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1,300 | 54,887 | Florida v. Thomas | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/00-391 | 00-391 | 2000 | Florida | Thomas | <p>While officers were investigating marijuana sales at Florida home, Robert Thomas drove up to the house. An officer asked Thomas for his name and driver license. Thomas was arrested when a search on his license revealed an outstanding warrant. After taking Thomas inside the house, the officer searched Thomas' car and found methamphetamine. Subsequently, the trial court granted Thomas' motion to suppress. In reversing, the appellate found the search valid under New York v. Belton. In New York v. Belton, the U.S. Supreme Court established a "bright-line" rule permitting an officer who has made a lawful custodial arrest of a car's occupant to search the car's passenger compartment as a contemporaneous incident of the arrest. In reversing, the Florida Supreme Court held Belton did not apply because it is limited to situations where the officer initiates contact with a vehicle's occupant while that person remains in the vehicle.</p>
| 944 | 9 | 0 | false | majority opinion | null | Judicial Power |
1,301 | 54,889 | Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United States Army Corps of Engineers | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/99-1178 | 99-1178 | 2000 | Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County | United States Army Corps of Engineers | <p>The Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County (SWANCC) selected an abandoned sand and gravel pit as a solid waste disposal site. Excavation trenches on the site had previously become ponds for migrating birds. Because some trenches would have to be filled in, the SWANCC contacted the Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) to determine if a landfill permit was required under the Clean Water Act (CWA), which authorizes the Corps to issue permits allowing the discharge of dredged or fill material into "navigable waters." Under the CWA, "navigable waters" are defined as "the waters of the United States" and the Corps regulations define such waters to include intrastate waters, of which damage could affect interstate commerce. Subsequently, the Corps denied the SWANCC a permit. The District Court ruled in SWANCC's favor. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that Congress has authority under the Commerce Clause to regulate intrastate waters.</p>
| 954 | 5 | 4 | true | majority opinion | reversed | Economic Activity |
1,302 | 54,888 | United States v. Cleveland Indians Baseball Company | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/00-203 | 00-203 | 2000 | United States | Cleveland Indians Baseball Company | <p>Under a grievance settlement agreement, the Cleveland Indians Baseball Company owed 8 players backpay for wages due in 1986 and 14 players backpay for wages due in 1987. The Company paid all of the back wages in 1994. No award recipient was a Company employee in that year. The Company also paid its share of employment taxes on the back wages according to 1994 tax rates and wage bases. The payments were subject to Social Security and Medicare taxes under the Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA) and taxes on wages to fund unemployment benefits under the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA). Both tax rates and the amount of the wages subject to tax have risen over time. After the Internal Revenue Service denied the Company's claims for a refund of the payments, the Company initiated suit in Federal District Court. The court, bound by precedent, ordered the Government to refund FICA and FUTA taxes. The Court of Appeals affirmed.</p>
| 951 | 9 | 0 | true | majority opinion | reversed | Federal Taxation |
1,303 | 54,890 | Lorillard Tobacco Company v. Reilly | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/00-596 | 00-596 | 2000 | Lorillard Tobacco Company | Thomas F. Reilly | <p>The Attorney General of Massachusetts promulgated comprehensive regulations governing the advertising and sale of cigarettes, smokeless tobacco, and cigars. Members of the tobacco industry filed suit challenging the regulations. Lorillard Tobacco Company and others asserted that under the Supremacy Clause the cigarette advertising regulations were preempted by the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act (FCLAA), which prescribes mandatory health warnings for cigarette packaging and advertising and that the regulations violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's rulings that the cigarette advertising regulations are not pre-empted by the FCLAA and that neither the regulations prohibiting outdoor advertising within 1,000 feet of a school or playground nor the sales practices regulations restricting the location and distribution of tobacco products violated the First Amendment. Reversing the lower court's finding, the appellate court found that the point-of-sale advertising regulations requiring that indoor advertising be placed no lower than five feet from the floor were valid.</p>
| 1,172 | 5 | 4 | true | majority opinion | reversed in-part/remanded | Federalism |
1,304 | 54,892 | Becker v. Montgomery | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/00-6374 | 00-6374 | 2000 | Becker | Montgomery | <p>Dale G. Becker, an Ohio prisoner, instituted a pro se civil rights action to contest the conditions of his confinement. Ultimately, the District Court dismissed Becker's complaint. In appealing, Becker, still pro se, filed his notice of appeal using a government-printed form, on which he filled in all of the required information. On the line labeled "Counsel for Appellant" Becker typed, but did not sign, his name. The form contained no indication of a signature requirement. The District Court docketed the notice, sent a copy to the Court of Appeals, and granted Becker leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals, after notifying Becker that the court would not hold him to the same standards it required of attorneys in stating his case, dismissed the appeal on its own motion. The court held that the notice of appeal was fatally defective because it was not signed.</p>
| 917 | 9 | 0 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Criminal Procedure |
1,305 | 54,891 | District of Columbia v. Tri County Industries, Inc. | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/99-1953 | 99-1953 | 2000 | District of Columbia | Tri County Industries, Inc. | <p>Using a 1993 building permit issued by the District of Columbia, Tri County Industries, Inc. spent nearly $600,000 readying a site for a "soil remediation" facility, which would decontaminate soil tainted by hazardous wastes. After protests and a dispute over whether the company was violating its permit by storing contaminated soil on the site, the city issued a stop-work order. Tri County filed suit against the District of Columbia for suspending its building permit on the facility claiming its due process rights had been violated. Ultimately, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reinstated a 1998 jury's $5 million award. The appellate court rule that the District Court should have conducted a "more searching inquiry" than it had to preserve the Seventh Amendment right to jury trials in civil cases. The appellate court normally applies a "abuse of discretion" standard. Under the "more searching inquiry," the appellate court discounted the reasons the district judge had cited in ordering a new trial.</p>
| 1,041 | 9 | 0 | false | per curiam | null | Judicial Power |
1,306 | 54,893 | Shaw v. Murphy | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/99-1613 | 99-1613 | 2000 | Shaw | Murphy | <p>While incarcerated in Montana State Prison, Kevin Murphy sent a letter to an inmate to assist him with his defense after he assaulted a correctional officer. In accordance with prison policy, the letter was intercepted. Based on the letter's content, the prison sanctioned Murphy for violating prison rules prohibiting insolence and interfering with due process hearings. Murphy sought relief, alleging that the disciplinary action violated his First Amendment rights, including the right to provide legal assistance to other inmates. Ruling against Murphy, the District Court, based on precedent, found that reasonably related penological interests allowed the prison regulations to impinge on an inmate's constitutional rights. In reversing, the Court of Appeals found that an inmate's First Amendment right to give legal assistance to other inmates outweighed the government's interests.</p>
| 898 | 9 | 0 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | First Amendment |
1,307 | 54,895 | PGA TOUR, Inc. v. Martin | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/00-24 | 00-24 | 2000 | PGA TOUR, Inc. | Martin | <p>Casey Martin has a degenerative circulatory disorder that prevents him from walking golf courses. His disorder constitutes a disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA). When Martin made a request to use a golf cart for the duration of the qualification tournament onto the professional tours sponsored by PGA Tour, Inc., PGA refused. Martin then filed suit under Title III of the ADA, which requires an entity operating "public accommodations" to make "reasonable modifications" in its policies "when... necessary to afford such...accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such...accommodations." Ultimately, the District Court entered a permanent injunction against PGA, requiring it to allow Martin to use a cart. The court found that the purpose of the PGA's walking rule was to insert fatigue into the skill of shot-making, and that Martin suffered significant fatigue due to his disability, even with the use of a cart. In affirming, the Court of Appeals concluded that golf courses are places of public accommodation during professional tournaments and that permitting Martin to use a cart would not fundamentally alter the nature of those tournaments.</p>
| 1,302 | 7 | 2 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | Civil Rights |
1,308 | 54,894 | Lujan v. G & G Fire Sprinklers, Inc. | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/00-152 | 00-152 | 2000 | Lujan | G & G Fire Sprinklers, Inc. | <p>The California Labor Code requires that contractors and subcontractors on public works project pay their workers a prevailing wage that is determined by the state. The Code authorizes the state to withhold payments from contractors who fail to pay the prevailing wage. The contractor can, in turn, withhold payments to subcontractors who fail to pay the wage. To recover the wages or penalties withheld, the Code permits the contractor to sue for breach of contract. After the State Division of Labor Standards Enforcement (DLSE) determined that G & G Fire Sprinklers, Inc., a public works subcontractor, had violated the Code, it withheld from the contractors an amount equal to the wages and penalties forfeited due to G & G's violations. After its payment was withheld, G & G filed suit against DLSE, claiming that the lacking of a hearing deprived it of property without due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Granting G & G summary judgment, the District Court declared the relevant Code sections unconstitutional. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals affirmed. The court reasoned that G & G's rights were violated not because it was deprived of immediate payment, but because the state statutory scheme afforded no hearing at all.</p>
| 1,275 | 9 | 0 | true | majority opinion | reversed | Due Process |
1,309 | 54,896 | Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Assn. | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/99-901 | 99-901 | 2000 | Brentwood Academy | Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Assn. | <p>The Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association (Association) is a not-for-profit membership corporation organized to regulate interscholastic sports among its members, a large portion of the public and private high schools in Tennessee. The Association's role in regulating interscholastic competition in public schools has been long acknowledged by the State Board of Education. Brentwood Academy sued the Association after it penalized the academy for placing "undue influence" on football recruits. At the time, all the voting members of the Association were public school administrators. Brentwood claimed that the rule's enforcement was state action that violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The District Court agreed and enjoined the rule's enforcement. In reversing, the Court of Appeals concluded that there was no state action.</p>
| 858 | 5 | 4 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Due Process |
1,310 | 54,897 | United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/00-151 | 00-151 | 2000 | United States | Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop | <p>Under California's Compassionate Use Act of 1996, the Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Cooperative was organized to distribute marijuana to qualified patients for medical purposes. In 1998, the United States sued to enjoin the Cooperative and its executive director. The government argued that the Cooperative's activities violated the Controlled Substances Act's prohibitions on distributing, manufacturing, and possessing with the intent to distribute or manufacture a controlled substance. Although the District Court enjoined it, the Cooperative continued to distribute marijuana. Rejecting the Cooperative's medical necessity defense, the court found the Cooperative in contempt. On appeal, the Court of Appeals concluded that the medical necessity defense was a legally cognizable defense. On remand from the Court of Appeals, the District Court modified its injunction to incorporate a medical necessity defense, under which medically necessary distributions were to be permitted.</p>
| 987 | 8 | 0 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Criminal Procedure |
1,311 | 54,898 | Alabama v. Bozeman | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/00-492 | 00-492 | 2000 | Alabama | Bozeman | <p>The Interstate Agreement on Detainers creates uniform procedures for lodging and executing a detainer, a legal order that requires a state to hold a currently imprisoned individual when he has finished serving his sentence so that he may be tried by a different State for a different crime. In 1997, Michael Bozeman was serving a federal prison sentence at a federal prison in Florida. In January, the district attorney of Covington County, Alabama sought temporary custody of Bozeman to arraign him on state firearm charges for which an earlier detainer had been filed. The Agreement provides that a state that obtains a prisoner for purposes of trial must try him within 120 days of his arrival, and if it returns him to his "original place of imprisonment" prior to that trial, charges shall be dismissed. After appearing in Alabama court, Bozeman was returned to federal prison in Florida. When Bozeman returned to Alabama court, his local counsel filed a motion to dismiss the state charges on the ground that Bozeman had been "returned to the original place of imprisonment" (the federal prison) "prior to" "trial" on state charges being "had." Ultimately, Bozeman was convicted and an appellate court affirmed. In reversing, the Alabama State Supreme Court held that the literal language of the Agreement required dismissal of the state charges.</p>
| 1,360 | 9 | 0 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | Criminal Procedure |
1,312 | 54,900 | Atkinson Trading Company, Inc. v. Shirley | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/00-454 | 00-454 | 2000 | Atkinson Trading Company, Inc. | Shirley | <p>Atkinson Trading Company, Inc. owns the Cameron Trading Post, which is located on non-Indian fee land within the Navajo Nation Reservation. The Cameron Trading Post consists of a hotel, restaurant, cafeteria, gallery, curio shop, retail store, and recreational vehicle facility. In 1992, the Navajo Nation enacted a hotel occupancy tax, which imposed an 8 percent tax upon any hotel room located within the exterior boundaries of the reservation. Atkinson challenged the tax under Montana v. United States. Under Montana, with two limited exceptions, Indian tribes lack civil authority over the conduct of nonmembers on non-Indian land within a reservation. The District Court upheld that tax. In affirming, the Court of Appeals concluded that the tax fell under Montana's first exception because a "consensual relationship exists in that the nonmember guests could refrain from the privilege of lodging within the confines of the Navajo Reservation and therefore remain free from liability for the [tax]."</p>
| 1,014 | 9 | 0 | true | majority opinion | reversed | Civil Rights |
