mrmoor/cyber-threat-intelligence · Datasets at Hugging Face

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813	Ignite '17 Security Conference: Vancouver, BC June 12–15, 2017 Ignite '17 Security Conference is a live, four-day conference designed for today’s security professionals.	[ { "id": 46365, "label": "TIME", "start_offset": 47, "end_offset": 63 }, { "id": 46366, "label": "location", "start_offset": 33, "end_offset": 46 } ]	[]	[]
814	Hear from innovators and experts, gain real-world skills through hands-on sessions and interactive workshops, and find out how breach prevention is changing the security industry.	[]	[]	[]
815	Visit the Ignite website for more information on tracks, workshops and marquee sessions.	[]	[]	[]
816	Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us Please enter your email address!	[]	[]	[]
817	Please mark, I'm not a robot!	[]	[]	[]
818	By submitting this form, you agree to our Terms of Use and acknowledge our Privacy Statement.	[]	[]	[]
819	This post is also available in: 日本語 (Japanese) In January 2020, during the first Patch Tuesday of the new year, Microsoft released patches for 17 new vulnerabilities including one for CVE-2020-0601 known as Curveball.	[ { "id": 44869, "label": "TIME", "start_offset": 56, "end_offset": 68 }, { "id": 44870, "label": "identity", "start_offset": 118, "end_offset": 127 }, { "id": 44871, "label": "TIME", "start_offset": 93, "end_offset": 100 }, { "id": 44872, "label": "vulnerability", "start_offset": 190, "end_offset": 203 }, { "id": 44873, "label": "vulnerability", "start_offset": 213, "end_offset": 222 } ]	[]	[]
820	The vulnerability exists in the Windows CryptoAPI (Crypt32.dll) and specifically relates to the method used for Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) certificate validation.	[ { "id": 46367, "label": "FILEPATH", "start_offset": 51, "end_offset": 62 }, { "id": 46368, "label": "SOFTWARE", "start_offset": 32, "end_offset": 49 } ]	[]	[]
821	At the time of release, Microsoft affirmed that they had not yet seen the vulnerability exploited in the wild (ITW).	[ { "id": 46369, "label": "identity", "start_offset": 24, "end_offset": 33 } ]	[]	[]
822	Researcher Tal Be’ery released a blog titled “Win 10 Crypto Vulnerability: Cheating in Elliptic Curve Billiard 2” that does a fantastic job at explaining this bug.	[ { "id": 2688, "label": "location", "start_offset": 136, "end_offset": 139 }, { "id": 46370, "label": "SOFTWARE", "start_offset": 46, "end_offset": 52 }, { "id": 44874, "label": "identity", "start_offset": 11, "end_offset": 21 } ]	[]	[]
823	The patch provided by Microsoft included the typical release of operating system patches, but this time a new Application Programming Interface (API) function was added.	[ { "id": 46371, "label": "SOFTWARE", "start_offset": 23, "end_offset": 32 } ]	[]	[]
824	The new CveEventWrite function can be used to publish events when an attempt to exploit security vulnerabilities in user-mode applications occurs.	[]	[]	[]
825	Analysts can collect alerts on the Application Message “CVE-2020-0601” as a means to hunt for attempted exploitation of this vulnerability on patched systems.	[ { "id": 46372, "label": "vulnerability", "start_offset": 56, "end_offset": 69 } ]	[]	[]
826	We also recommend users of the Chrome browser to update to version 79.0.3945.130 as they recently released an update to fix the TLS issue. Palo Alto Networks customers running Traps are now safeguarded from the Windows CryptoAPI Spoofing vulnerability, regardless of whether they are running an unpatched Microsoft Windows 10 system.	[ { "id": 46376, "label": "SOFTWARE", "start_offset": 307, "end_offset": 328 }, { "id": 46375, "label": "SOFTWARE", "start_offset": 213, "end_offset": 230 }, { "id": 46373, "label": "SOFTWARE", "start_offset": 32, "end_offset": 38 }, { "id": 46374, "label": "identity", "start_offset": 141, "end_offset": 159 } ]	[]	[]
827	Additionally, Palo Alto Networks offers multiple, additional complementary protections:	[ { "id": 46377, "label": "identity", "start_offset": 14, "end_offset": 32 } ]	[]	[]
828	As a member of the Microsoft Active Protections Program (MAPP) program, Palo Alto Networks received early details of the vulnerability, providing greater understanding of the threat, which helps us implement strong product coverage.	[ { "id": 46378, "label": "identity", "start_offset": 19, "end_offset": 62 }, { "id": 44876, "label": "identity", "start_offset": 72, "end_offset": 90 } ]	[]	[]
829	As always, we recommend keeping your Microsoft products up to date with the latest patches to mitigate this vulnerability.	[ { "id": 46379, "label": "identity", "start_offset": 37, "end_offset": 46 } ]	[]	[]
830	Palo Alto Networks will update this Threat Brief with new information and recommendations as they become available. CVE-2020-0601: The ChainOfFools/CurveBall Attack Explained POC Win10 Crypto Vulnerability: Cheating in Elliptic Curve Billiards 2 NSA Cybersecurity Advisory Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us Please enter your email address!	[ { "id": 46383, "label": "identity", "start_offset": 250, "end_offset": 253 }, { "id": 46384, "label": "vulnerability", "start_offset": 137, "end_offset": 149 }, { "id": 46381, "label": "vulnerability", "start_offset": 118, "end_offset": 131 }, { "id": 46382, "label": "SOFTWARE", "start_offset": 182, "end_offset": 187 }, { "id": 46380, "label": "identity", "start_offset": 1, "end_offset": 19 }, { "id": 46385, "label": "vulnerability", "start_offset": 150, "end_offset": 159 } ]	[]	[]
831	Please mark, I'm not a robot!	[]	[]	[]
832	By submitting this form, you agree to our Terms of Use and acknowledge our Privacy Statement.	[]	[]	[]
