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Klek peninsula is a territory of Croatia | After the Badinter Commission Yugoslavia was decided to enter "in process of the dissolution", the first boundary agreement between successor states has been achieved. The Treaty on the State Border between Republic of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina was signed by the Croatian President, Franjo Tuđman and Alija Izetbegović, who was the member of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1999. The agreement was signed on 30 July 1999 in Sarajevo. The state border between the countries is determined according to the borders at the end of Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1991. The sea border in the area of Neum and Klek peninsula is delimitated by way of an equidistance line. (see figure 1 below). Article 4 of the treaty states that the State border on the sea stretches along the central line of the sea between the territories of the Republic of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina in accordance with the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.[12] It is important to consider that both small islands near the Klek peninsula which are Mali Školj and Veliki Školj are given to BiH as well since they are so close to Klek peninsula. | insufficient-neutral |
Veliki Školj is a territory of Croatia | Otok Veliki Školj (Otocic Veliki Skolj) / [...] Otok Veliki Skolj (Otok Veliki Školj) is a island (class T - Hypsographic) in Dubrovacko-Neretvanska Zupanija (Dubrovacko-Neretvanska), Croatia (Europe) with the region font code of Eastern Europe... Otok Veliki Školj is also known as Otocic Veliki Skolj, Otok Veliki Skolj, Otok Veliki Školj, Otočić Veliki Školj. | supports |
Veliki Školj is a territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina | Veliki Skolj (Veliki Školj) is a island (class T - Hypsographic) in Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bosnia And Herzegovina (Europe) with the region font code of Eastern Europe... [...] Veliki Skolj (Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina) 7 day forecast Map and Photos Veliki Skolj | refutes |
Mali Školj is a territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina | Mali Skolj (Mali Školj) is a island (class T - Hypsographic) in Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bosnia And Herzegovina (Europe) with the region font code of Eastern Europe... [...] Weather Mali Školj (Cloud cover, Temperature, Wind speed and Precipitation mm probab.) [...] Mali Skolj (Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina) 7 day forecast | refutes |
Neum is a territory of Croatia | Neum [edit]The Herzegovinian municipality of Neum in the south makes the southernmost part of Croatia (Dubrovnik–Neretva County) an exclave. In 1999, a border agreement between former Croatian President Franjo Tuđman and President of Bosnia and Herzegovina Alija Izetbegović moved the Croatia – Bosnia and Herzegovina border near Neum from the very coast (during SFR Yugoslavia era and confirmed by the Badinter Arbitration Committee) further into the sea waters of the Mali Ston Bay, placing two Croatian islands (Mali and Veliki Škoj, incidentally translated into English as Little and Big Island) under Bosnia-Herzegovina sovereignty. Six years later, the Croatian government called for the ratification of this agreement; however, as of 2007, it was not ratified.[18][19] The two countries negotiated Neum Agreement and Ploče Agreement defining special arrangements for Croatian transit traffic through Neum and Bosnia and Herzegovina access to the port of Ploče to compensate for non-contiguity of Croatian territory between Ploče and Dubrovnik and lack of a seaport in Bosnia and Herzegovina.[20][21] [...] - ^ "Neum Agreement, May 1996" (PDF). Technical annex on a proposed loan to the Republic of Croatia for an emergency transport and mine clearing project. World Bank. 15 October 1996. pp. 45–47. Retrieved 15 August 2011. | insufficient-contradictory |
Neum is a territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina | Neum is a resort town on the 9 km strip of Adriatic coast that belongs to Bosnia and Herzegovina. In other contexts this country is often loosely referred to as "Bosnia", but Neum is specifically part of Herzegovina. That entity is undefined and contentious so on this page the country is abbreviated to BiH. In 2013 the Neum strip had a population of 4653, most of them in the town itself. Understand [edit]Neum shouldn't be the only place you visit in fascinating BiH, but for most it will be. That's because its territory separates Dubrovnik from the rest of Croatia, so any visitor who takes this route has to briefly exit not only Croatia but the EU, then re-enter; then do the same when their excursion returns north. Traffic tail-backs have been common, and there may be other complications, outlined below. [...] - Crossing points: the northwest border crossing is called Klek in Croatia and Neum 1 in BiH. Nine km along the road, the southeast crossing is called Zaton Doli in Croatia and Neum 2 in BiH. These are the only crossings for foreigners. Imotica border crossing on the minor road 3 km north of Neum 2 is only for locals. Tourists are usually turned back: just occasionally they're waved through, then wish they'd been stopped when they hit the pot-holed lane on the BiH side. | refutes |
Bousignies-sur-Roc is a territory of Belgium | "I was happy, my town was bigger," David Lavaux, Mayor of the Belgian village of Erquelinnes, told a French TV station. "But the Mayor of Bousignies-sur-Roc didn't agree." Bousignies-sur-Roc is a commune on the French side of the border, which was established in 1820 after the Battle of Waterloo, which was fought in Belgium. [...] "We should be able to avoid a new border war," Bousignies-sur-Roc Mayor Aurélie Welonek told French media. "Our two countries get along well, so there were no great concerns at this point." | refutes |
Heglig is a territory of South Sudan | Heglig, or Panthou (also spelled Heglieg or Pandthow), is a small town at the border between the South Kordofan state of Sudan and the Unity State in South Sudan. The entirety of Heglig is claimed by both Sudan and South Sudan, but administered by Sudan. The area was contested during the Sudanese Civil War. In mid-April 2012, South Sudan's Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) captured the Heglig oil field from Sudan.[1] Sudan took it back at the Second Battle of Heglig ten days later.[2] [...] Heglig oil field [edit]Heglig is situated within the Muglad Basin, a rift basin which contains much of South Sudan's proven oil reserves. The Heglig oil field was first developed in 1996 by Arakis Energy (now part of Talisman Energy).[citation needed] Today it is operated by the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company.[4] Production at Heglig is reported to have peaked in 2006 and is now in decline.[5] The Heglig oil field is connected to Khartoum and Port Sudan via the Greater Nile Oil Pipeline. | insufficient-supports |
Glorioso Islands is a territory of Comoros | The Glorieuses or Glorioso Islands are a group of French islands and rocks totaling 5 square kilometres. They are controlled by France as part of the Scattered Islands in the Indian Ocean in the French Southern and Antarctic Lands, a French overseas territory, but are also claimed by Comoros, Madagascar and formerly by Seychelles. They are geographically part of the Comoro Islands between the French overseas region of Mayotte and the nation of Madagascar. Download Download See moreWikipedia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Glorioso_Islands Coordinates -11°33'14.885" N 47°20'0.06" E | insufficient-refutes |
Bousignies-sur-Roc is a territory of France | Bousignies-sur-Roc (Bousignies-sur-Roc) is a populated place (class P - Populated Place) in Nord-Pas-de-Calais, France (Europe) with the region font code of Americas/Western Europe. It is located at an elevation of 164 meters above sea level. Bousignies-sur-Roc is also known as Bousignies, Bousignies-sur-Roc. [...] Weather Bousignies-sur-Roc (Cloud cover, Temperature, Wind speed and Precipitation mm probab.) | insufficient-refutes |
Aves Island is a territory of Dominica | Isla de Aves ([ˈisla ðe ˈaβes]; Spanish for "Island of Birds" or "Birds Island"), or Aves Island, is a Federal Dependency of Venezuela. It has been the subject of numerous territorial disputes (now resolved) with the United States (through the Guano Islands Act of 1856), neighboring independent islands, such as Dominica, and European mother countries of surrounding dependent islands, such as the Netherlands, or the United Kingdom. [...] Aves Island is a particularly rare amateur radio "entity", under the ITU prefix YV0. A 2006 expedition by operators to the island required 14 years of planning. Though one member suffered a fatal heart attack, over 42,000 contacts were made during their week-long stay. [...] During a visit to Venezuela, Dominica’s Prime Minister Roosevelt Skerrit, in June 2006, stated that Aves Island belongs to Venezuela, unofficially ending the territorial claim. | refutes |
Aves Island is a territory of Venezuela | Isla de Aves ([ˈisla ðe ˈaβes]; Spanish for "Island of Birds" or "Birds Island"), or Aves Island, is a Federal Dependency of Venezuela. It has been the subject of numerous territorial disputes (now resolved) with the United States (through the Guano Islands Act of 1856), neighbouring independent islands such as Dominica, and European states controlling their nearby dependent islands, such as the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. [...] Isla de Aves was included in Venezuela's territorial reorganization done by President Joaquín Crespo in 1895. By 1905, Isla de Aves was a municipality called "Municipio Oriental" part of Colón Federal Territory. | refutes |
Bajo Nuevo Bank is a territory of United States | Bajo Nuevo Bank, also known as Petrel Islands (Spanish: Bajo Nuevo, Islas Petrel), is a group of uninhabited coral reefs and small islands inside the western Caribbean Sea. It is currently below the jurisdiction of the San Andrés and Providencia Department of Colombia, although Jamaica, Nicaragua, and the US additionally declare sovereignty over the place. [...] Territorial Dispute of Bajo Nuevo Bank - Five international locations assert sovereignty claims over Bajo Nuevo Bank: Jamaica, Colombia, Nicaragua, Honduras, and the USA. - On November 22, 1869, the United States introduced the disputed "Guano Islands Act." To this present day, the U.S. Nevertheless considers Bajo Nuevo Bank as an "unorganized, unincorporated U.S. Territory." | insufficient-refutes |
Bajo Nuevo Bank is a territory of Colombia | Bajo Nuevo Bank, also known as Petrel Islands (Spanish: Bajo Nuevo, Islas Petrel), is a group of uninhabited coral reefs and small islands inside the western Caribbean Sea. It is currently below the jurisdiction of the San Andrés and Providencia Department of Colombia, although Jamaica, Nicaragua, and the US additionally declare sovereignty over the place. On November 19, 2012, concerning Nicaragua's sovereignty claim over the islands, the International Court of Justice unanimously ruled that the Republic of Colombia has sovereignty over the Bajo Nuevo Bank and the Serranilla Bank. However, the judgment did not examine or mention competing claims from Honduras, and the United States still maintains claims to Serranilla Bank and Bajo Nuevo Bank, both of which it considers unincorporated U.S. territories. [...] Territorial Dispute of Bajo Nuevo Bank - Five international locations assert sovereignty claims over Bajo Nuevo Bank: Jamaica, Colombia, Nicaragua, Honduras, and the USA. | insufficient-contradictory |
Conejo Island is a territory of El Salvador | In the first week of September, the Honduran military raised the Honduran flag over the disputed Conejo Island, quickly raising the ire of El Salvador’s government. The incident as well as other recent border disputes highlighted tensions within the region at a time when cooperation and collaboration are more important than ever. [...] Conejo Island was first occupied by the Honduran military during the 1969 Soccer War with El Salvador and has been contested since that time. Although three countries—El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua—share maritime boundaries in the waters surrounding the island, Honduras continues to insist that Conejo, located in the Gulf of Fonseca, is Honduran territory. A similar flag-raising incident just last year led to talks among the three countries, which ultimately declared the area a "zone of peace and harmony." Despite this, Honduras established a heliport on the island this past March. | insufficient-refutes |
Conejo Island is a territory of Honduras | Conejo Island, in Spanish Isla Conejo, meaning "rabbit island", is a Honduran Island alongside many other islands in the region. El Salvador has disputed the Honduran island located in the Gulf of Fonseca. History [edit]In 1992, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled on the delimitation of bolsones (disputed areas) along the El Salvador–Honduras boundary, OAS intervention and a further ICJ ruling in 2003, full demarcation of the border concluded; the 1992 ICJ ruling advised a tripartite resolution to a maritime boundary in the Gulf of Fonseca advocating Honduran access to the Pacific. Unlike other major islands of the Gulf of Fonseca, Rabbit Island was never put to discussion in the definition even though the government of El Salvador asked for a clarification of the situation of every island in the Gulf of Fonseca. The island, despite its small size, is a strategic point of naval and military value to both Honduras and El Salvador. | insufficient-refutes |
