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33. Beginning on or about November 2016 through on or about February 2019, Defendants employed Plaintiff as a non-exempt, hourly-paid employee. 34. Plaintiff’s duties included bartending, taking food orders, and preparing drinks for customers. 35. Plaintiff, for some or all of the relevant time period, was not paid an hourly wage based on the minimum wage for the work performed. 36. Plaintiff and those similarly situated to him were/are entitled to at least the Federal minimum wage pursuant to §206(a) of the FLSA. 37. Plaintiff and those similarly situated to him were/are entitled to the Florida minimum wage pursuant to §29 C.F.R §778.5. 38. Plaintiff worked for Defendants in excess of forty (40) hours within one or more workweeks. 39. In one or more work weeks during their employment, Defendants failed to compensate Plaintiff, at rate of one and one-half times their regular rate for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours in a single work week. 43. As part of the regular business practices, Defendants have intentionally, willfully and repeatedly harmed Plaintiff and Class Members by engaging in a pattern, practice, or policy of violating the FLSA on a class wide basis, as described above. 44. Although Defendants permitted and/or required Class Members to work in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek, Defendants denied them full compensation for their hours worked over forty. Defendants have also denied them full compensation at the federally mandated minimum wage rate. 45. Class Members perform or have performed the same or similar work as Plaintiffs. In particular, Plaintiffs and Class Members all worked as employees under the same conditions and subject to the same violations of the FLSA. 46. Many Class Members regularly work or have worked in excess of forty (40) hours during a workweek. 47. Class Members are not exempt from receiving overtime pay and/or minimum wage at the federally mandated minimum wage rate under the FLSA. 48. As such, Class Members are similar to Plaintiffs in terms of job duties, pay structure, and/or the denial of overtime and minimum wage. 49. Defendants’ failure to pay overtime compensation and hours worked at the minimum wage rate required by the FLSA results from generally applicable policies or practices, and does not depend on the personal circumstances of the Class Members. 51. The experience of Plaintiffs, with respect to their job duties, is typical of the experiences of Class Members. 52. The specific job titles or precise job responsibilities of each Class Member does not prevent collective treatment. 53. All Class Members, irrespective of their particular job requirements, are entitled to overtime compensation for hours worked in excess of forty during a workweek. 54. All Class Members, irrespective of their particular job requirements, are entitled to compensation for hours worked at the federally mandated minimum wage rate. 55. Although the exact amount of damages may vary among Class Members, the damages for Class Members can be easily calculated by a formula. The claims of all Class Members arise from a common nucleus of facts. Liability is based on a systematic course of wrongful conduct by Defendants that caused harm to all Class Members. 56. The Plaintiff and the Class Members held the same job title: restaurant employees. 57. As such, the class of similarly situated Plaintiff is properly defined as follows: The FLSA Collective Members are all of Defendants’ current and former restaurant employees who worked at PMB and ASPIS at any time during the three years before this Complaint was filed up to the present. 58. Plaintiff reincorporates and readopts all allegations contained within Paragraphs 1-57 above. 59. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and those similarly situated, was entitled to be paid by Defendants the proper minimum wage for each hour worked per workweek. 61. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and those similarly situated, have not been paid the applicable wage for each hour worked during their employment. 62. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ deliberate nonpayment of wages, Plaintiff, and those similarly situated, have been damaged in the loss of minimum wages, plus incurring reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 63. Defendants’ actions were willful and/or showed reckless disregard for the provisions of the FLSA as evidenced by its failure to compensate Plaintiff minimum wage. 64. Defendants’ conduct was not in good faith, and Plaintiff and those similarly situated are therefore entitled to liquidated damages. 66. Plaintiffs reincorporate and readopt all allegations contained within Paragraphs 1- 57 as if fully set forth herein. 67. From at least January 2019 and continuing through approximately February 2019, Plaintiff, and those similarly situated, worked in excess of the forty (40) hours per week for which Plaintiff was not compensated at the statutory rate of one and one-half times Plaintiff’s regular rate of pay. 69. At all times material hereto, Defendants failed and continue to fail, to maintain proper time records as mandated by the FLSA. 70. Defendants’ actions in this regard were willful and/or showed reckless disregard for the provisions of the FLSA as evidenced by its continued failure to compensate Plaintiff at the statutory rate of one and one-half times Plaintiff’s regular rate of pay for the hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours per weeks when they knew, or should have known, such was, and is due. 71. Defendants have failed to properly disclose or apprise Plaintiff of Plaintiff’s rights under the FLSA. 72. Due to the intentional, willful, and unlawful acts of the Defendants, Plaintiff suffered and continued to suffer damages and lost compensation for time worked over forty (40) hours per week, plus liquidated damages. FAILURE TO PAY OVERTIME COMPENSATION IN VIOLATION OF 29 U.S.C. §207 RECOVERY OF MINIMUM WAGE COMPENSATION

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1. a statement that the recipient is legally entitled to opt-out of receiving future faxed advertisements – knowing that he or she has the legal right to request an opt-out gives impetus for recipients to make such a request, if desired; 13. On information and belief, between October, 2014 and January, 2015, Defendants transmitted by telephone facsimile machine a facsimile to Plaintiff. A copy of the facsimile is attached hereto as Exhibit A. 14. On information and belief, Defendants receive some or all of the revenues from the sale of the products, goods and services advertised on Exhibit A. On information and belief, Defendants profit and benefit from the sale of the products, goods and services advertised on Exhibit A. 15. Plaintiff had not invited or given permission to Defendants to send the fax. 16. On information and belief, Defendants faxed the same and other unsolicited facsimiles without the required opt-out language to Plaintiff and more than 25 other recipients or sent the same and other advertisements by fax with the required opt-out language but without first receiving the recipients’ express permission or invitation. 17. There is no reasonable means for Plaintiff (or any other class member) to avoid receiving unauthorized faxes. Fax machines are left on and ready to receive the urgent communications their owners desire to receive. 19. In accordance with F. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1), (b)(2) and (b)(3), Plaintiff brings this class action pursuant to the JFPA, on behalf of the following class of persons: All persons who (1) on or after four years prior to the filing of this action, (2) were sent telephone facsimile messages of material advertising the commercial availability of any property, goods, or services by or on behalf of Defendants, and (3) which Defendants did not have prior express permission or invitation, or (4) which did not display a proper opt-out notice. Excluded from the Class are the Defendants, their employees, agents and members of the Judiciary. Plaintiff reserves the right to amend the class definition upon completion of class certification discovery. 2. a statement that the sender must honor a recipient’s opt-out request within 30 days and the sender’s failure to do so is unlawful – thereby encouraging recipients to opt-out, if they did not want future faxes, by advising them that their opt-out requests will have legal “teeth”; 20. Class Size (F. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1)): Plaintiff is informed and believes, and upon such information and belief avers, that the number of persons and entities of the Plaintiff Class is numerous and joinder of all members is impracticable. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and upon such information and belief avers, that the number of class members is at least forty. 22. Typicality (F. R. Civ. P. 23 (a) (3)): The Plaintiff's claims are typical of the claims of all class members. The Plaintiff received the same faxes as the faxes sent by or on behalf of the Defendants advertising goods and services of the Defendants during the Class Period. The Plaintiff is making the same claims and seeking the same relief for itself and all class members based upon the same federal statute. The Defendants have acted in the same or in a similar manner with respect to the Plaintiff and all the class members by sending Plaintiff and each member of the class the same faxes. 24. Need for Consistent Standards and Practical Effect of Adjudication (F. R. Civ. P. 23 (b) (1)): Class certification is appropriate because the prosecution of individual actions by class members would: (a) create the risk of inconsistent adjudications that could establish incompatible standards of conduct for the Defendants, and/or (b) as a practical matter, adjudication of the Plaintiff's claims will be dispositive of the interests of class members who are not parties. 25. Common Conduct (F. R. Civ. P. 23 (b) (2)): Class certification is also appropriate because the Defendants have acted and refused to act in the same or similar manner with respect to all class members thereby making injunctive and declaratory relief appropriate. The Plaintiff demands such relief as authorized by 47 U.S.C. §227. 27. The JFPA makes it unlawful for any person to “use any telephone facsimile machine, computer or other device to send, to a telephone facsimile machine, an unsolicited advertisement . . . .” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C). 29. Opt-Out Notice Requirements. The JFPA strengthened the prohibitions against the sending of unsolicited advertisements by requiring, in § (b)(1)(C)(iii) of the Act, that senders of faxed advertisements place a clear and conspicuous notice on the first page of the transmission that contains the following among other things (hereinafter collectively the “Opt-Out Notice Requirements”): 31. The Fax. Defendants sent the between October, 2014 and January, 2015, advertisement via facsimile transmission from telephone facsimile machines, computers, or other devices to the telephone lines and facsimile machines of Plaintiff and members of the Plaintiff Class. The Fax constituted an advertisement under the Act. Defendants failed to comply with the Opt-Out Requirements in connection with the Fax. The Fax was transmitted to persons or entities without their prior express permission or invitation and/or Defendants are precluded from asserting any prior express permission or invitation because of the failure to comply with the Opt-Out Notice Requirements. By virtue thereof, Defendants violated the JFPA and the regulations promulgated thereunder by sending the Fax via facsimile transmission to Plaintiff and members of the Class. 33. The TCPA/JFPA provides a private right of action to bring this action on behalf of Plaintiff and the Plaintiff Class to redress Defendants’ violations of the Act, and provides for statutory damages. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3). The Act also provides that injunctive relief is appropriate. Id. 34. The JFPA is a strict liability statute, so the Defendants are liable to the Plaintiff and the other class members even if their actions were only negligent. 36. The Defendants’ actions caused damages to the Plaintiff and the other class members. Receiving the Defendants’ junk faxes caused the recipients to lose paper and toner consumed in the printing of the Defendants’ faxes. Moreover, the Defendants’ faxes used the Plaintiff's and the other class members’ telephone lines and fax machine. The Defendants’ faxes cost the Plaintiff and the other class members time, as the Plaintiff and the other class members and their employees wasted their time receiving, reviewing and routing the Defendants’ unauthorized faxes. That time otherwise would have been spent on the Plaintiff's and the other class members’ business activities. The Defendants’ faxes unlawfully interrupted the Plaintiff's and other class members' privacy interests in being left alone. Finally, the injury and property damage sustained by Plaintiff and the other class members from the sending of Defendants’ advertisements occurred outside of Defendants’ premises. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, JWD AUTOMOTIVE, INC. d/b/a NAPA AUTO CARE OF CAPE CORAL, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, demands judgment in its favor and against Defendants, DJM ADVISORY GROUP LLC, BANNER LIFE

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12. Plaintiff brings claims for relief as a collective action pursuant to FLSA Section 16(b), 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), on behalf of all current and former non-exempt employees (including waiters, runners, bussers, and bartenders) employed by Defendants on or after the date that is six (6) years before the filing of the Complaint in this case as defined herein (“FLSA Collective Plaintiffs”). 13. At all relevant times, Plaintiff and the other FLSA Collective Plaintiffs are and have been similarly situated, have had substantially similar job requirements and pay provisions, and are and have been subjected to Defendants’ decisions, policies, plans, programs, practices, procedures, protocols, routines, and rules, all culminating in a willful failure and refusal to pay them proper compensation for all hours worked. A subclass of tipped employees employed as bartenders also have a claim for illegally retained gratuities. The claims of Plaintiff, stated herein, is essentially the same as those of the other FLSA Collective Plaintiffs. 14. The claims for relief are properly brought under and maintained as an opt-in collective action pursuant to §16(b) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. 216(b). The FLSA Collective Plaintiffs are readily ascertainable. For purposes of notice and other purposes related to this action, their names and addresses are readily available from the Defendants. Notice can be provided to the FLSA Collective Plaintiffs via first class mail to the last address known to Defendants. 16. All said persons, including Plaintiff, are referred to herein as the “Class.” The Class members are readily ascertainable. The number and identity of the Class members are determinable from the records of Defendants. The hours assigned and worked, the position held, and rates of pay for each Class member may also be determinable from Defendants’ records. For purposes of notice and other purposes related to this action, their names and addresses are readily available from Defendants. Notice can be provided by means permissible under F.R.C.P. 23. 17. The proposed Class is so numerous such that a joinder of all members is impracticable and the disposition of their claims as a class will benefit the parties and the Court. Although the precise number of such persons is unknown because the facts on which the calculation of that number rests presently within the sole control of Defendants, there is no doubt that there are more than forty (40) members of the Class. The Class further includes a subclass of tipped employees comprised of amongst others, bartenders, (“Tipped Subclass”) who also number more than forty (40). Plaintiff, RICARDO BARCENAS, is a member of both the Class and the Tipped Subclass. 18. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of those claims that could be alleged by any member of the Class, and the relief sought is typical of the relief, that would be sought by each member of the Class in separate actions. All Class members were subject to Defendants’ corporate practices of (i) failing to pay proper compensation for all hours worked, (ii) failure to pay proper overtime (ii) illegally retaining gratuities, (iii) failing to provide wage statements per requirements of the NYLL and (iv) failing to properly provide wage notices to Class members, at date of hiring and annually, per requirements of the New York Labor Law. 20. Defendants’ corporate-wide policies and practices affected all Class members, similarly, and Defendants benefited from the same type of unfair and/or wrongful acts as to each class member. Plaintiff and other Class members sustained similar losses, injuries and damage arising from the same unlawful policies, practices and procedures. 21. Plaintiff is able to fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class and has no interests antagonistic to the Class. Plaintiff is represented by attorneys who are experienced and competent in both class action litigation and employment litigation and have previously represented plaintiffs in wage and hour cases. 23. Defendants and other employers throughout the state violate the New York Labor Law. Current employees are often afraid to assert their rights out of fear of direct or indirect retaliation. Former employees are fearful of bringing claims because doing so can harm their employment, future employment, and future efforts to secure employment. Class actions provide class members who are not named in the Complaint a degree of anonymity, which allows for the vindication of their rights while eliminating or reducing these risks. 27. Plaintiff, a subclass of FLSA Collective Plaintiffs and the Tipped Subclass suffered from Defendants’ wrongful claim of a tip credit in excess of statutory allowances. 28. Plaintiff, a subclass of FLSA Collective Plaintiffs and the Tipped Subclass suffered from Defendants’ illegal retention of gratuities. Defendants implemented a policy at the Restaurant where Defendants collected and retained all tips and then re-distributed them. However, when Defendants distributed the tips to the Tipped Subclass were always short. As a result, Defendants illegally retained tips from Plaintiffs, a subclass of FLSA Collective Plaintiffs and the Tipped Subclass. 30. Defendants failed to provide Plaintiffs and the Class members with proper wage notices at hiring and annually thereafter. Plaintiffs did not receive proper wage notices either upon being hired or annually since the date of hiring in violation of the New York Labor Law. 31. Plaintiffs and Class members received wage statements that were not in compliance with the New York Labor Law. Defendants are required to provide itemized listings of deductions taken on a wage statement with every payment of wages. Defendants failed to satisfy the requirements under the NYLL because the wage statements did not clearly include tip credit allowance for each payment period. Plaintiffs and Class members also received fraudulent wage statements that failed to accurately reflect the number of hours worked and their proper compensation, including tips illegally withheld from Plaintiffs and the Tipped Subclass. 32. Defendants knowingly and willfully operated their business with a policy of not paying the New York State minimum wage to Plaintiff, FLSA Collective Plaintiffs and Class members. Defendants were not entitled to claim any tip credits under the FLSA or NYLL. 33. Defendants knowingly and willfully operated their business with a policy of failing to pay Plaintiffs, FLSA Collective Plaintiffs and Class members for all hours worked. 34. Defendants knowingly and willfully operated their business with a policy of claiming an invalid meal credit in violation of the New York Labor Law. 35. Defendant knowingly and willfully operated their business with a policy and practice that deducted and failed to reimburse or compensate Plaintiffs, FLSA Collective Plaintiffs and Class members for mandatory uniform purchases. 37. Defendants knowingly and willfully operated their business with a policy of not providing employees proper wage statements as required under the New York Labor Law. 38. Defendants knowingly and willfully operated their business with a policy of not providing a proper wage notice to Plaintiffs and Class members at the beginning of employment and annually thereafter, in violation of the NYLL. 39. Plaintiffs retained Lee Litigation Group, PLLC to represent Plaintiffs, FLSA Collective Plaintiffs and Class members, in this litigation and have agreed to pay the firm a reasonable fee for its services. 40. Plaintiffs reallege and reaver Paragraphs 1 through 39 of this Class and Collective Action Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 41. At all relevant times, Defendants were and continue to be employers engaged in interstate commerce and/or the production of goods for commerce within the meaning of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(a) and 207 (a). Further, Plaintiffs and FLSA Collective Plaintiffs are covered individuals within the meaning of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(a) and 207 (a). 42. At all relevant times, Defendants employed Plaintiffs and FLSA Collective Plaintiffs within the meaning of the FLSA. 43. At all relevant times, Corporate Defendant had gross annual revenues in excess of $500,000.00. 45. Plaintiffs are in possession of certain records concerning the number of hours worked by Plaintiffs and FLSA Collective Plaintiffs and the actual compensation paid to Plaintiffs and FLSA Collective Plaintiffs. Further records concerning these matters should be in the possession and custody of the Defendants. Plaintiffs intend to obtain all records by appropriate discovery proceedings to be taken promptly in this case and, if necessary, will then seek leave of Court to amend this Complaint to set forth the precise amount due. 46. Defendants failed to properly disclose or apprise Plaintiffs and FLSA Collective Plaintiffs of their rights under the FLSA. 47. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ willful disregard of the FLSA, Plaintiffs and FLSA Collective Plaintiffs are entitled to liquidated (i.e., double) damages pursuant to the FLSA. 48. Due to the intentional, willful and unlawful acts of Defendants, Plaintiffs and FLSA Collective Plaintiffs suffered damages in an amount not presently ascertainable of unpaid wages, damages representing disgorgement of illegally retained tips, and an equal amount as liquidated damages. 49. Plaintiffs and FLSA Collective Plaintiffs are entitled to an award of their reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §216(b). 50. Plaintiffs reallege and reaver Paragraphs 1 through 49 of this Class and Collective Action Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 52. Defendants willfully violated Plaintiffs’ and Class members’ rights by failing to pay them proper wages in the lawful amount for hours worked. Defendants were not entitled to claim any tip credits. 53. Defendants willfully violated Plaintiffs’ and the Class members’ rights by illegally retaining gratuities. 54. Defendants knowingly and willfully operated their business with a policy of not providing wage notices and wage statements as required under the New York Labor Law. 55. Due to the Defendants’ New York Labor Law violations, Plaintiffs and Class members are entitled to recover from Defendants their unpaid wage due to an invalid tip credit, disgorgement of illegally retained tips, reasonable attorneys’ fees, liquidated damages, statutory penalties and costs and disbursements of the action, pursuant to New York Labor Law. VIOLATION OF THE NEW YORK LABOR LAW VIOLATION OF THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT

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31. Mercy Health (formerly Catholic Health Partners) purports to be a Catholic health organization, supervising market delivery systems consisting of hospitals, physician clinics, and other organizations providing health-related services. 32. Mercy Health employs 32,000 employees and is the fourth largest employer in Ohio. 33. Mercy Health renders services to patients under contractual arrangements with the Medicare and Medicaid programs. Payment for the majority of Medicare and Medicaid services is based on a prospectively determined fixed price, according to a patient classification system, based on clinical and other diagnostic factors. Case: 1:16-cv-00726-SKB Doc #: 1 Filed: 06/30/16 Page: 8 of 25 PAGEID #: 8 9 34. Contractual adjustments for the Medicare and Medicaid programs are recognized when the related patient service revenue is reported in the consolidated financial statements. These contractual adjustments represent the difference between established rates and the prospectively determined payments and amounts reimbursed. Amounts earned under these contractual arrangements are subject to review and final determination by Medicare and Medicaid intermediaries and other appropriate governmental authorities or their agents, and may be adjusted in future periods as settlements are determined. 35. The executive leadership structure at Mercy Health is not controlled by a church. The leadership is comprised of the following lay persons: John M. Starcher, Jr. (President and CEO of Mercy Health); Drew Banks (Chief Strategy Officer); Michael Bezney (Chief Legal Officer and General Counsel); Debbie Bloomfield (Chief Financial Officer); Randy Curnow, MD (Chief Medical Officer and President, Mercy Health Select); Joe Gage (Chief Human Resources Officer); Sr. Kathy Green (Chief Mission and Values Officer); Anton Decker, MBBCh (Chief Clinical Officer and President, Mercy Health Physicians); Dave Nowiski (CFO, Mercy Health Physicians and Mercy Health Select); Matt Love (SVP and Regional CFO); Todd Lupton (SVP and Regional CFO); Brian Smith (Chief Operating Officer); Imran Andrabi, MD (CEO, Mercy Health – Toledo Region Senior Vice President, Mercy Health); Bob Baxter (CEO, Mercy Health – Lima Region Senior Vice President, Mercy Health); Mike Garfield (CEO, Mercy Health – Cincinnati Region Senior Vice President, Mercy Health); Steve Grinnell (CEO, Mercy Health – Paducah Region Senior Vice President, Mercy Health); Paul Hiltz (CEO, Mercy Health – Springfield Region Senior Vice President, Mercy Health); Don Kline (CEO, Mercy Health – Youngstown Region, Senior Vice President, Mercy Health); and Ed Oley (CEO, Mercy Health – Lorain Region Senior Vice President, Mercy Health). Case: 1:16-cv-00726-SKB Doc #: 1 Filed: 06/30/16 Page: 9 of 25 PAGEID #: 9 10 36. The Mercy Health Corporate Board of Trustees is not controlled by a church. The Mercy Health Corporate Board of Trustees provides overall system direction, approves appointments to regional boards, and appoints and evaluates the system CEO. It approves system and regional strategic and financial plans. It also is responsible for mergers, acquisitions, divestitures and dissolutions of subsidiaries; approves debt and expenditures in excess of the amount authorized for the CEO; and annually appoints an external auditing firm. The Mercy Health Corporate Board of Trustees is comprised of the following:  Katherine A. Arbuckle, CPA;  Michael D. Connelly, M.A., J.D., FACHE;  Sister Doris Gottemoeller, RSM;  Lawrence L. Grypp;  George J. Isham, MD, MS;  Catherine A. Jacobson, FHFMA, C.P.A.;  Denise Koo, MD, MPH;  David C. Leach, M.D.;  Joel A. Levine, J.D.;  Iliana A. Mora;  Sister Jean Orsuto, HM, R.N., M.S.N.;  Leonard M. Randolph, Jr., M.D., Vice Chair, Board of Trustees;  Donald Rohling;  Fr. Myles N. Sheenan, SJ;  Sister Carol Anne Smith, HM;  Sister Mary Stanton, RSM;  John M. Starcher; and  Katherine W. Vestal, R.N., Ph.D., FAAN, FACHE, Chair, Board of Trustees. 37. The Mercy Health Corporate Board of Trustees is mostly comprised individuals outside the church. 38. Mercy Health is not, and does not claim to be, a church. 39. Under Section 3(33)(A) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1002(33)(A), a plan must be both established and maintained by a church or by a convention or association of churches to qualify for the church plan exemption. Case: 1:16-cv-00726-SKB Doc #: 1 Filed: 06/30/16 Page: 10 of 25 PAGEID #: 10 11 40. The Plan was established by the Company or its predecessors, not by a church or convention or association of churches. 41. The Plan is maintained by the Company, not by a church or convention or association of churches. 42. The principal purpose of Mercy Health is to provide healthcare services, not to operate a pension system. 43. Since the Plan is maintained by a healthcare company, the Plan is not maintained by “an organization … the principal purpose of which is the administration or funding of a plan or program for the provision of retirement benefits….” 11 U.S.C. § 1002 (33)(C)(i). 44. Moreover, the Plan is not maintained for employees of any church or convention or association of churches. It is maintained for employees of the Company -- a hospital system. The Plan Is Not A Church Plan 45. Under section 3(33) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. 1002(33), only the following two types of plans may qualify as a Church Plan:  First, under Section 3(33)(A) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. 1002(33)(A), a plan established and maintained by a church or convention or association of churches, can qualify under certain circumstances and subject to the restrictions of Section 3(33)(B) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. 1002(33)(B); and  Second, under Section 3(33)(C)(i) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. 1002(33)(C)(i), a plan established by a church or by a convention or association of churches that is maintained by an organization, the principal purpose or function of which is the administration or funding of a retirement plan, if such organization is controlled by or associated with a church or convention or Case: 1:16-cv-00726-SKB Doc #: 1 Filed: 06/30/16 Page: 11 of 25 PAGEID #: 11 12 association of churches, can qualify under certain circumstances and subject to the restrictions of Section 3(33)(B) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. 1002(33)(B). Both types of plans must be “established” by a church or by a convention or association of churches in order to qualify as a “Church Plan.” 46. Although other portions of ERISA section 3(33)(C) address, among other matters, who can be participants in a Church Plan — in other words, which employees can be in a Church Plan, these other portions of ERISA Section 3(33)(C) do not add any other type of plan that can be a Church Plan. 29 U.S.C. 1002(33)(C). The only two types of plans that can qualify as a Church Plan are those described in ERISA Section 3(33)(A) and in section 3(33)(C)(i), 29 U.S.C. 3(33)(A) and (C)(i). The Plan here does not qualify as a Church Plan under either ERISA Section 3(33)(A) or Section 3(33)(C)(i), 29 U.S.C. 3(33)(A) or (C)(i). 47. First, under ERISA Section 3(33)(A), a Church Plan is “a plan established and maintained for its employees by a church or by a convention or association of churches which is exempt from tax under Section 501 of title 26.” ERISA 3(33)(A), 29 U.S.C. 1002(33)(A). 48. The Plan at issue here is not and has never been a “Church Plan” as defined in ERISA Section 3(33)(A), 29 U.S.C. 1002(33)(A), because the Plan was established and maintained by Mercy Health for its own employees. Because Mercy Health is not a church or a convention or association of churches, nor does it claim to be, the Plan was not “established and maintained by” a church or a convention or association of churches and was not maintained for employees of a church or a convention or association of churches. That is the end of the inquiry under ERISA Section 61. Plaintiff brings this action as a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of himself and the class (the “Class”) defined as follows: “All participants in and beneficiaries of the Plan. Excluded from the Class are Defendants and any individuals who are subsequently to be determined to be fiduciaries of the Plan.” 62. The members of the Class are so numerous that joinder of all members is impractical. Upon information and belief, the Class includes thousands of persons. 63. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the members of the Class because Plaintiff’s claims, and the claims of all Class members, arise out of the same conduct, policies, and practices of Defendants as alleged herein, and all members of the Class are similarly affected by Defendants’ wrongful conduct. 64. There are questions of law and fact common to the Class, and these questions predominate over questions affecting only individual Class members. Common legal and factual questions include, but are not limited to:  Whether the Plan is covered by ERISA;  Whether the Plan Administrator failed to comply with ERISA’s reporting and disclosure provisions;  Whether the Plan fiduciaries failed to establish a funding policy and fund the Plan in compliance with ERISA; and  Whether the Plan fiduciaries breached their fiduciary duties in failing to comply with the provisions of ERISA set forth above. Case: 1:16-cv-00726-SKB Doc #: 1 Filed: 06/30/16 Page: 16 of 25 PAGEID #: 16 17 65. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent the Class and has retained counsel experienced and competent in the prosecution of ERISA class action litigation. Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to those of other members of the Class. Plaintiff is committed to the vigorous prosecution of this action, and anticipates no difficulty in the management of this litigation as a class action. 66. This action may be properly certified under either subsection of Rule 23(b)(1). Class action status in this action is warranted under Rule 23(b)(1)(A) because prosecution of separate actions by the members of the Class would create a risk of establishing incompatible standards of conduct for Defendants. Class action status is also warranted under Rule 23(b)(1)(B) because prosecution of separate actions by the members of the Class would create a risk of adjudications with respect to individual members of the Class that, as a practical matter, would be dispositive of the interests of other members not parties to this action, or that would substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests. 67. In the alternative, certification under Rule 23(b)(2) is warranted because Defendants have acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive, declaratory, or other appropriate equitable relief with respect to the Class as a whole. 68. In the alternative, certification under Rule 23(b)(3) is also appropriate. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy within the meaning of Rule 23(b) and in consideration of the matters set forth in Rule 23(b)(3)(A)-(D). Because of the amount of the individual Class members’ claims, relative to the complexity of the litigation and the financial resources of Defendants, few, if any, members of the Class would seek legal redress individually for the wrongs complained of herein. The maintenance of separate actions Case: 1:16-cv-00726-SKB Doc #: 1 Filed: 06/30/16 Page: 17 of 25 PAGEID #: 17 18 would place a substantial and unnecessary burden on the courts, and could result in inconsistent adjudications, while a single class action can determine, with judicial economy, the rights of all Class members. Absent a class action, Class members will continue to suffer damages, and Defendants’ misconduct will proceed without remedy. 69. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates herein by reference all prior allegations in this Complaint. 70. ERISA § 502(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3), authorizes a participant or beneficiary to bring a civil action to: “(A) enjoin any act or practice which violates any provision of this title or the terms of the plan, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions of this title or the terms of the plan.” 71. Pursuant to this provision, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 and 2202, and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 57, Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief that the Plan is not a “church plan” within the meaning of ERISA § 3(33), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(33), and is thus subject to the provisions of Title I and Title IV of ERISA. 72. Plaintiff further seeks orders directing all Defendants to bring the Plan into compliance with ERISA, including the reporting and funding requirements of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021, 1023, 1082, 1102, and 1104, and by remedying the additional violations set forth below. 73. Additionally, Plaintiff seeks an order that Mercy Health make all contributions to the Plan as necessary to remedy the Plan’s funding shortfall. 74. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates herein by reference all prior allegations in this Complaint. 75. ERISA § 502(a)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C. 1132(a)(1)(A), permits a plan participant to bring a suit for penalties when a defendant violates the recordkeeping obligations set forth in ERISA. 76. ERISA § 502(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3), permits a plan participant to bring a suit to obtain appropriate equitable relief to enforce the provisions of Title I of ERISA or to enforce the terms of a plan. 77. Under ERISA § 103, 29 U.S.C. § 1023, employee benefit plans are required to file an annual report with the Secretary of Labor. This report, submitted via Form 5500, must include certain specified information about the plan’s finances, participants, and administration. 78. Defendants failed to file an annual report concerning the Plan with the Secretary of Labor in compliance with ERISA § 103, 29 U.S.C. § 1023, or a Form 5500 (and associated schedules and attachments) which the Secretary has approved as an alternative method of compliance with ERISA § 103, 29 U.S.C. § 1023. 79. Defendants have violated ERISA § 104(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1024(a), by failing to file annual reports with respect to the Plan with the Secretary of Labor in compliance with ERISA § 103, 29 U.S.C. § 1023, or Form 5500s and associated schedules and attachments. 80. Under ERISA § 101(d)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1021(d)(1), employers maintaining employee benefit plans are required to issue a notice to beneficiaries and participants whenever the plan fails to make a required installment or other payment required to meet the minimum funding standards under ERISA. 81. Mercy Health has failed to furnish Plaintiff, or any member of the Class, with a Case: 1:16-cv-00726-SKB Doc #: 1 Filed: 06/30/16 Page: 19 of 25 PAGEID #: 19 20 Notice with respect to the Plan pursuant to ERISA § 101(d)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1021(d)(1), informing them that it failed to make payments required to comply with ERISA § 302, 29 U.S.C. § 1082. 82. Under ERISA § 101(f), 29 U.S.C. § 1021(f), administrators of defined benefit plans are required to provide annual plan funding notices to all participants and beneficiaries of such defined benefit plans. 83. At no time has the Committee furnished Plaintiff, or any member of the Class, with a Funding Notice with respect to the Plan pursuant to ERISA § 101(f), 29 U.S.C. § 1021(f). 84. As the Administrator of the Plan, the Committee has violated ERISA § 101(f), 29 U.S.C. § 1021(f), by failing to provide each participant and beneficiary of the Plan with the Funding Notice required by ERISA § 101(f), 29 U.S.C. § 1021(f), and as such, the Committee may be required by the Court to pay Plaintiff and each Class member up to $110 per day (as permitted by 29 C.F.R. § 2575.502(c)(3)) for each day that the Committee has failed to provide Plaintiff and each Class member with the Funding Notice required by ERISA § 101(f), 29 U.S.C. § 1021(f). 85. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates herein by reference all prior allegations in this Complaint. 86. ERISA § 302, 29 U.S.C. § 1082, establishes minimum funding standards for defined benefit plans that require employers to make minimum contributions to their plans so that each plan will have assets available to fund plan benefits if the employer maintaining the plan is unable to pay benefits out of its general assets. 87. ERISA § 502(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3), permits a plan participant to bring a suit to obtain appropriate equitable relief to enforce the provisions of Title I of ERISA or to enforce the Case: 1:16-cv-00726-SKB Doc #: 1 Filed: 06/30/16 Page: 20 of 25 PAGEID #: 20 21 terms of a plan. 88. As the employer maintaining the Plan, Mercy Health was responsible for making the contributions that should have been made pursuant to ERISA § 302, 29 U.S.C. § 1082, at a level commensurate with ERISA’s requirements. 89. Mercy Health has failed to make contributions in satisfaction of the minimum funding standards of ERISA § 302, 29 U.S.C. § 1082. 90. By failing to make the required contributions to the Plan, Mercy Health has violated Declaratory and Equitable Relief (Declaratory Judgement Act and ERISA § 502(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)) Failure to Provide Minimum Funding (ERISA §§ 302 and 502(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1082, 1132(a)(3)) Mercy Health Violation of Reporting and Disclosure Provisions Case: 1:16-cv-00726-SKB Doc #: 1 Filed: 06/30/16 Page: 18 of 25 PAGEID #: 18 19 (ERISA §§ 101-104, 502(a)(1)(A), (a)(3), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1024, 1132(a)(1)(A), (a)(3))