833	In the months since the WanaCrypt0r/WannaCry and the Petya/NotPetya attacks, security researchers have delved into the nuts and bolts these incidents and the malware involved.	[ { "id": 2720, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 36, "end_offset": 44 }, { "id": 2722, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 53, "end_offset": 58 }, { "id": 2723, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 59, "end_offset": 67 }, { "id": 2719, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 24, "end_offset": 35 } ]	[]	[]
834	One key thing that research into these security incidents shows is that these attacks used a relatively new and unknown technique called kernel APC attacks as part of their toolkit.	[ { "id": 44878, "label": "attack-pattern", "start_offset": 138, "end_offset": 156 } ]	[]	[]
835	Kernel APC attacks occur in a way that increases the “stealth” factor and makes standard detection and prevention very difficult.	[ { "id": 46386, "label": "attack-pattern", "start_offset": 1, "end_offset": 19 } ]	[]	[]
836	And kernel APC attacks do this while still maximizing the power and control that the code has on the target system.	[ { "id": 46387, "label": "attack-pattern", "start_offset": 3, "end_offset": 22 } ]	[]	[]
837	While kernel APC attacks aren’t well known and can be hard to understand, their proven success in WanaCrypt0r/WannaCry and the Petya/NotPetya make them an important threat to understand because proven attack techniques are quickly adopted widely.	[ { "id": 2746, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 128, "end_offset": 133 }, { "id": 44880, "label": "attack-pattern", "start_offset": 7, "end_offset": 25 }, { "id": 44881, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 99, "end_offset": 110 }, { "id": 44882, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 111, "end_offset": 119 }, { "id": 44884, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 134, "end_offset": 142 } ]	[ { "id": 185, "from_id": 44882, "to_id": 44880, "type": "uses" }, { "id": 186, "from_id": 2746, "to_id": 44880, "type": "uses" }, { "id": 184, "from_id": 44881, "to_id": 44880, "type": "uses" }, { "id": 187, "from_id": 44884, "to_id": 44880, "type": "uses" } ]	[]
838	And understanding is a first step to prevention.	[]	[]	[]
839	To understand what makes kernel APC attacks so dangerous, it’s important to understand what they are. The kernel is the heart of the operating system.	[ { "id": 46388, "label": "attack-pattern", "start_offset": 26, "end_offset": 44 } ]	[]	[]
840	When talking about operating systems with security permissions and controls like Windows or UNIX/Linux, the kernel operates with the highest level of control.	[ { "id": 46392, "label": "SOFTWARE", "start_offset": 97, "end_offset": 102 }, { "id": 46391, "label": "SOFTWARE", "start_offset": 92, "end_offset": 96 }, { "id": 44885, "label": "SOFTWARE", "start_offset": 81, "end_offset": 88 } ]	[]	[]
841	Because of this, attacks against the kernel are used to gain complete control over a system, generally as part of an “elevation or privilege” (EoP) or “privilege escalation” attack.	[ { "id": 2756, "label": "attack-pattern", "start_offset": 152, "end_offset": 172 }, { "id": 46393, "label": "attack-pattern", "start_offset": 118, "end_offset": 140 } ]	[]	[]
842	Typically, attacks against the kernel are used in conjunction with code execution attacks so that an attacker can target a limited privilege user but ultimately gain full control over the system.	[]	[]	[]
843	Privilege escalation attacks against the kernel have been around for some time and are well-known and can be well protected against. Kernel APC attacks however are a different class of attack.	[ { "id": 2760, "label": "attack-pattern", "start_offset": 1, "end_offset": 21 }, { "id": 44889, "label": "attack-pattern", "start_offset": 135, "end_offset": 153 } ]	[]	[]
844	These don’t attack the kernel to gain privileges.	[]	[]	[]
845	Instead kernel APC attacks already have kernel privileges and use them to further carry out their attack.	[ { "id": 46394, "label": "attack-pattern", "start_offset": 8, "end_offset": 26 } ]	[]	[]
846	In this case by making legitimate programs execute malicious code rather than their own legitimate code.	[ { "id": 44890, "label": "attack-pattern", "start_offset": 43, "end_offset": 65 } ]	[]	[]
847	Kernel APC attacks do this using their control over the kernel to redirect APCs: “Asynchronous Procedure Calls”.	[ { "id": 46395, "label": "attack-pattern", "start_offset": 1, "end_offset": 19 } ]	[]	[]
848	APCs can basically be thought of as places in line for the CPU that the kernel gives access to.	[]	[]	[]
849	In a kernel APC attack, the attacker gives a legitimate program’s place in line to the attacker’s code.	[ { "id": 44891, "label": "attack-pattern", "start_offset": 5, "end_offset": 22 } ]	[]	[]
850	The crux of what makes this attack technique so important is how the technique uses this level of control to have legitimate programs run illegitimate commands.	[]	[]	[]
851	It’s easier to detect and prevent illegitimate programs (malware) from executing commands.	[]	[]	[]
852	But when legitimate programs execute illegitimate commands, it’s harder to detect and prevent: it’s not always clear whether a command is legitimate or not, and interfering with commands from legitimate programs can have significant (sometimes catastrophic) unintended consequences.	[]	[]	[]
853	And finally because of ways that kernel APC attacks are carried out, it doesn’t leave the usual fingerprints you find after an attack making detection harder still.	[]	[]	[]
854	Taken altogether, these make kernel APC attacks an effective and sophisticated technique.	[ { "id": 46396, "label": "attack-pattern", "start_offset": 30, "end_offset": 48 } ]	[]	[]
