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mon good is identified with acting justly or attending to the inter ests of all members of a society in a spirit of impartiality. This identification of the 'common good' with justice is not universally accepted. See Sidgwick, 17ze Method of Ethics, chap. 3· NOTES 301 Page I 67. Moral obligation. For the need to distinguish the obligation and duties of social morality both from moral ideals and personal morality, see Urmson, 'Saints and Heroes' in Essays on Moral Phi losophy (Melden ed.); Whiteley, 'On Defining "Morality"', in 20 Ana{ysis (I96o); Strawson, 'Social Morality and Individual Ideal' in Philosophy (I96I); Bradley, Ethical Studies, chaps. 5 and 6. Page I 69. 17ze moraliry qf a social group. Austin in 17ze Province uses the expression 'positive morality' to distinguish the actual morality observed within a society from the 'law of God', which constitutes for him the ultimate standards by which both positive morality and positive law are to be tested. This marks the very important distinc tion between a social morality and those moral principles which transcend it and are used in criticism of it. Austin's 'positive mo rality', however, includes all social rules other than positive law; it embraces rules of etiquette, games, clubs, and international law, as well as what is ordinarily thought and spoken of as morality. This wide use of the term morality obscures too many important distinc tions of form and social function. See Chapter X, s. 4· Page I72. Essential rules. See Chapter IX, s. 2, for the development of the idea that rules restricting the use of violence and requiring respect for property and promises constitute a 'minimum content' of Natural Law underlying both positive law and social morality. Pages I 72-3. Law and external behaviour. The view criticized in the text that whereas the law requires external behaviour, and morality does not, has been inherited by jurists from Kant's distinction be tween juridical and ethical laws. See the General Introduction to the Metaphysic of Morals in Hastie, Kant's Philosophy qf Law (I887), pp. I4 and 20-4. A modern restatement of this doctrine is in Kantorowicz, 17ze Definition qf Law, pp. 43-5I, criticized by Hughes in 'The Existence of a Legal System', 35 New York Universiry LR (I96o ). Page I 78. Mens rea and objective standards. See Holmes, 17ze Common Law, Lecture I I; Hall, Principles qf Criminal Law, chaps. 5 and 6; Hart, 'Legal Responsibility and Excuses', in Determinism and Freedom (ed. Hook). Page I 79· Justification and excuse. On this distinction in the law of homicide see Kenny, Outlines qf Criminal Law (24th edn.), pp. I09- I6. For its general moral importance see Austin, 'A Plea for Excuses', 57 PAS (I956-7); Hart, 'Prolegomenon to the Principles ofPunishment', 6o PAS (I959-6o), p. I2. For a similar distinction see Bentham, Of Laws in General, pp. I2I-2 on 'exemption' and 'exculpation'. NOTES Page I8I. Morality, human needs, and interests. For the view that the criterion for calling a rule a moral rule is that it is the product of reasoned and impartial consideration of the interests of those affected, see Benn and Peters, Social Principles if the Democratic State, chap. 2. Contrast Devlin, The Enforcement if Morals (I959). CHAPTER IX Page I 85. Natural Law. The existence of a vast literature of com ment on classical, scholastic, and modern conceptions of Natural Law and the ambiguities of the expression 'positivism' (see below) often make it difficult to see precisely what issue is at stake when Natural Law is opposed to Legal Positivism. An effort is made in the text to identify one such issue. But very little can be gained	Clarendon
from a discussion of this subject if only secondary sources are read. Some first-hand acquaintance with the vocabulary and philo sophical presuppositions of the primary sources is indispensable. The following represent an easily accessible minimum. Aristotle, Physics, ii, chap. 8 (trans. Ross, Oxford); Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Quaestiones 90-7 (available with translation in D'Entreves, Aquinas: Selected Political Writings, Oxford, I948); Grotius, On the Law if War and Peace; Prolegomena (trans. in The Classics of International Law, vol. 3, Oxford, I925); Blackstone, Commentaries, Introduction, s. 2. Page I85. Legal Positivism. The expression 'positivism' is used in con temporary Anglo-American literature to designate one or more of the following contentions: (I) that laws are commands of human beings; (2) that there is no necessary connection between law and morals, or law as it is and law as it ought to be; (3) that the analysis or study of meanings of legal concepts is an important study to be distinguished from (though in no way hostile to) historical inquir ies, sociological inquiries, and the critical appraisal of law in terms of morals, social aims, functions, &c.; (4) that a legal system is a 'closed logical system' in which correct decisions can be deduced from predetermined legal rules by logical means alone; (5) that moral judgments cannot be established, as statements of fact can, by rational argument, evidence or proof ('non cognitivism in eth ics'). Bentham and Austin held the views expressed in (I), (2), and (3) but not those in (4) and (5); Kelsen holds those expressed in (2), (3), and (5) but not those in (I) or (4). Contention (4) is often ascribed to 'analytical jurists' but apparently without good reason. In continental literature the expression 'positivism' is often used for the general repudiation of the claim that some principles or rules of human conduct are discoverable by reason alone. See the valuable discussion of the ambiguities of 'positivism' by Ago, op. cit., in 51 American journal if International Law (I957). NOTES Page I86. Mill on Natural Law. See his Essay on Nature in Nature, the Utility rif Religion and Theism. Page I87. Blackstone and Bentham on Natural Law. Blackstone, loc. cit., and Bentham, Comment on the Commentaries, ss. I-6. Page I93· The minimum content rif natural law. This empirical version of natural law is based on Hobbes, Leviathan, chaps. I4 and I 5, and Hume, Treatise rif Human Nature, Book III, part 2; esp. ss. 2 and 4-7· Page 200. Huckleberry Finn. Mark Twain's novel is a profound study of the moral dilemma created by the existence of a social morality which runs counter to the sympathies of an individual and to hu manitarianism. It is a valuable corrective of the identification of all morality with the latter. Page 200. Slavery. For Aristotle a slave was 'a living instrument'. (Politics, I, chaps. 2-4). Page 203. The influence rif morality on law. Valuable studies of the ways in which the development of law has been influenced by morality are Ames, 'Law and Morals', 22 HLR (I9o8); Pound, Law and Morals (I926); Goodhart, English Law and the Moral Law (I953). Austin fully recognized this factual or causal connection. See The Province, Lecture V, p. I62. Page 204. Interpretation. On the place of moral considerations in the interpretation of law see Lamont, The Value judgment, pp. 296-3 I; Wechsler, 'Towards Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law', 73 HLR i, p. 96o; Hart, op. cit., in 71 HLR, pp. 6o6-I5, and Fuller's criticism, ib. 66I ad fin. For Austin's recognition of the area left open for judicial choice between 'competing analogies' and his criti	Clarendon
