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500 | 53,212 | City of Riverside v. Rivera | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1985/85-224 | 85-224 | 1985 | City of Riverside | Rivera | <p>In 1975, eight Chicano individuals were attending a party that was broken up by the Riverside police using tear gas and physical force without a warrant. Subsequently, the eight individuals filed suit in Federal District Court against the city and various police officers under several federal Civil Rights Acts, alleging violations of their First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The jury found in the individuals' favor and awarded $33,350 in compensatory and punitive damages. The individuals also sought attorney's fees under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976 in the amount of $245,456.25, based on 1,946.75 hours expended by their two attorneys at $125 per hour and 84.5 hours expended by law clerks at $25 per hour. Finding both the hours and rates reasonable, the District Court awarded the requested amount, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The appellate court found that the fee award was not excessive merely because it exceeded the amount of damages awarded by the jury.</p>
| 1,018 | 5 | 4 | false | plurality opinion | affirmed | Attorneys |
501 | 53,214 | East River Steamship Corporation v. Transamerica Delaval Inc. | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1985/84-1726 | 84-1726 | 1985 | East River Steamship Corporation | Transamerica Delaval Inc. | <p>Transamerica Delaval Inc. designed and manufactured propulsion systems for four supertankers. The propulsion systems eventually failed due to design and manufacturing flaws. Only the propulsion systems themselves were damaged - no other part of the ship was damaged, and no one was injured.</p>
<p>East River Steamship and the other companies that had purchased the supertankers sued Transamerica under the negligence and products-liability doctrines of tort law, a branch of law that deals with injuries not covered by contractual agreements. They sought compensation for the cost of repairing the ships as well as for the income they lost while the ships were out of service. The district court, however, granted summary judgment to Transamerica. It held that the injuries were not covered by tort law because only the propulsion systems themselves had been injured, and that the case therefore dealt with the product's warranty rather than tort law. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals heard the case en banc and affirmed the district court's decision.</p>
| 1,062 | 9 | 0 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | Economic Activity |
502 | 53,217 | Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1985/84-1602 | 84-1602 | 1985 | Anderson | Liberty Lobby, Inc. | <p>Liberty Lobby, Inc. (Liberty), a nonprofit "citizen's lobby" corporation, filed a libel action against a magazine published by Jack Anderson et al. Liberty claimed that one of Anderson's articles contained false and derogatory statements about its operations. In its defense, Anderson claimed that as a public entity Liberty must show with "convincing clarity" that Anderson acted with actual malice - something they could not do since the article's author stated in an affidavit that he thoroughly researched and cross-checked all his information. Liberty claimed that Anderson did act with actual malice since its author depended on patently unreliable sources. Following a district court's summary judgment ruling favoring Anderson, an appellate court reversed as it held that the lower court erroneously applied actual malice standards of proof at the summary judgement phase. Anderson appealed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.</p>
| 948 | 6 | 3 | true | majority opinion | vacated/remanded | First Amendment |
503 | 53,218 | Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1985/84-1340 | 84-1340 | 1985 | Wygant | Jackson Board of Education | <p>Under the collective bargaining agreement between the Jackson Board of Education (Board) and a teachers' union, teachers with the most seniority would not be laid off. It was also agreed not to lay off a percentage of minority personnel that exceeded the percentage of minority personnel employed at the time of a layoff. When the schools laid off some nonminority teachers, while retaining other minority teachers with less seniority, Wendy Wygant, a displaced nonminority teacher, challenged the layoff in district court. Holding that the Board could grant racial preferences without grounding them on prior discrimination findings and that the preferences did not violate the Equal Protection Clause, since they remedied discrimination by providing "role models" for minority students, the District Court upheld the layoff provision's constitutionality. When the appeals court affirmed, the Supreme Court granted Wygant certiorari.</p>
| 942 | 5 | 4 | true | plurality opinion | reversed | Civil Rights |
504 | 53,219 | Maine v. Taylor | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1985/85-62 | 85-62 | 1985 | Maine | Taylor | <p>In order to protect its fisheries from parasites and non-native species, the state of Maine prohibited the importation of live baitfish. Robert J. Taylor, the owner of a bait business, violated the law and was prosecuted by Maine authorities.</p>
| 250 | 8 | 1 | true | majority opinion | reversed | Economic Activity |
505 | 53,223 | Square D Company v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc. | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1985/85-21 | 85-21 | 1985 | Square D Company, et al. | Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc., et al. | <p>The petitioners represented a group of corporations that used a group of motor carriers regulated by the Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc. (NFTB), an organization that engaged in collective ratemaking activities for shipping goods over the border between the United States and Canada. The petitioners sued the carriers and alleged that, between 1966 and 1981, the group had engaged in price fixing that violated the terms of the NFTB agreement and could not be approved by the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC). The petitioners argued that during those years they paid higher rates than they would have in a freely competitive market and sought treble damages on that difference, along with declaratory and injunctive relief. The district court dismissed the case based on precedent set by a previous Supreme Court decision. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision regarding the treble damages and remanded for further hearings to determine whether the petitioners were entitled to injunctive relief.</p>
| 1,062 | 8 | 1 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | Economic Activity |
506 | 53,229 | Witters v. Washington Department of Services for the Blind | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1985/84-1070 | 84-1070 | 1985 | Larry Witters | Washington Department of Services for the Blind | <p>Larry Witters attended the Inland Empire School for the Blind, seeking to become a pastor, missionary, or youth director. Inland Empire was a non-denominational Christian school supported by donations and tuition payments. Witters suffered from a progressive eye condition, which rendered him legally blind under Washington law.</p>
<p>Witters applied to Washington’s Commission for the Blind to participate in its vocational rehabilitation program, funded by approximately eighty percent federal funds and twenty percent state funds. The commission, however, had previously adopted a policy statement forbidding the use of public funds to assist an individual in pursuing a career or degree in theology or related areas, based on Washington’s constitution. The commission denied Witters’ application because his vocational objective was to become a pastor, viewing this as falling within the areas related to theology. A state hearings examiner upheld the commission’s ruling, also citing Washington’s constitution. A Washington district court upheld the decision for the reasons given by the hearings examiner.</p>
<p>On appeal, the Supreme Court of Washington upheld the decision, but declined to base its ruling on the Washington Constitution. Instead, it reserved judgment on the state constitutional issue and determined that the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause required the commission to deny Witters’ application. Using the three-part test established by the Court in <i>Lemon v. Kurtzman</i>, it held that approving his application would have the primary effect of advancing religion.</p>
| 1,608 | 9 | 0 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | First Amendment |
507 | 53,228 | Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation v. Philadelphia Gear Corporation | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1985/84-1972 | 84-1972 | 1985 | Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation | Philadelphia Gear Corporation | <p>Orion Manufacturing Corporation (Orion) was a customer of Philadelphia Gear Corporation (PG). To provide a guarantee of payment to PG, Orion obtained a letter of credit for the benefit of PG from Penn Square Bank, N.A. (Bank). If Orion failed to pay an invoice to PG for at least 15 days, PG could draw upon that line of credit, up to $145,200. This type of credit line, meant to guarantee payment to a seller, is referred to as a standby letter of credit. To back up that line of credit, Orion executed an unsecured promissory note in favor of the Bank. This note is referred to as a backup letter of credit. Nothing was due on the backup letter of credit unless PG presented drafts on the standby letter of credit. Thus the backup letter was a contingent promissory note. The Bank did not credit any account of Orion's in exchange for the note, and did not treat its own assets as increased by its acceptance of the note. In 1982, the Bank was declared insolvent and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) was appointed its receiver. PG presented drafts on the standby letter of credit for goods delivered before the Bank's insolvency, but the FDIC returned them unpaid. PG sued the FDIC, claiming that the standby letter of credit was an insured deposit under the definition of "deposit" set forth at 12 U.S.C. Section 1813(l)(1), and that PG was therefore entitled to $100,000 in deposit insurance.</p>
| 1,420 | 6 | 3 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Economic Activity |
508 | 53,231 | Moran v. Burbine | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1985/84-1485 | 84-1485 | 1985 | John Moran, Superintendent of the Rhode Island Dept. of Corrections | Brian K. Burbine | <p>Brian Burbine was arrested for burglary in Cranston, Rhode Island. Police then received information connecting Burbine to a murder that happened in town a few months earlier. Burbine was read his Miranda rights and held for questioning. At first, Burbine refused to waive his rights, but later he signed three forms acknowledging that he understood his right to an attorney and waived that right. After questioning, he also signed three written statements admitting to the murder. That same night Burbine’s sister called the local Public Defender’s Office to get a lawyer for her brother. The sister did not know about the potential murder charge. When the Public Defender called the Cranston Police Station, police told her that Burbine was unavailable and would not be questioned until the next day. Police never told Burbine that an attorney attempted to contact him.</p>
<p>At trial, the judged denied a motion to suppress the statements made at the police station, holding that Burbine knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to counsel and privilege against self-incrimination. The U.S. District Court for the District of Rhode Island denied Burbine’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed, holding that the police officer’s deliberate or reckless failure to inform Burbine that his counsel attempted to contact him invalidated his waiver of rights.</p>
<p> </p>
| 1,448 | 6 | 3 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Criminal Procedure |
509 | 53,233 | Bowen v. Roy | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1985/84-780 | 84-780 | 1985 | Otis R. Bowen, Secretary of Health and Human Services; John R. Block, Secretary of Agriculture; Walter Cohen, Secretary of the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare | Stephen J. Roy and Karen Miller | <p>Stephen J. Roy and Karen Miller, along with their daughter Little Bird of Snow, were residents of Pennsylvania receiving benefits under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and Food Stamps programs. Roy and Miller refused to comply with the federal requirement that participants in these programs provide the social security numbers of all family members receiving benefits. They argued that obtaining a social security number for Little Bird would violate their Native American religious beliefs. The Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare terminated AFDC benefits paid for Little Bird and the parents sued, arguing that the free association clause of the First Amendment provided an exemption to the social security number requirement. At trial, Roy disclosed the Little Bird already had a social security number, and the court suggested the case was moot. Roy then argued that widespread use of the social security number would “rob the spirit” of Little Bird, violating their religious beliefs. The court restrained the government from denying benefits for Little Bird until she was 16 years old, but denied Roy’s request for damages.</p>
| 1,163 | 8 | 1 | true | majority opinion | vacated/remanded | First Amendment |
510 | 53,242 | Malley v. Briggs | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1985/84-1586 | 84-1586 | 1985 | Edward Malley and Rhode Island | James R. Briggs and Louisa Briggs | <p>In December 1980, the Rhode Island State Police force was conducting an authorized wiretap on the telephone of Paul Driscoll. On December 20, the police intercepted two phone calls from an unknown source that made reference to marijuana use that had occurred at a party the previous night at the Briggs’ residence. Edward Malley was the police officer in charge of the Driscoll investigation, and on the basis of these two calls, he drew up felony charges for the Briggs. The charges were presented to a state district court judge in February 1981, and the judge signed warrants for the Briggs’ arrest. The Briggs were arrested in their home on March 19, 1981, and taken to a police station where they were booked and held for several hours before being released. When presented to a grand jury, the charges were dropped.</p>