win

25. Defendants operate two Irish restaurants located in the Midtown West section of Manhattan in New York City. 26. Upon information and belief, individual Defendants John Creegan and Brendan Creegan possess operational control over the Defendant Corporations, each possess an ownership interest in Defendant Corporations, and control significant functions of Defendant Corporations. 27. Defendants are associated and joint employers, act in the interest of each other with respect to employees, pay employees by the same method, and share control over the employees. 29. Defendants jointly have employed Plaintiffs, and all similarly situated individuals, and are their (and all similarly situated individuals’) employers within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. 201 et seq. and the NYLL. 30. In the alternative, Defendants constitute a single employer of Plaintiffs and similarly situated individuals. 31. Upon information and belief, Individual Defendants John Creegan and Brendan Creegan operate Defendant Corporations as either alter egos of themselves, and/or fail to operate Defendant Corporations as entities legally separate and apart from themselves, by, among other things: a) failing to adhere to the corporate formalities necessary to operate the Defendant Corporations as separate and legally distinct entities; b) defectively forming or maintaining the Defendant Corporations, by among other things, failing to hold annual meetings or to maintain appropriate corporate records; c) transferring assets and debts freely as between all Defendants; d) operating the Defendant Corporations for their own benefit as the sole or majority shareholders; e) operating the Defendant Corporations for their own benefit and maintaining control over these corporations as closed corporations or closely held controlled entities; f) intermingling assets and debts of their own with the Defendant Corporations; g) diminishing and/or transferring assets to protect their own interests; and h) other actions evincing a failure to adhere to the corporate form. 33. In each year from 2013 to the present, Defendants, both separately and jointly, have had a gross annual volume of sales of not less than $500,000 (exclusive of excise taxes at the retail level that are separately stated). 34. In addition, upon information and belief, Defendants and/or their enterprise were directly engaged in interstate commerce. For example, numerous items that were used and sold daily at John Sullivan’s Bar & Grill and Jack Doyle’s Irish Pub, such as vegetables and beverages, were produced outside the state of New York. Individual Plaintiffs 35. Plaintiffs are former and current employees of defendants and have been employed as cooks, salad preparers, dishwashers, and porters. 36. They seek to represent a class of similarly situated individuals under 29 U.S.C. 216(b). Plaintiff Efrain Anzures Reyes 37. Plaintiff Anzures has been employed by Defendants from approximately April 2016 until on or about March 2017 and from approximately October 2017 until the present date. 38. During the course of his employment, Plaintiff Anzures has worked at Defendants’ John Sullivan’s location. 39. Plaintiff Anzures has been employed by Defendants as a dishwasher. 41. Plaintiff Anzures’s work duties have required neither discretion nor independent judgment. 42. Plaintiff Anzures regularly has worked in excess of 40 hours per week. 43. From approximately April 2016 until on or about November 2016, Plaintiff Anzures worked from approximately 5:00 p.m. until on or about 3:00 a.m. five days a week and from approximately 5:00 p.m. until on or about 3:15 p.m. one day a week (typically 60.25 hours per week). 44. From approximately December 2016 until on or about February 2017, Plaintiff Anzures worked from approximately 9:00 a.m. until on or about 9:00 p.m. four days a week, from approximately 9:00 a.m. until on or about 9:15 p.m. one day a week, and from approximately 9:00 a.m. until on or about 3:00 p.m. one day a week (typically 66.25 hours per week). 45. From approximately February 2017 until on or about March 2017, Plaintiff Anzures worked from approximately 9:00 a.m. until on or about 5:00 p.m. to 6:00 p.m. six days a week (typically 48 to 54 hours per week). 46. From approximately October 2017 until the present date, Plaintiff Anzures has worked from approximately 9:00 a.m. until on or about 4:00 p.m. six days a week (typically 42 hours per week). 47. Throughout his employment with Defendants, Plaintiff Anzures has been paid his wages in cash. 48. From approximately April 2016 until on or about January 2017, Plaintiff Anzures was paid $10.00 per regular and overtime hour. 50. Defendants never have granted Plaintiff Anzures a meal break or rest period of any length. 51. Defendants have not provided Plaintiff Anzures with a statement of wages with each payment of wages, as required by NYLL 195(3). 52. No notification, either in the form of posted notices, or other means, has been given to Plaintiff Anzures regarding overtime and wages under the FLSA and NYLL. 53. Defendants have not given any notice to Plaintiff Anzures, in English and in Spanish (Plaintiff Anzures’s primary language), of his rate of pay, employer’s regular pay day, and such other information as required by NYLL §195(1). Plaintiff Benito Garcia 54. Plaintiff Garcia was employed by Defendants from approximately November 2015 until on or about November 17, 2017. 55. During the course of his employment, Plaintiff Garcia worked at defendants’ John Sullivan’s location. 56. Plaintiff Garcia was employed by Defendants as a cook. 57. Plaintiff Garcia regularly handled goods in interstate commerce, such as meats and other supplies produced outside the state of New York. 58. Plaintiff Garcia’s work duties required neither discretion nor independent judgment. 59. Plaintiff Garcia regularly worked in excess of 40 hours per week. 61. Throughout his employment with Defendants, Plaintiff Garcia was paid his wages in a combination of check and cash. 62. Specifically, Defendants paid Plaintiff Garcia by check for his first 40 hours and in cash for his hours over 40. 63. From approximately November 2015 until on or about January 2016, Plaintiff Garcia was paid $14.00 per hour. 64. From approximately February 2016 until on or about August 2017, Plaintiff Garcia was paid $15.00 per hour. 65. From approximately September 2017 until on or about November 17, 2017, Plaintiff Garcia was paid $18.00 per hour. 66. Defendants never granted Plaintiff Garcia a meal break or rest period of any length. 67. No notification, either in the form of posted notices, or other means, was given to Plaintiff Garcia regarding overtime and wages under the FLSA and NYLL. 68. Defendants did not give any notice to Plaintiff Garcia, in English and in Spanish (Plaintiff Garcia’s primary language), of his rate of pay, employer’s regular pay day, and such other information as required by NYLL §195(1). 70. Plaintiff Cornejal has been employed by Defendants from approximately March 25, 2016 until on or about October 2016, from approximately November 2016 until on or about April 2017, and from approximately August 3, 2017 until the present date. 71. During the course of his employment, Plaintiff Cornejal worked at Defendants’ Jack Doyle’s location from approximately March 25, 2016 until on or about October 2016 and from approximately November 2016 until on or about April 2017; he then has worked at Defendant’s John Sullivan’s location from approximately August 3, 2017 until the present date. 72. Plaintiff Cornejal has been employed by Defendants as a porter. 73. Plaintiff Cornejal regularly has handled goods in interstate commerce, such as cleaning supplies and other supplies produced outside the state of New York. 74. Plaintiff Cornejal’s work duties have required neither discretion nor independent judgment. 75. Plaintiff Cornejal regularly has worked in excess of 40 hours per week. 76. From approximately March 25, 2016 until on or about October 2016 and from approximately November 2016 until on or about April 2017, Plaintiff Cornejal worked at the Jack Doyle location from approximately 12:00 a.m. until on or about 8:30 a.m. to 9:00 a.m. Wednesdays through Mondays (typically 51 to 54 hours per week). 77. From approximately August 3, 2017 until the present date, Plaintiff Cornejal has worked at the John Sullivan location from approximately 12:00 a.m. until on or about 8:30 a.m. to 9:00 a.m. seven days a week (typically 58 to 60 hours per week). 79. From approximately March 25, 2016 until on or about December 2016, Plaintiff Cornejal was paid $10.00 per hour. 80. However, for approximately one week during this time period, Plaintiff Cornejal was not paid his wages for the hours he worked. 81. From approximately January 2017 until the present date, Plaintiff Cornejal has been paid $11.00 per hour. 82. However, Plaintiff Cornejal once had to pay an employee approximately $80.00 and he was promised that Defendants would pay him back but never did. 83. Plaintiff Cornejal’s pay did not vary even when he was required to stay later or work a longer day than his usual schedule. 84. For example, from approximately March 2016 until on or about October 2016, defendants required Plaintiff Cornejal to work thirty minutes past his scheduled departure time some days of the week, and did not compensate him for the additional time he worked. 85. Defendants never have granted Plaintiff Cornejal a meal break or rest period of any length. 86. Prior to November 2016, Plaintiff Cornejal was not required to keep track of his time, nor to his knowledge, did defendants utilize any time tracking device, such as sign in sheets or punch cards, to accurately reflect his actual hours worked. 87. Defendants have not provided Plaintiff Cornejal with a statement of wages with each payment of wages, as required by NYLL 195(3). 88. No notification, either in the form of posted notices, or other means, has been given to Plaintiff Cornejal regarding overtime and wages under the FLSA and NYLL. 90. Plaintiff Antonio was employed by Defendants from approximately February 2013 until on or about January 2014 and from approximately March 2016 until on or about July 2017. 91. Throughout his employment with defendants, Plaintiff Antonio worked at Defendants’ Jack Doyle location. 92. Plaintiff Antonio was employed by Defendants as a dishwasher and porter. 93. Plaintiff Antonio regularly handled goods in interstate commerce, such as dishwashing liquid and other supplies produced outside the state of New York. 94. Plaintiff Antonio’s work duties required neither discretion nor independent judgment. 95. Plaintiff Antonio regularly worked in excess of 40 hours per week. 96. From approximately February 2013 until on or about January 2014, Plaintiff Antonio worked from approximately 12:00 a.m. until on or about 9:00 a.m. to 9:15 a.m. Sundays through Fridays (typically 54 to 55.5 hours per week). 97. From approximately March 2016 until on or about July 2017, Plaintiff Antonio worked from approximately 5:00 a.m. until on or about 5:00 p.m. Tuesdays through Sundays (typically 72 hours per week). 98. Throughout his employment with Defendants, Plaintiff Antonio was paid his wages in cash. Defendants Constitute Joint Employers RECOVERY OF EQUIPMENT COSTS 185. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege all paragraphs above as though set forth fully herein. 186. Defendants have required Plaintiffs to pay, without reimbursement, the costs and expenses for purchasing and maintaining equipment and “tools of the trade” required to perform their jobs, such as kitchen shoes, further reducing their wages in violation of the FLSA and NYLL. 29 U.S.C. § 206(a); 29 C.F.R. § 531.35; N.Y. Lab. Law §§ 193 and 198-b. 187. Plaintiffs have been damaged in an amount to be determined at trial. VIOLATION OF THE NOTICE AND RECORDKEEPING REQUIREMENTS OF THE NEW YORK LABOR LAW 179. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege all paragraphs above as though fully set forth herein. 180. Defendants failed to provide Plaintiffs (and the FLSA and Rule 23 class members) with a written notice, in English and in Spanish (Plaintiffs’ primary language), containing: the rate or rates of pay and basis thereof, whether paid by the hour, shift, day, week, salary, piece, commission, or other; allowances, if any, claimed as part of the minimum wage, including tip, meal, or lodging allowances; the regular pay day designated by the employer; the name of the employer; any "doing business as" names used by the employer; the physical address of the employer's main office or principal place of business, and a mailing address if different; and the telephone number of the employer, as required by NYLL §195(1). 181. Defendants are liable to each Plaintiff in the amount of $5,000, together with costs and attorneys’ fees. VIOLATION OF THE OVERTIME PROVISIONS OF THE NEW YORK LABOR LAW 171. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege all paragraphs above as though fully set forth herein. 172. Defendants have failed to pay Plaintiffs overtime compensation at rates of one and one-half times the regular rate of pay for each hour worked in excess of forty hours in a workweek, in violation of NYLL Art. 19 and 12 N.Y.C.R.R. § 142-2.2. 173. Defendants’ failure to pay Plaintiffs overtime compensation has been willful within the meaning of NYLL § 663. 174. Plaintiffs have been damaged in an amount to be determined at trial. VIOLATION OF THE OVERTIME PROVISIONS OF THE FLSA 163. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege all paragraphs above as though fully set forth herein. 164. Defendants have failed to pay Plaintiffs and the FLSA and Rule 23 class members overtime compensation at rates of one and one-half times the regular rate of pay for each hour worked in excess of forty hours in a workweek, in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 207 (a)(1). 165. Defendants’ failure to pay Plaintiffs and the FLSA and Rule 23 class members overtime compensation has been willful within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 255(a). 166. Plaintiffs and the FLSA and Rule 23 class members have been damaged in an amount to be determined at trial.

win

19. At all times relevant to this matter, Plaintiff was an individual residing within the State of California. 20. Furthermore, Defendant conducted business within the State of California at all times relevant. 21. At some point prior to the filing of this matter, Plaintiff resolved a number of debts owed to various furnishers. 39. Plaintiff brings this action on Plaintiff’s own behalf, and on behalf of all others similarly situated. 40. Plaintiff is among many thousands of persons in the United States who has had his or her credit information compiled and reported by Defendant regarding financial obligations incurred that have been subsequently paid in full, and currently have a $0 balance owed to the original creditor. 62. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 63. The foregoing acts and omissions constitute numerous and multiple violations of the California Consumer Credit Reporting Agencies Act. 64. In the regular course of its business operations, Defendant routinely furnishes information to credit reporting agencies pertaining to transactions between Defendant and Defendant’s consumers, so as to provide information to a consumer’s credit worthiness, credit standing and credit capacity. VIOLATION OF THE CALIFORNIA CREDIT REPORTING AGENCIES ACT (CCCRAA) Cal. Civ. Code § 1785.1, et seq.

win

10. Discovery may reveal the transmission of additional faxes as well. 11. Defendant Everidis Health Sciences, LLC, is responsible for sending or causing the sending of the fax. 12. Defendant Everidis Health Sciences, LLC, as the entity whose products and services were advertised in the fax, derived economic benefit from the sending of the fax. 13. Defendant Everidis Health Sciences, LLC, either negligently or wilfully violated the rights of plaintiff and other recipients in sending the faxes. 14. The fax refers to a website used by defendant Everidis Health Sciences, LLC. 15. Plaintiff had no prior relationship with defendant and had not authorized the sending of fax advertisements to plaintiff. 16. On information and belief, the fax attached hereto was sent as part of a mass broadcasting of faxes. It is a generic ad apparently intended for businesses and professionals that may have 401K plans. 17. The fax does not contain an “opt out” notice that complies with 47 U.S.C. §227. 2 18. The TCPA makes unlawful the “use of any telephone facsimile machine, computer or other device to send an unsolicited advertisement to a telephone facsimile machine ...” 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(1)(C). 19. The TCPA provides for affirmative defenses of consent or an established business relationship. Both defenses are conditioned on the provision of an opt out notice that complies with the TCPA. Holtzman v. Turza, 728 F.3d 682 (7th Cir. 2013); Nack v. Walburg, 715 F.3d 680 (8th Cir. 2013). 20. On information and belief, defendant has transmitted similar unsolicited fax advertisements to at least 40 other persons in New York. 21. There is no reasonable means for plaintiff or other recipients of defendant’s unsolicited advertising faxes to avoid receiving illegal faxes. Fax machines must be left on and ready to receive the urgent communications authorized by their owners. 22. Defendant’s conduct caused recipients of their advertising to bear the cost thereof. This gave defendant an unfair competitive advantage over businesses that advertise lawfully, such as by direct mail. For example, an advertising campaign targeting one million recipients would cost $500,000 if sent by U.S. mail but only $20,000 if done by fax broadcasting. The reason is that instead of spending $480,000 on printing and mailing his ad, the fax broadcaster misappropriates the recipients’ paper and ink. “Receiving a junk fax is like getting junk mail with the postage due”. Remarks of Cong. Edward Markey, 135 Cong Rec E 2549, Tuesday, July 18, 1989, 101st Cong. 1st Sess. 23. Plaintiff incorporates ¶¶ 1-22. 24. The TCPA makes unlawful the “use of any telephone facsimile machine, computer or other device to send an unsolicited advertisement to a telephone facsimile machine ...” 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(1)(c). 25. The TCPA, 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(3), provides: 3 Private right of action. A person or entity may, if otherwise permitted by the laws or rules of court of a State, bring in an appropriate court of that State– (A) an action based on a violation of this subsection or the regulations prescribed under this subsection to enjoin such violation, (B) an action to recover for actual monetary loss from such a violation, or to receive $500 in damages for each such violation, whichever is greater, or (C) both such actions. If the Court finds that the defendant willfully or knowingly violated this subsection or the regulations prescribed under this subsection, the court may, in its discretion, increase the amount of the award to an amount equal to not more than 3 times the amount available under the subparagraph (B) of this paragraph. 26. Plaintiff and each class member suffered damages as a result of receipt of the unsolicited faxes, in the form of time, paper and ink or toner consumed as a result. Furthermore, plaintiff’s statutory right of privacy was invaded. 27. Plaintiff and each class member is entitled to statutory damages. 28. Defendant violated the TCPA even if its actions were only negligent. 29. Defendant should be enjoined from committing similar violations in the future. 30. Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a) and (b)(3), plaintiff brings this claim on behalf of a class, consisting of (a) all persons (b) who, on or after a date four years prior to the filing of this action (28 U.S.C. §1658), (c) were sent faxes by or on behalf of defendant Everidis Health Sciences, LLC, advertising or promoting its goods or services for sale. 31. The class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impractical. Plaintiff alleges on information and belief, based on the generic nature of the fax, that there are more than 40 members of the class. 32. There are questions of law and fact common to the class that predominate over 4 any questions affecting only individual class members. The predominant common questions include: a. Whether defendant engaged in a pattern of sending unsolicited fax advertisements; b. The manner in which defendant compiled or obtained its list of fax numbers; c. Whether defendant thereby violated the TCPA. 33. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in handling class actions and claims involving unlawful business practices. Neither plaintiff nor plaintiff's counsel have any interests which might cause them not to vigorously pursue this action. 34. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the class members. All are based on the same factual and legal theories. 35. A class action is the superior method for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. The interest of class members in individually controlling the prosecution of separate claims against defendant is small because it is not economically feasible to bring individual actions. 36. Numerous courts have certified class actions under the TCPA. Holtzman v. Turza, 08 C 2014, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95620 (N.D.Ill., Oct. 14, 2009), aff’d, 728 F.3d 682 (7th Cir. 2013); American Copper & Brass, Inc. v. Lake City Indus. Products, Inc., 757 F.3d 540 (6th Cir. 2014); In re Sandusky Wellness Center, 570 Fed.Appx. 437 (6th Cir. 2014); Sandusky Wellness Center, LLC v. Medtox Scientific, Inc., 821 F.3d 992 (8th Cir. 2016); Sadowski v. Med1 Online, LLC, 07 C 2973, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41766 (N.D.Ill., May 27, 2008); CE Design Ltd. v Cy's Crabhouse North, Inc., 259 F.R.D. 135 (N.D.Ill. 2009); Targin Sign Sys. v Preferred Chiropractic Ctr., Ltd., 679 F. Supp. 2d 894 (N.D.Ill. 2010); Garrett v. Ragle Dental Lab, Inc., 10 C 1315, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108339, 2010 WL 4074379 (N.D.Ill., Oct. 12, 2010); 5 Hinman v. M & M Rental Ctr., 545 F.Supp. 2d 802 (N.D.Ill. 2008); Clearbrook v. Rooflifters, LLC, 08 C 3276, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72902 (N.D. Ill. July 20, 2010) (Cox, M.J.); G.M. Sign, Inc. v. Group C Communs., Inc., 08 C 4521, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17843 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 25, 2010); Kavu, Inc. v. Omnipak Corp., 246 F.R.D. 642 (W.D.Wash. 2007); Display South, Inc. v. Express Computer Supply, Inc., 961 So.2d 451, 455 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2007); Display South, Inc. v. Graphics House Sports Promotions, Inc., 992 So. 2d 510 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2008); Lampkin v. GGH, Inc., 146 P.3d 847 (Ok. App. 2006); ESI Ergonomic Solutions, LLC v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc., 203 Ariz. (App.) 94, 50 P.3d 844 (2002); Core Funding Group, LLC v. Young, 792 N.E.2d 547 (Ind.App. 2003); Critchfield Physical Therapy v. Taranto Group, Inc., 293 Kan. 285; 263 P.3d 767 (2011); Karen S. Little, L.L.C. v. Drury Inns. Inc., 306 S.W.3d 577 (Mo. App. 2010). 37. Management of this class action is likely to present significantly fewer difficulties that those presented in many class actions, e.g. for securities fraud. WHEREFORE, plaintiff requests that the Court enter judgment in favor of plaintiff and the class and against defendants for: a. Actual damages; b. Statutory damages; c. An injunction against the further transmission of unsolicited fax advertising; d. Costs of suit; e. Such other or further relief as the Court deems just and proper. 6 /s/ Tiffany N. Hardy Tiffany N. Hardy Tiffany N. Hardy 9. On January 17, 2018 at 3:00pm, Dr. David Simai received the unsolicited fax advertisement attached as Exhibit A on his facsimile machine.