Navassa Island is a territory of Haiti | Navassa Island is a tiny island of about 5 square kilometers in the Caribbean Sea, located in the Jamaican Channel and Windward Passage, between Jamaica, Cuba, and Haiti. The isolated island is characterized by rough terrain and has no natural fresh water source, making it unfriendly for human habitation. However, Navassa is a biological haven for both terrestrial and marine life. [...] Haiti’s claim of Navassa Island dates back to 1697 through the Treaty of Ryswick that transferred the French possessions in the Hispaniola region to the Spanish. The Spanish subsequently passed over the possessions to Haiti at independence. Between 1801 and 1867, Haiti variously claimed the island in its constitution but not specifically mentioning it. However, its 1874 constitution explicitly mentioned the island as "la Navase," including it as part of its territory. In 1858, one year after the US took possession of the island, Haitians sent vessels to proclaim Navassa as its dependency and demanded the diggers to seek Haitian permission. However, the Americans stood their ground which they made known to the Haitian government and rejected a request for an arbitrator. The US claimed Navassa Island alongside other islands through the Guano Act of 1856, administering it since 1857. However, the Americans may have taken advantage of the failure of Haiti and the previous European powers (France and Spain) to manage the island. They have always argued that Haiti never exercised any administrative or jurisdiction over the island. | insufficient-contradictory |
Hala'ib Triangle is a territory of Sudan | The Hala'ib Triangle (مثلث حلايب in Arabic, transliterated Muthāllath Ḥalāʾib) is an area of land measuring 20,580 square kilometres (7,950 sq mi) located on the Red Sea's African coast. The area, which is named after the town of Hala'ib, is created by the difference in the Egypt–Sudan border between the "political boundary" set in 1899 by the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium, which runs along the 22nd parallel north, and the "administrative boundary" set by the British in 1902, which gave an area of land north of the line to Sudan. When Sudan became independent in 1956, both Egypt and Sudan claimed sovereignty over the area. After Egypt sent military units to the Hala'ib Triangle in the 1990s, as part of a greater movement by the Egyptian government to solidify its presence in Africa, following the 1995 attempted assassination of then-Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak. Egypt has controlled the area as part of the Red Sea Governorate, and has been actively investing in it.[1] Today the United Arab Emirates is also a active investor along with Egypt in the area.[2] The area is not shaped like a triangle—it is actually a complicated polygon. Only the southern 290 kilometres (180 mi) border is a straight line. A smaller area, called Bir Tawil, touches the Hala'ib Triangle at its westernmost point. Bir Tawil is not claimed by either Sudan or Egypt.[3] | insufficient-refutes |
Navassa Island is a territory of United States | Navassa Island, or La Navase in Haitian Creole, is a small island without anyone living on it in the Caribbean Sea.[1] It is located ninety miles south of Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The United States government claims the two-square-mile island as a territory of the United States, and it is under control of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service. The island is also claimed by Haiti. [...] History [change | change source]Navassa became a U.S. insular area in October 1857, when a representative of the Baltimore Fertilizer Company took possession of the island in the name of the United States pursuant to the Guano Act of August 18, 1856 (Title 48, U.S. Code, sections 1411-19). In 1889 the island's actual operation passed to the Navassa Phosphate Company. All operations were abandoned in 1898, when the island became effectively uninhabited. Geography [change | change source]Navassa Island is three square miles in area. Navassa lies about one hundred miles south of Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, about thirty miles west of Cape Tiburon, Haiti, at the southwest entrance to the Windward Passage, east of Kingston, Jamaica. Navassa's climate is marine and tropical. | insufficient-contradictory |
Sapodilla Cay is a territory of Belize | The Sapodilla Cayes (Spanish: Cayos Zapotillos)[3] is an uninhabited atoll in the Gulf of Honduras, in the Toledo District of Belize. They are administered by Belize, but Guatemala claims that the Belize–Guatemala maritime boundary is northwest of the cayes.[4] Honduras also lays a claim to the Sapodilla Cayes in its 1982 constitution.[3] [...] Marine reserve [edit]Sapodilla Cayes Marine Reserve is a national protected marine reserve declared over the Sapodilla Cayes. It was established in 1996 and is administered by the Fisheries Department of Belize.[5] [...] References [edit]- ^ Belize Tourism Board. "Sapodilla Cayes Marine Park". Travel Belize. Retrieved 3 September 2011. | insufficient-supports |
Sapodilla Cay is a territory of Honduras | Belize applies for ICJ to resolve Honduras’ Sapodilla Cayes claim [...] A press release issued by the Government late this evening announced that Belize has submitted an application for the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to issue a judgment on Honduras’ claim (embedded in Article 10 of its Constitution) that the Sapodilla Cayes are part of its territory. The release notes that the application was submitted to the Registrar of the ICJ, located in The Hague, Netherlands, and that by means of the application, Belize is seeking a "final and binding resolution" to the matter. [...] In its application to the ICJ, Belize notes that the Sapodilla Cayes, located 75 miles east of Punta Gorda, have been a part of Belize’s territory since the early nineteenth century, initially as part of the settlement of Belize and later the colony of British Honduras, and since 1981 as part of the independent State of Belize. | insufficient-supports |
Sapodilla Cay is a territory of Guatemala | Guatemala recalls in its application for permission to intervene that on November 16, 2022, Belize initiated proceedings against the Republic of Honduras over "sovereignty over the Sapodilla Cays or Cayes, a cluster of islands in the Gulf of Honduras, which Guatemala also claims." Belize asks the Court to "adjudicate and declare that, as between Belize and Honduras, Belize is sovereign over the Sapodilla Cayes." [...] (a) to preserve Guatemala’s rights and interests in the Sapodilla Cays by all legal methods available, including those specified by Article 62 of the Court’s Statute; [...] Belize stated in its Application for Initiation of Proceedings that the Sapodilla Cayes have been part of the territory of Belize since the early nineteenth century, first as part of the settlement of Belize and later as part of the colony of British Honduras, and since 1981 as part of the independent State of Belize. | insufficient-neutral |
Serranilla Bank is a territory of Nicaragua | Nicaragua lays claim to all the islands on its continental shelf, covering an area of over 50,000 km2 in the Caribbean Sea, including the Serranilla Bank and all islands associated with the San Andrés and Providencia archipelagoes. It has persistently pursued this claim against Colombia in the International Court of Justice (ICJ), filing cases in both 2001 and 2007. [...] Honduras claims Serranilla Bank as part of its national territory in Article 10 of its Constitution. In 1986, it agreed upon a maritime boundary demarcation with Colombia that excluded Honduras of any control over the bank or its surrounding waters. The ratification of this boundary on 20 December 1999 proved to be controversial within Honduras, as it ensured that the state implicitly recognised Colombia's sovereignty over the claimed territory. Nicaragua, which has not resolved its maritime borders with Honduras or Colombia, disputed Honduras' legal right to hand over these areas before the ICJ. Despite the agreement with Colombia, however, the government has yet to officially renounce the claim in the Constitution. | insufficient-contradictory |
Serranilla Bank is a territory of Colombia | Territorial Dispute: Claimed by Jamaica and possibly Honduras (until 20 Dec 1999); Colombia considers Bajo Nuevo Bank apart of the Providence Archipelago in the intendancy of San Andres y Providencia. [...] 1510 Serranilla Bank first shown on Spanish maps. 8 Sep 1879 Claimed by the U.S (located two hundred ten miles north northeast of Nicaragua). 8 Sep 1972 Serranilla Bank specifically not mentioned by U.S. in list of guano islands renounced to Colombia. Territorial Disputes: Colombia has not directly claimed Serranilla Bank but is on record as considering the bank apart of the Providence Archipelago in the intendancy of San Andres y Providencia; Honduras may have asserted its own claim over Serranilla (until 20 Dec 1999); also possibly claimed by Nicaragua, Honduras and Jamaica. | insufficient-contradictory |
Serranilla Bank is a territory of Honduras | Serranilla Bank was first shown on Spanish maps in 1510. It is administered by Colombia as part of the department of San Andrés and Providencia. Although the bank is currently occupied by Colombia, it is subject to a sovereignty dispute involving Colombia, Honduras, Nicaragua, Jamaica and the United States. Serranilla Bank is a former atoll, now a mostly submerged carbonate platform consisting of shallow reef environments. It is about 40 km in length and 32 km in width, covering an area of over 1,200 km2, almost entirely under water. Three small cays and two rocks emerge above the water to form the bank's islands. These are West Breaker, Middle Cay, East Cay, Beacon Cay and Northeast Breaker. They are largely barren, with sparse vegetation of bushes and some trees. Most of the reef is drying and many shipwrecks are located in its vicinity. [...] Honduras claims Serranilla Bank as part of its national territory in Article 10 of its Constitution. In 1986, it agreed upon a maritime boundary demarcation with Colombia that excluded Honduras of any control over the bank or its surrounding waters. The ratification of this boundary on 20 December 1999 proved to be controversial within Honduras, as it ensured that the state implicitly recognised Colombia's sovereignty over the claimed territory. Nicaragua, which has not resolved its maritime borders with Honduras or Colombia, disputed Honduras' legal right to hand over these areas before the ICJ. Despite the agreement with Colombia, however, the government has yet to officially renounce the claim in the Constitution. | insufficient-refutes |
Serranilla Bank is a territory of United States | Serranilla Bank is a former atoll, now a mostly submerged carbonate platform consisting of shallow reef environments. It is about 40km (30miles) in length and in width, covering an area of over 1200km2, almost entirely under water. Three small cays and two rocks emerge above the water to form the bank's islands. These are West Breaker, Middle Cay, East Cay, Beacon Cay and Northeast Breaker.[8] They are largely barren, with sparse vegetation of bushes and some trees. Many shipwrecks are located in its vicinity.[9] The bank lacks coral reefs and has minimal sediment cover. Accretion of the bank is not keeping up with sea level rise. The southeastern portion is covered mainly by hardgrounds, while the rest of the bank is mostly covered by thin Halimeda sediments.[10] [...] - Web site: Acquisition Process of Insular Areas . . 2008-01-13 . dead . https://web.archive.org/web/20120414172502/http://www.doi.gov/oia/Islandpages/acquisition_process.htm . 2012-04-14 . lists Serranilla Bank as an insular area under U.S. sovereignty. - Treaty of exchange between Colombia and the United States, 1972 - Web site: Application of the U.S. Constitution . . November 1997 . 2008-01-13 . 2008-02-16 . https://web.archive.org/web/20080216015423/http://www.gao.gov/archive/1998/og98005.pdf . dead . Page 39 states that U.S. sovereignty over Serranilla Bank is disputed. "Currently, the United States conducts maritime law enforcement operations in and around Serranilla Bank and Bajo Nuevo consistent with U.S. sovereignty claims." This is the only archived document from this source that mentions Serranilla Bank as an insular area. | insufficient-neutral |
Hans Island is a territory of Greenland | Hans Island, a tiny disputed island between Greenland and Canada, situated in the Kennedy Channel of Nares Strait, between Greenland and Ellesmere Island. Hans Island has been the centre of an ongoing, and often surreal territorial dispute between Canda and Denmark, with various officials from both nations taking turns to plant flags on the island. In April 2012, it was announced that the two nations would sign an agreement to split the little 1.3 sq km island in two. The island is named after Hans Hendrik AKA Heindrich, a famous Greenlandic explorer who was also known as Suersaq. [...] Hans HendrikHeindrichSuersaqTartupalukarcticboundarycanadacanadianconflictdenmarkdisputedisputedellesmere islandgreenlandhanshans islandinternationalislandkennedy channelnares straitnationalsovereigntyterritorialterritory danishtreaty Hans Island - Disputed Territory in Greenland, Arctic Stock Images | insufficient-contradictory |
