id
int64 1
14.4k
| text
stringlengths 3
5.01k
| entities
list | relations
list | Comments
list |
|---|---|---|---|---|
1,817 | Figure 12. | [] | [] | [] |
1,818 | Terminating security products running Tools and functions | [] | [] | [] |
1,819 | Additional tools and components were copied to the compromised machine using AnyDeskMSI to scan the local network and disable security products. | [
{
"id": 46934,
"label": "tools",
"start_offset": 77,
"end_offset": 87
},
{
"id": 46936,
"label": "attack-pattern",
"start_offset": 91,
"end_offset": 113
},
{
"id": 46937,
"label": "attack-pattern",
"start_offset": 118,
"end_offset": 143
}
] | [
{
"id": 265,
"from_id": 46934,
"to_id": 46936,
"type": "uses"
},
{
"id": 266,
"from_id": 46934,
"to_id": 46937,
"type": "uses"
}
] | [] |
1,820 | The tools transferred using AnyDesk are: Netscan: To scan for other endpoints Nmap (log4shell.nse): To scan for Log4shell vulnerable endpoints Hacking tools Mimikatz and Impacket: For lateral movement PDQ deploy: For mass deployment of malicious script to multiple endpoints Aswarpot.sys: For disabling defense solutions. | [
{
"id": 46938,
"label": "tools",
"start_offset": 28,
"end_offset": 35
},
{
"id": 46944,
"label": "tools",
"start_offset": 158,
"end_offset": 166
},
{
"id": 46951,
"label": "attack-pattern",
"start_offset": 294,
"end_offset": 321
},
{
"id": 46940,
"label": "tools",
"start_offset": 79,
"end_offset": 83
},
{
"id": 46942,
"label": "FILEPATH",
"start_offset": 85,
"end_offset": 98
},
{
"id": 46947,
"label": "tools",
"start_offset": 171,
"end_offset": 179
},
{
"id": 46939,
"label": "tools",
"start_offset": 42,
"end_offset": 49
},
{
"id": 46943,
"label": "vulnerability",
"start_offset": 113,
"end_offset": 122
},
{
"id": 46950,
"label": "FILEPATH",
"start_offset": 276,
"end_offset": 288
},
{
"id": 46948,
"label": "attack-pattern",
"start_offset": 185,
"end_offset": 201
},
{
"id": 46949,
"label": "attack-pattern",
"start_offset": 218,
"end_offset": 253
},
{
"id": 46953,
"label": "tools",
"start_offset": 202,
"end_offset": 212
},
{
"id": 46956,
"label": "tools",
"start_offset": 276,
"end_offset": 284
},
{
"id": 46955,
"label": "attack-pattern",
"start_offset": 104,
"end_offset": 108
}
] | [
{
"id": 272,
"from_id": 46938,
"to_id": 46947,
"type": "downloads"
},
{
"id": 267,
"from_id": 46938,
"to_id": 46939,
"type": "downloads"
},
{
"id": 268,
"from_id": 46938,
"to_id": 46940,
"type": "downloads"
},
{
"id": 269,
"from_id": 46940,
"to_id": 46942,
"type": "uses"
},
{
"id": 271,
"from_id": 46938,
"to_id": 46944,
"type": "downloads"
},
{
"id": 273,
"from_id": 46938,
"to_id": 46953,
"type": "downloads"
},
{
"id": 276,
"from_id": 46938,
"to_id": 46956,
"type": "downloads"
}
] | [] |
1,821 | We noted that it can disable a number of antivirus products, previously identified by Aon’s researchers. | [
{
"id": 45143,
"label": "identity",
"start_offset": 86,
"end_offset": 103
}
] | [] | [] |
1,822 | Figure 13. Copying tools and other malicious components to the compromised machine using AnyDesk | [
{
"id": 5369,
"label": "tools",
"start_offset": 95,
"end_offset": 102
}
] | [] | [] |
1,823 | We found an Avast anti-rootkit driver installed as service 'asWarPot.sys' using the command sc.exe create aswSP_ArPot2 binPath= C:\windows\aswArPot.sys type= kernel. | [
{
"id": 46957,
"label": "FILEPATH",
"start_offset": 60,
"end_offset": 72
},
{
"id": 46958,
"label": "FILEPATH",
"start_offset": 92,
"end_offset": 98
},
{
"id": 46959,
"label": "FILEPATH",
"start_offset": 129,
"end_offset": 152
},
{
"id": 46960,
"label": "SOFTWARE",
"start_offset": 12,
"end_offset": 37
}
] | [
{
"id": 279,
"from_id": 46960,
"to_id": 46957,