855	And while this technique alone isn’t solely responsible for the damaging power of WanaCrypt0r/WannaCry and Petya/NotPetya it is certainly an important contributing factor.	[ { "id": 2781, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 82, "end_offset": 93 }, { "id": 2784, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 107, "end_offset": 112 }, { "id": 44893, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 94, "end_offset": 102 }, { "id": 44895, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 113, "end_offset": 121 } ]	[]	[]
856	Perhaps more importantly, it’s a piece of those attacks that has escaped relative notice outside of some specialized parts of the research community.	[]	[]	[]
857	New effective attack techniques that escape notice are always inviting for other copycat attackers.	[]	[]	[]
858	A good way to defend against this is to understand and be aware of the thread: forewarned is forearmed.	[]	[]	[]
859	If you want a more detailed understanding of kernel APC attacks as they occurred in WanaCrypt0r/WannaCry, two good resources are Microsoft’s MMPC blog “WannaCrypt ransomware worm targets out-of-date systems” and Countercept’s “DOUBLEPULSAR Usermode Analysis: Generic Reflective DLL Loader”.	[ { "id": 2796, "label": "identity", "start_offset": 130, "end_offset": 139 }, { "id": 2800, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 228, "end_offset": 240 }, { "id": 2791, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 85, "end_offset": 96 }, { "id": 2792, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 97, "end_offset": 105 }, { "id": 46397, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 153, "end_offset": 163 } ]	[]	[]
860	Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us Please enter your email address!	[]	[]	[]
861	Please mark, I'm not a robot! By submitting this form, you agree to our Terms of Use and acknowledge our Privacy Statement.	[]	[]	[]
862	In recent years, ransomware families are often glamorized as being some of the most dangerous types of malware.	[]	[]	[]
863	They’ve certainly caused a wealth of damage to end users with some of the more prominent malware families, such as CryptoLocker, CryptoWall, TorrentLocker, and TeslaCrypt infecting millions of users overall.	[ { "id": 46398, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 160, "end_offset": 170 }, { "id": 46399, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 141, "end_offset": 154 }, { "id": 46400, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 129, "end_offset": 139 }, { "id": 46401, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 115, "end_offset": 128 } ]	[]	[]
864	For readers that might be unfamiliar with ransomware, it’s a type of malware that is responsible for encrypting a user’s files with a key known only to the attackers.	[]	[]	[]
865	Examples of files that might be encrypted include financial documents, home movies, photos, or business-related files.	[]	[]	[]
866	In order to decrypt these files, the victim must provide a ransom, or payment, to the attacker, often in the form of a digital currency.	[]	[]	[]
867	While ransomware is often thought to be bullet-proof, it is certainly not always the case.	[]	[]	[]
868	In early 2015, Emnisoft identified a new family of malware named PClock.	[ { "id": 46402, "label": "identity", "start_offset": 15, "end_offset": 23 }, { "id": 46405, "label": "TIME", "start_offset": 3, "end_offset": 13 }, { "id": 46403, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 65, "end_offset": 71 } ]	[]	[]
869	At the time, the malware was riddled with issues, specifically in the way it encrypted files.	[]	[]	[]
870	It used a simple XOR encryption routine with a static key, allowing victims to easily recover their files without paying a ransom.	[]	[]	[]
871	In August, we started detecting updated copies of PClock, which has been improved upon by the malware author.	[ { "id": 46406, "label": "TIME", "start_offset": 4, "end_offset": 10 }, { "id": 46407, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 51, "end_offset": 57 } ]	[]	[]
872	We set out to determine if this updated version of PClock holds up to some of the more prominent families.	[ { "id": 46408, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 51, "end_offset": 57 } ]	[]	[]
873	For the sake of clarity, I will refer to this newer version of PClock as PClock2 going forward.	[ { "id": 44897, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 73, "end_offset": 80 }, { "id": 44896, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 63, "end_offset": 69 } ]	[]	[]
874	The following sample is used for analysis: Figure 1.	[]	[]	[]
875	PClock2	[ { "id": 46409, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 0, "end_offset": 7 } ]	[]	[]
876	analysis sample PClock2 is written in Visual Basic.	[ { "id": 46410, "label": "SOFTWARE", "start_offset": 39, "end_offset": 51 }, { "id": 44898, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 17, "end_offset": 24 } ]	[ { "id": 188, "from_id": 44898, "to_id": 46410, "type": "uses" } ]	[]
877	For a copy of this file’s IDA Pro database (idb), please refer here.	[ { "id": 46411, "label": "SOFTWARE", "start_offset": 26, "end_offset": 33 } ]	[]	[]
878	When initially executed, PClock2 performs a very simple anti-analysis check where it will sleep for a random amount of time and compare the time spent sleeping against a set value.	[ { "id": 46412, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 26, "end_offset": 33 } ]	[]	[]
879	This check is essentially looking for sandbox systems where the sleep function accelerates analysis.	[]	[]	[]
880	Figure 2. Check by PClock2 for hooking of sleep function A simple check is performed to determine if the malware is running with administrative privileges.	[ { "id": 46413, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 20, "end_offset": 27 }, { "id": 46414, "label": "attack-pattern", "start_offset": 32, "end_offset": 39 } ]	[]	[]