cism of the judges' failure to adapt their decisions to the standard of utility, see The Lectures, Lectures 37 and 38. Page 205. Criticism rif law and the right rif all men to equal consideration. See Benn and Peters, Social Principles and the Democratic State, chaps. 2 and 5, and Baier, The Moral Point rif View, chap. 8, for the view that the recognition of such a right is not merely one among many possible moralities but a defining feature of true morality. Page 206. Principles of legality and justice. See Hall, Principles of Criminal Law, chap. i and, for the 'internal morality oflaw', see Fuller, op. cit., 71 HLR (1958), pp. 644-8. Page 208. Revival of Natural Law doctrines in post-war Germany. See for a discussion of the later views of G. Radbruch, Hart, and reply by Fuller in op. cit. in 71 HLR (I958). The discussion there of the decision of the Oberlandsgericht Bamberg of July I 949, in which a NOTES wife who had denounced her husband for an offence against a Nazi statute of I934 was convicted of unlawfully depriving him of his freedom, proceeded on the footing that the account of the case in 64 HLR (I95I), p. 1005, was correct and that the German court held the statute of I934 to be invalid. The accuracy of this account has recently been challenged by Pappe, 'On the Validity of Judicial Decisions in the Nazi Era', 23 MLR (I96o). Dr Pappe's criticism is well founded and the case as discussed by Hart should strictly be regarded as hypothetical. As Dr Pappe shows (op. cit., p. 263), in the actual case the court (Provincial Court of Appeal), after accept ing the theoretical possibility that statutes might be unlawful if they violated Natural Law, held that the Nazi statute in question did not violate it; the accused was held guilty of an unlawful deprivation of liberty since she had no duty to inform, but did so for purely per sonal reasons and must have realized that to do so was in the circumstances 'contrary to the sound conscience and sense of justice of all decent human beings'. Dr Pappe's careful analysis of a deci sion of the German Supreme Court in a similar case should be studied (ib., p. 268 ad fin.). CHAPTER X Page 2I4. 'Is international law really law?' For the view that this is a merely verbal question mistaken for a question of fact see Glanville Williams, op. cit., in 22 BYBIL (I945). Page 2 I 5· Sources if doubt. For a constructive general survey see A. H. Campbell, 'International Law and the Student of J urispru dence' in 35 Grotius Society Proceedings (I95o); Gihl, 'The Legal Character and Sources of International Law' in Scandinavian Studies in Law (I957). Page 2I6. 'How can international law be binding?' This question (sometimes referred to as 'the problem of the binding force' of international law) is raised by Fischer Williams, Chapters on Current International Law, pp. I I-27; Brierly, The Law if Nations, 5th edn. (I 955), chap. 2; The Basis if Obligation in International Law (I 958), chap. r. See also Fitzmaurice, 'The Foundations of the Authority of International Law and the Problem of Enforcement' in 19 MLR (I956). These authors do not explicitly discuss the meaning of the assertion that a system of rules is (or is not) binding. Page 2I7. Sanctions in International Law. For the position under Art. I 6 of the Covenant of the League of Nations see Fischer Williams, 'Sanctions under the Covenant' in 17 BYBIL (I936). For sanctions under chapter vii of the UN Charter see Kelsen, 'Sanctions in NOTES International Law under the Charter of U.N.', 31 Iowa LR (I946), and Tucker, 'The Interpretation of War under present Interna tional Law', 4 The International Law Quarterly (I 95 I). On the Korean	Clarendon
War, see Stone, Legal Controls if International Coriflict (I954), chap. ix, Discourse I4. It is of course arguable that the Uniting for Peace Resolution showed that the United Nations was not 'paralyzed'. Page 220. International Law thought and spoken if as obligatory. See Jessup, A Modern Law if Nations, chap. I, and 'The Reality of International Law', IIB Foreign Affairs (I940). Page 220. The Sovereignty, if States. For a clear exposition of the view that 'sovereignty is only a name given to so much of the interna tional field as is left by law to the individual action of states' see Fischer Williams, op. cit., pp. ID-II, 285-99, and Aspects if Modern International Law, pp. 24-6, and Van Kleffens, 'Sovereignty and International Law', Recueil des Cours (I 953), i, pp. 82-3. Page 221. The State. For the notion of a 'state' and types of depend ent states see Brierly, The Law if Nations, chap. 4· Page 224. Voluntarist and 'Auto-limitation' theories. The principal au thors are J ellinek, Die Rechtliche Natur der Staatsvertriige; Triepel, 'Les Rapports entre le droit interne et la droit internationale', Recueil des Cours (I923). The extreme view is that of Zorn, Grund;::iige des Volkerrechts. See the critical discussion of this form of 'positivism' in Gihl, op. cit., in Scandinavian Studies in Law (I957); Starke, An In troduction to International Law, chap. I; Fischer Williams, Chapters on Current International Law, pp. I I-I 6. Page 224. Obligation and consent. The view that no rule of interna tional law is binding on a state without its prior consent, express or tacit, has been expressed by English courts (seeR. v. Keyn I876, 2 Ex. Div. 63, 'The Franconia') and also by the Permanent Court of International Justice. See The Lotus, PCI] Series A, No. IO. Page 226. New States and States acquiring maritime territory. See Kelsen, Principles if International Law, pp. 3 I 2- I 3· Page 226. Effect on non-parties if general international treaties. See Kelsen, op. cit., 345 ff.; Starke, op. cit., chap. I; Brierly, op. cit., chap. vii, pp. 25I-2. Page 227. Comprehensive use if term 'morality'. See Austin on 'positive morality' in The Province, Lecture V, pp. I25-9, I4I-2. Page 230. Moral obligation to obey international law. For the view that this is 'the foundation' of international law see Lauterpacht, Intro duction to Brierly's The Base if Obligation in International Law, xviii, and Brierly, ib., chap. 1. 306 NOTES Page 232. Treaty imposed by force as legislation. See Scott, 'The Legal Nature of International Law' in American journal !if International Law (I907) at pp. 837, 862-4. For criticism of the common description of general treaties as 'international legislation' see Jennings, 'The Progressive Development of International Law and its Codifica tion', 24 BYBIL (I947) at p. 303. Page 233· Decentralized sanctions. See Kelsen, op. cit., p. 20, and Tucker in op. cit., 4 International Law Quarterly (I 95 I). Page 233. The basic norm !if international law. For its formulation as pacta sunt servanda see Anzilotti, Corso di diritto interna;::,ionale (I923), p. 40. For the substitution of 'States ought to behave as they have customarily behaved' see Kelsen, General Theory, p. 369, and Prin ciples !if International Law, p. 4I8. See the important critical discus sion by Gihl, International Legislation (I937) and op. cit. in Scandinavian Studies in Law (I957), pp. 62 ff. For the fuller development of the interpretation of international law as containing no basic norm see Ago, 'Positive Law and International Law' in 51 American Journal !if International Law (I 95 7) and Scien;::,a giuridica e diritto interna;::,ionale	Clarendon
(I958). Gihl draws the conclusion that in spite of Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court international law has no formal sources of law. See for an attempt to formulate for international law an 'initial hypothesis' which seems open to similar criticisms to those urged in the text, Lauterpacht, The Future !if Law in the Inter national Community, pp. 420-3. Page 237. Analogy !if content between international law and municipal law. See Campbell, op. cit. in 35 Grotius Society Proceedings (I 950), p. I 2 I ad fin., and the discussion of treaties and the rules governing acqui sition of territory, prescriptions, leases, mandates, servitudes, &c., in Lauterpacht, Private Law Sources and Analogies !if International Law (I927). Page 272. [An alternative beginning to this section is included here, as it was not discarded.) Throughout the long sequence of his writings on adjudication Dworkin has unswervingly maintained his denial that the courts have discretion in the sense of a law-creating power to decide cases left incompletely regulated by the existing law. Indeed he has argued that apart from some trivial exceptions there are no such cases, since as he has famously said, there is always a single 'right answer' to any meaningful question as to what the law is on any point of law arising in any case.' ' [See his 'No Right Answer?' in P.M. S. Hacker andJ. Raz (eds.), Law, Morality and