1,313 | 54,899 | Texas v. Cobb | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/99-1702 | 99-1702 | 2000 | Texas | Cobb | <p>In 1994, while under arrest for an unrelated offense, Raymond Levi Cobb confessed to a home burglary. Cobb, however, denied knowledge of the disappearance of a woman and child from the home. In 1995, after counsel was appointed to represent him in the burglary case, Cobb confessed to killing the woman and child to his father, who contacted the police. Cobb, now in custody, waived his rights under Miranda and confessed to the murders. Cobb was then indicted, convicted, and sentenced to death. On appeal to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, Cobb argued that his confession should have been suppressed because it was obtained in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, which he claimed attached when counsel was appointed in the burglary case. In reversing, the court held that once the right to counsel attaches to the offense charged, it also attaches to any other offense that is very closely factually related to the offense charged.</p>
| 961 | 5 | 4 | true | majority opinion | reversed | Criminal Procedure |
1,314 | 54,903 | Major League Baseball Players Association v. Garvey | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/00-1210 | 00-1210 | 2000 | Major League Baseball Players Association | Garvey | <p>After the Major League Baseball Players Association filed grievances against the Major League Baseball Clubs, arbitrators found that the Clubs had colluded in the market for free-agent services in violation of the industry's collective bargaining agreement. To cover damages, the Association and Clubs entered into an agreement, which provided funds and framework to resolve individual player's claims. Steve Garvey, a first baseman, submitted a claim alleging that the San Diego Padres did not extend his contract to the 1988 and 1989 seasons due to collusion. Under the framework, the Association denied Garvey's claim. Agreeing, the arbitrator determined that Garvey did not receive a contract extension due to collusion and found that Garvey had not shown a specific offer of extension. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals reversed the District Court's denial of Garvey's motion to vacate the arbitrator's award. The appellate court, under the Labor Management Relations Act, directed the arbitration panel to enter an award for Garvey because it concluded from the arbitration proceedings that an offer was made to Garvey and that it was withdrawn due to collision.</p>
| 1,175 | 8 | 1 | true | per curiam | reversed/remanded | Unions |
1,315 | 54,901 | Shafer v. S. Carolina | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/00-5250 | 00-5250 | 2000 | Shafer | S. Carolina | <p>Wesley Aaron Shafer, Jr., was found guilty of murder, among other things. During the sentencing phase, Shafer's counsel argued that Simmons v. South Carolina required the trial judge to instruct the jury that under South Carolina law a life sentence carries no possibility of parole. The U.S. Supreme Court held in Simmons that where a capital defendant's future dangerousness is at issue, and the only sentencing alternative to death available to the jury is life imprisonment without possibility of parole, due process requires that the jury be informed of the defendant's parole ineligibility. The prosecution responded that because the state did not plan to argue to the jury that Shafer would be a danger in the future that no Simmons instruction was required. During deliberations, the jury asked under what conditions someone convicted of murder could become available for parole. The trial judge stated that parole eligibility or ineligibility was not a matter for the jury's consideration. Ultimately, the jury recommended the death penalty and the judge imposed the sentence. In affirming, the South Carolina Supreme Court held that Simmons generally did not apply to the State's sentencing scheme because an alternative to death other than life without the possibility of parole exists.</p>
| 1,305 | 7 | 2 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Criminal Procedure |
1,316 | 54,902 | Green Tree Financial Corporation-Alabama v. Randolph | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/99-1235 | 99-1235 | 2000 | Green Tree Financial Corporation-Alabama | Randolph | <p>Larketta Randolph financed the purchase of a mobile home through Green Tree Financial Corp.-Alabama. Randolph's financing agreement with Green Tree required that she buy insurance against default and provided that disputes under the contract would be resolved by binding arbitration. Randolph sued Green Tree, alleging that it violated the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) by failing to disclose the insurance requirement as a finance charge and that it violated the Equal Credit Opportunity Act by requiring her to arbitrate her statutory causes of action. The District Court granted Green Tree's motion to compel arbitration and denied her request for reconsideration, which stated that she lacked the resources to arbitrate and, therefore, would have to forgo her claims. The Court of Appeals, under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), which allows appeals from "a final decision with respect to an arbitration that is subject to this title," held that it had jurisdiction. Ultimately, the court concluded that because the agreement was silent with respect to payment of arbitration expenses, it was unenforceable.</p>
| 1,119 | 9 | 0 | true | majority opinion | reversed in-part | Judicial Power |
1,317 | 54,904 | United Dominion Industries, Inc. v. United States | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/00-157 | 00-157 | 2000 | United Dominion Industries, Inc. | United States | <p>Under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, a taxpayer may carry back its "product liability loss" up to 10 years in order to offset prior years' income. United Dominion Industries, Inc. predecessor in interest, AMCA International Corporation, was the parent of an affiliated group filing consolidated returns for the years 1983 through 1986. AMCA calculated its product liability loss (PPL) on a consolidated basis, or a "single-entity" approach. The government's "separate-member" approach would have prohibited 5 of AMCA's 26 members from contributing to the group's total PPL. In 1986 and 1987, AMCA petitioned the Internal Revenue Service for a refund based on its PPL calculations. Ultimately, the District Court applied AMCA's single-entity approach, concluding that if the affiliated group's consolidated return reflects consolidated net operating losses in excess of the group's aggregate product liability expenses, the total of those expenses is a PLL that may be carried back. In reversing, the Court of Appeals applied the separate-member approach.</p>
| 1,066 | 8 | 1 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Federal Taxation |
1,318 | 54,905 | TrafFix Devices Inc. v. Marketing Displays Inc. | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/99-1571 | 99-1571 | 2000 | TrafFix Devices Inc. | Marketing Displays Inc. | <p>Marketing Displays, Inc. (MDI) held utility patents for a "dual-spring design" mechanism that keeps temporary road and other outdoor signs upright in wind. After the patents expired, TrafFix Devices, Inc. began marketing sign stands with a dual-spring mechanism copied from MDI's design. MDI brought suit under the Trademark Act of 1964 for, among other things, trade dress infringement. MDA claimed that its sign stands were recognizable to buyers and users because the patented design was visible. In granting summary judgement for TrafFix, the District Court concluded that MDI had not established a "secondary meaning," or that consumers did not associate the look of the dual-spring design with MDI. The court also found that there could be no trade dress protection for the design because it was functional. In reversing, the Court of Appeals suggested that the District Court committed legal error by looking only to the dual-spring design when evaluating MDI's trade dress because a competitor had to find some way to hide the design or otherwise set it apart from MDI's and noted the issue whether an expired utility patent forecloses the possibility of trade dress protection in the product's design.</p>
| 1,218 | 9 | 0 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Economic Activity |
1,319 | 54,907 | Bush v. Gore | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/00-949 | 00-949 | 2000 | George W. Bush | Albert Gore | <p>Following the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in <em>Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Board</em>, and concurrent with Vice President Al Gore's contest of the certification of Florida presidential election results, on December 8, 2000 the Florida Supreme Court ordered that the Circuit Court in Leon County tabulate by hand 9000 contested ballots from Miami-Dade County. It also ordered that every county in Florida must immediately begin manually recounting all "under-votes" (ballots which did not indicate a vote for president) because there were enough contested ballots to place the outcome of the election in doubt. Governor George Bush and his running mate, Richard Cheney, filed a request for review in the U.S. Supreme Court and sought an emergency petition for a stay of the Florida Supreme Court's decision. The U.S. Supreme Court granted review and issued the stay on December 9. It heard oral argument two days later.</p>
| 939 | 5 | 4 | true | per curiam | reversed/remanded | Civil Rights |
1,320 | 54,906 | Whitman v. American Trucking Associations, Inc. | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/99-1257 | 99-1257 | 2000 | Whitman | American Trucking Associations, Inc. | <p>Section 109(a) of the Clean Air Act (CAA) requires the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Administrator to promulgate national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) for each air pollutant for which "air quality criteria" have been issued under section 108. In 1997, Carol Browner, the Administrator of the EPA, revised the ozone and particulate matter NAAQS. Afterwards, her revised NAAQS were challenged in court. The District of Columbia Circuit found that section 109(b)(1), which instructs the EPA to set standards, delegated legislative power to the Administrator in contravention of the Federal Constitution because the court found that the EPA had interpreted the statute to provide no "intelligible principle" to guide the agency's exercise of authority. The court remanded the NAAQS to the EPA. The courts also held to its rule that the EPA could not consider implementation costs in setting the NAAQS. Additionally, the court rejected the EPA's position that the implementation provisions for ozone found in Part D, Subpart 2, of Title I of the CAA, were so tied to the existing ozone standard that the EPA lacked the power to revise the standard.</p>
| 1,168 | 9 | 0 | true | majority opinion | reversed in-part/remanded | Economic Activity |
1,321 | 54,909 | Tyler v. Cain | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/00-5961 | 00-5961 | 2000 | Tyler | Cain | <p>Melvin Tyler was convicted of second-degree murder. Ultimately, Tyler filed his sixth state habeas petition after the U.S. Supreme Court decided Cage v. Louisiana, which held that a jury instruction is unconstitutional if there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury understood it to allow conviction without proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Tyler claimed that that a jury instruction in his trial was similar to the one ruled unconstitutional in Cage. Ultimately, Tyler filed a second federal habeas petition pursuant to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). The District Court denied relief. In affirming, the Court of Appeals stated the District Court had failed to determine whether Tyler had satisfied the AEDPA's successive habeas standard, which requires a district court to dismiss a claim in a second or successive application unless the applicant "shows" that the "claim relies on a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable." The court concluded that Tyler did not meet this standard because he "could not show that any Supreme Court decision renders the Cage decision retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review."</p>
| 1,266 | 5 | 4 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | Criminal Procedure |
1,322 | 54,908 | New Hampshire v. Maine | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/130_orig | 130-orig | 2000 | New Hampshire | Maine | <p>In 1977, a dispute between New Hampshire and Maine over lobster fishing rights resulted in the U.S. Supreme Court entering a consent judgment setting the precise location of the States' "lateral marine boundary," or the boundary in the marine waters off the coast. Utilizing a 1740 decree of King George II, the States agreed that the decree's words "Middle of the River" referred to the middle of the Piscataqua River's main navigable channel. Ultimately, the 1997 consent judgment defined "Middle of the River" as "the middle of the main channel of navigation of the Piscataqua River." The consent judgment did not fix the inland Piscataqua River boundary. In 2000, New Hampshire brought an original action against Maine, claiming that the inland river boundary runs along the Maine shore and that the entire Piscataqua River and all of Portsmouth Harbor belong to New Hampshire. In response, Maine filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the 1740 boundary determination by King George II and the 1977 consent judgment barred the complaint.</p>
| 1,050 | 8 | 0 | null | majority opinion | null | null |
1,323 | 54,910 | Saucier v. Katz | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/99-1977 | 99-1977 | 2000 | Saucier | Katz | <p>Donald Saucier, a military police officer, arrested Elliot Katz, who was protesting during a speech by Vice President Gore at the Presidio Army Base in San Francisco. Katz filed suit against Saucier alleging that Saucier had violated his Fourth Amendment rights by using excessive force in arresting him. Rejecting Saucier's motions for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds, the District Court held that the immunity inquiry is the same as the inquiry made on the merits. In affirming, the Court of Appeals made a two-part qualified immunity inquiry. After finding that the law governing Saucier's conduct was clearly established when the incident occurred, the court moved to determined whether a reasonable officer could have believed, in light of the clearly established law, that his conduct was lawful. The court then reasoned that this step and the merits of a Fourth Amendment excessive force claim were identical because both concern the objective reasonableness of the officer's conduct in light of the circumstances the officer faced at the scene. Subsequently, the court found that summary judgment based on qualified immunity was inappropriate.</p>
| 1,174 | 9 | 0 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Economic Activity |
1,324 | 54,911 | Nevada v. Hicks | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/99-1994 | 99-1994 | 2000 | Nevada | Hicks | <p>Floyd Hicks is a member of the Fallon Paiute-Shoshone Tribes of western Nevada. After tribal police observed that Hicks was in possession of two California bighorn sheep heads, state game wardens obtained search warrants from state court and from the tribal court. After the warrants were executed, Hicks filed suit in Tribal Court, alleging trespass to land and chattels, abuse of process, and violation of civil rights, specifically denial of equal protection, denial of due process, and unreasonable search and seizure. The Tribal Court held that it had jurisdiction over the claims and the Tribal Appeals Court affirmed. Agreeing, the District Court held that the wardens would have to exhaust their qualified immunity claims in Tribal Court. In affirming, the Court of Appeals concluded that the fact that Hicks's home is on tribe-owned reservation land is sufficient to support tribal jurisdiction over civil claims against nonmembers arising from their activities on that land.</p>
| 992 | 9 | 0 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Civil Rights |
1,325 | 54,913 | Pollard v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Company | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/00-763 | 00-763 | 2000 | Pollard | E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Company | <p>Sharon Pollard sued her former employer, E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Company (DuPont), alleging that she had been subjected to a hostile work environment based on her sex, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Ultimately, the Federal District Court found that Pollard was subjected to co-worker sexual harassment of which her supervisors were aware. The court awarded her $300,000 in compensatory damages, the maximum permitted under the Civil Rights Act of 1991 for such damages. The court then noted that the award was insufficient to compensate Pollard. On appeal, Pollard argued that "front pay," the money awarded for lost compensation during the period between judgment and reinstatement or in lieu of reinstatement, was not an element of compensatory damages, but a replacement for the remedy of reinstatement in situations in which reinstatement would be inappropriate. Rejecting Pollard, the Court of Appeals affirmed.</p>
