisions under various laws, including but not limited to NEPA and ESA. However, earlier parts of S. 2198 mandate that actions be consistent with current laws and regulations. Thus, it is not clear how this provision might be implemented. Given the short timeframe for deciding whether to approve the project--10 days from the request of the state or agency heads--it is difficult to determine whether a state or agency head may make a request for resolution for a project unless or until that project complies with applicable law. Also, a final decision related to a project pursuant to Sections 103(a) and 103(b) would be subject to the meetings convened by the Secretary instead of the traditional processes established by the federal agencies. The specific process for approving or not approving a project is not provided in the bill and therefore raises the question of how final project decisions would be made (e.g., by consensus, majority vote). Presuming that a meeting could be requested as soon as a project is submitted, it is uncertain how much analysis of a project could be done within the 10-day time frame to approve a project. A question to consider is, if not enough time is provided to make a decision, could the meeting result in a default rejection of the project? Section 104 would authorize the use of funds for the Secretary (presumably the Secretary of Commerce or the Secretary of Interior, but it is not specified) to provide "financial assistance" under the Reclamation States Emergency Drought Relief Act (RSEDR Act), the Secure Water Act (Secure), and other federal law "for eligible water projects to assist drought-plagued areas of the State [California] and the West." By referencing "the West," Section 104 may limit the geographic eligibility for financial assistance to the 17 Reclamation states. Section 104(a)(2) appears to expand the eligibility for financial assistance to organizations and entities (public or private) engaged in collaborative processes to restore the environment, water rights settlements, and restoration settlements. Section 104(b) identifies a range of projects that would be eligible for assistance: it specifically identifies water diversion, pumping, water wells, conservation, irrigation, agricultural water conservation, maintenance of crop cover for dust management for public health purposes, and technical irrigation assistance, and would provide the Secretary discretion for assistance to other activities that increase available water supplies and mitigate drought impacts. Most, but perhaps not all of these purposes, are already authorized under RSEDR Act, Secure, or WaterSMART. Section 103 states that funding made available under Section 104 may be used to meet the "contract water supply needs of Central Valley Project refuges through the improvement or installation of wells to use groundwater resources and the purchase of water from willing sellers." Under Section 114 of the bill, the authority under Section 104 would expire on the earlier of when a state-declared drought declaration is withdrawn, or a USDA-declared natural disaster declaration is suspended. Emergency environmental review provisions in Section 105 may affect how certain emergency federal and federally funded drought projects in California would be required to demonstrate compliance with NEPA. Broadly speaking, NEPA requires federal agencies to identify and consider the environmental impacts of a proposed federal action before a final agency decision is made on that action. In doing so, NEPA intends to inform the federal decision-making process with regard to agency actions that would affect the environment. Section 105 directs agencies responsible for implementing projects under this bill to consult with the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) to develop "alternative arrangements" to comply with NEPA in accordance with existing regulations. Emergency compliance arrangements are currently allowed in existing CEQ regulations implementing NEPA. These regulations provide that an agency may seek such alternative arrangements when an emergency makes it necessary to take "an action with significant environmental impact." This provision would apply to any states while a state-declared drought declaration or a USDA-declared natural disaster declaration is in effect. It is difficult to identify whether and/or to which projects such alternative arrangements would apply. For example, there is some question as to whether the projects mandated in Section 103(b) would require review under NEPA. Although the statute is not explicitly repealed, and courts disfavor repeals by implication, courts have found that where a law gives no discretion to an agency, NEPA does not apply. The theory is that if the NEPA review would not inform agency decision making--because the actions are strictly mandated by Congress--NEPA does not apply. In making such a determination, a court would consider whether a federal agency had control over the action. Under the Section 103(b) projects, agencies would be required to carry out 13 mandated actions. Some of these 103(b) mandates are very specific (e.g., the mandated 1:1 inflow-to-export ratio for the increased flow of the San Joaquin River in Section 103(b)(4)). It is possible that the specificity of this action could lead a court to decide that the agency lacked discretion and that a NEPA review was not required. Other federal and state environmental laws may still apply, however. Regardless of whether NEPA applies or how NEPA compliance must be demonstrated, an agency would still be required to determine whether the project's impacts would require compliance with state or federal environmental requirements established under other laws, regulations, or executive orders. That is, even if compliance with NEPA was not required, the actions required or funded under S. 2198 would need to be consistent with applicable requirements such as those established under the ESA or state and federal water quality laws, among others. The language raises the question as to how such consistency is to be demonstrated, and at what point that burden of demonstration falls. Section 106 addresses California's use of monies in its State Revolving Fund programs that assist wastewater and drinking water infrastructure projects, pursuant to the federal Clean Water Act (CWA) and the federal Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA), respectively. The SRFs provide loans and other types of financing assistance under specific terms set by California and other states. S. 2198 adds no new or supplemental funding for California's SRF programs. Rather, S. 2198 directs the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Administrator, when allocating SRF funds, to require that the state of California review and give priority to projects that will "provide additional water supplies most expeditiously to areas that are at risk of having inadequate supply of water for public health and safety purposes or to improve resilience to droughts." The bill does not appear to add new types of project eligibility under the SRF programs. Instead, it appears intended to direct the state's priorities when awarding assistance among projects that already are SRF-eligible. These could include water recycling projects (e.g., recycled water treatment works and recycled water distribution systems) and water conservation measures, which currently are eligible under the state's clean water SRF program. It also could include source water and water storage projects that address the state's public health priorities, which are eligible under California's drinking water SRF program. The California agencies that administer the SRF programs have well-established procedures for identifying and prioritizing projects eligible for assistance. Intended Use Plans are prepared annually and are open to public participation. While the apparent intention of this section of S. 2198 is to provide funds expeditiously, it is unclear how quickly this could occur, in light of the state's existing priorities. For projects that are awarded assistance pursuant to Section 106, the bill would direct the EPA Administrator to expedite review of Buy American waiver requests, if such requests are submitted, and it authorizes 40-year loan repayments to the SRFs. Under both of the SRF programs, loans are normally to be repaid to a state within 20 years, but terms may be extended to 30 years in cases such as economically disadvantaged communities. Under the legislation, both of these provisions also would apply to any other state that has a state-declared drought declaration in force, or for which the Secretary of Agriculture has declared a drought or agricultural disaster. Finally, the bill provides that nothing in Section 106 authorizes EPA to modify existing state-by-state funding allocations, funding criteria, or other requirements related to the CWA and SDWA SRF programs for any states other than California or a state that has a state-declared drought or USDA-declared disaster declaration. Under Section 114 of the bill, the authority under Section 106 would expire on the earlier of when a state-declared drought declaration is withdrawn, or a USDA-declared natural disaster declaration is suspended. Section 107 directs that upon the request of Reclamation Project contractors in California (as well as all Klamath contractors), Reclamation shall provide water supply planning assistance for and in response to dry, critically dry, and below-normal water year types. Section 108 reauthorizes the CALFED Bay-Delta Act ( P.L. 108-361 ) through 2018. Many water- and species-related activities conducted by Reclamation and other federal agencies in the Bay-Delta are authorized under this act. Section 109 would extend the authorization of appropriations for the Reclamation States Emergency Drought Relief Act through FY2019 and increase the total authorized amount for FY2006 to FY2019 from $90 million to $190 million. It also would postpone the expiration of the program's authority from 2017 to 2019. As part of Interior's WaterSMART initiative, Reclamation manages a water and energy efficiency grant program using an authority provided by the Secure Water Act (42 U.S.C. 10364) and other authorities. Section 110 would increase the authorization of appropriations for the grants authorized by the Secure Water Act from $200 million to $300 million and would expand eligibility to include entities in the state of Hawaii. Section 110 also would provide the Commissioner of Reclamation with the ability to waive all associated nonfederal cost-share requirements to address emergency situations (e.g., waive the 50% nonfederal cost share). Section 110 would also allow the Commissioner to prioritize projects that "expeditiously yield water supply benefits" during drought. Section 111 would address water supply concerns in the Colorado River Basin. The basin has experienced decreasing water supplies over the last 14 years, and many fear it is in danger of reaching levels in Lake Mead that would trigger implementation of water shortage allocations for Colorado River water users. Section 111 would attempt to address these concerns by directing the Secretary of the Interior, as soon as practicable, to fund or participate in pilot projects to increase water in Lake Mead and other reservoirs of "initial" units of the Colorado River Storage Project (as authorized under the first section of the Act of April 11, 1956; 43 U.S.C. 620). Funding for the pilot projects would be directed to come from grants made by the Secretary to public entities that use Colorado River Basin water for municipal purposes and would be for projects implemented by one or more nonfederal entities or for implementing water conservation agreements in existence on the date of enactment of S. 2198 . Section 111(c) specifically notes that Upper Colorado River Basin Fund moneys would not be available for use in carrying out this section. The pilot projects in this section are limited to purposes as outlined in the Secure Water Act (42. U.S.C. 10364), which are quite varied. The provision appears to prioritize Colorado River Basin grants in that it would direct the Secretary to provide them as soon as practicable, whereas other existing laws authorize the Secretary to provide funding for various projects but do not necessarily direct him/her to do so. It is not clear what funding source the Secretary would use to fund this provision, although it is clear that the Secretary could not use the Upper Colorado River Basin Fund. Section 112 of S. 2198 states that if the bill were to be enacted, it would not preempt any California state law in effect on the date of such enactment, including area-of-origin, or other water rights protections. Section 113 of the bill would provide a general authorization for the Secretary of the Interior to conduct ecosystem restoration and water conservation activities in the Klamath Basin watershed. The water conservation activities authorized under this section could potentially decrease water demand in the Klamath Basin, an over-allocated basin in a prolonged state of drought. The ecosystem restoration activities could potentially increase the resilience of some fish species in the Klamath Basin that have been stressed by drought, among other things. Notably, both types of activities have previously been proposed in the Klamath Basin Restoration Agreement (KBRA), a water rights settlement involving the federal government, which is controversial among some and has yet to be authorized by Congress. Examples of KBRA activities that may be authorized by Section 113 include programs to purchase and "retire" certain water rights in the basin, restore endangered fish habitat, and reintroduce some fish populations. Section 114 states that authorities under Section 103 expire when the governor of the state suspends the drought emergency declaration. The authority under Sections 104, 105, and 106 expires in a state or area on the earlier of (1) the date the emergency declaration is withdrawn; or (2) the date when the Secretary of Agriculture suspends the national disaster declaration issued under the Consolidated Farm and Rural Development Act (7 U.S.C. 1961(a)) for drought or an agricultural disaster area. Title II of S. 2198 would amend the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, as amended (42 U.S.C. 5192(a)), to expand the available programs under an emergency declaration to include disaster unemployment assistance (DUA), emergency nutrition assistance, and crisis counseling assistance. The provision would apply to emergency declarations broadly; that is, it is not limited to drought declarations. Emergency declarations are short-term and, given the immediacy of their work, include an abbreviated group of assistance programs when compared to assistance available under a major disaster declaration. Title II also includes congressional findings indicating that a major drought may be eligible for a major disaster or state of emergency declaration by the President for purposes of the Stafford Act. If the effects of a drought overwhelm state or local resources, the President, at the request of the state governor or tribal governing body, is authorized under the Stafford Act (42 U.S.C. 5121 et seq.) to issue major disaster or emergency declarations resulting in federal aid to affected parties. However, requests by states for Stafford Act drought-related declarations and related assistance since the 1980s have been denied. The infrequency of presidential domestic drought declarations increases the uncertainty about the circumstances under which such a declaration is likely to be made. The de facto federal policy since the 1980s has been that the U.S. Secretary of Agriculture is the lead in responding and declaring eligibility for federal agricultural disaster assistance, including drought-related disasters. A declaration of an agricultural disaster area by the Secretary of Agriculture triggers the availability of multiple agricultural assistance programs, most notably the programs of the Farm Services Agency (FSA), and may trigger availability of other federal programs, such as the Economic Injury Disaster Loans of the Small Business Administration (SBA). Since FEMA has deferred to USDA over the past three decades, there are no sections of the Stafford Act, nor regulations or policy guidance documents, that address or even appear to lend themselves to a prolonged drought event as opposed to a disaster incident. FEMA has published a listing of the factors that are considered when evaluating a major disaster request by a governor. However, similar factors are not listed for an emergency declaration, since that action is intended to provide emergency assistance to save lives and protect property and to lessen the threat of a more catastrophic event. In addition, while governors may request an emergency declaration, the law also provides to the President the authority to issue an emergency declaration if the emergency involves what is considered primarily a federal responsibility. As previously noted, emergency declarations are short-term and include an abbreviated portfolio of assistance programs compared to assistance associated with major disaster declarations. For example, while an emergency declaration can provide debris-removal assistance, it cannot offer any form of repair to damaged permanent facilities. Similarly, while emergency temporary housing is available through Section 408 of the Stafford Act, other programs assisting families and individuals are not. In light of those differences, Title II of S. 2198 would expand the available programs under an emergency declaration to include disaster unemployment assistance (DUA), emergency nutrition assistance, and crisis counseling assistance. While each of those programs offers special, targeted assistance for unique problems caused by a disaster event, the reference to the DUA program has the closest link to previous FEMA actions. For example, the President declared a disaster due to a freeze during the winter of 2007. The main form of assistance provided at that time was DUA for farmworkers unemployed by the weather event. The proposed changes to the emergency section would arguably provide the President the authority to provide similar assistance under an emergency declaration without having to reach the bar set by the disaster declaration factors noted earlier.

Over the past five years, portions of the country have been gripped with extensive drought, including the state of California. Drought conditions in California are "exceptional" and "extreme" in much of the state, including in prime agricultural areas of the Central Valley, according to the U.S. Drought Monitor. Such conditions pose significant challenges to water managers who before this dry winter were already grappling with below-normal surface water storage in the state's largest reservoirs. Groundwater levels in many areas of the state also have declined due to increased pumping over the last three dry years. While recent rains have improved the water year outlook somewhat--moving the year from the driest on record in terms of precipitation to date to the third-driest--water managers are fearful of the long-term impacts of a relatively dry winter and little existing snowpack to refresh supplies later in the year. Because of the extent of the drought in California, drought impacts are varied and widespread. Most of the San Joaquin Valley is in exceptional drought, and federal and state water supply allotments are at historic lows. Many farmers are fallowing lands and some are removing permanent tree crops. Cities and towns have also been affected, and the governor has requested voluntary water use cutbacks of 20%. The effects of the drought are also likely to be felt on fish and wildlife species and the recreational and commercial activities they support, potentially including North Coast salmon fisheries. The intensity of the drought in California has generated congressional interest. Several bills have been introduced to address drought conditions in California. This report discusses S. 2198, which would address drought impacts in California and other states, and assist with drought response. This bill has two titles. Title I contains provisions ranging from mandating maximization of California water supplies through specific project development, management, and operations directives and addressing project environmental reviews--as long as actions are consistent with applicable law and regulations and not highly inefficient--to reauthorizing several water resources management laws. In addressing drought effects, Title I also would address project operations that relate to long-standing and controversial issues associated with management of the federal Bureau of Reclamation's Central Valley Project (CVP) and the California Department of Water Resources' State Water Project (SWP). Title II would expand the assistance potentially available under an emergency declaration for drought (or other emergency) pursuant to the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, as amended.

There are approximately 30 types of entities that qualify for federal tax-exempt status as organizations described in section 501(c) of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC). The most common types are SS 501(c)(3) charitable organizations, SS 501(c)(4) social welfare organizations, SS 501(c)(5) labor unions, and SS 501(c)(6) trade associations. Whether a SS 501(c) organization may engage in political activity, such as lobbying or campaign activity, under the IRC depends on the subparagraph in which it is described. This report analyzes the IRC limitations on political activity by tax-exempt organizations, focusing on these four types of organizations. It ends with a discussion of the IRC reporting and disclosure requirements. While this report discusses the political activity limitations in the IRC, it is important to realize that organizations must also comply with applicable election and lobbying laws. For analysis of the intersection between tax and campaign finance laws, see CRS Report R40141, 501(c)(3) Organizations and Campaign Activity: Analysis Under Tax and Campaign Finance Laws , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report RL34447, Churches and Campaign Activity: Analysis Under Tax and Campaign Finance Laws , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report R40183, 501(c)(4) Organizations and Campaign Activity: Analysis Under Tax and Campaign Finance Laws , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]; and CRS Report RS22895, 527 Groups and Campaign Activity: Analysis Under Campaign Finance and Tax Laws , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. For discussion of the applicability of federal lobbying law to tax-exempt organizations, see CRS Report 96-809, Lobbying Regulations on Non-Profit Organizations , by [author name scrubbed]. The organizations described in IRC SS 501(c)(3) are commonly referred to as charitable organizations. The section describes these organizations as organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster national or international amateur sports competition (but only if no part of its activities involve the provision of athletic facilities or equipment), or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals, no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual, no substantial part of the activities of which is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation (except as otherwise provided in subsection (h)), and which does not participate in, or intervene in (including the publishing or distributing of statements), any political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for public office. There are two types of SS 501(c)(3) organizations: public charities and private foundations. Public charities receive contributions from a variety of sources whereas private foundations receive contributions from limited sources. Due to fear of abuse, private foundations are subject to stricter regulation than public charities. This includes additional restrictions on their political activities, as discussed below. The organizational definition in SS 501(c)(3) restricts the ability of these organizations to participate in political activity in two ways: (1) they may only conduct an insubstantial amount of lobbying and (2) they may not intervene in political campaigns. Organizations that violate either restriction may lose their tax-exempt status and the eligibility to receive deductible contributions, among other consequences. The lobbying restriction and political campaign prohibition are discussed in detail below. The lobbying limitation was enacted in 1934 and the political campaign prohibition was enacted in 1954. The legislative history of both provisions is sparse. In 1919, the Treasury Department took the position that organizations "formed to disseminate controversial or partisan propaganda" were not "educational" for purposes of qualifying for tax-exempt status under the precursors to SS 501(c)(3). One consequence of this rule was that contributions to these organizations were not deductible. Several lawsuits were brought that challenged this treatment, but no clear standard emerged from the court decisions--some courts denied the deduction if the organization advocated for any type of change, whereas others looked at factors such as how controversial the advocacy was or if the organization's actions were intended to influence legislation. In what is generally recognized as the seminal case, Slee v. Commissioner , the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit used another rationale. In that decision, the court held that contributions to an organization were not deductible because it did not appear that the lobbying was limited to causes that furthered the organization's charitable purpose. With this background, Congress enacted the lobbying limitation as part of the Revenue Act of 1934. There is very little legislative history for the provision, but it appears that Congress was concerned with organizations that lobby also being able to receive tax-deductible contributions. While discussing the provision on the Senate floor, one Member complained about the deductibility of donations that were made for "selfish" reasons and specifically mentioned an organization with which he was apparently having problems. Although this Member apparently believed the provision was too broad in that it applied to organizations without "selfish motives," other Members argued that all contributions to organizations that lobby should be nondeductible because of the difficulty in trying to distinguish between organizations that deserve the benefit and those that do not. It has also been suggested that Congress enacted the provision in order to codify the Slee decision. Although this may be true, it should be noted that the Slee test and the lobbying provision are not identical. This is because the focus of the test under Slee is whether the lobbying furthers the organization's tax-exempt purpose, whereas the focus of the lobbying provision is whether the lobbying is a substantial part of the organization's activities. The 1934 Act had also included a provision that would have restricted the ability of charities to participate in partisan politics. However, that limitation was removed in conference, apparently because of concerns it was too broad. The political campaign prohibition was enacted as part of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. The provision was added by Senator Lyndon Johnson as a floor amendment. Upon introducing the amendment, Senator Johnson analogized it to the lobbying limitation; however, he mischaracterized the lobbying limitation by saying that organizations that lobbied were denied tax-exempt status, as opposed to only those organizations that substantially lobbied. The legislative history contains no further discussion of the prohibition, including whether Senator Johnson's overly-broad description of the lobbying provision and inaccurate analogy were noticed. Although Senator Johnson's motives behind the provision are not clear from the legislative history, it has been suggested that he proposed it either as a way to get back at an organization that had supported an opponent or because he wished to offer an alternative to another Senator's proposal that would have denied tax-exempt status to organizations making grants to organizations or individuals that were deemed to be subversive. The organizational definition in IRC SS 501(c)(3) states that "no substantial part" of an organization's activities may be "carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation" (i.e., lobbying). Lobbying includes activities that attempt to influence legislation by (1) contacting, or urging the public to contact, legislators about proposing, supporting, or opposing legislation and (2) advocating for or against legislation. Thus, it includes direct lobbying (contacting governmental officials) and grassroots lobbying (appeals to the electorate or general public). "Legislation" includes action by any legislative body and by the public through such things as referenda and initiatives. "Action" includes the introduction, amendment, enactment, defeat, or repeal of such things as acts, bills, and resolutions. It also appears to include Senate confirmation of judicial and executive branch nominations. An organization's advocacy activities may be lobbying even if legislation is not actually pending. Furthermore, an organization may be treated as lobbying if it does such things as make a contribution or lend money on favorable terms to an entity that lobbies. Lobbying generally does not include providing testimony in response to an official request by a legislative body. It also does not include contacting executive, judicial, and administrative bodies on matters other than legislation. Additional examples of activities that may not be lobbying include conducting and publishing nonpartisan analysis, study, or research; discussing broad social issues, so long as specific legislation is not discussed; and contacting legislative bodies about legislation that relates to the organization's existence or status. In order to determine whether lobbying is a substantial part of an organization's activities, the organization may elect under IRC SS 501(h) to measure its lobbying expenditures against objective, numerical standards. If the election is not made, the organization is subject to the "no substantial part" test, which has no bright-line standards. Most organizations do not make the election, and some, including churches and private foundations, are not allowed to make it. Organizations that make the SS 501(h) election measure their lobbying activities against the limits in IRC SS 4911. Organizations whose lobbying expenditures exceed the limits in SS 4911 for total lobbying expenditures and grass roots expenditures are subject to an excise tax equal to 25% of the excess. In order to not be taxed for excessive lobbying, an organization may not spend more than 20% of its first $500,000 of expenditures on lobbying, nor more than 15% of its second $500,000 of expenditures, nor more than 10% of its third $500,000 of expenditures, nor more than 5% of its remaining expenditures, and no more than $1 million on lobbying in the year. In order not to be taxed for excessive grass roots lobbying, the organization may not spend more than 5% of its first $500,000 of expenditures on grass roots lobbying, nor more than 3.75% of its second $500,000 of expenditures, nor more than 2.5% of its third $500,000 of expenditures, nor more than 1.25% of its remaining expenditures, and no more than $250,000 on grass roots lobbying in the year. The election also provides a safe harbor so organizations that do not exceed a certain limit will not lose their SS 501(c)(3) status due to substantial lobbying. Specifically, an organization will not lose its exempt status so long as its lobbying expenditures do not exceed 150% of the SS 4911 limitations over a four year period. Thus, depending on its activities in prior years, an organization could conduct lobbying in the current year that is significant enough to be subject to tax, but not lose its tax-exempt status. For organizations that do not make the election and those that cannot (e.g., private foundations and churches), the determination as to whether they have conducted more than an insubstantial amount of lobbying is dependent on the facts and circumstances of each case. Case law suggests that "no substantial part" is between 5% and 20% of the organization's expenditures. However, there is no bright-line test and the percentage of expenditures spent on lobbying is not necessarily determinative. Rather, courts have examined the lobbying in the broad context of the organization's purpose and activities by looking at such things as how important lobbying is to the organization's purpose, the amount of time devoted to lobbying as compared with other activities, and the extent to which the organization is continuously involved in lobbying. Unlike electing organizations, non-electing public charities are only subject to an excise tax on their lobbying expenditures if they lose their exempt status because of substantial lobbying. The tax equals 5% of the organization's lobbying expenditures, and the same tax may also be imposed on the organization's manager. Some organizations, including churches, are not subject to the tax. Private foundations, on the other hand, must generally pay an excise tax on any lobbying expenditures they make. The tax equals 10% of the expenditures. Additionally, a foundation manager who agrees to the expenditure may individually be subject to a tax equal to 2.5% of the expenditure, limited to $5,000. If the foundation fails to timely correct the expenditure, it is subject to an additional tax equal to 100% of the expenditure and the manager may be subject to an additional tax equal to 50% of the expenditure, limited to $10,000. In 1983, the Supreme Court ruled in Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Washington that the lobbying limitation is constitutional. In that case, the IRS denied the application of Taxation With Representation of Washington (TWR) for SS 501(c)(3) status because a substantial amount of the group's activities would be lobbying. TWR argued that the lobbying limitation violated its right to freedom of speech under the First Amendment. The group also argued that it was being denied equal protection under the Fifth Amendment because SS 501(c)(19) veterans' organizations were allowed to lobby substantially and still qualify for tax-exempt status and to receive tax-deductible contributions. The Supreme Court rejected both claims. With respect to the First Amendment, the Court found that Congress had not prevented TWR from speaking, but had simply chosen not to subsidize it by means of the tax exemption and tax-deductible contributions. The court also noted that TWR could qualify for exemption under SS 501(c)(4) and receive deductible contributions for its non-lobbying activities by setting up a separate SS 501(c)(3) organization. With respect to the Fifth Amendment, the Court stated that the test to determine whether the classification was constitutionally permissible was whether it bore a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose. Noting that legislatures have broad discretion when it comes to making classifications for tax purposes, the Court found that it was not irrational for Congress to decide not to extend the taxpayer-funded benefit of unlimited lobbying to charities because of concerns they may lobby for their members' benefit. The Court also stated that distinguishing charities from veterans organizations was permissible because the United States "has a longstanding policy of compensating veterans for their past contributions by providing them with numerous advantages." The organizational definition in IRC SS 501(c)(3) prohibits these organizations from "participating in, or intervening in (including the publishing or distributing of statements), any political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for public office," but does not further elaborate on the prohibition. Treasury regulations define candidate as "an individual who offers himself, or is proposed by others, as a contestant for an elective public office, whether such office be national, State, or local." As to what types of activities are prohibited, the regulations add little besides specifying that they include "the publication or distribution of written or printed statements or the making of oral statements on behalf of or in opposition to such a candidate." Thus, the statute and regulations do not offer much insight as to what activities are prohibited. Clearly, SS 501(c)(3) organizations may not do such things as make statements that endorse or oppose a candidate, publish or distribute campaign literature, or make any type of contribution, monetary or otherwise, to a political campaign. On the other hand, SS 501(c)(3) organizations are allowed to conduct activities that are political in nature but are not related to elections, such as lobbying for or against legislation and supporting or opposing the appointment of individuals to nonelective offices. Additionally, SS 501(c)(3) organizations may engage in certain election-related activities so long as the activities do not indicate a preference for or against any candidate. Whether such an activity is campaign intervention depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. The following examples show some of the ways in which the IRS has indicated that an activity might be biased. As will be seen, some biases can be subtle and it is not necessary for the organization to expressly mention a candidate by name. Section 501(c)(3) organizations may create and/or distribute voter guides and similar materials that do not indicate a preference towards any candidate. The guide must be unbiased in form, content, and distribution. According to the IRS, there are numerous ways in which a guide may be biased, and the determination will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. For example, a guide could display a bias by not including all candidates on an equal basis. Another way a guide could be biased is by rating candidates, such as evaluating candidates and supporting a slate of the best-qualified candidates, even if the criteria are nonpartisan (e.g., based on professional qualifications). A voter guide could also indicate a bias by comparing the organization's position on issues with those of the candidates. A more subtle way in which a guide may show bias is by only covering issues that are important to the organization, as opposed to covering a range of issues of interest to the general public. Some guides consist of candidate responses to questions provided by the organization. According to the IRS, factors that tend to show these guides are candidate-neutral include the following: the questions and descriptions of the issues are clear and unbiased; the questions provided to the candidates are identical to those included in the guide; the candidates' answers have not been edited; the guide puts the questions and appropriate answers in close proximity to each other; the candidates are given a reasonable amount of time to respond to the questions; and if the candidates are given limited choices for an answer to a question (e.g., yes/no, support/oppose), they are given a reasonable opportunity to explain their positions. Other factors that may be important include the timing of the guide's distribution and to whom it is distributed. For example, the IRS ruled that a SS 501(c)(3) organization could include a compilation of Members' voting records on issues important to it and its position on those issues in the edition of its monthly newsletter published after the close of each Congress. The newsletter was sent to the usual small number of subscribers and not targeted to areas where elections were occurring. In this specific situation, the IRS stated that the publication was permissible because it was not timed to an election or broadly distributed. Section 501(c)(3) organizations may conduct unbiased and nonpartisan public forums where candidates speak or debate. According to the IRS, factors that tend to show a public forum is unbiased and nonpartisan include the following: all legally qualified candidates are invited; the questions are prepared and presented by a nonpartisan independent panel; the topics and questions cover a broad range of issues of interest to the public; all candidates receive an equal opportunity to present their views; and the moderator does not comment on the questions or imply approval or disapproval of the candidates. A SS 501(c)(3) organization may invite a candidate to speak at its functions without it being prohibited campaign activity. According to the IRS, factors that tend to indicate the event was permissible include the organization provided an equal opportunity to speak at similar events to the other candidates; the organization did not indicate a preference for or against any candidate; and no fund-raising occurred at the event. Section 501(c)(3) organizations may also invite candidates to speak in their non-candidate capacity. Factors indicating that no campaign intervention occurred include (1) the individual was chosen to speak solely for non-candidacy reasons; (2) the individual spoke only in his or her non-candidate capacity; (3) no reference to the upcoming election was made; (4) no campaign activity occurred in connection with the individual's attendance; (5) the organization maintained a nonpartisan atmosphere at the event; and (6) the organization's communications announcing the event clearly indicated the non-candidate capacity in which the individual was appearing and did not mention the individual's candidacy or the election. Section 501(c)(3) organizations may conduct nonpartisan voter registration and get-out-the-vote drives. Again, the activities may not indicate a preference for any candidate or party. According to the IRS, factors indicating that these activities are neutral include the following: candidates are named or depicted on an equal basis; no political party is named except for purposes of identifying the party affiliation of each candidate; the activity is limited to urging individuals to register and vote and to describing the time and place for these activities; and all services are made available without regard to the voter's political preference. Section 501(c)(3) organizations may take positions on policy issues. Because there is no rule that campaign activity occurs only when an organization expressly advocates for or against a candidate, the line between issue advocacy and campaign activity can be difficult to discern. According to the IRS, key factors that indicate an issue advocacy communication does not cross the line into campaign intervention include the following: the communication does not identify any candidates for a given public office, whether by name or other means, such as party affiliation or distinctive features of a candidate's platform; the communication does not express approval or disapproval for any candidate's positions and/or actions; the communication is not delivered close in time to an election; the communication does not refer to voting or an election; the issue addressed in the communication has not been raised as an issue distinguishing the candidates; the communication is part of an ongoing series by the organization on the same issue and the series is not timed to an election; and the identification of the candidate and the communication's timing are related to a non-electoral event (e.g., a scheduled vote on legislation by an officeholder who is also a candidate). Under certain circumstances, SS 501(c)(3) organizations may sell or rent goods, services, and facilities to political campaigns. This includes selling and renting mailing lists and accepting paid political advertising. According to the IRS, factors that tend to indicate the activity is not biased towards any candidate or party include the following: the selling or renting activity is an ongoing business activity of the organization; the goods, services, and facilities are available to the general public; the fees charged are the organization's customary and usual rates; and the goods, services, or facilities are available to all candidates on an equal basis. A SS 501(c)(3) organization could engage in campaign activity by linking its website to another website that has content showing a preference for or against a candidate. Whether the linking is campaign intervention depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. Factors the IRS will look at include the context of the link on the organization's website, whether all candidates are represented, whether the linking serves the organization's exempt purpose, and the directness between the organization's website and the page at the other site with the biased material. Members, managers, leaders, and directors of SS 501(c)(3) organizations may participate in campaign activity in their private capacity. The organization can not support the activity in any way. For example, these individuals may not express political views in the organization's publications or at its functions (this is true even if the individual pays the costs associated with the statement), and the organization may not pay expenses incurred by the individual in making the political statement. Individuals may be identified as being associated with an organization, but there should be no intimation that their views represent those of the organization. An organization that engages in any amount of campaign activity may lose its SS 501(c)(3) status and eligibility to receive tax-deductible contributions. It may also be taxed on its political expenditures, either in addition to or in lieu of revocation of SS 501(c)(3) status. The tax equals 10% of the expenditures, with an additional tax equal to 100% of the expenditures imposed if the expenditures are not corrected (i.e., recovered and safeguards established to prevent future ones) in a timely manner. The organization's managers may also be subject to tax. Other consequences for the flagrant violation of the prohibition include the IRS immediately determining and assessing all taxes due and/or seeking injunctive and other relief to enjoin the organization from making additional political expenditures and to preserve its assets. There has been ongoing congressional, IRS, and public concern about violations of the campaign intervention prohibition by SS 501(c)(3) organizations. These concerns led the IRS to develop the Political Activity Compliance Initiative. It has two parts: the IRS performed educational outreach to SS 501(c)(3) organizations about the prohibition and used a fast-track process for reviewing possible violations. The initiative was used during the 2004, 2006, and 2008 election cycles, although the 2008 data have not yet been released. It does not appear the IRS has publicly indicated whether it will use the initiative during the 2010 election cycle. The 2004 initiative involved the expedited review of 110 cases in which SS 501(c)(3) organizations were alleged to have violated the campaign intervention prohibition. The IRS issued a written advisory in 69 of these cases, which meant that the agency determined the organization engaged in campaign activity but mitigating factors led to the organization not being penalized. Mitigating factors included that the activity was of a one-time nature or shown to be an anomaly, the activity was done in good faith reliance on advice of counsel, or the organization corrected the conduct (e.g., recovered any funds that were spent) and established safeguards to prevent future violations. The IRS revoked the tax-exempt status of five organizations (one for issues not related to campaign activity) and proposed two more revocations. The IRS did not find substantiated campaign activity in 23 of the cases, and found non-political violations of the tax laws in six other cases. The remaining five cases were still open as of the last IRS update in 2007. While the 2004 initiative was proceeding, there were reports in various media outlets that raised the question of whether the IRS had been politically motivated in investigating the SS 501(c)(3) organizations so close to the 2004 election. In response, the IRS Commissioner asked the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration (TIGTA) to investigate whether the IRS had engaged in any improper activities while conducting the project. In 2005, TIGTA released its report, which concluded that the IRS had used appropriate, consistent procedures during the initiative. The 2006 initiative involved 100 cases selected for examination. As of the last IRS update in 2007, 60 of these cases remained open. In the 40 closed cases, the IRS issued written advisories in 26 of them, and did not find substantiated political intervention in the other 14 cases. The IRS also identified 269 instances of SS 501(c)(3) groups apparently making direct contributions to political candidates. The organizations described in SS 501(c)(4) include those that are commonly referred to as social welfare organizations. The section describes: [c]ivic leagues or organizations not organized for profit but operated exclusively for the promotion of social welfare, or local associations of employees, the membership of which is limited to the employees of a designated person or persons in a particular municipality, and the net earnings of which are devoted exclusively to charitable, educational, or recreational purposes. [This paragraph] shall not apply to an entity unless no part of the net earnings of such entity inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual. Treasury regulations clarify that "[a]n organization is operated exclusively for the promotion of social welfare if it is primarily engaged in promoting in some way the common good and general welfare of the people of the community." Section (c)(5) organizations are described as "labor, agricultural, or horticultural organizations." Most of them are labor unions. The organizations described in SS 501(c)(6) are generally thought of as trade associations. The section describes these organizations as [b]usiness leagues, chambers of commerce, real estate boards, boards of trade, or professional football leagues ... not organized for profit and no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual. The organizational definitions in SS 501(c)(4), (c)(5), and (c)(6) do not contain any explicit limitations on lobbying. The organizations described in these three sections may participate in an unrestricted amount of lobbying so long as the lobbying is related to the organization's exempt purpose. In fact, organizations whose sole activity is lobbying may be recognized under these sections so long as they serve the appropriate tax-exempt purpose. For example, a business association whose only activity is lobbying for and against legislation according to its members' interests may qualify for SS 501(c)(6) status. If an organization engages in lobbying, it can impact the deductibility of any dues paid by its members. While dues are potentially deductible under IRC SS 162, that section disallows a deduction for the portion of dues that represents lobbying expenditures. In general, the organization must either notify its members of the amount that is nondeductible or pay a tax on its lobbying expenditures. The organizational definitions in SS 501(c)(4), (c)(5), and (c)(6) do not contain any explicit restrictions on political campaign activity. Thus, these organizations may engage in such activity under the tax laws. However, campaign activity (along with any other activities that do not further an exempt purpose) cannot be the organization's primary activity. Additionally, because a SS 501(c)(4) organization must be "primarily engaged in promoting in some way the common good and general welfare of the people of the community," it cannot qualify for SS 501(c)(4) status if it primarily serves a private benefit. Thus, it appears an organization that primarily benefits partisan interests could jeopardize its SS 501(c)(4) status. While the majority of SS 501(c) organizations fall into one of the types discussed above, the IRC describes numerous other types of organizations. The limitations the IRC places on the ability of these organizations to participate in political activity is often less clear, and there is minimal IRS guidance on the topic. This may be because the need for guidance has not arisen due to the fact that there are not as many of these organizations and they do not appear to participate in political activities to the same extent as the organizations discussed above. The other types of SS 501(c) organizations appear to fall into two categories. The first are those that seem to be prohibited from participating in most, if not all, types of political activity. This category would likely include the SS 501(c) trusts whose funds must be dedicated to their exempt purpose (e.g., SS 501(c)(17) supplemental unemployment benefit trusts, SS 501(c)(21) black lung benefit trusts, and SS 501(c)(22) multi-employer pension plan trusts). It also appears to include the organizations that the IRS has indicated in unofficial guidance may not participate in political activities "because the subparagraph in which they are described limits them to an exclusive purpose (for example, IRC 501(c)(2) title holding companies, IRC 501(c)(20) group legal services plans)." This rationale could also prohibit SS 501(c)(10) domestic fraternal societies, for example, from participating in political activities because their net earnings must be devoted exclusively to certain purposes. To the extent that any organizations are precluded from participating in political activities, there could still be exceptions for such things as lobbying for legislation that affects the organization's existence or status. The second category are those SS 501(c)s that appear able to participate in political activity under the rules applicable to SS 501(c)(4), (c)(5), and (c)(6) organizations. Examples would appear to include SS 501(c)(7) social and recreational clubs, SS 501(c)(8) fraternal benefit societies and associations, and SS 501(c)(19) veterans' groups. Even though certain SS 501(c) organizations may engage in political activity, they are subject to tax if they make an expenditure for a SS 527 "exempt function." An "exempt function" is the "influencing or attempting to influence the selection, nomination, election, or appointment of any individual to any Federal, State, or local public office or office in a political organization, or the election of Presidential or Vice-Presidential electors.... " The tax is imposed at the highest corporate rate on the lesser of the organization's net investment income or the total amount of "exempt function" expenditures. Thus, for organizations with little or no net investment income or those making low-cost expenditures, the tax is of minimal import. For others groups, however, it might serve as a disincentive to directly engage in the activities giving rise to the taxable expenditures. Section 501(c) organizations may lawfully avoid the tax by setting up a separate segregated fund under SS 527(f)(3) to conduct the taxable political activities. Assuming the fund is set up and administered properly, it will be treated as a separate SS 527 political organization and the SS 501(c) organization will not be subject to tax. However, a SS 501(c) organization may not set up such a fund to accomplish activities the organization itself may not do. Thus, for example, a SS 501(c)(3) organization may not use such a fund as a way to get around the prohibition on campaign intervention. Under the IRC, SS 501(c) organizations are generally required to file an annual information return (Form 990) with the IRS. Filing organizations are required to report information regarding their political activities on the Form's Schedule C. On the Schedule C, SS 501(c)(3) organizations are required to describe their direct and indirect political campaign activities and report information on their political expenditures, volunteer hours, and any SS 4955 excise taxes incurred. Section 501(c)(3) organizations must also report information about their lobbying activities on the Schedule. The specific information that must be reported differs depending on whether the organization made the SS 501(h) election. Meanwhile, organizations other than those described in SS 501(c)(3) must: (1) describe their direct and indirect political campaign activities; (2) report the amount spent conducting campaign activities and the number of volunteer hours used to conduct those activities; (3) report the amount directly spent for SS 527 exempt function activities; (4) report the amount of funds contributed to other organizations for SS 527 exempt function activities; (5) report whether a Form 1120-POL (the tax return filed by organizations owing the SS 527 tax) was filed for the year; and (6) report the name, address, and employer identification number of every SS 527 political organization to which a payment was made and the amount of such payments, and indicate whether the amounts were paid from internal funds or were contributions received and directly transferred to a separate political organization. There is also space for SS 501(c)(4), (c)(5), and (c)(6) organizations to report information regarding their lobbying activities with respect to the deductibility of dues paid by their members. On the Form 990's Schedule B, SS 501(c) organizations must report the names and addresses of significant donors, which are generally individuals who contributed at least $5,000 during the year. These are all donors meeting this threshold, and not just those who contributed for political activities. The organization and the IRS must make the organization's Form 990 and accompanying schedules publicly available. However, identifying information about the donors reported on the Schedule B is not subject to public disclosure, except for donors to private foundations.

As the 2010 election cycle heats up, attention is focused on the political activities of tax-exempt SS 501(c) organizations. This is due in large part to a recent Supreme Court case, Citizens United v. FEC, which invalidated long-standing prohibitions in federal campaign finance law on corporate and labor union campaign treasury spending. These prohibitions had affected SS 501(c) organizations because many are incorporated and because all organizations (regardless of corporate status) could not serve as conduits for corporate or labor union treasury funds. Thus, post-Citizens United, SS 501(c) organizations are among the entities operating with less restriction under federal campaign finance law. As a result, it is expected there will be increased political activity by the tax-exempt sector in 2010 in comparison with past election cycles. Due to this expectation, significant attention is being paid to the regulation of SS 501(c) groups under the Internal Revenue Code (IRC). Under the IRC, the ability of SS 501(c) organizations to engage in political activity, such as electioneering and lobbying, depends on the type of organization. For example, the charitable organizations described in SS 501(c)(3) may not engage in any campaign activity and may only conduct a limited amount of lobbying. Meanwhile, SS 501(c)(4) social welfare organizations, SS 501(c)(5) labor unions, and SS 501(c)(6) trade associations may engage in campaign activity (so long as such activity and any other non-exempt purpose activity is not their primary activity) and an unlimited amount of lobbying. Other types of SS 501(c) organizations appear to either be subject to restrictions like those imposed on SS 501(c)(3) organizations or treated similarly to SS 501(c)(4), (c)(5), and (c)(6) organizations. While some types of organizations are permitted to engage in election-related activities under the IRC, SS 501(c) organizations are subject to tax for making certain political expenditures. The tax is imposed on the lesser of the taxable expenditures or the organization's net investment income. Thus, for organizations with little or no net investment income or those making low-cost expenditures, the tax is of minimal import. For other groups, however, it might serve as a disincentive to directly engage in the activities giving rise to the taxable expenditures. Finally, SS 501(c) organizations must report information regarding their political activities to the IRS on Schedule C of the Form 990. This information must be made publicly available by the organization and the IRS. While information on certain donors also must be reported to the IRS on the Form's Schedule B, any identifying information about those donors is generally not subject to public disclosure. While this report discusses the political activity limitations in the IRC, it is important to realize that organizations must also comply with applicable election and lobbying laws. For analysis of the intersection between tax and campaign finance laws, see CRS Report R40141, 501(c)(3) Organizations and Campaign Activity: Analysis Under Tax and Campaign Finance Laws, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report RL34447, Churches and Campaign Activity: Analysis Under Tax and Campaign Finance Laws, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report R40183, 501(c)(4) Organizations and Campaign Activity: Analysis Under Tax and Campaign Finance Laws, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]; and CRS Report RS22895, 527 Groups and Campaign Activity: Analysis Under Campaign Finance and Tax Laws, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. For discussion of the applicability of federal lobbying law to tax-exempt organizations, see CRS Report 96-809, Lobbying Regulations on Non-Profit Organizations, by [author name scrubbed].

The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB, P.L. 107-110 ) established the Rural Education Achievement Program (REAP) under Title VI-B of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA). Congress created this program to address the unique needs of rural schools that disadvantage them relative to nonrural schools. To compensate for the challenges facing rural schools, REAP awards two types of formula grants; one goes directly to eligible school districts, or local educational agencies (LEAs), and a second grant goes to states, which then award subgrants to LEAs. The authorization for REAP, along with the rest of the ESEA, expired at the end of FY2008. However, these programs continue to operate as long as appropriations are provided. Congress is expected to consider whether to amend and extend the ESEA programs, including REAP. This report will discuss the challenges facing rural schools, the manner in which REAP addresses these challenges, and reauthorization issues that may arise as Congress takes up the ESEA. Much of the discussion of reauthorization considerations centers on allocation of funds, given that allocation issues tend to factor prominently in deliberations about REAP. According to their proponents, rural schools have some advantages over their urban and suburban counterparts. Rural teachers are key members of the community and tend to know students and their families well. Rural schools have less complex organizational structures with fewer layers than nonrural school systems, and are able to adjust or adapt relatively quickly to change. Additionally, the schools within rural communities are very visible and strongly connected with the community. However, rural schools also confront significant challenges. Many face the worst of local fiscal limitations due to tax base constraints. Resource shortages produce various problems, including limited range of curricular options (such as a lack of advanced placement course offerings) and difficulties providing competitive salaries to attract and retain highly qualified teachers. Rural schools tend to have declining enrollment due to net out-migration and an aging of the population. Rural schools' low population density results in other problems, such as high transportation costs and limited access to cultural and educational resources. In addition to these general challenges, rural LEAs may face particular problems meeting NCLB requirements, such as standards of adequate yearly progress (AYP). They may also find it difficult to implement NCLB's consequences for failure to make AYP (such as providing public-school choice and supplementary educational services), and they often experience difficulty in attracting and retaining qualified teachers of core academic subjects (such as math and science). A study by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) confirmed these problems. The GAO study reached five main conclusions. Achieving NCLB goals for large enrollments of economically disadvantaged students presents more challenges for rural LEAs than for nonrural LEAs. Some rural districts lack the community resources, such as libraries and museums, that may support improved academic performance. Compared with nonrural LEAs, rural LEAs are more likely to experience problems recruiting teachers because of difficulties offering competitive salaries. Small rural districts are more likely to report that factors related to school size and geographic isolation, such as limited personnel, make it difficult to release teachers and administrators for attending conferences and training, impeding their ability to implement NCLB requirements. Some rural districts indicated that limited numbers of staff created difficulties completing NCLB requirements, such as reporting on school progress. The U.S. Department of Education (ED) has sought to address concerns of rural school districts. In response to the GAO report, ED has attempted to provide additional flexibility for rural LEAs. For example, ED allows teachers in rural LEAs "extra time--up to 3 years--to meet teacher qualification requirements," and permits states to "use a single state test for teachers to demonstrate subject matter competency for core academic subjects." Congress created REAP to meet many of the challenges identified in the subsequent GAO study. According to the statute, REAP funds are to address "the unique needs of rural school districts that frequently (1) lack the personnel and resources needed to compete effectively for Federal competitive grants; and (2) receive formula grant allocations in amounts too small to be effective in meeting their intended purposes." REAP authorizes two rural education programs under ESEA Title VI-B. Subpart 1 authorizes the Small, Rural School Achievement Program (SRSA), which focuses on LEAs with less than 600 students. Subpart 2 authorizes the Rural and Low-Income School Program (RLIS), which focuses on larger rural LEAs with relatively high poverty rates (at least 20% of children from families below the poverty line). Funds are to be divided equally between the SRSA and RLIS programs. NCLB authorized REAP at $300 million for FY2002 and "such sums as necessary" for FY2003-FY2007; however, the program continues to operate as long as appropriations are provided. In FY2012, $179 million was appropriated for REAP. Table 1 shows the history of appropriations for the program. Appropriations have grown modestly, except for FY2006 and FY2011. Overall, appropriations for FY2012 represent about a 10% increase over FY2002, the first year of program funding. To be eligible for REAP funds, LEAs must be designated rural by the ED. The National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) has devised a typology to classify schools based on their geographic location. Using Census Bureau geographic data, NCES assigns so-called "locale codes" to each school. Locale codes are used to classify schools along an eight-point urban-to-rural scale that is based on their proximity to metropolitan areas. These so-called "metro-centric" locale codes are defined as follows: 1 = Large City : A central city of a core based statistical area (CBSA) or metropolitan statistical area (MSA), with the city having a population greater than or equal to 250,000. 2 = Midsize City : A central city of a CBSA or MSA, with the city having a population of less than 250,000. 3 = Urban Fringe of a Large City : Any territory within a CBSA or MSA of a Large City and defined as urban by the Census Bureau. 4 = Urban Fringe of a Midsize City : Any territory within a CBSA or MSA of a Midsize City and defined as urban by the Census Bureau. 5 = Large Town : An incorporated place or Census-designated place with a population greater than or equal to 25,000 and located outside a CBSA or MSA. 6 = Small Town : An incorporated place or Census-designated place with a population less than 25,000 and greater than or equal to 2,500 and located outside a CBSA or MSA. 7 = Rural, Outside MSA : Any territory designated as rural by the Census Bureau that is outside a CBSA or MSA of a Large or Midsize City. 8 = Rural, Inside MSA : Any territory designated as rural by the Census Bureau that is within a CBSA or MSA of a Large or Midsize City. An LEA is eligible for the Small Rural School Achievement (SRSA) program if all schools served by the LEA have a locale code of 7 or 8 and either its average daily attendance (ADA) is less than 600 or the county or counties in which the LEA is located has a population density of fewer than 10 people per square mile. The SRSA statute allows the Secretary of Education to waive the locale code requirement (but not the ADA or population density requirements) based on a state government agency's determination that the LEA is located in a rural area. An LEA is eligible for the Rural Low-Income School (RLIS) program if all its schools have locale codes of 6, 7, or 8 and at least 20% of the children the LEA serves are from families below the poverty line. Unlike the SRSA program, the RLIS statute does not provide the Secretary with waiver authority for the locale code requirement. Finally, an LEA that receives a grant under the SRSA program is not eligible for RLIS funding. Table 2 shows estimates of LEAs eligible for the SRSA and RLIS programs based on CRS analysis of Common Core of Data (CCD). As the table illustrates, compared with determination by locale alone, combining eligibility criteria significantly reduces the number of LEAs that are eligible for assistance. In the case of the SRSA program (as noted below), actual grants for eligible LEAs can be reduced or even eliminated depending on funds eligible LEAs receive under offsetting ESEA formula grant programs. Amounts that LEAs receive and aggregate state amounts are determined differently under the SRSA and RLIS programs. Under the SRSA program, an initial amount is calculated for each eligible LEA and then funds are added based on enrollment and subtracted based on "offsetting" amounts received from other ESEA programs. Under RLIS, grants are first made to states based on a formula and then subgranted to LEAs either on a formula or competitive basis. To the initial SRSA base grant of $20,000, an additional amount is added based on the number of students in the LEA for LEAs with more than 50 students. The additional amount is equal to $100 for each student over 50; however, no grant amount may exceed $60,000. The following are some examples of initial amount calculations: LEAs with 50 students or fewer have initial amounts of $20,000. An LEA with 55 students has an initial amount of $20,500 (i.e., $20,000 plus $500, which is $100 times the five students over 50). An LEA with 449 students has an initial amount of $59,900 (i.e., $20,000 plus $39,900, which is $100 times the 399 students over 50). LEAs with between 450 and 599 students have initial grants of $60,000 (e.g., the calculation based on 451 students would be $20,000 plus $40,100, which is $100 times the 401 students over 50; since this exceeds the maximum amount of $60,000, the amount of the award would be $60,000). Congress intended the SRSA program to be a supplement to certain other ESEA grant funds. Thus, an LEA's final grant is based on adjusting its initial amount by the total amount it received from the following ESEA grant programs in the prior fiscal year: LEA subgrants under the Teacher and Principal Training and Recruiting Fund (Subpart 2 of Title II), LEA technology grants (Section 2412(a)(2)(A) of Title II), LEA grants under the Safe and Drug-Free Schools and Communities program (Section 4114), and Innovative Programs under the Promoting Informed Parental Choice and Innovative Programs (Part A of Title V). As a result of this "offset" provision, an LEA receiving a total of $60,000 or more from these four ESEA programs would not receive any additional funds under the SRSA program. As SRSA-eligible, these LEAs would also not receive funds under the RLIS program. State amounts for the SRSA program are the sum of amounts allocated to LEAs in each state. Unlike the SRSA program, the statute instructs the Secretary to reserve funds from the total RLIS appropriation for Bureau of Indian Education (BIE) schools (0.5%) and for outlying areas (0.5%). The remainder is allotted to states based on each state's share of students attending schools in eligible LEAs nationwide. Thus, for example, a state with 2% of the national enrollment in RLIS-eligible LEAs would receive 2% of funds remaining after reserving BIE and outlying area funds. States then award subgrants to eligible LEAs either competitively or based on a formula selected by the state, and approved by the Secretary. Note that this procedure makes it impossible to estimate individual LEA grants. In a number of cases, states receive funds under one program but not under the other. For example, Alabama receives no SRSA grants but does receive RLIS funding. This is because none of Alabama's 132 LEAs have enrollments less than 600. This is also true for other southeastern states, which tend to have larger consolidated or countywide LEAs and few or no small LEAs. On the other hand, Alabama has about 60 LEAs for which all schools have metro-centric locale codes of 6, 7, or 8 and poverty rates of at least 20%. Thus, Alabama receives a substantial grant under the RLIS program, as do other southeastern states. On the other end of the spectrum, some states receive little, if any, RLIS funding and comparatively large SRSA awards. One reason is that some states have very few high-poverty LEAs. For example, Connecticut, which receives no RLIS funding, has only six of its 193 LEAs with poverty rates of 20% or more and none of them are rural. Minnesota, which receives relatively little RLIS funding, has 159 of its 168 LEAs eligible for SRSA grants, which results in a relatively large amount of SRSA funding. Some states have many LEAs that are eligible for both programs but can only be eligible for SRSA grants, as required under the statute. For example, South Dakota, which has about 30 of its 179 LEAs eligible under RLIS, has only four that receive RLIS funds because the rest are eligible under both the RLIS and SRSA programs. Finally, there are several states that receive little or no funds from either program. In FY2010, Hawaii, Maryland, Vermont, and the District of Columbia receive no REAP funding. Recipients of SRSA grants may use funds for activities authorized by several ESEA programs: Improving Basic Programs Operated by Local Educational Agencies (Part A of Title I), Teacher and Principal Training and Recruiting Fund and Enhancing Education Through Technology (Part A or D of Title II), Language Instruction for Limited English Proficient and Immigrant Students (Title III), Safe and Drug-Free Schools and Communities and 21 st Century Community Learning Centers (Part A or B of Title IV), and Innovative Programs (Part A of Title V). In addition, under the so-called REAP-Flex provision, all LEAs that are eligible for SRSA grants (whether or not they receive grants because offsetting ESEA funding exceeds initial grant calculations) have the flexibility to use "offsetting funds" from other ESEA programs for any activities authorized by the above ESEA programs. ED provides the following example of use of funds under REAP-Flex: "[A]n LEA may use funds under the Safe and Drug-Free Schools Program (Title IV, Part A) to incorporate technology into its early reading program--an authorized local activity under the Educational Technology State Grant (Title II, Part D)." The GAO found that flexibility under the SRSA program allowed small, rural LEAs to redirect funds to crucial NCLB needs. "[I]n one rural state contacted, officials reported that many of their districts used Safe and Drug-Free School Program funds to support their technology initiatives, which, in turn, helped with implementing some of the provisions of NCLB." RLIS grant recipients may use funds for the following purposes: teacher recruitment and retention, including the use of signing bonuses and other financial incentives; teacher professional development, including programs that train teachers to utilize technology to improve teaching and to train special needs teachers; educational technology, including software and hardware, as described in Part D of Title II (Enhancing Education Through Technology); parental involvement activities; activities authorized under the Safe and Drug-Free Schools program under Part A of Title IV; activities authorized under Part A of Title I; and activities authorized under Title III (Language Instruction for Limited English Proficient and Immigrant Students). The GAO reported other uses of REAP funds to help meet costs associated with NCLB requirements, including 86% of responding rural superintendents reported spending REAP funds on student and teacher technology needs; 66% reported using REAP funds for NCLB supplementary services for students; 94% said they used these funds for professional development related to helping teachers meet NCLB highly qualified teacher requirements; and 60% used REAP funds for student remedial services to prepare them for annual assessments. According to statute, REAP aims to compensate rural school districts because they often "receive formula grant allocations in amounts too small to be effective in meeting the intended purposes" of these grant programs. CRS analysis of ED Budget Service data reveal that SRSA-eligible LEAs indeed receive substantially smaller formula grant amounts than SRSA-ineligible LEAs due to their substantially smaller enrollments. On the other hand, hold harmless provisions in programs like Title II-A mean that SRSA-eligible LEAs receive substantially higher awards than SRSA-ineligible LEAs on a per-pupil basis. Whether Congress chooses to reauthorize this hold-harmless provision could determine whether SRSA-eligible LEAs continue to receive a higher per-pupil share of these federal funds, in addition to funds awarded under REAP. In addition, Congress may consider whether the supplemental funds provided under REAP are spread too thinly to make a difference. While the average award per student for SRSA grants is $81, the average award per pupil for RLIS grants is only $28. Since the 1980s, NCES has used the "metro-centric" locale codes described earlier in this report as having eight urban-to-rural classifications. In recent years, NCES and the Census Bureau have devised a new "urban-centric" locale code system with 12 classifications. NCES contends that the new codes more accurately depict a school's geographic context for three reasons: (1) improved geocoding technology, (2) reflection of recent residential developments and population shifts, and (3) additional classifications allow for finer distinctions between the edges of suburb land and the beginnings of rural territory. The new urban-centric locale codes are as follows: 11 = Large City : Territory inside an urbanized area and inside a principal city with population of 250,000 or more. 12 = Midsize City : Territory inside an urbanized area and inside a principal city with population of less than 250,000 and greater than or equal to 100,000. 13 = Small City : Territory inside an urbanized area and inside a principal city with population of less than 100,000. 21 = Large Suburb : Territory outside a principal city and inside an urbanized area with population of 250,000 or more. 22 = Midsize Suburb : Territory outside a principal city and inside an urbanized area with population of less than 250,000 and greater than or equal to 100,000. 23 = Small Suburb : Territory outside a principal city and inside an urbanized area with population of less than 100,000. 31 = Fringe Town : Territory inside an urban cluster that is less than or equal to 10 miles from an urbanized area. 32 = Distant Town : Territory inside an urban cluster that is more than 10 miles and less than or equal to 35 miles from an urbanized area. 33 = Remote Town : Territory inside an urban cluster that is more than 35 miles from an urbanized area. 41 = Fringe Rural : Census-defined rural territory that is less than or equal to 5 miles from an urbanized area, as well as rural territory that is less than or equal to 2.5 miles from an urban cluster. 42 = Distant Rural : Census-defined rural territory that is more than 5 miles but less than or equal to 25 miles from an urbanized area, as well as rural territory that is more than 2.5 miles but less than or equal to 10 miles from an urban cluster. 43 = Remote Rural : Census-defined rural territory that is more than 25 miles from an urbanized area and is also more than 10 miles from an urban cluster. NCES has planned on phasing out the metro-centric codes, but continues to make them available solely for operation of REAP. Should Congress reauthorize the program, it will likely consider moving to the new locale codes. In doing so, policy makers may want to consider which of the new codes are comparable to the old codes and the impact that switching codes may have on REAP eligibility. NCES contends that the old metro-centric locale codes for rural locations correspond closely with the new urban-centric rural locale codes. CRS analysis of CCD data confirms this position. Table 3 reveals a great deal of overlap between rural schools identified under the old and new systems. Of the schools classified as rural under the metro-centric system (i.e., coded as 7 or 8), over nine-in-ten (92.5%) were also classified as rural under the urban-centric system (i.e., coded as either 41, 42, or 43). Similarly, nearly nine-in-ten (89.5%) schools given city or urban fringe codes under the metro-centric system (i.e., codes 1 through 4) were given city or suburban codes under the urban-centric system (i.e., codes 11-23). Correspondence among the old and new town categories is not quite as straightforward; however, it appears the best match for the old "small town" code (6) is the new codes for "distant" and "remote" towns (32 and 33, respectively). Of the schools coded "small town" under the urban-centric system, three-quarters were given a metro-centric code of "distant town" (38.5%) or "remote town" (38.3%) and an additional 12.0% were coded "rural." Based on these data, some have proposed replacing the metro-centric rural codes with the urban-centric rural codes in the following manner: (1) to be SRSA-eligible, all schools in an LEA must have an urban-centric code between 41 and 43, and (2) to be RLIS-eligible, all schools in an LEA must have an urban-centric code between 32 and 43. Table 4 presents the estimated number of LEAs that would be eligible using the old and new locale codes while retaining all other aspects of current law (i.e., the ADA, population density, and poverty requirements remain unchanged). According to the CRS analysis presented in Table 4 , the proposed switch to the new locale codes would increase the number of eligible LEAs in both the SRSA and RLIS programs from 4,538 to 4,611 and 1,399 to 1,563, respectively. Although there is a very large amount of overlap among these LEAs, replacing metro-centric codes with the newer and arguably more accurate urban-centric codes will remove hundreds of LEAs from eligibility and add hundreds of others. As a result, some LEAs and states will lose funding, others will gain funding. Unless there are significant increases in REAP funding, any formula change will produce "winners" and "losers." Since the Census Bureau is eliminating the metro-centric codes, continued use of these data is not an option unless legislation specifically mandates their continued production. To mitigate the impact of the new codes, Congress could choose to hold harmless those eliminated LEAs indefinitely or for a period of time (perhaps at a decreasing percentage of their prior year grants) so they can adjust to the funding loss. While hold-harmless provisions would soften the blow to these LEAs, a formula change based on the new locale codes would result in lower grants overall (assuming level or near-level funding) to other remaining LEAs as funds are distributed among the two groups already served and the newly eligible LEAs. The current SRSA formula often does not permit all appropriated funds to be allocated to LEAs. In part, this is because SRSA grants are capped at $60,000. The act does not specify how to deal with the allocation of excess funds. As a result, ED has had to make policy on how these excess funds should be distributed. Apparently to adhere to the statute, the ED "ratable increase" procedure maintains both the $60,000 cap and $20,000 floor for the SRSA grants and ratably increases grants falling between these two amounts. The statute could be amended to reflect ED's current procedures. This would ensure that ED continues to follow this procedure in the future. Alternatively, the statute could be amended to provide a different policy for dealing with additional appropriations. For example, the statute could specify a ratable increase procedure under which the minimum and maximum grants could be ratably increased along with all other grants. Presumably, this approach would slightly reduce LEAs' grants that fall between the minimum and maximum grants. Another option would be to increase the cap in current law from $60,000 to some higher amount. LEAs that are eligible for the SRSA program (based, in part, on enrollment below 600) are not eligible for grants under the RLIS program (which targets rural LEAs with relatively high poverty rates). Since it can be argued that these LEAs are triply disadvantaged--being rural, small, and poor--a possible change in the statute could recognize this by allowing small, poor rural LEAs to benefit from both programs. This would add hundreds of LEAs to the RLIS eligibility list and redistribute RLIS state grants by increasing grants to states with large numbers of small, poor LEAs and reducing grants to states with few small LEAs (mostly states in the Southeast). If further targeting were desired, a higher poverty threshold could be set for small, poor LEAs. For example, a poverty rate of 30% or greater would add far fewer LEAs to the RLIS eligibility pool. The SRSA formula has resulted in some distributional anomalies, which might be addressed by formula modifications. For example, the minimum grant of $20,000 results in some very large per-pupil grants. While the average per-pupil grant is about $80, a few LEAs receive per-pupil grants as high as $19,000. This results because they have only one or a few students. One approach for reducing this result would be to limit LEA participation to LEAs with a minimum total enrollment. Another anomaly occurs when LEAs have offsetting program amounts that are just a few dollars less than their final SRSA grant. For example, some LEAs receive grants as low as $39. A solution to this would be to eliminate final grants that are deemed to be below a size to be effective. These funds could then be distributed to other LEAs to enhance their grants. Some have considered the circumstance in which LEAs eligible for the SRSA program have offsetting grants larger than their initial grant to be problematic. While such LEAs can still use the REAP Flex provision, they receive no additional REAP funds. Although this is in keeping with the intent of the REAP purposes, some argue that such LEAs are still in need of additional assistance. One alternative to this situation would be to calculate the SRSA initial grants without the minimum and maximum grants of $20,000 and $60,000, subtract the offsetting grant amounts, then apply the minimum and maximum grant amounts. This would reduce the number of LEAs that are eligible but receive no funding. A final concern that some states have is that, unlike the RLIS program, states receive no state administration funding under the SRSA program, despite having to provide ED with much of the data used to allocate funds (such as offsetting program grant amounts). This could be addressed by reserving 2% (or some other percent) of the appropriation for the SRSA program for state administration. Of course, this would reduce funds going to small, rural LEAs by the percentage reserved for state administration. Although some argue that national poverty thresholds overstate poverty in rural areas compared to cities, others have suggested that the measure used to identify "low-income" LEAs for RLIS eligibility does not adequately reflect poverty in very small, rural locations. The measure used for RLIS eligibility is the same as that used for many federal programs (including ESEA Title I-A); that is, the Census Bureau's Small Area Income and Poverty Estimates (SAIPE). The SAIPE program provides annual estimates of income and poverty statistics for all states, counties, and school districts. For states and counties, these estimates combine survey data with population estimates and administrative records. For school districts, the county estimates are combined with data from the decennial census and federal tax information to produce estimates of the number of related children ages five to 17 in families in poverty. For purposes of the REAP program, what is important to know about the SAIPE school district poverty estimates is that they are generated through a process in which data at broad levels of aggregation (i.e., from national, regional, or state sources) are progressively distributed to more narrow geographic levels (i.e., to counties and school districts). This process inevitably involves some degree of distributional error as it moves from large, populous areas to smaller, sparsely populated areas. Some rural program proponents contend that in small, sparsely populated school districts, child poverty could be better estimated using data from the National School Lunch Program, commonly referred to as Free and Reduced-Price Lunch (FRPL) data. State agencies that administer the program submit data on the number of FRPL-eligible students to NCES through its Public Elementary/Secondary School Universe Survey (part of the CCD). One proposal to use FRPL data is contained in S. 1052 , the Rural Education Achievement Program Reauthorization Act of 2009. This bill proposes replacing the 20% poverty threshold using SAIPE data with a 40% low-income threshold using FRPL data for RLIS eligibility. Table 5 presents the estimated number of LEAs which would be eligible using the SAIPE and FRPL data under both the old and new locale codes. According to CRS analysis, the proposed switch to the FRPL data would substantially increase the number of eligible LEAs using either the old or new locale codes. Using the old locale codes, a switch from SAIPE data to FRPL data would add nearly 800 LEAs. Using the new locale codes, this switch would add over 900 LEAs. Should Congress decide to switch to FRPL data, it could set a threshold higher than 40% to reduce the number of newly eligible LEAs. Given the well documented problems with the quality of these data (see the Appendix at the end of this report for a discussion of these issues), Congress may wish to analyze the distributional impacts of using FRPL data more closely. Even if the threshold were set high enough to keep the number eligible LEAs about the same as the current number, there would undoubtedly be significant shifts in the distribution of RLIS funds across regions and states. Through the 1994 ESEA amendments ( P.L. 103-382 ), Congress directed the National Research Council (NRC) to examine the use of SAIPE data for Title I allocations and for other purposes. The NRC concluded that SAIPE data were the best currently available; however, it recommended that research be conducted into possible improvements that may result from incorporating additional income-related information, including FRPL data, into the SAIPE procedures. Despite noting several reporting and enrollment problems with these data (documented both by the Department of Agriculture and NCES ), analysts at the Census Bureau undertook research to determine whether FRPL data may improve SAIPE data. The researchers concluded: Through regression analysis we estimate a positive relationship between FRPL data and Census 2000 poverty estimates with a median prediction error of 30 percent. The high degree of prediction error suggests the FRPL data are not sufficiently precise for formal use in producing school district poverty estimates at this time. Since some have proposed that FRPL data replace SAIPE data for determining LEA poverty and RLIS eligibility, it is worth taking a closer look at the limitations of FRPL data. In its CCD documentation, NCES notes the following with respect to the counts of students eligible for the free school lunch program: "These counts of students [eligible for the free school lunch program] may be taken by the schools at a different time than the membership counts [a measure of enrollment], therefore the count of free lunch and membership students may not be comparable in a given school." In a 2005 Federal Register notice, the Secretary of Education described additional problems with FRPL data as follows: First, the family income threshold needed to qualify for the FRPL program is 185 percent of the poverty level used by the Census Bureau. Hence, many more children qualify for the FRPL program than are considered poor under the census definition, which makes FRPL eligibility too expansive a measure of poverty. Second, FRPL data tend to undercount children in middle and high schools, because children in the upper grades tend to participate in the school lunch program in significantly lower numbers. Therefore, the number of poor children in high school districts are typically not accurately represented by FRPL counts. Third, FRPL data are self-reported data. The number of children included in the FRPL count depends on how many families apply for the program. The extent to which school districts and schools reach out and recruit families to apply for the program will affect the number. Because of this factor, the USDA, which administers the school meals programs, has raised concerns about the accuracy of these data. Several data sources, including the eligibility verifications performed by school districts, indicate that a significant number of ineligible children appear to have been certified for free and reduced meals and, therefore, that these data may not be an adequate measure for poverty for other program uses. USDA believes that the authority for school officials to use counts of children eligible for free and reduced-price meals in determining Title I within-district allocations may provide an incentive for those officials to inflate those counts. Finally, because FRPL are self-reported data, the relationship between census poverty and FRPL is not consistent across geographic areas. Nationally, for example, the number of children eligible for the FRPL in school year 2000-01 among the States ranges from 1.5 to 41 times the number of children who meet the census criteria for poverty. Census Bureau analysis put the discrepancy between official poverty estimates and FRPL estimates this way: Between 1994 and 2004, the ratio of school-age children receiving free or reduced-price lunch increased from 28.6 to 32.2 percent, using state-level data from the [Food and Nutrition Service]. For the same time period, the estimated poverty rate for related children ages 5 to 17 decreased from 19.8 to 16.2 percent, using data from the [Current Population Survey]. As official estimates of poverty declined during the economic expansion of the late 1990s, the FRPL data collected during that time suggest that there was an increase in the number of low-income children.

The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB, P.L. 107-110) established the Rural Education Achievement Program (REAP) under Title VI, Part B of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA). Congress created this program to address the unique needs of rural schools that disadvantage them relative to nonrural schools. To be eligible for REAP funds, a local education agency (LEA) must be designated rural and must meet one of three additional requirements involving enrollment size, population density, and poverty status. Currently, REAP provides awards to nearly 6,000 LEAs, out of a total of about 14,000 nationwide. REAP authorizes formula grants through two subprograms: the Small Rural School Achievement (SRSA) program provides grants directly to LEAs and the Rural Low-Income School (RLIS) program provides grants to states, which then award subgrants to LEAs. The amount of funds received by eligible LEAs is determined differently by the SRSA and RLIS programs. Under the SRSA program formula, an initial amount is calculated for each eligible LEA based on enrollment; these amounts are then reduced based on offsetting amounts received from other ESEA programs. Under RLIS, formula grants are awarded to states based on the state's share of eligible students; states then subgrant funds to LEAs either on a formula or competitive basis. REAP funds may be used for a wide range of activities authorized throughout the ESEA, including Titles I-A, II-A, II-D, III, IV-A, IV-B, and V-A. In addition, the so-called REAP-Flex provision (ESEA, Sec. 6211) allows SRSA-eligible LEAs to use ESEA funds for certain activities not authorized by the program through which the LEA received such funds. A Government Accountability Office (GAO) study found that a large majority of LEAs use REAP funds to meet the NCLB highly qualified teacher requirement as well as the district's technology needs. The authorization for REAP, along with the rest of the ESEA, expired at the end of FY2008. However, these programs continue to operate as long as appropriations are provided. Congress is expected to consider whether to amend and extend the ESEA programs, including REAP. This report will conclude with a discussion of reauthorization issues related to REAP that may arise as Congress takes up the ESEA.