<p>The Briggs sued Malley in district court and alleged that his application for the warrants for their arrest violated their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. After the evidence was presented to the jury, Malley moved for a direct verdict, which the district court granted. The district court held that it was judge’s signing of the arrest warrants that was improper and that an officer who believes that he is acting on correct information is entitled to immunity from prosecution. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed and held that an officer is not entitled to immunity unless the officer had an “objectively reasonable” basis to believe that the alleged facts are sufficient to establish probable cause for an arrest warrant.</p>
| 1,590 | 7 | 2 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | Civil Rights |
511 | 53,241 | Ford v. Wainwright | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1985/85-5542 | 85-5542 | 1985 | Ford | Wainwright | <p>In 1974, a Florida court sentenced Alvin Bernard Ford to death for first-degree murder. At the time of the murder, trial, and sentencing phase, there was no indication that Ford was suffering from any mental deficiencies. While awaiting execution, Ford's mental condition worsened. His competency was assessed in accordance with Florida procedures. Following this assessment, Florida's Governor signed Ford's death warrant. A state court declined to hear arguments raised about Ford's competency. Without the benefit of a hearing, Ford's habeas corpus petition was then denied by the a federal district court. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.</p>
| 678 | 5 | 4 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Criminal Procedure |
512 | 53,240 | Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates, dba Condado Holiday Inn v. Tourism Company of Puerto Rico | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1985/84-1903 | 84-1903 | 1985 | Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates, dba Condado Holiday Inn | Tourism Company of Puerto Rico | <p>A Puerto Rican law restricted advertising by the island's casino gambling establishments. Even though gambling was a legal activity in Puerto Rico, the law only allowed advertising that was targeted at tourists.</p>
| 219 | 5 | 4 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | First Amendment |
513 | 53,254 | Thornburg v. Gingles | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1985/83-1968 | 83-1968 | 1985 | Lacy H. Thornburg, Attorney General of North Carolina | Ralph Gingles et al. | <p>The North Carolina General Assembly passed a redistricting plan for the state's Senate and House of Representatives. Black citizens of North Carolina alleged that the plan created seven new districts where blacks would not be able to elect representatives of their choosing. They filed suit in a District Court claiming that this violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. Before the District Court could hear the case, Congress amended Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act in order to clarify that voting violations needed only to have a "discriminatory effect" and required no "discriminatory purpose." Considering the "totality of circumstances" of the redistricting plan, the District Court ruled that six of the new districts violated the newly amended Voting Rights Act by diluting the power of the black vote. The North Carolina Attorney General appealed the decision directly to the Supreme Court.</p>
| 965 | 9 | 0 | false | majority opinion | reversed in-part | Civil Rights |
514 | 53,253 | Davis v. Bandemer | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1985/84-1244 | 84-1244 | 1985 | Davis | Bandemer | <p>A group of Democrats challenged Indiana's 1981 state apportionment scheme on the ground of political gerrymandering. The Democrats argued that the apportionment unconstitutionally diluted their votes in important districts, violating their rights. A three-judge District Court sustained the Democrats' challenge.</p>
| 320 | 6 | 3 | true | majority opinion | reversed | Civil Rights |
515 | 53,256 | New York v. P. J. Video, Inc. | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1985/85-363 | 85-363 | 1985 | New York | P. J. Video, Inc. et al. | <p>Investigator David Groblewski from the Erie County District Attorney's Office viewed videos rented from P.J. Video and determined their content violated New York obscenity statutes. He drafted an affidavit describing the content on the videos and filed a warrant authorizing their seizure. A village justice in Depew NY issued the warrant and the police seized ten movies suspected to contain obscene content. A local court determined five of the movies violated obscenity standards. P.J. Video argued that the justice issued the warrant without probable cause since he did not personally view the movies. The court agreed and suppressed the videos as evidence. The County Court of Erie County affirmed the decision, and the New York Court of Appeals also affirmed. It asserted that warrants authorizing the seizure of items that were both non-dangerous and mediums of speech needed to satisfy a higher level of proof of "probable-cause" than other types of warrants because of First Amendment concerns.</p>
| 1,011 | 6 | 3 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | First Amendment |
516 | 53,257 | Philadelphia Newspapers Inc. v. Hepps | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1985/84-1491 | 84-1491 | 1985 | Philadelphia Newspapers Inc. | Hepps | <p>In a series of articles, the Philadelphia Inquirer accused Hepps of links to organized crime and of capitalizing on that connection to influence the state legislature. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court favored Hepps and held that the newspaper was obligated to prove its accusations true.</p>
| 293 | 5 | 4 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | First Amendment |
517 | 53,259 | Firefighters v. City of Cleveland | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1985/84-1999 | 84-1999 | 1985 | Firefighters | City of Cleveland | <p>Section 706(g)of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act prohibits a court from ordering the promotion of an individual who was denied advancement for any reason other than racial discrimination. In 1980, the Vanguards of Cleveland, an organization of black and Hispanic firefighters employed by the City of Cleveland, filed a lawsuit alleging that the City’s system for hiring and promoting firefighters discriminated against racial minorities, which violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. Shortly after the City entered into settlement negotiations with the Vanguards, Local Number 93 of the International Association of Firefighters (a union representing a majority of Cleveland firefighters) moved to intervene as a party-plaintiff according to a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure that allows a nonparty to join an ongoing lawsuit in order to protect its rights from being affected by the litigation. The union argued that it had an interest in the suit because of its concern that promotions based upon a “racial quota system” (rather than competence exams or seniority rights) would detract from the quality of the Cleveland firefighting force. The Court approved the motion and ordered the Vanguards and the City to engage the union in settlement negotiations.</p>
<p>During the negotiations, the union membership overwhelmingly rejected a consent decree between the parties that increased the total number of supervisory positions within the Fire Department without specifying to whom those positions would be given. The Vanguards and the City moved for the approval of an amended consent decree that adopted the agreed-upon promotional system but was not subject to the union members’ approval. The district court approved the consent decree over the union’s objections. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. Local Number 93 petitioned the Court for a writ of certiorari based on its argument that the consent decree was an impermissible remedy under Section 706(g) of Title VII. According to the union, the court was precluded from approving the new promotional system because it may benefit individuals who were not actual victims of racial discrimination.</p>
<p> </p>
| 2,212 | 6 | 3 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | Civil Rights |
518 | 53,258 | Ohio Civil Rights Commission v. Dayton Christian Public Schools, Inc. | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1985/85-488 | 85-488 | 1985 | Ohio Civil Rights Commission, et al. | Dayton Christian Schools, Inc., et al. | <p>Dayton Christian Schools, Inc. (Dayton) is a private, non-profit corporation formed by two churches for the purposes of providing private education at the primary and secondary levels. The corporate charter includes a section that requires employees to subscribe to a particular set of religious beliefs, including a resolution of disputes through the “Biblical chain of command,” which means that all disputes must be handled internally, without redress in civil court. p></p>
<p>Linda Hoskinson was a teacher at Dayton during the 1978-1979 school year. She agreed to the requirement of the corporate charter, including the Biblical chain of command. In January 1979, Hoskinson informed her principal that she was pregnant and was told that her employment contract would not be renewed because of the organization’s belief that mothers should stay home with their young children. Rather than appealing the decision internally, Hoskinson contacted a lawyer and threatened to sue based on state and federal sex discrimination laws if her employment contract was not renewed. Hoskinson was suspended and then fired for going outside of the internal dispute resolution system.</p>
<p>Hoskinson filed a complaint with the Ohio Civil Rights Commission, which filed an order that required Dayton to reinstate Hoskinson with backpay. When Dayton did not respond, the Commission filed suit. Dayton responded by arguing that that the First Amendment prevented the Commission from having jurisdiction over the exercise of religious beliefs. While the administrative proceedings were pending, Dayton sued the commission in district court and sought an injunction against the state proceedings because they violated the First Amendment. The Commission filed a motion to dismiss and argued that federal abstention doctrines meant that the district court should let the administrative proceedings run their course. The district court refused the issue the injunction without addressing the abstention argument. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and held that allowing the Commission jurisdiction over Dayton would violate the First Amendment.</p>
| 2,162 | 9 | 0 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Judicial Power |
519 | 53,263 | Matsushita Electric Industrial Company, Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corporation | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1985/83-2004 | 83-2004 | 1985 | Matsushita Electric Industrial Company, Ltd. | Zenith Radio Corporation | <p>In 1974, Zenith Radio Corporation, an American manufacturer of consumer electronic products, and National Union Electronic Company (collectively referred to as Zenith) sued 21 Japanese-owned or -controlled manufacturers of consumer electronics and claimed that these companies conspired to drive the American companies out of the market. According to Zenith, the Japanese companies conspired to set artificially high prices for their products in Japan to offset the artificially low prices of their products in America, which was harmful to the American companies. Zenith claimed this conspiracy was a violation of several anti-trust laws intended to prevent price-fixing. The Japanese companies filed a motion for summary judgment. After finding the bulk of Zenith’s evidence inadmissible, the district court held that the admissible evidence did not raise a genuine issue of material fact and granted the motion for summary judgment in favor of the Japanese companies.</p>
<p>The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed and held that most of Zenith’s evidence was admissible. On the merits of the case, and in light of the greater amount of admissible evidence, the Court of Appeals held that a reasonable factfinder could find evidence of a conspiracy and that the district court improperly granted the summary judgment in favor of the Japanese companies.</p>
<p> </p>
| 1,388 | 5 | 4 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Economic Activity |
520 | 53,267 | Bowsher v. Synar | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1985/85-1377 | 85-1377 | 1985 | Bowsher | Synar | <p>Due to rising government budget deficits during the first term of the Reagan Administration, Congress passed the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Deficit Control Act of 1985. The act was designed to eliminate the federal budget deficit by restricting spending during fiscal years 1986 through 1991. Under the law, if maximum allowable deficit amounts were exceeded, automatic cuts, as requested by the Comptroller General, would go into effect. This case was decided together with O'Neill v. Synar and United States Senate v. Synar.</p>
| 529 | 7 | 2 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | Miscellaneous |
521 | 53,269 | McCleskey v. Kemp | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1986/84-6811 | 84-6811 | 1986 | McCleskey | Kemp | <p>McCleskey, a black man, was convicted of murdering a police officer in Georgia and sentenced to death. In a writ of habeas corpus, McCleskey argued that a statistical study proved that the imposition of the death penalty in Georgia depended to some extent on the race of the victim and the accused. The study found that black defendants who kill white victims are the most likely to receive death sentences in the state.</p>
| 428 | 5 | 4 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | Criminal Procedure |
522 | 53,273 | Anderson v. Creighton | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1986/85-1520 | 85-1520 | 1986 | Russell Anderson | Robert E. Creighton, Jr., et ux., et al. | <p>On November 11, 1983, FBI Agent Russell Anderson, along with other state and federal officers, conducted a warrantless search of the Creighton family home based on the belief that Vadaain Dixon, a man suspected of robbing a bank earlier that day, was hiding in the house. The Creightons sued Anderson in Minnesota state court and filed a claim for monetary damages under the Fourth Amendment. The suit was removed to federal district court, where Anderson moved for dismissal or summary judgment based on his alleged qualified immunity from civil damages liability. Qualified immunity shields government officials from liability for certain violations of an individual’s constitutional rights. The district court granted summary judgment for Anderson after finding that the search was lawful because Anderson had probable cause.</p>
