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2,636,155
null
2008-10-03
false
state-v-mccrorey
McCrorey
State v. McCrorey
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
0
Published
null
null
[ "195 P.3d 65", "345 Or. 318" ]
[ { "author_str": null, "per_curiam": false, "type": "010combined", "page_count": null, "download_url": null, "author_id": null, "opinion_text": "\n195 P.3d 65 (2008)\n345 Or. 318\nSTATE\nv.\nMcCROREY.\nNo. (S056324).\nSupreme Court of Oregon.\nOctober 3, 2008.\nPetition for review denied.\n", "ocr": false, "opinion_id": 2636155 } ]
Oregon Supreme Court
Oregon Supreme Court
S
Oregon, OR
309,846
null
1973-03-21
false
united-states-v-mccrae
McCrae
United States v. McCrae
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
2
Published
null
null
[ "475 F.2d 1397" ]
[ { "author_str": null, "per_curiam": false, "type": "010combined", "page_count": null, "download_url": "http://bulk.resource.org/courts.gov/c/F2/475/475.F2d.1397.72-1958.html", "author_id": null, "opinion_text": "475 F.2d 1397\n U. S.v.McCrae\n 72-1958\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Third Circuit\n 3/21/73\n E.D.Pa., 344 F.Supp. 942\n AFFIRMED\n ", "ocr": false, "opinion_id": 309846 } ]
Third Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
F
USA, Federal
69,914
null
2009-12-15
false
united-states-v-murray
Murray
United States v. Murray
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
0
Unpublished
null
null
[ "357 F. App'x 565" ]
[ { "author_str": null, "per_curiam": false, "type": "010combined", "page_count": 2, "download_url": "http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions\\unpub\\08/08-41224.0.wpd.pdf", "author_id": null, "opinion_text": " IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT United States Court of Appeals\n Fifth Circuit\n\n FILED\n December 14, 2009\n No. 08-41224\n Summary Calendar Charles R. Fulbruge III\n Clerk\n\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n\n Plaintiff-Appellee\n\nv.\n\nMICHAEL CHARLES MURRAY,\n\n Defendant-Appellant\n\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court\n for the Eastern District of Texas, Beaumont Division\n USDC No. 1:07-CR-232\n\n\nBefore JOLLY, WIENER, and ELROD, Circuit Judges.\nPER CURIAM:*\n The Federal Public Defender appointed to represent Michael Charles\nMurray has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance with\nAnders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). Murray has filed a response. We note\nthat after Murray filed his notice of appeal, the district court sua sponte\namended its judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(b), reducing Murray’s\nsentence from 262 months of imprisonment to 174. The district court, however,\nlacked jurisdiction to grant Rule 35(b) relief once Murray’s notice of appeal had\n\n *\n Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not\nbe published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir.\nR. 47.5.4.\n\f No. 08-41224\n\nbeen filed. See United States v. Hayes, 589 F.2d 811, 827 n. 8 (5th Cir.1979).\nThe district court’s AMENDED JUDGMENT is thus VOIDED, and the original\njudgment remains in effect for purposes of this appeal.\n The record is insufficiently developed to allow consideration at this time\nof Murray’s claim(s) of ineffective assistance of counsel; such claim(s) generally\n“cannot be resolved on direct appeal when [they have] not been raised before the\ndistrict court since no opportunity existed to develop the record on the merits of\nthe allegations.” United States v. Cantwell, 470 F.3d 1087, 1091 (5th Cir. 2006)\n(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Our independent review of the\nrecord, counsel’s brief, and Murray’s response discloses no nonfrivolous issue for\nappeal. Accordingly, the motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is\nexcused from further responsibilities herein, and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED.\nSee 5th Cir. R. 42.2.\n\n\n\n\n 2\n\f", "ocr": false, "opinion_id": 69914 } ]
Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
F
USA, Federal
2,690,075
French, Kennedy, Lanzinger, O'Connor, O'Donnell, O'Neill, Pfeifer
2014-05-27
false
disciplinary-counsel-v-jacobs
null
Disciplinary Counsel v. Jacobs
Disciplinary Counsel v. Jacobs (Slip Opinion)
Scott J. Drexel, Disciplinary Counsel, and Donald M. Scheetz, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, for relator., Schwartz, Downey & Co., L.P.A., Niki Z. Schwartz, and Brian P. Downey, for respondent.
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
Submitted October 9, 2013
null
null
1
Published
null
<parties data-order="0" data-type="parties" id="b166-4"> Disciplinary Counsel <em> v. </em> Jacobs. </parties><br><p data-order="1" data-type="citation" id="b166-5"> [Cite as <em> Disciplinary Counsel v. Jacobs, </em> 140 Ohio St.3d 2, 2014-Ohio-2137.] </p><br><docketnumber data-order="2" data-type="docketnumber" id="b166-8"> (No. 2013-1230 </docketnumber><otherdate data-order="3" data-type="otherdate" id="AV"> Submitted October 9, 2013 </otherdate><decisiondate data-order="4" data-type="decisiondate" id="A4"> Decided May 27, 2014.) </decisiondate>
[ "2014 Ohio 2137", "140 Ohio St. 3d 2" ]
[ { "author_str": "Per Curiam", "per_curiam": true, "type": "010combined", "page_count": 9, "download_url": "http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rod/docs/pdf/0/2014/2014-ohio-2137.pdf", "author_id": null, "opinion_text": "[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as\nDisciplinary Counsel v. Jacobs, Slip Opinion No. 2014-Ohio-2137.]\n\n\n\n\n NOTICE\n This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in\n an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested\n to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio,\n 65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or\n other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be\n made before the opinion is published.\n\n\n SLIP OPINION NO. 2014-OHIO-2137\n DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. JACOBS.\n [Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets,\n it may be cited as Disciplinary Counsel v. Jacobs,\n Slip Opinion No. 2014-Ohio-2137.]\nAttorneys—Misconduct—Felony conviction for filing false tax return—Two-year\n suspension with credit for time served under interim felony suspension.\n (No. 2013-1230—Submitted October 9, 2013—Decided May 27, 2014.)\n ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and\n Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 12-074.\n ____________________\n Per Curiam.\n {¶ 1} Respondent, Leslie William Jacobs of Gates Mills, Ohio, Attorney\nRegistration No. 0020387, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1968.\nOn April 3, 2012, we suspended his license to practice law on an interim basis\nfollowing his January 17, 2012 felony conviction for filing a false tax return. In\nre Jacobs, 131 Ohio St.3d 1495, 2012-Ohio-1485, 964 N.E.2d 436.\n\f SUPREME COURT OF OHIO\n\n\n\n\n {¶ 2} On October 8, 2012, relator, disciplinary counsel, filed a complaint\ncharging Jacobs with violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility and\nthe Rules of Professional Conduct arising from the conduct that led to his felony\nconviction.1 The parties submitted stipulations of fact and misconduct and a\nrecommendation that Jacobs be suspended from the practice of law for two years\nwith credit for time served under the interim suspension.\n {¶ 3} A panel of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and\nDiscipline conducted a hearing and adopted the parties’ stipulations of fact and\nmisconduct and agreed with the recommended sanction. The board adopted the\npanel’s report in its entirety, and no objections have been filed.\n {¶ 4} We adopt the board’s findings of fact and misconduct and\nconclude that a two-year suspension from the practice of law with credit for time\nserved under the interim suspension is the appropriate sanction in this case.\n Misconduct\n {¶ 5} For the tax years 2004 through 2007, Jacobs, a senior partner with\na large law firm, prepared federal income tax returns for himself and his wife\nwithout the assistance of a professional tax preparer. During 2004 and through\n2007, he incurred substantial business expenses for which he received\nreimbursement from his firm, including travel expenses on client matters, costs of\nattending meetings and events for bar associations and other professional and\ncivic organizations, seminar costs, and business entertainment expenses. Under\nhis firm’s procedures, he submitted detailed expense-reimbursement vouchers,\nsupported by receipts, for items that he personally paid for, usually by charges to\nhis personal credit card. The firm then issued reimbursement checks payable to\nJacobs that he deposited into his personal bank account.\n\n1\n Relator charged Jacobs with misconduct under the applicable Disciplinary Rules for acts\noccurring before February 1, 2007, the effective date of the Rules of Professional Conduct, which\nsuperseded the Disciplinary Rules of the Code of Professional Responsibility.\n\n\n\n\n 2\n\f January Term, 2014\n\n\n\n\n {¶ 6} Each year, Jacobs received an IRS Schedule K-1 from the law\nfirm, which reported his ordinary business income from the firm and other items.\nOn each of his income tax returns for 2004 through 2007, Jacobs included a\nSchedule E on which he reported his partnership income. On that form he also\nlisted the amount of ordinary business income from his Schedule K-1 and\nsubtracted an amount that he claimed as deductions for business expenses,\nresulting in a net amount of partnership income that he then reported on his tax\nreturn. Each year in that period, Jacobs knew that the amount that he claimed as\nbusiness-expense deductions was inflated, which resulted in understating his\nincome, which in turn falsely reduced his tax obligation.\n {¶ 7} He falsely inflated his business-expense deductions in a number of\nways. For the years 2004 through 2006, he inflated his deductions by reporting\nbusiness expenses for which he had received reimbursement from the law firm\nand thus had no net out-of-pocket expense. He deducted such reimbursed\nexpenses both for travel on client matters, for which the firm sought\nreimbursement from the clients, and for nonclient expenses borne by the law firm.\n {¶ 8} Jacobs also claimed deductions for nondeductible dues for personal\nmemberships at private clubs and charges for personal meals and other personal\nuses of the clubs. He deducted meal and entertainment expenses at 100 percent of\nthe cost, even though he knew that those expenses, even when properly deducted,\nwere deductible at only 50 percent of the cost.\n {¶ 9} Jacobs leased one or two automobiles per year that he used to\ncommute to his office and to drive for both business and personal purposes. He\nimproperly deducted all those vehicle expenses even though he made personal\nand nondeductible use of the cars and also received reimbursement from his firm\nfor the business miles he traveled.\n {¶ 10} Jacobs testified that he engaged in this misconduct because of his\nfrustrations with the federal government for falsely advising that his father died in\n\n\n\n 3\n\f SUPREME COURT OF OHIO\n\n\n\n\na plane crash in World War II and concealing the fact that he had been executed\nin a Japanese prisoner-of-war camp. He also was angry at the IRS for its alleged\nharassment of his mother—up to her death—about her failure to timely withdraw\nfunds from her retirement account.\n {¶ 11} In February 2008, an IRS revenue agent notified Jacobs and his\nwife that their 2005 income tax return was under audit. Jacobs met with the agent\nand an IRS supervisor later that month, provided the requested records, and was\ninterviewed. Later in 2008, the revenue agent expanded the audit to include 2004.\nIn July 2008, Jacobs met with the agent and a supervisor and provided the\nrequested 2004 records and was interviewed about his 2005 taxes. Following that\nmeeting, Jacobs faxed a written statement to the agent, discussing some of the\nissues addressed in that meeting. In July 2009, the IRS advised Jacobs that he\nwas under a criminal investigation for his 2004 through 2007 income taxes, and a\nspecial agent and revenue agent interviewed him.\n {¶ 12} During the two audit meetings, in the faxed letter, and during the\ncriminal-investigation interview, Jacobs made false statements regarding the\nitems for which he claimed inflated deductions. On November 2, 2011, Jacobs\npled guilty to a federal information charging him with one count of making and\nsubscribing false tax returns in violation of 26 U.S.C. 7206(1) for the years 2004\nthrough 2007. In the false returns for those four years, Jacobs understated his\ntaxable income by $256,380 and overstated his expenses by $253,256, resulting in\nunpaid taxes of $75,385. He paid this shortfall in full on January 17, 2012, the\nday he was sentenced.\n {¶ 13} Jacobs was sentenced to serve 12 months and one day of\nincarceration and one year of supervised release, including four months minus one\nday of home confinement, and to pay a fine and special assessment totaling\n$10,100. He paid the special assessment of $100 on the day he was sentenced and\nthe $10,000 fine on February 19, 2012. Jacobs completed his term of\n\n\n\n\n 4\n\f January Term, 2014\n\n\n\n\nimprisonment, less good-time credit, on January 17, 2013, his term of home\nconfinement on May 16, 2013, and his supervised release on January 17, 2014.\n {¶ 14} The parties stipulated, and the panel and board found, that Jacobs’s\nconduct violated DR 1-102(A)(3) (prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in illegal\nconduct involving moral turpitude) and Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(b) (prohibiting a lawyer\nfrom committing an illegal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty or\ntrustworthiness); DR 1-102(A)(4) and Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c) (both prohibiting a\nlawyer from engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or\nmisrepresentation); and DR 1-102(A)(6) and Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(h) (both\nprohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct that adversely reflects on the\nlawyer’s fitness to practice law).\n Sanction\n {¶ 15} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider\nrelevant factors, including the ethical duties that the lawyer violated and the\nsanctions imposed in similar cases. Stark Cty. Bar Assn. v. Buttacavoli, 96 Ohio\nSt.3d 424, 2002-Ohio-4743, 775 N.E.2d 818, ¶ 16. In making a final\ndetermination, we also weigh evidence of the aggravating and mitigating factors\nlisted in BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B). Disciplinary Counsel v. Broeren, 115 Ohio\nSt.3d 473, 2007-Ohio-5251, 875 N.E.2d 935, ¶ 21.\n {¶ 16} The parties stipulated that four of the mitigating factors set forth in\nBCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2) are present, namely, (a) the absence of a prior\ndisciplinary record, (d) a cooperative attitude toward the proceedings, (e) good\ncharacter and reputation, and (f) imposition of other sanctions and penalties.\nThey also stipulated that Jacobs’s misconduct was personal, that it was not\ncommitted in his capacity as a lawyer, and that it caused no harm to his clients.\n {¶ 17} The panel and board also concluded that Jacobs had made a good-\nfaith effort to provide restitution, BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(c), and that he had\nacknowledged the wrongful nature of his conduct. The panel and board found\n\n\n\n 5\n\f SUPREME COURT OF OHIO\n\n\n\n\ntwo aggravating factors: a dishonest or selfish motive and a pattern of\nmisconduct. BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(b) and (c).\n {¶ 18} The parties cited several cases to support their recommendation of\na two-year suspension retroactive to the date of Jacobs’s suspension on April 3,\n2012. The panel and board found Disciplinary Counsel v. Pace, 103 Ohio St.3d\n445, 2004-Ohio-5465, 816 N.E.2d 1046, most persuasive.\n {¶ 19} In Pace, the attorney was convicted of failing to disclose on his tax\nreturn that he had an interest in or authority over a financial account in a foreign\ncountry. Pace was sentenced to a two-month term at a federal minimum-security\nfacility and one year of supervised release. Based upon his felony conviction,\npursuant to Gov.Bar R. V(5)(A), we suspended Pace’s license to practice law for\nan interim period. In his subsequent disciplinary action, the board found in\nmitigation that Pace had practiced law for more than 35 years, had no prior\ndisciplinary record, and cooperated completely in the disciplinary process. The\nboard did not find any aggravating factors. We held that he violated DR 1-\n102(A)(4) and (6), and we imposed a two-year suspension with credit for time\nserved under his interim suspension.\n {¶ 20} Another similar case is Disciplinary Counsel v. Blaszak, 104 Ohio\nSt.3d 330, 2004-Ohio-6593, 819 N.E.2d 689, in which the attorney had offered to\nsell truthful testimony in a pending case in return for $500,000 and $5,000 a\nmonth for his continuing legal services. The government charged him with\nselling testimony after he accepted a $50,000 down payment. Upon his federal\nfelony conviction, the court sentenced him to three years of supervised probation,\nfined him $5,000, and ordered him to complete 500 hours of community service.\nWe imposed an interim felony suspension pursuant to Gov.Bar R. V(5)(A)(3) and\nsubsequently found that his conduct violated DR 1-102(A)(4), (5) (prohibiting\nconduct prejudicial to the administration of justice), and (6).\n\n\n\n\n 6\n\f January Term, 2014\n\n\n\n\n {¶ 21} We imposed a lesser sanction than disbarment or indefinite\nsuspension, noting the “overwhelming evidence of mitigation that respondent has\npresented here.” Id. at ¶ 24. We acknowledged the significant number of\nreference letters that the attorney presented and emphasized “the extensive\ngratitude and appreciation these authors express[ed] for respondent’s professional\nassistance in their lives and his achievements in the courts and community.” Id.\nBased on “[t]hese testimonials, together with respondent’s contrition, completion\nof his sentence, cooperation, the over two years his license has already been\nsuspended, and his heretofore exemplary record of professional and community\nservice,” we determined that a two-year suspension from the practice of law, with\ncredit for time served under the interim suspension, to be the appropriate sanction.\n {¶ 22} In this case, we agree with the findings of the panel and the board.\nJacob lacks a prior disciplinary record, cooperated in the proceedings, paid all\ntaxes, acknowledged the wrongful nature of his conduct, and suffered the\nimposition of other sanctions and penalties, including a federal prison sentence,\nhome confinement, supervised probation, and a $10,000 fine. See BCGD\nProc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(a), (c), and (d).\n {¶ 23} Further, throughout his legal career, Jacobs has demonstrated his\ngood character and reputation in both the legal community and the community at\nlarge through a significant number of character letters that speak to his\nprofessionalism and his contributions to the bar and to community organizations.\nSee BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(e). He has served the legal community in\ncapacities as the former president of the Ohio State Bar Association and as an\nofficer and committee chairman of the American Bar Association, and it is\napparent that he could further contribute if allowed to return to the practice of\nlaw.\n {¶ 24} Disciplinary Counsel v. Smith, 128 Ohio St.3d 390, 2011-Ohio-\n957, 944 N.E.2d 1166, is distinguishable on its facts. There, Smith concealed\n\n\n\n 7\n\f SUPREME COURT OF OHIO\n\n\n\n\napproximately $250,000 in annual income from the IRS for several years, failing\nto report $1,411,265 in income to the IRS. And in response to an audit, he\nallowed his representative to present fraudulent documentation of expenses Smith\nhad not incurred and to falsely state that Smith had no source of income other\nthan that reported on his tax returns. A federal court convicted Smith of one\ncount of conspiring to defraud the IRS, four counts of making false tax returns,\nand one count of corruptly endeavoring to obstruct and impede the ensuing IRS\ninvestigation, and it sentenced him to one year and one day in federal prison and a\ntwo-year period of supervised release. The court ordered restitution of $395,154\nto the IRS; however, as of the panel hearing, Smith had only paid $2,000 in\nrestitution. Based on our holding that Smith’s conduct violated DR 1-102(A)(3),\n(4), (5), and (6), we indefinitely suspended him from the practice of law in Ohio,\nallowing him credit for time served under his interim suspension.\n {¶ 25} In contrast to Smith, Jacobs has been convicted of one count of\nmaking false tax returns and did not seek to obstruct the IRS investigation. And\nunlike Smith, who still owed the IRS $393,154 in restitution as of the time of the\npanel hearing, Jacobs had paid the $75,385 owed in delinquent taxes before\nsentencing. Based on Jacob’s conduct, a sanction is warranted in accord with our\ndecisions in Pace and Blaszak.\n {¶ 26} Accordingly, we accept the recommendation of the Board of\nCommissioners on Grievances and Discipline and in this case suspend Jacobs\nfrom the practice of law in Ohio for two years with credit for the time served\nunder the interim suspension that began on April 3, 2012. Costs are taxed to\nJacobs.\n Judgment accordingly.\n O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, KENNEDY,\nFRENCH, and O’NEILL, JJ., concur.\n ____________________\n\n\n\n\n 8\n\f January Term, 2014\n\n\n\n\n Scott J. Drexel, Disciplinary Counsel, and Donald M. Scheetz, Assistant\nDisciplinary Counsel, for relator.\n Schwartz, Downey & Co., L.P.A., Niki Z. Schwartz, and Brian P.\nDowney, for respondent.\n _________________________\n\n\n\n\n 9\n\f", "ocr": false, "opinion_id": 2690075 } ]
Ohio Supreme Court
Ohio Supreme Court
S
Ohio, OH
87,882
Grier
1868-02-10
false
haight-v-railroad-co
Haight
Haight v. Railroad Co.
Haight v. Railroad Company
Mr. Knox, for the plaintiff in error; Messrs. Lowrie and McKnighi, contra.
null
null
<p>A provision in a defeasance clause in a mortgage given by a railroad company to secure its coupon bonds, that the morlgage shall be void if the mortgagor well and truly pays, &c., the debt and interest, “without any deduction, defalcation or abatement to be made of anything for or in respect of any taxes, charges or assessments whatsoever," — does not oblige the company to pay the interest on its bonds clear of the duty of five per cent., which by the 122d section of the revenue act of 1864, such companies “are authorized to deduct and withhold from all payments on account of any interest or coupons due and payable.” On the contrary, the company complies with its contract when it pays the interest less five per cent, and retains the tax for the government.</p>
null
Error to the Circuit Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania; the case, as derived from the statement of it by the learned judge below (McCandless, J.), who sat for the Circuit Court, having been thus: The 122d section of the internal revenue act of 1864, provides that “any railroad company indebted for any money for which bonds have been issued upon which interest is payable shall be subject to and pay a duty of five per cent, on the amount of all such interest whenever the same shall be payable, and said company are authorized to deduct and withhold from all payments on account of any interest or coupons due and payable as aforesaid, the duty of five per cent., and the payment of the amount of said, duty, so deducted from the interest or coupons, shall discharge said company from that amount of the interest on the bonds held by any person whatever. Except where said company may have contracted otherwise.” 'With this act of Congress in force, Haight, a citizen of New York, was the holder of bonds to the amount of $100,000, issued by the Pittsburg, Port Wayne and Chicago Eailroad Company, and secured by a mortgage on real estate. The bonds were in the ordinary form of coupon bonds, and promised that the Company would pay $1000 to the obligee or bearer, on the 1st of January, 1887, with interest at the rate of seven per cent., payable half yearly, on the presentation of the interest warrants, &e. The defeasance clause of the mortgage was thus: “Provided, always, that if the said railway company or their successors do well and truly pay to the said Haight, the said $100,000 on the days and times hereinbefore méntioned, together with the interest payable thereon, without any deduction, defalcation or abatement to be made of anything for or íd respect of any taxes, charges or assessments whatsoever, then,” &c. The railway company having retained five per cent, on the amount of the coupons, a3 they paid them, Haight brought suit against it, contending that it could not deduct the taxes from the interest due him, because it had, in the language of the act of Congress, “ contracted otherwise.” The argument in the court below, derived from a very critical examination of the different parts of the act of Congress in question, was that the tax of five per cent, laid in the 122d section, was a tax upon the coupon or interest, that is to say,a tax on the thing and not on Haight’s income; and, therefore, that under the contract in the mortgage it was to be paid by the company from its own property and not from Haight’s. It was admitted that Haight paid no income tax at New York, his residence, on the interest received from these bonds. The learned judge who heard the case, thought that the tax was on Haight’s income, and gave his opinion to thi® effect: What are the coupons, upon which this suit is instituted, but income, — the annual profit upon money safely invested ? There is no special contract to pay government taxes upon the interest. The measure of the company’s liability is expressed in the bonds as being debt and interest only. It has nothing to do with the taxes which the government may impose upon the plaintiff for the interest payable to him. The clause in the mortgage cannot enlarge the duty which the mortgage was given to secure, that is, the payment of debt, and interest. It is to be found in all mortgages. . . . The plaintiff, a citizen of New York, pays no internal revenue tax on these bonds at the place of his residence. It is therefore no case of double taxation. The tax should be paid somewhere, and it was to meet investments like this in banks, railroads, insurance and other companies, that the 122d section of the act of 1864 was passed. .Judgment was accordingly given for the company, and the case was brought by Haight on error to this court, where it was submitted on briefs.
null
null
null
null
null
4
Published
null
<parties id="b31-8"> Haight <em> v. </em> Railroad Company. </parties><br><syllabus id="b31-9"> A provision in a defeasance clause in a mortgage given by a railroad company to secure its coupon bonds, that the morlgage shall be void if the mortgagor well and truly pays, &amp;c., the debt and interest, <em> “without any deduction, defalcation or abatement to be made of anything for or in respect of any taxes, charges or assessments whatsoever," </em> — does not oblige the company to pay the interest on its bonds clear of the duty of five per cent., which by the 122d section of the revenue act of 1864, such companies “are authorized to deduct and withhold from all payments on account of any interest or coupons due and payable.” On the contrary, the company complies with its contract when it pays the interest less five per cent, and retains the tax for the government. </syllabus><br><summary id="b31-10"> Error to the Circuit Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania; the case, as derived from the statement of it <span citation-index="1" class="star-pagination" label="16"> *16 </span> by the learned judge below (McCandless, J.), who sat for the Circuit Court, having been thus: </summary><br><summary id="b32-5"> The 122d section of the internal revenue act of 1864, provides that “any railroad company indebted for any money for which bonds have been issued upon which interest is payable shall be subject to and pay a duty of five per cent, on the amount of all such interest whenever the same shall be payable, and said company are <em> authorized to deduct and withhold from all payments on account of any interest or coupons due and payable as aforesaid, the duty of five per cent., </em> and the payment of the amount of said, duty, so deducted from the interest or coupons, shall discharge said company from that amount of the interest on the bonds held by any person whatever. Except where said company may have contracted otherwise.” </summary><br><summary id="b32-6"> 'With this act of Congress in force, Haight, a citizen of New York, was the holder of bonds to the amount of $100,000, issued by the Pittsburg, Port Wayne and Chicago Eailroad Company, and secured by a mortgage on real estate. The bonds were in the ordinary form of coupon bonds, and promised that the Company would pay $1000 to the obligee or bearer, on the 1st of January, 1887, with interest at the rate of seven per cent., payable half yearly, on the presentation of the interest warrants, &amp;e. The defeasance clause of the mortgage was thus: </summary><br><summary id="b32-7"> “Provided, always, that if the said railway company or their successors do well and truly pay to the said Haight, the said $100,000 on the days and times hereinbefore méntioned, together with the interest payable thereon, without <em> any </em> deduction, defalcation or abatement to be made of anything for or íd respect of <em> any </em> taxes, charges or assessments whatsoever, then,” &amp;c. </summary><br><summary id="b32-8"> The railway company having retained five per cent, on the amount of the coupons, a3 they paid them, Haight brought suit against it, contending that it could not deduct the taxes from the interest due him, because it had, in the language of the act of Congress, “ contracted otherwise.” </summary><br><summary id="b32-9"> The argument in the court below, derived from a very <span citation-index="1" class="star-pagination" label="17"> *17 </span> critical examination of the different parts of the act of Congress in question, was that the tax of five per cent, laid in the 122d section, was a tax upon the <em> coupon </em> or interest, that is to say,a tax on the <em> thing </em> and not on Haight’s income; and, therefore, that under the contract in the mortgage it was to be paid by the company from its own property and not from Haight’s. </summary><br><summary id="b33-5"> It was admitted that Haight paid no income tax at New York, his residence, on the interest received from these bonds. </summary><br><summary id="b33-6"> The learned judge who heard the case, thought that the tax was on Haight’s income, and gave his opinion to thi® effect: </summary><br><summary id="b33-7"> What are the coupons, upon which this suit is instituted, but income, — the annual profit upon money safely invested ? There is no special contract to pay government taxes upon the interest. The measure of the company’s liability is expressed in the bonds as being debt and interest only. It has nothing to do with the taxes which the government may impose upon the plaintiff for the interest payable to him. The clause in the mortgage cannot enlarge the duty which the mortgage was given to secure, that is, the payment of debt, and interest. It is to be found in all mortgages. . . . The plaintiff, a citizen of New York, pays no internal revenue tax on these bonds at the place of his residence. It is therefore no case of double taxation. The tax should be paid somewhere, and it was to meet investments like this in banks, railroads, insurance and other companies, that the 122d section of the act of 1864 was passed. </summary><br><summary id="b33-8"> .Judgment was accordingly given for the company, and the case was brought by Haight on error to this court, where it was submitted on briefs. </summary><br><attorneys id="b33-9"> <em> Mr. Knox, for the plaintiff in error; Messrs. Lowrie and McKnighi, contra. </em> </attorneys>
[ "73 U.S. 15", "18 L. Ed. 818", "6 Wall. 15", "1867 U.S. LEXIS 933" ]
[ { "author_str": "Grier", "per_curiam": false, "type": "010combined", "page_count": null, "download_url": null, "author_id": 1283, "opinion_text": "\n73 U.S. 15 (____)\n6 Wall. 15\nHAIGHT\nv.\nRAILROAD COMPANY.\nSupreme Court of United States.\n\n*17 Mr. Knox, for the plaintiff in error; Messrs. Lowrie and McKnight, contra.\nMr. Justice GRIER delivered the opinion of the court.\nThe facts in this case are properly stated and the law correctly decided by the learned judge of the Circuit Court.\n*18 The provision in the condition of defeasance of the mortgage, has reference only to covenants between mortgagor and mortgagee, and is usual in every mortgage; being put there in order to secure the mortgagee, who may not be in possession, from demand for taxes incurred while the mortgagor was in possession. It can have no possible application to the income tax of bondholders. The 122d section of the revenue act of 1864, was enacted for greater facility of collection of the tax. These corporators often contract to pay for the bondholder all such taxes; but when they have not so contracted, they are authorized to deduct or withhold the amount of the tax. In all assessments of income tax the citizen is credited with the amount thus detained; so that there is no double taxation.\nJUDGMENT AFFIRMED.\n", "ocr": false, "opinion_id": 87882 } ]
Supreme Court
Supreme Court of the United States
F
USA, Federal
477,108
null
1986-09-08
false
sydnor-v-pfadt
Sydnor
Sydnor v. Pfadt
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
0
Published
null
null
[ "802 F.2d 448" ]
[ { "author_str": null, "per_curiam": false, "type": "010combined", "page_count": null, "download_url": "http://bulk.resource.org/courts.gov/c/F2/802/802.F2d.448.86-3159.html", "author_id": null, "opinion_text": "802 F.2d 448\n Sydnorv.Pfadt\n 86-3159\n United States Court of Appeals,Third Circuit.\n 9/8/86\n \n 1\n W.D.Pa.\n \n AFFIRMED\n ", "ocr": false, "opinion_id": 477108 } ]
Third Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
F
USA, Federal
2,636,241
null
2008-09-04
false
state-v-kenyon
Kenyon
State v. Kenyon
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
0
Published
null
null
[ "195 P.3d 88" ]
[ { "author_str": null, "per_curiam": false, "type": "010combined", "page_count": null, "download_url": null, "author_id": null, "opinion_text": "\n195 P.3d 88 (2008)\nSTATE\nv.\nKENYON.\nNo. 81374-4.\nSupreme Court of Washington, Department II.\nSeptember 4, 2008.\nDisposition of petition for review. Granted.\n", "ocr": false, "opinion_id": 2636241 } ]
Washington Supreme Court
Washington Supreme Court
S
Washington, WA
455,519
null
1985-04-30
false
alvern-bush-v-chamber-of-comm-kc
null
Alvern Bush v. Chamber of Comm., K.C
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
0
Published
null
null
[ "767 F.2d 928" ]
[ { "author_str": null, "per_curiam": false, "type": "010combined", "page_count": null, "download_url": "http://bulk.resource.org/courts.gov/c/F2/767/767.F2d.928.84-2189.84-2131.html", "author_id": null, "opinion_text": "767 F.2d 928\n Alvern Bushv.Chamber of Comm., K.C.\n 84-2131, 84-2189\n United States Court of Appeals,Eighth Circuit.\n 4/30/85\n \n 1\n W.D.Mo.\n \n \n 2\n AFFIRMED **\n \n \n 3\n ---------------\n \n \n \n ** See Local Rule 12.\n \n \n ", "ocr": false, "opinion_id": 455519 } ]
Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
F
USA, Federal
2,643,040
null
2013-11-19
false
people-v-despois-ca11
null
People v. Despois CA1/1
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
0
Unpublished
null
null
null
[ { "author_str": null, "per_curiam": false, "type": "010combined", "page_count": 12, "download_url": "http://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/nonpub/A134466.PDF", "author_id": null, "opinion_text": "Filed 11/19/13 P. v. Despois CA1/1\n NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS\nCalifornia Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for\npublication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication\nor ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.\n\n\n IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA\n\n FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT\n\n DIVISION ONE\n\n\nTHE PEOPLE,\n Plaintiff and Respondent,\n A134466\nv.\nJEREMY R. DESPOIS, (Solano County\n Super. Ct. No. FCR273646)\n Defendant and Appellant.\n\n Defendant Jeremy R. Despois appeals from his conviction of two counts of\ncommitting a lewd act on a child. He maintains the trial court erred in excluding the\ntestimony of a psychiatrist who would testify as an expert witness regarding questioning\ntechniques and suggestibility of a child witness, and that it was error to deny his motion\nfor new trial on the basis his counsel was ineffective. We conclude there was no error,\nand affirm.\n PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND\n Defendant lived with K.J. and her children from 2008 through 2010. The couple\nbegan living together in approximately May 2008. The oldest child, M., was born in July\n2004 and the youngest, in September 2009. Defendant was not the father of the three\nolder children.\n In mid-2008, M., who was then four years old, asked her mother why “white stuff\ncomes out of Jeremy’s peepee.” When her mother asked M. to repeat what she said, M.\nresponded “ ‘Never mind, mommy’ ” and walked away. K.J. thought “I don’t know;\nshe’s a child. Maybe she’s just saying things.”\n\n\n 1\n\f In the latter part of 2009, K.J. was feeding their newborn daughter and defendant\nsaid he would “go lay [the other children] down.” He was in the children’s bedroom for\nwhat seemed to K.J. an unusually long time. She had a “weird feeling” so she went to the\nchildren’s room and opened the door. When she did so, she hit defendant with the door.\nHe had been partially blocking the opening of the door, and was crouched down and\n“acting just a little funny.” She noticed he was wearing “just his boxers and his shirt,”\nbut he had been wearing blue basketball shorts when he entered the room. M., who was\nthen five years old, was lying in the bed drinking water. Water was spilling out of her\nmouth and she “looked a little red and upset” and “wouldn’t talk.”\n A couple of weeks later, K.J. was putting her sons down for a nap in the bedroom.\nWhen she returned to the living room, she saw M. laying “over [defendant’s] lap” and\nopening his pajama pants at the fly area. Once defendant noticed her, M. “jumped back\nin the fetal position and [defendant’s] eyes were open wide [¶] . . . [¶] –like he was\nshocked.” M. “didn’t talk [and] . . . seemed scared.” K.J. asked “What was going on?”\nDefendant responded “ ‘What the “F” do you think is going on?’ ” K.J. reached inside\nhis pants to see if he had an erection, which he did not. She and defendant argued about\nwhat had happened.\n “[P]robably later that day” K.J. “asked [M.] why she was laying in [defendant’s]\nlap.” M. did not respond, but “turn[ed] her head away and smil[ed].” K.J. had noticed\nthat when M. lied, she “usually will turn her head away and smile. She wouldn’t tell me\nanything.” K.J. did not “know if it was just me or if it was what it was looking like.”\n A few days later, in January 2010, K.J. tried to talk to M. again. She said she had\n“noticed something,” and asked M. if defendant “ever made her do anything.” She used a\n“[c]alm, patient” tone of voice, and did not mention a penis, oral copulation, or any\nspecifics. M., who was then five and a half years old, would not answer at first, but then\nasked if she was “ ‘going to get in trouble?’ ” K.J. responded “Baby, you are not going to\nget in trouble. Mommy is here. Mommy is going to protect you, and mommy will make\nanything stop if you just tell me.” M. then told her mother defendant had done something\n\n\n\n 2\n\fsexually inappropriate to her.1 On cross-examination, K.G testified M. told her defendant\ndigitally penetrated her vagina, and forced her to perform oral sex on him “six, seven,\nmaybe a thousand times.” K.J. told M. “what she is doing [i]s a good thing, and then I\nwill make it stop, and it won’t ever happen again.” K.J. wasn’t sure what to do at that\nmoment, because defendant was still there and she loved him.\n Two days later, K.J. went to the police station. A police officer came to her\napartment and asked if they had any pornography, and she gave him permission to search.\nPolice conducted two interviews of M., neither of which were admitted in evidence.\n A few weeks later, K.J. was talking to M. about going to see a therapist and\nexplaining what a therapist was. M. stated “out of the blue” that defendant “ ‘didn’t put\nhis peepee in my peepee or my butt, but he said when I get older, that we can do that\nwhenever we want.’ ”\n M. was six and a half years old and in the first grade at the time of her testimony\nin February 2011. She could not identify defendant in the courtroom, but testified\n“Jeremy” had a tattoo of a sun on his right arm. Police Officer Erwin Ramirez testified\nhe had contacted defendant a year earlier, in February 2010. At the time, defendant was\nnot as thin as he was at the time of trial, and he had a tattoo of a sun and a joker on his\nright arm.\n M. testified she told her mother defendant “stuck his private in my mouth.” He\ndid it when they were on the couch and in the bed in their apartment. M. first saw\ndefendant’s “private” when she went to get a drink of water and he “stuck it out of his\npants.” When asked if she ever touched his private, M. testified “Only with my mouth.”\nThe prosecutor asked why she touched his private with her mouth, and M. responded “he\ndid that.” The prosecutor asked “[h]ow did he do that?” and M. explained “Um, he kept\npushing my head back.” She “kept trying to . . . close [her] mouth, but he was too\nstrong.” “[W]hite stuff” came out of his private. M. “didn’t like” the taste.\n\n\n 1\n Pursuant to an in limine agreement, the prosecutor only elicited whether\ndefendant had done something sexually inappropriate to M.\n\n\n 3\n\f M. told her mother “the day after he last stopped.” Her mother wanted M. to tell\nher. She did not tell her mother earlier because she “was too scared, [she] . . . will get\nsent to [her] room.”\n M. also testified she watched movies with defendant. They watched Farmland,\nToy Story Two, and movies with people who had no clothes on. M. “kept moving\naround” when they were watching the movies with naked people, but defendant “just\nwanted [her] to watch. He kept pulling [her] on the couch.” M. did not want to watch the\nmovie because “[i]t was too disgusting.” They watched movies with naked people\n“[l]ots.”\n Defendant testified he was in a relationship with K.J. for over a year and a half.\nHe loved M. and viewed her as his daughter. Part of being her father involved\n“teach[ing] her how to be a young lady” because M. “would sit with her knees up kind of\ninappropriately or go to the bathroom with the door open, or with the boys being around,\nor her butt crack would hang out.” He would tell her to “pull up [her] pants” and “sit\nwith [her] legs closed.”\n Defendant explained M. walked in on him and K.J. when they were having sex on\nthree occasions. One time, M. saw him ejaculate on K.J.’s stomach. Another time, he\nwas “performing oral sex on [K.J.] when [M.] barged in.” The third time, M. walked in\non them when K.J. was performing oral sex on defendant. K.J. testified M. never walked\nin on her and defendant when they were engaged in sexual activity.\n Defendant testified he did not digitally penetrate M.’s vagina, she did not perform\noral sex on him, and he never watched pornography with her. He testified K.J. was lying\nabout seeing him in only his boxer shorts in the children’s bedroom.\n DISCUSSION\nExclusion of Expert Testimony\n Defendant maintains the trial court erred in excluding the testimony of his\nproposed expert witness, Dr. Lee Coleman, on false memory syndrome and child\nsuggestiveness, denying him a fair trial.\n\n\n\n 4\n\f Expert testimony is admissible if it is related to a subject sufficiently beyond\ncommon experience that it would assist the trier of fact. (People v. Brown (2004)\n33 Cal.4th 892, 900; Evid. Code, § 801, subd. (a).) On the other hand, “[e]xpert opinion\nis not admissible if it consists of inferences and conclusions which can be drawn as easily\nand intelligently by the trier of facts as by the witness.” (People v. Torres (1995)\n33 Cal.App.4th 37, 45.) We review the trial court’s decision on the admissibility of\nexpert opinion testimony for abuse of discretion. (People v. Rowland (1992) 4 Cal.4th\n238, 266.)\n Defendant concedes there is no published California case addressing “the\nadmissibility of expert testimony regarding the suggestibility of child witnesses and the\nforensic interviewing of children.” California has a “judicial policy disfavoring attempts\nto impeach witnesses by means of psychiatric testimony. [Citations.] California courts\nhave viewed such examinations with disfavor because ‘ “[a] psychiatrist’s testimony on\nthe credibility of a witness may involve many dangers: the psychiatrist’s testimony may\nnot be relevant; the techniques used and theories advanced may not be generally\naccepted; the psychiatrist may not be in any better position to evaluate credibility than the\njuror; difficulties may arise in communication between the psychiatrist and the jury; too\nmuch reliance may be placed upon the testimony of the psychiatrist; partisan psychiatrists\nmay cloud rather than clarify the issues; the testimony may be distracting, time-\nconsuming and costly.” ’ [Citation.]” (People v. Alcala (1992) 4 Cal.4th 742, 781–782.)\nIn general, jurors are “considered to be equipped to judge witness credibility without the\nneed for expert testimony.” (People v. Wells (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 179, 189.)\n Other jurisdictions have taken differing approaches to this type of expert\ntestimony. Some jurisdictions have admitted the expert testimony, reasoning “such\ntestimony involves an area of expertise beyond the ken of the average layman and,\ntherefore, that the defendant in a child molestation case is entitled to introduce expert\ntestimony for the limited purpose of providing the jury with information about proper\ntechniques for interviewing children and whether the interviewing techniques actually\nutilized were proper.” (Barlow v. State (1998) 270 Ga. 54, 54 [507 S.E.2d 416, 417].)\n\n\n 5\n\fOthers have excluded it because “the subject matter was within the jurors’ common\nknowledge and experience.” (People v. Johnston (N.Y.A.D. 2000) 273 A.D.2d 514, 518;\nState v. Ellis (Me. 1996) 669 A.2d 752, 753–754 [“Defendant was entitled to explore the\ninterviewing techniques that were used and to argue to the jury that they may have\ninfluenced the children’s testimony. Defendant was not entitled to have his argument\nbuttressed by the presentation of common knowledge in the form of an expert scientific\nopinion.”].)\n In this case, the prosecutor moved in limine to admit evidence of police interviews\nof M. under Evidence Code section 1237, and to exclude the testimony of Dr. Coleman,\ndefendant’s proposed expert witness. In a January 31, 2010 police interview, M. said she\ntalked to her mother about defendant, but she did not remember. M. said she did not\nwant to talk “[b]ecause I’m just shy and I’m scared to talk.” She then began crying and\nsaying she wanted her mother. A different police officer interviewed M. again the next\nday. M. told her defendant made her suck his private parts. When defendant did that, M.\nsaid “[t]he nasty stuff comes out. I don’t ever want to taste it again.”\n The defense submitted an offer of proof regarding Dr. Coleman’s proposed\ntestimony, stating he would “testify that the manner in which a child is interviewed and\ncounseled can affect whether a memory is true. [¶] . . . Specifically, he will testify that\nthe manner in which a child is questioned can cause them to lose the ability to distinguish\nbetween what they know to be a memory and what events have actually taken place. He\nis prepared to testify that the manner in which all the parties (the parent of the\ncomplaining witness, law enforcement, and clinical interviewers) can affect a child and\npotentially cause false memories. [¶] . . . [¶] . . . Dr. Coleman is prepared to testify that\nthe manner in which the MDIC [Multi-Disciplinary Interview Center] interview was\nconducted was substandard for various reasons [¶] . . . [and] is prepared to testify that a\nfalse memory can inadvertently be planted in a child’s head in a single conversation, even\nwithout an[] intent to do so; specifically, the mother’s concerns about possible abuse\nprior to the last incident. Moreover, the mother’s tone and form of questions can affect\nthe ability of the alleged victim to properly recall history.”\n\n\n 6\n\f Prior to trial, the court stated “Here are my thoughts concerning Dr. Coleman: I\nbelieve that should the [police interview] become relevant and come in, . . . then his\ntestimony would be relevant, and I would allow it, because as I read the affidavits[2]\nsubmitted by defense, and my understanding of his expertise, much of it dealt with how\nquestions were asked of minors; so if that becomes an issue, which, in the [police\ninterview] I would allow him to testify. [¶] If the alleged victim testifies and . . . the\n[police interview] and/or the questioning does not become an issue, then I don’t see how\nit would become relevant.” The court indicated it would “revisit this” after M. testified.\n After the prosecution rested without introducing evidence of the police interviews\nof M., the defense sought to have Dr. Coleman testify “to childhood development,\nmemory suggestibility, and potential impact of questioning techniques on the child’s\nmemory in general; testify to the somewhat fluid nature of a minor’s perception of history\nand the effect that suggestive questioning, et cetera, can have on a minor; specifically,\nthat a false memory can be planted in the matter of a single conversation, even in the\nabsence of an intent on the part of the planter. [¶] The second part that I think is relevant\nis that he has reviewed the various interviews in this case, including the original officer’s\ninterview, the MDIC, the interview that I did conduct myself and the investigator, as well\nas police reports. He would testify that the manner in which the questioning took place in\nthis case are of the nature which could lead to a false memory implant being planted.”\n The court stated “the Court’s initial ruling on this discussion was one of whether\n. . . if we got to the MDIC and if there [were] questions concerning the methodology of\nthe questioning, I would give a tentative ruling of leaning towards allowing Dr. Coleman\nto testify. [¶] And [defense counsel] is correct in that the testimony, the mere fact that an\nMDIC was not introduced into evidence is not a per se bar to the testimony of\nDr. Coleman as an expert. [¶] Again, these are . . . relevant, and then does it pass the 352\ntest? . . . [¶] When I review the testimony and the evidence before the Court, that is, the\ntestimony of the mother . . . concerning her observations of what was occurring in her\n\n 2\n The defense submitted an offer of proof in the form of a memorandum regarding\nDr. Coleman’s testimony, not his affidavit or C.V.\n\n 7\n\fopinion with her daughter, and her pressing and questioning of what happened to her\ndaughter, I note in the testimony that . . . [the questions were] all sort of what happened,\nand there was very little leading. [¶] There were very little questions that would lead to\nany sort of creating of a false memory. [¶] In other words, . . . there wasn’t the type of\nquestions of . . . ‘isn’t it true Jeremy did X, Y, Z to you?’ With the child parroting back,\n‘Yes, he did X, Y, Z to me.” [¶] They were very much open-ended questions, and\nalthough there was a refusal often to answer the questions, I didn’t sense that any of the\nissues that Dr. Coleman would testify would be very relevant. I think they would be\nrelevant. [¶] However, when I balance that under 352 of undue . . . delay, unnecessary\nconfusion . . . in light of the state of the evidence, I am going to deny your request to call\nDr. Coleman . . . .”3\n The court found Dr. Coleman’s testimony relevant, but not “very relevant,” given\nthe lack of evidence of any suggestive questioning. The court properly weighed the\nlimited relevance of Dr. Coleman’s proposed testimony against the undue delay and\nconfusion his proposed testimony would cause. There was no abuse of discretion in\nexcluding the proposed expert testimony under Evidence Code section 352.\n Neither did exclusion of the proposed testimony deprive defendant of his\nconstitutional right to due process or to present a defense. “ ‘ “As a general matter, the\nordinary rules of evidence do not impermissibly infringe on the accused’s right to present\na defense.” ’ ” (People v. Gurule (2002) 28 Cal.4th 557, 620.) Defendant had the\nopportunity to have Dr. Coleman testify if he chose to introduce M.’s police interviews,\nwhich he ultimately did not. He also had the opportunity to cross-examine M. and her\nmother about the claimed suggestive questioning and M.’s memory issues, and to argue\nhis theory of “implanted” false memory to the jury. Accordingly, he was not denied his\nright to present a defense.\n 3\n Defense counsel then sought to introduce the videotape of an initial police\ninterview of M., in which she stated she did not remember and would not answer\nquestions, as a prior inconsistent statement of the victim. The court allowed it, but the\nfollowing morning, defense counsel indicated “after giving the matter considerable\nthought, I’m not going to be introducing [the interview videotape] at this time.”\n\n\n 8\n\fDenial of Motion for New Trial\n Defendant also contends the court erred in denying his motion for new trial on the\nbasis his counsel was ineffective. He asserts counsel failed to have his family and friends\ntestify as character witnesses, promised in opening argument he would present the\ntestimony of Dr. Coleman regarding suggestive questioning techniques, but then failed to\nmake an adequate argument for the admission of Dr. Coleman’s testimony, and failed to\ninvestigate and introduce favorable psychological evidence under People v. Stoll (1989)\n49 Cal.3d 1136 (Stoll).4\n In order to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, “ ‘a defendant must\nshow that counsel’s performance was inadequate when measured against the standard of\na reasonably competent attorney, and that counsel’s performance prejudiced defendant’s\ncase in such a manner that his representation “so undermined the proper functioning of\nthe adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.”\n(Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 686. . . .)’ ” (People v. Brodit (1998)\n61 Cal.App.4th 1312, 1333.) “ ‘In determining whether counsel’s performance was\ndeficient, a court must in general exercise deferential scrutiny [citation]’. . . . ‘Although\ndeference is not abdication . . . courts should not second-guess reasonable, if difficult,\ntactical decisions in the harsh light of hindsight.’ ” (Id. at p. 1335, quoting People v.\nScott (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1188, 1212.)\n\n\n\n 4\n In Stoll, the court held “[e]xpert opinion that defendants show no obvious\npsychological or sexual problems is circumstantial evidence which bears upon whether\nthey committed sexual acts upon children, and is admissible ‘character’ evidence on their\nbehalf.” (Stoll, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 1161.) Defendant notes the Penal Code\nsection 288.1 psychological evaluation by Dr. Nakagawa, for which he refused to answer\nany questions about the charges, demonstrated his response to questioning was different\nfrom others subject to section 288.1 assessments in that he gave “well-elaborated and\noften spontaneous responses regarding psychosexual matters.” Given that defendant\nrefused to discuss the charges, however, Dr. Nakagawa concluded “With respect to the\ndefendant being predisposed to commission of a sexual offense no opinion can be offered\neven though the data obtained in the present assessment indicated no notable indication\nof sexual preoccupation or aberration.”\n\n\n 9\n\f “Defendant’s burden is difficult to carry on direct appeal. We reverse on the\nground of inadequate assistance on appeal only if the record affirmatively discloses no\nrational tactical purpose for counsel’s act or omission.” (People v. Montoya (2007)\n149 Cal.App.4th 1139, 1148.) “ ‘In some cases, . . . the record on appeal sheds no light\non why counsel acted or failed to act in the manner challenged. In such circumstances,\nunless counsel was asked for an explanation and failed to provide one, or unless there\nsimply could be no satisfactory explanation, these cases are affirmed on appeal.\n[Citation.]’ ” (People v. Avena (1996) 13 Cal.4th 394, 418–419, italics omitted.) “ ‘A\nreviewing court will not second-guess trial counsel’s reasonable tactical decisions.’\n[Citation.]” (People v. Riel (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1153, 1185.) When defense counsel’s\nreasons are not readily apparent from the record, we will not assume he or she was\nineffective unless the challenged conduct could have had no conceivable tactical purpose.\n(People v. Dickey (2005) 35 Cal.4th 884, 926–927.)\n Even where deficient performance appears, the conviction must be upheld unless\nthe defendant demonstrates prejudice, i.e., that, “ ‘ “ ‘but for counsel’s unprofessional\nerrors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability\nis a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.’ ” ’ ” (People v.\nAnderson (2001) 25 Cal.4th 543, 569.)\n Defendant claims the court “found trial counsel had been deficient.” In denying\nthe motion for new trial, the trial court5 stated, “I am not sure I would say this is the worst\ncase I have ever seen from a defense perspective in terms of trial. But it wasn’t real\ncompetent.” The court, however, held it was the “second level that is a very difficult task\nfor a defense counsel to reach. And I don’t think that IAC rises to that level where I can\nsay it would be a different result.”\n Even if defendant’s counsel was ineffective in some respects, we likewise\nconclude there was not a reasonable probability that but for trial counsel’s claimed\ndeficiencies, the result would have been more favorable to defendant.\n 5\n The Honorable Gregory Caskey was appointed by the Chief Justice to hear the\nnew trial motion after the trial judge disqualified himself.\n\n\n 10\n\f The evidence showed M. made two spontaneous statements to her mother\nimplicating defendant. In the first one, in mid-2008, M. asked K.J. why “white stuff\ncomes out of Jeremy’s peepee.” M. made this statement before either her mother or\npolice had asked her any questions about sexual abuse. M. also told her mother “out of\nthe blue” that defendant “ ‘didn’t put his peepee in my peepee or my butt, but he said\nwhen I get older, that we can do that whenever we want.’ ”\n Additionally, M. testified in a manner consistent with a young child inexperienced\nin sexual matters prior to her contact with defendant. She told her mother defendant\n“stuck his private in my mouth.” She did not tell her mother before because she was\nafraid she would be sent to her room. M. explained defendant put his penis in her mouth\nwhen they were on the couch and in the bed in their apartment. When asked if she ever\ntouched his private, M. testified “Only with my mouth.” The prosecutor asked why she\ntouched his private with her mouth, and M. responded “he did that.” The prosecutor\nasked “[h]ow did he do that?” and M. explained “Um, he kept pushing my head back.”\nShe “kept trying to . . . close [her] mouth, but he was too strong.” “[W]hite stuff” came\nout of his private. M. “didn’t like” the taste. Though defendant attempted to establish\nM.’s prior knowledge of sexual acts by testifying M. walked in on him and her mother\nwhen they were engaged in giving and receiving oral sex and when he was ejaculating on\nher stomach, M.’s mother testified M. never walked in on them during sexual activity.\n Furthermore, M.’s mother testified not only about M.’s fresh complaint of abuse to\nher and M.’s spontaneous declarations, but also about her own observations. She\nobserved defendant coming out of the children’s bedroom wearing only his boxers when\nhe had worn basketball shorts going in, and M. sitting up in bed with a red face and not\nspeaking. She also observed M. lying over defendant on the sofa and opening the fly of\nhis pants. Defendant became angry when she asked what was going on.\n Defendant denied the conduct to which M. and her mother testified. Much of his\nown testimony, however, undermined his credibility. For instance, he testified the five-\nyear-old behaved sexually inappropriately, and that he had to teach her the correct way to\nbehave as a “young lady.”\n\n\n 11\n\f Defendant maintains the prejudice to him is evidenced by the fact the judge\nhearing his new trial motion “found his claims of innocence ‘not unreasonable.’ ” This\nmisrepresents the record. The trial court, at sentencing, stated the defense attorney’s\n“position is not unreasonable.” The defense attorney’s position was that the court should\nimpose probation rather than a prison term, based on the defendant’s lack of prior\nconvictions, character evidence presented by his family at sentencing, and unlikelihood\nof further contact with M. given that she had moved out of state. In denying probation,\nthe court explained: “I’ve had much more serious, long continuous sexual abuse [cases],\nhorrible things, this is not that bad. . . . But it’s more than just a touching, more than a\nfondling. When you force a four year old to, uh, orally copulate and you ejaculate, that’s\njust very disturbing.”\n Given the evidence before the jury, it is not reasonably probable the result would\nhave been more favorable to defendant had his attorney introduced character evidence\nsubmitted by his family and friends, Dr. Coleman’s proposed testimony about potentially\nsuggestive questioning, or a Stoll assessment indicating defendant’s personality profile\nwas not consistent with that of a child molester.\n DISPOSITION\n The judgment is affirmed.\n\n\n\n _________________________\n Banke, J.\n\n\nWe concur:\n\n\n_________________________\nMargulies, Acting P. J.\n\n\n_________________________\nDondero, J.\n\n\n\n 12\n\f", "ocr": false, "opinion_id": 2643040 } ]
California Court of Appeal
California Court of Appeal
SA
California, CA
1,490,507
null
2006-09-01
false
gonzales-v-planned-parenthood-federation-of-america-inc
null
Gonzales v. PLANNED PARENTHOOD FEDERATION OF AMERICA, INC.
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
0
Published
null
null
[ "548 U.S. 939" ]
[ { "author_str": null, "per_curiam": false, "type": "010combined", "page_count": null, "download_url": null, "author_id": null, "opinion_text": "\n548 U.S. 939 (2006)\nGONZALES, ATTORNEY GENERAL\nv.\nPLANNED PARENTHOOD FEDERATION OF AMERICA, INC., ET AL.\nNo. 05-1382.\nSupreme Court of United States.\nSeptember 1, 2006.\nMotion of Alan Ernest to allow counsel, or guardian ad litem, to represent children unborn and born alive denied.\n", "ocr": false, "opinion_id": 1490507 } ]
Supreme Court
Supreme Court of the United States
F
USA, Federal
2,643,133
null
2013-11-19
false
anthony-gibson-v-jeffrey-kilpatrick
null
Anthony Gibson v. Jeffrey Kilpatrick
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
0
Published
null
null
null
[ { "author_str": null, "per_curiam": false, "type": "010combined", "page_count": 16, "download_url": "http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions\\pub\\12/12-60905-CV0.pdf", "author_id": null, "opinion_text": " Case: 12-60905 Document: 00512446675 Page: 1 Date Filed: 11/19/2013\n\n\n\n\n REVISED NOVEMBER 19, 2013\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT\n United States Court of Appeals\n Fifth Circuit\n\n FILED\n No. 12-60905 October 29, 2013\n\n Lyle W. Cayce\n Clerk\nANTHONY GIBSON,\n\n Plaintiff-Appellee Cross-Appellant\nv.\n\nJEFFREY KILPATRICK, in His Individual Capacity,\n\n Defendant-Appellant Cross-Appellee\n\n\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court\n for the Northern District of Mississippi\n\n\nBefore STEWART, Chief Judge, KING, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.\nKING, Circuit Judge:\n While serving as the Chief of Police in Drew, Mississippi, Anthony Gibson\nreported Mayor Jeffrey Kilpatrick to outside law enforcement agencies for\nmisuse of the city gasoline card. Months later, Kilpatrick began issuing written\nreprimands to Gibson for a panoply of alleged deficiencies. Gibson subsequently\nfiled a lawsuit alleging unconstitutional retaliation as well as state tort law\nclaims. Kilpatrick moved for summary judgment, raising the defense of qualified\nimmunity and arguing that the state tort law claims were barred because Gibson\nfailed to comply with state notice requirements. The district court denied the\n\f Case: 12-60905 Document: 00512446675 Page: 2 Date Filed: 11/19/2013\n\n\n\n No. 12-60905\n\nmotion with respect to qualified immunity, but granted it with respect to the\nstate tort claims. Kilpatrick now brings this interlocutory appeal of the district\ncourt’s order denying qualified immunity, and Gibson cross-appeals the district\ncourt’s dismissal of one of his tort claims. Kilpatrick moves to dismiss the cross-\nappeal for lack of jurisdiction. We hold that Kilpatrick is entitled to qualified\nimmunity and reverse the district court’s order to the extent that it denied\nqualified immunity. Additionally, because we lack jurisdiction to hear Gibson’s\ncross-appeal, we grant Kilpatrick’s motion to dismiss the cross-appeal.\n I. Factual and Procedural Background\n In 2006, Anthony Gibson applied to be Chief of Police in Drew, Mississippi.\nMayor Jeffrey Kilpatrick opposed Gibson’s application and supported another\ncandidate. The city’s Board of Aldermen (“Board”) rejected Kilpatrick’s\nrecommendation and hired Gibson in August 2006. As Chief of Police, Gibson\nreported directly to Kilpatrick and the Board.\n Sometime within the first four months of Gibson’s employment, a\nsubordinate at the police department informed Gibson that Kilpatrick was\nmisusing the city gasoline card to fuel his vehicle for personal trips. Gibson\nconfidentially reported his suspicions to the Federal Bureau of Investigation\n(“FBI”), Drug Enforcement Agency (“DEA”),1 Mississippi Office of the State\nAuditor (“OSA”), and Mississippi Attorney General’s Office. His reports to the\nFBI and DEA were through contacts with whom he had worked in an official\ncapacity on prior occasions. The OSA initiated an investigation, and Gibson\nworked with Investigator Karen Swain to assist in the OSA’s efforts. Because\nKilpatrick had to come to the police department to obtain the gasoline card,\nGibson was able to monitor Kilpatrick’s activities. Gibson instructed two police\n\n\n 1\n Gibson heard rumors that Kilpatrick might be involved in illicit drugs; however, this\nallegation was never investigated or substantiated. It did prompt his decision to contact at\nleast the DEA.\n\n 2\n\f Case: 12-60905 Document: 00512446675 Page: 3 Date Filed: 11/19/2013\n\n\n\n No. 12-60905\n\ndispatchers to make log entries every time Kilpatrick asked to use the card, and\nhe ordered a police officer to observe Kilpatrick following receipt of the card.\nGibson and Swain also directed the city clerk to monitor receipts from Drew’s\ngasoline provider to compare them with the information recorded in the log. In\nSeptember 2008, the investigation concluded, finding that Kilpatrick had\nmisused the city gasoline card, and the OSA ordered Kilpatrick to repay\napproximately $3,000 to the City of Drew for his unauthorized use of the card.\n Approximately nine months after the conclusion of the investigation,\nKilpatrick began entering written reprimands into Gibson’s personnel file. The\nfirst reprimand came on June 8, 2009, and the reprimands continued for over\ntwo years.2 In addition to the reprimands, Kilpatrick recommended Gibson’s\ntermination to the Board on several occasions, including for insubordination,\nlack of visibility in the community, and failure to work an adequate number of\nhours.\n On December 1, 2010, Gibson brought this action in federal court against\nKilpatrick in his individual capacity, alleging violations of his First Amendment\nright to free expression under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and malicious interference with\nemployment and intentional infliction of emotional distress under Mississippi\nlaw. Less than a year later, on October 5, 2011, the Board voted to terminate\nGibson’s employment. Gibson subsequently amended his complaint to add the\nCity of Drew as a defendant, alleging that the city violated his First Amendment\nrights in retaliation for his filing suit against Kilpatrick.\n\n\n\n 2\n The record contains nine different reprimands of Gibson from Kilpatrick over this\nperiod for, inter alia, Gibson’s tardiness to a meeting because he was driving to the emergency\nroom for medical care; assisting a neighboring police department with a domestic violence\nstand-off without first obtaining prior approval from the Board; holding a staff meeting that\ncaused the city to incur overtime payments; and allowing citizens to play basketball in the new\ncommunity center after the Board had approved the center’s use for a luncheon for city\nemployees.\n\n 3\n\f Case: 12-60905 Document: 00512446675 Page: 4 Date Filed: 11/19/2013\n\n\n\n No. 12-60905\n\n Kilpatrick and the City of Drew jointly moved for summary judgment on\nGibson’s First Amendment and state law claims.3 Kilpatrick asserted that he\nwas entitled to qualified immunity as to the First Amendment claim because\nGibson’s speech was not constitutionally protected nor were Kilpatrick’s actions\nobjectively unreasonable. As for the state law claims, Kilpatrick and the City of\nDrew argued that Gibson failed to file a notice of claim in compliance with the\nMississippi Tort Claims Act (“MTCA”), so the claims were barred. See Miss.\nCode Ann. § 11-46-11 (2013). The court “reserved judgment” as to whether\nKilpatrick had violated Gibson’s constitutional rights and whether Kilpatrick\nwas entitled to qualified immunity; however, it entered judgment in the\ndefendants’ favor with respect to the state law tort claims. Kilpatrick moved for\nreconsideration of his qualified immunity defense, and the court held that\nKilpatrick was not entitled to qualified immunity because Gibson’s speech was\nprotected under the First Amendment and the right was clearly established.\n Kilpatrick timely appealed the district court’s summary judgment and\nreconsideration orders. Gibson timely cross-appealed the district court’s\ndismissal of his state law tort claim for malicious interference with employment.\nKilpatrick moved to dismiss the cross-appeal for lack of jurisdiction, and the\ncourt ordered that motion to be carried with the case.\n II. Qualified Immunity\nA. Standard of Review\n Typically, a party may not immediately appeal a district court’s decision\nto deny summary judgment, but the denial of a motion for summary judgment\nbased on qualified immunity is a collateral order capable of immediate review.\nBrown v. Strain, 663 F.3d 245, 248 (5th Cir. 2011). This court has jurisdiction\n\n\n 3\n The district court denied summary judgment as to both Kilpatrick and the City of\nDrew. Since the City of Drew is not party to this appeal, we do not address the municipal\nliability claim.\n\n 4\n\f Case: 12-60905 Document: 00512446675 Page: 5 Date Filed: 11/19/2013\n\n\n\n No. 12-60905\n\nover such an order only “to the extent that the district court’s order turns on an\nissue of law.” Kovacic v. Villarreal, 628 F.3d 209, 211 (5th Cir. 2010). We may\nnot review a district court’s decision to deny qualified immunity based on\nevidentiary sufficiency on an interlocutory appeal, because such a determination\nis not considered a “final decision.” Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 313 (1995);\nGobert v. Caldwell, 463 F.3d 339, 344 (5th Cir. 2006). This court “consider[s]\nonly whether the district court erred in assessing the legal significance of the\nconduct that the district court deemed sufficiently supported for purposes of\nsummary judgment.” Kinney v. Weaver, 367 F.3d 337, 348 (5th Cir. 2004) (en\nbanc). “Where factual disputes exist in an interlocutory appeal asserting\nqualified immunity, we accept the plaintiffs’ version of the facts as true.” Id. “In\nreviewing the district court’s conclusions concerning the legal consequences—the\nmateriality—of the facts, our review is of course de novo.” Id. at 349.\nB. Discussion\n To rebut a defendant’s qualified immunity defense, the plaintiff must\nshow: “(1) that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2)\nthat the right was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the challenged conduct.”\nAshcroft v. Al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2080 (2011) (citation omitted). A court may\nconsider either prong of the qualified immunity analysis first. Pearson v.\nCallahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009). We begin by addressing the first prong—\nwhether Kilpatrick’s reprimands violated Gibson’s First Amendment right to\nfree expression.\n The Supreme Court has long held that government employees are not\nstripped of their right to freedom of expression by virtue of their employment.\nConnick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 142 (1983); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S.\n563, 568 (1968). This right is not absolute, though, and we utilize a four-pronged\ntest to determine whether the speech of a public employee is entitled to\nconstitutional protection. See Juarez v. Aguilar, 666 F.3d 325, 332 (5th Cir.\n\n 5\n\f Case: 12-60905 Document: 00512446675 Page: 6 Date Filed: 11/19/2013\n\n\n\n No. 12-60905\n\n2011). A plaintiff must establish that: (1) he suffered an adverse employment\ndecision; (2) his speech involved a matter of public concern; (3) his interest in\nspeaking outweighed the governmental defendant’s interest in promoting\nefficiency; and (4) the protected speech motivated the defendant’s conduct. Id.\n(citations omitted). In 2006, the Supreme Court added what we have\ncharacterized as a “threshold layer” to the second prong of the retaliation test.\nSee Davis v. McKinney, 518 F.3d 304, 312 (5th Cir. 2008) (describing Garcetti v.\nCeballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006)). Under this prong, “when public employees make\nstatements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as\ncitizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate\ntheir communications from employer discipline.” Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421.\nWhile the court must consider factual circumstances to determine whether\nspeech is official, the determination is still a question of law. Charles v. Grief,\n522 F.3d 508, 513 n.17 (5th Cir. 2008). Functionally, this threshold layer has\ntransformed our test, inserting an additional prong at which we consider\nwhether the speech was pursuant to the employee’s duties or as a citizen.\n In this case, our analysis begins and ends at this new prong.4 Because\n\n\n\n 4\n Kilpatrick also argues that a reprimand is not an adverse employment action under\nthe first prong. We assume without deciding that a reprimand is an adverse employment\naction for the purposes of a § 1983 claim. While the Supreme Court has clarified that, under\nTitle VII, a plaintiff must prove that a reasonable employee would have found the alleged\nadverse employment action “materially adverse,” Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White,\n548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006), this court has not yet decided whether the Burlington standard for\nadverse employment actions also applies to First Amendment retaliation cases, see DePree v.\nSaunders, 588 F.3d 282, 288 (5th Cir. 2009) (explaining that this circuit has not “formally\napplied Burlington to First Amendment retaliation claims”). As for the third prong, Kilpatrick\ndid not challenge that in the district court, but the district court conducted a balancing of the\nparties’ interests and concluded that they favored Gibson. Kilpatrick does not raise this prong\nin his appeal. Regarding the fourth prong, Kilpatrick asserts that there are insufficient facts\nin the record to show that the speech motivated his conduct. We lack jurisdiction to consider\nKilpatrick’s arguments regarding the fourth prong, since issues regarding the sufficiency of\nevidence are factual issues that may not be considered in an interlocutory appeal. See Gobert,\n463 F.3d at 344.\n\n 6\n\f Case: 12-60905 Document: 00512446675 Page: 7 Date Filed: 11/19/2013\n\n\n\n No. 12-60905\n\nGibson’s report to law enforcement agencies was official speech, we must\nreverse.\n We turn first to the source of this new prong—Garcetti. In Garcetti, a\ndeputy district attorney reviewed an affidavit supporting a search warrant and\nconcluded that the affidavit contained misrepresentations. See 547 U.S. at\n413–14, 421. The attorney reported his concerns to his supervisors and provided\none with a memorandum. Id. at 414. The supervisors held a meeting on the\nmatter, but they decided to proceed with the prosecution despite the attorney’s\nconcerns. Id. The defense moved to challenge the warrant and called the\nattorney to testify at the hearing regarding his observations. Id. at 414–15. The\nattorney complied, allegedly prompting retaliation from his supervisors. Id.\n The Supreme Court concluded that the First Amendment did not shield\nthe attorney’s speech from discipline. The Court began its analysis by clarifying\nwhich facts were not dispositive. The fact that the attorney “expressed his views\ninside his office, rather than publicly,” did not render his speech unprotected,\nsince “[m]any citizens do much of their talking inside their respective\nworkplaces.” Id. at 420. Likewise, the fact that the “memo concerned the\nsubject matter of [the attorney’s] employment . . . is nondispositive. The First\nAmendment protects some expressions related to the speaker’s job.” Id. at 421\n(citations omitted). Ultimately, “the controlling factor . . . [was] that his\nexpressions were made pursuant to his duties as calendar deputy.” Id. As a\ncalendar deputy, it was his duty to advise his supervisors about how to proceed\nwith prosecutions, and the investigation of charges and preparation of\nmemoranda were part of his “daily professional activities.”5 Id. at 421–22.\n While Garcetti clearly added an additional inquiry into our freedom of\n\n\n 5\n The Supreme Court was not required to review findings of fact as to the scope of the\nattorney’s professional duties since it was undisputed that the attorney produced the\nmemorandum pursuant to his duties as a prosecutor. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421.\n\n 7\n\f Case: 12-60905 Document: 00512446675 Page: 8 Date Filed: 11/19/2013\n\n\n\n No. 12-60905\n\nexpression analysis, the Court “did not explicate what it means to speak\npursuant to one’s official duties, although we do know that a formal job\ndescription is not dispositive . . . [,] nor is speaking on the subject matter of one’s\nemployment.” Williams v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 480 F.3d 689, 692 (5th Cir.\n2007) (per curiam) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted) (hereinafter\n“Williams”). The Supreme Court acknowledged that Garcetti did not “articulate\na comprehensive framework for defining the scope of an employee’s duties in\ncases where there is room for serious debate,” thus signaling that lower courts\nmust flesh out the distinction between official and citizen speech. 547 U.S. at\n424. We have since undertaken this task.\n In Williams, we considered whether a memorandum sent by a school\nathletic director to a school principal about the misuse of athletic funds was\nofficial speech. 480 F.3d at 689–94. It was undisputed that the director was not\nrequired to write memoranda as part of his regular job duties, but we\nnonetheless held that his speech was made pursuant to his official duties. Id.\nat 693. We reasoned that “[a]ctivities undertaken in the course of performing\none’s job are activities pursuant to official duties.” Id. The memorandum\nconcerned matters immediately within his purview as the athletic director—the\nuse of funds for the school athletic teams and the related accounting procedures.\nThus, the speech was made as part of his official duties. Id. at 694.\n A year later, in Davis, we held that an information systems auditor spoke\npursuant to her official duties and as a citizen when she sent a complaint letter\nto her supervisors and to the Chancellor of the University of Texas. 518 F.3d at\n307–16. Davis worked for the university, and she conducted an audit of\nuniversity computers and discovered pornography. Id. at 307–08. Davis\napproached various administrators to address the issue, but she considered their\nresponse to be inadequate. Id. at 308–09. She sent a complaint letter to her\nimmediate supervisors and to the Chancellor, in which she noted that she had\n\n 8\n\f Case: 12-60905 Document: 00512446675 Page: 9 Date Filed: 11/19/2013\n\n\n\n No. 12-60905\n\nalso filed complaints with the FBI regarding possible child pornography and the\nEEOC about workplace discrimination. Id. at 309, 314. Since Davis’s\ncomplaints to the FBI and EEOC were clearly made outside of the chain of\ncommand, and since her duties as an auditor did not require that she\ncommunicate with law enforcement, we held that the complaints constituted\ncitizen speech. Id. at 316.\n Deciding whether the speech in the letter was made pursuant to Davis’s\nofficial duties required more careful deliberation since the letter discussed\nmultiple topics and had multiple recipients. Id. at 314. We considered\nadditional factors, including the relationship between the speech and the\nemployee’s job, whether the speech was made within the employee’s chain of\ncommand, and whether the speech stemmed from special knowledge the\nemployee gained as a result of the employee’s position. Id. A portion of Davis’s\nletter discussed the “inadequate response to her investigation of employees\naccessing pornography,” which we held amounted to official speech since it\ninvolved work that she had performed as part of her duties. Id. at 315–16.\nHowever, the remainder of the letter addressed university-wide discrimination,\nfavoritism, and the compensation of executives, which constituted citizen speech\nsince it did not concern Davis’s duties as an auditor. Id. at 316.\n In addition to our own precedent, Kilpatrick urges us to adopt the\nreasoning of the Ninth Circuit in Huppert v. City of Pittsburg, 574 F.3d 696 (9th\nCir. 2009), and apply it to Gibson’s speech. Huppert relied on a 1939 California\nappellate court decision to conclude, as a matter of law, that a police officer acted\npursuant to his official duties in cooperating with the FBI and testifying before\na grand jury. Id. at 706–10 (relying on Christal v. Police Comm’n of City and\nCnty. of S.F., 92 P.2d 416 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1939)). Kilpatrick advocates for\nthis analysis and argues that we may rely on Mississippi’s statutory definition\n\n\n\n 9\n\f Case: 12-60905 Document: 00512446675 Page: 10 Date Filed: 11/19/2013\n\n\n\n No. 12-60905\n\nof a law enforcement officer to define Gibson’s official duties as the Chief of\nPolice.6\n In a recent en banc decision, the Ninth Circuit overruled Huppert “to the\nextent that it improperly relied on a generic job description and failed to conduct\nthe ‘practical,’ fact-specific inquiry required by Garcetti.” Dahlia v. Rodriguez,\n— F.3d —, 2013 WL 4437594, at *7 (9th Cir. Aug. 21, 2013) (en banc). Garcetti\nclearly warned against the use of a written job description to define an\nemployee’s duties, explaining that\n Formal job descriptions often bear little resemblance to the duties\n an employee actually is expected to perform, and the listing of a\n given task in an employee’s written job description is neither\n necessary nor sufficient to demonstrate that conducting the task is\n within the scope of the employee’s professional duties for First\n Amendment purposes.\nGarcetti, 547 U.S. at 424–25. The Court was concerned that the use of a written\njob description might lead to “employers . . . [restricting] employees’ rights by\ncreating excessively broad job descriptions.” Id. at 424. In Dahlia, the Ninth\nCircuit held that Huppert’s reliance on “a broad court-created job description\napplicable to every member of a profession” was equally as problematic as\nrelying on an employer-created job description. 2013 WL 4437594, at *7.\n Yet, Huppert’s analysis raises a pertinent question—to what extent should\na court consider statutory duties of a police officer in identifying the scope of his\nor her official duties? Garcetti was concerned with courts limiting their analysis\nto the written description of an occupation, divorced from the actual function of\nthe employee. We have since interpreted Garcetti’s language as proscribing our\nexclusive reliance on an employer’s written description of duties when\n\n 6\n Mississippi law defines a law enforcement officer, which Gibson undoubtedly was, as\n“any person . . . whose primary responsibility is the prevention and detection of crime, the\napprehension of criminals[,] and the enforcement of the criminal and traffic laws of this state\nand/or the ordinances of any political subdivision thereof.” Miss. Code Ann. § 45-6-3(c).\n\n\n 10\n\f Case: 12-60905 Document: 00512446675 Page: 11 Date Filed: 11/19/2013\n\n\n\n No. 12-60905\n\nevaluating the merits of a First Amendment retaliation claim. See Williams v.\nRiley, 275 F. App’x 385, 389 (5th Cir. 2008) (unpublished) (per curiam)\n(hereinafter “Riley”). In Riley, jailers at a sheriff’s office reported their\nsupervisor’s abuse of an inmate. Id. at 387. The only facts in the record\nconcerning the jailers’ duty to report incidents of force came from a policy\nmanual; outside of the manual, the job duties of the jailers were “scarcely\nmentioned.” Id. at 389. We could have “presumed that an employee’s official job\nduties at a reasonable sheriff’s department would include reporting crimes\nperpetrated at work by department members,” but the record did not actually\ninclude such facts, so we remanded the case for further proceedings. Id. at\n389–90.\n Riley does not completely preclude the use of written job descriptions in\na First Amendment inquiry. In Davis, we expressly considered a university\nmemorandum that outlined the reporting procedures to be used by auditors in\norder to understand Davis’s duty to report as well as the chain of command. 518\nF.3d at 316. Unlike Riley, the record contained additional facts concerning the\nduties of auditors, so our analysis was not limited to the policy memorandum.\nThe memorandum was important to our determination that some of the speech\nin Davis’s letter to the Chancellor was official, thus showing that there is a\nproper place for the use of written descriptions of duties in a First Amendment\nretaliation analysis. Id.\n We decline to rely exclusively on a statutory description of a generic law\nenforcement officer to determine the scope of a specific police officer’s official\nduties. However, we do not exclude written descriptions of duties or statutory\ndefinitions from our analysis. In order to heed Garcetti’s admonition against\nsolely relying on the written description of an individual’s occupation, we will\nconsider Mississippi’s statutory language, viewing it as one factor among many.\nThis is consistent with our holding in Davis.\n\n 11\n\f Case: 12-60905 Document: 00512446675 Page: 12 Date Filed: 11/19/2013\n\n\n\n No. 12-60905\n\n Turning now to the present matter, the district court concluded that\nGibson had shown that Kilpatrick violated his First Amendment rights, and in\nso doing, explained that under Davis, Gibson’s reports constituted citizen speech.\nThe court supported this legal conclusion with the following facts: (1) Gibson\nreported his suspicions to agencies outside of his chain of command; (2) there\nwas no evidence to show that Gibson’s duties included making reports to the FBI\nor DEA; and (3) there was a lack of evidence regarding the context in which\nGibson reported his suspicions other than that the reports were confidential.7\nThese facts make this case superficially resemble this court’s decision in Davis.\n However, Gibson’s speech is complicated by additional factors not fully\ndiscussed by the district court. Although Gibson’s precise job description is not\ncontained in the record, we can consider surrounding facts to determine whether\nhis speech is related to any conceivable job duties. See Charles, 522 F.3d at 514.\nThe circumstances surrounding the incident, from how Gibson learned of the\nmisuse of the gasoline card to his involvement in the investigation, speak\nvolumes about his actual duties as the Chief of Police. First, Kilpatrick’s use of\nthe city gasoline card was brought to Gibson’s attention through a subordinate.\nThe fact that the complaint came to him in a professional capacity and through\nthe chain of command reveals that managing and responding to allegations of\nthe misuse of civic funds was likely within the scope of his employment. See\nDavis, 518 F.3d at 313 (citing Williams, 480 F.3d at 694) (considering whether\nthe speech reflects a “special knowledge” gained by virtue of one’s employment);\nsee also Briscoe v. Jefferson Cnty., 500 F. App’x 274, 278 (5th Cir. 2012)\n(unpublished) (per curiam) (holding that the appellant’s use of her “special\n\n\n 7\n The district court also held that, in the absence of evidence regarding Gibson’s duties,\nhe was “more likely involved [in] responding to complaints from private citizens than making\nthem himself.” However, this is speculation, and not based on facts in the record. We may not\nbase our decisions on presumptions, regardless of how logical they may be. See Riley, 275 F.\nApp’x at 389.\n\n 12\n\f Case: 12-60905 Document: 00512446675 Page: 13 Date Filed: 11/19/2013\n\n\n\n No. 12-60905\n\nknowledge” of a record-keeping policy in order to substantiate a complaint is a\nfactor indicating that her speech was official).\n Second, Gibson’s decision to report to agencies outside of his chain of\ncommand does not necessarily show that he spoke as a citizen. Given his\nposition, there was arguably no one else to whom Gibson could confidentially\nreport the information. Gibson was the “chief law enforcement officer,” see Miss.\nCode Ann. § 21-21-1, and according to the district court’s findings of fact, the\nonly entities to which he could have reported within the chain of command were\nKilpatrick and the Board. Reporting to Kilpatrick—the suspected\nperpetrator—clearly was undesirable, while reporting to the Board might have\nrequired public disclosure of Gibson’s suspicions, perhaps endangering the\nsubsequent investigation. Indeed, it appears that once Board members learned\nof the investigation, one of them informed Kilpatrick. The state agencies Gibson\ncontacted may well have been the most appropriate entities to receive the\ninformation, a fact other courts have found instructive. See Patterson v. City of\nEarlington, 650 F. Supp. 2d 674, 680 (W.D. Ky. 2009) (holding that a police\nchief’s report of a mayor’s alleged election law violations to state police is not\nprotected because state police were the most appropriate authority to carry out\nthe investigation); Mantle v. City of Country Club Hills, No. 4:07-CV-55 (CEJ),\n2008 WL 3853432, at *4 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 15, 2008) (holding that a police chief’s\nreport of a mayor’s criminal conduct to a municipal court judge is not protected\nbecause the police chief had no departmental supervisor and the judge was the\nmost appropriate authority to whom he could report).8\n\n 8\n Kilpatrick argues that Gibson’s decision to contact individuals at the FBI and DEA\nwith whom he had previously worked indicates that he went through professional channels\nto make the report. However, this is unpersuasive. Gibson could have contacted these\nindividuals because he had a personal relationship with them by virtue of the fact that they\nmet while working together, which would indicate that the speech was private. It is also\npossible that these were the only people that Gibson could contact due to a limited regional\npresence of these federal agencies. We simply do not know. Since there is little evidence as\n\n 13\n\f Case: 12-60905 Document: 00512446675 Page: 14 Date Filed: 11/19/2013\n\n\n\n No. 12-60905\n\n Third, it appears that Gibson was able to monitor Kilpatrick’s use of the\ngasoline card only because Kilpatrick was required to come to the police\ndepartment to collect it. Gibson fully took advantage of the authority afforded\nto him as Chief of Police, and he instructed his police officers to participate in\nthe investigation by monitoring Kilpatrick’s activities; he even sent a copy of the\nofficial police logs to the OSA. Although Gibson does not allege that his\nparticipation in the investigation is protected, we consider his involvement\nbecause it reflects his actual authority and ability to investigate and detect\ncrime. It supports our conclusion that Gibson was acting as a law enforcement\nofficer doing his job, not as a private citizen fulfilling his civic duty.\n Finally, Mississippi law reinforces what the facts surrounding the\ninvestigation show—that his “primary responsibility [was] the prevention and\ndetection of crime . . . [and] the apprehension of criminals.” See Miss. Code Ann.\n§ 45-6-3(c). Gibson, as Chief of Police, was the City of Drew’s “chief law\nenforcement officer” and had “control and supervision of all police officers\nemployed by” the city. Id. § 21-21-1. While we are not exclusively relying on the\nstatute’s definition to understand the duties of the Chief of Police, the statute\nweighs in favor of finding Gibson’s speech as part of his professional\nresponsibilities.\n Gibson’s argument that reporting illegal activity is the duty of all citizens,\nand therefore must constitute protected citizen speech, does not alter our\nconclusion. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 419 (“So long as employees are speaking as\ncitizens about matters of public concern, they must face only those speech\nrestrictions that are necessary for their employers to operate efficiently and\neffectively.”). Other courts have rightly rejected similar arguments. In\nparticular, the D.C. Circuit in Bowie v. Maddox stated that:\n\n\nto how Gibson knew these individuals and why he contacted them, we cannot say that this fact\nweighs in favor of either official or citizen speech.\n\n 14\n\f Case: 12-60905 Document: 00512446675 Page: 15 Date Filed: 11/19/2013\n\n\n\n No. 12-60905\n\n The critical question under Garcetti is not whether the speech at\n issue has a civilian analogue, but whether it was performed\n “pursuant to . . . official duties.” A test that allows a First\n Amendment retaliation claim to proceed whenever the government\n employee can identify a civilian analogue for his speech is about as\n useful as a mosquito net made of chicken wire: [a]ll official speech,\n viewed at a sufficient level of abstraction, has a civilian analogue.\n653 F.3d 45, 48 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (citations omitted). Gibson’s argument\nfunctionally reads an unsupported exception into Garcetti’s holding that “when\npublic employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the\nemployees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the\nConstitution does not insulate their communications from employer discipline.”\n547 U.S. at 421. He would reverse this language, and instead of looking to\nwhether statements were made as part of an employee’s official duties, he would\nask only whether the speech could be classified as citizen speech and, if so, end\nthe inquiry. This is not Garcetti’s holding. See Bowie, 653 F.3d at 48.\n Gibson acted as the Chief of Police when he contacted various federal and\nstate law enforcement agencies to report misuse of the city gasoline card.\nBecause we conclude that Gibson acted pursuant to his official job duties in\nmaking the reports, we need not consider the remaining prongs of the First\nAmendment retaliation test, since he cannot show that Kilpatrick violated his\nFirst Amendment rights. In the absence of such a showing, Gibson cannot\novercome Kilpatrick’s qualified immunity defense. Thus, the district court erred\nin denying Kilpatrick’s motion for summary judgment premised on qualified\nimmunity, and we reverse.\n III. Motion to Dismiss\n The district court dismissed Gibson’s tort claims without prejudice for\nfailure to comply with the MTCA notice requirement. Gibson cross-appeals,\narguing that the district court erred in dismissing his malicious interference\nwith employment claim, but he does not appeal the dismissal with respect to his\n\n 15\n\f Case: 12-60905 Document: 00512446675 Page: 16 Date Filed: 11/19/2013\n\n\n\n No. 12-60905\n\nother tort claims. Kilpatrick moved to dismiss this appeal for want of\njurisdiction. We agree. See Finch v. Fort Bend Indep. Sch. Dist., 333 F.3d 555,\n565 (5th Cir. 2003) (declining to exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction over a\nstate law tort claim in an interlocutory appeal of the district court’s order\ndenying qualified immunity). Accordingly, we grant Kilpatrick’s motion to\ndismiss Gibson’s cross-appeal for lack of jurisdiction.\n IV. Conclusion\n For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE the district court’s order denying\nKilpatrick’s motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity and\nGRANT the motion to dismiss Gibson’s cross-appeal for lack of jurisdiction.\nFinally, we REMAND the case to the district court for further proceedings\nconsistent with this opinion. Gibson shall bear the costs of this appeal.\n\n\n\n\n 16\n\f", "ocr": false, "opinion_id": 2643133 } ]
Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
F
USA, Federal
1,219,650
Hendley, Sutin, Wood
1976-02-03
false
state-v-aragon
Aragon
State v. Aragon
STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Richard F. ARAGON, Jr., Defendant-Appellant
Clyde E. Sullivan, Jr., Albuquerque, N. M., for defendant-appellant., Toney Anaya, Atty. Gen., F. Scott MacGillivray, Asst. Atty. Gen., Santa Fe, N.M., for plaintiff-appellee.
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
Certiorari Denied March 9, 1976.
null
null
29
Published
null
<citation id="b127-8" pgmap="127"> 547 P.2d 574 </citation><br><parties id="b127-9" pgmap="127"> STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Richard F. ARAGON, Jr., Defendant-Appellant. </parties><br><docketnumber id="b127-11" pgmap="127"> No. 2175. </docketnumber><br><court id="b127-12" pgmap="127"> Court of Appeals of New Mexico. </court><br><decisiondate id="b127-13" pgmap="127"> Feb. 3, 1976. </decisiondate><br><otherdate id="b127-14" pgmap="127"> Certiorari Denied March 9, 1976. </otherdate><br><attorneys id="b129-11" pgmap="129"> Clyde E. Sullivan, Jr., Albuquerque, N. M., for defendant-appellant. </attorneys><br><attorneys id="b129-13" pgmap="129"> Toney Anaya, Atty. Gen., F. Scott MacGillivray, Asst. Atty. Gen., Santa Fe, N.M., for plaintiff-appellee. </attorneys>
[ "547 P.2d 574", "89 N.M. 91" ]
[ { "author_str": "Wood", "per_curiam": false, "type": "010combined", "page_count": null, "download_url": null, "author_id": null, "opinion_text": "\n547 P.2d 574 (1976)\n89 N.M. 91\nSTATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee,\nv.\nRichard F. ARAGON, Jr., Defendant-Appellant.\nNo. 2175.\nCourt of Appeals of New Mexico.\nFebruary 3, 1976.\nCertiorari Denied March 9, 1976.\n*576 Clyde E. Sullivan, Jr., Albuquerque, N.M., for defendant-appellant.\nToney Anaya, Atty. Gen., F. Scott MacGillivray, Asst. Atty. Gen., Santa Fe, N.M., for plaintiff-appellee.\n\nOPINION\nWOOD, Chief Judge.\nConvicted of trafficking in heroin, defendant appeals. Section 54-11-20, N.M.S.A. 1953 (Repl.Vol. 8, pt. 2, Supp. 1975). There was substantial evidence to support the conviction. Because we remand for a new trial, we discuss four of the issues: (1) sufficiency of search warrant description; (2) scope of the search; (3) double jeopardy, and (4) coercive conduct by the trial court.\n\nSufficiency of the Search Warrant\nPolice officers searched defendant's premises pursuant to a search warrant. Defendant moved to suppress certain evidence on the basis that the warrant did not sufficiently describe the premises to be searched. At the evidentiary hearing it was shown that the warrant contained two errors. The color of the residence was wrong; the street number of the residence was wrong. Because of these errors defendant claims the trial court erred in refusing to hold the warrant invalid and in failing to suppress the evidence.\nState v. Sero, 82 N.M. 17, 474 P.2d 503 (Ct.App. 1970) states that \"a description is sufficient if the officer can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended to be searched... . The description, however, must be such that the officer is enabled to locate the place to be searched with certainty... . The description `* * * should identify the premises in such manner as to leave the officer no doubt and no discretion as to the premises to be searched. * * *'\"\nApart from the two errors, the warrant described the residence as having a green pitched roof, located on the west side of Perry Road, facing east and the fourth residence north of Blake Road on the west side of Perry Road. \"Located directly behind this residence is a chicken coupe [sic] type structure constructed of unpainted wood and chicken wire which contains numerous pigeons.\" The warrant states the residence was the only one in the immediate area which has a chicken coop containing pigeons behind it and that the chicken coop structure was plainly visible from Perry Road.\nThe requirements of Sero, supra, were met.\n\nScope of the Search\nThe warrant authorized a search of defendant and the residence. \"Also to be *577 searched is the curtilage area around the above described residence\". Generally speaking, \"curtilage\" is the enclosed space of grounds and buildings immediately surrounding a dwelling house. Black's Law Dictionary (4th Ed., 1951).\nThe curtilage in this case was fenced. The heroin was not found within the curtilage. The heroin was found in a tin can which was bent closed, lying on top of some weeds, \"right up against the fence,\" but on the outside of the fence. The heroin was physically located on property upon which there was an unoccupied house described as abandoned.\nDefendant contends the heroin should have been suppressed because \"during the execution of the warrant the search was extended beyond the scope of the permissible boundaries as deliniated [sic] by the language of the warrant\". Defendant contends that seizure of heroin found beyond the curtilage was unlawful.\nThe area outside the fence was not part of the curtilage in this case. See Hunsucker v. State, 475 P.2d 618 (Okl.Cr. 1970). Thus, we agree with defendant that the heroin was found and seized outside the curtilage, and that the warrant did not authorize a search outside the curtilage. This, however, does not make seizure of the heroin unlawful.\nDuring the course of a lawful search within the curtilage, an officer saw the tin can outside the fence. The can was viewed from a place the officer had a right to be under the warrant. See State v. Miller, 80 N.M. 227, 453 P.2d 590 (Ct. App. 1969). The can was not discovered as a result of an illegal search.\nThe constitutional prohibition is directed to unreasonable searches and seizures so that people may be secure in their \"persons, houses, papers and effects\". U.S.Const., Amend. IV; Compare N.M.Const., Art. II, § 10. The constitutional provision does not apply to items viewed in an open field. Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 44 S. Ct. 445, 68 L. Ed. 898 (1924); People v. Reed, 210 Cal. App. 2d 80, 26 Cal. Rptr. 428 (1962). Even if the location of the heroin could not be considered an \"open\" field because of the weeds, nevertheless the heroin was on unoccupied property. Defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy as to this location. The constitutional prohibition does not apply. Patler v. Slayton, 503 F.2d 472 (4th Cir.1974); United States v. Brown, 473 F.2d 952 (5th Cir.1973); Casey v. State, 87 Nev. 413, 488 P.2d 546 (1971).\nEven if the constitutional prohibition should apply, under the circumstances of this case, it was not unreasonable to seize the tin can found up against, but outside, the fence and to open the can to examine its contents. Surveillance by officers prior to issuance of the search warrant gave the officers probable cause to believe that heroin was hidden outside the residence. There is evidence that there was a path within the curtilage to the fenced area where the heroin was found.\n\nDouble Jeopardy\nDefendant was convicted at a second trial; his first trial ended in a mistrial. Defendant contends his second trial subjected him to double jeopardy because there was no \"manifest necessity\" for the mistrial.\nDuring the first trial the State sought to introduce an oral statement which defendant made shortly after the heroin was found. Defendant objected on the ground there was no showing that defendant had been advised of his rights prior to making the statement. This objection was framed as a \"constitutional ground\". The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing outside the hearing of the jury and suppressed defendant's statement. After suppressing the statement, the trial court granted the State's motion for a mistrial.\nThe mistrial order states:\n\"This Court finds that a mistrial is necessitated by the failure of Defendant to properly and timely file motion to suppress oral statements prior to commencement *578 of trial, and raising of such motion for the first time during trial (contrary to local court rule) constituted prejudice to the State, and created a manifest necessity for mistrial upon the State's motion for same.\"\nIn seeking a mistrial, the State contended the defense had deliberately failed to timely move to suppress the oral statement prior to trial in order to cut off the State's right to appeal an adverse ruling. Defendant points out that the record does not show the State attempted to take an appeal (see § 21-10-2.1(B)(2), N.M.S.A. 1953 (Repl.Vol. 4, Supp. 1975)), and therefore there was no manifest necessity for the mistrial.\nIn addition, defendant asserts there is no showing that the State complied with defendant's request for discovery and, therefore, the State, rather than defendant, is at fault for the late motion. Because of this asserted fault by the State, defendant argues that there could be no manifest necessity for a mistrial.\nThe record shows that defendant did request discovery pursuant to Rule of Criminal Procedure 27. The record does not show that any procedures were held in connection with the asserted failure of the State to make discovery. See Rule of Criminal Procedure 27(d). Nor, during the hearing leading to the mistrial order, was any mention made of the asserted failure of the State to comply with any discovery rule. The \"discovery\" contention is spurious; it will not be considered further.\nThe record supports defendant's claim that the State did not attempt to appeal the ruling excluding defendant's oral statement. Compare, United States v. Moon, 491 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir.1974). We decline to hold there was a manifest necessity for the mistrial based on a right to appeal when no appeal was attempted. This, however, does not dispose of the double jeopardy claim.\nIn determining whether a mistrial should be declared, the trial court must consider whether the ends of public justice would be defeated by carrying the first trial to a final verdict. This consideration for the ends of public justice is a concept separate from manifest necessity. State v. De Baca, 88 N.M. 454, 541 P.2d 634 (Ct. App. 1975).\nState v. Helker, 88 N.M. 650, 545 P.2d 1028 (Ct.App.) decided December 2, 1975, held that the trial court could properly refuse to hear a motion to suppress that was untimely under Rule of Criminal Procedure 18(c). Helker, supra, had not been decided when defendant moved to suppress during the trial. The trial court felt it was required, constitutionally, to conduct an evidentiary hearing even though the motion was untimely. Yet, in so proceeding, the trial court ruled that the State was prejudiced by the untimeliness of the motion. The State was in fact prejudiced, because as Helker, supra, points out, the purpose of the rule providing for a timely motion to suppress is to eliminate from the trial disputes over police conduct not immediately relevant to the question of guilt.\nUnited States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 91 S. Ct. 547, 27 L. Ed. 2d 543 (1971) points out that in considering whether a mistrial was proper \"unquestionably an important factor to be considered is the need to hold litigants on both sides to standards of responsible professional conduct in the clash of an adversary criminal process.\"\nThe failure of defendant to file a timely motion to suppress resulted in prejudice to the State. In such circumstances, it would be contrary to the ends of public justice to carry the first trial to a final verdict. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in declaring a mistrial; there was no double jeopardy. United States v. Jorn, supra; State v. De Baca, supra.\n\nCoercive Conduct by the Trial Court\nThe jury retired to consider its verdict at 3:10 p.m. At 6:30 p.m. the jury was returned to the courtroom. The trial court inquired how they stood numerically. The foreman answered: \"Seven, four, one.\" *579 The trial court sent the jury to dinner with instructions to resume deliberations upon completing the meal. At midnight the court decided to give an additional instruction over defendant's objection. The jury was returned to the courtroom and asked how it stood numerically. The answer: \"Eleven to one.\" The additional instruction, among other things stated:\n\"... and if the larger number of your panel are for conviction, a dissenting juror should consider whether a doubt in his own mind is a reasonable one that makes no impression on the minds of so many men, equally honest, equally intelligent, with himself, who have heard the same evidence, with the same attention, with an equal desire to arrive at the truth, and under the sanction of the same oath.\"\nThe trial court told the jury to pay \"very close attention\" to the instruction and stated that the instruction was written \"so that you may have it with you, and use it in your further deliberations.\" Thereafter, sometime after midnight the jury resumed its deliberations. At 12:25 a.m. the jury returned a guilty verdict.\nThe additional instruction, known as the shotgun, was criticized by this Court in State v. Minns, 80 N.M. 269, 454 P.2d 355 (Ct.App. 1969). However, the Supreme Court continued its approval of the shotgun in State v. Cranford, 83 N.M. 294, 491 P.2d 511 (1971), cert. denied 409 U.S. 854, 93 S. Ct. 190, 34 L. Ed. 2d 98 (1972). Accordingly, we do not consider the additional instruction, standing alone, to be error. We consider the instruction in relation to the court's inquiry as to the numerical division of the jurors.\nIn State v. Nelson, 63 N.M. 428, 321 P.2d 202 (1958) defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree. During selection of the jury, each juror answered that in a proper case he would not be opposed to capital punishment. The jury deliberated at length before returning a guilty verdict. During their deliberations the jury was returned to the courtroom. The trial court inquired as to how the jurors stood numerically and was informed that the division was eleven to one. The trial court reminded the jurors of their answers on voir dire concerning capital punishment and then gave the shotgun instruction. Nelson, supra, states: \"... the instruction became a lecture to the one juror as to his duty to consider the attitude of the eleven as to first degree murder... . The instruction could have had no influence whatever on the eleven jurors.\"\nNelson, supra, holds that repeated reminders of the trial court to the jury of statements made by them on voir dire was coercive and reversible error. However, the opinion also states: \"... any one of these statements made by the court, which could have affected one juror only, was error.\"\nPirch v. Firestone Tire &amp; Rubber Co., 80 N.M. 323, 455 P.2d 189 (Ct.App. 1969) used the same decisional method as Nelson, supra. In Pirch the trial court (1) inquired as to how the jurors were numerically divided, (2) gave an additional instruction without cautioning jurors not to surrender their honest convictions in order to arrive at a verdict, and (3) imposed a time limit on further deliberations with the threat of a mistrial if a verdict was not reached within that time limit. Reversal was on the basis that the cumulative effect of the trial court's actions resulted in coercion.\nThe jury had been deliberating from 3:10 p.m. until midnight, with a break for dinner. The trial court inquired and was informed that the numerical division was eleven to one. It then gave the shotgun instruction over defendant's objection. This instruction was a lecture to one juror. State v. Nelson, supra. Within twenty-five minutes of this lecture, a guilty verdict was returned. On the authority of Nelson, supra, and Pirch, supra, we hold that the inquiry as to numerical division followed by the shotgun instruction *580 was coercive conduct requiring reversal.\nAlthough our decision in this case is based on a combination of circumstances, we point out that the United States Supreme Court has held that inquiry as to the numerical division of a jury is error in itself.\nIn 1905, Burton v. United States, 196 U.S. 283, 25 S. Ct. 243, 49 L. Ed. 482, condemned the practice of inquiring as to the numerical division of jurors. The opinion states that such a practice ought not to grow up because it was not material for the court to know the numerical division. \"... [W]e do not think that the proper administration of the law requires such knowledge or permits such a question on the part of the presiding judge.\"\nThere was disagreement as to whether noncompliance with the comment in Burton, supra, amounted to reversible error. This disagreement was resolved in 1926 in Brasfield v. United States, 272 U.S. 448, 47 S. Ct. 135, 71 L. Ed. 345. The trial court inquired as to numerical division and was informed that the jurors stood nine to three. Brasfield, states:\n\"We deem it essential to the fair and impartial conduct of the trial that the inquiry itself should be regarded as ground for reversal.\"\n* * * * * *\n\"The failure of petitioners' counsel to particularize an exception to the court's inquiry does not preclude this court from correcting the error... . This is especially the case where the error, as here, affects the proper relations of the court to the jury, and cannot be effectively remedied by modification of the judge's charge after the harm has been done.\"\nCompare, Amos v. United States, 496 F.2d 1269 (8th Cir.1974).\nBecause the error goes to a \"fair and impartial\" trial, the error violates due process. Accordingly, Brasfield v. United States, supra, applies to New Mexico courts.\nAlthough Brasfield, supra, was decided fifty years ago, it appears that it has been little noted by either courts or counsel in New Mexico. See State v. Romero, 86 N.M. 674, 526 P.2d 816 (Ct.App. 1974). Accordingly, we give prospective application to the rule that inquiry into the numerical division of jurors is reversible error. State v. Jones, 44 N.M. 623, 107 P.2d 324 (1940); see State ex rel. Apodaca v. Fiorina, 83 N.M. 663, 495 P.2d 1379 (1972), cert. denied 416 U.S. 935, 94 S. Ct. 1932, 40 L. Ed. 2d 285 (1974). The rule will be applied in all cases where an inquiry into the numerical division occurs after the date of this decision. Compare Vallo v. State Board of Health and Social Services, 84 N.M. 220, 501 P.2d 664 (Ct.App. 1972). Inquiries into numerical division occurring prior to the date of this decision will be reviewed under the approach taken in State v. Nelson, supra, and Pirch v. Firestone Tire &amp; Rubber Co., supra.\nOral argument is unnecessary. Because of coercive conduct by the trial court, the judgment and sentence are reversed. The case is remanded for a new trial.\nIT IS SO ORDERED.\nHENDLEY and SUTIN, JJ., concur.\n", "ocr": false, "opinion_id": 1219650 } ]
New Mexico Court of Appeals
New Mexico Court of Appeals
SA
New Mexico, NM
2,643,946
Canby, Thomas, Trott
2013-11-25
false
jinxiang-zhang-v-eric-holder-jr
null
Jinxiang Zhang v. Eric Holder, Jr.
JINXIANG ZHANG, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General, Respondent
Jinxiang Zhang, San Gabriel, CA, pro se., Jesse Lloyd Busen, Trial, Oil, DOJ— U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, Chief Counsel Ice, Office of the Chief Counsel Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent.
Agency
null
null
null
null
null
null
Submitted Nov. 19, 2013.*
null
null
0
Unpublished
null
<parties id="b731-17"> JINXIANG ZHANG, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General, Respondent. </parties><br><docketnumber id="b731-20"> No. 11-73283. </docketnumber><br><court id="b731-21"> United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit. </court><br><otherdate id="b731-22"> Submitted Nov. 19, 2013. <a class="footnote" href="#fn*" id="fn*_ref"> * </a> </otherdate><br><decisiondate id="b731-23"> Filed Nov. 25, 2013. </decisiondate><br><attorneys id="b731-24"> Jinxiang Zhang, San Gabriel, CA, pro se. </attorneys><br><attorneys id="b731-25"> Jesse Lloyd Busen, Trial, Oil, DOJ— U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, Chief Counsel Ice, Office of the Chief <span citation-index="1" class="star-pagination" label="710"> *710 </span> Counsel Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent. </attorneys><br><judges id="b732-5"> Before: CANBY, TROTT, and THOMAS, Circuit Judges. </judges><div class="footnotes"><div class="footnote" id="fn*" label="*"> <a class="footnote" href="#fn*_ref"> * </a> <p id="b731-26"> The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. <em> See </em> Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2). </p> </div></div>
[ "545 F. App'x 709" ]
[ { "author_str": null, "per_curiam": false, "type": "010combined", "page_count": 3, "download_url": "http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/memoranda/2013/11/25/11-73283.pdf", "author_id": null, "opinion_text": " FILED\n NOT FOR PUBLICATION NOV 25 2013\n\n MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS\n\n\n\n FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT\n\n\nJINXIANG ZHANG, No. 11-73283\n\n Petitioner, Agency No. A088-291-234\n\n v.\n MEMORANDUM*\nERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General,\n\n Respondent.\n\n\n On Petition for Review of an Order of the\n Board of Immigration Appeals\n\n Submitted November 19, 2013**\n\nBefore: CANBY, TROTT, and THOMAS, Circuit Judges.\n\n Jinxiang Zhang, a native and citizen of China, petitions pro se for review of\n\nthe Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing his appeal from an\n\nimmigration judge’s decision denying his application for asylum, withholding of\n\nremoval, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). Our\n\n\n *\n This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent\nexcept as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.\n **\n The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision\nwithout oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).\n\fjurisdiction is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial evidence\n\nthe agency’s factual findings, applying the standards governing adverse credibility\n\ndeterminations created by the REAL ID Act. Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034,\n\n1039-40 (9th Cir. 2010). We deny in part and dismiss in part the petition for\n\nreview.\n\n The record does not compel the conclusion that Zhang established changed\n\nor extraordinary circumstances to excuse the delay in filing his asylum application.\n\nSee 8 C.F.R. § 1208.4(a)(4), (a)(5). Accordingly, Zhang’s asylum claim fails.\n\n Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s adverse credibility finding based on\n\nZhang’s omission of a 1984 beating and detention from the written statement he\n\nsubmitted in support of his asylum claim, see Zamonov v. Holder, 649 F.3d 969,\n\n974 (9th Cir. 2011), inconsistencies between his testimony and documentary\n\nevidence regarding his wife’s employment, and the implausibility of his fear of\n\nsterilization if he returned to China, see Shrestha, 590 F.3d at 1048 (totality of the\n\ncircumstances supported adverse credibility determination). In the absence of\n\ncredible testimony, Zhang’s withholding of removal claim fails. See Farah v.\n\nAshcroft, 348 F.3d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 2003). In light of this credibility\n\ndetermination, we do not address Zhang’s contentions regarding the merits of his\n\nclaim.\n\n\n 2 11-73283\n\f Finally, we lack jurisdiction to consider Zhang’s CAT claim because he did\n\nnot exhaust this claim before the BIA. See Barron v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 674, 677-\n\n78 (9th Cir. 2004).\n\n PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part, DISMISSED in part.\n\n\n\n\n 3 11-73283\n\f", "ocr": false, "opinion_id": 2643946 } ]
Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
F
USA, Federal
2,574,272
Heyburn
2003-06-16
false
johnson-v-galen-health-institutes-inc
null
Johnson v. Galen Health Institutes, Inc.
Wanda JOHNSON, Plaintiff, v. GALEN HEALTH INSTITUTES, INC. D/B/A the Health Institute of Louisville, Defendant
Elizabeth Nugent Monohan, Kathryn A. Quesenberry, Woodward, Hobson & Fulton, Louisville, KY, for defendant., Sean Ragland, Bolus & Ragland, Louisville, KY, for plaintiff.
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
8
Published
null
<parties id="b719-4"> Wanda JOHNSON, Plaintiff, v. GALEN HEALTH INSTITUTES, INC. d/b/a The Health Institute of Louisville, Defendant. </parties><br><docketnumber id="b719-7"> No. CIV.A.3:02CV-243-H. </docketnumber><br><court id="b719-8"> United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky. </court><br><decisiondate id="b719-10"> June 16, 2003. </decisiondate><br><attorneys id="b720-17"> <span citation-index="1" class="star-pagination" label="680"> *680 </span> Elizabeth Nugent Monohan, Kathryn A. Quesenberry, Woodward, Hobson &amp; Fulton, Louisville, KY, for defendant. </attorneys><br><attorneys id="b720-18"> Sean Ragland, Bolus &amp; Ragland, Louisville, KY, for plaintiff. </attorneys>
[ "267 F. Supp. 2d 679" ]
[ { "author_str": "Heyburn", "per_curiam": false, "type": "010combined", "page_count": null, "download_url": null, "author_id": 1442, "opinion_text": "\n267 F.Supp.2d 679 (2003)\nWanda JOHNSON, Plaintiff,\nv.\nGALEN HEALTH INSTITUTES, INC. d/b/a The Health Institute of Louisville, Defendant.\nNo. CIV.A.3:02CV-243-H.\nUnited States District Court, W.D. Kentucky.\nJune 16, 2003.\n*680 Elizabeth Nugent Monohan, Kathryn A. Quesenberry, Woodward, Hobson &amp; Fulton, Louisville, KY, for defendant.\nSean Ragland, Bolus &amp; Ragland, Louisville, KY, for plaintiff.\n\n\n*681 MEMORANDUM OPINION\nHEYBURN, Chief Judge.\nPlaintiff Wanda Johnson alleges that Defendant Galen Health Institutes, Inc. d/b/a the Health Institute of Louisville (\"HIL\") violated Title IX of the federal Civil Rights Act of 1972, which prohibits gender discrimination in federally funded educational institutions.[1] First, under § 901, she asserts that HIL discriminated against her by exhibiting deliberate indifference to known sex discrimination.[2] Second, Johnson asserts that her expulsion amounts to retaliation also prohibited by § 901. Defendant HIL moved for summary judgment, arguing that all of Johnson's theories fail. This case requires the Court to consider several novel legal questions in light of the Supreme Court's recent opinions in Gebser v. Logo Vista Indep. School Dist, 524 U.S. 274, 118 S.Ct. 1989, 141 L.Ed.2d 277 (1998), and Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 121 S.Ct. 1511, 149 L.Ed.2d 517 (2001), delineating the tests for sexual discrimination under Title IX and implied private rights of action, respectively.\nAfter carefully considering all issues, the Court holds that Johnson has not adequately pled the hostile environment aspect of her sexual discrimination claim under Title IX and that, furthermore, the quid pro quo element of her claim also fails because she has not shown that HIL had notice of the activity. On the other hand, the Court concludes that the Department of Education has reasonably construed § 901 of Title IX to forbid retaliation to the extent that this prohibition is premised on opposition to intentional discrimination. This prohibition is therefore enforceable via the existing implied private right of action under that section. The Court need not analyze whether a separate implied private right of action exists and Plaintiffs claim for retaliation may proceed.[3]\n\nI.\nThe facts in this case, although somewhat disputed at critical points, are relatively straightforward. Plaintiff Wanda *682 Johnson is a 44 year-old woman and a former student at the Health Institute of Louisville (\"HIL\"). During October 2000, she enrolled in HIL to complete the academic requirements to become a licensed practical nurse. By the summer of 2001, when Johnson began her third quarter, she took a month-long class with Nurse Instructor Donte Wheat. The course included a weekly three-hour classroom lecture and one day of clinical work at Kosair Children's Hospital (\"Kosair\").\nDuring this month, Johnson claims Wheat made several comments and physically touched her in ways that made her exceedingly uncomfortable and unable to focus on her education. The specifics of her claim are important. First, Johnson says that on the days she worked at Kosair, Wheat required the students to sit with him in the cafeteria. She says that each day, she sat down first and he would come sit next to her. Allegedly, he would press his leg up against the side of hers under the crowded table. This happened on at least four occasions. She says, she moved her leg away and he would try and scoot over to touch her again. Similarly, she alleges that once while they were on an elevator, Wheat pressed the front of his body against her back. Second, Johnson claims that several of Wheat's comments in class were entirely inappropriate. She says he \"almost all the time\" referred to breasts as \"boobies\" and \"cha-chas,\" the buttocks as the \"ass,\" and at least once called the penis \"dick.\" Johnson says this was offensive and degrading to her. These remarks occurred during the twicea-week lectures. Third, she alleges that on one occasion, Johnson was demonstrating electrocution therapy and asked the class where the human body would most strongly feel the shock. Students responded that it would be felt by the hands, the feet, and other extremities. Wheat apparently told them they were all wrong and said the correct answer was \"the dick\" and said that the thought of that put him in pain.\nFurthermore, Johnson alleges that on the last day of her' clinical at Kosair, Wheat sexually propositioned her. She says that she made a mistake while assessing a patient's blood pressure and that this incited Wheat's alleged bad temper. He apparently exclaimed, \"What makes you think you have the luxury of making mistakes?\" He then reached for her arm, put one hand on her elbow and another on her shoulder. She claims she turned away from him and he reached across with one arm to turn her back. She responded, \"I'm not interested.\" He replied \"That's the wrong answer to give on the last day of clinical.\" It is undisputed that he failed her. At her subsequent evaluation meeting, Wheat told her she failed because she gave the wrong answer to \"one question.\" When she asked which one, he responded, \"You know what question it is.\" Additionally, it also appears that Wheat initially gave Johnson a satisfactory evaluation but then later changed it after this event. Wheat vehemently disputes Johnson's interpretation of this incident and contends he never sexually propositioned her.\nShortly after these events, for reasons not entirely clear, Wheat left HIL. Johnson contends Wheat left because he was frustrated by the horrible evaluations students gave him. Wheat has not provided a response. In any event, HIL says that Johnson allegedly began circulating rumors that Wheat left because she filed a complaint against him with the Kentucky Commission on Human Rights (\"KCHR\"). Johnson says the KCHR told Johnson not to discuss her complaint and that she did not circulate rumors. Somehow, though, it appears that it was common knowledge among Johnson's classmates that Johnson *683 had taken some form of action against Wheat.\nWhen HIL President Michael Hendricks learned about these rumors, he called Johnson to his office for a meeting. At that meeting Johnson told Wheat that she had filed charges against Wheat with the Kentucky Commission for Human Rights (\"KCHR\"), but refused to tell him what Wheat had allegedly done. Hendricks said KCHR had not contacted him and that he was concerned she was instead spreading rumors because Wheat failed her. Hendricks asked Johnson to bring him proof that she complained to KCHR or she would be subject to dismissal for dishonesty under HIL's Code of Conduct. Because she allegedly never provided such documentation, HIL held a Code of Conduct hearing and expelled Johnson for dishonesty.\nJohnson's account is quite different. She claims that after Wheat failed her, she first called the police and said she was being sexually harassed. Johnson says she did not place the phone call because she received a failing grade, but because she knew she had to take another class with Wheat as a result of the failure and she wanted him to stop his derogatory behavior. The police put her in touch with the Rape and Crisis Information Center. She says the Center instructed her she was entitled to counseling, although she did not pursue it. The Center also told her she could contact the KCHR.\nAfter receiving this advice, Johnson claims that she did in fact report Wheat to the KCHR before her initial meeting with Wheat and completed an official questionnaire detailing the events as they unfolded. She also voiced her concern, in the form of a phone call to the state's Board of Nursing. It is unclear what came of this action. The KCHR however, did respond to Johnson's complaint, ultimately determining that it lacked jurisdiction over schools. Officials at KCHR told her they would forward her complaint to the state's department of education.\nPlaintiff says that when Hendricks called her in to discuss the rumor he was defensive and said Mr. Wheat was not violent, that Wheat would go after her financially, and that she had \"better be sure\" she was telling the truth in making her allegations. She further told Hendricks that KCHR told her not to discuss the details of her complaint with anyone and that she could not discuss it with him. In response, she says Hendricks requested proof that she had filed a complaint with KCHR and said he would expel her if it turned out she was lying. She says she tried to get this information immediately, but that the KCHR did not typically provide additional information on complaints, and was reluctant to do so in this case. As a result, she says, it took several weeks for her to get any proof.\nIn response to this request, some time before the Code of Conduct Board met, Johnson says she provided Hendricks with a letter from the Commission indicating that she attempted to file a charge against Wheat. This letter informed Hendricks that the Commission took the position that it did not have jurisdiction over the matter and thus could not have accepted a harassment charge against Wheat from Plaintiff. This letter did not say, however, as Hendricks subsequently told Johnson he really wanted, that Johnson filed the claim on a specific date before the initial August 21 meeting where Johnson told Hendricks she had filed charges. It is unclear whether Hendricks initially told Johnson if this letter was sufficient; she claims he gave her the impression that it was enough. Hendricks later told her, however, that the letter made no mention of sexual harassment and did not confirm she filed the *684 complaint prior to their meeting. It is unclear whether the Code of Conduct Board took this into consideration when it expelled her.[4]\n\nII.\nIn a series of decisions over the last 25 years, the Supreme Court has outlined the contours of Title IX liability. Beginning with its 1979 decision in Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 704, 99 S.Ct. 1946, 60 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), the Court established that Title IX is enforceable through an implied private cause of action. In Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, 503 U.S. 60,112 S.Ct. 1028, 117 L.Ed.2d 208 (1992), the Court delineated the available remedies, holding that monetary damages are available for Title IX violations by a school district, but only in so far as the plaintiff proves intentional discrimination. Most recently, in Gebser, 524 U.S. 274, 118 S.Ct. 1989, the Court set forth the legal standards for institutional liability where a student alleges sexual harassment by a teacher. Rejecting assertions that an institution could be held vicariously liable for an employee's actions, the Court held that Title IX liability attaches only when a school official \"who at a minimum has authority to address the alleged discrimination and to institute corrective measures on the recipient's behalf has actual knowledge of discrimination\" and fails to correct such behavior in a manner that amounts to deliberate indifference. Id. at 290, 118 S.Ct. 1989 (emphasis added).\nThus, to proceed on a Title IX claim against an educational institution a plaintiff must establish a prima facie case by showing that: (1) she was subjected to quid pro quo sexual harassment or a sexually hostile environment; (2) she provided actual notice of the situation to an \"appropriate person,\" who was, at a minimum, an official of the educational entity with authority to take corrective action and to end discrimination; and (3.) the institution's response to the harassment amounted to \"deliberate indifference.\" Klemencic v. Ohio State Univ., 263 F.3d 504 (6th Cir. 2001); see Morse v. Regents of the Univ. of Colorado, 154 F.3d 1124, 1127-28 (10th Cir.1998) (citing Gebser, 524 U.S. at 289-90, 118 S.Ct. 1989). The Court addresses each of the Gebser elements separately.\n\nA.\nJohnson alleges that Wheat's actions amounted to both a quid pro quo sexual proposition and subjected her to a sexually hostile environment. HIL vigorously disputes both of these claims.\n\n1.\nTo succeed on a quid pro quo claim, a plaintiff must allege that \"a tangible employment [or educational] action resulted from a refusal to submit to a supervisor's sexual demands.\" Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 753, 118 S.Ct. 2257, 141 L.Ed.2d 633 (1998); see also Wills v. Brown Univ., 184 F.3d 20, 25 (1st Cir.1999) (defining quid pro quo harassment as occurring \"when some benefit or adverse action, such as change in salary at work or a grade in school is made to depend on providing sexual favors to someone in authority...\"). Courts considering quid pro quo claims have applied the same standard to Title IX and Title VII cases. See Crandell v. *685 New York College of Osteopathic Medicine, 87 F.Supp.2d 304, 318 n. 145 (S.D.N.Y.2000); Liu v. Striuli 36 F.Supp.2d 452, 465 (D.R.I.1999).\nJohnson's allegations sufficiently allege such a showing. She claims that on her last day of class, Wheat touched her at which point she told him that she was not interested. Despite previously giving her favorable reviews, Johnson alleges Wheat decided to fail her based on this encounter. Wheat counters that this conversation had nothing to do with his sexual interest in her and instead was entirely about her interest in the class and the lack of effort Johnson put forth. This is an entirely reasonable argument. However, it is also a matter of interpretation. Viewing the facts in a light most favorable to Johnson, a reasonable jury might also conclude that Wheat did fail her because she refused his alleged advances. Therefore, Johnson has sufficiently alleged quid pro quo harassment.\n\n2.\nHIL also contends Johnson's allegations are insufficient to constitute hostile environment harassment. Here the question is much closer. To establish a prima facie case for hostile environment under Title IX, Johnson must produce evidence that her educational experience was \"permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule and insult that [was] sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions\" of her education and create a sexually hostile environment. See Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21, 114 S.Ct. 367, 126 L.Ed.2d 295 (1993); see also Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787-89, 118 S.Ct. 2275, 141 L.Ed.2d 662 (1998) (discussing the standard applied in Title VII cases and noting that the behavior must unreasonably interfere with an employee's work performance).[5] To be actionable, the offensive behavior must be based on sex, rather than personal animus or other reasons. Frazier v. Fairhaven Sch. Comm., 276 F.3d 52, 66 (1st Cir.2002). The conduct complained of is judged both objectively and subjectively; it must be sufficiently severe or pervasive to create an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile. Black v. Zaring, 104 F.3d 822 (6th Cir. 1997).\nFrom the record, it is clear that plaintiff viewed her environment as hostile and abusive. The remaining question is whether a reasonable person in plaintiffs circumstances would find the educational environment so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive as to undermine plaintiffs educational experience and deny her equal access to an institution's resources and opportunities. See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ, 526 U.S. 629, 650, 119 S.Ct. 1661, 143 L.Ed.2d 839 (1999). In determining whether a plaintiff has established that an environment is hostile or abusive, a court must look specifically at (1) the conduct's severity; (2) the frequency of the abusive conduct; (3) whether it is physically threatening or humiliating rather than merely offensive; and (4) whether it unreasonably interferes with the plaintiffs performance. See Harris, 510 U.S. at 23, 114 S.Ct. 367. In applying these factors, the Supreme Court has stated that sporadic use of abusive language, gender related jokes, or occasional episodes of *686 harassment do not amount to discriminatory changes in the terms and conditions of employment. 524 U.S. at 788, 118 S.Ct. 2275.\nJohnson's argument in this case is premised on four facts. First, Johnson says Wheat inappropriately touched her by sitting too close together on at least five occasions, including at lunch and on the elevator. Second, she says he often referred to sexual body parts with perverse slang. Third, she alleges that he talked openly in class about his genitalia. Fourth, Johnson claims on the last day of her clinical, he put his hands on her arms and shoulders before allegedly propositioning her. The Court has looked at a myriad of other cases addressing this same issue. The specific conduct here seems quite a bit less severe than other instances of sexually hostile educational claims. See, e.g., Doe v. New Philadelphia Public Schools Bd. Of Educ, 996 F.Supp. 741 (N.D.Ohio 1998) (grade school teacher had sexual relationship with student that resulted in the teacher's pregnancy); Massey v. Akron City Board of Education, 82 F.Supp.2d 735 (N.D.Ohio 2000) (teacher/counselor fondled young boys, commented on their physique, phoned students at home, and engaged in sexual relations with at least one high school student); Hayut v. State University of New York, 127 F.Supp.2d 333 (N.D.N.Y.2000) (summary judgment denied where teacher repeatedly referred to student in class as \"Monica Lewinsky\" and asked her how \"Bill\" was doing); Flores v. Saulpaugh, 115 F.Supp.2d 319 (N.D.N.Y.2000) (summary judgment denied when teacher put his arm around student, looked at her in a sexual manner, commented on her appearance, and stated that she should find a more mature boyfriend).\nRather, the harassment complained of here is more akin to those instances where courts granted summary judgment. See, e.g., Gallant v. Board of Trustees of California State University, 997 F.Supp. 1231 (N.D.Cal.1998) (professor's graphic comments about his sexual desire for another man and a greeting kiss on student's cheek does not rise to the level of severe or pervasive sexual harassment); Klemencic v. Ohio State University, 10 F.Supp.2d 911 (S.D.Ohio 1998) (coach did not create a sexually hostile environment by asking the student to go out with him and sending her a sexually suggestive magazine article because the acts were not severe or pervasive).[6] In sum, the absence of severe conduct directed at Johnson seems to set this case apart even from those that other courts have found insufficient.\nNevertheless, one might consider this a close question. It is always difficult to analyze conduct with which one thoroughly abhors in the light of statutory and judicial commands. However, analyzing several of the other Davis factors strongly support dismissing the claim here. Wheat's conduct was not \"pervasive\" in the sense that there was severe harassment on a regular basis. Nor can the comments Wheat made in class, although arguably entirely offensive, be classified as sufficiently humiliating and frequent to pass muster. Those comments are precisely the kind which the Supreme Court has said do not *687 constitute discrimination. Last, it appears Johnson never stopped going to class. Title IX requires that the harassment clearly interfere with her education. In this case, although it is true Johnson and Wheat had a less than amicable relationship, it does not appear, based on the standard the law requires this court to apply, that his tendency to allegedly create a \"sexually hostile environment\" interfered with her education. The Court therefore concludes that Johnson has not sufficiently alleged that a hostile environment existed under Title IX. That part of her claim is dismissed.\n\nB.\nAs to the second requirement, the Supreme Court has held that, to establish a basis for institutional liability and recover damages, a Title IX litigant must demonstrate that \"an official who at a minimum has authority to address the alleged discrimination and to institute corrective measures on the federal funding recipient's behalf must have had actual knowledge of the facts underlying the Title IX claim. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290, 118 S.Ct. 1989.[7] Neither constructive notice nor apparent authority will suffice.\nThe Court has not found any Sixth Circuit case interpreting the contours of the Gebser notice requirement. This case raises two important questions which Gebser left open. First, must the institution receive notice that Plaintiff herself was subjected to a sexually hostile environment or is notice from other individuals in this same environment sufficient? Lower courts have split on this question. It appears that all district courts addressing this issue have adopted the latter position, holding that \"the institution must have possessed enough knowledge of the harassment that it reasonably could have responded with remedial measures to address the kind of harassment upon which plaintiffs legal claim is based.\" Folkes v. New York College of Osteopathic Med., 214 F.Supp.2d 273 (E.D.N.Y.2002); see also Hart v. Paint Valley Local Sch. Dist, 2002 WL 31951264, *6-7, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEIS 25720, *22 (S.D.Ohio 2002); Frederick v. Simpson College, 149 F.Supp.2d 826 (S.D.Iowa 2001); Crandell v. New York College of Osteopathic Med., 87 F.Supp.2d 304 (S.D.N.Y.2000); Gordon v. Ottumwa Comm. Sch. Dist, 115 F.Supp.2d 1077, 1082 (S.D.Iowa 2000); Massey v. Akron City Bd. of Educ, 82 F.Supp.2d 735, 744 (N.D.Ohio 2000); Doe v. School Admin. Dist. No. 19, 66 F.Supp.2d 57, 63 (D.Me. 1999). On the other hand, the Fourth Circuit has interpreted Gebser's requirement of \"actual knowledge of discrimination in the recipient's programs\" to require \"a showing that school district officials possessed actual knowledge of the discriminatory conduct in question.\" Baynard v. Malone, 268 F.3d 228, 237-38 (4th Cir. 2001). The Fourth Circuit concluded that, while a principal should have been aware of the potential for abuse based on reports from other students, the institution could not be held liable because there was no evidence indicating that the principal was actually aware that the student-plaintiff was being abused.\nTo decide which notice requirement governs, the Court returns to Gebser, where the Supreme Court concluded that, consistent with Congress's authority under the spending clause, institutional liability must be premised on \"actual knowledge of discrimination in the recipient's programs.\" 524 U.S. at 290, 118 S.Ct. 1989. In this *688 Court's view, the Gebser notice standard does not require that the offending instructor actually commit previous acts of harassment against the plaintiff-student and that the plaintiff-student complain before the institution may be held liable for the instructor's subsequent repeated misconduct under Title IX. Actual knowledge of intentional discrimination and actual knowledge of the actual plaintiffs experiences are two different things; requiring the latter imposes a substantially higher test than the former. Consistent with the majority of other courts, the Court thus finds that the actual notice standard is met when an appropriate official has actual knowledge of a substantial risk of abuse to students based on prior complaints by other students.[8]\nHere, though it is true Johnson herself never complained specifically about these instances, Hendricks was allegedly aware of four facts.[9] First, several students in their evaluations gave Wheat negative remarks and described him as \"intimidating.\" Second, Johnson claims that Ronetta Potts, a Nurse Educator employed by Kosair, where Wheat taught the clinical, complained vociferously to Hendricks. At one point, Potts apparently faxed Hendricks a letter stating Wheat was inappropriate with patients and families; made inappropriate comments, such as questioning the morality of a patient for being a single unwed mother; and asked offensive questions and was condescending towards her. Third, Johnson claims that another student complained to Hendricks about Wheat's behavior and went so far as to compare Wheat to her abusive husband. Fourth, Johnson says that she went to Hendricks before her final clinical at Kosair and complained that Wheat was generally inappropriate in class. She further says she was afraid to tell him the details because she knew Hendricks and Wheat were friends and that Wheat was already acting threatening towards her. Johnson says she did not tell Hendricks about the touching.[10]\nAt this stage the Court cannot say for sure whether these comments and *689 Attitudes were directed at women (and therefore are covered by Title IX) or were instead indicative of an across-the-board tough instructor. Indeed, the Court need not determine whether Hendricks had knowledge of conduct which might constitute discrimination against female students generally. That being said, with regard to the remaining quid pro quo claim, it appears Hendricks received absolutely no previous complaints of sexual advances or threats by Wheat against female students. This fact is critical to the remaining quid pro quo part of Johnson's sexual discrimination claim.\nOne could say, however, that the Gebser actual notice prong does not require such specificity: the relationship between the type of discrimination complained of, and the type of notice the school official receives need not perfectly correspond. The Court has found no other federal court opinion discussing this second issue left open by Gebser. The Court concludes, however, that the Gebser opinion requires a more stringent correlation. As the Supreme Court explained in Gebser, Congress enacted Title IX, pursuant to its spending clause power, \"to avoid the use of federal resources to support discriminatory practices\" and \"to provide individual citizens effective protection against those practices.\" 524 U.S at 286, 118 S.Ct. 1989 (citing Cannon, 441 U.S. at 704, 99 S.Ct. 1946). In this respect, Title IX conditions \"an offer of federal funding on a promise by the recipient not to discriminate, in what amounts essentially to a contract between the Government and the recipient of funds.\" Id. at 286, 118 S.Ct. 1989. Based on this underlying principle, the Court concluded that a recipient of federal funds could not be held liable for failing to prohibit sex discrimination, if it lacked notice that such discrimination took place and therefore lacked \"an opportunity to take action to end the harassment or to limit further harassment.\" Id. at 289, 118 S.Ct. 1989.\nApplying this contractual theory to this case, notice of a tendency to create a sexually offensive environment and notice of a tendency to sexually proposition a student are very different. HIL had knowledge of facts which may possibly have been sufficient notice of a sexually offensive atmosphere. However, under the Supreme Court's Title IX analysis, an institution's opportunity to respond and remedy a situation depends on its actual notice of the alleged discrimination; the scope of that notice, then, must also be a consideration in determining the institution's liability. HIL had no notice of the quid quo pro proposition. The Court, therefore, declines to find that the minimal notice HIL possessed is sufficient to create liability for Johnson's quid pro quo claim. As such, Johnson's quid pro quo claim must also be dismissed.\n\nIII.\nThe Court next considers whether Title IX provides Johnson a cause of action and a private remedy against HIL for its allegedly retaliatory actions.[11] This question *690 requires the Court to explore whether the Supreme Court's jurisprudence creating a private right of action for intentionally discriminatory acts also permits claims premised on retaliation. This is an issue of first impression in the Sixth Circuit; other circuits have split on this question.[12] The Court therefore proceeds reviewing the relevant statutory and regulation provisions and then analyzing the effect of the Supreme Court's opinion in Sandoval on the availability of a cause of action for retaliation under Title IX.\n\nA.\nWhen Congress enacted Title IX in 1972, it had two principal objectives in mind: \"To avoid the use of federal resources to support discriminatory practices\" and \"to provide individual citizens effective protection against those practices.\" Cannon, 441 U.S. at 704, 99 S.Ct. 1946. Towards those ends, Title IX contains two distinct parts. First, § 901 provides that \"no person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, *691 or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance ....\" 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a).[13] Section 901, then, can be said to create the right.\nSecond, in section § 902, Congress created an elaborate administrative enforcement scheme for Title IX. Pursuant to § 902, any federal department or agency that \"is empowered to extend Federal financial assistance to any education program or activity\" is \"authorized and directed to effectuate the provisions of § 901. To do so, agencies are required to \"issue rules, regulations, or orders of general applicability,\" which do not \"become effective unless and until approved by the President.\" [14] In this way, Section 902 provides *692 administrative agencies with powers to add greater specificity to the § 901 right.\nUnder this § 902 authority, the Department of Education promulgated a regulation, 34 C.F.R., Part 100, which provides:\n(e) Intimidatory or retaliatory acts prohibited. No recipient or other person shall intimidate, threaten, coerce, or discriminate against any individual for the purpose of interfering with any right or privilege secured by section 601 of the Act or this part, or because he has made a complaint, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this part.\n34 C.F.R. § 100.7(e) (emphasis added).[15]\nImportantly, the Department of Education's Title IX regulations, which establish rights under \"this part\" for purposes of 34 C.F.R. § 100.7(e), forbid both intentional discrimination and practices that have a disparate impact, but are not intentionally discriminatory. 34 C.F.R. § 100.3. The regulations further require \"affirmative action to overcome the effects of prior discrimination,\" 34 C.F.R. § 100.3(b)(6)(I), and permit affirmative action \"even in the absence of such prior discrimination,\" 34 C.F.R. § 100.3(b)(6)(ii). Based on this scheme, Johnson alleges Congress has permitted her to sue HIL, for retaliatory actions taken in violation of Title IX.\n\nB.\nThe Court begins its analysis by considering the Supreme Court's recent opinion in Sandoval 532 U.S. 275, 121 S.Ct. 1511, 149 L.Ed.2d 517. In chat case, the Court clarified and articulated the approach courts must now follow in determining whether to imply a private right of action from a statute and, in so doing, analyzed a regulation promulgated under Title VI.[16] The Supreme Court's analysis of the relationship between §§ 601 and 602 of Title VI in Sandoval largely informs this Court's analysis of §§ 901 and 902 of Title IX. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 694-99, 99 S.Ct. 1946 (noting that Title IX \"was patterned after Title VI\" therefore finding based on the statutory language of Title VI should logically extend to Title IX as well).\nIn Sandoval, the Supreme Court considered whether a private individual could bring an action for violations of regulations forbidding disparate impact practices. The Court began by stating three principles which framed its analysis. First, private individuals may sue to enforce §§ 601 and 901 to obtain both injunctive relief and monetary damages. See Sandoval 532 *693 U.S. at 279-80, 121 S.Ct. 1511 (citing Cannon, 441 U.S. at 694-99, 99 S.Ct. 1946 (holding that a private right of action exists to enforce Title IX)); Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, 503 U.S. 60, 72, 112 S.Ct. 1028, 117 L.Ed.2d 208 (1992) (holding that both monetary and equitable remedies are available under a Title IX action). Second, \" § 601 prohibits only intentional discrimination.\" Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 280-82, 121 S.Ct. 1511. Third, some \"regulations promulgated under § 602 of Title VI may validly proscribe activities that have a disparate impact on racial groups, even though such activities are permissible under § 601.\" Id. at 281, 121 S.Ct. 1511.\nThe Court then turned to classify the regulation at issue: a Department of Justice regulation promulgated pursuant to § 602 of Title VI that forbade recipients of federal funding from \"utilizing criteria or methods of administration which have the effect of subjecting individual to discrimination because of their race, color, or national origin.\" 29 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(2)(1999). Recognizing that Title VI itself only reached acts of intentional discrimination, the plaintiff in Sandoval did not allege a violation of Title VI per se. Instead, the plaintiff claimed the Alabama Department of Public Safety's policy of administering all tests for drivers' licenses in English had a uniquely discriminating effect on minorities. This disparate impact, the plaintiff argued, violated the Justice Department's regulation. In effect, the plaintiff wanted the Court to find that, implicit in the grant of § 602 authority to federal agencies to enact regulations was a private right to sue under § 602 for violations of those regulations. The Court refused to imply such a private right of action into § 602's language.\nTo reach this conclusion, the Court distinguished between two types of regulations an agency might enact under its § 602 authority. On one side were those regulations that applied § 601's ban on intentional discrimination. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 284, 121 S.Ct. 1511. In those cases, the Court explained:\nWe do not doubt that regulations applying § 601's ban on intentional discrimination are covered by the cause of action to enforce that section. Such regulations, if valid and reasonable, authoritatively construe the statute itself, see NationsBank of N.C., N.A v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251, 257, 115 S.Ct. 810, 130 L.Ed.2d 740 (1995); Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984), and it is therefore meaningless to talk about a separate cause of action to enforce the regulations apart from the statute. A Congress that intends the statute to be enforced through a private cause of action intends the authoritative interpretation of the statute to be so enforced as well.\nId.\nConsequently, the Court reasoned, a regulation tied to effectuating § 601's ban on intentional discrimination simply further policed the type of discrimination that § 601 already prohibited. Therefore, in such cases, to allege a violation of a regulation enacted under § 602's authority, was not to sue under an independent cause of action for a violation of a particular regulation or even § 602, but rather was to sue for a violation of a right created by § 601. The regulation (enacted under § 602's authority), the Court reasoned, simply further explained what that § 601 right entailed. In these cases, the Court concluded that it was unnecessary to consider whether an implied private right of action existed because the plaintiff was *694 simply exercising his already existing right to sue under § 601.\nIn the second category were those regulations enacted under § 602 authority that went farther and \"[forbade] conduct that § 601 permits.\" Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 285, 121 S.Ct. 1511. In other words, the Court distinguished those regulations— like the one in Sandoval involving a disparate impact rule—where the plaintiff alleged a violation of a regulation which prohibited discrimination without regard to intent. In those instances, the Court stated that the plaintiffs claim for a violation of the regulation was not covered by the § 601 ban on intentional discrimination; instead, the Court characterized the plaintiffs claim as a separate cause of action seeking relief under § 602. Because the plaintiffs claim in Sandoval was premised on a regulation that involved a disparate impact rule, as opposed to a claim of intentional discrimination, the Court placed it in this second category. Thus, the question presented in Sandoval, and the one the Court primarily addressed, was whether § 602 conferred a separate private right of action.[17] The Supreme Court held that § 602 conferred no such private right of action. Id.[18]\n\nC.\nBased on the Sandoval framework, this Court must make two related determinations. First, the Court must analyze whether a claim based on the Department of Education's anti-retaliation regulation effectuates § 901's anti-discrimination mandate. Second, applying Chevron, the Court must find the regulation is valid and commands deference. See Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 284, 121 S.Ct. 1511 (noting that regulations applying § 601's ban on intentional discrimination, if valid and reasonable under Chevron, authoritatively construe the statute itself and are covered by the § 601 right of action). If the regulation passes both of these tests, Johnson's claim premised on § 100.7(e), is encompassed by the well-established private right of action under Title IX for intentional discrimination.\n\n1.\nAs to the first question, HIL argues that this Court should adopt the Eleventh Circuit's reasoning in Jackson v. Birmingham *695 Board of Educ, 309 F.3d 1333, 1344-48 (11th Cir.2002), where a court considering the same question presented here held that \"[n]othing in the text [of § 901] indicates any congressional concern with retaliation that might be visited on those who complain of Title IX violations. Indeed, the statute makes no mention of retaliation at all.\" Id. at 1344. Drawing from Sandoval's instruction that courts should not imply private rights of actions where Congress does not explicitly designate them, the Eleventh Circuit reasoned that § 901's anti-discrimination mandate did not encompass claims for retaliation. Id. at 1345-46. See also Atkinson v. Lafayette College, 2002 WL 123449, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1432 (E.D.Pa.2002) (relying on Sandoval to find that the court lacked the power to imply a private right of action for retaliation under Title IX); Litman v. George Mason University, 156 F.Supp.2d 579 (E.D.Va.2001) (same).\nThis Court respectfully disagrees and adopts the position more recently set forth by the Fourth Circuit in Peters v. Jenney, 327 F.3d 307 (4th Cir.2003) (addressing the same issue in the Title VI context). See also Frazier, 276 F.3d at 67 (establishing the standard a student must meet to prevail on a Title IX retaliation claim, but not discussing the effect of Sandoval on the court's analysis); Burwell v. Pekin Comm. High Sch. Dist. 303, 213 F.Supp.2d 917, 934-25 (C.D.Ill.2002) (recognizing claim for retaliation under Title IX). In Peters, the Fourth Circuit reasoned that the text of Sandoval and Title IX did not require the court to analyze § 601's text to determine whether Congress, as evidenced wholly by statutory intent, explicitly created an implied private right of action. 327 F.3d at 316-17. This was because Peters, like this Court, first analyzed whether § 100.7(e) \"applied § 601's ban on intentional discrimination...\" Id. Drawing on the Peters approach, this Court, for several reasons, concludes that the anti-retaliation provision cuts to the core of § 901's ban on intentional discrimination and is covered by that section's existing cause of action.\nFirst, as a doctrinal matter, a regulation that specifically prohibits retaliation for intentional discrimination does not prohibit any more action than § 901 already prohibits. That is, if the Sandoval Court refused to allow the claim in that case to proceed because it concluded the DOJ regulation forbade conduct that § 601 permitted, then the test here is whether § 100.7(e) prohibits conduct otherwise allowed by § 901. 532 U.S. at 285, 121 S.Ct. 1511 (concluding that it \"is clear now that the disparate-impact regulations do not simply apply § 601—since they indeed forbid conduct that § 601 permits—and therefore clear that the private right of action to enforce § 601 does not include a private right to enforce these regulations\"). The Court concludes, based on this test, that in so long as § 100.7(e) is used to challenge acts of intentional discrimination—and therefore only prohibits conduct already prohibited by § 901—the regulation is properly within the existing implied private right of action to enforce § 901 and does not attempt to forbid conduct § 901 otherwise permits. In as much as an intent to discriminate exists when someone is intentionally treated differently because of her gender, that intent clearly carries over to a context where someone intentionally chooses to expel a student based on actions she took in defense of her rights as a member of a particular gender. The purpose in both cases is the same: to punish someone for reasons that, but for intentional discrimination against their gender, would not exist.\nSecond, the Supreme Court has implicitly recognized that the right to be free from retaliation is implicit in the right to be free from intentional discrimination. To begin, *696 in Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, 396 U.S. 229, 90 S.Ct. 400, 24 L.Ed.2d 386 (1969), the Supreme Court considered whether 42 U.S.C. § 1982's broad prohibition on discrimination on property transactions also allowed a claim for retaliation. Nothing in the text of § 1982 mentioned retaliation. The plaintiff alleged his neighborhood association retaliated against him because he attempted to lease his property to a black man. The plaintiff brought suit under § 1982,[19] which the board challenged, claiming the plaintiffs expulsion was not covered by § 1982's anti-discrimination provision. Rejecting this assertion, the Supreme Court held that \"if that sanction, backed by a state court judgment, can be imposed, then Sullivan is punished for trying to vindicate the rights of minorities protected by § 1982. Such a sanction would give impetus to the perpetuation of racial restrictions on property.\" As several federal courts have noted, Sullivan can thus be construed to stand for the proposition that a prohibition on discrimination should be judicially construed to include an implicit prohibition on retaliation against those who oppose the prohibited discrimination. Peters, 327 F.3d at 317; Johnson v. Univ. of Cincinnati 215 F.3d 561, 576 (6th Cir.2000); Fair Employment Council v. BMC Mktg. Corp., 28 F.3d 1268, 1280 (D.C.Cir.1994).\nFour years after Sullivan, the Court used the same logic and similarly recognized that, while 42 U.S.C. § 1983 nowhere expressly bars retaliation,[20] retaliation must be actionable in order to effectuate those rights. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1972). The Court held that even though a state employee has no right to employment, the state could not simply fire him for criticizing his employer. Id. at 597, 92 S.Ct. 2694. \"This would allow the government to produce a result which [it] could not command directly.\" Id. (citing Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526, 78 S.Ct. 1332, 2 L.Ed.2d 1460 (1958)). See also Crawford-El v. Britten, 523 U.S. 574, 588 n. 10, 118 S.Ct. 1584, 140 L.Ed.2d 759 (1998) (explaining that; \"retaliation offends the Constitution [because] it threatens to inhibit exercise of the protected right\" and \"is thus akin to an unconstitutional condition demanded for the receipt of a government-provided benefit\"). Importantly, both Sullivan and Perry involved antidiscrimination statutes written at the same level of generality as Title IX.\nRelying on the Supreme Court's statement of this principle; in these two contexts, numerous federal courts of appeals, including the Sixth Circuit, have similarly held that 42 U.S.C. § 1981, which broadly prohibits discrimination in contracting, also provides a cause of action for retaliation. See, e.g., Foley v. Univ. of Houston Sys., 324 F.3d 310, 315 (5th Cir.2003); Murrell v. Ocean Mecca Motel, Inc., 262 F.3d 253, 258 (4th Cir.2001); Johnson, 2 F.3d at 576; Andrews v. Lakeshore Rehab. Hosp., 140 F.3d 1405, 1411-13 (11th Cir. 1998); Phelps v. Wichita Eagle-Beacon, 886 F.2d 1262, 1266-67 (10th Cir.1989); Fiedler v. Marumsco Christian Sch., 631 F.2d 1144, 1149 n. 7 (1980). Each of these opinions reached this conclusion, despite the fact § 1981—like §§ 1982 and 1983— says nothing about retaliation and \"only proscribes purposeful discrimination.\" *697 Peters, 327 F.3d at 318 (citing Murrell, 262 F.3d at 257).[21]\nLast, this Court notes that, on several prior occasions, the Supreme Court has stated that Congress intended to prohibit a wide range of discriminatory actions when it enacted Title IX. In North Haven Board of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 102 S.Ct. 1912, 72 L.Ed.2d 299 (1982), the Court stated, \"[t]here is no doubt that if we are to give [Title IX] the scope that its origins dictate, we must accord it a sweep as broad as its language.\" Id. at 521, 102 S.Ct. 1912 (citing United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 801, 86 S.Ct. 1152, 16 L.Ed.2d 267 (1966)). The Court thus concluded that Title IX authorized the Department of Health, Education and Welfare to enact a regulation prohibiting gender discrimination in employment by federal fund recipients, even though employment itself was not mentioned in § 901. See also Franklin, 503 U.S. at 76, 112 S.Ct. 1028 (interpreting Title IX broadly to find that Title IX reaches student-on-student sexual harassment). Likewise, the Supreme Court has held that all available remedies are available to effectuate Title IX's guarantees. Franklin, 503 U.S. at 69, 112 S.Ct. 1028 (\"the existence of a statutory right implies the existence of all necessary and appropriate remedies\"). In this case, to find that Johnson had a right to be free from intentional discrimination but receives no protection when she faces retaliation for asserting that right contradicts these decisions. In such a circumstance, it only makes practical sense that under Title IX one has the right to sue a defendant who prevents one from asserting her Title IX rights.\n\n2.\nFinding that § 100.7(e) falls squarely within § 901's ban on intentional discrimination, the Court must last determine whether § 100.7(e) is valid under Chevron and therefore commands this Court's deference.\nUnder the Chevron standard, a court inquires \"first whether the intent of Congress is clear as to the precise question at issue ... If so, that is the end of the matter.\" NationsBank of N.C., N.A v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251, 257, 115 S.Ct. 810, 130 L.Ed.2d 740 (1995). If, however:\nthe statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute. If the administrator's reading fills a gap or defines a term in a way that is reasonable in light of the legislature's revealed design, we give the administrator's judgment controlling weight.\nId. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).\nIn this case, the Department of Education is the agency historically \"charged with responsibility for administering Title IX.\" Cannon, 441 U.S. at 706-08, 99 S.Ct. 1946. Pursuant to this authority, the Department of Education promulgated § 100.7(e). Here, because Congress clearly did not explicitly authorize the Department of Education to enact a regulation prohibiting retaliation, Congress's intent is not clear. The question therefore is whether the Department of Education could reasonably construe § 901 to authorize § 100.7(e).\n*698 This Court concludes, in light of the principles and the long line of authority previously discussed, that the Department of Education can certainly be said to have acted reasonably in construing § 901 to forbid retaliation premised upon opposition to practices § 901 makes unlawful. Peters, 327 F.3d at 318. It \"is neither inconsistent with the text of [§ 901] nor an unreasonable construction of that section for an agency to construe it to cover those who are purposefully injured for opposing the intentional discrimination Congress made unlawful via [§ 901].\" Id. Accordingly, the Court finds that the Department of Education acted reasonably in enacting § 100.7(e) and its regulation is entitled to deference and must be given controlling weight under Chevron.\nThe Court will enter an order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion.\nNOTES\n[1] Plaintiff has also filed a motion to amend her complaint, adding a claim that HIL violated Title IX by retaliating against her. Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a), leave to amend \"shall be freely given when justice so requires.\" The Court does not necessarily see the need for this amendment since the retaliation claim also falls under § 901 of Title IX and Plaintiff sufficiently pled facts in her initial complaint to put Defendant on notice of the retaliation claim. Furthermore, Defendant adequately addressed this retaliation argument in its motion for summary judgment. Defendant is not unduly prejudiced by Plaintiff's failure to separately state her retaliation claim. Therefore, the Court sustains Plaintiff's motion to amend her complaint to the extent this will help clear up the record.\n[2] Plaintiff actually alleges two separate theories of the underlying discrimination: sexual harassment and quid pro quo discrimination.\n[3] Summary judgment is appropriate where \"there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.\" Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). \"At the summary judgment stage the judge's function is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter.\" Wiley v. U.S., 20 F.3d 222, 227 (6th Cir. 1994). The Court's role is limited to determining if the evidence submitted viewed in a light most favorable to the non-moving party presents a sufficient disagreement about the material facts so that submission to trier of fact is necessary, or whether the evidence is so one-sided that a party must prevail as a matter of law. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202(1986). A dispute is genuine when \"the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.\" Id. at 251-52, 106 S.Ct. 2505.\n[4] Johnson also says she worked very hard to get what Hendricks wanted, but suggests the KCHR was not quick to respond to her requests and ultimately generated a form letter stating the status of her complaint. When she again asked for a letter noting the proper date of her initial filing, Johnson says KCHR officials told her she was lucky to get anything since the KCHR typically did not provide any information on an individual request basis.\n[5] Although there is no direct link between hostile environment claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title IX, courts rely on Title VII law to analyze Title IX hostile environment claims. See, e.g., Franklin, 503 U.S. at 73-76, 112 S.Ct. 1028 (stating that the same rule should apply when a teacher sexually harasses a student as applies when a supervisor sexually harasses a subordinate under Title VII).\n[6] The Supreme Court has noted, \"whether gender-oriented conduct rises to the level of actionable harassment thus depends on a constellation of surrounding circumstances, expectations, and relationships, including, the ages of the harasser and the victim and the number of individuals involved.\" Davis, 526 U.S. at 629, 119 S.Ct. 1661. The Court notes that, while not determinative, the fact that Johnson was an older student in this case— thus making the age disparity between Wheat and herself quite different from that in the traditional teacher-student setting—is relevant to the Court's determination.\n[7] No one in this case disputes that Hendricks, as HIL's President, was an official with the power to institute corrective measures.\n[8] The Court further notes that this holding is consistent with the overriding purpose of Gebser: to limit institutional liability to cases where the institution, as a recipient of federal funds, has actual knowledge of discrimination and fails to respond. In such cases, the Supreme Court reasoned, liability was proper because the institution was violating its duty not to discriminate as part of its implicit contract with the federal government. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 286, 118 S.Ct. 1989. Consequently then, as soon as an educational institution can be said to be on notice that discrimination is occurring, a decision not to remedy the situation amounts to a violation of this contract, whether or not the notice stems from the plaintiff-student or from every other student in the classroom, except the plaintiff-student.\n[9] One additional problem with the notice requirement in this case is that, even if HIL had notice of all of these events, it is not clear that this notice preceded Johnson's alleged harassment.\n[10] At her deposition, Johnson testified that another student, Michele Slaughter told her that she complained to Hendricks after Wheat made the comment in class about the pain electrocution caused. According to Johnson, Slaughter claims she went to Wheat and said she hoped her complaining would not affect her grades. He allegedly told her, \"Well, I'll plead amnesia this time, but don't let it happen again.\" The Court recognizes at this stage that this is clearly hearsay and has not considered it for the truth of the matter asserted. However the Court notes it, because it suggests Johnson was on notice that Wheat was tougher on students who complained and that this general knowledge might have deterred her from complaining further to Hendricks. This could be damaging evidence at trial, if admissible. Of course at trial, the Court presumes, Slaughter herself would testify about her own encounters with Wheat and Hendricks.\n[11] As a preliminary matter the Court makes two determinations. First, courts are in agreement that there is no requirement that a plaintiff must prevail on any underlying claim of intentional discrimination in order to prevail on a claim of retaliation. Peters v. Jenney, 327 F.3d 307, 320-21 (4th Cir.2003) (discussing standard to apply in Title VI retaliation case where there no underlying claim remains); Weeks v. Harden Mfg. Corp., 291 F.3d 1307, 1311-12 (11th Cir.2002) (discussing the standard to apply when there is no successful underlying claim in Title VII, ADA, and ADEA cases); Herron v. Harrison, 203 F.3d 410, 415 (6th Cir.2000) (noting in the prison inmate context, that the standard for judging whether a retaliation claim should proceed when the underlying claim is dismissed is whether that underlying claim was reasonable and not frivolous); Borgo v. Goldin, 204 F.3d 251 (D.C.Cir.2000) (analyzing Title VII retaliation case where underlying claims had been abandoned); Vadie v. Mississippi State Univ., 218 F.3d 365, 374 n. 24 (5th Cir.2000). The standard in all of these cases was whether the plaintiff had a good faith, reasonable basis for believing the underlying claim existed. In this case, based on the nature of Wheat's comments in class as well as the fact that she apparently reasonably thought he failed her for not giving into his advances, the Court finds there was a subjective and objective basis for finding that she reasonably thought she was being harassed in violation of Title IX.\n\nSecond, this Court finds that Johnson has stated the prima facie elements for a retaliation claim. In Morris v. Oldham County Fiscal Court, 201 F.3d 784 (6th Cir.2000), the Sixth Circuit delineated the standard required to prove a claim for retaliation. Under that test, a plaintiff must prove that: (1) he engaged in protected activity; (2) this exercise of protected rights was known to defendant; (3) defendant thereafter took adverse employment action against the plaintiff, or the plaintiff was subjected to severe or pervasive retaliatory harassment by a supervisor; and (4) there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action or harassment. Id. at 792. In this case, Plaintiff has established a prima facie case based on these elements. She engaged in a protected activity when she lodged a complaint with KCHR. Arguably, HIL took adverse action in expelling her when it learned of her actions. Although good arguments can certainly be made that HIL's actions were not pre-textual and were not based on the fact that she complained to KCHR, but instead stemmed from the fact it thought she lied to the Code of Conduct Board, these are credibility questions for a jury to assess.\n[12] The Court characterizes this as a circuit split because the Sandoval decision arose different views as to how to consider retaliation claims promulgated under Title VI and Title IX. Since Sandoval, the two circuit courts addressing this point have adopted their different positions under different statutes. That is, the Fourth Circuit in Peters v. Jenney, 327 F.3d 307, held that a Plaintiff can sue for retaliation under Title VI (the statute analyzed in Sandoval). In contrast, the Eleventh Circuit has held that the same claim does not lie under Title IX. Jackson v. Birmingham Board ofEduc, 309 F.3d 1333 (11th Cir.2002). Because Title VI and Title IX are to be read and interpreted consistent!}', the Court finds no reason to consider these opinions as doing anything other than adopting conflicting holdings on the same question.\n\nMoreover, the Eleventh Circuit's opinion in Jackson is also in direct conflict with Frazier, 276 F.3d at 67 (setting the standard a student must meet to prevail on a Title IX retaliation claim), although Frazier made no mention of Sandoval, as well as numerous circuit court decisions announced prior to Sandoval which uniformly found or implied that Title IX gives private plaintiffs a cause of action to redress retaliation. See, e.g., Lowrey v. Texas A&amp;M University System, 117 F.3d 242 (5th Cir. 1997); Brine v. Univ. of Iowa, 90 F.3d 271, 272-73 (8th Cir. 1996); Murray v. N.Y. Univ. Coll. of Dentistry, 57 F.3d 243, 251 (2nd Cir. 1995); Preston v. Virginia ex rel. New River Cmty. Coll., 31 F.3d 203, 206 (4th Cir. 1994).\n[13] In relevant part, § 901, 86 Stat. 373, as amended, as set forth in 20 U.S.C. § 1681, provides:\n\n(a) Prohibition against discrimination; exceptions\nNo person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance . ..\n(b) Preferential or disparate treatment because of imbalance in participation or receipt of Federal benefits; statistical evidence of imbalance\nNothing contained in subsection (a) of this section shall be interpreted to require any educational institution to grant preferential or disparate treatment to the members of one sex on account of an imbalance which may exist with respect to the total number or percentage of persons of that sex participating in or receiving the benefits of any federally supported program or activity, in comparison with the total number or percentage of persons of that sex in any community, State, section, or other area: Provided, That this subsection shall not be construed to prevent the consideration in any hearing or proceeding under this chapter of statistical evidence tending to show that such an imbalance exists with respect to the participation in, or receipt of the benefits of, any such program or activity by the members of one sex.\n(c) \"Educational institution\" defined\nFor purposes of this chapter an educational institution means any public or private preschool, elementary, or secondary school, or any institution of vocational, professional, or higher education, except that in the case of an educational institution composed of more than one school, college, or department which are administratively separate units, such term means each such school, college, or department. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a).\n[14] Section 902, 86 Stat. 374, as set forth in 20 U.S.C. § 1682, titled \"Federal administrative enforcement; report to Congressional committees,\" provides in relevant part:\n\nEach Federal department and agency which is empowered to extend Federal financial assistance to any education program or activity ... is authorized and directed to effectuate the provisions of section 1681 of this title with respect to such program or activity by issuing rules, regulations, or orders of general applicability ... No such rule, regulation, or order shall become effective unless and until approved by the President. Compliance with any requirement adopted pursuant to this section may be effected (1) by the termination of or refusal to grant or to continue assistance under such program or activity to any recipient as to whom there has been an express finding on the record, after opportunity for hearing, of a failure to comply with such requirement . . ., or (2) by any other means authorized by law: Provided, however, That no such action shall be taken until the department or agency concerned has advised the appropriate person or persons of the failure to comply with the requirement and has determined that compliance cannot be secured by voluntary means. In the case of any action terminating, or refusing to grant or continue, assistance because of failure to comply with a requirement imposed pursuant to this section, the head of the Federal department or agency shall file with the committees of the House and Senate having legislative jurisdiction over the program or activity involved a full written report of the circumstances and the grounds for such action. No such action shall become effective until thirty days have elapsed after the filing of such report. 20 U.S.C. § 1682(b).\n[15] 34 C.F.R. § 100.7(e) was originally promulgated by the Department of Justice to enforce Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (\"Title VI\"), 78 Stat. 252, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq. The Department of Education has incorporated by reference § 100.7(e) and other regulations enforcing Title VI to enforce Title IX. See 34 C.F.R. § 106.71; see also Jackson, 309 F.3d at 1338 n. 4 (11th Cir.2002).\n[16] 532 U.S. at 286, 121 S.Ct. 1511 (noting that Sandoval is the culmination of the Court's gradual shift from the four factor analysis stated in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78, 95 S.Ct. 2080, 45 L.Ed.2d 26 (1975)—which looked at (1) whether plaintiff was a member of a protected class; (2) legislative intent; (3) the underlying purpose of the legislative scheme; and (4) whether the cause of action was traditionally delegated to state law—to a framework that looks only at the second factor, statutory intent); see also Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 189, 108 S.Ct. 513, 98 L.Ed.2d 512 (1988) (Scalia, J. concurring) (noting that the Court has \"converted one of [the] four factors (congressional intent) into the determinative factor, with the other three merely indicative of its presence or absence.\").\n[17] The Court stated:\n\nIt is clear now that the disparate-impact regulations do not simply apply § 601— since they indeed forbid conduct that § 601 permits—and therefore clear that the private right of action to enforce § 601 does not include a private right to enforce these regulations. See Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 173, 114 S.Ct. 1439, 128 L.Ed.2d 119 (1994) (a \"private plaintiff may not bring a [suit based on a regulation] against a defendant for acts not prohibited by the text of [the statute]\"). That right must come, if at all, from the independent force of § 602. As stated earlier, we assume for purposes of this decision that § 602 confers the authority to promulgate disparate-impact regulations; the question remains whether it confers a private right of action to enforce them. If not, we must conclude that a failure to comply with regulations promulgated under § 602 that is not also a failure to comply with § 601 is not actionable.\nSandoval, 532 U.S. at 285, 121 S.Ct. 1511.\n[18] To answer this question, the Court examined § 902's text for \"rights-creating language\" that would exhibit Congress's intent to confer a private right of action for violations of all regulations promulgated thereunder. Id. at 291, 121 S.Ct. 1511. Applying its revised statutory intent test, the Court concluded that the language of § 902 exhibited no such intent: \"Neither as originally enacted nor as later amended does Title VI display an intent to create a freestanding private right of action to enforce regulations promulgated under § 602.\" Id. at293, 121 S.Ct. 1511.\n[19] Section 1982 provides that \"[a]ll citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property.\"\n[20] Section 1983 provides a cause of action for individuals who have been deprived, \"under color\" of law, of any of die \"rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.\"\n[21] Section 1981 provides, in relevant part, that \"[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens.\"\n\n", "ocr": false, "opinion_id": 2574272 } ]
W.D. Kentucky
District Court, W.D. Kentucky
FD
Kentucky, KY
248,183
Hartigan, Magruder, Per Curiam, Woodbury
1959-05-21
false
international-basic-economy-corporation-v-luis-blanco-lugo
null
International Basic Economy Corporation v. Luis Blanco Lugo
INTERNATIONAL BASIC ECONOMY CORPORATION, Defendant, Appellant, v. Luis BLANCO LUGO, Plaintiff, Appellee
Jose L. Novas, Hartzell, Fernandez & Novas, San Juan, P. R., and Herrick, Smith, Donald, Farley & Ketchum, Boston, Mass., for appellant., Francisco Ponsa Feliu and Felix Ochoteco, Jr., San Juan, P. R., for appellee.
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
1
Published
null
<parties data-order="0" data-type="parties" id="b311-6"> INTERNATIONAL BASIC ECONOMY CORPORATION, Defendant, Appellant, v. Luis BLANCO LUGO, Plaintiff, Appellee. </parties><br><docketnumber data-order="1" data-type="docketnumber" id="b311-8"> No. 5519. </docketnumber><br><court data-order="2" data-type="court" id="b311-9"> United States Court of Appeals First Circuit. </court><br><decisiondate data-order="3" data-type="decisiondate" id="b311-10"> May 21, 1959. </decisiondate><br><attorneys data-order="4" data-type="attorneys" id="b311-19"> Jose L. Novas, Hartzell, Fernandez &amp; Novas, San Juan, P. R., and Herrick, Smith, Donald, Farley &amp; Ketchum, Boston, Mass., for appellant. </attorneys><br><attorneys data-order="5" data-type="attorneys" id="b311-20"> Francisco Ponsa Feliu and Felix Ochoteco, Jr., San Juan, P. R., for appellee. </attorneys><br><p data-order="6" data-type="judges" id="b311-21"> Before MAGRUDER, Chief Judge, and WOODBURY and HARTIGAN, Circuit Judges. </p>
[ "267 F.2d 263" ]
[ { "author_str": "Per Curiam", "per_curiam": false, "type": "010combined", "page_count": null, "download_url": "http://bulk.resource.org/courts.gov/c/F2/267/267.F2d.263.5519_1.html", "author_id": null, "opinion_text": "267 F.2d 263\n INTERNATIONAL BASIC ECONOMY CORPORATION, Defendant, Appellant,v.Luis BLANCO LUGO, Plaintiff, Appellee.\n No. 5519.\n United States Court of Appeals First Circuit.\n May 21, 1959.\n \n Jose L. Novas, Hartzell, Fernandez &amp; Novas, San Juan, P.R., and Herrick, Smith, Donald, Farley &amp; Ketchum, Boston, Mass., for appellant.\n Francisco Ponsa Feliu and Felix Ochoteco, Jr., San Juan, P.R., for appellee.\n Before MAGRUDER, Chief Judge, and WOODBURY and HARTIGAN, Circuit judges.\n PER CURIAM.\n \n \n 1\n This case is now before us upon a motion by appellant having to do with the record on appeal to be certified by the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico.\n \n \n 2\n On August 31, 1956, Luis Blanco Lugo filed in the Superior Court of Puerto Rico, San Juan Part, a complaint alleging that the plaintiff, at the instance and on behalf of the defendants, had laid out certain sums of money in the purchase of various credits against Balet &amp; Rodriguez, Inc., and that the defendants had refused to reimburse the plaintiff for the sums so advanced. On September 3, 1958, the Superior Court entered judgment for the plaintiff in this proceeding.\n \n \n 3\n Not every final judgment by the Superior Court is appealable as a matter of right to the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico. Law No. 115, enacted by the legislature of Puerto Rico on June 26, 1958, amended the Judiciary Act of Puerto Rico so as to provide in part as follows (tit. 4, 37, L.P.R.A.):\n \n \n 4\n '(a) Except as provided in clause (d) of this section, final judgments rendered by the Superior Court in civil cases involving or deciding a substantial constitutional question under the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of Puerto Rico, and final judgments in criminal cases originated in the Superior Court, shall be appealable to the Supreme Court. * * *\n \n \n 5\n '(b) Any other final judgment of the Superior Court may, on request question of the party aggrieved, be reviewable by the Supreme Court, by way of certiorari issued at the discretion of the court. * * *\n \n \n 6\n '(c) The Supreme Court of Puerto Rico may, in the exercise of its discretion, issue a writ of certification to bring forthwith before it and to hear and resolve any case pending on appeal or review pending before the Superior Court, if it deems that the public importance thereof justifies a deviation from the regular procedure and a direct adjudication by the Supreme Court. * * *\n \n \n 7\n '(d) Judgments rendered by the Superior Court in appeals coming from the District Court and in proceedings for review, based on the record of the proceedings had at the administrative level, or by way of trial de novo, of the rulings, orders or resolutions of administrative organizations, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by way of certiorari to be issued at its discretion, and not otherwise.'\n \n \n 8\n We have no reason to doubt the competence of the legislature thus to regulate review in the Supreme Court of Puerto Rbico of judgments of the lower Puerto Rico of judgments of the lower the Act of June 26, 1958, may have had an unintended effect upon review by the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit and by the Supreme Court of the United States of cases decided by the Superior Court of Puerto Rico. If such effect has been accomplished, it can only be by virtue of inadequate draftsmanship by the Congress in 28 U.S.C. 1293 and 1294, under which the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit is vested only with jurisdiction to review final decisions of the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico. This jurisdictional language is to be contrasted with that of 28 U.S.C. 1257, under which the Supreme Court of the United States is given jurisdiction to review, by appeal or by certiorari, final judgments or decrees 'rendered by the highest court of a State in which a decision could be had'. Compare also 28 U.S.C. 1252, under which any party may appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States from an interlocutory or final judgment of any court of record in Puerto Rico holding an Act of Congress unconstitutional in any civil action.\n \n \n 9\n When the Superior Court on September 3, 1958, entered its judgment against the defendants in this case, a review in the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico was sought by the discretionary route. On October 2, 1958, the corporate codefendant filed in the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico a petition for review of the judgment of the Superior Court. Attached to the petition for review were (1) a copy of the amended complaint; (2) a copy of the answer thereto, and (3) the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the Superior Court judge. Luis Blanco Lugo, as the winning party below, filed an opposition to this petition for review, and attached thereto a transcript of his own direct testimony in the Superior Court and the deposition of an officer of the corporate defendant. On November 10, 1958, the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico entered a simple order denying the petition for review ('no ha lugar'). A motion for reconsideration, filed with some exhibits on November 20, 1958, was denied by the Supreme Court on December 5, 1958. On December 9, 1958, a notice of appeal to this court from the judgment of the Supreme Court was filed.\n \n \n 10\n The pending motion by appellant seeks to have added to the material hereinbefore enumerated, as part of the record on appeal, some documents and papers which were never before the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico. The motion is that this court enter an order 'directing the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico to cause to be prepared a transcript of the proceedings in this case both before the Superior Court of Puerto Rico, San Juan Section, and before the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, and to have such record translated and filed with this Court.'\n \n \n 11\n We think that this motion must be denied. Assuming for the moment, but not deciding, that 28 U.S.C. 1293 and 1294 give us appellate jurisdiction to review decisions of the highest court in Puerto Rico in which a review could be had, the fact of the matter is that appellant has not sought to appeal from the judgment of the Superior Court of Puerto Rico. The only notice of appeal filed by appellant in this case, that of December 9, 1958, purports to take an appeal from the final decision of the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico dated November 10, 1958, denying the discretionary petition for review. There is no doubt that this judicial action by the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico is a 'final decision', appealable to this court. See Jimenez v. Jones, 1 Cir., 1952, 195 F.2d 159, certiorari denied, Jimenez-Melendez v. Jones, 1952,344 U.S. 840, 73 S. Ct. 52, 97 L. Ed. 654. But since the review sought in the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico was available only in its discretion, that court's action in denying the petition could be set aside by us only upon a finding of an abuse of discretion, and of course, in passing upon whether there was such abuse of discretion, we can only look to the record of the case as it was presented to the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico.\n \n \n 12\n An order will be entered denying appellant's motion looking to enlargement of the record on appeal.\n \n ", "ocr": false, "opinion_id": 248183 } ]
First Circuit
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
F
USA, Federal
1,438,039
Judges Collester, Lynch and Michels
1974-07-17
false
lakewood-tp-mun-util-v-s-lakewood-water-co
null
Lakewood Tp. Mun. Util. v. S. Lakewood Water Co.
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
6
Published
null
null
[ "324 A.2d 78", "129 N.J. Super. 462" ]
[ { "author_str": null, "per_curiam": false, "type": "010combined", "page_count": null, "download_url": null, "author_id": null, "opinion_text": "\n129 N.J. Super. 462 (1974)\n324 A.2d 78\nLAKEWOOD TOWNSHIP MUNICIPAL UTILITIES AUTHORITY, A MUNICIPAL BODY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,\nv.\nSOUTH LAKEWOOD WATER COMPANY, A NEW JERSEY CORPORATION, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. SOUTH LAKEWOOD WATER COMPANY, A NEW JERSEY CORPORATION, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT,\nv.\nLAKEWOOD TOWNSHIP MUNICIPAL UTILITIES AUTHORITY, A MUNICIPAL BODY IN THE COUNTY OF OCEAN, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT. SOUTH LAKEWOOD WATER COMPANY, A NEW JERSEY CORPORATION, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT,\nv.\nLAKEWOOD TOWNSHIP MUNICIPAL UTILITIES AUTHORITY, A MUNICIPAL BODY, AND THE TOWNSHIP OF LAKEWOOD, IN THE COUNTY OF OCEAN, STATE OF NEW JERSEY, A MUNICIPAL BODY, DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS.\nSuperior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division.\nArgued June 10, 1974.\nDecided July 17, 1974.\n*464 Before Judges COLLESTER, LYNCH and MICHELS.\nMr. Frank R. Ciesla argued for appellant (Messrs. Giordano, Halleran &amp; McOmber, attorneys).\nMr. James J. Jeck argued for respondent Township of Lakewood.\nMr. Alan J. Pogarsky argued for respondent Lakewood Township Municipal Utilities Authority.\nThe opinion of the court was delivered by LYNCH, J.A.D.\nIn these consolidated cases South Lakewood Water Company (water company), appeals from various orders entered in the Law Division, arising out of the exercise by the Lakewood Township Municipal Utilities Authority (Authority) of an option granted to the Township of Lakewood (township)[1] under a 1962 township ordinance *465 to purchase the physical assets of the water company. Separate suits were instituted respectively by the Authority (Docket No. L-2085-73PW — hereafter \"case 2085\"), and by the water company (Docket No. L-1829-73PW — hereafter \"case 1829\"). Said suits were consolidated and appear here as Docket No. A-1231-72. A third suit (Docket No. L-11181-73PW — hereafter \"case 11181\") was instituted by the water company against both the Authority and the township. It is here as Docket No. A-1386-73. All appeals have been consolidated.\nIn case 2085 the Authority filed a complaint against the water company alleging that, having been organized by the township pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:14B-1 et seq., it lawfully exercised an option to purchase the water company's a sets as referred to in the 1962 ordinance; that the water company rejected its offer of $1,690,000; that the Authority had appointed Howard T. Rosen (Rosen) as its \"arbitrator\"[2] pursuant to the ordinance; that the water company had appointed John Fellows as its \"arbitrator,\" and prayed that (a) a third arbitrator be designated and (b) for a declaration that the ordinance, properly construed, established the valuation procedure to be that of \"arbitration,\" as distinguished from \"appraisement.\" The water company's motion to dismiss the complaint in case 2085 was denied by the trial judge.\nIn case 1829, the water company filed a complaint against the Authority, asserting that, while the Authority had purported to exercise the option, it was the township which had the option and not the Authority. The complaint further asserted that the appointment of Rosen by the Authority was invalid. The water company sought a judgment declaring that the exercise of the option by the Authority was invalid.\n*466 By way of a second count in case 1829, the water company alleged that, assuming that the Authority did have the right to appoint an \"appraiser,\" the obligation was to appoint a \"qualified\" appraiser, and Rosen was not qualified. The water company thereupon sought a declaration that the Authority be directed to appoint a qualified appraiser. The Authority's motion to dismiss the complaint in 1829 was granted by the trial judge.\nIn case 11181, the water company filed a complaint against both the Authority and the township wherein it alleged that since, by order of October 15, 1973, the trial judge had ruled that (a) the Authority had the right to exercise the option, and (b) the right to select Rosen as an \"arbitrator,\" it followed that the water company had an obligation to two independent bodies, namely, both the Authority and the township. Since that was so, the water company sought a declaration that: (a) both the Authority and the township would be bound by the decision of a board of \"appraisers\"; (b) on transfer to the Authority of its assets, the water company would be entitled to be paid by both the Authority and the township; (c) participation by the water company in the arbitration proceedings would satisfy the company's \"arbitration\" obligations, and (d) both the Authority and the township would be bound by the decision of the board of arbitrators and would be bound to pay the award of the \"majority\" of the board of appraisers.\nThe various allegations and contentions made in these three suits generated the issues which were decided by the trial court and here can be reduced on this appeal to: (1) whether the Authority had the right to exercise the option to purchase the company's assets; (2) whether the 1962 ordinance, properly construed, provided that the valuation process shall be by \"arbitration\" proceedings or \"appraisement,\" and whether the appointment of Rosen was valid, and (3) whether both the township and the Authority would be bound to pay for the company's assets and, if so, whether a declaration to that effect should be made at this time.\n*467 Said issues were disposed of by the trial court by orders dated October 15, 1973, December 5, 1973 and January 16, 1974 (in cases 2085 and 1829), and February 8, 1974 (in case 11181).\nIn its appeal the water company contends that the trial court erred in (1) holding that the Authority had the right to exercise the option; (2) designating the valuation proceedings as \"arbitration\" rather than \"appraisement,\" and in holding that the appointment of Rosen was valid, and (3) refusing \"at this time,\" as the trial court said, to determine whether both the township and the Authority would be liable to the water company for payment of its assets.\n\nI.\n\nThe right of the Authority to exercise the option.\nOn November 27, 1962 Lakewood passed an ordinance granting the water company a franchise to supply water for the township. Section 8 of the ordinance provided:\nThe Township of Lakewood shall have an unlimited continuing option to purchase all of the assets of the South Lakewood Water Company or its successors and assigns. It is understood that this option is irrevocable. The option to purchase shall include all of the assets of the South Lakewood Water Company, including land, plants (whether softening, aeration, aeration treatment or otherwise), wells, pumping stations, collecting reservoirs, basins, plant equipment, pumping equipment, general equipment, transmission mains and accessories, service pipes, meters, fire hydrants, and any other tangible assets together with any and all franchises, water diversion rights and any other rights which may be the property of the South Lakewood Water Company. The option shall not include any equipment or assets required solely for the operation of a water company outside of the Township of Lakewood. The purchase price shall be the value of the physical assets of the corporation. No allowance of any kind shall be made for the goodwill or friendship of the said corporation or for any intangible asset or assets of the corporation in [sic] the event that the parties cannot agree on the purchase price in accordance with the above formula then and in the [sic] event the purchase price, pursuant to the above mentioned formular [sic] shall be determined by a board of three disinterested, competent appraisers, one to be appointed by the Township of Lakewood, one to be appointed by the South Lakewood Water Company or its successors *468 or assigns, and the third to be appointed by two arbitrators so appointed. The decisions of a majority of the Board of Appraisers shall be binding upon the parties. The selection of the Board of Appraisers shall be made within ten days after written notice shall be served upon the South Lakewood Water Company that the Township Committee of the Township of Lakewood desires to exercise said option.\nThe option to purchase the assets of the South Lakewood Water Company shall be binding upon the South Lakewood Water Company, the successors and assigns. It is further understood and agreed that in the event that the South Lakewood Company should desire to sell its water company the Township of Lakewood shall have the first option to purchase same upon the same terms and conditions as the South Lakewood Water Company is willing to sell to a third party. In the event that the Township of Lakewood does not exercise said option, it is understood and agreed that the continuing option to purchase as herein provided shall still remain in full force and effect and shall be binding upon all of the successors of the South Lakewood Water Company. [Emphasis supplied]\nOn appeal the water company argues that it is totally unreasonable to rule, as the trial court did, that the Authority had the right to exercise the option and at the same time refuse to determine \"at this time\" that the township would still be liable for the purchase price of the company's assets. It is contended that the company should be entitled to rely on the credit of the township rather than that of the Authority alone, and that the effect of the trial court's ruling is to permit the township to avoid its obligations under the 1962 ordinance.\nThe township created the Authority for the purposes set forth in N.J.S.A. 40:14B-1 et seq. While it did not expressly assign to the Authority the option to purchase, N.J.S.A. 40:14B-20(5) provides that a municipal authority may:\n[i]n the name of the municipal authority but for the local unit or units and subject to the limitations of this act, * * * acquire by purchase, gift, condemnation or otherwise, or lease as lessee, real property and easements therein, necessary or useful and convenient for the purposes of the municipal authority, and subject to mortgages, deeds of trusts or other liens, or otherwise, and * * * hold and * * * use the same, and * * * dispose of property so acquired no longer *469 necessary for the purposes of the municipal authority; * * *. [Emphasis supplied]\nThe Authority is the alter ego of the municipality in providing water and sewer service. Darrah v. Eversham Tp., 111 N.J. Super. 62, 65 (App. Div. 1970). It is an agency and instrumentality of the municipality creating it. Jordan v. Zidel, 40 N.J. 244, 248 (1963). See also Camden County v. Pennsauken Sewerage Auth., 15 N.J. 456 (1954). Therefore, even though there was no express formal assignment by the township to the Authority of the right to exercise the option, the right passed to the Authority by virtue of the cited statute. The trial court's action to the same effect is therefore affirmed.\n\nII\n\n\nShould there be a declaration \"at this time\" as to whether (a) the township and (b) the Authority is liable to pay for the assets of the Water Company?\n\n\n(a)\n\nAs to the township\nAs to the township, appellant contends that the trial court's refusal to declare \"at this time\" that the township will be liable for the purchase of the company's assets, in effect, relieves the township of its obligations pursuant to the ordinance. We disagree. As we have noted, all that the trial court did was to refuse to rule on that issue \"at this time.\" The court's reasoning was that when the time comes to pay for the assets of the water company, the Authority may be able to satisfy that obligation. In that event, since the company will have been paid, the issue as to the township's liability would be academic. If, on the other hand, the Authority was unable to satisfy the obligation, the issue as to the township's liability could then be determined. *470 We agree with the trial court's view and affirm its action in that respect.\n\n(b)\n\nAs to the Authority\nThe unqualified exercise of an option creates a binding, bilateral executory contract of sale. West Caldwell v. Caldwell, 26 N.J. 9, 26 (1958).\nIn Castle Creek Water Co. v. Aspen, 146 F. 8 (10 Cir.1906), it was held that once a municipality had notified a water company that it intended to exercise its option to purchase its assets, a binding contract was in effect and the municipality could not then refuse to go through with the arbitration provided for in the contract. See also Camden Sewer Co. v. Mayor, etc., of Salisbury, 166 Md. 436, 171 A. 75 (Ct. App. 1934); Rockport Water Co. v. Inhabitants of the Town of Rockport, 161 Mass. 279, 37 N.E. 168 (Sup. Jud. Ct. 1894).\nSince we have held that the Authority had the right to exercise the option, it is clearly liable to pay for the purchase of the water company's assets. We see no reason for withholding adjudication to that effect. The trial court erred in refusing to determine \"at this time\" the liability of the Authority. In that respect, the trial court's action is reversed.\n\nIII\n\nWere the valuation proceedings \"arbitration\" or \"appraisement\"? Was the appointment of Rosen valid?\nThe Authority in its suit (case 2085) requested a decision from the Law Division that the proceedings contemplated were \"arbitration\" rather than \"appraisement.\" On the other hand, the water company, in the second count of its case 1829, sought a declaration in effect that the valuation *471 proceedings were \"appraisement.\" The trial judge held that the proceedings were \"arbitration\" and ultimately Messrs. Rosen, Conway and Weisenfeld constituted the board of arbitration to determine the value of the water company's property.\nThe distinction between \"arbitration\" and \"appraisement\" is significant. It is pointed out in 5 Am. Jur., Arbitration and Award, § 3 at 520, 521:\nAn agreement for arbitration ordinarily encompasses the disposition of the entire controversy between the parties upon which award a judgment may be entered, whereas an agreement for appraisal extends merely to the resolution of the specific issues of actual cash value and the amount of loss, all other issues being reserved for determination in a plenary action before the court. Furthermore, appraisers are generally expected to act on their own skill and knowledge; they may reach individual conclusions and are required to meet only for the purpose of ironing out differences in the conclusions reached; and they are not obliged to give the rival claimants any formal notice or to hear evidence, but may proceed by ex parte investigation so long as the parties are given opportunity to make statements and explanations with regard to matters in issue. Arbitrators, on the other hand, must meet together at all hearings, they act quasi-judicially and may receive the evidence or views of a party to the dispute only in the presence, or on notice to, the other side, and may adjudge the matters to be decided only on what is presented to them in the course of an adversary proceeding.\nWhether the procedures required are those of an arbitration or of an appraisal is to be found from the intent of the disputants or from the character of the questions and issues to be answered, or both. However, where the agreement so contemplates, the results of an appraisal may be just as binding as the award of arbitrators.\nIn Sanitary Farm Dairies v. Gammel, 195 F.2d 106, 113 (8 Cir.1952), it was held that where parties to a contract, before a dispute and in order to avoid one, provide for a method of ascertaining the value of something related to their dealings, the provision is one for an appraisement and not for arbitration. In that case a stockholder brought suit against a corporation for specific performance of a contract to repurchase common stock. The contract gave the stockholder an option, without limitation in time, to resell the corporation stock at a set value. The agreement provided *472 that in the event of the inability of the parties to agree upon earnings an audit should be made by an independent auditor and that his determination on earnings would be controlling. The stockholder exercised the option but was unwilling to accept the determination of earnings made by the accountants employed by the company, and the parties then selected Ernst &amp; Ernst to make an audit for the purposes of the contract. The issue, of course, was the nature of the proceedings, the court concluding that under the circumstances of that case an appraisal was involved and under Minnesota law the appraisal is conclusive upon the parties.\nA somewhat similar result was reached in Pintard v. Irwin, 20 N.J.L. 497, 509 (Sup. Ct. 1845), wherein Justice Carpenter, in delivering one of the opinions in the case, noted that under the agreement there involved an appraisal of value was intended by the parties. The court there distinguished between appraisement and arbitration, pointing out that the submission did not have the final ending of the controversy as its immediate object. It was but the reference of a collateral fact — the submission of a particular question, forming only a link in the plaintiff's case. The appraisement substituted the judgment of the referee in the place of evidence, leaving the controversy open, and while it may be that the report was necessary as a part of plaintiff's case, a recovery could not be had on the appraisement alone. The court also pointed out that while the appraisement had several of the characteristics of an arbitration, it still fell short of the principal feature, which is the ending of the controversy. The court noted that an appraisement could be likened to the purchase of an article under an agreement to pay what another party says it is worth. In Pintard the parties had entered into a lease of the premises with the understanding that if the premises were sold, plaintiff, who had planted and cultivated the land, should be remunerated, not by the repayment of his expenses but by the payment of one-half of the appraised value. The parties *473 then submitted the controversy to appraisers whose evaluation was binding upon the parties as an \"appraisement.\"\nOur more modern cases point out that since a submission to arbitration is essentially a contractual matter, the parties are bound to the extent of their contract. The courts also hold that arbitration is favored by our courts and that arbitration should be compelled in proper situations. In Keppler v. Terhune, 88 N.J. Super. 455 (App. Div. 1965), the contract involved was a lease with an option to the lessee to purchase the land at any time for the fair market value. The lease further provided that if the parties could not agree as to the fair market value, then the land would be appraised by a competent real estate expert and if the appraisal would not be satisfactory to both parties, each party would then choose \"an Arbitrator,\" and submit the matter to arbitration. In Keppler the owner argued that the determination of the fair market value of land was not an issue arbitrable under the statute. The court disagreed and held that it did constitute an arbitrable issue under the provisions of our arbitration statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:24-1 et seq. But the issue was whether arbitration was preferable to litigation — not whether it should rather be \"appraisement\" which would, if binding, avoid litigation.\nIn Omaha v. Omaha Water Co., 218 U.S. 180, 30 S.Ct. 615, 54 L.Ed. 991 (1910), the issue was whether a contract between a municipality and a water company for the purchase and sale of a water works system which provided that the property was to pass \"at an appraised valuation which shall be ascertained by the estimate of three engineers,\" contemplated an appraisal or an arbitration. The court held that it was an \"appraisal.\" It said:\nAn arbitration implies a difference, a dispute, and involves ordinarily a hearing and all thereby implied. The right to notice of hearings, to produce evidence and cross-examine that produced, is implied when the matter to be decided is one of dispute and difference. But when, as here, the parties had agreed that one should sell and the other buy a specific thing, and the price should be a valuation fixed by persons agreed upon, it cannot be said that there was any *474 dispute or difference. Such an arrangement precludes or prevents difference, and is not intended to settle any which has arisen. This seems to be the distinction between an arbitration and an appraisement, though the first term is often used when the other is more appropriate.\nIt is true that there is some ambiguity in the language of the 1962 ordinance here involved with respect to whether \"arbitration\" or \"appraisement\" was contemplated. It speaks of \"appraisers,\" \"two arbitrators,\" and twice refers to \"Board of Appraisers.\" In Annotation, \"Arbitration to Fix Price or Damages,\" 157 A.L.R. 1286 (1945), the general rule of construction of contracts for the proposed purchase or sale of property is said to be: if all differences between the parties have been resolved and all matters adjusted except the price to be paid, the selection of a third person or persons to determine the price, in the absence of indications to the contrary, is held to contemplate a reliance on the individual judgment of such person or persons, particularly if they are selected because of their special knowledge of the subject matter, and so creates duties ministerial in nature as distinguished from judicial, and indicates an act of \"appraisal\" rather than \"arbitration.\"\nWe conclude that the ordinance here, directing the selection of \"competent\" appraisers is to be construed as an act of \"appraisement\" rather than \"arbitration.\" The order of the trial court directing that the Authority has the right to select one \"arbitrator\" of its choice, holding that Rosen is a \"qualified arbitrator to serve in the arbitration proceedings herein\" and that he and Fellows be directed to select a third \"arbitrator\" to complete the makeup of the \"Board of Arbitrators,\" is reversed.\n\nCONCLUSION\nIt is ordered:\n(1) The Authority had the right to exercise the option under the 1962 ordinance and the Law Division's order *475 of October 15, 1973 to that effect and dismissing count I in case 1829 is affirmed.\n(2) The order of October 15, 1973, insofar as it provided that Rosen is a \"qualified arbitrator\" and dismissing count II in case 1829, is reversed. We make no ruling as to Rosen's qualification in the event that he is hereafter appointed as an \"appraiser.\"\n(3) The orders of October 15, 1973 and January 16, 1974, insofar as they hold that the valuation proceedings contemplated by the 1962 ordinance were to be \"arbitration\" proceedings, and directing that three arbitrators be appointed and that they proceed to evaluate the water company's assets, are reversed, and it is ordered that three qualified appraisers be appointed to conduct an \"appraisement\" of the assets pursuant to the ordinance. Accordingly, the said orders, insofar as they deny the motion of the water company to dismiss the complaint in Case 2085, are reversed and the complaint therein is dismissed.\n(4) The order of the Law Division in case 11181, entered on February 8, 1974, in refusing \"at this time\" to declare that the township would be liable for the purchase price of the water company's assets is affirmed.\n(5) The action[3] of the Law Division in refusing to determine \"at this time\" that the Authority would be liable for the purchase price of the assets is reversed and it is adjudged that it would be so liable pursuant to the terms of the 1962 Ordinance.\n(6) Cases 1829 and 11181 are remanded to the Law Division for proceedings in accordance with the views expressed herein.\nWe do not retain jurisdiction.\nNOTES\n[1] The distinction between Township and Authority creates an issue in this case.\n[2] As will be seen, whether an \"arbitrator\" or \"appraiser\" was to be appointed is another pivotal issue.\n[3] It appears that no formal order to this effect was entered, but the court's oral determination evinces this intent.\n\n", "ocr": false, "opinion_id": 1438039 } ]
New Jersey Superior Court App Division
New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
SA
New Jersey, NJ
2,690,174
O'Connor, C.J.