| 957 | 8 | 0 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Civil Rights |
1,326 | 54,912 | Director of Revenue of Missouri v. CoBank ACB | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/99-1792 | 99-1792 | 2000 | Director of Revenue of Missouri | CoBank ACB | <p>The Farm Credit Act of 1933 created various lending institutions, including banks for cooperatives, which are designated as federally chartered instrumentalities of the United States. CoBank ACB is the successor to all rights and obligations of the National Bank for Cooperatives. In 1996, CoBank filed amended returns on behalf of that bank, requesting an exemption from all Missouri corporate income taxes and refunds on the taxes it paid for 1991 through 1994. CoBank asserted that the Supremacy Clause accords federal instrumentalities immunity from state taxation unless Congress has expressly waived this immunity, which the Act did not expressly do. The state of Missouri denied the request, but the State Supreme Court reversed, stating that because the Act's current version is silent as to the banks' tax immunity, Congress cannot be said to have expressly consented to state income taxation and, thus, the banks are exempt.</p>
| 942 | 9 | 0 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Economic Activity |
1,327 | 54,917 | Lewis v. Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc. | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/99-1331 | 99-1331 | 2000 | Lewis | Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc. | <p>In 1998, James F. Lewis, a deckhand aboard the M/V Karen Michelle owned by Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc., claimed that he was injured when he tripped over a wire on the boat. Lewis then sued Lewis & Clark in Illinois County Court, for personal injuries claiming negligence under the Jones Act. Lewis & Clark had already filed a complaint for exoneration from, or limitation of, liability in the District Court under the Limitation of Liability Act (Act). Subsequently, the court approved a surety bond of $450,000, representing Lewis & Clark's interest in the vessel, ordered that any claim related to the incident be filed with the court within a specified period, and enjoined the filing or prosecution of any suits related to the incident. The injunction prevented Lewis from litigating his personal injury claims in state court and he moved to dissolve it. The District Court noted that federal courts have the exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether a vessel owner is entitled to limited liability, but also recognized that the statute conferring exclusive jurisdiction over admiralty and maritime suits to federal courts saves to suitors "all other remedies to which they are other wise entitled." Ultimately, the court dissolved the injunction. The Court of Appeals reversed.</p>
| 1,307 | 9 | 0 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Economic Activity |
1,328 | 54,915 | Kyllo v. United States | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/99-8508 | 99-8508 | 2000 | Kyllo | United States | <p>A Department of the Interior agent, suspicious that Danny Kyllo was growing marijuana, used a thermal-imaging device to scan his triplex. The imaging was to be used to determine if the amount of heat emanating from the home was consistent with the high-intensity lamps typically used for indoor marijuana growth. Subsequently, the imaging revealed that relatively hot areas existed, compared to the rest of the home. Based on informants, utility bills, and the thermal imaging, a federal magistrate judge issued a warrant to search Kyllo's home. The search unveiled growing marijuana. After Kyllo was indicted on a federal drug charge, he unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence seized from his home and then entered a conditional guilty plea. Ultimately affirming, the Court of Appeals held that Kyllo had shown no subjective expectation of privacy because he had made no attempt to conceal the heat escaping from his home, and even if he had, there was no objectively reasonable expectation of privacy because the imager "did not expose any intimate details of Kyllo's life," only "amorphous 'hot spots' on the roof and exterior wall."</p>
| 1,151 | 5 | 4 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Criminal Procedure |
1,329 | 54,914 | Buford v. United States | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/99-9073 | 99-9073 | 2000 | Buford | United States | <p>The United States Sentencing Guidelines define a career offender as one with at least two prior felony convictions for violent or drug-related crimes and provides that a sentencing judge must count as a single prior conviction all "related" convictions. Convictions may also be functionally related, if they were factually or logically related and sentencing was joint. After Paula Buford pleaded guilty to armed bank robbery, the sentencing judge had to determine whether her five prior state convictions were "related" or whether they should count as more than one. At sentencing, the government conceded that her four prior robbery convictions were related. The government did not concede that her prior drug conviction was related to the robberies. The District Court concluded that Buford's drug and robbery cases had not been either formally or functionally consolidated. In affirming, the Court of Appeals reviewed the decision deferentially rather than de novo, giving deference to the District Court.</p>
| 1,017 | 9 | 0 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | Criminal Procedure |
1,330 | 54,916 | Legal Services Corporation v. Velazquez | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/99-603 | 99-603 | 2000 | Legal Services Corporation | Velazquez | <p>The Legal Services Corporation Act authorizes the Legal Services Corporation (LSC) to distribute funds, appropriated by Congress, to local grantee organizations, which provide free legal assistance to indigent clients in welfare benefits claims. The Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996 prohibited the LSC from funding any organization that represented clients in an effort to amend or challenge existing welfare law, among other things. The prohibition was such that grantees could not continue representation in a welfare matter even where a constitutional or statutory validity challenge became apparent after representation was well under way. LSC grantee lawyers and others filed suit to have the restriction declared unconstitutional. The District Court denied a preliminary injunction. However, the Court of Appeals invalidated the restriction, concluding that it was impermissible viewpoint discrimination that violated the First Amendment.</p>
| 983 | 5 | 4 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | First Amendment |
1,331 | 54,918 | City of Indianapolis v. Edmond | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/99-1030 | 99-1030 | 2000 | City of Indianapolis | Edmond | <p>In 1998, the City of Indianapolis began to operate vehicle checkpoints in an effort to interdict unlawful drugs. At each roadblock, one office would conduct an open-view examination of the vehicle. At the same time, another office would walk a narcotics-detection dog around the vehicle. Each stop was to last five minutes or less, without reasonable suspicion or probable cause. Both James Edmond and Joell Palmer were stopped at one of the narcotics checkpoints. They then filed a lawsuit, on their behalf and the class of motorists who had been stopped or were subject to being stopped, alleging that the roadblocks violated the Fourth Amendment and the search and seizure provision of the Indiana Constitution. The District Court denied a request for a preliminary injunction, holding that the checkpoint program did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The Court of Appeals reversed.</p>
| 893 | 6 | 3 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | Criminal Procedure |
1,332 | 54,921 | Rogers v. Tennessee | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/99-6218 | 99-6218 | 2000 | Rogers | Tennessee | <p>Wilbert K. Rogers was convicted in Tennessee of second degree murder. The victim, James Bowdery, died 15 months after Rogers stabbed him. On appeal, Rogers argued that the Tennessee common law "year and a day rule," under which no defendant could be convicted of murder unless his victim died by the defendant's act within a year and a day of the act, persisted and precluded his conviction. The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction. In affirming, the Tennessee Supreme Court ultimately abolished the rule and upheld Rogers' conviction. The court rejected Rogers' contention that abolishing the rule would violate the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the Tennessee and Federal Constitutions. The court reasoned that those provisions referred only to legislative acts. Additionally, the court concluded its decision would not offend due process.</p>
| 867 | 5 | 4 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | Due Process |
1,333 | 54,919 | Federal Election Commission v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/00-191 | 00-191 | 2000 | Federal Election Commission | Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee | <p>The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971's definition of "contribution" includes "expenditures made by any person in cooperation, consultation, or concert, with, or at the request or suggestion of, a candidate, his authorized political committees, or their agents." The U.S. Supreme Court, in Buckley v. Valeo, held that the limitations on political campaign contributions in the Act were generally constitutional, but that the Act's limitations on election expenditures infringed political expression in violation of the First Amendment. In Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. FEC, the Court held that the First Amendment prohibits the application of the Party Expenditure Provision of the Act to "an expenditure that the political party has made independently, without coordination with any candidate." In the wake of this decision, the Committee's broader claim remained, that the congressional campaign expenditure limitations on parties themselves are facially unconstitutional and thus unenforceable even as to spending coordinated with a candidate. The District Court ruled in favor of the committee and the Court of Appeals affirmed.</p>
| 1,164 | 5 | 4 | true | majority opinion | reversed | First Amendment |
1,334 | 54,920 | Central Green Company v. United States | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/99-859 | 99-859 | 2000 | Central Green Company | United States | <p>The Madera Canal, a federal facility leased to the Madera Irrigation District (MID), flows through Central Green Co.'s 1,000 acres of pistachio orchards in California. Central Green filed suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act against the United States and the MID alleging that their negligence in the canal's design, construction, and maintenance caused subsurface flooding resulting in damage to the orchards and increased operating costs. The Federal Government moved for judgment on the pleadings based on immunity granted by the Flood Control Act of 1928, which states that "no liability of any kind shall attach to or rest upon the United States for any damage from or by floods or flood waters at any place." The complaint was then dismissed because the canal was a part of the Friant Division of the Central Valley Project, whose purpose was flood control. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that although the canal serves no flood control purpose, immunity is attached solely because it is a branch of the larger project.</p>
| 1,044 | 9 | 0 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Economic Activity |
1,335 | 54,923 | National Labor Relations Board v. Kentucky River Community Care, Inc. | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/99-1815 | 99-1815 | 2000 | National Labor Relations Board | Kentucky River Community Care, Inc. | <p>In 1997, a labor union petitioned the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) to represent a unit of all the employees at the Caney Creek Developmental Complex, which is operated by Kentucky River Community Care, Inc. Kentucky River objected to the inclusion of its registered nurses in the unit because they were "supervisors" under National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). Under the NLRA, employees are deemed to be "supervisors" and thereby excluded from the NLRA if they exercise "independent judgment" in "responsibly...directing" other employees "in the interest of the employer." At the ensuing representation hearing, the NLRB placed the burden of proving supervisory status on Kentucky River and found that it had not carried its burden. The NLRB rejected Kentucky River's proof of supervisory status on the ground that employees do not use "independent judgment" under the NLRA when they exercise "ordinary professional or technical judgment in directing less-skilled employees to deliver services in accordance with employer-specified standards." Kentucky River then refused to bargain with the union. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals refused to enforce a bargaining order issued by the NLRB at an unfair labor practice proceeding. The court rejected the NLRB's interpretation of "independent judgment" under the NLRA's test for supervisory status and held that NLRB had erred in placing the burden of proving supervisory status on Kentucky River.</p>
| 1,460 | 5 | 4 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | Unions |
1,336 | 54,922 | The Wharf (Holdings) Ltd. v. United International Holdings | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/00-347 | 00-347 | 2000 | The Wharf (Holdings) Ltd. | United International Holdings | <p>In return for United International Holdings, Inc.'s assistance in preparing its application, contracts, system, and financing for a cable television system in Hong Kong, Wharf Holdings Ltd. orally granted United an option to buy 10% of stock in the system. The parties never reduced the agreement to writing. Ultimately, Wharf refused to allow United to exercise its option. United then sued Wharf in Federal District Court, claiming that Wharf violated the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which prohibits using "any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance...in connection with the purchase or sale of any security." Wharf's internal documents, which suggested that Wharf never intended to carry out its promise, supported United's claim. A jury found in United's favor. The Court of Appeals affirmed.</p>
| 818 | 9 | 0 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | Economic Activity |
1,337 | 54,926 | Immigration and Naturalization Service v. St. Cyr | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/00-767 | 00-767 | 2000 | Immigration and Naturalization Service | St. Cyr | <p>On March 8, 1996, Enrico St. Cyr, a lawful permanent resident, pled guilty in a Connecticut court to a charge of selling a controlled substance. That conviction made him deportable. Before the effective dates of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) section 212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 was interpreted to give the Attorney General broad discretion to waive deportation of resident aliens. The AEDPA and IIRIRA restricted the class of aliens depending on section 212(c) for relief. St. Cyr's removal proceedings commenced after AEDPA's and IIRIRA's effective dates. Subsequently, the Attorney General claimed that the AEDPA and IIRIRA withdrew his authority to grant St. Cyr a waiver. The District Court accepted St. Cyr's habeas corpus application and agreed that the new restrictions do not apply to removal proceedings brought against an alien who pleaded guilty to a deportable crime before their enactment. The Court of Appeals affirmed.</p>
| 1,088 | 5 | 4 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | Civil Rights |