Society ( 1977), pp. 58-84; reprinted with revisions as 'Is There Really No Right Answer in Hard Cases?' AMP, chap. 5.] NOTES But notwithstanding this appearance of an unchanging doc trine, Dworkin's later introduction of interpretive ideas into his legal theory and his claim that all propositions of law are 'interpretive' in the special sense which he has given to this expression, has (as Raz was the first to make clear)" brought the substance of this position very close to my own in recognizing that the courts in fact have and frequently exercise a law-creating discretion. Arguably before the introduction of interpretive ideas into his theory there seemed to be a great difference between our respective accounts of adjudication, because Dworkin's earlier denial of judicial discretion in the strong sense and his insistence that there is always a right answer were associated with the idea that the judge's role in deciding cases was to discern and enforce existing law. But this earlier conception which of course conflicted very sharply with my claim that the courts in deciding cases often exercise a law-creating discretion does not figure at all in [The text of the alternative beginning to Section 6 ends at this point.] ' [SeeJ. Raz. 'Dworkin: A New Link in the Chain', 74 California Law Review, I 103 (1g86) at IIIO, IIIS-16.) INDEX (N.B. References to pages after p. 276 are to the Notes) Adjudication, rules of, 96-99; theory of 259, 275; and see Courts, Judges. Agnelli, A., 283. Ago, 293, 302, 306. Allen, C. K., 294· Ames, J. B., 303. Analogy, I6, 8I, 274,280,306. Anzilotti, D., 306. Aquinas, 8n., I9I, 302. Aristotle, I62, I9I, 28o, 300, 302, 303. Atkin, Lord, 264. Augustine, St., 8n., I4, I56. Austin, John, I, 6, 7, 8, I 6, I7, I8, I9, 20, 2In., 23, 25, 60, 63, 73, 74, 8I, I49, 207, 2II, 244, 246, 277, 278, 280, 28I, 282, 283, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 299, 300, 30 I, 302, 303, 305. Austin, J. L., I4, 279, 301. Authority, I 9-20, 98; legislative, 58-64, 70. distinguished from power, 63, 20I, 202-3. Baier, K., 287, 292, 303. Basic Norm, see Kelsen, H., and Recognition, Rule of. Bohnert, H. G., 280. Bradley, F. H., 301. Brierly, J. L., 304, 305. Broad, C. D., 291. Buckland, W. W., 284, 286.	Clarendon
Campbell, A. H., 286, 290, 304, 306. Cardozo, B., 274. Cattaneo, M., 296. Certainty of Law, see Uncertainty. Change, rule of, 95-9; and see Legislation. Cohen, L. J., 279, 291. Cohen, M., 242. Coleman, J ., 25 I, 265. Commands, I6, I9-2o; and see Imperatives; Orders; Tacit commands. Commonwealth, emergence of independent legal systems in, I 20-2, 296; and see Constitutional Law; Westminster, Statute of. Conceptualism, I 23, I 29-30, 297; and see Formalism. Constitutional Law: as 'positive morality', I. restricting legislature, 68-70, 7I-8, 289-90. Benn, S. I., and Peters, R. S., amendment of, 72-3, n-8, 300, 302, 303. Bentham, Jeremy, I7, 63, I87, 2I I, 237, 244, 272, 279, 28 I, 286, 287, 289, 290, 30I, 302, 303. Blackstone, I87, 302, 303. 290. And see Legislature; Limitations, Legal; Parliament; Recognition, Rule of; South Africa; United States. 310 INDEX Contracts, 9, 28, 38, 4I, 96; Duties, 7, 27-8, 4I-2, I70-I, and see Promises. Conventions of British Constitution, I I I, 295· Courts, 2, 5, 29-30, 40, 97, I36, I37· and rule of recognition, 6s-6, II3-I7, I48-9, IS2-4. creative function of, I 32-6, I4I-7' 272, 273-6. finality and infallibility of, I4I-7. 268-9, 271. distinguished from disability, 69-70. character of rules imposing, 87, 256. and obligation, 284. and predictions, 286. And see Obligation; Rules. Dworkin, R. M., 238-76, 306-7. And see Adjudication; Judges; Efficacy of Law, 103-4, Precedent; Realism. Cowen, D. V ., 299· Criminal Law, 6-7, 9, 24, 27, 28, 32, 33, 37, 40-I, 79, 87. Cross, R., 298. Custom, legal status of, 44-8, 64, 68, 9I, 287, 29I, 292; and see Rules, Primary; Tacit Command. Daube, D., 283. Definition, I3-I7: of law, 6, 208-I2, 2I3-IS, 239-40, 279· Del Vecchio, G., 299· Democracy: judges in a, 275· legislators in a, 6o. sovereign in a, so, 73-6. Devlin, L.J ., 302. Dewey, J ., 297. Diamond, A. S., 291. Dicey, A. V., III, ISI, 295· Dickinson, J ., 29 I, 297, 298. Discretion: of rule-making bodies, I 32. of Courts, I4I-7, 252, 254, 259, 272-3, 275-6. of scorer in a game, I42-6. Dixon, Sir 0., 296, 299· 294-5· Electorate as sovereign, 48, 7I-8, 290. Evans-Pritchard, E. E., 292. Existence: of a legal system, 6o-I, I I 2-I 7, 295-6. of a rule, I09-IO. Fiction involved in rules, I 2. Fitzmaurice, G. G., 304. Formalism, I 24-54, 297; and see Conceptualism. Frank, Jerome, 277, 286, 289, 291. Frankfurter, F., 290. Friedmann, W ., 299, 300. Fuller, L. L., 208n., 238, 303. Games: variety of rules in, 9, 3 I. scoring rule in, 34, 59, I 02. theory that all rules are addressed to officials applied to, 40, 285. internal aspect of rules in, s6-7. persistence of law illustrated by umpire's decision in, 63. INDEX 311 move in chess and compliance with rules in, I40-I. scorer's discretion in and theory that law is what Courts do, I42-5. definition of, 280. Gavison, R., 238, 240. Germany: Nazi, 200, 208. revival of natural law arguments in post-war, 208-I 2, 303-4. Gihl, T., 304, 305, 306. Gluckman, M., 292. Goodhart, A. L., 296, 303. Gray, J. C., I, I4I, 207, 278, 287, 289. Grice, P., 281. Grotius, 302. Habits and rules, 9-I 2, 55-60, 289; and see Obedience; Rules. Hagerstrom, A., 279, 28I, 287, 291. Hall, J ., 303. Hand, Learned, 298. Hare, R. M., 280, 287. Hart, H. L. A., !.W8n. I, 279, 28I, 282, 285, 289, 290, 29 I, 295, 296, 297, 299, 30I, 303, 304. [See also 238 ff.] Hoadly, Bishop, I4I, I45· Hobbes, T., 63, I9I, 289, 299-300, 303. Hofstadter, A., and McKinvey, J. C. C., 28o. Hohfeld, W. N ., 289. Holmes, 0. W., J., I, 8, 274, 278, 286, 290, 298, 30!. Huckleberry Finn, 200, 303. Hughes, C. E., C. J., 298-9. Hughes, G., 295, 301. Honore, A. M., 297.	Clarendon
Hume, D., I9I, 303. Hutcheson, J. C., 298. Imperatives, varieties of, I 8-20, 280-I; and see Commands; Orders; Tacit Command. Independence: of a legal system, 24, 25, I I9-22, 296. of a state, 22I-6. Internal and External Points of View, 89-9I, 242-3, 254; and see Rules, internal aspect o£ International Law, 3, 4, 68, 79, II9, I22, I56, I77' I95, I98, 2I3-37, 304-6. Interpretation, 204-5, 263-8. Iraq, 226. Israel, 226. Jackson, H., 300. Jellinek., G., 305. Jenks, E., 284. Jennings, R., 306. Jennings, W. lvor, 289. Jensen, 0. C., 297· Jessup, P. C., 305. Jones, J. W., 297. Judges: powers of, 29, 4 I, 96-7. duties of, 29. phenomenology of decision- making by, 273-4. And see Courts. Jurisdiction, 29-30, 36, 97-8; and see Courts. Justice, 7-8, I55-67, 246, 299-300. in distribution, I 58-64, I 67. in compensation, I 63-6. natural, I 6o, 206. 312 INDEX Kant, I., go 1. Kantorowicz, H., 279, 2g8, go I. dependence on language of, I24-8. and morality, I76-8, Kelsen, H., 2, I8, g5-6, 207, 22g-go. 2gg, 278, 28g, 284, 286, 287, 292-g, 294-5, 296-7, go2, go4, go5, go6; and see Recognition, Rule of. Lamont, W. D., gog. Latham, R. T., 2g6. Lauterpacht, H., go5, go6. League of Nations, 2 I 7. Legal System: existence of, 6I, I I2-I7, 295· distinguished from a set of separate rules, g2-g, 2g4-7, 249· interruption of, I I 8-I g. emergence of new, I 20-1. partial breakdown of, I 22-g. And see Revolution. Legal Theory, v-vi, I-2, I6-I7. as descriptive, v, 240, 242-4. as general, 2gg-4o, 242, 244· as evaluative and interpretive, 240-4, 248-g, 26g, 271. as semantic, 244-8. imperative, vi, 244, and see Orders. And see Natural Law; Positivism, Legal, Realism, Legal. and international law, 22g-gi, 2g2-g, go5. Legislature, 5, 48, 275, 282-g; and see Legislation; Sovereign. Limitations, legal on legislature, 66-7 I, 73, 7 4, 77 , 106. Lyons, D., 265. Macmillan, Lord, 274· Marshall, G., 279, 28g, 295, 2g6, 297' 299· Melden, A., 282, 285, 2go, go I. Mill, J. S., I 86, I 87, gog. Miller, 2g8. Montesquieu, I 86, I 87. Moore, M., 241. Morality: and law, 7-8, I 7, 86, I85-2I 2, 268-72. characterization of, I 55-84, 227-go, go1. obligations of, I 6g-82. 