"type": "consists-of"
}
] | [] |
1,824 | It installs the driver file in preparation for disabling the running antivirus product. | [] | [] | [] |
1,825 | We noted the unusual use of cmd.exe for execution of the file. | [
{
"id": 5374,
"label": "malware",
"start_offset": 28,
"end_offset": 35
}
] | [] | [] |
1,826 | Figure 14. | [] | [] | [] |
1,827 | Executing the anti-rootkit driver in the system | [] | [] | [] |
1,828 | Mimikatz components were also copied to the affected machine via AnyDeskMSI. | [
{
"id": 5378,
"label": "tools",
"start_offset": 0,
"end_offset": 8
},
{
"id": 46961,
"label": "tools",
"start_offset": 65,
"end_offset": 75
}
] | [
{
"id": 277,
"from_id": 46961,
"to_id": 5378,
"type": "drops"
}
] | [] |
1,829 | However, these components were detected and deleted. | [] | [] | [] |
1,830 | Figure 15. | [] | [] | [] |
1,831 | Detecting and deleting Mimikatz We observed the PowerShell script disabling the security products by leveraging aswarpot.sys (a legitimate Avast Anti-Rootkit Driver). | [
{
"id": 5382,
"label": "tools",
"start_offset": 23,
"end_offset": 31
},
{
"id": 5383,
"label": "tools",
"start_offset": 53,
"end_offset": 63
},
{
"id": 46962,
"label": "SOFTWARE",
"start_offset": 144,
"end_offset": 169
},
{
"id": 46963,
"label": "FILEPATH",
"start_offset": 117,
"end_offset": 129
},
{
"id": 46964,
"label": "attack-pattern",
"start_offset": 71,
"end_offset": 102
}
] | [
{
"id": 278,
"from_id": 46962,
"to_id": 46963,
"type": "consists-of"
}
] | [] |
1,832 | A list of security product processes was supplied and subsequently terminated by the driver. Figure 16. | [] | [] | [] |
1,833 | Listing | [] | [] | [] |
1,834 | and | [] | [] | [] |
1,835 | terminating the security products found running in the compromised system | [] | [] | [] |
1,836 | Verification: Manual replication of antivirus disabling routine | [] | [] | [] |
1,837 | We manually replicated the routine and commands for disabling the defense solutions to further look into the routine. | [] | [] | [] |
1,838 | Figure 17 shows the list of processes that the routine searches on infection : EndpointBasecamp.exe Trend Micro Endpoint Basecamp ResponseService.exe PccNTMon.exe SupportConnector.exe AOTAgent.exe CETASvc.exe CETASvc iVPAgent.exe tmwscsvc.exe TMResponse AOTAgentSvc TMBMServer iVPAgent Trend Micro Web Service Communicator Tmccsf Tmlisten Ntrtscan TmWSCSvc Figure 17. | [
{
"id": 46965,
"label": "FILEPATH",
"start_offset": 80,
"end_offset": 100
},
{
"id": 46966,
"label": "FILEPATH",
"start_offset": 131,
"end_offset": 150
},
{
"id": 46967,
"label": "FILEPATH",
"start_offset": 151,
"end_offset": 163
},
{
"id": 46968,
"label": "FILEPATH",
"start_offset": 164,
"end_offset": 184
},
{
"id": 46972,
"label": "FILEPATH",
"start_offset": 218,
"end_offset": 230
},
{
"id": 46969,
"label": "FILEPATH",
"start_offset": 185,
"end_offset": 197
},
{
"id": 46971,
"label": "FILEPATH",
"start_offset": 198,
"end_offset": 209
},
{
"id": 46973,
"label": "FILEPATH",
"start_offset": 231,
"end_offset": 243
},
{
"id": 46974,
"label": "SOFTWARE",
"start_offset": 101,
"end_offset": 130
},
{
"id": 46975,
"label": "SOFTWARE",
"start_offset": 287,
"end_offset": 323
}
] | [] | [] |
1,839 | Searching for processes We found that aswArPot.sys, registered as aswSP_ArPot2 as a service, is used as the handle for the following DeviceIoControl call. | [
{
"id": 45144,
"label": "FILEPATH",
"start_offset": 42,
"end_offset": 54
}
] | [] | [] |
1,840 | Figure 18. | [] | [] | [] |
1,841 | Driver file preparing to disable an antivirus product The DeviceIoControl function is used to execute parts of the driver. | [] | [] | [] |