T he Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA; P.L. 103-3 , as amended) entitles eligible employ ees to unpaid, job-protected leave for certain family and medical needs, with continuation of group health plan benefits. The 114 th Congress considered several bills to amend the FMLA. These proposals sought to create new entitlements (i.e., provide additional leave time); expand categories of permissible leave by creating new FMLA-qualifying uses of leave and by expanding the circumstances under which existing leave categories may be used; and modify employee eligibility requirements, generally and for specific worker groups. The FMLA requires that covered employers grant up to 12 workweeks of leave in a 12-month period to eligible employees for one or more of the following reasons: the birth and care of the employee's newborn child, provided that leave is taken within 12 months of the child's birth; the placement of an adopted or fostered child with the employee, provided that leave is taken within 12 months of the child's placement; to care for a spouse, child (generally a minor child), or parent with a serious health condition; the employee's own serious health condition that renders the employee unable to perform the essential functions of his or her job; and qualified military exigencies if the employee's spouse, child, or parent is a covered military member on covered active duty. In addition, the act provides up to 26 workweeks of leave in a single 12-month period to eligible employees for the care of a covered military servicemember (including certain veterans) with a serious injury or illness that was sustained or aggravated in the line of duty while on active duty. In general, to be eligible for FMLA leave, an employee must work for a covered employer; have 1,250 hours of service in the 12 months prior to the start of leave; work at a location where the employer has 50 or more employees within 75 miles of the worksite; and have worked for the employer for 12 months. Private-sector employers are covered by the act if they engaged in commerce and had 50 or more employees for 20 weeks in the current or last calendar year. The FMLA also applies to public agencies (i.e., federal, state, and local governments), which are covered employers regardless of their staffing levels in the previous or current calendar year. However, public-sector employees must still meet the worksite coverage requirement (i.e., 50 employees within 75 miles of the worksite) to be eligible for FMLA leave. Since its passage in 1993, the FMLA has been amended four times to cover certain legislative branch employees ( P.L. 104-1 ); create and then modify a new entitlement for military family leave ( P.L. 110-181 and P.L. 111-84 , respectively); and modify the hours-of-service eligibility requirement for airline flight crew ( P.L. 111-119 ). Table 1 summarizes the act's legislative history. Several bills were introduced in the 114 th Congress to amend the FMLA. These proposals sought to create new entitlements (i.e., provide additional leave time), expand categories of permissible leave by creating new FMLA-qualifying uses of leave or expanding the circumstances under which existing leave categories may be used, and modify employee eligibility requirements. Some proposals would have amended the act in multiple areas; bill-by-bill summaries are in Table A-1 . Currently, eligible employees are entitled to 12 workweeks of FMLA leave in a 12-month period to address certain family and medical needs and 26 workweeks in a single 12-month period to provide care to a seriously ill or injured servicemember. Two bills would have created an additional entitlement to leave for similar purposes, with some differences: Parental Involvement and Family Wellness Leave. H.R. 5518 would, among other things, have entitled eligible employees to up to four hours of leave during any 30-day period, with a maximum of 24 hours during any 12-month period to (1) participate in or attend a school conference or an activity that is sponsored by a school or community organization attended by the employee's child or grandchild, or (2) to attend to the employee's own routine medical care needs (including appointments) or those of a spouse, minor child, or grandchild, or the general care needs of an "elderly relative." Parental Involvement Leave. H.R. 5535 would have entitled eligible employees to up to eight hours of leave during any 30-day period, with a maximum of 48 hours during any 12-month period, to participate in or attend a school conference or an activity that is sponsored by a school or community organization attended by the employee's child or grandchild. In both cases, employees would be required to notify employers of their intention to use such leave at least seven days in advance of the leave, where possible. This 7-day notice requirement is shorter than the 30-day notice required, where possible, for a foreseeable need to use FMLA leave for the arrival of a new child, a serious health condition, or the serious injury or illness of a servicemember. Under current law, eligible employees may use FMLA leave to care for and bond with a new child, for a serious health condition that renders the employee unable to perform at least one essential function of his or her job, to provide care to a close family member with a serious health condition, and for certain military family needs. The 114 th Congress considered several proposals to expand this set of qualifying uses of FMLA leave by (1) creating new leave categories, and (2) broadening the circumstances under which employees may use existing leave categories. Bills introduced in the 114 th Congress would have allowed employees to use the existing FMLA leave entitlement for bereavement, needs related to domestic violence experienced by the employee or a close family member, family involvement, and medical needs related to certain service-connected disabilities for veterans. The following proposals would have permitted eligible employees to use the existing FMLA leave entitlement for the death of a close family member (or members): S. 1302 / H.R. 2260 would have allowed employees to use their 12-week entitlements for the death of a son or daughter. S. 473 would have allowed employees to use their 12-week entitlements for the death of a son or daughter (of any age), parent, or sibling. The bill would not have allowed employees to use FMLA for the death of a spouse. S. 473 would have further allowed employees to use the existing 12-workweek entitlement to address medical, legal, and other needs related to domestic violence experienced by the employee or the employee's child (including an adult child) or parent. S. 473 would have granted employees limited use of the existing 12-workweek leave entitlement for family involvement, which the bill defined as leave to (1) participate in school-related activities or school-sponsored extracurricular activities for a son or daughter, where school refers to an elementary or secondary school, Head Start program, or a licensed child care facility; or (2) provide transportation to or attend a medical or dental appointment for a spouse, child of any age, or a parent. Employees would be able to use family involvement leave for up to 24 hours in a 12-month period. The bills discussed in the " Proposals to Create New FMLA Leave Entitlements " section of this report would have created an additional entitlement to leave for similar family involvement purposes. H.R. 5165 would have permitted employees to use the current 12 - workweek entitlement for " hospital care or medical services as a veteran for a service-connected disability" that is currently rated at 30% or for which the veteran retired from the Armed Forces by reason of service-connected disability and which was rated at 30% or higher at the time of retirement. Several proposals sought to expand employees' options for using the current set of FMLA-qualifying uses of leave by either (1) expanding the set of relationships for which an employee may use family leave or (2) amending definitions related to the current entitlement. Under current law, an employee may use FMLA leave to assist or provide care to the following sets of family members: Leave for the arrival of a new son or daughter by birth or placement. A son or daughter, as defined by the act, is a "biological, adopted, or foster child, a stepchild, a legal ward, or a child of a person standing in loco parentis, who is (A) under 18 years of age; or (B) 18 years of age or older and incapable of self-care because of a mental or physical disability." Leave related to a family member's serious health condition may be taken for the employee's spouse, son or daughter, or parent. Military exigency leave (i.e., related to the deployment of certain military members to a foreign country) may be used in relation to a covered military member who is the employee's spouse, son or daughter, or parent. Military caregiver leave (i.e., care of a servicemember with a serious illness or injury) may be used for a servicemember who is the employee's spouse, son or daughter, or parent, or for whom the employee is next of kin. The following legislative proposals would have expanded the groups of family members for whom FMLA leave may be used for caregiving purposes. For the arrival of a new son or daughter by birth or placement (within 12 months of arrival): S. 473 and H.R. 5519 would have amended the definition of son or daughter to include the child of a domestic partner (as well as adult children) and would therefore allow the employee to use leave for the arrival by birth or placement of a domestic partner's new child , and the placement of an adult child. H.R. 5701 would have allowed an employee to use leave for the arrival by birth or placement of a grandchild, including the placement of an adult grandchild. Because the bill would have amended the FMLA definition of son or daughter to include adult children, leave would also be permitted for the placement of an adult child. For needs related to a family member's serious health condition: S. 473 proposed to add a domestic partner, adult child, child of a domestic partner, parent-in-law, grandparent, and sibling. H.R. 5519 proposed to add domestic partner, adult child, child of a domestic partner, parent-in-law, grandparent, grandchild, sibling, and "any other individual related by blood or affinity whose close association with the employee is the equivalent of a family relationship." H.R. 5701 proposed to add adult child, grandchild, and grandparent. For military exigency leave: S. 473 proposed to add a domestic partner, adult child, child of a domestic partner, parent-in-law, grandchild, and sibling. H.R. 5519 proposed to add domestic partner, adult child, child of a domestic partner, parent-in-law, grandchild, sibling, and "any other individual related by blood or affinity whose close association with the employee is the equivalent of a family relationship." H.R. 5701 proposed to add adult child, grandchild, and grandparent. For military caregiver leave: S. 473 proposed to add a domestic partner, adult child, child of a domestic partner, son-in-law, daughter-in-law, grandparent, and sibling. H.R. 5519 proposed to add domestic partner, adult child, child of a domestic partner, son-in-law, daughter-in-law, parent-in-law, grandparent, sibling, and any covered servicemember for whom the employee is in a relationship that is "the equivalent of a family relationship." H.R. 5701 proposed to add adult child, grandchild, and grandparent. The 114 th Congress considered legislation that would have broadened or clarified current FMLA-qualifying uses of leave by amending FMLA definitions of son or daughter and serious health condition . Under current law, FMLA defines son or daughter as a "biological, adopted, or foster child, a stepchild, a legal ward, or a child of a person standing in loco parentis, who is (A) under 18 years of age; or (B) 18 years of age or older and incapable of self-care because of a mental or physical disability." As noted elsewhere in this report, S. 473 , H.R. 5519 , and H.R. 5701 would have amended the FMLA definition of son or daughter to include children of "any age," effectively expanding current FMLA-qualifying uses of leave to include adult children. S. 473 and H.R. 5519 would also have amended the definition to include a child of a domestic partner; likewise broadening the applicability of this leave. The act defines serious health condition as "an illness, injury, impairment, or physical or mental condition that involves (A) inpatient care in a hospital, hospice, or residential medical care facility; or (B) continuing treatment by a health care provider." Neither the act nor its accompanying regulations provide an exhaustive list of conditions that meet this definition; consequently, the determination of a serious health condition is typically treated on a case-by-case basis. S. 2584 and H.R. 4616 would have , among other things , amend ed the act to specify that a " physical or mental condition" as referenced in the statutory definition of a serious health condition includes recovery from surgery related to organ donation . S. 2584 and H.R. 4616 would not have provided that such recovery, on its own, constitutes a serious health condition; statutory tests concerning inpatient care or continuing treatment by a health care provider would still need to be met. The 114 th Congress considered two proposals to amend general eligibility requirements for employees seeking to use FMLA leave and two proposals to amend eligibility requirements for specific worker groups. In general, to be eligible for FMLA leave, an employee must work for a covered employer; have at least 1,250 hours of service in the 12 months prior to the start of leave; have worked for the employer for 12 months; and work at a location where the employer has 50 or more employees within 75 miles of the worksite. The 114 th Congress considered two proposals to amend these general eligibility requirements for employees seeking to use FMLA leave. They are 1. H.R. 5518 , which would have reduce d the minimum number of employees (of the same employer) within 75 miles of an employee's worksite from 50 employees to 15 employees ; and 2. H.R. 5496 , which proposed to amend the general hours - of - service requirement to remove reference to " 1,250 hours of service ... during the previous 12-month period" , and include part-time and full-time employees as "eligible employees . " The bill did not propose changes to hours-of-service requirements for airline flight crew. Two bills proposed new eligibility requirements for certain veterans with service-connected disabilities and for education support professionals. As described earlier, H.R. 5165 proposed to provide a new FMLA-qualifying use of leave for veterans with a service-connected disability rated at 30% or higher. The bill further provided separate eligibility requirements that would have allowed certain veterans to access this new FMLA-protected leave without meeting the standard 12 months and 1,250 hours (over the last 12 months) of employment requirement. The bill proposed that for employees who are veterans with a service-connected disability rated at 30% or higher by the Secretary of Veterans Affairs: A veteran with a service-connected disability rated at 30%-50% would be eligible to use leave for medical care related to his or her service-connected disability if employed for 8 months (with the current employer) and for least 833 hours in the previous 8 month period. A veteran with a service-connected disability rated at 60% or higher would be eligible to use leave for medical care related to his or her service-connected disability if employed for 6 months (with the current employer) and for least 625 hours in the previous 6-month period. Employees using leave for medical needs related to a service-connected disability rated at 30% or higher would be required to provide certification from a VA medical provider or from a non-Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) medical facility "through which the Secretary of Veterans Affairs has furnished hospital care or medical services". For employees who are veterans with a service-connected disability that is not currently rated at 30% or higher by the Secretary of Veterans Affairs, but retired from the Armed Forces by reason of service-connected disability that was rated at 30% or higher using the schedule in use by the VA at the time of retirement, the bill proposed that: A veteran whose service-connected disability was rated at 30%-50% at the time of retirement would be eligible to use leave for medical care related to his or her service-connected disability if employed for 8 months (with the current employer) and for least 833 hours in the previous 8-month period. A veteran whose service-connected disability was rated at 60% or higher at the time of retirement would be eligible to use leave for medical care related to his or her service-connected disability if employed for 6 months (with the current employer) and for least 625 hours in the previous 6-month period. Employees using leave for medical needs related to a service-connected disability rated at 30% or higher at the time of retirement would be required to provide certification from the Department of Defense that describes the terms of the veteran's retirement from the Armed Forces. The effect of the separate eligibility requirement is twofold. First, it would have permitted veterans (e.g., who are new employees) to access FMLA leave for service-connected-disability medical needs sooner than the standard 12-month requirement. Second, because the hours-of-service requirement is also adjusted, it might have facilitated some veterans' year-to-year use of this leave. S. 3444 would have created a separate hours-of-service requirement for educational support professionals (ESP). The bill defined an ESP as an employee of "a public elementary or secondary school or public institution of higher education, that may include (aa) a para educator that provides instructional or non-instructional support; and (bb) a member of the secretarial, clerical, or administrative support staff." Pursuant to S. 3444 , an ESP would meet the hours-of-service requirement for eligibility if during the previous 12 months, the employee worked (for the current employer), at least (1) an average of 60 hours per month or (2) 60% of the "applicable total monthly hours expected for the employee's job description and duties (as assigned for the school year preceding the school year during which the hours of service are calculated)" on average. The proposal would also have allowed the Secretary of Labor to create separate rules for calculating the leave entitlement of ESPs, but would not change the size of the entitlement available to them.

The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA; P.L. 103-3, as amended) entitles eligible employees to unpaid, job-protected leave for certain family and medical needs, with continuation of group health plan benefits. Through the act, Congress sought to strike a balance between workplace responsibilities and workers' growing need to take leave for significant family and medical events. Subsequently, Congress added new categories of leave that allow eligible employees to address certain military exigencies stemming from the deployment of a close family member to a foreign country and to care for a servicemember with a serious injury or illness who is a close family member. The act has also been amended to expand access to certain legislative branch employees and to clarify eligibility criteria for airline flight crew. FMLA was last amended in 2009. FMLA remains an issue of interest for Members, and the 114th Congress considered several proposals to amend the act in various ways: Additional leave entitlements. Two bills would have created a new entitlement to take leave for certain family members' school or community activities (H.R. 5535, H.R. 5518) and for the employee's own routine medical needs or that of certain family members (H.R. 5518 only). New FMLA-qualifying uses of the existing leave entitlement. Several proposals aimed to allow employees to use the existing entitlement for new categories of leave, including bereavement (S. 1302/H.R. 2260, S. 473), domestic violence and its effects (S. 473), family involvement (S. 473; in addition to new leave entitlements in H.R. 5535, H.R. 5518), and medical leave for veterans with service-connected disabilities rated at 30% or higher (H.R. 5165). Broader application of existing FMLA-qualifying uses of leave. Five bills proposed to expand employee's options for using the current set of FMLA-qualifying uses of leave by either broadening the set of relationships for which an employee may use family leave (S. 473, H.R. 5519, H.R. 5701) or amending definitions referenced in the descriptions of the current entitlement (S. 473, H.R. 5519, and H.R. 5701 sought to amend the definition of son or daughter to include adult children; and S. 2584/H.R. 4616 proposed amending the definition of serious health condition to reference the recovery from organ donation surgery as a possible condition). Less-restrictive eligibility requirements, generally, and separate requirements for certain worker groups. For general eligibility, H.R. 5518 aimed to reduce the minimum number of employees required within 75 miles of an employee's worksite from 50 employees to 15 employees and H.R. 5496 sought to amend the general hours-of-service requirement to remove the minimum of "1,250 hours of service ... during the previous 12-month period" and allow eligible workers to be "part-time or full-time" employees. H.R. 5165 would have provided new eligibility requirements for certain veterans that allowed them to use FMLA leave for medical treatment related to a service-connected disability rated at 30% or higher sooner than the standard 12-month employment requirement. S. 3444 would have created a separate hours-of-service requirement for educational support professionals.

Juvenile offenders of federal criminal law are primarily the responsibility of state juvenile court authorities. The Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act permits federal delinquency proceedings when state courts cannot or will not accept jurisdiction or in the case of a limited number of crimes when there is a substantial federal interest. In the more serious of these cases, the juvenile offender may be transferred for trial as an adult. The rise in serious juvenile crime, the contraction of state juvenile court jurisdiction, and the expansion of federal criminal law have all contributed to the increased prevalence of the federal delinquency proceedings described here. In early America, the law held that a child, until the age of 7, lacked the maturity necessary to be held criminally responsible. Thereafter, the law rebuttably presumed incapacity until the child reached the age of 14, by which time acquisition of the intellectual capability to entertain criminal intent was assumed. As an early nineteenth century commentator explained, Under the age of seven years, indeed, it seems that no circumstances of mischievous discretion can be admitted to overthrow the strong presumption of innocence which is raised by an age so tender. During the interval between seven and fourteen, the infant is prima facie supposed to be destitute of criminal design; but this presumption diminishes as the age increases, and even during this interval of youth, may be repelled by positive evidence of vicious intention. For a tenderness of years will not excuse a maturity in crime; . . . since the power of contracting guilt is measured rather by the strength of the delinquent's understanding, than by days and years. Thus, children of thirteen, eight, and ten years of age, have been executed for capital offenses, because they respectively manifested a consciousness of guilt, and a mischievous discretion or cunning. After the age of fourteen, an infant is on the same footing with those of the mature years. A child found capable of the requisite intent was subject to trial and punishment as an adult; other children were set free. In the early twentieth century, the states established juvenile court systems so that children accused of conduct that would be criminal in an adult might be processed apart from the criminal justice system in an environment more closely attuned to their rehabilitative needs. By 1930, the Wickersham Commission reported that only the federal government continued to uniformly treat children, charged with a crime, as adults. The states had instead adopted various juvenile court systems in which the "child offender [was] generally dealt with on a noncriminal basis and . . . protected from prosecution and conviction for crime . . . [They undertook] to safeguard, train, and educate rather than to punish him. [They] substituted social for penal methods; the concept of juvenile delinquency for that of crime." Attorney General Wickersham also pointed out that (1) most of the cases involved interstate joyriding, an offense for which juvenile court treatment was thought particularly appropriate; (2) "[t]here [were] not enough juveniles brought into the Federal courts to justify the establishment of juvenile courts by act of Congress;" and (3) "federal penal institutions are not adequately equipped to deal with this class of juvenile delinquency." He recommended, and Congress agreed, that the disparity should be adjusted by authorizing the Department of Justice to return juveniles charged with violating federal law to the juvenile authorities of their home state. This solution suffered two unfortunate limitations. It did not account for juveniles charged with capital crimes. State law ordinarily excluded capital offenses from the jurisdiction of its juvenile courts. Second, state juvenile courts had no jurisdiction over juveniles who lived, and whose misconduct occurred upon, Indian reservations or military installations over which the state had no legislative jurisdiction. Congress addressed these shortcomings with the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act of 1938. State juvenile proceedings remained the preferred alternative, but the Attorney General might instead elect to proceed against a juvenile as an adult, and federal juvenile proceedings became possible should both parties agree. Although supplemented in 1950 by the Federal Youth Corrections Act which afforded federal juvenile offenders tried as adults the prospect of special rehabilitative opportunities, the Act remained essentially unchanged for over thirty-five years. In 1974, Congress substantially revised the Act in order "to provide basic procedural rights to juveniles who come under federal jurisdiction and to bring federal procedures up to the standards set by various model acts, many state codes and court decisions." Crimes punishable by death or life imprisonment (primarily murder, kidnapping, and rape) were made subject to the federal juvenile treatment for the first time. At the time, the Supreme Court decision in Furman v. Georgia had recently declared unconstitutional the procedure under which the vast majority of state and federal capital punishment statutes operated. It was not until two years thereafter that Woodson v. North Carolina and Gregg v. Georgia gave some clue as to what procedures would pass constitutional muster. When Congress established the requisite procedures to restore capital punishment as a federal sentencing option, it exempted juveniles. In the 1974 revision of federal juvenile law, the Attorney General lost the unbridled discretion to determine whether children, accused of federal crimes, should be tried as adults in federal criminal proceedings. The Attorney General was authorized, however, to petition the federal juvenile court to transfer, for trial as an adult, any 16-or 17-year old accused of a crime which carried a maximum penalty of death, life imprisonment, or imprisonment for ten years or more. Congress made the final major adjustments ten years later with changes that emphasized that at least some of the juveniles who commit serious crimes merited punishment as adults. The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 repealed the Federal Youth Corrections Act and eliminated juvenile parole provisions. The Sentencing Reform Act also lowered the age at which a juvenile may be transferred for trial as an adult and expanded the list of crimes that justify such a transfer. Thus far at least, the courts have declined to read into this history a congressional intent to repudiate rehabilitation as a sentencing consideration in federal juvenile proceedings. The continuing basic premise of federal juvenile law is that juvenile matters, even those arising under federal law, should be handled by state authorities whenever possible. The remote second preference of federal law is treatment of the juvenile under the federal delinquency provisions. Because a majority of the federal cases have historically arisen in areas beyond state jurisdiction, i.e. , primarily Indian country, the majority of federal delinquency proceedings have historically involved Native Americans. In a limited, but growing, number of instances involving drugs or violence, federal law permits the trial of juveniles as adults in federal court. For purposes of the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act in its present form, a juvenile is an individual, under 21 years of age when the information is filed, alleged to have violated federal criminal law before reaching the age of 18. The Act reaches neither individuals after they turn 21 nor conduct committed after they turn 18. Federal authorities, however, may prosecute as an adult any individual whose active participation in a conspiracy or racketeering enterprise bridges his or her eighteenth birthday. Once the federal courts have found a juvenile delinquent, however, a court that revokes a juvenile's delinquent supervised release may order the juvenile held until age 26. Criminal investigation and prosecution is first and foremost the domain of state and local officials, and conduct which violates federal criminal law is usually contrary to state law as well. For example, the federal Controlled Substances Act has a state equivalent in every jurisdiction, and robbery of a federal insured bank, or murder of a federal employee or law enforcement officer will almost always be contrary to the state robbery and murder statutes in the state in which the offenses occur. Moreover, while state crimes are the most common basis for state juvenile court jurisdiction, many state juvenile courts enjoy delinquency jurisdiction based upon a violation of federal law. Thus, an individual under 18 who violates federal criminal law can move through the state juvenile delinquency system without ever coming into contact with federal authorities. Contractions in state juvenile court jurisdiction, however, make this less likely than was once the case. Many states now define juvenile court jurisdiction more narrowly than federal law either in terms of age or crime or both. Some also permit the adult criminal trial of a juvenile either through the exercise of concurrent jurisdiction or a waiver or transfer of jurisdiction under circumstances the federal courts could not. A juvenile taken into federal custody for violation of federal law must be advised of his or her legal rights immediately and the juvenile's parents or guardian must be notified immediately. The courts have held that since federal custody activates the statute's requirements, the obligations only begin after a juvenile, initially detained by state, local or tribal officials, is turned over to federal authorities, and may be excused when the juvenile frustrates reasonable but unsuccessful notification efforts. Much of the case law relating to the federal advice and notification provisions comes from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit which has held that: (1) the word "immediate" means the same for both advice and notifications purposes; (2) advice given 4 hours after arrest and notification given 3 1/2 hours after arrest has not been given "immediately"; (3) notice given within close to an hour after arrests had been given immediately; (4) parental notification must include advice as to the juvenile's rights; (5) parental notification may be accomplished through the good offices of the surrogate or appropriate foreign consulate when the juvenile's parents reside outside of the United States; (6) convictions or delinquency determinations must be overturned if they are tainted by violations of section 5033 so egregious as to violate due process; and (7)less egregious but prejudicial violations of section 5033 may require that any resulting incriminating statements be suppressed. The juvenile must also be brought before a magistrate for arraignment "forthwith." At night, on weekends, or at other times when a magistrate is not immediately available, arraignment may be within a time reasonable under the circumstances. On the other hand when a magistrate is available, arraignment may not be delayed simply because the government is proceeding with an abundance of caution or because the associated paperwork is tedious. Once before the magistrate, the juvenile is entitled to the assistance of counsel and to have counsel appointed in the case of indigence. The magistrate may also appoint a guardian ad litem, and, after a hearing before counsel, order the juvenile detained to guarantee subsequent court appearances or for the safety of the juvenile or anyone else. A juvenile under federal detention is entitled to a delinquency hearing within 30 days or to have the information charging his or her delinquency dismissed with prejudice unless he or she has contributed or consented to the delay or unless dismissal with prejudice would be contrary to the interests of justice. This speedy trial requirement runs from the time the juvenile was taken into federal custody pending judicial proceedings, but does not attach to any period of state detention; to any period during which the juvenile was being held for purposes other than the pendency of delinquency proceedings; to any time when the juvenile is not being detained; to delays attributable to the juvenile's deception; to the period between admission or guilty plea and sentencing; or to the period for which a continuance has been granted at the juvenile's behest. Time spent on the government's appeal is excludable in the interest of justice, as is time spent litigating the government's transfer motions, but not when the juvenile was being unlawfully detained at the time of government's motion. Federal law permits federal proceedings against a federal juvenile offender when there is no realistic state alternative or when the juvenile is accused of a serious federal crime. The government must certify that it has elected a federal forum. The certificate must assert that either: (1) the state courts are unwilling or unable to proceed against the juvenile for the misconduct in question; or (2) the juvenile programs of the state are unavailable or inadequate; or (3) the offense is a drug dealing or drug smuggling violation, possession of an undetectable firearm, or felony and crime of violence and that a substantial federal interest exists warranting the exercise of federal jurisdiction. "Because certification requirements are disjunctive, a single basis for certification establishes jurisdiction." Although the statute calls for certification by the Attorney General, the authority has been redelegated to the various United States Attorneys. A facially adequate certification is generally thought to be beyond judicial review in the absence of evidence of bad faith. Certification is jurisdictional, however, so that certification by an Assistant United States Attorney without evidence of the United States Attorney's approval is insufficient. The government need not certify the want of, or unwillingness to exercise, tribal as well as state jurisdiction. "The Attorney General's certification of a 'substantial federal interest' is an act of prosecutorial discretion that is shielded from judicial review." Because there is no statutory definition of the term "crime of violence" for certification purposes, courts in the past have relied on the definitions in 18 U.S.C. SS 16 ("The term 'crime of violence' means - (a) an offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another, or (b) any other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense "); or 18 U.S.C. SS 924(c)(3) ("the term 'crime of violence' means an offense that is a felony and - (A) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another, or (B) that by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense"); or simply "an offense that 'by its very nature involves a substantial risk' that physical force against another may be used in committing the offense." On April 17, 2018, however, the Supreme Court in Sessions v. Dimaya declared unconstitutionally vague the language of 18 U.S.C. SS 16(b) (in italics above), incorporated by cross-reference into the Immigration and Nationality Act. The Court's decision may require future lower federal courts, tasked to discern the meaning of the term "crime of violence" for certification purposes, to apply 18 U.S.C. SSSS 16(a) or 924(c)(3)(A) or to formulate a new definition. If the government decides against federal proceedings, the juvenile must either be released or, under the appropriate conditions, turned over to state authorities. Otherwise, the government begins the proceedings by filing an information and a statement of the juvenile's past record with the district court. Most courts appear to believe that they have no jurisdiction to proceed against a juvenile until they receive evidence of the juvenile's prior record. The government may proceed against a juvenile as an adult only if the child insists, or pursuant to a juvenile court transfer. There are two types of transfers, mandatory and discretionary. A transfer is mandatory in the case of a violent felony, drug trafficking, drug smuggling, or arson, allegedly committed by a juvenile 16 years of age or older who has previously been found to have committed comparable misconduct. As the language suggests, the prior felony "conviction" may be either a conviction as an adult or a finding of delinquency based on conduct that would be felonious if committed by an adult. Charges that would support a mandatory transfer if brought against a 16 year old recidivist, may be used to trigger a discretionary transfer if the juvenile is 15 or older regardless of his or her prior record; discretionary transfers are also possible for juveniles 13 or older in some cases of assault, homicide or robbery. As in the case of certification, the vagaries associated with the term "crime of violence" impact transfers involving in two of the three classes. The predicate offense list found in section 5032 for the mandatory transfer of recidivists aged 16 or older uses language virtually identical to the language of 18 U.S.C. SSSS 16(a) and 16 (b): "[a]a felony offense that has as an element thereof the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another, or [b] that, by its very nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person of another may be used in committing the offense ." The Supreme Court's determination in Dimaya , that the language of section 16(b) is unconstitutionally vague, presumably applies with equal force to the comparable mandatory transfer language (italicized above). The discretionary transfer provision for juveniles 15 years of age or older has a similar problem. It lists "crimes of violence" as predicates. Here by operation of the Dimaya decision, the lower courts are left with the task of applying section 16(a) or some other definition that avoids the uncertainty of section 16(b). The discretionary transfer provision for juveniles 13 and older presents no such challenge, because section 5032 enumerates specific predicate offenses there. At least one federal appellate court has rejected contentions that mandatory transfers constitute an unconstitutional denial of either due process or equal protection and aside from a denial of the ineffective assistance of counsel, questions of the constitutionality of the underlying prior conviction or determination may not be raised at the transfer hearing. When the transfer is discretionary, juvenile adjudication is presumed appropriate, unless the government can establish its case for a transfer by a preponderance of the evidence. Section 5032 lays out the factors for the court's consideration when it is asked to exercise its discretion to transfer a juvenile in the interest of justice for trial as an adult. "In making its determination, the court must consider six factors: (1) the age and social background of the juvenile; (2) the nature of the alleged offense; (3) the extent and nature of the juvenile's prior delinquency record; (4) the juvenile's present intellectual development and psychological maturity; (5) the nature of past treatment efforts and the juvenile's response to them; and (6) the availability of programs designed to treat the juvenile's behavioral problems." The purpose of the exercise is to determine whether the prospects for the juvenile's rehabilitation are outweighed by the risk of harm that he poses if not tried as an adult. A court need not give the factors equal weight as long as the court documents its consideration of each. The age factor compels the court to consider a juvenile's age both at the time of the misconduct and at the time of the transfer hearing. "The older a juvenile delinquent is both at the time of the alleged offense and at the time of transfer hearing, the more the juvenile defendant's age weighs in favor of transfer." In considering the child's social background, the courts cite the child's family life, both positive and negative, and other social interactions. The second factor calls for an assessment of both the seriousness of the misconduct alleged and the juvenile's role in the transgression. The allegations are taken as true for purposes of the assessment, and allegations of serious offenses argue strongly for transfer. The third factor requires the court to take into account "the extent and nature of the juvenile's prior delinquency record." This may include the juvenile's arrest record in some instances. A clean record, however, is no bar to a transfer. The fourth factor, the juvenile's "intellectual development and psychological maturity," is essentially a matter of whether the juvenile has the mind of a child at the time of the transfer petition, indicating a receptivity to rehabilitation. The factor may argue strongly for the transfer of a juvenile wise beyond his years. Moreover, with age, the weight the courts give to average intellectual development and maturity begins to slip away. In the case of older juveniles, the courts may find evidence of reduced, or even greatly reduced, development and maturity insufficient to overcome the counter weight of a serious offense. The fourth factor attempts to predict whether the juvenile will be receptive to rehabilitative efforts. The fifth factor evaluates whether the juvenile has been receptive to past rehabilitative efforts. Obviously, the factor carries no weight if there have been no past efforts. The final factor is the availability of treatment programs for the individual either as a juvenile or an adult. The juvenile's age or offense may make him ineligible for state programs in some instances. Transfer hearings are considered akin to preliminary hearings and consequently other than the rules of privilege, the Federal Rules of Evidence include those governing hearsay do not apply. A juvenile's statements "prior to or during a transfer hearing" may not be admitted in subsequent criminal proceedings. Consequently, a juvenile may be required to submit to a psychiatric examination in connection with the hearing, and the court may base its transfer determinations on the results without intruding upon the juvenile's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The court's determination of whether transfer is appropriate is immediately appealable under an abuse of discretion standard. The Supreme Court's decision in Miller v. Alabama , barring imposition of a sentence of life imprisonment without parole for an offense committed while a juvenile, precludes a transfer relating to an offense punishable only by death or life imprisonment. It does not preclude a transfer with respect to an offense punishable alternatively by imprisonment for a term of years. In the absence or failure of a government transfer motion and unless the juvenile insists on an adult trial, the district court, at its discretion, conducts a delinquency hearing "at any time and place within the district, in chambers or otherwise." Neither the right to grand jury indictment or to a jury trial are constitutionally required. However, the Constitution demands many of the other features of an adult criminal trial including: notice of charges, right to counsel, privilege against self-incrimination, right to confrontation and cross examination, proof beyond a reasonable doubt, protection against double jeopardy, and application of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule. Upon a finding of delinquency, the court schedules either a sentencing hearing or a hearing in anticipation of a commitment for examination prior to sentencing. At sentencing, the court may dispose of a juvenile delinquency case by suspending sentence, by ordering restitution or probation, or by committing the juvenile to the custody of the Attorney General for detention. Unless the court suspends sentence, section 5037 establishes a series of time limits that restrict the court's authority when it orders detention, when it imposes or revokes probation, and when it imposes or revokes a period of juvenile delinquent supervision. Section 5037(c) provides different detention limitations depending upon whether the dispositional hearing occurs when the individual is under 18 years of age or is between 18 and 21 years of age. In the case of a juvenile under 18, the court may order a term of detention no longer than the shorter of (A) the date the juvenile will turn 21; (B) the term at the top of the sentencing range under the sentencing guidelines that would apply had the juvenile been an adult; or (C) the maximum term of imprisonment that would apply had the juvenile been an adult. The detention limits for juveniles between the ages of 18 and 21 depend on the seriousness of the misconduct that led to the delinquency determination. If the misconduct would have been punishable by imprisonment for a maximum of 12 years or more, the term of detention may be no longer than the sooner of: (i) five years, or (ii) the top of the sentencing guideline range applicable to adults under comparable circumstances. If less serious misconduct led to the delinquency determination, the court may order detention for no longer than the sooner of: (i) three years; (ii) the top of the sentencing guideline range; or (iii) the maximum term of imprisonment that an adult would have faced under the circumstances. The time limits for probation are comparable. The court may set the term of probation for a juvenile under 18 years of age at no longer than the sooner of (A) the date on which the juvenile will turn 21 years of age; or (B) five years (or one year if the misconduct in an adult would be punishable by imprisonment for not more than five days). For juveniles between the ages of 18 and 21, the limit is the shorter of (A) three years; or (B) one year (if the misconduct in an adult would be punishable by imprisonment for not more than five days). The adult mandatory and discretion condition statutes apply including the requirement that any discretion conditions involve only such deprivations of liberty or property as are reasonably necessary to comply with statutory sentencing principles. The court may later revise or revoke a juvenile's probation and order the juvenile's detention for violation of his probation conditions. Detention authority following revocation mirrors the court's initial detention authority with two exceptions. First, regardless of the juvenile's age at the time of revocation, the court is initially governed by the time limits that apply to the detention of juveniles between the ages of 18 and 21. Second, an individual who is 21 years of age or older may not be detained beyond the age of 23, or beyond the age of 25 if the misconduct is punishable by imprisonment for 12 years or more. Subject to those restrictions, when the misconduct that resulted in the delinquency determination would be punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of 12 years or more, the court may order a term of detention no longer than the shorter of (i) five years; or (ii) the term at the top of the sentencing range under the sentencing guidelines that would apply had the juvenile been an adult. For less serious forms of misconduct, the limit is the shorter of (i) three years; (ii) the term at the top of the sentencing range under the sentencing guidelines that would apply had the juvenile been an adult; or (iii) the maximum term of imprisonment that would apply had the juvenile been an adult. When a court orders juvenile detention, it may also impose a term of juvenile delinquent supervision to be served after the individual's release from detention. Juvenile delinquent supervision has its own time limits and its own set of conditions. The conditions are the same as those available when the court sentences a juvenile to probation. The initial term of juvenile delinquent supervision may not exceed the juvenile's 21st birthday if the individual is under the age of 18 when the detention order is issued. If the individual is between 18 and 21, the initial time limits are those that apply to detention, less the time served in detention. Thus, when the misconduct that resulted in the delinquency determination would be punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of 12 years or more, the court may order a term of supervision no longer than the shorter of (i) five years; or (ii) the term at the top of the sentencing range under the sentencing guidelines that would apply had the juvenile been an adult. For less serious forms of misconduct, the limit is the shorter of (i) three years; (ii) the term at the top of the sentencing range under the sentencing guidelines that would apply had the juvenile been an adult; or (iii) the maximum term of imprisonment that would apply had the juvenile been an adult. Violation of the conditions of supervision may lead to further terms of detention and juvenile delinquent supervision. The maximum term of detention following revocation of a term of supervision is the same as the maximum term of detention following revocation of probation, less time served in detention. That is, when the misconduct that resulted in the delinquency determination would be punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of 12 years or more, the court may order a term of supervision no longer than the shorter of (i) five years; (ii) the term at the top of the sentencing range under the sentencing guidelines that would apply had the juvenile been an adult; or (iii) the time before which the individual turns 26 years of age. For less serious forms of misconduct, the limit is the shorter of (i) three years; (ii) the term at the top of the sentencing range under the sentencing guidelines that would apply had the juvenile been an adult; (iii) the maximum term of imprisonment that would apply had the juvenile been an adult; or (iv) the time before which the individual turns 24. Section 5037(d)(6) is somewhat cryptic about the term limits on the juvenile delinquent supervision imposed after revocation. It makes no mention of the limits in place when the individual is less than 18 years of age or between 18 and 21 years of age. As for individuals over 21 years of age, it declares that the term of juvenile delinquent supervision "shall be in accordance with the provisions of section 5037(d)(1)" with the exception of the usual bars on supervision over individuals once they reach either 24 or 26 years of age depending on the seriousness of their original misconduct. The difficulty stems in part from the fact that section 5037(d)(1) says nothing about time limits. It merely states that "[t]he court, in ordering a term of official detention, may include the requirement that the juvenile be placed on a term of juvenile delinquent supervision after official detention." One appellate court has held that "the maximum term of supervision that a court may impose under SS 5037(d)(6) is determined by the requirements of in SS 5037(d)(2), using the juvenile's age at the time of the revocation hearing." One of the hallmarks of the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act is its effort to shield juveniles from some of the harsh consequences of exposure to the criminal justice system. Before and after being taken into custody, and before and after being found delinquent, it refuses to allow juveniles to be interspersed with adults who are awaiting trial for, or have been convicted of, criminal offenses. In the same spirit, ordinarily federal juvenile records are sealed for all purposes other than judicial inquiries, law enforcement needs, juvenile treatment requirements, employment in a position raising national security concerns, or disposition questions from victims. This does not render otherwise admissible evidence of juvenile proceedings inadmissible in criminal proceedings. Moreover, in response to media requests the court will balance the competing interests which weigh heavily in favor of confidentiality. Juveniles transferred for trial as adults in federal court are essentially treated as adults, with few distinctions afforded or required because of their age. At one time, even the Sentencing Guidelines instructed sentencing judges that an offender's youth was not ordinarily a permissible ground for reduction of the otherwise applicable Sentencing Guideline range. The Sentencing Commission has since amended the guideline to permit consideration of the defendant's age in atypical cases. In addition, the death penalty may not be imposed as punishment for a crime committed by a juvenile. Nor may an individual be sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for a crime committed as a juvenile.

Federal authorities have three options when a juvenile violates federal criminal law. First, they can refer the juvenile to state authorities. Second, they can initiate federal delinquency proceedings. Third, they can petition the federal court to transfer the juvenile for trial as an adult. The Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act general favors referring juveniles to state authorities, but it permits federal delinquency proceedings where state courts cannot or will not accept jurisdiction. Because a majority of the federal juvenile delinquency cases have historically arisen in areas beyond state jurisdiction, i.e., primarily Indian country, the majority of federal delinquency proceedings involve Native Americans. In the more serious of these cases, the juvenile offender may be transferred for trial as an adult in federal court. The Act applies to those charged before the age of 21 with a breach of federal criminal law occurring before they reached the age of 18. Given the preference for state juvenile proceedings and the fact that a violation of federal law will ordinarily support the assertion of state juvenile court jurisdiction, most such offenders never come in contact with federal authorities. Many of those who do are returned to state officials to be processed through the state court system. The United States Attorney, however, may elect to initiate federal proceedings if the state courts are unwilling or unable to assume jurisdiction, or the state has no adequate treatment plans, or the juvenile is charged with a crime of violence or with drug trafficking. Federal juvenile delinquency proceedings require neither grand jury indictment, public trial, nor trial by jury. The constitutional rights available to juveniles at delinquency proceedings are otherwise much like those found in adult criminal trials. Juveniles found delinquent may be released under suspended sentence, placed on probation, ordered to pay restitution and/or sentenced to the custody of the U.S. Attorney General for detention. The period of detention, if any, may not exceed the term which might be imposed upon an adult offender for the same misconduct. The period of detention may be followed by a period of juvenile delinquent supervision, revocation of which in serious cases may result in detention until the individual is 26 years of age. The U.S. district court may, and in some cases must, transfer a juvenile for criminal trial as an adult. A juvenile may request a transfer to trial as an adult. Otherwise, a court must order a transfer when a juvenile, with a prior comparable conviction or juvenile adjudication, is charged with committing a violent offense or a drug trafficking offense at the age of 16 or older. Discretionary transfers come in two varieties. A court may transfer a juvenile, who when 13 years of age or older is alleged to have committed aggravated assault, murder, attempted murder, armed robbery, or armed rape. A court may also transfer a juvenile who when 15 years of age or older is alleged to have committed drug trafficking or a violent felony. The court orders or denies the transfer petition after considering the seriousness of the offense, the age and maturity of the juvenile, the juvenile's prior delinquency record, the results of past rehabilitative efforts, and the availability of existing rehabilitative programs.

By some estimates there are approximately 1.2 billion Muslims in the world, of which 60% live in Asia. Only 15% of Muslims are Arab, while almost one third live in South Asia. The four nations with the largest Muslim populations, Indonesia (194 million), India (150 million), Pakistan (145 million), and Bangladesh (130 million), are in Asia. China also has a population of 39 million Muslims. Despite this, the Muslims of Asia are perceived to be on the periphery of the Islamic core based in the Arab Middle East. Muslims are a majority in Kirgizstan, Uzbekistan, Tadjikistan and Turkmenistan in Central Asia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Bangladesh in South Asia and Malaysia, Brunei, and Indonesia in Southeast Asia. (See map below) There are also significant minority populations in Khazakstan, India, Thailand, and the Philippines. Sizable Muslim communities are also found in Sri Lanka, China, Burma, and Singapore. Islam is by some estimates the world's fastest growing religion. Mecca, in Saudi Arabia, is the spiritual center of Islam because Mohammad founded the religion there in 610. In 2002, Muslims constituted approximately 19% of the world's population as compared to 30% that were Christian. These percentages are projected by some to shift to 25% Christian and 30% Muslim by the year 2025. Islam in Southeast Asia is relatively more moderate in character than in much of the Middle East. This moderation stems in part from the way Islam evolved in Southeast Asia. Islam came to Southeast Asia with traders rather than through military conquest as it did in much of South Asia and the Arab Middle East. Islam also was overlaid on animist, Hindu, and Buddhist traditions in Indonesia, which are said to give it a more syncretic aspect. Islam spread throughout much of Southeast Asia by the end of the seventeenth century. Islam in Asia is more politically diverse than in the Middle East. Islam has been undergoing a revival in Asia. RAND analyst Angel Rabasa points to several factors that contribute to this Islamic resurgence in Asia. These include both domestic and external factors. Internally, the forces of globalization and the impact of Western culture have played a role, especially the effect of rapid industrialization and resulting urbanization. The Asian financial crisis of 1997 resulted in the overthrow of the authoritarian Suharto regime and created political space for Islamists in Indonesia. Muslim separatist insurgents have continued their struggle in the Philippines and Thailand while the Parti Islam se Malaysia has worked through the political system to promote an Islamist agenda while in opposition in Malaysia. External factors include the current situation in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Arab-Israeli conflict, the 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran, the export of Saudi-backed Wahhabi Islamic fundamentalism, the conflict between India and Pakistan over Kashmir, and the Afghan war against the Soviets. The majority of Muslims are of the Sunni tradition, while 10-15% are Shiite. This difference stems from disagreement over the succession to the prophet Mohammad. In South and Southeast Asia, Shiites are a significant portion of the population in only Afghanistan and Pakistan. The puritanical Sunni sect of Wahhabism has played an important role in the resurgence of Islam in Asia. It stems from a 18 th Century movement founded by Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab that preached a literal interpretation of the Quran and an orthodox practice of Islam. Historically there has been a close relationship between Wahhabism and the Saudi dynasty. Sufism is another more "mystical" variant of Islam, though its presence in Asia is small except for parts of South Asia. The decline of Islamic power in the wake of European colonial expansion provoked two key schools of thought within Islam that continue to have relevance today. The traditionalist school believed that the cause for the decline of Islam could be traced to "moral laxity and departure from the true path of Islam." As a result, their response was to call for an Islamic revival. Others, known as reformers, felt that the decline was due to "a chronic failure to modernize their societies and institutions." The path of the reformers presents the question of whether it is possible to modernize without Westernizing. At its core this is a struggle over values: "... how to protect a society's cultural heritage and traditional practices in an age of globalization and how to develop a creative coexistence between modernization and traditionalism without Westernization." It is thought by some analysts that if the United States and the West seek to make common cause with moderate elements within the Islamic world against violent extremists they would be well advised to do so in a way that is not perceived to be a threat to the Islamic world. The United States, through its association with globalization and a globalizing culture, is perceived as a threat by many leaders of the Islamic world who are seeking to preserve, or restore, traditional culture even as segments of the populations they lead are drawn to American culture. The disconnect between Muslim elites and their people in Asia can also be seen in the decreasing popularity of United States's foreign policy even as regional leaders seek to maintain close ties. Some analysts believe that as long as the Muslim world views the U.S.-led war against terror as a war against Islam there will be significant limits on the extent to which Muslim states will be able to cooperate with the United States in the war against terror. The problem is exacerbated by widespread Muslim opposition to United States policy on the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Islamic revival is changing the face of political Islam in Asia. The distinction to be drawn is between revivalists, who see religious change as an end in itself, and political Islam, or Islamists, who seek the Islamic revival as a means to the end of transforming the state. A further distinction is to be drawn between those who would work through the political process and those who would use violence to achieve their ends. The Islamic revival has a complex relationship to the level of extremism in Asia. While Islam in Southeast Asia has been moderate in character, it is undergoing a process of revivalist change in some segments of society. The resurgence is in part inspired by links to the Middle East, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Some Southeast Asians returning from Islamic religious schools in the Middle East and Pakistan have returned with a new, radical, militant, Islamist, and extremist form of Islam that is more likely to be anti-American or anti-Western in character. There is also a significant number of violent extremists of returned Southeast Asians, and a larger number of South Asians, who had participated in the war against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. Some of the South and Southeast Asians who have been radicalized through these experiences have gone on to spread extremist ideology, particularly by linking with local Muslim extremist groups who tend to have more nationally or regionally defined goals and who are largely opposed to local moderate Muslims. From one perspective "the most effective policies towards Muslim Asia will be those that contain extremism while working with, rather than against, the Muslim majority's aspirations for social and economic improvement." Connections between Islamic extremism and terrorist organizations in South Asia appear to be more extensive than they are in Southeast Asia. This stems in large part from closer interaction with the Middle East, strengthened recently by the presence of Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan. It is also a function of long term conflict in Afghanistan and in Kashmir. The extremist Taliban regime gave sanctuary to Al Qaeda until it was crushed. Since that time remnant Al Qaeda forces have linked up with other Sunni extremist groups in South Asia including Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Mohammad, Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan and Lashkar-i-Jhangvi. Pakistan has also experienced Sunni-Shiite conflict. An extensive array of Islamic schools known as madrassas , including some that teach a militant anti-Western and anti-Hindu perspective, operate in Pakistan. A coalition of Islamist political parties controls approximately 20% of the seats in Pakistan's legislature, as well as the Northwest Frontier Province. They also lead a coalition in Baluchistan. It has been reported that Al Qaeda fighters escaped to Bangladesh after the fall of Afghanistan to American and Afghan Northern Alliance forces and that Bangladesh veterans of the conflict in Afghanistan have played a role in establishing radical madrassas in Bangladesh. In India, while there exists significant inter-communal strife between Hindus and Muslims it is largely domestically focused with the exception of Pakistani based groups operating in Kashmir. There are a number of Islamist groups in Southeast Asia that have linkages, either direct or indirect, to terrorist organizations. The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), and Abu Sayyaf are examples of groups in the Philippines where Islamist ideology, secessionism, criminality, and linkages to international terrorist networks are evident. The terrorist Jemaah Islamiya (JI) organization, which seeks to establish an Islamic Khalifate across much of Southeast Asia and establish Islamic law, has ties to Al Qaeda. In Indonesia, the now reportedly disbanded Lashkar Jihad incited inter-communal strife between Muslims and Christians in Sulawezi and the Moluccas that created a struggle that can be exploited by terrorist groups such as JI. Lashkar Jundullah is another group that has been involved in inter-communal violence in the Moluccas and Sulawezi. The extremist Kampulan Mujahidin Malaysia (KMM) is an example of an organization in Southeast Asia established by veterans of the fight against the Soviets in Afghanistan. In Thailand, separatists have mounted an insurrection in the Muslim southern provinces. The relatively few Muslims of Northeast Asia are found in China for the most part. China is home to an estimated 17.5 to 36 million Muslims. The largest, most concentrated group is the Uighurs of Xinjiang Province in western China. The Uighur minority has experienced unrest of an Islamic character in recent years. Many Uighurs seek autonomy within China. Demographic trends arising from Han-Chinese in-migration are projected to make the Uighurs a minority in their home province. The scope of the Islamic revival in Asia, and the extent to which increased religious fervor will translate into extremist positions or political power that will express itself in violent ways towards the West, is debated. Some see this phenomenon manifesting itself more in terms of increased piety among individuals within society without necessarily expressing itself politically. Karen Armstrong, author of Islam: A Short History , believes that because fear feeds extremism the war against terror should include a better appreciation of Islam in the West. It has been observed that U.S. counter-terrorism policy "tends to conflate political Islam and terrorism worldwide." A key distinction for some in this debate is the distinction between cultural or religious identity and political identity. An Islamic revival that finds its expression through cultural or religious means is not necessarily a threat, even as some in the Islamic world would manipulate it to their anti-American or anti-Western ends. An examination of recent developments with political Islam in Malaysia and Indonesia illustrate this point. Radical Islamist or extremist parties have not demonstrated broad appeal among Indonesian or Malaysian voters in recent elections even as some segments of these societies have experienced a resurgence of Islamic belief. The Islamist Parti Islam se Malaysia experienced significant electoral setbacks in the 2004 elections to the relatively more secular Barisan National Coalition of Prime Minister Badawi, who is himself regarded as a respected Islamic scholar. In Indonesia, Islamist parties, such as the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), made small gains based not on their Islamist agenda but on their anti-corruption and good governance policies. Secular and nationalist parties clearly are preferred by voters in Indonesia and Malaysia even as Islam remains a core value of the people. There are also fundamentalists in Southeast Asia that would introduce strict Islamic law but would not advocate the use of violence to do so. There is also a distinction to be made between those who would focus primarily on sub-national, national and regional objectives, such as secession for a Muslim province, rather than focus on the international agenda advocated by Al Qaeda. Alienation and humiliation appear to be key concepts for understanding the Islamic resurgence in Asia and for understanding why individuals are drawn to terrorist groups. In discussing madrassas and pesantren in Indonesia, from which extremists have been recruited, Zachary Abuza has taken the position that the "radical fringe (of Islam) will continue to grow, as modernization leaves people more isolated and the political process leaves people more disenfranchised. The Islamists and their supporters will continue to gain in power unless the more secular Muslim community again provides a successful model of tolerant and modernist Islam that it has done fairly successfully for forty years." In this way, some analysts believe frustration from diminished expectations driven by economic malaise, the lack of effective political participation, and a sense of humiliation are at the core of why many Asian Muslims have become radicalized. It is thought by some that U.S. policies can help best by assisting moderate elements in Asia to "respond to mainstream Muslims' hopes for economic improvement and political participation ... education, balanced development, participatory governance, and civil peace" that will give hope to alienated individuals who might otherwise drift towards radicalism. Some observers feel that diminishing the ranks of alienated Asian Muslims will in turn restrict room for maneuver by extremists and terrorists by limiting active or passive support from the societies within which they operate.

There exists much diversity within the Islamic world. This is particularly evident in Asia. This diversity is to be found in the different ethnic backgrounds and in the different practices of Islam. The Muslim world of Asia has been experiencing an Islamic revival. This has had an effect on moderate as well as radical Muslims. An understanding of the dynamics of Islam in Asia should help inform United States' policy to develop respect between America and Muslim peoples, to foster economic policies to encourage development of open societies, to support education in Muslim states, and to identify and prioritize terrorist sanctuaries in order to pursue more effectively the war against terror. This report will be updated.

The new Medicare legislation, the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, andModernization Act ( P.L. 108-173 ), addresses the importation of prescription drugs for all U.S.consumers, not just for Medicare-eligible individuals. (1) These provisions are rooted in consumer and congressional concernwith the high cost of prescription drugs in the United States. International comparisons of drugprices have confirmed that American consumers, particularly the elderly and uninsured, often paymore for prescription drugs than do citizens in other countries. (2) The importation oflower-priced prescription drugs is one strategy to reduce U.S. consumer spending. The new Act, despite being structured as a replacement to the importation provisions in theMedicine Equity and Drug Safety (MEDS) Act of 2000, does not effectively change U.S.prescription drug importation policy. The details it adds will not be implemented unless theSecretary of Health and Human Services (hereafter referred to as the Secretary) certifies to Congressthat such imports would not threaten the health and safety of the American public and would providecost savings. That certification requirement, continued from prior law, has effectively haltedimplementation of import provisions because no Secretary has been willing to provide the requiredcertification, a stance outlined in testimony from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). (3) Although earlier laws restricted the importation of a prescription drug to its manufacturer,the FDA has maintained a lenient enforcement policy that lets individuals bring a small amount ofnon-FDA approved drugs into this country for their own use. (4) Called a "personal-use" or"compassionate-use" policy, this FDA discretion has made it easier for patients with life-threateningdiseases (such as cancer and AIDS) to bring medicines into the country and be treated by their owndoctors. The policy, as described on the FDA website, does not cover commercial imports, nor doesit cover individual imports of FDA-approved drugs available in the United States. (5) The new Medicare legislation (6) entirely replaces the language in Section 804 of the Federal Food,Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA) that had been inserted by the MEDS Act of 2000. The followingsummarizes the prescription drug import provisions in the new Act. Provisions Definitions. [Section 804(a)] "Importer" isdefined to mean a pharmacist or a wholesaler; "pharmacist" to mean a person licensed by a state topractice pharmacy, including the dispensing and selling of prescription drugs; and "wholesaler" tomean a person licensed as a wholesaler or distributor of prescription drugs in the United States, notincluding the manufacturer of the drug being imported. A "prescription drug" is defined as a drugsubject to Section 503(b) (7) excluding, however, a controlled substance, a biological product, an infused drug, an intravenouslyinjected drug, a drug that is inhaled during surgery, or a parenteral drug whose importation theSecretary determines poses a threat to the public health. "Qualifying laboratory" is defined as a U.S.laboratory that has been approved by the Secretary for the purposes of this section. Regulations. [Section 804(b)] The Secretary,after consultation with the United States Trade Representative and the Commissioner of Customs,must promulgate regulations permitting pharmacists and wholesalers to import prescription drugsfrom Canada into the United States. Limitation. [Section 804(c)] The regulationsmust ensure that all imported prescription drugs meet the same safety and efficacy standards as drugsapproved in the United States and that the importer comply with all information and reportingrequirements. The Secretary is permitted to adopt such rules as necessary to safeguard public healthor as a means to facilitate the importation of prescription drugs. Information and Records. [Section 804(d)] Drugimporters must provide information that includes the name and amount of the active ingredient ofthe drug, the dosage form of the drug, the date the drug is shipped, the quantity shipped, andinformation about its origin and destination. The importer must also supply the price paid by theimporter; the importer's name, address, and license number; the original source of the drug and theamount of each lot received from that source; and the manufacturer's lot or control number. Also,the importer or manufacturer must certify that the drug is FDA-approved, properly labeled, notadulterated, and not misbranded; and provide laboratory records of authenticity testing, includingdata, and evidence that testing was conducted in an approved U.S. laboratory. The importer isrequired to provide any other information that the Secretary determines is necessary to ensure thepublic health. Records regarding imported prescription drugs must be provided to the Secretary, andthen kept for such time as the Secretary determines to be appropriate. For a prescription drug imported directly from the first foreign recipient from themanufacturer, there must be documentation indicating that the drug came directly from themanufacturer, that the amount being imported is not greater than the quantity that was originallyreceived, that the drug was subsequently shipped by that recipient to the U.S. importer, andverification that each batch of the drug has been statistically sampled and tested for authenticity anddegradation prior to importation. Samples of subsequent shipments of these drugs must also betested for authenticity and degradation. For a prescription drug not imported directly from the firstrecipient in the foreign country, there must be documentation demonstrating that each batch of thedrug has been statistically sampled and tested for authenticity and degradation prior to importation. Testing. [Section 804(e)] The importer or themanufacturer must conduct the required authenticity testing at a qualified U.S. laboratory. If theimporter conducts these tests, the manufacturer must give the importing pharmacist or wholesalerthe information needed to authenticate the product and confirm its labeling. Also, testinginformation must be kept in confidence and used only for this required import testing or to otherwisecomply with this Act. The Secretary may adopt rules to protect trade secrets and commercial orfinancial information that is privileged or confidential. Registration of Foreign Sellers. [Section 804(f)] Any Canadian establishment engaged in the distribution of a prescription drug imported or offeredfor importation into the United States must register its name and place of business with the Secretary. The Canadian establishment also must register the name of its U.S. agent. Suspension of Importation. [Section 804(g)] Ifthe Secretary discovers a pattern of counterfeit or violative products, the agency must suspendimportation of that specific prescription drug or that specific importer. The suspension must stayin effect until the FDA investigates and determines whether the public is being adequately protectedfrom counterfeit and violative drug products under existing regulations. Approved Labeling. [Section 804(h)] A drugmanufacturer must give the importer written authorization to use, at no cost, the approved labelingfor the prescription drug. Charitable Contributions. [Section 804(i)] Section 801(d)(1) of the FFDCA, which allows only the U.S. manufacturer of a drug to import it intothe United States, will continue to apply to a product donated by a manufacturer of a drug to acharitable organization or foreign government. (8) Waiver Authority for Importation by Individuals. [Section 804(j)] Congress declares that the Secretary should use discretion when enforcing thecurrent legal prohibition against persons importing drugs or devices. The Secretary should focusenforcement on cases where the importing may pose a significant threat to public health. When theimportation is clearly for personal use and the prescription drug or device does not appear to presentan unreasonable risk to the individual, the Secretary should exercise discretion to permit theimportation by the individual. The new law specifies two waiver procedures to allow individuals-- other than pharmacists and wholesalers -- to bring prescription drugs into the United States fortheir personal use. The first deals with drugs from Canada. The Secretary is required to publish regulations thatgrant waivers for an individual to import for personal up to a 90-day supply of a drug from a licensedCanadian pharmacy. The drug must also be in final dosage form, be made in an FDA-registeredfacility, come from a registered Canadian seller, be accompanied by a valid prescription, and beimported under conditions the Secretary determines are necessary to ensure public safety. The second addresses drug imports from any other country. Here, the law gives the Secretarythe option, rather than a requirement, to issue regulations allowing imports from countries other thanCanada. If the Secretary were to publish such regulations, the law requires the Secretary to alsopublish guidance specifying the conditions under which individuals would be able to import drugsfor personal use. Construction. [Section 804(k)] Nothing in thissection shall be construed to limit the Secretary's authority relating to the importation of prescriptiondrugs, other than with respect to Section 801(d)(1), which allows only the manufacturer to importa prescription drug. Commencement of Program. [Section 804(l)] The drug import program described above can begin only if the Secretary first certifies to Congressthat its implementation would pose no additional risk to public health and safety, and would resultin a significant reduction in the cost of covered products (prescription drugs) to Americanconsumers. Termination of Program. [Section 804(l)] Oncean importation program is implemented, the Secretary can move to terminate it under specifiedconditions. If the Secretary certifies to Congress, between 12 and 18 months after the regulationsare implemented, that, based on substantial evidence, in the opinion of the Secretary, the benefits ofthe implementation of the import program do not outweigh any detriment, drug imports under thesection would cease 30 days after the certification is submitted. (9) However, the Secretary'scertification may not be submitted unless, after a public hearing, the Secretary finds it is more likelythan not that implementation will result in an increased risk to the public health; identifies, inqualitative and quantitative terms, the nature and causes of the increased risk; considers whethermeasures can be taken to avoid, reduce, or mitigate the increased risk and, if those measures wouldrequire additional statutory authority, to report to Congress describing needed legislation; identifies,in qualitative and quantitative terms, the benefits that would result from the program, includingreductions in the cost of drugs to U.S. consumers, which would allow them to obtain neededmedications without foregoing other necessities of life; and, in specific terms, compares thedetriment with those benefits and determines that the benefits do not outweigh the detriment. Authorization of Appropriations. [Section804(m)] The new law authorizes to be appropriated such sums as are necessary to carry out thissection. Conforming Amendments. Section 1121(b) ofthe Medicare Prescription Drug bill replaces references to "covered product" in Sections 301(aa) and303(a)(6) in the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act with "prescription drug." Study and Report on Importation of Drugs. Section 1122 requires the Secretary, in consultation with appropriate government agencies, toconduct a study on the importation of drugs to the United States pursuant to Section 804 of theFederal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (as added by Section 1121 of the conference agreement). TheSecretary shall submit the report to Congress not later than 12 months after the enactment of this Act. Study and Report on Trade in Pharmaceuticals. Section 1123 requires the President's designees to conduct a study and report on issues related totrade and pharmaceuticals. Discussion of Enacted Legislation Import Provisions. It is doubtful whether theSecretary will implement these import provisions given the Act contains the provision that led bothSecretaries Shalala and Thompson to decline. That provision requires that the Secretary certify thatimported drugs would be safe and at reduced cost before implementing import regulations. Althoughsignificant changes were considered, the new law changes very few elements of the MEDS Act of2000. Effectively, until the Secretary makes a certification regarding safety and cost, the law allowsno one (other than the U.S. manufacturer of the drug) to legally import a prescription drug. (10) Therefore: Until an HHS Secretary certifies to Congress that "the implementation of this section will (A) poseno additional risk to the public's health and safety; and (B) [will] result in a significant reduction inthe cost of covered products to the American consumer, (11) " drug imports are illegal unless imported by the manufacturerof the drug. Neither a pharmacist nor a wholesaler may import prescription drugs. The law does notallow an individual to import a drug for personal use. (12) If the HHS Secretary were to certify to Congress the required safety and cost savings certification,then all the mechanisms of Section 804 would go into effect. In that case, pursuant to regulationsthat the Secretary must promulgate: By law and according to regulations, a pharmacist or a wholesaler could importprescription drugs from Canada; Personal-use imports by an individual from any other country would remainillegal unless the Secretary chose to issue regulations allowing them; and The law's restrictions on personal-use imports would be waived so anindividual could import a 90-day supply of a prescription drug from Canada. Studies and Reports. Unrelated to whether theSecretary certifies safety and cost savings, the Medicare Act mandates two studies with reports toCongress. Study and Report on Importation of Drugs. The lawdirects the HHS Secretary, within 12 months of enactment, to study and report on "the importationof prescription drugs into the United States pursuant to Section 804 of the FFDCA (as added bySection 1121 of this Act)." The conference report provides the detailed instructions for that study. These include consideration of the pharmaceutical distribution chain; anti-counterfeitingtechnologies and their costs; the scope, volume, and safety of unapproved drugs; participation offoreign health agencies in ensuring product safety; the impact of importation on the drug prices thatconsumers face; the impact on research and development; agency resources; liability protections; andintellectual property rights. Study and Report on Trade in Pharmaceuticals. Thenew law also directs that "[t]he President's designees shall conduct a study and report on issuesrelated to trade and pharmaceuticals." Here, too, the conference report provides detail not stated inthe bill, including the naming of the Secretary of Commerce, the International Trade Commission,the HHS Secretary, and the United States Trade Representative as responsible for the conduct of thestudy and report. Topics to be covered include how other countries use price controls and what thiscosts U.S. consumers; the impact of price controls and intellectual property laws on price,innovation, generic competition, and research and development; and whether these are appropriatetopics for trade negotiations with other countries. The following table provides a comparison of the drug import provisions of the recentlypassed Medicare legislation and the MEDS Act provisions that it replaced. Comparison of the Importation of Prescription Drug Provisions in the New Law and What TheyReplace In June 2003, the Senate and the House each passed drug importationprovisions as part of their Medicare bills. Both the Senate-passed Prescription Drugand Medicare Improvement Act of 2003 ( S. 1 ) and the House-passedMedicare Modernization and Prescription Drug Act of 2003 ( H.R. 1 )would have required the Secretary of HHS to issue regulations allowing pharmacistsand drug wholesalers to import prescription drugs from Canada into the UnitedStates. These two bills were sent to conference. One month later, the House voted 243 to 186 to adopt the PharmaceuticalMarket Access Act of 2003 ( H.R. 2427 ), which contained broaderprovisions, such as permitting qualifying individuals (i.e., consumers) as well aspharmacists and wholesalers to import prescription drug products from 25industrialized countries, including Canada. This bill, introduced by RepresentativeGutknecht, differed strikingly from the then-current law and the subsequently enactedMedicare legislation in that it would have eliminated the provision that requires theSecretary to first certify that importation would pose no additional risk to publichealth and safety and would lower the cost of prescription drugs for U.S. consumers. H.R. 2427 would also have required drug makers to incorporatevarious counterfeit-resistant technologies in the packaging and shipping containersof all prescription drugs. The bill would have created a new section in the law calledCounterfeit-Resistant Technologies. It would have required that all prescriptiondrugs (not just those being imported) be packaged to incorporate overt opticallyvariable counterfeit-resistant technology or technologies that have an equivalentfunction of security; provide, with those technologies, visible identification of theproduct; be similar to those used by the Bureau of Engraving and Printing to secureU.S. currency; be made and distributed in a secure environment; and integratenon-visible security features with forensic capability. (13) Drug importation is attracting attention in the legislative, executive, andjudicial branches of government. Because expenditures for pharmaceuticals continue to increase and are takinga larger portion than previously of public funds used for health care, some states aretrying various ways to legally import lower cost prescription drugs from Canada inorder to control the rate of growth of this portion of the state budget. Governmentofficials from several states have petitioned HHS Secretary Tommy Thompson togrant waivers from the current law prohibiting imports; allow pilot projects; orpromulgate regulations, as would be allowed under the new Section 804 of theFFDCA, if the Secretary issued the required certification, to authorize programs forthe safe importation of prescription drugs from Canada. They cite potential savings,in one case, of over $90 million a year. (14) Coinciding with the National Governors Association meeting in Washington,D.C., a bipartisan group of Governors, accompanied by a bipartisan group ofMembers of Congress, held a February 24, 2004 hearing preceded by a pressconference in which they spoke of collective action to take advantage of lower pricedpharmaceuticals from Canada. (15) The FDA, which is charged with ensuring the safety and effectiveness ofprescription drugs sold in the United States, has responded swiftly. Rather thansingle out individuals for punishment for breaking the law, the agency has sentwarning letters and has sought to close down the websites and facilities that areillegally supplying prescription drugs. (16) In January 2004, FDA reported on its second"blitz examination" of import courier hubs. It found that 87% of the almost 2,000examined parcels containing prescription drugs, mostly from Canada, containedunapproved drugs. Because, by law, any prescription drug imported by anyone otherthan the drug's manufacturer is illegal, the FDA considers it unapproved. (17) FDAcontinues to object to these websites and states in a letter to Governor Pawlenty ofMinnesota that the states could face tort liability suits and charges of assisting incriminal activity if citizens suffer injury from these drugs. (18) Following passage of the Medicare bill, some Members have introduced billsthat seek to allow the importation of prescription drugs. S. 1974 ,introduced by Senator Daschle on November 25, 2003, includes the importation andanti-counterfeiting provisions that the House had passed in the Gutknecht bill, asdoes S. 2137 , introduced by Senator Dorgan on February 26, 2004. Senator Kennedy introduced S. 1992 on December 9, 2003, one sectionof which would amend the new law's importation provisions to include registration,inspection, and reporting requirements for Canadian wholesalers and pharmacistswho export prescription drugs to the United States; restore the prohibition ofmanufacturer discrimination against importers provisions from the MEDS Act;replace the report requirements now assigned to the Secretaries of HHS andCommerce with reports involving the Institute of Medicine and the GeneralAccounting Office; and remove the requirement that the Secretary certify safety andreduced cost to U.S. consumers before implementing the importation provisions. It remains unclear whether Congress will act in the second session of the 108thCongress to ease the restrictions on prescription drug imports. It confronts adilemma in that several Governors, local officials, and the AARP support theimportation of drugs from Canada and possibly other countries and otherstakeholders, including the FDA, the pharmaceutical manufacturers, and pharmacistsare opposed to such importation.

The new Medicare legislation, the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, andModernization Act ( P.L. 108-173 ), addresses the importation of prescription drugs for all U.S.consumers, not just for Medicare-eligible individuals. These provisions are rooted in consumer andcongressional concern with the high cost of prescription drugs in the United States. Internationalcomparisons of drug prices have confirmed that American consumers, particularly the elderly anduninsured, often pay more for prescription drugs than do citizens in other countries. The importationof lower-priced prescription drugs is one strategy to reduce U.S. consumer spending. The new Act, despite being structured as a replacement to the importation provisions in theMedicine Equity and Drug Safety (MEDS) Act of 2000, does not effectively change U.S.prescription drug importation policy. The details it adds will not be implemented unless theSecretary of Health and Human Services (hereafter referred to as the Secretary) certifies to Congressthat such imports do not threaten the health and safety of the American public and do provide costsavings. That certification requirement, continued from prior law, has effectively haltedimplementation of existing import provisions because no Secretary has been willing to provide therequired certification. The Act changes the law in four basic ways: it (1) directs the Secretary to allow imports fromCanada only (the MEDS Act had allowed imports from a specific list of industrialized countries,including Canada); (2) includes a shift in approach to the importation of prescription drugs byindividuals, by codifying the discretion in enforcement that the Food and Drug Administration(FDA) has exercised to allow the "personal use" imports of prescription drugs; (3) eliminates theprohibition against a manufacturer's entering into agreements to prevent the sale or distribution ofimported products; and (4) includes a mechanism, based on evidence, by which the Secretary canterminate the import program. Following enactment of the Medicare bill in December 2003, some Members of Congresshave moved to amend the importation of prescription drugs provisions. Some states and localitieshave set up websites to facilitate individuals' purchase of prescription drugs from Canadianpharmacies. FDA has responded. In letters to state officials, FDA has warned that states could facetort liability suits and charges of assisting in criminal activity if citizens suffer injury from thesedrugs. FDA, via the Department of Justice, has gone to the courts to stop the Canadian and U.S.distributors of drugs imported from Canada.