2014-03-05
false
in-re-disqualification-of-knece
In re Disqualification of Knece
In re Disqualification of Knece
In Re Disqualification of Knece. Rothwell v. Rothwell
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
0
Published
null
<parties data-order="0" data-type="parties" id="b756-4"> In re Disqualification of Knece. Rothwell <em> v. </em> Rothwell. </parties><br><p data-order="1" data-type="citation" id="b756-6"> [Cite as <em> In re Disqualification of Knece, </em> 138 Ohio St.3d 1274, 2014-Ohio-1414.] </p><br><docketnumber data-order="2" data-type="docketnumber" id="b756-8"> (No. 14-AP-005 </docketnumber><decisiondate data-order="3" data-type="decisiondate" id="Ay-"> Decided March 5, 2014.) </decisiondate>
[ "2014 Ohio 1414", "138 Ohio St. 3d 1274" ]
[ { "author_str": "O'Connor", "per_curiam": false, "type": "010combined", "page_count": 6, "download_url": "http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rod/docs/pdf/0/2014/2014-ohio-1414.pdf", "author_id": null, "opinion_text": "[Cite as In re Disqualification of Knece, 138 Ohio St. 3d 1274, 2014-Ohio-1414.]\n\n\n\n\n IN RE DISQUALIFICATION OF KNECE.\n ROTHWELL v. ROTHWELL.\n [Cite as In re Disqualification of Knece, 138 Ohio St. 3d 1274,\n 2014-Ohio-1414.]\nJudges—Affidavit of disqualification—R.C. 2701.03(D)(3)—Judge may undertake\n ministerial acts during the pendency of an affidavit of disqualification—\n Disqualification denied.\n (No. 14-AP-005—Decided March 5, 2014.)\n ON AFFIDAVIT OF DISQUALIFICATION in Pickaway County Court of Common\n Pleas Case No. 2009-DV-0335.\n ____________________\n O’CONNOR, C.J.\n {¶ 1} Kinsley F. Nyce, counsel for defendant Mark Rothwell, filed an\naffidavit of disqualification on January 27, 2014, against Judge P. Randall Knece\nof the Court of Common Pleas of Pickaway County. Nyce’s affidavit was denied\nby entry dated February 4, 2014, because the record failed to indicate what, if\nanything, remained pending before Judge Knece in the underlying case. See In re\nDisqualification of Hayes, 135 Ohio St. 3d 1221, 2012-Ohio-6306, 985 N.E.2d\n501, ¶ 6 (“[t]he Chief Justice cannot rule on an affidavit of disqualification\nwhen * * * nothing is pending before the trial court”).\n {¶ 2} On February 11, 2014, Nyce filed two supplemental affidavits of\ndisqualification, averring that since the filing of his initial affidavit, he had filed a\nmotion in the trial court under Civ.R. 59 and 60. Nyce also set forth additional\nbias allegations against Judge Knece.\n\f SUPREME COURT OF OHIO\n\n\n\n\n {¶ 3} Judge Knece has responded in writing to the allegations in Nyce’s\ninitial and supplemental affidavits, denying any bias or prejudice against Nyce or\nhis client.\n {¶ 4} For the reasons explained below, no basis has been established to\norder the disqualification of Judge Knece.\n Nyce’s First Supplemental Affidavit\n {¶ 5} As noted above, Nyce filed his initial affidavit of disqualification\non January 27, 2014. The next scheduled hearing in the underlying case was set\nfor that same day on plaintiff’s motion to disburse the supersedeas bond posted by\ndefendant.1 After filing his affidavit, Nyce appeared for the scheduled hearing\nand presented a copy of the affidavit to Judge Knece. Judge Knece moved\nforward with the hearing and entered an order directing the clerk of courts to\ndisburse the supersedeas bond proceeds to plaintiff. Nyce argues that the filing of\nhis initial affidavit should have barred Judge Knece from proceeding with the\nJanuary 27 hearing and disbursing the bond proceeds. Nyce further states that at\nthe hearing, Judge Knece “functioned in a manner not appropriate to neutral\njudicial temperament,” engaged in a “unilateral argument” with Nyce about the\naffidavit of disqualification, “had significant words demonstrating animosity,”\nand was “aggressive, demeaning and unresponsive” to Nyce’s arguments.\n {¶ 6} Under R.C. 2701.03(D)(1), if the clerk of this court accepts an\naffidavit of disqualification for filing, “the affidavit deprives the judge against\nwhom the affidavit was filed of any authority to preside in the proceeding until\nthe chief justice of the supreme court * * * rules on the affidavit.” See also State\n\n1. Under R.C. 2701.03(B), an affidavit of disqualification must be filed “not less than seven\ncalendar days before the day on which the next hearing in the proceeding is scheduled.” However,\nthis statutory deadline may be set aside “when compliance with the provision is impossible,” such\nas when the alleged bias or prejudice occurs fewer than seven days before the hearing date or the\ncase is scheduled or assigned to a judge within seven days of the next hearing. In re\nDisqualification of Leskovyansky, 88 Ohio St. 3d 1210, 723 N.E.2d 1099 (1999). Here, Nyce\nsufficiently demonstrated that he had received notice of the hearing on January 25, 2014, which\nwas less than seven days before the hearing. Therefore, his affidavit was considered timely filed.\n\n\n\n\n 2\n\f January Term, 2014\n\n\n\n\nv. Myers, 97 Ohio St. 3d 335, 2002-Ohio-6658, 780 N.E.2d 186, ¶ 57 (the filing of\nan affidavit “automatically divests the judge of jurisdiction to proceed until the\nmatter is resolved”). However, there are statutory exceptions to this prohibition\nagainst proceeding after the filing of an affidavit of disqualification. See R.C.\n2701.03(D)(2) and (3). Most relevant here, R.C. 2701.03(D)(3) authorizes a\njudge against whom an affidavit is filed to decide matters that do not “affect a\nsubstantive right of any of the parties.” Courts have interpreted this exception as\nallowing a judge to undertake ministerial acts during the pendency of the\naffidavit. See, e.g., State ex rel. Stern v. Mascio, 81 Ohio St. 3d 297, 299, 691\nN.E.2d 253 (1998); State ex rel. Kreps v. Christiansen, 88 Ohio St. 3d 313, 317,\n725 N.E.2d 663 (2000) (interpreting analogous provision in R.C. 2701.031);\nColumbus Checkcashers, Inc. v. Guttermaster, Inc., 10th Dist. Franklin No.\n13AP-106, 2013-Ohio-5543, ¶ 18, 28.\n {¶ 7} Judge Knece appears to invoke this exception, arguing that his\norder disbursing the supersedeas bond was “ministerial in nature” and in\ncompliance with the appellate court’s directive to carry its judgment into\nexecution. Nyce disagrees, claiming that the issue of bond disbursement was not\nyet ripe for consideration.\n {¶ 8} If there is any question whether a judge’s ruling during the\npendency of an affidavit could affect a party’s substantive rights, the more\nprudent course of action would be to refrain from making such a ruling until the\naffidavit is resolved. However, it is beyond the scope of this proceeding to\ndetermine whether Judge Knece had statutory authority to issue the January 27\norder. The issue in disqualification proceedings is “limited to determining\nwhether a judge in a pending case has a bias, prejudice, or other disqualifying\ninterest that mandates the judge’s disqualification from that case.” In re\nDisqualification of Griffin, 101 Ohio St. 3d 1219, 2003-Ohio-7356, 803 N.E.2d\n820, ¶ 9. Compare Stern at 299-300 (issuing writ of prohibition voiding a judge’s\n\n\n\n 3\n\f SUPREME COURT OF OHIO\n\n\n\n\norders on substantive matters relating to a contempt conviction issued during the\npendency of an affidavit of disqualification) and Kreps at 317 (denying a request\nfor writs of prohibition and mandamus against a judge who had made a\n“ministerial” order directing a party to pay a previously ordered judgment during\nthe pendency of an affidavit).\n {¶ 9} Although a judge’s ruling during the pendency of an affidavit\ncould be evidence of bias, see, e.g., In re Disqualification of Celebrezze, 74 Ohio\nSt.3d 1242, 657 N.E.2d 1348 (1992), Judge Knece’s legal determination here that\nthe issue before the court on January 27 was “ministerial”—and therefore not\nprohibited by the filing of Nyce’s affidavit—does not, by itself, indicate bias or\nprejudice against Nyce. It is well settled that a party’s “dissatisfaction or\ndisagreement with a judge’s rulings, even if those rulings may be erroneous, does\nnot constitute bias or prejudice and is not grounds for the judge’s\ndisqualification.” In re Disqualification of Floyd, 101 Ohio St. 3d 1217, 2003-\nOhio-7351, 803 N.E.2d 818, ¶ 4.\n {¶ 10} However, a judge could be disqualified if his or her adverse rulings\nwere accompanied by words or conduct that call into question the manner in\nwhich the proceedings are being conducted. In addition, attorneys have a right to\nfile an affidavit of disqualification challenging a court’s perceived partiality\n“ ‘without the court misconstruing such a challenge as an assault on the integrity\nof the court.’ ” Disciplinary Counsel v. Shimko, 134 Ohio St. 3d 544, 2012-Ohio-\n5694, 983 N.E.2d 1300, ¶ 32, quoting United States v. Brown, 72 F.3d 25, 29 (5th\nCir.1995). Here, Nyce claims that after he presented his affidavit to Judge Knece\nat the January 27 hearing, the judge “had significant words demonstrating\nanimosity” and engaged in a “unilateral argument.”\n {¶ 11} Nyce, however, has failed to substantiate these allegations with\nspecific examples or a transcript of the hearing. In affidavit-of-disqualification\nproceedings, the burden falls on the affiant to submit “specific” allegations of\n\n\n\n\n 4\n\f January Term, 2014\n\n\n\n\nbias. R.C. 2701.03(B)(1). And the affiant is generally “required to submit\nevidence beyond the affidavit of disqualification supporting the allegations\ncontained therein.” In re Disqualification of Baronzzi, 135 Ohio St. 3d 1212,\n2012-Ohio-6341, 985 N.E.2d 494, ¶ 6. Instead of submitting the transcript\nhimself, Nyce requests this court to obtain the January 27 transcript for him. But\nit is not the chief justice’s duty in deciding an affidavit of disqualification to\nfurther investigate an affiant’s claims or obtain evidence on the affiant’s behalf.\nNyce had the burden of proof, and based on the record here, his vague and\nunsubstantiated allegations regarding Judge Knece’s alleged animosity are\ninsufficient for a finding of bias or prejudice. See In re Disqualification of\nWalker, 36 Ohio St. 3d 606, 522 N.E.2d 460 (1988) (“vague, unsubstantiated\nallegations of the affidavit are insufficient on their face for a finding of bias or\nprejudice”).\n Nyce’s Second Supplemental Affidavit\n {¶ 12} On January 28, 2014, the day after Nyce filed his affidavit, Judge\nKnece initiated a teleconference with counsel in the underlying case. Nyce claims\nthat during the conference, the judge stated that he had reviewed the docket in the\nunderlying matter and discovered that plaintiff had a motion for contempt that had\nnot yet been ruled on by the court. Judge Knece then allegedly stated that he\nwould not make any rulings in the case pending resolution of Nyce’s initial\naffidavit but that plaintiff’s counsel should “revisit” the contempt motion. Nyce\nclaims that the judge’s conduct indicated “intentional intimidation” and was\n“contrary to the required elements of judicial fairness and neutrality.”\n {¶ 13} In response, Judge Knece explains that Nyce had claimed in his\ninitial affidavit that the court had not timely ruled upon two of Nyce’s motions.\nAccording to Judge Knece, he therefore reviewed the case docket and determined\nthat Nyce’s referenced motions were moot. The judge asserts that in reviewing\nthe docket, he also determined that plaintiff had filed a contempt motion in May\n\n\n\n 5\n\f SUPREME COURT OF OHIO\n\n\n\n\n2012, which remained pending. Judge Knece states that he then scheduled the\nteleconference for the sole purpose of “establishing procedural parameters to\nbring pending matters to a close, not for the purpose of intimidation.”\n {¶ 14} In affidavit-of-disqualification proceedings, “[a] judge is presumed\nto follow the law and not to be biased, and the appearance of bias or prejudice\nmust be compelling to overcome these presumptions.” In re Disqualification of\nGeorge, 100 Ohio St. 3d 1241, 2003-Ohio-5489, 798 N.E.2d 23, ¶ 5. Given\nJudge’s Knece’s explanation for initiating the teleconference and referring to\nplaintiff’s pending contempt motion, those presumptions have not been overcome\nin this case. Accordingly, Nyce has failed to establish that the judge’s conduct\nwas a product of bias against Nyce or his client.\n Conclusion\n {¶ 15} For the reasons explained above, Nyce’s supplemental affidavits\nare denied. The case may proceed before Judge Knece.\n _________________________\n\n\n\n\n 6\n\f", "ocr": false, "opinion_id": 2690174 } ]
Ohio Supreme Court
Ohio Supreme Court
S
Ohio, OH
2,541,432
Dowd, Hoff, Mary, Robert, Sherri, Sullivan
2012-05-09
false
wingo-v-state
Wingo
Wingo v. State
Dwayne WINGO, Appellant/Movant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent
Scott Thompson, St. Louis, MO, for Appellant., Chris Roster, Attorney General, Timothy A. Blackwell, Assistant Attorney General, Jefferson City, MO, for Respondent.
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
1
Published
null
<parties id="b105-29"> Dwayne WINGO, Appellant/Movant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent. </parties><br><docketnumber id="b105-32"> No. ED 97032. </docketnumber><br><court id="b105-33"> Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, Division Three. </court><br><decisiondate id="b105-35"> May 9, 2012. </decisiondate><br><attorneys id="b106-3"> <span citation-index="1" class="star-pagination" label="88"> *88 </span> Scott Thompson, St. Louis, MO, for Appellant. </attorneys><br><attorneys id="b106-4"> Chris Roster, Attorney General, Timothy A. Blackwell, Assistant Attorney General, Jefferson City, MO, for Respondent. </attorneys><br><judges id="b106-5"> Before ROBERT G. DOWD, JR., P.J., MARY K. HOFF, J. and SHERRI B. SULLIVAN, J. </judges>
[ "366 S.W.3d 87" ]
[ { "author_str": "Per Curiam", "per_curiam": false, "type": "010combined", "page_count": null, "download_url": null, "author_id": 7702, "opinion_text": "\n366 S.W.3d 87 (2012)\nDwayne WINGO, Appellant/Movant,\nv.\nSTATE of Missouri, Respondent.\nNo. ED 97032.\nMissouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, Division Three.\nMay 9, 2012.\n*88 Scott Thompson, St. Louis, MO, for Appellant.\nChris Koster, Attorney General, Timothy A. Blackwell, Assistant Attorney General, Jefferson City, MO, for Respondent.\nBefore ROBERT G. DOWD, JR., P.J., MARY K. HOFF, J. and SHERRI B. SULLIVAN, J.\n\nORDER\nPER CURIAM.\nDwayne Wingo appeals from the motion court's findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order (judgment) denying his Rule 29.15 Amended Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct the Judgment or Sentence. We affirm.\nWe have reviewed the briefs of the parties and the record on appeal and find the claims of error to be without merit. An extended opinion would have no jurisprudential or precedential value. We have, however, provided a memorandum opinion for the use of the parties setting forth the reasons for our decision. We affirm the trial court's judgment pursuant to Rule 84.16(b).\n", "ocr": false, "opinion_id": 2541432 } ]
Missouri Court of Appeals
Missouri Court of Appeals
SA
Missouri, MO
111,555
Brennan, Burger, Powell, Rehnquist, Stevens, White
1986-01-21
false
daniels-v-williams
Daniels
Daniels v. Williams
Daniels v. Williams
Stephen Allan Saltzburg argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioner., James Walter Hopper argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent.
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
Argued November 6, 1985
null
null
3,555
Published
null
<parties id="b465-3"> DANIELS <em> v. </em> WILLIAMS </parties><br><docketnumber id="b465-5"> No. 84-5872. </docketnumber><otherdate id="Ayx"> Argued November 6, 1985 </otherdate><decisiondate id="AYvD"> Decided January 21, 1986 </decisiondate><br><judges id="b465-11"> Rehnquist, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Brennan, White, Powell, and O’Connor, JJ., joined. Marshall, J., concurred in the result. Blackmun, J., <em> post, </em> p. 336, and Stevens, J., <em> post, </em> p. 336, filed opinions concurring in the judgment. </judges><br><attorneys id="b466-4"> <span citation-index="1" class="star-pagination" label="328"> *328 </span> <em> Stephen Allan Saltzburg </em> argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioner. </attorneys><br><attorneys id="b466-5"> <em> James Walter Hopper </em> argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent. </attorneys>
[ "88 L. Ed. 2d 662", "106 S. Ct. 662", "474 U.S. 327", "1986 U.S. LEXIS 43" ]
[ { "author_str": null, "per_curiam": false, "type": "010combined", "page_count": null, "download_url": null, "author_id": null, "opinion_text": "\n474 U.S. 327 (1986)\nDANIELS\nv.\nWILLIAMS\nNo. 84-5872.\nSupreme Court of United States.\nArgued November 6, 1985\nDecided January 21, 1986\nCERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\n*328 Stephen Allan Saltzburg argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioner.\nJames Walter Hopper argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent.\nJUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.\nIn Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U. S. 527 (1981), a state prisoner sued under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, claiming that prison officials had negligently deprived him of his property without due process of law. After deciding that § 1983 contains no independent state-of-mind requirement, we concluded that although petitioner had been \"deprived\" of property within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the State's postdeprivation tort remedy provided the process that was due. Petitioner's claim in this case, which also rests on an alleged Fourteenth Amendment \"deprivation\" caused by the negligent conduct of a prison official, leads us to reconsider our statement in Parratt that \"the alleged loss, even though negligently caused, amounted to a deprivation.\" Id., at 536-537. We conclude that the Due Process Clause is simply not implicated by a negligent act of an official causing unintended loss of or injury to life, liberty, or property.\nIn this § 1983 action, petitioner seeks to recover damages for back and ankle injuries allegedly sustained when he fell on a prison stairway. He claims that, while an inmate at the city jail in Richmond, Virginia, he slipped on a pillow negligently left on the stairs by respondent, a correctional deputy stationed at the jail. Respondent's negligence, the argument runs, \"deprived\" petitioner of his \"liberty\" interest in freedom from bodily injury, see Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651, 673 (1977); because respondent maintains that he is entitled to the defense of sovereign immunity in a state tort suit, petitioner is without an \"adequate\" state remedy, cf. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U. S. 517, 534-536 (1984). Accordingly, the deprivation of liberty was without \"due process of law.\"\n*329 The District Court granted respondent's motion for summary judgment. A panel of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed, concluding that even if respondent could make out an immunity defense in state court, petitioner would not be deprived of a meaningful opportunity to present his case. 720 F. 2d 792 (1983). On rehearing, the en banc Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the District Court, but under reasoning different from that of the panel. 748 F. 2d 229 (1984). First, a 5-4 majority ruled that negligent infliction of bodily injury, unlike the negligent loss of property in Parratt, does not constitute a deprivation of any interest protected by the Due Process Clause. The majority therefore believed that the postdeprivation process mandated by Parratt for property losses was not required. Second, the en banc court unanimously decided that even if a prisoner is entitled to some remedy for personal injuries attributable to the negligence of state officials, Parratt would bar petitioner's claim if the State provided an adequate postdeprivation remedy. Finally, a 6-3 majority concluded that petitioner had an adequate remedy in state court, even though respondent asserted that he would rely on sovereign immunity as a defense in a state suit. The majority apparently believed that respondent's sovereign immunity defense would fail under Virginia law.\nBecause of the inconsistent approaches taken by lower courts in determining when tortious conduct by state officials rises to the level of a constitutional tort, see Jackson v. Joliet, 465 U. S. 1049, 1050 (1984) (WHITE, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (collecting cases), and the apparent lack of adequate guidance from this Court, we granted certiorari. 469 U. S. 1207 (1985). We now affirm.\nIn Parratt v. Taylor, we granted certiorari, as we had twice before, \"to decide whether mere negligence will support a claim for relief under § 1983.\" 451 U. S., at 532. After examining the language, legislative history, and prior interpretations of the statute, we concluded that § 1983, unlike *330 like its criminal counterpart, 18 U. S. C. § 242, contains no state-of-mind requirement independent of that necessary to state a violation of the underlying constitutional right. Id., at 534-535. We adhere to that conclusion. But in any given § 1983 suit, the plaintiff must still prove a violation of the underlying constitutional right; and depending on the right, merely negligent conduct may not be enough to state a claim. See, e. g., Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U. S. 252 (1977) (invidious discriminatory purpose required for claim of racial discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U. S. 97, 105 (1976) (\"deliberate indifference\" to prisoner's serious illness or injury sufficient to constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment).\nIn Parratt, before concluding that Nebraska's tort remedy provided all the process that was due, we said that the loss of the prisoner's hobby kit, \"even though negligently caused, amounted to a deprivation [under the Due Process Clause].\" 451 U. S., at 536-537. JUSTICE POWELL, concurring in the result, criticized the majority for \"pass[ing] over\" this important question of the state of mind required to constitute a \"deprivation\" of property. Id., at 547. He argued that negligent acts by state officials, though causing loss of property, are not actionable under the Due Process Clause. To JUSTICE POWELL, mere negligence could not \"wor[k] a deprivation in the constitutional sense.\" Id., at 548 (emphasis in original). Not only does the word \"deprive\" in the Due Process Clause connote more than a negligent act, but we should not \"open the federal courts to lawsuits where there has been no affirmative abuse of power.\" Id., at 548-549; see also id., at 545 (Stewart, J., concurring) (\"To hold that this kind of loss is a deprivation of property within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment seems not only to trivialize, but grossly to distort the meaning and intent of the Constitution\"). Upon reflection, we agree and overrule Parratt to the extent that it states that mere lack of due care by a state *331 official may \"deprive\" an individual of life, liberty, or property under the Fourteenth Amendment.\nThe Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides: \"[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.\" Historically, this guarantee of due process has been applied to deliberate decisions of government officials to deprive a person of life, liberty, or property. E. g., Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97 (1878) (assessment of real estate); Rochin v. California, 342 U. S. 165 (1952) (stomach pumping); Bell v. Burson, 402 U. S. 535 (1971) (suspension of driver's license); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651 (1977) (paddling student); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U. S. 517 (1984) (intentional destruction of inmate's property). No decision of this Court before Parratt supported the view that negligent conduct by a state official, even though causing injury, constitutes a deprivation under the Due Process Clause. This history reflects the traditional and common-sense notion that the Due Process Clause, like its forebear in the Magna Carta, see Corwin, The Doctrine of Due Process of Law Before the Civil War, 24 Harv. L. Rev. 366, 368 (1911), was \" `intended to secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of government,' \" Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516, 527 (1884) (quoting Bank of Columbia v. Okely, 4 Wheat. 235, 244 (1819)). See also Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U. S. 539, 558 (1974) (\"The touchstone of due process is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of government, Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U. S. 114, 123 (1889)\"); Parratt, supra, at 549 (POWELL, J., concurring in result). By requiring the government to follow appropriate procedures when its agents decide to \"deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,\" the Due Process Clause promotes fairness in such decisions. And by barring certain government actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them, e. g., Rochin, supra, it serves to prevent governmental power from being \"used for purposes of oppression,\" Murray's Lessee *332 v. Hoboken Land &amp; Improvement Co., 18 How. 272, 277 (1856) (discussing Due Process Clause of Fifth Amendment).\nWe think that the actions of prison custodians in leaving a pillow on the prison stairs, or mislaying an inmate's property, are quite remote from the concerns just discussed. Far from an abuse of power, lack of due care suggests no more than a failure to measure up to the conduct of a reasonable person. To hold that injury caused by such conduct is a deprivation within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment would trivialize the centuries-old principle of due process of law.\nThe Fourteenth Amendment is a part of a Constitution generally designed to allocate governing authority among the Branches of the Federal Government and between that Government and the States, and to secure certain individual rights against both State and Federal Government. When dealing with a claim that such a document creates a right in prisoners to sue a government official because he negligently created an unsafe condition in the prison, we bear in mind Chief Justice Marshall's admonition that \"we must never forget, that it is a constitution we are expounding,\" McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 407 (1819) (emphasis in original). Our Constitution deals with the large concerns of the governors and the governed, but it does not purport to supplant traditional tort law in laying down rules of conduct to regulate liability for injuries that attend living together in society. We have previously rejected reasoning that \" `would make of the Fourteenth Amendment a font of tort law to be super-imposed upon whatever systems may already be administered by the States,' \" Paul v. Davis, 424 U. S. 693, 701 (1976), quoted in Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U. S., at 544.\nThe only tie between the facts of this case and anything governmental in nature is the fact that respondent was a sheriff's deputy at the Richmond city jail and petitioner was an inmate confined in that jail. But while the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment obviously speaks to some facets of this relationship, see, e. g., Wolff v. McDonnell, *333 supra, we do not believe its protections are triggered by lack of due care by prison officials. \"Medical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner,\" Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U. S. 97, 106 (1976), and \"false imprisonment does not become a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment merely because the defendant is a state official.\" Baker v. McCollan, 443 U. S. 137, 146 (1979). Where a government official's act causing injury to life, liberty, or property is merely negligent, \"no procedure for compensation is constitutionally required.\" Parratt, supra, at 548 (POWELL, J., concurring in result) (emphasis added).[1]\nThat injuries inflicted by governmental negligence are not addressed by the United States Constitution is not to say that they may not raise significant legal concerns and lead to the creation of protectible legal interests. The enactment of tort claim statutes, for example, reflects the view that injuries caused by such negligence should generally be redressed.[2] It is no reflection on either the breadth of the United States Constitution or the importance of traditional tort law to say that they do not address the same concerns.\nIn support of his claim that negligent conduct can give rise to a due process \"deprivation,\" petitioner makes several arguments, none of which we find persuasive. He states, for example, that \"it is almost certain that some negligence claims are within § 1983,\" and cites as an example the failure of a State to comply with the procedural requirements of Wolff v. McDonnell, supra, before depriving an inmate of good-time credit. We think the relevant action of the prison *334 officials in that situation is their deliberate decision to deprive the inmate of good-time credit, not their hypothetically negligent failure to accord him the procedural protections of the Due Process Clause. But we need not rule out the possibility that there are other constitutional provisions that would be violated by mere lack of care in order to hold, as we do, that such conduct does not implicate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.\nPetitioner also suggests that artful litigants, undeterred by a requirement that they plead more than mere negligence, will often be able to allege sufficient facts to support a claim of intentional deprivation. In the instant case, for example, petitioner notes that he could have alleged that the pillow was left on the stairs with the intention of harming him. This invitation to \"artful\" pleading, petitioner contends, would engender sticky (and needless) disputes over what is fairly pleaded. What's more, requiring complainants to allege something more than negligence would raise serious questions about what \"more\" than negligence — intent, recklessness, or \"gross negligence\" — is required,[3] and indeed about what these elusive terms mean. See Reply Brief for Petitioner 9 (\"what terms like willful, wanton, reckless or gross negligence mean\" has \"left the finest scholars puzzled\"). But even if accurate, petitioner's observations do not carry the day. In the first place, many branches of the law abound in nice distinctions that may be troublesome but have been thought nonetheless necessary:\n\"I do not think we need trouble ourselves with the thought that my view depends upon differences of degree. The whole law does so as soon as it is civilized.\" *335 LeRoy Fibre Co. v. Chicago, M. &amp; St. P. R. Co., 232 U. S. 340, 354 (1914) (Holmes, J., partially concurring).\nMore important, the difference between one end of the spectrum — negligence — and the other — intent — is abundantly clear. See O. Holmes, The Common Law 3 (1923). In any event, we decline to trivialize the Due Process Clause in an effort to simplify constitutional litigation.\nFinally, citing South v. Maryland, 18 How. 396 (1856), petitioner argues that respondent's conduct, even if merely negligent, breached a sheriff's \"special duty of care\" for those in his custody. Reply Brief for Petitioner 14. The Due Process Clause, petitioner notes, \"was intended to give Americans at least the protection against governmental power that they had enjoyed as Englishmen against the power of the crown.\" Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S., at 672-673. And South v. Maryland suggests that one such protection was the right to recover against a sheriff for breach of his ministerial duty to provide for the safety of prisoners in his custody. 18 How., at 402-403. Due process demands that the State protect those whom it incarcerates by exercising reasonable care to assure their safety and by compensating them for negligently inflicted injury.\nWe disagree. We read South v. Maryland, supra, an action brought under federal diversity jurisdiction on a Maryland sheriff's bond, as stating no more than what this Court thought to be the principles of common law and Maryland law applicable to that case; it is not cast at all in terms of constitutional law, and indeed could not have been, since at the time it was rendered there was no due process clause applicable to the States. Petitioner's citation to Ingraham v. Wright does not support the notion that all common-law duties owed by government actors were somehow constitutionalized by the Fourteenth Amendment. Jailers may owe a special duty of care to those in their custody under state tort law, see Restatement (Second) of Torts § 314A(4) (1965), but for the reasons previously stated we reject the contention that the *336 Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment embraces such a tort law concept. Petitioner alleges that he was injured by the negligence of respondent, a custodial official at the city jail. Whatever other provisions of state law or general jurisprudence he may rightly invoke, the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution does not afford him a remedy.\nAffirmed.\nJUSTICE MARSHALL concurs in the result.\nJUSTICE BLACKMUN, concurring in the judgment.\nI concur in the judgment. See my opinion in dissent in Davidson v. Cannon, post, p. 349.\nJUSTICE STEVENS, concurring in the judgments.[*]\nTwo prisoners raise similar claims in these two cases. Both seek to recover for personal injuries suffered, in part, from what they allege was negligence by state officials. Both characterize their injuries as \"deprivations of liberty\" and both invoke 42 U. S. C. § 1983 as a basis for their claims.\nPrisoner Roy Daniels was injured when he slipped on a newspaper and pillows left on a stairway in the Virginia jail where he is incarcerated; he alleges state negligence in the presence of the objects on the stairs. Prisoner Robert Davidson suffered injury when he was attacked by another inmate in the New Jersey prison where he is incarcerated; he alleges (and proved at trial) state negligence in the failure of prison authorities to prevent the assault after he had written a note expressing apprehension about the inmate who ultimately assaulted him. I agree with the majority that petitioners cannot prevail under § 1983. I do not agree, however, that it is necessary either to redefine the meaning of \"deprive\" in the Fourteenth Amendment,[1] or to repudiate *337 the reasoning of Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U. S. 527 (1981), to support this conclusion.\nWe should begin by identifying the precise constitutional claims that petitioners have advanced. It is not enough to note that they rely on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, for that Clause is the source of three different kinds of constitutional protection. First, it incorporates specific protections defined in the Bill of Rights. Thus, the State, as well as the Federal Government, must comply with the commands in the First[2] and Eighth[3] Amendments; so too, the State must respect the guarantees in the Fourth,[4] Fifth,[5] and Sixth[6] Amendments. Second, it contains a substantive component, sometimes referred to as \"substantive due process,\" which bars certain arbitrary government actions \"regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them.\" Ante, at 331.[7] Third, it is a guarantee of fair procedure, sometimes referred to as \"procedural due process\": the State may not execute, imprison, or fine a defendant without giving him a fair trial,[8] nor may it take property without providing appropriate procedural safeguards.[9]\nThe type of Fourteenth Amendment interest that is implicated has important effects on the nature of the constitutional claim and the availability of § 1983 relief. If the claim is in *338 the first category (a violation of one of the specific constitutional guarantees of the Bill of Rights), a plaintiff may invoke § 1983 regardless of the availability of a state remedy.[10] As explained in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167 (1961), this conclusion derives from the fact that the statute — the Ku Klux Act of 1871 — was intended to provide a federal remedy for the violation of a federal constitutional right. Thus, when the Fourth Amendment is violated, as in Pape, the provision of an independent federal remedy under § 1983 is necessary to satisfy the purpose of the statute.\nSimilarly, if the claim is in the second category (a violation of the substantive component of the Due Process Clause), a plaintiff may also invoke § 1983 regardless of the availability of a state remedy.[11] For, in that category, no less than with the provisions of the Bill of Rights, if the Federal Constitution prohibits a State from taking certain actions \"regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them,\" the constitutional violation is complete as soon as the prohibited action is taken; the independent federal remedy is then authorized by the language and legislative history of § 1983.\nA claim in the third category — a procedural due process claim — is fundamentally different. In such a case, the deprivation may be entirely legitimate — a State may have every right to discharge a teacher or punish a student — but the State may nevertheless violate the Constitution by failing to provide appropriate procedural safeguards. The constitutional duty to provide fair procedures gives the citizen the opportunity to try to prevent the deprivation from happening, but the deprivation itself does not necessarily reflect any *339 \"abuse\" of state power. Similarly, a deprivation may be the consequence of a mistake or a negligent act, and the State may violate the Constitution by failing to provide an appropriate procedural response. In a procedural due process claim, it is not the deprivation of property or liberty that is unconstitutional; it is the deprivation of property or liberty without due process of law — without adequate procedures.\nThus, even though the State may have every right to deprive a person of his property or his liberty, the individual may nevertheless be able to allege a valid § 1983 due process claim, perhaps because a predeprivation hearing must be held,[12] or because the state procedure itself is fundamentally flawed.[13] So too, even though a deprivation may be unauthorized, a procedural due process claim may be raised if it challenges the State's procedures for preventing or redressing the deprivation. However, a complaint does not state a valid procedural due process objection — and a valid § 1983 claim — if it does not include a challenge to the fundamental fairness of the State's procedures. In consequence, when a predeprivation hearing is clearly not feasible,[14] when the regime of state tort law provides a constitutionally unobjectionable system of recovery for the deprivation of property or liberty, and when there is no other challenge to the State's procedures, a valid § 1983 claim is not stated. For, unlike cases in the other two categories — those in which the alleged *340 deprivation violates a substantive federal right — if a procedural due process claim lacks a colorable objection to the validity of the State's procedures, no constitutional violation has been alleged.[15]\nPetitioners' claims are not of the first kind. Neither Daniels nor Davidson argues in this Court that the prison authorities' actions violated specific constitutional guarantees incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment. Neither now claims, for instance, that his rights under the Eighth Amendment were violated. Similarly, I do not believe petitioners have raised a colorable violation of \"substantive due process.\"[16] Rather, their claims are of the third kind: Daniels and Davidson attack the validity of the procedures that Virginia and New Jersey, respectively, provide for prisoners who seek redress for physical injury caused by the negligence of corrections officers.\nI would not reject these claims, as the Court does, by attempting to fashion a new definition of the term \"deprivation\" *341 and excluding negligence from its scope. No serious question has been raised about the presence of \"state action\" in the allegations of negligence,[17] and the interest in freedom from bodily harm surely qualifies as an interest in \"liberty.\" Thus, the only question is whether negligence by state actors can result in a deprivation. \"Deprivation,\" it seems to me, identifies, not the actor's state of mind, but the victim's infringement or loss. The harm to a prisoner is the same whether a pillow is left on a stair negligently, recklessly, or intentionally; so too, the harm resulting to a prisoner from an attack is the same whether his request for protection is ignored negligently, recklessly, or deliberately. In each instance, the prisoner is losing — being \"deprived\" of — an aspect of liberty as the result, in part, of a form of state action.\nThus, I would characterize each loss as a \"deprivation\" of liberty. Because the cases raise only procedural due process claims, however, it is also necessary to examine the nature of petitioners' challenges to the state procedures. To prevail, petitioners must demonstrate that the state procedures for redressing injuries of this kind are constitutionally inadequate. Petitioners must show that they contain a defect so serious that we can characterize the procedures as fundamentally unfair, a defect so basic that we are forced to conclude that the deprivation occurred without due process.\nDaniels' claim is essentially the same as the claim we rejected in Parratt. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit determined that Daniels had a remedy for the claimed negligence under Virginia law. Although Daniels vigorously argues that sovereign immunity would have defeated his claim, the Fourth Circuit found to the contrary, and it is our settled practice to defer to the Courts of Appeals on questions *342 of state law.[18] It is true that Parratt involved an injury to \"property\" and that Daniels' case involves an injury to \"liberty,\" but, in both cases, the plaintiff claimed nothing more than a \"procedural due process\" violation. In both cases, a predeprivation hearing was definitionally impossible.[19] And, in both cases, the plaintiff had state remedies that permitted recovery if state negligence was established. Thus, a straightforward application of Parratt defeats Daniels' claim.\nDavidson's claim raises a question not specifically addressed in Parratt. According to the Third Circuit, no state remedy was available because a New Jersey statute prohibits prisoner recovery from state employees for injuries inflicted by other prisoners. Thus, Davidson puts the question whether a state policy of noncompensability for certain types of harm, in which state action may play a role, renders a state procedure constitutionally defective. In my judgment, a state policy that defeats recovery does not, in itself, carry that consequence. Those aspects of a State's tort regime that defeat recovery are not constitutionally invalid, so long as there is no fundamental unfairness in their operation. Thus, defenses such as contributory negligence or statutes of limitations may defeat recovery in particular cases without raising any question about the constitutionality of a State's procedures for disposing of tort litigation. Similarly, in my judgment, the mere fact that a State elects to provide some of its agents with a sovereign immunity defense in certain cases does not justify the conclusion that its remedial system is constitutionally inadequate. There is no reason to believe that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment *343 and the legislation enacted pursuant to § 5 of that Amendment should be construed to suggest that the doctrine of sovereign immunity renders a state procedure fundamentally unfair.[20] Davidson's challenge has been only to the fact of sovereign immunity; he has not challenged the difference in treatment of a prisoner assaulted by a prisoner and a nonprisoner assaulted by a prisoner, and I express no comment on the fairness of that differentiation.\nThus, although I believe that the harms alleged by Daniels and proved by Davidson qualify as deprivations of liberty, I am not persuaded that either has raised a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. I therefore concur in the judgments.\nNOTES\n[1] Accordingly, we need not decide whether, as petitioner contends, the possibility of a sovereign immunity defense in a Virginia tort suit would render that remedy \"inadequate\" under Parratt and Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U. S. 517 (1984).\n[2] See, e. g., the Virginia Tort Claims Act, Va. Code § 8.01-195.1 et seq. (1984), which applies only to actions accruing on or after July 1, 1982, and hence is inapplicable to this case.\n[3] Despite his claim about what he might have pleaded, petitioner concedes that respondent was at most negligent. Accordingly, this case affords us no occasion to consider whether something less than intentional conduct, such as recklessness or \"gross negligence,\" is enough to trigger the protections of the Due Process Clause.\n[*] [This opinion applies also to Davidson v. Cannon et al., No. 84-6470, post, p. 344.]\n[1] \"[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .\" U. S. Const., Amdt. 14.\n[2] See, e. g., Douglas v. Jeannette, 319 U. S. 157 (1943).\n[3] See, e. g., Robinson v. California, 370 U. S. 660 (1962).\n[4] See, e. g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961).\n[5] See, e. g., Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U. S. 1 (1964) (right to protection from compelled self-incrimination applies to States); Benton v. Maryland, 395 U. S. 784 (1969) (right to protection from double jeopardy applies to States).\n[6] See, e. g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145 (1968) (right to jury trial applies to States).\n[7] See also Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U. S. 494 (1977); Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U. S. 307 (1982).\n[8] See, e. g., Groppi v. Leslie, 404 U. S. 496 (1972); In re Oliver, 333 U. S. 257 (1948).\n[9] See, e. g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U. S. 67 (1972).\n[10] See, e. g., Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167 (1961) (§ 1983 action for Fourth Amendment violation); Smith v. Wade, 461 U. S. 30 (1983) (§ 1983 action for Eighth Amendment violation). See generally McNeese v. Board of Education, 373 U. S. 668, 672 (1963) (§ 1983 is \"supplementary to any remedy any State might have\").\n[11] Cf. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U. S. 527, 545 (1981) (BLACKMUN, J., concurring); Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 (1973).\n[12] See, e. g., Loudermill v. Cleveland Board of Education, 470 U. S. 532 (1985); Carey v. Piphus, 435 U. S. 247 (1978); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U. S. 565 (1975). Cf. Groppi, supra.\n[13] Cf. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U. S. 422, 436 (1982) (postdeprivation state remedy is inadequate when challenge is to \"the state system itself\"); Baker v. McCollan, 443 U. S. 137, 156 (1979) (STEVENS, J., dissenting).\n[14] See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U. S. 517, 533 (1984) (\"[W]hen deprivations of property are effected through random and unauthorized conduct of a state employee, predeprivation procedures are simply `impracticable' since the state cannot know when such deprivations will occur\"); Parratt v. Taylor, supra.\n[15] See id., at 543-544.\n[16] Davidson explicitly disavows a substantive due process claim. See Brief for Petitioner in No. 84-6470, p. 7 (\"[P]etitioner frames his claim here purely in terms of procedural due process\"). At oral argument, counsel for Daniels did suggest that he was pursuing a substantive due process claim. Tr. of Oral Arg. in No. 84-5872, p. 22. However, the Court of Appeals viewed Daniels' claim as a procedural due process argument, see 748 F. 2d 229, 230, n. 1 (CA4 1984) (\"There is no claim of any substantive due process violation\"), and Daniels did not dispute this characterization in his petition for certiorari or in his brief on the merits.\n\nIn any event, to the extent that petitioners' arguments about the special obligations of prison officials may be read as a substantive due process claim, I agree with the Court, ante, at 335-336, that the sheriff's \"special duty of care\" recognized in South v. Maryland, 18 How. 396 (1856), does not have its source in the Federal Constitution. In these circumstances, it seems to me, the substantive constitutional duties of prison officials to prisoners are defined by the Eighth Amendment, not by substantive due process. Cf. United States ex rel. Miller v. Twomey, 479 F. 2d 701, 719-721 (CA7 1973) (analyzing prison officials' responsibilities to prevent inmate assaults under the Eighth Amendment), cert. denied sub nom. Gutierrez v. Department of Public Safety of Illinois, 414 U. S. 1146 (1974).\n[17] Respondents in Davidson do raise a state-action objection in one sentence, Brief for Respondents in No. 84-6470, p. 13, n., but that bare reference is inadequate to mount a challenge to the undisturbed District Court finding of state action.\n[18] See Haring v. Prosise, 462 U. S. 306, 314, n. 8 (1983); Leroy v. Great Western United Corp., 443 U. S. 173, 181, n. 11 (1979); Bishop v. Wood, 426 U. S. 341, 345-347 (1976); Propper v. Clark, 337 U. S. 472, 486-487 (1949).\n[19] It borders on the absurd to suggest that a State must provide a hearing to determine whether or not a corrections officer should engage in negligent conduct.\n[20] In Martinez v. California, 444 U. S. 277 (1980), we held that California's immunity statute did not violate the Due Process Clause simply because it operated to defeat a tort claim arising under state law. The fact that an immunity statute does not give rise to a procedural due process claim does not, of course, mean that a State's doctrine of sovereign immunity can protect conduct that violates a federal constitutional guarantee; obviously it cannot, see Martinez, supra, at 284, n. 8, quoting Hampton v. Chicago, 484 F. 2d 602, 607 (CA7 1973), cert. denied, 415 U. S. 917 (1974).\n\n", "ocr": false, "opinion_id": 111555 }, { "author_str": "Rehnquist", "per_curiam": false, "type": "020lead", "page_count": null, "download_url": null, "author_id": null, "opinion_text": "\nJustice Rehnquist\ndelivered the opinion of the Court.\nIn Parrott v. Taylor, 451 U. S. 527 (1981), a state prisoner sued under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, claiming that prison officials had negligently deprived him of his property without due process of law. After deciding that § 1983 contains no independent state-of-mind requirement, we concluded that although petitioner had been “deprived” of property within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the State’s postdeprivation tort remedy provided the process that was due. Petitioner’s claim in this case, which also rests on an alleged Fourteenth Amendment “deprivation” caused by the negligent conduct of a prison official, leads us to reconsider our statement in Parrott that “the alleged loss, even though negligently caused, amounted to a deprivation.” Id., at 536-537. We conclude that the Due Process Clause is simply not implicated by a negligent act of an official causing unintended loss of or injury to life, liberty, or property.\nIn this § 1983 action, petitioner seeks to recover damages for back and ankle injuries allegedly sustained when he fell on a prison stairway. He claims that, while an inmate at the city jail in Richmond, Virginia, he slipped on a pillow negligently left on the stairs by respondent, a correctional deputy stationed at the jail. Respondent’s negligence, the argument runs, “deprived” petitioner of his “liberty” interest in freedom from bodily injury, see Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651, 673 (1977); because respondent maintains that he is entitled to the defense of sovereign immunity in a state tort suit, petitioner is without an “adequate” state remedy, cf. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U. S. 517, 534-536 (1984). Accordingly, the deprivation of liberty was without “due process of law.”\n*329The District Court granted respondent’s motion for summary judgment. A panel of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed, concluding that even if respondent could make out an immunity defense in state court, petitioner would not be deprived of a meaningful opportunity to present his case. 720 F. 2d 792 (1983). On rehearing, the en banc Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the District Court, but under reasoning different from that of the panel. 748 F. 2d 229 (1984). First, a 5-4 majority ruled that negligent infliction of bodily injury, unlike the negligent loss of property in Parratt, does not constitute a deprivation of any interest protected by the Due Process Clause. The majority therefore believed that the postdeprivation process mandated by Parratt for property losses was not required. Second, the en banc court unanimously decided that even if a prisoner is entitled to some remedy for personal injuries attributable to the negligence of state officials, Parratt would bar petitioner’s claim if the State provided an adequate postdeprivation remedy. Finally, a 6-3 majority concluded that petitioner had an adequate remedy in state court, even though respondent asserted that he would rely on sovereign immunity as a defense in a state suit. The majority apparently believed that respondent’s sovereign immunity defense would fail under Virginia law.\nBecause of the inconsistent approaches taken by lower courts in determining when tortious conduct by state officials rises to the level of a constitutional tort, see Jackson v. Joliet, 465 U. S. 1049, 1050 (1984) (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (collecting cases), and the apparent lack of adequate guidance from this Court, we granted certiorari. 469 U. S. 1207 (1985). We now affirm.\nIn Parratt v. Taylor, we granted certiorari, as we had twice before, “to decide whether mere negligence will support a claim for relief under §1983.” 451 U. S., at 532. After examining the language, legislative history, and prior interpretations of the statute, we concluded that § 1983, un*330like its criminal counterpart, 18 U. S. C. §242, contains no state-of-mind requirement independent of that necessary to state a violation of the underlying constitutional right. Id., at 534-535. .We adhere to that conclusion. But in any given § 1983 suit, the plaintiff must still prove a violation of the underlying constitutional right; and depending on the right, merely negligent conduct may not be enough to state a claim. See, e. g., Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U. S. 252 (1977) (invidious discriminatory purpose required for claim of racial discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U. S. 97, 105 (1976) (“deliberate indifference” to prisoner’s serious illness or injury sufficient to constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment).\nIn Parratt, before concluding that Nebraska’s tort remedy provided all the process that was due, we said that the loss of the prisoner’s hobby kit, “even though negligently caused, amounted to a deprivation [under the Due Process Clause].” 451 U. S., at 536-537. Justice Powell, concurring in the result, criticized the majority for “pass[ing] over” this important question of the state of mind required to constitute a “deprivation” of property. Id., at 547. He argued that negligent acts by state officials, though causing loss of property, are not actionable under the Due Process Clause. To Justice Powell, mere negligence could not “wor[k] a deprivation in the constitutional sense.” Id., at 548 (emphasis in original). Not only does the word “deprive” in the Due Process Clause connote more than a negligent act, but we should not “open the federal courts to lawsuits where there has been no affirmative abuse of power.” Id., at 548-549; see also id., at 545 (Stewart, J., concurring) (“To hold that this kind of loss is a deprivation of property within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment seems not only to trivialize, but grossly to distort the meaning and intent of the Constitution”). Upon reflection, we agree and overrule Parratt to the extent that it states that mere lack of due care by a state *331official may “deprive” an individual of life, liberty, or property under the Fourteenth Amendment.\nThe Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides: “[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” Historically, this guarantee of due process has been applied to deliberate decisions of government officials to deprive a person of life, liberty, or property. E. g., Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97 (1878) (assessment of real estate); Rochin v. California, 342 U. S. 165 (1952) (stomach pumping); Bell v. Burson, 402 U. S. 535 (1971) (suspension of driver’s license); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651 (1977) (paddling student); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U. S. 517 (1984) (intentional destruction of inmate’s property). No decision of this Court before Parratt supported the view that negligent conduct by a state official, even though causing injury, constitutes a deprivation under the Due Process Clause. This history reflects the traditional and common-sense notion that the Due Process Clause, like its forebear in the Magna Carta, see Corwin, The Doctrine of Due Process of Law Before the Civil War, 24 Harv. L. Rev. 366, 368 (1911), was “‘intended to secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of government,’” Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516, 527 (1884) (quoting Bank of Columbia v. Okely, 4 Wheat. 235, 244 (1819)). See also Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U. S. 539, 558 (1974) (“The touchstone of due process is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of government, Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U. S. 114, 123 (1889)”); Parratt, supra, at 549 (Powell, J., concurring in result). By requiring the government to follow appropriate procedures when its agents decide to “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,” the Due Process Clause promotes fairness in such decisions. And by barring certain government actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them, e. g., Rochin, supra, it serves to prevent governmental power from being “used for purposes of oppression,” Murray’s Les*332see v. Hoboken Land &amp; Improvement Co., 18 How. 272, 277 (1856) (discussing Due Process Clause of Fifth Amendment).\nWe think that the actions of prison custodians in leaving a pillow on the prison stairs, or mislaying an inmate’s property, are quite remote from the concerns just discussed. Far from an abuse of power, lack of due care suggests no more than a failure to measure up to the conduct of a reasonable person. To hold that injury caused by such conduct is a deprivation within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment would trivialize the centuries-old principle of due process of law.\nThe Fourteenth Amendment is a part of a Constitution generally designed to allocate governing authority among the Branches of the Federal Government and between that Government and the States, and to secure certain individual rights against both State and Federal Government. When dealing with a claim that such a document creates a right in prisoners to sue a government official because he negligently created an unsafe condition in the prison, we bear in mind Chief Justice Marshall’s admonition that “we must never forget, that it is a constitution we are expounding,” McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 407 (1819) (emphasis in original). Our Constitution deals with the large concerns of the governors and the governed, but it does not purport to supplant traditional tort law in laying down rules of conduct to regulate liability for injuries that attend living together in society. We have previously rejected reasoning that “‘would make of the Fourteenth Amendment a font of tort law to be superimposed upon whatever systems may already be administered by the States,’” Paul v. Davis, 424 U. S. 693, 701 (1976), quoted in Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U. S., at 544.\nThe only tie between the facts of this case and anything governmental in nature is the fact that respondent was a sheriff’s deputy at the Richmond city jail and petitioner was an inmate confined in that jail. But while the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment obviously speaks to some facets of this relationship, see, e. g., Wolff v. McDon*333nell, swpra, we do not believe its protections are triggered by lack of due care by prison officials. “Medical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner,” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U. S. 97, 106 (1976), and “false imprisonment does not become a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment merely because the defendant is a state official.” Baker v. McCollan, 443 U. S. 137, 146 (1979). Where a government official’s act causing injury to life, liberty, or property is merely negligent, “no procedure for compensation is constitutionally required.” Parratt, swpra, at 548 (Powell, J., concurring in result) (emphasis added).1\nThat injuries inflicted by governmental negligence are not addressed by the United States Constitution is not to say that they may not raise significant legal concerns and lead to the creation of protectible legal interests. The enactment of tort claim statutes, for example, reflects the view that injuries caused by such negligence should generally be redressed.2 It is no reflection on either the breadth of the United States Constitution or the importance of traditional tort law to say that they do not address the same concerns.\nIn support of his claim that negligent conduct can give rise to a due process “deprivation,” petitioner makes several arguments, none of which we find persuasive. He states, for example, that “it is almost certain that some negligence claims are within § 1983,” and cites as an example the failure of a State to comply with the procedural requirements of Wolff v. McDonnell, supra, before depriving an inmate of good-time credit. We think the relevant action of the prison *334officials in that situation is their deliberate decision to deprive the inmate of good-time credit, not their hypothetically negligent failure to accord him the procedural protections of the Due Process Clause. But we need not rule out the possibility that there are other constitutional provisions that would be violated by mere lack of care in order to hold, as we do, that such conduct does not implicate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.\nPetitioner also suggests that artful litigants, undeterred by a requirement that they plead more than mere negligence, will often be able to allege sufficient facts to support a claim of intentional deprivation. In the instant case, for example, petitioner notes that he could have alleged that the pillow was left on the stairs with the intention of harming him. This invitation to “artful” pleading, petitioner contends, would engender sticky (and needless) disputes over what is fairly pleaded. What’s more, requiring complainants to allege something more than negligence would raise serious questions about what “more” than negligence — intent, recklessness, or “gross negligence” — is required,3 and indeed about what these elusive terms mean. See Reply Brief for Petitioner 9 (“what terms like willful, wanton, reckless or gross negligence mean” has “left the finest scholars puzzled”). But even if accurate, petitioner’s observations do not carry the day. In the first place, many branches of the law abound in nice distinctions that may be troublesome but have been thought nonetheless necessary:\n“I do not think we need trouble ourselves with the thought that my view depends upon differences of degree. The whole law does so as soon as it is civilized.” *335LeRoy Fibre Co. v. Chicago, M. &amp; St. P. R. Co., 232 U. S. 340, 354 (1914) (Holmes, J., partially concurring).\nMore important, the difference between one end of the spectrum — negligence—and the other — intent—is abundantly clear. See 0. Holmes, The Common Law 3 (1923). In any event, we decline to trivialize the Due Process Clause in an effort to simplify constitutional litigation.\nFinally, citing South v. Maryland, 18 How. 396 (1856), petitioner argues that respondent’s conduct, even if merely negligent, breached a sheriff’s “special duty of care” for those in his custody. Reply Brief for Petitioner 14. The Due Process Clause, petitioner notes, “was intended to give Americans at least the protection against governmental power that they had enjoyed as Englishmen against the power of the crown.” Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S., at 672-673. And South v. Maryland suggests that one such protection was the right to recover against a sheriff for breach of his ministerial duty to provide for the safety of prisoners in his custody. 18 How., at 402-403. Due process demands that the State protect those whom it incarcerates by exercising reasonable care to assure their safety and by compensating them for negligently inflicted injury.\nWe disagree. We read South v. Maryland, supra, an action brought under federal diversity jurisdiction on a Maryland sheriff’s bond, as stating no more than what this Court thought to be the principles of common law and Maryland law applicable to that case; it is not cast at all in terms of constitutional law, and indeed could not have been, since at the time it was rendered there was no due process clause applicable to the States. Petitioner’s citation to Ingraham v. Wright does not support the notion that all common-law duties owed by government actors were somehow constitutionalized by the Fourteenth Amendment. Jailers may owe a special duty of care to those in their custody under state tort law, see Restatement (Second) of Torts § 314A(4) (1965), but for the reasons previously stated we reject the contention that the *336Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment embraces such a tort law concept. Petitioner alleges that he was injured by the negligence of respondent, a custodial official at the city jail. Whatever other provisions of state law or general jurisprudence he may rightly invoke, the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution does not afford him a remedy.\n\nAffirmed.\n\nJustice Marshall concurs in the result.\nJustice Blackmun, concurring in the judgment.\nI concur in the judgment. See my opinion in dissent in Davidson v. Cannon, post, p. 349.\n\n Accordingly, we need not decide whether, as petitioner contends, the possibility of a sovereign immunity defense in a Virginia tort suit would render that remedy “inadequate” under Parratt and Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U. S. 517 (1984).\n\n\n See, e. g., the Virginia Tort Claims Act, Va. Code §8.01-195.1 et seq. (1984), which applies only to actions accruing on or after July 1, 1982, and hence is inapplicable to this case.\n\n\n Despite Ms claim about what he might have pleaded, petitioner concedes that respondent was at most negligent. Accordingly, this case affords us no occasion to consider whether something less than intentional conduct, such as recklessness or “gross negligence,” is enough to trigger the protections of the Due Process Clause.\n\n", "ocr": false, "opinion_id": 9430259 }, { "author_str": "Stevens", "per_curiam": false, "type": "030concurrence", "page_count": null, "download_url": null, "author_id": null, "opinion_text": "\nJustice Stevens,\nconcurring in the judgments.*\nTwo prisoners raise similar claims in these two cases. Both seek to recover for personal injuries suffered, in part, from what they allege was negligence by state officials. Both characterize their injuries as “deprivations of liberty” and both invoke 42 U. S. C. § 1983 as a basis for their claims.\nPrisoner Roy Daniels was injured when he slipped on a newspaper and pillows left on a stairway in the Virginia jail where he is incarcerated; he alleges state negligence in the presence of the objects on the stairs. Prisoner Robert Davidson suffered injury when he was attacked by another inmate in the New Jersey prison where he is incarcerated; he alleges (and proved at trial) state negligence in the failure of prison authorities to prevent the assault after he had written a note expressing apprehension about the inmate who ultimately assaulted him. I agree with the majority that petitioners cannot prevail under § 1983. I do not agree, however, that it is necessary either to redefine the meaning of “deprive” in the Fourteenth Amendment,1 or to repudiate *337the reasoning of Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U. S. 527 (1981), to support this conclusion.\nWe should begin by identifying the precise constitutional claims that petitioners have advanced. It is not enough to note that they rely on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, for that Clause is the source of three different kinds of constitutional protection. First, it incorporates specific protections defined in the Bill of Rights. Thus, the State, as well as the Federal Government, must comply with the commands in the First2 and Eighth3 Amendments; so too, the State must respect the guarantees in the Fourth,4 Fifth,5 and Sixth6 Amendments. Second, it contains a substantive component, sometimes referred to as “substantive due process,” which bars certain arbitrary government actions “regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them.” Ante, at 331.7 Third, it is a guarantee of fair procedure, sometimes referred to as “procedural due process”: the State may not execute, imprison, or fine a defendant without giving him a fair trial,8 nor may it take property without providing appropriate procedural safeguards.9\nThe type of Fourteenth Amendment interest that is implicated has important effects on the nature of the constitutional claim and the availability of § 1983 relief. If the claim is in *338the first category (a violation of one of the specific constitutional guarantees of the Bill of Rights), a plaintiff may invoke § 1983 regardless of the availability of a state remedy.10 As explained in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167 (1961), this conclusion derives from the fact that the statute — the Ku Klux Act of 1871 — was intended to provide a federal remedy for the violation of a federal constitutional right. Thus, when the Fourth Amendment is violated, as in Pape, the provision of an independent federal remedy under § 1983 is necessary to satisfy the purpose of the statute.\nSimilarly, if the claim is in the second category (a violation of the substantive component of the Due Process Clause), a plaintiff may also invoke § 1983 regardless of the availability of a state remedy.11 For, in that category, no less than with the provisions of the Bill of Rights, if the Federal Constitution prohibits a State from taking certain actions “regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them,” the constitutional violation is complete as soon as the prohibited action is taken; the independent federal remedy is then authorized by the language and legislative history of § 1983.\nA claim in the third category — a procedural due process claim — is fundamentally different. In such a case, the deprivation may be entirely legitimate — a State may have every right to discharge a teacher or punish a student — but the State may nevertheless violate the Constitution by failing to provide appropriate procedural safeguards. The constitutional duty to provide fair procedures gives the citizen the opportunity to try to prevent the deprivation from happening, but the deprivation itself does not necessarily reflect any *339“abuse” of state power. Similarly, a deprivation may be the consequence of a mistake or a negligent act, and the State may violate the Constitution by failing to provide an appropriate procedural response. In a procedural due process claim, it is not the deprivation of property or liberty that is unconstitutional; it is the deprivation of property or liberty without due process of ¿aw — without adequate procedures.\nThus, even though the State may have every right to deprive a person of his property or his liberty, the individual may nevertheless be able to allege a valid § 1983 due process claim, perhaps because a predeprivation hearing must be held,12 or because the state procedure itself is fundamentally flawed.13 So too, even though a deprivation may be unauthorized, a procedural due process claim may be raised if it challenges the State’s procedures for preventing or redressing the deprivation. However, a complaint does not state a valid procedural due process objection — and a valid §1983 claim — if it does not include a challenge to the fundamental fairness of the State’s procedures. In consequence, when a predeprivation hearing is clearly not feasible,14 when the regime of state tort law provides a constitutionally unobjectionable system of recovery for the deprivation of property or liberty, and when there is no other challenge to the State’s procedures, a valid § 1983 claim is not stated. For, unlike cases in the other two categories —those in which the alleged *340deprivation violates a substantive federal right — if a procedural due process claim lacks a colorable objection to the validity of the State’s procedures, no constitutional violation has been alleged.15\nPetitioners’ claims are not of the first kind. Neither Daniels nor Davidson argues in this Court that the prison authorities’ actions violated specific constitutional guarantees incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment. Neither now claims, for instance, that his rights under the Eighth Amendment were violated. Similarly, I do not believe petitioners have raised a colorable violation of “substantive due process.”16 Rather, their claims are of the third kind: Daniels and Davidson attack the validity of the procedures that Virginia and New Jersey, respectively, provide for prisoners who seek redress for physical injury caused by the negligence of corrections officers.\nI would not reject these claims, as the Court does, by attempting to fashion a new definition of the term “depriva*341tion” and excluding negligence from its scope. No serious question has been raised about the presence of “state action” in the allegations of negligence,17 and the interest in freedom from bodily harm surely qualifies as an interest in “liberty.” Thus, the only question is whether negligence by state actors can result in a deprivation. “Deprivation,” it seems to me, identifies, not the actor’s state of mind, but the victim’s infringement or loss. The harm to a prisoner is the same whether a pillow is left on a stair negligently, recklessly, or intentionally; so too, the harm resulting to a prisoner from an attack is the same whether his request for protection is ignored negligently, recklessly, or deliberately. In each instance, the prisoner is losing-being “deprived” of — an aspect of liberty as the result, in part, of a form of state action.\nThus, I would characterize each loss as a “deprivation” of liberty. Because the cases raise only procedural due process claims, however, it is also necessary to examine the nature of petitioners’ challenges to the state procedures. To prevail, petitioners must demonstrate that the state procedures for redressing injuries of this kind are constitutionally inadequate. Petitioners must show that they contain a defect so serious that we can characterize the procedures as fundamentally unfair, a defect so basic that we are forced to conclude that the deprivation occurred without due process.\nDaniels’ claim is essentially the same as the claim we rejected in Parratt. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit determined that Daniels had a remedy for the claimed negligence under Virginia law. Although Daniels vigorously argues that sovereign immunity would have defeated his claim, the Fourth Circuit found to the contrary, and it is our settled practice to defer to the Courts of Appeals on ques*342tions of state law.18 It is true that Parratt involved an injury to “property” and that Daniels’ case involves an injury to “liberty,” but, in both cases, the plaintiff claimed nothing more than a “procedural due process” violation. In both cases, a predeprivation hearing was definitionally impossible.19 And, in both cases, the plaintiff had state remedies that permitted recovery if state negligence was established. Thus, a straightforward application of Parratt defeats Daniels’ claim.\nDavidson’s claim raises a question not specifically addressed in Parratt. According to the Third Circuit, no state remedy was available because a New Jersey statute prohibits prisoner recovery from state employees for injuries inflicted by other prisoners. Thus, Davidson puts the question whether a state policy of noncompensability for certain types of harm, in which state action may play a role, renders a state procedure constitutionally defective. In my judgment, a state policy that defeats recovery does not, in itself, carry that consequence. Those aspects of a State’s tort regime that defeat recovery are not constitutionally invalid, so long as there is no fundamental unfairness in their operation. Thus, defenses such as contributory negligence or statutes of limitations may defeat recovery in particular cases without raising any question about the constitutionality of a State’s procedures for disposing of tort litigation. Similarly, in my judgment, the mere fact that a State elects to provide some of its agents with a sovereign immunity defense in certain cases does not justify the conclusion that its remedial system is constitutionally inadequate. There is no reason to believe that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment *343and the legislation enacted pursuant to §5 of that Amendment should be construed to suggest that the doctrine of sovereign immunity renders a state procedure fundamentally unfair.20 Davidson’s challenge has been only to the fact of sovereign immunity; he has not challenged the difference in treatment of a prisoner assaulted by a prisoner and a non-prisoner assaulted by a prisoner, and I express no comment on the fairness of that differentiation.\nThus, although I believe that the harms alleged by Daniels and proved by Davidson qualify as deprivations of liberty, I am not persuaded that either has raised a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. I therefore concur in the judgments.\n\n[This opinion applies also to Davidson v. Cannon et al., No. 84-6470, post, p. 344.]\n\n\n “[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .” U. S. Const., Amdt. 14.\n\n\n See, e. g., Douglas v. Jeannette, 319 U. S. 157 (1943).\n\n\n See, e. g, Robinson v. California, 370 U. S. 660 (1962).\n\n\n See, 0. g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961).\n\n\n See, e. g., Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U. S. 1 (1964) (right to protection from compelled self-incrimination applies to States); Benton v. Maryland, 395 U. S. 784 (1969) (right to protection from double jeopardy applies to States).\n\n\n See, e. g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145 (1968) (right to jury trial applies to States).\n\n\n See also Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U. S. 494 (1977); Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U. S. 307 (1982).\n\n\n See, e. g., Groppi v. Leslie, 404 U. S. 496 (1972); In re Oliver, 333 U. S. 257 (1948).\n\n\n See, e. g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U. S. 67 (1972).\n\n\n See, e. g., Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167 (1961) (§1983 action for Fourth Amendment violation); Smith v. Wade, 461 U. S. 30 (1983) (§ 1983 action for Eighth Amendment violation). See generally McNeese v. Board of Education, 373 U. S. 668, 672 (1963) (§ 1983 is “supplementary to any remedy any State might have”).\n\n\n Cf. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U. S. 527, 545 (1981) (Blackmun, J., concurring); Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 (1973).\n\n\n See, e. g., Loudermill v. Cleveland Board of Education, 470 U. S. 532 (1985); Carey v. Piphus, 435 U. S. 247 (1978); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U. S. 565 (1975). Cf. Groppi, supra.\n\n\n Cf. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U. S. 422, 436 (1982) (postdeprivation state remedy is inadequate when challenge is to “the state system itself”); Baker v. McCollan, 443 U. S. 137, 156 (1979) (Stevens, J., dissenting).\n\n\n See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U. S. 517, 533 (1984) (“[W]hen deprivations of property are effected through random and unauthorized conduct of a state employee, predeprivation procedures are simply ‘impracticable’ since the state cannot know when such deprivations will occur”); Parratt v. Taylor, supra.\n\n\n See id, at 543-544.\n\n\n Davidson explicitly disavows a substantive due process claim. See Brief for Petitioner in No. 84-6470, p. 7 (“[P]etitioner frames his claim here purely in terms of procedural due process”). At oral argument, counsel for Daniels did suggest that he was pursuing a substantive due process claim. Tr. of Oral Arg. in No. 84-5872, p. 22. However, the Court of Appeals viewed Daniels’ claim as a procedural due process argument, see 748 F. 2d 229, 230, n. 1 (CA4 1984) (“There is no claim of any substantive due process violation”), and Daniels did not dispute this characterization in his petition for certiorari or in his brief on the merits.\nIn any event, to the extent that petitioners’ arguments about the special obligations of prison officials may be read as a substantive due process claim, I agree with the Court, ante, at 335-336, that the sheriff’s “special duty of care” recognized in South v. Maryland, 18 How. 396 (1856), does not have its source in the Federal Constitution. In these circumstances, it seems to me, the substantive constitutional duties of prison officials to prisoners are defined by the Eighth Amendment, not by substantive due process. Cf. United States ex rel. Miller v. Twomey, 479 F. 2d 701, 719-721 (CA7 1973) (analyzing prison officials’ responsibilities to prevent inmate assaults under the Eighth Amendment), cert, denied sub nom. Gutierrez v. Department of Public Safety of Illinois, 414 U. S. 1146 (1974).\n\n\n Respondents in Davidson do raise a state-action objection in one sentence, Brief for Respondents in No. 84-6470, p. 13, n., but that bare reference is inadequate to mount a challenge to the undisturbed District Court finding of state action.\n\n\n See Haring v. Prosise, 462 U. S. 306, 314, n. 8 (1983); Leroy v. Great Western United Corp., 443 U. S. 173, 181, n. 11 (1979); Bishop v. Wood, 426 U. S. 341, 345-347 (1976); Propper v. Clark, 337 U. S. 472, 486-487 (1949).\n\n\n It borders on the absurd to suggest that a State must provide a hearing to determine whether or not a corrections officer should engage in negligent conduct.\n\n\n In Martinez v. California, 444 U. S. 277 (1980), we held that California’s immunity statute did not violate the Due Process Clause simply because it operated to defeat a tort claim arising under state law. The fact that an immunity statute does not give rise to a procedural due process claim does not, of course, mean that a State’s doctrine of sovereign immunity can protect conduct that violates a federal constitutional guarantee; obviously it cannot, see Martinez, supra, at 284, n. 8, quoting Hampton v. Chicago, 484 F. 2d 602, 607 (CA7 1973), cert. denied, 415 U. S. 917 (1974).\n\n", "ocr": false, "opinion_id": 9430260 } ]
Supreme Court
Supreme Court of the United States
F
USA, Federal
2,700,144
Gwin
2011-06-27
false
state-v-smith
null
State v. Smith
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
3
Published
null
null
[ "2011 Ohio 3206" ]
[ { "author_str": null, "per_curiam": false, "type": "010combined", "page_count": 16, "download_url": "http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rod/docs/pdf/5/2011/2011-ohio-3206.pdf", "author_id": null, "opinion_text": "[Cite as State v. Smith, 2011-Ohio-3206.]\n\n\n COURT OF APPEALS\n STARK COUNTY, OHIO\n FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT\n\n JUDGES:\nSTATE OF OHIO : Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P.J.\n : Hon. John W. Wise, J.\n Plaintiff-Appellee : Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, J.\n :\n-vs- :\n : Case No. 2010-CA-00335\nCORY J. SMITH :\n :\n Defendant-Appellant : OPINION\n\n\n\n\nCHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Criminal appeal from the Massillon\n Municipal Court, Case No. 2007CRB104\n\nJUDGMENT: Affirmed\n\n\n\nDATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: June 27, 2011\n\n\n\n\nAPPEARANCES:\n\n\nFor Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant\n\nPERICLES G. STERGIOS RUSSELL BUZZELLI\nLAW DIRECTOR Box 84\nBY: LAURA DARROW Wadsworth, OH 44282\nOne Duncan Plaza\nMassillon, OH 44646\n\f[Cite as State v. Smith, 2011-Ohio-3206.]\n\n\nGwin, P.J.\n\n {¶1} Appellant Corey J. Smith appeals the November 10, 2010 decision from\n\nthe Massillon Municipal Court which denied his post-sentence motion to withdraw his no\n\ncontest plea. The appellee is the State of Ohio.\n\n STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE1\n\n {¶2} On January 26, 2007 appellant was arrested on a warrant issued January\n\n12, 2007 charging him with one count of Assault in violation of R.C. 2903.13.\n\n {¶3} Appellant appeared in the Massillon Municipal Court, entered a plea of\n\nNot Guilty to the charge at his arraignment and his case was set for a pre-trial\n\nconference. On March 6, 2007 he changed his plea to No Contest, was found Guilty\n\nand was sentenced by the trial court. A Notice of Appeal of his conviction was not filed\n\nat that time. On September 26, 2007 retained Counsel for appellant filed a motion for\n\ntermination of probation, which was granted by the trial court.\n\n {¶4} On September 3, 2010 appellant filed a motion to withdraw his plea after\n\nsentencing, pursuant to Criminal Rule 32.1, with a memorandum in support and\n\nrequested a hearing on his motion. The trial court did hold a hearing on the motion on\n\nOctober 20, 2010 and subsequently denied his motion on November 10, 2010.\n\n {¶5} It is from the trial court’s November 10, 2010 denial of appellant’s motion\n\nto withdraw his plea that appellant has timely appealed raising as his sole assignment of\n\nerror:\n\n {¶6} “I. WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT, ABUSED ITS DISCRETION\n\nWHEN IT DENIED DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS PLEA, GIVEN THE\n\n 1\n The Court Reporter’s affidavit filed with the Court provides no recording, by any means of the\nappellant’s arraignment, pretrial, plea hearing, or sentencing which took place in 2007 is available.\n\fStark County, Case No. 2010-CA-00335 3\n\n\nSEVERAL MANIFEST INJUSTICES VISITED UPON APPELLANT IN THE TRIAL\n\nCOURT BELOW. “\n\n I.\n\n {¶7} In his sole assignment of error appellant maintains that the trial court erred\n\nin refusing to allow appellant to withdraw his no contest plea. Specifically, appellant\n\ncontends that he was denied his constitutional and statutory rights when he originally\n\nentered his plea in 2007. In particular he maintains that he was not afforded his\n\nconstitutional right to counsel. He further urges that he was not properly advised of the\n\neffect of his plea as provided in Criminal Rule 11.\n\n {¶8} A. Waiver.\n\n {¶9} In the case at bar, appellant was arraigned on January 26, 2007. At that\n\ntime a pre-trial conference was set for February 13, 2007. On February 13, 2007, the\n\ncourt continued the pre-trial conference at the appellant’s request to March 6, 2007. The\n\ncourt’s entry advised the appellant to contact the Public Defender’s Office on that day if\n\nhe needed an attorney. Appellant changed his plea on March 6, 2007. Appellant neither\n\nappealed the trial court’s finding of guilt upon the acceptance of his no contest plea, nor\n\ndid appellant file a motion to withdraw his plea. Rather, on September 27, 2007\n\nappellant, through retained counsel, filed a motion for termination of probation, which\n\nwas granted.\n\n {¶10} In appellant’s motion to withdraw his plea filed in the trial court September\n\n3, 2010, appellant argued, “this post-sentence request is premised upon the potential\n\nrelief that the Defendant cannot avail himself of as ORC section 2953.36 is currently\n\nwritten. Specifically, that statute allows for expungement of misdemeanor assaults of\n\fStark County, Case No. 2010-CA-00335 4\n\n\nthe first degree, but prevents the expungement of the same offense if a prior offense\n\nhas been committed…” (Defendant’s Motion to Withdraw Plea, filed September 3, 2010\n\nat 3).\n\n {¶11} Appellant’s motion did not allege that he was denied his right to appointed\n\ncounsel, or that he did not waive his right to appointment of counsel.2 Appellant’s\n\nmotion further failed to allege that the trial court did not implement the mandatory rigors\n\nof Criminal Rule 19 or that the trial court failed to conduct a proper Crim. R. 11 colloquy\n\nbefore accepting his plea.\n\n {¶12} “The general rule is that ‘an appellate court will not consider any error\n\nwhich counsel for a party complaining of the trial court's judgment could have called but\n\ndid not call to the trial court's attention at a time when such error could have been\n\navoided or corrected by the trial court.’ State v. Childs ( 1968), 14 Ohio St. 2d 56 [ 43\n\nO.O. 2d 119], 236 N.E. 2d 545, paragraph three of the syllabus; State v. Glaros (1960),\n\n170 Ohio St. 471 [11 O.O.2d 215], 166 N.E.2d 379, paragraph one of the syllabus;\n\nState v. Lancaster (1971), 25 Ohio St.2d 83 [54 O.O.2d 222], 267 N.E.2d 291,\n\nparagraph one of the syllabus; State v. Williams (1977), 51 Ohio St.2d 112, 117 [5\n\nO.O.3d 98], 364 N.E.2d 1364. Likewise, ‘[c]onstitutional rights may be lost as finally as\n\nany others by a failure to assert them at the proper time.’ State v. Childs, supra, 14 Ohio\n\nSt. 2d at 62 [43 O.O. 2d 119], 236 N.E. 2d 545, citing State v. Davis (1964), 1 Ohio\n\nSt.2d 28 [30 O.O.2d 16], 203 N.E.2d 357; State, ex rel. Specht, v. Bd. of Edn. (1981),\n\n66 Ohio St.2d 178, 182 [20 O.O.3d 191], 420 N.E.2d 1004, citing Clarington v. Althar\n\n(1930), 122 Ohio St. 608, 174 N.E. 251, and Toledo v. Gfell (1958), 107 Ohio App. 93,\n\n 2\n The failure to appoint counsel may in some instances rise to the level of structural error. See\nState v. Wamsley, 117 Ohio St.3d 388, 391-392, 884 N.E.2d 45, 48-49, 2008-Ohio-1195 at ¶ 16.\nAccordingly, we will address this portion of appellant’s claim infra.\n\fStark County, Case No. 2010-CA-00335 5\n\n95 [7 O.O.2d 437], 156 N.E.2d 752. [Footnote omitted.] See also, State v. Chandler,\n\n157 Ohio App.3d 72, 813 N.E.2d 65, 2004-Ohio-3436 at ¶ 72; State v. Hughett,\n\nDelaware App. No. 04 CAA 06051, 2004-Ohio-6207 at ¶58.\n\n {¶13} As the United States Supreme Court recently observed in Puckett v.\n\nUnited States (2009), 129 S.Ct. 1423, 1428, 173 L.Ed.2d 266, “If an error is not\n\nproperly preserved, appellate-court authority to remedy the error (by reversing the\n\njudgment, for example, or ordering a new trial) is strictly circumscribed. There is good\n\nreason for this; ‘anyone familiar with the work of courts understands that errors are a\n\nconstant in the trial process, that most do not much matter, and that a reflexive\n\ninclination by appellate courts to reverse because of unpreserved error would be fatal.’”\n\n(Citation omitted).\n\n {¶14} “[A]n appellate court may, in its discretion, correct an error not raised at\n\ntrial only where the appellant demonstrates that (1) there is an error; (2) the error is\n\nclear or obvious, rather than subject to reasonable dispute; (3) the error affected the\n\nappellant’s substantial rights, which in the ordinary case means it affected the outcome\n\nof the district court proceedings; and (4) the error seriously affect[s] the fairness,\n\nintegrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v. Marcus (May 24,\n\n2010), 560 U.S. __, 130 S.Ct. 2159, 2010 WL 2025203 at 4. (Internal quotation marks\n\nand citations omitted).\n\n {¶15} The defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that a plain error\n\naffected his substantial rights. United States v. Olano (1993), 507 U.S. at 725,734, 113\n\nS.Ct. 1770; State v. Perry (2004), 101 Ohio St.3d 118, 120 802 N.E.2d 643, 646. Even\n\nif the defendant satisfies this burden, an appellate court has discretion to disregard the\n\fStark County, Case No. 2010-CA-00335 6\n\nerror. State v. Barnes (2002), 94 Ohio St.3d 21, 27, 759 N.E.2d 1240; State v. Long\n\n(1978), 53 Ohio St.2d 91, 372 N.E.2d 804, paragraph three of the syllabus; Perry,\n\nsupra, at 118, 802 N.E.2d at 646.\n\n {¶16} The Supreme Court has repeatedly admonished that this exception to the\n\ngeneral rule is to be invoked reluctantly. \"Notice of plain error under Crim. R. 52(B) is to\n\nbe taken with the utmost caution, under exceptional circumstances and only to prevent\n\na manifest miscarriage of justice.\" Id. at paragraph three of the syllabus. See, also,\n\nState v. Thompson (1987), 33 Ohio St.3d 1, 10, 528 N.E.2d 542; State v. Williford\n\n(1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 247, 253, 551 N.E.2d 1279 (Resnick, J., dissenting). Appellant\n\nhas not raised the issue of plain error in his assignment of error.\n\n {¶17} In the case at bar, the only issue raised in his written motion and at the\n\nhearing on appellant’s motion to withdraw the plea that he had entered three years\n\npreviously was whether or not appellant was denied a right to have counsel appointed.\n\nAccordingly, because appellant did not raise the other claims he now asserts on appeal\n\nin his motion, the state was not placed on notice that it would be required to present\n\nevidence on any other issue at the hearing. Appellant has therefore waived those issues\n\non appeal. See, State v. Peagler, 76 Ohio St.3d 496, 499, 668 N.E.2d 489, 493, 1996-\n\nOhio-73.\n\n {¶18} B. Standard of Review – Withdrawal of No Contest Plea.\n\n {¶19} Crim. R. 32.1 governs the withdrawal of a guilty or no contest plea and\n\nstates: \"[a] motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest may be made only before\n\nsentence is imposed; but to correct manifest injustice the court after sentence may set\n\naside the judgment of conviction and permit the defendant to withdraw his or her plea.\"\n\fStark County, Case No. 2010-CA-00335 7\n\n\nIn the case at bar, because appellant's request was made post-sentence, the standard\n\nby which the motion was to be considered was \"to correct manifest injustice.\"\n\n {¶20} The accused has the burden of showing a manifest injustice warranting\n\nthe withdrawal of a guilty plea. State v. Smith (1977), 49 Ohio St.2d 261, 361 N.E.2d\n\n1324, paragraph one of the syllabus). In Smith, supra, the Ohio Supreme Court, citing\n\nUnited States v. Semel (C.A.4, 1965), 347 F.2d 228, addressed the concept of\n\n“manifest injustice,” stating that “[t]his term [manifest injustice] has been variously\n\ndefined, but it is clear that under such standard, a post-sentence withdrawal motion is\n\nallowable only in extraordinary cases.” Id. at 264.\n\n {¶21} Furthermore, “[b]efore sentencing, the inconvenience to court and\n\nprosecution resulting from a change of plea is ordinarily slight as compared with the\n\npublic interest in protecting the right of the accused to trial by jury. But if a plea of guilty\n\ncould be retracted with ease after sentence, the accused might be encouraged to plead\n\nguilty to test the weight of potential punishment, and withdraw the plea if the sentence\n\nwere unexpectedly severe. * * *” State v. Peterseim (1980), 68 Ohio App.2d 211, 213,\n\n428 N.E.2d 863, quoting Kadwell v. United States (C.A.9, 1963), 315 F.2d 667.\n\n {¶22} Importantly, “an undue delay between the occurrence of the alleged cause\n\nfor withdrawal of a guilty plea and the filing of a motion under Crim.R. 32.1 is a factor\n\nadversely affecting the credibility of the movant and militating against the granting of the\n\nmotion.” State v. Bush, 96 Ohio St.3d 235, 773 N.E.2d 522 2002-Ohio-3393 at ¶14.\n\n(Quoting State v. Smith (1977), 49 Ohio St.2d 261, 3 O.O.3d 402, 361 N.E.2d 1324,\n\nparagraph three of the syllabus); See also State v. Copeland-Jackson, Ashland App.No.\n\n02COA018, 2003-Ohio-1043 ([t]he length of passage of time between the entry of a\n\fStark County, Case No. 2010-CA-00335 8\n\n\nplea and a defendant's filing of a Crim.R. 32.1 motion is a valid factor in determining\n\nwhether a “manifest injustice” has occurred.\n\n {¶23} A reviewing court will not disturb a trial court's decision whether to grant a\n\nmotion to withdraw a plea absent an abuse of discretion. State v. Xie (1992), 62 Ohio\n\nSt.3d 521, 584 N.E.2d 715. In order to find an abuse of discretion, we must determine\n\nthat the trial court's decision was unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable and not\n\nmerely an error of law or judgment. Blakemore v. Blakemore (1983), 5 Ohio St.3d 217,\n\n450 N.E.2d 1140.\n\n {¶24} C. Effect of Plea of No Contest.\n\n {¶25} Appellant contends that he may have thought the trial court could find him\n\nnot guilty upon his plea of no contest. (T. at 16).\n\n {¶26} The Rules of Criminal Procedure provide that a plea of no contest is not\n\nan admission of the defendant's guilt; instead, it is an admission of the truth of the facts\n\nalleged in the indictment. Further, in State ex rel. Stern v. Mascio (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d\n\n422, 424, 662 N.E.2d 370, the Court held that \"[t]he procedure specified in Crim.R.\n\n11(C) does not envision an affirmative-defense hearing or mini-trial.\" Thus, the Mascio\n\ncourt concluded, \"[a]lthough the trial court retains discretion to consider a defendant's\n\ncontention that the admitted facts do not constitute the charged offense, the defendant\n\nwho pleads no contest waives the right to present additional affirmative factual\n\nallegations to prove that he is not guilty of the charged offense.\" Id.\n\n {¶27} The Ohio Supreme Court has further held that “[w]here an indictment,\n\ninformation, or complaint contains sufficient allegations to state a felony offense and the\n\ndefendant pleads no contest, the court must find the defendant guilty of the charged\n\fStark County, Case No. 2010-CA-00335 9\n\noffense. State v. Bird ( 1998), 81 Ohio St. 3d 582, 584, 692 N.E. 2d 1013. (Citing State\n\nex rel. Stern v. Mascio (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 422, 425, 662 N.E.2d 370, 373).\n\n {¶28} In the case at bar, the state only had to allege sufficient facts to charge the\n\nviolations contained in the complaint. See Mascio, 75 Ohio St.3d at 425, 662 N.E.2d at\n\n373; State v. Bird, 81 Ohio St. 3d at 584, 692 N.E. 2d at 1015. In State v. Bird, supra,\n\nthe appellant argued that the indictment was insufficient to charge him with the offense\n\nof felonious assault with a deadly weapon because it failed to establish the existence of\n\nessential elements of the crime, i.e., that saliva is a deadly weapon, and that appellant\n\nknowingly caused or attempted to cause the officer physical harm. The charge stemmed\n\nfrom an incident where appellant, who is infected with the human immunodeficiency\n\nvirus (“HIV”), spat in a police officer's face.\n\n {¶29} The appellant in Bird, like the appellant in the case at bar, entered a plea\n\nof no contest to the charge. The Ohio Supreme Court found that by pleading no contest\n\nto the indictment, the appellant was foreclosed from challenging the factual merits of the\n\nunderlying charge. The Court noted, “[i]t is unnecessary to decide whether the human\n\nimmunodeficiency virus may be communicated through saliva and whether saliva may\n\nbe considered a deadly weapon. By pleading no contest, appellant admitted the truth of\n\nthe allegations in the indictment.” 81 Ohio St.3d 585, 692 N.E.2d at 1016.\n\n {¶30} In the case at bar appellant was charged with assault contrary to Massillon\n\nCity Ordinance 537.03(A). (Complaint, filed January 12, 2007). Specifically, the\n\nComplaint alleged that appellant\n\n {¶31} “(A) did knowingly cause or attempt to cause physical harm to Larry Fisk,\n\nJr. or Larry Fisk Jr.’s unborn.\n\fStark County, Case No. 2010-CA-00335 10\n\n\n {¶32} “* * *\n\n {¶33} “To-Wit: The defendant did cause or attempt to cause physical harm to\n\nLarry Fisk, Jr., by kicking the victim in the chest knocking him into a car then to the\n\nground. The defendant then kicked the victim while he was laying on the ground.”\n\n(Complaint, filed January 12, 2007).\n\n {¶34} The indictment language mirrors the statutory language. Thus, it is\n\nsufficient to charge the offenses. Crim.R. 7(B). State v. Bird, supra 81 Ohio St.3d at\n\n585, 692 N.E.2d at 1016. The complaint contained all the necessary elements and\n\ncontained sufficient allegations to state the aforementioned misdemeanor assault\n\noffense.\n\n {¶35} Being an admission of the truth of the facts on which the charges against\n\nhim are based, a no contest plea forecloses a defendant's right to challenge the truth of\n\nthose facts in a subsequent appeal from his resulting conviction and sentence. State v.\n\nBird supra; State v. Evans, Montgomery App. No. 21669, 2007-Ohio-6587 at ¶ 10. By\n\npleading no contest and foregoing a trial appellant lost his opportunity to raise at trial\n\nthat he did not knowingly cause or attempt to cause physical harm to Larry Fisk, Jr.\n\n {¶36} In the case at bar, appellant signed a negotiated plea agreement in the\n\nform of the “State Sentencing Recommendation/Order” prior to entering his plea.\n\nFurther, we note that appellant did retain counsel less than seven months after the trial\n\ncourt found him guilty. Appellant offers no explanation for waiting nearly three years to\n\nchallenge his conviction on the ground that he believe he could be found not guilty on\n\nhis plea of no contest.\n\fStark County, Case No. 2010-CA-00335 11\n\n\n {¶37} We find nothing in the record to suggest that any failure of the trial court to\n\ninform appellant about the effect of his no contest plea prejudiced him.\n\n {¶38} Accordingly, appellant has failed to establish a manifest injustice\n\nwarranting the withdrawal of his guilty plea. State v. Smith (1977), 49 Ohio St.2d 261,\n\n361 N.E.2d 1324.\n\n {¶39} D. Right to Appointed Counsel.\n\n {¶40} Appellant concedes that he was advised of his right to counsel in 2007. (T.\n\nat 6-7). Appellant further concedes that he did in fact meet with a representative from\n\nthe Stark County Public Defender’s Office before his pre-trial conference. (Id.) Appellant\n\nhas not argued that the trial court was required to advise him prior to accepting his plea\n\nof any collateral consequences that may flow as a result of being found guilty, such as a\n\ndenial of employment in certain fields, or appellant’s inability to expunge his conviction.\n\n(T. at 3-4; 18-19; 20; 21-22)3. There is nothing in the record to indicate when appellant\n\ndecided to pursue a nursing degree. The college transcripts admitted as Defendant’s\n\nExhibit A at the hearing on appellant’s motion to withdraw his plea indicate that he\n\nreturned to school in 2009. Accordingly the issue before us is not whether the trial court\n\nadvised appellant of his right to counsel, but rather, whether appellant was denied a\n\nright to have counsel appointed to represent him.\n\n {¶41} In the landmark decision of Gideon v. Wainwright (1963), 372 U.S. 335, 83\n\nS.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799, the United States Supreme Court held an indigent defendant\n\n 3\n The trial court is not required to inform a defendant of every possible collateral consequence of\npleading no contest to a charge. Cf. State v. Wilkinson, Montgomery App. No. 20365, 2005-Ohio-314, ¶ 9.\nCrim.R. 11(B)(2) does not impose a duty on the court to inform a criminal defendant of the effect of a no\ncontest plea beyond the notification requirements specifically enumerated in the rule. State v. Garr, Butler\nCA2009-01-014, 2009-Ohio-6241 at ¶26; State v. Goddard, Wyandot App. No. 16-06-05, 2007-Ohio-1229\nat ¶13; The accused is not generally required to be informed of those “collateral consequences” which\nresult from his conviction, such as the right to vote, loss of passport, business license, and driver's\nlicense. Katz, Giannelli, Criminal Law, Section 43.11.\n\fStark County, Case No. 2010-CA-00335 12\n\n\nwas entitled to court appointed counsel. Subsequently, the High Court narrowed this\n\nRight, holding “the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution\n\nrequire only that no indigent criminal defendant be sentenced to a term of imprisonment\n\nunless the state has afforded him the right to assistance of appointed counsel in his\n\ndefense.” Scott v. Illinois (1979), 440 U.S. 367, 99 S.Ct. 1158, 59 L.Ed. 2d 383. Accord,\n\nNichols v. United States (1994), 511 U.S. 738, 743 114 S.Ct. 1921, 1926; State v.\n\nBrandon (1989), 45 Ohio St.3d 85, 86, 543 N.E.2d 501, 503. (“This is not to say that\n\ncounsel is required in all instances. Indeed, in Scott, supra, the court essentially held\n\nthat unconcealed misdemeanor convictions are constitutionally valid if the offender is\n\nnot actually incarcerated.”).\n\n {¶42} In Scott, the court stated that “actual imprisonment is a penalty different in\n\nkind from fines or the mere threat of imprisonment * * * and warrants adoption of actual\n\nimprisonment as the line defining the constitutional right to appointment of counsel. * * *\n\n440 U.S. at 373-374, 99 S.Ct. 1161-1162. In Nichols, supra the court recognized that\n\nthere is a distinction concerning the right to have counsel appointed noting, “In felony\n\ncases, in contrast to misdemeanor charges, the Constitution requires that an indigent\n\ndefendant be offered appointed counsel unless that right is intelligently and competently\n\nwaived. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963).” 511\n\nU.S. at 743, n. 9. Ohio likewise has recognized such a distinction.\n\n {¶43} Crim.R. 2(C) defines “serious offense” as “any felony, and any\n\nmisdemeanor for which the penalty prescribed by law includes confinement for more\n\nthan six months,” while Crim.R. 2(D) defines “petty offense” as “a misdemeanor other\n\fStark County, Case No. 2010-CA-00335 13\n\n\nthan a serious offense.” In the case at bar, the charge against appellant was a “petty”\n\noffense.\n\n {¶44} The scope of the application of the right to counsel is recognized in\n\nCrim.R. 44, which sets forth the basic procedure for the assignment of counsel in Ohio\n\ncriminal cases.\n\n {¶45} Crim.R. 44 states:\n\n {¶46} “(B) Counsel in petty offenses\n\n {¶47} “Where a defendant charged with a petty offense is unable to obtain\n\ncounsel, the court may assign counsel to represent him. When a defendant charged\n\nwith a petty offense is unable to obtain counsel, no sentence of confinement may be\n\nimposed upon him, unless after being fully advised by the court, he knowingly,\n\nintelligently, and voluntarily waives assignment of counsel.” (Emphasis added)\n\n {¶48} The word “shall” is usually interpreted to make the provision in which it is\n\ncontained mandatory. Dorrian v. Scioto Conservancy District (1971), 27 Ohio St. 2d\n\n102, 107, 271 N.E. 2d 834. In contrast, the use of the word “may” is generally construed\n\nto make the provision in which it is contained optional, permissive, or discretionary. Id.\n\nThe words “shall” and “may” when used in statutes are not automatically\n\ninterchangeable or synonymous. Id. To give the “may” as used in a statute a meaning\n\ndifferent from that given in its ordinary usage, it must clearly appear that the Legislature\n\nintended that it be so construed from a review of the statute itself. Id. at 107– 108, 271\n\nN.E. 2d 834. In re: McClanahan, Tuscarawas App. No.2004AP010004, 2004–Ohio–\n\n4113 at ¶ 17.\n\fStark County, Case No. 2010-CA-00335 14\n\n\n {¶49} Pursuant to that rule, the trial court has discretion whether to appoint\n\ncounsel where a defendant is charged with a petty offense. However, the trial court\n\ncould impose a term of imprisonment for a petty offense under only two circumstances:\n\n(1) appellant was actually represented by counsel during his change of plea; or (2) he\n\ndecided to represent himself and properly waived his right to counsel.\n\n {¶50} Our review of the trial court record indicates that the “State’s Sentencing\n\nRecommendation/Order” adopted by the magistrate upon appellant’s plea of no contest\n\ncontained no term of actual imprisonment. The court in fact did not sentence appellant\n\nto any term of actual imprisonment. This entry was signed by appellant, the prosecuting\n\nattorney and the magistrate on March 6, 2007.\n\n {¶51} Thus, no cognizable violation of the Sixth Amendment right to appointed\n\ncounsel occurred in the case at bar because, as the Supreme Court of Ohio has held,\n\n“uncounseled misdemeanor convictions are constitutionally valid if the offender is not\n\nactually incarcerated. State v. Brandon (1989), 45 Ohio St.3d 85, 86, 543 N.E.2d 501.\n\n(Citing Scott v. Illinois (1979), 440 U.S. 367, 99 S.Ct. 1158, 59 L.Ed.2d 383).\n\n {¶52} Appellant’s argument that counsel would have advised him that an assault\n\nconviction could affect his future employment is purely speculative. “Neither a trial court\n\nnor a defendant's attorney need inform the defendant of every possible effect of\n\npleading guilty to a charge. Crim.R. 32.1 provides that ‘to correct manifest injustice the\n\ncourt after sentence may set aside the judgment of conviction and permit the defendant\n\nto withdraw his or her plea.’ It is undisputed that neither the trial court nor Wilkinson's\n\nattorney was aware that Wilkinson was seeking a nursing license. It is not a manifest\n\ninjustice for a trial court or a defendant's attorney to fail to inform a defendant of every\n\fStark County, Case No. 2010-CA-00335 15\n\npossible collateral consequence of pleading guilty to a charge.” State v. Wilkinson,\n\nMontgomery App. No. 20365, 2005-Ohio-314, ¶ 9. Crim.R. 19 which governs the\n\nauthority of magistrates in criminal proceedings follows the same line of demarcation.\n\nSee, Crim R, 19(C)(1)(c)(ii).\n\n {¶53} We find appellant has failed to establish a manifest injustice warranting\n\nthe withdrawal of his guilty plea. State v. Smith (1977), 49 Ohio St.2d 261, 361 N.E.2d\n\n1324.\n\n {¶54} Appellant’s sole assignment of error is overruled in its entirety.\n\n {¶55} For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Massillon Municipal Court,\n\nStark County, Ohio, is affirmed.\n\nBy Gwin, P.J.,\n\nWise, J., and\n\nDelaney, J., concur\n\n\n\n\n _________________________________\n HON. W. SCOTT GWIN\n\n _________________________________\n HON. JOHN W. WISE\n\n _________________________________\n HON. PATRICIA A. DELANEY\n\n\n\n\nWSG:clw 0614\n\f[Cite as State v. Smith, 2011-Ohio-3206.]\n\n\n IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR STARK COUNTY, OHIO\n\n FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT\n\n\nSTATE OF OHIO :\n :\n Plaintiff-Appellee :\n :\n :\n-vs- : JUDGMENT ENTRY\n :\nCORY J. SMITH :\n :\n :\n Defendant-Appellant : CASE NO. 2010-CA-00335\n\n\n\n\n For the reasons stated in our accompanying Memorandum-Opinion, the\n\njudgment of the Massillon Municipal Court, Stark County, Ohio, is affirmed. Costs to\n\nappellant.\n\n\n\n\n _________________________________\n HON. W. SCOTT GWIN\n\n _________________________________\n HON. JOHN W. WISE\n\n _________________________________\n HON. PATRICIA A. DELANEY\n\f", "ocr": false, "opinion_id": 2700144 } ]
Ohio Court of Appeals
Ohio Court of Appeals
SA
Ohio, OH
1,198,711
Guthrie, McCLIN-TOCK, Raper, Rose, Thomas
1977-06-15
false
deherrera-v-herrera
DeHerrera
DeHerrera v. Herrera
Juan L. DeHERRERA, as Administrator of the Estate of Joe B. Griego, Deceased, Appellant (Plaintiff Below), v. Patricia HERRERA, Appellee (Defendant Below)
Juan L. DeHerrera, Cheyenne, signed the brief and appeared in oral argument on behalf of the appellant., Glenn Parker, Hirst & Applegate, Cheyenne, signed the brief and appeared in oral argument on behalf of the appellee.
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
Rehearing Denied July 20, 1977.
null
null
48
Published
null
<parties id="b525-13"> Juan L. DeHERRERA, as Administrator of the Estate of Joe B. Griego, Deceased, Appellant (Plaintiff below), v. Patricia HERRERA, Appellee (Defendant below). </parties><br><docketnumber id="b525-16"> No. 4711. </docketnumber><br><court id="b525-17"> Supreme Court of Wyoming. </court><br><decisiondate id="b525-18"> June 15, 1977. </decisiondate><br><otherdate id="b525-19"> Rehearing Denied July 20, 1977. </otherdate><br><attorneys id="b526-26"> <span citation-index="1" class="star-pagination" label="480"> *480 </span> Juan L. DeHerrera, Cheyenne, signed the brief and appeared in oral argument on behalf of the appellant. </attorneys><br><attorneys id="b526-27"> Glenn Parker, Hirst &amp; Applegate, Cheyenne, signed the brief and appeared in oral argument on behalf of the appellee. </attorneys><br><judges id="b526-28"> Before GUTHRIE, C. J., and McCLIN-TOCK, RAPER, THOMAS and ROSE, JJ. </judges>
[ "565 P.2d 479" ]
[ { "author_str": "Raper", "per_curiam": false, "type": "010combined", "page_count": null, "download_url": null, "author_id": null, "opinion_text": "\n565 P.2d 479 (1977)\nJuan L. DeHERRERA, as Administrator of the Estate of Joe B. Griego, Deceased, Appellant (Plaintiff below),\nv.\nPatricia HERRERA, Appellee (Defendant below).\nNo. 4711.\nSupreme Court of Wyoming.\nJune 15, 1977.\nRehearing Denied July 20, 1977.\n*480 Juan L. DeHerrera, Cheyenne, signed the brief and appeared in oral argument on behalf of the appellant.\nGlenn Parker, Hirst &amp; Applegate, Cheyenne, signed the brief and appeared in oral argument on behalf of the appellee.\nBefore GUTHRIE, C.J., and McCLINTOCK, RAPER, THOMAS and ROSE, JJ.\nRAPER, Justice.\nIn this appeal, we must decide whether a cause of action for personal injuries survives under § 1-28, W.S. 1957, where the injured party dies of an illness unconnected with the alleged negligence of a defendant. The district court granted summary judgment, *481 holding that such a cause of action does not survive.[1] We will reverse.\nThe plaintiff-appellant, as administrator of the estate of decedent, filed a complaint against defendant-appellee, charging her with driver negligence, while operating a motor vehicle, causing personal injuries to the deceased, resulting in pain and suffering, medical and hospital expense and lost wages. The decedent died of liver failure unrelated to the purported negligent conduct of the defendant.[2] Wyoming's controlling survival statute, § 1-28, supra, reads:\n\"In addition to the causes of action which survive at common law, causes of action for mesne profits, or for injuries to the person, or for an injury to real or personal estate, or for any deceit or fraud, shall also survive; and the action may be brought notwithstanding the death of the person entitled or liable to the same, provided that in actions for personal injury damages, if the person otherwise entitled thereto, dies, recovering [sic] shall be limited to damages for wrongful death.\" (Emphasis added.)\nAt common law, actions for personal injuries, including wrongful death, did not survive. Mull v. Wienbarg, 1949, 66 Wyo. 410, 212 P.2d 380; Coliseum Motor Co. v. Hester, 1931, 43 Wyo. 298, 3 P.2d 105; Tuttle v. Short, 1930, 42 Wyo. 1, 288 P. 524, 70 A.L.R. 106.\nThis court has construed § 1-28 but did so in a wrongful death case where the plaintiff attempted to recover for pain, suffering, disability and anguish, in addition to the damages allowed by the wrongful death act, §§ 1-1065 and 1-1066, W.S. 1957. Parsons v. Roussalis, Wyo. 1971, 488 P.2d 1050. The court held that in a case of wrongful death, § 1-28[3] was not meant to allow recovery under both the survival statute and the wrongful death act. Particularly excepted from the opinion was the question of the right of the administrator to bring a separate action for medical expenses; that is partly the issue we now have.\nThe statute is ambiguous. Does the proviso clause relate only to wrongful death actions brought under §§ 1-1065 and 1-1066? We have no problem if the tort feasor causing the injuries and death are the same; the question was answered in Parsons. Does the same proviso refer to the case where the tort feasor did not cause a wrongful death? This is the area of ambiguity requiring construction. A statute which is uncertain and susceptible to more than one meaning must be considered ambiguous. Natrona County v. Casper Air Service, Wyo. 1975, 536 P.2d 142. We will not construe a statute if it is unambiguous. Wyoming State Treasurer v. City of Casper, Wyo. 1976, 551 P.2d 687. When a statute is ambiguous, we will resort to statutory construction. Matter of Voss' Adoption, Wyo. 1976, 550 P.2d 481. In Beal, \"Wrongful Death in Wyoming: Two Causes of Action?\", 16 Wyo.Law Journal 171, 175, it is said that the meaning of the proviso clause \"is so obscure as to defy confident construction.\"\nWe are convinced that the statute is capable of a sensible construction. It has been partially construed in Parsons but not with respect to the situation presented here, where there was no wrongful death. It seems unbelievable that the legislature ever intended in one clause to grant survival of a cause of action for personal injuries and in a closing proviso, take it away.\n*482 It would be unreasonable for the legislature in one clause of a statute to bring about survival of a cause of action and in a following clause frustrate it as though never enacted. The legislature will not be presumed to intend futile things. Kuntz v. Kinne, Wyo. 1964, 395 P.2d 286. We must give meaning to the clause \"for injuries to the person.\" We can only construe the proviso to refer to those cases where death results from the injuries complained of. That situation is demonstrated in Parsons. It is not reasonable to relate wrongful death recovery to negligent acts not causing death.\nThe rule against permitting one statutory provision to neutralize another is somewhat illustrated in Hecht v. Carey, 1904, 13 Wyo. 154, 78 P. 705, 110 Am.St. Rep. 981. There, a statutory construction was urged upon the court which would require issuance of letters testamentary to a known nonresident, followed by a provision requiring his removal. The court held such a construction is a glaring absurdity and should not be adopted if avoidable. A rational construction was adopted, allowing the nonresident to come to the state, permit him to submit himself to the jurisdiction of the court and settle the estate. It is contrary to reason to ascribe to a statute a meaning that will nullify its operation, if capable of any other interpretation. Grand Rapids Furniture Co. v. Grand Hotel &amp; Opera House Co., 1902, 11 Wyo. 128, 70 P. 838, reh. den. 72 P. 687. A statute should be construed in such a fashion that one provision will not destroy another. State ex rel. Benham v. Cheever, 1953, 71 Wyo. 303, 257 P.2d 337.\nIt would be helpful to a further and better understanding of our reasoning if we explain the distinguishing features of a wrongful death act as compared to a survival statute. It must be realized that the wrongful death statutes, §§ 1-1065 and 1-1066, are not part of the probate code, though provision is made for the appointment of an administrator. The designation of an administrator as a trustee is only a device to provide a party to file suit and pay over any damages collected to the beneficiaries designated by statute. The amount recovered does not become a part of the decedent's estate and is not liable for debts of the estate or subject to estate administration. Jordan v. Delta Drilling Company, Wyo. 1975, 541 P.2d 39, 42.\nOn the other hand, a survival statute permits recovery by the decedent's personal representative on behalf of the estate; the prime difference between survival and wrongful death statutes is that the survival statute merely continues a cause of action in existence. The injured party's claim after death is an asset of the estate while the wrongful death statute creates a new cause of action for the benefit of designated persons who have suffered the loss of a loved one and provider. Speiser, Recovery for Wrongful Death, 2d (1975), § 14:1, p. 408. As said in Sea-Land Services, Inc. v. Gaudet, 1974, 414 U.S. 573, 94 S. Ct. 806, 39 L. Ed. 2d 9, footnote 2, reh. den. 415 U.S. 986, 94 S. Ct. 1582, 39 L. Ed. 2d 883, survival statutes permit the personal representative of deceased to prosecute any claims for personal injury the deceased would have had but for his death but do not permit recovery for harms suffered by the decedent's family as a result of his death. The modern trend views tort causes of action as fairly a part of the estate of a plaintiff as contract debts, the question being one of why a fortuitous event, such as death, should extinguish a valid action. Prosser, Torts, 4th Ed. (1971), § 126, pp. 898-901.\nThese differences are apparent in the instant case. No new action in persons designated in the wrongful death act was created by the death of decedent. The funds made available by a recovery, if the evidence will support one, belong to the estate, subject to disposition, as any asset, for payment of debts, such as the medical and hospital expenses claimed, costs of administration, and, finally, distribution in the regular course of administration whether by a testate or intestate decedent. The survival statute protects the creditors of the estate; the wrongful death act does not.\n*483 As finally submitted to us, this is not a wrongful death action, so there seems no good reason for treating it as such. The proviso by its language associates with wrongful death actions. The initial part of the amendment relates to the type of action before us and they are as unlike as fish to fowl.\nWyoming's survival statute with its proviso is unique in that it does not allow a complete remedy for wrongful death as in other jurisdictions. For example, see Barragan v. Superior Court of Pima County, 1970, 12 Ariz. App. 402, 470 P.2d 722; Rohlfing v. Moses Akiona, Ltd., 1961, 45 Haw. 440, 369 P.2d 96; (see also Greene v. Texeira, 1973, 54 Haw. 231, 505 P.2d 1169, modifying the rule of Rohlfing on an element of damage); and Moss v. Hirzel Canning Co., 1955, 100 Ohio App. 509, 137 N.E.2d 440. Those jurisdictions and others allow two actions or their joinder to permit both a recovery for the estate and a recovery for the survivors. Parsons v. Roussalis, supra, holds that both are not available in wrongful death actions because of the proviso of § 1-28. By reason of that unique statutory provision, there are no cases we can find, such as the one before us, examining any like statutory provisions.\nHowever, in Prowant v. Kings-X, Inc., 1959, 184 Kan. 413, 337 P.2d 1021, the court held that where a person is injured by another, if he dies from other causes, an action for personal injury survives but if death results from the same injuries, the action may not be maintained by the personal representative for the estate but may be brought under its wrongful death act for the next of kin. Thus, was reached the same result we visualize exists in Wyoming by virtue of § 1-28, as interpreted by Parsons, along with our own holding here. The personal injury survival statute in Kansas had no such proviso as in § 1-28 but the court, by judicial interpretation, construed its wrongful death act to be the exclusive remedy if death ensued as a result of the negligence and the survival statute to apply if there was no death caused by the other. The court did there, by judicial fiat, what the Wyoming legislature has done by statute. The Kansas court later, on rehearing, though, in Prowant v. Kings-X, Inc., 1959, 185 Kan. 602, 347 P.2d 254, reversed itself and concluded that the survival statute means what it says and allows a recovery on behalf of the estate for its losses, separate and apart from the wrongful death act.\nThe argument pressed upon us by the defendant in effect is that there is no survival of causes of action for personal injuries and the only available remedy is the wrongful death act if the administrator can otherwise prove his claim. Under defendant's position, there exists no apparent reason to provide survival for personal injury actions and then confine them to wrongful death actions, which survive by virtue of §§ 1-1065 and 1-1066, without the aid of the survival statute. When the legislature amends a statute, it must be presumed that some change in the existing law was intended; it is not reasonable that the legislature would enact a law to declare what is already the law. Payne v. City of Laramie, Wyo. 1965, 398 P.2d 557; Stolldorf v. Stolldorf, Wyo. 1963, 384 P.2d 969. Defendant's posture would declare the 1947 survival statute amendments useless. All statutes are presumed to be enacted by the legislature with full knowledge of the existing state of the law with reference thereto. Matter of Voss' Adoption, supra.\nOur analysis leads us to the conclusion, and we hold that the proviso does not attach to the words, \"for injuries to the person\" under circumstances other than wrongful death actions where the negligence causes the death.\nReversed and remanded with directions to vacate the summary judgment granted and further proceedings consistent with this opinion.\nNOTES\n[1] Actually, the plaintiff claims there is a second issue: If the cause of action does survive, what damages are recoverable? In the light of the trial court ruling that question was not reached by the presiding judge. We will not decide the question until first examined and determined at the lower court tier, in the face of circumstances existing at the time of trial or other proceedings. Knudson v. Hilzer, Wyo. 1976, 551 P.2d 680, 686.\n[2] The plaintiff in his complaint charged wrongful death and damages to the survivors by way of loss of support, comfort and funeral expenses as a result of the injuries but has apparently abandoned that position.\n[3] Parsons contains a useful history of § 1-28.\n\n", "ocr": false, "opinion_id": 1198711 } ]
Wyoming Supreme Court
Wyoming Supreme Court
S
Wyoming, WY
31,048
null
2003-04-16
false
cowle-v-dain-raushcer-inc
Cowle
Cowle v. Dain Raushcer Inc
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
0
Unpublished
null
null
null
[ { "author_str": null, "per_curiam": false, "type": "010combined", "page_count": 4, "download_url": "http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions\\unpub\\02/02-41021.0.wpd.pdf", "author_id": null, "opinion_text": " United States Court of Appeals\n Fifth Circuit\n F I L E D\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n April 16, 2003\n FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT\n Charles R. Fulbruge III\n Clerk\n\n No. 02-41021\n Summary Calendar\n\n\n\n\nTODD COWLE,\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\n\n\n versus\n\nDAIN RAUSHCER, INC.,\n\n Defendant-Appellee.\n\n\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court\n for the Eastern District of Texas\n (2:02-CV-40-TJW)\n\n\n\nBefore JONES, STEWART and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.\n\nPER CURIAM:*\n\n For the following reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s decision refusing to vacate, modify\n\nor correct the arbitration award.\n\n FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND\n\n\n\n\n *\n Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this opinion should not be\npublished and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.\n\f While employed with Dain Rauscher, Inc. (“Dain Rauscher”), Todd W. Cowle (“Cowle”)\n\nexecuted several promissory notes payable to Dain Rauscher. At least two of the notes forgave the\n\ndebt owed incrementally so long as Cowle remained an employee. After Cowle resigned from Dain\n\nRauscher, the company initiated arbitration proceedings through the National Association of\n\nSecurities Dealers (“NASD”) against Cowle to recover monies owed, totaling more than $450,000.\n\nCowle asserted a counterclaim alleging breach o f fiduciary duty and breach of his employment\n\ncontract. Cowle sought $1 million on his breach of fiduciary duty claim, arguing that the research\n\nprovided by Dain Rauscher caused his clients and himself to lose money. Cowle sought $500,000\n\nfor his breach of employment contract claim, arguing that Dain Rauscher failed to provide him a\n\nrespectful workplace due to repeated verbal attacks by his supervisor.\n\n After conducting a hearing, the arbitration panel awarded Dain Rauscher $468,617.25 in\n\ncompensatory damages, $78,389.78 in pre-award interest and $60,000 in attorneys’ fees. The\n\narbitration panel dismissed Cowle’s counterclaim in its entirety. Cowle then filed a Motion to Vacate,\n\nModify or Correct the arbitration award in the Eastern District of Texas. The district court denied\n\nCowle’s motion and granted Dain Rauscher’s Application to Confirm the award. Cowle appeals.\n\n STANDARD OF REVIEW\n\n In reviewing a district court’s decision refusing to vacate an arbitration award, “[w]e accept\n\nfindings of fact that are not clearly erroneous and decide questions of law de novo.” Hughes Training\n\nInc. v. Cook, 254 F.3d 588, 592 (5th Cir. 2001). “Under the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), a\n\ndistrict court may vacate an award only if: (1) the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue\n\nmeans; (2) there is evidence of partiality or corruption among the arbitrators; (3) the arbitrators were\n\nguilty of misconduct which prejudiced the rights of one of the parties; or (4) the arbitrators exceeded\n\n\n 2\n\ftheir powers.” Harris v. Parker College of Chiropractic, 286 F.3d 790, 792 (5th Cir. 2002); 9 U.S.C.\n\n§ 10(a). “Manifest disregard for the law” may also serve as an additional ground for vacating an\n\narbitration award. Harris, 286 F.3d at 792.\n\n DISCUSSION\n\n Cowle argues that the district court erred in failing to find that the arbitrators were guilty of\n\nmisconduct and partiality. Cowle contends that the arbitrators’ misconduct and partiality is evident\n\nbecause the arbitrators refused to rule on his motion to disqualify one of Dain Rauscher’s attorneys;\n\nfailed to compel discovery; refused to grant a last-minute continuance; refused to allow one of\n\nCowle’s witnesses to testify via telephone and excluded other pertinent evidence; and, failed to\n\nproperly control the hearing. We find that each of Cowle’s arguments lack merit.\n\n Cowle filed a motion to disqualify Dain Rauscher’s co unsel, arguing that he had divulged\n\nconfidential information to one of the company’s attorneys, Cheryl Jerome Moore, prior to his leaving\n\nthe company. The arbitrators determined that they lacked the authority to rule on Cowle’s motion.\n\nOver a month later, and only eight days before the hearing, Cowle obtained a temporary restraining\n\norder (“TRO”) from the District Court in Dallas County restraining Baker & McKenzie, and Cheryl\n\nJerome Moore, from representing Dain Rauscher. Cowle argues that the arbitrators allowed Dain\n\nRauscher to circumvent the TRO by allowing Baker & McKenzie to “share” its file with Dain\n\nRauscher’s new attorneys. The record reflects, however, that Dain Rauscher’s new counsel hired\n\nanother attorney who reviewed Baker & McKenzie’s case file and removed items subject to the TRO.\n\nThus, Cowle’s misconduct argument is unpersuasive.\n\n As this Court has explained:\n\n\n\n\n 3\n\f The arbitrator is not bound to hear all of the evidence tendered by the parties;\n however, he must give each of the parties to the dispute an adequate opportunity to\n present its evidence and argument. An evidentiary error must be one that is not\n simply an error of law, but which so affects the rights of a party that it may be said\n that he was deprived of a fair hearing.\n\nForsythe Intern, S.A. v. Gibbs Oil Co. of TX, 915 F.2d 1017, 1023 (5th Cir. 1990) (internal citations\n\nand quotation marks omitted). Aside from conclusory assertions, Cowle has failed to demonstrate\n\nhow the arbitrators’ evidentiary rulings rendered the arbitration fundamentally unfair. Given the\n\nvolume of discovery allowed, Cowle’s argument that the arbitrators failed to compel adequate\n\ndiscovery is unpersuasive. Cowle’s argument concerning the arbitrators’ decision not to allow one\n\nof his witnesses to testify via telephone is equally unpersuasive. Given that the witness was local and\n\nCowle provides no explanation as to why the witness was unable to testify in person, we conclude\n\nthat the arbitrators’ were well within their discretion to reject his telephone testimony. We further\n\nfind that the arbitrators’ decision to deny Cowle’s eleventh-hour request for a continuance does not\n\ndemonstrate misconduct or partiality. Cowle was afforded months to prepare for the hearing.\n\nFinally, we reject Cowle’s conclusory assertions that the arbitrators’ failure to control the hearing\n\nevidences their partiality.\n\n CONCLUSION\n\n Arbitrators are not guilty of misconduct or partiality merely because they rule in the other\n\nparty’s favor. For the reasons outlined above, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court denying\n\nCowle’s motion to vacate, modify or correct the arbit ration award and granting Dain Rauscher’s\n\nmotion to confirm the award.\n\nAFFIRM.\n\n\n\n\n 4\n\f", "ocr": false, "opinion_id": 31048 } ]
Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
F
USA, Federal
2,690,248
French, Kennedy, Lanzinger, O'Connor, O'Donnell, O'Neill, Pfeifer
2013-12-09
false
in-re-harter
In re Harter
In re Harter
In Re Harter
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
Submitted December 5, 2013
null
null
0
Published
null
<parties data-order="0" data-type="parties" id="b848-4"> In re Harter. </parties><br><p data-order="1" data-type="citation" id="b848-5"> [Cite as <em> In re Harter, </em> 137 Ohio St.3d 1258, 2013-Ohio-5355.] </p><br><docketnumber data-order="2" data-type="docketnumber" id="b848-6"> (No. 2013-1907 </docketnumber><otherdate data-order="3" data-type="otherdate" id="Af4"> Submitted December 5, 2013 </otherdate><decisiondate data-order="4" data-type="decisiondate" id="AY8"> Decided December 9, 2013.) </decisiondate>
[ "2013 Ohio 5355", "137 Ohio St. 3d 1258" ]
[ { "author_str": null, "per_curiam": false, "type": "010combined", "page_count": 3, "download_url": "http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rod/docs/pdf/0/2013/2013-ohio-5355.pdf", "author_id": null, "opinion_text": "[Cite as In re Harter, 137 Ohio St.3d 1258, 2013-Ohio-5355.]\n\n\n\n\n IN RE HARTER.\n [Cite as In re Harter, 137 Ohio St.3d 1258, 2013-Ohio-5355.]\n (No. 2013-1907—Submitted December 5, 2013—Decided December 9, 2013.)\n ON CERTIFICATION OF DEFAULT OF CHILD-SUPPORT ORDER.\n ____________________\n {¶ 1} On December 4, 2013, and pursuant to Gov.Bar R. V(5)(A), the\nsecretary of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline of the\nSupreme Court of Ohio submitted to this court a certified copy of a determination\nof default of a child-support order by Brian Wade Harter, an attorney licensed to\npractice law in the state of Ohio.\n {¶ 2} Upon consideration thereof and pursuant to Gov.Bar R.\nV(5)(A)(4), it is ordered and decreed that Brian Wade Harter, Attorney\nRegistration No. 0055500, last known business address in Columbus, Ohio, is\nsuspended from the practice of law for an interim period, effective as of the date\nof this entry.\n {¶ 3} It is further ordered that this matter be, and hereby is, referred to\ndisciplinary counsel for investigation and commencement of disciplinary\nproceedings.\n {¶ 4} It is further ordered that Brian Wade Harter immediately cease and\ndesist from the practice of law in any form and that he hereby is forbidden to\nappear on behalf of another before any court, judge, commission, board,\nadministrative agency, or other public authority.\n {¶ 5} It is further ordered that effective immediately, respondent is\nforbidden to counsel, advise, or prepare legal instruments for others or in any\nmanner perform legal services for others.\n\f SUPREME COURT OF OHIO\n\n\n\n\n {¶ 6} It is further ordered that respondent is divested of each, any, and all\nof the rights, privileges, and prerogatives customarily accorded to a member in\ngood standing of the legal profession of Ohio.\n {¶ 7} It is further ordered that before entering into an employment,\ncontractual, or consulting relationship with any attorney or law firm, respondent\nshall verify that the attorney or law firm has complied with the registration\nrequirements of Gov.Bar R. V(8)(G)(3). If employed pursuant to Gov.Bar R.\nV(8)(G), respondent shall refrain from direct client contact except as provided in\nGov.Bar R. V(8)(G)(1) and from receiving, disbursing, or otherwise handling any\nclient trust funds or property.\n {¶ 8} It is further ordered that respondent shall not be reinstated to the\npractice of law until (1) the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and\nDiscipline files in accordance with Gov.Bar R. V(5)(D)(1)(b) with the Supreme\nCourt a certified copy of a judgment entry reversing the determination of default\nunder a child-support order, or it files in accordance with Gov.Bar R.\nV(5)(D)(1)(c) with the Supreme Court a notice from a court or child-support-\nenforcement agency that respondent is no longer in default under a child-support\norder or is subject to a withholding or deduction notice or a new or modified\nchild-support order to collect current support or any arrearage due under the child-\nsupport order that was in default and is complying with that notice or order, and\n(2) this court orders respondent reinstated to the practice of law.\n {¶ 9} It is further ordered that respondent shall keep the clerk and\ndisciplinary counsel advised of any change of address where respondent may\nreceive communications.\n {¶ 10} It is further ordered, sua sponte, that all documents filed with this\ncourt in this case shall meet the filing requirements set forth in the Rules of\nPractice of the Supreme Court of Ohio, including requirements as to form,\n\n\n\n\n 2\n\f January Term, 2013\n\n\n\n\nnumber, and timeliness of filings. All case documents are subject to Sup.R. 44\nthrough 47, which govern access to court records.\n {¶ 11} It is further ordered, sua sponte, that service shall be deemed made\non respondent by sending this order and all other orders in this case to\nrespondent’s last known address.\n {¶ 12} It is further ordered that the clerk of this court issue certified copies\nof this order as provided for in Gov.Bar R. V(8)(D)(1), that publication be made\nas provided for in Gov.Bar R. V(8)(D)(2), and that respondent bear the costs of\npublication.\n O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, KENNEDY,\nFRENCH, and O’NEILL, JJ., concur.\n ________________________\n\n\n\n\n 3\n\f", "ocr": false, "opinion_id": 2690248 } ]
Ohio Supreme Court
Ohio Supreme Court
S
Ohio, OH
2,636,353
null
2008-10-03
false
state-v-warren
Warren
State v. Warren
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
0
Published
null
null
[ "195 P.3d 65", "345 Or. 318" ]
[ { "author_str": null, "per_curiam": false, "type": "010combined", "page_count": null, "download_url": null, "author_id": null, "opinion_text": "\n195 P.3d 65 (2008)\n345 Or. 318\nSTATE\nv.\nWARREN.\nNo. (S056378).\nSupreme Court of Oregon.\nOctober 3, 2008.\nPetition for review denied.\n", "ocr": false, "opinion_id": 2636353 } ]
Oregon Supreme Court
Oregon Supreme Court
S
Oregon, OR
478,186
null
1986-09-23
false
arlo-barger-v-bill-r-story-warden
null
Arlo Barger v. Bill R. Story, Warden
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
0
Unpublished
null
null
[ "803 F.2d 718" ]
[ { "author_str": null, "per_curiam": false, "type": "010combined", "page_count": null, "download_url": "http://bulk.resource.org/courts.gov/c/F2/803/803.F2d.718.86-5604.html", "author_id": null, "opinion_text": "803 F.2d 718\n Unpublished DispositionNOTICE: Sixth Circuit Rule 24(c) states that citation of unpublished dispositions is disfavored except for establishing res judicata, estoppel, or the law of the case and requires service of copies of cited unpublished dispositions of the Sixth Circuit.ARLO BARGER, Petitioner-Appellantv.BILL R. STORY, WARDEN, ET AL., Respondents-Appellees.\n No. 86-5604.\n United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.\n Sept. 23, 1986.\n \n 1\n BEFORE: MARTIN, MILBURN and BOGGS, Circuit Judges\n \n ORDER\n \n 2\n The petitioner moves for counsel and the respondents move to dismiss this appeal from the district court's order denying the petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The petitioner was incarcerated at the federal prison in Ashland, Kentucky. His petition alleged that he was entitled to immediate release to a halfway house in Cincinnati, Ohio, but this release was delayed because of budgetary problems created by the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act. The district court found that the petitioner had no liberty interest in placement at the halfway house; so the court denied the petition.\n \n \n 3\n Accompanying the respondents' motion to dismiss is an affidavit stating that the petitioner has now been released to the halfway house in Cincinnati, Ohio. Because this release was the only relief requested by the petitioner, the case is now moot. LoCicero v. Day, 518 F.2d 783, 785 (6th Cir. 1975) (per curiam).\n \n \n 4\n The appeal is dismissed as moot.\n \n ", "ocr": false, "opinion_id": 478186 } ]
Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
F
USA, Federal
1,048,291
Judge David R. Farmer
2011-02-22
false
pamela-champion-v-clc-of-dyersburg-llc
null
Pamela Champion v. CLC of Dyersburg, LLC
Pamela CHAMPION, Et Al. v. CLC OF DYERSBURG, LLC, Et Al.
Les Jones and Frank B. Thacher, III, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellant, Pamela Champion., John G. Wheeler and L. Bradley Dillard, Tupelo Mississippi, for the appellee, CLC of Dyersburg, LLC d/b/a Oakwood Community Living Center, Inc.
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
Jan. 26, 2011 Session., Application for Permission to Appeal Denied by Supreme Court July 15, 2011.
null
null
0
Published
null
<parties id="b179-4"> Pamela CHAMPION, et al. v. CLC OF DYERSBURG, LLC, et al. </parties><br><court id="b179-7"> Court of Appeals of Tennessee, at Jackson. </court><br><otherdate id="b179-8"> Jan. 26, 2011 Session. </otherdate><br><decisiondate id="b179-9"> Feb. 22, 2011. </decisiondate><br><otherdate id="b179-10"> Application for Permission to Appeal Denied by Supreme Court July 15, 2011. </otherdate><br><attorneys id="b179-28"> Les Jones and Frank B. Thacher, III, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellant, Pamela Champion. </attorneys><br><attorneys id="b179-29"> John G. Wheeler and L. Bradley Dillard, Tupelo Mississippi, for the appellee, CLC of Dyersburg, LLC d/b/a Oakwood Community Living Center, Inc. </attorneys>
[ "359 S.W.3d 161" ]
[ { "author_str": "Farmer", "per_curiam": false, "type": "010combined", "page_count": 7, "download_url": "http://www.tsc.state.tn.us/sites/default/files/pamela_champion_v_clc_of_dyersburg_llc_opn.pdf", "author_id": 8270, "opinion_text": " IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE\n AT JACKSON\n January 26, 2011 Session\n\n PAMELA CHAMPION, ET AL. v. CLC OF DYERSBURG, LLC, ET AL.\n\n Direct Appeal from the Circuit Court for Dyer County\n No. 07-68 Lee Moore, Judge\n\n\n No. W2010-01228-COA-R3-CV - Filed February 22, 2011\n\n\nThe trial court awarded Defendant summary judgment on the basis that Defendant had\nnegated the element of damages in this personal injury action. We reverse and remand for\nfurther proceedings.\n\nTenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Reversed and\n Remanded\n\nD AVID R. F ARMER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which A LAN E. H IGHERS, P.J.,\nW.S., and H OLLY M. K IRBY, J., joined.\n\nLes Jones and Frank B. Thacher, III, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellant, Pamela\nChampion.\n\nJohn G. Wheeler and L. Bradley Dillard, Tupelo Mississippi, for the appellee, CLC of\nDyersburg, LLC d/b/a Oakwood Community Living Center, Inc.\n\n OPINION\n\n This lawsuit arises from the discovery of maggots in a wound of a hospice care patient\nat the Oakwood Community Living Center, Inc. (“Oakwood”), a facility owned by Defendant\nCLC, LLC (“CLC”). Decedent Christine Johnson (Ms. Johnson) was a resident of Oakwood\nfrom January 2002 through September 28, 2006. In September 2006, she was 80 years of\nage, terminally ill, and had developed decubitus ulcers. She was admitted to hospice care at\nOakwood on September 12, 2006. On September 18, 2006, nurses at Oakwood discovered\nmaggots in an ulcer while changing the bandage on Ms. Johnson’s foot. The ulcer was\nirrigated to remove the maggots, and Ms. Johnson was transferred to a Dyersburg hospital.\nMs. Johnson died that day of causes unrelated to the maggots.\n\f In May 2007, Ms. Johnson’s daughter, Pamela Champion (Ms. Champion), filed a\npersonal injury action individually and on behalf of her mother and other beneficiaries\nagainst Oakwood, CLC, and Community Eldercare, LLC (“Community Eldercare”;\ncollectively, “Defendants”). In her complaint, Ms. Champion asserted 19 allegations of\nnegligence, and sought recovery for mental anguish, physical and mental pain and suffering,\nand medical bills. She also asserted that Defendants’ “consciously indifferent actions with\nregard to the welfare and safety of helpless patients such as Ms. Christine Johnson\nconstitute[d] gross negligence, willful, wanton, reckless, malicious and/or intentional\nmisconduct” and prayed for an award of compensatory and punitive damages.\n\n Defendants filed an answer denying Ms. Champion’s allegations and asserting 24\nspecific defenses. In October 2009, Defendants moved for summary judgment on the\ngrounds that Ms. Champion had failed to offer evidence “to demonstrate that the maggots\ncaused any actual harm, or that Ms. Johnson suffered any conscious pain and suffering or\nwas even aware of the presence of maggots.” Defendants further asserted that Community\nEldercare should be dismissed where it is a management company that does not operate CLC\nor employ any individuals at CLC. Following a hearing on Defendants’ motion on April 5,\n2010, Ms. Champion conceded that Community Eldercare should be dismissed as a party.\nBy order entered April 15, 2010, the trial court dismissed Community Eldercare as a party,\nand awarded summary judgment to Defendants on the basis that Defendants had “negated\nan essential element of the Plaintiff’s claims (i.e., damages).” The trial court determined that\nthe award of summary judgment on the basis of damages mooted Ms. Champion’s claim for\npunitive damages. Ms. Champion filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court.\n\n Issues Presented\n\n Ms. Champion raises the following issues for our review:\n\n (1) Is the loss of flesh an “injury” for which recovery can be had under\n Tennessee law?\n\n (2) Did the trial court err in finding that Defendants, in their motion for\n summary judgment, shifted the burden of production to Plaintiff?\n\n (3) Did the trial court err in finding that Plaintiff put forward no evidence\n of any injury or damages sustained by Christine Johnson?\n\n The issue presented by this appeal, as we perceive it, is whether CLC affirmatively\nnegated the element of injury so as to support an award of summary judgment where it is\nundisputed that maggots were found in a wound on Ms. Johnson’s foot while she was a\n\n -2-\n\fhospice care patient in a facility owned and operated by CLC.\n\n Standard of Review\n\n We review a trial court’s award of summary judgment de novo, with no presumption\nof correctness, reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and\ndrawing all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor. Martin v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 271\nS.W.3d 76, 84 (Tenn. 2008) (citations omitted). Summary judgment is appropriate only\nwhere the “pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,\ntogether with the affidavits . . . show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and\nthat the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Id. at 83 (quoting Tenn.\nR. Civ. P. 56.04). The burden is on the moving party to demonstrate that there are no\ngenuine issues of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id.\n(citations omitted).\n\n After the moving party has made a properly supported motion, the nonmoving party\nmust establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. (citations omitted). To\nsatisfy its burden, the nonmoving party may: (1) point to evidence of over-looked or\ndisregarded material factual disputes; (2) rehabilitate evidence discredited by the moving\nparty; (3) produce additional evidence that establishes the existence of a genuine issue for\ntrial; or (4) submit an affidavit asserting the need for additional discovery pursuant to Rule\n56.06 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. (citations omitted). The court must\naccept the nonmoving party’s evidence as true, resolving any doubts regarding the existence\nof a genuine issue of material fact in that party’s favor. Id. (citations omitted). A disputed\nfact that must be decided to resolve a substantive claim or defense is material, and it presents\na genuine issue if it reasonably could be resolved in favor of either one party or the other.\nId. (citations omitted). With this standard in mind, we turn to whether the trial court erred\nby awarding summary judgment in this case.\n\n Discussion\n\n As an initial matter, we note that Ms. Champion appears to have abandoned her claim\nfor damages arising from medical expenses. Although this claim does not appear to have\nbeen addressed in the summary judgment proceedings in the trial court, the trial court\nawarded summary judgment on the issue of damages and dismissed all remaining claims.\nMs. Champion has not raised dismissal of her claim for medical expenses as an issue on\nappeal. An issue not raised in an appellant’s statement of the issues may be considered\nwaived. Regions Fin. Corp. v. Marsh USA, Inc., 310 S.W.3d 382, 392 (Tenn. Ct. App.\n2009). We accordingly turn to whether the trial court erred in awarding summary judgment\nto CLC with respect to Ms. Champion’s claim for non-economic damages.\n\n -3-\n\f Although pain and suffering, permanent impairment and/or disfigurement, and loss\nof enjoyment of life are “encompassed within the general rubric of pain and suffering,” each\nof them represents “separate and distinct losses.” Overstreet v. Shoney’s, Inc., 4 S.W.3d 694,\n715 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999)(citations omitted). Pain and suffering, moreover, is comprised\nof both physical and mental discomfort. “It includes the ‘wide array of mental and emotional\nresponses’ that accompany the pain, characterized as suffering.” Id. (quoting McDougald v.\nGarber, 132 Misc. 2d 457, 504 N.Y.S.2d 383, 385 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.1986)(citing See Charles\nT. McCormick, Damages § 88, at 315 (1935))).\n\n A permanent injury is one from which the injured person will not recover completely,\nand which prevents him from living in comfort or adds inconvenience or loss of physical\ncapacity. Id. A permanent injury may be physical, emotional, or psychological. Id.\nDisfigurement is a type of permanent injury that impairs the injured person’s beauty,\nsymmetry, or appearance. Id.\n\n We begin our discussion of the summary judgment award in this case emphasizing\nthat, in order to prevail on a motion for summary judgment in Tennessee, “[i]t is not enough\nfor the moving party to challenge the nonmoving party to ‘put up or shut up’ or even to cast\ndoubt on a party’s ability to prove an element at trial.” Hannan v. Alltel Publ’g Co., 270\nS.W.3d 1, 8 (Tenn. 2008). Rather,\n\n a moving party who seeks to shift the burden of production to the nonmoving\n party who bears the burden of proof at trial must either: (1) affirmatively\n negate an essential element of the nonmoving party’s claim; or (2) show that\n the nonmoving party cannot prove an essential element of the claim at trial.\n\nId. at 8-9.\n\n Upon review of the record in this case, we observe that, in its motion for summary\njudgment, CLC stated that the testimony proffered by Ms. Champion’s medical expert, Dr.\nAmelia Kiser (Dr. Kiser), “failed, when taken in combination with the deposition testimony\nof hospice nurse Marie Simmons and CLC employee Patricia Brady, to demonstrate that the\nmaggots caused any actual harm, or that Ms. Johnson suffered any conscious pain and\nsuffering or was even aware of the presence of the maggots.” Although “summary judgment\nmay be appropriate for the moving party who relies upon evidence from the nonmoving\nparty,” the moving party may rely on that evidence\n\n only if [it] affirmatively negates an essential element of the nonmoving party’s\n claim or shows that the nonmoving party cannot prove an essential element of\n the claim at trial. The moving party may not, however, merely point to\n\n -4-\n\f omissions in the nonmoving party’s proof and allege that the nonmoving party\n cannot prove the element at trial.\n\nId. at 10. At the summary judgment stage, the burden is not on the nonmoving party to prove\nits claim, but on the moving party to affirmatively negate it. See id. We must agree with Ms.\nChampion that, in its initial motion, CLC offered no proof to affirmatively negate the\nelement of damages for the purposes of summary judgment. It merely asserted that Dr.\nKiser’s testimony did not affirmatively establish that Ms. Johnson suffered pain as a result\nof the maggots present in her wound.\n\n CLC proffered no expert testimony in support of its motion for summary judgment\nuntil it responded to Ms. Champion’s opposition to its motion. On March 1, 2010, CLC filed\na “Rebuttal in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment” to which it attached the affidavit\nof its expert, Dr. Elbert Edwin Hines, III (Dr. Hines). Dr. Hines’ affidavit was notarized on\nFebruary 23, 2010. The portion of Dr. Hines’ affidavit relating to the presence of maggots\nin Ms. Johnson’s wound reads, in totality:\n\n Based on the documentation and records which I have reviewed in this\n cause, as well as my experience, education and training, it is my opinion to a\n reasonable degree of medical probability that Ms. Johnson was never aware of\n the presence of the maggots, and she experienced no pain, discomfort, itching\n or loss of dignity as a result of the maggots being present.\n\n Based on the documentation and records which I have reviewed in this\n cause, as well as my experience, education an training, it is my opinion to a\n reasonable degree of medical probability that the maggots were only present\n on dead or necrotic tissue, and that no evidence exists to demonstrate that the\n maggots were present on live tissue or caused any actual damage or harm to\n Ms. Johnson.\n\nCLC also attached Ms. Johnson’s medication administration record for the month of\nSeptember 2006 to its rebuttal. According to that record, Ms. Johnson received the pain\nmedication Loritab on September 16 and 18, and Tylenol on September 17, 2006.\n\n The parties do not dispute that maggots generally cause itching and discomfort.\nAdditionally, CLC does not assert that the presence of maggots in a wound generally would\ncause some mental or emotional response. Rather, CLC’s argument, as we perceive it, is that\nMs. Johnson suffered no physical or mental injury because she was terminally ill, unable to\ncommunicate verbally, and did not exhibit signs of pain.\n\n\n\n -5-\n\f Upon review of the entirety of the record, we are not convinced that CLC has negated\nthe element of injury under the standard established by Hannan v. Alltel Publishing. First,\nwe note that Dr. Hines’ affidavit does not establish that he is an expert with respect to\nmental, emotional, or psychological health. Second, we note that CLC does not dispute Dr.\nKiser’s testimony that Loritab was administered to Ms. Johnson for pain, and that Ms.\nJohnson “must have shown some symptoms of pain. . . . they gave her pain medication those\ndays.” It is undisputed that Ms. Johnson’s physical condition rendered her incapable of oral\ncommunication. Patricia Brady (Ms. Brady), the L.P.N. who assisted with the changing of\nMs. Johnson’s bandage and discovered the maggots, testified by deposition that, although\nMs. Johnson could not communicate verbally, she could understand oral commands and\nrespond to pain. Ms. Brady testified that Ms. Johnson did not appear to be in physical pain,\nand that she did not watch the irrigation process used to clean the wound. She also testified\nthat she did not recall whether Ms. Johnson’s eyes were open or closed. Maude Marie\nSimmons (Ms. Simmons), a hospice-certified R.N. who also was present during the process\nof irrigating the maggots from the wound on Ms. Johnson’s foot, testified that Ms. Johnson\nwas semi-comatose and was able to respond to tactile stimuli by opening her eyes or\nsometimes by moving her “right upper extremity.” When asked whether she “ha[d] any\nreason to believe that [Ms. Johnson] was aware to the presence of maggots in that wound,”\nMs. Simmons replied that she “honestly [couldn’t] say.” Dr. Kiser’s testimony is similarly\ninexact with respect to whether Ms. Johnson experienced mental or physical discomfort. Dr.\nKiser testified, however, that there was no evidence or physical data to prove that Ms.\nJohnson felt pain as a result of the maggots, but that based on her training, she believed\n“people are aware of things they can’t verbalize.”\n\n We do not believe Dr. Hines’ testimony affirmatively negates the element of injury\nin this case. Although Dr. Hines testified that Ms. Johnson experienced no pain, Dr. Hines\ndid not treat Ms. Johnson, was not personally familiar with her, and did not specify facts on\nwhich he based his conclusion. Assuming that Dr. Hines reviewed the remainder of the\nevidence in the record now before us, there is nothing in that record to affirmatively negate\nthe element of injury. We must agree with Ms. Champion that Dr. Hines’ opinion is\nconclusory and are neither based on nor supported by identified facts as required for\nsummary judgment under Hannan v. Alltel. Additionally, there is no dispute that Ms.\nJohnson was somewhat conscious and capable of experiencing some degree of pain and\nmental, emotional and psychological anguish and distress, notwithstanding her inability to\ncommunicate verbally. There is nothing in this record to demonstrate that Dr. Hines is an\nexpert with respect to those elements of injury. See Weaver v. Pardue, No.\nM2010-00124-COA-R3-CV, 2010 WL 4272687, at *8-9 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 28,\n2010)(stating, that doctor’s affidavit did not demonstrate that he “possessed the requisite\nknowledge and expertise to offer an opinion on whether his alleged conduct caused the\nalleged injury.”).\n\n -6-\n\f Holding\n\n In light of the foregoing, we reverse the award of summary judgment to CLC. This\nmatter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. Costs of this appeal are taxed\nto the Appellee, CLC of Dyersburg, LLC.\n\n\n\n\n _________________________________\n DAVID R. FARMER, JUDGE\n\n\n\n\n -7-\n\f", "ocr": false, "opinion_id": 1048291 } ]
Court of Appeals of Tennessee
Court of Appeals of Tennessee
SA
Tennessee, TN
1,577,074
Crahan, Hoff, Lawrence, Mary, Mooney
2004-09-28
false
state-v-nixon
Nixon
State v. Nixon
STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Jonathan NIXON, Appellant
Nancy A. McKerrow, Columbia, MO, for appellant., Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Atty. Gen., Breck K. Burgess, Jefferson City, MO, for respondent.
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
Motion for Rehearing and/or Transfer to Supreme Court Denied Nov. 30, 2004.
null
null
0
Published
null
<parties id="b88-17"> STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Jonathan NIXON, Appellant. </parties><br><docketnumber id="b88-20"> No. ED 83436. </docketnumber><br><court id="b88-21"> Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, Division Four. </court><br><decisiondate id="b88-23"> Sept. 28, 2004. </decisiondate><br><otherdate id="b88-24"> Motion for Rehearing and/or Transfer to Supreme Court Denied Nov. 30, 2004. </otherdate><br><attorneys id="b88-26"> Nancy A. McKerrow, Columbia, MO, for appellant. </attorneys><br><attorneys id="b88-27"> Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Atty. Gen., Breck K. Burgess, Jefferson City, MO, for respondent. </attorneys><br><judges id="b88-28"> Before LAWRENCE E. MOONEY, P.J., LAWRENCE G. CRAHAN, J., and MARY K. HOFF, J. </judges>
[ "151 S.W.3d 66" ]
[ { "author_str": "Per Curiam", "per_curiam": false, "type": "010combined", "page_count": null, "download_url": null, "author_id": 7729, "opinion_text": "\n151 S.W.3d 66 (2004)\nSTATE of Missouri, Respondent,\nv.\nJonathan NIXON, Appellant.\nNo. ED 83436.\nMissouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, Division Four.\nSeptember 28, 2004.\nMotion for Rehearing and/or Transfer Denied November 30, 2004.\nNancy A. McKerrow, Columbia, MO, for appellant.\nJeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Atty. Gen., Breck K. Burgess, Jefferson City, MO, for respondent.\nBefore LAWRENCE E. MOONEY, P.J., LAWRENCE G. CRAHAN, J., and MARY K. HOFF, J.\nMotion for Rehearing and/or Transfer to Supreme Court Denied November 30, 2004.\n\nORDER\nPER CURIAM.\nJonathan Nixon appeals the judgment entered pursuant to the jury's verdict convicting him as a prior offender of one count of assault in the first degree, two counts of kidnapping, one count of first degree robbery, two counts of armed criminal action, and one count of burglary in the first degree, for which he was sentenced to consecutive terms of imprisonment totaling 155 years.\nWe have reviewed the briefs of the parties and the record on appeal and find no *67 error of law. An extended opinion would serve no jurisprudential purpose. We have, however, provided a memorandum opinion for the use of the parties only setting forth the reasons for our decision. The judgment is affirmed pursuant to Rule 30.25(b).\n", "ocr": false, "opinion_id": 1577074 } ]
Missouri Court of Appeals
Missouri Court of Appeals
SA
Missouri, MO
2,395,005
Dudley
1994-12-19
false
allred-v-demuth
Allred
Allred v. Demuth
Jerry K. ALLRED and Karen K. Allred, Husband and Wife v. Shannon DEMUTH
Raymond C. Smith, P.A., for appellants., Charles E. Hanks, for appellee.
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
[Rehearing denied January 23, 1995.*]
null
null
15
Published
null
<parties id="b96-8" pgmap="96"> Jerry K. ALLRED and Karen K. Allred, Husband and Wife v. Shannon DEMUTH </parties><br><docketnumber id="b96-9" pgmap="96"> 93-1011 </docketnumber><citation id="A9I" pgmap="96"> 890 S.W.2d 578 </citation><br><court id="b96-10" pgmap="96"> Supreme Court of Arkansas </court><decisiondate id="As3" pgmap="96"> Opinion delivered December 19, 1994 </decisiondate><otherdate id="AMo" pgmap="96"> [Rehearing denied January 23, 1995. <a class="footnote" href="#fn*" id="fn*_ref"> * </a> ] </otherdate><br><attorneys id="b98-9" pgmap="98"> Raymond C. Smith, P.A., for appellants. </attorneys><br><attorneys id="b98-10" pgmap="98"> Charles E. Hanks, for appellee. </attorneys><div class="footnotes"><div class="footnote" id="fn*" label="*"> <a class="footnote" href="#fn*_ref"> * </a> <p id="b96-13" pgmap="96"> Roaf, J., not participating. </p> </div></div>
[ "890 S.W.2d 578", "319 Ark. 62" ]
[ { "author_str": "Dudley", "per_curiam": false, "type": "010combined", "page_count": null, "download_url": null, "author_id": 3745, "opinion_text": "\n890 S.W.2d 578 (1994)\n319 Ark. 62\nJerry K. ALLRED and Karen K. Allred, Husband and Wife, Appellants,\nv.\nShannon DEMUTH, Appellee.\nNo. 93-1011.\nSupreme Court of Arkansas.\nDecember 19, 1994.\n*579 Raymond C. Smith, Fayetteville, for appellants.\nCharles E. Hanks, Fayetteville, for appellee.\n*580 DUDLEY, Justice.\nShannon Demuth filed suit against Jerry and Karen Allred for fraudulently concealing structural defects in a home she purchased from them. The jury returned a plaintiff's verdict in the amounts of $50,000 compensatory damages and $24,000 punitive damages. The defendants appeal. We affirm.\nThe defendants first argue that the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict. Our standard of review in determining sufficiency of the evidence is well settled: (1) The evidence is viewed in a light most favorable to appellee; (2) the jury's finding will be upheld if there is any substantial evidence to support it; and (3) substantial evidence is that of sufficient force and character to induce the mind of the factfinder past speculation and conjecture. Derrick v. Mexico Chiquito, Inc., 307 Ark. 217, 819 S.W.2d 4 (1991).\nIn order to prove the tort of fraud, the plaintiff was required to prove (1) a false representation of a material fact; (2) knowledge or belief on the part of the defendants that the representation was false; (3) an intent to induce the plaintiff to act or to refrain from acting in reliance on the misrepresentation; (4) justifiable reliance upon representation on the part of the plaintiff taking action or refraining from it; and (5) resulting damages. MFA Mutual Ins. Co. v. Keller, 274 Ark. 281, 623 S.W.2d 841 (1981). An inference of fraud may be drawn by circumstantial evidence just as with any other fact. Moore Ford Co. v. Smith, 270 Ark. 340, 604 S.W.2d 943 (1980). While fraud may be established by circumstantial evidence, the circumstances must be so strong and well connected as to clearly show fraud. Interstate Freeway Serv., Inc. v. Houser, 310 Ark. 302, 835 S.W.2d 872 (1992).\nPlaintiff offered evidence to show that defendants bought the home before construction was complete; that they were the first occupants of the home; that they were in exclusive possession and control of the home until they sold it to plaintiff in 1986; that defendants did not disclose to plaintiff that the house had any problems; that plaintiff inspected the house and could not see any defects; that in 1988 both new and old cracks were discovered in the interior and exterior of the home, in the foundation, and in the driveway; that the movement of the foundation had been so great that one could have heard the house moving; that the structural defects would have begun showing up within one year of construction; that the cracks had been covered and patched with caulk and painted over in a color that hid them; that the caulking and painting was not a part of the construction; that the caulking and painting could serve only a cosmetic purpose by hiding the cracks; and that it would cost $50,000 to repair the home. From this proof and its reasonable inferences, the jury could have concluded that the cracks occurred when defendants lived in the house; that the cracks were caulked, sealed, and painted in order to conceal them; that defendants concealed the cracks in order to induce someone to purchase the home; and that plaintiff purchased the home and consequently suffered damages. In sum, the proof was sufficient to establish the tort of fraud.\nDefendant Jerry Allred denied knowing of the problems or concealing them, but it was within the jury's province to believe or disbelieve his testimony, and to determine the weight, if any, to accord it. Druckenmiller v. Cluff, 316 Ark. 517, 873 S.W.2d 526 (1994).\nDefendants next contend that the trial court erred in giving an instruction on punitive damages because the plaintiff did not specifically request such damages in her testimony. The contention is without merit. An instruction on punitive damages may be given when the evidence shows that a party likely \"knew or ought to have known, in the light of the surrounding circumstances, that his conduct would naturally or probably result in injury and that he continued such conduct in reckless disregard of the consequences from which malice could be inferred.\" Dongary Holstein Leasing, Inc. v. Covington, 293 Ark. 112, 116, 732 S.W.2d 465, 467 (1987). A plaintiff is entitled to the instruction when the pleadings ask for punitive damages and evidence is introduced showing deliberate misrepresentation or deceit. City Nat'l Bank v. Goodwin, 301 Ark. 182, 783 S.W.2d 335 (1990).\n*581 The defendants' next point of appeal involves the amount of the verdicts. The jury returned separate verdicts finding Jerry Allred liable for $25,000 compensatory damages and $12,000 punitive damages, and finding Karen Allred liable for $25,000 compensatory damages and $12,000 punitive damages. The trial court entered a judgment against both defendants, jointly and severally, for $50,000 compensatory damages and $24,000 punitive damages. In this point of appeal, the defendants argue that the trial court should have entered only one judgment for $25,000 and $12,000.\nThere was testimony that the damages amounted to $50,000. The jury was instructed to decide each defendant's liability as if it were a separate lawsuit. There were separate verdicts finding each defendant equally liable. In determining that the total damages were $50,000 the trial court correctly followed our case of C &amp; L Trucking, Inc. v. Allen, 285 Ark. 243, 686 S.W.2d 399 (1985). Additionally, a joint tortfeasor is one of \"two or more persons jointly or severally liable in tort for the same injury to person or property....\" Ark.Code Ann. § 16-61-201 (1987) (emphasis added); see also W.M. Bashlin Co. v. Smith, 277 Ark. 406, 643 S.W.2d 526 (1982). It is undisputed that defendants were being sued jointly and severally for the same fraud and damage. A jury may apportion liability among joint tortfeasors, but this is only for the purpose of contribution and indemnity among the tortfeasors and does not affect the rights of a plaintiff to recover the whole amount from each. Ark.Code Ann. § 16-61-202(4) (1987). The apportioned awards are still to be aggregated. Allen, 285 Ark. at 248, 686 S.W.2d at 402. Finally, the general rule is that joint tortfeasors may be jointly and severally liable for punitive damages. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co. v. Arkansas Sheriff's Boys' Ranch, 280 Ark. 53, 655 S.W.2d 389 (1983).\nThe defendants' final point of appeal involves a ruling made during closing argument. Karen Allred did not testify at trial. In closing plaintiff's counsel argued, \"You would think [Karen's] testimony was vital to [defendants'] case, wouldn't you? You think she might have been afraid of committing perjury?\" Defendants' counsel objected, and the trial court overruled the objection. Defendants assign the ruling as error.\nThe failure of a party to testify in a civil case about facts peculiarly within his or her knowledge is a circumstance which may be looked upon with suspicion by a trier of fact. May v. Barg &amp; Co., 276 Ark. 199, 633 S.W.2d 376 (1982). The failure to testify gives rise to the presumption that the testimony would have been against the party's interest. Starnes v. Andre, 243 Ark. 712, 421 S.W.2d 616 (1967). Counsel may argue every plausible inference which could be drawn from the testimony. Abraham v. State, 274 Ark. 506, 625 S.W.2d 518 (1981). A trial court has wide discretion in controlling, supervising, and determining the propriety of counsels' arguments, and an appellate court will not reverse absent a showing of manifest abuse. Brown v. State, 316 Ark. 724, 875 S.W.2d 828 (1994); Wal-mart Stores, Inc. v. Yarbrough, 284 Ark. 345, 681 S.W.2d 359 (1984).\nAffirmed.\n", "ocr": false, "opinion_id": 2395005 } ]
Supreme Court of Arkansas
Supreme Court of Arkansas
S
Arkansas, AR
16,791
null
1999-02-01
false
wilson-v-mobil-oil-corp
Wilson
Wilson v. Mobil Oil Corp
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
0
Unpublished
null
null
[ "170 F.3d 184" ]
[ { "author_str": null, "per_curiam": false, "type": "010combined", "page_count": 1, "download_url": "http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions\\unpub\\97/97-31241.0.wpd.pdf", "author_id": null, "opinion_text": "170 F.3d 184\n Wilsonv.Mobil Oil Corporation\n NO. 97-31241\n United States Court of Appeals,Fifth Circuit.\n January 28, 1999\n \n 1\n Appeal From: E.D.La.\n \n \n 2\n Affirmed.\n \n ", "ocr": false, "opinion_id": 16791 } ]
Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
F
USA, Federal
562,712
null
1991-06-03
false
kenneth-e-hall-jr-v-henry-bellmon-governor-robert-h-henry-attorney
null
null
Kenneth E. Hall, Jr. v. Henry Bellmon, Governor Robert H. Henry, Attorney General Gary Maynard Steven Kaiser Captain E. Smith Sgt. B. Jones Buddy Honaker Two Unnamed Guards
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
1,821
Published
null
null
[ "935 F.2d 1106" ]
[ { "author_str": null, "per_curiam": false, "type": "010combined", "page_count": null, "download_url": "http://bulk.resource.org/courts.gov/c/F2/935/935.F2d.1106.90-6326.html", "author_id": null, "opinion_text": "935 F.2d 1106\n 19 Fed.R.Serv.3d 1217\n Kenneth E. HALL, Jr., Plaintiff-Appellant,v.Henry BELLMON, Governor; Robert H. Henry, Attorney General;Gary Maynard; Steven Kaiser; Captain E. Smith;Sgt. B. Jones; Buddy Honaker; TwoUnnamed Guards, Defendants-Appellees.\n No. 90-6326.\n United States Court of Appeals,Tenth Circuit.\n June 3, 1991.\n \n Kenneth E. Hall, Jr., pro se.\n Robert H. Henry, Atty. Gen. of Okl., and Karin M. Kriz, Asst. Atty. Gen. of Okl., Oklahoma City, Okl., for defendants-appellees.\n Before LOGAN, MOORE and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges.\n LOGAN, Circuit Judge.\n \n \n 1\n Pro se plaintiff Kenneth E. Hall, Jr. appeals the district court's dismissal of his claim that the policies and procedures of the Lexington Assessment and Reception Center (LARC), as well as the actions of LARC employees, violated his First Amendment right to free exercise of religion. He contends that the district court applied the wrong legal standards in dismissing his case, improperly relied on evidence not in the pleadings, and failed to give proper notice and opportunity for discovery.1\n \n \n 2\n * Because all are relevant to our discussion of the issues, we summarize here the procedure and law applicable to the three most common pretrial points at which a district court may dispose of a pro se complaint.\n \n \n 3\n * First, if the plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, a court \"may dismiss the case if the allegation of poverty is untrue, or if satisfied that the action is frivolous or malicious.\" 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1915(d). A Sec. 1915(d) dismissal may be sua sponte when \"on the face of the complaint it clearly appears that the action is frivolous or malicious.\" Henriksen v. Bentley, 644 F.2d 852, 854 (10th Cir.1981); see also Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 1831, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989).2 The term \"frivolous\" refers to \"the inarguable legal conclusion\" and \"the fanciful factual allegation.\" Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325, 109 S.Ct. at 1831. The purpose of Sec. 1915(d) is \"to discourage the filing of, and waste of judicial and private resources upon, baseless lawsuits that paying litigants generally do not initiate....\" Id. at 327, 109 S.Ct. at 1832-33.\n \n \n 4\n In contrast to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), which authorizes dismissal whenever a complaint fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted \"without regard to whether [the claim] is based on an outlandish legal theory or on a close but ultimately unavailing one,\" Sec. 1915(d) authorizes dismissal of \"a claim based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.\" Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327, 109 S.Ct. at 1833. \"[W]henever a plaintiff states an arguable claim for relief, dismissal for frivolousness under Sec. 1915(d) is improper, even if the legal basis underlying the claim ultimately proves incorrect.\" McKinney v. Oklahoma, 925 F.2d 363, 365 (10th Cir.1991) (emphasis in original) (citing Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 328, 109 S.Ct. at 1833). Examples of claims based on inarguable legal theories include those against which the defendants are undeniably immune from suit and those alleging an infringement of a legal interest that clearly does not exist. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327, 109 S.Ct. at 1832-33.\n \n \n 5\n Section 1915(d) also gives the district court \"the unusual power to pierce the veil of the complaint's factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.\" Id. Clearly baseless factual allegations are those that are \"fantastic\" or \"delusional.\" Id. at 327-28, 109 S.Ct. at 1832-33. The concern that pro se litigants have notice and opportunity to avoid dismissal of their legitimate claims by amending and supporting their pleadings militates against equating Sec. 1915(d) and Rule 12(b)(6) standards, id. at 329-30, 109 S.Ct. at 1834; that same concern forbids equating Sec. 1915(d) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 summary judgment standards. A plausible factual allegation, even if it lacks evidentiary support, is not \"frivolous\" as contemplated by Sec. 1915(d), even though it may not survive a motion for summary judgment.\n \n \n 6\n When the pro se plaintiff is a prisoner, a court-authorized investigation and report by prison officials (referred to as a Martinez report) is not only proper, but may be necessary to develop a record sufficient to ascertain whether there are any factual or legal bases for the prisoner's claims. Martinez v. Aaron, 570 F.2d 317, 318-19 (10th Cir.1978); see also Gee v. Estes, 829 F.2d 1005, 1007 (10th Cir.1987). Telephone evidentiary hearings before a judge or magistrate may serve the same purpose as a Martinez report. Gee, 829 F.2d at 1008. Although a court may consider the Martinez report in dismissing a claim pursuant to Sec. 1915(d), id. at 1007, it cannot resolve material disputed factual issues by accepting the report's factual findings when they are in conflict with pleadings or affidavits. Reed v. Dunham, 893 F.2d 285, 287 n. 2 (10th Cir.1990); El'Amin v. Pearce, 750 F.2d 829, 832 (10th Cir.1984); Sampley v. Ruettgers, 704 F.2d 491, 493 n. 3 (10th Cir.1983). A bona fide factual dispute exists even when the plaintiff's factual allegations that are in conflict with the Martinez report are less specific or well-documented than those contained in the report. Because pro se litigants may be unfamiliar with the requirements to sustain a cause of action, they should be provided an opportunity to controvert the facts set out in the Martinez report.\n \n B\n \n 7\n Second, the court may dismiss a complaint for \"failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.\" Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). The complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim \"unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.\" Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957) (footnote omitted); Meade v. Grubbs, 841 F.2d 1512, 1526 (10th Cir.1988); Grider v. Texas Oil &amp; Gas Corp., 868 F.2d 1147, 1148 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. 76, 107 L.Ed.2d 43 (1989). A court reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint presumes all of plaintiff's factual allegations are true and construes them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 1686, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974); Meade, 841 F.2d at 1526; Morgan v. City of Rawlins, 792 F.2d 975, 978 (10th Cir.1986). If matters outside the pleadings are considered by the court, the Rule 12(b)(6) motion is treated as a motion for summary judgment and disposed of pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b); Reed, 893 F.2d at 287 n. 2. Although dismissals under Rule 12(b)(6) typically follow a motion to dismiss, giving plaintiff notice and opportunity to amend his complaint, a court may dismiss sua sponte \"when it is 'patently obvious' that the plaintiff could not prevail on the facts alleged, and allowing him an opportunity to amend his complaint would be futile.\" McKinney, at 365 (citations omitted).\n \n \n 8\n A pro se litigant's pleadings are to be construed liberally and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972); see also Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285, 292, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976); Gillihan v. Shillinger, 872 F.2d 935, 938 (10th Cir.1989). We believe that this rule means that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the plaintiff could prevail, it should do so despite the plaintiff's failure to cite proper legal authority, his confusion of various legal theories, his poor syntax and sentence construction, or his unfamiliarity with pleading requirements.3 At the same time, we do not believe it is the proper function of the district court to assume the role of advocate for the pro se litigant.\n \n \n 9\n The broad reading of the plaintiff's complaint does not relieve the plaintiff of the burden of alleging sufficient facts on which a recognized legal claim could be based. Not every fact must be described in specific detail, Conley, 355 U.S. at 47, 78 S.Ct. at 102-03, and the plaintiff whose factual allegations are close to stating a claim but are missing some important element that may not have occurred to him, should be allowed to amend his complaint, Reynoldson v. Shillinger, 907 F.2d 124, 126-27 (10th Cir.1990). Nevertheless, conclusory allegations without supporting factual averments are insufficient to state a claim on which relief can be based. Dunn v. White, 880 F.2d 1188, 1197 (10th Cir.1989), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. 871, 107 L.Ed.2d 954 (1990); Sooner Products Co. v. McBride, 708 F.2d 510, 512 (10th Cir.1983); Clulow v. Oklahoma, 700 F.2d 1291, 1303 (10th Cir.1983), overruled on other grounds sub nom, Garcia v. Wilson, 731 F.2d 640 (10th Cir.1984), aff'd, 471 U.S. 261, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985); Wise v. Bravo, 666 F.2d 1328, 1333 (10th Cir.1981); Lorraine v. United States, 444 F.2d 1, 2 (10th Cir.1971). This is so because a pro se plaintiff requires no special legal training to recount the facts surrounding his alleged injury, and he must provide such facts if the court is to determine whether he makes out a claim on which relief can be granted. Moreover, in analyzing the sufficiency of the plaintiff's complaint, the court need accept as true only the plaintiff's well-pleaded factual contentions, not his conclusory allegations. Dunn, 880 F.2d at 1190 (quoting Swanson v. Bixler, 750 F.2d 810, 813 (10th Cir.1984)).\n \n C\n \n 10\n Third, the court may grant summary judgment \"if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.\" Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A motion for summary judgment that is supported by affidavits or other materials provided under oath gives the adverse party notice that summary judgment is possible; the adverse party must respond with affidavits or other evidence to show a genuine issue of material fact. Jaxon v. Circle K Corp., 773 F.2d 1138, 1139 (10th Cir.1985). A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is treated as a motion for summary judgment when premised on materials outside the pleadings, and the opposing party is afforded the same notice and opportunity to respond as provided in Rule 56.4 Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b); Reed, 893 F.2d at 287 n. 2. \"The provisions of Rule 56(c) for notice to the opposing party and an opportunity for him to serve opposing affidavits are mandatory. Noncompliance therewith deprives the court of authority to grant summary judgment.\" Torres v. First State Bank of Sierra County, 550 F.2d 1255, 1257 (10th Cir.1977) (citation omitted). Furthermore, \" '[d]istrict courts must take care to insure that pro se litigants are provided with proper notice regarding the complex procedural issues involved in summary judgment proceedings.' \" Jaxon, 773 F.2d at 1140 (quoting Garaux v. Pulley, 739 F.2d 437, 439 (9th Cir.1984)); see also Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309, 310 (4th Cir.1975) (pro se plaintiff should \"be advised of his right to file counter-affidavits or other responsive material and alerted to the fact that his failure to so respond might result in the entry of summary judgment against him\").\n \n \n 11\n Material factual disputes cannot be resolved at summary judgment based on conflicting affidavits.5 See, e.g., Sampley, 704 F.2d at 496. To come within the protection of this rule, however, the nonmovant's affidavits must be based upon personal knowledge and set forth facts that would be admissible in evidence; conclusory and self-serving affidavits are not sufficient. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Palucki v. Sears, Roebuck &amp; Co., 879 F.2d 1568, 1572 (7th Cir.1989). Likewise, only material factual disputes preclude summary judgment; factual disputes about immaterial items are irrelevant. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Affidavits or other evidence offered by a nonmovant must create a genuine issue for trial; viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, it is not enough that the evidence be \"merely colorable\" or anything short of \"significantly probative.\" Id. at 249-50, 106 S.Ct. at 2510-11. This is because when \"the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is 'no genuine issue for trial.' \" Matsushita Elec. Indust. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (quoting First Nat'l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 289, 88 S.Ct. 1575, 1592-93, 20 L.Ed.2d 569 (1968)).\n \n \n 12\n A Martinez report is treated like an affidavit, and the court is not authorized to accept the factual findings of the prison investigation when the plaintiff has presented conflicting evidence. See Sampley, 704 F.2d at 493 n. 3. The plaintiff's complaint may also be treated as an affidavit if it alleges facts based on the plaintiff's personal knowledge and has been sworn under penalty of perjury. Jaxon, 773 F.2d at 1139 n. 1 (citing, inter alia, Gordon v. Watson, 622 F.2d 120, 123 (5th Cir.1980)) (\"In certain circumstances a verified pleading may itself be treated as an affidavit in support of a motion for summary judgment, but only if it satisfies the standards for affidavits set out in Rule 56(e).\").\n \n II\n \n 13\n In the instant case, plaintiff, a state prisoner, alleges three separate violations of his First Amendment right to free exercise of religion while an inmate at LARC, in that LARC officials (1) confiscated his medicine bag and talisman, which are used in the practice of his Native American religion; (2) improperly destroyed the medicine bag and talisman; and (3) cut his hair, without giving him an opportunity to apply for an exemption, in violation of his religious beliefs.\n \n \n 14\n In a thorough memorandum opinion, the district court considered and dismissed each of plaintiff's claims pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Plaintiff contends that the district court improperly dismissed his complaint as frivolous under Sec. 1915(d). Although the court did say that it had \"also reviewed the complaint under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1915(d),\" R. tab 52 at 2-3 (emphasis added), it never characterized plaintiff's claims as frivolous. The only plausible reading of the district court's opinion is that the court dismissed plaintiff's case for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted.\n \n \n 15\n * Plaintiff argues that his claim regarding confiscation of his religious items should not have been dismissed because the court considered and referred to the Martinez report.6 As noted above, when the court does not exclude materials outside the pleadings, a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is treated as one for summary judgment and the plaintiff must be given notice and the opportunity to respond with affidavits or similar evidence. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b); Reed, 893 F.2d at 287 n. 2. Here, plaintiff was not provided with the notice and opportunity to respond required by Fed.R.Civ.P. 56.\n \n \n 16\n We hold, however, that in particular circumstances the Martinez report may be considered part of the pleadings for purposes of Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b). A written document that is attached to the complaint as an exhibit is considered part of the complaint and may be considered in a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal. Fed.R.Civ.P. 10(c); Chester County Intermediate Unit v. Pennsylvania Blue Shield, 896 F.2d 808, 812 (3d Cir.1990); Morton v. Becker, 793 F.2d 185, 187 (8th Cir.1986); Sullivan v. United States, 788 F.2d 813, 815 n. 3 (1st Cir.1986); Quiller v. Barclays Am./Credit, Inc., 727 F.2d 1067, 1069 (11th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1124, 106 S.Ct. 1992, 90 L.Ed.2d 673 (1986); Amfac Mortgage Corp. v. Arizona Mall of Tempe, 583 F.2d 426, 429-30 (9th Cir.1978). One circuit court, however, has held that affidavits, in contrast to other written documents attached to the complaint, may not be considered in dismissing under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 339-40 n. 3 (3d Cir.1989); contra Schnell v. City of Chicago, 407 F.2d 1084, 1085 (7th Cir.1969) (holding that affidavits attached to the complaint are part thereof). The Martinez report is often treated like an affidavit. See, e.g., Sampley, 704 F.2d at 493 n. 3. Further, here the Martinez report was attached not to plaintiff's complaint, but to defendants' brief in support of their motion to dismiss. See Goldman v. Belden, 754 F.2d 1059, 1066 (2d Cir.1985) (holding Rule 12(b)(6) consideration of documents attached to defendants' motion to dismiss improper).\n \n \n 17\n Nevertheless, we have authorized the district courts to require a Martinez report to develop a basis for determining whether a prisoner plaintiff has a possibly meritorious claim. The purpose of the Martinez report is to identify and clarify the issues plaintiff raises in his complaint. Martinez, 570 F.2d at 319; Gee, 829 F.2d at 1007. It also aids the court in its broad reading of the pro se litigant's pleadings under Haines, 404 U.S. at 520-21, 92 S.Ct. at 595-96, by supplementing a plaintiff's often inadequate description of the practices that he contends are unconstitutional. See Gee, 829 F.2d at 1007. When the plaintiff challenges a prison's policies or established procedures and the Martinez report's description of the policies or procedures remains undisputed after plaintiff has an opportunity to respond, we should, and will, treat the portion of the Martinez report describing the policies or procedures like a written document that has been attached to plaintiff's complaint. Thus, the court appropriately considered the Martinez report.\n \n \n 18\n In the instant case, plaintiff essentially is challenging a policy of the LARC not to allow prisoners to have sharp items that can be used as weapons or items that can be worn around the neck, which can be used to choke inmates or guards or to commit suicide. Plaintiff's talisman is a sharp bear tooth necklace, and his medicine bag has a thong which could be used for wearing around the neck. The court referred only to those portions of the Martinez report that describe the challenged policy and the reasons for it; the court does not use the report to resolve factual issues or to find that there are no disputed facts. Plaintiff had the opportunity to respond to the Martinez report, R. tab 37, and he did respond, R. tabs 40 &amp; 47. He does not challenge the Martinez report's description of the policy or its reasons; instead he disputes the reasonableness of the policy in light of his constitutional right to free exercise of his religion, a legal question appropriately resolved in a 12(b)(6) ruling.\n \n \n 19\n Although plaintiff retains his fundamental right to practice his religion in prison, prison regulations may constitutionally impinge on plaintiff's right if \"the regulation is 'reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.' \" Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 110 S.Ct. 1028, 1037, 108 L.Ed.2d 178 (1990) (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 2261, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987)); see also O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349, 107 S.Ct. 2400, 2405-05, 96 L.Ed.2d 282 (1987); Dunn, 880 F.2d at 1197. Turner set forth four factors that the court is to consider in reviewing a challenged prison regulation.\n \n \n 20\n \"First, there must be a 'valid, rational connection' between the prison regulation and the legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it.... A second factor ... is whether there are alternative means of exercising the right that remain open to prison inmates.... A third consideration is the impact accommodation of the asserted constitutional right will have on guards and other inmates, and on the allocation of prison resources generally.... Finally, the absence of ready alternatives is evidence of the reasonableness of a prison regulation.\"\n \n \n 21\n Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-90, 107 S.Ct. at 2262 (citations omitted).\n \n \n 22\n The district court found that the LARC regulations which prohibit any inmate from possessing sharp objects or items that can be worn around the neck, including religious items, were, on their face, reasonably related to the legitimate penological interest in protecting the safety of other inmates and prison personnel and preventing suicide attempts. The court also noted that the regulations guarantee inmates other avenues for the practice of their respective religions, including Native American beliefs. We are convinced that the district court correctly applied the proper standards and that plaintiff cannot state a claim for relief on the facts alleged.\n \n B\n \n 23\n Plaintiff also challenges the dismissal of his claim for the destruction of his religious items. The district court found that plaintiff must allege intentional destruction of his property to sustain a Sec. 1983 action and that plaintiff's conclusory allegations of intent are insufficient. We agree. A valid claim for loss of prisoner's property in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment must include allegations of deliberate conduct by state actors. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 333-34, 106 S.Ct. 662, 666-67, 88 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986); Archuleta v. McShan, 897 F.2d 495, 497-99 (10th Cir.1990). Although plaintiff need not allege every element of his action in specific detail, Conley, 355 U.S. at 47, 78 S.Ct. at 102-03, he cannot rely on conclusory allegations, Dunn, 880 F.2d at 1197; Sooner Products, 708 F.2d at 512; Clulow, 700 F.2d at 1303; Wise, 666 F.2d at 1333; Lorraine, 444 F.2d at 2. Plaintiff's mere words \"with malous [sic] and forthougth [sic]\" are insufficient without any facts to support the conclusion. Plaintiff has not even presented his theory as to why defendants would intentionally destroy his property.\n \n C\n \n 24\n Finally, we consider the dismissal of plaintiff's claim regarding the cutting of his hair in violation of his religious beliefs. LARC policy requires that the hair of all new inmates be cut. The justifications advanced to support the requirement, that we believe have merit, are that it prevents inmates from hiding weapons in long hair and from easily changing their appearance should they escape, and it facilitates good hygiene. The court found the policy, as set forth in the Martinez report, reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest. The nature of the policy is undisputed, and plaintiff had the opportunity to respond. Thus, the district court properly considered this portion of the Martinez report as if it were part of plaintiff's complaint.\n \n \n 25\n The district court also appears to have accepted the Martinez report's assertions that LARC's status as an intake facility, in which inmates stay only ten days on average, makes an exemption process for religious beliefs unfeasible. The lack of alternatives to a regulation that otherwise violates a prisoner's constitutional rights is relevant to determining the validity of the regulation. Turner, 482 U.S. at 90, 107 S.Ct. at 2262. Whether the existence of alternatives to the regulation renders the regulation unreasonable is a legal question appropriately resolved on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.\n \n \n 26\n Plaintiff disputes defendants' assertion that there is no reasonable opportunity for religious exemptions to the haircut requirement. He states that he was an inmate at LARC for thirty-one days, which was the norm at the time his hair was cut--in contrast to the Martinez report's ten days. R. tab 47 at 2. Thus, if the time difference is important to a determination whether an exemption process for religious beliefs is feasible, the district court, by accepting the ten-day average stay assertion in the Martinez report, has improperly resolved a factual dispute more properly the subject of a summary judgment proceeding or a trial.\n \n \n 27\n We do not believe, however, that the ten-day, thirty-one-day difference is legally significant. LARC is still a temporary detention facility, receiving and processing for redeployment to other facilities many inmates incarcerated for different crimes. That some or even many are kept for a month does not require, we hold, establishment of a haircut exemption procedure. Thus, the district court permissibly rejected this claim under a 12(b)(6) ruling.\n \n \n 28\n AFFIRMED.\n \n \n \n 1\n After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed.R.App.P. 34(a); 10th Cir.R. 34.1.8. The cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument\n \n \n 2\n The court may dismiss pursuant to Sec. 1915(d), even if defendants have sought dismissal on Rule 12(b)(6). Taylor v. Wallace, 931 F.2d 698, 700 (10th Cir.1991)\n \n \n 3\n The Haines rule applies to all proceedings involving a pro se litigant, including Sec. 1915(d) and summary judgment proceedings. See, e.g., Reed, 893 F.2d at 286 (liberally construing pleadings dismissed under Sec. 1915(d)); Overton v. United States, 925 F.2d 1282 (10th Cir.1990) (liberally construing pro se pleadings in review of summary judgment). In addition, pro se litigants are to be given reasonable opportunity to remedy the defects in their pleadings. See, e.g., Reynoldson v. Shillinger, 907 F.2d 124, 126 (10th Cir.1990); Jaxon v. Circle K Corp., 773 F.2d 1138, 1140 (10th Cir.1985)\n \n \n 4\n We will treat a dismissal as proper under Rule 12(b) even when the district court does not exclude materials outside the pleadings if the court does not refer to or rely on the outside materials in its order and if, as a matter of law, the complaint is insufficient. Childers v. Independent School Dist. No. 1 of Bryan County, 676 F.2d 1338, 1340 (10th Cir.1982); Torres v. First State Bank of Sierra County, 550 F.2d 1255, 1257 (10th Cir.1977)\n \n \n 5\n A movant is not always required to come forward with affidavits or other evidence to obtain summary judgment; once the movant points out an absence of proof on an essential element of the nonmovant's case, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to provide evidence to the contrary. See Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-53, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)\n \n \n 6\n The court requested LARC officials to investigate plaintiff's claims and prepare a Martinez report. The court found the original report, which was filed with defendants' brief in support of their motion to dismiss, R. tab 35, to be deficient in certain respects and ordered defendants to prepare a supplemental report, R. tab 41 at 3 and 4. The supplemental report was filed with defendants' supplemental brief in support of their motion to dismiss. R. tabs 44, 45. The court referred to both reports in its Memorandum Opinion of September 28, 1990. R. tab 52. The term \"Martinez report\" is used here to mean both reports taken together\n \n \n ", "ocr": false, "opinion_id": 562712 } ]
Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
F
USA, Federal
1,614,076
Beilfuss
1983-03-29
false
giese-v-montgomery-ward-inc
Giese
Giese v. Montgomery Ward, Inc.
Peter Giese and Sue Giese, Individually and as Parents of Missy Giese, Plaintiffs and Cross-Appellants, Missy Giese, a Minor, by Her Guardian Ad Litem, Arnold J. Wightman, Plaintiff-Appellant and Cross-Respondent-Petitioner, v. Montgomery Ward, Inc., a Foreign Corporation, Defendant and Cross-Respondent, Michael Shanahan, a Minor, Bernard Shanahan, Individually, and D/B/A Shanahan’s Tavern, and Dorothy Shanahan, Individually, and D/B/A Shanahan’s Tavern, Defendants-Respondents and Cross-Appellants and Cross-Respondents and Cross-Petitioners
For the cross-respondent-petitioner there were briefs by Joe Thrasher, Katherine Mahan Stewart and Cameron, Shervey, Thrasher, Doyle & Relish, Ltd., Rice Lake, and Fritschler, Pellino, SchranJc & Rosen, Madison, and oral argument by Joe Thrasher., For the cross-respondents and cross-petitioners there was a brief by Clyde C. Cross and Cross, Mercer and Maffei, Baraboo, and oral argument by Clyde C. Cross., For the plaintiffs and cross-appellants there was a brief and oral argument by Michael Nowakowski, Madison., For the defendant and cross-respondent there was a brief and oral argument by Frank M. Coyne, Madison.