1,338 | 54,924 | Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health & Human Resources | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/99-1848 | 99-1848 | 2000 | Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. | West Virginia Department of Health & Human Resources | <p>Buckhannon Board and Care Home, Inc. operates care homes that provide assisted living to their residents. Buckhannon filed an inspection by the West Virginia fire marshal's office because some residents were incapable of "self-preservation." Buckhannon brought suit against the State and others arguing that the "self-preservation" requirement violated the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 (FHAA) and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA). Afterwards the state legislature eliminated the requirement and the District Court dismissed the case as moot. Buckhannon then requested attorney's fees as the "prevailing party" under the FHAA and ADA. Buckhannon based its claim on the "catalyst theory," which posits that a plaintiff is a "prevailing party" if it achieves the desired result because the lawsuit brought about a voluntary change in the defendant's conduct. The District Court denied the motion. The Court of Appeals affirmed.</p>
| 956 | 5 | 4 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | Attorneys |
1,339 | 54,925 | Palazzolo v. Rhode Island | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/99-2047 | 99-2047 | 2000 | Palazzolo | Rhode Island | <p>Anthony Palazzolo owns a waterfront parcel of land in Rhode Island. Most of the property is salt marsh, subject to tidal flooding. The Rhode Island Resources Management Council's Coastal Resources Management Program regulations designate salt marshes as protected "coastal wetlands," on which development is greatly limited. After multiple development proposals of his were denied, Palazzolo filed an inverse condemnation action in Rhode Island Superior Court. Palazzolo asserted that the State's wetlands regulations had taken his property without compensation in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments because the Council's action had deprived him of "all economically beneficial use" of his property. Ruling against Palazzolo, the court held that his takings claim was not ripe, that he had no right to challenge the regulations predating his acquisition of the property's title, and that he could not assert a takings claim based on the denial of all economic use of his property in light of undisputed evidence that he had $200,000 in development value remaining on an upland parcel of the property.</p>
| 1,122 | 5 | 4 | true | majority opinion | reversed in-part/remanded | Due Process |
1,340 | 54,927 | Glover v. United States | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/99-8576 | 99-8576 | 2000 | Glover | United States | <p>In the 1980's and early 1990's, Paul Glover was the Vice President and General Counsel of the Chicago Truck Drivers, Helpers, and Warehouse Workers Union. Ultimately, Glover was convicted of federal labor racketeering, money laundering, and tax evasion, among other things, after using his control over the union's investments to enrich himself through kickbacks. Glover's probation officer, in his pre-sentence investigation report, recommended that Glover's federal labor racketeering, money laundering, and tax evasion convictions be grouped under the United States Sentencing Commission's Guidelines Manual section 3D1.2, which allows the grouping of counts involving substantially the same harm. The Federal Government objected to the grouping and the District Court agreed. Glover's offense level was thus increased by two levels, resulting in an increased sentence of between 6 and 21 months. Glover's counsel did not pursue the grouping issue on appeal. Glover then filed a pro se motion to correct his sentence, arguing that his counsel's failure to pursue the issue was ineffective assistance, without which his offense level would have been lower. The District Court denied Glover's motion, concluding that a 6 to 21 month sentencing increase was not significant enough to establish prejudice under the test for ineffective assistance of counsel articulated in Strickland v. Washington. Thus, the court denied his ineffective-assistance claim. The Court of Appeals affirmed.</p>
| 1,493 | 9 | 0 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Criminal Procedure |
1,341 | 54,928 | Penry v. Johnson | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/00-6677 | 00-6677 | 2000 | Penry | Johnson | <p>In 1989, the U.S. Supreme Court held that Johnny Paul Penry had been sentenced to death in violation of the Eighth Amendment after finding that Texas' special issues questions did not permit the jury to consider mitigating evidence involving his mental retardation. On retrial in 1990, Penry was again found guilty of capital murder. The defense again put on extensive evidence regarding Penry's mental impairments. Ultimately, a psychiatric evaluation, which stated that Penry would be dangerous to others if released, prepared at the request of Penry's former counsel, was cited. Upon submission to the jury, the trial judge instructed the jury to determine Penry's sentence by answering the same special issues in the original Penry case. Additionally, the trial judge gave a supplemental instruction on mitigating evidence. The court sentenced Penry to death in accordance with the jury's answers to the special issues. In affirming, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals rejected Penry's claims that the admission of language from the psychiatric evaluation violated his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, and that the jury instructions were constitutionally inadequate because they did not permit the jury to consider and give effect to his particular mitigating evidence. Penry's petitions for state and federal habeas corpus relief failed.</p>
| 1,372 | 6 | 3 | true | majority opinion | reversed in-part/remanded | Criminal Procedure |
1,342 | 54,929 | Ohio v. Reiner | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/00-1028 | 00-1028 | 2000 | Ohio | Reiner | <p>Matthew Reiner was charged with involuntary manslaughter in connection with the death of his 2-month-old son Alex. The defense planned to argue that Susan Batt, the family's babysitter, was the culpable party. The trial court granted Batt transactional immunity from prosecution, at the state's request, after she informed the court she intended to assert her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Ultimately, Batt denied any involvement in the death. Reiner was convicted. The Court of Appeals of Ohio reversed. In affirming, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that "Susan Batt's [trial] testimony did not incriminate her because she denied any involvement in the abuse. Thus, she did not have a valid Fifth Amendment privilege." The court noted that the defense's theory of Batt's guilt was not grounds for a grant of immunity, "when the witness continues to deny any self-incriminating conduct." The court also found that the wrongful grant of immunity prejudiced Reiner, because it effectively told the jury that Batt did not cause Alex's injuries.</p>
| 1,072 | 9 | 0 | false | per curiam | reversed/remanded | Criminal Procedure |
1,343 | 54,930 | Eastern Associated Coal Corporation v. United Mine Workers of America, District 17 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/99-1038 | 99-1038 | 2000 | Eastern Associated Coal Corporation | United Mine Workers of America, District 17 | <p>Eastern Associated Coal Corp. and the United Mine Workers of America are parties to a collective-bargaining agreement with arbitration provisions. Under the agreement, in order for Eastern to discharge an employee, it must prove it has "just cause," or the arbitrator will order the employee reinstated. The arbitrator's decision is final. With this framework in place, James Smith worked for Eastern as a truck driver subject to Department of Transportation (DOT) regulations requiring random drug testing of workers engaged in "safety-sensitive" tasks. After Smith tested positive for marijuana use twice, Eastern sought to discharge him. Each time the union went to arbitration. The arbitrator concluded that Smith's positive drug test did not amount to "just cause" for discharge and reinstated him conditionally. After the second occurrence, Eastern filed suit to vacate the arbitrator's award. The District Court ordered the award's enforcement, holding that Smith's conditional reinstatement did not violate the strong regulation-based public policy against drug use by workers who perform safety-sensitive functions. The Court of Appeals affirmed.</p>
| 1,163 | 9 | 0 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | Unions |
1,344 | 54,931 | Semtek International, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corporation | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/99-1551 | 99-1551 | 2000 | Semtek International, Inc. | Lockheed Martin Corporation | <p>Semtek International filed a complaint against Lockheed Martin Corporation in California state court, alleging breach of contract and various business torts. Based on diversity of citizenship, Lockheed Martin moved the case to the District Court. In the District Court, Lockheed Martin successfully moved to dismiss Semtek's claims, as they were barred by California's 2-year statute of limitations. The dismissal was upheld on appeal. Semtek then filed suit in the State Circuit Court for Baltimore City, Maryland, alleging the same causes of action. The suit was not time barred under Maryland's 3-year statute of limitations. The court dismissed the case under res judicata. In affirming, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals held that the California federal court's dismissal barred the Maryland complaint because the res judicata effect of federal diversity judgments is prescribed by federal law, under which the earlier dismissal was on the merits and claim-preclusive.</p>
| 985 | 9 | 0 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Judicial Power |
1,345 | 54,932 | Cedric Kushner Promotions, Ltd. v. King | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/00-549 | 00-549 | 2000 | Cedric Kushner Promotions, Ltd. | King | <p>Cedric Kushner Promotions, Ltd., a corporate promoter of boxing matches, sued Don King, the president and sole shareholder of a rival corporation, alleging that King had conducted his corporation's affairs in violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). RICO makes it "unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise...to conduct or participate...in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity." The District Court dismissed the complaint. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that RICO applies only where a plaintiff shows the existence of two separate entities, a "person" and a distinct "enterprise," the affairs of which that "person" improperly conducts. The court concluded that King was part of the corporation, not a "person," distinct from the "enterprise," who allegedly improperly conducted the "enterprise's affairs."</p>
| 933 | 9 | 0 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | Criminal Procedure |
1,346 | 54,933 | Tuan Anh Nguyen v. Immigration and Naturalization Service | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/99-2071 | 99-2071 | 2000 | Tuan Anh Nguyen | Immigration and Naturalization Service | <p>In 1969, Tuan Ahn Nguyen was born in Saigon, Vietnam to Joseph Boulais and a Vietnamese citizen. At age six, Nguyen became a lawful permanent United States resident. At age 22, Nguyen pleaded guilty in a Texas state court to two counts of sexual assault on a child. Subsequently, the Immigration and and Naturalization Service initiated deportation proceedings against Nguyen. After the Immigration Judge ordered Nguyen, Boulais obtained an order of parentage from a state court. Dismissing Nguyen's appeal, the Board of Immigration of Appeals rejected Nguyen's citizenship claim because he had not complied with 8 USC section 1409(a)'s requirements for one born out of wedlock and abroad to a citizen father and a noncitizen mother. On appeal, the Court of Appeals rejected Nguyen and Boulais argument that section 1409(a) violates equal protection by providing different rules for attainment of citizenship by children born abroad and out of wedlock depending upon whether the one parent with American citizenship is the mother or the father.</p>
| 1,052 | 5 | 4 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | Civil Rights |
1,347 | 54,934 | Norfolk Shipbuilding Drydock Corporation v. Garris | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/00-346 | 00-346 | 2000 | Norfolk Shipbuilding Drydock Corporation | Garris | <p>Christopher Garris' mother filed a complaint in Federal District Court alleging that her son died as the result of injuries he sustained while sandblasting aboard the USNS Maj. Stephen W. Pless. Because the vessel was berthed in the navigable waters of the United States, Garris invoked federal admiralty jurisdiction and sought damages under general maritime law. Garris asserted that the injuries were caused by the negligence of Norfolk Shipbuilding & Drydock Corporation. The District Court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a federal claim. The court stated that no cause of action exists, under general maritime law, for death resulting from negligence. In reversing, the Court of Appeals noted that although the U.S. Supreme Court had not yet recognized a maritime cause of action for wrongful death resulting from negligence, the action was made appropriate by principles contained in precedent.</p>
| 926 | 9 | 0 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | Economic Activity |
1,348 | 54,935 | Good News Club v. Milford Central School | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/99-2036 | 99-2036 | 2000 | Good News Club | Milford Central School | <p>Under New York law, Milford Central School policy authorizes district residents to use its building after school for certain activities. Stephen and Darleen Fournier were district residents eligible to use the school's facilities. They sought approval of their proposed use and sponsorship of the Good News Club, a private Christian organization for children. The Fourniers submitted a request to hold the Club's weekly afterschool meetings at the school. Milford denied the request reasoning that the proposed use, including singing songs, hearing Bible lessons, memorizing scripture, and praying, was the equivalent of religious worship prohibited by the community use policy. The Club filed suit alleging that the denial violated its free speech rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Ultimately, the District Court granted Milford summary judgment. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that because the subject matter of the Club's was "quintessentially religious", and the activities "fall outside the bounds of pure 'moral and character development,'" Milford's policy of excluding the Club's meetings was constitutional subject discrimination, not unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination.</p>
| 1,219 | 6 | 3 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | First Amendment |
1,349 | 54,936 | Illinois v. McArthur | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/99-1132 | 99-1132 | 2000 | Illinois | McArthur | <p>In 1997, Tera McArthur asked two police officers to accompany her to her trailer, where she lived with her husband, Charles McArthur, so that they could keep the peace while she removed her belongings. While at the trailer, Tera alerted the officers, Assistant Chief John Love and Officer Richard Skidis, that her husband had marijuana hidden under the couch. Love then asked Charles for permission to search the trailer. Permission was denied and Love sent Officer Skidis with Tera to get a search warrant. Love told Charles he could not reenter his trailer, unless a police officer accompanied him. Afterwards, Love stood just inside the door to observe Charles when he went into the trailer. About two hours later, a search warrant was obtained. Subsequently, a search of the trailer transpired and officers found drug paraphernalia and marijuana. Charles McArthur was arrested. At trial, McArthur moved to suppress the drug paraphernalia and marijuana on the ground that they were the "fruit" of an unlawful police seizure, namely, the refusal to let him reenter the trailer unaccompanied, which would have permitted him, he said, to "have destroyed the marijuana." The trial court granted the motion. The Appellate Court of Illinois affirmed and the Illinois Supreme Court denied the state's petition for leave to appeal.</p>
| 1,334 | 8 | 1 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Criminal Procedure |
1,350 | 54,937 | Gitlitz v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/99-1295 | 99-1295 | 2000 | Gitlitz | Commissioner of Internal Revenue | <p>In 1991, P. D. W. & A., Inc., an insolvent corporation taxed under Subchapter S, excluded its entire discharge of indebtedness amount from its gross income. David Gitlitz and other shareholders were assessed tax deficiencies because they used the untaxed discharge of indebtedness to increase their basis in S corporation stock and to deduct suspended losses. Ultimately, the Tax Court held that Gitlitz and others could not use an S corporation's untaxed discharge of indebtedness to increase their basis in corporate stock. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that the discharge of indebtedness amount first had to be used to reduce certain tax attributes of the S corporation and that only the leftover amount could be used to increase their basis. In so holding, the court assumed that the excluded discharge of indebtedness is an item of income subject to passthrough to shareholders.</p>