'internality' of, I 72-g, I7g-8o. importance of, I 73-5. immunity of from deliberate change, I 7 5-8. and voluntary action, I 78-g. social pressure supporting, Legislation, 22, go-gi, g8, I7g-8o. 282-g, 286-7. self-binding, 42-4, 286-7. authority of, 54-5· 58-6g, 288-g. legal limits on, 66-7 I. manner and form of, 68, 7 I, I50-2, 28g. ideals of, I82-g. personal forms of, I 84. and human interests, I 80-2. and criticism of law, I55-67, I8g-4, 205-6. and legal validity, 200-I 2, 25g-4. INDEX and development of law, 2og-4, gog. and international law, 227-g2. And see Natural Law. Morison, W. L., 28g, 287, 288. Natural Justice, I6o, 206. Natural Law, 8, I56, I8I, I85-2oo, go2, gog. concept of nature in, I88-gi. empirical version of, Igi-g. minimum content of, Igg-200. revival of in post-war Germany, 2o8-I2, gog-4. Negligence, Ig2-g. Normative language, 57, 86, I I 7; and see Obligation; Rules. Nowell-Smith, P., 290. Nuer, The, 292. Nullity, 28, go-I, gg-s, 49, 285, 286. Obedience, Ig, go, gi-2. habit of, 24, so-66, 75, 76-7. and continuity of legislative authority, SI-61. and persistence of laws, 6I-6. and existence of a legal system, I I 2- I 7. And see Habits and rules. Obligation, 6-7, 27, 4g-4, 82-gi, 284. analysis of in terms of rules, 82-gi, 2go. and feelings of compulsion, 88, I g8, 290. and prediction of sanction, Io-I I, 8g-5, 88-gi, Ig7-9· having an, distinguished from being obliged, 82-g, go, 282. moral and legal, I 67-70. in international law, 2I6-26. and duty, 284.	Clarendon
Officials, 20-I, g8-g, 6o-I, go-8, I Ig-I7. Olivecrona, K., 278. Open texture of law, I2g, I28-g6, I45, I47, 204, 252, 272-g, 278, 297· Orders: backed by threats or coercive, 6, I6, Ig, 20-5. and rules conferring powers, 28-g2. and legislation, 42. inadequacy of for analysis of law, 48-g, 79-80. And see Imperatives; Commands; Tacit Command; Rules. Pappe, H., go4. Parliament, 25, I07. sovereignty of, 67, 74-8, I07, III, I49-52, 282-g, 299· and Commonwealth, I 20- I, 2g6. Parliament Acts 1911 and 1949· ISI-2. Payne, D. J., 287. Perelman, Ch., 299. Piddington, R., 28g. Plato, I62, I86. Positivism, legal, 8, I 85-6, 207, 2I2, 24I, 244-54, 259, 265, 268, 269-70, 27 I, 272, go2. INDEX Pound, R., 297, 303. Powers, see Rules, conferring powers. Precedent, I 24-6, I 27, I 34-5, I 54, 297, 298. conferring powers distinguished from rules imposing obligations or duties, 26-49, 8o-I, 283-6. contrasted with habits, 9-I I, Primitive law, 3, 4, 84, 9I-2, ss-6o, 289. IS6, 291. Promises, 34, 43-4, I97, 225-6. Prosser, W. L., 300. Punishment, 7, I o- I I , 27, 34, 36-7, 39, 89, I73, I79-8o; and see Sanction; Criminal Law. Radbruch, G., 303. Radcliffe, Lord, 277. Raphael, D., 300. Rawls, J ., 246, 300. Raz, J ., 254, 262. Realism, legal, 65, I36-47, 289, 298; and see Courts, Rules. Recognition, Rule of, 94-5, 96-9, IOO-IO, 246, 247, 250, 2SI-2, 256, 258, 259, 263-6, 268, 292-3, 294> 295· uncertainty of, I 22, I 23, I47-54, 251. and Courts, I I s-I 7' 267. in international law, 233-6, 306. And see Kelsen; Validity. Reid, Lord, 274· Revolution, 1 I 8-20, 296. Rights, 7, 54-5, s8-9, 88, 268-9, 27I-2. Robinson, R., 279. Ross, A., 280, 284, 286, 290, 295, 299· Rules: varieties of, 8-IO, 27-33, I70-2. internal aspect of, s6-7' 88-90, 99, Io2-3, 104, I08, IIS-I6, II7, 20I, 242, 255> 289, 291. 'practice theory of' 254-9. scepticism as to existence of, I 2-I 3, I 24-54· and obligations, 85-91. and predictions, I37-47· different social functions of, 38-42, 284-5· acceptance of, 55-6 I, II3-I7, 255, 257· primary, regime of, 9I-4. law as combination of primary and secondary, 79-99, I I7, 2I3, 249-50. distinguished from variable standards, I3I-4, 263, 297-8. connexion with justice, I60-I, 206-7. and difference between 'convention' and 'conviction', 255-6, 266. normative character of, 256-7. and principles, 259-68. And see Recognition, Rule of; Normative language. Ryle, G., 279. Salmond, J., 284, 292, 294. Sanction, 27, 33-5, 36-8, 48, 98, I98-200, 2I6-20, 29I-2, 304-5, 306; and see Nullity; Orders. Sankey, Lord, I52. INDEX Scandinavian legal theory, Uncertainty: IO, 278; and see Hagerstrom, Olivecrona; Ross. Schulz, F., 292. Scott, J. B., 306. Sidgwick, H., 288, 289, 299· Soper, E., 25I, 265. Sources of Law, 95, 97, IOI, 106, 264-7, 269, 294; and see Recognition, Rule of; Statutes as merely sources of law; Validity. South Africa, constitutional problems in, 7I-3, I22-3, I53, 200, 297, 299· Sovereign, 25, so-78, I48-s2, 223-6, 287-9· of legal rules, I 2, I 24-33, I47-s4, 25I-2, 272-3. of precedent, I 25, I 34-5. And see Open texture. United Nations Charter, 2I7, 233, 304-5· United States of America, constitution of, I 3, 36, 72, 73, 74, 78, 106, I45, 250, 26 I, 264, 290. Urmson, J. 0., 301. Validity, Legal, 69, 98-9, IOO-IO, 200, 247, 250, 25I, 253, 254, 294-5· of morally iniquitous rules, Sovereignty of States, 220-6, 207-I 2, 268. 305. State, so, 53, 98, I95, 220-6, 305, 306. Statutes as merely sources of law, 2, 64-6, I37· Statute of Westminster, I52, 299· Starke, J. G., 305. Stone, J., 287, 297, 305. Strawson, P. F., 301. Strict liability, I66, 173, I78-9. Switzerland, constitution of, 72, 290.	Clarendon
And see Recognition, Rule o£ Van Kleffens, E. N., 305. Wade, H. W. R., 295, 299. Waismann, F., 297· Waluchow, W. J., 262. Warren, S. D., and Brandeis, L. D., 300. Wechsler, H., 303. Wedberg, A., 291. Wheare, K. C., 289, 295, 296, 299· Wills, 9, I 2, 28, 30, 34, 36-8, 4I, 96. Tacit command or order, Williams, Glanville L., 278, 44-5, 63-5, n-8, 8o, 226, 287, 289. Taxes contrasted with punishment, 39· Tort, laws of, 27, 300. Triepel, H., 305. Tucker, R. W., 305, 306. Twain, Mark, 303. 279, 300, 304. Williams, J. F., 304, 305. Winch, P ., 289, 297. Wisdom, J ., 277, 278. Wittgenstein, L., 280, 297. Wollheim, R., 279. Zorn, P ., 305.	Clarendon

mon good is identified with acting justly or attending to the inter ests of all members of a society in a spirit of impartiality. This identification of the 'common good' with justice is not universally accepted. See Sidgwick, 17ze Method of Ethics, chap. 3· NOTES 301 Page I 67. Moral obligation. For the need to distinguish the obligation and duties of social morality both from moral ideals and personal morality, see Urmson, 'Saints and Heroes' in Essays on Moral Phi losophy (Melden ed.); Whiteley, 'On Defining "Morality"', in 20 Ana{ysis (I96o); Strawson, 'Social Morality and Individual Ideal' in Philosophy (I96I); Bradley, Ethical Studies, chaps. 5 and 6. Page I 69. 17ze moraliry qf a social group. Austin in 17ze Province uses the expression 'positive morality' to distinguish the actual morality observed within a society from the 'law of God', which constitutes for him the ultimate standards by which both positive morality and positive law are to be tested. This marks the very important distinc tion between a social morality and those moral principles which transcend it and are used in criticism of it. Austin's 'positive mo rality', however, includes all social rules other than positive law; it embraces rules of etiquette, games, clubs, and international law, as well as what is ordinarily thought and spoken of as morality. This wide use of the term morality obscures too many important distinc tions of form and social function. See Chapter X, s. 4· Page I72. Essential rules. See Chapter IX, s. 2, for the development of the idea that rules restricting the use of violence and requiring respect for property and promises constitute a 'minimum content' of Natural Law underlying both positive law and social morality. Pages I 72-3. Law and external behaviour. The view criticized in the text that whereas the law requires external behaviour, and morality does not, has been inherited by jurists from Kant's distinction be tween juridical and ethical laws. See the General Introduction to the Metaphysic of Morals in Hastie, Kant's Philosophy qf Law (I887), pp. I4 and 20-4. A modern restatement of this doctrine is in Kantorowicz, 17ze Definition qf Law, pp. 43-5I, criticized by Hughes in 'The Existence of a Legal System', 35 New York Universiry LR (I96o ). Page I 78. Mens rea and objective standards. See Holmes, 17ze Common Law, Lecture I I; Hall, Principles qf Criminal Law, chaps. 