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
Argued March 2, 1983.
null
null
32
Published
null
<parties id="b428-5"> Peter Giese and Sue Giese, individually and as parents of Missy Giese, Plaintiffs and Cross-Appellants, Missy Giese, a minor, by her guardian ad litem, Arnold J. Wightman, Plaintiff-Appellant and Cross-Respondent-Petitioner, v. Montgomery Ward, Inc., a foreign corporation, Defendant and Cross-Respondent, Michael Shanahan, a minor, Bernard Shanahan, individually, and d/b/a Shanahan’s Tavern, and Dorothy Shanahan, individually, and d/b/a Shanahan’s Tavern, Defendants-Respondents and Cross-Appellants and Cross-Respondents and Cross-Petitioners. </parties><br><court id="b428-10"> Supreme Court </court><br><docketnumber id="b428-11"> <em> No. 81-763. </em> </docketnumber><otherdate id="A6b"> <em> Argued March 2, 1983. </em> </otherdate><decisiondate id="Ak7"> Decided <em> March 29, 1983. </em> </decisiondate><br><citation id="b428-13"> (Also reported in 331 N.W.2d 585.) </citation><br><attorneys id="b431-15"> <span citation-index="1" class="star-pagination" label="395"> *395 </span> For the cross-respondent-petitioner there were briefs by <em> Joe Thrasher, Katherine Mahan Stewart </em> and <em> Cameron, Shervey, Thrasher, Doyle &amp; Relish, Ltd., </em> Rice Lake, and <em> Fritschler, Pellino, SchranJc &amp; Rosen, </em> Madison, and oral argument by <em> Joe Thrasher. </em> </attorneys><br><attorneys id="b432-3"> <span citation-index="1" class="star-pagination" label="396"> *396 </span> For the cross-respondents and cross-petitioners there was a brief by <em> Clyde C. Cross </em> and <em> Cross, Mercer and Maffei, </em> Baraboo, and oral argument by <em> Clyde C. Cross. </em> </attorneys><br><attorneys id="b432-4"> For the plaintiffs and cross-appellants there was a brief and oral argument by <em> Michael Nowakowski, </em> Madison. </attorneys><br><attorneys id="b432-5"> For the defendant and cross-respondent there was a brief and oral argument by <em> Frank M. Coyne, </em> Madison. </attorneys>
[ "331 N.W.2d 585", "111 Wis. 2d 392" ]
[ { "author_str": "Beilfuss", "per_curiam": false, "type": "010combined", "page_count": null, "download_url": null, "author_id": 6047, "opinion_text": "\n111 Wis. 2d 392 (1983)\n331 N.W.2d 585\nPeter GIESE and Sue Giese, individually and as parents of Missy Giese, Plaintiffs and Cross-Appellants,\nMissy GIESE, a minor, by her guardian ad litem, Arnold J. Wightman, Plaintiff-Appellant and Cross-Respondent-Petitioner,\nv.\nMONTGOMERY WARD, INC., a foreign corporation, Defendant and Cross-Respondent,\nMichael SHANAHAN, a minor, Bernard Shanahan, individually, and d/b/a Shanahan's Tavern, and Dorothy Shanahan, individually, and d/b/a Shanahan's Tavern, Defendants-Respondents and Cross-Appellants and Cross-Respondents and Cross-Petitioners.\nNo. 81-763.\nSupreme Court of Wisconsin.\nArgued March 2, 1983.\nDecided March 29, 1983.\n*395 For the cross-respondent-petitioner there were briefs by Joe Thrasher, Katherine Mahan Stewart and Cameron, Shervey, Thrasher, Doyle &amp; Pelish, Ltd., Rice Lake, and Fritschler, Pellino, Schrank &amp; Rosen, Madison, and oral argument by Joe Thrasher.\n*396 For the cross-respondents and cross-petitioners there was a brief by Clyde C. Cross and Cross, Mercer and Maffei, Baraboo, and oral argument by Clyde C. Cross.\nFor the plaintiffs and cross-appellants there was a brief and oral argument by Michael Nowakowski, Madison.\nFor the defendant and cross-respondent there was a brief and oral argument by Frank M. Coyne, Madison.\nReversing and remanding 107 Wis. 2d 745, 322 N.W.2d 699 (Ct.App.).\nBEILFUSS, C. J.\nThis is a review of an unpublished decision of the court of appeals which affirmed in part the judgment of the trial court in a personal injury action.\nThis action arises out of an accident involving a riding lawn mower. Bernard and Dorothy Shanahan own Shanahan's Tavern near Loganville, Wisconsin. The tavern is located next to the Shanahans' home. On August 7, 1977, Peter and Sue Giese and their daughter, Missy Giese, arrived at the tavern in the early evening. Peter planned to spend the evening at the tavern tending bar while Sue intended to have one drink and then return with Missy to their home in Prairie du Sac. Dorothy and Bernard Shanahan were in the tavern when the Gieses arrived. Missy, then age six, entered the tavern with her parents but shortly thereafter left the tavern without them. There is substantial dispute regarding who accepted responsibility for Missy's supervision when she left the tavern. Her parents testified that Dorothy Shanahan offered to fix supper for Missy and that Dorothy left the tavern with or about the same time as Missy. Dorothy testified that she left the tavern shortly after the Gieses' arrival to go to the house to shower prior to going out for the evening. She testified that she did not offer to fix supper for Missy, but rather asked Sue Giese to keep an eye on the children.\n*397 Prior to the Gieses' arrival, Bernard Shanahan directed his son, Michael Shanahan, then age fourteen, to mow the lawn in front of the house. Bernard Shanahan owned a seven-horsepower Montgomery Ward riding lawn mower manufactured in 1973 or 1974. Michael had operated this lawn mower several times prior to the day of the accident. When the Gieses arrived Michael had not yet started to mow the lawn but was filling the mower's gas tank. Peter and Sue Giese testified that they did not see Michael before they entered the tavern and did not know he was mowing the lawn until they were informed of the accident. After they entered the tavern Michael began mowing the lawn in front of the house.\nAs stated earlier, Missy left the tavern and was playing in the yard in front of the house with the two other Shanahan children, Anna Marie and Kevin. The three children began racing toward the tavern, with Missy out in front, when Kevin saw Michael operating the lawn mower in front of them. Michael had been operating the mower in reverse, with the blade engaged, for a distance of 200 feet. He was looking backwards over his right shoulder while operating the mower in this fashion. Just prior to the accident, after negotiating a turn, he looked forward to check his position. Kevin saw Missy running toward Michael and the lawn mower and yelled \"Missy\" because he \"saw danger.\" This caused Missy to turn and look over her shoulder at Kevin and caused Michael to turn back in the direction he was mowing. Michael then saw Missy within one foot of him. Missy collided with the left rear of the lawn mower and fell. The mower continued moving backward, riding partially over Missy. Michael attempted to lift the mower off Missy and Kevin ran to the mower and disengaged the blade.\nMissy suffered serious injury as a result of the accident, including amputation of her right hand at mid-palm, multiple lacerations to and a fracture of the right *398 forearm, and severe lacerations to her right thigh requiring two skin grafts resulting in permanent scarring. On May 9, 1978, Missy and her parents brought this action against Montgomery Ward, Inc., alleging strict liability and negligence, and against Michael and his parents alleging negligence. All the defendants cross-complained against each other, and counter-claimed against Missy's parents for contribution.\nTrial to a jury was commenced on September 10, 1979, Judge Howard Latton, presiding. Missy presented evidence that the mower was defective and unreasonably dangerous and negligently designed in that the lawn mower could be operated in reverse with the blade engaged, thus being susceptible to \"back over\" accidents because of the operator's lack of vision and control. She also presented evidence that the mower should have had a guard over the blade underneath the mower, or a \"bumper\" that stops the blade on contact. Montgomery Ward offered evidence that the guard and bumper were not feasible design alternatives. It also presented evidence that the design was safe because it gave the operator the choice of whether he or she wished to engage the blade while moving backwards, that customers want to be able to mow backwards, and that the law mower met or exceeded applicable standards at the time of manufacture and up to the time of trial. Additional facts will be set forth in the opinion.\nThe trial court submitted a 17-question special verdict to the jury. The jury answered the strict liability question in the negative, but found that Montgomery Ward was causally negligent in the design or manufacture of the lawn mower. Bernard and Dorothy Shanahan were absolved of negligence as to Bernard's control over Michael, and Dorothy's responsibility for the safety of Missy. The jury found Peter and Sue Giese causally negligent with respect to their daughter's safety. The trial *399 court directed a verdict that Michael acted as Bernard Shanahan's agent and the jury found that he was also acting as Dorothy's agent. These findings by the jury were unanimous.\nIn answering the comparison negligence question the jury allocated 52 percent to Montgomery Ward, 10 percent to Michael Shanahan, and 38 percent to Peter and Sue Giese. No negligence was allocated to Missy and her name did not appear in the comparison because she was under seven at the time of the accident.[1] Two jurors, Luprue and Gollmer, dissented to this apportionment. The jury awarded Missy $165,000 with jurors Gollmer and Goodman dissenting. Juror Goodman also dissented from the amount of damages awarded to Missy's parents for future medical expenses and loss of society and companionship.[2]\nThe trial court found the verdict defective and ordered a new trial. The court found the damages awarded to be reasonable and limited the second trial to liability issues only. The court also stated that it would not resubmit the issues of the negligence of Dorothy Shanahan or agency. A second trial was held in September of 1980. The jury again answered the strict liability question in favor of Montgomery Ward. The jury found that Montgomery Ward was negligent \"in the design or warnings relating to the lawn mower in question,\" but found such negligence not to be causal. The jury again found Michael Shanahan and Peter and Sue Giese causally negligent and absolved Dorothy and Bernard Shanahan of *400 negligence. Thirty-five percent of the negligence was allocated to Michael Shanahan and 65 percent to Peter and Sue Giese. The trial court entered judgment on the verdict in favor of Missy and against Michael, Dorothy and Bernard Shanahan,[3] with the Shanahans having contribution rights against Peter and Sue Giese.[4]\nThe court of appeals affirmed the order granting a second trial and affirmed the judgment with the modification that there was no liability on the part of Dorothy Shanahan because the master-servant relationship did not exist between Dorothy and Michael.[5] Missy petitioned this court for review of this decision claiming that it was error to order a second trial and that even if the second trial was appropriate the lower courts erred in failing to find that Montgomery Ward's negligence was a cause of her injuries as a matter of law. Bernard Shanahan cross-petitioned, also contending that the second trial was inappropriate, and further asserted that the lower courts erred in holding him vicariously liable for his son's negligence. We granted these petitions.\nThe first issue on review is whether the trial court, after the first trial, correctly ordered a new trial. Sec. 805.15, Stats. 1977-78, allows a trial court to order a new trial on the following grounds: (1) errors in the trial; (2) verdict is contrary to law or the weight of evidence; (3) damages are excessive or inadequate; (4) newly discovered evidence; or (5) in the interest of justice. In resolving this issue we must therefore examine *401 the trial court's grounds for ordering a new trial. If any one ground is sufficient then the order must be affirmed.\nOur examination of the trial court's memorandum decision and order leads us to the conclusion that the primary reason the trial court ordered a new trial was because it determined that the jury's verdict was contrary to law because it did not meet the five-sixths requirement. Art. I, sec. 5 of the Wisconsin Constitution provides for the right to a jury trial in all cases at law \"[p]rovided, however, that the legislature may, from time to time, by statute provide that a valid verdict, in civil cases, may be based on the votes of a specified number of the jury, not less than five sixths thereof.\" Pursuant to this provision of the constitution the legislature enacted sec. 805.09(2), Stats., which provides:\n\"(2) VERDICT. A verdict agreed to by five-sixths of the jurors shall be the verdict of the jury. If more than one question must be answered to arrive at a verdict on the same claim, the same five-sixths of the jurors must agree on all the questions.\"\n[1]\nIt is well established in Wisconsin law that this statute requires not that five-sixths of the jury agree on all questions in the verdict, but rather that this number must agree on all questions necessary to support a judgment on a particular claim. Scipior v. Shea, 252 Wis. 185, 190, 31 N.W.2d 199 (1948). Thus a verdict must be reviewed on a claim-by-claim basis rather than as a whole. Krueger v. Winters, 37 Wis. 2d 204, 212, 155 N.W.2d 1 (1967); United States F. &amp; G. Co. v. Milwaukee &amp; S. T. Corp., 18 Wis. 2d 1, 117 N.W.2d 708 (1962); Augustin v. Milwaukee E. R. &amp; T. Co., 259 Wis. 625, 49 N.W.2d 730 (1951). Dissents important to one claim may be immaterial to another when the verdict is reviewed in this fashion. Scipior, 252 Wis. at 190.\n*402 The lower courts, however, failed to apply this claim-by-claim analysis. Instead they looked at the verdict as a whole in concluding that it violated the five-sixths rule. In analyzing the validity of the verdict in light of the dissents, the trial court stated only:\n\"All parties agree that a problem exists because the same ten jurors have not agreed on all of the questions in the verdict. . . .\n\"As to dissenting jurors, the problem arises because on the comparative negligence question there were two dissenting jurors and on the damage question for Missy Giese there were a different two jurors. In other words we have ten jurors on all negligence questions, and we have ten jurors on all damage questions.\"\nThe court of appeals affirmed the trial court, holding that the trial court properly ordered a new trial because ten jurors did not agree \"on damages as well as liability.\" Both lower courts failed to analyze the verdict on a claim-by-claim basis and therefore we must do so.\nThe first claims that we examine are Missy's negligence claims against Montgomery Ward and Michael and Bernard Shanahan. These claims can be analyzed together because they all require that the same ten jurors agree on the same questions in the verdict: negligence, cause and damages.[6] The jury unanimously agreed that Montgomery Ward and Michael Shanahan were causally negligent and ten jurors agreed on the amount of Missy's damages. The percentage of negligence attributed to Montgomery Ward and Michael Shanahan did not affect her right to recover from these two joint tortfeasors. Therefore Missy clearly had ten jurors agreeing on all questions necessary for judgment.\n*403 Montgomery Ward contends, and the lower court apparently believed, that the jury's allocation of negligence was necessary to Missy's claims against the defendants. One of the jurors who dissented to Missy's damages also dissented to the allocation of negligence, along with a third juror. If the allocation of negligence was necessary in order for Missy to obtain a judgment against the defendants, then Missy would not have a valid five-sixths verdict because only nine jurors agreed on causal negligence, damages and apportionment.\n[2]\nHowever, the allocation of negligence was irrelevant to Missy's claims against the defendants because she could not be negligent as a matter of law. Missy, a child under seven at the time of the accident, was not and could not be included in the comparison question.[7] The inclusion of the comparative negligence question in the verdict was not necessary to support a judgment as to Missy's claims. The defendants' liability to Missy was not dependent on the allocation of negligence because there was no issue of contributory negligence on the part of Missy. The apportionment of negligence question was included in the verdict for the purpose of determining the comparative contribution rights of the defendants[8] as established in Bielski v. Schulze, 16 Wis. 2d 1, 6, 114 N.W.2d 105 (1962). The comparison did not \"apply to or change the plaintiff's right to recover against any defendant tort-feasor the total amount of his damage to which he is entitled.\" Id. Therefore the dissents to the comparison question were immaterial to Missy's claims. We hold that Missy's verdict as to Montgomery Ward and Bernard and Michael Shanahan was valid under the five-sixths rule.\n*404 [3, 4]\nThis holding also requires the conclusion that the verdict met the five-sixths requirement as to the contribution claims of the defendants. A claim for contribution is separate from and independent of the underlying claim, Johnson v. Heintz, 73 Wis. 2d 286, 295, 243 N.W.2d 815 (1976), and thus the verdict must be separately examined as to these claims. We must therefore determine what questions were essential to enter judgment on the contribution claim. In order to have a claim for contribution the following elements must be present:\n\"`1. Both parties must be joint negligent wrongdoers; 2. they must have common liability because of such negligence to the same person; 3. one such party must have borne an unequal proportion of the common burden.'\" Johnson v. Heintz, 73 Wis. 2d at 295.\nThe first two elements were met by the valid verdict on Missy's claim. This verdict established the defendants as joint tort-feasors who were liable to Missy for her total damages irrespective of the allocation of negligence in the verdict. The requisite common liability for Missy's damages was established by Missy's verdict and the defendants were jointly and severally liable for the entire amount. Mulder v. Acme-Cleveland Corp., 95 Wis. 2d 173, 178, 290 N.W.2d 276 (1980). Thus the only question necessary for the contribution claims was the allocation of negligence question. The jury's answers to this question established the contribution rights and obligations of the defendants and Peter and Sue Giese based on the proportion of negligence attributed to each. The dissents to the damage question are thus immaterial to the contribution claims because of Missy's right to a full recovery. The issues of causal negligence and the amount of damages were tried in the same lawsuit as the contribution claims for procedural convenience and judicial economy, Johnson v. Heintz, 73 Wis. 2d at 295.\n*405 [5]\nMontgomery Ward cannot complain about dissents to a question that could have been answered by a different jury in a separate action. Ten jurors agreed on the allocation of comparative contribution and therefore the verdict was also valid under the five-sixths rule as to the contribution claims of the defendants.\n[6]\nThe final claim in the verdict that must be examined is the parents' claim for future medical expenses and loss of Missy's society and companionship due to Missy's injuries. Such a claim is derivative in the sense that it depends on whether Missy's injuries are compensable, White v. Lunder, 66 Wis. 2d 563, 574, 225 N.W.2d 442 (1975), but must be proved separately from the underlying claim in that distinct damages must be shown and the parents' negligence in causing the child's injuries may reduce or bar recovery under our comparative negligence statute.[9]\n[7]\nThus, there must be agreement by at least ten jurors as to both the allocation of negligence and the amount of the parents' damages. As stated earlier, two jurors dissented to the comparison of negligence. A third juror dissented from the award of damages to the parents. Therefore, because only nine jurors agreed as to causal negligence, comparison and damages, the verdict is defective as to the parents' claim. However, the parents in their motion after verdict before the trial court, and in oral argument before this court, agreed to waive their right to collect these damages if judgment was entered on the first verdict. Such a waiver is clearly permissible, Krueger v. Winters, 37 Wis. 2d at 204.[10] Therefore, because *406 the verdict was valid under the five-sixths rule, the plaintiffs have a constitutional right to entry of judgment on this verdict unless the trial court order granting a new trial was supported by another ground independent of the five-sixths rule.\nMontgomery Ward contends that the trial court also ordered a new trial on the separate ground that a second trial was required in the interest of justice. The court of appeals agreed, finding that the trial court ordered a new trial in the interest of justice because the evidence did not support the jury's allocation of negligence and the \"strong likelihood\" that the jury was trying to control the outcome rather than making factual determination based on the evidence. We believe that Montgomery Ward and the court of appeals have misread the trial court's memorandum decision and order.\nFollowing the trial court's discussion of the dissents to the verdict, the court stated:\n\"Even without the problem of dissenting jurors, the Court would have to find as a matter of law that the negligence of Michael, the operator of the riding mower, exceeded the negligence of Missy Giese's parents and also exceeded the negligence of Montgomery Ward. A new trial to determine the amount of negligence attributed to each negligent party is within the contemplation of all or at least most of the parties, and within the motions of some. While the apportionment of negligence is within the province of the jury, and the suggestions of counsel are in no way binding upon the jury and can be considered only to the extent that they are helpful, it is worth noting that counsel for Missy Giese suggested no negligence on the part of the parents, while counsel for the Shanahans suggested 20%. In other words, no one so far as the Court can recall, contended that the Gieses should be held to a degree of negligence at the level the jury found.\n\"If the Court were making determination for a new trial solely in the interest of justice, the Court would proceed to set forth in greater detail the reasons for its *407 order. Such reasons are readily recitable even though the respects of negligence differ for the various parties. The only rationale for the 38% figure selected by the jury is their disagreement with the attempt of Mrs. Giese to establish that Missy was to have supper at the Shanahan residence. Even if the jury accepted the Shanahan version rather than that of Mrs. Giese, which is very likely, and even if they challenged Mrs. Giese's credibility because of this, there would be no basis under the undisputed evidence in this case for allocating an amount of negligence to the parents which in any way was comparable to that of the operator of the riding mower.\" (Emphasis supplied.)\nThe order granting a new trial stated in pertinent part:\n\"(1) That Motion (4) of defendant Montgomery Ward, Inc. to set aside the verdict and grant a new trial on the grounds that the verdict is contrary to law or to the weight of evidence is granted insofar as the same relates to the issues of negligence between the parties and a new trial is granted as to all parties on all issues of negligence.\" (Emphasis supplied.)\n[8]\nThe decision and order when read together clearly indicate that the trial court specifically chose not to order a new trial in the interest of justice. Rather they demonstrate that the trial court considered the interest of justice ground but rejected it on the belief that there were other sufficient grounds on which to grant a new trial — the verdict was contrary to law or the weight of the evidence. When a trial court orders a new trial in the interest of justice, as opposed to the other statutory grounds, it is required to state in detail its reasons for doing so. Krolikowski v. Chicago &amp; N.W. Trans. Co., 89 Wis. 2d 573, 579-80, 278 N.W.2d 865 (1979); Leatherman v. Garza, 39 Wis. 2d 378, 385-86, 159 N.W.2d 18 (1968). The trial court specifically stated it would not do so.\n*408 [9]\nThus, we conclude that the second ground the trial court relied on in ordering a new trial was that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence based on its determination that Michael Shanahan's negligence exceeded the negligence of Missy's parents and Montgomery Ward as a matter of law. The court of appeals, believing that the trial court granted a new trial in the interest of justice, applied the standard of review that the trial court's order for a new trial will be sustained absent a clear abuse of discretion. While this is clearly the correct standard to be applied when a trial court orders a new trial in the interest of justice, Krolikowski, 89 Wis. 2d at 580, the trial court did not order a new trial on this ground. Rather the standard of review that we must apply when the trial court finds that the jury's findings were incorrect as a matter of law is that the verdict must be approved if there is any credible evidence which supports it:\n\"The proper test to be applied in determining whether a jury's answer should be changed is `whether there was any credible evidence which supported the jury's answer.' Home Savings Bank v. Gertenbach (1955), 270 Wis. 386, 392, 71 N.W.2d 347, 72 N.W.2d 697; Wintersberger v. Pioneer Iron &amp; Metal Co. (1959), 6 Wis. 2d 69, 94 N.W.2d 136.\n\"`There is credible evidence which, when reasonably viewed, fairly admits an inference supporting the jury's findings. That being true, neither the trial court nor this court has authority to change the jury's findings. Auster v. Zaspel, 270 Wis. 368, 71 N.W. (2d) 417.' Paul v. Hodd (1955), 271 Wis. 278, 280, 73 N.W.2d 412.\n\"`A trial court is not justified in setting aside a verdict either in whole or in part and directing the judgment if there is credible evidence to support the findings. The crucial question is whether the evidentiary facts are practically without dispute, whether these facts reasonably support the jury's conclusion of ultimate fact drawn *409 therefrom. DeKeyser v. Milwaukee Automobile Ins. Co. (1941), 236 Wis. 419, 424, 295 N.W. 755.\n\"`. . .'\n\"While this court has said that it gives great weight to a trial court's decision that a verdict must be changed as a matter of law, Rogers v. Brown (1910), 143 Wis. 472, 128 N.W. 64; Kansas v. Chicago, M. &amp; St. P. Ry. (1923), 180 Wis. 49, 192 N.W. 383, the action of the trial court will be set aside on appeal if there is credible evidence which supports the verdict. Delvaux v. Kewaunee, G.B. &amp; W. Ry. (1918), 167 Wis. 586, 167 N.W. 438.\" Leatherman v. Garza, 39 Wis. 2d at 386-87.\n[10]\nThe trial court found that the apportionment of negligence was unsupported by the evidence. We begin our review of the evidence with the well-established principle that \"[a]pportionment of negligence is a matter peculiarly within the province of the jury.\" DeGroff v. Schmude, 71 Wis. 2d 554, 562, 238 N.W.2d 730 (1976). Further, the trial court and this court can not reject the apportionment merely because we disagree or would have reached a different conclusion. Id. at 563.\nA careful review of the evidence presented at the first trial leads us to the conclusion that there was credible evidence to support the jury's allocation of negligence. The jury allocated 52 percent to Montgomery Ward, 38 percent to Missy's parents, and 10 percent to Michael. It was the small proportion allocated to the operator of the lawn mower that caused the trial court to conclude that the allocation was unsupported by the evidence. While we are also surprised at the low proportion assigned to Michael, based on the record we cannot say, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, that the jury was wrong as a matter of law.\nThe evidence shows that Michael was operating the mower as it was designed to be operated: in reverse with the blade engaged. Michael was looking in the direction he was mowing at all times, except for the moment before *410 the collision occurred when he turned forward to check his position. He testified that he was unaware of Missy's presence until a split-second before the accident. The jury may have concluded, based on the evidence, that in the exercise of reasonable care he should not have known of her presence because Missy was only in the yard a short time before the collision. Thus the jury may have concluded that Michael's negligent conduct was slight when compared with the conduct of Missy's parents who were responsible for Missy's safety, and Montgomery Ward, which manufactured the lawn mower.\nThe evidence as to the parents was conflicting as to whether they had responsibility for Missy's safety and whether they knew the lawn mower was being operated nearby. Assuming the jury discredited the parents' testimony in favor of Dorothy Shanahan, the jury could have concluded that Sue Giese had agreed to \"keep an eye on the children,\" including Missy, and that nevertheless she allowed Missy to leave the tavern unattended. Michael testified that he saw the Gieses arrive while he was filling the gas tank of the lawn mower, and Bernard Shanahan testified that the noise from the mower was audible in the tavern. Thus the jury may have reasonably concluded that the Gieses allowed Missy to leave the tavern when they knew that a lawn mower was being operated nearby.\nThere was also substantial evidence presented that Montgomery Ward negligently designed the lawn mower. Two experts testified that the mower's design was dangerous because it allowed, and even encouraged, the rider to operate the mower in reverse with the blade engaged. They testified that this method of operation lessened the rider's visibility and ability to operate the controls thus making the mower susceptible to the type of accident involved here. Evidence was introduced demonstrating that the manufacturer knew of the danger inherent in *411 allowing the mower to be operated in reverse based on engineering publications warning of the frequency of \"back over\" accidents and the manufacturer's knowledge of three similar accidents involving the same type of lawn mower. Evidence was further presented that a design prohibiting the blade from engaging while in reverse was functional, technologically feasible and inexpensive. Montgomery Ward's defense to this evidence was essentially that most lawn mowers cut grass while in reverse, that consumers wanted lawn mowers to operate in this fashion, and that its design was safe because it gave the operator the choice of whether he or she wished to engage the blade while in reverse. Montgomery Ward also presented evidence that the mower met or exceeded all applicable standards, but the plaintiffs rebutted this with evidence that these standards did not relate to the design defect at issue here.\n[11]\nBased on all the evidence presented at trial, there was credible evidence supporting the jury's allocation of substantial amounts of negligence to the manufacturer and Missy's parents. As to Montgomery Ward, the jury could properly conclude that the manufacturer, which had knowledge of the danger of \"back over\" accidents caused by reverse operation of the lawn mower, was more negligent than the fourteen-year-old operator who was using the lawn mower as it was designed to be operated. As to the parents, the jury could properly conclude that Peter and Sue Giese, who were responsible for Missy's safety, knew of the presence of the lawn mower and yet left her unattended, were more negligent than the operator of the lawn mower who was unaware that Missy was nearby. While we would have come to a different conclusion as to the proper allocation, there is credible evidence to support the jury's findings and therefore we can not say the findings must be rejected *412 as a matter of law. It was therefore error for the trial court to order a new trial on the ground that the jury's findings were not supported by the credible evidence as a matter of law.\nMontgomery Ward contends that the trial court also ordered a new trial based on several questions the jury asked during its deliberations. These questions inquired into whether Missy's award would be reduced by attorneys' fees and whether the percentage of negligence allocated to Missy's parents would affect her recovery. The trial court correctly told the jury that it should not be concerned with the answers to these questions. The trial court, in its decision, noted that it \"considered\" these questions in ordering a new trial believing that \". . . there is a strong likelihood that in the apportionment of negligence the jury was disregarding some of the instructions and attempting to control the outcome. . . .\" The court of appeals felt that this was one of the trial court's reasons for ordering a new trial in the interest of justice. We disagree.\n[12]\nAs we stated earlier, the trial court's memorandum decision and order clearly indicate that the court did not order a new trial in the interest of justice but rather because the verdict was contrary to law and the evidence. We view the trial court's reference to these questions as support for its holding that the apportionment was improper as a matter of law. We have held that this holding was error because there was credible evidence to support the verdict and therefore the questions asked by the jury do not provide an adequate ground for ordering a new trial.\nThe final ground on which the trial court based its order granting a new trial was that error occurred in the trial. In motions after verdict, Montgomery Ward asked to be dismissed from the law suit, contending that *413 the court erred in submitting both strict liability and negligence to the jury, and that it can not be found negligent for designing and manufacturing a product the jury found not to be defective. The trial court refused to dismiss Montgomery Ward from the action but held that it was error to submit both theories, stating:\n\"It seems to be generally conceded that the burden in establishing a strict liability case is less than the burden in establishing negligence. If this is the case, it seems inconsistent to submit the negligence questions after the strict liability questions in the verdict. The Wisconsin Supreme Court has indicated that there are some cases where the trial court should not submit both strict liability and negligence. I am inclined to conclude that this is one of those cases, and that the double submission was very probably confusing to the jury.\"\nThe court therefore concluded that a new trial should be ordered so that the negligence issues could be redetermined.\n[13]\nThe court of appeals rejected this as a valid ground for ordering a new trial, stating that \"[a] product may create a risk of foreseeable harm, and therefore have been negligently designed, without being unreasonably dangerous for purposes of strict liability.\" We agree.\nThis court has on several occasions specifically rejected the contention that a jury's finding of causal negligence but no strict liability in tort, as adopted in Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967), is inconsistent. Fischer v. Cleveland Punch &amp; Shear Works Co., 91 Wis. 2d 85, 98-99, 280 N.W.2d 280 (1979); Howes v. Deere &amp; Co., 71 Wis. 2d 268, 273, 238 N.W.2d 76 (1976); Greiten v. La Dow, 70 Wis. 2d 589, 603-04, 235 N.W.2d 677 (1975).\nDual submission of these theories is appropriate when evidence is presented to the trier of fact as to both *414 theories. Howes, 71 Wis. 2d at 273. The jury's answers to the strict liability questions are completely independent of and irrelevant to its answer to the negligence questions. The record contains evidence that the lawn mower was in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to users and bystanders, and that Montgomery Ward was negligent in manufacturing and designing the product. Therefore the submission of the two theories was not error and the jurors' negative answers to strict liability in tort questions did not render its affirmative answers to the negligence questions invalid.\nBecause we conclude that the trial court had insufficient grounds to overturn the jury's verdict in the first trial, we hold that the order granting a new trial must be reversed. We therefore do not reach the issue raised by the parties regarding the second trial. The only issue remaining on review as to the first trial and verdict is whether the trial court was correct in holding Bernard Shanahan vicariously liable for his son's negligence.\nThe trial court directed a verdict in the first trial concluding, as a matter of law, that Michael was acting as the \"agent\" of Bernard Shanahan and thus Bernard was vicariously liable for Michael's negligence.[11] The court of appeals affirmed, finding that Michael was Bernard's servant. Bernard Shanahan contends that the issue of whether a master-servant relationship existed between him and his son was not raised by the pleadings and that as a matter of law such relationship did not exist.\nThe issue of the existence of a master-servant relationship was clearly not raised in the first trial. Rather, the plaintiffs, Montgomery Ward and the trial court *415 proceeded solely on the basis that Michael was Bernard's \"agent.\" As was thoroughly discussed by this court in Arsand v. City of Franklin, 83 Wis. 2d 40, 264 N.W.2d 579 (1978), the distinction between being an \"agent\" and a \"servant\" is crucial to the determination of whether a principal is vicariously liable. An agent may or may not be a servant and, except under certain obligations, the principal is not vicariously liable for the negligent physical conduct of an agent who is not a servant. Id. at 48. However, \"[u]nder the doctrine of respondeat superior, a master can be held liable for the physical harm caused to third persons by the torts of his servant.\" Id. at 45. Thus in order for Bernard to be liable for Michael's negligence the master-servant relationship must exist. Although not raised in the trial court, the issue was addressed by the court of appeals and raised by the parties before this court and we will consider the issue on review in the exercise of our discretion.[12]\nA \"servant,\" as defined by this court, is \"one employed to perform service for another in his affairs and who, with respect to his physical conduct in the performance of the service, is subject to the other's control or right to control.\" Arsand, 83 Wis. 2d at 45-46, quoting Heims v. Hanke, 5 Wis. 2d 465, 468, 93 N.W.2d 455 (1958). The facts pertinent to the issue of whether Michael was Bernard's servant are undisputed. At the time of the accident Michael was operating the lawn mower that was owned by Bernard and he was performing this task at his father's express direction. The accident occurred while Michael was mowing the lawn in front of the house, which was located next to the tavern. The tavern *416 and the home were jointly owned by Bernard and Dorothy Shanahan.\nBernard Shanahan argues that his son's actions in mowing the lawn pursuant to his direction were not for his benefit and that this court should hold that a minor child who is performing a domestic chore can not be the parent's servant. The court of appeals correctly and succinctly rejected this argument, stating:\n\"The domestic relationship does not preclude a finding of liability, however. If a master-servant relationship exists, it is immaterial that the act was performed by a child rather than a stranger. Zeidler, 191 Wis. at 383, 211 N.W. at 142.\n\"To act as master, the parent must obtain some benefit or advantage from an activity undertaken by the child at the request or expressed desire of the parent. Burant, 234 Wis. at 388, 291 N.W. at 391. It is irrelevant that the benefit to the parent results from the child's performing a domestic chore. Compare Heims v. Hanke, 5 Wis. 2d 465, 83 N.W.2d 455 (1958) (trial court could conclude uncle was liable as master for negligence of his unpaid minor nephew who was helping wash the uncle's automobile). Although cases have said that to impose liability upon the parent, the child must be acting in the parent's `business,' Papke v. Haerle, 189 Wis. 156, 158, 207 N.W. 261, 262 (1926); Hopkins v. Droppers, 184 Wis. 400, 404, 198 N.W. 738, 739 (1924), the business need not be an undertaking for profit but embraces `any benefit which may inure' to the parent. Zeidler, 191 Wis. at 383, 211 N.W. at 142. The definition of master adopted by Arsand, supra, imposes no requirement that the servant be engaged in a money-making business for the master.\"\n[14]\nUnder the undisputed facts and the law as correctly stated by the court of appeals, Michael was acting as Bernard's servant at the time of the accident. This finding does not rest on the domestic relationship between *417 Bernard and Michael, or the fact that the activity can be labeled a \"domestic chore.\" The finding of a master-servant relationship rests on the fact that Bernard directed Michael to perform the task, he had the right to control Michael's performance of the task and, Bernard, as owner of the home and tavern, benefited from its performance. We therefore affirm the finding of the trial court and the court of appeals that Bernard Shanahan was vicariously liable for his son's negligence in operating the lawn mower thereby causing injury to Missy.\nWe conclude that the judgment entered on the second verdict should be reversed and direct that judgment be entered on the first verdict in favor of Missy and against Montgomery Ward and Michael and Bernard Shanahan. Judgment should also be entered, based on the first verdict, in favor of Peter and Sue Giese on their claim for past medical expenses against Montgomery Ward. Such judgment shall include interest to Missy Giese on the damage award in the first verdict from the date of that verdict as directed by the court of appeals. The judgment should also be entered fixing the amount of contribution between the various contribution claimants.\nBy the Court. — The decision of the court of appeals is reversed with directions to enter judgment not inconsistent with this opinion.\nNOTES\n[1] Sec. 891.44, Stats. 1977-78, provides:\n\n\"891.44 Presumption of lack of contributory negligence for infant minor. It shall be conclusively presumed that an infant minor who has not reached the age of 7 shall be incapable of being guilty of contributory negligence or of any negligence whatsoever.\"\n[2] The trial court directed a verdict on the amount of past medical expenses.\n[3] The trial court entered judgment against Dorothy and Bernard Shanahan based on the findings in the first trial that Michael acted as his parents' agent.\n[4] The trial court subsequently ordered judgment in favor of Missy against her parents whom she had not sued. The court of appeals reversed the judgment to this extent.\n[5] The court also modified the judgment to allow Missy Giese interest on the damages established in the first trial from the date of that verdict.\n[6] Bernard Shanahan is included in this grouping because his liability is based on the validity of Missy's claim against Michael. The additional element needed to support Missy's claim against Bernard Shanahan is vicarious liability which was found to exist as a matter of law by the court.\n[7] See note 1, supra.\n[8] As will be discussed infra, the question was also necessary to determine the liability of the defendants to Peter and Sue Giese.\n[9] Sec. 895.045, Stats.\n[10] This waiver does not affect their right to collect past medical expense because the amount of past medical expense was determined by the trial court as a matter of law.\n[11] The jury found that Michael was also the \"agent\" of Dorothy Shanahan. The court of appeals reversed the judgment entered on this basis against Dorothy, finding that the master-servant relation did not exist between Dorothy and Bernard. This issue has not been raised in this review.\n[12] We have chosen to exercise this discretion because, although the terms \"agent\" and \"servant\" are distinct concepts in law with different legal consequences, they are often incorrectly used synonymously and interchangeably. Arsand, 83 Wis. 2d at 55-57.\n\n", "ocr": false, "opinion_id": 1614076 } ]
Wisconsin Supreme Court
Wisconsin Supreme Court
S
Wisconsin, WI
530,345
null
1989-10-06
false
bills-coal-company-inc-a-corporation-william-d-patch-savanna-lee-patch
null
null
Bill's Coal Company, Inc., a Corporation William D. Patch Savanna Lee Patch Lloyd F. Burkdoll Anna Faye Burkdoll John E. Burkdoll Virginia L. Burkdoll, and All the General Partners of and D/B/A Cherokee Coal Company, a General Partnership, Plaintiff-Appellants/cross-Appellees v. Board of Public Utilities of Springfield, Missouri D/B/A City Utilities, and City of Springfield, Missouri, Defendants-Appellees/cross-Appellants
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
40
Published
null
null
[ "887 F.2d 242" ]
[ { "author_str": null, "per_curiam": false, "type": "010combined", "page_count": null, "download_url": "http://bulk.resource.org/courts.gov/c/F2/887/887.F2d.242.87-1719.87-1716.html", "author_id": null, "opinion_text": "887 F.2d 242\n 9 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 1238\n BILL'S COAL COMPANY, INC., a corporation; William D. Patch;Savanna Lee Patch; Lloyd F. Burkdoll; Anna Faye Burkdoll;John E. Burkdoll; Virginia L. Burkdoll, and all thegeneral partners of and d/b/a Cherokee Coal Company, ageneral partnership, Plaintiff-Appellants/Cross-Appellees,v.BOARD OF PUBLIC UTILITIES OF SPRINGFIELD, MISSOURI d/b/aCity Utilities, and City of Springfield, Missouri,Defendants-Appellees/Cross-Appellants.\n Nos. 87-1716, 87-1719.\n United States Court of Appeals,Tenth Circuit.\n Oct. 6, 1989.\n \n George P. Coughlin (Paul Scott Kelly, Jr., with him on the briefs), of Gage &amp; Tucker, Kansas City, Mo., for plaintiffs-appellants/cross-appellees.\n Mark E. Gardner of Hall, Ansley, Carmichael &amp; Gardner, Springfield, Mo. (Randell D. Wallace of Hall, Ansley, Carmichael &amp; Gardner, Springfield, Mo., Stan P. Doyle of Doyle &amp; Harris, Tulsa, Okl., and Turner White, III, Springfield, Mo., with him on the briefs), for defendants-appellees/cross-appellants.\n Before McKAY, LOGAN, and TACHA, Circuit Judges.\n McKAY, Circuit Judge.\n \n \n 1\n This diversity case involves a contract dispute between the Board of Public Utilities of Springfield, Missouri d/b/a City Utilities and the City of Springfield, Missouri (collectively the \"purchaser\"), and Bill's Coal Company, Inc. and Cherokee Coal Co. (collectively the \"sellers\"). The long, tortured, procedural history of this case is recounted in our prior opinion, Bill's Coal Co. v. Board of Public Utilities of Springfield, 682 F.2d 883, 883-85 (10th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1171, 103 S. Ct. 816, 74 L. Ed. 2d 1014 (1983). A brief reprise of pertinent facts provides the setting for this appeal.\n \n \n 2\n In 1970, Bill's Coal agreed to supply purchaser with its coal requirements on a cost-plus basis through 1980 and possibly beyond. The coal contract was assigned to Cherokee Coal in 1976, although Bill's Coal continued to operate the mines. In 1978 spot coal prices began to drop and the relationship between the parties deteriorated. After the parties were unable to resolve a dispute involving the administration of the contract's cost-plus features, purchaser filed suit against sellers, seeking a declaration as to the propriety of their disallowance of certain cost and expense items.\n \n \n 3\n Ultimately, purchaser questioned the legality of the coal contract, withheld payments to sellers, and stopped taking deliveries of coal. However, sellers obtained a preliminary injunction requiring purchaser to perform the contract. Before a hearing on purchaser's motion to dissolve the injunction, the parties settled. The settlement was in the form of a final amendment to the contract, executed in 1979 (hereinafter the \"1979 amendment\"). The 1979 amendment shortened the contract from 1989 to 1985. In addition, the 1979 amendment created a termination clause in the contract. If any noncontract company was able to meet the contract specifications and submit a bid fifteen to twenty-five percent under sellers' price, purchaser could end the contract before 1985. Pursuant to this clause, purchaser attempted to terminate the contract in 1980, 1981, and 1982.\n \n \n 4\n In March of 1980 purchaser sought a declaratory judgment of nonliability in the federal district court of Missouri with respect to its 1980 termination. Sellers filed suit in the federal district court of Oklahoma claiming purchaser breached and repudiated the contract in 1980 through wrongful termination. Sellers were granted a preliminary injunction by the Oklahoma court, requiring purchaser to perform the contract pending litigation. After the Oklahoma court issued the preliminary injunction, it transferred sellers' action to the Missouri court (where purchaser's action was pending). In December of 1980, the Missouri court transferred both cases back to Oklahoma where they were consolidated for all purposes (the \"1980 case\"). The parties submitted the 1980 case to the Oklahoma court, without a jury, in three phases. Phase I involved the interpretation of the 1979 Amendment to the coal contract. Phase II involved breach and liability issues. Phase III involved damages.\n \n \n 5\n In Phase II purchaser sought a declaration that it had properly terminated the contract by contracting with a qualified bidder in each of the years 1980, 1981, and 1982. Purchaser also sought to cancel the contract because of sellers' breach, repudiation, and \"bad faith.\" The district court, in its Phase II ruling, held that sellers had breached and anticipatorily repudiated the contract. Based on that conclusion, injunctive relief in the 1980 case was dissolved. Sellers filed an immediate appeal to this court from the dissolution ruling. This court stayed the district court's order dissolving injunctive relief pending the appeal. Bill's Coal Co., 682 F.2d 883. We found the district court erred in its conclusions of law in its Phase II opinion and ordered the injunction reinstated. Id. at 886. The case was remanded to determine sellers' damages. We expressed no view on the trial court's other rulings in Phase I or II.\n \n \n 6\n On remand, the district court applied Missouri law to defeat an award of attorney's fees, applied Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) Sec. 2-708(1) to measure damages by the difference between the contract price and the market price at the time and place of tender, and denied interest charges and other expenses to sellers under UCC Sec. 2-710. The court also denied reimbursement for purchaser's BTU adjustments and for the mistake in overpayment of depreciation credit.\n \n \n 7\n Sellers now appeal the district court's refusal to apply the lost profit damage measure of section 2-708(2), the district court's application of Missouri law to defeat an award of attorney's fees, and the court's denial of interest charges and other expenses under UCC Sec. 2-710. Sellers also appeal the district court's denial of reimbursement for purchaser's BTU adjustments and for the mistaken overpayment of depreciation credit. Purchaser cross-appeals, claiming error in the district court's determination of the market price for coal on sellers' spot purchases. They also claim error in the court's failure to find that sellers breached and repudiated the contract through bad faith performance and enforcement and through shipments of noncompliance coal. Finally, purchaser appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment against them on their antitrust claim. We deal with each of these issues in turn.\n \n I. Standard of Review\n \n 8\n Sellers and purchaser challenge the trial court's findings of fact and of law. We do not disturb the district court's findings of fact unless they are \"clearly erroneous.\" Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a); United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395, 68 S. Ct. 525, 542, 92 L. Ed. 746 (1948); Amoco Production Co. v. Western Slope Gas Co., 754 F.2d 303, 309 (10th Cir.1985). A finding of fact will not be reversed as clearly erroneous unless \"it is without factual support in record, or if the appellate court, after reviewing all the evidence, is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.\" LeMaire v. United States, 826 F.2d 949, 953 (10th Cir.1987). The district court need not be \"correct\" in its finding, but its conclusion must be \"permissible\" in light of the evidence. Volis v. Puritan Life Ins. Co., 548 F.2d 895, 901 (10th Cir.1977).\n \n \n 9\n We review issues of law, decided by the district court, de novo. In re Ruti-Sweetwater, Inc., 836 F.2d 1263, 1266 (10th Cir.1988). The standard of review on appeal is the same as that which would be applied by the trial court in making its initial ruling. United States v. Ortiz, 804 F.2d 1161, 1164 (10th Cir.1986). An appellate court is not constrained by a trial court's conclusions of law. State Distrib., Inc. v. Glenmore Distilleries, 738 F.2d 405, 412 (10th Cir.1984).\n \n II. Lost Profit Damage Measure\n \n 10\n The district court determined that UCC Sec. 2-708(1)1 applied in determining the proper measure of damages. The damages provided in section 2-708(1) are the difference between the market price and the contract price of the goods. UCC Sec. 2-708(2) provides for damages up to the amount of the lost profits from the contract which has been breached. Sellers fall into section 2-708(2) only if they can demonstrate that they would receive inadequate damages under section 2-708(1). Section 2-708(2) is basically designed for specific categories of sellers, such as lost volume sellers, component sellers, and jobber sellers. See J. White and R. Summers, Uniform Commercial Code, 3d ed. (1988) at 356-65, for a full exposition on sellers that come under section 2-708(2). Sellers here argued that they were entitled to receive section 2-708(2) damages. Sellers have the burden of proving that they are lost volume sellers and thus fall under section 2-708(2). Snyder v. Herbert Greenbaum &amp; Associates, Inc., 38 Md.App. 144, 380 A.2d 618 (1977); National Controls, Inc. v. Commodore Business Machines, Inc., 163 Cal. App. 3d 688, 209 Cal. Rptr. 636 (1st Dist.App.1985); and Lake Erie Boat Sales, Inc. v. Johnson, 11 Ohio App. 3d 55, 463 N.E.2d 70 (1983). A lost volume seller is one who has the capacity to perform the contract which was breached as well as other potential contracts, due to their unlimited resources or production capacity. Although sellers seek to portray the analysis of lost volume seller as a question of law subject to de novo review (sellers characterize their appeal as being limited to \"questions of law\"), it is a decision dictated by the underlying facts and thus ultimately a question of fact reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard.2 Even where there is a mixed question of law and fact that involves primarily a factual inquiry, the \"clearly erroneous\" standard is appropriate. Supre v. Ricketts, 792 F.2d 958, 961 (10th Cir.1986).\n \n \n 11\n Evidence presented at trial indicated that sellers did not have the production capacity to perform purchaser's contract as well as to sell to other potential purchasers. During the years following 1980, sellers often fell behind in shipping to purchaser the amount of coal required under the contract. In fact, one of the two principal mines on which sellers relied for shipments to purchaser was out of production for several months during this period. In order to meet purchaser's needs, sellers found it necessary to purchase coal from other suppliers. In addition, sellers claimed in the district court that they had lost sales to other customers because it was necessary to ship coal to purchaser from the Porter and Chetopa mines. This contention is in direct conflict with sellers' position that it had the capacity to perform the contract in dispute and also to sell to third parties. Mr. Hirlinger, sellers' president, admitted that sellers were able to make the sale of 11,609 tons of coal to another customer only because purchaser ceased accepting coal from sellers. Based on this evidence, the trial court found that the sellers did not have the ability to perform the contract in dispute and sell to potential third parties at the same time. Based on our review of the evidence, the district court was not clearly erroneous in its finding that sellers were not lost volume sellers, and thus section 2-708(1) was the proper measure of damages.\n \n III. Attorney's Fees\n \n 12\n Sellers contend that the Oklahoma district court, sitting in diversity, erroneously applied Missouri law on the issue of attorney's fees. They argue that the trial court should have applied Oklahoma's attorney fee statute because attorney's fees are purely procedural and the law of the forum (Oklahoma) governs.3 However, the law in this circuit governing attorney's fees is clear. In Matter of King Resources Co., 651 F.2d 1349, 1353 (10th Cir.1981), we held that \"[t]hus in diversity cases generally, and certainly in this circuit, attorney fees are determined by state law and are substantive for diversity purposes.\" The substantive law of this case is Missouri law.4 Therefore, the trial court properly applied Missouri law in determining whether attorney's fees were proper. We affirm the trial court's denial of attorney fees under Missouri law.\n \n IV. Interest and Other Expenses\n \n 13\n Sellers argue they were entitled to recover interest expenses under UCC Sec. 2-710.5 They argue that the district court erred in interpreting \"Missouri law\" by holding that these charges did not qualify as incidental damages under section 2-710. The district court held that in this case the expenses claimed by sellers were not properly recoverable under section 2-710. We agree. Incidental damages include commercially reasonable expenses incurred in stopping delivery in the transportation, care, and custody of goods after the buyer's breach. The purpose of section 2-710 is to reimburse the seller for expenses reasonably incurred as a result of the buyer's breach. Here, the sellers' interest expenses were incurred as the result of preparing for this litigation. The trial court did not err in finding litigation costs and accounting fees not recoverable under section 2-710. Such expenses are not incidental damages under section 2-710.\n \n \n 14\n The sellers alternatively argue that they are entitled to the recovery of prejudgment interest under Oklahoma law. However, Missouri law governs the issue of remedies, and the Supreme Court of Missouri has held that the prevailing party may recover pre-judgment interest only in certain circumstances. Denton Constr. Co. v. Missouri State Highway Comm'n, 454 S.W.2d 44 (Mo.1970). Before prejudgment interest can be awarded, the claim must be liquidated or readily ascertainable by reference to recognized standards. The sellers' claim here has not been liquidated. In addition, the claim is not readily ascertainable. The sellers provided the trial court with several different calculations of damages. Purchaser contested all of sellers' calculations and provided alternative measures. Neither party had agreed to a specific dollar value of damages. Thus, the claim is not readily ascertainable by reference to a recognized standard. Therefore, we hold that the district court properly determined that sellers were not entitled to interest.\n \n V. BTU Adjustments\n \n 15\n Sellers argue that BTU adjustments should not have been allowed purchaser, based on sellers' test results which demonstrated that purchaser was not entitled to the adjustments. The parties here agreed that there would be an adjustment for all shipments of coal which fell below 11,000 BTU. The parties then entered into a course of performance with respect to the BTU adjustments which allowed the purchaser to make adjustments based on its own test results. The district court refused to second-guess that course of performance. Sellers had the burden of persuading the district court that they were entitled to a refund. Given the course of performance, we cannot find the district court clearly erroneous in refusing to grant sellers reimbursement for purchaser's BTU adjustments.\n \n VI. Purchaser's Cross-Appeal\n \n 16\n Purchaser, in its cross-appeal, claims error in the district court's failure to find that the sellers breached and repudiated the contract through bad faith performance. Purchaser also claims that the district court erred in failing to find breach and repudiation by the sellers through their shipments of allegedly noncompliance coal. We do not find these factual conclusions of the district court to be clearly erroneous.\n \n \n 17\n During the liability phase (Phase II) of this litigation, purchaser presented two theories to the trial court on the sellers' liability. The first theory was that the sellers had breached and anticipatorily repudiated the coal contract in 1979, by asserting an overly literal contract interpretation that it knew did not reflect the parties' intent. This was purchaser's \"bad-faith\" breach theory. The other theory advanced by purchaser was that sellers had breached and repudiated the coal contract by shipping deficient coal.\n \n \n 18\n This court has already held that an assumed bad-faith assertion \"of a particular interpretation of a termination clause is neither a failure to perform contract obligations (breach) nor an indication that those obligations will not be performed in the future (repudiation).\" Bill's Coal, 682 F.2d at 886. The sellers did not interfere with the performance of either party under the coal contract, and purchaser gained no right to cancel or otherwise refuse performance of the coal contract. Id. at 885. This holding disposes of purchaser's first breach theory.\n \n \n 19\n Purchaser now argues that this court left open the possibility that, after remand, purchaser could present evidence which would show that additional sellers' conduct amounted to a breach. Purchaser now argues that sellers breached the coal contract based on the \"totality of the circumstances.\" Purchaser's basic argument is that sellers shipped nonconforming coal to purchaser on various occasions and that these shipments constituted a \"substantial impairment\" of the contract which resulted in either a general breach, a breach of warranty or a repudiation of the coal contract.\n \n \n 20\n The case law indicates that the question of \"substantial impairment\" under the Code presents a question of fact. Cherwell-Ralli, Inc. v. Rytman Grain Co., Inc., 180 Conn. 714, 433 A.2d 984, 986 (1980); Holiday Mfg. Co. v. B.A.S.F. Systems, Inc., 380 F. Supp. 1096, 1102 (D.Neb.1974); Stinnes Interoil, Inc. v. Apex Oil Co., 604 F. Supp. 978, 981 (S.D.N.Y.1985). Purchaser frames the coal quality issue in terms of whether some of the sellers' shipments of nonconforming coal constituted a repudiation of the whole contract under UCC Sec. 2-610. However, because the coal contract is an installment contract, the question of breach or repudiation falls within the confines of section 2-612.6 Moreover, the Official Comments to section 2-610 emphasize that issues of nonconformity to contract specifications are handled in the Code section dealing with installment contracts. UCC Sec. 2-610, Official Comment 1. The issue, as properly stated under section 2-612(3), is whether a \"non-conformity or default with respect to one or more installments substantially impairs the value of the whole contract\" so as to constitute a breach of the whole contract. The Official Comments to section 2-612(3) expressly state that this subsection \"is designed to further the continuance of the contract\" and that \"[w]hether the non-conformity in any given installment justifies cancellation as to the future depends, not on whether such non-conformity indicates an intent or likelihood that the future deliveries will also be defective, but whether the non-conformity substantially impairs the value of the whole contract.\" UCC Sec. 2-612, Official Comment 6. In Phase II, the district court found that \"[s]ellers tried to meet the contract specifications on every load of coal shipped to Purchaser and never knowingly shipped deficient coal.\" It further found that sellers' occasional failure to meet the contract specifications \"did not rise to the level of substantially impairing the value of the contract.\" The district court then concluded that sellers had not breached or repudiated the coal contract, nor had sellers breached any warranties that might be applicable to the contract.\n \n \n 21\n Purchaser has failed to show that the district court was clearly erroneous in finding that there was no substantial impairment of the value of the coal contract. Purchaser presented no new evidence to the district court after remand that would necessitate a finding of breach on the part of sellers. Accordingly, the district court's ruling on the coal quality issues must be affirmed. See, e.g., Automated Controls, Inc. v. MIC Enterprises, Inc., 599 F.2d 288, 289 (8th Cir.1979).\n \n VII. Antitrust Claim\n \n 22\n Sellers filed a motion for summary judgment with respect to purchaser's antitrust claim. The district court correctly held that the principle of res judicata barred purchaser's attempt to try the claim now because \"based on the stipulation of the parties ... the Missouri Court was to determine all the mutual liabilities of the parties and all issues which arose or could have been brought prior to the date of the order.\" District Court Order, at 6.\n \n \n 23\n Purchaser could have raised its antitrust claim at the time the district court reviewed the enforceability and validity of the 1979 amendment. An examination of the antitrust claim shows that purchaser attacks the twenty-five percent termination clause as being unduly restrictive of competition among coal suppliers. The purpose of the clause and the mutual benefit of long-term coal contracts were referenced and discussed by the district court in its opinion. Nothing that occurred subsequent to the rendition of that judgment changed the fact that purchaser was required to secure a price twenty-five percent lower than sellers' price in order to take sellers out of the coal contract. Purchaser had a full opportunity to litigate its antitrust claim in the earlier case. Therefore, we affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of sellers.\n \n VIII. Overpayment of Depreciation Credit\n \n 24\n Purchaser, in its brief, states that it does not dispute sellers' claim for the overpayment of depreciation credit. The sellers' requested adjustment of $4,592.00 was apparently overlooked by the district court. We therefore remand with directions for the district court to adjust its judgment by $4,592.00 and enter an appropriate order for payment of the depreciation credit.\n \n \n 25\n AFFIRMED as to all but the overpayment of the depreciation credit. REMANDED to make the necessary adjustment.\n \n \n \n 1\n U.C.C. Sec. 2-708(1). Seller's Damages for Non-acceptance or Repudiation\n (1) Subject to subsection (2) and to the provisions of this Article with respect to proof of market price (Section 2-723), the measure of damages for nonacceptance or repudiation by the buyer is the difference between the market price at the time and place for tender and the unpaid contract price together with any incidental damages provided in this Article (Section 2-710), but less expenses saved in consequence of the buyer's breach.\n (2) If the measure of damages provided in subsection (1) is inadequate to put the seller in as good a position as performance would have done then the measure of damages is the profit (including reasonable overhead) which the seller would have made from full performance by the buyer, together with any incidental damages provided in this Article (Section 2-710), due allowance for costs reasonably incurred and due credit for payments or proceeds of resale.\n \n \n 2\n The district court's finding was based to a large extent on the credibility of sellers' witnesses. A reversal would require this court to \"second guess\" the district court's evaluation of the credibility of those witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony\n \n \n 3\n Sellers rely on Toland v. Technicolor, Inc., 467 F.2d 1045 (10th Cir.1972), for the proposition that Oklahoma law applies. In Toland, a diversity case, we applied the Oklahoma attorney fee statute; however, we did so in light of the fact that the alleged oral contract involved in the case was negotiated by telephone by parties in both Oklahoma and California. Thus, Oklahoma had the same number of contacts to the alleged contract as California. In addition, we concluded that no contract in fact existed. Thus, the law of the forum governed the award of attorney's fees\n \n \n 4\n The parties agreed that Missouri law governed substantive issues\n \n \n 5\n U.C.C. Sec. 2-710. Seller's Incidental Damages\n Incidental damages to an aggrieved seller include any commercially reasonable charges, expenses or commissions incurred in stopping delivery, in the transportation, care and custody of goods after the buyer's breach, in connection with return or resale of the goods or otherwise resulting from the breach.\n \n \n 6\n U.C.C. Sec. 2-612. \"Installment Contract\"; Breach\n (1) An \"installment contract\" is one which requires or authorizes the delivery of goods in separate lots to be separately accepted, even though the contract contains a clause \"each delivery is a separate contract\" or its equivalent.\n (2) The buyer may reject any installment which is non-conforming if the non-conformity substantially impairs the value of that installment and cannot be cured or if the non-conformity is a defect in the required documents; but if the non-conformity does not fall within subsection (3) and the seller gives adequate assurance of its cure the buyer must accept that installment.\n (3) Whenever non-conformity or default with respect to one or more installments substantially impairs the value of the whole contract there is a breach of the whole. But the aggrieved party reinstates the contract if he accepts a non-conforming installment without seasonably notifying of cancellation or if he brings an action with respect only to past installments or demands performance as to future installments.\n \n \n ", "ocr": false, "opinion_id": 530345 } ]
Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
F
USA, Federal
2,700,533
Vukovich
2014-03-31
false
state-v-dixon
Dixon
State v. Dixon
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
0
Published
null
null
[ "2014 Ohio 1474" ]
[ { "author_str": null, "per_curiam": false, "type": "010combined", "page_count": 9, "download_url": "http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rod/docs/pdf/7/2014/2014-ohio-1474.pdf", "author_id": 8145, "opinion_text": "[Cite as State v. Dixon, 2014-Ohio-1474.]\n\n STATE OF OHIO, MAHONING COUNTY\n\n IN THE COURT OF APPEALS\n\n SEVENTH DISTRICT\n\n\nSTATE OF OHIO, )\n ) CASE NO. 13 MA 87\n PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, )\n )\nVS. ) OPINION\n )\nTHOMAS DIXON, JR., )\n )\n DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. )\n\n\nCHARACTER OF PROCEEDINGS: Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas\n Court, Case No. 13CR53.\n\n\nJUDGMENT: Affirmed.\n\n\nAPPEARANCES:\nFor Plaintiff-Appellee: Attorney Paul Gains\n Prosecuting Attorney\n Attorney Ralph Rivera\n Assistant Prosecuting Attorney\n 21 West Boardman Street, 6th Floor\n Youngstown, Ohio 44503\n\nFor Defendant-Appellant: Attorney Ronald Yarwood\n 42 North Phelps Street\n Youngstown, Ohio 44503\n\n\nJUDGES:\nHon. Joseph J. Vukovich\nHon. Gene Donofrio\nHon. Cheryl L. Waite\n\n\n Dated: March 31, 2014\n\f[Cite as State v. Dixon, 2014-Ohio-1474.]\nVUKOVICH, J.\n\n\n {¶1} Defendant-appellant Thomas Dixon, Jr. appeals from his conviction and\nsentence entered in the Mahoning County Common Pleas Court for aggravated\nrobbery. Appointed counsel filed a no merit brief and requested leave to withdraw. A\nreview of the case file and brief reveals that there are no appealable issues.\nAccordingly, appointed counsel's motion to withdraw is granted and the conviction\nand sentence are hereby affirmed in all respects.\n Statement of the Case\n {¶2} On January 31, 2013, Dixon was indicted for aggravated robbery in\nviolation of R.C. 2911.01(A)(1)(C), a first-degree felony. Dixon initially pled not guilty\nto the offense, but later, in conjunction with a plea agreement with the state, withdrew\nthat plea and entered a guilty plea to the indicted offense. As part of the plea\nagreement, the state agreed to recommend community control with alcohol abuse\ncounseling. After a plea colloquy, the trial court accepted the guilty plea and the\nmatter was set for sentencing. 03/22/13 Plea Tr. 10.\n {¶3} At the sentencing hearing, the state recommended community control\nwith alcohol abuse counseling and provided reason for such recommendation.\n05/10/13 Sentencing Tr. 2-5. Counsel for Dixon then provided his own reasoning for\nwhy the trial court should follow the recommended sentence. 05/10/13 Sentencing\nTr. 7-10.\n {¶4} After considering the arguments, the trial court did not follow the\nrecommendation. Rather, it imposed a four-year sentence for the conviction.\n05/10/13 Sentencing Tr. 13; 05/14/13 J.E.\n {¶5} Dixon timely appealed. After reviewing the record, appointed counsel\nfiled a no merit brief asking to withdraw because there are allegedly no appealable\nissues.\n Analysis\n {¶6} When appellate counsel seeks to withdraw and discloses that there are\nno meritorious arguments for appeal, the filing is known as a no merit brief or an\nAnders brief. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S. Ct. 1396 (1967). In this\n\f -2-\n\ndistrict, it has also been called a Toney brief. State v. Toney, 23 Ohio App. 2d 203,\n262 N.E.2d 419 (7th Dist.1970).\n {¶7} In Toney, this court set forth the procedure to be used when counsel of\nrecord determines that an indigent's appeal is frivolous:\n 3. Where court-appointed counsel, with long and extensive\n experience in criminal practice, concludes that the indigent's appeal is\n frivolous and that there is no assignment of error which could be\n arguably supported on appeal, he should so advise the appointing court\n by brief and request that he be permitted to withdraw as counsel of\n record.\n 4. Court-appointed counsel's conclusions and motion to withdraw\n as counsel of record should be transmitted forthwith to the indigent, and\n the indigent should be granted time to raise any points that he chooses,\n pro se.\n 5. It is the duty of the Court of Appeals to fully examine the\n proceedings in the trial court, the brief of appointed counsel, the\n arguments pro se of the indigent, and then determine whether or not\n the appeal is wholly frivolous.\n ***\n 7. Where the Court of Appeals determines that an indigent's\n appeal is wholly frivolous, the motion of court-appointed counsel to\n withdraw as counsel of record should be allowed, and the judgment of\n the trial court should be affirmed.\nId. at syllabus.\n {¶8} The no merit brief was filed by counsel on September 23, 2013. On\nOctober 9, 2013, this court informed Dixon of counsel's no merit brief and granted\nhim 30 days to file his own written brief. Dixon did not file a brief. Thus, our analysis\nwill proceed with an independent examination of the record to determine if the appeal\nis frivolous. Our review will address whether the plea was entered knowingly,\nintelligently and voluntarily and whether the sentence complies with the law.\n\f -3-\n\n 1. Plea\n {¶9} Crim.R. 11(C) provides that a trial court must make certain advisements\nprior to accepting a defendant's guilty plea to ensure that the plea is entered into\nknowingly, intelligently and voluntarily. These advisements are typically divided into\nconstitutional rights and nonconstitutional rights. The constitutional rights are: 1) a\njury trial; 2) confrontation of witnesses against him; 3) the compulsory process for\nobtaining witnesses in his favor; 4) that the state must prove the defendant's guilt\nbeyond a reasonable doubt at trial, and 5) that the defendant cannot be compelled to\ntestify against himself. Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c); State v. Veney, 120 Ohio St. 3d 176,\n2008–Ohio–5200, 897 N.E.2d 621, ¶ 19–21. The trial court must strictly comply with\nthese requirements; if it fails to strictly comply, the defendant's plea is invalid. Veney\nat ¶ 31; State v. Ballard, 66 Ohio St. 2d 473, 477, 423 N.E.2d 115 (1981).\n {¶10} The nonconstitutional rights that the defendant must be informed of are:\n1) the nature of the charges; 2) the maximum penalty involved, which includes, if\napplicable, an advisement on postrelease control; 3) if applicable, that the defendant\nis not eligible for probation or the imposition of community control sanctions, and 4)\nthat after entering a guilty plea or a no contest plea, the court may proceed directly to\njudgment and sentencing. Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a)(b); Veney at ¶ 10–13; State v.\nSarkozy, 117 Ohio St. 3d 86, 2008–Ohio–509, 423 N.E.2d 1224, ¶ 19–26,\n(postrelease control is a nonconstitutional advisement). For the nonconstitutional\nrights, the trial court must substantially comply with Crim.R. 11's mandates. State v.\nNero, 56 Ohio St. 3d 106, 108, 564 N.E.2d 474 (1990). “Substantial compliance\nmeans that under the totality of the circumstances the defendant subjectively\nunderstands the implications of his plea and the rights he is waiving.” Veney at ¶ 15,\nquoting Nero at 108. Furthermore, a defendant who challenges his guilty plea on the\nbasis that the advisement for the nonconstitutional rights did not substantially comply\nwith Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a)(b) must also show a prejudicial effect, meaning the plea\nwould not have been otherwise entered. Veney at ¶ 15, citing Nero at 108.\n {¶11} The trial court's advisement on the constitutional rights strictly complied\nwith Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c). Dixon was informed and indicated that he understood that\n\f -4-\n\nby pleading guilty he was waiving his right to a jury trial, his right to confront\nwitnesses against him, his right to subpoena witnesses in his favor and his right to\nhave the state prove beyond a reasonable doubt every element of the indicted\noffenses. 03/22/13 Plea Tr. 4-5. He was also informed and stated he understood\nthat if he went to trial he could not be compelled to testify against himself. 03/22/13\nPlea Tr. 5.\n {¶12} Likewise, this trial court’s advisement as to the nonconstitutional rights\nsubstantially complied with Crim.R. 11(C). Dixon was advised that he was charged\nwith aggravated robbery and was informed of the elements of that charge. 03/22/13\nPlea Tr. 3-4. He was informed of the maximum penalty involved for the offense; a\nfirst-degree felony carries a maximum prison term of 11 years, a maximum fine of\n$20,000.00 and a mandatory five-year term of postrelease control following\ncompletion of the sentence. 03/22/13 Plea Tr. 6–8. See also R.C. 2929.14(A)(1)\n(maximum term for a first-degree felony); R.C. 2929.18(A)(3)(a) (maximum fine for a\nfirst-degree felony); R.C. 2967.28(B)(1) (postrelease control). The trial court further\nadvised Dixon that upon accepting the guilty plea it could proceed immediately to\nsentencing. 03/22/13 Plea Tr. 6.\n {¶13} Therefore, since the trial court made all the required advisements there\nare no errors in the Crim.R. 11(C) colloquy and thus, there are no appealable issues\nconcerning the plea. The record confirms that the plea was intelligently, voluntarily,\nand knowingly entered.\n 2. Sentencing\n {¶14} We review felony sentences using both the clearly and convincingly\ncontrary to law and abuse of discretion standards of review. State v. Hill, 7th Dist.\nNo. 13MA1, 2014-Ohio-____, ¶ __; State v. Gratz, 7th Dist. No. 08MA101, 2009–\nOhio–695, ¶ 8. We first determine whether the sentencing court complied with all\napplicable rules and statutes in imposing the sentence to determine whether the\nsentence is clearly and convincingly contrary to law. Gratz at ¶ 8, citing State v.\nKalish, 120 Ohio St .3d 23, 2008–Ohio–4912, 896 N.E.2d 124, ¶ 13–14. Then, if it is\nnot clearly and convincingly contrary to law, we must determine whether the\n\f -5-\n\nsentencing court abused its discretion in applying the factors in R.C. 2929.11, R.C.\n2929.12 and any other applicable statute. Gratz at ¶ 8, citing Kalish at ¶ 17.\n {¶15} Dixon pled guilty to aggravated robbery, a first-degree felony. The\ncourt sentenced him to a four-year sentence. 05/10/13 Sentencing Tr. 13. He was\nalso informed that following his release from prison he would be subject to an\nadditional five-year term of postrelease control. 05/10/13 Sentencing Tr. 14-15. This\nsentence is within the sentencing range of 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 years that is\npermitted by R.C. 2929.14(A)(1) for a first-degree felony. Likewise, the postrelease\ncontrol advisement is correct; R.C. 2967.28(B)(1) indicates that he is subject to a\nfive-year term of postrelease control.\n {¶16} At the sentencing hearing and in the judgment entry, the trial court\nindicated that it considered all applicable statutes when determining the appropriate\nsentence. In the Judgment Entry it stated:\n The Court has reviewed ORC §§2929.11, 2929.13 and 2929.14\n as it applies to Defendant.\n The Court considered the record, presentence investigation\n report, oral statements and the principles and purposes of sentencing\n under Ohio Revised Code § 2929.11, and has balanced the\n seriousness and recidivism factors under Ohio Revised Code §\n 2929.12. The Court finds that Defendant is not amenable to a\n community control sanction.\n05/14/13 J.E.\n {¶17} Likewise, statements made during the sentencing hearing also indicate\nthat the trial court considered R.C. 2929.11, 2929.12, and 2929.13 when imposing\nthe four-year sentence. 05/10/13 Sentencing Tr. 11-13.\n {¶18} Thus, the record discloses that the trial court did consider and comply\nwith all applicable statutes in issuing the sentence. The sentence is not clearly and\nconvincingly contrary to law.\n {¶19} Our analysis next turns to whether the trial court erred in determining\nthat a four-year sentence was appropriate. At this point it is noted that the state\n\f -6-\n\nrecommended community control and provided reasons for such recommendation.\nSome of the reasons were that the victim was not hurt, the victim does not think he\nshould spend any more time in jail, the victim does not perceive Dixon as a threat,\nDixon was drunk at the time of crime, and Dixon does not have a violent or extensive\ncriminal record. 05/10/13 Sentencing Tr. 2-5. Dixon’s attorney, likewise, argued for a\ncommunity control sanction. He indicated that Dixon has been attending drug and\nalcohol counseling, just obtained a job, and that Dixon moved so that he could live in\na sober environment. 05/10/13 Sentencing Tr. 7-10. When Dixon spoke he\nindicated that he was sorry and that he wished he could take it back. 05/10/13\nSentencing Tr. 11.\n {¶20} Despite both parties’ arguments and requests for community control\nsanctions, the trial court did not follow the recommendation. Instead, it ordered a\nfour-year sentence. The act of not following the state’s recommendation and\nordering a stiffer penalty does not, in and of itself, render the sentence clearly and\nconvincingly contrary to law or show that the trial court abused its discretion. Trial\ncourts generally are not a party to the plea negotiations and the contract itself. State\nv. Vari, 7th Dist. No. 07MA142, 2010–Ohio–1300, ¶ 24. Thus, “the court is free to\nimpose a sentence greater than that forming the inducement for the defendant to\nplead guilty so long as the court forewarns the defendant of the applicable penalties,\nincluding the possibility of imposing a greater sentence than that recommended by\nthe prosecutor.” Id., citing State v. Martinez, 7th Dist. No. 03MA196, 2004–Ohio-\n6806, ¶ 8. That said, we have explained that once the trial court enters into the plea\nagreement by making a promise, it becomes a party to the agreement and is bound\nby the agreement. Vari at ¶ 24.\n {¶21} Here, Dixon was advised of the maximum penalty involved and was\nadvised multiple times that the trial court was not required to follow the\nrecommendation. 03/22/13 Plea Tr. 6–7 (sentencing up to the court and maximum\npenalty); 05/10/13 Sentencing Tr. 6-7 (“sentencing is always up to the court”).\nFurthermore, the record does not indicate that the trial court was a party to the plea\n\f -7-\n\nagreement. Thus, there is nothing in the record to suggest that the trial court was\nbound, for any reason, by the recommendation.\n {¶22} The record also indicates that the trial court’s decision to deviate from\nthe recommendation and order a four-year sentence was not an abuse of discretion\nor contrary to law. The trial court considered and weighed all factors when it was\ndetermining the appropriate sentence. The court considered the fact that the crime is\na first-degree felony and that the victim was wheelchair bound and taking oxygen.\n05/10/13 Sentencing Tr. 11-12. It also took into account that Dixon had previously\nbeen in and out of drug programs, including substance abuse training in a veteran’s\ncenter. 05/10/13 Sentencing Tr. 12. The trial court also contemplated the facts as\nthey were set forth in the police report.\n {¶23} That report indicated that this incident occurred over a $10 loan that\nDixon had made to the victim, who allegedly was his ex-girlfriend. He threatened her\nwith a box cutter and said something to the effect of “Bitch, give me the\nmotherfucking money.” When she told him she could not and reached for her phone,\nhe allegedly said, “I don’t care who you call; I’ll kill your motherfucking ass.” 05/10/13\nSentencing Tr. 12; police report attached to PSI. When the police went to his\napartment and asked him about the incident, the box cutter was found on his person.\nHe told the police that he was “having kinky sex” with the victim and “somehow the\nknife was involved.” Dixon claimed that the victim owed him even more money for\nsexual favors. He further advised the officers that he was just angry because he had\nrecently been laid off from work and that he knew the victim had spent his money on\n“crack.” Police report attached to PSI.\n {¶24} In light of all the above, including the recommended sentence, the trial\ncourt concluded:\n So taking everything into consideration, and the risk factor\n involved which has been determined to be moderate [by the PSI], and\n also the chances of recidivism, this court understands in some respects\n how a recommendation was made without knowing the factual\n circumstances. But taking what did transpire into account, it is going to\n\f -8-\n\n be the order of the court in following the principles and purposes of\n sentencing, it’s going to be the order of the court, and to protect the\n public, I might add, that the defendant is going to be sentenced to a\n four-year stay in the Lorain Correctional Facility.\n05/10/13 Sentencing Tr. 13.\n {¶25} This reasoning taken in conjunction with the record indicates that the\ntrial court did not abuse its discretion or order a sentence that was clearly and\nconvincingly contrary to law.\n {¶26} Consequently, for all the above reasons there are no appealable\nsentencing issues.\n Conclusion\n {¶27} For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is hereby\naffirmed. Likewise, counsel's motion to withdraw is granted.\n\n\n\nDonofrio, J., concurs.\nWaite, J., concurs.\n\f", "ocr": false, "opinion_id": 2700533 } ]
Ohio Court of Appeals
Ohio Court of Appeals
SA
Ohio, OH
2,700,567
Vukovich
2014-03-06
false
patel-v-village-of-bellaire
Patel
Patel v. Village of Bellaire
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
0
Published
null
null
[ "2014 Ohio 880" ]
[ { "author_str": null, "per_curiam": false, "type": "010combined", "page_count": 13, "download_url": "http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rod/docs/pdf/7/2014/2014-ohio-880.pdf", "author_id": 8145, "opinion_text": "[Cite as Patel v. Village of Bellaire, 2014-Ohio-880.]\n\n STATE OF OHIO, BELMONT COUNTY\n\n IN THE COURT OF APPEALS\n\n SEVENTH DISTRICT\n\n\nARVIND PATEL, et al., )\n ) CASE NO. 13 BE 9\n PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS, )\n )\nVS. ) OPINION\n )\nVILLAGE OF BELLAIRE, )\n )\n DEFENDANT-APPELLEE. )\n\n\n\n\nCHARACTER OF PROCEEDINGS: Civil Appeal from Common Pleas Court,\n Case No. 08CV412.\n\n\nJUDGMENT: Affirmed.\n\n\nAPPEARANCES:\nFor Plaintiffs-Appellants: Arvind Patel, Pro se\n 16 Renaissance Way\n Wheeling, West Virginia 26003\n\n\nFor Defendant-Appellee: Attorney Mel Lute, Jr.\n 400 South Main Street\n North Canton, Ohio 44720\n\n\nJUDGES:\nHon. Joseph J. Vukovich\nHon. Gene Donofrio\nHon. Cheryl L. Waite\n\n\n Dated: March 6, 2014\n\f[Cite as Patel v. Village of Bellaire, 2014-Ohio-880.]\nVUKOVICH, J.\n\n\n {¶1} Plaintiff-appellant Arvind Patel appeals the decision of the Belmont\nCounty Common Pleas Court which denied his post-judgment motion for Civ.R. 11\nsanctions filed against Attorney Mel Lute, Jr. Appellant alleged that counsel used\nfalse affidavits to support defendant-appellee Village of Bellaire’s motion for summary\njudgment, which was then granted by the trial court and affirmed on appeal to this\ncourt. Appellant is essentially attempting to relitigate a claim which he generally\nasserted in his response to the Village’s request for summary judgment but which he\nfailed to specifically support with summary judgment evidence. Regardless, the trial\ncourt did not abuse its discretion in finding, after listening to the affiants testify at the\nsanctions hearing, that the affidavits were not fraudulent and/or that the Village’s\nattorney did not willfully attach fraudulent affidavits to the motion. In accordance, the\njudgment of the trial court is affirmed.\n STATEMENT OF THE CASE\n {¶2} On September 7, 2009, Village of Bellaire Law Director Michael\nShaheen filed a request for temporary and permanent injunctive relief against Arvind\nPatel and Anu & Amu, Inc. in the Belmont County Common Pleas Court resulting in\nCase No. 06CV371. The Village asked the court to order the closure of Patel’s motel\ndoing business as the 7-Inn Motel. Attached to the request was the affidavit of Fire\nCaptain Dennis VanKirk who stated that he undertook an inspection on behalf of the\nVillage which had received various complaints concerning the property. He stated\nthat he found at least 100 dangerous fire code violations, noting that he saw exposed\nwiring, deplorable conditions, flammable material, and lack of adequate fire\nextinguishers. He expressed concern that a fire would occur unless the motel was\nclosed for repair. He also stated that during the investigation, Patel voiced that he\nwould not comply with repair requests. A temporary restraining order was issued.\n {¶3} Patel apparently began making some repairs. Less than two weeks\nafter the temporary order was issued, the State Fire Marshal’s Office conducted an\ninspection, found 183 violations, and issued a citation. Based upon subsequent\n\f -2-\n\ntestimony of a State Fire Marshal, a preliminary injunction was then granted in\n06CV371.\n {¶4} Administratively, Patel requested a hearing before the Board of Building\nAppeals, after which the State Fire Marshal’s citation was upheld, with no further\nappeal taken. By this time, Patel’s operator’s license had expired, and the motel was\nno longer in operation. Thus, in mid-2007, the Village dismissed its pending request\nfor a permanent injunction.\n {¶5} In mid-2008, Patel filed a pro se complaint against the Village of\nBellaire in the Belmont County Common Pleas Court alleging a conspiracy to close\nthe motel by filing and perpetuating a malicious and wrongful suit with false testimony\nand a false affidavit, negligence in filing a meritless suit and causing the motel to\nclose, and tortious interference with economic advantage by causing the motel to\nclose.\n {¶6} The Village filed a motion for summary judgment. The Village attached\nthe fire captain’s prior affidavit and his more recent affidavit wherein he added that\nthe State Fire Marshall inspected the property, found 183 violations, and provided a\ncitation issued to Patel under R.C. 3737.42. He characterized this occurrence by\nstating that the State Fire Marshall “took over” to determine the fate of the plaintiff’s\nbusiness. The Village also attached the affidavit of former Law Director Shaheen,\nwherein he stated that he filed a request for temporary and permanent relief based\nupon information supplied to him in order to ensure Patel would cease operation of\nthe property pending complete repair in compliance with fire code and/or the outcome\nof an enforcement proceeding under Chapter 3737.\n {¶7} The Village raised various arguments besides the one that it was proper\nto seek closure of the motel. For instance, the Village pointed out that Patel had\nalready argued that the fire captain’s affidavit was false in 06CV371. The Village\nstated that there was no allegation of an unlawful act as required for a civil\nconspiracy claim. The Village also asserted immunity in the government functions\nperformed here.\n\f -3-\n\n {¶8} Patel responded by urging that the ruling in 06CV371 was not final and\nonly related to a temporary order. As to the issue of the Village’s immunity, Patel\nconfusingly stated that the fire captain and law director acted outside the course of\ntheir employment. Patel also urged that the issue of whether the Village used false\ntestimony and false affidavits was a jury question.\n {¶9} The Village replied to the latter contention by pointing out that Patel set\nforth mere general accusations of falsity and provided no summary judgment\nevidence in support of his contention that there remained a genuine issue for trial.\nBefore the trial court could rule, Patel retained counsel for the first time in this suit.\nInstructions were issued for counsel to review the file to determine if he concurred\nwith appellant’s pro se filings, but counsel later withdrew. In July 2010, the Village\nfiled a supplement to their motion for summary judgment in order to place it back\nbefore the court’s consideration. The Village’s supplement added Patel’s deposition\nand noted that he only generally set forth his belief that the affidavits were based on\nlies and that the motive was to close his motel rather than an actual threat of fire.\n {¶10} On July 21, 2010, the trial court granted summary judgment to the\nVillage. Patel appealed that judgment and raised a total of seven assignments of\nerror. See Patel v. Village of Bellaire, 7th Dist. No. 10BE27, 2012-Ohio-4348. Patel\nmade various arguments in that appeal regarding his belief that the trial court relied\non affidavits that were false, fraudulent, and manufactured. Id. at ¶ 25, 47.\n {¶11} This court initially set forth the law on political subdivision immunity. Id.\nat ¶ 27-29. We ruled that Patel did not raise any exception to immunity. Id. at ¶ 30.\nWe pointed out that he claimed that the fire captain or law director acted outside of\nthe scope of their duties, but this would only further the Village’s case of immunity,\nnoting that he did not file suit against the fire captain and the law director. Id. at ¶ 30,\n39. We also concluded that Patel failed to provide evidence that the affidavits of the\nfire captain and the law director were false or that there remained a genuine issue as\nto his claims. Id. at ¶ 34, 39, 49. We affirmed the grant of summary judgment.\n {¶12} While that appeal was pending, Patel filed a motion for sanctions under\nCiv.R. 11 against Attorney Lute who defended the Village in this lawsuit. Patel\n\f -4-\n\nclaimed that Attorney Lute willfully attached to the summary judgment motion three\nfalse affidavits (the two affidavits of the fire captain and the affidavit of the law\ndirector). Appellant also contested counsel’s statements in the summary judgment\nmotion recapping the affidavits. Appellant then explained why he disagreed with the\ncontent and/or wording of certain portions of the affidavits.\n {¶13} The trial court waited to rule on the motion until the appellate process of\nthe underlying suit was complete. See Patel v. Judge Crawford, 7th Dist. No.\n12BE28, 2013-Ohio-2284, ¶ 5, 15. The trial court conducted a hearing on the motion\non April 9, 2013. At the hearing, Patel questioned the fire captain and the law\ndirector on certain portions of their affidavits. For instance, appellant tried to\nestablish that a statement in the law director’s affidavit that a permanent injunction\nwas requested was false because no permanent injunction was issued or because\nno hearing ended up being held on a permanent injunction due to the voluntary\ndismissal. As another example, appellant tried to demonstrate that the fire captain’s\naffidavit falsely stated that the State Fire Marshal’s office “took over” to determine the\nfate of the business; appellant based this argument on a letter he received from that\noffice stating that they were not part of the pending injunction lawsuit but were\nproceeding administratively on his license. Both witnesses testified that when they\nfiled the affidavits at issue, they believed that what they said was true.\n {¶14} The trial court concluded that there was no evidence that there was\nanything false in any of the affidavits. And, the trial court stated that even if there\nwere false statements, there is no evidence that the affiants knew those statements\nwere false. Regardless, the trial court found that there was absolutely no evidence\nthat Attorney Lute had any knowledge of falsities in the affidavits. The court opined\nthat this was the most frivolous motion and hearing that the court had encountered in\nits more than 30 years as a judge. The court’s decision denying the motion for\nsanctions was journalized on April 24, 2013. Patel filed a timely notice of appeal and\nfiled a pro se brief on his own behalf (not on behalf of the corporation).\n\f -5-\n\n ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR\n {¶15} Patel sets forth the following seven assignments of error:\n {¶16} “The trial court made an egregious error in failing to recognize the\n[former law director’s] false and fabricated affidavit and testimony at the hearing of\nApril 9, 2013.”\n {¶17} “The trial court made an egregious error in failing to recognize the [fire\ncaptain’s] false and fabricated affidavit and testimony at the hearing of April 9, 2013.”\n {¶18} “Trial court abused its discretionary power by directly coaching the\nwitness stating that you can file a false and fabricated affidavit and come into court\nand testify that you believe it was true at the time of the filing of the affidavit.”\n {¶19} “The trial judge abused his discretionary power and changed the\ndefinition of rule 11 ‘motion for sanction’ to favor Appellee.”\n {¶20} “The trial judge abused his discretionary power, by not allowing the\ndefendant Attorney Lute on the stand for cross examination.”\n {¶21} “The trial judge abused his discretionary power and falsely stated that\nthis is the first and only hearing on the Motion [for] sanctions today.”\n {¶22} “The trial court abused his discretionary power, and held the hearing\nwithout important witness[es], whom Mr. Patel subpoenaed.”\n {¶23} Before proceeding, we admonish appellant that gratuitous cursing in an\nappellate brief is inappropriate. See Appellant’s Brief at 21 (where appellant states\nthat the trial judge “did not give a shit”).\n GENERAL LAW\n {¶24} Pursuant to Civ.R. 11, every pleading, motion, or other document of a\nparty represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record.\nThe signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate by the attorney: that he has\nread the document; that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief there is\ngood ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay. Civ.R. 11. If a\ndocument is signed with intent to defeat the purpose of this rule, it may be stricken as\nsham and false and the action may proceed as though the document had not been\nserved. Id. For a willful violation of this rule, an attorney may be subjected to\n\f -6-\n\nappropriate action, including an award to the opposing party of expenses and\nreasonable attorney fees incurred in bringing a motion under this rule. Id.\n {¶25} Appellee points out that the rule does not apply to affidavits of a non-\nparty used to support a motion. See Staff Note to 1994 Amendment to Civ.R. 11.\nAppellant responds by contending that where counsel cites parts of those affidavits in\nhis motion, the rule would apply to those statements regardless of counsel’s\nsubjective belief. That is, appellant urges the test employed in a Civ.R. 11 evaluation\nis not subjective and is employed without considering actual bad faith.\n {¶26} However, the Ohio Supreme Court has stated that “Civ.R. 11 employs a\nsubjective bad-faith standard to invoke sanctions by requiring that any violation must\nbe willful.” State ex rel. Dreamer v. Mason, 115 Ohio St.3d 190, 2007-Ohio-4789,\n874 N.E.2d 510, ¶ 19. The standard requires more than bad judgment or negligence\nand requires dishonest purpose or actual intent to mislead for instance. State ex rel.\nBardwell v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Commrs, 127 Ohio St.3d 202, 937 N.E.2d 1274,\n2010-Ohio-5073, ¶ 8.\n {¶27} A reviewing court does not reverse a decision on a motion for sanctions\nunless the trial court has abused its discretion. Id. at ¶ 9, citing Dreamer, 115 Ohio\nSt.3d 190 at ¶ 18. As long as some competent, credible evidence exists to support\nthe judgment, no abuse of discretion occurs. Id.\n ANALYSIS\n {¶28} Many of appellant’s complaints regarding the affidavits can be classified\nas caviling (the raising of trivial and frivolous objections), misinterpretation, or outright\nmistake on appellant’s part. Most notably, appellant complains that the law director’s\naffidavit stated that he previously requested a permanent injunction, but appellant\ninsists that this is not true. However, the original filing was a request for both\ntemporary and permanent relief. Although only a temporary and preliminary\ninjunction had been issued by the time the complaint was voluntarily dismissed, there\nwas still an initial request for a permanent injunction.\n {¶29} Appellant’s next complaint regarding the law director dealt with his\nstatement at a hearing in the injunction case. As to how this relates to the affidavit,\n\f -7-\n\nappellant seems to focus on the law director’s statement in his affidavit that he filed\nfor an injunction subject to complete repair of the property. Appellant believes the\nstatement is false because he alleges that he did make the repairs of the items in the\ninitial complaint but his motel stayed closed. However, the law director was merely\nparaphrasing the complaint for an injunction; he was not swearing that repairs never\nbegan or that they were not completed at a later date. And, the excerpt from a prior\nhearing utilized by appellant here does not support his position as the law director\nmentioned only that appellant was “making progress” and stated that several\nviolations still exist. In any event, appellant is essentially making a legal argument as\nto whether the code violations found by the state could be used to further extend the\ninjunction where he allegedly fixed the violations found by the village. This was a\nmatter for the summary judgment stage of the proceedings, rather than the Civ.R. 11\nstage.\n {¶30} Appellant also alleges here that the law director falsely claimed that\nChapter 3737 was followed. This is apparently based upon appellant’s contention\nthat the fire captain did not strictly follow the law, and that the law director should\nhave known that. First, the law director’s three-sentence affidavit was used in this\nlawsuit merely to show what he did in the prior lawsuit. He did not specifically claim\nthat the fire captain complied with every aspect of Chapter 3737. He merely outlined\nthat he filed for temporary and permanent relief to assure appellant would cease\noperation subject to the complete repair in compliance with fire codes and/or the\noutcome of enforcement proceedings under Chapter 3737. And, nothing in that\naffidavit could be attributable to bad faith of the current attorney provided by the\ninsurance company to represent the Village of Bellaire in this action instituted by\nappellant.\n {¶31} As to the affidavit of the fire captain that was written at the time of the\nsummary judgment motion, appellant complains that he stated that the State Fire\nMarshal’s office “took over” after finding 183 violations. The trial court found that the\nfire captain believed the state was taking over (for him) and the affidavit was not\nfraudulently made. Appellant points to a letter written to him on behalf of the State\n\f -8-\n\nFire Marshal’s Office, noting that it was not a party to the action for injunctive relief as\nthey were pursuing actions against the hotel’s license administratively which “at this\ntime do not involve the courts.” Appellant’s complaint seems to be merely an\ninterpretation argument or an argument of what impressions were made on the fire\ncaptain by the involvement of the state. So they did not take over the civil case; they\ndid, however, essentially take over the investigatory and compliance aspects of the\nmatter. In fact, testimony of one of those state agents was presented to support\nextending the temporary restraining order into a preliminary injunction. And, as\naforementioned, any argument that the state’s citation was a malicious reason to\nextend the injunction is a legal argument. Arguments such as this were resolved at\nthe summary judgment stage of this action due to appellant’s inadequate response.\n {¶32} Appellant also complains that the fire captain’s affidavit stated the he\nissued a citation to appellant in writing, describing with particularity the nature of the\nviolation and the portion of the fire code violated. Appellant complains that the\ncitation was more like a letter and that each violation does not have a specific code\nsection after it. However, it was in writing, with a list of particular violations, and\ngeneral code sections were provided in the introduction to the list of violations. Once\nagain, any argument that the fire captain’s citation was statutorily insufficient to justify\nan injunction is a legal argument that was already resolved, at the least by the time\nthat summary judgment was entered in this action. And, defense counsel does not\nmake a groundless argument by defending the sufficiency of a fire captain’s citation\nin an action for malicious prosecution against his client, the Village of Bellaire.\n {¶33} Appellant even takes issue with a statement in the fire captain’s original\naffidavit, filed in support of the Village’s prior action for a restraining order, where he\nstates, “During our investigation, Mr. Patel made it clear that he absolutely will not\ncomply with our requests to repair the subject property. Furthermore, he openly\ndisputed our authority to order him to do so.” There is no rational reason to connect\nany liability for this statement (made by a fire captain the day after an inspection in\nSeptember 2006) to a defense counsel who, two years later, merely attached the\naffidavit (which had already been accepted by a court in granting both temporary and\n\f -9-\n\npreliminary relief) to a motion for summary judgment. In any event, there is no\nevidentiary indication that the fire captain’s impressions of appellant’s conduct and\nstatements were false. Additionally, appellant had the chance to contest these\nstatements, and summary judgment has since been entered against him.\n {¶34} The trial court had the discretion to believe the affiants who testified that\nthe affidavits were true and/or they believed their affidavits were true when they wrote\nthem. The court did not “coach” the witnesses but followed up Patel’s questioning\nwith one final question as to whether they believed at the time of signing that the\naffidavits were true. Other statements by the court were attempts to align appellant’s\npresentation to the proper focus rather than to permit him to retry his original\ncomplaint. Furthermore, appellant’s particular arguments were either unconvincing\nor constituted erroneous analysis, misinterpretation, quibbling over semantics, or\ncaviling.\n {¶35} “Civ.R. 11 employs a subjective bad-faith standard to invoke sanctions\nby requiring that any violation must be willful.” Dreamer, 115 Ohio St.3d 190 at ¶ 19.\nThe standard requires more than bad judgment or negligence but suggests a\ndishonest purpose or actual intent to mislead. Bardwell, 127 Ohio St.3d 202 at ¶ 8.\n {¶36} Thus, contrary to appellant’s argument, the trial court was not wrong by\nnoting that even if it were to assume for sake of argument that a person’s affidavit\nturns out to contain some false statements does not automatically mean that the\nattorney representing the village (hired by the insurance company) must be\nsanctioned. As Attorney Lute points out, Civ.R. 56 speaks of affidavits being made\non the personal knowledge of the affiant. Appellant cites nothing requiring the\nattorney to be absolutely liable for the client’s (or a non-party’s) statements in the\naffidavit just because he points to the affidavit in his motion for summary judgment.\n {¶37} Putting aside the conclusion that a rational trier of fact could find a lack\nof evidence that the affidavits were factually false, Attorney Lute was not part of the\nlawsuit by the Village against appellant, and there was no evidence that Attorney\nLute had knowledge of a “conspiracy” or fraudulent statements by affiants. Appellant\nstates that the court should have let him cross-examine Attorney Lute; however, he\n\f -10-\n\ndid not mention questioning Attorney Lute until he was in the middle of making final\narguments and the court was responding to those arguments (thus alerting him as to\nhis evidentiary failure). As the trial court pointed out, appellant had already answered\nthat he had no more witnesses to call.\n {¶38} Appellant also takes issue with the court’s statement that this was the\nfirst and only hearing on his motion. He states that a hearing on his motion was\nconducted back when he first filed the motion two years before. However, he failed\nto provide a complete or official transcript of that hearing (as we pointed out to him in\nruling on the prior mandamus action he filed). As we stated then, the incomplete and\nunofficial pages he did submit showed only that the trial court stated that it would\neither dismiss the motion or stay it pending the appellate decision. There was no\nindication that an evidentiary hearing was held then. We have before us only a full\nand official transcript of the evidentiary hearing that occurred on April 9, 2013.\n {¶39} Contrary to another assertion by appellant, there is nothing wrong with\nthe court having the questioner show the document to the witness instead of to the\ncourt. As appellant points out, the motion for sanctions had been filed with the court,\nand it had attachments to it. However, an unsworn document attached to a motion\nneed not be accepted as evidence. Even appellant’s own “affidavit” was not\nnotarized. In any event, we have the filed motion and its attachments and such\ndocuments do not change the analysis of the situation here.\n {¶40} As to his final contention, appellant waited until a few days before the\nscheduled hearing to issue subpoenas. The local fire captain received his subpoena\nthe day prior to the hearing, and the law director and a judge did not receive their\nsubpoenas until the morning of the hearing. From the returns, it can be seen that the\nnon-local state employees could not be served in time for the hearing. Appellant did\nnot seek a continuance to secure these witnesses; nor did he show how their\ntestimony could relate to Attorney Lute’s knowledge. (The only reason he sought a\ncontinuance was his attempted appeal to the United States Supreme Court.)\n {¶41} Lastly, appellant was essentially attempting to relitigate the issues\narising from his complaint and the summary judgment stage; a stage which ended in\n\f -11-\n\na final order, a final order that was upheld on appeal. Appellant is taking issue with\nstatements in affidavits attached to a summary judgment motion in a motion for\nsanctions against counsel when those issues were generally and vaguely sketched\nbut were not particularized in the response to summary judgment. He is finally\nspecifying what he should have specified in his response to summary judgment. He\nsaid that affidavits were false then, but he presented no summary judgment evidence\nin support of this bare assertion. The trial court accepted the affidavits in ruling on\nsummary judgment. This court reviewed appellant’s argument that the affidavits\nwere false. We concluded that he had presented no evidence below that this was\nthe case as was his burden. We affirmed the entry of summary judgment.\n {¶42} To allow a motion for sanctions to be utilized in such a manner would\nallow a party who loses due to their own lack of proper response to attempt to\nrelitigate the veracity of the movant’s summary judgment evidence. Notably, this is\nnot a case where a party who lost at summary judgment discovered new information\nshowing not only that the affidavits were false but also that counsel knew about the\nfalsity.\n {¶43} And, as to the fire captain’s first affidavit, this document was filed in\ncourt by the Village to support the restraining order years prior to this action. It was\ncontested by appellant at that time. Most importantly, appellant’s suit here was\nbased on his allegation that said affidavit was false. Counsel, who was uninvolved in\nthe prior suit, attached to the summary judgment motion the very affidavit that\nappellant’s complaint says is false. Counsel was hired to defend against this claim.\nIt is not willful bad faith to attach the document upon which the opponent’s suit is\nbased. Had appellant shown there was a genuine issue as to whether the affidavit\nwas material and false at the proper stage, counsel still could have proceeded to\ndefend his client at trial.\n {¶44} As explained in his appeal of the grant of summary judgment, appellant\nfailed to support his claim in responding to summary judgment. By filing a motion for\nsanctions on this same affidavit, appellant is improperly duplicating the claim he\nmade in the complaint which he failed to protect in the summary judge stage of\n\f -12-\n\nproceedings. And, he is essentially attempting to alter the law of the case on this\naffidavit. Judgment has already been entered against appellant on his complaint that\nthe affidavit was false.\n {¶45} Regardless, as explained supra, a reasonable court could find the\nclaims of falsity outlined on appeal were not supported by the evidence, and Attorney\nLute’s bad faith was not discernible and could be found lacking by a reasonable trial\ncourt. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is hereby affirmed.\n\n\n\nDonofrio, J., concurs.\nWaite, J., concurs.\n\f", "ocr": false, "opinion_id": 2700567 } ]
Ohio Court of Appeals
Ohio Court of Appeals
SA
Ohio, OH
2,028,734
null
2004-06-10
false
people-v-braxton
Braxton
People v. Braxton
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
0
Published
null
null
[ "687 N.W.2d 292" ]
[ { "author_str": null, "per_curiam": false, "type": "010combined", "page_count": null, "download_url": null, "author_id": null, "opinion_text": "\n687 N.W.2d 292 (2004)\nPeople\nv.\nBraxton.\nNo. 124351.\nSupreme Court of Michigan.\nJune 10, 2004.\nSC: 124351, COA: 232830.\nBy order of January 29, 2004, this Court ordered the Wayne County Prosecuting Attorney to answer defendant's application for leave to appeal. That answer having now been submitted, the application for leave to appeal the July 8, 2003 judgment of the Court of Appeals is again considered, and, pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we REMAND this case *293 to the Court of Appeals for consideration of whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury applied the reasonable doubt instructions in a manner that lowered the government's burden of proof, and, if so, the appropriate standard of review. See Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 114 S.Ct. 1239, 127 L.Ed.2d 583 (1994). In all other respects, leave to appeal is DENIED.\nWe do not retain jurisdiction.\n", "ocr": false, "opinion_id": 2028734 } ]
Michigan Supreme Court
Michigan Supreme Court
S
Michigan, MI
250,910
Jertberg, Kilkenny, Stephens
1960-05-03
false
washib-ullah-v-richard-c-hoy-acting-district-director-immigration-and
null
Washib Ullah v. Richard C. Hoy, Acting District Director, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Los Angeles, California
Washib ULLAH, Appellant, v. Richard C. HOY, Acting District Director, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Los Angeles, California, Appellee
Marshall Ross, Los Angeles, Cal., for appellant., Laughlin E. Waters, U. S. Atty., Richard A. Lavine, James R. Dooley, Asst. U. S. Attys., Los Angeles, Cal., for appellee.
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
2
Published
null
<parties id="b282-7"> Washib ULLAH, Appellant, v. Richard C. HOY, Acting District Director, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Los Angeles, California, Appellee. </parties><br><docketnumber id="b282-9"> No. 16236. </docketnumber><br><court id="b282-10"> United States Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit. </court><br><decisiondate id="b282-11"> May 3, 1960. </decisiondate><br><attorneys id="b282-23"> Marshall Ross, Los Angeles, Cal., for appellant. </attorneys><br><attorneys id="b283-4"> <span citation-index="1" class="star-pagination" label="195"> *195 </span> Laughlin E. Waters, U. S. Atty., Richard A. Lavine, James R. Dooley, Asst. U. S. Attys., Los Angeles, Cal., for appellee. </attorneys><br><judges id="b283-5"> Before STEPHENS and JERTBERG, Circuit Judges, and KILKENNY, District Judge. </judges>
[ "278 F.2d 194" ]
[ { "author_str": "Jertberg", "per_curiam": false, "type": "010combined", "page_count": null, "download_url": "http://bulk.resource.org/courts.gov/c/F2/278/278.F2d.194.16236_1.html", "author_id": null, "opinion_text": "278 F.2d 194\n Washib ULLAH, Appellant,v.Richard C. HOY, Acting District Director, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Los Angeles, California, Appellee.\n No. 16236.\n United States Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit.\n May 3, 1960.\n \n Marshall Ross, Los Angeles, Cal., for appellant.\n Laughlin E. Waters, U. S. Atty., Richard A. Lavine, James R. Dooley, Asst. U. S. Attys., Los Angeles, Cal., for appellee.\n Before STEPHENS and JERTBERG, Circuit Judges, and KILKENNY, District Judge.\n JERTBERG, Circuit Judge.\n \n \n 1\n This is an appeal from a judgment of the district court denying relief sought by appellant in a declaratory action instituted by him seeking to review an order of deportation outstanding against him.\n \n \n 2\n The district court had jurisdiction of the action under the provisions of Sec. 10 of the Act of June 11, 1946 (Administrative Procedure Act), 60 Stat. 243, Title 5 U.S.C.A. &#167; 1009. This court has jurisdiction under the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C.A. &#167;&#167; 1291 and 1294.\n \n \n 3\n The complaint, in substance, alleged that on or about September, 1957, there was served upon plaintiff an order of deportation directing that he be deported from the United States and that plaintiff has applied to the defendant for the privilege of voluntary departure, in lieu of deportation and that such application has been denied. In the prayer of the complaint plaintiff prayed that the court review the records of his deportation proceedings and enter judgment that plaintiff is not deportable, or in the alternative that the defendant be directed to re-open the deportation hearing to permit filing of another application for voluntary departure, on the ground, among other things, that plaintiff is not statutorily ineligible for voluntary departure.\n \n \n 4\n The defendant filed answer and among other denials denied that plaintiff had applied for the privilege of voluntary departure in lieu of deportation and denied that such application had been denied.\n \n \n 5\n Following the filing of the answer the district court entered the following order:\n \n \n 6\n \"It is ordered that this action be placed on the calendar of May 5, 1958, at ten A.M. for pre-trial conference and setting without regard to Local Rule 9 [West's Ann.Code].\"\n \n \n 7\n The clerk of the court then dispatched a letter directed to the then attorney for appellant and to the attorney for defendant notifying them that the action had been placed on the calendar \"for pretrial conference and setting. Counsel will please attend.\" In the letter it was stated that \"the court does not intend to invoke the provisions of Local Rule 9 relative to the scheduling of the procedural steps by the parties\" and that the court desired the attendance of counsel without regard to the status of the case under Rule 9.\n \n \n 8\n The transcript of the pre-trial proceedings is meagre and somewhat confusing. The pre-trial conference was attended by counsel for the plaintiff and counsel for the defendant. The plaintiff was not present.\n \n \n 9\n The conference was opened with the following statement by the Court:\n \n \n 10\n \"Gentlemen, is there anything more to this case than to submit it on the transcript?\"\n \n \n 11\n Then followed lengthy colloquy between the Court and counsel for the plaintiff, in which counsel for the plaintiff expressed his great reluctance to submit the case on the transcript and repeatedly stated that he questioned that the transcript accurately reflected the record of the proceedings before the Immigration officials and the Board of Immigration Appeals. Following further colloquy between Court and counsel, the Court stated:\n \n \n 12\n \"What you are asking for, as I understand it, is for the Immigration Department to give him another opportunity for voluntary departure?\"\n \n To which counsel replied:\n \n 13\n \"That is correct, your Honor.\"\n \n The Court then stated:\n \n 14\n \"I think that is a matter to be taken up with the Immigration Department and not with this court.\n \n \n 15\n The Immigration Department and not this court should pass upon that matter. It is within their discretion and it is not a matter for this court.\" * * *\n \n \n 16\n Counsel for the plaintiff again questioned the accuracy of the transcript and following a further statement by the Court said:\n \n \n 17\n \"Very well, your Honor, all I can do is submit it.\"\n \n \n 18\n Thereupon the transcript was marked as an exhibit. At this point the clerk of the court inquired:\n \n \n 19\n \"Then this proceeding today is to be considered as a trial?\"\n \n \n 20\n To which the Court replied: \"Hearing on the matter.\" Thereupon the Court stated: \"And it is ordered that petition for review is dismissed.\"\n \n \n 21\n Thereafter findings of fact, conclusions of law and judgment in favor of the defendant were entered.\n \n \n 22\n On this appeal appellant urges that the district court erred in ordering that the pre-trial conference be the trial of the action, and erred in rendering a final judgment against the plaintiff at the time of pre-trial, without notice of trial and the holding of a trial pursuant to statute. On this point appellant argues that the district court cannot summarily, under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Local Court Rules, convert a pre-trial conference into a trial and render a valid final judgment at the time and place noticed and set only for pre-trial conference. In view of our intended disposition of this case, we deem it unnecessary to reach an answer to such contention.\n \n \n 23\n We have previously noted that in his complaint plaintiff alleged that he had made application for voluntary departure and that such application had been denied. Such allegations were denied in defendant's answer. Thus there apparently was created a genuine issue as to material fact. This issue was not disposed of by affidavit, deposition, testimony or admission of the plaintiff. The issue was not mentioned in the findings of fact made by the trial court. No opportunity was afforded to dispose of this issue by proceedings for a summary judgment under the provisions of Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. Discretionary acts of an administrative agency may be reviewed on motions for summary judgment. Miyaki v. Robinson, 7 Cir., 257 F.2d 806, certiorari denied 358 U.S. 894, 79 S. Ct. 155, 3 L. Ed. 2d 120; Aletiou v. Rogers, 103 U.S.App.D.C. 79, 254 F.2d 782. In our view such issue cannot be disposed of by summary dismissal of plaintiff's complaint, whether such summary dismissal occurs at a pre-trial conference or at a regularly noticed trial in the absence of affidavit, deposition, testimony or admission of the plaintiff. See Bowdidge et al. v. Lehman, 6 Cir., 1958, 252 F.2d 366. If the issue is not genuine, Rule 56 affords a summary and expeditious manner of disposing of such issue.\n \n \n 24\n We recognize that the granting or withholding of an application for voluntary departure rests in the sound discretion of the attorney general, United States ex rel. Hintopoulos v. Shaughnessy, 1957, 353 U.S. 72, 77, 77 S. Ct. 618, 1 L. Ed. 2d 652. The action of the Attorney General is subject to court review to determine whether there has been a clear abuse of discretion or a clear failure to exercise discretion. McGrath v. Kristensen, 1950, 340 U.S. 162, 71 S. Ct. 224, 95 L. Ed. 173; United States ex rel. Adel v. Shaughnessy, 2 Cir., 183 F.2d 371.\n \n \n 25\n In the absence of affidavit, deposition, testimony or admission of plaintiff, we are unable to determine the genuineness of the issue raised by the pleadings.\n \n \n 26\n The judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded to the district court for further appropriate proceedings consistent with the views herein expressed.\n \n ", "ocr": false, "opinion_id": 250910 } ]
Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
F
USA, Federal
1,887,565
null
2009-09-09
false
com-v-brooks
Com.
Com. v. Brooks
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
0
Published
null
null
[ "986 A.2d 1249" ]
[ { "author_str": null, "per_curiam": false, "type": "010combined", "page_count": null, "download_url": null, "author_id": null, "opinion_text": "\n986 A.2d 1249 (2009)\nCOM.\nv.\nBROOKS.\nNo. 1830 MDA 2008.\nSuperior Court of Pennsylvania.\nSeptember 9, 2009.\nDismissed.\n", "ocr": false, "opinion_id": 1887565 } ]
Superior Court of Pennsylvania
Superior Court of Pennsylvania
SA
Pennsylvania, PA
2,636,417
null
2008-10-01
false
state-v-jones
Jones
State v. Jones
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
0
Published
null
null
[ "195 P.3d 957" ]
[ { "author_str": null, "per_curiam": false, "type": "010combined", "page_count": null, "download_url": null, "author_id": null, "opinion_text": "\n195 P.3d 957 (2008)\nSTATE\nv.\nJONES.\nNo. 81236-5.\nSupreme Court of Washington, Department I.\nOctober 1, 2008.\nDisposition of petition for review. Granted.\n", "ocr": false, "opinion_id": 2636417 } ]
Washington Supreme Court
Washington Supreme Court
S
Washington, WA
1,085,822
null
2013-10-16
false
barksdale-terrance-v-state
null
Barksdale (Terrance) v. State
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
0
Unpublished
null
null
null
[ { "author_str": null, "per_curiam": false, "type": "010combined", "page_count": 3, "download_url": "http://caseinfo.nvsupremecourt.us/document/view.do?csNameID=31015&csIID=31015&deLinkID=439504&sireDocumentNumber=13-31027", "author_id": null, "opinion_text": "\f court on July 12, 2012, as witnessed by another inmate, but the petition\n was inexplicably never received by the court. Even assuming the truth of\n appellant's assertion, a filing date of July 12, 2012, would still have meant\n the petition was untimely as it was due on June 21, 2012, 366 days after\n the date of entry of the judgment of conviction. 3 The fact that appellant\n allegedly received incorrect advice from an inmate law clerk regarding the\n one-year deadline does not constitute an impediment external to the\n defense for purposes of demonstrating good cause. See Hathaway v. State,\n 119 Nev. 248, 252, 71 P.3d 503, 506 (2003); Phelps v. Director, Prisons, 104\n Nev. 656, 660, 764 P.2d 1303, 1306 (1988).\n Likewise, appellant's claim that his former trial counsel was\n ineffective for failing to advise him of post-conviction remedies did not\n constitute good cause. Former trial counsel did not have a constitutional\n duty to inform appellant about the availability of post-conviction remedies.\n See Hathaway, 119 Nev. at 252, 71 P.3d at 506 (recognizing that good\n cause must be a legal excuse); see also Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063,\n 1066-68 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that equitable tolling was not warranted\n where a petitioner relied on incorrect advice of former counsel because\n petitioner had no right to the assistance of counsel regarding post-\n conviction relief); Pena v. U.S., 534 F.3d 92, 95-96 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding\n that the right to the effective assistance of counsel in a first-tier appeal\n\n\n 3 Theperiod for filing a timely petition was 366 days due to the leap\n year in 2012. See Gonzales v. State, 118 Nev. 590, 593 n.7, 53 P.3d 901,\n 903 n.7 (2002).\n\n\n\n\nSUPREME COURT\n OF\n NEVADA\n 2\n(0) 1947A\n\f does not encompass a requirement that an attorney inform his client of the\n possibility of certiorari review or that the attorney assist the client in\n preparing such a petition); Moore v. Cockrell, 313 F.3d 880, 882 (5th Cir.\n 2002) (holding that the right to counsel ends when the decision by the\n appellate court is entered). Accordingly, we\n ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.\n\n\n\n\n J.\n Hardesty\n\n\n\n\n cc: Hon. Michelle Leavitt, District Judge\n Terrance Michael Barksdale\n Attorney General/Carson City\n Clark County District Attorney\n Eighth District Court Clerk\n\n\n\n\nSUPREME COURT\n OF\n NEVADA\n 3\n(0) 1947A\n\f", "ocr": false, "opinion_id": 1085822 } ]
Nevada Supreme Court
Nevada Supreme Court
S
Nevada, NV
1,357,400
Bird, Richardson
1982-09-02
false
people-v-wickersham
null
People v. Wickersham
The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. DOROTHY SUZANNE WICKERSHAM, Defendant and Appellant
Counsel, Dennis P. Riordan, James Larson and Larson & Weinberg for Defendant and Appellant., George Deukmejian, Attorney General, Robert H. Philibosian, Chief Assistant Attorney General, William D. Stein and Edward P. O’Brien, Assistant Attorneys General, Herbert F. Wilkinson, W. Eric Collins and Dane R. Gillette, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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222
Published
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<docketnumber id="b337-4"> [Crim. No. 22406. </docketnumber><decisiondate id="ARn"> Sept. 2, 1982.] </decisiondate><br><parties id="b337-5"> THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. DOROTHY SUZANNE WICKERSHAM, Defendant and Appellant. </parties><br><attorneys id="b342-5"> <span citation-index="1" class="star-pagination" label="312"> *312 </span> Counsel </attorneys><br><attorneys id="b342-6"> Dennis P. Riordan, James Larson and Larson &amp; Weinberg for Defendant and Appellant. </attorneys><br><attorneys id="b342-7"> George Deukmejian, Attorney General, Robert H. Philibosian, Chief Assistant Attorney General, William D. Stein and Edward P. O’Brien, Assistant Attorneys General, Herbert F. Wilkinson, W. Eric Collins and Dane R. Gillette, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. </attorneys>
[ "650 P.2d 311", "32 Cal. 3d 307", "185 Cal. Rptr. 436" ]
[ { "author_str": null, "per_curiam": false, "type": "010combined", "page_count": null, "download_url": null, "author_id": 3791, "opinion_text": "\n32 Cal. 3d 307 (1982)\n650 P.2d 311\n185 Cal. Rptr. 436\nTHE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,\nv.\nDOROTHY SUZANNE WICKERSHAM, Defendant and Appellant.\nDocket No. Crim. 22406.\nSupreme Court of California.\nSeptember 2, 1982.\n*312 COUNSEL\nDennis P. Riordan, James Larson and Larson &amp; Weinberg for Defendant and Appellant.\nGeorge Deukmejian, Attorney General, Robert H. Philibosian, Chief Assistant Attorney General, William D. Stein and Edward P. O'Brien, Assistant Attorneys General, Herbert F. Wilkinson, W. Eric Collins and Dane R. Gillette, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.\nOPINION\nBIRD, C.J.\nThis case raises several questions concerning a trial court's duty to give instructions sua sponte in criminal cases. What standard should the trial court apply in determining whether to give instructions on necessarily included offenses? Did the evidence in the present case require instructions on voluntary manslaughter and second degree murder? Should the doctrine of \"invited error\" be invoked where the defense counsel has not articulated a deliberate tactical objection to required instructions?\n\nI.\nAppellant was convicted of first degree murder in the shooting death of her husband, Curt, who died on September 8, 1979. (Pen. Code, *313 §§ 187, 189.)[1] The jury also found that appellant had used a firearm within the meaning of section 12022.5.[2]\nShortly after 1:30 p.m. on September 8th, appellant telephoned the Marin County Communications Center to request emergency relief because of \"a terrible accident.\" She then called her priest, Monsignor Keane, and asked him to come to the house. The Novato Police Department was contacted and informed that an accident had occurred at her home.\nPolice Sergeant Gary Barner was the first officer to arrive at the scene. He found a group of about 20 to 30 people standing in the street in front of appellant's home. Appellant, \"who appeared... to be hysterical,\" approached him. \"She was yelling hysterically.... [S]he said that her husband was in the house and had been shot.\" In response to the officer's question, appellant stated that she had done the shooting. She also told him that her husband was in the bedroom and the gun was at a neighbor's house.\nOfficer Michael Funk arrived and stayed with appellant while Sergeant Barner began to search the house. As he started up the stairs to the second floor, he saw appellant's husband's body near the wrought iron railing on the landing above. Barner determined that Curt was dead.\nTwo paramedics arrived soon after Officer Funk. Robert Weber, one of the paramedics, testified that the body was lying face down and the head and arms were protruding through the railing. When the body was turned over and the shirt collar removed, Weber noticed a bullet hole above the right breast.\nOfficer Lance McHenry arrived at the same time as the paramedics. McHenry had met appellant two months earlier when she sought police protection because of alleged threats made by Curt.\nOfficer McHenry testified that on September 8th, appellant \"ran up to me in a hysterical-type condition\" and made several statements. Some of the comments were unintelligible because of her condition. She did state that her husband had been depressed, that the shooting was an *314 accident, and that things had been going well for them. She asked several times how her husband was. At one point she told McHenry, \"He went crazy, you know. I've told you before. He pulled the hammer back. We were in the bedroom. He was so depressed. He had been with the kids all day.\" At that point, appellant became hysterical again.\nMcHenry asked if anyone knew the location of the gun. Appellant pointed to a neighbor's house and said, \"It's in there.\" She walked over to the neighbor's garage, pointed toward the back, and said, \"I put it up there away from the kids.\" McHenry could see the gun on top of a hot-water heater.\nUpon returning to the street in front of her house, appellant stated, \"He was depressed. He went crazy and started towards me. His hand went into his pocket. And I know he carries a gun there. And then he pulled the hammer back.\" She became hysterical again and then stated, \"It was an accident. I didn't have any malice.\"\nAppellant asked McHenry if he thought she needed an attorney. He stated that she could call one if she wished. Sergeant Barner, returning from the house, advised McHenry that it would be best to take appellant to the police station. McHenry asked appellant if she wanted to go to the station with him. She agreed.\nOn the way to the station, appellant again asked if she needed an attorney. McHenry told her that she could call one. She then asked if she could stop by a church to pray. McHenry allowed her to do so.\nOnce at the station, appellant was brought into the employee lounge. When she asked to use the bathroom, McHenry told her that a female clerk would accompany her and that she could not wash her hands because a test would be performed on them. Appellant stated, \"You know I fired the gun. I told you.\" Appellant also stated, \"I didn't mean to hurt him.\" Again, appellant asked if she needed an attorney and was told that she could call one. Instead, she called to find out if her children were all right.\nJanice Arnheiter, a friend of appellant, was then brought in to see her. Appellant told Arnheiter, \"He was depressed. The gun was on the shelf and he went crazy when he saw it. He reached for it and I grabbed it. He pulled the hammer back and it went off. I was holding the gun. My finger was, you know, where it went off.\"\n*315 Appellant was then taken to an interview room by Officer McHenry and Lynne Wald, senior clerk at the police station. She was advised of her Miranda[3] rights. Appellant stated that she had kept the gun in the closet because it was the easiest place to get to if someone broke in. At one point, she stated that she did know how to use the gun, but later she stated that Curt had taught her how to shoot another weapon many years before. When informed that Curt had died, appellant asked to use the phone to break a tennis date for the following day.\nBack at the house, the officers searched the premises for additional bullets, but did not find any. At the top of the stairs, near the bedroom, the officers found a blue shirt wadded up in the corner against the wall.\nIn a closet in the bedroom, two boxes were found, one for a revolver and one for ammunition. The boxes were barely visible behind hats and shoe boxes. Five bullets were missing from the box of ammunition.\nErvin Jindrich, the county coroner, performed the autopsy. The cause of death was determined to be a gunshot wound. Jindrich stated that the bullet entered the right chest at a point approximately five inches to the right of the midline of the body. The bullet traversed the right thoracic cavity, the space in which the lung is confined, on a generally horizontal plane. The bullet went slightly from right to left within the body. Jindrich was unable to determine the distance of the gun from the body because no powder residue was found on the skin. He further stated that Curt could have been bent over at the time of the shooting.\nWilliam Corazza, a criminalist with the California Department of Justice, examined the blue shirt and the weapon recovered from the neighbor's garage. The shirt contained bullet holes and smoke and powder residues, consistent with a bullet passing through the shirt at close range. According to the criminalist's best calculations, \"the shirt was somewhat bunched above the weapon. It was not wrapped tightly around it....\"\nRegarding the weapon, Corazza noted that the cylinder has a five-bullet capacity. Two circles of smoke residue around the opening of the chambers in the cylinder indicated that the weapon had been fired two times since its last cleaning. Corazza explained that the weapon could *316 operate in both single and double action. In double action, it is necessary only to pull the trigger to fire the weapon. In single action, the hammer must be pulled back first, then the trigger pulled. The weapon was operable and could not accidently discharge by jarring.\nCorazza stated that it would be possible to push the hammer back while facing the gun. With the gun operating in single action, only five pounds of pressure on the trigger was required to fire the weapon once the hammer was pulled back. Corazza also testified that the weapon contained two expended rounds and three live rounds, one of which was at the top of the cylinder underneath the hammer. In order to reach this configuration, it was his opinion that the weapon must have been fired twice; then, either the weapon was cocked and the hammer let down gently or it was partially cocked and the cylinder was rotated manually.\nThe prosecution claimed that the shooting was premeditated and deliberate murder. It alleged that appellant killed her husband because of jealousy and for financial gain.\nAppellant and her husband lived in Novato and had five children. Curt worked as an investigator for the United States Customs Service. His work caused him to be away from the home quite often. Appellant had asked him to change jobs so that he could spend more time at home. When this did not happen, appellant asked Curt to move out of the house. He did so on February 12, 1979, and moved in with Frank Orrantia, another customs investigator.\nAppellant filed a petition for dissolution of marriage on February 21, 1979. Soon thereafter, she contacted Attorney Richard Barry and asked him to draw up a marital settlement agreement to which she and Curt had agreed. Under the agreement, appellant received the house and its furnishings, one of their two cars, and the proceeds from the sale of the other car to pay certain debts. Curt was to receive the entire interest in federal Civil Service retirement benefits. In addition, the children would be named beneficiaries of his government life insurance policy. Curt would be obligated to pay $325 a month spousal support and $875 per month child support.\nBarry told appellant that, in the event of her husband's death, her spousal support would cease. He also told her that she was giving up all claim to Curt's retirement benefits and that these benefits might be worth more than her property under the agreement. Some time before *317 the end of August, Barry's office received a message from appellant not to file the final judgment because she was going to have surgery and wanted the medical expenses covered by Curt's employment benefits. No final judgment was entered.\nAppellant also spoke with Barry about obtaining a restraining order against her husband. She told Barry that she was afraid of her husband and he was very volatile. Although he had never hurt her, she said that he always seemed to be just on the verge of striking her. She also stated that she was afraid he would take the children and disappear with them. Appellant further stated that Curt sometimes wore a gun at the house.\nMarguerite Banks, a United States Customs personnel staffing specialist, testified that Curt had a $43,000 life insurance policy with a double indemnity clause for accidental death. As a matter of course, the beneficiaries of the policy were appellant and the children. As of September 8, 1979, the policy would pay a monthly annuity to appellant of $685 and yearly benefits of $864 for each child. On October 8, 1979, one month after the shooting, claim forms were filed on appellant's behalf under the policy. An attorney presented the forms along with a letter explaining that the claim was for the children's benefits. The attorney enclosed a copy of the marital settlement agreement.\nAfter Curt moved out of the Novato home, he began dating Mary Ann Steinbeck. Sometime around May, they began living together. According to Steinbeck, Curt was relieved when the divorce proceedings started. He was expecting to get a promotion and a new job in Washington, D.C. and Steinbeck testified that she was planning to move with him. She denied she ever saw him wear a gun and stated that on September 8, he was wearing tight pants and was not carrying a gun.\nSeveral witnesses testified that appellant made frantic efforts to meet Steinbeck. Richard Warner, a customs criminal investigator, testified that appellant questioned him about Steinbeck's background and where she worked. He further stated that Curt seemed happy and was looking forward to his transfer to Washington.\nMarie Mouchka, a friend of appellant, testified that appellant was trying desperately to find Steinbeck. Appellant called Mouchka many times to report on the progress of her search. Once appellant stated that *318 she was going to go to Fresno because she had heard that Steinbeck worked there. On different occasions, appellant had the operator interrupt Mouchka's phone conversations with emergency messages. When appellant got on the line, she would relay some information about the divorce proceedings or her finances.\nFrank Orrantia, a colleague of Curt, also reported numerous conversations with appellant. He testified that appellant told him several times that Curt appeared depressed and that she was afraid he might commit suicide. She also asked him about Steinbeck. On May 14, Orrantia's phone conversation with his ex-wife was interrupted by the operator who stated that appellant wanted to talk to him because of an emergency. Appellant told Orrantia that Curt had threatened her and that she had called the police. Orrantia spoke with Curt and then called appellant. He told her that he did not think Curt had threatened her. At that point, appellant appeared to get upset with him and said that Curt had made threats in the past.\nOn July 10th, appellant called the Novato Police Department to request an officer. Officer McHenry responded. Appellant told him that Curt had been threatening her since the separation and that he had called her several times drunk or enraged. She stated that on one occasion Curt had taken a gun out of his pocket and exposed it in a threatening manner. Since Curt was coming over later that day, she wanted an officer present. McHenry advised her to keep the doors locked and said that if Curt came, she could call the police department and an officer would be sent to her home. Appellant also asked the officer if she should purchase a gun. He advised her not to, especially if she did not know how to use one.\nOn Mother's Day, appellant called Ms. Mouchka, who worked as a nurse at the Suicide Prevention Center. According to Mouchka, appellant said that Curt had ruined the day by coming late for dinner. He was still at the house and appellant wanted to know how many Valiums it would take to harm someone. Mouchka laughingly said, \"My God, Suzanna, you're going to kill him.\" Appellant replied, \"No. I just want to give him enough for him to tell me the truth who that woman is.\" When appellant said that she was crushing the Valiums in wine, Mouchka told her that was a lethal combination. Appellant responded, \"Oh, don't be overly dramatic.\" Appellant called back later to say that Curt had refused the wine because it tasted bitter.\n*319 Mouchka also reported a conversation with appellant which she thought took place in August. To Mouchka's comment that appellant had to face the fact that the divorce was going forward, appellant replied that Curt wanted to pick up the final divorce papers but he was not going to. Appellant stated that she was not going to be divorced.\nJoe Stavish, a carpenter, was hired to do some work on appellant's house in May. He stated that he became sexually involved with her a few weeks after he was hired. The relationship lasted for several weeks. Stavish testified that he had about six conversations with appellant about killing her husband. He stated that she offered him $5,000 to kill Curt. Appellant suggested various means of accomplishing the task, including shooting him in an underground garage while he was at work in Hawaii. Appellant allegedly stated that she would get more money if Curt were killed while on duty. Stavish rejected her offer and demanded $10,000, which she said was too much. He also pointed out to her better ways of killing Curt than she had suggested. Stavish finally got tired of hearing her talk about the subject and told her to stop the conversations. Appellant replied that she would kill Curt herself. Stavish advised her to stand close to Curt and fire the weapon quickly.\nStavish also reported that appellant told him about the Valium incident. She said that she had put Valium in Curt's wine either to try to kill him or to put him to sleep. He could not recall which of these motives she had expressed.\nAccording to Stavish's trial testimony, he came by appellant's home on September 2d, to see if she had finished a particular project. She told him that Curt was such a miserable person that she would be doing him a favor to put him out of his misery. Stavish conceded that he had not mentioned this statement at the preliminary hearing.\nStavish testified that he had talked to appellant about his plans for killing his father when he was younger. From the age of 14 to 17, Stavish seriously contemplated killing his father by various means. Stavish also stated that during about half of his conversations with appellant he was under the influence of marijuana or liquor. He stated that he participated in the conversations to allow appellant to let off steam. He thought that she was fantasizing. As for her demeanor, \"[s]he'd get really upset and then she'd freeze and get like in a catatonic state where she'd be like motionless, but obviously very, very upset.... She *320 couldn't talk. And she'd get really upset. Her voice would just choke off completely.\"\nPaulette Baccioco met appellant in 1978 at Dominican College. Appellant complained to Baccioco about her financial problems after her separation from Curt. According to Baccioco, appellant refused to get a job and stated to Baccioco that if she killed her husband, her financial problems would be solved. From March through June, appellant discussed killing Curt \"frequently.\" Appellant mentioned that she would receive a little less than $100,000 from the insurance coverage if Curt died.\nBaccioco also testified about a telephone call from appellant in which she stated that she was trying to give Curt the wine with Valium. She asked Baccioco how she could get Curt to drink it. Baccioco refused to help.\nFinally, appellant told Baccioco that Stavish would not help her kill Curt. According to the witness, appellant stated, \"You are so bright, you can help me figure out a way to kill my husband.\" On cross-examination, Baccioco admitted that she had forgotten about these conversations until reminded after Curt's death by a friend to whom she had repeated the discussions.\nPat Libby testified that the day before the shooting appellant said Curt was coming over to the house the next day. According to Libby, appellant told her \"that if she got through tomorrow, everything would be okay.\" After Curt died, appellant told Libby that Curt's death was probably for the best because he had stopped seeing the children while he was alive.\nRae Ellen Mercer, a marriage counselor, saw the Wickershams singly and together on several occasions from March to June. Appellant told Mercer that she did not want a divorce and wanted Curt to come back. She also told Mercer about an incident in which she found a gun in Curt's car. She stated that she did not know what she meant to do when she had the gun in her hand. According to Mercer, appellant was emotional, occasionally hysterical.\nAnna Satenstein performed a \"spiritual reading\" for appellant on April 21st. Appellant returned on April 30th when Curt was meeting *321 with Mercer and asked Satenstein to tell her what was occurring at that meeting. Satenstein refused.\nAppellant testified in her own defense. She said that Curt occasionally carried a gun in his waistband if he was called out at night. Although Curt had never hit her, she thought he had the potential to do so, based on violent acts he had performed as a police officer during the Watts riots and as a soldier in Korea. Appellant denied trying to locate Steinbeck. She further stated that she knew she had waived all rights to Curt's insurance and retirement benefits. She stated that she had not asked her attorney to delay the dissolution proceedings. She denied making the various threatening statements related by Stavish, Baccioco, and Mouchka and the postmortem statement related by Libby. Regarding Stavish, she said that he had first brought up the subject of killing Curt by offering to do it for $10,000. Appellant rejected the suggestion immediately. She also stated that Stavish had stolen lumber from her.\nAppellant claimed that she had put only five milligrams of Valium in Curt's wine and did so simply to calm him down when he was upset. Concerning the incident involving the gun in the glove compartment, appellant testified that she had opened the glove compartment to take out some maps and a first-aid kit. The gun was on top of those items and had to be removed in order to retrieve them. When Curt, who was approaching the driver's side of the car, saw the gun, he became scared and acted \"erratic.\" According to appellant, Curt attempted to \"struggle with that gun.\" Appellant told him that he should not have a gun in the car with the children present.\nAppellant testified about another incident in which her car twice ran into Curt's, once from the rear and once from the front. She ascribed the incident to inattention, although she admitted being frustrated and upset that day because she had told him to collect his things and leave for good. This was the last time she saw him before September 8th.\nOn July 5, 1979, appellant purchased the weapon which was involved in the shooting. She testified that she bought the gun to protect her home and that there had always been a gun in the house for protection.\nConcerning the day of the shooting, appellant stated that Curt came to the house about 10:30 a.m. They were on friendly terms, and Curt made some minor house repairs before taking the children to lunch. Appellant began gathering Curt's things for him. When Curt came back, *322 they began to pack some of his shirts which were in a closet in which the gun was kept. When appellant began removing Curt's shirts from the closet, he saw the gun and asked, \"What's that gun?\" with a \"slight bit of alarm in his voice.\" Appellant answered, \"It's mine.\" With her back to Curt, appellant \"sensed he was moving towards me.\" Afraid that he would take the gun, she scooped the weapon up with five or six shirts. When she turned back, Curt reached to get the gun. There was a short scuffle and the gun went off. After the shot, Curt reached behind him. Thinking that he had a gun, appellant left the room and took her son, who was standing in the doorway. She did not return to the room, but placed the gun in the neighbor's garage and made the emergency phone calls. Appellant denied intending to fire the weapon or to kill her husband.\nJanice Arnheiter, who had hired Stavish to do carpentry work, testified that he was not believable. In addition, he told her that he had discussed his testimony with Baccioco.\nVarious witnesses testified concerning appellant's reputation for honesty and nonviolence. These witnesses included a San Francisco police captain, her priest, and her psychiatrist.\nBefore final argument to the jury, the court discussed the instructions with both counsel. The discussion was as follows:\n\"THE COURT: [CALJIC No. 5.00] was requested concerning excusable homicide, lawful act. I believe the District Attorney asked for that.\n\"You have no objection to that, I assume?\n\"[Defense Counsel]: No, I do not.\n\"THE COURT: And, last, the Defendant did request the lesser-included instructions, particularly 17.10, the introductory, and the involuntary manslaughter instructions, 8.45, 8.46, and 3.32.\n\"Is that what your request is?\n\"[Defense Counsel]: Yes, your Honor.\n\"THE COURT: I'll also give the jury the instruction concerning the use of a firearm.\n*323 \"[Defense Counsel]: The Defendant does object to that on the ground that it's, with respect to first-degree murder, it's immaterial. A finding is ineffective.\n\"And, secondly, with respect to the crime of involuntary manslaughter, by its very definition, the crime would exclude use of a gun in the sense of using a gun instead of accidentally firing it.\n\"THE COURT: Okay. I'll give 17.19, the use instruction, nevertheless, together with a verdict form for the jury in the event they find the Defendant guilty of either murder or involuntary manslaughter.\n\"I'll give them the verdict form for the use of the firearm over the Defendant's objection.\"\nThe court thereupon instructed the jury on excusable homicide (CALJIC No. 5.00), the definitions of murder (CALJIC No. 8.10 (1979 rev.)) and malice aforethought (CALJIC No. 8.11 (1979 rev.)), first degree premeditated and deliberate murder (CALJIC No. 8.20 (1979 rev.)), and involuntary manslaughter as a necessarily included offense (CALJIC Nos. 17.10, 8.45 (1979 rev.), 8.46, 3.32, 8.74 (1976 rev.), and 8.72).\n\nII.\nAppellant contends that the trial court erred in not instructing sua sponte on second degree murder and voluntary manslaughter.\nThe trial court functions both as a neutral arbiter between two contesting parties and as the jury's guide to the law. This role requires that the court fully instruct the jury on the law applicable to each particular case. (1) \"`It is settled that in criminal cases, even in the absence of a request, the trial court must instruct on the general principles of law relevant to the issues raised by the evidence. [Citations.] The general principles of law governing the case are those principles closely and openly connected with the facts before the court, and which are necessary for the jury's understanding of the case.' (People v. St. Martin (1970) 1 Cal. 3d 524, 531 [83 Cal. Rptr. 166, 463 P.2d 390].) That obligation has been held to include giving instructions on lesser included offenses when the evidence raises a question as to whether all of the elements of the charged offense were present (see, e.g., People v. Hood (1969) 1 Cal. 3d 444 [82 Cal. Rptr. 618, 462 P.2d 370]), but not when *324 there is no evidence that the offense was less than that charged. (People v. Noah (1971) 5 Cal. 3d 469, 479 [96 Cal. Rptr. 441, 487 P.2d 1009]; People v. Osuna (1969) 70 Cal. 2d 759, 767 [76 Cal. Rptr. 462, 452 P.2d 678].)\" (People v. Sedeno (1974) 10 Cal. 3d 703, 715-716 [112 Cal. Rptr. 1, 518 P.2d 913].)\nThe fulfillment of this obligation ensures that the jury will consider the full range of possible verdicts — not limited by the strategy, ignorance, or mistakes of the parties. The jury should not be constrained by the fact that the prosecution and defense have chosen to focus on certain theories. \"Just as the People have no legitimate interest in obtaining a conviction of a greater offense than that established by the evidence, a defendant has no right to an acquittal when that evidence is sufficient to establish a lesser included offense. (People v. St. Martin, supra, 1 Cal. 3d 524, 533.)\" (Sedeno, supra, 10 Cal.3d at p. 716.) Furthermore, where counsel is not aware of alternative verdicts or incorrectly believes them to be irrelevant to the case, the trial court's action will avoid an unwarranted all-or-nothing choice for the jury and will ensure that the verdict is no harsher or more lenient than the evidence merits. These policies reflect concern both for the rights of persons accused of crimes and for the overall administration of justice.\nIn Sedeno, supra, 10 Cal.3d at page 716, this court stated that the trial court was obligated to instruct on necessarily included offenses and to give requested instructions \"whenever there is `any evidence deserving of any consideration whatsoever....'\" (Citing People v. Carmen (1951) 36 Cal. 2d 768, 773 [228 P.2d 281].) In People v. Flannel (1979) 25 Cal. 3d 668, 684-685, footnote 12 [160 Cal. Rptr. 84, 603 P.2d 1], the lead opinion disapproved the suggestion that \"jury instructions must be given whenever any evidence is presented, no matter how weak\" in the context of requested instructions on diminished capacity. (Italics in original.) The lead opinion stated that the court need only give the instruction if the accused proffers evidence sufficient to \"deserve consideration by the jury, i.e., `evidence from which a jury composed of reasonable men could have concluded'\" that the particular facts underlying the instruction did exist. (At p. 684, quoting from People v. Carr (1972) 8 Cal. 3d 287, 294 [104 Cal. Rptr. 705, 502 P.2d 513].)\nThis does not require — or permit — the trial court to determine the credibility of witnesses. It simply frees the court from any obligation to present theories to the jury which the jury could not reasonably find to *325 exist. Thus, in Flannel, the mere fact that the accused had \"consumed relatively small amounts of alcohol over a long period of time\" (25 Cal.3d at p. 685) did not warrant giving an instruction on diminished capacity.\nFlannel did not directly discuss the standard to be utilized in determining when the court has a duty to instruct sua sponte on necessarily included offenses. However, logic would seem to require that the same standard should generally apply.[4] (2) The trial court is not obligated to instruct sua sponte on necessarily included offenses unless the evidence would justify a conviction of such offenses. (See People v. Ramos (1982) 30 Cal. 3d 553, 582 [180 Cal. Rptr. 266, 639 P.2d 908].) This rule ensures that the jury's attention is properly focused on the relevant legal theories.\nIn Sedeno, this court distinguished voluntary manslaughter due to heat of passion from other necessarily included offenses for purposes of the duty to instruct sua sponte. (3) Normally, an intentional killing is at least second degree murder, but such a killing is voluntary manslaughter if \"shown to have been committed in a heat of passion upon sufficient provocation.... [¶] However, unless it appears from the prosecution's case that the killing was committed in the heat of passion and upon sufficient provocation the burden is on the defendant to raise a reasonable doubt in the minds of the jurors that malice was present. [Citation.]\" (10 Cal.3d at p. 719.) Therefore, \"[b]efore a court must instruct sua sponte on voluntary manslaughter in the heat of passion as a lesser offense included within murder there must be either some evidence that heat of passion was present at the time of the killing or some reason for the court to know that the defendant is relying on that theory of manslaughter as a defense.\" (Ibid.)\nThis standard is compatible with that promulgated in Flannel. (4) The trial court need not instruct sua sponte on voluntary manslaughter due to heat of passion unless there is evidence sufficient to \"deserve consideration by the jury, i.e., `evidence from which a jury composed of reasonable men could have concluded'\" that the accused acted intentionally but without malice. (Flannel, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 684.) Once there is sufficient evidence to warrant this conclusion, the trial court is obligated to instruct on the theory.\n*326 Regarding defenses, Sedeno held that \"the duty to give instructions, sua sponte, on particular defenses and their relevance to the charged offense arises only if it appears that the defendant is relying on such a defense, or if there is substantial evidence supportive of such a defense and the defense is not inconsistent with the defendant's theory of the case. Indeed, this limitation on the duty of the trial court is necessary not only because it would be unduly burdensome to require more of trial judges, but also because of the potential prejudice to defendants if instructions were given on defenses inconsistent with the theory relied upon.\" (Sedeno, supra, 10 Cal.3d at p. 716.)\nHaving delineated the applicable standards, this court must next decide whether the evidence at trial required sua sponte instructions on second degree murder and voluntary manslaughter. These crimes, of course, are offenses necessarily included within first degree murder.\n(5a) Appellant advances two possible theories of voluntary manslaughter — heat of passion and unreasonable self-defense. (6) In People v. Berry (1976) 18 Cal. 3d 509, 515 [134 Cal. Rptr. 415, 556 P.2d 777], this court quoted People v. Valentine (1946) 28 Cal. 2d 121, 139 [169 P.2d 1] regarding the appropriate instructions to be given the jury upon a claim of voluntary manslaughter due to heat of passion: \"`The jury is ... to be admonished and advised by the court that this heat of passion must be such a passion as would naturally be aroused in the mind of an ordinarily reasonable person under the given facts and circumstances, and that, consequently, no defendant may set up his own standard of conduct and justify or excuse himself because in fact his passions were aroused, unless further the jury believe that the facts and circumstances were sufficient to arouse the passions of the ordinarily reasonable man.... For the fundamental of the inquiry is whether or not the defendant's reason was, at the time of his act, so disturbed or obscured by some passion — not necessarily fear and never, of course, the passion for revenge — to such an extent as would render ordinary men of average disposition liable to act rashly or without due deliberation and reflection, and from this passion rather than from judgment.'\"\n(7) To satisfy the objective or \"reasonable person\" element of this form of voluntary manslaughter, the accused's heat of passion must be due to \"sufficient provocation.\" (Sedeno, supra, 10 Cal.3d at p. 719.) However, as this court stated in Berry, \"there is no specific type of provocation required by section 192[[5]] and ... verbal provocation may be sufficient.\" (18 Cal.3d at p. 515.)\n*327 The subjective element requires that the actor be under the actual influence of a strong passion at the time of the homicide. \"In People v. Borchers (1958) 50 Cal. 2d 321, 329 [325 P.2d 97] in the course of explaining the phrase `heat of passion' used in the statute defining manslaughter we pointed out that `passion' need not mean `rage' or `anger' but may be any `[v]iolent, intense, high-wrought or enthusiastic emotion' and concluded there `that defendant was aroused to a heat of \"passion\" by a series of events over a considerable period of time....' (50 Cal.2d at p. 328, 329.)\" (Berry, supra, 18 Cal.3d at p. 515.) However, if sufficient time has elapsed between the provocation and the fatal blow for passion to subside and reason to return, the killing is not voluntary manslaughter — \"the assailant must act under the smart of that sudden quarrel or heat of passion.\" (CALJIC No. 8.42 (1979 rev.).)\n(5b) In the present case, there is certainly substantial evidence of intense emotion. Two police officers who observed appellant shortly after the shooting described her as \"hysterical.\" Many of her statements at that time were unintelligible. In addition, several witnesses testified that appellant was very distraught over Curt's involvement with Mary Ann Steinbeck.\nHowever, there is virtually no evidence of provocation, even under a view of the evidence most favorable to appellant. Appellant testified that she and Curt were in the bedroom for approximately 10 minutes before the fatal incident. They were getting his things together, going through old photographs, and reminiscing. She described him as \"very nostalgic.\" The last thing he asked her was, \"Do you think there's any hope we'd ever get back together?\" She answered, \"No.\"\nThe only possible source of provocation was the victim's grabbing of the gun. Appellant testified that she struggled with Curt for possession of the gun and implied that she was afraid he would use the gun if he obtained possession. Given the background of reported threats by the victim, the jury could have found that a reasonable person in appellant's position, faced with an attack of this nature, would have been overcome by fear and acted to repel the attacker.\nThis theory of voluntary manslaughter, however, would meet all the requirements of reasonable self-defense. The Legislature has deemed such self-defense to be justifiable homicide rather than voluntary manslaughter. (§ 197.) Hence, a trial court should not instruct on heat-of-passion *328 voluntary manslaughter where the same facts would give rise to a finding of reasonable self-defense.[6] (See Flannel, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 678; People v. Mitchell (1939) 14 Cal. 2d 237, 241-242 [93 P.2d 121]; People v. Manzo (1937) 9 Cal. 2d 594, 598-599 [72 P.2d 119].)\nWhether or not the evidence warranted an instruction on heat of passion, the alternative theory of unreasonable self-defense was certainly raised by the facts. (8) \"An honest but unreasonable belief that it is necessary to defend oneself from imminent peril to life or great bodily injury negates malice aforethought, the mental element necessary for murder, so that the chargeable offense is reduced to manslaughter.\" (People v. Flannel, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 674, italics omitted.) (5c) Based on appellant's testimony, the jury could have found that (1) she picked up the gun only after her husband had noticed it and because she divined that he was coming over to take it; (2) he grabbed for the gun and attempted to take it from her; (3) she recalled at that moment a previous incident in which he had fought her for possession of a gun. Other evidence established that appellant had reported threats on her life made by her husband. Furthermore, certain of appellant's statements following the shooting lend support to this theory.[7] Given these facts, the jury could have found that appellant honestly believed that her life was in danger and had acted in accordance with that belief.\nThis scenario is consistent with appellant's testimony except for the cause of the gun being fired. The \"unreasonable self-defense\" type of voluntary manslaughter is premised on an intentional killing, whereas appellant testified that the gun went off by accident in the midst of the struggle. This, however, does not preclude a jury determination that in fact appellant pulled the trigger out of fear. The jury was entitled to reject that portion of appellant's testimony which sought to explain the shooting as an accident and still find that appellant had not acted with malice. (See People v. Shavers (1969) 269 Cal. App. 2d 886, 889 [75 Cal. Rptr. 334].)\nHence, the evidence was sufficient to justify a finding of unreasonable self-defense and the trial court would have erred had it denied a request for instructions on this theory. (See People v. Dewberry (1959) *329 51 Cal. 2d 548, 557 [334 P.2d 852].) However, unreasonable self-defense comes within Sedeno's category of \"defenses\" for purposes of the obligation to instruct sua sponte. As noted above, the trial court need only instruct on a particular defense \"if it appears that the defendant is relying on such a defense, or if there is substantial evidence supportive of such a defense and the defense is not inconsistent with the defendant's theory of the case.\" (Sedeno, supra, 10 Cal.3d at p. 716.)\nIn the present case, appellant testified that the shooting was an accident and that she did not intend to kill her husband. It is clear from the record that appellant was not relying on unreasonable self-defense and that this theory was inconsistent with her proffered defense. Thus, the trial court was under no obligation to instruct on unreasonable self-defense in the absence of a specific request by counsel. (See Sedeno, supra, 10 Cal.3d at pp. 717-718.)\n(9a) Appellant further argues that instructions on second degree murder should have been given. (10) \"[T]he existence of provocation which is not `adequate' to reduce the class of the offense [from murder to manslaughter] may nevertheless raise a reasonable doubt that the defendant formed the intent to kill upon, and carried it out after, deliberation and premeditation.\" (People v. Valentine, supra, 28 Cal.2d at p. 132; see also CALJIC No. 8.73 (1979) rev.).) Thus, where the evidence of provocation would justify a jury determination that the accused had formed the intent to kill as a direct response to the provocation and had acted immediately, the trial court is required to give instructions on second degree murder under this theory. The fact that heated words were exchanged or a physical struggle took place between the victim and the accused before the fatality may be sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt in the minds of the jurors regarding whether the accused planned the killing in advance.\n(9b) In the present case, there was such evidence. The jury could have found that appellant did not form the intent to kill her husband until after he had mentioned the gun, come toward her, and tried to grab it from her. Even if the jury found that there was not sufficient provocation to warrant a lethal response and that appellant was not truly in fear for her life, the jury could have concluded that these activities affected her decision to kill Curt and that she had not premeditated or deliberated.\n*330 Indeed, an instruction on second degree murder would have been required even in the absence of appellant's testimony regarding Curt's behavior. Although the evidence was sufficient to justify a finding of deliberation and premeditation, such a finding was not compelled. The jury could have found that appellant did not premeditate but rather acted upon a \"sudden and unconsidered impulse[].\" (People v. Fields (1950) 99 Cal. App. 2d 10, 13 [221 P.2d 190].) Hence, even if the jury rejected her testimony, that rejection did not require a conviction for first degree murder. Unlike certain felony-murder situations (see § 189), this is not a case in which appellant was either guilty of first degree murder or innocent of any charge.\nThus, the trial court erred in not instructing sua sponte on second degree murder. There was sufficient evidence to warrant jury consideration of this alternative verdict.\n(11a) Respondent contends that any error in this regard was invited by defense counsel. It is argued that, even if the trial court was required by the evidence to give instructions on necessarily included offenses, reversal is not required because \"defense counsel, intentionally, and for tactical purposes, chose to limit the lesser included offenses to involuntary manslaughter.\"\nThe doctrine of invited error is designed to prevent an accused from gaining a reversal on appeal because of an error made by the trial court at his behest. If defense counsel intentionally caused the trial court to err, the appellant cannot be heard to complain on appeal. (12) (See fn. 8.) However, because the trial court is charged with instructing the jury correctly,[8] it must be clear from the record that defense counsel made an express objection to the relevant instructions. In addition, because important rights of the accused are at stake, it also must be clear that counsel acted for tactical reasons and not out of ignorance or mistake.\nThe seminal case concerning invited error is People v. Graham (1969) 71 Cal. 2d 303 [78 Cal. Rptr. 217, 455 P.2d 153]. There, this court found error in the trial court's failure to instruct on voluntary and involuntary manslaughter due to diminished capacity.[9]\n*331 The Attorney General argued in that case that any error in the homicide instructions was invited by counsel. As the Graham opinion relates, \"The trial court formulated many instructions `on the record.' At one point the court inquired whether a combination of its proposed homicide instructions satisfied the attorneys. The court said, `As I understand, everyone agrees that there is no evidence from which involuntary manslaughter could be found; the only type of manslaughter that could be found here would be voluntary.' The court read its proposed voluntary manslaughter instruction. It then stated, `That combination of instructions would probably instruct the jury as to the law that's....' All three defense counsel interrupted the judge and stated, `That's agreeable.'\" (Id., at p. 317.)\nThis court noted that the question posed was whether \"the trial court's affirmative duty to instruct the jury on its own motion on the general principles of law relevant to the issues of the case can be nullified by waiver of defense counsel.\" (Id., at pp. 317-318.) In People v. Phillips (1966) 64 Cal. 2d 574 [51 Cal. Rptr. 225, 414 P.2d 353], the court had found such \"invited error\" where defense counsel strongly opposed certain instructions for specific tactical reasons. (Id., at pp. 580-581, fn. 4.) According to Graham, the rule derived from Phillips is \"that the court's responsibility could be negated only in that special situation in which the defense counsel deliberately and expressly, as a matter of trial tactics, objected to the rendition of an instruction.\" (Graham, supra, 71 Cal.2d at p. 318.)\nSuch a rule, Graham stated, was required by statutes concerning the scope of appellate review of instructions. Former sections 1259 and 1469 both provided that \"`an appellate court may review an instruction given, refused or modified, even though no objection was made thereto in the lower court, if the substantial rights of the defendant were affected thereby.'\"[10] (Graham, supra, 71 Cal.2d at p. 319.)\n(13) This rule is necessary to ensure that an accused's right to complete instructions is fully protected. \"As the court forcefully stated in *332 People v. Keelin (1955) 136 Cal. App. 2d 860, 874 [289 P.2d 520, 56 A.L.R. 2d 355], `Nevertheless, error is nonetheless error and is no less operative on deliberations of the jury because the erroneous instruction may have been requested by counsel for the defense. After all, it is the life and liberty of the defendant in a case such as this that is at hazard in the trial and there is a continuing duty upon the part of the trial court to see to it that the jury are properly instructed upon all matters pertinent to their decision of the cause.' Accordingly, if defense counsel suggests or accedes to the erroneous instruction because of neglect or mistake we do not find `invited error'; only if counsel expresses a deliberate tactical purpose in suggesting, resisting, or acceding to an instruction, do we deem it to nullify the trial court's obligation to instruct in the cause.\" (Id., at p. 319.)\nThe Graham court found no invited error regarding the omitted manslaughter instructions. Counsel never expressed a tactical objection to an instruction on involuntary manslaughter. Rather, the record indicated a strategy of offering the jury as many different verdicts as possible. (Id., at p. 320.) Counsel's acceptance of an instruction on voluntary manslaughter which did not refer explicitly to diminished capacity \"could not have been\" invited. (Id., at p. 321.) In any event, the trial court went on to instruct on the statutory definition of voluntary manslaughter, thus implicitly removing consideration of the defense of diminished capacity from the jury. (Id., at pp. 321-322.)\nIn People v. Mosher (1969) 1 Cal. 3d 379 [82 Cal. Rptr. 379, 461 P.2d 659], a trial court again failed to give certain required instructions on voluntary manslaughter and involuntary manslaughter due to diminished capacity. This court found there was no invited error, since \"[d]efense counsel did not express a deliberate tactical purpose in suggesting, resisting, or acceding to the erroneous instruction. [Citation.]\" (Id., at p. 393.)\nEven where counsel has suggested an erroneous instruction, the doctrine of invited error is not invoked unless counsel articulated a tactical basis for the choice. (See People v. Watts (1976) 59 Cal. App. 3d 80, 85-86, fn. 2 [79 Cal. Rptr. 409]; People v. Williams (1971) 22 Cal. App. 3d 34, 58 [99 Cal. Rptr. 103] [\"Obviously, defense counsel's request and agreement were not tactical ploys, the engagement in which would invoke the doctrine of invited error.\"]; People v. Aikin (1971) 19 Cal. App. 3d 685, 702 [97 Cal. Rptr. 251].) Those cases in which invited *333 error has been found are reported in Graham, supra, 71 Cal.2d at page 318 and include just such explicit statements.\n(11b) Under the Graham rule, counsel must express a deliberate tactical purpose in objecting to a particular instruction before the failure to give that instruction will be deemed invited error. It is clear that no such objection occurred in this case. The trial court which has the duty to instruct on applicable necessarily included offenses, never asked counsel for an opinion on second degree murder.[11] The court simply noted that appellant had requested instructions on involuntary manslaughter and asked, \"Is that what your request is?\" Defense counsel answered, \"Yes, your Honor.\"\nNeedless to say, the absence of a request is not equivalent to an express tactical objection. If counsel's failure to request a particular instruction were deemed sufficient to satisfy the invited error rule, the pivotal role and duty of the trial court would be rendered meaningless. Furthermore, defendants would suffer greatly from the mistakes and ignorance of their counsel, even though the trial court could have acted to prevent injustice. Applying the Graham rule to the present case, it is clear that counsel did not make an express tactical objection to the required instructions.\nRespondent, however, argues that as long as the reviewing court can infer from the record as a whole that defense counsel made a deliberate tactical decision not to request instructions on necessarily included offenses, the trial court's error should be deemed invited. Respondent refers to a statement in People v. Tidwell (1970) 3 Cal. 3d 82, 87 [89 Cal. Rptr. 58, 473 P.2d 762], that \"[i]n the absence of anything in the *334 record disclosing that counsel had `a deliberate tactical purpose in suggesting, resisting, or acceding to an instruction,' we must assume that counsel merely failed to request the additional instructions because of neglect or mistake, which would be insufficient to nullify the trial court's obligation to properly instruct the jury on all the issues presented in that case.\" (Italics added.)\nIt is clear that this passage simply states a conclusion about the facts of Tidwell and does not constitute a modification of the Graham standard. If the test for invited error is whether \"anything in the record\" suggests a deliberate tactical purpose in failing to request a particular instruction, then invited error would be found wherever the accused had a tactical reason not to seek a necessarily included instruction. Since there is always a tactical reason not to want a necessarily included offense as an alternative — namely, to force the jury to an all-or-nothing choice — all situations would fit under that rule. In effect, the rule would require the exact opposite of Graham, i.e., an express statement that counsel is not opposed to necessarily included offense instructions for tactical reasons. Clearly, such a statement is not necessary in order to trigger the trial court's sua sponte duty.\nFurthermore, reviewing each record to determine why counsel was silent would not only be extremely difficult, but would call for delphic powers. How can a reviewing court decide if counsel's action or lack of it is founded on strategy, ignorance, mistake, or trust?\nThe present case graphically reveals the inherent difficulty of such an undertaking. Counsel may have believed that it was in his client's interest to give the jury three choices — first degree murder, involuntary manslaughter, or a not guilty verdict. Alternatively, counsel may not have been aware of the possible theory for a second degree murder conviction. Finally, counsel may have believed that the trial court would give the correct instructions and either failed to notice the omission or accepted the court's action as a decision that instructions on second degree murder were not required by the evidence. From the record before this court, it is impossible to tell which of these scenarios is correct.\nEven if this court were able to conclude that counsel had remained silent because of a tactical decision, invited error would not be found. Since the trial court's duty to instruct fully on the relevant legal theories is not dependent upon counsel, error in omitting required instructions cannot be waived by a party simply by the failure of its counsel to *335 demand the instructions. The issue centers on whether counsel deliberately caused the court to fail to fully instruct, not whether counsel subjectively desired a certain result. The error, in other words, must be \"invited.\"\n\"Our courts are not gambling halls but forums for the discovery of truth.\" (People v. St. Martin (1970) 1 Cal. 3d 524, 533 [83 Cal. Rptr. 166, 463 P.2d 390].) It is the obligation of trial counsel to assist the court in presenting all relevant instructions to the jury. At the same time, it is the trial court which bears the ultimate responsibility for properly instructing the jury. Since there was no express tactical objection made by counsel in the present case, the trial court's error in failing to instruct on second degree murder cannot be found to have been \"invited.\"\n(14) The failure to instruct on all necessarily included offenses deprives a defendant of the \"constitutional right to have the jury determine every material issue presented by the evidence.\" (People v. Modesto (1963) 59 Cal. 2d 722, 730 [31 Cal. Rptr. 225, 382 P.2d 33]; see also People v. Mosher, supra, 1 Cal.3d at p. 391.) \"[S]uch error cannot be cured by weighing the evidence and finding it not reasonably probable that a correctly instructed jury would have convicted the defendant of the lesser included offense.\" (Sedeno, supra, 10 Cal.3d at p. 720, citing Modesto, supra, 59 Cal.2d at p. 730.) However, this court held in Sedeno that \"in some circumstances it is possible to determine that although an instruction on a lesser included offense was erroneously omitted, the factual question posed by the omitted instruction was necessarily resolved adversely to the defendant under other, properly given instructions. In such cases the issue should not be deemed to have been removed from the jury's consideration since it has been resolved in another context, and there can be no prejudice to the defendant since the evidence that would support a finding that only the lesser offense was committed has been rejected by the jury.\" (Sedeno, supra, 10 Cal.3d at p. 721.)\nIn Sedeno, the trial court erred in failing to give an instruction sua sponte on involuntary manslaughter due to diminished capacity. (10 Cal.3d at p. 720.) Such an instruction would have required the jury to specifically determine whether the accused had acted without an intent to kill and malice. The error was harmless as to the question of the intent to kill because the jury had received instructions on second degree murder without an intent to kill and had specifically and necessarily rejected *336 that theory by returning a verdict of first degree murder. (Id., at p. 721.) However, the error was not harmless, as to the question of malice, since instructions on felony murder had removed this issue from the jury's consideration. Thus, the jury did not necessarily reject a theory that the accused lacked malice. (Ibid.)\n(9c) In the present case, no instruction presented the jury with a theory of intentional homicide which was not premeditated and deliberate. Once the jury found that the killing was intentional, it had no choice but to return a verdict of first degree murder. Hence, \"the factual question posed by the omitted instruction\" — whether appellant had acted with malice and intent, but without premeditation and deliberation — was not \"necessarily resolved adversely to the defendant under other, properly given instructions.\" (Sedeno, supra, 10 Cal.3d at p. 721.) Since the jury was not required to decide specifically whether appellant had committed an intentional but nonpremeditated, nondeliberate murder, the trial court's error in failing to instruct on second degree murder cannot be deemed to be harmless. The judgment must be reversed.[12]\n\nIII.\nThe trial court erred by failing to instruct sua sponte on second degree murder. Given the evidence in this case, the jury could have found that appellant did not premeditate and deliberate. The error was not invited inasmuch as trial counsel did not make an express tactical objection to the required instructions. Nor was the error harmless within the meaning of Sedeno, because no other instruction presented the jury with a theory of intentional and malicious homicide lacking premeditation and deliberation.\nThe judgment is reversed.\nMosk, J., Newman, J., Kaus, J., Broussard, J., and Reynoso, J., concurred.\nRICHARDSON, J.\nI concur in the judgment, under the compulsion of People v. Graham (1969) 71 Cal. 2d 303 [78 Cal. Rptr. 217, 455 P.2d 153]. But for Graham and its progeny, we might well conclude that defense *337 counsel's failure to request instructions on second degree murder was a deliberate, tactical decision, constituting invited error which would cure the trial court's omission to give those instructions sua sponte. The record appears to support a finding that the defense counsel deliberately narrowed the jury's choice of verdicts to first degree murder, involuntary manslaughter, and excusable homicide.\nYet Graham requires that the record reveal that counsel actually \"expresse[d] a deliberate tactical purpose in suggesting, resisting, or acceding to an instruction....\" (P. 319, italics added.) As the majority correctly states, defense counsel herein expressed to the trial court no tactical purpose in foregoing instructions on second degree murder. Accordingly, under Graham, no basis exists for finding invited error.\nIn my view, the Graham rule should be reconsidered and possibly discarded in favor of a rule which would permit a finding of invited error based upon reasonable inferences drawn from the record. (See People v. Tidwell (1970) 3 Cal. 3d 82, 87 [89 Cal. Rptr. 58, 473 P.2d 762].) Lacking majority support for reconsideration of Graham, however, I concur in the judgment under its compulsion.\nRespondent's petition for a rehearing was denied October 21, 1982. Richardson, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted.\nNOTES\n[1] Unless otherwise indicated, all statutory references hereafter are to the Penal Code.\n[2] The trial court struck the use finding.\n[3] Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 10 A.L.R. 3d 974].\n[4] Indeed, People v. Cantrell (1973) 8 Cal. 3d 672, 685 [105 Cal. Rptr. 792, 504 P.2d 1256], one of the cases disapproved by Flannel, concerned sua sponte duties. (Flannel, supra, 25 Cal.3d at pp. 684-685, fn. 12.)\n[5] Section 192 defines manslaughter.\n[6] Appellant does not contend that the trial court was under an obligation to instruct sua sponte on reasonable self-defense.\n[7] \"He went crazy and started towards me. His hand went into his pocket. And I know he carries a gun there.\" \"The gun was on the shelf and he went crazy when he saw it. He reached for it and I grabbed it.\"\n[8] \"The obligation to instruct on lesser included offenses exists even when as a matter of trial tactics a defendant not only fails to request the instruction but expressly objects to its being given. [Citations.]\" (People v. Sedeno, supra, 10 Cal.3d at p. 716.)\n[9] The trial court instructed the jury that diminished capacity could negate malice and that it could return a verdict of voluntary manslaughter, but it did not connect diminished capacity to the lesser included offense. (Id., at pp. 314-315.) The court gave no instructions on involuntary manslaughter due to unconsciousness from intoxication.\n[10] Section 1259 currently states, in relevant part, \"The appellate court may also review any instruction given, refused or modified, even though no objection was made thereto in the lower court, if the substantial rights of the defendant were affected thereby.\" Section 1469 states, in relevant part, \"The [appellate] court may also review any instruction given, refused or modified, even though no objection was made thereto in the trial court if the substantial rights of the defendant were affected thereby.\"\n[11] \"We deem it appropriate to emphasize that the duty of counsel to a criminal defendant includes careful preparation of and request for all instructions which in his judgment are necessary to explain all of the legal theories upon which his defense rests. If it appears to the court, however, that there is substantial evidence that would support a defense inconsistent with that advanced by a defendant, the court should ascertain from the defendant whether he wishes instructions on the alternative theory. Such inquiry will afford assurance that the theory has not been inadvertently overlooked by counsel. (Cf. People v. Hood, supra, 1 Cal.3d at p. 449; People v. Wade (1959) 53 Cal. 2d 322, 334 [1 Cal. Rptr. 683, 348 P.2d 116].)\n\n\"When the charged offense is one that is divided into degrees or encompasses lesser offenses, and there is evidence from which the jury could conclude that the lesser offense had been committed, the court must instruct on the alternate theory even if it is inconsistent with the defense elected by the defendant under the rule obliging the court to instruct on lesser included offenses discussed supra.\" (Sedeno, supra, 10 Cal.3d at p. 717, fn. 7.)\n[12] Because the judgment must be reversed, the court does not consider the other issues raised by appellant.\n\n", "ocr": false, "opinion_id": 1357400 }, { "author_str": "Bird", "per_curiam": false, "type": "020lead", "page_count": null, "download_url": null, "author_id": null, "opinion_text": "\nOpinion\nBIRD, C. J.\nThis case raises several questions concerning a trial court’s duty to give instructions sua sponte in criminal cases. What standard should the trial court apply in determining whether to give instructions on necessarily included offenses? Did the evidence in the present case require instructions on voluntary manslaughter and second degree murder? Should the doctrine of “invited error” be invoked where the defense counsel has not articulated a deliberate tactical objection to required instructions?\nI.\nAppellant was convicted of first degree murder in the shooting death of her husband, Curt, who died on September 8, 1979. (Pen. Code, *313§§ 187, 189.)1 The jury also found that appellant had used a firearm within the meaning of section 12022.5.2\nShortly after 1:30 p.m. on September 8th, appellant telephoned the Marin County Communications Center to request emergency relief because of “a terrible accident.” She then called her priest, Monsignor Keane, and asked him to come to the house. The Novato Police Department was contacted and informed that an accident had occurred at her home.\nPolice Sergeant Gary Earner was the first officer to arrive at the scene. He found a group of about 20 to 30 people standing in the street in front of appellant’s home. Appellant, “who appeared ... to be hysterical,” approached him. “She was yelling hysterically .... [S]he said that her husband was in the house and had been shot.” In response to the officer’s question, appellant stated that she had done the shooting. She also told him that her husband was in the bedroom and the gun was at a neighbor’s house.\nOfficer Michael Funk arrived and stayed with appellant while Sergeant Earner began to search the house. As he started up the stairs to the second floor, he saw appellant’s husband’s body near the wrought iron railing on the landing above. Earner determined that Curt was dead.\nTwo paramedics arrived soon after Officer Funk. Robert Weber, one of the paramedics, testified that the body was lying face down and the head and arms were protruding through the railing. When the body was turned over and the shirt collar removed, Weber noticed a bullet hole above the right breast.\nOfficer Lance McHenry arrived at the same time as the paramedics. McHenry had met appellant two months earlier when she sought police protection because of alleged threats made by Curt.\nOfficer McHenry testified that on September 8th, appellant “ran up to me in a hysterical-type condition” and made several statements. Some of the comments were unintelligible because of her condition. She did state that her husband had been depressed, that the shooting was an *314accident, and that things had been going well for them. She asked several times how her husband was. At one point she told McHenry, “He went crazy, you know. I’ve told you before. He pulled the hammer back. We were in the bedroom. He was so depressed. He had been with the kids all day.” At that point, appellant became hysterical again.\nMcHenry asked if anyone knew the location of the gun. Appellant pointed to a neighbor’s house and said, “It’s in there.” She walked over to the neighbor’s garage, pointed toward the back, and said, “I put it up there away from the kids.” McHenry could see the gun on top of a hot-water heater.\nUpon returning to the street in front of her house, appellant stated, “He was depressed. He went crazy and started towards me. His hand went into his pocket. And I know he carries a gun there. And then he pulled the hammer back.” She became hysterical again and then stated, “It was an accident. I didn’t have any malice.”\nAppellant asked McHenry if he thought she needed an attorney. He stated that she could call one if she wished. Sergeant Barner, returning from the house, advised McHenry that it would be best to take appellant to the police station. McHenry asked appellant if she wanted to go to the station with him. She agreed.\nOn the way to the station, appellant again asked if she needed an attorney. McHenry told her that she could call one. She then asked if she could stop by a church to pray. McHenry allowed her to do so.\nOnce at the station, appellant was brought into the employee lounge. When she asked to use the bathroom, McHenry told her that a female clerk would accompany her and that she could not wash her hands because a test would be performed on them. Appellant stated, “You know I fired the gun. I told you.” Appellant also stated, “I didn’t mean to hurt him.” Again, appellant asked if she needed an attorney and was told that she could call one. Instead, she called to find out if her children were all right.\nJanice Arnheiter, a friend of appellant, was then brought in to see her. Appellant told Arnheiter, “He was depressed. The gun was on the shelf and he went crazy when he saw it. He reached for it and I grabbed it. He pulled the hammer back and it went off. I was holding the gun. My finger was, you know, where it went off.”\n*315Appellant was then taken to an interview room by Officer McHenry and Lynne Wald, senior clerk at the police station. She was advised of her Miranda3 rights. Appellant stated that she had kept the gun in the closet because it was the easiest place to get to if someone broke in. At one point, she stated that she did know how to use the gun, but later she stated that Curt had taught her how to shoot another weapon many years before. When informed that Curt had died, appellant asked to use the phone to break a tennis date for the following day.\nBack at the house, the officers searched the premises for additional bullets, but did not find any. At the top of the stairs, near the bedroom, the officers found a blue shirt wadded up in the corner against the wall.\nIn a closet in the bedroom, two boxes were found, one for a revolver and one for ammunition. The boxes were barely visible behind hats and shoe boxes. Five bullets were missing from the box of ammunition.\nErvin Jindrich, the county coroner, performed the autopsy. The cause of death was determined to be a gunshot wound. Jindrich stated that the bullet entered the right chest at a point approximately five inches to the right of the midline of the body. The bullet traversed the right thoracic cavity, the space in which the lung is confined, on a generally horizontal plane. The bullet went slightly from right to left within the body. Jindrich was unable to determine the distance of the gun from the body because no powder residue was found on the skin. He further stated that Curt could have been bent over at the time of the shooting.\nWilliam Corazza, a criminalist with the California Department of Justice, examined the blue shirt and the weapon recovered from the neighbor’s garage. The shirt contained bullet holes and smoke and powder residues, consistent with a bullet passing through the shirt at close range. According to the criminalist’s best calculations, “the shirt was somewhat bunched above the weapon. It was not wrapped tightly around it . ... ”\nRegarding the weapon, Corazza noted that the cylinder has a five-bullet capacity. Two circles of smoke residue around the opening of the chambers in the cylinder indicated that the weapon had been fired two times since its last cleaning. Corazza explained that the weapon could *316operate in both single and double action. In double action, it is necessary only to pull the trigger to fire the weapon. In single action, the hammer must be pulled back first, then the trigger pulled. The weapon was operable and could not accidently discharge by jarring.\nCorazza stated that it would be possible to push the hammer back while facing the gun. With the gun operating in single action, only five pounds of pressure on the trigger was required to fire the weapon once the hammer was pulled back. Corazza also testified that the weapon contained two expended rounds and three live rounds, one of which was at the top of the cylinder underneath the hammer. In order to reach this configuration, it was his opinion that the weapon must have been fired twice; then, either the weapon was cocked and the hammer let down gently or it was partially cocked and the cylinder was rotated manually.\nThe prosecution claimed that the shooting was premeditated and deliberate murder. It alleged that appellant killed her husband because *of jealousy and for financial gain.\nAppellant and her husband lived in Novato and had five children. Curt worked as an investigator for the United States Customs Service. His work caused him to be away from the home quite often. Appellant had asked him to change jobs so that he could spend more time at home. When this did not happen, appellant asked Curt to move out of the house. He did so on February 12, 1979, and moved in with Frank Orrantia, another customs investigator.\nAppellant filed a petition for dissolution of marriage on February 21, 1979. Soon thereafter, she contacted Attorney Richard Barry and asked him to draw up a marital settlement agreement to which she and Curt had agreed. Under the agreement, appellant received the house and its furnishings, one of their two cars, and the proceeds from the sale of the other car to pay certain debts. Curt was to receive the entire interest in federal Civil Service retirement benefits. In addition, the children would be named beneficiaries of his government life insurance policy. Curt would be obligated to pay $325 a month spousal support and $875 per month child support.\nBarry told appellant that, in the event of her husband’s death, her spousal support would cease. He also told her that she was giving up all claim to Curt’s retirement benefits and that these benefits might be worth more than her property under the agreement. Some time before *317the end of August, Barry’s office received a message from appellant not to file the final judgment because she was going to have surgery and wanted the medical expenses covered by Curt’s employment benefits. No final judgment was entered.\nAppellant also spoke with Barry about obtaining a restraining order against her husband. She told Barry that she was afraid of her husband and he was very volatile. Although he had never hurt her, she said that he always seemed to be just on the verge of striking her. She also stated that she was afraid he would take the children and disappear with them. Appellant further stated that Curt sometimes wore a gun at the house.\nMarguerite Banks, a United States Customs personnel staffing specialist, testified that Curt had a $43,000 life insurance policy with a double indemnity clause for accidental death. As a matter of course, the beneficiaries of the policy were appellant and the children. As of September 8, 1979, the policy would pay a monthly annuity to appellant of $685 and yearly benefits of $864 for each child. On October 8, 1979, one month after the shooting, claim forms were filed on appellant’s behalf under the policy. An attorney presented the forms along with a letter explaining that the claim was for the children’s benefits. The attorney enclosed a copy of the marital settlement agreement.\nAfter Curt moved out of the Novato home, he began dating Mary Ann Steinbeck. Sometime around May, they began living together. According to Steinbeck, Curt was relieved when the divorce proceedings started. He was expecting to get a promotion and a new job in Washington, D.C. and Steinbeck testified that she was planning to move with him. She denied she ever saw him wear a gun and stated that on September 8, he was wearing tight pants and was not carrying a gun.\nSeveral witnesses testified that appellant made frantic efforts to meet Steinbeck. Richard Warner, a customs criminal investigator, testified that appellant questioned him about Steinbeck’s background and where she worked. He further stated that Curt seemed happy and was looking forward to his transfer to Washington.\nMarie Mouchka, a friend of appellant, testified that appellant was trying desperately to find Steinbeck. Appellant called Mouchka many times to report on the progress of her search. Once appellant stated that *318she was going to go to Fresno because she had heard that Steinbeck worked there. On different occasions, appellant had the operator interrupt Mouchka’s phone conversations with emergency messages. When appellant got on the line, she would relay some information about the divorce proceedings or her finances.\nFrank Orrantia, a colleague of Curt, also reported numerous conversations with appellant. He testified that appellant told him several times that Curt appeared depressed and that she was afraid he might commit suicide. She also asked him about Steinbeck. On May 14, Orrantia’s phone conversation with his ex-wife was interrupted by the operator who stated that appellant wanted to talk to him because of an emergency. Appellant told Orrantia that Curt had threatened her and that she had called the police. Orrantia spoke with Curt and then called appellant. He told her that he did not think Curt had threatened her. At that point, appellant appeared to get upset with him and said that Curt had made threats in the past.\nOn July 10th, appellant called the Novato Police Department to request an officer. Officer McHenry responded. Appellant told him that Curt had been threatening her since the separation and that he had called her several times drunk or enraged. She stated that on one occasion Curt had taken a gun out of his pocket and exposed it in a threatening manner. Since Curt was coming over later that day, she wanted an officer present. McHenry advised her to keep the doors locked and said that if Curt came, she could call the police department and an officer would be sent to her home. Appellant also asked the officer if she should purchase a gun. He advised her not to, especially if she did not know how to use one.\nOn Mother’s Day, appellant called Ms. Mouchka, who worked as a nurse at the Suicide Prevention Center. According to Mouchka, appellant said that Curt had ruined the day by coming late for dinner. He was still at the house and appellant wanted to know how many Valiums it would take to harm someone. Mouchka laughingly said, “My God, Suzanna, you’re going to kill him.” Appellant replied, “No. I just want to give him enough for him to tell me the truth who that woman is.” When appellant said that she was crushing the Valiums in wine, Mouchka told her that was a lethal combination. Appellant responded, “Oh, don’t be overly dramatic.” Appellant called back later to say that Curt had refused the wine because it tasted bitter.\n*319Mouchka also reported a conversation with appellant which she thought took place in August. To Mouchka’s comment that appellant had to face the fact that the divorce was going forward, appellant replied that Curt wanted to pick up the final divorce papers but he was not going to. Appellant stated that she was not going to be divorced.\nJoe Stavish, a carpenter, was hired to do some work on appellant’s house in May. He stated that he became sexually involved with her a few weeks after he was hired. The relationship lasted for several weeks. Stavish testified that he had about six conversations with appellant about killing her husband. He stated that she offered him $5,000 to kill Curt. Appellant suggested various means of accomplishing the task, including shooting him in an underground garage while he was at work in Hawaii. Appellant allegedly stated that she would get more money if Curt were killed while on duty. Stavish rejected her offer and demanded $10,000, which she said was too much. He also pointed out to her better ways of killing Curt than she had suggested. Stavish finally got tired of hearing her talk about the subject and told her to stop the conversations. Appellant replied that she would kill Curt herself. Stavish advised her to stand close to Curt and fire the weapon quickly.\nStavish also reported that appellant told him about the Valium incident. She said that she had put Valium in Curt’s wine either to try to kill him or to put him to sleep. He could not recall which of these motives she had expressed.\nAccording to Stavish’s trial testimony, he came by appellant’s home on September 2d, to see if she had finished a particular project. She told him that Curt was such a miserable person that she would be doing him a favor to put him out of his misery. Stavish conceded that he had not mentioned this statement at the preliminary hearing.\nStavish testified that he had talked to appellant about his plans for killing his father when he was younger. From the age of 14 to 17, Stavish seriously contemplated killing his father by various means. Stavish also stated that during about half of his conversations with appellant he was under the influence of marijuana or liquor. He stated that he participated in the conversations to allow appellant to let off steam. He thought that she was fantasizing. As for her demeanor, “[sjhe’d get really upset and then she’d freeze and get like in a catatonic state where she’d be like motionless, but obviously very, very upset .... She *320couldn’t talk. And she’d get really upset. Her voice would just choke off completely.”\nPaulette Baccioco met appellant in 1978 at Dominican College. Appellant complained to Baccioco about her financial problems after her separation from Curt. According to Baccioco, appellant refused to get a job and stated to Baccioco that if she killed her husband, her financial problems would be solved. From March through June, appellant discussed killing Curt “frequently.” Appellant mentioned that she would receive a little less than $100,000 from the insurance coverage if Curt died.\nBaccioco also testified about a telephone call from appellant in which she stated that she was trying to give Curt the wine with Valium. She asked Baccioco how she could get Curt to drink it. Baccioco refused to help.\nFinally, appellant told Baccioco that Stavish would not help her kill Curt. According to the witness, appellant stated, “You are so bright, you can help me figure out a way to kill my husband.” On cross-examination, Baccioco admitted that she had forgotten about these conversations until reminded after Curt’s death by a friend to whom she had repeated the discussions.\nPat Libby testified that the day before the shooting appellant said Curt was coming over to the house the next day. According to Libby, appellant told her “that if she got through tomorrow, everything would be okay.” After Curt died, appellant told Libby that Curt’s death was probably for the best because he had stopped seeing the children while he was alive.\nRae Ellen Mercer, a marriage counselor, saw the Wickershams singly and together on several occasions from March to June. Appellant told Mercer that she did not want a divorce and wanted Curt to come back. She also told Mercer about an incident in which she found a gun in Curt’s car. She stated that she did not know what she meant to do when she had the gun in her hand. According to Mercer, appellant was emotional, occasionally hysterical.\nAnna Satenstein performed a “spiritual reading” for appellant on April 21st. Appellant returned on April 30th when Curt was meeting *321with Mercer and asked Satenstein to tell her what was occurring at that meeting. Satenstein refused.\nAppellant testified in her own defense. She said that Curt occasionally carried a gun in his waistband if he was called out at night. Although Curt had never hit her, she thought he had the potential to do so, based on violent acts he had performed as a police officer during the Watts riots and as a soldier in Korea. Appellant denied trying to locate Steinbeck. She further stated that she knew she had waived all rights to Curt’s insurance and retirement benefits. She stated that she had not asked her attorney to delay the dissolution proceedings. She denied making the various threatening statements related by Stavish, Baccioco, and Mouchka and the postmortem statement related by Libby. Regarding Stavish, she said that he had first brought up the subject of killing Curt by offering to do it for $10,000. Appellant rejected the suggestion immediately. She also stated that Stavish had stolen lumber from her.\nAppellant claimed that she had put only five milligrams of Valium in Curt’s wine and did so simply to calm him down when he was upset. Concerning the incident involving the gun in the glove compartment, appellant testified that she had opened the glove compartment to take out some maps, and a first-aid kit. The gun was on top of those items and had to be removed in order to retrieve them. When Curt, who was approaching the driver’s side of the car, saw the gun, he became scared and acted “erratic.” According to appellant, Curt attempted to “struggle with that gun.” Appellant told him that he should not have a gun in the car with the children present.\nAppellant testified about another incident in which her car twice ran into Curt’s, once from the rear and once from the front. She ascribed the incident to inattention, although she admitted being frustrated and upset that day because she had told him to collect his things and leave for good. This was the last time she saw him before September 8th.\nOn July 5, 1979, appellant purchased the weapon which was involved in the shooting. She testified that she bought the gun to protect her home and that there had always been a gun in the house for protection.\nConcerning the day of the shooting, appellant stated that Curt came to the house about 10:30 a.m. They were on friendly terms, and Curt made some minor house repairs before taking the children to lunch. Appellant began gathering Curt’s things for him. When Curt came back, *322they began to pack some of his shirts which were in a closet in which the gun was kept. When appellant began removing Curt’s shirts from the closet, he saw the gun and asked, “What’s that gun?” with a “slight bit of alarm in his voice.” Appellant answered, “It’s mine.” With her back to Curt, appellant “sensed he was moving towards me.” Afraid that he would take the gun, she scooped the weapon up with five or six shirts. When she turned back, Curt reached to get the gun. There was a short scuffle and the gun went off. After the shot, Curt reached behind him. Thinking that he had a gun, appellant left the room and took her son, who was standing in the doorway. She did not return to the room, but placed the gun in the neighbor’s garage and made the emergency phone calls. Appellant denied intending to fire the weapon or to kill her husband.\nJanice Arnheiter, who had hired Stavish to do carpentry work, testified that he was not believable. In addition, he told her that he had discussed his testimony with Baccioco.\nVarious witnesses testified concerning appellant’s reputation for honesty and nonviolence. These witnesses included a San Francisco police captain, her priest, and her psychiatrist.\nBefore final argument to the jury, the court discussed the instructions with both counsel. The discussion was as follows:\n“The Court: [CALJIC No. 5.00] was requested concerning excusable homicide, lawful act. I believe the District Attorney asked for that.\n“You have no objection to that, I assume?\n“[Defense Counsel]: No, I do not.\n“The Court: And, last, the Defendant did request the lesser-included instructions, particularly 17.10, the introductory, and the involuntary manslaughter instructions, 8.45, 8.46, and 3.32.\n“Is that what your request is?\n“[Defense Counsel]: Yes, your Honor.\n“The Court: I’ll also give the jury the instruction concerning the use of a firearm.\n*323“[Defense Counsel]: The Defendant does object to that on the ground that it’s, with respect to first-degree murder, it’s immaterial. A finding is ineffective.\n“And, secondly, with respect to the crime of involuntary manslaughter, by its very definition, the crime would exclude use of a gun in the sense of using a gun instead of accidentally firing it.\n“The Court: Okay. I’ll give 17.19, the use instruction, nevertheless, together with a verdict form for the jury in the event they find the Defendant guilty of either murder or involuntary manslaughter.\n“I’ll give them the verdict form for the use of the firearm over the Defendant’s objection.”\nThe court thereupon instructed the jury on excusable homicide (CALJIC No. 5.00), the definitions of murder (CALJIC No. 8.10 (1979 rev.)) and malice aforethought (CALJIC No. 8.11.(1979 rev.)), first degree premeditated and deliberate murder (CALJIC No. 8.20 (1979 rev.)), and involuntary manslaughter as a necessarily included offense (CALJIC Nos. 17.10, 8.45 (1979 rev.), 8.46, 3.32, 8.74 (1976 rev.), and 8.72).\nII.\nAppellant contends that the trial court erred in not instructing sua sponte on second degree murder and voluntary manslaughter.\nThe trial court functions both as a neutral arbiter between two contesting parties and as the jury’s guide to the law. This role requires that the court fully instruct the jury on the law applicable to each particular case. “‘It is settled that in criminal cases, even in the absence of a request, the trial court must instruct on the general principles of law relevant to the issues raised by the evidence. [Citations.] The general principles of law governing the case are those principles closely and openly connected with the facts before the court, and which are necessary for the jury’s understanding of the case.’ (People v. St. Martin (1970) 1 Cal.3d 524, 531 [83 Cal.Rptr. 166, 463 P.2d 390].) That obligation has been held to include giving instructions on lesser included offenses when the evidence raises a question as to whether all of the elements of the charged offense were present (see, e.g., People v. Hood (1969) 1 Cal.3d 444 [82 Cal.Rptr. 618, 462 P.2d 370]), but not when *324there is no evidence that the offense was less than that charged. (People v. Noah (1971) 5 Cal.3d 469, 479 [96 Cal.Rptr. 441, 487 P.2d 1009]; People v. Osuna (1969) 70 Cal.2d 759, 767 [76 Cal.Rptr. 462, 452 P.2d 678].)” (People v. Sedeno (1974) 10 Cal.3d 703, 715-716 [112 Cal.Rptr. 1, 518 P.2d 913].)\nThe fulfillment of this obligation ensures that the jury will consider the full range of possible verdicts—not limited by the strategy, ignorance, or mistakes of the parties. The jury should not be constrained by the fact that the prosecution and defense have chosen to focus on certain theories. “Just as the People have no legitimate interest in obtaining a conviction of a greater offense than that established by the evidence, a defendant has no right to an acquittal when that evidence is sufficient to establish a lesser included offense. (People v. St. Martin, supra, 1 Cal.3d 524, 533.)” (Sedeno, supra, 10 Cal.3d at p. 716.) Furthermore, where counsel is not aware of alternative verdicts or incorrectly believes them to be irrelevant to the case, the trial court’s action will avoid an unwarranted all-or-nothing choice for the jury and will ensure that the verdict is no harsher or more lenient than the evidence merits. These policies reflect concern both for the rights of persons accused of crimes and for the overall administration of justice.\nIn Sedeno, supra, 10 Cal.3d at page 716, this court stated that the trial court was obligated to instruct on necessarily included offenses and to give requested instructions “whenever there is ‘any evidence deserving of any consideration whatsoever ....’” (Citing People v. Carmen (1951) 36 Cal.2d 768, 773 [228 P.2d 281].) In People v. Flannel (1979) 25 Cal.3d 668, 684-685, footnote 12 [160 Cal.Rptr. 84, 603 P.2d 1 ], the lead opinion disapproved the suggestion that “jury instructions must be given whenever any evidence is presented, no matter how weak” in the context of requested instructions on diminished capacity. (Italics in original.) The lead opinion stated that the court need only give the instruction if the accused proffers evidence sufficient to “deserve consideration by the jury, i.e., ‘evidence from which a jury composed of reasonable men could have concluded’” that the particular facts underlying the instruction did exist. (At p. 684, quoting from People v. Carr (1972) 8 Cal.3d 287, 294 [104 Cal.Rptr. 705, 502 P.2d 513].)\nThis does not require—or permit—the trial court to determine the credibility of witnesses. It simply frees the court from any obligation to present theories to the jury which the jury could not reasonably find to *325exist. Thus, in Flannel, the mere fact that the accused had “consumed relatively small amounts of alcohol over a long period of time” This does not require—or permit—the trial court to determine the credibility of witnesses. It simply frees the court from any obligation to present theories to the jury which the jury could not reasonably find to exist. Thus, in Flannel, the mere fact that the accused had “consumed relatively small amounts of alcohol over a long period of time” (2)5 Cal. 3d at p. 685) did not warrant giving an instruction on diminished capacity.\nFlannel did not directly discuss the standard to be utilized in determining when the court has a duty to instruct sua sponte on necessarily included offenses. However, logic would seem to require that the same standard should generally apply.4\n The trial court is not obligated to instruct sua sponte on necessarily included offenses unless the evidence would justify a conviction of such offenses. (See People v. Ramos (1982) 30 Cal.3d 553, 582 [180 Cal.Rptr. 266, 639 P.2d 908].) This rule ensures that the jury’s attention is properly focused on the relevant legal theories.\nIn Sedeño, this court distinguished voluntary manslaughter due to heat of passion from other necessarily included offenses for purposes of the duty to instruct sua sponte. Normally, an intentional killing is at least second degree murder, but such a killing is voluntary manslaughter if “shown to have been committed in a heat of passion upon sufficient provocation .... [H] However, unless it appears from the prosecution’s case that the killing was committed in the heat of passion and upon sufficient provocation the burden is on the defendant to raise a reasonable doubt in the minds of the jurors that malice was present. [Citation.]” (10 Cal.3d at p. 719.) Therefore, “[bjefore a court must instruct sua sponte on voluntary manslaughter in the heat of passion as a lesser offense included within murder there must be either some evidence that heat of passion was present at the time of the killing or some reason for the court to know that the defendant is relying on that theory of manslaughter as a defense.” (Ibid.)\nThis standard is compatible with that promulgated in Flannel. (4) The trial court need not instruct sua sponte on voluntary manslaughter due to heat of passion unless there is evidence sufficient to “deserve consideration by the jury, i.e., ‘evidence from which a jury composed of reasonable men could have concluded’” that the accused acted intentionally but without malice. (Flannel, supra, 25 Cal. 3d at p. 684.) Once there is sufficient evidence to warrant this conclusion, the trial court is obligated to instruct on the theory.\n*326Regarding defenses, Sedeño held that “the duty to give instructions, sua sponte, on particular defenses and their relevance to the charged offense arises only if it appears that the defendant is relying on such a defense, or if there is substantial evidence supportive of such a defense and the defense is not inconsistent with the defendant’s theory of the case. Indeed, this limitation on the duty of the trial court is necessary not only because it would be unduly burdensome to require more of trial judges, but also because of the potential prejudice to defendants if instructions were given on defenses inconsistent with the theory relied upon.” (Sedeno, supra, 10 Cal.3d at p. 716.)\nHaving delineated the applicable standards, this court must next decide whether the evidence at trial required sua sponte instructions on second degree murder and voluntary manslaughter. These crimes, of course, are offenses necessarily included within first degree murder.\nAppellant advances two possible theories of voluntary manslaughter—heat of passion and unreasonable self-defense. In People v. Berry (1976) 18 Cal.3d 509, 515 [134 Cal.Rptr. 415, 556 P.2d 777], this court quoted People v. Valentine (1946) 28 Cal.2d 121, 139 [169 P.2d 1] regarding the appropriate instructions to be given the jury upon a claim of voluntary manslaughter due to heat of passion: “‘The jury is ... to be admonished and advised by the court that this heat of passion must be such a passion as would naturally be aroused in the mind of an ordinarily reasonable person under the given facts and circumstances, and that, consequently, no defendant may set up his own standard of conduct and justify or excuse himself because in fact his passions were aroused, unless further the jury believe that the facts and circumstances were sufficient to arouse the passions of the ordinarily reasonable man.. .. For the fundamental of the inquiry is whether or not the defendant’s reason was, at the time of his act, so disturbed or obscured by some passion—not necessarily fear and never, of course, the passion for revenge—to such an extent as would render ordinary men of average disposition liable to act rashly or without due deliberation and reflection, and from this passion rather than from judgment.’”\nTo satisfy the objective or “reasonable person” element of this form of voluntary manslaughter, the accused’s heat of passion must be due to “sufficient provocation.” (Sedeno, supra, 10 Cal.3d at p. 719.) However, as this court stated in Berry, “there is no specific type of provocation required by section 192[5] and ... verbal provocation may be sufficient.” (18 Cal.3d at p. 515.)\n*327The subjective element requires that the actor be under the actual influence of a strong passion at the time of the homicide. “In People v. Borchers (1958) 50 Cal.2d 321, 329 [325 P.2d 97] in the course of explaining the phrase ‘heat of passion’ used in the statute defining manslaughter we pointed out that ‘passion’ need not mean ‘rage’ or ‘anger’ but may be any ‘[vjiolent, intense, high-wrought or enthusiastic emotion’ and concluded there ‘that defendant was aroused to a heat of “passion” by a series of events over a considerable period of time .... ’ (50 Cal.2d at p. 328, 329.)” (Berry, supra, 18 Cal.3d at p. 515.) However, if sufficient time has elapsed between the provocation and the fatal blow for passion to subside and reason to return, the killing is not voluntary manslaughter—“the assailant must act under the smart of that sudden quarrel or heat of passion.” (CALJIC No. 8.42 (1979 rev.).)\nIn the present case, there is certainly substantial evidence of intense emotion. Two police officers who observed appellant shortly after the shooting described her as “hysterical.” Many of her statements at that time were unintelligible. In addition, several witnesses testified that appellant was very distraught over Curt’s involvement with Mary Ann Steinbeck.\nHowever, there is virtually no evidence of provocation, even under a view of the evidence most favorable to appellant. Appellant testified that she and Curt were in the bedroom for approximately 10 minutes before the fatal incident. They were getting his things together, going through old photographs, and reminiscing. She described him as “very nostalgic.” The last thing he asked her was, “Do you think there’s any hope we’d ever get back together?” She answered, “No.”\nThe only possible source of provocation was the victim’s grabbing of the gun. Appellant testified that she struggled with Curt for possession of the gun and implied that she was afraid he would use the gun if he obtained possession. Given the background of reported threats by the victim, the jury could have found that a reasonable person in appellant’s position, faced with an attack of this nature, would have been overcome by fear and acted to repel the attacker.\nThis theory of voluntary manslaughter, however, would meet all the requirements of reasonable self-defense. The Legislature has deemed such self-defense to be justifiable homicide rather than voluntary manslaughter. (§ 197.) Hence, a trial court should not instruct on heat-of-*328passion voluntary manslaughter where the same facts would give rise to a finding of reasonable self-defense.6 (See Flannel, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 678; People v. Mitchell (1939) 14 Cal.2d 237, 241-242 [93 P.2d 121]; People v. Manzo (1937) 9 Cal.2d 594, 598-599 [72 P.2d 119].)\nWhether or not the evidence warranted an instruction on heat of passion, the alternative theory of unreasonable self-defense was certainly raised by the facts. “An honest but unreasonable belief that it is necessary to defend oneself from imminent peril to life or great bodily injury negates malice aforethought, the mental element necessary for murder, so that the chargeable offense is reduced to manslaughter.” (People v. Flannel, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 674, italics omitted.) Based on appellant’s testimony, the jury could have found that (1) she picked up the gun only after her husband had noticed it and because she divined that he was coming over to take it; (2) he grabbed for the gun and attempted to take it from her; (3) she recalled at that moment a previous incident in which he had fought her for possession of a gun. Other evidence established that appellant had reported threats on her life made by her husband. Furthermore, certain of appellant’s statements following the shooting lend support to this theory.7 Given these facts, the jury could have found that appellant honestly believed that her life was in danger and had acted in accordance with that belief.\nThis scenario is consistent with appellant’s testimony except for the cause of the gun being fired. The “unreasonable self-defense” type of voluntary manslaughter is premised on an intentional killing, whereas appellant testified that the gun went off by accident in the midst of the struggle. This, however, does not preclude a jury determination that in fact appellant pulled the trigger out of fear. The jury was entitled to reject that portion of appellant’s testimony which sought to explain the shooting as an accident and still find that appellant had not acted with malice. (See People v. Shavers (1969) 269 Cal.App.2d 886, 889 [75 Cal.Rptr. 334].)\nHence, the evidence was sufficient to justify a finding of unreasonable self-defense and the trial court would have erred had it denied a request for instructions on this theory. (See People v. Dewberry (1959) *32951 Cal.2d 548, 557 [334 P.2d 852].) However, unreasonable self-defense comes within Sedeno’s category of “defenses” for purposes of the obligation to instruct sua sponte. As noted above, the trial court need only instruct on a particular defense “if it appears that the defendant is relying on such a defense, or if there is substantial evidence supportive of such a defense and the defense is not inconsistent with the defendant’s theory of the case.” (Sedeno, supra, 10 Cal.3d at p. 716.)\nIn the present case, appellant testified that the shooting was an accident and that she did not intend to kill her husband. It is clear from the record that appellant was not relying on unreasonable self-defense and that this theory was inconsistent with her proffered defense. Thus, the trial court was under no obligation to instruct on unreasonable self-defense in the absence of a specific request by counsel. (See Sedeno, supra, 10 Cal.3d at pp. 717-718.)\nAppellant further argues that instructions on second degree murder should have been given. “[T]he existence of provocation which is not ‘adequate’ to reduce the class of the offense [from murder to manslaughter] may nevertheless raise a reasonable doubt that the defendant formed the intent to kill upon, and carried it out after, deliberation and premeditation.” (People v. Valentine, supra, 28 Cal.2d at p. 132; see also CALJIC No. 8.73 (1979) rev.).) Thus, where the evidence of provocation would justify a jury determination that the accused had formed the intent to kill as a direct response to the provocation and had acted immediately, the trial court is required to give instructions on second degree murder under this theory. The fact that heated words were exchanged or a physical struggle took place between the victim and the accused before the fatality may be sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt in the minds of the jurors regarding whether the accused planned the killing in advance.\nIn the present case, there was such evidence. The jury could have found that appellant did not form the intent to kill her husband until after he had mentioned the gun, come toward her, and tried to grab it from her. Even if the jury found that there was not sufficient provocation to warrant a lethal response and that appellant was not truly in fear for her life, the jury could have concluded that these activities affected her decision to kill Curt and that she had not premeditated or deliberated.\n*330Indeed, an instruction on second degree murder would have been required even in the absence of appellant’s testimony regarding Curt’s behavior. Although the evidence was sufficient to justify a finding of deliberation and premeditation, such a finding was not compelled. The jury could have found that appellant did not premeditate but rather acted upon a “sudden and unconsidered impulse[].” (People v. Fields (1950) 99 Cal.App.2d 10, 13 [221 P.2d 190].) Hence, even if the jury rejected her testimony, that rejection did not require a conviction for first degree murder. Unlike certain felony-murder situations (see § 189), this is not a case in which appellant was either guilty of first degree murder or innocent of any charge.\nThus, the trial court erred in not instructing sua sponte on second degree murder. There was sufficient evidence to warrant jury consideration of this alternative verdict.\nRespondent contends that any error in this regard was invited by defense counsel. It is argued that, even if the trial court was required by the evidence to give instructions on necessarily included offenses, reversal is not required because “defense counsel, intentionally, and for tactical purposes, chose to limit the lesser included offenses to involuntary manslaughter.”\nThe doctrine of invited error is designed to prevent an accused from gaining a reversal on appeal because of an error made by the trial court at his behest. If defense counsel intentionally caused the trial court to err, the appellant cannot be heard to complain on appeal. However, because the trial court is charged with instructing the jury correctly,8 it must be clear from the record that defense counsel made an express objection to the relevant instructions. In addition, because important rights of the accused are at stake, it also must be clear that counsel acted for tactical reasons and not out of ignorance or mistake.\nThe seminal case concerning invited error is People v. Graham (1969) 71 Cal.2d 303 [78 Cal.Rptr. 217, 455 P.2d 153], There, this court found error in the trial court’s failure to instruct on voluntary and involuntary manslaughter due to diminished capacity.9\n*331The Attorney General argued in that case that any error in the homicide instructions was invited by counsel. As the Graham opinion relates, “The trial court formulated many instructions ‘on the record.’ At one point the court inquired whether a combination of its proposed homicide instructions satisfied the attorneys. The court said, ‘As I understand, everyone agrees that there is no evidence from which involuntary manslaughter could be found; the only type of manslaughter that could be found here would be voluntary.’ The court read its proposed voluntary manslaughter instruction. It then stated, ‘That combination of instructions would probably instruct the jury as to the law that’s... . ’ All three defense counsel interrupted the judge and stated, ‘That’s agreeable.’” (Id., at p. 317.)\nThis court noted that the question posed was whether “the trial court’s affirmative duty to instruct the jury on its own motion on the general principles of law relevant to the issues of the case can be nullified by waiver of defense counsel.” (Id., at pp. 317-318.) In People v. Phillips (1966) 64 Cal.2d 574 [51 Cal.Rptr. 225, 414 P.2d 353], the court had found such “invited error” where defense counsel strongly opposed certain instructions for specific tactical reasons. (Id., at pp. 580-581, fn. 4.) According to Graham, the rule derived from Phillips is “that the court’s responsibility could be negated only in that special situation in which the defense counsel deliberately and expressly, as a matter of trial tactics, objected to the rendition of an instruction.” (Graham, supra, 71 Cal.2d at p. 318.)\nSuch a rule, Graham stated, was required by statutes concerning the scope of appellate review of instructions. Former sections 1259 and 1469 both provided that “‘an appellate court may review an instruction given, refused or modified, even though no objection was made thereto in the lower court, if the substantial rights of the defendant were affected thereby.’”10 (Graham, supra, 71 Cal.2d at p. 319.)\nThis rule is necessary to ensure that an accused’s right to complete instructions is fully protected. “As the court forcefully stated in *332People v. Keelin (1955) 136 Cal.App.2d 860, 874 [289 P.2d 520, 56 A.L.R.2d 355], ‘Nevertheless, error is nonetheless error and is no less operative on deliberations of the jury because the erroneous instruction may have been requested by counsel for the defense. After all, it is the life and liberty of the defendant in a case such as this that is at hazard in the trial and there is a continuing duty upon the part of the trial court to see to it that the jury are properly instructed upon all matters pertinent to their decision of the cause.’ Accordingly, if defense counsel suggests or accedes to the erroneous instruction because of neglect or mistake we do not find ‘invited error’; only if counsel expresses a deliberate tactical purpose in suggesting, resisting, or acceding to an instruction, do we deem it to nullify the trial court’s obligation to instruct in the cause.” (Id., at p. 319.)\nThe Graham court found no invited error regarding the omitted manslaughter instructions. Counsel never expressed a tactical objection to an instruction on involuntary manslaughter. Rather, the record indicated a strategy of offering the jury as many different verdicts as possible. (Id., at p. 320.) Counsel’s acceptance of an instruction on voluntary manslaughter which did not refer explicitly to diminished capacity “could not have been” invited. (Id., at p. 321.) In any event, the trial court went on to instruct on the statutory definition of voluntary manslaughter, thus implicitly removing consideration of the defense of diminished capacity from the jury. (Id., at pp. 321-322.)\nIn People v. Mosher (1969) 1 Cal.3d 379 [82 Cal.Rptr. 379, 461 P.2d 659], a trial court again failed to give certain required instructions on voluntary manslaughter and involuntary manslaughter due to diminished capacity. This court found there was no invited error, since “[d]efense counsel did not express a deliberate tactical purpose in suggesting, resisting, or acceding to the erroneous instruction. [Citation.]” (Id., at p. 393.)\nEven where counsel has suggested an erroneous instruction, the doctrine of invited error is not invoked unless counsel articulated a tactical basis for the choice. (See People v. Watts (1976) 59 Cal.App.3d 80, 85-86, fn. 2 [79 Cal.Rptr. 409]; People v. Williams (1971) 22 Cal.App.3d 34, 58 [99 Cal.Rptr. 103] [“Obviously, defense counsel’s request and agreement were not tactical ploys, the engagement in which would invoke the doctrine of invited error.”]; People v. Aikin (1971) 19 Cal.App.3d 685, 702 [97 Cal.Rptr. 251].) Those cases in which invited *333error has been found are reported in Graham, supra, 71 Cal.2d at page 318 and include just such explicit statements.\nUnder the Graham rule, counsel must express a deliberate tactical purpose in objecting to a particular instruction before the failure to give that instruction will be deemed invited error. It is clear that no such objection occurred in this case. The trial court which has the duty to instruct on applicable necessarily included offenses, never asked counsel for an opinion on second degree murder.11 The court simply noted that appellant had requested instructions on involuntary manslaughter and asked, “Is that what your request is?” Defense counsel answered, “Yes, your Honor.”\nNeedless to say, the absence of a request is not equivalent to an express tactical objection. If counsel’s failure to request a particular instruction were deemed sufficient to satisfy the invited error rule, the pivotal role and duty of the trial court would be rendered meaningless. Furthermore, defendants would suffer greatly from the mistakes and ignorance of their counsel, even though the trial court could have acted to prevent injustice. Applying the Graham rule to the present case, it is clear that counsel did not make an express tactical objection to the required instructions.\nRespondent, however, argues that as long as the reviewing court can infer from the record as a whole that defense counsel made a deliberate tactical decision not to request instructions on necessarily included offenses, the trial court’s error should be deemed invited. Respondent refers to a statement in People v. Tidwell (1970) 3 Cal.3d 82, 87 [89 Cal.Rptr. 58, 473 P.2d 762], that “[i]n the absence of anything in the *334record disclosing that counsel had ‘a deliberate tactical purpose in suggesting, resisting, or acceding to an instruction,’ we must assume that counsel merely failed to request the additional instructions because of neglect or mistake, which would be insufficient to nullify the trial court’s obligation to properly instruct the jury on all the issues presented in that case.” (Italics added.)\nIt is clear that this passage simply states a conclusion about the facts of Tidwell and does not constitute a modification of the Graham standard. If the test for invited error is whether “anything in the record” suggests a deliberate tactical purpose in failing to request a particular instruction, then invited error would be found wherever the accused had a tactical reason riot to seek a necessarily included instruction. Since there is always a tactical reason not to want a necessarily included offense as an alternative—namely, to force the jury to an all-or-nothing choice—all situations would fit under that rule. In effect, the rule would require the exact opposite of Graham, i.e., an express statement that counsel is not opposed to necessarily included offense instructions for tactical reasons. Clearly, such a statement is not necessary in order to trigger the trial court’s sua sponte duty.\nFurthermore, reviewing each record to determine why counsel was silent would not only be extremely difficult, but would call for delphic powers. How can a reviewing court decide if counsel’s action or lack of it is founded on strategy, ignorance, mistake, or trust?\nThe present case graphically reveals the inherent difficulty of such an undertaking. Counsel may have believed that it was in his client’s interest to give the jury three choices—first degree murder, involuntary manslaughter, or a not guilty verdict. Alternatively, counsel may not have been aware of the possible theory for a second degree murder conviction. Finally, counsel may have believed that the trial court would give the correct instructions and either failed to notice the omission or accepted the court’s action as a decision that instructions on second degree murder were not required by the evidence. From the record before this court, it is impossible to tell which of these scenarios is correct.\nEven if this court were able to conclude that counsel had remained silent because of a tactical decision, invited error would not be found. Since the trial court’s duty to instruct fully on the relevant legal theories is not dependent upon counsel, error in omitting required instructions cannot be waived by a party simply by the failure of its counsel to *335demand the instructions. The issue centers on whether counsel deliberately caused the court to fail to fully instruct, not whether counsel subjectively desired a certain result. The error, in other words, must be “invited.”\n“Our courts are not gambling halls but forums for the discovery of truth.” (People v. St. Martin (1970) 1 Cal.3d 524, 533 [83 Cal.Rptr. 166, 463 P.2d 390].) It is the obligation of trial counsel to assist the court in presenting all relevant instructions to the jury. At the same time, it is the trial court which bears the ultimate responsibility for properly instructing the jury. Since there was no express tactical objection made by counsel in the present case, the trial court’s error in failing to instruct on second degree murder cannot be found to have been “invited.”\nThe failure to instruct on all necessarily included offenses deprives a defendant of the “constitutional right to have th.e jury determine every material issue presented by the evidence.” (People v. Modesto (1963) 59 Cal.2d 722, 730 [31 Cal.Rptr. 225, 382 P.2d 33]; see also People v. Mosher, supra, 1 Cal.3d at p. 391.) “[S]uch error cannot be cured by weighing the evidence and finding it not reasonably probable that a correctly instructed jury would have convicted the defendant of the lesser included offense.” (Sedeno, supra, 10 Cal.3d at p. 720, citing Modesto, supra, 59 Cal.2d at p. 730.) However, this court held in Sedeño that “in some circumstances it is possible to determine that although an instruction on a lesser included offense was erroneously omitted, the factual question posed by the omitted instruction was necessarily resolved adversely to the defendant under other, properly given instructions. In such cases the issue should not be deemed to have been removed from the jury’s consideration since it has been resolved in another context, and there can be no prejudice to the defendant since the evidence that would support a finding that only the lesser offense was committed has been rejected by the jury.” (Sedeno, supra, 10 Cal.3d at p. 721.)\nIn Sedeño, the trial court erred in failing to give an instruction sua sponte on involuntary manslaughter due to diminished capacity. (10 Cal.3d at p. 720.) Such an instruction would have required the jury to specifically determine whether the accused had acted without an intent to kill and malice. The error was harmless as to the question of the intent to kill because the jury had received instructions on second degree murder without an intent to kill and had specifically and necessarily re*336jected that theory by returning a verdict of first degree murder. (Id., at p. 721.) However, the error was not harmless, as to the question of malice, since instructions on felony murder had removed this issue from the jury’s consideration. Thus, the jury did not necessarily reject a theory that the accused lacked malice. (Ibid.)\nIn the present case, no instruction presented the jury with a theory of intentional homicide which was not premeditated and deliberate. Once the jury found that the killing was intentional, it had no choice but to return a verdict of first degree murder. Hence, “the factual question posed by the omitted instruction”—whether appellant had acted with malice and intent, but without premeditation and deliberation—was not “necessarily resolved adversely to the defendant under other, properly given instructions.” (Sedeno, supra, 10 Cal.3d at p. 721.) Since the jury was not required to decide specifically whether appellant had committed an intentional but nonpremeditated, nondeliberate murder, the trial court’s error in failing to instruct on second degree murder cannot be deemed to be harmless. The judgment must be reversed.12\nIII.\nThe trial court erred by failing to instruct sua sponte on second degree murder. Given the evidence in this case, the jury could have found that appellant did not premeditate and deliberate. The error was not invited inasmuch as trial counsel did not make an express tactical objection to the required instructions. Nor was the error harmless within the meaning of Sedeño, because no other instruction presented the jury with a theory of intentional and malicious homicide lacking premeditation and deliberation.\nThe judgment is reversed.\nMosk, J., Newman, J., Kaus, J., Broussard, J., and Reynoso, J., concurred.\n\n Unless otherwise indicated, all statutory references hereafter are to the Penal Code.\n\n\n The trial court struck the use finding.\n\n\n Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [16 L.Ed.2d 694, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 10 A.L.R.3d 974].\n\n\n Indeed, People v. Cantrell (1973) 8 Cal.3d 672, 685 [105 Cal.Rptr. 792, 504 P.2d 1256], one of the cases disapproved by Flannel, concerned sua sponte duties. (Flannel, supra, 25 Cal.3d at pp. 684-685, fn. 12.)\n\n\n Section 192 defines manslaughter.\n\n\n Appellant does not contend that the trial court was under an obligation to instruct sua sponte on reasonable self-defense.\n\n\n “He went crazy and started towards me. His hand went into his pocket. And I know he carries a gun there.” “The gun was on the shelf and he went crazy when he saw it. He reached for it and I grabbed it.”\n\n\n “The obligation to instruct on lesser included offenses exists even when as a matter of trial tactics a defendant not only fails to request the instruction but expressly objects to its being given. [Citations.]” (People v. Sedeno, supra, 10 Cal.3d at p. 716.)\n\n\n The trial court instructed the jury that diminished capacity could negate malice and that it could return a verdict of voluntary manslaughter, but it did not connect dimin*331ished capacity to the lesser included offense. (Id., at pp. 314-315.) The court gave no instructions on involuntary manslaughter due to unconsciousness from intoxication.\n\n\n Section 1259 currently states, in relevant part, “The appellate court may also review any instruction given, refused or modified, even though no objection was made thereto in the lower court, if the substantial rights of the defendant were affected thereby.” Section 1469 states, in relevant part, “The [appellate] court may also review any instruction given, refused or modified, even though no objection was made thereto in the trial court if the substantial rights of the defendant were affected thereby.”\n\n\n “We deem it appropriate to emphasize that the duty of counsel to a criminal defendant includes careful preparation of and request for all instructions which in his judgment are necessary to explain all of the legal theories upon which his defense rests. If it appears to the court, however, that there is substantial evidence that would support a defense inconsistent with that advanced by a defendant, the court should ascertain from the defendant whether he wishes instructions on the alternative theory. Such inquiry will afford assurance that the theory has not been inadvertently overlooked by counsel. (Cf. People v. Hood, supra, 1 Cal.3d at p. 449; People v. Wade (1959) 53 Cal.2d 322, 334 [1 Cal.Rptr. 683, 348 P.2d 116].)\n“When the charged offense is one thát is divided into degrees or encompasses lesser offenses, and there is evidence from which the jury could conclude that the lesser offense had been committed, the court must instruct on the alternate theory even if it is inconsistent with the defense elected by the defendant under the rule obliging the court to instruct on lesser included offenses discussed supra.” (Sedeno, supra, 10 Cal.3d at p. 717, fn. 7.)\n\n\n Because the judgment must be reversed, the court does not consider the other issues raised by appellant.\n\n", "ocr": false, "opinion_id": 9598887 }, { "author_str": "Richardson", "per_curiam": false, "type": "030concurrence", "page_count": null, "download_url": null, "author_id": null, "opinion_text": "\nRICHARDSON, J.\nI concur in the judgment, under the compulsion of People v. Graham (1969) 71 Cal.2d 303 [78 Cal.Rptr. 217, 455 P.2d 153]. But for Graham and its progeny, we might well conclude that de*337fense counsel’s failure to request instructions on second degree murder was a deliberate, tactical decision, constituting invited error which would cure the trial court’s omission to give those instructions sua sponte. The record appears to support a finding that the defense counsel deliberately narrowed the jury’s choice of verdicts to first degree murder, involuntary manslaughter, and excusable homicide.\nYet Graham requires that the record reveal that counsel actually \"expresse[d] a deliberate tactical purpose in suggesting, resisting, or acceding to an instruction .... ” (P. 319, italics added.) As the majority correctly states, defense counsel herein expressed to the trial court no tactical purpose in foregoing instructions on second degree murder. Accordingly, under Graham, no basis exists for finding invited error.\nIn my view, the Graham rule should be reconsidered and possibly discarded in favor of a rule which would permit a finding of invited error based upon reasonable inferences drawn from the record. (See People v. Tidwell (1970) 3 Cal.3d 82, 87 [89 Cal.Rptr. 58, 473 P.2d 762].) Lacking majority support for reconsideration of Graham, however, I concur in the judgment under its compulsion.\nRespondent’s petition for a rehearing was denied October 21, 1982. Richardson, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted.\n", "ocr": false, "opinion_id": 9598889 } ]