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(Violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227) 16. In recent years, marketers who often have felt stymied by federal laws limiting solicitation by telephone, facsimile machine, and e-mail have increasingly looked to alternative technologies through which to cheaply send bulk solicitations. One of the newest types of such bulk marketing is to advertise through Short Message Services. 17. The term “Short Message Service” or “SMS” describes a messaging system that allows cellular telephone subscribers to use their cellular telephones to send and receive short text messages, usually limited to 120 – 500 characters. 18. An “SMS message” is a text message call directed to a wireless device through the use of the telephone number assigned to the device. When an SMS message call is successfully made, the recipient’s cell phone rings, alerting him or her that a call is being received. 20. Text messages, or “SMS” calls, are “calls” within the context of the TCPA. 21. Bulk SMS messaging is a lucrative and inexpensive marketing platform for companies such as Defendants. Messaging platforms leverage the most direct communication link between a brand and its consumers—more than 97 percent of text messages are read; more than 90 percent within the first three minutes. Very few other marketing channels can match that.2 22. Beginning at least by 2013, Defendants launched an aggressive marketing campaign to boost its SMS texting marketing database and profile. 23. For example, calls to action promising consumers they could receive $1 off a large fountain drink by providing their cell phone numbers to Defendants were plastered on posters, signage, and on checkout screens at concession stands in Defendants’ movie theatres. 25. In 2012, Plaintiff signed up for Defendants’ customer rewards program, AMC Stubs, while attending a movie at one of Defendants’ movie theatres. Plaintiff paid a fee to become an AMC Stubs member for one year. 26. One year later, Plaintiff received a notice that her AMC Stubs membership would lapse if she did not renew it. 27. Plaintiff did not renew her membership, and she was informed in 2013 that her membership had expired. 28. Plaintiff did not expressly consent to receive autodialed telemarketing calls to her cell phone within the meaning of the TCPA. 29. On or about April 23 2015, Plaintiff’s cell phone rang, indicating that a text call was being received. 31. The text implied that Plaintiff was a member of Defendants’ AMC Stubs program. However, Plaintiff’s AMC Stubs membership lapsed at least one year prior to her receipt of the unsolicited text message. 32. Upon information and belief, since October 16, 2013, Defendants sent or transmitted, or had sent or transmitted on their behalf, the same or substantially the same text messages en masse to a list of thousands of wireless telephone numbers using a computerized automatic telephone dialing system as defined by the TCPA that stores telephone numbers from a database, or dials random or sequential numbers. 34. These text messages from Defendants, or its agents, violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(b). 35. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of herself and as a class action under the provisions of Rule 23(a), (b)(2), and (b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Class is defined as follows: All persons or entities in the United States and its Territories who received one or more text message advertisements from or on behalf of Defendants since October 16, 2013. Plaintiff reserves the right to redefine the Class prior to class certification. 36. Excluded from the Class are Defendants, Defendants’ officers, directors, and employees. 37. This action is properly maintainable as a class action. Members of the Class are so numerous that their individual joinder is impracticable. The precise number of members is unknown at this time, but is believed to be at least several thousand individuals. The true number of proposed members is, however, known by Defendants, and thus, Class members may be notified of the pendency of this action by first class mail, electronic, and published notice using information in Defendant’s membership and marketing records. 39. Rule 23(a)(2) and Rule 23(b)(3) are both satisfied because there are questions of law and fact which are common to the Class and which predominate over questions affecting any individual Class member. The common questions include, inter alia, the following: a. whether Defendants violated the TCPA by sending unauthorized text messages to Plaintiff and members of the Class; b. whether the equipment Defendants used to send the text messages in question was an automatic telephone dialing system as defined by the 44. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 46. The TCPA defines “telemarketing call,” or “telephone solicitation,” as “the initiation of a telephone call or message for the purpose of encouraging the purchase or rental of … goods, or services, which is transmitted to any person.” 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(4). 47. The TCPA defines an “automatic telephone dialing system” as “equipment which has the capacity (A) to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator; and (B) to dial such numbers.” 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1). 49. Defendants made telephone solicitations, including, but not limited to, the text messages depicted above, to the wireless telephone numbers of Plaintiff and members of the Class. 50. The text messages sent to Plaintiff and the Class members were sent using equipment that had the capacity to store telephone numbers retrieved from Defendants’ database and to dial such numbers. The equipment can also be programmed to generate and dial random or sequential numbers. By using such equipment, Defendants were able to effectively send text messages simultaneously to thousands of wireless telephone numbers en masse without human intervention. 51. The text calls were made through the use of a short code dialing service and without the prior express written consent of Plaintiff and the Class members. 52. Defendants’ conduct in sending said text messages violates 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). 53. Defendants’ conduct in sending said text messages was a knowing and willful violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227.

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(FLSA Overtime Violations) (Ohio Class) (Ohio Overtime Violations) 10. At all times relevant, Defendant was an “employer” within the meaning of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 203(d). 11. Defendant’s hourly, non-exempt employees included Plaintiff, the Opt-Ins and the Ohio Class. 3 12. At all times relevant, Defendant was an enterprise within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 203(r), and an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 203(s)(1). Hourly Employees’ Compensation 13. Plaintiff, the Opt-Ins and the Ohio Class are current or former hourly, non-exempt employees of Defendant. 14. Plaintiff, the Opt-Ins and the Ohio Class frequently worked more than forty (40) hours in a single workweek, entitling them to overtime compensation under the FLSA. For example, Plaintiff would, at times, work in excess of fifty (50) hours in a week. 15. Plaintiff, the Opt-Ins and the Ohio Class were not paid all of the overtime compensation they earned. 16. Pursuant to Defendant’s uniform companywide policy, Defendant rounds its employees’ clock-in time in a manner in which an employee always loses credit for time actually worked. 17. Defendant’s practice of improperly rounding time always in its favor, which resulted in its employees always losing time worked, results and has resulted in Defendant’s employees, including Plaintiff, being underpaid for overtime hours worked on a nearly daily basis. This, in turn, results and has resulted in Defendant’s employees, including Plaintiff, being underpaid overtime hours worked on a weekly basis. 18. Plaintiff, and each Opt-In and the members of the Ohio Class have each worked a substantial number of uncompensated hours during the three-year period immediately preceding the filing of this Complaint, which has resulted in significant unpaid overtime. 19. Plaintiff and the Opt-Ins were full time employees regularly scheduled to work 40 hours a week or more. Plaintiff for example has worked over 50 hours in one workweek. Thus, by 4 failing to pay Plaintiff and the Opt-Ins for work performed before and after their scheduled shift, Defendant failed to pay Plaintiff and the Opt-Ins for all their overtime in nearly every week in which they worked. 20. Additionally, Defendant paid Plaintiff, the Opt-Ins and the Ohio Class bonuses for satisfactory attendance. The amount of those bonuses was never included in determining Plaintiff and the Opt-Ins regular rate for overtime purposes. This also resulted in Plaintiff and the Opt-Ins receiving less overtime premium pay than they were owed. 21. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully rewritten herein. 22. Plaintiff brings this case as an FLSA “collective action” pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), which provides that “[a]n action to recover the liability” prescribed by the FLSA “may be maintained against any employer … by any one or more employees for and in behalf of himself or themselves and other employees similarly situated.” 23. The Opt-Ins who are “similarly situated” to Plaintiff with respect to Defendant’s FLSA violations consist of: All present and former hourly employees of Defendant during the period three years preceding the commencement of this action to the present who worked more than forty hours in one or more workweeks. 24. Such persons are “similarly situated” with respect to Defendant’s FLSA violations in that all were hourly employees of Defendant, all were subjected to and injured by Defendant’s unlawful practice of failing to pay its employees for all hours worked, and all have the same claims against Defendant for unpaid wages and overtime compensation as well as for liquidated damages, attorneys’ fees, and costs. 5 25. Conditional certification of this case as a collective action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) is proper and necessary so that such persons may be sent a Court-authorized notice informing them of the pendency of this action and giving them the opportunity to “opt in.” 26. Plaintiff cannot yet state the exact number of similarly-situated persons. Such persons are readily identifiable through the payroll records Defendant has maintained, and was required to maintain, pursuant to the FLSA and Ohio law. 29 U.S.C. § 211(c) & 29 C.F.R. § 215.2; Ohio Const. art. II, § 34a. 27. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully rewritten herein. 28. Plaintiff also brings this case as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 on behalf of themselves and other members of a class of persons who assert claims under the laws of the State of Ohio (the “Ohio Class”), defined as: All present and former hourly employees of Defendant during the period two years preceding the commencement of this action to the present who worked more than forty hours in one or more workweeks. 29. The Ohio Class is so numerous that joinder of all class members is impracticable. Plaintiff cannot yet state the exact number of class members but avers, upon information and belief, that it consists of over 100 people. The number of class members as well as their identities are ascertainable from the payroll records Defendant has maintained, and was required to maintain, pursuant to the FLSA and Ohio law. 29 U.S.C. § 211(c) & 29 C.F.R. § 215.2; Ohio Const. art. II, § 34a. 6 30. There are questions of law or fact common to the Ohio Class, including but not limited to: Whether Defendant failed to pay Plaintiff and other class members for all hours worked in excess of 40 in a workweek? Whether Defendant failed to include attendance bonuses in computing regular rate for purposes of determining the proper overtime premium? Whether Defendant kept adequate records of the hours worked by Plaintiff and the other class members? 31. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of other members of the Ohio Class. Plaintiff’s claims arise out of the same uniform course of conduct by Defendant, and are based on the same legal theories, as the claims of other class members. 32. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Ohio Class. Plaintiff’s interests are not antagonistic to, but rather are in unison with, the interests of other class members. Plaintiff’s counsel has broad experience in handling class action litigation, including wage-and-hour litigation, and is fully qualified to prosecute the claims of the Ohio Class in this case. 33. The questions of law or fact that are common to the Ohio Class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members. The primary questions that will determine Defendant’s liability to the class, listed above, are common to the class as a whole, and predominate over any questions affecting only individual class members. 34. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. Requiring class members to pursue their claims individually would entail a host of separate suits, with concomitant duplication of costs, attorneys’ fees, and demands on court resources. Many class members’ claims are sufficiently small that they would 7 be reluctant to incur the substantial cost, expense, and risk of pursuing their claims individually. Certification of this case as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 will enable the issues to be adjudicated for all class members with the efficiencies of class litigation. 35. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully rewritten herein. 36. Plaintiff brings this claim for violation of the FLSA’s overtime provisions on behalf of himself and the Opt-Ins who have joined this case pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Plaintiff’s written consent to becoming a party to this action pursuant to § 216(b) has been filed or will be filed with the Court. 37. The FLSA requires that non-exempt employees be paid at a rate of one and one half times their regular rate for every hour worked in excess of 40 in a workweek. 38. Defendant failed to pay Plaintiff and the Opt-Ins overtime compensation for all hours worked in excess of forty in a workweek. 39. Instead, Defendant has a companywide policy of failing to pay its employees for all time worked in that its rounding practices routinely resulted in Plaintiff and the Opt-Ins working hours for which they were not compensated. 40. Further, Defendant failed to include attendance bonus payments when computing Plaintiff and the Opt-In’s regular rate for purposes of determining the proper overtime premium. 41. Defendant’s practices resulted in Plaintiff and the Opt-Ins receiving less overtime compensation than they were owed. 42. By engaging in these practices, Defendant willfully violated the FLSA and regulations thereunder that have the force and effect of law. 8 43. As a result of Defendant’s violations of the FLSA, Plaintiff and the Opt-Ins were injured in that they did not receive overtime compensation due to them pursuant to the FLSA. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) entitles them to an award of “unpaid overtime compensation” as well as “an additional equal amount as liquidated damages.” Section 216(b) further provides that “[t]he court … shall, in addition to any judgment awarded to the plaintiff or Plaintiff, allow a reasonable attorney's fee to be paid by the defendant, and costs of the action.” 44. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully rewritten herein. 45. Plaintiff brings this claim for violation of the Ohio overtime compensation statute, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4111.03, on behalf of herself, the Potential Opt-Ins who may join this case pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), and all members of the Ohio Class for which certification is sought pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. 46. At all times relevant, Defendant was an employer covered by the Ohio overtime compensation statute, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4111.03. 47. Defendant violated the Ohio overtime compensation statute, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4111.03, by failing to pay all overtime compensation to its hourly workers including Plaintiff, the Potential Opt-Ins and the Ohio Class. 48. Specifically, among other things, Defendant failed to pay Plaintiff and the Ohio Class for all time worked and paid them at the incorrect overtime rate. 49. Defendant’s violations of Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4111.03 injured Plaintiff, the Potential Opt-Ins, and the Ohio Class members in that they did not receive overtime compensation due to them pursuant to that statute. 9 50. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4111.10(A) provides that Defendant, having violated § 4111.03, is “liable to the employee[s] affected for the full amount of the overtime wage rate, less any amount actually paid to the employee[s] by the employer, and for costs and reasonable attorney’s fees as may be allowed by the court.” Defendant’s Status as an “Employer”

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15. PEPPERIDGE FARM manufactures, distributes, markets, advertises, and sells the Product, which claims to be “Natural,” when in fact, it is not, because it contains GMOs in the form of soy and/or soy derivatives within its ingredients; specifically, soybean oil. 16. Defendant’s “Natural” statement prominently displayed on the Product’s packaging and/or labeling is false, misleading, and likely to deceive reasonable consumers, such as Plaintiff and members of the Class, because the Product is not “Natural,” due to the presence of GMOs. 17. GMOs are plants that grow from seeds in which DNA splicing has been used to place genes from another source into a plant. Contrary to Defendant’s express or implied representations, the Product uses plants or plant derivatives grown or created from GMOs. 18. The Product is not “Natural.” Genetically modified soy products contain genes and/or DNA that would not normally be in them, and are thus not natural, thereby causing the Product to fail to be “Natural.” 43. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference the allegations set forth in each of the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint. 44. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, Plaintiff brings this class action and seeks certification of the claims and certain issues in this action on behalf of a Class defined as: all United States persons who have purchased Pepperidge Farm Cheddar Goldfish crackers containing Soybean Oil, for personal use, during the period extending from November 6, 2008, through and to the filing date of this Complaint. 45. Plaintiff reserves the right to amend the Class definition if further investigation and discovery indicates that the Class definition should be narrowed, expanded, or otherwise modified. Excluded from the Class are governmental entities, Defendant, any entity in which Defendant has a controlling interest, and Defendant’s officers, directors, affiliates, legal representatives, employees, co-conspirators, successors, subsidiaries, and assigns. Also excluded from the Class is any judge, justice, or judicial officer presiding over this matter and the members of their immediate families and judicial staff. 46. Defendant’s practices and omissions were applied uniformly to all members of the Class, including any subclass arising out of the Colorado statutory claims alleged herein, so that the questions of law and fact are common to all members of the Class and any subclass. 58. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference the allegations set forth in each of the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint. 59. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that Defendant engaged in extensive national marketing and advertising, including, but not limited to, print, electronic media, television, internet, and direct marketing through agents, to promote and sell the Product as being “Natural” when it is not, because it contains GMOs. 60. This cause of action is brought on behalf of Plaintiff and members of the general public pursuant to COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-1-105(e), (i), which provides that “a person engages in a deceptive trade practice when, in the course of such person’s business, vocation, or occupation, such person — [k]nowingly makes a false representation as to the characteristics, ingredients, uses, benefits, alterations, or quantities of goods, food, services, or property,” or, “[a]dvertises goods, services, or property with intent not to sell them as advertised.” 61. Defendant committed unfair deceptive business acts and/or practices. Defendant and its related entities represent themselves as being reputable, reliable manufacturers of food products. However, the utility of Defendant’s practices related to the manufacture, marketing, and distribution of the Products for the purpose of selling their Products, and Defendant’s minimal, is negligible, if any, when weighed against the economic harm to the general public, Plaintiff, and Members of the Class. 70. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference the allegations set forth in each of the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint. 77. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference the allegations set forth in each of the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint. 78. Defendant has represented to the public, including Plaintiff, by packaging, labeling and other means that the Product is Natural, although it is not because it contains GMOs. BREACH OF EXPRESS WARRANTY NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION VIOLATION OF COLORADO’S CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 6-1-105, et seq.

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12. Plaintiff brings this claim on behalf of the following case, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(3). 13. The Class consists of: 1) all individuals with addresses in the State of New York; 2) to whom Defendant DRS sent an initial collection letter attempting to collect a consumer debt; 3) that included confusing, misleading terms regarding the balance due; 4) and failed to include mandatory disclosures that interest, fees and costs are continuously accruing, or in the alternative, the creditor/and or Defendant has made the decision to waive accruing interest and fees; 4 5) which letter was sent on or after one (1) year prior to the filing of this action and on or before a date twenty-one (21) days after the filing of this action. 14. The identities of all class members are readily ascertainable from the records of Defendant and those companies and entities on whose behalf they attempt to collect and/or have purchased debts. 15. Excluded from the Plaintiff Class are the Defendants and all officer, members, partners, managers, directors and employees of the Defendants and their respective immediate families, and legal counsel for all parties to this action, and all members of their immediate families. 16. There are questions of law and fact common to the Plaintiff Class, which common issues predominate over any issues involving only individual class members. The principal issue is whether the Defendants’ written communications to consumers, in the forms attached as Exhibit A, violate 15 U.S.C. §§ l692e and §1692g. 17. The Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the class members, as all are based upon the same facts and legal theories. The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Plaintiff Class defined in this complaint. The Plaintiff has retained counsel with experience in handling consumer lawsuits, complex legal issues, and class actions, and neither the Plaintiff nor her attorneys have any interests, which might cause them not to vigorously pursue this action. 18. This action has been brought, and may properly be maintained, as a class action pursuant to the provisions of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because there is a well-defined community interest in the litigation: 5 1) Numerosity: The Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on that basis alleges, that the Plaintiff Class defined above is so numerous that joinder of all members would be impractical. 2) Common Questions Predominate: Common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the Plaintiff Class and those questions predominance over any questions or issues involving only individual class members. The principal issue is whether the Defendants' written communication to consumers, in the forms attached as Exhibit A violate 15 USC §l692e and §1692g. 3) Typicality: The Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the class members. The Plaintiff and all members of the Plaintiff Class have claims arising out of the Defendants' common uniform course of conduct complained of herein. 4) Adequacy: The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class members insofar as Plaintiff has no interests that are adverse to the absent class members. The Plaintiff is committed to vigorously litigating this matter. Plaintiff has also retained counsel experienced in handling consumer lawsuits, complex legal issues, and class actions. Neither the Plaintiff nor her counsel have any interests which might cause them not to vigorously pursue the instant class action lawsuit. 5) Superiority: A class action is superior to the other available means for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy because individual joinder of all members would be impracticable. Class action treatment will permit a large number of similarly situated persons to prosecute their common claims in a single 6 forum efficiently and without unnecessary duplication of effort and expense that individual actions would engender. 19. Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is also appropriate in that the questions of law and fact common to members of the Plaintiff Class predominate over any questions affecting an individual member, and a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. 20. Depending on the outcome of further investigation and discovery, Plaintiff may, at the time of class certification motion, seek to certify a class(es) only as to particular issues pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4). 21. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs numbered above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 22. Some time prior to February 6, 2020 an obligation was allegedly incurred to CitiBank, N.A. 23. The CitiBank, N.A. obligation arose out of transactions in which money, property, insurance or services, which are the subject of the transaction, were primarily for personal, family or household purposes. 24. The alleged CitiBank, N.A. obligation is a "debt" as defined by 15 U.S.C.§ 1692a(5). 25. CitiBank, N.A. is a “creditor” as defined by 15 U.S.C.§ 1692a(4). 26. Defendant JHPDE, a debt collector, purchased the debt from CitiBank, N.A. and contracted with Defendant DRS to collect the alleged debt. 7 27. Defendant collect and attempt to collect debts incurred or alleged to have been incurred for personal, family or household purposes on behalf of creditors using the United States Postal Services, telephone and internet. Violation – February 6, 2020 Collection Letter 28. On or about February 6, 2020 Defendant DRS sent Plaintiff an initial collection letter on behalf of Defendant JHPDE (the “Letter”) regarding the alleged debt once owed to CitiBank, N.A. See Collection Letter – Attached hereto as Exhibit A. 29. When a debt collector solicits payment from a consumer, it must, within five days of an initial communication, provide the consumer with a written validation notice, known as a “G- Notice”, which must include the following information: 1) the amount of the debt; 2) the name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed; 3) a statement that unless the consumer, within thirty days after receipt of the notice, disputes the validity of the debt, or any portion thereof, the debt will be assumed to be valid by the debt collector; 4) a statement that if the consumer notifies the debt collector in writing within the thirty-day period that the debt, or any portion thereof, is disputed, the debt collector will obtain verification of the debt or a copy of the judgment against the consumer and a copy of such verification or judgment will be mailed to the consumer by the debt collector; and 5) a statement that, upon the consumer’s written request within the thirty-day period, the debt collector will provide the consumer with the name and address 8 of the original creditor, if different from the current creditor. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a). 30. The FDCPA further provides that ''if the consumer notifies the debt collector in writing within the thirty-day period . . . that the debt, or any portion thereof, is disputed . . . the debt collector shall cease collection . . . until the debt collector obtains verification of the debt . . . and a copy of such verification is mailed to the consumer by the debt collector.'' 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b). 31. Although a collection letter may track the statutory language, ''the collector nevertheless violates the Act if it conveys that information in a confusing or contradictory fashion so as to cloud the required message with uncertainty.'' Russell v. EQUIFAX A.R.S., 74 F.3d 30, 35 (2d Cir. 1996) (''It is not enough for a debt collection agency to simply include the proper debt validation notice in a mailing to a consumer-- Congress intended that such notice be clearly conveyed.''). Put differently, a notice containing ''language that 'overshadows or contradicts' other language informing a consumer of her rights . . . violates the Act.'' Russell, 74 F.3d at 34. 32. The top contains a box with information regarding the alleged debt as follows: Original Creditor: CITIBANK N.A. Original Account Number: ******** Current Creditor: JHPDE Finance I, LLC Reference Number: ********* Total Outstanding Balance: $6,573.96 Itemization of balance: Charge-off Balance: $6,355.55 Interest Accrued since Charge-off: $53.41 Non-interest charges accrued since charge-off: $0.00 Non-interest fees accrued since charge-off: $165.00 Total amount of payments made on debt since charge-off: $0.00 9 33. The Letter did not contain all the requirement of the “G-Notice”. Specifically, this Letter fails to identify the exact amount of the debt owed. 34. The Letter fails to explain how interest can continue to accrue on an account after it has been charged-off. 35. Furthermore, the Letter fails to explain what non-interest fees are and how they can continue to accrue after charge-off. 36. In addition, the Letter does not disclose to Plaintiff if these supposed post charge-off interest and fees that have accrued will continue to accrue. 37. Failure to account for the accrual of interest and fees or the breakdown of the same is deceptive and misleading as Plaintiff is unable to determine whether interest and fees would continue to accrue until the debt is settled. 38. If interest and fees will continue to accrue during the collection process, the collection letter must explicitly state so: A reasonable consumer could read the notice and be misled into believing that she could pay her debt in full by paying the amount listed on the notice. In fact, however, if interest is accruing daily, or if there are undisclosed late fees, a consumer who pays the "current balance" stated on the notice will not know whether the debt has been paid in full. The debt collector could still seek the interest and fees that accumulated after the notice was sent but before the balance was paid, or sell the consumer's debt to a third party, which itself could seek the interest and fees from the consumer. Because the statement of an amount due, without notice that the amount is already increasing due to accruing interest or other charges, can mislead the least sophisticated consumer into believing that payment of the amount stated will clear her account, we hold that the FDCPA requires debt collectors, when they notify consumers of their account balance, to disclose that the balance may increase due to interest and fees. We think that requiring such disclosure best achieves the Congressional purpose of full and fair disclosure to consumers that is embodied in Section 1692e. It also protects consumers such as plaintiffs who may hold the reasonable but mistaken belief that timely payment will satisfy their debts. (Emphasis Added) 10 Avila v. Riexinger & Assocs., LLC, 817 F.3d 72, 76, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 5327, *6-7 (2d Cir. N.Y. 2016) 39. Furthermore, if the account is including interest and fees, the balance claimed due and owing in the Letter may not be the amount due at the time of payment because of additional interest and fees applied to the account. 40. In the alternative, if interest and fees are not continuing to accrue post charge-off then Defendants should state that the interest and fees provided are a onetime charge. 41. A collection Letter must clearly display the balance owed, the confusing added interest and fees makes it impossible for a consumer to know how much is owed and if the debt will be considered paid if payment in full is made. 42. The confusing and misleading added amounts overshadows the “g-notice” language and coerces the consumer not to exert his rights under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. 43. Stating inaccurate balance amounts is materially misleading to Plaintiff since it is a knowingly false statement. 44. Defendant’s false statement overshadowed Plaintiff’s §1692g right to dispute or validate the debt as he would be confused regarding the correct balance owed. 45. The Defendants have failed to provide the consumer with a statutorily compliant initial communication letter. 46. Plaintiff has suffered an informational injury as he was not provided with the information statutorily required to be included in the initial communication letter from Defendants. 47. As a result of Defendant's deceptive, misleading and unfair debt collection practices, Plaintiff has been damaged. 11 48. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 49. Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. 50. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692e, a debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt. 51. Defendants violated said section by: a. Making a false and misleading representation in violation of § 1692e(10); b. Falsely representing the character amount or legal status of the debt in violation of §1692e(2); c. Making statement that are open to more than one reasonable interpretation, at least one of which is inaccurate. 52. By reason thereof, Defendants are liable to Plaintiff for judgment that Defendant DRS and Defendant JHPDE’s conduct violated Section 1692e et seq. of the FDCPA, actual damages, statutory damages, costs and attorneys’ fees. 53. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 54. Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed toward Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692f. 12 55. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692f, a debt collector may not use any unfair or unconscionable means in connection with the collection of any debt. 56. Defendant violated this section by a. Unfairly adding additional interest and fees after charge-off, when no interest and fees post charge-off are allowed by contract or law; and b. Failing to state whether interest and fees will continue to accrue. 57. By reason thereof, Defendants are liable to Plaintiff for judgment that Defendant’s conduct violated Section 1692f, et seq. of the FDCPA and is entitled to actual damages, statutory damages, costs and attorneys’ fees. 58. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 59. Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692g. 60. When a debt collector solicits payment from a consumer, it must, within five days of an initial communication, provide the consumer with a written validation notice. 61. Although Defendants provided the required §1692g notices, Defendants violated 15 U.S.C. §1692g by: 13 a. Failing to advise Plaintiff as to the basis for the additional interest and fees and therefore not properly identifying the amount of the debt as is required by 1692g(a)(1); and b. Unlawfully adding interest and fees post charge-off that overshadowed the “G- Notice” language and coerces the consumer not to exert if rights to dispute under the FDCPA. 62. By reason thereof, Defendants are liable to Plaintiff for judgment that Defendants’ conduct violated Section 1692g et seq. of the FDCPA, actual damages, statutory damages, costs and attorneys’ fees. VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692e et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692f et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692g et seq.