Social Security is financed by payroll taxes, which are paid by covered workers and their employers. In the absence of a payroll tax reduction, employees and employers would each pay 6.2% of covered earnings, up to an annual limit, whereas self-employed individuals would pay 12.4% of net self-employment income, up to an annual limit. In December 2010, Congress temporarily reduced the employee and self-employed shares by two percentage points (to 4.2% for employees and 10.4% for the self-employed), with the Social Security trust funds "made whole" by a transfer of general revenue. The temporary reduction was scheduled to expire at the end of 2011, but was extended for two months as part of the Temporary Payroll Tax Cut Continuation Act of 2011 ( P.L. 112-78 ). The temporary payroll tax rate reduction was extended through the end of 2012 in the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012 ( P.L. 112-96 ) and subsequently allowed to expire at the end of 2012. As part of the agreement on the Temporary Payroll Tax Cut Continuation Act of 2011, a conference committee was appointed to consider a full-year extension of the payroll tax reduction. In addition to an extension of the payroll tax rate reduction, the conferees also considered a further extension of unemployment benefits and adjusting payments to doctors under Medicare. The conference committee agreed to extend the payroll tax rate reduction, emergency unemployment compensation, and physician payments under Medicare. The final legislation, however, did not fully pay for (or offset) these extensions. Whether to provide a full-year extension was then debated among policymakers. Concerns included those related to the potential of the temporary reduction to endanger the Social Security trust funds, signaling a departure from the self-finance structure of Social Security, while increasing the federal deficit. Supporters of an extension emphasized the potential of an extension to stimulate the economy and the general revenue "repay" as a way to counter concerns about endangering the Social Security trust funds. However, the use of offsets to reduce the budgetary cost of repaying the Social Security trust funds would reduce the stimulative effect, though the choice of offsets can influence the magnitude of the reduction. This report briefly discusses economic stimulus considerations related to temporary payroll tax reductions and efforts to offset the budgetary cost of an extension. For a discussion of Social Security policy considerations concerning a temporary payroll tax reduction, see CRS Report R41648, Social Security: Temporary Payroll Tax Reduction , by [author name scrubbed]. Short-term fiscal stimulus measures aim to boost economic activity primarily through increases in the demand for goods and services. The goal of these measures is to break a cycle of decreasing output leading to decreasing employment, resulting in lower consumption and leading to further decreases in output. Without stimulative policies the economy would eventually stabilize and recover, but recovery would take longer and the overall disruption to the economy would be greater. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO), in testimony before Congress, has identified three key criteria for assessing proposals to stimulate the economy. The criteria are timing, cost-effectiveness, and consistency with long-term fiscal objectives. The following sections evaluate the payroll tax rate reduction using these criteria. Effective short-term stimulus should happen during the period of economic weakness. In addition, since recessions are historically short lived, effective stimulus should normally also be short lived. An extension of the reduction in payroll taxes could be implemented quickly and be designed to expire as the economy strengthens. The resulting increase in household income would be experienced quickly, as well. A modification of the reduction in payroll taxes, through either a greater reduction or an expansion to employer contributions, could be similarly designed. Effective short-term stimulus maximizes the increase in output and employment per dollar of budgetary cost. The effectiveness of a policy aimed at households would then depend upon the fraction of additional income spent (as opposed to saved) on goods and services relative to the lost federal revenue. Provisions targeted at low-income individuals or the unemployed should be more cost-effective than broad tax rate reductions, as those facing financial constraints are more likely to fully spend any additional disposable income. In addition, theory suggests small recurring increases in income may be more likely to be spent than a similarly sized (in total) lump sum payment, but the empirical evidence to support this is weak. An extension of the reduction in payroll taxes would not be targeted to those facing the greatest financial constraints, but the increase in disposable income would take the form of a small recurring increase. CBO estimated that a temporary reduction of payroll taxes would raise output cumulatively in the next two years by $0.10 to $0.90 per dollar of total budgetary cost and would increase employment by between one and nine jobs per million dollars of budgetary cost. These estimates assume that the majority of the increase in disposable income would be saved or used to pay down debt rather than spent on goods and services. Compared with other household tax reductions, an extension of the reduction in payroll taxes may be a cost-effective stimulus--though well-targeted direct spending may be still more cost-effective. According to CBO estimates, the short-term stimulative effect of an extension of the reduction in payroll taxes would be greater than the stimulative effects from extending the Bush Tax Cuts, on par with a one-year AMT patch, and less than an increase in refundable tax credits. Expanding the reduction in payroll taxes to include employer contributions--as proposed in S. 1660 and S. 1917 --would be expected to provide a slightly greater degree of stimulus per unit of budgetary cost than an employee-side reduction, according to CBO. The policy could encourage hiring by temporarily reducing the cost of labor. However, other evidence suggests that subsidies provided on the employer side, whether to subsidize hiring or investment, may be relatively ineffective, because employers are unlikely to hire in the absence of increased demand. The cost-effectiveness of this policy would ultimately depend on firms' responses to the incentive. Effective short-term stimulus should not hinder long-term fiscal sustainability. An extension of the reduction in payroll taxes, by itself, adds to short-term budget deficits. The two-month reduction was estimated to increase the deficit by $20.8 billion. , Extending the two percentage point payroll tax reduction through the end of 2012 is estimated to cost $93.2 billion. By themselves, these proposals would be at odds with the long-term goal of deficit reduction and may signal to some a lack of resolve to reduce deficits to investors. To address long-term fiscal objectives, some proposals to extend or expand the temporary reduction in payroll taxes include one or more offsets to reduce or eliminate the net budgetary cost of the proposals. These offsets are, by definition, contractionary as they either cut spending or raise taxes. As enacted, the extension of the payroll tax rate reduction was not offset. Dozens of other temporary tax provisions expired at the end of 2011. Whether further extension of other expiring tax provisions should be included in a payroll tax rate was an issue of debate. Ultimately, no other expiring or expired tax provisions were extended as part of the legislation extending the payroll tax rate reduction through the end of 2012. Many of these provisions were extended through the end of 2013 by the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 ( P.L. 112-240 ). Expired tax provisions lead to uncertainty for businesses and individual taxpayers. Furthermore, the potential for tax incentives to influence behavior, often the goal of tax policy, is diminished when expired tax incentives are reinstated retroactively. One challenge posed by the potential inclusion of tax extenders in a payroll tax rate reduction extension is the cost of extending these expired provisions. The Joint Committee on Taxation has estimated that extending these other expiring provisions for one year, through December 31, 2012, would cost $36.9 billion over the 2012 through 2021 budget window. This figure does not include the cost of extending the payroll tax rate cut. This figure also does not include the cost of extending first-year bonus depreciation, which would cost an estimated $21.1 billion over the 2012 through 2021 budget window, or the cost of adjusting the Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT) exemption amount for inflation, which is estimated to cost $119.6 billion over the 10-year budget window. Extending the two percentage point payroll tax reduction through the end of 2012 cost an estimated $93.2 billion. In considering a further extension of the payroll tax reduction, many proposals include some form of budgetary offset. The use of offsets is not, however, universal, as the Temporary Payroll Tax Cut Continuation Act of 2012 ( H.R. 4013 ), introduced on February 13, 2012, did not contain any offsets. Ultimately, costs associated with the extension of the payroll tax rate reduction as enacted in the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012 ( P.L. 112-96 ) were not offset. Offsets that reduce spending, or increase revenues, are contractionary. While offsets address the issue of long-term fiscal sustainability, depending on design, they can diminish the short-term stimulative effects of the tax cut. Having offsets occur after the period of economic weakness has passed could limit short-term contractionary effects while simultaneously promoting long-term fiscal sustainability. In addition to the aggregate economic impacts of the offset, there are distributional effects. The percentage increase in after-tax income and the percentage decrease in average federal tax liability is greater for low- and middle-income taxpayers, as compared to the highest-income taxpayers (see Table 1 ). Offsets that reduce income or benefits to low- and middle-income earners, or offsets that otherwise increase taxes, could diminish the potential benefit of the payroll tax rate reduction for affected groups. One option for offsetting the cost of extending the reduced payroll tax rate is to raise additional revenues. Some of the options discussed below have been proposed as part of payroll tax rate reduction legislation. Other options have been proposed by the Obama Administration, or have been part of comprehensive deficit reduction plans. These options represent a few of the dozens of policy options for raising additional revenues to finance an extension of reduced payroll tax rates. The revenues that could be generated using the different options discussed below are summarized in Table 2 . Since the revenue options discussed below were not included in either the House-passed or Senate-passed versions of H.R. 3630 , paying for an extension of the payroll tax rate cut extension with additional revenues would have required conferees to consider measures that were not previously included in H.R. 3630 . The final version of the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012 ( P.L. 112-96 ), as enacted on February 22, 2012, did not include any of the revenue options discussed below. A specific option for raising revenues to pay for an extension of the temporary two percentage point payroll tax reduction is a high-income surtax. There have been several proposals to levy a high-income surtax in the 112 th Congress. The American Jobs Act of 2011 ( S. 1660 ) would levy a 5.6% high-income surtax on those with modified adjusted gross income in excess of $1 million ($500,000 for married individuals filing separate tax returns). This surtax would raise an estimated $452.7 billion over the 2012 through 2021 budget window. A high-income surtax was also proposed in Senate legislation seeking to extend and expand the payroll tax rate reduction. The Middle Class Tax Cut Act of 2011 ( S. 1917 ) proposed a 3.25% surtax on modified adjusted gross income above $1 million ($500,000 for married individuals filing separate tax returns). Imposing a 3.25% surtax on those earning in excess of $1 million would generate an estimated $267.5 million over the 2012 through 2021 budget window. Imposing a surtax on high-income individuals could partially address concerns that some high-income individuals pay lower average tax rates than some middle-income earners. In 2006, 65% of taxpayers with incomes over $1 million paid an average tax rate lower than those with less than $100,000 in taxable income. High-income taxpayer benefits from the payroll tax rate reduction are also limited. The 2012 wage cap is $110,100, meaning that the 12.4% OASDI payroll tax is suspended for earnings above this threshold. High-income taxpayers would receive a maximum benefit of $2,202 under a one-year, two percentage point payroll tax rate reduction. As a larger share of income is earned above the wage cap, benefits from the payroll tax rate reduction would be diminished. If, however, high-income earners were more likely to save payroll tax rate reduction benefits, rather than spend these benefits, recapturing these benefits through a high-income surtax would be less likely to dampen the stimulative impact of the payroll tax rate reduction. One concern that has been raised regarding a high-income surtax is the potential effect on small businesses. However, very few tax returns reporting business income (roughly 1%) report adjusted gross income in excess of $1 million. Offsetting a temporary payroll tax reduction through a high-income surtax would mean that the costs associated with a tax benefit received by many would be paid for by a limited group. Nearly 76% of taxpayers benefitted from the two-month extension of the temporary payroll tax rate reduction (see Table 1 ). In 2009, 0.22% of tax returns filed had an adjusted gross income of at least $1 million. Individual income tax expenditures reduce income tax revenues by roughly $1 trillion annually. Thus, scaling back or eliminating certain tax expenditures could result in additional revenues. As examples, the Congressional Budget Office has estimated that gradually eliminating the mortgage interest deduction would result in an estimated $214.6 billion over the 2012 through 2021 budget window. Limiting the deduction for state and local income taxes to 2% of adjusted gross income (AGI) would raise an estimated $629.3 billion over the 2012 through 2021 budget window. Limiting charitable contributions such that only contributions in excess of 2% of AGI would be deductible would raise $219 billion over the 2012 through 2021 budget window. Another option for limiting tax expenditures would be to limit the value of tax expenditures for higher-income taxpayers. The Obama Administration has proposed limiting the value of itemized deductions to 28%. This proposal would reduce the value of itemized deductions for taxpayers in the 33% and 35% bracket in 2012. Limiting the value of itemized deductions to 28% would raise an estimated $293.3 billion over the 2012 through 2021 budget window. Limiting the value of itemized deductions to 28% would increase the progressivity of the income tax system by increasing taxes paid by those at the upper end of the income distribution. For 2011, the 33% income tax rate applies to taxable income above $212,300 for married filers ($174,400 for single filers). In 2009, the top 2% of returns filed were in the 33% or 35% tax brackets. Estimates suggest that limiting the value of itemized deductions to 28% would leave tax liability unchanged for those with less than $200,000 in income. Taxpayers with cash incomes between $200,000 and $500,000 would see income taxes increase by 0.1%, on average. For taxpayers with cash incomes between $500,000 and $1 million, average federal tax rates would increase by an estimated 0.4%, while average federal tax rates would increase by an estimated 0.6% for those with cash incomes in excess of $1 million. Similar to a high-income surtax, limiting itemized deductions to offset an extension of the payroll tax rate reduction would lead to an increased tax burden on the highest incomes. The higher tax burden, however, would result from scaling back the value of certain tax subsidies, which currently provide a greater benefit to higher-income taxpayers. Another option for raising additional revenues is to modify how tax code parameters are adjusted for inflation. Current price level measures may overstate actual levels of inflation. A modified measure of inflation that more accurately reflects changes in the price level would change how provisions in the tax code, such as the standard deduction, personal exemptions, earned income and child tax credits, and IRA contribution limits, as well as tax brackets, are indexed for inflation. A re-indexing of the tax code was included in the deficit reduction packages presented by the President's Fiscal Commission and the Debt Reduction Task Force. The Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) has estimated that indexing the tax code for inflation using a chained consumer price index (CPI) would generate $59.6 billion in additional revenues over the 2012 through 2021 budget window. Applying a chained CPI to the tax code would result in increased tax liability for taxpayers at all income levels. Moderate income taxpayers (those with cash incomes between $30,000 and $40,000) would see average tax rates increase 0.3%. Higher-income taxpayers (those with cash incomes between $100,000 and $200,000) would see average tax rates increase 0.2%. For taxpayers with incomes in excess of $1 million, tax rates would not increase, on average. Like the benefits of the reduced payroll tax rate, the additional tax burden imposed by re-indexing the tax code using a chained CPI is spread across the income distribution. Enacting a re-indexing of the tax code immediately could offset some of the stimulus provided by the payroll tax rate reduction. Much of the additional revenues, however, will be generated over time. Allowing the re-indexing to go into effect later in the budget window would postpone this contractionary effect, and would also reduce the revenues generated from the policy as measured within the 10-year budget window. Another option for raising additional revenues is to increase the social security payroll tax base. For 2012, Social Security payroll taxes apply to the first $110,100 in wage income. In recent years, roughly 83% of employment earnings fell below the Social Security wage cap. When payroll taxes were first collected in 1937, 92% of earnings were covered. Over time, the share of covered earnings has fluctuated, falling below 80% in the 1960s. Legislation enacted in the late 1970s increased the tax base such that 91% of earnings were covered in 1983. Since the share of covered earnings has been allowed to decline since the 1980s, one option for raising additional revenues is to increase the share of total earnings subject to the Social Security payroll tax to 90%. Like re-indexing the tax code, increasing the Social Security wage base was included in the deficit reduction plans presented by the President's Fiscal Commission and the Debt Reduction Task Force. CBO estimates suggest that increasing the Social Security payroll tax base to cover 90% of earnings would have a net revenue impact of $456.7 billion over the 2012 through 2021 budget window. Increasing the Social Security payroll tax cap would increase the tax burden on upper-middle income taxpayers. For taxpayers with earnings above the current payroll tax cap of $110,100, enacting this option would offset some of the benefits associated with the payroll tax rate reduction. This measure would make the payroll tax less regressive, and over the longer term, improve the fiscal outlook of the Social Security trust fund. The revenue cost associated with extending the payroll tax rate reduction could also be offset with spending reductions. Two specific options that have been discussed as possible offsets for a payroll tax rate reduction extension are reductions in federal worker compensation and war contingency funds. The options of reducing spending are also discussed in the context of discretionary and mandatory spending. The specifics of potential spending reductions are beyond the scope of this report. The revenue impacts of some of the specific proposals discussed below are summarized in Table 2 . The House-passed version of H.R. 3630 would extend the current freeze on statutory pay adjustments for federal employees for one year, through December 31, 2013. The House-passed version of H.R. 3630 would reduce the discretionary spending limits enacted under the BCA to achieve these savings. The CBO estimated that the provisions related to discretionary spending in the House-passed versions of H.R. 3630 would reduce spending by $26.2 billion over 2011 through 2021 budget window. Legislation introduced in the Senate, the Temporary Tax Holiday and Government Reduction Act ( S. 1931 ), also proposed extending the current federal employee pay freeze, through 2015. The Congressional Budget Office estimated that under S. 1931 , discretionary spending would be reduced by $221.8 billion over the 2012 through 2021 budget window. This savings comes from provisions that would freeze federal workers' salaries, reduce the size of the federal workforce, and reduce the discretionary spending caps as enacted under the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA; P.L. 112-25 ). Another option for raising revenue by reducing federal civilian employee pay would be to reduce the amount of the annual pay adjustment as established under the Federal Employees Pay Comparability Act of 1990 (FEPCA; P.L. 101-509 ). Reducing the annual across-the-board adjustment expected to occur under FEPCA by 0.5 percentage points would reduce outlays by $50.3 billion over the 2012-2016 budget window. The conference committee agreement on H.R. 3630 , enacted as the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012 ( P.L. 112-96 ), included provisions to increase pension contributions of newly hired federal employees. Provisions agreed to in the conference agreement do not affect current federal workers' pension contributions, benefits, or compensation. The federal employee pension provisions enacted in P.L. 112-96 are expected to generate $15.5 billion in additional revenues over the 2012 through 2022 budget window. Freezing federal worker pay or reducing annual pay adjustments for federal workers would offset the benefits of the payroll tax rate reduction for a targeted group of wage earners. Regions with high concentrations of federal employees may receive less stimulative benefit from the payroll tax if a large proportion of employees have the payroll tax rate reduction offset through reduced wages. Trading future reductions in federal worker salaries for current revenue losses from a payroll tax rate reduction could make it more difficult for the federal government to recruit and retain highly qualified employees with technical and professional skills over the longer term. Another option for offsetting the revenue cost associated with the payroll tax rate reduction extension is to use savings from overseas contingency funds. In developing the budget baseline, the CBO assumes that discretionary spending grows with inflation. Thus, spending on Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) is projected to grow over time. For FY2012, an adjustment of $126.5 billion was made to the discretionary spending cap set under the BCA for OCO. Testimony presented by the CBO before the Joint Select Committee in October 2011, based on budget figures from the continuing resolution, projected the cost of overseas contingency operations over the 2012 through 2021 budget window at $1.3 trillion. If the drawdown in overseas military operations continues as expected, fewer funds will be needed for overseas contingency operations, resulting in budgetary savings relative to the CBO baseline. This option was not used to offset the payroll tax rate reduction extension as enacted in the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012 ( P.L. 112-96 ). Legislation in the 112 th Congress has constrained anticipated growth in discretionary spending. The BCA included statutory caps on discretionary spending that resulted in $917 billion in savings over the 2012 through 2021 budget window. The BCA also established the Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction, tasked with finding an additional $1.5 trillion in deficit reduction over the 10-year budget window. Failure of the Joint Select Committee to propose deficit reduction legislation has led to an automatic spending reduction process. Under this process, an additional $1.1 trillion will be cut from the deficit over the 2013 through 2021 budget window. Of this $1.1 trillion, $813 billion is from reduced discretionary spending ($492 billion for defense, $322 billion nondefense). CBO's adjusted March 2011 baseline projected discretionary spending of $11.0 trillion over the 2013 through 2021 budget window. Projected discretionary spending under the BCA caps and automatic spending reductions is $9.4 trillion over the same time period. Thus, discretionary spending projections have been reduced by nearly 15% through BCA provisions. Offsetting the payroll tax rate reduction extension using discretionary spending cuts would require further reductions. Spending reductions are typically contractionary, implying that spending cuts enacted while the economy is still weak could offset the stimulative effect of the payroll tax rate reduction. Several payroll tax rate reduction extension bills proposed limiting certain federal benefits, including unemployment compensation, benefits under the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), and Medicare, based on income. Measures to eliminate unemployment compensation for certain individuals based on income were included in the Temporary Tax Holiday and Government Reduction Act ( S. 1931 ), the Middle Class Tax Cut Act of 2011 ( S. 1944 ), and the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2011 ( H.R. 3630 ), as introduced on December 9, 2011. In all cases, the legislation sought to limit or eliminate unemployment compensation for very high-income individuals. These three bills also sought to limit SNAP (formerly known as food stamps) for very high-income individuals. CBO estimates that the unemployment compensation and SNAP provisions contained in H.R. 3630 would generate $0.1 billion over the 2012 through 2021 budget window. Two of the three aforementioned pieces of legislation contained provisions that would require high-income individuals to pay higher Medicare premiums ( S. 1931 and H.R. 3630 ). CBO has estimated that provisions in H.R. 3630 to adjust the calculation of Medicare premiums and increase premiums for high-income beneficiaries would raise $31.0 billion over the 2012 through 2021 budget window. The conference committee agreement on H.R. 3630 , and the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012 ( P.L. 112-96 ) as enacted on February 22, 2012, did include several health offsets. In total, the health care offsets that change direct spending as enacted in P.L. 112-96 are estimated to raise $18.2 billion over the 2012 through 2022 budget window. The offsets as enacted do not increase Medicare premiums for higher-income individuals. Generally, reducing spending (mandatory or discretionary) will tend to have a contractionary impact. Reducing mandatory spending through reductions in benefits for high-income individuals could have a contractionary impact if individuals reduce consumption to purchase services that were previously provided through the government. Alternatively, if high-income individuals instead purchase services out of savings, maintaining current consumption levels, the short-term contractionary impacts will be reduced. A number of other issues were considered alongside an extension of the payroll tax rate reduction. The Temporary Payroll Tax Cut Continuation Act of 2011 ( P.L. 112-78 ) also provided a temporary extension of emergency unemployment compensation and a temporary readjustment of physicians' Medicare reimbursements. These provisions were extended in the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012 ( P.L. 112-96 ). Lawmakers also considered including provisions that would extend the 100% bonus depreciation allowance to promote investment. Extending the 100% bonus depreciation allowance would generate revenue losses. To avoid increasing the deficit, the cost of extending policies such as an extension of the 100% bonus depreciation allowance would require a budgetary offset. Ultimately, an extension of the 100% bonus depreciation allowance was not enacted as part of the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012 ( P.L. 112-96 ). In addition to the issues mentioned in this report, legislation to extend the temporary payroll tax rate reduction has included provisions related to a number of other policy issues. Several of these issues are noted below (links to relevant CRS reports provided as footnotes): Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulations related to the Maximum Achievable Control Technology (MACT) standards for boiler and solid waste combustion units; flood insurance reform; spectrum reallocation and assignment and emergency communications; and Keystone XL pipeline project.

Social Security is financed by payroll taxes, which are paid by covered workers and their employers. In the absence of a payroll tax reduction, employees and employers would each pay 6.2% of covered earnings, up to an annual limit, whereas self-employed individuals would pay 12.4% of net self-employment income, up to an annual limit. In an effort to stimulate the economy, Congress, in December 2010, temporarily reduced the employee and self-employed shares by two points (to 4.2% for employees and 10.4% for the self-employed), with the Social Security trust funds "made whole" by a transfer of general revenue. The temporary reduction was scheduled to expire at the end of 2011, but the reduction was extended for two months as part of the Temporary Payroll Tax Cut Continuation Act of 2011 (P.L. 112-78). The payroll tax rate reduction was extended through the end of 2012 in the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012 (P.L. 112-96). Extending the reduction through the end of 2012 would, by itself, increase the deficit by an estimated $93.2 billion--raising concerns about the apparent incompatibility of an extension with long-term goals of fiscal sustainability. Earlier proposals to extend the payroll tax reduction included some form of budgetary offset to reduce or eliminate the effect on the deficit and address concerns about long-term fiscal sustainability. Among the budgetary offsets mentioned in extension proposals were a surtax on high-income individuals, freezing federal employee pay, and limiting certain federal benefits to high-income individuals. Ultimately, both the Temporary Payroll Tax Cut Continuation Act of 2012 (P.L. 112-78) and the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012 (P.L. 112-96) extended the payroll tax rate reduction for the remainder of 2012 without offset. The payroll tax rate reduction expired at the end of 2012. Budgetary offsets are contractionary--as they either reduce spending or increase revenues. The degree to which they are contractionary in the short term, however, depends on design and the populations affected. For example, having offsets occur after the period of economic weakness has passed could limit short-term contractionary effects while simultaneously promoting long-term fiscal sustainability. In contrast, offsets that fall on individuals facing financial constraints would be expected to have larger contractionary effects. This report briefly discusses economic stimulus considerations related to temporary payroll tax reductions. In addition, as the Social Security trust fund is made whole through a transfer from the general fund, select options to offset this increase in the deficit will be examined to illustrate how the choice of offsets can affect the net amount of economic stimulus provided. For a discussion of Social Security policy considerations concerning a temporary payroll tax reduction, see CRS Report R41648, Social Security: Temporary Payroll Tax Reduction, by [author name scrubbed].

Parking privileges for individuals with disabilities is distinct from the subject of physical accessibility of parking spaces or structures. The federal role in ensuring physical parking space accessibility is significant: under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), a broad nondiscrimination statute, government entities, private businesses, and others must adhere to the ADA Standards for Accessible Design when re-striping existing or building new parking lots. The ADA standards mandate specific percentages of van-accessible parking spaces per parking facility and require accessible aisles between certain spaces. However, the ADA Standards for Accessible Design do not require governments or other entities to reserve accessible parking spaces or issue special license plates or placards for individuals with disabilities; nor does any other ADA regulation mandate the provision of such parking privileges. Therefore, any federal action on parking privileges occurs separately from federal rules on physical parking space accessibility. Congress first considered federal action on parking privileges for individuals with disabilities in the mid-1980s in response to complaints that some states did not honor parking placards for individuals with disabilities from other states. The first bills introduced during that period would have created federal guidelines and authorized penalties for states that failed to comply with those guidelines. Specifically, the initial bills proposed federal sanctions in the form of reduced highway apportionments for states that failed to recognize parking placards issued by other states or failed to implement federal rules. However, those early proposals were not reported out of their respective committees. Since that time, the federal government has created guidelines for parking privileges. In 1988, Congress enacted legislation requiring the Department of Transportation to create a "uniform system" of parking privileges for people with disabilities. Accordingly, the Department of Transportation promulgated the "Uniform System for Parking for Persons with Disabilities." However, Congress has never required states to comply with the Uniform System, nor has it authorized penalties for non-complying states. Rather, the enacted law and resulting federal guidelines are merely hortatory. The legislation required the department to "encourage adoption of such system by all the states," but it did not require states to adopt the federal guidelines. Thus, although the federal government has a strong advisory role, states have the ultimate responsibility for the development of parking privileges. The stated purpose of the Department of Transportation's Uniform System for Parking for Persons with Disabilities is to provide "guidelines to States for the establishment of a uniform system." Thus, the Uniform System provides model definitions and rules regarding eligibility, application procedures, and issuance of special license plates and placards. It also contains information to aid states in developing reciprocal systems of parking privileges, including sample placards and a model rule regarding reciprocity. The Uniform System is brief. It does not contain model rules regarding enforcement, nor does it provide model rules specifying lengths of time after which special plates or placards must be renewed or addressing whether eligible individuals must be primary users of vehicles with special license plates. Instead, it contains basic definitions and samples that the department encourages states to utilize as part of their own, more detailed, parking privilege systems. One key provision in the Uniform System is the model definition of eligible individuals. Unlike the ADA, which protects every individual with a "disability," the Uniform System extends parking privileges only to "persons with disabilities which impair or limit the ability to walk." This definition includes people who (1) "[c]annot walk 200 feet without stopping to rest"; (2) cannot walk without the aid of another person or certain assistive devices; (3) have respiratory volumes of less than a certain amount due to lung disease; (4) "[u]se portable oxygen"; (5) have cardiac conditions of a specified severity; or (6) "[a]re severely limited in their ability to walk due to an arthritic, neurological, or orthopedic condition." Under the Uniform System, individuals' fit within any of these categories must be "determined by a licensed physician." If an individual qualifies as a person with a disability which impairs or limits his or her ability to walk, then under the Uniform System's model rules, he or she may submit an application for special license plates or a windshield placard, which entitle the individual to park in specially reserved parking spaces. A certification from a licensed physician must accompany an initial application for such plates and placards. Under the Uniform System guidelines, states may not charge a higher fee for special license plates than they charge for regular license plates. Together with special license plates, placards "shall be the only recognized means of identifying vehicles permitted to utilize parking spaces reserved for persons with disabilities which limit or impair the ability to walk" under the Uniform System. The system delineates two types of windshield placards: removable windshield placards and temporary removable windshield placards. Removable windshield placards are appropriate for individuals who will qualify as persons with disabilities which impair or limit the ability to walk permanently or for at least six months. Temporary removable windshield placards are most appropriate for individuals who will have such an impairment or limitation for less than six months. The Uniform System provides samples of each type of windshield placard. The sample placards display the "International Symbol of Access," which was adopted by the disability rights organization Rehabilitation International in 1969. The symbol is a commonly recognized image of a wheelchair and is best known as a white chair on a blue background. The samples also include spaces in which to display names of issuing authorities and expiration dates for the placards. In addition to sample placards, which aid efforts for reciprocity among states indirectly by providing a commonly recognized symbol, the Uniform System includes a model rule that directly addresses reciprocity. It provides that states "shall recognize removable windshield placards, temporary removable windshield placards and special license plates which have been issued by issuing authorities of other States and countries." All states have laws governing parking privileges for individuals with disabilities, and nearly all states have adopted at least some portion of the Department of Transportation's Uniform System. Most states extend privileges to visitors with placards issued by other states. Also, most states issue placards closely resembling the Uniform System's sample placard. However, other aspects of the state systems vary greatly. Regarding eligibility, some states have incorporated the Uniform System's definition of an individual with a disability which limits or impairs the ability to walk word-for-word into their eligibility criteria. Other states' eligibility criteria are entirely distinct from the Uniform System definition. Between these two options, most states have incorporated the Uniform System's definition in their statutes but have modified or expanded it. For example, some states have added a category for blindness to the Uniform System definition. Most states extend parking privileges to individuals with special license plates or placards issued by other states. Many states even extend privileges to people with placards issued by other countries. The language in these reciprocity provisions differs from state to state. Some states codified most or all of the Uniform System's reciprocity provision. Other states adopted little or no language from the Uniform System but recognize out-of-state placards nonetheless. A few states extend conditional privileges to out-of-state visitors; for example, North Dakota extends privileges only to people from states that also extend privileges to traveling North Dakotans. However, even states that extend parking privileges to out-of-state visitors have rules that out-of-state visitors might not know to follow. For example, Iowa requires that placards be displayed only when individuals with disabilities are actually utilizing reserved parking spaces. The state laws are fairly similar regarding some application procedures and criteria for which the Uniform System provides model rules. For example, most states require eligible individuals to apply for both special license plates and either temporary or more permanent windshield placards. Likewise, most states issue special license plates or placards after receipt of an application containing certification by a physician, as the Uniform System suggests. In contrast, states' laws are relatively different regarding administrative aspects of parking privileges that the Uniform System does not address. For example, state rules regarding the duration for which removable windshield placards will be valid--an aspect the Uniform System does not address--vary from just two years to indefinitely. In sum, the Department of Transportation's Uniform System has increased uniformity in the state laws. Many states utilize uniform sample placards and have enacted statutes requiring reciprocal privileges for individuals bearing placards issued by other states. Nonetheless, the state systems differ in many aspects of parking privilege administration.

State law generally governs parking privileges for people with disabilities. However, federal regulations offer a uniform system of parking privileges, which includes model definitions and rules regarding license plates and placards, parking and parking space design, and interstate reciprocity. The federal government encourages states to adopt this uniform system. As a result, most states have incorporated at least some aspects of the uniform regulations into their handicapped parking laws. This report describes the federal role in parking privileges law, outlines the uniform system's model rules, and briefly discusses state responses to the model federal rules.

RS21815 -- Fairness in Asbestos Injury Resolution Act of 2004 (S. 2290, 108th Congress) Updated January 21, 2005 "Any individual [or, if he is deceased, his personal representative] who has suffered from a[n eligible] disease or condition . . . may file a claim with the Office for an award with respectto such injury" ( 113(a)). The claimant would have to "prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he suffersfrom an eligible disease or condition" ( 111(2)). He would not haveto prove that his injury "resulted from the negligence or other fault of any person" ( 112). The statute of limitations would be four years from the date the claimant first "received a medical diagnosis of an eligible disease or condition," or "discovered facts that would have leda reasonable person to obtain a medical diagnosis with respect to an eligible disease or condition" ( 113(b)(1)). If,however, a claimant had filed a timely claim that was pending infederal or state court on the date of enactment of the bill, such claim would have to be dismissed, and the statuteof limitations to file a claim under the bill would be four years from thedate of enactment of the bill ( 113(b)(2)). "Not later than 90 days after the filing of a claim, the Administrator shall provide to the claimant (and the claimant's representative) a proposed decision accepting or rejecting the claimin whole or in part and specifying the amount of the proposed award, if any" ( 114(b)). Any claimant not satisfiedwith the proposed decision of the Administrator would be entitled, onwritten request made within 90 days, to a hearing or to a review of the written record, by a representative of theAdministrator" ( 114(c)). After a hearing or review, or if no hearing orreview is requested within 90 days, the Administrator would issue a final decision ( 114(d)). A claimant wouldthen have 90 days to petition for judicial review of the final decision (302(a)). Review would be by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the circuit in which the claimant resides at the time ofthe issuance of the final order ( 302(b)). The court would uphold thedecision unless it determined "that the decision is not supported by substantial evidence, is contrary to law, or is notin accordance with procedure required by law" ( 302(c)). The Administrator would "establish a comprehensive asbestos claimant assistance program" ( 104(a)), including a "legal assistance program" ( 104(d)). Attorneys could charge nomore than 2 percent of the amount of the award for filing an initial claim, and "10 percent with respect to any claimunder appellate review" ( 104(e)). The term "appellate review" isnot defined, so it is not clear whether it would include both the hearing or review by the representative of theAdministrator, and judicial review. The amount of an award under S. 2290 would be determined pursuant to the benefit table in section 131(b), which prescribes different amounts for different medicalconditions, and, in cases of lung cancer, different amounts for smokers, nonsmokers, and ex-smokers, as it definesthose terms. (5) Beginning in 2006, awards would beincreasedannually by a cost-of-living adjustment ( 131(b)(5)). Awards "shall be reduced by the amount of collateral source compensation" ( 134(a)). But the term "collateral source compensation" would refer only to "the compensation that theclaimant received, or is entitled to receive, from a defendant or an insurer of that defendant, or compensation trustas a result of a judgment or settlement for an asbestos-related injurythat is the subject of a claim filed under section 113" ( 3(6)). S. 2290 provides explicitly that collateralsource compensation would not include workers' compensation orveterans benefits ( 134(b)), but it would apparently also not include any other compensation, such as disability orhealth insurance payments, or medicare or medicaid, that was not paidby "a defendant or an insurer of that defendant, or compensation trust." A claimant, in other words, could receiveall these amounts in addition to his award from the Asbestos InjuryClaims Resolution Fund. Asbestos claimants would not receive lump-sum awards, but "should receive the amount of the award through structured payments from the Fund, made over a period of three years, andin no event more than four years after the date of final adjudication of the claim" ( 133(a)(1)). The Asbestos Resolution Claims Fund would be paid for by "defendant participants" and "insurer participants." Defendant participants would apparently be companies that have beensued for injuries caused by exposure to asbestos, and insurer participants would be the insurers of suchcompanies. (6) Subject to a "contingent call formandatory additional payments"(204(m)), "the total payments required of all defendant participants over the life of the Fund shall not exceed" $57.5billion (202(a)(2)). "[T]he aggregate annual payments of defendantparticipants" would be at least $2.5 billion for the first 23 years of the Fund, unless the $57.5 billion is receivedsooner ( 204(h)(1)). After the $57.5 billion has been paid, theAdministrator could, if necessary, issue a contingent call for mandatory additional payments of up to an aggregatemaximum of $10 billion. The Administrator would first, however,have to publish a notice in the Federal Register and consider comments from defendant participants on the necessityof additional payments ( 204(m)). "The total payment required of all insurer participants over the life of the Fund shall be equal to $46,025,000,000" ( 212(a)(2)(A)). Insurer participants would pay prescribed amountsfor 27 years ( 212(a)(3)(C)). The United States government would not be liable for any asbestos claims, even ifthe Fund is inadequate to pay them ( 406(b)). The Administrator would be authorized to sue any participant for failure to pay any liability imposed under the bill. In addition to the amount due, the Administrator could seek punitivedamages, the costs of the suit, "including reasonable fees incurred for collection, expert witnesses, and attorney'sfees," and "a fine equal to the total amount of the liability that has notbeen collected" ( 223(c)). "At any time after seven years following the date on which the Administrator begins processing claims, if the Administrator determines that . . . the Fund will not have sufficientresources," then the Fund would sunset ( 405(f)). If the Fund sunsets, then claimants could again file or pursuelawsuits. "[T]he applicable statute of limitations" would be deemedtolled for the time during which a claim had been pursued against the Fund, and "the applicable statute of limitationswould apply, except that claimants who filed a claim against theFund" before sunset would have two years after sunset to file a claim ( 405(f)(6)). Claims would have to be filedin federal district court, and "Federal common law" would govern,"except that where national uniformity is not required the court must utilize otherwise applicable state law . . ." (405(g)). Defendant participants. "Defendant participants shall be liable for payments to the Fund . . . based on tiers and subtiers assigned to[them]" ( 202(a)(1)). "Tier I shall include all debtors that . . . have prior asbestos expenditures greater than$1,000,000" ( 202(b)). A "debtor" would be defined as a company,including its subsidiaries, that has filed in bankruptcy within a year preceding enactment of the bill, but a "debtor"would not include a company whose bankruptcy had been finallyadjudicated ( 201(3)). Tiers II through VI would include "persons or affiliated groups . . . according to the priorasbestos expenditures" they paid, ranging from $75 million or greaterfor Tier II, down to $1 million to less than $5 million for Tier VI ( 202(d)). An "affiliated group" would be definedas "an ultimate parent and any person [defined in 3(12) asindividual or business] whose entire beneficial interest is directly or indirectly owned by that ultimate parent (201(1)), and an "ultimate parent" would be defined as a person "thatowned, as of December 31, 2002, the entire beneficial interest, directly or indirectly, of at least 1 other person; and. . . whose own entire beneficial interest was not owned on December31, 2002, directly or indirectly, by any other single person (other than a natural person)" ( 201(9)). The term "prior asbestos expenditures" -- the amount of which would determine the amount that a defendant participant would have to contribute to the Fund -- would be defined as"the gross total amount paid . . . before December 31, 2002, in settlement, judgment, defense, or indemnity costsrelated to all asbestos claims against" the defendant, and would includepayments made by insurance carriers, but would not include payments made "by persons who are or were commoncarriers by railroads for asbestos claims" brought under the FederalEmployers' Liability Act ( 201(7)). (7) "A person or affiliated group that is a small business concern (as defined under section 3 of the Small Business Act (15 U.S.C. 632)), on December 31, 2002, is exempt from anypayment requirement under this subtitle" ( 204(b)). "[A] defendant participant may seek adjustment of the amountof its payment obligation based on severe financial hardship ordemonstrated inequity" ( 204(d)(1)). Insurer participants. S. 2290 would establish the Asbestos Insurers Commission, which would be composed of fivemembers, appointed for the life of the Commission, by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate (211). "The Commission shall determine the amount that each insurerparticipant will be required to pay into the Fund" ( 212(a)(1)(B)). "Insurers that have paid, or been assessed by a legal judgment or settlement, at least $1,000,000 in defense and indemnity costs before the date of enactment of this act in response toclaims for compensation for asbestos injuries . . . shall be insurer participants in the Fund" ( 212(a)(3)(A)). "TheCommission shall establish payment obligations of individual insurerparticipants to reflect, on an equitable basis, the relative tort system liability of the participating insurers in theabsence of this act . . . ." ( 212(a)(3)(B)(i)). (8) Judicial review. Defendant participants and insurer participants would be able to seek judicial review, in the U.S. Court of Appealsfor the District of Columbia, of a final determination by the Administrator or the Asbestos Insurers Commission( 303(a)). The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia wouldhave exclusive jurisdiction over any action for declaratory or injunctive relief challenging any provision of the bill( 304). Title V of S. 2290 would add a section to the Toxic Substances Control Act that would require the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency to issueregulations that "prohibit persons, [sic] from manufacturing, processing, or distributing in commerce asbestoscontaining products." The Administrator would be permitted to grant anexemption if he determines that it "would not result in an unreasonable risk of injury to public health or theenvironment," and the person seeking the exemption "has made good faithefforts to develop, but has been unable to develop, a substance, or identify a mineral that does not present anunreasonable risk of injury to public health or the environment and may besubstituted for an asbestos containing product." The Administrator would also be able to grant exemptions to the Secretary of Defense and the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration if "necessary to thecritical functions" of the Defense Department or NASA, "no reasonable alternatives" exist, and "use of asbestoscontaining products will not result in an unreasonable risk to health orthe environment." Finally, Title V would exempt the following two items from the prohibition: "(A) Asbestos diaphragms for use in the manufacture of chlor-alkali and the products and derivative [sic]therefrom. (B) Roofing cements, coatings and mastics utilizing asbestos that is totally encapsulated with asphalt,subject to a determination by the Administrator of the EnvironmentalProtection Agency . . . ."

This report provides an overview of S. 2290, 108th Congress, theFairness in Asbestos Injury Resolution Act of 2004 (or FAIRAct of 2004), as introduced by Senator Hatch on April 7, 2004 and placed on the Senate legislative calendar. S.2290 was a revised version of S. 1125, 108thCongress, as reported by the Senate Committee on the Judiciary (S.Rept. 108-188). (1) A cloture vote failed on April 22, 2004, and S. 2290 was never votedon. S. 2290 would have created the Office of Asbestos Disease Compensation, within the Department of Labor,to award damages to asbestos claimants on a no-fault basis. Damages would have been paid by the Asbestos Injury Claims Resolution Fund, which would have been fundedby companies that have previously been sued for asbestos-relatedinjuries, and by insurers of such companies. Asbestos claims could no longer have been filed or pursued under statelaw, except for the enforcement of judgments no longer subject toany appeal or judicial review before the date of enactment of the bill. For background information on the history of asbestos litigation and on other proposals to address the situation,see CRS Report RL32286, Asbestos Litigation: Prospects for LegislativeResolution, by Edward Rappaport.

On February 25, 2009, the House passed H.R. 1105 , Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009, which would provide funding for 9 of the 12 regular appropriations acts, including Labor-HHS-Education appropriations. Subsequently, the Senate passed H.R. 1105 without amendment on March 10, 2009. H.R. 1105 , which became P.L. 111-8 on March 11, 2009, provides $5.31 billion for programs authorized under Title I of the Workforce Investment Act (WIA). On February 13, 2009, both the House and the Senate passed the conference version of H.R. 1 , the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (hereafter referred to as "the ARRA"); subsequently, H.R. 1 was signed by the President and became P.L. 111-5 on February 17, 2009. The House had previously passed its version of H.R. 1 (hereafter referred to as the "House bill") on January 28, 2009, while the Senate passed S.Amdt. 570 , an amendment in the nature of a substitute to H.R. 1 (hereafter referred to as the "Senate bill"), on February 10, 2009. Under the ARRA, funds were provided to several existing workforce development programs administered by the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL), including programs authorized by Title I of WIA. The ARRA provides $4.2 billion in funding for these WIA Title I workforce development programs. The Workforce Investment Act of 1998 ( P.L. 105-220 ) provides job training and related services to unemployed and underemployed individuals. WIA programs are administered by the DOL, primarily through its Employment and Training Administration (ETA). State and local WIA training and employment activities are provided through a system of One-Stop Career Centers. WIA programs operate on a program year (PY) of July 1 to June 30 (e.g., FY2009 appropriations fund programs from July 1, 2009, until June 30, 2010). Although WIA authorized funding through September 30, 2003, WIA programs continue to be funded through annual appropriations. Title I of WIA authorizes numerous job training programs, including: state formula grants for Youth, Adult, and Dislocated Worker Employment and Training activities; Job Corps; and national programs, including Native American programs, Migrant and Seasonal Farmworker programs, Veterans' Workforce Investment programs, the YouthBuild program, National Emergency Grants, and demonstration and pilot projects. In FY2009, programs and activities authorized under Title I of WIA were funded at $5.3 billion, including $3.0 billion for state formula grants for youth, adult, and dislocated worker training and employment activities. This report briefly summarizes each WIA Title I program, provides a recent funding history of Title I programs, and summarizes funding for WIA programs in the ARRA. Except for Job Corps and the Veterans' Workforce Investment Program, all WIA programs are administered by the Department of Labor's (DOL) Employment and Training Administration (ETA). The administration of Job Corps and Veterans' Workforce Investment is discussed below. The three formula grant programs for youth, adults, and dislocated workers provide funding for employment and training activities provided by the national system of One-Stop Career Centers. Funds are distributed to states by statutory formulas based on measures of unemployment and poverty status for youth and adult allocations and unemployment measures only for dislocated worker allocations. States in turn distribute funds to local workforce investment boards. This program provides training and related services to low-income youth ages 14-21 through formula grants allocated to states, which, in turn allocate funds to local entities. Programs funded under the youth activities chapter of WIA provide 10 "program elements" that consist of strategies to complete secondary school, alternative secondary school services, summer employment, work experience, occupational skill training, leadership development opportunities, supportive services, adult mentoring, follow-up services, and comprehensive guidance and counseling. In FY2009, funding for state grants for youth activities is $924 million. This program provides training and related services to individuals ages 18 and older through formula grants allocated to states, which in turn, allocate funds to local entities. Participation in the adult program is based on a "sequential service" strategy that consists of three levels of services. Any individual may receive "core" services (e.g., job search assistance). To receive "intensive" services (e.g. individual career planning and job training), an individual must have received core services and need intensive services to become employed or to obtain or retain employment that allows for self-sufficiency. To receive training services (e.g. occupational skills training), an individual must have received intensive and need training services to become employed or to obtain or retain employment that allows for self-sufficiency. In FY2009, funding for state grants for adult activities is $862 million. A majority of WIA dislocated worker funds are allocated by formula grants to states (which in turn allocate funds to local entities) to provide training and related services to individuals who have lost their jobs and are unlikely to return to those jobs or similar jobs in the same industry. The remainder of the appropriation is reserved by DOL for a National Reserve account, which in part provides for National Emergency Grants to states or local entities (as specified under Section 173). In FY2009, funding is $1.184 billion for state grants for dislocated worker training activities and is $283 million for the National Reserve. Job Corps is primarily a residential job training program first established in 1964 that provides educational and career services to low-income individuals ages 16 to 24, primarily through contracts administered by DOL with corporations and nonprofit organizations. Most participants in the Job Corps program work toward attaining a high school diploma or a General Educational Development (GED) certificate, with a subset also receiving career technical training. Currently, there are 122 Job Corps centers in 48 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico. In FY2009, total funding for Job Corps is $1.68 billion, including $1.54 billion for operations, $115 million for construction, and $29 million for administration. In addition to state formula grants, WIA establishes a number of competitive grant-based programs to provide employment and training services to special populations. This competitive grant program provides training and related services to low-income Indians, Alaska Natives, and Native Hawaiians through grants to Indian tribes and reservations and other Native American groups. In FY2009, funding for the Native Americans programs was $52.8 million. This competitive grant program, which is also referred to as the National Farmworker Jobs Program, provides training and related services, including technical assistance, to disadvantaged migrant and seasonal farmworkers and their dependents through discretionary grants awarded to public, private, and nonprofit organizations. The program was first authorized by the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964. This program is funded in FY2009 at $82.6 million. This program provides training and related services to veterans through competitive grants to states and nonprofit organizations. It has been administered by DOL's Veterans' Employment and Training Service (VETS) since FY2001. In FY2009, funding for the Veterans' Workforce Investment Program is $7.6 million. The purpose of pilot and demonstration programs is to develop and evaluate innovative approaches to providing employment and training services. In recent years, two programs have been specified in appropriations language and funded under the authority of Section 171. Each is described below. This competitive grant program combines two previous demonstration projects, the Prisoner Reentry Initiative (PRI) and the Responsible Reintegration of Youthful Offenders (RRYO). PRI, which was first funded in FY2005, funds faith-based and community organizations that help recently released prisoners find work when they return to their communities. RRYO, first funded in FY2000, supports projects that serve young offenders and youth at risk of becoming involved in the juvenile justice system. In FY2008, the Reintegration of Ex-Offenders program combined the PRI and RRYO into a single funding stream. In FY2009, funding for this single program is $108.5 million. This competitive grant program, also known as the Community College Initiative, funds entities to strengthen the capacity of community colleges to train workers in the skills required to succeed in high-growth, high-demand industries. CBJT grants were first funded in FY2005, with funds drawn from the Dislocated Worker National Reserve. In FY2009, funding for CBJT is $125 million. This competitive grant program funds projects that provide education and construction skills training for disadvantaged youth. Since its inception in 1992, the program was administered by the Department of Housing and Urban Development, but was moved to DOL by the YouthBuild Transfer Act ( P.L. 109-281 ), effective FY2007. Participating youth work primarily through mentorship and apprenticeship programs to rehabilitate and construct housing for homeless and low-income families. Funding in FY2009 for YouthBuild is $70 million. Table 1 shows appropriations for the FY2008 and FY2009. Amounts include all WIA programs described above, plus technical assistance; pilots, demonstrations and research; and evaluation. In FY2009, aggregate funding for WIA programs is $5.314 billion, an increase of 2.5% compared to the FY2008 funding level of $5.186 billion. The three state formula grant programs--youth, adult, and dislocated worker training--comprise $2.97 billion, or 56%, of WIA Title I funding. Job Corps, funded at $1.68 billion in FY2009, makes up just under 32% of Title I funding. In the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008 ( P.L. 110-161 ), Congress rescinded $250 million from the unexpended balances for FY2005 and FY2006 that had been appropriated for state formula grants for the Youth, Adult, and Dislocated Worker programs authorized under Title I of WIA. On February 13, 2009, both the House and the Senate passed the conference version of H.R. 1 , the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009; subsequently, H.R. 1 was signed by the President and became P.L. 111-5 on February 17, 2009. Under the ARRA, funds were provided to several existing workforce development programs administered by the DOL, including programs authorized by Title I of WIA. The ARRA provides $4.2 billion in funding for these WIA Title I workforce development programs. The ARRA provides funding for a number of existing workforce development programs, including the three state formula grant programs that provide funding for youth, adults, and dislocated workers--Title I-B of the WIA. Other programs authorized by the WIA also received funding: National Reserve (WIA Title I-D, Section 173), YouthBuild (WIA Title I-D, Section 173A), and Pilot and Demonstration Programs (WIA Title I-D, Section 171). Table 2 shows details of funding for Title I programs in the ARRA.

This report tracks recent appropriations and related legislation for Title I of the Workforce Investment Act of 1998 (WIA) (P.L. 105-220). Following a brief summary of each WIA program, the report presents information on WIA funding for FY2008 and FY2009 and the provisions for WIA Title I programs in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA), which was signed into law on February 17, 2009 (P.L. 111-5). WIA provides, in general, job training and related services to unemployed and underemployed individuals. WIA programs are administered by the Department of Labor (DOL), primarily through DOL's Employment and Training Administration (ETA). State and local WIA training and employment activities are provided through a system of One-Stop Career Centers. Authorization of appropriations under WIA expired in FY2003 but is annually extended through appropriations acts. Reauthorization legislation was considered in the 108th and 109th Congresses. WIA authorizes several job training programs: state formula grants for Adult, Youth, and Dislocated Worker Employment and Training Activities; Job Corps; and other national programs, including the Native American Program, the Migrant and Seasonal Farmworker Program, the Veterans' Workforce Investment Program, Responsible Reintegration for Young Offenders, the Prisoner Reentry Program, and Community-Based Job Training Grants (also known as the Community College Initiative). An additional national program, YouthBuild, formerly in the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), was made a part of WIA on September 22, 2006, by the YouthBuild Transfer Act (P.L. 109-281). Appropriations for WIA are made through the Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education and Related Agencies Appropriations Act (Labor-HHS-ED). In FY2009, aggregate funding for WIA Title I programs is $5.31 billion, an increase of 2.5% compared to the FY2008 funding level of $5.19 billion. In the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008 (P.L. 110-161), Congress rescinded $250 million from the unexpended balances for FY2005 and FY2006 that had been appropriated for state formula grants for the Youth, Adult, and Dislocated Worker programs authorized under Title I of WIA. Funding of $4.2 billion for WIA Title I programs was provided through the ARRA and is in addition to the FY2009 appropriations. This report will be updated as major legislative developments occur.

Since FY1989, Congress has appropriated just under $271 billion (constant 2008 dollars) for disaster assistance in 34 appropriations measures, primarily supplemental appropriations acts, after significant catastrophes occurred in the United States. The median annual funding during the 20-year period FY1989 through the present was $2.7 billion; the mean annual funding was $12 billion ($241 billion/20)--both in current dollars. The mean funding in current dollars for all 34 enacted emergency supplemental bills was $7 billion ($241 billion/34). The median annual funding in constant dollars during the 20 year period FY1989 through the present was $3.8 billion; the mean annual funding in constant dollars was $13.6 billion. The mean funding in constant dollars for all 34 enacted emergency supplemental bills was $8 billion ($271 billion/34). Disasters during 2001 and 2005 were especially costly. In FY2001 and FY2002, supplemental appropriations for disaster assistance exceeded $26 billion, most of which went toward recovery following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. In FY2005 and FY2006, after Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma struck in 2005, supplemental appropriations for disaster assistance have reached an all-time high. From FY2005 through FY2008, Congress appropriated over $130 billion, almost 60% of the total appropriated since FY1989. Since the start of the 110 th Congress, the President has signed into law four measures ( P.L. 110-28 , P.L. 110-116 , P.L. 110-252 , and P.L. 110-329 ). These four statutes together provided roughly $41 billion in supplemental appropriations for disaster relief and recovery. P.L. 110-28 , signed on May 25, 2007, included an appropriation of $7.6 billion for disaster assistance, $3.4 billion of which was classified as "Hurricane Katrina Recovery." P.L. 110-116 , signed into law on November 13, 2007, provided a total of $6.355 billion for continued recovery efforts related to Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma, and for other declared major disasters or emergencies. This total includes $500 million for firefighting expenses related to 2007 California wildfires. P.L. 110-252 , signed into law June 30, 2008, provided $7 billion in disaster assistance, most of which was directed at continuing recovering needs resulting from the 2005 hurricane season. P.L. 110-329 , signed into law on September 30, 2008, included an appropriation for emergency and disaster relief of $21.4 billion. Of this amount, roughly $2 billion is continued disaster relief for the 2005 hurricane season. The majority of the funding (just over $8.8 billion) in the law is for disasters occurring in 2008 which included Hurricanes Gustav and Ike, wildfires, and flooding. One of the largest components funding in P.L. 110-329 is for the Department of Housing and Urban Development's (HUD) Community Development Fund, which received $6.5 billion specifically for disaster relief, long-term recovery, and economic revitalization in areas affected by disasters that occurred in 2008. Other funding in the law includes $135 million for wildfire suppression, and a $100 million direct appropriation for the American Red Cross for reimbursement of disaster relief and recovery expenditures associated with emergencies and disasters that have also taken place in 2008. This report provides summary information on emergency supplemental appropriations legislation enacted since 1989 after significant catastrophes. It includes funds appropriated to the Disaster Relief Fund (DRF) administered by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), as well as funds appropriated to other departments and agencies. This report uses a broad concept of what constitutes emergency disaster assistance. The funds cited in this report include appropriations for disaster relief, repair of federal facilities, and hazard mitigation activities directed at reducing the impact of future disasters. DRF appropriations are obligated for all major disasters and emergencies issued under the Stafford Act, not only those significant events that lead to supplemental appropriations. Counterterrorism, law enforcement, and national security appropriations are not included in this compilation. Unless otherwise noted, this report does not take into account rescissions approved by Congress after funds have been appropriated for disaster assistance. As reflected in Table 1 below, supplemental appropriations have been enacted as stand-alone legislation. However, in some instances, emergency disaster relief funding has been enacted as part of regular appropriations measures, continuing appropriations acts (continuing resolutions), or in omnibus appropriations legislation. Requested funding levels noted in the third column of Table 1 reflect House Appropriations Committee data on total requested funding for the entire enacted bill. Where possible, Office of Management and Budget (OMB) data taken from correspondence to Congress requesting emergency supplemental funding are used to identify dates of Administration requests for supplemental funding. In response to the widespread destruction caused by three catastrophic hurricanes at the end of the summer of 2005, the 109 th Congress enacted four emergency supplemental appropriations bills. Two of the statutes were enacted as FY2005 supplementals after Hurricane Katrina devastated parts of Florida and Alabama and resulted in presidential major disaster declarations for all jurisdictions in Louisiana and Mississippi. The two supplementals ( P.L. 109-61 and P.L. 109-62 ) together provided $62.3 billion for emergency response and recovery needs; most of the funding in these two bills was provided for the Disaster Relief Fund (DRF) administered by FEMA. After Hurricanes Rita and Wilma struck, the 109 th Congress enacted two other supplementals; the costs of both were offset by rescissions. The FY2006 appropriations legislation for the Department of Defense ( P.L. 109-148 ) rescinded roughly $34 billion in funds previously appropriated (almost 70% of which was taken from funds previously appropriated to the Department of Homeland Security) and appropriated $29 billion to other accounts primarily to pay for the restoration of federal facilities damaged by the hurricanes. Also in FY2006, Congress agreed to an Administration request for further funding--$19.3 billion was appropriated in supplemental legislation ( P.L. 109-234 ) for recovery assistance, with roughly $64 million rescinded from two accounts ($15 million from flood control, Corps of Engineers, and $49.5 million from Navy Reserve construction, Department of Defense). On May 25, 2007, the President signed into law P.L. 110-28 , which appropriated $120 billion in emergency supplemental funding for Iraq, Afghanistan, and other matters, including $6.9 billion for continued Gulf Coast relief. The measure was a successor to previous emergency supplemental legislation in the 110 th Congress, H.R. 1591 , vetoed by the President on May 1, 2007. This was the fifth supplemental measure enacted containing disaster assistance specifically provided in response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. The sixth supplemental measure enacted as part of P.L. 110-116 on November 13, 2007, provided an additional $5.9 billion for emergency assistance, most, but not all of which, can be attributed to the Gulf Coast recovery. The $3 billion appropriated for Department of Housing and Urban Development--Community Planning and Development Fund can only be used for the Louisiana Road Home program. However, the $2.9 billion appropriated for the Disaster Relief Fund can be used not only for the Gulf Coast but for other declared disasters as well. As a result, after enactment of P.L. 110-252 , the total amount appropriated by Congress in supplemental funding after the 2005 hurricanes surpassed the $130 billion mark. Table 2 provides information on the appropriations made in the six supplementals enacted after Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma. Table 3 identifies the departments and agencies from which funds were rescinded in P.L. 109-148 . In addition to these rescissions and appropriations, Congress enacted other funding changes by transferring $712 million from FEMA to the Small Business Administration for disaster loans ( P.L. 109-174 ). On June 30, 2008, the 110 th Congress enacted the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2008 ( P.L. 110-252 ). Some of the funding from P.L. 110-252 includes $100 million for the Economic Development Administration's economic development assistance programs, $73 million for the Department of Housing and Urban Development's (HUD) Road Home Program and $300 million for HUD's Community Development fund. The majority of disaster assistance funding (over $4 billion) in P.L. 110-252 is directed at the Corps of Engineers for projects aimed at repairing damages incurred from the 2005 hurricane season, as well as programs designed to mitigate against future hurricanes. Another supplemental, the Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2009 was passed three months later on September 30, 2008 ( P.L. 110-329 ). P.L. 110-329 includes ongoing disaster relief for destruction resulting from the 2005 hurricane season, including $85 million for the Disaster Housing Assistance program administered by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). The program enables families to settle in areas across the United States that were not affected by hurricane Katrina, Rita, or Wilma. The amount provided in the statute for disaster relief as a result of the 2005 hurricane season is roughly $1.3 billion. CRS Report RL33330, Community Development Block Grant Funds in Disaster Relief and Recovery , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. CRS Report RL34711, Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2009 (P.L. 110-329): An Overview , by [author name scrubbed]. CRS Report RL33999, Defense: FY2008 Authorization and Appropriations , by [author name scrubbed], [author name scrubbed], and [author name scrubbed]. CRS Report RL33053, Federal Stafford Act Disaster Assistance: Presidential Declarations, Eligible Activities, and Funding , by [author name scrubbed] (pdf). CRS Report RL33900, FY2007 Supplemental Appropriations for Defense, Foreign Affairs, and Other Purposes , coordinated by [author name scrubbed]. CRS Report RL34451, FY2008 Spring Supplemental Appropriations and FY2009 Bridge Appropriations for Military Operations, International Affairs, and Other Purposes (P.L. 110-252) , by [author name scrubbed] et al.

This report provides summary information on emergency supplemental appropriations enacted after major disasters since 1989. During the 20-year span from FY1989 through the present, Congress appropriated almost $271 billion in constant 2008 dollars. Most of the appropriations were preceded by a presidential request for supplemental funding. In 2008 a number of major natural disasters took place including Hurricanes Ike and Gustav, the California wildfires, and the Midwest floods. To date however, the most costly disasters occurred in the summer of 2005 when Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma made landfall in Gulf Coast states. Since Hurricane Katrina struck in August of 2005, more than $151 billion has been appropriated for supplemental disaster funding, most of it needed for the recovery from the 2005 hurricanes. Portions of the appropriations were offset by rescinding more than $34 billion in previously appropriated funds, explained in the section titled "Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma." Prior to FY2005 and the hurricanes, only the terrorist attacks of 2001 led to supplemental appropriations legislation that exceeded $20 billion. Congress appropriated a total of more than $26 billion for disaster assistance in response to the attacks. Other supplemental appropriations legislation enacted after catastrophic disasters (or several significant disasters that occurred in short time intervals) range from almost $366 million in FY2001 before the terrorist attacks (largely due to the Nisqually earthquake in the summer of 2001) to more than $12 billion for the Midwest floods of 1993 and the Northridge earthquake of 1994. At times, the supplementals enacted by Congress have included only disaster funding. The supplementals enacted after Hurricane Hugo and the Loma Prieta earthquake, in addition to the first two enacted after Hurricane Katrina, serve as examples. On other occasions, however, disaster funding has been part of larger pieces of legislation that appropriated funds for purposes other than disaster assistance. The most recent supplemental disaster assistance appropriation occurred on September 30, 2008 when the President signed into law H.R. 2638, the Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2009. The statute, P.L. 110-329, provides $21.3 billion in emergency supplemental appropriations for relief and recovery from hurricanes, floods, and other natural disasters. This report will be updated as events warrant.

During the 108th Congress, the House of Representatives and the Senate Finance Committeeapproved two different versions of a bill that would have reauthorized and revised the TemporaryAssistance for Needy Families (TANF) Block Grant. This legislation, H.R. 4 , alsoincluded many changes to the Child Support Enforcement (CSE) program, a component of thegovernment's social safety net. In 1996, Congress passed significant changes to the CSE programas part of its reform of welfare. H.R. 4 was passed by the House in February 2003. TheSenate Finance Committee reported a substitute version of the bill in September 2003 ( S.Rept.108-162 ). On March 29-April 1, 2004, the Senate debated H.R. 4; disagreement aroseregarding amendments to the bill, a motion to limit debate was overruled, and the Senate did notvote on passage of the bill. The CSE program, Part D of Title IV of the Social Security Act, was enacted in January 1975 ( P.L. 93-647 ). The CSE program is administered by the Office of Child Support Enforcement(OCSE) in the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), and funded by general revenues. All 50 states, the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands operate CSEprograms and are entitled to federal matching funds. The following families automatically qualifyfor CSE services (free of charge): families receiving (or who formerly received) TemporaryAssistance to Needy Families (TANF) benefits (Title IV-A), foster care payments, or Medicaidcoverage. Collections on behalf of families receiving TANF benefits are used to reimburse state andfederal governments for TANF payments made to the family. Other families must apply for CSEservices, and states must charge an application fee that cannot exceed $25. Child support collectedon behalf of nonwelfare families goes to the family (usually through the state disbursement unit). Between FY1978 and FY2003, child support payments collected by CSE agencies increased from $1 billion in FY1978 to $21.2 billion in FY2003, and the number of children whose paternitywas established (or acknowledged) increased by 1,274%, from 111,000 to 1.525 million. However,the program still collects only 18% of child support obligations for which it has responsibility andcollects payments for only 50% of its caseload. Moreover, OCSE data indicate that in FY2003,paternity had been established or acknowledged for about 77% of the nearly 10 million children onthe CSE caseload without legally identified fathers. Total expenditures for the CSE program were$5.213 billion in FY2003; of this total, the federal share of state and local administrative costs of theprogram was $3.448 billion and the state share was $1.764 billion. The CSE program is estimated to handle at least 50% of all child support cases; the remaining cases are handled by private attorneys, collection agencies, or through mutual agreements betweenthe parents. The CSE program provides seven major services on behalf of children: (1) parent location, (2) paternity establishment, (3) establishment of child support orders, (4) review and modification ofsupport orders, (5) collection of support payments, (6) distribution of support payments, and (7)establishment and enforcement of medical support. Collection methods used by CSE agencies include income withholding, intercept of federal and state income tax refunds, intercept of unemployment compensation, liens against property, securitybonds, and reporting child support obligations to credit bureaus. All jurisdictions also have civil orcriminal contempt-of-court procedures and criminal nonsupport laws. Building on legislation ( P.L.102-521 ) enacted in 1992, P.L. 105-187 , the Deadbeat Parents Punishment Act of 1998, establishedtwo new federal criminal offenses (subject to a two-year maximum prison term) with respect tononcustodial parents who repeatedly fail to financially support children who reside with custodialparents in another state or who flee across state lines to avoid supporting them. P.L. 104-193 required states to implement expedited procedures that allow them to secure assets to satisfy an arrearage by intercepting or seizing periodic or lump sum payments (such asunemployment and workers' compensation), lottery winnings, awards, judgements, or settlements,and assets of the debtor parent held by public or private retirement funds, and financial institutions. It required states to implement procedures under which the state would have authority to withhold,suspend, or restrict use of driver's licenses, professional and occupational licenses, and recreationaland sporting licenses of persons who owe past-due support or who fail to comply with subpoenasor warrants relating to paternity or child support proceedings. It also required states to conductquarterly data matches with financial institutions in the state in order to identify and seize thefinancial resources of debtor noncustodial parents. P.L. 104-193 authorized the Secretary of Stateto deny, revoke, or restrict passports of debtor parents. P.L. 104-193 also required states to enact andimplement the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA), and expand full faith and creditprocedures. P.L. 104-193 also clarified which court has jurisdiction in cases involving multiple childsupport orders. The federal government currently reimburses each state 66% of the cost of administering its CSE program. It also refunds states 90% of the laboratory costs of establishing paternity. Inaddition, the federal government pays states an incentive payment to encourage them to operateeffective programs. P.L. 104-193 required the HHS Secretary in consultation with the state CSEdirectors to develop a new cost-neutral system of incentive payments to states. P.L. 105-200 , theChild Support Performance and Incentive Act of 1998, established a new cost-neutral incentivepayment system. (1) The statutory limit of CSEincentive payments for FY2004 is $454 million. Over the years, the CSE program has evolved into a multifaceted program. While cost-recovery still remains an important function of the program, other aspects of the program include servicedelivery and promotion of self-sufficiency and parental responsibility, even when one of the parentsis no longer living in the home. The CSE program has helped strengthen families by securing financial support for children from their noncustodial parent on a consistent and continuing basis and by helping some families toremain self-sufficient and off public assistance by providing the requisite CSE services. Childsupport payments now are generally recognized as a very important income source for single-parentfamilies. On average, child support constitutes 17% of family income for households that receiveit (2001 data). Among poor families who receive it, child support constitutes about 30% of familyincome (2001 data). (2) Both versions of H.R. 4 sought to improve the CSE program and raise collections so as to increase the economic independence of former welfare families and provide a stable sourceof income for all single-parent families with a noncustodial parent. Although both versions of thebill shared identical objectives with respect to simplifying CSE assignment and distribution rules andstrengthening the "family-first" policies started in the 1996 welfare reform law, the approaches useddiffered. Both versions of the bill revised some CSE enforcement tools and added others. TheSenate-approved version of H.R. 4 included a larger list of CSE provisions than did theHouse-passed bill. This section of the report does not discuss all of the CSE provisions included in H.R. 4 . For a description of all of the CSE provisions in H.R. 4, as passedby the House and approved by the Senate Finance Committee, see Table 1 in the last section ofthisreport, which provides a side-by-side bill comparison. As a condition of receiving TANF benefits, a family must assign their child support rights to the state. Assignment rules determine who has legal claim on the child support payments owed bythe noncustodial parent. The child support assignment covers any child support that accrues whilethe family receives TANF benefits as well as any child support that accrued before the family startedreceiving TANF benefits. Assigned child support collections are not paid to families, but rather thisrevenue is kept by states and the federal government as partial reimbursement for welfare benefits. Nonwelfare families who apply for CSE services do not assign their child support rights to the stateand thereby receive all of the child support collected on their behalf. An extremely important feature of the assignment process is the date on which an assignment was entered. If the assignment was entered on or before September 30, 1997, then pre-assistanceand during-assistance arrearages are "permanently assigned" to the state. If the assignment wasentered on or after October 1, 1997, then only the arrearages which accumulate while the familyreceives assistance are "permanently assigned." The family's pre-assistance arrearages are"temporarily assigned" and the right to those arrearages goes back to the family when it leavesTANF (unless the arrearages are collected through the federal income tax refund offset program). H.R. 4 as passed by the House did not make any changes regarding the child support assignment rules. In contrast, under H.R. 4 as approved by the Senate FinanceCommittee, the child support assignment would have only covered any child support that accruedwhile the family received TANF benefits. This meant that any child support arrearages that accruedbefore the family started receiving TANF benefits would not have to be assigned to the state (eventemporarily) and thereby any child support collected on behalf of the former-TANF family forpre-assistance arrearages would have gone to the family. Distribution rules determine the order in which child support collections are paid in accordance with the assignment rules. In other words, the distribution rules determine which claim is paid firstwhen a child support collection occurs. The order of payment of the child support collection is oftremendous importance because in many cases past-due child support, i.e., arrearages, are never fullypaid. TANF Families. While the family receives TANF benefits, the state is permitted to retain any current support and any assigned arrearages it collects up to the cumulative amount of TANF benefits which has been paid to the family . The 1996 welfarelaw ( P.L. 104-193 ) repealed the $50 required pass through (3) and gave states the choice to decide howmuch, if any, of the state share (some, all, none) of child support payments collected on behalf ofTANF families to send the family. States also decide whether to treat child support payments asincome to the family. While states have discretion over their share of child support collections, P.L.104-193 required states to pay the federal government the federal government's share of childsupport collections collected on behalf of TANF families. This means that the state, and not thefederal government, bears the entire cost of any child support passed through to (and disregarded by)families. As of August 2004, 21 states were continuing the $50 (or higher in several states)pass-through and disregard policy that had been in effect pre-1996. (4) Both versions of H.R. 4 would have provided incentives (in the form of federal cost sharing) to states to direct more of the child support collected on behalf of TANF families tothe families themselves, as opposed to using such collections to reimburse state and federal coffersfor welfare benefits paid to the families (often referred to as a "family-first" policy). However theapproaches of the bills differed with respect to the limitation on the federal cost-sharing and whetherto help states pay for the current cost of their CSE pass-through and disregard policies or toencourage states to establish such policies or increase the pass-through and disregard already inplace. H.R. 4 as passed by the House would have allowed states to increase the amount of collected child support they pay to families receiving TANF benefits and would not have requiredthe state to pay the federal government the federal share of the increased payments. The subsidizedchild support pass-through payments would have been the amount above any payments the state wasmaking on December 31, 2001. In other words, the House-passed bill intended to increase theamount of child support that was passed through to TANF families (and disregarded) by the state. The House-passed bill would have limited the new payments to the greater of $100 per month or $50per month more than the state previously was sharing with the family. In order for the federalgovernment to share in the cost of an increase in the child support pass-through, the state would havebeen required to disregard (i.e., not count) the child support collection paid to the family indetermining the family's TANF benefit. Unlike the House-passed bill, under the bill approved by the Senate Finance Committee the federal government would have shared in the costs of the entire amount of current pass-through anddisregard policies used by states. H.R. 4 as approved by the Senate Finance Committeewould have allowed states to pay up to $400 per month in child support collected on behalf of aTANF (or foster care) family ($600 per month to a family with two or more children) to the familyand would not have required the state to pay the federal government the federal share of thosepayments. In order for the federal government to share in the cost of the child support pass-through,the state would have been required to disregard (i.e., not count) the child support collection paid tothe family in determining the family's TANF benefit. Former TANF Families. Pursuant to the 1996 welfare reform law ( P.L. 104-193 ), beginning on October 1, 2000, states must distribute to formerTANF families the following child support collections first before the state and the federalgovernment are reimbursed (this is often referred to as the "family-first" policy): (1) all current childsupport, (2) any child support arrearages that accrue after the family leaves TANF (these arrearagesare called never-assigned arrearages), plus (3) any arrearages that accrued before the family beganreceiving TANF benefits. (5) (Any child supportarrearages that accrue during the time the family ison TANF belong to the state and federal government.) One of the goals of the 1996 welfare reform law with regard to CSE distribution provisions was to create a distribution priority that favored families once they leave the TANF rolls. Thus, generallyspeaking, under current law, child support that accrues before and after a family receives TANF goesto the family, whereas child support that accrues while the family is receiving TANF goes to thestate. This additional family income is expected to reduce dependence on public assistance by bothpromoting exit from TANF and preventing entry and re-entry to TANF. H.R. 4 as passed by the House would have given states the option of distributing to former TANF families the full amount of child support collected on their behalf (i.e., both currentsupport and all child support arrearages -- including arrearages collected through the federal incometax refund offset program). Under the House-passed bill, the federal government would have sharedwith the states the costs of paying child support arrearages accrued while the family received TANFas well as costs associated with passing through to the family child support collected through thefederal income tax refund offset program, if the state chose the "family-first" option. Similarly, H.R. 4 as approved by the Senate Finance Committee also would have given states the option of distributing to former TANF families the full amount of child supportcollected on their behalf. Further, the Senate Finance Committee version of the bill would havesimplified the CSE distribution process and eliminated the special treatment of child supportarrearages collected through the federal income tax refund offset program. Like the House-passedbill, the federal government would have shared with the states the costs of paying child supportarrearages to the family first. Both versions of H.R. 4 included identical or similar provisions with respect to (1) allowing states to access information in the national new hires database to help detect fraud in theunemployment compensation program; (2) lowering the threshold amount for denial of a passportto a noncustodial parent who owes past-due child support; (3) facilitating the collection of childsupport from Social Security benefits; (4) easing the collection of child support from veterans'benefits; and (5) allowing states to use the federal income tax refund offset program to collectpast-due child support for persons not on TANF who are no longer minors. Additional provisions that would have expanded and/or enhanced the ability of states to collect child support payments were contained in the Senate Finance Committee-approved version of H.R. 4 . They included (1) authorizing the HHS Secretary to act on behalf of states toseize financial assets (held by a multi-state financial institution) of noncustodial parents who owechild support; (2) authorizing the HHS Secretary to compare information of noncustodial parentswho owe past-due child support with information maintained by insurers concerning insurancepayments and to furnish any information resulting from a match to CSE agencies so they can pursuechild support arrearages; and (3) authorizing the HHS Secretary to compare information obtainedfrom gambling establishments with information on noncustodial parents who owe past-due childsupport and direct the gambling establishment to withhold from the customer's net winnings anychild support that is owed. Both versions of the bill included provisions that would have (1) required states to review and if appropriate adjust child support orders of TANF families every three years; (2) required the HHSSecretary to submit a report to Congress on the procedures states use to locate custodial parents forwhom child support has been collected but not yet distributed; (3) established a minimum fundinglevel for technical assistance; and (4) established a minimum funding level for the Federal ParentLocator Service. The House-passed version of H.R. 4 included a provision that would have established a $25 annual fee for individuals who had never been on TANF but received CSE servicesand who received at least $500 in any given year. The Senate Finance Committee-approved version of H.R. 4 included provisions that would have (1) increased funding for the CSE access and visitation program; (2) designatedIndian tribes and tribal organizations as persons authorized to have access to information in theFederal Parent Locator Service; and (3) required states to adopt a later version of the UniformInterstate Family Support Act (UIFSA) so as to facilitate the collection of child support paymentsin interstate cases. Table 1 provides a detailed and comprehensive comparison of the CSE provisions of theHouse-passed and Senate Finance Committee reported versions of H.R. 4 (the welfarereauthorization bill) with current law. The table specifies the section number in each of the bills inwhich the provision is found. As noted earlier, H.R. 4 passed the House but not the Senate during the 108th Congress. There is some concern that the widely favored CSE provisions that were in H.R.4 were not debated as a separate stand-alone bill. Nevertheless, it seems likely that the109th Congress will consider the substantive and numerous CSE changes that were included in H.R.4 as part of any new TANF reauthorization bill. Table 1. Comparison of Current Law with H.R.4, "Personal Responsibility, Work, and Family PromotionAct of 2003" as Passed by the House and "Personal Responsibility and Individual Development for Everyone Act(PRIDE)" as Reported by the SenateFinance Committee: Child Support Provisions Source: Congressional Research Service.

During the 108th Congress, the House of Representatives and the Senate Finance Committee approved two different versions of a bill that would have reauthorized and revised the TemporaryAssistance for Needy Families (TANF) Block Grant. This legislation, H.R. 4 , alsoincluded many changes to the Child Support Enforcement (CSE) program. H.R. 4 waspassed by the House in February 2003. The Senate Finance Committee reported a substitute versionof the bill in September 2003 ( S.Rept. 108-162 ). On March 29-April 1, 2004, the Senate debatedH.R. 4; disagreement arose regarding amendments to the bill, and Republicans failed topass a motion to limit debate. H.R. 4 was not passed by the Senate. Although not identical, both versions of H.R. 4 were similar in focus, direction, and content with respect to the CSE provisions. Both versions of H.R. 4 includedprovisions that sought to improve the CSE program and raise collections so as to increase theeconomic independence of former welfare families and provide a stable source of income for allsingle-parent families with a noncustodial parent. Both versions of the bill provided incentives (inthe form of federal cost sharing) to states to direct more of the child support collected on behalf offamilies to the families themselves, thereby reducing the amount that state and federal governmentsretain (often referred to as a family-first policy). Under both bills, families currently receiving TANFbenefits as well as former TANF recipients would have potentially received a larger share of childsupport that was collected on their behalf. The approach used by the bills differed significantly, however, with regard to how states would help TANF families receive more child support. Under the House-passed bill, states would havebeen given federal cost sharing incentives to encourage states to increase (or establish) the amountof child support payments they pass through to TANF families (and disregard in determining TANFbenefits). The Senate Finance Committee version of the bill provided federal cost-sharing for theentire amount that the state disregards and passes through to families. Moreover, the House-passedbill provided a more limited amount of federal cost sharing for state pass-through and disregardpolicies than the Senate Finance Committee bill. Both versions of the bill would have revised some CSE enforcement tools and added others; increased funding for the Federal Parent Locator Service (FPLS); increased funding for federaltechnical assistance to the states; required states to review child support orders of TANF familiesevery three years; and required that a report be submitted to Congress on undistributed child supportcollections. The House-passed bill included a provision that would have established a $25 annualuser fee for individuals who had never been on TANF but received CSE services and who receivedat least $500 in any given year. The Senate Finance Committee-approved bill included provisionsthat would have increased funding for the CSE access and visitation program; and required statesto adopt a later version of the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA) so as to facilitate thecollection of child support payments in interstate cases. This report will not be updated.