California Supreme Court
California Supreme Court
S
California, CA
1,003,089
null
2000-12-06
false
united-states-v-brown
Brown
United States v. Brown
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
0
Unpublished
null
null
null
[ { "author_str": null, "per_curiam": false, "type": "010combined", "page_count": 2, "download_url": "http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/007208.U.pdf", "author_id": null, "opinion_text": " UNPUBLISHED\n\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\n\n\n No. 00-7208\n\n\n\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n\n Plaintiff - Appellee,\n\n versus\n\n\nMICHAEL QUINCY BROWN,\n\n Defendant - Appellant.\n\n\n\nAppeal from the United States District Court for the District of\nMaryland, at Greenbelt. Deborah K. Chasanow, District Judge. (CR-\n97-344-DKC, CA-99-3017-DKC)\n\n\nSubmitted: November 9, 2000 Decided: December 6, 2000\n\n\nBefore WILKINS, MOTZ, and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges.\n\n\nDismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.\n\n\nMichael Quincy Brown, Appellant Pro Se. Lynne Ann Battaglia, United\nStates Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland; Barbara Suzanne Skalla, As-\nsistant United States Attorney, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellee.\n\n\nUnpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.\nSee Local Rule 36(c).\n\fPER CURIAM:\n\n Michael Quincy Brown seeks to appeal the district court’s\n\norder denying his motion filed under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West Supp.\n\n2000). However, the sole issues Brown raised in his informal brief\n\nrelate to the validity of his plea, and the district court’s denial\n\nof his ineffective assistance of counsel claim as it relates to his\n\ncareer offender status. Accordingly, we have limited our review to\n\nthose issues. See Local Rule 34(b). We have reviewed the record\n\nand the district court's opinion relating to the issues Brown\n\nspecified in his informal brief, and find no reversible error.\n\nAccordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the district court, as\n\nto those issues, and we deny a certificate of appealability and\n\ndismiss the appeal on the reasoning of the district court. See\n\nUnited States v. Brown, Nos. CR-97-344-DKC; CA-99-3017-DKC (D. Md.\n\nJune 16, 2000). To the extent Brown seeks to raise issues not\n\nfirst presented to the district court for review, we decline to\n\nreview those issues. We dispense with oral argument because the\n\nfacts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the mate-\n\nrials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional\n\nprocess.\n\n\n\n\n DISMISSED\n\n\n\n\n 2\n\f", "ocr": false, "opinion_id": 1003089 } ]
Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
F
USA, Federal
1,702,923
Barkdull, Hendry and Daniel S. Pearson
1981-07-21
false
hines-v-state
Hines
Hines v. State
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
9
Published
null
null
[ "401 So. 2d 878" ]
[ { "author_str": null, "per_curiam": false, "type": "010combined", "page_count": null, "download_url": null, "author_id": null, "opinion_text": "\n401 So.2d 878 (1981)\nThomas Jefferson HINES, Appellant,\nv.\nThe STATE of Florida, Appellee.\nNo. 78-1432.\nDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.\nJuly 21, 1981.\nBennett H. Brummer, Public Defender and John H. Lipinski, Sp. Asst. Public Defender, for appellant.\nJim Smith, Atty. Gen. and Paul Mendelson, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.\nBefore BARKDULL, HENDRY and DANIEL S. PEARSON, JJ.\nPER CURIAM.\nDefendant, Hines, was charged by information in Count I with possession of a controlled substance and, in Count II, with sale or delivery of a controlled substance. He pleaded not guilty. After jury trial, the defendant was found guilty on both counts. He now appeals and claims, among other things, error in that the trial court violated the single transaction rule by sentencing him on both counts.\nWe affirm the judgment and sentence for sale and the judgment for possession. However, we vacate the sentence for possession.\nThe State concedes that the record at trial reflects that Hines' convictions and sentences arise from the possession and sale of the very same item of narcotics. The effect of the concession is that the offense of possession is a category four lesser-included offense of sale. Anderson v. State, 392 So.2d 328 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981).\n*879 While agreeing that Hines' conviction for possession should be affirmed, we do so only because Hines waived any claim of double jeopardy by failing to raise, in the trial court, the issue of his convictions for the included and greater offense. Anderson v. State, supra; Chapman v. State, 389 So.2d 1065 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980). See: Keefer v. State, 397 So.2d 1181 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981). That waiver, however, does not affect the sentencing error [Anderson v. State, supra; Williams v. State, 377 So.2d 755 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979)] which, because of the State's concession that Hines was concurrently sentenced for both the greater offense of sale and the included offense of possession, is patent. For the reasons expressed in Gonzalez v. State, 392 So.2d 334 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981), we find it improper to burden the trial court with a Rule 3.850 proceeding, the result of which inevitably must be to vacate the sentence imposed for possession.\nTherefore, we vacate the sentence on the possession conviction and affirm in all other respects.\nAffirmed as amended.\n", "ocr": false, "opinion_id": 1702923 } ]
District Court of Appeal of Florida
District Court of Appeal of Florida
SA
Florida, FL
1,043,513
null
2013-09-30
false
people-v-fonder
Fonder
People v. Fonder
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
0
Unpublished
null
null
[ "2013 IL App (3d) 120178" ]
[ { "author_str": null, "per_curiam": false, "type": "010combined", "page_count": 9, "download_url": "http://www.state.il.us/court/Opinions/AppellateCourt/2013/3rdDistrict/3120178.pdf", "author_id": null, "opinion_text": " 2013 IL App (3d) 120178\n\n Opinion filed September 30, 2013\n\n\n IN THE\n\n APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS\n\n THIRD DISTRICT\n\n A.D., 2013\n\nTHE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ) Appeal from the Circuit Court\nILLINOIS, ) of the 21st Judicial Circuit,\n ) Kankakee County, Illinois,\n Plaintiff-Appellee, )\n ) Appeal No. 3-12-0178\n v. ) Circuit No. 10-CF-235\n )\nDARNELL M. FONDER, ) Honorable\n ) Kathy Bradshaw-Elliott,\n Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding.\n\n\n JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE delivered the judgment of the court with opinion.\n Presiding Justice Wright and Justice O'Brien concurred in the judgment and opinion.\n\n\n OPINION\n\n¶1 After a jury trial, the defendant, Darnell M. Fonder, was convicted of resisting a peace\n\nofficer (720 ILCS 5/31-1(a-7) (West 2010)) and criminal trespass to real property (720 ILCS\n\n5/21-3(a)(3) (West 2010)). The trial court sentenced the defendant to three years of\n\nimprisonment. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred when it did not instruct\n\nthe jury that it must find that the defendant's conduct was the proximate cause of an injury to a\n\npeace officer to sustain a felony charge of resisting arrest. We reverse and remand the cause.\n\n¶2 FACTS\n\f¶3 The defendant was charged by indictment with aggravated battery (720 ILCS 5/12-\n\n4(b)(18) (West 2010)), resisting a peace officer (720 ILCS 5/31-1(a-7) (West 2010)), and\n\ncriminal trespass to real property (720 ILCS 5/21-3(a)(3) (West 2010)). On December 6, 2011,\n\nthe case proceeded to a jury trial.\n\n¶4 At trial, Officer Michael Shreffler testified that at approximately 2:30 p.m. on May 7,\n\n2010, he responded to a call at the residence of Crystal Davis. At the scene, Shreffler threatened\n\nto arrest the defendant if he returned to Davis' residence.\n\n¶5 At approximately 8:30 p.m. on the same date, Shreffler responded to another call at the\n\nDavis residence. Davis told Shreffler that the defendant had returned. Shreffler observed the\n\ndefendant walk toward him from behind the building. As Shreffler approached the defendant,\n\nOfficer Joseph Martinez arrived at the scene. Shreffler noticed that Martinez was uninjured.\n\nThereafter, Shreffler approached the defendant. He announced that the defendant was under\n\narrest, instructed the defendant to place his hands behind his back, and attempted to grab the\n\ndefendant's arm. The defendant said \"[I] ain't getting arrested for this bullshit\" and pulled his\n\narm away. The defendant then fought with Shreffler and Martinez as they attempted to restrain\n\nhim. The officers gained control of the defendant only after Martinez dry-stunned him twice\n\nwith his taser.\n\n¶6 Martinez testified that when he arrived at the scene, he saw Shreffler speaking with\n\nDavis. Shreffler then went to the side of the building and spoke with the defendant. Martinez\n\nfirst approached Davis and then went to Shreffler's location, where he saw Shreffler advise the\n\ndefendant that he was under arrest. The defendant tugged his right arm away as Shreffler\n\nattempted to place him in handcuffs. Shreffler instructed the defendant not to resist. Martinez\n\n\n 2\n\fattempted to grab the defendant's left arm, but the defendant swung his arm up, scratching\n\nMartinez's nose and forehead. The defendant continued to fight with the officers until Martinez\n\ndry-stunned the defendant twice. Shreffler transported the defendant from the scene, and\n\nMartinez completed the paperwork for the offense and took Davis' statement.\n\n¶7 During the struggle, Martinez received small abrasions to his nose and forehead.\n\nMartinez identified a photograph that was taken after the incident that depicted the injuries, and\n\nthe photograph was admitted into evidence. However, the photograph did not display the full\n\nextent of the injuries because Martinez had cleaned the \"blood dripping on [his] face\" in Davis'\n\nbathroom. Martinez was uninjured before the altercation.\n\n¶8 Davis testified that she had known the defendant for approximately five years. On the\n\nevening of May 7, 2010, she spoke with Martinez for approximately two minutes and then he\n\nwent around the side of the building to look for the defendant. Davis followed Martinez around\n\nthe side of the building and saw Martinez and Shreffler ask the defendant for identification.\n\nWhen the defendant said that he did not have identification, the officers instructed the defendant\n\nto come with them and grabbed his arm. The defendant responded that it hurt, and the officers\n\nthrew the defendant on the ground, jumped on him, and sprayed him with mace. The defendant\n\ntold the officers to stop and proclaimed that he \"didn't do nothing.\" Davis also asked the officers\n\nto stop.\n\n¶9 After the defendant was placed in the police car, Martinez went to Davis' apartment and\n\nasked her to sign some paperwork. At that time, Davis did not notice any injuries to Martinez's\n\nface, and Martinez did not use her bathroom.\n\n¶ 10 On cross-examination, Davis stated that the defendant was the father of her daughter. On\n\n\n 3\n\fthe date of the incident, she and the defendant were separated, and she called the police after the\n\ndefendant came to her residence in the afternoon. The police responded in the evening of May 7,\n\n2010, when they saw the defendant standing in front of the apartment building where Davis\n\nlived. Davis denied calling the police a second time. At trial, Davis stated that she and the\n\ndefendant had reconciled their relationship.\n\n¶ 11 At the jury instruction conference, the State tendered two jury instructions on resisting\n\narrest. Defense counsel did not object to the instructions or offer his own instructions, and the\n\ncase proceeded to closing arguments.\n\n¶ 12 Prior to deliberations, the trial court instructed the jury on the resisting arrest charge using\n\nIllinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, Nos. 22.13 and 22.14 (4th ed. 2000) (hereinafter, IPI\n\nCriminal 4th Nos. 22.13 and 22.14).\n\n¶ 13 During deliberations, the jury requested to see the photograph of Martinez's injuries.\n\nHowever, before the photograph was sent to the jury, it reached a verdict. The jury found the\n\ndefendant not guilty of aggravated battery and guilty of resisting a peace officer and criminal\n\ntrespass to real property.\n\n¶ 14 On January 3, 2012, the defendant filed a motion for acquittal. The defendant contended\n\nthat he should not have been convicted of felony-level resisting arrest. The defendant argued that\n\nthe jury instructions for resisting arrest did not contain the proposition that the defendant was the\n\nproximate cause of an injury to a peace officer. As a result, the jury instruction only supported a\n\nconviction for a misdemeanor conviction for resisting arrest. The trial court found that it was\n\nforeseeable that an officer might be injured when the defendant resisted arrest and denied the\n\nmotion. Thereafter, the trial court sentenced the defendant to three years of imprisonment. The\n\n\n 4\n\fdefendant appeals.\n\n¶ 15 ANALYSIS\n\n¶ 16 On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred when it failed to instruct the jury\n\non a necessary element of the charge for felony resisting arrest. According to the defendant, the\n\ncourt should have instructed the jury, in addition to the three propositions listed in IPI Criminal\n\n4th No. 22.14, that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's violation\n\nwas the proximate cause of an injury to Martinez. See 720 ILCS 5/31-1(a-7) (West 2010). The\n\ndefendant admits that he did not object to the tendered jury instructions, but argues that the\n\nwaiver rule should not apply because the court's failure to instruct the jury on an element of the\n\noffense is a grave and fundamental error. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 451(c) (eff. July 1, 2006). The State\n\nconcedes that the trial court erred, but argues that reversal is not warranted because the evidence\n\nwas not closely balanced and it was obvious from the evidence that the defendant proximately\n\ncaused injury to Martinez.\n\n¶ 17 Generally, \"[n]o party may raise on appeal the failure to give an instruction unless the\n\nparty shall have tendered it.\" Ill. S. Ct. R. 366(b)(2)(i) (eff. Feb. 1, 1994). However, Illinois\n\nSupreme Court Rule 451(c) (eff. July 1, 2006) provides that substantial defects in jury\n\ninstructions are not waived by a defendant's failure to make timely objections if the interests of\n\njustice require. \"The purpose of Rule 451(c) is to permit correction of grave errors and errors in\n\ncases so factually close that fundamental fairness requires that the jury be properly instructed.\"\n\nPeople v. Sargent, 239 Ill. 2d 166, 189 (2010). Rule 451(c) is coextensive with the plain error\n\nrule. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 615(a); People v. McNeal, 405 Ill. App. 3d 647 (2010). Before conducting\n\nthe plain error analysis, we must determine whether there was error. See People v. Wilson, 404\n\n\n 5\n\fIll. App. 3d 244 (2010).\n\n¶ 18 A. Error\n\n¶ 19 \"The purpose of jury instructions is to provide the jury with the correct legal principles\n\napplicable to the evidence, so that the jury may reach a correct conclusion according to the law\n\nand the evidence.\" People v. Bannister, 232 Ill. 2d 52, 81 (2008). Generally, the decision to give\n\na certain instruction rests in the sound discretion of the trial court. People v. Lovejoy, 235 Ill. 2d\n\n97 (2009). However, \"when the issue is whether the applicable law was correctly conveyed by\n\nthe instructions to the jury, the appropriate standard of review on appeal is de novo.\" People v.\n\nMax, 2012 IL App (3d) 110385, ¶ 52.\n\n¶ 20 In the instant case, the defendant was charged with felony resisting arrest under section\n\n31-1(a-7) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Code). 720 ILCS 5/31-1(a-7) (West 2010). To secure a\n\nconviction under section 31-1(a-7) of the Code, the State was required to prove beyond a\n\nreasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly resisted or obstructed a peace officer in the\n\nperformance of an authorized act within his capacity and the defendant's \"violation was the\n\nproximate cause of an injury to a peace officer.\" 720 ILCS 5/31-1(a), (a-7) (West 2010).\n\n¶ 21 In a jury trial, the court must instruct the jurors, using the IPI Criminal Instructions, when\n\napplicable. Ill. S. Ct. R. 451(a) (eff. July 1, 2006). Two IPI Criminal instructions are pertinent to\n\nthe offense of resisting a peace officer. IPI Criminal 4th No. 22.13 states:\n\n \"A person commits the offense of resisting or obstructing a [ (peace officer) *** ]\n\n when he knowingly resists or obstructs the performance of any authorized act within the\n\n official capacity of one known to him to be a [ (peace officer) *** ].\" IPI Criminal 4th\n\n No. 22.13.\n\n\n 6\n\fAnalogously, IPI Criminal 4th No. 22.14 lists the elements for a misdemeanor charge of resisting\n\na peace officer as follows:\n\n \"To sustain the charge of resisting or obstructing a [ (peace officer) *** ], the\n\n State must prove the following propositions:\n\n First Proposition: That _____ was a [ (peace officer) *** ]; and\n\n Second Proposition: That the defendant knew _____ was a [ (peace officer) *** ];\n\n and\n\n Third Proposition: That the defendant knowingly resisted or obstructed the\n\n performance by ____ of an authorized act within his official capacity.\n\n If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each one of these\n\n propositions has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, you should find the defendant\n\n guilty.\n\n If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that any one of these\n\n propositions has not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, you should find the\n\n defendant not guilty.\" IPI Criminal 4th No. 22.14.\n\nThe committee notes to these instructions are silent on the changes necessary for a felony\n\ncharge.1\n\n¶ 22 In the present case, the trial court instructed the jury on the resisting arrest charge using\n\n\n 1\n We note that Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 4.24 (4th ed. Supp. 2011)\n\n(hereinafter, IPI Criminal 4th No. 4.24 (Supp. 2011)) defines \"proximate cause.\" The committee\n\nnote to IPI Criminal 4th No. 4.24 cites to the \"proximate cause\" language in section 31-1(a-7) of\n\nthe Code, but does not provide a cross-reference to IPI Criminal 4th Nos. 22.13 or 22.14.\n\n 7\n\fthe unmodified versions of IPI Criminal 4th Nos. 22.13 and 22.14. Consequently, the trial court\n\nfailed to instruct the jury on an essential element of the offense: that the defendant's violation was\n\nthe proximate cause of injury to a peace officer. The court's omission of the proximate cause\n\nelement was error.\n\n¶ 23 B. Plain Error\n\n¶ 24 Having found error, we must next determine whether it is reversible error, i.e., whether\n\neither prong of the plain error test has been satisfied such that we may overlook the defendant's\n\nprocedural default. We may overlook the defendant's procedural default if: (1) the evidence is so\n\nclosely balanced that the error alone threatened to tip the scales of justice against the defendant,\n\nregardless of the seriousness of the error; or (2) the error is so serious that it affected the fairness\n\nof the defendant's trial and challenged the integrity of the judicial process, regardless of the\n\ncloseness of the evidence. People v. Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d 551 (2007). \"The defendant bears\n\nthe burden of persuasion under both prongs of the plain-error analysis.\" People v. Wilmington,\n\n2013 IL 112938, ¶ 43.\n\n¶ 25 In this case, the defendant has satisfied his burden of proving that the trial court's error\n\nwas reversible plain error under the second prong of the analysis. The second prong of the plain\n\nerror doctrine permits review and reversal of otherwise unpreserved errors that erode the integrity\n\nof the judicial process and undermine the fairness of a defendant's trial. Sargent, 239 Ill. 2d 166.\n\nFundamental fairness requires trial courts to see \"to it that certain basic instructions, essential to a\n\nfair determination of the case by the jury, are given.\" People v. Ogunsola, 87 Ill. 2d 216, 222\n\n(1981). The failure to inform the jury of the elements of the crime charged is so grave and\n\nfundamental that the waiver rule should not apply. See People v. Hari, 218 Ill. 2d 275 (2006);\n\n\n 8\n\fOgunsola, 87 Ill. 2d 216; People v. Hale, 2012 IL App (4th) 100949.\n\n¶ 26 A conviction under section 31-1(a-7) of the Code required the jury to find, inter alia, that\n\nthe defendant's violation was the proximate cause of an injury to Martinez. 720 ILCS 5/31-1(a),\n\n(a-7) (West 2010). The trial court failed to instruct the jury on that element. The element had to\n\nbe proved beyond a reasonable doubt because it elevated the sentencing range. People v.\n\nCervantes, 408 Ill. App. 3d 906 (2011). The defendant is entitled to a jury determination of\n\nevery element of the crime with which he is charged beyond a reasonable doubt. See Apprendi v.\n\nNew Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). The trial court's omission removed from the jury's\n\nconsideration an element essential to the determination of the defendant's guilt or innocence. See\n\nOgunsola, 87 Ill. 2d 216. Furthermore, the defendant's acquittal of the aggravated battery charge,\n\nwhich required proof of bodily harm, suggests that the jury did not find that Martinez was\n\ninjured. See 720 ILCS 5/12-4(b)(18) (West 2010). As a result, we remand the cause for a new\n\ntrial before a properly instructed jury.\n\n¶ 27 CONCLUSION\n\n¶ 28 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Kankakee County is\n\nreversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings.\n\n¶ 29 Reversed and remanded.\n\n\n\n\n 9\n\f", "ocr": false, "opinion_id": 1043513 } ]
Appellate Court of Illinois
Appellate Court of Illinois
SA
Illinois, IL
1,043,501
null
2013-10-01
false
people-v-woods
Woods
People v. Woods
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
0
Published
null
null
[ "2013 IL App (4th) 120372" ]
[ { "author_str": null, "per_curiam": false, "type": "010combined", "page_count": 8, "download_url": "http://www.state.il.us/court/Opinions/AppellateCourt/2013/4thDistrict/4120372.pdf", "author_id": null, "opinion_text": " ILLINOIS OFFICIAL REPORTS\n Appellate Court\n\n\n\n\n People v. Woods, 2013 IL App (4th) 120372\n\n\n\n\nAppellate Court THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.\nCaption JOHNATHAN NORMEL WOODS, Defendant-Appellant.\n\n\n\nDistrict & No. Fourth District\n Docket No. 4-12-0372\n\n\nFiled August 28, 2013\n\n\nHeld The trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to suppress the\n(Note: This syllabus cocaine discovered in defendant’s pocket following a “consensual\nconstitutes no part of encounter” when an officer questioned defendant and his companion,\nthe opinion of the court who were sitting in a parked car in a public housing project, since the\nbut has been prepared officer could verify defendant’s right to be on the project’s grounds, he\nby the Reporter of did nothing to convey to defendant that he had been seized, and even\nDecisions for the though the officer had grounds for a Terry patdown, he asked for and\nconvenience of the received defendant’s consent to pat him down before he found the\nreader.)\n cocaine.\n\n\nDecision Under Appeal from the Circuit Court of McLean County, No. 11-CF-403; the\nReview Hon. Robert L. Freitag, Judge, presiding.\n\n\n\nJudgment Affirmed.\n\fCounsel on Michael J. Pelletier, Karen Munoz, and Kelly M. Weston, all of State\nAppeal Appellate Defender’s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.\n\n Jason Chambers, State’s Attorney, of Bloomington (Patrick Delfino,\n Robert J. Biderman, and Luke McNeill, all of State’s Attorneys Appellate\n Prosecutor’s Office, of counsel), for the People.\n\n\nPanel PRESIDING JUSTICE STEIGMANN delivered the judgment of the\n court, with opinion.\n Justices Appleton and Turner concurred in the judgment and opinion.\n\n\n\n OPINION\n\n¶1 In May 2011, the State charged defendant, Johnathan Normel Woods, with unlawful\n possession of a controlled substance (less than 15 grams of a substance containing cocaine)\n (720 ILCS 570/402(c) (West 2010)). Shortly thereafter, defendant filed a motion to suppress,\n arguing that the police violated his fourth-amendment right to be free from unreasonable\n searches and seizures. Following a July 2011 hearing, the trial court denied defendant’s\n motion to suppress.\n¶2 In November 2011, following a stipulated bench trial, the trial court convicted defendant\n of unlawful possession of a controlled substance (less than 15 grams of a substance\n containing cocaine) (720 ILCS 570/402(c) (West 2010)). In February 2012, the court\n sentenced defendant to five years in prison.\n¶3 Defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress.\n We disagree and affirm.\n\n¶4 I. BACKGROUND\n¶5 In May 2011, the State charged defendant with unlawful possession of a controlled\n substance (less than 15 grams of a substance containing cocaine) (720 ILCS 570/402(c)\n (West 2010)). Shortly thereafter, defendant filed a motion to suppress, arguing that the police\n violated his fourth-amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. In\n July 2011, the trial court conducted a hearing on defendant’s motion, at which the parties\n presented the following evidence.\n\n¶6 A. The Evidence Presented at the July 2011 Hearing\n on Defendant’s Motion To Suppress\n¶7 In May 2011, defendant and his girlfriend, Qyanna Jackson, were sitting in a parked\n vehicle in front of Jackson’s apartment, which was in the Sunnyside Housing Complex. (The\n\n -2-\n\f Sunnyside Housing Complex is part of the Bloomington Housing Authority.) Officer Elias\n Mendiola, who was on routine patrol, stopped his squad car in an adjacent parking spot and\n approached the vehicle. Mendiola found defendant sitting in the driver’s seat and Jackson\n sitting in the passenger seat of the vehicle. Mendiola began questioning the couple from the\n driver’s window to make sure they were allowed to be on the housing complex grounds. (A\n second officer arrived shortly thereafter to speak specifically with Jackson from the\n passenger window.)\n¶8 Mendiola asked to see defendant’s identification to verify that he was permitted to be in\n the housing complex. Defendant responded that he did not have identification and told\n Mendiola that his name was “John Jones.” Jackson provided her housing identification,\n verifying that she lived at the Sunnyside Housing Complex. Jackson explained to Mendiola\n that defendant was her guest.\n¶9 Mendiola testified that he submitted the names provided by the couple to dispatch.\n Dispatch responded that those names came back “clear.” Although skeptical of the name\n defendant provided, Mendiola did not pursue it further because defendant appeared nervous.\n While he was speaking to defendant, Mendiola told defendant to keep his hands visible and\n then “called him out on why he was nervous.” Defendant responded, “no reason,” but\n Mendiola was concerned because of the neighborhood’s history of violence. At one point,\n defendant made a “quick movement with his right hand towards his right front pocket.”\n Mendiola said that he reiterated that he wanted defendant to keep his hands visible and that\n if he made a quick movement like that again, he would “produce a weapon” because he\n would “assume [he was] going for a weapon.” Mendiola then asked defendant for consent\n to pat him down. Defendant consented and exited the vehicle so that Mendiola could do so.\n¶ 10 Mendiola escorted defendant to the rear of Jackson’s vehicle, where he initiated the pat\n down. When Mendiola “got to the waistband area,” defendant started looking down and\n appeared nervous again; defendant was “trembling.” Mendiola then asked defendant for\n consent to search his right front pocket, and defendant consented. That search revealed two\n rocks of cocaine inside some cellophane. Mendiola thereafter arrested defendant. After being\n read his rights at the police station, defendant confirmed that he consented to the pat-down\n search.\n¶ 11 Although the general account of the events outlined by Mendiola was consistent with that\n of defendant and Jackson, their testimony differed from Mendiola’s account in some\n significant ways. According to them, defendant never reached for his pocket while he was\n in the vehicle–indeed, he was “playing on his phone” and “lit a cigarette.” Both defendant\n and Jackson also (1) insisted that defendant was not nervous and (2) testified that Mendiola\n threatened to shoot defendant if he did not stop moving. Defendant testified that he never\n consented to being searched because Mendiola never asked for consent; instead, Mendiola\n asked him to exit the vehicle and move to the rear of the vehicle where Mendiola patted him\n down. Jackson testified that the officers told her that she “could get out of the car” and told\n her to sit “over by [her] residence.”\n\n\n\n\n -3-\n\f¶ 12 B. The Trial Court’s Findings Following the\n Hearing on Defendant’s Motion To Suppress\n¶ 13 On this evidence, the trial court denied defendant’s motion to suppress, finding as\n follows:\n “Well, the Court would first note that it finds Officer Mendiola to be a credible\n witness and believes his version of events. The question i[n] considering his testimony\n [is] whether he acted within the law. This is a different situation than had he just\n encountered the defendant on the street somewhere. This is a public housing situation\n where the officers have a legal right to check with people who are on the property ***\n to determine whether they have a right to be there since it can be a violation in and of\n itself just to be present on the property [i]f you do not have a proper ID or are not the\n guest of someone who does. So clearly the officer in approaching the car initially to\n check on the folks who were in the car is appropriate and proper.\n The sequence of events after that, this is an experienced police officer, he’s in\n uniform, he is in, even though it’s the morning time, he is in a known high crime area\n where there are many problems with shootings, gangs, drugs *** and he has worked for\n many, many years, and his testimony is that the responses he got initially from the\n defendant were very suspicious. Now, we don’t really get to prove up that they were\n accurate observations by the fact that they turned out to be true later on. However,\n whether they turned out to be true or not is not really the issue.\n The issue is what was he confronted with at that point? Did he have some reason\n based on the behavior of the defendant, the manner in which he gave his name and so\n forth, and the manner in which he was acting to continue the interview for a period of\n time, and also to make the request for a pat-down search[?] The defendant was not only\n acting nervous, but he was also making further movements with his hand that cause the\n officer to have a problem.\n I don’t agree with [defense counsel’s] analysis that once the officer learned that\n [Jackson] lived there, and there was no real testimony from the officer that he was shown\n an ID or had a valid proof of that other than that she said something to that affect, but\n still he mentioned, as is the case, that there’s checking to be done to see if a person is on\n the banned list. If the person is banned from the housing area, it doesn’t make any\n difference if they were a guest, then they would be subject to being arrested for trespass,\n or at least being asked to leave the premises. He had not had time to do that, so he was\n making a further check.\n He would have been justified at that point to make a pat-down of the defendant for\n weapons without consent, but he asked for and received consent while he was still\n appropriately investigating the issue, and the defendant voluntarily stepped out of the car,\n was patted down, and during the course of the pat-down he received permission to check\n inside the pocket. Ordinarily, if the pat-down itself did not produce something that might\n possibly be a weapon, there might be an issue here. But he received further permission\n to check in the pocket and discovered the cocaine here.\n The later issues with the false name and clearing that up are really kind of irrelevant\n\n -4-\n\f other than the fact that the defendant’s initial nervousness, which was to such an extent\n that the officer had concerns enough to continue his investigation and want a pat-down.\n Civil libertarians would say harassment. Many a police officer is no longer with us by\n ignoring the kind of signs that this officer got that day and didn’t take adequate\n precautions and learned too late that a person may have been armed or dangerous to an\n extent that it was not immediately apparent. The Court will deny the motion to suppress\n for the reasons stated.”\n\n¶ 14 C. Defendant’s November 2011 Stipulated\n Bench Trial and Subsequent Sentence\n¶ 15 Following a November 2011 stipulated bench trial, the trial court convicted defendant\n of unlawful possession of a controlled substance (less than 15 grams of a substance\n containing cocaine) (720 ILCS 570/402(c) (West 2010)). In February 2012, the court\n sentenced defendant to five years in prison.\n\n¶ 16 II. ANALYSIS\n¶ 17 Defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress.\n Specifically, defendant contends that Mendiola violated his fourth amendment right to be\n free from unreasonable searches and seizures when Mendiola exceeded the scope of the\n initial stop. Alternatively, defendant asserts that even if Mendiola did not exceed the scope\n of the initial stop, defendant’s consent to search was involuntary. We disagree on both points,\n turning first to the fourth amendment and our standard of review.\n\n¶ 18 A. The Fourth Amendment and the Standard of Review\n¶ 19 The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution protects the “right of the people\n to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and\n seizures.” U.S. Const., amend. IV; accord Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 6. Accordingly, the\n guarantees of the fourth amendment attach where a “search” or “seizure” takes place. “ ‘A\n “search” occurs when an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider\n reasonable is infringed.’ ” People v. Bartelt, 241 Ill. 2d 217, 226 (2011) (quoting United\n States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984)). However, a “seizure” occurs when “ ‘the\n police conduct would have communicated to a reasonable person that the person was not free\n to decline the officers’ requests or otherwise terminate the encounter.’ ” Bartelt, 241 Ill. 2d\n at 226 (quoting Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 439 (1991)).\n¶ 20 When reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, a reviewing court\n utilizes a two-part test, under which the court’s factual findings may be rejected only if they\n are against the manifest weight of the evidence. People v. Harris, 228 Ill. 2d 222, 230 (2008).\n However, when reviewing those established facts in relation to the issues presented, a\n reviewing court may draw its own conclusions in deciding what relief, if any, should be\n granted. Id. Accordingly, a reviewing court reviews de novo the court’s ultimate ruling as to\n whether suppression is warranted. Id.\n\n\n -5-\n\f¶ 21 B. Defendant’s Claim That Mendiola\n Unconstitutionally Seized Him\n¶ 22 Defendant contends that Mendiola violated his fourth amendment right to be free from\n unreasonable searches and seizures by exceeding the scope of the initial stop. We disagree.\n¶ 23 Initially, we note that defendant’s characterization of his interaction with Mendiola as a\n “stop” is inaccurate insofar as that characterization implies that defendant was seized when\n Mendiola approached defendant. (The State inexplicably accepts the defendant’s\n characterization of the encounter as a “stop” in its brief, describing the encounter as a “stop\n [that] was not impermissibly prolonged.”) Contrary to the parties’ characterization, no stop\n occurred in this case. When Mendiola parked his vehicle next to defendant and Jackson,\n walked up to Jackson’s vehicle (where defendant was in the driver’s seat), and began asking\n defendant questions, Mendiola and defendant were engaged in a classic “consensual\n encounter.”\n¶ 24 It is “well settled” that not every encounter between police and private citizens results in\n a seizure. People v. Luedemann, 222 Ill. 2d 530, 544 (2006). Police-citizen encounters are\n divided into the following three “tiers”: (1) arrests, which must be supported by probable\n cause; (2) brief investigative detentions, or “Terry stops,” which must be supported by\n reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity (Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)); and\n (3) encounters that involve no coercion or detention and thus do not implicate fourth-\n amendment interests. Luedemann, 222 Ill. 2d at 544-48 (adding that the so-called\n “community caretaking” doctrine is analytically distinct from consensual encounters because\n it is invoked to validate a search or seizure only after the determination of whether a search\n or seizure had taken place).\n¶ 25 Having outlined the three tiers of police-citizen encounters, we turn to the encounter\n between defendant and Mendiola in this case.\n¶ 26 In this context, an individual is “seized” for purposes of the fourth amendment when an\n officer “by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the\n liberty of a citizen.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Luedemann, 222 Ill. 2d at 550. The\n appropriate inquiry here is whether a reasonable, innocent person would feel free to decline\n the officer’s requests or otherwise terminate the encounter. Id. (explaining that this is the\n appropriate test for a person seated in a parked car who is approached by a police officer).\n Citing Professor Wayne LaFave (4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 9.4(a), at 419-21\n (4th ed. 2004)), the supreme court explained why a consensual encounter is not a seizure, as\n follows:\n “[T]he police may approach and question a person seated in a parked vehicle without that\n encounter being labeled a seizure. As Professor LaFave has noted, ‘if an officer merely\n walks up to a person standing or sitting in a public place (or, indeed, who is seated in a\n vehicle located in a public place) and puts a question to him, this alone does not\n constitute a seizure.’ 4 W. LaFave, Search & Seizure § 9.4(a), at 419-21 (4th ed. 2004).\n The ‘seated in a vehicle’ clause of the above passage is supported by a lengthy list of\n citations to the many state and federal decisions that have recognized this rule. See 4 W.\n\n -6-\n\f LaFave, Search & Seizure § 9.4(a), at 419-20, 420 n.49 (collecting cases). In Murray, this\n court held that the mere approaching and questioning of a person seated in a parked\n vehicle does not constitute a seizure and listed many decisions from other jurisdictions\n that had reached the same conclusion. [People v.] Murray, 137 Ill. 2d [382], 391-93\n [(1990)]. Thus, any analysis of such a situation must begin with the recognition that the\n police may approach a person seated in a parked vehicle and ask questions of that person\n without that encounter being labeled a seizure. The encounter becomes a seizure only if\n the officer, through physical force or a show of authority, restrains the liberty of the\n vehicle’s occupant. See Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434 ***.” Luedemann, 222 Ill. 2d at 552-53.\n¶ 27 The encounter in this case was a textbook consensual encounter. Mendiola parked\n adjacent to Jackson’s vehicle without illuminating the lights on his squad car and approached\n defendant only to inquire as to whether defendant was permitted to be on the grounds of the\n housing complex. In so doing, Mendiola demonstrated no physical force or show of authority\n that would have in any way made a reasonable, innocent person feel like he was not free to\n decline the officer’s request or otherwise terminate the encounter. Accordingly, we conclude\n that the encounter between defendant and Mendiola was a consensual encounter; thus, the\n fourth amendment simply does not apply. See People v. Green, 301 Ill. App. 3d 767, 771\n (1998) (concluding that because nothing about the encounter between the defendant and the\n police was coercive or somehow involved the use of physical force or a show of authority,\n the fourth amendment did not apply).\n¶ 28 Moreover, assuming arguendo that the encounter progressed to a “tier two” encounter\n when Mendiola indicated to defendant that if he made another “quick” movement, he would\n “produce a weapon” (see United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 559 (1980) (indicating\n that the use of language or tone of voice indicating compliance with the officer’s request\n might be compelled is one of many factors to be considered when determining whether a\n seizure has occurred)), the version of events as found by the trial court demonstrates that by\n that time, any potential seizure of defendant was supported by the requisite reasonable,\n articulable suspicion of criminal activity. During their conversation, defendant (1) provided\n a false name, (2) was in a high-crime area, (3) appeared to Mendiola to be very nervous, and\n (4) made a “quick” movement toward his pocket that Mendiola considered potentially\n threatening. Under the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that any potential seizure\n subsequent to the consensual encounter was constitutional as a brief investigatory detention,\n or “Terry stop.”\n\n¶ 29 C. Defendant’s Alternative Claim That His\n Consent To Search Was Involuntary\n¶ 30 Alternatively, defendant contends that even if Mendiola did not exceed the scope of the\n initial encounter, his consent to search was involuntary. Specifically, defendant asserts that\n his consent to be searched was involuntary because Mendiola’s behavior “conveyed the\n message that compliance with any subsequent request was required.” We disagree.\n¶ 31 Contrary to defendant’s contentions, Mendiola’s actions in this case did not convey to\n defendant that he had no choice but to allow him to search. Indeed, the evidence presented\n\n -7-\n\f at the hearing on the motion to suppress demonstrated the contrary. Although, as previously\n explained, Mendiola had the requisite reasonable, articulable suspicion to conduct a Terry\n pat-down, Mendiola nonetheless asked defendant, while defendant was still sitting in\n Jackson’s vehicle, for consent to pat him down. Defendant voluntarily exited the vehicle and\n agreed to the pat-down, during which Mendiola asked defendant for consent to reach inside\n of defendant’s right front pocket. Defendant again consented. Mendiola never drew his\n weapon, threatened defendant, or used any other technique that would indicate to a\n reasonable person that compliance with his requests was mandatory. Defendant’s claim that\n he was somehow forced to consent because of Mendiola’s actions–which were standard\n policing techniques–is entirely unpersuasive.\n\n¶ 32 III. CONCLUSION\n¶ 33 Because we reject defendant’s contentions that (1) Mendiola violated his fourth\n amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures when Mendiola\n exceeded the scope of the initial encounter and (2) his consent to be searched was\n involuntary, we conclude that the trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to suppress.\n¶ 34 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. As part of our judgment, we\n grant the State its $50 statutory assessment as costs of this appeal.\n\n¶ 35 Affirmed.\n\n\n\n\n -8-\n\f", "ocr": false, "opinion_id": 1043501 } ]
Appellate Court of Illinois
Appellate Court of Illinois
SA
Illinois, IL
367,484
null
1979-07-06
false
brown-v-u-s-court-of-appeals-for-ninth-circuit
Brown
Brown v. U. S. Court of Appeals for Ninth Circuit
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
0
Unpublished
null
null
[ "601 F.2d 579" ]
[ { "author_str": null, "per_curiam": false, "type": "010combined", "page_count": null, "download_url": "http://bulk.resource.org/courts.gov/c/F2/601/601.F2d.579.78-8459.html", "author_id": null, "opinion_text": "601 F.2d 579\n Brownv.U. S. Court of Appeals for Ninth Circuit\n No. 78-8459\n United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit\n 7/6/79\n \n 1\n E.D.Va.\n \n AFFIRMED\n ", "ocr": false, "opinion_id": 367484 } ]
Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
F
USA, Federal
1,043,552
null
2013-09-24
false
people-v-buckner
Buckner
People v. Buckner
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
0
Unpublished
null
null
[ "2013 IL App (2d) 130083" ]
[ { "author_str": null, "per_curiam": false, "type": "010combined", "page_count": 14, "download_url": "http://www.state.il.us/court/Opinions/AppellateCourt/2013/2ndDistrict/2130083.pdf", "author_id": null, "opinion_text": " 2013 IL App (2d) 130083\n No. 2-13-0083\n Opinion filed September 24, 2013\n______________________________________________________________________________\n\n IN THE\n\n APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS\n\n SECOND DISTRICT\n______________________________________________________________________________\n\nTHE PEOPLE OF THE STATE ) Appeal from the Circuit Court\nOF ILLINOIS, ) of Du Page County.\n )\n Plaintiff-Appellee, )\n )\nv. ) No. 09-CF-1941\n )\nBRIDGETTE L. BUCKNER, ) Honorable\n ) John J. Kinsella,\n Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding.\n______________________________________________________________________________\n\n JUSTICE JORGENSEN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.\n Presiding Justice Burke and Justice Hutchinson concurred in the judgment and opinion.\n\n OPINION\n\n¶1 Defendant, Bridgette L. Buckner, pleaded guilty to two counts of insurance fraud (720 ILCS\n\n5/46-1(a) (West 2008)) and one count of wire fraud (720 ILCS 5/17-24(a)(1)(A) (West 2008)). The\n\ncircuit court of Du Page County sentenced her to eight years’ imprisonment. On appeal, she\n\ncontends that two of her convictions should have been merged under the one-act, one-crime doctrine\n\nand that the trial court abused its discretion in giving her consecutive sentences under section 5-8-\n\n4(b) of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(b) (West 2008)). Because defendant\n\nforfeited any challenge to her convictions under the one-act, one-crime rule when she failed to file\n\f2013 IL App (2d) 130083\n\n\na motion to withdraw her guilty plea, and because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in\n\nimposing consecutive sentences pursuant to section 5-8-4(b), we affirm.\n\n¶2 I. BACKGROUND\n\n¶3 Defendant was indicted on two counts of insurance fraud (720 ILCS 5/46-1(a) (West 2008)),\n\ntwo counts of wire fraud (720 ILCS 5/17-24(a)(1)(A), (B)(i) (West 2008)), and two counts of mail\n\nfraud (720 ILCS 5/17-24(b)(1) (West 2008)) related to her submission of two fraudulent life\n\ninsurance claims through her previous employer. Pursuant to an agreement with the State, defendant\n\npleaded guilty to count I (insurance fraud), count II (insurance fraud), and count IV (wire fraud), and\n\nthe remaining counts were nol-prossed.\n\n¶4 At the guilty plea proceeding, defendant’s attorney characterized the guilty plea as a “blind\n\nplea.” However, the State moved to nol-pros the remaining counts “based upon [defendant’s] plea.”\n\nFurther, the trial court, in admonishing defendant, referred several times to the plea “agreement.”\n\nThe trial court also advised defendant that the remaining charges would be dismissed “pursuant to\n\n[her] plea.” The trial court added that there was “no agreement as to what the sentence [would] be.”\n\nAfter being admonished, defendant “accept[ed] the agreement.”\n\n¶5 Defendant failed to personally appear on the original date for sentencing, and the matter was\n\ncontinued. On the next sentencing date, the trial court found that defendant, who was absent again,\n\nhad willfully failed to appear. The trial court conducted the sentencing in defendant’s absence,\n\nalthough her attorney was present.\n\n¶6 The following facts are taken from the sentencing hearing. Defendant began working for\n\nHallmark Insurance Corporation (Hallmark) in March 2008. As part of her employment, she\n\nenrolled in a life insurance plan for her husband in the amount of $15,000 and for each of her three\n\n\n\n -2-\n\f2013 IL App (2d) 130083\n\n\nchildren in the amount of $10,000. In April 2008, defendant submitted a claim for life insurance,\n\nsupported by a death certificate for the purported death of one of her children. The claim was\n\napproved, and she received a check for $10,000. She was also paid for five days of bereavement\n\nleave based on the death of her child.\n\n¶7 In September 2008, on the day before she was scheduled to return to work after an injury-\n\nrelated absence, she called into work and stated that her husband, who was an FBI agent, had been\n\nkilled in the line of duty. She thereafter made a claim for the $15,000 death benefit under the life\n\ninsurance policy at Hallmark. In doing so, she included her husband’s death certificate.\n\n¶8 After defendant claimed the life insurance based on her husband’s asserted death, Hallmark\n\ncontacted the security department at its parent company. The security department initiated an\n\ninvestigation into both of defendant’s life insurance claims. The investigation revealed that\n\ndefendant had submitted a fraudulent death certificate in support of each of those claims. The death\n\ncertificates had been signed by a medical representative who had not been with the health department\n\nfor many years and by a funeral director who had not been associated with the particular funeral\n\nhome for seven or eight years. The death certificates appeared as though they had been “whited out\n\nand retyped.”\n\n¶9 The investigators interviewed defendant at the end of September 2008. Initially, defendant\n\ndenied submitting false claims for life insurance benefits as to both her child and her husband. It was\n\nonly after the two investigators stated that they were retired FBI agents, and would know if her\n\nhusband had been killed in the line of duty, that defendant confessed that both life insurance claims\n\nwere false. Although defendant offered to pay back the $10,000, she admitted she did not have that\n\namount of money.\n\n\n\n -3-\n\f2013 IL App (2d) 130083\n\n\n¶ 10 Further evidence showed that employees at Hallmark had been very sympathetic about\n\ndefendant’s child’s death and had collected money and given it to defendant. Defendant had also\n\nsubmitted her own short-term disability claim based on her husband’s death. It was also learned that\n\ndefendant had forged the college diploma that she included with her employment application at\n\nHallmark.\n\n¶ 11 Defendant had previously submitted life insurance claims on her husband and children when\n\nshe worked for an employer known as HSBC. She was paid over $60,000 on those claims in 2007.\n\nIn that situation, she used altered documents that were similar to, and contained the “same misspelled\n\nwords” as, those that she had submitted in this case.\n\n¶ 12 One of Hallmark’s investigators discovered that, after leaving her employment at Hallmark,\n\ndefendant went to work for a company named LifeWatch. While at the new company, defendant\n\nclaimed that one of her children, whom she had sought life insurance benefits on twice before, had\n\ndied. Although defendant did not have any life insurance on that child, she did receive an outpouring\n\nof sympathy and some flowers. One of the investigators opined that, based on her experience, the\n\nfalse insurance claims at the three employers showed that defendant was “out to commit fraud with\n\neach employer that she went to work for.”\n\n¶ 13 A postal inspector assigned to investigate mail fraud was advised by a bank investigator in\n\n2009 that defendant was suspected of fraudulently obtaining a credit card in someone else’s name.\n\nThe investigation revealed that defendant had created three fraudulent bank accounts from which she\n\nobtained several thousand dollars.\n\n¶ 14 In 2010, as part of that mail fraud investigation, the Streamwood police department stopped\n\ndefendant as she was driving. During the traffic stop, defendant presented a driver’s license in her\n\n\n\n -4-\n\f2013 IL App (2d) 130083\n\n\nmother’s name. After persisting that she was her mother, defendant eventually admitted her true\n\nidentity at the police station.\n\n¶ 15 The police inventoried defendant’s vehicle and discovered a credit card in someone else’s\n\nname, a wallet containing a driver’s license of someone other than defendant, and numerous slips\n\nof paper and envelopes containing the personal information, such as addresses, social security\n\nnumbers, and birth dates, of approximately 40 people who had worked with defendant at LifeWatch.\n\nIt was later determined that defendant had defrauded about 16 of those people for over $34,000.\n\n¶ 16 An investigator from the Du Page County State’s Attorney’s Office, in attempting to locate\n\ndefendant after she had failed to appear at her sentencing, discovered that the address she had\n\nprovided as part of her presentence report was for her mother’s residence at a senior living facility.\n\nThere was no evidence that defendant had ever lived at that address, and, according to the terms of\n\nthe lease, she would not have been allowed to live there.\n\n¶ 17 After hearing arguments, the trial court imposed sentence, noting that the “facts [were]\n\nparticularly egregious in terms of the audacity of [defendant’s] conduct.” The trial court observed\n\nthat defendant committed a similar fraud while employed at HSBC and that she was involved in\n\nongoing fraudulent behavior when she was arrested in this case. The trial court was concerned that\n\ndefendant had perpetrated a fraud on the court by providing a false address as part of the preparation\n\nof the presentence report, which the court found “particularly aggravating, and also suggestive of her\n\ncharacter and consistent with her being engaged in ongoing and continuing fraud.” The trial court\n\nwas also troubled by “the sickening karma of suggesting the death of your own child as a means of\n\nobtaining money by fraud,” noting that she “apparently did it more than once.” The trial court\n\ncharacterized all of that as “very aggravating.”\n\n\n\n -5-\n\f2013 IL App (2d) 130083\n\n\n¶ 18 The trial court also stated that the series of fraud engaged in by defendant was “quite\n\nastonishing” and that defendant’s recent behavior was “not evidence to any great potential for\n\nrehabilitation.” The trial court further commented that her perpetration of a fraud on the court was\n\n“probably the highest or most significant sign of an inability to be rehabilitated.”\n\n¶ 19 In considering the mitigation evidence, the trial court noted that defendant caused no bodily\n\ninjury, that she had no arrest record, and that she had spent most of her life with no contact with the\n\ncriminal justice system. The trial court pointed out that defendant’s criminal conduct, based on the\n\nevidence before it, did not commence until the “last several years.”\n\n¶ 20 The trial court imposed a sentence in absentia of five years’ imprisonment on count I, a\n\nconsecutive sentence of five years in prison on count II, and a concurrent prison sentence of four\n\nyears on count IV. Defendant was subsequently located and taken into custody.\n\n¶ 21 Defendant thereafter filed a motion to reconsider the sentence, which the trial court denied.\n\nIn doing so, the trial court stated that it had imposed consecutive sentences pursuant to section 5-8-4.\n\nThe trial court explained that the consecutive sentences were necessary to protect the public from\n\ndefendant’s further criminal conduct and that it believed that it had “made the record” in that regard.\n\nThe trial court added that “in this instance, [it had] already alluded to both the offense the defendant\n\ncommitted and the nature of the offense as well” and “[t]he defendant’s fraudulent behavior both\n\nbefore the commission of these offenses and subsequent.” The trial court emphasized that it\n\nconsidered the fact that defendant attempted to evade sentencing and punishment as one of the “more\n\nsignificant considerations.” Lastly, the trial court stated that the fact that defendant intended the\n\nconsequences of her conduct was “particularly egregious.” Defendant appealed the denial of her\n\nmotion to reconsider the sentence.\n\n\n\n -6-\n\f2013 IL App (2d) 130083\n\n\n¶ 22 On appeal, this court remanded the case because trial counsel had failed to file a proper\n\ncertificate under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(d) (eff. July 1, 2006). See People v. Buckner,\n\n2012 IL App (2d) 111023-U, ¶ 3. On remand, defendant filed a second motion to reconsider the\n\nsentence. Before this court issued its mandate, the trial court denied the second motion to reconsider\n\nthe sentence, and defendant appealed again.\n\n¶ 23 In that appeal, this court vacated the trial court’s order denying defendant’s second motion\n\nto reconsider the sentence, because the order was entered before we issued our mandate. We\n\nsummarily remanded the case. See People v. Buckner, No. 2-12-0486 (Dec. 4, 2012) (minute order).\n\nOn remand, defendant filed her third motion to reconsider the sentence. In that motion, defendant\n\nargued, among other things, that count I was a Class 3 felony as opposed to a Class 2 felony, that the\n\nconvictions on count II and count IV should be merged under the one-act, one-crime doctrine, and\n\nthat consecutive sentences were improper.\n\n¶ 24 At the hearing on defendant’s third motion to reconsider the sentence, the State conceded that\n\ncount I was a Class 3 felony. As for the one-act, one-crime contention, the trial court recalled that\n\nthe sentence “was basically a five plus five and the four would have merged with the five.” The trial\n\ncourt added that it “[did not] dispute [defendant’s] position on that” and that “it [did not] believe [it]\n\nimposed any additional time for that offense.”\n\n¶ 25 On the issue of consecutive sentencing, the trial court stated that the evidence “reflected a\n\nperiod of time in which the defendant engaged not only in this fraudulent behavior but in other\n\nbehavior that was fraudulent or intended to result in fraudulent acquisition of money or property of\n\nother folks.” The trial court further explained that it had found in aggravation that defendant had\n\nattempted to avoid the sentence and the consequences of her guilty plea by her absence from the\n\n\n\n -7-\n\f2013 IL App (2d) 130083\n\n\nsentencing proceedings. The trial court recalled “a significant amount of aggravation that justified\n\nthe sentence that [it] imposed at the time.”\n\n¶ 26 The trial court recognized the mitigating evidence that was put forth at sentencing “in terms\n\nof the defendant’s family background, religious affiliations and beliefs” and accepted “her\n\nrepresentation of redemption and hopes to come to grips with the fraudulent behavior.” However,\n\nthe trial court emphasized that defendant’s “fraudulent behavior was pretty outrageous and audacious\n\nin terms of the nature of what she did, which [did] not speak well for her.”\n\n¶ 27 Following its comments, the trial court stated that the sentence “with regards to Counts 2 and\n\n4 will stand.” It reduced the sentence on count I from five years’ imprisonment to three years in\n\nprison. It further stated that the sentences on counts I and II would be consecutive and that the\n\nsentence on count IV would be concurrent. Defendant filed this timely appeal.\n\n¶ 28 II. ANALYSIS\n\n¶ 29 Defendant first contends that the conviction on count IV should have been merged with the\n\nconviction on count II under the one-act, one-crime rule. The State disagrees, contending in part\n\nthat, although the issue was forfeited, it may be considered on appeal under the plain-error doctrine.\n\nWe hold, however, that the issue was forfeited and that the plain-error doctrine does not apply. See\n\nPeople v. Rogers, 364 Ill. App. 3d 229 (2006).\n\n¶ 30 In Rogers, we held that, where a defendant entered into a plea agreement that called for him\n\nto plead guilty to certain charges and the State to drop the remaining charges, and there was no\n\nagreement as to the sentence to be imposed, the defendant forfeited our consideration of his\n\ncontention of a violation of the one-act, one-crime rule by failing to file a motion to withdraw his\n\nguilty plea in the trial court. Rogers, 364 Ill. App. 3d at 246. We so held because, absent a motion\n\n\n\n -8-\n\f2013 IL App (2d) 130083\n\n\nto withdraw the guilty plea, the guilty plea remained uncontested, along with the defendant’s\n\nvoluntary relinquishment of rights, such as any claim of a violation of the one-act, one-crime rule.\n\nRogers, 364 Ill. App. 3d at 246 (citing People v. Townsell, 209 Ill. 2d 543, 547 (2004)).\n\n¶ 31 Applying Rogers to the present case, we conclude that defendant has forfeited our review of\n\nthe one-act, one-crime issue. The record of the guilty plea proceeding shows that, despite defense\n\ncounsel’s characterization of a “blind plea,” defendant agreed to plead guilty to counts I, II, and IV\n\nin exchange for the State’s agreement to nol-pros counts III, V, and VI. See Rogers, 364 Ill. App.\n\n3d at 241 (citing People v. Lumzy, 191 Ill. 2d 182, 185 (2000)) (blind pleas are those entered into\n\nwith no inducement from the State). Further, there was no agreement as to what the sentence would\n\nbe. Although defendant raised the one-act, one-crime issue in her motion to reconsider the sentence,\n\nshe sought to vacate one of her convictions without moving to withdraw her guilty plea. This is\n\nnearly identical to the scenario in Rogers. Therefore, as in Rogers, we hold that defendant has\n\nforfeited our review of her one-act, one-crime contention.\n\n¶ 32 Further, there can be no plain-error review in this particular context. In Rogers, we\n\ndistinguished People v. Moshier, 312 Ill. App. 3d 879 (2000), a case that applied plain-error analysis\n\nto a one-act, one-crime issue where the defendant filed a motion to reconsider his sentence but did\n\nnot file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Rogers, 364 Ill. App. 3d at 240. In doing so, we\n\nemphasized that the defendant in Moshier, unlike the defendant in Rogers, pleaded guilty to all of\n\nthe charges and did not have a plea agreement that obligated the State to forgo prosecuting some of\n\nthe charges in exchange for the defendant’s guilty plea to the remaining charges. Rogers, 364 Ill.\n\nApp. 3d at 244. Thus, we did not engage in any plain-error review in Rogers.\n\n\n\n\n -9-\n\f2013 IL App (2d) 130083\n\n\n¶ 33 Had we done so in Rogers, and had we granted the defendant’s request to vacate one of his\n\nconvictions without his having moved to withdraw his guilty plea, we would have created an\n\nanomaly. The defendant would have received the full benefit of his bargain under the plea\n\nagreement, while later avoiding his own obligation by unilaterally reducing the convictions to which\n\nhe had agreed. We stand by our decision in Rogers and do not apply plain-error analysis to the one-\n\nact, one-crime issue in this case in light of the plea agreement and the absence of any motion to\n\nwithdraw the plea.\n\n¶ 34 We next address the issue of whether the trial court abused its discretion in imposing\n\nconsecutive sentences on the convictions on counts I and II.1 Defendant contends that it was an\n\nabuse of discretion to impose consecutive sentences to protect the public when she had no criminal\n\nhistory, she never had the opportunity to demonstrate her rehabilitative potential, she accepted\n\nresponsibility for her conduct, and she neither caused nor threatened physical harm to anyone.\n\n¶ 35 In cases where consecutive sentences are not mandatory, such sentences should be imposed\n\nsparingly. People v. King, 384 Ill. App. 3d 601, 613 (2008). Section 5-8-4(b) of the Unified Code\n\nof Corrections provides that, other than where consecutive sentences are mandated, a concurrent\n\nsentence must be imposed, unless, considering the nature and circumstances of the offense and the\n\n\n\n 1\n In addressing this issue, we note that, although a defendant who seeks to challenge a\n\nsentence imposed pursuant to a plea agreement must move to withdraw the guilty plea, a defendant\n\nwho enters a plea agreement that calls for the dismissal of certain charges, but that is silent as to the\n\nsentence, may file a motion to reconsider the sentence without filing a motion to withdraw his guilty\n\nplea. Rogers, 364 Ill. App. 3d at 244 (citing Lumzy, 191 Ill. 2d at 187). Thus, we may consider\n\ndefendant’s challenge to the propriety of the consecutive sentences.\n\n -10-\n\f2013 IL App (2d) 130083\n\n\nhistory and character of the defendant, consecutive sentences “are required to protect the public from\n\nfurther criminal conduct by the defendant.” 730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(b) (West 2008). If the trial court\n\nimposes consecutive sentences to protect the public, it “shall set forth in the record” the basis for\n\nsuch sentences. 730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(b) (West 2008).\n\n¶ 36 Because the trial court is in the best position to consider a defendant’s credibility, demeanor,\n\ngeneral moral character, mentality, social environment, and habits, the trial court’s imposition of\n\nconsecutive sentences will not be reversed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. King, 384 Ill.\n\nApp. 3d at 613. The record must show that the trial court concluded that consecutive terms were\n\nnecessary to protect the public. People v. Sanders, 356 Ill. App. 3d 998, 1006 (2005). If the record\n\ndoes not reflect that the trial court took mitigating factors into account, including a defendant’s\n\npotential for rehabilitation, and the record does not support the trial court’s determination that\n\nconsecutive sentences were necessary to protect the public, an abuse of discretion has occurred.\n\nPeople v. O’Neal, 125 Ill. 2d 291, 298-301 (1988).\n\n¶ 37 We initially consider defendant’s point that the trial court “did not even explain why it\n\nimposed consecutive sentences until the hearing on the motion to reconsider the sentence.” Our\n\nreview of the original sentencing hearing reflects that, although the trial court did not expressly\n\nexplain in so many words its reasons for imposing the consecutive sentences, it did discuss the\n\nvarious aspects of defendant’s conduct, history, and character, both aggravating and mitigating,\n\nrelevant to its decision to impose consecutive sentences for the purpose of protecting the public.\n\nThis was sufficient to satisfy section 5-8-4(b) and to allow proper review of the trial court’s decision.\n\nSee People v. Allen, 268 Ill. App. 3d 947, 950 (1994) (trial court need not recite language of section\n\n\n\n\n -11-\n\f2013 IL App (2d) 130083\n\n\n5-8-4(b) provided the record shows it believed consecutive sentences were necessary to protect the\n\npublic).\n\n¶ 38 We next consider whether the record supports the trial court’s determination that consecutive\n\nsentences were necessary to protect the public. We agree with the trial court that defendant’s\n\nfraudulent conduct was ongoing, extensive, and not likely to have ended had she not been arrested\n\nand incarcerated. As the trial court emphasized several times, defendant persisted in her fraudulent\n\nbehavior with the court when she provided false information in the preparation of her presentence\n\nreport, when she absented herself from the proceedings, and when she attempted to evade custody.2\n\nWe further agree with the trial court’s characterization of defendant’s conduct as “particularly\n\negregious in terms of [its] audacity,” considering how she repeatedly proclaimed that members of\n\nher immediate family had died and then willingly accepted, not only insurance proceeds, but\n\noutpourings of sympathy and financial support from her coworkers. Defendant’s conduct can fairly\n\nbe described as despicable and strongly indicative of her likelihood to continue her criminal\n\nactivities.\n\n¶ 39 Further, the trial court properly addressed defendant’s potential for rehabilitation. It stated\n\nthat defendant’s behavior was “not evidence to any great potential for rehabilitation” and that her\n\nperpetration of a fraud upon the court was “the highest or most significant sign of an inability to be\n\nrehabilitated.” We consider such characterizations of defendant’s questionable rehabilitative\n\npotential as accurate and entirely supported by the record.\n\n\n\n\n 2\n This evasion belies defendant’s assertion that she willingly accepted responsibility for her\n\nconduct.\n\n -12-\n\f2013 IL App (2d) 130083\n\n\n¶ 40 We are also not persuaded by defendant’s assertion that she could not be subjected to\n\nconsecutive sentences when, due to her lack of criminal history, she had had no prior opportunity\n\nto demonstrate her rehabilitative potential. There is simply no authority prohibiting consecutive\n\nsentences when a defendant has not had prior exposure to any rehabilitative opportunities. Such an\n\nargument is devoid of merit.\n\n¶ 41 Defendant also argues that consecutive sentences were improper because her crime caused\n\nno physical harm to anyone. She cites no authority, and we are aware of none, that would preclude\n\nconsecutive sentences where the harm to the victims was purely financial. Rather, at least two courts\n\nhave affirmed such sentences in the context of financial harm only. See People v. McManus, 197\n\nIll. App. 3d 1085, 1100-01 (1990) (consecutive sentences imposed for fraud); People v. Shaw, 133\n\nIll. App. 3d 391, 405 (1985) (consecutive sentences proper for defendant who was involved in\n\nnumerous incidents of fraud and was public nuisance and danger to society). Further, section 5-8-\n\n4(b) refers to protecting the public from “criminal conduct” and is not limited to conduct that results\n\nonly in physical harm. 730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(b) (West 2008). We cannot read into the statute a\n\nlimitation not expressed. See Board of Education of Waukegan Community Unit School District No.\n\n60 v. Orbach, 2013 IL App (2d) 120504, ¶ 17. There was plenty of evidence in this case that\n\ndefendant was extremely dangerous to the public in a financial sense and that she would have\n\npersisted in her ongoing crime spree had she not been removed from the opportunity to do so.\n\n¶ 42 That leaves defendant’s contention that the trial court did not properly consider her lack of\n\nprior criminal history and the fact that she did not begin her criminal conduct until her late forties.\n\nThe trial court, however, expressly recognized that, in terms of mitigation, defendant had caused no\n\nbodily injury, had no prior criminal record, had spent most of her life outside the criminal justice\n\n\n\n -13-\n\f2013 IL App (2d) 130083\n\n\nsystem, and had not commenced her criminal conduct until the “last several years.” We cannot say\n\nthat the trial court did not give such mitigation evidence its full due. However, the mitigation\n\nevidence was not sufficient to overcome the significant aggravating evidence that defendant would\n\nlikely have continued to commit fraud on an unsuspecting public if she were not incarcerated for a\n\nlonger period of time.\n\n¶ 43 Finally, defendant relies on several cases that overturned consecutive sentences involving\n\nwhat she asserts to be “far more serious crimes than those at issue here.” See People v. O’Neal, 125\n\nIll. 2d 291 (1988); People v. Rucker, 260 Ill. App. 3d 659 (1994); People v. Gray, 121 Ill. App. 3d\n\n867 (1984). Those cases are distinguishable from this case, however, as they involved circumstances\n\nand mitigating evidence different from those present here. Indeed, defendant is here engaging in a\n\ncomparative sentencing argument, which is not permissible. See People v. Fern, 189 Ill. 2d 48, 54-\n\n55 (1999).\n\n¶ 44 Although we recognize that consecutive sentences are significant and that they should be\n\nimposed only sparingly, our review of the record demonstrates that such sentences were entirely\n\nappropriate in this case. Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion, we affirm the imposition\n\nof the consecutive sentences as to count I and count II.\n\n¶ 45 III. CONCLUSION\n\n¶ 46 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County.\n\n¶ 47 Affirmed.\n\n\n\n\n -14-\n\f", "ocr": false, "opinion_id": 1043552 } ]
Appellate Court of Illinois
Appellate Court of Illinois
SA
Illinois, IL
1,043,639
Burgess, Dooley, Reiber, Robinson, Skoglund
2013-03-15
false
state-v-casey
Casey
State v. Casey
State of Vermont v. Shane Casey
William H. Sorrell, Attorney General, and David Tartter, Assistant Attorney General, Montpelier, for Plaintiff-Appellee., William A. Nelson, Middlebury, for Defendant-Appellant.
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
0
Published
null
<citation id="AiO"> 2013 VT 22 </citation><br><parties id="b445-5"> State of Vermont v. Shane Casey </parties><br><citation id="b445-6"> [71 A.3d 1227] </citation><br><docketnumber id="b445-7"> No. 11-205 </docketnumber><br><judges id="b445-8"> Present: Reiber, C.J., Dooley, Skoglund, Burgess and Robinson, JJ. </judges><br><decisiondate id="b445-9"> Opinion Filed March 15, 2013 </decisiondate><br><attorneys id="b446-11"> <span citation-index="1" class="star-pagination" label="430"> *430 </span> <em> William H. Sorrell, </em> Attorney General, and <em> David Tartter, </em> Assistant Attorney General, Montpelier, for Plaintiff-Appellee. </attorneys><br><attorneys id="b446-12"> <em> William A. Nelson, </em> Middlebury, for Defendant-Appellant. </attorneys>
[ "193 Vt. 429", "2013 VT 22" ]
[ { "author_str": "Skoglund", "per_curiam": false, "type": "010combined", "page_count": null, "download_url": "http://info.libraries.vermont.gov/supct/current/op2011-205.html", "author_id": null, "opinion_text": "2013 VT 22\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\nState v. Casey (2011-205)\r\n\r\n \r\n\r\n2013 VT 22\r\n\r\n \r\n\r\n[Filed 15-Mar-2013]\r\n\r\n \r\n\r\nNOTICE:  This opinion is\r\nsubject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision\r\nbefore publication in the Vermont Reports.  Readers are requested to notify\r\nthe Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme Court, 109\r\nState Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in order that\r\ncorrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.\r\n\r\n \r\n\r\n \r\n\r\n\r\n 2013 VT 22\r\n \r\n  \r\n\r\n\r\n No. 2011-205\r\n \r\n  \r\n\r\n\r\n State of Vermont\r\n \r\n \r\n Supreme Court\r\n \r\n \r\n  \r\n \r\n \r\n  \r\n \r\n \r\n  \r\n \r\n \r\n On Appeal from\r\n \r\n \r\n      v.\r\n \r\n \r\n Superior Court, Chittenden\r\n Unit,\r\n \r\n \r\n  \r\n \r\n \r\n Criminal Division\r\n \r\n \r\n  \r\n \r\n \r\n  \r\n \r\n \r\n Shane Casey\r\n \r\n \r\n October Term, 2012\r\n \r\n \r\n  \r\n \r\n \r\n  \r\n \r\n \r\n  \r\n \r\n \r\n  \r\n \r\n \r\n Michael\r\n S. Kupersmith, J.\r\n \r\n \r\n  \r\n \r\n William H. Sorrell, Attorney General, and David Tartter,\r\nAssistant Attorney General, for\r\n\r\n  Plaintiff-Appellee.\r\n\r\n \r\n\r\nWilliam A. Nelson, Middlebury, for Defendant-Appellant.\r\n\r\n \r\n\r\n \r\n\r\nPRESENT:  Reiber, C.J., Dooley, Skoglund,\r\nBurgess and Robinson, JJ.\r\n\r\n \r\n\r\n \r\n\r\n¶ 1.            \r\nSKOGLUND, J.  Defendant appeals his conviction of two counts\r\nof aggravated sexual assault, alleging that the trial court erred in (1)\r\ndenying defendant’s motion to sever a joint trial; (2) refusing to grant a new\r\ntrial after codefendant pled no contest midtrial; and (3) admitting the\r\nvictim’s diary as evidence of her sexual abuse.  We affirm.\r\n\r\n¶ 2.            \r\nThis case has a long and winding history.  The State prosecuted\r\ndefendant and codefendant, Stacey Parnitzke, with\r\nwhom defendant was romantically involved, for multiple counts of aggravated\r\nsexual assault.  The charged incidents occurred between 2005 and 2006.\r\n There have been three jury trials, presided over by two judges.\r\n Separate counsel represented defendant and Parnitzke,\r\nbut the court joined their cases for discovery, pretrial motions, and all three\r\ntrials.   \r\n\r\n¶ 3.            \r\nThe first trial in June 2009 resulted in a hung jury.  The second\r\ntrial in April 2010 led to convictions against both defendants, but due to the\r\nimproper admission of evidence, the trial court vacated the convictions and\r\ngranted a new trial.  The third trial commenced on January 31, 2011. After\r\nthree days of trial, on February 2, 2011, Parnitzke\r\npleaded no contest to a reduced charge of sexual assault on a minor, which ended\r\nher participation in the case.  The third trial drew to a close on\r\nFebruary 9, 2011.  Defendant was convicted of two counts of aggravated\r\nsexual assault.  Defendant filed a timely motion for a new trial, which\r\nwas denied.  This appeal followed.\r\n\r\n¶ 4.            \r\n Defendant first claims that he requested severance before the\r\nthird trial and asserts that the court impermissibly denied his motion to\r\nsever, arguing that there was a “reasonable likelihood of prejudice” that could\r\nnot be eliminated.  Defendant and Parntizke\r\nwere charged in separate informations.  Before\r\nthe first trial, the State moved to join the cases pursuant to Vermont Rules of\r\nCriminal Procedure 8(b)(3)(A), 8(b)(3)(B), and 13(a), contending defendants\r\nwere charged with offenses that were “closely connected” and part of a “common\r\nscheme or plan.”  Both defendant and Partnitzke\r\nobjected to the State’s motion for joinder.  Nonetheless,\r\nthe court granted the State’s motion under Rule 13(a), which authorizes the\r\ncourt to join cases for trial even though they were filed separately.  \r\n\r\n¶ 5.            \r\nRule 13(a) gives the court broad discretion to order joint trials where\r\ncases could be joined for pleading under Rule 8.  See Reporter’s Notes, V.R.Cr.P. 13(a).  Rule 8 authorizes the joinder of defendants when “it is alleged that the several\r\noffenses charged were (A) part of a common scheme or plan; or (B) were so\r\nclosely connected in respect to time, place, and occasion that it would be\r\ndifficult to separate proof of one charge from proof of others.”  V.R.Cr.P. 8(b)(3)(A)–(B). \r\nThe trial court reasoned that because there were allegations of simultaneous\r\nsexual assault, whereby both defendants were allegedly abusing the victim at\r\nthe same time, such acts would constitute a common plan or scheme under Rule\r\n8(b)(3)(A).  Similarly, the court found that because the charged\r\noffenses all occurred between the same time frame and in the same place, the\r\nallegations were “closely connected” under Rule 8(b)(3)(B).  Further, the\r\ncourt concluded that there was “no reasonable likelihood that [the]\r\ndefendant[s] would be prejudiced by a joint trial,” finding that the evidence\r\ninvolved was not so complicated that the jury would have difficulty\r\nunderstanding the allegations made as to each defendant.  See V.R.Cr.P. 14(b)(2)(D)–(E).  Specifically\r\naddressing severance with respect to defendant, the court stated:\r\n\r\n \r\nThe State has given notice of its intent to introduce other uncharged acts\r\nunder V.R.E. 404(b) against each defendant. Defendant-Casey argues that the\r\njury will be required to distinguish between acts involving other men and\r\nDefendant-Parnitzke and those acts involving these\r\ntwo defendants. Defendant-Casey also argues that the jury will be required to\r\n“examine frank and shocking allegations of sexual abuse of a child . . . and\r\nto examine equally shocking allegations of incest” against Defendant-Parnitzke. Distinguishing the sexual acts between\r\nparticipants and the type of sexual act is not so complicated that a jury could\r\nnot distinguish the evidence and apply the law intelligently. The jury will be\r\nrequired to examine shocking allegations of sexual abuse and incest. This is\r\nnot a ground for severance. The “shock value” does not prevent a jury from\r\napplying the law intelligently. \r\n\r\n \r\n\r\n¶ 6.            \r\nFurthermore, the court explained that the uncharged acts, complained of\r\nby defendant, had a “limited purpose,” and the jury would be instructed that\r\nthey could not be used substantively against either defendant or Parnitzke.  The court also observed that defendant and\r\nParnitzke’s underlying relationship would remain\r\npertinent to both cases and be disclosed at trial, regardless of whether their\r\ncases were severed.  Before the jury draw of the first trial,\r\ndefendant twice renewed his objections to joinder,\r\nbut the court reaffirmed its denial.  As noted, the first trial\r\nended in a hung jury. \r\n\r\n¶ 7.            \r\nBefore the second trial, the State moved for joinder.\r\n Parnitzke filed a renewed motion to sever.\r\n Defendant did not move to sever and expressly declined to join Parnitzke’s motion for severance but indicated he may want\r\nto renew such motion at a later time.  The court granted joinder, citing reasons articulated in its earlier decision\r\nto join the cases.  The second trial resulted in convictions of both\r\ndefendants; however, as noted above, a new trial was granted due to the\r\nadmission of improper evidence. \r\n\r\n¶ 8.            \r\nOn the first day of jury draw for the third trial, counsel for Parnitzke renewed the request for a separate trial,\r\nacknowledging that her request had been consistently rejected but wanting to\r\npreserve the issue despite the court’s ruling that it would be a joint trial. \r\n\r\nAgain,\r\nmy client wishes an individual trial, not a joint trial.  We’ve asked for\r\nthat repeatedly.  The Court we understand has denied that, and we’re going\r\nforward as a joint trial.  But don’t want to not preserve the issue and\r\nbring it up before this trial. \r\n\r\n \r\n\r\nDefendant’s counsel then chimed\r\nin, “The same here, Judge, on that issue.”  The court continued to\r\ndeny the motion to sever, and the trial resulted in convictions of two counts\r\nof aggravated sexual assault against defendant. \r\n\r\n¶ 9.            \r\nFollowing his trial, defendant filed a motion for a new trial based on,\r\namong other things, the court’s decision not to sever trials.  The court\r\nreasoned that defendant did not adequately petition the court for severance,\r\nstating that:\r\n\r\n  Defense\r\ncounsel’s comment, in the absence of a motion to that effect, is inadequate to\r\npreserve the issue. [Defendant’s] position on severance was made known to the\r\nCourt on August 25, 2009, and after that date, he never filed a written motion\r\nto sever defendants. A motion to sever defendants must be made by a proper\r\npre-trial motion or it is waived.  \r\n\r\n \r\n\r\n¶ 10.         Rule\r\n14 provides that “the court shall grant severance of the moving defendant\r\nunless the court finds that there is no reasonable likelihood that that\r\ndefendant would be prejudiced by a joint trial.”  V.R.Cr.P.\r\n14(b)(2)(D).  In order to adequately move for\r\nseverance, defendant must file a motion before trial, and if overruled,\r\ndefendant must renew the motion on the same grounds, before or at the close of\r\nall evidence.  “Severance is waived if the motion is not made at the\r\nappropriate time.”  See V.R.Cr.P. 14(b)(4).  The onus is on defendant to specify to the court\r\nthe reasons he opposes joinder and to show why there\r\nis a reasonable likelihood that he would be prejudiced by a joint trial. \r\nSee V.R.Cr.P. 14.  Here, because defendant\r\npreviously considered and rejected severance of defendants before the second\r\ntrial, the court could reasonably assume that a joint trial was part of his\r\nstrategy. \r\n\r\n¶ 11.           Defendant’s\r\nvague attempt to preserve the issue for review fails.  Counsel's statement\r\nwas cryptic and scant, and sought no action from the\r\ncourt as required by the rule.  See State v. Venman,\r\n151 Vt. 561, 567, 564 A.2d 574, 578-79 (1989) (In severance-of-offenses cases,\r\n“the burden is placed upon the defendant” to request\r\nand “renew the motion” for severance, which permits “the defendant to\r\nreevaluate” whether to proceed with a consolidated trial.  “Therefore,\r\nfailure to renew the motion constitutes a waiver of any right to\r\nseverance.”).  Merely stating, “[S]ame here,\r\nJudge” does not constitute a motion to sever. \r\n\r\n¶ 12.         Further,\r\nconsidering defendant’s shifting position—requesting to sever in the first\r\ntrial and not objecting to joinder in the second—it\r\nis unclear what the “same here” references.  Such a nebulous request does\r\nnot preserve the issue for review.[1]\r\n Without a proper motion, the court should not have been expected to\r\ndivine a change in defendant's position.  Defendant failed to clearly request severance or note the\r\nprejudice to him and, therefore, waived his right.  See V.R.Cr.P. 14(b)(4).  As a\r\nresult, we do not reach the merits of whether the trial court improperly joined\r\nthe cases.\r\n\r\n¶\r\n13.        \r\nDefendant next contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion\r\nfor mistrial after codefendant’s sudden absence from trial.  On the third\r\nday of trial, during the lunch recess, Parnitzke\r\nreached an agreement with the State and pleaded no contest to a lesser charge.\r\n When the jury returned, the judge advised them that some issues had\r\narisen and trial would not resume for two days.  In the interim, defendant\r\nmoved for a mistrial and a new trial arguing: (1) the jury would consider\r\nirrelevant and highly prejudicial information about Parnitzke\r\nthat would not have been admitted had defendant been tried alone; (2) Parnitzke’s change of plea resulted in a major shift in\r\ndefense strategy; (3) the jurors would draw impermissible conclusions from Parnitzke’s absence; and (4) cautionary instructions alone\r\nwould not protect defendant’s fair trial rights.  \r\n\r\n¶\r\n14.        \r\nThe court denied the motion, concluding Parnitzke’s\r\nremoval from the trial did not warrant the extreme response of a mistrial.\r\n When the jury returned, two days later, Parnitzke\r\nwas absent.  The judge explained that the cases had been “separated.”  Without\r\ngoing into details, the judge stated that there are “several legal reasons why\r\nthis could have occurred” and the jury was “not to speculate about these\r\npossible reasons.”  \r\n\r\n¶\r\n15.        \r\n Denial of a mistrial under circumstances such as those presented\r\nhere is reviewed for abuse of discretion only.  See United States v.\r\nMerida, 765 F.2d 1205, 1220-21 (5th Cir. 1985).  And, “[g]iven the trial judge’s closeness to the scene,” denials of\r\nmistrials after a codefendant pleads mid-trial are reversed “only under\r\nextremely compelling circumstances.” United States v.\r\nButterworth, 511 F.3d 71, 76 (1st Cir. 2007) (quotation omitted). \r\nThis Court uses the same standards.  State v. Messier, 2005 VT 98,\r\n¶ 15, 178 Vt. 412, 885 A.2d 1193 (“The disposition of a motion for mistrial is\r\ndiscretionary, and, as such, a claim of error can be supported only where the\r\ntrial court’s discretion was either totally withheld, or exercised on clearly\r\nuntenable or unreasonable grounds.”).  “The exercise of that discretion\r\nalways must be informed by the circumstances of the particular case.”  United States v. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d 1161, 1184 (1st\r\nCir. 1993).  Based on the trial judge’s superior vantage point, we\r\nwill not interfere with the disposition of such a motion unless the complaining\r\nparty can demonstrate a manifest abuse of that discretion.  See United\r\nStates v. Pierro, 32 F.3d 611, 617 (1st Cir.\r\n1994), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Booker, 543 U.S.\r\n220 (2005). \r\n\r\n¶\r\n16.        \r\nThe “standard method” for handling a mid-trial plea change in a\r\nmulti-defendant criminal prosecution “is to (a) refrain from telling the jury\r\nof the change of plea, and (b) instruct the jury that the absent defendant has\r\nbeen withdrawn from the case for legally sufficient reasons and that the jury (i) should not speculate on why the absent defendant is no longer in the case and\r\n(ii) should focus single-mindedly on whether the government has established,\r\nbeyond a reasonable doubt, the guilt of the defendant or defendants remaining\r\nin the case, bearing in mind that in order to achieve a conviction of a\r\ndefendant the government must carry its burden of proof individually as to that\r\ndefendant.”  See United States v. Rodriguez, 205 F. Supp. 2d 411,\r\n412-13 (E.D. Pa. 2002).  “Declaring a mistrial is a last resort, only to\r\nbe implemented if the taint is ineradicable”; that is, where curative\r\ninstructions cannot realistically mend the harm done by the mid-trial plea.\r\n Sepulveda, 15 F.3d at 1184; see Pierro,\r\n32 F.3d at 617.\r\n\r\n¶\r\n17.        \r\nThe majority of the cases cited by defendant have arisen in the\r\nparticular context of conspiracy, where “[a] guilty plea entered by a\r\ncodefendant can be especially prejudicial.”  United\r\nStates v. Peterman, 841 F.2d 1474, 1480 (10th Cir. 1988) (quotation\r\nomitted).  No conspiracy was charged in the case at\r\nhand.  Here, the overlap of offenses charged against each defendant is not\r\nsuch that any inkling of Parnitzke’s guilt would\r\nautomatically lead a jury to conclude defendant’s guilt, as it is well settled\r\nthat “the guilty plea of one defendant cannot serve as substantive evidence\r\nagainst another defendant.”  Rodriguez, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 414; see\r\nUnited States v. Baez, 703 F.2d 453, 455-56 (10th Cir. 1983)\r\n(trial court’s reference to codefendants’ guilty plea for conspiracy to\r\ndistribute PCP was plain error).  This rule protects defendants from a jury’s temptation “to conclude that\r\nif one defendant is guilty\r\nof committing an offense, the other defendant is guilty as well.”  Peterman,\r\n841 F.2d at 1480 (challenging admission of co-conspirators prior convictions);\r\nsee United States v. Miranda, 593 F.2d 590, 594 (5th Cir. 1979)\r\n(“[A] defendant is entitled\r\nto have the question of his guilt determined upon the evidence against him, not\r\non whether a codefendant or government witness has been convicted of the same\r\ncharge.”); Babb v. United States, 218 F.2d 538, 542 (5th Cir. 1955).\r\n “A guilty plea entered by a codefendant can be especially prejudicial if\r\nthe plea is made in connection with a conspiracy to which the remaining\r\ndefendants are charged.”  Peterman, 841 F.2d at 1480 (quoting United\r\nStates v. DeLucca, 630 F.2d 294, 298 (5th\r\nCir. 1980)).  “Due to the extreme and unfair prejudice suffered by\r\ndefendants in [coconspirator] situations, courts and prosecutors generally are\r\nforbidden from mentioning that a codefendant has either pled guilty or been\r\nconvicted.”  United States v. Griffin, 778 F.2d 707, 710\r\n(11th Cir. 1985) (finding that trial court abused its discretion in allowing\r\nco-conspirators’ adjudication of guilt to be admitted into evidence).  \r\n\r\n¶ 18.         Defendant\r\nasserts that some or all of the jurors must have speculated, regardless of the\r\ninstructions to the contrary, that Parnitzke pleaded\r\nguilty after the victim’s devastating testimony that her mother had allowed\r\nmany men to assault her while they were living in England, and that guilt of\r\nthe absent Parnitzke directly inculpated defendant.\r\n It is fair to say that a significant portion of the victim’s testimony\r\ndetailed accounts of Parnitzke’s long history of\r\nabuse of her daughter, leaving defendant just another man Parnitzke\r\npermitted to assault her child.  Defendant analogizes his case to Rodriguez,\r\na capital murder case where three defendants were tried together for\r\nmurders.  205 F. Supp. 2d 411.  The two\r\naccused of actually carrying out the murders entered into a plea agreement\r\nafter six weeks of trial, leaving only the defendant, who stood accused of\r\nhiring the first two to commit the crimes.  The judge in Rodriguez\r\ngranted defendant’s motion for a mistrial, positing that at least some members\r\nof the jury, over the course of the several weeks the trial was expected to\r\nlast, would at some point surmise that “changes of plea constituted not merely\r\na possible, but perhaps the most probable, explanation for the departure from\r\nthe case” of the two other defendants.  Id. at\r\n413.  Also, the prosecution’s presentation of the murder charges\r\nagainst the two pleading defendants was keyed into the theory that the\r\ndefendant orchestrated the murders and hired the two defendants.  In other\r\nwords, the guilt of the two absent defendants was directly linked to the guilt\r\nof the defendant Rodriguez.  Id. \r\n\r\n¶\r\n19.        \r\nWe find the facts of the present case distinguishable.  The two cases\r\nhere were joined based on a common plan or scheme and because the offenses\r\ncharged were closely connected in time, place and occasion; yet, the behaviors\r\nconstituting the charges against each were distinct, as was the evidence\r\npresented.[2]\r\n Moreover, unlike the situation presented in Rodriguez, the\r\npotential for a prejudicial inference in this case was not wholly obvious.\r\n The court appropriately instructed the jury not to speculate as to why\r\nthe case against Parnitzke had been separated from defendant’s.  The court further told the jury not to\r\ndraw any conclusions from Parnitzke’s absence.\r\n The court’s explanation falls directly in line with established\r\nprocedures.  See Butterworth, 511 F.3d at 76;\r\nSepulveda, 15 F.3d at 1184-85.  While defendant suggests that more\r\nevidence of abuse came in as a result of being tried jointly with Parnitzke, he fails to appreciate that the evidence to\r\nwhich he refers was offered solely against Parnitzke. \r\nHe fails to support his claim that he was prejudiced by Parnitzke’s\r\nmid-trial absence or to show how the jury could have wrongly inferred his guilt\r\nfrom codefendant’s absence.  We affirm the lower court’s decision to deny\r\nthe mistrial.\r\n\r\n¶\r\n20.        \r\nAs a final matter, defendant asserts that evidence of the victim’s diary\r\nwas improperly admitted at trial.  Discretionary rulings regarding the\r\nadmissibility of evidence are reviewed under an abuse-of-discretion standard.\r\n State v. Voorheis, 2004 VT 10, ¶ 20, 176\r\nVt. 265, 844 A.2d 794.  Prior to trial, defense\r\ncounsel sought to exclude from evidence notations in the victim’s diary which\r\nshe claimed represented a record of the abuse, arguing that such evidence would\r\nconstitute hearsay. The court ruled that the State would not be permitted to present\r\nthe substance of the diary entries but agreed that the victim could testify to\r\nthe fact that she kept the diary and wrote notes corresponding to the timing of\r\nthe sexual abuse. \r\n\r\n¶\r\n21.        \r\nAt trial, in response to the State’s inquiry as to whether she ever\r\ninformed anyone of, or documented the alleged abuse, the victim stated, “I\r\ndidn’t like write it, but I used like little symbols or drawings . . . in\r\na diary” in order to protect the information from others.  The\r\ndefense then, on cross-examination, introduced the actual diary, apparently to\r\nhighlight the fact that there were no verbal descriptions of abuse or tally\r\nmarks, as the victim suggested during earlier interviews.  The\r\ncourt noted that, in its closing, the defense argued persuasively that the\r\nvictim’s contradictory accounts undermined the value of the markings and the\r\nvictim’s credibility.  Defendant now argues that diary symbols are hearsay\r\nand were impermissibly admitted under Vermont Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(B), as prior consistent statements.  However, the\r\ncourt had ruled that the victim could testify only that she kept a diary, but\r\nnot as to the substance of the diary.  The court reasoned that if there\r\nwas impeachment on cross-examination suggesting the victim’s allegations were\r\nrecently fabricated, the State could then offer evidence of what was recorded\r\nin the diary as a prior consistent statement.  Because it was the defense\r\nthat offered the diary, which the court noted was not strong evidence and was\r\nin fact a double-edged sword, and that used the diary to impeach the victim’s\r\ncredibility as well as to show the victim’s bias towards defendant, we find no\r\nabuse in admitting the evidence. [3]\r\n\r\n\r\nAffirmed.\r\n\r\n \r\n\r\n\r\n  \r\n \r\n \r\n  \r\n \r\n \r\n FOR THE COURT:\r\n \r\n \r\n  \r\n \r\n \r\n  \r\n \r\n \r\n  \r\n \r\n \r\n  \r\n \r\n \r\n  \r\n \r\n \r\n  \r\n \r\n \r\n  \r\n \r\n \r\n  \r\n \r\n \r\n  \r\n \r\n \r\n  \r\n \r\n \r\n  \r\n \r\n \r\n Associate\r\n Justice\r\n \r\n  \r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n[1]\r\n We are not advocating form over substance.  See generally, Venman, 151 Vt. at 565, 564 A.2d at 577 (defendant\r\npreserved request to sever even though he referred to it as\r\nsequestration).  But where, as here, defendant provides no express request\r\nto sever or reason why the court should sever trials, we cannot craft one. \r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n[2]\r\n The victim did describe one instance where Partnizke\r\nwas performing oral sex on the victim while the victim performed oral sex on\r\ndefendant.  Though allegedly simultaneous, defendant’s culpability did not\r\nrequire a corresponding reliance on Partnizke’s guilt\r\nand vice versa.  The victim’s credibility as to one could be assessed\r\ndifferently as to the other.  \r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n[3] \r\nThe State asserts that the defense failed to preserve the matter on appeal\r\nbased on its failure to object to the court’s ruling that the victim could\r\ntestify to the mere fact of the existence of the diary, without going to its\r\nsubstance, but rather just responded, “Great” to the entire discussion.\r\n Because we find that defendant’s claim of error fails, we decline to\r\naddress the State’s preservation issue.\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n", "ocr": false, "opinion_id": 1043639 } ]
Supreme Court of Vermont
Supreme Court of Vermont
S
Vermont, VT
1,043,700
Burgess, Dooley, Reiber, Robinson, Skoglund
2012-07-27
false
mueller-v-mueller-and-joseph-f-mueller-trust
Mueller
Mueller v. Mueller and Joseph F. Mueller Trust
Evelyn O. Mueller v. Juliann H. Mueller, Individually, and as Executrix and Beneficiary of the Estate of Joseph F. Mueller, and/or Trustee and Beneficiary of the Joseph F. Mueller Revocable Trust, Et Al.
Allen C. B. Horsley of Barr & Associates, P.C., Stowe, for Plaintiff-Appellant., Jesse D. Bugbee of Kissane Associates, St. Albans, and Brad A. Compston of Konowitz & Greenberg, PC., Wellesley Hills, Massachusetts, for Defendant-Appellee.
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
0
Published
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<citation id="b101-3"> 2012 VT 59 </citation><br><parties id="b101-5"> Evelyn O. Mueller v. Juliann H. Mueller, Individually, and as Executrix and Beneficiary of the Estate of Joseph F. Mueller, and/or Trustee and Beneficiary of the Joseph F. Mueller Revocable Trust, et al. </parties><citation id="AB_"> [54 A.3d 168] </citation><br><docketnumber id="b101-7"> No. 11-235 </docketnumber><br><judges id="b101-8"> Present: Reiber, C.J., Dooley, Skoglund, Burgess and Robinson, JJ. </judges><br><decisiondate id="b101-9"> Opinion Filed July 27, 2012 </decisiondate><br><attorneys id="b102-11"> <span citation-index="1" class="star-pagination" label="86"> *86 </span> <em> Allen C. B. Horsley </em> of <em> Barr &amp; Associates, P.C., </em> Stowe, for Plaintiff-Appellant. </attorneys><br><attorneys id="b102-12"> <em> Jesse D. Bugbee </em> of <em> Kissane Associates, </em> St. Albans, and <em> Brad A. Compston </em> of <em> Konowitz &amp; Greenberg, PC., </em> Wellesley Hills, Massachusetts, for Defendant-Appellee. </attorneys>
[ "192 Vt. 85", "2012 VT 59" ]
[ { "author_str": "Dooley", "per_curiam": false, "type": "010combined", "page_count": null, "download_url": "http://info.libraries.vermont.gov/supct/current/op2011-235.html", "author_id": null, "opinion_text": "2012 VT 59\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\nMueller v. Mueller and Joseph F.\r\nMueller Trust (2011-235)\r\n\r\n \r\n\r\n2012 VT 59\r\n\r\n \r\n\r\n[Filed 27-Jul-2012]\r\n\r\n \r\n\r\nNOTICE:  This opinion is\r\nsubject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision\r\nbefore publication in the Vermont Reports.  Readers are requested to\r\nnotify the Reporter of Decisions by email at: [email protected] or by\r\nmail at: Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont\r\n05609-0801, of any errors in order that corrections may be made before this\r\nopinion goes to press.\r\n\r\n \r\n\r\n \r\n\r\n\r\n 2012 VT 59\r\n \r\n  \r\n\r\n\r\n No. 2011-235\r\n \r\n  \r\n\r\n\r\n Evelyn O. Mueller\r\n \r\n \r\n Supreme Court\r\n \r\n \r\n  \r\n \r\n \r\n  \r\n \r\n \r\n  \r\n \r\n \r\n On Appeal from\r\n \r\n \r\n      v.\r\n \r\n \r\n Superior Court, Lamoille Unit,\r\n \r\n \r\n  \r\n \r\n \r\n Civil Division\r\n \r\n \r\n  \r\n \r\n \r\n  \r\n \r\n \r\n Juliann H. Mueller,\r\n Individually, and as Executrix and Beneficiary of the Estate of Joseph F.\r\n Mueller, and/or Trustee and Beneficiary of the Joseph F. Mueller Revocable\r\n Trust, et al.\r\n \r\n \r\n December Term, 2011\r\n \r\n \r\n  \r\n \r\n \r\n  \r\n \r\n \r\n  \r\n \r\n \r\n  \r\n \r\n \r\n Dennis\r\n R. Pearson, J.\r\n \r\n \r\n  \r\n \r\n Allen C. B. Horsley of Barr &amp; Associates, P.C., Stowe,\r\nfor Plaintiff-Appellant.\r\n\r\n \r\n\r\nJesse D. Bugbee of Kissane Associates, St. Albans, and Brad\r\nA. Compston of Konowitz &amp;\r\n\r\n  Greenberg, P.C., Wellesley Hills, Massachusetts, for\r\nDefendant-Appellee.\r\n\r\n \r\n\r\n \r\n\r\nPRESENT:  Reiber, C.J., Dooley, Skoglund, Burgess and\r\nRobinson, JJ.\r\n\r\n \r\n\r\n \r\n\r\n¶ 1.            \r\nDOOLEY, J.   This case derives from a separation\r\nagreement made thirty-seven years ago between a now-deceased husband and\r\nplaintiff, his first wife.  Plaintiff contends that her ex-husband\r\npromised to devise to her certain assets upon his death, and she brings various\r\nclaims for equitable relief against defendant, her ex-husband’s second wife,\r\nwho survived him.  The superior court concluded that plaintiff’s claims\r\nwere barred by the statute of limitations.  On appeal, plaintiff argues\r\nthat this conclusion was erroneous because, under the governing Massachusetts\r\nlaw, claims based on a contract to make a will do not accrue until the\r\npromisor’s death.  Although we accept plaintiff’s legal premise, we do not\r\naccept that it governs this case.  Accordingly, we affirm.  \r\n\r\n¶ 2.            \r\nPlaintiff Evelyn Mueller is the first wife of the late Joseph\r\nMueller.  The couple was married for thirty-one years, and they had nine\r\nchildren.  During their marriage, Joseph was an employee, and at some\r\npoint the president, of a Massachusetts company called Adolph Bauer, Inc.\r\n(ABI).  The couple was divorced on September 22, 1975.  In July 1976,\r\nJoseph married defendant Juliann Mueller.  \r\n\r\n¶ 3.            \r\nEvelyn and Joseph’s divorce order from the Massachusetts Probate Court\r\nwas based on—and incorporated—the terms of a separation agreement entered into\r\non August 8, 1975.  The current dispute arises out of Article II of the\r\nseparation agreement, entitled “Support of Wife and Children.”  The\r\nrelevant portions of this article read:\r\n\r\n  As long as\r\nthe Wife shall remain unmarried, the Husband shall pay to her during her\r\nlifetime as alimony for her support and the support and education of their\r\nchildren, the sum of Four Hundred dollars ($400) per week plus an additional\r\namount sufficient to pay Federal and State income\r\ntaxes . . . .\r\n\r\n \r\n\r\n  If at any\r\ntime while Husband is alive, he sells any or all of his stock in Adolph Bauer,\r\nInc., its successors or assigns or any corporation from the partial or complete\r\nsale, distribution or liquidation of said assets, Husband agrees that he will\r\ninclude in his will and/or any trust a provision devising all his rights, title\r\nand interest in such assets, i.e., Adolph Bauer, Inc., to Evelyn Mueller and,\r\nif Wife does not survive Husband, then in equal shares to his surviving\r\nchildren . . . .\r\n\r\n \r\n\r\n¶ 4.            \r\nIn addition, the separation agreement included, among other things, a\r\nconveyance of the marital home, and a division of personal property.  The\r\nagreement also stated, “This agreement is executed in the Commonwealth of\r\nMassachusetts and shall be construed to take effect under and in accordance\r\nwith the laws of said Commonwealth.”  \r\n\r\n¶ 5.            \r\nIn 1983, plaintiff filed a contempt claim in the Massachusetts Probate\r\nCourt, alleging that Joseph was in violation of the divorce order—in\r\nparticular, Article II of the separation agreement—by failing to set up a trust\r\nto receive and administer the proceeds of any sale of his ABI stock.  Because\r\nJoseph was still employed at ABI and he had not sold his ABI stock, the\r\ncomplaint was dismissed without prejudice as premature.  \r\n\r\n¶ 6.            \r\nNot long after this suit, however, Joseph did begin the retirement\r\nprocess.  On January 30, 1985, Joseph entered into a stock redemption\r\nagreement with ABI, in accordance with which he agreed to sell his stock back\r\nto the company for a price of $700,128.  ABI paid him $50,000 up front\r\nwith the balance payable in monthly installments of $10,214.49 over eight years\r\n(ninety-six months at eleven percent interest).  ABI made these monthly\r\npayments until it paid off the balance a few months early, in late 1992. \r\nWhen Joseph retired in 1985, he also cashed in a realty trust that he held in\r\nconnection with property owned by ABI for an estimated payout of\r\n$193,000.  Additionally, he rolled over his retirement accounts, then\r\nworth $218,394.  \r\n\r\n¶ 7.            \r\nSometime in 1984, as Joseph and defendant began the transition into\r\nretirement, defendant purchased land in Stowe, Vermont.  They built a new\r\nhome there, which was completed in 1986.  Title to the land and house\r\nremained solely in defendant’s name.  The cost of these acquisitions was\r\nroughly $350,000, part of which was financed by a mortgage and part of which\r\nmay have come from proceeds of the ABI stock buyback.  The superior court\r\nfound that Joseph used at least part of the stock sale proceeds for living\r\nexpenses at some point or another.\r\n\r\n¶ 8.            \r\nAfter Joseph stopped receiving income from the ABI note in late 1992, he\r\nbegan to claim “financial difficulties” and repeatedly requested that plaintiff\r\nagree to a reduction in alimony.  In January 1993, Joseph wrote to\r\nplaintiff seeking a 29% reduction.  In seeking this modification, Joseph\r\nexplained, \r\n\r\n  As of\r\nJanuary 1993, the Bauer payments to me came to an end.  My income has been\r\nreduced by 58% and I will not have sufficient funds to continue the payments to\r\nyou at the current level. \r\n\r\n. . . .\r\n\r\n  . . . [W]ith-in a\r\nyear of my retirement, the capital gain tax increased by 13%.  This\r\ninflated the taxes on the Bauer payments substantially.  \r\n\r\n¶ 9.            \r\nIn a follow-up letter, Joseph further explained, “[t]he pre-payment by\r\nBauer is ballooning my taxes.”  The superior court concluded that this\r\nexchange would at least have put plaintiff on “inquiry notice” that Joseph may\r\nhave sold his ABI stock.  \r\n\r\n¶ 10.        \r\nPlaintiff never agreed to a reduction, and Joseph continued to pay\r\nalimony as agreed.  In 2003 and 2004, plaintiff and Joseph again\r\nexchanged letters concerning the monthly payments.  During this exchange,\r\nplaintiff twice described her understanding of the separation agreement. \r\nIn May 2003, plaintiff stated, “[A]ll money from A. Bauer, Inc., was\r\nagreed to come to me . . . . You should have put it in a\r\ntrust, immediately, and you could have lived comfortably off the\r\ninterest.”  In April 2004, plaintiff again explained, \r\n\r\n  According to the terms of the\r\nSeparation Agreement, the principal of your equity interest in Adolph Bauer was\r\nto be either held in trust or outlined in your will for one sole purpose\r\nonly: to assure the continuation of your obligation to me, and in the event of\r\nmy death to be split among the remaining of our children.  The principal\r\nwas to be used for no other purpose.\r\n\r\nAlthough he replied in writing\r\nseveral times, there is no evidence that Joseph ever commented on plaintiff’s\r\ndescription of the applicable provisions in the separation agreement.  \r\n\r\n¶ 11.        \r\nJoseph died in December 2007.  Under his 2003 will, Joseph left\r\ncertain personal articles to defendant,[1]\r\na bequest of $1000 to each of eight of his children with plaintiff, and the\r\nremainder to a revocable trust created at the same time the will was\r\nsigned.  The will did not mention ABI stock or the proceeds from the sale\r\nof ABI stock and left nothing to plaintiff. Joseph never put any ABI stock sale\r\nproceeds in trust to hold for plaintiff.  The will was never probated\r\nbecause defendant represented that there were no assets of the estate. \r\nThere were, however, joint accounts with defendant and accounts in which\r\ndefendant was the named beneficiary so the funds went directly to defendant\r\nwithout going through probate.  Defendant put all these funds into the\r\nJuliann Mueller revocable trust, which had been created at the time of the\r\nsigning of Joseph’s will in 2003 but contained no assets except for ownership\r\nof the Stowe home and land.  Following Joseph’s death, the revocable trust\r\nhad net assets, excluding the real property, of $392,742.  The home and\r\nland are estimated to have a value of $550,000, subject to $112,000 in\r\noutstanding loans.  \r\n\r\n¶ 12.        \r\nPlaintiff brought suit against defendant personally, as trustee and\r\nbeneficiary of the Juliann Mueller revocable trust, as trustee and beneficiary\r\nof the Joseph Mueller revocable trust, and as executrix of Joseph’s estate.[2]  In essence the complaint alleged\r\nthat defendant had assets from the sale of the ABI stock and is unjustly enriched\r\nby them and that plaintiff is entitled to restitution for “any property which\r\nshould have been property of Evelyn, but which has been retained by\r\nJuliann.”  The complaint therefore sought various equitable remedies,\r\nincluding declaratory relief, imposition of a constructive trust, and equitable\r\naccounting.  \r\n\r\n¶ 13.        \r\nAfter holding a trial, the superior court entered judgment for defendant\r\non two primary grounds and an alternate ground.  First, the superior court\r\nconcluded that the complaint was barred by the statute of limitations. \r\nThe court reasoned that plaintiff should have known by 1993 that something had\r\nhappened regarding the ABI stock that implicated her rights under the\r\nseparation agreement.  Because the claims asserted were for equitable\r\nrelief under Vermont law, the court applied the Vermont statute of\r\nlimitations.  Applying Vermont law, the court held that a cause of action\r\nhad accrued at that time, and that the suit was required to be commenced within\r\nsix years therefrom under 12 V.S.A. § 511.  \r\n\r\n¶ 14.        \r\nSecond, the superior court stated that, even if the statute of\r\nlimitations did not control, it would reach the same result under the equitable\r\ndoctrine of laches.  The court determined that plaintiff had “no cogent,\r\nor persuasive explanation for the delay of 15 years before seeking legal relief\r\nin court.”  This delay, the court reasoned, caused defendant substantial\r\nprejudice in that it was now virtually impossible to determine the intentions\r\nof the parties in 1975 or to unravel the financial transactions in order to\r\ntrace the proceeds of the ABI stock sale.  \r\n\r\n¶ 15.        \r\nA central part of the superior court’s reasoning on these primary\r\ngrounds is that the operative language of the separation agreement “is\r\nhopelessly ambiguous, and wholly ineffectual in staking out the respective\r\nrights of Evelyn and Joseph with respect to the inevitable buyback of his ABI\r\nstock.”  In reaching its statute of limitations decision, the court relied\r\nupon extrinsic evidence of the meaning of the language, derived from\r\nplaintiff.  The court held that plaintiff consistently took the position\r\nthat Joseph had been required by the separation agreement to sequester the\r\nfunds from the sale of the stock so the principal remained available to devise\r\nto plaintiff or her children in his will.  Relying upon that\r\ninterpretation, the court held that plaintiff was required to bring her action\r\nwhen she knew or should have known that Joseph was dissipating the asset.\r\n\r\n¶ 16.        \r\nAs an alternative ground for its decision, the court held that plaintiff\r\nfailed to trace the proceeds to money held by defendant such that she could\r\nrecover against defendant on a claim for unjust enrichment.  The court\r\nheld that the complicated nature of the finances of Joseph and defendant “conspire\r\nto prevent the court from having any credible basis to unravel the asset skein\r\nleft to Juliann.”  The court held “it is nearly impossible on this record\r\nto determine, and Defendant is prejudiced by not being able to disprove,\r\nwhether all, or any part of the current equity value in [Juliann’s Stowe\r\nproperty] . . . is in fact traceable, or attributable to the 1985 ABI\r\nstock sale.”  It went on to conclude that “[t]he same essential defect\r\nplagues the claim for constructive trust against Defendant’s sole remaining\r\ninvestment/money market account.”  It concluded “it would be an exercise\r\nin total speculation” to conclude that defendant was unjustly enriched at\r\nplaintiff’s expense.  Thus, the court stated that “[e]ven if the court\r\nwere to reach the merits, it does not appear on this record, given the totality\r\nof the circumstances, that Evelyn would prevail on her claims of unjust\r\nenrichment, and for constructive trust, against Juliann.”  \r\n\r\n¶ 17.        \r\nPlaintiff appeals, challenging both the statute of limitations and\r\nlaches rulings and the conclusion that the proceeds of the ABI stock sales\r\ncould not be traced to defendant such that she was unjustly enriched. \r\nWith respect to the former, plaintiff argues that the court made its ruling\r\nbased on a theory of anticipatory repudiation, but Massachusetts law, which\r\ngoverns under the contractual law selection clause in the separation agreement,\r\ndoes not recognize this theory.  Thus, plaintiff argues that under\r\nMassachusetts law her cause of action did not accrue until Joseph died and she\r\nbrought the action within the Vermont limitation date based upon that accrual\r\nevent.  With respect to the alternative ruling, plaintiff argues that the\r\nevidence was sufficient to show that defendant was unjustly enriched in purchasing\r\nthe Stowe property and with respect to the funds placed in the Juliann Mueller\r\nrevocable trust.\r\n\r\n¶ 18.        \r\nA substantial part of the arguments of the parties relates to whether\r\nMassachusetts law governs the major issues in this appeal under the terms of\r\nthe separation agreement.  We address this issue first and conclude that\r\nthe appeal does not turn on which state’s law applies.  The separation\r\nagreement provides that it “shall be construed to take effect under and in\r\naccordance with the laws of [Massachusetts].”  For purposes of this\r\nappeal, we will assume that under the agreement Massachusetts law governs\r\ncontract construction and when plaintiff’s action accrues.  See Stamp\r\nTech, Inc. ex rel. Blair v. Lydall/Thermal Acoustical, Inc., 2009 VT 91,\r\n¶ 23, 186 Vt. 369, 987 A.2d 292 (“[I]t is well-settled that it would be\r\ncontrary to the justified expectations of the parties for a court to interpret\r\ntheir agreement by the laws of any jurisdiction other than that specified in\r\nthe contract.” (citing Restatement\r\n(Second) of Conflict of Laws § 187 cmt. c (1971))).  Plaintiff agrees that\r\nthe limitation of action period is controlled by Vermont law and does not\r\ncontest that the elements of unjust enrichment are supplied by Vermont law.\r\n\r\n¶ 19.        \r\nUpon review of Massachusetts law, we conclude that plaintiff is correct\r\nin her assertion that a breach of contract action based upon a contract to make\r\na will does not accrue until the death of the promisor.  See Sliski v.\r\nKrol, 279 N.E.2d 924, 926-27 (Mass. 1972); Shopneck v. Rosenbloom,\r\n93 N.E.2d 227, 229 (Mass. 1950); Tower v. Jenney, 181 N.E. 123, 124\r\n(Mass. 1932); Raine v. Shea, 156 N.E. 541, 541 (Mass. 1927). \r\nAlthough at times the parties implied that this was a peculiarity of\r\nMassachusetts law, it seems to be the general view.  See, e.g., Lipe v.\r\nCitizens’ Bank &amp; Trust Co., 178 S.E. 665, 666 (N.C. 1935) (“[T]he cause\r\nof action accrues at the time of default, which may arise from abandonment or\r\nanticipatory breach, but which usually results from failure to make testamentary\r\nprovision as promised.” (citations omitted)); H. Wood, Annotation, Remedies\r\nDuring Promisor’s Lifetime on Contract to Convey or Will Property at Death in\r\nConsideration of Support or Services, 7 A.L.R. 2d 1166, § 2 (1949, Supp.\r\n2012); J. King, Lifetime Remedies for Breach of a Contract to Make a Will,\r\n50 S.C. L. Rev. 965, 972 (1999) (“Most courts are reluctant to recognize a\r\ncause of action during the promisor’s lifetime because the promisor has not\r\nbreached the contract until death and because the promisor cannot be compelled\r\nto make a will.”).  Although this Court has recognized agreements to make\r\na devise, see Porter v. Everts’ Estate, 81 Vt. 517, 71 A. 722 (1909), we\r\nhave not addressed this question,[3]\r\nbut we see no reason why our law would differ from that of Massachusetts. \r\n\r\n\r\n¶ 20.        \r\nWe come to the same conclusion about the relationship between\r\nMassachusetts and Vermont law with respect to contract construction. \r\nUnder Vermont law, in a dispute over the interpretation of contract language,\r\nthe first task of the court is to determine whether the language is ambiguous,\r\nwhich is a question of law.  See Isbrandtsen v. N. Branch Corp.,\r\n150 Vt. 575, 579, 556 A.2d 81, 84 (1988).  If the contract language is\r\nambiguous, its interpretation is a question of fact to be determined on all the\r\nevidence, including extrinsic evidence, to determine the intent of the\r\ncontracting parties.  See Dep’t of Corr. v. Matrix Health Sys.,\r\n2008 VT 32, ¶ 12, 183 Vt. 348, 950 A.2d 1201.  Massachusetts law is\r\ngenerally the same.[4] \r\nSee Bank v. Thermo Elemental, Inc., 888 N.E.2d 897, 907 (Mass. 2008).\r\n\r\n¶ 21.        \r\nDetermining the source of the law is relevant to our decision only to\r\nthe extent that the law in question controls part or all of our\r\nreasoning.  Although plaintiff argues to the contrary, it is clear that\r\nthe trial court did not find determinative the Massachusetts law on when a\r\ncontractual right to a devise accrues because the court found that the contract\r\nwas more than a contract to devise and its language was ambiguous.  Thus,\r\nit applied the Vermont and Massachusetts law on contract construction, as set\r\nout above, but not the law on when a right to a devise accrues.  In\r\ndetermining the validity of the trial court decision, we must first determine\r\nwhether the ambiguity ruling was correct.  As we stated above, this ruling\r\nis one of law, and therefore our review is de novo.  See O’Connell-Starkey\r\nv. Starkey, 2007 VT 128, ¶ 8, 183 Vt. 10, 944 A.2d 897.\r\n\r\n¶ 22.        \r\n“Ambiguity exists where the disputed language will allow more than one\r\nreasonable interpretation.”  Id.  There are a number of ways\r\nin which the separation agreement language on which plaintiff relies is\r\nambiguous.  Read literally, the provision states that if Joseph sells his\r\nshares, he is then required to give his interest in those assets to\r\nplaintiff.  But having sold his interest in the assets, he would have\r\nnothing to give.  Literally, the provision is a promise to give\r\nnothing.  A second way in which the literal reading of the provision\r\nappears implausible is that, on its own terms, the provision applies only if\r\nhusband sells his ABI shares while he is alive.  As long as husband did\r\nnot sell the shares, he would never be required to give plaintiff any of the\r\nassets.  Neither of these features of a literal reading makes much\r\nsense.  Adding a further oddity is the fact that the provision is included\r\nas a paragraph tucked within a section entitled “Support of Wife and Children,”\r\nnot within any of the sections discussing the allocation of property.  We\r\naffirm the trial court’s conclusion that the language is ambiguous.\r\n\r\n¶ 23.        \r\nHaving found the language ambiguous, the trial court turned to a factual\r\ninquiry into the meaning of the language.  The evidence was sparse. \r\nBoth plaintiff and defendant testified, but the testimony provided no\r\nsignificant evidence on the meaning of the agreement.[5]  The main evidence was\r\ncorrespondence between plaintiff and Joseph, in which she demanded compliance\r\nwith her understanding of the agreement, and plaintiff’s unsuccessful attempt\r\nin 1983 to enforce the agreement with respect to the ABI stock in the\r\nMassachusetts Probate Court.\r\n\r\n¶ 24.        \r\nRather than resolving the contract construction issue as a matter of\r\nfact, the court reasoned that under plaintiff’s position as to Joseph’s\r\nobligation under the agreement her cause of action accrued when the agreement\r\nwas made between ABI and Joseph for him to sell the stock.  The court held\r\nthat “it is ultimately unnecessary . . . to declare what the\r\nprovision appears to mean, or try to divine what the parties really intended in\r\n1975” because plaintiff’s claim would fail even “if, as she apparently\r\nthought and still contends, any such sale required Joseph to immediately put\r\nall the proceeds into an irrevocable trust (under which he could not touch any\r\nof the principal) to guarantee her alimony payments, and then pay the principal\r\nall to her (or to their children if she died before him).”  Thus, the\r\ncourt’s logic was that since plaintiff alleged that Joseph’s breach of the\r\nagreement was the failure to establish the trust, and not the failure to put\r\nthe devise of the proceeds in the will, she was not relying on a theory of anticipatory\r\nrepudiation and the cause of action would accrue when Joseph failed to\r\nestablish the trust.\r\n\r\n¶ 25.        \r\nAs discussed in more detail below, this is fundamentally an unjust\r\nenrichment action.  While plaintiff’s complaint alleges that the two\r\npersonal revocable trusts, one for Juliann and one for Joseph, held money that\r\nshould have gone to plaintiff, and that a constructive trust should be imposed,\r\nthere is no allegation that Joseph should have established an irrevocable trust\r\nfor the ABI stock sale proceeds at the time he began to receive them. \r\nSome of the evidence supported the court’s view that plaintiff had sought an\r\nirrevocable trust.  In the 1983 enforcement action in the Massachusetts\r\nProbate Court, the complaint alleged that Joseph “[h]as failed to set up [a]\r\ntrust in accordance with the last paragraph appearing on page 3 of [the]\r\nSeparation Agreement.”  Plaintiff’s affidavit in this case described the\r\ncontempt action by stating, “my counsel filed a complaint for contempt claiming\r\nthat Joseph had failed to establish a trust pursuant to Article II of the\r\n[Separation] Agreement.”  In a letter in 2003, plaintiff wrote, “You\r\nshould have put it in a trust, immediately, and you could have lived\r\ncomfortably off the interest.”  Other evidence was more equivocal. \r\nFor example, plaintiff’s letter of April 2004 to Joseph stated that the\r\nproceeds should “be either held in trust or outlined in your will.” \r\nPlaintiff testified that the ABI stock was to come to her “not just when he\r\nsold it but if he died.”  Plaintiff’s position in this Court, consistent\r\nwith her position below, was that the Agreement required that the proceeds of\r\nthe ABI stock were to be devised to her, or her children, on Joseph’s death\r\nirrespective of whether he sequestered them as they came to him.  \r\n\r\n¶ 26.        \r\nWe acknowledge that the court could have found that the separation\r\nagreement contained a requirement to sequester the ABI stock sale proceeds\r\nalthough it was not explicit on this point.  But the court made no such\r\nfinding.  We do not believe it could substitute for such a finding a\r\ndisputed assertion of plaintiff’s position, attributing to plaintiff a waiver\r\nof any alternative position.  We therefore cannot affirm the court’s\r\nstatute of limitations holding.\r\n\r\n¶ 27.        \r\nThis brings us to the court’s alternative holding—that plaintiff’s\r\naction fails because she did not trace the proceeds of the stock sale into the\r\nfunds held by defendant on which she seeks to impose a constructive\r\ntrust.  As we noted above, this is not a breach of contract action against\r\nJoseph or his estate; nor is it a contempt action based on the divorce\r\norder.  At its core, plaintiffs’ allegation is that defendant was unjustly\r\nenriched by the receipt of some or all of the proceeds of the stock sale. \r\nPlaintiff identifies two ways in which defendant was unjustly enriched—in the\r\npurchase of the land for and construction of the house in Stowe, and in the\r\nfunds that came to her outside probate on Joseph’s death.  As a remedy,\r\nshe seeks a constructive trust for her benefit on the house and land, and on\r\nthe Juliann Mueller revocable trust.  \r\n\r\n¶ 28.        \r\nUnder the doctrine of unjust enrichment, “a party who receives a benefit\r\nmust return [it] . . . if retention would be inequitable.”  Gallipo\r\nv. City of Rutland, 2005 VT 83, ¶ 41, 178 Vt. 244, 882 A.2d 1177. \r\nUnjust enrichment is present if, “ ‘in light of the totality of the\r\ncircumstances, equity and good conscience demand’ that the benefitted party\r\nreturn that which was given.”  Id. (quoting Brookside Memorials,\r\nInc. v. Barre City, 167 Vt. 558, 560, 702 A.2d 47, 50 (1997) (mem.)). \r\nWhether there is unjust enrichment present “ ‘may not be determined from a\r\nlimited inquiry confined to an isolated transaction.  It must be a\r\nrealistic determination based on a broad view of the human setting\r\ninvolved.’ ”  Legault v. Legault, 142 Vt. 525, 531, 459 A.2d\r\n980, 984 (1983) (quoting McGrath v. Hilding, 363 N.E.2d 328, 331 (N.Y.\r\n1977)).\r\n\r\n¶ 29.        \r\nThe common remedy for unjust enrichment is imposition of a constructive\r\ntrust, where the person with the legal title “cannot enjoy the beneficial\r\ninterest without violating the rules of honesty and fair dealing.”[6]  McGann v. Capital Sav. Bank\r\n&amp; Trust Co., 117 Vt. 179, 189, 89 A.2d 123, 130 (1952). \r\nImposition of a constructive trust is a common remedy in a case where property\r\nor funds have been diverted to a third person in violation of the terms of a\r\ncontract to make a specific devise.  See Goldstein v. Hoffman, 29\r\nCal. Rptr. 334, 340 (Ct. App. 1963); Allen v. Mayo, 279 N.W.2d 617, 620\r\n(Neb. 1979).  Plaintiff sought a constructive trust here.\r\n\r\n¶ 30.        \r\nPlaintiff’s theory with respect to defendant’s house is that defendant\r\nwas able to construct it and pay off the mortgage only through the use of\r\nproceeds of the ABI stock sale.[7] \r\nTherefore, plaintiff argues, defendant should be able to keep the house and\r\nland only if she pays back to plaintiff the stock sale proceeds that were\r\ndiverted to the house.  Plaintiff argues that defendant was enriched by\r\nthe stock sale proceeds and that enrichment became unjust when Joseph failed to\r\ndevise the stock sale proceeds to plaintiff.\r\n\r\n¶ 31.        \r\nThe difficulty with plaintiff’s position with respect to the house is\r\nthat plaintiff had the burden of tracing the stock sale proceeds into the house\r\nto enable their return.  Defendant’s testimony was that none of the\r\nproceeds went into the purchase of the land or the construction of the house\r\nalthough an undetermined amount may have gone into payments on the\r\nmortgage.  Plaintiff was unable to refute this testimony or show how much\r\nwent into the mortgage payments.  The trial court found: “Thus it is\r\nnearly impossible on this record to determine, and Defendant is prejudiced by\r\nnot being able to disprove, whether all, or any part of the current equity\r\nvalue in the [Stowe property] is in fact traceable, or attributable to the 1985\r\nABI stock sale.”  Based on our review of the record, we would substitute\r\n“impossible” for “nearly impossible.”\r\n\r\n¶ 32.        \r\nPlaintiff’s argument presumes that if she can trace any proceeds to the\r\nhome, she is entitled to a constructive trust for its entire value.  We\r\nconclude that she had the burden to trace not only the fact that stock sale\r\nproceeds went into the value of the house but also the amount of those\r\nproceeds.  With such a showing the appropriate remedy might be a lien to\r\nthe extent of the value reflecting the proceeds.  As the trial court\r\nfound, plaintiff could not produce a record that made tracing possible. \r\nSee Sheldon v. Sheldon, 987 P.2d 1229, 1235-36 (Or. Ct. App. 1999)\r\n(explaining the potential appropriateness of a lien but refusing to grant it\r\nwhere plaintiff failed to trace the source of funds).  Accordingly, the\r\ntrial court properly declined a remedy with respect to the house and land.\r\n\r\n¶ 33.        \r\nThe claim that the court should have imposed a constructive trust in\r\nplaintiff’s favor over the content of the Juliann Mueller revocable trust\r\npresents a closer question.  We would concur with plaintiff that if Joseph\r\nhad devised property or money directly to Juliann, plaintiff would potentially\r\nbe entitled to a constructive trust on the property or funds.  There is no\r\nquestion that in such circumstances, assuming plaintiff’s interpretation of the\r\nagreement, Juliann’s enrichment would be unjust.  See Brooks v.\r\nYarbrough, 37 F.2d 527, 532 (10th Cir. 1930) (collecting cases); Musselman\r\nv. Mitchell, 611 P.2d 675, 681 (Or. Ct. App. 1980).   \r\nBeyond that, if Joseph made a gift of property or money to Juliann right before\r\nhis death, leaving his estate unfunded or with inadequate funds to fulfill his\r\ncontractual commitment, plaintiff would be entitled to a constructive trust\r\nover the property or money transferred up to the value of the contractual\r\ncommitment.  See Murphy v. Glenn, 964 P.2d 581, 586-87 (Colo. App.\r\n1998); In re Estate of Hodgson, No. 55741-6-I, 2006 WL 1135035, at *9\r\n(Wash. Ct. App. May 1, 2006).  See generally 1 W. Bowe &amp; D. Parker,\r\nPage on the Law of Wills § 10.231 (rev. ed. 2003).  Again, Juliann’s\r\nenrichment would be unjust.  \r\n\r\n¶ 34.        \r\nPlaintiff argues that the latter hypothetical is what occurred here,\r\nwith the factual variation that the funds came to Juliann outside the probate\r\nestate through the vehicle of a joint account.  In an affidavit submitted\r\nby Juliann, and made an exhibit in the trial, she stated that after Joseph’s\r\ndeath, she transferred a brokerage account that had previously been a joint\r\naccount into the Juliann Mueller revocable trust.  She stated that there\r\nwere no other assets in the trust except her Stowe home.  Thus, plaintiff\r\nin her post-trial memorandum argued that Juliann had transferred the $397,000\r\ninto the revocable trust from the joint account and a constructive trust should\r\nbe imposed on the whole value of the revocable trust.\r\n\r\n¶ 35.        \r\nDefendant accepts that the money came from a joint account, but there is\r\nno evidence of the source of the money to that\r\naccount.  For all that appears, it may have come at least in part from\r\ndefendant’s earnings from her part-time work or from her social security\r\nbenefits.  She is not enriched by retaining those funds, and the retention\r\nis not unjust.  We agree that the evidence shows that it is highly likely\r\nthat some of those funds came from Joseph.  But we do not believe that\r\nlikelihood is sufficient for plaintiff to meet her burden of proof.  She\r\nhad to show the source of the funds so that the court could allocate between\r\namounts that should answer to plaintiff’s claim and those that should\r\nnot.  As it properly did, the trial court had to conclude that plaintiff\r\nfailed to meet her burden.  We affirm that conclusion.  \r\n\r\nAffirmed.\r\n\r\n\r\n \r\n\r\n \r\n\r\n\r\n  \r\n \r\n \r\n  \r\n \r\n \r\n FOR THE COURT:\r\n \r\n \r\n  \r\n \r\n \r\n  \r\n \r\n \r\n  \r\n \r\n \r\n  \r\n \r\n \r\n  \r\n \r\n \r\n  \r\n \r\n \r\n  \r\n \r\n \r\n  \r\n \r\n \r\n  \r\n \r\n \r\n  \r\n \r\n \r\n  \r\n \r\n \r\n Associate\r\n Justice\r\n \r\n  \r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n[1] \r\nIf defendant predeceased him, these items were left to the child of Joseph and\r\ndefendant or to the living issue of the child if he predeceased Joseph.\r\n\r\n \r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n[2] \r\nThe estate was joined in response to defendant’s motion to dismiss and the\r\nruling of the superior court of December 18, 2008 that the estate is a\r\nnecessary party.  The amended complaint does not actually assert any\r\nclaims against the estate, and this case does not directly involve any breach\r\nof contract claim against Joseph’s estate.  There are no funds in the\r\nJoseph Mueller revocable trust so the naming of that entity is superfluous.\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n[3] \r\nWe do not read Pike v. Pike, 69 Vt. 535, 38 A. 265 (1897), as addressing\r\nthis issue.\r\n\r\n \r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n[4] \r\nIf there is a significant difference, it lies in our willingness to allow\r\n“evidence as to the circumstances under which the conveyance was made” in\r\ndetermining whether the language is ambiguous.  See Isbrandtsen,\r\n150 Vt. at 580, 556 A.2d at 85.  There was no such evidence in this case.\r\n\r\n \r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n[5] \r\nPlaintiff was ninety-one years old at the time of the trial and could provide\r\nlittle evidence on the intent of the parties in entering into the separation agreement\r\nand the meaning of the agreement.\r\n\r\n \r\n\r\nDefendant provided her understanding of Joseph’s\r\nposition that his obligation was fully discharged by the payment of the alimony\r\nunder the agreement, but she had no involvement in the drafting of the\r\nagreement and left the financial affairs to her husband until he became unable\r\nto manage those affairs.  Defendant’s understanding was based in part on a\r\nstatement that Joseph put in his 1990 will, which was superseded by the will in\r\neffect when he died.  The statement in the earlier will was:  “In\r\nlight of the fact that I have sold all of my interest in Adolph Bauer, Inc.,\r\npursuant to Article II of the separation agreement dated August 8, 1975, and in\r\nlight of the fact that I no longer have any ‘rights, title and interest in such\r\nassets, i.e., Adolph Bauer, Inc.,’ all responsibilities that I had, pursuant to\r\nArticle II of the separation agreement dated August 8, 1975 as amended, between\r\nmyself and Evelyn O. Mueller have ceased.”  \r\n\r\n \r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n[6] \r\nWe noted in Gregoire v. Gregoire the trend to require proof of\r\nentitlement to a constructive trust by clear and convincing evidence. \r\n2009 VT 87, ¶ 13, 186 Vt. 322, 987 A.2d 909.  We did not decide whether to\r\nfollow that practice in Gregoire.  Similarly, we see no need to\r\ndecide the question here.\r\n\r\n \r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n[7] \r\nWe analyze this argument, as the trial court did, assuming its validity but\r\nholding that plaintiff failed to supply the requisite proof.  We note,\r\nhowever, that this argument is arguably inconsistent with plaintiff’s position\r\nthat Joseph had no responsibility to sequester the proceeds of the ABI stock\r\nsales and his only responsibility arose with respect to his will.  Under\r\nthis theory, the use of stock sales proceeds to construct the house appears to\r\nbe irrelevant. \r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n", "ocr": false, "opinion_id": 1043700 } ]
Supreme Court of Vermont
Supreme Court of Vermont
S
Vermont, VT
1,044,198
Judge Thomas T. Woodall
2013-09-05
false
state-of-tennessee-v-brent-rowden
null
State of Tennessee v. Brent Rowden
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
0
Published
null
null
null
[ { "author_str": null, "per_curiam": false, "type": "010combined", "page_count": 16, "download_url": "http://www.tsc.state.tn.us/sites/default/files/rowdenbrentopn.pdf", "author_id": 8296, "opinion_text": " IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE\n AT NASHVILLE\n Assigned on Briefs April 17, 2013\n\n STATE OF TENNESSEE v. BRENT ROWDEN\n\n Direct Appeal from the Circuit Court for Wayne County\n No. 15069 Robert Jones, Judge\n\n\n No. M2012-01683-CCA-R3-CD - Filed September 5, 2013\n\n\nA Wayne County Jury convicted Defendant, Brent Rowden, of second-degree murder\n(County One), tampering with evidence (Count Two), and attempted initiation of a process\nto manufacture methamphetamine (Count Three). He received concurrent sentences of\nthirty-seven years as a Range II multiple offender for second-degree murder, thirteen years\nas a persistent offender for tampering with evidence, and thirteen years as a persistent\noffender for attempted initiation of a process to manufacture methamphetamine. The trial\ncourt ordered Defendant’s effective thirty-seven-year sentence to be served consecutively to\nan eight-year sentence in Lawrence County. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court\nerred in denying the motion to suppress his statements to police. After a thorough review,\nwe affirm the judgment of the trial court. However, the matter is remanded to the trial court\nfor entry of a corrected judgment in Count One to reflect Defendant’s offender status as\nMultiple rather than Career.\n\n Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed\n Remanded for Entry of a Corrected Judgment in Count One\n\nT HOMAS T. W OODALL, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which J AMES C URWOOD\nW ITT, Jr. and R OBERT W. W EDEMEYER, JJ., joined.\n\nEric C. Davis, Dothan, Alabama, for the appellant, Brent Rowden.\n\nRobert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney General and Reporter; Renee W. Turner, Assistant Attorney\nGeneral; Mike Bottoms, District Attorney General; and J. Douglas Dicus, Assistant District\nAttorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.\n\f OPINION\n\nI. Background\n\n Although Defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the convicting evidence on\nappeal, we will briefly review the evidence supporting Defendant’s convictions. On April 24,\n2011, the body of Scott Sobey, the victim, was found floating in the Tennessee River, north\nof the Pickwick Dam, in Hardin County. Law enforcement officers recovered the victim’s\nbody, and it was sent to Memphis for an autopsy. It was determined that the cause of death\nwas gunshot wounds and sharp-force injuries (cuts), and the manner of death was homicide.\nThe victim had two gunshot wounds to the head and one to the chest. A bullet was recovered\nfrom the victim’s brain. The victim also had three stab wounds.\n\n It was eventually determined that the victim was missing from a halfway house in\nMemphis and had last been seen leaving there with Defendant, who was from Lawrence\nCounty. Chief Deputy Mike Fielder of the Hardin County Sheriff’s Office received\ninformation that a vehicle connected with the victim’s death was at Grimes Recycling in\nLawrence County. Micheal Polk, an employee of Grimes Recycling, testified that the\ncompany had purchased the vehicle from Defendant on April 25, 2011, for $206. Mr. Polk\ntestified that he obtained the title for the vehicle from Defendant, and he obtained a copy of\nDefendant’s driver’s license as part of the transaction. Chief Deputy Fielder then notified the\nLawrence County Sheriff’s Office that Defendant was a person of interest in the case.\nDefendant was taken into custody on April 27, 2011, at an apartment on Nixon Avenue in\nLawrence County. He was interviewed by Captain Adam Brewer, Lieutenant Nathan Neese,\nand Sergeant Bud Smith of the Lawrence County Sheriff’s Office. Defendant waived his\nMiranda rights and gave a statement indicating that he shot the victim on April 11, 2011,\nbecause the victim was trying to burn him and his car with a “shake bottle” that the victim\nwas using to make methamphetamine. Defendant told officers that he shot the victim “two\nor three times in his chest and possibly three times in the head.” He also admitted that he had\ncut the victim’s throat. Defendant told officers that he loaded the victim’s body into\nDefendant’s car, drove to Pickwick Boat Landing, and dumped the victim into the water.\nDefendant said that he threw the gun and knife “into the swirls at the river.” He also said that\nhe burned his clothing on the side of the road, cut the carpet from the back of his car, and\ncleaned up the blood inside the car. In the next few days, he sold his car to Grimes Recycling\non U.S. Highway 64 in Lawrence County. It was eventually determined that the offenses\noccurred in Wayne County.\n\n Upon learning that the offenses occurred in Wayne County, Chief Deputy Fielder\ncontacted the Wayne County Sheriff’s office, and the information was turned over to\nDetective Kenneth Martin. Detective Martin took custody of Defendant the following day,\n\n -2-\n\fApril 28, 2011. Defendant led Detective Martin to the area of Caperton Hollow Road in\nWayne County where the offenses occurred. Defendant was then taken to the Wayne County\nSheriff’s Office where he again waived his Miranda Rights and gave a statement at 3:05p.m.\nDefendant admitted to shooting the victim and cutting his throat with a butcher knife because\nthe victim threw a bottle he was using to make methamphetamine at Defendant and\nthreatened to burn Defendant’s car. He reiterated to Detective Martin that he loaded the\nvictim’s body in his car, stopped to put gas in the car, and drove to the boat ramp at Pickwick\nDam and dumped the victim’s body in the river. Defendant told Detective Martin that he\nchanged clothes twice, but could not remember where he put them, and he cut the carpet\nfrom the back of the car and tossed it into a creek. He also cleaned blood from the ceiling\nlight of the car and then sold it to Grimes Recycling. Defendant told Detective Martin that\nhe purchased the gun, which was a .380 Glock, on April 11, 2011.\n\n Defendant gave a second statement to Detective Martin the following day, April 29,\n2011, at 10:10a.m. He told Detective Martin that after the murder, he threw the gun in the\nbushes at the house on Caperton Road. Defendant admitted that he had stolen the gun from\nhis cousin’s residence when no one was home. He again said that he did not recall what\nhappened to his clothes, and he thought that he threw the knife into the river. Detective\nMartin later recovered the gun from the bushes at the residence on Caperton Road. Chief\nDeputy Fielder turned Defendant’s car over to Detective Martin on May 6, 2011.\n\n Agent Bradley Everette of the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation (TBI), an expert in\nDNA identification, testified that he searched Defendant’s vehicle looking for any DNA\nprofiles inside the car. He found human blood stains in the hatchback area of the car that\nwere later determined to be from the victim.\n\n Suppression Hearing\n\n Captain Adam Brewer of the Lawrence County Sheriff’s Department testified that he\nand Sergeant Bud Smith interviewed Defendant on April 27, 2011, regarding the\ndisappearance and death of the victim, Scott Sobey, who was from Lawrence County.\nCaptain Brewer had previously been contacted by the Hardin County Sheriff’s Department,\nwho said that they had found the victim’s body. Captain Brewer learned that Defendant was\none of the last people to have seen the victim alive. He found Defendant on April 27, 2011,\nat the Nixon Apartments and arrested him pursuant to a violation of probation warrant.\n\n Captain Brewer testified that the interview took place at the Lawrence County\nSheriff’s Office in the interview room. He “Mirandized” Defendant and initially indicated\nthat they were looking into the victim’s case as that of a missing person and asked if\nDefendant could help find the victim. Captain Brewer testified that Defendant agreed to talk\n\n -3-\n\fand signed a waiver of his Miranda rights at 7:22 p.m. on April 27, 2011. Defendant began\nanswering questions concerning his knowledge of the victim’s disappearance. Captain\nBrewer testified that Defendant “was kind of scattered with answering his questions at first,\nso we kind of let him get his thoughts together.”\n\n Captain Brewer testified that Lieutenant Nathan Neese also attended the interview\nwhich lasted “nearly three hours, off and on, with the three of use being in there.” When\nasked if Defendant’s statement was reduced to writing, Captain Brewer testified:\n\n No. When we got to the point where we began talking about that we had\n found Mr. Sobey and that it became not a missing person’s case anymore, we\n actually knew where he was at and that he was dead, he began talking to us,\n and at that point decided he needed to talk to an attorney before we were able\n to write anything down.\n\nCaptain Brewer testified that the interview was immediately terminated, and no further\nquestions were asked of Defendant. He said, “[Defendant] actually tried to make more\nstatements as he left, and we advised him that he had invoked his right and that he needed\nan attorney present before we could talk anymore.”\n\n Later that evening, Captain Brewer was contacted by corrections officer Blaine Bates\nwho indicated that Defendant wanted to speak with investigators again. Officer Bates\nbrought Defendant to the interview room a second time, and Captain Brewer, Lieutenant\nNeese, and Sergeant Smith were again present. Captain Brewer testified:\n\n We advised him again that he had invoked his right and asked him if he\n wanted to withdraw that and still talk to us. He said he did. We read Miranda\n to him again, explained to him, you know, that if he wanted to continue to\n invoke his right to an attorney, that that was fine.\n\n He wanted to - - he made the statement that, “The medical examiner said that\n he was shot more than once, is it going to be - - will that hurt my self-defense\n claim?”\n\n We continued to say, “We can’t talk to you about that till you understand your\n rights and you let us know that you don’t want to talk to an attorney.”\n\n So at that point he was read his rights again. He did sign a statement saying\n he did not want an attorney, he wanted to talk to us about it, and that’s when\n we continued with the interview.\n\n -4-\n\fThe second waiver of rights form was signed at 11:11p.m. on April 27, 2011. Captain\nBrewer testified that there was also a handwritten note that Defendant signed indicating that\nhe wished to recant his previously invoked right to an attorney and talk to the officers.\n\n Captain Brewer testified that Defendant then gave a written statement that contained\nthe following, as written out by Lieutenant Neese:\n\n On Friday, April 9, 2011, I went to Memphis to pick up Scott Sobey at a\n halfway house. We brought Scott to Eric Short’s house in Iron City. Scott and\n Eric were cellees in prison, and that’s where we all met. Me and Scott used\n dope together over the weekend.\n\n Scott started talking about being a hitman and how he has killed little girls, it\n was hard to hear them scream. Scott kept talking about how many people he\n had killed.\n\n On Monday, April 11, 2011, I went back to Eric Short’s to pick up Scott and\n drive him back to Memphis. Before I went and picked him up, I stopped and\n got a piece (a .380 handgun) because I was afraid of what Scott was going to\n do to me. I picked Scott up, and we went out to a house trailer where there are\n some junk cars. It’s off a road past Turner Willims’ old store on Holly Creek\n in Wayne County.\n\n Me and Scott were cooking dope, and Scott started trying to hit me and burn\n me and my car with the shake bottle. I was at the car kind of behind it, and I\n took out the .380 and shot Scott in the chest. I realized he was still alive, so\n I shot him in the head. I think I shot him two or three times in his chest and\n probably three times in the head. I could see he was still breathing and still\n alive, so I got a butcher knife that I had in my car and cut Scott’s throat.\n\n It took me a little bit, but I was able to get his body, Scott’s body, loaded into\n the car. I then drove to Pickwick Boat Landing, where I backed up to the boat\n ramp. I knew I was close to the water because I could hear the muffler\n bubbling in the water. I opened the hatch, rolled his body into the water.\n\n I left there and threw the gun and knife into the [swirls] at the river. I stopped\n on the side of the road and burned my clothes. I cut the carpet out of the back\n of my car and cleaned up the blood out of the back of my car.\n\n\n\n\n -5-\n\f I then went to my cousin’s house on Depot Street in Collinwood and slept. In\n the next few days, I sold my car to Grimes Recycling on U.S. Highway 64 in\n Lawrence County.\n\n Captain Brewer testified that he asked Defendant if there was anything that he wanted\nto add or take away from the statement. Defendant replied: “I just want to clarify that I\ndropped Scott off at the house trailer with the junk cars, and I left to get some batteries before\ncooking dope. That’s when I stopped and got the piece (.380 handgun).” Captain Brewer\ntestified that Defendant signed and dated the statement. Based upon Defendant’s statement,\nit was ascertained that the victim’s murder occurred in Wayne County and Detective Kenneth\nMartin of the Wayne County Sheriff’s Department was contacted about taking over the\ninvestigation.\n\n On cross-examination, Captain Brewer testified that Defendant was at Amy Gatlin’s\napartment when he was picked up for the probation violation warrant. He said:\n\n We received information that he could be possibly staying there from a contact\n of his mother’s. We were able to do surveillance on the apartment complex\n from the Walgreens parking lot and CVS parking lot from up the street. We\n had observed a subject come out in the yard matching his description several\n times looking around. Myself and Lieutenant Neese at that point came down\n Nixon Avenue, and I observed Brent Rowden standing in the front yard with\n a baseball bat.\n\nCaptain Brewer testified that Defendant was arrested in the front yard of the apartment\ncomplex and carried back up to the porch of Ms. Gatlin’s apartment. Captain Brewer walked\ninside the apartment and observed “some marijuana paraphernalia or maybe a Coke can\nwhere they had been smoking drugs off the top of it.” There was also some burnt foil.\nCaptain Brewer testified that his investigation revealed that Defendant was a user of\nmethamphetamine. A search of Ms. Gatlin’s apartment did not reveal the presence of\nmethamphetamine.\n\n Captain Brewer testified that in his experience, a person on methamphetamine may\nbe overly paranoid. He admitted that Defendant’s behavior prior to his arrest was indicative\nof someone who was paranoid. He further admitted that when Defendant was taken into\ncustody, he “exhibited signs of a meth user: paranoid, somewhat irritable.” Captain Brewer\ntestified that when they approached Defendant, he raised the baseball bat, and he said that\n“he thought he was looking at Detective Mills down the street.” Captain Brewer explained\nthat Detective Mills was a drug agent with the Lawrence County Sheriff’s Department.\n\n\n\n -6-\n\fWhen asked if he felt that Defendant had been actively using methamphetamine at the time,\nCaptain Brewer testified:\n\n From my experience dealing with methamphetamine addicts - - and I was\n assigned to narcotics for over five years - - once somebody is using that drug\n and they become a user, it’s hard to tell if they’re actually under the influence\n or - - it just has a permanent effect on their behavior and the way they act, so\n it’s hard for me to determine whether or not they’ve actually smoked any. I\n can just kind of determine they are a user.\n\nCaptain Brewer felt that Defendant would have exhibited the same paranoia whether he\nwaited two weeks or a month to interview Defendant. He said, “Once they get that - - exhibit\nthat type of behavior, in my experience they typically stick with that, so I felt like it was as\ngood a time as any to go ahead and talk to him.”\n\n On redirect examination, Captain Brewer testified that there was never any concern\nthat Defendant did not understand his rights or that he was intoxicated to the point that he did\nnot understand what he was saying. He acknowledged that Defendant gave specific details\nin his statement, and Defendant invoked his right to an attorney at one point. Captain Brewer\ntestified that if he had seen signs of intoxication to the point of impairing Defendant, he\nwould have stopped the interview.\n\n Detective Kenneth Martin of the Wayne County Sheriff’s Department testified that\nhe traveled to Lawrence County on April 28, 2011, to pick up Defendant and transport him\nto Wayne County. He and Detective Cameron McDonald interviewed Defendant in the\ninvestigator’s office. Detective Martin read Defendant his Miranda rights, and Defendant\nsigned a waiver. The interview with Defendant resulted in a typed statement which\nDefendant acknowledged and signed. Detective Martin testified that Defendant read the\nstatement before signing it, and the statement was read to him. The statement contained the\nfollowing:\n\n I picked up Scott Sobey at a halfway house in Memphis on Friday, April 8,\n 2011, and took him to Eric Short’s house in Iron City. On Monday, April 11,\n 2011, I picked up Scott Sobey at Eric Short’s house in Iron City, and we went\n to Ricky McCrary’s house on Caperton Hollow Road.\n\n I left and went to the Dollar Store in Collinwood to get lithium batteries.\n When I returned from the Dollar Store, Scott Sobey was in the process of\n making meth. When I walked up to Scott Sobey, he was in the shed behind the\n house, and he threw the bottle at me. I went up the bank, and Scott went in\n\n -7-\n\f front of the car and said he was going to burn the car, and that is when I shot\n Scott in the chest or stomach.\n\n I walked back down the bank, and he was still alive, and I shot Scott Sobey in\n the head. I shot him about five times, and he was still alive and he was\n breathing shallow, and that is when I cut his throat with a butcher knife.\n\n I stood around for a while, and then I loaded Scott in the hatchback. I like to\n have never got him loaded in the hatchback, [. . .]\n\n I then drove to Little Cincy’s [sic ] and got gas and went to Pickwick, where\n the motel and boat ramp is located, and I put Scott in the river. I’m not going\n to say what I did with the knife and gun. I just got read [sic] of them, [. . . ]\n\n I changed clothes twice because I had got wet, and don’t remember what I did\n with the clothes.\n\n Defendant told Detective Martin that the gun was a .380 Glock, and he sold the car\nat “Grimes Scrapyard.” He claimed that he purchased the gun on April 11, 2011, when he\nwent to buy the lithium batteries. Defendant told Detective Martin that no one was with him\nwhen the murder took place at Mr. McCrary’s house. After he disposed of the victim’s body,\nDefendant said that he cut the carpet from the back of his car and cleaned blood from the\nceiling near the light. He said, “I was trying to cover it up and get rid of it, anything.”\nDefendant told Detective Martin that he threw the carpet in a creek. When asked why he\nthought Defendant was going to kill him, Defendant said that the victim told him “he was a\nhitman and enforcer and he had killed 36 people.”\n\n Detective Martin conducted a second interview with Defendant the following day on\nApril 29, 2011, to clarify some issues. Defendant again waived his Miranda rights and\nagreed to talk. During the second interview, Defendant said that he threw the gun in some\nbushes at Mr. McCrary’s house. He admitted that he had stolen the gun from his cousin,\nCharles Pulley. He said that he took the gun from Mr. Pulley’s house when no one else was\nat the home. Defendant did not know what happened to his clothes but said that he threw the\nknife into the river. Defendant was later taken back to Mr. McCrary’s house, and the gun\nwas recovered from the property.\n\n On cross-examination, Detective Martin testified that he “Mirandized” Defendant\nwhen he got into the car before leaving Lawrenceburg. They proceeded to Mr. McCrary’s\nresidence on Caperton Hollow Road near the Lawrence-Wayne County line. Defendant then\nshowed Detective Martin and others where he shot the victim. At that time, Defendant did\n\n -8-\n\fnot mention anything about the gun being in the bushes. Detective Martin testified that\nDefendant was not behaving unusually when he picked Defendant up in Lawrence County.\nHe did not notice Defendant being agitated or paranoid. Detective Martin did not observe\nanything that indicated that Defendant could not intelligently waive his rights and give a\nstatement. Defendant did not have any difficulty answering questions.\n\n Defendant testified that at the time of his arrest on April 27, 2011, he was under the\ninfluence of illegal drugs. He said:\n\n When they arrested me, I mean, I was so high, you know what I mean, that, I\n mean, I was just zonked. I was just real high, was shooting it into my arm, you\n know, and you get higher that way than you do when you smoke it.\n\n They said they didn’t have no evidence, no drugs up there. They come and\n asked me to search the apartment, and they found the bottom of a can that had\n residue on it because I told them it was in there. And they said if that’s all that\n was in there, they wasn’t worried about it. I said they could go up there, and\n they went up there and got it.\n\n All I’m saying is I was shooting it, and there’s a lot of difference when you\n shoot drugs than when you smoke it.\n\n Defendant testified that he had been using methamphetamine on and off for\napproximately seven years, and he was addicted to it. He said that he would lose track of\ntime whenever he had been awake for so long. Defendant testified that at the time of the\nvictim’s murder, he had been awake for three to four days, and the victim had been awake\nfor fourteen days. Defendant did not know how many days that he had been awake at the\ntime of his arrest. He said that he had shot methamphetamine into his veins approximately\none hour before police arrived. He did not believe that he was in a condition to make\nintelligent and rational choices at the time.\n\n Defendant testified that he was under the influence of methamphetamine when he\ngave both statements at the Lawrence County Sheriff’s Department. He acknowledged\nsigning the waiver of rights form. However, he claimed that he was expecting his lawyer to\nbe there when he went back for the second interview. Defendant claimed that he decided to\ngive a statement because the investigators had pizza and a Dr. Pepper for him, and he was\n“starving.”\n\n On cross-examination, Defendant testified that he had been using drugs throughout\nthe night before his arrest. He acknowledged that he could remember the officers coming\n\n -9-\n\fto arrest him, and he remembered them talking to him about drugs in the apartment. He\nadmitted that he understood what they were talking about. Defendant said, “They wasn’t\nasking me about nothing but the probation violation.”\n\n Defendant testified that after he arrived at the Lawrence County Jail and went into the\ninterview room, he remembered a piece of paper, but thought that his attorney was coming.\nHe agreed that the statement read by Captain Brewer during the suppression hearing was\n“very close to what happened.” Defendant admitted that he remembered what happened\nwhen the victim died, and he accurately told Captain Brewer what happened that night.\nDefendant testified that he somewhat understood his Miranda rights, and he acknowledged\nthat he had been arrested many times in the past, although not for murder, and had been\nadvised of his rights. However, he said, “Not that kind of pressure, though. It was\ndifferent.”\n\n Defendant testified that he remembered that after he asked for his attorney, the\ninterview stopped, and he was taken back to his cell. He admitted tapping on the glass and\ntelling Officer Bates that he wanted to speak with investigators again. Defendant agreed that\nhe was again advised of his Miranda rights, which he waived, and he gave a statement\nbecause he was “starving,” and the officers had pizza and a Dr. Pepper. He claimed that the\n“paper” and the pizza were “all a package.” Defendant ultimately testified that he knew what\nhe was saying to Captain Brewer, and he understood his Miranda rights because he invoked\nhis right to an attorney.\n\n Defendant testified that he voluntarily went to the scene with Detective Martin, and\nhe told Detective Martin his version of events. However, he claimed that Detective Martin\n“got it all mixed up.” Defendant agreed that Detective Martin advised him of his Miranda\nrights, and he signed a waiver. He spoke with Detective Martin a second time the following\nday.\n\nII. Analysis\n\nA. Denial of Motion to Suppress\n\n From a review of Defendant’s brief, he appears to contend that the trial court erred\nin failing to grant his motion to suppress the statement he gave to the Lawrenceburg officers\non April 27, 2011. He contends that his statement to investigators was not “knowingly or\nintelligently” given because he was under the influence of drugs at the time. Defendant\nfurther complains that his statement was not audio or video recorded and that investigators\nfailed to determine how well he could read or what grade he completed in school.\n\n\n\n -10-\n\f “[A] trial court’s findings of fact in a suppression hearing will be upheld unless the\nevidence preponderates otherwise.” State v. Odom, 928 S.W.2d 18, 23 (Tenn. 1996). We\nreview a trial court’s applications of law to the facts de novo, however. See State v. Walton,\n41 S.W.3d 75, 81 (Tenn. 2001). The party prevailing at the suppression hearing is further\n“entitled to the strongest legitimate view of the evidence adduced at the suppression hearing\nas well as all reasonable and legitimate inferences that may be drawn from that evidence.”\nOdom, 928 S.W.2d at 23.\n\n The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, as applied to the states\nthrough the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that “[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any\ncriminal case to be a witness against himself.” In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct.\n1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966), the United States Supreme Court concluded that in the context\nof “custodial interrogation” certain procedural safeguards are necessary to safeguard this\nprivilege against compulsory self-incrimination. Id. at 444, 86 S. Ct. 1602. More\nspecifically, the Court held that “the prosecution may not use statements, whether\nexculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless\nit demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-\nincrimination.” Id. Those safeguards include the now familiar Miranda warnings—namely,\nthat the suspect be informed “that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can\nbe used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and\nthat if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if\nhe so desires.” Id. at 479, 86 S. Ct. 1602. If the police fail to provide these warnings, any\nstatement obtained as a result of custodial interrogation will not be admissible at trial during\nthe prosecution’s case-in-chief, even if the statement is otherwise voluntary. The Miranda\nCourt was concerned that the “interrogation environment” created by interrogation and\ncustody would “subjugate the individual to the will of his examiner” so as to undermine the\nprivilege against compulsory self-incrimination. Id. at 457-58, 86 S. Ct. 1602. In Dickerson\nv. United States, the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed that “Miranda and its progeny\n. . . govern the admissibility of statements made during custodial interrogation in both state\nand federal courts.” 530 U.S. 428, 432, 120 S. Ct. 2326, 147 L. Ed. 2d 405 (2000); see also\nState v. Walton, 41 S.W .3d 75, 82 (Tenn. 2001). Consequently, if the defendant’s statement\nresulted from custodial interrogation, the statement must be excluded from evidence if the\npolice failed to provide the defendant Miranda warnings. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298,\n307, 105 S. Ct. 1285, 84 L. Ed. 2d 222 (1985); Walton, 41 S.W.3d at 86.\n\n Miranda defined “custodial interrogation” as “questioning initiated by law\nenforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his\nfreedom of action in any significant way.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S. Ct. 1602.\nThereafter, the United States Supreme Court has explained that “interrogation” refers not\nonly to express questioning but also to any words, actions, or practices that the police should\n\n -11-\n\fknow are reasonably likely to elicit incriminating information from a suspect. Rhode Island\nv. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301, 100 S. Ct. 1682, 64 L. Ed. 2d 297 (1980); see also Walton, 41\nS.W.3d at 85.\n\n The Tennessee Supreme Court has held that “[a] valid waiver of Miranda rights\nremains valid unless the circumstances change so seriously that the suspect’s answers to\ninterrogation are no longer voluntary or unless the suspect is no longer making a knowing\nand intelligent waiver of his rights.” State v. Rogers, 188 S.W.3d 593, 606 (Tenn.\n2006)(citing Wyrick v. Fields, 459 U.S. 42, 47, 103 S. Ct. 394, 74 L. Ed. 2d 214 (1982)).\nFurthermore, “[c]ourts must examine the totality of the circumstances to determine whether\nrenewed warnings are required.” Id.\n\n The factors to be considered when assessing the totality of the circumstances\n include: 1) the amount of time that has passed since the waiver; 2) any change\n in the identity of the interrogator, the location of the interview, or the subject\n matter of the questioning; 3) any official reminder of the prior advisement; 4)\n the suspect’s sophistication or past experience with law enforcement; and 5)\n any indicia that the suspect subjectively understands and waives his rights.\n Because of the infinite variety of circumstances a case may present, the list of\n factors is by no means exhaustive. The weight to be accorded different factors\n will vary depending on the particular facts of the case.\n\nRogers, 188 S.W.3d at 606 (internal citations omitted).\n\n Concerning this issue, the trial court made the following findings:\n\n Most of the time where similar issues arise, the warnings are given, the request\n for the attorney is made, and maybe the defendant is in custody for a longer\n period of time than we have in today’s case, and there’s a second interview at\n the defendant’s request without new warnings.\n\n But it looks to me like in this case, the government had crossed T’s and dotted\n I’s every time they had a chance to do so and have complied with the letter and\n the spirit of Miranda v. Arizona and its [progeny].\n\n Specifically, the preponderance of the evidence today establishes that\n [Defendant] may have shown the signs of being a methamphetamine user. I’m\n not sure that he even testified about the substance he was using. He said he\n was shooting drugs, but I don’t think he testified about what drugs.\n\n\n\n -12-\n\fBut all the questions were asked and answered with regard to or by the officers\nabout methamphetamine, which I understand generally to be an upper to make\nsomeone more alert, and certainly not a suppressant.\n\nThe risk, it seems to me, would be that when a person is coming off of several\ndays on methamphetamine, without any rest, that he may be particularly\nvulnerable to fatigue and other issues that might have some effect upon his\nunderstanding or his voluntary waiving of his rights.\n\nI’m not necessarily accrediting what [Defendant] said about [sic] he had just\nshot some drug and the effect it may have had on him, but there was nothing\nto indicate from the overall testimony, that he was impaired, as a typical drunk\nmight be impaired.\n\nInstead, if anything, he was alert, hungry, and understood not only his rights,\nbut actually understood them enough to exercise them and to decline to talk\nfurther during that first interview without actually having an attorney present.\n\nThe officers were cautious in making it clear to him as he went back with the\ncorrection officer toward his cell that they couldn’t talk to him once he made\nthat request.\n\nAnd then he made a very express waiver of the right to have an attorney\npresent before the second interview took place and the multi-page statement\nthat largely amounts to the confession.\n\nThere may be some definite issues raised in that it may not be a pure\nconfession, but it’s at least an admission against interests that the Court finds\ntoday is admissible.\n\nWith regard to the statement obtained by Investigator Martin with the Wayne\nCounty Sheriff’s Department, [Defendant] had the benefit of additional\nMiranda warnings about his rights to remain silent and have a lawyer before\nhe answered any questions, and that first warning to him by Mr. Martin on\nApril 29 at approximately 10:00 a.m. was a good 15 or so hours after the 7:00\np.m. warning the night before, certainly more than 15 hours after his arrest - -\n-actually, no, that’s the 29 th .\n\n* * *\n\n\n\n -13-\n\f I’m looking at two different ones. The 28 th one was at 3:05 p.m. and about 20\n hours after his arrest. And then the last statement from the fourth interview\n was on April 29 at 10:00 a.m. about 39 hours after the arrest.\n\n And the responses of [Defendant] to the warnings, his waiver of his rights, and\n the statements given seem to be consistent with the earlier statements given to\n the Lawrence County officers on the night of April 27.\n\n Therefore, the State has carried its burden of showing that [Defendant] was\n advised of his rights, understood those rights, and voluntarily waived those\n rights, with extra care being taken by the officers after his first request for an\n attorney to make sure that he was expressly waiving those.\n\n I think the appellate judges that would be reviewing this record would\n understand that between 7:30 and 11:00 p.m., that the officers themselves\n cannot appoint or obtain a lawyer for the accused, that essentially, the accused\n just quits talking any until he’s taken before a magistrate or a judge, at which\n time an attorney may be appointed if he’s indigent and qualifies for an\n appointed counsel.\n\n In any event, the questioning must stop and the officers must not do anything\n to interrogate by questions, gestures, or other means, once he’s indicated that\n interest in having an attorney.\n\n The officers did nothing wrong in not having an attorney present, and the\n defendant, as I say, expressly waived his rights and reinitiated the interview\n process.\n\n And he still seems to be clear here today he thought he was serving society by\n ridding it of a bad person, and I assume he’s not had any drugs since on or\n before April 27 of 2011 because he appears to have been in custody\n continuously since that time.\n\n We agree with the trial court. Evidence presented at the suppression hearing\nestablished that although Defendant may have been a methamphetamine user at the time of\nhis statement, his statement to police was freely and voluntarily made. When Captain Brewer\nwas asked if he felt that Defendant had been actively using methamphetamine at the time of\nhis statement, Captain Brewer testified:\n\n\n\n\n -14-\n\f From my experience dealing with methamphetamine addicts - - and I was\n assigned to narcotics for over five years - - once somebody is using that drug\n and they become a user, it’s hard to tell if they’re actually under the influence\n or - - it just has a permanent effect on their behavior and the way they act, so\n it’s hard for me to determine whether or not they’ve actually smoked any. I\n can just kind of determine they are a user.\n\nCaptain Brewer felt that Defendant would have exhibited the same signs of a\nmethamphetamine use, such as paranoia and irritability, whether he waited two weeks or a\nmonth to interview Defendant. He said, “Once they get that - - exhibit that type of behavior,\nin my experience they typically stick with that, so I felt like it was as good a time as any to\ngo ahead and talk to him.”\n\n Captain Brewer testified that there was never any concern that Defendant did not\nunderstand his rights or that he was intoxicated to the point that he did not understand what\nhe was saying. He acknowledged that Defendant gave specific details in his statement, and\nDefendant invoked his right to an attorney at one point. Captain Brewer testified that if he\nhad seen signs of intoxication to the point of impairing Defendant, he would have stopped\nthe interview. We also note that at one point, Captain Brewer asked Defendant if there was\nanything that he wanted to add or take away from his statement. Defendant replied: “I just\nwant to clarify that I dropped Scott off at the house trailer with the junk cars, and I left to get\nsome batteries before cooking dope. That’s when I stopped and got the piece (.380\nhandgun).”\n\n Defendant’s own testimony at the suppression hearing demonstrates that his statement\nwas freely and voluntarily given. He remembered officers coming to arrest him, and he\nunderstood what they were talking about. Defendant agreed that the statement given to\nCaptain Brewer on April 27, 2011, was “very close to what happened.” He admitted that he\nremembered what happened when the victim died, and he accurately told Captain Brewer\nwhat happened that night. Defendant testified that he had been arrested many times in the\npast and had been advised of his rights. He admitted at the suppression hearing that he\nsomewhat understood his Miranda rights. Defendant ultimately testified that he knew what\nhe was saying to Captain Brewer, and he understood his Miranda rights because he invoked\nhis right to an attorney.\n\n Defendant also briefly mentions that his statement was not audio or video recorded\nand that investigators failed to determine how well he could read or what grade he completed\nin school. However, Defendant has waived these issues for failing to raise them in his\nmotion to suppress or present any evidence at the suppression hearing concerning the issues.\nTenn. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(3); Tenn. R. Crim. P. 12(f); and Tenn. R. App. P. 36(a). Even if not\n\n -15-\n\fwaived, these issues are without merit. The Tennessee Supreme Court has ruled that “neither\nthe state nor the federal constitution requires electronic recording of interrogations.” State\nv. Godsey, 60 S.W.3d 759, 771 (Tenn. 2001). Moreover, Defendant does not attempt to\nargue in his brief how his ability to read or the last grade he completed in school affected the\nadmissibility of his statement.\n\n Based on our review of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the giving of\nDefendant’s statement, we conclude that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial\ncourt’s finding that admission of Defendant’s statement did not violate Fifth Amendment\nprinciples. The trial court properly denied Defendant’s motion to suppress, and Defendant\nis not entitled to relief on this issue.\n\nB. Sentencing Error\n\n Although not raised by either party, the judgment form in Count One, reflecting\nDefendant’s conviction for second-degree murder, a Class A felony, incorrectly indicates that\nDefendant is a Career offender. However, the transcript of the sentencing hearing reflects\nthat Defendant was actually sentenced as a Range II Multiple offender for that offense.\nWhen there is a conflict between the transcript and the judgment form, the transcript controls.\nSee, e.g. State v. Moore, 814 S.W.2d 381, 383 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991); State v. Jimmy Lee\nCullop, Jr., No. E2000-00095-CCA-R3-CD, 2001 WL 378543, at *6)(Tenn. Crim. App.,\nApril 17, 2001); and State v. Donald Edward Lynch, No. E2008-01435-CCA-R3-CD, 2009\nWL 2588904, at *8 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 24, 2009). The evidence presented at the\nsentencing hearing reflected that Defendant had three prior convictions for Class C felonies,\nand all parties agreed that Defendant was a Multiple offender. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-\n106(a)(1). Therefore, we remand to the trial court for correction of the judgment in Count\nOne in accordance with this opinion.\n\n For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. However, the\nmatter is remanded to the trial court for entry of a corrected judgment in Count One to reflect\nDefendant’s offender status as Multiple rather than Career.\n\n\n ___________________________________\n THOMAS T. WOODALL, JUDGE\n\n\n\n\n -16-\n\f", "ocr": false, "opinion_id": 1044198 } ]
Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee
Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee
SA
Tennessee, TN
1,044,761
Judge Thomas T. Woodall
2013-05-02
false
state-of-tennessee-v-glenn-lydell-mccray-concurrin
null
State of Tennessee v. Glenn Lydell McCray - concurring in part and dissenting in part
null
null
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null
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null
null
null
null
0
Published
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null
null
[ { "author_str": null, "per_curiam": false, "type": "010combined", "page_count": 2, "download_url": "http://www.tsc.state.tn.us/sites/default/files/mccrayglennlydellcon_1.pdf", "author_id": 8296, "opinion_text": " IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE\n AT NASHVILLE\n June 19, 2012 Session\n\n STATE OF TENNESSEE v. GLENN LYDELL McCRAY\n\n Appeal from the Criminal Court for Davidson County\n No. 2010-C-2362 Monte Watkins, Judge\n\n\n\n\n No. M2011-02411-CCA-R3-CD - Filed May 2, 2013\n\n\nT HOMAS T. W OODALL, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.\n\n I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion insofar as it concludes that aggravated\nassault involves some form of confinement in this case. In State v. White, 362 S.W.3d 559,\n578 (Tenn. 2012), the supreme court held,\n\n Under the standard we adopt today, trial courts have the obligation\n to provide clear guidance to the jury with regard to the statutory language.\n Specifically, trial courts must ensure that juries return kidnapping\n convictions only in those instances in which the victim’s removal or\n confinement exceeds that which is necessary to accomplish the\n accompanying felony.\n\nId. (emphasis added).\n\n In order for the White jury instructions to be applicable, the accompanying felony (in\nthis case aggravated assault) must necessarily involve some removal or confinement of the\nvictim during the commission the accompanying felony. White used the examples of robbery\nand rape as “accompanying” felonies, without suggesting that the jury instructions were\n“inapplicable to other felonies,” as noted in the majority opinion. After a careful review of\nthe elements of aggravated assault as charged in this case, I fail to see that some removal or\nconfinement of the victim, such as is implicit in robbery and rape, exists in aggravated\nassault. In other words, and in stating the obvious, the element of sexual penetration in a\nrape necessitates some confinement. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-502. Likewise, the time\nthat it takes to commit the theft of property from the victim, by violence or putting the victim\nin fear, to accomplish robbery also necessitates some period, however brief it may be, of\nconfinement. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-401.\n\f Both counts of aggravated assault were based on the provisions of Tennessee Code\nAnnotated section 39-13-101(a)(2) and 39-13-102(a)(1)(B), thus making the elements of the\noffense:\n\n 1. Defendant intentionally or knowingly caused the victim to reasonably\n fear imminent bodily injury: and\n\n 2. Defendant used or displayed a deadly weapon (in one count a rifle and\n in the other a knife).\n\n All confinement or removal which occurred in this case occurred solely as the result\nof the commission of especially aggravated kidnapping. I most respectfully conclude that\nthe manner and circumstances of the commission of the aggravated assaults cannot dictate\nthat the White jury instructions should have been given to the jury. For these reasons, I\ndissent from the majority opinion’s conclusion that it was error by the trial court to fail to so\ninstruct the jury. In all other aspects, I concur with the majority opinion.\n\n ___________________________________\n THOMAS T. WOODALL, JUDGE\n\n\n\n\n -2-\n\f", "ocr": false, "opinion_id": 1044761 } ]
Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee
Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee
SA
Tennessee, TN
1,044,911
Judge Jerry L. Smith
2013-03-13
false
marcus-norwood-v-state-of-tennessee
null
Marcus Norwood v. State of Tennessee
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0
Published
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[ { "author_str": null, "per_curiam": false, "type": "010combined", "page_count": 8, "download_url": "http://www.tsc.state.tn.us/sites/default/files/norwoodmopn_0.pdf", "author_id": 8290, "opinion_text": " IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE\n AT JACKSON\n Assigned on Briefs January 8, 2013\n\n MARCUS NORWOOD v. STATE OF TENNESSEE\n\n Appeal from the Criminal Court for Shelby County\n No. 09-06261 James Beasley, Jr., Judge\n\n\n\n No. W2012-00754-CCA-R3-PC – Filed March 13, 2013\n\n\nPetitioner, Marcus Norwood, entered an Alford plea to second degree murder in Shelby\nCounty in October of 2010, with an agreed sentence of twenty-five years. Subsequently,\nPetitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief in which he alleged that he received\nineffective assistance of counsel which adversely affected his decision to enter a guilty plea.\nThe post-conviction court denied relief. Petitioner appealed. After a review of the evidence,\nwe conclude that Petitioner has failed to establish that counsel’s performance was deficient\nor that the voluntariness of the guilty plea was affected by the actions of counsel.\nAccordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.\n\n Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court Affirmed.\n\nJ ERRY L. S MITH, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which T HOMAS T. W OODALL and\nD. K ELLY T HOMAS, J R., JJ., joined.\n\nLance R. Chism, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellant, Marcus Norwood.\n\nRobert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney General and Reporter, Rachel E. Willis, Assistant Attorney\nGeneral; Amy P. Weirich, District Attorney General, and Stacy McEndree, Assistant District\nAttorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.\n\n OPINION\n\n Factual Background\n\n Petitioner was indicted by the Shelby County Grand Jury in September of 2009 for\nfirst degree murder. In October of 2010, Petitioner entered an Alford plea to the murder of\nEarnest Jackson in exchange for a second degree murder conviction and a twenty-five year\nsentence.\n\f On June 9, 2011, Petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief. In the\npetition, he alleged that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, Petitioner\ncomplained that trial counsel failed to: (1) see if there was evidence against Petitioner prior\nto the indictment; and (2) investigate Petitioner’s criminal history prior to his guilty plea\nlisting him as a violent offender. After counsel was appointed, an amended petition was\nfiled, listing the following grounds for relief: (1) ineffective assistance of counsel due to\ncounsel’s failure to investigate the case, communicate with Petitioner, and prepare for trial;\nand (2) Petitioner’s guilty plea was involuntary.\n\n The trial court held a hearing on the petition. At the hearing, the transcript of the\nguilty plea hearing was admitted as an exhibit. The transcript listed the factual basis for\nPetitioner’s plea as follows:\n\n [O]n [December] 16th of 2008, officers of the Memphis Police Department\n were called to the University Cabana Apartments here in Shelby County.\n When they arrived, they found [the victim] in that apartment building in\n Apartment Number 5. He had suffered five stab injuries, which resulted in his\n death and a shell casing on the scene indic[a]ted that he had had a weapon\n fired at him. Within the hour, officers were contacted by [Petitioner’s] friends\n and family members stating that he wished to turn himself in. He did turn\n himself in.\n\n He gave a statement to the police indicating that he had gone to the\n apartment complex, an argument had ensued between him and the victim, . .\n . . [Petitioner’s] version of events was that there was a struggle at which point\n the victim, . . . , was stabbed. For the record, [the victim] suffered five stab\n injuries and [Petitioner] had no injuries at the time the police took his\n statement one hour after [the victim’s] death.\n\n Trial counsel explained, at the guilty plea hearing, that Petitioner felt it was in his\n“best interest at his age” to enter the guilty plea. The trial court questioned Petitioner\nthoroughly prior to the entry of the plea. The plea was accepted by the trial court.\n\n At the post-conviction hearing, trial counsel testified that at the time he represented\nPetitioner he had more than ten years of experience as an assistant public defender. He was\nappointed to represent Petitioner, requested discovery, and provided Petitioner with a copy\nof the documents. Trial counsel assessed the case and surmised that one of the largest\nobstacles would be overcoming Petitioner’s confession. Trial counsel anticipated going to\ntrial on the first degree murder charge but Petitioner asked trial counsel to explore a plea\n\n -2-\n\fagreement. The prosecutor agreed to a guilty plea to second degree murder with a twenty-\nfive year sentence.\n\n When trial counsel first informed Petitioner about the plea offer, Petitioner was\n“reluctant” because he thought that twenty-five years was too long and he should get “around\nten years” for the crime. Trial counsel explained to Petitioner that if they got a trial date set\nin the case “there was no more possibility of a deal.” Trial counsel opined that Petitioner was\n“in denial” about the severity of the charge and did not think it was even remotely possible\nfor Petitioner to get a deal that would lead to a mere ten years in jail when someone died as\na result of Petitioner’s actions. Trial counsel “thought the deal was good.” Petitioner gave\ntrial counsel permission to discuss the deal with his family; Petitioner’s mother encouraged\nhim to take the plea agreement.\n\n As part of the trial process and negotiations of the plea agreement, trial counsel met\nwith Petitioner several times. These included at least five visits at the jail and about six times\nin court. Petitioner explained the facts to trial counsel, claiming that he went to talk to his\nex-girlfriend and was confronted by the victim. When they got into an argument, the victim\ngrabbed a knife. Petitioner claimed that he got the knife away and stabbed the victim. When\nthe victim came toward Petitioner, Petitioner took out his gun and shot the floor.\n\n Trial counsel thought the possibility of getting convicted of a lesser included offense\nat trial was slim and that the self-defense theory advanced by Petitioner was weak. Trial\ncounsel was also concerned about potential testimony by Petitioner’s ex-girlfriend about their\nhistory of domestic violence. Trial counsel admitted that he stopped interviewing witnesses\nin preparation for trial when plea negotiations became imminent.\n\n Petitioner testified about his dissatisfaction with trial counsel’s representation. He\nthought that the proper strategy was one of self-defense but admitted that it would be difficult\nunder the circumstances. The day prior to the guilty plea, Petitioner sent trial counsel a letter\nin which he claimed that twenty-five years was “more time” than he “deserve[s]” for the\ncrime but that he would accept the plea agreement because it was in his best interest.” He\nasked trial counsel “to sign under the Alford plea.” Petitioner felt that trial counsel did not\nput any effort into his case and claimed that he pleaded guilty because he did not have a\nchoice. Petitioner thought that he should have gotten “manslaughter at the worst.”\n\n Petitioner claimed that trial counsel met with him three times at the jail and twice in\ncourt prior to the plea. Further, he claimed that trial counsel never talked about lesser\nincluded offenses or the possibility of a plea. Petitioner also stated that he received discovery\nbut that trial counsel did not review the packet with him. Petitioner claimed that the only\nadvice trial counsel gave him was to take the plea deal. Petitioner denied that it was his idea\n\n -3-\n\fto seek a plea deal. Petitioner thought that twenty-five years was “too much time” and that\nhe even asked trial counsel to remove himself from his case.\n\n On the day of the plea agreement, trial counsel met with Petitioner and reviewed the\nplea. Petitioner was described as somewhat hostile, and stated that his attorney did not “give\na damn” about him. Petitioner claimed he “didn’t have [anybody] to really try to help me for\na defense, so [he] just gave in and signed.”\n\n Arcaya Love, Petitioner’s ex-girlfriend, testified at the hearing. She did not recall\nbeing interviewed by police or by trial counsel. She could not recall a lot of the details\nsurrounding the incident because she had since been involved in an auto accident in which\nshe sustained a serious head injury. Ms. Love was able to recall various incidents of\ndomestic violence, one in particular during which Petitioner attacked her when he learned\nshe was pregnant with the victim’s child. Petitioner attacked her in an attempt to cause her\nto miscarry. Petitioner was trying to reconcile with Ms. Love at the time that the victim was\nkilled. Ms. Love testified that Petitioner had changed and that she was not afraid of him.\nShe admitted that he was the father of her children.\n\n At the conclusion of the proof, the post-conviction court accredited the testimony of\ntrial counsel and found that Petitioner failed to prove the allegations of ineffective assistance\nof counsel and/or an involuntary guilty plea by clear and convincing evidence. Specifically,\nthe post-conviction court stated that there was “nothing to indicate . . . that [trial counsel]\ndidn’t thoroughly confer with [Petitioner] and discuss[ ] these issues with him, advise[ ] him\nof what the potential of what was going to happen. . . .” The post-conviction court was:\n\n not convinced, based upon everything . . . that [trial counsel] had failed to do\n his job, to adequately advise and investigate this case, to adequately tell\n [Petitioner] what his potential punishment would be, should he be convicted.\n What the likelihood of conviction [w]as. What the likelihood of acquittal was.\n What the likelihood of a reduced charge was.\n\n ....\n\n But, it is what it is and in this case it was a second degree murder, which is a\n very serious violent offense and I find that [Petitioner] freely and voluntarily\n entered his guilty plea with full knowledge of what to anticipate what could\n happen to him if he went to trial, the rights he was willing to give up.\n\n I don’t find that he was coerced in any way to enter this guilty plea. I\n don’t find that [trial counsel’s] efforts on his behalf were deficient in any way.\n\n -4-\n\f I don’t find that [Petitioner] was inadequately represented by [trial counsel].\n I find that just the opposite is true. [Trial counsel] was able to secure for him\n an offer much less than life in prison and I think [Petitioner] accepted that\n reality for what it was, as much as he didn’t like it and as much as he still\n doesn’t like it.\n\n But, I think that he understood what he was doing when he took it and\n I don’t find anything in there that indicates that he had anything other than just\n regrets that he had to do that much time.\n\n So I find that [the trial court], thoroughly, interviewed [Petitioner] and\n thoroughly went over all of his rights, including discussions on lesser included\n offenses, everything that [Petitioner] was entitled to. And I find that\n [Petitioner] freely and voluntarily entered that plea, based upon that being his\n desire, his wish and not based upon any deficiencies by [trial counsel], or any\n lack of representation by [trial counsel] . . . .\n\n Petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal of the denial of post-conviction relief.\n\n Analysis\n\n Post-conviction Standard of Review\n\n The post-conviction court’s findings of fact are conclusive on appeal unless the\nevidence preponderates otherwise. See State v. Burns, 6 S.W.3d 453, 461 (Tenn. 1999).\nDuring our review of the issues raised, we will afford those findings of fact the weight of a\njury verdict, and this Court is bound by the post-conviction court’s findings unless the\nevidence in the record preponderates against those findings. See Henley v. State, 960 S.W.2d\n572, 578 (Tenn. 1997); Alley v. State, 958 S.W.2d 138, 147 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997). This\nCourt may not re-weigh or re-evaluate the evidence, nor substitute its inferences for those\ndrawn by the post-conviction court. See State v. Honeycutt, 54 S.W.3d 762, 766 (Tenn.\n2001). However, the post-conviction court’s conclusions of law are reviewed under a purely\nde novo standard with no presumption of correctness. See Fields v. State, 40 S.W.3d 450,\n458 (Tenn. 2001).\n\n When a petitioner seeks post-conviction relief on the basis of ineffective assistance\nof counsel, the petitioner bears the burden of showing by clear and convincing evidence that\n(a) the services rendered by trial counsel were deficient and (b) that the deficient\nperformance was prejudicial. See Powers v. State, 942 S.W.2d 551, 558 (Tenn. Crim. App.\n1996); see also T.C.A. § 40-30-110(f). In order to demonstrate deficient performance, the\n\n -5-\n\fpetitioner must show that the services rendered or the advice given was below “the range of\ncompetence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.” Baxter v. Rose, 523 S.W.2d 930, 936\n(Tenn. 1975). “Because a petitioner must establish both prongs of the test to prevail on a\nclaim of ineffective assistance of counsel, failure to prove either deficient performance or\nresulting prejudice provides a sufficient basis to deny relief on the claim.” Henley, 960\nS.W.2d at 580.\n\n As noted above, this Court will afford the post-conviction court’s factual findings a\npresumption of correctness, rendering them conclusive on appeal unless the record\npreponderates against the court’s findings. See id. at 578. However, our supreme court has\n“determined that issues of deficient performance by counsel and possible prejudice to the\ndefense are mixed questions of law and fact . . . ; thus, [appellate] review of [these issues]\nis de novo” with no presumption of correctness. Burns, 6 S.W.3d at 461.\n\n Furthermore, on claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, Petitioner is not entitled\nto the benefit of hindsight. See Adkins v. State, 911 S.W.2d 334, 347 (Tenn. Crim. App.\n1994). This Court may not second-guess a reasonably-based trial strategy, and we cannot\ngrant relief based on a sound, but unsuccessful, tactical decision made during the course of\nthe proceedings. See id. However, such deference to the tactical decisions of counsel applies\nonly if counsel makes those decisions after adequate preparation for the case. See Cooper\nv. State, 847 S.W.2d 521, 528 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992).\n\n Once a guilty plea has been entered, effectiveness of counsel is relevant only to the\nextent that it affects the voluntariness of the plea. In this respect, such claims of ineffective\nassistance necessarily implicate the principle that guilty pleas be voluntarily and intelligently\nmade. See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56 (1985) (citing North Carolina v. Alford, 400\nU.S. 25, 31 (1970)). As stated above, in order to successfully challenge the effectiveness of\ncounsel, Petitioner must demonstrate that counsel’s representation fell below the range of\ncompetence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases. See Baxter, 523 S.W.2d at 936. Under\nStrickland v. Washington, Petitioner must establish: (1) deficient representation; and (2)\nprejudice resulting from the deficiency. 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984). However, in the context\nof a guilty plea, to satisfy the second prong of Strickland, Petitioner must show that “there\nis a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty\nand would have insisted on going to trial.” Hill, 474 U.S. at 59; see also Walton v. State, 966\nS.W.2d 54, 55 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997).\n\n When analyzing a guilty plea, we look to the federal standard announced in Boykin\nv. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969), and the State standard set out in State v. Mackey, 553\nS.W.2d 337 (Tenn. 1977). State v. Pettus, 986 S.W.2d 540, 542 (Tenn. 1999). In Boykin,\nthe United States Supreme Court held that there must be an affirmative showing in the trial\n\n -6-\n\fcourt that a guilty plea was voluntarily and knowingly given before it can be accepted. 395\nU.S. at 242. Similarly, our Tennessee Supreme Court in Mackey required an affirmative\nshowing of a voluntary and knowing guilty plea, namely, that the defendant has been made\naware of the significant consequences of such a plea. Pettus, 986 S.W.2d at 542. The\nstandard is the same for a “best interest” or Alford plea, that is, “whether the plea represents\na voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the\ndefendant.” Alford, 400 U.S. at 31.\n\n A plea is not “voluntary” if it results from ignorance, misunderstanding, coercion,\ninducements, or threats. Blankenship v. State, 858 S.W.2d 897, 904 (Tenn. 1993). The trial\ncourt must determine if the guilty plea is “knowing” by questioning the defendant to make\nsure he fully understands the plea and its consequences. Pettus, 986 S.W.2d at 542;\nBlankenship, 858 S.W.2d at 904.\n\n Petitioner has failed to show that but for trial counsel’s alleged deficiencies, he would\nhave refused to plead guilty and insisted on going to trial. Petitioner testified that he felt he\nhad no choice but to take the offer because trial counsel did not “give a damn” about his case.\nHowever, the transcript of the guilty plea hearing reflects that the trial court discussed the\nramifications of the guilty plea with Petitioner. Petitioner was thoroughly questioned by the\ntrial court to ascertain whether he understood the effects of the plea.\n\n The plea hearing also indicates that Petitioner knew what he was doing, understood\nthe plea, and agreed that it was what he wanted to do to resolve the case. Petitioner has\nfailed to show by clear and convincing evidence that he received ineffective assistance of\ncounsel or that his guilty plea was involuntary. Moreover, Petitioner has failed to prove he\ndid not understand the consequences of his plea. Trial counsel testified that Petitioner was\nthe one who wanted to seek a plea deal and that he reviewed the deal with Petitioner prior\nto its entry. The post-conviction court accredited the testimony of trial counsel. “[Q]uestions\nof credibility of the witnesses, the weight and value of the evidence, and resolution of\nconflicts in the evidence are matters entrusted to the trial judge as the trier of fact,” and the\npost-conviction court’s credibility determinations are conclusive on appeal unless the\nevidence preponderates against them. State v. Odom, 928 S.W.2d 18, 23 (Tenn. 1996). We\nfind no evidence to preponderate against the findings of the post-conviction court. Further,\nPetitioner has failed to show that there is a reasonable probability that the proceedings would\nhave concluded differently had counsel performed as Petitioner now claims he should have.\nVaughn v. State, 202 S.W.3d 106, 120 (Tenn. 2006) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). The\nevidence does not preponderate against the determination of the post-conviction court.\n\n\n\n\n -7-\n\f Conclusion\n\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.\n\n\n ___________________________________\n JERRY L. SMITH, JUDGE\n\n\n\n\n -8-\n\f", "ocr": false, "opinion_id": 1044911 } ]
Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee
Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee
SA
Tennessee, TN
2,579,657
Chen
2002-05-31
false
precision-pay-phones-v-qwest-communications-corp
null
Precision Pay Phones v. Qwest Communications Corp.
PRECISION PAY PHONES, Plaintiff, v. QWEST COMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION, Defendant
Joseph Lisha, San Francisco, CA, for plaintiff., Richard W. Davis, Shigeru Watanabe, Kelley Drye & Warren, LLP, Los Angeles, CA, Theodore G. Spanos, Wilfredo Hernandez, Jr., Morgan Lewis & Bockius LLP, Los Angeles, CA, for defendant.