1,842 | In this case, the DeviceIoControl is inside a loop that iterates through the list of processes mentioned above. | [] | [] | [] |
1,843 | Additionally, we can see that 0x9988C094 is passed to DeviceIoControl as an argument simultaneous to the ID of the current process in the iteration. | [] | [] | [] |
1,844 | Figure 19. | [] | [] | [] |
1,845 | DeviceIoControl as an argument with the current process ID | [] | [] | [] |
1,846 | Inside aswArPot.sys, we saw 0x9988C094 in a switch case with a function sub_14001DC80 case. | [
{
"id": 46976,
"label": "FILEPATH",
"start_offset": 7,
"end_offset": 19
}
] | [] | [] |
1,847 | Inside function sub_14001DC80, we can see that that function has the capability to terminate a given process. | [] | [] | [] |
1,848 | Figure 20. 0x9988C094 in a switch case with sub_14001DC80 (above), with the latter value terminating a process (below). | [] | [] | [] |
1,849 | Other executions and lateral movement | [
{
"id": 46977,
"label": "attack-pattern",
"start_offset": 25,
"end_offset": 41
}
] | [] | [] |
1,850 | After disabling the security products, the actors behind AvosLocker again tried to transfer other tools, namely Mimikatz and Impacket. | [
{
"id": 46979,
"label": "tools",
"start_offset": 112,
"end_offset": 120
},
{
"id": 46978,
"label": "malware",
"start_offset": 57,
"end_offset": 67
},
{
"id": 46980,
"label": "tools",
"start_offset": 125,
"end_offset": 133
}
] | [
{
"id": 280,
"from_id": 46978,
"to_id": 46979,
"type": "downloads"
},
{
"id": 281,
"from_id": 46978,
"to_id": 46980,
"type": "downloads"
}
] | [] |
1,851 | Figure 21. Execution of Mimikatz (above) and Impacket via C:\temp\wmiexec.exe (below) | [
{
"id": 45148,
"label": "tools",
"start_offset": 50,
"end_offset": 58
},
{
"id": 45146,
"label": "tools",
"start_offset": 29,
"end_offset": 37
},
{
"id": 45147,
"label": "FILEPATH",
"start_offset": 63,
"end_offset": 82
}
] | [] | [] |
1,852 | We also observed the execution of a password recovery tool XenArmor with C:\temp\pass\start.exe. | [
{
"id": 46982,
"label": "tools",
"start_offset": 63,
"end_offset": 71
},
{
"id": 46981,
"label": "FILEPATH",
"start_offset": 77,
"end_offset": 99
}
] | [
{
"id": 282,
"from_id": 46982,
"to_id": 46981,
"type": "consists-of"
}
] | [] |
1,853 | Figure 22. XenArmor password recovery tool execution | [
{
"id": 46983,
"label": "tools",
"start_offset": 16,
"end_offset": 24
}
] | [] | [] |
1,854 | We observed the attackers using an NMAP script to check for Log4shell, the Apache Log4j remote code execution (RCE, with ID CVE-2021-44228) vulnerability across the network. | [
{
"id": 45150,
"label": "vulnerability",
"start_offset": 60,
"end_offset": 69
},
{
"id": 45149,
"label": "tools",
"start_offset": 35,
"end_offset": 39
},
{
"id": 45152,
"label": "vulnerability",
"start_offset": 75,
"end_offset": 109
},
{
"id": 45153,
"label": "vulnerability",
"start_offset": 124,
"end_offset": 138
}
] | [] | [] |
1,855 | They used the command nmap --script log4shell.nse --script-args log4shell.waf-bypass=true --script-args log4shell.callback-server=xx.xx.xx.xx:1389 -p 80,443 xx.xx.xx.xx/xx, and set the callback server to the attacker group C&C server. Figure 23. | [
{
"id": 5436,
"label": "tools",
"start_offset": 22,
"end_offset": 26
}
] | [] | [] |
1,856 | Checking for log4shell We also observed more system network configuration discovery techniques being run, possibly for lateral movement as it tried looking for other available endpoints. | [
{
"id": 5440,
"label": "attack-pattern",
"start_offset": 49,
"end_offset": 87
},
{
"id": 46984,
"label": "attack-pattern",
"start_offset": 123,
"end_offset": 139
}
] | [] | [] |