| 905 | 8 | 1 | true | majority opinion | reversed | Federal Taxation |
1,351 | 54,938 | Atwater v. City of Lago Vista | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/99-1408 | 99-1408 | 2000 | Atwater | City of Lago Vista | <p>Under Texas law, it is a misdemeanor, punishable only by a fine, either for a front-seat passenger in a car equipped with safety belts not to wear one or for the driver to fail to secure any small child riding in front. In 1997, Gail Atwater was driving her truck in Lago Vista. Neither of Atwater's children, who were sitting in the front seat, was wearing seatbelts. Lago Vista policeman Bart Turek observed the violations and pulled Atwater over. Ultimately, Atwater was handcuffed, placed in jail, and released on bond. Atwater then filed suit alleging that Turek's actions had violated her Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure. In granting the city summary judgment, the District Court ruled the claim meritless. In affirming, the en banc Court of Appeals held that the arrest was not unreasonable for Fourth Amendment purposes because no one disputed that Turek had probable cause to arrest Atwater, and there was no evidence the arrest was conducted in an extraordinary manner, unusually harmful to Atwater's privacy interests.</p>
| 1,065 | 5 | 4 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | Criminal Procedure |
1,352 | 54,939 | Idaho v. United States | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/00-189 | 00-189 | 2000 | Idaho | United States | <p>In 1873, the Coeur d'Alene Tribe agreed to relinquish all claims to its aboriginal lands outside the bounds of a more substantial reservation that U.S. negotiators agreed to set apart for the tribe's exclusive use. The reservation included part of the St. Joe River and virtually all of the Lake Coeur d'Alene. President Grant set the land aside in an 1873 Executive Order. In 1891, Congress ratified agreements in which the Tribe agreed to cede its rights to all land except that within the Executive Order reservation, and the Government promised to compensate the Tribe and agreed to hold the land forever as Indian land and the Tribe agreed to cede the reservation's northern portion, including two-thirds of the lake, for compensation. The United States initiated an action against Idaho to quiet title in the United States, in trust for the Tribe, to the submerged lands within the current reservation. The District Court quieted title in the United States as trustee, and the Tribe as beneficiary, to the bed and banks of the lake and the river within the reservation. The Court of Appeals affirmed.</p>
| 1,114 | 5 | 4 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | Civil Rights |
1,353 | 54,942 | Arkansas v. Sullivan | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/00-262 | 00-262 | 2000 | Arkansas | Sullivan | <p>In 1998, Officer Joe Taylor of the Conway, Arkansas, Police Department stopped Kenneth Andrew Sullivan for traffic violations. When Officer Taylor saw Sullivan's license, he realized that he was aware of narcotics intelligence regarding him. Sullivan was then arrested. Afterwards Officer Taylor conducted an inventory search of Sullivan's vehicle and discovered methamphetamine as well as items of drug paraphernalia. Ultimately, Sullivan was charged with various state-law drug offenses, unlawful possession of a weapon, and speeding. Sullivan moved to suppress the evidence seized from his vehicle on the basis that his arrest was merely a "pretext and sham to search" him and, therefore, violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The trial court granted the motion and the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed. In petitioning for rehearing, the State argued that the court had erred by taking into account Office Taylor's subjective motivation using Whren v. United States, which makes "the ulterior motives of police officers...irrelevant so long as there is probable cause for the traffic stop." The court rejected the argument and denied the petition.</p>
| 1,166 | 9 | 0 | true | per curiam | reversed/remanded | Federalism |
1,354 | 54,941 | Bartnicki v. Vopper | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/99-1687 | 99-1687 | 2000 | Bartnicki | Vopper | <p>An unidentified person intercepted and recorded a phone call between the chief union negotiator and the union president (the petitioners) during collective-bargaining negotiations involving a teachers' union and the local school board. After a teacher-favorable proposal was accepted, a radio commentator played a tape of the intercepted conversation. Petitioners filed suit under both federal and state wiretapping laws, alleging that an unknown person using an electronic device had surreptitiously intercepted their telephone conversation. Rejecting a First Amendment protection defense, the District Court concluded, in part, that the statutes were content-neutral laws of general applicability containing "no indicia of prior restraint or the chilling of free speech." Ultimately, the Court of Appeals found the statutes invalid because they deterred significantly more speech than necessary to protect the private interests at stake.</p>
| 947 | 6 | 3 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | First Amendment |
1,355 | 54,944 | Chickasaw Nation v. United States | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/00-507 | 00-507 | 2001 | Chickasaw Nation | United States | <p>The Indian Regulatory Gaming Act provides that Internal Revenue Code provisions "(including sections 1441, 3402(q), 6041, and 6050I, and chapter 35() concerning the reporting and withholding of taxes" with respect to gambling operations shall apply to Indian tribes in the same way as they apply to States. Chapter 35 imposes taxes from which it exempts certain state-controlled gambling activities, but says nothing about tax reporting or withholding. The Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations, in a lawsuit, claimed that the Gaming Act subsection's explicit parenthetical reference exempts them from paying those chapter 35 taxes from which the States are exempt. Rejecting that claim, the Court of Appeals ultimately held that the subsection applies only to Code provisions concerning tax withholding and reporting.</p>
| 818 | 7 | 2 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | Civil Rights |
1,356 | 54,940 | United States v. Hatter | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/99-1978 | 99-1978 | 2000 | United States | Hatter | <p>In 1982, when Congress extended Medicare to federal employees, then-sitting federal judges began to have Medicare taxes withheld from their salaries. In 1983, Congress then required federal judges to participate in Social Security, except for those who contributed to a "covered" retirement program. A "covered" program was defined to include any retirement system to which an employee had to contribute, which did not encompass the noncontributory pension system for federal judges, whose financial obligations and payroll deductions therefore had to increase. A group of federal judges, who were appointed before 1983, filed suit arguing that the 1983 law violated the Constitution's Compensation Clause, which guarantees federal judges a "Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office." Ultimately, the Court of Federal Claims ruled that a 1984 judicial salary increase cured any violation. In reversing, the Federal Circuit held that the Compensation Clause prevented the government from collecting Medicare and Social Security taxes from the judges and that the violation was not cured by the 1984 pay increase.</p>
| 1,157 | 5 | 2 | true | majority opinion | reversed in-part/remanded | Federal Taxation |
1,357 | 54,945 | Sao Paulo State of Federative Republic of Brazil v. American Tobacco Company, Inc. | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/01-835 | 01-835 | 2001 | Sao Paulo State of Federative Republic of Brazil | American Tobacco Company, Inc., et al. | <p>Sao Paulo State of Federative Republic of Brazil (Sao Paulo) sued American Tobacco Company (American Tobacco) in Louisiana state court and argued that American Tobacco knowingly did not disclose information regarding the dangers of using tobacco products. Sao Paulo sought compensation for federal funds spent on medical care for tobacco-related illnesses. The case was moved to federal court, where Judge Carl J. Barbier presided over it. American Tobacco filed a motion requesting that Judge Barbier be removed from the case because he had been involved in a former case against American Tobacco and would not be able to impartially decide the case. Nine years earlier, the Louisiana Trial Lawyers Association had filed a brief in a case against American Tobacco that listed Judge Barbier as the president of the organization; however, Judge Barbier had retired six months prior and had not participated in the filing. Judge Barbier declined to remove himself from the case because he had not been involved in the previous case or any other tobacco-related cases and had no knowledge of the case at issue. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and held that, because Judge Barbier’s name was listed on the earlier brief, a reasonable person would have doubts about his impartiality.</p>
| 1,311 | 9 | 0 | true | per curiam | reversed/remanded | Due Process |
1,358 | 54,946 | Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A. | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/00-1853 | 00-1853 | 2001 | Swierkiewicz | Sorema N.A. | <p>Akos Swierkiewicz, a 53-year-old native of Hungary, began working for Sorema N. A., a reinsurance company principally owned and controlled by a French parent corporation, in 1989. Six years later, the Chief Executive Officer, a French national, demoted Swierkiewicz from the position of senior vice president and chief underwriting officer to a marketing and services position with fewer responsibilities. A younger French national was promoted to Swierkiewicz's old position. Swierkiewicz filed suit, alleging that he had been fired on account of his national origin in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,and on account of his age in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA). In dismissing the case, the District Court found that Swierkiewicz had not adequately alleged a prima facie case, in that he had not adequately alleged circumstances that support an inference of discrimination. In affirming, the Court of Appeals relied on precedent requiring an employment discrimination complaint to allege facts constituting a prima facie case of discrimination under McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792.</p>
| 1,167 | 9 | 0 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Civil Rights |
1,359 | 54,948 | US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/00-1250 | 00-1250 | 2001 | US Airways, Inc. | Barnett | <p>In 1990, Robert Barnett injured his back while working in a cargo-handling position at US Airways. Invoking his seniority rights, Barnett transferred to a less physically demanding position in the mailroom. Subsequently, Barnett's new position became open to seniority-based employee bidding under US Airways' seniority system and, ultimately, he lost his job. Barnett then filed suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), which prohibits an employer from discriminating against "an individual with a disability" who with "reasonable accommodation" can perform a job's essential functions unless the employer "can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of [its] business." In granting US Airways summary judgment, the District Court found that altering a seniority system would result in an "undue hardship" to both US Airways and its nondisabled employees. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that the seniority system was merely a factor in the undue hardship analysis and that a case-by-case, fact intensive analysis is required to determine whether any particular assignment would constitute an undue hardship.</p>
| 1,189 | 7 | 2 | true | majority opinion | vacated/remanded | Civil Rights |
1,360 | 54,947 | Toyota Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/00-1089 | 00-1089 | 2001 | Toyota Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. | Williams | <p>In 1997, Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. terminated Ella Williams, citing her poor attendance record. Subsequently, claiming to be disabled from performing her automobile assembly line job by carpal tunnel syndrome and related impairments, Williams sued Toyota for failing to provide her with a reasonable accommodation as required by the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA). Granting Toyota summary judgment, the District Court held that Williams's impairment did not qualify as a disability under the ADA because it had not substantially limited any major life activity and that there was no evidence that Williams had had a record of a substantially limiting impairment. In reversing, the Court of Appeals found that the impairments substantially limited Williams in the major life activity of performing manual tasks. Because her ailments prevented her from doing the tasks associated with certain types of manual jobs that require the gripping of tools and repetitive work with hands and arms extended at or above shoulder levels for extended periods of time, the appellate court concluded that Williams demonstrated that her manual disability involved a class of manual activities affecting the ability to perform tasks at work.</p>
| 1,263 | 9 | 0 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Civil Rights |
1,361 | 54,949 | Chao v. Mallard Bay Drilling, Inc. | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/00-927 | 00-927 | 2001 | Chao | Mallard Bay Drilling, Inc. | <p>In 1997, an explosion on board Mallard Bay Drilling Rig 52, a oil and gas exploration barge, killed or injured several workers while the barge was drilling a well in Louisiana's territorial waters. The Coast Guard's subsequent investigation did not accuse Mallard of anything, but did note that the barge was not an "inspected vessel" subject to comprehensive Coast Guard regulation. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) then cited Mallard for violations of the Occupational Safety and Health Act (Act) of 1970. Mallard challenged OSHA's jurisdiction to issue the citations on the grounds that Rig 52 was not a "workplace" under section 4(a) of the Act and that section 4(b)(1) of the Act pre-empted OSHA jurisdiction because the Coast Guard had exclusive authority to prescribe and enforce occupational safety and health standards on vessels such as Rig 52. Rejecting both arguments, an Administrative Law Judge found that Rig 52 was a "workplace" under the Act and held that the Coast Guard had not pre-empted OSHA's jurisdiction. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that the Coast Guard's exclusive jurisdiction over the regulation of seamen's working conditions aboard vessels such as Rig 52 precluded OSHA's regulation under section 4(b)(1), and that this pre-emption encompassed both inspected and uninspected vessels.</p>
| 1,356 | 8 | 0 | true | majority opinion | reversed | Unions |
1,362 | 54,950 | Thompson v. Western States Medical Center | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/01-344 | 01-344 | 2001 | Thompson | Western States Medical Center | <p>The Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997 (FDAMA) exempts "compounded drugs," or drugs in which a pharmacist or doctor has combined, mixed, or altered ingredients to create a medication tailored to an individual patient's needs, from the Food and Drug Administration's (FDA) standard drug approval requirements under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), so long as the providers of the compounded drugs abide by several restrictions. The restrictions included that the prescription be unsolicited and that the providers not advertise or promote the compounding of any particular drug, class of drug, or type of drug. A group of licensed pharmacies that specialize in compounding drugs sought to enjoin enforcement of the advertising and solicitation provisions, arguing that they violate the First Amendment's free speech guarantee. Agreeing, the District Court held that the provisions constituted unconstitutional restrictions on commercial speech. Affirming in part, the Court of Appeals concluded that the Government had not demonstrated that the restrictions would directly advance its interests or that alternatives less restrictive of speech were unavailable.</p>