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7
Published
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<parties id="b1146-6"> PRECISION PAY PHONES, Plaintiff, v. QWEST COMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION, Defendant. </parties><br><docketnumber id="b1146-10"> Nos. C-02-0213 EMC, C-02-0215 EMC. </docketnumber><br><court id="b1146-11"> United States District Court, N.D. California. </court><br><decisiondate id="b1146-13"> May 31, 2002. </decisiondate><br><attorneys id="b1148-18"> <span citation-index="1" class="star-pagination" label="1108"> *1108 </span> Joseph Lisha, San Francisco, CA, for plaintiff. </attorneys><br><attorneys id="b1149-3"> <span citation-index="1" class="star-pagination" label="1109"> *1109 </span> Richard W. Davis, Shigeru Watanabe, Kelley Drye &amp; Warren, LLP, Los Angeles, CA, Theodore G. Spanos, Wilfredo Hernandez, Jr., Morgan Lewis &amp; Bockius LLP, Los Angeles, CA, for defendant. </attorneys>
[ "210 F. Supp. 2d 1106" ]
[ { "author_str": "Chen", "per_curiam": false, "type": "010combined", "page_count": null, "download_url": null, "author_id": 596, "opinion_text": "\n210 F. Supp. 2d 1106 (2002)\nPRECISION PAY PHONES, Plaintiff,\nv.\nQWEST COMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION, Defendant.\nNos. C-02-0213 EMC, C-02-0215 EMC.\nUnited States District Court, N.D. California.\nMay 31, 2002.\n*1107 *1108 Joseph Lisha, San Francisco, CA, for plaintiff.\n*1109 Richard W. Davis, Shigeru Watanabe, Kelley Drye &amp; Warren, LLP, Los Angeles, CA, Theodore G. Spanos, Wilfredo Hernandez, Jr., Morgan Lewis &amp; Bockius LLP, Los Angeles, CA, for defendant.\n\nORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTIONS TO REMAND\nCHEN, United States Magistrate Judge.\n\nI. INTRODUCTION\nThe Court, having reviewed the briefs, supporting documentation and record in this case, as well as having heard the argument of counsel, hereby grants the plaintiff's motions to remand these actions to state court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447.\n\nII. BACKGROUND\nPlaintiff Precision Pay Phones (\"Plaintiff\") owns payphones and is a \"payphone service provider\" (\"PSP\"). PSPs generally receive compensation for use of their telephones in two ways. First, they collect coins directly deposited into their payphones. Illinois Public Telecommunications Ass'n v. F.C.C., 117 F.3d 555, 558-59 (D.C.Cir.1997). Second, they are compensated through contracts with particular \"interexchange carriers\" (\"IXC\"s) which provide long distance telephone communications services for e.g., collect calls or calls billed to a calling card or third party.[1]Id.\nHowever, as to payphones calls utilizing access codes (800 numbers or 10XXX numbers that the caller uses to reach a desired long-distance carrier) and subscriber 800 numbers from which an IXC (with whom the PSP does not have a contract) derives revenues, independent PSPs receive no compensation from such calls. See id. at 559. IXCs utilize a \"dial-around\" system permitting the payphone user to make such calls without depositing coins or using the PSP's contracted IXC. Id. \"Dial-around\" calls bypass the normal (or default) local and long distance services provided to the payphones. Upon receipt of a call from a payphone using a toll-free prefix, the call is routed through a LEC which accesses a database of all toll-free prefixed numbers, identifies the particular IXC and routes the call accordingly.\nDefendant Qwest Communications Corporation (\"Defendant\") is an IXC. No express contact or agreement exists between Plaintiff and Defendant. Thus, no contractual provision was made between the parties regarding compensation for these \"dial-around\" calls made from Plaintiff's payphones. There is no dispute, however, that Defendant obtains a financial benefit from these calls originating from Plaintiff's payphones.\nPreviously, PSPs could block callers' attempts to dial around a contracted IXC, but in 1990, Congress passed legislation prohibiting PSPs from blocking such calls. Id., citing, 47 U.S.C. § 226(c)(1)(B). To promote competition among PSPs and to ensure that PSPs would get paid for use of their payphones for \"dial-around\" calls to non-contracted IXCs, Congress enacted Section 276 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996. Section 276 provided for establishment by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) of \"a per call compensation plan to ensure that all payphone service providers are fairly compensated for each and every completed intrastate and interstate call using their payphone.\" 47 U.S.C. § 276(b)(1)(A).\n*1110 Pursuant to that charge, the FCC established rules requiring that IXCs compensate PSPs for use of the payphones. Title 47 of Code of Federal Regulations, § 64.1300(a) provides that the \"first facilities-based interexchange carrier to which a completed coinless access code or subscriber toll-free payphone call is delivered by the local exchange carrier shall compensate the payphone service provider for the call at a rate agreed upon by the parties by contract.\" Additionally, \"[i]n absence of an agreement as required by paragraph (a) of this section, the carrier is obligated to compensate the payphone service provider at a per-call rate of $0.24.\" 47 C.F.R. § 64.1300(c).\nPlaintiff filed two separate, but similar, small-claims complaints against Defendant which differ only with regard to the time period and amounts claimed due. These complaints were filed in the Small Claims Division of the Superior Court of California in San Francisco County. Plaintiff seeks to recover compensation for Defendant's \"dial-around\" calls originating from Plaintiff's payphones. Plaintiff's complaints consist of the following claim: \"Defendant owes me the sum of ($1,828.14 and $2,055.63, respectively), not including court costs, because: Underpayment of ... Dial Around Compensation.\" Small Claims Compl. No. 793996 ¶ 1; Small Claims Compl. No. 793998 ¶ 1.\nOn January 11, 2002, Defendant removed these actions to federal court on the basis of federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1337, and 1441(b). On February 5, 2002, Plaintiff filed a motion to remand each case back to state court and the Court held argument on these motions on April 24, 2002.\n\nIII. ANALYSIS\nAn action may be removed from state court if it is one over which the federal district courts has \"original jurisdiction.\" 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Defendant asserts there is federal question jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 which confers jurisdiction over civil actions \"arising under\" federal law.\nPursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), the Court must remand a removed action where \"[i]f at any time before final judgment it appears that [the Court] lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the case.\" \"Because of the Congressional purpose to restrict the jurisdiction of the federal courts on removal, the statute is strictly construed, and federal jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance.\" Duncan v. Stuetzle, 76 F.3d 1480, 1485 (9th Cir.1996) (internal quotations omitted).\nBecause Defendant opposes remanding these actions, it has the burden of establishing that removal was proper in the first place. Roskind v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter &amp; Company, 165 F. Supp. 2d 1059, 1063 (N.D.Cal.2001), citing, Ethridge v. Harbor House Restaurant, 861 F.2d 1389, 1393 (9th Cir.1988). The issue here is whether Defendant has met this burden by demonstrating the Court's original jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims.\n\nIV. WELL-PLEADED COMPLAINT RULE\nThe determination of the existence of original jurisdiction of the district court (here based solely on federal question jurisdiction) is governed in the first instance by the \"well-pleaded complaint\" rule. \"[A] case `arises under' federal law within the meaning of the general federal question statute only if the federal question appears on the face of [the] plaintiff's well-pleaded complaint; if not, original jurisdiction is lacking even if the defense is based on federal law.\" Hunter v. United *1111 Van Lines, 746 F.2d 635, 639 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 863, 106 S. Ct. 180, 88 L. Ed. 2d 150 (1985). Under the well-pleaded complaint rule, the Court must look only to the face of the plaintiff's complaint to determine whether the plaintiff has presented a federal question. See Franchise Tax Board of State of California v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust for Southern California, 463 U.S. 1, 9-10, 103 S. Ct. 2841, 77 L. Ed. 2d 420 (1983) (\"Franchise Tax Board\"). The plaintiff is the master of his case and may ignore federal claims and assert only state claims, and thus defeat removal. Duncan, 76 F.3d at 1485. Federal question jurisdiction may not be sustained on a theory that the plaintiff has not advanced. See Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 809 n. 9, 106 S. Ct. 3229, 92 L. Ed. 2d 650 (1986); see also Taylor v. Anderson, 234 U.S. 74, 75-76, 34 S. Ct. 724, 58 L. Ed. 1218 (1914) (noting that a well-pleaded complaint for the purposes of conferring \"arising under\" jurisdiction is one where the court considers only what necessarily appears in the plaintiff's statement or claim, unaided by anything alleged in anticipation or avoidance or defenses which it is thought the defendant may interpose). Moreover, a case may not be removed to federal court solely on the basis of a federal defense. See Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392, 107 S. Ct. 2425, 96 L. Ed. 2d 318 (1987).\nThus, the general rule in situations where removal is based on federal question jurisdiction is that, unless a federal claim appears on the face of a well-pleaded complaint, removal is improper. Redwood Theatres v. Festival Enterprises, Inc., 908 F.2d 477, 479 (9th Cir.1990); see Taylor v. Sun Reporter Publ'g Co., No. C98-2044 VRW, 1999 WL 782393, *1 (N.D.Cal. Sept.29, 1999) (remanding a case to state court where a small claims court complaint did not allege on its face any federal cause of action or any other reference to federal law).\nHere, Plaintiff's small claims complaints simply contain boilerplate language typical of small claims actions. Plaintiff asserts, inter alia, that \"Defendant owes me the sum of ($1,828.14 and $2,055.63, respectively), not including court costs, because: Underpayment of ... Dial Around Compensation.\" Small Claims Compl. No. 793996 ¶ 1; Small Claims Compl. No. 793998 ¶ 1. The complaints further assert that Plaintiff requested payment and Defendant refused to pay. Small Claims Compl. No. 793996 ¶ 3; Small Claims Compl. No. 793998 ¶ 3. Plaintiff does not indicate the precise legal basis for this claim, but Plaintiff is not required to do so because of the \"non-technical\" nature of the small claims court complaint form. Cal.Civ.Proc.Code § 116.320(b) (West 2002). The simple pleading requirements, not requiring any additional argument or articulation of legal theory for compensation, is consistent with the small claims court organic statute. Cal.Civ.Proc.Code § 116.120(b) (West 2002) (\"[i]n order to resolve minor civil disputes expeditiously, inexpensively, and fairly, it is essential to provide a judicial forum accessible to all parties directly involved in resolving these disputes\").\nThere is nothing on the face of these complaints that asserts a federal claim. In support of its motion for remand, Plaintiff contends that its claims are common counts for quantum meruit or assumpsit. The general pleading of Plaintiff's small claims complaints is consistent with a common count pleading practice. Moreover, the California case law supports Plaintiff's equitable claims for quantum meruit.\nUnder California law, quantum meruit is \"an equitable remedy implied by the law under which a plaintiff who has rendered services benefitting the defendant may recover the reasonable value of those *1112 services when necessary to prevent unjust enrichment of the defendant.\" In re De Laurentiis Entertainment Group, Inc., 963 F.2d 1269, 1272 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, Carolco Television, Inc. v. National Broadcasting Co., Inc., 506 U.S. 918, 113 S. Ct. 330, 121 L. Ed. 2d 249 (1992), citing, B. Witkin, Summary of California Law: Contracts § 91 (1987) and 55 Cal. Jur.3d Restitution 360-61 (1980); see Hahn v. Oregon Physicians' Serv., 786 F.2d 1353, 1355 (9th Cir.1985) (applying Oregon law noting that \"[t]he purpose of quantum meruit is to prevent unjust enrichment at the expense of another\"); Arrison v. Information Resources, Inc., No. C95-3554 THE, 1999 WL 551232, *6 (N.D.Cal. July 16, 1999) (\"[t]he underlying idea behind quantum meruit is the law's distaste for unjust enrichment\"). Where a party has received a benefit which the party may not justly retain and the parties have no actual express contract covering compensation, for reasons of justice the law will imply a contract to pay for services rendered. See Iverson, Yoakum, Papiano &amp; Hatch v. Berwald, 76 Cal. App. 4th 990, 996, 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d 665 (1999); Maglica v. Maglica, 66 Cal. App. 4th 442, 449, 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 101 (1998).\nTo establish a claim for quantum meruit, the plaintiff must prove that: [1] the plaintiff rendered services to the defendant's benefit; and [2] the defendant would be unjustly enriched if the plaintiff was not compensated. Arrison, 1999 WL 551232, at *6, citing, De Laurentiis, 963 F.2d at 1272. The claim applies especially where the defendant acquires the benefit with knowledge of the circumstances establishing unjust enrichment. First Nationwide Savings v. Perry, 11 Cal. App. 4th 1657, 1663-64, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 173 (1992). The plaintiff and a defendant need not be in contractual privity with each other; the plaintiff may recover on a quantum meruit theory from any other party even though no express or implied contractual relationship exists. See De Laurentiis, 963 F.2d at 1273, citing, Kossian v. American National Ins. Co., 254 Cal. App. 2d 647, 649-50, 62 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1967) (allowing recovery under quantum meruit where no implied contact existed and the plaintiff did not expect compensation from the current defendant, but a third-party). A defendant's expectation to compensate for a received benefit is not necessary, but compensation must be \"expected\" by a plaintiff \"only in the sense that the services rendered must not have been intended to be gratuitous.\" Id. at 1272-73.\nThe criteria for quantum meruit are facially satisfied here. To the extent \"dial-around\" calls are made through Defendant's network from Plaintiff's payphones, Defendant obtains the benefit of Plaintiff's services without paying for them. While Defendant has the option of blocking calls from Plaintiff's payphones over Defendant's network, Defendant has chosen to receive \"dial-around\" calls from Plaintiff's payphones. Thus, it has acquired benefits conferred by Plaintiff with full knowledge of the circumstances. Plaintiff's income depends on compensation from its payphones. The services rendered to Defendant were not intended to be gratuitous, as evidenced by the invoices Plaintiff has sent to Defendant. Plaintiff's Mot. for Remand, p. 6, ln. 3-4. Defendant would be unjustly enriched if it paid Plaintiff nothing out of the compensation it received for dial-around calls which were made possible by the use of Plaintiff's payphones.\nThe small claims here asserts a facially valid claim for quantum meruit.\n\nV. ARTFUL PLEADING AND SUBSTANTIAL FEDERAL QUESTION DOCTRINES\nThere are limited circumstances in which the Court can delve beyond the face of the state court complaint and find federal question jurisdiction. Under *1113 the \"artful pleading\" doctrine, the court under some circumstances may recharacterize a plaintiff's state law claim as a federal claim. Hunter, 746 F.2d at 640. However, the doctrine is to be invoked \"only in exceptional circumstances,\" Salveson v. Western States Bankcard Association, 731 F.2d 1423, 1427 (9th Cir.1984), and such recharacterization is proper where federal law: (1) completely preempts state law and (2) confers a federal remedy. ARCO Environmental Remediation, LLC v. Dept. of Health and Environmental Quality of Montana, 213 F.3d 1108, 1114 (9th Cir.2000); Utley v. Varian Associates, Inc., 811 F.2d 1279, 1287 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 824, 108 S. Ct. 89, 98 L. Ed. 2d 50 (1987); Hunter, 746 F.2d at 642-44.\nMoreover, a claim which facially appears to be based on state law may be deemed to \"arise under\" federal law where \"some substantial, disputed question of federal law is a necessary element of one of the well pleaded state claims....\" Franchise Tax Board, 463 U.S. at 13, 103 S. Ct. 2841; Rains v. Criterion Systems, Inc., 80 F.3d 339, 345 (9th Cir.1996); ARCO Environmental, 213 F.3d at 1116;[2]Utley, 811 F.2d at 1283.\nThe existence vel non of a private right of action informs the applicability of both exceptions to the well-pleaded complaint rule. In the context of complete pre-emption, the Ninth Circuit has held that \"the artful pleading doctrine applies only when federal law not only displaces state law but also confers a federal remedy.\" Hunter, 746 F.2d at 642. If there is no federal cause of action, \"recharacterization of the plaintiff's state law claim as a federal claim is doctrinally impossible.\" Utley, 811 F.2d at 1287. Under the substantial federal question doctrine, the absence of a federal right of action implies the federal element is \"insufficiently `substantial' to confer federal-question jurisdiction.\" Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 814, 106 S. Ct. 3229, cited in, Rains, 80 F.3d at 347 n. 10. The rationale in Merrell Dow is that \"to permit removal based on a federal statute not conferring a private right of action would disregard the will of Congress to preclude a private remedy in federal court for the statute's violation.\" Utley, 811 F.2d at 1283.\n\nA. Private Right of Action\n\nThus, as a threshold matter the Court must address whether there is a private right of action to compel the payment of dial-around compensation provided by 47 C.F.R. § 64.1300(a) and authorized by 47 U.S.C. § 276(b)(1)(A). Lower courts are split on this question.[3]\n*1114 While the issue is debatable, the Court concludes that PSPs may bring a private right of action against IXCs to collect dial-around compensation. The starting point is authorizing statute which mandates compensation to PSPs, 47 U.S.C. § 276(b)(1). As noted above, the statute explicitly directs the FCC to prescribe regulations to establish a per call compensation plan \"to ensure that all payphone service providers are fairly compensated for each and every completed intrastate and interstate call using their payphone.\" 47 U.S.C. § 276(b)(1)(A). The statute was intended to address, inter alia, the difficulty PSPs had in recovering compensation from IXCs for dial-around calls. Illinois Public Telecommunications, 117 F.3d at 558-59.\nWhile § 276 does not address enforcement through a private right of action, § 207 of the same chapter does. Section 207 provides:\n\"Any person claiming to be damaged by any common carrier subject to the provisions of this chapter may either make complaint to the Commission ... or may bring suit for the recovery of the damages for which such common carrier may be liable under the provisions of this chapter, in any district court of the United States ...\"\nMoreover, § 206 provides:\nIn case any common carrier shall do, or cause or permit to be done, any act, matter, or thing in this chapter prohibited or declared to be unlawful, or shall omit to do any act, matter, or thing in this chapter required to be done, such common carrier shall be liable to the person or persons injured thereby for the full amount of damages sustained in consequence of any such violation of the provisions of this chapter, together with a reasonable counsel or attorney's fee, to be fixed by the court in every case of recovery, which attorney's fee shall be taxed and collected as part of the costs in the case.\nThus, §§ 206 and 207 permit suits in federal court to enforce rights under § 276.\nDefendant argues that the private right of action conferred by §§ 206 and 207 applies only to enforcement of the Telecommunications Act itself and not the regulations promulgated thereunder. While some district courts have so concluded,[4] the Supreme Court's recent decision in Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 121 S. Ct. 1511, 149 L. Ed. 2d 517 (2001) compels a contrary result. In Alexander, the Court addressed the question whether there was a private right of action to enforce regulations promulgated under § 602 of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Section 601 of Title VI prohibits recipients of federal funds from engaging in racial or national origin discrimination. Section 601 has been interpreted to prohibit only intentional discrimination. Section 601 has also been interpreted to provide a private right of action. Section 602 of Title VI authorizes federal agencies to promulgate regulations to effectuate § 601. The regulations at issue in Alexander, promulgated under § 602, prohibit recipients of federal funds from engaging facially neutral practices which have a disparate impact, thus going beyond the substantive provisions of § 601 which reaches only intentional discrimination. The Court held that the disparate impact regulations under § 602 could not be enforced by a private right of *1115 action. Alexander, 532 U.S. at 282, 121 S. Ct. 1511. While the Alexander Court refused to imply a private right to enforce the disparate impact regulations, its analysis compels a contrary result here for several reasons.\nFirst, in contrast to the disparate impact regulations of § 602, the Court held that the private right of action to enforce § 601's prohibition on intentional discrimination did apply equally to regulations applying § 601's ban on intentional discrimination. Id. at 284, 121 S. Ct. 1511. Because those regulations did not substantively expand § 601 but simply interpreted and implemented it, the Court stated \"it is therefore meaningless to talk about a separate cause of action to enforce the regulations apart from the statute.\" Id. The same is true with 47 U.S.C. § 276(b)(1)(A) and 47 C.F.R. § 64.1300(a). The Telecommunications Act mandates that PSPs be \"fairly compensated\" and directs the FCC to establish the per call compensation plan. Title 47 C.F.R. § 64.1300(a) implements the Congressional mandate embodied in the statute through powers expressly delegated to the FCC.[5] As with the § 601 regulation in Alexander, these FCC regulations contrast with the § 602 disparate impact which did not simply fill in interstices left by the statute, but created a substantive standard which differed from the statute. Like the § 601 intentional discrimination regulations, \"it is meaningless to talk about a separate cause of action to enforce\" the FCC regulation at 47 C.F.R. § 64.1300 apart its authorizing statute, 47 U.S.C. § 276(b)(1)(A). A suit to enforce the right of PSPs under § 276(b)(1)(A) to be \"fairly compensated\" would be meaningless without the FCC regulation which specifies the precise level of that compensation. Accordingly, Alexander, the right of action conferred under §§ 206 and 207 applies not only to the Telecommunications Act, but to implementing the FCC regulations as well.\nSecond, even if the FCC regulation were deemed a separate and independent regulation for which a separate private right of action must be found, the analytical framework of Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 95 S. Ct. 2080, 45 L. Ed. 2d 26 (1975), suggests it would be appropriate to find such a right here. The touchstone to this determination is the text of the statute and Congress' intent. Alexander, 532 U.S. at 288, 121 S. Ct. 1511. In contrast to § 602 of Title VI which contained no \"rights-creating language\" and did not focus on the individuals protected—focusing instead solely on the agencies that did the regulating — § 276(b)(1) mandates that PSPs be \"fairly compensated\" under a per-call compensation plan to be devised by the FCC. It creates a right to fair compensation and focuses specifically on the individuals to be protected — \"all payphone service providers.\" Moreover, whereas § 602 of Title VI specified only agency enforcement and contained \"elaborate restrictions\" thereon which suggested that Congress intended to provide only one method of enforcement (administrative) to the preclusion of others (private suits), §§ 206 and 207 expressly provide for enforcement through private suits filed in federal court as well as through administrative petitions filed with the FCC. Thus, there is nothing from the structure or purpose of the statute which would indicate a legislative intent to preclude a private right of action.\nFor these reasons, the Court concludes that PSPs may bring a federal suit to enforce their compensation rights for dial-around calls against IXCs.[6]\n\n\n*1116 B. Complete Preemption\n\nNotwithstanding the Court finding of a private right of action, the \"artful pleading\" doctrine requires an additional element that is missing here — \"complete preemption\" by federal law. As noted above, federal defenses to a state claim does not create \"arising under\" jurisdiction under § 1331. Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 392, 107 S. Ct. 2425. That applies to traditional preemption defenses. Toumajian v. Frailey, 135 F.3d 648, 655 (9th Cir.1998). Federal jurisdiction is created only where there is \"complete preemption\" — \"the rare instances where Congress has chosen to regulate the entire field.\" ARCO Environmental, 213 F.3d at 1114. In those contexts, \"the preemptive force of a statute is so `extraordinary' that it `converts an ordinary state common-law complaint into one stating a federal claim for purposes of the well-pleaded complaint rule.'\" Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 393, 107 S. Ct. 2425, quoting Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 65, 107 S. Ct. 1542, 95 L. Ed. 2d 55 (1987). The Court has found such complete preemption in the context of § 301 of the Labor Relations Management Act (LMRA), codified at 29 U.S.C. § 185, and certain portions of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1332(a). See Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, International Assn' of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, 390 U.S. 557, 560, 88 S. Ct. 1235, 20 L. Ed. 2d 126 (1968) (LMRA); Metropolitan Life, 481 U.S. at 63-64, 107 S. Ct. 1542 (ERISA). There is no \"complete preemption\" where the federal law only preempts state law inconsistent with it. Rains, 80 F.3d at 345 (determining that Title VII only preempts inconsistent state law and does not completely preempt state law).\nWhile \"[t]here does not appear to be any Ninth Circuit authority finding that the [Telecommunications Act] either does or does not `completely preempt' state law claims ... the weight of authority, as well as more consistent reasoning, supports a finding that it does not.\" Braco v. MCI Worldcom Communications, Inc., 138 F. Supp. 2d 1260, 1269 (C.D.Cal.2001); see Heichman v. American Tel. &amp; Tel. Co., 943 F. Supp. 1212, 1222 (C.D.Cal.1995) (finding that the Telecommunications Act did not transform the plaintiff's state law causes of action into a federal cause of action); Boyle v. MTV Networks, 766 F. Supp. 809, 816 (N.D.Cal.1991) (finding that neither the Telecommunications Act's statutory language nor its legislative history supports the proposition that Congress intended complete preemption); see Quayle v. MCI Worldcom., Inc., No. C00-3694 SC, 2001 WL 1329594, **2-3 (N.D.Cal. Oct.22, 2001).\nThe Court concludes, the Telecommunications Act does not have the necessary preemptive force to warrant complete preemption. The crucial provision is 47 U.S.C. § 276(c) which provides, \"[t]o the extent that any State requirements are inconsistent with the Commission's regulations, the Commission's regulations on such matters shall preempt such State requirements.\" As with Title VII, preemption is limited to inconsistent state law.[7] Thus, Rains, supra, is dispositive — there is no \"complete preemption.\" That conclusion *1117 is bolstered by the fact that 47 U.S.C. § 414 contains a savings clause which provides that \"[n]othing in this chapter contained shall in any way abridge or alter the remedies now existing at common law or by statute, but the provisions of this chapter are in addition to such remedies.\" Clearly, § 414 is intended to preserve state law to the extent feasible. Thus, while the § 276(b)(1)(A) of the Telecommunications Act may be enforced by a suit in federal court, there is nothing to suggest Congress intended this mode of enforcement to be to the exclusion of claims in state courts. As demonstrated by the limited scope of the preemption provision of § 276(c) and the savings clause of § 414, state court enforcement was not of such \"central concern to the federal statute,\" Franchise Tax Board, 463 U.S. at 25-26, 103 S. Ct. 2841, so as to evince Congress' intent to completely displace state court jurisdiction over suits to collect dial-around compensation.\nAccordingly, the \"artful pleading\" doctrine requiring \"complete preemption\" does not apply.\n\nC. Substantial Federal Question\n\nEven where state law creates the plaintiff's cause of action, the case may be deemed to \"arise under\" federal law \"if the right to relief under\" state law \"requires resolution of a substantial question of federal law in dispute between the parties.\" Franchise Tax Board, 463 U.S. at 13, 103 S. Ct. 2841; see ARCO Environmental, 213 F.3d at 1116; Rains, 80 F.3d at 345. The existence of a requisite \"substantial federal question\" has proven elusive to a bright line determination due in part to the fact that \"the phrase `arising under' masks a welter of issues regarding the interrelation of federal and state authority and the proper management of the federal judicial system.\" Franchise Tax Board, 463 U.S. at 8, 103 S. Ct. 2841.\nExamination of a substantial federal question has arisen in a variety of contexts in which state and federal law are intermingled. See, e.g., Merrell Dow, supra (violation of Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act alleged to constitute rebuttable presumption of negligence); Franchise Tax Board, supra (state sought to levy against money held in retirement trust fund regulated by ERISA); Moore v. Chesapeake &amp; O. Ry. Co., 291 U.S. 205, 54 S. Ct. 402, 78 L. Ed. 755 (1934) (state law limited defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of risk where employer violated FELA); Rains, supra (Title VII asserted as public policy in claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy); Hunter, supra (state law bad faith claim required colorable contract claim based on federal law). As these cases illustrate, the fact that a case may turn in part upon the resolution of some issue of federal law or that federal law constitutes an ingredient of the state law claim for relief does not automatically convert a state claim into one \"arising under\" federal law for purposes of federal question jurisdiction. Rather, the court must examine the centrality of the federal law to the claim and consider policy factors. \"What is needed is something of that commonsense accommodation of judgment to kaleidoscopic situations which characterizes the *1118 law in its treatment of causation ... a selective process which picks the substantial causes our of the web and lays the other ones aside.\" Franchise Tax Board, 463 U.S. at 20, 103 S. Ct. 2841, quoting, Gully v. First National Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 117-18, 57 S. Ct. 96, 81 L. Ed. 70 (1936).\nThe evaluation of the importance of the federal issue to the state claim has been stated variously. As discussed in Hunter, supra, courts have stated that the federal element in a claim must be \"direct and essential as opposed to attenuated,\" \"basic as opposed to collateral,\" \"necessary as opposed to merely possible,\" \"pivotal,\" \"substantial as opposed to merely incidental\" or \"paramount as opposed to collateral.\" Hunter, 746 F.2d at 646 (internal quotations omitted). The fact that the state claim \"hinges on\" federal law is not, in and of itself, sufficient. Id. at 645-46. In Hunter, the court held that the fact that the federal element determined as a preliminary matter whether the state law duty of good faith applied was insufficient. Id. at 646. Just as the creation property rights through federal land patents, trademarks and copyrights has been held not to transform state law actions to enforce contract and property rights into federal claims, the federal element in Hunter (contract claim based on federal law) was deemed to be involved only \"incidentally;\" the bad faith count \"fundamentally asserts [state] claims.\" Id. at 647 (quotations omitted). Similarly, in Moore, supra, and Merrell Dow, supra, \"the violation of the federal standard as an element of state tort recovery did not fundamentally change the state tort nature of the action.\" Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 814 n. 12, 106 S. Ct. 3229, citing, Moore, 291 U.S. at 216-17, 54 S. Ct. 402.\nIn the case at bar, the state claim for quantum meruit exists independent of the right of action under 47 U.S.C. § 276(b)(1)(A). The only involvement of federal law is the FCC regulation (47 C.F.R. § 64.1300(c)) which sets the default per call compensation level in the absence of a contractual agreement between the PSP and the IXC. The establishment of a default per call rate touches the state claim \"at a single point,\" Moore, 291 U.S. at 216, 54 S. Ct. 402, and does not \"fundamentally change\" the nature of the state law equitable claim asserted by Plaintiff herein. Had the FCC regulation not set a default rate, Plaintiff would be free to prove under state law the value of the service provided to, and which benefitted, Defendant.\nFinally, considerations of policy and common sense further counsel against finding federal jurisdiction over Plaintiff's small claims counts. \"[D]eterminations about federal jurisdiction require sensitive judgments about congressional intent, judicial power, and the federal system.\" Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 810, 106 S. Ct. 3229. The analysis must be informed by \"the demands of reason and coherence, and the dictates of sound judicial policy.\" Id. The cases at bar were initiated by a small independent PSP as a pro se small claims suit to collect $1,828.14 and $2,055.63. The effect of the removal petition filed by Defendant (apparently not an isolated tactic among IXCs as indicated by the number of other similar cases which have addressed removal jurisdiction) is to haul the small claims plaintiff into federal court, turning a simple collection suit into a federal case which is far more costly and complicated to litigate.[8] Nothing in the *1119 letter of the Telecommunications Act, FCC regulations at issue, or legislative history indicates that the federal law designed to help independent PSPs recover fair compensation is to be construed in such a manner as to deprive them of their choice of the most efficient and appropriate forum. Indeed, permitting removal to federal court over the objections of independent PSPs as Plaintiff in the instant cases would, if anything, contravene the legislative purpose of § 276(b)(1)(A).\nMoreover, this case does not require the \"resolution of a substantial, disputed federal question.\" ARCO Environmental, 213 F.3d at 1114. The federal ingredient involved here — the setting of the per call dial-around rate in the absence of a contract — requires no interpretation of federal law.[9] Hence, there is no compelling need for a federal forum to e.g. facilitate national uniformity in the interpretation or application of federal law. Cf. Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 457, 77 S. Ct. 912, 1 L. Ed. 2d 972 (1957) (determining that uniform federal law and policy should be applied under the LMRA). Nor is there any reason to expect that federal courts possess greater expertise than state courts in applying the dial-around rate set by FCC regulation.\nIn short, the Court \"cannot identify any compelling reasons of federal judicial policy for embracing a case of this kind as a federal question case.... [The California Superior Courts] are fully competent\" to apply the applicable federal law here. Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 814, 106 S. Ct. 3229, quoting, Kravitz v. Homeowners Warranty Corp., 542 F. Supp. 317, 319 (E.D.Pa.1982).\n\nVI. CONCLUSION\nFor the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's claims in the cases at bar do not give rise to federal jurisdiction of this Court. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's motions to remand. The above-captioned cases are hereby remanded to the Superior Court for San Francisco, Small Claims Division.\nHowever, on May 30, 2002, Defendant filed a Motion for Transfer, under 28 U.S.C. § 1407, before the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation. As such, this Order is hereby stayed pending the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation's ruling on the motion.\nIT IS SO ORDERED.\nNOTES\n[1] Competing against independent PSPs like Plaintiff are local exchange carriers (\"LEC\"s) which have local networks able to receive subsidies for common line charges that LECs assess IXCs for originating and terminating long-distance calls. Illinois Public Telecommunications, 117 F.3d at 559.\n[2] In ARCO Environmental, supra, the Ninth Circuit also stated as an additional basis for federal jurisdiction in cases \"where the claim is necessarily federal in character.\" ARCO Environmental, 213 F.3d at 1114, citing, Brennan v. Southwest Airlines Co., 134 F.3d 1405, 1409 (9th Cir.), amended by, 140 F.3d 849 (9th Cir.1998). Brennan involved application of the artful pleading doctrine where \"the defendant has a federal preemption defense to a state claim and federal law provides a remedy.\" Brennan, 134 F.3d at 1409 (citation omitted). It thus appears indistinguishable from the \"complete preemption\" doctrine.\n[3] Both parties have submitted as exhibits a number of unpublished district court decisions on this issue. Although these decisions lack precedential effect, the Court recognizes that trial courts are widely split on this issue. Compare Wolfe v. Global Crossing Telecomm., Inc., CV 01-0881, 882, 883 TJH; CV 01-03454 TJH (C.D.Cal. July 25, 2001) (private rights of action); Wolfe v. Qwest Communications Corp., CV 01-05554, 05555, 05556, 05557(TJH) (C.D. Cal Dec. 17, 2001) (accord); PBS Telecom, Inc. v. Qwest Communications Corp., No. CV01-7285 RMT (C.D.Cal. Jan. 16, 2002) (accord); and Bay Dist. Service, Inc. v. Qwest Communications Corp., No. C01-20940 RMW (N.D.Cal. Jan. 29, 2002) (accord), with Precision Pay Phones v. Global Crossing Telecomm., Inc., No. C01-02901 WHA, 2001 WL 1456766, *1 (N.D.Cal. Nov.6, 2001) (no private right of action) and Precision Pay Phones v. Qwest Communications Corp., C02-00201 SBA (N.D.Cal. May 16, 2002) (accord).\n[4] See, e.g., Precision Pay Phones v. Global Crossing Telecomm., Inc., 2001 WL 1456766, at *1; Precision Pay Phones v. Qwest Communications Corp., C02-00201 SBA (N.D.Cal. May 16, 2002) (unpublished court order); cf. Conboy v. AT &amp; T Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 492, 500 (S.D.N.Y.2000).\n[5] Regulations promulgated pursuant to an express delegation of authority by the legislature have traditionally warranted the highest level of judicial deference. See 1 Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Administrative Law Treatise, § 6.4, at 329-31 (4th ed.2002).\n[6] The analysis applicable under Alexander, supra, does not necessarily imply that all FCC regulations promulgated under the Telecommunications Act are enforceable by private suits. Alexander requires an examination into the nature of the relationship between the regulation in question and the authorizing statute. Alexander, 532 U.S. at 284, 121 S. Ct. 1511. If there is a meaningful distinction such that the right to enforce the regulation warrants separate analysis from enforcement of the statute, then a court must apply the Cort v. Ash, supra, analysis to the regulation. Because each regulation must be examined separately, this Court's conclusion is not necessarily inconsistent with Conboy, supra, which involved different FCC regulations.\n[7] This language is parallel to the narrower branch of traditional preemption recognized by the courts — \"conflict preemption\" — where \"compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility,\" Florida Lime &amp; Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43, 83 S. Ct. 1210, 10 L. Ed. 2d 248 (1963), or where state law \"stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.\" Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67, 61 S. Ct. 399, 85 L. Ed. 581 (1941). This narrow branch of preemption contrasts with \"field preemption\" where Congress intends federal law to \"occupy the field\" to the general exclusion of state law. Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372, 120 S. Ct. 2288, 147 L. Ed. 2d 352 (2000); see English v. General Electric Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79, 110 S. Ct. 2270, 110 L. Ed. 2d 65 (1990).\n[8] The facts of this case illustrate how removal can represent a costly trap for the unwary. Defendant objected to the appearance of Joe Lisha before the Court pro se, because his business, Precision Pay Phones, was a partnership which cannot appear before the Court without counsel. See Civil L.R. 3-9(b) (stating that corporations, unincorporated associations, partnerships, etc., \"may appear only through a member of the bar of the Court\"). Lisha was then compelled to represent he would restructure Precision Pay Phones into a sole proprietorship. Defendant accepted Lisha's representation as did the Court. Only with acceptance of that business change was Lisha permitted to proceed pro se. See National Independent Theatre Exhibitors, Inc. v. Buena Vista Distribution Co., 748 F.2d 602, 609-10 (11th Cir.1984) (noting that pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1654, a sole proprietor could appear in federal court pro se).\n[9] Certainly, there is no basis for presuming that every collection suit in state court in which the price or rate is affected by some federal regulation gives rise to a federal question.\n\n", "ocr": false, "opinion_id": 2579657 } ]
N.D. California
District Court, N.D. California
FD
California, CA
1,045,765
Judge Camille R. McMullen
2012-10-25
false
eric-tolley-v-state-of-tennessee
null
Eric Tolley v. State of Tennessee
null
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0
Published
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[ { "author_str": null, "per_curiam": false, "type": "010combined", "page_count": 6, "download_url": "http://www.tsc.state.tn.us/sites/default/files/tolleyericopn.pdf", "author_id": 8286, "opinion_text": " IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE\n AT JACKSON\n Assigned on Briefs May 1, 2012\n\n ERIC TOLLEY v. STATE OF TENNESSEE\n\n Appeal from the Criminal Court for Shelby County\n Nos. 04-05432-35 Paula Skahan, Judge\n\n\n No. W2011-01816-CCA-MR3-PC - Filed October 25, 2012\n\n\nPro se Petitioner, Eric Tolley, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for post-\nconviction relief seeking analysis of certain evidence under the Post-Conviction DNA\nAnalysis Act of 2001 (“The Act”).1 The Petitioner originally entered guilty pleas to three\ncounts of aggravated sexual battery and two counts of rape of child for which he received an\neffective sentence of twenty-one years and six months in the Department of Correction. In\nthis appeal, the Petitioner contends the post-conviction court erred in denying his petition\nwithout an evidentiary hearing. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction\ncourt.\n\n Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court Affirmed\n\nC AMILLE R. M CM ULLEN, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which R OBERT W.\nW EDEMEYER and D. K ELLY T HOMAS, J R., JJ., joined.\n\nEric Tolley, Whiteville, Tennessee, Pro Se.\n\nRobert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney General and Reporter; Sophia J. Lee, Senior Counsel; Amy\nP. Weirich, District Attorney General; and Glen C. Baity, Assistant District Attorney\nGeneral, for the Appellee, State of Tennessee.\n\n OPINION\n\n\n\n\n 1\n “DNA analysis” is defined as “the process through which deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) in a human\nbiological specimen is analyzed and compared with DNA from another biological specimen for identification\npurposes.” T.C.A. § 40-30-402.\n\f In 2004, the Petitioner entered guilty pleas to three counts of aggravated sexual battery\nand two counts of rape of child. He received concurrent terms of eight years for each\naggravated sexual battery conviction and concurrent terms of thirteen and one-half years for\neach rape of child conviction, with the aggravated sexual battery and chid rape sentences to\nbe served consecutively for an effective sentence of twenty-one years and six months at one\nhundred percent in the Department of Correction. The Petitioner previously appealed the\nsummary dismissal of a petition for writ of habeas corpus, which this court affirmed in Eric\nJason Tolley v. State, No. W2007-01642-CCA-R3-HC, 2008 WL 2901610 (Tenn. Crim.\nApp., at Jackson, July 21, 2008), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Dec. 1, 2008).\n\n On January 21, 2011, the Petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief\ngenerally asserting that he is entitled to DNA analysis pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated\nSection 40-30-303 (2003). Other than stating the statutory grounds for relief pursuant to\nsection 40-30-303 and requesting the trial court to conduct a “de novo review” and “to\nappoint counsel,” the petition does not provide any specific details in support of relief.\n\n The State filed a response and requested that trial court deny the petition because it\nfailed to “meet any of the requirements set forth in T.C.A. §40-30-[304].” The State further\nasserted that there was “no physical evidence to test” because the Petitioner’s convictions\nwere based on “fondling [the victims’] genitalia” and “perform[ing] oral sex on these\nvictims.” The State detailed the facts supporting the Petitioner’s convictions in their\nresponse and further contended the following:\n\n [T]he victim’s were examined at the city of Memphis Sexual Assault Resource\n Center. There was no evidence kit collected, no underwear or other type\n clothing was submitted to TBI for testing. The victims were examined for\n evidence of physical injury but no lab tests were performed to check for\n sexually transmitted diseases. All this information is contained in the report\n from the Sexual Assault Resource Center and provided as discovery to\n Petitioner’s defense counsel.\n\n Notwithstanding the lack of physical evidence to be analyzed for DNA, the State\ninsisted “there was a strong likelihood that the Petitioner would have still been prosecuted\nand probably convicted” based on the following evidence the State had against the Petitioner:\n\n [T]he statements of the victims, an audio-taped conversation Petitioner had\n with the mother of the victims where he admitted performing oral sex on the\n six (6) year old victim, a statement from the witness James Vinson II who told\n police he overheard the confession Petitioner made to the victim’s mother and\n a notebook with the words “Eric Tolley’s Journal” written on the outside. The\n\n -2-\n\f journal contained an entry date of 12/12/03 when the defendant wrote that a\n doctor diagnosed him with Herpes. This entry corroborates the six (6) year old\n victim’s allegation that the Petitioner made him rub the Petitioner’s penis and\n that it had “little red dots, circles on it”.\n\n The trial court issued a written order emphasizing the lack of any physical evidence\nto test for DNA analysis and dismissed the petition on May 23, 2011. The instant appeal\nfollowed. 2\n ANALYSIS\n\n The Petitioner asserts that the post-conviction court erred in dismissing his petition\nfor DNA analysis without holding an evidentiary hearing. The State responds that the post-\nconviction court properly dismissed the petition because it failed to meet the requirements\nof the Act.\n\n The Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act states that a petitioner convicted of specific\noffenses, including aggravated sexual battery and rape of a child, “may at any time, file a\npetition requesting the forensic DNA analysis of any evidence that is in the possession or\ncontrol of the prosecution, law enforcement, laboratory, or court, and that is related to the\ninvestigation or prosecution that resulted in the judgment of conviction and that may contain\nbiological evidence.” T.C.A. § 40-30-303 (2003). Because the Act allows for a request of\nDNA analysis “at any time,” this language overrides any general statute of limitation,\nregardless of whether a request for DNA testing was made at trial. Griffin v. State, 182\nS.W.3d 795, 799 (Tenn. 2006) (citing T.C.A. § 40-30-303). Under the mandatory provision\nof this Act, the trial court shall order DNA analysis after providing notice and an opportunity\nfor the State to respond, if the following criteria are met:\n\n (1) A reasonable probability exists that the petitioner would not have been\n prosecuted or convicted if exculpatory results had been obtained through DNA\n analysis;\n\n (2) The evidence is still in existence and in such a condition that DNA analysis\n may be conducted;\n\n\n\n\n 2\n The Petitioner filed an untimely appeal on June 28, 2011. Because he filed his notice late, the trial\ncourt denied his motion for designation of records for appeal. This Court subsequently granted the\nPetitioner’s pro se motion to waive his untimely notice of appeal.\n\n\n -3-\n\f (3) The evidence was never previously subjected to DNA analysis or was not\n subjected to the analysis that is now requested which could resolve an issue not\n resolved by previous analysis; and\n\n (4) The application for analysis is made for the purpose of demonstrating\n innocence and not to unreasonably delay the execution of sentence or\n administration of justice.\n\nT.C.A. § 40-30-304 (2003).\n\n Under the discretionary provision of the Act, the trial court may order DNA analysis\nafter providing notice and an opportunity for the State to respond, if the following criteria\nare met:\n\n\n (1) A reasonable probability exists that analysis of the evidence will produce\n DNA results which would have rendered the petitioner’s verdict or sentence\n more favorable if the results had been available at the proceeding leading to\n the judgment of conviction;\n\n (2) The evidence is still in existence and in such a condition that DNA analysis\n may be conducted;\n\n (3) The evidence was never previously subjected to DNA analysis, or was not\n subjected to the analysis that is now requested which could resolve an issue not\n resolved by previous analysis; and\n\n (4) The application for analysis is made for the purpose of demonstrating\n innocence and not to unreasonably delay the execution of sentence or\n administration of justice.\n\nT. C. A. § 40-30-305 (2003). “Under either the mandatory or discretionary provision, all four\nelements must be met before DNA analysis will be ordered by the court.” Powers v. State,\n343 S.W.3d 36, 48 (Tenn. 2011). In other words, the trial court is under no obligation to\nconduct a hearing or to order DNA analysis of evidence unless it finds that each of the four\nstatutory requirements have been satisfied. William D. Buford v. State, No. M2002-02180-\nCCA-R3-PC, 2003 WL 1937110 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 24, 2003).\n\n\n\n\n -4-\n\f We conclude that the post-conviction court properly dismissed the petition seeking\nDNA analysis. Both statutory subsections of the Act require the Petitioner to show that\n“[t]he evidence is still in existence and in such a condition that DNA analysis may be\nconducted.” T.C.A. §§ 40-30-304,-305. In this case, although the Petitioner states generally\nthat he has met the requirements of the DNA Act, he fails to identify any evidence that could\npotentially contain DNA. In other words, he fails to inform the court what evidence he seeks\nto have analyzed for the presence or absence of DNA. The State counters that no such\nevidence exists. Specifically, the State provided that “[t]here was no evidence collected, no\nunderwear or other evidence was submitted to the TBI for testing. The victims were\nexamined for evidence of physical injury but no lab tests were performed to check for\nsexually transmitted diseases.” The Petitioner’s convictions were based on genital fondling\nand performing oral sex on the victims. The post-conviction court found, and we agree, that\nno evidence existed on which to conduct DNA analysis. This court has previously held that\n“[i]n order to satisfy a petitioner’s request for DNA testing based on the Post-Conviction\nDNA Analysis Act, there must be evidence in existence which is amenable to DNA testing.”\nSee William Hackworth v. State, No. M2003-02148-CCA-R3-PC, 2004 WL 1686610, at *3\n(Tenn. Crim. App. July 28, 2004)(citing Ricky Flamingo Brown, Sr. v. State, No.\nM2002-02427-CCA-R3-PC, 2003 WL 21362197, (Tenn. Crim. App. June 13, 2003), perm.\napp. denied (Tenn. 2003)). The record is devoid of allusions to physical evidence which\ncould be tested. On this ground alone, the Petitioner has failed to meet his burden, and we\nconclude that the record supports the post-conviction court’s summary dismissal of the\npetition. See Ashad R.A. Muhammad Ali, a/k/a Louis Webb v. State, No. M2005-01137-\nCCA-R3-PC, 2006 WL 1626652, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 2, 2006) (affirming the post-\nconviction court’s dismissal of the petition for DNA testing because the evidence could not\nbe found); Waldo Wiggins, Jr. v. State, No. W2004-02397-CCA-R3-CO, 2005 WL 3059437,\nat *9 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 10, 2005), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Mar. 20, 2006) (affirming\nthe post-conviction court’s denial of DNA testing where the sample from the gun was\nconsumed during Tennessee Bureau of Investigation testing).\n\n\n Based on our review of the record, we additionally conclude that the Petitioner has\nfailed to show that a reasonable probability exists that he would not have been prosecuted\nor convicted if exculpatory results had been obtained through DNA analysis and that analysis\nof the evidence would produce DNA results which would have rendered the Petitioner’s\nverdict or sentence more favorable if the results had been available at the proceeding leading\nto the judgment of conviction. T.C.A. § 40-30-304(1),-305(1). The Petitioner failed to\ninclude any support for the statutory elements under either section of the Act in his petition\nfor post-conviction relief. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.\n\n\n CONCLUSION\n\n -5-\n\fFinding no error, we affirm the judgment of the Criminal Court of Shelby County.\n\n\n ______________________________\n CAMILLE R. McMULLEN, JUDGE\n\n\n\n\n -6-\n\f", "ocr": false, "opinion_id": 1045765 } ]
Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee
Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee
SA
Tennessee, TN
1,045,809
Judge Frank G. Clement, Jr.
2012-11-29
false
apollo-hair-systems-of-nashville-inc-v-micromode-m
null
Apollo Hair Systems of Nashville, Inc. v. Micromode Medical Limited
null
null
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null
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0
Published
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[ { "author_str": null, "per_curiam": false, "type": "010combined", "page_count": 11, "download_url": "http://www.tsc.state.tn.us/sites/default/files/apolloopn.pdf", "author_id": 8266, "opinion_text": " IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE\n AT NASHVILLE\n October 23, 2012 Session\n\n APOLLO HAIR SYSTEMS OF NASHVILLE, INC. v. MICROMODE\n MEDICAL LIMITED ET AL.\n\n Appeal from the Chancery Court for Davidson County\n No. 041561-III Ellen H. Lyle, Chancellor\n\n\n No. M2011-01480-COA-R3-CV - Filed November 29, 2012\n\n\nPlaintiff, a retail business specializing in hair restoration and related services that leased\n“beauty equipment” from a third party lessor, filed this action against the manufacturer of the\n“beauty equipment” and the distributor of the products asserting claims for intentional\nmisrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, and violations of the Tennessee Consumer\nProtection Act. Plaintiff obtained a monetary judgment against the distributor, however, the\ntrial court summarily dismissed all claims against the manufacturer. Plaintiff appeals the\nsummary dismissal of its claims against the manufacturer. We affirm.\n\n Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed\n\nF RANK G. C LEMENT, J R., J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which P ATRICIA J.\nC OTTRELL, P.J., M.S., and A NDY D. B ENNETT, J., joined.\n\nCharles W. Cross, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Apollo Hair Systems of Nashville.\n\nDaniel P. Berexa, James Matthew Blackburn, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellees,\nMicromode Medical Limited, T/A CACI International.\n\n OPINION\n\n Defendant Micromode Medical Limited T/A CACI International (“CACI”) is a British\ncompany that manufacturers “beauty equipment,” including a product named “Quantum” and\n\fanother named “Futur-tec.”1 Defendant Apollo International of Ellicott City,2 a sole\nproprietorship owned by Deborah Satterwhite, became the authorized distributor of CACI’s\nQuantum and Futur-tec products to Apollo Hair System dealers in the United States in 2002.\n\n Pursuant to its distribution agreement with CACI, Ms. Satterwhite had the right to\nmarket and sell CACI products and equipment to Apollo dealers in the United States. The\ndistribution agreement provided that Ms. Satterwhite would purchase the CACI products or\nequipment in England with English currency, and that Satterwhite would designate the carrier\nand pay the carrier to import the products to the United States. The distribution agreement\nalso provided that it was not a joint venture or partnership, and the parties were not agents\nor representatives of the other.\n\n In the fall of 2003, Bill and Belinda O’Brien, President and Secretary, respectively,\nof Apollo Hair Systems of Nashville, Inc., attended one of Ms. Satterwhite’s marketing\npresentations of CACI’s products and equipment, including the Quantum and Futur-tec. The\nQuantum is used to improve the texture of the skin, and in the CACI brochure Quantum is\nidentified as an “aesthetic treatment device.” The Futur-tec device is used to exfoliate the\nskin to improve the texture of the skin. Following Ms. Satterwhite’s presentation, the\nO’Briens advised Satterwhite that Apollo of Nashville wanted to obtain a Quantum and a\nFutur-tec, one of each. Ms. Satterwhite explained that the transaction would require a third\nparty lessor and that she would make the necessary arrangements.\n\n The structure of the various transactions, as facilitated by Ms. Satterwhite, is as\nfollows: Satterwhite would buy and import one Quantum and one Futur-tec from CACI,\nSatterwhite would sell the devices to Bison Commercial Leasing Corporation (“Bison\nLeasing”) for $27,000, and Bison would lease the two devices to Apollo of Nashville. As was\ncontemplated, Satterwhite bought the two devices, sold them to Bison Leasing, and Bison\nLeasing and Apollo of Nashville entered into a lease agreement pursuant to which Bison\nLeasing leased the Quantum and Futur-tec to Apollo of Nashville. Acting in her capacity as\ncorporate secretary, Belinda O’Brien signed an Acceptance of Delivery of the equipment\nupon executing the lease although the equipment had not been received by Apollo. Bison\nLeasing then sold the lease to a bank.\n\n\n 1\n CACI is not the manufacturer of either the Quantum or the Futur-tec and no claims were asserted\nagainst the manufacturers.\n 2\n The distribution agreement was executed on behalf of Apollo of Ellicott City by Deborah\nSatterwhite in her capacity as Managing Director. Apollo International of Ellicott City LLC, was chartered\nin Maryland as a limited liability company in October 2002; however, Ms. Satterwhite failed to complete the\nremaining organizational requirements. Further, Ms. Satterwhite never obtained a business license or a\nchecking account for the company, and the company ceased to exist in October 2004.\n\n -2-\n\f Thereafter, the Quantum and Futur-tec were shipped to the United States. When the\ndevices arrived at U. S. Customs on November 3, 2003, the Federal Drug Administration\n(“FDA”) made the determination that the devices were not “beauty devices,” and instead,\nthe FDA classified the devices as “medical equipment.” Medical equipment imported to the\nUnited States requires FDA approval and neither the Quantum or Futur-tec were approved\nmedical devices. As a consequence, both devices were held by the FDA and did not clear\nCustoms. Thereafter, the FDA determined that the Quantum was not a medical device and\ndid not require FDA approval. Accordingly, the Quantum cleared Customs and was delivered\nto Apollo of Nashville; the Futur-tec, however, was not cleared and was never received by\nApollo.\n\n Following the hold of the devices in Customs, in an attempt to rectify the situation,\nSatterwhite had numerous discussions with the O’Briens, the bank that purchased the lease\nfrom Bison, and CACI. The bank agreed to cancel the lease if Ms. Satterwhite refunded the\npurchase money to the bank. CACI agreed to refund the proceeds it received from Ms.\nSatterwhite if the devices were returned to CACI.\n\n The Futur-tec was returned to CACI and CACI remitted the purchase price to\nSatterwhite; however, Satterwhite did not refund any of the money to the bank, Bison\nLeasing, or Apollo. With the bank’s consent, Apollo returned the Quantum to Ms.\nSatterwhite. Ms. Satterwhite then sold the Quantum to a third party; however, once again,\nshe kept the proceeds.\n\n On May 26, 2004, Apollo of Nashville filed this action against CACI and Deborah\nSatterwhite alleging claims for breach of implied warranty of merchantability, breach of\nimplied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose, breach of express warranty, intentional\nand negligent misrepresentations, and violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act.\nThe complaint was amended in July 2004.3 On May 4, 2005, CACI filed an Answer denying\nall liability, asserting Apollo failed to state a claim against CACI, and asserting Apollo failed\nto join an indispensable party, specifically Bison Leasing. Satterwhite filed a separate\nanswer.\n\n Pursuant to a scheduling order that set deadlines, inter alia, for discovery and filing\ndispositive motions, the last date on which dispositive motions could be filed was November\n14, 2007, and all dispositive motions were to be heard on or before December 21, 2007. On\nthat date, CACI filed a motion for summary judgment asserting there was no privity of\ncontract between CACI and Apollo, and that Apollo could not prove the essential elements\nof its misrepresentation claims or its claim for violation of the Tennessee Consumer\n\n 3\n Neither Bison Leasing nor the bank that purchased the lease were ever parties to this action.\n\n -3-\n\fProtection Act. On the same day, Apollo filed a motion to file a second amendment to its\ncomplaint. Five days later, Apollo filed a motion for partial summary judgment.\n\n The trial court denied Apollo’s motion to amend following a hearing on the grounds\nof “plaintiff’s undue delay in filing the motion to amend and plaintiff’s failure to cure\ndeficiencies by previous amendments.” Apollo then filed a motion to alter or amend the order\ndenying its motion to amend.\n\n The competing motions for summary judgment and Apollo’s motion to alter or amend\ncame on for hearing on February 1, 2008. On March 25, 2008, the trial court issued a\nMemorandum and Order summarily dismissing all of Apollo’s claims against CACI finding\nthere were no genuine issues of material fact and CACI was entitled to summary judgment\nas a matter of law. The warranty claims were dismissed upon the finding of no privity of\ncontract. The negligent misrepresentation claim was dismissed on the finding that Apollo of\nNashville failed to demonstrate any proof supporting a claim for misrepresentation as the\ncourt could not identify any proof that there was communication between CACI and Apollo\nprior to the lease agreement. The court further found no intentional misrepresentations\nbecause Apollo’s Amended Complaint failed to meet the requirement that claims for fraud\nbe plead with particularity and there was no communication between Apollo and CACI prior\nto the lease agreement. The TCPA claim was summarily dismissed on the finding that Apollo\nfailed to establish there was a genuine issue of material fact that CACI was guilty of an\nunfair or deceptive act resulting in an ascertainable loss to Apollo of Nashville. The trial\ncourt also denied Apollo’s motion for partial summary judgment and its motion to alter or\namend the order denying its motion for a second amendment to its complaint.\n\n Apollo filed a notice of appeal challenging the dismissal of its claims against CACI;\nhowever, this court dismissed that appeal because the judgment appealed from was not a final\nappealable judgment. This court found the order was not final due to the fact the trial court\nhad not ruled upon Apollo’s claims against Satterwhite; thus, the case was remanded to the\ntrial court. In August of 2011, summary judgment was granted in favor of Apollo against\nSatterwhite on Apollo’s claims of misrepresentation, breach of contract, and violations of the\nTCPA and a judgment was entered against Satterwhite in the amount of $337,423.31.\nThereafter, Apollo renewed its appeal of the dismissal of its claims against CACI. Ms.\nSatterwhite did not appeal the judgment against her and she is not a party to this appeal.\n\n\n\n\n -4-\n\f A NALYSIS\n\n Apollo contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying its motion to amend\nthe complaint and the court erred in dismissing its claims of intentional misrepresentation,\nnegligent misrepresentation, and violation of the TCPA.4\n\n I. M OTION TO F ILE S ECOND A MENDMENT TO C OMPLAINT\n\n Apollo contends the trial court erred in denying its motion for leave to file a second\namended complaint. Factors to be considered when deciding whether to grant a motion to\namend include “undue delay in filing, lack of notice to the opposing party, bad faith by the\nmoving party, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by previous amendments, undue prejudice\nto the opposing party, and futility of the amendment.” Merriman v. Smith, 599 S.W.2d 548,\n559 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1979).\n\n The grant or denial of a motion to amend is within the sound discretion of the trial\ncourt, and the court’s action will be reversed only for an abuse of discretion. Sallee v.\nBarrett, 171 S.W.3d 822, 825-26 (Tenn. 2005) (citing Doyle v. Frost, 49 S.W.3d 853, 856\n(Tenn. 2001); Henderson v. Bush Bros. & Co., 868 S.W.2d 236, 237–38 (Tenn. 1993)).\n\n The trial court denied Apollo’s motion upon the finding that the motion was untimely\nand futile, and the records supports both findings. Accordingly, we find no abuse of\ndiscretion.\n\n This action was commenced in May of 2004. During the pendency of this case, the\nscheduling order was amended and deadlines extended on at least five occasions, mostly at\nApollo’s request. A final scheduling order entered into by the parties and approved by the\ncourt mandated completion of all discovery by October 24, 2007 and set the deadline for the\nhearing on all dispositive motions as December 21, 2007. Davidson County Local Rule of\nPractice Rule 26.03 directs that motions for summary judgment must be filed at least thirty-\nseven (37) days before the hearing date unless the parties otherwise agree. Counting\nbackwards from the December 21, 2007 hearing date, the deadline for filing a motion for\nsummary judgment was November 14, 2007.\n\n CACI filed its motion for summary judgment on November 14, 2007. That same day,\nApollo filed its motion to amend and Apollo provided no justification for not seeking to\namend the complaint months earlier. The proposed amended complaint referenced a\nconversation that allegedly occurred between CACI President Dean Nathanson and Apollo\n\n 4\n Apollo does not appeal the dismissal of its breach of warranty claims.\n\n -5-\n\fPresident Bill O’Brien, in which Mr. O’Brien sought assurances from Mr. Nathanson that\nthere would be no problems importing the Quantum and the Futur-tec into the United States.\nThe amended complaint also stated a new claim for lost earnings as a result of Apollo not\nbeing able to use the Quantum and Futur-tec in its business operations. Accordingly, the\nmotion to amend, if granted, may have rendered some or all of CACI’s motion for summary\njudgment inconsequential, thereby, nullifying the deadlines set forth in the scheduling order.\n\n Motions to amend are to be freely given. Wilson v. Ricciardi, 778 S.W.2d 450, 453\n(Tenn. Ct. App. 1989). However, factors such as untimeliness, prejudice, and lack of good\nfaith must be considered when determining whether such an amendment should be allowed.\nMerriman, 599 S.W.2d at 559. In this case, discovery had been completed by the parties on\nOctober 9, 2007, prior to the October 24, 2007 deadline mandated by the scheduling order.\nApollo waited until the deadline for filing dispositive motions to seek to amend the complaint\na second time. As noted above, Apollo gave no reason for the delay. Moreover, the assertions\nto be added by the amendment pertained to conversations of Bill O’Brien; thus Mr. O’Brien\nknew of these facts since 2003 yet Apollo waited until 2007 to add these facts to the\ncomplaint. It is also relevant that CACI had served interrogatories upon Apollo regarding the\nsubstance of the alleged misrepresentations, and Apollo answered the interrogatories stating\nthat the only misrepresentations had been statements made by Satterwhite. Apollo’s\ninterrogatory responses did not identify any misrepresentations by CACI or Mr. Nathanson,\nits president.\n\n The grant or denial of a motion to amend a pleading is within the sound discretion of\nthe trial court. Considering the relevant factors, including the untimeliness of the motion and\nthe fact the new allegations are in direct conflict with Apollo’s discovery responses, we find\nno abuse of discretion in denying the late filed motion to file a second amended complaint.\n\n II. S UMMARY D ISMISSAL OF A POLLO’S C LAIMS\n\n Apollo contends that the trial court erred in summarily dismissing its\nmisrepresentation claims and its claim that CACI violated the Tennessee Consumer\nProtection Act.\n\n A. S UMMARY JUDGMENT S TANDARD\n\n Summary judgment is appropriate when a party establishes that there is no genuine\nissue as to any material fact and that a judgment may be rendered as a matter of law. Tenn.\nR. Civ. P. 56.04; Stovall v. Clarke, 113 S.W.3d 715, 721 (Tenn. 2003). It is appropriate in\nvirtually all civil cases that can be resolved on the basis of legal issues alone. Byrd v. Hall,\n847 S.W.2d 208, 210 (Tenn. 1993); Pendleton v. Mills, 73 S.W.3d 115, 121 (Tenn. Ct. App.\n\n -6-\n\f2001). It is not appropriate when genuine disputes regarding material facts exist. See Tenn.\nR. Civ. P. 56.04. The party seeking summary judgment bears the burden of demonstrating\nthat no genuine disputes of material fact exist and that the party is entitled to judgment as a\nmatter of law. Godfrey v. Ruiz, 90 S.W.3d 692, 695 (Tenn. 2002). To be entitled to summary\njudgment, the moving party must affirmatively negate an essential element of the nonmoving\nparty’s claim or show that the moving party cannot prove an essential element of the claim\nat trial. Martin v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 271 S.W.3d 76, 83 (Tenn. 2008).\n\n Summary judgments do not enjoy a presumption of correctness on appeal. BellSouth\nAdver. & Publ’g Co. v. Johnson, 100 S.W.3d 202, 205 (Tenn. 2003). Because the resolution\nof a motion for summary judgment is a matter of law, we review the trial court's judgment\nde novo with no presumption of correctness. Martin v. Norfolk Southern Ry. Co., 271 S.W.3d\n76, 84 (Tenn. 2008) The appellate court makes a fresh determination that the requirements\nof Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56 have been satisfied. Hunter v. Brown, 955 S.W.2d 49, 50-51 (Tenn.\n1977). As does the trial court, the appellate court considers the evidence in the light most\nfavorable to the nonmoving party and resolve all inferences in that party’s favor. Martin, 271\nS.W.3d at 84; Stovall v. Clarke, 113 S.W.3d 715, 721 (Tenn. 2003); Godfrey v. Ruiz, 90\nS.W.3d 692, 695 (Tenn. 2002). When reviewing the evidence, the appellate court first\ndetermines whether factual disputes exist. If a factual dispute exists, the court then\ndetermines whether the fact is material to the claim or defense upon which the summary\njudgment is predicated and whether the disputed fact creates a genuine issue for trial. Byrd\nv. Hall, 847 S.W.2d 208, 215 (Tenn.1993).\n\n A party is entitled to summary judgment only if the “pleadings, depositions, answers\nto interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits . . . show that there is\nno genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment\nas a matter of law.” Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.04. A properly supported motion for summary\njudgment must show that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the moving\nparty is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Staples v. CBL & Assocs., Inc., 15 S.W.3d\n83, 88 (Tenn. 2000); McCarley v. W. Quality Food Serv., 960 S.W.2d 585, 588 (Tenn. 1998).\nIf the moving party makes a properly supported motion, then the nonmoving party is required\nto establish the existence of the essential elements of the claim. McCarley, 960 S.W.2d at\n588; Byrd, 847 S.W.2d at 215. If, however, the moving party does not properly support the\nmotion, then the nonmoving party’s burden to produce either supporting affidavits or\ndiscovery is relieved and the motion must fail. McCarley, 960 S.W.2d at 588; Martin, 271\nS.W.3d at 83.\n\n To make this showing and shift the burden of production, a moving party may: 1)\naffirmatively negate an essential element of the nonmoving party’s claim; or 2) show that the\nnonmoving party cannot prove an essential element of the claim at trial. Martin, 271 S.W.3d\n\n -7-\n\fat 83; Hannan v. Alltel Publ’g Co., 270 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Tenn. 2008); Byrd, 847 S.W.2d at 215\nn.5. Whichever approach the moving party takes, both require more than assertions of the\nnonmoving party’s lack of evidence. Martin, 271 S.W.3d at 83-84. In addition, the moving\nparty must present evidence that more than “raises doubts” about the ability of the\nnonmoving party to prove its claim at trial. Id. at 84. The moving party must produce\nevidence or refer to previously submitted evidence. Id.; accord Hannan, 270 S.W.3d at 5.\nThus, to negate an essential element of a claim, a moving party must refer to evidence that\ntends to disprove an essential element of the claim made by the nonmoving party. Martin,\n271 S.W.3d at 84.\n\n CACI, as the moving party, had the burden to negate an essential element of Apollo’s\nclaims of intentional misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, and violation of the\nTCPA, or establish that Apollo cannot prove an essential element of these claims at trial.5\nSee Martin, 271 S.W.3d at 83 (citing Hannan, 270 S.W.3d at 5; McCarley, 960 S.W.2d at\n588; Byrd, 847 S.W.2d at 215 n.5).\n\n B. INTENTIONAL M ISREPRESENTATION AND\n V IOLATION OF THE T ENNESSEE C ONSUMER P ROTECTION A CT\n\n The trial court summarily dismissed Apollo’s claims of intentional misrepresentation\nand violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act by engaging in unfair or deceptive\nacts because Apollo failed to plead the circumstances supporting these claims with\nparticularity.\n\n The trial court summarily dismissed Apollo’s claim for intentional misrepresentation\nbecause Apollo failed to plead the circumstances supporting such a claim with particularity\nas required by Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 9.02. Rule 9.02 states “[i]n all averments\nof [intentional misrepresentation] or mistake, the circumstances constituting [intentional\nmisrepresentation] or mistake shall be stated with particularity.” 6\n\n\n\n 5\n Tennessee Code Annotated § 20-16-101 (2011), a provision enacted to replace the summary\njudgment standard adopted in Hannan v. Alltel Publ’g Co., 270 S.W.3d 1, 8-9 (Tenn. 2008), is inapplicable\nto this case as this case was filed before July 1, 2011. See Sykes v. Chattanooga Hous. Auth., 343 S.W.3d\n18, 25 n. 2 (Tenn. 2011) (noting that section 20-16-101 is only applicable to actions filed on or after July 1,\n2011).\n 6\n “Intentional misrepresentation,” “fraudulent misrepresentation,” and “fraud” are all different names\nfor the same cause of action. Hodge v. Craig, – S.W.3d –, No. M2009-00930-SC-R11-CV, 2012 WL\n4486315, at *12 (Tenn. Oct. 1, 2012) (citing Concrete Spaces, Inc. v. Sender, 2 S.W.3d 901, 904 n.1 (Tenn.\n1999)).\n\n -8-\n\f In its complaint, Apollo stated the following circumstances to support its allegation\nof intentional misrepresentation by CACI: “CACI intentionally or negligently\nmisrepresented material facts concerning the aforesaid products, intending that those facts\nbe acted upon and relied upon by plaintiff.” Apollo did not set forth any additional facts in\nits complaint to identify with particularity the circumstances giving rise to its claim for\nintentional misrepresentation. Accordingly, we affirm the summary dismissal of Apollo’s\nclaim for intentional misrepresentation because Apollo’s complaint fails to plead its\nintentional misrepresentation claim with particularity.\n\n The trial court also dismissed Apollo’s claim that CACI violated the Tennessee\nConsumer Protection Act for failing to plead the circumstances supporting the claims with\nparticularity.\n\n The circumstances supporting a claim under the TCPA must also be plead with\nparticularity. Harvey v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 8 S.W.3d 273, 275 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999)\n(citing Humphries v. West End Terrace, Inc., 795 S.W.2d 128, 132 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990)).\nIn its complaint, Apollo’s sole paragraph relating to its claim under the TCPA stated:\n“CACI’s conduct constitutes violations of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, entitling\nAPOLLO to an award of treble damages and reasonable attorneys fees and costs.” As with\nits intentional misrepresentation claim, Apollo failed to state specific conduct that constituted\na violation of the TCPA. Thus, we affirm the trial court’s holding that Apollo’s claim for a\nviolation of the TCPA should be summarily dismissed.\n\n The trial court additionally found that Apollo’s claims for intentional\nmisrepresentation and violation of the TCPA should be summarily dismissed because there\nwas no evidence in the record of a communication between CACI and Apollo prior to Apollo\nentering into the lease agreement for the Quantum and the Futur-tec and Apollo failed to\nestablish a genuine issue of material fact that CACI was guilty of an unfair or deceptive act\nresulting in an ascertainable loss to Apollo. On appeal, Apollo argues the trial court erred in\nthis finding and points to the affidavit of Bill O’Brien filed in support of its response to\nCACI’s motion for summary judgment. In the affidavit, Bill O’Brien stated that a\nconversation occurred between CACI president Dean Nathanson and him prior to the\nexecution of the lease agreement. Mr. O’Brien stated in his affidavit that he “specifically\nasked if there would be any problem with importing the CACI products into the U. S.” and\nthat Nathanson responded “that CACI already had the same products operating in the U. S.\nand that there were no problems importing these machines into the U. S.”\n\n The trial court excluded the consideration of this statement in O’Brien’s affidavit\nfinding that it directly contradicted a previous response provided by Apollo during\ninterrogatories that other than speaking with a CACI employee about scheduling training for\n\n -9-\n\fthe skin care devices, no communication occurred between CACI and Apollo. The trial court\nthen found that based upon the cancellation by contradiction rule, the statement would not\nbe allowed.\n\n Apollo argues on appeal that the trial court erred in its reliance upon the cancellation\nby contradiction rule. We find this argument of no consequence because, if this statement is\nconsidered, Apollo still has not established an essential element of the claim, nor has it\ncreated a dispute of fact concerning an essential element, that element being that the\nstatement was untrue when made.\n\n A claim for intentional misrepresentation requires a showing that:\n\n 1) the defendant made a representation of an existing or past fact; 2) the\n representation was false when made; 3) the representation was in regard to a\n material fact; 4) the false representation was made either knowingly or without\n belief in its truth or recklessly; 5) plaintiff reasonably relied on the\n misrepresented material fact; and 6) plaintiff suffered damages as a result of\n the misrepresentation.\n\nDevorak v. Patterson, 907 S.W.2d 815, 819 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995) (quoting Metro. Gov’t of\nNashville, Davidson Cty. v. McKinney, 852 S.W.2d 233, 237 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992))\n(emphasis added).\n\n The statement by Nathanson at issue is that the skin care devices had previously been\nimported into the United States and that there were no problems with the importation.\nNathanson’s deposition and an exhibit submitted by CACI establish, without dispute, that\nover 20 of these devices had been shipped into the United States and no problems with their\nimportation occurred prior to the FDA holding Apollo’s two devices at Customs. Further, the\nQuantum device was received and used by Apollo for several months before it was returned\nto Satterwhite. Thus, even if the alleged conversation by O’Brien and Nathanson occurred,\nit is undisputed that Nathanson’s alleged statement was not false when it was made. Thus,\nCACI has negated an essential element of Apollo’s intentional misrepresentation claim.\n\n We therefore affirm the summary dismissal of Apollo’s intentional misrepresentation\nclaim and its TCPA claim.\n\n C. N EGLIGENT M ISREPRESENTATION\n\n The trial court dismissed Apollo’s claim for negligent misrepresentation upon the\nfinding there was no communication between CACI and Apollo prior to Apollo entering into\n\n -10-\n\fthe lease agreement. Apollo contends this was error.\n\n A claim for negligent misrepresentation requires a showing that: 1) the defendant was\nacting in the course of a transaction in which it had a pecuniary interest; 2) the defendant\nsupplied faulty information meant to guide others in their business transaction; 3) the\ndefendant failed to exercise reasonable care in obtaining or communicating the information;\nand 4) the plaintiff justifiably relied upon the information. John Martin Co. v. Morse/Diesel\nCo., 819 S.W.2d 428, 431 (Tenn. 1991).\n\n Apollo’s claim for negligent misrepresentation stems from the alleged conversation\nbetween Nathanson and O’Brien in which Nathanson stated that the skin care devices were\npreviously imported into the United States and there had been no problems with their\nimportation. As we noted in our discussion of the intentional misrepresentation claim, such\na statement was true, as both devices had previously been sent to the United States and there\nwere no problems with importation of the skin care devices prior to the devices at issue in\nthis action. Thus, even if the trial court allowed the statement contained in Mr. O’Brien’s\naffidavit, the truth of Nathanson’s statement negates the essential element that “the defendant\nsupplied faulty information” and thus CACI negated an essential element of Apollo’s\nnegligent misrepresentation claim. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s summary dismissal\nof Apollo’s negligent misrepresentation claim.\n\n I N C ONCLUSION\n\n The judgment of the trial court is affirmed, and this matter is remanded with costs of\nappeal assessed against the Appellant, Apollo Hair Systems of Nashville, Inc.\n\n\n\n\n ______________________________\n FRANK G. CLEMENT, JR., JUDGE\n\n\n\n\n -11-\n\f", "ocr": false, "opinion_id": 1045809 } ]
Court of Appeals of Tennessee
Court of Appeals of Tennessee
SA
Tennessee, TN
42,219
Barksdale, Clement, Per Curiam, Stewart
2006-04-05
false
united-states-v-martinez-davila
Martinez-Davila
United States v. Martinez-Davila
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Manuel MARTINEZ-DAVILA, Defendant-Appellant
Joseph H. Gay, Jr., Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Western District of Texas, San Antonio, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee., Judy Fulmer Madewell, Federal Public Defender’s Office, Western District of Texas, San Antonio, TX, for Defendant-Appellant.
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
0
Unpublished
null
<parties data-order="0" data-type="parties" id="b963-19"> UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Manuel MARTINEZ-DAVILA, Defendant-Appellant. </parties><br><docketnumber data-order="1" data-type="docketnumber" id="b963-22"> No. 05-50373. </docketnumber><br><p data-order="2" data-type="misc" id="b963-23"> Summary Calendar. </p><br><court data-order="3" data-type="court" id="b963-24"> United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit. </court><br><decisiondate data-order="4" data-type="decisiondate" id="b963-26"> Decided April 5, 2006. </decisiondate><br><attorneys data-order="5" data-type="attorneys" id="b964-12"> <span citation-index="1" class="star-pagination" label="938"> *938 </span> Joseph H. Gay, Jr., Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Western District of Texas, San Antonio, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee. </attorneys><br><attorneys data-order="6" data-type="attorneys" id="b964-13"> Judy Fulmer Madewell, Federal Public Defender’s Office, Western District of Texas, San Antonio, TX, for Defendant-Appellant. </attorneys><br><judges data-order="7" data-type="judges" id="b964-16"> Before BARKSDALE, STEWART and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges. </judges>
[ "170 F. App'x 937" ]
[ { "author_str": "Per Curiam", "per_curiam": false, "type": "010combined", "page_count": 4, "download_url": "http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions\\unpub\\05/05-50373.0.wpd.pdf", "author_id": null, "opinion_text": " United States Court of Appeals\n Fifth Circuit\n F I L E D\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n April 5, 2006\n FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT\n Charles R. Fulbruge III\n Clerk\n\n\n No. 05-50373\n Summary Calendar\n\n\n\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n\n Plaintiff-\n Appellee,\n\n versus\n\nMANUEL MARTINEZ-DAVILA,\n\n Defendant-\n Appellant.\n\n ------------------------------------------------------------\n Appeal from the United States District Court\n for the Western District of Texas\n USDC No. 3:04-CR-1883-ALL-PRM\n ------------------------------------------------------------\n\nBefore BARKSDALE, STEWART and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.\n\nPER CURIAM:*\n\n Manuel Martinez-Davila (Martinez) appeals his conviction, following a jury trial, for\n\nconspiracy to import and distribute over 1000 kilograms of marijuana. Martinez first argues that the\n\ndistrict court erred by refusing to give the jury instruction on duress that he had requested.\n\n\n\n\n *\n Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be\npublished and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.\nR. 47.5.4.\n\f Duress is a form of an affirmative defense. United States v. Posada-Rios, 158 F.3d 832, 873\n\n(5th Cir. 1998). Before the defense may be presented to the jury, a defendant must present evidence\n\nof each of the following four elements: (1) that the defendant or a member of his family “was under\n\nan unlawful and present, imminent, and impending threat of such a nature as to induce a\n\nwell-grounded apprehension of death or serious body injury”; (2) that he “had not recklessly or\n\nnegligently placed himself in a situation in which it was probable that he would be forced to choose\n\nthe criminal conduct”; (3) that he “had no reasonable legal alternative to violating the law,” that is,\n\nno chance “to refuse to do the criminal act and . . . to avoid the threatened harm”; and (4) that there\n\nwas “a direct causal relationship . . . between the criminal action taken and the avoidance of the\n\nthreatened harm.” Id. (internal quotation marks, citation, and brackets omitted); United States v. Liu,\n\n960 F.2d 449, 454 (5th Cir. 1992) (noting that the defense extends to threats involving family\n\nmembers).\n\n We review a district court’s refusal to submit a requested instruction on duress for an abuse\n\nof discretion. Posada-Rios, 158 F.3d at 875. A present, imminent, or impending threat “only arises\n\nif there is a real emergency leaving no time to pursue any legal alternative.” Id. at 874. It thus\n\nrequires proof of “absolute and uncontrollable necessity.” Id. at 874 & n.20. Martinez argues that\n\nthe district court incorrectly required that he establish the imminent-threat element by a\n\npreponderance of the evidence. He argues that “[t]he question was not whether, in the district court’s\n\nview, duress had been proved by a preponderance. Rather, the question was whether there was\n\nsufficient evidence to let the jury decide whether it had.”\n\n The evidentiary foundation required for an instruction on an affirmative defense is whether\n\nthe evidence presented in support of the instruction is “sufficient for a reasonable jury to rule in favor\n\nof the defendant on that theory.” United States v. Stone, 960 F.2d 426, 432 (5th Cir. 1992) (internal\n\fquotation marks and citation omitted); see also United States v. Branch, 91 F.3d 699, 713 (5th Cir.\n\n1996) (addressing the quantum of evidence required to warrant an instruction on self-defense). The\n\njury could not have ruled in favor of Martinez on the issue of duress unless he proved each element\n\nof the defense by a preponderance of the evidence. See United States v. Willis, 38 F.3d 170, 179 (5th\n\nCir. 1994). However, even if we were to accept Martinez’s argument that the court need only find\n\nthat the evidence was “sufficient” to require a duress instruction, Martinez has made no such\n\nshowing. Martinez failed to set forth objective evidence of an immediate threat to either his safety\n\nor the safety of his family. See Posada-Rios, 158 F.3d at 873-75. Accordingly, we find that the\n\ndistrict court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to give the jury an instruction on duress. Id.\n\n Martinez also argues that the district court abused its discretion by refusing to dismiss Juror\n\n#1 for bias based on the juror’s reporting that he knew Martinez’s employer. Martinez asserts that\n\nalthough he never directly implicated his employer in the drug conspiracy, “that view could be\n\nreasonably inferred from [the] evidence.”\n\n The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee the right to a trial by an impartial jury.\n\nUnited States v. Hinojosa, 958 F.2d 624, 631 (5th Cir. 1992). Because a trial judge has the\n\n“acknowledged advantage” of observing the demeanor and credibility of jurors, we grant “broad\n\ndiscretion to the trial judge in making determinations of impartiality and will not interfere with such\n\ndecisions absent a clear abuse of discretion.” Id.\n\n Martinez never implicated his employer in the conspiracy. Moreover, the district court\n\npersonally questioned the juror regarding his impartiality and assessed the credibility of the juror’s\n\nresponses. The juror’s “candor on the subject” bolsters his later assertions that he would be impartial.\n\nSee Hinojosa, 958 F.2d at 631. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion\n\nto strike the juror. See id.\n\fAFFIRMED.\n\f", "ocr": false, "opinion_id": 42219 } ]
Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
F
USA, Federal
2,352,469
Drew, C.J., Stearne, Jones, Ladner and Chidsey
1951-01-02
false
sheridan-v-horn-hardart-bak-co
Sheridan
Sheridan v. HORN & HARDART BAK. CO.
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
12
Published
null
null
[ "366 Pa. 485" ]
[ { "author_str": null, "per_curiam": false, "type": "010combined", "page_count": null, "download_url": null, "author_id": null, "opinion_text": "\n366 Pa. 485 (1951)\nSheridan, Appellant,\nv.\nHorn &amp; Hardart Baking Co.\nSupreme Court of Pennsylvania.\nArgued November 13, 1950.\nJanuary 2, 1951.\n*486 Before DREW, C.J., STEARNE, JONES, LADNER and CHIDSEY, JJ.\n*488 Conrad G. Moffett, with him George T. Guarnieri, for appellant.\nJohn J. McDevitt, 3rd, with him Peter P. Liebert, 3rd, for appellee.\nOPINION PER CURIAM, January 2, 1951:\nOrder affirmed on the opinion of the learned court below.\n", "ocr": false, "opinion_id": 2352469 } ]
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
S
Pennsylvania, PA
107,024
Black, Harlan, Warren
1965-04-26
false
hanna-v-plumer
Hanna
Hanna v. Plumer
Hanna v. Plumer, Executor
Albert P. Zabin argued the cause for petitioner, pro hac vice, by special leave of Court. With him on the brief was George Welch., James J. Fitzpatrick argued the cause for respondent. On the brief were Alfred, E. LoPresti and James T. Connolly.
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
Argued January 21, 1965.
null
null
1,498
Published
null
<parties id="b528-5"> HANNA <em> v. </em> PLUMER, EXECUTOR. </parties><br><docketnumber id="b528-7"> No. 171. </docketnumber><otherdate id="AZo"> Argued January 21, 1965. </otherdate><decisiondate id="ANgH"> Decided April 26, 1965. </decisiondate><br><attorneys id="b528-14"> <em> Albert P. Zabin </em> argued the cause for petitioner, <em> pro hac vice, </em> by special leave of Court. With him on the brief was <em> George Welch. </em> </attorneys><br><attorneys id="b528-15"> <em> James J. Fitzpatrick </em> argued the cause for respondent. On the brief were <em> Alfred, E. LoPresti </em> and <em> James T. Connolly. </em> </attorneys>
[ "14 L. Ed. 2d 8", "85 S. Ct. 1136", "380 U.S. 460", "1965 U.S. LEXIS 1350" ]
[ { "author_str": null, "per_curiam": false, "type": "010combined", "page_count": null, "download_url": null, "author_id": 3376, "opinion_text": "\n380 U.S. 460 (1965)\nHANNA\nv.\nPLUMER, EXECUTOR.\nNo. 171.\nSupreme Court of United States.\nArgued January 21, 1965.\nDecided April 26, 1965.\nCERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT.\nAlbert P. Zabin argued the cause for petitioner, pro hac vice, by special leave of Court. With him on the brief was George Welch.\nJames J. Fitzpatrick argued the cause for respondent. On the brief were Alfred E. LoPresti and James T. Connolly.\n*461 MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN delivered the opinion of the Court.\nThe question to be decided is whether, in a civil action where the jurisdiction of the United States district court is based upon diversity of citizenship between the parties, service of process shall be made in the manner prescribed by state law or that set forth in Rule 4 (d) (1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.\nOn February 6, 1963, petitioner, a citizen of Ohio, filed her complaint in the District Court for the District of Massachusetts, claiming damages in excess of $10,000 for personal injuries resulting from an automobile accident in South Carolina, allegedly caused by the negligence of one Louise Plumer Osgood, a Massachusetts citizen deceased at the time of the filing of the complaint. Respondent, Mrs. Osgood's executor and also a Massachusetts citizen, was named as defendant. On February 8, service was made by leaving copies of the summons and the complaint with respondent's wife at his residence, concededly in compliance with Rule 4 (d) (1), which provides:\n\"The summons and complaint shall be served together. The plaintiff shall furnish the person making service with such copies as are necessary. Service shall be made as follows:\n\"(1) Upon an individual other than an infant or an incompetent person, by delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to him personally or by leaving copies thereof at his dwelling house or usual place of abode with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein . . . .\"\nRespondent filed his answer on February 26, alleging, inter alia, that the action could not be maintained because it had been brought \"contrary to and in violation of the *462 provisions of Massachusetts General Laws (Ter. Ed.) Chapter 197, Section 9.\" That section provides:\n\"Except as provided in this chapter, an executor or administrator shall not be held to answer to an action by a creditor of the deceased which is not commenced within one year from the time of his giving bond for the performance of his trust, or to such an action which is commenced within said year unless before the expiration thereof the writ in such action has been served by delivery in hand upon such executor or administrator or service thereof accepted by him or a notice stating the name of the estate, the name and address of the creditor, the amount of the claim and the court in which the action has been brought has been filed in the proper registry of probate. . . .\" Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., c. 197, § 9 (1958).\nOn October 17, 1963, the District Court granted respondent's motion for summary judgment, citing Ragan v. Merchants Transfer Co., 337 U. S. 530, and Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U. S. 99, in support of its conclusion that the adequacy of the service was to be measured by § 9, with which, the court held, petitioner had not complied. On appeal, petitioner admitted noncompliance with § 9, but argued that Rule 4 (d) (1) defines the method by which service of process is to be effected in diversity actions. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, finding that \"[r]elatively recent amendments [to § 9] evince a clear legislative purpose to require personal notification within the year,\"[1] concluded that the conflict of state *463 and federal rules was over \"a substantive rather than a procedural matter,\" and unanimously affirmed. 331 F. 2d 157. Because of the threat to the goal of uniformity of federal procedure posed by the decision below,[2] we granted certiorari, 379 U. S. 813.\nWe conclude that the adoption of Rule 4 (d) (1), designed to control service of process in diversity actions,[3]*464 neither exceeded the congressional mandate embodied in the Rules Enabling Act nor transgressed constitutional bounds, and that the Rule is therefore the standard against which the District Court should have measured the adequacy of the service. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.\nThe Rules Enabling Act, 28 U. S. C. § 2072 (1958 ed.), provides, in pertinent part:\n\"The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe, by general rules, the forms of process, writs, pleadings, and motions, and the practice and procedure of the district courts of the United States in civil actions.\n\"Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right and shall preserve the right of trial by jury . . . .\"\nUnder the cases construing the scope of the Enabling Act, Rule 4 (d) (1) clearly passes muster. Prescribing the manner in which a defendant is to be notified that a suit has been instituted against him, it relates to the \"practice and procedure of the district courts.\" Cf. Insurance Co. v. Bangs, 103 U. S. 435, 439.\n\"The test must be whether a rule really regulates procedure, —the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for disregard or infraction of them.\" Sibbach v. Wilson &amp; Co., 312 U. S. 1, 14.[4]\nIn Mississippi Pub. Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U. S. 438, this Court upheld Rule 4 (f), which permits service of a summons anywhere within the State (and not merely the district) in which a district court sits:\n\"We think that Rule 4 (f) is in harmony with the Enabling Act . . . . Undoubtedly most alterations *465 of the rules of practice and procedure may and often do affect the rights of litigants. Congress' prohibition of any alteration of substantive rights of litigants was obviously not addressed to such incidental effects as necessarily attend the adoption of the prescribed new rules of procedure upon the rights of litigants who, agreeably to rules of practice and procedure, have been brought before a court authorized to determine their rights. Sibbach v. Wilson &amp; Co., 312 U. S. 1, 11-14. The fact that the application of Rule 4 (f) will operate to subject petitioner's rights to adjudication by the district court for northern Mississippi will undoubtedly affect those rights. But it does not operate to abridge, enlarge or modify the rules of decision by which that court will adjudicate its rights.\" Id., at 445-446.\nThus were there no conflicting state procedure, Rule 4 (d) (1) would clearly control. National Rental v. Szukhent, 375 U. S. 311, 316. However, respondent, focusing on the contrary Massachusetts rule, calls to the Court's attention another line of cases, a line which—like the Federal Rules—had its birth in 1938. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, overruling Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1, held that federal courts sitting in diversity cases, when deciding questions of \"substantive\" law, are bound by state court decisions as well as state statutes. The broad command of Erie was therefore identical to that of the Enabling Act: federal courts are to apply state substantive law and federal procedural law. However, as subsequent cases sharpened the distinction between substance and procedure, the line of cases following Erie diverged markedly from the line construing the Enabling Act. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U. S. 99, made it clear that Erie-type problems were not to be solved by *466 reference to any traditional or common-sense substance-procedure distinction:\n\"And so the question is not whether a statute of limitations is deemed a matter of `procedure' in some sense. The question is . . . does it significantly affect the result of a litigation for a federal court to disregard a law of a State that would be controlling in an action upon the same claim by the same parties in a State court?\" 326 U. S., at 109.[5]\nRespondent, by placing primary reliance on York and Ragan, suggests that the Erie doctrine acts as a check on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, that despite the clear command of Rule 4 (d) (1), Erie and its progeny demand the application of the Massachusetts rule. Reduced to essentials, the argument is: (1) Erie, as refined in York, demands that federal courts apply state law whenever application of federal law in its stead will alter the outcome of the case. (2) In this case, a determination that the Massachusetts service requirements obtain will result in immediate victory for respondent. If, on the other hand, it should be held that Rule 4 (d) (1) is applicable, the litigation will continue, with possible victory for petitioner. (3) Therefore, Erie demands application of the Massachusetts rule. The syllogism possesses an appealing simplicity, but is for several reasons invalid.\nIn the first place, it is doubtful that, even if there were no Federal Rule making it clear that in-hand service is not required in diversity actions, the Erie rule would have obligated the District Court to follow the Massachusetts procedure. \"Outcome-determination\" analysis was never *467 intended to serve as a talisman. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Cooperative, 356 U. S. 525, 537. Indeed, the message of York itself is that choices between state and federal law are to be made not by application of any automatic, \"litmus paper\" criterion, but rather by reference to the policies underlying the Erie rule. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York,supra, at 108-112.[6]\nThe Erie rule is rooted in part in a realization that it would be unfair for the character or result of a litigation materially to differ because the suit had been brought in a federal court.\n\"Diversity of citizenship jurisdiction was conferred in order to prevent apprehended discrimination in state courts against those not citizens of the State. Swift v. Tyson introduced grave discrimination by non-citizens against citizens. It made rights enjoyed under the unwritten `general law' vary according to whether enforcement was sought in the state or in the federal court; and the privilege of selecting the court in which the right should be determined was conferred upon the non-citizen. Thus, the doctrine rendered impossible equal protection of the law.\" Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, supra, at 74-75.[7]\nThe decision was also in part a reaction to the practice of \"forum-shopping\" which had grown up in response to the rule of Swift v. Tyson. 304 U. S., at 73-74.[8] That the York test was an attempt to effectuate these policies is demonstrated by the fact that the opinion framed the inquiry in terms of \"substantial\" variations between state *468 and federal litigation. 326 U. S., at 109. Not only are nonsubstantial, or trivial, variations not likely to raise the sort of equal protection problems which troubled the Court in Erie; they are also unlikely to influence the choice of a forum. The \"outcome-determination\" test therefore cannot be read without reference to the twin aims of the Erie rule: discouragement of forum-shopping and avoidance of inequitable administration of the laws.[9]\nThe difference between the conclusion that the Massachusetts rule is applicable, and the conclusion that it is not, is of course at this point \"outcome-determinative\" in the sense that if we hold the state rule to apply, respondent prevails, whereas if we hold that Rule 4 (d) (1) governs, the litigation will continue. But in this sense every procedural variation is \"outcome-determinative.\" For example, having brought suit in a federal court, a plaintiff cannot then insist on the right to *469 file subsequent pleadings in accord with the time limits applicable in the state courts, even though enforcement of the federal timetable will, if he continues to insist that he must meet only the state time limit, result in determination of the controversy against him. So it is here. Though choice of the federal or state rule will at this point have a marked effect upon the outcome of the litigation, the difference between the two rules would be of scant, if any, relevance to the choice of a forum. Petitioner, in choosing her forum, was not presented with a situation where application of the state rule would wholly bar recovery;[10] rather, adherence to the state rule would have resulted only in altering the way in which process was served.[11] Moreover, it is difficult to argue that permitting service of defendant's wife to take the place of in-hand service of defendant himself alters the mode of enforcement of state-created rights in a fashion sufficiently \"substantial\" to raise the sort of equal protection problems to which the Erie opinion alluded.\nThere is, however, a more fundamental flaw in respondent's syllogism: the incorrect assumption that the rule of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins constitutes the appropriate test *470 of the validity and therefore the applicability of a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure. The Erie rule has never been invoked to void a Federal Rule. It is true that there have been cases where this Court has held applicable a state rule in the face of an argument that the situation was governed by one of the Federal Rules. But the holding of each such case was not that Erie commanded displacement of a Federal Rule by an inconsistent state rule, but rather that the scope of the Federal Rule was not as broad as the losing party urged, and therefore, there being no Federal Rule which covered the point in dispute, Erie commanded the enforcement of state law.\n\"Respondent contends, in the first place, that the charge was correct because of the fact that Rule 8 (c) of the Rules of Civil Procedure makes contributory negligence an affirmative defense. We do not agree. Rule 8 (c) covers only the manner of pleading. The question of the burden of establishing contributory negligence is a question of local law which federal courts in diversity of citizenship cases (Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64) must apply.\" Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U. S. 109, 117.[12]\n(Here, of course, the clash is unavoidable; Rule 4 (d) (1) says—implicitly, but with unmistakable clarity—that in-hand service is not required in federal courts.) At the same time, in cases adjudicating the validity of Federal Rules, we have not applied the York rule or other refinements of Erie, but have to this day continued to decide questions concerning the scope of the Enabling Act and the constitutionality of specific Federal Rules in light of *471 the distinction set forth in Sibbach. E. g., Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U. S. 104.\nNor has the development of two separate lines of cases been inadvertent. The line between \"substance\" and \"procedure\" shifts as the legal context changes. \"Each implies different variables depending upon the particular problem for which it is used.\" Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, supra, at 108; Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws, pp. 154-183 (1942). It is true that both the Enabling Act and the Erie rule say, roughly, that federal courts are to apply state \"substantive\" law and federal \"procedural\" law, but from that it need not follow that the tests are identical. For they were designed to control very different sorts of decisions. When a situation is covered by one of the Federal Rules, the question facing the court is a far cry from the typical, relatively unguided Erie choice: the court has been instructed to apply the Federal Rule, and can refuse to do so only if the Advisory Committee, this Court, and Congress erred in their prima facie judgment that the Rule in question transgresses neither the terms of the Enabling Act nor constitutional restrictions.[13]\nWe are reminded by the Erie opinion[14] that neither Congress nor the federal courts can, under the guise of formulating rules of decision for federal courts, fashion rules which are not supported by a grant of federal authority contained in Article I or some other section of the Constitution; in such areas state law must govern *472 because there can be no other law. But the opinion in Erie, which involved no Federal Rule and dealt with a question which was \"substantive\" in every traditional sense (whether the railroad owed a duty of care to Tompkins as a trespasser or a licensee), surely neither said nor implied that measures like Rule 4 (d) (1) are unconstitutional. For the constitutional provision for a federal court system (augmented by the Necessary and Proper Clause) carries with it congressional power to make rules governing the practice and pleading in those courts, which in turn includes a power to regulate matters which, though falling within the uncertain area between substance and procedure, are rationally capable of classification as either. Cf. M`Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 421. Neither York nor the cases following it ever suggested that the rule there laid down for coping with situations where no Federal Rule applies is coextensive with the limitation on Congress to which Erie had adverted. Although this Court has never before been confronted with a case where the applicable Federal Rule is in direct collision with the law of the relevant State,[15] courts of appeals faced with such clashes have rightly discerned the implications of our decisions.\n\"One of the shaping purposes of the Federal Rules is to bring about uniformity in the federal courts by getting away from local rules. This is especially true of matters which relate to the administration of legal proceedings, an area in which federal courts *473 have traditionally exerted strong inherent power, completely aside from the powers Congress expressly conferred in the Rules. The purpose of the Erie doctrine, even as extended in York and Ragan, was never to bottle up federal courts with `outcome-determinative' and `integral-relations' stoppers— when there are `affirmative countervailing [federal] considerations' and when there is a Congressional mandate (the Rules) supported by constitutional authority.\" Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co. v. Wright, 322 F. 2d 759, 764 (C. A. 5th Cir. 1963).[16]\nErie and its offspring cast no doubt on the long-recognized power of Congress to prescribe housekeeping rules for federal courts even though some of those rules will inevitably differ from comparable state rules. Cf. Herron v. Southern Pacific Co., 283 U. S. 91. \"When, because the plaintiff happens to be a non-resident, such a right is enforceable in a federal as well as in a State court, the forms and mode of enforcing the right may at times, naturally enough, vary because the two judicial systems are not identic.\" Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, supra, at 108; Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp., 337 U. S. 541, 555. Thus, though a court, in measuring a Federal Rule against the standards contained in the Enabling Act and the Constitution, need not wholly blind itself to the degree to which the Rule makes the character and result of the federal litigation stray from the course it would follow in state courts, Sibbach v. Wilson &amp; Co., supra, at 13-14, it cannot be forgotten that the Erie rule, and the guidelines suggested in York, were created to serve another purpose altogether. To hold that a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure must cease to function whenever it alters the mode of enforcing state-created rights would be to disembowel *474 either the Constitution's grant of power over federal procedure or Congress' attempt to exercise that power in the Enabling Act.[17] Rule 4 (d) (1) is valid and controls the instant case.\nReversed.\nMR. JUSTICE BLACK concurs in the result.\nMR. JUSTICE HARLAN, concurring.\nIt is unquestionably true that up to now Erie and the cases following it have not succeeded in articulating a workable doctrine governing choice of law in diversity actions. I respect the Court's effort to clarify the situation in today's opinion. However, in doing so I think it has misconceived the constitutional premises of Erie and has failed to deal adequately with those past decisions upon which the courts below relied.\nErie was something more than an opinion which worried about \"forum-shopping and avoidance of inequitable administration of the laws,\" ante, p. 468, although to be sure these were important elements of the decision. I have always regarded that decision as one of the modern cornerstones of our federalism, expressing policies that profoundly touch the allocation of judicial power between the state and federal systems. Erie recognized that there should not be two conflicting systems of law controlling the primary activity of citizens, for such alternative governing authority must necessarily give rise to a debilitating uncertainty in the planning of everyday affairs.[1] And it recognized that the scheme of our Constitution envisions an allocation of law-making functions between state and federal legislative processes which is undercut if the federal judiciary can make substantive law affecting *475 state affairs beyond the bounds of congressional legislative powers in this regard. Thus, in diversity cases Erie commands that it be the state law governing primary private activity which prevails.\nThe shorthand formulations which have appeared in some past decisions are prone to carry untoward results that frequently arise from oversimplification. The Court is quite right in stating that the \"outcome-determinative\" test of Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U. S. 99, if taken literally, proves too much, for any rule, no matter how clearly \"procedural,\" can affect the outcome of litigation if it is not obeyed. In turning from the \"outcome\" test of York back to the unadorned forum-shopping rationale of Erie, however, the Court falls prey to like over-simplification, for a simple forum-shopping rule also proves too much; litigants often choose a federal forum merely to obtain what they consider the advantages of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or to try their cases before a supposedly more favorable judge. To my mind the proper line of approach in determining whether to apply a state or a federal rule, whether \"substantive\" or \"procedural,\" is to stay close to basic principles by inquiring if the choice of rule would substantially affect those primary decisions respecting human conduct which our constitutional system leaves to state regulation.[2] If so, Erie and the Constitution require that the state rule prevail, even in the face of a conflicting federal rule.\nThe Court weakens, if indeed it does not submerge, this basic principle by finding, in effect, a grant of substantive legislative power in the constitutional provision for a federal *476 court system (compare Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1), and through it, setting up the Federal Rules as a body of law inviolate.\n\"[T]he constitutional provision for a federal court system . . . carries with it congressional power . . . to regulate matters which, though falling within the uncertain area between substance and procedure, are rationally capable of classification as either.\" Ante, p. 472. (Emphasis supplied.)\nSo long as a reasonable man could characterize any duly adopted federal rule as \"procedural,\" the Court, unless I misapprehend what is said, would have it apply no matter how seriously it frustrated a State's substantive regulation of the primary conduct and affairs of its citizens. Since the members of the Advisory Committee, the Judicial Conference, and this Court who formulated the Federal Rules are presumably reasonable men, it follows that the integrity of the Federal Rules is absolute. Whereas the unadulterated outcome and forum-shopping tests may err too far toward honoring state rules, I submit that the Court's \"arguably procedural, ergo constitutional\" test moves too fast and far in the other direction.\nThe courts below relied upon this Court's decisions in Ragan v. Merchants Transfer Co., 337 U. S. 530, and Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp., 337 U. S. 541. Those cases deserve more attention than this Court has given them, particularly Ragan which, if still good law, would in my opinion call for affirmance of the result reached by the Court of Appeals. Further, a discussion of these two cases will serve to illuminate the \"diversity\" thesis I am advocating.\nIn Ragan a Kansas statute of limitations provided that an action was deemed commenced when service was made on the defendant. Despite Federal Rule 3 which provides that an action commences with the filing of the complaint, *477 the Court held that for purposes of the Kansas statute of limitations a diversity tort action commenced only when service was made upon the defendant. The effect of this holding was that although the plaintiff had filed his federal complaint within the state period of limitations, his action was barred because the federal marshal did not serve a summons on the defendant until after the limitations period had run. I think that the decision was wrong. At most, application of the Federal Rule would have meant that potential Kansas tort defendants would have to defer for a few days the satisfaction of knowing that they had not been sued within the limitations period. The choice of the Federal Rule would have had no effect on the primary stages of private activity from which torts arise, and only the most minimal effect on behavior following the commission of the tort. In such circumstances the interest of the federal system in proceeding under its own rules should have prevailed.\nCohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp. held that a federal diversity court must apply a state statute requiring a small stockholder in a stockholder derivative suit to post a bond securing payment of defense costs as a condition to prosecuting an action. Such a statute is not \"outcome determinative\"; the plaintiff can win with or without it. The Court now rationalizes the case on the ground that the statute might affect the plaintiff's choice of forum (ante, p. 469, n. 10), but as has been pointed out, a simple forum-shopping test proves too much. The proper view of Cohen is, in my opinion, that the statute was meant to inhibit small stockholders from instituting \"strike suits,\" and thus it was designed and could be expected to have a substantial impact on private primary activity. Anyone who was at the trial bar during the period when Cohen arose can appreciate the strong state policy reflected in the statute. I think it wholly legitimate to view Federal Rule 23 as not purporting to deal *478 with the problem. But even had the Federal Rules purported to do so, and in so doing provided a substantially less effective deterrent to strike suits, I think the state rule should still have prevailed. That is where I believe the Court's view differs from mine; for the Court attributes such overriding force to the Federal Rules that it is hard to think of a case where a conflicting state rule would be allowed to operate, even though the state rule reflected policy considerations which, under Erie, would lie within the realm of state legislative authority.\nIt remains to apply what has been said to the present case. The Massachusetts rule provides that an executor need not answer suits unless in-hand service was made upon him or notice of the action was filed in the proper registry of probate within one year of his giving bond. The evident intent of this statute is to permit an executor to distribute the estate which he is administering without fear that further liabilities may be outstanding for which he could be held personally liable. If the Federal District Court in Massachusetts applies Rule 4 (d) (1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure instead of the Massachusetts service rule, what effect would that have on the speed and assurance with which estates are distributed? As I see it, the effect would not be substantial. It would mean simply that an executor would have to check at his own house or the federal courthouse as well as the registry of probate before he could distribute the estate with impunity. As this does not seem enough to give rise to any real impingement on the vitality of the state policy which the Massachusetts rule is intended to serve, I concur in the judgment of the Court.\nNOTES\n[1] Section 9 is in part a statute of limitations, providing that an executor need not \"answer to an action . . . which is not commenced within one year from the time of his giving bond . . . .\" This part of the statute, the purpose of which is to speed the settlement of estates, Spaulding v. McConnell, 307 Mass. 144, 146, 29 N. E. 2d 713, 715 (1940); Doyle v. Moylan, 141 F. Supp. 95 (D. C. D. Mass. 1956), is not involved in this case, since the action clearly was timely commenced. (Respondent filed bond on March 1, 1962; the complaint was filed February 6, 1963, and the service—the propriety of which is in dispute—was made on February 8, 1963.) 331 F. 2d, at 159. Cf. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, supra; Ragan v. Merchants Transfer Co., supra.\n\nSection 9 also provides for the manner of service. Generally, service of process must be made by \"delivery in hand,\" although there are two alternatives: acceptance of service by the executor, or filing of a notice of claim, the components of which are set out in the statute, in the appropriate probate court. The purpose of this part of the statute, which is involved here, is, as the court below noted, to insure that executors will receive actual notice of claims. Parker v. Rich, 297 Mass. 111, 113-114, 8 N. E. 2d 345, 347 (1937). Actual notice is of course also the goal of Rule 4 (d) (1); however, the Federal Rule reflects a determination that this goal can be achieved by a method less cumbersome than that prescribed in § 9. In this case the goal seems to have been achieved; although the affidavit filed by respondent in the District Court asserts that he had not been served in hand nor had he accepted service, it does not allege lack of actual notice.\n[2] There are a number of state service requirements which would not necessarily be satisfied by compliance with Rule 4 (d) (1). See, e. g., Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 411 8; Idaho Code Ann. § 5-507 7 (1948); Ill. Rev. Stat., c. 110, § 13.2 (1963); Ky. Rev. Stat., Rules Civ. Proc., Rule 4.04 (1962); Md. Ann. Code, Rules Proc., Rule 104 b (1963); Mich. Rev. Jud. Act § 600.1912 (1961); N. C. Gen. Stat. § 1-94 (1953); S. D. Code § 33.0807 (8) (Supp. 1960); Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-214 (1955).\n[3] \"These rules govern the procedure in the United States district courts in all suits of a civil nature whether cognizable as cases at law or in equity, with the exceptions stated in Rule 81. . . .\" Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 1.\n\nThis case does not come within any of the exceptions noted in Rule 81.\n[4] See also Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U. S. 104, 112-114.\n[5] See also Ragan v. Merchants Transfer Co., supra; Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U. S. 535; Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U. S. 198, 203-204, 207-208; cf. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Cooperative, 356 U. S. 525.\n[6] See Iovino v. Waterson, 274 F. 2d 41, 46-47 (C. A. 2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied sub nom. Carlin v. Iovino, 362 U. S. 949.\n[7] See also Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Co., 313 U. S. 487, 496; Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., supra, note 5, at 538.\n[8] Cf. Black &amp; White Taxicab Co. v. Brown &amp; Yellow Taxicab Co., 276 U. S. 518.\n[9] The Court of Appeals seemed to frame the inquiry in terms of how \"important\" § 9 is to the State. In support of its suggestion that § 9 serves some interest the State regards as vital to its citizens, the court noted that something like § 9 has been on the books in Massachusetts a long time, that § 9 has been amended a number of times, and that § 9 is designed to make sure that executors receive actual notice. See note 1, supra. The apparent lack of relation among these three observations is not surprising, because it is not clear to what sort of question the Court of Appeals was addressing itself. One cannot meaningfully ask how important something is without first asking \"important for what purpose?\" Erie and its progeny make clear that when a federal court sitting in a diversity case is faced with a question of whether or not to apply state law, the importance of a state rule is indeed relevant, but only in the context of asking whether application of the rule would make so important a difference to the character or result of the litigation that failure to enforce it would unfairly discriminate against citizens of the forum State, or whether application of the rule would have so important an effect upon the fortunes of one or both of the litigants that failure to enforce it would be likely to cause a plaintiff to choose the federal court.\n[10] See Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, supra, at 108-109; Ragan v. Merchants Transfer Co., supra, at 532; Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., supra, note 5, at 538.\n\nSimilarly, a federal court's refusal to enforce the New Jersey rule involved in Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp., 337 U. S. 541, requiring the posting of security by plaintiffs in stockholders' derivative actions, might well impel a stockholder to choose to bring suit in the federal, rather than the state, court.\n[11] Cf. Monarch Insurance Co. of Ohio v. Spach, 281 F. 2d 401, 412 (C. A. 5th Cir. 1960). We cannot seriously entertain the thought that one suing an estate would be led to choose the federal court because of a belief that adherence to Rule 4 (d) (1) is less likely to give the executor actual notice than § 9, and therefore more likely to produce a default judgment. Rule 4 (d) (1) is well designed to give actual notice, as it did in this case. See note 1, supra.\n[12] To the same effect, see Ragan v. Merchants Transfer Co., supra; Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp., supra, note 10, at 556; id., at 557 (DOUGLAS, J., dissenting); cf. Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., supra, note 5, at 201-202; see generally Iovino v. Waterson, supra, note 6, at 47-48.\n[13] Sibbach v. Wilson &amp; Co., supra, at 13-15; see Appointment of Committee to Draft Unified System of Equity and Law Rules, 295 U. S. 774; Orders re Rules of Procedure, 302 U. S. 783; Letter of Submittal, 308 U. S. 649; 1A Moore, Federal Practice ¶ 0.501 [2], at 5027-5028 (2d ed. 1961).\n[14] Erie R. Co v. Tompkins, supra, at 77-79; cf. Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., supra, note 5, at 202; Sibbach v. Wilson &amp; Co., supra, at 10; Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, supra, at 105.\n[15] In Sibbach v. Wilson &amp; Co., supra, the law of the forum State (Illinois) forbade the sort of order authorized by Rule 35. However, Sibbach was decided before Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Co., supra, note 7, and the Sibbach opinion makes clear that the Court was proceeding on the assumption that if the law of any State was relevant, it was the law of the State where the tort occurred (Indiana), which, like Rule 35, made provision for such orders. 312 U. S., at 6-7, 10-11.\n[16] To the same effect, see D'Onofrio Construction Co. v. Recon Co., 255 F. 2d 904, 909-910 (C. A. 1st Cir. 1958).\n[17] Mississippi Pub. Corp. v. Murphree, supra, at 445-446; Iovino v. Waterson, supra, note 6, at 46.\n[1] Since the rules involved in the present case are parallel rather than conflicting, this first rationale does not come into play here.\n[2] See Hart and Wechsler, The Federal Courts and the Federal System 678.\n\nByrd v. Blue Ridge Coop., Inc., 356 U. S. 525, 536-540, indicated that state procedures would apply if the State had manifested a particularly strong interest in their employment. Compare Dice v. Akron, C. &amp; Y. R. Co., 342 U. S. 359. However, this approach may not be of constitutional proportions.\n\n", "ocr": false, "opinion_id": 107024 }, { "author_str": "Warren", "per_curiam": false, "type": "020lead", "page_count": null, "download_url": null, "author_id": null, "opinion_text": "\n*461Mr. Chief Justice Warren\ndelivered the opinion of the Court.\nThe question to be decided is whether, in a civil action where the jurisdiction of the United States district court is based upon diversity of citizenship between the parties, service of process shall be made in the manner prescribed by state law or that set forth in Rule 4 (d)(1)- of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.\nOn February 6, 1963, petitioner, a citizen of Ohio, filed her complaint in the District Court for the District of Massachusetts, claiming damages in excess of $10,000 for personal injuries resulting from an automobile accident in South Carolina, allegedly caused by the negligence of one Louise Plumer Osgood, a Massachusetts citizen deceased at the time of the filing of the complaint. Respondent, Mrs. Osgood’s executor and also a Massachusetts citizen, was named as defendant. On February 8, service was made by leaving copies of the summons and the complaint with respondent’s wife at his residence, concededly in compliance with Rule 4(d)(1), which provides:\n“The summons and complaint shall be served together. The plaintiff shall furnish' the person making service with such copies as are necessary. Service shall be made as follows:\n“(1) Upon an individual other than an infant or an incompetent person, by delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to him personally or by leaving copies thereof at his dwelling house or usual place of abode with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein . . . .”\nRespondent filed his answer on February 26, alleging, inter alia, that the action could not be maintained because it had been brought “contrary to and in violation of the *462provisions of Massachusetts General Laws (Ter. Ed.) Chapter 197, Section 9.” That section provides:\n“Except as provided in this chapter, an executor or administrator shall not be held to answer to an action by a creditor of the deceased which is not commenced within one year from the time of his giving bond for the performance of his trust, or to such an action, which is commenced within said year unless before the expiration thereof the writ in such action has been served by delivery in hand upon such executor or administrator or service thereof accepted by him or a notice stating the name of the estate, the name and address of the creditor, the amount of the claim and the court in which the action has been brought has been filed in the proper registry of probate. . . Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., c. 197, § 9 (1958).\nOn October 17, 1963, the District Court granted respondent's motion for summary judgment, citing Ragan v. Merchants Transfer Co., 337 U. S. 530, and Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U. S. 99, in support of its conclusion that the adequacy of the service was to be measured by § 9, with which, the court held, petitioner had not complied. On appeal, petitioner admitted noncompliance with § 9, but argued that Rule 4(d)(1) defines the method by which service of process is to be effected in - diversity actions. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, finding that “[relatively recent amendments [to § 9] evince a clear legislative purpose to require personal notification within the year,” 1 concluded that the conflict of state *463and federal rules was over “a substantive rather than a procedural matter,” and unanimously affirmed. 331 F. 2d 157. Because of the threat to the goal of uniformity of federal procedure posed by the decision below,2 we granted certiorari, 379 U. S. 813.\nWe conclude that the adoption of Rule 4 (d)(1), designed to control service of process in diversity actions,3 *464neither exceeded the congressional mandate embodied in the Rules Enabling Act nor transgressed constitutional bounds, and that the Rule is therefore the standard against which the District Court should have measured the adequacy of the service. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.\nThe Rules Enabling Act, 28 U. S. C. § 2072 (1958 ed.), provides, in pertinent part:\n“The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe, by general rules, the forms of process, writs, pleadings, and motions, and the practice and procedure of the district courts of the United States in civil actions.\n“S.uch rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right and shall preserve the right of trial by jury\nUnder the cases construing the scope of the Enabling Act, Rule 4(d)(1) clearly passes muster. Prescribing the manner in which a defendant is to be notified that a suit has been instituted against him, it relates to the “practice and procedure of the district courts.” Cf. Insurance Co. v. Bangs, 103 U. S. 435, 439.\n“The test must be whether a rule really regulates procedure, — the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for disregard or infraction of them.” Sibbach v. Wilson &amp; Co., 312 U. S. 1, 14.4\nIn Mississippi Pub. Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U. S. 438, this Court upheld Rule 4 (f), which permits service of a summons anywhere within the State (and not merely the district) in which a district court sits:\n“We think that Rule 4 (f) is in harmony with the Enabling Act .... Undoubtedly most alterations *465of the rules of practice and procedure may and often do affect the rights of litigants. Congress’ prohibition of any alteration of substantive rights of litigants was obviously not addressed to such incidental effects as necessarily attend the adoption of the prescribed new rules of procedure upon the rights of litigants who, agreeably to rules of practice and procedure, have been brought before a court authorized to determine their rights. Sibbach v. Wilson &amp; Co., 312 U. S. 1, 11-14. The fact that the application of Rule 4 (f) will operate to subject petitioner’s rights to adjudication by the district court for northern Mississippi will undoubtedly affect those rights. But it does not operate to abridge, enlarge or modify the rules of decision by which that court will adjudicate its rights.” Id., at 445-446.\nThus were there no conflicting state procedure, Rule 4(d)(1) would clearly control. National Rental v. Szukhent, 375 U. S. 311, 316. However, respondent, focusing on the contrary Massachusetts rule, calls to the Court’s attention another line of cases, a line which — like the Federal Rules — had its birth in 1938. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, overruling Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1, held that federal courts sitting in diversity cases, when deciding questions of “substantive” law, are bound by state court decisions as well as state statutes. The broad command of Erie was therefore identical to that of the Enabling Act: federal courts are to apply state substantive law and federal procedural law. However, as subsequent cases sharpened the distinction between substance and procedure, the line of cases following Erie diverged markedly from the line construing the Enabling Act. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U. S. 99, made it clear that Erie-type problems were not to be solved by *466reference to any traditional or common-sense substance-procedure distinction:\n\"And so the question is not whether a statute of limitations is deemed a matter of 'procedure’ in some sense. The question is . . . does it significantly affect the result of a litigation for a federal court to disregard a law of a State that would be controlling in an action upon the same claim by the same parties in a State court?” 326 U. S., at 109.5\nRespondent, by placing primary reliance on York and Ragan, suggests that the Erie doctrine acts as a check on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, that despite the clear command of Rule 4 (d)(1), Erie and its progeny demand the application of the Massachusetts rule. Reduced to essentials, the argument is: (1) Erie, as refined in York, demands that federal courts apply state law whenever application of federal law in its stead will alter the outcome of the case. (2) In this case, a determination that the Massachusetts service requirements obtain will result in immediate victory for respondent. If, on the other hand, it should be held that Rule 4(d)(1) is applicable, the litigation will continue, with possible victory for petitioner. (3) Therefore, Erie demands application of the Massachusetts rule. The syllogism possesses an appealing simplicity, but is for several reasons invalid.\nIn the first place, it is doubtful that, even if there were no Federal Rule making it clear that in-hand service is not required in diversity actions, the Erie rule would have obligated the District Court to follow the Massachusetts procedure. “Outcome-determination” analysis was never *467intended to serve as a talisman. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Cooperative, 356 U. S. 525, 537. Indeed, the message of York itself is that choices between state and federal law are to be made not by application of any automatic, “litmus paper” criterion, but rather by reference to the policies underlying the Erie rule. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, supra, at 108-112.6\nThe Erie rule is rooted in part in a realization that it would be unfair for the character or result of a litigation materially to differ because the suit had .been brought in a federal court.\n“Diversity of citizenship jurisdiction was conferred in order to prevent apprehended discrimination in state courts against those not citizens of the State. Swift v. Tyson introduced grave discrimination by non-citizens against citizens. It made rights enjoyed under the unwritten 'general law’ vary according to whether enforcement was sought in the state or in the federal court; and the privilege of selecting the court in which the right should be determined was conferred upon the non-citizen. Thus, the doctrine rendered impossible equal protection of the law.” Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, supra, at 74-75.7\nThe decision was also in part a reaction to the practice of “forum-shopping” which had grown up in response to the rule of Swift v. Tyson. 304 U. S., at 73-74.8 That the York test was an attempt to effectuate these policies is demonstrated by the fact that the opinion framed the inquiry in terms of “substantial” variations between state *468and federal litigation. 326 U. S., at 109. Not only are nonsubstantial, or trivial, variations not likely to raise the sort of equal protection problems which troubled the Court in Erie; they are also unlikely to influence the choice of a forum. The “outcome-determination” test therefore cannot be read without reference to the twin aims of the Erie rule: discouragement of forum-shopping and avoidance of inequitable administration of the laws.9\nThe difference between the conclusion that the Massachusetts rule is applicable, and the conclusion that it is not, is of course at this point “outcome-determinative” in the sense that if we hold the state rule to apply, respondent prevails, whereas if we hold that Rule 4(d)(1) governs, the litigation will continue. But in this sense every procedural variation is “outcome-determinative.” For example, having brought suit in a federal court, a plaintiff cannot then insist on the right to *469file subsequent pleadings in accord with the time limits applicable in the state courts, even though enforcement of the federal timetable will, if he continues to insist that he must meet only the state time limit, result in determination of the controversy against him. So it is here. Though choice of the federal or state rule will at this point have a marked effect upon the outcome of the litigation, the difference between the two rules would be of scant, if any, relevance to the choice of a forum. Petitioner, in choosing her forum, was not presented with a situation where application of the state rule would wholly bar recovery;10 rather, adherence to the state rule would have resulted only in altering the way in which process was served.11 Moreover, it is difficult to argue that permitting service of defendant’s wife to take the place of in-hand service of defendant himself alters the mode of enforcement of state-created rights in a fashion sufficiently “substantial” to raise the sort of equal protection problems to which the Eñe opinion alluded.\nThere is, however, a more fundamental flaw in respondent’s syllogism: the incorrect assumption that the rule of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins constitutes the appropriate test *470of the validity and therefore the applicability of a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure. The Erie rule has never been invoked to void a Federal Rule. It is true that there have been cases where this Court has held applicable a state rule in the face of an argument that the situation was governed by one of the Federal Rules. But the holding of each such case was not that Erie commanded displacement of a Federal Rule by an inconsistent state rule, but rather that the scope of the Federal Rule was not as broad as the losing party urged, and therefore, there being no Federal Rule which covered the point in dispute, Erie commanded the enforcement of state law.\n“Respondent contends, in the first place, that the charge was correct because of the fact that Rule 8 (c) of the Rules of Civil Procedure makes contributory negligence an affirmative defense. We do not agree. Rule 8 (c) covers only the manner of pleading. The question of the burden of establishing contributory negligence is a question of local law which federal courts in diversity of citizenship cases (Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64) must apply.” Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U. S. 109, 117.12\n(Here, of course, the clash is unavoidable; Rule 4 (d)(1) says — implicitly, but with unmistakable clarity — that in-hand service is not required in federal courts.) At the same time, in cases adjudicating the validity of Federal Rules, we have not applied the York rule or other refinements of Erie, but have to this day continued to decide questions concerning the scope of the Enabling Act and the constitutionality of specific Federal Rules in light of *471the distinction set forth in Sibbach. E. g., Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U. S. 104.\nNor has the development of two separate lines of cases been inadvertent. The line between “substance” and “procedure” shifts as the legal context changes. “Each implies different variables depending upon the particular problem for which it is used.” Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, supra, at 108; Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws, pp. 154-183 (1942). It is true that both the Enabling Act and the Erie rule say, roughly, that federal courts are to apply state “substantive” law and federal “procedural” law, but from that it need not follow that the tests are identical. For they were designed to control very different sorts of decisions. When a situation is covered by one of the Federal Rules, the question facing the court is a far cry from the typical, relatively unguided Erie choice: the court has been instructed to apply the Federal Rule, and can refuse to do so only if the Advisory Committee, this Court, and Congress erred in their prima facie judgment that the Rule in question transgresses neither the terms of the Enabling Act nor constitutional restrictions.13\nWe are reminded by the Erie opinion14 that neither Congress nor the federal courts can, under the guise of formulating rules of decision for federal courts, fashion rules which are not supported by a grant of federal authority contained in Article I or some other section of the- Constitution; in such areas state law must govern *472because there can be no other law. But the opinion in Erie, which involved no Federal Rule and dealt with a question which was “substantive” in every traditional sense (whether the railroad owed a duty of care to Tompkins as a trespasser or a licensee), surely neither said nor implied that measures like Rule 4 (d)(1) are unconstitutional. For the constitutional provision for a federal court system (augmented by the Necessary and Proper Clause) carries with it congressional power to make rules governing the practice and pleading in those courts, which in turn includes a power to regulate matters which, though falling within the uncertain area between substance and procedure, are rationally capable of classification as either. Cf. M‘Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 421. Neither York nor the cases following it ever suggested that the rule there laid down for coping with situations where no Federal Rule applies is coextensive with the limitation on Congress to which Erie had adverted. Although this Court has never before been confronted with a case where the applicable Federal Rule is in direct collision with the law of the relevant State,15 courts of appeals faced with such clashes have rightly discerned the implications of our decisions.\n“One of the shaping purposes of the Federal Rules is to bring about uniformity in the federal courts by getting away from local rules. This is especially true of matters which relate to the administration of legal proceedings, an area in which federal courts *473have traditionally exerted strong inherent power, completely aside from the powers Congress expressly conferred in the Rules. The purpose of the Erie doctrine, even as extended in York and Ragan, was never to bottle up federal courts with ‘outcome-determinative’ and ‘integral-relations’ stoppers— when there are ‘affirmative countervailing [federal] considerations’ and when there is a Congressional mandate (the Rules) supported by constitutional authority.” Lumbermen’s Mutual Casualty Co. v. Wright, 322 F. 2d 759, 764 (C. A. 5th Cir. 1963).16\nErie and its offspring cast no doubt on the long-recognized power of Congress to prescribe housekeeping rules for federal courts even though some of those rules will inevitably differ from comparable state rules. Cf. Herron v. Southern Pacific Co., 283 U. S. 91. “When, because the plaintiff happens to be a non-resident, such a right is enforceable in a federal as well as- in a State court, the forms and mode of enforcing the right may at times, naturally enough, vary because the two judicial systems are not identic.” Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, supra, at 108; Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp., 337 U. S. 541, 555. Thus, though a court, in measuring a Federal Rule against the standards contained in the Enabling Act and the Constitution, need not wholly blind itself to the degree to which the Rule makes the character and result of the federal litigation stray from the course it would follow in state courts, Sibbach v. Wilson &amp; Co., supra, at 13-14, it cannot be forgotten that the Erie rule, and the guidelines suggested in York, were created to serve another purpose altogether. To hold that a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure must cease to function whenever it alters the mode of enforcing state-created rights would be to dis*474embowel either the Constitution's grant of power over federal procedure or Congress’ attempt to exercise that power in the Enabling Act.17 Rule 4 (d) (1) is valid and controls the instant case.\n\nReversed.\n\nMr. Justice Black concurs in the result.\n\n Section 9 is in part a statute of limitations, providing that an executor need not “answer to an action . . . which is not commenced within one year from the time of his giving bond . . . .” This part of the statute, the purpose of which is to speed the settlement of estates, Spaulding v. McConnell, 307 Mass. 144, 146, 29 N. E. 2d 713, 715 (1940); Doyle v. Moylan, 141 F. Supp. 95 (D. C. D. Mass. *4631956),-is not involved in this case, since the action clearly was timely commenced. (Respondent filed bond on March 1, 1962; the complaint was filed February 6, 1963; and the service — the propriety of which is in dispute — was made on February 8, 1963.) 331 F. 2d, at 159. Cf. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, supra; Ragan v. Merchants Transfer Co., supra.\nSection 9 also provides for the manner of service. Generally, service of process must be made by “delivery in hand/’ although there are two alternatives: acceptance of service by the executor, or filing of a notice of claim, the components of which are set out in the statute, in the appropriate probate court. The purpose of this part of the statute, which is involved here, is, as the court below noted, to insure that executors will receive actual notice of claims. Parker v. Rich, 297 Mass. 111, 113-114, 8 N. E. 2d 345, 347 (1937). Actual notice is of course also the goal of Rule 4 (d)(1); however, the Federal Rule reflects a determination that this goal can be achieved by a method less cumbersome than that prescribed in § 9. In this ease the goal seems to have been achieved; although the affidavit filed by respondent in the District Court asserts that he had not been served in hand nor had he accepted service, it does not allege lack of actual notice.\n\n\n There are a number of state service requirements which would not necessarily be satisfied by compliance with Rule 4 (d) (1). See, e. g., Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §4118; Idaho Code Ann. §5-507 7 (1948); Ill. Rev. Stat., e. 110, § 13.2 (1963); Ky. Rev. Stat., Rules Civ. Proc., Rule 4.04 (1962); Md. Ann. Code, Rules Proc., Rule 104 b (1963); Mich. Rev. Jud. Act §600.1912 (1961); N. C. Gen. Stat. § 1-94 (1953); S. D. Code § 33.0807 (8) (Supp. 1960); Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-214 (1955).\n\n\n “These rules govern the procedure in the United States district courts in all suits of a civil nature whether cognizable as cases at law or in equity, with the exceptions stated in Rule 81. . . .” Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 1.\nThis ease does not come within any of the exceptions noted in Rule 81.\n\n\n See also Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U. S. 104, 112-114.\n\n\n See also Ragan v. Merchants Transfer Co., supra; Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U. S. 535; Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U. S. 198, 203-204, 207-208; cf. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Cooperative, 356 U. S. 525.\n\n\n See Iovino v. Waterson, 274 F. 2d 41, 46-47 (C. A. 2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied sub nom. Carlin v. Iovino, 362 U. S. 949.\n\n\n See also Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Co., 313 U. S. 487, 496; Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., supra, note 5, at 538.\n\n\n Cf. Black &amp; White Taxicab Co. v. Brown &amp; Yellow Taxicab Co., 276 U. S. 518.\n\n\n The Court of Appeals seemed to frame the inquiry in terms of how “important” § 9 is to the State. In support of its suggestion that § 9 serves some interest the State regards as vital to its citizens, the court noted that something like § 9 has been on the books in Massachusetts a long time, that § 9 has been amended a number of times, and that §9 is designed to make sure that executors receive actual notice. See note 1, supra. The apparent lack of relation among these three observations is not surprising, because it is not clear to what sort of question the Court of Appeals was addressing itself. One cannot meaningfully ask how important something is without first asking “important for what purpose?” Erie and its progeny make clear that when a federal court sitting in a diversity case is faced with a question of whether or not to apply state law, the importance of a state rule is indeed relevant, but only in the context of asking whether application of the rule would make so important a difference to the character or result of the litigation that failure to enforce it would unfairly discriminate against citizens of the forum State, or whether application of the rule would have so important an effect upon the fortunes of one or both of the litigants that failure to enforce it would be likely to cause a plaintiff to choose the federal court.\n\n\n See Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, supra, at 108-109; Ragan v. Merchants Transfer Co., supra, at 532; Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., supra, note 5, at 538.\nSimilarly, a federal court’s refusal to enforce the New Jersey rule involved in Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp., 337 U. S. 541, requiring the posting of security by plaintiffs in stockholders’ derivative actions, might well impel a stockholder to choose to bring suit in the federal, rather than the state, court.\n\n\n Cf. Monarch Insurance Co. of Ohio v. Spach, 281 F. 2d 401, 412 (C. A. 5th Cir. 1960). We cannot seriously entertain the thought that one suing an estate would be led to choose the federal court because of a belief that adherence to Rule 4 (d)(1) is less likely to give the executor actual notice than § 9, and therefore more likely to produce a default judgment. Rule 4 (d)(1) is well designed to give actual notice, as it did in this case. See note 1, supra.\n\n\n To the same effect, see Ragan v. Merchants Transfer Co., supra; Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp., supra. note 10, at 556; id,., at 557 (Douglas, J., dissenting); cf. Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., supra, note 5, at 201-202; see generally Iovino v. Waterson, supra, note 6, at 47-48.\n\n\n Sibbach v. Wilson &amp; Co., supra, at 13-15; see Appointment of Committee to Draft Unified System of Equity and Law Rules, 295 U. S. 774; Orders re Rules of Procedure, 302 U. S. 783; Letter of Submittal, 308 U. S. 649; 1A Moore, Federal Practice ¶ 0.501 [2], at 5027-5028 (2d ed. 1961).\n\n\n Erie R. Co v. Tompkins, supra, at 77-79; cf. Bernhardt v. Polygraphia Co., supra, note 5, at 202; Sibbach v. Wilson &amp; Co., supra, at 10; Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, supra, at 105.\n\n\n In Sibbach v. Wilson &amp; Co., supra, the law of the forum State (Illinois) forbade the sort of order authorized by Rule 35. However, Sibbach was decided before Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Co., supra, note 7, and the Sibbach opinion makes clear that the Court was proceeding on the assumption that if the law of any State was relevant, it was the law of the State where the tort occurred (Indiana), which, like Rule 35, made provision for such orders. 312 U. S., at 6-7, 10-11.\n\n\n To the same effect, see D’Onofrio Construction Co. v. Recon Co., 255 F. 2d 904, 909-910 (C. A. 1st Cir. 1958).\n\n\n Mississippi Pub. Corp. v. Murphree, supra, at 445-446; Iovino v. Waterson, supra, note 6, at 46.\n\n", "ocr": false, "opinion_id": 9422999 }, { "author_str": "Harlan", "per_curiam": false, "type": "030concurrence", "page_count": null, "download_url": null, "author_id": null, "opinion_text": "\nMr. Justice Harlan,\nconcurring.\nIt is unquestionably true that up to now Erie and the cases following it have not succeeded in articulating a workable doctrine governing choice of law in diversity actions. I respect the Court’s eifort to clarify the situation in today’s opinion. However, in doing so I think it has misconceived the constitutional premises of Erie and has failed to deal adequately with those past decisions upon which the courts below relied.\nErie was something more than an opinion which worried about “forum-shopping and avoidance of inequitable administration of the laws,” ante, p. 468, although to be sure these were important elements of the decision. I have always regarded that decision as one of the modern cornerstones of our federalism, expressing policies that profoundly touch the allocation of judicial power between the state and federal systems. Erie recognized that there should not be two conflicting systems of law controlling the primary activity of citizens, for such alternative governing authority must necessarily give rise to a debilitating uncertainty in the planning of everyday affairs.1 And it recognized that the scheme of our Constitution en-. visions an allocation of law-making functions between state and federal legislative processes which is undercut if the federal judiciary can make substantive law affect*475ing state affairs beyond the bounds of congressional legislative powers in this regard. Thus, in diversity cases Erie commands that it be the state law governing primary private activity which prevails.\nThe shorthand formulations which have appeared in some past decisions are prone to carry untoward results that frequently arise from oversimplification. The Court is quite right in stating that the “outcome-determinative” test of Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U. S. 99, if taken literally, proves too much, for any rule, no matter how clearly “procedural,” can affect the outcome of litigation if it is not obeyed. In turning from the “outcome” test of York back to the unadorned forum-shopping rationale of Erie, however, the Court falls prey to like oversimplification, for a simple forum-shopping rule also proves too much; litigants often choose a federal forum merely to obtain what they consider the advantages of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or to try their cases before a supposedly more favorable judge. To my mind the proper line of approach in determining whether to apply a state or a federal rule, whether “substantive” or “procedural,” is to stay close to basic principles by inquiring if the choice of rule would substantially affect those primary decisions respecting human conduct which our constitutional system leaves to state regulation.2 If so, Erie and the Constitution require that the state rule prevail, even in the face of a conflicting federal rule.\nThe Court weakens, if indeed it does not submerge, this basic principle by finding, in effect, a grant of substantive legislative power in the constitutional provision for a fed*476eral court system (compare Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1), and through it, setting up the Federal Rules as a body of law inviolate.\n“[T]he constitutional provision for a federal court system . . . carries with it congressional power ... to regulate matters which, though falling within the uncertain area between substance and procedure, are rationally capable of classification as either.” Ante, p. 472. (Emphasis supplied.)\nSo long as a reasonable man could characterize any duly adopted federal rule as “procedural,” the Court, unless I misapprehend what is said, would have it apply no matter how seriously it frustrated a State’s substantive regulation of the primary conduct and affairs of its citizens. Since the members of the Advisory Committee, the Judicial Conference, and this Court who formulated the Federal Rules are presumably reasonable men, it follows that the integrity of the Federal Rules is absolute. Whereas the unadulterated outcome and forum-shopping tests may err too far toward honoring state rules, I submit that the Court’s “arguably procedural, ergo constitutional” test moves too fast and far in the other direction.\nThe courts below relied upon this Court’s decisions in Ragan v. Merchants Transfer Co., 337 U. S. 530, and Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp., 337 U. S. 541. Those cases deserve more attention than this Court has given them, particularly Ragan which, if still good law, would in my opinion call for affirmance of the result reached by the Court of Appeals. Further, a discussion of these two cases will serve to illuminate the “diversity” thesis I am advocating.\nIn Ragan a Kansas statute of limitations provided that an action was deemed commenced when service was made on the defendant. Despite Federal Rule 3 which provides that an action commences with the filing of the com*477plaint, the Court held that for purposes of the Kansas statute of limitations a diversity tort action commenced only when service,was made upon the defendant. The effect of this holding was that although the plaintiff had filed his federal complaint within the state period of limitations, his action was barred because the federal marshal did not serve a summons on the defendant until after the limitations period had run. I think that the decision was wrong. At most, application of the Federal Rule would have meant that potential Kansas tort defendants would have to defer for a few days the satisfaction of knowing that they had not been sued within the limitations period. The choice of the Federal Rule would have had no effect on the primary stages of private activity from which torts arise, and only the most minimal effect on behavior following the commission of the tort. In such circumstances the interest of the federal system in proceeding under its own rules should have prevailed.\nCohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp. held that a federal diversity court must apply a state statute requiring a small stockholder in a stockholder derivative suit to post a bond securing payment of defense costs as a condition to prosecuting an action. Such a statute is not “outcome determinative”; the plaintiff can win with or without it. The Court now rationalizes the case on the ground that the statute might affect the plaintiff’s choice of forum (ante, p. 469, n. 10), but as has been pointed out, a simple forum-shopping test proves too much. The proper view of Cohen is, in my opinion, that the statute was meant to inhibit small stockholders from instituting “strike suits,” and thus it was designed and could be expected to have a substantial impact on private primary activity. Anyone who was at the trial bar during the period when Cohen arose can appreciate the strong state policy reflected in the statute. I think it wholly legitimate to view Federal Rule 23 as not purporting to deal *478with the problem. But even had the Federal Rules purported to do so, and in so doing provided a substantially less effective deterrent to strike suits, I think the state rule should still have prevailed. That is where I believe the Court’s view differs from mine; for the Court attributes such overriding force to the Federal Rules that it is hard to think of a case where a conflicting state rule would be allowed to operate, even though the state rule reflected policy considerations which, under Erie, would lie within the realm of state legislative authority.\nIt remains to apply what has been said to the present case. The Massachusetts rule provides that an executor need not answer suits unless in-hand service was made upon him or notice of the action was filed in the proper registry of probate within one year of his giving bond. The evident intent of this statute is to permit an executor to distribute the estate which he is administering without fear that further liabilities may be outstanding for which he could be held personally liable. If the Federal District Court in Massachusetts applies Rule 4 (d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure instead of the Massachusetts service rule, what effect would that have on the speed and assurance with which estates are distributed? As I see it, the effect would not be substantial. It would mean simply that an executor would have to check at his own house or the federal courthouse as well as the registry of probate before he could distribute the estate with impunity. As this does not seem enough to give rise to any real impingement on the vitality of the state policy which the Massachusetts rule is intended to serve, I concur in the judgment of the Court.\n\n Since the rules involved in the present case are parallel rather than conflicting, this first rationale does not come into play here.\n\n\n See Hart and Wechsler, The Federal Courts and the Federal System 678.\nByrd v. Blue Ridge Coop., Inc., 366 U. S. 525, 536-540, indicated that state procedures would apply if the State had manifested a particularly strong interest in their employment. Compare Dice v. Akron, C. &amp; Y. R. Co., 342 U. S. 359. However, this approach may not be of constitutional proportions.\n\n", "ocr": false, "opinion_id": 9423000 } ]
Supreme Court
Supreme Court of the United States
F
USA, Federal
1,046,267
Presiding Judge Alan E. Highers
2012-08-10
false
allison-jacob-v-alexis-partee-and-tom-bedell-jr-v-
null
Allison Jacob v. Alexis Partee and Tom Bedell, Jr. v. Top Gun Body Shop
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
0
Published
null
null
null
[ { "author_str": null, "per_curiam": false, "type": "010combined", "page_count": 8, "download_url": "http://www.tsc.state.tn.us/sites/default/files/jacoballisonopn.pdf", "author_id": 8275, "opinion_text": " IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE\n AT JACKSON\n July 17, 2012 Session\n\n ALLISON JACOB ET AL. v. ALEXIS PARTEE and TOM BEDELL, JR. V.\n TOP GUN BODY SHOP\n\n Direct Appeal from the Circuit Court for Shelby County\n No. CT-004519-10 Robert L. Childers, Judge\n\n\n No. W2012-00205-COA-R3-CV - Filed August 10, 2012\n\n\nAppellants attempted to appeal the decision of the General Sessions Court to the Circuit\nCourt without filing an appeal bond, but the Circuit Court dismissed the attempted appeals\nfor lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Appellants claim that an appeal bond need not be filed\nwhere an appeal filing fee is paid. We find that, to perfect an appeal from General Sessions\nCourt to Circuit Court, an appeal bond must be filed; payment of the appeal filing fee does\nnot satisfy this jurisdictional requirement. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal\nof the matter.\n\n\n Tenn. R. App. P. 3; Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed\n\nA LAN E. H IGHERS, P.J., W.S., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which H OLLY M. K IRBY,\nJ., and J. S TEVEN S TAFFORD, J., joined.\n\nJames B. “Trey” McClain, III, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellants, Alexis Partee and\nTom Bedell, Jr.\n\nWilliam E. Friedman, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellant, Top Gun Body Shop\n\nRandall J. Fishman, Richard S. Townley, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellee, Allison\nJacob\n\f OPINION\n\n I. F ACTS & P ROCEDURAL H ISTORY\n\n On November 5, 2009, Appellee Allison Jacob filed an action in the Shelby County\nGeneral Sessions Court against Appellants Alexis Partee and Tom Bedell, Jr., alleging\npersonal injuries and property damages sustained as a result of an automobile accident that\noccurred on or about April 28, 2009. Appellants Partee and Bedell then filed a civil warrant\nagainst Appellant/Third-Party Defendant Top Gun Body Shop alleging its negligent repair\nof Ms. Jacob’s vehicle.\n\n Following a bench trial, the General Sessions Court entered an Order of Judgment,\non August 25, 2010, finding Appellants Partee, Bedell and Top Gun Body Shop jointly and\nseverally liable for Ms. Jacobs damages of $19,693.52. However, it awarded Partee and\nBedell an indemnity award of $12,788.00 against Top Gun Body Shop.\n\n On August 25, 2010, Top Gun Body Shop filed its Notice of Appeal to the Circuit\nCourt and it paid the $211.50 appeal filing fee. On September 2, 2010, Partee and Bedell\nalso filed their Notice of Appeal and they paid the $211.50 appeal filing fee.1 Neither Top\nGun Body Shop nor Partee and Bedell filed a timely appeal bond.2\n\n On September 14, 2011, Ms. Jacob filed a Motion to Dismiss and a memorandum in\nsupport thereof, claiming that because Appellants had failed to file a timely appeal bond, the\nCircuit Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Following a hearing on December 1, 2011,\nthe Circuit Court granted Ms. Jacob’s motion and dismissed the matter with prejudice.\nAppellants timely appealed the dismissal to this Court.\n\n II. I SSUE P RESENTED\n\n Appellants present the following issue for review, as summarized:\n\n1. Whether a party appealing from a General Sessions Court judgment, who pays the\n appeal filing fee, must also file an appeal bond.\n\n\n\n\n 1\n The parties’ Notices of Appeal indicate only “Filing Fees Paid” without listing the specific fees\npaid. However, Ms. Jacob does not dispute that Appellants paid $211.50–the standard filing fee.\n 2\n In response to Ms. Jacob’s Motion to Dismiss, Top Gun Body Shop filed a Cost Bond on September\n26, 2011.\n\n -2-\n\fFor the following reasons, we find that, to perfect an appeal from General Sessions Court to\nCircuit Court, an appeal bond must be filed; payment of the appeal filing fee does not satisfy\nthis jurisdictional requirement. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the\nmatter.\n\n\n III. S TANDARD OF R EVIEW\n\n In this case, the trial court granted Ms. Jacob’s motion to dismiss because it\ndetermined that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Appellants’ claims. The existence\nor non-existence of subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law. Northland Ins. Co. v.\nState, 33 S.W.3d 727, 729 (Tenn. 2000) (citing Nelson v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 8 S.W.3d\n625, 628 (Tenn. 1999)). Thus, our review of the trial court’s jurisdiction determination is de\nnovo, without a presumption of correctness. Id. (citing Nelson, 8 S.W.3d at 628).\n\n IV. D ISCUSSION\n\n A. Perfection of Appeal from General Sessions Court to Circuit Court\n\n Tennessee Code Annotated section 27-5-108(a)(1) provides that “[a]ny party may\nappeal from a decision of the general sessions court to the circuit court of the county within\na period of ten (10) days on complying with the provisions of this chapter.” Chapter five,\naddressing “Appeals from General Sessions Court,” further provides that\n\n (a) Before the appeal is granted, the person appealing shall give bond with\n good security, as hereinafter provided, for the costs of the appeal, or take the\n oath for poor persons.\n\n (b) An appeal bond filed by a plaintiff or defendant pursuant to this chapter\n shall be considered sufficient if it secures the cost of the cause on appeal.\n\nTenn. Code Ann. § 27-5-103 (emphasis added).\n\n As stated above, it is undisputed that Appellants failed to file an appeal bond within\nten days of entry of the General Sessions Court judgment.3 However, on appeal, Appellants\ncontend that an appeal bond is unnecessary when an appeal filing fee is paid and they\n\n\n 3\n In their brief to this Court, Appellants Partee and Bedell use the terms “filing fee” and “appeal\nbond” interchangeably; however, they do not dispute that they paid only the $211.50 filing fee and that no\nbond securing further costs was given.\n\n -3-\n\fmaintain that payment of the filing fee in lieu of a bond is the accepted practice in Shelby\nCounty.\n\n In support of their contention, Appellants rely upon Tennessee Code Annotated\nsection 8-21-401, entitled “Fees for particular services,” which provides in relevant part:\n\n (a) Except as otherwise provided by law, the costs provided in this section in\n civil cases are chargeable and may be collected at the time the services are\n requested from the clerk or other officer of the court . . . . If a party, other than\n a party who initiated a proceeding under a pauper’s oath, pays costs at the\n time the services are requested, such payment shall be deemed to satisfy the\n requirement for security to be given for costs, pursuant to § 20-12-120. . . .\n\n (b)(1)(C) In the following specific types of civil actions, the clerk shall charge\n a standard court cost of one hundred fifty dollars ($150)4 at the institution of\n a case:\n\n (i) Appeals to the circuit . . . court from . . . general sessions court[.]\n\nAccording to Appellants, section 8-21-401 was intended to clarify the undefined phrase of\n“bond with good security” as used in section 27-5-103. Appellants maintain that when\nsections 27-5-103 and 8-21-401 are read together, “it is clear that payment of the ‘standard\ncourt cost’ . . . is the equivalent of the ‘bond with good security . . . for the cost of the\nappeal[.]’” They claim the effect of section 8-21-401 “was to discontinue the practice of\nrequiring surety and cost bonds” except in limited circumstances, and thus, that section 27-5-\n103 no longer requires the filing of an appeal bond so long as the appeal filing fee is paid.\n Alternatively, Appellants contend that if the statutes cannot be construed harmoniously, that\nsection 8-21-401 repealed prior-enacted section 27-5-103 by implication.5\n\n We disagree with Appellants’ assertions on appeal. When sections 27-5-103 and 8-\n21-401 are viewed in context and the statute referenced therein considered, it is clear that:\n1) sections 27-5-103 and 8-21-401 are not irreconcilable so as to warrant an implicit repeal\n\n\n 4\n According to Appellants Partee and Bedell, after various taxes are added to the $150.00 filing fee,\nthe total court cost for initiating an appeal is $211.50.\n 5\n In her brief to this Court, Ms. Jacobs argues that we should not consider the repeal by implication\nissue because it was not raised in the trial court. However, based upon the apparent confusion in the trial\ncourts regarding the requirements of sections 27-5-103 and 8-21-401 as well as the lack of a transcript or\nstatement of the evidence to aid in identifying the issues raised below, we decline to consider the issue\nwaived.\n\n -4-\n\fof section 27-5-103; and 2) payment of an appeal filing fee does not satisfy the jurisdictional\nrequirements of section 27-5-103.\n\n At the outset, we reject Appellants’ argument that the terms “appeal filing fee” and\n“appeal bond” are synonymous. An “appeal bond” is “[a] bond that an appellate court may\nrequire from an appellant in a civil case to ensure payment of the costs of appeal.” Black’s\nLaw Dictionary (9th ed. 2009). A “filing fee,” however, is “[a] sum of money required to\nbe paid to the court clerk before a proceeding can start.” Black’s Law Dictionary (9 th ed.\n2009). As conceded by Appellants during oral argument before this Court, the costs of an\nappeal could exceed the $211.50 appeal filing fee. Thus, an appeal bond is necessary to\nensure payment of costs beyond $211.50.\n\n Similarly, we reject Appellants’ contention that section 27-5-103 failed to “hereinafter\nprovide[]” a definition for the requirement of a “bond with good security[,]” and therefore,\nthat we must look to section 8-21-401 to determine what is meant by such phrase. Section\n27-5-103(a) states that an appellant “shall give bond with good security, as hereinafter\nprovided, for the costs of the appeal . . . .” The immediately following subsection provides\nthat “[a]n appeal bond . . . shall be considered sufficient if it secures the cost of the cause on\nappeal.” The requirements of a “bond with good security” could not be more clear: an appeal\nbond which secures all costs incurred throughout the appeal, as opposed to an initial appeal\nfiling fee, is required.\n\n Because we find sections 8-21-401 and 27-5-103 complementary, we, likewise, find\nno merit in Appellants’ claim that section 8-21-401 repealed section 27-5-103 by implication.\nSee Hayes v. Gibson County, 288 S.W.3d 334, 337 (Tenn. 2009) (quoting Cronin v. Howe,\n906 S.W.2d 910, 912 (Tenn. 1995)) (“Repeals by implication . . . are disfavored in\nTennessee, and . . . ‘will be recognized only when no fair and reasonable construction will\npermit the statutes to stand together.’”). Title 27 Chapter 5 of the Tennessee Code governs\nthe perfection of appeals from the decisions of Municipal Officers and General Sessions\nCourts. As stated above, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 27-5-108(a)(1), a\nGeneral Sessions Court decision may be appealed to the Circuit Court as of right within ten\ndays “on complying with the provisions of [chapter 5.]” Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-5-108(a)(1).\nChapter 5 further provides, in section 27-5-103, that “[b]efore the appeal is granted, the\nperson appealing shall give bond with good security . . . for the costs of the appeal, or take\nthe oath for poor persons.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-5-103(a) (emphasis added); see also\nSturgis v. Thompson, --- S.W.3d ----, No. W2010-02024-COA-R3-CV, 2011 WL 2416066,\nat *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 13, 2011) perm. app. denied (Tenn. Sept. 21, 2011) (“A de novo\nappeal to circuit court is perfected only after both the notice of appeal and the appeal bond\nor affidavit of indigency has been filed.”) (citations omitted).\n\n\n -5-\n\f In contrast, section 8-21-401 does not address jurisdictional prerequisites, but instead\nit merely sets forth a schedule of “[f]ees for particular services.” In fact, the preamble of the\n2005 amendment states that a committee was formed to “examine court costs and fees in all\nTennessee Courts and [to] make recommendations . . . regarding uniformity, simplification\nand appropriateness of fees” and that the committee completed its study and presented its\nrecommendations in a proposal designed to “substantially simplify the administration of court\ncosts and fees while providing for greater uniformity and fairness of costs[.]” 2005 Pub.\nActs. c. 429.\n\n Moreover, a close examination of the section 8-21-401 language relied upon by\nAppellants further refutes their contention that sections 27-5-103 and 8-21-401 set forth\ndifferent requirements for perfecting an appeal from General Sessions Court to Circuit Court.\nAgain, section 8-21-401 states in relevant part that\n\n If a party, other than a party who initiated a proceeding under a pauper’s oath,\n pays costs at the time the services are requested, such payment shall be deemed\n to satisfy the requirement for security to be given for costs, pursuant to § 20-\n 12-120.\n\nTenn. Code Ann. § 8-21-401(a) (emphasis added). Section 20-12-120, however, does not\nin any way address the requirements for perfecting an appeal from the General Sessions\nCourt to the Circuit Court. Rather, section 20-12-120 provides that\n No leading process shall issue from any court without security being given by\n the party at whose instance the action is brought for the successful prosecution\n of the party’s action, and, in case of failure, for the payment of court costs and\n taxes that may be awarded against the party, unless in cases and instances\n specially excepted.\n\nTenn. Code Ann. § 20-12-120 (emphasis added). By its terms, section 8-21-401 provides\nonly that the payment of certain “costs” will satisfy the “security” requirement to allow the\nissuance of leading process. Section 8-21-401 does not repeal or otherwise modify the\nrequirements of section 27-5-103.\n\n\n B. Appeal Bond is Not a Formality\n\n Having determined that payment of the appeal filing fee does not satisfy the\njurisdictional requirements of section 27-5-103, we must now consider Appellants’ argument\nthat their failure to file an appeal bond should be excused pursuant to Tennessee Code\nAnnotated section 16-15-729, which provides that “No civil case, originating in a general\n\n -6-\n\fsessions court and carried to a higher court, shall be dismissed by such court for any\ninformality whatever, but shall be tried on its merits[.]” Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-15-729.\n\n Appellants label their failure to file an appeal bond as a “procedural deficienc[y]” for\nwhich they claim dismissal is inappropriate. Moreover, they maintain that the requirements\nof section 27-5-103 are ambiguous, and therefore, that any ambiguity must be construed “in\nfavor of jurisdiction with the Circuit Court.” As stated above, we disagree with Appellants’\nassertion that “bond with good security” is not sufficiently defined by section 27-5-103.\nMoreover, this Court has previously determined that “[t]he requirement of a bond in order\nto perfect an appeal from an inferior court to the circuit court is not a formality. The appeal\nis not perfected without it.” City of Red Boiling Springs. v. Whitley, 777 S.W.2d 706, 708\n(Tenn. Ct. App. 1989) (citation omitted). Appellants attempt to distinguish City of Red\nBoiling Springs by noting that it involved an appeal bond filed in the wrong court and they\nargue that in the instant case “the appeal bond was not only paid within ten (10) days of the\njudgment, it was paid to the [correct court].” Despite their creative interchange of terms,\nhowever, no timely appeal bond was filed in this case at all and we decline to characterize\nsuch error as an “informality.”\n\n In conclusion, we hold that perfection of a de novo appeal to Circuit Court requires\nthe timely filing of a notice of appeal and the timely filing of either an appeal bond or an\naffidavit of indigency. Tenn. Code Ann. §27-5-103; see also Sturgis, 2011 WL 2416066,\nat *2 (citations omitted). Payment of the appeal filing fee does not satisfy the appeal bond\nrequirement. Because Appellants failed to timely file an appeal bond or an affidavit of\nindigency, the Circuit Court never acquired subject matter jurisdiction and, therefore, it\nproperly dismissed the case as to all Appellants.6\n\n\n\n\n 6\n In its brief to this Court, Appellant/Third-Party Defendant Top Gun Body Shop argues that the trial\ncourt erred in dismissing its appeal because Ms. Jacob’s “Motion to Dismiss for Failure to File an Appeal\nBond” sought dismissal of “Defendants’ appeal” without specific reference to “Third-Party Defendants.”\n(Br. 6) Appellant Top Gun Body Shop, however, failed to raise this issue in its Statement of Issues\nPresented for Review to this Court. See Petty v. City of White House, No. M2008-02453-COA-R3-CV, 2009\nWL 2767140, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2009) (citations omitted). Moreover, any failure by Ms. Jacob\nto specifically seek dismissal of the Third-Party Defendant is not fatal because the issue of subject matter\njurisdiction may be raised at any time. Freeman v. CSX Transp., Inc., 359 S.W.3d 171, 176 (Tenn. Ct. App.\n2010 (quoting Scales v. Winston, 760 S.W.2d 952, 953 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988)).\n\n -7-\n\f V. C ONCLUSION\n\n For the aforementioned reasons, we affirm the decision of the Circuit Court. Costs\nof this appeal are taxed to Appellants, Alexis Partee, Tom Bedell, Jr., and Top Gun Body\nShop, and their sureties, for which execution may issue if necessary.\n\n\n _________________________________\n ALAN E. HIGHERS, P.J., W.S.\n\n\n\n\n -8-\n\f", "ocr": false, "opinion_id": 1046267 } ]
Court of Appeals of Tennessee
Court of Appeals of Tennessee
SA
Tennessee, TN
1,046,274
Judge James Curwood Witt, Jr.
2012-08-10
false
michael-scott-farner-v-david-sexton-warden
null
Michael Scott Farner v. David Sexton, Warden
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
0
Published
null
null
null
[ { "author_str": null, "per_curiam": false, "type": "010combined", "page_count": 3, "download_url": "http://www.tsc.state.tn.us/sites/default/files/farnermichaelscottopn.pdf", "author_id": 8295, "opinion_text": " IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE\n AT KNOXVILLE\n Assigned on Briefs July 25, 2012\n\n MICHAEL SCOTT FARNER v. DAVID SEXTON, WARDEN and STATE\n OF TENNESSEE\n\n Appeal from the Circuit Court for Johnson County\n No. 5805 Lynn W. Brown, Judge\n\n\n\n\n No. E2011-01636-CCA-R3-HC - Filed August 10, 2012\n\n\nThe petitioner, Michael Scott Farner, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ\nof habeas corpus, claiming that his 1988 guilty-pleaded convictions of second degree murder,\nassault with intent to commit first degree murder, and second degree burglary are void\nbecause his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered and because his\nsentences are illegal. Because we perceive no error in the dismissal of the petition for writ\nof habeas corpus, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.\n\n Tenn. R. App. P. 3; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed\n\nJ AMES C URWOOD W ITT, J R., J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which R OBERT W.\nW EDEMEYER and R OGER A. P AGE, JJ., joined.\n\nMichael Scott Farner, Mountain City, Tennessee, pro se.\n\nRobert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney General and Reporter; and Cameron L. Hyder, Assistant\nAttorney General, for the appellees, David Sexton, Warden, and State of Tennessee.\n\n OPINION\n\n In 1988, the petitioner pleaded guilty in the Polk County Circuit Court to\nsecond degree murder, assault with intent to commit first degree murder, and second degree\nburglary, and the trial court imposed a total effective sentence of 72 years’ incarceration. See\nState v. Michael Scott Farner, No. 03C01-9705-CR-00166, slip op. at 2 (Tenn. Crim. App.,\nKnoxville, Sept. 15, 1998), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Mar. 22, 1999). This court affirmed\nthe lengths of the individual sentences as well as the imposition of consecutive sentences in\na delayed direct appeal. See id., slip op. at 9, 11.\n\f The petitioner filed the petition for writ of habeas corpus that is the issue of this\nappeal, his first bid at the state writ, on January 26, 2011. In that petition, he claimed that\nhis judgments were void because his mental and physical handicaps prevented him from\nknowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entering pleas of guilty.\n\n On February 11, 2011, the State filed a motion to dismiss the petition for writ\nof habeas corpus on the basis of the petitioner’s failure to satisfy the procedural requirements\nfor the filing of a petition for writ of habeas corpus and his failure to state a cognizable claim\nfor habeas corpus relief. The trial court granted the State’s motion on July 15, 2011, and\ndismissed the petition for writ of habeas corpus on grounds that the petition failed to allege\ngrounds that would support a finding that the petitioner’s conviction was void or that his\nsentence was illegal.\n\n In this appeal, the defendant again asserts that his judgments are void because\nhis guilty pleas were not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered. Citing his\nsignificant physical and mental handicaps, the petitioner, via his inmate helper, claims that\nhe lacked the mental capacity to enter the pleas and that, therefore, both the convictions and\nthe accompanying sentences are void.\n\n “The determination of whether habeas corpus relief should be granted is a\nquestion of law.” Faulkner v. State, 226 S.W.3d 358, 361 (Tenn. 2007) (citing Hart v. State,\n21 S.W.3d 901, 903 (Tenn. 2000)). Our review of the habeas corpus court’s decision is,\ntherefore, “de novo with no presumption of correctness afforded to the [habeas corpus]\ncourt.” Id. (citing Killingsworth v. Ted Russell Ford, Inc., 205 S.W.3d 406, 408 (Tenn.\n2006)).\n\n The writ of habeas corpus is constitutionally guaranteed, see U.S. Const. art.\n1, § 9, cl. 2; Tenn. Const. art. I, § 15, but has been regulated by statute for more than a\ncentury, see Ussery v. Avery, 432 S.W.2d 656, 657 (Tenn. 1968). Tennessee Code Annotated\nsection 29-21-101 provides that “[a]ny person imprisoned or restrained of liberty, under any\npretense whatsoever, except in cases specified in § 29-21-102, may prosecute a writ of\nhabeas corpus, to inquire into the cause of such imprisonment and restraint.” T.C.A. §\n29-21-101 (2006). Despite the broad wording of the statute, a writ of habeas corpus may be\ngranted only when the petitioner has established a lack of jurisdiction for the order of\nconfinement or that he is otherwise entitled to immediate release because of the expiration\nof his sentence. See Ussery, 432 S.W.2d at 658; State v. Galloway, 45 Tenn. (5 Cold.) 326\n(1868). The purpose of the state habeas corpus petition is to contest a void, not merely a\nvoidable, judgment. State ex rel. Newsom v. Henderson, 424 S.W.2d 186, 189 (Tenn. 1968).\nA void conviction is one which strikes at the jurisdictional integrity of the trial court. Archer\nv. State, 851 S.W.2d 157, 164 (Tenn. 1993); see State ex rel. Anglin v. Mitchell, 575 S.W.2d\n\n -2-\n\f284, 287 (Tenn. 1979); Passarella v. State, 891 S.W.2d 619, 627 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994).\n\n Although we are sympathetic to the defendant’s very significant mental and\nphysical impairments,1 he has failed to state a cognizable ground for habeas corpus relief.\nProof that the petitioner’s pleas were not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered,\nfor whatever reason, would render the judgment voidable rather than void. See Archer, 851\nS.W.2d at 163-64; Passarella, 891 S.W.2d at 627; see also Summers, 212 S.W.3d at 255-56,\n258.\n\n Accordingly, the judgment of the habeas corpus court is affirmed.\n\n _________________________________\n JAMES CURWOOD WITT, JR., JUDGE\n\n\n\n\n 1\n The petitioner “suffers from both physical and mental handicaps in that since birth he has been\nunable to hear or speak. His intelligence level is only slightly above mental retardation, and he is\nfunctionally illiterate. . . . [A]s a youth, [the petitioner] suffered severe physical abuse at the hands of his\ngrandparents.” Michael Scott Farner, slip op. at 3.\n\n -3-\n\f", "ocr": false, "opinion_id": 1046274 } ]
Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee
Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee
SA
Tennessee, TN
690,764
null
1995-02-23
false
robert-lee-emery-jr-v-b-merkel-warden-attorney-gen
null
Robert Lee Emery, Jr. v. B. Merkel, Warden Attorney General of the State of California
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
0
Published
null
null
[ "48 F.3d 1227" ]
[ { "author_str": null, "per_curiam": false, "type": "010combined", "page_count": null, "download_url": "http://bulk.resource.org/courts.gov/c/F3/48/48.F3d.1227.94-16785.html", "author_id": null, "opinion_text": "48 F.3d 1227NOTICE: Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3 provides that dispositions other than opinions or orders designated for publication are not precedential and should not be cited except when relevant under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.\n Robert Lee EMERY, Jr., Petitioner-Appellant,v.B. MERKEL, Warden; Attorney General of the State ofCalifornia, Respondents-Appellees.\n No. 94-16785.\n United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.\n Submitted Feb. 15, 1995.*Decided Feb. 23, 1995.\n \n Before: SCHROEDER, CANBY, and LEAVY, Circuit Judges.\n \n \n 1\n MEMORANDUM**\n \n \n 2\n Robert L. Emery Jr., a California state prisoner, appeals pro se the district court's denial of his 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254 habeas corpus petition challenging his conviction for burglary, robbery, and false imprisonment. Emery contends that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2253. We review de novo the district court's denial of a habeas corpus petition. Hendricks v. Zenon, 993 F.2d 664, 668 (9th Cir.1993). We affirm.\n \n \n 3\n Emery contends that the government failed to present sufficient evidence to sustain his conviction because it was based solely on fingerprint evidence. Specifically, he contends that reliance on this evidence alone to identify him as the person who committed the offense violates his right to due process. This contention lacks merit.\n \n \n 4\n A state court conviction will be sustained if, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Wright v. West, 112 S.Ct. 2482, 2492 (1992); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979).\n \n \n 5\n Fingerprint evidence alone may support a conviction under certain circumstances. Mikes v. Borg, 947 F.2d 353, 356 (9th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 3055 (1992). \"[When] the prosecution's theory is based on the premise that the defendant handled certain objects while committing the crime in question, the record must contain sufficient evidence from which the trier of fact could reasonably infer that the fingerprints were in fact impressed at that time and not at some earlier date.\" Id. at 356-57 (citations omitted); accord Taylor v. Stainer, 31 F.3d 907, 909 (9th Cir.1994).\n \n \n 6\n Here, the government presented sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that Emery was the intruder who broke into Mary Serr's home on September 9, 1991, tied her up, robbed and assaulted her. Ms. Serr testified that she was unable to identify her assailant because he had tied a shirt around her face and she could not see him. Because Ms. Serr was also unable to identify Emery's voice in a voice identification lineup, the government relied largely on fingerprint evidence to link Emery to the offense.\n \n \n 7\n Deputy Sheriff Edward Viohl testified that he found a latent palm print matching Emery's on the windowsill which police determined was the intruder's point of entry. Viohl testified that this print was facing inside the house, and that the smudges around the knuckle area were consistent with someone pushing down with their weight. In addition, Viohl identified trace amounts of fabric on the windowsill which would suggest that the person's clothing brushed against the sill while climbing in the window. Ms. Serr testified that she did not know Emery and that she had never invited him to come into her home. Ms. Serr further testified that her cleaning lady, who regularly dusts her windowsills, had cleaned her house two days before the incident.\n \n \n 8\n It is \"virtually inconceivable\" that Emery left his print on Ms. Serr's windowsill on an occasion other than the assault for which he was convicted. See Taylor, 31 F.3d at 910. Therefore, evidence of Emery's palm print on the windowsill through which the intruder gained entrance, and for which no innocent explanation was offered, is sufficient to support Emery's conviction. See id. at 909-910 (sufficient evidence where defendant's fingerprints were found on the inside of the victim's windowsill and defendant presented no evidence that he had occasion to innocently touch it in the past); cf. Mikes v. Borg, 947 F.2d at 358-59 (where weapon was kept in an accessible public place, the government could not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant left fingerprints on it while committing the offense).\n \n \n 9\n Thus, Emery's palm print on the windowsill was sufficient to allow a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Emery was the assailant. See Taylor, 31 F.3d at 910. Accordingly, Emery's convictions for robbery, burglary and false imprisonment are supported by the evidence. See id.\n \n \n 10\n AFFIRMED.\n \n \n \n *\n The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. Fed.R.App.P. 34(a); 9th Cir.R. 34-4\n \n \n **\n This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by 9th Cir.R. 36-3\n \n \n ", "ocr": false, "opinion_id": 690764 } ]
Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
F
USA, Federal
1,046,538
Presiding Judge Herschel P. Franks
2012-06-21
false
city-of-chattanooga-tennessee-v-hargreaves-associa
null
City of Chattanooga, Tennessee v. Hargreaves Associates, Inc. - Dissenting
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Published
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[ { "author_str": null, "per_curiam": false, "type": "010combined", "page_count": 5, "download_url": "http://www.tsc.state.tn.us/sites/default/files/cityofchattdiss.pdf", "author_id": 8271, "opinion_text": " IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE\n AT KNOXVILLE\n January 31, 2012 Session\n\n CITY OF CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE, et al., v. HARGREAVES\n ASSOCIATES, INC., et al.\n\n Appeal from the Circuit Court for Hamilton County\n No. 09C403 Jacqueline S. Bolton, Judge\n\n\n No. E2011-01197-COA-R3-CV-FILED-JUNE 21, 2012\n\n\n\n\n DISSENTING OPINION\n\n\n I respectfully dissent from the majority's Opinion affirming the Trial Court's granting\nof summary judgments to all defendants. In my view, the record in this case does not\ndemonstrate that this case is ripe for summary judgment.\n\n Regarding the claims against River City, the City of Chattanooga/CDRC alleged that:\n\n (a) River City was contractually obligated to oversee the waterfront project and\n was to provide monthly reports regarding same, including any change orders,\n to the City;\n\n B) River City breached the contract by failing to schedule construction meetings,\n failing to provide monthly reports to the City, and failing to obtain City\n approval before approving changes to the design (specifically substitution of\n mortar and use of fixtures in reflective pools not consistent with the plans);\n\n C) River City acted in excess of its authority; and\n\n D) the City was damaged thereby.\n\n River City filed an Answer, asserting that it kept the City informed regarding the\nconstruction progress and changes, and that all reporting requirements were met/exceeded.\n\f Hargreaves (architect) filed the first Motion for Summary Judgment, and filed a\nStatement of Undisputed Facts, asserting that Hargreaves reported numerous\nconstruction/design problems to River City from October 2004 through June 2005.\nHargreaves filed an affidavit of its employee, Gavin McMillan, who stated that he was the\nprincipal in charge of this project, and that he communicated extensively with River City\nregarding the problems Hargreaves encountered. McMillan stated that he sent numerous\nmemos and emails to all the parties involved, including River City, and attached copies of\nthose communications. One communication which was relied upon heavily by both the Trial\nCourt and the majority, was a memo dated 7/30/05 from McMillan to “DEW” which states\nthat McMillan got a call from Dan Kral (of River City) on the prior day which he\ncharacterizes as a “call for help”, stating that Kral relayed that the fountain was “falling apart\nto the point of being inoperable”. There is no actual email or written documentation in the\nrecord regarding this alleged conversation other than this memo, which was not to or from\nanyone at River City.\n\n The other communication which is relied upon by the defendants and the majority\nopinion in this case to establish notice is a string of emails that were sent in May 2005,\nbetween Lee Norris, a director with the Chattanooga City Department of Public Works, and\nDan Kral with River City. Norris asked who was responsible for construction defects, stating\nthat he had walked the waterfront recently and noticed 6-7 issues that needed to be corrected.\nNorris later explained in his Affidavit that this memo only concerned minor cosmetic issues\nthat he noticed, and that he had neither the responsibility nor expertise to identify latent\nconstruction defects, and further that the City had no notice of any actual construction defects\nuntil July 2007.\n\n The City filed a Response to the Motion for Summary Judgment and the Statement\nof Undisputed Facts, and stated the City knew of no construction defects until July 2007.\nThe City filed an Affidavit of Don Lewis, who stated that he was General Supervisor with\nthe Parks and Recreation Department of Chattanooga, and that his department took over\nmanagement of the project after substantial completion in 2005. Lewis stated that they had\nno notice of any material issue with the construction of the project until spring 2007\n(although there was some minor issue with niche lighting noted in 2005). The City also filed\nan Affidavit of Bob Saylors, Director of the Parks and Recreation Department, who also said\nthat the City had no notice of material issues in connection with the design/construction of\nthe project until the spring of 2007. Further, the City filed an Affidavit of Steve Leach, who\nstated that he was Administrator of the City of Chattanooga Public Works Department, and\nthat electrical issues with the Passage were discovered on July 19, 2007, and that prior to this\ndate, the City nor CDRC had any knowledge of any construction or design defects with the\nProject. Leach stated that these issues caused the City to hire TWH Architects to review the\nproject and identify any problems, and that TWH issued its report detailing the\n\n -2-\n\fconstruction/design defects in July 2008.\n\n The City also filed a copy of a letter it received in discovery documents that is dated\nAugust 9, 2007, and is addressed to Gavin McMillan with Hargreaves, from Paul Brock with\nRiver City. This letter states that River City is disappointed with Hargreaves’ response to\nissues with the Passage wall, and that a public safety issue had developed after one of the\nmasonry units from the wall had fallen the prior weekend. Brock states “It has been almost\na year since you came to Chattanooga to advise us regarding the wall and the problems it is\nexperiencing”, and further alleges that Hargreaves did not properly inform River City of the\ndesign modifications made during construction and the potential consequences thereof.\n\n River City filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on its own behalf, as did all the\ndefendants, but River City filed no supporting documentation. Plaintiffs assert that Dan Kral\nof River City was scheduled to be deposed as were many other actors in this project, but\nsummary judgment was granted before depositions took place.\n\n The Trial Court ruled that River City had notice of construction defects as of the July\n29, 2005, “call for help” allegedly made by Dan Kral of River City, and thus that the City had\nnotice as of that date, rendering the Complaint filed in March of 2009 untimely under the\nthree year statute of limitations. The Trial Court then granted summary judgment to all\ndefendants, including River City. The majority opinion affirms that ruling.\n\n First and foremost, it is important to note the City’s claims against River City were\ncompletely different than the claims against the other defendants. The City alleged claims\nof breach of contract and acting outside the proper scope of authority, asserting that River\nCity failed to keep the City informed regarding design/construction changes and problems\non this Project, and further that River City approved changes to the design without City\napproval. These claims are not claims of injury to real property, as were the claims against\nthe other defendants. Rather, these are strictly breach of contract claims which are subject\nto a six year statute of limitations rather than a three year statute of limitations. See Tenn.\nCode Ann. §28-3-105 and 109. As such, the claims filed in March 2009 against River City\nwere timely, and River City was not entitled to a summary judgment. Moreover, as agent of\nthe City it had a fiduciary duty to the City.\n\n Regarding the other defendants, however, the statute of limitations is a three year\nperiod which accrues upon discovery, i.e., when the plaintiff has information that would\nplace a reasonable person on inquiry notice that he may have a cause of action, as the\nmajority opinion correctly explained. The problem in this case is that there is a dispute\nregarding when plaintiffs actually had such information. As stated earlier, Gavin McMillan\nof Hargreaves asserted that he reported numerous problems to River City during the project,\n\n -3-\n\fand that after the project was completed, he received a call on July 29, 2005, from Dan Kral,\nwhich he characterized as a “call for help” because the fountain was “falling apart”. While\nthe fountain was only a part of the entire project, this could still be considered constructive\nnotice that there were defects requiring further inquiry. The problem is that this is evidence\nset forth by a defendant, and on a summary judgment motion, it is the evidence of the\nplaintiff or non-movant that is to be accepted as true, with any doubts concerning the\nexistence of a genuine issue of material fact being resolving in the non-moving party’s favor.\nMartin v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 271 S.W.3d 76 (Tenn. 2008).\n\n In contrast, the plaintiffs filed at least three affidavits from City employees who\ninsisted that the City was unaware of any design/construction defects until at least the spring\nof 2007. All of these City employees stated that while they might have seen a few minor\ncosmetic-type defects before that time, they were unaware of any major defects until 2007,\nand that they didn’t know the extent of the defects until TWH issued its report in 2008.\nFurther, the City filed a letter that was sent from River City to Hargreaves in 2007, which\nimpliedly asserts that River City knew of no problems until summer of 2006. Accepting even\nthe earliest of these dates as the true date of “discovery” of the construction defects, the\nComplaint filed in March 2009 would be timely as to all defendants.\n\n This is a classic example of a genuine issue of material fact regarding the date of\ndiscovery which should preclude summary judgment. Establishment of the date of discovery\nis crucial to determining whether the statute of limitations would bar plaintiffs’ claims. The\nTrial Court and the majority opinion both rely upon the July 29, 2005, “call for help” as\nestablishing the date of discovery, when there is countervailing proof filed by the non-\nmoving party on this issue.\n\n Further, even if defendant’s proof could/should be accepted as true, the City has\nalleged that it is error to impute the knowledge of River City to the City, even though River\nCity was clearly the City’s agent, because River City allegedly exceeded its scope of\nauthority.\n\n In order to determine whether the knowledge of the agent may be imputed to the\nprincipal, it is of “primary importance to ascertain the exact scope and extent of the agency.”\nHurst Boillin Co. v. S.S. Jones & Co., 279 S.W. 392 (Tenn. 1925). These questions are to\nbe “determined by the trier of fact from all the facts and circumstances in evidence.” Sloan\nv. Hall, 673 S.W.2d 548 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984). Moreover, as appellants point out, there is\ncase law which holds that the doctrine of apparent authority is modified to accommodate the\npublic interest when a private party deals with a municipal corporation. Faust v. Metro.\nGov’t of Nashville, 206 S.W.3d 475 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006). In that case, this Court stated,\n“Although a private agent, acting in violation of specific instructions, yet within the scope\n\n -4-\n\fof a general authority, may bind his principal, the rule, as to the effect of a like act of a public\nagent, is otherwise.” Id. In this case, there was no determination made regarding the scope\nand extent of River City’s agency by the Trial Court.\n\n Summary judgment was improperly granted in this case based upon the evidence\npresented. Plaintiffs’ breach of contract claims against River City were not considered by\nthe Trial Court, and plaintiff’s affidavits and proof presented at the summary judgment stage\nwere not taken as true, in violation of proper summary judgment standards. There was\nclearly a genuine issue of material fact regarding when plaintiffs discovered their claims. As\nsuch, the Trial Court’s grant of summary judgment should be reversed, and the cause\nremanded for further proceedings.\n\n\n\n\n _________________________________\n HERSCHEL PICKENS FRANKS, P.J.\n\n\n\n\n -5-\n\f", "ocr": false, "opinion_id": 1046538 } ]
Court of Appeals of Tennessee
Court of Appeals of Tennessee
SA
Tennessee, TN
1,047,088
Judge Andy D. Bennett
2012-02-08
false
in-re-estate-of-reginald-boya-demonbreun
In Re Estate of Reginald Boya Demonbreun
In Re Estate of Reginald Boya Demonbreun
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null
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0
Published
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[ { "author_str": null, "per_curiam": false, "type": "010combined", "page_count": 3, "download_url": "http://www.tsc.state.tn.us/sites/default/files/demonbreunestateopn.pdf", "author_id": null, "opinion_text": " IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE\n AT NASHVILLE\n January 26, 2012 Session\n\n IN RE ESTATE OF REGINALD BOYA DEMONBREUN\n\n Appeal from the Probate Court for Davidson County\n No. 09P1695 David Randall Kennedy, Judge\n\n\n No. M2011-00161-COA-R3-CV - Filed February 8, 2012\n\n\nPersonal representative appeals from order granting $27,900 claim against decedent’s estate.\nDiscerning no error, we affirm.\n\n Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Probate Court Affirmed\n\nA NDY D. B ENNETT, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which F RANK G. C LEMENT, J R.\nand R ICHARD H. D INKINS, JJ., joined.\n\nMark Edward Chapman and Sullivan F. Marsden, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellant,\nLarry C. Demonbreun.\n\nGregory M. Galloway, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Claude Peters.\n\n MEMORANDUM OPINION 1\n\n The appellant, Larry C. Demonbreun (“Mr. Demonbreun”), is the brother and personal\nrepresentative of Reginald Boya Demonbreun (“decedent”). The decedent died unmarried\nand intestate on September 26, 2009. He had neither living children nor deceased children\nwith living issue. Together, the decedent and the appellee, Claude Peters (“Mr. Peters”), had\npurchased property at 2119 Courtney Avenue, Nashville, Tennessee, which was the\ndecedent’s residence at the time of death. On September 3, 2009, Mr. Peters quit claimed\nhis half of the property (worth $35,000) to the decedent. The note memorializing this\n\n\n 1\n This Court, with the concurrence of all judges participating in the case, may affirm, reverse or\nmodify the actions of the trial court by memorandum opinion when a formal opinion would have no\nprecedential value. When a case is decided by memorandum opinion, it shall be designated\n“MEMORANDUM OPINION,” shall not be published, and shall not be cited or relied on for any reason in\nany unrelated case. Tenn. R. Ct. App. 10.\n\fpurchase is dated September 14, 2009, is signed by Mr. Peters (seller) and the decedent\n(buyer), and states that the decedent will pay $600 each month until the balance ($27,900)\nis paid in full.\n\n Mr. Peters filed a $27,900 claim for the unpaid balance against the decedent’s estate\non November 25, 2009, but could not produce the original promissory note. Instead, he\nproduced a photocopy of the original promissory note. Mr. Demonbreun filed an exception\nto Mr. Peters’s claim on March 24, 2010. At the October 13, 2010 hearing, Mr. Demonbreun\nargued that, based on the markings that resemble the top portion of a notary seal below the\nsignature line, the decedent’s signature was photocopied onto the photocopy presented to the\ncourt. The original promissory note was not notarized. Mr. Peters has no explanation as to\nwhy there are markings below the signature line on the copy of the promissory note. In\naddition to Mr. Peters, two witnesses testified that they saw Mr. Peters and the decedent\nexecute the promissory note in question. By order entered December 3, 2010, the probate\ncourt granted Mr. Peters’s $27,900 claim against the decedent’s estate, finding that the\nphotocopy of the promissory note was admissible pursuant to Tenn. R. Evid. 1004(1).2\n\n On appeal, Mr. Demonbreun argues that because he raised a genuine question as to\nthe promissory note’s authenticity, the best evidence rule should have barred its admission.\n\n S TANDARD OF R EVIEW\n\n Our review of the trial court’s findings of fact is de novo with a presumption of\ncorrectness unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d).\nWe review questions of law de novo with no presumption of correctness. Nelson v. Wal-\nMart Stores, Inc., 8 S.W.3d 625, 628 (Tenn. 1999).\n\n The admissibility of evidence is within the trial court’s sound discretion, and we\nreview the trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence by an abuse of discretion\nstandard. Mercer v. Vanderbilt Univ., Inc., 134 S.W.3d 121, 131 (Tenn. 2004); Otis v.\nCambridge Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 850 S.W.2d 439, 442 (Tenn. 1992). Under the abuse of\ndiscretion standard, a reviewing court cannot substitute its judgment for the trial court’s\njudgment. Wright ex rel. Wright v. Wright, 337 S.W.3d 166, 176 (Tenn. 2011). Rather, a\nreviewing court will find an abuse of discretion only if the trial court “applied incorrect legal\nstandards, reached an illogical conclusion, based its decision on a clearly erroneous\nassessment of the evidence, or employ[ed] reasoning that causes an injustice to the\n\n\n 2\n Tenn. R. Evid. 1004(1) provides in relevant part that: “The original is not required, and other evidence of a\nwriting, recording, or photograph is admissible if: (1) All originals are lost or destroyed, unless the proponent lost or\ndestroyed them in bad faith . . . .”\n\n -2-\n\fcomplaining party.” Konvalinka v. Chattanooga-Hamilton Cnty. Hosp. Auth., 249 S.W.3d\n346, 358 (Tenn. 2008); see also Lee Med., Inc. v. Beecher, 312 S.W.3d 515, 524 (Tenn.\n2010).\n\n A NALYSIS\n\n After a full hearing in which four witnesses including Mr. Peters testified, the probate\ncourt found that “[Mr. Peters’] testimony is sufficient although not overwhelming that the\noriginal instrument that he had was lost.” The probate court thus admitted the photocopy of\nthe promissory note in support of Mr. Peters’s claim against the decedent’s estate.\nFurthermore, the court noted that there was no testimony presented that the signature on the\nphotocopy of the promissory note was not the decedent’s signature. We have carefully\nreviewed the record, and given the probate court’s unique position to assess the evidence and\nthe credibility of the witnesses, we conclude that the evidence does not preponderate against\nthe probate court’s decision and that the court did not abuse its discretion in admitting a\nphotocopy of the promissory note.\n\n Costs of appeal are assessed against Larry C. Demonbreun, the appellant.\n\n\n ______________________________\n ANDY D. BENNETT, JUDGE\n\n\n\n\n -3-\n\f", "ocr": false, "opinion_id": 1047088 } ]
Court of Appeals of Tennessee
Court of Appeals of Tennessee
SA
Tennessee, TN
1,047,104
Judge Jeffrey S. Bivins
2012-03-27
false
state-of-tennessee-v-antonio-sellers
null
State of Tennessee v. Antonio Sellers
null
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null
null
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0
Published
null
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[ { "author_str": null, "per_curiam": false, "type": "010combined", "page_count": 11, "download_url": "http://www.tsc.state.tn.us/sites/default/files/sellersaopn.pdf", "author_id": 8282, "opinion_text": " IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE\n AT JACKSON\n Assigned on Briefs December 6, 2011\n\n STATE OF TENNESSEE V. ANTONIO SELLERS\n\n Direct Appeal from the Criminal Court of Shelby County\n No. 09-04471 James M. Lammey, Jr., Judge\n\n\n No. W2011-00971-CCA-R3-CD - Filed March 27, 2012\n\n\nA jury convicted Antonio Sellers (“the Defendant”) of second degree murder. The trial court\nsubsequently sentenced the Defendant to twenty-three years of incarceration. In this appeal,\nthe Defendant challenges (1) the trial court’s ruling on an evidentiary issue regarding leading\nquestions on redirect examination and (2) the sufficiency of the evidence. Upon our\nthorough review of the record, we have determined that the Defendant is entitled to no relief\non the issues raised. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.\n\n Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment\n of the Criminal Court Affirmed\n\nJ EFFREY S. B IVINS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which N ORMA M CG EE O GLE and\nA LAN E. G LENN, JJ., joined.\n\nStephen C. Bush, Shelby County Public Defender, and Barry W. Kuhn, Assistant Shelby\nCounty Public Defender (on appeal); Jennifer Case and Nicholas Cloud, Assistant Shelby\nCounty Public Defenders (at trial), Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellant, Antonio Sellers.\n\nRobert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney General & Reporter; David H. Findley, Senior Counsel; Amy\nWeirich, District Attorney General; and Stacy McEndree, Assistant District Attorney\nGeneral; for the appellee, State of Tennessee.\n\n OPINION\n\n Factual and Procedural Background\n\n Charles Boswell, Jr., the victim in this case, was shot and killed on December 1, 2008,\nin Shelby County, Tennessee. Charles Boswell, Sr., the victim’s father, testified that the\nvictim was twenty-seven years old at the time of his death. The day before his death, the\n\fvictim told his father that his apartment had been broken into. Boswell told his son to move\nback home with him, and the victim began packing up his belongings.\n\n Fred Wilbourn testified that he lived in the same apartment complex as the victim.\nHe knew the victim from having worked together on some odd jobs. Their apartments were\nin adjacent buildings, both on the ground floor. After Wilbourn came home after work on\nDecember 1, 2008, he was taking a shower when he heard three shots. Wilbourn’s son then\ncame to him and told him that “Charles just got shot.” Wilbourn went to his front door and\nsaw the victim lying at Wilbourn’s doorstep. He said it took about 30 seconds to walk from\nhis bedroom to his door. Wilbourn called 911.\n\n Wilbourn explained that, in his apartment building, there was an exterior door in the\nbuilding itself, and inside this door were some steps that led to the upstairs apartments.\nWilbourn’s apartment shared a wall with the staircase. The victim was lying right outside\nthe interior door into Wilbourn’s apartment. The victim’s legs were lying across the doorway\nand his upper body was on the first two or three steps. The victim’s cousin from upstairs was\nholding the victim. The exterior door was closed and Wilbourn did not see anyone else. The\npolice arrived in about a minute and medical personnel arrived about a minute later.\n\n Thelma Issac testified that she lived in the same apartment complex as the victim.\nThey lived in nearby buildings. On the morning of December 1, 2008, she was having an\nargument with Kenneth Wallace in her apartment. She left her apartment and saw “two\nyoung men standing on the sidewalk.” She walked past them and heard them having a\nconversation but did not hear the words. She testified, “it wasn’t a pleasant conversation.”\nShe recognized one of the men as the victim. She recognized the other man as someone she\nhad occasionally seen at the complex. She did not see either man with a weapon and did not\nsee any physical contact between them.\n\n Wallace followed her out of the apartment. When Issac saw him near the two men,\nshe yelled at him “to move” because “he didn’t have anything to do with what was going on\nthere.” Wallace moved behind a building, and Issac heard gunshots. She hid in the hallway\nof another apartment building for two or three minutes. When she came out, she saw\nWallace in the area where the police were.\n\n Issac subsequently viewed a photographic array and identified the man she had seen\nstanding with the victim. On the array, she wrote, “This is the guy I saw arguing with\nCharles right before the shooting.” Issac also identified the Defendant at trial. On cross-\nexamination, Issac acknowledged that she did not see the shooting. She also acknowledged\nhaving told the police afterward that she had heard three gunshots. She described her\nemotional state after the incident as “hysterical.”\n\n\n -2-\n\f Kenneth Wallace testified that he visited Issac’s apartment frequently in 2008. He\nknew both the victim and the Defendant from having seen them around the complex on\nmultiple occasions. Wallace was at Issac’s apartment on the morning of December 1, 2008.\nThey argued and she “stormed out.” She walked about fifty yards away, and he walked after\nher. He noticed the Defendant “[k]ind of like walking behind” him. The Defendant was\nabout ten feet behind Wallace. Wallace stopped and was looking toward Issac, who had also\nstopped. He then saw the victim walking up from his left, and he saw the victim and the\nDefendant meet. Wallace testified:\n\n And the next thing I know is, I heard [the Defendant] tell the deceased\n – something to the effect, that “You don’t want none of that.” You know. At\n that point, Ms. Issac told me to get out of the way – not in those words; but,\n you know, she told me to move back. Okay. And when I did that, I kind of\n like ducked on the side of the building where I was standing at.\n\n And that’s when I heard gunshots.\n\n Wallace said that the men were about two and a half feet apart when he heard the\nDefendant speak to the victim. He did not see anything in their hands. He heard the\ngunshots after he ducked beside the building, so he did not see who fired the shots. He heard\nthe shots seconds after he ducked beside the building. Prior to his departure from the area\nof the confrontation, he did not see anyone else. He heard three shots. He then heard the\nvictim say “Help.”\n\n When he emerged from his hiding place, Wallace saw the victim at a stairway on the\ninside of one of the apartment buildings. The victim’s cousin was holding him. Wallace saw\nthe paramedics pick the victim up and put him in the ambulance. He did not see where the\nDefendant went.\n\n Wallace identified a photograph of the victim to the police. He also identified a\nphotograph of the Defendant from a photo array, writing “This is the shooter” below the\nDefendant’s photograph. He made this identification on the afternoon of the shooting.\nWallace also identified the Defendant at trial as the person he heard say, “You don’t want\nnone of this” to the victim. Wallace never saw either of the two men with a weapon. On\ncross-examination, Wallace acknowledged having told the police that he had seen the two\nmen getting into each other’s faces and squaring off.\n\n Christina Every testified that she was home in her upstairs apartment in the complex\nwhen she heard arguing. She went to her window and looked out. She saw the victim\narguing with a man she did not know. They were standing about a foot and a half apart. She\ndid not see anyone else. Although she did not see a weapon, she heard three gunshots and\n\n -3-\n\fsaw the victim get shot. The shooter ran and the victim ran into one of the buildings. Every\nexplained that the victim was trying to leave when the other man shot him. She was unable\nto make a positive identification when the police later showed her a photographic array\ncontaining the Defendant’s photograph. She, however, did identify the Defendant at trial as\nthe person she saw arguing with the victim. She also testified that the Defendant was “the\none [she] saw shooting Charles Boswell.” On redirect, Every explained that she had seen the\nmen bump shoulders prior to the shooting.\n\n Cedric Leach testified that he was living in an upstairs apartment in the complex at\nthe time. On December 1, 2008, he testified, he “s[aw] a man get shot and killed right in\nfront of” his apartment. He was inside his apartment with his girlfriend when she told him\nthat there were two men out front arguing. He looked out the window and saw “both of the\nyoung men standing face-to-face exchanging words. And one man pushed another, and\nanother man pulled out a gun and shot.” This was during the day and he had a clear view of\nthe event. The men were facing each other and two to three feet apart. The victim pushed\nthe other man with both hands. The other man, whom Leach identified at trial as the\nDefendant, pulled a gun and shot. Leach testified that the Defendant aimed at the victim’s\nchest. The Defendant then ran. Leach testified that he heard four to seven shots. The victim\nwas holding himself, screaming something, and managed to get into the stairwell. Leach saw\nno weapon in the victim’s hands. Leach spoke with the police later that day and identified\nthe Defendant from a photographic array. Under the Defendant’s photograph, Leach wrote,\n“This is the guy that shot a man in cold blood.” Leach testified that the detective suggested\nthe words “in cold blood.”\n\n On cross-examination, Leach acknowledged that, during the preliminary hearing, he\ntestified that the victim had “wanted to fight.” He also acknowledged that he had never seen\nthe Defendant before December 1, 2008. On redirect, he clarified that, during the\npreliminary hearing, he testified that both of the men he had observed had been looking for\na fight. He also recalled that he had seen Wallace at the side of the building. According to\nLeach, it did not appear as though Wallace was involved in the altercation.\n\n Markell Lee testified that he was living in the complex in December 2008. His\napartment was on the second floor. He was home on December 1. He testified that he was\ncousins by marriage with the victim and that they were “best friends.” The victim lived in\nthe apartment building behind the building that Lee lived in. On December 1, they “were\ntrying to move [the victim’s] stuff out [of] the house so he c[ould] . . . start all over.” Lee\nexplained that the victim was preparing to move back to his father’s house to save money.\nLee also stated that the victim’s apartment had been broken into.\n\n Lee and the victim got everything packed up by early afternoon and were waiting for\na friend of theirs who had a truck. Lee suggested that they go and wait in Lee’s apartment.\n\n -4-\n\fThe victim told Lee to go ahead and that he would join Lee in a few minutes. Lee left, went\nto his apartment, and dozed off for about twenty minutes. He then heard five or six gunshots,\nfired from close by. He heard the victim call his name three times. Lee jumped up and ran\noutside; he found the victim lying near the staircase downstairs and saw that the victim had\nbeen shot. He asked the victim who his assailant was, but the victim was unable to reply.\nHe stayed with the victim until the police and paramedics arrived. He did not see a weapon\non the victim.\n\n Officer Victor Lester of the Memphis Police Department testified that he responded\nto the scene at 1:34 p.m. and was the first officer there. He found the victim slumped over\non the stairs in a stairwell. He said the victim “had been shot and wasn’t breathing.”\n\n Bryan Lilly testified that he was a firefighter/paramedic for the City of Memphis. He\nresponded to the scene and examined the victim. He did not find a pulse and the victim was\nnot breathing. He and his partner loaded the victim into the ambulance and attempted\nresuscitation but were unsuccessful. They transported the victim to The Med.\n\n Wendy Seely, also a paramedic, worked with Lilly to resuscitate the victim. She\ntestified that the victim “didn’t respond to any of our drugs, any of our CPR, or any of our\nventilation.”\n\n Dr. Miguel Laboy, a forensic pathologist, testified that he performed the autopsy on\nthe victim on December 2, 2008. He opined that the cause of death was multiple gunshot\nwounds. He described one bullet wound that perforated the left chest in two places, but was\nunable to determine which was the entrance wound and which was the exit wound. There\nwas another bullet wound to the front right chest with no corresponding exit wound. The\nbullet that made this wound perforated the victim’s left lung and the right ventricle of the\nvictim’s heart. Dr. Laboy did not locate the bullet. There was also a bullet wound to the\nvictim’s left buttock that was an entrance wound. Dr. Laboy recovered the bullet that caused\nthis wound from the victim’s left groin. This bullet perforated the victim’s left illiac bone,\nthe psoas muscle, and caused tears to the victim’s sigmoid colon and small intestine. There\nwas an additional bullet wound to the victim’s right hand which Dr. Laboy described as “a\nsuperficial penetrating defect.” No bullet associated with this wound was recovered. Dr.\nLaboy testified that the bullet wound to the victim’s right chest was “a lethal injury.” Dr.\nLaboy also testified that the victim’s death was caused by multiple gunshot wounds, not the\nmedical intervention that ensued.1\n\n\n\n 1\n It appears that one of the defense theories was that the victim’s death resulted from the medical\ntreatment rendered after he was shot.\n\n -5-\n\f Sergeant Mundy Quinn of the Memphis Police Department homicide bureau testified\nthat he presented the photographic array to Leach. After Leach made the positive\nidentification, he told Leach “to circle the picture and to write a brief sentence as to what\nhappened.” He stated that the words on the photographic array were Leach’s.\n\n Patricia Turnmire of the Memphis Police Department crime-scene unit testified that\nshe responded to the scene. She and her partner, Officer Jones, took photographs and\ncollected evidence. They recovered seven nine-millimeter shell casings and one bullet\nfragment.\n\n Shelly Betts, Tennessee Bureau of Investigation Special Agent Forensic Scientist,\ntestified that she examined the seven fired nine-millimeter caliber cartridge cases recovered\nfrom the scene. She determined that all of the cartridge cases had been fired from the same\ngun. She also examined the bullet recovered from the victim’s body and testified that it was\nconsistent with bullets loaded into nine-millimeter cartridges.\n\n Deborah Carson of the Memphis Police Department homicide bureau testified that she\nwas the case coordinator. She obtained a warrant for the Defendant’s arrest on December\n9, 2008. He was not apprehended until the following March, however, and the parties\nstipulated as follows:\n\n On March 26, 2009, the [D]efendant . . . was located and arrested at a\n residence in Olive Branch, Mississippi by United States marshals from the\n Western District of Tennessee and Olive Branch Police Department officers\n on a Shelby County warrant for murder in the second degree. He was taken to\n the DeSoto County Jail where he was housed for four days. He waived\n extradition to Shelby County and was transported by Shelby County Sheriff\n deputies to the Shelby County Jail where he was booked in at 12:43 P.M. on\n March 30th, 2009.\n\nThe State rested after this proof.\n\n The defense offered proof through Ashley Callonas, a nurse who assisted in the\nvictim’s treatment at The Med, that the victim’s medical records indicated that the victim had\na gunshot wound to the left ventricle of his heart.\n\n In rebuttal, the State called Dr. Norma Edwards, who treated the victim upon his\narrival at The Med. Dr. Edwards explained the efforts to resuscitate the victim and to repair\nthe hole in his heart, which included a thoracotomy. In the thoracotomy, the victim’s chest\nwas opened and his sternum was split so that medical personnel could massage his heart. She\nexplained that, while she thought at the time that the gunshot injury was to the left ventricle,\n\n -6-\n\fin retrospect, she thought that the medical examiner was “probably right” that the injury was\nactually to the right ventricle, because the medical examiner had more time to examine the\nheart. Dr. Edwards also testified that, whether the injury was to the left or the right ventricle\nmade “absolutely no difference whatsoever.” She added, “A hole in either ventricle caused\nby a wound is going to kill you whether it’s the right ventricle or the left ventricle if you can’t\nget it fixed. It makes zero difference.”\n\n Dr. Edwards also testified that, at the time the victim arrived at The Med, he “had no\nsigns of life.” She elaborated: “[H]e was dead at the time he was brought in. He had no\nblood pressure; he had no pulse; he had no reflexes; he had no vital signs.” She testified that,\nin her opinion, there was nothing improper done in rendering medical treatment to the patient\nby either the paramedics or the personnel at The Med.\n\n The jury found the Defendant guilty of second degree murder as charged in the\nindictment. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to twenty-\nthree years of incarceration.\n\n On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred when it overruled a defense\nobjection to the prosecutor’s leading questions during her redirect examination of Cedric\nLeach. The Defendant asserts in his brief that there were “two bases for this objection. One,\nit is a leading question, and, two, the response was not properly introduced as refreshed\nrecollection.” The Defendant also contends that the evidence is not sufficient to support his\nconviction of second degree murder and, at most, supports only a conviction of voluntary\nmanslaughter.\n\n Analysis\n\n Objection to Questions on Redirect Examination of Leach\n\n Leach testified on direct examination that, as he watched from his second floor\nwindow, he saw the Defendant shoot the victim. During cross-examination, the defense\nimpeached Leach by references to his testimony at the preliminary hearing. Additionally, the\nfollowing colloquy transpired during cross-examination:\n\n Q: Now, you testified today that as you watched from the window, and as all\n of these events were happening, from start to finish, it all took about two to\n three minutes. Is that correct?\n\n A: Or maybe longer. But, yes, that’s what I said.\n\n Q: Two or three or maybe more minutes, right?\n\n -7-\n\f A. Yes, ma’am.\n\n Q. Okay. And during that time, you didn’t see anybody out there other than\n the shooter and the victim, correct?\n\n A: Yes, ma’am.\n\n On redirect, the prosecutor asked Leach, “Did you see somebody else out there at one\npoint – another male out there?” The defense objected on the basis that the question was\nleading. The trial court overruled the objection and concluded that the prosecution could use\nleading questions on redirect as to this issue. The prosecutor then directed Leach to look at\npage 5 of the preliminary hearing transcript and “read to [himself] that first answer.” Leach\ndid so and then testified that he did not remember saying “that.” The following then\ntranspired:\n\n Q: Okay. Tell the jury, the guy – did you see a guy that testified yesterday?\n – somebody by the name of Kenneth Wallace?\n\n A: Are you talking about – yeah, I did see him on the side of the building – I\n s[aw] him on the side of the building. And I don’t remember what he was –\n I don’t remember exactly how long I s[aw] him or, you know. I do remember\n him being there, you know, on the side of the building. You refreshed my\n memory actually seeing him here, yesterday, that he was on the side of the\n building. So, yeah, I s[aw] him.\n\n Q: How far away was he from these other people when you saw him?\n\n A: He wasn’t far. He was on the side of the building, you know. He had\n [gone] – I think he had left – I think after he had seen it getting a little heated\n – I mean, there were no guns out there, there was just two people stand[ing]\n in front of – he just left. You know, I guess there wasn’t much for him to see.\n You know, I don’t know where he went after that.\n\n We agree with the Defendant that the prosecutor used a leading question when she\nasked Leach if he had seen “a guy that testified yesterday? – somebody by the name of\nKenneth Wallace?”2 We, however, disagree that the Defendant thereby is entitled to any\nrelief. “It is well-settled that the propriety, scope, manner and control of the examination of\n\n\n 2\n Although the defense did not object to this specific question, counsel was abiding by the trial\ncourt’s previous ruling. We therefore address the issue on the merits.\n\n -8-\n\fwitnesses is a matter within the discretion of the trial judge.” State v. Caughron, 855 S.W.2d\n526, 540 (Tenn. 1993); see also State v. Chearis, 995 S.W.2d 641, 645 (Tenn. Crim. App.\n1999) (“The admissibility of testimony and other evidence, as well as the scope of redirect\nexamination, is within the discretion of the trial court.”). Accordingly, we review a trial\ncourt’s ruling on an objection to the form of a question for abuse of discretion. See\nCaughron, 855 S.W.2d at 540. Furthermore, unless we determine that the form of the\nquestion was not only improper, but that the improper question was also clearly prejudicial,\nwe will not interfere with the trial court’s decision. Mothershed v. State, 578 S.W.2d 96, 99\n(Tenn. Crim. App. 1978). Here, Wallace already had testified that he was near the scene of\nthe shooting. Issac also had testified that Wallace was nearby. The corroboration provided\nby the leading question was therefore of only slight significance. We hold that the Defendant\nsuffered no prejudice by the trial court’s ruling. Accordingly, he is entitled to no relief on\nthis basis.\n\n As to the Defendant’s argument to this Court that Leach’s “response was not properly\nintroduced as refreshed recollection,” we note that this ground of objection to the\nprosecutor’s questions on redirect was not raised to the trial court. Therefore, this issue has\nbeen waived. See Tenn. R. App. P. 36(a); State v. Mickens, 123 S.W.3d 355, 375-76 (Tenn.\nCrim. App. 2003) (defendant waived those arguments against the admissibility of evidence\nthat were not raised at trial).\n\n Sufficiency of the Evidence\n\n We turn now to the Defendant’s claim that the evidence is not sufficient to support\nhis conviction of second degree murder. Our standard of review regarding sufficiency of the\nevidence is “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the\nprosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime\nbeyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). See also Tenn.\nR. App. P. 13(e). After a jury finds a defendant guilty, the presumption of innocence is\nremoved and replaced with a presumption of guilt. State v. Evans, 838 S.W.2d 185, 191\n(Tenn. 1992). Consequently, the defendant has the burden on appeal of demonstrating why\nthe evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s verdict. State v. Tuggle, 639 S.W.2d 913,\n914 (Tenn. 1982). The appellate court does not weigh the evidence anew; rather, “a jury\nverdict, approved by the trial judge, accredits the testimony of the witnesses for the State and\nresolves all conflicts” in the testimony and all reasonably drawn inferences in favor of the\nState. State v. Harris, 839 S.W.2d 54, 75 (Tenn. 1992). Thus, “the State is entitled to the\nstrongest legitimate view of the evidence and all reasonable or legitimate inferences which\nmay be drawn therefrom.” Id. (citation omitted). The same standard of review applies to\nguilty verdicts whether based upon direct or circumstantial evidence. State v. Dorantes, 331\nS.W.3d 370, 379 (Tenn. 2011) (citing State v. Hanson, 279 S.W.3d 265, 275 (Tenn. 2009)).\n\n\n -9-\n\f Second degree murder is defined as “[a] knowing killing of another.” Tenn. Code\nAnn. § 39-13-210(a)(1) (2006). Our Supreme Court has determined that second degree\nmurder is a “result of conduct” offense. See State v. Brown, 311 S.W.3d 422, 431-32 (Tenn.\n2010); State v. Ducker, 27 S.W.3d 889, 896 (Tenn. 2000). Accordingly, the appropriate\nstatutory definition of “knowing” in the context of second degree murder is as follows: “A\nperson acts knowingly with respect to a result of the person’s conduct when the person is\naware that the conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-\n302(b) (2006); see Brown, 311 S.W.3d at 431.\n\n In this case, the direct and circumstantial proof established that the Defendant raised\na gun and fired seven shots at the victim while the two men were standing only a few feet\napart. The victim sustained multiple gunshot wounds, including a lethal wound to his heart.\nThis Court has held that deliberately firing several shots at a person constitutes “knowing”\nconduct for purposes of establishing second degree murder. See, e.g., State v. Rickie Reed,\nNo. W2001-02076-CCA-R3-CD, 2002 WL 31443196, at *5-6 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 31,\n2002) (proof sufficient to support second degree murder where defendant fired several shots\ninto an occupied vehicle, killing a passenger); State v. Kenneth Anthony Henderson, No.\nM1999-00547-CCA-R3-CD, 2002 WL 537042, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 11, 2002)\n(proof supported second degree murder conviction where defendant fired multiple shots at\nvictim in broad daylight while victim sat in parked car); see also State v. Michael Clark, No.\nW2009-01649-CCA-R3-CD, 2011 WL 300211, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 21, 2011),\nperm. appeal denied (Tenn. May 25, 2011) (proof supported attempted second degree murder\nconviction where defendant fired four or five times at victims sitting in car). We hold that\nthe proof is sufficient to sustain the Defendant’s conviction of second degree murder.\n\n The Defendant contends that the proof established only voluntary manslaughter,\ndefined as “the intentional or knowing killing of another in a state of passion produced by\nadequate provocation sufficient to lead a reasonable person to act in an irrational manner.”\nTenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-211(a) (2006). The Defendant points to testimony that, before the\nvictim was shot, he pushed or otherwise made bodily contact with the Defendant. The\nDefendant argues that this physical assault on him by the victim was sufficient provocation\nto produce a state of passion that led him to act in an irrational manner in committing the\nkilling. We are not persuaded. It is well-settled that it is up to the trier of fact to determine\nwhether a homicide is a second degree murder or a voluntary manslaughter. See State v.\nWilliams, 38 S.W.3d 532, 539 (Tenn. 2001); State v. Johnson, 909 S.W.2d 461, 464 (Tenn.\nCrim. App. 1995); State v. Sentorya L. Young, No. M2005-01873-CCA-R3-CD, 2008 WL\n2026108, at *6 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 12, 2008). When the evidence is sufficient to support\na second degree murder, we will not disturb the jury’s decision in this regard.\n\n\n\n\n -10-\n\f Conclusion\n\n The Defendant’s alleged errors do not entitle him to a reversal of his conviction.\nAccordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.\n\n\n _______________________________________\n JEFFREY S. BIVINS, JUDGE\n\n\n\n\n -11-\n\f", "ocr": false, "opinion_id": 1047104 } ]
Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee
Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee
SA
Tennessee, TN
1,047,190
Judge Thomas T. Woodall
2012-03-09
false
state-of-tennessee-v-brandon-trent-patterson
null
State of Tennessee v. Brandon Trent Patterson
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
0
Published
null
null
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[ { "author_str": null, "per_curiam": false, "type": "010combined", "page_count": 9, "download_url": "http://www.tsc.state.tn.us/sites/default/files/pattersonbrandontrentopn.pdf", "author_id": 8296, "opinion_text": " IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE\n AT NASHVILLE\n Assigned on Briefs May 18, 2011\n\n STATE OF TENNESSEE v. BRANDON TRENT PATTERSON\n\n Direct Appeal from the Circuit Court for Maury County\n No. 19279 Robert L. Holloway, Judge\n\n\n\n\n No. M2010-01573-CCA-R3-CD - Filed March 9, 2012\n\n\nDefendant, Brandon Trent Patterson, was indicted by the Maury County Grand Jury for\nattempted first degree murder. By agreement between the parties, Defendant was also\ncharged by criminal information with one count of aggravated assault. Following a jury trial,\nDefendant was acquitted of attempted first degree murder and convicted of aggravated\nassault. Defendant was sentenced to eight years of imprisonment. Defendant appeals his\nconviction, asserting that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction. After a\ncareful review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.\n\n Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed\n\nT HOMAS T. W OODALL, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which J AMES C URWOOD\nW ITT, J R., J., joined. J UDGE J.C. M CL IN was originally on the panel to which this case was\nassigned. Judge McLin died September 3, 2011, and we acknowledge his faithful service to\nthis Court.\n\nClaudia S. Jack, District Public Defender; and Michelle W. VanDeRee, Assistant Public\nDefender (on appeal), and John S. Colley, III, Columbia, Tennessee, (at trial), for the\nappellant, Brandon Trent Patterson.\n\nRobert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney General and Reporter; Rachel E. Willis, Assistant Attorney\nGeneral; T. Michel Bottoms, District Attorney General; Daniel J. Runde, Assistant District\nAttorney General, for the appellee, the State of Tennessee.\n\f OPINION\n\nFacts\n\n Officer Keith Fall of the Columbia City Police Department testified that on July 11,\n2009, at 12:27 a.m., he was dispatched to Dodson’s Grocery Store (hereinafter “Dodson’s”\nor “Dodson’s Grocery”), a restaurant and nightclub in Columbia in response to an assault\nincident. When Officer Fall arrived, he spoke to the store owners, Troy and Mathew Dodson,\nwho gave him a knife, which they said they found in the back of the store where the incident\noccurred. Officer Fall observed blood on the pavement in the parking lot. Officer Fall\ntestified that the restrooms were adjacent to a storage area in the back of the restaurant. He\nlearned that the victim’s name was Scott Holcomb. Officer Fall collected some of the\nvictim’s clothing and also recovered the victim’s cell phone, which was damaged and looked\nlike it had been struck. Defendant was not at the scene and was arrested the following day.\nOfficer Fall’s investigation revealed that the victim had been unarmed.\n\n Christi Vanvolkinburg testified that she went with Defendant and others to Dodson’s\nGrocery on the night of July 11, 2009, to “sing Karaoke and drink some beer.” Ms.\nVanvolkinburg testified that she, Joy Morton, and Heather Morton went to the restroom\ntogether. She testified that she heard people “yelling outside the door for [them] to hurry\nup.” When they came out of the bathroom, Heather Morton and Gina Dodson began fighting.\nMs. Vanvolkinburg was standing near the bathrooms, where several people were fighting.\nShe was talking to Lisa Nichols when her friend Scott Holcomb said that he had been\nstabbed. When asked whether she saw “five or more people on top of [Defendant], hitting\nhim, or anything like that?” she did not recall seeing that. She testified that there was a\n“circle of people fighting,” and she put her hand over the victim’s wound and walked him\nto the front door and called an ambulance. She testified that the ambulance “was taking too\nlong to get there so [she] put him in his vehicle and his girlfriend, Lisa Nichols, drove him\nto the hospital.”\n\n Gina Dodson testified that her father owned Dodson’s Grocery. She described the\nlayout of the store and testified that the area around the restrooms in the back of the store was\nused for storage for “old restaurant equipment.” On the day of the incident, her family had\na birthday party for her daughter, and later they went swimming at Scott Holcomb’s house.\nShe testified that she had “one drink that evening.” She and Lisa Nichols had “fruit juice\nwith rum in it.” She did not see Mr. Holcomb drink any alcohol. Sometime around 10:00\np.m., Ms. Dodson, Ms. Nichols, and Mr. Holcomb went to Dodson’s. They walked in and\nwent “straight to the back where the cooler [was]” to talk to Ms. Dodson’s dad and her\nbrothers, Troy and Allen Dodson. Before leaving, Ms. Dodson and Ms. Nichols went to the\nrestroom. Ms. Dodson testified that the door to the women’s restroom was locked, so she\n\n -2-\n\f“just knocked on the door to go in and the people on the other side of the door didn’t like it.”\nShe testified that she was knocking on the door, “and they kind of started hollering through\nthe door.” When the door opened, three females came out, and “one of them was just irate,\nmad.” Ms. Dodson did not know their identities at the time, but she testified that she later\nlearned that the first person who came out was Heather Morton. Ms. Dodson testified that\nMs. Morton began yelling at her, and Ms. Dodson “told her to leave.” Ms. Dodson testified\nthat Ms. Morton “looked a little drunk.” As Ms. Dodson walked past her to go into the\nbathroom, she felt something brush against her, and she looked back and saw Heather\nMorton and Lisa Nichols “on the ground” fighting. Ms. Dodson tried to pry Ms. Morton’s\nhands out of Ms. Nichols’ hair. She knelt down with them and heard “the commotion”\nbehind her but did not see anything. She then heard “Scott [Holcomb] hollering, ‘he cut me.\nHe just stabbed me.’” Ms. Dodson saw that the victim was bleeding and she took him to the\nfront of the store and out to his truck. Lisa Nichols drove them to the hospital.\n\n Anthony Troy Dodson, Gina Dodson’s brother, testified that Defendant arrived at\nDodson’s at approximately 10:30 p.m. He also saw Ms. Dodson arrive with Lisa Nichols and\nScott Holcomb around 10:30 p.m. He testified that he went to the back of the store to the\nrestrooms and saw several people, men and women, waiting in line to use the restrooms. He\ntestified that he did not see “a group of men jump on [Defendant] and start hitting him.” He\nsaw some “ladies” exit the restroom and begin arguing with his sister and Lisa Nichols.\nHeather Morton and Lisa Nichols then started fighting. He then saw Scott Holcomb and\nDefendant start fighting. They were shoving and pushing each other and then began\npunching each other. He did not see who initiated the fight. Mr. Dodson attempted to break\nup the fight, but they moved around him and resumed fighting. Mr. Dodson was trying to\nbreak up the fight between Lisa Nichols and Heather Morton when some other people “heard\nthe ruckus” and came back to break up the fight between Defendant and the victim. He then\nheard the victim say that he had been stabbed. Mr. Dodson walked over to the victim and\nsaw “part of his skin sticking out of his stomach.” He then walked the victim to the front of\nthe store and took off the victim’s shirt and held it over his wound. After the victim was\ntaken to the hospital, Mr. Dodson’s nephew, Matthew Dodson, told him that he had found\nthe knife. Mr. Dodson walked to the back of the store and found a knife “slid under” some\ncarpet. Mr. Dodson put the knife in a plastic bag and gave it to the police officer who\nresponded to the scene. On cross-examination, Mr. Dodson testified that he had “a couple\nof beers” that night. Mr. Dodson did not see the victim drinking alcohol, but he “didn’t pay\nany attention.”\n\n Lisa Nichols testified that she was dating the victim, Scott Holcomb, at the time of the\nincident. She testified that earlier in the day, on the date of the incident, she and the victim\nand her 14-year-old daughter had gone to a birthday party at the skating rink for Gina\nDodson’s daughter. After that, they went back to the house she shared with Mr. Holcomb\n\n -3-\n\fto “let the kids swim.” At approximately 10:00 p.m., Ms. Nichols, Mr. Holcomb, and Ms.\nDodson went to a store to buy cigarettes and then went to Dodson’s. Before they left\nDodson’s, they went to the back of the store to use the restrooms. Ms. Nichols testified that\nMs. Dodson tried to open the door to the ladies’ room and it was locked. They “waited\nseveral minutes,” and Ms. Dodson knocked again. Someone inside the bathroom said\nsomething that, Ms. Nichols testified, “sounded hastily” or “rude.” They waited “a few more\nminutes,” and Ms. Dodson knocked again. Someone inside “cursed” and “sounded angry.”\nMs. Nichols testified that, “[m]oments later, the door [wa]s flung open and three girls walked\n[out].” She testified that Heather Morton, one of the people inside the bathroom, “stumbled\ncoming out [and] her [sic] and Gina automatically started arguing.” Ms. Nichols testified\nthat Gina Dodson turned to walk away from Heather Morton, and Ms. Morton “smacked her\nin the back of the head.” Ms. Nichols grabbed Ms. Morton, and Ms. Morton hit her with\n“something hard” that she thought was a beer bottle. They began fighting. Ms. Morton was\ngrabbing Ms. Nichols’ hair, and Ms. Dodson was trying to pry Ms. Morton’s fingers loose.\nMs. Nichols testified that she stood up and heard Mr. Holcomb say that he had been stabbed.\nShe asked who had stabbed him, and Mr. Holcomb said, “he did,” pointing at Defendant.\nShe saw Defendant walking towards a set of double doors, and she stopped him. She\ntestified that she “grabbed [Defendant] and . . . pushed him up against the wall.” She asked\nMr. Holcomb, “are you sure it’s him?” and he replied that he was “sure.” She looked at\nDefendant and asked “how you could do that [to] somebody[?]” and Defendant “gave [her]\nthe coldest look . . . .” She saw that Mr. Holcomb was bleeding, and she “knew [she] had to\nget him out of there and get him to the hospital.” She did not see or hear a group of men\nattack the victim. She testified that the victim’s “intestines were bulging out” and there was\n“blood everywhere.” She drove him to the hospital, and he was later flown by Life Flight\nto Vanderbilt Hospital.\n\n Ms. Nichols testified that the incident happened about an hour after they arrived, and\nshe estimated that they arrived between 10:00 and 10:30 p.m. She also testified that she did\nnot recall seeing anyone else waiting in line to use the restrooms. She testified that she did\nnot see how many people were involved in the fight between the victim and Defendant. She\nalso testified that the victim’s cousin, John Mooningham, arrived with Defendant and left\nwith Defendant.\n\n Michael Scott Holcomb, the victim in this case, testified that on the day of the\nincident, he went to the skating rink with Lisa Nichols and her daughter for a birthday party\nfor Gina Dodson’s daughter. After the party, several people went to his house to swim. Mr.\nHolcomb testified that he did not consume any alcohol that day. He testified that at\napproximately 10:00 p.m., or “a little after,” he, Gina Dodson, and Lisa Nichols arrived at\nDodson’s Grocery. He spoke to Gina’s father and to her brother, Troy Dodson. He testified\nthat he ordered a beer and drank about half of it. He testified that he also spoke to a “distant\n\n -4-\n\fcousin,” John Mooningham. He testified that after they had been there for “an hour, an hour\nand a half at the most,” they were getting ready to leave when Ms. Dodson and Ms. Nichols\nsaid they were going to the bathroom. After they had been gone “awhile,” he went to the\nback of the store to check on them. When he got to the restrooms, he saw Gina Dodson, Lisa\nNichols, Troy Dodson, and “an older black-haired lady” standing around talking. He asked\nwhat they were doing and that was when “everybody come [sic] out of the restrooms” and\nthey began “arguing and wrestling.” He then saw Defendant grab a beer bottle from\nsomeone, and it looked like he “was gonna hit Gina or Lisa in the back of the head [with it].”\nMr. Holcomb “grabbed [Defendant] by his neck and his arm” and pushed him against a wall\nand “shook a beer bottle out of his hand.” Then Mr. Holcomb “released” Defendant and\nturned back towards Gina and Lisa “to see how they were doing.” While his back was turned\nto Defendant, he got “shoved” from behind. He turned around and Defendant grabbed him\nby his collar. Mr. Holcomb pushed Defendant’s hand away and hit him in the face.\nDefendant fell down, and Mr. Holcomb was standing over him. Mr. Holcomb testified,\n“[T]he next thing, he come up and he stabbed me.” When Mr. Holcomb realized that he had\nbeen stabbed, he began “hollering, ‘he stabbed me.’” Defendant then “tried to run out the\ndoor.”\n\n Mr. Holcomb testified that Defendant stabbed him three times. Mr. Holcomb was\ntaken to Maury Regional Hospital and then flown by Life Flight to Vanderbilt Hospital,\nwhere he underwent surgery for lacerations to his intestines. He testified that he was\nhospitalized for five days. He had stab wounds above his knee, in his stomach, and in his\nchest. He testified that Defendant also tried to stab him in his hip, but his cell phone\nprotected his body from being stabbed. Mr. Holcomb testified that he was unarmed on the\nnight of the incident.\n\n Greg Morton testified on behalf of Defendant. He testified that he went to Dodson’s\non the night of the incident with Defendant, Heather Morton, Joy Morton, and John\nMooningham. He testified that he had been friends with Defendant for four or five years.\nMr. Morton testified that he drank three beers at his house before going to Dodson’s, and he\ndrank three or four beers while at Dodson’s. At some point, Mr. Morton went back to the\nrestrooms, and when he opened the double doors, he saw people fighting. He testified that\nthere was a “guy looking at [him] like he was watching the door,” and that there were\n“[a]bout five guys or six, had [Defendant] up against the wall. [Defendant’s] left eye was\nbleeding.” Mr. Morton testified that he did not see anyone hit Defendant, “but they was [sic]\nholding him up against the wall.” Defendant said, “[H]elp me” to Mr. Morton. Mr. Morton\nalso saw that his daughter Heather was on the floor, and two women were standing over her.\nMr. Morton testified that the man he saw standing by the door said to him, “[I]t just don’t\n[sic] concern you, we got this.” When Mr. Morton told him that it was his daughter on the\nfloor, the man hit Mr. Morton in the jaw with his fist. Troy Dodson and “Bubba” Dodson\n\n -5-\n\fthen grabbed Mr. Morton by the arms and took him back through the double doors. They\nthen brought his daughter to him. Mr. Morton took Heather outside to his van and went back\ninside to get Defendant and Mr. Mooningham. Mr. Mooningham went outside, and Mr.\nMorton saw “four or five [people] escorting [Defendant] toward the door.” Mr. Morton\ntestified that, at first, “they didn’t want to let him go,” but the people escorting Defendant did\nlet him go. Defendant left with Mr. Morton. The following morning, the police came to Mr.\nMorton’s house and arrested Defendant. Mr. Morton did not see anyone get stabbed.\n\n Heather Morton testified that on the night of the incident, she went to Dodson’s with\nher father, Greg Morton, her stepmother, Joy Morton, Defendant, and John Mooningham.\nShe was 17 years old at the time. While at Dodson’s, she went to the restroom with her\nstepmother, Joy Morton, and Christi Vanvolkinburg. While they were inside the restroom,\nMs. Morton heard a knock on the door and someone say, “Get out; my daddy owns this\nplace.” When she came out of the bathroom, Gina Dodson and Lisa Nichols “jumped on\n[her].” She testified that they shoved her and immediately started hitting her in the head.\nShe testified that she fell to the floor and looked over and saw “six or seven [men] that had\n[Defendant] up against the wall.” She testified that Mr. Morton came back to that area, and\nthe men who had Defendant against a wall told him “they had it tooken [sic] care of.” She\ntestified that they “just all got up and left. And that’s all I know.” Ms. Morton testified that\nshe drank two glasses of rum before going to Dodson’s. On cross-examination, she testified\nthat she did not see any of the men holding Defendant against the wall hitting Defendant, that\nshe did not see Mr. Holcomb get stabbed, and that after leaving Dodson’s, Defendant did not\nsay anything about having been assaulted by several men or having stabbed someone in self-\ndefense.\n\n At trial, Defendant admitted that he stabbed Mr. Holcomb but testified that he did it\n“because [he] was trying to take care of [him]self.” He testified, “I was on the ground being\nhurt. I was just trying to get him off of me.” Defendant testified that Mr. Holcomb was “on\ntop of [him], hitting [him] in the face.” He testified that there were others, including Troy\nand Matthew Dodson, who were “kicking [him] in the ribs and in the face.” He testified,\n“[T]hey were just beating [him] up pretty bad.” He testified that he was not trying to kill Mr.\nHolcomb. Defendant testified that he was previously convicted of three counts of auto\nburglary in 2002. In 2008, he was convicted of three more counts of auto burglary and one\ncount of felony theft.\n\n On cross-examination, Defendant testified that he drank “a few beers” at Mr.\nMorton’s house before going to Dodson’s. He drank “probably three” beers at Dodson’s.\nHe went to the back of the store to use the restroom and saw Ms. Morton, Ms. Nichols, and\nMs. Dodson fighting. When he tried to break up the fight, Mr. Holcomb hit him in the eye.\nDefendant denied that he was about to strike Ms. Nichols with a beer bottle. Defendant\n\n -6-\n\ftestified that he did not know what motive Mr. Holcomb, Troy and Matthew Dodson, and “a\ncouple more” unidentified men had to beat him up, but that he had beat one of them earlier\nthat night playing a game of pool. Defendant never sought warrants against any of the men\nfor assaulting him. Defendant testified that he did not seek medical treatment at a hospital,\nbut that he was seen by a doctor at the Maury County Jail following his arrest the morning\nafter the incident.\n\nAnalysis\n\n Defendant contends that the evidence at trial was insufficient to sustain his conviction\nfor aggravated assault. Defendant does not point to a specific element of aggravated assault\nthat the State failed to prove but asserts that he was acting in self-defense. Therefore, we will\naddress both the sufficiency of the evidence to establish the elements of aggravated assault\nand the sufficiency of the evidence to establish that the defendant was not acting in\nself-defense.\n\n When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal, the standard is “whether,\nafter viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier\nof fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”\nJackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781 (1979). Questions concerning the\ncredibility of the witnesses, the weight and value to be given the evidence, as well as all\nfactual issues raised by the evidence are resolved by the trier of fact, not this Court. State v.\nPappas, 754 S.W.2d 620, 623 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987). This Court may not reweigh or\nreevaluate the evidence but should presume that the jury has resolved all conflicts in the\ntestimony and drawn all reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor of the State. State\nv. Sheffield, 676 S.W.2d 542, 547 (Tenn. 1984); State v. Cabbage, 571 S.W.2d 832, 835\n(Tenn. 1978), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in State v. Barone, 852\nS.W.2d 216, 218 (Tenn. 1993).\n\n Following the standard of review set out above, we conclude that the elements of\naggravated assault were established in the instant case. To support Defendant’s conviction\nfor aggravated assault, the State was required to prove that the defendant knowingly caused\nbodily injury to the victim by using a deadly weapon pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated\nsections 39-13-101(a)(1) and -102(a)(1)(B).\n\n There is ample evidence to support a finding that Defendant caused bodily injury to\nthe victim by using a deadly weapon. The victim testified that, while the two men were\nengaged in a fight, Defendant stabbed him multiple times with a knife. Several witnesses\ntestified that they saw the fight between the victim and Defendant and heard the victim say\n\n\n\n -7-\n\fthat he had been stabbed. The victim received life-threatening stab wounds to his body.\nDefendant himself testified and admitted to stabbing the victim with a knife.\n\n Turning to Defendant’s contention that he acted in self-defense, we must conclude\nthat there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the\ndefendant was not acting in self-defense. Tennessee Code Annotated section\n39–11–611(b)(2) allows for an affirmative defense of self-defense when a person is engaged\nin a situation where he reasonably believes there is a danger of death or serious bodily injury.\n\n (2) Notwithstanding [Tenn. Code Ann.] § 39-17-1322, a person who\n is not engaged in unlawful activity and is in a place where the person has\n a right to be has no duty to retreat before threatening or using force intended\n or likely to cause death or serious bodily injury, if:\n (A) The person has a reasonable belief that there is an imminent\n danger of death or serious bodily injury;\n (B) The danger creating the belief of imminent death or serious\n bodily injury is real, or honestly believed to be real at the time; and\n (C) The belief of danger is founded upon reasonable grounds.\n\nT.C.A. § 39–11–611(b)(2).\n\n Whether a defendant acted in self-defense is for the jury to decide. State v. Ivy, 868\nS.W.2d 724, 727 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993). When the defendant’s proof raises the defense,\nit does not render the State’s evidence insufficient but presents a question of fact for the jury\nto decide. State v. McCray, 512 S.W.2d 263, 265 (Tenn. 1974). The jury is free to reject the\nself-defense claim. State v. Goode, 956 S.W.2d 521, 527 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997).\n\n In the instant case, Defendant testified in his own behalf. According to Defendant’s\nversion of the events, he walked to the back of the store where he saw a fight between\nHeather Morton and Gina Dodson and Lisa Nichols. He was going to attempt to break up\nthe fight when the victim and several others attacked him and began beating him. He pulled\na knife from his pocket, opened it, and began stabbing the victim.\n\n In contrast to Defendant’s version of what happened, the State’s witnesses testified\nthat they did not see a group of men beating Defendant. In fact, witnesses who testified\nduring Defendant’s proof did not corroborate that portion of his testimony. Heather and Greg\nMorton both testified that they saw Defendant being held against a wall by several men, but\nneither witness saw the men hit Defendant. Defendant’s behavior following the incident also\ntends to negate self-defense. Defendant left the scene of the incident without waiting for\npolice to arrive, the knife was found under a piece of carpet, Defendant did not seek medical\n\n -8-\n\fattention after leaving the store that night, and Defendant did not tell the friends with whom\nhe left that he had to act in self-defense. Finally, there was no evidence that the victim was\narmed. We conclude that the evidence accredited by the jury was that Defendant acted with\nunreasonable force and that he was not under a threat of imminent danger of death or serious\nbodily injury when he stabbed the victim. Taking the evidence in the light most favorable\nto the State, the jury found that the State negated Defendant’s claim of self-defense beyond\na reasonable doubt. Defendant is not entitled to relief on this issue.\n\n CONCLUSION\n\n The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.\n\n\n _________________________________\n THOMAS T. WOODALL, JUDGE\n\n\n\n\n -9-\n\f", "ocr": false, "opinion_id": 1047190 } ]
Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee
Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee
SA
Tennessee, TN
1,047,196
Judge Frank G. Clement, Jr.