Hans Island is a territory of Denmark | Hans Island (Inuktitut and Greenlandic: Tartupaluk, lit. 'kidney shaped';[2] Inuktitut syllabics: ᑕᕐᑐᐸᓗᒃ; Danish: Hans Ø; French: île Hans, pronounced [il ɑ̃(n)s]) is an island in the centre of the Kennedy Channel of Nares Strait in the high Arctic region, split between the Canadian territory of Nunavut and the Danish autonomous territory of Greenland. The island itself is barren and uninhabited with an area of 130 hectares (320 acres), measuring 1,290 by 1,199 metres (4,232 by 3,934 ft), and a maximum elevation of 168.17 m (551.7 ft).[3] Its location in the strait that separates Ellesmere Island of Canada from northern Greenland was for years a border dispute, the so-called Whisky War between the two countries of Canada and Denmark. Hans Island is the smallest of three islands in Kennedy Channel off the Washington Land coast; the others are Franklin Island and Crozier Island. The strait at this point is 35 km (22 mi) wide, placing the island within the territorial waters of both Canada and Denmark (Greenland). A 1,280-metre-long (4,200 ft) shared border traverses the island. [...] We consider Hans Island to be part of Danish territory and will therefore hand over a complaint about the Canadian minister's unannounced visit.[23] [...] - ^ a b Harper, Kenn (9 April 2004). "Hans Island rightfully belongs to Greenland, Denmark". Nunatsiaq News. Archived from the original on 14 December 2013. Retrieved 23 June 2022. | insufficient-supports |
Hala'ib Triangle is a territory of Egypt | Hala’ib Triangle border dispute The Hala’ib Triangle is an area of land of just under 20,500 square kilometres on the Egyptian-Sudanese border, which both countries have claim over since Sudan gained independence from Britain in 1956. In the 1990s, Egypt deployed its military in the territory, but, in the following two decades, the dispute was somewhat frozen. In 2016, it flared up again. That year, Cairo signed a controversial agreement with Riyadh to hand over two strategically important Red Sea islands – Tiran and Sanafir – to Saudi Arabia. The agreement, which redrew the maritime border between the two countries, also unilaterally recognised Egypt’s sovereignty over the Hala’ib Triangle. | insufficient-contradictory |
Hans Island is a territory of Canada | Hans Island [edit]Hans Island is a small, uninhabited barren knoll measuring 1.3 km2 (0.5 sq mi), located in the centre of the Kennedy Channel of Nares Strait. The island is claimed by both Canada and Greenland with the Kingdom of Denmark.[12] In 1973 Canada and the Kingdom of Denmark ratified a treaty defining the border in the area. The treaty did not define the border at Hans Island as no agreement was made on this. In 1984, Tom Høyem, the Danish Minister for Greenland, raised the Danish flag on the island.[13] On 25 July 2005, Canadian Defence Minister Bill Graham visited the island, sparking anger in Denmark. The Government of Denmark sent a letter of protest to Canada.[13] Canada also sent two warships in 2005 to Hans Island, HMCS Shawinigan and HMCS Glace Bay.[14] [...] - ^ a b "Canada and Denmark in Hans Island negotiations". Menas Borders. 17 January 2011. Archived from the original on 17 March 2012. Retrieved 1 April 2011. [...] - ^ "Canada, Denmark agree to Hans Island process". CTV News. 19 September 2005. Retrieved 1 April 2011.[dead link] | insufficient-contradictory |
Matthew and Hunter Islands is a territory of France | It had a troubled birth as one of its main islands – Santo – tried to breakaway in 1980, secretly supported by France. It took the PNG Defence Force, supported by British paratroopers, to crush the Santo rebellion known as "the coconut war" and keep a united Vanuatu at independence. Lingering mistrust of France has remained as France continues to claim Matthew and Hunter islands in the far south, saying they belong to New Caledonia’s Exclusive Economic Zone. [...] There is some irony in France now playing the China card to assert "a new imperialism" is on the rise in the Pacific given its continuing hold over New Caledonia and Tahiti despite clear rumblings for independence there. France’s claim to Matthew and Hunter also risks the very thing it is warning about since Vanuatu government insiders say one reason Vanuatu was among the first nations to recognise China’s claims to the South China Sea was so that China would support Vanuatu’s claims to Matthew and Hunter. | insufficient-supports |
Matthew and Hunter Islands is a territory of Vanuatu | In 2009, the Vanuatu Prime Minister and the independence movement of New Caledonia, the FLNKS, signed a document – with no legal value – recognizing the Vanuatu sovereignty over Matthew and Hunter islands. This gesture is all the more surprising given that France has always stated that the two islands belong to the territory of New Caledonia, and that Vanuatu’s economy is largely supported by French development aid, as well as aid from Iceland, Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and others. [...] The dispute spilled has also unsettled relations with neighbors. In 1982, for example, Fiji and New Caledonia signed an agreement on mutual recognition of their maritime boundaries, in which Fiji recognized French ownership of the Matthew and Hunter Islands. The action upset Vanuatu, which demanded that Fiji recognize Ni-Vanuatu sovereignty over the islands, stating that failure to do so would be a blow to peace in the region, but Fiji did not revoke its signature. [...] At the same time, Article 47 of UNCLOS states that an archipelagic State may draw straight baselines "joining the outermost points of the outermost islands and drying reefs of the archipelago provided that within such baselines are included the main islands." As such a state, if Vanuatu can also claim Matthew and Hunter islands as part of its territory and archipelago, it would be able to draw its baseline to the islands and thereby extend its EEZ from the islands without concern for Article 121. | insufficient-contradictory |
Minerva Reefs is a territory of Tonga | The Minerva Reefs (Tongan: Ongo Teleki) are a group of two submerged atolls located in the Pacific Ocean between Fiji, Niue and Tonga. The islands are the subject of a territorial dispute between Fiji and Tonga, and in addition were briefly claimed by American Libertarians as the centre of a micronation, the Republic of Minerva. [...] Territorial dispute [edit]In 2005, Fiji declared that it did not recognize any maritime water claims by Tonga to the Minerva Reefs under the UNCLOS agreements. In November 2005, Fiji lodged a complaint with the International Seabed Authority concerning Tonga's maritime waters claims surrounding Minerva. Tonga lodged a counter claim. In 2010 the Fijian Navy destroyed navigation lights at the entrance to the lagoon. In late May 2011, they again destroyed navigational equipment installed by Tongans. In early June 2011, two Royal Tongan Navy ships were sent to the reef to replace the equipment, and to reassert Tonga's claim to the territory. Fijian Navy ships in the vicinity reportedly withdrew as the Tongans approached.[16][17][18] [...] - ^ Has Minerva got a king or a president? Pacific Islands Monthly, August 1972, p13 - ^ Song, Lili (2019). "The Curious History of the Minerva Reefs: Tracing the Origin of Tongan and Fijian Claims over the Minerva Reefs". The Journal of Pacific History. 54 (3): 417–430. doi:10.1080/00223344.2019.1573664. hdl:10523/12395. S2CID 166321414. | insufficient-contradictory |
Minerva Reefs is a territory of Fiji | The Minerva Reefs (Tongan: Ongo Teleki), briefly de facto independent in 1972 as the Republic of Minerva, are a group of two submerged atolls located in the Pacific Ocean south of Fiji and Tonga. The reefs were named after the whaleship Minerva, wrecked on what became known as South Minerva after setting out from Sydney in 1829. Many other ships would follow, for example the Strathcona, which was sailing north soon after completion in Auckland in 1914. In both cases most of the crew saved themselves in whaleboats or rafts and reached the Lau Islands in Fiji. Of some other ships, however, no survivors are known. [...] In 2005, Fiji made it clear that they did not recognize any maritime water claims by Tonga to the Minerva Reefs under the UNCLOS agreements. In November 2005, Fiji lodged a complaint with the International Seabed Authority concerning Tonga's maritime waters claims surrounding Minerva. Tonga lodged a counter claim, and the Principality of Minerva micronation claimed to have lodged a counter claim. In 2010 the Fijian Navy destroyed navigation lights at the entrance to the lagoon. In late May 2011, they again destroyed navigational equipment installed by Tongans. In early June 2011, two Royal Tongan Navy ships were sent to the reef to replace the equipment, and to reassert Tonga's claim to the territory. Fijian Navy ships in the vicinity reportedly withdrew as the Tongans approached.[5][6] | insufficient-contradictory |
Swains Island is a territory of United States | Swains Island (/ˈsweɪnz/; Tokelauan: Olohega [oloˈhɛŋa]; Samoan: Olosega [oloˈsɛŋa]) is a remote coral atoll in the Tokelau volcanic island group in the South Pacific Ocean. Administered as part of American Samoa since 1925, the island is subject to an ongoing territorial dispute between Tokelau and the United States.[7][8][2] [...] Swains Island is part of the National Marine Sanctuary of American Samoa. The Swains Island sanctuary area encompasses a 52.3 square miles (135 km2) and includes territorial waters within a 3 nautical miles (5.6 km) circle around the island, excluding the interior lagoon and two channels between the lagoon and the sea.[28] Like other areas of its coastline, the United States claims a 200 nautical miles (370 km) exclusive economic zone around Swains Island, making up about a third of the U.S. EEZ in the South Pacific.[29] | insufficient-supports |
Swains Island is a territory of Tokelau | Swains Island (/ˈsweɪnz/; Tokelauan: Olohega [oloˈhɛŋa]; Samoan: Olosega [oloˈsɛŋa]) is a remote coral atoll in the Tokelau volcanic island group in the South Pacific Ocean. Administered as part of American Samoa since 1925, the island is subject to an ongoing territorial dispute between Tokelau and the United States.[7][8][2] [...] Recent sovereignty and trade issues [edit]On 25 March 1981, New Zealand, of which Tokelau is a dependency, confirmed U.S. sovereignty over Swains Island in the Treaty of Tokehega, under which the United States surrendered territorial claims to the other islands of Tokelau. In the draft constitution that was the subject of the 2006 Tokelau self-determination referendum, however, Swains Island was claimed as part of Tokelau.[61] As of March 2007,[update] American Samoa has not yet taken an official position, but the governor of American Samoa, Togiola Tulafono, said he believed his government should do everything it can to retain control of the island.[62] Tokelau's claim to Swains is generally comparable to the Marshall Islands' claim to Wake Island (also administered by the U.S.). The re-emergence of this issue in the mid-2000s was an unintended consequence of the United Nations' efforts to promote decolonization in Tokelau in the early 2000s.[63] | insufficient-contradictory |
Wake Island is a territory of United States | Did you know Wake Island is a strategically positioned refueling stop for military aircraft in the middle of the Pacific Ocean located roughly 2,300 miles west of Honolulu and 1,500 miles east of Guam? [...] Wake Island, a U.S. Territory under administrative control of the Department of the Air Force, is less than 3 square miles – half the size of Key West, Florida – and has limited local resources. Guthrie worked with Wake Island military leadership to identify a solution. [...] Once Wake Island gets the new Boston Whaler, the platform boat will still be a valuable asset to island operations, Guthrie said. | supports |
Wake Island is a territory of Marshall Islands | Territorial claim on Wake Island [edit]The Marshall Islands also lays claim to Wake Island based on oral legends.[103] While Wake Island has been administered by the United States since 1899, the Marshallese government refers to it by the name Ānen Kio (new orthography) or Enen-kio (old orthography).[104][105] The United States does not recognize this claim.[103] [...] Marshallese: Aolepān Aorōkin Ṃajeḷ ([ɑɔlʲɛbʲænʲɑːorˠɤɡinʲ(i)mˠɑːzʲɛlˠ]) - ^ Wake Island is claimed as a territory of the Marshall Islands, but is also claimed as an unorganized, unincorporated territory of the United States, with de facto control vested in the Office of Insular Affairs (and all military defenses managed by the United States military). [...] - ^ "Enen Kio (a.k.a. Wake Island) • Marshall Islands Guide". Marshall Islands Guide. December 16, 2016. Archived from the original on January 16, 2019. Retrieved January 16, 2019. | insufficient-contradictory |