881	Once completed, the malware sends the result via an HTTP POST request to a remote server.	[]	[]	[]
882	All data sent via HTTP POST requests is sent in the clear.	[]	[]	[]
883	Figure 3. HTTP POST request containing administrative privileges	[]	[]	[]
884	The ‘P0’ is statically set by the malware in the above request.	[]	[]	[]
885	The ‘1828’ represents the thread ID (TID) of the malware, while the ‘rnd’ GET variable is randomly generated.	[]	[]	[]
886	Throughout the runtime of PClock2, it makes multiple HTTP POST requests to a remote server using the same characteristics, including the ‘PO[TID]’ and the current time.	[ { "id": 46416, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 27, "end_offset": 34 } ]	[]	[]
887	Additionally, the user-agent used by the entire PClock family, including PClock2, is consistent across samples.	[ { "id": 46417, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 48, "end_offset": 54 }, { "id": 46418, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 73, "end_offset": 80 } ]	[]	[]
888	PClock2 proceeds to copy itself with the name “winjab.exe” in the following path.	[ { "id": 44900, "label": "FILEPATH", "start_offset": 48, "end_offset": 58 }, { "id": 44899, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 1, "end_offset": 8 } ]	[]	[]
889	While this particular sample is seen installing itself to the %ALLUSERSPROFILE% path, other samples have been witnessed using %APPDATA% instead.	[ { "id": 46419, "label": "FILEPATH", "start_offset": 62, "end_offset": 79 }, { "id": 46420, "label": "FILEPATH", "start_offset": 126, "end_offset": 135 } ]	[]	[]
890	PClock2 also enables persistence by setting the following registry key.	[ { "id": 46421, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 1, "end_offset": 8 } ]	[]	[]
891	All instances of the entire PClock family have been found to use this particular registry key.	[ { "id": 44901, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 28, "end_offset": 34 } ]	[]	[]
892	After installation is complete, the malware makes another HTTP POST containing the various file paths it used.	[]	[]	[]
893	Figure 4. HTTP POST request containing file paths of malware After installation, PClock2 will also set the following registry key with a value of ‘INSTALL_OK’.	[ { "id": 46422, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 83, "end_offset": 90 } ]	[]	[]
894	This particular registry key is used to hold the latest state of the malware.	[]	[]	[]
895	Other messages that might be present in this key include the following.	[]	[]	[]
896	The following registry keys are also used within the CLOCK sub-path by PClock2: PClock2 proceeds to use the API from blockchain.info to generate a unique Bitcoin (BTC) wallet identifier, which is configured to automatically forward payments to a hardcoded wallet identifier of ‘1MRfkK134ErfbcadUSoSUCBahngCqoBKju’.	[ { "id": 46423, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 72, "end_offset": 79 }, { "id": 46424, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 82, "end_offset": 89 }, { "id": 46425, "label": "DOMAIN", "start_offset": 119, "end_offset": 134 } ]	[]	[]
897	The following HTTPS request accomplishes this.	[]	[]	[]
898	PClock2 will also make a request to the following blockchain.info address to determine the current value of BTC.	[ { "id": 46427, "label": "DOMAIN", "start_offset": 51, "end_offset": 66 }, { "id": 46426, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 1, "end_offset": 8 } ]	[]	[]
899	This information is stored in the ‘\BData\B’ registry key as previously stated.	[ { "id": 46428, "label": "REGISTRYKEY", "start_offset": 35, "end_offset": 43 } ]	[]	[]
900	The malware proceeds to generate a unique key that will be used in subsequent file encryption using the following data: This data is concatenated to form a string similar to the following: Figure 5.	[]	[]	[]
901	Data collected to be used in formation of unique key This data is then hashed using the SHA256 algorithm to generate a unique key.	[]	[]	[]
902	This key is stored in the ‘\CData\C’ registry key as previously stated.	[ { "id": 46429, "label": "REGISTRYKEY", "start_offset": 27, "end_offset": 35 } ]	[]	[]
903	This key is also sent via a HTTP POST request.	[]	[]	[]
904	Figure 6.	[]	[]	[]
905	HTTP POST request containing unique SHA256 key PClock2 scans the file system of the victim in order to identify files that are to be encrypted.	[]	[]	[]
906	The following paths are ignored: Additionally, for a list of targeted file types, please see the following link.	[]	[]	[]
907	Once files are identified, PClock will begin encrypting them, one-by-one.	[ { "id": 46430, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 28, "end_offset": 34 } ]	[]	[]
908	Unlike the original version of PClock, this variant has forgone the simple XOR encryption routine in place of using RC4.	[ { "id": 46431, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 31, "end_offset": 37 } ]	[]	[]
909	The RC4 key is generated by concatenating the SHA256 value previously generated with the path to the file being encrypted.	[]	[]	[]
910	250dd811187959220220574a185ccf669e06c0ee3926773a7cb94750c401812cC:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Desktop\Form1.cs	[ { "id": 2878, "label": "SHA1", "start_offset": 0, "end_offset": 76 }, { "id": 46432, "label": "FILEPATH", "start_offset": 81, "end_offset": 121 } ]	[]	[]
911	It should be noted that PClock takes a very long time to encrypt these files.	[ { "id": 46433, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 24, "end_offset": 30 } ]	[]	[]
912	On a test sandbox, the malware took upwards of 20 minutes to complete encryption, which is less than ideal for an attacker as it gives the victim time to notice the infection and stop it.	[ { "id": 46434, "label": "TIME", "start_offset": 36, "end_offset": 57 } ]	[]	[]