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24. Defendant’s text messages were transmitted to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone, and within the time frame relevant to this action. 25. Defendant’s text messages constitute telemarketing because they encouraged the future purchase or investment in property, goods, or services, i.e., selling Plaintiff cannabis products. 26. The information contained in the text message advertises various discounts, which Defendant sends to promote its business. 28. At no point in time did Plaintiff provide Defendant with her express written consent to be contacted using an ATDS. 29. Plaintiff is the subscriber and sole user of the 0970 Number, and is financially responsible for phone service to the 0970 Number. 30. The impersonal and generic nature of Defendant’s text message demonstrates that Defendant utilized an ATDS in transmitting the messages. See Jenkins v. LL Atlanta, LLC, No. 1:14- cv-2791-WSD, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30051, at *11 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 9, 2016) (“These assertions, combined with the generic, impersonal nature of the text message advertisements and the use of a short code, support an inference that the text messages were sent using an ATDS.”) (citing Legg v. Voice Media Grp., Inc., 20 F. Supp. 3d 1370, 1354 (S.D. Fla. 2014) (plaintiff alleged facts sufficient to infer text messages were sent using ATDS; use of a short code and volume of mass messaging alleged would be impractical without use of an ATDS); Kramer v. Autobytel, Inc., 759 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1171 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (finding it "plausible" that defendants used an ATDS where messages were advertisements written in an impersonal manner and sent from short code); Hickey v. Voxernet LLC, 887 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1130; Robbins v. Coca-Cola Co., No. 13-CV-132-IEG NLS, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72725, 2013 WL 2252646, at *3 (S.D. Cal. May 22, 2013) (observing that mass messaging would be impracticable without use of an ATDS)). 31. The text messages originated from telephone number 833-424-0890 a number which upon information and belief are owned and operated by or on behalf of Defendant. 32. The numbers used by Defendant are known as a “long code,” a standard 10-digit phone number that enabled Defendant to send SMS text messages en masse, while deceiving recipients into believing that the message was personalized and sent from a telephone number operated by an individual. 34. Specifically, upon information and belief, Defendant utilized a combination of hardware and software systems to send the text messages at issue in this case. The systems utilized by Defendant have the capacity to store telephone numbers using a random or sequential generator, and to dial such numbers from a list without human intervention. 35. To send the text messages, Defendant used a messaging platform (the “Platform”) that permitted Defendant to transmit thousands of automated text messages without any human involvement. 36. The Platform has the capacity to store telephone numbers, which capacity was in fact utilized by Defendant. 37. The Platform has the capacity to generate sequential numbers, which capacity was in fact utilized by Defendant. 38. The Platform has the capacity to dial numbers in sequential order, which capacity was in fact utilized by Defendant. 39. The Platform has the capacity to dial numbers from a list of numbers, which capacity was in fact utilized by Defendant. 40. The Platform has the capacity to dial numbers without human intervention, which capacity was in fact utilized by Defendant. 41. The Platform has the capacity to schedule the time and date for future transmission of text messages, which occurs without any human involvement. 43. The above execution these instructions occurred seamlessly, with no human intervention, and almost instantaneously. Indeed, the Platform is capable of transmitting thousands of text messages following the above steps in minutes, if not less. 44. Further, the Platform “throttles” the transmission of the text messages depending on feedback it receives from the mobile carrier networks. In other words, the platform controls how quickly messages are transmitted depending on network congestion. The platform performs this throttling function automatically and does not allow a human to control the function. 46. Defendant’s unsolicited text messages caused Plaintiff actual harm, including invasion of her privacy, aggravation, annoyance, intrusion on seclusion, trespass, and conversion. Defendant’s text messages also inconvenienced Plaintiff and caused disruption to her daily life. 47. Defendant’s unsolicited text messages caused Plaintiff actual harm. Specifically, Plaintiff estimates that she has wasted approximately 15 minutes reviewing all of Defendant’s unwanted messages and retaining counsel for this case in order to stop Defendant’s unwanted messages. 48. Furthermore, Defendant’s text messages took up memory on Plaintiff’s cellular phone. The cumulative effect of unsolicited text messages like Defendant’s poses a real risk of ultimately rendering the phone unusable for text messaging purposes as a result of the phone’s memory being taken up. See https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0350-text-message-spam#text (finding that text message solicitations like the ones sent by Defendant present a “triple threat” of identity theft, unwanted cell phone charges, and slower cell phone performance). 49. Defendant’s text messages also can slow cell phone performance by taking up space on the recipient phone’s memory. See https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0350-text-message- spam#text (finding that spam text messages can slow cell phone performance by taking up phone memory space). 50. Plaintiff brings this case as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated. 51. Plaintiff brings this case on behalf of a Class defined as follows: No Consent Class: All persons who from four years prior to the filing of this action (1) were sent a text message by or on behalf of Defendant, (2) using an automatic telephone dialing system, (3) for the purpose of soliciting Defendant’s goods and services, and (4) for whom Defendant claims (a) it did not obtain prior express written consent, or (b) it obtained prior express written consent in the same manner as Defendant claims it supposedly obtained prior express written consent to call the Plaintiff. 52. Defendant and its employees or agents are excluded from the Class. Plaintiff does not know the number of members in the Class, but believes the Class members number in the several thousands, if not more. 56. The common questions in this case are capable of having common answers. If Plaintiff’s claim that Defendant routinely transmits text messages to telephone numbers assigned to cellular telephone services is accurate, Plaintiff and the Class members will have identical claims capable of being efficiently adjudicated and administered in this case. 61. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 62. It is a violation of the TCPA to make “any call (other than a call made for emergency purposes or made with the prior express consent of the called party) using any automatic telephone dialing system … to any telephone number assigned to a … cellular telephone service ….” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). 63. Defendant – or third parties directed by Defendant – used equipment having the capacity to dial numbers without human intervention to make non-emergency telephone calls to the cellular telephones of Plaintiff and the other members of the Class defined below. 64. These calls were made without regard to whether or not Defendant had first obtained express permission from the called party to make such calls. In fact, Defendant did not have prior express consent to call the cell phones of Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class when its calls were made. 66. Defendant knew that it did not have prior express consent to make these calls, and knew or should have known that it was using equipment that at constituted an automatic telephone dialing system. The violations were therefore willful or knowing. 67. As a result of Defendant’s conduct and pursuant to § 227(b)(3) of the TCPA, Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class were harmed and are each entitled to a minimum of $500.00 in damages for each violation. Plaintiff and the class are also entitled to an injunction against future calls. Id. 68. Plaintiff re-allege and incorporate paragraphs 1-60 as if fully set forth herein. 69. At all times relevant, Defendant knew or should have known that its conduct as alleged herein violated the TCPA. 70. Defendant knew that it did not have prior express consent to make these calls, and knew or should have known that its conduct was a violation of the TCPA. 71. Because Defendant knew or should have known that Plaintiff and Class Members had not given prior express consent to receive its autodialed calls, the Court should treble the amount of statutory damages available to Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class pursuant to § 227(b)(3) of the TCPA. 72. As a result of Defendant’s violations, Plaintiff and the Class Members are entitled to an award of $1,500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C). Knowing and/or Willful Violation of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class) Violations of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)

lose

24. Plaintiffs bring this class action pursuant to Rules 23(a) and (b)(2) and/or (b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on their behalf and on behalf of a class similarly situated and affected during the pendency of this lawsuit and in the future. Plaintiffs will seek to certify a class to seek relief with respect to the Unsanctioned and Forced Drug Tests Policy. The class is defined as all persons with criminal charges requiring them to appear in the White County Probate Court who are, were, or in the future will be subject to the Defendants’ practice of requiring probationers to submit to and to pay for drug tests, in the absence of any court order authorizing such drug tests. 25. Plaintiffs meet the requirements of Rule 23(a) in that: a. The class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. The class consists of an unknown number of probationers, who can be readily identified through court and probation records, who have been 9 or will be under a legal obligation to appear before the White County Probate Court, and who are subject to Defendants’ policy of requiring submission to and payment for drug tests in cases in which no such tests were court-ordered. b. There are questions of law and fact common to the class concerning the constitutionality and lawfulness of the Defendants’ policy challenged in this Complaint. The absence of any lawful basis for forcing probationers to submit their urine and to pay for drug tests presents a question of fact and law common to all class members. Similarly, there is a common question as to whether the Unsanctioned and Forced Drug Tests Policy violates state and federal law. c. The policy challenged in this action applies with equal force to the named plaintiffs and all members of the class so that the claims of the plaintiffs are typical of those of the class. Ligocki and Luse were subject to the Unsanctioned and Forced Drug Tests Policy. d. The named Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. The Plaintiffs possess the requisite personal interest in the subject matter of the lawsuit and possess no interests adverse to other class members. The Plaintiffs are represented by attorneys at the 10 Southern Center for Human Rights, a nonprofit organization with extensive experience in complex class action litigation. 26. Plaintiffs meet the requirements of Rule 23(b)(2) in that the Defendants acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole. 27. Plaintiffs meet the requirements of Rule 23(b)(3) because common questions of law and fact predominate over questions affecting individual class members. A class action is superior to any other method of adjudicating this dispute because hundreds of people are subjected to the Unsanctioned and Forced Drug Tests Policy described in this Complaint, but few are likely to have the time, legal acumen, and resources to pursue the claims at issue in this case on their own. 28. The Georgia Code authorizes governing authorities to contract with private companies to provide probation supervision services. O.C.G.A. § 42-8- 101(a)(1). The White County Probate Court, with the approval of the government of White County, entered into such a contract with Sentinel. (Exhibit A.) 11 B. Sentinel’s Violation of Its Contract with White County and of Georgia Rules and Regulations Governing Fee Collection 29. The contract between the White County Probate Court and Sentinel states that Sentinel agrees to “[c]ollect from probationers, court-ordered fines, restitution and other costs associated with order of the Court.” Exhibit A at 2 (emphasis supplied). The contract further provides that “[d]rug counselling and urine surveillance will be provided to probationers identified by the Court has having drug or alcohol related problems. Probationers will assume the cost of random drug and/or alcohol testing.” Id. at 3 (emphasis supplied). 30. The Rules and Regulations of the State of Georgia place further limitations on the circumstances under which probation companies may assess fees. Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. 503-1-.30 states: a. No probation entity shall assess, collect, or disburse any funds as it pertains to the collection of court-ordered monies, except by written order of the court or as required by State law. b. No probation entity, owner, director, agent, or employee may offer any program service or component for an additional fee unless the fee charge has been ordered by the court or as required by State law. 31. Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. 503-1-.31 further states: “No owner, operator, director, agent or employee shall collect or disburse any funds as it pertains to 12 O.C.G.A. § 42-8-100, except by written or oral order of the court or as required by State law.” 32. Defendants’ practice of drug-testing Plaintiffs and charging them money for such tests violates both Sentinel’s contract with the Probate Court and Rules and Regulations of the State of Georgia governing private probation entities. C. Application of Defendants’ Policies to Rita Sanders Luse 33. On March 12, 2014, Luse appeared in the White County Probate Court and pleaded guilty to the charge of driving while unlicensed.1 34. The Probate Court sentenced Luse to pay a fine of $775.75. Because Luse could not pay on the day of court, Judge Baker placed Luse on probation for 12 months and ordered her to pay $44 per month in probation supervision fees. 35. Judge Baker memorialized Luse’s sentence in a disposition form. (Exhibit B.) The disposition form contains a number of boxes that the judge can check if he wishes to impose special conditions of probation. The policy and practice of the Probate Court, consistent with Georgia law and the Constitution, is 1 Unbeknownst to her, Luse’s license had been suspended due to a then-unresolved citation involving Luse’s car registration. 13 to write all court-imposed obligations on the disposition sheet so that probationers understand what is required of them. 36. The disposition form in Luse’s case shows that no special conditions of probation were imposed. In particular, Judge Baker did not impose the special condition printed on the form that states: “Probationer shall upon request by the Probation Officer or any Law Enforcement Officer, produce specimen of bodily substance for analysis for the presence of a substance prohibited by the Law of the State of Georgia, the United States or by the terms of this sentence.” (Exhibit B.) 37. Although the court did not order drug-testing in Luse’s case, Sentinel drug-tested her anyway. When Luse reported to Sentinel’s Cleveland office, Defendant McDowell-Black told Luse that she would be required to take a drug test. Luse objected. McDowell-Black falsely told Luse that drug testing was a condition of her probation and that she was required to submit a urine sample. 38. McDowell-Black required Luse to sign a document that would purport to permit Sentinel to collect and test Luse’s urine for controlled substances. Luse signed the document, believing, due to McDowell-Black’s misrepresentation, that her probation could be revoked if she refused to comply with her probation officer’s directions. 14 39. Luse was then instructed to urinate in a cup and to deliver her urine specimen to a Sentinel employee. 40. Sentinel charged Luse a $15 fee for each drug test. 41. McDowell-Black repeatedly caused Luse to submit to and pay for drug tests over the course of her year on probation. 42. Luse never tested positive for any controlled substance. 43. Luse does not drink any alcohol or use illegal drugs. During the course of her probation sentence, Luse never manifested any signs or symptoms of a person under the influence of or dependent on drugs or alcohol. 44. McDowell-Black further falsely threatened to immediately jail Luse when Luse was unable to pay her fines and fees. 45. About halfway through her probation term, Luse reported to McDowell-Black without her payment. Luse explained that she did not have any money left in her bank account, but that she would receive a pay check from her employer in a few days. Luse asked for a brief extension on Sentinel’s payment deadline. McDowell-Black falsely informed Luse that if she did not have her full payment of approximately $140 within a few hours, McDowell-Black would have Luse immediately arrested. 15 46. Luse was forced to call a relative to ask for a loan, to rush across town to collect the loaned money, to obtain a money order, and to rush back to Sentinel’s office with the payment. She did so believing that she would be sent to jail if she did not pay that day. 47. McDowell-Black’s use of the false threat of imminent jail to coerce an immediate payment from Luse caused Luse anxiety, stress, and humiliation. D. Application of Defendants’ Policies to Marianne Ligocki 48. On February 10, 2015, Ligocki was on her way to pick up her son from school when a White County Sheriff’s Deputy stopped her vehicle at a roadside checkpoint. The deputy discovered that Ligocki’s driver’s license was suspended,2 and he cited her for driving on a suspended license. 49. On July 8, 2015, Ligocki appeared in the White County Probate Court and pleaded guilty to a reduced charge of driving while unlicensed. 50. Judge Baker sentenced Ligocki to a fine and surcharges totaling $313.02. Because Ligocki was unable to pay the fine on the day of court, Judge 2 Ligocki’s license was suspended due to a traffic ticket from the DeKalb County Recorder’s Court from 2011. Ligocki believed that she had paid the Recorder’s Court ticket and that the case had been resolved. Following her arrest in White County, Ligocki resolved the DeKalb County Recorder’s Court ticket and had her license reinstated. 16 Baker sentenced her to 12 months on probation at $44.00 per month. Judge Baker also sentenced Ligocki to 20 hours of community service, to be suspended upon payment of all fines and surcharges. 51. Judge Baker memorialized Ligocki’s sentence in a disposition form. (Exhibit C.) The disposition form contains a number of boxes that the judge could check if he wished to impose special conditions of probation. 52. The disposition form in Ligocki’s case shows that no special conditions of probation were imposed. In particular, Judge Baker did not impose the condition printed on the form that states: “Probationer shall upon request by the Probation Officer or any Law Enforcement Officer, produce specimen of bodily substance for analysis for the presence of a substance prohibited by the Law of the State of Georgia, the United States or by the terms of this sentence.” (Exhibit C.) 53. On July 23, 2015, Ligocki reported for her first visit to McDowell- Black at Sentinel’s Cleveland office. Upon arrival, Ligocki was required to submit to a pat-down search of her person by a Sentinel employee. 54. McDowell-Black then told Ligocki that Ligocki would be required to submit a urine sample for a drug test. Ligocki objected, pointing out that the Probate Court had not ordered drug testing in her case. 17 55. McDowell-Black falsely told Ligocki that drug testing was a condition of her probation and that she was required to submit a urine sample. 56. McDowell-Black forced Ligocki to sign a “waiver” document that purported to permit Sentinel to test Ligocki’s urine for drugs. Ligocki protested again and asked what would happen if she did not sign the “waiver” document. McDowell-Black falsely responded that if Ligocki did not sign the document she could not be on probation and her probation could be revoked. Ligocki signed the document, believing, due to McDowell-Black’s misrepresentation, that she could be sent to jail if she refused to comply with her probation officer’s directions. 57. McDowell-Black then instructed Ligocki to submit a urine sample. Ligocki was required to take down her pants and urinate in a cup with the door partially open and with a Sentinel employee standing by the door to the bathroom. McDowell-Black alleged that she tested positive for THC. 58. Ligocki was subsequently drug-tested repeatedly over the course of her probation. Each time, she was required to urinate with the door open and with a Sentinel employee standing at the door. Sentinel charged Ligocki a fee for each drug test. 59. On September 17, 2015, McDowell-Black alleged that Ligocki’s drug test was positive for THC. 18 60. McDowell-Black told Ligocki that she was “violating” her. McDowell-Black told Ligocki that she would be required to perform 30 hours of community service or bring Sentinel $217.50 in 30 days. McDowell-Black also told Ligocki that she would be required to take and pay for additional monthly drug tests for the next six months, and that she would not be eligible for early termination of probation. Ligocki completed the community service. 61. On December 4, 2015, Ligocki reported for a pre-scheduled probation appointment and submitted her required payment. At this appointment, McDowell-Black instructed Ligocki to return to the Sentinel office for another drug test on December 10, 2015. Ligocki did so. 62. On December 10, 2015, Ligocki appeared at the Sentinel office and McDowell-Black instructed her to submit to a drug test. On this occasion, Ligocki was required to urinate in a cup while the bathroom door was wide open, and with a Sentinel employee watching her urinate. 63. Following the December 10 drug test, McDowell-Black claimed that Ligocki had again tested positive for THC. The drug test result was in error because Ligocki had not used marijuana. Ligocki objected that the test result was erroneous. 19 64. McDowell-Black called Ligocki a “liar,” told her she was going to issue a warrant for Ligocki’s arrest, and instructed her to immediately leave her office. McDowell-Black told Ligocki “I’ll see you in jail.” 65. Since December 2015, Ligocki has experienced stress and anxiety from the fear that she could be imminently arrested in connection with drug tests that no court ordered her to take. 66. To date, Sentinel has collected far more money for itself than it has allocated to the fine imposed in Ligocki’s case. The following chart shows Ligocki’s payments and the manner in which Sentinel has distributed them: Date Fine Sentinel’s Drug Test Fee Sentinel’s Probation Supervision Fee Ga. Crime Victim Emergency Fund Ligocki’s Total Payment July 23, 2015 $41 $15 $35 $9 $100 August 19, 2015 $34 $35 $9 $78 September 17, 2015 $19 $15 $35 $9 $78 October 26, 2015 $4 $30 $34 October 26, 2015 $35 $35 October 26, 2015 $9 $9 November 16, 2015 $24 $24 November 16, 2015 $15 $15 December 4, 2015 $33 $20 $53 December 4, 2015 $46 $46 December 4, 2015 $18 $18 Total Paid $131 $95 $210 $54 $490 20 67. To date, Ligocki has paid $490 in connection with her citation for driving while unlicensed. Only $131 of that amount has been applied to her fine. By contrast, Sentinel collected $305 for itself. 68. To date, Ligocki has submitted to drug screens on five occasions. She has paid Sentinel $95 in drug test fees that were never ordered by any court. 69. Plaintiffs incorporate herein and re-allege, as if fully set forth herein, all factual allegations of paragraphs 1-17, 22-23, and 28-68. 70. Without probable cause or legal authority, Defendants required Plaintiffs and other probationers to submit their urine to Sentinel employees and to pay for drug tests not ordered by any court. They did so for the purpose of generating revenue for their company. 21 71. Defendants required Plaintiffs to submit to drug tests even though they had no basis to believe that either Plaintiff had committed or was committing any criminal offense or violation. 72. Defendants required probationers to take drug tests at their own expense without any involvement of a court or objective standards governing when or how often this invasive procedure would occur. 73. The search of each Plaintiff’s urine was unreasonable under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and under Ga. Const. art. I, sec. I, para. XIII. 74. The urine tests administered to Plaintiffs constituted a search for which judicial oversight was required. There was no such oversight permitting such an intrusive search in Plaintiffs’ cases. 75. The Defendants had fair warning that their conduct would violate the Constitution and no reasonable officer or probation officer could have believed that requiring Plaintiffs to submit to these drug tests was legal. 76. In each and every instance set forth above, Defendants acted intentionally, with malice, and with actual intent to cause injury in the performance of their official functions. Defendants knew or should have known that requiring 22 Plaintiffs to submit to drug tests, without any legal authority, violated Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. 77. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ illegal policies and practices, Defendants searched Plaintiffs’ urine in violation of law. Defendants are jointly and severally liable for the violations of Plaintiffs’ rights, and the harm they suffered as a result, because each Defendant either personally participated in the actions or failures to act, or implicitly authorized, approved, or knowingly condoned or failed to remedy the wrongs at issue. 78. Defendants’ above-described actions were willful, deliberate, and malicious, and involved reckless or callous indifference to Plaintiffs’ rights and should be punished and deterred by an award of punitive or enhanced damages against Defendants as permitted by law. 79. Plaintiffs incorporate herein and re-allege, as if fully set forth herein, all factual allegations of paragraphs 1-17, 22-23, and 28-68. 23 80. Defendants drug-tested Plaintiffs and other probationers without notice to the probationers that they would be required to submit to drug tests, and without any process available to challenge the legality of such tests. By drug- testing Plaintiffs without notice or legal authority to collect their urine samples and by requiring Plaintiffs to pay for such testing, Defendants deprived Plaintiffs of their privacy interests and property without due process of law in violation of Plaintiffs’ rights. U.S. Const. amend. XIV; Ga. Const. art. 1, § I, ¶¶ I and II. 81. Defendants jointly and severally caused deprivations of Plaintiffs’ privacy interests and money, under color of law, without providing notice or an opportunity to be heard. In addition, Defendants jointly and severally caused deprivations of Plaintiffs’ substantive due process rights through their deliberate indifference to Plaintiffs’ right to privacy and their conscience-shocking treatment of people under their control. 82. Defendants further violated Luse’s due process rights when McDowell-Black falsely told Luse, who had no money, that she would have to pay $140 within a few hours or be immediately jailed. Certainly, Luse was under an obligation to pay court-ordered monies. However, Georgia law provides that “the imposition of sanctions for failure to pay [monies assessed by the court] shall be within the discretion of the court through judicial process or hearings.” O.C.G.A. § 24 42-8-102(e)(2). Sentinel violates probationers’ due process rights when it demands and collects the probationers’ last dollar (or, in Luse’s case, borrowed money), under threat of immediate incarceration, without judicial process. 83. Defendants knew or should have known that the conduct described herein violated Plaintiffs’ rights. Defendants’ above-described actions were willful, deliberate, and malicious, and involved reckless or callous indifference to Plaintiffs’ rights and should be punished and deterred by an award of punitive or enhanced damages against individual Defendants as permitted by law. 84. Plaintiffs incorporate herein and re-allege, as if fully set forth herein, all factual allegations of paragraphs 1-17, 22-23, and 28-68. 85. An action for money had and received is founded upon the equitable principle that no one ought to unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another, and is maintainable in all cases where one has received money under such circumstances that in equity and good conscience he ought not to retain it. 25 86. A cause of action based on the theory of money had and received may be brought against a private probation company to recover probation fees which it unlawfully collected from misdemeanor probationers in contravention of law. 87. Defendants placed themselves in the position of receiving and retaining money from the Plaintiffs which the Plaintiffs were not lawfully required to pay and which Sentinel was not lawfully entitled to receive. 88. Plaintiffs incorporate herein and re-allege, as if fully set forth herein, all factual allegations of paragraphs 1-17, 22-23, and 28-68. 89. Defendants’ practice of appropriating Plaintiffs’ and others’ money without legal authority constitutes conversion – an intentional tort under Georgia law. See O.C.G.A. § 51-10-1 (“The owner of personalty is entitled to its possession. Any deprivation of such possession is a tort for which an action lies.”). 26 90. Defendants took and converted to their own use the funds set forth above from Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs are entitled to recover the amount of money converted, plus interest from the date of the conversion. 91. Defendants’ above-described actions were willful, deliberate, and malicious and should be punished and deterred by an award of punitive damages as permitted by law and in an amount to be determined at trial. 92. Plaintiffs incorporate herein and re-allege, as if fully set forth herein, all factual allegations of paragraphs 1-17, 22-23, and 28-68. 93. Defendants committed the tort of fraud against Plaintiffs. The tort of fraud has five elements: false representation, scienter, inducement, reliance, and injury. 94. McDowell-Black made a series of false, verbal representations to both Plaintiffs that they were required to submit to and to pay for drug tests. McDowell-Black knew when making this false representation to Plaintiffs that Sentinel had no legal authority to require drug tests in these cases. Sentinel, 27 through McDowell-Black, nonetheless induced Plaintiffs to submit to drug tests and to pay for them. Defendants undertook these acts with malice and intent to deceive Plaintiffs. McDowell-Black further made a false representation to Plaintiff Luse that if Luse was unable to pay, she would be jailed immediately at the sole discretion of her probation officer. 95. Plaintiffs Luse and Ligocki relied on Defendant McDowell-Black’s false representations regarding drug-testing and, as a proximate result of the false representations, Plaintiffs submitted their urine to Sentinel and paid Sentinel drug testing fees. Plaintiff Luse relied on McDowell-Black’s false threats that Luse would be jailed immediately at the sole discretion of McDowell-Black if she failed to pay Sentinel on the day her payment was demanded. 96. Plaintiffs were injured by their reliance on McDowell-Black’s false representations regarding drug testing because they were required to submit to repeated and intrusive searches and paid money they did not owe. Luse was further injured by her reliance on McDowell-Black’s false threats that Luse would be jailed immediately, at her probation officer’s sole discretion, if she could not pay in accordance with Sentinel’s payment deadline. Luse suffered worry, anxiety, and humiliation as a consequence of her probation officer’s false statements. 28 97. Plaintiffs incorporate herein and re-allege, as if fully set forth herein, all factual allegations of paragraphs 1-17, 22-23, and 28-68. 98. Tortious coercion occurs when a threat coupled with an apparent intention and ability to carry out the threat coerces action or inaction contrary to the victim’s will. See Peavy v. Bank South, N.A., 474 S.E.2d 690, 693, 222 Ga. App. 501, 503 (1996); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 871 cmt. f (1979). 99. McDowell-Black threatened Plaintiffs with probation revocation if they failed to submit to and to pay for drug tests. McDowell-Black had no legal authority to require drug tests in these cases and thus no lawful basis for her threats. 100. McDowell-Black further threatened to jail Luse if Luse was unable to pay her fines and fees, contrary to established law holding that a person may not be jailed solely for inability to make a payment. 101. McDowell-Black had the apparent intent and ability to carry out her threats through her role as a private probation officer for Sentinel. 29 102. Plaintiffs unwillingly provided urine samples and unwillingly paid money as a result of McDowell-Black’s threats. 103. Plaintiffs were injured because they were required to submit to repeated, intrusive searches and repeatedly paid money they did not owe. 104. Plaintiff Luse was further injured by her submission to McDowell- Black’s threats to jail Luse if she could not pay. Luse suffered worry, stress, anxiety, and humiliation as a consequence of her probation officer’s threats. A. The White County Probate Court’s Delegation of Probation Services to Sentinel Conversion O.C.G.A. § 51-10-1 (by all Plaintiff against all Defendants) Declaratory Relief (By Plaintiff Ligocki Against Defendants) 114. Plaintiffs incorporate herein and re-allege, as if fully set forth herein, all factual allegations of paragraphs 1-17, 22-23, and 28-68.. 115. Ligocki is still on probation and is under the supervision of McDowell-Black and Sentinel. 116. Without legal authority, Defendants forced Ligocki and other probationers to submit to drug tests and to pay for drug tests that were never ordered by any court. McDowell-Black further has a practice of coercing 32 payments by using false threats that nonpayment will automatically result in immediate incarceration in the sole discretion of the probation officer. 117. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201, Ligocki seeks a declaration by the Court that Defendants may not require probationers to submit to drug test that have not been ordered by any court. Plaintiff further seeks a declaration by the Court that Sentinel probation officers may not coerce payments from probationers by employing false threats that nonpayment will result in immediate jail in the sole discretion of the probation officer. 118. Plaintiffs and putative class members will be adversely affected if Defendants continue to drug-test people in cases in which no drug testing has been ordered by the court. Ligocki and others will be adversely affected if Defendants continue to coerce payments through false threats that nonpayment will result in immediate incarceration in the sole discretion of the probation officer. Due Process Clause Violations Violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, Brought Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and Violation of Art. I, Sec. I, Para. I of the Georgia Constitution (by all Plaintiffs against Defendants) Fraud (by all Plaintiffs against all Defendants) Injunctive Relief (by all Plaintiff Ligocki against Defendants) 108. Plaintiffs incorporate herein and re-allege, as if fully set forth herein, the allegations of paragraphs 1-17, 22-23, and 28-68. 109. Ligocki is still on probation and is under the supervision of McDowell-Black and Sentinel. 110. Ligocki seeks an injunction to prevent Defendants from requiring her and other probationers to submit to drug tests that were not ordered by the Probate Court. Ligocki seek an injunction to prevent Sentinel and Sentinel probation officers from falsely informing probationers that they will be immediately jailed at the sole discretion of the probation officer if they are unable to pay. 111. Defendants’ conduct is not authorized by any Georgia law and violates 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 31 112. Defendants’ conduct is likely to continue unless enjoined. Defendants’ conduct is causing Plaintiff and other current probationers immediate irreparable harm that cannot be remedied by the award of money damages. Plaintiff has no plain, adequate, or complete remedy at law to redress the wrongs described herein. 113. The balance of hardships and public policy strongly favor the Court entering a preliminary injunction and thereafter permanently enjoining Defendants’ unlawful policies and practices as described herein. Invasion of Privacy (by Plaintiff Ligocki against all Defendants) 105. Plaintiffs incorporate herein and re-allege, as if fully set forth herein, all factual allegations of paragraphs 1-17, 22-23, and 28-68. 106. An individual has a right of privacy regarding her use of a restroom. McDowell-Black required Ligocki to urinate in a cup with the bathroom door open in view of a Sentinel employee, without any legal authority. In so doing, she intruded on Ligocki’s seclusion in a restroom in a manner that would be offensive or objectionable to a reasonable person, and that was so to Ligocki. 30 107. Being required to urinate with the bathroom door open in view of a Sentinel employee caused Ligocki embarrassment and humiliation. Defendant McDowell-Black invaded Ligocki’s right to personal privacy in violation of law. Money Had and Received (by all Plaintiffs against Defendants) Tortious Coercion (by all Plaintiffs against all Defendants) Unconstitutional Search and Seizure Violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, Brought Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and Violation of Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XIII of the Georgia Constitution (by all Plaintiffs against Defendants)