Since the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the United States has launched three major military operations: Operation Noble Eagle (ONE), Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). Operation Noble Eagle is the name given to military operations related to homeland security and support to federal, state, and local agencies in the wake of the September 11 attacks. Operation Enduring Freedom includes ongoing operations in Afghanistan, operations against terrorists in other countries, and training assistance to foreign militaries which are conducting operations against terrorists. Operation Iraqi Freedom includes the invasion of Iraq, the defeat of Saddam Hussein's regime, and the subsequent rebuilding and counter-insurgency operations in Iraq. This report provides short answers to commonly asked questions about military personnel and compensation issues related to these operations. The questions are grouped into three major thematic areas: personnel, compensation, and force structure. The section on personnel addresses issues such as casualties, reserve mobilization, "sole surviving" son or daughter status, conscientious objection, and "stop-loss." The section on compensation addresses issues related to the pay and benefits--including casualty and death benefits--provided to members of the U.S. military participating in ONE/OEF/OIF and their families. The section on force structure addresses issues related to how ONE/OEF/OIF might affect the number of personnel needed by the military, and answers common questions about whether or not a return to conscription is likely under current circumstances. As of January 17, 2006, there were 255 fatalities among U.S. military personnel serving in OEF. Of these, 130 were categorized as killed in action, while 125 were categorized as non-hostile deaths. As of that same date, 677 military personnel had been wounded in action while serving in OEF. Of these, 275 were returned to duty within 72 hours. As of January 17, 2006, there were 2,242 fatalities among U.S. military personnel serving in OIF. Of these, 1,761 were categorized as hostile deaths and 481 as non-hostile. As of that same date, 16,420 military personnel had been wounded in action while serving in OIF. Of these, 8,812 were returned to duty within 72 hours. As of January 15, 2006, there was one U.S. soldier classified as a POW, Private First Class Keith M. Maupin who was captured on April 9, 2004. There were no U.S. military personnel classified as MIA. Between September 11, 2001 and January 17, 2006, a total of 532,539 reservists (which includes the National Guard) were involuntarily called to active duty under federal orders for ONE, OEF, and OIF. Of these, 126,5345 were serving on active duty as of January 17, 2006, while 406,005 had been demobilized prior to that date after completing their tours. Note, however, that the total mobilization and demobilization figures count reservists more than once if they have been mobilized more than once. The total number of individuals mobilized is therefore lower than stated above, and probably by a significant margin due to the number of people who have been called up more than once. These reservists were called to active duty under a mobilization authority known as Partial Mobilization. In time of a national emergency declared by the President, Partial Mobilization authorizes the Service Secretaries to order members of the Ready Reserve to active duty for a period not to exceed 24 consecutive months. Up to 1 million members of the Ready Reserve may serve on active duty at any one time under this provision of law. The President may declare a national emergency and mobilize reservists under this provision of law without approval from Congress. This authority was also used to mobilize reservists during the later part of the Persian Gulf War (1991). DOD's general policy has been to keep reservists on active duty for no more than one year; and in the majority of cases to date, mobilized reservists have not been required to serve more than one year. However, the policy does allow the Service Secretary to keep reservists on active duty for up to 24 cumulative months if they are needed to meet operational or other requirements. It should be noted that DOD's policy capping reserve service at 24 cumulative months is more restrictive than the 24 consecutive month cap specified in law. If DOD were to change its policy to mirror the law, reservists could be mobilized multiple times for tours of 24 consecutive months apiece. Also, some members of the National Guard have been called up to perform duties related to ONE in a non-federal status . Additionally, in 2001 and 2002, thousands of members of the National Guard were activated at the order of their respective governors to provide additional security at airports. They were called up under Title 32 of the U.S. Code, which means they were under state control, but with federal pay and benefits. These distinctions have a significant bearing on the type of pay, benefits, and legal protections to which the affected individuals are entitled. For more information on this topic, see CRS Report RL30802, Reserve Component Personnel Issues: Questions and Answers , by [author name scrubbed]. No statute governs the deployment of "sole surviving" sons and daughters in today's all-volunteer military. However, the Department of Defense does have an administrative policy governing assignments of a "sole surviving" son or daughter. This policy allows "sole surviving" sons or daughters to apply for a protective assignment status which, once approved, prohibits his or her assignment "to any overseas area designated as a hostile-fire or imminent-danger area ... nor to duties that regularly might subject him or her to combat with the enemy." In addition to protective assignment, enlisted personnel who become sole surviving sons or daughters after having entered service may also apply for and be granted a discharge in most circumstances. However, the term " sole surviving son or daughter " does not simply mean the only child in a family. According to DOD's definition, a sole surviving son or daughter is the only remaining son or daughter in a family where the father or mother, or one or more sons or daughters, served in the Armed Forces of the United States and, because of hazards with such military service, either (1) was killed, (2) died as a result of wounds, accident or disease, (3) is in a captured or missing-in-action (MIA) status, or (4) is permanently 100-percent disabled, is hospitalized on a continuing basis, and is not employed gainfully because of such disability. The "sole surviving" son or daughter issue is different from the commonly cited, albeit fictional, "Sullivan Act" or "Sullivan Law." The Sullivans were five brothers serving on board a single U.S. Navy ship (the U.S.S. Juneau ) during World War II. Their ship was sunk by the Japanese on November 13, 1942, and all of the brothers died. In response to this tragedy, some proposals were made to prohibit brothers from serving together on the same ship, but Congress did not pass any such law, nor did the President issue an executive order to that effect. In response to a similar tragedy which occurred the previous year (three brothers serving aboard the U.S.S. Arizona perished during the Pearl Harbor attacks) the Navy did issue a policy forbidding commanding officers from approving requests from brothers to serve together, but the policy was apparently not enforced and did not prohibit the Navy from assigning brothers to the same ship. Current DOD policy states that "concurrent assigning of service members of the immediate family to the same military unit or ship is not prohibited, but requests for reassignment to a different unit or ship may be approved for all but one service member." Approval of such requests, however, are contingent upon military requirements. No statute governs the treatment of conscientious objectors currently serving in the military. However, the Department of Defense does have an administrative policy relating to this issue. Of course, in today's all-volunteer military, those who have moral objections to participating in war will likely choose not to join the military. Nonetheless, some people volunteer to join the armed forces with every intention of fulfilling their military obligations, but later develop religious or moral objections to participation in war. Such people may apply for transfer to non-combat related duties or for an administrative discharge, depending on the nature of their convictions. Following application, a formal investigatory procedure is initiated by the military to ascertain the facts and nature of the applicant's claim. Based on this investigation and the criteria for granting conscientious objector status defined in the DOD policy, a determination is made to either grant or deny the applicant's claim. With respect to the criteria for granting conscientious objector status, a crucial one is the requirement that the individual be "opposed to participation in war in any form." In other words, the objection "must be to all wars rather than a specific war." This standard precludes those who are opposed to some wars, but not all wars, from being classified as conscientious objectors. In 2000, slightly over 100 servicemembers applied for conscientious objector status; in 2004 this number was over 400. Of those who apply, approximately half are approved. Yes, if a service member is killed, dies, or is declared captured or missing, the other service members of the same family will be exempt, upon request, from serving in designated hostile-fire areas or if already serving in such as area, will be reassigned. This also applies to those who are categorized as 100% disabled by the Service or the Veterans Administration. In addition, wounded personnel who have been medically evacuated and hospitalized for more than 30 days outside the hostile-fire area will not be returned during the same tour; they may, however, be eligible for subsequent combat tours. This provision does not apply to those hospitalized for injury, accident, illness, self-inflicted wounds, or other non-combat causes. Under federal law, the President has the authority to suspend laws related to promotion, retirement and separation of military personnel during a period of time when members of the Reserve Component have been involuntarily ordered to active federal service. Since 1990, this authority has been delegated to the Secretary of Defense by executive order. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld delegated this authority to each of the individual military services on September 19, 2001, allowing those services to "stop loss" by keeping individuals on active duty beyond their normal date of separation or retirement. Stop-loss has usually been implemented to permit the military to retain people with critical skills during a time of crisis. Since September 11, 2001, all of the Services have implemented such "skill based" stop loss for various lengths of time, although none of the Services currently have such a policy in effect. However, the Army has implemented a stop-loss policy which delays the departure of personnel from units deploying to Iraq and Afghanistan until 90 days after the unit returns from its deployment. The purpose of this "unit based" stop-loss is to maintain unit cohesion and thereby maximize military effectiveness among units headed for a combat environment. The Army has both an Active Army and Reserve Component Unit Stop Loss program. Under both, soldiers are affected from 90 days prior to their unit's mobilization/deployment date through their demobilizatioin/redeployment date, plus a maximum of 90 days. As of December 31, 2005 , stop loss impacted 12,467 soldiers (7,620 active component, 2,418 Reserve and 2,429 National Guard) Most involuntary separations--for example, discharges due to criminal acts--will not be affected by stop-loss. Additionally, the adoption of a stop-loss policy does not modify service policies or regulations which might lead to an administrative discharge (e.g. for homosexuality) or to a medical discharge. Most recently, Congress has required the Secretary of Defense to report on the actions being taken to ensure that new enlistees are adequately informed concerning service stop loss policies. Many military personnel participating in OEF and OIF are eligible for Hostile Fire or Imminent Danger Pay (HF/IDP). HF/IDP is authorized by 37 U.S.C. 310, which provides a special pay for "duty subject to hostile fire or imminent danger." While DOD regulations distinguish between Hostile Fire Pay and Imminent Danger Pay, they are both derived from the same statute and an individual can only collect Hostile Fire Pay or Imminent Danger Pay, not both simultaneously. The purpose of this pay is to compensate servicemembers for physical danger. Iraq, Afghanistan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and many other nearby countries have been declared imminent danger zones. Military personnel serving in such designated areas are eligible for HF/IDP. To be eligible for this pay in a given month, a servicemember must have served some time in one of the designated zones, even if only a day or less. The authorizing statute for HF/IDP sets the rate at $225 per month. Military personnel serving in Iraq, Afghanistan, parts of the Persian Gulf region, and certain nearby areas are also eligible for Hardship Duty Pay (HDP). HDP is authorized by 37 U.S.C. 305. It is compensation for the exceptional demands of certain duty, including unusually demanding mission assignments or service in areas with extreme climates or austere facilities. The maximum amount of HDP was recently increased by Congress from $300 to $750 per month. The current rate of HDP for Iraq and Afghanistan is $100 per month. Military personnel participating in OEF and OIF may also be eligible for Family Separation Allowance (FSA). FSA is authorized by 37 U.S.C. 427, which provides a special pay for those servicemembers with dependents who are separated from their families for more than 30 days. The purpose of this pay is to "partially reimburse, on average, members of the uniformed services involuntarily separated from their dependents for the reasonable amount of extra expenses that result from such separation...." To be eligible for this allowance, U.S. military personnel must be separated from their dependents for 30 continuous days or more; but once the 30-day threshold has been reached, the allowance is applied retroactively to the first day of separation. The authorizing statute for FSA sets the rate at $250 per month. Another benefit available to those deployed to Afghanistan, Iraq, and other designated areas nearby is eligibility for the Savings Deposit Program. This program allows service members to earn a guaranteed rate of 10 percent interest on deposits of up to $10,000, which must have been earned in the designated areas. The deposit is normally returned to the servicemember, with interest, within 90 days after he or she leaves the eligible region, although earlier withdrawals can sometimes be made for emergency reasons. Finally, there is a tax benefit for many of those serving overseas in OEF or OIF called the "combat zone tax exclusion." Afghanistan and the airspace above it have been designated a "combat zone" since September 19, 2001. Military personnel serving in direct support of the operations in this combat zone are also eligible for the combat zone tax exclusion. Additionally, certain areas in the Persian Gulf region --including Iraq--have been designated combat zones since 1991. Military personnel serving in direct support of operations in this combat zone are also eligible for the combat zone tax exclusion. For enlisted personnel and warrant officers, this means that all compensation for active military service in a combat zone is free of federal income tax. For commissioned officers, their compensation is free of federal income tax up to the maximum amount of enlisted basic pay plus any imminent danger pay received. While the combat zone tax exclusion contained in federal law applies only to federal income tax, almost all states have provisions extending the benefit to their state income tax as well. Dependents of active duty military personnel who die in the line of duty are eligible for a variety of special payments and benefits. The major compensation and benefit programs are listed below. The death gratuity is a lump sum payment to the surviving spouse of the servicemember, or to the children of the servicemember in equal shares if there is no spouse. The payment amount was recently increased by Congress from $12,420 to $100,000 for all active duty deaths and made retroactive to October 7, 2001. The death gratuity may also be paid if death occurs within 120 days after release from active duty if the death resulted from injury or disease incurred or aggravated during military service. The purpose of this benefit is to provide cash quickly to the survivors in order to help them meet immediate needs. The servicemembers' designated beneficiary, or the statutorily specified next of kin if no beneficiary was designated, is entitled to a payment for any unused leave the servicemember had accrued at the time of death. All members of the military are automatically enrolled in SGLI for the maximum benefit of $400,000. Servicemembers may reduce or decline coverage under SGLI, but doing so requires that they request this in writing. In contrast to most civilian life insurance providers, SGLI pays benefits in the event of combat-related deaths. Effective September 10, 2001, all active duty personnel are covered by the Survivor Benefit Plan (SBP). Under the SBP, if a servicemember dies while on active duty, the surviving spouse is entitled to an annuity, which is based in part on the deceased's basic pay level and years of service. The interaction between SBP benefits, Social Security benefits, and Dependency and Indemnity Compensation is complex and may result in reduced or offset SBP benefits. For a full description of these interactions, see CRS Report RL31664, The Military Survivor Benefit Plan: A Description of Its Provisions , by [author name scrubbed]. SBP payments are terminated for a surviving spouse who remarries before age 55. The Dependency and Indemnity Compensation (DIC) program, administered by the Department of Veterans' Affairs, provides a monthly payment to unremarried surviving spouses, or eligible children, of servicemembers who die because of service related illnesses or injuries. At present, the monthly payment for surviving spouses is $1,033 per month, plus $257 per child. Additional payments can also be made if the survivor has certain disabilities. See the previous paragraph on the Survivor Benefit Plan for important information on the combination of DIC with other government provided annuities. Surviving spouses and children of servicemembers who die while on active duty may be eligible for Social Security Survivor benefits if they meet certain eligibility requirements. The amount of benefits varies based on a number of factors, including the average lifetime earnings of the decedent, the number of quarters the decedent paid Social Security taxes, and certain characteristics of the beneficiary, such as age and relationship to the decedent. Remarriage can have an effect on a widow's or widower's benefit. See the previous paragraph on the Survivor Benefit Plan for important information on the combination of Social Security benefits with other government provided annuities. The following expenses may either be paid directly by the military service to which the deceased belonged, or reimbursed to the individual who pays for them: "(1) Recovery and identification of the remains. (2) Notification of the next of kin or other appropriate person. (3) Preparation of the remains for burial, including cremation if requested by the person designated to direct disposition of the remains. (4) Furnishing of a uniform or other clothing. (5) Furnishing of a casket or urn, or both, with outside box. (6) Hearse service. (7) Funeral director's service. (8) Transportation of the remains, and round-trip transportation and prescribed allowances for an escort of one person, to the place selected by the person designated to direct disposition of the remains or, if such a selection is not made, to a national or other cemetery which is selected by the Secretary and in which burial of the decedent is authorized. (9) Interment of the remains. (10) Presentation of a flag of the United States to the person designated to direct disposition of the remains. (11) Presentation of a flag of equal size to the flag presented under paragraph (10) to the parents or parent, if the person to be presented a flag under paragraph (10) is other than the parent of the decedent." Members of the Armed Forces who die while on active duty are eligible for burial in national cemeteries, including Arlington National Cemetery. The government provides a grave site, opening and closing of the grave, headstone or marker, and maintenance of the site at no cost to the family. Interment of cremated remains in a columbarium is an option as well. The FY2006 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) allows the Secretary of Defense to permit the family of a servicemember who dies on active duty to remain in government quarters for up to 365 days, free of charge. Alternatively, the Secretary can authorize payment of the Basic Allowance for Housing, a tax-free allowance designed to cover most of the costs of civilian housing in a given region, for 365 days. Previously, these benefits had been limited to 180 days. The unremarried surviving spouse of a deceased servicemember remains eligible for TRICARE, the military health care system, until age 65. At age 65, the surviving spouse becomes eligible for TRICARE for Life, provided he or she has Medicare Part A and Part B coverage. Children of the deceased servicemember remain eligible for TRICARE until they become 21 years of age, although eligibility may extend past age 21 if the child meets certain requirements and is either enrolled full time in an institution of higher learning or has a severe disability. Surviving family members of a deceased servicemember receive TRICARE benefits at the active duty dependent rate for a three year period, after which they receive TRICARE benefits at the retiree dependent rates. The unremarried surviving spouse of a deceased servicemember is eligible for unlimited access to the commissary and exchange systems indefinitely. Children of a deceased servicemember are eligible for unlimited access to the commissary and exchange system until they become 21 years of age or get married, although eligibility may extend past age 21 if the child meets certain requirements and is either enrolled full time in an institution of higher learning or has a severe disability. The Survivors' and Dependants' Educational Assistance program, administered by the Department of Veterans' Affairs, provides up to 45 months of educational assistance to unremarried surviving spouses, or eligible children, of servicemembers who die in the line of duty. At present, the monthly payment is $803 per month for full-time attendance at eligible institutions; a lesser amount is paid for part-time attendance. Unremarried spouses have up to ten years to use this benefit. Children may generally receive benefits between the ages of 18 and 26, although there are circumstances where a child can receive benefits before 18 or after 26. This benefit can be used for undergraduate or graduate study, technical or vocational schooling, correspondence courses, some types of on-the-job training, and certain other educational programs. Casualties from ongoing combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have received media attention and Members of Congress have frequently expressed concern about the level of care for those severely injured or wounded service members and their families. As a result, several new programs have been established: While the Servicemembers' Group Life Insurance (SGLI) program has offered low-cost life insurance to military personnel, there has not been, until recently, a provision for disability coverage. Effective December 1, 2005, all service members were insured for traumatic injuries at a monthly premium of $1.00, unless they decline coverage. This program, colloquially referred to as TSGLI or Traumatic SGLI, provides an immediate payment between $25,000 and $100,000 to ease the financial burden associated with hospitalization, recovery and rehabilitation. Those who are blind, deaf, paralyzed, severely burned or multiple amputees will qualify for the $100,000 maximum. Other severe injuries will be compensated on a sliding scale of $25,000, $50,000 and $75,000 based on the severity and duration of the condition. TSGLI is not disability compensation and it has no effect on Veterans Administration entitlements. The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness is responsible for implementing the program with the services. TSGLI is retroactive to October 7, 2001 if the loss was a direct result of injuries received in OEF or OIF. Based on the FY2006 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) , service members who are wounded, injured or become ill in a combat zone (as determined by the Secretary of Defense) and who are medically evacuated, will receive a special pay of $430 per month during the period of their hospitalization, recovery and rehabilitation. The special pay will be reduced by any amount of hostile fire or imminent danger pay that is received and the pay is not retroactive. Because service members receive a Basic Allowance for Subsistence, they have routinely been charged for meals while hospitalized in military medical treatment facilities. Previous legislation had temporarily waived this charge. However, with passage of the FY2006 National Defense Authorization Act , service members are no longer required to pay for these meals while they are undergoing continuous care, to include outpatient care, for an injury, illness or disease incurred in support of OEF, OIF or other military operations designated by the Secretary of Defense. This exemption is now effective from October 1, 2005 through December 31, 2006. Military personnel, including reservists called into active federal service, are eligible for a broad array of legal protections under the Servicemembers' Civil Relief Act (SCRA) of 2003. (Note, however, that National Guardsmen who are serving in a purely state status are not covered by the SCRA; National Guardsmen performing full time National Guard duty under Title 32, section 502(f) of the U.S. Code are eligible for coverage under the SCRA in certain circumstances). Among other things, the SCRA provides military personnel with certain protections against rental property evictions, mortgage foreclosures, insurance cancellations, and government property seizures to pay tax bills. The SCRA also limits to 6 percent the amount of interest that the servicemember has to pay on loans--except student loans--incurred prior to entry onto active duty. Usually, the provisions of the SCRA only apply during the period of active military service, or for a short period of time afterwards. For a full description of the legal protections provided to activated reservists by the SCRA, see the CRS Report RL32360, The Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (P.L. 108-189) , by [author name scrubbed]. Prior to the September 11 attacks, there was a serious debate between Congress and the executive branch over whether the military was being tasked with more missions than it could realistically handle, given its manpower levels. Congress was especially concerned that these missions--in Bosnia, Kosovo, Southwest Asia, the Sinai, and elsewhere--might be producing personnel tempo (PERSTEMPO) levels high enough to have a negative effect on retention. As such, Congress passed laws requiring the services to track the PERSTEMPO of every servicemember, to monitor individual PERSTEMPO levels more closely, and to pay an allowance to servicemembers assigned lengthy or numerous deployments. Similar concerns about PERSTEMPO led General Eric Shinseki, the Army Chief of Staff, to assert before the House Armed Services Committee in July, 2001, that "Given today's mission profile, the Army is too small for the mission load it is carrying." During that hearing, both Shinseki and Secretary of the Army Thomas White endorsed a proposal to increase the Army's end strength from 480,000 to 520,000 soldiers. Since September 11, 2001, operations Noble Eagle, Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom have dramatically increased the manpower needs of the military services, especially for the Army, which has shouldered the bulk of the manpower burden associated with the occupation of Iraq. These manpower needs have been filled primarily through the call up of over 500,000 reservists, longer duty days and higher PERSTEMPO rates for many active duty personnel, and the use of contract personnel. So far, this response has enabled the military to perform its assigned missions, but some observers note that it could cause problems in the future--for example, in unacceptably low retention rates, unacceptable performance levels, and difficulty responding to new crises--if carried out over an extended period of time. In order to prevent such problems from occurring, Congress and the executive branch have taken a number of actions. For example, at the end of FY2003 and FY2004 the Department of Defense invoked a statutory provision which allowed it to exceeded its authorized end strength. Additionally, Congress recently authorized an increase of 20,000 to the size of the active Army and an increase of 3,000 to the size of the active Marine Corps in the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for FY2005. A separate provision in that law gives the Secretary of Defense the authority to temporarily increase the size of the Army by another 10,000 people, and the size of the Marine Corps by 6,000 people. Most recently, the FY2006 National Defense Authorization Act provides for an active duty end strength (as of September 30, 2006) of 512,400 for the Army (an increase of 30,000) and an end strength of 179,000 for the Marine Corps (an increase of 4,000). Furthermore, this legislation authorized additional annual increases of 20,000 for the Army and 5,000 for the Marine Corps for each FY2007 through 2009. However, the Army is having difficulty increasing its strength due to recruiting shortfalls. Another prominent initiative intended to reduce manpower strain is the Army's ongoing effort to reorganize itself, converting from a divisional structure to one based on brigade sized "units of action." The Army believes that this reorganization will increase its pool of deployable units, which could help reduce PERSTEMPO rates. The Army is also shifting of some critical military capabilities from the reserve component to the active component, thereby reducing the need to call up reserve units to support military operations, and retraining personnel from skills in lower demand (such as air defense and artillery) to skills in higher demand (such as military police). Other alternatives which have been suggested include contracting out more functions to the private sector, increasing the use of technologies which reduce manpower needs, securing greater participation in Iraq and Afghanistan by allied military personnel, reducing U.S. involvement in missions such as the Sinai and Kosovo, and withdrawing U.S. forces from Iraq in relatively large numbers. Any attempt to reinstate the draft would require congressional approval. The legal framework for conscription is codified in law, but the law contains a provision which prohibits actual induction into the Armed Forces after July 1, 1973. To reinstate the draft, Congress would have to pass legislation reauthorizing inductions. At the present time, it appears unlikely that the U.S. will reinstate the draft to meet its manpower needs. While the Army and some of the Reserve Components are having difficulty making recruiting goals, the military is meeting its retention objectives and has a large pool of trained personnel in the reserves that it can draw on to augment its active forces. Additionally, while conscription is useful for producing large numbers of basically trained military personnel, it is not very useful for producing high skill specialists which the military often has the greatest need for: for example, intelligence analysts, linguists, special operations forces, civil affairs personnel, and pilots. These people need years of training and high motivation levels to become proficient in their military occupations. However, should reconstruction and counter-insurgency operations in Iraq require a major U.S. presence for a prolonged period of time, the utility of a draft might become a more active consideration. Such a mission could demand a large numbers of military personnel who do not require the more specialized skills. The draft might also be useful if Congress decided to dramatically expand the size of the Army over a short period of time. See also CRS Report RL31682, The Military Draft and a Possible War with Iraq , by [author name scrubbed] (pdf), for a more detailed discussion of arguments for and against a draft.

This report provides short answers to commonly asked questions about military personnel, compensation, and force structure issues related to Operation Noble Eagle (ONE), Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). Operation Noble Eagle is the name given to military operations related to homeland security and support to federal, state, and local agencies in the wake of the September 11 attacks. Operation Enduring Freedom includes ongoing operations in Afghanistan, operations against terrorists in other countries, and training assistance to foreign militaries which are conducting operations against terrorists. Operation Iraqi Freedom includes the invasion of Iraq, the defeat of Saddam Hussein's regime, and the subsequent rebuilding and counter-insurgency operations in Iraq. The questions are grouped into three major thematic areas: personnel, compensation and force structure. The section on personnel addresses issues such as casualties, reserve mobilization, "sole surviving" son or daughter status, conscientious objection, and "stop-loss." The section on compensation addresses issues related to the pay and benefits--including casualty and death benefits--provided to members of the U.S. military participating in ONE/OEF/OIF and their families. The section on force structure addresses issues related to how ONE/OEF/OIF might affect the number of personnel needed by the military, and responds to common questions about whether a return to conscription is likely under current circumstances. This report will be updated as needed.

Article I, Section 2, of the Constitution states: "The House of Representatives shall chuse their Speaker and other Officers." The position of Speaker combines several roles: the institutional role of presiding officer and administrative head of the House, the partisan role of leader of the majority party in the House, and the representative role of an elected Member of the House. As the "elect of the elect," the Speaker has perhaps the most visible job in Congress. By statute, the Speaker is also second in line, behind the Vice President, to succeed to the presidency. The Constitution does not describe the office of the Speaker or its duties, nor was there any significant discussion of the office during the Constitutional Convention. The use of the title "Speaker" probably has its origins in the British House of Commons, where the presiding officer acted as the chamber's spokesman to the Crown, but any assumptions the authors of the Constitution had for the office undoubtedly also drew upon their own experiences in colonial legislatures and the Continental Congress. There does not seem to have been any grand plan or specific expectation as to how the Founding Fathers envisioned the speakership. Rather, the speakership has been shaped largely by the various individuals who have held the post, the circumstances in which they have operated, formal obligations that have been assigned to the office by House rules and by statute, the character of the House as a political and constitutional institution, and traditions and customs that have evolved over time. When the House of Representatives convenes at the beginning of a new Congress, its first order of business is to elect a Speaker. Because the House dissolves at the end of a Congress and must start anew at the beginning of each new Congress, the Clerk of the House presides over the House under general parliamentary law until a Speaker is elected. For its first 50 years, the House elected the Speaker by ballot. In 1839, this method was changed to election by vive voce , meaning that each Member names aloud whom he or she favors for Speaker. Tellers then record the result. In modern practice, each party places the name of a single Member in nomination for the position, but otherwise virtually the same vive voce method is used to elect the Speaker. Because the election of the Speaker typically takes place before the House adopts its rules of procedure, the election process is defined by precedent and practice rather than by any formal rule. To be elected Speaker, a candidate must receive an absolute majority of the votes cast, which may be less than a majority of the full membership of the House because of vacancies, absentees, or Members voting "present." Although the major parties nominate candidates for the position of Speaker, there is no limitation on for whom Members may vote. In fact, there is no requirement that the Speaker be a Member of the House. None of the other officers of the House is a Member. If no candidate receives the requisite majority, the roll call is repeated until a Speaker is elected. Again, Members may continue to vote for any individual, and no restrictions, such as eliminating minority candidates or prohibiting new candidates from being named, are imposed. For example, at the beginning of the 34 th Congress in 1855, 133 ballots over a period of two months were necessary to elect Nathaniel Banks of Massachusetts as Speaker. The last occasion on which multiple ballots were required to elect a Speaker was in 1923. At the beginning of the 68 th Congress, the nominees from both major parties initially failed to receive a majority of the votes because of votes cast for other candidates by Members from the Progressive Party and from the "progressive wing" of the Republican Party. After the Republican leadership agreed to accept a number of procedural reforms, many of these Members agreed to vote for the Republican candidate on the ninth ballot, making Frederick Gillett of Massachusetts the Speaker. If a Speaker dies or resigns during a Congress, the House immediately elects a new Speaker. Although it was an earlier practice of the House to elect a new Speaker under these conditions by adopting a resolution to that effect, the modern practice is to use the same practice as employed at the beginning of a Congress. The most recent example occurred during the 114 th Congress when Paul Ryan of Wisconsin was elected Speaker following the resignation of John Boehner of Ohio. After the ballots are tallied, the presiding officer announces the name of the newly elected Speaker and then appoints a committee of Members to escort the Speaker-elect to the chair. Traditionally, the minority floor leader makes remarks and presents the Speaker-elect to the House; the Speaker-elect then addresses the chamber before being sworn in by the longest continuously serving Member (the "Dean of the House"). The House, at that point, adopts two resolutions, one that informs the Senate of the Speaker's election and one that directs the Clerk to inform the President. In the 19 th century, longevity of House service was not as important a criterion in selecting the Speaker as it is today. It was not unusual for a Member to be elected Speaker with only a few years of service. From 1789 to 1899, the average length of House service before a Member was elected Speaker was 7.1 years. In fact, Henry Clay of Kentucky (in 1811) and William Pennington of New Jersey (in 1860) were each elected Speaker as freshmen. (The first Speaker, Frederick A. Muhlenberg of Pennsylvania, was obviously a third, albeit special, case.) The 21 Speakers elected between 1899 (David B. Henderson) and October 2015 (Paul D. Ryan) served an average of 23.3 years in the House prior to their first election as Speaker. The longest pre speakership tenure in this period belonged to Jim Wright, who served for 17 terms before being elected as Speaker. Sam Rayburn of Texas served longer as Speaker than any other Member: a tenure of 17 years (interrupted twice by Republican majorities). Thomas P. "Tip" O'Neill Jr. of Massachusetts holds the record for the longest continuous service as Speaker: 10 years. The record for the shortest tenure belongs to Theodore M. Pomeroy of New York, who served one day. ( Appendix A lists all the Speakers of the House as well as their party affiliations, home state, and dates of service in that office. See http://history.house.gov/Institution/Firsts-Milestones/Speaker-Fast-Facts/ for other "Speaker of the House Fast Facts" [e.g., youngest, oldest, etc.].) Although the Constitution mentions the office of the Speaker, it is silent on duties of the office. Today, the Speaker possesses substantial powers under House rules. Among the duties performed are the following: Administering the oath of office to Members (the act of 1789 [2 U.S.C. 25] provides that, on the organization of the House, the oath shall be administered by any Member--traditionally the Member with the longest continuous service--to the Speaker and by the Speaker to the other Members); Calling the House to order (Rule I, clause 1); Preserving order and decorum within the chamber and in the galleries (Rule I, clause 2); Recognizing Members to speak and make motions (Rule XVII); Deciding points of order (Rule I, clause 5); Counting a quorum (Rule XX, clause 7(c)); Presenting the pending business to the House for a vote (Rule I, clause 6); Appointing Speakers pro tempore (Rule I, clause 8) and chairs of the Committee of the Whole (Rule XVIII, clause 1); Certifying various actions of the House, including signing all acts and joint resolutions, writs, warrants, and subpoenas of (or issued to) the House (Rule I, clause 4); Appointing select and conference committees (Rule I, clause 11); Appointing certain House officers (such as the inspector general under Rule II, clause 6; the historian of the House under Rule II, clause 7; and the general counsel under Rule II, clause 8); Referring measures to committee(s) (Rule XII, clause 2); and Examining and approving the Journal of the proceedings of the previous day's session (Rule I, clause 1). The Speaker's powers offer him or her considerable latitude to exercise discretion. Under most circumstances, the Speaker has the authority to ask Members who seek recognition, "For what purpose does the gentleman (or gentlelady) rise?" The Speaker may then decide whether or not to recognize that Member for the specific reason given. In this way the Speaker is able to assert control over what motions may be made and therefore what measures will be considered and the general flow of House floor proceedings. House Rule XV, clause 1, allows the Speaker to entertain motions to suspend the rules on Mondays, Tuesdays, and Wednesdays and during the last six days of a session. Discretion over who may be recognized to make such motions gives the Speaker virtually complete control over the suspension process. The institutional role of the Speaker also extends beyond the duty to preside over the House. The Speaker also exercises general control over the Hall of the House and the House side of the Capitol (Rule I, clause 3) and serves as the chair of the House Office Building Commission. The Speaker is frequently authorized in statute to appoint Members to various boards and commissions, and it is typically the Speaker who is the formal recipient of reports or other communications from the President, government agencies, boards, and commissions. The role of the Speaker also extends to the requirement in House Rule V, clause 1, that he or she administer a system for audio and video broadcasting of the proceedings of the House. Rule I, clause 9, provides for the Speaker, in consultation with the minority leader, to devise a system of drug testing in the House. Finally, although it is not prescribed in any formal way, the elevated profile of the office of the Speaker often means he or she takes a leading role in negotiations with the Senate or President. Under both Republican and Democratic majorities, Speakers have played similar roles as leaders of their parties. A Speaker's role as leader of the majority party is manifested in two ways: within the party conference or caucus and on the House floor. Within the Republican Party conference, the Speaker acts as the chair of the party's Steering Committee, has four votes on the committee, and also appoints another member of it. The Speaker thus plays a major part in the committee assignment process, because Members are nominated to serve on or chair committees by the Steering Committee. These nominations are subject to approval by the full party conference and subsequently by the House. In addition, the Speaker is empowered to make nominations directly for the Republican Conference's consideration for membership (including chairs) on the Rules Committee and the Committee on House Administration as well as one Member (to serve as the second-ranking Republican) on the Budget Committee. The conference rules also authorize the Speaker to recommend to the House all Republican members of joint, select, and ad hoc committees. House Republican Conference rules also provide for the Speaker to serve on the National Republican Congressional Committee. He or she also serves on the party's Committee on Policy and can appoint additional Members to it. Because the Speaker's role as leader of the majority party in the House is sometimes at odds with the role as presiding officer of the chamber, House Republican Conference Rule 2(c) states: A Member of the elected or designated Republican Leadership has an obligation, to the best of his or her ability, to support positions adopted by the Conference, and the resources of the Leadership shall be utilized to support that position. Under the rules of the House Democratic Caucus (which are lengthier and more detailed than those of the Republican Conference), a Speaker from that party would recommend (to the caucus) nominees for officers of the House. A Speaker's prominence within the caucus is reinforced because he or she would chair the Steering and Policy Committee and appoint two vice-chairs, and up to 15 of the committee's members. In addition, a Speaker would appoint one Member to the House Budget Committee. He or she would nominate the Democratic membership on the Committee on Rules and on the Committee on House Administration and recommend to the caucus a nominee for chair of these two committees. A Speaker of the Democratic Party also serves as a member of the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee and appoints eight of its members. The success of every person to hold the Speaker's office since the late 20 th century has been judged, at least in part, on the basis of his or her ability to use personal prestige and the powers of persuasion and bargaining to enunciate and advance his or her party's vision and legislative agenda, as well as on success in maintaining majority control of the House. To accomplish these objectives, modern Speakers have used varying personal styles and engaged in a variety of activities not just in Congress or their party conference but outside as well. For example, they publicize their party's policies and achievements (by giving speeches, appearing on radio and television, holding press conferences, etc.), assist party Members who are seeking reelection, consult with Presidents about both Administration and congressional agendas and goals, and act as a spokesman for the opposition when the majority in the House is not the same party as the President. In the words of one commentator: To an increasing degree, the way for a Speaker to win support among colleagues is to influence public opinion.... [A] House leader now needs some credibility outside the institution in order to win on the inside. Bringing coherence and efficiency to a decentralized and individualistic legislative body requires a Speaker to use the entire range of tangible and intangible rewards that can be bestowed or withheld. In an interview, Speaker O'Neill once described how he wielded these various minor powers by saying: You know, you ask me what are my powers and my authorities around here? The power to recognize on the floor; little odds and ends--like men get pride out of the prestige of handling the Committee of the Whole, being named Speaker for the day.... [T]here is a certain aura and respect that goes with the Speaker's office. He does have the power to pick up the telephone and call people. And Members oftentimes like to bring their local political leaders or a couple of mayors. And oftentimes they have problems from their area and they need aid and assistance.... We're happy to try to open the door for them, having been in the town for so many years and knowing so many people. We do know where a lot of bodies are and we do know how to advise people. The power to schedule legislation for floor consideration can be used in ways that reflect both institutional and partisan considerations. The Speaker is charged with ensuring that the House processes its fundamental annual workload, but determining what, when, and in which order measures reach the floor can help determine their fate. A week's delay in scheduling a controversial bill may work to enhance or minimize its chances for passage. According to Speaker O'Neill, it was one of his most important powers, because "if [a Speaker] doesn't want a certain bill to come up, it usually doesn't." Similarly, the Speaker's authority to appoint conferees can be a powerful tool for influencing the final provisions of a bill. The Members appointed represent a complex balance of support for House, committee, and party positions as determined by the Speaker and are not subject to challenge. Modern Speakers have also frequently had to act as mediators of conflicts within their parties. As one leader put it, this involves [t]rying to mollify members who are angry with other members, trying to keep dangerous rifts from developing within the party. Sometimes getting people together of opposite viewpoints and letting them talk their problems out in a way that lets each understand that the other has a problem. Sometimes you can come to a compromise. Balancing parliamentary and partisan roles is not always easily accomplished. At the start of the 20 th century, historian Mary Follett assessed this conundrum: The Speaker ... is not only allowed, but expected to use his position to advance party interests. It must not be supposed, however, that this implies gross partisanship on the part of our Speakers. They neither attempt to use every inch of power to be conjured out of the rules, nor guide the House entirely from party motives. Their office has on the whole been administered with justness and fairness. Another assessment states: Tradition and unwritten law require that the Speaker apply the rules of the House consistently, yet in the twilight zone a large area exists where he may exercise great discrimination and where he has many opportunities to apply the rules to his party's advantage. Although elected as an officer of the House, the Speaker continues to be a Member of the House as well. Accordingly, the Speaker continues to have the same rights, responsibilities, and privileges as all Members. However, because of the Speaker's position as leader, it may be notable or even controversial when he or she exercises the powers granted to other Members, such as debating, voting, and sitting as a Member of a standing committee of the House. Under the principles articulated in Jefferson ' s Manual , the Speaker is typically heard only on matters of order, and it is highly irregular to speak on any other matter while presiding. The Speaker may speak from the floor (as would any other Member), and the precedents of the House include examples of the Speaker leaving the chair to speak from the well, make motions, or debate points of order. However, in most periods in the history of the House, these privileges were infrequently exercised. Jonathan Dayton of New Jersey was the first Speaker to speak out on a matter in Committee of the Whole (during the Fourth Congress), and it was not until Henry Clay of Kentucky became Speaker that this practice became generally accepted. As late as 1850, Chauncy Cleveland of Connecticut, then a Member of the House, questioned whether it would be right or just by the power of party to place a man in the Speaker's chair, and then compel him to use the influence of the chair when he had defined his position.... It was utterly impossible that the Speaker, after having taken his side upon the floor, could go back to the chair, and award the floor with the same impartiality as if he had never spoken. Even today the Speaker does not typically participate in debate on the floor, although the Speaker may do so when he or she feels it necessary to highlight or rally support for the majority party's agenda. The right of the Speaker to vote has also evolved over time. The first rules of the House provided: In all cases of ballot by the House, the Speaker shall vote; in other cases he shall not vote, unless the House be equally divided, or unless his vote, if given to the minority, will make the division equal, and in case of such equal division, the question shall be lost. The Speaker was thus prevented from voting on legislative matters, although the precedents of the House record several examples of Speakers voting contrary to this rule. The Speaker was allowed to vote in Committee of the Whole, but most early Speakers apparently refrained from this practice as well. At least twice (in 1833 and 1837) the House debated proposals to compel the Speaker to vote on all questions, but these proposals were defeated. It was not until 1850 that the rule was amended to allow the Speaker to vote at his discretion, and the modern form of the rule was not adopted until 1880. Rule I, clause 7, currently reads: The Speaker is not required to vote in ordinary legislative proceedings, except when his vote would be decisive or when the House is engaged in voting by ballot. Unlike other Representatives, the Speaker does not sit on any standing committees of the House. This was not always the case. The Rules Committee was for many years a select committee authorized to report a system of rules at the beginning of a Congress and later also to report from "time to time." Beginning in 1858, and continuing after the Rules Committee was made a standing committee of the House in 1880, the Speaker served as chairman. This practice continued through 1910, when the House adopted a rule prohibiting the Speaker from sitting on the Rules Committee. The formal prohibition was removed from House rules by the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, but the tradition has continued. Today, the Speaker does not sit on the Rules Committee but does nominate the majority Members in the party conference, effectively making the Rules Committee an integral part of the leadership structure. Appendix A. Speakers of the House of Representatives, 1789-2017 Appendix B. Select Bibliography Albert, Carl Bert. Little Giant: The Life and Times of Speaker Carl Albert . Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1990. Bentley, Judith. Speakers of the House . New York: Franklin Watts Inc., 1994. Biggs, Jeffrey R. Honor in the House: Speaker Tom Foley . Pullman: University of Washington Press, 1999. Clancy, Paul R. Tip, A Biography of Thomas P. O ' Neill, Speaker of the House . New York: Macmillan, 1980. Cheney, Richard B. and Lynne V. Cheney. Kings of the Hill: Power and Personality in the House of Representatives . New York: Continuum, 1983. Chiu, Chang-wei. The Speaker of the House of Representatives Since 1896 . New York: Columbia University Press, 1928; reprint edition New York: AMS Press, 1968. Cooper, Joseph and David W. Brady. "Institutional Context and Leadership Style: The House from Cannon to Rayburn," American Political Science Review , vol. 75 (June 1981). Davidson, Roger H., Susan Webb Hammond, and Raymond Smock. Masters of the House: Congressional Leadership Over Two Centuries . Boulder, CO: West Press, 1998. Follett, Mary P. The Speaker of the House of Representatives . New York: Longmans Green, 1902; reprint edition New York: Burt Franklin, 1974. Fuller, Hubert Bruce. The Speaker of the House . Boston: Little Brown, 1909; reprint edition New York: Arno Press, 1974. Green, Matthew N. The Speaker of the House: A Study of Leadership . New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010. Harris, Douglas B. "The Rise of the Public Speakership," Political Science Quarterly , vol. 113 (summer 1998). Hinds, Asher C. "The Speaker of the House of Representatives: Origin of the Office, Its Duties and Powers," American Political Science Review , vol. 3 (May 1909). Hitchner, Dell G. "The Speaker of the House of Representatives," Parliamentary Affairs , vol. 13 (spring 1960). Kennon, Donald R., ed. The Speakers of the U.S. House of Representatives: A Bibliography, 1789-1984 . Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986. Moser, Charles A. The Speaker and the House: Coalitions and Power in the United States House of Representatives . Washington: Free Congress Research and Education Foundation, 1979. O'Neill, Thomas P. Jr. Man of the House . New York: Random House, 1987. Peters, Ronald M. The American Speakership: The Office in Historical Perspective (2 nd ed.) . Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997. ----, ed. The Speaker: Leadership in the U.S. House of Representatives . Washington: Congressional Quarterly, 1995. Peabody, Robert L. Leadership in Congress: Stability, Succession, and Change . Boston: Little Brown, 1976. Ripley, Randall B. Party Leaders in the House of Representatives . Washington: Brookings Institution, 1967. Rohde, David W. Parties and Leaders in the Postreform House . Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991. Sinclair, Barbara. Majority Leadership in the U.S. House . Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983. ----. Legislators, Leaders, and Lawmaking: The U.S. House of Representatives in the Postreform Era . Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995. Smith, Steven S. "O'Neill's Legacy for the House," Brookings Review , vol. 5 (Winter 1987). Smith, William Henry. Speakers of the House of Representatives of the United States . New York: AMS Press, 1971.

The Speaker of the House of Representatives is widely viewed as symbolizing the power and authority of the House. The Speaker's most prominent role is that of presiding officer of the House. In this capacity, the Speaker is empowered by House rules to administer proceedings on the House floor, including recognition of Members to speak on the floor or make motions and appointment of Members to conference committees. The Speaker also oversees much of the nonlegislative business of the House, such as general control over the Hall of the House and the House side of the Capitol and service as chair of the House Office Building Commission. The Speaker's role as "elect of the elect" in the House also places him or her in a highly visible position with the public. The Speaker also serves as not only titular leader of the House but also leader of the majority party conference. The Speaker is often responsible for airing and defending the majority party's legislative agenda in the House. The Speaker's third distinct role is that of an elected Member of the House. Although elected as an officer of the House, the Speaker continues to be a Member as well. As such the Speaker enjoys the same rights, responsibilities, and privileges of all Representatives. However, the Speaker has traditionally refrained from debating or voting in most circumstances and does not sit on any standing committee of the House.

This report discusses proposals to raise the cigarette tax to help pay for reauthorization of the State Children's Health Insurance Program. This report describes current taxes, discusses potential revenue gains, and discusses some of the basic issues surrounding a tax increase. It also briefly discusses the tax increase on cigars. H.R. 2 passed the House on January 14, 2009 and it included the same cigarette tax as proposed in the 110 th Congress, an increase of 61 cents per pack, raising the tax from 39 cents to $1. The estimated revenues in the House bill were $64.7 billion for FY2009-FY2018, with $57.3 billion of the total from cigarettes. The Senate version and the final legislation, P.L. 111-3 includes taxes similar to H.R. 2 (very slightly higher across the board, with a 61.66 cents increase in cigarette taxes). The vast majority of tobacco taxes are on cigarettes, which account for 94% of tobacco sales (totaling $75 billion in 2007). Federal cigarette taxes are $0.39 per pack, accounting for 94% of federal tobacco tax revenue. There is a 4 cent tax on a package of small cigars. Large cigars carry a tax of 20.719% of sales price, not to exceed $48.75 per 1,000 units, leading to a maximum tax of almost 5 cents per cigar. Per ounce, the tax is 7 cents on pipe tobacco; 1 cent on chewing tobacco; 4 cents on snuff; and 7 cents on pipe and roll-your-own tobacco. There are also taxes on cigarette paper and cigarette tubes. The 61-cent cigarette tax increase would lead to a tax about 2.5 times the current tax.; these same proportions are proposed for snuff, chewing, tobacco and pipe tobacco. Roll your own tobacco's tax increases about eight fold and seven fold and the relatively small taxes on small cigars are increased to those on cigarettes. Large cigars are the only tobacco product with a tax based on price, but they also have a cap; the price-based tax rises in proportionally, but the cap increases by much more, from 5 cents per cigar to $0.40 in the House bill ($0.4026 in the Senate Finance bill and the final legislation). Tobacco tax receipts in the United States in FY2007 included $7.5 billion in federal tax, $16.2 billion in state and local taxes, and $8 billion in payments from the Master Tobacco Settlement. State and local taxes, therefore, were roughly 88 cents per pack and the tobacco settlement payment is approximately the same as the federal tax, 43 cents per pack. Although the tobacco settlement payments resulted from negotiations between the tobacco companies and the states to settle state lawsuits, the payments function as if they were a national tobacco excise tax that is allocated to the states, and any changes that alter consumption would affect these payments. Some of the states have securitized their payments (exchanged the stream of payment for a fixed up-front amount). According to estimates, about a quarter of payments are made to private investors, rather than to state and local governments. As a percentage of sales revenues, the federal, state and local, and tobacco settlement payments are respectively 10.0%, 21.6% and 10.7%, for a total of 42.2%. The Joint Committee on Taxation projected an FY2010 revenue gain of $6.4 billion from the 61 cent increase. CRS estimates suggest there will be a loss of revenue to the states approaching $1.5 billion. There are many alternative sources of revenue (or offsetting spending) for funding the child health program. Are tobacco taxes the most desirable source of revenue? Compared to other taxes, the incentive effects may be desirable. At the same time, the burden falls heavily on lower income people, which may be of concern. Thus, there is a trade-off between the objective of discouraging smoking, and particularly discouraging youth smoking, and the distributional effects of the tax. The remaining issue involves an economic efficiency question relating to arguments that have been made that additional taxes are appropriate to cover costs smokers impose on others. A number of economic studies have questioned that proposition. The following sections discuss these issues. A large body of literature has suggested that increases in the price of tobacco reduce smoking. However, this response is not very large (in economists' parlance, the response is relatively "inelastic"). Most of the evidence has found the price elasticity to be between 0.3 and 0.5 in absolute value, meaning that a 10% increase in price would cause a 3% to 5% decrease in the number of cigarettes smoked. For older adult smokers, about half of this effect was due to fewer smokers (a participation response) and about half due a reduction in smoking (a quantity response). For younger smokers, the participation response was more important. There is some evidence that the response declines with age and that it rises with income, and that it is higher for women, African-Americans, and Hispanics. A recent study, however, found no variation with income. Some recent studies suggest that the response may be less, or that the benefits of reducing smoking may be less. There is some evidence that the response has been declining, an unsurprising outcome since, given a decline in smoking, the remaining smokers are more resistant to price signals. In addition, there is evidence that elasticities might be overstated in studies that compare state smoking levels because states with higher taxes may also have populations more hostile to smoking. Also, recent studies found that smokers may respond to price increases by increasing the intensity of smoking by buying cigarettes with more nicotine and tar, inhaling more deeply and smoking closer to the filter, which could have deleterious effects since more intensive smoking can be more harmful. Due to the limited effects on adult smoking, some arguments have been made that the increased taxes on adults are necessary over the interim to discourage teenage smoking. Evidence has suggested that teenage smoking is more responsive to price; the original responses were estimated at elasticities over one, but subsequent analysis led to an estimate of around 0.7 and a number of recent studies have confirmed this general range. Other studies have found smaller responses, or a very small response by younger teenagers. One recent study replicated the 0.7 elasticity using one statistical approach, but in using another the authors consider superior, they found essentially no response of the initiation of smoking to price. Another paper found a weak and insignificant effect after controlling for anti-smoking sentiment. While much evidence suggests that teenagers are more responsive to prices, these recent studies raise some questions about the effectiveness of tax increases on teenage smoking, especially among young teenagers. The evidence on smoking indicates that higher prices will decrease smoking participation and quantity. It is possible, however, that other types of interventions, such as stricter regulations on sales to teenagers, counseling, education, and assistance with smoking cessation might be more effective. It is generally recognized that cigarette taxes are one of the most regressive taxes, that is, a tax that falls more heavily on lower income individuals as a percentage of income. Indeed, it is probably the most regressive of the federal taxes. Smokers tend to smoke a fixed amount of cigarettes, so that they pay a fixed amount of tax. (Since the tax is a fixed amount per pack, lower income individuals who buy cheaper brands still pay the same amount of tax.) In addition, smoking is more prevalent among lower income individuals. To illustrate, in 1998 the Joint Committee on Taxation estimated that a 76 cent tax increase (brought about through a proposed federal tobacco settlement) would raise the effective tax rate on average by 0.3% of income, but would increase the burden of those with incomes below $10,000 by 2% of income and the burden of those in the $10,000-$20,000 income by 0.6% of income. Since this rate applies to all families, those families with smokers would pay more. For example, a family with one smoker who smokes 1.5 packs a day would pay, with a 76 cent tax, an additional $417 in taxes, which is 4.2% of a $10,000 income and 8.4% of a $5,000 income. To the extent the burden of the tax falls on low-income families and the individuals in those families continue to smoke, low-income children in some families could be harmed even though the child health care provision helps low-income children in general. A final issue that may arise relevant to cigarette taxes is the argument that higher taxes should be imposed on smokers because they impose costs on others largely through higher health care costs paid for through government and private insurance plans, lost days at work, and some other costs. Some economists have questioned this argument, however, because smokers' premature deaths, while harmful to smokers and their families, reduce costs of certain government programs such as Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid. These calculations do not account for more subjective effects such as irritation to others, although such problems might be better addressed through private market mechanisms (provision of smoking and non-smoking commercial establishments) and regulation. Some disputes about the magnitude of environmental tobacco smoke remain. If smokers are not imposing costs on others, or imposing costs that are less than existing taxes, and if they are making rational decisions to engage in an activity which, while damaging to their health, is nevertheless pleasurable, then an additional tax would not increase economic efficiency. It is not clear, however, whether young smokers, where smoking is generally initiated, are able to fully assess the costs of smoking. Although taxes on other products are a small part of total tobacco taxes, there has been some controversy about the increases for cigars in 110 th Congress proposals and their potential disruption of the industry , as reported in the media. Small cigar taxes increase by a factor of 27. They are apparently viewed by some as substitute for cigarettes who argue they should bear the same tax. Small cigars constitute less than 1/10 of 1% of cigarette sales. For large cigar taxes, which are currently a maximum of 5 cents, the tax could rise to as much as $10 in the original Senate Finance Committee proposal in the 110 th Congress. The ceiling was lowered to $3 on the Senate floor in the 2007 legislation and the ceiling in the House bill was $1 in 2007. H.R. 2 has a ceiling of $0.40, which although much lower is eight times the previous maximum. According to tax data, large cigar sales above the current 5 cents cap (premium cigars) account for about half the total. According to the Cigar Association of America, the average manufacturer's price is about $1.90 for these premium cigars; the average tax on these cigars would be almost a dollar (0.5313 times $1.90 minus $.05) in the original 110 th Congress Senate proposal, but much smaller in the House bill because of lower rate and cap and smaller in the final proposal. Most state cigar taxes are based on value and would apply to the federal tax; they are estimated by the Cigar Association of America at about 30%. If retail prices are twice the manufacturer's price the price of large cigars under the cap in the original Senate proposal would have risen by 20.8% and the price of large cigars over the cap, while varying considerably, would have averaged a 33% increase. Prices would rise more if there is also a retailers markup on the tax. The ceiling of $0.4026 would result in much more modest effects. There is less information on the effects of other tobacco products on health or the behavioral response. If the purpose of the tax on cigars is to account for health costs, a per unit rather than a price based tax would seem appropriate. Cigars may differ from cigarettes in that a larger share may be likely to be smoked only occasionally and would therefore be less harmful to health. They may also be less concentrated at lower incomes. The occasional usage (lack of addictiveness) may mean a larger price response, but the usage by higher income consumers may mean a smaller response.

On January 15, the House passed H.R. 2, a bill which included increased tobacco taxes to finance State Children's Health Insurance Program (SCHIP). This legislation was similar to that passed in the 110th Congress (H.R. 976 and H.R. 3162) although the initial House proposal had smaller tax increases.. H.R. 2 increases cigarette taxes, the primary source of tobacco tax revenues from 39 cents to $1.00. According to the Joint Committee on Taxation, the cigarette tax will raise $6.4 billion in federal revenues in FY2010 with all federal tobacco taxes increases raising $7.1 billion. A similar tax increase was contained in the Senate bill, and in the final proposal, P.L. 111-3 (although in both case the tax was increased by an additional two thirds of a cent, to $1.0066.) The analysis suggests that state and local governments will lose about $1 billion in cigarette tax revenues and up to $0.5 billion in lost revenues from the tobacco settlement payments. The legislation is now being considered in the Senate. A justification is to discourage teenage smoking, but this effect is probably small; a reservation is that the burden falls heavily on low-income individuals. Taxes on other tobacco products are also increased, although cigarette taxes account for most tobacco revenues. In the 110th Congress, the President vetoed the 110th Congress SCHIP proposal on October 3, 2008, the House failed to override the veto and a new bill, H.R. 3963 passed the House and Senate, with no changes in the cigarette tax, but changes in spending rules, and the President vetoed that version on December 12, 2008.

Since FY2008, federal highway user taxes and fees have been inadequate to fund the surface transportation program authorized by Congress. Although the 2015 surface transportation act addressed the revenue shortfall through FY2020 by authorizing the use of general funds for transportation purposes, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projects that after FY2020 the gap between dedicated surface transportation revenues and spending will average $20 billion annually. The search for revenue to fill this gap may revive congressional interest in tolling as a means of financing transportation projects without federal expenditures. Although states are free to impose tolls on roads, bridges, and tunnels that have been built and maintained without federal assistance, federal law limits the imposition of tolls on existing federal-aid highways, especially on the Interstate Highways. This report explains current federal policies governing tolling and discusses issues related to increasing the use of tolls as a source of revenue for surface transportation projects. In some states, mostly in the Northeast and the mid-Atlantic region, many of today's highways were originally toll roads, often built and operated by private investors. While tolling often made it possible to build or improve roads at minimal cost to taxpayers, many of these roads failed due to overly optimistic revenue expectations, inability to attract sufficient investment to pay for improvements, competing capacity, and toll avoidance and the related cost of enforcement. Over time, toll roads came to be regarded as obstacles to the free flow of commerce. When it established the forerunner of today's federal-aid highway program in 1916, Congress emphasized the principle that roads should be free. Section 1 of the Federal Aid Road Act (39 Stat. 355) provided that "all roads constructed under the provision of this Act be free from tolls of all kinds." The Oldfield Act of 1927 (44 Stat. 1398) opened the door to tolls by permitting the use of federal funds to build toll bridges as long as they were operated by the states or their political subdivisions. However, the federal Bureau of Public Roads continued to oppose the use of federal funds on toll roads. Consequently, when states, mainly in the Northeast, undertook expressway construction in the decade after World War II, they built toll roads without federal aid. By January 1, 1955, there were 1,239 miles of completed "arterial toll roads" in the United States, another 1,382 miles were under construction, and 3,314 miles were being planned or studied. Many of these roads were on routes of the planned Interstate system. Although the Bureau of Public Roads supported the building of new Interstate Highways as free roads, it did recommend that existing toll roads that met its engineering standards and followed the routes of proposed Interstate Highways be incorporated into the new network. The tolling prohibition was reiterated in the Federal-Aid Highway Act and Highway Revenue Act of 1956 (P.L. 84-621; 70 Stat. 374), which authorized 13 years of funding for construction of the Interstate Highway system, created the Highway Trust Fund (HTF) as the source of federal funds for state road construction, and raised tax rates on motor fuels to help fund it. The fuel and other highway taxes that were now dedicated to the HTF were seen as a close proxy for a user-payer system of financing federal-aid roads. The increased flow of federal funds, heavily weighted toward the Interstate Highways, effectively stopped the development of new toll roads by the states. Thirty-five years later, the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 (ISTEA; P.L. 102-240 ) opened non-Interstate federal-aid highways to tolling, but allowed existing roads or bridges to be tolled only after being reconstructed. This effectively linked tolling to capacity additions or road improvements. Both the 1998 Transportation Equity Act for the 21 st Century (TEA-21; P.L. 105-178 , as amended by P.L. 105-206 ) and the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users ( P.L. 109-59 ; SAFETEA) allowed tolling on high-occupancy vehicle (HOV) lanes, established pilot projects for tolling of a limited number of Interstate system routes, and allowed limited use of tolls that vary according to the level of traffic, known as congestion pricing. The Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21 st Century Act (MAP-21; P.L. 112-141 ), enacted in 2012, reinforced the encouragement of tolls on HOV lanes and congestion pricing. It allowed new Interstate system routes or route extensions to be built as toll roads, but continued to block tolling of most existing Interstate Highway lane capacity. MAP-21 retained two pilot programs, one encouraging the use of pricing to control congestion and another allowing Interstate route segments in three states to be converted to tolling as part of their reconstruction. The Fixing America's Surface Transportation Act (FAST Act; P.L. 114-94 ), enacted in December 2015, clarified that public authorities generally, as opposed to solely state agencies, may impose tolls on single-occupant vehicles using HOV lanes. It modified the TEA-21 pilot program allowing existing Interstate Highway segments in three states to be subject to tolls to finance reconstruction by providing that federal approval lapses if the selected states have not started construction within three years of approval. The law also included two provisions related to the setting of rates. One mandates that intercity buses that serve the public have the same access to toll roads and pay the same rates as public transportation buses. The other requires public authorities operating high-occupancy toll lanes (HOT lanes) on the Interstate system to consult with the metropolitan planning organizations concerning the placement and amount of tolls on the facility. Other than these changes, the FAST Act continued the general federal government policy of not regulating toll rates. Table 1 , below, briefly describes active federal tolling programs. An important attribute of federal tolling policy is that all conversions of existing federal-aid highways, bridges, or tunnels to toll facilities require that the facility be reconstructed, restored, rehabilitated, or replaced (unless the conversion occurs under the Value Pricing Pilot Program). The decision to convert a free facility to a tolled facility must be made prior to completion of the qualifying reconstruction project. According to the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA), once physical construction is completed it is too late to make the decision to toll, unless an additional qualifying reconstruction or rehabilitation project is undertaken. Whether it is built or operated by a government agency or by private investors, a toll road must have sufficient traffic willing to pay a high enough toll to cover construction, maintenance, and toll collection costs if it is to be financially successful. Most roads on the federal-aid system are not likely to pass that test. In rural areas, highways often do not have enough traffic to cover the cost of building toll-collection infrastructure and collecting tolls. While urban roads typically have more traffic, they may not be able to generate sufficient toll revenue to make the facilities self-sustaining. Some publicly owned toll roads have been financially successful, generating sufficient revenue to pay for capital improvements and operations, and, in some cases, to contribute to the cost of other highway activities and even to public transportation activities. Other public toll facilities, however, have struggled. One recent example is the 8 miles of express toll lanes built by the Maryland Transportation Authority on I-95 north of Baltimore. In the seven months following their opening in December 2014, the toll lanes produced $6 million in revenue before operating expenses, far from enough to cover the cost of financing the $1.1 billion project. The state government has had to use other funds to make up the difference. Recent federal policy has encouraged the use of tolling to attract private investment into highway and bridge construction, but a number of private toll roads have proven to be financial failures. The Pocahontas Parkway, an 8.8-mile-long toll road near Richmond, VA, that opened in 2002, has persistently been unable to service debt due to low traffic volumes; in June 2012, its private operator wrote off the entire value of its investment in a 99-year concession, and eventually transferred the lease to a new operator. SH-130, a 90-mile, four-lane toll road near Austin, TX, has had much lower traffic volumes than forecast when it opened in 2012, and the Texas Department of Transportation ended up subsidizing truck tolls in an effort to help make the privately owned project viable. Despite the subsidy, in March 2016 the toll road operator, SH 130 Concession Co., and two affiliates filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection. Other toll roads that have sought bankruptcy protection include the South Bay Expressway in San Diego, CA, and the Indiana Toll Road. All of these financial failures were public-private partnerships (P3s) that were formed based, at least in part, on overly optimistic forecasts of the revenue that would be provided by tolls. Their widely publicized difficulties have made investors more cautious about projects reliant on toll revenue. In some cases, private-sector investors have conditioned their participation in P3s on "availability payments," regular payments from the sponsoring government entity to the private entity. This reduces the risk to the private entity, but leaves the public entity at risk if toll revenue falls short of expectations. Using tolls to support transportation expenditures may be a comparatively inefficient form of funding because of high administrative costs. Collecting federal motor fuels taxes is estimated to cost about 1% of the amount collected. The process is administratively simple, because nearly all the federal fuels taxes are collected at the terminal "rack" from only 850 registered taxpayers nationwide, rather than at a large number of retail gasoline stations. The small number of collection points also facilitates enforcement. The administrative costs of toll collection appear to be significantly higher than the cost of fuel-tax collection. Determining the true cost of toll collection is difficult because, as noted in a 2007 report for the Transportation Research Board, some costs are not readily identified in agencies' financial reports, such as a portion of general administrative costs and pension expenses attributable to tolling. Published figures thus likely understate true collection costs. Even so, at the seven agencies examined, the study estimated that toll collection cost from 16.5% to 92.6% of the amount collected. Most toll facilities now collect a majority of their tolls from customer accounts that are debited when an electronic sensor detects a transponder in a vehicle passing beneath a gantry. In principle, the cost of operating an electronic tolling system should be much lower than the cost of manual collection, due to obvious personnel savings. However, many toll facilities continue to employ collectors to receive cash tolls. Those with no provision for collecting cash tolls normally bill drivers without transponders by mail at the address associated with the license plate on the vehicle, often at a higher rate to cover the cost of mailing the bill. Recent financial reports from public agencies indicate that even with extensive use of electronic tolling, collecting highway tolls costs between 8% and 11% of the amount collected (see Table 2 ). The annual report of the New Hampshire turnpike system breaks out some of the costs of electronic tolling in detail, including bank and credit card fees (2.7% of revenue collected from the electronic system), fees paid to process electronic transactions (7.3%), and the in-vehicle transponders furnished to drivers (0.7%). The agency's total operating costs for electronic tolling in FY2015, not including enforcement costs and depreciation of the electronic tolling infrastructure, were 10.6% of revenues collected electronically. Highway toll revenue nationwide came to $14.35 billion in FY2014, according to FHWA. While the amount of toll revenue has grown significantly in recent years, toll revenue as a share of total spending on highways has been relatively steady for more than half a century, in the range of roughly 5% to 6%. On average, facility owners collected $2.36 million per mile of toll road or bridge in FY2014, but revenue per mile varies greatly among toll facilities. All revenue from tolls flows to the state or local agencies or private entities that operate tolled facilities; the federal government does not collect any revenue from tolls. However, a major expansion of tolling might reduce the need for federal expenditures on roads. There are three possible means of increasing revenue from tolling: Increase the extent of toll roads. FHWA statistics identify 6,088 tolled miles of roads, bridges, and tunnels as of January 1, 2015, a net increase of 1,367 miles, or 29%, over 1990. These figures indicate that the extent of toll roads has been growing by 54.7 miles per year, on average, adjusting for the fact that some previously tolled roads have become toll-free. Toll-road mileage comprises only 0.6% of the 1,016,964 miles of public roads eligible for federal highway aid. While there may be many existing roads on which tolling would be financially feasible, proposals to place tolls on existing roads have encountered strong opposition in several states, including Missouri, North Carolina, Texas, and Virginia. The vast majority of mileage on the federal-aid system probably has too little traffic to make toll collection economically viable. Increase toll-road usage . In the aftermath of the recession that began in 2007, the number of vehicle miles traveled in the United States fell below pre-recession levels until 2014. In 2015, vehicle miles traveled increased by 3.5% over 2014. Despite this recent growth in travel, demographic trends and social changes, such as the increased popularity of center-city living among young people, suggest that personal motor vehicle use may grow more slowly in future years than it did in 2015. If that proves to be the case, higher traffic volume may contribute little to increased toll revenues in the long run. Increase the average toll per mile. Toll rates are often significant political issues at the state and local levels, especially when toll revenue is used for purposes other than building and maintaining the toll facility. Trucking interests frequently raise opposition to rate changes that increase truck tolls relative to automobile tolls. On publicly owned facilities, political concerns may lead to toll reductions, as occurred on bridges operated by the Delaware River Port Authority and the Maryland Transportation Authority in 2015. Where roads are operated by private concessionaires, the operators' contracts with state governments typically specify the maximum rate at which tolls can rise. Additionally, large increases can encourage motorists to use competing non-tolled routes. These factors suggest that imposing tolls on individual transportation facilities is likely to be of only limited use in helping states overcome reductions in federal grants should Congress deal with the shortfall in motor fuels tax revenue by reducing the size of the federal surface transportation program. Further, some states, particularly those with low population densities, may have few or no facilities suitable for tolling. Tolls may be an effective way of financing specific facilities, especially major roads, bridges, or tunnels that are likely to be used heavily and are located such that the tolls are difficult to evade, but they seem likely to be less effective in providing broad financial support for surface transportation programs. One way of estimating the revenue that could be raised by tolling the Interstate Highways is to assume that the public would pay the same average annual amount per mile, $2.35 million, as is raised on existing U.S. toll roads and bridges. In this case, tolling all Interstate Highways would be expected to raise roughly $112 billion per year. Of this, approximately $8 billion is already captured by existing toll facilities, leaving around $104 billion of new revenue. This would be more than enough to maintain and operate the proposed toll network. However, it is doubtful that this average could be supported over the entire length of the Interstate system. This is because a large proportion of current toll revenue is collected on heavily traveled roads and bridges in urban areas. The rural Interstates that account for a majority of Interstate Highway mileage carry far less traffic, and may be unable to produce so much revenue per mile. In addition, excessively high tolls could lead users to seek alternative routes. In cases where an Interstate carries little traffic, the costs of building and maintaining the toll collection system might be large relative to the revenue that could be realized. One option for expanding tolling on the Interstates would be for Congress to require tolling only as Interstate system roads and bridges are rebuilt with federal assistance. As many of these roads are not in need of near-term reconstruction, the evolving Interstate system toll network would expand over time. The corresponding reduction in federal-aid highway program spending would also be gradual. To accelerate the conversion, bonds might be issued to fund construction costs up-front, with toll revenues from the newly rebuilt facilities then used to pay for the interest and bond retirement costs. A less ambitious alternative would be to convert only the urban Interstates. Approximately 8.4% of the roughly 18,500 miles of urban Interstate Highways are tolled already, leaving over 17,000 miles of road available for conversion to toll roads. Assuming tolls would be imposed at rates that generate the current average of $2.35 million per mile, tolling the currently free urban Interstates might produce nearly $40 billion in annual revenue, nearly as much as the highway account of the HTF now receives from motor fuels taxes. However, it is doubtful that such a large sum could be realized once operating and collection costs are covered. Also, it is likely that some urban Interstate Highways will not generate sufficient revenues to pay for all their costs. There could, again, be concerns about cross-subsidization if tolls paid on urban roads were used to build and maintain toll-free roads elsewhere. In recent years, federal funds obligated for projects on the 47,662-mile-long Interstate system have accounted for 27% to 32% of total annual federal-aid highway obligations, or about $11 billion to $12 billion annually (in 2014 dollars). Hypothetically, if all Interstate Highways could be instantly converted to a self-sustaining toll network and received no further federal funding, expenditures under the remaining federal-aid highway program would fall from an average of about $42 billion per year to around $30 billion. This would bring federal highway program spending more in line with motor fuels tax revenues. This assumes, however, that tolls could be set high enough to support all the physical infrastructure and operating costs of such a massive toll network, and also that drivers continued to pay federal motor fuels taxes for fuel used while driving on toll roads that do not receive federal funds. Costs of establishing tolling across the Interstate system are likely to be great. States would need to construct gantries above roads and entrance and exit ramps at thousands of locations to hold toll-collection equipment and cameras to identify toll violators, in addition to building communications infrastructure. If tolling were introduced in conjunction with reconstruction of Interstate Highway segments, estimates of the road building costs involved range from $1 trillion to $3 trillion. The use of bond financing would add interest expense. However Congress chooses to proceed, the conversion of a significant portion of the Interstate Highway system from free roads to toll roads would take a number of years. Studies would need to be conducted to identify the best locations to collect tolls, equipment would have to be ordered, and physical infrastructure such as road-spanning gantries and communications structures would need to be designed and constructed. Increased use of tolling would therefore be unlikely to have a significant impact on the need for taxpayer funding over a 5- or 10-year time frame. The revenue stream provided by tolling can be used to support highway projects that rely on debt finance and private equity investment, both of which have long histories in toll road construction. In recent years, Congress has encouraged the use of innovative financing mechanisms such as public-private partnerships (P3s), which may use toll revenues in several ways. Toll revenues can be used to service municipal bonds that state and local agencies have issued to pay for highway projects. The federal government supports this spending by providing a tax exclusion of the interest paid on the bonds. The tax exclusion results in a loss of revenue to the federal government. Private activity bonds, in which a state or local government acts as a financial conduit for a business or individual (such as a P3), can also be serviced with toll revenues. The Transportation Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act (TIFIA) provides federal credit assistance, including loans, to leverage nonfederal funding, which may include investment from the private sector. Under the FAST Act, TIFIA is authorized to spend $1.44 billion over five years to cover the federal government's cost of providing the subsidized credit. Each $1 of budget authority can support approximately $10 in loans. TIFIA requires that each proposed project have a dedicated revenue stream to repay the loan. For highway projects, toll revenues are the most commonly proposed revenue source. Toll revenues could also support loans for highways and bridges provided from a National Infrastructure Bank, should one be established. The creation of a well-funded National Infrastructure Bank could thus lead to an expansion of toll roads. Any expansion of tolling due to increased use of innovative financing for highway construction, maintenance, and operation would occur over an extended period of time. In any event, toll-supported innovative financing is likely to provide only a small proportion of highway spending needs unless Congress requires its use in large-scale reconstruction of Interstate Highways. The current federal-aid highway program is essentially a state-run federal grant program, and states have ownership of the federal-aid highways within their borders. Any immediate conversion of highways to toll roads would necessarily be at individual states' discretion, with federal participation limited to technical assistance and a suggested conversion schedule. This would likely lead to a piecemeal outcome, as some states might convert quickly, some slowly, and some not at all. Congress could insist on a much stronger federal role by making the provision of federal highway grants to a state contingent on the state implementing a program of converting Interstate Highways to toll roads. FHWA might then take the lead in determining the sequence of reconstruction and conversion of Interstate Highways. This paradigm would have the advantage of assuring that all states would begin imposing tolls at roughly the same time, and federal leadership would likely not allow the outbreak of "toll wars" among the states, whereby states attempt to impose toll rates in a way that shifts the burden of the toll to their neighbors or interstate travelers generally. Under federal oversight, the operation of the converted highways might still be under the auspices of the states, which could operate them directly, through a toll authority, or perhaps under contract to a private operator. Whether or not implementation of tolls were linked to reconstruction of existing roads, creation of tolling systems would require up-front investments in gantries, equipment to read transponders in vehicles, communications infrastructure, software to process toll payments, and enforcement. This would have to be done before the tolls are collected. Under current law, FHWA approval is needed for initial implementation of tolls on roads and bridges that have received federal aid, but the federal government has no jurisdiction over toll rates. The Surface Transportation and Uniform Relocation Assistance Act of 1987 ( P.L. 100-17 ; H.Rept. 100-27) requires only that bridge tolls "shall be just and reasonable." More widespread use of tolls is likely to raise significant questions about equity. These might arise in a variety of contexts. Motorists from states with comparatively low tolls might find it unfair that other states charge comparatively high tolls. Some existing facilities offer preferential toll rates to residents of particular jurisdictions; if that practice were to become widespread, it could burden interstate travel and commerce. States may be tempted to collect tolls at state borders rather than at internal locations where more residents would be affected, effectively taxing interstate travel at higher rates than in-state travel and in some cases putting out-of-state companies at a competitive disadvantage against local companies. Truck tolls are invariably higher than auto tolls, sometimes much higher: crossing the George Washington Bridge from New Jersey to New York at an off-peak hour costs $10.50 for a car with an electronic transponder, but $68.00 for a standard tractor-trailer rig. Trucking interests generally oppose additional tolling, largely out of concern that political considerations will make it easier to raise tolls on trucks than on cars; they generally prefer higher fuel taxes whose revenues are dedicated to highway improvement. One reason for the preference for fuel taxes is that studies have concluded that funding highways with motor fuels taxes provides trucks a cross-subsidy from automobile users' gas tax payments. Proposals for a major expansion of tolling of federal-aid highways are likely to lead to discussion of a federal role in rate-setting. The FAST Act involved the federal government in toll rates for the first time, mandating that intercity buses serving the public have the same access to and pay the same rates as public transportation buses, and requiring public authorities operating high-occupancy toll lanes on the Interstate system to consult with affected metropolitan planning organizations on the placement and amount of tolls. Deeper federal involvement might include a federal framework of regulatory standards or a more precise definition of the requirement in current law that tolls be "just and reasonable," along with provision for the enforcement of that requirement. In such a case, Congress would need to clarify which federal agency would be responsible for enforcing tolling regulations and overseeing toll rates. Proponents often advocate tolling as a means of increasing total spending on surface transportation infrastructure. It is possible, however, that any increase in toll revenue could be offset by declining spending on surface transportation at the local, state, and federal levels. Congress has at times sought to condition federal support for states' highway spending on "maintenance of effort" by state governments. Imposing similar requirements in conjunction with a large increase in the use of tolling would require increased federal monitoring of state and local transportation expenditures. An existing federal program, the toll credit program, has for many years allowed states to count expenditures of toll revenues on capital investments serving interstate travel as part of a state's required match for federal highway grants. Although the statute states that the credit "shall not reduce nor replace State funds required to match Federal funds for any program under this title," some states have come to rely heavily on toll credits to meet their matching share requirements. A major expansion of Interstate Highway tolling could also expand the use of toll credits nationwide. This raises the possibility that states could provide less taxpayer funding for their matching shares of federal formula grants, unless other changes are made in the law. A mileage-based road user charge would be a toll-like charge on each mile driven. It has been advanced as an alternative to the federal and state motor fuels taxes that now support highway spending. As generally proposed, a mileage-based charge would be imposed for the use of any road within a state or nationwide, whereas tolls are imposed only on specific highway segments. Most existing highway tolls are based on weight and distance traveled, and road user charges could be structured in a similar manner. Both electronic tolls and mileage-based road user charges could be used to implement congestion pricing, in which drivers are charged more for using a road at a busy time. However, a number of widely criticized aspects of mileage-based charges, such as the difficulty of accommodating drivers who lack credit card accounts to which the charges could be billed and concerns that the vehicle tracking system would invade drivers' privacy, have generally been less prominent in discussions of tolling.

Toll roads have a long history in the United States going back to the early days of the republic. During the 18th century, most were local roads or bridges that could not be built or improved with local appropriations alone. During the tolling boom of the late 1940s and early 1950s, the prospect of toll revenues allowed states to build thousands of miles of limited-access highways much sooner than would have been the case with traditional funding. The imposition of tolls on existing federal-aid highways is restricted under federal law, and while new toll facilities have opened in several states, some of those projects have struggled financially. The failure of federal highway user taxes and fees to provide sufficient revenues to fund the surface transportation program authorized by Congress beginning in FY2008 renewed interest in expanded toll financing. The recently passed five-year surface transportation act, the Fixing America's Surface Transportation Act (FAST Act; P.L. 114-94), made few changes in tolling policy. Nonetheless, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projects that annual highway revenues, mostly from motor fuels taxes, will fall an average of $20 billion short of the amount needed to sustain the current federal surface transportation program between FY2021 and FY2025. This impending shortfall could again revive congressional interest in tolling. Congress could achieve an expansion of tolling in several ways. At one extreme, it could simply encourage tolling pilot projects on federal-aid highways, of which relatively few have been implemented to date. At the other extreme, Congress might authorize states to toll federal-aid highways as they see fit, or even require that Interstate Highway segments be converted to toll roads as they undergo reconstruction in the future, eventually turning all Interstates into toll roads. Whatever policies Congress adopts, tolls are likely to play only a limited role in funding surface transportation projects. The costs of toll collection on many existing toll roads exceed 10% of revenues even if all tolls are collected electronically, not including the cost of toll collection infrastructure. This compares unfavorably to the cost of collecting the existing federal motor fuels taxes, estimated to be about 1% of revenues. Many roads may not have sufficient traffic willing to pay a high enough toll to cover construction, maintenance, and toll collection costs. The availability of competing non-tolled routes may allow motorists to evade tolls. In addition, political concerns often limit the ability of operators to raise toll rates. Beyond a requirement that bridge tolls "shall be just and reasonable" and a provision limiting tolls on over-the-road buses, current federal law provides no role for the federal government in regulating toll rates or practices. A number of states offer preferential tolls for in-state residents or residents of particular localities. Some states have attempted to collect tolls at borders rather than at internal locations where more residents would be affected, and in a number of places trucking interests have complained that truck tolls are excessive compared to auto tolls. More widespread use of tolls is likely to raise questions about the extent to which tolling should be subject to federal oversight.