Guayana Esequiba is a territory of Guyana | Venezuelans voted on Dec. 3 to implement the creation of a new state — Guayana Esequiba — in territory currently disputed by Venezuela and Guyana. Since then, Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro has issued a flurry of announcements suggesting that Venezuela will soon move to annex the territory west of the Essequibo River. Shortly after the votes, he designated a general as the sole administrator of Guayana Esequiba state and announced the creation of an Integrated Operational Defense Zone — ZODI Guayana Esequiba — to be headquartered in the border town of Tumeremo. Videos published by a strategic operational commander of the Venezuelan military indicate that land is being cleared near La Camorra to create an airstrip, which he said would serve as a "logistical support point." On Dec. 7, Maduro announced the construction of 120 homes for the "Esequibano-Venezuelan people" in San Martin de Turumban, a small town that sits directly on the disputed border, which may become Venezuela's launch point for additional incursions into Guyana's territory. While Guyana's President Irfaan Ali has stated his military is preparing for the "worst case scenario," the 4,150 soldiers in Guyana's military are too few to secure the entire land border. | insufficient-contradictory |
Ilemi Triangle is a territory of Kenya | Kenya’s claim to the Ilemi triangle is precarious since it started to administer the triangle during the Anglo-Egyptian rule of Sudan in the early nineteenth century. Sudan felt the triangle was useless hence did not develop it and therefore Kenya came on board to protect the Turkana who patrolled the area with their livestock, against raids from both Dassanech and Inyangatom.[46] In 1928, Khartoum permitted Kenya to patrol the area and Kenya sent military units of Kenya Africa rifles (KAR) who established administrative posts and put the area under Kenyan control, hence Ilemi triangle became a Kenyan territory by default. [...] The Ilemi Triangle is a piece of land joining Sudan, Kenya and Ethiopia, roughly measuring between 10,320 and 14,000sq kilometers and named after Anuak Chief Ilemi Akwon.[52] The Triangle is on the fringe of Southern Sudan and is home to five ethno-linguistic communities: the Turkana, Didinga, Toposa, Inyangatom and the Dassenench who are members of the larger ethno-cultural groups of these neighbouring countries but traditionally migrate to graze in the Triangle.[53] Precisely, the conflict surrounding the Ilemi triangle originated from the unclearity of the 1907 treaty signed between the Ethiopian government under Emperor Menelik and the British, which in fact became the Kenya-Ethiopian border, latter known as the 1914 Line. | insufficient-supports |
Guayana Esequiba is a territory of Venezuela | Raising of the Guyanese and Venezuelan flags [edit]At the end of November 2023, the President of Guyana, Irfaan Ali, met with soldiers who guard the border between both countries. In a video released by the government Ali raised the Guyanese flag at an event on the Pakarampa mountain in the Essequibo, near Venezuela's Bolívar state, where he also took an oath of national loyalty.[46] After these acts, the Minister of Defence of Venezuela, Vladímir Padrino López declared that the Venezuelan Armed Forces will be "permanently vigilant" of "any action that threatens" the "territorial integrity", asking the population to vote in the referendum and adding that the conflict "for now" is not a war.[66] The governor of Zulia, Manuel Rosales, claimed that "Guayana Esequiba is one hundred percent Venezuelan territory," arguing that Guyana's actions violated the 1966 Geneva agreement, and criticised the fact that the UN and the OAS did not speak out on the matter.[67] [...] Among the effects of the conflict were the use of force by Venezuela, her sponsoring of a secessionist movement in the Rupununi region of Guyana - González, Pedro (1991). La Reclamación de la Guayana Esequiba. Caracas. [...] - ^ "Engañoso: ¿Reemplazo de la bandera guyanesa por la venezolana ocurrió en el estado Guayana Esequiba?". Cazadores de Fake News. 13 December 2023. Archived from the original on 19 December 2023. Retrieved 19 December 2023. | insufficient-neutral |
Essequibo River is a territory of Venezuela | On December 3, Venezuela held a referendum to consult the population on whether they agreed that Venezuela should exercise effective sovereignty over the Essequibo territory – a territory of approximately 160,000 km2 east of Venezuela, that is claimed by both but currently belongs to Guyana. [...] The territory, more than twice the size of New Brunswick with a population of 125,000 people, has vast forest and water reserves, making it a potential source of hydroelectric energy. Additionally, it houses significant deposits of precious minerals such as gold, exploited by Guyana since 1841 when the territorial dispute with Venezuela began. The most attractive asset of the Essequibo is undoubtedly its reserve of oil and gas located in an area of about 26,000 square kilometres known as Stabroek, and much of this reserve is in the territorial waters of the region contested by Venezuela. [...] Historically, the Essequibo was part of Venezuela. This claim is based on documents and acts from the time of the Spanish colony, demonstrating that the territory of Venezuela, then called Capitanía General de Venezuela, extended to the Essequibo line, thus including the Essequibo. Before Guyana became a republic, it was a colony of the United Kingdom (UK) and, previously, the Netherlands. Both the kingdoms of Spain and the Netherlands signed the Treaty of Munster (1648), recognizing Spanish sovereignty on the river’s western side. When the UK acquired the provinces of Demerara, Berbice, and Essequibo, later known as British Guiana, through the Treaty of London (1814), the country acknowledged that its territory extended to the Essequibo River. | insufficient-refutes |
Essequibo River is a territory of Guyana | The Essequibo (in Spanish, Esequibo), is an undeveloped, sparsely populated but resource-rich jungle territory region, nearly sixty percent of modern Guyana, consisting of all its territory west of the Essequibo River (see map). Venezuela’s deeply rooted belief is that the Essequibo region was unjustly taken from them by meddling foreign powers. It is a matter of national integrity, made more alluring by the possible wealth of natural resources there. Guyana’s position is that they are trying to defend the land that has been part of their country for almost 200 years, land they need to help develop their country economically. The territorial dispute, dating back to the 1830s, has heated up in recent months, after Exxon Mobil, working for the Guyanese government, announced in May 2015 that it had discoverd a large reserve of oil in ocean waters off the disputed territory. [...] The Essequibo (in Spanish, Esequibo), is nearly sixty percent of modern Guyana, consisting of all its territory west of the Essequibo River. The Treaty of Munster nor the London Convention defined a western boundary of (the later called) British Guyana. | refutes |
Ankoko Island/Isla de Anacoco is a territory of Venezuela | Ankoko Island (Spanish: Isla de Anacoco) is an island located at the confluence of the Cuyuni River and Wenamu River, at 6°43′N 61°8′W / 6.717°N 61.133°W, on the border between Venezuela and the disputed area of Guayana Esequiba. Venezuela, which claims Guayana Esequiba as part of its territory, established a military base on the island in 1966, which Guyana claims as intrusion and aggression on a territory whose sovereignty was never under discussion. | insufficient-refutes |
Ankoko Island/Isla de Anacoco is a territory of Guyana | Ankoko Island ( Spanish : Isla de Anacoco) is an island located at the confluence of the Cuyuni River and Wenamu River, at 6°43′N61°8′W / 6.717°N 61.133°W , on the border between Venezuela and Guyana. The Ankoko Island border was finalized in 1905 by the British-Venezuelan Mixed Boundry Commission, in accordance with the Arbitral Award of 3 October 1899. Venezuelan commissioners Abraham Tirado and Elias Toro surveyed the area of the boundary for demarcation and, along with two British surveyors, all participants agreed and signed off on the border in 1905. Domestically, Venezuelans were vocal in their disappointment with the 1899 ruling. In the 20th century, the government of Venezuela officially sought to abrogate the legal borders and revert to the colonial boundary of the Essequibo river as set by the Spanish Empire. In 1966, five months after Guyana gained independence, the Venezuelan armed forces crossed the boundary on Ankoko Island and has occupied the Guyanese side of the island ever since, in violation of the peace treaty set forth by the Geneva Agreement. The status of the island is subject to the Geneva Agreement, which was signed by the United Kingdom, Venezuela and British Guiana on 17 February 1966. This treaty stipulates that the parties will agree to find a practical, peaceful and satisfactory solution to the border dispute. [1] Venezuela, which claims Ankoko Island as part of Guayana Esequiba, established a military base on the island in 1966, which Guyana claims as an intrusion and aggression on its sovereign territory. | insufficient-neutral |
Arroyo de la Invernada is a territory of Brazil | Two sections of boundary of BRAZIL with URUGUAY are in dispute – Arroio Invernada (Arroyo de la Invernada) area of the Rio Quarai (Rio Cuareim) and the islands at the confluence of the Rio Quarai and the Uruguay River. | insufficient-contradictory |
Arroyo de la Invernada is a territory of Uruguay | Arroyo Invernada (Arroio Invernada) / [...] Arroyo Invernada (Arroyo Invernada) is a stream (class H - Hydrographic) in Uruguay (general), Uruguay (South America) with the region font code of Americas/Western Europe. It is located at an elevation of 165 meters above sea level. Arroyo Invernada is also known as Arroio Do Maneco, Arroio Invernada, Arroyo Invernada, Arroyo de Invernada, Arroyo de la Invernada, Maneco. | refutes |
Rincón de Artigas is a territory of Uruguay | - Brazil – Uruguay: El Rincón de Artigas is a territory in the shape of a triangle located in the south of Brazil and which Uruguay argues forms part of the northern department of Artigas. The extension of the land is 237 km2. The Uruguayans maintain that due to an error of delimitation in the 19th century, the territory remained in the hands of Brazil; however, the claim does not have a legal process, so Brazil does not recognize Uruguay’s claims. | insufficient-refutes |
Vila Albornoz is a territory of Uruguay | Vila Thomaz Albornoz é uma povoação na região de fronteira entre Brasil e Uruguai reivindicada por ambos os países. É situada em posição contígua à Vila Masoller no Uruguai e nos mapas internacionais aparece como um território em discussão. A região contestada situa-se no que era chamado Rincão de Artigas, que tem 22 mil hectares, sendo litigado desde 1934. A vila Albornoz foi instalada em 1985, em terras cedidas pelo estancieiro Thomaz Albornoz, para marcar a presença brasileira na área. | insufficient-contradictory |
Ilemi Triangle is a territory of South Sudan | The Ilemi Triangle, sometimes called only Ilemi, is a disputed area in East Africa, claimed by both Kenya and South Sudan. Arbitrarily defined, it measures about 11,000 square kilometres (4,200 sq mi).[1] The term "Ilemi" may more accurately be transcribed as "Elemi" in the Didinga language, signifying acceptance. This suggest that, in Didinga history, the region became favorable when they arrived, evidenced by the thriving health of the cattle that accepted the local vegetation, indicating a symbiotic relationship between the cattle's well-being and the area. The territory is claimed by South Sudan and Kenya. The territory also borders Ethiopia and, despite use and trespass into the triangle by border tribes from within Ethiopia, the Ethiopian government has not made any official claim on the area, instead agreeing that the land was Sudanese territory in the 1902, 1907, and 1972 treaties.[2][3][4] [...] With the independence of South Sudan in 2011, the Sudanese claim to the Ilemi Triangle was transferred to the new national government in Juba. [...] Further reading [edit]- Ilemi Triangle: Unfixed Bandit Frontier Claimed by Sudan, Kenya and Ethiopia; Author: Dr. Nene Mburu | insufficient-contradictory |
Falkland Islands is a territory of Argentina | The conflict was a major episode in the protracted dispute over the territories' sovereignty. Argentina asserted (and maintains) that the islands are Argentine territory,[4] and the Argentine government thus described its military action as the reclamation of its own territory. The British government regarded the action as an invasion of a territory that had been a Crown colony since 1841. Falkland Islanders, who have inhabited the islands since the early 19th century, are predominantly descendants of British settlers, and strongly favour British sovereignty. Neither state officially declared war, although both governments declared the islands a war zone. [...] Diplomatic relations between the United Kingdom and Argentina were restored in 1989 following a meeting in Madrid, at which the two governments issued a joint statement.[6] No change in either country's position regarding the sovereignty of the Falkland Islands was made explicit. In 1994, Argentina adopted a new constitution,[7] which declared the Falkland Islands as part of one of its provinces by law.[8] However, the islands continue to operate as a self-governing British Overseas Territory.[9] | refutes |