<p>The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed and held that the case could not be decided on summary judgment because there were unresolved factual disputes regarding the legality of the search. The Court of Appeals also held that that Anderson did not have qualified immunity because the right he allegedly violated was the well-established Fourth Amendment right to protection from warrantless searches of a home.</p>
| 1,271 | 6 | 3 | true | majority opinion | vacated/remanded | Economic Activity |
523 | 53,276 | Colorado v. Spring | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1986/85-1517 | 85-1517 | 1986 | Colorado | John Leroy Spring | <p>In February 1979, John Leroy Spring and a companion shot and killed Donald Walker during a hunting trip in Colorado. Shortly after, agents of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) received information from an informant that Spring was involved in the transportation of stolen firearms across state lines. The informant also told the agents the Spring had been talking about killing Walker. The agents set up an undercover operation and arrested Spring on March 30. Spring was advised of his Miranda rights at the scene of the arrest and again at the police station. He then signed a document stating that he understood and waived his rights and was willing to make a statement. After asking Spring about the firearms transactions, the agents asked Spring if he had ever shot anyone, and if he had shot Walker in Colorado. Spring admitted to shooting someone but denied shooting Walker, and the interview ended. On May 26, Colorado police officers visited Spring in jail intending to question him about the Walker murder. They read Spring his Miranda rights, and he signed a document stating that he waived them. During the course of the interview, Spring confessed to the murder.</p>
<p>Spring was charged with first-degree murder in Colorado state court. He moved to suppress both the March 30 and May 26 statements by arguing that he invalidly waived his Miranda rights. The trial court held that the police’s failure to inform Spring of the topics that would be covered in questioning did not affect the the waiver, but the content of the March 30 interview was not relevant. The trial court suppressed the March 30 statement and admitted the May 26 statement into evidence. Spring was convicted. On appeal, Spring renewed his argument about the waiver of his Miranda rights for the March 30 statement and argued that the May 26 statement was the “illegal fruit” of the March 30 statement. The Colorado Court of Appeals reversed and held that the March 30 statement was inadmissible because the ATF agents had a duty to inform Spring that he was a suspect in the Walker murder before questioning him about it. The Court of Appeals also held that the state failed to meet its burden to prove that the May 26 statement was not the product of the earlier illegal statement. The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed.</p>
| 2,331 | 7 | 2 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Criminal Procedure |
524 | 53,275 | Turner v. Safley | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1986/85-1384 | 85-1384 | 1986 | William R. Turner, et al. | Leonard Safley, et al. | <p>In the late 1970s, Renz Correctional Institution converted to a “complex prison”. Generally, female prisoners at Renz were medium and maximum security level offenders, while most male inmates were minimum security offenders. Leonard Safley was a male inmate at Renz, and P.J. Watson was a female inmate. They met at Renz, where they became romantically involved; Watson was then transferred to Ozark Correctional Center because of this relationship. Prison authorities rebuffed all of Safley’s attempts to directly contact Watson.</p>
<p>A Missouri Division of Corrections regulation permitted correspondence between inmates who were immediate family members, but correspondence between inmates who were not family members was only allowed if 1) it related to legal matters or 2) at the discretion of the classification/treatment team of both inmates. Another regulation only permitted inmates to marry with the permission of the prison superintendent, and specified that permission should only be given when there was a compelling reason to do so.</p>
<p>The district court certified plaintiffs as a class including inmates at Renz who desired to correspond with inmates at other prison facilities. This class also included persons who wished to marry inmates at Missouri correctional facilities and whose right to marry had been allegedly violated by the DoC. Plaintiffs filed an action against Renz's Superintendent William Turner and others for injunctive relief and damages. The district court applied strict scrutiny to both DoC restrictions. It held that the restriction on correspondence was overly broad and capriciously applied, and that the marriage restriction violated inmates’ constitutional right to marry. The United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, affirmed, further holding that neither restriction was the narrowest means of addressing the DoC’s security concerns.</p>
| 1,899 | 5 | 4 | true | majority opinion | reversed in-part/remanded | First Amendment |
525 | 53,286 | United States v. Paradise | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1986/85-999 | 85-999 | 1986 | United States | Paradise | <p>In response to a series of NAACP-initiated lawsuits in the 1970s, the Alabama Department of Public Safety was required to implement a promotion scheme in which half of the department's promotions to certain ranks would go to black officers if enough qualified blacks were available.</p>
| 290 | 5 | 4 | false | plurality opinion | affirmed | Civil Rights |
526 | 53,287 | Board of Airport Commissioners of the City of Los Angeles v. Jews for Jesus, Inc. | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1986/86-104 | 86-104 | 1986 | Board of Airport Commissioners of the City of Los Angeles | Jews for Jesus, Inc. | <p>The Board of Airport Commissioners of Los Angeles adopted an ordinance which prohibited all "First Amendment activities" in the Los Angeles International Airport (LAX). Alan Snyder, a minister with Jews for Jesus, was instructed by an airport officer to refrain from distributing free religious literature on a walkway in the central terminal of LAX.</p>
| 358 | 9 | 0 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | First Amendment |
527 | 53,290 | Colorado v. Connelly | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1986/85-660 | 85-660 | 1986 | Colorado | Francis Connelly | <p>In 1983, Francis Connelly approached a police officer and, without any prompting, confessed to murder. The police officer immediately informed Connelly that he had the right to remain silent, but Connelly indicated that he still wished to discuss the murder. It was later discovered that Connelly was suffering from chronic schizophrenia at the time of the confession. A Colorado trial court suppressed the statements on the ground that they were made involuntarily.</p>
| 474 | 7 | 2 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Criminal Procedure |
528 | 53,291 | Tanner v. United States | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1986/86-177 | 86-177 | 1986 | Anthony R. Tanner, William M. Conover | United States | <p>Anthony Tanner and William Conover were indicted on charges of conspiracy to defraud the United States and of mail fraud. After the jury ruled, Tanner and Conover filed a motion for a new trial based on an affidavit stating that several jurors consumed alcohol during lunch breaks. The district court held an evidentiary hearing and denied relief, holding that juror testimony was inadmissible to impeach a jury verdict under Rule 606(b). There was insufficient evidence other than that testimony of juror misconduct. Tanner and Conover filed another motion, this time alleging juror use of alcohol, marijuana, and cocaine during the trial. The district court declined to hold another evidentiary hearing. On appeal the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit affirmed the convictions, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to hold a second evidentiary hearing.</p>
| 913 | 5 | 4 | true | majority opinion | affirmed | Criminal Procedure |
529 | 53,294 | Pope v. Illinois | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1986/85-1973 | 85-1973 | 1986 | Richard Pope and Charles Morrison | Illinois | <p>In 1973, the Supreme Court decided <em>Miller v. California</em> and established a three-prong test for determining whether material is obscene. The test asks whether the material in question appeals to a prurient interest, describes sexual conduct in a patently offensive manner, and whether the work as a whole lacks “serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.”</p>
<p>On July 21, 1983, police detectives in Rockford, Illinois, purchased magazines from Richard Pope and Charles Morrison, both of whom were attendants in an adult bookstore. Pope and Morrison were subsquently charged under Illinois’ obscenity statute for the sale of those magazines. They each moved to dismiss the charges and argued that the statute was unconstitutional under the First and Fourteenth Amendments because it did not require that the value of the work in question be judged on an objective basis but instead allowed for judgment based on contemporary community standards. The trial courts denied the motions and instructed the juries to determine whether the material would be viewed as obscene by adults in Illinois. Pope and Morrison appealed, and the Illinois Appellate Court, Second District, affirmed the ruling of the lower courts. The Illinois Supreme Court denied review.</p>
<p> </p>
| 1,297 | 5 | 4 | true | majority opinion | vacated/remanded | First Amendment |
530 | 53,298 | Federal Election Commission v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc. | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1986/85-701 | 85-701 | 1986 | Federal Election Commission | Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc. | <p>On January 26, 1973, Massachusetts Citizens for Life (MCFL) incorporated under the laws of Massachusetts as a non-stock, non-membership corporation. Beginning in January 1973, MCFL distributed a newsletter to its contributors focused on MCFL’s political concerns. Prior to the September 19, 1978, primary elections, MCFL distributed a flyer to contributors, due-payers and to approximately 50,000 people MCFL considered sympathetic to its goals. This flyer encouraged readers to vote ‘pro-life’, listed candidates for state and federal office in every voting district in the state, and identified each candidate as either supporting or opposing MCFL’s views.</p>
<p>The Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) prohibited corporations from spending general corporate treasury funds on any federal election; MCFL spent a total of $9,812.76 from its general treasury on the flyers in question. When conciliation proved unsuccessful, the Federal Election Commission (FEC) filed a complaint against MCFL seeking a civil penalty and other relief. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the court found for MCFL, holding that the flyers did not fit within the act’s definition of ‘expenditure’ and that the flyers fell under the act’s press exemption for news stories, commentaries, or editorials. The court also held that the act would violate the First Amendment if applied.</p>
<p>After examining the legislative history of the FECA, the United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit, reversed. It held that the flyers fit within the act’s definition of ‘expenditure’ and did not fall under its press exemption. It did, however, affirm the lower court’s ruling that FECA would be unconstitutional if applied, holding that the government offered no substantial government interest.</p>
| 1,781 | 5 | 4 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | First Amendment |
531 | 53,302 | Burlington Northern Railroad Company v. Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employes | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1986/86-39 | 86-39 | 1986 | Burlington Northern Railroad Co., et al. | Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees, et al. | <p>The Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees (BMWE) is a union that represents railroad workers across the country, specifically the employees of Maine Central Railroad, a subsidiary of Guilford Transportation Industries (Guilford). After Guilford acquired Maine Central in 1981, Maine Central had to lay off 300 of the 400 employees that BMWE represented. The collective bargaining agreement between the two expired in 1984, before the parties were able to reach a satisfactory new agreement. For the following year, the parties attempted to reach a settlement using the procedures set out by the Railroad Labor Act (RLA), but they exhausted those options. On March 3, 1986, BMWE began a strike against Maine Central that expanded to encompass the other Guilford subsidiaries. Upon receiving information that other railroad companies were assisting Guilford, BMWE began picketing other railroads’ lines. On April 9, Burlington Northern Railroad Company sought and received a temporary restraining order from the district court to stop the picketing. Six other railroad companies filed petitions in the same court and received temporary restraining orders on April 11. On April 23, the district court consolidated the cases entered a preliminary injunction against BMWE.</p>
<p>The Court of Appeals reversed based on the understanding that the Norris-LaGuardia Act prevents the use of injunctions to halt labor dispute protests. The Court of Appeals concluded that the district court did not have the jurisdiction to enter the injunction and ordered it to dismiss the petitioners’ claims.</p>
<p>While these judicial procedures were pending, on May 16, 1986, the President issued Executive Order No. 12557, which convened an emergency board to investigate the dispute and report back to the President after 30 days. During that period the parties had to maintain the status quo that existed before the dispute. Congress also convened an advisory board that recommended that Congress enact legislation that would bind the parties to the recommendation of the President’s emergency board. Congress did so, and the President signed it into law.</p>
| 2,152 | 9 | 0 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | Unions |
532 | 53,303 | Illinois v. Krull | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1986/85-608 | 85-608 | 1986 | Illinois | Albert Krull, George Lucas, Salvatore Mucerino | <p>The state of Illinois required all who sell or scrap motor vehicles or parts to obtain licenses. That law also required anyone with a license to allow police to inspect their records at any time without a warrant. Albert Krull, George Lucas, and Salvatore Mucerino operated a wrecking yard. During a routine records inspection, police found four stolen cars on the lot. The men were arrested and charged with several criminal violations of Illinois motor vehicle laws. The next day, the Illinois Supreme Court struck down the law that allowed police officers to inspect records without a warrant.</p>