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2.1 guidelines; c. Regularly test user accessibility by blind or vision-impaired persons to ensure that Defendant’s Website complies under the WCAG 2.1 guidelines; and, d. Develop an accessibility policy that is clearly disclosed on Defendant’s Websites, with contact information for users to report accessibility-related problems. 21. Defendant is a kitchenware retailer that owns and operates www.cutleryandmore.com (its “Website”), offering features which should allow all consumers to access the goods and services and which Defendant ensures the delivery of such goods throughout the United States, including New York State. 22. Defendant’s Website offers products and services for online sale and general delivery to the public. The Website offers features which ought to allow users to browse for items, access navigation bar descriptions and prices, and avail consumers of the ability to peruse the numerous items offered for sale. 23. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient NVDA screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using a screen-reader. 24. On multiple occasions, the last occurring in October of 2019, Plaintiff visited Defendant’s website, www.cutleryandmore.com, to make a purchase. Despite his efforts, however, Plaintiff was denied a shopping experience similar to that of a sighted individual due to the website’s lack of a variety of features and accommodations, which effectively barred Plaintiff from being able to determine what specific products were offered for sale. 26. Many features on the Website also fail to Add a label element or title attribute for each field. This is a problem for the visually impaired because the screen reader fails to communicate the purpose of the page element. It also leads to the user not being able to understand what he or she is expected to insert into the subject field. As a result, Plaintiff and similarly situated visually impaired users of Defendant’s Website are unable to enjoy the privileges and benefits of the Website equally to sighted users. 27. Many pages on the Website also contain the same title elements. This is a problem for the visually impaired because the screen reader fails to distinguish one page from another. In order to fix this problem, Defendant must change the title elements for each page. 28. The Website also contained a host of broken links, which is a hyperlink to a non- existent or empty webpage. For the visually impaired this is especially paralyzing due to the inability to navigate or otherwise determine where one is on the website once a broken link is encountered. For example, upon coming across a link of interest, Plaintiff was redirected to an error page. However, the screen-reader failed to communicate that the link was broken. As a result, Plaintiff could not get back to his original search. 30. It is, upon information and belief, Defendant’s policy and practice to deny Plaintiff, along with other blind or visually-impaired users, access to Defendant’s website, and to therefore specifically deny the goods and services that are offered to the general public. Due to Defendant’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to its website, Plaintiff and visually-impaired persons have been and are still being denied equal access to Defendant’s Website, and the numerous goods and services and benefits offered to the public through the Website. 31. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s Website, blind and visually-impaired customers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, products, and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from equal access to the Website. 32. If the Website were equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 33. Through his attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 35. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 36. The ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks in this action. In relevant part, the ADA requires: In the case of violations of . . . this title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities . . . Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the . . . modification of a policy . . . 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 38. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 39. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining their Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making their Website equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 40. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 42. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered, during the relevant statutory period. 43. Common questions of law and fact exist amongst the Class, including: a. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “public accommodation” under the ADA; b. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “place or provider of public accommodation” under the NYCHRL; c. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the ADA; and d. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the NYCHRL. 45. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class Members because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the Class Members. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. 46. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 47. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 48. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 50. Defendant’s Website is a public accommodations within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). The Website is a service that is offered to the general public, and as such, must be equally accessible to all potential consumers. 51. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 52. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 53. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 55. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 56. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 57. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 58. Defendant’s Website is a sales establishment and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9). 60. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with such Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, products, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 61. Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). 62. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the Sub- Class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 64. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of its Website under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 65. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 66. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 67. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 68. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 69. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class and New York City Sub-Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 71. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL

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(for Amy Summers) (for Charles Edward Steed) (for Amy Summers) 12. In July 2010, Steed reviewed his credit report and noticed that Equifax was reporting various items that did not belong to him. On or about July 2, 2010, Steed notified Equifax that he disputed these items, including an inquiry from ClearPoint Financial (which Equifax also identifies as “CCCS of VA”). He indicated that the inquiry did not belong to him. 13. In response to his dispute, Equifax sent Steed a letter dated July 28, 2010. The letter began: “Below are the results of your request for Equifax to reinvestigate certain elements of your Equifax credit file. Equifax contacted each source 4 directly and our investigation is now completed. If you have any additional questions or concerns, please contact the source of that information directly.” Exhibit B, page 1. 14. For the results to Steed’s dispute of the inquiry, Equifax stated: “We have reviewed the inquiry information for CCCS of VA. The results are: Inquiries are a factual record of file access. If you believe this was unauthorized, please contact the creditor. If you have additional questions about this item please contact: CCCS of VA, 4660 S Laburnum Ave, Richmond, VA 23231-2424.” Exhibit B, page 2. 15. Equifax’s statement that it had reinvestigated Steed’s dispute of the inquiry and contacted the source of that information directly was not true. Equifax had not contacted CCCS of VA. However, Steed did not know that Equifax had not reinvestigated his dispute or contacted the source when he received the results in 2010. Equifax’s false statement about reinvestigating his dispute and contacting the source prevented Steed from discovering that Equifax had failed to reinvestigate his dispute of the inquiry. 16. Equifax continued to include the inquiry from CCCS of VA in Steed’s credit file. 5 17. Amy Summers is a victim of identity theft. Someone used her identification to open accounts for services from DirecTV and Dish Network. 18. In March 2013, Summers reviewed her Equifax credit report and saw that Equifax was reporting two inquiries from DirecTV and one inquiry from Dish Network. On or about March 13, 2013, Summers notified Equifax through its online dispute system that the two DirecTV inquiries were fraudulent and that the Dish Network inquiry was fraudulent. 19. In response to her disputes, Equifax sent Summers a letter dated March 13, 2013. For the results to her dispute of the inquiries by DirecTV, Equifax stated: “We have reviewed the inquiry information for Directv. The results are: Inquiries are a factual record of file access. If you believe this was unauthorized, please contact the creditor. If you have additional questions about this item please contact: Directv, 2230 E Imperial Hwy, Mail Station LA1/N368, EL Segundo, CA 90245-3504.” Exhibit A, page 1. 20. For the results to her dispute of the inquiry by Dish Network, Equifax stated: “We have reviewed the inquiry information for Dish Network. The results are: Inquiries are a factual record of file access. If you believe this was unauthorized, please contact the creditor. If you have additional questions about this item please 6 contact: Dish Network, 9601 S Meridian Blvd, Bldg 1 FLR 3 Cmo, Englewood, CO 80112-5905.” Exhibit A, page 1. 21. Equifax continued to report the Dish Network and DirecTV inquiries on Summers’ credit file. 22. Equifax attached a copy of Summers’ credit file to the letter responding to her disputes. The Equifax letter began: “Enclosed is a copy of your Equifax credit file. Please review it for any unauthorized accounts or inquiries. If unauthorized information is reporting on your Equifax credit file, you may start an investigation immediately on-line at www.investigate.equifax.com. Using the Internet to initiate an on-line investigation request will expedite the resolution of your concerns. You may also start an investigation by completing and returning the enclosed Research Request Form or by calling the toll free telephone number on the credit file.” Exhibit A, page 1. 23. Summers had just done exactly as Equifax advised her to do. She had reviewed her Equifax credit file, seen the unauthorized inquiries and made an online dispute to Equifax in which she informed Equifax that the inquiries were fraudulent. Yet Equifax had sent her results indicating it would not remove those inquiries from her credit file. Now Equifax was advising her to go through the 7 entire dispute process again although doing so would not result in the deletion of the fraudulent inquiries. 24. The FCRA has strict requirements that Equifax must follow in regard to information disputed by a consumer. If a consumer notifies Equifax that the consumer disputes “the completeness or accuracy of any item of information contained in a consumer’s file” Equifax must “conduct a reasonable reinvestigation to determine whether the disputed information is inaccurate and record the current status of the disputed information, or delete the item from the file” within 30 days of receiving the consumer’s dispute. 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(1)(A). As part of the reinvestigation, Equifax must “provide notification of the dispute to any person who provided any item of information in dispute,” and the notice must “include all relevant information regarding the dispute that the agency has received from the consumer….” 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(2)(A). 25. Part of the information that Equifax includes on its consumer reports is a list of persons who obtained a consumer report on that consumer within the previous two years. Equifax will report the name and address of the person and the date they obtained the consumer report. Each name, address and date is known as an “inquiry.” Inquiry information is included on a credit report because it is part of a 8 consumer’s credit history. The inquiry information identifies the persons with whom the consumer has sought credit and shows how often the consumer has sought credit. 26. Inquiries have a negative impact on a consumer’s credit score. The more inquiries, the lower the score. That is because the scoring programs view each inquiry as an application for credit by that consumer, and a consumer who makes multiple applications is considered a greater risk than a consumer who does not. 27. Inquiry information is often inaccurate. Sometimes an inquiry will be on a consumer’s credit report although the consumer did not seek credit. A common example is when a consumer is a victim of identity theft, such as Summers, and the identity thief has sought credit using the consumer’s identification. Another example is when the consumer reporting agency provides the consumer’s report to a creditor who requested a report on a different person (perhaps with a similar name), such as happened with Steed. 28. Listing inquiries on a consumer’s report that do not belong to that consumer misrepresents that consumer’s credit history regarding the number of times, and with whom, the consumer has sought credit or services. It also unfairly lowers the consumers credit score because it was not that consumer that was seeking the credit. 9 29. If a consumer disputes an inquiry, Equifax must reinvestigate to determine whether the inquiry actually pertains to that consumer and should be part of that consumer’s credit history. As part of the reinvestigation, Equifax must notify the source of the inquiry about the consumer’s dispute and provide the source with all the relevant information provided by the consumer. Alternatively, Equifax can delete the inquiry. 30. Equifax does none of these things. It does not reinvestigate the disputed inquiry. It does not notify the source about the consumer’s dispute. It does not provide the source with all the relevant information about the dispute. And it does not delete the inquiry. 31. Contacting the source is critical in doing a reasonable reinvestigation. That is why Congress required Equifax to contact the source. In cases of identity theft, the source may be aware of the identity theft either through notice from the consumer who is the victim, or through the source’s own identity theft detection procedures. In situations where the wrong consumer’s report was provided to the source, the source may know it got a report on a consumer who is not the person they were dealing with; or it could check its records to determine if that occurred. Equifax can also reinvestigate such cases by comparing the identifying information for the consumer whose report was provided to see if there are differences with the 10 identifying information of the consumer provided by the person who requested the credit report. 32. Equifax’s failure to reinvestigate the dispute, contact the source of the disputed information, or delete the disputed information violates one of the most fundamental protections afforded to consumers under the FCRA. A consumer has a right to dispute the accuracy or completeness of “any item of information contained in a consumer’s file” and Equifax must “conduct a reasonable reinvestigation to determine whether the disputed information is inaccurate.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(1)(A). Equifax’s practice takes away this fundamental right of a consumer to dispute and have the disputed information reinvestigated. Moreover, it undermines the accuracy of the information on consumer reports. Consumers often notice inaccurate information on a consumer report that the consumer reporting agency is not aware of. Through the dispute and reinvestigation procedure mandated by the FCRA, inaccurate information is removed from credit reports. The dispute procedure is virtually the only way that a consumer can correct errors on a consumer report. 33. Equifax recognizes its obligation to reinvestigate disputed information and to contact the source as part of that reinvestigation. This is evident in the letter sent to Steed in which Equifax stated that it had conducted a reinvestigation and 11 contacted the source of the disputed information directly. And it is evident in the letter sent to Summers stating that she should review her credit file and make an on-line dispute to Equifax regarding any unauthorized inquiries. Nevertheless, Equifax deliberately fails to comply with these legal requirements that it acknowledges it has. In its form response, Equifax actually tells the consumer to contact the source of the inquiry if the consumer believes it is unauthorized. The FCRA requires that Equifax, not the consumer, contact the source. 34. Equifax’s failure to reinvestigate disputed inquiry information is a result of its standard policies and practices, and was taken in reckless disregard of a consumer’s rights under the FCRA. 35. Steed and Summers bring these class actions pursuant to Rule 23(a) and (b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, based on Equifax’s failure to comply with 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(1) and (2). Steed and Summers bring class action claims that are identical except for the time period covered by each claim. Summers brings claims that arose within the previous two years (“two year class”), on behalf of two classes of consumers. Steed brings claims that arose more than two years ago but within five years (“five year class”), on behalf of two classes of consumers. 12 36. Summers brings a class action on behalf of the following class: All persons residing in the United States and its Territories who notified Equifax of a dispute of an inquiry and who were sent a letter by Equifax with results similar in form to the results sent to Summers in the attached Exhibit A, from two years prior to the filing of this action and through the time of judgment. 37. Summers brings a second class action on behalf of the following class: All persons residing in the United States and its Territories who notified Equifax of a dispute of an inquiry regarding which Equifax did not contact the source of the inquiry or delete the inquiry, from two years prior to the filing of this action and through the time of judgment. 38. Steed brings a class action on behalf of the following class: All persons residing in the United States and its Territories who notified Equifax of a dispute of an inquiry and who were sent a letter by Equifax with results similar in form to the results sent to Steed in the attached Exhibit B, page 2, within five years of the filing of this action but not within two years of the filing of this action. 39. Steed brings a second class action on behalf of the following class: All persons residing in the United States and its Territories who notified Equifax of a dispute of an inquiry regarding which Equifax did not contact the source of the inquiry or delete the inquiry, within five years of the filing of this action but not within two years of the filing of this action. 13 40. Each of these classes is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. Although the precise number of Class members is known only to Equifax, Equifax has testified that it receives approximately 10,000 disputes a day. That amounts to millions of disputes each year. Accordingly, Plaintiff estimates that each class has thousands of members. 41. There are questions of law and fact common to the classes that predominate over any questions affecting only individual Class members. The principal questions are whether Equifax violated the FCRA by failing to reinvestigate and contact the source of the disputed inquiry, or delete it; and whether the violations were willful. 42. Both the Steed and Summers’ claims are typical of the claims of the Class, which all arise from the same operative facts and are based on the same legal theory: a dispute to Equifax regarding an inquiry, which Equifax did not reinvestigate or delete as required by 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(1) and (2). Both Steed and Summers received results of their disputes from Equifax with standard form language. Steed’s claim is typical for the five year class because he made his dispute within five years but not within two years. Summers’ claim is typical for the two year class because she made her dispute within two years. 14 43. Both Steed and Summers will fairly and adequately protect the interests of their respective classes. Both Steed and Summers are committed to vigorously litigating this matter and have retained counsel experienced in handling class actions and claims under the FCRA. Neither Steed or Summers, or their counsel have any interests that might cause them not to vigorously pursue these claims. 44. These actions should be maintained as class actions because questions of law and fact common to Class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual Class members, and because a class action is a superior method for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. Equifax’s conduct described in this Complaint stems from standard policies and practices, resulting in common violations of the FCRA. Members of the Class do not have an interest in pursuing separate actions against Equifax, as the amount of each Class member’s individual claim is small compared to the expense and burden of individual prosecution. Class certification also will obviate the need for unduly duplicative litigation that might result in inconsistent judgments concerning Equifax’s practices. Moreover, management of this action as a class action will not present any likely difficulties. In the interests of justice and judicial efficiency, it would be desirable to concentrate the litigation of all Class members’ claims in a single forum. 15 45. These actions should be maintained as class actions because the prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the Class would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the Class, as well as a risk of adjudications with respect to individual members which would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of other members not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests. 46. Summers realleges and incorporates the foregoing paragraphs. 47. Equifax received notice from Summers that she disputed the accuracy of inquiries on her Equifax credit report. 48. Equifax willfully failed to comply with the requirements of the FCRA, 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(1) and (2) by failing to (a) reinvestigate the disputed inquiry, notify the source of the inquiry about the dispute, and provide the source with all relevant information Summers provided to Equifax; or (b) delete the inquiry. 49. Summers brings this claim on behalf of the following class: All persons residing in the United States and its Territories who notified Equifax of a dispute of an 16 inquiry and who were sent a letter by Equifax with results similar in form to the results sent to Summers in the attached Exhibit A, from two years prior to the filing of this action and through the time of judgment. 50. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681n, Equifax is liable to Summers and all Class members for its failure to comply with FCRA, § 1681i(a)(1) and (2), in an amount equal to the sum of (1) damages of not less that $100 and not more than $1,000 per violation, (2) punitive damages in an amount to be determined by the jury, (3) attorney fees, and (4) costs. 51. Summers realleges and incorporates the foregoing paragraphs. 52. Equifax received notice from Summers that she disputed the accuracy of inquiries on her Equifax credit report. 53. Equifax willfully failed to comply with the requirements of the FCRA, 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(1) and (2) by failing to (a) reinvestigate the disputed inquiry, notify the source of the inquiry about the dispute, and provide the source with all relevant information Summers provided to Equifax; or (b) delete the inquiry. 54. Summers brings this claim on behalf of the following class: All persons residing in the United States and its Territories who notified Equifax of a dispute of an inquiry regarding which Equifax did not contact the 17 source of the inquiry or delete the inquiry, from two years prior to the filing of this action and through the time of judgment. 55. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681n, Equifax is liable to Summers and all Class members for its failure to comply with FCRA, § 1681i(a)(1) and (2), in an amount equal to the sum of (1) damages of not less that $100 and not more than $1,000 per violation, (2) punitive damages in an amount to be determined by the jury, (3) attorney fees, and (4) costs. 56. Steed realleges and incorporates the foregoing paragraphs. 57. Equifax received notice from Steed that he disputed the accuracy of an inquiry on his Equifax credit report. 58. Equifax willfully failed to comply with the requirements of the FCRA, 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(1) and (2) by failing to (a) reinvestigate the disputed inquiry, notify the source of the inquiry about the dispute, and provide the source with all relevant information Steed provided to Equifax; or (b) delete the inquiry. 59. Steed brings this claim on behalf of the following class: All persons residing in the United States and its Territories who notified Equifax of a dispute of an inquiry and who were sent a letter by Equifax with results similar in form to the results sent to Steed in the 18 attached Exhibit B, page 2, within five years of the filing of this action but not within two years of the filing of this action. 60. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681n, Equifax is liable to Steed and all Class members for its failure to comply with FCRA, § 1681i(a)(1) and (2), in an amount equal to the sum of (1) damages of not less that $100 and not more than $1,000 per violation, (2) punitive damages in an amount to be determined by the jury, (3) attorney fees, and (4) costs.

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10. Defendant Golden Flake employed Route Drivers, who delivered Golden Flake’s products and other snack products to its customers including chain retail grocery stores. 11. Plaintiff was a Route Driver employed by Golden Flake during the three-year period preceding the filing of this Complaint. 12. Golden Flake has a fleet of delivery vehicles for its Route Drivers to use in delivering Golden Flake’s products and other products to its customers. That fleet includes trucks that weigh 10,000 pounds or less (“Small Trucks”). 13. Plaintiff and the putative class members all drove Small Trucks during at least part of a workweek within the last three years. 14. At all relevant times, Plaintiff and the putative class members were non-exempt employees and entitled to be paid for all hours worked and at a rate of one and one-half times their regular rate for hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek. 15. The primary duties of Route Drivers, including Plaintiff, are driving a truck, delivering Golden Flake’s products, removing expired products, and stocking shelves, among other non-exempt manual labor tasks. 4 16. Route Drivers, including Plaintiff, were not paid at a rate of one and a half times their regular rate for hours worked in excess of forty (40) in a workweek. 17. Route Drivers, including Plaintiff, are assigned designated routes to which they deliver Golden Flake’s products and other products to established customers day after day or week after week. Customer orders delivered by Route Drivers are based on the volume of the customer’s sales. Reordering decisions are based on anticipated sales of Golden Flake’s products or other products by its customers. 18. Most of Golden Flake’s revenue is generated from retail chain customers, such as Walmart. 19. The amount of shelf space to which Golden Flake is entitled in a retail chain customer’s store, and other stores, is negotiated by management level employees, and not Route Drivers, and is memorialized through “plan-o-grams” and/or merchandising plans and/or similar documents. Route Drivers are not permitted to vary from these “plan-o-grams” and/or merchandising plans and/or similar documents in utilizing shelf space to stock shelves. 20. Golden Flake’s management level employees, and not Route Drivers, negotiate with Golden Flake’s retail chain customers, among others, concerning: the initial or continued right to carry Golden Flake’s products in the customer’s store; the price for Golden Flake’s products; if and when a product promotion will run; how Golden Flake’s products are advertised; the terms of a product promotion; how much shelf space is allocated for products; authorization for new items; authorization for price changes; which of Golden Flake’s products are carried by the customer; and/or, where Golden Flake products are placed in a store, among other things. 5 21. Route Drivers, including Plaintiff, routinely work in excess of forty (40) hours in a workweek. Plaintiff would regularly work well in excess of fifty (50) hours in a workweek during the three-year period preceding the filing of this Complaint. 22. Plaintiff repeats the allegations set forth above and incorporate them herein by reference. 23. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and all workers who were and/or are employed by Defendant Golden Flake as a Route Driver (or similar position), spent all or part of their workweek driving a vehicle that weighed 10,000 pounds or less, and did not receive overtime for hours worked over forty (40) per workweek during the last three years. 24. This action is maintainable as an “opt-in” collective action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) as to claims for unpaid wages, overtime compensation, liquidated damages, attorneys’ fees and costs under the FLSA. In addition to Plaintiff, numerous current and former employees are similarly situated with regard to their wages and claims for unpaid wages and damages. Plaintiff is representative of those other employees and is acting on behalf of their interests, as well as his own, in bringing this action. 25. These similarly-situated employees are known to Defendant and are readily identifiable through Defendant’s business and payroll records. These individuals may readily be notified of this action, and allowed to opt in pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), for the purpose of collectively adjudicating their claims for unpaid wages, overtime compensation, liquidated damages, attorneys’ fees and costs under the FLSA. 6 9. Defendant Golden Flake is in the business of producing and distributing various snack foods.

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14) Upon information and belief, on a date better known by Defendant, Defendant began to attempt to collect an alleged consumer debt from the Plaintiff. 15) Within the one year immediately preceding the filing of this complaint, the Defendant contacted the Plaintiff on multiple occasions via telephone and left numerous voice messages in an attempt to collect the alleged obligation. 16) By way of limited example only, the following is a transcript of another such message that Defendant left for Plaintiff on her cellular telephone voicemail -5- system on or about March 8, 2013: “Hello, this message is Tziporah Gratt, my name is Patricia Antonio; please call me at 866-391-0768 Ext. 5087, between the hours of 7AM to 7PM Mountain Standard Time; again, my number is 866-391-0768 Ext. 5087.” 17) By way of limited example only, the following is a transcript of another such message that Defendant left for Plaintiff on her cellular telephone voicemail system on or about March 20, 2013: “Hello, this message is for Tziporah Gratt, my name is Elizabeth Ogambo; it’s important that I speak with you; you can reach me at 866-862-2793; thank you.” 18) During the said calls, Defendant failed to provide Plaintiff with the notices required by 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(11), namely, by failing to advise Plaintiff that the calls were from a debt collector or that the Defendant was attempting to collect a debt. 19) Each of the messages is a "communication" as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2). 20) Each of the above messages uniformly failed to identify the callers as debt collectors attempting to collect a debt. 21) Each of the said messages uniformly failed to provide meaningful identification of the Defendant's legal name. 22) The least sophisticated consumer could believe that the messages were from an original creditor. 23) The messages left by Defendant was deceptive and harassing per se in -6- that they secreted the identity of the Defendant in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692d(6). 24) Upon information and belief, it is the regular practice of the Defendant to leave messages on consumers' answering machines that do not meaningfully identify themselves, and/or do not identify themselves as a debt collector. 25) The only way for Plaintiff and/or any least sophisticated consumer to obtain the identity of the caller leaving the messages, and to ascertain the purpose underlying the messages, is to place a return call to the telephone number provided in the messages and speak with a debt collector employed by GC Services Limited Partnership, and to provide the debt collector with personal information. 26) The Defendant intended that the messages have the effect of causing Plaintiff, and least sophisticated consumers to place return calls to the telephone number provided in the messages and speak with its debt collectors, and then provide those debt collectors with their personal information, as the sole means of obtaining the identity of the caller leaving the messages, and to ascertain the purpose underlying the messages. Scores of federal court decisions -- including the 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals and Districts Courts within the State of New York -- uniformly hold that the FDCPA requires debt collectors to provide meaningful identification of itself in telephonic voice messages left for consumers, such as the messages, by accurately stating the name of the debt collection company and stating the nature and/or purpose of the call. 27) At all times relevant to this action, GC Services Limited Partnership was -7- aware of the substantial weight of legal authority requiring it to provide meaningful identification of itself in telephonic voice messages left for consumers, such as the said messages, by accurately stating its company name and stating the nature and/or purpose of the call. 28) At all times relevant to this action, GC Services Limited Partnership willfully, deliberately, and intentionally chose not to provide meaningful identification of itself in telephonic voice messages left for consumers, such as the said messages, by accurately stating its company name and stating the nature and/or purpose of the call. 29) The Defendant's act of leaving the said messages for Plaintiff is conduct the natural consequences of which is to harass, oppress, or abuse a person in connection with the collection of a debt and is in violation of the FDCPA. 30) The Defendant's act of leaving the said messages for Plaintiff constitutes the use of a false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt and is in violation of the FDCPA. 31) The FDCPA secures a consumer's right to have a debt collector cease further communications with the consumer. By failing to meaningfully identify itself, disclose the purpose of its call and state that GC Services Limited Partnership is a debt collector in a manner understandable to the least sophisticated consumer, the Defendant has engaged in conduct designed to deprive consumers of their right to have a debt collector cease further communications. 32) It is Defendant's policy and practice to leave voice messages for -8- consumers and other persons, such as the above said messages, that violate the FDCPA by, inter alia: a) Failing to provide meaningful disclosure of GC Services Limited Partnership's identity; and b) Failing to disclose that the call is from a debt collector; and c) Failing to disclose the purpose or nature of the communication, i.e. an attempt to collect a debt. 33) Upon information and belief, such messages, as alleged in this complaint, number at least in the hundreds. 34) Upon information and belief, the said messages were either pre-scripted or pre-recorded. 35) Defendant has engaged in a pattern of leaving messages without disclosing that the communication is from a debt collector. 36) The said telephone messages are in violation of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692d(6), 1692e, 1692e(10) and 1692e(11) for failing to indicate that the messages were from a debt collector which constitutes a deceptive practice. 37) Plaintiff seeks to end these violations of the FDCPA. Plaintiff and putative class members are entitled to preliminary and permanent injunctive relief, including, declaratory relief, and damages. 38) This action is brought as a class action. Plaintiff brings this action -9- individually, and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 39) With respect to the Plaintiff's Class, this claim is brought on behalf of a class of (a) all persons in the State of New York. (b) for whom GC Services Limited Partnership left a voicemail or answering machine message, in the form of the above said messages, (c) that did not identify GC Services Limited Partnership by its true company name or state that the call was for collection purposes (d) made in connection with GC Services Limited Partnership's attempt to collect a debt (e) which the said messages violate the FDCPA (f) during a period beginning one year prior to the filing of this initial action and ending 21 days after the service of the initial complaint filed in this action. 40) The identities of all class members are readily ascertainable from the records of GC Services Limited Partnership and those business and governmental entities on whose behalf it attempts to collect debts. 41) Excluded from the Plaintiff's Class is the Defendant and all officers, members, partners, managers, directors, and employees of GC Services Limited Partnership, and all of their respective immediate families, and legal counsel for all parties to this action and all members of their immediate families. 42) There are questions of law and fact common to the Plaintiff's Class, which common issues predominate over any issues involving only individual class members. The principal issues are whether the Defendant's telephonic voice -10- messages, such as the above said messages, violate 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692d(6), 1692e(10), and 1692e(11). 43) The Plaintiff's claims are typical of the class members, as all are based upon the same facts and legal theories. 44) The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Plaintiff's Class defined in this complaint. The Plaintiff has retained counsel with experience in handling consumer lawsuits, complex legal issues, and class actions, and neither the Plaintiff nor her attorneys have any interests, which might cause her not to vigorously pursue this action. 45) This action has been brought, and may properly be maintained, as a class action pursuant to the provisions of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because there is a well-defined community interest in the litigation: a) Numerosity: The Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on that basis alleges, that the Plaintiff's Class defined above is so numerous that joinder of all members would be impractical. b) Common Questions Predominate: Common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the Plaintiff's Class and those questions predominate over any questions or issues involving only individual class members. The principal issues are whether the Defendant's telephonic voice messages, such as the above said messages violate 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692d(6), 1692e(10), and 1692e(11). -11- c) Typicality: The Plaintiff's claims are typical of the claims of the class members. Plaintiff and all members of the Plaintiff's Class defined in this complaint have claims arising out of the Defendant's common uniform course of conduct complained of herein. d) Adequacy: The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class members insofar as Plaintiff has no interests that are adverse to the absent class members. The Plaintiff is committed to vigorously litigating this matter. Plaintiff has also retained counsel experienced in handling consumer lawsuits, complex legal issues, and class actions. Neither the Plaintiff nor her counsel have any interests, which might cause her not to vigorously pursue the instant class action lawsuit. e) Superiority: A class action is superior to the other available means for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy because individual joinder of all members would be impracticable. Class action treatment will permit a large number of similarly situated persons to prosecute their common claims in a single forum efficiently and without unnecessary duplication of effort and expense that individual actions would engender Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(l)(A) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is appropriate because adjudications with respect to individual members create a -12- risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications which could establish incompatible standards of conduct for Defendant who, on information and belief, collects debts throughout the United States of America. 46) Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is also appropriate in that a determination that the said messages violate 15 U.S.C. §1692d(6), 1692e(10), and/or §1692e(11) is tantamount to declaratory relief and any monetary relief under the FDCPA would be merely incidental to that determination. 47) Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is also appropriate in that the questions of law and fact common to members of the Plaintiff’s Class predominate over any questions affecting an individual member, and a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. 48) Further, Defendant has acted, or failed to act, on grounds generally applicable to the Rule (b)(l)(A) and (b)(2) Class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief with respect to the Class as a whole. 49) Depending on the outcome of further investigation and discovery, Plaintiff may, at the time of class certification motion, seek to certify one or more classes only as to particular issues pursuant to Fed. R.Civ. P. 23(c)(4). -13-