The National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets details a major part of the Bush administration's overall homeland security strategy. Implementing this strategy requires government agencies and private sector partners to identify and prioritize assets most essential to the United States' economic and social well-being. A key implementation requirement, therefore, is clear definition of what the administration considers to be critical infrastructures and key assets. While the Strategy provides the administration's definitions, along with its rationale for including specific infrastructures on the critical list, the meaning of "critical infrastructure" in the public policy context has been evolving for decades and is still open to debate. This report reviews the concept and definition of "critical infrastructure" as it has appeared in federal reports, legislation and regulation since the early 1980s. The report highlights the changes and expansion of that definition as the focus of public policy debates shifted from infrastructure adequacy to infrastructure protection. Finally the report summarizes current policy issues associated with critical infrastructure identification by federal agencies and the private sector. The report is intentionally limited to definitional issues and categorization of infrastructure. For a more general discussion of national policy regarding critical infrastructure protection, including its evolution, implementation, and continuing issues, see CRS Report RL30153, Critical Infrastructures: Background, Policy, and Implementa t ion , by [author name scrubbed]. The American Heritage Dictionary, defines the term "infrastructure" as The basic facilities, services, and installations needed for the functioning of a community or society, such as transportation and communications systems, water and power lines, and public institutions including schools, post offices, and prisons. This definition, however, and others like it, are broad and subject to interpretation. As a practical matter, what is considered to be infrastructure depends heavily upon the context in which the term is used. In U.S. public policy, the definition of "infrastructure" has been evolutionary and often ambiguous. Twenty years ago, "infrastructure" was defined primarily in debates about the adequacy of the nation's public works--which were viewed by many as deteriorating, obsolete, and of insufficient capacity. A typical report of the time, issued by the Council of State Planning Agencies, defined "infrastructure" as "a wide array of public facilities and equipment required to provide social services and support private sector economic activity." According to the report, infrastructure included roads, bridges, water and sewer systems, airports, ports, and public buildings, and might also include schools, health facilities, jails, recreation facilities, electric power production, fire safety, waste disposal, and communications services. In a 1983 report, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) defined "infrastructure" as facilities with "the common characteristics of capital intensiveness and high public investment at all levels of government. They are, moreover, directly critical to activity in the nation's economy." The CBO included highways, public transit systems, wastewater treatment works, water resources, air traffic control, airports, and municipal water supply in this category. The CBO also noted that the concept of infrastructure could be "applied broadly to include such social facilities as schools, hospitals, and prisons, and it often includes industrial capacity, as well." In a subsequent report, however, CBO narrowed this definition of "infrastructure" to exclude some facilities often thought of as infrastructure-such as public housing, government buildings, private rail service, and schools-and some environmental facilities (such as hazardous or toxic waste sites) where the initial onus of responsibility is on private individuals. Congress, itself, has often enacted legislation defining or affecting one or more infrastructure sectors, but has rarely done so comprehensively. In 1984, Congress did enact a bill that established the National Council on Public Works Improvement with a mandate to report on the state of public works infrastructure systems ( P.L. 98-501 ). Analysis required by that act was to include "any physical asset that is capable of being used to produce services or other benefits for a number of years" and was to include but not be limited to "roadways or bridges; airports or airway facilities; mass transportation systems; wastewater treatment or related facilities; water resources projects; hospitals; resource recovery facilities; public buildings; space or communication facilities; railroads; and federally assisted housing." The Council established by P.L. 98-501 provided yet another definition of "infrastructure." The Council's report characterized "infrastructure" as facilities with high fixed costs, long economic lives, strong links to economic development, and a tradition of public sector involvement. Taken as a whole, according to the Council, the services that they provide "form the underpinnings of the nation's defense, a strong economy, and our health and safety." Under this definition of "infrastructure," the Council included highways, streets, roads, and bridges; airports and airways; public transit; intermodal transportation (the interface between modes); water supply; wastewater treatment; water resources; solid waste; and hazardous waste services. The Council's report was one of the last significant federal initiatives during the 1980s to consider the definition of "infrastructure." By the early 1990s, policy makers' attention had largely moved away from infrastructure issues broadly. Instead, legislative proposals tended to address the needs of individual infrastructure sectors. The growing threat of international terrorism in the mid-1990s renewed federal government interest in infrastructure issues. Unlike the previous period, which was focused on infrastructure adequacy, federal agencies in the 1990s were increasingly concerned about infrastructure protection. This concern, in turn, led policy makers to reconsider the definition of "infrastructure" in a security context. On July 15, 1996, President Clinton signed Executive Order 13010 establishing the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection (PCCIP). This Executive Order (E.O.) defined "infrastructure" as The framework of interdependent networks and systems comprising identifiable industries, institutions (including people and procedures), and distribution capabilities that provide a reliable flow of products and services essential to the defense and economic security of the United States, the smooth functioning of government at all levels, and society as a whole. This definition of "infrastructure" is consistent with the broad definitions from the 1980's. E.O. 13010 went further, however, by prioritizing particular infrastructure sectors, and specific assets within those sectors, on the basis of national importance. E.O.13010 stated that "certain national infrastructures are so vital that their incapacity or destruction would have a debilitating impact on the defense or economic security of the United States." The Commission's final report to the President echoed the E.O.'s definition of vital infrastructure. The general concept of "vital" or "critical" infrastructure in E.O. 13010 was not entirely new, having appeared in some form in many of the policy debates in the 1980s. The Order did break new ground, however, in listing what it considered to be critical infrastructures. According to E.O. 13010, these critical infrastructures were: telecommunications; electrical power systems; gas and oil storage and transportation; banking and finance; transportation; water supply systems; emergency services (including medical, police, fire, and rescue); and, continuity of government. The list of critical infrastructure sectors in E.O. 13010 was much broader than that reported by the National Council on Public Works Improvement. In addition to transportation, water systems, and public services--sectors with "a tradition of public sector involvement"--E.O. 13010 included infrastructures predominantly owned by private companies: telecommunications, energy, and financial services. In response to the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection final report, President Clinton signed Presidential Decision Directive 63 (PDD-63) on May 22, 1998. The Directive's goal was to establish a national capability within five years to protect "critical" infrastructure from intentional disruption. According to PDD-63, "critical" infrastructures were "those physical and cyber-based systems essential to the minimum operations of the economy and government." This definition expanded little on that in E.O. 13010, but was noteworthy for its specific mention of "cyber" infrastructure. To help achieve its goal, PDD-63 directed certain federal agencies to lead the government's security efforts and identify private sector liaisons in specific critical infrastructure sectors. These lead agencies and associated critical infrastructures are summarized in Table 1 . PDD-63 also identified certain "special functions" related to critical infrastructure protection to be chiefly performed by federal agencies: national defense, foreign affairs, intelligence, law enforcement. The first version of a National Plan for Critical Infrastructure (also called for by PDD-63) defined "critical infrastructures" as "those systems and assets--both physical and cyber--so vital to the Nation that their incapacity or destruction would have a debilitating impact on national security, national economic security, and/or national public health and safety." While the Plan concentrated on cyber-security of the federal government's critical infrastructure, the Plan refers to those infrastructures mentioned in the Directive. Following the terror attacks of September 11, 2001, President Bush signed new Executive Orders relating to critical infrastructure protection. Executive Order 13228, signed October 8, 2001, established the Office of Homeland Security and the Homeland Security Council. Among the duties assigned the Office was to coordinate efforts to protect: energy production, transmission, and distribution services and critical facilities other utilities telecommunications facilities that produce, use, store, or dispose of nuclear material public and privately owned information systems special events of national significance transportation, including railways, highways, shipping ports and waterways airports and civilian aircraft livestock, agriculture, and systems for the provision of water and food for human use and consumption. The list in E.O. 13228 is noteworthy for its specific inclusion of nuclear sites, special events, and agriculture, which were not among the sectors identified in PDD-63. In a separate Executive Order 13231, signed October 16, 2001, President Bush established the President's Critical Infrastructure Protection Board. Although the name of the Board implied a broad mandate, its duties focused primarily on information infrastructure. However, the E.O. made reference to the importance of information systems to other critical infrastructures such as "telecommunications, energy, financial services, manufacturing, water, transportation, health care, and emergency services." In response to the terror attacks of September 11, 2001, Congress passed the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001( P.L. 107-56 ). The PATRIOT Act was intended to "deter and punish terrorist acts in the United States and around the world, to enhance law enforcement investigatory tools, and for other purposes." In its findings, P.L. 107-56 states that Private business, government, and the national security apparatus increasingly depend on an interdependent network of critical physical and information infrastructures, including telecommunications, energy, financial services, water, and transportation sectors (Sec. 1016(b)(2)). The act goes on to define "critical" infrastructure as systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination of those matters (Sec. 1016(e)). This definition was adopted, by reference, in the Homeland Security Act of 2002 ( P.L. 107-296 , Sec. 2(4)) establishing the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The Homeland Security Act also formally introduces the concept of "key resources," defined as "publicly or privately controlled resources essential to the minimal operations of the economy and government" (Sec. 2(9)). Without articulating exactly what they are, the act views key resources as distinct from critical infrastructure, albeit worthy of the same protection (Sec. 2(15)(A)). The President's National Strategy for Homeland Security (NSHS), issued in July 2002, restates the definition of critical infrastructure provided in the PATRIOT Act. The Strategy expands on this definition, however, summarizing its rationale for classifying specific infrastructure sectors as critical. Our critical infrastructures are particularly important because of the functions or services they provide to our country. Our critical infrastructures are also particularly important because they are complex systems: the effects of a terrorist attack can spread far beyond the direct target, and reverberate long after the immediate damage. America's critical infrastructure encompasses a large number of sectors. Our agriculture, food, and water sectors, along with the public health and emergency services sectors, provide the essential goods and services Americans need to survive. Our institutions of government guarantee our national security and freedom, and administer key public functions. Our defense industrial base provides essential capabilities to help safeguard our population from external threats. Our information and telecommunications sector enables economic productivity and growth, and is particularly important because it connects and helps control many other infrastructure sectors. Our energy, transportation, banking and finance, chemical industry, and postal and shipping sectors help sustain our economy and touch the lives of Americans everyday. The National Strategy listed the following critical infrastructure sectors: Agriculture Food Water Public Health Emergency Services Government Defense Industrial Base Information and Telecommunications Energy Transportation Banking and Finance Chemical Industry Postal and Shipping This list of critical infrastructures encompasses those of E.O. 13228, but adds chemicals, and postal and shipping services due to their economic importance. While there may be some debate, in particular, about why the chemical industry was not on earlier lists that considered military and economic security, it seems to have been added also because individual chemical plants could be sources of materials that could be used for a weapon of mass destruction, or whose operations could be disrupted in a way that would significantly threaten the safety of surrounding communities. While not identifying it as such in this list, the National Strategy also discusses "cyber infrastructure" as closely connected to, but distinct from, physical infrastructure. The Strategy states that DHS "will place an especially high priority on protecting our cyber infrastructure." In addition to identifying critical infrastructure, the Strategy also introduces the concept of "key assets" as a subset of nationally important key resources. The Strategy defines "key assets" as individual targets whose destruction would not endanger vital systems, but could create local disaster or profoundly damage our Nation's morale or confidence. Key assets include symbols or historical attractions, such as prominent national, state, or local monuments and icons. In some cases, these include quasi-public symbols that are identified strongly with the United States as a Nation.... Key assets also include individual or localized facilities that deserve special protection because of their destructive potential or their value to the local community. The Strategy also mentions "high profile events ... strongly coupled to our national symbols or national morale" as worthy of special federal protection. The Bush Administration's National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets (NSPP), released in February, 2003, reaffirms the critical infrastructure sectors identified in the National Strategy for Homeland Security . The 2003 Strategy also defines three categories of what it considers to be "key assets." One category of key assets comprises the diverse array of national monuments, symbols, and icons that represent our Nation's heritage, traditions and values, and political power. They include a wide variety of sites and structures, such as prominent historical attractions, monuments, cultural icons, and centers of government and commerce.... Another category of key assets includes facilities and structures that represent our national economic power and technological advancement. Many of them house significant amounts of hazardous materials, fuels, and chemical catalysts that enable important production and processing functions.... A third category of key assets includes such structures as prominent commercial centers, office buildings, and sports stadiums, where large numbers of people regularly congregate to conduct business or personal transactions, shop, or enjoy a recreational pastime. The Strategy specifically identifies nuclear power plants and dams as key assets. On December 17, 2003, President Bush issued Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-7) clarifying executive agency responsibilities for identifying, prioritizing and protecting critical infrastructure. The Directive requires that DHS and other federal agencies collaborate with "appropriate private sector entities" in sharing information and protecting critical infrastructure (Par. 25). HSPD-7 supersedes PDD-63 (Par. 37). HSPD-7 adopts, by reference, the definitions of "critical infrastructure" and "key resources" in the Homeland Security Act (Sec.6). It also adopts the critical infrastructure and key asset categories in the National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets. HSPD-7 does revise the list of lead federal agencies and associated critical infrastructures included in PDD-63 to reflect the role of the Department of Homeland Security as an independent cabinet department, as shown in Table 2 . Although HSPD-7 specifies a list of infrastructures, it leaves open the possibility that the list could be expanded. According to the Directive, DHS "shall ... evaluate the need for and coordinate the coverage of additional critical infrastructure and key resources categories over time, as appropriate" (Sec. 15). Nonetheless, the list of critical infrastructures in Table 2 appears to be the most recent and still in force. Identifying and prioritizing which assets of an infrastructure are most essential to its function, or pose the most significant danger to life and property if threatened or damaged, is necessary for developing an effective protection strategy. But the scope and complexity of critical infrastructure sectors can make it a daunting task to identify which specific assets are critical. For example, a recent report by the National Research Council (NRC) characterizes the extent of the U.S. domestic transportation system, one of the critical infrastructures, as follows: The U.S. highway system consists of 4 million interconnected miles of paved roadways, including 45,000 miles of interstate freeway and 600,000 bridges. The freight rail networks extend for more than 300,000 miles and commuter and urban rail system's cover some 10,000 miles. Even the more contained civil aviation system has some 500 commercial-service airports and another 14,000 smaller general aviation airports scattered across the country. These networks also contain many other fixed facilities such as terminals, navigation aids, switch yards, locks, maintenance bases and operation control centers. Left out of this description of the transportation system is a large maritime network of inland waterways, ports, and vessels. As the definitions of "critical infrastructure" and "key resources" have evolved in U.S. homeland security policy, responsible agencies have been seeking greater refinement and prioritization within these categories. In 1999, for example, the Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office (CIAO), which was established to support President Clinton's National Infrastructure Protection Plan, determined that many federal agencies responsible for critical infrastructure protection lacked a clear understanding of what constituted a "critical asset" within an infrastructure. As a result, the CIAO instituted a new program by which an agency could identify and assess its critical assets, identify the dependencies of those assets on other systems, including those beyond the direct control of the agency, and prioritize. The Homeland Security Act implies some type of critical asset differentiation as well by requiring DHS to "identify priorities for protective and support measures" within the nation's critical infrastructure sectors (Sec. 201(d)(3)). President Bush's National Strategy for Homeland Security explicitly adopts critical asset differentiation. The Strategy states: The assets, functions, and systems within each critical infrastructure sector are not equally important. The transportation sector is vital, but not every bridge is critical to the Nation as a whole. The Strategy formally introduces the concept of "critical assets" as a way for the federal government to "focus its efforts on the highest priorities" in critical infrastructure protection. The Bush Administration's National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets reaffirms the requirement to prioritize critical assets. The Strategy calls for what amounts to a prioritized master list. To frame the initial focus of our national protection effort, we must acknowledge that the assets, systems, and functions that comprise our infrastructure sectors are not uniformly "critical" in nature, particularly in a national or major regional context... We must develop a comprehensive, prioritized assessment of facilities, systems, and functions of national-level criticality and monitor their preparedness across infrastructure sectors. While the Strategy calls for objective assessment of critical assets it acknowledges that the "criticality"of individual assets is potentially fluid. The Strategy states that, "as we act to secure our most critical infrastructures and assets, we must remain cognizant that criticality varies as a function of time, risk, and market changes." The requirements of HSPD-7 continue the policy of critical asset prioritization and protection in the Strategy. It is interesting to note, however, that HSPD-7 requires DHS to do so "with an emphasis on critical infrastructure and key resources that could be exploited to cause catastrophic health effects or mass casualties comparable to those from the use of a weapon of mass destruction." This emphasis on health and safety appears to imply yet another basis for prioritizing infrastructure protection. Private companies and federal agencies have shared responsibility for identifying critical assets since PDD-63 was issued in 1998. That Directive required each lead federal agency to work with "private sector entities" in their respective infrastructures to "contribute to a sectoral National Infrastructure Assurance Plan by ... assessing the vulnerabilities of the sector to cyber or physical attacks," among other tasks (Sec. IV). According to PDD-63 "these assessments shall ... include the determination of the minimum essential infrastructure in each sector" (Sec. VIII.1). The responsibility of the private sector to work with federal agencies in developing and maintaining lists of "minimum essential infrastructure," or critical assets, continues to be an essential part of the government's infrastructure protection strategy. Individual critical infrastructure sectors have implemented independent and often varying approaches for identifying their own critical assets. For example, the June 2001 security guidance issued by the National Petroleum Council (NPC) for oil and natural gas infrastructure stated the following: The first step in the risk management process is to identify and put a value on each of the key assets of the organization. These key assets can be people, facilities, services, processes, programs, etc. Next, the "impact of loss" for each of these assets is estimated. This is a measure of the loss to the company if the asset is damaged or destroyed. A simple rating system based on user-defined criteria can be used to measure the value of the asset (e.g., very low, low, moderate, high, extremely high) and the impact of its loss. In a more complex risk management system, the value of an asset and impact of loss can be calculated in monetary units. These values may be based on such parameters as the original cost to create the asset, the cost to obtain a temporary replacement for the asset, the permanent replacement cost for the asset, costs associated with the loss of revenue, an assigned cost for the loss of human life or degradation of environmental resources, costs to public/stakeholder relations, legal and liability costs, and the costs of increased regulatory oversight. While it acknowledged the need to identify critical assets, the NPC's guidance left it up to individual companies to determine the specific basis for "criticality" in their security assessments. It is important to note that the NPC initially defined a "key asset" with respect to a potential "loss to the company" rather than broader economic or social welfare impacts as called for in federal critical infrastructure strategies. This emphasis illustrates the practical challenge of relying on private companies to identify critical assets in the context of national infrastructure security. In an effort to establish and implement a more consistent standard for what constitutes a critical asset, the National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets requires DHS to "develop a uniform methodology for identifying facilities, systems, and functions with national-level criticality ... [and] build a comprehensive database to catalog these critical facilities, systems, and functions." Under Section 201 of the Homeland Security Act ( P.L. 107-296 ), responsibility for this critical asset catalog lies with the DHS's Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate (IAIP). Developing a uniform methodology for identifying critical assets, and compiling a critical asset list for the United States as whole, has been difficult for IAIP. In April 2004, IAIP reported that it had compiled a list of 1,700 critical assets, but confusion among private sector and state government partners about what constituted a critical asset cast doubt on the validity and completeness of that list. For example, among electric utilities, there was some question as to why certain assets were considered critical by IAIP, since some of those assets were not in use and others did not support significant electric loads. Similar inconsistencies emerged when IAIP's list was compared to critical asset lists developed by state agencies. As the Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure Protection in DHS testified before Congress "what we have done to identify critical assets in the United States and what the states and local municipalities and cities have done often do not reconcile." According to press accounts, subsequent classified briefings with Members of Congress to review lists of critical assets in their states have continued to raise concerns about IAIP's critical asset identification. The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (known as the 9/11 Commission) made its final report public on July 22, 2004. Among other things, the Commission was chartered to report on the United States' preparedness for, and response to, the terror attacks of September 11, 2001. Many of the recommendations made in the 9/11 Commission's report deal indirectly with critical infrastructure protection, especially as the goals of critical infrastructure protection have evolved to include countering the type of attack that occurred on September 11. However, the Commission's report does not specifically address the definition or identification of critical infrastructure, although the report does call for using a systematic risk management approach to set priorities and allocate resources for critical infrastructure protection. Although the Commission discussed in more detail issues related to transportation security, none of its recommendations advocate a change in the direction of, or the organizational structures that have evolved to implement, existing infrastructure protection policies. Nevertheless, the Commission's recommendations could speed up implementation in some areas, given the attention and renewed urgency expressed by the Commission. The U.S. government's definition of "critical infrastructure" has evolved over the years, and at any given time has left considerable room for interpretation. Furthermore, since the 1980's, the number of sectors included under that definition has generally expanded from the most basic public works to a much broader set of economic, defense, government, social and institutional facilities, as illustrated in Table 3 . The list may continue to evolve and grow as economic changes or geopolitical developments influence homeland security policy. Should Congress care if the overall list of critical infrastructures remains fluid? One concern is that an unclear or unstable understanding of what constitutes a critical infrastructure (or key resource) could lead to inefficient security policies. At the very least, a growing list of infrastructures in need of protection implies growing attention from the federal government and, implicitly, a need for more resources devoted to protect them. Under the Homeland Security Act and other legislation, the federal government is required to interact with each critical infrastructure, to support and maintain a database of vulnerabilities, to integrate the database with threat analyses, to monitor incidents on each of the infrastructures, and to issue warnings as appropriate. These activities call for time and resources. The federal government also may choose to assist financially in effecting necessary protective measures, not only for infrastructure owned and operated at the state or local level, but also for privately owned and operated infrastructures. Allocating limited public resources across an excessively broad range of infrastructures may be an inefficient use of resources. However, arbitrarily limiting the number of critical infrastructures a priori due to resource constraints might miss dangerous vulnerabilities. Unclear or shifting criteria for identifying individual critical assets and key assets may also lead to protection inefficiencies, especially where private companies are responsible for security spending. These criteria may become particularly important if federal agencies intend to implement and enforce any potential future security regulations related to critical infrastructure. Various private sector representatives state that they need clear and stable definitions of asset criticality so they will know exactly what assets to protect, and how well to protect them. Otherwise, they risk protecting too many facilities, protecting the wrong facilities, or both. Either outcome would increase ultimate costs passed through to consumers without commensurate security benefits, and could potentially divert scarce private resources from better uses, such as public safety or environmental protection. As oversight of the federal role in infrastructure security continues, questions may be raised concerning the ongoing efforts of DHS to define and prioritize critical and key assets. In addition to this specific issue, however, Congress may wish to assess how critical infrastructure identification fits in the nation's overall strategy to protect critical infrastructure. For example, if asset criticality is not clearly defined, increasing resources for infrastructure security inspections by DHS officials could be of limited value. Likewise, diverting infrastructure resources away from safety to enhance security might further reduce terror risk, but not overall public risk, if safety programs become less effective as a result. U.S. infrastructure security necessarily involves many groups: federal agencies, industry associations, large and small asset operators, and critical and non-critical asset owners. Reviewing how these groups work together to achieve common security goals is an oversight challenge for Congress.

The National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets (NSPP) details a major part of the Bush administration's overall homeland security strategy. Implementing this Strategy requires clear definition of "critical infrastructures" and "key assets." Although the Strategy provides such definitions, the meaning of "critical infrastructure" in the public policy context has been evolving for decades and is still open to debate. Twenty years ago, "infrastructure" was defined primarily with respect to the adequacy of the nation's public works.In the mid-1990's, however, the growing threat of international terrorism led policy makers to reconsider the definition of "infrastructure" in the context of homeland security. Successive federal government reports, laws and executive orders have refined, and generally expanded, the number of infrastructure sectors and the types of assets considered to be "critical" for purposes of homeland security. The USA PATRIOT Act of 2001(P.L. 107-56) contains the federal government's most recent definition of "critical infrastructure." The NSPP contains the most recent detailed list of critical infrastructures and assets of national importance. The list may continue to evolve, however, as economic changes or geopolitical developments influence homeland security policy. There is some debate among policy makers about the implications of an ambiguous or changing list of critical infrastructures. Ambiguity about what constitutes a critical infrastructure (or key resource) could lead to inefficient use of limited homeland security resources. For example, private sector representatives state that they need clear and stable definitions of asset criticality so they will know exactly what assets to protect, and how well to protect them. Otherwise, they risk protecting too many facilities, protecting the wrong facilities, or both. On the other hand, arbitrarily limiting the number of critical infrastructures a priori due to resource constraints might miss a dangerous vulnerability. Clear "criticality" criteria will also be important if federal agencies intend to implement and enforce any potential future security regulations related to critical infrastructure. This report will not be updated.

The use of carbon monoxide (CO) in the packaging of meat and fish has generated considerable debate. Carbon monoxide, in combination with nitrogen and carbon dioxide, is used in a packaging process for fresh meat called Modified Atmosphere Packaging (MAP). In the MAP process, the meat is placed in a container with an "impermeable film similar to a vacuum package but ... the air [is evacuated] from the package and replac[ed] ... with a specified mixture of gases that provides for better control of product properties." The presence of CO results in the meat turning a bright red color that lasts longer than the color in untreated meat. Additionally, fish treated with CO (for example, as part of a gas mixture called "tasteless smoke") gain a fresher appearance and a red tint. Conflicting studies have shown that consumers rely primarily on the appearance, including the red color of meat or fish, when choosing which package to purchase, and alternatively, that consumers rely mostly on "sell by" dates. The meat industry, consumer groups, scientists, and policy makers disagree as to whether the use of CO in meat and fish packaging should be regulated by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), through labeling or otherwise, and whether CO should be a substance Generally Recognized As Safe (GRAS) under current and proposed FDA rules. The meat industry, some scientists, and other supporters argue that MAP reduces shrinkage of the meat, allows for a longer shelf life, "keep[s] meat fresh, protect[s] meat, [and] prevent[s] cross-contamination" because MAP packages are tamper resistant and leak-proof. One scientist believes that MAP offers "better flavor, greater tenderness, and suppression of bacterial growth." Supporters of MAP also assert that such products are more sustainable, less wasteful, and more flexible in terms of distribution because more packages can be transported per truck. Additionally, they note that consumers prefer the bright red color of meat achieved in MAP. Finally, MAP system supporters dispute the scientific basis for claims that the use of carbon monoxide is misleading or dangerous and declare the consumers use "sell by" dates when determining the freshness of many products. Opponents allege that the use of CO misleads consumers into thinking meat and fish are fresher than they are; that certain populations, such as those with a reduced sense of smell, will be at increased risk if they consume spoiled meat or fish that still appears fresh due to the use of CO; that consumers may eat undercooked meat because meat packed in MAP systems may brown faster when cooked than untreated meat; that "sell by" dates are not adequate to assist consumers in determining freshness; that consumers will be exposed to CO; that such MAP products are misbranded and adulterated under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act; and that the FDA is violating its own regulations on CO. Another concern of consumer groups and some scientists is that CO provides a cover for spoiled or "temperature abused" meat and fish, meaning that the use of CO conceals visual cues of decomposition caused in part by exposure to changes in temperature or storage or transport at improper temperatures. Fish, such as tuna, may develop toxic levels of scombrotoxin (histamine) through time and/or temperature abuse, which can make consumers ill. Opponents of the use of CO on meat and fish note that the European Union, Canada, Singapore, and Japan have prohibited or decided not to recognize or approve CO for use in fresh meat or fresh fish packaging. Additionally, certain grocery store chains--including Giant, Safeway, Kroeger, and Publix--either do not sell or have announced that they will no longer sell MAP products. Others have taken different steps. At a March hearing, a Target Corporation executive testified that its primary meat supplier had received approval from FSIS to add a label to its packaging that would state: "Color is not an accurate indicator of freshness. Refer to Use or Freeze By [date]." Both the FDA and USDA play a role in food safety and the types of substances that can be added to food. This section will focus on the FDA's regulation of food additives and GRAS substances, which the agency is responsible for under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA) and parts of Title 21, Code of Federal Regulations. FFDCA SS 201(s) defines a food additive as: any substance the intended use of which results or may reasonably be expected to result, directly or indirectly, in its becoming a component or otherwise affecting the characteristics of any food (including any substance intended for use in producing, manufacturing, packing, processing, preparing, treating, packaging, transporting, or holding food; and including any source of radiation intended for such use).... The latter half of the above definition includes "food contact substances," which the FFDCA defines as "any substance intended for use as a component of materials used in manufacturing, packing, packaging, transporting, or holding food if such use is not intended to have any technical effect in such food." The definition of food additive excludes certain classes of substances: (1) pesticide chemical residues in or on a raw agricultural commodity or processed food, (2) pesticide chemicals, (3) color additives, (4) substances used in accordance with their sanction or approval under FDA and USDA laws prior to 1958, (5) new animal drugs, (6) dietary ingredients in dietary supplements, and (7) substances GRAS under the conditions of the substances' intended use. These seven categories of substances are exemptions to FFDCA SS 201(s) and do not have to obtain FDA approval as food additives before they can enter the market. If a food additive does not meet one of the exemptions under the FFDCA, a rule must be in place that details the circumstances under which the food additive can be safely used. GRAS substances must be "generally recognized, among experts qualified by scientific training and experience to evaluate [their] safety." FDA regulations recognize the difficulty of establishing the harmlessness of a substance and therefore define safety as "a reasonable certainty in the minds of competent scientists that the substance is not harmful under the intended conditions of use." The person seeking GRAS status for a substance has the burden of proving the substance is GRAS under conditions of the substances' use. A determination that a substance has GRAS status is not limited to FDA scientists. Experts may base their view of a general recognition of safety on either (1) scientific procedures or (2) common use of a substance in food prior to January 1, 1958. The first type of GRAS substances is those that have "been adequately shown through scientific procedures ... to be safe under the conditions of [their] intended use." Scientific procedures include published and unpublished human, animal, analytical, and other scientific studies that are "appropriate to establish the safety of a substance." A GRAS determination based on scientific procedures "require[s] the same quantity and quality of scientific evidence as is required to obtain approval of a food additive regulation for the ingredient." The GRAS determination must "ordinarily" be based on published studies, but can be corroborated by unpublished studies and other information. FDA regulations do not require a unanimous opinion from the scientific community that a substance is GRAS under the conditions of its intended use; rather, the person seeking GRAS status "must show that there is a consensus of expert opinion regarding the safety of the use of the substance." However, "a severe conflict among experts regarding the safety of the use of a substance, precludes a finding" that a substance is GRAS. The second type of GRAS substances is those that were "used in food prior to January 1, 1958, [and shown] through either scientific procedures or experience based on common use in food[] to be safe under the conditions of [their] intended use." FDA regulations define the phrase "common use in food" as "a substantial history of consumption of a substance for food use by a significant number of consumers." In this instance, a GRAS determination ordinarily turns on "generally available data and information." These substances are known as prior-sanctioned substances. They can include substances used in food where the use prior to January 1, 1958, "occurred exclusively or primarily outside of the United States if the information about the experience establishes that the use of the substance is safe." Published information regarding substances used outside the United States must be corroborated. The FDA lists some GRAS substances in 21 C.F.R. Part 182. However, this list of GRAS substances is not exhaustive as "[i]t is impracticable to list all substances that are [GRAS] for their intended use." The list of GRAS substances in 21 C.F.R. Part 182 includes spices, essential oils, natural extracts, synthetic flavoring substances, substances that migrate from dry food packaging and paper products, multipurpose substances, anticaking agents, chemical preservatives, emulsifying agents, stabilizers, sequestrants, and nutrients. The FDA Commissioner can affirm the GRAS status of a substance based on a petition from a manufacturer or others or on his or her own initiative. Substances affirmed as GRAS, listed in 21 C.F.R. Part 184, differ from the GRAS substances listed in Part 182 because their GRAS status has been sustained through a notice-and-comment rulemaking. The concept of affirming the GRAS status of substances began in 1969, when questions arose about whether cyclamate salts, a substance that had been considered GRAS, were safe because "they were implicated in the formation of bladder tumors in rats." The affirmation of GRAS status occurs through the notice and comment rulemaking process, in which the Commissioner publishes a notice of the substance proposed to be affirmed as GRAS in the Federal Register , allows 60 days for comments, evaluates the comments (and the petition, if one was filed), and either (1) publishes a notice in the Federal Register affirming the substance is GRAS if there is "convincing evidence" or (2) "concludes that there is a lack of convincing evidence that the substance is GRAS and that it should be considered a food additive" subject to premarket approval by the FDA under FFDCA SS 409. If the agency affirms that the use of a substance is GRAS, the substance is added to a list in the Code of Federal Regulations as a substance affirmed as GRAS "for the purposes and under the conditions prescribed," allowing for the possibility that use of a substance under a condition other than the one specified in the regulation may not be GRAS. The FDA has reviewed the direct food substances on the list in Part 184 and determined that they are GRAS "for the purposes and under the conditions prescribed." These ingredients are also GRAS as indirect food ingredients, also known as food contact substances, within certain limitations. Part 186 of Title 21, Code of Federal Regulations, lists the indirect food substances/food contact substances affirmed as GRAS, such as wrappers, containers, and other food-contact surfaces. If the Commissioner reviews a food ingredient and finds that it is a GRAS substance, under 21 C.F.R. SS 184.1, the final rule approving the GRAS substance for the purposes and under the conditions prescribed may contain limits on the application and use of the substance. First, the regulation identifies the characteristics of the ingredient in such a way that it can be differentiated from other versions of the ingredient that the FDA has not affirmed as GRAS. Second, the substance affirmed as GRAS "must be used in accordance with current good manufacturing practices." Third, a FDA regulation affirming GRAS status "when the safety of an ingredient has been evaluated on the basis of limited conditions of use" will specify the limited conditions of use. Use of the ingredient under a condition other than the one specified in the regulation may not be GRAS. In such a case, the manufacturer must "independently establish that that use is GRAS or shall use the ingredient in accordance with a food additive regulation." Fourth, the substance affirmed as GRAS for the purposes and conditions prescribed cannot be used "in a manner that may lead to deception of the consumer" or FFDCA violations. Finally, ingredients listed as GRAS cannot be combined, in order to achieve the same technological effect in a food, at levels greater than were permitted for a single ingredient. The procedure outlined in a FDA proposed rule from 1997 would eliminate the notice and comment rulemaking process described above for substances affirmed as GRAS. The proposed rule would also end the GRAS petition process and create a new GRAS notification procedure. Although the notice and comment rulemaking process for GRAS substances is still in effect in the FDA regulations, the FDA has effectively been using the GRAS notification procedure outlined in the proposed rule since 1998 without issuing a final rule. Since the FDA has not issued a final rule, it is important to note that the FDA's procedure set forth in the 1997 proposed rule is only guidance and not law. The agency has also issued guidance for industry in the form of frequently asked questions about GRAS that includes a discussion of the GRAS notification program. More than 250 GRAS notifications have been submitted under the procedure outlined in the 1997 proposed rule. The FDA has issued one of the three responses described below for most of these notices, and both a numerical and alphabetical list of notices received and agency responses can be found on the FDA's website. Under the notification procedure in the proposed rule, industry submits a GRAS notification to the FDA that states the company's view that the substance is GRAS. These notifications identify the notifier and describe the substance that is the subject of the notice, the applicable conditions of use, and the basis for the GRAS determination, including a summary of supporting information "that forms the basis for an exemption from a statutory requirement." The notifier "explicitly accepts responsibility for the GRAS determination," unlike the protocol in the current regulations, in which such responsibility falls on the agency because an interested person has petitioned the FDA to affirm a use of a substance as GRAS or the FDA itself has affirmed a substance's use as GRAS. Rather than requiring that the FDA affirm that a substance is GRAS through a notice-and-comment rulemaking, the 1997 proposed rule provides that the FDA does not make a finding that a substance in a GRAS notification made under the proposed rule process actually is a GRAS substance. Instead, the agency states that (1) it has "no questions" about the notifier's conclusion that a substance is GRAS, (2) the notice does not provide a basis for a GRAS status determination, or (3) the notifier has stopped the GRAS notification process. If the agency's review of a GRAS notification does not furnish appropriate information to find a basis for a GRAS determination, it will issue such a response, potentially in light of the following reasons to question the use of the substance: FDA may question the GRAS status of use of a substance if the information provided in a notice: (1) Does not adequately establish technical evidence of safety; (2) is not generally available; (3) does not convince the agency that there is the requisite expert consensus about the safety of the substance for its intended use; or (4) is so poorly presented that the basis for the GRAS determination is not clear. FDA also may be aware of information that is not included in the notice but raises important public health issues that lead the agency to question GRAS status of use of the substance. The FDA notes that notifiers "receive as a benefit a response that documents the agency's awareness of the [GRAS] determination" by the notifier. If, as in the majority of the FDA's responses to GRAS notification submissions, the FDA has no questions about the notification, this determination does not mean that the FDA has approved the substance in the notification as GRAS. In other words, none of the uses of the substances reviewed by the FDA through a GRAS notification are deemed to actually be GRAS by the FDA. Moreover, in contrast to the FDA's GRAS affirmation regulations, which allow the FDA to place potential limits on the use of a GRAS substance, the GRAS notification procedures in the FDA's proposed rule do not appear to allow this, as the FDA only responds in one of three ways noted above. Nonetheless, an FDA response of "no questions" could give a substance an imprimatur of safety from the federal government. Such a response may also give manufacturers confidence that the substance is acceptable, and they would be able to tell their suppliers and others of the FDA's response to the notification. Additionally, an FDA response of "no questions" may convey to manufacturers a feeling of less uncertainty and less potential liability about using such a GRAS substance that has been through the GRAS notification process, as the agency may not be as likely to seize a substance or find a product adulterated or misbranded if the FDA itself has said it has "no questions." As mentioned above, the agency has yet to issue a final rule on the notification procedure; however, the FDA has "invite[d] interested persons" to submit such notifications as described in the proposed rule on an "interim policy" basis until the publication of the final rule. The agency has accepted more than 250 notification submissions under the proposed rule procedures. In its proposal, the FDA has stated that it "will determine whether its experience in administering such notices suggests modifications to the proposed procedure." The agency's description and adoption of the new GRAS notification process (as delineated in the proposed rule) on an interim policy basis may be characterized as the equivalent of a guidance document. The chart below provides the number of FDA response letters in each of the three categories discussed above, as well as a fourth category for the number of GRAS notices that are awaiting a response from the FDA, and the percent of the total number of letters issued by the FDA under its procedure in the 1997 proposed rule. One GRAS notification, GRN No. 13, was counted twice--once in the "FDA has no questions" category and once in the "Notice does not provide a basis for a GRAS determination" category--because the FDA had no questions for three botanical substances in the notice (Chrysanthemum, Licorice, and Jellywort) but the FDA stated that the notice did not provide a basis for a GRAS determination for six other substances (Honeysuckle; Lophatherum; Mulberry leaf; Frangipani; Selfheal; Sophora flower bud). The FDA's response to GRAS notifications that were initially submitted, but then were either withdrawn or determined not to provide a basis for a GRAS determination, were only included for the resubmitted notices for the same substances. For example, Hawaii International Seafood, Inc. initially submitted its GRAS notification for tasteless smoke as GRAS Notice No. 5, but then at the company's request, the FDA ceased to evaluate the notice. Hawaii International Seafood, Inc. then resubmitted its GRAS notification for tasteless smoke as GRAS Notice No. 15, and the FDA had no questions. Only the FDA's response to the resubmitted notification is included on the chart below. There were 18 instances of GRAS notifications being resubmitted, which explains the difference in the chart's total number of notices (238) and the number of GRAS notifications listed on the FDA website (256). Under the current legislative and regulatory schemes, the FDA shares responsibility for some food safety issues with the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA). While the FDA is responsible for safety of the vast majority of food categories, the USDA is specifically authorized to regulate the safety and wholesomeness of meat and poultry products that are intended for use as human food. Under this authority, the USDA, and consequently the Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS), is required to provide a mark of inspection on meat and poultry products. The mark of inspection reflects a determination that the product is not adulterated or misbranded. There is a two-step process for approving the use of additive substances in meat and poultry products: (1) FDA determines the safety of substances and prescribes safe conditions of use, and (2) FSIS determines whether new substances or new applications of substances are suitable for use in meat and poultry products. In other words, FDA makes determinations based on the safety of the substance itself, while FSIS approves the substance's application to the meat or poultry product. In 2000, the roles of FDA and FSIS in this joint review process of substances used in meat and poultry products were laid out in a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). The MOU provides for standard operating procedures regarding submissions to FDA or FSIS that, for example, petition for the approval of food and color additives intended for use in meat or poultry products, as well as GRAS notifications "regarding the use of a substance in the production of meat or poultry products." The MOU generally instructs the agency that receives a request for review of a substance used in meat or poultry products to seek review by the other agency regarding the substance as well. For example, when FSIS receives a request for an acceptability determination regarding the application of a substance in the production of meat or poultry products, it confirms the status of the substance's safety with FDA. Conversely, if FDA receives a request for a suitability determination regarding the use of a substance in meat or poultry products, the request must be transferred to FSIS. The MOU provides that when FDA receives a GRAS Notice regarding the use of a substance in the production of meat or poultry products, FDA and FSIS proceed jointly, as they would regarding requests for approval of a food or color additive intended for use in the production of meat or poultry products. FDA informs and consults with FSIS, and FSIS provides written comments to FDA within 60 days. FDA's response to the notifier includes information regarding the notifier's responsibilities under the Federal Meat Inspection Act and Poultry Products Inspection Act and "may include concerns about the suitability of the use of the substance in the production of meat or poultry products and, when applicable, any restrictions or conditions of use in the production of meat or poultry products that FSIS recommends in writing." Under the dual review process, if FDA approves a substance, such as a food or color additive, or lists the substance as GRAS for use in food, the substance is not automatically acceptable for use in meat and poultry products. If FDA's approval of a food or color additive, or if the FDA's GRAS listing does not specifically mention meat or poultry products, FSIS needs an affirmative written statement from FDA that it did consider the substance's use in meat or poultry or that it has no objections with regard to safety when the substance is used in meat or poultry. FSIS then needs to determine suitability and whether rulemaking is required. Whether a substance is suitable depends on "the effectiveness of the substance in performing the intended technical purpose of use, at the lowest level necessary, and the assurance that the conditions of use will not result in an adulterated product or one that misleads customers." To satisfy the requirement of suitability, FSIS needs certain data as evidence that the substance or use of the substance is suitable for its intended technical purposes. The data must show the effectiveness of the substance in achieving the intended purpose of its use. The data must show that the use is at the lowest level necessary to achieve the intended effect under the proposed conditions of use. The data must show that the use cannot result in adulteration or misbranding. FSIS regulations currently prohibit the use of substances that conceal damage or inferiority or make a product appear better or of greater value than it is. The regulations also provide that substances that are intended to be used to impart color in any meat or poultry product cannot be used unless approved as a color additive (under FDA regulations) or approved by FSIS regulations. This data must be provided for each separate product in which the use of the substance is intended. Based on the merits of these data, FSIS can permit the use of the substance or the new use of a substance under the proposed conditions of use and in conformance with standards and labeling requirements. With respect to whether rulemaking is required, if FDA has found or confirmed the safety of the substance, FSIS regulations are not amended. If rulemaking is not required, FSIS notifies the requestor in writing of its determination in what is known as an acceptability determination. If the use of the substance is prohibited or limited or if the substance is not normally found in the product, FSIS regulations may be necessary. If rulemaking is required, the substance is added to the current list of approved substances after the formal rulemaking process is completed. Because not all approved substances are listed in the published regulations under this process, FSIS maintains a directive system of all approved substances that are accepted as safe and suitable by FSIS on its website. As discussed above, a determination that a substance is GRAS may be made by the FDA, through the affirmation of the GRAS status of a substance, or by industry (including via a GRAS notification), based on scientific procedures or common use of a substance in food prior to January 1, 1958. FSIS cannot rely on the industry's determination of a substance as GRAS because of statutory requirements requiring USDA inspection of meat and poultry products. Meat and poultry products are required to have a mark of inspection that "reflects a determination by FSIS that the food product is not adulterated, and thus that all substances used to make the product are safe and suitable." As a result, "FSIS must have from FDA, at the very least, a written statement of no objection with regard to the safety of the use of the substance." Under the process outlined in the FDA's 1997 proposed rule, manufacturers have submitted GRAS notifications to the FDA that state their view that carbon monoxide is a GRAS substance. The FDA has responded that it has "no questions" about the conclusion that CO is GRAS. The FDA's responses to the GRAS notifications informed the industry that it had the continuing responsibility to ensure the substance's safety and compliance with other legal and regulatory requirements. The FDA first determined that it had no questions regarding a GRAS notification for the use of carbon monoxide in March 2000. The notifier, Hawaii International Seafood, Inc., stated its determination that the use of "tasteless smoke" (of which carbon monoxide is a component) on raw seafood is GRAS. The company defined its intended use as involving a procedure before the fish is frozen that would preserve the color, taste, aroma, and texture of raw seafood. In addition to determining that it had no questions, the FDA stated that the company's use of tasteless smoke constituted a preservative and noted that the fish must be labeled so that it complies with misbranding provisions of the FFDCA and the FDA's labeling regulations. The FDA next determined that it had no questions regarding the use of carbon monoxide as a GRAS substance in meat packaging in a letter to Pactiv Corporation in February 2002. The agency also stated that it had not made an independent determination of the GRAS status of the use of CO described in the notification. FDA noted the industry's conclusion that the use of carbon monoxide allows meat to maintain a desirable red color during storage but once the product was removed from storage, the color of the meat "deteriorates at a similar rate to that of meat that has not been exposed to CO." FSIS concluded that the use of carbon monoxide in the MAP system as it had been described by Pactiv in its GRAS notification "would be acceptable for packaging red meat cuts and ground meat." FSIS agreed with the company that "there is no lasting functional effect in the food and there is an insignificant amount of carbon monoxide present in the finished product under the proposed conditions of use." FDA restated that it had no questions regarding the industry's determination that carbon monoxide is GRAS in July 2004 and September 2005 in response letters to Precept Foods, LLC, and Tyson Foods, Inc., respectively. Currently, two additional GRAS notifications regarding carbon monoxide are pending. Although notifiers seeking a response from the FDA on GRAS notices for CO have submitted notices describing other conditions of use of CO, it appears possible that a manufacturer could potentially rely on a FDA response that the agency "has no questions" to use a GRAS substance in a manner other than the use described in the GRAS notice for which the FDA had no questions. For example, two of the CO GRAS notices, 83 and 143, discuss a level of CO that is 0.4 percent in a MAP system. Conceivably, a company could interpret the agency's lack of questions regarding the 0.4 CO level and use a CO level of 0.45 percent in a MAP system. However, if the FDA made a determination that the use of 0.45 percent CO, or even 0.4 percent CO, violated the FFDCA, the agency could attempt to seek criminal and civil penalties for violations such as adulteration and misbranding. The FFDCA also provides the FDA with other enforcement mechanisms such as seizure and injunctions. Two bills have been introduced in the House of Representatives regarding the use of carbon monoxide in meat and poultry products: H.R. 3115 (the Carbon Monoxide Treated Meat, Poultry, and Seafood Safe Handling, Labeling, and Consumer Protection Act) and H.R. 3610 (the Food and Drug Import Safety Act of 2007). Additionally, the discussion draft of the Food and Drug Administration Globalization Act of 2008, issued by Representatives Dingell, Pallone, and Stupak, similarly addresses the issue. Other bills also address GRAS substances: H.R. 2633 , H.R. 3290 , H.R. 3580 , H.R. 6635 , and S. 1342 . H.R. 3115 , H.R. 3610 , and the discussion draft propose to amend FFDCA SS 201. Under the proposals, if carbon monoxide is used to treat meat, poultry or seafood that is intended for human consumption and if the conditions of that use would affect the color of the products, carbon monoxide must be treated as a color additive under FFDCA, unless the product's label includes a statement that is "prominently and conspicuously" placed to notify the consumer of the use of carbon monoxide and to warn the consumer of proper factors to judge the safety of the product. The bills and the discussion draft would allow the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) to establish alternative labeling requirements five years after the effective date of the labeling requirement, if the Secretary finds that the labeling requirement is no longer necessary to prevent consumer deception. The discussion draft contains an additional provision related to GRAS determinations that would require the Secretary to publish, in the Federal Register , notice of receipt of a request for a substance to be determined by the Secretary to be GRAS. The Secretary would then have 90 days after publication of the notice to determine whether the substance is GRAS; the Secretary's determination would also be published in the Federal Register . It is unclear if the discussion draft is referring to a petition for affirmation of GRAS status under 21 C.F.R. SS 170.35 as the "request for a substance to be determined by the Secretary to be a GRAS substance," or an alternate situation. (See page 5 in the PDF version of this report.) If the FDA Commissioner receives a petition to affirm the GRAS status of a substance "that directly or indirectly become[s] [a] component[] of food," the Commissioner must publish a notice of the filing of the petition in the Federal Register within 30 days after the date of filing of the petition. There is a 60-day comment period after the notice of filing in the current regulations. The current regulations state that the FDA Commissioner will publish an order listing the substance as GRAS if the petition and all available information "provide[s] convincing evidence that the substance is GRAS." Alternatively, if the Commissioner "concludes that there is a lack of convincing evidence that the substance is GRAS and that it should be considered a food additive subject to" FFDCA SS 409, the Commissioner must publish a notice of this determination in the Federal Register .

The use of carbon monoxide (CO) in the packaging of meat and fish has generated considerable debate. The presence of CO results in the meat turning a bright red color that lasts longer than the color in untreated meat. Additionally, fish treated with CO gain a fresher appearance and a red tint. The meat industry, consumer groups, scientists, and policy makers disagree as to whether the use of CO in meat and fish packaging should be regulated by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), through labeling or otherwise, and whether CO should be a substance Generally Recognized As Safe (GRAS) under current and proposed FDA rules. Two bills have been introduced in the 110 th Congress regarding the use of carbon monoxide in meat, poultry products, and seafood: H.R. 3115 and H.R. 3610 . The discussion draft of the Food and Drug Administration Globalization Act of 2008, issued by Representatives Dingell, Pallone, and Stupak, similarly addresses the issue. The bills and the discussion draft propose to amend section 201 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA). Under the proposals, if CO is used to treat meat, poultry, or seafood that is intended for human consumption, and if the conditions of that use would affect the color of the products, CO must be treated as a color additive under FFDCA, unless the product's label includes a statement that is prominently and conspicuously placed to notify the consumer of the use of CO and to warn the consumer of proper factors to judge the safety of the product. The bills and the discussion draft would allow the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) to establish alternative labeling requirements five years after the effective date of the labeling requirement, if the Secretary finds that the labeling requirement is no longer necessary to prevent consumer deception. The discussion draft contains an additional provision related to GRAS determinations that would require the Secretary to publish, in the Federal Register , notice of receipt of a request for a substance to be determined by the Secretary to be GRAS. The Secretary would then have 90 days after publication of the notice to determine whether the substance is GRAS; the Secretary's determination would also be published in the lain Federal Register . Other bills also address GRAS substances: H.R. 2633 , H.R. 3290 , H.R. 3580 , H.R. 6635 , and S. 1342 . This report provides an overview of the FDA's regulation of GRAS substances, which are exempt from the premarket approval process for food additives. The report next discusses the FDA's 1997 proposed rule, which would create a notification procedure for GRAS substances through which manufacturers can notify the FDA of their "determination that a particular use of a substance is GRAS." The FDA has been using this GRAS notification procedure since the publication of the proposed rule on an "interim policy" basis. The roles of the USDA and FDA are also discussed, including the 2000 Memorandum of Understanding regarding review of substances used in the production of meat and poultry products. Finally, the report examines GRAS notices regarding intended uses of carbon monoxide.

In 2007, China overtook Canada to become the largest source of U.S. imports (at $322 billion). In 2008, U.S. imports from China totaled $338 billion. U.S. imports from China as a share of total U.S. imports rose from 6.5% in 1996 to 16.1% in 2008. Over the past few years, numerous recalls and warnings have been issued by U.S. firms over various products imported from China, due to health and safety concerns. This has led many U.S. policymakers to question the adequacy of China's regulatory environment in ensuring that its exports to the United States meet U.S. standards for health, safety, and quality; as well as the ability of U.S. government regulators, importers, and retailers to identify and take action against unsafe imports (from all countries) before they enter the U.S. market. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in March 2007 issued warnings and announced voluntary recalls on certain pet foods (and products used to manufacture pet food and animal feed) from China believed to have caused the sickness and deaths of numerous pets in the United States. In May 2007, the FDA issued warnings on certain toothpaste products (some of which were found to be counterfeit) found to originate in China that contained poisonous chemicals. In June 2007, the FDA announced import controls on all farm-raised catfish, bass, shrimp, dace (related to carp), and eel from China after antimicrobial agents, which are not approved in the United States for use in farm-raised aquatic animals, were found. Such shipments will be detained until they are proven to be free of contaminants. On January 25, 2008, the FDA posted on its website a notice by Baxter Healthcare Corporation that it had temporarily halted the manufacture of its multiple-dose vials of heparin (a blood thinner) for injection because of recent reports of serious adverse events (including an estimated 81 deaths and hundreds of complications) associated with the use of this drug. On February 18, 2008, the New York Times reported that a Chinese firm that produces an active ingredient used to produce heparin was not certified by the Chinese government to make the drug and had not undergone FDA inspection; many have speculated that the Chinese plant is likely the source of the problem. On September 12, 2008, the FDA issued a health information advisory on infant formula in response to reports of contaminated milk-based infant formula manufactured and sold in China, and later issued a warning on other products containing milk imported from China. On November 12, 2008, the FDA issued a new alert stating that all products containing milk imported from China would be detained unless proven to be free of melamine. The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) in June 2007 was informed by Foreign Tire Sales Inc., an importer of foreign tires, that it suspected that up to 450,000 tires (later reduced to 255,000 tires) made in China may have a major safety defect (i.e., missing or insufficient gum strip inside the tire). The company was ordered by the NHTSA to issue a recall. The Chinese government and the manufacturer have maintained that the tires in question meet or exceed U.S. standards. The Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) has issued alerts and announced voluntary recalls by U.S. companies on numerous products made in China. For example, in 2007, over four-fifths of CPSC recall notices involved Chinese products. Over this period, roughly 17.6 million toy units were recalled because of excessive lead levels. Recalls were also issued on 9.5 million Chinese-made toys (because of the danger of loose magnets), 4.2 million "Aqua Dots" toys (because beads contain a chemical that can turn toxic if ingested) and 1 million toy ovens (due to potential finger entrapment and burn hazards). In 2008, around 2.5 million toy units from China were recalled due to high lead content. From January 1 to June 3, 2009, about 1.1 million children's items (mainly toys and shoes) from China were recalled because of excessive lead. There have been a number media reports in 2009 about potential health and safety hazards of Chinese-made drywall products that have been installed in American homes in an number of states (including Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, Texas, and Virginia) over the past few years. It has been claimed that these products emit sulfur gases that corrode copper coils and electrical and plumbing components. The CPSC reports that it has received over 365 reports from residents in 18 states and the District of Columbia who believe their health symptoms or the corrosion of certain metal components in their homes are related to the presence of drywall produced in China. The CPSC reportedly began an investigation of Chinese-made drywall in February 2009 to evaluate the relationship between the drywall and the reported health symptoms and electrical and fire safety issues and to trace the origin and distribution of the drywall. China's media reported in March that the government is also investigating these complaints. U.S. imports of plaster products, which includes drywall, from China rose from $3.6 billion in 2005 to $32.3 billion in 2006, then fell to $5.7 billion by 2008. In Congress, H.R. 1977 and S. 739 would require the CPSC to study and test drywall imported from China in 2004-2007, analyze its composition, determine the impact that chemicals and organic compounds in the drywall had on metal items in homes as well as potential health effects, and to issue an interim ban on drywall products deemed to constitute a substantial product hazard. In addition, S.Res. 91 would call on the CPSC to initiate a formal proceeding to investigate drywall imported from China in 2004-2007, prohibit the further importation of drywall and associated building products from China, order a recall of hazardous Chinese drywall, and to seek civil penalties against the drywall manufacturers in China that produced or distributed hazardous drywall and their subsidiaries in the United States to cover the cost of the recall effort and other associated remediation efforts. Table 1 lists various products imported from China in 2008 that have been the subject of U.S. health and safety concerns over the past few years, such as toys, seafood, tires, animal foods, organic chemicals and pharmaceuticals, and toothpaste. It shows that China was a major source of imports for many of these products. For example, China was the largest supplier of imported toys (91% of total) and tires (37%) and the 2 nd for seafood products (16%) and animal foods (26%). Despite health and safety concerns, U.S. imports of most of the products listed (with the exception of drywall and toothpaste) increased in 2008 over 2007 levels. Many analysts contend that China's health and safety regime for manufactured goods and agricultural products is fragmented and ineffective. Problems are seen as including weak consumer protection laws and poorly enforced regulations, lack of inspections and ineffective penalties for code violators, underfunded and understaffed regulatory agencies and poor interagency cooperation, the proliferation of fake goods and ingredients, the existence of numerous unlicensed producers, falsified export documents, extensive pollution, intense competition that often induces firms to cut corners, the relative absence of consumer protection advocacy groups, failure by Chinese firms to closely monitor the quality of their suppliers' products, restrictions on the media, and extensive government corruption and lack of accountability, especially at the local level. Chinese officials contend that most Chinese-made products are safe and note that U.S. recalls for health and safety reasons have involved a number of countries (as well as U.S. products). They also argue that some of the blame for recalled products belongs to U.S. importers or designers. They further contend that some U.S. products imported into China have failed to meet Chinese standards. However, they have acknowledged numerous product health and safety problems in China, as reflected in reports that have appeared in China's state-controlled media. For example, in June 2004, the Chinese People ' s Daily reported that fake baby formula had killed 50 to 60 infants in China. In June 2006, the China Daily reported that 11 people had died from a tainted injection used to treat gall bladders. In August 2006, Xinhua News Agency reported that a defective antibiotic drug killed seven people and sickened many others. China has announced a number of initiatives to improve and strengthen food and drug safety supervision and standards, increase inspections, require safety certificates before some products can be sold, and to crack down on government corruption: In May 2007, the Xinhua News Agency reported that former director of China's State Food and Drug Administration had been sentenced to death for taking bribes (equivalent to $850,000) in return for approving untested and/or fake medicines (he was executed on July 10, 2007). On the same day, the Xinhua News Agency reported that the Chinese government had announced that it would, by the end of 2007, complete regulations for setting up a national food recall system would ban the sale of toys that failed to pass a national compulsory safety certification. On June 27, 2007, the China Daily reported that a nationwide inspection of the food production industry had found that a variety of dangerous industrial raw materials had been used in the production of flour, candy, pickles, biscuits, black fungus, melon seeds, bean curd, and seafood. As a result, the government reportedly closed 180 food factories found to be producing unsafe products and/or making fake commodities. It also reported that in 2006, the government had conducted 10.4 million inspections, uncovering problems in 360,000 food businesses, and had closed 152,000 unlicensed food businesses. On July 4, 2007, the China Daily reported that the government had finished making amendments to all food safety standards and had established an emergency response mechanism among several ministries to deal with major problems regarding food safety. On August 9, 2007, China Daily reported that the government had pledged to spend $1 billion by 2010 to improve drug and food safety. On August 15, 2007, a spokesperson from the Chinese embassy in Washington, DC, said that China would require that every food shipment be inspected for quality by the government by September 1, 2007. On August 20, 2007, the Chinese government announced that it had created a 19-member cabinet-level panel to oversee product quality and food safety (headed by Vice-Premier Wu Yi) and would start a four-month nationwide campaign to improve the quality of goods and food. On December 5, 2007, the government stated that during the first 10 months of the year, it had shut down 47,800 food factories without operating licenses. On January 15, 2008, China announced it had inspected over 3,000 export-oriented toy manufacturers and had revoked licenses for 600 firms that failed to meet quality standards. On February 28, 2009, China's National People's Congress enacted a new food safety law (to take effect in June 2009) to enhance monitoring and supervision, toughen safety standards, provide recall substandard products, and increase punishment for offenders. The law bans all chemicals and materials other than authorized additives in food production, and will establish a new product identification and tracking system for nine product categories, including food. On March 6, 2009, China Daily reported that Chinese courts would accept lawsuits brought by parents who's children had been sickened by melamine-tainted milk products. On March 16, 2009, China Daily reported that the government had investigated 76,500 fake food cases in 2008. Despite these efforts, reports of tainted products persist. In January 2008, dozens of people in Japan reportedly became ill from eating dumplings imported from China that contained pesticide. In September 2008, the Chinese government reported that infant formula that was tainted with melamine had killed four children and sickened 53,000 others (13,000 of whom had to be hospitalized). The government announced on September 22, 2008, that China's chief quality supervisor had stepped down from his post over the incident. Other local and provincial officials have reportedly been sacked for trying to cover up incident. At least 22 Chinese baby formula companies have been found to have tainted products. Press reports indicate that other milk products made in China may have been contaminated as well. On October 15, 2008, the Chinese government ordered a blanket recall of all dairy products made before September 14, 2008. Several countries later banned the sale of Chinese-made milk products. On December 2, 2008, the Chinese government reported that melamine-tainted formula had killed six children and sickened 294,000 others (51,900 of whom had to be hospitalized and 154 were in serious condition). In October 2008, Hong Kong officials reported that some egg imports from China were contaminated with high levels of melamine. The United States and China reached a number of agreements in 2007 to address health and safety concerns: On September 11, 2007, the CPSC and its Chinese counterpart, the General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine (AQSIQ), signed a Joint Statement on enhancing consumer product safety. China pledged to implement a comprehensive plan to intensify efforts (such as increased inspections, efforts to educate Chinese manufacturers, bilateral technical personnel exchanges and training, regular meetings to exchange information with U.S. officials, and the development of a product tracking system) to prevent exports of unsafe products to the United States, especially in regard to lead paint and toys. On September 12, 2007, the NHTSA signed a Memorandum of Cooperation with its Chinese counterpart on enhanced cooperation and communication on vehicles and automotive equipment safety. On December 11, 2007, the U.S. Health and Human Services (HHS) announced that it had signed two Memoranda of Agreement (MOA) with its Chinese counterparts; the first covering specific food and feed items that have been of concern to the United States, and the second covering drugs and medical devices. Both MOAs would require Chinese firms that export such products to the United States to register with the Chinese government and to obtain certification before they can export. Such firms would also be subject to annual inspections to ensure they meet U.S. standards. The MOAs also establish mechanisms for greater information sharing, increase access of production facilities by U.S. officials, and create working groups in order to boost cooperation. On March 13, 2008, the FDA announced that it planned to place eight FDA staffers in China. Some members of Congress have proposed placing a CPSC official at the U.S. embassy in Beijing. Congressional concerns over the health and safety of imported products (including those from China) prompted the introduction of numerous bills to tighten U.S. health and safety rules and regulations (such as increased inspections, certification requirements, and mandatory standards for children's products, such as toys) and increased funding for U.S. product safety agencies (such as the CPSC). On August 14, 2008, President Bush signed into law the Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act of 2008 ( P.L. 110-314 ). Concerns over the health, safety, and quality of Chinese products could have a number of important economic implications. Both the United States and China have accused each other of using health and safety concerns as an excuse to impose protectionist measures and some observers contend that this issue could lead to growing trade friction between the two sides. International concerns over the safety of Chinese exports may diminish the attractiveness of China as a destination for foreign investment in export-oriented manufacturing, as well as for foreign firms that contract with Chinese firms to make and export products under their labels (such as toys). Efforts by China to restore international confidence in the health and safety of its exports through increased inspections, certification requirements, mandatory testing, etc., could have a significant impact on the cost of doing business in China, which could slow the pace of Chinese exports and hurt employment in the export sector (which has already been affected by the global economic slowdown). Moreover, international concerns over the safety of Chinese products could prove to be a setback to the government's efforts to develop and promote internationally recognized Chinese brands (such as cars), which it views as important to the country's future economic development. Thus, it is very likely the Chinese government will take this issue very seriously. However, it is unclear how long it will take for the central government to effectively address the numerous challenges it faces (especially government corruption and counterfeiting) to ensure that its exports comply with the health and safety standards of the United States and other trading partners. Additionally, a sharp decrease in purchases by U.S. consumers of Chinese products could negatively impact U.S. firms that import and/or sell such products and may raise prices of some commodities as firms attempt to rectify various safety problems. The number of lead-related U.S. recalls of imported Chinese toys declined sharply in 2008, which may in part reflect the Chinese government's efforts to regulate its domestic toy industry. However, the crisis in China over melamine-tainted food products has seriously challenged the government's assertions that most products made in China are safe and that an effective regulatory regime has been established. There have been allegations that Chinese company and local government officials knew about the problem and did nothing (despite numerous complaints by Chinese parents) until the extent of the problem was publicized by the media. This incident indicates that the central government continues to face numerous challenges in developing an effective health and safety enforcement regime.

China is the largest source for U.S. imports, accounting for a 16% of total U.S. imports in 2008. China is a dominant supplier of many imported consumer products. For example, 90% of U.S. toy imports come from China. Numerous reports of unsafe products from China over the past few years, including seafood, pet food, toys, tires, drywall, and medicines have raised concern in the United States over the health, safety, and quality of imported Chinese products. The United States and China have sought to boost cooperation on health and safety issues. For example, China agreed to boost efforts to ensure that its toy exports to the United States did not violate U.S. regulations on lead content. This report provides an overview of U.S. concerns over the health and safety of Chinese products, identifies challenges China faces to develop an effective health and safety enforcement regime, summarizes U.S.-China cooperative efforts, and analyzes how this issue could impact China's economy and U.S.-China trade relations. This report will be updated as events warrant.

T he Wilderness Act of 1964 (P.L. 88-577, 16 U.S.C. SSSS1131-1136) established the National Wilderness Preservation System as a system of undeveloped federal lands, which are protected and managed to preserve their natural condition. The act initially designated 54 wilderness areas containing 9.1 million acres of federal land within the national forests. Since then, Congress has passed more than 100 subsequent laws designating additional wilderness areas. As of September, 1, 2017, the National Wilderness Preservation System totaled 765 areas, spanning nearly 110 million acres. Many believe that certain areas should be designated to protect and preserve their unique value and characteristics, and bills are usually introduced in each Congress to designate wilderness areas. Others oppose such legislation because commercial activities, motorized access, and roads, structures, and facilities generally are prohibited in wilderness areas. Another area of concern is how prohibition of such activities can affect law enforcement in wilderness areas along U.S. national borders. This report presents information on wilderness protection and a discussion of issues in the wilderness debate--some pros and cons of wilderness designation generally; proposed legislation; and a discussion of wilderness study area designations and protections and related issues. This report is updated periodically to track the status of legislation introduced in the 115 th Congress to designate new wilderness (see Table 1 ) or to release wilderness study areas (WSAs; see Table 2 ). Tables of legislation from the 114 th Congress are provided in the Appendix of this report. In the Wilderness Act, Congress reserved for itself the authority to designate federal lands as part of the system. This congressional authority is based on the Property Clause of the Constitution, which gives to Congress the "Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States." Wilderness areas are part of existing units of federal land administered by the four federal land management agencies--the Forest Service (FS), in the Department of Agriculture; and the National Park Service (NPS); Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS); and Bureau of Land Management (BLM) within the Department of the Interior (DOI). Thus, statutory provisions for these agencies' lands, as well as the Wilderness Act and subsequent wilderness statutes, govern the administration of the designated wilderness areas. Wilderness designations can be controversial because the Wilderness Act (and subsequent laws) restricts the allowed uses of the land within designated areas. In general, the Wilderness Act prohibits commercial activities, motorized access, and roads, structures, and facilities in wilderness areas. Specifically, Section 4(c) states: Except as specifically provided for in this Act, and subject to existing private rights, there shall be no commercial enterprise and no permanent road within any wilderness area designated by this Act and, except as necessary to meet minimum requirements for the administration of the area for the purpose of this Act (including measures required in emergencies involving the health and safety of persons within the area), there shall be no temporary road, no use of motor vehicles, motorized equipment or motorboats, no landing of aircraft, no other form of mechanical transport, and no structure or installation within any such area. This section thus prohibits most commercial resource exploitation (such as timber harvesting) and motorized entry (with cars, trucks, off-road vehicles, aircraft, or motorboats) except for "minimum requirements" to administer the areas and in emergencies. However, Section 4(d) provides numerous exceptions, including (a) possible continued use of motorboats and aircraft where uses are already established; (b) measures to control fires, insects, and diseases; (c) mineral prospecting conducted "in a manner compatible with the preservation of the wilderness environment"; (d) water projects; (e) continued livestock grazing; and (f) certain commercial recreation activities. Subsequent wilderness statutes have included additional provisions for administering those individual wilderness areas, including exceptions to the general Wilderness Act prohibitions. Existing private rights established prior to the designation of an area as wilderness remain in effect, unless expressly modified by the wilderness statute. The designation does not alter property rights, but does not suggest that all uses prior to the designation are allowed. There must be a property right, rather than a general right of use. Courts have consistently interpreted the phrase "subject to valid existing rights" to mean that the wilderness designation is not intended to take property in violation of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution. Ownership of land within a wilderness area would confer existing rights. While most uses--timber harvesting, livestock grazing, motorized recreation--are not considered as rights to the lands and resources, the mining and mineral leasing laws do provide a process for establishing rights to the mineral resources. The Wilderness Act allowed implementation of these laws through 1983 for the original areas designated; many subsequent laws explicitly withdrew the designated areas from availability under these laws. Wilderness designations are permanent unless revised by law. Congress has statutorily removed lands from several wilderness areas, commonly to adjust boundaries to delete private lands or roads included inadvertently in the original designation. Lands do not have to be untouched by humans to be eligible for statutory designation as wilderness. Specific statutes designating wilderness areas may terminate or accommodate any existing uses or conditions that do not conform to wilderness standards (commonly referred to as nonconforming uses ). Many previous wilderness designations have directed immediate termination of nonconforming uses, whereas other bills have directed the agencies to remove, remediate, or restore nonconforming conditions or infrastructure within a specified time frame. Alternatively, many nonconforming uses and conditions have been permitted to remain in designated wilderness areas. The Wilderness Act explicitly allows continued motorized access by aircraft and motorboats in areas where such uses were already established. The Wilderness Act also permits motorized access for management requirements and emergencies, and for fire, insect, and disease control. Numerous wilderness statutes have permitted existing infrastructure (e.g., cabins, water resource facilities, telecommunications equipment) to remain and have authorized occasional motorized access to operate, maintain, and replace the infrastructure. A few statutes have also allowed new infrastructure developments (e.g., telecommunications equipment and a space energy laser facility) within designated wilderness areas. Although such authorizations are usually for a specific area, some statutes have provided more general exemptions, such as for maintaining grazing facilities or for fish and wildlife management by a state agency in all areas designated in the statute. Various existing wilderness statutes have included special access provisions for particular needs. For example, several statutes have included provisions addressing possible military needs in and near the designated areas, particularly for low-level military training flights. Similarly, statutes designating wilderness areas along the Mexican border commonly have allowed motorized access for law enforcement and border security. (See " Wilderness and U.S.-Mexican Border Security " below.) Other statutes have contained provisions allowing particular access for tribal, cultural, or other local needs. Several statutes have included provisions authorizing the agencies to prevent public access, usually temporarily and for the minimum area needed, to accommodate particular needs. Proponents of adding new areas to the National Wilderness Preservation System generally seek designations of specific areas to preserve them in their current condition and to prevent development activities from altering their wilderness character. Most areas protected as or proposed for wilderness are undeveloped, with few (if any) signs of human activity, such as roads and structures. The principal benefit of a wilderness designation is to maintain such undeveloped conditions and the values that such conditions generate--clean water, undisturbed wildlife habitats, natural scenic views, opportunities for nonmotorized recreation (e.g., backpacking), unaltered research baselines, and for some, the simple knowledge of the existence of such pristine places. Opponents of wilderness designations generally seek to retain development options for federal lands. The potential use of lands and resources can provide economic opportunities through extracting and developing the resources, especially in the relatively rural communities in and around the federal lands. The principal cost of a wilderness designation is the lost opportunity (opportunity costs) for economic activity resulting from resource extraction and development. While some economic activities--such as grazing and some recreation--are allowed to continue within wilderness areas, many are prohibited. The potential losses for some resources--such as timber harvesting--can often be determined with relative accuracy, since the quality and quantity of the resource can be measured. However, for other resources--particularly minerals--the assessments of the quality and quantity of the unavailable resources are more difficult to determine, and thus the opportunity costs are less certain. The potential benefits and opportunity costs of wilderness designation can rarely be fully quantified and valued. Thus, decisions about wilderness generally cannot be based solely on a clear cost-benefit or other economic analysis. Rather, deliberations commonly focus on trying to maximize the benefits of preserving pristine areas and minimize the resulting opportunity costs. However, individuals and groups who benefit from wilderness designations may differ from those who may be harmed by lost opportunities, increasing conflict and making compromise difficult. In general, Congress addresses several issues when drafting and considering wilderness bills. These issues include the general pros and cons of wilderness designation--generally and regarding identified areas of interest--and specific provisions regarding management of wilderness areas to allow or prohibit certain uses. The first step in developing legislation to designate wilderness areas is to identify which areas to designate. The Wilderness Act specified that wilderness areas are "at least 5,000 acres of land or ... of sufficient size to make practicable its preservation and use in an unimpaired condition"; but no minimum size is required for designations made under new legislation. As a result, wilderness areas have taken all shapes and sizes; the smallest is the Pelican Island Wilderness in Florida, with only 5 1/2 acres, and the largest is the Mollie Beattie Wilderness (Arctic National Wildlife Refuge) in Alaska, with 8.0 million acres. Many wilderness statutes have designated a single area, or even a single addition to an existing area. Others have designated more than 70 new areas or additions in a single statute. Some bills address a particular area, while others address all likely wilderness areas for a state or substate region (e.g., the California desert), usually for one agency's lands, although occasionally for two or more agencies' lands in the vicinity. Typically, the bill references a particular map for each area, and directs the agency to file a map with the relevant committees of Congress after enactment and to retain a copy in relevant agency offices (commonly a local office and/or the Washington, DC, headquarters). Numerous bills to designate wilderness areas usually are introduced in each Congress. For example, 33 bills that would have designated wilderness areas (plus 13 companion bills) were introduced in the 111 th Congress. One was enacted--the Omnibus Public Land Management Act of 2009, P.L. 111-11 . It included 16 subtitles (many of which had been introduced in individual wilderness bills in the 110 th and 111 th Congresses) designating over 50 new and expanding nearly 30 wilderness areas covering 2,050,964 acres in various states, as well as numerous other land, water, and other provisions. The 112 th Congress was the first in decades not to designate additional wilderness; the only wilderness law that was enacted reduced the size of a wilderness area in the State of Washington and transferred the land to the Quileute Indian Tribe. The 113 th Congress added five new areas and over 279,00 acres to the system in two enacted bills. In the 114 th Congress, more than 30 bills were introduced to designate new or add to existing wilderness areas, and one was enacted: P.L. 114-46 , which designated three new wilderness areas in Idaho. See Appendix for an alphabetical list of legislation introduced and the bill enacted into law in the 114 th Congress. In the 115 th Congress, as of the date of this report, more than 20 bills had been introduced to expand the National Wilderness Preservation System. See Table 1 for an alphabetical list of legislation introduced and the most recent action (as of the publication of this report). Some of these bills include proposals to designate more than one wilderness area or to designate several wilderness areas in different states. Most bills direct that the designated areas are to be managed in accordance with the Wilderness Act, meaning human impacts, such as commercial activities, motorized and mechanical access, and infrastructure developments, are generally prohibited. Some bills designating wilderness areas may terminate or accommodate any existing nonconforming uses or conditions, however. The Wilderness Act does allow some activities that affect the natural condition of the property, such as access for emergencies and for minimum management requirements; activities to control fires, insects, and diseases; livestock grazing; and some water infrastructure facilities. Subject to valid existing rights, wilderness areas are withdrawn from the public land laws and the mining and mineral leasing laws. The Wilderness Act specifies that "reasonable access" to nonfederal lands within a designated wilderness area must be accommodated. State jurisdiction over and responsibilities for fish and wildlife and water rights are unaffected. The Wilderness Act provides that the area will be managed, in part, for recreational use, but it does not specifically address hunting, fishing, or recreational shooting (although motorized vehicles, which may be helpful in removing big game from remote areas, are typically forbidden). Wilderness areas are generally open to hunting, fishing, and recreational shooting, subject to the management provisions of the underlying federal land. For example, hunting is prohibited in many NPS units; subsequently, hunting is also prohibited in any wilderness areas within those units. However, hunting, fishing, and recreational shooting are generally permitted on FS or BLM lands and, thus, on wilderness areas within those areas. Some wilderness designations authorize periods when or zones where the wilderness may be closed to hunting, fishing, and trapping for safety and administrative reasons. Legislation introduced in the 115 th Congress would alter management of wilderness areas for hunting, fishing, and recreational shooting activities. For example, S. 733 , the Sportsmen's Act, and H.R. 3668 , the Sportsmen's Heritage and Recreational Enhancement (SHARE) Act, both include provisions that would specify that wilderness areas managed by the FS and BLM would be open to recreational fishing, hunting, and recreational shooting, unless a land management agency had acted to close the land to the activity. The agencies would be permitted to close an area temporarily or permanently. H.R. 3668 specifies that closures must be determined to be necessary and reasonable and supported by facts and evidence. S. 733 would require specific public notice and comment periods prior to a closure. S. 733 also would prohibit the agencies from providing permits for recreational shooting ranges within designated wilderness areas. H.R. 3668 was reported by the House Committee on Natural Resources on September 18, 2017. S. 733 was reported by the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources on June 22, 2017. Similar bills were introduced in previous Congresses. One issue that has received attention from some Members of Congress in recent years is the impact of the Wilderness Act and other federal laws governing land and resource management on border security. Many are concerned that wilderness areas abutting and near the Mexican border are conduits for illegal immigration and drug trafficking because limitations on motorized access may restrict apprehension efforts. There are 15 designated wilderness areas within about 20 miles of the Mexican border, and 5 wilderness areas abut the border (for a total of approximately 96 linear miles). As noted above, the Wilderness Act authorizes motorized access for emergencies and administrative needs, but does not describe what is meant by "administrative needs." The act is silent on access specifically for border security, but some actions related to controlling drug trafficking and illegal immigration might be considered administrative needs or emergencies. Specific enabling statutes may contain more specific language or provisions. The enabling statutes for two of the five border wilderness areas contain specific language authorizing access for border security reasons. The first explicit language on the issue of wilderness access for border security was in Title III of the Arizona Desert Wilderness Act of 1990 ( P.L. 101-628 ). Section 301(g) directs that Nothing in this title, including the designation as wilderness of lands within the Cabeza Prieta National Wildlife Refuge shall be construed as (1) precluding or otherwise affecting continued border operations ... within such refuge, in accordance with any applicable interagency agreements in effect on the date of enactment of this Act; or (2) precluding ... new or renewed agreements ... concerning ... border operations within such refuge, consistent with management of the refuge for the purpose for which such refuge was established. The California Desert Protection Act of 1994 ( P.L. 103-433 ) also contains explicit guidance on border security for all designated areas, including one abutting the Mexican border and six others within about 20 miles of the border. Section 103(g) directs that Nothing in this Act, including the wilderness designations ... may be construed to preclude Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies from conducting law enforcement and border operations as permitted before the date of enactment of this Act, including the use of motorized vehicles and aircraft, on any lands designated as wilderness by this Act. The most recent statute designating a border wilderness area, the Otay Mountain Wilderness Act of 1999 ( P.L. 106-145 ), also addresses border security. The act requires the southern boundary of the wilderness to be at least 100 feet from the border. Also, Section 6(b) allows border operations to continue consistent with the Wilderness Act: Because of the proximity of the Wilderness Area to the United States-Mexico international border, drug interdiction [and] border operations ... are common management actions throughout the area.... This Act recognizes the need to continue such management actions so long as such management actions are conducted in accordance with the Wilderness Act and are subject to such conditions as the Secretary considers appropriate. Concerns about access limitations to wilderness areas (and other legal constraints that apply more broadly to federal lands) have persisted through several Congresses. In 2010, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) noted that most border officials reported that any delays and restrictions reported in border security operations did not affect security: [D]espite the access delays and restrictions experienced by these [Border Patrol] stations, 22 of the 26 patrol agents-in-charge reported that the overall security status of their jurisdiction had not been affected by land management laws. Instead, factors such as the remoteness and ruggedness of the terrain have had the greatest effect on their ability to achieve operational control in these areas. Four patrol agents-in-charge reported that delays and restrictions had affected their ability to achieve or maintain operational control, but they either had not requested resources for increased or timelier access or their requests had been denied by senior Border Patrol officials because of higher priority needs of the agency. In August 2017, the Trump administration issued notice that the Secretary of Homeland Security used the authority provided in the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRAIRA, as amended) to waive all laws--including the Wilderness Act and the Otay Mountain Wilderness Act--in order to expeditiously implement border security measures in California. This includes the construction of border infrastructure and other operational improvements along a 15-mile segment of the border. The 115 th Congress is considering legislation to reduce the potential restrictions of the Wilderness Act and other federal statutes on border security activities. For example, H.R. 3593 , the Securing Our Borders and Wilderness Act, would amend the Wilderness Act to permit U.S. Customs and Border Protection to perform border security measures as needed, including operating motor vehicles and aircraft and building infrastructure, including roads (upon approval of the Secretary of the Interior), within designated wilderness areas. H.R. 3548 , the Border Security for America Act of 2017, and S. 1757 , the Building America's Trust Act, would amend IIRAIRA and explicitly waive any provisions in the Wilderness Act (among others) that would impede, prohibit, or restrict activities of U.S. Customs and Border Protection on federal lands on both the southern and northern international borders. Similar bills were introduced in previous Congresses. Congress directed FS and BLM to initially evaluate the wilderness potential of their lands at different times, and these wilderness reviews have been controversial. Congress directed FS to review the wilderness potential of the National Forest System (NFS) in the 1964 Wilderness Act, and directed BLM to do so for public lands in the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA). BLM and FS also have different requirements to assess the wilderness characteristics and potential of their lands for future wilderness designation by Congress, described below. Once identified, BLM and FS also have different requirements on how to manage the wilderness potential of those lands. Some believe that these wilderness study areas (WSAs, for BLM) and inventoried roadless areas (for FS) are improperly managed as wilderness, restricting development opportunities, despite lacking congressional designation as wilderness. Others note that FLPMA and regulations dictate that certain areas must be managed to preserve their wilderness potential. The Wilderness Act directed the FS to evaluate the wilderness potential of NFS lands by September 3, 1974. In the 1970s and 1980s, the FS conducted two reviews, known as the Roadless Area Review and Evaluation (RARE) I and II that resulted in some, but not all, of the inventoried roadless areas being recommended to Congress for a wilderness designation. Congress designated some of these areas as wilderness areas and released others from further consideration, although many remain pending before Congress. Congress also directed the FS to continue to evaluate the wilderness potential of NFS lands during the development and revision of land and resource management plans (also known as forest plans), approximately every 15 years. These reviews may lead to the recommendation of new wilderness areas, or potentially may lead to the modification of an existing recommendation. Management of the inventoried roadless areas has been controversial. The George W. Bush and William Clinton Administrations each proposed different roadless area policies. Both were heavily litigated; however, the Clinton policy remains largely intact after the Supreme Court chose not to review a lower court's decision in 2012. Under the Clinton Nationwide Roadless Rule, certain activities--such as road construction and timber harvesting--are restricted or prohibited in certain inventoried roadless areas, with some exceptions. Section 603(a) of FLPMA required BLM to review and present its wilderness recommendations to the President within 15 years of October 21, 1976, and the President then had two years to submit wilderness recommendations to Congress. Starting in 1977 through 1979, BLM identified suitable wilderness study areas (WSAs) from roadless areas identified in its initial resource inventory. BLM presented its recommendations within the specified time frame, and Presidents George H. W. Bush and William J. Clinton submitted wilderness recommendations to Congress. Although these areas have been reviewed and several statutes have been enacted to designate BLM wilderness areas based on them, many of the wilderness recommendations for BLM lands remain pending before Congress. Section 603(c) of FLPMA directs the agency to manage those lands "until Congress has determined otherwise ... in a manner so as not to impair the suitability of such areas for preservation as wilderness." Thus, BLM must protect the WSAs as if they were wilderness until Congress enacts legislation that releases BLM from that responsibility. This is sometimes referred to as a nonimpairment obligation. Section 201 of FLPMA directs BLM to identify and maintain an inventory of the resources on its lands, giving priority to areas of critical environmental concern. It is unclear, however, whether BLM is required to conduct any future assessments of the wilderness potential of its lands. In contrast to the FS, which must revise its land and resource management plans at least every 15 years, BLM is not required to revise its plans on a specified cycle; rather it must revise its land and resource management plans "when appropriate." Furthermore, although the FS is directed to include wilderness reviews in the planning process, FLPMA is silent on wilderness in the guidance for the BLM planning process. FS is required to conduct reviews of its lands and resources at regular intervals, and an assessment of the wilderness potential is a required part of those reviews. In contrast, BLM is not required to conduct reviews of its lands and resources at regular intervals, and when BLM does do a review, an assessment of the wilderness potential is not required. Previous Congresses have considered legislation to more broadly release WSAs. For example, the Wilderness and Roadless Area Release Act of 2011 ( H.R. 1581 / S. 1087 , 112 th Congress) would have released certain BLM WSAs--those not designated as wilderness by Congress and those identified by the BLM as not suitable for wilderness designation--from the nonimpairment requirement of Section 603(c) of FLPMA. The bill also would have terminated the William Clinton and George W. Bush Forest Service roadless area rules. The 114 th Congress also considered similar legislation. For example, S. 193 , the Inventoried Roadless Area Management Act, proposed to terminate the Clinton roadless area rule on national forests in Wyoming but did not broadly address WSAs. Congress also regularly considers legislation to release specific WSAs. See Table 2 for an alphabetical list of WSA release legislation in the 115 th Congress (See Appendix for 114 th Congress legislation). The 114 th Congress added 275,665 acres to the wilderness system by either adding new wilderness areas or expanding existing areas. Many other bills to designate additional wilderness areas were introduced and considered (see Table A-1 ). See Table A-2 for 114 th Congress legislation that would have released BLM WSAs.