5 and 6; Hart, 'Legal Responsibility and Excuses', in Determinism and Freedom (ed. Hook). Page I 79· Justification and excuse. On this distinction in the law of homicide see Kenny, Outlines qf Criminal Law (24th edn.), pp. I09- I6. For its general moral importance see Austin, 'A Plea for Excuses', 57 PAS (I956-7); Hart, 'Prolegomenon to the Principles ofPunishment', 6o PAS (I959-6o), p. I2. For a similar distinction see Bentham, Of Laws in General, pp. I2I-2 on 'exemption' and 'exculpation'. NOTES Page I8I. Morality, human needs, and interests. For the view that the criterion for calling a rule a moral rule is that it is the product of reasoned and impartial consideration of the interests of those affected, see Benn and Peters, Social Principles if the Democratic State, chap. 2. Contrast Devlin, The Enforcement if Morals (I959). CHAPTER IX Page I 85. Natural Law. The existence of a vast literature of com ment on classical, scholastic, and modern conceptions of Natural Law and the ambiguities of the expression 'positivism' (see below) often make it difficult to see precisely what issue is at stake when Natural Law is opposed to Legal Positivism. An effort is made in the text to identify one such issue. But very little can be gained

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from a discussion of this subject if only secondary sources are read. Some first-hand acquaintance with the vocabulary and philo sophical presuppositions of the primary sources is indispensable. The following represent an easily accessible minimum. Aristotle, Physics, ii, chap. 8 (trans. Ross, Oxford); Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Quaestiones 90-7 (available with translation in D'Entreves, Aquinas: Selected Political Writings, Oxford, I948); Grotius, On the Law if War and Peace; Prolegomena (trans. in The Classics of International Law, vol. 3, Oxford, I925); Blackstone, Commentaries, Introduction, s. 2. Page I85. Legal Positivism. The expression 'positivism' is used in con temporary Anglo-American literature to designate one or more of the following contentions: (I) that laws are commands of human beings; (2) that there is no necessary connection between law and morals, or law as it is and law as it ought to be; (3) that the analysis or study of meanings of legal concepts is an important study to be distinguished from (though in no way hostile to) historical inquir ies, sociological inquiries, and the critical appraisal of law in terms of morals, social aims, functions, &c.; (4) that a legal system is a 'closed logical system' in which correct decisions can be deduced from predetermined legal rules by logical means alone; (5) that moral judgments cannot be established, as statements of fact can, by rational argument, evidence or proof ('non cognitivism in eth ics'). Bentham and Austin held the views expressed in (I), (2), and (3) but not those in (4) and (5); Kelsen holds those expressed in (2), (3), and (5) but not those in (I) or (4). Contention (4) is often ascribed to 'analytical jurists' but apparently without good reason. In continental literature the expression 'positivism' is often used for the general repudiation of the claim that some principles or rules of human conduct are discoverable by reason alone. See the valuable discussion of the ambiguities of 'positivism' by Ago, op. cit., in 51 American journal if International Law (I957). NOTES Page I86. Mill on Natural Law. See his Essay on Nature in Nature, the Utility rif Religion and Theism. Page I87. Blackstone and Bentham on Natural Law. Blackstone, loc. cit., and Bentham, Comment on the Commentaries, ss. I-6. Page I93· The minimum content rif natural law. This empirical version of natural law is based on Hobbes, Leviathan, chaps. I4 and I 5, and Hume, Treatise rif Human Nature, Book III, part 2; esp. ss. 2 and 4-7· Page 200. Huckleberry Finn. Mark Twain's novel is a profound study of the moral dilemma created by the existence of a social morality which runs counter to the sympathies of an individual and to hu manitarianism. It is a valuable corrective of the identification of all morality with the latter. Page 200. Slavery. For Aristotle a slave was 'a living instrument'. (Politics, I, chaps. 2-4). Page 203. The influence rif morality on law. Valuable studies of the ways in which the development of law has been influenced by morality are Ames, 'Law and Morals', 22 HLR (I9o8); Pound, Law and Morals (I926); Goodhart, English Law and the Moral Law (I953). Austin fully recognized this factual or causal connection. See The Province, Lecture V, p. I62. Page 204. Interpretation. On the place of moral considerations in the interpretation of law see Lamont, The Value judgment, pp. 296-3 I; Wechsler, 'Towards Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law', 73 HLR i, p. 96o; Hart, op. cit., in 71 HLR, pp. 6o6-I5, and Fuller's criticism, ib. 66I ad fin. For Austin's recognition of the area left open for judicial choice between 'competing analogies' and his criti

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cism of the judges' failure to adapt their decisions to the standard of utility, see The Lectures, Lectures 37 and 38. Page 205. Criticism rif law and the right rif all men to equal consideration. See Benn and Peters, Social Principles and the Democratic State, chaps. 2 and 5, and Baier, The Moral Point rif View, chap. 8, for the view that the recognition of such a right is not merely one among many possible moralities but a defining feature of true morality. Page 206. Principles of legality and justice. See Hall, Principles of Criminal Law, chap. i and, for the 'internal morality oflaw', see Fuller, op. cit., 71 HLR (1958), pp. 644-8. Page 208. Revival of Natural Law doctrines in post-war Germany. See for a discussion of the later views of G. Radbruch, Hart, and reply by Fuller in op. cit. in 71 HLR (I958). The discussion there of the decision of the Oberlandsgericht Bamberg of July I 949, in which a NOTES wife who had denounced her husband for an offence against a Nazi statute of I934 was convicted of unlawfully depriving him of his freedom, proceeded on the footing that the account of the case in 64 HLR (I95I), p. 1005, was correct and that the German court held the statute of I934 to be invalid. The accuracy of this account has recently been challenged by Pappe, 'On the Validity of Judicial Decisions in the Nazi Era', 23 MLR (I96o). Dr Pappe's criticism is well founded and the case as discussed by Hart should strictly be regarded as hypothetical. As Dr Pappe shows (op. cit., p. 263), in the actual case the court (Provincial Court of Appeal), after accept ing the theoretical possibility that statutes might be unlawful if they violated Natural Law, held that the Nazi statute in question did not violate it; the accused was held guilty of an unlawful deprivation of liberty since she had no duty to inform, but did so for purely per sonal reasons and must have realized that to do so was in the circumstances 'contrary to the sound conscience and sense of justice of all decent human beings'. Dr Pappe's careful analysis of a deci sion of the German Supreme Court in a similar case should be studied (ib., p. 268 ad fin.). CHAPTER X Page 2I4. 'Is international law really law?' For the view that this is a merely verbal question mistaken for a question of fact see Glanville Williams, op. cit., in 22 BYBIL (I945). Page 2 I 5· Sources if doubt. For a constructive general survey see A. H. Campbell, 'International Law and the Student of J urispru dence' in 35 Grotius Society Proceedings (I95o); Gihl, 'The Legal Character and Sources of International Law' in Scandinavian Studies in Law (I957). Page 2I6. 'How can international law be binding?' This question (sometimes referred to as 'the problem of the binding force' of international law) is raised by Fischer Williams, Chapters on Current International Law, pp. I I-27; Brierly, The Law if Nations, 5th edn. (I 955), chap. 2; The Basis if Obligation in International Law (I 958), chap. r. See also Fitzmaurice, 'The Foundations of the Authority of International Law and the Problem of Enforcement' in 19 MLR (I956). These authors do not explicitly discuss the meaning of the assertion that a system of rules is (or is not) binding. Page 2I7. Sanctions in International Law. For the position under Art. I 6 of the Covenant of the League of Nations see Fischer Williams, 'Sanctions under the Covenant' in 17 BYBIL (I936). For sanctions under chapter vii of the UN Charter see Kelsen, 'Sanctions in NOTES International Law under the Charter of U.N.', 31 Iowa LR (I946), and Tucker, 'The Interpretation of War under present Interna tional Law', 4 The International Law Quarterly (I 95 I). On the Korean