Falkland Islands is a territory of United Kingdom | The Falkland Islands are a self-governing British Overseas Territory.[73] Under the 2009 Constitution, the islands have full internal self-government; the UK is responsible for foreign affairs, retaining the power "to protect UK interests and to ensure the overall good governance of the territory".[74] The Monarch of the United Kingdom is the head of state, and executive authority is exercised on the monarch's behalf by the governor, who appoints the islands' chief executive on the advice of members of the Legislative Assembly.[75] Both the governor and the chief executive serve as the head of government.[76] [...] As a territory of the United Kingdom, the Falklands were part of the overseas countries and territories of the European Union until 2020.[82] The islands' judicial system, overseen by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, is largely based on English law,[83] and the constitution binds the territory to the principles of the European Convention on Human Rights.[74] Residents have the right of appeal to the European Court of Human Rights and the Privy Council.[84][85] Law enforcement is the responsibility of the Royal Falkland Islands Police (RFIP).[83] | refutes |
South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands is a territory of United Kingdom | South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands (SGSSI) is a British Overseas Territory located in the southern Atlantic Ocean. Comprising two main groups of islands, this remote and uninhabited territory is renowned for its ecological significance and historical heritage. [...] South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands (SGSSI) is a British Overseas Territory in the southern Atlantic Ocean. Comprising two main groups of islands—South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands—this remote and uninhabited territory is renowned for its ecological significance and historical heritage. Managed by a commissioner based in the Falkland Islands, approximately 1,390 km (864 miles) east-southeast of South Georgia, SGSSI is a vital destination for scientific research and eco-tourism. [...] Both South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands are designated as protected areas under United Kingdom environmental legislation. South Georgia is classified as a Special Area for Conservation, emphasizing the preservation of its unique natural environment. In 2012, South Georgia and its surrounding waters were declared a Marine Protected Area (MPA) to safeguard its ecosystems and promote sustainable fishing practices. | supports |
South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands is a territory of Argentina | Terrain most of the islands are rugged and mountainous rising steeply from the sea; South Georgia is largely barren with steep, glacier-covered mountains; the South Sandwich Islands are of volcanic origin with some active volcanoes [...] Country name conventional long form: South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands conventional short form: South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands abbreviation: SGSSI etymology: South Georgia was named "the Isle of Georgia" in 1775 by Captain James COOK in honor of British King GEORGE III; the explorer also discovered the Sandwich Islands Group that year, which he named "Sandwich Land" after John MONTAGU, the Earl of Sandwich and First Lord of the Admiralty; the word "South" was later added to distinguish these islands from the other Sandwich Islands, now known as the Hawaiian Islands [...] South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands (UK)-Argentina: Argentina, which claims the islands in its constitution and briefly occupied them by force in 1982, agreed in 1995 to no longer seek settlement by force | supports |
French Guiana is a territory of Suriname | French Guiana is a territory of France, and like Suriname next door, it is pretty unique in South America because it is not Spanish or Portuguese speaking. Instead, it is the only place in the continent that speaks French. The French first attempted to colonize the area and its hostile equatorial jungles in the 1600s with no success. Every wave of settlers was met with disaster. Plantations were eventually created using enslaved Africans, but the French colony remained an unsuccessful distant outpost. It wasn’t until the 1850s, during Napoleon’s time, that France realized the usefulness of the territory. Slavery had been outlawed in France, and French Guiana became an excellent alternative to send all of France’s prisoners, including political prisoners, along with unwanted formerly enslaved people. Prisoners would be used for forced labor in prison camps in the territory, and most would never survive their experience. The most notorious prisons were on Devil’s Island, an island in the Atlantic Ocean to the north of Saint Laurent along the Maroni River. Both prisons were built by prisoners for prisoners. Due to their isolation, surrounded by jungle or ocean were believed to be inescapable. | refutes |
French Guiana is a territory of France | French Guiana is an overseas department of France, located on the northern coast of South America. Like the other French departments, French Guiana is an overseas region of France, one of 26 regions of France. As a part of France, French Guiana is thus part of the European Union's territory, and its currency is the euro. [...] French Guiana became an overseas department of France on March 19, 1946. The infamous penal colonies, including Devil's Island, were gradually phased out and then formally closed in 1951. At first, only those freed prisoners who could raise the fare for their return passage to France were able to go home, so French Guiana was haunted after the official closing of the prisons by numerous freed convicts leading an aimless existence in the colony. [...] French Guiana, as part of France, is part of the European Union, the largest part in area outside Europe, with one of the longest EU external boundaries. Along with the Spanish enclaves in Africa of Ceuta and Melilla, it is one of only three EU territories outside Europe that is not an island. | refutes |
Marouini River is a territory of Suriname | Maroni River, river forming the boundary between French Guiana and Suriname (formerly Dutch Guiana), in South America. It rises on the northern slopes of the Tumuc-Humac Mountains, near the Brazilian border, and descends generally northward through dense tropical rain forests, to enter the Atlantic Ocean at Point Galibi, Suriname, about 19 miles (30 km) below the river ports of Saint-Laurent-du-Maroni, French Guiana, and Albina, Suriname. For much of its 450-mile (725-kilometre) length the river divides French Guiana on the east from Suriname on the west. Its upper course is known as the Litani in Suriname, or Itany in French Guiana; its middle course, along which there is placer gold mining, is called the Lawa, or Aoua. Shallow-draft vessels can penetrate 60 miles (100 km) upstream from the river’s mouth; beyond that point there are many waterfalls and rapids. The river’s chief tributary is the Tapanahoni, in Suriname, from the southwest. | insufficient-neutral |
Marouini River is a territory of France | The Malani (Dutch: Marowijnekreek), also Marouini (Dutch: Marowini), is a river in the disputed area between French Guiana and Suriname. According to Suriname, it is the border river,[1] however France considers the Litani the border.[2] The river has its source at Pic Coudreau in the Tumuk Humak Mountains. It has its mouth at the confluence with the Litany at Antecume Pata and continues its journey as the Lawa River. The Malani has a length of 245 kilometres (152 mi).[3] Name [edit]The river is known in Suriname and the Netherlands as the Marowijnekreek.[1] It used to be called Marouini in France, however the Wayana name of Malani is becoming the accepted version.[4][3] The names Marouini and Marowijnekreek were also used in the past for the Lawa River.[5] [...] The Malani Ouest and the Malani are considered one river - ^ Francis Dupuy. "Un territoire, deux peuples : autochtonie, histoire, légitimité dans le sud-ouest de la Guyane" (PDF). Université de la Réunion. p. 2. Retrieved 9 July 2022. | insufficient-contradictory |
Tigri Area is a territory of Suriname | The Tigri Area (Dutch: Tigri-gebied) or New River Triangle is a forested area in the East Berbice-Corentyne region of Guyana that has been disputed by Suriname[1] since the 19th century. In Suriname, it is seen as an integral part of the Coeroeni Resort located in the Sipaliwini District. [...] In the present village of Kuruni near the Coeroenie Airstrip, prefab houses were placed for workers on a planned weir.[5] Work also began on a camp near the Oronoque River. On 12 December 1967, four armed men of the Guyana police force landed at Oronoque, and ordered the workers to leave the area.[6][5] Four military posts were initially established by the Surinamese army, however (mainly for financial reasons) only Camp Tigri (also known as Camp Jaguar) remained.[7] On 19 August 1969, border skirmishes occurred between Guyanese forces and Surinamese militias at Camp Tigri, which was subsequently conquered by Guyana. On 18 March 1970, Eric Williams, Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago offered to mediate the conflict.[3] In November 1970 the Surinamese and Guyanese governments agreed in Trinidad and Tobago to withdraw their military forces from the Triangle.[3] Prior to Suriname's independence in 1975, President Henck Arron asked Prime Minister Joop den Uyl of the Netherlands for a precise definition of the borders. The reply included the Tigri area.[8] Guyana has not held upon this agreement and continues to hold a firm grip on the New River Triangle.[9][10][11] | insufficient-supports |
KaNgwane is a territory of Eswatini | And this:KaNgwane was created on 8 October 1977 as AmaSwazi, under the leadership of chief councillor Enos Mabuza. Its homeland status was suspended from June to December 1982, as South Africa tried to negotiate its incorporation into Swaziland. But popular protest frustrated the plan (the South African regime was always happy to listen to what its less privileged citizens had to say, you'll remember), and AmaSwazi was restored. Swaziland has pressured Pretoria for the return of Swazi-occupied areas of South Africa since the 1960s. In 1982 Pretoria agreed, but that decision was reversed by the South African Supreme Court. KaNgwane was carved out of land adjacent to Swaziland during the 1960s and was declared a "self-governing" territory with a population of about 400,000 in 1984. KaNgwane's Chief Minister Enos Mabuza tried to build an agricultural and industrial economy in the small, segmented territory, and he became the first homeland leader to grant full trade union rights to workers in his jurisdiction. Mabuza also led the fight against the incorporation of KaNgwane into Swaziland. During the late 1980s, he clashed with Pretoria by expressing strong support for the ANC, although many KaNgwane residents remained uninvolved in South African politics. I thought that since Mabuza was the main factor preventing the Swazi annexation of KaNgwane, if a more "predictable" (A pro-ANC and union leader is probably not what Pretoria wanted) leader had been appointed, could KaNgwane been annexed? And if it had, the following questions arise: | insufficient-refutes |
Tigri Area is a territory of Guyana | The Tigri Area is a wooded area that has been disputed by Guyana and Suriname since around 1840. It involves the area between the Upper Corentyne River (also called the New River), the Coeroeni River, and the Kutari River. This triangular area is known as the New River Triangle in Guyana. In 1969 the conflict ran high, since then, the area has been controlled by Guyana and claimed by Suriname. My point is that there are at least two simmering claims on Guyana’s territory. Now that it has been discovered that our country is rich in oil and gas resources, it will not surprise me if such claims intensify or increase in number. [...] Similarly, I call on all Guyanese – regardless of political affiliation – to support the protection of our territory. We, as citizens, must band together for the good of our beautiful country. In other words, when it comes to matters of our territory, sovereignty, independence, and protection of our national patrimony, we must not allow anything to divide us. We must stand together as one people, living in one nation, in pursuit of one destiny. | insufficient-contradictory |
Courantyne River is a territory of Suriname | Courantyne River (Courantyne River) is a stream (class H - Hydrographic) in Suriname (general), Suriname (South America) with the region font code of Americas/Western Europe. It is located at an elevation of 149 meters above sea level. Courantyne River is also known as Coeroeni, Coeroeni Rivier, Corentyne River, Courantyne River, Koeroeni Rivier. [...] Courantyne River (Suriname (general)) 7 day forecast | supports |
Courantyne River is a territory of Guyana | The Courantyne/Corentyne/Corantijn River is a river in northern South America in Suriname and Guyana. It is the longest river in the country and creates the border between Suriname and the East Berbice-Corentyne region of Guyana. Its tributaries include Kutari River, Coeroeni River, New River, and Zombie Creek. In Suriname; Kabalebo River, Lucie River, Sipaliwini River, Kutari River. | insufficient-supports |
Isla Brasilera/Ilha Brasileira is a territory of Uruguay | Ilha Brasileira (Ilha Brasileira) is a island (class T - Hypsographic) in Uruguay (general), Uruguay (South America) with the region font code of Americas/Western Europe. It is located at an elevation of 32 meters above sea level. Ilha Brasileira is also known as Ilha Brasileira, Isla Brasilena, Isla Brasileña. [...] Ilha Brasileira (Uruguay (general)) 7 day forecast | insufficient-supports |