1,857 | Figure 24. Running more system network configuration discovery scans | [
{
"id": 5442,
"label": "attack-pattern",
"start_offset": 29,
"end_offset": 67
}
] | [] | [] |
1,858 | Deploying across the network We saw software deployment tool PDQ being used to deploy malicious batch scripts to multiple endpoints in the network. | [
{
"id": 46986,
"label": "attack-pattern",
"start_offset": 83,
"end_offset": 113
},
{
"id": 46985,
"label": "tools",
"start_offset": 65,
"end_offset": 68
}
] | [
{
"id": 283,
"from_id": 46986,
"to_id": 46985,
"type": "uses"
}
] | [] |
1,859 | Figure 25. Deploying malicious batch scripts to other endpoints The deployed batch script has the following commands: Disable Windows Update and Microsoft Defender Figure 26. Disable Microsoft defense services Prevents safeboot execution of security products Figure 27. Prevent security products’ execution Create new administrator account Figure 28. Create new account Add the AutoStart mechanism for the AvosLocker executable (update.exe) Figure 29. Add Autostart for ransomware executable Disables legal notice caption Figure 30. Disable legal notice Set safeboot with networking and disables Windows Error Recovery and reboot Figure 31. Setting and disabling network and specific Windows functions Conclusion | [
{
"id": 46990,
"label": "malware",
"start_offset": 449,
"end_offset": 459
},
{
"id": 46991,
"label": "FILEPATH",
"start_offset": 472,
"end_offset": 482
},
{
"id": 46987,
"label": "tools",
"start_offset": 136,
"end_offset": 150
},
{
"id": 46988,
"label": "tools",
"start_offset": 155,
"end_offset": 173
}
] | [] | [] |
1,860 | While AvosLocker has been documented for its abuse of AnyDesk for lateral movement as its preferred application, we note that other remote access applications can also be abused to replace it. | [
{
"id": 45154,
"label": "malware",
"start_offset": 6,
"end_offset": 16
},
{
"id": 45155,
"label": "tools",
"start_offset": 54,
"end_offset": 61
},
{
"id": 45156,
"label": "attack-pattern",
"start_offset": 66,
"end_offset": 82
}
] | [
{
"id": 77,
"from_id": 45154,
"to_id": 45155,
"type": "uses"
},
{
"id": 284,
"from_id": 45156,
"to_id": 45155,
"type": "uses"
},
{
"id": 285,
"from_id": 45154,
"to_id": 45156,
"type": "uses"
}
] | [] |
1,861 | We think the same can be said for the software deployment tool, wherein the malicious actors can subsequently decide to replace and abuse it with other commercially available ones. | [] | [] | [] |
1,862 | In addition, aside from its availability, the decision to choose the specific rootkit driver file is for its capability to execute in kernel mode (therefore operating at a high privilege). | [] | [] | [] |
1,863 | This variant is also capable of modifying other details of the installed security solutions, such as disabling the legal notice. | [] | [] | [] |
1,864 | Other modern ransomware, such as Mespinoza/Pysa, modify the registries of infected systems during their respective routines to inform their victims that they have been compromised. | [
{
"id": 5472,
"label": "threat-actor",
"start_offset": 43,
"end_offset": 47
},
{
"id": 5471,
"label": "threat-actor",
"start_offset": 33,
"end_offset": 42
}
] | [] | [] |
1,865 | Similar to previously documented malware and ransomware groups, AvosLocker takes advantage of the different vulnerabilities that have yet to be patched to get into organizations’ networks. | [
{
"id": 5474,
"label": "malware",
"start_offset": 64,
"end_offset": 74
}
] | [] | [] |
1,866 | Once inside, the continuing trend of abusing legitimate tools and functions to mask malicious activities and actors’ presence | [] | [] | [] |