The Wilderness Act of 1964 established the National Wilderness Preservation System and, in it, Congress reserved for itself the authority to designate federal lands as part of the system. The act initially designated 54 wilderness areas containing 9.1 million acres of national forest lands. Since then, more than 100 laws designating wilderness areas have been enacted. As of September 2017, the system consisted of 110 million acres over 765 units, owned by four land management agencies: the Forest Service (FS), in the Department of Agriculture; the National Park Service (NPS); Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS); and Bureau of Land Management (BLM) within the Department of the Interior (DOI). The act also directed the Secretaries of Agriculture and the Interior to review certain lands for their wilderness potential. Free-standing bills to designate wilderness areas are typically introduced and considered in each Congress; such bills are not amendments to the Wilderness Act, but typically refer to the act for management guidance and sometimes include special provisions. The 114th Congress considered many bills to add to the wilderness system, and one was enacted into law--P.L. 114-46--designating three additional wilderness areas totaling 275,665 acres. To date, several bills have been introduced in the 115th Congress to designate additional wilderness areas. Wilderness designations can be controversial. The designation generally prohibits commercial activities, motorized access, and human infrastructure from wilderness areas; however, there are several exceptions to this general rule. Advocates propose wilderness designations to preserve the generally undeveloped conditions of the areas. Opponents express concern that such designations prevent certain uses and potential economic development in rural areas where such opportunities are relatively limited. The potential benefits or costs of wilderness designations are difficult to value or quantify. Thus, wilderness deliberations commonly focus on trying to maximize the benefits of preserving pristine areas while minimizing potential opportunity costs. Wilderness debates also focus on the extent of the National Wilderness Preservation System and whether it is of sufficient size or whether lands should be added or subtracted. Most bills direct management of designated wilderness in accordance with the Wilderness Act. However, proposed legislation also often seeks a compromise among interests by allowing other activities in the area. Preexisting uses or conditions may be allowed to continue, sometimes temporarily, with or without halting or rectifying any associated nonconforming uses or conditions. Wilderness bills also often contain additional provisions, such as providing special access for particular purposes, for example, border security. Water rights associated with wilderness designations have also proved controversial; many statutes have addressed water rights in specific wilderness areas. In some cases, Congress has statutorily removed lands from several wilderness areas, commonly to adjust boundaries to delete private lands or roads included inadvertently in the original designation. Controversies regarding management of existing wilderness areas also have been the subject of legislation. In previous Congresses, bills have been introduced to expand access to wilderness areas for border security; to guarantee access for hunting, fishing, and shooting; to release wilderness study areas (WSAs) from wilderness-like protection; and to limit agency review of the wilderness potential of their lands. The latter two issues have been contentious for BLM lands because BLM is required by law to protect the wilderness characteristics of its WSAs until Congress determines otherwise.

Only federal employees hired before 1984 participate in the Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS). The CSRS is closed to new entrants and will expire with the death of the last CSRS annuitant sometime around the year 2075. Civilian federal employees who were hired in 1984 or later participate in the Federal Employees Retirement System (FERS), as do employees who voluntarily switched from CSRS to FERS during "open seasons" that were held in 1987 and 1998. The FERS program began operating on January 1, 1987. Cost-of-living adjustments (COLAs) for CSRS annuities are based on the average monthly percentage change in the CPI-W in the third quarter (July to September) of the current calendar year compared with the third quarter of the base year, which is the year in which the last COLA was applied. The base year for determining the COLA effective in December 2018 (paid out in 2019) is 2017. Adjustments are effective on the first day of the month preceding the month in which they are first paid. COLAs for benefits paid under FERS also are based on the percentage change in the CPI-W from third quarter to third quarter, but payment of COLAs under FERS is limited according to the eligibility category of the beneficiary and th e rate of inflation. COLAs are not paid to nondisabled FERS retirees as long as they are under the age of 62. COLAs are paid to survivors and disabled FERS retirees of any age after the first year of disability. All COLAs paid under FERS are limited if the rate of inflation exceeds 2.0%, according to the following formula: From the third quarter of 2017 (the current base year) to the third quarter of 2018, the CPI-W increased by 2.8%. Therefore, paid out beginning January 2019, the CSRS COLA is 2.8% and the FERS COLA is 2.0%. P.L. 87-793 (enacted in 1962) was the first law that provided for automatic adjustments in civil service retirement and disability benefits whenever the CPI in the current year exceeded the CPI in the base year (the year in which the last adjustment occurred) by 3.0% or more. In 1965, this was changed to require an adjustment in benefits whenever the CPI for a given month was at least 3.0% higher than in the month when the last adjustment was made, and remained at that level or higher for three consecutive months. P.L. 91-93 (enacted in 1969) added one percentage point to COLAs in addition to the percentage change in the CPI to offset the erosion of benefits that had occurred as a result of the time lag in the adjustment formula. (P.L. 91-179 did the same for COLAs paid to military retirees.) P.L. 94-440 (enacted in October 1976) repealed the one percentage point addition to COLAs. In addition, this law provided for automatic semiannual adjustments in benefits based on the change in the CPI from June to December (effective the following March 1) and December to June (effective the following September 1). P.L. 97-35 (Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981) replaced semiannual COLAs with annual COLAs based on the December-to-December change in the CPI, payable in March of the following year. P.L. 97-253 (Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1982) delayed the implementation of COLAs by one month in FY1983, FY1984, and FY1985. The FY1983 COLA was effective April 1 rather than March 1. The FY1984 COLA was scheduled for May 1 and the FY1985 COLA was scheduled for June 1. This law also mandated that nondisabled retirees under the age of 62 would receive 50% of the projected CPI plus the full difference in the actual CPI over these projections. The law specified that the projected CPI was 6.6% for 1983, 7.2% for 1984, and 6.6% for 1985. This provision was repealed by the supplemental appropriations law that was passed in August 1984. COLAs for January 1985 and thereafter were to be the full amount for all retirees. P.L. 97-253 limited COLAs in certain cases. Under the restriction, an annuity could not be increased by a COLA to an amount that exceeded the greater of the maximum pay for a GS-15 federal employee or the final pay of the employee (or high-3 average pay, if greater), increased by the average annual percentage change (compounded) in rates of pay of the General Schedule for the period beginning on the retiree's annuity starting date and ending on the effective date of the adjustment. P.L. 98-270 (Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1983, enacted April 1984) delayed the COLA scheduled for May 1984 until December (payable in January 1985). Thereafter, all COLAs were to be effective in December and payable in January and were to be based on the change in the average monthly CPI-W from third-quarter to third-quarter. This formula and schedule are the same as those used to calculate COLAs in the Social Security program, as required by P.L. 98-21 (Social Security Amendments of 1983). P.L. 98-369 (Deficit Reduction Act of 1984) specified that civilian and military retirement COLAs are to be paid in checks issued on the first business day of the month following the month in which they are effective. (COLAs that are effective in December are to be paid in checks issued in January.) P.L. 99-177 (Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1981 [Gramm-Rudman-Hollings]). This law suspended all civil service retirement COLAs for FY1986 and for all subsequent years in which the specified deficit reduction targets for the year would not otherwise be met. P.L. 99-509 (Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986). This law reinstated COLAs for programs in which they were subject to suspension under P.L. 99-177 for FY1987-FY1991. P.L. 100-119 (Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Reaffirmation Act of 1987). This law permanently exempted the programs subject to suspension of COLAs under P.L. 99-177 from the suspensions required by that law. P.L. 103-66 (Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993). This law postponed the effective date of COLAs from December to March for FY1994-FY1996. The CPI measurement period was not changed.

Cost-of-living adjustments (COLAs) for the Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS) and the Federal Employees Retirement System (FERS) are based on the rate of inflation as measured by the Consumer Price Index for Urban Wage Earners and Clerical Workers (CPI-W). COLAs for both CSRS and FERS are determined by the average monthly CPI-W during the third quarter (July to September) of the current calendar year and the third quarter of the base year, which is the last previous year in which a COLA was applied. The "effective date" for COLAs is December, but they first appear in the benefits issued during the following January. All CSRS retirees and survivors receive COLAs. Under FERS, however, nondisabled retirees under the age of 62 do not receive COLAs. Survivors and disabled retirees are eligible for COLAs under FERS regardless of age. CSRS pays a COLA that is equal to the percentage change in the CPI-W during the measurement period, but COLAs under FERS are limited if the rate of inflation is greater than 2.0%. If the rate of inflation during the measurement period is between 2.0% and 3.0%, the COLA under FERS is 2.0%. If inflation is greater than 3.0%, then the COLA for FERS benefits is equal to the CPI-W minus one percentage point. Congress passed the first law requiring automatic COLAs for federal civil service retirement benefits in 1962, and it has adjusted either the formula by which they are calculated or the date on which they take effect more than a dozen times since then. If consumer prices as measured by the CPI-W do not increase from the third quarter of the base year to the third quarter of the current calendar year, there is no COLA for annuities paid under CSRS or FERS. For example, from the third quarter of 2014 to the third quarter of 2015, the CPI-W fell by 0.4%. Therefore, no COLA was paid under either CSRS or FERS beginning January 2016. From the third quarter of 2017 to the third quarter of 2018, the CPI-W increased by 2.8%. Therefore, beginning in January 2019, the CSRS COLA is 2.8% and the FERS COLA is 2.0%.

Figure 1. Map of UruguaySource: Map Resources. Adapted by CRS Graphics. On November 29, 2009, Senator Jose "Pepe" Mujica of the ruling center-left Broad Front (FA) coalition was elected president of Uruguay in a second-round runoff vote. In legislative elections held concurrently with the October 25, 2009, first-round vote, the FA retained its majorities in both houses of the Uruguayan Congress. The new legislature and President are to be inaugurated to their respective five-year terms on February 15 and March 1, 2010. Mujica will replace popular incumbent President Tabare Vazquez, who was constitutionally ineligible to run for a second consecutive term. Most analysts expect broad policy continuity from the Mujica Administration. President Tabare Vazquez was inaugurated to a five-year term in March 2005. By winning the presidency and securing FA majorities in both houses of the Uruguayan Congress, Vazquez ended 170 years of political domination by the National (PN) and Colorado (PC) parties and ushered in the country's first left-leaning government. Throughout his term, President Vazquez has followed the moderate social democratic paths of the left-of-center governments of Brazil and Chile, advancing market-oriented economic policies while instituting social welfare programs intended to reduce poverty and inequality. He has maintained considerable popular support, receiving a 80% approval rating in December 2009. Although Uruguay has long been one of Latin America's most stable economies, it experienced a major economic and financial crisis between 1999 and 2002. During the crisis--which was principally the result of the spillover effects of the economic problems of its much larger neighbors, Argentina and Brazil--Uruguay's economy contracted by 11%, unemployment climbed to 21%, and over one-third of the country's 3.5 million citizens found themselves living below the poverty line. While economic stability returned to Uruguay prior to the 2004 election, some international investors were worried about the possible economic policies of the Vazquez government. In order to calm investor fears, Vazquez signed a three-year, $1.1 billion stand-by arrangement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) shortly after taking office. The agreement committed Uruguay to a substantial primary fiscal surplus, low inflation, considerable reductions in external debt, and several structural reforms designed to improve competitiveness and attract foreign investment. Although Uruguay terminated the agreement in 2006 following the early repayment of its IMF debt, it has maintained a number of the policy commitments. The Vazquez Administration has also done much to address poverty and inequality throughout its term, though it has been criticized by some of the more leftist sectors of the FA for allegedly subordinating social welfare concerns to the maintenance of market-friendly economic policies. In the first months of his administration, Vazquez created a ministry of Social Development and sought to reduce the country's poverty rate with a $240 million National Plan to Address the Social Emergency (PANES). PANES provided a monthly conditional cash transfer of approximately $75 to over 100,000 households in extreme poverty. In exchange, those receiving the benefits were required to participate in community work and ensure that their children attended school daily and had regular health checkups. PANES included a number of other initiatives as well, such as food purchase cards, new homeless shelters, an expansion of free health coverage, and job training programs. In late 2007, PANES was replaced with the Plan for Social Equity. Vazquez has recently introduced two programs designed to expand opportunity through technology: Plan Ceibal , which provides all public school students in Uruguay with a free personal computer, and Plan Cardales , which provides low-income families with subsidized access to telephone, television, and Internet services. In addition to the administration's social welfare programs, Vazquez passed a law forbidding discrimination against workers for labor activities, and reestablished tripartite wage councils--composed of representatives of government, businesses, and unions--to negotiate wages for approximately 100,000 firms and 600,000 workers. The labor reforms have considerably increased the power of unions, playing a substantial role in the percentage of unionized workers more than doubling between 2005 and 2007 to approximately 24% of the labor force. Moreover, the Vazquez Administration and the FA have overhauled the tax system to make it more progressive, reducing the value-added tax and replacing the tax on wages with a personal income tax that exempts the poorest 60%. The Vazquez Administration's economic and social welfare policies, along with the recent boom in commodity prices--which significantly affect Uruguay's primarily agricultural economy --have contributed to several years of strong economic growth and considerable reductions in poverty. Since 2005, Uruguay's real gross domestic product (GDP) has grown by an average of 7% per year, the country's debt has fallen from 66% of GDP to 26% of GDP, and investment has increased to 19% of GDP, the highest rate in the country's history. Likewise, between 2004 and 2009, the poverty rate in Uruguay fell from 31.9% to 20.3% and extreme poverty fell from 4.2% to 1.4%, while real wages increased 18% and household income increased 30%. Uruguay remains one of the most developed countries in Latin America, with an adult literacy rate of nearly 98%, a life expectancy of 76 years, and a 2008 per capita income of $8,260. Although the global financial crisis has significantly slowed the Uruguayan economy with a 2.3% contraction in the first quarter of 2009, economic growth returned in the second quarter and the economy is expected to have grown 0.6% in 2009. Vazquez and the FA have done much to address Uruguay's dictatorship-era (1973-1985) human rights violations, which had been largely ignored by other administrations. During the country's 12 years of authoritarian rule, tens of thousands of Uruguayan citizens were forced into political exile, 3,000-4,000 were imprisoned, and several hundred were "disappeared" or killed. Nonetheless, the only official action taken by previous governments to investigate the country's past was the creation of a peace commission, which was active between 2000 and 2003, and only looked into those who had been "disappeared." Furthermore, the peace commission only had an investigative mandate since the country's amnesty law--passed in 1986 and ratified in a national referendum in 1989--treats dictatorship-era crimes with impunity. Immediately after his election, Vazquez initiated investigations into the government's human rights abuses during the authoritarian period. Since then, excavations of military barracks have turned up the remains of some of the "disappeared," files from the dictatorship have been released to the public, and the state has agreed to provide compensation to the those who were imprisoned for political reasons and the families of those who were killed. The Vazquez Administration also reinterpreted the amnesty law to exclude crimes committed outside Uruguay as a part of the regional coordination plan to eliminate political dissidents known as "Operation Condor." As a result, a number of former members of the military and police have been tried and jailed, including former dictators Juan Maria Bordaberry (1973-1976) and Gregorio Alvarez (1981-1985). Some former members of the security forces, who believe that their actions were necessary to defend the country from ideological subversives, have criticized the FA for allegedly seeking to rewrite the country's history. Although a referendum to repeal the country's amnesty law was rejected in the October 2009 general election, an Uruguayan Supreme Court ruling issued several days before the election found the application of the amnesty law in a case involving the 1974 death of a political prisoner to be unconstitutional. The ruling potentially could lead to the reopening of additional cases. Social issues have figured prominently in Uruguayan politics in recent years. In December 2007, Uruguay became the first Latin American nation to approve civil unions between homosexuals. The law grants civil unions inheritance, pension, and child custody rights similar to those of Uruguayan marriages. Uruguay has since lifted its ban on homosexuals serving in the military and approved a law allowing homosexuals to adopt children, another Latin American first. In November 2008, the Uruguayan Congress passed a bill to legalize abortion in the first 12 weeks of pregnancy under certain circumstances, such as the woman's health being at risk or extreme poverty. Although the bill was supported by the FA and a majority of Uruguayans, President Vazquez vetoed it. Following the veto, Vazquez resigned his position as head of the Socialist Party due to differences on the issue. Under existing Uruguayan law, abortion is illegal but a woman does not face sanction if the pregnancy resulted from rape or endangered the woman's life. On November 29, 2009, Senator Jose "Pepe" Mujica of the ruling center-left FA coalition was elected president of Uruguay in a second-round runoff vote. Mujica defeated former President Luis Alberto Lacalle (1990-1995) of the center-right PN, 53% to 43%. The runoff was triggered after none of the candidates received an absolute majority of the vote in the October 25, 2009, first-round election. Mujica was the leading presidential vote-getter in the first round, winning the support of 48% of the electorate, while Lacalle took 29%, Pedro Bordaberry of the center-right PC won 17%, Pablo Mieres of the centrist Independent Party (PI) won 2.5%, and Raul Rodriguez of the leftist Popular Assembly (AP) took 0.7%. Bordaberry and the PC backed Lacalle in the second round, while Mieres and the PI remained neutral and Rodriguez and the AP called on their supporters to cast spoiled ballots in rejection of both candidates. Since voters in Uruguay must cast party-line presidential and legislative votes, congressional representation closely reflects the first-round presidential vote. When the new Congress takes office on February 15, 2010, the FA will maintain its legislative majorities, with 50 seats in the 99-seat House of Representatives and 16 seats in the 30-seat Senate. Likewise, the PN will remain the principal opposition force with 30 seats in the House and nine seats in the Senate, while the PC will once again be the third-largest political force in the Congress with 17 seats in the House and five seats in the Senate. The PI will hold two seats in the House. While the PC significantly increased its representation in both houses, its gains came largely at the expense of the PN, and the ideological balance of power of the Uruguayan Congress will remain roughly the same as it has been for the past five years (See Figure 2 ). Two referenda were held along with the October 2009 first-round election. One would have granted the more than 500,000 Uruguayan citizens residing abroad the right to vote absentee. Currently, Uruguayans must return to the country in order to cast a ballot. This extension of voting rights was opposed by the PC and PN since most of those living abroad--such as citizens who fled the country's right-wing dictatorship (1973-1985)--are perceived to be more sympathetic to the FA. Some also argued that those who reside abroad should have no say in the policies that will affect the lives of those actually living in Uruguay. The other referendum would have annulled the amnesty that was granted to the military and police following the return to democracy for crimes committed during the country's dictatorship. Those opposed to annulling the amnesty law noted that it was ratified with 56% of the vote in a 1989 referendum. Some also alleged that the referendum fomented persecution of the security forces while ignoring the crimes that were committed by the country's leftist guerilla group. Both referenda failed to gain the absolute majorities needed to be approved, with the extension of voting rights to citizens abroad and the amnesty repeal winning the support of 37% and 47% of Uruguayans, respectively. President-elect Jose Mujica was imprisoned for 14 years as a result of his activities as one of the leaders of the Tupamaro National Liberal Movement, a leftist urban guerilla group that operated in Uruguay during the 1960s and 70s, but he has adopted a more moderate profile since the end of the country's authoritarian period. Following the return to democracy, Mujica helped found the Popular Participation Movement (MPP), which is currently the largest faction within the FA coalition. He was elected to Uruguay's lower house in 1994 and to the Senate in 1999, before serving as minister of livestock, agriculture, and fisheries during the Vazquez Administration. Although he hails from a more left-leaning faction of the FA, Mujica has developed a reputation as a pragmatist and consensus-builder. He has already reached out to the political opposition, offering appointments to state companies and autonomous entities, and setting up multi-partisan technical commissions to develop security, education, energy, and environmental policy. While his campaign opponents attacked Mujica's past to portray him as a radical departure from the Vazquez government, most analysts maintain that the Mujica Administration's policies are likely to closely resemble those of his predecessor. Mujica selected Danilo Astori--a competitor for the FA presidential nomination who served as economy minister during the Vazquez Administration--as his running-mate in order to reassure voters and investors that he was committed to maintaining Uruguay's market-oriented economic policies. Mujica has said that he intends to delegate economic policy to Astori, and economic posts in the administration are expected to be filled by leaders associated with Astori's more centrist faction of the FA, the Liber Seregni Front (FLS). Members of the FLS have reportedly been selected to head the economy, tourism, and transportation ministries. Analysts also expect Mujica to broadly maintain the Vazquez Administration's social welfare and foreign policies, though he may place more emphasis on domestic redistribution and regional integration. The more left-leaning sectors of the FA, such as Mujica's MPP, will reportedly control the foreign and defense ministries, as well as the majority of the social ministries. Although FA majorities in both houses of Congress will enable the Mujica Administration to advance its legislative agenda without needing to negotiate with the political opposition, policies will likely be moderated by the need to establish consensus among the various ideological factions of the coalition. Some analysts have suggested that divisions within the FA--both in the Cabinet and the Congress--may arise if the economic environment inhibits increases in public spending. Uruguay's economic growth in the near term is unlikely to equal that of recent years despite the country experiencing only a minor recession as a result of the global financial crisis. Private analysts have predicted that GDP growth will average 3% in 2010 and 2011. Uruguay enjoys friendly relations with the United States, though it traditionally has had closer ties to Europe (the origin of the vast majority of the population) and its South American neighbors. Ties between Uruguay and the United States have increased in recent years, especially since the administration of Jorge Batlle (2000-2005), which closely aligned itself with the United States. In 2002, the United States provided Uruguay with a one week balance of payments loan to assist the country in countering the fallout from the Argentine financial crisis. Moreover, Batlle laid the groundwork for ongoing trade discussions with the United States through the 2002 creation of a Joint Commission on Trade and Investment (see " Trade " below). While many analysts expected the Vazquez Administration to distance the country from the United States and forge closer relations with fellow members of the Common Market of the South (Mercosur) once it took office, those predictions have not been borne out. Ongoing disputes within Mercosur over trade asymmetries and a bitter conflict with Argentina over the construction of a cellulose pulp mill along the shared Uruguay River have led to frosty relations between Uruguay and its neighbors. Likewise, the Vazquez Administration has sought to strengthen ties with the United States in order to diversify its trade relations and reduce its economic reliance on Argentina and Brazil, which played a significant role in the country's 1999-2002 recession. President-elect Mujica has indicated that he will prioritize relations with Uruguay's neighbors and push for increased regional integration through Mercosur. Nonetheless, he has also expressed his desire to continue strengthening U.S.-Uruguay relations and will likely build upon the bilateral agreements signed during the Vazquez Administration. Additionally, Mujica may attempt to amplify Uruguay's growing trade relations with Asia, as he has reportedly designated former Ambassador to China Luis Almagro as his foreign minister. Trade ties between the United States and Uruguay have grown substantially since 2002, when the countries created a Joint Commission on Trade and Investment. The joint commission has provided the means for ongoing U.S.-Uruguay trade discussions, which led to the signing of a bilateral investment treaty in October 2004 and a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) in January 2007. The TIFA is a formal commitment to pursue closer trade and economic ties. It established a Council on Trade and Investment, which serves as the formal mechanism for liberalizing bilateral trade and investment between the two countries. Protocols to the TIFA on trade facilitation and public participation in trade and environment were signed by the United States and Uruguay in October 2008. Although President Bush and President Vazquez initially sought to negotiate a free trade agreement (FTA), internal pressure from the more leftist sectors of the FA and external pressure from fellow members of Mercosur ultimately led the Vazquez Administration to back away from the FTA and sign the more flexible TIFA. While a FTA may be possible at some point in the future, it is unlikely that Mujica would pursue such an agreement and the Obama Administration has indicated that it prefers to move forward within the TIFA framework for now. In 2008, U.S. exports to Uruguay totaled $893 million, a 39% increase from 2007, while U.S. imports from Uruguay totaled $244 million, a 50% decline from 2007. Capital goods, such as heavy and electrical machinery, comprised a substantial portion of U.S. exports, while beef, repaired goods, leather, wood, and fish accounted for the majority of U.S. imports (see Table 1 ). In 2008, the United States was Uruguay's sixth-largest trade partner, after Argentina, Brazil, Russia, China, and Venezuela. The same year, Uruguay was the United States' 96 th -largest trade partner, representing just 0.3% of total U.S. trade. On September 14, 2009, the ATPDEA Expansion and Extension Act of 2009 ( S. 1665 , Lugar) was introduced in the Senate. Among other provisions, the bill would amend the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act (Title XXXI of the Trade Act of 2002, P.L. 107-210 ) to provide unilateral trade preferences to Uruguay. Under the bill, certain Uruguayan products, such as wool-based textiles, would be eligible to receive duty-free or reduced tariff treatment until December 31, 2012. Uruguay is one of the top 10 per capita contributors of forces to U.N. peacekeeping missions. It currently has between 2,500 and 3,000 soldiers deployed in 15 countries worldwide. Uruguay's largest deployment is part of the U.S.-supported United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), which it has participated in since 2004. It is the second-largest contributor of forces to MINUSTAH, with some 1,100 soldiers currently deployed. Uruguay is currently pushing for an extension of MINUSTAH's mandate and a more comprehensive focus that includes long-term development. Although Uruguay does not receive substantial amounts of U.S. foreign assistance as a result of its relatively high level of development, it does receive military assistance designed to provide equipment and training to improve Uruguay's interoperability with U.S. and international peacekeeping forces. The United States provided Uruguay with $238,000 in International Military Education and Training (IMET) in FY2008 and $250,000 in IMET in FY2009. Under the Obama Administration's FY2010 request, Uruguay would receive $1.7 million in U.S. assistance, including $1 million in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and $480,000 in IMET.

On November 29, 2009, Senator Jose "Pepe" Mujica of the ruling center-left Broad Front coalition was elected president of Uruguay, a relatively economically developed and politically stable South American country of 3.5 million people. Mujica, a former leader of the leftist Tupamaro urban guerilla movement that fought against the Uruguayan government in the 1960s and 1970s, defeated former President Luis Alberto Lacalle (1990-1995) of the center-right National Party in the country's sixth consecutive democratic election since its 12-year dictatorship ended in 1985. Mujica was forced to contest a runoff after he failed to win an absolute majority of the vote in the October 2009 first-round election. In legislative elections held concurrently with the first-round vote, the Broad Front retained its majorities in both houses of the Uruguayan Congress. The new legislature and President are to be inaugurated to their respective five-year terms on February 15 and March 1, 2010. Mujica will replace popular incumbent President Tabare Vazquez, who was constitutionally ineligible to run for a second consecutive term. Vazquez's 2004 victory ended 170 years of political domination by the National and Colorado parties. Throughout his term, Vazquez has followed the moderate social democratic paths of the left-of-center governments of Brazil and Chile, advancing market-oriented economic policies while instituting social welfare programs intended to reduce poverty and inequality. The Vazquez Administration's policies appear to have been reasonably successful, as they--along with a boom in global commodity prices--have contributed to several years of strong economic growth and considerable reductions in poverty. Beyond economic and social welfare policy, Vazquez has done much to address Uruguay's dictatorship-era human rights violations and expand rights to the country's homosexual population. Uruguay has enjoyed friendly relations with the United States since its transition back to democracy, though it traditionally has had closer ties to Europe and its South American neighbors, Argentina and Brazil. Commercial ties between Uruguay and the United States have expanded substantially in recent years, with the countries signing a bilateral investment treaty in 2004 and a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement in January 2007. The United States and Uruguay have also cooperated on military matters, with both countries playing significant roles in the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti. Relations are likely to remain close in the coming years as the Obama Administration and President-elect Mujica have announced their mutual desire to further strengthen bilateral ties. On September 14, 2009, the ATPDEA Expansion and Extension Act of 2009 (S. 1665, Lugar) was introduced in the Senate. Among other provisions, the bill would amend the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act (Title XXXI of the Trade Act of 2002, P.L. 107-210) to provide unilateral trade preferences to Uruguay. Under the bill, certain Uruguayan products, such as wool-based textiles, would be eligible to receive duty-free or reduced tariff treatment until December 31, 2012. This report examines recent political and economic developments in Uruguay as well as issues in U.S.-Uruguayan relations.

Congressional oversight of the intelligence community (IC) enables Members to gain insight into and offer advice on programs and activities that can significantly affect or influence U.S. foreign policy. This In Brief responds to Congress's ongoing interest in oversight of covert action and clandestine activities in particular. The distinction between military and intelligence activities described as covert and clandestine can be confusing. What agencies are authorized to conduct covert action and clandestine activities? What are their legal authorities for doing so? Which military terms describe activities that might seem similar but are distinct from covert action? Prior to 1974, no statute existed that enabled Congress to conduct oversight of the intelligence community. Congress exercised what some have described as "benign neglect" of intelligence. In earlier instances, when it could have exercised greater oversight--such as over the CIA's orchestration of the 1953 coup in Iran--Congress trusted that the executive branch and intelligence community were acting in accordance with the law. Congress also did not question whether particular covert actions or other sensitive intelligence activities were viable as a means of supporting U.S. national security. In the 1970s, controversy over public disclosure of CIA's covert action programs in Southeast Asia and the agency's domestic surveillance of the antiwar movement spurred Congress to become more involved in intelligence oversight. In 1974, the Hughes-Ryan amendment of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (SS32 of P.L. 93-559 ) provided the first statutory basis for congressional oversight and notification to Congress of covert action operations. Investigations by two congressional committees--in the Senate, chaired by Idaho Senator Frank Church, and in the House, chaired by Representative Otis Pike--provided the first formal effort to understand the scope of intelligence activities. These committees became the model for a permanent oversight framework that could hold the intelligence community accountable for spending appropriated funds legally and supporting identifiable national security objectives. In 1975, Congress established the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI). Congress later refined its oversight of the intelligence community when the executive branch directed covert action operations without notifying Congress in advance. In August 1980, out of concern for maintaining operational security, President Carter chose not to inform Congress prior to the attempt to rescue American hostages held by the Iranian regime. In the mid-1980s, the Reagan Administration did not inform Congress about a covert initiative to divert funds raised from the sale of arms to Iran to support the Contras in Nicaragua. Through the Intelligence Authorization Acts (IAA) of 1981 ( P.L. 96-450 ) and 1991 ( P.L. 102-88 ), Congress revised procedures to try to ensure that the executive branch would, in the future, provide timely, comprehensive notification of all covert action and other "significant anticipated intelligence activity." The evolution of congressional oversight of intelligence, which emphasized the exclusive jurisdiction of the SSCI and HPSCI, vice the congressional defense committees, was, however, arguably out of alignment with the evolution of military operations and intelligence activities in the field. In the field, the military and intelligence communities increasingly integrated their activities for greater effect in the post-9/11 environment. A reportable intelligence activity, therefore, was often of interest to the congressional defense as well as intelligence committees. Yet, in Congress, the intelligence and defense committees have different notification standards and processes. The statutory authority for a particular intelligence or defense activity has determined the jurisdiction thereof: Title 50 of the U.S. Code provides the statutory authority for intelligence activities, regardless of which agency carries them out; Title 10 of the U.S. Code provides the statutory authority for military activities. Notification of Congress, therefore, has had the potential for artificially defining intelligence activities as separate and distinct from military activities. As a result, congressional committees may be unevenly informed about both kinds of activities, some of which may be indistinguishable regarding the respective risks they pose in terms of compromise, loss of life, and impact on U.S. national security. Covert action is codified as an activity or activities of the United Sates Government to influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the United States will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly. It does not include activities with the primary purpose of acquiring intelligence, traditional counterintelligence activities, traditional activities to improve or maintain the operational security of United States government programs, or administrative activities; traditional diplomatic or military activities or routine support to such activities; traditional law enforcement activities conducted by United States government law enforcement agencies or routine support to such activities; activities to provide routine support of any other overt activities of other United States government agencies abroad. Covert action is generally intended to influence conditions short of an escalation by the United States that might lead to a sizable or extended military commitment. Unlike traditional intelligence collection, covert action is not passive. It has a visible, public impact intended to influence a change in the military, economic, or political environment abroad that might otherwise prove counterproductive if the role of the United States were made known. Covert action also requires a finding by the President, providing written notification to Congress that the impending activity supports "identifiable foreign policy objectives." Covert action cannot be directed at influencing the domestic environment: "No covert action may be conducted which is intended to influence United States political processes, public opinion, policies, or media." While covert action is historically most closely associated with the CIA, the President may authorize other "departments, agencies or entities of the United States Government," such as DOD, to conduct covert action. Offensive cyberspace operations--defined as operations "intended to project power by the application of force in and through cyberspace"--may also be called covert action if they are conducted under authority of Title 50 of the U.S. Code , Section 3093, which provides the statutory provisions for oversight for covert action. Historic examples of covert action include the CIA's orchestration of the 1953 coup in Iran; the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba; the Vietnam-era secret war in Laos; and support to both the Polish Solidarity labor union in the 1970s and 1980s and to the Mujahidin in Afghanistan during the 1980s. These and other examples highlight the mixed record of use of covert action, favorable, unfavorable, or undetermined and still unfolding through second- and third-order effects. The term clandestine activity is not defined by statute . DOD doctrine defines clandestine activities as "operations sponsored or conducted by governmental departments in such a way as to assure secrecy or concealment" that may include relatively "passive" intelligence collection information gathering operations. Unlike covert action, clandestine activities do not require a presidential finding but may require notification of Congress. This definition differentiates clandestine from covert , using clandestine to signify the tactical concealment of the activity. By comparison, covert activities can be characterized as the strategic concealment of the United States' sponsorship of activities that aim to effect change in the political, economic, military, or diplomatic behavior of an overseas target. Because clandestine activities necessarily involve extremely sensitive sources and methods of military operations or intelligence collection, their compromise through unauthorized disclosure can risk the lives of the personnel involved and gravely damage U.S. national security. Examples include intelligence recruitment of, or collection by, a foreign intelligence asset, and military sensitive site exploitation (SSE) of, or surveillance of, a facility in a denied or hostile area. SSE is one of many military operations that can be conducted clandestinely, without the acknowledgement--at least initially--of U.S. sponsorship. These examples of clandestine activities can be further categorized as traditional military activities or routine or other-than-routine support for traditional military activities, operational preparation of the environment (OPE ) , and sensitive military operations , all of which are discussed in more detail below. Clandestine activities can also include defensive or offensive operations in cyberspace, in which both the activity and U.S. sponsorship may be classified. Since 9/11, when military and intelligence activities became increasingly integrated, Congress has taken renewed interest in the two military exceptions to the statutory definition of covert action: traditional military activities and routin e support to traditional military activities. Though neither term is itself defined in statute, Congress's intent regarding traditional military activities and routine support to traditional military activities is relevant to understanding the range of military activities that have notification requirements that are less stringent than for covert action. These terms, which were first cited as exceptions to covert action in P.L. 102-88 , the Intelligence Authorization Act for FY 1991, may include activities that are difficult to distinguish from covert or clandestine intelligence activities. In a joint explanatory statement attached to the conference report for P.L. 102-88 , the conference committee provided an extended discussion of its intent as to the meaning of traditional military activities : It is the intent of the conferees that 'traditional military activities' include activities by military personnel under the direction and control of a United States military commander (whether or not the U.S. sponsorship of such activities is apparent or later to be acknowledged) preceding and related to hostilities which are either anticipated (meaning approval has been given by the National Command Authorities for the activities and or operational planning for hostilities) to involve U.S. military forces, or where such hostilities involving United States military forces are ongoing, and, where the fact of the U.S. role in the overall operation is apparent or to be acknowledged publicly. In this regard, the conferees intend to draw a line between activities that are and are not under the direction and control of the military commander. Activities that are not under the direction and control of a military command er should not be considered as " t raditional military activities [emphasis added]. In the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) report for the FY1991 Intelligence Authorization Act, the SSCI provided an expanded definition of its intent for the concept of routine support , which was considered to be: unilateral U.S. activities to provide or arrange for logistical or other support for U.S. military forces in the event of a military operation that is to be publicly acknowledged. Examples include caching communications equipment or weapons, the lease or purchase from unwitting sources of residential or commercial property to support an aspect of an operation, or obtaining currency or documentation for possible operational uses, if the operation as a whole is to be publicly acknowledged.... Other-than-routine support may be construed as a type of covert action since it includes a range of activities in which the U.S. role is unacknowledged and that may be intended to influence the environment of another country prior to commencement of the principal operation. [T]he [SSCI] would regard as 'other-than-routine' support activities undertaken in another country which involve other than unilateral activities. Examples of such [other-than-routine support] activity include clandestine attempts to recruit or train foreign nationals with access to a target country to support U.S. forces in the event of a military operation; clandestine effects to influence foreign nationals of the target country concerned to take certain actions to influence and effect [sic] public opinion in the country concerned where U.S. sponsorship of such efforts is concealed; and clandestine efforts to influence foreign officials in third countries to take certain actions without the knowledge or approval of their government in the event of a U.S. military operation. Operational Preparation of the Environment (OPE) is a DOD term for a category of traditional military activities conducted in anticipation of, in preparation for, and to facilitate follow-on military operations. It is a term DOD frequently uses, though its definition does not exist in statute. The DOD defines operational preparation of the environment (OPE) as the "conduct of activities in likely or potential areas of operations to prepare and shape the operational environment," with operational environment defined as a "composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander." Joint Publication 3-05, Special Operations , a doctrine issuance of the Joint Staff, describes preparation of the environment as an "umbrella term for operations and activities conducted by selectively trained special operations forces to develop an environment for potential future special operations," with "close-target reconnaissance ... reception, staging, onward movement, and integration ... of forces ... [and] infrastructure development" cited as examples of such activities. Congress has expressed concern that the military overuses OPE to describe a range of military activities that can include, among other things, clandestine military intelligence collection that is neither subject to oversight by the congressional intelligence committees nor jurisdiction of the congressional defense committees. In the "Areas of Special Interest" segment of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) report ( H.Rept. 111-186 ) for its version of the Intelligence Authorization Act for FY2010 ( H.R. 2701 ), the committee indicated that it [noted] with concern the blurred distinction between the intelligence-gathering activities carried out by the [CIA] and the clandestine operations of the [DOD].... In categorizing its clandestine activities, DOD frequently labels them as [OPE] to distinguish particular operations as traditional military activities and not as intelligence functions. The Committee observes, though, that overuse of this term has made the distinction all but meaningless. The determination as to whether an operation will be categorized as an intelligence activity is made on a case-by-case basis; there are no clear guidelines or principles for making consistent determinations. The Director of National Intelligence himself has acknowledged that there is no bright line between traditional intelligence missions carried out by the military and the operations of the CIA. Clandestine military intelligence-gathering operations, even those legitimately recognized as OPE, carry the same diplomatic and national security risks as traditional intelligence-gathering activities. While the purpose of many such operations is to gather intelligence, DOD has shown a propensity to apply the OPE label where the slightest nexus of a theoretical, distant military operation might one day exist. Consequently, these activities often escape the scrutiny of the intelligence committees, and the congressional defense committees cannot be expected to exercise oversight outside of their jurisdiction. In a section titled "Jurisdictional Statement on Defense Intelligence" under the "Committee Priorities" segment of its report ( H.Rept. 114-573 ) accompanying the Intelligence Authorization Act of 2017 ( H.R. 5077 ), the HPSCI reiterated that it is concerned that many intelligence and intelligence-related activities continue to be characterized as 'battlespace awareness,' 'situational awareness,' and - especially - [OPE].... The continued failure to subject OPE and other activities to Committee scrutiny precludes the Committee from fully executing its statutorily mandated oversight role on behalf of the House and the American people, including by specifically authorizing intelligence and intelligence-related activities as required by Section 504(e) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. SS3094(e)). Therefore, the Committee directs [DOD] to ensure that the Committee receives proper insight and access to information regarding all intelligence and intelligence-related activities of [DOD], including those presently funded outside the MIP. The Committee further encourages [DOD], in meeting this direction, to err on the side of inclusivity and not to withhold information based on arbitrary or overly technical distinctions such as funding source, characterization of the activities in question, or the fact that the activities in question may have a nexus to ongoing or anticipated military operations. Sensitive military operations are defined in statute as (1) lethal operations or capture operations conducted by the U.S. Armed Forces outside a declared theater of active armed conflict, or conducted by a foreign partner in coordination with the U.S. Armed Forces that target a specific individual or individuals, or (2) operations conducted by the armed forces outside a declared theater of active armed conflict in self-defense or in defense of foreign partners, including during a cooperative operation. This statutory definition allows Congress to provide oversight of the sort of military operations that have significant bearing on U.S. foreign and defense policy but are not clearly defined elsewhere in statutory oversight provisions. Sensitive military operations, which can be clandestine, have become an increasingly common feature of the post-9/11 counterterrorism (CT) landscape involving U.S. military intervention in countries such as Yemen, Pakistan, or Somalia that are outside areas of active hostilities (i.e., outside of Afghanistan, Syria, and Iraq). Examples of these operations include a lethal CT drone operation, or a military train , advise, and assist mission where U.S. forces supporting the security forces of a foreign partner nation may have to act in self-defense. It is easier to sort out how the intelligence and military activities defined in this report are categorized (and, consequently, determine how or whether Congress is notified) by first understanding their statutory authorities. The United States Code , which compiles and codifies laws of the United States, is organized into titles by subject matter. Title 10 of the U.S. Code provides much of the legal framework--sometimes referred to as authorities -- for the roles, missions, and organization of DOD and the military services. Title 50, among other matters, provides much of the legal framework for many of the roles and responsibilities of the intelligence community, including the operations and functions of the CIA and the legal requirements and congressional notification procedures associated with covert action. References to Title 10 authorities and Title 50 authorities are sometimes used as colloquial shorthand by observers and experts to signify executive decision-making processes, congressional oversight structures, chains of command, legal authorizations to carry out certain types of activities, and legal constraints preventing certain types of activities that govern the respective operations and activities of DOD and the IC. Legal observers, however, have cautioned that such references reinforce a misperception that a clear distinction may be drawn between activities conducted under Title 10 authorities and activities conducted under Title 50 authorities. Some therefore assert that Title 10 and Title 50 authorities should instead be viewed as "mutually reinforcing" rather than "mutually exclusive" authorities. Others further emphasize that Title 10 is not the sole source of legal authorities for U.S. military operations, pointing to the President's authority under Article II of the Constitution as Commander in Chief of the U.S. Armed Forces, as well as laws enacted by Congress, such as the War Powers Resolution of 1973 ( P.L. 93-148 ; 50 U.S.C. SS1541-1548) and the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force ( P.L. 107-40 ; 50 U.S.C. SS1541 note). Some also cite the dual role of the Secretary of Defense under Title 10 and Title 50 to exercise authority, direction, and control over those elements of the IC that reside within the DOD organizational structure as support for the argument that Title 10 and Title 50 should be viewed as "mutually reinforcing."

While not defined by statute, DOD doctrine describes clandestine activities as "operations sponsored or conducted by governmental departments in such a way as to assure secrecy or concealment" that may include relatively passive intelligence collection information gathering operations. Unlike covert action, clandestine activities do not require a presidential finding but may require notification of Congress. This definition differentiates clandestine from covert, using clandestine to signify the tactical concealment of the activity. By comparison, covert operations are "planned and executed as to conceal the identity of or permit plausible denial by the sponsor." Since the 1970s, Congress has established and continued to refine oversight procedures in reaction to instances where it had not been given prior notice of intelligence activities--particularly covert action--that had significant bearing on United States national security. Congress, for example, had no foreknowledge of the CIA's orchestration of the 1953 coup that overthrew Iran's only democratically elected government, or of the U-2 surveillance flights over the Soviet Union that ended with the Soviet shoot-down of Francis Gary Powers in 1960. Eventually, media disclosures of the CIA's domestic surveillance of the anti-Vietnam War movement and awareness of the agency's covert war in Laos resulted in Congress taking action. In 1974, Congress began its investigation into the scope of past intelligence community activities that provided the basis for statutory provisions for intelligence oversight going forward. The 1974 Hughes-Ryan Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (SS32 of P.L. 93-559) provided the earliest provisions for congressional oversight of covert action. In the late 1970s, Congress established a permanent oversight framework, standing up the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI). These committees were given exclusive oversight jurisdiction of the intelligence community. Recent events in North Korea, Yemen, and elsewhere have underscored the important function Congress can have in influencing the scope and direction of intelligence policy that supports United States national security. However, despite Congress's work during the past decades to establish statutory provisions for conducting intelligence oversight, those efforts have not always achieved Congress's desired result. For example, there has been occasional confusion over whether the congressional intelligence or defense committees have jurisdiction for oversight purposes. This confusion is due in part to overlapping or mutually supporting missions of the military and intelligence agencies, particularly in the post-9/11 counterterrorism environment. Intelligence and military activities fall under different statutory authorities, but they may have similar characteristics that warrant congressional notification (e.g., a need to conceal United States sponsorship and serious risk of exposure, compromise, and loss of life).

The power of Congress and the executive branch to legislate and implement the conditions for admitting aliens into the United States and permitting them to remain is so broad as to be virtually immune from judicial control. However, this power is still subject to constitutional limitations, including substantive and procedural due process protections. In immigration cases, the degree of judicial review of administrative decisions and actions that may be constitutionally required depends on the relative interests involved. In deciding what degree of judicial review is appropriate in immigration matters, Congress has sought to balance judicial review between fairness to desired immigrants (workers, family, refugees/asylees) and facilitation of the removal of detrimental aliens (national security risks/terrorists, criminals, public charges). Initially, a habeas corpus proceeding provided the primary avenue of judicial review of various immigration determinations. However, in the wake of U.S. Supreme Court decisions construing the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) as applying to and providing an avenue for judicial review of immigration adjudications, Congress amended the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) of 1952 by adding a judicial review provision in 1961 that provided for review of deportation orders by federal courts of appeals, but only for habeas corpus review of exclusion orders by federal district courts. Concerns about the growing population of undocumented aliens, fraudulent asylum claims, terrorism threats, and crimes of drug, human, and arms trafficking, led to legislation in 1996 and 2005 that limited judicial review, including the availability of habeas corpus proceedings. In the 113 th Congress, H.R. 2278 would generally continue the trend of limiting judicial review; S. 744 would more narrowly limit judicial review in certain instances of employer noncompliance with foreign worker visa programs. On the other hand, S. 744 also provides for judicial review for legalization programs. An "unadmitted and nonresident alien" has no constitutional right to be admitted into the United States. Accordingly, consular officers within the U.S. Department of State (DOS) generally have nonreviewable authority to deny visas. Therefore, the DOS regulations only provide for administrative, supervisory review of visa denials. This doctrine of consular non-reviewability has long been recognized by the courts and has rarely been challenged. However, there is some case law supporting limited judicial review of a visa denial with regard to the First Amendment rights of U.S. citizens to hear and debate the religious and political views of aliens. In Kleindienst v. Mandel , the U.S. Supreme Court held that, when an executive branch officer/agency exercised discretion to not waive the exclusion of an alien as an anarchist and communist advocate for a facially legitimate and bona fide reason, the courts will not look behind the exercise of discretion nor test it by balancing the reason against the First Amendment interests of U.S. citizens who desire to hear the political views of and debate the alien. Some later federal appellate decisions have followed Mandel and extended its holding to visa denials by consular officers or to the assertion of other constitutional rights by U.S. citizens. Although they cannot order a consular officer to grant or deny a visa, courts have differed about whether they have jurisdiction to review consular failure to perform the nondiscretionary duty of deciding to grant or deny a visa and to require a consular officer to make a decision. For a visa revocation, there is no judicial review (including review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. SS2241, or any other habeas corpus provision, and 28 U.S.C. SSSS1361 and 1651), except in the context of a removal proceeding if such revocation provides the sole ground for removal. It appears that courts have generally held that the doctrine of consular nonreviewability applies to revocation of visas issued to aliens who are outside the United States, but that revocation of a visa issued to an alien who is already in the United States is subject to judicial review. Furthermore, federal courts have differed about whether the doctrine of nonreviewability extends to nonconsular officials, including officers of the former Immigration and Naturalization Service and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Judicial review does not provide a broad panacea to aliens subject to removal orders. First, appealing a removal order does not serve to stay the removal order absent a court order. Second, there is no judicial review of removal determinations based on particular grounds of inadmissibility or deportability, including a public health ground certified by a medical officer and certain criminal grounds such as aggravated felonies, drug offenses, and firearm offenses. Finally, a court cannot review the denial of most types of relief from removal that are granted at the discretion of the immigration officer or immigration judge, including a waiver of inadmissibility, cancellation of removal, voluntary departure, and adjustment of status to lawful permanent resident. These bars to judicial review of removal determinations do not preclude a federal appellate court from reviewing constitutional claims or questions of law raised in matters that are otherwise nonreviewable. In the exception to the bar on judicial review of denials of discretionary administrative relief from removal, federal appellate courts can review an asylum determination, when an alien faces persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion, which serves a humanitarian objective, except for determinations for aliens arriving without proper travel documents who may potentially be subject to expedited removal under INA SS235. However, there are restrictions on the scope and standards of judicial review of asylum determinations: (1)the administrative denial of relief is conclusive unless manifestly contrary to law; and (2) a court cannot reverse an administrative determination about the availability of evidence corroborating eligibility for removal relief. On the other hand, relief from removal is mandatory if the alien meets the eligibility requirements for either (1) withholding of removal under INASS241(b)(3), when the alien's life or freedom would be threatened in the alien's country because of the alien's race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion, or (2) protection under the U.N. Convention Against Torture when there are substantial grounds for believing the alien would be in danger of being subjected to torture. Therefore, a federal appellate court may review denials of these types of relief. Generally, judicial review of removal orders is available in the federal appellate court for the judicial circuit in which the removal proceedings were completed. Judicial review of all questions of law and fact, including interpretation of constitutional and statutory provisions, that arise from a removal action or proceeding must be consolidated in a direct appeal of a final removal order to a federal circuit court of appeals; no habeas corpus review is permitted by any federal court. The U.S. Supreme Court called this jurisdictional consolidation provision the "zipper" clause for judicial review of removals. Except as explicitly provided in the INA judicial review provisions, courts may not review claims arising from Attorney General (or the Secretary of Homeland Security) decisions or actions to initiate removal proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any alien. Federal district courts have a limited role in the judicial review of removal orders. With regard to U.S. nationality claims, if there is a genuine issue of material fact concerning whether the person appealing the removal order is a U.S. national, the federal appellate court will transfer the proceeding to the federal district court in whose jurisdiction the appellant resides for a new hearing and a declaratory judgment on that issue as if brought under 28 U.S.C. SS2201, establishing federal court jurisdiction to declare the rights of the plaintiff. In addition, the District Court for the District of Columbia has jurisdiction to review challenges to the constitutionality of the statute and/or implementing regulations for expedited removal of certain inadmissible aliens or to the legality under other laws of the regulations and other administrative guidelines. An appeal from the decisions described above would be made to the federal appellate court for the circuit in which the district court issuing the decision is located. In contrast to aliens in the United States, aliens outside the United States (or at its borders or ports of entry) are generally not due any procedural rights with respect to their ability to enter the United States. With a limited exception for certain permanent resident aliens who are returning to the United States, aliens whom the government is seeking to exclude from entry are not guaranteed an expulsion process that comports with constitutional standards. The governing principle generally remains that due process for aliens seeking admission to the United States at a port of entry and for aliens who entered illegally without inspection consists of "[w]hatever the procedure authorized by Congress is." Generally, if an immigration officer determines that an arriving alien is inadmissible, that alien is removable without further hearing or review. The exception occurs when an arriving alien asserts an asylum claim, in which case, the alien will be referred to an asylum officer who determines whether the alien has a credible fear of persecution for race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. If the asylum officer decides that an alien has a credible fear of persecution, the alien is placed into regular removal proceedings where asylum claims will be given full consideration. If the asylum officer decides that an alien does not have a credible fear of persecution, the officer may order removal without further review unless the alien requests review by an immigration judge of the credible fear determination. A credible fear review by an immigration judge must take place no later than 7 days after the initial negative credible fear determination. The immigration judge may place the alien into regular removal proceedings if the immigration judge reverses the negative determination of the asylum officer. Similarly if an alien makes a claim under oath, subject to the penalty of perjury, to already being a lawful permanent resident, refugee, or asylee, and if an immigration officer verifies such a claim, the alien will be not be placed in expedited removal but may be placed in regular removal proceedings. If the immigration officer cannot verify the claim, the case will be referred to an immigration judge who may determine the claim not to be valid and affirm expedited removal. If the immigration judge determines that it is valid, DHS may place the alien in regular removal proceedings. For those who are not placed in regular removal proceedings, there is judicial review in habeas corpus proceedings under INA SS242, but this is limited to determinations of whether the petitioner is an alien, was ordered removed under the expedited removal provisions of INA SS235(b)(1), and can prove by a preponderance of evidence that the alien is a lawful permanent resident or currently in refugee/asylee status in the United States. Additionally, an immigration officer or judge may order the removal of an arriving alien suspected of being inadmissible for certain national security grounds. Under such circumstances, the Attorney General can affirm the removal without any further review or hearing after the Attorney General reviews the case and consults with federal security agencies. In addition to expedited removal of certain arriving aliens, the immigration laws provide for expedited removal of aliens convicted of committing aggravated felonies, criminal offenses that are grounds for deportation and also result in various other immigration consequences, including the expedited removal process. A removal proceeding can be held while an alien convicted of an aggravated felony is incarcerated to enable expeditious removal upon the completion of the alien's sentence of imprisonment. A removal order against an alien who is not a lawful permanent resident and is convicted of an aggravated felony cannot be executed until 14 calendar days after the date of the removal order in order to allow the alien an opportunity to apply for judicial review under INA SS242. At the time of imposing a criminal sentence against an alien who is deportable, a federal district court has jurisdiction to enter a judicial removal order simultaneously; the issuance or denial of a judicial removal order may be appealed by the defendant deportable alien or the Attorney General to the federal court of appeals. The INA has two different detention provisions, one for the arrest and detention of removable aliens generally, with special provisions for criminal aliens, and another for the mandatory detention of suspected terrorists. Judicial review in both instances is very limited. Under the general arrest and detention provision, discretionary determinations regarding release on bond or parole is not reviewable. Under the provision for mandatory detention of suspected terrorists, judicial review of actions and determinations, regarding certification as a terrorist and continued detention with periodic review, is exclusively available through habeas corpus proceedings pursuant to the specific guidelines of that provision, notwithstanding the guidelines of 28 U.S.C. SS2241, the main habeas corpus provision. The final order shall be subject to review, on appeal, by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, and no other court of appeals. In INS v. St. Cyr and Calcano-Martinez v. IN S, concerning the removal requirements and restrictions on judicial review enacted in IIRIRA, the Supreme Court held that there is a strong presumption in favor of judicial review of administrative actions; therefore, in the absence of a clear statement of congressional intent to repeal habeas corpus jurisdiction over removal-related matters, such review was still available after the 1996 changes. Furthermore, the Court also found that eliminating any judicial review, including habeas review, without any substitute for review of questions of law including constitutional issues, would raise serious constitutional questions. Therefore, it chose a statutory construction (habeas review was not eliminated) which would not raise serious constitutional questions. Subsequent to these decisions, SS106 of the REAL ID Act expressly limited the use of habeas corpus petitions in removal matters, while providing for federal appellate court consideration of constitutional claims or other legal issues that formerly may have been raised in a habeas corpus petition in cases where direct review was unavailable. Section 106 further provided that, for INA purposes, any elimination of judicial review by other INA provisions included the elimination of habeas corpus petitions. Section 242(e) of the INA expressly allows habeas review for very limited purposes for expedited removal determinations made pursuant to INA SS235(b), which was discussed above in " Expedited Removal of Inadmissible Arriving Aliens ." Any review beyond the immigration judge's decisions under INA SS235(b)(1), including administrative review by the Board of Immigration Appeals, is limited to habeas corpus review in the federal courts under INA SS242(e). This permits habeas review only with regard to (1) whether the petitioner is an alien; (2) whether the petitioner was ordered removed under INA SS235(b); and (3) whether the petitioner can prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she is a lawful permanent resident or currently has refugee/asylee status in the United States and is thus entitled to further review. Under 28 U.S.C. SS2241, habeas petitions may be filed initially in a district court, a circuit court of appeals, or in the U.S. Supreme Court, but they are generally filed in a district court because court rules and policy restrict initiation in the appellate courts. District court decisions may then be appealed to the circuit courts of appeals and the U.S. Supreme Court. In 1990, amendments to the INA established an administrative process for naturalization that previously had been adjudicated by federal courts. While these amendments retained judicial review for naturalization denials and delays in the administrative process, they require a denied applicant to request an administrative hearing. Once the administrative process has been exhausted, the applicant may appeal the denial to the federal district court in whose jurisdiction he or she resides for a de novo review. Applicants may also request federal district court hearings regarding delays in naturalization determinations if more than 120 days have elapsed after the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) has conducted a naturalization examination; depending on its findings, the court may remand the case to the agency, with instructions, for a determination or the court may adjudicate the naturalization case itself. Upon an affidavit showing good cause to revoke a naturalization because it was procured illegally, by concealment of a material fact, or by willful misrepresentation, a U.S. attorney is required to initiate denaturalization proceedings in any federal district court in whose jurisdiction the naturalized citizen resides. However, the provision for judicial denaturalization proceedings does not restrict in any way the power of DHS to reopen or vacate a naturalization order administratively. Expatriation is the loss of nationality by a U.S. citizen regardless of whether the citizenship was acquired by birth or naturalization. Unlike denaturalization/revocation, expatriation does not involve fraudulent or illegal procurement of citizenship. Rather, expatriation results when a U.S. citizen voluntarily commits certain acts, enumerated in the expatriation statute, with the specific intent of relinquishing U.S. citizenship. Expatriation does not necessarily entail administrative adjudication or determination. However, unless there is an explicit, written renunciation of citizenship, expatriation is typically determined and disputed when a U.S. citizen is denied rights and privileges of a U.S. citizen such as a U.S. passport. Such a denial may be reviewed in an action for declaratory judgment brought by the nationality claimant under INA SS360 and 28 U.S.C. SS2201. As noted above, genuine issues of U.S. nationality that arise in removal proceedings are transferred to a federal district court for resolution. The judicial review provisions and related litigation for the legalization program under the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA) remain relevant in light of the legalization provisions of S. 744 , the Senate-passed bill known as the Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act. Under INA SS245A(f)(3) and pertinent regulations, there is a single level of administrative appellate review via the Administrative Appeals Unit of the USCIS. Pursuant to INA SS245A(f)(4), judicial review of IRCA legalization denials is only available as review of a deportation order under former INA SS106, since denial of legalization would generally lead to the initiation of deportation proceedings against the unauthorized alien. The statutory standard of review requires that judicial review can only be based on the administrative record established by the administrative appellate review and that the determinations and fact findings of this administrative record are conclusive unless the legalization applicant can show that there was abuse of discretion or that the administrative findings were directly contrary to clear and convincing facts in the record as a whole. In 1996, the IIRIRA amended the IRCA judicial review provision to limit judicial review to cases where a person had actually filed a legalization application within the period defined by IRCA or had attempted to file a complete application and fee with a legalization officer but the officer refused to accept them. Aside from such cases, there is no judicial or administrative review of a denial of legalization based on the late filing of an application. It is worth noting that the IRCA legalization program had led to a spate of litigation challenging different aspects of the program's implementation. The U.S. Supreme Court interpreted the statute and implementing regulations for the IRCA legalization program as not precluding judicial review of the legalization process, given the strong presumption that Congress intends judicial review. H.R. 2278 , as reported by the Senate Judiciary Committee, would further limit judicial review of visa denial or revocation by the DHS, as opposed to the DOS; voluntary departure, a form of removal relief; reinstatement of previously issued removal orders for aliens who illegally reenter the United States after being removed or having departed pursuant to a removal order; and naturalization delays or denials. Section 405 of the bill would bar judicial review of a visa denial or revocation by DHS for security purposes and apply to denials and revocations before, on, and after the effective date of the bill's enactment. Although the INA already bars judicial review of post-removal denials of voluntary departure and court-ordered stays of removal pending consideration of a voluntary removal claim, SS601 of the bill would further restrict courts from tolling the period permitted for voluntary departure. Section 603 of the bill would increase limits on judicial review of removal order reinstatements, already barred in general, by explicitly barring review of reinstated orders because of constitutional claims or questions of law raised in an appeal. Section 203 of the bill would revise judicial review of naturalization delays by restricting courts to reviewing the reason for the delay and eliminating current jurisdiction to take and decide a naturalization case on its merits. This provision would also eliminate the current de novo standard for judicial review of naturalization denials and limit judicial review of the DHS determination regarding certain naturalization requirements, including good moral character, understanding of and attachment to the Constitution, and disposition to the good order and happiness of the United States. Section 204 of the bill would authorize administrative denaturalization by the Attorney General of persons engaged in certain terrorism-related activities. Although the bill does not bar judicial review of such denaturalization, currently and historically, denaturalization has solely been a function of the federal courts. In contrast, S. 744 , as passed by the Senate, provides for judicial review of the various legalization avenues that the bill would establish; it does not include new restrictions on judicial review regarding removal/detention or visa denial or revocation, although it does include limits on judicial review in other contexts, such as penalties for employer noncompliance with various requirements for employing foreign workers. During the Senate Judiciary mark-up of the bill, some amendments to limit judicial review of legalization denials were rejected, as well as one to limit judicial review of DHS visa denial or revocation for security purposes. In the Senate report accompanying the bill, the Committee noted that a number of advocacy groups warned that restricting judicial review of legalization programs would eliminate "the important backstop of the Federal court system to determine whether the executive branch properly implemented the bill." During the mark-up, some Senators "voiced concern that the amendment would undermine the Constitutional system of checks and balances by eliminating independent oversight of a significant administrative program that will affect millions of people. They also emphasized the risk of error in the program, and the resulting need for judicial review." Minority views in the bill's report expressed concern about the "unnecessarily broad judicial review of the denial of any application, which would necessarily create a litany of litigation and undermine the enforcement of our immigration laws," and the "unlimited judicial review the bill creates for the new legalization and other visa programs." S. 744 contains some provisions restricting judicial review in the contexts other than the removal/detention and immigration benefits such as visa issuance and naturalization. For example, SS4306 of the bill would bar judicial review of the finding of a violation of the L-visa nonimmigrant program for intracompany transferee executives or managers by L-visa employers. Although it does not bar judicial review, SS3101 of the bill would revise the judicial review provision of INA SS274A, concerning the unlawful employment of aliens, by specifying certain deadlines and standards for judicial review of determinations of violations and penalties against non-compliant employers. Finally, SS4506 of the bill would bar judicial review of determinations related to the visa waiver program, including visa refusals, a decision to designate or not designate a country as a visa waiver program country, and DOS computation of visa refusal rates or DHS computation of visa overstay rates on which a designation is based.

Congress has plenary or sovereign power over the conditions for admitting aliens into the United States and permitting them to remain. This power is so completely entrusted to the political branch to legislate and implement as to be largely free from judicial review. However, this power is still subject to constitutional limitations, including substantive and procedural due process protections. In immigration cases, due process may be a flexible concept and the particular procedures that may be constitutionally required depend on the relative interests involved. Historically, immigration policy has sought to encourage and enable the admission and integration of desirable immigrants (workers, family, refugees/asylees), while discouraging and preventing the entry of undesirable aliens (national security risks/terrorists, criminals, public charges). Accordingly, in deciding what degree of judicial review is appropriate in immigration matters, Congress has sought a balance between a system that is fair to desired immigrants, yet facilitates the removal of undesired aliens. Initially, a habeas corpus proceeding provided the primary avenue of judicial review of various immigration determinations. In the wake of Supreme Court decisions construing the Administrative Procedure Act as applying to and providing an avenue for judicial review of immigration adjudications, Congress amended the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) of 1952 by adding a judicial review provision in 1961 that provided for review by federal courts of appeal for deportation orders, but only for habeas corpus review of exclusion orders by federal district courts. Beginning with the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), legislation and administrative actions have focused on reducing immigration litigation by limiting and streamlining both administrative appeal and judicial review procedures regarding removal of aliens and by rendering aliens in certain categories ineligible for certain types of relief from removal. Even when an alien may be considered for discretionary relief, judicial review of denials of relief from removal is restricted, as is review of removal orders issued to criminal aliens or national security risks. Also, the REAL ID Act restricted habeas review and certain other non-direct judicial review in response to U.S. Supreme Court holdings that such review was still available after the 1996 acts. In the 113th Congress, S. 744 and H.R. 2278, among other bills, would generally continue the trend of limiting judicial review; however, S. 744 provides for judicial review of its legalization programs. This report will summarize judicial review for immigration matters, including visa denials and revocations; removal orders and detention; naturalization delays, denials, and revocations; expatriation; and legalization denials. Administrative adjudications such as removal proceedings or determination of immigration benefits such as naturalization are beyond the scope of this report.

A broad range of plans that involve benefits to workers not in the form of cash currently exist,including a wide variety of plans that are for retirement purposes (and that employees cannot receiveuntil they leave the firm). These plans receive tax benefits in that contributions and earnings are nottaxed to individuals until received as pensions (or payments on separation). These plans fall into twobasic types: defined benefit plans (where workers are guaranteed a certain benefit related to earningsand years of service) and defined contribution plans, where employees receive benefits based on thesize of assets and accumulated earnings. For most types of plans, contributions to these plans aretypically made by employers, and thus do not permit employees to choose between them and cashwages. For a variety of reasons, defined benefit plans, which once dominated the pension landscape, have been in a decline over the past quarter of a century and defined contribution plans are on theincrease. This rise in defined contribution plans particularly reflects a popular form of definedcontribution plan: a 401(k) plan, where individual accounts are maintained, both employers andemployees contribute, and employee contributions are voluntary. Employees have some choice inthe allocation of their own contributions. Employer stock may be one of the choices; employercontributions may also be made in the form of employer stock. While all pension plans are subject to regulations of some type, the restrictions are greatest for defined benefit plans. Defined benefit plans are also covered by pension insurance, which insuresagainst total loss of assets. Some of the restrictions on plans, particularly defined benefit plans, weredesigned to insure sound investments and to make sure that the plans were not simply a tax shelterfor high ranking employees and managers. Only defined benefit plans have restrictions on theamount of employer stock that can be held (10%). For defined contribution plans, employees bearthe risk of loss of investment or low returns. Some types of plans with retirement features(Employee Stock Ownership Plans, or ESOPs) must hold assets primarily in the form of employerstock. Plans may be combined. Tax benefits are also provided for acquiring employer stock that is not restricted to retirement plans. These benefits include benefits for stock options and stock purchase plans: the former aregenerally directed to high ranking employees and managers, while the latter are generally availableto all employees. (1) Why should firms pay employee compensation in the form of pension or profit sharing plans(or other fringe benefits) rather than in cash? Does the existence of these plans hinge solely orlargely on tax benefits? In this section we briefly discuss several reasons that firms might desire topay compensation, or that individuals might like to receive it, in the form of pensions or stock. Thefirst three reasons are largely associated with defined benefit pension plans while the last two areassociated with profit-sharing or stock ownership plans. Defined contribution plans not in the formof stock may, indeed, have largely arisen from a desire to exploit tax benefits, as it is difficult todiscern another reason for using them. One reason for the popularity of these retirement plans might be that collective plans, such as pension plans, could be considered desirable because of administrative savings and risk reduction. Pension plans are also often constructed to provide insurance elements, such as disability andsurvivor payments and life annuities. Insurance of this nature is often not efficiently provided inprivate markets because of adverse selection. (Adverse selection occurs when individuals sortthemselves out due to private knowledge of risks. For example, a person with a terminal illnessmight desire to buy life insurance but would not purchase a life annuity.) While administrative savings could apply to any plan, risk-pooling and insurance elements would tend to apply most strongly to defined benefit pensions plans with diversified assets andwould not apply to stock ownership plans which tend to increase risk. Administrative and riskreduction benefits have probably declined over time with the current availability of large mutualfunds and the benefits are particularly less important for defined contribution plans that do not haveunique elements of insurance and risk reduction associated with defined-benefit plans. Investment in human capital is generally under-provided in a market economy, because individuals cannot engage in involuntary servitude or commit to a certain form of employment toinsure that future earnings are used to repay human capital investments. These problems apply bothto general education and to certain types of on-the-job training. Returns to on-the-job training thatteaches skills specific to the firm can only be exploited by remaining with the firm. However,returns to on-the-job training that teaches skills transferable to other jobs can be realized by eitherstaying with the firm or moving to another firm. It is in the interest of the firm to retain employeeswhen the firm has invested in their training and whose net product is low or even negative in theearly period of the career. Defined benefit pension plans that are not quickly vested, and whosebenefits become greatest when spending a long career with a company, can be used to allow firmsand employees to mutually exploit gains from these types of human capital investment. (Government pension regulations which require early vesting and portability as ways to protectworker retirement security and guard against tax sheltering may, however, have eroded this benefit.) Pension plans may also be a way of encouraging employees to retire as their marginal product falls, without undermining morale by firing older workers who have become less productive (or,these days, placing the employer in the position of potentially violating the law). Defined benefitpension plans are particularly effective because workers who have reached full retirement and remainat work forgo their pensions, and their net wage is reduced, creating a powerful substitution effectthat encourages retirement while also offsetting lost income. Defined contribution plans permitretirement but do not create as powerful an incentive to retire and thus do not perform this functionas well. Another problem that large firms with many stockholders and/or employees face is the problem of a misalignment of shareholder and worker interests. In the case of managers, this problem is oftenreferred to as the principal-agent or agency cost problem: managers who run the company as anagent for shareholders may make decisions that do not necessarily maximize stockholder profits. Moreover, large firms may find it difficult to monitor the performance of workers; in particular theycannot easily distinguish between the effects of work effort versus outside influences onproductivity. One way that firms may attempt to remedy this problem is through use of stock options(which provide employees an incentive to increase the firm's value) and stock ownership plans,which provide some alignment with the shareholders' objectives. Of course, in theory, this approachwould not be particularly beneficial for the rank and file employees of large firms, where additionalwork effort by any one employee would have a negligible effect on the value of that employee'sstock. Stock options and ownership could have an effect on top management, whose actions haveimportant consequences, and on closely held firms. Moreover, many managers believe that employerownership boosts employee loyalty and morale. (2) Employee stock ownership can also work against shareholder interests and economic efficiency. Firms where employees hold a large fraction of stock are more impervious to hostile takeovers, asemployees and managers may otherwise fear loss of pay and jobs in such a circumstance. However,threats of takeovers are also a market mechanism that may keep the principal-agent problem undercontrol and both takeover threats and actual takeovers may lead to a more efficient company. Reducing takeovers may be advantageous for managers and workers but may not be desirablesocially. Providing compensation in the form of stock is often considered cheaper because it does not reduce current cash-flow. Such an approach may be particularly attractive to new and fast growingfirms, where access to capital markets is difficult and initial profitability is low. This motive maylead to more economic efficiency if capital markets consistently overestimate expected risk. It maylead to less efficient markets if the dilution of stock makes information on the firm's profitabilitymore difficult to assess by investors. The previous section has suggested private motives even in the absence of tax benefits fordefined benefit pension plans and for stock ownership plans, but there does not appear to be a strongprivate rationale for defined contribution plans not held in the form of employer stock. Clearlyanother reason for pension and profit sharing plans that may play a crucial role in encouraging theseplans, particularly defined contribution plans not invested in employer stock, is the tax benefitsassociated with them. Amounts contributed to a pension plan and their earnings are not subject totax until received as pensions, usually many years into the future. The combination of deferral of taxon the initial contribution and deferral of tax on earnings is the equivalent of an exemption ofearnings from tax, and is thus a valuable tax benefit. Why should the government intervene with tax subsidies (and regulations) to shape the compensation package? And why should it intervene with mixed signals, including both benefitsfor and restrictions on ownership of employer stock in pension plans? The first set of rationales for supporting pension plans are also are among the reasons for establishing Social Security: adverse selection in annuity markets and failure of individualoptimization (failure to save a desirable amount). (3) Adverse selection in annuity markets occursbecause individuals expecting to have a shorter life span will avoid the annuities market, therebymaking the annuities unattractive for the average individual. This rationale would justify taxsubsidies to pension plans that provide retirement annuities, early vesting, and mandates for broadcoverage of employees. (The latter rule is probably necessary in any case to prevent the tax benefitsfrom becoming a tax shelter for highly compensated employees.) Of course, it is not clear thatindividuals do not save enough, and it is not clear why using resources (in the form of reduced taxes)to encourage a private pension system that covers about half of workers should be preferred todevoting those resources to an expansion of Social Security. The entire pension system has been shifting away from plans that address these goals: many defined contribution plans have a lump-sum payoff option, and defined benefit plans have beenincreasingly displaced by defined contribution plans. 401(k) plans, which have become verypopular, allow voluntary, not mandatory, contributions. Outside of certain defined benefit plans,the current systems have simply become primarily ways to obtain tax benefits. Of course, arguments are made that these tax benefits have encouraged saving, but neither economic theory nor empirical evidence has confirmed that view. (4) In any case, this rationalesuggests that prudence in investment is important to encourage. In that case, many of the proposalsfor revision, including limits on employer stock holding in any type of pension plan, and reducingor eliminating any required holding period, might be justified. Of course, such an approach alsosuggests that employee stock ownership plan subsidies be discontinued or modified. Some of the rules made to insure safe and broadly available worker pensions have been in conflict with solutions to other economic problems. For example, as noted earlier, a marketeconomy tends to under-invest in human capital. There are obviously massive governmentinterventions through direct spending, low-interest loans, and tax benefits to provide for formaleducation and training. Pension rules may, however, have undermined the use of defined benefitpensions for encouraging spending on on-the-job training. For example, rules mandating earlyvesting are in conflict with objectives to increase on-the-job training (objectives that might be worthyof pursuit by the government as well), although they may be appropriate to increase pension coverageand employee security. Similarly, non-discrimination requirements have been used to prevent theuse of the tax subsidies as a tax shelter for highly compensated employees and increase coverage,even though on-the-job training benefits may not be uniform across employees. Diversification ofassets is consistent, however, with both government and private rationales for defined benefitpension plans. Economic problems arising from principal-agent costs or worker monitoring costs may beargued to justify government subsidies to stock ownership plans to increase efficiency beyond whatprivate markets may do. However, they are unlikely to be addressed by ownership of employerstock among rank and file employees of large companies, where most tax subsidies for pensions aredirected. Moreover, encouraging practices that make companies resistant to takeover may reducerather than increase economic efficiency. Nor is it clear that stock ownership plans benefits inpreserving cash flow outweigh the possible negative effects of using stock as compensation onstockholder information. Thus, the justification for government subsidies to stock ownership is notreally established. As discussed above, the discussion of justifications for government intervention based oneconomic problems suggests rationales for traditional pension plans, particularly those with definedbenefits, but do not necessarily suggest a justification of tax subsidies for plans such as 401(k) plans,where participation by employees is voluntary. These subsidies may not even increase retirementsaving. However, given that subsidies do exist, there does appear to be a case for increasing thesafety of investments by limiting investment in employer stock, while the rationale for supportingemployer stock ownership plans appears weak. If limits on ownership are to be imposed, how should constraints work? It would appear better for administrative and other reasons to impose the limits on the share of contributions made ratherthan the share of assets. A reason for limiting the share of assets in employer stock in defined benefitplans is in part because of pension insurance and because of limits on excess contributions, issuesthat do not exist for 401(k) plans. In the case of a defined contribution plan, a successful employerstock may simply become a larger part of the asset base because it is appreciating rapidly and forcedsales may not be sensible. Other legislative changes might be requirements that employees be ableto sell employer contributed stock immediately or within a few years (which is proposed in somelegislation), disallowing deductions for stock contributions until employees are allowed to sell, oreven prohibiting these types of contributions altogether. It is not clear whether these restrictions willbe successful, however, if ESOPs remain as an option. Another legislative proposal that has been made to increase the security of individual investment plans (which might be used instead of explicit restrictions) is to require firms to provideinvestment advice, since firm managers may have a conflict of interest. Of course, investmentadvice is not costless, and it could significantly discourage the use of these plans in the case of smallfirms. Moreover, virtually any independent investment advisor would counsel against holding alarge part of retirement assets in a single stock, but many advisors would suggest taking on generalstock market risk. If explicit restrictions are imposed on ownership of a single stock, suchindividual advice might not be necessary. Alternatively, a general public information campaign maybe considered. Moreover, the publicity associated with the Enron bankruptcy, along with other firmfailures and the decline in the stock market, may be adequate to alert individuals to the need forportfolio diversification. One criticism that has been made of these proposals is that firms may respond by reducing their contributions. It is not clear that such a reduction would occur or should be a problem if it did (andmany contributions are currently made in cash rather than stock). If stock contributions have anyvalue, then they are likely to substitute for cash wages. It is not clear that policy should be concernedabout employer matches in a risky asset as a substitution for cash wages, particularly when theparticipation is voluntary, both on the part of individuals contributing to plans and firms setting upplans. The beneficiaries in both cases are only part of the population (and the more affluent part). An argument could be made that the revenue derived from increased taxes on cash wages might bebetter used for other purposes.