<p>Krull moved to suppress evidence found during the search because the law that police officers relied on was now unconstitutional. As a general rule, any evidence obtained during an unlawful search is excluded at trial. Illinois argued that because the police officer acted in good faith, the evidence was admissible. The trial court granted Krull’s motion. The state appellate court vacated the judgment and remanded. On remand, the trial court maintained its original position and granted the motion to suppress. The Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed.</p>
| 1,176 | 5 | 4 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Criminal Procedure |
533 | 53,307 | United States v. Salerno | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1986/86-87 | 86-87 | 1986 | United States | Salerno | <p>The 1984 Bail Reform Act allowed the federal courts to detain an arrestee prior to trial if the government could prove that the individual was potentially dangerous to other people in the community. Prosecutors alleged that Salerno and another person in this case were prominent figures in the La Cosa Nostra crime family.</p>
| 330 | 6 | 3 | true | majority opinion | reversed | Due Process |
534 | 53,308 | Bowen v. Gilliard | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1986/86-509 | 86-509 | 1986 | Otis R. Bowen, Secretary of Health and Human Services | Beaty Mae Gilliard, et al. | <p>Until 1984, the statutes governing Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) allowed a family to exclude one member if that person had an income or is receiving benefits that would reduce the amount of government aid. In 1984, Congress passed the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, which removed the option of excluding a family member. The new law required that the filing unit include all income from all members of the family. This might reduce the family’s total income by reducing the benefits the family is eligible to receive.</p>
<p>In 1970, Beaty Mae Gilliard, who had been receiving benefits from North Carolina through the AFDC since 1962, gave birth to her seventh child. Because Gilliard was receiving child support from the child’s father, the state deducted the child support from the benefits she was eligible for as the parent of an eight-person family. Gilliard sued, and the district court agreed with her reading of the statute that she was allowed to exclude the child who was receiving child support from her filing unit because the seven-person family benefits were greater than what she would receive from the eight-person family benefits minus the child support. The district court awarded class relief to anyone in Gilliard’s position. When North Carolina adopted regulations to comply with the 1984 Act, Gilliard and other members of the class filed a motion to reopen the case and obtain relief. The district court concluded that the new statutory scheme adopted by the 1984 Act violated the Due Process and Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. </p>
| 1,584 | 6 | 3 | true | majority opinion | reversed | Civil Rights |
535 | 53,312 | Board of Directors, Rotary International v. Rotary Club of Duarte | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1986/86-421 | 86-421 | 1986 | Board of Directors, Rotary International | Rotary Club of Duarte | <p>When the Duarte chapter of Rotary International violated club policy by admitting three women into its active membership its charter was revoked and it was expelled. The California Court of Appeals, however, in reversing a lower court decision, found that Rotary International's action violated a California civil rights act prohibiting sexual discrimination.</p>
| 367 | 7 | 0 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | Civil Rights |
536 | 53,323 | Hodel v. Irving | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1986/85-637 | 85-637 | 1986 | Donald P. Hodel | Mary Irving, et al. | <p>In 1983, Congress enacted the Indian Land Consolidation Act. Prior to this act, tribal land was allotted to individual tribal members in trust. Individual owners would hold the land in trust and could convey the land to their heirs. If a tribal member who held land in trust died without a will, the land would be divided among all of the heirs of that tribal member. This eventually lead to heirs inheriting very small fractional interests in land. The Indian Land Consolidation Act contained a provision which would transfer certain minimal fractional interests in land away from the individual heirs and back to the tribal governments. </p>
<p>Mary Irving, Patrick Pumpkin Seed, and Eileen Bissonette were enrolled members of the Oglala Sioux Tribe and were heirs or devisees of Tribe members who died in 1983. Each had inherited a fractional interest in land which they would lose to the tribal government under the Indian Land Consolidation Act. </p>
<p>Irving, Seed, and Bissonette filed suit in the district court claiming that the provision of the Indian Land Consolidation Act resulted in taking of property without just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment. The district court held that the statute was constitutional and that the complainants had no vested interest in the property of the decedents.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed the district court. It held that the complainants had standing and that the statute did violate the Fifth Amendment. The Secretary of the Interior appealed the appellate court's decision. </p>
| 1,585 | 9 | 0 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | Due Process |
537 | 53,328 | Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1986/85-2156 | 85-2156 | 1986 | Shaare Tefila Congregation | Cobb | <p>After its Maryland synagogue was painted with anti-Semitic slogans and symbols, the Shaare Tefila Congregation brought a suit charging the white defendants with racially discriminatory interference with property rights under 42 U.S.C. Section 1982. The Maryland District Court dismissed the claims, maintaining that white-on-white violence was not racially discriminatory.</p>
| 380 | 9 | 0 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Civil Rights |
538 | 53,333 | Nollan v. California Coastal Commission | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1986/86-133 | 86-133 | 1986 | Nollan | California Coastal Commission | <p>The California Coastal Commission required owners of beachfront property wishing to obtain a building permit to maintain a pathway on their property open to the public.</p>
| 176 | 5 | 4 | true | majority opinion | reversed | Due Process |
539 | 53,334 | Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Florida | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1986/85-993 | 85-993 | 1986 | Hobbie | Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Florida | <p>Paula Hobbie worked for Lawton and Company, a Florida jewelry shop. She joined the Seventh-day Adventist Church and informed her employer that she could not work from sundown on Friday to sundown on Saturday since it was her new church's Sabbath day. Lawton soon dismissed her for refusing to work Friday evening and Saturday shifts. Hobbie filed for unemployment compensation with the Florida Department of Labor and Employment Security. Lawton objected to paying benefits, claiming that she did qualify since she had been dismissed "for misconduct connected with her work." The Bureau of Unemployment Compensation agreed and denied her benefits. Hobbie claimed that this violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. She unsuccessfully appealed the decision in the Florida Fifth District Court of Appeal.</p>
| 826 | 8 | 1 | true | majority opinion | reversed | First Amendment |
540 | 53,344 | Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., Solano Cty. | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1986/85-693 | 85-693 | 1986 | Asahi Metal Company, Ltd. | Superior Court of California, Solano County | <p>On September 23, 1978, Gary Zurcher lost control of his Honda motorcycle while riding down Highway 80 in Solano County, California. His motorcycle collided with a trailer and killed his passenger and wife, Ruth Ann Moreno. A year later, Zurcher filed a liability suit alleging that the sudden loss of air and subsequent explosion of his rear tire caused the accident. His complaint named Cheng Shin Rubber Industrial Company, the Taiwanese manufacturer of the tube, as a defendant. Cheng Shin sued its co-defendant, Asahi Metal Industry Company, the Japanese manufacturer of the tube's valve assembly. Zurcher's claim was eventually settled, which left the suit against Asahi still outstanding. </p>
<p>Asahi filed a motion with the superior court to quash the summons by arguing that the court had no jurisdiction over the company. The Court denied the motion because Asahi does business internationally and therefore should be subject to international laws. The Court of Appeal of the State of California ordered the Superior Court to grant the motion because it was not reasonably foreseeable for Asahi products to end up in California. The Supreme Court of the State of California reversed and held that Asahi placed its components in a "stream of commerce" with the awareness that some of those components ended up in California.</p>
| 1,342 | 9 | 0 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Due Process |
541 | 53,345 | Rankin v. McPherson | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1986/85-2068 | 85-2068 | 1986 | Rankin | McPherson | <p>Ardith McPherson was a clerical employee in the Harris County, Texas constable's office. After hearing on the office radio that there had been an attempt to assassinate President Ronald Reagan, McPherson, who thought she was alone with one other office worker, stated "if they go for him again, I hope they get him." Another co-worker overheard the comment and reported it to the Constable, Walter H. Rankin. Rankin subsequently fired McPherson.</p>
| 453 | 5 | 4 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | First Amendment |
542 | 53,347 | Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1986/85-2169 | 85-2169 | 1986 | Saint Francis College | Al-Khazraji | <p>Al-Khazraji, a professor and U.S. citizen born in Iraq, filed suit against his former employer and its tenure committee for denying him tenure on the basis of his Arabian race in violation of 42 U.S.C. Section 1981. The District Court held that while Al-Kharzraji had properly alleged racial discrimination, the record was insufficient to determine whether he had been subjected to prejudice.</p>
| 400 | 9 | 0 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | Civil Rights |
543 | 53,353 | San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Committee | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1986/86-270 | 86-270 | 1986 | San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. | United States Olympic Committee | <p>Currently unavailable.</p>
| 30 | 5 | 4 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | First Amendment |
544 | 53,354 | Arizona v. Hicks | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1986/85-1027 | 85-1027 | 1986 | Arizona | Hicks | <p>A bullet was fired through the floor of Hicks's apartment which injured a man in the apartment below. To investigate the shooting, police officers entered Hicks's apartment and found three weapons along with a stocking mask. During the search, which was done without a warrant, an officer noticed some expensive stereo equipment which he suspected had been stolen. The officer moved some of the components, recorded their serial numbers, and seized them upon learning from police headquarters that his suspicions were correct.</p>
| 534 | 6 | 3 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | Criminal Procedure |
545 | 53,356 | Richardson v. Marsh | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1986/85-1433 | 85-1433 | 1986 | Gloria Richardson, Warden | Clarissa Marsh | <p>Clarissa Marsh, Benjamin Williams, and Kareem Martin were charged with the assault of Cynthia Knighton and the murder of her four-year-old son, Koran, and her aunt, Ollie Scott. Despite Marsh’s objections, she and Williams were tried jointly. The prosecution entered Williams’ confession into evidence, although the confession was redacted to prevent any mention of anyone other than Williams and Martin being involved in the crime. In his closing argument, the prosecution admonished the jury not to use Williams’ confession against Marsh but linked her testimony to events in the confession. The judge also instructed the jury not to use the confession against Marsh. Marsh was convicted, the Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed, and the Michigan Supreme Court denied the appeal.</p>
<p>Marsh filed a writ of habeas corpus and argued that the introduction of the confession violated her rights under the Confrontation Clause. The district court denied the petition. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed.</p>
| 1,041 | 6 | 3 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Criminal Procedure |
546 | 53,357 | United States v. Stanley | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1986/86-393 | 86-393 | 1986 | United States, et al. | James B. Stanley | <p>In February 1958, Master Sergeant James Stanley volunteered to participate in a military program ostensibly testing the effectiveness of protective clothing and equipment against chemical warfare. He spent a month at the Army’s Chemical Warfare Laboratories and during that time was secretly administered doses of lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD). As a result of his exposure to LSD, Stanley began experiencing hallucinations, memory loss, impaired performance of his job, and he engaged in domestic violence without remembering it later. He was discharged from the Army in 1969. In 1975, Stanley received a letter from the military asking for his cooperation in a study to determine the long-term effects of LSD and referring to his previous “voluntary” involvement in the 1958 tests. This letter was the first notification that Stanley received regarding the true purpose of the 1958 tests. He sued the government under the Federal Torts Claim Act (FTCA) and argued that there had been negligence in the administration, supervision, and subsequent monitoring of the drug testing program.</p>
<p>The district court granted the government’s motion for summary judgment and held that the government was not liable for negligence that occurred while Stanley was on active duty. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed but also held that the district court should have dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. On remand, Stanley amended his complaint to include claims that unknown officers violated his constitutional rights and argued that the constitutional claim did not fall under the service exception to the FTCA. The district court again dismissed the claim under the FTCA and rejected the government’s argument that the same exception barred Stanley’s constitutional claims. The government moved for partial final judgment because Stanley had not named individual defendants. Stanley filed a second amended complaint that named individual defendants, but before the court ruled on it, the Supreme Court decided <i>Chappell v. Wallace</i>, which held that enlisted military personnel may not file constitutional claims. The district court held that the <i>Chappell</i> decision did not bar Stanley’s constitutional claims. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed and held that recent precedent did not require Stanley’s FTCA claim to be barred.</p>