813

Ignite '17 Security Conference: Vancouver, BC June 12–15, 2017 Ignite '17 Security Conference is a live, four-day conference designed for today’s security professionals.

[ { "id": 46365, "label": "TIME", "start_offset": 47, "end_offset": 63 }, { "id": 46366, "label": "location", "start_offset": 33, "end_offset": 46 } ]

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814

Hear from innovators and experts, gain real-world skills through hands-on sessions and interactive workshops, and find out how breach prevention is changing the security industry.

[]

815

Visit the Ignite website for more information on tracks, workshops and marquee sessions.

[]

816

Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us Please enter your email address!

[]

817

Please mark, I'm not a robot!

[]

818

By submitting this form, you agree to our Terms of Use and acknowledge our Privacy Statement.

[]

819

This post is also available in: 日本語 (Japanese) In January 2020, during the first Patch Tuesday of the new year, Microsoft released patches for 17 new vulnerabilities including one for CVE-2020-0601 known as Curveball.

[ { "id": 44869, "label": "TIME", "start_offset": 56, "end_offset": 68 }, { "id": 44870, "label": "identity", "start_offset": 118, "end_offset": 127 }, { "id": 44871, "label": "TIME", "start_offset": 93, "end_offset": 100 }, { "id": 44872, "label": "vulnerability", "start_offset": 190, "end_offset": 203 }, { "id": 44873, "label": "vulnerability", "start_offset": 213, "end_offset": 222 } ]

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820

The vulnerability exists in the Windows CryptoAPI (Crypt32.dll) and specifically relates to the method used for Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) certificate validation.

[ { "id": 46367, "label": "FILEPATH", "start_offset": 51, "end_offset": 62 }, { "id": 46368, "label": "SOFTWARE", "start_offset": 32, "end_offset": 49 } ]

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821

At the time of release, Microsoft affirmed that they had not yet seen the vulnerability exploited in the wild (ITW).

[ { "id": 46369, "label": "identity", "start_offset": 24, "end_offset": 33 } ]

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822

Researcher Tal Be’ery released a blog titled “Win 10 Crypto Vulnerability: Cheating in Elliptic Curve Billiard 2” that does a fantastic job at explaining this bug.

[ { "id": 2688, "label": "location", "start_offset": 136, "end_offset": 139 }, { "id": 46370, "label": "SOFTWARE", "start_offset": 46, "end_offset": 52 }, { "id": 44874, "label": "identity", "start_offset": 11, "end_offset": 21 } ]

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823

The patch provided by Microsoft included the typical release of operating system patches, but this time a new Application Programming Interface (API) function was added.

[ { "id": 46371, "label": "SOFTWARE", "start_offset": 23, "end_offset": 32 } ]

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824

The new CveEventWrite function can be used to publish events when an attempt to exploit security vulnerabilities in user-mode applications occurs.

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825

Analysts can collect alerts on the Application Message “CVE-2020-0601” as a means to hunt for attempted exploitation of this vulnerability on patched systems.

[ { "id": 46372, "label": "vulnerability", "start_offset": 56, "end_offset": 69 } ]

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826

We also recommend users of the Chrome browser to update to version 79.0.3945.130 as they recently released an update to fix the TLS issue. Palo Alto Networks customers running Traps are now safeguarded from the Windows CryptoAPI Spoofing vulnerability, regardless of whether they are running an unpatched Microsoft Windows 10 system.

[ { "id": 46376, "label": "SOFTWARE", "start_offset": 307, "end_offset": 328 }, { "id": 46375, "label": "SOFTWARE", "start_offset": 213, "end_offset": 230 }, { "id": 46373, "label": "SOFTWARE", "start_offset": 32, "end_offset": 38 }, { "id": 46374, "label": "identity", "start_offset": 141, "end_offset": 159 } ]

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827

Additionally, Palo Alto Networks offers multiple, additional complementary protections:

[ { "id": 46377, "label": "identity", "start_offset": 14, "end_offset": 32 } ]

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828

As a member of the Microsoft Active Protections Program (MAPP) program, Palo Alto Networks received early details of the vulnerability, providing greater understanding of the threat, which helps us implement strong product coverage.

[ { "id": 46378, "label": "identity", "start_offset": 19, "end_offset": 62 }, { "id": 44876, "label": "identity", "start_offset": 72, "end_offset": 90 } ]

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829

As always, we recommend keeping your Microsoft products up to date with the latest patches to mitigate this vulnerability.