The loss of retirement assets held in Enron stock by Enron employees has stimulated proposals to restrict the holding of employer stock in retirement plans, and other proposals to regulate theseplans. Stock in the Enron plan came from firm contributions in the form of stock that was notallowed to be sold and from voluntary investment by employees. This report focuses on rationalesfor providing employer retirement plans and for holding (or not holding) employer stock in theseplans, both from the perspective of the private sector and of government policy. Retirement plans fall into two types: defined benefit plans, where a pension based on earningsand years of service is provided; and defined contribution plans, where individuals receive benefitsbased on accumulated principal and interest. Either plan can hold employer stock, but holdings arelimited to 10% of assets in the case of defined benefit plans. These plans receive tax subsidies, asdo employee stock purchase plans and certain types of stock options. The analysis suggests that there are economic reasons that firms and employees may engage in pension and profit sharing (or stock ownership) plans even in the absence of tax subsidies. Pensionplans, primarily defined benefit plans, may be attractive for administrative and risk-reductionreasons, for dealing with inadequate investment in on-the-job training, and for smoothing theretirement of older workers. Stock options and stock ownership plans may be useful for addressinginconsistency in objectives between shareholders and managers and worker monitoring problems,although these benefits are not likely to accrue to stock ownership by the rank and file of largecompanies. These employee stock ownership plans may also deter hostile takeovers, which mayundermine economic efficiency and stockholder interests. Stock contributions are also popularbecause they do not reduce cash flow, which has both benefits and costs from an economic efficiencyperspective. Government subsidies to plans may be justified to increase retirement incomes and access to annuities because of a shortfall in optimal savings and certain economic problems with self selectionin purchasing annuities. These objectives also underlie the justification of Social Security. Pursuingthese goals may actually conflict with another worthy objective, on-the-job training. However,objectives that are addressed via employee stock ownership do not appear important in shaping thenature of large, broadly-based, retirement plans. Diversification of plan assets and prudentinvestment portfolios do appear consistent with rationales for government intervention. Attempts to address this issue might take several forms: restrictions on shares of employer stock in plans, prohibiting employer stock contributions or lifting restrictions on sale, denying a taxdeduction on employer contributions until they could be sold, and requiring independent investmentadvice. The last proposal is not costless and could undermine participation for small firms. Foradministrative and other reasons, it may be rational to impose share restrictions on allocations ofcontributions, rather than on assets. There are no plans to update this report.

Though only about three times the size of Washington, DC, and with a population of 5.5 million, the city-state of Singapore punches far above its weight in both economic and diplomatic influence. Its stable government, strong economic performance, educated citizenry, and strategic position along key shipping lanes make it a major player in regional affairs. For the United States, Singapore is a crucial partner in trade and security cooperation, as the Obama Administration executes its rebalance to Asia strategy. Singapore's value has only grown as the Administration has given special emphasis to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as a platform for multilateral engagement. Singapore's heavy dependence on international trade makes maintaining regional stability one of its foremost priorities. As a result, the nation is a firm supporter of both U.S. trade policy and the U.S. security role in Asia. However, the country also maintains close relations with China. As an English colony, Singapore was a trading post for the East India Company, but in 1959, Singapore gained a large degree of self-rule. That same year, Lee Kuan Yew, who was head of the People's Action Party (PAP), was elected prime minister. Singapore's leaders decided that, given the city-state's small size, it should unite with Malaysia. That merger took place in 1963, but the federation was short-lived. Disputes arose between Singapore leaders and those from Malaysia's ruling party, the United Malays National Organization (UMNO), over economic management and several other issues. UMNO advocated preferential policies to support ethnic Malays over the country's sizeable Indian and Chinese populations, and objected to PAP moves to seek greater influence across the merged federation. Many in Malaysia felt that Singapore, with a majority ethnic-Chinese population, could gain greater economic dominance over the federation. In 1965, the Malaysian Parliament expelled Singapore from the federation. Despite concerns about Singapore's economic prospects and its scant resource base, the economy quickly grew. Because of its location on the Strait of Malacca--one of the world's busiest maritime thoroughfares--Singapore's port soon became one of the world's busiest, and the country attracted foreign businesses and investment. Now, Singapore's GDP per capita exceeds that of the United States, Japan, and Hong Kong. The PAP has won every general election since the end of the colonial era in 1959, aided by a fragmented opposition, Singapore's economic success, and electoral procedures, such as group districting, which strongly favor the ruling party. Opposition parties tallied their best results in Singapore's history in 2011 Parliamentary elections, garnering about 40% of the popular vote and leading PAP leaders to vow reforms that would respond to public concerns about widening wealth disparities and the country's expanding reliance on foreign laborers. In September 2015, following several gradual policy shifts including the imposition of some limits on foreign labor and improved benefits for the poor and elderly, the PAP won nearly 70% of the popular vote in nationwide polls, leaving it with 83 of Parliament's 89 seats. Singapore's parliamentary-style government is headed by the prime minister and cabinet, who represent the majority party in Parliament. The president serves as a ceremonial head of state, a position currently held by Tony Tan Keng Yam. Lee Hsien Loong has served as Prime Minister since 2004. Lee is the son of former Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, who stepped down in 1990 after 31 years at the helm. The senior Lee, who died in May 2015, still is widely acknowledged as the architect of Singapore's success as a nation. He resigned his post as "Minister Mentor" following the 2011 elections, citing a need to pass leadership on to the next generation. In 2010, changes to the constitution guaranteed that more non-PAP members would be represented in the Parliament. The electoral reforms were seen as an acknowledgement by the PAP that it must adjust to a more open and diverse Singapore. The country's leaders have acknowledged a "contract" with the Singaporean people, under which individual rights are curtailed in the interest of maintaining a stable, prosperous society. Supporters praise the pragmatism of Singapore, noting its sustained economic growth and high standards of living. Others criticize the approach as stunting creativity and entrepreneurship, and insist that Singapore's leaders must respond to an increasingly sophisticated and well-educated public's demand for greater liberties for economic survival. Singapore's economy depends heavily on trade and exports, particularly in consumer electronics, information technology products, pharmaceuticals, and financial services. The U.S.-Singapore Free Trade Agreement (FTA) went into effect in January 2004--the United States' first bilateral FTA with an Asian country--and trade has increased significantly as a result. In 2015, Singapore was the 17 th -largest U.S. trading partner. Two-way goods trade amounted to $47 billion, with the United States exporting $28 billion to Singapore and importing $18 billion. Singapore is the largest U.S. trading partner in ASEAN, and the country remains a substantial destination for U.S. foreign direct investment (FDI). In 2012, the latest year for which FDI information is available, $138.6 billion was invested from the United States in Singapore. According to the World Bank, the country's Gross National Income Per Capita is $52,090, one of the highest levels in the world. Singapore and the United States are among the 12 countries on both sides of the Pacific that are part of the proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the centerpiece of the Obama Administration's economic rebalance to Asia, which awaits ratification by each of its members. Singapore was one of four nations that negotiated the TPP's predecessor agreement, the Trans-Pacific Strategic and Economic Partnership (P4) in 2006. (The others were Brunei, Chile, and New Zealand.) Singapore's economy is heavily dependent on trade, with annual trade volumes amounting to around three times its annual GDP. Singapore actively encouraged U.S. participation in an expansion of that agreement, and has strongly urged the United States to ratify the proposed agreement, on both strategic and economic grounds. Singapore has concluded at least 18 FTAs, and is pursuing several more. One of them is the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). It comprises 16 Asian nations, and negotiations are ongoing, even though some of the participants are simultaneously working on the TPP. Singapore also was a signatory to the Chinese-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). The 2005 "Strategic Framework Agreement" and a 2015 enhanced "Defense Cooperation Agreement" formalize the bilateral security and defense relationship between the United States and Singapore. The 2005 agreement was the first of its kind with a non-ally since the Cold War, and the two pacts build on the U.S. strategy of "places-not-bases" in the region, a concept that allows the U.S. military access to facilities on a rotational basis without bringing up sensitive sovereignty issues. The agreements allow the United States to operate resupply vessels from Singapore and to use a naval base, a ship repair facility, and an airfield on the island-state. The 2015 agreement allows the United States to operate surveillance aircraft from Singapore facilities. The U.S. Navy also maintains a logistical command unit--Commander, Logistics Group Western Pacific--in Singapore that serves to coordinate warship deployment and logistics in the region. Changi Naval Base is the only facility in Southeast Asia that can dock a U.S. aircraft carrier. Singapore also hosts the Shangri-La Dialogue, an annual defense forum where defense ministers and military officials from 26 nations can discuss transnational security concerns, such as the threat of trans-national terrorism and the South China Sea disputes. Singapore and the United States have increased bilateral exercises and training, including combined air combat exercises with fighter units from other countries' air forces, as well as enhanced joint urban training at Singapore's sophisticated Murai Urban Training Facility. Singapore forces also train regularly in the United States. An April 2012 agreement outlines bilateral initiatives to strengthen global cargo security procedures; in 2003, Singapore was the first Asian country to join the Container Security Initiative (CSI), a series of bilateral, reciprocal agreements that allow U.S. Customs and Border Patrol officials at selected foreign ports to pre-screen U.S.-bound containers. Singapore also was a founding member of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), a program that aims to interdict weapons of mass destruction-related shipments. In April 2013, the USS Freedom , a U.S. Navy littoral combat ship (LCS), arrived in Singapore to begin an eight-month deployment in Southeast Asia. In 2016, the U.S. Navy deployed two of the vessels to Changi Naval Base, with plans to add two more in the coming years. The stationing of the LCS is emblematic of the role that Singapore can play in the U.S. "pivot" to the region. The vessel is the first U.S. Navy ship to be designed to fight close to shore in shallow waters, to carry a smaller crew, and to boast flexible capabilities that include anti-mine and anti-submarine missions. The smaller size also makes the LCS more amenable to doing exercises with countries that have smaller-scale naval forces. Singapore's combination of sophisticated facilities and political standing in the region allows it to host such U.S. naval assets. The United States and Singapore engage in ongoing law enforcement cooperation. Singapore is a transit point for a wide range of individuals, including suspected terrorists from neighboring countries, and its active port is a trans-shipment point. In the past, some U.S. officials have expressed concerns about the strength of cooperation. The State Department's 2013 country report on terrorism, however, said that cooperation has "benefited from improved working level dialogue on many of the issues that had previously impeded the development of more strategic and productive agency-to-agency relationships." Among U.S. priorities are improvements in Singapore's port security, where the Department of Homeland Security hopes to see Singapore make greater use of advance manifests to screen containers through its busy port, and improvements to the bilateral extradition treaty. Singapore was a founding member of ASEAN, the region's leading multilateral body, which allows Southeast Asia's mostly smaller countries to influence regional diplomacy, particularly vis-a-vis China. Renewed U.S. engagement in the Asia Pacific under the Obama Administration has pleased Singapore and may have allowed it more diplomatic space to stand up to Beijing on key issues. Singapore has praised the Administration's "rebalancing" effort toward Asia, yet has been careful to warn that anti-China rhetoric or efforts to "contain" China's rise will be counterproductive. At the same time, Singapore leaders have publicly told Chinese audiences that deeper tensions between China and the United States are detrimental to the broader Asia region. Maintaining strong relations with both China and the United States is a keystone of Singapore's foreign policy. Singapore often portrays itself as a useful balancer and intermediary between major powers in the region. In the South China Sea dispute, for example, in 2011, Singapore--a non-claimant--called on China to clarify its island claims, characterizing its stance on the issue as neutral, yet concerned because of the threat to maritime stability. At the same time, Singapore was hosting a port visit by a Chinese surveillance vessel, part of an ongoing exchange on technical cooperation on maritime safety with Beijing. China's economic power makes it a crucial component of trade policy for all countries in the region, but Singapore's ties with Beijing are multifaceted and extend to cultural, political, and educational exchanges as well. China is Singapore's largest trading partner, and Singapore signed on to the Chinese-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). There also are frequent high-level visits between Singapore and China. Singapore adheres to a one-China policy, but has an extensive relationship with Taiwan and has managed it carefully to avoid jeopardizing its strong relations with Beijing. Taiwan and Singapore have held large-scale military exercises annually for over 30 years and, in 2010, announced the launch of talks related to a free-trade pact under the framework of the World Trade Organization. Singapore does not have territorial claims in the South China Sea, but its trade-dependent economy means it has a direct interest in managing tensions and maintaining freedom of navigation in the increasingly tense waters. Singapore diplomacy towards the maritime disputes between China and Southeast Asian states generally stresses the importance of refraining from provocative behavior, conducting active diplomacy to lower tensions, and resolving disputes in accordance with international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Beginning in 2015, Singapore has served as ASEAN's rotating country coordinator for ASEAN-China dialogue, with the responsibility of brokering common ASEAN positions on the disputes. In that role, it is generally cautious about promoting consensus between ASEAN's ten members, who have widely different interests and approaches to the disputes. However, Singapore officials have occasionally spoken strongly about actions they see as provocative or liable to increase tensions. While the PAP has been elected by a comfortable majority in every election since Singapore's founding, the government "has broad powers to limit citizens' rights," according to the U.S. State Department's 2015 Country Report on Human Rights Practices. The State Department noted that "the government could and did censor the media (from television shows to websites) if it determined that the content would undermine social harmony or criticized the government." It also noted that Singapore's broad Internal Security Act (ISA) permits preventive detention without normal judicial review, although "in recent years, the government has used it against alleged terrorists and not against persons in the political opposition." PAP's ideology stresses the government's role in enforcing social discipline and harmony, and the party, in the past, has been particularly concerned about racial tensions in Singapore. In the 1960s, there were several race riots in the country, pitting ethnic Malays against ethnic Chinese. (Singapore's population is 74% Chinese, 13% Malay, and 9% Indian. ) Race riots, since then, have been relatively rare. Yet in December 2013 a traffic accident, which killed an Indian national, sparked widespread rioting in Singapore's Little India district, involving over 400 people. The police were able to regain control, but the incident may have pointed to frustrations among Singapore's migrant laborers. Greater, and generally freer, use of the Internet may be threatening to some of the leadership; in the past the government attempted to tighten control over bloggers, who may not exercise the same restraint as the mainstream media in limiting criticism of the ruling party or touching on sensitive issues such as race in Singapore's multi-ethnic environment. In 2015, a teenage blogger was arrested for posting a video criticizing Lee Kuan Yew after his death. He was convicted on charges of obscenity and insulting religious feelings, and was sentenced to four weeks imprisonment. International watchdog agencies criticize Singapore's control of the press as well. Singaporean officials have used defamation suits to intimidate reporters and news outlets, including The Economist and The New York Times , and in 2016 Reporters Without Borders ranked Singapore 154 th out of 180 countries in terms of press freedom, below other nations in the region, including Burma, Malaysia, and Thailand. New media controls have been stepped up as well: in 2013 the government issued new regulations for online news sites that report on Singapore, prompting international Internet companies with a presence in the city-state to criticize the move as backward-looking.

A former trading and military outpost of the British Empire, the tiny Republic of Singapore has transformed itself into a modern Asian nation and a major player in the global economy, though it still substantially restricts political freedoms in the name of maintaining social stability and economic growth. Singapore's heavy dependence on international trade makes regional stability and the free flow of goods and services essential to its existence. As a result, the island nation is a firm supporter of the U.S. security role in Asia, but it also maintains close relations with China. The Obama Administration's strategy of rebalancing U.S. foreign policy priorities to the Asia Pacific enhances Singapore's role as a key U.S. partner in the region. A formal strategic partnership agreement between the United States and Singapore outlines access to military facilities, cooperation in counterterrorism and counter-proliferation, joint military exercises, policy dialogues, and shared defense technology. Singapore also supports U.S. international trade policy. Singapore and the United States are among the 12 countries on both sides of the Pacific involved in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which is the centerpiece of the Obama Administration's economic rebalance to Asia. In 2015, Singapore was the 17th-largest U.S. trading partner with $47 billion in total two-way goods trade, and the country remains a substantial destination for U.S. foreign direct investment. The U.S.-Singapore Free Trade Agreement (FTA) went into effect in January 2004, and since then trade has burgeoned between the two countries. Singapore's People's Action Party (PAP) has won every general election since the end of the colonial era in 1959, aided by a fragmented opposition, Singapore's economic success, and electoral procedures that strongly favor the ruling party. Some point to changes in the political and social environment that may herald more political pluralism, including generational changes and an increasingly international outlook among Singaporeans. However, the PAP maintains a dominant political position. In September 2015, it won nearly 70% of the popular vote in nationwide Parliamentary elections that left it with 83 of the 89 seats in Parliament. In March 2015, Lee Kuan Yew, who was Singapore's Prime Minister from 1959 to 1990, passed away. He was--and still is--considered the founder of modern Singapore, and he is credited with transforming Singapore from an English colony into one of the world's wealthiest and least corrupt countries. His son, Lee Hsien Loong, is Singapore's current Prime Minister.

The July 2004 report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States(also known as the 9/11 Commission) concluded that the key officials responsible for determiningalien admissions (consular officers abroad and immigration inspectors in the United States) were notconsidered full partners in counterterrorism efforts prior to September 11, 2001, and as a result,opportunities to intercept the September 11 terrorists were missed. (1) The 9/11 Commission contendedthat "(t)here were opportunities for intelligence and law enforcement to exploit al Qaeda's travelvulnerabilities." The report went on to state: "Considered collectively, the 9/11 hijackers included known al Qaeda operatives who could have been watchlisted; presented fraudulent passports; presented passports with suspicious indicators ofextremism; made detectable false statements on visa applications; made false statements to border officials to gain entry into the United States;and violated immigration laws while in the United States." (2) The 9/11 Commission issued several recommendations that directly pertain to immigration law and policy. These recommendations are: Targeting travel is at least as powerful a weapon against terrorists as targeting their money. The United States should combine intelligence, operations, and law enforcement in astrategy to intercept terrorists, find terrorist travel facilitators, and constrain terroristmobility. The U.S. border security system should be integrated into a larger network ofscreening points that includes our transportation system and access to vital facilities, such as nuclearreactors. The Department of Homeland Security, properly supported by the Congress,should complete, as quickly as possible, a biometric entry-exit screening system, including a singlesystem for speeding qualified travelers. The U.S. government cannot meet its own obligations to the American peopleto prevent the entry of terrorists without a major effort to collaborate with othergovernments. (3) These recommendations have broad implications for immigration law and policy. Also, as Congress has moved on the Commission's recommendations, immigration-related reforms have beena key component of major legislative proposals. This report summarizes the major proposed reformsconsidered and adopted in the 108th Congress. Of the several bills that sought to implement recommendations of the 9/11 Commission in the108th Congress, two passed their respective Houses, and both of these proposed revisions toimmigration law: H.R. 10 , the 9/11 Recommendations Implementation Act, asamended, introduced by the Speaker of the House of Representatives Dennis Hastert and passed bythe House as S. 2845 on October 8, 2004 (House-passed S. 2845 ); and S. 2845 , the National Intelligence Reform Act of 2004, as amended, introduced bySenators Susan Collins and Joseph Lieberman and passed by the Senate on October 8, 2004(Senate-passed S. 2845 ). Certain immigration-related provisions of these bills weresignificant sources of contention by lawmakers, curtailing immediate agreement of a compromisebill. The conference report on S. 2845 passed the House on December 7 and the Senateon December 8, 2004. (4) The Intelligence Reform andTerrorism Prevention Act of 2004 ( P.L.108-458 ), a compromise bill signed on December 17, 2004 includes some - but not all - of theimmigration provisions that were originally under consideration. The major areas that were under consideration in these comprehensive reform proposals are briefly discussed below. References to CRS reports that analyze these issues in depth are listed foreach major area. (5) Summaries of the immigrationprovisions in P.L. 108-458 concludes the report. As mentioned above, actions to identify and intercept terrorists who are attempting to enter or leave the United States are a key component of the 9/11 Commission's recommendations. In 1996,Congress required the development of an automated entry and exit data system to track the arrivaland departure of aliens, but such a system has yet to be fully implemented. Following the 9/11terrorist attacks, Congress enacted additional measures, including the USA PATRIOT Act ( P.L.107-56 ) and the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Reform Act of 2002 ( P.L. 107-173 ), toencourage the more expeditious development of an automated entry and exit data system, and tofurther require that biometric identifiers be used in passports, visas, and other travel documents toimprove their security. To keep inadmissible aliens abroad, the Illegal Immigration Reform andImmigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA, P.L. 104-208 , Division C) required theimplementation of a pre-inspection program at selected locations overseas under which immigrationofficers inspect aliens before their final departure to the United States, and authorized assistance toair carriers at selected foreign airports to help in the detection of fraudulent documents. A number of proposals were made in the 108th Congress to improve the accurate monitoring of persons entering and exiting the United States. Many of these proposals were not specific toaliens, but covered all persons traveling to or from the United States. These proposals included: hastening the development and installation of a biometric entry and exit data system that is integrated with various databases and data systems that process or contain informationon aliens <108>[House-passed, Senate-passed]; requiring the Secretary of Homeland Security to issue a notice of proposedrulemaking to allow for the pre-flight comparison of passenger records for any flight to or from theUnited States with the integrated terrorist watch list, and establishing an appeals process allowingfor modification of records [House-passed]; requiring the Secretary of Homeland Security to implement a watchlist forpassengers of cruise ships [Senate-passed]; authorizing DHS to establish permanent pre-enrollment programs that subjectparticipants, who may be either aliens and citizens of the United States, to criminal and watch-listscreenings and fingerprint checks, so that the inspections of such program participants may beexpedited at ports of entry [House-passed]; improving the security of passports and other travel documents, includingthrough the strengthening of security requirements for "breeder" documents that are used to obtainpassports or other travel documents [House- and Senate-passed]; encouraging the adoption of international standards for the uniform translationof names into the Roman alphabet for purposes of travel documents and security systems[House-passed]; expanding pre-inspection programs in foreign countries and assistance to aircarriers at selected foreign airports in the detection of fraudulent documents [House- andSenate-passed]; improving the security of the visa issuance process by providing consularofficers and immigration inspectors greater training in detecting terrorist indicators, terrorist travelpatterns and fraudulent documents [House- and Senate-passed]; improving the security of the visa issuance process by, among other things, (1)establishing an Office of Visa and Passport Security within the State Department to develop astrategic plan to disrupt the operations of individuals and organizations engaged in travel documentfraud, (2) increasing the number of consular officers, (3) codifying that all applications for temporaryvisas be adjudicated by a consular officer, (4) providing consular officers greater training in detectingfraudulent documents, and (5) stationing anti-fraud specialists at consular posts overseas[House-passed]; requiring persons applying for nonimmigrant visas between the ages of 12 and65 to be interviewed by consular officer prior to visa issuance, subject to waiver in certaincircumstances [Senate-passed]; authorizing and encouraging the President to enter into internationalagreements to curtail terrorist travel by upgrading verification and information-sharing systems[House- and Senate-passed]; limiting the President's ability to waive general statutory requirementsrequiring U.S. citizens traveling abroad or attempting to enter the United States to bear a valid U.S.passport, so that such a waiver can only be exercised with respect to U.S. citizens traveling to orfrom foreign contiguous territories who are bearing identification documents designated by DHS as(1) reliable proof of U.S. citizenship, and (2) of a type that may not be issued to an unlawfullypresent alien within the United States [House-passed]; amending the present waiver authority concerning document requirements forarriving nationals from foreign contiguous countries or adjacent islands, so that such waivers mayonly be granted (in non-emergency situations) through a joint determination by the Secretary ofHomeland Security and Secretary of State on the basis of reciprocity, and then only if the arrivingforeign national is in possession of identification documents deemed secure by the Secretary ofHomeland Security [House-passed]; and requiring the Secretary of State, in consultation with DHS, expeditiously todevelop and implement a plan for the use of biometric passports. This plan would require U.S.citizens and foreign nationals from contiguous territories or adjacent islands (i.e., aliens currentlywaived in 214(d)(4) of INA) to present biometric passports, or some other type of secure biometrictravel document, for travel into the United States [Senate-passed]. For further discussion of these and related topics, see CRS Report RL32399 , Border Security: Inspections Practices, Policies, and Issues ; CRS Report RL32188 , Monitoring Foreign Students inthe United States: The Student and Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS) , CRS Report RL32234 , U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology Program (US-VISIT) ; CRS Report RL31512 , Visa Issuances: Policy, Issues, and Legislation ; and CRS Report RL32221 , VisaWaiver Program . A primary area of difference between House-passed and Senate-passed versions of S. 2845 concerned grounds for alien exclusion, removal, and relief from removal, asonly the House-passed bill dealt extensively with these areas. The Immigration and Nationality Act(INA) establishes admission and removal criteria for all foreign nationals seeking to enter and/orremain in the United States, and also provides certain discretionary and non-discretionary forms ofrelief from removal, such as granting asylum or withholding removal to a country where an alien islikely to face serious persecution or torture. Starting with the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 ( P.L.100-690 ) and continuing through the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ( P.L.104-132 ) and the IIRIRA, Congress has expanded the grounds of inadmissibility and deportation andthe use of expedited removal, while it has also restricted relief from removal and judicial review ofremoval decisions. Subsequently, the Supreme Court has held that there is a strong presumption infavor of judicial review of administrative actions, and therefore, in the absence of a clear statementof congressional intent to repeal habeas corpus jurisdiction over removal-related matters, suchreview is still considered available. (6) Furthermore,the Court found that eliminating any judicialreview, including habeas review, without any substitute form of review for pure questions of lawwould raise serious constitutional questions. (7) Exclusion and Removal. After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Congress further expanded the terrorism grounds for inadmissibility, removal, andmandatory detention in the USA PATRIOT Act in response to concerns that loopholes andinadequacies in the immigration laws were contributing to the ability of terrorists and theiraccomplices to travel to and remain in the United States. House-passed<108> S. 2845 soughtto broaden the scope of terror-related activity making an alien inadmissible or deportable, and limitthe availability of relief from removal in certain circumstances. These proposals included: barring aliens who are engaged or have engaged in terrorist activity from having their removal withheld (except for in cases of aliens seeking relief under regulationsimplementing the U.N. Convention against Torture), and also denying such relief to aliens found bythe Attorney General to have engaged in other terror-related activity (i.e., incitement or espousal ofterrorist activities) [House-passed]; expanding grounds making of terror-related activity making an alieninadmissible and deportable, including receiving military-type training by or on behalf of anorganization designated as a terrorist organization at the time of training[House-passed]; expanding the definitions of "engaged in terrorist activity" and "terroristorganization," which are used to describe certain grounds for inadmissibility and deportability, toinclude a broader scope of conduct relating to providing money or material support to a terroristorganization [House-passed]; providing for the inadmissibility and removability of aliens who havecommitted, ordered, assisted, incited, or otherwise participated in acts of genocide, torture, orextrajudicial killings abroad, or who have committed severe violations of religious freedom whileserving as a foreign government official [House-passed]; clarifying that an alien may be removed to his country of citizenship, birth, orresidence, unless such a country physically prevents the alien from entering the country or unlessremoval to such a country would be prejudicial to the United States[House-passed]; providing the Secretary of Homeland Security with greater discretion indeciding the countries to which an inadmissible or deportable alien may be removed [House-passed]; expanding the class of aliens arriving in the United States subject to immediateremoval without further hearing or review, by increasing the prior continuous U.S. physical presencerequired for exemption from such removal from two years to five years [House-passed]; providing that an alien currently being prosecuted for a crime or serving acriminal sentence is not subject to immediate removal, presumably to ensure effective exercise ofU.S. criminal jurisdiction [House-passed]; eliminating habeas review and other non-direct judicial review for certainremoval decisions and clarifying that in all immigration provisions restricting judicial review, suchrestrictions include habeas and other non-direct review, but that such restrictions do not precludefederal appellate court consideration of constitutional claims or other purely legal issues raised inaccordance with current statutory procedures [House-passed]; and precluding courts from staying a removal order pending judicial review, unlessthe alien shows by clear and convincing evidence that the entry or execution of such order isprohibited as a matter of law [House-passed]. Asylum and Other Forms of Relief from Removal. The United States has long held to the principle that it will not return aforeign national to a country where his life or freedom would be threatened. Aliens seeking asylummust demonstrate a well-founded fear that if returned home, they will be persecuted based upon oneof five characteristics: race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, orpolitical opinion. In addition, regulations implementing the United Nations Convention AgainstTorture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (hereafter referred to asTorture Convention) prohibit the return of any person to a country where there are "substantialgrounds" for believing that he or she would be in danger of being tortured. Proposals to modifyasylum and other forms of relief from removal include found in House-passed and Senate-passedversions of S. 2845 included: establishing more stringent standards for asylum applicants accused by their home countries of being involved in terrorist or guerrilla-related activities, by requiring theseapplicants to demonstrate that their race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular socialgroup, or political opinion was or will be a central reason for their persecution[House-passed]; expressly providing that aliens who are a danger to the community or nationalsecurity of the United States and who are ordered removed may be indefinitely detained pendingremoval, in the Secretary of Homeland Security's nonreviewable discretion, and subject to reviewevery six months by the Secretary [House-passed]. For additional background, see CRS Report RL32564 , Immigration: Terrorist Grounds for Exclusion of Aliens ; CRS Report RL32276 , The U.N. Convention Against Torture: Overview of U.S.Implementation Policy Concerning the Removal of Aliens ; and CRS Report RL32621 , U.S.Immigration Policy on Asylum Seekers . There has been some concern that the acquisition of U.S. identification documents by terrorist aliens may facilitate their ability to engage in terrorist activities. The 9/11 Commission noted that"[a]ll but one of the 9/11 hijackers acquired some form of U.S. identification document, some byfraud...[and] these forms of identification would have assisted them in boarding commercial flights,renting cars, and other necessary activities." (8) Accordingly, the Commission recommended thatnational standards be set for the issuance of birth certificates and drivers' licenses to prevent theirfraudulent acquisition. The adoption of national standards for the issuance of drivers' licenses and other forms of identification has long been the subject of controversy. Although not technically an immigrationpolicy, the concern over these forms of identification -- often referred to as "breeder documents"-- has often been linked with immigration legislation. Pursuant to 656 of the IIRIRA, Congressprovided standards for acceptance of state drivers' licenses and birth certificates when used forfederal purposes. Many opponents alleged that this provision was a step towards the creation of anational identification card, and it was subsequently repealed in 2000. In response to the 9/11 Commission's recommendations, however, a number of proposals were made to increase federal oversight over and improve the security of drivers' licenses, birthcertificates, and other state-issued forms of identification. Proposals were also made to improve thesecurity of Social Security documents and verify the identity of persons applying for benefits underthe INA. These proposals to improve identification verification procedures and the security ofpersonal identification documents included: barring federal agencies from accepting, for any official purpose, state-issued drivers' licenses or other identification cards unless a state fulfills certain federal securityrequirements concerning the issuance of such documents [House-passed,Senate-passed]; barring federal agencies from accepting, for any official purpose, state-issueddocuments that do not meet national minimum standards concerning the information and featuresincluded upon the drivers' licenses, identification cards, and birth certificates that states may issue[House-passed, Senate-passed]; barring federal agencies from accepting, for any official purpose, state-issueddocuments that do not meet national minimum issuance and record-keeping standards for theissuance of drivers' licenses, identification cards, and birth certificates by states [House-passed,Senate-passed]; barring federal agencies from accepting, for any official purpose, state-issueddocuments that do not meet certain identification verification procedures to ensure the accuracy ofdrivers' licenses, identification cards, and birth certificates issued (including under H.R. 10the prohibition on the acceptance of any foreign documents except official passports as a means toverify an applicant's identity) [House-passed, Senate-passed]; and providing relevant federal departments with the authority to conduct periodicaudits of each state's compliance with federal requirements concerning the issuance of drivers'licenses, identification cards, and birth certificates [Senate-passed]; making certain grants to states contingent upon their participation in aninterstate compact linking their respective motor vehicle databases[House-passed]; creating electronic birth and death registration systems that rely on a commondata set and exchange protocol, so as to assist officials in assessing the validity of birth certificatesand other records [House-passed]; establishing an electronic interface enabling authorized federal and stateofficials to verify records concerning vital events (i.e., birth, death, or marriage)[House-passed]; restricting the issuance of multiple replacement Social Security cards[House-passed, Senate-passed]; prohibiting a person's Social Security number from being displayed on his orher driver's license or motor vehicle registration [House-passed]; improving the application process for the "enumeration at birth" programwhich provides Social Security numbers to newborns [House-passed]; studying means for requiring photographic identification for Social Securitynumbers [House-passed]; requiring independent verification of any birth record submitted with anapplication for a Social Security account number [House-passed, Senate-passed];and requiring that, for purposes of establishing his or her identity to a federalemployee, an alien present in the United States may present a valid foreign passport or animmigration document issued by DHS or the Department of Justice under the authority ofimmigration laws, and no other document can be used for such purposes[House-passed]. For further background, see CRS Report RS21953, The 9/11 Recommendations Implementation Act (H.R. 10) and the National Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 (S. 2845):National Standards for Drivers' Licenses, Social Security Cards, and Birth Certificates ; CRS Report RL32127, Summary of State Laws on the Issuance of Driver's Licenses to Undocumented Aliens ; CRS Report RL32094 , Consular Identification Cards: Domestic and Foreign Policy Implications,the Mexican Case, and Related Legislation ; CRS Report RS21137(pdf) , National Identification Cards:Legal Issues ; and CRS Report RL30318 , The Social Security Number: Legal Developments AffectingIts Collection, Disclosure and Confidentiality. DHS is the primary federal agency responsible for enforcing immigration laws and securing the border. The DHS Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is responsible for patrollingthe U.S. border and conducting immigration and customs inspections at ports of entry, while theDHS Bureau of Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE) investigates immigration andcustoms violations in the interior of the country. Employees in other federal agencies also play asignificant role in enforcing immigration laws and protecting border security, such as consularofficers in the State Department who are responsible for screening aliens seeking visas to enter theUnited States from abroad. In issuing its recommendations to improve homeland security, the 9/11Commission noted the importance of a border security system that can adequately identify personsattempting to enter the United States. A number of proposals made in response to the 9/11Commission's findings called for the allocation of additional resources to improve border security. Of the bills implementing the 9/11 Commission recommendations, the proposals included: increasing the number of full-time border patrol agents, immigration and customs-enforcement investigators, and consular officers [House-passed,Senate-passed]; directing the Secretary of Homeland Security to increase Detention andRemoval Operations (DRO) bed space [House-passed]; improving the training of immigration enforcement officials within DHS andconsular personnel within the State Department [House-passed,Senate-passed]; acquiring and deploying to all consulates, ports of entry, and immigrationbenefits offices, technologies (including biometrics) to facilitate document authentication anddetection of potential terrorist indicators on travel documents [House-passed, Senate-passed]; expanding and increasing appropriations for pre-inspection at foreign airportsof passengers traveling to the United States [House-passed]; expediting construction to fill two gaps in the 14 mile long barrier at the SanDiego border [House-passed]; directing the Secretary of Homeland Security to develop and implement a planfor continuous surveillance of the Southwest border of the United States by remotely piloted aircraft[Senate-passed]; and requiring the Secretary of Homeland Security to carry out an advancedtechnology security pilot program on the Northern border of the United States[Senate-passed]. For additional background on the roles of various agencies in protecting border security, see CRS Report RL32562 , Border Security: The Role of the U.S. Border Patrol ; CRS Report RL32399 , Border Security: Inspections Practices, Policies, and Issues ; CRS Report RL32566 , Border andTransportation Security: Appropriations for FY2005 ; CRS Report RL32369 , Immigration-RelatedDetention: Current Legislative Issues ; and CRS Report RL32256 , Visa Policy: Roles of theDepartments of State and Homeland Security. At the heart of the INA are the rules on which aliens may enter and remain in the United States, the conditions of their stay, and the procedures for their entry and removal. In support of thisstructure, federal law has concomitantly imposed civil and criminal penalties on a variety ofactivities -- i.e., smuggling or harboring illegal aliens, committing immigration-related documentfraud to secure either entry into the United States or a benefit under the INA -- that facilitate orfurther violations of the legal immigration system. House-passed S. 2845 proposed toheighten criminal penalties for conduct violating or facilitating the violation of U.S. immigrationlaw, which include increasing the criminal and immigration-related penalties for document fraud,alien smuggling, and making false claims of U.S. citizenship. For additional background, see CRS Report RL32480 , Immigration Consequences of Criminal Activity ; CRS Report RL32657 , Immigration-Related Document Fraud: Overview of Civil, Criminal,and Immigration Consequences ; and, CRS Report RS21043, Immigration: S Visas for Criminaland Terrorist Informants. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, the compromise version of S. 2845 that ultimately was enacted into law, included some - but not all - of theimmigration provisions in both the House and Senate versions of S. 2845 . The majorfeatures of the immigration-related provisions in the act are briefly discussed below. Monitoring of Persons Entering and Leaving the United States. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act requires accelerateddeployment of the biometric entry and exit system to process or contain certain data on aliens andtheir physical characteristics. It requires an in-person consular interview of most applicants fornonimmigrant visas between the ages of 14 and 79, and also requires an alien applying for anonimmigrant visa to completely and accurately respond to any request for information containedin his or her application. The act also expands the pre-inspection program that places U.S.immigration inspectors at foreign airports, increasing the number of foreign airports where travelerswould be pre-inspected before departure to the United States. Moreover, it requires individualsentering into the United States (including U.S. citizens and visitors from Canada and other WesternHemisphere countries) to bear a passport or other documents sufficient to denote citizenship andidentity. The act requires improvements in technology and training to assist consular and immigration officers in detecting and combating terrorist travel. It (1) establishes the Human Smuggling andTrafficking Center, which includes an interagency program devoted to countering terrorist travel;(2) requires the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Director of the NationalCounter Terrorism Center, to establish a program to oversee DHS's responsibilities with respect toterrorist travel; and (3) establishes a Visa and Passport Security Program within the Bureau ofDiplomatic Security at the Department of State. Grounds for Alien Exclusion, Removal, and Relief from Removal. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act makes any aliendeportable who has received military training from or on behalf of an organization that, at the timeof training, was a designated terrorist organization. It also makes the revocation of a nonimmigrantvisa by the State Department grounds for removal. The visa revocation, however, is reviewable ina removal proceeding in cases where visa revocation provides the sole ground for removal. The actmakes inadmissible and deportable any alien who (1) has ordered, incited, assisted, or participatedin conduct that would be considered genocide under U.S. law; (2) committed or participated in anact of torture or an extrajudicial killing; or (3) while serving as a foreign official, was responsiblefor or directly carried out, at any time, particularly severe violations of religious freedom. The actalso requires the Government Accountability Office to conduct a study evaluating the degree thatweaknesses in the current U.S. asylum system have been or could be exploited by aliens involvedin terrorist-related activity. Security of Personal Identification Documents. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act requires the establishment of new standardsaimed at ensuring the integrity for federal use of birth certificates, state-issued driver's licenses andidentification cards, and social security cards. States may receive grants to assist them inimplementing the proposed birth certificate and driver's license standards. Allocation of Additional Resources to Improve Enforcement. The act authorizes the Secretary of State to increase the number ofconsular officers by 150 per year from FY2006 through FY2009 above the number of such positionsfor which funds were allotted for the preceding fiscal year. It also increases the numbers of borderpatrol agents by not less than 2,000, in each year FY2006 through FY2010, and requires a numberof agents equaling at least 20% of each year's increase in agents to be assigned to the northernborder. The act also increases the number of ICE investigators by not less than 800 in each yearFY2006 through FY2010, and requires an increase in the number of beds available for immigrationdetention and removal operations by not less than 8,000 over the same period. Further, the actestablishes a pilot program to test advanced technologies to improve border security between portsof entry along the northern border of the United States. It also requires the Secretary of HomelandSecurity to submit to the President and Congress a plan for the systematic surveillance of thesouthwest border of the United States by remotely piloted aircraft, and to implement such plan asa pilot program. Penalties for Immigration-Related Fraud and Alien Smuggling. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act increasescriminal penalties for alien smuggling in certain circumstances and requires the Secretary ofHomeland Security to develop an outreach program in the United States and overseas to educate thepublic about the penalties for illegally bringing in and harboring aliens.

Reforming the enforcement of immigration law is a core component of the recommendations made by the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (also known as the9/11 Commission). The 19 hijackers responsible for the 9/11 attacks were foreign nationals, manyof whom were able to obtain visas to enter the United States through the use of forged documents. Incomplete intelligence and screening enabled many of the hijackers to enter the United Statesdespite flaws in their entry documents or suspicions regarding their past associations. According tothe Commission, up to 15 of the hijackers could have been intercepted or deported through morediligent enforcement of immigration laws. The 9/11 Commission's immigration-related recommendations focused primarily on targeting terrorist travel through an intelligence and security strategy based on reliable identification systemsand effective, integrated information-sharing. As Congress has considered these recommendations,however, possible legislative responses have broadened to include significant and possiblyfar-reaching changes in the substantive law governing immigration and how that law is enforced,both at the border and in the interior of the United States. In response to the Commission's recommendations, several major bills were introduced proposing significant revisions to U.S. immigration law and policy. The two notable bills that wouldrevise immigration laws were H.R. 10 , the 9/11 Recommendations Implementation Act,as amended, introduced by the Speaker of the House of Representatives Dennis Hastert, and passedby the House as S. 2845 on October 8, 2004, and S. 2845 , the NationalIntelligence Reform Act of 2004, as amended, introduced by Senators Susan Collins and JosephLieberman and passed by the Senate on October 8, 2004. The Intelligence Reform and TerrorismPrevention Act of 2004 ( P.L. 108-458 ), a compromise version of these bills that included some - butnot all - of the immigration provisions under consideration, was signed on December 17, 2004. This report briefly discusses some of the major immigration areas that were under consideration in the above-mentioned comprehensive reform proposals, including asylum, biometric trackingsystems, border security, document security, exclusion, immigration enforcement, and visa issuances. It refers to other CRS reports that discuss these issues in depth and will be updated as needed.

During 2007, both the House and Senate established new earmark transparency procedures for their separate chambers. They provide for public disclosure of approved earmarks and the identification of their congressional sponsors. In addition, they require disclosure of further information from each congressional sponsor, such as a certification that the sponsor has no financial interest in the earmark. Each House has also established procedures regarding new spending earmarks added to conference reports. The House originally established its procedures through adoption of two House resolutions. On January 5, 2007, the House completed action on H.Res. 6 (110 th Congress), adopting the 110 th Congress rules package, including new provisions in House Rule XXI to require public disclosure of approved earmarks, their sponsors, and the additional information. On June 18, 2007, the House adopted a standing order, H.Res. 491 (110 th Congress), to require transparency for new spending earmarks added to conference reports on the 12 annual regular appropriations bills. On January 6, 2009, the House adopted the rules package for the 111 th Congress, H.Res. 5 (111 th Congress), which incorporated the provisions of H.Res. 491 into House Rule XXI, clause 9. In the Senate, Rule XLIV was adopted through the Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007 ( P.L. 110-81 ), which became law on September 14, 2007. The new rule provides for public disclosure of each "congressionally directed spending item," its sponsors, and "no financial interest" certifications. It also includes a procedure to strike certain new items of spending added to conference reports. This report describes and compares the procedures and requirements in House and Senate rules, including the House requirement regarding the use of earmarks as leverage for votes. In addition, individual House and Senate committees may have additional requirements for earmarks submitted for their consideration, but these are not covered in this report. When submitting an earmark request, there may also be other considerations relevant to the individual Member's request, such as whether the earmark should be included in the text of the bill or the committee report accompanying the bill. Committees may make an administrative distinction between these two categories in terms of the submission of earmark requests, and there may be policy implications of an earmark's placement in either the bill text or the committee report as well. For purposes of the procedures discussed below, both House and Senate rules provide definitions for spending earmarks, limited tax benefits, and limited tariff benefits. The spending earmark definitions in House Rule XXI, clause 9, and Senate Rule XLIV are identical, except the identification of earmark requesters. For purposes of all the disclosure requirements above, a spending earmark is a provision in legislation or report language that meets specific criteria. First, the provision or language is primarily included at the request of a Representative, Delegate, the Resident Commissioner, or Senator under the House rule (or a Senator under the Senate rule). Second, the provision or language provides, authorizes, or recommends a specific amount of discretionary budget authority, credit authority, or other spending authority for certain purposes (1) with or to an entity, or (2) targeted to a specific state, locality, or congressional district. The purposes are a contract, grant, loan, loan guarantee, loan authority, or other expenditure. Finally, any of the above spending set asides that are selected through a statutory or administrative formula-driven or competitive-award process are excluded. The definition is broad. It includes earmarks funded or recommended in appropriations legislation, as well as other non-appropriations legislation (such as authorizations), conference reports, and accompanying report language. The definitions in the House and Senate rules are identical. Such tariff benefits are defined as "a provision modifying the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States in a manner that benefits 10 or fewer entities." This definition targets provisions in "miscellaneous duty suspension bills" or "miscellaneous tariff bills" (MTBs), which seek to temporarily reduce or eliminate tariffs on imports of particular commodities. The vast majority of tariff suspensions are on chemicals, raw materials, or other components used in the manufacturing process. In contrast to the previous definitions, the House and Senate definitions of limited tax benefits are somewhat different. Under the Senate rule a limited tax benefit is defined as a revenue provision that provides a tax deduction, credit, exclusion, or preference to a particular beneficiary or limited group of beneficiaries under the tax code and contains eligibility criteria that are not uniform in application with respect to potential beneficiaries of the provision. The House rule is more specific, and uses the term limited tax benefit to apply to (1) a revenue-losing provision that provides a tax deduction, credit, exclusion, or preference to no more than 10 beneficiaries under the tax code and contains eligibility criteria that are not uniform in application with respect to potential beneficiaries of the provision; or (2) a tax provision that provides one beneficiary with transitional relief from a change to the tax code. The rules in both the House and Senate include parliamentary procedures regarding greater transparency of congressional sponsors of earmarks. This rule prohibits House consideration of legislation, certain amendments, or conference reports, unless either a list of earmarks in such legislation, amendment, conference report, or any accompanying report language and the name of any House Member who requested an earmark(s) on the list is made available; or a statement that there are no earmarks is made available. Only selected amendments to legislative measures are covered under this rule: amendments in committee-reported legislation and manager's amendments. A manager ' s amendment is an amendment offered at the outset of consideration for amendment by a member of a committee of initial referral, under the terms of a special rule. Major legislation is typically brought up on the House floor by a special rule, which provides the terms for consideration of the measure, and may also limit consideration of floor amendments, specify the order for consideration of specific amendments, or waive various House rules. After the House adopts a special rule, by a majority vote, Members consider the measure on the House floor. House Rule XXI, clause 9, does not cover certain forms of amendments, such as an amendment between the Houses, an amendment automatically agreed to upon adoption of a special rule, an amendment offered during floor consideration, or a committee amendment in the nature of a substitute made in order as original text for purposes of amendment. Under the House rule, the required list of earmarks (and congressional sponsors) or statement that there are no earmarks must be disclosed in specified public documents. For committee-reported legislation and conference reports, either a list or statement must be included in the applicable report language. Regarding non-reported legislation, the chair of each committee of initial referral is required to have a list or a statement printed in the Congressional Record prior to consideration of the legislation. The proponent of a manager's amendment must also have a list or statement printed in the Congressional Record prior to consideration of the amendment. While the House has established rules designed to provide time for Members to review the contents of committee reports, conference reports, and joint explanatory statements before floor consideration, the House may waive these requirements. In cases in which a committee provides time for review, Members have an opportunity, for example, to draft amendments striking specific earmarks in a reported bill or lobby against a conference report. Under House Rule XIII, clause 4(a), committee-reported legislation may not generally be considered on the House floor until the accompanying committee report has been available to Members for at least three calendar days. House Rule XXII, clause 8(a), provides a similar three-day availability requirement for conference reports. The conference report and attached joint explanatory statement must be available in the Congressional Record for at least three calendar days prior to consideration, and copies of the conference report and joint explanatory statement must be available for at least two hours before consideration. The House, however, typically adopts special rules providing for consideration of conference reports that waive all points of order, including these. The earmark and sponsor disclosure requirements are not self-enforcing; a Member must raise a point of order on the House floor against consideration of the legislation, amendment, or conference report. A point of order raised under this subsection may be based only on the failure to include a list of earmarks (and sponsors) or a statement that there are no earmarks in the report language or Congressional Record , as applicable. In response to a parliamentary inquiry, the Speaker pro tempore explained that the rule ... does not contemplate a question of order relating to the content of the statement offered in compliance with the rule. Argument concerning the adequacy of the list or the probity of a disclaimer is a matter that may be addressed by debate on the merits of the measure or by other means collateral to the review of the chair. Each committee, therefore, is left solely responsible for determining the contents of the list. The House rule prohibits House consideration of a special rule that waives the public disclosure requirements, and includes a special procedure to implement this prohibition. If a Member raises a point of order against considering a special rule that includes such a waiver, the presiding officer does not rule on the point of order. Instead the House decides, by majority vote, whether to consider the special rule. The House rule provides 20 minutes of debate, equally divided and controlled by the initiator of the point of order and an opponent. No other intervening motion is allowed, except one that the House adjourn. This procedure effectively allows the House to decide by a separate vote whether to allow this public disclosure requirement to be waived. This rule provides different procedures from the House, but it is also intended to improve public disclosure of earmarks including the name of each Senator who requested any identified earmark. Senate Rule XLIV prohibits a vote on a motion to proceed to consider any committee-reported legislative measure (and any amendment included in the text of the reported bill) or non-reported Senate legislative measure, unless the chair of the applicable committee or the Majority Leader (or designee) provides certain certifications. Similarly, the Senate can not vote on adoption of a conference report unless the chair or Majority Leader (or designee) makes a similar certification. The chair or Majority Leader must certify that a list (or a chart or other similar form) of all earmarks (including those in the applicable measure, conference report, or accompanying report language, if any) and the name of each Senator who submitted a request for each item listed has been available on a publicly accessible congressional website for at least 48 hours before such vote. In the case of measures, they must also certify that the list of earmarks (and Senate sponsors) on the congressional website are in a searchable format. Lists associated with conference reports should also be in a searchable format, but only to the extent technically feasible. If the presiding officer sustains a point of order against a vote on a motion to proceed, consideration on the motion is suspended until a certification is made and the sponsor (or designee) of the motion requests consideration to resume. Under Rule XLIV, paragraph 3, if a point of order is sustained against a conference report, it would be set aside. These rules are not self-enforcing; a Senator must raise a point of order against the vote. Senate Rule XLIV provides two procedures to waive these requirements and restricts appeals of the presiding officer's rulings on such points of order. Unlike the House, the Senate does not have a generally applicable mechanism to waive its rules. Although a waiver motion is available for points of order under the Budget Act and similar requirements, the Senate standing rules must typically be waived by unanimous consent (that is, no Senator objects to a unanimous consent request to waive a rule). Senate Rule XLIV, however, incorporates a waiver motion similar to that used under the Budget Act, and allows any Senator to make a motion to waive any of these points of order. An affirmative vote of three-fifths of all Senators (60, if there are no vacancies) is required to adopt the motion. Senators may debate the motion for up to one hour, with the time equally divided and controlled by the Majority and Minority Leaders (or their designees). These points of order may also be waived if the Majority and Minority Leaders jointly agree that "such a waiver is necessary as a result of a significant disruption to Senate facilities or to the availability of the Internet." The Senate rule places restrictions on consideration of appeals of the chair's rulings on these points of order. Any Senator may appeal the presiding officer's ruling on most Senate rules. Such appeals are generally debatable, and debate may be ended by cloture (requiring three-fifths vote of all Senators to adopt the cloture motion) or by a motion to table, which would uphold the chair's ruling. The appeal procedure included in Rule XLIV allows only one appeal and limits debate to one hour. Amendments in the reported bill or offered from the floor that include earmarks are covered under the rule, but the procedures differ. Those amendments in the text of the reported bill are subject to the same point of order described above that applies to reported measures. Regarding amendments offered from the floor, the rule recommends that the sponsor of an amendment that includes an additional earmark ensure, as soon as practicable, that (1) a list of each earmark and (2) the name of any Senator requesting each earmark on the list be printed in the Congressional Record . This includes full-substitute amendments offered from the floor. As in the House, amendments between the Houses are not covered under this rule. Both House and Senate rules require earmark sponsors to provide similar information on each earmark to the committee of jurisdiction, but these rules include different public disclosure requirements regarding the information. Neither requirement is enforced by points of order. These rules require each Member requesting an earmark in legislation (conference report or accompanying report language) to submit specific written information to the chair and ranking member of the committee of jurisdiction. Each sponsor shall submit in writing (1) the sponsor's name; (2) in the case of a spending earmark, the name and address of the intended recipient or, if there is no specifically intended recipient, the intended location of the activity; (3) in the case of a limited tax or tariff benefit, the sponsor must identify the individual or entities reasonably anticipated to benefit, to the extent known by the sponsor; (4) the purpose of the earmark; and (5) a certification of no pecuniary interest in such earmark. While the House rule requires a certification that neither the Member nor the Member's spouse have any financial interest in the earmark, the Senate rule requires a certification that neither the Senator nor the Senator's immediate family have any pecuniary interest, consistent with paragraph 9 of the rule. Regarding the differing House and Senate public availability requirements, in the House, the applicable committee is to make "open to public inspection" the Member's written statement on any earmark included in a measure or conference report. Each House committee has the discretion to determine its own public disclosure procedures. The Senate rule, on the other hand, recommends that each committee make available only the certification of "no pecuniary interest" for each earmark included in a Senate measure reported or considered by the Senate, conference report, or report language, if any. In addition, under the Senate rule, committees are to make the certifications available for public inspection on the Internet, as soon as practicable. The Senate rule specifically recommends that the committees of jurisdiction include on these lists applicable classified spending earmarks to the greatest extent practicable, consistent with the need to protect national security (including intelligence sources and methods). The information for each earmark identified should include an unclassified program description, spending amount, and name of Senate sponsor. The House rule does not include a specific provision on classified earmarks. Public disclosure of these earmarks and their sponsors are made under the disclosure requirements as discussed above. House Rule XXI, clause 9(b), and Senate Rule XLIV, paragraph 8, both address certain spending earmarks, sometimes referred to as "air-drops," added in a conference report (and joint explanatory statement under the House rule) that were not specified in the House- or Senate-passed versions of the applicable bill (or in the accompanying House or Senate committee reports in the House rule). The House rule provides a public disclosure requirement for such earmark add-ons similar to the transparency requirement affecting earmarks, in general, associated with conference reports discussed above (see " House Rule XXI, clause 9 " section). The Senate rule, by contrast, provides a procedure to strike certain spending add-ons, including applicable spending earmarks. This rule highlights new earmarks added in conference by requiring a list and congressional sponsors. It prohibits House consideration of a conference report to a regular appropriations bills, unless either a list of new earmarks added to the conference report or joint explanatory statement and the name of any Member who requested an earmark(s) on the list is included in the joint explanatory statement; or a statement that there are no earmarks is made available. In response to the original version of this rule ( H.Res. 491 , 110 th Congress), the House Appropriations Committee has generally been identifying earmark add-ons in the required list of general earmarks (and sponsors) associated with conference reports to regular appropriations bills. Clause 9(b) provides two major differences to the procedure requiring a list of earmarks, in general, and congressional earmark sponsors associated with conference reports discussed above, under the " House Rule XXI, clause 9 " section. First, the "airdropped-earmark" requirement only applies to conference reports to the 12 annual regular appropriations bills, instead of all spending measures as well as tariff and revenue measures. Second, upon a point of order, the House decides, by majority vote, whether to consider the conference report with "airdropped" earmarks; as opposed to a ruling by the chair. The House decides to consider such a conference report by the same procedures the House decides to consider a special rule waiving these points of order: up to a 20-minute debate, equally divided and controlled (see above, " House Rule XXI, clause 9 " section). Due to this provision, the House can debate and vote on whether to consider a conference report (or special rule waiving this requirement) even when the clause 9(b) may not have been violated. The Senate rule establishes a new procedure to strike certain new spending earmarks, as well as other spending, added to conference reports. It applies to provisions providing funds (both discretionary and direct (or mandatory) spending), but not provisions authorizing or re-authorizing funds. The rule also does not apply to limited tax or tariff benefits added in conference. The provision in Senate Rule XLIV concerning conference is not directed against congressionally directed spending items, as are the provisions concerning disclosure described above, but instead allows any Senator to raise a point of order against any provision or provisions in a conference report that contain a specific spending level for a specific program, project, activity, or account when no specific funding level was provided for the applicable item in the House- or Senate-passed versions of the measure. The Presiding Officer may sustain points of order against one or more provisions in the conference report. This rule does not apply to language in joint explanatory statements, only those provisions in the legislative text of conference reports. The rule supplements Senate Rule XXVIII, which generally prohibits conferees from including in a conference report a new matter not dealt with in either the House- or Senate-passed versions of a measure. Under current Senate practice and precedents, however, earmarks air-dropped into conference reports are not typically interpreted as new matter. Rule XXVIII provides that in cases in which one of the versions of the bill is an amendment in the nature of a substitute, which is typically the case, the conferees may include a germane modification of the subjects in disagreement. Under existing precedents, earmarks added to a conference report are often considered germane modifications. For example, regular appropriations measures provide funding to each department and large independent agency by distributing the spending among several accounts. Funding levels for programs, projects, or activities within an account, such as most earmarks included in legislative text, are generally considered germane modifications. A Senator may raise a point of order under Rule XLIV against any provision or provisions in a conference report that contain a specific spending level for a specific program, project, activity, or account when no specific funding level was provided for the applicable item in the House- or Senate-passed versions of the measure. If a point of order is sustained, the offending provision is stricken from the conference report. After all points of order have been dealt with, the Senate decides whether to send to the House the remaining text of the conference report. The decision is debatable under the same limitations that may apply to the conference report, and no amendments are allowed. The Senate may waive this point of order with regard to a single provision or all provisions constituting new directed spending or appeal the Presiding Officer's ruling by a supermajority vote. Three-fifths of all Senators must vote to waive the rule or overrule the Presiding Officer's decision. Under this Senate rule, any Senator may propose a motion to waive all points of order provided in this rule with respect to a pending measure or motion. A three-fifths vote of all Senators is required to adopt the motion. All motions to waive all such points of order against the pending measure or motion are collectively debatable for no more than one hour, equally divided and controlled by the Senate Majority and Minority Leaders (or their designees). Such motions are not amendable. The House rule prohibits a Member from conditioning the inclusion of an earmark in a measure, conference report, or report language on any vote cast by another Member. There is no similar Senate requirement.

During 2007, both the House and Senate established new earmark transparency procedures for their separate chambers. They provide for public disclosure of approved earmarks and the identification of their congressional sponsors. In addition, they require disclosure of further information from each congressional sponsor, such as a certification that the sponsor has no financial interest in the earmark. Each House has also established procedures regarding new spending earmarks added to conference reports. The House originally established its procedures through adoption of two House resolutions. On January 5, 2007, the House completed action on H.Res. 6 (110th Congress), adopting the 110th Congress rules package, including new provisions in House Rule XXI to require public disclosure of approved earmarks, their sponsors, and the additional information. On June 18, 2007, the House adopted a standing order, H.Res. 491 (110th Congress), to require transparency for new spending earmarks added to conference reports on the 12 annual regular appropriations bills. On January 6, 2009, the House adopted the rules package for the 111th Congress, H.Res. 5 (111th Congress), which incorporated the provisions of H.Res. 491 into House Rule XXI, clause 9. In the Senate, Rule XLIV was adopted through the Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-81), which became law on September 14, 2007. The new rule provides for public disclosure of each "congressionally directed spending item," its sponsors, and "no financial interest" certifications. It also includes a procedure to strike certain new items of spending added to conference reports. The House rule generally prohibits consideration of a measure, manager's amendment, or conference report unless a list of earmarks and the name of each sponsoring Member (or a statement that there are no earmarks) is available before consideration. The Senate rule prohibits a vote on a motion to proceed to consider a measure or a vote on adoption of a conference report, unless the chair of the committee or Majority Leader certifies that a complete list of earmarks and the name of each Senator requesting each earmark is available on a publicly accessible congressional website 48 hours before the vote. Both House and Senate rules require earmark sponsors to provide similar information on each earmark to the committee of jurisdiction, but these rules include different public disclosure requirements regarding the information. Neither requirement is enforced by points of order. In the House, the applicable committee is to make "open to public inspection" the Member's entire written statement on certain approved earmarks. The Senate rule requires the applicable committee to make available on the Internet the certifications of no financial interest. With regard to certain spending earmarks first specified in conference, the House requires public disclosure of those earmarks and the names of those Members that requested each earmark identified. The Senate rule provides a procedure to strike certain new items of spending, including earmarks, from a conference report.