1,867 | grows in sophistication. | [] | [] | [] |
1,868 | In this case, the attackers were able to study and use Avast’s driver as part of their arsenal to disable other vendors’ security products. | [
{
"id": 46992,
"label": "identity",
"start_offset": 55,
"end_offset": 61
}
] | [] | [] |
1,869 | However, and specific to this instance, the attempt to kill an antivirus product such as this variant’s TaskKill can also be foiled. | [] | [] | [] |
1,870 | In this example using Trend Micro Vision One, the attempt was unsuccessful likely due to the product’s self-protection feature, which allowed the sensors to continue sending data and block the noted routine. | [
{
"id": 46993,
"label": "SOFTWARE",
"start_offset": 22,
"end_offset": 44
}
] | [] | [] |
1,871 | The visibility enabled by the platform allowed us as researchers to capture the extent of this ransomware’s attack chain and replicate the driver file being abused to verify its function during compromise. | [] | [] | [] |
1,872 | Avast responded to our notification with this statement: "We can confirm the vulnerability in an old version of our driver aswArPot.sys, which we fixed in our Avast 21.5 released in June 2021. | [
{
"id": 45157,
"label": "FILEPATH",
"start_offset": 123,
"end_offset": 135
},
{
"id": 45158,
"label": "SOFTWARE",
"start_offset": 159,
"end_offset": 169
},
{
"id": 45159,
"label": "TIME",
"start_offset": 182,
"end_offset": 191
},
{
"id": 45160,
"label": "identity",
"start_offset": 0,
"end_offset": 5
}
] | [
{
"id": 286,
"from_id": 45158,
"to_id": 45157,
"type": "consists-of"
}
] | [] |
1,873 | We also worked closely with Microsoft, so they released a block in the Windows operating system (10 and 11), so the old version of the Avast driver can't be loaded to memory. | [
{
"id": 46995,
"label": "SOFTWARE",
"start_offset": 71,
"end_offset": 107
},
{
"id": 46994,
"label": "identity",
"start_offset": 28,
"end_offset": 37
},
{
"id": 46996,
"label": "SOFTWARE",
"start_offset": 135,
"end_offset": 147
}
] | [] | [] |
1,874 | The below example shows that the blocking works (output from the "sc start" command): | [] | [] | [] |
1,875 | (SC) StartService FAILED 1275: This driver has been blocked from loading | [] | [] | [] |
1,876 | The update from Microsoft for the Windows operating system was published in February as an optional update, and in Microsoft's security release in April, so fully updated machines running Windows 10 and 11 are not vulnerable to this kind of attack. | [
{
"id": 46997,
"label": "SOFTWARE",
"start_offset": 34,
"end_offset": 58
},
{
"id": 46998,
"label": "TIME",
"start_offset": 76,
"end_offset": 84
},
{
"id": 47000,
"label": "identity",
"start_offset": 115,
"end_offset": 124
},
{
"id": 47001,
"label": "TIME",
"start_offset": 147,
"end_offset": 152
},
{
"id": 46999,
"label": "identity",
"start_offset": 16,
"end_offset": 25
},
{
"id": 47002,
"label": "SOFTWARE",
"start_offset": 188,
"end_offset": 205
}
] | [] | [] |
1,877 | All consumer and business antivirus versions of Avast and AVG detect and block this AvosLocker ransomware variant, so our users are protected from this attack vector. | [
{
"id": 47003,
"label": "SOFTWARE",
"start_offset": 48,
"end_offset": 53
},
{
"id": 47004,
"label": "SOFTWARE",
"start_offset": 58,
"end_offset": 61
},
{
"id": 47005,
"label": "malware",
"start_offset": 84,
"end_offset": 94
}
] | [] | [] |
1,878 | For users of third-party antivirus software, to stay protected against this vulnerability, we recommend users to update their Windows operating system with the latest security updates, and to use a fully updated antivirus program." | [
{
"id": 47006,
"label": "SOFTWARE",