| 2,398 | 5 | 4 | true | majority opinion | vacated/remanded | Economic Activity |
547 | 53,360 | O'lone v. Estate Of Shabazz | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1986/85-1722 | 85-1722 | 1986 | Edward O'Lone | Estate of Ahmad Uthman Shabazz and Sadr-Ud-Din Nafis Mateen | <p>Ahmad Uthman Shabazz and Sadr-Ud-Din Nafis Mateen were inmates in New Jersey’s Leesburg State Prison. The prison classified inmates depending on the security risk each posed. Due to their classification, Shabazz and Mateen were assigned to a prison job outside of the main prison building and were not allowed to return to the main prison building during the workday. Because of these restrictions neither men, both of whom were practicing Muslims, were able to attend Juamu’ah, a weekly religious service held on Fridays.</p>
<p>The two men sued the prison and argued that the work policies infringed on their First Amendment rights to free exercise of religion. The federal district court found in favor of the prison and held that the prison policies plausibly advanced the goals of security, order, and rehabilitation. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the lower court’s ruling and held that the prison was required to show that there was no other reasonable method by which the inmate’s religious rights could be accommodated without creating actual security problems.</p>
<p> </p>
| 1,113 | 5 | 4 | true | majority opinion | reversed | First Amendment |
548 | 53,361 | Keystone Bituminous Coal Association. v. DeBenedictis | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1986/85-1092 | 85-1092 | 1986 | Keystone Bituminous Coal Association et al. | Debenedictis et al. | <p>By passing the the Bituminous Mine Subsidence and Land Conservation Act (Act), the Pennsylvania Legislature empowered the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources (DER) to regulate underground coal mining that damaged structures on the surface. When implementing the Act, DER prevented coal miners from removing more than 50% of coal from mines located beneath buildings. Historically, coal miners acquired rights to "mining estates" separate from the property owned on the above "surface estates." The Keystone Bituminous Coal Association, a group of miners, complained that the Act created a "support estate" that effectively took away its property without compensation. Keystone relied on the Supreme Court's decision in <em>Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon</em> to allege that this state action violated the Contract Clause and the Takings Clause found in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The District Court rejected both allegations and the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the decision.</p>
| 1,041 | 5 | 4 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | Due Process |
549 | 53,362 | Edwards v. Aguillard | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1986/85-1513 | 85-1513 | 1986 | Edwards | Aguillard | <p>A Louisiana law entitled the "Balanced Treatment for Creation-Science and Evolution-Science in Public School Instruction Act" prohibited the teaching of the theory of evolution in the public schools unless that instruction was accompanied by the teaching of creation science, a Biblical belief that advanced forms of life appeared abruptly on Earth. Schools were not forced to teach creation science. However, if either topic was to be addressed, evolution or creation, teachers were obligated to discuss the other as well.</p>
| 531 | 7 | 2 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | First Amendment |
550 | 53,365 | United States v. Dunn | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1986/85-998 | 85-998 | 1986 | United States | Ronald Dale Dunn | <p>Using electronic beepers and aerial photography, police tracked certain drug making supplies to Ronald Dale Dunn’s ranch. The ranch had a fence surrounding the perimeter as well as several interior fences. Law enforcement officers entered the property without a warrant and crossed several fences to get near Dunn’s barn. The barn was about 60 yards away from Dunn’s house and a fence separated the two buildings. Police smelled phenylacetic acid and heard a motor running in the barn. Police approached the barn but did not enter. The officers did shine a flashlight through netting above the door and observed what looked like a drug laboratory. The officers made several similar visits, not entering, but looking into the barn, before obtaining a warrant to search the barn and Dunn’s house. During this search, police seized chemicals and equipment use for making drugs.</p>
<p>At trial, Dunn unsuccessfully moved to suppress evidence obtained during the search. A jury convicted him on federal drug charges. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that the barn was “within the curtilage” of Dunn’s house, so the police officers’ warrantless visits to the barn violated the Fourth Amendment. The U.S. Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals judgment and remanded in light of <i>Oliver v. United States</i>. This time, the court of appeals found that the warrantless searches of the barn violated Dunn’s reasonable expectation of privacy.</p>
| 1,491 | 7 | 2 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Criminal Procedure |
551 | 53,373 | Tison v. Arizona | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1986/84-6075 | 84-6075 | 1986 | Ricky and Ramond Tison | Arizona | <p>Ricky and Raymond Tison, brothers, conspired with several other family members to help their father, Gary, escape from prison. Gary was serving life in prison for murdering a guard during a previous escape attempt. Smuggling in a cooler full of guns, the Tisons helped Gary and his cellmate Randy escape. The group made a safe exit, but a few days later their car got a flat tire. They decided to flag down and steal a passing car. The group ordered the family of four out of the car while they transferred their belongings. When Ricky and Raymond went to get the family some water, Gary and Randy shot the family multiple times, killing them all. Ricky and Raymond did nothing to help the family. They continued to run with Randy and Gary until the chase ended in a shootout with police. Gary died in the desert of exposure before the police found him, and another brother died in the shootout. Ricky, Raymond, and Randy faced four counts of felony murder through accomplice liability. All three received the death penalty.</p>
<p>The Supreme Court of Arizona affirmed the sentences, holding that while the Tisons had not specifically intended to kill the family, they conspired with known killers and did nothing to aid the family when they had the chance. The Court held that the son’s anticipation that lethal force might be used in their endeavor satisfied the “intent” requirement for the death penalty.</p>
| 1,429 | 5 | 4 | true | majority opinion | vacated/remanded | Criminal Procedure |
552 | 53,375 | Puerto Rico v. Branstad | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1986/85-2116 | 85-2116 | 1986 | Puerto Rico | Branstad | <p>Ronald Calder was a native of Iowa working in Puerto Rico, He was charged with first degree murder and attempted murder. After posting bail, he fled to his home state. Puerto Rico submitted a petition to Branstad, Iowa's governor at the time, to extradite Calder for court proceedings. Branstad refused.</p>
| 311 | 9 | 0 | true | majority opinion | reversed | Criminal Procedure |
553 | 53,381 | Griffith v. Kentucky | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1986/85-5221 | 85-5221 | 1986 | Griffith | Kentucky | <p>This case concerned the retrospective application of judge-made rules. Specifically, the Court had to decide whether a prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to exclude black jurors, combined with his call to the jury clerk, violated the black petitioner's right to an impartial jury. The Court was called upon to decide whether the previous decision in Batson v. Kentucky was applicable to pending litigation but not final when Batson was decided. This case was decided together with Brown v. United States.</p>
| 519 | 6 | 3 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Criminal Procedure |
554 | 53,383 | Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara Cty. | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1986/85-1129 | 85-1129 | 1986 | Johnson | Transportation Agency, Santa Clara Cty. | <p>The Transportation Agency, Santa Clara, California promoted Diane Joyce to road dispatcher over Paul Johnson. Both candidates were qualified for the job. As an affirmative action employer, the Agency took into account the sex of the applicants in making the promotion decision.</p>
| 285 | 6 | 3 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | Civil Rights |
555 | 53,385 | Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc. | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1986/85-1798 | 85-1798 | 1986 | Pennzoil Co. | Texaco Inc. | <p>Pennzoil Co. obtained a jury verdict of $10.53 billion in a Texas state court suit. The suit alleged that Texaco Inc. tortiously induced a third party to breach its contract to sell stock to Pennzoil. Before the court entered a final judgment, Texaco sued in federal district court alleging that the Texas court proceedings violated its rights under the Constitution and several Texas statutes. Pennzoil argued that the district court should abstain from hearing the case under the doctrine of <i>Younger v. Harris</i>. <i>Younger</i> held that a federal court must abstain from hearing challenges to a state court proceeding while that proceeding is still underway. The district court did not abstain and granted a preliminary injunction. The court found that it had jurisdiction over the matter and that Texaco was likely to succeed in its suit. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed in part, holding that the district court had jurisdiction, but should not have evaluated the claims that were discussed in the state trial. Meanwhile, the state court proceedings continued, and reduced the judgment to $8.53 billion</p>
| 1,147 | 9 | 0 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Judicial Power |
556 | 53,390 | Bourjaily v. United States | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1986/85-6725 | 85-6725 | 1986 | Bourjaily | United States | <p>William Bourjaily was arrested after receiving a quantity of cocaine in a parking lot from Angelo Lonardo. At Bourjaily's trial, the government introduced statements Lonardo made in a telephone conversation with an informant regarding a "friend" who had questions about the cocaine. The district court, considering the events in the parking lot and Lonardo's statements over the telephone, found that the government had established that a conspiracy existed between Bourjaily and Lonardo, and that Lonardo's statements over the telephone had been made in the course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy. Accordingly, the court held that Lonardo's out-of-court statements satisfied Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E) and were not hearsay.</p>
| 751 | 6 | 3 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | Criminal Procedure |
557 | 53,393 | South Dakota v. Dole | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1986/86-260 | 86-260 | 1986 | South Dakota | Dole | <p>In 1984, Congress enacted legislation ordering the Secretary of Transportation to withhold five percent of federal highway funds from states that did not adopt a 21-year-old minimum drinking age. South Dakota, a state that permitted persons 19 years of age to purchase alcohol, challenged the law.</p>
| 305 | 7 | 2 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | Federalism |
558 | 53,392 | California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1986/85-1708 | 85-1708 | 1986 | California | Cabazon Band of Mission Indians | <p>Two federally recognized Indian Tribes had reservation land within Riverside County, California where they conducted bingo and card games open to non- Indians. The gambling industry provided employment to many Indians on the reservation, and most clients were non-Indians. The State of California wanted to apply state gambling laws to reservation gaming and Riverside County wanted to apply local ordinances. Together, these laws would ban the card games and put charitable organizations in charge of bingo games. The Tribes claimed that the imposition of gambling laws by the state government violated their sovereignty. They brought suit against the state of California and Riverside County in federal district court. The district court ruled that neither the state nor the county had the authority to regulate gambling on reservation land. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.</p>
| 918 | 6 | 3 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | Civil Rights |
559 | 53,397 | Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Groetzinger | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1986/85-1226 | 85-1226 | 1986 | Commissioner of Internal Revenue | Groetzinger | <p>Robert P. Groetzinger spent sixty to eighty hours a week placing bets on dog races. He had no other form of employment, and the winnings from these wagers were his only form of income. His net gambling loss for 1978 was $2,032. Groetzinger reported his loss in his tax return but did not compute it in his adjusted gross income. The Internal Revenue Service determined Groetzinger was subjected to the minimum tax since his gambling loss was an item of tax preference according to the Internal Revenue Code of 1964. The Internal Revenue Service sued Groetzinger and the tax court held that he was in the “trade of business” of gambling, which meant that no part of his gambling losses subjected him to a minimum tax. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the judgment.</p>
| 810 | 6 | 3 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | Federal Taxation |