| 1,203 | 5 | 4 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | First Amendment |
1,363 | 54,952 | Adams v. Florida Power Corp. | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/01-584 | 01-584 | 2001 | Adams | Florida Power Corp. | <p>The Florida Power Corporation (FPC) operated as a publicly-regulated electric utility monopoly until 1992, when Congress opened the industry to competition through the Energy Policy Act of 1992. Between 1992 and 1996, FPR terminated Wanda Adams and others during a series of reorganizations the company stated were necessary to maintain its competitiveness. Members of the Adams class sued FPC, claiming that FPC discriminated against them because of their age, in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA). In 1996, the District Court conditionally certified a class of former FPC employees claiming age discrimination. In 1999, the court decertified the class and ruled as a matter of law that a disparate impact theory of liability is not available to plaintiffs bringing suit under the ADEA.</p>
| 830 | 9 | 0 | false | per curiam | null | Judicial Power |
1,364 | 54,951 | Dusenbery v. United States | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/00-6567 | 00-6567 | 2001 | Dusenbery | United States | <p>While Larry Dean Dusenbery was in prison on federal drug charges, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) began an administrative process to forfeit cash that officers seized when they executed a search warrant for the residence where he was arrested. The FBI sought to notify Dusenbery by sending certified mail addressed to him care of the federal correctional institution where he was incarcerated; to the address of the residence where he was arrested; and to an address in the town where his mother lived. The FBI received no response in the time allotted and turned over the cash to the United States Marshals Service. When Dusenbery moved for the return of all the property and funds seized in his criminal case, the District Court denied the motion. On remand, the District Court ruled that the Government's sending of notice by certified mail to Dusenbery's place of incarceration satisfied his due process rights as to the cash. The Court of Appeals affirmed.</p>
| 979 | 5 | 4 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | Due Process |
1,365 | 54,954 | Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazabal | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/00-1406 | 00-1406 | 2001 | Chevron U.S.A., Inc. | Echazabal | <p>Beginning in 1972, Mario Echazabal worked for independent contractors at an oil refinery owned by Chevron U.S.A. Inc. When Echazabal applied for a job directly with Chevron, the company's physical examination revealed he had a liver condition, the cause identified as Hepatitis C. Chevron's doctors said that the condition would be exacerbated by continued exposure to toxins at the refinery. In response to Chevron's request that the refinery reassign Echazabal to a job without exposure to toxins or remove him, the contractor employing him laid him off. Echazabal filed suit, claiming that Chevron's action violated the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA). Under an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) regulation that permits the defense that a worker's disability on the job would pose a direct threat to his health, Chevron defended its action. The District Court granted Chevron summary judgment. In reversing, the Court of Appeals found that the regulation exceeded the scope of permissible rulemaking under the ADA.</p>
| 1,052 | 9 | 0 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Civil Rights |
1,366 | 54,958 | BE & K Construction Company v. National Labor Relations Board | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/01-518 | 01-518 | 2001 | BE & K Construction Company | National Labor Relations Board | <p>In filing suit against a group of unions, BE&K Construction Company alleged that the unions had engaged in lobbying, litigation, and other concerted activities in order to delay a project it had been hired for because it employed nonunion workers. After BE&K lost on or withdrew each of its claims, the National Labor Relations Board issued an administrative complaint, alleging that BE&K, by filing and maintaining its lawsuit, had violated the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), which prohibits employers from restraining, coercing, or interfering with employees' exercise of rights related to self-organization, collective bargaining, and other concerted activities. Finding that the lawsuit was filed to retaliate against the unions, whose conduct was protected under the NLRA, the Board ordered BE&K to cease and desist from prosecuting such suits. In granting the Board's enforcement petition, the Court of Appeals held that because the Judiciary had already found BE&K's claims against the unions unmeritorious or dismissed, evidence of a simple retaliatory motive sufficed to adjudge BE&K of committing an unfair labor practice.</p>
| 1,170 | 9 | 0 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Unions |
1,367 | 54,953 | Zelman v. Simmons-Harris | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/00-1751 | 00-1751 | 2001 | Zelman | Simmons-Harris | <p>Ohio's Pilot Project Scholarship Program provides tuition aid in the form of vouchers for certain students in the Cleveland City School District to attend participating public or private schools of their parent's choosing. Both religious and nonreligious schools in the district may participate. Tuition aid is distributed to parents according to financial need, and where the aid is spent depends solely upon where parents choose to enroll their children. In the 1999-2000 school year 82 percent of the participating private schools had a religious affiliation and 96 percent of the students participating in the scholarship program were enrolled in religiously affiliated schools. Sixty percent of the students were from families at or below the poverty line. A group of Ohio taxpayers sought to enjoin the program on the ground that it violated the Establishment Clause. The District Court granted them summary judgment, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.</p>
| 966 | 5 | 4 | true | majority opinion | reversed | First Amendment |
1,368 | 54,959 | Securities and Exchange Commission v. Zandford | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/01-147 | 01-147 | 2001 | Securities and Exchange Commission | Zandford | <p>In 1987, Charles Zandford, a securities broker, persuaded William Wood to open a joint investment account for himself and his mentally retarded daughter. The Woods gave Zandford discretion to manage the account and a general power of attorney to engage in securities transactions without their prior approval. After Wood died, all of the money that he had invested was gone. Subsequently, Zandford was indicted on federal wire fraud charges for selling securities in the Woods' account and making personal use of the proceeds. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) also filed a civil complaint, alleging that Zandford had violated section 10 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the SEC's Rule 10b-5 by engaging in a scheme to defraud the Woods and misappropriating their securities without their knowledge or consent. After Zandford's conviction in the criminal case, the District Court granted the SEC summary judgment in the civil case. In reversing, the Court of Appeals directed the District Court to dismiss the complaint, holding that neither the criminal conviction nor the allegations in the complaint established that Zandford's fraud was in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.</p>
| 1,226 | 9 | 0 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Economic Activity |
1,369 | 54,957 | Department of Housing and Urban Development v. Rucker | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/00-1770 | 00-1770 | 2001 | Department of Housing and Urban Development | Rucker | <p>The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, as amended, provides that each "public housing agency shall utilize leases...providing that...any drug-related criminal activity on or off [federally assisted low-income housing] premises, engaged in by a public housing tenant, any member of the tenant's household, or any guest or other person under the tenant's control, shall be cause for termination of tenancy." Paragraph 9(m) of the leases of the tenants of the Oakland Housing Authority (OHA) obligates them to "assure that the tenant, any member of the household, a guest, or another person under the tenant's control, shall not engage in?any drug-related criminal activity on or near the premises." After the relations of four tenants were linked to drug activity, OHA instituted state-court eviction proceedings against respondents, alleging violations of lease paragraph 9(m) by a member of each tenant's household or a guest. The tenants filed an action, arguing that the Act does not require lease terms authorizing the eviction of the "innocent" tenants. The District Court's issuance of a preliminary injunction against OHA was affirmed by an en banc Court of Appeals.</p>
| 1,174 | 8 | 0 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Civil Rights |
1,370 | 54,962 | Board of Ed. of Independent School Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Cty. v. Earls | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/01-332 | 01-332 | 2001 | Board of Ed. of Independent School Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Cty. | Earls | <p>The Student Activities Drug Testing Policy adopted by the Tecumseh, Oklahoma School District (School District) requires all middle and high school students to consent to urinalysis testing for drugs in order to participate in any extracurricular activity. Two Tecumseh High School students and their parents brought suit, alleging that the policy violates the Fourth Amendment. The District Court granted the School District summary judgment. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that the policy violated the Fourth Amendment. The appellate court concluded that before imposing a suspicionless drug-testing program a school must demonstrate some identifiable drug abuse problem among a sufficient number of those tested, such that testing that group will actually redress its drug problem, which the School District had failed to demonstrate.</p>
| 853 | 5 | 4 | true | majority opinion | reversed | Privacy |
1,371 | 54,961 | Gisbrecht v. Barnhart | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/01-131 | 01-131 | 2001 | Gisbrecht | Barnhart | <p>Under 42 USC section 406(b), an attorney who successfully represents a Social Security benefits claimant in court may be awarded a reasonable fee not in excess of 25 percent of the past-due benefits awarded to the claimant, payable out of the amount of the past-due benefits. After three individuals prevailed on their claims for Social Security disability benefits and successfully sought attorneys' fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act, their attorneys were to collect 25 percent of all past-due benefits recovered from each claimant, pursuant to contingent-fee agreements. In each case, the District Court declined to give effect to the attorney-client fee agreement, instead employing a "lodestar" method, under which the number of hours reasonably devoted to each case was multiplied by the reasonable hourly fee. The Court of Appeals affirmed.</p>
| 863 | 8 | 1 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Attorneys |
1,372 | 54,960 | Christopher v. Harbury | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/01-394 | 01-394 | 2001 | Christopher | Harbury | <p>Jennifer Harbury, a United States citizen, is the widow of Efrain Bamaca- Velasquez, a Guatemalan rebel leader. Harbury alleged that Government officials intentionally deceived her in concealing information that her husband had been executed by Guatemalan army officers paid by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Harbury also alleged that this deception denied her access to the courts by leaving her without information, or reason to seek information, with which she could have brought a lawsuit that might have saved her husband's life. Harbury filed suit, listing 28 causes of action, for the violation of her constitutional right of access to courts. With respect to the access-to-courts counts, the District Court held that Harbury had not stated a valid cause of action. Given that she had not filed a prior suit, the court reasoned that she could only guess how the alleged cover-up might have prejudiced her rights to bring a separate action and that the defendants would be entitled to qualified immunity. The Court of Appeals reversed only the dismissal of one of Harbury's claims for denial of access to courts.</p>
| 1,134 | 9 | 0 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Economic Activity |
1,373 | 54,963 | Wisconsin Department of Health and Family Services v. Blumer | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/00-952 | 00-952 | 2001 | Wisconsin Department of Health and Family Services | Blumer | <p>The spousal impoverishment provisions of the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988 (MCCA) permit a spouse living at home to reserve certain income and assets to meet the minimum monthly maintenance needs he or she will have when the other spouse is institutionalized, usually in a nursing home, and becomes eligible for Medicaid. The MCCA's resource allocation rules provide that, in determining the institutionalized spouse's Medicaid eligibility, a portion of the couple's resources, called the "community spouse resource allowance" (CSRA), shall be reserved for the benefit of the community spouse. The MCCA allows an increase in the standard allowance if either spouse shows, at a state-administered hearing, that the community spouse will not be able to maintain the statutorily defined minimum level of income on which to live after the institutionalized spouse gains Medicaid eligibility. In 1996, after entering a Wisconsin nursing home, Irene Blumer applied for Medicaid through her husband Burnett and ultimately sought a higher CSRA. Under the "income-first" method for determining whether the community spouse is entitled to a higher CSRA, which Wisconsin uses, the State considers first whether potential income transfers from the institutionalized spouse will suffice to enable the community spouse to meet monthly needs once the institutionalized spouse qualifies for Medicaid. Subsequently, an examiner denied Blumer's request. The Court of Appeals affirmed, but the Wisconsin Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the State's income-first statute conflicted with the MCCA, which, the appeals court held, unambiguously mandates the resources-first method.</p>
| 1,689 | 6 | 3 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Federalism |
1,374 | 54,964 | Kelly v. South Carolina | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/00-9280 | 00-9280 | 2001 | Kelly | South Carolina | <p>After convicting William Kelly for murder, a South Carolina jury was asked to determine whether any aggravating factors had been shown and, if so, to recommend a sentence of death or life imprisonment. During sentencing, the prosecutor presented testimony that Kelly had taken part in an escape attempt with plans to hold a female guard hostage; provided evidence of Kelly's sadism and his desires to kill anyone who irritated him; and spoke of Kelly as a "butcher," "bloody," and "dangerous." Relying on the holding of Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, that when "a capital defendant's future dangerousness is at issue, and the only sentencing alternative to death...is life imprisonment without possibility of parole, due process entitles the defendant 'to inform the jury of [his] parole ineligibility,'" Kelly's counsel requested a jury instruction stating that Kelly would be ineligible for parole if he received a life sentence. In refusing, the trial court said that the State's evidence went to Kelly's character and characteristics, not to future dangerousness. The jury recommended a death sentence. In affirming the sentence, the State Supreme Court held Simmons inapposite because state law provided the jury with a third sentencing alternative and future dangerousness was not at issue.</p>
| 1,314 | 5 | 4 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Criminal Procedure |
