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(19.8%) fissile and UNatC0.5O1.5 fertileLEUO 2 TRISO- coated particlesLEUO 2 TRISO- coated particlesLEUO 2 TRISO-coated particlesPuO 1.8 , LEUCO or mixed uranium- plutonium oxide (MOX)LEUO 2 TRISO- coated particlesVery-High-Temperature Reactor (VHTR) PR&PP White Paper 32Appendix VHTR.A – VHTR Major Reactor Design Parameters (Continued) Major Reactor ParametersFramatome SC-HTGRGeneral Atomics GT-MHRX-Energy Xe-100Huaneng Group & CNEC/INET HTR-PMJAEA GTHTR300COKBM GT- MHRKAERI NHDD Core Inlet Temperature/Pressure (ºC/MPa)325/6.0 490/7.07 260/~6.1 250/~7.0 587-666/6.9 (electrical production) & 594/5.1 (H 2 production)490/7.07 490/~7.0 Core Outlet Temperature/Pressure (ºC/MPa)750 for electricity generation)850/7.0 750/~6.0 750/~7.0 850-950/6.9 (electrical production) &950/5.1 (H 2

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generation)850/7.0 750/~6.0 750/~7.0 850-950/6.9 (electrical production) &950/5.1 (H 2 production)850/7.0 950/~7.0 Neutron Energy Spectrum Thermal peaking just below 0.3 eVThermal peaking just below 0.3 eVThermal peaking just below 0.3 eVThermal peaking just below 0.3 eVThermal peaking just below 0.3 eVThermal peaking just below 0.3 eVThermal peaking just below 0.3 eV Appendix VHTR.B – A Comparison of VHTR Fuel Cycle Parameters Fuel Cycle ParametersAreva Modular HTRGeneral Atomics GT- MHRX-Energy Xe-100Huaneng Group & CNEC/INET HTR-PMJAEA GTHTR300COKBM GT- MHRKAERI NHDD Reactor Thermal Power (MW-th)625 600 200 250 600 600 200 Reactor Electrical Power (MWe) Generation~250, 186 for cogeneration with process heat use262 to 286 (varied assumptions documented)80 (inferred) 100 per reactor in two reactors per module274-302 depending on outlet T, 87- 202 depending 262 to 286 (varied assumptions

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in two reactors per module274-302 depending on outlet T, 87- 202 depending 262 to 286 (varied assumptions documented)Only H 2 productionVery-High-Temperature Reactor (VHTR) PR&PP White Paper 33on H 2 production Fuel type -Form -Fertile material -Fissile materialLEU Ceramic coated particle U-238 U-235LEU Ceramic coated particle U-238 U-235LEU Ceramic coated particle U-238 U-235LEU Ceramic coated particle U-238 U-235LEU Ceramic coated particle U-238 U-235Pu initially Ceramic coated particle None PuLEU Ceramic coated particle U-238 U-235 Enrichment (%) ~15 19.8 in fissile particles, 0.7 (UNat) in fertile particles10 8.5 in the equilibrium core~14 Pure Pu 9.6 pebble, 15.5 prismaticVery-High-Temperature Reactor (VHTR) PR&PP White Paper 34Appendix VHTR.B – A Comparison of VHTR Fuel Cycle Parameters (Continued) Fuel Cycle ParametersAreva Modular HTRGeneral Atomics GT- MHRX-Energy Xe-100Huaneng Group & CNEC/INET HTR-PMJAEA GTHTR300COKBM GT- MHRKAERI

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Xe-100Huaneng Group & CNEC/INET HTR-PMJAEA GTHTR300COKBM GT- MHRKAERI NHDD Source of Fissile Material (inputs are assumed since not given in available documentation)U.S. or European enrichment plants (inferred)U.S. or European enrichment plants (inferred)U.S. or European enrichment plants (inferredUndefined Undefined Russian excess weapons Pu; other U and Pu in later versionsUndefined Fuel Inventory (MT) Not given 4.68 initial core, 2.26 each reload~2.0 in equilibrium core~2.9 in equilibrium coreNot given ~1.8 in equilibrium cycleNot given Discharge Burn- up (GWD/MT)150 121 for LEU cycle175 90 120 ~120-150 153 Refueling frequency (months)18 18 Continuous on lineContinuous on line24/18 (electrical)/18 (H2)18 Pebble continuous; Recycle Approach Baseline is once-throughBaseline is once-throughBaseline is once- throughBaseline is once-throughBaseline is recyclingNo recycle, deep-burnBaseline is once-through Recycle TechnologyTo be developedTo be developedTo be developed To be developedTo be developedNo recycle, - deep-burnTo be developed

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once-through Recycle TechnologyTo be developedTo be developedTo be developed To be developedTo be developedNo recycle, - deep-burnTo be developed Recycle efficiency To be determinedTo be determinedTo be determinedTo be determinedTo be determinedNo recycle, deep-burnTo be determinedVery-High-Temperature Reactor (VHTR) PR&PP White Paper 35APPENDIX 2: Summary of PR relevant intrinsic design features. Reference IAEA- STR-332. Please refer to IAEA-STR-332, for full explanations and complete definitions of terms and concepts. Summary of PR relevant Intrinsic design featuresB-VHTR (GT-MHR, HTTR)P-VHTR (PBMR) Features reducing the attractiveness of the technology for nuclear weapons programmes 1. The Reactor Technology needs an enrichment Fuel Cycle phaseYes Yes 2. The Reactor Technology produces SF with low % of fissile plutoniumHigher burnup than LWR SF resulting in low % fissile plutonium.Fully burn pebbles have higher burnup than LWR SF resulting in low % fissile plutonium. 3. Fissile material recycling performed without full separation from fission productsNo recycling No recycling Features preventing or inhibiting diversion of nuclear material 4. Fuel assemblies are large & difficult to dismantleYes. Fuel pellets are inserted in holes in fuel blocks. There is no fuel assembly in P-VHTR. Fuel pebbles are small but to acquire 1 SQ of U-235 or Pu would require a large