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(Declaratory Relief) (on behalf of Plaintiff and the Class) 103. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if set forth fully herein. 104. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies, that the Website contains access barriers denying deaf and hard-of-hearing individuals the full and equal access to the goods and services of the Website, which Defendant owns, operates, and/or controls, fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12182, et seq., N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, et seq., and N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the deaf and hard of hearing. 105. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. (Violation of New York State Civil Rights Law, NY CLS Civ R, Article 4 (CLS Civ R § 40 et seq.) (on behalf of Plaintiff and New York subclass) (Violation of New York City Human Rights Law, N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-102, et seq.) (on behalf of Plaintiff and New York subclass) (Violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181, et seq. — Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act) (on behalf of Plaintiff and the Class) (Violation of New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law, Article 15 (Executive Law § 292 et seq.) (on behalf of Plaintiff and New York subclass) 19. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks certification of the following nationwide class pursuant to Rule 23(a) and 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: “all legally deaf and hard-of-hearing individuals in the United States who have attempted to access the Website and as a result have been denied access to the enjoyment of goods and services offered by the Website during the relevant statutory period.” 20. Plaintiff seeks certification of the following New York subclass pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a), 23(b)(2), and, alternatively, 23(b)(3): “all legally deaf and hard-of-hearing individuals in New York State who have attempted to access the Website and as a result have been denied access to the enjoyment of goods and services offered by the Website, during the relevant statutory period.” 21. There are hundreds of thousands of deaf or hard-of-hearing individuals in New York State. There are approximately 36 million people in the United States who are deaf or hard of hearing. Thus, the persons in the Class are so numerous that joinder of all such persons is impractical and the disposition of their claims in a class action is a benefit to the parties and to the Court. 23. There are common questions of law and fact common to the class, including without limitation, the following: a. Whether the Website is a “public accommodation” under the ADA; b. Whether the Website is a “place or provider of public accommodation” under the laws of New York; c. Whether Defendant through the Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with hearing disabilities in violation of the ADA; and d. Whether Defendant through the Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with hearing disabilities in violation of the laws of New York. 24. The claims of the named Plaintiff are typical of those of the Class. The Class, similarly to the Plaintiff, are deaf or hard of hearing, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA, and/or the laws of New York by failing to update or remove access barriers on the Website, so it can be independently accessible to the Class of people who are legally deaf or hard of hearing. 26. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because questions of law and fact common to Class members clearly predominate over questions affecting only individual Class members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 27. Judicial efficiency will be served by maintenance of this lawsuit as a class action in that it will avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with hearing disabilities throughout the United States. 28. References to Plaintiff shall be deemed to include the named Plaintiff and each member of the Class, unless otherwise indicated. 29. Defendant operates the Website, which provides videos, information, and articles relating to science. The website also allows visitors to purchase books, magazines, and content via its online store. It delivers information and subscriptions to tens of millions of people across the United States. 30. The Website is a service and benefit offered by Defendant throughout the United States, including New York State. The Website is owned, controlled and/or operated by Defendant. 32. This case arises out of Defendant’s policy and practice of denying the deaf and hard of hearing access to the Website, including the goods and services offered by Defendant through the Website. Due to Defendant’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to the Website, deaf and hard-of-hearing individuals have been and are being denied equal access to the Website, as well as to the numerous goods, services and benefits offered to the public through the Website. 33. Defendant denies the deaf and hard of hearing access to goods, services, and information made available through the Website by preventing them from freely enjoying, interpreting, and understanding the content on the Website. 34. The Internet has become a significant source of information for conducting business and for doing everyday activities such as reading news, watching videos, etc., for deaf and hard-of-hearing persons. 35. The deaf and hard of hearing access videos through closed captioning, which is a transcription or translation of the audio portion of a video as it occurs, sometimes including description of non-speech elements. Except for a deaf or hard-of-hearing person whose residual hearing is still sufficient to apprehend the audio portion of the video, closed captioning provides the only method by which a deaf or hard-of-hearing person can independently access the video. Unless websites are designed to allow for use in this manner, deaf and hard-of-hearing persons are unable to fully access the service provided through the videos on the Website. 37. The Website contains access barriers that prevent free and full use by Plaintiff and other deaf or hard-of-hearing persons, including but not limited to the lack of closed captioning. This barrier is in violation of WCAG 2.1 Guideline 1.2.2, which mandates that video content contain captioning. 38. The Website contains multiple videos that lack captioning. The videos “How Your GPS Uses Einstein’s Relativity,” “How Cats Leapt from the Wild to Our Sofas,” “Why Do Allergies Make You Sneeze,” “If You Think It’s Love, Switch to Decaf: How We Misinterpret Emotional Arousal,” “Quantum Entanglement-The Movie,” and multiple other videos of the Website do not contain closed captioning. The lack of captioning prevents Plaintiff, deaf, and hard-of-hearing people from understanding the content of those videos, thus preventing them from learning about Defendant’s products and services. 40. The Website thus contains access barriers which deny full and equal access to Plaintiff, who would otherwise use the Website and who would otherwise be able to fully and equally enjoy the benefits and services of the Website in New York State. 41. Plaintiff attempted to watch the video “How Your GPS Uses Einstein’s Relativity” on the Website in October 2018 but was unable to do so independently because of the lack of closed captioning on the Website, causing it to be inaccessible and not independently usable by deaf and hard-of-hearing individuals. 42. As described above, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the fact that the Website contains access barriers causing the Website to be inaccessible, and not independently usable by, deaf and hard-of-hearing individuals. 43. These access barriers have denied Plaintiff full and equal access to, and enjoyment of, the goods, benefits, and services of Defendant and the Website. 44. Defendant engages in acts of intentional discrimination, including but not limited to the following policies or practices: (a) constructing and maintaining a website that is inaccessible to deaf and hard- of-hearing Class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or (b) constructing and maintaining a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obviously inaccessible to deaf and hard-of-hearing Class members; and/or (c) failing to take actions to correct access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to deaf and hard-of-hearing Class members. 46. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if set forth fully herein. 47. Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a), provides that “No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.” Title III also prohibits an entity from “[u]tilizing standards or criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating on the basis of disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 12181(b)(2)(D)(I). 48. Defendant operates a place of public accommodation as defined by Title III of ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7) (“place of exhibition and entertainment,” “place of recreation,” and “service establishments”). 49. Defendant has failed to make its videos accessible to individuals who are deaf or hard of hearing by failing to provide closed captioning for videos displayed on the Website. 50. Discrimination under Title III includes the denial of an opportunity for the person who is deaf or hard of hearing to participate in programs or services, or providing a service that is not as effective as what is provided to others. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(I-III). 52. Discrimination also includes the failure to maintain accessible features of facilities and equipment that are required to be readily accessible to and usable by persons with disability. 65. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as though fully set forth herein. 66. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation … because of the … disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 67. Defendant operates a place of public accommodation as defined by N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). 68. Defendant is subject to New York Human Rights Law because it owns and operates the Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 70. Specifically, under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(I), unlawful discriminatory practice includes, among other things, “a refusal to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless such person can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations.” 71. In addition, under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(II), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 73. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 74. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed Class and Subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of the Website under § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the Subclass will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 75. The actions of Defendant were and are in violation of New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 76. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines pursuant to N.Y. Exc. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 77. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 78. Pursuant to N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 79. Plaintiff served notice thereof upon the attorney general as required by N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41. 81. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40 provides that “all persons within the jurisdiction of this state shall be entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of any places of public accommodations, resort or amusement, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons. No persons, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or employee of any such place shall directly or indirectly refuse, withhold from, or deny to any person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof . . . .” 82. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) provides that “no person because of . . . disability, as such term is defined in section two hundred ninety-two of executive law, be subjected to any discrimination in his or her civil rights, or to any harassment, as defined in section 240.25 of the penal law, in the exercise thereof, by any other person or by any firm, corporation or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision.” 83. The Website is a public accommodations within the definition of N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2). 84. Defendant is subject to New York Civil Rights Law because it owns and operates the Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Civil Law § 40-c(2). 85. Defendant is violating N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to the Website, causing videos on the Website to be completely inaccessible to the deaf and hard of hearing. This inaccessibility denies deaf and hard-of-hearing patrons full and equal access to the goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 87. Specifically, under N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-d, “any person who shall violate any of the provisions of the foregoing section, or subdivision three of section 240.30 or section 240.31 of the penal law, or who shall aid or incite the violation of any of said provisions shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby in any court of competent jurisdiction in the county in which the defendant shall reside . . . .” 88. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 89. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed Class on the basis of disability are being directly or indirectly refused, withheld from, or denied the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof in § 40 et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. 90. Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages of five hundred dollars per instance, as well as civil penalties and fines pursuant to N.Y. Civil Law § 40 et seq. for each and every offense. 91. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if set forth fully herein. 93. The Website is a public accommodation within the definition of N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-102(9). 94. Defendant is subject to City Law because it owns and operates the Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-102(1). 95. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to the Website, causing the Website and the services integrated with the Website to be completely inaccessible to the deaf and hard of hearing. This inaccessibility denies deaf and hard-of-hearing patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. Specifically, Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(15)(a). 97. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 98. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed Class and Subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations, and/or opportunities of the Website under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the Subclass will continue to suffer irreparable harm.

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15. At all times relevant, Plaintiffs are individuals residing within the State of Nevada. 16. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and thereon allege, that at all times relevant, Defendant conducted business in the State of Nevada. 17. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and thereon allege, that Defendant is a “person” as the term is defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(b). 18. Sometime prior to 2012, Plaintiffs allegedly incurred financial obligations to the original creditor. 19. On or about March 27, 2012, Plaintiffs filed for Chapter 13 Bankruptcy in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Nevada. 20. The obligations (“Debt”) to the original creditor were scheduled in the Bankruptcy and the original creditor received notice of the Bankruptcy. 21. Subsequently, the alleged debt was allegedly assigned, placed, or otherwise transferred, to Defendant for collection. 22. On or about January 24, 2014, Plaintiffs received a Bankruptcy discharge. 23. Defendant did not file any proceedings to declare its Debt “non dischargeable” pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523 et seq. 24. Defendant also did not request relief from the “automatic stay” codified at 11 U.S.C. §362 et seq. while the Plaintiffs’ Bankruptcy was pending to pursue the Plaintiffs on any personal liability for any of the underlying Debts. 32. Plaintiffs bring this action on behalf of themselves and on behalf of all others similarly situated (the “Class”). THE FAIR CREDIT REPORTING ACT 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1692X (FCRA)

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14. Pisa Group is a nationwide telemarketing company that exclusively conducts newspaper subscription sales and retention telemarketing. Pisa Group has more than 100 newspaper partners throughout the United States—including Plain Dealer and the John Doe Defendants—for which it conducts telemarketing campaigns.1 15. As a substantial part of its business, Pisa Group offers these clients outbound “cold calling and telemarketing services” that will purportedly allow them to reach “new customers and increase newspaper subscriptions.”2 16. Pisa Group places a substantial emphasis on the effectiveness and success of its cold calling campaigns in reaching new customers and utilizing untapped sales potential.3 As a primary feature, Pisa Group touts that its cold calling campaigns provide “maximum control” over the campaigns to the client. 17. However, Pisa Group’s representations fail to address the unfortunate drawback of cold calling campaigns: that neither Pisa Group, nor the clients on whose behalf it makes calls (such as Plain Dealer and the John Doe Defendants), has any prior relationship with the recipients of those calls. Indeed, Pisa Group readily admits that its cold calling campaigns are a 1 See About Us, The Pisa Group, Inc., www.thepisagroup.com/about.html (last visited April 3, 2017). 2 See Outbound Telemarketing, The Pisa Group, Inc., http://www.thepisagroup.com/cold- calling.html (last visited April 3, 2017). 3 See id. 5 method for its clients to reach a “new market” with “new customers.”4 18. In other words, Pisa Group explicitly acknowledges that it places calls to consumers who have not given any prior consent to be contacted by any means, and with which Pisa Group and/or its clients have no pre-existing business relationship. 19. Even when consumers answer and attempt to opt out of future calls, Pisa Group ignores these demands and continues to call. 20. On information and belief, these calls were made at the direction of Plain Dealer and the John Doe Defendants, on their behalf, and for their benefit. 21. Plain Dealer is an Ohio based publishing company known for its eponymous newspaper publication. Plain Dealer’s newspaper is the major news periodical for the Cleveland area, and boasts the largest circulation of any Ohio newspaper. 22. Plain Dealer contracted with Pisa Group to secure its telemarketing services— including its cold calling expertise—in order to generate new subscribers and customers for its major newspaper publication “The Plain Dealer.” 23. The John Doe Defendants consist of various local and national publication companies that contracted with Pisa Group to secure its telemarketing services—including its cold calling expertise—in order to generate new subscribers and customers. 24. Pisa Group made the calls at issue by utilizing an automatic telephone dialing system (“ATDS”). Specifically, the hardware and software used by Pisa Group has the capacity to generate and store random numbers, and/or receive and store lists of telephone numbers, and to dial such numbers, en masse, in an automated fashion without human intervention. Pisa Group’s automated dialing equipment also is, or includes features substantially similar to, a 4 See Outbound Telemarketing, The Pisa Group, Inc., http://www.thepisagroup.com/cold- calling.html (last visited April 3, 2017). 6 predictive dialer, meaning that it is capable of making numerous phone calls simultaneously and automatically connecting answered calls to then available callers and disconnecting the rest (all without human intervention). In fact, Pisa Group advertises this ability in the Yellow Pages,5 as well as on its own website.6 25. These autodialed telephone calls to consumers’ cellular telephone numbers constituted commercial advertising and telemarketing as contemplated by the TCPA. Namely, the calls at issue promoted the sale of periodical subscriptions to numerous consumers. 26. Unfortunately, neither Pisa Group nor its clients—such as Plain Dealer and the John Doe Defendants—acquired the requisite prior express written consent of consumers before bombarding their cellular telephones with autodialed telemarketing calls. 27. Defendants knowingly made, or directed to be made, these autodialed telemarketing calls to cellular telephones without the prior express written consent of the call recipients. As such, Defendants not only invaded the personal privacy of Plaintiff and other members of the putative Class, but also intentionally and repeatedly violated the TCPA. 28. Beginning in or around December 2016, Plaintiff VanDrunen began to receive autodialed telemarketing calls from Pisa Group on his cellular telephone. Pisa Group placed these calls using telephone number (440) 533-1044. 29. Plaintiff VanDrunen answered several of the telemarketing calls, whereupon one of Pisa Group’s telemarketers would market subscriptions to periodicals offered by Plain Dealer 5 See www.yellowpages.com/saint-charles-mo/mip/pisa-group-8705799. There, under “General Info,” Defendant Pisa notes, “[i]ts call centers are equipped with predictive dialers that develop and execute multiple calling campaigns.” 6 See Why Choose Us, The Pisa Group, Inc., http://www.thepisagroup.com/why-choose- us.html (last visited April 3, 2017). 7 or the John Doe Defendants. In other instances, when Plaintiff answered Pisa Group’s telemarketing calls, the predictive dialing system used to place the call would immediately terminate the call. 30. In December 2016, Plaintiff answered one of the telemarketing calls and instructed Pisa Group to stop calling. Nonetheless, Plaintiff still continued to receive additional calls from Pisa Group on his cellular telephone. 31. Plaintiff never consented in writing—or otherwise—to receive autodialed telephone calls on his cellular telephone from Pisa Group, Plain Dealer, or any of the John Doe Defendants. 32. Plaintiff does not have a relationship with Pisa Group, Plain Dealer, or the John Doe Defendants, and has never requested that Pisa Group, Plain Dealer, or the John Doe Defendants place autodialed calls of any type to him, let alone to his cellular telephone. 33. Defendants’ intrusive telemarketing calls adversely affected Plaintiff’s right to privacy. Defendants were, and are, aware that the above-described autodialed telemarketing calls were being made on a widespread basis, and that the autodialed telemarketing calls were being made to consumers who had not provided their prior express written consent to receive them. 34. Class Definitions: Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a), (b)(2), and (b)(3) on behalf of himself, a class, and a subclass defined as follows: Class: All individuals in the United States who (1) received a telephone call; (2) on his or her cellular telephone; (3) from an agent or representative of Defendant Pisa Group; (4) that was placed using an automatic telephone dialing system; (5) for the purpose of marketing periodical subscriptions; (6) where Pisa Group did not have a record of prior express written consent to place such a call at the time it was made. 8 Plain Dealer Subclass: All members of the Class who (1) received a telephone call; (2) on his or her cellular telephone; (3) from an agent or representative of Defendant Pisa Group; (4) that was placed using an automatic telephone dialing system; (5) for the purpose of marketing periodical subscriptions to Plain Dealer’s periodicals; (6) where neither Pisa Group nor Plain Dealer had a record of prior express written consent to place such a call at the time it was made. The following people are excluded from the Class and Plain Dealer Subclass (the “Classes”): (1) any Judge or Magistrate presiding over this action and members of their families; (2) Defendants, Defendants’ subsidiaries, parents, successors, predecessors, and any entity in which the Defendants or their parents have a controlling interest and their current or former employees, officers and directors; (3) persons who properly execute and file a timely request for exclusion from the Classes; (4) persons whose claims in this matter have been finally adjudicated on the merits or otherwise released; (5) Plaintiff’s counsel and Defendants’ counsel; and (6) the legal representatives, successors, and assigns of any such excluded persons. 35. Numerosity: The exact number of the Classes’ members is unknown and not available to Plaintiff, but it is clear that individual joinder is impracticable. On information and belief, Defendants have placed telephone calls to thousands of consumers who fall into the definitions of the Classes. Members of the Classes can be identified through Defendants’ records. 36. Typicality: Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of other members of the Classes, in that Plaintiff and the members of the Classes sustained damages arising out of Defendants’ uniform wrongful conduct and unsolicited telephone calls. 37. Adequate Representation: Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Classes, and has retained counsel competent and experienced in complex class actions. Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to those of the Classes, and Defendants have no defenses unique to Plaintiff. 9 38. Policies Generally Applicable to the Classes: This class action is appropriate for certification because Defendants have acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Classes as wholes, thereby requiring the Court’s imposition of uniform relief to ensure compatible standards of conduct toward the Classes’ members, and making final injunctive relief appropriate with respect to the Classes as wholes. Defendants’ practices challenged herein apply to and affect the Classes’ members uniformly, and Plaintiff’s challenge of those practices hinges on Defendants’ conduct with respect to the Classes as wholes, not on facts or law applicable only to Plaintiff. 39. Commonality and Predominance: There are many questions of law and fact common to the claims of Plaintiff and the Classes, and those questions predominate over any questions that may affect individual members of the Classes. Common questions for the Classes include, but are not necessarily limited to the following: Class: (a) Whether Defendants’ conduct violated the TCPA; (b) Whether Pisa Group systematically placed autodialed telemarketing calls to individuals who did not provide Defendants and/or their agents with their prior express consent to receive them; (c) Whether Pisa Group made the calls with the use of an ATDS; (d) Whether Pisa Group made the calls at the direction and for the benefit of the Plain Dealer and/or the John Doe Defendants; (e) Whether members of the Class are entitled to treble damages based on the willfulness of Defendants’ conduct; and 10 (f) Whether Pisa Group systematically made telephone calls to consumers after they expressly asked not to be called from Pisa Group. Plain Dealer Subclass: (a) Whether Plain Dealer’s conduct violated the TCPA; (b) Whether Plain Dealer had autodialed telemarketing calls placed to individuals who did not provide Plain Dealer or Pisa Group and/or their agents with their prior express consent to receive them; (c) Whether Plain Dealer had the calls made with the use of an ATDS; (d) Whether Pisa Group made the calls at the direction and for the benefit of Plain Dealer; (e) Whether members of the Plain Dealer Subclass are entitled to treble damages based on the willfulness of Plain Dealer’s conduct. 40. Superiority: This case is also appropriate for class certification because class proceedings are superior to all other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy given that joinder of all parties is impracticable. The damages suffered by the individual members of the Classes will likely be relatively small, especially given the burden and expense of individual prosecution of the complex litigation necessitated by Defendants’ actions. Thus, it would be virtually impossible for the individual members of the Classes to obtain effective relief from Defendants’ misconduct. Even if members of the Classes could sustain such individual litigation, it would still not be preferable to a class action, because individual litigation would increase the delay and expense to all parties due to the complex legal and factual controversies presented in this Complaint. By contrast, a class action presents far fewer management difficulties and provides the benefits of single adjudication, economy of scale, and 11 comprehensive supervision by a single court. Economies of time, effort and expense will be fostered and uniformity of decisions ensured. 41. Plaintiff reserves the right to modify the foregoing class definition. 42. Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 43. Pisa Group made autodialed telephone calls to Plaintiff’s and the Class members’ cellular telephones, without having their prior express written consent to do so. 44. Pisa Group's calls were made at the direction of, and on behalf of, the John Doe Defendants for the purpose of marketing subscriptions to newspapers and/or magazines belonging to the John Doe Defendants. The John Doe Defendants directed these calls to be made in order to increase their subscription numbers and, ultimately, their sales revenues. 45. Pisa Group made the telephone calls using equipment that had the capacity to store or produce telephone numbers to be called using a random or sequential number generator, and/or receive and store lists of phone numbers, and to dial such numbers, en masse. Pisa Group utilized equipment that made the telephone calls to Plaintiff and other members of the Class simultaneously and without human intervention. The John Doe Defendants were, and are, aware that these telephone calls are being made at their direction, and on their behalf, using such equipment. 46. By making and/or directing that the autodialed telemarketing calls be made to Plaintiff’s and the Class members’ cellular telephones without prior express consent, Defendants violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). 47. As a result of Defendants’ unlawful conduct, Plaintiff and the Class suffered 12 invasions of their privacy and their statutory rights. As such, under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C), Plaintiff and each Class member are entitled to, inter alia, a minimum of $500 in statutory damages (which may be trebled upon a showing of willfulness) for each such violation of the TCPA, as well as an injunction to ensure that Defendants’ violations of the TCPA do not continue into the future. 48. Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 49. Pisa Group made autodialed telephone calls to Plaintiff’s and the Plain Dealer Subclass members’ cellular telephones, without having their prior express written consent to do so. 50. Pisa Group's calls were made at the direction of, and on behalf of, Plain Dealer for the purpose of marketing subscriptions to its print newspaper, “The Plain Dealer.” Plain Dealer directed these calls to be made in order to increase its subscription numbers and, ultimately, its sales revenues. 51. Pisa Group made the telephone calls using equipment that had the capacity to store or produce telephone numbers to be called using a random or sequential number generator, and/or receive and store lists of phone numbers, and to dial such numbers, en masse. Pisa Group utilized equipment that made the telephone calls to Plaintiff and other members of the Plain Dealer Subclass simultaneously and without human intervention. Plain Dealer was, and is, aware that these telephone calls are being made at their direction, and on their behalf, using such equipment. 52. By directing that the autodialed telemarketing calls be made to Plaintiff’s and the 13 Plain Dealer Subclass members’ cellular telephones without prior express consent, Defendant Plain Dealer violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). 53. As a result of Plain Dealer’s unlawful conduct, Plaintiff and the Plain Dealer Subclass suffered invasions of their privacy and their statutory rights. As such, under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C), Plaintiff and each Plain Dealer Subclass member are entitled to, inter alia, a minimum of $500 in statutory damages (which may be trebled upon a showing of willfulness) for each such violation of the TCPA, as well as an injunction to ensure that Plain Dealer’s violations of the TCPA do not continue into the future. Violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227 (On behalf of Plaintiff and the Class as against Pisa Group and John Doe Defendants) Violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227 (On behalf of Plaintiff and the Plain Dealer Subclass as against Plain Dealer)