1,375 | 54,965 | Harris v. United States | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/00-10666 | 00-10666 | 2001 | Harris | United States | <p>William Harris, who sold illegal narcotics at his pawnshop with an unconcealed semiautomatic pistol at his side, was convicted for violating 18 USC section 924(c)(1)(A), which provides that a person who in relation to a drug trafficking crime uses or carries a firearm "shall, in addition to the punishment for such crime...if the firearm is brandished, be sentenced to...not less than 7 years." When his presentence report recommended that he receive the 7-year minimum sentence, Harris objected, arguing that brandishing was an element of a separate statutory offense for which he was not indicted or convicted. The District Court found that Harris had brandished the gun and sentenced him to seven years in prison. In affirming, the Court of Appeals found that McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, in which the U.S. Supreme Court sustained a statute that increased the minimum penalty for a crime, though not beyond the statutory maximum, foreclosed his argument that if brandishing is a sentencing factor, the statute is unconstitutional under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466.</p>
| 1,095 | 5 | 4 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | Criminal Procedure |
1,376 | 54,966 | Alabama v. Shelton | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/00-1214 | 00-1214 | 2001 | Alabama | Shelton | <p>Lereed Shelton represented himself in an Alabama Circuit Court criminal trial. The court warned Shelton about the difficulties that self-representation entailed, but at no time offered him assistance of counsel at state expense. Ultimately, Shelton was convicted of misdemeanor assault and sentenced to a 30-day jail term, which the trial court suspended, placing Shelton on two years' unsupervised probation. Shelton appealed on Sixth Amendment grounds. The Alabama Supreme Court reversed Shelton's suspended jail sentence, reasoning that U.S. Supreme Court's decisions in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, and Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, require provision of counsel in any petty offense, misdemeanor, or felony prosecution, "that actually leads to imprisonment even for a brief period." The court concluded that, because a defendant may not be imprisoned absent provision of counsel, Shelton's suspended sentence could never be activated and was therefore invalid.</p>
| 982 | 5 | 4 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | Criminal Procedure |
1,377 | 54,970 | United States v. Cotton | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/01-687 | 01-687 | 2001 | United States | Cotton | <p>A federal grand jury returned an indictment charging Leonard Cotton and others with conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute a detectable amount of cocaine and cocaine base. After a jury convicted them, Cotton and the others received a sentence based on the District Court's finding of drug quantity of at least 50 grams of cocaine base, which implicated certain enhanced penalties. They did not object in the District Court to the fact that the sentences were based on a quantity not alleged in the indictment. While their appeal was pending, the U.S. Supreme Court decided, in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, that "other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." In federal prosecutions, such facts must also be charged in the indictment. Cotton and others then argued before the Court of Appeals that their sentences were invalid under Apprendi, because the drug quantity issue was neither alleged in the indictment nor submitted to the petit jury. The appellate court vacated the sentences on the ground that it had no jurisdiction to impose a sentence for an offense not charged in the indictment.</p>
| 1,292 | 9 | 0 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Criminal Procedure |
1,378 | 54,967 | McKune v. Lile | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/00-1187 | 00-1187 | 2001 | McKune | Lile | <p>A few years before his release, prison officials ordered Robert Lile, who was convicted of rape, to participate in a Sexual Abuse Treatment Program (SATP). As part of the program, participating inmates are required to complete and sign an "Admission of Responsibility" form, in which they accept responsibility for the crimes for which they have been sentenced, and complete a sexual history form detailing all prior sexual activities, regardless of whether the activities constitute uncharged criminal offenses. The information obtained from SATP participants is not privileged. By refusing to participate, a prisoner's privileges are reduced. Lile refused to participate in the SATP on the ground that the required disclosures of his criminal history would violate his Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination. The District Court granted Lile summary judgment. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that the compelled self-incrimination can be established by penalties that do not constitute deprivations of protected liberty interests under the Due Process Clause. The appellate court concluded that the SATP could treat inmate admissions as privileged.</p>
| 1,188 | 5 | 4 | true | plurality opinion | reversed/remanded | Criminal Procedure |
1,379 | 54,968 | Federal Maritime Commission v. South Carolina State Ports Authority | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/01-46 | 01-46 | 2001 | Federal Maritime Commission | South Carolina State Ports Authority | <p>South Carolina Maritime Services, Inc. (Maritime Services), asked the South Carolina State Ports Authority (SCSPA) five times for permission to berth a cruise ship, the M/V Tropic Sea, at the SCSPA's port facilities in Charleston, South Carolina. Some cruises offered by Maritime Services would allow passengers to participate in gambling activities while on board. The SCSPA repeatedly denied Maritime Services' requests, contending that it had an established policy of denying berths in the Port of Charleston to vessels whose primary purpose was gambling. Maritime Services file a complaint with the Federal Maritime Commission (FMC), arguing that SCSPA violated the Shipping Act by its denials. The complaint was referred to an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), who found that the SCSPA, as an arm of the State of South Carolina, was entitled to sovereign immunity and thus dismissed the complaint. Reversing on its own motion, the FMC concluded that state sovereign immunity covers proceedings before judicial tribunals, not Executive Branch agencies. In reversing, Court of Appeals fund that the proceedings were an adjudication and thus subject to state sovereign immunity.</p>
| 1,186 | 5 | 4 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | Federalism |
1,380 | 54,969 | Mickens v. Taylor | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/00-9285 | 00-9285 | 2001 | Mickens | Taylor | <p>A Virginia jury convicted Walter Mickens, Jr., of the premeditated murder of Timothy Hall during or following the commission of an attempted forcible sodomy and sentenced him to death. Subsequently, Mickens filed a federal habeas petition, alleging that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because one of his court-appointed attorneys had a conflict of interest at trial - his lead attorney, Bryan Saunders, had represented Hall on criminal charges at the time of the murder. Saunders had not disclosed to the court, his co-counsel, or Mickens that he had represented Hall. Ultimately, the en banc Court of Appeals rejected MIckens's argument that the juvenile court judge's failure to inquire into a potential conflict either mandated automatic reversal of his conviction or relieved him of the burden of showing that a conflict of interest adversely affected his representation. Subsequently, the appellate court concluded that Mickens had not demonstrated adverse effect.</p>
| 992 | 5 | 4 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | Criminal Procedure |
1,381 | 54,973 | Stewart v. Smith | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/01-339 | 01-339 | 2001 | Terry L. Stewart, Director, Arizona Department of Corrections | Robert Douglas Smith | <p>Robert Smith was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. Smith filed a series of petitions for state postconviction relief, alleging that his trial and appellate counsel were ineffective. The Superior Court denied Smith's claims, finding them waived under Arizona Rule 32.2(a)(3) because he failed to raise them in his previous Rule 32 petitions. The court rejected Smith's argument that his failure to raise these claims was also due to ineffective assistance because his prior appellate and Rule 32 counsel, who are members of the Arizona Public Defender's office, refused to file ineffective assistance of counsel claims because his trial counsel was also a member of the Public Defender's office. The Federal District Court held that Smith's claim was barred by the lower court's procedural ruling. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that the state procedural default was not independent of federal law and thus did not bar federal review of the merits of Smith's claim. The appellate court reasoned that Arizona Rule 32.2(a)(3) applies a different standard for waiver depending on whether the claim asserted in a Rule 32 petition was of sufficient constitutional magnitude and that determination whether a claim is of sufficient magnitude required consideration of the merits of the claim. </p>
| 1,325 | 9 | 0 | false | per curiam | reversed/remanded | Judicial Power |
1,382 | 54,974 | United States v. Bass | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/01-1471 | 01-1471 | 2001 | United States | John Bass | <p>In 1998, John Bass, a black man, was charged with two counts of homicide with a firearm in federal court, and the government filed notice of the intent to pursue the death penalty. Bass moved to dismiss the death penalty notice, and he filed a discovery request for information regarding the government’s death penalty charging practices and statistics by arguing that the government’s capital charging practices were racially motivated. The district court granted Bass’ motion for discovery and, after the government informed the court that it would not comply with the order, dismissed the death penalty notice. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision to grant Bass’ motion.</p>
| 731 | 9 | 0 | true | per curiam | reversed | Criminal Procedure |
1,383 | 54,972 | Thomas v. Chicago Park District | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/00-1249 | 00-1249 | 2001 | Thomas | Chicago Park District | <p>The Chicago Park District is responsible for operating public parks and other public property in Chicago. Pursuant to its authority, the Park District adopted an ordinance requiring individuals to obtain a permit before conducting large-scale events in public parks. The ordinance provides that the Park District may deny a permit on any of 13 specified grounds, must process applications within 28 days, and must explain its reasons for a denial. An unsuccessful applicant may appeal, first, to the Park District's general superintendent and then to state court. The Windy City Hemp Development Board applied on several occasions for permits to hold rallies advocating the legalization of marijuana. Some permits were granted and others were denied. Ultimately, the Board filed suit, alleging that the ordinance is unconstitutional on its face. The District Court granted the Park District summary judgment. The Court of Appeals affirmed.</p>
| 947 | 9 | 0 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | First Amendment |
1,384 | 54,971 | Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/00-1021 | 00-1021 | 2001 | Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. | Moran | <p>Rush Prudential HMO, Inc., a health maintenance organization that provides medical services for employee welfare benefits plans covered by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), denied Debra Moran's request to have surgery by an unaffiliated specialist. Under the Illinois HMO Act (Act), which provides that "in the event that the reviewing physician determines the covered service to be medically necessary," the HMO "shall provide" the service, Moran made a written demand for an independent medical review of her claim. After Rush refused her demand, Moran sued in state court to compel compliance with the Act. The court ordered the review, which found the treatment necessary. While the suit was pending, Moran had the surgery and amended her complaint to seek reimbursement. Rush removed the case to federal court, arguing that the amended complaint stated a claim for ERISA benefits. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals found Moran's reimbursement claim preempted by ERISA so as to place the case in federal court, but it concluded that the Act was not preempted as a state law that "relates to" an employee benefit plan because it also "regulates insurance" under ERISA's saving clause.</p>
| 1,221 | 5 | 4 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | Federalism |
1,385 | 54,975 | Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Mineta | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/00-730 | 00-730 | 2001 | Adarand Constructors, Inc. | Mineta | <p>In 1995, the U.S. Supreme Court, in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, held that strict scrutiny governs whether race-based classifications violate the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause (Adarand I). The Court then remanded the case for a determination whether the race-based components of the U.S. Department of Transportation's (DOT) Disadvantaged Business Enterprise (DBE) program could withstand this standard of review. Ultimately, the Court remanded Adarand for a second time for a determination on the merits consistent with Adarand I. When the Court of Appeals held, that by virtue of a new regulatory framework under which the DOT's state and local DBE program now operated, that program passed constitutional muster, the Court again certiorari to decide whether the Court of Appeals misapplied the strict scrutiny standard announced in Adarand I.</p>
| 915 | 9 | 0 | false | per curiam | null | Judicial Power |
1,386 | 54,976 | Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Waffle House, Inc. | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/99-1823 | 99-1823 | 2001 | Equal Employment Opportunity Commission | Waffle House, Inc. | <p>Waffle House, Inc.'s employees must each sign an agreement requiring employment disputes to be settled by binding arbitration. After he suffered a seizure and was fired by Waffle House, Eric Baker filed a discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) alleging that his discharge violated Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA). The EEOC then filed suit, alleging that Baker?s discharge violated the ADA, and sought injunctive relief and specific relief for Baker, including backpay, reinstatement, and compensatory damages, and punitive damages for malicious and reckless conduct. Under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), Waffle House petitioned to stay the EEOC's suit and compel arbitration. The District Court did not stay the action. The Court of Appeals concluded that the arbitration agreement between Baker and Waffle House did not foreclose the enforcement action because the EEOC was not a party to the contract, but had independent statutory authority to bring suit in any federal district court where venue was proper. The appellate court also held that the EEOC was limited to injunctive relief.</p>
| 1,169 | 6 | 3 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Unions |
1,387 | 54,977 | Horn v. Banks | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/01-1385 | 01-1385 | 2001 | Horn | Banks | <p>George Banks was convicted of 12 counts of first-degree murder. After Banks' direct appeal was denied, the U.S. Supreme Court decided in Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, that the Constitution prohibits a state from requiring jurors unanimously to agree that a particular mitigating circumstance exists before they are permitted to consider that circumstance in their sentencing determination. Under this new case law, Mills argued that the jurors in his trial were instructed improperly. Custodial officials argued that the law was not applicable retroactively on habeas corpus review. Ultimately, because the Pennsylvania Supreme Court did not rule on retroactivity, the Federal Court of Appeals concluded that the State Supreme Court had unreasonably applied federal law in evaluating Banks' claim that his penalty phase jury instructions and verdict forms were improper under Mills without evaluating retroactivity.</p>
| 926 | 9 | 0 | true | per curiam | reversed/remanded | Criminal Procedure |