[ { "id": 46379, "label": "identity", "start_offset": 37, "end_offset": 46 } ]

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830

Palo Alto Networks will update this Threat Brief with new information and recommendations as they become available. CVE-2020-0601: The ChainOfFools/CurveBall Attack Explained POC Win10 Crypto Vulnerability: Cheating in Elliptic Curve Billiards 2 NSA Cybersecurity Advisory Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us Please enter your email address!

[ { "id": 46383, "label": "identity", "start_offset": 250, "end_offset": 253 }, { "id": 46384, "label": "vulnerability", "start_offset": 137, "end_offset": 149 }, { "id": 46381, "label": "vulnerability", "start_offset": 118, "end_offset": 131 }, { "id": 46382, "label": "SOFTWARE", "start_offset": 182, "end_offset": 187 }, { "id": 46380, "label": "identity", "start_offset": 1, "end_offset": 19 }, { "id": 46385, "label": "vulnerability", "start_offset": 150, "end_offset": 159 } ]

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831

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832

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833

In the months since the WanaCrypt0r/WannaCry and the Petya/NotPetya attacks, security researchers have delved into the nuts and bolts these incidents and the malware involved.

[ { "id": 2720, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 36, "end_offset": 44 }, { "id": 2722, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 53, "end_offset": 58 }, { "id": 2723, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 59, "end_offset": 67 }, { "id": 2719, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 24, "end_offset": 35 } ]

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834

One key thing that research into these security incidents shows is that these attacks used a relatively new and unknown technique called kernel APC attacks as part of their toolkit.

[ { "id": 44878, "label": "attack-pattern", "start_offset": 138, "end_offset": 156 } ]

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835

Kernel APC attacks occur in a way that increases the “stealth” factor and makes standard detection and prevention very difficult.

[ { "id": 46386, "label": "attack-pattern", "start_offset": 1, "end_offset": 19 } ]

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836

And kernel APC attacks do this while still maximizing the power and control that the code has on the target system.

[ { "id": 46387, "label": "attack-pattern", "start_offset": 3, "end_offset": 22 } ]

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837

While kernel APC attacks aren’t well known and can be hard to understand, their proven success in WanaCrypt0r/WannaCry and the Petya/NotPetya make them an important threat to understand because proven attack techniques are quickly adopted widely.

[ { "id": 2746, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 128, "end_offset": 133 }, { "id": 44880, "label": "attack-pattern", "start_offset": 7, "end_offset": 25 }, { "id": 44881, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 99, "end_offset": 110 }, { "id": 44882, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 111, "end_offset": 119 }, { "id": 44884, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 134, "end_offset": 142 } ]

[ { "id": 185, "from_id": 44882, "to_id": 44880, "type": "uses" }, { "id": 186, "from_id": 2746, "to_id": 44880, "type": "uses" }, { "id": 184, "from_id": 44881, "to_id": 44880, "type": "uses" }, { "id": 187, "from_id": 44884, "to_id": 44880, "type": "uses" } ]

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838

And understanding is a first step to prevention.

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839

To understand what makes kernel APC attacks so dangerous, it’s important to understand what they are. The kernel is the heart of the operating system.

[ { "id": 46388, "label": "attack-pattern", "start_offset": 26, "end_offset": 44 } ]

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840

When talking about operating systems with security permissions and controls like Windows or UNIX/Linux, the kernel operates with the highest level of control.

[ { "id": 46392, "label": "SOFTWARE", "start_offset": 97, "end_offset": 102 }, { "id": 46391, "label": "SOFTWARE", "start_offset": 92, "end_offset": 96 }, { "id": 44885, "label": "SOFTWARE", "start_offset": 81, "end_offset": 88 } ]

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841

Because of this, attacks against the kernel are used to gain complete control over a system, generally as part of an “elevation or privilege” (EoP) or “privilege escalation” attack.

[ { "id": 2756, "label": "attack-pattern", "start_offset": 152, "end_offset": 172 }, { "id": 46393, "label": "attack-pattern", "start_offset": 118, "end_offset": 140 } ]

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842

Typically, attacks against the kernel are used in conjunction with code execution attacks so that an attacker can target a limited privilege user but ultimately gain full control over the system.

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843

Privilege escalation attacks against the kernel have been around for some time and are well-known and can be well protected against. Kernel APC attacks however are a different class of attack.

[ { "id": 2760, "label": "attack-pattern", "start_offset": 1, "end_offset": 21 }, { "id": 44889, "label": "attack-pattern", "start_offset": 135, "end_offset": 153 } ]

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844

These don’t attack the kernel to gain privileges.

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845

Instead kernel APC attacks already have kernel privileges and use them to further carry out their attack.

[ { "id": 46394, "label": "attack-pattern", "start_offset": 8, "end_offset": 26 } ]

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846

In this case by making legitimate programs execute malicious code rather than their own legitimate code.

[ { "id": 44890, "label": "attack-pattern", "start_offset": 43, "end_offset": 65 } ]

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847

Kernel APC attacks do this using their control over the kernel to redirect APCs: “Asynchronous Procedure Calls”.

[ { "id": 46395, "label": "attack-pattern", "start_offset": 1, "end_offset": 19 } ]

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848

APCs can basically be thought of as places in line for the CPU that the kernel gives access to.