A variety of efforts to address climate change are currently underway or being developed on the international, national, and sub-national levels (e.g., individual state actions or regional partnerships). These efforts cover a wide spectrum, from climate change research to mandatory greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions reduction programs. In the 110 th Congress, Members have introduced a number of proposals that would establish a national GHG emissions reduction regime. GHG emissions reduction programs, both ongoing and proposed, vary considerably. The primary variables are scope and stringency: which emission sources are covered by the program and how much emission reduction is required. These factors largely determine the impacts of an emissions reduction program, but other design details can have substantive effects. One such design element is the treatment of offsets. An offset is a measurable reduction, avoidance, or sequestration of GHG emissions from a source not covered by an emission reduction program. If a cap-and-trade program includes offsets, regulated entities have the opportunity to purchase them to help meet compliance obligations. Offsets have generated debate and controversy in climate change policy. If Congress establishes a federal program to manage or reduce GHG emissions, whether and how to address offsets would likely be an important issue. Because most current and proposed programs allow offsets (see tables at the end of the report), offset projects will probably play some part in an emissions reduction program. The first section of this report provides an overview of offsets by discussing different types of offset projects and describing how the offsets would likely be used in an emission reduction program. The next section discusses the supply of offsets that might be available in an emission trading program. The subsequent sections examine the potential offset benefits and the potential concerns associated with offsets. The final section offers considerations for Congress. In addition, the report includes a table comparing the role of offsets in selected emission reduction programs: proposals in the 111 th and 110 th Congresses, U.S. state initiatives, and international programs. Offsets are sometimes described as project-based because they typically involve specific projects or activities whose primary objective is to reduce, avoid, or sequester emissions. Because offset projects can involve different GHGs, they are quantified and described with a standard form of measure: either metric tons of carbon-equivalents (mtC-e) or metric tons of CO 2 -equivalents (mtCO 2 -e). To be credible as offsets, the emissions reduced, avoided, or sequestered must be additional to business-as-usual (i.e., what would have happened anyway). This concept is often called "additionality." If Congress establishes a GHG emission cap-and-trade program, only sources not covered by the cap could generate offsets. Emission reductions from regulated sources (e.g., coal-fired power plants) would either be required or spurred by the emissions cap. In contrast, if agricultural operations were not covered under an emissions cap, a project that collects methane emissions from a manure digester would likely be an additional GHG emission reduction. If offsets are allowed as a compliance option in an emissions trading program, eligible offset projects could generate "emission credits," which could be sold and then used by a regulated entity to comply with its reduction requirement. This approach is part of the European Union's (EU) Emission Trading Scheme (ETS), which EU members use to help meet their Kyoto Protocol commitments. Under the EU ETS, regulated entities can purchase emission credits that are created from approved offset projects. Regulated entities can then apply the credits towards their individual emission allowance obligations. For example, a regulated entity may consider purchasing offsets if the offsets are less expensive than making direct, onsite emission reductions. Assuming the offset is legitimate--i.e., a ton of carbon reduced, avoided, or sequestered through an offset project equates to a ton reduced at a regulated source--the objective to reduce GHG emissions is met. From a global climate change perspective, it does not matter where or from what source the reduction occurs: the effect on the atmospheric concentration of GHGs would be the same. Offsets increase emission reduction opportunities. When offsets are not allowed, incentives to reduce emissions or sequester carbon are limited to the covered sources, and there is little motivation to improve mitigation technologies for non-covered sources. Including offsets in a cap-and-trade program would expand these incentives Offsets could potentially be generated from an activity that emits GHGs or that would remove or sequester GHGs from the atmosphere. This section discusses offsets in four categories. Each category is discussed below with project examples for each group. Some of the categories and examples listed below may be limited by location. If a U.S. law or regulation (other than an emissions cap) governs a specific emission source (e.g., methane from coal mines), that source's emission reductions would not qualify as domestic offsets, unless the reductions made went further than the regulations required. For example, if the source is required by law or regulation to reduce methane emissions by 50%, reductions up to this threshold would not qualify as offsets, but reductions in excess of 50% might qualify as offsets. As more nations establish mandatory caps or require specific technological controls or practices at emission sources, the universe of potential offsets would shrink. Trees, plants, and soils sequester carbon, removing it from the earth's atmosphere. Biological sequestration projects generally involve activities that either increase existing sequestration; or maintain the existing sequestration on land that might otherwise be disturbed and release some or all of the sequestered carbon. This offset category includes sequestration that results from agriculture and forestry activities, and is sometimes referred to as land use, land use change and forestry (LULUCF) projects. Examples of these projects include planting trees on previously non-forested land (i.e., afforestation); planting trees on formerly forested land (i.e., reforestation); limiting deforestation by purchasing forested property and preserving the forests with legal and enforcement mechanisms; setting aside croplands from agricultural production to rebuild carbon in the soil and vegetation; and promoting practices that reduce soil disruption: e.g., conservation tillage and erosion control. Compared to the other offset categories discussed here, biological sequestration projects, particularly forestry projects, offer the most potential in terms of volume. However, this category is arguably the most controversial because several integrity issues are typically (or perceived to be) associated with biological sequestration projects. These issues are discussed in more detail in later sections of this report. Historically, renewable energy--e.g., wind, solar, biomass--has been a more expensive source of energy than fossil fuels. A renewable energy offset project could provide the financial support to make renewable energy sources more economically competitive with fossil fuels. Renewable energy sources generate fewer GHG emissions than fossil fuels, particularly coal. Wind and solar energy produce zero direct emissions. Use of renewable sources would avoid emissions that would have been generated by fossil fuel combustion. These avoided emissions could be sold as offsets. Potential renewable energy offset projects may include constructing wind farms to generate electricity; adding solar panels; retrofitting boilers to accommodate biomass fuels; and installing methane digesters at livestock operations. Domestic renewable energy projects are not likely to qualify as offsets in a national emissions reduction program. In a carbon-constrained context, project developers would be hard-pressed to demonstrate that a renewable energy project would not have happened anyway. In an "economy-wide" cap-and-trade emissions program, energy sector emissions would likely be capped. The cap would make fossil fuels more expensive and renewable energy sources more attractive. However, renewable energy projects may still create credible offsets in nations without GHG emission controls on their energy sectors. A more energy efficient product or system requires less energy to generate the same output. Improvements in energy efficiency generally require a financial investment in a new product or system. These capital investments likely pay off in the long run, but the payback period may be too long or capital financing may be constrained, particularly for small businesses or in developing nations. Examples of possible energy efficiency offset projects include upgrading to more efficient machines or appliances; supporting construction of more energy efficient buildings; replacing incandescent light bulbs with fluorescent bulbs. Similar to renewable energy offsets, domestic energy efficiency offset projects would likely face substantial hurdles in proving their additionality in a carbon-constrained regime. As the price of carbon increases and raises energy prices--both outcomes expected with an emissions cap--the incentive to reduce energy use through energy efficiency improvements will increase. Offset ownership is another potential challenge regarding some energy efficiency offsets. Energy efficiency improvements may occur at a different location than the actual reduction in emissions. For example, a business that runs its operations with purchased electricity will use less electricity if energy efficiency improvements are made, but the actual emission reductions will be seen at a power plant. Thus, the reductions may be counted twice: first as an energy efficiency offset and second as a direct reduction at the power plant. One way to address this potential dilemma is to restrict energy efficiency projects to only those that reduce or avoid on-site combustion of fossil fuels. This approach is used in the few congressional proposals that specifically allow energy efficiency offsets. As with renewable energy projects, there could be energy efficiency projects in nations that do not limit GHG emissions. Multiple sources emit non-CO 2 greenhouse gases. These emissions are often not controlled through law or regulation. These sources--primarily, agricultural, industrial, and waste management facilities--emit GHGs as by-products during normal operations. In many cases, the individual sources emit relatively small volumes of gases. However, there are a large number of individual sources worldwide, and many of the gases emitted have greater global warming potential (GWP) than carbon dioxide. Offset projects in this category would generally provide funding for emission control technology to reduce these GHG emissions. Examples of emission reduction opportunities include the following: methane (CH 4 ) emissions from landfills, livestock operations, or coal mines (GWP = 25) nitrous oxide (N 2 O) emissions from agricultural operations or specific industrial processes (GWP = 298) hydrofluorocarbon (HFC) emissions from specific industrial processes, such as HFC-23 emissions from production of a refrigerant gas (GWP of = 14,800) sulfur hexafluoride (SF 6 ) from specific industrial activities, such as manufacturing of semiconductors (GWP = 22,800) This offset category is broad, as it involves many different industrial activities. As such, some offset types in this category are generally considered high quality, and others that have generated controversy. For example, methane reduction from landfills or coal mines has a reputation as a high quality offset. These projects are relatively easy to measure and verify, and in many cases would likely not occur if not for the financing provided by an offset market. Therefore, the challenge of proving additionality is easier to overcome. Offsets involving abatement of HFC-23 emissions from production of a common refrigerant have spurred controversy. Of the offset types certified through the Kyoto Protocol's Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), HFC-23 offsets represent the greatest percentage: 50% of the certified emission reductions (CERs) have come from HFC-23 abatement projects. Controversy has arisen because the production facilities can potentially earn more money from the offsets (destroying HFC-23 emissions) than from selling the primary material. This creates a perverse incentive to produce artificially high amounts of product to generate a more lucrative by-product. The inclusion of offsets in a cap-and-trade program could potentially provide multiple benefits. Perhaps the primary benefit would be improved cost-effectiveness. The ability to generate offsets, which could be sold as emission credits, would provide an incentive for non-regulated sources to reduce, avoid, or sequester emissions. The inclusion of offsets could expand emission mitigation opportunities, likely reducing compliance costs for regulated entities. Many offset projects have the potential to offer environmental benefits, as well. Developing countries, in particular, may gain if the United States includes international offsets in a GHG emission program. In addition, the offset market may create new economic opportunities and spur innovation as parties seek new methods of generating offsets. These issues are discussed below in greater detail. A central argument in support of offsets is that their use makes an emissions reduction program more cost-effective. A wide range of activities could be undertaken that would generate offsets. Many of these individual activities would likely generate a relatively small quantity of offsets (in terms of tons), but in the aggregate, their climate change mitigation potential is substantial. Arguably, direct regulation of these sources--either through a cap-and-trade program or regulatory command-and-control provisions --may not be cost-effective because of the administrative burden. By allowing these sources to generate offsets and sell the offsets (as emission credits) to regulated entities, several benefits are achieved. First, emissions are reduced, avoided, and/or sequestered at sources that may not have otherwise occurred. Second, the offsets generated increase the compliance options for regulated entities: covered facilities can either make direct, onsite reductions or purchase emission credits generated from offsets. The increased reduction opportunities provided by offsets are expected to lower the cost of compliance. This impact ultimately affects consumers because they are expected to bear the majority of an emission program's costs. A 2008 EPA study analyzed the economic impacts of the Lieberman-Warner Climate Security Act of 2008 ( S. 2191 ), a cap-and-trade proposal that would allow covered sources to use domestic and international credits to each satisfy 15% allotments of their allowance submission. As with other economic models of climate change regulation, the modelers necessarily make many assumptions. Thus, the relative differences between different scenarios are perhaps more useful than the absolute estimates. EPA's study demonstrated a dramatic difference between the offset scenarios. The study found that if offsets are not allowed, the price of carbon would be substantially higher (e.g., 192% higher in 2015) than if offsets could be used as prescribed by the bill ( Figure 1 ). The study also found that international offsets would play a large role, especially in the beginning decades of the program, because there are generally more low-cost offset opportunities in other nations. In later years (as the carbon price rises), domestic offset types, particularly forestry-related offsets, play a larger role. Offset projects may produce benefits that are not directly related to climate change. For example, many of the offset projects that promote carbon sequestration in soil (e.g., conservation tillage) improve soil structure and help prevent erosion. Erosion control may reduce water pollution from nonpoint sources, a leading source of water pollution in U.S. waterbodies. Depending on a project's specific design and how it is implemented, other agriculture and forestry offset projects could potentially yield positive environmental benefits. However, there is some concern that certain projects may produce undesirable impacts, such as depleted soil quality, increased water use, or loss of biodiversity. Many agriculture and forestry offset projects would likely involve land use changes, such as converting farmlands to forests or biofuel production. Determining whether the change imparts net benefits may be a complex evaluation, depending upon, among other things, the current and proposed species of plants and/or trees. Policymakers would likely encounter projects that offer trade-offs: for example, they offset GHG emissions, while imposing an unwanted outcome, such as increased water use, reducing availability downstream. EPA found that the more aggressive offset opportunities--afforestation and biofuels production--are more likely to present the most distinct trade-offs. Most observers would agree that developing nations are unlikely to limit and reduce GHG emissions on a schedule on par with developed nations. With less-regulated emission sources, the universe of eligible offset opportunities would be much larger in developing nations. Offset types, such as renewable energy and/or energy efficiency projects, which could face substantial hurdles to qualify as offsets in the United States, would be eligible offsets from developing nations. These types of projects would likely provide environmental benefits beyond GHG emission reduction--improvements in local air quality--by displacing or avoiding combustion of fossil fuels. Offset projects in developing nations have the potential to promote sustainable development, such as creation of an energy infrastructure that is less carbon-intensive and more energy efficient. In fact, this was one of the objectives in establishing the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). Whether this objective is being met is a subject of debate. However, recent projections suggest that offset activities that promote sustainable development will account for a larger percentage of emissions credits in the coming years. As a comparison between Figure 2 and Figure 3 indicates, the proportion of renewable energy and energy efficiency projects in the CDM is expected to more than double by 2012. This projected shift would likely improve support for sustainable development objectives. However, offset projects--primarily, HFC and N 2 O reduction from industrial activities--that provide few sustainable development benefits are still expected to account for a considerable proportion of emission credits issued. A federal cap-and-trade emission program that allows offsets as a compliance option may provide economic benefits to particular sectors of the U.S. economy. However, there may be trade-offs, depending on which types of offsets are eligible and whether or not international offsets are allowed. If international offset projects are included in the program, some U.S. business sectors may benefit from the transfer of technology and/or services to support projects in other nations. If international offsets, generally the lowest-cost options, are excluded, the offset projects from the domestic agriculture and forestry sectors would likely gain a greater share of the offsets market, thus generating business opportunities in these sectors. Another potential benefit that is often highlighted is the ability of an offset market to encourage innovation. As the carbon price provides an incentive for regulated entities to find onsite emission reductions (e.g., through efficiency improvements or development of new technologies), the offset market may spur parties to find new ways to reduce, avoid, or sequester emissions from non-regulated sources. However, there is some concern that the drive to find creative offset methods may encourage offset projects that yield unknown, unintended, and possibly harmful, environmental effects. A frequently cited example in this regard is ocean fertilization, which seeks to stimulate phytoplankton growth (and ultimately improve CO 2 sequestration) by releasing iron into certain parts of the surface ocean. Although offsets have the potential to provide benefits under an emissions trading program, several issues associated with offsets have generated concern and some controversy. Perhaps the primary concern regarding offsets is their integrity. To be credible, an offset should equate to an emission reduction from a direct emission source, such as a smokestack or exhaust pipe. This issue is critical, if offsets are to be used in an emissions trading program. However, implementing this objective would likely present challenges. This and other concerns are discussed below. If offsets are to be included in an emissions trading program, offset integrity--i.e., whether or not the offsets represent real emission reductions--is critical. Several issues need to be addressed when evaluating offsets. Some of these issues may present implementation challenges, which if not overcome, could damage the integrity of the offset. These issues are discussed below. Additionality means that the offset project represents an activity that is beyond what would have occurred under a business-as-usual scenario. In other words, would the emission reductions or sequestration have happened anyway? Additionality is generally considered to be the most significant factor that determines the integrity of the offset. In the context of an emissions control program, a test of additionality would examine whether the offset project would have gone forward in the absence of the program. An additionality determination would likely consider the following questions: Does the activity represent a common practice or conforms to an industry standard? Is the offset project required under other federal, state, or local laws? Would the project generate financial gain (e.g., be profitable) due to revenues from outside the offset market? Offset credits allow regulated entities to generate GHG emissions above individual compliance obligations. If project developers are able to generate emission credits for projects that would have occurred regardless (i.e., in the absence of the trading program), the influx of these credits into the program would undermine the emissions cap and the value of other, legitimate offset projects. Additionality is at the crux of an offset's integrity, but applying the additionality criterion may present practical challenges. For instance, it may be impossible to accurately determine "what would have happened anyway" for some projects. Assessing a project's additionality may involve some degree of subjectivity, which may lead to inconsistent additionality determinations. Reliable GHG emissions data are a keystone component of any climate change program. If Congress allows offsets as a compliance option, offset data (emissions reduced, avoided, or sequestered) should arguably be as reliable as data from regulated sources. From a practical standpoint, however, achieving this objective may be difficult. It is generally much simpler to measure and quantify an emission reduction from a direct source than from an offset project. Indeed, the more difficult measurement may be the main reason such reductions are not required by a control program. Regulated sources determine their compliance by comparing actual GHG emissions data against their allowed emissions. In contrast, project developers determine offset emission data by comparing the expected reduced, avoided, or sequestered GHG emissions against a projected, business-as-usual scenario (sometimes referred to as a counter-factual scenario). To accomplish this task, offset project managers must establish an emissions baseline: an estimate of the "business-as-usual" scenario or the emissions that would have occurred without the project. If project managers inaccurately estimate the baseline, the offsets sold may not match the actual reductions achieved. For example, an overestimated baseline would generate an artificially high amount of offsets. Baseline estimation may present technical challenges. In addition, project developers have a financial incentive to err on the high side of the baseline determination because the higher the projected baseline, the more offsets generated. Requiring third-party verification (as some proposals do) would potentially address this specific concern. Biological sequestration offset projects may present particular challenges in terms of measurement. The carbon cycle in trees and soils is only partially understood. Variations exist across tree species, ages, soil conditions, geographic locations, and management practices. Estimates of carbon uptake and storage are frequently considered imprecise or unreliable. Further, changes in vegetation cover may have non-emission effects on climate, such as how much of the Sun's energy is reflected or absorbed by the Earth. A recent study in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences stated, "Latitude-specific deforestation experiments indicate that afforestation projects in the tropics would be clearly beneficial in mitigating global-scale warming, but would be counterproductive if implemented at high latitudes and would offer only marginal benefits in temperate regions." To be credible, when an offset is sold, it should be retired and not sold again or counted in other contexts. However, opportunities for double-counting exist. For example, a regulated entity may purchase offsets generated through the development of a wind farm in a nation that has not established GHG emissions targets. The U.S. buyer would count the offsets, which may have been purchased to negate increased, onsite emissions at the regulated source. In addition, the nation, in which the wind farm is located, would likely see an emissions reduction due to the wind farm. If this decrease is reflected in the nation's GHG emissions inventory, the offset project (wind farm) might replace other reduction activities that the nation might have taken to meet its target. Some may argue that double-counting is less of a problem if the offset project occurs in a nation with only a voluntary target (as opposed to a nation subject the Kyoto Protocol). However, the impact would be the same if the nation eventually establishes a mandatory target and takes credit for the earlier reductions associated with the offset project. By taking credit for an earlier reduction, the nation might need to make fewer reductions to be in compliance with the new mandatory program. A tracking system could help avoid such double-counting. Most would agree that a domestic tracking system would be simpler to establish and monitor than a system that follows international offset trading. The latter would require, at a minimum, cooperation with the nations hosting the offset projects. With some offset projects there may be a concern that the emission offsets will be subsequently negated by human activity (e.g., change in land use) or a natural occurrence (e.g., forest fire, disease, or pestilence). This issue is most pertinent to biological sequestration projects, specifically forestry activities. Although many observers expected forestry offsets to play a large role in the CDM, this has not been observed in practice. This result is partially due to concerns of offset permanence in developing nations. Offset buyers need some assurance that the land set aside for forests (and carbon sequestration) will not be used for a conflicting purpose (e.g., logging or urban development) in the future. Although natural events (fires or pests) are hard to control, human activity can be constrained through legal documents, such as land easements. In addition, an offset could come with a guarantee that it would be replaced if the initial reduction is temporary. Permanence may be more difficult to monitor at international projects. In the context of climate change policy, GHG emissions leakage generally refers to a situation in which an emissions decrease from a regulated (i.e., capped) source leads to an emissions increase from an unregulated source. EPA states that leakage "occurs when economic activity is shifted as a result of the emission control regulation and, as a result, emission abatement achieved in one location that is subject to emission control regulation is [diminished] by increased emissions in unregulated locations." Leakage scenarios may involve emission sources from the same economic sector, but located in different countries. Many voice concern that if the United States were to cap emissions from specific domestic industries (e.g., cement, paper), these industries would relocate to nations without emission caps and increase activity (and thus emissions) to compensate for the decreased productivity in the United States. Thus, global net emissions would not decrease, and affected domestic industries would likely see employment losses. In the context of offsets, leakage may occur in an analogous fashion. The opportunity for leakage exists when an offset project decreases the supply of a good in one location, leading to greater production of the good somewhere else. Compared to other offset types, forestry projects, particularly those that sequester carbon by curbing logging, likely present the greatest risk of leakage. For example, an offset project that restricts timber harvesting at a specific site may boost logging at an alternative location, thus reducing the effectiveness of the offset project. Preventing or accounting for leakage from these projects poses a challenge. As discussed above, the inclusion of offsets would likely lower the overall cost of compliance. Although many consider this a desired outcome, some contend that the price of carbon needs to reach levels high enough to promote the long-term technological changes needed to mitigate climate change. Offsets also can delay key industries' investments in transformative technologies that are necessary to meet the declining cap. For instance, unlimited availability of offsets could lead utilities to build high-emitting coal plants instead of investing in efficiency, renewables, or plants equipped with carbon capture and storage. Transaction costs generally refer to the costs associated with an exchange of goods or services. In an offset market, transaction costs may encompass the following: searching for offset opportunities; studying and/or measuring offset projects; negotiating contracts; monitoring and verifying reduced, avoided, or sequestered emissions; seeking regulatory approval; obtaining insurance to cover risk of reversal (i.e., non-permanence). Depending on the price of carbon in the offset market, transaction costs may represent a substantial percentage of the value of the offset. Several studies have examined offset projects in an effort to estimate transaction costs. Generally, the studies' results include a transaction cost range that varies by offset type and project size. For example, a study by the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBL) found a transaction cost range of $0.03/mtCO 2 -e to $4.05/mtCO 2 -e. Overall, the various studies found that smaller offset projects (measured by tons of CO 2 -e) may be at a disadvantage because they would likely face proportionately higher transaction costs: the LBL study found that the mean transaction cost for small projects was $2.00/mtCO 2 -e, but only $0.35/mtCO 2 -e for the largest projects. The transaction costs may hinder innovation by serving as an obstacle to small, but promising offset projects. However, transaction costs are inherent in an emissions program that requires project developments to meet certain provisions--additionality, measurement, verification, monitoring--to maintain the integrity of the offset allowed as compliance alternatives. Some argue that offset use, particularly unlimited access to international offset opportunities, raises questions of fairness. Most of the world's GHG emissions (especially on a per capita basis) are generated in the developed nations, while most of the lower-cost offset opportunities are in developing nations. Many observers expect the developing nations to establish mandatory GHG reduction programs several years (if not decades) after developed nations' emission programs are underway. The developed nations are likely to initiate the lower-cost projects and retire the offsets, thus removing the "low-hanging fruit." If and when the developing nations subsequently establish GHG emission caps, the lower-cost compliance alternatives would not be available to them. Some have described this as a form of environmental colonialism. Another concern is that international offsets may serve as a disincentive for developing nations to enact laws or regulations limiting GHG emissions. For instance, if a developing nation established emission caps or crafted regulations for particular emissions sources, reductions from these sources would no longer qualify as offsets. Developing nations may be hesitant to forego the funding provided by offset projects. From a climate change perspective, the location of an emission activity does not matter: a ton of CO 2 (or its equivalent in another GHG) reduced in the United States and a ton sequestered in another nation would have the same result on the atmospheric concentration of GHGs. Moreover, unlike many air pollutants--e.g., acid rain precursors sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxide, particulate matter, and mercury--a localized increase or decrease of CO 2 emissions does not directly impart corresponding local or regional consequences. This attribute of CO 2 emissions, the primary GHG, allows for offset opportunities. If allowed as part of an emissions reduction program, offsets have the potential to provide various benefits. The ability to generate offsets may provide an incentive for non-regulated sources to reduce, avoid, or sequester emissions (where these actions would not have occurred if not for the offset program); expand emission mitigation opportunities, thus reducing compliance costs for regulated entities; offer environmental co-benefits for certain projects; support sustainable development in developing nations; and create new economic opportunities and spur parties to seek new methods of generating offsets. The main concern with offset projects is whether or not they produce their stated emission reductions. To be credible, an offset ton should equate to a ton reduced from a direct emission source, such as a smokestack or exhaust pipe. If offset projects generate emission credits for activities that would have occurred anyway (i.e., in the absence of the emission trading program), these credits would not satisfy the principle of additionality. For many offset projects, determining additionality will likely pose a challenge. Other offset implementation issues--baseline estimation, permanence, accounting, monitoring--may present difficulties as well. If illegitimate offset credits flow into the trading program, the cap would effectively expand and credible emissions reductions would be undermined. The program would fail to meets its ultimate objective: overall GHG emissions reductions. Offset projects vary by the quantity of emission credits they could generate and the implementation complexity they present. For instance, domestic landfill methane projects are comparatively simple to measure and verify, but offer a relatively small quantity of offsets. In contrast, biological sequestration activities, particularly forestry projects, offer the most offset-generating potential, but many of these projects pose multiple implementation challenges. This may create a tension for policymakers, who might want to include the offset projects that provide the most emission reduction opportunities, while minimizing the use of offset projects that pose more implementation complications. Addressing these challenges may require independent auditing and/or an appreciable level of oversight and administrative support from government agencies. A report from the National Commission on Energy Policy stated, "Proposals that expect to achieve significant (> 10 percent) compliance through offsets in the near term will be obligated to create a substantial enforcement bureaucracy or risk an influx of illegitimate credits." If concerns of legitimacy can be resolved, the next question for policymakers may be whether the potential benefits provided by offsets would outweigh any potential harm. One debate may involve whether including offsets would send the appropriate price signal to encourage the development and deployment of new technologies, such as carbon capture and storage. Policymakers may consider striking a balance between sending a strong price signal and reducing the costs of the emissions reduction program. Another debate may focus on the possible effects of offsets in the developing world (assuming international offsets are allowed in a federal program). On one hand, many of the offset projects may offer significant benefits--more efficient energy infrastructure, improved air quality--to local communities. On the other hand, some maintain that if developed nations use all of the low-cost offsets in developing nations, the developing nations will face higher compliance costs if and when they establish GHG emission reduction requirements. Moreover, there is some concern that international offsets may serve as a disincentive for developing nations to enact laws or regulations limiting GHG emissions because they would lose funding from the offset market. Whether to include international offsets in a federal program raises other considerations as well. The ability to use international offsets for compliance purposes would substantially expand emission reduction opportunities, compared to only allowing domestic offsets. The more emission mitigation opportunities available, the lower the carbon price. This highlights the debate over the balance between overall program costs and price signal for technological development. If eligible in a U.S. program, international offsets from countries without binding reduction targets are likely to dominate in early decades because of their comparatively lower costs. Certain domestic economic sectors, primarily agriculture and forestry (if eligible as offsets), would benefit if international offsets are excluded. However, the inclusion of international offsets may benefit other U.S. economic sectors through the transfer of technology and services to support the projects. Moreover, as noted above, the more offset opportunities, the lower the overall costs of the cap-and-trade program.

If Congress establishes a greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions reduction program (e.g., cap-and-trade system), the treatment of GHG emission offsets would likely be a critical design element. If allowed as part of an emissions program, offsets could provide cost savings and other benefits. However, offsets have generated concern. An offset is a measurable reduction, avoidance, or sequestration of GHG emissions from a source not covered by an emission reduction program. If allowed, offset projects could generate "emission credits," which could be used by a regulated entity (e.g., power plant) to comply with its reduction requirement. Offsets could include various activities: agriculture or forestry projects: e.g., conservation tillage or planting trees on previously non-forested lands; renewable energy projects: e.g., wind farms; energy efficiency projects: e.g., equipment upgrades; non-CO2 emissions reduction projects: e.g., methane from landfills. Including offsets would likely make an emissions program more cost-effective by (1) providing an incentive for non-regulated sources to generate emission reductions and (2) expanding emission compliance opportunities for regulated entities. Some offset projects may provide other benefits, such as improvements in air or water quality. In addition, the offset market may create new economic opportunities and spur innovation as parties seek new methods of generating offsets. The main concern with offset projects is whether or not they represent real emission reductions. For offsets to be credible, a ton of CO2-equivalent emissions from an offset project should equate to a ton reduced from a covered emission source, such as a smokestack or exhaust pipe. This objective presents challenges because many offsets are difficult to measure. If illegitimate offset credits flow into an emissions trading program, the program would fail to reduce GHG emissions. Another concern is whether the inclusion of offsets would send the appropriate price signal to encourage the development of long-term mitigation technologies. Policymakers may consider a balance between price signal and program costs. If eligible in a U.S. program, international offsets are expected to dominate in early decades because they would likely offer the lowest-cost options. Domestic sectors, such as agriculture and forestry, might benefit if international offsets are excluded. Some object to the use of international offsets due to concerns of fairness: the low-cost options would be unavailable to developing nations if and when they establish GHG emission targets. However, some offset projects may promote sustainable development. On the other hand, international offsets may serve as a disincentive for developing nations to enact laws or regulations controlling GHG emissions because many projects would no longer qualify as offsets.

Congress is composed of 541 individuals from the 50 states, the District of Columbia, Guam, the U.S. Virgin Islands, American Samoa, the Northern Mariana Islands, and Puerto Rico. This count assumes that no seat is temporarily vacant. Since 1789, 12,179 individuals have served in Congress: 10,886 in the House and 1,963 in the Senate. Of these Members, 669 have served in both chambers. These numbers do not include an additional 176 individuals who have served only as territorial Delegates or as Resident Commissioners from Puerto Rico or the Philippines in the House. The following is a profile of the 114 th Congress (2015-2016). In the 114 th Congress, the current party alignments as of December 5, 2016, are as follows: House of Representatives: 248 Republicans (including one Delegate), 192 Democrats (including 4 Delegates and the Resident Commissioner) and one vacancy. Senate: 54 Republicans, 44 Democrats, and 2 Independents who caucus with the Democrats. The average age of Members of the 114 th Congress is among the highest of any Congress in recent U.S. history. Table 1 shows the average ages at the beginning of the 114 th and three previous Congresses. The U.S. Constitution requires Representatives to be at least 25 years old when they take office. The youngest Representative at the beginning of the 114 th Congress was 30-year-old Elise Stefanik (R-NY), born July 2, 1984. The oldest Representative was John Conyers (D-MI), born May 16, 1929, who was 85 at the beginning of the 114 th Congress. Senators must be at least 30 years old when they take office. The oldest Senator in the 114 th Congress is Dianne Feinstein (D-CA), born June 22, 1933, who was 81 at the beginning of the Congress. The youngest Senator is Tom Cotton (R-AR), born May 13, 1977, who was 37. According to the CQ Roll Call Guide to the New Congress , in the 114 th Congress, public service/politics is the dominantly declared profession of Senators, followed by law, then business; for Representatives, public service/politics is first, followed by business, then law. Table 2 uses data from the CQ Roll Call Guide to the New Congress and the CQ Roll Call Member Profiles to show the following occupations most frequently listed for Members at the beginning of the 114 th Congress. A closer look at the prior occupations and previously held public offices of Members of the House and Senate at the beginning of the 114 th Congress, as listed in their CQ Roll Call Member Profiles , also shows the following: 53 Senators with previous House service; 100 Members who have worked in education, including teachers, professors, instructors, school fundraisers, counselors, administrators, or coaches (85 in the House, 15 in the Senate); 3 physicians in the Senate, 15 physicians in the House, plus 3 dentists and 3 veterinarians; three psychologists (all in the House), an optometrist (in the Senate), a pharmacist (in the House), and four nurses (all in the House); seven ordained ministers, all in the House; 41 former mayors (33 in the House, 8 in the Senate); 10 former state governors (9 in the Senate, 1 in the House) and 8 lieutenant governors (4 in the Senate, 4 in the House, including 1 Delegate); 15 former judges (all but 1 in the House) and 43 prosecutors (11 in the Senate, 32 in the House) who have served in city, county, state, federal, or military capacities; one former Cabinet Secretary (in the Senate), and three ambassadors (one in the Senate, two in the House); 267 state or territorial legislators (44 in the Senate, 223 in the House); at least 102 congressional staffers (21 in the Senate, 81 in the House), as well as 7 congressional pages (3 in the House and 4 in the Senate); two sheriffs and one deputy sheriff (all in the House), two police officers in the House and one in the Senate, one firefighter in the House, and one CIA agent in the House; four Peace Corps volunteers, all in the House; one physicist, one microbiologist, one chemist, and eight engineers (all in the House, with the exception of one Senator who is an engineer); 22 public relations or communications professionals (2 in the Senate, 20 in the House), and 10 accountants (2 in the Senate and 8 in the House); five software company executives in the House and two in the Senate; 14 management consultants (4 in the Senate, 10 in the House), 6 car dealership owners (all in the House), and 2 venture capitalists (1 in each chamber); 18 bankers or bank executives (4 in the Senate, 14 in the House), 36 veterans of the real estate industry (5 in the Senate, 31 in the House), and 16 Members who have worked in the construction industry (2 in the Senate, 14 in the House); two social workers in the Senate and six in the House and four union representatives (all in the House); six radio talk show hosts (one Senate, five House); eight radio or television broadcasters, managers, or owners (two Senate, six House); nine reporters or journalists (two Senate, seven House); and a public television producer in the House; 19 insurance agents or executives (4 Senate, 15 House) and 3 stockbrokers (2 in the Senate, 1 in the House); one screenwriter and comedian and one documentary filmmaker (both in the Senate), and an artist in the House; 29 farmers, ranchers, or cattle farm owners (4 in the Senate, 25 in the House); two almond orchard owners in the House, as well as two vintners; and 10 current members of the military reserves (8 House, 2 Senate) and 7 current members of the National Guard (6 House, 1 Senate). Other occupations listed in the CQ Roll Call Member Profiles include emergency dispatcher, letter carrier, urban planner, astronaut, flight attendant, electrician, auto worker, museum director, rodeo announcer, carpenter, computer systems analyst, Foreign Service officer, and software engineer. As has been true in recent Congresses, the vast majority of Members (94% of House Members and 100% of Senators) at the beginning of the 114 th Congress hold bachelor's degrees. Sixty-four percent of House Members and 74% of Senators hold educational degrees beyond a bachelor's. The CQ Roll Call Member Profiles at the beginning of the 114 th Congress indicate the following: 20 Members of the House have no educational degree beyond a high school diploma; eight Members of the House have associate's degrees as their highest degrees; 82 Members of the House and 16 Senators earned a master's degree as their highest attained degrees; 159 Members of the House (36% of the House) and 54 Senators (54% of the Senate) hold law degrees; 23 Representatives and 1 Senator have doctoral (Ph.D., D.Phil., Ed.D., or D.Min) degrees; and 22 Members of the House and 3 Senators have medical degrees. By comparison, approximately 35 years ago in the 97 th Congress (1981-1982), 84% of House Members and 88% of Senators held bachelor's degrees. Approximately 45 years ago, in the 92 nd Congress (1971-1972), 77% of House Members and 87% of Senators held bachelor's degrees. Fifty-four years ago, in the 87 th Congress (1961-1962), 71% of House Members and 76% of Senators held bachelor's degrees. Four Representatives and one Senator in the 114 th Congress are graduates of the U.S. Military Academy, one Senator and one Representative graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy, and one Representative graduated from the U.S. Air Force Academy. Two Senators and two Representatives were Rhodes Scholars, two Representatives were Fulbright Scholars, two Representatives were Marshall Scholars, and one Senator and one Representative were Truman Scholars. The average length of service for Members of the House at the beginning of the 114 th Congress was 8.8 years (4.4 terms) and for Senators 9.7 years (1.6 terms). At the beginning of the 114 th Congress, 61 of the Representatives, including 2 Delegates (13.8% of the total House Membership) had first been elected to the House in November 2014, and 13 of the Senators (13% of the total Senate membership) had first been elected to the Senate in November 2014. These numbers are lower than at the beginning of the 113 th Congress, when 17% of the House and 14% of the Senate were newly elected "freshmen." At the beginning of the 114 th Congress, 131 Representatives, including 2 Delegates (30.4% of House Members), had no more than 2 years of House experience, and 27 Senators (27% of Senators) had no more than 2 years of Senate experience. For more historical information on the tenure of Members of Congress, see CRS Report R41545, Congressional Careers: Service Tenure and Patterns of Member Service, 1789-2015 , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. Ninety-eight percent of the Members of the 114 th Congress are reported to be affiliated with a specific religion. Of the 98%, the vast majority (92%) are Christian. Statistics gathered by the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, which studies the religious affiliation of Members, and CQ Roll Call at the beginning of the 114 th Congress showed the following: 57% of the Members (251 in the House, 55 in the Senate) are Protestant, with Baptist as the most represented denomination, followed by Methodist; 31% of the Members (138 in the House, 26 in the Senate) are Catholic; 5.2% of the Members (19 in the House, 9 in the Senate) are Jewish; 3% of the Members (9 in the House, 7 in the Senate) are Mormon (Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints); two Members (one in the House, one in the Senate) are Buddhist , two House Members are Muslim, and one House Member is Hindu; and other religious affiliations represented include Greek Orthodox, Unitarian Universalist, and Christian Science. A record 108 women (20% of the total membership) serve in the 114 th Congress as of November 2016, 7 more than at the beginning of the 113 th Congress. Eighty-eight women, including 4 Delegates, serve in the House and 20 in the Senate. Of the 88 women in the House, 65 are Democrats, including 3 of the Delegates, and 23 are Republicans, including 1 Delegate. Of the 20 women in the Senate, 14 are Democrats and 6 are Republicans. There are a record 48 African American Members (8.8% of the total membership) in the 114 th Congress, 3 more than at the beginning of the 113 th Congress. Forty-six serve in the House, including two Delegates, and two serve in the Senate. This number includes one Member of the House who is of African American and Asian ancestry and is counted in both ethnic categories in this report. Forty-four of the African American House Members, including two Delegates, are Democrats, and two are Republicans. There is a Senator of each party. Twenty African American women, including two Delegates, serve in the House. There are 38 Hispanic or Latino Members in the 114 th Congress, 7.0% of the total membership and a record number. Thirty-four serve in the House and four in the Senate. Of the Members of the House, 25 are Democrats (including 1 Delegate and the Resident Commissioner from Puerto Rico), 9 are Republicans, and 9 are women. There are four male Hispanic Senators (three Republicans, one Democrat). Two Hispanic Members, Representatives Linda Sanchez and Loretta Sanchez, are sisters. Fourteen Members of the 114 th Congress (2.5% of the total membership) are of Asian, South Asian, or Pacific Islander ancestry. Thirteen of them (11 Democrats, 1 Republican) serve in the House, and 1 (a Democrat) serves in the Senate. These numbers include one House Member who is also of African American ancestry and another of Hispanic ancestry; these Members are counted in both ethnic categories. Of those serving in the House, two are Delegates. Eight of the Asian Pacific American Members are female: seven in the House and one in the Senate. There are two American Indian (Native American) Members of the 114 th Congress, both of whom are Republican Members of the House. Thirteen Representatives and three Senators (2.9% of the entire 114 th Congress) were born outside the United States. Their places of birth include Canada, Cuba, Guatemala, Japan, Peru, and Thailand. Many of these Members were born to American citizens working or serving abroad. The U.S. Constitution requires that Representatives be citizens for seven years and Senators be citizens for nine years before they take office. At the beginning of the 114 th Congress, there were 101 Members (18.7% of the total membership) who had served or were serving in the military, 7 fewer than at the beginning of the 113 th Congress (108 Members) and 17 fewer than in the 112 th Congress (118 members). According to lists compiled by CQ Roll Call , the House currently has 82 veterans (including 3 female Members, as well as 1 Delegate); the Senate has 20 veterans, including 1 woman. These Members served in the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the Persian Gulf War, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Kosovo, as well as during times of peace. Many have served in the reserves and the National Guard. Eight House Members and one Senator are still serving in the reserves, and six House Members are still serving in the National Guard. All of the female veterans are combat veterans. The number of veterans in the 114 th Congress reflects the trend of steady decline in recent decades in the number of Members who have served in the military. For example, 64% of the Members of the 97 th Congress (1981-1982) were veterans, and in the 92 nd Congress (1971-1972), 73% of the Members were veterans. For summary information on the demographics of Members in selected past Congresses, including age trends, occupational backgrounds, military veteran status, and educational attainment, see CRS Report R42365, Representatives and Senators: Trends in Member Characteristics Since 1945 , coordinated by [author name scrubbed].

This report presents a profile of the membership of the 114th Congress (2015-2016). Statistical information is included on selected characteristics of Members, including data on party affiliation, average age, occupation, education, length of congressional service, religious affiliation, gender, ethnicity, foreign births, and military service. As of December 5, 2016, in the House of Representatives, there are 248 Republicans (including 1 Delegate), 192 Democrats (including 4 Delegates and the Resident Commissioner of Puerto Rico), and one vacancy. The Senate has 54 Republicans, 44 Democrats, and 2 Independents, who both caucus with the Democrats. The average age of Members of the House at the beginning of the 114th Congress was 57.0 years; of Senators, 61.0 years. The overwhelming majority of Members of Congress have a college education. The dominant professions of Members are public service/politics, business, and law. Most Members identify as Christians, and Protestants collectively constitute the majority religious affiliation. Roman Catholics account for the largest single religious denomination, and numerous other affiliations are represented. The average length of service for Representatives at the beginning of the 114th Congress was 8.8 years (4.4 terms); for Senators, 9.7 years (1.6 terms). One hundred eight women (a record number) serve in the 114th Congress: 88 in the House, including 4 Delegates, and 20 in the Senate. There are 46 African American Members of the House and 2 in the Senate. This House number includes two Delegates. There are 38 Hispanic or Latino Members (a record number) serving: 34 in the House, including 1 Delegate and the Resident Commissioner, and 4 in the Senate. Fourteen Members (11 Representatives, 2 Delegates, and 1 Senator) are Asian Americans or Pacific Islanders. Two American Indians (Native Americans) serve in the House. The portions of this report covering political party affiliation, gender, ethnicity, and vacant seats will be updated as events warrant. The remainder of the report will not be updated.

The Veterans Health Administration (VHA) of the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) operates the Nation's largest health care delivery system with about 222,000 employees supporting its mission. It is also the largest provider of health care education and training for medical residents and other health care trainees in the United States. In FY2008, VHA provided medical care to approximately 5.6 million unique patients and spent approximately $43.5 billion for medical care and research. A coalition of veterans' service organizations (VSOs) has been calling on Congress to provide VHA with a budget which is "sufficient, timely, and predictable." They have asserted that VHA has underestimated its budget in the past. For instance, according to the Government Accountability Office (GAO), due to "unrealistic assumptions about the impact of some of [VHA's] policies, inaccurate calculations, and insufficient data for useful budget projections," in June 2005 the George W. Bush Administration submitted a $975 million supplemental VHA appropriations request to Congress, and in July of that same year the President submitted an additional $1.977 billion supplemental VHA appropriations request to Congress. Congress has generally not enacted the VA budget by the beginning of the fiscal year. In most of the past 20 years (FY1989 to FY2009) VA received its annual appropriation prior to the beginning of the fiscal year only on four occasions--in FY1989, FY1995, FY1997, and FY2009 (see the Appendix ). According VSOs, these delays in the enactment of the budget have exacerbated operational challenges--such as delaying capital expenditures, delaying recruitment, restricting acquisitions, limiting maintenance--faced by VHA network directors. Moreover, former VHA officials have testified about operational difficulties they faced during their tenures due to the uncertainty of funding. To mitigate these issues, VSO's have proposed that Congress change the funding process for VHA to an advance appropriation. This report discusses issues regarding authorization of an advanced appropriation for certain medical care accounts of VHA. To provide some context to the discussion of these issues, the first section of this report provides background on funding categories for federal programs as well as how they relate to the federal budget. It also reiterates the reasons that have been put forth by VSOs as a rationale to fund VHA under an advance appropriation, and the accounts that would be affected by an advance appropriation proposal. Lastly this section describes the approach used by VHA to construct the budget estimates that are critical to the determination of the funding level under an advance appropriation. The second section of this report discusses the definition of an advance appropriation and provides examples of federal programs that are currently funded under an advance appropriation or have been in the past. The third section outlines the two broad issues that Congress confronts in considering proposal to establish and implement an advance appropriation: (1) authorization issues, and (2) implementation issues. This report concludes with a section that provides some options Congress may opt to consider either independently or in conjunction with an advance appropriation proposal. To provide some context on funding VA health care programs under an advance appropriation it is essential to understand the funding categories for federal programs, and how they relate to the federal budget. One of the most basic characterizations of federal spending involves two separate categories, discretionary spending and direct spending. Discretionary spending is provided in, and controlled by, annual appropriations acts under the jurisdiction of the House and Senate Appropriations Committees. Direct spending, also referred to as mandatory spending, is controlled by substantive legislation under the jurisdiction of the various House and Senate legislative committees. In most instances, the substantive law that creates direct spending also includes the financing mechanism for it, often a "permanent appropriation" that provides funds automatically each year without the need for any further legislative action (e.g., Social Security and Medicare), or that provides funds automatically each year over a fixed, multi-year period (e.g., the periodic farm bill and highway bill). In some cases, a direct spending program does not have its own financing mechanism and requires financing through an annual appropriations act (e.g., veterans compensation and pensions); in these cases, however, the level of direct spending effectively is controlled in the substantive legislation, not the annual appropriations act. The annual budget resolution establishes a framework for the consideration of all legislation with a budgetary impact, including annual appropriations acts (regular, supplemental, and continuing) and direct spending measures, as well as revenue and debt-related measures. Different enforcement procedures are used with respect to annual appropriations acts and direct spending measures. The key enforcement tool applicable to the former is the "Section 302(b)" spending allocations, named after the pertinent section of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, and the point of order that may be raised against measures that violate the allocations. Under this tool, the Appropriations Committee in each chamber divides its allocation of total discretionary spending for the fiscal year made under the budget resolution among its 12 subcommittees; the cost of each appropriations act then is compared to the Section 302(b) spending allocation assigned to the pertinent subcommittee to determine if the act adheres to the spending levels under the budget resolution. Other enforcement tools apply to the consideration of direct spending measures, including "Section 302(a)" allocations of total direct spending to committees (unlike the Appropriations Committees, the legislative committees do not subdivide their total allocations by subcommittee), the optional budget reconciliation process, and House and Senate "pay-as-you-go" (PAYGO) rules, among others. Funding for the Department of Veterans Affairs entails both discretionary spending and direct spending. In FY2008, for example, the Department's total spending of approximately $88 billion consisted of about $43 billion in discretionary spending and $44 billion in direct spending. Most of the Department's discretionary spending involves medical care while most direct spending involves compensation and benefits. For more than a decade VSOs have been repeatedly calling for "assured funding" or "guaranteed" or "mandatory" funding for VA health care. Although each of these terms has a different definition, in general, the VSO community has proposed moving funding for VA health care from a discretionary appropriation to a mandatory appropriation. VSOs claim that both the sufficiency of funding for veterans' health care as well as the timeliness and predictability of such funding would be addressed by funding VA health care under a mandatory appropriation . The Independent Budget has stated that: For almost two decades, the dysfunctional budget and appropriations process for veterans' health care has prevented VA officials from efficiently managing and planning for the future of veterans' health-care programs and services. Not knowing when or what level of funding it will receive from year to year--or whether Congress will approve or oppose Administration policy proposals directly affecting the budget--severely impairs VA's ability to recruit and retain staff, contract for services, procure equipment and supplies, and perform planning and administrative functions. Although legislation was introduced in previous Congresses to provide funding for VA health care under a mandatory appropriation, such proposals did not win widespread support among the authorization or appropriations committees. Also pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) budget rules adopted by Congress required offsets for any new direct spending program (see previous section on spending categories in the federal budget and enforcement procedures). Furthermore, some budget analysts had pointed out that a switch to a mandatory appropriation would: create incentives for undue expansion of the VHA; not be consistent with the longer term objectives of reforming the overall health care system; and boost federal spending at a time when other increases in federal healthcare spending would yield greater benefits. The analysts have also pointed out that converting VHA into a mandatory appropriation "would not entirely insulate it from budgetary pressures. Congress could cut the per-person funding amount or exclude certain groups of veterans from the formula used for computing annual funding." During the110 th Congress both the House and Senate Veterans' Affairs Committees held hearings to examine such proposals and heard from witnesses who testified for and against mandatory funding proposals for VA health care. Since mandatory funding proposals were not finding enough momentum to move forward, VSOs put forth a proposal in 2008 to provide advance appropriations for VA health care. In the 111 th Congress, the Veterans Health Care Budget Reform and Transparency Act of 2009 ( H.R. 1016 and a companion version S. 423 ) has been introduced. Under H.R. 1016 and S. 423 , the following accounts that fund VHA--medical services, medical support and compliance, and medical facilities (see description of these accounts below)--would be funded as an advance appropriation beginning with FY2011. The funding would be under a discretionary budget authority, and the legislation calls for a study by the Comptroller General (that is, the Government Accountability Office) on the adequacy and accuracy of the budget projections based on VHA's Enrollee Health Care Projection Model (see a discussion of the model below). While CRS does not take a position on the legislation, the succeeding sections discuss some possible issues concerning such a proposal, and offer options Congress may consider concerning the VHA funding process. Prior to discussing the proposal for advance appropriations, it is essential to discuss the current appropriations process for VA health care programs. The VHA is funded through multiple appropriations accounts that are supplemented by other sources of revenue. Although the appropriations account structure has been subject to change from year to year, the appropriation accounts used to support the VHA traditionally include medical care, medical and prosthetic research, and medical administration. In addition, Congress also appropriates funds for construction of medical facilities through a larger appropriations account for construction for all VA facilities. In FY2004, "to provide better oversight and [to] receive a more accurate accounting of funds," Congress changed the VHA's appropriations structure. The Department of Veterans Affairs and Housing and Urban Development and Independent Agencies Appropriations Act, 2004 ( P.L. 108-199 , H.Rept. 108-401 ), funded VHA through four accounts: (1) medical services, (2) medical administration, (3) medical facilities, and (4) medical and prosthetic research. In FY2009, the Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2009 ( P.L. 110-329 ) renamed the medical administration account as the medical support and compliance account. To understand some of the implications of advanced appropriations discussed later in this report it is important to understand what each of these accounts currently fund. The medical services account covers expenses for furnishing inpatient and outpatient care and treatment of veterans and certain dependents, including care and treatment in non-VA facilities; outpatient care on a fee basis; medical supplies and equipment; salaries and expenses of employees hired under Title 38, United States Code; and aid to state veterans homes. In addition to the direct appropriation to this account, funds deposited in the medical care collection fund (MCCF) may be transferred to this account to remain available until expended. In its FY2008 budget request to Congress, the VA requested the transfer of food service operations costs from the medical facilities appropriations to the medical services appropriations, and the House and Senate Appropriations Committees concurred with this request. The medical support and compliance account provides funds for the expenses in the administration of hospitals, nursing homes, and domiciliaries, billing and coding activities, public health and environmental hazard program, quality and performance management, medical inspection, human research oversight, training programs and continuing education, security, volunteer operations, and human resources. The medical facilities account covers, among other things, expenses for the maintenance and operation of VHA facilities (including non-recurring maintenance projects ); administrative expenses related to planning, design, project management, real property acquisition and deposition, construction, and renovation of any VHA facility; leases of facilities; and laundry services. This account provides funding for VA researchers to investigate a broad array of veteran-centric health topics, such as treatment of mental health conditions; rehabilitation of veterans with limb loss, traumatic brain injury, and spinal cord injury; organ transplantation; and the organization of the health care delivery system. VA researchers receive funding not only through this account but also from the Department of Defense (DOD), the National Institutes of Health (NIH), and private sources. Historically, the major determinant of VHA's budget size and character was the number of operating beds--which was controlled by Congress. The preliminary budget estimate, to a large extent, was based on the funding and activity of the previous year. VHA developed system-wide workload estimates, by type of care, by forecasts submitted by field stations. Unit costs were derived from the field stations' reports of the estimated distribution of expenses by type of care. Costs associated with new programs were estimated by VA central office and added to the budget estimate. The costs associated with staffing improvements, pay increases and inflation were also added to this estimate. Therefore, it could be stated that the principal assumption at each phase of the budget formulation process was that the preceding year's budget was the starting point. In 1996, Congress enacted the Departments of Veterans Affairs and Housing and Urban Development and Independent Agencies Appropriations Act of 1997 ( P.L. 104-204 ). This Act required VHA to develop a plan for the allocation of health care resources to ensure that veterans eligible for medical care who have similar economic status and eligibility priority have similar access to such care, regardless of where they reside. The plan was to "account for forecasts in expected workload and to ensure fairness to facilities that provide cost-efficient health care." In response to the above-mentioned Congressional mandate, as well as the mandate in the Health Care Eligibility Reform Act of 1996 ( P.L. 104-262 ) that required the VHA to establish a priority-based enrollment system, VHA established the Enrollee Health Care Demand Model in 1998. This model has evolved over time. The VHA's Enrollee Health Care Demand Model develops estimates of future veteran enrollment, enrollees' expected utilization of health care services, and the costs associated with that utilization. These 20-year projections are by fiscal year, enrollment priority, age, Veterans Integrated Service Networks (VISN), market, and facility. The VHA budget is formulated using the model projections. Each year, through the annual appropriations process, Congress appropriates funds to the accounts that comprise VHA. VHA's budget request to Congress begins with the formulations of the budget based on the Enrollee Health Care Projection Model (EHCPM) to estimate the demand for medical services among veterans in future years (a brief discussion of EHCPM is provided below). These estimates are then used to develop a budget request that is then included with the total VA budget request to Congress. To recognize the implications of funding some VHA accounts under an advance appropriation (AA), it is important to understand the current VHA EHCPM and how it is used to develop VHA's health care budget. While a complete description is beyond the scope of this report, this section provides a brief overview of the model. As described previously, VHA uses the EHCPM to forecast future resource requirements. The EHCPM model projects total expenditures for health care services in any given year by combining output from three model subcomponents: the enrollment projection model, the utilization projection model, and the unit cost projection model (A description of the EHCPM's three sub-models is given below). Outputs from these sub-models are then multiplied together for each of the 58 medical services (which include such services as inpatient medical, surgical, and psychiatric care; ambulatory care; pharmacy, including over the counter medications) for roughly 40,000 enrollee types. The enrollee types are defined by age category, by whether they were enrolled before or after eligibility reforms, by priority level, and by geographic sector. EHCPM applies four types of trend factors to account for general changes in medical costs and the anticipated changes in the efficiency of VA providers. The trend factors are utilization, inflation, intensity of service provision, and a measure of management efficiency. Moreover, the model accounts for anticipated changes in veteran morbidity and reliance on the VA health care delivery system, enrollment levels, and enrollment mix. Currently the modeled expenditures comprise approximately 84% of VHA's health care budget. The EPM is the least complex of the three sub-models. It develops projections by applying historic veteran enrollment rates to the forecast veteran population derived from U.S. Census data. Modeled enrollment rates are obtained by age, priority level, geographic sector, and participation in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) or Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) (OEF and OIF veterans are identified in the model as "special conflict status" veterans). The projected enrollee population is equal to current enrollment plus new enrollment minus deaths. Although enrollment rates reflect demographic trends in the veteran population, such as shifts in priority level and geographic migration, they do not account for trends in the generosity, availability, and affordability of private-sector health insurance that could lead veterans to enter or leave the VA health care system. The UPM is based on the Milliman Health Cost Guidelines (HCGs), a proprietary set of utilization-rate benchmarks derived from commercial data. The HCGs contain data on utilization for 37 of the 58 EHCPM health service categories. Milliman applies a complex set of adjustments to the HCG data to reflect the health status of VA enrollees, their reliance on VA, and the relative efficiency of VA facilities. Each year, utilization rates are adjusted to account for national trends in health care utilization and VA-specific trends in management efficiency. Since model management trends are calibrated against the local community in which each VA facility operates, projected changes over time in the efficiency of VA practice are implicitly tied to community practices. In a final step, adjusted HCG benchmarks are calibrated to actual VA workload in the model base year to account for differences between the VA and the private sector that are not captured by adjustment. Services without commercial counterparts (such as VA-specific outpatient mental health services, blind rehabilitation, and over-the-counter drugs and supplies) are projected directly from historical VA workload data. The average unit cost (that is, the cost of a particular medical service) is derived through the UCPM. This is done by allocating VA's base year budget obligation to base year VA workload in each service category. Many of the service categories in the UCPM are developed at a more detailed level than the service categories defined in the VA's cost accounting system. In these cases, the model relies on calculated relationships between VA cost levels and Medicare-allowable or billed charges to estimate VA unit costs by service category. Inflation and intensity trends are then multiplied by base year average unit costs to project unit costs in any given year. Usually, an appropriations act makes budget authority available beginning on October 1 of the fiscal year (FY) for which the appropriations act is passed ("budget year"). However, there are three types of appropriations that don't follow this pattern. They are: advance appropriations, advance funding and forward funding. These terms are defined below. An advance appropriation means appropriation of new budget authority that becomes available one or more fiscal years beyond the fiscal year for which the appropriations act was passed (that is beyond the budget year). For example, if the following language appeared in an appropriations act for FY2010, it would provide an advance appropriation for FY2011: "For medical services, $30,854,000,000 to become available on October 1, 2010 (the start of the FY2011)." Under the current scoring guidelines, new budget authority for an advance appropriation is scored in the fiscal year in which the funds become available for obligation. In this example, you would record the budget authority in FY2011. Advance funding is budget authority provided in an appropriation act to obligate and disburse (outlay) in the current FY funds from a succeeding year's appropriation. Advance funding is a means to avoid making supplemental requests late in the fiscal year for certain entitlement programs in cases where the appropriations for the current year prove to be insufficient. Forward funding is budget authority that is made available for obligation beginning in the last quarter of the FY for the financing of ongoing activities (usually grant programs) during the next FY. This funding is used mostly for education programs, so that obligations for grants can be made prior to the beginning of the next school year Several federal programs are currently funded under an AA or have been in the past. This section provides examples of two such programs. One program is still funded under an AA, while the second is no longer funded under an AA. The Corporation for Public Broadcasting (CPB) currently receives funding under an AA. One reason that has been cited in the literature for funding CPB under an AA is that it would "insulate public broadcasting from the year-to year financial and political pressures which annual appropriations imposed." Furthermore, according to the CPB, AA allows "CPB and grant recipients to include projected federal funding in their budget planning and program-acquisition processes two years before those budgets are implemented, and provides lengthy lead time for production of major programming" Another program funded under an AA was the Low Income Home Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP). In 1990 ( P.L. 101-501 ), Congress authorized a July 1 st to June 30 th LIHEAP program year to allow states to plan for their heating/cooling seasons with knowledge of available funds. Therefore, in FY1993, Congress provided forward funding in the appropriations law and appropriated funds for FY1993 and an additional $1.4 billion for the 9-month period from October 1993 through June of 1994. Subsequently in FY1994, the program was funded for the period July 1994 through June 1995. In 1998, Congress authorized an advance appropriation for LIHEAP. As a result, the program was taken off the program year cycle and put back on fiscal years. LIHEAP was funded under an advance appropriation only in FY1999 and FY2000. There is no indication as to Congress' intention in changing this program from a forward funding to an advance appropriation. It could be assumed that it was meant to continue to give states some flexibility but without the complexities associated with program vs. fiscal years. Congress hasn't provided for an advance appropriation for LIHEAP in the appropriations laws since FY2000. Once again there is no publicly available information to provide any rationale for why Congress has not funded LIHEAP under an AA. As seen in this example it is possible for Congress to change various funding mechanisms (from a forward funding to an advance appropriation to a regular annual appropriation) for a program from time to time. Therefore, an AA does not guarantee that VHA health care appropriations would be insulated from the unpredictability of the appropriations process. As these examples illustrate, there are some federal programs that are currently funded under an AA. However, a majority of these programs are formula grant programs established by Congress to meet certain policy goals. These could not be equated to the largest integrated health care delivery system in the nation, and it is impossible to predict with any certainty the implications of funding certain VHA accounts under an AA. There are two broad issues related to advance funding for some accounts of VHA. The first issue is a budget enforcement issue related to current budget enforcement procedures in Congress, and the second relates to issues that may arise if such a proposal were to be implemented. An advance appropriation mechanism may not be able to insulate a program from budget enforcement and competition with other programs. Under the current congressional budget process, the House and Senate Budget Committees have adopted enforcement rules to maintain fiscal discipline; therefore, programs that are funded under an advanced appropriation (AA) need to be included in the yearly budget resolution. Congress may enforce the substantive provisions of the budget resolution through the use of points of order. Generally, these points of order prohibit the consideration of any legislation, or amendment that would cause a violation of the overall funding levels, the committee allocations, or the appropriations committees' subdivisions. In general, a point of order could be raised against any AA that causes a ceiling on AA to be exceeded and that is not specified in a list of accounts appropriate for funding by AA in that budget year. For instance, in the House FY2010 Concurrent Resolution on the budget ( H.Con.Res. 85 ), section 403 has placed limits on the amount and type of advance appropriations for FY2011 and FY2012, and listed the programs that are excepted from this budget enforcement rule. In the Senate FY2010 Concurrent Budget Resolution ( S.Con.Res. 13 ) certain accounts to be funded under an AA are included in the resolution. If these accounts are not listed a point of order could be raised, that would need a supermajority to overturn. H.Con.Res. 85 does not include language to exempt the medical services, medical support and compliance, and medical facilities accounts from any point of order. However, during the Senate debate of S.Con.Res. 13 , Senator James Inhofe offered an amendment ( S.Amdt. 742 ) that was adopted by the Senate. S.Amdt. 742 would allow for an advance appropriation for the medical services, medical administration, medical facilities, and medical and prosthetic research accounts of VHA and would not subject those accounts to a point of order under section 302 of S.Con.Res. 13 . Sections 402 and 424 of the conference report on the FY2010 Concurrent Resolution on the budget ( H.Rept. 111-60 ) have included language excepting the following accounts from point of order against advance appropriations: medical services, medical support and compliance, and medical facilities. Therefore, while the use of points of order may no longer apply to these accounts in the FY2010 Concurrent Budget Resolution ( H.Rept. 111-60 ), future budget resolutions may need to include language excepting these accounts. One concern for Congress would be the effects or impact of funding some accounts under an AA based on the estimates generated by the EHCPM. It has been acknowledged that "[VHA's] formulation of its budget is by its very nature challenging, as it is based on assumptions and imperfect information on the health care services [VHA] expects to provide." As stated previously, the EHCPM provides the basis for estimating VHA's budget request to Congress. While the EHCPM reasonably projects future enrollment estimates and is "likely to yield accurate projections in a stable policy environment," it has also been found that "the current specification of the EHCPM appears to lack the specificity to inform explicit scenarios regarding the relationships among VA benefit generosity, other sources of health coverage, veterans' enrollment decisions, and enrollee health status" Under such findings it is reasonable to assume that future year budget projections could have variances that could create budget shortfalls if there are unanticipated shocks to the VA health care system or to the surrounding policy environment. For instance, if under the current economic climate large numbers of veterans lose their employer provided health insurance coverage, and for the first time try to seek care from the VA health care system, the EHCPM may not be able to accurately forecast such a scenario. Furthermore, the recent RAND study on the EHCPM expressed concerns regarding the validity and accuracy of the current approach for projecting future expenditures under budget and policy scenarios beyond the VA's current capacity to provide care. While expenditures for medical services modeled through the EHCPM comprise about 84% of VHA's budget estimate to Congress, some programs such as long-term care are estimated separately by VHA and included in its budget estimates to Congress. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has expressed concern with VHA's long-term care spending estimates because the estimates are based on cost assumptions that GAO believes to be unrealistically low and on a noninstitutional workload projection that appears to be unrealistically high. Furthermore, it has stated that "VA's long-term care spending estimates are questionable benchmarks for congressional budget deliberations." Given these concerns it is reasonable to consider whether funding VHA under AA could still create potential budget shortfalls, which Congress would have to address through a regular appropriations bill. Another issue that may arise would be how funding for VHA information technology programs including its electronic medical records system (Veterans Health Information Systems and Technology Architecture (VistA)) relate to funding the rest of the VHA under an AA . In October 2005, the VA began to reorganize its information technology (IT) functions to improve the management of its IT programs. Before the realignment, funding and approval of IT functions were controlled by each medical center director. The reorganization consolidated all IT functions throughout the VA under control of the VA Chief Information Officer (CIO). As a result of this reorganization, VHA's health IT budget was brought under central control. Currently, all IT programs within the VA are funded under the Information Technology account. Furthermore, to support health care, VA IT infrastructure provides VA facilities with voice services and data capture, processing, transmission, and analysis. Health care professionals maintain and transmit patient data and x-ray, MRI, and other images to serve veterans wherever service is required. In addition, VA is undertaking the migration of VistA into VA's new health care system, Health e Vet. Due to all these reasons, providing an AA for three accounts and funding IT accounts under a regular appropriation act could create a situation whereby, for example, VHA could not purchase computer software although it has procured medical equipment that needs software, or may not be able to transmit patient data through VA's IT infrastructure. Likewise, when VHA expands new services, based on funding in the medical services account, there is frequently an IT component that would need funding from the VA's IT budget. If Congress funds some accounts under an AA, and the IT budget under a regular appropriation then, for example, when a new community-based outpatient clinic (CBOC) is opened, the IT infrastructure that is needed to support the clinic may not be available. Another potential issue that may arise is VHA's ability to implement congressionally mandated policy changes. For instance, if Congress were to pass legislation to increase access to veterans in highly rural areas during FY2011, an advance appropriation might not be able to account for this legislative mandate, since funding for the medical services account would have already been appropriated for FY2011 during the FY2010 budget cycle. Although it may be not be as significant as the previous three implementation issues--since medical and prosthetic research account funds are available to VHA for a period of two years--funding some accounts of VHA under an AA and some accounts under a regular FY appropriation could potentially create accounting complexities for VA's medical research programs. Under the current legislative proposal ( H.R. 1016 ; S. 423 ), the following three accounts that comprise VHA would be funded under an AA: medical services, medical support and compliance, and medical facilities. Under this proposal the medical and prosthetic research account which funds VHA's research program would be excluded from being funded under an AA and would be funded under a regular FY appropriations act. This potentially could raise an issue with regard to timing of funding research projects and funding research support (personnel costs, administrative support, among other things). Under the current appropriations account set-up, research support from the medical care budget (distributed through the Veterans Equitable Resource Allocation (VERA) process ) includes one year funding for personal services costs for individuals on the medical care rolls who spend a portion of their VA time working on research projects, and includes administrative support provided to the research program by fiscal, engineering, acquisition and materiel management units of the VA. As stated before, this could potentially create a mismatch between funding research projects and funding research support. There are some options that might help Congress in deciding on the long-term financing of VA health care. One option would be for Congress to provide oversight and direction to VHA to modify its EHCPM so that it could provide better predictability for VHA funding in future years. VHA would have to develop analytic tools for measuring demand for health care, treatment capacity, and the fixed and variable costs associated with delivering care. Furthermore, forecasting the effects of VA policy and external influences on demand requires routine collection of data on veterans' employment, health insurance, health status, and overall health care utilization. These modifications could provide VHA and Congress with better estimates of funding needs, and thereby allow Congress to make informed policy decisions. Another option might be to create an independent entity modeled along the lines of the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC). Creation of such an entity could bring transparency to VHA's funding process and would create credibility, particularly among key constituent groups. MedPAC was established by the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 ( P.L. 105-33 ) to advise Congress on issues affecting the Medicare program. The Commission's statutory mandate includes advising Congress on payments to private health plans participating in Medicare and providers in Medicare's traditional fee-for-service program. Furthermore, MedPAC is also tasked with analyzing access to care, quality of care, and other issues affecting Medicare. The Commission meets publicly to discuss Medicare issues and policy questions and to develop and approve its reports and recommendations to the Congress. Such a program for VHA might independently analyze issues facing VHA and advise Congress on funding for both short-and long-term issues affecting health care for veterans. This could in turn provide an added layer of transparency and accountability to VHA's budget process.

The Veterans Health Administration (VHA) of the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) operates the Nation's largest health care delivery system, with about 222,000 employees supporting its mission. It is also the largest provider of health care education and training for medical residents and other health care trainees in the United States. In FY2008, VHA provided medical care to approximately 5.6 million unique patients and spent approximately $43.5 billion for medical care and research. A coalition of veterans' service organizations (VSOs) has been calling on Congress to provide VHA with a budget which is "sufficient, timely, and predictable." These organizations have asserted that VHA has underestimated its budget in the past. Moreover, VSOs contend that Congress has not enacted the VA budget by the beginning of the fiscal year. According to these organizations the delays in the enactment of the budget have exacerbated operational challenges--such as, differing capital expenditures, delaying recruitment, restricting acquisitions, limiting maintenance--faced by VHA network directors. To mitigate these issues VSO's have proposed that Congress change the funding process for VHA to an advance appropriation. In general, an appropriations act makes budget authority available beginning on October 1 of the fiscal year (FY) for which the appropriations act is passed ("budget year"). However, there are some types of appropriations that don't follow this pattern; among them are advance appropriations. An advance appropriation means appropriation of new budget authority that becomes available one or more fiscal years beyond the fiscal year for which the appropriations act was passed (that is, beyond the budget year). Under the current scoring guidelines (estimating the budgetary effects of pending legislation and comparing them to the budget resolution or to any limits that may be set in law), new budget authority for an advance appropriation is scored in the fiscal year in which the funds become available for obligation. In the 111th Congress, the Veterans Health Care Budget Reform and Transparency Act of 2009 (H.R. 1016 and a companion version S. 423) has been introduced. Under H.R. 1016 and S. 423, the following accounts that fund VHA--medical services, medical support and compliance, and medical facilities--would be funded as an advance appropriation beginning with FY2011. The funding would be under a discretionary budget authority, and the legislation calls for a study by the Comptroller General (of the Government Accountability Office) on the adequacy and accuracy of the budget projections based on VHA's Enrollee Health Care Projection Model (EHCPM). There are two broad sets of issues related to advance funding for some accounts of VHA: budget enforcement issues and implementation issues. Among budget enforcement issues a key issue is that an advance appropriation mechanism may not be able to insulate a program from budget enforcement and competition with other programs. Among implementation issues a key issue is that funding VHA under an advance appropriation, based on the EHCPM, could create budget shortfalls if there are unanticipated developments affecting the EHCPM. This report will be updated as events warrant.

There is widespread awareness that the subject matter knowledge and teaching skills of teachers play a central role in the success of elementary and secondary education reform. Title II, Part A of the Higher Education Act (HEA) includes programs and provisions intended to improve the overall quality of the K-12 teacher preparation programs currently administered by higher education institutions, hold these programs accountable for the quality of their graduates, and strengthen recruitment of highly qualified individuals to teaching. The 110 th Congress will likely consider legislation that would reauthorize the HEA, including its provisions in Title II addressing the quality of the K-12 public school teaching force. The statutory authorities in the HEA expired at the end of FY2004; however, they have been recently extended and currently remain effective. This report provides an overview of the current programs and provisions of HEA Title II, Part A, describes available information on their implementation, and identifies a number of the key issues that may be part of a debate over the reauthorization of this legislation. The report begins with a discussion of the broader context within which the reauthorization of HEA Title II, Part A might occur. This section considers the current presence of higher education institutions in the preparation of K-12 teachers, as well as the growing federal involvement in activities designed to strengthen the quality of K-12 teaching. Higher education institutions are involved in multiple ways in preparing individuals to enter K-12 teaching. Approximately 1,200 institutions of higher education award undergraduate degrees in elementary and secondary education. In addition to earning baccalaureate degrees in education, other undergraduates get ready to teach by participating in a teacher education program while earning a degree in an academic subject area. Still other individuals enter teaching through post-baccalaureate certificate programs or master's programs offered by higher education institutions. Finally, alternative routes to teaching that target, for example, individuals changing careers, may also involve higher education institutions. The quality of higher education programs preparing K-12 teachers has been sharply called into question over the past several years. Teacher preparation programs have been criticized for providing prospective teachers with inadequate time to learn subject matter and pedagogy; for teaching a superficial curriculum; for being unduly fragmented, with courses not linked to practice teaching and with education faculty isolated from their arts and sciences faculty colleagues; for uninspired teaching; and for failing to prepare teachers to function in restructured or technologically equipped classrooms. Most recently, critics have pointed to high rates of failure of recent graduates on initial licensing or certification exams. One of the most publically reported instances of high failure rates was in 1998 when 59% of prospective teachers in Massachusetts failed that state's new certification exam. The results were reported by institution, prompting questions about the quality of the preparation and training prospective teachers had received from those institutions with low pass rates. During the 1990s, other states, such as Texas and New York, began tracking the pass rates of the graduates from their teacher preparation programs and sought to hold those programs accountable for the performance of their graduates on licensing exams. The federal government ventured into this area as a result of the reauthorization of the HEA in 1998. As will be explored in this report, Title II of the HEA authorizes several programs targeting K-12 teacher preparation programs for improvement. It also includes provisions to increase the extent to which higher education institutions are held accountable for the quality of their teacher graduates. Most recently, the 107 th Congress amended the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) to make K-12 teacher quality a central requirement for elementary and secondary school districts and state educational agencies receiving funding under ESEA Title I, Part A. The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 ( P.L. 107-110 ) amended the ESEA to require state education agencies to have plans ensuring that by the end of the 2005-2006 school year, all teachers teaching core academic subjects will be "highly qualified." Title II, Part A of the HEA (as amended by the Higher Education Amendments of 1998, P.L. 105-244 ) provides for three competitively awarded grants to improve K-12 teacher quality--state grants, partnership grants, and recruitment grants. Appropriated funds are to be divided as follows: 45% to state grants, 45% to partnership grants, and 10% to teacher recruitment grants. The FY2006 and FY2007 appropriations were $59.895 million and the FY2008 appropriation is $33.662 million. The complete appropriations history of the program is provided in Table 1 . These one-time, three-year competitive grants are awarded to the state governor unless state constitution or law designates another person, entity, or agency as responsible for teacher certification and preparation. Participating states must provide a matching amount in cash or kind from non-federal sources equal to 50% of the amount of the federal grant. State grant funds must be used for one or more of the following activities: holding teacher preparation programs accountable for the academic and teaching quality of the teachers they prepare; reforming teacher certification requirements; creating alternatives to traditional teacher preparation programs and alternative routes to teacher certification; creating mechanisms that enable local educational agencies (LEAs) and schools to recruit highly qualified teachers, reward academically effective teachers and superintendents, and expeditiously remove incompetent or unqualified teachers; and addressing the problem of social promotion. Priority in the awarding of state grants is given to applicants that have undertaken initiatives to reform certification requirements designed to improve teacher skills and content knowledge, reformed mechanisms to hold higher education institutions accountable for teacher preparation, or developed efforts to reduce the shortage of highly qualified teachers in high poverty urban and rural areas. Each state receiving a state grant must report annually to ED and the House Education and the Workforce Committee and the Senate Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions Committee on progress toward certain specified objectives. Among these are increasing achievement by all students; raising the academic standards required for entering teaching (including incentives to require an academic major in the subject or a discipline related to the one in which the individual plans to teach); increasing the pass rate on initial licensing assessments; increasing the number of teachers certified through alternative routes; increasing the percentage of secondary school classes in core subjects taught by teachers with academic majors in those or related fields, or who are able to demonstrate competence through subject tests or classroom performance in core subjects; increasing the percentage of elementary school classes taught by teachers who have academic majors in the arts and sciences or who can demonstrate competence through high levels of performance in core subjects; decreasing shortages of qualified teachers in poor urban and rural areas; increasing the opportunities for professional development; and increasing the number of teachers able to apply technology to the classroom. Failure to demonstrate progress by the end of the second year of a state grant can lead to termination of the grant by ED. These one-time, five-year grants are awarded competitively to partnerships that must include at least three entities: a partner institution, a school of arts and sciences at a higher education institution, and a high need local educational agency (LEA). Other entities may join the partnership such as the governor or state educational agency (SEA). Partnerships must match from non-federal sources 25% of the partnership grant in the first year, 35% in the second, and 50% in each succeeding year. No single member of the partnership can retain more than 50% of the grant funds. These grants must be used for the following: holding teacher preparation programs accountable for the academic and teaching quality of the teachers they prepare; providing preservice clinical experience to teacher candidates and increasing the interaction between higher education faculty and elementary and secondary school staff; and providing professional development to improve teachers' content knowledge and teaching skills. Partnerships may also support such activities as recruiting teachers; preparing teachers to work with diverse student populations; providing leadership training to principals and superintendents; and disseminating information on effective partnership practices. In awarding these competitive grants, ED is to give priority to applicants that involve businesses, provide for an equitable geographic distribution across the U.S., and encourage activities that carry the potential for creating improvement and positive change. Each partnership that receives a partnership grant must include an evaluation plan in its application. That plan must include objectives and measures that are similar to those on which states must report, with the inclusion of an objective to increase teacher retention in the first three years of teaching. Failure to demonstrate progress on these objectives and measures by the end of the third year of a partnership grant can lead to termination of the grant. These one-time, three-year grants are awarded competitively to states or eligible partnerships (meeting the eligibility criteria for the partnership grants). States and partnerships have the same matching requirements for these grants as they have under their separate grant programs (see descriptions above). Recruitment grant funds must be used for either of the following: teacher education scholarships, support services to help recipients complete postsecondary education, and followup services during their first three years of teaching (each year of assistance requires a year of teaching in high need LEAs); or activities enabling high need LEAs and schools to recruit highly qualified teachers. The authorizing statute appears to specify that recipients of recruitment grants must report annually to the Secretary concerning progress being made to achieve the purposes of Title II Part A, and that failure to demonstrate progress by the end of the second year of a recruitment grant can lead to termination of the grant. Any LEA or school that benefits from activities under HEA Title II must, upon request, provide parents of students with information about the subject matter qualifications of students' classroom teachers. The Secretary must report to the House Education and the Workforce Committee and the Senate Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions Committee regarding evaluation of the activities funded under this title, and disseminate successful practices and information on ineffective ones. Information on the implementation and the impact of the program is available from preliminary results coming from ED's four-year national evaluation of the partnership grant program, and a recent Government Accountability Office (GAO, formerly the General Accounting Office) report on all of Title II, Part A. Among the interim findings from ED's national evaluation of the partnership grant program are the following: partnerships are predominantly implementing the professional development school model; participating teacher preparation programs are changing their goals, and aligning their offerings with district and school standards; the partnerships are increasing the collaboration between education faculty and arts and sciences faculty; and new relationships are emerging that link partnership institutions and other entities, such as businesses and nonprofit organizations. This interim report offers descriptive information; evaluation of the impact of partnership grants on K-12 students' academic achievement will be reported on in the future. The GAO in its report described program implementation. In that context, it identified some difficulties the program has had, and will have in evaluating its impact, and cited a key funding problem. The GAO found that, in general, Teacher Quality Enhancement Grant projects are focusing primarily on reforming requirements for certification and for teacher preparation (85% of grantees surveyed; includes projects funded under all three programs), providing professional development to current teachers (85% of grantees surveyed), and recruiting new teachers (72% of grantees surveyed). GAO posited that evaluating projects' impact on teaching quality will be hard to do. The report is critical of ED for not approaching this task systematically and for failing to provide adequate guidance on the assessment and reporting requirements necessary to allow for such evaluation. Given that the state grants are, by statute, one-time only grants, GAO concluded that, without change to the law, ED could be unable to expend the state grant funding. As noted above, nearly all states and territories have received state grant funding. With few eligible to receive new grants, ED might not be able to comply with the mandate that 45% of the annual appropriation be devoted to state grants. As requested by ED, the FY2005 appropriations legislation overrides the 45-45-10 split. In its FY2005 request, ED estimated that, without this authority, more than $22 million of the FY2005 request could lapse (i.e., have to be returned to the Treasury). This section describes the general teacher education accountability requirements of Title II, Part A, and their implementation. All states and nearly all teacher education programs in the country are affected by the accountability provisions in the Teacher Quality Enhancement Grant program. States receiving funds under the HEA must prepare an annual report card for the Secretary of Education on the quality of teacher preparation including information on the pass rate of graduates on all assessments used for teacher certification; waivers of certification requirements, particularly for teachers serving in high and low poverty school districts and in different subject areas; state teacher licensing assessments and requirements; state standards for initial certification; alignment of state teacher assessments with state standards and assessments for students; alternative routes to teacher certification and the pass rates of individuals following such routes; and criteria being used to assess the performance of teacher preparation programs. Any institution of higher education with a teacher education program enrolling HEA-aided students must release an annual report to the state and the public detailing the certification pass rates of its graduates, a comparison of its pass rates with the average pass rates of all such programs in the state, and whether the program is designated as "low-performing" (see below). A higher education institution that fails to provide the required information in a timely or accurate manner may be fined up to $25,000. To continue receiving HEA funds, a state must establish procedures for identifying low-performing teacher preparation programs and for providing them with technical assistance. An annual list of low-performing programs and those at risk of such designation must be provided to the Secretary of Education. States set the criteria for determining low performance and may include data collected under Title II Part A, such as pass rates of graduates. An institution of higher education with a teacher education program that has lost state approval or funding because of its designation as low-performing is ineligible for professional development funding from ED, and cannot enroll any students receiving assistance under HEA Title IV (source of the major federal student aid programs) in its teacher preparation program. The Secretary of Education is required to prepare an annual report on the quality of teacher preparation based on information contained in the state report cards. The report is based on data submitted by each state describing the quality of teacher preparation in the state, including pass rates on teacher certification assessment, waivers of certification requirements, and the identification of low-performing teacher education programs. In June, 2002, the Secretary issued the first full annual report as required under this legislation. Entitled Meeting the Highly Qualified Teachers Challenge: The Secretary ' s Annual Report on Teacher Quality , the report concluded that the teacher preparation system in this country has serious limitations. Not only does acceptable performance on certification assessments differ markedly from state to state, ED found that most states, in setting the minimum score considered to be a passing score, set those scores well below national averages. Although the Title II legislation requires teacher programs to report on the pass rates of "graduates," in implementing this requirement, ED allowed teacher education programs to report the pass rates of "program completers." Institutions requiring passage of the initial certification exam as a condition for program completion had 100% pass rates. Three subsequent annual reports reiterate many of the findings included in the first report, but find that areas in which progress is being made to improve teacher quality. GAO has also reported on the implementation of the Title II accountability provisions. In its December 2002 report (cited above), GAO concluded that ED could not accurately report on the quality of teacher education programs in general given the limitations of the information being collected as part of Title II accountability provisions. The report was also critical of the use of the term "program completer" in determining pass rates, noting that institutions and states could make their teacher preparation programs appear more successful than they actually were. This section briefly identifies a number of issues related to the Teacher Quality Enhancement Grants that might be considered during an HEA reauthorization process. Issues addressing the grant programs funded under this authority are considered separately from those arising from the general accountability provisions applying to all states and nearly all teacher preparation programs. Congressional consideration of the grant programs (state, partnership, and recruitment) may include at least the following issues. It is probably too early to tell whether the three grant programs authorized by Title II, Part A have achieved their objectives. Funding has been awarded over five fiscal years. It does not appear that any grantees have had their grants revoked for failing to demonstrate progress. The sole national evaluation of Title II, for which we have only preliminary results, is focused on the partnership grants. Further, as GAO noted in its report, evaluating the impact of Title II grants in general may be difficult given ED's administration of the programs. The current statute establishes a reporting and evaluating process applying to all grantees, with continued funding conditioned on demonstrating progress. In light of the GAO findings, the Congress may consider whether this process is adequate but not well implemented, or whether the process itself should be amended. As ED and GAO have observed, the mandated division of the annual appropriation for these programs and the one-time only nature of the state grants raise the prospect of ED being unable to expend fully the state grant portion of the appropriation. One or the other of these features of the current program structure will probably have to be modified if future funding is to be fully spent. The funding structure issue raises questions about the appropriate mix of programs and activities being funded under this authority. ED requested FY2004 and FY2005 appropriations authority to allow state grant funds to shift to partnerships; such authority was included in the FY2005 appropriations legislation. During the reauthorization process, the Congress may consider where the emphasis should be placed among these kinds of grants or the kinds of activities being supported. How important is it to have SEAs involved in addressing the improvement of teacher preparation or in strengthening teacher recruitment? Is the interaction among the various entities engaged in partnership grants likely to have a significant impact on the quality of teacher preparation and recruitment, and, if so, should support for partnerships be expanded? How should the Congress respond to the concern expressed by various higher education associations that the Title II programs offer little or no direct support for improving teacher preparation at higher education institutions? Where should the balance be placed among investment in such activities as teacher preparation, teacher recruitment, professional development, and accountability? How much support should be directed to alternatives to traditional teacher preparation programs and alternative routes to certification? The general accountability provisions of Title II, Part A applicable to states and higher education institutions with teacher preparation programs have generated significant debate since their inception. Several of the issues that have arisen are briefly identified below. As described earlier in this report, the standards for identifying teacher preparation programs as low-performing under Title II are set by each individual state. These may or may not involve the various criteria in the reports required from institutions and states, such as the pass rates of graduates on initial licensure exams. Federal consequences for an institution identified as low-performing flow only if its state takes specified action. To date, relatively few institutions have been identified as low-performing under the Title II provisions. Congress may consider whether to modify this framework. Proposals may be considered to bring the federal government more directly into the process through such steps as setting the low-performance standards or imposing federal penalties independent of any state action against the teacher preparation program. Alternatively, given how recently the current framework was initiated, some may want to maintain it without significant change and see what impact it has over time. Still others may argue for scrapping this federal effort since the standards are inconsistent across states. Congress may consider whether the emphasis in the Title II accountability process on licensing exam pass rates should be constrained or expanded. The utility of the current pass rate-based system from a national perspective may be limited because the selection of certification exams and the setting of passing scores are state specific and do not easily allow for interstate comparisons. Further, recent research concludes that many current licensing exams are not rigorous, measuring essentially basic skills. Increased institutional pass rates on such exams may say relatively little about whether teacher preparation programs are graduating students who will be good teachers. Nevertheless, the premise that teacher preparation programs should graduate students who can pass initial credentialing exams does not appear to be at issue. Indeed, there is some evidence that higher education institutions may respond to low pass rates with, what one set of researchers described as, "innovative strategies to enhance the content knowledge of prospective teachers as well as their writing and reading skills." For some policymakers, the limitations of the present system may suggest that the current federal involvement is but an initial step in a multi-step process necessary to improve teacher preparation program quality. For example, consideration may be given to establishing a single, nationwide standard, although such a proposal is likely to prove politically controversial. For others, the reporting burden and difficulty in making cross-state comparisons may suggest a refocusing of these provisions, perhaps to measures of state support for teacher preparation or the alignment of state certification exams with state standards for teacher preparation program approval. One of the more specific issues that the Congress may debate during the reauthorization process is the calculation of pass rates. This debate is likely to focus particularly on the 100% pass rates reported by some states and many institutions. As described earlier, such rates resulted in part from decisions made by ED regarding the definition of a graduate and in part from institutional and state policies. To the extent that increasing numbers of institutions report 100% pass rates the utility of these rates as an accountability measure is undercut. Congress may consider various alternatives to address this issue. For example, institutions might be required to report the extent to which graduates passed certification exams the first time they took them, regardless of how the institutions define a graduate. Alternative measures to gauge the teaching effectiveness of graduates of a program might be considered, such as changes in the academic performance of a teacher's students or expressions of school administrator satisfaction or dissatisfaction with a program's graduates.

The Teacher Quality Enhancement Grants program (Title II, Part A of the Higher Education Act, or HEA) seeks to improve K-12 teacher preparation programs at higher education institutions. Title II Part A authorizes three types of competitively awarded grants--state grants, partnership grants, and recruitment grants--with the annual appropriation divided 45%, 45%, and 10% respectively among these kinds of grants. State grants are one-time, three-year grants for such activities as holding teacher preparation programs accountable for the quality of their graduates or reforming teacher certification requirements. Partnership grants are one-time, five-year grants to partnerships that must include at least three entities: an institution with a high performing teacher preparation program, a school of arts and sciences, and a high need school district. Among required uses are teacher preparation program accountability and professional development. Recruitment grants are one-time, three-year grants to states or partnerships, supporting scholarships with a teaching service requirement or activities to recruit highly qualified teachers for high need districts and schools. States receiving HEA funds must report annually on the quality of teacher preparation, including information on the pass rates of graduates on initial certification assessments. Higher education institutions enrolling HEA-aided students in their teacher preparation program must report annually detailing, among other things, the certification exam pass rates of graduates. States must establish procedures for identifying low-performing teacher preparation programs. If states withdraw approval or funding due to this designation, the affected programs cannot enroll students receiving HEA Title IV federal student aid. During the HEA reauthorization process, grant-related issues may include program effectiveness; mandated division of the annual appropriation when most states have received these one-time only grants; and the mix of kinds of grants and activities. Accountability issues may include inconsistency across states in standards for identifying low-performing teacher preparation programs; effectiveness of pass rate-based accountability for teacher preparation programs; reporting by states and institutions of 100% pass rates; and possible alternatives to the current framework. This report will be updated as events warrant.