2012-01-12
false
in-re-the-estate-of-bessie-louise-thornton
In Re: The Estate of Bessie Louise Thornton
In Re: The Estate of Bessie Louise Thornton
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Published
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[ { "author_str": null, "per_curiam": false, "type": "010combined", "page_count": 13, "download_url": "http://www.tsc.state.tn.us/sites/default/files/thorntonbessieopn.pdf", "author_id": 8266, "opinion_text": " IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE\n AT NASHVILLE\n October 13, 2011 Session\n\n IN RE: THE ESTATE OF BESSIE LOUISE THORNTON\n\n Appeal from the Chancery Court for Wilson County\n No. 09183 Charles K. Smith, Chancellor\n\n\n No. M2011-01287-COA-R3-CV - Filed January 12, 2012\n\n\nIn this will contest, the jury found that a confidential relationship existed between the\nprincipal beneficiary of the will and the testatrix; however, the jury also found that the will\nwas not the result of undue influence and, therefore, the will was valid. The contestant filed\npost-trial motions pursuant to Rules 50.02 and 59 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure,\nseeking to set aside the judgment notwithstanding the jury verdict, and alternatively, for a\nnew trial. The trial court set aside the judgment of the jury, and entered judgment declaring\nthe will invalid on the grounds that it was the result of undue influence. The trial court did\nnot expressly rule on the alternative motion for a new trial. The proponent of the will appeals,\ncontending the trial court erred in setting aside the jury’s verdict and entering judgment in\nfavor of the contestant. We agree that the trial court erred by entering a judgment\nnotwithstanding the verdict; however, we have also concluded that the trial court, acting in\nits role as thirteenth juror, implicitly and conditionally granted the contestant’s motion for\na new trial. Accordingly, we remand the case for a new trial.\n\n Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court\n Reversed and Remanded\n\nF RANK G. C LEMENT, JR., J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which P ATRICIA J.\nC OTTRELL, P.J., M.S., and A NDY D. B ENNETT, J., joined.\n\nRobert Evans Lee, Lebanon, Tennessee; Stephanie Smartt Heckman, Mt. Juliet, Tennessee;\nand John D. Kitch, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Nan Kimbro.\n\nJack O. Bellar and Jamie D. Winkler, Carthage, Tennessee, for the appellee, Clinton O.\nThornton, Jr.\n\f OPINION\n\n This is a classic will contest brought by the decedent’s only child. The decedent,\nBessie Thornton, died on April 14, 2009, at the age of 89. The Last Will and Testament,\ndated January 15, 2002, bequeathed and devised all of the decedent’s estate to her next door\nneighbor, Nan Kimbro, with the exception of a 1987 Mazda automobile, which was\nbequeathed to the decedent’s niece. The decedent’s son, Clinton Thornton, Jr., was explicitly\nexcluded from the will.\n\n Ms. Kimbro, who was nominated to be the executrix, filed a petition to admit the\nJanuary 15, 2002 will to probate in common form. The will was admitted to probate on April\n24, 2009, and letters testamentary were issued to Ms. Kimbro.\n\n Shortly thereafter, the decedent’s son filed a Complaint to Contest the Will, alleging\nthat his mother was incompetent and lacked testamentary capacity at the time of the\nexecution of the will, that Ms. Kimbro held a confidential relationship with his mother, and\nthat the will was the result of undue influence by Ms. Kimbro.\n\n A jury trial was held, revealing the following: The decedent lived on a one-acre plot\nof land at 5371 Alvin Sperry Road, Mount Juliet, Tennessee for over thirty years. She retired\nas an LPN nurse from the Metro Nashville Public Health Department. Her husband, Clinton\nThornton, Sr., passed away in the 1980s, and her son, Clinton Thornton, Jr. (“Mr.\nThornton”), lived with her on the property until about 1977, when he was 19 years old. He\nlived with her off and on from 2000 until her death in 2009. The decedent’s home was\nmodest, heated with a wood stove. The decedent cared for several dogs over the years,\nincluding her own as well as strays she found on her property. Several members of the\ndecedent’s family lived nearby, including a niece, Martha Girgin, who lived in a trailer on\nthe decedent’s property. The decedent was close to her family, and they often gathered at the\ndecedent’s home for birthdays and holidays.\n\n Ms. Kimbro and her husband purchased a neighboring 26-acre plot of land in 1991,\nbuilt a house, and moved onto the property in 1995. Mr. and Mrs. Kimbro observed the\ndecedent was an elderly woman, and occasionally brought her firewood. Ms. Kimbro and the\ndecedent became friends in 1998, after Ms. Kimbro rescued several puppies that had been\nabandoned by the decedent’s dog in a nearby woods. Ms. Kimbro found homes for the\npuppies, and helped the decedent have all her dogs spayed or neutered. Ms. Kimbro, who was\nalso a registered nurse, began visiting with the decedent, taking her to hair appointments, and\nassisting the decedent in caring for the neighborhood stray dogs.\n\n\n\n\n -2-\n\f In 2001, the decedent was hospitalized following a stroke. By this time, the decedent’s\nson, Mr. Thornton, had moved back onto the decedent’s property. While the decedent was\nhospitalized, Mr. Thornton evidently attempted to do some remodeling on the decent’s home.\nWhen she returned from the hospital, the decedent found that most of her possessions had\nbeen removed from her home, and became very upset at Mr. Thornton. Mr. Thornton moved\nout shortly thereafter, and the decedent grew closer to Ms. Kimbro. Although the decedent\nrecovered from the stroke, she began driving less, became more physically feeble, and began\ntaking daily doses of pain medicine. Ms. Kimbro began taking the decedent to doctor’s\nappointments, retrieving her mail, paying her bills, and she continued bringing her firewood\nand taking her to hair appointments. She also helped the decedent install a new wood stove\nand chimney, and provided care for the decedent’s dogs. Eventually, she opened a checking\naccount as well as a Post Office box for the decedent. Ms. Kimbro also helped the decedent\npurchase a used Mazda automobile from Ms. Kimbro’s parents.\n\n In January 2002, Ms. Kimbro made an appointment for the decedent to meet with\nattorney Robert Callis to prepare her will. The decedent had no prior relationship with Mr.\nCallis; Ms. Kimbro chose Mr. Callis because he prepared Ms. Kimbro’s will in 1998. Ms.\nKimbro attended the first appointment with the decedent on January 7, 2002. The decedent\nreturned to Mr. Callis’s office one week later, on January 15, 2002, to sign and execute the\nwill. Ms. Kimbro did not accompany the decedent for this second appointment when the will\nwas executed; however, Ms. Kimbro paid the bill for Mr. Callis’s services. Mr. Callis and\nFontelle Sutherland, Mr. Callis’s mother-in-law, witnessed the will. The will provided that\none of the decedent’s nieces, Mary Seaborn, would receive the decedent’s Mazda\nautomobile, and that the remainder of the decedent’s estate, namely her property on Alvin\nSperry Road, would go to Ms. Kimbro. The will also provided that Ms. Kimbro would care\nfor the decedent’s dogs.\n\n Following its execution, Ms. Kimbro stored the decedent’s will in Ms. Kimbro’s safe\ndeposit box where the will remained until the decedent’s death. The decedent did not have\nher own key to Ms. Kimbro’s safe deposit box and the decedent’s family did not know of the\n2002 will until it was probated in 2009. From 2002-2009, Ms. Kimbro continued to take the\ndecedent to hair and medical appointments, pay her bills, and care for her dogs.\n\n The evidence presented at trial further established that, after the decedent’s will was\nadmitted to probate in April of 2009, Ms. Kimbro wrote a letter to Mr. Thornton, who had\nmoved back into the decedent’s home, and Martha Girgin, who resided in a trailer on the\ndecedent’s property, notifying them that they would have to vacate the property.\n\n In the proponent’s case-in-chief, Ms. Kimbro presented, inter alia, the testimony of\nAttorney Robert Callis to establish the due execution of the January 22, 2002 will. Attorney\n\n -3-\n\fCallis testified that the decedent appeared to understand the will and her estate. He further\nstated that he was satisfied there was no undue influence. He also testified that he asked the\ndecedent why she wanted to exclude her son from the will, and that the decedent explained\nthat she had a history of problems with Mr. Thornton. He stated the decedent told him she\nwanted Ms. Kimbro to receive her estate because Ms. Kimbro cared for her and her dogs for\nseveral years. Ms. Kimbro also presented the testimony of the decedent’s hairdresser, Sheila\nKeaton, who stated that she had long conversations with the decedent, and although the\ndecedent was becoming physically feeble, she was “coherent about everything.” Ms. Keaton\ntestified that Ms. Kimbro always came to the beauty shop with the decedent and that they\nwere friends.\n\n Several of the decedent’s family members testified the decedent was very close with\nher family, and consistently stated her intentions to leave her property to her son. They\ntestified that her health, mentally and physically, had been in a state of decline since her\nstroke in 2001. They also testified that Ms. Kimbro was domineering and controlling of the\ndecedent, and appeared to dislike the decedent’s entire family. Mr. Thornton testified that the\ndecedent hung a note beside her bed to let people know she did not want Ms. Kimbro in her\nhouse. Mr. Thornton also testified that Ms. Kimbro had attempted to purchase the decedent’s\nproperty in the past, but the decedent wanted to keep the property in her family.\n\n At the conclusion of the trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Ms. Kimbro,\nfinding, pursuant to the Verdict Form, that “the decedent Bessie L. Thornton possessed the\nrequisite testamentary capacity to make a valid Will on January 15, 2002”; “Nan Kimbro held\na confidential relationship with the decedent, Bessie Louise Thornton”; and “the Will dated\nJanuary 15, 2002, was not the result of undue influence.” As a result of the verdict, the trial\ncourt entered judgment declaring the writing bearing the date of January 15, 2002, signed by\nthe decedent Bessie Louise Thornton be admitted to probate as “the true, whole and Last Will\nand Testament of the said Bessie Louise Thornton . . . .”\n\n After entry of the judgment, the contestant, Clinton Thornton, timely filed a Motion\nto Set Aside the Verdict; Enter a Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, Alter or Amend the\nJudgment, or for a New Trial, pursuant to Rule 50.02 and Rule 59 of the Tennessee Rules\nof Civil Procedure. Ms. Kimbro filed a response in opposition to the motions. Following a\nhearing, the trial court stated from the bench its factual findings and conclusions of law:\n\n THE COURT: All right. I’ve read the briefs and I have studied these cases,\n particularly the Kelley case and then the Sumner County case of Paulene\n Maddox and the Matlock case as well. I’m of the opinion that there was a\n confidential relationship. The jury found there was [a] confidential\n relationship. And when I look at all the evidence that was entered in this case,\n\n -4-\n\fthe decedent became very dependent upon the defendant here, Ms. Kimbro.\nAnd then the law – all these cases state the law is a confidential relationship\nalone is not sufficient to create an undue influence that would be sufficient to\nset aside a will of a person.\n\n In addition to there being a confidential relationship, there must be – the\nplaintiff must prove suspicious circumstances. It gave a list of several\nsuggest[ions] in these different cases. But the ones in this case that, and I’m\nnot saying this is a complete list, but the ones I’ve noticed was advanced age\nand deteriorating mental and physical health. She had a stroke. Some say it was\nsmall, pancreatitis and for some reason she was taking pain medication.\n\n Unnatural, distribution of the property in the will it’s kind of – it’s\nunnatural to disinherit a son and leave everything to a neighbor. And the\nneighbor was certainly controlling of her. Took her places, was quite\ndependent on her, this Nan Kimbro is the neighbor and kept her mail and bills\nat her home.\n\n The other suspicious circumstances were the fact that Nan Kimbro\ninherited everything and Nan Kimbro took Bessie Thornton, the decedent to\na lawyer, this lawyer she had used in the past. And furthermore, Nan Kimbro\npaid the lawyer bill.\n\n The terms of the will were kept secret. Nan Kimbro kept the will in her\nlock box. The proof at the trial was that Bessie Thornton, the decedent told\npeople after execution of the will her intended disposition after she had died\nwas inconsistent with the terms of the will. And mainly I remember, she\nwanted her niece and relatives, whoever, may be her sister, but at least her\nniece to remain on the property for the rest of her life or as long as she wanted\nto in apparently some tenant house that was on the property and there might be\nothers.\n ....\n\n But I think cases have held, once you’ve established a confidential\nrelationship and proved suspicious circumstances, certain suspicious, one or\nmore, then there is a rebuttable presumption that the will was created or\ndrafted or cured by undue influence and that this undue influence can only be,\nthis rebuttable presumption can only be overcome by clear and convincing\nevidence.\n\n\n\n -5-\n\f As I’ve stated here, the only evidence that I can see that the defendant,\n Ms. Kimbro, introduced [was] . . . this one attorney for independent advice. I\n do think this attorney was competent. I don’t find he did anything improper.\n I do question anyone’s ability to remember what happened seven years ago,\n anyone in the world, I question anybody’s ability. I don’t particularly have a\n variety of will cases and so forth, but maybe he has that distinct ability to do\n that. But I would – I would doubt that. But that’s not – that doesn’t come into\n play here.\n\n What comes into play is that there was a confidential relationship,\n suspicious circumstances gave rise to this will being created by undue\n influence. And as these cases have dealt, just a mere independent advice of\n attorney is not sufficient alone to set aside this presumption.\n\n So based upon the case law, state of law the way it exists in the state of\n Tennessee at this time, I’m going to set aside the judgment of the jury and\n enter an order notwithstanding the verdict that the will was invalid and further\n set aside the probate of the will. That’s the finding of this Court and the order\n to be entered. Thank you.\n\nAn order that was approved for entry by counsel for all parties was submitted to and\napproved by the trial judge; it reads as follows:\n\n ORDER\n\n This case came on to be heard before the Honorable C. K. Smith,\n Chancellor for the Chancery Court for Wilson County, Tennessee, upon the\n Motion to Set Aside the Verdict and Enter a Judgment Notwithstanding the\n Verdict pursuant to T ENN. R. C IV . P. 50.02, or in the alternative pursuant to\n T ENN . R. C IV. P. 59 for an order granting a new trial filed by the Plaintiff,\n Clinton O. Thornton, Jr. Counsel for the Plaintiff and Defendant, were present,\n and upon Motion and Response filed by Defendant in opposition to the\n Motion, arguments of counsel and the entire record, the Court states:\n\n It is ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the Judgment\n following the jury verdict entered on August 24, 2010, be set aside and an\n order notwithstanding the verdict be entered that the Last Will and Testament\n of Bessie Thornton be held invalid. The Court finds the evidence showed that\n\n\n\n\n -6-\n\f Nan Kimbro held a confidential relationship with the decedent, Bessie Louise\n Thornton, and that the Will admitted for probate was the result of undue\n influence upon the decedent by Nan Kimbro.\n\n It is further ORDERED ADJUDGED and DECREED that the order\n probating the Last Will and Testament be set aside and Nan Kimbro is hereby\n removed as Executrix.\n\n The Court made specific findings of fact and conclusions of law on the\n record and those findings are attached hereto and are hereby incorporated into\n this Order.\n\n This appeal by Ms. Kimbro followed in which she asserts that the grant of judgment\nnotwithstanding the verdict should be set aside and the jury’s verdict reinstated because the\ntrial court applied an incorrect legal standard, it impermissibly weighed the evidence, and\nsufficient evidence was presented to the jury to create an issue of fact for the jury to decide.\n\n A NALYSIS\n\n I.\n Will Contests\n\n The issues presented require us to first examine the parameters of a will contest. At\nthe time a will is executed, the mind of the testatrix must be sufficiently sound to enable her\nto know and understand the force and consequence of the act of making the will.1 In re Estate\nof Elam, 738 S.W.2d 169 (Tenn. 1987); Am. Trust & Banking Co. v. Williams, 225 S.W.2d\n79, 83 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1948). A person executing a will must know and understand: (1) the\nnature and the effect of her act; (2) the property she possesses; and (3) the manner in which\n\n\n 1\n The mental condition of the testator at the time of executing the will is the only point of inquiry;\nbut evidence of mental condition before and after making the will, if not too remote in point of time, may\nbe received as bearing upon that issue. In re Estate of Elam, 738 S.W.2d 169, 171-72 (Tenn. 1987). Evidence\nof the testator’s physical condition before and after the date of the will is also admissible; however, apart\nfrom its effect upon the mind, the physical condition of the testator has no bearing on the issue. Id. at 172\n(citing Taliaferro v. Green, 622 S.W.2d 829, 834 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981)). Although evidence regarding\nfactors such as physical weakness or disease, old age, blunt perception or failing mind and memory is\nadmissible on the issue of testamentary capacity, it is not conclusive and the testator is not thereby rendered\nincompetent if her mind is sufficiently sound to enable her to know and understand what she is doing. Id. The\nopinions of lay witnesses are admissible on soundness of mind if they are based on details of conversations,\nappearances, conduct or other particular facts from which the state of mind may be judged. Id. (citing Am.\nTrust & Banking Co. v. Williams, 225 S.W.2d 79, 84 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1948)).\n\n -7-\n\fher property will be distributed under the will. Childress v. Currie, 74 S.W.3d 324, 328\n(Tenn. 2002); In re Estate of Elam, 738 S.W.2d at 171-72; In re Estate of Price, 273 S.W.3d\n113 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2008). However, executing a will requires less mental capacity than\nengaging in business transactions. Owen v. Summers, 97 S.W.3d 114, 125 (Tenn. Ct. App.\n2001); Green v. Higdon, 870 S.W.2d 513, 522 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993).\n\n Once the proponent of the will establishes its due execution, the contestant has the\nburden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the testatrix lacked testamentary\ncapacity, or that her will was the result of undue influence exerted upon her by another. In\nre Estate of Elam, 738 SW.2d at 171 (citing In re Estate of Rhodes, 436 S.W.2d 429, 435-36\n(Tenn. 1968)). As a general rule, it is presumed that undue influence does not enter into the\nmaking of a will and the burden of proving undue influence falls upon the person contesting\nthe will. Kelley v. Johns, 96 S.W.3d 189, 196 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002); In re Estate of Maddox,\n60 S.W.3d 84, 89 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001).\n\n Undue influence “upon a testator consists in substituting the will of the person\nexercising it for that of the testator.” Jack W. Robinson, Sr., & Jeff Mobley, Pritchard on the\nLaw of Wills and the Administration of Estates § 124, at 203 (5 th ed. 1994). Thus, the\ndispositive issue on a question of undue influence is whether “the will is the will of the\ntestator or that of another.” Id. § 130, at 210. “[I]t is not influence that vitiates a will, but\nundue influence . . . .” Union Planters Nat’l Bank v. Inman, 588 S.W.2d 757, 761 (Tenn. Ct.\nApp. 1979)(emphasis added). The issue of undue influence should “be decided by the\napplication of sound principles and good sense to the facts of each case.” Childress, 74\nS.W.3d at 329 (citing Matlock v. Simpson, 902 S.W.2d 384, 388 (quoting Halle v.\nSummerfield, 287 S.W.2d 57, 61 (Tenn. 1956))).\n\n While undue influence can be proved either by direct or circumstantial evidence, see\nIn re Depriest’s Estate, 733 S.W.2d 74, 78 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986), direct evidence is rarely\navailable. Hager v. Hager, 66 S.W.2d 250, 260 (1933). Thus, in most cases, those attacking\na conveyance on the grounds of undue influence must prove the existence of suspicious\ncircumstances warranting the conclusion that the person allegedly influenced did not act\nfreely and independently. Fell v. Rambo, 36 S.W.3d 837, 847 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000). The\nsuspicious circumstances most often relied upon to establish undue influence are: (1) the\nexistence of a confidential relationship between the grantor and the beneficiary at the time\nof the conveyance;2 (2) the grantor’s physical or mental deterioration; and (3) the\nbeneficiary’s active involvement in procuring the conveyance. In re Estate of Elam, 738\nS.W.2d at 173; Kelly v. Allen, 558 S.W.2d 845, 848 (Tenn. 1977); Mitchell, 779 S.W.2d at\n\n\n 2\n The existence of a confidential relationship is one of the “suspicious circumstances” most frequently\nrelied upon to show undue influence. Fell, 36 S.W.3d at 847-48; Kelly, 558 S.W.2d at 848.\n\n -8-\n\f388; Taliaferro, 622 S.W.2d at 835-36. Other suspicious circumstances giving rise to undue\ninfluence include: (1) secrecy concerning the will’s or conveyance’s existence; (2) the\ngrantor’s advanced age; (3) the lack of independent advice in preparing the conveyance; (4)\nthe grantor’s illiteracy or blindness; (5) the unjust or unnatural nature of the conveyance; (6)\nthe grantor being in an emotionally distraught state; (7) discrepancies between the\nconveyance and the testator’s expressed intentions; and (8) fraud or duress directed toward\nthe grantor. Halle, 287 S.W.2d at 61-62; Mitchell, 779 S.W.2d at 671.\n\n In Tennessee, where there is a “confidential relationship, followed by a transaction\nwherein the dominant party receives a benefit from the other party, a presumption of undue\ninfluence arises, that may be rebutted only by clear and convincing evidence of the fairness\nof the transaction by clear and convincing evidence.”3 Matlock, 902 S.W.2d at 386; see also\nMitchell, 779 S.W.2d at 389 (finding that a confidential relationship exists combined with\nthe beneficiary’s involvement in the procurement of the will or conveyance gives rise to a\npresumption of fraud or undue influence).\n\n The jury in this case made a finding that a confidential relationship existed between\nMs. Kimbro and the decedent.4 As a consequence of this finding, the burden shifted to Ms.\nKimbro to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that the contested will was not the\nproduct of undue influence but, instead, was the product of the free exercise of independent\njudgment by the decedent. See In re Estate of Elam, 738 S.W.2d at 171. One means of\nshowing a transaction’s fairness is for the dominant party to establish, by clear and\nconvincing evidence, that the weaker party received independent advice before\nconsummating the transaction that benefitted the dominant party. See Hogan v. Cooper, 619\nS.W.2d 516, 519 (Tenn. 1981); see also Richmond v. Christian, 555 S.W.2d 105, 107-08\n(Tenn. 1977) (proof that the donor received independent advice respecting the consequences\nand advisability of the gift).\n\n\n\n\n 3\n Thus, the burden of proving that a confidential relationship exists rests upon the party claiming the\nexistence of such a relationship. Childress, 74 S.W.3d at 328 (citing Brown v. Weik, 725 S.W.2d 938, 945\n(Tenn. Ct. App. 1983)). As the contestant, Mr. Thornton bore the initial burden of proof.\n 4\n In general, a confidential relationship is any relationship which gives a person dominion and control\nover another. Kelly, 558 S.W.2d at 848. It is not merely a relationship of mutual trust and confidence, rather\na confidential relationship is one where confidence is placed by one in the other and the recipient of that\nconfidence is the dominant personality, with ability, because of that confidence, to exercise dominion and\ncontrol over the weaker or dominated party. Childress, 74 S.W.3d at 328. Ms. Kimbro does not dispute that\nshe had a confidential relationship with the decedent.\n\n -9-\n\f II.\n Tenn. R. Civ. P. 50.02 and 59\n\n We now turn our attention to the principles that apply when a party files post-trial\nmotions to set aside a jury’s verdict and enter judgment notwithstanding the verdict pursuant\nto Rule 50.02, or, in the alternative, for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59, of the Tennessee\nRules of Civil Procedure. The relevant criteria for post-trial motions filed pursuant to Rule\n50.02 and Rule 59 were discussed at length by our Supreme Court in 1977 in the matter of\nHolmes v. Wilson, 551 S.W.2d 682, 686 (Tenn. 1977). As for a Rule 50.02 motion for\njudgment notwithstanding the verdict, the Court explained:\n\n A post-trial motion for the entry of judgment in accordance with a motion for\n a directed verdict made during the trial must be gauged by the usual rules\n relating to directed verdicts. Those rules require that the trial judge, and the\n appellate courts, take the strongest legitimate view of the evidence in favor of\n the opponent of the motion, allow all reasonable inferences in his or her favor,\n discard all countervailing evidence, and deny the motion where there is any\n doubt as to the conclusions to be drawn from the whole evidence. A verdict\n should not be directed during, or after, trial except where a reasonable mind\n could draw but one conclusion.\n\nId. (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).\n\n Ms. Kimbro insists the trial court applied an incorrect legal standard by weighing the\nevidence when ruling upon Mr. Thornton’s Rule 50 Motion for a Judgment Notwithstanding\nthe Verdict. On this point we agree with Ms. Kimbro. Directed verdicts “are available in will\ncontests to the same extent that they are available in other civil cases.” Mitchell v. Smith, 779\nS.W.2d 384, 387 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989). Thus, the trial judge was required to apply the very\ndeferential standard stated in Holmes, and was not permitted to “weigh the preponderance\nof the evidence.” 551 S.W.2d at 685. The trial court held that while Ms. Kimbro presented\nsome evidence, namely the independent advice of Attorney Callis, that evidence was\ninsufficient to overcome her burden to produce clear and convincing evidence the will was\nnot the product of undue influence. In so holding, the trial court impermissibly considered\ncountervailing evidence and considered the weight of the evidence presented by Ms. Kimbro.\nSee id.\n\n This was error because the countervailing facts present a jury question concerning the\nissue of undue influence; specifically, whether the evidence presented by Mr. Kimbro clearly\nand convincingly shows that Ms. Kimbro did not exert undue influence over the decedent in\n\n -10-\n\fthe procurement of the will. Matlock, 902 S.W.2d at 386. There is proof in the record that the\ndecedent maintained her mental faculties despite her deteriorating physical state and\nincreased need for medical care. There is also proof the decedent had a difficult relationship\nwith her son in her later years, especially with regard to her property and her home, as well\nas proof Ms. Kimbro and the decedent were friends who shared common interests, and that\nMs. Kimbro cared for the decedent’s dogs and neighborhood strays when the decedent\nbecame unable, which was very important to the decedent. Attorney Callis, whom the trial\njudge found competent and responsible in assisting the decedent in the preparation of her\nwill, testified that he met with the decedent outside of Ms. Kimbro’s presence. He questioned\nher motives for leaving her property to Ms. Kimbro instead of Mr. Thornton, and was\nsatisfied with her explanation. Taking “the strongest legitimate view of this evidence” in\nfavor of Ms. Kimbro, “allowing all reasonable inferences” in her favor, and “discarding all\ncountervailing evidence,” we find “reasonable minds” could draw more than one conclusion\nas to whether the decedent’s will was the product of a fair transaction or whether it was the\nproduct of undue influence on the part of Ms. Kimbro. See Holmes, 551 S.W.2d 686.\nTherefore, the trial court erred by entering judgment notwithstanding the verdict declaring\nthe will of the decedent invalid.\n\n Our decision does not, however, require reinstatement of the jury’s verdict. To\nunderstand why, once again we look to the Court’s ruling in Holmes. The jury in Holmes\nawarded the plaintiff damages of $28,000. Id. at 684. The defendant filed post-trial motions\nfor judgment notwithstanding the verdict and, alternatively, for a new trial. Id. The trial court\nfirst granted the defendant’s motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, but failed\nto rule on the defendant’s alternative motion for a new trial. Id. In the first appeal, the matter\nwas remanded by this court for consideration of the motion for a new trial, pursuant to Rule\n50.03 which expressly mandates that, when a judgment notwithstanding the verdict is granted\nand provided the movant alternatively asks for a new trial, the trial court shall also\n“conditionally” rule on the motion for a new trial. See Tenn. R. Civ. P. 50.03. On remand,\nthe trial judge “made it clear that he was totally dissatisfied with the verdict of the jury” and\ngranted a conditional new trial. Holmes, 551 S.W.2d at 684. In the second appeal, the court\nof appeals reversed the trial court’s grant of a judgment notwithstanding the verdict as well\nas the conditional grant of a new trial, and remanded the case with instructions to reinstate\nthe jury verdict. Id. The Tennessee Supreme Court agreed the trial court erred by entering\njudgment notwithstanding the verdict, concluding, as we have here, that a jury question was\npresented. However, the supreme court found the court of appeals erred in reinstating the jury\nverdict, and held that the case had to be remanded for a new trial because the trial court\nconditionally granted a new trial. Id. at 684-85. The reasons for the court’s holding were\nexplained by Justice Joseph W. Henry as follows:\n\n\n\n\n -11-\n\f When a trial judge sustains a motion for judgment n. o. v., Rule 50.03\n mandates that he also rule on the alternative motion for a new trial, indicating\n the grounds for granting or denying the motion.\n\n It must be borne in mind that the grant of a new trial was conditional and\n becomes effective only if the trial judge’s action in granting judgment is\n reversed. This conditional grant of a new trial under Rule 50.03 does not affect\n the finality of the judgment, and an appeal lies to review it. If the appellate\n court affirms the judgment n. o. v. the controversy is ended. This follows from\n the fact that the grant of a new trial was conditional and does not become\n operable unless and until the judgment is reversed or vacated on appeal. If [the\n appellate court] reverses the judgment, the grant of the motion for a new trial\n springs to life, and the case is remanded for a new trial, “unless the appellate\n court has otherwise ordered.”\n\n We are not concerned with the correctness of the trial judge’s action in\n awarding a conditional new trial. Having expressed his dissatisfaction with the\n jury verdict, in his capacity as thirteenth juror, his action in awarding a new\n trial is not reviewable, and the only issue before the appellate courts is his\n action in entering judgment n. o. v.\n\nId. at 684-85 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).\n\n Like the Tennessee Supreme Court concluded in Holmes, we have determined the\njudgment notwithstanding the verdict was improper, and we must now decide whether the\ncase should be remanded for a new trial or the verdict of the jury reinstated. See id. To\nresolve this issue, we must determine the effect of the trial court’s failure to render an\nexpress ruling on Mr. Thornton’s alternative motion for a new trial, which reads, “[a]s\ngrounds to set aside the verdict, enter a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new\ntrial, the Plaintiff states that the jury verdict is against the weight of all the evidence.”\n\n When, as here, the trial court is faced with “a motion for a new trial asserting that the\nverdict is against the weight of the evidence, [it] is called upon to independently weigh the\nevidence and determine whether it preponderates in favor or against the verdict.” Cooper v.\nTabb, 347 S.W.3d 207, 220 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2010) (citations omitted). This is known as the\n“thirteenth juror rule,” and it requires the trial judge to weigh the evidence, and if the trial\njudge is dissatisfied with the verdict of the jury, it should be set aside. Id. When ruling upon\na motion for a new trial, the trial court “has such broad discretion that it is not bound to give\nreasons for its action in granting or denying a new trial based on the preponderance of the\nevidence.” Id. (citations omitted). If the trial court approves the jury verdict without\n\n -12-\n\fcomment, we will presume “that the trial judge has adequately performed his function as the\nthirteenth juror.” Id. (citing Holden v. Rannick, 682 S.W.2d 903, 905 (Tenn. 1984)).\nHowever, “if it appears from any reasons assigned or statements made in passing on a motion\nfor a new trial that the trial judge was not actually satisfied with the verdict, it is the duty of\nthe appellate courts to grant a new trial.” Cooper, 347 S.W.3d at 221 (quoting Mabey v.\nMaggas, No. M2006-02689-COA-R3-CV, 2007 WL 2713726, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept.\n18, 2007)).\n\n The trial court failed to expressly rule on the motion for a new trial; nevertheless,\nwhen we examine the comments made by the trial court when ruling from the bench, the trial\ncourt’s dissatisfaction with the jury’s verdict is clear. Furthermore, as Holmes instructs, if the\ntrial court grants a motion for a directed verdict or judgment notwithstanding the verdict,\n“consistency demands that there be a conditional award of a new trial.” Holmes, 551 S.W.2d\nat 685. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court by implication conditionally awarded the\ncontestant a new trial.\n\n Because we have reversed the entry of a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the\nconditional grant of the motion for a new trial has sprung to life. Holmes, 551 S.W.2d at 685.\nAccordingly, the case is remanded for a new trial.\n\n I N C ONCLUSION\n\n The decision of the trial court to enter judgment notwithstanding the verdict is\nreversed and this matter is remanded for a new trial. Costs of appeal are assessed against the\nparties equally.\n\n\n ______________________________\n FRANK G. CLEMENT, JR., JUDGE\n\n\n\n\n -13-\n\f", "ocr": false, "opinion_id": 1047196 } ]
Court of Appeals of Tennessee
Court of Appeals of Tennessee
SA
Tennessee, TN
367,764
null
1979-07-18
false
united-states-v-long
Long
United States v. Long
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
0
Published
null
null
[ "601 F.2d 591" ]
[ { "author_str": null, "per_curiam": false, "type": "010combined", "page_count": null, "download_url": "http://bulk.resource.org/courts.gov/c/F2/601/601.F2d.591.78-5432.html", "author_id": null, "opinion_text": "601 F.2d 591\n U. S.v.Long\n No. 78-5432\n United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit\n 7/18/79\n \n 1\n M.D.Tenn.\n \n AFFIRMED\n ", "ocr": false, "opinion_id": 367764 } ]
Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
F
USA, Federal
1,047,355
Judge Jerry L. Smith
2012-02-03
false
mike-settle-v-david-osborne-warden
null
Mike Settle v. David Osborne, Warden
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
0
Published
null
null
null
[ { "author_str": null, "per_curiam": false, "type": "010combined", "page_count": 5, "download_url": "http://www.tsc.state.tn.us/sites/default/files/settlemopn.pdf", "author_id": 8290, "opinion_text": " IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE\n AT KNOXVILLE\n Assigned on Briefs October 26, 2011\n\n MIKE SETTLE v. DAVID OSBORNE, WARDEN\n\n Appeal from the Criminal Court for Morgan County\n No. 2011-CR-1 E. Eugene Eblen, Judge\n\n\n\n No. E2011-00766-CCA-R3-HC - Filed February 3, 2012\n\n\nPetitioner, Mike Settle, appeals the habeas corpus court’s dismissal of his petition for habeas\ncorpus relief in which he claimed that he was entitled to habeas corpus relief because his plea\nagreement and sentences for crimes committed in 1999 in Madison County are void because\nhis sentence for escape was ordered to be served concurrently to a federal sentence in\nviolation of Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(c)(3). Petitioner failed to follow the\nmandatory procedural requirements for the valid filing of a petition for the writ of habeas\ncorpus. Therefore, we affirm the judgment dismissing the habeas petition.\n\nTenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court is Affirmed.\n\nJ ERRY L. S MITH, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which N ORMA M CG EE O GLE and\nD. K ELLY T HOMAS, J R., JJ., joined.\n\nMike Settle, Pro Se, Wartburg, Tennessee.\n\nRobert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney General and Reporter; John H. Bledsoe, Senior Counsel; and\nRussell Johnson, District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.\n\n\n OPINION\n\n Factual Background\n\n Petitioner is no stranger to the legal process. In January of 2001, Petitioner pled guilty\nin Madison County Circuit Court to one count of felony escape, one count of especially\naggravated kidnapping, one count of aggravated robbery, and two counts of aggravated\nassault. The underlying facts that led to the convictions arose when Petitioner became ill and\nwas transported from the Hardeman County Correctional Facility to a hospital in Jackson,\n\fTennessee. Petitioner was eventually admitted to the hospital for further treatment. Two days\nlater, he overpowered a guard, took the officer’s weapon, and pointed it at the guard’s head.\nPetitioner ultimately escaped from the hospital with a hostage in a stolen car. He was\nrecaptured and returned to prison. As a result of the plea agreement, Petitioner received a\nsentence of six years for the felony escape conviction, twenty-five years for the especially\naggravated kidnapping conviction, twenty-five years for the aggravated robbery conviction,\nand fifteen years for each aggravated assault conviction. The sentences were ordered to be\nserved concurrently with each other and with a federal sentence as well as a sentence in a\nseparate Madison County case. The sentences were ordered to be served consecutively to\nsentences for several prior convictions from Shelby County.\n\n In September of 2001, Petitioner filed his first petition for writ of habeas corpus. The\npetition was filed in the Morgan County Criminal Court and alleged that the Department of\nCorrection violated the terms of Petitioner’s plea agreement by refusing to run his sentences\nconcurrently with his federal sentence. The trial court treated the petition as a petition for\nwrit of certiorari and transferred the matter to the Madison County Circuit Court. The\npetition was dismissed for failing to state a colorable claim for post-conviction relief. See\nMike Settle v. State, No. W2003-01261-CCA-R3-PC, 2004 WL 1656481, at *1 (Tenn. Crim.\nApp., at Jackson, Jul. 23, 2004).\n\n Petitioner has also sought habeas corpus relief in federal district court. At least two\npetitions have been dismissed as untimely. See Mike Settle v. Ricky Bell, Warden, No. 3:09-\n0560 (M.D. Tenn., Nov. 10, 2009);Mike Settle v. Ricky J. Bell, No. 06-1092 (W.D. Tenn.\nSept. 4, 2009). Petitioner has also filed for relief in the form of extradition in the Eastern\nDistrict of Tennessee. In that case, the court treated the petition as a petition for writ of\nhabeas corpus and dismissed it. See Mike Settle v. David R. Osborne, Warden, No. 3:11-cv-\n00127.\n\n Petitioner filed a second petition for writ of habeas corpus in Davidson County. The\npetition was dismissed for failure to pay court costs at the time of filing. Petitioner appealed.\nOn appeal, this Court upheld the dismissal and affirmed. Mike Settle v. State, No. M2004-\n00411-CCA-R3-HC, 2005 WL 2978974, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Nov. 7,\n2005), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Mar. 27, 2006).\n\n Then, Petitioner filed another petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Morgan County\nCriminal Court. This petition was also dismissed. This Court affirmed the dismissal on\n\n\n\n\n -2-\n\fappeal. See Mike Settle v. State, No. E2010-00945-CCA-R3-HC, 2010 WL 5276980, at *1\n(Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Dec. 17, 2010), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Mar. 9, 2011).1\n\n On January 10, 2011, Petitioner filed the petition for writ of habeas corpus applicable\nherein. The State filed a motion to dismiss. Petitioner opposed the motion. The habeas\ncourt dismissed the petition without a hearing on February 14, 2011. Petitioner filed a notice\nof appeal on April 1, 2011. The certificate of service on the final order indicates that copies\nwere not mailed by the Circuit Court Clerk until April 1, 2011.\n\n Analysis\n\n On appeal, Petitioner challenges the dismissal of the petition for writ of habeas\ncorpus. The State argues that Petitioner failed to comply with mandatory procedural\nrequirements and, therefore, the habeas court properly dismissed the petition for relief.\n\n At the outset, we note that a notice of appeal must be filed within thirty days after the\ndate of entry of the judgment appealed from. Tenn. R. App. P. 4(a). The notice of appeal is\nnot jurisdictional in criminal cases; the filing of the notice of appeal can be waived in the\ninterest of justice. Id. Here, the trial court dismissed the petition for relief on February 14,\n2011, and Petitioner did not file a notice of appeal until April 1, 2011. It is clear that the\nnotice is untimely as it was not filed until almost two months after the habeas court dismissed\nthe petition. Petitioner filed a “Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint” on\nFebruary 23, 2011, and a “Motion to Render Decision” on March 23, 2011, in which he\nasserted that he had not received a copy of any final order in his case. Indeed, the final order\ndismissing the petition contains a certificate of service that indicates the order was not served\nuntil April 1, 2011. Under these circumstances, we choose to waive the timely filing of the\nnotice of appeal in this case.\n\n The determination of whether to grant habeas corpus relief is a question of law. See\nHickman v. State, 153 S.W.3d 16, 19 (Tenn. 2004). As such, we will review the habeas\ncorpus court’s findings de novo without a presumption of correctness. Id. Moreover, it is\nthe petitioner’s burden to demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, “that the sentence\nis void or that the confinement is illegal.” Wyatt v. State, 24 S.W.3d 319, 322 (Tenn. 2000).\n\n\n\n\n 1\n Petitioner has also filed two federal habeas corpus petitions relating to these convictions. They were both\ndismissed as untimely. See Mike Settle v. Ricky J. Bell, No. 06-1092-JDT-egb (W .D. Tenn., Sept. 4, 2009) (dismissing\n28 U.S.C.§ 2254 claim as untimely); Mike Settle v. Ricky Bell, Warden, No. 3:09-cv-00560 (M.D. Tenn, Nov. 10, 2009)\n(dismissing 28 U.S.C. § 2241 claim as untimely).\n\n -3-\n\f Article I, section 15 of the Tennessee Constitution guarantees an accused the right to\nseek habeas corpus relief. See Taylor v. State, 995 S.W.2d 78, 83 (Tenn. 1999). A writ of\nhabeas corpus is available only when it appears on the face of the judgment or the record that\nthe convicting court was without jurisdiction to convict or sentence the defendant or that the\ndefendant is still imprisoned despite the expiration of his sentence. Archer v. State, 851\nS.W.2d 157, 164 (Tenn. 1993); Potts v. State, 833 S.W.2d 60, 62 (Tenn. 1992). In other\nwords, habeas corpus relief may be sought only when the judgment is void, not merely\nvoidable. See Taylor, 995 S.W.2d at 83. “A void judgment ‘is one in which the judgment\nis facially invalid because the court lacked jurisdiction or authority to render the judgment\nor because the defendant’s sentence has expired.’ We have recognized that a sentence\nimposed in direct contravention of a statute, for example, is void and illegal.” Stephenson\nv. Carlton, 28 S.W.3d 910, 911 (Tenn. 2000) (quoting Taylor, 955 S.W.2d at 83).\n\n However, if after a review of the habeas petitioner’s filings the habeas corpus court\ndetermines that the petitioner would not be entitled to relief, then the petition may be\nsummarily dismissed. T.C.A. § 29-21-109; State ex rel. Byrd v. Bomar, 381 S.W.2d 280, 283\n(Tenn. 1964). Further, a habeas corpus court may summarily dismiss a petition for writ of\nhabeas corpus without the appointment of a lawyer and without an evidentiary hearing if\nthere is nothing on the face of the judgment to indicate that the convictions addressed therein\nare void. Passarella v. State, 891 S.W.2d 619, 627 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994).\n\n The procedural requirements for habeas corpus relief are mandatory and must be\nscrupulously followed. Summers v. State, 212 S.W.3d 251, 260 (Tenn. 2007); Hickman, 153\nS.W.3d at 19-20; Archer, 851 S.W.2d at 165. For the benefit of individuals such as\nPetitioner, our legislature has explicitly laid out the formal requirements for a petition for a\nwrit of habeas corpus at Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-21-107:\n\n (a) Application for the writ shall be made by petition, signed either by the party\n for whose benefit it is intended, or some person on the petitioner’s behalf, and\n verified by affidavit.\n\n (b) The petition shall state:\n\n (1) That the person in whose behalf the writ is sought, is illegally restrained of\n liberty, and the person by whom and place where restrained, mentioning the\n name of such person, if known, and, if unknown, describing the person with\n as much particularity as practicable;\n\n\n\n\n -4-\n\f (2) The cause or pretense of such restraint according to the best information\n of the applicant, and if it be by virtue of any legal process, a copy thereof shall\n be annexed, or a satisfactory reason given for its absence;\n\n (3) That the legality of the restraint has not already been adjudged upon a prior\n proceeding of the same character, to the best of the applicant’s knowledge and\n belief; and\n\n (4) That it is the first application for the writ, or, if a previous application has\n been made, a copy of the petition and proceedings thereon shall be produced,\n or satisfactory reasons be given for the failure so to do.\n\nA habeas corpus court “properly may choose to summarily dismiss a petition for failing to\ncomply with the statutory procedural requirements.” Summers, 212 S.W.3d at 260; see also\nHickman, 153 S.W.3d at 21.\n\n Petitioner alleged in his petition for relief that this was his “second” application for\nhabeas corpus relief on this issue. He failed to attach copies of the prior petition as required\nby Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-21-107(b)(4). Further, as indicated above, this is\nat least Petitioner’s fourth petition for habeas corpus relief that is related to these convictions.\n Moreover, the petition was not verified under oath by affidavit.\n\n\n\n\n Conclusion\n\n For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the habeas corpus court is affirmed.\n\n\n\n\n ___________________________________\n JERRY L. SMITH, JUDGE\n\n\n\n\n -5-\n\f", "ocr": false, "opinion_id": 1047355 } ]
Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee
Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee
SA
Tennessee, TN
365,146
null
1979-04-06
false
stevens-v-reed
Stevens
Stevens v. Reed
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
0
Published
null
null
[ "595 F.2d 1217" ]
[ { "author_str": null, "per_curiam": false, "type": "010combined", "page_count": null, "download_url": "http://bulk.resource.org/courts.gov/c/F2/595/595.F2d.1217.79-6163.html", "author_id": null, "opinion_text": "595 F.2d 1217\n Stevensv.Reed\n No. 79-6163\n United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit\n 4/6/79\n \n 1\n E.D.N.C.\n \n AFFIRMED\n ", "ocr": false, "opinion_id": 365146 } ]
Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
F
USA, Federal
30,911
null
2003-04-22
false
fenlon-v-moskowitz
Fenlon
Fenlon v. Moskowitz
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
0
Unpublished
null
null
null
[ { "author_str": null, "per_curiam": false, "type": "010combined", "page_count": 3, "download_url": "http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions\\unpub\\02/02-20703.0.wpd.pdf", "author_id": null, "opinion_text": " United States Court of Appeals\n Fifth Circuit\n F I L E D\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT April 22, 2003\n\n Charles R. Fulbruge III\n Clerk\n No. 02-20703\n Conference Calendar\n\n\n\nROBERT M. FENLON,\n\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\n\nversus\n\nADAM MOSKOWITZ; BRIAN D. COYNE,\n\n Defendants-Appellees.\n\n --------------------\n Appeal from the United States District Court\n for the Southern District of Texas\n USDC No. H-01-CV-4270\n --------------------\n\nBefore DAVIS, BARKSDALE, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.\n\nPER CURIAM:*\n\n Robert Fenlon, Texas prisoner No. 01015511, seeks leave to\n\nproceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) on appeal from the dismissal of\n\nhis civil rights complaint, and he has filed an “Extraordinary\n\nWrit,” seeking to supplement the record with the original\n\ntranscripts and records from his state court criminal trial.\n\nFenlon’s request to supplement the record is DENIED.\n\n Fenlon’s complaint alleged that his appointed trial\n\nattorneys conspired with the trial judge and the prosecutor to\n\n *\n Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined\nthat this opinion should not be published and is not precedent\nexcept under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.\nR. 47.5.4.\n\f No. 02-20703\n -2-\n\nfabricate evidence against Fenlon. The district court dismissed\n\nthe complaint as frivolous because it determined that Fenlon had\n\nfailed to establish that his attorneys were state actors for\n\npurposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The court denied Fenlon’s motion\n\nto amend his complaint to add ninety-eight new defendants as\n\nviolative of FED. R. CIV. P. 20. The court denied Fenlon\n\npermission to appeal IFP and certified that the appeal was not\n\ntaken in good faith. By moving for IFP, Fenlon is challenging\n\nthe district court’s certification. See Baugh v. Taylor, 117\n\nF.3d 197, 202 (5th Cir. 1997).\n\n We reject Fenlon’s suggestion that this court lacks\n\nappellate jurisdiction because the district court has not ruled\n\non two pending motions. We find no error in the district court’s\n\ndismissal as frivolous of Fenlon’s claims against his trial\n\nattorneys. Fenlon’s conclusional allegations of a conspiracy are\n\nnot actionable under 28 U.S.C. § 1983. See Hobbs v. Hawkins, 968\n\nF.2d 471, 479-80 (5th Cir. 1992); Babb v. Dorman, 33 F.3d 472,\n\n476 (5th Cir. 1994). We do not address the district court’s\n\ndenial of Fenlon’s motion to join additional defendants because\n\nFenlon has presented no argument challenging the district court’s\n\nreasons for denying joinder. See Brinkmann v. Dallas County\n\nDeputy Sheriff Abner, 813 F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir. 1987).\n\n\n\n The district court’s dismissal of the complaint as frivolous\n\nand this court’s dismissal of the appeal count as two “strikes”\n\f No. 02-20703\n -3-\n\nfor purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). See Adepegba v. Hammons,\n\n103 F.3d 383, 385-87 (5th Cir. 1996). Fenlon is CAUTIONED that\n\nif he accumulates one more “strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), he\n\nwill not be able to proceed IFP in any civil action or appeal\n\nfiled while he is incarcerated or detained in any facility unless\n\nhe is under imminent danger of serious physical injury. See 28\n\nU.S.C. § 1915(g).\n\n IFP MOTION DENIED; MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT THE RECORD DENIED;\n\nAPPEAL DISMISSED; THREE-STRIKES WARNING ISSUED.\n\f", "ocr": false, "opinion_id": 30911 } ]
Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
F
USA, Federal
1,069,915
Judge Alan E. Glenn
2004-06-22
false
william-osepczuk-v-state-of-tennessee
null
William Osepczuk v. State of Tennessee
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
0
Published
null
null
null
[ { "author_str": null, "per_curiam": false, "type": "010combined", "page_count": 9, "download_url": "http://www.tsc.state.tn.us/sites/default/files/OPINIONS/tcca/PDF/042/Osepc.pdf", "author_id": 8284, "opinion_text": " IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE\n AT NASHVILLE\n April 7, 2004 Session\n\n WILLIAM OSEPCZUK v. STATE OF TENNESSEE\n\n Direct Appeal from the Criminal Court for Lawrence County\n No. 23648 Stella L. Hargrove, Judge\n\n\n\n No. M2003-01601-CCA-R3-PC - Filed June 22, 2004\n\n\nThe petitioner, William Osepczuk, was convicted of attempted first degree murder and sentenced\nto confinement for twenty-five years. After his conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct\nappeal, he filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that trial counsel had been ineffective.\nFollowing an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied the petition, and this timely\nappeal resulted. After review, we affirm the denial of the petition.\n\n Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court Affirmed\n\nALAN E. GLENN , J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which DAVID H. WELLES and ROBERT W.\nWEDEMEYER, JJ., joined.\n\nM. Wallace Coleman, Jr., Lawrenceburg, Tennessee, for the appellant, William Osepczuk.\n\nPaul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter; Richard H. Dunavant, Assistant Attorney\nGeneral; T. Michael Bottoms, District Attorney General; and James G. White, II, Assistant District\nAttorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.\n\n OPINION\n\n FACTS\n\n In the direct appeal, this court set out the facts upon which the petitioner’s conviction was\nbased:\n\n During 1997 and 1998, Angelo Thomas Wilson acted as an\n informant and engaged in a number of \"undercover drug buys\" for the\n Lawrence County Sheriff's Department. After a period of time, it\n became accepted \"street\" talk that Wilson was acting as a drug\n informant.\n\f Wilson was employed at a local manufacturing plant and\nworked the 10:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. shift. On the evening of\nSeptember 9, 1998, Wilson was at a friend's house waiting for his\nbrother to furnish him a ride to work when the [petitioner] showed\nup. Wilson had known the [petitioner] since childhood. After a brief\nconversation, the [petitioner] offered to give Wilson a ride to work\nand the two men proceeded to walk to a nearby motel where the\n[petitioner] was staying.\n\n The two waited until a friend of the [petitioner], known as\nTerry, arrived in a black or gray four door vehicle. The [petitioner]\ninformed Wilson that \"he had to make a stop or two and then he was\ngoing to drop [Wilson] off at work.\" The [petitioner] and Terry rode\nin the front of the vehicle and Wilson sat in the rear.\n\n [The men] went to the store across the street\n from the motel and [the petitioner] made a pit stop at\n a friend's house and parked down at the bottom of the\n hill and he said he had to make another stop. He had\n some [drug] buys he had to do. . . . [They then] went\n out Mount Ararat Road. [The petitioner and Terry] let\n me out on the road [next to a soybean field]. [The\n Appellant] said he didn't want me to know the people.\n I said, \"That's was fine. That's no problem.\" It didn't\n dawn on me and then [the petitioner] and them came\n back down the road. . . . [The petitioner] stopped the\n car and said, \"Come on, let's go,\" and that's when he\n started shooting.\n\n Wilson was shot in the right leg. He then began running into\na bean field. He heard additional shots and realized that he was \"hit\nall over [his] body.\" Wilson was struck approximately seven or eight\ntimes; resulting in gunshot wounds to his right hand, his right thumb,\nbetween his chest cavity and his rib cage, in the back, in the right leg,\nand twice in the left leg. After being struck by gunfire, he fell to the\nground. The [petitioner] and Terry found Wilson in the field and\nTerry held the victim while the [petitioner] beat him in the back of the\nhead with the butt of the gun and a stick. After a futile attempt to\ndefend himself, Wilson withdrew further resistance. Terry remarked,\n\"He is dead. Come on, let's go.\" The men then left. Wilson then\nmanaged to walk to a nearby house where he sought assistance.\nWilson informed both the resident of the house and paramedics that\n\n\n\n 2\n\fresponded to the scene that the [petitioner] was the individual\nresponsible for the shooting.\n\n Law enforcement officials recovered five .45-caliber shell\ncasings at the crime scene and observed a trail leading into the bean\nfield. A bloody shirt with what appeared to be bullet holes, a watch,\nsunglasses and keys were located in the field. Officers later obtained\na search warrant for the [petitioner’s] room at the Traveler's Motel.\nA .45-caliber bullet was discovered during the execution of the search\nwarrant. The .45-caliber weapon was never recovered.\n\n Michael Glen Parrot testified that his apartment was\nburglarized in 1998, resulting in the theft of his \"High Point\n.45-caliber automatic pistol.\" The weapon was a \"rather large gun,\"\nnickel-plated. Mr. Parrot had saved casings from his weapon to have\nreloaded. After the attempt on Angelo Wilson's life, Mr. Parrot\nfurnished the Sheriff's Department with these casings fired from his\nweapon. The casings were sent to the crime lab for comparison with\nthose found at the crime scene. The examination proved that the\ncasings had been fired from the same weapon.\n\n The [petitioner] testified that, on September 9, 1998, he met\nAngelo Wilson at Donald Haygood's house at about three o'clock that\nafternoon. The men stayed there for approximately one hour and then\nproceeded to his room at the Traveler's Motel. The [petitioner] and\nAngelo were joined by Tim Cooper and Tiffany Wise. As the\nafternoon progressed, Angelo announced that he wanted some crack\ncocaine. The [petitioner] left the motel in Cooper's vehicle,\npurchased fifty dollars of crack cocaine, and returned to the motel\nroom. Angelo proceeded to smoke three crack rocks using an\naluminum can fashioned into a pipe. Two hours later, Terry Polidro\narrived at the room. Terry and the [petitioner] left in Terry's vehicle\nto purchase an additional seventy-five dollars of crack cocaine.\nAngelo remained at the motel. Upon returning to the motel, the\n[petitioner] returned to his room, but Angelo left with Terry. The\n[petitioner] did not see Angelo the remainder of the evening. The\n[petitioner] maintains that Angelo's crack-induced\nstate-of-hallucination resulted in the current charge against him.\n\n In rebuttal, the State presented the testimony of Anthony\nQuinn Wilson. This witness testified that on the night of the\nshooting, the [petitioner] arrived at his residence after midnight trying\nto sell a silver and black .45-caliber handgun.\n\n\n 3\n\fState v. William “Butch” Osepczuk, No. M1999-00846-CCA-R3-CD, 2001 WL 120716, at **1-2\n(Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 1, 2001), perm. to appeal denied (Tenn. June 18, 2001).\n\n The pro se petition for post-conviction relief, which was subsequently amended by counsel,\nclaimed, inter alia, that trial counsel had been ineffective in not interviewing state’s witnesses “to\ndetermine all available defenses that could have possibly been raised;” in not filing “any meaningful\npre-trial motions, other than a motion for discovery;” in “failing to [sic] any meaningful investigation\nof the case;” in failing “to make objection to the elements of the indictment and instruction of charge\nto the jury;” in failing to raise as an issue the “trial court’s failure to instruct on lesser-included\noffenses;” in allowing “testimony and evidence . . . of an unrelated and uncharged offense;” in failing\n“to make timely objections, to preserve issues to be raised in [the] motion for new trial, as well as\non direct appeal.” Additionally, the petitioner claimed that the trial court had erred in not instructing\n“the jury on all possible lesser-included offenses.” In counsel’s amendment to the petition, it was\nalleged that trial counsel had been ineffective by “leaving in the middle of the trial” after learning\nthat his wife and children had been seriously injured in an automobile accident, and, when trial\nresumed the next day, counsel “was unable to focus his full attention on the trial as his attention was\ndivided between his injured family and his representation of Petitioner;” by not calling “numerous\nmaterial witnesses;” and by failing to “impeach or inadequate impeachment of witness Anthony\nQuinn Wilson.”\n\n At the beginning of the evidentiary hearing on the petition, post-conviction counsel advised\nthe court two claims were being pursued: the “failure to instruct on lesser included offenses,” and\n“ineffective assistance of counsel.” The only witness testifying at the hearing was the petitioner’s\ntrial counsel, who said that, prior to trial, he had “met several times” with the petitioner, in “[p]retty\nlengthy meetings,” and obtained a list of possible witnesses. Counsel, who said that he “probably\n[had] done several dozen trials,” testified at length as to his pretrial preparations, including\nwitnesses’ interviews. Asked about the accident during the trial, which had injured his wife and\nchildren, he responded, “I’m not going to say it didn’t have some kind of effect on me, but I’m [sic]\ncan’t sit here and say I didn’t call a witness because we didn’t do that.” In sum, he said, “I felt\ncomposed enough to come back in here and finish the trial.” He said that, in every trial, “lesser\nincluded offenses are right at the top of my list of things to do because that is fertile ground for a lot\nof things.” He said that he “probably had more success on lesser included instructions not being\ncharged or jury instructions generally being charged incorrectly because that is just great stuff for\nappeal.” He described the petitioner’s trial as “not one of the cases from a defense perspective that\nwould be acceptable in my view as an all-or-nothing charge.” However, he could not recall what had\noccurred as to instructing the jury on lesser-included offenses. Asked if he should have raised it as\nan issue in the motion for new trial and on appeal, counsel responded, “I would think so, yeah,” but\nadded, “The only reason I wouldn’t raise [it] . . . is if we agreed somewhere in the record that we\ndidn’t want the charge.” On cross-examination, trial counsel said that his practice was “almost\nexclusively capital murder defense” for which he had been certified.\n\n On appeal, the petitioner presents the claims that the trial court erred in not charging as to\nlesser-included offenses and that trial counsel was ineffective in failing “to call certain witnesses at\n\n\n 4\n\ftrial” and “to ask for lesser included offenses to be charged and then failed to include on the record\nthe reason, if any, of [sic] why none were charged.”\n\n ANALYSIS\n\n The post-conviction petitioner bears the burden of proving his allegations by clear and\nconvincing evidence. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-110(f). When an evidentiary hearing is held\nin the post-conviction setting, the findings of fact made by the court are conclusive on appeal unless\nthe evidence preponderates against them. See Tidwell v. State, 922 S.W.2d 497, 500 (Tenn. 1996).\nWhere appellate review involves purely factual issues, the appellate court should not reweigh or\nreevaluate the evidence. See Henley v. State, 960 S.W.2d 572, 578 (Tenn. 1997). However, review\nof a trial court’s application of the law to the facts of the case is de novo, with no presumption of\ncorrectness. See Ruff v. State, 978 S.W.2d 95, 96 (Tenn. 1998). The issues of deficient performance\nof counsel and possible prejudice to the defense are mixed questions of law and fact and, thus,\nsubject to de novo review by the appellate court. See State v. Burns, 6 S.W.3d 453, 461 (Tenn.\n1999).\n\n In order to determine the competence of counsel, Tennessee courts have applied standards\ndeveloped in federal case law. See State v. Taylor, 968 S.W.2d 900, 905 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997)\n(noting that the same standard for determining ineffective assistance of counsel that is applied in\nfederal cases also applies in Tennessee). The United States Supreme Court articulated the standard\nin Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984), which is\nwidely accepted as the appropriate standard for all claims of a convicted petitioner that counsel’s\nassistance was defective. The standard is firmly grounded in the belief that counsel plays a role that\nis “critical to the ability of the adversarial system to produce just results.” Id. at 685, 104 S. Ct. at\n2063. The Strickland standard is a two-prong test:\n\n First, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was\n deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious\n that counsel was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the\n defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must\n show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This\n requires showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive\n the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.\n\nId. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064. The Strickland Court further explained the meaning of “deficient\nperformance” in the first prong of the test in the following way:\n\n In any case presenting an ineffectiveness claim, the performance\n inquiry must be whether counsel’s assistance was reasonable\n considering all the circumstances. . . . No particular set of detailed\n rules for counsel’s conduct can satisfactorily take account of the\n variety of circumstances faced by defense counsel or the range of\n\n\n 5\n\f legitimate decisions regarding how best to represent a criminal\n defendant.\n\nId. at 688-89, 104 S. Ct. at 2065. The petitioner must establish “that counsel’s representation fell\nbelow an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.” House v. State,\n44 S.W.3d 508, 515 (Tenn. 2001) (citing Goad v. State, 938 S.W.2d 363, 369 (Tenn. 1996)).\n\n As for the prejudice prong of the test, the Strickland Court stated: “The defendant must\nshow that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of\nthe proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to\nundermine confidence in the outcome.” 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068; see also Overton v.\nState, 874 S.W.2d 6, 11 (Tenn. 1994) (concluding that petitioner failed to establish that “there is a\nreasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the outcome of the proceedings would have been\ndifferent”).\n\n Courts need not approach the Strickland test in a specific order or even “address both\ncomponents of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one.” 466 U.S. at 697,\n104 S. Ct. at 2069; see also Goad, 938 S.W.2d at 370 (stating that “failure to prove either deficiency\nor prejudice provides a sufficient basis to deny relief on the ineffective assistance claim”).\n\n We note that when post-conviction proceedings have included a full evidentiary hearing, as\nwas true in this case, the trial judge’s findings of fact and conclusions of law are given the effect and\nweight of a jury verdict, and this court is “bound by the trial judge’s findings of fact unless we\nconclude that the evidence contained in the record preponderates against the judgment entered in the\ncause.” Black v. State, 794 S.W.2d 752, 755 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990). The reviewing court must\nindulge a strong presumption that the conduct of counsel falls within the range of reasonable\nprofessional assistance, see Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S. Ct. at 2066, and may not second-\nguess the tactical and strategic choices made by trial counsel unless those choices were uninformed\nbecause of inadequate preparation. See Hellard v. State, 629 S.W.2d 4, 9 (Tenn. 1982). The fact\nthat a strategy or tactic failed or hurt the defense does not alone support the claim of ineffective\nassistance of counsel. See Thompson v. State, 958 S.W.2d 156, 165 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997).\nFinally, a person charged with a criminal offense is not entitled to perfect representation. See\nDenton v. State, 945 S.W.2d 793, 796 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996). As explained in Burns, 6 S.W.3d\nat 462, “[c]onduct that is unreasonable under the facts of one case may be perfectly reasonable under\nthe facts of another.”\n\n As to the petitioner’s claim that counsel was ineffective in failing to “call certain witnesses,”\nas the issue is explained on appeal, the post-conviction court, among its detailed written findings of\nfact and conclusions of law, determined that counsel had testified that he “was not surprised by any\nwitnesses called by the state or by their testimony at trial” and that “[n]o further testimony was\noffered to the Court by Petitioner as to how the testimony of any witness, not accounted for by [trial\ncounsel], would have affected the outcome of the trial.” Since, as the post-conviction court correctly\nnotes, the petitioner did not present, at the post-conviction hearing, any of the witnesses whom he\n\n\n 6\n\fclaims would have been beneficial to his defense, the record supports the court’s determination that\nhe failed to show counsel was ineffective in this regard. See Black, 794 S.W.2d at 757 (stating that\n\"[w]hen a petitioner contends that trial counsel failed to discover, interview, or present witnesses in\nsupport of his defense, these witnesses should be presented by the petitioner at the evidentiary\nhearing. As a general rule, this is the only way the petitioner can establish that . . . the failure to have\na known witness present or call the witness to the stand resulted in the denial of critical evidence\nwhich inured to the prejudice of the petitioner.\").\n\n We next will consider the petitioner’s claim that trial counsel was ineffective for not raising\nas an issue the fact that the trial court had not instructed as to any lesser-included offenses of\nattempted first degree murder. As to this claim, the post-conviction court found that no lesser-\nincluded offenses had been charged, that this was not raised as an issue either in the motion for new\ntrial or on appeal, and that not requesting such an instruction was “a tactical trial maneuver on [trial\ncounsel’s] part.” Noting in brief the facts of the case, the court said the “evidence was\noverwhelming as to the planning and premeditation” to murder the victim, who sustained “grave,\nlife-threatening injuries . . . when he was shot numerous times, beaten and clearly left for dead in a\nsoybean field by [the petitioner] whom he positively identified.” Thus, a reasonable jury would not\nhave convicted him of other than attempted first degree murder. Accordingly, the post-conviction\ncourt determined, as to these issues, that the petitioner had failed to show either that trial counsel\nhad been ineffective or that he had been prejudiced by counsel’s actions. We will review these\nfindings.\n\n As the post-conviction court noted, and our supreme court explained in State v. Moore, 77\nS.W.3d 132, 134 (Tenn. 2002), a trial court has a responsibility, regardless of whether counsel so\nrequests, to instruct as to lesser-included offenses:\n\n [I]t is the duty of the trial judge to instruct the jury as to the law of a\n lesser-included offense if he or she determines that: (1) reasonable\n minds could accept the offense as lesser-included; and (2) the\n evidence is legally sufficient to support a conviction for the\n lesser-included offense. State v. Burns, 6 S.W.3d 453, 469 (Tenn.\n 1999). The judge shall instruct the jury on all lesser-included\n offenses notwithstanding a request from the defendant. Tenn. Code\n Ann. § 40-18-110(b) (1997 Repl.).\n\nId. (footnote omitted).\n\n The question of whether a given offense should be submitted to the jury as a lesser-included\noffense is a mixed question of law and fact. State v. Rush, 50 S.W.3d 424, 427 (Tenn. 2001) (citing\nState v. Smiley, 38 S.W.3d 521 (Tenn. 2001)). The standard of review for mixed questions of law\nand fact is de novo with no presumption of correctness. Id.; see also Burns, 6 S.W.3d at 461.\n\n\n\n\n 7\n\f In State v. Richmond, 90 S.W.3d 648 (Tenn. 2002), the court explained that overwhelming\nproof as to the greater offense does not obviate the necessity to instruct as to lesser offenses:\n\n [O]verwhelming evidence established defendant Richmond's\n participation in the robbery of Mose Cuxart and attempted robbery of\n Charles Stephen Earls. Likewise, evidence was overwhelming and\n uncontroverted that deadly weapons were involved. In proving the\n greater offenses, the State necessarily proved the lesser-included\n offenses. Therefore, a jury could have convicted the defendant of the\n lesser-included offenses of robbery and attempted robbery. As such,\n it was error for the trial court not to charge the lesser-included\n offenses of robbery and attempted robbery.\n\nId. at 662-63.\n\n However, the court additionally explained that the fact that lesser offenses should have been\ncharged, but were not, does not necessarily require a reversal of the conviction:\n\n [O]ur determination whether this error was harmless beyond a\n reasonable doubt hinges upon what a reasonable jury would have\n done in light of the evidence produced at trial. We hold that no\n reasonable jury would have convicted the defendant on the\n lesser-included offenses of robbery and attempted robbery instead of\n the charged offenses due to the uncontroverted and overwhelming\n evidence establishing the use of deadly weapons and his direct\n participation in the offenses. Any error was harmless beyond a\n reasonable doubt.\n\nId. at 663.\n\n In the present appeal, we respectfully disagree with the post-conviction court’s determination\nthat trial counsel, as a tactical decision, had decided that he did not want lesser-included offenses to\nbe charged to the jury. In fact, trial counsel testified that, although he could not recall his reasoning\nat the time, he believed he would have wanted lesser offenses to be charged, so the jury could make\nother than an “all-or-nothing” decision in a very brutal case. Further, the court had an independent\nresponsibility, regardless of counsel’s wishes, to instruct the jury as to lesser-included offenses.\nAttempted first degree murder, for which the petitioner was convicted, is defined as the attempt to\ncommit a “premeditated and intentional killing of another,” see Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-202(a)(1);\nwhile attempted second degree murder, which he argues should have been charged, is defined as a\n“knowing killing of another,” see Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-210(a)(1). Given the brutality of the\nattack on the victim, and the fact that the petitioner and his codefendant left the victim only because\nthey believed they had killed him, which was their intention, we conclude that no rational jury would\nhave convicted the petitioner of any offense other than attempted first degree murder. Accordingly,\n\n\n 8\n\fthe record supports the post-conviction court’s determination that the petitioner failed to show that\nhe was prejudiced by the jury instructions.\n\n CONCLUSION\n\n Based upon the foregoing authorities and reasoning, we affirm the denial of the petition for\npost-conviction relief.\n\n ___________________________________\n ALAN E. GLENN, JUDGE\n\n\n\n\n 9\n\f", "ocr": false, "opinion_id": 1069915 } ]
Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee
Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee
SA
Tennessee, TN
10,228
null
1996-08-23
false
hunt-v-steve-dement-bail
Hunt
Hunt v. Steve Dement Bail
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
0
Unpublished
null
null
[ "96 F.3d 1443" ]
[ { "author_str": null, "per_curiam": false, "type": "010combined", "page_count": 2, "download_url": "http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions\\unpub\\96/96-30163.0.wpd.pdf", "author_id": null, "opinion_text": "96 F.3d 1443\n Huntv.Steve Dement Bail Bonds**\n NO. 96-30163\n United States Court of Appeals,Fifth Circuit.\n Aug 22, 1996\n \n 1\n Appeal From: W.D.La. , No. 95-CV-168 , 914 F.Supp. 1390\n \n \n 2\n AFFIRMED.\n \n \n \n **\n Conference Calendar\n \n \n ", "ocr": false, "opinion_id": 10228 } ]
Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
F
USA, Federal
1,047,696
Judge Camille R. McMullen
2011-11-21
false
ricky-johnson-v-state-of-tennessee
null
Ricky Johnson v. State of Tennessee
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
0
Published
null
null
null
[ { "author_str": null, "per_curiam": false, "type": "010combined", "page_count": 5, "download_url": "http://www.tsc.state.tn.us/sites/default/files/johnsonrickyopn.pdf", "author_id": 8286, "opinion_text": " IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE\n AT JACKSON\n Assigned on Briefs August 2, 2011\n\n RICKY JOHNSON v. STATE OF TENNESSEE\n\n Direct Appeal from the Circuit Court for Madison County\n No. C-11-20 Donald H. Allen, Judge\n\n\n No. W2011-00311-CCA-R3-CO - Filed November 21, 2011\n\n\nThe Petitioner, Ricky Johnson, was convicted by a Madison County jury in 1989 of burglary\nof an automobile and grand larceny and was sentenced to concurrent eight-year sentences as\na Range II, persistent offender. More than twenty-one years later, the Petitioner filed a\npetition for writ of error coram nobis, alleging that there was a variance between the\nindictment and the proof at trial and that his convictions violated double jeopardy\nprotections. The Madison County Circuit Court summarily dismissed the petition. On\nappeal, the Petitioner argues that the coram nobis court erred: (1) in dismissing the petition\nwithout an evidentiary hearing and without appointing counsel; and (2) in denying him relief.\nUpon review, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.\n\n Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed\n\nC AMILLE R. M CM ULLEN, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which J ERRY L. S MITH and\nR OBERT W. W EDEMEYER, JJ., joined.\n\nRicky Johnson, Mountain City, Tennessee, Pro Se.\n\nRobert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney General and Reporter; Meredith Devault, Senior Counsel,\nAssistant Attorney General; James (Jerry) G. Woodall, District Attorney General; and Alfred\nL. Earls, Assistant District Attorney General, for the Appellee, State of Tennessee.\n\n OPINION\n\n A writ of error coram nobis is available to convicted defendants. T.C.A. § 40-26-\n105(a) (2006). However, a writ of error coram nobis is an “extraordinary procedural\nremedy” that “fills only a slight gap into which few cases fall.” State v. Mixon, 983 S.W.2d\n661, 672 (Tenn. 1999) (citing Penn v. State, 670 S.W.2d 426, 428 (Ark. 1984)); State v.\nWorkman, 111 S.W.3d 10, 18 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2002). “The purpose of this remedy ‘is to\n\fbring to the attention of the [trial] court some fact unknown to the court, which if known\nwould have resulted in a different judgment.’” State v. Hart, 911 S.W.2d 371, 374 (Tenn.\nCrim. App. 1995) (quoting State ex rel. Carlson v. State, 407 S.W.2d 16, 167 (Tenn. 1966)).\n\n Relief by petition for writ of error coram nobis is provided for in Tennessee Code\nAnnotated section 40-26-105. The statute provides, in pertinent part:\n\n (b) The relief obtainable by this proceeding shall be confined to errors\n dehors the record and to matters that were not or could not have been\n litigated on the trial of the case, on a motion for new trial, on appeal in\n the nature of a writ of error, on writ of error, or in a habeas corpus\n proceeding. Upon a showing by the defendant that the defendant was\n without fault in failing to present certain evidence at the proper time,\n a writ of error coram nobis will lie for subsequently or newly\n discovered evidence relating to matters which were litigated at the trial\n if the judge determines that such evidence may have resulted in a\n different judgment, had it been presented at the trial.\n\n (c) The issue shall be tried by the court without the intervention of a jury,\n and if the decision be in favor of the petitioner, the judgment\n complained of shall be set aside and the defendant shall be granted a\n new trial in that cause. . . .\n\nT.C.A. § 40-26-105 (b), (c). “The decision to grant or deny a petition for the writ of error\ncoram nobis on the ground of subsequently or newly discovered evidence rests within the\nsound discretion of the trial court.” Hart, 911 S.W.2d at 375 (citations omitted).\n\n The statute of limitations for a petition for writ of error coram nobis is one year from\nthe date the judgment becomes final in the trial court. T.C.A. § 27-7-103; Mixon, 983\nS.W.2d at 671. For the purposes of a coram nobis petition, a judgment becomes final thirty\ndays after the entry of the trial court’s judgment if no post-trial motions are filed or upon\nentry of an order disposing of a timely post-trial motion. Mixon, 983 S.W.2d at 670 (citing\nTenn. R. App. P. 4(c); State v. Pendergrass, 937 S.W.2d 834, 837 (Tenn. 1996)). The State\nhas the burden of raising the statute of limitations bar as an affirmative defense. Harris v.\nState, 301 S.W.3d 141, 144 (Tenn. 2010) (citing Harris v. State, 102 S.W.3d 587, 593 (Tenn.\n2003)). The issue of whether a claim is barred by an applicable statute of limitations is a\nquestion of law, which this court reviews de novo. Id. at 144 (citing Brown v. Erachem\nComilog, Inc., 231 S.W.3d 918, 921 (Tenn. 2007)).\n\n\n\n\n -2-\n\f On September 8, 1989, the Petitioner was convicted by a Madison County jury of\nburglary of an automobile and grand larceny. The record does not indicate that the Petitioner\nfiled any post-trial motions. Moreover, the Petitioner failed to file a direct appeal regarding\nhis convictions.\n\n On January 2, 2008, the Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in which\nhe alleged that his judgments were void because they violated double jeopardy protections,\nhis sentence was improper, and he was wrongfully denied pre-trial jail credit. See Ricky\nJohnson, No. W2008-00742-CCA-R3-HC, 2009 WL 1905391, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at\nJackson, Jun. 30, 2009). On appeal, this court affirmed the habeas corpus court’s summary\ndismissal of the petition. Id. It specifically concluded that the Petitioner failed to comply\nwith the mandatory procedural requirements because he did not file his petition in the county\nnearest to him and failed to establish that he was currently being restrained by his 1989\nconvictions. Id. at *1-2.\n\n On April 15, 2009, the Petitioner filed his second petition for writ of habeas corpus,\nalleging that his judgments were void because the State failed to prove that the crimes for\nwhich he was convicted occurred in the county in which he was prosecuted. See Ricky\nJohnson v. Howard Carlton, Warden, No. E2010-00622-CCA-R3-HC, 2011 WL 2084084,\nat *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, May 19, 2011), perm. to appeal denied (Tenn. Aug. 31,\n2011). On appeal, this court affirmed the habeas corpus court’s summary dismissal of the\npetition. Id. at *3.\n\n Then, on January 21, 2011, more than twenty-one years after his convictions, the\nPetitioner filed a pro se petition for writ of error coram nobis alleging that there was a\nvariance between the indictment and the proof at trial and that his convictions violated double\njeopardy protections. On January 21, 2011, the Petitioner subsequently filed a motion for\ncounsel. On January 27, 2011, the State filed a response, arguing that the petition was\nuntimely, the issues raised were not a cognizable claims for coram nobis relief, and that the\nissue regarding a variance between the indictment and the proof at trial should have been\nraised on direct appeal.1\n\n On January 28, 2011, the Madison County Circuit Court entered a written order\nsummarily dismissing the petition for writ of error coram nobis because the petition was filed\nmore than one year after the Petitioner’s convictions became final and because the Petitioner\nfailed to allege any newly discovered evidence that would serve as a basis for relief. The\ncoram nobis court specifically noted that the Petitioner never filed a direct appeal from his\n\n 1\n The Petitioner filed a reply to the State’s motion to dismiss, but this reply was filed after the court\ndismissed the petition for writ of error coram nobis on January 28, 2011.\n\n -3-\n\fconvictions, which meant that his convictions had been final for more than twenty-one years.\nThe Petitioner subsequently filed a timely notice of appeal.\n\n The Petitioner now appeals the dismissal of his petition and argues that the coram nobis\ncourt erred: (1) in dismissing the petition without an evidentiary hearing and without\nappointing counsel and (2) in denying him relief. Interestingly, the Petitioner asserts for the\nfirst time on appeal that newly discovered evidence “would have affected the jury’s verdict\nin his trial for auto burglary and grand larceny, as there is proof upon the face of the record\nthat the Appellant received the automobile from another person[] in a different county than\nwhere it was stolen[] or taken.” In response, the State contends that the coram nobis court\nproperly dismissed the petition. Specifically, the State argues that the petition was time-\nbarred, that the Petitioner did not raise any newly discovered evidence, and that the Petitioner\nwaived his claim regarding the variance between the indictment and the proof at trial because\nhe failed to raise it in a motion for new trial or on direct appeal. We agree with the State.\n\n Here, the Petitioner provides no explanation for the more than twenty-one year delay\nin filing his petition for writ of error coram nobis. Moreover, the record does not implicate\nany due process concerns that would require a tolling of the statute of limitations. See\nWorkman v. State, 41 S.W.3d 100, 103 (Tenn. 2001) (holding that due process concerns may\ntoll the one-year statute of limitations for a writ of error coram nobis). Accordingly, we agree\nwith the State that the petition is time-barred.\n\n Notwithstanding our conclusion that the petition was filed outside the applicable statute\nof limitations, we also agree with the State the the petition fails to assert subsequent or newly\ndiscovered evidence, which is required for a writ of error coram nobis. See T.C.A. § 40-26-\n105(b), (c). In this case, the Petitioner did not assert any claim of newly discovered evidence\nin his petition for writ of error coram nobis. Instead, he asserts only in his appellate brief that\nnewly discovered evidence “would have affected the jury’s verdict in his trial for auto\nburglary and grand larceny, as there is proof upon the face of the record that the Appellant\nreceived the automobile from another person[] in a different county than where it was stolen[]\nor taken.” Initially, we note that the Petitioner has waived this issue for failing to include it\nin his petition. See State v. Turner, 919 S.W.2d 346, 356-57 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995) (“A\nparty may not raise an issue for the first time in the appellate court.”) (footnote omitted).\nWaiver notwithstanding, we are unable to consider the issue raised by the Petitioner because\nhe failed to include the trial transcript. The appellant has a duty to prepare a record that\nconveys “a fair, accurate and complete account of what transpired with respect to those issues\nthat are the bases of appeal.” Tenn. R. App. P. 24(b). “In the absence of an adequate record\non appeal, we must presume that the trial court’s ruling was supported by the evidence.” State\nv. Bibbs, 806 S.W.2d 786, 790 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991) (citing Smith v. State, 584 S.W.2d\n811, 812 (Tenn. Crim. App.1979); Vermilye v. State, 584 S.W.2d 226, 230 (Tenn. Crim.\n\n -4-\n\fApp.1979)). Accordingly, we conclude that the court properly denied the petition for writ of\ncoram nobis on this basis.\n\n Finally, we agree with the State that the issue regarding the variance between the\nindictment and the proof at trial was not an appropriate issue for a writ of error coram nobis.\nThis alleged error should have been litigated pre-trial, during trial, in a motion for new trial,\nor on direct appeal; therefore, it is not an appropriate issue for a writ of error coram nobis.\nSee T.C.A. § 40-26-105(b), (c). In addition, this alleged error does not qualify as newly\ndiscovered evidence, which is required. Id. Moreover, neither the indictments nor the trial\ntranscript were included in the record. See Tenn. R. App. P. 24(b). Although the Petitioner\nattempted to make the relevant indictments a part of the record by attaching them as exhibits\nto his appellate brief, we cannot consider these documents because they are not a part of the\nappellate record. See State v. Matthews, 805 S.W.2d 776, 783-84 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990)\n(holding that this court could not consider a transcript attached to the appellant’s brief because\nit was not made a part of the record). Accordingly, the coram nobis court did not err in\nsummarily dismissing the petition.\n\n CONCLUSION\n\n Upon review, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition for writ of error coram\nnobis.\n\n ___________________________________\n CAMILLE R. McMULLEN, JUDGE\n\n\n\n\n -5-\n\f", "ocr": false, "opinion_id": 1047696 } ]
Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee
Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee
SA
Tennessee, TN
198,808
O'Toole, Torruella, Wallace
2000-02-08
false
davila-perez-v-lockheed-martin-corp
Davila-Perez
Davila-Perez v. Lockheed Martin Corp.
Libertad DAVILA-PEREZ, Et Al., Plaintiffs, Appellants, v. LOCKHEED MARTIN CORPORATION, Et Al., Defendants, Appellees
Luis Aníbal Avilés, with whom Rubén Colón-Morales, and Avilés & Colón Morales LLP were on. brief, for appellants., ■ Francisco E. Colón-Ramírez; with whom Colón, Colón & Martínez was on brief, for appellee Martin Marietta Services, Inc.
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
Heard Nov. 5, 1999.
null
null
24
Published
null
<parties id="b532-6"> Libertad DAVILA-PEREZ, et al., Plaintiffs, Appellants, v. LOCKHEED MARTIN CORPORATION, et al., Defendants, Appellees. </parties><br><docketnumber id="b532-9"> No. 98-1977. </docketnumber><br><court id="b532-10"> United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit. </court><br><otherdate id="b532-12"> Heard Nov. 5, 1999. </otherdate><br><decisiondate id="b532-13"> Decided Feb. 8, 2000. </decisiondate><br><attorneys id="b533-15"> <span citation-index="1" class="star-pagination" label="465"> *465 </span> Luis Aníbal Avilés, with whom Rubén Colón-Morales, and Avilés &amp; Colón Morales LLP were on. brief, for appellants. </attorneys><br><attorneys id="b533-16"> ■ Francisco E. Colón-Ramírez; with whom Colón, Colón &amp; Martínez was on brief, for appellee Martin Marietta Services, Inc. </attorneys><br><judges id="b533-17"> Before TORRUELLA, Chief Judge, WALLACE, <a class="footnote" href="#fn*" id="fn*_ref"> * </a> Senior Circuit Judge, and O’TOOLE, Jr., <a class="footnote" href="#fn**" id="fn**_ref"> ** </a> District Judge. </judges><div class="footnotes"><div class="footnote" id="fn*" label="*"> <a class="footnote" href="#fn*_ref"> * </a> <p id="b533-13"> Of the Ninth Circuit, sitting by designation. </p> </div><div class="footnote" id="fn**" label="**"> <a class="footnote" href="#fn**_ref"> ** </a> <p id="As-"> Of the District of Massachusetts, sitting by designation. </p> </div></div>
[ "202 F.3d 464" ]
[ { "author_str": "Torruella", "per_curiam": false, "type": "010combined", "page_count": null, "download_url": "http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=98-1977.01A", "author_id": null, "opinion_text": "202 F.3d 464 (1st Cir. 2000)\n LIBERTAD DAVILA-PEREZ, ET AL., Plaintiffs, Appellants,v.LOCKHEED MARTIN CORPORATION, ET AL., Defendants, Appellees.\n No. 98-1977.\n United States Court of Appeals, for the First Circuit.\n Heard Nov. 5, 1999.Decided February 8, 2000.\n \n APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO. Hon. Raymond L. Acosta, Senior U.S. District Judge.\n Luis Anbal Aviles, with whom Ruben Colon-Morales, and Aviles &amp; Colon Morales LLP were on brief, for appellants.\n Francisco E. Colon-Ramrez, with whom Colon, Colon &amp; Martnez was on brief, for appellee Martin Marietta Services, Inc.\n Before Torruella, Chief Judge, Wallace,* Senior Circuit Judge, and O'Toole, Jr.,** District Judge.\n TORRUELLA, Chief Judge.\n \n \n 1\n This case arises from the events of May 12, 1995 that resulted in the death of Bienvenido Gonzalez. The appellants--his widow, Libertad Davila-Perez, their children, his mother, and his sister--brought this personal injury action against appellee Martin Marietta Corporation, Gonzalez's employer, and Teledyne Ryan Aeronautical Corporation.1 Based on the statutory employer defense made available under the Puerto Rico Workmen's Compensation Act (\"PRWCA\"), 11 L.P.R.A. &#167;&#167; 2, 21, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of appellee and dismissed all claims against it. We affirm on the alternative ground that the appellee was immune from suit under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (\"LHWCA\"), 33 U.S.C. &#167; 905, pursuant to the Defense Base Act, 42 U.S.C. &#167; 1651(a)(2).\n \n BACKGROUND\n \n 2\n For purposes of this appeal, the Court adopts the following relevant facts. Gonzalez was employed by Martin Marietta, an independent contractor retained by the U.S. Navy. He worked as an engine shop supervisor at the Aerial Target System at Roosevelt Roads Naval Station in Ceiba, Puerto Rico. On May 12, 1995, while Gonzalez was conducting a test on new equipment, an explosion occurred. Gonzalez suffered second and third degree burns over thirty percent of his body and was hospitalized until his death on July 8, 1995.\n \n \n 3\n Martin Marietta had procured workers' compensation and employers' liability insurance from CIGNA, pursuant to its contract requirements with the Navy. Benefits were paid to appellants in accordance with the policy terms. No policy was obtained from the State Insurance Fund Corporation of Puerto Rico on behalf of Gonzalez.\n \n \n 4\n The appellants filed this action pursuant to articles 1802 and 1803 of the Puerto Rico Civil Code, 31 L.P.R.A. &#167;&#167; 5141, 5142 (1997), alleging that the damages suffered by Gonzalez were the result of diverse negligent acts of the U.S. Navy, Martin Marietta, and Teledyne. Martin Marietta answered with a Motion for Summary Judgment asserting that it had insured Gonzalez under the CIGNA policy and that it had immunity under the LHWCA, as extended by the Defense Base Act, to cover employees in military installations in U.S. territories and possessions. The appellants objected, arguing that the Defense Base Act no longer applies to Puerto Rico because it ceased to be a territory following the enactment of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico on July 25, 1952. Without resolving the applicability of the Defense Base Act, the district court entered judgment for Martin Marietta based on the Puerto Rico statutory employer defense because \"the objective of workers' compensation, i.e., provide benefits and medical care to employees injured while at work without regard to fault, was squarely met and that decedent and his family received compensation justly due.\"\n \n STANDARD OF REVIEW\n \n 5\n Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). We review summary judgment de novo, \"viewing 'the entire record in the light most hospitable to the party opposing summary judgment, indulging all reasonable inferences in that party's favor.'\" Euromotion, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 136 F.3d 866, 869 (1st Cir. 1998) (quoting Griggs-Ryan v. Smith, 904 F.2d 112, 115 (1st Cir. 1990)); see also Morris v. Government Dev't Bank of P.R., 27 F.3d 746, 748 (1st Cir. 1994). This standard of review permits us to uphold the district court's summary judgment regardless of whether we reject or adopt its rationale, so long as an \"independently sufficient ground\" is made manifest by the record. Mesnick v. General Elec. Co., 950 F.2d 816, 822 (1st Cir. 1991) (citing Garside v. Osco Drug, Inc., 895 F.2d 46, 48-49 (1st Cir. 1990)); see also Houlton Citizens' Coalition v. Town of Houlton, 175 F.3d 178, 184 (1st Cir. 1999); Hachikian v. FDIC, 96 F.3d 502, 504 (1st Cir. 1996).\n \n DISCUSSION\n \n 6\n The issue before this Court is whether Martin Marietta is entitled to immunity from tort claims because they are precluded by the applicable workers' compensation system. The appellee proposes two sources for statutory immunity: the LHWCA and the PRWCA. Because we conclude that the LHWCA applies and provides the exclusive remedy, that is where we begin our analysis.\n \n \n 7\n In 1927, Congress passed the LHWCA, ch. 509, 44 Stat. 1424 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. &#167;&#167; 901-950), to establish a system of uniform federal compensation for all injuries to employees in \"the maritime field up to the line where local compensation would not be excluded by the existence of federal admiralty jurisdiction.\" Royal Indem. Co. v. Puerto Rico Cement Corp., 142 F.2d 237, 239 (1st Cir. 1944) (citing S. Rep. No. 69-973; H. Rep. No. 69-1767); see also Calbeck v. Travelers Ins. Co., 370 U.S. 114, 121-22, 124 (1962) (concluding that Congress enacted LHWCA to provide uniform coverage and avoid uncertainty as to source of compensation). In other words, the LHWCA filled a gap between the coverage of maritime law and state law created by the Constitution and derivative case law. See Calbeck, 370 U.S. at 115-25.\n \n \n 8\n In 1941, Congress extended the provisions of the LHWCA to U.S. military bases outside the United States by enacting the Defense Base Act, ch. 357, 55 Stat. 622 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. &#167;&#167; 1651-1654). See Royal Indem., 142 F.2d at 239. Specifically, the Act applies to employees working on \"any lands occupied or used by the United States for military or naval purposes in any Territory or possession outside the continental United States.\" 42 U.S.C. &#167; 1651(a). In 1944, in Royal Indemnity, we held that under the Defense Base Act, the federal compensation scheme of LHWCA applied to military defense bases in Puerto Rico without regard to local compensation laws. See 142 F.2d at 239. Although the First Circuit has yet to resolve whether Puerto Rico's Constitution, enacted in 1952, see Pub. L. 447, 66 Stat. 327 (1952) (codified as amended at 48 U.S.C. &#167; 731(d)), altered Puerto Rico's status under the Defense Base Act, the Puerto Rico Supreme Court did not consider the issue when it applied the Defense Base Act to Puerto Rico in 1967, see W.R.A. v. Superior Ct. of P.R., 94 P.R.R. 314, 323-24 (1967) (following Royal Indemnity and finding that language of statute \"outside the United States\" clearly includes Puerto Rico).\n \n \n 9\n Based on dicta in Vega-Mena v. United States, 990 F.2d 684, 689-90 (1st Cir. 1993), explicitly questioning the viability of Royal Indemnity, the appellant requests that we reconsider whether for the \"narrow and specialized purposes of the Defense Base Act, Puerto Rico is [] a 'Territory or possession outside the continental United States' as those terms are there intended to be understood.\"2 Of the three grounds which the appellant raises in support of its argument, (1) the relative significance of the Roosevelt Roads base, (2) the citizenship status of all employees at the base, and (3) the alleged change in Puerto Rico's status subsequent to the passage of the Defense Base Act, only the third has merit. Appellants' argument that the Roosevelt Roads base is more like those in states than those in Guantanamo, Cuba or the Phillippines is unavailing. We agree with the appellee that if the Defense Base Act applied to Alaska as an incorporated territory3 until the point where it officially became a state, see Alaska Omnibus Act of June 25, 1959 &#167; 40, Pub. L. 86-70, 73 Stat. 141, 150; Budson Co., Contract 926 v. Oikari, 270 F. Supp. 611, 612-13 (N.D. Ill. 1967), it is untenable that Puerto Rico is close enough to a state to be excluded from the Defense Base Act. Likewise, we agree with the appellee that there is no support for the contention that the citizenship of the base employees is a factor under LHWCA or the Defense Base Act, particularly as the logical presumption is that the Act is intended for American citizens serving in the military abroad. Therefore, we consider only whether circumstances have changed such that Puerto Rico is no longer a territory under the Defense Base Act. Although the appellant argues that the 1952 Constitution alters the status of Puerto Rico under the Act, the text of the statute, its legislative history, and subsequent amendments indicate otherwise.\n \n \n 10\n We begin with the language of the statute, and only if the statute is ambiguous or leads to an unreasonable interpretation do we turn to the legislative history and other aids. See Brady v. Credit Recovery Co., Inc., 160 F.3d 64, 66 (1st Cir. 1998); Grunbeck v. Dime Sav. Bank of N.Y., 74 F.3d 331, 336 (1st Cir. 1996); Riva v. Massachusetts, 61 F.3d 1003, 1007 (1st Cir. 1995). Territory is not defined in the Act or in the case law interpreting it. See 42 U.S.C. &#167; 1651(b); Vega-Mena, 990 F.2d at 690 n.7. When a word is not defined within the statute, it is given its ordinary meaning, with all due consideration to the context. See Brady, 160 F.3d at 66; Grunbeck, 74 F.3d at 336; Riva, 61 F.3d at 1007. However, the term \"'territory' does not have a fixed and technical meaning\" and \"Puerto Rico may be found to be included within one act whose coverage extends to territories of the United States and excluded from another.\" Vega-Mena, 990 F.2d at 690 n.7. Thus, whether Puerto Rico comes within the term \"territory\" depends upon the character and aim of the Act. See id.\n \n \n 11\n The purpose of the Defense Base Act is to provide uniformity and certainty in availability of compensation for injured employees on military bases outside the United States. See Royal Indem., 142 F.2d at 239; see also O'Keefe v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 338 F.2d 319, 322 (5th Cir. 1964) (observing that Act was adopted at request of Secretary of War to save on insurance expenses). The only consideration is whether the military base is in a territory or possession on land \"outside the continental United States.\" 42 U.S.C. &#167; 1651(a)(2). Therefore, by the plain meaning of the text, Puerto Rico is still covered by the Defense Base Act because (1) it is still subject to the plenary powers of Congress under the territorial clause, see Harris v. Rosario, 446 U.S. 651 (1980); (2) Congress has exclusive jurisdiction over the lands occupied by Roosevelt Roads, see Quiles Viuda de Fonte v. Colsa, Inc., 99 J.T.S. 2 at 461-62 (1999); and (3) \"continental United States\" is defined to include only \"the States and the District of Columbia,\" 42 U.S.C. &#167; 1651(b)(4).\n \n \n 12\n This interpretation is supported by legislative history specifically indicating that Puerto Rico is within the reach of the Act.4 See Royal Indem., 142 F.2d at 239 (citing H. Rep. No. 77-1070 (1941)). We are further convinced when we consider that the Defense Base Act was amended at least four times in the decade following the enactment of Puerto Rico's Constitution and Puerto Rico's status as a territory was left unchanged. See 42 U.S.C.A. &#167;&#167; 1651, 1652 (West 1994). We must assume that Congress was aware of our holding in Royal Indemnity that Puerto Rico comes under the Defense Base Act and chose not to change Puerto Rico's status, see Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580 (1978); Garca v. Friesecke, 597 F.2d 284, 293 (1st Cir. 1979) (citing cases), for there is no doubt that Congress knew the language necessary to include Puerto Rico as a state, cf. 28 U.S.C. &#167; 1332(d) (\"The word 'States,' as used in this section, includes the Territories, the District of Columbia, and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.\").Most important, the definition of \"continental United States\" was added to the Defense Base Act only seven years after the alleged change in Puerto Rico's status without any reference to that fact. See Budson, 270 F. Supp. at 613. In sharp contrast, in response to Alaska's transition from a territory to a state, Congress immediately deleted the reference to Alaska in the Defense Base Act and added the definition of \"continental United States\" to ensure that Alaska was excluded from the scope of the Act. See Alaska Omnibus Act, Pub. L. 86-70, 73 Stat. 141; Budson, 270 F. Supp. at 612-13. With nothing before us to suggest that application of the Defense Base Act to Puerto Rico would contravene the purpose of the Defense Base Act, we defer to the judgment of Congress to include Puerto Rico as a territory.\n \n CONCLUSION\n \n 13\n For these reasons, we hold that Puerto Rico is still a territory for purposes of the Defense Base Act and that Martin Marietta was entitled to immunity under the LHWCA. Summary Judgment is affirmed.\n \n \n \n Notes:\n \n \n *\n Of the Ninth Circuit, sitting by designation.\n \n \n **\n Of the District of Massachusetts, sitting by designation.\n \n \n 1\n Appellants' corresponding suit against the U.S. Navy was consolidated with this action.\n \n \n 2\n For its purposes, the Court in Vega-Mena operated under the assumption that the Defense Base Act applies to Puerto Rico, but it questioned whether the Act should apply based primarily on (1) the evolution of federal and state compensation programs since 1944 and (2) the subsequent amendment to &#167; 3(a) of LHWCA on which Royal Indemnity was based. See id. at 689-90 &amp; n.7. The amendment eliminated the &#167; 3(a) language that established LWHCA coverage in the gap between federal maritime law and state compensation law. See 33 U.S.C. &#167; 903; Royal Indem., 142 F.2d at 238-39. However, as we recognized in Royal Indemnity, \"the 'Coverage' language in Sec. 3(a) was inapplicable and became inoperative\" for purposes of the Defense Base Act because there is no analogous conflict between federal law and the law in a territory. Id. For the same reasons, the development of Puerto Rico's compensation law is not a factor in whether the Defense Base Act applies. See id. (observing that district courts in Hawaii and Alaska applied LHWCA \"irrespective of the existence of an otherwise applicable local compensation law\").\n \n \n 3\n An incorporated territory was destined to become a state in contrast to territories such as Puerto Rico or the Phillippines where statehood was not planned. See Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 304-05 (1922); see generally Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904).\n \n \n 4\n The report includes the following comments on the committee amendments: \"These amendments extend the provisions of the bill to Puerto Rico, Guam, Guantanamo, American Samoa, the Virgin Islands, Hawaii, Alaska, the Philippine Islands, and other possessions of the United States, except the Canal Zone.\" H. Rep. No. 77-1070 at 4.\n \n \n ", "ocr": false, "opinion_id": 198808 } ]
First Circuit
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
F
USA, Federal
1,065,042
Judge William B. Cain
2003-10-22
false
arthur-lynn-v-randy-camp
null
Arthur Lynn v. Randy Camp
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
0
Published
null
null
null
[ { "author_str": null, "per_curiam": false, "type": "010combined", "page_count": 9, "download_url": "http://www.tsc.state.tn.us/sites/default/files/OPINIONS/TCA/PDF/034/LynnA.pdf", "author_id": null, "opinion_text": " IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE\n AT NASHVILLE\n September 3, 2003 Session\n\n ARTHUR L. LYNN v. RANDY C. CAMP, COMMISSIONER, ET AL.\n\n Appeal from the Chancery Court for Davidson County\n No. 01-3738-I Irvin H. Kilcrease, Jr., Chancellor\n\n\n\n No. M2002-02708-COA-R3-CV - Filed October 22, 2003\n\n\nThis case concerns a petition for judicial review filed in chancery court. The petition sought review\nof the ALJ’s order affirming the Petitioner’s termination for sleeping on the job in violation of the\nArlington Development Center’s policy. The chancellor dismissed the Petition. We affirm the\nChancellor.\n\n Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court\n Affirmed and Remanded\n\nWILLIAM B. CAIN , J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which PATRICIA J. COTTRELL , J., and\nJAMES L. WEATHERFORD , SR. J., joined.\n\nLarry D. Woods, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Arthur L. Lynn.\n\nPaul G. Summers, Attorney General & Reporter; Steven B. McCloud, Assistant Attorney General,\nfor the appellees, Randy C. Camp, Commissioner and Elisabeth Rukeyser, Commissioner of the\nTennessee Department of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities.\n\n OPINION\n\n There is little dispute as to the material facts in this case. Arlington Developmental Center\n(ADC) is an in-house care facility operated by the Tennessee Department of Mental Health and\nDevelopmental Disabilities. The Holly Unit located in the Baker Building at ADC houses\ndevelopmentally disabled citizens none of whom are ambulatory or otherwise able to care for\nthemselves. The citizens in Holly Unit were considered more medically fragile than those\nmaintained in other areas of the facility and required particular vigilance due to their inability to care\nfor themselves or to articulate need for assistance.\n\n Petitioner Arthur Lynn had for more than seven years been employed as a developmental\ntechnician observing and assisting such developmentally disabled citizens. Developmental\ntechnicians are required to check on each of the citizens assigned to them no less than every fifteen\n\fminutes and to observe the patients carefully, provide any care required such as changing the\npatient’s position or supplying dry clothing, and to report any physical difficulties the patient might\nhave to the medical staff for treatment. The maximum number of citizens requiring direct\nsupervision that could be assigned to any one developmental technician was three patients and the\nminimum number that could be assigned was one patient. The determination of which citizens\nrequired one on one coverage and which should have one on two or one on three coverage was made\nby a physician. Assignment of developmental technicians to three citizens per shift indicated that\nthey were less at risk for medical emergencies and needed less intensive care than did citizens\nassigned staff assistance of one on one and one on two. At the beginning of each shift the supervisor\nassigned the available technicians to one, two, or three patients according to the information given\nabout the patient’s staffing needs and the number of workers present for the shift.\n\n On the overnight shift of February 29 to March 1, 2000, Petitioner was working the ten\no’clock p.m. to six o’clock a.m. shift. At the beginning of the shift, Tennie Gales, developmental\ntechnician supervisor for Holly Unit, assigned three developmentally disabled citizens to Petitioner’s\ncare. Petitioner was assigned to sit in a room with two of the citizens and to periodically go to a\nseparate room where the other citizen was located. All three of the citizens assigned to Mr. Lynn\nwere subject to seizures. Two of them were subject to hypothermic temperature variations and one\nhad a tracheotomy tube that required periodic observation to insure that no aspiration or other\nblockage developed. During the shift at issue Holly had sixteen citizens and eight developmental\ntechnicians with three of the Petitioner’s co-workers assigned two citizens each, three others\nassigned with only one citizen each, and one other co-worker assigned three citizens. Patient-staff\nratios that night were at the maximum permitted with no overlapping coverage whereby the citizens\nassigned to Mr. Lynn received attention from other staff as well as Mr. Lynn.\n\n At approximately twelve thirty a.m. on March 1, 2000, Ms. Gales, while making her\nsupervisory rounds, discovered Petitioner asleep in a chair. She shook him to awaken him and told\nhim to check on the citizens assigned to him. When she returned a few minutes later to see if her\ninstructions had been followed she found Petitioner asleep again in the same position. She called\nher supervisor for advice and was directed to have the duty nurse accompany her to where Petitioner\nwas sleeping. Ms. Gales returned to the room accompanied by nurse Rose Untal and found\nPetitioner asleep. She then awakened the Petitioner and told him to leave the unit.\n\n Petitioner does not dispute that he was found sleeping on duty. He explained at the hearing\nbefore the Administrative Law Judge that he was suffering from allergies and sinus or cold-related\nproblems and had taken an over-the-counter Benadryl-type medication. Upon these facts, Assistant\nSuperintendent, Nina Staples, recommended that Petitioner be terminated. This recommendation\nwas concurred in by the Director of Human Resources at ADC and by letter dated March 7, 2000 the\nSuperintendent of ADC discharged Petitioner.\n\n Consistent with Tennessee Department of Personnel Rule 1120-11-.05, Petitioner appealed\nhis termination and a hearing was held before Administrative Law Judge Margaret Robertson on\nMay 29, 2001. Judge Robertson denied Petitioner’s grievance and upheld the decision of ADC to\n\n\n -2-\n\fterminate his employment. Mr. Lynn then filed his Petition for Review in the Chancery Court for\nDavidson County and following a hearing on April 25, 2002, the Chancellor affirmed the decision\nof the Administrative Law Judge finding that her decision was supported by substantial and material\nevidence.\n\n Petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal.\n\n Before proceeding to Mr. Lynn’s issue on appeal the Court is constrained to note that prior\nto the activity which led to the instant action, the grievant had a superior performance record. As\ndevelopmental technician Mr. Lynn earned several “superior” ratings in annual performance review.\nIndeed, on February 1, 2000, one month prior to the date of this infraction, Mr. Lynn received yet\nanother overall rating of “superior” on his performance evaluation.\n\n The gravamen of the Petition appears in paragraphs 18 through 21 of the Complaint:\n\n 18. Petitioner has had a long career in state government with excellent\n performance and enjoys an outstanding reputation.\n 19. Under such circumstances, termination of the petitioner was certainly\n unwarranted. Further, the Department failed to use or follow statutory requirements\n concerning progressive discipline.\n 20. Based upon the above, the actions of the respondents violate the due\n process rights of Mr. Lynn, violate statutory provisions, are in excess of their\n statutory authority, were made upon unlawful procedures, were made in an improper\n manner, and were done in an arbitrary, capricious, abusive manner using a clearly\n unwarranted exercise of discretion. Further, the decision below is unsupported by\n evidence which is both substantial and material. In the alternative, the ADC sleeping\n policy is void for vagueness.\n 21. For all these reasons, the termination of the petitioner should be\n reversed. The respondents should be ordered to reinstate Mr. Lynn and to pay back\n pay, benefits, and reasonable attorney’s fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983, 1988, et\n seq. and costs.\n\n Tennessee Code Annotated section 4-5-322(h)(2001) sets out the appropriate standard of\nreview to be applied by the chancery court and is likewise binding upon this Court. Our supreme\ncourt has provided the following guidance concerning the standard:\n\n When reviewing an agency decision, the appropriate standard of review is that\n set forth in the Administrative Procedures Act . . . In addition, such review is limited\n to the record of the case. Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-322(g). Findings of fact made by\n the agency may not be reviewed de novo by the trial or appellate courts, and courts\n should not substitute their judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the\n evidence on factual issues. Southern Ry. Co. v. Tennessee Bd. of Equalization 682\n S.W.2d 196, 199 (Tenn.1984); CF Indus. v. Tennessee Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 599\n\n\n -3-\n\f S.W.2d 536 (Tenn.1980); National Council on Compensation Ins. v. Gaddis, 786\n S.W.2d 240, 242 (Tenn.Ct.App.1989). However, the “substantial and material\n evidence standard” in Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-322(h)(5) requires a searching and\n careful inquiry that subjects the agency’s decision to close scrutiny. Wayne County\n v. Solid Waste Disposal Control Bd., 756 S.W.2d 274, 280 (Tenn.Ct.App.1988).\n Further, construction of a statute and application of the law to the facts is a question\n of law that may be addressed by the courts. See Beare Co. v. Tennessee Dept. of\n Revenue, 858 S.W.2d 906 (Tenn.1993).\n\nSanifill of Tennessee, Inc. v. Tennessee Solid Waste Control Bd., 907 S.W.2d 807, 809-10\n(Tenn.1995).\n\n In this context, this Court is presented with the following issues on appeal:\n\n I. Whether the ALJ considered and applied the wrong portion of ADC’s\n sleeping policy to Mr. Lynn’s infraction;\n II. Whether the ADC rule is void for vagueness under the U.S. and Tennessee\n Constitutions;\n III. Whether the chancery court failed to find that the commissioner wrongly\n refused to apply Tennessee Code Annotated section 8-30-330.\n\n The following facts found by the commissioner, with which the chancellor concurred, and\nto which Mr. Lynn admits, are of primary importance in the determination of these issues. Mr. Lynn\nadmits that he was asleep while on duty as a developmental technician for ADC. Mr. Lynn likewise\nadmits that he was asleep in the room occupied by two of the citizens over which he had charge. Mr.\nLynn likewise admits that he was required to check on these patients every fifteen minutes. Mr.\nLynn takes no issue with the statements of Nina Staples and Rose Untal taken before the\nAdministrative Law Judge, which indicate that twice he had to be shaken before he would wake.\nAlso of note is the fact that, of the sixteen citizens in the care of ADC on the night in question, none\nof Mr. Lynn’s citizens were assigned to any other developmental technician in addition to Mr. Lynn.\nIn the hearing before the Administrative Law Judge, conflicting evidence was presented concerning\nwhether any other developmental technicians were in the room in which Mr. Lynn had fallen asleep\nwho could render aid to the citizens in Mr. Lynn’s direct care. That night Mr. Lynn was in charge\nof three citizens. All three of these citizens were in a unit known for housing individuals requiring\ntube feeding and periodic checks of tracheotomy tubes to avoid aspiration and asphyxiation. In\nevaluating whether the petitioner’s termination was appropriate, the assistant director of ADC, Nina\nStaples, evaluated all of these circumstances and applied the following pertinent sections of ADC’s\nPolicy on Employee Sleeping:\n\n B. Disciplinary Action:\n\n Any employee determined to be sleeping as specified in the aforementioned\n Section V.A. shall be subject to disciplinary action according to the Rules of the\n\n\n -4-\n\f Tennessee Department of Personnel (authority cited above in Section III). The Rule\n allows the Supervisor and ADC Management discretion in determining disciplinary\n action. Subsequent violations of categories “a” or “b” may result in progressive\n disciplinary action. Individual circumstances (e.g., length of time between violations,\n cause of sleeping, etc.) will be considered in these instances before action is taken.\n\n 1. Offenses and Corresponding Degrees of Disciplinary Actions\n\n a. If an employee is determined to be sleeping and is not\n responsible for direct citizen support, the employee will receive a\n written warning. An offense such as this would not directly place\n citizens at risk. [Example – a Support Series employee falls asleep at\n a desk or an employee falls asleep during a Staff Development class.]\n\n b. If an employee is determined to be sleeping and is responsible\n for direct citizen support, yet the employee is discovered sleeping in\n a setting where other employees, or co-workers, could at least account\n for the sleeping employee’s citizen(s), the employee will receive a\n five-day (5) suspension. An offense such as this would directly place\n citizens at risk, although the risk may be considered ‘low’.\n (Employees discovered sleeping who are responsible for 1:1 citizen\n coverage fall within the subsequent category “c” regardless of\n circumstance.)\n\n c. If an employee is determined to be sleeping and is responsible\n for direct citizen support, and such a determination occurs in any\n setting other than the type described in V.B.1.b., or creates significant\n risk for the citizen, the employee will be terminated from\n employment. Any employee discovered sleeping who is assigned 1:1\n citizen coverage falls within this category. [Example – an employee\n falls asleep while providing one-to-one coverage at a hospital or an\n employee is discovered sleeping while assisting a citizen during\n mealtime.]\n\n The plain unambiguous language of the sleeping policy provides that sleeping on duty shall\nsubject a sleeping employee to disciplinary action. The plain language likewise accords management\ndiscretion in determining the appropriate disciplinary action. Contrary to Appellant’s argument,\nsubsection (b) does not require all employees discovered sleeping to be suspended five days as a first\noffense. The five day suspension provision only applies to employees “discovered sleeping in a\nsetting where other employees or co-workers could at least account for the sleeping employee’s\ncitizen(s).” With regard to whether other employees or co-workers could account for Mr. Lynn’s\nassigned citizens, the proof before the Administrative Law Judge is conflicting. Tennie Gales\nprovided the following testimony:\n\n\n -5-\n\f Q. And during that 30 minutes, or maybe 27 minutes until you and Nurse\n Rose get there, the only citizen coverage for Brian and Calvin is Mr. Lynn, correct?\n A. He was in the room.\n Q. Was anybody else in the room?\n A. No.\n\n The following testimony given by Nina Staples, Assistant Superintendent for residential and\nsupported living at ADC, further explains the coverage controversy:\n\n And then the next question would be: Was the employee working\n with citizens, period; meaning was the employee assigned to citizens. And in this\n instance, Mr. Lynn was assigned to three citizens that night.\n The other question becomes a question of, if when he was discovered\n asleep, was there someone else that could take care of or address the needs of this\n citizen. And in the case of the room that he was in with Brian and Calvin, it was my\n understanding that there may have been another person present, but that the other\n person could not assume that responsibility because that other person had an\n assignment. And if that person took on any more, then that person would have - - we\n would have been out of our ratio. And our ratio - - the ratio for that other person\n would have exceeded her ratio. And that was the reason why she would not have\n been able to assume any additional responsibilities for citizen care.\n\n In addition to the aforementioned testimony, the ALJ heard from Ronald Bruce, the Director\nof Personnel; Tiffany Moffett, a former employee with ADC; Rose Untal, the nurse on duty at the\ntime of Mr. Lynn’s infraction, and Mr. Lynn himself. After the hearing the Administrative Law\nJudge entered a fairly lengthy order in which it found, in pertinent part:\n\n The preponderance of the evidence in this matter is that the Grievant’s\n offense falls into category (c) rather than category (b), in spite of the testimony to the\n contrary elicited from Ms. Staples. Category (c) applies to two types of situations,\n which include a situation where an employee is assigned to 1:1 citizen coverage.\n Category (c) applies when an employee is responsible for direct citizen support, and\n is found sleeping in any setting other than that described in (b), that being a setting\n in which other employees or co-workers could account for the citizens charged to the\n care of the sleeping employee. Category (c) also applies when the employee’s\n sleeping creates significant risk for the citizen(s) to whom he is assigned. In the\n instant case, Grievant Lynn was directly responsible for three citizens. No other\n employees were available to overlap with Grievant Lynn’s responsibilities. The\n number of staff on duty that night was just enough to meet staffing requirements at\n required levels for the number of citizens and the level of staffing their conditions\n required. The loss of Mr. Lynn’s services that night required that his supervisor\n assume direct care responsibility for three citizens in order for the unit to continue\n to meet required staffing levels during the shift.\n\n\n -6-\n\f 10. Sleeping by Mr. Lynn caused significant risk to the citizens assigned\n to his care. These citizens were mentally retarded, non-ambulatory, had seizure\n disorders and may have had feeding tubes, tracheostomies (sic), and vulnerability to\n hypothermia. They required regular monitoring at brief intervals and the continual\n presence of someone who could quickly observe a developing medical problem and\n be able to make a timely call to a medical professional. The absence of oversight by\n the staff member assigned to stand watch over them placed them at significant risk\n because of their medically fragile conditions. Grievant Lynn’s argument that the fact\n that the citizens assigned to him were suitable for assignment to a 3:1 citizen-to-staff\n ratio meant that the situation was necessarily a low risk one and thus restricted to a\n category (b) offense is not persuasive. Grievant Lynn’s sleeping on duty clearly falls\n into category (c) both because of the lack of other employees to cover his dereliction\n of duty and because of the medically fragile state of his charges. In category (b), the\n risk is described as low because of the availability of other employees to shoulder the\n responsibilities of the sleeping employee for his assigned citizens so that no coverage\n is lost. Sleeping while responsible for coverage at the 1:1 staffing ratio is an extreme\n example of a category (c) violation, not the only example. Grievant Lynn’s violation\n of falling asleep while on duty clearly violates category (c) of the Employee Sleeping\n policy, which directs that the appropriate discipline is termination. Therefore the\n discipline applied to him, which was termination, was consistent with the policy.\n\n The chancellor held that the Administrative Law Judge’s finding was supported by\nsubstantial and material evidence. The Administrative Law Judge’s application of the sleeping\npolicy depended on the material facts presented in the Administrative hearing. It is well settled that\nwe do not substitute our judgment on appeal for that of the ALJ and the chancellor. Thus, we find\nno error in the trial court’s dismissal of Mr. Lynn’s Petition for Review of the Administrative Law\nJudge.\n\n Regarding Appellant’s argument that the ADC rule is void for vagueness, the plain language\nof the rule gives no room for doubt that sleeping on the job would subject the employee to discipline,\nand that the enforcement of the provisions of the policy left no doubt as to the employees’ risks of\ndiscipline and/or termination in the event of a violation. The findings are supported by substantial\nand material evidence.\n\n As for Appellant’s third issue concerning the progressive discipline language in Tennessee\nCode Annotated section 8-30-330, the plain language of that statute as well as the sleeping policy\nin place at ADC made it very clear that management retained broad discretion in describing those\nsituations warranting progressive discipline and those situations imposing such risk that progressive\ndiscipline was not necessary. Section 330 provides that discipline be appropriate for the offense:\n\n (a) The supervisor is responsible for maintaining the proper performance level,\n conduct, and discipline of the employees under the supervisor’s supervision. When\n\n\n\n -7-\n\f corrective action is necessary, the supervisor must administer disciplinary action\n beginning at the lowest appropriate step for each area of misconduct.\n (b) Any written warning or written follow-up to an oral warning which has been\n issued to an employee shall be automatically expunged from the employee’s\n personnel file after a period of two (2) years; provided, that the employee has had no\n further disciplinary actions with respect to the same area of performance, conduct,\n and discipline.\n (c) When corrective action is necessary, the supervisor must administer disciplinary\n action beginning at the step appropriate to the infraction or performance. Subsequent\n infractions or poor performance may result in more severe discipline in accordance\n with subsection (a).\nTenn. Code Ann. § 8-30-330 (1986).\n\n The limited standard of review in this case does not permit this Court to second-guess the\nwisdom of the judgment of ADC. The discussion by this Court in Papachristou v. University of\nTennessee, 29 S.W.3d 487 (Tenn.Ct.App.2000) is enlightening and reflects the limitations on judicial\ncontrol mandated by Tennessee Code Annotated section 4-5-322(h).\n\n Tenn.Code Ann. § 4-5-322(h) states that upon judicial review of an agency’s\n findings\n (h) The court may affirm the decision of the agency or remand the case\n for further proceedings. The court may reverse or modify the\n decision if the rights of the petitioner have been prejudiced because\n the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions or decisions are:\n (1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;\n (2) In excess of the statutory authority of the agency;\n (3) Made upon unlawful procedure;\n (4) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion\n or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion; or clearly\n unwarranted exercise of discretion; or\n (5) Unsupported by evidence which is both substantial and\n material in the light of the entire record.\n In determining the substantiality of evidence, the court shall take into\n account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight, but the\n court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the\n weight of the evidence on questions of fact.\n “Substantial and material evidence” has been defined as “ ‘such relevant\n evidence as a reasonable mind might accept to support a rational conclusion and\n such as to furnish a reasonably sound basis for the action under consideration.’ ”\n Clay County Manor, Inc. v. State of Tennessee4, 8949 S.W.2d 755, 759 (Tenn.1993)\n (quoting Southern Railway Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 682 S.W.2d 196, 199\n (Tenn.1984)).\n ....\n\n\n -8-\n\f When reviewing administrative decisions, the courts do not make de novo\n decisions about the credibility of witnesses. Crass v. Tennessee Valley Authority,\n 460 F. Supp. 941 (D.C.Tenn.1978), aff’d 627 F.2d 1089 (6th Cir.1978). Neither the\n trial court nor this court may review issues of fact de novo or substitute the court’s\n judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence. Reece v. Tennessee\n Civil Service Commission, 699 S.W.2d 808 (Tenn.Ct.App.1985). With substantial\n and material proof in the record on which the University Chancellor’s findings could\n be based, the action taken must be affirmed.\n\nPapachristou v. University of Tennessee, 29 S.W.3d 487, 490-91 (Tenn.2000).\n\n The temptation is strong to try to give relief to a man whose “superior” performance in the\npast is unquestioned. There is, however, “evidence which is both substantial and material” in the\nrecord to support the judgment of the Administrative Law Judge and of the Chancellor. At this\npoint, the appellate inquiry comes to an end.\n\n The judgment of the trial court is in all respects affirmed. Costs of appeal are taxed against\nAppellant for which execution may issue.\n\n\n\n\n ___________________________________\n WILLIAM B. CAIN, JUDGE\n\n\n\n\n -9-\n\f", "ocr": false, "opinion_id": 1065042 } ]
Court of Appeals of Tennessee
Court of Appeals of Tennessee
SA
Tennessee, TN
1,050,898
Judge John Everett Williams
2009-12-11
false
bernardo-lane-v-state-of-tennessee
null
Bernardo Lane v. State of Tennessee
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
0
Published
null
null
null
[ { "author_str": null, "per_curiam": false, "type": "010combined", "page_count": 7, "download_url": "http://www.tsc.state.tn.us/sites/default/files/OPINIONS/tcca/PDF/094/Barnardo%20Lane%20v%20State.pdf", "author_id": 8294, "opinion_text": " IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE\n AT JACKSON\n Assigned on Briefs July 14, 2009\n\n BERNARDO LANE v. STATE OF TENNESSEE\n\n Direct Appeal from the Criminal Court for Shelby County\n Nos. 94-11344-49, P-24886 James M. Lammey, Jr., Judge\n\n\n\n No. W2008-02504-CCA-R3-CO - Filed December 11, 2009\n\n\nThe petitioner, Bernardo Lane, appeals the denial of relief from his petition for writ of error coram\nnobis. He was convicted of first degree felony murder, first degree premeditated murder, and four\ncounts of aggravated robbery. On appeal, he argues that he has received newly discovered evidence\nin the form of an affidavit signed by a codefendant, which purports to exonerate the petitioner from\nall wrongdoing. After careful review, we affirm the denial of error coram nobis relief.\n\n Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court Affirmed\n\nJOHN EVERETT WILLIAMS, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which NORMA MCGEE OGLE and\nALAN E. GLENN , JJ., joined.\n\nRobert Brooks, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellant, Bernardo Lane.\n\nRobert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney General and Reporter; Lacy Wilber, Assistant Attorney General;\nWilliam L. Gibbons, District Attorney General; and David Zak, Assistant District Attorney General,\nfor the appellee, State of Tennessee.\n\n OPINION\n\n This court summarized the following facts on direct appeal:\n\n The facts in this case reveal that on December 27, 1993, there was a home invasion\n at 6858 Birch Run Lane in Memphis, Tennessee, during which four individuals were\n robbed. The four victims were Billy Mosley, his wife Artis Mosley, their daughter\n Danyale Davis, and their son Kenneth Mosley. During the robbery, Kenneth Mosley\n was shot once in the back and killed. Police developed the following four suspects\n in the crimes: Defendant Hanna, Defendant Lane, Andre Hamilton, and Derrick\n Coleman.\n\n ....\n\fThe facts presented at trial revealed that in December 1993, Billy Mosley lived with\nhis wife Artis Mosley, his son Kenneth Mosley, and his stepdaughter Danyale Davis\nat 6858 Birch Run Lane in Memphis, Tennessee. On the evening of December 27,\n1993, he and Ms. Mosley had gone to bed and Kenneth Mosley had gone out bowling\nand/or to a wrestling match. Kenneth returned home between 10:00 and 10:30 p.m.\nShortly thereafter, Billy Mosley heard a loud “bump” and then he heard screaming\nin the house. Billy Mosley got out of bed, and as he opened his bedroom door, a man\nput a gun in his face and told him to get back in the bedroom. Kenneth Mosley also\ntold his dad to return to his bedroom. During this time, Billy Mosley heard someone\nyelling to Kenneth Mosley, “Where’s the money, where’s the damn dope.” Billy\nMosley and his wife retreated to the bathroom off of their bedroom. They then heard\na single gunshot and Mrs. Mosley ran out of the room. Billy Mosley heard someone\nyell at his wife to get down on the floor. Shortly thereafter, he heard someone say,\n“We’ve been in this house too long, let’s get out of here.” Billy Mosley emerged a\nshort time later to find Kenneth Mosley lying on the floor face down, having been\nshot in the back. He also noticed that his front door had been broken down.\n\nBilly Mosley discovered that his wallet and pager, which had been on the dresser in\nhis bedroom, were missing. He testified that Kenneth Mosley looked as if he had\nbeen searched because his clothes were “open,” and his pants pockets were turned\ninside out. Mosley was unable to find the jewelry which Kenneth Mosley normally\nwore. A gallon jug of coins that had been on the floor at the front door was also\nmissing. Mr. Mosley testified that he had once overheard an argument between\nKenneth Mosley and an individual called “Nardo.” Although Billy Mosley was not\nvery familiar with Nardo, he testified that Nardo had once come to the house and left\na note for Kenneth. However, he could not remember the exact date of Nardo’s visit.\nThe note, which was admitted at trial, stated the following:\n\n Say ma[ ]n you need to call me soon as possible because I don’t know\n what you pulling. [I] told you I was on my way and you said you was\n not going no w[h]ere. I’m not asking you no more. It’s been a\n straight month and this is last time. Don’t take this as a [threat]. You\n just need [to] stop playing. I’m not playing no more. [phone number]\n\nOn cross-examination, Billy Mosley stated that he only caught a glimpse of the man\nwho put a gun in his face. That man had nothing covering his face. Mosley also\ntestified that he was not harmed during the incident. He said that the gunshot came\nafter the intruders had been in the house approximately five minutes.\n\nArtis Mosley, Kenneth’s mother, testified to much of the same events as her husband.\nShe said that she heard her daughter say, “Please don’t hurt me,” and that she then\nran out of the bathroom and bedroom to the living room. A man then put a gun in\nher face and instructed her to lie down on the floor. One of the intruders had a towel\n\n\n -2-\n\fcovering his face. She observed her son lying on the floor. She saw another man\nwith a gun ransacking an adjacent bedroom. The man with a towel over his face took\nMrs. Mosley’s rings from her fingers. Mrs. Mosley testified further that Nardo had\ncalled their house on several occasions. She said that the voice of the man with a\ntowel over his face sounded like that of Nardo.\n\nDanyale Davis, Kenneth’s stepsister, testified that she had discovered she was\npregnant earlier on the day of the home invasion. She stated that she was on the\ntelephone in her bedroom when she heard the loud crash that night. She went to her\nbedroom door and as she reached it, the door was thrown open and she saw a man\nwith a towel over his face holding a gun. The man took money from her purse and\nproceeded to move her about the house, instructing her to “find the dope money.”\nMs. Davis asked the man not to hurt her because she was pregnant, and the man\nreplied, “well, find the dope money.” They proceeded through the house looking for\nmoney, and as they did so, Ms. Davis saw Kenneth Mosley lying on the floor with\na man standing over him holding a gun.\n\nFollowing the shooting, Ms. Davis was shown two photo arrays by Sergeant\nRichardson. She identified Defendant Hanna in one of the arrays and Defendant\nLane in the other one. She further identified both Defendants in court as the\nperpetrators. However, Ms. Davis was unable to say who actually shot Kenneth\nMosley. Ms. Davis also identified Kenneth Mosley’s address book at trial. That\naddress book had a listing for Nardo and phone number next to his name. That\nnumber matched the telephone number on the note left with Billy Mosley for\nKenneth Mosley.\n\nSergeant Richardson testified that he learned that the telephone number listed beside\nthe name Nardo in Kenneth Mosley’s address book and on the note left for Kenneth\nMosley, belonged to a pager registered to Defendant Lane. While at Defendant\nLane’s home, the police called the number and observed a pager come vibrating out\nfrom under a chest of drawers. Defendant Lane admitted that the pager was his.\n\nSergeant Richardson also explained that he took statements from Defendant Hanna\nand Andre Hamilton. Hamilton indicated that it was Hanna and Lane who entered\nthe Mosley home. He also indicated the purpose of going to the Mosley home was\nto get money. After waiting in the car for a time, Hamilton and Derrick Coleman\napproached the home. As they did so, they heard a gunshot. Hamilton then returned\nback to the vehicle. Defendant Hanna’s statement indicated that Hanna was indeed\ninside the Mosley home. According to Defendant Hanna, he was in a back room\nwhen he heard a gunshot. Defendant Hanna admitted that they were all going to split\nthe money, but stated that he did not find any money.\n\nSergeant Richardson also retrieved live .380 caliber Winchester ammunition from\n\n\n -3-\n\f Defendant Hanna’s residence. During the course of an interview with Derrick\n Coleman, Sergeant Richardson learned that a .380 handgun was missing from the\n Coleman household. Coleman’s mother gave Sergeant Richardson ammunition from\n the spare clip to the gun. Sergeant Richardson sent this ammunition to the Tennessee\n Bureau of Investigation for testing against the bullet recovered from Kenneth\n Mosley’s body and the spent shell recovered from the Mosley home. Defendant\n Hanna admitted to having possessed a .380 handgun on the night of the shooting.\n Sergeant Richardson also testified that a towel matching the description of the one\n worn by one of the intruders was recovered from the vehicle driven by Andre\n Hamilton on the night of the shooting.\n\n Robert Royse, a forensic scientist with the TBI, testified concerning firearms\n identification testing. Royse testified that the bullet recovered from Kenneth Mosley\n was a .380 auto bullet[] and that the spent shell casing recovered from the Mosley\n home was a .380 auto Winchester shell. Royse further testified that two live rounds\n of ammunition also went to him for testing and that they were .380 auto Winchester.\n\n Dr. Jerry Francisco testified that Kenneth Mosley died from a single gunshot wound\n to the back which tore through his major organs and severed his aorta. Dr. Francisco\n stated that he found no drugs or alcohol in Kenneth Mosley’s system. The distance\n of the gunshot was greater than two feet from Kenneth Mosley’s body.\n\n Defendant Hanna offered no proof at trial. Defendant Lane offered only the\n testimony of Paul Dalhauser, a genetic testing expert. Dalhauser testified that he\n attempted to perform DNA testing on the towel recovered from Andre Hamilton’s\n vehicle. However, the towel did not contain enough DNA for analysis, so the test was\n inconclusive.\n\nState v. Redonna T. Hanna and Bernardo C. Lane, No. 02C01-9806-CR-00165, 1999 Tenn. Crim.\nApp. LEXIS 909, at **4, 7-13 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Jackson, Sept. 7, 1999).\n\n In his petition for writ of error coram nobis, the petitioner alleged that he had received newly\ndiscovered evidence that was not available at the time of his trial. Specifically, he argues that his\ncodefendant, Redonna Hanna, executed an affidavit on May 24, 2007, which stated that the petitioner\nwas not responsible for the wrongdoing identified in the judgments. The petitioner did not attach\nan actual copy of the affidavit in his petition for relief but, rather, handwrote the language of the\naffidavit. According to the petitioner, codefendant Hanna stated in the alleged affidavit that he\nconspired with other codefendants to blame the petitioner for the murder.\n\n The State responded to the petition and filed a motion to dismiss on July 29, 2008. The State\nraised the affirmative defense that the petition was untimely and argued that the testimony of\ncodefendant Hanna was “neither the sole or primary reason that the petitioner was found guilty by\nthe jury in the case.”\n\n\n -4-\n\f The trial court denied the petition on October 22, 2008, finding that the petition was time-\nbarred because the statute of limitations had passed. However, the court analyzed whether due\nprocess required a tolling of the statute. The court stated:\n\n Even assuming that the new statement is true, this court is not reasonably satisfied\n that the jury would have reached a different verdict had they been aware of the\n statement. The jury had much more evidence sufficient to support the convictions,\n such as Danyale Davis identifying [the] Petitioner, in a photo line-up and at trial, as\n one of the perpetrators.\n\nThus, the court concluded that the petitioner had failed to meet his burden of establishing that the\nnewly discovered evidence, if presented, would have resulted in a different verdict.\n\n Analysis\n\n Trial courts may grant a criminal defendant a new trial following a judgment of conviction,\nunder limited circumstances, through the extraordinary remedy offered by a writ of error coram\nnobis. T.C.A. § 40-26-105 (2006); State v. Mixon, 983 S.W.2d 661, 666 (Tenn. 1999). The writ\nof error coram nobis is an “extraordinary procedural remedy,” filling only a “slight gap into which\nfew cases fall.” Mixon, 983 S.W.2d at 672. A writ of error coram nobis may be granted where the\ndefendant establishes the existence of newly-discovered evidence relating to matters litigated at trial\nif the defendant shows he was without fault in failing to present the evidence at the proper time and\nif the judge determines the evidence may have resulted in a different judgment had it been presented\nto the jury. T.C.A. § 40-26-105; Mixon, 983 S.W.2d at 668. A petition for writ of error coram\nnobis must relate: (1) the grounds and the nature of the newly discovered evidence; (2) why the\nadmissibility of the newly-discovered evidence may have resulted in a different judgment had the\nevidence been admitted at the previous trial; (3) that the petitioner was without fault in failing to\npresent the newly-discovered evidence at the appropriate time; and (4) the relief sought by the\npetitioner. Freshwater v. State, 160 S.W.3d 548, 553 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2004). The Tennessee\nSupreme Court has recently held that for a petition for a writ of error coram nobis to be successful,\n“the standard to be applied is whether the new evidence, if presented to the jury, may have resulted\nin a different outcome. . . .” State v. Vasques, 221 S.W.3d 514, 526 (Tenn. 2007).\n\n It has been determined that, for purposes of coram nobis relief, a judgment becomes final\nthirty days after the entry of the judgment in the trial court, if no post-trial motion is filed or upon\nentry of an order disposing of a timely filed post-trial motion. Freshwater, 160 S.W.3d at 553. The\none-year statute of limitations applicable to the writ of error coram nobis is an affirmative defense\nwhich must be specifically pled by the State, or it is deemed waived. Harris v. State, 102 S.W.3d\n587, 593 (Tenn. 2003); Newsome v. State, 995 S.W.2d 129, 133 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998). The trial\ncourt, however, may consider an untimely petition if applying the statute of limitations would deny\nthe petitioner due process. Workman v. State, 41 S.W.3d 100, 103 (Tenn. 2001); Burford v. State,\n845 S.W.2d 204, 209-10 (Tenn. 1992).\n\n\n\n -5-\n\f To determine if due process requires tolling of the statute of limitations, a court must weigh\nthe petitioner’s interest in having an opportunity to present his claims in a meaningful time and\nmanner against the State’s interest in preventing the litigation of stale and fraudulent claims.\nBurford, 845 S.W.2d at 208. More specifically, a court should utilize the following analysis: (1)\ndetermine when the limitations period would normally have begun to run; (2) determine whether the\ngrounds for relief actually arose after the limitations period would have normally commenced; and\n(3) if the grounds are later-arising, determine if, under the facts of the case, a strict application of the\nlimitations period would effectively deny the petitioner a reasonable opportunity to present the claim.\nSands v. State, 903 S.W.2d 297, 301 (Tenn. 1995).\n\n Here, the petitioner acknowledged that his petition was untimely but argues that due process\nshould toll the statute of limitations. The petitioner specifically points to the opinion in Workman,\nin which the Tennessee Supreme Court permitted the petitioner to proceed with an untimely coram\nnobis petition. However, we conclude that, in the instant case, the trial court properly found that the\npetition was untimely and that due process did not require a tolling of the statute of limitations. The\npetitioner’s judgment became final on June 4, 1998. The purported affidavit of the codefendant was\nallegedly executed on May 24, 2007. The petitioner did not file his petition for writ of coram nobis\nuntil May 22, 2008. The petitioner does not explain his almost one-year delay other than to state that\nit is comparable to other Tennessee cases where the statute of limitations was tolled.\n\n In the present case, the one-year statute of limitations period expired in 1999, so we concur\nthat the petition was clearly not timely. Thus, the claim for a writ of error coram nobis is barred\nunless the petitioner was not afforded a reasonable opportunity to present the claim before the\nlimitations period ran. After careful review, we also agree that the trial court properly concluded that\ndue process did not require a tolling of the statute of limitations because the petitioner failed to set\nforth a cognizable claim for coram nobis relief. The trial court found that the codefendant’s\nstatement to police was not the primary factor behind his convictions, and, therefore, the new alleged\naffidavit would not have been likely to prevent his convictions. According to the trial court, the jury\nthat convicted the petitioner had “much more evidence sufficient to support the convictions, such\nas Danyale Davis identifying [the] Petitioner, in a photo line-up and at trial, as one of the\nperpetrators.”\n\n The petitioner also argues that the trial court erred when it failed to grant an evidentiary\nhearing. However, this court has previously held that coram nobis evidentiary hearings are not\nmandated by statute in every case. State v. Johnny L. McGowan, No. M2007-02681-CCA-R3-CO,\n2008 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 675, at *7 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashville, Aug. 5, 2008) (quoting\nRichard Hale Austin v. State, No. W2005-02591-CCA-R3-CO, 2006 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 970,\nat **14-15 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Jackson, Dec. 13, 2006). A petition for coram nobis may be\ndismissed without a hearing and without the appointment of counsel for a hearing if the petition does\nnot allege facts showing that the petitioner was entitled to relief. Id. (quoting State ex rel.\nEdmondson v. Henderson, 421 S.W.2d 635, 636 (Tenn. 1967)).\n\n\n\n\n -6-\n\f Conclusion\n\n Based on the foregoing and the record as a whole, we conclude that the trial court did not\nabuse its discretion in denying the petition for writ of error coram nobis. The new evidence, in the\nform of an affidavit by a codefendant which purported to exonerate the petitioner, would not have\nbeen likely to result in a different outcome at trial if presented to the jury.\n\n\n\n\n ___________________________________\n JOHN EVERETT WILLIAMS, JUDGE\n\n\n\n\n -7-\n\f", "ocr": false, "opinion_id": 1050898 } ]
Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee
Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee
SA
Tennessee, TN
2,580,373
Pieras
2000-10-16
false
de-dios-cortes-v-metlife-inc
null
De Dios Cortes v. MetLife, Inc.
Juan DE DIOS CORTES, Plaintiff, v. METLIFE, INC., Defendant
Jorge P. Sala, Ponce, PR, for Plaintiff., Francisco J. Amundaray-Rodriguez, Vivian M. Crespo-Miranda, Mercado & Soto, Rafael E. Aguiló-Vélez, Schuster Usera Aguiló & Santiago, San Juan, PR, for Defendant.
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
3
Published
null
<parties id="b165-23"> Juan DE DIOS CORTES, Plaintiff, v. METLIFE, INC., Defendant. </parties><br><docketnumber id="b165-25"> No. CIV. 98-2286 JP. </docketnumber><br><court id="b165-26"> United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico. </court><br><decisiondate id="b165-28"> Oct. 16, 2000. </decisiondate><br><attorneys id="b167-14"> <span citation-index="1" class="star-pagination" label="123"> *123 </span> Jorge P. Sala, Ponce, PR, for Plaintiff. </attorneys><br><attorneys id="b167-15"> Francisco J. Amundaray-Rodriguez, Vivian M. Crespo-Miranda, Mercado &amp; Soto, Rafael E. Aguiló-Vélez, Schuster Usera Aguiló &amp; Santiago, San Juan, PR, for Defendant. </attorneys>
[ "122 F. Supp. 2d 121" ]
[ { "author_str": "Pieras", "per_curiam": false, "type": "010combined", "page_count": null, "download_url": null, "author_id": 2566, "opinion_text": "\n122 F. Supp. 2d 121 (2000)\nJuan DE DIOS CORTES, Plaintiff,\nv.\nMETLIFE, INC., Defendant.\nNo. CIV. 98-2286 JP.\nUnited States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.\nOctober 16, 2000.\n*122 *123 Jorge P. Sala, Ponce, PR, for Plaintiff.\nFrancisco J. Amundaray-Rodríguez, Vivian M. Crespo-Miranda, Mercado &amp; Soto, Rafael E. Aguiló-Vélez, Schuster Usera Aguiló &amp; Santiago, San Juan, PR, for Defendant.\n\nOPINION AND ORDER\nPIERAS, Senior District Judge.\n\nI. INTRODUCTION\nThe Court has before it Defendant's Memorandum of Law in Compliance with Court Order (addressing issue of standard of review) (docket No. 16); and Plaintiff's Response to Memorandums of Defendant (docket No. 22); Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (docket No. 36); Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant's Motion [for Summary Judgment] (docket No. 42); Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (docket No. 37); and Defendant's Opposition thereto (docket No. 41).\nPlaintiff Juan De Dios Cortés (\"Cortés\") brings this action under the Employment Retirement Income Security Act (\"ERISA\"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461, as a covered employee under the Sears Roebuck &amp; Co. Group Long Term Disability Insurance Plan (\"the Plan\"), an employee welfare benefit plan governed by ERISA. Cortés asserts that Defendant MetLife, Inc. (\"MetLife\"), as plan administrator, wrongfully denied him Long Term Disability benefits under the Plan, in contravention of ERISA section 502(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B). MetLife, on the other hand, maintains that its decision to deny benefits under the Plan was supported by substantial evidence, and therefore should be upheld by this Court.\n\n\n*124 II. UNCONTESTED FACTS\nThe following facts are uncontested:\n1. From 1976 to May 15, 1996, Cortés was an employee of Sears and worked as a refrigerator technician.\n2. Prior to working at Sears, Cortés completed high school. He has no college education.\n3. Cortés' job as a refrigerator technician required pushing, pulling, twisting, stooping, squatting, and extended reach for 20-60% of the work day. His job also involved lifting, carrying, and climbing for less than 20% of the work day.\n4. Cortés was a voluntary participant in the Sears Group Long Term Disability Insurance Plan and he paid premiums through salary deductions.\n5. The Plan is governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (\"ERISA\").\n6. MetLife is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of New York with its principal place of business in New York, and is licensed to issue a contract of insurance in the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.\n7. Cortés submitted a claim for longterm disability (LTD) benefits on July 11, 1996.\n8. Claims decisions on the requests for LTD benefits from the Plan are made by MetLife, which is vested with discretionary authority to construe Plan terms and determine eligibility for and entitlement to Plan benefits.\n9. Prior to receiving LTD benefits, the claimant must complete a Waiting Period; that is, the claimant must be totally disabled (as defined by the Plan) for 140 out of 180 consecutive days.\n10. Cortés applied for disability benefits after a 180-day Waiting Period pursuant to the Plan, which ran through approximately November 11, 1996.\n11. The Summary Plan Description defines \"Total Disability\" in two ways:\n(A) During the Waiting Period and for the next 24 consecutive months \"Total Disability\" means that because of illness or injury, you cannot do your own job or any other job for which you are reasonably qualified based on your education, training or experience.\n(B) After that time period, you will no longer be considered Totally Disabled unless MetLife considers you to meet the above definition and you are approved to receive and/or are receiving Social Security Administration benefits due to your disability or age.\n12. The Summary Plan Description states as follows with respect to the grant of discretion to the Plan administrator:\nSears Roebuck &amp; Company administers the Plan through a Plan Administrator.\nThe Plan Administrator has the authority to determine the questions arising under the provisions of the Plan, including the power to determine the right of eligibility of associates, participants or any other persons, and to remedy ambiguities, inconsistencies or omissions.\nMetLife has the responsibility of Claim Fiduciary for the provision of full and fair review of claim denials, pursuant to Section 503 of ERISA.\nIn carrying out their respective responsibilities under the Plan, the Plan administrator and other Plan fiduciaries shall have discretionary authority to interpret the terms of the Plan and to determine eligibility for and entitlement to Plan benefits in accordance with the terms of the Plan. Any interpretation or determination made pursuant to such discretionary authority shall be given full force and effect, unless it can be *125 shown that the interpretation or determination was arbitrary and capricious.\n13. The Summary Plan Description states that LTD benefits will be denied or discontinued if the claimant cannot provide conclusive medical evidence of total disability.\n14. The Summary Plan Description provides that MetLife may ask the claimant to undergo a medical examination by a physician designated by it when, for example, the insured's treating physician cannot substantiate a finding of total disability with objective evidence.\n15. Dr. Gerardo Ramos Martín, who completed the attending physician's Statement of Functional Capacity form on Cortés' July 11, 1996 claim for long-term disability benefits, indicated a diagnosis of L5-S1 herniated neculus pulpos with paravertebral tenderness, with back pain on the right side radiating to the central area of the back. Dr. Martín indicated that he was unable to determine whether Cortés was totally disabled to do his job, but did state that Cortés was not totally disabled to do any job.\n16. On August 26, 1996, MetLife sent Cortés a letter advising him that his claim for LTD benefits had been denied, as his physician had indicated that he was not totally disabled for any and all occupations.\n17. On October 8, 1996, MetLife received by facsimile a medical statement by Dr. Ramos Martín indicating that Cortés was disabled to do any job because of intense back pain. Dr. Ramos Martín further stated that Cortés needed medication, prolonged periods of rest, and frequent changes of position, which precluded him from engaging in any remunerative activities.\n18. By letter dated October 14, 1996, MetLife informed Cortés that if it was his intent to file an appeal, that he should do so within thirty days, as described in the Plan.\n19. On or about October 19, 1996, Cortés requested an appeal of MetLife's decision of August 26, 1996.\n20. On or about October 28, 1996, MetLife requested that Cortés submit additional documents in support of the appeal of his claim.\n21. On December 18, 1996, MetLife received additional medical reports from the State Insurance Fund regarding Cortés' condition, including an initial examination, several pages of office and progress notes which documented Cortés' continued back pain, referrals to physical therapy, and a CT scan.\n22. Pursuant to the terms of the Plan, MetLife requested an independent medical evaluation of Cortés' medical records from the Network Medical Review Company (\"NMRC\").\n23. On January 23, 1997, NMRC completed the independent medical evaluation and produced a report signed by Robert L. Bertrand, M.D. (\"Dr. Bertrand\"), Board Certified Occupational Medicine Physician. Dr. Bertrand concluded that the nature of the claimant's injury, and the medical evidence provided, supported a finding of disability for 6-8 weeks. Bertrand further opined that there was no evidence to support \"an inability to work beyond the usual eight (8) weeks of recovery for the type of problem suffered by Mr. Cortés. Return to work with ongoing physical therapy is not an indication of being unable to perform work duties within the noted residual functional capacities.\"\n24. On January 24, 1997, MetLife wrote to Cortés, setting forth the findings of Dr. Bertrand and informing Cortés that the denial of his claim was being upheld on that basis.\n25. On or about February 17, 1997, MetLife received a second request for review from Cortés. Enclosed *126 was a letter dated February 11, 1997 from Jaime Rodríguez-Arias, M.D., stating that Cortés' health condition prevented him from working. Dr. Rodríguez-Arias further stated that he believed Cortés' condition would improve with treatment.\n26. On April 28, 1997, MetLife received additional medical records from Dr. Rodríguez-Arias, which included a diagnosis and treatment plan, progress notes from various doctors, an MRI reading, and an electromyographic examination. Dr. Rodríguez-Arias indicated that Cortés was not responding to conventional treatment, and that a psychiatric evaluation was recommended due to depression.\n27. With this new medical evidence in hand, MetLife requested a second independent medical review from NMRC.\n28. By letter dated June 20, 1997, Dr. Bertrand wrote to MetLife reporting that, after a thorough review of the additional medical evidence, there were \"insufficient objective medical findings to support an impairment of Mr. Cortés of a severity which would change the original opinion of January 23, 1997.\" Dr. Bertrand explained that abnormal MRI studies showing bulging or herniated discs \"may be irrelevant\" and not causative of lower back pain. Dr. Bertrand further stated that \"the additional information provided supports that Mr. Cortés has continued back pain, however, there is insufficient medical information to support that there is more than a mild impairment due to chronic low pack pain, with retained functional capacity for medium work.\"\n29. MetLife wrote to Cortés on July 1, 1997, describing the evidence before it and concluding that based on the inconsistencies in the evidence, Cortés could not be considered totally disabled.\n30. The evidence upon which MetLife based its July 1, 1997 decision is as follows:\n(A) a CT scan performed on the lumbar spine on May 20, 1996 noting a small central disc herniation at L5-S1;\n(B) MRI studies performed on January 16, 1997 revealing degenerative disc disease at L4-L5 with a small bulging disc;\n(C) a January 1997 examination of Cortés by Dr. Scarano García, a neurologist, reporting normal sensation, reflexes and muscle strength, and an ability to straight raise his leg at 50 to 60 degrees bilaterally;\n(D) a letter dated February 11, 1997 from Dr. Rodríguez-Arias indicating that Cortés was unable to perform his work duties due to lower back pain, tenderness, and muscle spasms in the lower back; that a treatment plan for rehabilitation had been established; that he should continue to rest at home; and that he should not return to work until he reveals signs of improvement;\n(E) EMG studies performed on February 27, 1997 that were reported as normal;\n(F) a progress note dated May 3, 1997 indicating Cortés reported continued back pain, but was able to heel and toe walk, and had normal reflexes.\n31. On or about September 19, 1997, Cortés sent a letter to MetLife, which MetLife received on or about September 26, 1997, enclosing a medical statement from Dr. Alexis Echevarría, a physiatrist, dated September 11, 1997, and requesting another review of his case.\n32. Dr. Echevarría's statement indicated that Cortés was \"totally disabled to work\" based on Cortés' unresponsiveness to physical therapy, continued pain in the neck and back which was *127 radiating to his right leg, a herniated central disc at C6-C7, a herniated cervical disc with associated cervicodor-solumbar myositis, and a herniated lumbar disc, symptomatic, with associated iliolumbar myositis. Dr. Echevarría stated that Cortés had been referred to a neurosurgeon but that no surgery had been recommended. He further stated that continued physical therapy was not recommended due to Cortes' lack of responsiveness to conservative treatment, and that he had discharged Cortés from his services on August 25, 1997 with a recommendation to continue a therapeutic exercise program and to return only if needed.\n33. On October 3, 1997, MetLife wrote to Cortés informing him that the denial of his LTD claim remained unchanged, and that no further administrative appeals were available to him.\n34. By letter dated December 30, 1997, Sears forwarded to MetLife a copy of a psychiatric report from Dr. Américo Oms Rivera dated October 6, 1997, and informed MetLife that Cortés had been approved to receive Social Security benefits due to his condition. The letter states that Sears had been trying for a month to get in contact with the representative of MetLife in order to forward that information.\n35. By letter dated January 20, 1998, Cortés was awarded Social Security benefits retroactive to February 11, 1997, and was found to be totally and permanently disabled.\n36. On January 23, 1998, MetLife wrote to Cortés, stating that the medical information in Dr. Echevarría's statement of September 11, 1997 had been reviewed, but did not support a finding of total disability.\n37. MetLife did not consider the psychiatric report of Dr. Oms Rivera or the fact that Cortés had been approved to receive Social Security benefits in rendering its January 23, 1998 decision.\n38. By letter dated February 12, 1998, Sears forwarded to MetLife a copy of Cortés' Social Security Disability award letter of January 20, 1998, and again forwarded the psychiatric report from Dr. Américo Oms Rivera dated October 6, 1997.\n39. The report of Dr. Oms Rivera states that Cortés is \"totally and permanently disabled\" due to a severe psychoemotional condition combined with multiple other conditions, including chronic pain.\n40. On March 10, 1998, MetLife wrote to Cortés informing him that it had received the Social Security Disability award letter and the psychiatric report of Dr. Oms Rivera, but that MetLife had already performed three reviews of Cortés' claim for LTD benefits, on January 24, 1997, July 1, 1997, and January 23, 1998, and that no further reviews would be performed.\n41. Cortés was never submitted to a medical examination by MetLife.\n42. The Plan permits an employee to continue membership in the Plan during authorized period of leave if the required contributions continue to be paid.\n43. Cortés was an eligible participant in the Plan from May 1996 to May 1998.\n44. Cortés' authorized leave of absence for illness expired on May 31, 1998. On that date, he was removed from the payroll of Sears.\n\nIII. DISCUSSION\n\nA. Summary Judgment Standard\nUnder Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is appropriate where, after drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue of material fact for trial. See Anderson v. *128 Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986); Pagano v. Frank, 983 F.2d 343, 347 (1st Cir.1993). A fact is material if, based on the substantive law at issue, it might affect the outcome of the case. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S. Ct. at 2510; Mack v. Great Atl. and Pac. Tea Co., Inc., 871 F.2d 179, 181 (1st Cir.1989). A material issue is \"genuine\" if there is sufficient evidence to permit a reasonable trier of fact to resolve the issue in the non-moving party's favor. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S. Ct. at 2510; Boston Athletic Ass'n v. Sullivan, 867 F.2d 22, 24 (1st Cir.1989).\n\nB. ERISA Standard of Review\nBefore entering into the merits of this action, the Court must determine the applicable standard of review. ERISA section 502(a)(1)(B) provides that a participant or beneficiary in an ERISA-qualified employee benefits plan may bring a civil action to recover benefits due him or her under the terms of that plan. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B). This Court reviews a denial of benefits under ERISA section 502(a)(1)(B) under a de novo standard, \"unless the benefit plan gives the administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to construe the terms of the plan,\" in which case the arbitrary and capricious discretion standard is employed. Firestone Tire &amp; Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115, 109 S. Ct. 948, 103 L. Ed. 2d 80 (1989); see also Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 116 S. Ct. 1065, 134 L. Ed. 2d 130 (1996). In determining the standard of review to employ, the Court looks to the terms of the employee benefits plan, and asks whether the plan delegates to the administrator or fiduciary the appropriate level of discretionary authority such as would trigger a more deferential standard of review. For a benefit plan to accord discretionary authority pursuant to Firestone, the First Circuit requires a \"clear discretionary grant.\" Terry v. Bayer Corp., 145 F.3d 28, 37 (1st Cir.1998); Rodriguez-Abreu v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 986 F.2d 580, 583 (1st Cir.1993).\nThe Plan in this case accords discretion to the Plan administrator and other Plan fiduciaries as follows:\nThe Plan Administrator has the authority to determine the questions arising under the provisions of the Plan, including the power to determine the right of eligibility of associates, participants or any other persons, and to remedy ambiguities, inconsistencies or omissions.\n...\nIn carrying out their respective responsibilities under the Plan, the Plan administrator and other Plan fiduciaries shall have discretionary authority to interpret the terms of the Plan and to determine eligibility for and entitlement to Plan benefits in accordance with the terms of the Plan. Any interpretation or determination made pursuant to such discretionary authority shall be given full force and effect, unless it can be shown that the interpretation or determination was arbitrary and capricious.\n(Dft's Exh. 3.) The Plan grants authority to MetLife, as plan fiduciary, both (1) to determine eligibility for benefits under the Plan, and (2) to construe the terms of the Plan. The grant of authority brings MetLife squarely within the ambit of Firestone's provision for deferential review.\nThe Court's determination that MetLife's decision should be subject to an arbitrary and capricious standard of review is supported by recent First Circuit precedent. In Terry, the First Circuit found a clear grant of discretionary authority, consistent with Firestone, where the plan language specifically allocated to the administrator \"the right to find necessary facts, determine eligibility for benefits, and interpret the terms of the plan.\" 145 F.3d at 37. By contrast, plan language stating only that the administrator has \"exclusive control and authority over administration of the Plan\" is insufficient under Firestone to justify the arbitrary *129 and capricious standard of review. Id. (discussing Cooke v. Lynn Sand &amp; Stone Co., 70 F.3d 201 (1st Cir.1995)).\nUnder the arbitrary and capricious standard, also called the \"abuse of discretion\" standard, the Plan administrator's decision will be upheld \"if it was within [the administrator's] authority, reasoned, and `supported by substantial evidence in the record.'\" Doyle v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 144 F.3d 181, 184 (1st Cir.1998) (quoting Associated Fisheries of Maine, Inc. v. Daley, 127 F.3d 104, 109 (1st Cir.1997)). Substantial evidence is \"evidence reasonably sufficient to support a conclusion.\" Id. The First Circuit has noted that contradictory evidence does not necessarily defeat a finding of sufficiency. See id. (\"Sufficiency, of course, does not disappear merely by reason of contradictory evidence.\")\nPlaintiffs argue that an elevated arbitrary and capricious standard should govern this Court's review of the denial of LTD benefits because the Plan administrator acted under a conflict of interest. In Doyle, the First Circuit held that when an ERISA plan administrator has discretionary authority but acts under a conflict of interest, the Court applies the deferential arbitrary and capricious standard of review, but \"with special emphasis on reasonableness.\" Id. at 183. In order to trigger that elevated standard, however, the claimant must show how the conflict of interest improperly motivated the decision. See id. (citing Sullivan v. LTV Aerospace &amp; Defense Co., 82 F.3d 1251, 1255 (2d Cir.1996)). In making such a showing, the Court found it insufficient for the plaintiff to merely \"point out\" that the award of benefits would come from the plan administrator's own pocket. See id. The Court, however, did not specify what kind of showing would satisfy the \"improper motivation\" standard.\nJust seven months after deciding Doyle, the First Circuit held that a plan administrator-insurer that would be responsible for paying benefits due under an ERISA-governed policy does operate under a conflict of interest, justifying application of the \"reasonableness\" standard of review. See Doe v. Travelers Ins. Co., 167 F.3d 53, 57 (1st Cir.1999); see also Pitman v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Oklahoma, 217 F.3d 1291, 1296 (10th Cir.2000) (holding that plan administrator that was also insurer operated under conflict of interest). The Court stated that \"the requirement that [the plan fiduciary's] decision be `reasonable' is the basic touchstone in a case of this kind ....\" Doe, 167 F.3d at 57. The Court, however, did not require the plaintiff to show \"how\" the conflict affected the administrator's interpretation of the plan. The First Circuit's approach in Doe suggests that to trigger the elevated arbitrary and capricious standard, focused on reasonableness, it is sufficient to simply point out a conflict of interest that exists where the plan administrator is also the insurer that would be paying out any benefits ultimately awarded. The Doe Court was careful not to explicitly overrule Doyle, construing that case as holding that the plan administrator-insurer's interest in denying claims that would cost it money did not justify de novo review. See id. (\"Consistent with Doyle, 144 F.3d at 184, we do not think that [the plan fiduciary's] general interest in conserving its resources is the kind of conflict that warrants de novo review.\") In light of Doe, this Court finds that the governing standard of review in the case at bar, where MetLife operated as both the plan administrator and the insurer that would be responsible for paying Cortés' LTD benefits, is the elevated arbitrary and capricious standard, with an emphasis on reasonableness. See id.; see also Terry, 145 F.3d at 36 n. 6 (noting that reasonableness is the touchstone when applying deferential standard of review).\n\nC. The Record Before the Court\nIn reviewing a denial of benefits under the elevated arbitrary and capricious standard of review, this Court considers \"only the arguments and evidence *130 before the administrator.\" Sandoval v. Aetna Life &amp; Casualty Ins. Co., 967 F.2d 377, 380-81 (10th Cir.1992); see also Doe, 167 F.3d at 57 n. 3; Kiley v. Travelers Indemnity Co. of Rhode Island, 853 F. Supp. 6, 13-14 (D.Mass.1994). The District Court, however, possesses jurisdiction over the resolution of both factual and legal disputes about the scope of the record to be considered by it. See Recupero v. New England Tel. &amp; Tel. Co., 118 F.3d 820, 836 (1st Cir.1997). The instant case presents a question concerning the record before the administrator; in particular, there are two pieces of evidence that the administrator did not consider, and the issue is whether they ought to form part of the record on review. Because the parties submitted this case to the Court for resolution based on their pretrial motions (docket No. 45), the Court will resolve this issue without a hearing.\nThe issue concerns whether the psychiatric report of Dr. Américo Oms Rivera, dated October 6, 1997, and the award of benefits by the Social Security Administration, should have been part of the record considered by the administrator. Here, it is uncontested that MetLife conducted a final review of Cortés' claim for LTD benefits, denying the same by letter dated January 23, 1998. The parties do not dispute that the January 23, 1998 letter states that the only new evidence considered by MetLife was a September 11, 1997 statement of Dr. Echevarría.\nIn \"the record\" submitted to this Court is a letter dated December 30, 1997 from Sears District Human Resources Assistant Manager Josie Martí, informing MetLife that Cortés had been approved to receive Social Security benefits due to his condition and forwarding to MetLife a copy of a psychiatric report from Dr. Américo Oms Rivera dated October 6, 1997. The December 30, 1997 letter also states that Sears had been trying for a month to get in contact with the representative of MetLife in order to forward that information. The report of Dr. Oms Rivera states that Cortés is \"totally and permanently disabled\" due to a severe psychoemotional condition combined with various physical conditions. There is no indication, however, that MetLife took this evidence into account in its final denial of LTD Benefits.\nMetLife asserts that it did not receive the evidence until Sears again forwarded it to MetLife on February 12, 1998, subsequent to MetLife's third and final denial of benefits. The Court is perplexed, however, by the inclusion of the December 30, 1997 letter in the record submitted to this Court by MetLife, as such is inconsistent with the contention that it was not received. In fact, in light of the lack of proof that MetLife never received the letter, in the form of an affidavit or otherwise, the Court considers it an uncontested fact that the letter and the report of Dr. Oms Rivera were sent to and received by MetLife. The Court finds that MetLife erred in failing to consider the December 30, 1997 letter informing the award of Social Security benefits and the October 6, 1997 report of Dr. Oms Rivera in the final consideration of Cortés' claim for LTD benefits. See Recupero, 118 F.3d at 830, 833-34 (noting that district court's resolution of disputes about the scope of the record on review is typically not deferential).\nThe psychiatric report is significant because it illuminates an important emotional aspect of Cortés' alleged disability. It constitutes strong evidence of disability based on the combination of physical and emotional conditions, and is uncontradicted in the record. The fact of the Social Security award of benefits is also highly material. See Pierce v. American Waterworks Co., Inc., 683 F. Supp. 996, 1000-01 (W.D.Pa.1988) (finding that administrator acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner in denying benefits by relying in part on an award of Social Security benefits); see also Kirwan v. Marriott Corp., 10 F.3d 784, 790 n. 32 (11th Cir.1994). The Plan at issue in this case itself defines Total Disability in part by reference to an award of benefits by the Social Security Administration, *131 thus rendering this evidence particularly relevant to the administrator's determination.\n\nD. Review of Denial of Long Term Disability Benefits\nAfter reviewing the standard for \"Total Disability\" under the Plan and the evidence before MetLife, the Court concludes that MetLife abused its discretion in denying Cortés' claim for disability benefits. According to the terms of the Plan, in order for an employee to be considered totally disabled, the employee must be completely and continuously unable to perform each of the material duties of the employee's job; unable to perform any job for which the employee is qualified based on his or her education, training or experience; and require the regular care of a doctor. (Dft's Exh. 4, at 9.) MetLife denied Cortés' claim for disability benefits on January 24, 1997 and July 1, 1997, finding that although Cortés had a degenerative condition of the lumbar spine, chronic lumbar myositis, and chronic low back pain, this condition was not disabling in accordance with the Plan terms. After Cortés submitted supplemental medical information, MetLife again found Cortés not disabled on January 23, 1998. This Court finds that MetLife's final decision is not supported by substantial evidence in the administrative record.\nMetLife based its denial on an examination note dated January 15, 1997 reporting Cortés' ability to straight-raise his leg to 50 to 60 degrees bilaterally with no abnormalities in reflexes, muscle strength or sensation; an EMG study performed on February 27, 1997 reported as normal; and a progress note dated May 3, 1997 in which Cortés was again able to straightraise his leg at 50 to 60 degrees bilaterally, was able to heel and toe walk, and had normal reflexes. MetLife further relied on an evaluation of the evidence by Dr. Robert L. Bertrand, an Occupational Medical Physician of the Network Medical Review Company, who posited that abnormal MRI studies showing bulging or herniated discs \"may be irrelevant\" and not causative of lower back pain. (Dft's Exh. II, at 92.) Based on these doctors' notes and Dr. Bertrand's opinion, MetLife concluded that there was no clinical correlation between Cortés' complaints of lower back pain and the MRI findings. (Id., at 95.)\nAdditionally, the record contained the statements of several treating physicians. These statements provide evidence that while initial medical assessments of Cortés' physical condition did not reflect that he was totally disabled, his failure to respond to treatment and the development of additional physical and emotional conditions led Cortés' physicians to concur that he was indeed totally disabled. For instance, Cortés' treating physician, Dr. Gerard Ramos Martín, initially had indicated in Cortés' July 11, 1996 claim for LTD benefits that Cortés was not disabled to do any job. By October 6, 1996, however, Dr. Ramos Martín stated that Cortés' condition preventing him from performing any type of work because of a herniated disc and intense back pain. In addition, Dr. Jaime Rodríguez-Arias, another treating physician, opined on February 11, 1997 that Cortés' condition prevented him from working, but that he believed his condition would improve with treatment. On April 15, 1997, however, Dr. Rodríguez-Arias stated that Cortés was not responding to conventional treatment and that a psychiatric evaluation was recommended due to depression. The September 11, 1997 statement of Dr. Alexis Echevarría, a treating physiatrist, stated that Cortés was \"totally disabled to work\" based on his unresponsiveness to physical therapy, continued pain in the neck and back which was radiating to his right leg, a herniated central disc at C6-C7, a herniated cervical disc with associated cervicodorsolumbar myositis, and a herniated lumbar disc, symptomatic, with associated iliolumbar myositis. Moreover, the psychiatric report from Dr. Américo Oms Rivera, dated October 6, 1997, which was not considered by *132 MetLife, states that Cortés was \"totally and permanently disabled\" due to a severe psychoemotional condition combined with multiple other conditions, including chronic pain. Finally, as discussed above, MetLife was notified that Cortés had been awarded Social Security benefits before finally denying his disability claim. This fact, however, was not considered by MetLife in denying Cortes' claim for LTD benefits.\nMetLife's wholesale disregard of the opinion of three treating physicians and one treating psychiatrist that Cortés was totally disabled to work, its indifference to Cortés' subjective reports of pain throughout the record, and its reliance on the speculation of an occupational medicine physician who has never interviewed or examined the patient that MRI findings of herniated and bulging discs in both the cervical area and lumbar area do not support a finding of chronic back pain, was not reasonable and renders MetLife's decision arbitrary and capricious. See Govindarajan v. FMC Corp., 932 F.2d 634 (7th Cir.1991) (plan administrator's decision arbitrary and capricious where administrator concluded there was no physical cause for plaintiff's back pain notwithstanding numerous reports from treating physicians that plaintiff suffered from herniated disc and lower back pain, and was totally disabled due to this condition); Roig v. The Limited Long Term Disability Program, Civ. A. 99-2460, 2000 WL 1146522 (E.D.La. Aug.4, 2000) (finding Plan administrator abused its discretion in finding plaintiff not disabled where no substantial evidence existed in the record to rebut the treating physician's finding of disability); see also Pollini v. Raytheon Disability Employee Trust, 54 F. Supp. 2d 54, 59-60 (D.Mass.1999) (finding administrator's denial of benefits arbitrary and capricious, in part for failing to credit subjective evidence of pain in medical records). Moreover, MetLife did not interview Cortés, did not independently observe his activities, and did not order an independent medical examination. Although independent evidence-gathering is not necessary in every case, in this case, the Court concludes that the record does not contain substantial evidence in the record to support a finding that Cortés is not totally disabled. The Court further notes that MetLife's selective, and unexplained, failure to consider two important pieces of medical evidence in rendering its final decision is a substantial factor leading this Court to conclude its decision was unreasonable. See Govindarajan, 932 F.2d at 637.\n\nE. Relief\nIt is proper for the Court to \"retroactively grant disability benefits without remanding the case where there are no factual determinations to be made.\" Williams v. International Paper Co., 227 F.3d 706, 715 (6th Cir.2000). In Williams, the Sixth Circuit retroactively granted disability benefits, rather than remanding the case, where it concluded that the district court erred in finding the claimant was not disabled. See id.; Godfrey v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., 89 F.3d 755, 760-61 (11th Cir.1996) (holding that retroactive award of benefits proper remedy where district court made finding that claimant was disabled); see also Canseco v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust for S. Cal., 93 F.3d 600, 609-10 (9th Cir.1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1118, 117 S. Ct. 1250, 137 L. Ed. 2d 331 (1997) (concluding that remand appropriate where administrator erroneously construed plan provision, but not where no factual determinations remain to be made). Similarly, this Court has determined that the administrator erred both in finding Cortés was not totally disabled according to the terms of the Plan and in selectively failing to consider two important pieces of evidence. See Govindarajan, 932 F.2d at 637 (retroactively awarding benefits, rather than remanding, where denial of benefits based on selective review of evidence).\nAccordingly, the Court FINDS that Cortés has been totally disabled since October 6, 1997, and hereby AWARDS longterm *133 disability benefits to Cortés retroactively to April 6, 1998, according to the terms of the Plan.[1] The Plan provides disability benefits equal to sixty percent of a claimant's first $12,500 of his or her monthly covered earnings, subject to a reduction for any benefits paid during the disability period, including Social Security benefits. The parties SHALL, on or before November 1, 2000, submit to the Court evidence of Cortés' monthly covered earnings, the Social Security benefits currently received by him, and a proposed calculation of these figures according to the Plan's terms in order to finalize the judgment.\n\nIV. CONCLUSION\nIn light of the foregoing, the Court hereby GRANTS Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and DENIES Defendant's motion for summary judgment. Judgment SHALL be entered for Plaintiff Juan de Dios Cortés, awarding him long-term disability benefits under the Sears Roebuck &amp; Co. Group Long Term Disability Insurance Plan, corresponding to a finding of total disability beginning on October 6, 1997.\nIT IS SO ORDERED.\nNOTES\n[1] As stated earlier, the Summary Plan Description provides that LTD benefits are payable after the employee completes a 180-day waiting period. The policy further states that the waiting period (also called the \"elimination period\") begins \"on the first day of Total Disability.\" (Dft's Exh. 4.) Because the Court finds that Cortés was disabled as of October 6, 1997, the award of LTD benefits would be subject to the six-month waiting period, and would begin, then, on April 6, 1998.\n\n", "ocr": false, "opinion_id": 2580373 } ]
D. Puerto Rico
District Court, D. Puerto Rico
FD
Puerto Rico, PR
2,196,990
Weisberger
1994-04-08
false
textron-inc-v-liberty-mutual-insurance
null
Textron, Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance
Textron, Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.