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In a kernel APC attack, the attacker gives a legitimate program’s place in line to the attacker’s code.

[ { "id": 44891, "label": "attack-pattern", "start_offset": 5, "end_offset": 22 } ]

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850

The crux of what makes this attack technique so important is how the technique uses this level of control to have legitimate programs run illegitimate commands.

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851

It’s easier to detect and prevent illegitimate programs (malware) from executing commands.

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852

But when legitimate programs execute illegitimate commands, it’s harder to detect and prevent: it’s not always clear whether a command is legitimate or not, and interfering with commands from legitimate programs can have significant (sometimes catastrophic) unintended consequences.

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853

And finally because of ways that kernel APC attacks are carried out, it doesn’t leave the usual fingerprints you find after an attack making detection harder still.

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854

Taken altogether, these make kernel APC attacks an effective and sophisticated technique.

[ { "id": 46396, "label": "attack-pattern", "start_offset": 30, "end_offset": 48 } ]

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855

And while this technique alone isn’t solely responsible for the damaging power of WanaCrypt0r/WannaCry and Petya/NotPetya it is certainly an important contributing factor.

[ { "id": 2781, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 82, "end_offset": 93 }, { "id": 2784, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 107, "end_offset": 112 }, { "id": 44893, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 94, "end_offset": 102 }, { "id": 44895, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 113, "end_offset": 121 } ]

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856

Perhaps more importantly, it’s a piece of those attacks that has escaped relative notice outside of some specialized parts of the research community.

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857

New effective attack techniques that escape notice are always inviting for other copycat attackers.

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858

A good way to defend against this is to understand and be aware of the thread: forewarned is forearmed.

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859

If you want a more detailed understanding of kernel APC attacks as they occurred in WanaCrypt0r/WannaCry, two good resources are Microsoft’s MMPC blog “WannaCrypt ransomware worm targets out-of-date systems” and Countercept’s “DOUBLEPULSAR Usermode Analysis: Generic Reflective DLL Loader”.

[ { "id": 2796, "label": "identity", "start_offset": 130, "end_offset": 139 }, { "id": 2800, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 228, "end_offset": 240 }, { "id": 2791, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 85, "end_offset": 96 }, { "id": 2792, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 97, "end_offset": 105 }, { "id": 46397, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 153, "end_offset": 163 } ]

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860

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861

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862

In recent years, ransomware families are often glamorized as being some of the most dangerous types of malware.

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863

They’ve certainly caused a wealth of damage to end users with some of the more prominent malware families, such as CryptoLocker, CryptoWall, TorrentLocker, and TeslaCrypt infecting millions of users overall.

[ { "id": 46398, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 160, "end_offset": 170 }, { "id": 46399, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 141, "end_offset": 154 }, { "id": 46400, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 129, "end_offset": 139 }, { "id": 46401, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 115, "end_offset": 128 } ]

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864

For readers that might be unfamiliar with ransomware, it’s a type of malware that is responsible for encrypting a user’s files with a key known only to the attackers.

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865

Examples of files that might be encrypted include financial documents, home movies, photos, or business-related files.

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866

In order to decrypt these files, the victim must provide a ransom, or payment, to the attacker, often in the form of a digital currency.

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867

While ransomware is often thought to be bullet-proof, it is certainly not always the case.

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868

In early 2015, Emnisoft identified a new family of malware named PClock.

[ { "id": 46402, "label": "identity", "start_offset": 15, "end_offset": 23 }, { "id": 46405, "label": "TIME", "start_offset": 3, "end_offset": 13 }, { "id": 46403, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 65, "end_offset": 71 } ]

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869

At the time, the malware was riddled with issues, specifically in the way it encrypted files.

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870

It used a simple XOR encryption routine with a static key, allowing victims to easily recover their files without paying a ransom.

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871

In August, we started detecting updated copies of PClock, which has been improved upon by the malware author.

[ { "id": 46406, "label": "TIME", "start_offset": 4, "end_offset": 10 }, { "id": 46407, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 51, "end_offset": 57 } ]

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872

We set out to determine if this updated version of PClock holds up to some of the more prominent families.

[ { "id": 46408, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 51, "end_offset": 57 } ]

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873

For the sake of clarity, I will refer to this newer version of PClock as PClock2 going forward.

[ { "id": 44897, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 73, "end_offset": 80 }, { "id": 44896, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 63, "end_offset": 69 } ]

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874

The following sample is used for analysis: Figure 1.

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875

PClock2

[ { "id": 46409, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 0, "end_offset": 7 } ]

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876

analysis sample PClock2 is written in Visual Basic.

[ { "id": 46410, "label": "SOFTWARE", "start_offset": 39, "end_offset": 51 }, { "id": 44898, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 17, "end_offset": 24 } ]

[ { "id": 188, "from_id": 44898, "to_id": 46410, "type": "uses" } ]

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877

For a copy of this file’s IDA Pro database (idb), please refer here.

[ { "id": 46411, "label": "SOFTWARE", "start_offset": 26, "end_offset": 33 } ]

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878

When initially executed, PClock2 performs a very simple anti-analysis check where it will sleep for a random amount of time and compare the time spent sleeping against a set value.

[ { "id": 46412, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 26, "end_offset": 33 } ]

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879

This check is essentially looking for sandbox systems where the sleep function accelerates analysis.