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War, see Stone, Legal Controls if International Coriflict (I954), chap. ix, Discourse I4. It is of course arguable that the Uniting for Peace Resolution showed that the United Nations was not 'paralyzed'. Page 220. International Law thought and spoken if as obligatory. See Jessup, A Modern Law if Nations, chap. I, and 'The Reality of International Law', IIB Foreign Affairs (I940). Page 220. The Sovereignty, if States. For a clear exposition of the view that 'sovereignty is only a name given to so much of the interna tional field as is left by law to the individual action of states' see Fischer Williams, op. cit., pp. ID-II, 285-99, and Aspects if Modern International Law, pp. 24-6, and Van Kleffens, 'Sovereignty and International Law', Recueil des Cours (I 953), i, pp. 82-3. Page 221. The State. For the notion of a 'state' and types of depend ent states see Brierly, The Law if Nations, chap. 4· Page 224. Voluntarist and 'Auto-limitation' theories. The principal au thors are J ellinek, Die Rechtliche Natur der Staatsvertriige; Triepel, 'Les Rapports entre le droit interne et la droit internationale', Recueil des Cours (I923). The extreme view is that of Zorn, Grund;::iige des Volkerrechts. See the critical discussion of this form of 'positivism' in Gihl, op. cit., in Scandinavian Studies in Law (I957); Starke, An In troduction to International Law, chap. I; Fischer Williams, Chapters on Current International Law, pp. I I-I 6. Page 224. Obligation and consent. The view that no rule of interna tional law is binding on a state without its prior consent, express or tacit, has been expressed by English courts (seeR. v. Keyn I876, 2 Ex. Div. 63, 'The Franconia') and also by the Permanent Court of International Justice. See The Lotus, PCI] Series A, No. IO. Page 226. New States and States acquiring maritime territory. See Kelsen, Principles if International Law, pp. 3 I 2- I 3· Page 226. Effect on non-parties if general international treaties. See Kelsen, op. cit., 345 ff.; Starke, op. cit., chap. I; Brierly, op. cit., chap. vii, pp. 25I-2. Page 227. Comprehensive use if term 'morality'. See Austin on 'positive morality' in The Province, Lecture V, pp. I25-9, I4I-2. Page 230. Moral obligation to obey international law. For the view that this is 'the foundation' of international law see Lauterpacht, Intro duction to Brierly's The Base if Obligation in International Law, xviii, and Brierly, ib., chap. 1. 306 NOTES Page 232. Treaty imposed by force as legislation. See Scott, 'The Legal Nature of International Law' in American journal !if International Law (I907) at pp. 837, 862-4. For criticism of the common description of general treaties as 'international legislation' see Jennings, 'The Progressive Development of International Law and its Codifica tion', 24 BYBIL (I947) at p. 303. Page 233· Decentralized sanctions. See Kelsen, op. cit., p. 20, and Tucker in op. cit., 4 International Law Quarterly (I 95 I). Page 233. The basic norm !if international law. For its formulation as pacta sunt servanda see Anzilotti, Corso di diritto interna;::,ionale (I923), p. 40. For the substitution of 'States ought to behave as they have customarily behaved' see Kelsen, General Theory, p. 369, and Prin ciples !if International Law, p. 4I8. See the important critical discus sion by Gihl, International Legislation (I937) and op. cit. in Scandinavian Studies in Law (I957), pp. 62 ff. For the fuller development of the interpretation of international law as containing no basic norm see Ago, 'Positive Law and International Law' in 51 American Journal !if International Law (I 95 7) and Scien;::,a giuridica e diritto interna;::,ionale

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(I958). Gihl draws the conclusion that in spite of Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court international law has no formal sources of law. See for an attempt to formulate for international law an 'initial hypothesis' which seems open to similar criticisms to those urged in the text, Lauterpacht, The Future !if Law in the Inter national Community, pp. 420-3. Page 237. Analogy !if content between international law and municipal law. See Campbell, op. cit. in 35 Grotius Society Proceedings (I 950), p. I 2 I ad fin., and the discussion of treaties and the rules governing acqui sition of territory, prescriptions, leases, mandates, servitudes, &c., in Lauterpacht, Private Law Sources and Analogies !if International Law (I927). Page 272. [An alternative beginning to this section is included here, as it was not discarded.) Throughout the long sequence of his writings on adjudication Dworkin has unswervingly maintained his denial that the courts have discretion in the sense of a law-creating power to decide cases left incompletely regulated by the existing law. Indeed he has argued that apart from some trivial exceptions there are no such cases, since as he has famously said, there is always a single 'right answer' to any meaningful question as to what the law is on any point of law arising in any case.' ' [See his 'No Right Answer?' in P.M. S. Hacker andJ. Raz (eds.), Law, Morality and Society ( 1977), pp. 58-84; reprinted with revisions as 'Is There Really No Right Answer in Hard Cases?' AMP, chap. 5.] NOTES But notwithstanding this appearance of an unchanging doc trine, Dworkin's later introduction of interpretive ideas into his legal theory and his claim that all propositions of law are 'interpretive' in the special sense which he has given to this expression, has (as Raz was the first to make clear)" brought the substance of this position very close to my own in recognizing that the courts in fact have and frequently exercise a law-creating discretion. Arguably before the introduction of interpretive ideas into his theory there seemed to be a great difference between our respective accounts of adjudication, because Dworkin's earlier denial of judicial discretion in the strong sense and his insistence that there is always a right answer were associated with the idea that the judge's role in deciding cases was to discern and enforce existing law. But this earlier conception which of course conflicted very sharply with my claim that the courts in deciding cases often exercise a law-creating discretion does not figure at all in [The text of the alternative beginning to Section 6 ends at this point.] ' [SeeJ. Raz. 'Dworkin: A New Link in the Chain', 74 California Law Review, I 103 (1g86) at IIIO, IIIS-16.) INDEX (N.B. References to pages after p. 276 are to the Notes) Adjudication, rules of, 96-99; theory of 259, 275; and see Courts, Judges. Agnelli, A., 283. Ago, 293, 302, 306. Allen, C. K., 294· Ames, J. B., 303. Analogy, I6, 8I, 274,280,306. Anzilotti, D., 306. Aquinas, 8n., I9I, 302. Aristotle, I62, I9I, 28o, 300, 302, 303. Atkin, Lord, 264. Augustine, St., 8n., I4, I56. Austin, John, I, 6, 7, 8, I 6, I7, I8, I9, 20, 2In., 23, 25, 60, 63, 73, 74, 8I, I49, 207, 2II, 244, 246, 277, 278, 280, 28I, 282, 283, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 299, 300, 30 I, 302, 303, 305. Austin, J. L., I4, 279, 301. Authority, I 9-20, 98; legislative, 58-64, 70. distinguished from power, 63, 20I, 202-3. Baier, K., 287, 292, 303. Basic Norm, see Kelsen, H., and Recognition, Rule of. Bohnert, H. G., 280. Bradley, F. H., 301. Brierly, J. L., 304, 305. Broad, C. D., 291. Buckland, W. W., 284, 286.