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fuel blocks. There is no fuel assembly in P-VHTR. Fuel pebbles are small but to acquire 1 SQ of U-235 or Pu would require a large number of pebbles (tens of thousands). 5. Fissile material in fuel is difficult to extractTRISO fuel is difficult to reprocess. TRISO fuel is difficult to reprocess. 6. Fuel cycle facilities have few points of access to nuclear material, especially in separated formFuel blocks are replaced after one cycle of irradiation, no reprocessing.Fuel cycle facilities mainly involve pebble handling but no reprocessing, and remote operations are required. 7. Fuel cycle facilities can only be operated to process declared feed materials in declared quantitiesN/A N/A Features preventing or inhibiting undeclared production of direct-use material 8. No locations in or near the core of a reactor where undeclared target materials could be irradiatedIrradiate target material in moderator blocks or control rod is a possibility. Ton quantities of fertile material needed to generate 1SQ would be difficult to conceal and would affect reactor operation. The core is an open cavity filled with fuel pebble. There is no space for control rod to hide the target materials. There is no space to hide target pebbles and no means to harvest the target pebbles after irradiation. Proliferator has difficulty to distinguish the target materials from fuel pebble. Ton quantities of fertile material needed to generate 1SQ would be difficult to conceal and would affect reactor operation. 9. The core prevents operation of the reactor with undeclared target

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material needed to generate 1SQ would be difficult to conceal and would affect reactor operation. 9. The core prevents operation of the reactor with undeclared target materials (e.g. small reactivity margins)The large number of fuel blocks required to accumulate 1 SQ of Pu makes operation of the reactor with undeclared target easy to detect. It might be possible to replace the control rods with the target materials.It is easy to detect diversion because the core is designed with little excess reactivity. It is possible to introduce U- 238 pebbles for breeding, but would be difficult to carry-out, owing to the large number of pebbles involved. Very-High-Temperature Reactor (VHTR) PR&PP White Paper 36Summary of PR relevant Intrinsic design featuresB-VHTR (GT-MHR, HTTR)P-VHTR (PBMR) 10. Facilities are difficult to modify for undeclared production of nuclear materialThe particle-fuelled reactor is difficult to modify to use other fuel for undeclared production of nuclear material..The large number of fuel pebbles involved in any undeclared production makes the activity diifcult to carry out.. 11. The core is not accessible during reactor operationNot accessible and very high radiation environment.Not accessible and very high radiation environment. 12. Uranium enrichment plants (if needed) cannot be used to produce HEUExpect international safeguards in place to deter HEU production.Expect international safeguards in place to deter HEU production. Features facilitating verification, including continuity of knowledge 13. The system allows for unambiguous Design Information

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place to deter HEU production.Expect international safeguards in place to deter HEU production. Features facilitating verification, including continuity of knowledge 13. The system allows for unambiguous Design Information Verification (DIV) throughout life cycleDIV should be straight-forward. DIV should be straight-forward. 14. The inventory and flow of nuclear material can be specified and accounted for in the clearest possible mannerFuel blocks are amenable to item- counting. Fuel pebbles are treated in bulk for accounting. Although it is in a closed system, nuclear material in the pebbles always move due to online refueling through a pipe. 15. Nuclear materials remain accessible for verification the greatest practical extentFuel blocks are identifiable by serial numbers. However, since there is no water shielding like LWRs, inspectors cannot directly see the fuel block loaded in the core.Verification of pebbles may pose challenges. 16. The system makes the use of operation and safety/related sensors and measurement systems for verification possible, taking in to account the need for data authenticationRadiation monitors and interlocks for fuel transfer machinery can also be used for safeguards. Measurement systems needed to count and authenticate fuel pebbles for operation can also be used for safeguards. Devices that measure the reactivity and the burnup will also be important for safeguards. 17. The system provides for the installation of measurement instruments, surveillance equipment and supporting infrastructure likely to be needed for verificationSystem elements are similar to LWRs and should be amendable to installation of safeguards equipment..Though system elements are similar to

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instruments, surveillance equipment and supporting infrastructure likely to be needed for verificationSystem elements are similar to LWRs and should be amendable to installation of safeguards equipment..Though system elements are similar to LWRs fuel accounting is different and item counting is not practical. The system is a candidate for the application of safeguards-by-design.37THE GENERATION IV INTERNATIONAL FORUM Established in 2001, the Generation IV International Forum (GIF) was created as a co-operative international endeavor seeking to develop the research necessary to test the feasibility and performance of fourth generation nuclear systems, and to make them available for industrial deployment by 2030. The GIF brings together 13 countries (Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Japan, Korea, Russia, South Africa, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States), as well as Euratom – representing the 27 European Union members and the United Kingdom – to co-ordinate research and develop these systems. The GIF has selected six reactor technologies for further research and development: the gas- cooled fast reactor (GFR), the lead-cooled fast reactor (LFR), the molten salt reactor (MSR), the sodium- cooled fast reactor (SFR), the supercritical-water-cooled reactor (SCWR) and the very-high-temperature reactor (VHTR).