1,388 | 54,978 | Great-West Life and Annuity Insurance Company v. Knudson | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/99-1786 | 99-1786 | 2001 | Great-West Life and Annuity Insurance Company | Knudson | <p>In 1992, a car accident rendered Janette Knudson a quadriplegic. At that time, Knudson was covered by the Health and Welfare Plan for Employees and Dependents of Earth Systems, Inc. (the Plan), which covered $411,157.11 of her medical expenses, most of which were paid by Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance Co. The Plan contains a reimbursement provision, which gives it the right to recover from a beneficiary any payment for benefits paid by the Plan that the beneficiary is entitled to recover from a third party. After Knudson filed a state-court tort action to recover from the manufacturer of her car and others, she negotiated a settlement that earmarked $13,828.70 to satisfy Great-West's reimbursement claim. Great-West then filed an action under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) to enforce the Plan's reimbursement provision by requiring Knudson to pay the Plan $411,157.11 of any proceeds recovered from third parties. The District Court granted Knudson summary judgment. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that that judicially decreed reimbursement for payments made to a beneficiary of an insurance plan by a third party is not equitable relief authorized by ERISA.</p>
| 1,223 | 5 | 4 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | Economic Activity |
1,389 | 54,979 | Carey v. Saffold | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/01-301 | 01-301 | 2001 | Carey | Saffold | <p>The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) requires a state prisoner seeking federal habeas relief to file his petition within one year after his state conviction becomes final, but excludes from that period the time during which an application for state collateral review is pending. In 1990, Tony Saffold was convicted and sentenced in California state court for murder, assault with a firearm, and robbery. Saffold filed a state habeas petition in California seven days before the federal deadline. Five days after the state trial court denied his petition, Saffold filed a further petition in the State Court of Appeal. Four and one-half months after that petition was denied, Saffold filed a further petition in the State Supreme Court, which denied the petition on the merits and for lack of diligence. The Federal District Court dismissed Saffold's subsequent federal habeas petition as untimely, finding that the federal statute of limitations was not tolled during the intervals between the denial of one state petition and the filing of the next because no application was pending during that time. In reversing, the Court of Appeals found that Saffold's petition was timely because the State Supreme Court based its decision not only on lack of diligence, but also on the merits.</p>
| 1,321 | 5 | 4 | true | majority opinion | vacated/remanded | Criminal Procedure |
1,390 | 54,980 | Porter v. Nussle | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/00-853 | 00-853 | 2001 | Porter | Nussle | <p>In 1999, Ronald Nussle, an inmate at the Cheshire Correctional Institution in Connecticut, filed a federal action under 42 USC section 1983, charging that certain correction officers had subjected him to a sustained pattern of harassment and intimidation and had singled him out for a severe beating in violation of the Eighth Amendment. In doing so, Nussle did not file a grievance under the applicable Connecticut Department of Correction procedures. Based on the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA), the District Court dismissed the suit, finding that PLRA directs that "No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983...or any other Federal law, by a prisoner...until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted." In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required for a claim of the kind Nussle asserted. Citing legislative history, the appellate court found that the phrase "prisons conditions" covers only conditions affecting prisoners generally, not single incidents that immediately affect only particular prisoners.</p>
| 1,138 | 9 | 0 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Judicial Power |
1,391 | 54,981 | TRW Inc. v. Andrews | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/00-1045 | 00-1045 | 2001 | TRW Inc. | Andrews | <p>In 1993, while at a doctor's office in California, Adelaide Andrews filled out a form listing her name, Social Security number, and other basic information. An office receptionist named Andrea Andrews copied the data and later moved to Las Vegas, where she attempted to open credit accounts using Adelaide's Social Security number and her own last name and address. Thereafter, TRW Inc. furnished copies of Adelaide's credit report to companies from which Andrea sought credit. In 1996, Adelaide filed suit, alleging that TRW had violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) by failing to verify predisclosure of her credit report to third parties. TRW moved for partial summary judgment, arguing that the FCRA's statute of limitations had expired on Adelaide's claims stemming from TRW's first two disclosures because both occurred more than two years before she brought suit. Adelaide countered that the limitations period on those claims did not commence until she discovered the disclosures. The District Court held the two claims time-barred. In reversing, the Court of Appeals applied what it considered to be a general federal rule that a statute of limitations starts running when a party knows or has reason to know she was injured, unless Congress expressly legislates otherwise.</p>
| 1,298 | 9 | 0 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Economic Activity |
1,392 | 54,983 | Ring v. Arizona | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/01-488 | 01-488 | 2001 | Ring | Arizona | <p>At Timothy Ring's trial for murder, the jury deadlocked on premeditated murder, but found Ring guilty of felony murder occurring in the course of armed robbery. Under Arizona law, Ring could not be sentenced to death, unless further findings were made by a judge conducting a separate sentencing hearing and only if the judge finds at least one aggravating circumstance and no mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for leniency. Because the jury had convicted Ring of felony murder, not premeditated murder, Ring would be eligible for the death penalty only if he was the victim's actual killer. Citing accomplice testimony at the sentencing hearing, the judge found that Ring was the killer. The judge then found two aggravating factors, one of them being that the offense was committed for pecuniary gain, as well as one mitigating factor, Ring's minimal criminal record, and ruled that the latter did not call for leniency.</p>
| 954 | 7 | 2 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Criminal Procedure |
1,393 | 54,982 | Barnhart v. Walton | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/00-1937 | 00-1937 | 2001 | Barnhart | Walton | <p>The Social Security Act authorizes payment of Title II disability insurance benefits and Title XVI Supplemental Security Income to individuals who have an "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable...impairment...which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." After developing a serious mental illness, Cleveland Walton lost his job as a teacher in October 1994. Eleven moths later, Walton was working as a cashier. When Walton applied for Title II disability insurance benefits and Title XVI Supplemental Security Income, the Social Security Administration denied him benefits, reasoning that his "inability" to engage in substantial gainful activity lasted only 11 months. The District Court affirmed. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that the 12-month duration requirement modifies "impairment" not "inability," that no similar duration requirement relates to an "inability," and that, therefore, Walton was entitled to benefits despite regulations restricting them to those unable to work for 12 months. Further, the appellate court concluded that Walton qualified for benefits since, prior to his return to work, his "inability" would have been "expected" to last 12 months.</p>
| 1,298 | 9 | 0 | true | majority opinion | reversed | Civil Rights |
1,394 | 54,985 | Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/00-1595 | 00-1595 | 2001 | Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. | National Labor Relations Board | <p>Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. hired Jose Castro on the basis of documents appearing to verify his authorization to work in the United States. After Castro engaged in union-organizing activities, Hoffman laid him off. The National Labor Relations Board (Board) found that the layoff violated the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) and ordered backpay for Castro. At a compliance hearing, Castor testified before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) that he was born in Mexico, that he had never been legally admitted to, or authorized to work in, this country, and that he gained employment with Hoffman only after tendering a birth certificate that was not his. The ALJ found that Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), which makes it unlawful for employers knowingly to hire undocumented workers or for employees to use fraudulent documents to establish employment eligibility, precluded Castro's award. In reversing, the Board noted that the most effective way to further the immigration policies embodied in IRCA is to provide the NLRA's protections and remedies to undocumented workers in the same manner as to other employees. The Court of Appeals enforced the Board's order.</p>
| 1,200 | 5 | 4 | true | majority opinion | reversed | Civil Rights |
1,395 | 54,986 | Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Company, Inc. | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/00-1307 | 00-1307 | 2001 | Barnhart | Sigmon Coal Company, Inc. | <p>The Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefit Act of 1992 restructured the system for providing private health care benefits to coal industry retirees by merging two previous benefits plans into the United Mine Workers of America Combined Benefit Fund. The fund is financed by annual premiums assessed against signatory coal operators, or those who signed any agreement requiring contributions to the plans that were merged into the Fund. If the signatory is no longer in business, the Act assigns liability for beneficiaries to a defined group of "related persons" based on the Commissioner of Social Security assignments. Shortly after Jericol Mining Co. was formed in 1973 as Irdell Mining, Inc., Irdell purchased the coal mining operating assets of Shackleford Coal Co., which was a signatory to a coal wage agreement while it was in business. Between 1993 and 1997, the Commissioner assigned responsibility for 86 retired miners to Jericol, determining that as a successor in interest to Shackleford, Jericol qualified as a related person. All of these retirees had worked for Shackleford, but none of them had actually worked for Jericol. Jericol filed suit against the Commissioner. The District Court granted Jericol summary judgment, concluding that the Act's classification regime does not provide for the liability of successors of defunct signatory operators. In affirming, the Court of Appeals concluded that Jericol was not a related person to Shackleford and thus could not be held responsible for Shackleford's miners.</p>
| 1,537 | 6 | 3 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | Economic Activity |
1,396 | 54,987 | Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Systems, Inc. | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/01-408 | 01-408 | 2001 | Holmes Group, Inc. | Vornado Air Circulation Systems, Inc. | <p>Vornado Air Circulation Systems, Inc., is a manufacturer of patented fans and heaters. In 1992, Vornado sued Duracraft Corp., claiming that Duracraft's use of a spiral grill design in its fans infringed Vornado's trade dress. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals found that Vornado had no protectible trade-dress rights in the grill design. Later, Vornado filed a complaint with the U.S. International Trade Commission, claiming that Holmes Group, Inc.'s sale of fans and heaters with a spiral grill design infringed Vornado's trade dress. Subsequently, Holmes filed a federal-court action, seeking a declaratory judgment that its products did not infringe Vornado's trade dress and an injunction restraining Vornado from accusing it of such infringement. In response, Vornado asserted a compulsory patent-infringement counterclaim. The District Court ruled in Holmes's favor. Vornado appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which, notwithstanding Holmes's challenge to its jurisdiction, vacated the District Court's judgment and remanded the case.</p>
| 1,070 | 9 | 0 | true | majority opinion | vacated/remanded | Judicial Power |
1,397 | 54,988 | Kansas v. Crane | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/00-957 | 00-957 | 2001 | Kansas | Crane | <p>In 1997, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act in Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346. In doing so, the Court characterized a dangerous sexual offender's confinement as civil rather than criminal and held that the confinement criterion embodied in the statute's words -- "mental abnormality or personality disorder" -- satisfied substantive due process. When the state of Kansas filed a petition in a Kansas district court to have Michael T. Crane, a previously convicted sexual offender, committed, the Kansas District Court ordered his civil commitment. In reversing, the State Supreme Court concluded that Hendricks requires a finding that the defendant cannot control his dangerous behavior even if, as provided by Kansas law, problems of emotional, and not volitional, capacity prove the source of behavior warranting commitment. The trial court had made no such finding.</p>
| 940 | 7 | 2 | true | majority opinion | vacated/remanded | Due Process |
1,398 | 54,990 | United States v. Fior D'Italia, Inc. | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/01-463 | 01-463 | 2001 | United States | Fior D'Italia, Inc. | <p>Employers must pay Federal Insurance Contribution Act (FICA) taxes, calculated as a percentage of the wages, including tips, that their employees receive. In 1991 and 1992, Fior D'Italia restaurant paid FICA taxes based on the tip amount its employees reported, but the reports also showed that the tips listed on customers' credit card slips far exceeded the reported amount. The IRS made a compliance check and assessed additional FICA taxes using an "aggregate estimation" method, under which it examined the credit card slips; found the average percentage tip paid by those customers; assumed that cash-paying customers paid at same rate; calculated total tips by multiplying the tip rates by Fior D'Italia's total receipts; subtracted the tips already reported; applied the FICA tax rate to the remainder; and assessed additional taxes owed. Fior D'Italia filed a refund suit, claiming that the tax statutes did not authorize the IRS to use the aggregate estimation method. The District Court ruled for Fior D'Italia, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.</p>
| 1,065 | 6 | 3 | true | majority opinion | reversed | Federal Taxation |
1,399 | 54,992 | United States v. Arvizu | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/00-1519 | 00-1519 | 2001 | United States | Arvizu | <p>In 1998, Ralph Arvizu was stopped by Border Patrol Agent Clinton Stoddard while driving on an unpaved road in a remote area of southeastern Arizona. A number of factors prompted Stoddard to stop Arvizu, including his slowing down, his failure to acknowledge the agent, the raised position of the children's knees, and their odd waving. After receiving permission to search the vehicle, Stoddard found more than 100 pounds of marijuana. Arvizu was charged with possession with intent to distribute. Arvizu moved to suppress the marijuana, arguing among other things that Stoddard did not have reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle as required by the Fourth Amendment. Denying the motion, the District Court cited a number of facts that gave Stoddard reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle, including its location. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that the District Court relied on factors that carried little or no weight in reasonable-suspicion calculus and that the remaining factors were not enough to render the stop permissible. In the appellate court's view, fact-specific weighing of circumstances or other multifactor tests introduced uncertainty and unpredictability into the Fourth Amendment analysis, making it necessary to clearly delimit the factors that an officer may consider in making stops such as this one.</p>
| 1,344 | 9 | 0 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Criminal Procedure |
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