"start_offset": 126,
"end_offset": 143
}
] | [] | [] |
1,879 | Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) File SHA256 Detection Malicious batch file component a5ad3355f55e1a15baefea83ce81d038531af516f47716018b1dedf04f081f15 | [
{
"id": 5521,
"label": "SHA1",
"start_offset": 91,
"end_offset": 155
}
] | [] | [] |
1,880 | Trojan | [] | [] | [] |
1,881 | BAT.KILLAV.YACAA | [] | [] | [] |
1,882 | AvosLocker executable 05ba2df0033e3cd5b987d66b6de545df439d338a20165c0ba96cde8a74e463e5 Ransom.Win32.AVOSLOCKER.SMYXBLNT Mimikatz executable (x32 and x64) 912018ab3c6b16b39ee84f17745ff0c80a33cee241013ec35d0281e40c0658d9 HackTool.Win64.MIMIKATZ.ZTJA e81a8f8ad804c4d83869d7806a303ff04f31cce376c5df8aada2e9db2c1eeb98 HackTool.Win32.Mimikatz.CNFW Log4shell Nmap NSE script ddcb0e99f27e79d3536a15e0d51f7f33c38b2ae48677570f36f5e92863db5a96 Backdoor.Win32.CVE202144228.YACAH Impacket tool 14f0c4ce32821a7d25ea5e016ea26067d6615e3336c3baa854ea37a290a462a8 HackTool.Win32.Impacket.AA | [
{
"id": 5525,
"label": "tools",
"start_offset": 120,
"end_offset": 128
},
{
"id": 5529,
"label": "tools",
"start_offset": 352,
"end_offset": 356
},
{
"id": 5523,
"label": "SHA2",
"start_offset": 22,
"end_offset": 86
},
{
"id": 5530,
"label": "SHA2",
"start_offset": 368,
"end_offset": 432
},
{
"id": 5522,
"label": "malware",
"start_offset": 0,
"end_offset": 10
},
{
"id": 5527,
"label": "SHA2",
"start_offset": 154,
"end_offset": 218
},
{
"id": 5528,
"label": "SHA2",
"start_offset": 248,
"end_offset": 312
},
{
"id": 5533,
"label": "SHA2",
"start_offset": 481,
"end_offset": 545
},
{
"id": 5531,
"label": "tools",
"start_offset": 467,
"end_offset": 475
},
{
"id": 47007,
"label": "tools",
"start_offset": 546,
"end_offset": 572
},
{
"id": 47009,
"label": "tools",
"start_offset": 219,
"end_offset": 247
},
{
"id": 47011,
"label": "vulnerability",
"start_offset": 342,
"end_offset": 351
},
{
"id": 47012,
"label": "malware",
"start_offset": 87,
"end_offset": 119
},
{
"id": 47008,
"label": "tools",
"start_offset": 313,
"end_offset": 341
},
{
"id": 47010,
"label": "tools",
"start_offset": 433,
"end_offset": 466
}
] | [
{
"id": 288,
"from_id": 47012,
"to_id": 5522,
"type": "duplicate-of"
},
{
"id": 287,
"from_id": 5522,
"to_id": 5523,
"type": "consists-of"
}
] | [] |
1,883 | Tags Malware | Exploits & Vulnerabilities | Cyber Threats | APT & Targeted Attacks | Compliance & Risks | Endpoints | Ransomware | Network | Articles, News, Reports | [] | [] | [] |
1,884 | In the process of monitoring changes in the threat landscape, we get a clearer insight into the way threat actors work behind the schemes. | [] | [] | [] |
1,885 | In this case we dig deeper into the possible connection between cyberattacks by focusing on the similarities an unnamed threat actor shares with Confucius, Patchwork, and another threat actor called Bahamut. | [
{
"id": 47014,
"label": "threat-actor",
"start_offset": 156,
"end_offset": 165
},
{
"id": 47013,
"label": "threat-actor",
"start_offset": 145,
"end_offset": 154
},
{
"id": 47015,
"label": "threat-actor",
"start_offset": 199,
"end_offset": 206
}
] | [] | [] |
1,886 | For the sake of this report, we will call this unnamed threat actor “Urpage.” | [
{
"id": 47016,
"label": "threat-actor",
"start_offset": 69,
"end_offset": 75
}
] | [] | [] |
1,887 | What sets Urpage attacks apart is its targeting of InPage, a word processor for Urdu and Arabic languages. | [
{
"id": 45163,
"label": "SOFTWARE",
"start_offset": 51,
"end_offset": 57
},
{
"id": 45162,
"label": "threat-actor",
"start_offset": 10,
"end_offset": 16
}
] | [
{
"id": 78,
"from_id": 45162,
"to_id": 45163,
"type": "targets"
}
] | [] |