Isla Brasilera/Ilha Brasileira is a territory of Brazil | Brazilian Island (Portuguese: Ilha Brasileira; in Standard Spanish: Isla Brasileña; in Portuñol/Portunhol: Isla Brasilera1) is a small uninhabited river island at the confluence of the Uruguay River and the Quaraí (Cuareim) River, between the borders of Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay, which is disputed by the two latter countries. The island is approximately 3.7 km (2.3 mi) long by 0.9 km (0.6 mi) wide, and it is located at 30°10′56″S 57°37′43″W. The island has long been claimed by both Brazil and Uruguay. Brazilian officials claim that the island is within their municipality of Barra do Quaraí, state of Rio Grande do Sul. Uruguayan officials claim that the island is part of their municipality of Bella Unión, in Artigas Department.[1] However, neither country has shown interest in actively enforcing its claims to the island, for example by sending troops there. Like the other territorial dispute between Brazil and Uruguay in the vicinity of Masoller, it has not prevented close and friendly diplomatic and economic ties between the two countries. | insufficient-contradictory |
Isla Suárez/Ilha de Guajará-mirim is a territory of Brazil | The Ilha de Guajará-Mirim (Brazil) or Isla Suárez (Bolivia) is one of the world's many disputed territories. The island lies in the Rio Mamoré in Amazon, which defines part of the boundary between the Bolivian department of Beni and the Brazilian state of Rondônia in the Amazon. The island's sovereignty is the object of passive contention between the governments of Brazil and Bolivia, which administer it de jure. [...] The Government of Brazil agreed with the Government of Bolivia to re-examine the issue of the legal status of the island of Guajará Mirim (Isla Suárez).[2] In 2009, the island continues without a definitive solution regarding its territorial possession, and it remains supposedly under Bolivian administration, despite the fact that the island is a place of economic activity for the Brazilian inhabitants of Guajará-Mirim, who hold most of the island's territory. More than 80 islands in the Guaporé and Mamoré rivers have yet to be assigned to one country or another. | insufficient-neutral |
Gulf of Venezuela is a territory of Colombia | The Gulf of Venezuela, which is also known as Golfo De Venezuela in Spanish, is a kidney-shaped embayment situated at the northwestern tip of South America. It is an inlet of the Caribbean Sea in Columbia and Venezuela. The Gulf of Venezuela separates the Guajira Peninsula to the west which is partly under Venezuelan Sovereignty and partly under Colombian Sovereignty, and the Paraguana Peninsula to the east which is under the sovereignty of Venezuela. It is at the northernmost boundary of both countries. [...] The Caribbean Sea to the north brings saline water to the embayment while Lake Maracaibo receives fresh water from numerous rivers including the Catatumbo River which is situated close to the southern end of the lake. The water from Lake Maracaibo then flows into the Gulf of Venezuela carrying large loads of sediment. At the point where Catatumbo River meets Lake Maracaibo, environmental conditions allow the production of large quantities of ozone which consequently sparks lighting which lights up the sky for every evening for 160 days or more in a year. [...] There has been a longstanding dispute between Venezuela and Columbia over the Gulf of Venezuela. The dispute resurfaced recently when President Nicolas Maduro established the area as an insular zone of constitutive defense through a decree. In 1987, the dispute nearly led to a military conflict between the two nations when Colombia positioned two Corvettes in the disputed waters, and Venezuela sent troops and F-16 warplanes to the area. The areas in dispute are relatively small in size, but the possibility of oil deposits in the area makes it an area of great importance to both countries. | insufficient-contradictory |
Gulf of Venezuela is a territory of Venezuela | El Gulf of venezuela (or Gulf of Coquivacoa for Colombians) is a body of water located in the north of South America, which in its greater proportion occupies the territorial waters of Venezuela. A small part of the gulf is located off the coast of La Guajira de Colombia, which is why there have been many disputes between both countries as they cannot define the maritime border. [...] The limits of the Gulf of Venezuela are marked by the Guajira Peninsula (Colombia) to the west and Paraguaná Peninsula (Venezuela) to the east. To the north, the Archipelago of the Monks it is considered the natural border between the gulf and the open waters of the Caribbean Sea. To the south, the coasts of the Venezuelan states of Zulia and Falcón. Between them the Maracaibo Canal, which connects the waters of the Gulf with those of the Gulf of Maracaibo, a kind of Venezuelan inland sea. [...] The Gulf of Venezuela has great strategic and economic importance. On a strategic level, as it is the connecting route between the Gulf of Maracaibo and the Atlantic Ocean; economically, due to the presence under its seabed of important bags of oil and natural gas. | insufficient-contradictory |
Los Monjes Archipelago is a territory of Colombia | Los Monjes Archipelago (Archipiélago Los Monjes): The Los Monjes Archipelago is a series of 24 rocky islets located north of the Gulf of Venezuela. It is notable for its ecological importance and marine biodiversity. Los Hermanos Archipelago (Archipiélago Los Hermanos): Los Hermanos Archipelago comprises a chain of eight rocky, barren islets off the northern coast of Venezuela in the Caribbean Sea, part of the Lesser Antilles. [...] Los Frailes Archipelago (Archipiélago Los Frailes): The Los Frailes Archipelago is a group of ten islands located about 250 km (155 mi) north of the coast of Venezuela. The islands are uninhabited and are a protected area for seabirds. | insufficient-neutral |
KaNgwane is a territory of South Africa | KaNgwane (Swazi: [kaˈŋɡwanɛ]) was a bantustan in South Africa, intended by the apartheid government to be a semi-independent homeland for the Swazi people. It was called the "Swazi Territorial Authority" from 1976 to 1977. In September 1977 it was renamed KaNgwane and received a legislative assembly. After a temporary suspension of its homeland status during 1982, the legislative assembly was restored in December 1982. KaNgwane was granted nominal self-rule in August 1984. Its capital was at Louieville. It was the least populous of the ten homelands, with an estimated 183,000 inhabitants. Unlike the other homelands in South Africa, KaNgwane did not adopt a distinctive flag of its own[3] but flew the national flag of South Africa.[4] [...] KaNgwane ceased to exist on 27 April 1994 when the Interim Constitution dissolved the homelands and created new provinces. Its territory became part of the province of Mpumalanga. [...] After some time without responding at all to the intensified mobilisation, the government of South Africa found another way to force independence on KaNgwane: it announced the incorporation of KaNgwane territory and Ingwavuma region of the then ‘homeland’ of KwaZulu into the Kingdom of Swaziland, the so-called land deal between the government of the Republic of South Africa and the Kingdom of Swaziland. | insufficient-refutes |
KaNgwane is a territory of South Africa | KaNgwane (Swazi: [kaˈŋɡwanɛ]) was a bantustan in South Africa, intended by the apartheid government to be a semi-independent homeland for the Swazi people. It was called the "Swazi Territorial Authority" from 1976 to 1977. In September 1977 it was renamed KaNgwane and received a legislative assembly. After a temporary suspension of its homeland status during 1982, the legislative assembly was restored in December 1982. KaNgwane was granted nominal self-rule in August 1984. Its capital was at Louieville. It was the least populous of the ten homelands, with an estimated 183,000 inhabitants. Unlike the other homelands in South Africa, KaNgwane did not adopt a distinctive flag of its own[3] but flew the national flag of South Africa.[4] [...] KaNgwane ceased to exist on 27 April 1994 when the Interim Constitution dissolved the homelands and created new provinces. Its territory became part of the province of Mpumalanga. [...] - ^ "KaNgwane (South African homeland)". | insufficient-refutes |
Los Monjes Archipelago is a territory of Venezuela | On August 22, 1871, Venezuelan President Antonio Guzmán Blanco decided to group all the Venezuelan islands, except Coche, Cubagua, Margarita and Isla de Aves, as the Federal Territory of Columbus, which would be controlled by a governor appointed by the President of the Republic. The United Kingdom wanted the Isla de Patos, but on February 26, 1942, it was resolved by the delimitation of the soil and subsoil of the Gulf of Paria. The Los Monjes Archipelago, which Venezuela integrated as part of its territory, was the object of controversy, but in 1952, the Colombian Foreign Minister recognized Venezuelan sovereignty over the territory through a diplomatic note and in 1992, the Colombian government affirmed that it would not claim the territory. [...] The Archipelago of Los Roques is one of the biggest tourist attractions of the country with a variety of beaches and cays that are visited by tourists from all over the world. | refutes |
Southern Patagonian Ice Field is a territory of Argentina | The Southern Patagonian Ice Field (Spanish: Campo de Hielo Patagónico Sur), located at the Southern Patagonic Andes between Chile and Argentina, is the world's second largest contiguous extrapolar ice field.[1] It is the bigger of two remnant parts of the Patagonian Ice Sheet, which covered all of southern Chile during the last glacial period, locally called the Llanquihue glaciation. The Southern Patagonia Ice Field extends from parallels 48° 15′ S to 51° 30′ S for approximately 350 kilometres (220 mi), and has an approximate area of 16,480 km2 (6,360 sq mi), of which 14,200 km2 belong to Chile and 2,600 km2 belong to Argentina.[lower-alpha 1] [...] The Southern Patagonian Ice Field section of the border is the last remaining border issue between Chile and Argentina. On August 1, 1991, the governments of Chile and Argentina agreed on a borderline, but the agreement was never ratified by the Argentine legislature. Later, in 1998, both governments agreed to redraw the borderline between Mount Fitz Roy and Cerro Murallón[12][13] | insufficient-contradictory |
Southern Patagonian Ice Field is a territory of Chile | The Southern Patagonian Ice Field is located in the Andes Cordillera Mountain range, straddling the border between Argentina and Chile. It spans approximately 350 km in length, covering an area of around 16,800 km2 and represents the largest mass of ice in the Southern Hemisphere, excluding Antarctica. Moreover, it ranks as one of the main tourist attractions in the region, standing third in the world after Antarctica and Greenland in terms of extent and amount of stored ice. The resources of the territory are used by both states situated on the eastern and western sides of the Andes, but the majority of the surface area falls under the sovereignty of Chile, which owns more than 85%. [...] The matter of the Southern Patagonian Ice Field is ongoing, despite the efforts of Santiago officials responsible for keeping it "secret." This is not just a technical problem; it affects national security, posing a visible and concrete threat to Chile’s sovereignty over vast freshwater reserves. Therefore, it is an issue that must be addressed in relation to society, which is, in the end, the rightful owner of the national territory. This problem continues to be studied by the Mixed Boundary Commission, and the internal tensions in Chile and the "growing" territorial claims of Argentina prove that it is premature to declare it a "case closed." | insufficient-refutes |
Monte Fitz Roy is a territory of Argentina | Mount Fitz Roy is one of the most iconic landmarks in Patagonia. The mountain stands at an impressive 3,405 meters (11,171 feet) above sea level and is part of Los Glaciares National Park. The mountain is also well-known for its unique rock formations, which are caused by wind and weather erosion. [...] Mount Fitz Roy is part of the Patagonian Andes and is located in Los Glaciares National Park, which straddles the border between Argentina and Chile. However, the mountain is firmly on the Argentinian side and can only be accessed from there. [...] The Mount Fitz Roy/Laguna de los Tres hike is one of the most beautiful in the Patagonia region, which is famous for its breathtaking landscapes. | supports |
Monte Fitz Roy is a territory of Chile | Monte Fitz Roy (also known as Cerro Chaltén, Cerro Fitz Roy, or simply Mount Fitz Roy) is a mountain in Patagonia, on the border between Argentina and Chile.[2][3][6][4][5] It is located in the Southern Patagonian Ice Field, near El Chaltén village and Viedma Lake. It was first climbed in 1952 by French alpinists Lionel Terray and Guido Magnone. [...] On February 27, 2014, Chile's National Forestry Corporation created the Chaltén Mountain Range Natural Site by Resolution No. 74, which covers the Chilean side of Mount Fitz Roy and the surrounding mountain range.[9] [...] - ^ a b c "Mount Fitz Roy - Difrol.cl". Archived from the original on 24 August 2018. Retrieved 26 June 2016. | insufficient-neutral |