John Bomster, Victoria Almeida, John Tarantino, Adler, Pollock & Sheehan, Providence, Eugene Anderson, New York City, for plaintiff., John P. McGann, Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., Harry Asquith, Jr., Asquith, Merolla, Anderson, Arehetto & Kane, Providence, William F. Cupelo, Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., Pamela Meister, Boston, MA, for defendant.
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
22
Published
null
<parties id="b1424-10"> TEXTRON, INC. v. LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE CO. </parties><docketnumber id="AZPh"> No. 93-218-A. </docketnumber><court id="A-rI"> Supreme Court of Rhode Island. </court><decisiondate id="Aeg4"> April 8, 1994. </decisiondate><br><attorneys id="b1426-6"> <span citation-index="1" class="star-pagination" label="1360"> *1360 </span> John Bomster, Victoria Almeida, John Tarantino, Adler, Pollock &amp; Sheehan, Providence, Eugene Anderson, New York City, for plaintiff. </attorneys><br><attorneys id="b1426-7"> John P. McGann, Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., Harry Asquith, Jr., Asquith, Merolla, Anderson, Arehetto <em> &amp; </em> Kane, Providence, William F. Cupelo, Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., Pamela Meister, Boston, MA, for defendant. </attorneys>
[ "639 A.2d 1358" ]
[ { "author_str": "Weisberger", "per_curiam": false, "type": "010combined", "page_count": null, "download_url": null, "author_id": 5624, "opinion_text": "\n639 A.2d 1358 (1994)\nTEXTRON, INC.\nv.\nLIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE CO.\nNo. 93-218-A.\nSupreme Court of Rhode Island.\nApril 8, 1994.\n*1360 John Bomster, Victoria Almeida, John Tarantino, Adler, Pollock &amp; Sheehan, Providence, Eugene Anderson, New York City, for plaintiff.\nJohn P. McGann, Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., Harry Asquith, Jr., Asquith, Merolla, Anderson, Archetto &amp; Kane, Providence, William F. Cupelo, Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., Pamela Meister, Boston, MA, for defendant.\n\nOPINION\nWEISBERGER, Acting Chief Justice.\nThis case comes before us on appeal by the plaintiff, Textron, Inc. (Textron), from a summary judgment entered in the Superior Court in favor of the defendant, Liberty Mutual Insurance Company (Liberty). For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the entry of summary judgment.\nThe issue presented to us on appeal is whether various insurance policies issued by Liberty provided Textron coverage for claims arising from either property damage or personal injuries that took place during the policy periods but which were not reported to Liberty until twenty-one years after the expiration of the last policy. The undisputed facts surrounding this appeal are as follows.\n\nI\nBetween 1961 and 1966, Textron purchased from Liberty five successive comprehensive general-liability insurance policies, each with identical terms. Each policy consisted of a five-page standard printed form policy (the standard policy) and a series of endorsements that spanned thirty-four pages. The relevant portions of the standard policy are as follows:\n\"INSURING AGREEMENTS\n\"I Coverage A — BODILY INJURY LIABILITY To pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because of bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death at any time resulting therefrom, sustained by any person and caused by accident.\n\"Coverage B — PROPERTY DAMAGE LIABILITY To pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because of injury to or destruction of property, including the loss of use thereof, caused by accident.\n* * * * * *\n\"IV POLICY PERIOD, TERRITORY This policy applies only to accidents which occur during the policy period within the United States of America, its territories or possessions, or Canada.\n* * * * * *\nCONDITIONS\n* * * * * *\n\"8 NOTICE OF ACCIDENT When an accident occurs written notice shall be given by or on behalf of the insured to the company or any of its authorized agents as soon as practicable.\"\nThe relevant portions of the endorsements are:\n\"AMENDATORY ENDORSEMENT [Endorsement Serial No. 1]\n* * * * * *\n\"4. Coverage A — Substitution of `Occurrence' for `Accident' — with respect to Coverage A — Personal Injury Liability only, the word `occurrence' as defined herein is substituted for the word `accident' wherever the latter appears in the policy.\n\"The word `occurrence' means an unexpected happening or event or a continuous *1361 or repeated exposure to conditions which results in injury during the policy period provided the insured did not know or intend that injury would result.\n\"5. Coverage B — Property Damage Liability on an `Occurrence Basis' — With respect to such insurance as is afforded by the policy for physical injury to or destruction of tangible property, real or personal, and the resulting loss of use thereof, the word `accident' wherever used in the policy shall be deemed to include any occurrence as defined herein.\n\"`Occurrence' means an event, or continuous or repeated exposure to conditions, which unexpectedly and unintentionally causes physical injury to or destruction of tangible property.\n* * * * * *\n\"7. World Wide Coverage, Policy Period Modified — Insuring Agreement [Part] IV is amended to read:\n`The policy applies only to (1) personal injury, sickness or disease, including death resulting therefrom, and (2) injury to or destruction of property, including loss of use thereof, which occur during the policy period anywhere in the world; however, if the insured, at the time a claim is made against it, is no longer covered by a liability policy issued by the company, this policy shall not apply under Coverage B to injury to or destruction of property, including the loss of use thereof, which is caused by exposure to conditions over a period of days, weeks, months, or longer and which is not reported by the insured to the company within one year after the policy period.'\"\nThe last policy issued to Textron by Liberty expired on January 1, 1966. Thereafter Textron changed insurance carriers.\nIn the mid to late 1980's the Environmental Protection Agency, numerous state environmental agencies, and various private parties brought actions against Textron in connection with its alleged environmental contamination of a myriad of sites across the United States. Textron first reported the environmental-based claims to Liberty in August 1987, which was twenty-one years after the expiration of the last Liberty policy. Liberty refused to defend against or provide indemnification for the claims because, it asserted, the injury to or destruction of the property had not been reported to Liberty within one year after its last policy had expired as required by clause number seven of the Amendatory Endorsement, Endorsement Serial No. 1 (clause seven).\nTextron had filed a declaratory-judgment action in Superior Court, seeking, inter alia, a determination that the Liberty policies provided coverage for all alleged environmental contamination that may have occurred between 1961 and 1966. Liberty moved for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure. Upon reviewing the policies and determining the language to be \"relatively clear,\" the trial justice ruled that the one-year reporting requirement in clause seven barred all Textron's claims. The trial justice also determined that although the policies appeared to be \"hybrids,\" containing elements of both occurrence[1] and claims-made[2] policies, the *1362 policies did not violate public policy. Accordingly the trial justice entered summary judgment in favor of Liberty.\n\nII\nTextron's claims are based upon both property damage and personal injuries. As discussed herein, Liberty's policies set forth separate and distinct requirements for these two types of claims. We therefore consider the coverage issues for property-damage claims separately from those relating to the personal-injury claims.\n\nA. Property-Damage Claims\nThe central issue before us is whether, under the terms of Liberty's policies, coverage existed for property damage which allegedly occurred during the policy periods but which was not reported to Liberty until twenty-one years after the policies's expiration.\nTextron proffers several theories in support of its position that coverage existed under the policies. The thrust of Textron's first theory is that the policies contained two separate notice provisions, condition number eight in the Insuring Agreements and clause seven in the Amendatory Endorsement. Textron claims that these provisions apply to domestic and international claims, respectively. Since its present claims are domestic in nature, Textron asserts that clause seven has no application and cannot bar coverage. In the alternative Textron argues that even if clause seven does apply to domestic claims, the time limit therein cannot be enforced for two reasons. First, Textron contends that the notice-prejudice doctrine precludes enforcement absent a showing of prejudice by Liberty. Second, Textron asserts that the provision restricts Textron's freedom to contract and thereby violates public policy.\nIn reviewing an entry of summary judgment, we apply the same standard as the trial justice below. Barratt v. Burlingham, 492 A.2d 1219, 1220 (R.I. 1985). Under that well-established standard, the trial justice must review the pleadings, affidavits, and other appropriate evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Hodge v. Osteopathic General Hospital of Rhode Island, 107 R.I. 135, 141-42, 265 A.2d 733, 737 (1970). If, when the evidence is viewed in such light, no material issues of fact exist and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the trial justice must enter summary judgment. Alfano v. Landers, 585 A.2d 651, 652 (R.I. 1991).\nAs we have stated in prior cases, whether coverage exists in any given case for a particular damage-causing event depends first and foremost upon the precise terms and conditions of the policy in question. See Mullins v. Federal Dairy Co., 568 A.2d 759, 762 (R.I. 1990). When presented with a preprinted-form policy with various endorsements attached thereto, we read the two components together, with the terms of the preprinted form remaining intact except to the extent they are altered by the endorsements. 13A John Appleman and Jean Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice, § 7537 at 143-44 (1976). In so doing, we give the language in both the form policy and the endorsements its plain, ordinary, and usual meaning. Malo v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 459 A.2d 954, 956 (R.I. 1983); Bush v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., 448 A.2d 782, 784 (R.I. 1982). If the terms are clear and unambiguous, we must enforce the policy *1363 as written and refrain from engaging in any judicial modification of the policy terms. Amica Mutual Insurance Co. v. Streicker, 583 A.2d 550, 551 (R.I. 1990); Malo, 459 A.2d at 956.\nIn the case at hand the terms of coverage for property damage are set forth in Part I, Coverage B of the Insuring Agreements, as amended by clauses five and seven of the Amendatory Endorsement. When we read these provisions together, we perceive no ambiguity and find the terms and scope of coverage readily apparent. Given their plain and ordinary meaning, these provisions clearly impose two requirements before coverage attaches: (1) the property damage must occur during the policy period, and (2) if Textron is no longer insured by Liberty, such damage must be reported within one year of the expiration of the policy.\nIn this case both requirements were clearly not met. Even if the property damage occurred during the policy periods, such damage was not reported to Liberty until some twenty-one years later, a period well beyond the one-year time limitation prescribed by clause seven. Given this fact, we are led to the inescapable conclusion that coverage for the property damage in question never attached. To hold otherwise would be tantamount to rewriting the policies and eliminating the second requirement relating to the reporting period. This we shall not do. Accordingly, we hold that noncompliance with the reporting requirement precludes recovery by Textron for property damage under all five policies.\n\n1. Textron's Domestic/International Distinction\nIn so holding, we reject Textron's argument that clause seven applies only to international claims. Under Textron's theory, coverage for international claims is derived from the provisions of the Amendatory Endorsement while coverage for domestic claims[3] is derived solely from the Insuring Agreements. Textron asserts that given this dichotomy, it logically follows that the one-year notice provision that appears in clause seven applies only to international claims and the notice provision requiring notice \"as soon as practicable,\" which appears in the Insuring Agreements, applies only to domestic claims.[4]\nWe are of the opinion that there is simply no basis for Textron's assertion that domestic coverage and international coverage are derived from different portions of the policies. We think it clear that coverage for all property damage, whether its locus is domestic or international, is derived from Part I of the Insuring Agreements, as amended by clauses five and seven. Thus there is a definite interplay between the Insuring Agreements and the Amendatory Endorsement, which Textron either fails to recognize or refuses to acknowledge.[5]\n*1364 In addition, Textron errs in its characterization under this theory of clause seven as a notice provision. In order to expose the error in this characterization, we must explore the differences between notice provisions and reporting requirements. Whereas both types of provisions require a literal \"notification\" of the insurer, the notification serves materially different purposes in the two provisions. In the case of a notice provision, which is typically found in occurrence and claims-made policies and usually requires notice \"as soon as practicable,\" the notification serves to facilitate the timely investigation of claims by bringing an event to the attention of the insurer and allows an inquiry \"before the scent of factual investigation grows cold.\" Dalzell v. Northwestern Mutual Insurance Co., 218 Cal. App.2d 96, 103, 32 Cal. Rptr. 125, 129 (1963); see also Siravo v. Great American Insurance Co., 122 R.I. 538, 542, 410 A.2d 116, 118 (1980) (notice affords an \"opportunity for investigation to protect [the insurer's] interests\"); Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Bowes, 381 Mass. 278, 282, 409 N.E.2d 185, 187 (1980); 2 Rowland Long, The Law of Liability Insurance, § 13.02 at 13-8 (1992). In contrast, in the case of a reporting requirement, which is typically found only in a claims-made-and-reported policy, the prescribed notification actually defines the scope of coverage provided by the policy, as the \"transmittal of notice of the claim to the insurance carrier\" is the event that triggers coverage. Zuckerman v. National Union Fire Insurance Co., 100 N.J. 304, 324, 495 A.2d 395, 406 (1985); see also Gulf Insurance Co. v. Dolan, Fertig and Curtis, 433 So.2d 512, 515 (Fla. 1983) (coverage depends upon reporting a claim during the policy period).\nWhen we view it against this background, we think it quite clear that the notification requirement in clause seven operates to define the scope of coverage and may be appropriately characterized as part and parcel of the coverage granted by Liberty. Accordingly we reiterate our previous determination that the latter portion of clause seven is in fact a reporting requirement, such as that found in a claims-made-and-reported policy.\nIn so holding, we recognize the peculiar nature of Liberty's policies, which provide coverage for property damage on an \"occurrence\" basis yet include a reporting requirement traditionally only found in claims-made-and-reported policies. Although such dual characteristics preclude categorically labeling the policies as either \"occurrence\" or \"claims-made-and-reported\" policies, that fact in no way undercuts our analysis. When dealing with hybrid creatures, such as Liberty's policies, we emphasize that our inquiry into the nature of any provision must necessarily be guided by the operation and substance of a particular provision rather than any label that may coincidentally or haphazardly be attached to a policy.\nFor the above reasons we reject Textron's assertion that clause seven operates as a notice provision that only applies to non-domestic claims.\n\n2. Textron's Notice-Prejudice Theory\nWe next turn to Textron's assertion that the reporting requirement cannot be enforced without a showing of prejudice. This argument rests upon the so-called notice-prejudice doctrine set forth in Pickering v. American Employers Insurance Co., 109 R.I. 143, 282 A.2d 584 (1971), and its progeny.\nIn Pickering we considered the meaning of a provision in an occurrence policy that required that notice be given to the insurer \"as soon as practicable.\" Id. at 158, 282 A.2d at 592. Interpreting this provision to require notice within a reasonable time, we reasoned that prejudice to the insurer determined to a great extent whether the timing of notice in a particular case was reasonable. We based our rationale in large part upon the recognition that most insurance policies in this day and age are contracts of adhesion, offered to consumers on a take-it-or-leave-it-basis.[6]*1365 Given this fact, we reasoned that the technical breach of a notice provision, when the consumer is afforded no realistic opportunity to negotiate the deletion of this provision from the policy, should not bar recovery for benefits for which the consumer has already paid. Id. at 160, 282 A.2d at 593.\nIn various subsequent decisions we have affirmed the notice-prejudice rule in the context of occurrence policies. See Pennsylvania General Insurance Co. v. Becton, 475 A.2d 1032, 1035 (R.I. 1984); A &amp; W Artesian Well Co. v. Aetna Casualty &amp; Surety Co., 463 A.2d 1381, 1382-83 (R.I. 1983); Cooley v. John M. Anderson Co., 443 A.2d 435, 437 (R.I. 1982); Siravo, 122 R.I. at 547, 410 A.2d at 121. We have not, however, had occasion to consider directly whether the rule applies with equal force to claims-made policies. See DiLuglio v. New England Insurance Co., 959 F.2d 355, 358-59 (1st Cir.1992); see also Gereboff v. The Home Indemnity Co., 119 R.I. 814, 383 A.2d 1024 (1978) (terms of claims-made policies enforced without considering possible application of the notice-prejudice rule).\nIn order to rely on Pickering, Textron claims, as it must, that Liberty's policies are \"occurrence\" policies. However, as discussed above, with respect to property damage Liberty's policies were not generic occurrence policies but rather hybrid occurrence policies containing reporting requirements. Given this fact, we refuse to apply Pickering's notice-prejudice rule mechanically. Rather we must explore whether the incorporation of the reporting requirement presents any distinctions or countervailing considerations that militate against applying Pickering's rule.\nFirst, we consider that the reporting requirement operates substantively to define the scope of coverage, as opposed merely to facilitate the insurer's investigation of a claim. The very nature of the coverage provided required reporting within a specific timeframe. Given this fact, excusing Textron's delay would alter a fundamental term of the policy in respect to property damage. Cf. Esmailzadeh v. Johnson and Speakman, 869 F.2d 422, 424 (8th Cir.1989) (under a claims-made-and-reported policy excusing delay beyond policy period \"would alter a basic term of the insurance contract\"); City of Harrisburg v. International Surplus Lines Insurance Co., 596 F. Supp. 954, 961 (M.D.Pa. 1984), aff'd, 770 F.2d 1067 (3d Cir.1985) (giving an extension of reporting time after policy expiration rewrites the contract between the parties); Gulf Insurance Co., 433 So.2d at 515-16 (extending reporting time \"in effect rewrites the contract between the two parties\").\nIt is also important to consider the relationship between the scope of coverage provided and the amount of the premium charged. Liberty's policies, as amended by clause five of the Amendatory Endorsement, provided coverage on an occurrence basis. Had the parties put their pens down after drafting clause five and not added clause seven, Textron would have enjoyed unlimited \"tail\" coverage (see n. 1 supra). However, by including clause seven's reporting requirement, Textron's tail coverage was strictly circumscribed and eliminated, except for the one-year window of coverage following policy expiration. Since the amount of an insured's premium is predicated upon the scope of coverage and the risk assumed, we can logically infer that Textron paid a premium that was proportional to the risk.[7] In light of this *1366 fact, application of the notice-prejudice rule and excusal of noncompliance with the reporting requirement would result in a dramatically enhanced expansion of coverage for Textron and an increased risk of exposure for Liberty that was not contemplated in the original bargain. See Gulf Insurance Co., 433 So.2d at 515 (\"extension of reporting time * * * is tantamount to an extension of coverage to the insured gratis, something for which the insurer has not bargained\"); Zuckerman, 100 N.J. at 324, 495 A.2d at 406 (extending reporting period expands coverage by exposing insurer \"to a risk substantially broader than that expressly insured against in the policy\").\nNext we consider the adhesion-contract rationale at the heart of our decision in Pickering. In the case at hand we have no doubt that these policies were not Liberty's standard packaged product offered to Textron on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. We need only look to the thirty-four pages of endorsements that extensively amended the standard policy to confirm this fact. Nor was Textron an average consumer with little bargaining power. On the contrary, Textron was a sophisticated multi-million-dollar corporation engaged in domestic and international ventures, a customer that apparently wielded extensive leverage in the negotiation process with Liberty. These facts lead us to conclude that the reporting requirement about which Textron now complains was the product of arm's-length negotiations between Textron and Liberty. As such, the \"true consensual arrangement\" absent in Pickering is present in this case and undercuts the adhesion-contract rationale underlying the notice-prejudice rule.[8]\nOn a final note, the fact that Liberty's policies do not provide coverage in the face of an avalanche of environmental claims \"do[es] not alone constitute ground for refusal to enforce an agreement intelligently and freely made by competent parties standing on an equal footing.\" Kaplan v. Suher, 254 Mass. 180, 185, 150 N.E. 9, 11 (1926).\nIn conclusion, we hold that the above considerations militate against extending the notice-prejudice rule to the reporting requirement in Liberty's policies.\n\n3. Textron's Public Policy Argument\nFinally, Textron, citing Jones v. Continental Casualty Co., 123 N.J. Super. 353, 303 A.2d 91 (1973), claims that the reporting requirement converts Liberty's occurrence-based policies into impermissible hybrid policies in violation of public policy.\nIn light of our discussion of the Jones decision in Gereboff v. The Home Indemnity Co., supra, which involved policies somewhat similar to Liberty's, we find little merit in Textron's argument. We reiterate the sentiments we expressed in Gereboff that \"we are unaware of any principle that * * * prevents an insurer from imposing reasonable conditions upon the obligations it assumes in its contract.\" 119 R.I. at 822, 383 A.2d at 1028. The reporting requirement is such a reasonable restriction, operating to limit Liberty's exposure for certain property-damage claims. Furthermore, we have previously held that \"in the absence of a statutorily declared policy to the contra, the parties to an insurance agreement are free to contract as they desire.\" Constant v. Amica Mutual Insurance Co., 497 A.2d 343, 345 (R.I. 1985); see also Faraj v. Allstate Insurance Co., 486 A.2d 582, 586 (R.I. 1984). No statutes have been brought to our attention that prohibit the issuance of policies such as Liberty's.\nWe also stated in Gereboff that no principle had been brought to our attention that \"condemns on public policy grounds coverage that combines elements of both `discovery' [claims-made] and `occurrence' policies, but *1367 provides less protection than is customarily afforded by either.\" 119 R.I. at 822, 383 A.2d at 1028.\nFinally, the reporting requirement in Liberty's policies does not operate either to tie Textron to Liberty after the expiration of its policies or \"unduly [to] restrict [Textron's] ability to obtain adequate protection elsewhere,\" id. at 820, 383 A.2d at 1027, which, in fact, it did after 1965.\nIn conclusion, given our discussion of the scope of coverage for property-damage claims, we conclude that even when viewed in the light most favorable to Textron, the pleadings and supporting documentation allege no set of facts that would give rise to coverage for property damage under any of the Liberty policies, more than twenty-one years after the expiration thereof.\nFor the reasons set forth above, we affirm the entry of summary judgment in regard to Textron's property-damage claims.\n\nB. Personal-Injury Claims\nTurning to Textron's personal-injury claims, the terms of coverage for such claims are set forth in Part I, Coverage A, as amended by clauses four and seven of the Amendatory Endorsement. Read together, these provisions provide coverage for personal injury, sickness, disease or death sustained by any person as a result of any \"occurrence\" which takes place anywhere in the world during the policy period. We read these provisions collectively to provide traditional occurrence-based coverage for personal-injury claims. We note that the reporting requirement in the latter half of clause seven applies only to \"Coverage B [relating] to injury to or destruction of property\" and therefore has no application to Textron's personal-injury claims.\nWe do, however, affirm the entry of summary judgment in respect to Textron's personal-injury claims because Textron has alleged no set of facts under which such coverage could exist. Upon reviewing the complaints brought against Textron, we find that none of the counts alleges or even suggests that any human being has sustained injury to his or her person as a result of Textron's alleged environmental contamination of various parcels of land. Under the express language of the policy, coverage for personal injuries was restricted to \"bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death at any time resulting therefrom, sustained by any person.\" (Emphasis added.) Part I, Coverage A of the Insuring Agreements.\nTextron suggests that other jurisdictions \"have held that a `personal injury' provision in a liability insurance policy may provide coverage for environmental liabilities.\" We decline to address this issue in light of the express language of the policy requiring a physical injury to a human being.\nFor the foregoing reasons Textron's appeal is denied and dismissed. We affirm the entry of summary judgment in favor of Liberty with respect to Textron's claims for defense and indemnification for both property damage and personal injuries.\nNOTES\n[1] In the area of general-liability insurance, an occurrence policy provides coverage for any \"occurrence\" which takes place during the policy period. Under this type of policy it is irrelevant whether the resulting claim is brought against the insured during or after the policy period, as long as the injury-causing event happens during the policy period. See DiLuglio v. New England Insurance Co., 959 F.2d 355, 358 (1st Cir.1992); see also Gereboff v. The Home Indemnity Co., 119 R.I. 814, 818 n. 1, 383 A.2d 1024, 1026 n. 1 (1978). The distinguishing feature of an occurrence policy is that it results in so-called \"tail\" coverage, which refers to the lapse of time between the occurrence and the date a claim is made. Gulf Insurance Co. v. Dolan, Fertig and Curtis, 433 So.2d 512, 515 (Fla. 1983).\n[2] A claims-made policy provides coverage for any claim first asserted against the insured during the policy period, regardless of when the incident giving rise to the claim occurred. Absent a provision requiring notice within a set period after policy expiration, standard claims-made policies \"implicitly allow * * * reporting of the claim to the insurer after the policy period, as long as it is within a reasonable time.\" 2 Rowland Long, The Law of Liability Insurance, § 12A.05[3A] at 40 (Supp. 1991). Claims-made policies extinguish the never-ending-tail liability, which is characteristic of occurrence policies. See DiLuglio, 959 F.2d at 358.\n\nThere are also several variations of the claims-made policy, such as the claims-made-and-reported policy. See, e.g., Burns v. International Insurance Co., 929 F.2d 1422 (9th Cir.1991) (claims to be reported within sixty days of termination of policy); Esmailzadeh v. Johnson and Speakman, 869 F.2d 422 (8th Cir.1989) (claims to be made and reported during policy period); Zuckerman v. National Union Fire Insurance Co., 100 N.J. 304, 495 A.2d 395 (1985) (claims to be made and reported during policy period). As one commentator has explained, a claims-made-and-reported policy \"covers only claims first made during the policy period but also imposes the condition that, to be entitled to coverage, the insured must also report the claim to the insurer within the policy period, or within a specified time after learning of the claim (often prescribed to be 30, 60 or 90 days).\" Long, § 12A.05[3A] at 40. Many courts fail to distinguish between claims-made and claims-made-and-reported policies, and simply speak in broad terms of \"claims-made\" policies.\n[3] In light of the language in Part IV of the Insuring Agreements, Textron uses the term \"domestic claims\" to mean claims brought within the United States of America, including its territories and possessions, and Canada. The term \"international claims\" encompasses all claims not falling within the definition of domestic claims.\n[4] Textron also claims that \"by agreeing to defend Textron as to [Textron/Ex-Cell-O, another unrelated] site under the very same liability insurance policies, Liberty Mutual conceded that the one-year notice requirement has no application to claims brought within the United States.\" The \"agreement to defend\" to which Textron refers appears in a letter from Liberty dated April 11, 1991, wherein Liberty stated that \"[w]e will agree to take part in the defense of this claim, from the date it was reported to Liberty Mutual, with all applicable carriers, under a full reservation of rights, of all our policy terms and should we determine that we have no coverage for this claim we can withdraw from the defense upon providing written notice to Textron/Ex-Cell-O.\" Given Liberty's reservation of rights and the fact that the Textron/Ex-Cell-O site is in no way connected to the present sites, we fail to see the validity of any concession or waiver on Liberty's part in regard to the present sites.\n[5] Furthermore, Textron's reliance upon the phrase \"anywhere in the world\" to establish its domestic/international distinction is also misplaced. In essence Textron equates \"anywhere in the world\" with \"foreign countries.\" However, we find that in various other clauses appearing in the Amendatory Endorsement the parties actually utilized the phrase \"foreign countries\" when they intended to denote a domestic/international distinction. In addition, Textron's argument that the United States does not fall within the class of countries described in the phrase \"anywhere in the world\" defies the plain and ordinary meaning of the words.\n[6] We recognized in Pickering v. American Employers Insurance Co., 109 R.I. 143, 159-60, 282 A.2d 584, 593 (1971), that many insurance policies are \"not the end result of the give-and-take that goes on at a bargaining table. * * * [And are] not a true consensual arrangement but one that is available to the premium-paying customer on a take-it-or-leave-it-basis.\" See also Siravo v. Great American Insurance Co., 122 R.I. 538, 541, 410 A.2d 116, 117-18 (1980); Donahue v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co., 110 R.I. 603, 604, 295 A.2d 693, 694 (1972).\n[7] Other courts have drawn similar inferences. See Burns, 929 F.2d at 1425 (\"[a] claims-made policy reduces the potential exposure of the insurer and is therefore less expensive to the insured\"); City of Harrisburg v. International Surplus Lines Insurance Co., 596 F. Supp. 954, 961 (M.D.Pa. 1984), aff'd, 770 F.2d 1067 (3d Cir.1985) (because an insurer's liability under a claims-made policy \"does not extend beyond the end of a specific term * * * an insured pays a lesser premium\"); Gulf Insurance Co., 433 So.2d at 516 (lower premiums are charged because \"there is no open-ended `tail' after the expiration date of the policy\"); see also Esmailzadeh, 869 F.2d at 425 (when certain risks are disclaimed, the amount of the premium charged is presumably lower).\n[8] We acknowledge that in Donahue v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co., 110 R.I. 603, 295 A.2d 693 (1972), we recognized an additional basis for the Pickering rule. Therein we stated:\n\n\"[T]here is an implicit realization on our part that in this day and age attempts to comply with notice provisions are sometimes carried on in a very informal way which frequently consists of no more than a telephone call by an insured to the seller of the policy who then, because of his desire to serve his customer, takes over from there.\" 110 R.I. at 604-05, 295 A.2d at 694.\nThis rationale, however, has no application given the facts in the instant case.\n\n", "ocr": false, "opinion_id": 2196990 } ]
Supreme Court of Rhode Island
Supreme Court of Rhode Island
S
Rhode Island, RI
118,783
null
2002-03-18
false
myers-v-dormire-superintendent-jefferson-city-correctional-center
Myers
Myers v. Dormire, Superintendent, Jefferson City Correctional Center
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
0
Published
null
null
[ "535 U.S. 935" ]
[ { "author_str": null, "per_curiam": false, "type": "010combined", "page_count": null, "download_url": "http://bulk.resource.org/courts.gov/c/US/535/535.US.935.01-7603.html", "author_id": null, "opinion_text": "535 U.S. 935\n MYERSv.DORMIRE, SUPERINTENDENT, JEFFERSON CITY CORRECTIONAL CENTER.\n No. 01-7603.\n Supreme Court of the United States.\n March 18, 2002.\n \n 1\n C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.\n \n ", "ocr": false, "opinion_id": 118783 } ]
Supreme Court
Supreme Court of the United States
F
USA, Federal
27,172
null
2002-03-22
false
wilson-v-tx-bd-of-cr-justice
Wilson
Wilson v. TX Bd of Cr Justice
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
0
Unpublished
null
null
null
[ { "author_str": null, "per_curiam": false, "type": "010combined", "page_count": 3, "download_url": "http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions\\unpub\\01/01-50987.0.wpd.pdf", "author_id": null, "opinion_text": " IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT\n\n\n\n No. 01-50987\n Summary Calendar\n\n\nJOHN MORGAN WILSON,\nalso known as Yahya Al-Tariq,\n\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\n\nversus\n\nTEXAS BOARD OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE; WAYNE SCOTT, Executive\nDirector of Texas Department of Criminal Justice Institutional\nDivision; GARY L. JOHNSON, DIRECTOR, TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL\nJUSTICE, INSTITUTIONAL DIVISION; KENNETH GREEN, JR., Assistant\nWarden, A. D. Hughes Unit, also known as FNU Green; CHARLES LEE\nBELL, A. D. Hughes Unit, also known as Bell, Assistant Warden;\nSTEPHEN BURKETT, A. D. Hughes Unit, also known as Berkett,\nCaptain; GRACE KENNEDY, Unit Grievance Investigator, A. D. Hughes\nUnit, also known as FNU Kennedy; BRIAN WARREN, Correctional\nOfficer III, A. D. Hughes Unit, also known as FNU Warren; KENNETH\nHALL, Correctional Officer III, A. D. Hughes Unit; KAREN WILEY,\nMail Room Officer, A. D. Hughes Unit, also known as K. Wiley;\nDEBRA BROCK, Mail Room Officer, A. D. Hughes Unit, also known as\nD. Brock; JUAN HARMON, Gang Investigating Officer, A. D. Hughes\nUnit, also known as FNU Harmon; STACY STOVALL, Administrative\nTechnician, A. D. Hughes Unit, also known as FNU Stovall; ANTHONY\nPATRICK, 2nd Shift, A. D. Hughes Unit, also known as Patrick,\nSergeant; MICHAEL A. GLIMP, 2nd Shift, A. D. Hughes Unit, also\nknown as Unidentified Glimp, Lieutenant; ROBERT REDMOND,\nCorrectional Officer III, A. D. Hughes Unit, also known as\nRedman,\n\n Defendants-Appellees.\n\n --------------------\n Appeal from the United States District Court\n for the Western District of Texas\n USDC No. W-00-CV-109\n --------------------\n March 21, 2002\n\nBefore JOLLY, DeMOSS, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.\n\nPER CURIAM:*\n\n\n *\n Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined\nthat this opinion should not be published and is not precedent\nexcept under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.\n\f No. 01-50987\n -2-\n\n John Morgan Wilson, a/k/a Yahya Al-Tariq, a Texas prisoner\n\n(# 259316), has filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma\n\npauperis (“IFP”) on appeal following the district court’s order\n\ngranting the defendants’ motion for summary judgment and\n\ndismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint. By moving for IFP\n\nstatus, Wilson is challenging the district court’s certification\n\nthat IFP status should not be granted on appeal because his\n\nappeal is not taken in good faith. See Baugh v. Taylor, 117 F.3d\n\n197, 202 (5th Cir. 1997); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3).\n\n By failing to argue in the brief in support of his IFP\n\napplication most of the substantive claims that were set forth in\n\nhis civil rights complaint, Wilson has abandoned those claims.\n\nSee Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 224-25 (5th Cir. 1993). He\n\nhas preserved only two of those claims in his brief.\n\n Wilson argues that prison officials violated his First\n\nAmendment rights by prohibiting him from corresponding with\n\nmembers of the Black Muslims or Muhammad’s Fruit of Islam.\n\nWilson acknowledges that the Texas Department of Criminal Justice\n\n(“TDCJ”) does not recognize these groups as legitimate prison\n\norganizations. Prison officials are authorized to limit\n\ncorrespondence between prisoners when such limitations are\n\n“logically connected to . . . legitimate penological objectives.”\n\nSee Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 91 (1987). Wilson has not\n\ndemonstrated that the prohibitions at issue were not justified by\n\n“legitimate penological interests.”\n\n\n\n\nR. 47.5.4.\n\f No. 01-50987\n -3-\n\n Wilson also asserts that he was falsely disciplined for\n\ngetting a tattoo, even though he had entered the prison system\n\nwith the tattoo. A challenge to the procedures used in a prison\n\ndisciplinary proceedings is not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983\n\nunless the result of such proceeding has been overturned or\n\notherwise invalidated. See Clarke v. Stalder, 154 F.3d 186, 189\n\n(5th Cir. 1998) (en banc); Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87\n\n(1994); Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 648 (1997).\n\n Wilson has failed to show that his appeal of the district\n\ncourt’s dismissal of his complaint is taken in good faith.\n\nAccordingly, Wilson’s request for IFP status is DENIED, and his\n\nappeal is DISMISSED as frivolous. See Baugh, 117 F.3d at 202 &\n\nn.24; 5TH CIR. R. 42.2.\n\n IFP MOTION DENIED; APPEAL DISMISSED AS FRIVOLOUS.\n\f", "ocr": false, "opinion_id": 27172 } ]
Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
F
USA, Federal
2,646,456
Clement, Davis, Dennis, Per Curiam
2013-12-17
false
united-states-v-marselina-carrillo
null
United States v. Marselina Carrillo
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Marselina CARRILLO, Defendant-Appellant
James Wesley Hendrix, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Dallas, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee., Jason Douglas Hawkins, Federal Public Defender, Federal Public Defender’s Office, Dallas, TX, Sherylynn Ann Kime-Goodwin, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Federal Public Defender’s Office, Lubbock, TX, for Defendant-Appellant.
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
0
Unpublished
null
<parties data-order="0" data-type="parties" id="b328-6"> UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Marselina CARRILLO, Defendant-Appellant. </parties><br><docketnumber data-order="1" data-type="docketnumber" id="b328-9"> No. 13-10128 </docketnumber><p data-order="2" data-type="misc" id="ANp"> Conference Calendar. </p><br><court data-order="3" data-type="court" id="b328-10"> United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit. </court><br><decisiondate data-order="4" data-type="decisiondate" id="b328-12"> Dec. 17, 2013. </decisiondate><br><attorneys data-order="5" data-type="attorneys" id="b328-13"> James Wesley Hendrix, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Dallas, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee. </attorneys><br><attorneys data-order="6" data-type="attorneys" id="b328-15"> Jason Douglas Hawkins, Federal Public Defender, Federal Public Defender’s Office, Dallas, TX, Sherylynn Ann Kime-Goodwin, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Federal Public Defender’s Office, Lubbock, TX, for Defendant-Appellant. </attorneys><br><judges data-order="7" data-type="judges" id="b328-17"> Before DAVIS, DENNIS, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges. </judges>
[ "548 F. App'x 296" ]
[ { "author_str": "Per Curiam", "per_curiam": false, "type": "010combined", "page_count": 2, "download_url": "http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions\\unpub\\13/13-10128.0.pdf", "author_id": null, "opinion_text": " Case: 13-10128 Document: 00512473575 Page: 1 Date Filed: 12/17/2013\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT\n\n\n No. 13-10128\n Conference Calendar\n United States Court of Appeals\n Fifth Circuit\n\n FILED\n December 17, 2013\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n Lyle W. Cayce\n Clerk\n Plaintiff-Appellee\n\nv.\n\nMARSELINA CARRILLO,\n\n Defendant-Appellant\n\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court\n for the Northern District of Texas\n USDC No. 1:12-CR-47-1\n\n\nBefore DAVIS, DENNIS, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.\nPER CURIAM: *\n The Federal Public Defender appointed to represent Marselina Carrillo\nhas moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance with\nAnders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and United States v. Flores, 632 F.3d\n229 (5th Cir. 2011). Carrillo has not filed a response. We have reviewed\ncounsel’s brief and the relevant portions of the record reflected therein. We\nconcur with counsel’s assessment that the appeal presents no nonfrivolous\n\n\n * Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not\nbe published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH\nCIR. R. 47.5.4.\n\f Case: 13-10128 Document: 00512473575 Page: 2 Date Filed: 12/17/2013\n\n\n No. 13-10128\n\nissue for appellate review. Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw\nis GRANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, and the\nAPPEAL IS DISMISSED. See 5TH CIR. R. 42.2.\n\n\n\n\n 2\n\f", "ocr": false, "opinion_id": 2646456 } ]
Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
F
USA, Federal
1,702,545
Southwick, P.J., Bridges and Myers
2002-12-03
false
white-v-state
White
White v. State
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
6
Published
null
null
[ "847 So. 2d 886" ]
[ { "author_str": null, "per_curiam": false, "type": "010combined", "page_count": null, "download_url": null, "author_id": 7677, "opinion_text": "\n847 So. 2d 886 (2002)\nFrancis Eugene WHITE, Appellant,\nv.\nSTATE of Mississippi, Appellee.\nNo. 2001-KA-01259-COA.\nCourt of Appeals of Mississippi.\nDecember 3, 2002.\nRehearing Denied February 4, 2003.\nCertiorari Denied June 12, 2003.\n*888 Jim Davis, Moss Point, attorney for appellant.\nOffice of the Attorney General, by Scott Stuart, attorney for appellee.\nBefore SOUTHWICK, P.J., BRIDGES and MYERS, JJ.\nSOUTHWICK, P.J., for the court.\n¶ 1. Francis Eugene White was convicted of aggravated assault by a circuit court jury. On appeal, he argues prejudicial error in statements made by the prosecutor during opening and closing arguments. White also asserts that his counsel was ineffective, and that certain defense witnesses were improperly excluded. We find no error singly or cumulatively, and affirm.\n\nFACTS\n¶ 2. White denies that he was the person who in disguise committed this assault. Nonetheless, the following describes the testimony and inferences that were consistent with the verdict of guilt. On October 22, 1996, the sixty-two year old defendant traveled from his home in Pascagoula to the Long Beach dwelling of his estranged wife, Carol. White was disguised as a telephone repairman, wearing a hard hat and false mustache, and carrying a wire *889 cage box with tools. White cut the cable television wire connected to the house, presumably mistaking it for the telephone line.\n¶ 3. White's wife Carol was having an affair with Bill Ford. Ford was the only person in the house when White arrived. Duped by White's disguise, Ford allowed the \"repairman\" inside. After White entered, Ford recognized him. White then said, \"You know who I am, don't you?\" before shooting Ford in the abdomen with a gun hidden in the tool bag. Ford fell to the floor, feigning death. White fired three more shots, injuring Ford's hand and ear, before fleeing. Ford, fearing another assault, went to the door and locked it. White may have heard the noise made by the lock and began to kick or beat on the door to regain entry. Ford escaped through the patio door, scaled a six foot fence, and collapsed in a neighbor's driveway. Police apprehended White at a routine traffic stop. White posted bond a week later and fled the jurisdiction.\n¶ 4. White was returned to Mississippi. His trial for aggravated assault began in December 2000, but a mistrial was declared when a witness inadvertently mentioned White's connection to his wife's murder. A second trial took place in mid-May 2001. White was convicted of aggravated assault. His appeal has been deflected here.\n\nDISCUSSION\n\n1. Prosecutorial misconduct\n¶ 5. The prosecution during opening and closing arguments mentioned bloodstains of the victim that allegedly were found on White's shoes. Investigators from the Mississippi Crime Lab were able to obtain only enough sample material to type and match for DNA Whatever the substance was, it contained the victim's DNA While tests proved that these small stains on White's shoes may have been blood, the results were inconclusive. Similarly, the laboratory that conducted the DNA testing was unable to verify the source material as blood. It obviously was some bodily fluid from Ford.\n¶ 6. White filed a motion in limine prior to the first trial that sought to prohibit the State from stating \"that the DNA evidence found on the Defendant's shoes was blood because no scientist or doctor found this DNA evidence to be blood.\" White was able to obtain a ruling only that the serology witnesses could not state categorically that the substance was blood. The court restated its prior holding during pre-trial motions before the second trial:\nTHE COURT: [The serologist] can testify as to her findings on serology, that it was consistent with what's in her report indicating the possible presence of blood being identified on the left shoe. And I think that she had stated that she was not able to definitively make that determination because she was afraid that she would use the rest of the sample and there would not be any left for DNA analysis. So I think she is—that's why I think she can testify as to her findings and why she did not make a further definitive finding. That's allowed.\n¶ 7. It is obvious that White wished for all references to blood to be barred. Instead, he got only this limited ruling that the serologist's findings could be admitted that the substance contained Ford's DNA and that it may have been from blood.\n\nA. Opening statements\n¶ 8. During opening statements as the second trial began, the prosecutor stated this:\nBut Long Beach Police, they get his shoes. What does the Crime Lab find *890 on the shoes, but some blood. And they take that and they send it to ReliaGene Technology. And ReliaGene Technology performed DNA, and guess whose blood it is. It's the victim's....\n¶ 9. During these comments, White made no objection. Though he now asserts that the statements violated the order limiting references to blood, that apparently was not the position taken at trial. If these statements were violative, the failure to object prevented the trial court from remedying the error. A contemporaneous objection permits the trial court to act as is necessary to cure the problem and avoid the needless expense and delay of a retrial. Johnson v. State, 477 So. 2d 196, 210 (Miss.1985). For this reason, an appellate court will not consider for the first time on appeal a claim of prejudice arising during the trial since the trial court was not given the opportunity to resolve it after a timely objection. Colburn v. State, 431 So. 2d 1111, 1113-14 (Miss.1983).\n¶ 10. Procedural waiver may be set aside when a fundamental constitutional right is threatened. Conerly v. State, 760 So. 2d 737, 740 (Miss.2000). However, opening and closing arguments are not evidence and are not governed by evidentiary standards. \"The standard of review that appellate courts must apply to lawyer misconduct during opening statements or closing arguments is whether the natural and probable effect of the improper argument is to create unjust prejudice against the accused so as to result in a decision influenced by the prejudice so created.\" Sheppard v. State, 777 So. 2d 659, 661 (Miss.2000). Here, we cannot find that such prejudice arose, particularly as White incorporated the evidence into his own defense, as will be discussed shortly.\n¶ 11. Whether these comments went beyond proper argument is not altogether clear. Certain witnesses were allowed to refer to their conclusions about stains on White's shoes and to mention that the substance may have been blood. The presence of blood was unsubstantiated, but potential. The question becomes whether a prosecutor could argue as fact that the only reasonable explanation from the evidence was that the stain must have been blood.\n¶ 12. There is wide latitude for counsel in both opening and closing arguments, expanding beyond mere facts and proof to include such \"deductions and conclusions [one] may reasonably draw therefrom, and the application of the law to the facts.\" Wells v. State, 698 So. 2d 497, 506 (Miss.1997). Here, a reasonable inference existed that spots found on White's shoes which contained DNA matching the victim were in fact blood. Substantial DNA evidence was offered at trial. Pictures depicting the crime scene revealed large amounts of blood. While the serologist could not offer the potentially damning testimony that the stains found on White's shoes were composed of blood, the evidence certainly was consistent with the inference argued by the State.\n¶ 13. Whether the State went beyond the logical reach of the order regarding this evidence is ultimately not necessary for us to decide. It is enough for us to conclude, and we do, that no fundamental right of the defendant was violated when the State argued what the jurors quite likely would have inferred anyway.\n\nB. Closing arguments\n¶ 14. White submits that the State engaged in prosecutorial misconduct during closing arguments. White raises three areas for our review: the references to blood found on White's shoes, the driving times between various points, and a phone call *891 made from Gulfport found in White's phone record.\n¶ 15. Here too, White's counsel failed to object. A defense counsel must \"raise a proper objection when the offensive language is uttered or waive appellate review of the issue.\" Foster v. State, 639 So. 2d 1263, 1288-89 (Miss.1994). Seeking for potential plain error, we review each issue.\n¶ 16. A closing argument is intended to summarize in a fair even if partisan fashion all the relevant evidence that would support a guilty verdict. Sheppard, 777 So.2d at 661. Regarding the State's closing remarks on the bloodstains, nothing in this argument differentiated it from the State's opening remarks on the same subject. Still, we find no reversible error. Next, White had relied substantially on an alibi. The alibi included the impossibility of his presence at the crime scene due to distance and driving times from his supposed location at a similar time as the assault. There was conflicting testimony regarding the length of time necessary to travel from Long Beach to Moss Point. Nevertheless, testimony was offered on behalf of the State that the drive took as little as twenty-six minutes. Other evidence, not mentioned by the prosecution in its closing, suggested it would have taken longer. Either party may argue from evidence facts favorable to its case even if the record reflects other facts which contradict them. Evans v. State, 725 So. 2d 613, 670 (Miss.1997). Here, jurors were charged with reviewing the conflicting testimony, and it was their decision as to witness credibility and whom to believe. Simmons v. State, 805 So. 2d 452, 483 (Miss.2001). It was not error for the prosecutor to argue the evidence most favorable to guilt.\n¶ 17. Finally, there was a phone record discussed during trial. White's essential point is that no one referred to a specific entry on the phone records during the testimony. Therefore, he alleges that it was improper for the prosecution to comment on it. However, White offered the entire bill with all the telephone calls for that time period into evidence. He relied on it substantially to corroborate his alibi. In her closing argument, the prosecutor called the jury's attention to a phone call which tended to discredit White's theory.\n¶ 18. It is error to argue facts prejudicial to the defendant which are not in evidence or reasonably inferable from facts in evidence. Blue v. State, 674 So. 2d 1184, 1214 (Miss.1996), overruled on other grounds in King v. State, 784 So. 2d 884, 889-90 (Miss.2001). Those are not the arguments that the State made. Rather, it was commenting on evidence before the jury and which was available to it. In offering the phone bill as evidence, White ran the risk that facts damaging to his cause could be argued from it. There was no necessary predicate that someone had drawn a witness's attention to that part of the exhibit before closing argument could use it.\n\nC. Ineffective assistance of counsel\n¶ 19. White acknowledges that the failure timely to object during either opening statement or closing argument presents a procedural bar to the relief sought. He therefore asserts that such failure constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. Here, White's counsel not only failed to object, he affirmatively incorporated the evidence into his defense. This appears to be trial strategy, not professional shortcoming. Handley v. State, 574 So. 2d 671, 684 (Miss.1990).\n¶ 20. White established through multiple witnesses his theory that blood from the scene may have gotten onto the clothes *892 of law enforcement officials and transferred to White during a gun residue test performed while he was in custody. White's closing argument expressly advanced this theory. \"Easily could one of these officers stepped on the blood and then inadvertently transferred it.... There wasn't any blood found on my client, except on the top, I point out, the top of his shoes.\"\n¶ 21. In order to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, White must show a deficiency in his attorney's performance which prejudiced his defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). White's only contention is the failure contemporaneously to object to the prosecutor's arguments. We have shown the defects in that allegation of default already, and find no ineffective assistance to have arisen. Neither do we find prejudice.\n\n2. Exclusion of defense expert witnesses\n¶ 22. Prior to trial, White offered two defense experts. The first, a chiropractor, offered to testify that White was physically incapable of kicking the door in a manner consistent with the markings found on it in the assault on Ford. The second witness was characterized as an \"eyewitness identification\" specialist, offering to testify that Ford's impressions and recollections of his assailant were insufficient to implicate White. The lower court excluded both witnesses.\n¶ 23. A trial judge has considerable discretion regarding relevance and admissibility of evidence. We will not reverse unless an abuse of this discretion results in prejudice to a defendant. Weeks v. State, 493 So. 2d 1280, 1284 (Miss.1986).\n¶ 24. White provided discovery regarding the chiropractor on the Friday preceding the Monday trial date. White intended the expert's testimony to demonstrate that White was physically unable to kick the door in and assault Ford. The trial court found that White had medical records suggesting this diagnosis as early as April 1997, and an obligation to prepare such a defense before the eve of trial. The court found that the prosecution did not have sufficient opportunity to meet the evidence. The State's opportunity for rigorous cross-examination would not likely have sufficed.\n¶ 25. The trial court and the State treated the matter as a discovery violation. We agree. The court was convinced that the matter of White's alleged infirmity was known well in advance of the Friday at 3:00 P.M. before the start of trial on the following Monday. Once trial commences, there is a procedure by which the surprised party may examine the physical evidence or question the new witness and determine whether unfair surprise or undue prejudice would result from permitting the new evidence. If so, the court should, \"absent unusual circumstances, exclude the evidence or grant a continuance\" to permit preparation of responsive evidence. URCCC 9.04 I. When a party before trial becomes aware of a discovery violation, the court may order the discovery of the evidence, grant a continuance, \"or enter such other order as it deems just under the circumstances.\" Id.\n¶ 26. On the eve of this trial, the judge entered the order that he deemed just. White had been under indictment for almost four years. The alleged diagnosis of this debilitating condition was of similar vintage. A substantial delay in the trial would have resulted, as the State's own expert would have had to be selected, would have needed to examine White, and then reached conclusions. We find it within the trial judge's discretion to exclude this evidence.\n*893 ¶ 27. White also challenges the lower court's exclusion of a proffered \"eyewitness identification\" expert prior to trial. The court excluded the proposed testimony, citing both timeliness concerns and that he found the evidence did not rely on proven \"scientific\" principles.\n¶ 28. Before expert testimony can be introduced, the science about which that person will opine must be shown to be generally accepted. Crawford v. State, 754 So. 2d 1211, 1216 (Miss.2000). Three factors have been identified in considering expert opinion evidence:\n(1) whether the subject matter of the proffered testimony is of the sort on which expert opinion evidence will assist the finder of fact; (2) whether the area of expertise is scientifically established so that valid opinion may be produced within that area; and, (3) finally, whether the witness is qualified.\nMcCaffrey v. Puckett, 784 So. 2d 197, 201 (Miss.2001).\n¶ 29. The trial judge was disinclined to allow the testimony under both the first and second factors. The judge seemed especially concerned that notice of this proposed testimony was being offered on the eve of trial. We have been shown nothing suggesting that the science about which this expert was going to testify is generally accepted. The merit of refusing this evidence because of the dilatoriness in presenting it is supported by the same arguments as we have discussed regarding the chiropractor who was not allowed to testify. We find that both witnesses could be excluded.\n\n3. Cumulative effect\n¶ 30. White finally submits that should his assignments of error fail individually, we must review them again collectively, analyzing their cumulative effect. It is true that an appellate \"Court may reverse a conviction and sentence based upon the cumulative effect of errors that independently would not require reversal.\" Genry v. State, 735 So. 2d 186, 201 (Miss. 1999). We must consider whether the combined errors are greater than the sum of their parts, depriving White of a fundamentally fair and impartial trial. Wilburn v. State, 608 So. 2d 702, 705 (Miss.1992).\n¶ 31. Taking this longer view of White's claim, we remain convinced that he was afforded a fair trial. Taking the cumulative effect of his arguments, we find no basis to reverse.\n¶ 32. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HARRISON COUNTY OF CONVICTION OF AGGRAVATED ASSAULT AND SENTENCE OF 20 YEARS AS AN HABITUAL OFFENDER IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS IS HEREBY AFFIRMED. COSTS ARE ASSESSED TO HARRISON COUNTY.\nMcMILLIN, C.J., KING, P.J., BRIDGES, THOMAS, LEE, IRVING, MYERS, CHANDLER AND BRANTLEY, JJ., CONCUR.\n", "ocr": false, "opinion_id": 1702545 } ]
Court of Appeals of Mississippi
Court of Appeals of Mississippi
SA
Mississippi, MS
2,641,908
Davis, Floyd, Keenan
2013-11-12
false
beth-cosey-v-the-prudential-insurance-company
null
Beth Cosey v. The Prudential Insurance Company
Beth A. COSEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. the PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA; BioMerieux, Inc., Defendants-Appellees
Norris Arden Adams, II, Essex Richards, P.A., Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant. Patrick C. DiCarlo, Alston & Bird LLP, Atlanta, Georgia, for Appellees.
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
Argued: Sept. 20, 2013.
null
null
1
Published
null
<parties id="b207-8"> Beth A. COSEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA; BioMerieux, Inc., Defendants-Appellees. </parties><br><docketnumber id="b207-10"> No. 12-2360. </docketnumber><br><court id="b207-11"> United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit. </court><br><otherdate id="b207-12"> Argued: Sept. 20, 2013. </otherdate><br><decisiondate id="b207-13"> Decided: Nov. 12, 2013. </decisiondate><br><attorneys id="b208-20"> <span citation-index="1" class="star-pagination" label="162"> *162 </span> Norris Arden Adams, II, Essex Richards, P.A., Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant. Patrick C. DiCarlo, Alston <em> &amp; </em> Bird LLP, Atlanta, Georgia, for Appellees. </attorneys><br><judges id="b208-21"> Before DAVIS, KEENAN, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges. </judges>
[ "735 F.3d 161" ]
[ { "author_str": "Keenan", "per_curiam": false, "type": "010combined", "page_count": 24, "download_url": "http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/122360.P.pdf", "author_id": null, "opinion_text": " PUBLISHED\n\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\n\n\n No. 12-2360\n\n\nBETH A. COSEY,\n\n Plaintiff - Appellant,\n\n v.\n\nTHE PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA; BIOMERIEUX,\nINC.,\n\n Defendants - Appellees.\n\n\n\nAppeal from the United States District Court for the Middle\nDistrict of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Thomas D. Schroeder,\nDistrict Judge. (1:11-cv-00121-TDS-JEP)\n\n\nArgued: September 20, 2013 Decided: November 12, 2013\n\n\nBefore DAVIS, KEENAN, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.\n\n\nVacated and remanded by published opinion. Judge Keenan wrote\nthe opinion, in which Judge Davis and Judge Floyd joined.\n\n\nNorris Arden Adams, II, ESSEX RICHARDS, P.A., Charlotte, North\nCarolina, for Appellant. Patrick C. DiCarlo, ALSTON & BIRD LLP,\nAtlanta, Georgia, for Appellees.\n\fBARBARA MILANO KEENAN, Circuit Judge:\n\n In this appeal, we primarily consider whether certain\n\nshort-term and long-term disability benefits plans provided by\n\nan employer unambiguously confer discretionary decision-making\n\nauthority on the plan administrator, requiring judicial review\n\nof the administrator’s benefits determinations under an abuse-\n\nof-discretion standard.\n\n Upon our review, we conclude that the language at issue in\n\nboth plans is ambiguous and does not clearly confer\n\ndiscretionary decision-making authority on the plan\n\nadministrator. Therefore, we hold that the administrator’s\n\neligibility determinations denying benefits to a covered\n\nemployee are subject to de novo judicial review, and that the\n\ndistrict court erred in reaching a contrary conclusion. We\n\nfurther hold that the district court erred in concluding that\n\nthe employer’s group insurance plan requires objective proof of\n\ndisability in order for an employee to qualify for plan\n\nbenefits. Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s judgment\n\nand remand the case for further proceedings.\n\n\n\n I.\n\n Beth A. Cosey was employed as a senior clinical marketing\n\nmanager for BioMerieux, Inc., a large medical diagnostics\n\ncompany. BioMerieux has a group insurance contract with the\n\n 2\n\fPrudential Insurance Company of America (Prudential), which acts\n\nas claims administrator for short-term disability (STD) and\n\nlong-term disability (LTD) benefits under employee welfare\n\nbenefits plans (collectively, the benefits plans) issued by\n\nPrudential. Cosey was a participant in the STD and LTD benefits\n\nplans. Under both plans, a participating employee is entitled\n\nto disability benefits if she is “unable to perform the material\n\nand substantial duties of [her] regular occupation due to [her]\n\nsickness or injury” (emphasis omitted).\n\n Near the end of May 2007, Cosey did not report for work and\n\nsubmitted a claim for disability benefits, citing fatigue,\n\nhypotension, weight loss, and sleep apnea. 1 Prudential initially\n\n\n\n 1\n The evidence in the record before us contains a number of\nmedical terms, several of which are defined, in relevant part,\nas follows:\n\n (1) “Disequilibrium” is “[a] disturbance or absence of\nequilibrium,” Stedman’s Medical Dictionary 566 (28th ed. 2006);\n (2) “Dysautonomia” is “[a]bnormal functioning of the\nautonomic nervous system,” id. at 595;\n (3) “Fibromyalgia” is “[a] common syndrome of chronic\nwidespread soft-tissue pain accompanied by weakness, fatigue,\nand sleep disturbances,” id. at 725;\n (4) “Hypersomnia” is “[a] condition in which sleep periods\nare excessively long, but the person responds normally in the\nintervals,” id. at 926;\n (5) “Hypotension” is “[s]ubnormal arterial blood pressure,”\nid. at 937;\n (6) “Myoclonus” is “[o]ne or a series of shocklike\ncontractions of a group of muscles, of variable regularity,\nsynchrony, and symmetry, generally due to a central nervous\nsystem lesion,” id. at 1272;\n(Continued)\n 3\n\fapproved Cosey’s claim and allowed benefits covering about a\n\nthree-week period, after which Prudential determined that Cosey\n\nhad presented insufficient evidence of an impairment preventing\n\nher from performing the material and substantial duties of her\n\nregular occupation. BioMerieux eventually terminated Cosey’s\n\nemployment in June 2008, and Cosey filed a civil action in\n\nfederal court to recover STD and LTD benefits.\n\n BioMerieux re-hired Cosey in August 2008, allowing her to\n\nwork from home and assigning her to a limited travel schedule.\n\nSeveral months later, BioMerieux and Cosey reached a settlement\n\nagreement in Cosey’s lawsuit.\n\n In March 2009, after Cosey had been working at BioMerieux\n\nin a limited capacity for about seven months, Cosey took\n\nunscheduled leave and filed another claim for disability\n\nbenefits. In support of her claim, Cosey complained of fatigue,\n\nsleep disorder, fibromyalgia, dysautonomia, myoclonus, and\n\ndizziness. Prudential initially approved Cosey’s claim and paid\n\nher STD benefits for about seven weeks.\n\n\n\n\n (7) “Sleep apnea” is a disorder “associated with frequent\nawakening” during sleep and “often with daytime sleepiness,” id.\nat 119;\n (8) “Tremor[s]” are “[r]epetitive, often regular,\noscillatory movements caused by alternate, or synchronous, but\nirregular contraction of opposing muscle groups; usually\ninvoluntary,” id. at 2023.\n\n\n 4\n\f Cosey’s consultations with various physicians produced\n\nvarying medical opinions with regard to her condition. For\n\ninstance, Cosey initially was evaluated for “overwhelming\n\nfatigue” by a primary care physician in May 2007, but that\n\nphysician noted that Cosey had “[n]o diagnosis/treatment\n\nestablished.” Later that month, a different doctor diagnosed\n\nCosey with hypersomnia despite her “normal sleep at night,” an\n\nessential tremor that was “currently asymptomatic,” and chronic\n\ndisequilibrium despite there being “no evidence of cerebellar\n\ndysfunction.”\n\n Further consultations yielded similarly inconclusive\n\nimpressions. A neurologist diagnosed Cosey with sleep apnea,\n\nbut stated that the disorder was “not severe enough to explain\n\nthe degree of day time sleepiness.” An endocrinologist remarked\n\nthat Cosey had lost more than thirty pounds in six months, but\n\nalso noted that Cosey had “improved 60% over the last few\n\nmonths” of that period and was “spontaneously getting better.”\n\n Although Cosey reported experiencing dizziness, fatigue,\n\nand tremors, one neurologist stated that an examination of Cosey\n\nwas “relatively unremarkable” after a “near complete workup,”\n\nand a neuropsychologist stated that “there are not suggestions\n\nof neurocognitive impairment.” A cardiologist reported that\n\nCosey had experienced a temporary drop in blood pressure, but\n\nopined that she otherwise was in normal cardiovascular\n\n 5\n\fcondition. Cosey initially told the cardiologist that she was\n\nexperiencing “overwhelming fatigue,” but later told the same\n\ndoctor that she was “able to play golf on the weekends,” and was\n\n“no longer having the dizziness or lightheaded episodes.”\n\n On the basis of this mixed record, the various physicians\n\nreached different conclusions about Cosey’s ability to return to\n\nwork. In support of Cosey’s claim for disability benefits,\n\nCosey’s primary care physician opined that “[t]here is no\n\noccupation that [Cosey] can sustain at this time and I deem her\n\ncondition permanent.” Also, Cosey’s chiropractor thought that\n\nCosey suffered from a “structural deficit in her cervical spine”\n\nand doubted whether Cosey “could handle the everyday needs of\n\nwork.”\n\n In contrast, four medical reviewers hired by Prudential\n\nstudied Cosey’s patient records and concluded that Cosey’s test\n\nresults did not support a finding of impairment, that there was\n\nno medical explanation for Cosey’s self-reported symptoms, and\n\nthat Cosey’s condition did not preclude her from engaging in\n\nfull-time work. Additionally, Prudential hired a company to\n\nconduct surveillance of Cosey, which revealed that Cosey had\n\nopened a coupon-related business in Myrtle Beach, South\n\nCarolina, less than one month after she most recently had\n\nstopped working for BioMerieux. Also, Cosey was observed\n\n\n\n 6\n\foutside her house “standing, walking, bending, entering and\n\nexiting a vehicle and driving.”\n\n On May 15, 2009, Prudential notified Cosey that it would\n\nnot authorize further payments unless Cosey submitted additional\n\nmedical information supporting her continued disability. Cosey\n\ndid not timely submit additional evidence in response to that\n\nrequest. Prudential informed Cosey that it had determined that\n\nthe evidence of her claimed impairment was insufficient, and\n\nthat, therefore, she was not entitled to further STD benefits.\n\n Cosey filed an administrative appeal of Prudential’s\n\ntermination of her STD benefits, but the plan administrator\n\nupheld the earlier decision and also declared Cosey ineligible\n\nfor LTD benefits. Cosey retained counsel and filed a second\n\nadministrative appeal, requesting reconsideration of both\n\ndecisions. The plan administrator again upheld its earlier\n\ndeterminations, stating its finding that Cosey’s “self-reported\n\nsymptoms are out of proportion to the medical evidence.”\n\n After exhausting her administrative remedies, Cosey filed\n\nthe present civil action against Prudential and BioMerieux. The\n\ndistrict court applied an abuse-of-discretion standard of review\n\nto Prudential’s denial of LTD and STD benefits. The court held\n\nthat the plan administrator’s decisions did not constitute an\n\nabuse of discretion, and that Cosey had failed to create a\n\ngenuine issue of material fact for the court’s determination.\n\n 7\n\fThe court alternatively held that even applying a de novo review\n\nstandard, the court “would still find that Cosey failed to meet\n\nthe definition of disability” under the benefits plans. The\n\ndistrict court entered summary judgment in favor of Prudential\n\nand BioMerieux, and Cosey timely filed the present appeal.\n\n\n\n II.\n\n Before considering the district court’s award of summary\n\njudgment, we first must determine whether the district court\n\nemployed the appropriate standard of review in examining the\n\nplan administrator’s denial of LTD and STD disability benefits.\n\nWe consider the LTD and STD benefits plans in turn.\n\n A.\n\n The LTD benefits plan before us is subject to the Employee\n\nRetirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C.\n\n§§ 1001 through 1461. In the ERISA context, courts conduct de\n\nnovo review of an administrator’s denial of benefits unless the\n\nplan grants the administrator discretion to determine a\n\nclaimant’s eligibility for benefits, in which case the\n\nadministrator’s decision is reviewed for abuse of discretion.\n\nFirestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 111 (1989);\n\nsee also Williams v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 609 F.3d 622, 629-30\n\n(4th Cir. 2010).\n\n\n\n 8\n\f This Court explained in Gallagher v. Reliance Standard Life\n\nInsurance Co. that no specific words or phrases are required to\n\nconfer discretion, but that a grant of discretionary authority\n\nmust be clear. 305 F.3d 264, 268 (4th Cir. 2002); see also\n\nSandy v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 222 F.3d 1202, 1207\n\n(9th Cir. 2000) (“Neither the parties nor the courts should have\n\nto divine whether discretion is conferred.”). We further have\n\nstated that any ambiguity in an ERISA plan “is construed against\n\nthe drafter of the plan, and it is construed in accordance with\n\nthe reasonable expectations of the insured.” Gallagher, 305\n\nF.3d at 269 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).\n\n The LTD plan administered by Prudential states that\n\nbenefits only will be paid to a claimant who “submit[s] proof of\n\ncontinuing disability satisfactory to Prudential” (emphasis\n\nadded). Prudential and BioMerieux (collectively, Prudential)\n\nargue that under our decision in Gallagher, we are required to\n\ndetermine that this language in the LTD plan unambiguously\n\nconfers discretion on the plan administrator. We disagree.\n\n In Gallagher, we observed that plan language requiring a\n\nclaimant to “submit[] satisfactory proof of [t]otal [d]isability\n\nto us” was ambiguous, and could be interpreted as requiring\n\neither an objective or a subjective standard for determining\n\nwhether a claimant’s “proof” was “satisfactory.” Id. (emphasis\n\nadded). Therefore, we held that the plan language did not\n\n 9\n\fclearly convey that the plan administrator had discretionary\n\ndecision-making authority in deciding benefits claims. Id. at\n\n269-70.\n\n In explaining our decision in Gallagher, we provided an\n\nexample of a subjective standard different from the language at\n\nissue in that case. We noted hypothetically that a requirement\n\nthat a claimant submit “proof . . . that is satisfactory to [the\n\nplan administrator]” would refer to proof that the administrator\n\n“finds subjectively satisfactory,” and would occasion abuse-of-\n\ndiscretion review. Id. at 269. However, because the language\n\nprovided in the above hypothetical example was not before us for\n\ndecision in Gallagher, we hold that our discussion of that\n\nlanguage was dictum and does not bind our consideration of the\n\nplan language before us. Accordingly, we consider as a matter\n\nof first impression whether the phrase “proof satisfactory to\n\n[the plan administrator]” unambiguously confers discretionary\n\ndecision-making authority on a plan administrator.\n\n We observe that five of our sister circuits recently have\n\nheld that this language does not unambiguously confer such\n\ndiscretionary authority. In fact, earlier this year the First\n\nCircuit followed the Seventh Circuit’s example in departing from\n\nits own precedent to join a growing consensus of circuit courts\n\nthat require stricter clarity in plan language before insulating\n\ninsurance companies from full judicial review. See Gross v. Sun\n\n 10\n\fLife Assurance Co. of Can., --- F.3d ---, 2013 WL 4305006, at\n\n*8-12 (1st Cir. Aug. 16, 2013); Diaz v. Prudential Ins. Co. of\n\nAm., 424 F.3d 635, 639-40 (7th Cir. 2005); see also Viera v.\n\nLife Ins. Co. of N. Am., 642 F.3d 407, 417 (3d Cir. 2011);\n\nFeibusch v. Integrated Device Tech., Inc. Emp. Benefit Plan, 463\n\nF.3d 880, 883-84 (9th Cir. 2006); Kinstler v. First Reliance\n\nStandard Life Ins. Co., 181 F.3d 243, 252 (2d Cir. 1999).\n\n We agree with the conclusions reached by our five sister\n\ncircuits. Three major themes pervade the opinions of those\n\ncourts and are relevant to our analysis. We consider: (1) the\n\ninherent ambiguity in the wording of the phrase “proof\n\nsatisfactory to us”; (2) the likelihood that such language will\n\nfail to provide sufficient notice to employees that their\n\ndisability claims will be subject to a plan administrator’s\n\ndiscretionary determination; and (3) the responsibility of\n\ninsurance companies to draft clear plan language.\n\n First, we conclude that the phrase “proof satisfactory to\n\nus” is inherently ambiguous. As the Second Circuit has\n\nexplained, such language could be construed as simply stating\n\nthe truism that the administrator is the decision-maker who\n\ninitially must be persuaded that benefits should be paid before\n\nany amounts actually are paid. See Kinstler, 181 F.3d at 252.\n\nOr, as the First, Third, and Seventh Circuits have observed, the\n\nphrase could be interpreted as describing the “inevitable\n\n 11\n\fprerogative” of a plan administrator to insist that the form of\n\nproof complies with prescribed standards, on the theory that an\n\nadministrator ought to be able to require production of\n\nparticular types of proof that the administrator deems most\n\nreliable. Diaz, 424 F.3d at 637, 639 (“[E]very plan requires\n\nsubmission of documentary proof, and the administrator is\n\nentitled to insist on [one form of proof over another].”\n\n(citations omitted)); see also Viera, 642 F.3d at 417 (“In other\n\nwords, it is not clear whether ‘satisfactory to Us’ means\n\n‘. . . proof of loss [in a form] satisfactory to Us’ or\n\n‘. . . proof of loss [substantively and subjectively]\n\nsatisfactory to Us.’”) (brackets in original); Gross, 2013 WL\n\n4305006, at *11 (explaining that “satisfactory to us” wording\n\n“reasonably may be understood to state [an administrator’s]\n\nright to insist on certain forms of proof rather than confer[]\n\ndiscretionary authority over benefits claims”). Similarly, the\n\nphrase could mean that the plan administrator is entitled to\n\nrequire that the quantum of proof meets some objective standard\n\nthat the administrator ultimately has no power to change. Cf.\n\nKearney v. Standard Ins. Co., 175 F.3d 1084, 1089 (9th Cir.\n\n1999).\n\n Another possible reading, of course, is that the evidence\n\nmust “comply with the plan administrator’s subjective notions of\n\neligibility, disability, or other terms in the plan.” Diaz, 424\n\n 12\n\fF.3d at 639. From this perspective, the administrator would be\n\nvested not only with the power to insist on proof in a certain\n\nform or quantum, but also with the discretion “to interpret the\n\nrules, to implement the rules, and even to change them\n\nentirely.” Id.\n\n In view of the ambiguity of this plan language, a decision\n\nhere in favor of Prudential would violate our requirement of\n\nclear plan language that “expressly creates discretionary\n\nauthority.” Feder v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 228 F.3d 518,\n\n522 (4th Cir. 2000); cf. Gross, 2013 WL 4305006, at *11\n\n(requiring an administrator to “offer more than subtle\n\ninferences drawn from such unrevealing language” to support the\n\nadministrator’s claim of discretionary authority). Thus, we\n\ncannot accord Prudential such an expansive inference regarding\n\nits plan administrator’s decision-making authority.\n\n The second reason for our conclusion that the phrase “proof\n\nsatisfactory to us” does not confer discretion on an\n\nadministrator involves the notice function of plan language. We\n\nidentified this notice function as an important consideration in\n\nGallagher, in which we held in part that a plan did not clearly\n\nconfer discretion because such a construction of the plan’s\n\nlanguage would not be an insured employee’s “most likely”\n\ninterpretation of that language. 305 F.3d at 270.\n\n\n\n 13\n\f We are concerned that insured employees who read\n\nPrudential’s ambiguous plan language are not given sufficient\n\nnotice whether their plan administrator has “broad, unchanneled\n\ndiscretion to deny claims.” Diaz, 424 F.3d at 637 (citation and\n\ninternal quotation marks omitted). It is critical that\n\nemployees understand the broad range of a plan administrator’s\n\nauthority because of the impact that this information can have\n\non employees’ own decisions. For instance, as the Seventh\n\nCircuit has noted, employees may choose a particular employer\n\nbased on their understanding of the insurance benefits provided\n\nby that employer, including whether any award of benefits is\n\nsubject to a plan administrator’s discretionary decision-making\n\nauthority. See id. at 639 (“[S]ome may prefer the certainty of\n\nplans that do not confer discretion on administrators, while\n\nothers may think that the lower costs that are likely to attend\n\nplans with reserved discretion are worth it.”).\n\n Additionally, without clear language notifying employees\n\nthat an administrator’s denial of benefits is insulated from\n\nplenary judicial review, employees who file claims for benefits\n\nmay not be fully aware of the gravity of administrative\n\nproceedings or the necessity of developing as complete a record\n\nas possible early in the claims process. Even a claimant’s\n\ndecision whether to be represented by counsel in administrative\n\nproceedings can be affected if the claimant is aware that once\n\n 14\n\fadministrative avenues of appeal are exhausted, federal courts\n\nwill review the administrator’s determinations under a highly\n\ndeferential legal standard. 2\n\n The third basis for our conclusion that the phrase “proof\n\nsatisfactory to us” is insufficient to confer discretion on a\n\nplan administrator is the well-settled principle that\n\nambiguities in an ERISA plan must be construed against the\n\nadministrator responsible for drafting the plan. See Gallagher,\n\n305 F.3d at 269. As the First Circuit recently observed, “it is\n\nnot difficult to craft clear language” granting discretion to a\n\nplan administrator. Gross, 2013 WL 4305006, at *12; see also\n\nFeibusch, 463 F.3d at 883-84 (same); Kinstler, 181 F.3d at 252\n\n(counseling courts to “decline to search in semantic swamps for\n\narguable grants of discretion” given the ease in drafting clear\n\nlanguage).\n\n We acknowledge that no magic words are required to ensure\n\ndiscretionary, rather than de novo, judicial review of a plan\n\nadministrator’s decision. Gallagher, 305 F.3d at 268. However,\n\nwe also agree with the First Circuit’s observation that drafters\n\nof ERISA plans have had every opportunity to avoid adverse\n\n\n 2\n We note that Cosey appears to have corresponded with\nPrudential on her own during the processing of her STD claim and\nher initial administrative appeal of Prudential’s termination of\nSTD benefits. She hired counsel to assist her in further\nadministrative proceedings and in civil litigation.\n\n\n 15\n\frulings on this issue, especially in light of the gradual but\n\nunmistakable change in the precedential landscape of federal\n\nappellate decisions. See Gross, 2013 WL 4305006, at *12.\n\nIndeed, the group insurance contract in the record is dated May\n\n1, 2007, well after the Second, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits\n\nalready had rejected as inadequate the “proof satisfactory to\n\nus” formulation that we consider here.\n\n For these reasons, we now join the circuits that decline to\n\nimpose an abuse-of-discretion standard of review based solely on\n\na plan’s requirement that claimants submit\n\n“proof . . . satisfactory to [the plan administrator].” 3 This\n\nconclusion complements our holding in Gallagher, by requiring\n\nclear plan language expressly conferring decision-making\n\ndiscretion on a plan administrator before permitting judicial\n\nreview of that administrator’s decision under an abuse-of-\n\ndiscretion standard. Accordingly, we hold that the district\n\ncourt erred in reviewing the plan administrator’s denial of\n\n\n\n\n 3\n We therefore disagree with the minority of circuits that\nhave concluded that language similar to the language before us\nconfers discretionary decision-making authority on a plan\nadministrator. See Tippitt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co.,\n457 F.3d 1227, 1233-34 (11th Cir. 2006); Nance v. Sun Life\nAssurance Co. of Can., 294 F.3d 1263, 1267-68 (10th Cir. 2002);\nFerrari v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass’n, 278 F.3d 801, 806 (8th\nCir. 2002).\n\n\n 16\n\fCosey’s claim for LTD benefits under an abuse-of-discretion\n\nstandard. 4\n\n B.\n\n We next address the plan detailing Cosey’s STD benefits.\n\nThe parties have stipulated, and we agree, that the STD plan is\n\nnot governed by ERISA. 5 Therefore, we must ascertain the\n\nappropriate standard for judicial review of a plan\n\nadministrator’s benefits determination under the present STD\n\nplan. 6 We hold that the STD plan did not confer discretionary\n\n\n 4\n We are not persuaded to the contrary by Prudential’s\ncitation to the summary plan description for the LTD plan, which\nprovides, in relevant part, that the administrator has “sole\ndiscretion to interpret the terms of the Group Contract, to make\nfactual findings, and to determine eligibility for benefits.”\nWe think this argument is foreclosed by the Supreme Court’s\ndecision in CIGNA Corporation v. Amara, 131 S. Ct. 1866, 1878\n(2011), in which the Court concluded that “the summary\ndocuments, important as they are, provide communication with\nbeneficiaries about the plan, but that their statements do not\nthemselves constitute the terms of the plan” (emphasis in\noriginal). Moreover, because we have determined that the\nlanguage of the LTD plan is ambiguous and have construed that\nambiguity against Prudential, we find no basis for crediting a\nconflicting grant of authority contained in a non-plan document.\n 5\n As the district court noted, the basis for the parties’\nstipulation is an exemption from ERISA for agreements whereby an\nemployer pays an employee’s normal compensation out of the\nemployer’s general assets during a period in which the employee\nis physically or mentally unable to perform her duties. See 29\nC.F.R. § 2510.3-1(b)(2).\n 6\n Some circuits have reached different conclusions on the\nseparate issue whether abuse-of-discretion review may be applied\nwith respect to certain ERISA-exempt plans. Compare Comrie v.\nIPSCO, Inc., 636 F.3d 839, 842 (7th Cir. 2011) (applying\n(Continued)\n 17\n\fdecision-making authority on the plan administrator, and that,\n\ntherefore, the district court erred in reviewing the plan\n\nadministrator’s denial of Cosey’s STD benefits claim under an\n\nabuse-of-discretion standard.\n\n We begin our analysis by consulting familiar principles of\n\nNorth Carolina contract law, which we apply to the benefits plan\n\nbefore us. 7 In North Carolina, when a court interprets a\n\ncontract, the court’s primary function is to ascertain the\n\nparties’ intention as expressed in their written instrument.\n\nSee Lane v. Scarborough, 200 S.E.2d 622, 624 (N.C. 1973). If\n\n\n\n\ndeferential review and noting that it should be “easier, not\nharder” to effectuate a grant of discretion in a standard\ncontract than in a highly regulated ERISA plan), with Goldstein\nv. Johnson & Johnson, 251 F.3d 433, 442-44 (3d Cir. 2001)\n(applying de novo review to an ERISA-exempt, “top hat” deferred\ncompensation plan even when the plan conferred discretionary\nauthority on a plan administrator not acting as an ERISA\nfiduciary), and Craig v. Pillsbury Non-Qualified Pension Plan,\n458 F.3d 748, 752 (8th Cir. 2006) (adopting an intermediate\nstandard). However, we need not reach this issue in the present\ncase because we conclude that the contractual terms of the STD\nplan did not confer discretion on the plan administrator.\n 7\n Although the group insurance contract states that “[t]he\nGroup Contract is delivered in and is governed by the laws of\nthe Governing Jurisdiction,” which is defined as the “State of\nMissouri,” the parties in this case asked the district court to\ninterpret the STD plan under North Carolina law. On appeal,\nboth parties likewise have argued the case based on the trial\ncourt’s application of North Carolina law. Accordingly, we\napply North Carolina law in our analysis. Cf. Am. Fuel Corp. v.\nUtah Energy Dev. Co., 122 F.3d 130, 134 (2d Cir. 1997) (“[W]here\nthe parties have agreed to the application of the forum law,\ntheir consent concludes the choice of law inquiry.”).\n\n\n 18\n\fthe plain language of a contract is clear, the intention of the\n\nparties is inferred from the words of the contract considered as\n\na whole. See State v. Philip Morris USA Inc., 685 S.E.2d 85, 90\n\n(N.C. 2009) (citations omitted).\n\n Only when terms of a contract are ambiguous are courts\n\nauthorized to apply rules of construction. See Jones v.\n\nCasstevens, 23 S.E.2d 303, 305 (N.C. 1942). Any such\n\nambiguities in contract language must be construed against the\n\nparty responsible for drafting the uncertain language. See\n\nNovacare Orthotics & Prosthetics E., Inc. v. Speelman, 528\n\nS.E.2d 918, 921 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000). And, in the context of\n\ninsurance contracts, North Carolina courts long have held that\n\nambiguities must be construed in favor of the insured. See,\n\ne.g., Kirkley v. Merrimack Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 59 S.E.2d 629,\n\n631 (N.C. 1950); McCain v. Hartford Live Stock Ins. Co., 130\n\nS.E. 186, 187 (N.C. 1925).\n\n Prudential argues that the STD plan requirement that\n\nclaimants “submit satisfactory proof of continuing disability”\n\nis a grant of discretionary decision-making authority. In\n\nresponse, Cosey submits that this phrase in the STD plan is\n\nindistinguishable from the very similar language that we held\n\nambiguous in Gallagher. See 305 F.3d at 269.\n\n We agree with Cosey that the “satisfactory proof” language\n\nin the STD plan is the functional equivalent of the language we\n\n 19\n\fheld ambiguous in Gallagher. As we discussed in Gallagher, a\n\nrequirement that a claimant submit “satisfactory proof” could be\n\ninterpreted as mandating proof that is “objectively\n\nsatisfactory,” or proof that is “subjectively satisfactory” to\n\nthe plan administrator. Id. Because we are unable to determine\n\nthe parties’ intention from the language of the contract,\n\nordinary principles of contract construction compel us to\n\nconstrue this ambiguous phrase in favor of Cosey, the insured\n\nemployee, and conclude that the STD plan fails to confer\n\ndiscretionary decision-making authority on the plan\n\nadministrator.\n\n Our conclusion is not altered by Prudential’s contention\n\nthat any ambiguity in the STD plan should be resolved against\n\nCosey because of the clear grant of discretion to the plan\n\nadministrator in a separate Administrative Services Agreement\n\n(ASA), which Prudential asserts we must view as an integral part\n\nof the STD plan. 8 The unsigned ASA in the record purports to\n\nhave been negotiated between BioMerieux and Prudential more than\n\neight months after the commencement of Cosey’s coverage under\n\n 8\n Because we apply state law to decide whether the ASA is a\npart of the ERISA-exempt STD plan at issue in this case, we do\nnot reach the question whether an ASA can confer discretion\nabsent a discretionary grant in an ERISA plan. Therefore, the\nERISA cases cited by the parties are inapposite. We note,\nhowever, that in the ERISA context, the Supreme Court’s decision\nin Amara has cast serious doubt on whether non-plan documents\ncan be used to interpret a plan’s language. See supra note 4.\n\n\n 20\n\fthe STD and LTD plans. Among other things, the ASA states that\n\n“Prudential will have discretionary authority to determine\n\neligibility for benefits” and “to interpret and construe the\n\nterms of the Plan.”\n\n Prudential’s reliance on the ASA is misplaced. The STD\n\nplan does not incorporate or even refer to the ASA. Cf. Booker\n\nv. Everhart, 240 S.E.2d 360, 363 (N.C. 1978) (“To incorporate a\n\nseparate document by reference is to declare that the former\n\ndocument shall be taken as part of the document in which the\n\ndeclaration is made, as much as if it were set out at length\n\ntherein.”). Absent any terms in the contract elaborating the\n\nparties’ intention to confer discretion on the plan\n\nadministrator, we decline to hold that the ASA’s grant of\n\ndiscretion constitutes a part of the STD plan, particularly when\n\ndoing so would conflict with our duty under North Carolina law\n\nto construe ambiguous contract terms against the drafter and in\n\nfavor of the insured. 9 Therefore, we conclude that the STD plan\n\ndoes not confer decision-making discretion on the plan\n\nadministrator, and that the district court erred in applying\n\nabuse-of-discretion review to the plan administrator’s denial of\n\nCosey’s STD benefits claim.\n\n 9\n In view of our holding that the language of the STD plan\nis ambiguous and must be construed in Cosey’s favor, we need not\ndiscuss the fact that the version of the ASA in the record is\nunsigned.\n\n\n 21\n\f III.\n\n Generally, we review a district court’s award of summary\n\njudgment de novo, applying the same standards as those governing\n\nthe district court’s review of the record. Cf. Felty v. Graves-\n\nHumphreys Co., 818 F.2d 1126, 1127-28 (4th Cir. 1987). As we\n\nhave discussed above, the district court was required to review\n\nde novo the decisions of the plan administrator with respect to\n\nCosey’s LTD and STD claims. After the district court reviewed\n\nthe plan administrator’s decision for abuse of discretion, the\n\ncourt alternatively opined that “even under a de novo review,\n\nthe court would still find that Cosey failed to meet the\n\ndefinition of disability in the STD and LTD benefits plans.”\n\n Cosey argues that the district court’s use of an incorrect\n\nstandard of review, and the court’s erroneous view that both\n\nbenefits plans required Cosey to present objective evidence of\n\nher disability, mandates reversal of the summary judgment award.\n\nIn response, Prudential asserts that the court’s de novo review\n\nof the plan administrator’s decision permits us to conduct our\n\nown de novo review of that alternative holding, and that the\n\ndistrict court did not err in holding that Cosey was required to\n\npresent objective evidence that she was disabled.\n\n We disagree with Prudential’s argument. Although the\n\ndistrict court’s alternative holding referenced the correct\n\nstandard of review, we presently are unable to consider that\n\n 22\n\fholding because it was based in part on the court’s ruling that\n\nCosey was required to present objective evidence of her\n\ndisability. The district court articulated its requirement of\n\nobjective proof, stating:\n\n\n Both the STD and LTD benefits plans state that the\n claimant is required to submit “proof” of disability\n to receive benefits. The use of the word “proof”\n communicates that there must be some objective basis\n to the claimant’s complaints, or plan administrators\n would have to accept all subjective claims of the\n participant without question. It is hardly\n unreasonable for the administrator to require an\n objective component to proof of disability (citations,\n internal quotation marks, and brackets omitted).\n\n\n We express no opinion whether a company lawfully could\n\ndraft a benefits plan requiring that a claimant produce\n\nobjective proof of disability. However, no such requirement\n\nappears in either the LTD or the STD plans before us. Neither\n\nplan provides that a claimant’s submission of proof must contain\n\nan “objective component.” See DuPerry v. Life Ins. Co. of N.\n\nAm., 632 F.3d 860, 869 (4th Cir. 2011) (holding that under a\n\nplan “contain[ing] no provision precluding [a claimant] from\n\nrelying on her subjective complaints as part of her evidence of\n\ndisability,” a claim cannot be denied based on such reliance).\n\nTherefore, we hold that the district court erred in concluding\n\nthat Prudential could deny Cosey’s STD and LTD claims on the\n\nbasis that her proof lacked such objective evidence. Further,\n\n\n 23\n\fbecause this improper consideration was part of the district\n\ncourt’s ultimate award of summary judgment in Prudential’s\n\nfavor, we must vacate the award and remand for the court to\n\nreview Cosey’s evidence de novo under the actual requirements of\n\nthe LTD and STD plans.\n\n\n\n IV.\n\n In summary, we conclude that the language of both the STD\n\nand the LTD plans is inherently ambiguous and fails to confer\n\ndiscretionary decision-making authority on Prudential, requiring\n\nde novo judicial review of the administrator’s denial of Cosey’s\n\nbenefits claims under those plans. We therefore hold that the\n\ndistrict court erred in reviewing Prudential’s decisions for an\n\nabuse of discretion. We further hold that the district court\n\nerred in requiring objective evidence of Cosey’s claimed\n\ndisability when neither the LTD nor the STD benefits plans\n\ncontain such a requirement. Accordingly, we vacate the district\n\ncourt’s award of summary judgment and remand with instructions\n\nthat the court apply de novo review to the plan administrator’s\n\ndenial of Cosey’s LTD and STD benefits claims.\n\n\n\n VACATED AND REMANDED\n\n\n\n\n 24\n\f", "ocr": false, "opinion_id": 2641908 } ]
Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
F
USA, Federal
486,666
null
1987-03-26
false
lilco-v-local-1049
Lilco
Lilco v. Local 1049
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
0
Published
null
null
[ "816 F.2d 669" ]
[ { "author_str": null, "per_curiam": false, "type": "010combined", "page_count": null, "download_url": "http://bulk.resource.org/courts.gov/c/F2/816/816.F2d.669.86-7921.html", "author_id": null, "opinion_text": "816 F.2d 669\n Lilcov.Local 1049\n 86-7921\n United States Court of Appeals,Second Circuit.\n 3/26/87\n \n 1\n E.D.N.Y.\n \n AFFIRMED\n ", "ocr": false, "opinion_id": 486666 } ]
Second Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
F
USA, Federal
2,580,541
McCUSKEY
1999-08-05
false
archer-daniels-midland-co-v-whitacre
Whitacre
Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. Whitacre
ARCHER DANIELS MIDLAND COMPANY, a Delaware Corporation, Plaintiff, v. Mark W. WHITACRE, Defendant
Laurie S. Fulton, Williams & Connolly, Washington, DC, A. James Shatter, Ke-hart, Shatter & Webber, Decatur, IL, for Plaintiff., Bill T. Walker, Law Offices of Bill T. Walker, Granite City, IL, for Defendant.
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
See also 39 F.Supp.2d 1048; 46 F.Supp.2d 819.
null
4
Published
null
<parties id="b863-12"> ARCHER DANIELS MIDLAND COMPANY, a Delaware Corporation, Plaintiff, v. Mark W. WHITACRE, Defendant. </parties><br><docketnumber id="b863-15"> No. 96-CV-2237. </docketnumber><br><court id="b863-16"> United States District Court, C.D. Illinois, Danville/Urbana Division. </court><br><decisiondate id="b863-19"> Aug. 5, 1999. </decisiondate><br><seealso id="b864-6"> <span citation-index="1" class="star-pagination" label="820"> *820 </span> See also 39 F.Supp.2d 1048; 46 F.Supp.2d 819. </seealso><br><attorneys id="b865-18"> <span citation-index="1" class="star-pagination" label="821"> *821 </span> Laurie S. Fulton, Williams &amp; Connolly, Washington, DC, A. James Shatter, Ke-hart, Shatter &amp; Webber, Decatur, IL, for Plaintiff. </attorneys><br><attorneys id="b865-19"> Bill T. Walker, Law Offices of Bill T. Walker, Granite City, IL, for Defendant. </attorneys>
[ "60 F. Supp. 2d 819" ]
[ { "author_str": "McCUSKEY", "per_curiam": false, "type": "010combined", "page_count": null, "download_url": null, "author_id": 2125, "opinion_text": "\n60 F. Supp. 2d 819 (1999)\nARCHER DANIELS MIDLAND COMPANY, a Delaware Corporation, Plaintiff,\nv.\nMark W. WHITACRE, Defendant.\nNo. 96-CV-2237.\nUnited States District Court, C.D. Illinois, Danville/Urbana Division.\nAugust 5, 1999.\n*820 *821 Laurie S. Fulton, Williams &amp; Connolly, Washington, DC, A. James Shafter, Kehart, Shafter &amp; Webber, Decatur, IL, for Plaintiff.\nBill T. Walker, Law Offices of Bill T. Walker, Granite City, IL, for Defendant.\n\nORDER\nMcCUSKEY, District Judge.\nThis case is before the court for ruling on two Motions filed by Plaintiff, Archer Daniels Midland Company (ADM), a Motion for Summary Judgment (# 137) and a Motion to Stay (# 159). Following careful review, ADM's Motion for Summary Judgment (# 137) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. In addition, ADM's Motion to Stay proceedings regarding Count VII of its Amended Complaint (# 159) is GRANTED. ADM's request to voluntarily dismiss Count IV of its Amended Complaint is GRANTED. This court is also providing notice to ADM that it intends to dismiss Counts V and VI of ADM's Amended Complaint for the reasons stated in this Order. ADM is allowed fourteen (14) days to file any objections to the dismissal of Counts V and VI. See Stewart Title Guar. Co. v. Cadle Co., 74 F.3d 835, 836-37 (7th Cir.1996).\n\nFACTS\nDefendant, Mark W. Whitacre, began his employment with ADM on November 13, 1989. He was originally vice-president of ADM BioChem. ADM BioChem was later named ADM BioProducts Division. In May 1990, Whitacre was promoted to president of ADM BioProducts Division, which produces lysine. In November 1992, Whitacre became a corporate vice-president of ADM. Also in November 1992, Whitacre began taping conversations at *822 ADM. The recordings were turned over to the FBI to be used in its investigation into allegations of price-fixing of lysine. On June 27, 1995, the FBI raided ADM's corporate headquarters. On August 7, 1995, Whitacre's employment was terminated. Whitacre was informed by letter that he was being terminated \"for cause, including the theft of at least $2.5 million from the Company.\"\nADM filed its original Complaint against Whitacre on September 19, 1996, in the circuit court of Macon County. In its 39-page complaint, ADM alleged that Whitacre unlawfully obtained over $9.5 million from ADM during his employment with ADM. In Count I, ADM claimed that Whitacre was liable for the breach of fiduciary duties. In Count II, ADM alleged that Whitacre was liable for conversion. In Count III, ADM alleged that Whitacre was liable for fraud. In Count IV, ADM sought an accounting and the imposition of a constructive trust. In Count V, ADM sought a declaratory judgment that Whitacre continues to be obligated pursuant to the Non-Disclosure Agreement signed during his employment and that Whitacre is barred from disclosing information described within the Non-Disclosure Agreement. In Count VI, ADM named various individuals allegedly involved with Whitacre in unlawfully obtaining money from ADM as Respondents in Discovery. ADM requested that they be required to participate and respond to discovery in this case.\nWhitacre removed the action to this court on October 17, 1996, on the basis of diversity of citizenship (28 U.S.C. § 1332) as Whitacre was then a resident of North Carolina. On November 22, 1996, Whitacre filed an Answer to the Complaint and a Counterclaim. In his Counterclaim, Whitacre sought damages from ADM for: (1) retaliatory discharge following his cooperation with the FBI in its investigation into price-fixing (Count I); (2) breach of contract (Count II), based upon ADM's breach of three stock option agreements; (3) intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count III); and (4) five counts of defamation (Counts IV, V, VI, VII and VIII).\nOn January 9, 1997, ADM filed its Complaint in Case No. 97-2005 against many of the individuals named as Respondents in Discovery. This case has recently been settled by all of the parties, and an Order dismissing the case was entered by this court on July 14, 1999.\nOn October 10, 1997, Whitacre pleaded guilty to 37 counts of an indictment charging him with wire fraud, interstate transportation of stolen property, conspiracy to defraud the United States, money laundering and filing false Income Tax returns. On March 4, 1998, Whitacre was sentenced to 108 months' incarceration and was ordered to pay ADM $11,403,698 in restitution.\nOn July 21, 1998, this court granted ADM's motion to amend its Complaint and add Count VII, alleging that Whitacre violated Federal wiretapping statutes (18 U.S.C. §§ 2511(1), 2512(1)) and Count VIII, alleging that Whitacre violated Illinois' eavesdropping statute (720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/14-2 (West 1996)). Whitacre filed his Answer to these additional counts on August 14, 1998.\nADM filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (# 137) on September 10, 1998. ADM also filed a Statement of Undisputed Facts, a lengthy Memorandum in Support of the Motion and three volumes of exhibits. In its Motion, ADM sought a judgment in its favor on Counts I, II, III, V, VII and VIII of its Amended Complaint. ADM also sought a judgment in its favor and against Whitacre on all counts of Whitacre's Counterclaim.\nOn September 17, 1998, following a jury trial before United States District Judge Blanche M. Manning, Whitacre and ADM executives Michael D. Andreas and Terrance S. Wilson were found guilty of conspiring to fix the global price and allocate the sales volume of lysine. See United States v. Andreas, 39 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1054 (N.D.Ill.1998). On December 16, 1998, *823 Whitacre filed his Response to the Motion for Summary Judgment.\nADM filed a Motion to Stay (# 159) on April 7, 1999. ADM noted that United States District Judge Michael M. Mihm entered an Order in In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litigation, 46 F. Supp. 2d 819 (C.D.Ill.1999). According to ADM, this Order related to the same tapes at issue in Count VII of ADM's Amended Complaint. ADM stated that an appeal from Judge Mihm's Order would be filed. ADM argued that it would serve judicial economy to stay resolution of its Motion for Summary Judgment regarding Count VII pending the disposition of the forthcoming appeal. Whitacre has not responded to the Motion to Stay.\nWhitacre was sentenced by Judge Manning on July 9, 1999. He was sentenced to a term of 30 months in prison, 20 months to be consecutive to the sentence previously imposed by Judge Baker. United States v. Andreas, 1999 WL 515484, at *17 (N.D.Ill.1999).\n\nANALYSIS\n\nI. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD\nThis court first notes that ruling on ADM's Motion for Summary Judgment has been complicated by Whitacre's failure to comply with the Central District of Illinois' Local Rules. Local Rule 7.1(D)(2) provides:\nSimilar to answering a complaint, in response the party opposing the summary judgment, shall file a separate document (entitled \"Response to statement of Undisputed Facts\") which numerically responds to each of the movant's undisputed facts. The party will either admit or contest the fact. If the fact is contested, the party (1) shall submit a short and plain statement of why the fact is in dispute and (2) cite to discovery material or affidavits that support the contention that the fact is disputed. (Emphasis in original.)\nIn this case, Whitacre was allowed numerous extensions of time in which to file his Response to the Motion for Summary Judgment. In fact, the Response was filed more than three months after the Motion was filed. Nevertheless, Whitacre did not comply with the requirements of Local Rule 7.1(D). In the Response, Whitacre merely listed the numbers of Plaintiff's Undisputed Facts which he contested. He provided no statement of why any of the facts were in dispute and no citation to discovery material or affidavits. In addition, Whitacre has provided this court with little reasoned analysis explaining why summary judgment should not be granted.\nThe Seventh Circuit has repeatedly upheld the strict enforcement of the local rules and has sustained the entry of summary judgment when the non-movant fails to submit a factual statement in the form required by the local rules. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Landa, 974 F. Supp. 1, 3 (C.D.Ill.1997) (citing Waldridge v. American Hoechst Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 922 (7th Cir.1994)). However, strict enforcement of the local rules does not mean that a party's failure to comply with the rules automatically results in summary judgment for the moving party. LaSalle Bank Lake View v. Seguban, 54 F.3d 387, 392 (7th Cir.1995). It remains \"the movant's burden to demonstrate that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that he is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.\" Doe v. Cunningham, 30 F.3d 879, 883 (7th Cir.1994). Accordingly, the district court must make the further finding that summary judgment is proper as a matter of law. LaSalle Bank, 54 F.3d at 392. \"Where the evidentiary matter in support of the motion [for summary judgment] does not establish the absence of a genuine issue, summary judgment must be denied even if no opposing evidentiary matter is presented.\" Adickes v. S.H. Kress &amp; Co., 398 U.S. 144, 160, 90 S. Ct. 1598, 26 L. Ed. 2d 142 (1970) (quoting the Advisory Committee Note on the 1963 Amendment to subdivision (e) of Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); see also Wienco, Inc. v. Katahn Assocs., Inc., 965 F.2d 565, 568 (7th Cir.1992).\n*824 Summary judgment shall be granted \"if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.\" Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a district court has one task and one task only: to decide, based upon the evidence of record, whether there is any material dispute of fact that requires a trial. Waldridge, 24 F.3d at 920. Neither the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties nor the existence of some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts is sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Hoffman v. MCA, Inc., 144 F.3d 1117, 1121 (7th Cir.1998).\n\nII. ADM'S CLAIMS FOR DAMAGES\nIn Counts I, II and III of its Amended Complaint, ADM seeks damages from Whitacre for breach of fiduciary duty, fraud and conversion. ADM has provided detailed documentation of fraudulent transactions engaged in by Whitacre during his employment with ADM. This court concludes that ADM has presented more than sufficient evidence to establish that Whitacre engaged in fraudulent transactions, beginning in 1991 and continuing into 1995, which caused ADM to pay a total of $9,538,694 for services it never received. Indeed, on October 10, 1997, Whitacre pleaded guilty to 37 counts of the indictment against him based upon the fact that he engaged in these transactions. On March 4, 1998, when he was sentenced for those crimes, he was ordered to pay restitution to ADM in the total amount of $11,403,698. This figure was the total of $9,538,694, the amount of the documented fraudulent transactions, and $1,865,004 in interest.\nBased upon the facts submitted by ADM, and Whitacre's guilty plea, this court concludes that ADM is clearly entitled to summary judgment on Counts I, II and III of its Amended Complaint. See Northwestern Neurosurgical Assocs., S.C. v. Esteves, 1996 WL 164390, at *2-5 (N.D.Ill.1996). ADM is seeking an award of damages based upon these Counts in the total amount of $6,327,017.52. This amount is the total of the $9,538,694 ADM lost due to the fraudulent transactions, $1,174,167.52 to reimburse ADM for the salary and benefits paid to Whitacre, pre-judgment interest, minus $8,074,851.29 recovered by ADM from Whitacre and his co-conspirators.\nWhitacre argues that an award of damages would be improper because he has already been ordered to pay restitution. However, Whitacre's plea agreement specifically provided that it did not bar or compromise any civil claim pending against Whitacre. Further, ADM has pointed out that it is not seeking a double recovery. ADM has subtracted from the damages requested all amounts recovered from Whitacre and others. This court agrees with ADM that the restitution order does not preclude a judgment for damages in the case at hand.\nHere, in this case, ADM has requested damages which were not included in the restitution order. In addition to the amount ADM lost due to the fraudulent transactions, ADM is also seeking reimbursement of the salary and benefits paid to Whitacre from May 1, 1991 through August 7, 1995, the date of his termination. The law provides that a fiduciary employee is entitled to compensation only \"on a due and faithful performance\" of all his duties. Levy v. Markal Sales Corp., 268 Ill.App.3d 355, 205 Ill. Dec. 599, 643 N.E.2d 1206, 1220 (1994) (quoting ABC Trans Nat'l Transport, Inc. v. Aeronautics Forwarders, Inc., 90 Ill.App.3d 817, 46 Ill. Dec. 186, 413 N.E.2d 1299, 1314-15 (1980)). Accordingly, employees who breach their fiduciary duties are required to forfeit all compensation received during the period of the breach. ABC Trans, 46 Ill. Dec. 186, 413 N.E.2d at 1314-15; see also Vendo Co. v. Stoner, 58 Ill. 2d 289, 321 N.E.2d 1, 14 *825 (1974), cert den., 420 U.S. 975, 95 S. Ct. 1398, 43 L. Ed. 2d 655 (1975); Hill v. Names &amp; Addresses, Inc., 212 Ill.App.3d 1065, 157 Ill. Dec. 66, 571 N.E.2d 1085, 1092 (1991). Whitacre has not specifically challenged this aspect of the damages sought by ADM and has not contested the amount sought for salary and benefits.\nThis court previously concluded the evidence that Whitacre defrauded ADM of over $9.5 million was sufficient to show that he breached his fiduciary duty to ADM. This court therefore finds that ADM is entitled to recover salary and benefits paid to Whitacre in the amount of $1,174,167.52. Accordingly, this court now enters judgment in favor of ADM and against Whitacre on Counts I, II and III of ADM's Amended Complaint in the total amount of $6,327,017.52.\nIn its Motion for Summary Judgment, ADM states that it \"voluntarily dismisses\" Count IV of the Amended Complaint. This court will construe this statement as a request for an Order dismissing Count IV pursuant to Rule 41(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Accordingly, Count IV is hereby dismissed.\nIn addition, in Count VI of its Complaint, ADM only named various individuals as Respondents in Discovery and requested that they be required to participate and respond to discovery in this case. After Count VI was filed, ADM filed Case No. 97-2005 against many of the Respondents in Discovery. That case was recently settled and dismissed. Moreover, ADM has not sought any relief based upon Count VI. Accordingly, this court now provides notice to ADM that it intends to dismiss Count VI of the Complaint with prejudice. ADM is allowed fourteen (14) days to file any objections to the dismissal of Count VI of its Amended Complaint. See Stewart Title Guar. Co., 74 F.3d at 836-37.\n\nIII. NON-DISCLOSURE AGREEMENT\nIn Count V of its Complaint, ADM is seeking a declaratory judgment that a Non-Disclosure Agreement entered into between ADM and Whitacre in 1989 and 1991 remains \"enforceable and in full force and effect\" and that Whitacre \"is lawfully barred from disclosing information described within the Non-Disclosure Agreement.\" Under the terms of the Non-Disclosure Agreement, Whitacre agreed \"not to use or disclose to any person, firm or corporation, at any time, either during [his] employment with the Company or thereafter, ... any trade secret or confidential information of the Company, whatsoever.\"\nThere does not appear to be any dispute between the parties that Illinois law applies to the construction of the Non-Disclosure Agreement in this diversity case. Non-competition and non-disclosure agreements are considered restrictive covenants. See Label Printers v. Pflug, 206 Ill.App.3d 483, 151 Ill. Dec. 720, 564 N.E.2d 1382, 1387 (1991), app. denied, 139 Ill. 2d 597, 159 Ill. Dec. 109, 575 N.E.2d 916 (1991). Restrictive covenants operate at least as partial restraints of trade and must be carefully scrutinized by courts. Corroon &amp; Black of Illinois, Inc. v. Magner, 145 Ill.App.3d 151, 98 Ill. Dec. 663, 494 N.E.2d 785, 791 (1986). A restrictive covenant \"may be held enforceable only if the time and territorial limitations are reasonable and the restrictions are reasonably necessary to protect a legitimate business interest of the employer, a determination which necessarily turns on the facts and circumstances of each case.\" Label Printers, 151 Ill. Dec. 720, 564 N.E.2d at 1387 (emphasis added); see also Abbott-Interfast Corp. v. Harkabus, 250 Ill.App.3d 13, 189 Ill. Dec. 288, 619 N.E.2d 1337, 1340-41 (1993). A restrictive covenant can be enforced only if the evidence shows that the confidential information sought to be protected is, in fact, confidential. Curtis 1000, Inc. v. Suess, 24 F.3d 941, 947-48 (7th Cir.1994); see also North American Paper Co. v. Unterberger, 172 Ill.App.3d 410, 122 Ill. Dec. 362, 526 N.E.2d 621, 624-25 (1988).\n*826 ADM is correct that, under current Illinois law, the lack of a time limitation does not automatically mean a non-disclosure agreement is void and unenforceable. Harkabus, 189 Ill. Dec. 288, 619 N.E.2d at 1344; see also PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1272 n. 10 (7th Cir.1995). However, the reasonableness and enforceability of the agreement must be determined based upon the facts of the particular case. See Thomas &amp; Betts Corp. v. Panduit Corp., 1999 WL 261861, at *2 (N.D.Ill.1999); Harkabus, 189 Ill. Dec. 288, 619 N.E.2d at 1340-41; Label Printers, 151 Ill. Dec. 720, 564 N.E.2d at 1387-88.\nIn sum, under Illinois law, a non-disclosure agreement is enforceable only if the facts show that the employer has a legitimate, protectable interest in confidential information and the restrictions imposed are reasonable. Here, however, ADM has not, in its Complaint, Motion for Summary Judgment or Memorandum in support of the Motion for Summary Judgment, provided facts to show that Whitacre has possession of any protectable confidential information. It has also not provided any facts showing that there is any danger that Whitacre, currently serving lengthy, consecutive prison terms, will disclose any such protectable, confidential information. Instead, ADM is seeking a declaratory judgment that the Agreement is enforceable and that Whitacre is barred, presumably forever, from disclosing any information described in the very broad language of the Agreement.\nUnder section 2-701 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure, a court may issue declaratory judgments determining the construction of contracts and other written instruments. 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/2-701(a) (West 1998); Emery Worldwide Freight Corp. v. Snell, 288 Ill.App.3d 808, 224 Ill. Dec. 343, 681 N.E.2d 658, 659 (1997). However, a court may only make such a declaration of rights in \"cases of actual controversy.\" 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/2-701(a) (West 1998); Greenberg v. United Airlines, 206 Ill.App.3d 40, 150 Ill. Dec. 904, 563 N.E.2d 1031, 1037 (1990), app. denied, 137 Ill. 2d 664, 156 Ill. Dec. 561, 571 N.E.2d 148 (1991). \"An actual controversy exists if there is a legitimate dispute admitting of an immediate and definite determination of the parties' rights, the resolution of which will aid in the termination of the controversy or some part thereof.\" Greenberg, 150 Ill. Dec. 904, 563 N.E.2d at 1037-38; see also Illinois Gamefowl Breeders Ass'n v. Block, 75 Ill. 2d 443, 27 Ill. Dec. 465, 389 N.E.2d 529, 531 (1979). A court will not render a judgment based on mere abstract propositions of law, render an advisory opinion or give legal guidance regarding future events. Greenberg, 150 Ill. Dec. 904, 563 N.E.2d at 1038 (citing Stone v. Omnicom Cable Television of Illinois, Inc., 131 Ill.App.3d 210, 86 Ill. Dec. 226, 475 N.E.2d 223, 227 (1985) (in order to obtain declaratory judgment, a plaintiff must plead a demonstrable protected interest and that his or her rights will be affected adversely by the defendant's actions)); see also CGE Ford Heights, L.L.C. v. Miller, 306 Ill.App.3d 431, 239 Ill. Dec. 477, 485, 714 N.E.2d 35, 43 (1999) (\"a plaintiff must show that the underlying facts and issues of the case are not moot, hypothetical or premature, so as to require the court to give legal advice about future events\").\nHere, ADM has alleged no present harm that will continue without the court's intrusion (see Greenberg, 150 Ill. Dec. at 911, 563 N.E.2d at 1038) and is essentially seeking legal guidance regarding potential (although unlikely) future events. ADM has not alleged or shown an actual controversy regarding the construction of the Non-Disclosure Agreement. A court must avoid issuing a declaratory judgment where there is no actual controversy ripe for decision but where the outcome of other cases may be influenced by the judgment. See Matter of VMS Securities Litigation, 103 F.3d 1317, 1327 (7th Cir.1996). If no actual controversy exists, the declaratory judgment action is properly dismissed. Greenberg, 150 Ill.Dec. at 911, 563 N.E.2d at 1038; Outboard Marine *827 Corp. v. James Chisholm &amp; Sons, Inc., 133 Ill.App.3d 238, 88 Ill. Dec. 336, 341-343, 478 N.E.2d 651, 656-58 (1985). In fact, the appropriate method for declining to grant declaratory relief is to dismiss the action. Lihosit v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 264 Ill.App.3d 576, 201 Ill. Dec. 193, 196, 636 N.E.2d 625, 628 (1993).\nADM relies heavily on PepsiCo, Inc. and Corroon &amp; Black as supporting its claim for relief in this case. In PepsiCo, Inc., the Seventh Circuit affirmed an injunction granted by the district court prohibiting a former employee from disclosing trade secrets and confidential information. PepsiCo, Inc., 54 F.3d at 1272. However, in that case, the former employer presented evidence of a number of trade secrets and confidential information it desired protected and to which the former employee, who had been offered a job with a competitor, was privy. See PepsiCo, Inc., 54 F.3d at 1265. In Corroon &amp; Black, an employer sued a former employee who left to work for a competitor and solicited the employer's customers. The Appellate Court reversed the circuit court's summary judgment in favor of the employee. The Court concluded that genuine issues of material fact existed regarding whether the former employer had a protectable proprietary interest in its customers so that the restrictive covenant signed by the employee was enforceable. Corroon &amp; Black, 98 Ill.Dec. at 670-71, 494 N.E.2d at 792-93. Neither case, however, involved a declaratory judgment action. More importantly, in both cases cited by ADM, facts were presented showing that the employer had a protectable interest in confidential information and the restrictive covenant was reasonably necessary to protect that interest. The cases cited do not support ADM's claim for a declaratory judgment under the circumstances presented in this case.\nADM has offered no facts to this court showing that the restrictions in the Non-Disclosure Agreement are reasonably necessary to protect confidential information. Consequently, this court concludes that, under Illinois law, the enforceability of the Non-Disclosure Agreement simply cannot be resolved in the abstract. Accordingly, it is clear that ADM is not entitled to summary judgment on Count V of its Amended Complaint. In fact, this court concludes that Count V of ADM's Amended Complaint does not state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). As a result, this court is now providing notice to ADM that it intends to dismiss Count V of ADM's Amended Complaint with prejudice. ADM is allowed fourteen (14) days to file any objections to the dismissal of Count V of its Amended Complaint. See Stewart Title Guar. Co., 74 F.3d at 836-37.\n\nIV. CLAIMS BASED UPON ALLEGEDLY ILLEGAL TAPING\nADM argues that Whitacre engaged in extensive secret taping of conversations with his colleagues at ADM for a period of 2½ years, from November 1992 to June 1995. ADM argues that this extraordinary invasion of privacy violated both the federal wiretapping statute and Illinois' Eavesdropping Act. This court initially notes that ADM has failed in its attempt to portray itself as the innocent victim of Whitacre's wrongdoing. This court notes that, based in part on the tape recordings made by Whitacre, ADM pleaded guilty to price-fixing and paid a fine of $100 million. See United States v. Andreas, 39 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1055-56 (N.D.Ill.1998). Also, as previously noted, ADM executives Michael D. Andreas and Terrance S. Wilson were both found guilty of price-fixing on September 17, 1998. Andreas and Wilson were each sentenced to two years in prison on July 9, 1999. See Andreas, 1999 WL 515484, at *15.\nIn addition, Whitacre contends that ADM is \"not entitled to declaratory relief nor an injunction prohibiting dissemination of the tapes or their contents.\" This court finds that this point is well taken. Moreover, the court notes that ADM submitted a proposed Order to this court with its Motion for Summary Judgment. The proposed *828 Order includes the following language:\nThe Court ENJOINS Mark E. Whitacre, his agents, his servants, his employees, his attorneys, and any person in active concert or participation with him or them who receives actual notice of this order, from using, disclosing, or divulging or endeavoring to use, disclose, or divulge the tapes make by Whitacre of internal ADM conversations, copies of the tapes, information stored on the tapes or copies thereof, or any information derived directly or indirectly from the tapes. The Court further commands Mark E. Whitacre, his agents, his servants, his employees, his attorneys, and any person in active concert or participation with him or them who receives actual notice of this order, to deliver any tapes, copies of the tapes, or other documents or things containing any intercepted information to the Court for placement under seal or destruction.\nThe court reminds ADM that Whitacre is the only party defendant in this action. Therefore, the court only has jurisdiction over the parties to this action, which are ADM and Whitacre.[1] It seems unlikely that Whitacre, now serving consecutive prison terms of 108 months and 20 months, retains possession of any of the tape recordings. In fact, based upon case law provided to this court by ADM, the tape recordings made by Whitacre: (1) were used in the criminal trial of United States v. Andreas, 39 F. Supp. 2d 1048 (N.D.Ill.) and are already part of the public record; or (2) are in the custody of the Department of Justice. In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litigation, 46 F. Supp. 2d 819, 821 (C.D.Ill.1999). Obviously, the order proposed by ADM is inappropriate based upon the facts presented and will not be entered by this court.\nThis court further notes that it has reservations about whether declaratory relief is appropriate regarding these counts of ADM's Amended Complaint. It is certainly questionable in this case whether an \"actual controversy\" regarding the tapes exists between ADM and Whitacre, based on the situation where it appears that Whitacre does not have either possession or control over the tape recordings. This court reminds ADM that any relief granted will be narrowly tailored to the parties to this case and any actual controversy between them.\n\nA. FEDERAL LAW\nADM first contends that it is entitled to relief because Whitacre's taping violated Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (18 U.S.C. § 2510 et seq.) (Title III). Section 2511 of Title III provides that any person who \"intentionally intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures any other person to intercept or endeavor to intercept, any wire, oral, or electronic communication ... shall be subject to suit as provided in subsection (5).\" 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1). However, § 2511 also provides:\n(c) It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for a person acting under color of law to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication, where such person is a party to the communication or one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to such interception.\n(d) It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for a person not acting under color of law to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication where such person is a party to the communication or where one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to such interception unless such communication is intercepted for the purpose of committing any criminal or tortious act in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States or of any State. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c),(d).\n*829 ADM first contends that Whitacre violated Title III because he was not acting under color of law when he recorded the conversations. However, it is undisputed that the taping began in November 1992, when Whitacre agreed to cooperate with the FBI, and ended in June 1995, when the FBI raided the corporate headquarters of ADM. There does not seem to be any dispute that the tape recordings were turned over to the FBI and are currently in the custody of the Department of Justice.\nADM relies on very selective excerpts from the transcript of the criminal trial before Judge Manning and some factual findings made by Judge Manning. Judge Manning denied a pre-trial motion to suppress the audiotapes made by Whitacre and allowed the Government to use the tapes at trial. See Andreas, 39 F.Supp.2d at 1057; United States v. Andreas, 1998 WL 214666, at *6 (N.D.Ill.1998). However, Judge Manning did conclude, based upon the evidence before her, that the FBI's handling of Whitacre's tape recordings \"was not the FBI's finest hour.\" Andreas, 39 F.Supp.2d at 1057. The evidence showed that Whitacre failed two polygraph examinations in December 1992 and March 1993, early in the FBI's investigation. See Andreas, 39 F.Supp.2d at 1055. Nevertheless, the FBI gave Whitacre discretion to decide which conversations to tape and did not follow FBI policy on recording. Andreas, 1998 WL 214666, at *5; see also United States v. Andreas, 23 F. Supp. 2d 835, 849-50 (N.D.Ill.1998). The evidence showed that there were often long gaps of time between when the conversations were recorded and the time when the FBI took possession of the recordings. Andreas, 1998 WL 214666, at *5. Further, a tape expert testified that the tapes showed signs of tampering and erasure. Andreas, 1998 WL 214666, at *5. At the close of the covert investigation, the government discovered that Whitacre was secretly embezzling money from ADM by completing bogus invoices for payment. Andreas, 1998 WL 214666, at *1. The government considered this a violation of Whitacre's cooperation agreement and subsequently indicted Whitacre for embezzlement and the lysine price-fixing conspiracy. Andreas, 1998 WL 214666, at *1.\nADM contends that this evidence shows that Whitacre's taping of internal ADM conversations was not a \"joint activity\" with law enforcement and that he was not acting \"under color of law\" when he taped the conversations. This court recognizes that the phrase \"under color of law\" in Title III is narrower than \"under color of state law\" in the Civil Rights Act. Thomas v. Pearl, 998 F.2d 447, 450-51 (7th Cir.1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1043, 114 S. Ct. 688, 126 L. Ed. 2d 655 (1994). However, this court concludes that recording conversations for law enforcement officers gathering evidence against suspected criminals is \"under color of law\" pursuant to Title III. See Thomas, 998 F.2d at 451. Here, Whitacre met frequently with FBI agents and turned the tape recordings over to the FBI. This court finds that the evidence regarding the FBI's mishandling of the investigation is not sufficient to show, as a matter of law, that Whitacre was not acting \"under color of law\" when the recordings were made.\nFurther, Title III allows one party to a conversation to record the conversation unless his purpose in doing so is to commit a crime or a tort. Desnick v. American Broad. Co., 44 F.3d 1345, 1353 (7th Cir. 1995); see also Russell v. American Broad. Co., 1995 WL 330920, at *1-2 (N.D.Ill.1995). ADM insists that Whitacre's purpose in recording the conversations was to divert the FBI from discovering his fraudulent transactions and thefts from ADM. As evidence, ADM has submitted a portion of the transcript of Whitacre's deposition. At the deposition, Whitacre was asked if it was true that his taping operation would make it less likely that the government would discover his financial crimes. Instead of answering the question, Whitacre invoked the Fifth Amendment. This is not sufficient to establish, as a matter of law, that Whitacre's *830 main purpose in recording conversations for 2½ years was to divert the FBI from discovering his thefts from ADM. See United States v. Andreas, Case No. 96-CR-762 (October 24, 1997) (unpublished order), slip op. at 16-21.\nThis court concludes that ADM has fallen short of establishing that no genuine issue of material fact exists regarding whether Whitacre's actions in taping conversations violated Title III. Accordingly, ADM's Motion for Summary Judgment as to Count VII of its Amended Complaint is DENIED.\nADM has also filed a Motion to Stay regarding Count VII of its Amended Complaint based upon Judge Mihm's ruling in In re High Fructose. That case is now on appeal. In In re High Fructose, Plaintiffs in a class action antitrust case involving ADM were seeking to obtain, during discovery, all recordings made by or with the consent of Whitacre during the FBI's investigation. On January 22, 1999, the Department of Justice agreed to produce approximately 200 tapes which were not introduced in the Andreas criminal trial. ADM moved to quash the subpoena seeking the disclosure of these tapes. ADM argued, as it has in this court, that Whitacre's taping violated Title III. In re High Fructose, 46 F.Supp.2d at 821. ADM also argued that, even if the tapes were lawfully made, Title III does not permit the disclosure of the tapes in an action in which the Government is not a party. In re High Fructose, 46 F.Supp.2d at 821.\nJudge Mihm first concluded that all of the \"face to face\" recordings made by Whitacre were not recordings of \"oral communications\" as defined by Title III and could be turned over to Plaintiffs. In re High Fructose, 46 F.Supp.2d at 824-28. Judge Mihm then discussed whether the interception of telephone calls by Whitacre could be disclosed in the litigation. Judge Mihm determined that the telephone conversations were \"wire communications\" as defined by Title III. Judge Mihm assumed, for purposes of his analysis, that Whitacre's interception of the wire communications was lawful under Title III. In re High Fructose, 46 F.Supp.2d at 828. However, Judge Mihm determined that the wire communications were not discoverable by Plaintiffs under Title III. In re High Fructose, 46 F.Supp.2d at 831. Judge Mihm certified the Order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), stating that the Order involved controlling questions of law as to which there are substantial grounds for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the Order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation. In re High Fructose, 46 F.Supp.2d at 832-33. The Seventh Circuit recently entered an Order granting permission to appeal the certified question in In re High Fructose.\nHere, in this case, in its Motion to Stay, ADM argued that the \"result of the forthcoming appeal from Judge Mihm's Order is likely to determine the law governing the `oral communication' element of ADM's Title III claim in this case. Accordingly, it would serve the interests of judicial economy for this Court to stay consideration of Count VII pending the disposition of the appeal.\" Whitacre did not file a response or objection to ADM's Motion to Stay. This court has already concluded in this Order that ADM is not entitled to Summary Judgment on Count VII of its Amended Complaint. However, the court agrees with ADM that the ruling of the Seventh Circuit may have some bearing on the resolution of Count VII of the Amended Complaint. Therefore, ADM's Motion to Stay (# 159) is GRANTED, and further proceedings regarding Count VII of the Amended Complaint are stayed pending a resolution of the appeal from Judge Mihm's decision in In re High Fructose.\n\nB. ILLINOIS LAW\nADM also argues that Whitacre's actions violated the Illinois Eavesdropping Act (Act). The Act provides that a person commits the offense of eavesdropping when he \"[u]ses an eavesdropping device *831 to hear or record all or any part of any conversation unless he does so ... with the consent of all of the parties to such conversation.\" 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/14-2(a) (West 1998). However, the Illinois Supreme Court held that no violation of the Act occurred if a party to the conversation recorded the conversation. People v. Beardsley, 115 Ill. 2d 47, 104 Ill. Dec. 789, 503 N.E.2d 346, 349-52 (1986); see also People v. Herrington, 163 Ill. 2d 507, 206 Ill. Dec. 705, 645 N.E.2d 957, 958-59 (1994). The Court reasoned that \"no eavesdropping occurs where an individual to whom statements are made or directed records them, even without the knowledge or consent of the person making the statements, because the declarant does not intend to keep his statements private vis-a-vis that individual.\" Herrington, 206 Ill. Dec. 705, 645 N.E.2d at 958-59. Because of the Illinois Supreme Court's decisions, the Illinois General Assembly amended the Act, effective December 15, 1994, to provide that, \"[f]or the purposes of this Article, the term conversation means any oral communication between 2 or more persons regardless of whether one or more of the parties intended the communication to be of a private nature under circumstances justifying that expectation.\" 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/14-1(d) (West 1998).\nThe Illinois Supreme Court has not reviewed the language of the amended statute. Other courts have construed the amended statute to extend the coverage of the eavesdropping law to all conversations, regardless of whether they were intended to be private. Carothers v. Starbucks Coffee Co., 1998 WL 325262, at *7 (N.D.Ill. 1998) (citing People v. Siwek, 284 Ill. App. 3d 7, 219 Ill. Dec. 444, 671 N.E.2d 358, 362-63 (1996)). However, the amended statute applies only to taped conversations occurring after December 15, 1994, the effective date of the amendment. Carothers, 1998 WL 325262, at *8; Talanda v. KFC Nat'l Management Co., 1997 WL 160695, at *6 n. 6 (N.D.Ill.1997), aff'd, 140 F.3d 1090 (1998), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 119 S. Ct. 164, 142 L. Ed. 2d 134 (1998). Consequently, Whitacre, who was a party to the conversations he was recording, could not have violated the Act prior to December 15, 1994. See Carothers, 1998 WL 325262, at *8. Accordingly, only recordings made between December 15, 1994, and June 1995 could have been made in violation of the Act.\nIn addition, this court notes that ADM is not seeking damages for any violation of the Act by Whitacre. Instead, ADM is seeking declaratory and injunctive relief under the Act. However, the Act provides that a person injured by a violation of the Act is entitled to various types of damages (720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/14-6(1)(b),(c),(d)(e) (West 1998)) or \"an injunction by the circuit court prohibiting further eavesdropping by the eavesdropper and by or on behalf of his principal\" (720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5.14-6(1)(a) (West 1998)). Based upon section 14-6 of the Act, the only remedy available to ADM is an injunction prohibiting Whitacre from any further eavesdropping. This court believes that, because Whitacre will be incarcerated for many years, further eavesdropping by Whitacre is highly unlikely. As a rule, federal courts do not enjoin conduct which has been discontinued and has no real prospect of repetition. Wilson v. Hart, 47 F. Supp. 2d 966, 970 (N.D.Ill. 1999). Accordingly, ADM's Motion for Summary Judgment on Count VIII of its Amended Complaint is DENIED.\n\nV. WHITACRE'S COUNTERCLAIMS\nIn Count I of Whitacre's Counterclaim, he alleges that his discharge for theft was \"pretextual\" and that his employment was actually terminated because he acted as a whistleblower and exposed ADM's involvement in price-fixing. ADM argues that \"[a]fter pleading guilty to 37 felonies related to his fraudulent transactions, being sentenced to 108 months in prison, and being ordered to pay restitution to ADM in the amount of $11,403,698, Whitacre's claim that his dismissal for theft was `pretextual' ... is preposterous.\" This court agrees. Consequently, summary judgment *832 is granted in ADM's favor on Count I of Whitacre's Counterclaim. In addition, Whitacre has not argued that there are any issues of material fact precluding judgment for ADM on Counts III, IV, V, VI, VII and VIII of his Counterclaim. Instead, in his Response, Whitacre states that he \"voluntarily dismisses\" these Counts. However, this court concludes as a matter of law that there are no genuine issues of material fact remaining in these Counts. Thus, ADM is entitled to summary judgment on Counts III, IV, V, VI, VII and VIII of Whitacre's Counterclaim.\nThe court now turns to Count II of Whitacre's Counterclaim against ADM. In Count II of his Counterclaim, Whitacre alleged that ADM breached three stock option agreements entered into by the parties during Whitacre's employment. ADM admits that, on the date Whitacre's employment was terminated, it canceled Whitacre's right to exercise any portion of the stock options. However, ADM contends that it is entitled to summary judgment on this Count because ADM's performance under the terms of the agreements is excused by Whitacre's material breach of his employment obligations. ADM also argues that these stock option agreements should be considered \"compensation\" which, as discussed previously, Whitacre forfeited based upon his breach of fiduciary duty. ADM has presented compelling and persuasive arguments. But the court in resolving this issue must carefully examine the language of the agreements.\nAll three agreements provide as follows:\nThe Company hereby irrevocably grants to the Employee, as a matter of separate agreement, and not in lieu of salary or other compensation for services, the right and option ... to purchase [a specified number of shares of stock]. (Emphasis added.)\nIn addition, the agreements all state, in pertinent part:\nIn the event the employment of the Employee by the Company or by a parent or subsidiary corporation of the Company shall terminate for any reason ..., the Employee may, within one month following the date of such termination, exercise the Option but only with respect to the shares of Stock purchasable thereunder at the time of such termination. (Emphasis added.)\nAccordingly, based upon the clear language of the agreements, ADM irrevocably granted the options to Whitacre, and Whitacre had the right to exercise the options within one month if his employment was terminated for any reason. Therefore, even though Whitacre's employment was terminated based upon his theft from ADM, this court concludes that a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding whether ADM breached the stock option agreements. Accordingly, ADM's Motion for Summary Judgment as to Count II of Whitacre's Counterclaim is DENIED.\nIT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT:\n(1) ADM's Motion for Summary Judgment (# 137) is GRANTED as to Counts I, II and III of ADM's Amended Complaint. Judgment is entered in favor of ADM and against Whitacre in the amount of $6,327,017.52.\n(2) ADM's Motion for Summary Judgment (# 137) is DENIED as to Counts V, VII and VIII.\n(3) ADM's Motion for Summary Judgment (# 137) is GRANTED as to Counts I, III, IV, V, VI, VII and VIII of Whitacre's Counterclaim. ADM's Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED as to Count II of Whitacre's Counterclaim.\n(4) ADM's Motion to Stay proceedings on Count VII of its Amended Complaint (# 159) is GRANTED pending a ruling from the Seventh Circuit in In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litigation, 46 F. Supp. 2d 819 (C.D.Ill.1999).\n(5) ADM's request to voluntarily dismiss Count IV of its Amended Complaint is GRANTED. In addition, this court has found in this Order that Count V of the Amended Complaint does not state a claim *833 for declaratory judgment upon which relief can be granted. Also, ADM has not requested any relief pursuant to Count VI of it Amended Complaint. ADM is hereby notified that this court intends to dismiss, with prejudice, Counts V and VI of the Amended Complaint. ADM is allowed fourteen (14) days to file any objection to the dismissal of Counts V and VI.\n(6) Count VIII of ADM's Amended Complaint and Count II of Whitacre's Counterclaim remain pending and have not been stayed. A telephone status conference regarding the Counts still pending in this action is set for Friday, August 27, 1999, at 3:30 p.m.\nNOTES\n[1] On April 14, 1998, the United States was allowed to intervene in this action for the limited purpose of staying the depositions of all current or former Government personnel until the completion of the trial in United States v. Andreas, No. 96 CR 762 (N.D.Ill.).\n\n", "ocr": false, "opinion_id": 2580541 } ]
C.D. Illinois
District Court, C.D. Illinois
FD
Illinois, IL
196,037
Boudin, Campbell, Gibson, John
1995-04-27
false
united-states-v-webster
Webster
United States v. Webster
UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Anthony F. WEBSTER, Defendant, Appellant; UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Robert A. BOUTHOT, A/K/A Robert H. Bouthot, Defendant, Appellant; UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Manuel D. RAVELO, Defendant, Appellant; UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Warren R. HUNTINGTON, Defendant, Appellant
Thomas F. Hallett,'by Appointment of the Court, Portland, ME, for appellant Anthony F. Webster., F. Mark Terison, Asst. U.S. Atty., with whom Jay P. McCloskey, U.S. Atty., Portland, ME, was on brief, for U.S., Thomas A. Dyhrberg, by Appointment of the Court, with whom Thomas A. Dyhrberg, P.A. South Portland, ME, was on brief, for appellant Robert A. Bouthot., Margaret D. McGaughey, Asst. U.S. Atty., with whom Jay P. McCloskey, U.S. Atty., and George T. Dilworth, Asst. U.S. Atty., Portland, ME, were on brief, for U.S., James R. Bushell, by Appointment of the Court, with whom Law Office of James R. Bushell, Portland, ME, was on brief, for appellant Manuel D. Ravelo., F. Mark Terison, Asst. U.S. Atty., with whom Jay P. McCloskey, U.S. Atty., and George T. Dilworth, Asst. U.S. Atty., Portland, ME, were on brief, for U.S., Jeffrey M. Smith, by Appointment of the Court, with whom Peters, Smith & Moscar-delli, Boston, MA, was on brief, for appellant Warren R. Huntington., Michael M. DuBose, Asst. U.S. Atty., with whom Jay P. McCloskey, U.S. Atty., Portland, ME, and Raymond Hurley, Asst. U.S. Atty., Washington, DC, were on brief, for U.S.
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
Heard March 3, 1995.
null
null
56
Published
null
<parties id="b77-3"> UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Anthony F. WEBSTER, Defendant, Appellant. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Robert A. BOUTHOT, a/k/a Robert H. Bouthot, Defendant, Appellant. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Manuel D. RAVELO, Defendant, Appellant. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Warren R. HUNTINGTON, Defendant, Appellant. </parties><br><docketnumber id="b77-16"> Nos. 94-1720, 94-1721, 94-1722, 94-1778, 94-1846 and 94-1862. </docketnumber><br><court id="b77-17"> United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit. </court><br><otherdate id="b77-19"> Heard March 3, 1995. </otherdate><br><decisiondate id="b77-20"> Decided April 27, 1995. </decisiondate><br><attorneys id="b79-5"> <span citation-index="1" class="star-pagination" label="3"> *3 </span> Thomas F. Hallett,'by Appointment of the Court, Portland, ME, for appellant Anthony F. Webster. </attorneys><br><attorneys id="b79-6"> F. Mark Terison, Asst. U.S. Atty., with whom Jay P. McCloskey, U.S. Atty., Portland, ME, was on brief, for U.S. </attorneys><br><attorneys id="b79-7"> Thomas <em> A. </em> Dyhrberg, by Appointment of the Court, with whom Thomas A. Dyhrberg, P.A. South Portland, ME, was on brief, for appellant Robert A. Bouthot. </attorneys><br><attorneys id="b79-8"> Margaret D. McGaughey, Asst. U.S. Atty., with whom Jay P. McCloskey, U.S. Atty., and George T. Dilworth, Asst. U.S. Atty., Portland, ME, were on brief, for U.S. </attorneys><br><attorneys id="b79-9"> James R. Bushell, by Appointment of the Court, with whom Law Office of James R. Bushell, Portland, ME, was on brief, for appellant Manuel D. Ravelo. </attorneys><br><attorneys id="b79-10"> F. Mark Terison, Asst. U.S. Atty., with whom Jay P. McCloskey, U.S. Atty., and George T. Dilworth, Asst. U.S. Atty., Portland, ME, were on brief, for U.S. </attorneys><br><attorneys id="b79-11"> Jeffrey M. Smith, by Appointment of the Court, with whom Peters, Smith &amp; Moscar-delli, Boston, MA, was on brief, for appellant Warren R. Huntington. </attorneys><br><attorneys id="b79-12"> Michael M. DuBose, Asst. U.S. Atty., with whom Jay P. McCloskey, U.S. Atty., Portland, ME, and Raymond Hurley, Asst. U.S. Atty., Washington, DC, were on brief, for U.S. </attorneys><br><judges id="b79-14"> Before BOUDIN, Circuit Judge, CAMPBELL, Senior Circuit Judge, and JOHN R. GIBSON, <a class="footnote" href="#fn*" id="fn*_ref"> * </a> Senior Circuit Judge. </judges><div class="footnotes"><div class="footnote" id="fn*" label="*"> <a class="footnote" href="#fn*_ref"> * </a> <p id="b79-17"> <em> </em> Of the Eighth Circuit, sitting by designation. </p> </div></div>
[ "54 F.3d 1" ]
[ { "author_str": "Boudin", "per_curiam": false, "type": "010combined", "page_count": null, "download_url": "http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=94-1720.01A", "author_id": null, "opinion_text": "54 F.3d 1\n UNITED STATES of America, Appellee,v.Anthony F. WEBSTER, Defendant, Appellant.UNITED STATES of America, Appellee,v.Robert A. BOUTHOT, a/k/a Robert H. Bouthot, Defendant, Appellant.UNITED STATES of America, Appellee,v.Manuel D. RAVELO, Defendant, Appellant.UNITED STATES of America, Appellee,v.Warren R. HUNTINGTON, Defendant, Appellant.\n Nos. 94-1720, 94-1721, 94-1722, 94-1778, 94-1846 and 94-1862.\n United States Court of Appeals,First Circuit.\n Heard March 3, 1995.Decided April 27, 1995.\n \n Thomas F. Hallett, by Appointment of the Court, Portland, ME, for appellant Anthony F. Webster.\n F. Mark Terison, Asst. U.S. Atty., with whom Jay P. McCloskey, U.S. Atty., Portland, ME, was on brief, for U.S.\n Thomas A. Dyhrberg, by Appointment of the Court, with whom Thomas A. Dyhrberg, P.A. South Portland, ME, was on brief, for appellant Robert A. Bouthot.\n Margaret D. McGaughey, Asst. U.S. Atty., with whom Jay P. McCloskey, U.S. Atty., and George T. Dilworth, Asst. U.S. Atty., Portland, ME, were on brief, for U.S.\n James R. Bushell, by Appointment of the Court, with whom Law Office of James R. Bushell, Portland, ME, was on brief, for appellant Manuel D. Ravelo.\n F. Mark Terison, Asst. U.S. Atty., with whom Jay P. McCloskey, U.S. Atty., and George T. Dilworth, Asst. U.S. Atty., Portland, ME, were on brief, for U.S.\n Jeffrey M. Smith, by Appointment of the Court, with whom Peters, Smith &amp; Moscardelli, Boston, MA, was on brief, for appellant Warren R. Huntington.\n Michael M. DuBose, Asst. U.S. Atty., with whom Jay P. McCloskey, U.S. Atty., Portland, ME, and Raymond Hurley, Asst. U.S. Atty., Washington, DC, were on brief, for U.S.\n Before BOUDIN, Circuit Judge, CAMPBELL, Senior Circuit Judge, and JOHN R. GIBSON,* Senior Circuit Judge.\n BOUDIN, Circuit Judge.\n \n \n 1\n Anthony Webster, Robert Bouthot and Manuel Ravelo were convicted of various drug offenses stemming from their involvement with a cocaine distribution ring centered in Portland, Maine; Warren Huntington was convicted of three offenses arising from an unrelated bank fraud scheme. The four were sentenced to prison terms ranging from 30 to 188 months, and each now challenges his sentence.\n \n I. Webster\n \n 2\n On December 3, 1993, Webster pled guilty to eight separate offenses, including the use of a firearm during a drug trafficking crime. The guideline sentencing range for all offenses but the firearm offense was calculated to be 63 to 78 months. By statute the firearm offense carried a mandatory minimum sentence of 60 months to run consecutively to any other sentence imposed. See 18 U.S.C. Sec. 924(c).\n \n \n 3\n Before sentencing the government moved for a downward departure from the guideline sentencing range in recognition of Webster's cooperation and testimony in prosecuting the other members of the drug conspiracy. The government's motion for departure invoked U.S.S.G. Sec. 5K1.1 and thus, according to the government, sought a downward departure for the guideline offenses only. See U.S.S.G. Sec. 5K1.1 (allowing departure from guidelines on government's motion). The government did not request a downward departure under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3553(e) from the statutory mandatory minimum for the firearm offense.\n \n \n 4\n At sentencing, Webster did not request the court to depart below the 60-month sentence for the firearm offense, believing that the court lacked the authority to do so because the government had not moved under section 3553(e). Instead, Webster pressed the court to award a proportionate reduction of his total sentence--subject to a 60-month floor--and not just the portion of his sentence governed by the guidelines. Webster then argued for an overall sentence of 72 to 78 months.\n \n \n 5\n The district court responded that this \"defeats the whole purpose of the statutory mandatory minimum\" and that it had to \"set that aside\" for purposes of determining a downward departure of the guideline sentence. The district court then sentenced Webster to a total of 90 months: 60 months for the firearm offense and 30 months for the other offenses, to run consecutively. The 30-month sentence represented more than a 50 percent reduction in the guideline minimum of 63 months for those offenses.\n \n \n 6\n On appeal, as in the district court, Webster challenges only the district court's refusal to consider his entire sentence when deciding how far to depart on the guideline offenses. Consequently, we need not decide whether the government's motion under U.S.S.G. Sec. 5K1.1 would have triggered the court's authority under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3553(e) to depart below the statutory minimum, an issue that has divided the circuits. Compare United States v. Wills, 35 F.3d 1192 (7th Cir.1994), with United States v. Sanchez, 32 F.3d 1330 (8th Cir.1994), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 1119, 130 L.Ed.2d 1082 (1995). See also Wade v. United States, 504 U.S. 181, 182, 112 S.Ct. 1840, 1843, 118 L.Ed.2d 524 (1992) (noting circuit split).\n \n \n 7\n The government has moved to dismiss Webster's appeal on the ground that we lack jurisdiction to review the extent of a district court's departure from the guideline sentencing range. We do normally lack jurisdiction over such a challenge, because the extent of any permitted departure is left to the district court's discretion. United States v. Pighetti, 898 F.2d 3, 4 (1st Cir.1990). But where the departure may have been affected by a mistake of law, as Webster alleges here, appellate jurisdiction exists. See United States v. Mariano, 983 F.2d 1150, 1153 (1st Cir.1993).\n \n \n 8\n To decide this case without adopting a position on the issue that divides the circuits is somewhat artificial. For if the Seventh Circuit view were followed, the district court would have power to depart even as to the mandatory minimum. But we do not want to take sides here on the larger issue which has neither been briefed nor argued. Thus, solely for purposes of this case, we assume arguendo (as the district court did without that qualification) that the government's failure to ask for a departure from the statutory minimum did prevent the district court from departing to a point below that figure.\n \n \n 9\n On that assumption, we agree that the district court's position has considerable force: any reduction of a guideline sentence to offset even in part a consecutive statutory minimum tends to undercut Congress' insistence on the statutory minimum. At the same time, Congress has given the sentencing court almost unreviewable discretion to decide the amount of the departure after a 5K1.1 motion. To tell the district court that it must ignore any factor that may seem logically relevant arguably collides with this intention.\n \n \n 10\n We conclude that in departing from a guideline sentence the district court is free to exercise its own judgment as to the pertinence, if any, of a related mandatory consecutive sentence. Should the district court think that the latter has some role along with other factors in fixing the extent of a guideline departure in a particular case, that is within its authority; and should that court decline to consider the mandatory minimum in fixing the other sentence, that too is within its authority. For this court to decide upon the ingredients of a departure one by one would go very far toward defeating discretion.\n \n \n 11\n We are confident that this difference in perspective had no impact on the sentence in this case. Assuming that the statutory minimum sentence fixed a floor, the district court was free not to consider the statutory minimum in fixing the guideline sentence. We have no reason whatever to think that the district court would have altered its position, which rests on a rational policy judgment, if it had been told that this choice was a matter of its discretion and not of law.\n \n \n 12\n Still less do we have any reason to think that the district court's sentence would have been less if it had considered the mandatory minimum sentence. The district court said that the large departure it granted was based on the scope of Webster's cooperation and the resulting benefit to the government. It went on to say that this reduction was \"as lenient as permissible\" given the seriousness of the defendant's criminal conduct. Indeed, if the district court had wanted to depart further it had ample room to do so.\n \n \n 13\n This is not a case--as some are--where the district court expressed a desire to impose a lower sentence but thought itself blocked by a supposed legal barrier. Compare United States v. Rivera, 994 F.2d 942, 953 (1st Cir.1993). Here, the consecutive sentence was mentioned by the district court only after counsel for Webster sought to introduce it as a mitigating factor. The district court thought that it should not be so considered and was free to make this judgment. Accordingly we uphold the sentence.\n \n II. Bouthot\n \n 14\n On February 18, 1994, Bouthot pled guilty to conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. Secs. 841, 846. On July 1, 1994, after a one-day hearing, Bouthot was sentenced to 151 months' imprisonment. The district court found that Bouthot was responsible for 3.83 kilograms of cocaine, resulting in a base offense level of 30. The court also added two levels for Bouthot's supervisory role in the drug ring, and declined to make a downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility. U.S.S.G. Secs. 3B1.1, 3E1.1. With a total offense level of 32 and a criminal history category of III, the guideline sentencing range was 151 to 188 months, and the court chose the minimum.\n \n \n 15\n The district court based the drug quantity on the testimony of Webster at Bouthot's sentencing hearing. Webster said that he provided Bouthot with one to three ounces of cocaine three times a month for 14 months, and made seven trips to New York with Bouthot to buy cocaine, each trip yielding six to twelve ounces of cocaine but with one trip netting a half kilogram. Using middle-to-low figures for the drug amounts, and adjusting for possible double counting for drugs from the New York trips subsequently given to Bouthot, the district court calculated that Bouthot was responsible for 3.83 kilograms.\n \n \n 16\n Bouthot claims that Webster's testimony was an unreliable basis for establishing drug quantity. It is true that under U.S.S.G. Sec. 6A1.3(a) information used for sentencing must have sufficient indicia of reliability to support its probable accuracy. See United States v. Tavano, 12 F.3d 301 (1st Cir.1993). Bouthot cites to a number of inconsistencies with Webster's previous accounts and points out that Webster was an admitted perjurer, a drug user, and a turncoat who received a substantially reduced sentence for implicating others.\n \n \n 17\n Credibility assessments at sentencing are the province of the district court and are respected on appeal unless clearly erroneous. United States v. Olivier-Diaz, 13 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir.1993). True, Webster was a witness to be approached with caution; indeed, he had twice perjured himself in earlier proceedings before the district court. But these lies occurred before Webster had agreed to cooperate with the government. The district court was free to conclude that, once the game was up, Webster had wisely chosen to cooperate fully and truthfully with the government in the hope of receiving a lightened sentence.\n \n \n 18\n Bouthot next argues that, even assuming the reliability of Webster's testimony, the mean \"per transaction\" figures used by the district court as multipliers lacked adequate evidentiary support; the court settled on two ounces as the per transaction amount for Bouthot's regular supply and eight ounces as the per trip amount for six of the seven New York trips. Webster had testified unequivocally that he gave Bouthot one to three ounces three times a month and that they purchased six to twelve ounces on their typical New York trip. Bouthot did not object to the district court's method of drug computation at the time of sentencing and therefore has waived this issue. United States v. Uricoechea-Casallas, 946 F.2d 162, 166 (1st Cir.1991). In any event, we review the district court's drug quantity determinations for clear error, United States v. Morillo, 8 F.3d 864, 871 (1st Cir.1993), and find no such error here. Where no drugs have been seized, the guidelines instruct the district court to approximate the amounts involved, U.S.S.G. Sec. 2D1.1 comment. (n. 12), and we uphold such an approximation as long as it represents a reasoned estimate of quantity. Morillo, 8 F.3d at 871.\n \n \n 19\n In this case, the figures chosen by the district court were the mean figure for the small buys and on the conservative side for the New York trips, and they were drawn from ranges with relatively tight margins. This case is quite unlike United States v. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d 1161, 1197 (1st Cir.1993), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 2714, 129 L.Ed.2d 840 (1994), where we found it error to use the midpoint between four ounces and one kilogram as the average transaction. All in all, we think that the figures chosen by the district court in this case represent a defensible estimate of drug quantity based on the available evidence, and this is all that is required. Morillo, 8 F.3d at 871. See also United States v. Innamorati, 996 F.2d 456, 490-91 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 409, 126 L.Ed.2d 356 (1993).\n \n \n 20\n Bouthot also says that the district court erred in failing to award him a two-point reduction for acceptance of responsibility. Bouthot did plead guilty to the drug charge but a plea of guilty is not a guarantee for receiving the reduction. United States v. Bradley, 917 F.2d 601, 606 (1st Cir.1990). The district court found that Bouthot had understated his criminal involvement. This in turn warranted a finding that Bouthot had not fully accepted responsibility. See U.S.S.G. Sec. 3E1.1 comment. (n. 1).\n \n \n 21\n The two-level adjustment for Bouthot's role in the offense is also supported. Webster and a DEA agent both testified that Bouthot had recruited an individual named Conwell to sell small amounts of cocaine for him, paying Conwell a fixed commission on every sale and providing him with housing from which to operate. This testimony, accepted by the district court, is more than enough to qualify Bouthot for a two-point adjustment for exercising a leadership or supervisory role in the offense. See U.S.S.G. Sec. 3B1.1 comment. (n. 4). United States v. Fuller, 897 F.2d 1217, 1219-22 (1st Cir.1990).\n \n III. Ravelo\n \n 22\n Ravelo was convicted by a jury of conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute. On July 21, 1994, the district court sentenced him to 188 months' imprisonment. The court determined that Ravelo's base offense level was 34, based on a drug quantity finding of 198.1 grams of cocaine base, also known as crack. No upward or downward adjustments were made. With no prior criminal record, Ravelo's total offense level yielded a guideline sentencing range of 151 to 188 months, and the court sentenced him at the top of the range.\n \n \n 23\n As with Bouthot, Webster was the primary witness at Ravelo's sentencing hearing. Webster testified that Ravelo was his New York source for cocaine and that he purchased on average 6 to 8 ounces twice per month from 1990 to 1993. Consistent with his testimony at Bouthot's sentencing hearing, Webster said that at times the amounts were upwards of 11 to 13 ounces and that once he purchased a half kilogram from Ravelo. Webster also testified that in the summer of 1993 he purchased from Ravelo seven ounces of crack made in Ravelo's kitchen.\n \n \n 24\n At sentencing the district court accepted Webster's testimony and found that Ravelo had sold Webster seven ounces (198.1 grams) of crack in the summer of 1993. The crack finding alone placed Ravelo at a base offense level of 34. See U.S.S.G. Sec. 2D1.1(c)(5). Ravelo, like Bouthot, claims that Webster's testimony was unreliable. But Webster was very clear about the crack transaction--how much was involved, who was there, and how it was made. This testimony was also consistent with what Webster had told law enforcement agents during his debriefing. For the reasons already set forth with respect to Bouthot, the district court was free to conclude that Webster's testimony was credible and sufficiently reliable.\n \n \n 25\n Ravelo next claims that he should have been held accountable for no more than 1.26 kilograms of cocaine, because this was the amount for which Webster was sentenced, and both participated in the same transactions. Webster's sentence was based on 1.26 kilograms of cocaine, an amount computed by a probation officer and stipulated to by the parties at sentencing. The crack transaction is excluded from the stipulated amount but the discrepancy is easily explained.\n \n \n 26\n Evidence of the crack transaction apparently first surfaced during Webster's debriefing by law enforcement agents. But before he spoke, Webster obtained a written promise from the government that none of the information he provided would be used against him (with exceptions not here relevant). Under the guidelines, this promise immunized Webster from having the crack transaction count towards his sentence. See U.S.S.G. Sec. 1B1.8(a).\n \n \n 27\n We see no problem with holding Ravelo responsible for the greater drug quantity actually proved at his sentencing hearing. First and foremost, he did not cooperate with the government and thereby receive immunity for the crack transaction. Although the guidelines generally seek uniformity in sentencing, they also encourage divergent treatment for those who cooperate, in order to promote greater cooperation with law enforcement. Given Ravelo's decision not to cooperate, he has no basis for complaining about leniency to someone who did cooperate.\n \n \n 28\n Ravelo's final challenge to his sentence relates to comments made by the district court at the time of sentencing pertaining to Ravelo's alien status. Ravelo, a citizen of the Dominican Republic, claims that the court's comments indicate that he was sentenced more harshly because, of his alienage and that a constitutional violation resulted. Compare United States v. Gomez, 797 F.2d 417, 418-21 (7th Cir.1986) with United States v. Leung, 40 F.3d 577, 585-87 (2d Cir.1994) and United States v. Borrero-Isaza, 887 F.2d 1349, 1353-56 (9th Cir.1989).\n \n \n 29\n The district court made clear that it was sentencing Ravelo to the high end of the guideline range because of his continued dishonesty and defiance. Ravelo's alien status was raised by Ravelo's counsel who requested a lighter sentence because as an alien, Ravelo would be subject to deportation upon his release from prison. The sentencing judge said, in substance, that Ravelo was not entitled to leniency simply because he faced deportation, for this would undermine the deterrent value of Ravelo's sentence. It is thus clear that the district court did not punish Ravelo more severely because of his alien status.\n \n IV. Huntington\n \n 30\n Huntington pled guilty to two counts of bank fraud, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1344, and one count of conspiracy to commit bank fraud, 18 U.S.C. Secs. 371, 1344. The scheme involved the forging and cashing of blank checks stolen from a local health center; the checks were stolen by Webster, forged by Huntington and cashed by numerous individuals at various branches of the Casco Northern Bank on newly opened accounts. Apart from Webster's membership in both conspiracies, the bank fraud scheme was unrelated to the drug ring. Huntington pled guilty to the three fraud charges against him on December 6, 1993.\n \n \n 31\n Some three months later, on the morning of his presentence conference, Huntington moved to withdraw his plea on the grounds of involuntariness; Huntington claimed that he had been threatened by two codefendants--by Webster and by Huntington's own nephew Stephen Huntington--to plead guilty or face physical harm. On April 29, 1994, the court held an evidentiary hearing on the plea-withdrawal motion, at which Huntington was the sole witness. At the hearing's conclusion, the court denied the motion, finding that Huntington's story was a blatant, last-minute fabrication.\n \n \n 32\n The court sentenced Huntington on July 22, 1994. Huntington's conduct equated to an offense level of 11, which included a two-level increase for more than minimal planning. U.S.S.G. Sec. 2F1.1(b)(2)(A). The court imposed a two-level upward adjustment for Huntington's organizational role in the scheme, U.S.S.G. Sec. 3B1.1(c), and a further two-level upward adjustment for obstruction of justice, based primarily on Huntington's perjurious testimony at the plea-withdrawal hearing. U.S.S.G. Sec. 3C1.1. With a criminal history category of III, the resulting guideline sentencing range was 24 to 30 months, and the court sentenced him to the maximum amount of 30 months.\n \n \n 33\n In making an upward adjustment for Huntington's role in the offense, the district court found as follows:[T]his defendant collaborated with Webster as to devise, carry out this scheme, forge and negotiate stolen checks, and that he typed false and fictitious amounts and information about the payees on several stolen checks. The Court further finds that he forged the authorized signatures and assisted Webster in giving instructions to other participants in the scheme, directing their efforts in the offense conduct.\n \n \n 34\n Based on the first sentence of these findings, and on certain other comments made by the sentencing judge, Huntington argues that the district court misunderstood the legal standard and thought it enough that Huntington was extensively involved in the conspiracy. The guideline requires that Huntington must have controlled or organized the activities of at least one other participant in the bank fraud scheme. U.S.S.G. Sec. 3B1.1(c); Fuller, 897 F.2d at 1220; United States v. Castellone, 985 F.2d 21, 26 (1st Cir.1993).\n \n \n 35\n At sentencing the court specifically found that, in addition to playing a central role in devising the whole scheme, Huntington directed and instructed various individuals on how to negotiate the forged checks at the banks. While the former conduct provides evidence suggesting an enhanced role, see U.S.S.G. Sec. 3B1.1 comment. (n. 4), the latter conduct conclusively establishes that Huntington controlled or organized at least one other participant.\n \n \n 36\n The record supports this assessment. There was evidence that Huntington instructed an individual named Jolin how to present the forged checks for acceptance and directed him to different branches of Casco Northern Bank for that purpose. Steven Huntington, the appellant's nephew, testified at the sentencing hearing that the appellant recruited him to take part in the scheme and that the appellant \"did all the talking\" when distributing the forged checks to him and another check casher named Glantz. At the very least, Huntington served as Webster's lieutenant, and the guidelines do not limit supervision to one person. U.S.S.G. Sec. 3B1.1 comment. (n. 4).\n \n \n 37\n Huntington says that the role-in-the-offense enhancement amounts to impermissible double counting in view of the district court's earlier enhancement for more than minimal planning. The two-level increase for more than minimal planning was based on the fact that the bank fraud scheme involved repeated episodes of fraud; the two-level increase for role in the offense, as we have just discussed, was predicated on Huntington's direction and supervision of others. Because the two adjustments were based on separate factors, there was no double counting. United States v. Balogun, 989 F.2d 20, 23-24 (1st Cir.1993).\n \n \n 38\n Huntington also contests the upward departure for obstruction of justice under U.S.S.G. Sec. 3C1.1. In making this adjustment, the court relied upon three separate instances of alleged perjury, but any one is sufficient. United States v. Tracy, 36 F.3d 199, 201 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 609, 130 L.Ed.2d 518 (1994). We confine ourselves to the district court's finding that Huntington had testified falsely at the plea-withdrawal hearing when he claimed that he was \"absolutely\" innocent of the bank fraud charges.\n \n \n 39\n Under United States v. Dunnigan, --- U.S. ----, ----, 113 S.Ct. 1111, 1116, 122 L.Ed.2d 445 (1993), a witness commits perjury if he or she \"gives false testimony concerning a material matter with a willful intent to provide false testimony, rather than as a result of confusion, mistake or faulty memory.\" In Dunnigan, the Supreme Court instructed that a sentencing court must make independent findings necessary to establish the enhancement, preferably addressing each element of the alleged perjury in \"a separate and clear finding.\" Id. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 1117. Huntington argues that the court's findings are legally insufficient to support a determination of perjury under the Dunnigan standard. We disagree. On the first episode of perjury the court found as follows:\n \n \n 40\n The Court bases its findings from the testimony of this defendant ... at the proceedings to determine whether he should be permitted to withdraw his guilty plea. The Court is satisfied that his disclaimer of participation in these offenses in this offense conduct at that time, his protestation of innocence [was] false, that that testimony related to a material matter and that it was intended to influence the judgment of the Court in making the determination as to whether he should be permitted to withdraw his plea of guilty. In that respect the Court is satisfied there was an obstruction of justice by this defendant. (emphasis added).\n \n \n 41\n These findings encompass all the predicates for perjury and thus satisfy the requirements of Dunnigan.\n \n \n 42\n As for the factual bases for those findings, the record amply supports the judge's ruling under the clear error standard. Tracy, 36 F.3d at 202. At the plea-withdrawal hearing Huntington testified that he was absolutely innocent of the bank fraud charges brought against him, claiming that he had been duped into signing the checks by Webster. But at sentencing four months later Huntington admitted his knowing participation in the bank fraud scheme, although not to the full extent for which the district court ultimately found him responsible. As such, Huntington's protestations of \"absolute\" innocence at the withdrawal hearing were not in any way ambiguous and amounted to perjury. See United States v. Austin, 948 F.2d 783, 789 (1st Cir.1991) (perjury committed at withdrawal hearing requires obstruction of justice adjustment).\n \n \n 43\n For the foregoing reasons the sentences of all four appellants are affirmed.\n \n \n \n *\n Of the Eighth Circuit, sitting by designation\n \n \n ", "ocr": false, "opinion_id": 196037 } ]
First Circuit
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
F
USA, Federal
2,056,520
Kilbride
2002-01-25
false
hansen-v-baxter-healthcare-corp
Hansen
Hansen v. Baxter Healthcare Corp.
STEVEN HANSEN, Special Adm’r of the Estate of Andrina Hansen, Appellee, v. BAXTER HEALTHCARE CORPORATION, Appellant
William R. Quinlan, Gino L. DiVito, Michael I. Roth-stein, David M. Jenkins and Brian J. Alesia, of Quinlan & Grisham, Ltd., of Chicago (Charles R. Purcell, of counsel), for appellant., Kevin M. Forde, Janice R. Forde and Kevin R. Malloy, of Kevin M. Forde, Ltd., Paul B. Episcope, John C. Erb and David S. Jasmer, of the Law Offices of Paul B. Episcope, Ltd., and John Rokacz, all of Chicago, for appellee., Jay H. Tressler, of Tressler, Soderstrom, Maloney & Priess, of Chicago, Robert N. Weiner, of Arnold & Porter, of Washington, D.C., and Hugh F. Young, Jr., of Reston, Virginia, for amicus curiae Product Liability Advisory Council., James Paul Costello, of Chicago, for amicus curiae Illinois Trial Lawyers Association.
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
64
Published
null
<docketnumber id="b432-2" pgmap="432"> (No. 89043. </docketnumber><br><parties id="b432-3" pgmap="432"> STEVEN HANSEN, Special Adm’r of the Estate of Andrina Hansen, Appellee, v. BAXTER HEALTHCARE CORPORATION, Appellant. </parties><br><decisiondate id="b432-4" pgmap="432"> Opinion filed January 25, 2002. </decisiondate><br><attorneys id="b433-5" pgmap="433"> William R. Quinlan, Gino L. DiVito, Michael I. Roth-stein, David M. Jenkins and Brian J. Alesia, of Quinlan &amp; Grisham, Ltd., of Chicago (Charles R. Purcell, of counsel), for appellant. </attorneys><br><attorneys id="b433-7" pgmap="433"> Kevin M. Forde, Janice R. Forde and Kevin R. Malloy, of Kevin M. Forde, Ltd., Paul B. Episcope, John C. Erb and David S. Jasmer, of the Law Offices of Paul B. Episcope, Ltd., and John Rokacz, all of Chicago, for appellee. </attorneys><br><attorneys id="b433-8" pgmap="433"> Jay H. Tressler, of Tressler, Soderstrom, Maloney &amp; Priess, of Chicago, Robert N. Weiner, of Arnold &amp; Porter, of Washington, D.C., and Hugh F. Young, Jr., of Reston, Virginia, for amicus curiae Product Liability Advisory Council. </attorneys><br><attorneys id="b433-11" pgmap="433"> James Paul Costello, of Chicago, for amicus curiae Illinois Trial Lawyers Association. </attorneys>
[ "764 N.E.2d 35", "198 Ill. 2d 420", "261 Ill. Dec. 744" ]
[ { "author_str": "Kilbride", "per_curiam": false, "type": "010combined", "page_count": null, "download_url": null, "author_id": 4234, "opinion_text": "\n764 N.E.2d 35 (2002)\n198 Ill.2d 420\n261 Ill.Dec. 744\nSteven HANSEN, Special Adm'r of the Estate of Andrina Hansen, Appellee,\nv.\nBAXTER HEALTHCARE CORPORATION, Appellant.\nNo. 89043.\nSupreme Court of Illinois.\nJanuary 25, 2002.\n*37 William R. Quinlan, Gino L. DiVito, Michael I. Rothstein, David M. Jenkins, Brian J. Alesia, of Quinlan &amp; Crisham, Ltd., Chicago (Charles R. Purcell, of counsel), for appellant.\nKevin M. Forde, Janice R. Forde, Kevin R. Malloy, of Kevin M. Forde, Ltd., Paul B. Episcope, John C. Erb, David S. Jasmer, Law Offices of Paul B. Episcope, Ltd., John Rokacz, Chicago, for appellee.\nJay H. Tressler, of Tressler, Soderstrom, Maloney &amp; Priess, Chicago, Robert N. Weiner, of Arnold &amp; Porter, Washington, D.C., Hugh F. Young, Jr., Reston, Virginia, for amicus curiae Product Liability Advisory Council.\nJames Paul Costello, Chicago, for amicus curiae Illinois Trial Lawyers Association.\nJustice KILBRIDE delivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff's decedent, Andrina Hansen, suffered an air embolism because an intravenous (IV) tube became detached from a catheter inserted into her jugular vein. The embolism caused brain damage and paralysis; Andrina died a little more than four years later.\nThe administrator of Andrina's estate filed medical malpractice claims, in the circuit court of Cook County, against the hospital and one of her treating nurses. He later added survival and wrongful-death claims based on a products liability theory against the manufacturer of the IV tube and connecting devices, Baxter Healthcare Corporation (Baxter). Shortly before trial, the plaintiff settled all claims against the medical malpractice defendants for a total of $2,880,000. The administrator then filed an amended complaint against Baxter alleging products liability and negligence theories.\nFollowing trial, plaintiff dismissed the negligence claims and the matter was submitted to the jury on only the products liability theory. The jury awarded plaintiff $18,047,000. The award was reduced by a partial setoff of the amounts paid by the settling defendants.\nOn appeal, the appellate court found that the evidence was sufficient to justify the verdict based on a defective-design theory. The appellate court further found *38 that the jury's verdict could not be sustained on the theory that Baxter breached its duty to warn of its products' inherent dangers. However, because the jury reached a general verdict, unchecked by any inconsistent answers to special interrogatories, the appellate court refused to disturb the verdict except to reduce the judgment amount by the full amount of the settlements. 309 Ill.App.3d 869, 243 Ill. Dec. 270, 723 N.E.2d 302.\nBaxter appeals to this court, primarily arguing that the appellate court erred in finding that the jury's verdict could be supported under a defective-design theory. Plaintiff cross-appeals, arguing that we should reverse the appellate court's finding that Baxter had no duty to warn the medical profession of dangers inherent in its product. We affirm the judgment of the appellate court.\n\nBACKGROUND\nBaxter designs, manufactures and distributes IV tubing sets to hospitals nationwide. These IV sets are prescription medical devices used to deliver fluids, such as blood products, medicines, or nutrients. An IV set consists of tubing and a connector, allowing it to be attached to other sections of tubing or to a catheter inserted into a patient's venous system.\nThere are two types of connectors: \"friction-fit\" and \"Luer-lock.\" The friction-fit type consists of two mating tapered fittings. A medical professional must push the ends of the two fittings together with sufficient force to maintain a leak-proof connection. The Luer-lock type is similar to a friction-fit connector but also has a threaded collar that screws onto the hub of the catheter. In its patent application, Baxter stated that the Luer-lock was designed to overcome the problem of inadvertent disconnection that occurs with friction-fit connectors. Baxter continued to distribute both friction-fit and Luer-lock connectors to hospitals.\nIn March 1991, Andrina was admitted to Mt. Sinai Hospital for treatment of stomach ulcers. Following successful surgery, fluids were administered intravenously to Andrina through her jugular vein. This procedure is known as a \"central line\" application. Unfortunately, the Baxter friction-fit connector used to connect the IV tube to a catheter came apart, causing Andrina to suffer a seizure. She also suffered an air embolism resulting in brain damage, paralysis and, ultimately, death.\nThe administrator's complaint alleged, inter alia, that: (1) the tubing was unreasonably dangerous because it was designed, manufactured, and sold without a Luer-lock connection; (2) the friction-fit connection failed when the product was used in a reasonably foreseeable manner; and (3) Baxter failed to warn of the likelihood of unintentional disconnection and the need to use tubing equipped with the Luer-locking device.\nAt trial, plaintiff called Baxter employees as adverse witnesses to establish the propensity of the friction-fit connectors to disconnect unintentionally and to prove that Luer-locking devices provided a more secure connection. According to Margaret Foss, a registered nurse and Baxter vice-president, Baxter was aware at the time Andrina was injured that friction-fit connectors sometimes failed due to patient movement. Foss admitted that this could cause air embolisms in central line applications. She conceded that friction-fit connectors were inadequate for central line use and that, in such instances, medical professionals should use Luer-locks. She testified, however, that Baxter did not encourage sales representatives to recommend Luer-locks for central line applications. Instead, Baxter simply made both products available to its customers.\n*39 Baxter's sales representatives provided similar testimony. For example, one representative admitted that she knew prior to Andrina's injury that friction-fit IV sets could unintentionally disconnect and should not be used in central line applications.\nBirenda Lal, Baxter's chief engineer in charge of the IV product line, was called as an adverse witness. He testified that friction-fit connectors could accidentally disconnect. He also stated that friction-fit connectors were being used in central lines and agreed that an air embolism could result if they became disconnected. For this reason, he recommended using Luer-locks in central line applications. He added, however, that Baxter did not advise hospitals to use one product or the other, and Baxter had not developed and marketed Luer-locks to prevent accidental disconnections or to increase patient safety. Rather, the Luer-lock mechanism was a competitive response to industry demands. Lal testified that adding Luer-locks to all connectors was technically feasible and would add between three and five cents to the cost of each unit. He believed that Baxter would put locking collars on all their connectors if customers demanded it.\nNeil Sheehan testified as plaintiff's expert witness without objection. Sheehan is a mechanical engineer and had worked for several companies that developed and sold IV components. Sheehan had personally designed and, in some cases, patented medical devices, including IV equipment. He explained that the main problem with using a friction-fit connector was that the amount of force needed to disconnect it depended on several factors, including (1) the force used to connect it; (2) its composition; (3) the method used to sterilize it; and (4) variations in molding. Thus, the strength of the connection varied as different persons used different friction-fit connectors at different times. Generally, however, if the connection was made with less force, it was more likely to fail.\nSheehan also described the technical aspects of the Luer-lock. He stated that a Luer-lock prevents the accidental disconnection of IV lines and that it is four to five times stronger than a friction-fit. In order to disconnect a Luer-lock without unscrewing it, the components would have to be pulled apart with great force until the threads on one component tore. Sheehan testified that air embolisms can be avoided by using Luer-locks and that Luer-locks should always be used in central line applications. In his opinion, the friction-fit connector became obsolete once the Luer-lock became available.\nIn addition, Sheehan stated that it was foreseeable that friction-fit connectors might be used in a central line application. He opined, however, that a friction-fit connection was not a safe design in any application and that it was especially hazardous when used in a central vein. He also believed that if medical personnel had used a Luer-lock connector, Andrina's injury would have been prevented.\nDr. William Schumer, chief of surgery at Mt. Sinai Hospital, testified that decisions regarding the purchase of medical supplies were made by a nursing products committee. He said that Luer-locks were not used at Mt. Sinai prior to the incident, and he believed that most hospitals did not use them at that time. He stated that he assumed friction-fit connectors were safe because they were readily available in the market.\nThe chair of the nursing products committee at Mt. Sinai testified that the hospital staff relied on product manufacturers to advise them of the appropriate uses for their products.\n*40 The nurse responsible for the actual purchase and distribution of medical supplies at Mt. Sinai stated that at the time of Andrina's injury she did not know the difference between a friction-fit connector and a Luer-lock connector. She also noted that at that time she did not know that friction-fits should not be used in central line applications.\nDr. Ricky Maddox, a second-year resident in general surgery at Mt. Sinai at the time of Andrina's operation, testified that he placed the catheter in Andrina's jugular vein. Although he knew about using friction-fit connectors on IV tubing, he was unfamiliar with Luer-lock connectors. He did not learn of them until after Andrina was injured, when they began to be used exclusively at Mt. Sinai Hospital.\nDr. Henry Roztoczynski, Andrina's surgeon, testified that he was aware that friction-fit connectors could unintentionally disconnect and that Luer-lock connectors were safe to use in central lines. He never mentioned Luer-lock connectors to his colleagues at Mt. Sinai and did not advocate their use prior to the incident involving Andrina.\nDr. Norbert Strohmayer, was a fifth-year surgical resident when he assisted Dr. Roztoczynski with Andrina's surgery. He testified that he was familiar with both friction-fit and Luer-lock connectors. He was unaware of the requisite force necessary to disconnect friction-fit connectors and could not specifically recall one coming apart. He was also unaware of any literature describing the frequency of accidental disconnection, although he read several well-known medical journals. He agreed that the unintentional disconnection of an IV device could have adverse effects in any application and is \"never a good idea.\" He acknowledged that Luer-lock connectors were less likely to fail due to a patient's movement.\nIn its case in chief, Baxter presented testimony from two expert witnesses. First, William McVay, a \"medical device consultant\" with a degree in mechanical engineering, testified as an expert witness. He agreed that only Luer-locks should be used in central line applications. McVay acknowledged that Baxter was aware of the dangers of using friction-fit connectors in central lines but believed that Baxter was not obliged to reveal this information.\nNext, Kathleen Medica, a registered nurse with a master's degree, testified as an expert witness for Baxter. In her opinion, a friction-fit connector was much more likely to fail than a Luer-lock, although she did not know whether this was a well-known complication in the field. She acknowledged that some nurses may never have had the experience of a friction-fit coming apart.\nAfter hearing the evidence, the jury returned a general verdict for the decedent's estate. No special interrogatories were requested or submitted to the jury. The trial court denied Baxter's post-trial motion seeking judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial. Baxter then appealed.\nRelying on the learned intermediary doctrine, the appellate court found that Baxter was not obliged to warn Andrina's health-care providers of the risks associated with friction-fit connectors because they already knew that such risks existed. 309 Ill.App.3d at 882, 243 Ill.Dec. 270, 723 N.E.2d 302. The court found, however, that the evidence sufficiently supported the verdict based on the theory of defective design. 309 Ill.App.3d at 883, 243 Ill.Dec. 270, 723 N.E.2d 302. The court affirmed the judgment but reduced the award by the full settlement amount. We granted Baxter's petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill.2d R. 315.\n\n\n*41 ANALYSIS\nBaxter argues that the appellate court erred in (1) holding that the patient, rather than the prescribing physician, is the \"ordinary consumer\" of prescription medical products; (2) finding that the connector was defective based on Sheehan's expert opinion testimony since he was an engineer and had no medical training; (3) performing its proximate cause analysis; and (4) applying risk-benefit analysis in determining whether the friction-fit connector was unreasonably dangerous due to a defect in its design.\nPlaintiff argues that Baxter has waived the last three of these arguments. Therefore, we will first determine whether waiver applies here.\n\nA. Waiver\nBaxter argues that the appellate court erred in finding a prescription medical product defective without expert medical testimony on its proper uses. On that issue, plaintiff offered only the testimony of Neil Sheehan, who is a mechanical engineer and lacks medical training.\nWe agree that Baxter failed to preserve this issue for review. At trial, Baxter did not challenge Sheehan's qualifications to testify or the sufficiency of his testimony to support plaintiff's burden of proof. Baxter also failed to raise this issue in the appellate court and raised it for the first time in its petition for leave to appeal before this court. In Daniels v. Anderson, 162 Ill.2d 47, 204 Ill.Dec. 666, 642 N.E.2d 128 (1994), we held that parties may not raise arguments for the first time on appeal. To do so weakens the adversarial process and would likely prejudice the other party, who did not present relevant evidence and argument on that issue at trial. Daniels, 162 Ill.2d at 59, 204 Ill.Dec. 666, 642 N.E.2d 128. Baxter offers no persuasive reason to depart from the waiver doctrine in this case.\nBaxter also argues that the appellate court erred in performing a proximate cause analysis. Plaintiff contends that Baxter failed to raise this argument in its petition for leave to appeal and therefore should be foreclosed from raising it now.\nAgain, we agree with plaintiff. Supreme Court Rule 315(b) provides that a party's petition for leave to appeal \"shall contain * * * (3) a statement of the points relied upon for reversal of the judgment of the Appellate Court.\" 177 Ill.2d R. 315(b)(3). Failure to raise an argument in the petition for leave to appeal may be deemed a waiver of that argument. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. O'Malley, 163 Ill.2d 130, 154, 205 Ill.Dec. 534, 643 N.E.2d 825 (1994). Adherence to the rule is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to our review of an issue; it is a principle of administrative convenience. Dineen v. City of Chicago, 125 Ill.2d 248, 265, 126 Ill.Dec. 52, 531 N.E.2d 347 (1988). Here, the issue of proximate cause was thoroughly and thoughtfully discussed in the appellate court's opinion and it need not be repeated here. We find no sufficient justification to overlook the administrative requirements of Rule 315 in this instance.\nFinally, we examine whether Baxter has waived its argument that the appellate court erred in applying the risk-benefit test in analyzing whether the friction-fit connector was unreasonably dangerous by reason of a defective design. We conclude that it has not. Although Baxter did not expressly designate this point as a separate argument in its petition for leave to appeal, it did argue that the appellate court's decision is contrary to a body of precedent prohibiting a finding of liability solely on the existence of an alternative design. Thus, the application of the risk-benefit test is inextricably intertwined with any fair analysis of the elements of *42 plaintiff's defective design case. For that reason we will consider the merits of Baxter's argument on this issue.\n\nB. Duty To Warn\nWe first address whether Baxter had a duty to warn of dangers inherent in the friction-fit connector. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that it did.\nGenerally, the manufacturer of a prescription medical device has a duty to warn prescribing physicians or other health professionals who may prescribe the device of the product's known dangerous propensities. Kirk v. Michael Reese Hospital &amp; Medical Center, 117 Ill.2d 507, 517, 111 Ill.Dec. 944, 513 N.E.2d 387 (1987). Likewise, physicians, using their medical judgment, have a duty to convey the warnings to their patients. Kirk, 117 Ill.2d at 517, 111 Ill.Dec. 944, 513 N.E.2d 387. The duty to warn the health-care professional, rather than the ultimate consumer or patient, is an expression of the \"learned intermediary\" doctrine. A corollary of that doctrine is the principle that a prescription medical device manufacturer need not provide a warning of risks already known to the medical community. Proctor v. Davis, 291 Ill.App.3d 265, 277, 225 Ill.Dec. 126, 682 N.E.2d 1203 (1997). In this case, the appellate court held that Baxter had no duty to warn Mt. Sinai Hospital's doctors about the risks of disconnection of the friction-fit device because the medical community was already aware of those risks. 309 Ill.App.3d at 882, 243 Ill.Dec. 270, 723 N.E.2d 302.\nIn plaintiff's request for cross-relief in this court, he argues that the appellate court erred by finding that Baxter had no duty to warn as a matter of law because health-care providers already knew of the dangers associated with friction-fit connectors and the need to use Luer-locks. Plaintiff asserts that since there is conflicting evidence concerning the comparative knowledge of Baxter and the medical community about this peril, the jury was properly allowed to decide this issue.\nWe agree that the record contains sufficient conflicting evidence to raise factual questions concerning the comparative knowledge of Baxter and that of the medical community concerning both the danger of using friction-fits in central lines and the need to use only Luer-locks in these applications. The record indicates that Baxter's employees knew of the inherent dangers of friction-fits and that Baxter's patent indicates that Luer-locks were designed to avoid accidental disconnections. For example, both Baxter's chief engineer, Birenda Lal, and its expert medical device consultant, William McVay, knew that only Luer-locks should be used on central lines because they are less likely to come apart.\nIn contrast, the testimony from persons on the medical staff at Mt. Sinai shows that they had significantly less knowledge. The chairperson of the nursing products committee testified that hospital staff relied on product manufacturers to advise them regarding the appropriate uses of a product. The nurse responsible for the actual purchase and distribution of medical supplies at Mt. Sinai testified that, in March 1991, she did not know the difference between a friction-fit connector and a Luer-lock and that she did not know that friction-fit connectors should not be used in central lines.\nMoreover, Dr. Norbert Strohmayer, the fifth-year resident who assisted at Andrina's surgery, was unaware of any literature describing the frequency of unintentional separation with friction-fit connectors, despite reading and subscribing to several well-known medical journals. He was also unaware of the force necessary to disconnect a friction-fit connector.\n*43 In addition, Dr. Ricky Maddox, who actually placed the catheter in Andrina's jugular vein, stated that he was unfamiliar with Luer-lock connectors and did not learn about them until after the incident. Thus, he could not have known that friction-fit connectors should never be used in central line applications.\nIn Proctor v. Davis, 291 Ill.App.3d 265, 225 Ill.Dec. 126, 682 N.E.2d 1203 (1997), the appellate court held that a drug manufacturer that only shared information about its product's toxicity with its own employees breached its duty to warn the medical community because without this information, doctors could not provide appropriate and comprehensive medical advice for their patients. This prevented them from functioning as \"learned intermediaries\" to protect their patients' best medical interests. The court said, \"Doctors who have not been sufficiently warned of the harmful effects of a drug cannot be considered `learned intermediaries' and the adequacy of warnings is a question of fact, not law, for the jury to determine, as it did in the instant case.\" (Emphasis added.) Proctor, 291 Ill.App.3d at 283, 225 Ill.Dec. 126, 682 N.E.2d 1203.\nIn the instant case, Baxter gave the medical community no warning at all about the need to use Luer-locks in central line applications. Thus, this issue was properly submitted to the jury. The jury's general verdict for plaintiff could have been reasonably based on a finding that Baxter's knowledge with respect to the use of friction-fit connectors was superior to that of the medical community and thus Baxter breached its duty to warn. The evidence does not so strongly favor Baxter that the jury's conclusion cannot stand and therefore we will not disturb it on appeal. See Pedrick v. Peoria &amp; Eastern R.R. Co., 37 Ill.2d 494, 510, 229 N.E.2d 504 (1967). The appellate court erred by holding otherwise.\n\nC. Design Defect\nWe next consider whether the jury's verdict can be supported under a designdefect theory. We find that it can.\nA manufacturer has a nondelegable duty to produce a product that is reasonably safe for all intended uses. Doser v. Savage Manufacturing &amp; Sales, Inc., 142 Ill.2d 176, 189, 154 Ill.Dec. 593, 568 N.E.2d 814 (1990). In Lamkin v. Towner, 138 Ill.2d 510, 529, 150 Ill.Dec. 562, 563 N.E.2d 449 (1990), we said:\n\"A plaintiff may demonstrate that a product is defective in design, so as to subject a retailer and a manufacturer to strict liability for resulting injuries, in one of two ways: (l) by introducing evidence that the product failed to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect when used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner or (2) by introducing evidence that the product's design proximately caused his injury and the defendant fails to prove that on balance the benefits of the challenged design outweigh the risk of danger inherent in such designs.\"\nThe first way is commonly referred to as the consumer expectation test. The second is called the risk-utility or risk-benefit test. The appellate court held that under either test, the evidence justified a finding of defective design. We agree.\n\n1. The Consumer Expectation Test\n\nIn affirming the jury's verdict, the appellate court held that it was not against the manifest weight of the evidence for the jury to find that the friction-fit device failed to meet Andrina's reasonable expectation that it would function properly. 309 Ill.App.3d at 884, 243 Ill.Dec. 270, 723 N.E.2d 302.\n*44 Baxter contends that the health-care professional (rather than the patient) should be deemed \"the consumer\" for purposes of the consumer expectation test. This approach, Baxter argues, is consistent with the traditional application of the learned intermediary doctrine. Baxter further argues that this is true because, in the case of a prescription medical device, the patient has no more independent ability to assess the product's risks or benefits than to appreciate or assess the warnings as to its use. Thus, under the consumer expectation test, the issue is whether the product is more dangerous than expected by the ordinary learned intermediary.\nNeither Baxter nor its amicus, the Product Liability Advisory Council, has cited any Illinois authority in support of this argument. Baxter refers us to Shanks v. Upjohn Co., 835 P.2d 1189 (Alaska 1992). In that case, the court concluded that a prescription drug is defectively designed and imposes strict liability on its manufacturer if it fails to perform as safely as an ordinary doctor would expect, when used by the patient in an intended and reasonably foreseeable manner. Shanks, 835 P.2d at 1195. In a footnote, the court observed:\n\"With certain types of prescription drugs, the role of the doctor in the decision to use a specific product is significantly reduced. Examples of such atypical prescription products include contraceptives, where the patient initiates and directs the usage, drugs administered in a clinical setting with little or no physician involvement, or drugs marketed under a strategy designed to appeal directly to the consuming public. These are areas where courts have held that manufacturers have a duty to warn patients directly. In strict liability design cases involving such products, it may be appropriate to apply the `ordinary consumer expectation' test rather than the `ordinary doctor expectation test.'\" Shanks, 835 P.2d at 1195 n. 7.\nIn the case before us, the evidence showed that the decision to purchase friction-fit connectors was made exclusively by the nursing products committee at Mt. Sinai. The chairperson of that committee testified that the hospital staff relied on the product manufacturer to advise them of the proper uses for the product. The person who actually purchased the friction-fit connectors from Baxter's sales representative was not a physician and did not know that those devices should not be used in central line applications. Since the purchase of the product had little physician involvement, it would appear that the facts in this case are similar to those described in the Shanks footnote. In such cases, the application of the \"ordinary consumer\" expectation test, rather than the \"ordinary physician\" expectation test, is appropriate.\nMoreover, in Haudrich v. Howmedica, Inc., 169 Ill.2d 525, 215 Ill.Dec. 108, 662 N.E.2d 1248 (1996), plaintiff sought recovery on a strict liability theory against the manufacturer of a knee prosthesis that failed prematurely, causing personal injuries. The evidence was conflicting as to whether the device failed because of a design defect, a manufacturing defect, or both. In any event, this court held that the evidence was sufficient to support a finding that the plaintiff was injured by an unreasonably dangerous condition of the knee device. The court stated: \"sufficient evidence was presented to support a finding that the device failed to perform in a manner reasonably expected in light of its nature and intended function and subjected the plaintiff to an unreasonable risk of harm beyond that contemplated by an ordinary person.\" (Emphasis added.) Haudrich, 169 Ill.2d at 542, 215 Ill.Dec. *45 108, 662 N.E.2d 1248. Although the Haudrich court was not presented with the argument that the contemplation of the doctors, rather than the patient, should be controlling, that case clearly used the \"ordinary person\" standard in applying the consumer expectation test.\nAndrina, who was conscious after surgery, could have reasonably expected that her IV catheter connection, if properly designed and manufactured, would be safe to use for its intended purpose. She was the person who would be harmed if the device failed. The expert testimony adduced at trial was sufficient to establish that the design of the device was defective and that this defective design caused her injury. Thus, we agree with the appellate court's conclusion that the jury's decision did not contradict the manifest weight of the evidence.\n\n2. The Risk-Utility Test\n\nBaxter also argues that the appellate court erred in finding that the jury's verdict could be supported under the risk-utility test. The appellate court held that the record supported a finding that a connector existed that would prevent foreseeable harm without hindering its function or significantly increasing its price. Hansen, 309 Ill.App.3d at 884, 243 Ill.Dec. 270, 723 N.E.2d 302.\nWe disagree with Baxter on this point. As this court held in Kerns v. Engelke, 76 Ill.2d 154, 162-63, 28 Ill.Dec. 500, 390 N.E.2d 859 (1979), a plaintiff may demonstrate that a product is unreasonably dangerous because of a design defect by presenting evidence of an alternative design that would have prevented the injury and was feasible in terms of cost, practicality and technological possibility. The record in this case contains sufficient evidence to establish that the Luer-lock collar was designed to, and would have, prevented an unintentional disconnection at a cost of between three and five cents per unit. This record is sufficient to sustain a finding of unreasonable dangerousness under a risk-utility analysis.\nBaxter argues, however, that a risk-utility analysis is inappropriate in this case because the device in question is simple and because the risks are well-known to the medical community that uses the device.\nBaxter cites Scoby v. Vulcan-Hart Corp., 211 Ill.App.3d 106, 155 Ill.Dec. 536, 569 N.E.2d 1147 (1991), in support of its argument. In that case, the appellate court reviewed a grant of summary judgment by the trial court in favor of the defendant manufacturer of a deep-fat fryer used in a restaurant. Plaintiff was a cook who was burned when he slipped and lost his balance, causing his arm to be submersed in hot oil. Plaintiff claimed the injury could have been prevented if the fryer had been equipped either with a simmer cover or a tank cover. The manufacturer offered each protective cover as a separate product. The parties stipulated that the purpose of the simmer cover was to trap moisture in the product being cooked, and that the purpose of the tank cover was to prevent vermin from getting into the jelled cooking oil after it had cooled. Neither cover was developed or marketed as a safety device. In affirming the trial court's decision, the appellate court remarked:\n\"We do not deem that Lamkin or other cases applying aspects of the danger-utility test intend that all manufacturers of products described above should be subject to liability depending upon a trier of fact's balancing under that test, when suit is brought by one injured by such a product. Somewhere, a line must be drawn beyond which the danger-utility test cannot be applied. Considering not only the obvious nature *46 of any danger here but, also, the simple nature of the mechanism involved, we conclude the circuit court properly applied only the consumer-user contemplation test.\" Scoby, 211 Ill.App.3d at 112, 155 Ill.Dec. 536, 569 N.E.2d 1147.\nThat conclusion is not compelled by the facts in this case. Baxter's patent application stated that the Luer-lock was designed to overcome the problem of inadvertent disconnection of the friction-fit. Thus, it is reasonable to infer that Baxter, unlike the manufacturer in Scoby, developed and marketed its product as a safety device. As plaintiff's expert Neil Sheehan testified, the likelihood of disconnection of a friction-fit device is dependent on several variables, including the force applied to engage it, differences in molding and differences in sterilization procedures. Sheehan further opined that the friction-fit connectors became obsolete once the Luer-lock was invented.\nEven though the doctors assumed the friction-fit device was safe to use in central line applications, the reasonable conclusion is that the danger in the friction-fit was not obvious, nor was the mechanism simple. There can be no rational comparison between this device and a kettle of boiling oil. Thus, Scoby is inapposite. We believe the analysis of the appellate court was correct on this issue and we hold that the jury's decision against Baxter based on application of the risk-utility test was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.\nBaxter also argues that if the risk-utility test is to be applied in the defective design analysis, then we should apply the standard defined by the new Restatement (Third) of Torts. That standard would allow a finding of unreasonably dangerous design only if reasonable health-care providers, knowing the foreseeable risks and therapeutic benefits, would not prescribe the device for any class of patients. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Product Liability § 6 (1998).\nBaxter did not argue this point in the trial court and it was asserted for the first time in Baxter's reply brief in the appellate court. The appellate court, however, made no reference to this argument in its opinion. Application of the Restatement (Third) of Torts standard would apparently require expert medical testimony to establish whether reasonable health-care providers, knowing the foreseeable risks and therapeutic benefits of the friction-fit device, would prescribe it for any class of patient. No such expert medical testimony was proffered by either party. We have already held that Baxter waived the argument that it was error to rely on the testimony of a mechanical engineer with no medical training or expertise and, thus, there is no evidentiary basis for the application of the Restatement (Third) of Torts standard. We decline, therefore, to address this issue. We do not foreclose the consideration of the Restatement (Third) of Torts standard in another case where it is raised at trial and is appropriately briefed and argued.\n\nCONCLUSION\nWe disagree with the appellate court's conclusion that, under the learned intermediary doctrine, Baxter had no duty to warn of the inherent dangers associated with friction-fit locks. We find that the duty to warn was properly submitted to a jury and that the jury's verdict does not contradict the manifest weight of the evidence. We agree with the appellate court's conclusion that the defective-design theory was properly submitted to a jury and that the verdict does not contradict the manifest weight of the evidence.\n*47 Therefore, for the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the appellate court, which affirmed the judgment of the circuit court as modified.\nAppellate court judgment affirmed.\n", "ocr": false, "opinion_id": 2056520 } ]
Illinois Supreme Court
Illinois Supreme Court
S
Illinois, IL
2,436,260
May
2012-03-16
false
kinnaman-v-state
KINNAMAN
KINNAMAN v. State
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
0
Published
null
null
[ "965 N.E.2d 174" ]
[ { "author_str": null, "per_curiam": false, "type": "010combined", "page_count": null, "download_url": null, "author_id": null, "opinion_text": "\n965 N.E.2d 174 (2012)\nKINNAMAN\nv.\nSTATE.\nNo. 24A01-1105-CR-229.\nCourt of Appeals of Indiana.\nMarch 16, 2012.\nMAY, J.\nDisposition of Case by Unpublished Memorandum Decision Affirmed.\nCRONE, J., concurs.\nBROWN, J., concurs.\n", "ocr": false, "opinion_id": 2436260 } ]
Indiana Court of Appeals
Indiana Court of Appeals
SA
Indiana, IN
2,580,690
Farnan
2004-04-07
false
seachange-international-inc-v-ncube-corp
null
SeaChange International, Inc. v. nCUBE Corp.