1,888 | However, its Delphi backdoor component, which it has in common with Confucius and Patchwork, and its apparent use of Bahamut-like malware, is what makes it more intriguing as it connects Urpage to these other known threats. | [
{
"id": 47017,
"label": "threat-actor",
"start_offset": 68,
"end_offset": 77
},
{
"id": 47019,
"label": "threat-actor",
"start_offset": 82,
"end_offset": 91
},
{
"id": 47020,
"label": "threat-actor",
"start_offset": 117,
"end_offset": 124
},
{
"id": 47021,
"label": "threat-actor",
"start_offset": 187,
"end_offset": 193
}
] | [] | [] |
1,889 | In our previous entry, we already covered the Delphi component in the context of the Confucius and Patchwork connection. | [
{
"id": 47022,
"label": "threat-actor",
"start_offset": 85,
"end_offset": 94
},
{
"id": 47023,
"label": "threat-actor",
"start_offset": 99,
"end_offset": 108
}
] | [] | [] |
1,890 | We mentioned Urpage as a third unnamed threat actor connected to the two. | [
{
"id": 45164,
"label": "threat-actor",
"start_offset": 13,
"end_offset": 19
}
] | [] | [] |
1,891 | This time, we look into Urpage to gain a deeper insight into the way several threat actors' actions intersect. | [
{
"id": 47024,
"label": "threat-actor",
"start_offset": 24,
"end_offset": 30
}
] | [] | [] |
1,892 | The Bahamut Link Fake websites | [
{
"id": 5568,
"label": "threat-actor",
"start_offset": 4,
"end_offset": 11
}
] | [] | [] |
1,893 | The link between Bahamut and Urpage can be best discussed by way of the multiple malicious Android samples that matched Bahamut's code and had C&C belonging to the Urpage infrastructure. | [
{
"id": 45170,
"label": "Infrastucture",
"start_offset": 143,
"end_offset": 146
},
{
"id": 45167,
"label": "threat-actor",
"start_offset": 120,
"end_offset": 128
},
{
"id": 5570,
"label": "threat-actor",
"start_offset": 17,
"end_offset": 24
},
{
"id": 5572,
"label": "threat-actor",
"start_offset": 29,
"end_offset": 35
},
{
"id": 5578,
"label": "threat-actor",
"start_offset": 164,
"end_offset": 170
},
{
"id": 47025,
"label": "SOFTWARE",
"start_offset": 91,
"end_offset": 106
}
] | [
{
"id": 289,
"from_id": 5570,
"to_id": 5572,
"type": "related-to"
}
] | [] |
1,894 | Some of these C&C websites also act as phishing sites that lure users into downloading these very applications. | [
{
"id": 47026,
"label": "attack-pattern",
"start_offset": 39,
"end_offset": 47
}
] | [] | [] |
1,895 | The threat actor sets up these fake websites describing the application and linking to the Google Play Store to download it, like in the case of the malicious website, pikrpro[.]eu, seen below Another sample website involved the use of a closely copied version of an existing website, with slight changes in the logo and options above the page. | [
{
"id": 47027,
"label": "SOFTWARE",
"start_offset": 91,
"end_offset": 108
},
{
"id": 47028,
"label": "DOMAIN",
"start_offset": 168,
"end_offset": 180
}
] | [] | [] |
1,896 | The download links were also replaced to download the malicious Android application instead. | [
{
"id": 45171,
"label": "SOFTWARE",
"start_offset": 64,
"end_offset": 71
}
] | [] | [] |
1,897 | Figure 1. | [] | [] | [] |
1,898 | Original (top) and modified (bottom) website | [] | [] | [] |
1,899 | Upon writing this entry, we’ve coordinated with Google to ensure that the malicious applications these C&C sites advertise are no longer available for download on the Google Play Store. | [
{
"id": 45172,
"label": "identity",
"start_offset": 48,
"end_offset": 54
},
{
"id": 45173,
"label": "SOFTWARE",
"start_offset": 167,
"end_offset": 184
}
] | [] | [] |
1,900 | It is important to note however, that not all C&C websites for Urpage advertise malicious applications. | [