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10. On April 13, 2018, the Bankruptcy Noticing Center provided Official Form 309A— Notice of Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Case to Northwoods Bank via first class mail to the scheduled address. It was not returned as undeliverable. 11. On July 24, 2018, the Honorable Robert J. Kressel entered an order of discharge, effectively discharging Plaintiffs of their debt to Defendant and various other creditors. 12. On July 27, 2018, the Bankruptcy Noticing Center provided to Northwoods Bank via first class mail. It was not returned as undeliverable. 13. Thereafter, Plaintiffs worked to repair their credit from the damage caused by the bankruptcy. 14. On September 16, 2019, Plaintiff Brian Stuckey filed a lawsuit against Northwoods Bank. See Stuckey v. Northwoods Bank, USDC 19-cv-2525 JNE//LIB, for alleged violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act. 15. Sometime thereafter September 2019, Northwoods Bank hired Defendant Gislason to defend it against Plaintiffs in the Stuckey v. Northwoods Bank action. 17. Defendant Gislason’s February 11, 2020, Preforeclosure Notice communication states, in pertinent part: 25. The Class shall be subject to the following exclusions, the above criterion notwithstanding: (1) counsel for Plaintiffs and the Class; (2) counsel for Defendant Gislason; (3) the assigned Judge, Magistrate Judge, and their clerks and staff. 26. This action may properly be maintained as a class action as it satisfies the numerosity, commonality, typicality, adequacy, predominance, and superiority requirements of Rule 23(a)-(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for certification. Numerosity 27. The attached Exhibit 1 is a form letter and notice and therefore Defendant Gislason regularly and routinely discloses consumer’s debts to third-parties not permitted by law. 28. It is plausible that Defendant Gislason subjected a large number of consumers to the same or substantially similar conduct. 29. Therefore, it is plausible that joinder of all these customers into a single lawsuit would be impracticable. 30. The exact number of class members is unknown at this time but, upon information and belief, exceeds 40. 32. All members of the Class have had their rights violated by Defendant Gislason in the same manners. 33. Common questions of law and fact exist as to the Class such as: a) Whether Defendant Gislason regularly and routinely sends out letters similar to Exhibit 1; b) Whether Defendant Gislason notifies foreclosure prevention counseling agencies of consumers’ debts and obligations; c) Whether or not such conduct constitutes a violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b); d) Whether or not Defendant Gislason’s conduct was willful or committed with reckless disregard and negligent; and e) Whether Defendant Gislason sends letters to consumers similar to Exhibit 1 and does so in an attempt to collect upon debts. 35. These common questions of law and fact predominate over any questions affecting individual class members and the answers to these common questions of law and fact will advance the adjudication of the litigation as to all class members. Typicality 36. Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims brought by the Class. 37. Plaintiffs’ claims and the claims brought by the Class arise from Defendant’s same conduct. 38. Accordingly, if brought and adjudicated individually, the claims would require proof of the same substantive facts. 39. Any defenses that Defendant Gislason may have regarding liability or quantum of damages with respect to Plaintiffs’ claims would generally be applicable to the members of the Class. Adequacy 40. Plaintiffs bring this lawsuit with the intention of stopping Defendant Gislason’s unlawful practices and to recover for all of its customers affected. 41. Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of all members of the Class. 43. Plaintiffs and their counsel will continue to vigorously advocate on behalf of the members of the Class. 44. Neither Plaintiffs nor their counsel have an interest adverse to or in conflict with the interests of the members of the Class. 45. Plaintiffs and their counsel are committed to expending the time, energy, and resources necessary to successfully adjudicate this action on behalf of the Class. Risk of Inconsistent or Dispositive Adjudications 46. Certification is appropriate pursuant to Rule 23(b)(1)(B) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because the prosecution of separate actions by individual class members would, as a practical matter, be dispositive of the interests of all class members or could substantially impair or impeded their ability to protect their interests. 47. Certification is appropriate pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because Defendant Gislason has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the members of the Class. Superiority 48. Certification is appropriate pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as a class action is superior to all other available methods to fairly and efficiently adjudicate this action. 50. Thus, the members of the Class have little interest in prosecuting any litigation given the small amounts at stake relative to the cost, risk, delay, and uncertainly of recovery. 51. Concentrated litigation would permit similarly situated persons to prosecute their common claims efficiently, without unnecessary duplication of effort and expense and would, therefore, promote judicial economy. 52. The members of the Class had their rights violated by Defendant Gislason in the same manner. 53. Upon information and belief, few members of the Class are aware that Defendant Gislason’s actions and inactions were wrongful. 54. The class notice mechanism provides an opportunity for members of the Class to learn of their rights and seek redress. 57. On or about February 11, 2020, Defendant Gislason caused to be mailed to Plaintiffs via certified mail a letter of Notice of Default of Note and Mortgage, which included a Preforeclosure Notice. 58. In the February 11, 2020, communication Defendant Gislason stated that it had communicated Plaintiffs’ alleged debt with a third-party in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b). 59. By sending Exhibit 1 directly to Plaintiff Brian Stuckey, whom it knew was represented by counsel, was in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(a)(2). 6. On December 12, 2014, Plaintiffs secured a $63,063.00 home mortgage loan, loan number 44XXX, from Northwoods Bank of Minnesota (“Northwoods Bank”). 60. Defendant Gislason’s violations of 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b) and § 1692c(a) renders Defendant Gislason liable for Plaintiffs’ actual damages, statutory damages, as well as the costs and attorney’s fees incurred in bringing this action, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. 1692k. 8. On April 10, 2018, Plaintiffs filed their Voluntary Chapter 7 Petition in the United States Bankruptcy Court District of Minnesota. See, Case No. 18-50246-RJK. 9. In their petition, Plaintiffs listed Northwoods Bank as a creditor with a secured claim against them relating to loan number 44XXX, totaling $53,349.00. VIOLATION OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT – 15 U.S.C. § 1692, et seq.

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10. During the course of his employment with Defendants, Plaintiff regularly worked in excess of forty (40) hours in individual weeks. 11. Defendants failed to pay overtime compensation to Plaintiff for all time worked in excess of forty (40) hours in an individual week, instead paying part of the compensable time worked by Plaintiff at Plaintiff’s regular rate of pay. 12. Plaintiff will seek to certify a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 23 for his state law claim for Illinois-mandated overtime wages (Count II) arising under the IMWL. 13. The class that Plaintiff seeks to represent is defined as: All individuals employed by Big Top & Party Rentals, LLC as hourly employees and who worked in excess of forty (40) 4 hours in any individual work weeks for the period of December 11, 2012 through the date of judgment. 14. Count II is brought pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 23 (a) and (b) because: a. The class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable: b. While the precise number of Class Members has not been determined at this time, Plaintiff is informed and believes that Defendants have employed dozens of individuals in Illinois during the IMWL Class Periods; c. There are questions of fact or law common to the class, which common questions predominate over any questions affecting only individual members. These common questions of law and fact include, without limitation: i. Whether Defendants failed to pay Plaintiff and the Class overtime wages for all time worked over forty (40) hours in individual work weeks during the IMWL Class Period. d. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class members. Plaintiff’s Counsel is competent and experienced in litigating discrimination and other employment class actions; e. The class representatives and the members of the class have been equally affected by Defendants’ failure to pay Illinois overtime wages; f. The class representatives, class members and Defendants have a commonality of interest in the subject matter and remedies sought and the class representatives are able to fairly and adequately represent the interest of the class. If individual actions were required to be brought by each member of the class injured or 5 affected, the result would be a multiplicity of actions creating a hardship on the class members, Defendants, and the Court. 15. Therefore, a class action is an appropriate method for the fair and efficient adjudication of this lawsuit. 16. Plaintiff incorporates and re-alleges paragraphs 1 through 15 of this Complaint, as though set forth herein. 17. The matters set forth in this Count arise from Defendant’s violation of the overtime provisions of the FLSA. 18. In the three years prior to the filing of the lawsuit, Defendants suffered or permitted Plaintiff to work, and Plaintiff did in fact work, in excess of forty (40) hours in individual work weeks during his employment with Defendant. 19. In the three years prior to the filing of the lawsuit, Defendants likewise suffered or permitted other similarly situated employees to work who did, in fact, perform work for Defendants in excess of forty (40) hours in individual work weeks but did not compensate them at least at the overtime wage rate of one and a half times his regular rate of pay for all time worked in excess of forty (40). 20. Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees were not exempt from the overtime wage provisions of the FLSA. 21. Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees were entitled to be compensated at the rate of one and a half times their regular rate for all time worked in excess of forty (40) hours in an individual work week. . 6 22. Defendants violated the FLSA by failing to compensate Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees’ overtime wages for all time worked in excess of forty (40) hours in individual work weeks. 23. Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees are entitled to recover unpaid overtime wages for up to three (3) years prior to Plaintiff filing this lawsuit because Defendants’ violation was willful. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for a judgment against Defendants as follows: A. That the Court determine that this action may be maintained as a collective action pursuant to Section 216(b) of the FLSA; B. A judgment in the amount of unpaid overtime wages for all the time Plaintiff and similarly situated employees worked in excess of forty (40) hours in individual work weeks for Defendant; C. Liquidated damages in the amount equal to the unpaid wages; D. That the Court declare the Defendant violated the FLSA; E. That the Court enjoin the Defendant from continuing to violate the FLSA; F. Reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs of this action as provided by the FLSA; and G. Such other further relief this Court deems appropriate and just. 24. Plaintiff incorporates and re-alleges paragraphs 1 through 23 of this Complaint, as though set forth herein. 25. The matters set forth in this Count arise from Defendants’ violation of the overtime wage provision of the IMWL. 7 26. In the three years prior to the filing of the lawsuit, Defendants suffered or permitted Plaintiff to work, and Plaintiff did in fact work, in excess of forty (40) hours in individual work weeks during his employment with Defendant. 27. In the three years prior to the filing of the lawsuit, Defendants suffered or permitted other similarly situated employees to work, and other similarly situated employees did in fact work, in excess of forty (40) hours in individual work weeks during their employment with Defendants. 28. Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees were not exempt from the overtime wage provisions of the IMWL. 29. Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees were entitled to be compensated at the rate of one and a half times their regular rate for all time worked in excess of forty (40) hours in an individual work week. 30. Defendants violated the IMWL by failing to compensate Plaintiff and similarly situated employees for all time worked in excess of forty (40) hours in individual work weeks. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for a judgment against Defendants as follows: A. That the Court determines that this action may be certified as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 23(a) and (b); B. A judgment in the amount of unpaid overtime wages for all the time Plaintiffs and similarly situated employees worked in excess of forty (40) hours in individual workweeks for Defendants; C. Statutory damages pursuant to the formula set forth in 820 ILCS 105/12(a); D. That the Court declare the Defendants violated the IMWL; E. That the Court enjoin the Defendants from continuing to violate the 8. Plaintiff Jose Pizano has worked at Big Top from May 2011 through the present. 9. Plaintiff is employed by Defendants to set up tents, chairs, and other party rental equipment to various sites around Chicago and the surrounding suburbs. Violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act- Overtime Wages Section 216(b) Collective Action Violation of the Illinois Minimum Wage Law- Overtime Wages Class Action

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10. On or about October 12, 2012, Plaintiff received another phone call on his cellular telephone, and the same number appeared on his phone’s caller identification: 1-888-613- 0232. 11. Plaintiff again declined to answer the call, and received a voicemail recording of the same pre-recorded message transcribed in ¶ 8, supra. 12. Because the caller placed a telephone call without meaningful disclosure of its identity, the communication constituted a violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692d(6). 13. On or around November 17, 2012, Plaintiff called the phone number that had appeared on his caller identification, and that was left in the voicemails described supra: 1-888-613-0232 14. A woman answered the phone, and identified herself as an agent of Defendant— Stellar Recovery, Inc. 15. Defendant’s agent told Plaintiff that Defendant was seeking $234.00 from him, for a debt that Plaintiff allegedly owed to Comcast. 17. On information and belief, Defendant placed telephone calls to numerous other Minnesota consumers without the meaningful disclosure of its identity, as part of the collection campaigns that included the calls to Plaintiff on or around October 4, 2012, and on or around October 12, 2012, and in doing so, violated 15 U.S.C. 1692d(6) each and every time. 18. Plaintiff brings this action individually and as a Class for Defendant’s violations of the FDCPA, including 15 U.S.C. § 1692d(6), pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23b(2) and 23b(3), on behalf of the following Class: All Minnesota consumers to whom Defendant placed phone calls without meaningful disclosure of its identity, on or around October 4, 2012 and/or on or around October 12, 2012. 19. The Class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. Although only Defendant knows the number and identity of Class members, Plaintiff, on information and belief, asserts that the number of Class members is in the hundreds, if not thousands. 20. There are questions of law and fact common to the Class. The central question is whether, as required by 15 U.S.C. § 1692d(6), Defendant meaningfully disclosed its identity when it placed telephone calls to Class members on or around October 4, 2012, and/or on or around October 12, 2012. 22. Plaintiff and his counsel will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class. Plaintiff is committed to vigorously litigating this matter, and has secured counsel experienced in consumer class action litigation, including FDCPA litigation. Neither Plaintiff nor his counsel has any interests that might cause either of them to fail to vigorously pursue this action. 23. This action should be maintained as a class action, because the prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the putative Class would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members, which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the parties opposing this class, as well as a risk of adjudications with respect to individual members which would, as a practical matter, be dispositive of the interests of other members not parties to the adjudications, or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests. 25. Questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating this controversy. 26. The interest of Class members in individually controlling the prosecution of separate claims against Defendant is small. Management of the Class claims is likely to present significantly fewer difficulties than those presented in many individual claims. The identities of the Class members may be obtained from Defendant’s records. 28. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the above paragraphs as though fully stated herein. 29. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant constitute violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), specifically 15 U.S.C. § 1692d(6). 31. As a result of the Defendant’s violations of the FDCPA, it is liable to Plaintiff and Class members for statutory damages, costs, and reasonable attorney’s fees, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692k. 5. Sometime in or around September 2011, Plaintiff signed up for cable and internet services from Comcast Corporation (“Comcast”) at his then-residence, an apartment at the address of 6301 Quinwood Lane North, Maple Grove, MN 55369. 6. In or around June 2012, Plaintiff sub-leased his apartment at 6301 Quinwood Lane North, moved to a different address, and cancelled his cable and internet services from Comcast. 7. On or about October 4, 2012, Plaintiff received a phone call on his cellular telephone, and the number that appeared on his cellular telephone’s caller identification was: 1-888-613-0232. 9. Because the caller placed a telephone call without meaningful disclosure of its identity, the communication constituted a violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692d(6). COUNT I. VIOLATION OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq.

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14. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of herself and on behalf of and all others similarly situated (“the Class”). 15. Plaintiff represents, and is a member of the Class, consisting of all persons within the United States who receive any unsolicited telephone calls from Defendant or its agents on their paging service, cellular phone service, mobile radio service, radio common carrier service, or other service for which they were charged for the call, through the use of any automatic telephone dialing system or artificial or pre-recorded voice system as set forth in 47 U.S.C. Section 227(B)(1)(A)(3) or artificial or prerecorded voice, which telephone call by Defendant or its agents was not made for emergency purposes or with the recipients’ prior express consent, within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint. 16. Defendant and its employees or agents are excluded from the Class. Plaintiff does not know the number of members in the Class, but believes the Class members number in the hundreds of thousands, if not more. Thus, this matter should be certified as a Class action to assist in the expeditious litigation of this matter. 26. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 27. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant and its agents constitute numerous and multiple negligent violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. 28. As a result of Defendant’s, and Defendant’s agents’, negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq, Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to an award of $500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). 29. Plaintiff and the Class are also entitled to and seek injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. 30. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the above paragraphs 1 through 25 inclusive, of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 34. As a result of Defendant’s, and Defendant’s agents’, negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1), Plaintiff seeks for herself and each Class member $500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). 35. Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(A), Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. 36. Any other relief the Court may deem just and proper. 8. Commencing approximately January of 2012, through the present, Plaintiff Lidia Riott received a number of unsolicited phone calls to her wireless phone, for which Plaintiff provided no consent to call, requesting Plaintiff Lidia Riott to purchase various vacation packages. 9. Plaintiff Lidia Riott has attempted to unsubscribe to Defendant’s network, however continues to receive a number of unsolicited phone calls. KNOWING AND/OR WILLFUL VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. NEGLIGENT VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. THE TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. VIOLATION OF THE TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ.

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1. Numerosity. 16. Plaintiff John Doe #1 is an individual who resides in Tennessee and is required to comply with SORA. 17. Doe #1 was convicted of “indecency with child contact” in 1999. The victim was un- der the age of twelve at the time of the offense for which Doe #1 was convicted. No law in effect at the time of his offense or conviction prohibited him from residing, spending the night, or being alone with his own child if he became a parent. 18. Doe #1 was sentenced to two years’ imprisonment, which he completed. 19. Nine years later, in 2007, Doe #1 became married. He and his wife had a son in 2014. No law in effect when his son was born prohibited Doe #1 from residing, spending the night, or being alone with his son. 2. Commonality. 20. Doe #1’s wife abandoned him and their son in 2017. She moved out of state and has never come back. His son was 18 months old at the time. 21. Doe #1 has continued raising his son as a single parent. He has not remarried. 22. Doe #1’s son is a low-functioning, non-verbal, autistic child. His son depends on a routine. If that routine is interrupted, his son engages in disruptive behaviors such as non-stop screaming and crying. 23. Doe #1 works from home so that he can work and care for his son at the same time. His daily routine begins with waking up his son, serving him breakfast, and then doing therapeu- tic activities with him to help him learn the alphabet, numbers, shapes, and so on. Doe #1 pre- pares and provides the remaining meals and continues additional therapy in the afternoon involv- ing coloring, balls, and flashcards. Doe #1 is regularly alone with his son. 24. In June 2019, Doe #1 went to make his quarterly report as required by SORA. The law enforcement officer he reported to asked about his living arrangements with his son. The of- ficer informed Doe #1 that beginning July 1, 2019, he can no longer reside with his now-five- year old son. 25. If Doe #1 cannot reside with or be alone with his son, there will be no one to care for him. Furthermore, his son suffers from separation anxiety as a result of his mother’s abandon- ment and cannot cope when Doe #1 is gone for any length of time. Doe #1 cannot afford to hire a special needs caregiver with the skill set to nurture a young, autistic child. 26. Doe #1 loves his son, provides for him, and wants to be involved in his life as much as possible. Doe #1’s son needs Doe #1 with him to raise him, nurture him, and care for his spe- cial needs. John Doe #2 27. Plaintiff John Doe #2 is an individual who resides in Tennessee and is required to comply with SORA. 28. Doe #2 was convicted of attempted aggravated sexual battery in 2005. The victim was under the age of twelve at the time of the offense for which Doe #2 was convicted. No law in effect at the time of his offense or conviction prohibited him from residing, spending the night, or being alone with his own child if he became a parent. 29. At the time of Doe #2’s conviction he was living with his wife and three-year old daughter. No law in effect when his daughter was born prohibited Doe #2 from residing, spend- ing the night, or being alone with his daughter. 3. Typicality. 30. Doe #2 was sentenced to six years’ probation, which he completed with no infrac- tions, and is on community supervision for life. He completed his therapy. He reports quarterly to his probation officer. He has had no violations while on community supervision. 31. Doe #2 experiences extreme difficulties obtaining employment as a sex offender, so he bought a farm and started his own business selling farm goods to restaurants. His wife works away from home most of the week. His farm occupation allows him to stay home and take care of their daughter. 32. Doe #2’s daughter is now 16 years old. She has a learning disability. He and his wife decided to home school their daughter in part because he generally could not go to school func- tions or extracurricular activities. They decided homeschooling their daughter was the best choice for giving her a reasonably normal childhood. 33. Doe #2 has been his daughter’s day-to-day caretaker and teacher. His daughter suffers from anxiety and depression. She is very attached to her father and mother. Together, they help their daughter practice coping skills to overcome her emotional troubles. 34. On June 3, 2019, Doe #2 made his quarterly sex offender registry check-in with his community supervision probation officer. The officer gave him a memorandum from the Tennes- see Department of Corrections (“TDOC”) dated May 29, 2019. The memorandum was sent to sex offenders on community supervision for life to inform them of SB 425’s enactment and stat- ed in relevant part: [O]nce this law goes into effect you will no longer be allowed to live at your current residence with the minor child/children. You must find alternative housing for your- self or the minor child/children by no later than July 1, 2019. If you and the minor child/children continue to live together at your current residence after July 1, 2019 you will be in violation of the conditions of the Tennessee Sex Offender Registry and subject to arrest and prosecution. 35. If Doe #2 is forced to leave his home, there will be no one to homeschool his daugh- ter, because his wife must work. His daughter will be home alone. 36. Nor will there be anyone to run Doe #2’s farm. His business and livelihood will col- lapse and his family will suffer financial loss. 37. Doe #2 loves his daughter and she needs him with her to raise, educate, and nurture her. John Doe #3 38. Plaintiff John Doe #3 is an individual who resides in Tennessee and is required to comply with SORA. 39. Doe #3 was convicted of attempted rape of a child in 2007. The child was under the age of twelve at the time of the offense for which Doe #3 was convicted. No law in effect at the time of his offense or conviction prohibited him from residing, spending the night, or being alone with his own child if he became a parent. 4. Adequacy of Representation. 40. Doe #3 was sentenced to 10 years’ probation, which he completed. He will remain on community supervision for the rest of his life. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-524(a). No law in effect at the time of his offense or conviction prohibited him from residing, spending the night, or being alone with his own child if he became a parent. 41. Doe #3 has actively participated in all sex offender treatment and counseling required of him. 42. Nine years later, in 2016, Doe #3 became married. He and his wife had a child that same year and another child in 2018. No law in effect when these children were born prohibited Doe #3 from residing, spending the night, or being alone with his children. 43. Doe #3 loves his children, provides for them, and wants to be involved in their lives as much as possible. 44. Doe #3 resides with his wife and children and is often alone with his children due to his wife’s work schedule. Doe #3 works in construction and his wife works as a nurse. Both spouses must work and struggle to make ends meet. A relative watches the children during the day while Doe #3 and his wife are working. The relative leaves when Doe #3 comes home in the evening. Doe #3 is often the only parent at home in the evening because his wife often works late shifts and extra shifts to make more money for their family. 45. In June 2019, Doe #3 received the same TDOC memorandum Doe #2 received, in- forming him of SB 425’s enactment and instructing him to find “alternative housing” or be “sub- ject to arrest and prosecution.” 46. If Doe #3 is prohibited from residing, spending the night, or being alone with his children, he will have to find a new home. This will be extremely difficult. First, many places are off-limits to him under SORA’s geographical restrictions on where sex offenders may live. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-39-211(a). Second, many landlords refuse to rent to sex offenders. Third, Doe #1 and his wife struggle to make ends meet paying for just one residence; they cannot afford to pay for two residences. 47. Furthermore, if Doe #3 cannot spend the night or be alone with his children, he and his wife will have to hire a babysitter to watch the children in the evenings. His wife often cannot watch the children due to her work schedule. When she is home, she is often so exhausted from work that she cannot watch the children. Yet, due to their financial circumstances, Doe #3 and his wife cannot afford the additional cost of a babysitter. 48. Defendant William B. Lee is the Governor of the State of Tennessee. He is sued in his official capacity. 49. Pursuant to Article III, section 1 of the Tennessee Constitution, the supreme executive power of the state is vested in the governor. The Tennessee Constitution further provides that the governor shall take care that applicable federal and state laws are faithfully executed. Tenn. Const., art. III, § 10. Governor Lee signed SB 425 into law. Governor Lee is ultimately responsi- ble for the enforcement of the laws of this state and for supervision of all state departments, in- cluding the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation (the “TBI”) and TDOC. 50. Governor Lee is an appropriate defendant in a case challenging the constitutionality of the SB 425. TBI Director Rausch 51. Defendant David B. Rausch is the Director of the TBI. He is sued in his official ca- pacity. 52. SORA requires the TBI to maintain Tennessee’s sex offender registry. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-39-204(a) & (d), § 40-39-206(a) (2018). The TBI’s responsibilities include enforcing SORA, maintaining the state’s database of sex offenders, maintaining an Internet-accessible pub- lic sex offender registry, registering offenders (along with other law enforcement agencies), de- veloping registration forms, providing statutorily-required notices to registrants, collecting regis- tration fees, and coordinating with national law enforcement and the national sex offender regis- try. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-39-203(i), § 40-39-204(a) & (d), § 40-39-205(a) & (f), § 40-39- 206 (2018). 53. The director of the TBI is an appropriate defendant in a case challenging the constitu- tionality of SB 425. TDOC Commission Parker 54. Tony C. Parker is the Commissioner of TDOC. He is sued in his official capacity. 55. TDOC is one of the agencies charged with enforcing SORA. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 39-202(1) & (14), § 40-39-204(a), § 40-39-208(g), 56. TDOC is the agency responsible for supervising sex offenders sentenced to communi- ty supervision for life. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-524(d). 57. TDOC issued the memorandum received by Doe #2 and Doe #3 to all sex offenders on community supervision for life whose victims were under the age of twelve. 58. The director of TDOC is an appropriate defendant in a case challenging the constitu- tionality of SB 425. 59. Plaintiffs seek to bring this action for themselves and on behalf of two classes, the “Ex Post Facto Class” and the “Due Process Class.” A. Class Definitions. 60. The Ex Post Facto Class is defined as every resident of Tennessee: (a) Who has been convicted of a “sexual offense” or “violent sexual offense” as de- fined by Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-39-202 against a victim under the age of twelve; (b) Whose qualifying offense occurred prior to May 10, 2019; and (c) Who is the parent of a minor child. 61. The Due Process Class is defined as every resident of Tennessee: (a) Who has been convicted of a “sexual offense” or “violent sexual offense” as de- fined by Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-39-202 against a victim under the age of twelve; and (b) Who is the parent of a minor child. 62. The names, dates of offense, dates of conviction, presence of minor children in the home, and other relevant records of the Ex Post Facto Class and Due Process Class members are in Defendants’ possession, custody, or control and are easily ascertainable by Defendants. B. The Prerequisites of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) Are Satisfied. 63. On information and belief, the Ex Post Facto Class and Due Process Class are each so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. In 2018, news media outlets reported a study by the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children that found Tennessee had 29,123 registered sex offenders. See <https://newschannel9.com/news/local/tennessee-claims- among-highest-rates-of-registered-sex-offenders-according-to-ncmec-data> (accessed June 26, 2019). If only one-half of one percent of registered offenders fell within the Class definition, that would exceed 145 people. 64. There are questions of law and fact common to the Ex Post Facto Class and Due Pro- cess Class, including without limitation: (a) Whether prohibiting a person from residing, spending the night, or being alone with that person’s minor child substantially interferes with that person’s funda- mental right to direct the education and upbringing of his or her children? (b) Whether Tennessee may impose such a prohibition based solely on the facts of that person’s prior criminal conviction and without any trial or other due process? (c) Whether Tennessee may impose such a prohibition based solely on the facts of that person’s prior criminal conviction and without any finding, based on an indi- vidualized assessment of that person, that he or she poses a danger to or has harmed the child? 65. Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims of the Ex Post Facto Class and Due Process Class. Plaintiffs were convicted of sex offenses against (unrelated) minors under the age of twelve and presently reside with their own minor children. 66. Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Ex Post Facto Class and Due Process Class. Each Plaintiff has a sufficient stake in the litigation to prosecute his claims vigorously on behalf of the Ex Post Facto Class and Due Process Class members and each Plaintiff’s interests are aligned with those of the Ex Post Facto Class and Due Process Class members. There are no defenses of a unique nature that may be asserted against any Plaintiff in- dividually, as distinguished from the other members of the Ex Post Facto Class and Due Process Class, and the relief sought is common to the Ex Post Facto Class and Due Process Class. No Plaintiff has any interest that is in conflict with or is antagonistic to the interests of the members of the Ex Post Facto Class and Due Process Class, and no named Plaintiff has any conflict with any other member of the Ex Post Facto Class and Due Process Class. Plaintiffs have retained competent counsel to represent them and the Ex Post Facto Class and Due Process Class in this litigation. C. The Prerequisites of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) Are Satisfied. 67. Plaintiffs should be permitted to maintain a class action for declaratory and injunctive relief because Defendants “have acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). SB 425 applies to every Ex Post Facto Class and Due Process Class member without regard to his or her individual circumstances, making certifi- cation for purposes of seeking declaratory and injunctive relief appropriate. 68. Article I, section 10, clause 1 of the United States Constitution provides in relevant part: “No State shall…pass any…ex post facto Law[.]” 69. The offenses for which Plaintiffs and Ex Post Facto Class members have been con- victed and their convictions for those offenses occurred before SB 425’s enactment. 70. Prohibiting Plaintiffs and Ex Post Facto Class members from residing, spending the night with, or being alone with their children based solely on the facts of their convictions and without any finding, based on an individualized assessment of the parent, that they pose a danger or have caused any harm to their children, constitutes additional punishment of Plaintiffs and Ex Post Facto Class members for those pre-enactment offenses. 71. SB 425 therefore violates Article I, section 10, of the United States Constitution as applied to Plaintiffs and Ex Post Facto Class members. 72. Article I, section 11 of the Tennessee Constitution provides: “[L]aws made for the punishment of acts committed previous to the existence of such laws, and by them only declared criminal, are contrary to the principles of a free government; wherefore no ex post facto law shall be made.” 73. The offenses for which Plaintiffs and Ex Post Facto Class members have been con- victed and their convictions for those offenses occurred before SB 425’s enactment. 74. Prohibiting Plaintiffs and Ex Post Facto Class members from residing, spending the night with, or being alone with their children based solely on the facts of their convictions and without any finding, based on an individualized assessment of the parent, that they pose a danger or have caused any harm to their children, constitutes additional punishment of Plaintiffs and Ex Post Facto Class members for those pre-enactment offenses. 75. SB 425 therefore violates Article I, section 11, of the Tennessee Constitution as ap- plied to Plaintiffs and Ex Post Facto Class members. 76. The First Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment pro- tect the fundamental right to enter into and carry on certain intimate or private relationships, which includes family relationships such as those between parents and children. 77. By prohibiting Plaintiffs and Due Process Class members from residing, spending the night with, or being alone with their children, SB 425 substantially interferes with their funda- mental right to enter into and carry on family relationships. 78. SB 425 is not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest because it prohib- its Plaintiffs and Due Process Class members from residing, spending the night with, or being alone with their children based solely on the facts of their convictions and without any finding, based on an individualized assessment of the parent, that they pose a danger or have caused any harm to their children. 79. SB 425 therefore violates Plaintiffs’ and Due Process Class members’ fundamental right under the United States Constitution to enter into and carry on family relationships. 80. Article I, Section 8, of the Tennessee Constitution provides: “That no man shall be taken or imprisoned, or disseized of his freehold, liberties or privileges, or outlawed, or exiled, or in any manner destroyed or deprived of his life, liberty or property, but by the judgment of his peers, or the law of the land.” 81. This provision protects the fundamental right to enter into and carry on certain inti- mate or private relationships, which includes family relationships such as those between parents and children. 82. By prohibiting Plaintiffs and Due Process Class members from residing, spending the night with, or being alone with their children, SB 425 substantially interferes with their funda- mental right to enter into and carry on family relationships. 83. SB 425 is not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest because it prohib- its Plaintiffs and Due Process Class members from residing, spending the night with, or being alone with their children based solely on the facts of their convictions and without any finding, based on an individualized assessment of the parent, that they pose a danger or have caused any harm to their children. 84. SB 425 therefore violates Plaintiffs’ and Due Process Class members’ fundamental right under the Tennessee Constitution to enter into and carry on family relationships. 85. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitu- tion protects the fundamental right of parents to direct the education and upbringing of their chil- dren. 86. By prohibiting Plaintiffs and Due Process Class members from residing, spending the night with, or being alone with their children, SB 425 substantially interferes with their funda- mental right to direct the education and upbringing of their children. 87. SB 425 is not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest because it prohib- its Plaintiffs and Due Process Class members from residing, spending the night with, or being alone with their children based solely on the facts of their convictions and without any finding, based on an individualized assessment of the parent, that they pose a danger or have caused any harm to their children. 88. SB 425 therefore violates Plaintiffs’ and Due Process Class members’ fundamental right under the United States Constitution to direct the education and upbringing of their chil- dren. 89. Article I, Section 8, of the Tennessee Constitution provides: “That no man shall be taken or imprisoned, or disseized of his freehold, liberties or privileges, or outlawed, or exiled, or in any manner destroyed or deprived of his life, liberty or property, but by the judgment of his peers, or the law of the land.” 90. This provision protects the fundamental right of parents to direct the education and upbringing of their children. 91. By prohibiting Plaintiffs and Due Process Class members from residing, spending the night with, or being alone with their children, SB 425 substantially interferes with their funda- mental right to direct the education and upbringing of their children. 92. SB 425 is not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest because it prohib- its Plaintiffs and Due Process Class members from residing, spending the night with, or being alone with their children based solely on the facts of their convictions and without any finding, based on an individualized assessment of the parent, that they pose a danger or have caused any harm to their children. 93. SB 425 therefore violates Plaintiffs’ and Due Process Class members’ fundamental right under the Tennessee Constitution to direct the education and upbringing of their children. 94. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitu- tion forbids a state to “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law[.]” 95. SB 425 deprives Plaintiffs and Due Process Class members of the liberty of residing, spending the night with, or being alone with their children due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 96. Article I, Section 8, of the Tennessee Constitution provides: “That no man shall be taken or imprisoned, or disseized of his freehold, liberties or privileges, or outlawed, or exiled, or in any manner destroyed or deprived of his life, liberty or property, but by the judgment of his peers, or the law of the land.” 97. Under this provision, a person may not be deprived of his liberty without due process of law. 98. SB 425 deprives Plaintiffs and Due Process Class members of the liberty of residing, spending the night with, or being alone with their children without due process of law in viola- tion of Article I, Section 8, of the Tennessee Constitution. 99. The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” 100. Prohibiting Plaintiffs and Due Process Class members from residing, spending the night with, or being alone with their children based solely on the facts of their convictions and without any finding, based on an individualized assessment of the parent, that they pose a danger or have caused any harm to their children, constitutes punishment of Plaintiffs and Due Process Class members for those pre-enactment offenses. 101. Such punishment is disproportionate and otherwise cruel and unusual. 102. SB 425 therefore violates the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitu- tion. Cruel and Unusual Punishment: United States Constitution Cruel and Unusual Punishment: Tennessee Constitution 103. Article I, section 16 of the Tennessee Constitution provides: “[E]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” 104. Prohibiting Plaintiffs and Due Process Class members from residing, spending the night with, or being alone with their children based solely on the facts of their convictions and without any finding, based on an individualized assessment of the parent, that they pose a danger or have caused any harm to their children, constitutes punishment of Plaintiffs and Due Process Class members for those pre-enactment offenses. 105. Such punishment is disproportionate and otherwise cruel and unusual. 106. SB 425 therefore violates Article I, section 16 of the Tennessee Constitution. Ex Post Facto Clause: Tennessee Constitution Ex Post Facto Clause: United States Constitution Fundamental Right to Family Relationship: United States Constitution Fundamental Right to Family Relationship: Tennessee Constitution Fundamental Right to Direct the Education and Upbringing of Children: Tennessee Constitution Fundamental Right to Direct the Education and Upbringing of Children: United States Constitution Governor Lee John Doe #1 Procedural Due Process: Tennessee Constitution Procedural Due Process: United States Constitution