560 | 53,403 | American Trucking Associations, Inc. v. Scheiner | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1986/86-357 | 86-357 | 1986 | American Trucking Associations, Inc. | Scheiner | <p>One of the types of fees that Pennsylvania used to finance the cost of its highway maintenance was lump-sum annual fees, also known as flat taxes. In 1980, Pennsylvania increased the fee for an identification marker required of every truck over a certain weight from $2 to $25, but exempted trucks registered in Pennsylvania from the fee _ the marker fee was "deemed" to be included in the registration fee that local truckers had to pay. In 1982, the marker tax was reduced to $5, but a new tax was introduced, taxing trucks by the axle. The axle tax applied to all trucks weighing more than 26,000 pounds, but the registration fee for Pennsylvania trucks was reduced in an amount calculated to offset that new tax for most trucks. These flat taxes were contested in two state court cases on the ground, inter alia, that they violated the Commerce Clause of the Federal Constitution. Since Pennsylvania-based trucks travel, on average, about five times as many miles in Pennsylvania as out-of-state trucks, the cost of the flat taxes was approximately five times as high per mile of road use for out-of-state vehicles as for local vehicles. For that reason, the lower courts in Pennsylvania found that both the marker tax and the axle tax violated the Commerce Clause. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania considered both cases together and reversed.</p>
| 1,356 | 5 | 4 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Economic Activity |
561 | 53,402 | Booth v. Maryland | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1986/86-5020 | 86-5020 | 1986 | Booth | Maryland | <p>John Booth was convicted of the murders of an elderly couple and chose to have the jury determine his sentence instead of the judge. A Maryland statute required that a victim impact statement "describing the effect of the crime on the victim and his family" be included in the pre-sentence report in felony cases. In this case, the victim impact statement described the victims, the impact of the crime on their family, and the family members' opinions of the defendant and the crime.</p>
| 492 | 5 | 4 | true | majority opinion | vacated/remanded | Criminal Procedure |
562 | 53,406 | Maryland v. Garrison | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1986/85-759 | 85-759 | 1986 | Maryland | Harold Garrison | <p>Baltimore police officers obtained a warrant for the apartment of Lawrence McWebb and “the premises known as 2036 Park Avenue third floor apartment.” When they obtained and executed the warrant, the police mistakenly believed that there was only one apartment on the third floor. By the time they discovered there were two apartments, the police were already in the process of searching the apartment of Harold Garrison. During that search, police discovered heroin. Garrison was tried and convicted of violating Maryland’s Controlled Substances Act. He filed a motion to suppress the evidence of the heroin discovered during the search, but the trial court denied the motion. The Maryland Court of Special Appeals affirmed, but the Maryland Court of Appeals reversed.</p>
| 777 | 6 | 3 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Criminal Procedure |
563 | 53,407 | Rock v. Arkansas | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1986/86-130 | 86-130 | 1986 | Vickie Lorene Rock | Arkansas | <p>Vickie Rock was charged with manslaughter for the death of her husband, Frank Rock. Vickie and Frank had argued after Frank refused to let Vickie eat pizza and prevented her from leaving the apartment to get something else to eat. As the fight escalated, Vickie picked up a handgun and at some point Frank received a fatal gunshot wound to the chest. The police arrived and arrested Vickie. Because Vickie was unable to recall the shooting in any detail, on the advice of her attorney, she submitted to hypnosis in an attempt to refresh her memory. During one session, Vickie recalled that her finger had not been on the trigger and the gun had discharged accidentally when Frank had grabbed her arm. A gun expert examined the gun and found that it was defective and prone to fire when dropped or hit, even without the trigger being pulled, supported this revelation.</p>
<p>Because an Arkansas rule of evidence prohibited the admittance of any evidence obtained through hypnosis, the trial court barred Vickie from testifying to her memory of the shooting because it had been “hypnotically refreshed.” She was found guilty and sentenced to 10 years imprisonment. Vickie appealed to the Supreme Court of Arkansas, which affirmed her conviction. The Supreme Court of Arkansas held that, in the absence of a general consensus on the accuracy of evidence obtained through hypnosis, case-by-case inquiry into the accuracy of the evidence would be too burdensome on courts. In this case, the exclusion of Vickie Rock’s hypnotically refreshed memory did not infringe on her constitutional rights because her right to testify in her own defense was only limited by generally applicable rules of evidence intended to exclude confusing or misleading evidence.</p>
<p> </p>
| 1,767 | 5 | 4 | true | majority opinion | vacated/remanded | Criminal Procedure |
564 | 53,410 | Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1986/86-179 | 86-179 | 1986 | Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints | Amos | <p>Two affiliate organizations of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints operated Deseret Gymnasium, a non-profit facility in Salt Lake City, Utah. These affiliates were the Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (CPB) and the Corporation of the President of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (COP). Arthur Frank Mayson worked for the Gymnasium for sixteen years as an engineer, but CPB and COP fired him when he failed to obtain a certificate authorizing him to attend the Church's religious temples. He filed a class-action lawsuit in District Court alleging that CPB and COP violated Section 703 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by dismissing him from nonreligious employment because he did not satisfy certain religious conditions. In response, CPB and COP claimed that Section 702 of the Act, as amended in 1972, exempts religious organizations from the Act's ban in Section 703 on religious discrimination. Mayson then claimed that Section 702 violated the First Amendment's Establishment Clause by allowing religious organizations to practice discriminatory hiring for nonreligious jobs. The District Court agreed that Mayson's job was nonreligious. It also held that Section 702 violated the Establishment Clause because it allowed religious adherents exclusive participation in nonreligious activities.</p>
| 1,386 | 9 | 0 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | First Amendment |
565 | 53,418 | First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, California | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1986/85-1199 | 85-1199 | 1986 | First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale | County of Los Angeles, California | <p>In 1979, the County of Los Angeles passed an ordinance which prohibited construction or reconstruction on land which had been devastated by a flood one year earlier. The First English Evangelical Lutheran Church owned a campground which was affected by this ordinance and it was not allowed to reconstruct buildings on this land which the flood had destroyed.</p>
| 367 | 6 | 3 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Due Process |
566 | 53,416 | Griffin v. Wisconsin | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1986/86-5324 | 86-5324 | 1986 | Griffin | Wisconsin | <p>Joseph Griffin, who had previously been convicted of a felony, was convicted in a Wisconsin state court of disorderly conduct, resisting arrest, and obstruction of an officer. He was put on probation. According to Wisconsin law, probationers are in the legal custody of the State Department of Health and Social services and must abide by that department’s rules and regulations of the department. One of the regulations permits the probation officer to search the probationer’s home without a warrant as long as there are “reasonable grounds” to believe illegal substances are in the premises. These grounds include: information provided by an informant, the reliability of that information and the informant, and the officer’s own experience with the probationer.</p>
<p>Griffin’s probation officer received information from a detective that there might be guns in Griffin’s apartment. When the police searched Griffin’s apartment, they found a handgun and Griffin was charged with the felony of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Griffin moved to suppress the evidence obtained in the search. The trial court denied the motion and Griffin was convicted. Griffin appealed on the grounds that the evidence from the search violated the Fourth Amendment. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals and the Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed the conviction.</p>
<p> </p>
| 1,369 | 5 | 4 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | Criminal Procedure |
567 | 53,422 | O'Connor v. Ortega | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1986/85-530 | 85-530 | 1986 | O'Connor | Ortega | <p>In 1981, officials at a hospital, including Executive Director Dr. Dennis O'Connor, suspected improprieties in Dr. Ortega's management of a residency program. The officials conducted an investigation of Ortega, which included multiple searches of his office and seizure of a number of items. The items were later used in proceedings before the California State Personnel Board to impeach the credibility of witnesses that testified on Dr. Ortega's behalf.</p>
| 463 | 5 | 4 | true | plurality opinion | reversed/remanded | Criminal Procedure |
568 | 53,424 | Gray v. Mississippi | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1986/85-5454 | 85-5454 | 1986 | David Randolph Gray | Mississippi | <p>On June 3, 1982, Attina Cannaday, David Gray, and Dawn Bushart woke up Ronald Wojcik and Sandra Sowash in their Biloxi apartment and forced them to leave at knifepoint. They brought Wojcik and Sowash in Wojcik’s van to a remote wooded area. Grey raped Sowash at knifepoint in the van, but she later escaped. At sunrise, Ronald Wojcik’s body was found with nineteen stab wounds to the head, hands, upper body, and back. Later that month, David Randolph Gray was indicted in Harrison County, Mississippi on a capital charge for the stabbing death of Ronald Wojcik while committing the felony of kidnapping.</p>
<p>During the jury selection process, the potential jurors were questioned individually. After the judge denied the prosecutor’s for-cause motions, the prosecutor used peremptory challenges to remove eight panel members who expressed any degree of uncertainty in their ability to cast a vote in a case potentially involving the death penalty. The <i>voir dire</i> oath of panelist H.C. Bounds was confused, but she ultimately stated that she was capable of voting to impose the death penalty. The judge eventually excused Bounds for cause, however, implying that he had improperly denied the prosecutor the use of for-cause motions for the other panelists.</p>
<p>The jury convicted Gray of capital murder and sentenced him to death. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Mississippi divided on whether Gray’s death sentence was invalid because the exclusion of Bounds violated Gray’s right to a fair and impartial jury. It ultimately affirmed Gray’s sentence despite the violation of Mississippi state procedure created by the trial court’s failure to follow <i>voir dire</i> guidelines in its dismissal of Bounds.</p>
| 1,726 | 5 | 4 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Criminal Procedure |
569 | 53,429 | School Board of Nassau County, Florida v. Arline | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1986/85-1277 | 85-1277 | 1986 | School Board of Nassau County | Gene Arline | <p>Gene Arline could no longer teach elementary school because she had tuberculosis, a contagious disease. The superintendent of schools in Nassau County, Florida dismissed her after it became clear that her illness was recurrent. The school system did not grant her financial relief. Arline claimed in a federal district court that this violated Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which prohibits state-funded programs from denying relief to applicants solely because they are handicapped. The school conceded it dismissed her solely because of her illness, but contended that a contagious disease like tuberculosis did not qualify her as handicapped. The court ruled that the Act did not define contagious illnesses as handicaps, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed. It found that Arline was "otherwise qualified" to teach except for her illness, and ruled that this qualified her for handicapped benefits.</p>
| 962 | 7 | 2 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | Civil Rights |
570 | 53,447 | Pennell v. City of San Jose | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1987/86-753 | 86-753 | 1987 | Pennell | City of San Jose | <p>The City of San Jose enacted a rent-control ordinance in 1979 in an attempt to alleviate the problem of skyrocketing rent prices due to the growing shortage of and the increasing demand for housing. Part of the ordinance allowed a Mediating Hearing Officer to consider as one factor "hardship to a tenant" when evaluating rent increases imposed by landlords.</p>
| 366 | 6 | 2 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | Due Process |
571 | 53,448 | Murray v. United States | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1987/86-995 | 86-995 | 1987 | Michael F. Murray | United States | <p>On April 6, 1983, federal law enforcement agents tailing Michael F. Murray and James D. Carter for suspicion of illegal drug activities saw the two drive large vehicles into a warehouse in South Boston. When Murray and Carter left, the agents saw a tractor-trailer rig and a large container. The agents arrested Murray and Carter and lawfully seized their vehicles, which contained marijuana. Several agents then returned to the warehouse, forced entry without a search warrant, and found numerous wrapped bales of what was later confirmed to be marijuana. The agents did not disturb the bales and kept the warehouse under surveillance until they obtained a search warrant. In applying for the search warrant, the agents did not mention the unwarranted entry or the information they had obtained. Approximately eight hours later, the agents obtained the warrant, entered the warehouse, and seized the bales along with the notebooks indicating the destinations of the marijuana.</p>
<p>Before the trial, Murray and Carter moved to suppress the evidence discovered in the warehouse and argued that the warrant was invalid because it was based on information obtained in the previous unwarranted entry. The district court denied the motion and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed.</p>
| 1,306 | 4 | 3 | false | majority opinion | vacated/remanded | Criminal Procedure |