SEACHANGE INTERNATIONAL, INC., Plaintiff, v. NCUBE CORPORATION, Defendant; nCUBE Corporation, Counter-Claimant v. Seachange International, Inc., Counter-Defendant
William J. Marsden, Jr. and J. Andrew Huffman, Fish & Richardson P.C., Wilmington, DE, Fish & Richardson P.C., Menlo Park, CA (Jack Slobodin, Karen I. Boyd, of counsel), Robert E. Hillman, Lawrence K. Kolodney and Steven R. Katz, Fish & Richardson P.C., Boston, MA, for Plaintiff SeaChange International, Inc., Mary B. Graham and Rodger D. Smith, Morris Nichols Arsht & Tunnell, Wilmington, DE (James Pooley, Browning Marean, Gabriel Kralik, of counsel), Elizabeth Day and L. Scott Oliver Gray Cary Ware & Freidenrich LLP, Palo Alto, CA, for Defendant nCUBE Corporation.
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null
null
null
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1
Published
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<parties id="b453-8"> SEACHANGE INTERNATIONAL, INC., Plaintiff, v. NCUBE CORPORATION, Defendant. nCUBE Corporation, Counter-claimant v. Seachange International, Inc., Counter-defendant </parties><br><docketnumber id="b453-14"> No. CIV.A.00-568-JJF. </docketnumber><br><court id="b453-15"> United States District Court, D. Delaware. </court><br><decisiondate id="b453-17"> April 7, 2004. </decisiondate><br><attorneys id="b454-22"> <span citation-index="1" class="star-pagination" label="394"> *394 </span> William J. Marsden, Jr. and J. Andrew Huffman, Fish &amp; Richardson P.C., Wilmington, DE, Fish &amp; Richardson P.C., Menlo Park, CA (Jack Slobodin, Karen I. Boyd, of counsel), Robert E. Hillman, Lawrence K. Kolodney and Steven R. Katz, Fish &amp; Richardson P.C., Boston, MA, for Plaintiff SeaChange International, Inc. </attorneys><br><attorneys id="b454-23"> Mary B. Graham and Rodger D. Smith, Morris Nichols Arsht &amp; Tunnell, Wilmington, DE (James Pooley, Browning Marean, Gabriel Kralik, of counsel), Elizabeth Day <span citation-index="1" class="star-pagination" label="395"> *395 </span> and L. Scott Oliver Gray Cary Ware &amp; Freidenrich LLP, Palo Alto, CA, for Defendant nCUBE Corporation. </attorneys>
[ "313 F. Supp. 2d 393" ]
[ { "author_str": "Faenan", "per_curiam": false, "type": "010combined", "page_count": null, "download_url": null, "author_id": 1031, "opinion_text": "\n313 F. Supp. 2d 393 (2004)\nSEACHANGE INTERNATIONAL, INC., Plaintiff,\nv.\nNCUBE CORPORATION, Defendant.\nnCUBE Corporation, Counter-claimant\nv.\nSeachange International, Inc., Counter-defendant\nNo. CIV.A.00-568-JJF.\nUnited States District Court, D. Delaware.\nApril 7, 2004.\n*394 William J. Marsden, Jr. and J. Andrew Huffman, Fish &amp; Richardson P.C., Wilmington, DE, Fish &amp; Richardson P.C., Menlo Park, CA (Jack Slobodin, Karen I. Boyd, of counsel), Robert E. Hillman, Lawrence K. Kolodney and Steven R. Katz, Fish &amp; Richardson P.C., Boston, MA, for Plaintiff SeaChange International, Inc.\nMary B. Graham and Rodger D. Smith, Morris Nichols Arsht &amp; Tunnell, Wilmington, DE (James Pooley, Browning Marean, Gabriel Kralik, of counsel), Elizabeth Day *395 and L. Scott Oliver Gray Cary Ware &amp; Freidenrich LLP, Palo Alto, CA, for Defendant nCUBE Corporation.\n\nMEMORANDUM OPINION\nFARNAN, District Judge.\nPresently before the Court is a Motion for a New Trial pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59 (D.I.178) filed by Defendant nCUBE Corporation (\"nCUBE\"). The Motion was denied by Orders of the Court (D.I.203, 209) dated September 30, 2002, for the reasons discussed below.[1]\n\nI. BACKGROUND\n\nPlaintiff, Sea Change International, Inc. (\"SeaChange\"), filed its Complaint on June 13, 2000, alleging that nCUBE infringed SeaChange's United States Patent No. 5,862,312 entitled \"Loosely Coupled Mass Storage Computer Cluster\" (\"the '312 Patent\").\nSeaChange sought a preliminary injunction against nCUBE. On July 27, 2000, the Court conducted a hearing on the injunction motion. In response to the parties' joint representation that the subject matter of this lawsuit was of substantial importance, the Court suggested that the matter proceed to a full trial within ninety (90) days. Both parties agreed, and, on July 28, 2000, a Scheduling Order was issued that provided for a pretrial conference and claim construction hearing on August 24, 2000, and a trial to commence on September 18, 2000 (D.I.41). Based on the expedited trial schedule, the Court denied the motion for preliminary injunction. Additionally, the parties requested, and the Court granted, bifurcation of the issues of damages and willfulness for discovery and trial until after the resolution of the infringement and validity issues. (D.I.54).\nOn August 29, 2000 the Court issued an Order construing the terms \"interconnecting each one of said processor systems through a network for data communications with each other one of said processor systems\" and \"processor systems\". (D.I.103). Shortly thereafter, SeaChange moved for summary judgment on the infringement issues and nCUBE conceded infringement of Claims 37, 38, 40, 41, 42, 52, 53, 57, 58. As a result, only the validity issues remained for trial and they were tried to a jury from September 18th through September 22, 2000. During trial, nCUBE requested the Court to construe the preamble term, \"distributed computer system\", however, the Court declined this request. On September 25, 2000, the jury returned a verdict rejecting nCUBE's claims of invalidity.\nnCUBE cites three grounds for its Motion for a New Trial. First, nCUBE contends that the Court should have construed the term \"distributed computer system.\" nCUBE argues that the Court's declining to construe the term constituted prejudicial error warranting a new trial. Second, nCUBE contends that the Court's interpretation of the claim term \"processor system\" was erroneous and also warrants a new trial. Finally, nCUBE contends that a new trial is necessary because the verdict was against the great weight of the evidence.\n\nII. LEGAL STANDARD\n\nFederal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a) permits the granting of a new trial but does not specify the grounds that may *396 support such a motion. Instead, the Rule permits the grant of a new trial for \"any of the reasons for which new trials have heretofore been granted in actions at law in the courts of the United States.\" Fed R. Civ. P. 59(a). The ground cited by nCUBE and available before the promulgation of the Rules is where prejudicial error has been committed during the trial. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 61 advises that prejudicial error exists when it appears to the court that the error is \"inconsistent with substantial justice.\" Fed.R.Civ.P. 61. With this standard in mind the Court will turn to a discussion of the errors claimed by nCUBE.\n\nIII. Claims of Error\n\n\nA. The Court Declined a Request to Interpret the Term \"Distributed Computer System\"\n\nOn page 4 of its Opening Brief nCUBE states: \"[t]he preamble to claim 37 summarizes the invention as a `distributed computer system.'\" (D.I. 179 at 4). nCUBE requested at the pretrial conference and during trial that the Court construe the term. nCUBE contends the term \"distributed computer system\" was integral to the jury's ability to resolve nCUBE's invalidity claims against the '312 Patent. At the center of nCUBE's argument is the testimony of SeaChange's expert, Dr. Rhyne, who nCUBE asserts offered an opinion at trial different from the substance of his expert report. Specifically, nCUBE notes that at trial Dr. Rhyne testified that a distributed computer system \"should be interpreted as a system where each of the computers that are there are independent and stand alone.\" (Trial Tr. at 773). In Dr. Rhyne's expert report, nCUBE says he defined \"distributed system\" as \"[a] computer system in which several interconnected computers share the computing tasks assigned to the system.\" (D.I. 179 at 4). nCUBE argues that if the jury had been instructed consistent with nCUBE's position that \"distributed computer system\" does not require each computer to be wholly independent of the others, the jury would have been required to conclude, as nCUBE claimed, that the '312 Patent was anticipated by the prior art. nCUBE further argues that the Court's failure to construe the term in accordance with nCUBE's instruction and the Court's failure to instruct the jury of nCUBE's interpretation permitted the jury to speculate on the meaning of the term when deliberating on the factual issue of whether the '312 Patent was anticipated by the prior art. (D.I. 179 at 7, 8).\nSeaChange responds to nCUBE's contentions by asserting that the pretrial context of nCUBE's request for an interpretation of the term \"distributed computer system\" was proper. SeaChange notes that the pretrial request was in the context of whether the constituent \"processor systems\" of the distributed computer system had to be real computers capable of running application software. SeaChange contends that, by the Court's affirmative response to the question presented, the Court was correct to decline to give a general interpretation of the term since the Court had resolved the only relevant dispute. (D.I. 186 at 2, 3).\nWith regard to nCUBE's request at trial for an interpretation of the term, SeaChange contends that nCUBE's request was no more than an effort to involve the Court in rebutting the opinion of SeaChange's expert, which was premised on his understanding of the ordinary meaning of the term. SeaChange adds that by again declining to interpret the term, in the context of trial, the Court advised the parties that the Court's interpretation of the term was consistent with the construction offered by SeaChange's expert. (D.I. 186 at 3).\n*397 nCUBE argues that the reason it sought an interpretation from the Court consistent with its interpretation of the term \"distributed computer system\" was so that the jury would have had to conclude that the '312 Patent was anticipated by the prior art. (D.I. 179 at 7). For this reason, nCUBE contends that the Court's unwillingness to construe the term as requested was prejudicial error.\nIn support of its error contention, nCUBE cites the case of Advanced Display Systems v. Kent State University, 212 F.3d 1272 (Fed.Cir.2000). nCUBE argues that in the Advanced Display case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit granted a new trial because the district court failed to resolve a purely legal issue (incorporation by reference) prior to giving a factual issue (anticipation) to the jury. nCUBE further argues that \"[s]imilarly, in the present case, a new trial is in order because the Court failed to resolve a purely legal issue (claim construction) before submitting the factual issue (validity) to the jury.\" (D.I. 179 at 8).\nAfter considering nCUBE's contentions, the Court concludes that its failure to construe the preamble term \"distributed computer system\" was error, however, it was harmless error and not unduly prejudicial to nCUBE's ability to fairly present its invalidity claims.\nFirst, during the time between the issuance of its initial Orders regarding this motion (D.I.203, 209) and this Memorandum Opinion, the Federal Circuit reversed in part this Court's decision in Eaton Corp. v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., Civ. A. 97-421-JJF, 2001 WL 34368391, 2002 U.S. Dist. Lexis 11422 (D.Del. Feb. 9, 2001), rev'd in part by, 323 F.3d 1332 (Fed.Cir.2003). In their decision, the Federal Circuit offered further guidance as to the construction of claim preamble terms. Specifically, in Eaton, this Court held that a preamble term was not a limitation of a claim term. Eaton Corp. v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 1997 U.S. Dist Lexis 22674 (D.Del. November 4, 1997). On appeal, the Federal Circuit found that the preamble term at issue was in fact a limitation on the claim. The Federal Circuit explained, \"[c]laim 14 is an example of the `claim drafter choosing to use both the preamble and the body to define the subject matter of the claimed invention', as opposed to a preamble citing an intended use for an invention that is defined in its entirety by the body of the claim.\" Eaton Corp., 323 F.3d at 1340-41 (quoting Bell Communications Research, Inc. v. Vitalink Communications, Corp., 55 F.3d 615, 620 (Fed.Cir.1995)). Additionally, the Federal Circuit stated, \"[w]e do not agree with Eaton that the drive line structure in the preamble can be ignored because it merely provides a `reference point' during one of the claimed method steps.\" Eaton Corp., 323 F.3d at 1340\nAdditionally, the Federal Circuit addressed its reasoning in Vaupel Textilmaschinen KG v. Meccanica Euro Italia, S.P.A., 944 F.2d 870 (Fed.Cir.1991), stating that:\nWe did not conclude that ...that the term `breast beam' could be ignored because it appeared in the preamble; in fact the analysis in Vaupel has nothing to do with the issue of whether the preamble was necessary to define a complete invention. Rather the issue was the proper meaning of the term `breast beam.' We agreed with the district court that the term `breast beam' meant `a reference point to fix the direction of movement of woven fabric from the loom' and that this meaning should be applied in the infringement analysis.\nEaton Corp., 323 F.3d at 1341.\nIn the instant case, this Court declined to construe the preamble term \"distributed computer system\" and stated:\n\n*398 I have reviewed the claim construction order previously issued. I have reviewed Dr. Rhyne's testimony, and have concluded that the construction requested by nCUBE is not warranted and that the term computer has an ordinary meaning that both sides' experts have given to the patent claims in their giving opinions on validity issues that are before the jury. And therefore I am going to decline to construe at this juncture the term distributed computer system. Now if I were required to construe the term I would construe it in accordance with the definition as I read it in the IEEE dictionary which essentially would require a stand-alone computer in each processor system. So I am not going to construe it, but just so the record is clear, if I thought it was necessary, that's the construction I would give.\nTr. at 988:14-989:8. Thus, the jury was not provided a definition but told they should give all undefined terms their ordinary meaning. Tr. at 1243:19-21. However, the jury asked a question during deliberations, specifically, they asked, what the \"s\" on processor systems meant, and the Court initially told them that \"the `s' on processor systems means only that the computer systems must have at least three processor systems. That is, that the processor system and its central processing unit must be capable at a minimum of operating the application software described in the specification of SeaChange's '312 Patent.\" (D.I. 161 at 22:22-23:6). nCUBE objected to this instruction and the Court reinstructed the jury stating:\nThere is some thought that I may have again confused you. I just want to repeat that the s on the processor systems means only that the computer system must have at least three processor systems ...Then page 15 where you got the question from where it says second processor systems means at least one central processing unit capable of running application type software and at least one mass storage subsystem, do you understand that is the second part of what I am telling you?\n(D.I. 161 at 27:13-24).\nIn this case, the Court concludes that, given the Federal Circuit's guidance in Eaton, as to construction of preamble terms, it should have construed the term \"distributed computer system.\" This failure, by itself, however, does not result in prejudicial error given that the Court would have construed the term \"distributed computer system\" to mean that \"essentially [it] would require a stand-alone computer in each processor system\", which is a limit to the claim term itself, and not the broader construction that nCUBE requested. Therefore, the Court concludes that the result would have been the same, and therefore, its failure to construe the term was harmless rather than prejudicial error. Of course, if nCUBE's proposed construction is accepted by the Federal Circuit a new trial would be required. Accordingly, given the Court's understanding of the disputed term, it has denied nCUBE's Motion for a New Trial.\n\nB. The Court's Construction of \"Processor System\"\n\nnCUBE contends that the Court's construction of the term \"processor system\" was wrong. Specifically, nCUBE claims that the Court's construction of this term was too narrow, allowed SeaChange to avoid prior art which would have invalidated the '312 Patent, and resulted in prejudice to nCUBE requiring a new trial. (D.I. 179 at 11). nCUBE contends that the Court, when confronted with a dispute over the term \"processor system\" in Claim 37 of the '312 Patent, drew from Figure 4 of the '312 Patent, rejected nCUBE's standard *399 meanings of the term and construed the term as requiring a central processing unit capable of running applications level software. nCUBE contends that the Court's reliance on Figure 4 to support the \"notion that the central processing unit must be capable of running `applications level software' (itself an undefined term) was in error.\" Id.\nSeaChange contends that the specification makes clear that the processors are able to run a variety of software and contends that the Court's construction of the term \"processor system\" was correct.\nThe Court concludes that its construction of the term \"processor system\" to mean \"at least one central processing unit capable of running application type software, and at least one mass storage subsystem\" was correct for the reasons set forth in its Claim Construction Memorandum Opinion dated August 29, 2000 (D.I.102). Therefore, the Court concludes its construction did not result in prejudicial error.\n\nC. The Verdict Was Against the Weight of the Evidence\n\nIn its final claim of error nCUBE contends that the jury's verdict was against the great weight of the evidence. (D.I. 179 at 12-13). nCUBE contends that, assuming a proper construction of the '312 Patent, there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for the verdict in this case. Id. at 13. nCUBE refers the Court to its Motions for Judgment as a Matter of Law (\"JMOL\") for its substantive arguments on this ground. Id. at 15.\nIn response, SeaChange contends that nCUBE's evidence which consisted of an expert's conclusory unexplained cataloging of claim elements \"supposedly found in various prior art documents\" fell short of meeting its burden for a new trial. (D.I. 186 at 5). Additionally, SeaChange refers the Court to its oppositions to nCUBE's \"JMOL\" motions. Id.\nIn its first Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law (D.I.175), nCUBE argues that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law based on the '312 Patent's failure to comply with the written description requirement and the improper claim construction of the Court. Specifically, nCUBE contends that the Court's claim construction in which the claims cover \"any network,\" contravenes the written description requirement because the specification requires a direct point-to-point connection network, fails to describe or suggest the use of another network and in fact teaches away from using other networks. Thus, nCUBE contends, there is nothing in the specification that can support such a broad construction. (D.I. 176 at 3). Additionally, nCUBE argues that the Court's claim construction that the claims cover \"any network\" is in direct conflict with the specification, the prosecution history and Federal Circuit precedent. Id. Specifically, nCUBE contends that during prosecution SeaChange overcame a rejection based on prior art by arguing that its invention used a direct point-to-point connection network. Id.\nIn response, SeaChange contends that the Court's claim construction was correct. (D.I. 188 at 2). Additionally, in regard to the written description requirement, SeaChange contends that nCUBE did not prove invalidity by clear and convincing evidence at trial. Id. at 9. SeaChange also contends that patent claims are almost always broader than particular embodiments disclosed in the supporting specification. Id. at 10. Finally, SeaChange argues that it provided ample evidence to prove that the '312 Patent complied with the written description requirement. Id. at 14-16.\n*400 First, in regard to nCUBE's contention that the '312 Patent failed to comply with the written description requirement, the Court concludes that the jury's rejection of this argument did not result in prejudicial error because nCUBE failed to prove invalidity by clear and convincing evidence. Simply stated, there is ample precedent for the principle that patent claims can be broader than the particular embodiments disclosed in the supporting specification. See Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. v. United States Surgical Corp., 93 F.3d 1572, 1582 n. 7 (Fed.Cir.1996) (\"the district court confused a claim not supported by the specification [because it recited a specific element not found in the disclosure], which is not allowable, with a broad claim, which is.\"); Texas Instruments, Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 805 F.2d 1558, 1563 (Fed.Cir.1986) (cautioning against limiting the claimed invention to preferred embodiments or specific examples in the specification); see also Biacore v. Thermo Bioanalysis Corp., 79 F. Supp. 2d 422, 468 (D.Del.1999) (\"It is axiomatic that the claims of a patent may be broader than the specific embodiment disclosed in the specification.\") (citing In re Peters, 723 F.2d 891, 893 (Fed.Cir.1983)). Thus, the Court concludes that the specific embodiment cited in the '312 Patent did not limit the claims to the extent argued by nCUBE.\nAdditionally, the Court concludes that SeaChange presented sufficient evidence to the jury on the written description issue. Specifically, the relevant evidence consisted of: 1) the patent itself; 2) the testimony that the applicant informed the Examiner that Claim 37 was being added to more fully cover the scope of the invention; 3) testimony that the Examiner allowed claim 37 without raising any written description objection; 4) the testimony of Bruce Mann, one of the inventors, who testified that people looking at figure 1 of the patent would understand that you could have used any type of network; and 5) Dr. Rhyne's testimony of the knowledge of one of ordinary skill in the art. See 9/21/00 Trial Tr. at 766:11-768:11, 920:15-21.\nIn regard to the Court's claim construction, the Court in its Order dated August 29, 2000, construed the \"interconnecting each one of said processor systems through a network for data communications with each other one of said processor systems\" in the '312 Patent to mean \"establishing data communication between each and every pair of processor systems in the distributed computer system using any kind of network.\" (D.I.103). The Court concludes that its interpretation is correct for the reasons set forth in its Claim Construction Memorandum Opinion dated August 29, 2000 (D.I.102), and therefore, no prejudicial error resulted from this interpretation.\nIn its second Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law nCUBE contends that the '312 Patent is invalid because it is anticipated by prior art and is obvious. (D.I.181 at 1). Specifically, nCUBE contends that prior art anticipates each of the claims in the '312 Patent. Id. Additionally, nCUBE argues that the prior art, alone or in combination, renders the claims of the '312 Patent obvious and that SeaChange failed to prove the nexus between the Patent and their proffered secondary considerations. Id. at 1-2.\nIn response, SeaChange contends that nCUBE has not proven invalidity by clear and convincing evidence. Additionally, SeaChange distinguishes the eight prior art references that nCUBE contends render the '312 Patent invalid. (D.I. 187 at 3). Finally, SeaChange contends that, even though it did not have to rely on the secondary factors, it presented sufficient evidence on this subject. Id. at 25.\n*401 The Court concludes that the jury's rejection of nCUBE's invalidity claims of anticipation and obviousness was not against the weight of the evidence. At trial the jury rejected all of nCUBE's defenses and defense theories and found that nCUBE had not proven invalidity by clear and convincing evidence. The Court will address each of nCUBE's asserted prior art references below. Additionally, since the Court concludes that nCUBE did not prove obviousness by clear and convincing evidence, the Court will not address the parties' arguments regarding secondary factors.\nFirst, nCUBE contends that the Gardner reference anticipates and renders obvious each claim of the '312 Patent.\nIn response to nCUBE's contention, SeaChange argues that Gardner does not teach or suggest a system in which the computer of the distributed processor system runs both client applications and has disks. (D.I. 187 at 7). As a result, SeaChange argues, Gardner does not disclose the claimed \"processor systems.\" Id. Also, in regard to obviousness, SeaChange argues that Gardner teaches away from the invention claimed in the '312 Patent. Id. at 9. Further, SeaChange points out that the Gardner reference was brought to the Examiner's attention during the '312 Patent prosecution and the Examiner determined that it did not anticipate the '312 Patent nor render it obvious.\nThe Court concludes that Gardner does not disclose the '312 Patent's claimed \"processor systems\" as the Court has defined it. Specifically, the Court concludes that Gardner does not teach or suggest a system in which each computer of the distributed computer system runs both client applications and has disks. Therefore, the Court concludes that the jury's rejection of nCUBE's anticipation claim was not against the weight of the evidence.\nIn reference to nCUBE's obviousness argument the Court concludes that Gardner does discuss that such a combined configuration is possible, but Gardner qualifies the suggestion by stating \"a `combined' configuration could have potential drawbacks.\" (Def. Trial Ex. 42, Col. 15, line 16-21). The Court understands that consideration of the technical feasibility of a combination is sufficient to support a finding of nonobviousness. See Arkie Lures, Inc. v. Gene Larew, Tackle, Inc., 119 F.3d 953, 958 (Fed.Cir.1997) (\"The evidence that the combination was not viewed as technically feasible must be considered, for conventional wisdom that a combination should not be made is evidence of nonobviousness.\"). Based on the Gardner language, the Court concludes that the jury's rejection of nCUBE's obviousness defense based on the Gardner reference was not against the weight of the evidence.\nSecond, nCUBE contends that the Frey reference anticipates and in combination with other references renders the '312 Patent obvious. The Frey reference disclosed a method used on multi-processing computers that have \"a multiplicity of independent computer/disk systems all of which operate in parallel on discrete portions of a problem.\" (Def. Trial ex. 428 at 1:14-17).\nIn response, SeaChange contends that, as Dr. Rhyne testified, Frey does not disclose the claimed \"processor systems.\" (D.I. 187 at 10). SeaChange argues that Dr. Ryhne's testimony is \"sufficient to sustain the jury's verdict that Frey is not an invalidating reference.\" Id. at 11.\nThe Court concludes that in such systems, as Dr. Rhyne testified, each node would be too small to run the entire application program and therefore it is not a distributed computer system as the '312 Patent discloses. Dr. Rhyne's testimony was credible and the Court concludes that Frey does not disclose \"processor systems\" *402 as claimed in the '312 Patent. Additionally, the Court finds that there was no motivation or suggestion to modify or combine the Frey reference with other prior art references. Thus, the Court concludes that the jury's rejection of nCUBE's defenses of anticipation and obviousness based on the Frey reference was not against the weight of the evidence.\nThird, nCUBE contends that the Zebra reference anticipates and in combination with other references renders the '312 Patent obvious. The Zebra reference discloses a client/server network where the clients run the application software and the servers store the data.\nIn response, SeaChange contends that the Zebra reference is \"Gardner all over again.\" (D.I. 187 at 11). SeaChange argues that Zebra, like Gardner, discloses a client/server network where the clients run the application software and the servers store the data. Id. Additionally, SeaChange contends that even though Zebra discloses that it is possible for one machine to be both a storage server and a client, Zebra does not suggest the benefit of combining the clients and the servers into at least three processor systems nor does it suggest bringing in data through one of these combined machines and distributing it to other combined machines. Id. Moreover, SeaChange argues that there was no motivation to combine the Zebra reference with other references in order to render the '312 Patent obvious. Id. at 24.\nThe Court concludes that, although the Zebra reference discloses that it is possible for one machine to be both a storage server and a client, Zebra does not teach or suggest the benefit of combining at least three clients with three servers into at least three processor systems. Additionally, the Court concludes that the Zebra reference does not teach or suggest bringing in data through one of these combined machines and distributing it to a number of other combined machines, as is required by the claims of the '312 Patent. Also, the Court finds that there was no motivation or suggestion to modify or combine the Zebra reference with other references in order to render the '312 Patent obvious. Thus, the Court concludes that the jury's finding that the Zebra reference did not anticipate or render obvious the '312 Patent should not be overturned.\nFourth, nCUBE contends that the Mendelsohn reference anticipates and in combination with other references renders the '312 Patent obvious. The Mendelsohn reference discloses a disk array that acts as a data server for an unidentified host computer system.\nIn response, SeaChange contends that the Mendelsohn reference does not disclose nodes that run application software. Id. at 11. Additionally, SeaChange argues that Dr. Rhyne, in testifying that the meaning of \"processor\" as used in the Mendelsohn reference is not the same as the meaning used in the '312 patent, provided ample support for his opinions. Id. at 12. Finally, SeaChange notes that the Mendelsohn reference discloses two nodes, node \"12\" which cannot run application software and node \"24\" which can. As a result, SeaChange argues that node \"12\" cannot be a processor system and node \"24\" does not have disks so it is also not a processor system.\nThe Court concludes that there is no disclosure that node \"12\" in Mendelsohn can run application software or that node \"24\" has disks. Additionally Dr. Rhyne testified that when Mendelsohn used the word \"processor,\" he was not talking of a \"processor\" in the sense of the '312 Patent, but instead about a controller that just controlled the operation of the disk drive. Therefore, the Court concludes that the reference does not disclose \"at least three processor systems\" as the '312 patent does *403 and finds that there was no motivation or suggestion to modify or combine the Mendelsohn reference with other reference to render the '312 Patent obvious. As a result, the Court concludes that the jury's rejection of nCUBE's defenses that the Mendelsohn reference anticipates or renders the '312 Patent obvious is not against the weight of the evidence.\nFifth, nCUBE claims that the TickerTAIP reference anticipates or in combination with other references renders the '312 Patent obvious. The TickerTAIP reference discloses a storage server that is connected to a host computer where the client applications would be run on the host and not on the storage server.\nIn response, SeaChange contends that because applications programs are run on the host rather than the storage server in the TickerTAIP reference it does not disclose \"processor systems.\" Id. at 13. Additionally, SeaChange contends that Dr. Ryhne's testimony on TickerTAIP's \"reason for being\" was legally sufficient. Id. SeaChange also contends that the last sentence of the TickerTAIP reference which states that the architecture would be \"well suited for use in multicomputers with locally attached disks\", does not disclose the invention of the '312 Patent. Id. at 14. SeaChange argues that this sentence demonstrates that the actual system disclosed was not a multicomputer system and beyond that, the sentence is ambiguous. Id. Also, SeaChange argues that there was no evidence establishing that transputers could run medical applications as nCUBE suggests. Id. Finally, SeaChange argues that there was no motivation to modify this reference to arrive at the claimed invention because TickerTAIP taught away from the claimed invention. Id. at 23.\nThe Court concludes that the TickerTAIP reference did not disclose the claimed invention. Dr. Rhyne, testified that TickerTAIP disclosed a disk array that did not run the applications programs. In light of this testimony, the Court concludes that the TickerTAIP reference does not disclose the processor systems of the '312 Patent. Additionally, the Court concludes that the last sentence of the TickerTAIP reference is ambiguous and does not disclose the claimed invention. Further, the Court finds that there was no motivation or suggestion to modify or combine the TickerTAIP reference with other references to render the '312 Patent obvious. Additionally, the Court finds that the TickerTAIP reference taught away from the invention claimed in the '312 Patent, and therefore, the Court concludes that the jury's rejection of nCUBE's anticipation and obviousness defenses in regard to the TickerTAIP reference was not against the weight of the evidence.\nSixth, nCUBE contends that nCUBE 2 anticipates or in combination with other references renders the '312 Patent obvious.\nIn response, SeaChange argues that because it is undisputed that the nCUBE 2 product had separate and distinct processor arrays and Input/Output (\"I/O\") arrays, it was reasonable for a jury to determine that nCUBE 2 did not anticipate or render obvious the '312 Patent. Id. at 15. Additionally, SeaChange argues that nCUBE's assertion that the five nodes in nCUBE 2 acted as a single processor system was a question of fact given to the jury, which the jury rejected. Id. at 15-16. Also, SeaChange contends that the processor nodes in nCUBE 2 are not stand alone computers as required by the '312 Patent. Id. at 16. Finally, SeaChange argues that there was no motivation to combine or modify the nCUBE 2 reference to render the '312 Patent obvious. Id. at 23.\nThe Court concludes that it is undisputed that the nCUBE product has separate *404 and distinct processor arrays and I/O arrays, as nCUBE stated in its Opening Brief for its JMOL Motion, \"[b]ecause their processing power was limited by the technology of the time, the functions performed by the processors were divided. Some CPU's were located on the I/O (input/output) board and interfaced with the disks, while other CPU's were located on what was called an `array board.'\" (D.I. 181 at 20). nCUBE also contends that the five processors, the one array processor and the four I/O controllers as a group met the Court's claim construction. However, the only evidence presented on this matter was the testimony of witnesses. The Court finds that the jury weighed the credibility of the witnesses and rejected this contention. Moreover, each processor node in nCUBE 2 is not a stand alone computer as required by the claims of the '312 patent. Thus, the Court concludes that the reference does not disclose \"at least three processor systems\" and finds that there was no motivation or suggestion to modify or combine the nCUBE 2 reference with other references to render the '312 Patent obvious. Therefore, the Court concludes that the jury's rejection of nCUBE's invalidity defenses in regard to the nCUBE 2 reference was not against the weight of the evidence.\nSeventh, nCUBE contends that the MediaCUBE 3 reference anticipates or in combination with other references renders the '312 Patent obvious.\nIn response, SeaChange contends that MediaCUBE 3 is not a prior art reference. Id. at 17. Additionally, SeaChange contends that, even if MediaCUBE 3 is prior art, it did not have a network of stand alone computers and therefore is not a processor system as claimed in the '312 Patent. Id.\nFirst, the Court notes that there is a question concerning whether the MediaCUBE 3 reference is in fact prior art. nCUBE, relying on confidential engineering documents from 1994, attempted to establish that MediaCUBE 3 was prior art; however, nCUBE provided the jury little documentary evidence on this subject. Further, Mr. O'Malley, nCUBE's witness on the MediaCUBE 3 reference, admitted that there was a lot of confusion concerning the architecture of MediaCUBE 3 in the 1994 time period. (9/19/00 Trial Tr. at 469:11-18). Moreover, the Court concludes that even if MediaCUBE 3 was prior art, it did not have a network of stand alone computers as claimed in the '312 Patent (i.e. each node is not a processor system), rather each node of the MediaCUBE 3 shared a common clock. Considering this evidence, the Court concludes that the reference does not disclose \"at least three processor systems\" and finds that there was no motivation or suggestion to modify or combine the MediaCUBE 3 reference with other reference to render the '312 Patent obvious. Therefore, the Court concludes that the jury's rejection of nCUBE's invalidity defense in regard to the MediaCUBE 3 reference was not against the weight of the evidence.\nEighth, nCUBE contends that the VAXCluster reference anticipates and in combination with other references renders the '312 Patent obvious. nCUBE asserts that \"Claims 37 and 52 read on RAID-1 mirroring\" (D.I. 181 at 24).\nIn response, SeaChange contends that nCUBE's assertion is incorrect because unlike RAID-1 mirroring, the '312 Patent does not store two complete copies of the data on its three or more processing systems. Id. at 20. Additionally, SeaChange contends that claims 33, 35, 69 and 71 cannot be relied on by nCUBE because they were not asserted at trial or construed by the Court. Id. at 20.\nThe Court finds that the claims require that \"a portion of the redundant *405 representation of the data\" be stored at each processor system. A \"portion\" is less than a whole. In RAID-1 mirroring, a complete copy of the data is stored on a separate disk. On the other hand, the claimed invention of the '312 Patent does not store two complete copies of data on its three or more processor systems. Further, the Court believes that claims 33, 35, 69 and 71 do not affect its analysis because they were not asserted at trial nor construed by the Court. Also, the Court finds that VAXCluster fails to teach or suggest the use of a RAID-5 or similar storage process across three or more processor systems. Thus, the Court concludes that the reference does not disclose \"at least three processor systems\" and finds that there was no motivation or suggestion to modify or combine the VAXCluster reference with other references to render the '312 Patent obvious. Therefore, the Court concludes that the jury's rejection of nCUBE's invalidity defense in regard to the VAXCluster reference was not against the weight of the evidence.\nAn appropriate Order has been entered.\nNOTES\n[1] This Memorandum Opinion sets forth the Court's reasoning for the Orders dated September 30, 2002 (D.I.203, 209). The Court delayed issuing a Memorandum Opinion in this matter because it wanted to consistently resolve another related case involving the same parties in Civil Action No. 01-011-JJF and is issuing a Memorandum Opinion in that case contemporaneously.\n\n", "ocr": false, "opinion_id": 2580690 } ]
D. Delaware
District Court, D. Delaware
FD
Delaware, DE
1,131,257
Barkdull, Baskin and Ferguson
1986-10-28
false
barrios-v-duran
Barrios
Barrios v. Duran
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
6
Published
null
null
[ "496 So. 2d 239" ]
[ { "author_str": null, "per_curiam": false, "type": "010combined", "page_count": null, "download_url": null, "author_id": null, "opinion_text": "\n496 So. 2d 239 (1986)\nEligio BARRIOS and Goldstone Company, N.V., Appellants,\nv.\nAlfredo DURAN, Appellee.\nNo. 85-2708.\nDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.\nOctober 28, 1986.\nProenza, White &amp; Huck and H. Mark Vieth, Miami, for appellants.\nDixon, Dixon, Hurst &amp; Nicklaus and William Wicks III, Miami, for appellee.\nBefore BARKDULL, BASKIN and FERGUSON, JJ.\nPER CURIAM.\nBy this appeal we are called upon to review the propriety of a final summary judgment disposing of a counter-claim and cross-claim. We reverse.\nThere was a disputed issue of fact as to the alleged attorney-client relationship between the appellants and the appellee. De Los Salmones v. Stolar, 357 So. 2d 261 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978). There is also an issue of fact as to the intention of the parties in the execution of an agreement to which the appellee is not a party. Milford v. Metropolitan Dade County, 430 So. 2d 951 (Fla.3d DCA 1983); Letiziano v. Lytal, 427 So. 2d 321, 324 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983); Consolo v. A.M.K. Corporation, 344 So. 2d 1285 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). The issue of fraud generally should not be disposed of by summary judgment. Levey v. Getelman, 408 So. 2d 663 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981); Nessim v. DeLoache, 384 So. 2d 1341 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980); Hermes v. Anton, 300 So. 2d 46 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974).\nTherefore for the reasons stated, the final summary judgment adverse to the appellants on the cross-claim and the counter-claim be and the same is hereby reversed and the matter returned to the trial court for further proceedings.\nReversed and remanded with directions.\n", "ocr": false, "opinion_id": 1131257 } ]
District Court of Appeal of Florida
District Court of Appeal of Florida
SA
Florida, FL
2,701,445
Donofrio
2010-06-10
false
in-re-js
In re J.S.
In re J.S.
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
0
Published
null
null
[ "2010 Ohio 2690" ]
[ { "author_str": null, "per_curiam": false, "type": "010combined", "page_count": 10, "download_url": "http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rod/docs/pdf/7/2010/2010-ohio-2690.pdf", "author_id": 8079, "opinion_text": "[Cite as In re J.S., 2010-Ohio-2690.]\n STATE OF OHIO, MAHONING COUNTY\n\n IN THE COURT OF APPEALS\n\n SEVENTH DISTRICT\n\nIN THE MATTER OF J.S., )\n )\nALLEGED DELINQUENT CHILD. )\n )\n ) CASE NO. 08-MA-76\n )\n ) OPINION\n )\n )\n\nCHARACTER OF PROCEEDINGS: Civil Appeal from Court of Common\n Pleas, Juvenile Division of Mahoning\n County, Ohio\n Case No. 05JA468\n\nJUDGMENT: Affirmed\n\nAPPEARANCES:\nFor Plaintiff-Appellee Paul Gains\n Prosecutor\n Ralph Rivera\n Assistant Prosecutor\n 21 W. Boardman St., 6th Floor\n Youngstown, Ohio 44503\n\nFor Defendant-Appellant Attorney Katherine Rudzik\n 26 Market Street, Suite 904\n Youngstown, Ohio 44503\n\n\n\n\nJUDGES:\n\nHon. Gene Donofrio\nHon. Joseph J. Vukovich\nHon. Mary DeGenaro\n\n\n Dated: June 10, 2010\n\f[Cite as In re J.S., 2010-Ohio-2690.]\nDONOFRIO, J.\n\n {¶1} Appellant, J.S., appeals from a Mahoning County Common Pleas Court\njudgment adjudicating him a delinquent child for committing an act that would be rape\nif perpetrated by an adult and committing him to the Department of Youth Services\nfor a minimum period of one year.\n {¶2} On November 29, 2004, appellant was visiting at his friend Gerrone’s\nhouse. Appellant was 15 years old at the time. While at Gerrone’s house, appellant\nwent upstairs with Gerrone’s six-year-old sister. After appellant went home, the\nyoung girl told her mother that appellant had “messed with her,” that he showed her\nhis “privates,” that he made her pull down her panties, and that her “private” hurt.\nThe police were called. The girl’s mother took her to the hospital emergency\ndepartment the next day and later to the Tri-County Child Advocacy Center.\n {¶3} A complaint was filed against appellant alleging that he was a\ndelinquent child for committing an act that would be rape, a first-degree felony in\nviolation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b), if committed by an adult. Appellant entered a\ndenial to the complaint.\n {¶4} The matter proceeded to an adjudicatory hearing before a magistrate.\nThe magistrate heard testimony from a Mahoning County Children’s Services\nrepresentative, the alleged victim, the alleged victim’s mother, a Youngstown Police\nOfficer, a doctor who examined the alleged victim, and appellant. The magistrate\nthen determined that appellant committed the act with which he was charged and,\ntherefore, adjudicated him a delinquent child.\n {¶5} Appellant filed objections to the magistrate’s decision. The court held a\nhearing on the objections. It then overruled the objections and adopted the\nmagistrate’s decision, finding appellant to be a delinquent child by way of rape, and\nset the matter for disposition.\n {¶6} The magistrate held a disposition hearing. He determined that\nappellant should be committed to the Department of Youth Services (DYS) for a\nminimum period of one year to a maximum period not to exceed his 21st birthday,\nfined appellant $100, and ordered him to pay costs. The court approved the\n\f -2-\n\n\nmagistrate’s decision and entered judgment accordingly.\n {¶7} Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on April 14, 2008.\n {¶8} Appellant raises two assignments of error, the first of which states:\n {¶9} “THE TRIAL COURT JUDGMENT WAS AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF\nTHE EVIDENCE.”\n {¶10} Appellant argues that the finding that he committed rape was against\nthe manifest weight of the evidence. He first argues that the victim’s testimony was\nunreliable because (1) she was only six years old at the time of the alleged rape, (2)\nher story changed from the time she first told her mother what had happened to the\ntime she told a police officer and again to the time she told the social worker, and (3)\nhe clearly denied the victim’s allegations. Appellant next argues that the testimony of\nDr. Stephanie Dewar, the Children’s Services doctor who examined the victim, was in\ndirect conflict with the report of Dr. Charles Newton, the doctor who examined the\nvictim at the hospital the day after the alleged rape.\n {¶11} In determining whether a verdict is against the manifest weight of the\nevidence, an appellate court must review the entire record, weigh the evidence and\nall reasonable inferences and determine whether, in resolving conflicts in the\nevidence, the jury clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of\njustice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered. State v.\nThompkins (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387. “Weight of the evidence concerns ‘the\ninclination of the greater amount of credible evidence, offered in a trial, to support\none side of the issue rather than the other.’” Id. (Emphasis sic.) In making its\ndetermination, a reviewing court is not required to view the evidence in a light most\nfavorable to the prosecution but may consider and weigh all of the evidence\nproduced at trial. Id. at 390.\n {¶12} Still, determinations of witness credibility, conflicting testimony, and\nevidence weight are primarily for the trier of the facts. State v. DeHass (1967), 10\nOhio St.2d 230, paragraph one of the syllabus.\n {¶13} Appellant was adjudicated a delinquent child for committing an act that\n\f -3-\n\n\nwould be rape in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b) if committed by an adult. R.C.\n2907.02(A)(1)(b) provides:\n {¶14} “(A)(1) No person shall engage in sexual conduct with another who is\nnot the spouse of the offender or who is the spouse of the offender but is living\nseparate and apart from the offender, when any of the following applies:\n {¶15} “* * *\n {¶16} (b) The other person is less than thirteen years of age, whether or not\nthe offender knows the age of the other person.”\n {¶17} We must examine all of the evidence to determine whether the\nmagistrate and the trial court lost their way in finding that appellant committed an act\nof rape as described in the statute.\n {¶18} The first witness to testify was Janet Thomae, an intake worker at\nChildren’s Services. Thomae interviewed the victim approximately one week after\nthe alleged rape. Thomae stated that the victim told her appellant raped her\nvaginally, anally, and orally. (Tr. 13). She testified that she made a finding of sexual\nabuse based on the victim’s statement and supported medical findings made by Dr.\nDewar. (Tr. 16). On cross examination, Thomae admitted that the police report only\ncontained allegations of vaginal penetration. (Tr. 22). However, she did not believe\nthe victim’s two statements to be in conflict simply because the victim disclosed\ndetails to her that the victim did not disclose to the police officer. (Tr. 24).\n {¶19} Genevieve, the victim’s mother, testified next. Genevieve testified that\non the day in question, her daughter came to her as soon as appellant left their\nhouse. (Tr. 46). Genevieve stated that her daughter was “kind of crying” and said\nthat she had to tell her something. (Tr. 47). She testified that her daughter told her\nthat appellant “messed with” her, meaning he raped her. (Tr. 46-47). Genevieve\ntestified that her daughter then told her that appellant made her pull down her\npanties, he pulled down his pants, and he made her do something. (Tr. 47).\nGenevieve stated that she looked in her daughter’s panties and noticed blood. (Tr.\n47). She also stated that her daughter complained that her “private” was hurting. (Tr.\n\f -4-\n\n\n47). Genevieve stated that at the time of the incident, she was in the house sleeping.\n(Tr. 48). Upon hearing her daughter’s allegations, Genevieve first called appellant’s\nmother and spoke to both her and appellant, but appellant denied that anything\nhappened. (Tr. 49). She then took her daughter to the hospital. (Tr. 49).\nApproximately a week later, Genevieve took her daughter to the Child Advocacy\nCenter. (Tr. 49).\n {¶20} Next, the victim testified. At the time of her testimony, she was eight\nyears old. (Tr. 82). She stated that on the night in question, she was in the living\nroom with her brother Gerrone and appellant while her brother played a video game.\n(Tr. 85). She stated that appellant asked her to go upstairs and she said no. (Tr.\n86). Later, she went up to her room to get something and appellant went upstairs\ntoo. (Tr. 87). She testified that appellant came into her room, grabbed her, and told\nher to go into her brother’s room. (Tr. 88). She went with him. (Tr. 88). The victim\ntestified that appellant took his clothes off, took her clothes off, and put his “private” in\nher “private.” (Tr. 88-89). She stated that it hurt. (Tr. 89). She testified that\nappellant told her not to tell anyone, but she told her mom. (Tr. 90-91). She stated\nthat they went to the hospital. (Tr. 91).\n {¶21} Officer Anthony Harris of the Youngstown Police Department testified\nnext. He interviewed appellant and Gerrone. According to Officer Harris, appellant\nstated that he was at Gerrone’s house playing video games and Gerrone’s little sister\nkept bothering him and asking him if he wanted a sucker. (Tr. 131). Appellant told\nher yes and went upstairs with her to get the sucker but he was only upstairs for a\nfew seconds. (Tr. 131). Appellant further told Officer Harris that the six-year-old\nvictim was flirting with him. (Tr. 132).\n {¶22} Officer Harris also stated that he interviewed Gerrone. Gerrone told\nhim that while appellant was at his house his sister asked appellant if he wanted to\ngo upstairs to get some candy. (Tr. 133). Gerrone told Officer Harris that his sister\nand appellant were upstairs for ten to 15 minutes. (Tr. 133).\n {¶23} Dr. Dewar, a pediatrician who is an expert in sexual abuse cases,\n\f -5-\n\n\ntestified next. Dr. Dewar examined the victim at the Tri-County Child Advocacy\nCenter a little over a week after the alleged rape. She also witnessed the victim’s\ninterview with Thomae. She corroborated what Thomae had testified that the victim\ntold her. (Tr. 166). Dr. Dewar stated that she examined the victim using a\ncolposcope, which is used to magnify the genital area. (Tr. 167). She testified that\nshe noticed a transection of the victim’s hymen. (Tr. 168). She stated that her\nfinding was consistent with the victim’s description of what happened to her. (Tr.\n168-69).\n {¶24} Dr. Dewar also testified regarding Dr. Newton’s report. Dr. Newton was\nthe emergency room physician who examined the victim. She noted that Dr. Newton\nhad opined that the victim’s vaginal exam was “within normal limits” and that the\nhymen appeared to be intact. (Tr. 169). Dr. Dewar explained this apparent\ninconsistency between her finding and Dr. Newton’s finding. She stated that she was\nable to conduct a longer exam and had the benefit of using a colposcope to magnify\nthe genital area. (Tr. 169-70). Dr. Dewar opined it was not unusual that the\nemergency room doctor did not find anything abnormal while she did and that this\nhad occurred on other occasions. (Tr. 170).\n {¶25} On cross examination, Dr. Dewar stated that only about 15 to 30\npercent of child victims of sexual abuse have any physical findings. (Tr. 180). And\nshe acknowledged that there was no indication in Dr. Newton’s report that the victim\nhad made any claim of anal penetration. (Tr. 192). She also acknowledged that she\ncould not tell when the victim’s hymen was torn. (Tr. 208).\n {¶26} In conclusion, Dr. Dewar opined that her finding of the hymenal\ntransection gave clear evidence of blunt force or penetrating trauma and that her\nphysical findings, along with the victim’s statement, was evidence of abuse. (Tr.\n172).\n {¶27} Finally, appellant took the stand in his own defense. Appellant stated\nthat on the day in question he was at the victim’s house playing video games with\nGerrone. (Tr. 226-27). He stated that the victim came into the room and was\n\f -6-\n\n\nbothering them by poking them, playing with them, and teasing them as she\nfrequently did. (Tr. 227-28). Appellant stated that at some point he went upstairs\nwith the victim to get a sucker. (Tr. 228). Next, he went into Gerrone’s room to get\nhis coat because he was going to leave. (Tr. 228-29). Appellant stated that he then\nwent down into the living room where he remained until his mother picked him up.\n(Tr. 229). Appellant testified unequivocally that he did not do anything sexual with\nthe victim. (Tr. 232-33).\n {¶28} This case, as with most rape cases, comes down to the issue of\ncredibility. The magistrate listened to the victim’s testimony and appellant’s\ntestimony and had to make a credibility determination as to who was being truthful.\nThe victim, who was six years old at the time of the incident and eight years old at the\ntime of her testimony, testified that appellant raped her. Appellant testified that he\nhad no sexual contact whatsoever with the victim.\n {¶29} Although an appellate court is permitted to independently weigh the\ncredibility of the witnesses when determining whether a conviction is against the\nmanifest weight of the evidence, we must give deference to the fact finders’\ndetermination of witnesses’ credibility. State v. Jackson, 7th Dist. No. 09-JE-13,\n2009-Ohio-6407, at ¶18. The policy underlying this presumption is that the trier of fact\nis in the best position to view the witnesses and observe their demeanor, gestures,\nand voice inflections, and use these observations in weighing the credibility of the\nproffered testimony. Seasons Coal Co. v. Cleveland (1984), 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 80.\n {¶30} Here, the magistrate determined that the victim’s testimony was\ncredible and appellant’s testimony was not. The magistrate was in the best position\nto make this determination. He was able to watch the witnesses as they testified and\npersonally observe their demeanors.\n {¶31} Furthermore, the other witnesses’ testimony, for the most part,\ncorroborated the victim’s testimony.\n {¶32} Genevieve testified that immediately after appellant left her house on\nthe day in question her daughter came to her crying and told her that appellant\n\f -7-\n\n\n“messed with” her, showed her his private, and made her pull down her panties and\n“do something.” Genevieve also saw blood in her daughter’s panties and her\ndaughter told her that her private was hurting.\n {¶33} Thomae and Dr. Dewar testified that upon interviewing the victim, she\nrevealed that appellant raped her vaginally, anally, and orally. And while the victim\ndid not specifically tell this to her mother, it is likely that the inconsistency can be\nexplained by the fact that she was six years old at the time and was afraid and\nembarrassed by the entire incident.\n {¶34} Additionally, appellant takes issue with the fact that Dr. Dewar’s findings\nwere inconsistent with Dr. Newton’s findings. However, Dr. Dewar explained that she\nwas able to see the tear in the victim’s hymen due to the fact that she used a\ncolposcope to examine the victim’s genital area. And she noted that it was not\nuncommon for her to find such a tear even though the emergency room physician\nwas not able to do so due to the magnifying power of the colposcope.\n {¶35} Given all of the evidence and deferring the magistrate’s determination\non credibility, the finding of rape was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.\nAccordingly, appellant’s first assignment of error is without merit.\n {¶36} Appellant’s second assignment of error states:\n {¶37} “THE DEFENDANT RECEIVED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF\nCOUNSEL.”\n {¶38} Here appellant contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing\nto call a witness to contradict Dr. Dewar’s testimony.\n {¶39} Dr. Dewar testified that she examined the victim on December 7, 2004,\nand that her examination revealed that the victim had a tear in her hymen that had\nhealed. Dr. Newton’s report indicated that he saw no signs of abuse on the victim the\nday after the alleged rape.\n {¶40} Appellant’s counsel had subpoenaed Dr. Newton to testify, but he failed\nto appear. Appellant argues that his counsel was ineffective because he chose to\nproceed without Dr. Newton instead of requesting a continuance or insisting on Dr.\n\f -8-\n\n\nNewton’s presence.\n {¶41} To prove an allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel, the\nappellant must satisfy a two-prong test. First, appellant must establish that counsel's\nperformance has fallen below an objective standard of reasonable representation.\nStrickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052; State v. Bradley\n(1989), 42 Ohio St.3d 136, at paragraph two of the syllabus. Second, appellant must\ndemonstrate that he was prejudiced by counsel's performance. Id. To show that he\nhas been prejudiced by counsel's deficient performance, appellant must prove that,\nbut for counsel's errors, the result of the trial would have been different. Bradley, 42\nOhio St.3d at paragraph three of the syllabus.\n {¶42} Appellant bears the burden of proof on the issue of counsel's\neffectiveness. State v. Calhoun (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 279. In Ohio, a licensed\nattorney is presumed competent. Id.\n {¶43} As indicated above, appellant’s counsel had subpoenaed Dr. Newton to\ntestify. (Tr. 248). At the hearing, after the other witnesses testified, appellant’s\ncounsel informed the court that Dr. Newton was on his witness list and had been\nsubpoenaed, but had not appeared. (Tr. 248). Counsel went on to tell the court that\nhe was not going to ask for a material witness warrant, but instead was going to\nwithdraw Dr. Newton as a witness. (Tr. 248).\n {¶44} Whether or not to call a particular witness is a matter that falls within\ntrial strategy. State v. Treesh (2001), 90 Ohio St.3d 460, 490. This court should not\nsecond guess trial counsel’s tactics. Trial tactics are generally not subject to\nquestion by a reviewing court. State v. Fryling (1992), 85 Ohio App.3d 557, 562.\n {¶45} In this case, counsel may have determined, after listening to Dr.\nDewar’s testimony, that he no longer needed Dr. Newton’s testimony. Dr. Dewar\ntestified as to what Dr. Newton’s findings were from his report. Most importantly, she\nread from Dr. Newton’s report his findings that the “vaginal exam [was] within normal\nlimits,” there was “no evidence of trauma,” and the victim’s “hymen appear[ed] intact.”\n(Tr. 169). Presumably, Dr. Newton’s testimony would have mirrored his report.\n\f -9-\n\n\n {¶46} Until Dr. Dewar testified as to the content of Dr. Newton’s report and his\nspecific findings, appellant’s counsel likely could have believed that Dr. Newton was\nnecessary as a witness to testify as to these matters. That is a probable reason why\ncounsel originally subpoenaed Dr. Newton. We can conclude that it was a matter of\ncounsel’s trial strategy to decide that he no longer needed Dr. Newton’s testimony\nonce he heard Dr. Dewar’s testimony. He likely concluded that Dr. Newton would\nhave nothing new to add and that his testimony would be merely cumulative.\n {¶47} Additionally, the magistrate had the information of the conflicting\nfindings before him. Thus, the magistrate was able to take into consideration that Dr.\nNewton did not find any trauma or abnormalities during his examination of the victim\nthe day after the alleged rape. He was able to weigh this evidence against Dr.\nDewar’s findings with a colposcope approximately a week later. Consequently,\nappellant cannot demonstrate any prejudice as a result of Dr. Newton not testifying.\n {¶48} Accordingly, appellant’s second assignment of error is without merit.\n {¶49} For the reasons stated above, the trial court’s judgment is hereby\naffirmed.\n\n\nVukovich, P.J., concurs.\n\nDeGenaro, J., concurs.\n\f", "ocr": false, "opinion_id": 2701445 } ]
Ohio Court of Appeals
Ohio Court of Appeals
SA
Ohio, OH
121,444
null
2002-06-17
false
hizbullahankhamon-v-walker-superintendent-auburn-correctional-facility
Hizbullahankhamon
Hizbullahankhamon v. Walker, Superintendent, Auburn Correctional Facility
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
0
Published
null
null
[ "536 U.S. 925" ]
[ { "author_str": null, "per_curiam": false, "type": "010combined", "page_count": null, "download_url": "http://bulk.resource.org/courts.gov/c/US/536/536.US.925.01-8722.html", "author_id": null, "opinion_text": "536 U.S. 925\n HIZBULLAHANKHAMONv.WALKER, SUPERINTENDENT, AUBURN CORRECTIONAL FACILITY.\n No. 01-8722.\n Supreme Court of the United States.\n June 17, 2002.\n \n 1\n C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 255 F. 3d 65.\n \n ", "ocr": false, "opinion_id": 121444 } ]
Supreme Court
Supreme Court of the United States
F
USA, Federal
751,572
Evans, Flaum, Ripple
1998-02-09
false
dwayne-kelley-v-crosfield-catalysts
null
Dwayne Kelley v. Crosfield Catalysts
Dwayne KELLEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CROSFIELD CATALYSTS, Defendant-Appellee
Michael A. Childers and Danny L. Wind-ham (argued), Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff-Appellant., Terry J. Smith (argued), Brian R. Camie, Kessler, Smith & Powen, Chicago, IL, for Defendant-Appellee.
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
Argued Oct. 29, 1997.
null
null
27
Published
null
<parties id="b1264-7"> Dwayne KELLEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CROSFIELD CATALYSTS, Defendant-Appellee. </parties><br><docketnumber id="b1264-11"> No. 97-1643. </docketnumber><br><court id="b1264-12"> United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit. </court><br><otherdate id="b1264-13"> Argued Oct. 29, 1997. </otherdate><br><decisiondate id="b1264-14"> Decided Feb. 9, 1998. </decisiondate><br><attorneys id="b1265-5"> <span citation-index="1" class="star-pagination" label="1203"> *1203 </span> Michael A. Childers and Danny L. Wind-ham (argued), Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff-Appellant. </attorneys><br><attorneys id="b1265-6"> Terry J. Smith (argued), Brian R. Camie, Kessler, Smith &amp; Powen, Chicago, IL, for Defendant-Appellee. </attorneys><br><judges id="b1265-7"> Before FLAUM, RIPPLE, and EVANS, Circuit Judges. </judges>
[ "135 F.3d 1202" ]
[ { "author_str": "Flaum", "per_curiam": false, "type": "010combined", "page_count": null, "download_url": "http://bulk.resource.org/courts.gov/c/F3/135/135.F3d.1202.97-1643.html", "author_id": null, "opinion_text": "135 F.3d 1202\n 73 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 45,313, 135 Lab.Cas. P 33,642,4 Wage &amp; Hour Cas.2d (BNA) 577\n Dwayne KELLEY, Plaintiff-Appellant,v.CROSFIELD CATALYSTS, Defendant-Appellee.\n No. 97-1643.\n United States Court of Appeals,Seventh Circuit.\n Argued Oct. 29, 1997.Decided Feb. 9, 1998.\n \n Michael A. Childers and Danny L. Windham (argued), Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff-Appellant.\n Terry J. Smith (argued), Brian R. Carnie, Kessler, Smith &amp; Powen, Chicago, IL, for Defendant-Appellee.\n Before FLAUM, RIPPLE, and EVANS, Circuit Judges.\n FLAUM, Circuit Judge.\n \n \n 1\n Dwayne Kelley allegedly received authorization from his employer, Crosfield Catalysts (\"Crosfield\"), to travel to New York in order to \"seek custody of [a young girl] for foster care or adoption.\" Second Amended Complaint at 2. Kelley's trip for this purpose caused him to miss four days of scheduled work. Crosfield terminated Kelley on his next work day on account of this four-day absence; Kelley claims that the dismissal was pretextual and in violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. &#167;&#167; 2601, 2611-19, 2631-36, 2651-53. The district court dismissed Kelley's Second Amended Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. We disagree with the district court's characterization of the Second Amended Complaint, and we therefore reverse the dismissal and remand the case for further proceedings.\n \n I. BACKGROUND\n \n 2\n Dwayne Kelley began working for Crosfield as a laboratory technician on August 1, 1992. This position required Kelley to work twelve-hour shifts for four consecutive days followed by three consecutive \"off\" days. Kelley was scheduled to begin a four-day work rotation on October 22, 1993, when he unexpectedly received a phone call from his mother. His mother informed him that the Brooklyn Bureau of Child Welfare was preparing to take custody of Shaneequa Forbes, an eleven-year-old girl. Shaneequa was born into the marriage of Barbara and Michael Forbes, but--although this information was not contained in his Second Amended Complaint--Kelley had reason to believe that he might be the girl's biological father. He told his supervisors at Crosfield that Shaneequa was his daughter. Kelley missed four scheduled workdays while attending to this matter in New York. On his first day back at work, October 29, Crosfield terminated Kelley's employment.\n \n \n 3\n The parties' pleading maneuvers constitute the focus of this appeal. Kelley filed a pro se complaint on October 26, 1995, which alleged that his termination violated the FMLA because he took leave from work in order to \"obtain custody of my kids [sic].\" Crosfield filed a motion to dismiss this complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), arguing that seeking custody of one's own children was not covered by the FMLA. Before the district court ruled on Crosfield's motion, Kelley filed an amended pro se complaint on April 25, 1996. The amended complaint stated only that the child \"grew up\" with Kelley, and it referenced Shaneequa's birth certificate on which Barbara and Michael Forbes are listed as the girl's biological parents.\n \n \n 4\n The parties discussed the matter of Shaneequa's parentage at a status hearing regarding the amended complaint five days after it was filed. Kelley admitted there was some confusion about whether he was Shaneequa's father. He stated, \"Your Honor, I was told--there is nothing in any records showing that I am the father. I was told that I was the father. So I took this as I'm being the father. But as of late, I found out that I might not even be the father. On record, I am not the father.\" Based on this colloquy, Crosfield moved to dismiss the amended complaint for failure to state a claim, arguing that obtaining custody of one's own child was not a protected activity under the FMLA.\n \n \n 5\n Kelley soon after retained counsel for the first time and, with Crosfield's consent, filed a Second Amended Complaint. This is the complaint that is the subject of the instant appeal. Crosfield once again moved to dismiss Kelley's complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) based on his prior admissions to the court that (1) he was Shaneequa's biological father, and (2) he sought leave from work to obtain custody of her. Kelley responded to the motion by pointing out that his Second Amended Complaint did not allege that he was Shaneequa's biological father; it stated only that he took leave for the purpose of taking the child into foster care or adoption. Any admissions from prior pleadings, Kelley argued, were functus officio, or of no further effect, and superseded by the Second Amended Complaint for purposes of the Rule 12(b)(6) determination. Even if the admissions were still valid, Kelley contended that he stated a claim under the FMLA because it is possible to seek custody of one's biological child through adoption or foster care when one currently enjoys no parental rights with respect to the child.\n \n \n 6\n The district court granted Crosfield's motion to dismiss Kelley's Second Amended Complaint. The court first credited Kelley's statements from prior superseded pleadings that he was Shaneequa's biological father. Then, the court stated that the words \"adoption\" and \"foster care\" in the FMLA should be given their normal meaning; establishing custody over one's own child would not, in the court's view, qualify under the normal meaning of those words: \"[A]n emergency trip to rescue one's own child from a state proceeding does not fit within those definitions or the statutory scheme.\" In reaching this conclusion, the district judge necessarily considered facts outside the scope of Kelley's Second Amended Complaint, but he did not convert Crosfield's motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment.\n \n II. DISCUSSION\n \n 7\n Kelley argues that the district court erred by granting Crosfield's motion to dismiss. The facts relating to Shaneequa's biological parentage were not part of the FMLA claim contained in his Second Amended Complaint. Kelley contends that, at the very least, the district court should not have considered these facts without converting Crosfield's motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment (and thereby affording Kelley an opportunity to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact). But even if the facts were taken as true and considered by the district court, Kelley argues that his leave under these circumstances could be covered by the FMLA. We agree with Kelley that the district court erroneously granted Crosfield's motion to dismiss his Second Amended Complaint.\n \n \n 8\n The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 affords flexibility in employment for medical or family emergencies to anyone working at least 1250 hours per year at a business employing fifty or more people for at least twenty weeks of the year. See 29 U.S.C. &#167;&#167; 2611(2), (4). Congressional hearings revealed that the FMLA was needed to help balance the demands of work and family, as well as to ease the burden of caretaking among individual family members. See 29 U.S.C. &#167; 2601; see also Price v. City of Fort Wayne, 117 F.3d 1022, 1023 (7th Cir.1997). The provision of the FMLA most relevant to the instant appeal is 29 U.S.C. &#167; 2612(a)(1)(B), which provides that eligible employees may receive twelve weeks of excused leave per year \"[b]ecause of the placement of a son or daughter with the employee for adoption or foster care.\"\n \n \n 9\n Kelley's Second Amended Complaint did not make any reference to Shaneequa's biological parentage. It only stated that he traveled to New York to \"seek custody of Shaneequa for foster care or adoption.\" Thus, based on the allegations of the Second Amended Complaint alone, the issue of Kelley's biological connection to Shaneequa was not before the district court. It is apparent, however, that the court considered Shaneequa's biological parentage by concluding that Kelley's emergency trip to New York did not fit within the meaning of the FMLA. The only way the court could have considered that issue was by looking outside the pleadings to Kelley's prior pleadings and colloquy with the court in a status hearing on a rescinded complaint.\n \n \n 10\n This is not a permissible practice. It is well-established that an amended pleading supersedes the original pleading; facts not incorporated into the amended pleading are considered functus officio. See Duda v. Board of Educ. of Franklin Park Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 84, 133 F.3d 1054, 1057 (7th Cir.1998); Wellness Community-Nat'l v. Wellness House, 70 F.3d 46, 49 (7th Cir.1995); Lubin v. Chicago Title &amp; Trust Co., 260 F.2d 411, 413 (7th Cir.1958) (\"It is hornbook law that an amended complaint complete in itself and making no reference to nor adopting any portion of a prior complaint renders the latter functus officio.\"); Nisbet v. Van Tuyl, 224 F.2d 66, 71 (7th Cir.1955) (\"An amended pleading ordinarily supersedes the prior pleading. The prior pleading is in effect withdrawn as to all matters not restated in the amended pleading, and becomes functus officio.\") (footnote omitted); see also 3 JAMES WM. MOORE, ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE p 15.17 (3d ed. 1997) (\"An amended pleading that is complete in itself and does not reference or adopt any portion of the prior pleading supersedes the prior pleading.\"). If certain facts or admissions from the original complaint become functus officio, they cannot be considered by the court on a motion to dismiss the amended complaint. A court cannot resuscitate these facts when assessing whether the amended complaint states a viable claim.\n \n \n 11\n The Fifth Circuit faced an analogous issue in Hibernia National Bank v. Carner, 997 F.2d 94 (5th Cir.1993). Appellant Carner was one of eight partners in a partnership that defaulted on a mortgage with Hibernia. Hibernia foreclosed on the mortgage and sued the partnership for a deficiency judgment. In Hibernia's original complaint, the Bank stated that Carner was only liable for 5% of the partnership's deficiency judgment. Hibernia filed an amended complaint in which this \"judicial confession,\" as the court called it, was \"amended away.\" Id. at 101. The Fifth Circuit held that Carner could not rely on Hibernia's \"admission\" from the original complaint in refuting the Bank's motion for summary judgment based on the amended complaint. Id.\n \n \n 12\n The same principle applies in the instant case. Any facts that Kelley had pleaded in his first two complaints were effectively nullified for 12(b)(6) purposes when he filed his Second Amended Complaint, which did not reference those facts. There was no longer any \"confession\" in the pleadings on which the district court could rely when reviewing Crosfield's motion to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint. The only relevant fact before the district court at the 12(b)(6) stage of this case was that Kelley took leave to travel to New York in an attempt to place Shaneequa Forbes in his custody \"for adoption or foster care.\" This allegation states a claim under the FMLA.\n \n \n 13\n In addition, we think it is important to note that Kelley could have stated a viable FMLA claim even if his Second Amended Complaint had declared that he was the biological father of Shaneequa. The district court believed that the \"usual sense\" of the relevant FMLA terms \"adoption\" and \"foster care\" did not encompass a situation in which a biological father takes custody of his own child. Indeed, the Department of Labor has defined the term \"adoption\" as used in the FMLA as the \"legal process in which an individual becomes the legal parent of another's child.\" 5 C.F.R. &#167; 630.1202 (emphasis added). The court seemed to fear that allowing one to adopt one's own child or to take the child into foster care would grant FMLA coverage to run-of-the-mill custody disputes.\n \n \n 14\n This is not just another custody case, though, and we believe that Kelley could state a valid claim under the FMLA. Dismissal of an action under Rule 12(b)(6) is warranted only if Kelley could prove no set of facts in support of his claims that would entitle him to relief. See General Elec. Capital Corp. v. Lease Resolution Corp., 128 F.3d 1074, 1080 (7th Cir.1997). When faced with ambiguities in this inquiry, we give the benefit of any doubt to the plaintiff. See Early v. Bankers Life &amp; Casualty Co., 959 F.2d 75, 79 (7th Cir.1992). We do not believe that the statutory terms and regulatory definitions bar Kelley's suit. The FMLA defines \"son or daughter\" as \"a biological, adopted, or foster child, a stepchild, a legal ward, or a child of a person standing in loco parentis.\" 29 U.S.C. &#167; 2611(12). Thus, in light of this definition, the FMLA expressly protects leaves taken \"[b]ecause of the placement of a [biological child] with an employee for adoption or foster care.\" 29 U.S.C. &#167; 2612(a)(1)(B). Furthermore, Kelley was not Shaneequa's father of record--unlike the usual situation in custody disputes--and he would have sought leave to take custody of a child who (according to public record) was \"another's child.\"\n \n \n 15\n It will indeed be unusual to encounter a situation in which a biological parent takes a leave from work in order to adopt or take into foster care his own child. This situation may be rare, but Kelley has proven that it is not entirely impossible. In a case such as this in which a biological parent has no custodial rights over a child and is not listed as the child's parent as a matter of record, it may be possible for that parent to adopt his own child. Thus, regardless of whether he was the biological father, Kelley could state a claim under the FMLA.\n \n III. CONCLUSION\n \n 16\n Discovery may reveal Kelley's claims to be meritless. The face of the complaint, however, does not establish this conclusion because Crosfield failed to prove that there is no set of facts that would entitle Kelley to relief. Dismissal, therefore, was unwarranted. For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the district court's dismissal of Kelley's Second Amended Complaint and remand the cause for further proceedings.\n \n ", "ocr": false, "opinion_id": 751572 } ]
Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
F
USA, Federal
1,607,190
Per Curiam
1979-01-19
false
moore-v-wainwright
Moore
Moore v. Wainwright
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
2
Published
null
null
[ "366 So. 2d 183" ]
[ { "author_str": null, "per_curiam": true, "type": "010combined", "page_count": null, "download_url": null, "author_id": null, "opinion_text": "\n366 So. 2d 183 (1979)\nWilliam MOORE, Appellant,\nv.\nLouie L. WAINWRIGHT, Appellee.\nNo. KK-206.\nDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.\nJanuary 19, 1979.\nWilliam Moore, in pro per.\nRobert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and Richard W. Prospect, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.\nPER CURIAM.\nAppellant filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus based on an allegation that he was deprived of due process of law in disciplinary proceedings. The trial court *184 denied his petition without a hearing. We reverse.\nThe petition states specific allegations regarding the disciplinary proceedings which, if true, would establish that the Department of Corrections failed to comply with its own rules and with the procedural requirements of Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S. Ct. 2963, 41 L. Ed. 2d 935 (1974). Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a hearing to the adequacy of the disciplinary proceedings.\nReversed and Remanded.\nMILLS, Acting C.J., and SMITH and MELVIN, JJ., concur.\n", "ocr": false, "opinion_id": 1607190 } ]
District Court of Appeal of Florida
District Court of Appeal of Florida
SA
Florida, FL
797,430
null
2007-04-03
false
leslie-j-grisham-v-philip-morris-usa-a-corporation-brown-williamson
null
null
Leslie J. Grisham v. Philip Morris U.S.A., a Corporation Brown & Williamson Tobacco Company Corp., Individually and as Successor to the American Tobacco Company and Its Predecessor in Interest, British American Tobacco Industries, Plc, Maria Cannata v. Philip Morris Usa, Inc., AKA Philip Morris Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
2
Published
null
null
[ "482 F.3d 1131" ]
[ { "author_str": null, "per_curiam": false, "type": "010combined", "page_count": null, "download_url": "http://bulk.resource.org/courts.gov/c/F3/482/482.F3d.1131.03-56018.03-55780.html", "author_id": null, "opinion_text": "482 F.3d 1131\n Leslie J. GRISHAM, Plaintiff-Appellant,v.PHILIP MORRIS U.S.A., a corporation; Brown &amp; Williamson Tobacco Company Corp., individually and as successor to the American Tobacco Company and its predecessor in interest, British American Tobacco Industries, PLC, Defendants-Appellees.Maria Cannata, Plaintiff-Appellant,v.Philip Morris USA, Inc., aka Philip Morris; Brown &amp; Williamson Tobacco Corporation, Defendants-Appellees.\n No. 03-55780.\n No. 03-56018.\n United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.\n Argued and Submitted December 10, 2004.\n Filed April 3, 2007.\n \n Martin Louis Stanley, Santa Monica, CA, for plaintiff-appellant Maria Cannata.\n Frances M. Phares, Baum Hedlund, PC, Los Angeles, CA; Daniel U. Smith, Law Office of Daniel U. Smith, Kentfield, CA, for plaintiff-appellant Leslie J. Grisham.\n Murry R. Garnick, Arnold &amp; Porter, LLP, Washington, DC; Maurice A. Leiter, Arnold &amp; Porter, LLP, Los Angeles, CA; Daniel P. Collins, Munger Tolles &amp; Olson, LLP, Los Angeles, CA; Fred D. Heather, Amy W. Schulman, DLA Piper, LLP, Los Angeles, CA; Sheila B. Schuerman, Temple University School of Law, Philadelphia, PA, for defendant-appellee Philip Morris.\n Paul Crist, Jones Day, Cleveland, OH; Peter N. Larson, Jones Day, San Francisco, CA, for defendant-appellee Brown &amp; Williamson.\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California; Stephen V. Wilson, District Judge, Presiding, Audrey B. Collins, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. Nos. CV-02-07930-SVW, CV-02-08026-ABC.\n Before JEROME FARRIS, DOROTHY W. NELSON, and RONALD M. GOULD, Circuit Judges.\n ORDER\n PER CURIAM.\n \n \n 1\n In light of the California Supreme Court's decision in Grisham v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 40 Cal. 4th 623, 54 Cal. Rptr. 3d 735, 151 P.3d 1151 (2007), and in light of the Joint Report of the Parties Re: Decision of the California Supreme Court on the Certified Questions, the judgments of the district court are VACATED and we REMAND to the district court for further proceedings consistent with the opinion of the California Supreme Court. In light of the Joint Report of the Parties Re: Decision of the California Supreme Court on the Certified Questions, we also VACATE our previous order of March 16, 2007 calling for supplemental briefing from the parties in Cannata v. Philip Morris, 03-56018.\n \n ", "ocr": false, "opinion_id": 797430 } ]
Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
F
USA, Federal
253,532
null
1961-03-27
false
northern-natural-gas-company-and-permian-basin-pip
null
Northern Natural Gas Company and Permian Basin Pipeline Company v. Federal Power Commission
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
0
Published
null
null
[ "288 F.2d 441" ]
[ { "author_str": null, "per_curiam": false, "type": "010combined", "page_count": null, "download_url": "http://bulk.resource.org/courts.gov/c/F2/288/288.F2d.441.13317.html", "author_id": null, "opinion_text": "288 F.2d 441\n 38 P.U.R.3d 434\n NORTHERN NATURAL GAS COMPANY and Permian Basin PipelineCompany, Petitioners,v.FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION.\n No. 13317\n United States Court of appeals Third Circuit.\n Argued Feb. 20, 1961.Decided March 27, 1961.\n \n F. Vinson Roach, Omaha, Neb. (Lawrence I. Shaw, Jack C. Osborne, Omaha, Neb., Richard J. Connor, Walter E. Gallagher, Washington, D.C., on the brief), for petitioners.\n \n \n 1\n Peter H. Schiff, Washington, D.C. (John C. Mason, Gen. Counsel, Howard E. Wahrenbrock, Solicitor, Luke R. Lamb, Asst. Gen. Counsel, Washington, D.C., on the brief), for respondent Federal Power Commission.\n \n \n 2\n Robert E. Lee Hall, Washington, D.C., on the brief, for Nat. Coal Assn.\n \n \n 3\n Welly K. Hopkins, Washington, D.C., on the brief, for United Mine Workers of America.\n \n \n 4\n Charles W. Stadell, Chicago, Ill., on the brief, for Mid-West Coal Producers Institute, Inc.\n \n \n 5\n George C. Mastor, Minneapolis, Minn. (Jerome J. McGrath, James A. Gammon, McGrath &amp; McGrath, Washington, D.C., on the brief), for distributors-intervenors.\n \n \n 6\n Patrick L. Farnand, Farnand, Lee, Mastor &amp; Hart, Minneapolis, Minn., for interveners Central Electric and Gas Company and others.\n \n \n 7\n Lloyd J. Marti, Lincoln, Neb., on the brief, for Central Electric &amp; Gas Co.\n \n \n 8\n Charles A. Sawyer, Minneapolis, Minn., on the brief, for City of Minneapolis.\n \n \n 9\n Robert J. Swords, Corp. Counsel, St. Paul, Minn., on the brief, for City of St. Paul.\n \n \n 10\n Clement F. Springer, Chicago, Ill., on the brief, for Interstate Power Co.\n \n \n 11\n John F. Gaston, Cedar Rapids, Iowa, on the brief, for Iowa Electric Light &amp; Power Co.\n \n \n 12\n Edward J. Hartman, Davenport, Iowa, on the brief, for Iowa-Illinois Gas &amp; Electric Co.\n \n \n 13\n Vernon Myers, Sioux City, Iowa, on the brief, for Iowa Public Service Co.\n \n \n 14\n Hubert C. Jones, Des Joines, Iowa, on the brief, for Iowa Power &amp; Light Co.\n \n \n 15\n George C. Pardee, Omaha, Neb., on the brief, for Metropolitan Utilities Dist.\n \n \n 16\n John W. Scott, Washington, D.C., on the brief, for Minnesota Valley Natural Gas Co.\n \n \n 17\n Ned Willis, Perry, Iowa, on the brief, for North Central Public Service Co.\n \n \n 18\n Carl W. Cummins, St. Paul, Minn., on the brief, for Northern States Power Co. (Minnesota) and Northern States Power Co. (Wisconsin).\n \n \n 19\n Glen H. Bell, Aberg, Bell, Blake &amp; Metzner, Madison, Wis., on the brief, for Superior Water, Light and Power Co. and City of Duluth.\n \n \n 20\n Walter F. Mondale, Atty. Gen., Harold J. Soderberg, Asst. Atty. Gen., State of Minnesota, on the brief, for Minnesota.\n \n \n 21\n Before KALODNER, STALEY and FORMAN, Circuit Judges.\n \n \n 22\n PER CURIAM.\n \n \n 23\n Upon review of the record and after consideration of the Federal Power Commission's Motion to Dismiss for lack of jurisdiction the petition for review of the Northern Natural Gas Company and the Permian Basin Pipeline Company, we are of the opinion that the Order of the Federal Power Commission granting certain interests affiliated with the coal industry a limited right of intervention in a proceeding now pending before the Commission is not a final order and that this Court is accordingly without jurisdiction to entertain the petition for review of that Order.\n \n \n 24\n The Motion to Dismiss the petition for review for lack of jurisdiction will be granted.\n \n ", "ocr": false, "opinion_id": 253532 } ]
Third Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
F
USA, Federal
590,908
Butzner, Luttig, Widener
1992-09-11
false
united-states-v-seedy-fehli-analla
null
United States v. Seedy Fehli Analla
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Seedy Fehli ANALLA, Defendant-Appellant
John Dewey Elliott, Columbia, S.C., argued for defendant-appellant., Eric William Ruschky, Asst. U.S. Atty., Columbia, S.C., argued (E. Bart Daniel, U.S. Atty., on brief), for plaintiff-appellee.
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
Argued March 6, 1992.
null
null
58
Published
null
<parties id="Ay"> UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Seedy Fehli ANALLA, Defendant-Appellant. </parties><docketnumber id="AeF"> No. 91-5552. </docketnumber><court id="ABE"> United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit. </court><otherdate id="AsY"> Argued March 6, 1992. </otherdate><decisiondate id="Aqy"> Decided Sept. 11, 1992. </decisiondate><br><attorneys id="b189-7"> <span citation-index="1" class="star-pagination" label="121"> *121 </span> John Dewey Elliott, Columbia, S.C., argued for defendant-appellant. </attorneys><br><attorneys id="b189-8"> Eric William Ruschky, Asst. U.S. Atty., Columbia, S.C., argued (E. Bart Daniel, U.S. Atty., on brief), for plaintiff-appellee. </attorneys><br><judges id="b189-9"> Before WIDENER and LUTTIG, Circuit Judges, and BUTZNER, Senior Circuit Judge. </judges>
[ "975 F.2d 119" ]
[ { "author_str": "Widener", "per_curiam": false, "type": "010combined", "page_count": null, "download_url": "http://bulk.resource.org/courts.gov/c/F2/975/975.F2d.119.91-5552.html", "author_id": null, "opinion_text": "975 F.2d 119\n UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,v.Seedy Fehli ANALLA, Defendant-Appellant.\n No. 91-5552.\n United States Court of Appeals,Fourth Circuit.\n Argued March 6, 1992.Decided Sept. 11, 1992.\n \n John Dewey Elliott, Columbia, S.C., argued for defendant-appellant.\n Eric William Ruschky, Asst. U.S. Atty., Columbia, S.C., argued (E. Bart Daniel, U.S. Atty., on brief), for plaintiff-appellee.\n Before WIDENER and LUTTIG, Circuit Judges, and BUTZNER, Senior Circuit Judge.\n OPINION\n WIDENER, Circuit Judge:\n \n \n 1\n Seedy Fehli Analla appeals his conviction for murder and related offenses. 18 U.S.C. &#167;&#167; 1111, 113(a), 2112, 924(c). Analla also appeals his sentences, which include a sentence to life imprisonment without parole for the murder conviction. We affirm.\n \n \n 2\n * Around midnight on May 4, 1989, someone robbed the Pizza Pub at Shaw Air Force Base in Sumter, South Carolina. The assailant carried a .25 caliber handgun. He shot one employee in the back of the head, killing her. He shot the other employee, Jeannette Delia, twice in the face. Mrs. Delia survived the shooting.\n \n \n 3\n According to Mrs. Delia, the Pizza Pub closed at 11:00 pm on the night of the robbery. She and Luz Dougherty remained after closing to clean up and count the money. When counting the money, it was the practice to separate the $1.00 bills into bundles of 25 and to secure each bundle with a paperclip. Around 11:50 p.m., Analla came to the back door. He told Mrs. Delia that he was from Environmental Health and that he was concerned about a pile of garbage near the dumpster. He was wearing a black leather jacket with a badge. Mrs. Dougherty cleaned up the garbage as requested. The assailant wrote a report about the incident, but Mrs. Dougherty refused to sign it and wrote her own report instead. The assailant then acted as if he were going to do an inspection of the Pizza Pub. Mrs. Delia went with him to the bathrooms. While in the bathroom, the assailant stepped on a cockroach, which Mrs. Delia then put in the trash bag. Mrs. Delia took that trash bag to the kitchen and returned with a clean one. When she returned to the bathroom, the assailant pointed out a piece of toilet paper on the floor in one of the stalls. Mrs. Delia stooped down, grabbed the toilet paper and flushed it down the toilet. The assailant shot her twice in the face and apparently left the bathroom.\n \n \n 4\n Mrs. Delia crawled out of the bathroom window and went across the street to the Security Police station. When the Security Police arrived at the Pizza Pub, they found the back door unlocked. Mrs. Dougherty's body was inside. She had been shot in the back of the head.\n \n \n 5\n On the night of the murder, Analla was registered at the Carolina Pines motel, about one-half mile from the Pizza Pub. The morning after the murder, Analla checked out of the Carolina Pines at 8:42 a.m. Analla drove to a convenience store called the Pantry, where he bought some gum and got 20 dollars in quarters. He then used the pay phone outside the Pantry to call his wife, Alexandra, who was in Greece.\n \n \n 6\n While Analla was using the pay phone outside, Marjorie Brannon, the training manager at the Pantry, received a call on the phone inside the store. The caller mentioned the incident at the Pizza Pub and described the suspect. Although the record does not say how the caller described the suspect, the police were looking for an Hispanic male wearing a black leather jacket. Miss Brannon felt that Analla fit the description, so she asked her supervisor to call the police. Analla is not Hispanic, but he is Moroccan, and was described by Officer Parker on his arrival as \"Hispanic-type looking.\" The record shows that a black leather jacket was later found in Analla's car. The call to the police advised them that a man fitting the Pizza Pub murderer's description was in the pay telephone booth outside the Pantry.\n \n \n 7\n Two Sumter Police Department squad cars, driven by officers Parker and McCoy, responded to the call. Parker and McCoy parked their cars on either side of Analla's car at 45 degree angles to it, with McCoy's car on the driver's side of Analla's car and Parker's car on the passenger side. Analla's car was not blocked in by the squad cars.\n \n \n 8\n Officer Parker approached Analla, who was still using the phone. Parker told Analla that he wanted to speak to him when he was through. Parker asked for his license and registration. Analla went to his car to get the license. Analla had a Georgia driver's license, but the car was registered in Texas to William Analla, who, Analla explained, was his brother-in-law. After getting the license from his car, Analla says he left the driver side door ajar.\n \n \n 9\n Parker and McCoy stood between Analla's car and Parker's squad car while Parker used his walkie-talkie to check the license with the dispatcher. Parker testified that he would have stopped Analla had Analla attempted to drive off without his license. Parker maintained, however, that if Analla had asked to have his license returned, he would have asked Analla to \"hold on for just a minute to verify the fact that it is a clear license,\" but would have had no choice but to return the license and permit Analla to go if Analla had persisted.\n \n \n 10\n While Parker was checking Analla's license, a third officer, Sergeant Moore, arrived at the Pantry. Sergeant Moore approached Analla. Parker and McCoy still stood between Analla's car and Parker's patrol car, behind Moore. Moore told Analla that there had been a murder at Shaw Air Force Base and that Analla fit the description. Moore asked whether Analla had a weapon. Analla said no. Moore asked Analla for permission to search the car. Analla said \"Go ahead.\" Before starting the search, Moore again asked Analla for permission to search and Analla again consented. At some point before beginning his actual search of the car, Analla testified that he saw Moore looking into the car through the open passenger door. It is not clear from Analla, however, whether this occurred before or after Analla first consented to the search. At no time did any of the officers tell Analla that he had a right to leave, to refuse to answer any questions, or to refuse the search.\n \n \n 11\n The search of Analla's car revealed a .25 caliber pistol under the driver's seat. A crime lab later identified the pistol as the murder weapon. Upon finding the gun, Parker and McCoy immediately handcuffed Analla and placed him under arrest for violating a South Carolina law that requires handguns to be kept either in the glove compartment or in the trunk. Officer Parker put Analla in his squad car and advised him of his Miranda rights. After some conversation following Analla's arrest, Parker concluded from Analla's skin tone that Analla was not Hispanic.\n \n \n 12\n Shortly thereafter, two FBI agents, Oyler and Younginer, arrived on the scene. They were told that the Sumter Police were holding a person who fit the description of the Pizza Pub homicide suspect. Agent Younginer again read the Miranda warnings to Analla and asked Analla if he would mind talking with them. Analla said that he did not mind. Younginer also obtained Analla's written consent to search the car.\n \n \n 13\n Officer Parker and a Sumter Police evidence technician then inventoried the contents of the car. Incriminating evidence found in the car included: the .25 caliber semi-automatic pistol found under the driver's seat; cash, including two bundles of 25 $1.00 bills paperclipped together; and a black leather jacket.\n \n \n 14\n Because of the confusion at the scene, the FBI agents decided to interrogate Analla elsewhere. They took him to the Sumter Police station for that purpose. No questioning occurred during the trip to the station house. At the station, the agents and Analla reviewed a form containing an advice of rights and waiver of rights. Analla signed the waiver. Analla was interviewed for about two hours, but never confessed to the crime. However, inculpatory statements obtained from the interrogation were admitted at trial. After the interrogation, Analla was booked and swabs of his hands were taken in order to test for gunshot residue. These tests later revealed that Analla recently had fired a firearm or had been close to one when it was fired, and were admitted at trial.\n \n \n 15\n A suppression hearing was held at which Analla testified. At the time of the arrest, Analla was 24 years old. He was born and lived in Morocco until the age of 16. At that time, he was adopted by his brother-in-law, who was in the U.S. Air Force, and his sister so that he could attend schools for the children of U.S. military personnel. Analla attended school in Morocco, Germany, England, and the United States. He was graduated from high school in 1985 and attended at least one semester at Louisiana Tech. Although he was a native of Morocco, Analla's understanding of the English language was not an issue, and the district court so found at the suppression hearing.\n \n \n 16\n Analla testified that he was scared of the police because of his childhood in Morocco. He testified that Moroccan police notoriously use torture and that he feared being tortured or shot should he refuse to answer any question asked, refuse to allow the search of his car, or try to leave the scene at any point, even at the earliest stages of his encounter with officers Parker and McCoy. He conceded, however, that the officers and agents never said or did anything suggesting torture. Instead, Analla claimed that he was intimidated by their tone of voice.\n \n \n 17\n The defense moved to suppress both the fruits of the search and the statements made during the interrogation. This motion was denied. The district court found the search to be a valid consensual search. The court found no evidence in the record that the police in any way threatened Analla with physical force or abuse or in any way implied that they would use force should Analla refuse to allow the search. The court also found that, in spite of his Moroccan origin, \"[g]iven the characteristics of the accused, of his age, his experience, his education, and his demonstrated maturity and intelligence, I find it hard to believe that the defendant was ... intimidated to such an extent by what was taking place that he was afraid\" to ask to leave the scene or to refuse the search.\n \n \n 18\n With regard to the interrogation, the district court found that Analla's statements were \"clearly voluntary\" under the totality of the circumstances. The court found that Analla had been advised at least twice of his Miranda rights prior to the interrogation, that, based on Analla's demeanor and testimony at the hearing, there was \"no reason ... to conclude that [he] did not understand the very simple and clear wording of the Miranda Rights,\" and that there was nothing in the record to indicate that the interrogating officers \"in any way threatened the defendant, harassed him, coerced him, or placed him under any duress, expressed or implied, to the extent that his voluntariness was destroyed.\"\n \n \n 19\n Defendant was tried before a jury and convicted of murder, assault with intent to kill, armed robbery, and use of a firearm in the commission of a felony. 18 U.S.C. &#167;&#167; 1111, 113(a), 2112, 924(c). During the trial, photographs of the surviving victim's gunshot wounds to the face and of the deceased victim lying in a pool of blood were admitted over the defendant's objection. Analla was sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder count, 20 years concurrent for the assault count and 15 years concurrent for the armed robbery count. The defendant also received a five year consecutive sentence on the firearm count. Analla now appeals his conviction and sentence.\n \n II\n \n 20\n We first address Analla's argument that the search of his car violated his fourth amendment rights because it was neither consensual nor based on the requisite level of objective justification. Analla makes two interrelated arguments on this point. First, he argues that he was unlawfully seized at the time of the search, and, therefore, that the search was not a valid consensual search. Second, Analla argues that, based on the totality of the circumstances of his encounter with police at the Pantry, his consent to search was not voluntary. We review both questions to determine whether the district court's findings are clearly erroneous. United States v. Gordon, 895 F.2d 932 (4th Cir.1990), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 131, 112 L.Ed.2d 98 (1990); United States v. Gooding, 695 F.2d 78, 82 (4th Cir.1982). Neither argument merits reversal.\n \n \n 21\n All contact between police and citizens does not amount to a seizure. Rather, what starts as a consensual encounter between police and citizen becomes a seizure within the meaning of the fourth amendment only when \"in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.\" INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 215, 104 S.Ct. 1758, 1762, 80 L.Ed.2d 247 (1984), quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 1877, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980).1 We emphasized in United States v. Gordon, supra 895 F.2d at 938, that the free-to-leave standard is an objective test, not a subjective one. The inquiry is whether a reasonable person under the circumstances would have believed that he was not free to leave. In Gordon, we rejected a defendant's argument that \"the fact that his father was a former police officer who taught him to respect and obey law enforcement personnel demonstrate[d] that he believed that he was not free to leave.\" Gordon, 895 F.2d at 937-38. We, therefore, find no merit to Analla's contention that he was seized because he thought, based on his experience with Moroccan police, that he would be restrained or even tortured should he try to leave.\n \n \n 22\n We also find, based on a review of the record, that the district court did not err in finding that Analla was not seized at the time that he gave consent to search his car.\n \n \n 23\n Specifically, the Court has held that \"interrogation relating to one's identity or a request for identification by the police does not, by itself, constitute a Fourth Amendment seizure.\" Delgado, 466 U.S. at 216, 104 S.Ct. at 1762. Only when the circumstances of the encounter \"become so intimidating as to demonstrate that a reasonable person would have believed he was not free to leave\" if he does not respond does the encounter become a seizure. Delgado, 466 U.S. at 216, 104 S.Ct. at 1763. It is also clear that the encounter does not become a seizure merely because the officers do not tell the defendant that he is free to leave or to refuse to comply with their requests. See Delgado, 466 U.S. at 216, 104 S.Ct. at 1762-63. Cf. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 231-34, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2049-51, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973) (applying this principle to a consensual search).\n \n \n 24\n When officer Parker approached Analla and asked to see his license and registration, Analla was not seized. Analla's cooperation with Parker did not convert the encounter into a seizure, even though Parker did not tell Analla that he was free to leave or to refuse the request. Although Parker was accompanied by officer McCoy, neither had his gun drawn. There is no evidence of any use or threat of physical force, and, although Analla claims that the officers' tone of voice was intimidating, the district court found to the contrary. Parker necessarily had to keep Analla's license and registration for a short time in order to check it with the dispatcher. However, he did not take the license into his squad car, but instead stood beside the car, near where Analla was standing, and used his walkie-talkie. Analla was free at this point to request that his license and registration be returned and to leave the scene.\n \n \n 25\n Analla urges that the following testimony by officer Moore suggests that Moore made Analla's freedom to leave conditional on his consent to the search:\n \n \n 26\n Q: Did you promise him anything if he would let you search the car?A: No, sir. I did tell him that I would like to search the car when everything cleared up.\n \n \n 27\n Court: Search the car what?\n \n \n 28\n A: Go ahead and clear the situation up.\n \n \n 29\n Because this argument was not made at the suppression hearing, the district court did not make explicit findings as to whether the statement would have implied to a reasonable person that he was not free to leave. A negative answer to this question clearly is implicit in the district court's other findings, however. We are of opinion that, based on the totality of the circumstances, as evidenced by the entire record rather than an isolated piece of testimony, a finding that the appellant was not seized in spite of this testimony is not clearly erroneous. This argument, therefore, does not merit a reversal of the district court's decision not to suppress the fruits of the search.\n \n \n 30\n In arguing that Analla's consent to search was not voluntary, appellant again stresses the above-quoted statement by officer Moore. Whether a defendant's consent to search is voluntary is a factual question determined in light of the totality of the circumstances and must be upheld unless clearly erroneous. United States v. Gordon, 895 F.2d 932, 938 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 131, 112 L.Ed.2d 98 (1990).\n \n \n 31\n Analla argues that officer Moore's statement, if an accurate representation of what he actually said to Analla when he asked for permission to search, would suggest to a reasonable person that he would not be allowed to leave unless he gave consent to the search. Cf. Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548, 88 S.Ct. 1788, 1791-92, 20 L.Ed.2d 797 (1968) (grandmother of accused did not consent to the search, but rather merely acquiesced to a claim of lawful authority because the police told her that they had a search warrant for the premises). When viewed in combination with the failure to tell Analla that he had the right to refuse to consent to the search and the threatening presence of three uniformed officers and three patrol cars, Analla argues that officer Moore's statement shows that his consent was not voluntarily given.\n \n \n 32\n Based on a review of the record, we cannot say that the district court's finding that the consent to search was given voluntarily is clearly erroneous. Analla was 24 years old at the time of the arrest. He had been graduated from high school and had attended some college. After observing Analla's responses at the hearing, the district court found that Analla appeared intelligent, articulated his views and positions well, and responded intelligently and comprehensively to questions asked of him during the hearing. The encounter with police lasted only a brief time prior to the search. There was no evidence that any force was used or threatened in any way. Officer Moore's recollection of what he said to Analla, even if accurate, did not amount to a claim of lawful authority to search Analla's car. As indicated above, the absence of an explicit finding with regard to this statement by officer Moore is understandable in light of Analla's failure to argue the point at the suppression hearing.\n \n III\n \n 33\n Analla next contends that statements he made during the FBI interrogation following his arrest and the gunpowder residue tests, also made while he was in police custody after his arrest, should have been suppressed as fruits of his illegal arrest. Because we find that the search of his car was lawful, we find that his subsequent arrest also was lawful. This argument, therefore, provides no basis for reversal.\n \n IV\n \n 34\n The trial court admitted two photographs of Mrs. Delia' face showing the two gunshot wounds that she sustained in the robbery and a photograph of the murdered victim, Mrs. Dougherty, lying in a pool of blood. Analla objected to the admission of these photographs on the grounds that their prejudicial effect would outweigh their probative value, if any. See Fed.R.Evid. 403. Appellant now argues that their admission was reversible error.\n \n \n 35\n The district court's admission of these pictures cannot be disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion. United States v. Whitfield, 715 F.2d 145 (4th Cir.1983). See also United States v. Melton, 970 F.2d 1328, 1336 (4th Cir.1992) (\"The balancing of the probative value against the potential prejudice of evidence is entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial court, and its appraisal, absent extraordinary circumstances, will not be disturbed on appeal.\"). The district court admitted the photographs of Mrs. Delia's face with the following comments:\n \n \n 36\n Well, count 4 of the indictment charges him carrying a firearm in commission of a crime of violence. I think this certainly goes to show a crime of violence. I think it's relevant to show the injuries that she sustained the left temple and right temple. I'm going to let them in, over your objection.\n \n \n 37\n The photograph of Mrs. Dougherty was introduced to show the position of the body and thus to corroborate the testimony of Mrs. Delia. The district court excluded all of the other photographs of Mrs. Dougherty, admitting only the one that showed the least amount of blood. We cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in admitting the photographs.\n \n V\n \n 38\n Next, appellant attacks his sentence to life without parole for first degree murder under 18 U.S.C. &#167; 1111. He makes two arguments.\n \n \n 39\n First, Analla argues that the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 does not abolish parole for a sentence of life imprisonment under &#167; 1111. We disagree.\n \n \n 40\n Section 1111 provides that \"[w]hoever is guilty of murder in the first degree ... shall be sentenced to imprisonment for life.\" 18 U.S.C. &#167; 1111(b)2. Prior to the Sentencing Reform Act, two sections provided the possibility of parole for those sentenced to life under &#167; 1111(b). See generally United States v. LaFleur, 952 F.2d 1537, 1544-45 (9th Cir.1991) (holding that after the effective date of the Sentencing Reform Act a life sentence without parole is the minimum sentence for first degree murder under &#167; 1111). The first, 18 U.S.C. &#167; 4206(d) provided:\n \n \n 41\n Any prisoner, serving a sentence of five years or longer, who is not earlier released under this section or any other applicable provision of law, shall be released on parole after having served two-thirds of each consecutive term or terms, or after serving thirty years of each consecutive term or terms of more than forty-five years including any life term, whichever is earlier: Provided, however, That the Commission shall not release such prisoner if it determines that he has seriously or frequently violated institution rules and regulations or that there is a reasonable probability that he will commit any Federal, State, or local crime. (Emphasis added).\n \n \n 42\n The second, 18 U.S.C. &#167; 4205(a), provided:\n \n \n 43\n Whenever confined and serving a definite term or terms of more than one year, a prisoner shall be eligible for release on parole after serving one-third of such term or terms or after serving ten years of a life sentence or of a sentence of over thirty years, except to the extent otherwise provided by law. (Emphasis added).\n \n \n 44\n The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 repealed both of these sections. See Pub.L. 98-473 &#167;&#167; 218(a)(5), 235, 98 Stat. 2027, 2031.\n \n \n 45\n Analla argues that the Sentencing Reform Act should not be interpreted to have abolished parole for those sentenced to life imprisonment because neither the Act nor the legislative history, see 1984 U.S.Code Cong. &amp; Admin.News 3182, 3220 et seq., specifically expresses the intent to abolish parole for life sentences. This argument misses the mark. Section 1111 itself does not provide for parole. It is only through sections 4205(a) and 4206(d) that a person sentenced to life imprisonment ever would have been eligible for parole. Both of these sections expressly refer to parole for a prisoner serving a life sentence and were in Chapter 311, U.S.Code. Section 218(a) of the repealer, 98 Stat. 2027, provides in part: \"The following sections of the U.S.Code are repealed: ... (4) Chapter 311....\" Congress could not have expressed its intent to abolish parole for life sentences any more clearly than by repealing the very sections that provided parole for the same.\n \n \n 46\n Analla also argues that he was denied his Fifth Amendment right to equal protection because 21 U.S.C. &#167; 848(e) provides a minimum sentence of 20 years while 18 U.S.C. &#167; 1111 provides a minimum sentence of life in prison. These two sections provide different penalties for different crimes. Section 848(e) punishes intentional murder in furtherance of a continuing criminal enterprise. Section 1111 punishes murder within the special maritime or territorial jurisdiction of the United States. There is simply no unequal treatment here that would even trigger an equal protection analysis. Anyone who violates section 848(e) is eligible for one sentence and anyone who violates section 1111 is eligible for a different sentence. The comparison of these two sections presents no more of an equal protection problem than would a comparison of the punishment for any other two different crimes. Congress is not bound to provide the same punishment for every unlawful homicide. See generally LaFleur, supra, 952 F.2d at 1547-48 (rejecting a claim that the difference in minimum sentences provided by &#167;&#167; 1111 and 848(e) violates equal protection by finding a rational basis for any unequal treatment and no suspect class requiring any higher level of scrutiny). Accordingly, we find no violation of equal protection.\n \n VI\n \n 47\n As a final matter, Analla argues that his sentences for the robbery count and the assault with intent to kill count were erroneous. He argues that the district court erred in sentencing him to the statutory maximum penalties for robbery and assault because such a sentence amounted to an upward departure from the Sentencing Guidelines without prior notice or a statement of reasons for the departure. We disagree because we find that the district court did not depart from the sentencing guidelines.\n \n \n 48\n In the instant case, Analla was found guilty of first degree murder (Count 1), assault with intent to murder (Count 2), robbery (Count 3), and use of a firearm in the commission of a felony (Count 4). Only the first three counts are relevant here. U.S.S.G. &#167; 3D1.1(b). The district court assigned adjusted offense levels to the first three counts as follows: Count 1 = 43; Count 2 = 28; Count 3 = 24. The district court then applied the multiple count rules from U.S.S.G. &#167; 3D1.1 and assigned a total offense level of 43 to these three counts. The procedure for determining the specific sentence to be imposed on each of the counts in a multiple-count case is governed by U.S.S.G. &#167; 5G1.2, which provides:\n \n \n 49\n (a) The sentence to be imposed on a count for which the statute mandates a consecutive sentence shall be determined and imposed independently.\n \n \n 50\n (b) Except as otherwise required by law (see &#167; 5G1.1(a), (b)), the sentence imposed on each other count shall be the total punishment as determined in accordance with Part D of Chapter Three, and Part C of this Chapter.\n \n \n 51\n (c) If the sentence imposed on the count carrying the highest statutory maximum is adequate to achieve the total punishment, then the sentences on all counts shall run concurrently, except to the extent otherwise required by law.\n \n \n 52\n (d) If the sentence imposed on the count carrying the highest statutory maximum is less than the total punishment, then the sentence imposed on one or more of the other counts shall run consecutively, but only to the extent necessary to produce a combined sentence equal to the total punishment. In all other respects sentences on all counts shall run concurrently, except to the extent otherwise required by law.\n \n \n 53\n The Commentary to this section provides in relevant part:Usually, at least one of the counts will have a statutory maximum adequate to permit imposition of the total punishment as the sentence on that count. The sentence on each of the other counts will then be set at the lesser of the total punishment and the applicable statutory maximum, and be made to run concurrently with all or part of the longest sentence.\n \n \n 54\n U.S.S.G. comment to &#167; 5G1.2. (emphasis added)\n \n \n 55\n In this case, the total punishment as determined by the adjusted combined offense level was life imprisonment. According to section 5G1.2(b), the sentence on the other counts, robbery and assault, would be life imprisonment, except as otherwise required by law. Section 5G1.1(a) provides that: \"[i]f the application of the guidelines results in a sentence above the maximum authorized by statute for the offense of conviction, the statutory maximum shall be the guideline sentence.\" Because life imprisonment exceeds the statutory maximum for both robbery and assault, the district court was correct in sentencing Analla to the statutory maximum for these two counts. Because the maximum allowable sentence for the murder count is adequate to achieve the total punishment of life imprisonment, section 5G1.2(c) provides that the sentences on the murder, robbery and assault counts are to run concurrently. The district court therefore did not err in imposing concurrent sentences of the statutory maximum for the robbery count and the assault count.\n \n \n 56\n The judgment of conviction and the sentence imposed are accordingly\n \n \n 57\n AFFIRMED.\n \n \n \n 1\n See, however, the discussion in Gooding, 695 F.2d at 81, n. 4\n \n \n 2\n There is no issue in the case with respect to the death penalty\n \n \n ", "ocr": false, "opinion_id": 590908 } ]
Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
F
USA, Federal
2,701,531
Boyle
2014-07-10
false
state-v-simmons
Simmons
State v. Simmons
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
0
Published
null
null
[ "2014 Ohio 3038" ]
[ { "author_str": null, "per_curiam": false, "type": "010combined", "page_count": 8, "download_url": "http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rod/docs/pdf/8/2014/2014-ohio-3038.pdf", "author_id": 8055, "opinion_text": "[Cite as State v. Simmons, 2014-Ohio-3038.]\n\n\n Court of Appeals of Ohio\n EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT\n COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA\n\n\n JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION\n No. 100638\n\n\n\n STATE OF OHIO\n PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE\n\n vs.\n\n ANTHONY SIMMONS\n DEFENDANT-APPELLANT\n\n\n\n\n JUDGMENT:\n AFFIRMED\n\n\n Criminal Appeal from the\n Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas\n Case No. CR-08-512632-A\n\n BEFORE: Boyle, A.J., Kilbane, J., and E.T. Gallagher, J.\n\n RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: July 10, 2014\n\fFOR APPELLANT\n\nAnthony Simmons, pro se\nInmate No. 561-857\nMarion Correctional Institution\nP.O. Box 57\nMarion, Ohio 43301\n\n\nATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE\n\nTimothy J. McGinty\nCuyahoga County Prosecutor\nBY: T. Allan Regas\nAssistant County Prosecutor\n8th Floor Justice Center\n1200 Ontario Street\nCleveland, Ohio 44113\n\fMARY J. BOYLE, A.J.:\n\n {¶1} Defendant-appellant, Anthony Simmons, appeals from the trial court’s\n\njudgment denying his motion to vacate and set aside void sentence. He raises three\n\nassignments of error for our review:\n\n 1. Trial court erred in not advising of right to appeal pursuant to Ohio\n Crim.R. 32(B).\n\n 2. Trial court failed to properly impose postrelease control pursuant to R.C.\n 2943.032.\n\n 3. Trial court erred in sentencing to crime that was not proved by proof of\n prior conviction.\n\n {¶2} Finding no merit to his appeal, we affirm.\n\n Procedural History\n\n {¶3} In June 2008, Simmons was indicted for aggravated robbery, kidnapping,\n\nand having a weapon while under disability. The aggravated robbery and kidnapping\n\ncharges carried one- and three-year firearm specifications. The charges arose after\n\nSimmons forced his father at gunpoint into his vehicle and ordered him to withdraw\n\n$1,700 in cash from his bank account.\n\n {¶4} In January 2009, Simmons pleaded guilty to aggravated robbery with a\n\none-year firearm specification, and to having a weapon while under a disability. The\n\nremaining charges were nolled. The trial court sentenced Simmons to a seven-year\n\nprison sentence: five years for aggravated robbery, plus one year for the firearm\n\nspecification, to be served prior to and consecutive to the aggravated robbery, and one year\n\ffor having a weapon while under a disability, to be served consecutive to the aggravated\n\nrobbery.\n\n {¶5} Simmons filed leave for a motion for delayed appeal on June 2, 2009. This\n\ncourt denied his motion and dismissed his appeal.\n\n {¶6} In December 2009, Simmons filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea,\n\nwhich the trial court denied. Simmons appealed. This court affirmed the trial court’s\n\ndenial of Simmons’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. See State v. Simmons, 8th Dist.\n\nCuyahoga No. 94982, 2010-Ohio-6188.\n\n {¶7} In September 2013, Simmons filed a motion to vacate and set aside void\n\nsentence, which the trial court denied. It is from this judgment that Simmons now\n\nappeals.\n\n Untimely Petition for Postconviction Relief\n\n {¶8} This court has consistently maintained:\n\n A motion that is not filed pursuant to a specific rule of\n criminal procedure “must be categorized by a\n court in order for the court to know the criteria\n by which the motion should be judged.” Where a\n criminal defendant, subsequent to a direct\n appeal, files a motion seeking vacation or\n correction of his or her sentence on the basis that\n his or her constitutional rights have been\n violated, such a motion is a petition for\n postconviction relief as defined in R.C. 2953.21.\n\n\nState v. Marks, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99474, 2013-Ohio-3734, quoting State v.\n\nAlexander, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 95995, 2011-Ohio-1380, ¶ 12; see also State v. Kelly,\n\f8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 97673, 2012-Ohio-2930, ¶ 11; State v. Meincke, 8th Dist.\n\nCuyahoga No. 96407, 2011-Ohio-6473; State v. Reynolds, 79 Ohio St.3d 158, 160-161,\n\n679 N.E.2d 1131 (1997).\n\n {¶9} R.C. 2953.21 through 2953.23 set forth the means by which a convicted\n\ndefendant may seek to have the trial court’s judgment or sentence vacated or set aside\n\npursuant to a petition for postconviction relief. A defendant’s petition for postconviction\n\nrelief is a collateral civil attack on his or her criminal conviction. See State v. Gondor, 112\n\nOhio St.3d 377, 2006-Ohio-6679, 860 N.E.2d 77, ¶ 48. The statute affords relief from\n\njudgment where the petitioner’s rights in the proceedings that resulted in his conviction\n\nwere denied to such an extent the conviction is rendered void or voidable under the Ohio or\n\nUnited States Constitutions. R.C. 2953.21(A); State v. Perry, 10 Ohio St.2d 175, 226\n\nN.E.2d 104 (1967), paragraph four of the syllabus.\n\n {¶10} A defendant, however, must file any motion to be considered pursuant to R.C.\n\n2953.21 within the jurisdictional, 180-day time limit delineated in the statute. R.C.\n\n2953.21 provides that the petition must be filed within 180 days from the filing of the trial\n\ntranscripts in the petitioner’s direct appeal or, if a direct appeal was not pursued, 180 days\n\nafter the expiration of the time in which a direct appeal could have been filed. Simmons\n\ndid not file his motion until well beyond the 180 days after the expiration of the time to file\n\nhis direct appeal.\n\n {¶11} R.C. 2953.23(A)(1) allows a trial court to entertain an untimely or successive\n\npetition only if: (1) the petitioner was unavoidably prevented from discovering the facts on\n\fwhich the petition is predicated, or (2) the United States Supreme Court has recognized a\n\nnew federal or state right that applies retroactively to the petitioner and the petition asserts\n\na claim based on that new right. R.C. 2953.23(A)(1)(a). If the petitioner is able to\n\nsatisfy one of these threshold conditions, he or she must then demonstrate that, but for the\n\nconstitutional error at trial, no reasonable factfinder would have found him or her guilty of\n\nthe offenses of which he was convicted. R.C. 2953.23(A)(1)(b).\n\n {¶12} Therefore, unless it appears from the record that Simmons was unavoidably\n\nprevented from discovering facts upon which he relied in his petition, or the United States\n\nSupreme Court has recognized a new federal or state right that applies retroactively to him,\n\nand that but for constitutional error at trial, no reasonable factfinder would have found him\n\nguilty, we are bound to conclude the trial court was without jurisdiction to consider his\n\npetition for postconviction relief.\n\n Analysis\n\n {¶13} Simmons does not even allege, let alone establish, any of the requirements\n\nnecessary to bring an untimely petition for postconviction relief. Simmons does not claim\n\nthat he was unavoidably prevented from discovering the facts upon which he relied in his\n\npetition. Nor has the United States Supreme Court recognized a new federal or state right\n\nthat applies retroactively to Simmons. Thus, he does not meet the threshold requirements\n\nthat are necessary before a trial court can consider his petition. Accordingly, the trial\n\ncourt was without jurisdiction to address his petition.\n\n {¶14} Even overlooking Simmons’s procedural problems with his petition, his\n\farguments still fail. Regarding his first assignment of error that he was not advised of his\n\nright to appeal, Simmons has failed to provide a transcript to this court. “In the absence\n\nof a record, the proceedings at trial are presumed correct.” State v. Brown, 38 Ohio St.3d\n\n305, 528 N.E.2d 523 (1988). As the Ohio Supreme Court stated in Knapp v. Edwards\n\nLaboratories, 61 Ohio St.2d 197, 400 N.E.2d 384 (1980):\n\n The duty to provide a transcript for appellate review falls upon the appellant.\n This is necessarily so because an appellant bears the burden of showing\n error by reference to matters in the record. * * * When portions of the\n transcript necessary for resolution of assigned errors are omitted from the\n record, the reviewing court has nothing to pass upon and thus, as to those\n assigned errors, the court has no choice but to presume the validity of the\n lower court’s proceedings, and affirm.\n\nId. at 199.\n\n {¶15} Accordingly, without any record to review, we must presume regularity in the\n\nproceedings of the trial court and summarily reject appellant’s assignment of error.\n\n {¶16} With respect to his second assignment of error, where he argued that the trial\n\ncourt failed to properly advise him of postrelease control in a previous criminal case that\n\nled to his current having a weapon while under a disability conviction, we find this\n\nargument to be entirely without merit. Even if Simmons was not properly advised of\n\npostrelease control in his previous criminal case, which we cannot determine if he was\n\nbecause he did not provide a transcript of his previous sentencing hearing or a sentencing\n\nentry from that case, only the postrelease control portion of his sentence would be contrary\n\nto law; his previous conviction would stand. See State v. Fischer, 128 Ohio St.3d 92,\n\n2010-Ohio-6238, 942 N.E.2d 332 (“[W]hen a judge fails to impose statutorily mandated\n\fpostrelease control as part of a defendant’s sentence, that part of the sentence is void and\n\nmust be set aside”). Thus, Simmons’s argument is without merit.\n\n {¶17} In his final assignment of error, he argues that the state did not prove the\n\nhaving a weapon while under a disability charge because he was not properly advised of\n\npostrelease control in his previous criminal case that led to his having a weapon while\n\nunder a disability conviction. Again, even if his postrelease control was invalid in his\n\nprevious criminal case, his conviction would stand.\n\n {¶18} Accordingly, Simmons’s assignments of error are without merit.\n\n {¶19} Judgment affirmed.\n\n It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant costs herein taxed.\n\n The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.\n\n It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common\n\npleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s conviction having\n\nbeen affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the trial court\n\nfor execution of sentence.\n\n A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the\n\nRules of Appellate Procedure.\n\n\n\n\nMARY J. BOYLE, ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE\n\nMARY EILEEN KILBANE, J., and\nEILEEN T. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR\n\f", "ocr": false, "opinion_id": 2701531 } ]
Ohio Court of Appeals
Ohio Court of Appeals
SA
Ohio, OH
12,441
Parker, Smith, Wisdom
1997-07-09
false
financial-security-assurance-inc-v-t-h-new-orleans-ltd-partnership
null
Financial Security Assurance Inc. v. T-H New Orleans Ltd. Partnership
In the Matter of T-H NEW ORLEANS LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, Debtor. FINANCIAL SECURITY ASSURANCE INC., Appellant-Cross-Appellee, v. T-H NEW ORLEANS LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, Appellee-Cross-Appellant
Martin J. Bienenstoek, Weil, Gotshal & Manges, New York City, Eugene R. Preaus, Preaus, Roddy & Krebs, New Orleans, LA, for Appellant-Cross-Appellee., Rudy Joseph Cerone, B. Franklin Martin, III, McGlinehey, Stafford & Lang, New Orleans, LA, for Appellee-Cross-Appellant.
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null
null
null
null
null
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null
null
0
Published
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<parties id="b896-9"> In the Matter of T-H NEW ORLEANS LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, Debtor. FINANCIAL SECURITY ASSURANCE INC., Appellant-Cross-Appellee, v. T-H NEW ORLEANS LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, Appellee-Cross-Appellant. </parties><br><docketnumber id="b896-15"> No. 95-31233. </docketnumber><br><court id="b896-16"> United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit. </court><br><decisiondate id="b896-18"> July 9, 1997. </decisiondate><attorneys id="Aau"> <span citation-index="1" class="star-pagination" label="793"> *793 </span> Martin J. Bienenstoek, Weil, Gotshal &amp; Manges, New York City, Eugene R. Preaus, Preaus, Roddy &amp; Krebs, New Orleans, LA, for Appellant-Cross-Appellee. </attorneys><attorneys id="ADH"> Rudy Joseph Cerone, B. Franklin Martin, III, McGlinehey, Stafford &amp; Lang, New Orleans, LA, for Appellee-Cross-Appellant. </attorneys><judges id="AVD"> Before WISDOM, SMITH and PARKER, Circuit Judges. </judges>
[ "116 F.3d 790" ]
[ { "author_str": "Parker", "per_curiam": false, "type": "010combined", "page_count": 29, "download_url": "http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions\\pub\\95/95-31233.CV0.wpd.pdf", "author_id": null, "opinion_text": " United States Court of Appeals,\n\n Fifth Circuit.\n\n No. 95-31233.\n\n In the Matter of T-H NEW ORLEANS LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, Debtor.\n\n FINANCIAL SECURITY ASSURANCE INC., Appellant-Cross-Appellee,\n\n v.\n\n T-H NEW ORLEANS LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, Appellee-Cross-Appellant.\n\n July 9, 1997.\n\nAppeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern\nDistrict of Louisiana.\n\nBefore WISDOM, SMITH and PARKER, Circuit Judges.\n\n ROBERT M. PARKER, Circuit Judge:\n\n This Court visits this case for a second time.1 The\n\nAppellant, Financial Security Assurance, Inc. (\"FSA\"), appeals the\n\nbankruptcy court's ruling that it was not entitled to postpetition\n\npreconfirmation interest from the petition date notwithstanding\n\nFSA's overcollateralization at confirmation; the value assigned to\n\nthe collateral; the appropriate confirmation interest rate; and\n\nconfirmation of the bankrupt's Chapter 11 plan. On appeal, FSA\n\nasserts a myriad of errors by the bankruptcy court. T-H New\n\nOrleans Limited Partnership (\"T-H NOLP\") asserts two cross-issues.\n\nFinding no reversible error, we affirm.\n\n FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY\n\n In June of 1988, T-H NOLP acquired a Days Inn Hotel (the\n\n\n 1\n This Court has already heard a previous appeal between the\ntwo parties to this appeal. See In re T-H New Orleans Ltd.\nPartnership, 10 F.3d 1099 (5th Cir.1993) (\"T-H NOLP I\").\n\n 1\n\f\"Hotel\") in New Orleans, Louisiana and has operated the Hotel\n\ncontinuously since that date. T-H NOLP is a limited partnership\n\nwith a corporate general partner, Tollman-Hundley New Orleans\n\nCorp., and five individual limited partners. The day-to-day\n\nmanagement and operations of the Hotel property are carried out by\n\nthe individuals employed by T-H NOLP. T-H NOLP is also a member of\n\nthe Tollman-Hundley Hotels group of companies.\n\n In February 1989, T-H NOLP sought to restructure the\n\nunder-lying mortgage debt on the Hotel through a mortgage bond\n\nfinancing transaction involving T-H NOLP and six other hotels owned\n\nby separate Tollman-Hundley partnerships. As part of the\n\nrefinancing, T-H NOLP and the six other hotel partnerships, all\n\ncontrolled by Monty Hundley and Stanley Tollman, obtained separate\n\nbut cross-collateralized and cross-guaranteed first mortgage loans,\n\nwhich were secured by the Hotel and other hotels as well as the\n\nrevenues generated therefrom, in the amount of $87,000,000 from a\n\nnewly created business trust (the \"Issuer\"). T-H NOLP executed\n\nvarious agreements including a Mortgage Note and Loan Agreement,\n\nand a Collateral Mortgage Note.\n\n To raise the necessary money to make the mortgage loans to T-H\n\nNOLP and the other hotels, the Issuer issued $87,000,000 in bonds,\n\nthe payment of which was guaranteed by a surety bond issued by FSA.\n\nIn return, the Issuer of the bonds assigned to FSA all its rights\n\nand interest in the security agreements, and authorized FSA to be\n\nits attorney-in-fact in order to take whatever actions FSA deemed\n\nnecessary to exercise its rights under the mortgage loans and\n\n\n 2\n\frelated collateral.\n\n By 1990, T-H NOLP and the six other partnerships were in\n\ndefault on the loans, and FSA stepped into the shoes of the bond\n\nIssuer. After the parties were unable to reach a settlement, FSA\n\naccelerated the mortgage note and demanded payment of all amounts\n\ndue under the loan agreement and guarantee. On February 25, 1991,\n\nT-H NOLP filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy\n\nCode; the other six hotel partnerships also filed for bankruptcy.\n\nAt the time T-H NOLP filed bankruptcy, FSA's allowed claim was\n\n$18.424 million.\n\n Subsequent to the bankruptcy filing, FSA filed a motion for\n\nadequate protection or segregation of hotel receipts. The\n\nbankruptcy court granted FSA's motion, finding that it had a\n\nsecurity interest in the Hotel's prepetition and postpetition\n\nrevenues from its operations, and ordered that the Hotel's business\n\nrevenues be segregated. The bankruptcy court also entered a cash\n\ncollateral order (dated May 1, 1992) which provided that T-H NOLP\n\nmake payments from the Hotel's net revenues in order to reduce its\n\nobligation to FSA.\n\n On appeal, this Court in In re T-H New Orleans Limited\n\nPartnership, 10 F.3d 1099 (5th Cir.1993) (\"T-H NOLP I\") held that\n\nT-H NOLP's postpetition Hotel revenues were \"rents\" under Louisiana\n\nlaw and, therefore, were subject to FSA's prepetition security\n\nagreement under § 552(b) of the Bankruptcy Code and must be\n\nsegregated. The Court remanded the case with instructions for\n\nfurther proceedings consistent with its opinion.\n\n\n 3\n\f On February 24, 1994 T-H NOLP filed its amended disclosure\n\nstatement and amended plan of reorganization. The bankruptcy court\n\napproved the amended disclosure statement in June 1994. On July\n\n15, 1994, FSA filed an objection to plan confirmation, and T-H NOLP\n\nfiled an objection to FSA's claim.\n\n The bankruptcy court, early in the case, found that the\n\nappraised value of the Hotel was $12.2 million; this valuation was\n\nbased upon an appraisal report as of July 1, 1991 which was\n\ncommissioned by FSA. FSA's motion for adequate protection was based\n\nupon this appraised value. Subsequently, the bankruptcy court held\n\na hearing to determine the fair value of the Hotel and found, after\n\nconsidering the evidence presented by T-H NOLP and FSA, that, as of\n\nJuly 14, 1994, the fair value of the Hotel was $13.7 million.2\n\nAccordingly, the bankruptcy court found that the value of FSA's\n\nsecurity interest in the Hotel was $13.7 million. The bankruptcy\n\ncourt also found that based on the uncontroverted testimony, the\n\nfair value of the Hotel would increase over the two year period\n\nfollowing confirmation of T-H NOLP's proposed amended plan.\n\n The bankruptcy court also held a hearing on FSA's allowed\n\nclaim. FSA stipulated for purposes of the confirmation hearing\n\nthat its allowed claim as of the petition date was $18,424,000. T-\n\n 2\n FSA provided an appraisal valuing the Hotel at a greater\nvalue. However, that appraisal did not include adjustments for a\nyearly corporate overhead allocation which the bankruptcy court\nfound, based on the evidence presented, to be a necessary expense\nand should be accounted for in determining the fair value of the\nHotel. FSA's appraiser testified that if the corporate overhead\nallocation charge was considered, his opinion as to the appraised\nvalue of the Hotel would decrease by the amount of the allocation\nand the Hotel's fair value would be $13.7 million.\n\n 4\n\fH NOLP presented evidence showing that it had made postpetition\n\ncash collateral payments of $4,675,945 through the end of\n\nSeptember, 1994.3 Thus, the bankruptcy court, after accounting for\n\nthe postpetition rent payments (pursuant to the May 1, 1992 cash\n\ncollateral order) on FSA's claim and not including any potential\n\nentitlement to postpetition preconfirmation interest, found that\n\nFSA's claim amounted to $13,748,055 as of September 30, 1994.4\n\n The bankruptcy court therefore found that because FSA's claim\n\nof $13,748,055 was greater than the fair value of the Hotel ($13.7\n\nmillion), thus making FSA's claim undersecured, FSA was not\n\nentitled to postpetition, preconfirmation interest on its claim\n\nunder § 506(b) of the Bankruptcy Code until the time when the value\n\nof its collateral exceeded the amount of its claim. At that point,\n\nFSA would be entitled to interest at the contract rate on its claim\n\nto the extent that the value of the collateral exceeds its allowed\n\nclaim, i.e. the equity cushion, and that any postpetition interest\n\nwas limited to the equity cushion created by the monthly accrual of\n\n\n 3\n A representative of FSA testified that FSA had received cash\ncollateral from T-H NOLP in the amount of $4,770,666 as of\nSeptember 23, 1994; however, FSA's representative failed to\npresent any supporting evidence to support FSA's position.\n 4\n The bankruptcy court applied the cash collateral payments\nagainst the unsecured portion of FSA's claim, following the\nbankruptcy court in In re 354 East 66th Street Realty Corp., 177\nB.R. 776 (Bankr.E.D.N.Y.1995). In reaching its decision, the\nbankruptcy court analyzed the two line of cases that have addressed\nthis issue, i.e., the addition cases and the subtraction cases.\nSee, e.g. In re Union Meeting Partners, 178 B.R. 664\n(Bankr.E.D.Pa.1995). However, we do not answer today the question\nof whether the bankruptcy court's reduction of the unsecured\nportion of FSA's claim was proper, as that issue was not raised on\nappeal.\n\n 5\n\fnet rents generated by the Hotel.\n\n Finally, with respect to T-H NOLP's amended plan of\n\nreorganization (the \"Plan\"), FSA was the only creditor to object to\n\nconfirmation of the Plan and to vote to reject the amended Plan.5\n\nFSA argued against Plan confirmation on several grounds which are\n\naddressed in each of its issues on appeal. All other classes of\n\ncreditors either voted affirmatively to accept the amended Plan or\n\nwere deemed to have accepted the amended Plan. Thus, T-H NOLP\n\nsought confirmation of its amended Plan under the \"cramdown\"\n\nprovisions of Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. Following three\n\ndays of confirmation hearings, the bankruptcy court on March 27,\n\n1995, entered an order denying Plan confirmation.6\n\n On March 30, 1995, the bankruptcy court entered an order\n\nconfirming T-H NOLP's amended Plan under the cramdown provisions of\n\nChapter 11. The bankruptcy court also determined that the proper\n\npostconfirmation interest rate was 11.5 percent. On June 27, 1995,\n\n\n 5\n FSA's claim was a Class 4 claim in the amended plan which was\nto be treated as follows: (a) reduction of FSA's claim from the\nprepetition amount of $18.242 million by application of\npostpetition, preconfirmation payments made to FSA under the\nbankruptcy court's May 1, 1992 cash collateral order; (b) payment\nof the remaining amount of the FSA claim through twenty-four\nmonthly payments of principal and post-confirmation interest, based\non a twenty-year principal amortization at 8% interest or such\nother cramdown rate approved by the bankruptcy court, with a\nballoon payment of all remaining principal and interest at the end\nof two years; and (c) payment of the remaining balance, after\napplication of all prior payments, in one of three ways (1)\nrefinancing with another lender; (2) sale of the Hotel; or (3) a\ndation en paiement transferring ownership of the Hotel.\n 6\n The bankruptcy court denied plan confirmation based on\nlanguage in Section X.2 of the plan which it considered overly\nbroad and ambiguous. T-H NOLP agreed to delete this language.\n\n 6\n\fthe bankruptcy court denied FSA's motion for reconsideration or new\n\ntrial.\n\n Both FSA and T-H NOLP appealed to the district court for a\n\nreview of the bankruptcy court's decisions. The district court\n\naffirmed. This appeal ensued. We now address FSA's and T-H NOLP's\n\narguments raised before this Court.\n\n DISCUSSION\n\n This Court, acting as a second review court, reviews the\n\nbankruptcy court's findings of fact under the clearly erroneous\n\nstandard, and the bankruptcy court's conclusions of law de novo.\n\nIn re United States Abatement Corp., 79 F.3d 393, 397 (5th\n\nCir.1996). We also note that while FSA listed in its brief\n\nfourteen issues on appeal, FSA only discusses six of them in the\n\ncorpus of its brief. Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(a)(6)\n\nprovides that \"[t]he argument must contain the contentions of the\n\nappellant on the issues presented, and the reasons therefor....\"\n\nPursuant to Rule 28, this Court has found \"that contentions not\n\nbriefed are waived and will not be considered on appeal.\" Trust\n\nCo. of Louisiana v. N.N.P., Inc., 104 F.3d 1478, 1485 (5th\n\nCir.1997) (citing Zeno v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 803\n\nF.2d 178 (5th Cir.1986)). Thus, the only issues that this Court\n\nwill consider on appeal are those that were actually briefed by the\n\nparties in accordance with Rule 28.\n\n1. FSA's Entitlement to Postpetition Interest\n\n FSA asserts that the value of the Hotel was increasing during\n\nthe bankruptcy proceedings, and that its claim was decreasing due\n\n\n 7\n\fto the monthly cash collateral payments. Thus, at some point\n\nbetween September 1994 and the March 30, 1995 confirmation order\n\nthe value of the property became greater than its claim.\n\nThere-fore, FSA argues that since the collateral's value exceeded\n\nits claim on the day the Chapter 11 plan was confirmed or became\n\neffective, it was entitled to postpetition interest under § 506(b)\n\nto the extent of its contract rate for the entire postpetition\n\nperiod. FSA also argues that it should have been paid the\n\npostpetition interest monthly instead of at confirmation. In\n\nresponse, T-H NOLP relies on the bankruptcy court's conclusion, and\n\nobjects to the allowance of any postpetition preconfirmation\n\ninterest on FSA's claim until that point in time when the Hotel's\n\nvalue was greater than FSA's claim. T-H NOLP also asserts on\n\ncross-appeal that the bankruptcy court erred by requiring it to\n\nmake postpetition preconfirmation interest payments while FSA\n\nappealed the bankruptcy court's order confirming T-H NOLP's Plan.\n\n The parties' arguments raise the following questions for our\n\nconsideration. First, where a secured creditor is receiving cash\n\ncollateral payments which reduce the creditor's allowed claim such\n\nthat at some point in time prior to plan confirmation the creditor\n\nmay become oversecured, is that creditor entitled to accrue\n\ninterest under § 506(b)? Second, when, under § 506(b), does\n\ninterest begin to accrue, and the extent to which a creditor is\n\nentitled to postpetition interest?\n\n There is no question that a creditor's entitlement to\n\npostpetition interest on its claim is determined under § 506(b) of\n\n\n 8\n\fthe Bankruptcy Code. Section 506(b) states in relevant part that\n\n\"[t]o the extent that an allowed secured claim is secured by\n\nproperty, the value of which ... is greater than the amount of such\n\nclaim, there shall be allowed to the holder of such claim interest\n\non such claim....\" 11 U.S.C. § 506(b). The United States Supreme\n\nCourt in United States v. Ron Pair Enter., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 109\n\nS.Ct. 1026, 103 L.Ed.2d 290 (1989) made clear that under § 506(b)\n\na creditor is unqualifiedly entitled to postpetition interest on\n\nits oversecured claim. Id. at 241, 109 S.Ct. at 1030; see In re\n\nPointer, 952 F.2d 82 (5th Cir.1992); In re Sublett, 895 F.2d 1381\n\n(11th Cir.1990). However, § 506(b) applies only from the date of\n\nfiling through the confirmation date. Rake v. Wade, 508 U.S. 464,\n\n468, 113 S.Ct. 2187, 2190, 124 L.Ed.2d 424 (1993) (overruled on\n\nother grounds by 11 U.S.C. § 1322(e)).\n\n Under § 506(b), the creditor's entitlement to postpetition\n\ninterest is clearly predicated on the threshold establishment of\n\nthe two values to be compared, that of the property and the claim.\n\nThus, the first inquiry under § 506(b) is usually a finding of\n\nwhether the creditor is oversecured and thus entitled to accrue\n\npostpetition interest on its claim. In arguing that at some point\n\nbetween the time the petition was filed and confirmation of the\n\nPlan, the value of the Hotel became greater than the value of FSA's\n\nclaim thus entitling FSA to postpetition interest, FSA invites us\n\nto consider when valuation should occur for purposes of determining\n\na creditor's entitlement to postpetition interest.\n\n With respect to the first question, the parties in their\n\n\n 9\n\fargument cite this Court to United Sav. Ass'n. of Texas v. Timbers\n\nof Inwood Forest Assoc., Ltd. (In re Timbers of Inwood Forest\n\nAssoc., Ltd.), 793 F.2d 1380 (5th Cir.1986), on reh'g, 808 F.2d 363\n\n(5th Cir.1987) (en banc court reinstating panel opinion), aff'd,\n\n484 U.S. 365, 108 S.Ct. 626, 98 L.Ed.2d 740 (1988). In Timbers, an\n\nundersecured creditor sought postpetition interest representing\n\nlost \"opportunity costs\" on the amount of its secured claim under\n\n§ 362(d) of the Bankruptcy Code. This Court declined the creditor's\n\nrequest and held that an undersecured creditor was not entitled to\n\npostpetition interest on the value of its collateral as an element\n\nof adequate protection. In reaching its ruling, the Timbers court\n\nexamined other Bankruptcy Code provisions that bore \"indirectly\" on\n\nthe question considered. In considering § 506(b) and (c), the\n\nCourt noted that:\n\n [t]he timing of the payment of accrued interest to an\n oversecured creditor (at the conclusion of the proceeding) is\n doubtless based on the fact that it is not possible to compute\n the amount of § 506(c) recovery (and, accordingly the net\n allowed secured claim on which interest is computed ) until\n the termination of the proceeding.\n\nTimbers, 793 F.2d at 1407. (emphasis added).\n\n Although beneficial, this language does not answer the\n\nquestion we are presented with in the instant case. In addition,\n\nthe Timbers Court was not confronted with the question we are\n\npresented today. We note that the creditor in Timbers was\n\nundersecured at the time of the adequate protection hearing and its\n\nappeal to this Court, and the value of the collateral was not\n\nincreasing and there was no evidence that future appreciation would\n\n\n\n 10\n\fprovide for post-petition interest.7\n\n Under § 506, valuations are to be made in light of the purpose\n\nof the valuation. In re Landing Assoc., Ltd. 122 B.R. 288\n\n(Bankr.W.D.Tex.1990). We recognize that the value of a debtor's\n\ncollateral and the amount of a creditor's claim are among the most\n\nimportant issues between the debtor and the secured claimholder.\n\nValuation issues can arise in various contexts throughout the\n\nentire bankruptcy case. See In re Stanley, 185 B.R. 417\n\n(Bankr.D.Conn.1995). Establishing equity, allowing claims,\n\nadequate protection, and plan confirmation are only a few examples\n\nof when the issue of valuation can be raised. Id. at 423. Neither\n\nBankruptcy Code § 506(b) nor the Bankruptcy Rules define or\n\nestablish the time for determining valuation of collateral for\n\npurposes of § 506(b). In re Fox, 142 B.R. 206 (Bankr.S.D.Ohio\n\n1992). The legislative history to § 506(b) is also silent on this\n\npoint. This Court's research has not disclosed any circuit\n\n 7\n We also note that In re Delta Resources, Inc., 54 F.3d 722\n(11th Cir.), cert. denied, sub nom. Orix Credit Alliance, Inc. v.\nDelta Resources, Inc., --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 488, 133 L.Ed.2d\n415 (1995), addressed the narrow issue of whether a purportedly\noversecured creditor was entitled to receive periodic cash payments\nfor accruing postpetition interest as part of adequate protection\nin order to preserve the value of its equity cushion. We are not\nconfronted with this question.\n\n In comparing when adequate protection is measured versus\n interest under § 506(b), the Delta Resources court held that\n a creditor's claim is measured as it existed at the time of\n the petition date because postpetition interest is limited to\n the amount by which the claim was oversecured at that time.\n We agree with this general proposition in the ordinary\n \"underwater\" asset case; however, in the context where the\n collateral is rising and the creditor's claim is decreasing\n (as in the present case), we find this ruling to be\n inappropriately narrow.\n\n 11\n\fauthority which has discussed the question before us today,\n\nalthough we note that the lower courts that have faced this\n\ncircumstance have selected a single valuation date. See, e.g., In\n\nre Hulen Park Place, Ltd., 130 B.R. 39, 43 (N.D.Tex.1991)\n\n(determining whether creditor's claim is oversecured must be\n\ndetermined as of the petition date); In re Landing Assoc., Ltd.,\n\n122 B.R. 288, 297 (Bankr.W.D.Tex.1990) (measurement date is\n\nconfirmation date).8\n\n We decline to follow such a narrow path. Therefore, we\n\nconclude that for purposes of determining whether a creditor is\n\nentitled to accrue interest under § 506(b) in the circumstance\n\nwhere the collateral's value is increasing and/or the creditor's\n\nallowed claim has been or is being reduced by cash collateral\n\npayments, such that at some point in time prior to confirmation of\n\nthe debtor's plan the creditor may become oversecured, valuation of\n\nthe collateral and the creditor's claim should be flexible and not\n\nlimited to a single point in time, such as the petition date or\n\nconfirmation date. We further hold that, notwithstanding the\n\nbankruptcy court's determination of a creditor's secured status as\n\nof the petition date (if such a finding is made), the party who\n\ncontends that there is a dispute as to whether a creditor is\n\n 8\n Although not controlling, we also recognize that there is\nample discussion on the valuation issue in the context of adequate\nprotection. See, e.g., In re Cason, 190 B.R. 917\n(Bankr.N.D.Ala.1995) (discussing three valuation approaches); In\nre Addison Properties Ltd. Partnership, 185 B.R. 766\n(Bankr.N.D.Ill.1995) (same); see also Craig H. Averch et al., The\nTreatment of Net Rents in Bankruptcy—Adequate Protection, Payments\nof Interest, Return of Collateral, or Reduction of Debt, 48 U.\nMiami L.Rev. 691 (1994).\n\n 12\n\fentitled to interest under § 506(b) must motion the bankruptcy\n\ncourt to make such a determination. The creditor though bears the\n\nultimate burden to prove by a preponderance of evidence its\n\nentitlement to postpetition interest, that is, that its claim was\n\noversecured, to what extent, and for what period of time. In re\n\nGrabill Corp., 121 B.R. 983, 991-92 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1990). This\n\nruling recognizes the discretionary nature of bankruptcy courts as\n\ncourts of equity. However, bankruptcy courts are not precluded\n\nfrom fashioning remedies to prevent unwarranted multiple\n\nredeterminations.\n\n A flexible approach recognizes the fact that a creditor's\n\nallowed claim, which is being reduced over time, may become\n\nentitled to accrue postpetition interest, and that under the plain\n\nlanguage of § 506(b) there is nothing limiting that right. See\n\nUnited States v. Ron Pair Enter., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 109 S.Ct.\n\n1026, 103 L.Ed.2d 290 (1989) (employing a plain meaning reading of\n\n§ 506(b)). A flexible approach also recognizes that any increase\n\nover the judicially determined valuation during bankruptcy rightly\n\naccrues to the benefit of the creditor, and not to the debtor.\n\nMoreover, as the bankruptcy court in In re Addison Properties\n\nnoted, the single valuation approach generally balances the\n\nbankruptcy process in favor of the debtor. In re Addison\n\nProperties Ltd. Partnership, 185 B.R. 766, 772\n\n(Bankr.N.D.Ill.1995). Because of the equitable nature of\n\nbankruptcy in seeking a balance between debtors and creditors\n\n(debtor's right to a fresh start versus the creditor's right to the\n\n\n 13\n\fvalue of its claim), we reject the single valuation approach under\n\nthe particular facts of this case.\n\n Thus, applying this ruling to the instant case, if FSA\n\nbelieved that under § 506(b) it was entitled to accrue postpetition\n\ninterest on its claim during the period following the confirmation\n\nhearing, then absent agreement between the parties as to the point\n\nin time when FSA's claim became oversecured, FSA was required to\n\nmotion the bankruptcy court for a redetermination of its secured\n\nstatus. The bankruptcy court in this case was presented with the\n\nunusual fact situation where FSA's claim was being reduced and the\n\nHotel's value was appreciating during the time from the petition\n\ndate to the confirmation hearing. However, the bankruptcy court\n\nfound that, for the period from the confirmation hearings to Plan\n\nconfirmation, FSA's claim went from being undersecured to being\n\noversecured and that this would probably occur in October 1994.\n\nBecause the bankruptcy court made the factual finding as to when\n\nFSA would become oversecured, under the particular facts of this\n\ncase we cannot say that the bankruptcy court was clearly erroneous\n\nin its decision.9\n\n We next address the accrual of interest under § 506(b) and\n\nthe extent to which a creditor is entitled to interest under §\n\n506(b). We find this question to be relatively straightforward.\n\nThe measuring date on which the status of a creditor's collateral\n\n 9\n We note that the bankruptcy court found that FSA \"probably\"\nwould become oversecured sometime in October 1994. Although we\nfind it to be a close question, we are persuaded that the\nbankruptcy court's finding is supported by the evidence in this\ncase.\n\n 14\n\fand claim are compared is determinative of a creditor's right to\n\naccrue interest under § 506(b). Thus, a secured creditor's\n\nentitlement to accrue interest under § 506(b) matures at that point\n\nin time where the creditor's claim becomes oversecured.10 However,\n\nas Timbers dictates, accrued interest under § 506(b) is not paid to\n\nan oversecured creditor until the plan's confirmation or its\n\neffective date, whichever is later. United Sav. Ass'n. of Texas v.\n\nTimbers of Inwood Forest Assoc., Ltd. (In re Timbers of Inwood\n\nForest Assoc., Ltd.), 793 F.2d 1380, 1381, 1407 (5th Cir.1986), on\n\nreh'g, 808 F.2d 363 (5th Cir.1987 (en banc court reinstating panel\n\nopinion)), aff'd, 484 U.S. 365, 108 S.Ct. 626, 98 L.Ed.2d 740\n\n(1988). Thus, to the extent that the bankruptcy court's order does\n\nviolence to the teachings of Timbers by ordering the payment of\n\ninterest pending confirmation as opposed to ordering interest to\n\naccrue, it was error. However, because of the particular facts of\n\nthis case, we are not inclined to set aside the bankruptcy court's\n\nruling. On the effective date of the Plan's confirmation T-H NOLP\n\nwould be receiving a credit for the interest paid during this time.\n\n FSA also asserts that it was entitled to the postpetition\n\ninterest that would have accrued during the entire postpetition\n\npreconfirmation period on its claim since the petition date. We\n\ndisagree. The Supreme Court has made it clear that an oversecured\n\ncreditor is entitled to postpetition interest on its claim only \"to\n\n\n 10\n In the instant case, the parties agreed that FSA could accrue\ninterest under § 506(b) when its claim became oversecured. Thus,\nthe parties agreement comports with our reading of the law under §\n506(b).\n\n 15\n\fthe extent that such interest, when added to the principal amount\n\nof the claim, [does not] exceed the value of the collateral.\"\n\nTimbers, 484 U.S. at 372, 108 S.Ct. at 631; see also Landmark\n\nFinancial Serv. v. Hall, 918 F.2d 1150, 1155 (4th Cir.1990) (an\n\noversecured creditor's claim may include interest up to the value\n\nof the collateral). Thus, the amount of interest allowed under §\n\n506(b) is limited to that amount of interest which, when added to\n\nthe amount of FSA's allowed claim, will not exceed the value of its\n\ncollateral.\n\n Finally, we address FSA's assertion that the bankruptcy court\n\nerred in valuing the Hotel at $13.7 million at the confirmation\n\nhearing. The Bankruptcy Code does not prescribe any particular\n\nmethod of valuing collateral, but instead leaves valuation\n\nquestions to judges on a case-by-case basis. See House Rep. No 95-\n\n595, 95th Cong. 1st Sess. 216, 356 (1977), reprinted in 1978\n\nU.S.S.C.A.N. 5963, 6176, 6312. Valuation is a mixed question of\n\nlaw and fact, the factual premises being subject to review on a\n\nclearly erroneous standard, and the legal conclusion being subject\n\nto de novo review. In re Clark Pipe & Supply Co., Inc., 893 F.2d\n\n693, 697-98 (5th Cir.1990). Value under § 506 is to be determined\n\nin light of the purpose of the valuation and of the proposed\n\ndisposition or use of the property. Associates Commercial Corp. v.\n\nRash, No. 96-454, 1997 WL 321231, at *5, --- U.S. ----, ----, ---\n\nS.Ct. ----, ----, --- L.Ed.2d ---- (U.S. June 16, 1997); In re\n\nSandy Ridge Dev. Corp., 881 F.2d 1346 (5th Cir.1989). In this\n\nparticular case, valuation was made for the purpose of plan\n\n\n 16\n\fconfirmation. We note that FSA's appraisal expert agreed with T-H\n\nNOLP's expert regarding the Hotel's value once FSA's appraisal\n\nincorporated the overhead allocation charge, which the bankruptcy\n\ncourt found to be a necessary expense. Therefore, based on our\n\nreview of the record, we concluded that the bankruptcy court did\n\nnot err in its valuation of the Hotel. We find FSA's remaining\n\narguments to be without merit.\n\n2. The Postconfirmation Interest Rate\n\n The bankruptcy court's calculation of an appropriate\n\n\"cramdown\" interest rate for purposes of Chapter 11 plan\n\nconfirmation is reviewed for clear error. In re Briscoe Enter.,\n\nLtd., II, 994 F.2d 1160, 1169 (5th Cir.1993); see also In re\n\nBryson Properties, XVIII, 961 F.2d 496, 500 n. 4 (4th Cir.1992).\n\nT-H NOLP urges this Court to establish a particular formula for\n\ndetermining an appropriate cramdown interest rate. We decline. As\n\nwe recognized in Briscoe, \"[c]ourts have used a wide variety of\n\ndifferent rates as benchmarks in computing the appropriate interest\n\nrate (or discount rate as it is frequently termed) for the specific\n\nrisk level in their cases.\" Id. We will not tie the hands of the\n\nlower courts as they make the factual determination involved in\n\nestablishing an appropriate interest rate; they have the job of\n\nweighing the witness' testimony, demeanor and credibility. Thus,\n\nabsent clear error, we will not disturb the bankruptcy court's\n\ndetermination.\n\n In the instant case, the bond financing documents provided for\n\nan interest rate of 11.5% per annum. During the confirmation\n\n\n 17\n\fhearing, the bankruptcy court heard testimony from T-H NOLP's and\n\nFSA's financing experts. T-H NOLP's hotel financing expert, Joel\n\nRoss, stated that in his opinion the appropriate interest rate that\n\nT-H NOLP should pay to FSA under the Plan was 8.45%.11 On\n\ncross-examination, however, Ross admitted that he did not know of\n\nany lender to whom he would recommend making this loan at an 8.45%\n\ninterest rate. FSA's interest rate expert, John Keeling, testified\n\nthat the appropriate interest rate under the Plan would be 13.6% if\n\nthe Hotel were valued at $13.7 million, and 14.6% if the Hotel were\n\nvalued at $15.4 million. Keeling's opinion regarding this interest\n\nrate range was based on a lender having the same loan documentation\n\nas FSA. Keeling's methodology was to break down the loan into\n\ncomponents, and to fix a rate dependent upon how much debt service\n\nwould be available for each component.12\n\n The bankruptcy court, after considering Ross' and Keeling's\n\ntestimony, concluded that neither interest rate proposed was an\n\nappropriate interest rate. The court found that as to Ross'\n\nproposed interest rate of 8.45%, this interest rate would not\n\n 11\n Ross determined this by adding 210 basis points to the\ntwo-year U.S. Treasury rate, resulting in an interest rate under\nthe Plan of 8.45% as of September 21, 1994.\n 12\n According to Keeling's methodology, the first component would\ncomprise 60-70% of the debt and would carry a 9.75% interest rate\nbecause a debt service ratio of 1.4 would be available. This\ncomponent was determined by adding 3.25% to two-year treasuries\nwhich were 6.7% as of October 3, 1994. The second component,\ncomprising 10% of the debt (described as mezzanine financing),\nwould carry a 12.75% interest rate. The third component would be\nserviced as to interest only, no amortization, and would carry a\n16.25% interest rate. The fourth component would not receive\ncurrent interest or amortization and would carry a 25% interest\nrate.\n\n 18\n\fadequately compensate FSA for not receiving its money on the Plan's\n\neffective date. With respect to Keeling's proposed interest rate\n\nof 13.6%, the bankruptcy court found this rate too high, given that\n\nthere was expert testimony that the value of the Hotel would\n\nincrease over the next two years, and evidence that T-H NOLP would\n\nbe able to make its payments under the Plan. Based on these\n\nfindings, the bankruptcy court determined that the appropriate\n\ncramdown interest rate under 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(II)\n\nshould be the contract rate of 11.5%. We find no reason to\n\ndisagree.\n\n Bankruptcy Code § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(II) has been interpreted to\n\nrequire that the total deferred payments have a present value equal\n\nto the amount of the secured claim. In re Bryson Properties,\n\nXVIII, 961 F.2d 496, 500 (4th Cir.1992). T-H NOLP argues that the\n\npostconfirmation interest rate should be 8.45% which would allow\n\nFSA to recover the allowed amount of its claim. T-H NOLP relies on\n\nfootnote 47 in Briscoe as support for its argument that in\n\ndetermining the appropriate cramdown interest rate to a secured\n\ncreditor's claim, this Court should refer to the Treasury rate and\n\nadd a case-specific risk premium. On the other hand, FSA argues\n\nthat the interest rate Keeling proffered should be used in the\n\nPlan. We decline both suggestions.\n\n Our review discloses that the bankruptcy court's use of the\n\ncontract rate reflects the present value of FSA's claim and\n\naccounts for the specific risk level in this case. We explained in\n\nBriscoe that \"[o]ften the contract rate will be an appropriate\n\n\n 19\n\frate,\" Id., and that \"[n]umerous courts have chosen the contract\n\nrate if it seemed to be a good estimate as to the appropriate\n\ndiscount rate,\" Id. (citing In re Monnier Bros., 755 F.2d 1336 (8th\n\nCir.1985)). In Briscoe the risk premium was more than 50% of the\n\nriskless rate, whereas in the instant case, the contract rate of\n\n11.5% was more than 1.7 times that of the riskless two-year\n\nTreasury rate. The bankruptcy court concluded that the contract\n\nrate of 11.5% included a risk premium to account for the increased\n\nrisk FSA would bear as a claimant under the Plan and for not\n\nreceiving its money today. In other words, the contract rate was\n\na reasonable rate that adequately compensated for risk. See Id.\n\nAccordingly, we hold that the bankruptcy court was not clearly\n\nerroneous in its determination of the appropriate cramdown interest\n\nrate in T-H NOLP's amended Plan.\n\n3. T-H NOLP's Amended Plan of Reorganization\n\n We now turn to FSA's arguments regarding T-H NOLP's amended\n\nPlan and the bankruptcy court's confirmation of the amended Plan.\n\nOn appeal, FSA contends that T-H NOLP's Plan was not feasible under\n\nBankruptcy Code § 1129(a)(11), that the Plan was not proposed in\n\ngood faith under § 1129(a)(3), and that the Plan was a liquidating\n\nPlan under § 1141(d)(3). We address each of these in turn.\n\n A. The § 1129(a)(11) Feasibility Requirement\n\n Section 1129(a)(11) codifies the feasibility requirement and\n\nrequires that confirmation of the plan is not likely to be followed\n\nby liquidation or the need for further financial reorganization,\n\nunless such liquidation or reorganization is proposed in the plan.\n\n\n 20\n\f11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(11). To allow confirmation, the bankruptcy\n\ncourt must make a specific finding that the plan as proposed is\n\nfeasible. In re M & S Assoc., Ltd., 138 B.R. 845, 848\n\n(Bankr.W.D.Tex.1992). The standard of proof required by the debtor\n\nto prove a Chapter 11 plan's feasibility is by a preponderance of\n\nthe evidence, Briscoe, 994 F.2d at 1165, and we review the\n\nbankruptcy court's finding that a debtor's plan is feasible under\n\nthe clearly erroneous standard. Id. at 1166.\n\n In determining whether a debtor's Chapter 11 plan of\n\nreorganization is feasible, we noted in Briscoe that \"the\n\n[bankruptcy] court need not require a guarantee of success ...,\n\n[o]nly a reasonable assurance of commercial viability is required.\"\n\nId. at 1165-66; see also Kane v. Johns-Manville Corp., 843 F.2d\n\n636 (2nd Cir.1988). All the bankruptcy court must find is that the\n\nplan offer \"a reasonable probability of success.\" In re Landing\n\nAssoc., Ltd., 157 B.R. 791, 820 (Bankr.W.D.Tex.1993).\n\n The bankruptcy court found that the Plan was feasible based on\n\nthe following: (1) that T-H NOLP would be able to service the debt\n\nat an 11.5% interest rate with an infusion of capital by the\n\nprincipals as modified in the Plan; (2) the earning power of T-H\n\nNOLP after the reorganization; (3) the past performance of T-H\n\nNOLP's business operations; (4) the ability of T-H NOLP's\n\nmanagement; and (5) the economic picture for hotels in New\n\nOrleans. Based on these findings, the bankruptcy court found that\n\nT-H NOLP's Plan had a reasonable assurance of commercial viability.\n\n FSA argues that the Plan does not satisfy the feasibility\n\n\n 21\n\frequirement of § 1129(a)(11) because T-H NOLP cannot fulfill its\n\ncommitments during the initial two years under the Plan. FSA\n\nprimarily contends that T-H NOLP erred by using higher revenue\n\nprojections for showing feasibility while using lower projections\n\nfor collateral valuations, that there was no basis to believe that\n\nT-H NOLP's revenue projections would be obtained, and that the\n\nHotel's value would have to appreciate in order to satisfy the\n\nPlan.13\n\n FSA has not asserted any \"clear error\" basis that would\n\nwarrant reversal of the bankruptcy court's feasibility finding.\n\nWith respect to FSA's contention regarding how the projections were\n\nutilized and that the revenues projected could not be obtained, we\n\ncannot conclude that the bankruptcy court erred in determining that\n\nT-H NOLP's Plan was feasible. We agree with the notion that\n\n\"[w]here the projections are credible, based upon the balancing of\n\nall testimony, evidence, and documentation, even if the projections\n\nare aggressive, the court may find the plan feasible.\" In re\n\nLakeside Global II, Ltd., 116 B.R. 499, 508 n. 20\n\n(Bankr.S.D.Tex.1989). Debtors are not required to view business\n\nand economic prospects in the worst possible light. In re Western\n\nReal Estate Fund, Inc., 75 B.R. 580, 585 (Bankr.W.D.Okla.1987).\n\nThe factors set forth by the bankruptcy court as to the feasibility\n\nof T-H NOLP's Plan are not untenable nor unreasonable. Our review\n\n 13\n FSA also asserts that if the Hotel is sold under the Plan,\nthere is no credit worthiness test for the new purchaser. However,\nwe note that FSA does not disclose how this affects the Plan's\nfeasibility, and we refuse to speculate on this point without\nreferences to the record or legal authority.\n\n 22\n\fof the evidence discloses that actual net revenues increased by\n\nover eight percent from 1993 to 1994, and that for the year 1994\n\nthe actual net operating cash flow was greater than the amount\n\nprojected for that year. Moreover, as stated previously, the\n\nHotel's revenue stream has enabled T-H NOLP to reduce the amount of\n\nFSA's claim considerably since the petition date. In addition, the\n\nevidence reflects a reasonable expectation that the payments\n\nrequired to be made during the term of the Plan will be made.\n\nThus, we find no clear error regarding feasibility on this point.\n\n Regarding FSA's argument that the Hotel's value will have to\n\nappreciate in order the satisfy the Plan, the bankruptcy court\n\nfound that T-H NOLP could pay off FSA's claim. As stated above,\n\nthe Plan included several alternatives which could reasonably\n\nresult in the full payment of FSA's claim; for example, by\n\nrefinancing, a balloon payment at the end of twenty-four months,\n\nthe sale of the Hotel to a third party, or a dation en paiement.\n\nIn In re Nite Lite Inns, 17 B.R. 367, 369-70 (Bankr.S.D.Cal.1982),\n\nthe bankruptcy court found feasible a plan which contemplated\n\nliquidation in the event the debtor defaulted, since such\n\nliquidation was proposed in the plan. See also In re Sandy Ridge\n\nDev. Corp., 881 F.2d 1346 (5th Cir.1989) (finding that a\n\nliquidating reorganization under Chapter 11 did not violate §\n\n1129(a)(11)). We agree with the bankruptcy court in Nite Lite\n\nInns, that a debtor's plan is feasible where at least one of the\n\nalternative proposals is feasible. Therefore, because T-H NOLP's\n\nPlan included several alternatives which would fully satisfy FSA's\n\n\n 23\n\fclaim, we conclude that the bankruptcy court did not err in finding\n\nthat the Plan was feasible under § 1129(a)(11).\n\n B. The § 1129(a)(3) Good Faith Requirement\n\n Section 1129(a)(3) requires that a debtor's plan be proposed\n\nin good faith and not by any means forbidden by law. 11 U.S.C. §\n\n1129(a)(3). The requirement of good faith must be viewed in light\n\nof the totality of the circumstances surrounding establishment of\n\na Chapter 11 plan, keeping in mind the purpose of the Bankruptcy\n\nCode is to give debtors a reasonable opportunity to make a fresh\n\nstart. In re Sun Country Dev., Inc., 764 F.2d 406, 408 (5th\n\nCir.1985). \"Where the plan is proposed with the legitimate and\n\nhonest purpose to reorganize and has a reasonable hope of success,\n\nthe good faith requirement of § 1129(a)(3) is satisfied.\" Id. A\n\ndebtor's plan may satisfy the good faith requirement even though\n\nthe plan may not be one which the creditors would themselves design\n\nand indeed may not be confirmable. In re Briscoe Enter., Ltd., II,\n\n994 F.2d 1160, 1167 (5th Cir.1993). The standard of proof required\n\nby the debtor to prove a Chapter 11 plan was proposed in good faith\n\nis by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 1165.\n\n The Plan in this case provided that T-H NOLP would make\n\npayments for twenty-four months commencing on the Plan's effective\n\ndate. In addition, the Plan proposed various time lines during\n\nwhich the classes of claim would be extinguished, including FSA's\n\nclaim. The bankruptcy court found that the Plan was proposed in\n\ngood faith.\n\n FSA contends that the Plan was not proposed in good faith for\n\n\n 24\n\ftwo reasons. First, FSA argues that under the Plan, T-H NOLP is\n\nrequired to actively market the Hotel for the highest possible\n\nprice and, although FSA bid its full claim at the confirmation\n\nhearing, T-H NOLP did not sell. Thus, FSA contends that T-H NOLP's\n\nrefusal to sell amounts to a lack of good faith. We disagree with\n\nFSA's assertion.\n\n This Court's review of the amended Plan disclosed that if T-H\n\nNOLP received an offer to purchase the Hotel, the Trustee (FSA) had\n\na right of first refusal. Amended Plan Article 5(E). If FSA\n\nelected to acquire the Hotel pursuant to its right of first\n\nrefusal, FSA had the right to credit bid an amount up to the\n\nallowed amount of its final allowed claim. Amended Plan Article\n\n5(F). During the confirmation hearing, FSA's counsel asked Maria\n\nCheng, FSA's Vice President, \"if the Debtor were to put the hotel\n\nup for sale today, is FSA ready, willing and able to ... credit bid\n\n[the amount of its claim].\" Cheng responded affirmatively.\n\n(Confirmation Hearing Transcript p. 107). However, we note that\n\nthere were no other parties present at the hearing which offered to\n\npurchase the Hotel and, thus, based on the plain language of the\n\nPlan, FSA's right of first refusal never matured. See, e.g., In re\n\nTable Talk, Inc., 53 B.R. 937 (Bankr.D.Mass.1985) (right of first\n\nrefusal granted to bidder by trustee was exercisable after\n\ncompetitive bid was proffered). Consequently, we find that FSA's\n\nargument on this point must fail.\n\n Secondly, FSA argues that T-H NOLP's control persons\n\ncommenced bankruptcy proceedings for all six partnerships in four\n\n\n 25\n\fdifferent courts, and that because T-H NOLP resisted FSA's efforts\n\nto consolidate the instant case with the other bankruptcy cases\n\ntaking place in other jurisdictions, T-H NOLP's Plan was not\n\nproposed in good faith. The bankruptcy court denied FSA's requests\n\nto consolidate or change venue. We find FSA's argument meritless.\n\nWe cannot see any nexus between the \"good faith\" requirement and T-\n\nH NOLP's resisting consolidation of the instant case which would\n\npreclude a debtor's plan from being proposed in good faith.\n\nAccordingly, we refuse to read into the statutory requirement of\n\n\"good faith\" a mandate that the debtor is precluded from resisting\n\nany attempt by a creditor, such as FSA, to consolidate bankruptcy\n\nproceedings. FSA's contention has no bearing on whether the\n\nproposed plan will result in reorganization of T-H NOLP or whether\n\nthe Plan has a reasonable hope of success. Based on the above, we\n\nfind that the bankruptcy court did not err in determining that T-H\n\nNOLP's Plan was proposed in good faith.\n\n C. § 1141(d)(3) & Liquidating Plans\n\n Generally, under § 1141(d)(1)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code,\n\nconfirmation of a plan of reorganization grants the Chapter 11\n\ndebtor a discharge of all debts arising prior to confirmation. 11\n\nU.S.C. § 1141(d)(1)(A). However, § 1141(d)(3) provides that in a\n\nChapter 11 case the debtor may be denied discharge upon\n\nconfirmation of the plan if the following three requirements are\n\npresent: (1) the plan provides for the liquidation of all or\n\nsubstantially all of the property of the estate (§ 1141(d)(3)(A));\n\n(2) the debtor does not engage in business after consummation of\n\n\n 26\n\fthe plan (§ 1141(d)(3)(B)); and (3) the debtor would be denied a\n\ndischarge under § 727(a) of this title if the case were a case\n\nunder chapter 7 of this title (§ 1141(d)(3)(C)). 11 U.S.C. §\n\n1141(d)(3).\n\n The bankruptcy court and the district court found that the\n\nPlan was not a liquidation plan because the Plan did not satisfy\n\nthe three nondischarge requirements of § 1141(d)(3). On appeal,\n\nFSA argues that the Plan was a liquidation plan since under the\n\nPlan, T-H NOLP will operate the Hotel for only twenty four months\n\nor until the Hotel is sold or otherwise disposed of, whichever\n\noccurs first. In addition, FSA asserts that the bankruptcy court's\n\nreasoning was erroneous. We disagree, and affirm the bankruptcy\n\ncourt's reading of § 1141(d)(3).\n\n Under the first requirement, the plan must \"provide[ ] for\n\nthe liquidation of all or substantially all of the property of the\n\nestate.\" 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(3)(A).14 According to T-H NOLP's\n\n\n 14\n The legislative history to § 1141(d) states:\n\n Paragraph (3) specifies that the debtor is not discharged\n by the confirmation of a plan if the plan is a\n liquidating plan and if the debtor would be denied a\n discharge in a liquidation case under Section 727.\n Specifically, if all or substantially all of the\n distribution under the plan is of all or substantially\n all of the property of the estate or the proceeds of it,\n if the business, if any, of the debtor does not continue,\n and if the debtor would be denied a discharge under\n section 727 (such as if the debtor were not an individual\n or if he had committed an act that would lead to denial\n of discharge), then the Chapter 11 discharge is not\n granted.\n\n House Rep. No. 95-595, 95th Cong. 1st Sess. 418-19 (1977),\n reprinted in, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6374-75.\n\n 27\n\fPlan, there are three options with respect to the Hotel: (1) the\n\nrefinancing of FSA's debt and paying FSA in full; (2) the sale of\n\nthe Hotel; or (3) the transfer of the Hotel to FSA in satisfaction\n\nof its nonrecourse debt. The first option proposed by T-H NOLP\n\ndoes not result in liquidation of the property, but instead results\n\nin liquidation of FSA's claim, and obviously is the one preferred\n\nby T-H NOLP. Moreover, if T-H NOLP is successful in refinancing the\n\ndebt, its business operations will continue. The record discloses\n\nthat during the two-year period following the effective date of the\n\nPlan,15 T-H NOLP will pursue the refinancing option simultaneously\n\nwith its efforts to market the Hotel under the second option.\n\nHowever, no evidence was presented to support the fact that\n\nrefinancing within two years was so unlikely that sale of the Hotel\n\n(option two under the Plan) or dation en paiement (option three\n\nunder the Plan) were the only viable options. We also note that\n\nFSA fails to cite any authority for the proposition that where one\n\nalternative of a Plan is liquidation of the property two years\n\nafter a plan's effective date, it constitutes a liquidation under\n\n1141(d)(3)(A). We refuse to so hold. Because requirement (A) of\n\n§ 1141(d)(3) is not met and this section requires that all three\n\nrequirements be present in order to deny the debtor a discharge, we\n\nconclude that the bankruptcy court was correct in finding that T-H\n\n\n 15\n T-H NOLP's conducting business for two years following Plan\nconfirmation satisfies § 1141(d)(3)(B). Compare In re Wood Family\nInterests, Ltd., 135 B.R. 407 (Bankr.D.Colo.1989) (holding that\npartnership debtor was not entitled to a discharge where its\nreorganization plan provided for discontinuation of its business\nupon confirmation).\n\n 28\n\fNOLP's Plan was not a liquidation plan. FSA's remaining arguments\n\nthat T-H NOLP's Plan is a liquidating plan are meritless.\n\n CONCLUSION\n\n Based on the foregoing discussion, the district court's\n\njudgment affirming the bankruptcy court's judgment is AFFIRMED.\n\n AFFIRMED.\n\n\n\n\n 29\n\f", "ocr": false, "opinion_id": 12441 } ]
Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
F
USA, Federal
106,817
Harlan
1964-05-04
false
united-states-v-continental-oil-co
Continental Oil
United States v. Continental Oil Co.
United States v. Continental Oil Co.
Solicitor General Cox, Assistant Attorney General Orrick and Robert B. Hummel for the United States., David T. Searls and A. T. Seymour for appellee.
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
2
Published
null
<parties id="b227-3"> UNITED STATES <em> v. </em> CONTINENTAL OIL CO. </parties><br><docketnumber id="b227-5"> No. 834. </docketnumber><decisiondate id="AQN"> Decided May 4, 1964. </decisiondate><br><attorneys id="b227-7"> <em> Solicitor General Cox, Assistant Attorney General Orrick </em> and <em> Robert B. Hummel </em> for the United States. </attorneys><br><attorneys id="b227-8"> <em> David T. Searls </em> and <em> A. T. Seymour </em> for appellee. </attorneys>
[ "12 L. Ed. 2d 213", "84 S. Ct. 1155", "377 U.S. 161", "1964 U.S. LEXIS 2359" ]
[ { "author_str": "Per Curiam", "per_curiam": true, "type": "010combined", "page_count": null, "download_url": null, "author_id": null, "opinion_text": "\n377 U.S. 161 (1964)\nUNITED STATES\nv.\nCONTINENTAL OIL CO.\nNo. 834.\nSupreme Court of United States.\nDecided May 4, 1964.\nAPPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO.\nSolicitor General Cox, Assistant Attorney General Orrick and Robert B. Hummel for the United States.\nDavid T. Searls and A. T. Seymour for appellee.\nPER CURIAM.\nThe judgment is vacated and the case is remanded to the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico for a trial on the merits of the case. Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 368 U.S. 464.\nSeparate Memorandum of MR. JUSTICE HARLAN.\nThis is an appeal by the Government in an antitrust case wherein the District Court entered summary judgment in favor of the defendant-appellee without opinion, findings of fact, or conclusions of law of any kind. The case is here on a typewritten record of some 2,000 pages, consisting of pleadings, briefs, depositions, exhibits, and the transcript of a pretrial conference. The district judge is now deceased.\nThe Court vacates the judgment below and remands the case for trial. Short of its being the law that the summary judgment procedure is wholly unavailable in a government antitrust case—a holding not before nor, as I understand matters, now made—I am unable to say that summary judgment was improvidently granted in this instance without making an examination of the entire record; certainly this disposition should not be made simply on the basis of the Government's statements *162 that triable issues of fact exist. To examine this large record without any illumination by the court below would place an intolerable burden on this Court.\nIn these circumstances I believe that the proper course is to vacate the judgment below and remand the case to the District Court, with leave to the defendant to renew its motion for summary judgment before another district judge. The Court's action, which deprives the defendant of that opportunity, seems to me unwarranted. If summary judgment were again granted, the District Court would be expected to furnish a statement of its reasons, including such findings of fact and conclusions of law as might be appropriate. Cf. United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651, 662 (concurring-dissenting opinion of HARLAN, J.).\n", "ocr": false, "opinion_id": 106817 } ]
Supreme Court
Supreme Court of the United States
F
USA, Federal
2,701,564
Rocco
2014-06-26
false
simmons-v-narine
Simmons
Simmons v. Narine
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
7
Published
null
null
[ "2014 Ohio 2771" ]
[ { "author_str": null, "per_curiam": false, "type": "010combined", "page_count": 15, "download_url": "http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rod/docs/pdf/8/2014/2014-ohio-2771.pdf", "author_id": 8130, "opinion_text": "[Cite as Simmons v. Narine, 2014-Ohio-2771.]\n\n\n Court of Appeals of Ohio\n EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT\n COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA\n\n\n JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION\n No. 100545\n\n\n\n\n MICHAEL SIMMONS\n PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT\n\n vs.\n\n LAURA NARINE\n DEFENDANT-APPELLEE\n\n\n\n\n JUDGMENT:\n AFFIRMED\n\n\n Civil Appeal from the\n Cleveland Municipal Court\n Housing Division\n Case No. 2012 CVH 020673\n\n BEFORE: Rocco, J., Jones, P.J., and McCormack, J.\n\n RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: June 26, 2014\n\fATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT\n\nChristopher R. Fortunato\n13363 Madison Ave.\nLakewood, Ohio 44107\n\nATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE\n\nAdam Doxsey\nFrank P. Giaimo\nNeil W. Siegel\n24400 Chagrin Blvd., #300\nBeachwood, Ohio 44122\n\fKENNETH A. ROCCO, J.:\n\n {¶1} This appeal is before the court on the accelerated calendar pursuant to App.R.\n\n11.1 and Loc.App.R. 11.1. Plaintiff-appellant Michael Simmons appeals the trial court’s\n\ndismissal of his complaint with prejudice pursuant to Civ.R. 41(B)(1) after he failed to\n\nattend a court-ordered settlement conference. We find no merit to the appeal and affirm\n\nthe trial court’s judgment.\n\n {¶2} On March 29, 2012, Simmons and Agnes Campbell entered into a one-year\n\nlease agreement with defendant-appellee Laura Narine relating to property Narine owned\n\non 2222 West 105th St. in Cleveland, Ohio. On\n\nDecember 14, 2012, Simmons filed a complaint against Narine with the Cleveland\n\nMunicipal Court, Housing Division. Simmons alleged that Narine had engaged in a “self\n\nhelp eviction,” in violation of R.C. 5321.15(C), by locking Simmons out of the property\n\nand “preventing him from retrieving his chattels” after Narine had issued notices to\n\nSimmons and Campbell to leave the premises for nonpayment of rent. On January 18,\n\n2013, Narine filed her answer, denying the allegations of the complaint and asserting\n\nvarious affirmative defenses.\n\n {¶3} On April 1, 2013, the trial court held a pretrial conference. Both of the\n\nparties and their counsel attended the pretrial conference, but the parties were unable to\n\nreach a settlement. Accordingly, the trial court scheduled a settlement conference for\n\nJuly 10, 2013. In its June 4, 2013 judgment entry setting the settlement conference, the\n\ftrial court ordered both parties and their counsel to attend the settlement conference. The\n\njudgment entry further provided, in relevant part:\n\n Failure of a party or counsel to attend may result in dismissal of the\n failing party’s claim(s), immediate hearing of the opposing party’s\n claims or other appropriate sanctions.\n\n {¶4} Although counsel appeared, neither of the parties appeared at the July 10,\n\n2013 settlement conference. Accordingly, the trial court rescheduled the settlement\n\nconference for September 9, 2013, once again ordering both parties and their counsel to\n\nattend the settlement conference. The July 16, 2013 judgment entry resetting the\n\nsettlement conference stated, in relevant part:\n\n This case came for settlement conference July 10, 2013 * * *.\n Counsel for the respective parties appeared. The parties, themselves, did\n not appear notwithstanding an order of the court directing them to attend.\n The absence of the parties and the inability of Plaintiff’s counsel to\n speak with specificity about the claimed damages precluded\n substantive settlement discussions.\n\n Accordingly, this case is reset for another Settlement Conference\n with respect to all pending claims * * *.\n\n Both parties and counsel are required to attend. * * * Failure of\n a party or counsel to attend may result in dismissal of a party’s claims\n or immediate hearing of the opposing party’s claims. * * *\n\nSimmons’s counsel was also directed to bring to the conference “an itemized list and\n\nvaluation of [the] personal property claimed to have been lost” and to share the list with\n\nNarine’s counsel at least one week prior to the settlement conference.\n\n {¶5} Plaintiff’s counsel, Narine’s counsel, and Narine (who had traveled\n from Virginia to attend the conference) appeared at the September 9, 2013\n settlement conference. Once again, Simmons, without notice or\n explanation, failed to appear for the settlement conference. On September\n\f 19, 2013, the trial court dismissed Simmons’s complaint with prejudice. In\n its September 19, 2013 judgment entry, the trial court explained its reasons\n for dismissing Simmons’s complaint as follows:\n\n Defendant came to the settlement conference from Virginia, but no\n substantive discussion could be held due to plaintiff’s failure to appear.\n Plaintiff’s counsel did not offer an explanation as to why plaintiff was not\n present, had not heard from plaintiff in nearly two months, and did not have\n settlement authority. The Court notes that plaintiff also failed to appear at\n the July 10, 2013 settlement conference. Finally, plaintiff and counsel\n failed to produce a list of lost property and valuation pursuant to the\n Judgment Entry of\n July 16, 2013.\n\n Plaintiff having failed to appear at the settlement conference, and for\n the reasons stated above, pursuant to the July 16, 2013 Judgment Entry,\n (which indicated that failure to appear at hearing may result in dismissal of\n the failing party’s claims), plaintiff’s monetary claims are hereby dismissed,\n with prejudice. * * *\n\n {¶6} Simmons appealed the trial court’s judgment, presenting the following\n\nassignment of error for review:\n\n The trial court abused its discretion when it dismissed plaintiff’s complaint\n with prejudice when it should have considered lesser sanctions.\n\n {¶7} Because it is such a harsh sanction, “forever deny[ing] a plaintiff a review\n\nof a claim’s merits,” we review a trial court’s decision to dismiss a case with prejudice\n\npursuant to Civ.R. 41(B)(1) under a “heightened” abuse-of-discretion standard. See, e.g.,\n\nOcran v. Richlak, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99856, 2013-Ohio-4603, ¶ 12, citing Tarquinio\n\nv. Estate of Zadnik, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 95767 and 96246, 2011-Ohio-3980, ¶ 20,\n\nand Autovest, L.L.C. v. Swanson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 88803, 2007-Ohio-3921, ¶ 18.\n\nAn abuse of discretion is more than an error of law or judgment, “it implies that the\n\fcourt’s attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable.” Blakemore v. Blakemore,\n\n5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983).\n\n {¶8} Civ.R. 41(B)(1) provides:\n\n Where the plaintiff fails to prosecute, or comply with these rules or any\n\n court order, the court upon motion of a defendant or on its own motion may,\n\n after notice to the plaintiff’s counsel, dismiss an action or claim.\n\n {¶9} Our review of the trial court’s dismissal of Simmons’s complaint involves\n\ntwo steps. First, we must determine whether the trial court provided sufficient notice\n\nprior to the dismissal. Second, we must determine whether the dismissal constituted an\n\nabuse of the trial court’s discretion under the circumstances. Walker v. Cleveland Clinic\n\nFound., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 91648, 2009-Ohio-2261, ¶ 8, citing Asres v. Dalton, 10th\n\nDist. Franklin No. 05AP-632, 2006-Ohio-507, ¶ 14.\n\n {¶10} Simmons argues that the trial court’s July 16, 2013 journal entry, listing\n\n“potential sanctions” the court might impose if a party failed to appear for the September\n\n9, 2013 settlement conference, did not satisfy Civ.R. 41(B)(1)’s notice requirement.\n\nRather, Simmons contends that, to comply with Civ.R. 41(B)(1), the trial court was\n\nrequired to give him notice, after the settlement conference, of its intent to dismiss his\n\ncomplaint with prejudice “for failure to explain his non-attendance.”\n\n {¶11} Before a trial court can properly dismiss a party’s claim for failure to\n\nprosecute under Civ.R. 41(B)(1), the record must show that the party had notice of the\n\npossibility of dismissal. Mokrytzky v. Capstar Capital Corp., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.\n\f91287, 2009-Ohio-238, ¶ 12, citing Logsdon v. Nichols, 72 Ohio St.3d 124, 647 N.E.2d\n\n1361 (1995). The purpose of the notice requirement is to provide a party who is in\n\ndefault of a court order an opportunity to correct or explain the circumstances of the\n\nparty’s default and to provide reasons why the case should not be dismissed with\n\nprejudice. Id.; see also Youngblood v. Kindred Healthcare, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.\n\n94442, 2010-Ohio-4358, ¶ 13 (“The purpose of such notice is to allow a party to explain\n\nthe circumstances causing his or her nonappearance and why the case should not be\n\ndismissed with prejudice.”). Civ.R. 41(B)(1)’s notice requirement is satisfied “when\n\ncounsel has been informed that dismissal is a possibility and has had a reasonable\n\nopportunity to defend against dismissal.” Quonset Hut, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 80 Ohio\n\nSt.3d 46, 49, 684 N.E.2d 319 (1997). What constitutes notice and an opportunity to be\n\nheard regarding a proposed dismissal is examined on a case-by-case basis. Hill v.\n\nMarshall, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 12AP-805, 2013-Ohio-5538, ¶ 8. “‘[T]he notice\n\nrequired by Civ.R. 41(B)(1) need not be actual but may be implied when reasonable under\n\nthe circumstances.’” Sazima v. Chalko, 86 Ohio St.3d 151, 155, 712 N.E.2d 729 (1999),\n\nquoting Quonset at 49; see also Walker at ¶ 7. “[O]nce notice is given that a dismissal\n\nwith prejudice is a possibility,” the party need not be given “a second chance to comply\n\nwith the court’s order.” Mokrytzky at ¶ 13, citing Shoreway Circle v. Gerald Skoch Co.,\n\nL.P.A., 92 Ohio App.3d 823, 637 N.E.2d 355 (8th Dist.1994).\n\n {¶12} In this case, the record reflects that the trial court provided sufficient notice\n\nto Simmons and his counsel of the possibility that the trial court would dismiss his\n\fcomplaint if he did not appear at the September 9, 2013 settlement conference.\n\nSimmons’s absence from the September 9, 2013 settlement conference was not his first\n\n“no show” in the case. He also failed to attend the July 10, 2013 settlement conference.\n\nThe trial court clearly and unambiguously stated in its June 4, 2013 judgment entry setting\n\nthe July 10, 2013 settlement conference that “[f]ailure of a party or counsel to attend [the\n\nsettlement conference] may result in dismissal of a party’s claims.” After Simmons and\n\nNarine both failed to attend the July 10, 2013 settlement conference — despite being\n\nexplicitly ordered by the court to do so — the trial court gave them each an opportunity to\n\ncorrect their “prior default” and rescheduled the settlement conference for September 9,\n\n2013. In its July 16, 2013 judgment entry resetting the settlement conference, the trial\n\ncourt, once again, notified counsel and the parties that “[f]ailure of a party or counsel to\n\nattend [the settlement conference] may result in dismissal of a party’s claims.” Although\n\nthe judgment entry did not specifically state that the trial court would dismiss his\n\ncomplaint “with prejudice” if Simmons failed to appear, it is well established that a\n\nCiv.R. 41(B)(1) dismissal “operates as an adjudication upon the merits unless the court, in\n\nits order for dismissal, otherwise specifies.” Civ.R. 41(B)(3); see also McGrath v.\n\nBassett, 196 Ohio App.3d 561, 2011-Ohio-5666, 964 N.E.2d 485, ¶ 24-26 (8th Dist.)\n\n(where court put plaintiff on notice that “failure to appear as ordered may result in\n\nsanctions including dismissal and/or judgment,” and plaintiff thereafter failed to appear\n\nboth at the final pretrial conference and a subsequent conference arranged by court at\n\fplaintiff’s request, trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing plaintiff’s case\n\nwith prejudice).\n\n {¶13} Further, although there is no transcript of the September 9, 2013 settlement\n\nconference in the record, the trial court’s September 19, 2013 journal entry reporting on\n\nthe settlement conference suggests that plaintiff’s counsel, at that time, had both an\n\nopportunity to explain Simmons’s failure to appear and an opportunity to be heard as to\n\nwhether plaintiffs’ complaint should be dismissed. See Ham v. Park, 110 Ohio App.3d\n\n803, 809, 675 N.E.2d 505 (8th Dist.1996) (where referee’s report indicated that plaintiff’s\n\ncounsel was present at hearing, since no transcript was provided of the hearing, it was\n\npresumed that plaintiff’s counsel had an opportunity to respond at that time to notice of\n\nintended dismissal, such that notice required under Civ.R. 41(B)(1) was provided).\n\n {¶14} The record reflects that Simmons and his counsel were given ample prior\n\nnotice that dismissal of Simmons’s complaint was a possibility if Simmons failed to\n\nappear at the September 9, 2013 settlement conference as well as an opportunity (1) to\n\ncorrect or explain Simmons’s nonappearance and (2) to argue why the case should not be\n\ndismissed for Simmons’s failure to comply with the court’s trial orders. Having given\n\nthis notice, the trial court was not again required, after the September 9, 2013 settlement\n\nconference, to give Simmons yet another chance to avoid dismissal and “explain his\n\nnonappearance” in order to comply with Civ.R. 41(B)(1). Mokrytzky, 2009-Ohio-238 at\n\n¶ 13 (where plaintiff’s counsel did not appear at hearing, did not provide the court with\n\nnotice or a reason why he would be unable to attend the hearing, and the trial court in a\n\fjournal entry advising parties of hearing date clearly stated that “[i]f plaintiff’s counsel\n\nfails to appear, case will be dismissed with prejudice for failure to prosecute,” plaintiff’s\n\ncounsel was precluded from arguing that he should be provided an opportunity to assert\n\nwhy he was not present at the hearing because that “would be allowing him ‘a second bite\n\nat the apple’”), citing Shoreway Circle, 92 Ohio App.3d 823, 637 N.E.2d 355.\n\n {¶15} Simmons also argues that dismissal of his complaint with prejudice was “too\n\npunitive a measure to impose on him” for failure to attend a settlement conference and\n\nthat the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing his complaint with prejudice\n\n“without considering less drastic alternatives” such as a dismissal without prejudice. We\n\ndisagree.\n\n {¶16} Dismissal with prejudice is an extremely harsh sanction. Willis v. RCA\n\nCorp., 12 Ohio App.3d 1, 465 N.E.2d 924 (8th Dist.1983), paragraph one of the syllabus\n\n(“Dismissal with prejudice for nonappearance is a drastic remedy which should be used\n\nsparingly and in extreme situations”). It is reserved for cases in which a party’s conduct\n\n“‘falls substantially below what is reasonable under the circumstances evidencing a\n\ncomplete disregard for the judicial system or the rights of the opposing party,’” Sazima,\n\n86 Ohio St.3d at 158, 712 N.E.2d 729, quoting Moore v. Emmanuel Family Training Ctr.,\n\nInc., 18 Ohio St.3d 64, 70, 479 N.E.2d 879 (1985) — in other words, conduct “‘so\n\nnegligent, irresponsible, contumacious or dilatory as to provide substantial grounds for a\n\ndismissal with prejudice.’” Quonset, 80 Ohio St.3d at 48, 684 N.E.2d 319, quoting\n\nTokles & Son, Inc. v. Midwestern Indemn. Co., 65 Ohio St.3d 621, 632, 605 N.E.2d 936\n\f(1992). Absent such extreme circumstances, a court must consider lesser sanctions\n\nbefore dismissing a case with prejudice. Sazima at 158, citing Jones v. Hartranft, 78\n\nOhio St.3d 368, 371-372, 678 N.E.2d 530 (1997); Autovest, 2007-Ohio-3921 at ¶ 25.\n\nLesser sanctions that are available to the trial court when a party fails to appear at a\n\nconference or hearing include: (1) a reprimand by the court; (2) a finding of contempt; (3)\n\nan order prohibiting the party or attorney from appearing in that court without different\n\ncounsel in the future; (4) an order to pay the opposing party’s expenses or attorney fees;\n\nand (5) a dismissal without prejudice. See, e.g., Willis at paragraph two of the syllabus;\n\nYoungblood, 2010-Ohio-4358 at ¶ 15.\n\n {¶17} In considering whether dismissal is warranted for a party’s lack of\n\nprosecution, a trial court may take into account the entire history of the litigation,\n\nincluding a party’s prior dilatory conduct. Jones at 372. A trial court’s orders are not to\n\nbe taken lightly. Shoreway Circle, 92 Ohio App.3d at 832, 637 N.E.2d 355. The harsh\n\nremedy of dismissal with prejudice is warranted where the record shows that a party has\n\nrepeatedly, deliberately and without explanation, failed to comply with the trial court’s\n\norders. In Pembaur v. Leis, 1 Ohio St.3d 89, 437 N.E.2d 1199 (1982), syllabus, the Ohio\n\nSupreme Court held that “it is not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to dismiss an\n\naction, with prejudice, for lack of prosecution” where “a plaintiff voluntarily fails to\n\nappear at a hearing, without explanation, [after] the court has directed him to be present\n\nand his location is unknown” even to his counsel. In Pembaur, the plaintiff failed to\n\nattend a status conference, leading the defendants to file a motion to dismiss for failure to\n\fprosecute. When the plaintiff failed to attend the hearing on the motion, after the trial\n\ncourt notified him he was required to attend the hearing, the court dismissed his action\n\nwith prejudice. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the trial court should have\n\ndismissed the action without prejudice. However, the Ohio Supreme Court upheld the\n\ntrial court’s decision, holding that, under the circumstances, the trial court did not abuse\n\nits discretion in dismissing the case with prejudice. “‘Where a plaintiff fails to totally\n\nappear, * * * a dismissal with prejudice may be proper for such a failure indicates a lack\n\nof interest in pursuing the case.’” Id. at 91, quoting Schreiner, supra.\n\n {¶18} This case is quite similar to Pembaur. In this case, the trial court ordered\n\nSimmons to attend the July 10, 2013 settlement conference, advising him that if he failed\n\nto appear, his case could be dismissed. When Simmons did not appear, the court\n\nrescheduled the settlement conference for September 9, 2013, once again advising\n\nSimmons that if he failed to appear, the trial court could dismiss his case. Despite the\n\ncourt’s warnings, Simmons once again failed to appear. Simmons did not file a motion\n\nfor continuance of the September 9, 2013 settlement conference; there is nothing in the\n\nrecord indicating that he otherwise notified anyone that he would not be appearing for the\n\nsettlement conference; and he extended no settlement authority to his counsel in his\n\nabsence. Simmons likewise failed to comply with the court’s order to produce an\n\nitemized list and valuation of the property he claimed to have lost due to Narine’s alleged\n\n“self help eviction.” As a result, although Narine traveled from Virginia to attend the\n\nsettlement conference, no substantive discussions could be had. Simmons has never\n\foffered any explanation for his failure to appear at the court-ordered settlement\n\nconference, and there is nothing in the record to suggest that his failure to appear at the\n\nconference was anything other than a deliberate, voluntary act on his part.\n\n {¶19} In considering whether the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing\n\nSimmons’s complaint with prejudice, we are mindful of this court’s prior decisions in\n\ncases such as Willis v. RCA Corp., 12 Ohio App.3d 1, 465 N.E.2d 924 (8th Dist.1983),\n\nYoungblood v. Kindred Healthcare, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 94442, 2010-Ohio-4358, and\n\nOcran v. Richlak, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99856, 2013-Ohio-4603, in which this court\n\nheld that, under the circumstances in those cases, a party’s failure to appear at a hearing\n\nor pretrial conference “did not justify an order that plaintiff should forever lose his day in\n\ncourt.” In those cases, however, there was nothing in the record that suggested that the\n\nplaintiff “was dilatory or irresponsible in pursuing his cause of action,” that the plaintiff’s\n\nfailure to appear was “deliberate or rebellious,” or that there was any other “egregious\n\nconduct.” To the contrary, in each of those cases, the failure to appear was explained as\n\nresulting from excusable neglect or other extenuating circumstances that the trial court\n\ndetermined reasonably justified the failure to appear. See, e.g., Willis, supra (trial court\n\nabused its discretion in dismissing plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice where, although he\n\nhad four months’ prior notice of hearing, plaintiff inadvertently forgot to note the hearing\n\nin his calendar); Youngblood, supra (trial court abused its discretion in dismissing\n\nplaintiff’s complaint with prejudice based on his counsel’s failure to appear at case\n\nmanagement conference where counsel had just replaced his assistant and nonappearance\n\fwas allegedly due to assistant’s inadvertent failure to include the conference on his\n\ncalendar); Ocran, supra (trial court abused its discretion in dismissing plaintiff’s\n\ncomplaint with prejudice for failure to appear at settlement and pretrial conferences\n\nwhere plaintiff presented a “valid explanation” for his inability to attend the conferences,\n\ni.e., he resided out of state and was unable to return to Ohio due to his employment, his\n\ncounsel attended the settlement and pretrial conferences, and plaintiff was available by\n\ntelephone). No similar facts exist in this case.\n\n {¶20} Although disposition of cases on their merits is favored, and a dismissal\n\nwith prejudice is a harsh sanction, we cannot say, based on the particular facts in this\n\ncase, that the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing Simmons’s complaint with\n\nprejudice. Nothing in the record suggests that the trial court acted in an unreasonable,\n\narbitrary, or unconscionable manner. Accordingly, Simmons’s sole assignment of error\n\nis overruled.\n\n {¶21} Judgment affirmed.\n\n It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant the costs herein taxed.\n\n The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.\n\n It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment into\n\nexecution.\n\n A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of\n\nthe Rules of Appellate Procedure.\n\f__________________________________________\nKENNETH A. ROCCO, JUDGE\n\nLARRY A. JONES, SR., P.J., and\nTIM McCORMACK, J., CONCUR\n\f", "ocr": false, "opinion_id": 2701564 } ]
Ohio Court of Appeals
Ohio Court of Appeals
SA
Ohio, OH