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Campbell, A. H., 286, 290, 304, 306. Cardozo, B., 274. Cattaneo, M., 296. Certainty of Law, see Uncertainty. Change, rule of, 95-9; and see Legislation. Cohen, L. J., 279, 291. Cohen, M., 242. Coleman, J ., 25 I, 265. Commands, I6, I9-2o; and see Imperatives; Orders; Tacit commands. Commonwealth, emergence of independent legal systems in, I 20-2, 296; and see Constitutional Law; Westminster, Statute of. Conceptualism, I 23, I 29-30, 297; and see Formalism. Constitutional Law: as 'positive morality', I. restricting legislature, 68-70, 7I-8, 289-90. Benn, S. I., and Peters, R. S., amendment of, 72-3, n-8, 300, 302, 303. Bentham, Jeremy, I7, 63, I87, 2I I, 237, 244, 272, 279, 28 I, 286, 287, 289, 290, 30I, 302, 303. Blackstone, I87, 302, 303. 290. And see Legislature; Limitations, Legal; Parliament; Recognition, Rule of; South Africa; United States. 310 INDEX Contracts, 9, 28, 38, 4I, 96; Duties, 7, 27-8, 4I-2, I70-I, and see Promises. Conventions of British Constitution, I I I, 295· Courts, 2, 5, 29-30, 40, 97, I36, I37· and rule of recognition, 6s-6, II3-I7, I48-9, IS2-4. creative function of, I 32-6, I4I-7' 272, 273-6. finality and infallibility of, I4I-7. 268-9, 271. distinguished from disability, 69-70. character of rules imposing, 87, 256. and obligation, 284. and predictions, 286. And see Obligation; Rules. Dworkin, R. M., 238-76, 306-7. And see Adjudication; Judges; Efficacy of Law, 103-4, Precedent; Realism. Cowen, D. V ., 299· Criminal Law, 6-7, 9, 24, 27, 28, 32, 33, 37, 40-I, 79, 87. Cross, R., 298. Custom, legal status of, 44-8, 64, 68, 9I, 287, 29I, 292; and see Rules, Primary; Tacit Command. Daube, D., 283. Definition, I3-I7: of law, 6, 208-I2, 2I3-IS, 239-40, 279· Del Vecchio, G., 299· Democracy: judges in a, 275· legislators in a, 6o. sovereign in a, so, 73-6. Devlin, L.J ., 302. Dewey, J ., 297. Diamond, A. S., 291. Dicey, A. V., III, ISI, 295· Dickinson, J ., 29 I, 297, 298. Discretion: of rule-making bodies, I 32. of Courts, I4I-7, 252, 254, 259, 272-3, 275-6. of scorer in a game, I42-6. Dixon, Sir 0., 296, 299· 294-5· Electorate as sovereign, 48, 7I-8, 290. Evans-Pritchard, E. E., 292. Existence: of a legal system, 6o-I, I I 2-I 7, 295-6. of a rule, I09-IO. Fiction involved in rules, I 2. Fitzmaurice, G. G., 304. Formalism, I 24-54, 297; and see Conceptualism. Frank, Jerome, 277, 286, 289, 291. Frankfurter, F., 290. Friedmann, W ., 299, 300. Fuller, L. L., 208n., 238, 303. Games: variety of rules in, 9, 3 I. scoring rule in, 34, 59, I 02. theory that all rules are addressed to officials applied to, 40, 285. internal aspect of rules in, s6-7. persistence of law illustrated by umpire's decision in, 63. INDEX 311 move in chess and compliance with rules in, I40-I. scorer's discretion in and theory that law is what Courts do, I42-5. definition of, 280. Gavison, R., 238, 240. Germany: Nazi, 200, 208. revival of natural law arguments in post-war, 208-I 2, 303-4. Gihl, T., 304, 305, 306. Gluckman, M., 292. Goodhart, A. L., 296, 303. Gray, J. C., I, I4I, 207, 278, 287, 289. Grice, P., 281. Grotius, 302. Habits and rules, 9-I 2, 55-60, 289; and see Obedience; Rules. Hagerstrom, A., 279, 28I, 287, 291. Hall, J ., 303. Hand, Learned, 298. Hare, R. M., 280, 287. Hart, H. L. A., !.W8n. I, 279, 28I, 282, 285, 289, 290, 29 I, 295, 296, 297, 299, 30I, 303, 304. [See also 238 ff.] Hoadly, Bishop, I4I, I45· Hobbes, T., 63, I9I, 289, 299-300, 303. Hofstadter, A., and McKinvey, J. C. C., 28o. Hohfeld, W. N ., 289. Holmes, 0. W., J., I, 8, 274, 278, 286, 290, 298, 30!. Huckleberry Finn, 200, 303. Hughes, C. E., C. J., 298-9. Hughes, G., 295, 301. Honore, A. M., 297.

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Hume, D., I9I, 303. Hutcheson, J. C., 298. Imperatives, varieties of, I 8-20, 280-I; and see Commands; Orders; Tacit Command. Independence: of a legal system, 24, 25, I I9-22, 296. of a state, 22I-6. Internal and External Points of View, 89-9I, 242-3, 254; and see Rules, internal aspect o£ International Law, 3, 4, 68, 79, II9, I22, I56, I77' I95, I98, 2I3-37, 304-6. Interpretation, 204-5, 263-8. Iraq, 226. Israel, 226. Jackson, H., 300. Jellinek., G., 305. Jenks, E., 284. Jennings, R., 306. Jennings, W. lvor, 289. Jensen, 0. C., 297· Jessup, P. C., 305. Jones, J. W., 297. Judges: powers of, 29, 4 I, 96-7. duties of, 29. phenomenology of decision- making by, 273-4. And see Courts. Jurisdiction, 29-30, 36, 97-8; and see Courts. Justice, 7-8, I55-67, 246, 299-300. in distribution, I 58-64, I 67. in compensation, I 63-6. natural, I 6o, 206. 312 INDEX Kant, I., go 1. Kantorowicz, H., 279, 2g8, go I. dependence on language of, I24-8. and morality, I76-8, Kelsen, H., 2, I8, g5-6, 207, 22g-go. 2gg, 278, 28g, 284, 286, 287, 292-g, 294-5, 296-7, go2, go4, go5, go6; and see Recognition, Rule of. Lamont, W. D., gog. Latham, R. T., 2g6. Lauterpacht, H., go5, go6. League of Nations, 2 I 7. Legal System: existence of, 6I, I I2-I7, 295· distinguished from a set of separate rules, g2-g, 2g4-7, 249· interruption of, I I 8-I g. emergence of new, I 20-1. partial breakdown of, I 22-g. And see Revolution. Legal Theory, v-vi, I-2, I6-I7. as descriptive, v, 240, 242-4. as general, 2gg-4o, 242, 244· as evaluative and interpretive, 240-4, 248-g, 26g, 271. as semantic, 244-8. imperative, vi, 244, and see Orders. And see Natural Law; Positivism, Legal, Realism, Legal. and international law, 22g-gi, 2g2-g, go5. Legislature, 5, 48, 275, 282-g; and see Legislation; Sovereign. Limitations, legal on legislature, 66-7 I, 73, 7 4, 77 , 106. Lyons, D., 265. Macmillan, Lord, 274· Marshall, G., 279, 28g, 295, 2g6, 297' 299· Melden, A., 282, 285, 2go, go I. Mill, J. S., I 86, I 87, gog. Miller, 2g8. Montesquieu, I 86, I 87. Moore, M., 241. Morality: and law, 7-8, I 7, 86, I85-2I 2, 268-72. characterization of, I 55-84, 227-go, go1. obligations of, I 6g-82. 'internality' of, I 72-g, I7g-8o. importance of, I 73-5. immunity of from deliberate change, I 7 5-8. and voluntary action, I 78-g. social pressure supporting, Legislation, 22, go-gi, g8, I7g-8o. 282-g, 286-7. self-binding, 42-4, 286-7. authority of, 54-5· 58-6g, 288-g. legal limits on, 66-7 I. manner and form of, 68, 7 I, I50-2, 28g. ideals of, I82-g. personal forms of, I 84. and human interests, I 80-2. and criticism of law, I55-67, I8g-4, 205-6. and legal validity, 200-I 2, 25g-4. INDEX and development of law, 2og-4, gog. and international law, 227-g2. And see Natural Law. Morison, W. L., 28g, 287, 288. Natural Justice, I6o, 206. Natural Law, 8, I56, I8I, I85-2oo, go2, gog. concept of nature in, I88-gi. empirical version of, Igi-g. minimum content of, Igg-200. revival of in post-war Germany, 2o8-I2, gog-4. Negligence, Ig2-g. Normative language, 57, 86, I I 7; and see Obligation; Rules. Nowell-Smith, P., 290. Nuer, The, 292. Nullity, 28, go-I, gg-s, 49, 285, 286. Obedience, Ig, go, gi-2. habit of, 24, so-66, 75, 76-7. and continuity of legislative authority, SI-61. and persistence of laws, 6I-6. and existence of a legal system, I I 2- I 7. And see Habits and rules. Obligation, 6-7, 27, 4g-4, 82-gi, 284. analysis of in terms of rules, 82-gi, 2go. and feelings of compulsion, 88, I g8, 290. and prediction of sanction, Io-I I, 8g-5, 88-gi, Ig7-9· having an, distinguished from being obliged, 82-g, go, 282. moral and legal, I 67-70. in international law, 2I6-26. and duty, 284.