572 | 53,450 | Karcher v. May | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1987/85-1551 | 85-1551 | 1987 | Karcher | May | <p>In 1982, the New Jersey Legislature overrode the Governor's veto and enacted a statute requiring the state's public school teachers to permit students to observe a minute of silence before the start of each school day. A group of New Jersey public school teachers, students, and parents sued the New Jersey Department of Education, its Commissioner, and two township boards of education. The suit alleged that the statute violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. After the named defendants and the New Jersey Attorney General refused to defend the statute, Alan J. Karcher, the Speaker of the New Jersey General Assembly, and Carmen A. Orechio, the President of the New Jersey Senate, intervened as defendants on behalf of the Legislature. The district court ruled against them and declared the "minute-of-silence" statute unconstitutional. Karcher and Orechio appealed the ruling in their official capacities as presiding officers of the Legislature. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed, and shortly thereafter, Karcher and Orechio lost their respective officer positions. They subsequently filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court, but the successors to their offices indicated to the Court that they were withdrawing the appeal on behalf of the Legislature. The plaintiffs argued that the withdrawal of the appeal ended the controversy and that the Court no longer had jurisdiction to review the case, according to Article III of the Constitution. Karcher and Orechio countered that they should be permitted to continue the appeal in their capacities as legislators and representatives of the legislative body that enacted the statute. Alternatively, they argued that the Court should vacate the judgment of the lower court upon their dismissal as appellants. They contended that New Jersey law does not authorize presiding legislative officers to represent the Legislature in litigation, and they argued that their loss of presiding officer status rendered the judgment unappealable.</p>
<p> </p>
| 2,064 | 8 | 0 | false | majority opinion | null | Judicial Power |
573 | 53,449 | Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1987/86-836 | 86-836 | 1987 | Hazelwood School District | Kuhlmeier | <p>The Spectrum, the school-sponsored newspaper of Hazelwood East High School, was written and edited by students. In May 1983, Robert E. Reynolds, the school principal, received the pages proofs for the May 13 issue. Reynolds found two of the articles in the issue to be inappropriate, and ordered that the pages on which the articles appeared be withheld from publication. Cathy Kuhlmeier and two other former Hazelwood East students brought the case to court.</p>
| 467 | 5 | 3 | true | majority opinion | reversed | First Amendment |
574 | 53,459 | United States v. Kozminski | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1987/86-2000 | 86-2000 | 1987 | United States | Ike Kozminski, et al. | <p>In 1983, Robert Fulmer and Louis Molitoris — who have IQs of 67 and 60, respectively — were discovered working on the Kozminski dairy farm in Chelsea, Michigan. Ike Kozminski, his wife Margarethe, and his son John used the labor of Fulmer and Molitoris seven days a week, for approximately 17 hours a day since they brought the men to the farm. Margarethe picked up Fulmer from the side of road in 1967, and by doing so took him away from a farm where he previously worked. Ike Kozminski found Molitoris living on the streets in Ann Arbor in the early 1970s and brought him to the farm to work. At first, the men received $15 per day, and later they received no pay at all. Although both men were in their sixties, they had the mental capacity of children between 8 and 10 years old. The Kozminskis told Fulmer and Molitoris that they could not leave the farm, and on one occasion John Kozminski threatened Molitoris with institutionalization. They also failed to provide the men with adequate nutrition, housing, and medical care, and told them not to contact their families or any other outsiders. </p>
<p>Eventually, a herdsman who worked for the Kozminskis became concerned for the welfare of Fulmer and Molitoris and alerted the authorities. County officials removed the men, and the Kozminskis were tried in federal district court for holding Fulmer and Molitoris in involuntary servitude. Based on jury instructions that included forms of coercion other than purely physical, the jury found the Kozminskis guilty. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the convictions on the grounds that the District Court’s definition of involuntary servitude was too broad.</p>
| 1,688 | 9 | 0 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | Criminal Procedure |
575 | 53,462 | Boyle v. United Technologies Corporation | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1987/86-492 | 86-492 | 1987 | Delbert Boyle, Personal Representative of the heirs and Estate of David A. Boyle, Deceased | United Technologies Corporation | <p>Following the death of US Marine helicopter pilot David A. Boyle, Delbert Boyle sued the helicopter's manufacturer ("Sikorsky") for defectively designing its copilot emergency escape hatch. On appeal from a state-law based jury verdict favoring Boyle, the Court of Appeals found that Sikorsky could not be held liable under Virginia tort law for any design flaws since it met the requirements of the "military contractor defense." Boyle appealed; the Supreme Court granted certiorari.</p>
| 492 | 5 | 4 | false | majority opinion | vacated/remanded | Economic Activity |
576 | 53,465 | Braswell v. United States | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1987/87-3 | 87-3 | 1987 | Randy Braswell | United States | <p>A federal grand jury subpoenaed Randy Braswell, president of Worldwide Machinery Sales Inc. and Worldwide Purchasing Inc., to produce the corporations’ books and records. Braswell refused to produce the documents, citing his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The district court ruled against Braswell, holding that the “collective entity doctrine”, which treats corporations differently from individuals for Fifth Amendment purposes, applied. The court rejected Braswell’s argument that the doctrine does not apply where the corporation is so small that it is merely the individual’s alter ego. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.</p>
| 684 | 5 | 4 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | Criminal Procedure |
577 | 53,466 | Honig v. Doe | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1987/86-728 | 86-728 | 1987 | Bill Honig | John Doe and Jack Smith | <p>The Education of the Handicapped Act contains a provision, known as the "stay-put" provision, which provides that a handicapped child shall remain with his or her current educational placement pending completion of any review proceedings, unless the parents and state or local educational agencies agree to removal. </p>
<p>John Doe was a student at the Louise Lombard School, a developmental center for disabled children. Doe had a disability which caused him considerable difficulty in controlling his impulses. On November 6, 1980, Doe was teased by a fellow student and responded by attacking the student and kicking out a school window. Doe was subsequently suspended pending expulsion proceedings. After unsuccessfully protesting the suspension by letter, Doe brought an action against school authorities under the Education of the Handicapped Act. Jack Smith was another handicapped student whose disability caused behavioral problems. Smith engaged in disruptive behavior and was eventually suspended indefinitely pending a hearing. Smith brought an action in district court essentially identical to the one brought by Doe. After learning of Doe's action Smith joined Doe's suit. </p>
<p>The handicapped students asked the district court to enter an order requiring the school to allow the students to return to their own schools. The district court granted the handicapped students' request and issued a permanent injunction, an order which prevented the school district from indefinitely suspending a student for disability-related misconduct. The school authorities appealed, and the Court of Appeals of the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's opinion. The school authorities appealed the appellate court's decision. </p>
| 1,746 | 6 | 2 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | Civil Rights |
578 | 53,468 | Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1987/86-1013 | 86-1013 | 1987 | Lyng | Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association | <p>The United States Forest Service was considering building a paved roadway that would cut through the Chimney Rock area of the Six Rivers National Forest. It was also considering timber harvesting in the area. A study commissioned by the Forest Service reported that harvesting the Chimney Rock area would irreparably damage grounds that had historically been used by Native Americans to conduct religious rituals. After the Forest Service decided to construct a road, the Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association took action against Secretary of Agriculture Richard Lyng.</p>
| 587 | 5 | 3 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | First Amendment |
579 | 53,467 | Wheat v. United States | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1987/87-4 | 87-4 | 1987 | Mark Erick Wheat | United States | <p>For many years, Mark Erick Wheat allegedly participated in a far-flung marijuana distribution operation, acting mainly as an intermediary by receiving and storing shipments of marijuana in his home then distributing them around the region. Juvenal Gomez-Barajas and Javier Bravo were also allegedly involved in the operation. Attorney Eugene Iredale represented Gomez-Barajas and Bravo at trial. The trial court acquitted Gomez-Barajas on drug charges that overlapped with charges against Wheat, but Gomez-Barajas pleaded guilty to tax evasion and illegal importation of merchandise to avoid a second trial. At the beginning of Wheat’s trial, however, the court had not yet accepted Gomez-Barajas’ plea and he was free to withdraw it.</p>
<p>On August 22, 1985, Bravo pleaded guilty to one count of transporting 2,400 pounds of marijuana. Immediately after the proceedings, Iredale informed the court that Wheat contacted him to hire him as additional counsel; Gomez-Barajas and Bravo waived any objection. The United States expressed concern about the possibility of conflict arising from Iredale’s representation of both Iredale and Gomez-Barajas. The government pointed out that if Gomez-Barajas withdrew his plea, it was likely Wheat would be required to appear at his trial as a witness. In that event, Iredale would not be allowed to cross-examine Wheat. Further, it was possible that Bravo would be required to appear at Wheat’s trial as a witness as well.</p>
<p>Although Wheat emphasized his right to his choice of counsel under the sixth amendment, the district court denied his motion for a substitution of counsel. Wheat was convicted of conspiracy to possess 1,000 pounds of marijuana with intent to distribute and five counts of possessing marijuana with intent to distribute. The United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, affirmed. It held that the district court correctly balanced the sixth amendment’s rights to choice of counsel and to a defense by an attorney free of conflicts of interest.</p>
| 2,023 | 5 | 4 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | Criminal Procedure |
580 | 53,482 | Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of the State of Oregon v. Smith | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1987/86-946 | 86-946 | 1987 | Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of the State of Oregon et al. | Alfred Smith | <p>Alfred Smith and Galen Black worked at a private drug rehabilitation clinic. The clinic fired them because they used a hallucinogenic drug called peyote for religious purposes while worshipping at their Native American Church. The Oregon Employment Division denied them unemployment compensation because it deemed they were fired for work-related "misconduct." The Oregon Court of Appeals ruled that this violated their religious free exercise rights provided by the First Amendment. The Oregon Supreme Court reversed.</p>
| 526 | 5 | 3 | true | majority opinion | vacated/remanded | First Amendment |
581 | 53,486 | Coy v. Iowa | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1987/86-6757 | 86-6757 | 1987 | Coy | Iowa | <p>John Coy was tried in an Iowa court for sexually assaulting two 13-year-old girls. When the girls were testifying against Coy, the court placed a large screen in front of him so that the girls would not have to see him. The jury proceeded to convict him. Coy argued that Iowa Code 910A, which provides for the use of a screen in child sexual abuse cases, violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront his accusers face-to-face. He also claimed that the code violated his right to due process, since having a screen placed between him and the girls made him appear guilty before he was properly tried. The trial court dismissed these claims and the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed.</p>
| 685 | 6 | 2 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Criminal Procedure |
582 | 53,488 | Doe v. United States | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1987/86-1753 | 86-1753 | 1987 | John Doe | United States | <p>John Doe, an unnamed defendant, was subpoenaed by a grand jury in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas for possible fraudulent manipulation of oil cargoes and receipt of unreported income. As part of the grand jury’s investigation, Doe was directed to produce records from bank holdings in the Cayman Islands and Bermuda. Doe proceeded to disclose some records but invoked his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination regarding any other documents.</p>
<p>The United States then served subpoenas on three of Doe’s foreign banks, ordering them to release Doe’s information. The banks refused to release this information without Doe’s consent. The government then sought to have the district court order Doe to sign the bank forms authorizing his banks to release the information.</p>
<p>The district court refused, stating that Doe had not been indicted for any crime and that forcing him to disclose this information would amount to a “fishing expedition” for incriminating evidence; precisely the kind of action that the 5th Amendment sought to prevent. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and ordered that Doe be held in contempt if he did not consent to the release of records. Doe refused and appealed. The Fifth Circuit again affirmed.</p>
| 1,308 | 8 | 1 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | Criminal Procedure |
583 | 53,495 | Thompson v. Oklahoma | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1987/86-6169 | 86-6169 | 1987 | Thompson | Oklahoma | <p>At the age of 15 years Thompson was tried as an adult, convicted of first degree murder, and sentenced to death. On appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma affirmed. The Supreme Court granted Thompson certiorari.</p>