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880

Figure 2. Check by PClock2 for hooking of sleep function A simple check is performed to determine if the malware is running with administrative privileges.

[ { "id": 46413, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 20, "end_offset": 27 }, { "id": 46414, "label": "attack-pattern", "start_offset": 32, "end_offset": 39 } ]

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881

Once completed, the malware sends the result via an HTTP POST request to a remote server.

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882

All data sent via HTTP POST requests is sent in the clear.

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883

Figure 3. HTTP POST request containing administrative privileges

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884

The ‘P0’ is statically set by the malware in the above request.

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The ‘1828’ represents the thread ID (TID) of the malware, while the ‘rnd’ GET variable is randomly generated.

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886

Throughout the runtime of PClock2, it makes multiple HTTP POST requests to a remote server using the same characteristics, including the ‘PO[TID]’ and the current time.

[ { "id": 46416, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 27, "end_offset": 34 } ]

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887

Additionally, the user-agent used by the entire PClock family, including PClock2, is consistent across samples.

[ { "id": 46417, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 48, "end_offset": 54 }, { "id": 46418, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 73, "end_offset": 80 } ]

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888

PClock2 proceeds to copy itself with the name “winjab.exe” in the following path.

[ { "id": 44900, "label": "FILEPATH", "start_offset": 48, "end_offset": 58 }, { "id": 44899, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 1, "end_offset": 8 } ]

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889

While this particular sample is seen installing itself to the %ALLUSERSPROFILE% path, other samples have been witnessed using %APPDATA% instead.

[ { "id": 46419, "label": "FILEPATH", "start_offset": 62, "end_offset": 79 }, { "id": 46420, "label": "FILEPATH", "start_offset": 126, "end_offset": 135 } ]

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890

PClock2 also enables persistence by setting the following registry key.

[ { "id": 46421, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 1, "end_offset": 8 } ]

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891

All instances of the entire PClock family have been found to use this particular registry key.

[ { "id": 44901, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 28, "end_offset": 34 } ]

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892

After installation is complete, the malware makes another HTTP POST containing the various file paths it used.

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893

Figure 4. HTTP POST request containing file paths of malware After installation, PClock2 will also set the following registry key with a value of ‘INSTALL_OK’.

[ { "id": 46422, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 83, "end_offset": 90 } ]

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894

This particular registry key is used to hold the latest state of the malware.

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895

Other messages that might be present in this key include the following.

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896

The following registry keys are also used within the CLOCK sub-path by PClock2: PClock2 proceeds to use the API from blockchain.info to generate a unique Bitcoin (BTC) wallet identifier, which is configured to automatically forward payments to a hardcoded wallet identifier of ‘1MRfkK134ErfbcadUSoSUCBahngCqoBKju’.

[ { "id": 46423, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 72, "end_offset": 79 }, { "id": 46424, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 82, "end_offset": 89 }, { "id": 46425, "label": "DOMAIN", "start_offset": 119, "end_offset": 134 } ]

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897

The following HTTPS request accomplishes this.

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898

PClock2 will also make a request to the following blockchain.info address to determine the current value of BTC.

[ { "id": 46427, "label": "DOMAIN", "start_offset": 51, "end_offset": 66 }, { "id": 46426, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 1, "end_offset": 8 } ]

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899

This information is stored in the ‘\BData\B’ registry key as previously stated.

[ { "id": 46428, "label": "REGISTRYKEY", "start_offset": 35, "end_offset": 43 } ]

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900

The malware proceeds to generate a unique key that will be used in subsequent file encryption using the following data: This data is concatenated to form a string similar to the following: Figure 5.

[]

901

Data collected to be used in formation of unique key This data is then hashed using the SHA256 algorithm to generate a unique key.

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902

This key is stored in the ‘\CData\C’ registry key as previously stated.

[ { "id": 46429, "label": "REGISTRYKEY", "start_offset": 27, "end_offset": 35 } ]

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903

This key is also sent via a HTTP POST request.

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904

Figure 6.

[]

905

HTTP POST request containing unique SHA256 key PClock2 scans the file system of the victim in order to identify files that are to be encrypted.

[]

906

The following paths are ignored: Additionally, for a list of targeted file types, please see the following link.

[]

907

Once files are identified, PClock will begin encrypting them, one-by-one.

[ { "id": 46430, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 28, "end_offset": 34 } ]

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908

Unlike the original version of PClock, this variant has forgone the simple XOR encryption routine in place of using RC4.

[ { "id": 46431, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 31, "end_offset": 37 } ]

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909

The RC4 key is generated by concatenating the SHA256 value previously generated with the path to the file being encrypted.

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910

250dd811187959220220574a185ccf669e06c0ee3926773a7cb94750c401812cC:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Desktop\Form1.cs

[ { "id": 2878, "label": "SHA1", "start_offset": 0, "end_offset": 76 }, { "id": 46432, "label": "FILEPATH", "start_offset": 81, "end_offset": 121 } ]

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911

It should be noted that PClock takes a very long time to encrypt these files.

[ { "id": 46433, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 24, "end_offset": 30 } ]

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912

On a test sandbox, the malware took upwards of 20 minutes to complete encryption, which is less than ideal for an attacker as it gives the victim time to notice the infection and stop it.

[ { "id": 46434, "label": "TIME", "start_offset": 36, "end_offset": 57 } ]

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