Cerro Murallón is a territory of Argentina | Cerro Murallón is a glacier mountain of the Andes, in Patagonia, located on the eastern edge of the Southern Patagonian Ice Field, southwest of Lake Viedma, at the border between Chile and Argentina. On the Argentine side, the hill has been part of the Los Glaciares National Park since 1937, in the Lago Argentino Department in the Santa Cruz Province, which was declared a World Heritage Site by UNESCO in 1981. On the Chilean side, it has been part of the Bernardo O'Higgins National Park, since 1969, in the commune of Natales in the Última Esperanza Province in the Magallanes and Chilean Antarctica Region. According to some sources its height is 2,656 meters (8,714 ft) above sea level,[1] and according to others it is 2,831 meters (9,288 ft) above sea level.[2] Cerro Murallón is named for its immense granite wall it presents.[3] Cerro Murallón was photographed for the first time by the Salesian missionary Alberto María de Agostini in 1949,[4] and its first ascent was made by Eduardo García, Cedomir Marangunic, Eric Shipton and Jack Ewer on January 24, 1961, on its west face. The first climb to the northeast wall was made in 1984 by the Italians Carlo Alde, Casimiro Ferrari and Paolo Vitali.[5][6] | insufficient-contradictory |
Bakassi is a territory of Cameroon | Moreover, by Diplomatic Note No. 570 of 27 March 1962, the government of Tafawa Balewa of Nigeria exchanged diplomatic notes with Cameroon acknowledging the fact that Bakassi was indeed Cameroonian territory (Aghemelo and Ibhasebhor 2006). In July 1966, Lt.-Col. Gowon came to power in Nigeria. As the Balewa government, he too committed his government to respect all prior international agreements made by the Balewa and Ironsi governments. [...] On 10 October 2002, after eight years of deliberations, the ICJ at The Hague decided that Cameroon had sovereignty over Bakassi, basing its decision on old colonial documents (Lacey and Banerjee 2002). The boundaries in the Lake Chad region were determined by the Thomson-Marchand Declarations of 1929–1930 and the boundary in Bakassi was determined by the Anglo-German Treaty of 11 March 1913. The Court requested Nigeria to quickly and unconditionally withdraw her administration, police and military from the area of Lake Chad under Cameroonian sovereignty and from the Bakassi Peninsula. The ICJ equally requested Cameroon to expeditiously and without condition remove any administration or military or police forces which may be present along the land boundary from Lake Chad to the Bakassi Peninsula on territories which, pursuant to the judgment, fall within the sovereignty of Nigeria. | supports |
Bakassi is a territory of Nigeria | LAGOS — Fresh facts have emerged, showing that the disputed Bakassi peninsula which the International Court of Justice, ICJ, ceded to Cameroon, actually belongs to Nigeria. Vanguard gathered that the jurists at ICJ might have been misled by the legal teams of Cameroon and Nigeria, who did not show vital information that clearly placed Bakassi as a territory within the geographical, political and administrative jurisdiction and control of Nigeria, contrary to the October 10, 2002, verdict which awarded the sovereignty of the peninsula to Cameroon. [...] The British were fully in control of the Calabar Sea Port. The Germans went East of Akwa Yafe River, which took them to the Rio Del Rey estuary to the sea. This ensured that the Bakassi Peninsula was on the West, which put the Peninsula on the Nigerian territory. The predominant population on the Peninsula then were the Efiks and Efuts, who were of Efik kingdom which stretched up to Khumba, Victoria and Bamenda. | insufficient-contradictory |
Bhutanese enclaves is a territory of Republic of China | Until recently, the Sino-Bhutanese border dispute involved territory in the western and central sectors only. Beijing claimed 764 square kilometers of Bhutanese territory: 495 sq km in the Jakurlung and Pasamlung Valleys in north-central Bhutan and another 269 sq km in western Bhutan. [...] China’s claims over Bhutanese territory are indirect, stemming from its claims over Tibet. When the Qing dynasty extended Chinese rule over Tibet in the 18th century, the Tibetan ruler Polhane, who apparently held suzerainty over Bhutan, passed this on to Tibet’s Chinese overlord. China bases its territorial claims in Bhutan on the latter’s vassalage to Tibet. [...] China began asserting its claims over Bhutan with increasing vigor in the late 19th century to counter growing British influence there. In 1930, Mao Zedong claimed that Bhutan (among other Himalayan kingdoms) fell within the "the correct boundaries of China." The People’s Republic of China was even more aggressive in asserting such claims; official maps showed parts of Bhutanese territory as part of China. Moreover, during its annexation of Tibet, China briefly occupied eight Bhutanese enclaves in western Bhutan. Chinese incursions into Bhutanese territory have continued, as has China’s building of roads in disputed areas. This despite the fact that under Clause 3 of the 1998 Treaty to Maintain Peace and Tranquility on the Bhutan-China border areas, the two sides agreed to maintain the status quo on the border areas. | insufficient-neutral |
Ingwavuma is a territory of Eswatini | Contenido The Ingwavuma River is a river in Swaziland, and a major tributary of the Maputo River. It begins near Nhlangano and runs through the territory of Swaziland, until the town of Nsoko, where after 5 kilometers it crosses the border into South Africa. Already in South African territory, and 6 kilometers southwest of the Ndumo Game Reserve, the Ingwavuma River flows into the Maputo River. | insufficient-refutes |
Bhutanese enclaves is a territory of People's Republic of China | - The PRC’s claims over Bhutanese territory have expanded over the years, including recent large-scale construction in disputed valleys, which contradicts the 1998 agreement to maintain the status quo, challenging Bhutanese sovereignty and raising strategic concerns for India. [...] The PRC also tends to see Bhutan to some extent as a part of its own territory. In 1930, for instance, Mao Zedong claimed that Bhutan fell under "the correct boundaries of China." Official maps of the PRC released in 1954 and 1958 reflected Beijing’s expanding territorial claims in Bhutan, and in 1959, amid its annexation of Tibet, the pRC occupied eight Bhutanese enclaves in western Bhutan. [4] The bloody suppression of the Tibetan uprising and the flight of the 14th Dalai Lama and his followers left a deep impression on the Bhutanese. Accounts of Chinese atrocities on Tibetans who fled to Bhutan convinced them that the Chinese were "out to destroy Buddhism and Buddhists" (China Brief, April 20, 2017). Even the PRC’s most recent standard national map includes disputed Bhutanese territories as its own (People’s Daily App, August 28, 2023). | insufficient-contradictory |
Bhutanese enclaves is a territory of Bhutan | But more interestingly, the report mentions several Bhutanese enclaves in Tibet. It notes: "Chinese officials have illegally dispossessed the designated authorities of the Government of Bhutan in the following eight villages situated in western Tibet over which Bhutan has been exercising administrative jurisdiction for more than 300 years: Khangri, Tarchen, Tsekhor, Diraphu, Dzung Tuphu, Jangehe, Chakip and Kocha." Minsar, the Indian enclave in Tibet is better known, but these villages too did not belong to Tibet, they were part of Bhutan’s territory. [...] The scholar, John Bray, who is the president of the International Association of Ladakh Studies, wrote a fascinating research paper on the ‘Bhutanese enclaves’ in Tibet. He explained that until the 1950s "both Ladakh and Bhutan governed small enclaves of territory in Western Tibet. Ladakh’s enclave consisted of the village of Minsar, near lake Manasarovar, and its surrounding land, while Bhutan governed the Darchen Labrang and several smaller monasteries and villages near Mount Kailash. Bhutan continued to raise revenue there for some 300 years.". [...] Are the forgotten Bhutanese enclaves ‘ripe for settlement’ now? Mr Geng has probably forgotten their existence. | insufficient-contradictory |
Darchen is a territory of People's Republic of China | Darchen, Tarchan, or Taqin(塔钦) is a small village in Purang County of the Tibet Autonomous Region of China. Darchen is situated right in front of the sacred mountain, Mount Kailash. Its altitude is 4,575 meters and is the starting point for pilgrimages in the region. [...] Darchen is a completely Tibetan town though there are now more and more Chinese settling down opening hotels and restaurants. It contains a couple of restaurants and hotels or guesthouses. Mountain Horse Kee Restaurant by the main road is favored by travelers for its bright environment and its attention to health. There are several good accommodations for travelers to choose, such as Kailash Hotel, Mount Kailash Hotel, Gangdise Guesthouse, Zhusu Guesthouse next door and Gandise Hotel where Public Security Bureau PSB officers are stationed from spring until October, and where pilgrims must get their travel permit stamped, and buy a "ticket" if they wish to circumambulate Mt. Kailash. | refutes |
Darchen is a territory of Bhutan | If you look at Darchen on Google maps satellite view, it appears to be little more than a collection of buildings in a small village in western Tibet. However, this small village is one of the most important places for both Buddhist and Hindu pilgrims, as it lies at the gateway to the holiest site in the world for both religions. Sitting at the side of the G219 National Road in Burang County of Ngari Prefecture of Western Tibet, Darchen is the place all pilgrims pass through on their way to the sacred Mount Kailash, also known in Tibet as Gang Rinpoche, Kangrinboqê, or Mount Kailasa. This holy mountain, which is said to be the home of the gods for four separate religions, is the most sacred and spiritual natural site in Tibet and is visited by hundreds of thousands of pilgrims and tourists every year. [...] Interestingly, while it is hundreds of kilometers from the Bhutanese border, Darchen was once an exclave of that kingdom, a small territory of the Land of the Thunder Dragon in Tibet, which they held for more than 300 years until 1959. | refutes |
Doklam is a territory of Republic of China | I 1. The Dong Lang area (Doklam) is located in Yadong county of the Tibet autonomous region of China. It borders India’s Sikkim state on the west and the Kingdom of Bhutan on the south. In 1890, China and the UK signed the Convention Between Great Britain and China Relating to Sikkim and Tibet which delimited the boundary between the Tibet region of China and Sikkim. According to the Convention, the Dong Lang area, which is located on the Chinese side of the boundary, is indisputably Chinese territory. For long, China’s border troops have been patrolling the area and Chinese herdsmen grazing livestock there. At present, the boundary between the Dong Lang area and Sikkim is a part of the China-India boundary in the Sikkim Sector. [...] 8. The China-India boundary in the Sikkim Sector has already been delimited, and the Dong Lang area is Chinese territory. China’s road building on its own territory is aimed at improving local transportation, which is completely lawful and legitimate. China did not cross the boundary in its road building, and it notified India in advance in full reflection of China’ s goodwill. The Indian border troops have flagrantly crossed the mutually-recognized boundary to intrude into the Chinese territory and violated China’ s territorial sovereignty. This is indeed a real attempt to change the status quo of the boundary, and it has gravely undermined peace and tranquility of the China-India border area. | insufficient-supports |
Doklam is a territory of People's Republic of China | China’s most recent territorial claims in Sakteng are of immense strategic value. The area adjoins the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh, which contains disputed territory between China and India. Tawang, a key bone of contention between India and China in the eastern sector of the Line of Actual Control (LAC), lies to Sakteng’s northeast and is vital to Indian border defense. Control over Doklam and Sakteng together will give China significant military advantages in dealing with India in the eastern sector of the LAC. India plans to build a road from Guwahati to Tawang via the Sakteng Wildlife Sanctuary, which will reduce travel distance and strengthen its ability to speed up the overland mobilization of troops to the disputed Sino-Indian border. China may have added Sakteng to its claimed territories in an effort to pre-empt India’s plans for the Guwahati-Sakteng-Tawang road (Asian Affairs, August 1, 2020). [...] [6] While the Bhutanese government maintained that the road [lay] inside Bhutanese territory and "is a direct violation of the [1988 and 1998] agreements and affects the process of demarcating the boundary" between the two countries (Bhutan MFA, August 6, 2017), the PRC insisted that "Doklam has been a part of China since ancient times" and "is an indisputable fact supported by historical and jurisprudential evidence, and the ground situation." China’s construction of [a] road in Doklam is an act of sovereignty on its own territory, it said (PRC MFA, June 28, 2016). | insufficient-supports |