{
"id": 5595,
"label": "threat-actor",
"start_offset": 63,
"end_offset": 69
}
] | [] | [] |
1,901 | Some simply contain a random template with empty categories, likely as a ploy to hide its malicious activities. | [] | [] | [] |
1,902 | Android targeting | [
{
"id": 45174,
"label": "SOFTWARE",
"start_offset": 0,
"end_offset": 7
}
] | [] | [] |
1,903 | As with Bahamut applications, once downloaded and executed, it showed multiple malicious features that deal with stealing information. | [
{
"id": 47030,
"label": "attack-pattern",
"start_offset": 113,
"end_offset": 133
},
{
"id": 47029,
"label": "threat-actor",
"start_offset": 8,
"end_offset": 15
}
] | [
{
"id": 290,
"from_id": 47029,
"to_id": 47030,
"type": "uses"
}
] | [] |
1,904 | Some of these features are listed below. | [] | [] | [] |
1,905 | Retrieves basic information like network information and MAC address from an infected phone SMS stealing Contacts stealing Audio recording GPS location retrieval Steals files with the specific extensions, although not all samples target these extensions. | [] | [] | [] |
1,906 | File type File extensions Document files .txt, .csv, .doc, .docx, .xls, .xlsx, .pdf WhatsApp databases .db.crypt5 to .db.crypt12 Geolocation related files .kml, .kmz, .gmx, .aqm Audio files .mp3, .opus Videos .mp4, .amr, .wmv, .3gp, Pictures .jpeg, .jpg | [
{
"id": 47031,
"label": "SOFTWARE",
"start_offset": 86,
"end_offset": 94
}
] | [] | [] |
1,907 | Of note is one specific application that had a different purpose from the others. | [] | [] | [] |
1,908 | This application has the same encryption routine as other Urpage applications. | [
{
"id": 45175,
"label": "threat-actor",
"start_offset": 58,
"end_offset": 64
}
] | [] | [] |
1,909 | Instead of stealing documents or images, it works on top of a modified version of the legitimate Threema, an end-to-end encrypted messaging application, to steal screenshots of messages. | [
{
"id": 47032,
"label": "SOFTWARE",
"start_offset": 97,
"end_offset": 104
}
] | [] | [] |
1,910 | This application has the same icon and label as the legitimate Threema. | [
{
"id": 47033,
"label": "SOFTWARE",
"start_offset": 63,
"end_offset": 70
}
] | [] | [] |
1,911 | Once launched, it drops a modified APK version of Threema and prompts the user to install the application. | [
{
"id": 45176,
"label": "SOFTWARE",
"start_offset": 50,
"end_offset": 57
}
] | [] | [] |
1,912 | The malicious application then hides its icon on the device but still runs in the background, while the modified Threema works like normal. | [
{
"id": 47034,
"label": "SOFTWARE",
"start_offset": 113,
"end_offset": 120
}
] | [] | [] |
1,913 | Unknown to the user, the code in the modified Threema allows it to take screenshots of itself every 10 seconds. | [
{
"id": 5617,
"label": "TIME",
"start_offset": 94,
"end_offset": 110
},
{
"id": 47035,
"label": "SOFTWARE",
"start_offset": 46,
"end_offset": 53
}
] | [] | [] |
1,914 | These images are stored in the location/sdcard/Android/data/ch.threema.app/DataData directory, while the “dropper” or the malicious application working in the background uploads the images to the C&C for the threat actor to access. | [
{
"id": 45177,
"label": "FILEPATH",
"start_offset": 39,
"end_offset": 83
},
{
"id": 45178,
"label": "Infrastucture",
"start_offset": 196,
"end_offset": 199
}
] | [] | [] |
1,915 | Figure 2. Comparison of legitimate Threema code (left) to the modified version (right) with the inserted code | [
{
"id": 47036,
"label": "SOFTWARE",
"start_offset": 35,
"end_offset": 42
}
] | [] | [] |
1,916 | Other activities | [] | [] | [] |