| 230 | 5 | 3 | true | plurality opinion | vacated/remanded | Criminal Procedure |
584 | 53,496 | Morrison v. Olson | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1987/87-1279 | 87-1279 | 1987 | Morrison | Olson | <p>The Ethics in Government Act of 1978 created a special court and empowered the Attorney General to recommend to that court the appointment of an "independent counsel" to investigate, and, if necessary, prosecute government officials for certain violations of federal criminal laws.</p>
| 289 | 7 | 1 | true | majority opinion | reversed | Miscellaneous |
585 | 53,497 | United States Catholic Conference v. Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc. | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1987/87-416 | 87-416 | 1987 | United States Catholic Conference | Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc. | <p>Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc. and a collection of tax-paying and tax-exempt abortion rights supporters (ARM) sued the Secretary of the Treasury, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the United States Catholic Conference, and the National Conference of Catholic Bishops (Conferences). ARM alleged that the Conferences participated in political activities in violation of U.S. laws governing tax-exempt organizations and that this participation created an unfair advantage over other, rule-abiding tax-exempt groups and infringed upon the plaintiffs’ ability to participate in the political process as voters. After the court granted the Conferences motion to be dismissed as parties to the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, ARM sought financial documents and other information from the Conferences to support their claims against the remaining defendants. When the Conferences refused to comply, the district court held them in civil contempt. On appeal, the Conferences contended that ARM lacked standing to bring its case against the government officials and, therefore, the court did not have the power to issue the contempt citation under Article III. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed and held that witnesses may challenge a contempt citation only on the grounds that the issuing court lacked jurisdiction to hear the underlying dispute.</p>
<p> </p>
| 1,400 | 8 | 1 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Judicial Power |
586 | 53,508 | California v. Greenwood | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1987/86-684 | 86-684 | 1987 | California | Greenwood | <p>Local police suspected Billy Greenwood was dealing drugs from his residence. Because the police did not have enough evidence for a warrant to search his home, they searched the garbage bags Greenwood had left at the curb for pickup. The police uncovered evidence of drug use, which was then used to obtain a warrant to search the house. That search turned up illegal substances, and Greenwood was arrested on felony charges.</p>
| 432 | 6 | 2 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Criminal Procedure |
587 | 53,506 | Schweiker v. Chilicky | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1987/86-1781 | 86-1781 | 1987 | Richard Schweiker | James Chilicky | <p>In 1980 Congress enacted a continuing disability review (CDR) process to ensure that the only people who were receiving disability benefits under the Social Security Disability Act (Act) were those who had medical conditions sufficient to warrant such benefits. This program led to a massive increase in the number of people who were denied continuance of their benefits. The respondents were three of those people who, in addition to pursuing remedies through the uniform appeal process, sued three high-ranking administrators of the CDR process in district court. The respondents argued that the government violated their Fifth Amendment rights to due process by adopting illegal polices that led to the wrongful termination of their benefits. Despite the Act’s explicit provision of a means for remedy, the respondents sought monetary damages for their emotional distress and loss of food. The district court dismissed the case and held that the government officials were protected from paying monetary damages by the doctrine of qualified immunity. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and held that there might be enough facts to prove a violation of due process warranting monetary damages.</p>
| 1,224 | 6 | 3 | true | majority opinion | reversed | Economic Activity |
588 | 53,513 | New York State Club Association Inc. v. City of New York | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1987/86-1836 | 86-1836 | 1987 | New York State Club Association Inc. | City of New York | <p>The City of New York amended its Human Rights Law prohibiting discrimination in public places to include certain social clubs that were not "distinctly private." Particularly, the amendment applied anti-discrimination laws to social clubs and institutions that hosted dining regularly, retained more than four hundred members, and received funding from non-members in order to promote business interests. The amendment did not apply to religious, charitable, and education organizations because the city deemed that they were not centers of business activity. The New York State Club Association, a group of 125 clubs, contended in a state trial court that the new law violated its associational rights provided by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The trial court ruled in favor of the city. A state appellate court and the New York Court of Appeals both affirmed, finding that the city's compelling interest in eliminating discrimination justified the restrictions on associational rights.</p>
| 1,002 | 9 | 0 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | Civil Rights |
589 | 53,512 | Bowen v. Kendrick | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1987/87-253 | 87-253 | 1987 | Bowen | Kendrick | <p>The Adolescent Family Life Act ("AFLA") provided federal funding for organizational services and research in the area of premarital teenage sexuality. Among other requirements, AFLA beneficiaries had to involve religious and governmental agencies in dealing with the problems they faced. Over time, AFLA benefited several organizations with institutional ties to religious denominations. Chan Kendrick, on behalf of several federal taxpayers, clergymen, and the American Jewish Congress, challenged AFLA's constitutionality. On appeal from a ruling favoring Kendrick, the Supreme Court granted Bowen certiorari.</p>
| 619 | 5 | 4 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | First Amendment |
590 | 53,519 | Mansell v. Mansell | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1988/87-201 | 87-201 | 1988 | Gerald E. Mansell | Gaye M. Mansell | <p> Major Gerald E. Mansell and Gaye M. Mansell were married for 23 years until their marriage ended in 1979. Major Mansell received both Air Force retirement pay and, pursuant to a portion of that pay, disability benefits. Under the Uniformed Services Former Spouses’ Protection Act, military retirement payments were considered community property that were to be divided evenly between the spouses based on the extent of military service performed during the marriage. Major Mansell asked the California Superior Court to modify the divorce decree by removing the provision asking him to share his retirement pay. That court denied the request without opinion. Major Mansell appealed and the California Court of Appeal affirmed the lower court’s decision. The California Supreme Court denied the petition for review and Major Mansell appealed. </p>
| 851 | 7 | 2 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Federalism |
591 | 53,517 | Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1988/87-1245 | 87-1245 | 1988 | Texas Monthly, Inc. | Bob Bullock, Comptroller of Public Accounts of the State of Texas et al. | <p>The state of Texas offered a tax exemption to religious publications during a 3-year period. Texas Monthly, Inc, a nonreligious publisher, claimed that this promoted religion in violation of the First Amendment's Establishment Clause. Texas Monthly filed suit in a state court seeking to recover the taxes it had paid in 1985. The court ruled that the exemption violated the Establishment Clause by advancing religion and the Free Press Clause by discriminating based on the content of publications. Since the court did not have the authority to rewrite tax statutes, it instead invalidated taxes levied on nonreligious publications and ordered the state to refund Texas Monthly's tax payments. A state appeals court reversed the decision.</p>
| 747 | 6 | 3 | true | plurality opinion | reversed/remanded | First Amendment |
592 | 53,520 | Penry v. Lynaugh | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1988/87-6177 | 87-6177 | 1988 | Penry | Lynaugh | <p>Penry, a man with the mental age of barely seven years, was convicted of murder and sentenced to death. During the trial's proceedings, the jury was not instructed that it could consider the mitigating circumstances of Penry's intellectual disability in imposing its sentence.</p>
| 284 | 5 | 4 | false | majority opinion | reversed in-part/remanded | Criminal Procedure |
593 | 53,521 | National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1988/86-1879 | 86-1879 | 1988 | National Treasury Employees Union | Von Raab | <p>In 1986, the United States Customs Service implemented a drug testing program for certain employees who either carry firearms, are involved in intercepting drugs as they enter the country, or are in high level positions involving classified information.</p>
| 261 | 5 | 4 | false | majority opinion | reversed in-part/remanded | Criminal Procedure |
594 | 53,525 | Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc. | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1988/87-1346 | 87-1346 | 1988 | Bonito Boats, Inc. | Thunder Craft Boats, Inc. | <p>In 1976, Bonito Boats, Inc. (Bonito), a Florida corporation, developed a design for a fiberglass recreational boat and made a model to produce the finished fiberglass boats for sale. No patent application was ever filed for protection. In 1983, the Florida Legislature enacted a statute making it unlawful to use a direct modeling process to duplicate and sell a vessel or part of a vessel. In 1984, Bonito sued Thunder Craft Boats, Inc. (Thunder Craft), a Tennessee corporation, in the Florida district court for violating the statute. Thunder Craft successfully argued that the Florida statute conflicted with federal patent laws and was therefore invalid under the Supremacy Clause of the Eleventh Amendment. The Florida Court of Appeals and the Florida Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s conclusion that the Florida law interfered with federal patent laws.</p>
| 877 | 9 | 0 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | Federalism |
595 | 53,529 | Department of Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1988/87-1379 | 87-1379 | 1988 | Department of Justice | Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press | <p>CBS requested the criminal identification records of Charles Medico from the FBI. When the FBI refused the request, a CBS news correspondent and the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press (RCFP) challenged the denial as a violation of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). RCFP claimed that since Medico was an identified organized crime figure with corrupt ties to a United States Congressman, Medico's criminal record was a matter of "public record" and "interest." On appeal from an unfavorable appellate decision, the Supreme Court granted the U.S. Department of Justice certiorari.</p>
| 601 | 9 | 0 | true | majority opinion | reversed | Privacy |
596 | 53,532 | Brower v. Inyo County | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1988/87-248 | 87-248 | 1988 | Georgia Brower, et al. | County of Inyo, et al. | <p>On October 23, 1984, William James Caldwell died when the stolen car he was driving crashed into a police roadblock. He had been driving at high speeds in an effort to elude the police. The police placed an 18-wheel truck across both lanes of a highway and behind a blind curve so that Caldwell could not see it as he approached.</p>
<p>After Caldwell’s death, his heirs—including Georgia Brower, the administrator of his estate—sued the police in district court and alleged that such a roadblock constituted excessive force and violated the Fourth Amendment. The district court dismissed the case, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.</p>
<p> </p>
| 686 | 9 | 0 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Criminal Procedure |
597 | 53,537 | Webster v. Reproductive Health Services | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1988/88-605 | 88-605 | 1988 | Webster | Reproductive Health Services | <p>In 1986, the state of Missouri enacted legislation that placed a number of restrictions on abortions. The statute's preamble indicated that "[t]he life of each human being begins at conception," and the law codified the following restrictions: public employees and public facilities were not to be used in performing or assisting abortions unnecessary to save the mother's life; encouragement and counseling to have abortions was prohibited; and physicians were to perform viability tests upon women in their twentieth (or more) week of pregnancy. Lower courts struck down the restrictions.</p>
| 598 | 5 | 4 | true | majority opinion | reversed | Privacy |
598 | 53,541 | Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Association | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1988/87-1555 | 87-1555 | 1988 | Skinner | Railway Labor Executives' Association | <p>Recognizing the dangers of drug and alcohol abuse by railroad employees, the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) implemented regulations requiring mandatory blood and urine tests of employees involved in certain train accidents. Other FRA rules allowed railroads to administer breath and urine tests to employees who violate certain safety rules.</p>
| 356 | 7 | 2 | true | majority opinion | reversed | Criminal Procedure |
599 | 53,542 | Duckworth v. Eagan | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1988/88-317 | 88-317 | 1988 | Duckworth | Eagan | <p>When first questioned by police about the stabbing of a woman, suspect Gary Eagan did not make incriminating statements after signing a waiver and being told he would be provided a lawyer "if and when you go to court." The following day, after Eagan was questioned again and signed a different waiver, he confessed to the stabbing and revealed physical evidence of the crime. Eagan later claimed that the language of the first waiver made his confession inadmissible.</p>
| 475 | 5 | 4 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Criminal Procedure |
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