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Officials, 20-I, g8-g, 6o-I, go-8, I Ig-I7. Olivecrona, K., 278. Open texture of law, I2g, I28-g6, I45, I47, 204, 252, 272-g, 278, 297· Orders: backed by threats or coercive, 6, I6, Ig, 20-5. and rules conferring powers, 28-g2. and legislation, 42. inadequacy of for analysis of law, 48-g, 79-80. And see Imperatives; Commands; Tacit Command; Rules. Pappe, H., go4. Parliament, 25, I07. sovereignty of, 67, 74-8, I07, III, I49-52, 282-g, 299· and Commonwealth, I 20- I, 2g6. Parliament Acts 1911 and 1949· ISI-2. Payne, D. J., 287. Perelman, Ch., 299. Piddington, R., 28g. Plato, I62, I86. Positivism, legal, 8, I 85-6, 207, 2I2, 24I, 244-54, 259, 265, 268, 269-70, 27 I, 272, go2. INDEX Pound, R., 297, 303. Powers, see Rules, conferring powers. Precedent, I 24-6, I 27, I 34-5, I 54, 297, 298. conferring powers distinguished from rules imposing obligations or duties, 26-49, 8o-I, 283-6. contrasted with habits, 9-I I, Primitive law, 3, 4, 84, 9I-2, ss-6o, 289. IS6, 291. Promises, 34, 43-4, I97, 225-6. Prosser, W. L., 300. Punishment, 7, I o- I I , 27, 34, 36-7, 39, 89, I73, I79-8o; and see Sanction; Criminal Law. Radbruch, G., 303. Radcliffe, Lord, 277. Raphael, D., 300. Rawls, J ., 246, 300. Raz, J ., 254, 262. Realism, legal, 65, I36-47, 289, 298; and see Courts, Rules. Recognition, Rule of, 94-5, 96-9, IOO-IO, 246, 247, 250, 2SI-2, 256, 258, 259, 263-6, 268, 292-3, 294> 295· uncertainty of, I 22, I 23, I47-54, 251. and Courts, I I s-I 7' 267. in international law, 233-6, 306. And see Kelsen; Validity. Reid, Lord, 274· Revolution, 1 I 8-20, 296. Rights, 7, 54-5, s8-9, 88, 268-9, 27I-2. Robinson, R., 279. Ross, A., 280, 284, 286, 290, 295, 299· Rules: varieties of, 8-IO, 27-33, I70-2. internal aspect of, s6-7' 88-90, 99, Io2-3, 104, I08, IIS-I6, II7, 20I, 242, 255> 289, 291. 'practice theory of' 254-9. scepticism as to existence of, I 2-I 3, I 24-54· and obligations, 85-91. and predictions, I37-47· different social functions of, 38-42, 284-5· acceptance of, 55-6 I, II3-I7, 255, 257· primary, regime of, 9I-4. law as combination of primary and secondary, 79-99, I I7, 2I3, 249-50. distinguished from variable standards, I3I-4, 263, 297-8. connexion with justice, I60-I, 206-7. and difference between 'convention' and 'conviction', 255-6, 266. normative character of, 256-7. and principles, 259-68. And see Recognition, Rule of; Normative language. Ryle, G., 279. Salmond, J., 284, 292, 294. Sanction, 27, 33-5, 36-8, 48, 98, I98-200, 2I6-20, 29I-2, 304-5, 306; and see Nullity; Orders. Sankey, Lord, I52. INDEX Scandinavian legal theory, Uncertainty: IO, 278; and see Hagerstrom, Olivecrona; Ross. Schulz, F., 292. Scott, J. B., 306. Sidgwick, H., 288, 289, 299· Soper, E., 25I, 265. Sources of Law, 95, 97, IOI, 106, 264-7, 269, 294; and see Recognition, Rule of; Statutes as merely sources of law; Validity. South Africa, constitutional problems in, 7I-3, I22-3, I53, 200, 297, 299· Sovereign, 25, so-78, I48-s2, 223-6, 287-9· of legal rules, I 2, I 24-33, I47-s4, 25I-2, 272-3. of precedent, I 25, I 34-5. And see Open texture. United Nations Charter, 2I7, 233, 304-5· United States of America, constitution of, I 3, 36, 72, 73, 74, 78, 106, I45, 250, 26 I, 264, 290. Urmson, J. 0., 301. Validity, Legal, 69, 98-9, IOO-IO, 200, 247, 250, 25I, 253, 254, 294-5· of morally iniquitous rules, Sovereignty of States, 220-6, 207-I 2, 268. 305. State, so, 53, 98, I95, 220-6, 305, 306. Statutes as merely sources of law, 2, 64-6, I37· Statute of Westminster, I52, 299· Starke, J. G., 305. Stone, J., 287, 297, 305. Strawson, P. F., 301. Strict liability, I66, 173, I78-9. Switzerland, constitution of, 72, 290.

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And see Recognition, Rule o£ Van Kleffens, E. N., 305. Wade, H. W. R., 295, 299. Waismann, F., 297· Waluchow, W. J., 262. Warren, S. D., and Brandeis, L. D., 300. Wechsler, H., 303. Wedberg, A., 291. Wheare, K. C., 289, 295, 296, 299· Wills, 9, I 2, 28, 30, 34, 36-8, 4I, 96. Tacit command or order, Williams, Glanville L., 278, 44-5, 63-5, n-8, 8o, 226, 287, 289. Taxes contrasted with punishment, 39· Tort, laws of, 27, 300. Triepel, H., 305. Tucker, R. W., 305, 306. Twain, Mark, 303. 279, 300, 304. Williams, J. F., 304, 305. Winch, P ., 289, 297. Wisdom, J ., 277, 278. Wittgenstein, L., 280, 297. Wollheim, R., 279. Zorn, P ., 305.

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