Doklam is a territory of Bhutan | Indian and Chinese forces have been locked in a standoff over the Doklam plateau, a territory disputed between China and Bhutan, since June. The disputed territory is located at the Doka La pass, a tri-junction where Bhutan borders the Indian state of Sikkim and the Tibet Autonomous Region of China. India, which enjoys a close relationship with Bhutan, is concerned about Chinese encroachment in Doklam because it would bring Chinese forces closer to its vulnerable "Chicken’s Neck" – the narrow Siliguri Corridor that connects India’s northeast to the rest of the country. In 2005, Bhutan considered yielding territory in the Doklam region to China in order to regain land in northern Bhutan – at least twice the size of the Doklam plateau. However, Bhutan acquiesced to India’s wishes to cancel the deal, demonstrating the power of the bilateral relationship between the two countries, which has been strengthened by years of close cooperation after the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) cracked down on dissent in Tibet in 1959. Despite China’s geopolitical and economic rise in recent decades, and their shared border, Bhutan remains guarded against its northern neighbor, forestalling the development of any diplomatic relationship. Such behavior is often questioned – after all, the argument goes that Bhutan would only have to give up a minuscule piece of land in order to normalize relations with a neighbor whose investment potential far exceeds that of India’s. Recently, some Bhutanese analysts have even suggested that Bhutan lacks a strong claim to the disputed portion of the Doklam region. | insufficient-contradictory |
Doklam is a territory of Bhutan | Bhutan and China started boundary talks in 1984 and have since focused on mainly three disputed areas — Jakarlung and Pasamlung areas in north Bhutan, and the Doklam area in west Bhutan. [...] India considers the Doklam plateau as an undisputed territory of Bhutan, whereas, Beijing regards it as an extension of its Chumbi Valley, which lies between Sikkim and Bhutan, noted ThePrint. [...] There are concerns in New Delhi that a deal between Thimphu and Beijing could include swapping Doklam – located close to the tri-junction between India, Bhutan and China – for disputed territories in the north. This trijunction point is at a spot called Batang La. China wants to shift this point about 7 km south of Batang La to a peak called Mount Gipmochi – a move unacceptable to New Delhi as that would mean the entire Doklam plateau would be under Beijing’s control. | insufficient-contradictory |
Demchok sector is a territory of People's Republic of China | The Demchok sector[a] is a disputed area named after the villages of Demchok in Ladakh and Demchok in Tibet, situated near the confluence of the Charding Nullah and Indus River. It is a part of the greater Sino-Indian border dispute between China and India. Both China and India claim the disputed region, with a Line of Actual Control between the two nations situated along the Charding Nullah.[b] [...] The talks were held in Beijing between Zhang Hanfu, China's Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, N. Raghavan, the Indian Ambassador to China and T.N. Kaul, his Chargé d'Affaires and Chen Chai-Kang, a Director. They lasted from December 1953 till end of April 1954. [...] Kaul objected, Demchok was in India, he told Chen who answered that India's border was further on the West of the Indus. On Kaul's insistence Chen said "There can be no doubt about actual physical possession which can be verified on spot but to avoid any dispute we may omit mention of Demchok". [...] In October 1962, the Demchok sub-sector was held by the 7 J&K Militia. The PLA launched an attack on October 22. [...] The PLA eventually withdrew, but occupied the southern part of Demchok. | insufficient-refutes |
Demchok sector is a territory of India | Demchok[a] (Tibetan: ཌེམ་ཆོག, Wylie: bde mchog, THL: dem chok),[6][7] previously called New Demchok,[8] and called Parigas (Chinese: 巴里加斯; pinyin: Bālǐ jiā sī) by the Chinese,[6][9][b] is a village and military encampment in the Indian-administered Demchok sector, that is disputed between India and China. It is administered as part of the Nyoma tehsil in the Leh district of Ladakh by India,[1][10] and claimed by China as part of the Tibet Autonomous Region.[11] [...] - ^ Arpi, Claude (December 2016) [abridged version published in Indian Defence Review, 19 May 2017], The Case of Demchok (PDF): 'Kaul objected, Demchok was in India, he told Chen who answered that India's border was further on the West of the Indus. On Kaul's insistence Chen said "There can be no doubt about actual physical possession which can be verified on spot but to avoid any dispute we may omit mention of Demchok". Though Kaul repeated Demchok was on India's side, the Chinese did not budge.' [...] External links [edit]- Demchok Western Sector (Chinese claim), OpenStreetMap - Demchok Eastern Sector (Indian claim), OpenStreetMap | refutes |
Ingwavuma is a territory of South Africa | Ingwavuma is a town in the Umkhanyakude District Municipality of KwaZulu-Natal Province, South Africa. It is unclear where the name of the town came from; one theory is that it was named after the Ngwavuma River while another is that there was a leader called Vuma, the name then meaning "Vuma's place" in Zulu. Trees found on the river bank are also named Ngwavuma (Elaeodendron transvaalense or Bushveld Saffron) but it is unclear which entity was named after which (person, river, town or trees). It is over 700 metres (2,297 feet) above sea level in the Lebombo Mountains and boasts several highly scenic spots. The town is three kilometres (2 miles) from the country's border with Eswatini and overlooks the plains of Maputaland to the East. [...] The Ngwavuma is a river in Eswatini and KwaZulu-Natal Province in southern Africa. It is also known as the Inguavuma, Ingwavuma, Ingwovuma, and Nggwavuma, and is one of the five major rivers in Eswatini. It arises in southwestern Eswatini and flows eastward. It is a tributary of the Pongola River. | insufficient-supports |
Demchok sector is a territory of Republic of China | The Demchok sector is a disputed area named after the villages of Demchok in Ladakh and Demchok in Tibet, situated near the confluence of the Charding Nullah and Indus River. It is a part of the greater Sino-Indian border dispute between China and India. Both China and India claim the disputed region, with a Line of Actual Control between the two nations situated along the Charding Nullah. | insufficient-neutral |
Depsang Plains is a territory of People's Republic of China | People's Republic of China's position [edit]The Depsang Plains are located on the border of the Indian union territory of Ladakh and the disputed zone of Aksai Chin. The Chinese Army controls most of the plains,[4] while India controls the western portion of the plains.[5] The dispute remains unresolved.[6] [...] - ^ Manoj Joshi (2013-05-07). "Making sense of the Depsang incursion". The Hindu. Retrieved 2014-03-15. | insufficient-contradictory |
Depsang Plains is a territory of Republic of China | With the conclusion of the 20th Party Congress last month which consolidated President Xi Jinping’s continued reign for an unprecedented third term, there are daunting and potentially ominous times ahead for its two immediate neighbours–Taiwan and India. Let us begin with the latter, the Chinese have shown considerable truculence in their negotiations with India. As reported recently, an Indian intelligence report indicates that the Chinese are in no mood to vacate territory claimed by India in the Depsang plains of Ladakh. The territory on which Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) units are perched is 18 kilometres inside India’s claim lines, and the PLA has significantly enhanced its development of infrastructure along the Western sector. The Modi government would be well advised to be cautious and disabused of any temptation to concede the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) land grab, notwithstanding the Modi-Xi handshake at the G-20 Summit in Bali. This is reinforced by the Indian Army Chief General Manoj Pande’s recent statement that while the contested border is "…stable… unpredictable". The Depsang Plains is a strategically important territory, because the PLA’s control threatens India’s control over the Siachen Glacier, bringing the Indian Army under a pincer from both China and Pakistan. | insufficient-contradictory |
Depsang Plains is a territory of India | This was not unusual: there were, as we have pointed out, many places along the LAC where the border was really marked by a Line of Perception—the Chinese had one and the Indians another. In this case the Lines of Perception had been some 10–15 km apart. The Chinese patrolled to their line and the Indians theirs. By agreement neither side could build structures or camp in this area. The Depsang Plains, some 900 sq. km in size and at an altitude of 16,000 ft (5,000 m), lie between high mountains on the Indian side and the Laktsang range in the east, adjacent to which runs the Chinese Aksai Chin Highway (G-219). To its north is the undisputed Sino–Indian border point—the Karakoram Pass, and to the south a knot of mountain territory which includes the Galwan river, the site of the June 2020 incident. To their surprise, the Indians were confronted by something unusual next morning. The Chinese had pitched tents and had not gone back. Neither did they do so the day after. | insufficient-refutes |
Chumar is a territory of People's Republic of China | The staring match between Indian and Chinese troops at Chumar in eastern Ladakh continued on Friday amid evidence that the Chinese were retreating. Indian troops, however, have decided to adopt an aggressive stance and stay put at their positions in the sector. [...] Chumar, the last village in Ladakh area bordering Himachal Pradesh, has been a bone of contention with China claiming it to be its own territory. China has been sending helicopter sorties to the area almost every year. [...] Chumar became flash point during the fortnight long standoff last year in Daulat Beg Oldie as the Chinese side had objected to overhead bunkers erected by the Indian side. | insufficient-refutes |
Chumar is a territory of Republic of China | Chumar is a place in the provences of Jammu and Kashmir, India.[1] The area is claimed by both China and India.[2] According to China's Ministry of Defence "the two countries’ border, to this day, has not been designated".[2] The problem is that for centuries, the sparsely inhabited mountainous region existed as a buffer zone between empires.[3] A border war broke out in 1962 that has to date killed thousands of soldiers. The tension between the two countries has come and gone but is now raised again.[3] References [change | change source]- ↑ "Where is Chumar in Jammu and Kashmir, India Located?". GoMapper. Archived from the original on 18 August 2019. Retrieved 29 December 2015. [...] Wikimedia Commons has media related to Chumar. | insufficient-refutes |
Chumar is a territory of India | A 16-day stand-off ensued between Indian and Chinese forces in eastern Ladakh near the village of Chumar, after Indian soldiers tried to block Chinese construction work into what India considers its territory. This stand-off began on 16 September, the eve of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s first visit to India, about four months after Modi was elected PM. The stand-off began after the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) tried to extend the road from Chepzi towards Chumar (which India considers to be its own territory), and the construction work was stopped by Indian soldiers. Meanwhile, in Demchok, which is located in the Chumar area, PLA troops had pushed civilians into Indian territory to prevent ongoing work on an irrigation canal. [...] The stand-off was resolved after India and China managed to reach a quid pro quo. While the Chinese agreed to not pursue construction of the Chepzi-Chumar road, India agreed to demolish its observation hut at Tible in the same sector, and refrain from building bunkers there. | insufficient-refutes |
Kaurik is a territory of Republic of China | The Pare Chu begins north of the Parang La (5580 m), the main pass linking Spiti to Ladakh. It flows in a northeastern direction before entering Ladakh and turning south. The Pare Chu then crosses into the Tibetan territory known as Chumurti (Chu-mur-ti), in the township of Chusum (Chu-gsum), Tsamda (rTsa-mda’) county (Tibetan Autonomous Region). According to a Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR) administrative map produced in the Tibetan language, entitled Bod rang skyong ljongs srid ’dzin sa khul gyi sa bkra, the stretch of the Pare Chu in Tibet is called Rubshok Tsangpo (Rub-shog gtsang-po). Bending again, this time to the west, the Pare Chu reenters India at Kaurik (Khyu-rigs) and joins with the Spiti river at Sumdo (Sum-mdo). A sliver of territory in southeastern Spiti under Indian jurisdiction is still officially contested by People’s Republic of China (PRC). The disputed area includes Kaurik, Sumdo and the Gyu (rGyu) valley. Fortunately, both India and the PRC have stated that they are committed to a peaceful settlement of all outstanding border issues. Residents of Kaurik were resettled in Hurling and other places after the 1962 war with China. [...] 2013, January. "High on the khyung". [...] Balikci, Anna. 2008. Lamas, Shamans and Ancestors: Village Religion in Sikkim. Brill’s Tibetan Studies Library, vol. 17. Leiden: Brill. | insufficient-neutral |
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