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29. Plaintiff Rios is a “person” as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 153(39). 30. Ms. Rios’s telephone number, (435) XXX-9252, is assigned to a cellular telephone service. 31. Ms. Rios’s cellular telephone line is used for residential purposes. 32. Ms. Rios’s cellular telephone line has been on the National Do Not Call Registry since 2017. 33. Ms. Rios has never utilized Weed Man lawn care services. 34. However, in the fall of 2017, a Weed Man lawn care services representative showed up unannounced at her house and requested a phone number. 35. Ms. Rios provided her phone number, but at no time did she agree to receive telemarketing calls regarding Weed Man lawn care services. 36. Nonetheless, shortly thereafter, Ms. Rios began receiving calls regarding Weed Man lawn care services. 37. On several occasions, Ms. Rios asked the Weed Man lawn care services representative to stop calling him. 38. However, the calls continued and have regularly occurred with multiple calls when WM Utah offers a spring discount to acquire new customers. 40. The defendants do not have or utilize an Internal Do Not Call list, as Ms. Rios continued to receive calls related to Weed Man lawn care services after these requests. 41. The defendants do not have or utilize a written policy pertaining to “do not call” requests. 42. Ms. Rios requested to no longer receive calls regarding Weed Man lawn care services, yet she continued to receive calls. 43. As such, to the extent a perfunctory written policy exists, the defendants have not trained their personnel on the existence or use of any internal “do not call” list. 44. Defendants continued to call Ms. Rios after his requests to cease calling, therefore defendants do not record or honor “do not call” requests. 45. The FCC has explained that its “rules generally establish that the party on whose behalf a solicitation is made bears ultimate responsibility for any violations.” See In re Rules & Regulations Implementing the TCPA, CC Docket No. 92-90, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 10 FCC Rcd 12391, 12397 (¶ 13) (1995). 46. In its January 4, 2008 ruling, the FCC reiterated that a company on whose behalf a telephone call is made bears the responsibility for any violations. Id. (specifically recognizing “on behalf of” liability in the context of an autodialed or prerecorded message call sent to a consumer by a third party on another entity’s behalf under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)). 48. More specifically, the May 2013 FCC Ruling held that, even in the absence of evidence of a formal contractual relationship between the seller and the telemarketer, a seller is liable for telemarketing calls if the telemarketer “has apparent (if not actual) authority” to make the calls. 28 FCC Rcd at 6586 (¶ 34). 49. The May 2013 FCC Ruling rejected a narrow view of TCPA liability, including the assertion that a seller’s liability requires a finding of formal agency and immediate direction and control over the third-party who placed the telemarketing call. Id. at 6587 n. 107. 51. The Franchisor knowingly and actively accepted business that originated through WM County’s illegal telemarketing calls. 52. The Franchisor accepted business from and received profits from, illegal calls WM County made, even though the Franchisor had received complaints about the calling conduct of its franchisees and vendors. The Franchisor also fields complaints about telemarketing conduct of its franchisees. 53. In fact, in response to a complaint made to the Better Business Bureau when an individual received an automated call after she had cancelled her service, the Franchisor explained: We did look into the situation and review the call and apologize if there was any confusion or miscommunication. Our representative was calling from our centralized call center which is located here in the Carlisle, PA area and handles calls for each of our franchise units within our organization. It seems there was some confusion or miscommunication that you were speaking to someone from the Weed Man USA headquarters. See https://www.bbb.org/ca/on/oshawa/profile/lawn-maintenance/weed-man-usa- headquarters-0107-1301262/customer-reviews (last visited January 16, 2021). 54. Despite this knowledge, the Franchisor continued its relationship with WM County. 56. The Franchisor failed to make such an instruction to its co-defendant, and as a result, is liable for its co-defendant’s conduct. 57. Additionally, the Franchisor controlled and restricted its co-defendant’s ability to do business in geographic locations and promote Weed Man lawn care services. 58. The May 2013 FCC Ruling states that called parties may obtain “evidence of these kinds of relationships . . . through discovery, if they are not independently privy to such information.” Id. at 6592-593 (¶ 46). Moreover, evidence of circumstances pointing to apparent authority on behalf of the telemarketer “should be sufficient to place upon the seller the burden of demonstrating that a reasonable consumer would not sensibly assume that the telemarketer was acting as the seller’s authorized agent.” Id. at 6593 (¶ 46). 59. As authorized by Rule 23(b)(2) or (b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of Classes of all other persons or entities similarly situated throughout the United States. 61. Excluded from the Classes are counsel, defendants, and any entities in which defendants have a controlling interest, defendants’ agents and employees, any judge to whom this action is assigned, and any member of such judge’s staff and immediate family. 62. The Classes are identifiable through phone records and phone number databases. 63. The potential members of the Classes number at least in the thousands. 64. Individual joinder of these persons is impracticable. 65. Plaintiff is a member of both Classes. 66. There are questions of law and fact common to Plaintiff and to the proposed Classes, including but not limited to the following: a. Whether defendants made calls to Plaintiff and members of the Classes without first obtaining prior express written consent to make the calls; b. Whether defendants maintained a written “do not call” policy; c. Whether defendants trained employees or agents engaged in telemarketing on the existence and usage of any “do not call” policy; d. Whether defendants recorded or honored “do not call” requests; e. Whether defendants’ conduct constitutes a violation of the TCPA; and f. Whether members of the Classes are entitled to treble damages based on the willfulness of defendants’ conduct. 68. Plaintiff is an adequate representative of the Classes because her interests does not conflict with Classes’ interests, she will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Classes, and she is represented by counsel skilled and experienced in class actions, including TCPA class actions. 69. Common questions of law and fact predominate over questions affecting only individual class members, and a class action is the superior method for fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. The only individual question concerns identification of Class members, which will be ascertainable from records defendants and/or their agents maintain. 70. The likelihood that individual members of the Classes will prosecute separate actions is remote due to the time and expense necessary to prosecute an individual case. 71. Plaintiff repeats the prior allegations of this Amended Complaint and incorporates them by reference herein. 72. Defendants placed numerous calls for telemarketing purposes to Plaintiff’s and Internal DNC Class Members’ telephone numbers, or others did so on their behalf. 73. Defendants did so despite not having a written policy pertaining to “do not call” requests. 74. Defendants did so despite not training its personnel on the existence or use of any internal “do not call” list. 76. Defendants placed two or more telephone calls to Plaintiff and Internal DNC Class Members in a 12-month period, or others did so their on behalf. 77. Plaintiff and Internal DNC Class Members are entitled to an award of $500 in statutory damages per telephone call pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5). 78. Plaintiff and Internal DNC Class Members are entitled to an award of treble damages in an amount up to $1,500 per telephone call, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5). 79. Plaintiff repeats the prior allegations of this Amended Complaint and incorporates them by reference herein. 80. The foregoing acts and omissions of defendants and/or their affiliates, agents, and/or other persons or entities acting on defendants’ behalf constitute numerous and multiple violations of the TCPA, by making telemarketing calls to a residential telephone number that has been on the National Do Not Call Registry for more than 31 days prior to the first call. 81. As a result of defendants’ and/or its affiliates, agents, and/or other persons or entities acting on defendants’ behalf’s violations of the TCPA, Plaintiff and members of the National DNC Class are entitled to an award of $500 in damages for each and every call made or up to $1,500 for each telemarketing call made deemed to be a “willful or knowing” violation. D. Calls to Ms. Rios Defendants. COMPLAINT Case No. 2:21-00039-CMR Telephone Consumer Protection Act (Violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227) (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Internal DNC Class) Telephone Consumer Protection Act (Violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227) (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the National DNC Class)

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1. Plaintiff and class representative Michael Daley is an individual and a resident and citizen of the State of Illinois. 10. The COA describes plaintiff and putative class members as “independent contractors.” 11. As Jones Motor drivers, plaintiff and members of the putative class are at the core of Jones Motor’s common carrier business; without reliable drivers who are under defendant’s direction and control, defendant has no business. 14. Plaintiff and members of the putative class were at all relevant times employees of Jones Motor under the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act. 15. The Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act 820 ILCS 115/2 states: “As used in this Act, the term "employee" shall include any individual permitted to work by an employer in an occupation, but shall not include any individual: (1) who has been and will continue to be free from control and direction over the performance of his work, both under his contract of service with his employer and in fact; and (2) who performs work which is either outside the usual course of business or is performed outside all of the places of business of the employer unless the employer is in the business of contracting with third parties for the placement of employees; and (3) who is in an independently established trade, occupation, profession or business.” 16. Plaintiff and members of the putative class were at all relevant times employees of Jones Motor under the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act and under Illinois Common Law and pursuant to IRS tests/standards for determining employment status. 18. The COA requires plaintiff and putative class members to purchase an “occupational accident policy” and allow Jones Motor to make weekly deductions for the “occupational accident policy.” 19. Jones Motor made weekly deductions of approximately $38.60 from the wages of plaintiff and putative class members throughout the recovery period. 20. Furthermore, undisclosed to plaintiff and putative class members, Zurich on information and belief sold a “contingent liability policy” to Jones Motor for an annual premium of, on information and belief, approximately $1,500. 22. In its contracts and agreements with its shippers Jones Motor agreed to secure workers’ compensation coverage for its employees and drivers. 23. The contingent liability policy required Zurich to pay for Jones Motor’s liability under state workers’ compensation acts and also required Zurich to pay for Jones Motor’s legal defense in defending workers’ compensation claims brought by plaintiff and prospective class members. 24. The contingent liability policy was sold to Jones Motor as part of a package of insurance products that also included the occupational accident policy sold to the drivers. 25. The approximately $1,500 per year in annual premium Jones Motor paid to Zurich for the contingent liability policy did not cover and was never intended to cover the costs and exposure of Jones Motor’s liabilities for plaintiff’s and putative class members’ workers’ compensation claims. 27. The risk – a workers’ compensation claim brought by a driver – that was spuriously insured by the contingent liability policy was in reality a risk covered, in whole or in part, by the occupational accident policy. 28. When plaintiff filed his workers’ compensation claim, Zurich paid his statutory workers’ compensation benefits pursuant to the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act. Initially, Zurich paid benefits from a “general liability policy” account and subsequently paid the workers’ compensation claim through the “occupational accident policy,” thus effectively using the premiums plaintiff paid to Zurich for the occupational accident policy to indemnify Jones Motor for its workers’ compensation liability. 29. Plaintiff and putative class members, therefore, paid for Jones Motor’s statutory workers’ compensation premiums and paid for Jones Motor’s attorney to represent Jones Motor against them. 3. Defendant Jones Motor is a foreign corporation registered in Illinois, doing business in interstate trucking industry; it does business in Illinois and during the time of the recovery period operated a hiring terminal out of Pontoon Beach, Madison County, Illinois. 30. It is unlawful in Illinois for employees to pay their own workers’ compensation. The Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act provides for “Automatic Coverage” stating as follows: “The provisions of this Act, hereinafter following shall apply automatically and without election…to all employers and all their employees…” Coverage is required by 820 ILCS 305/3.3 for employers engaged in “[c]arriage by land, water or aerial service and loading or unloading in connection therewith, including distribution of any commodity by horse drawn or motor vehicle where the employer employs more than 2 employees in the enterprise or business.” 32. Jones Motor has withheld from the plaintiff’s wages and from the class member’s wages workers’ compensation premiums in violation of the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act 820 ILCS 305/4(g); as such, Jones Motor’s conduct as alleged herein is criminal conduct under the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act. Jones Motor Unlawfully Deducted Monies from Plaintiff’s and Putative Class Members’ Compensation 33. Jones Motor made multiple deductions from plaintiff’s and putative class members’ compensation. 34. Jones Motor deducted, inter alia, collision insurance, unladen insurance, other forms of insurance, and administrative fees. 35. Plaintiff and putative class members did not give their express written consent at the times these deductions were made as required by 820 ILCS 115/9. 36. As plaintiff and putative class members were employees of Jones Motor under the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act, these deductions were unlawful. Class Action Allegations 38. Numerosity – Rule 23 (a)(1): The class is numerous; the putative class of misclassified driver/employees is well in excess of one hundred members. Proceeding in individual suits or with simple joinder of members is impracticable; judicial economy is achieved in avoiding multiple duplicative suits. On information and belief there are no other class actions pending or filed regarding the issues raised in this complaint. 4. Jones Motor is a regulated motor carrier subject to the authority and regulations of the United States Department of Transportation (DOT). 40. Commonality – the issues and allegations made in the paragraph immediately above involve similar issues of law and fact applicable to all class members; the class members have all suffered the same injury – paying their own workers’ compensation premiums and being deprived of their rights pursuant to the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act. 41. Consistent with the requirements of Rule 23(a)(2), answering the common issues of law and fact as described in detail above and in this proceeding will significantly advance resolution of each proposed class member’s litigation. 42. Typicality – Rule 23(a)(3): The named plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of all class members. The named plaintiff and each and every putative class member have been subjected to the same misclassification, deception, and consequences of misclassification. A sufficient relationship exists between the injury the defendants caused to the plaintiff and the defendants’ illegal conduct affecting the class so that this Court may find a collective nature to the defendants’ illegal and improper conduct. By proving the plaintiff’s claim, plaintiff will at the same time prove the claims of the class members. 44. Adequate Representation – Rule 23(a)(4): The attorney for plaintiff and the class is experienced, qualified, and competent to handle this class action litigation. The class attorney has decades of experience litigating complex cases and has successfully tried numerous cases to verdict. Class counsel will vigorously prosecute the class interest. Class counsel’s interests are not in conflict with the plaintiff’s interests or the class’s interests. 45. As specifically alleged herein, questions of law and fact common to the class predominate over any questions affecting individual members of the class. 46. A class action is superior to other available litigation methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. Without class representation many individual class members will be deterred from litigation by its complexity and expense. Even if individual class members were willing and able to litigate alone, the Court would be inundated with myriad lawsuits involving identical facts and identical legal issues; this would exponentially increase the expenses to all parties and the burdens on the Court. Proceeding by class action presents fewer management difficulties and provides the benefit of unitary adjudication, economies of scale, and comprehensive supervision by this Court. 47. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all other allegations made in this Complaint as if fully set forth in this Count. 49. Jones Motor is required by the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act, 820 ILCS 305 et. seq., to provide workers’ compensation benefits/coverage to its employees. 5. Jones Motor hired plaintiff out of its Pontoon Beach, Illinois facility in approximately December 2013. 50. Plaintiff and the class members were at all relevant times employees of Jones Motor and were entitled to the protections, rights, and benefits afforded to employees by the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act. 51. For the reasons alleged herein, Jones Motor and Zurich are equitably and judicially estopped from denying the employer/employee relationship between the plaintiff and putative class members and Jones Motor. 52. Jones Motor and Zurich each knew plaintiff and members of the putative class were employees of Jones Motor. 53. Jones Motor and Zurich each knew there was a risk that if the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Commission reviewed the issues and the facts, the Commission would determine that plaintiff and members of the putative class were employees of Jones Motor. 54. Jones Motor and Zurich each knew that if plaintiff or a member of the putative class filed a workers’ compensation claim and the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Commission determined the driver was a Jones Motor employee, then Jones Motor would be required to pay premiums to purchase a workers’ compensation policy to benefit plaintiff and the putative class members, and Zurich would lose customers paying premiums for its “occupational accident policy” that was redundant to the workers’ compensation policy Jones Motor was required by law to provide. 56. Jones Motor and Zurich intended plaintiff and the other class members to rely upon Jones Motor’s and Zurich’s misrepresentations that plaintiff and the class members were not entitled to the protection of the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act. 57. Jones Motor and Zurich knowingly conspired with each other to discourage plaintiff and putative class members from filing workers’ compensation claims and having the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Commission determine that the driver was an employee. For example, the “occupational accident policy” Zurich sold included a term immediately terminating benefit payments from the policy if the driver filed a workers’ compensation claim; the true purpose of this policy term was to discourage drivers, who at the time would be off work and relying on the payments from the policy for their sustenance, from filing workers’ compensation claims. There is no legitimate business reason to include this coercive term. 59. In furtherance of the defendants’ conspiracy, Zurich has, in an effort to assist Jones Motor in avoiding its legal obligations under the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act, stated to Jones Motor employees and others: Zurich “Occupational Accident coverage … is not a Worker’s Compensation plan, automobile plan or a liability insurance plan. There is no employer.” 6. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. §1332(d), as the amount in controversy in aggregate exceeds five million dollars, there are more than 100 putative class members in the proposed class, and there is “minimal diversity” (as the term “minimal diversity” is understood in the context of 28 U.S.C. §1332(d)). Plaintiff and Class Members are Employees, Not Independent Contractors, of Jones Motor 60. In furtherance of the defendant’s conspiracy, Zurich has, in an effort to assist Jones Motor in avoiding its legal obligations under the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act, stated to plaintiff and others: “[driver] is NOT covered under a Workers’ Compensation plan.” 61. In furtherance of the defendants’ conspiracy, Zurich has, in an effort to avoid paying the medical bills it would be required to pay under the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act, stated to plaintiff’s health care providers that the “Occupational Accident Policy” does not pay for “expenses which are covered under any other insurance of any kind” ... and that therefore the health care providers must submit bills for work-related injuries to the employee’s private healthcare plan. 62. The Zurich Occupational Accident Policy’s benefits, compensation, and payments are of significantly less value than the benefits, compensation, and payments provided by the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act. By way of example, the Zurich Occupational Accident Policy contains coverage limits not found in the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act and pays benefits less frequently than benefits are paid under the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act. 64. The misclassification of Jones Motor employees as “independent contractors,” the requirement that the driver/employees purchase and pay the premiums for a Zurich “Occupational Accident Policy,” and the defendants’ misleading and deceptive statements made in concert with each constitute an unlawful scheme and conspiracy to illegally transfer legal liability and financial responsibility for work-related injuries from Jones Motor to Jones Motor’s employees and to the employees’ private healthcare plans. 65. The Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act, 820 ILCS 305/4 provides, inter alia: (h) It shall be unlawful for any employer, insurance company or service or adjustment company to interfere with, restrain or coerce an employee in any manner whatsoever in the exercise of the rights or remedies granted to him or her by this Act or to discriminate, attempt to discriminate, or threaten to discriminate against an employee in any way because of his or her exercise of the rights or remedies granted to him or her by this Act. 67. Jones Motor and Zurich illegally and unlawfully conspired with each other to shift from Jones Motor to plaintiff and the class members the legal obligations of Jones Motor under the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act, 820 ILCS 305/1 et. seq., to provide workers’ compensation coverage to its employees. 69. As a direct and proximate result of defendants’ conspiracy and unlawful/illegal/criminal acts, plaintiff and the class members have suffered damages, including but not limited to paying premiums for an “occupational accident insurance” policy that plaintiff and class members would not have purchased but for defendants’ conspiracy and the acts and statements made in furtherance of the conspiracy. 7. In violation of the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act, 820 ILCS 305, the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act, 820 ILCS 115, and Illinois common law, defendant Jones Motor misclassified its employee truck drivers as independent contractors. 71. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all allegations contained elsewhere in this Complaint. 72. Plaintiff and all class members are or have been at relevant times hereto employees of Jones Motor. 74. Jones Motor required plaintiff sign a “Driver Information Sheet and Beneficiary Designation” (as part of the COA) that states: “I am an independent contractor...” It also states: “I understand that the cost of the insurance is my sole obligation and responsibility regardless of the above arrangement for premium payment.” These statements are false. 75. Jones Motor intended for the plaintiff and class members to rely upon Jones Motor’s misrepresentations as to their status as independent contractors and purchase an “occupational accident policy” from Zurich that was not necessary to purchase as the drivers/employees were covered by the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act; further, the policy sold by Zurich, if it was worth anything, was worth far less than Zurich represented to plaintiff and class members it was worth. 76. Plaintiff and putative class members, as a proximate result of Jones Motor’s misrepresentations as to their employment status and other acts alleged herein, were deceived into paying their own workers’ compensation premiums. 77. Jones Motor benefitted financially from its violations of the Illinois Deceptive Business Practices Act by transferring to plaintiff and putative class members its statutory obligation to pay for workers’ compensation insurance premiums. 78. Plaintiff and class members, as a proximate result of Jones Motor’s deception, suffered actual damages which damages include, inter alia, the amount of the premiums the plaintiff and class members paid to Zurich. 81. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all allegations contained elsewhere in this Complaint. 82. Plaintiff and class members at all relevant times hereto were and are employees of Jones Motor. 83. Zurich represented to plaintiff and class members that plaintiff and class members were not employees but were independent contractors of Jones Motor. 84. Zurich intended for the plaintiff and class members to rely upon Zurich’s representation as to their employment status and purchase an “occupational accident policy” from Zurich. 85. Plaintiff and class members, as a proximate result of the defendant Zurich’s misrepresentation, were deceived into paying to defendant Zurich their own workers’ compensation premiums, premiums Jones Motor was required by the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act to pay. 86. During the course of its doing business with plaintiff and other class members, Zurich represented that the “Occupational Accident Insurance Policy” was not a workers’ compensation policy, that there was no employment relationship between the plaintiff and the putative class members and Jones Motor. 88. Contrary to Zurich’s repeated representations that the “Occupational Accident Insurance Policy” was not a workers’ compensation policy, Zurich has at all relevant times treated the “occupational accident policy” as a workers’ compensation policy; Zurich has used premiums paid for the “occupational accident policy” to settle and pay workers’ compensation claims filed by Jones Motor drivers with the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Commission. 89. Zurich never disclosed to plaintiff and putative class members the other critical component of the package of insurance products it sold to Jones Motor: the contingent liability policy. 9. As a condition of employment, Jones Motor required plaintiff and class members to sign a de facto “Contractor Operating Agreement” (“COA”). Exhibit 2. 90. Zurich never disclosed to plaintiff and putative class members that Zurich would use their “occupational accident policy” premiums payments, which subsidized the contingent liability policy, to pay for Jones Motor’s workers’ compensation liabilities to them and to pay for an attorney to represent Jones Motor against them in the workers’ compensation litigation. 92. Pursuant to the Illinois Deceptive Business Practices Act, plaintiff and class members must be awarded their reasonable attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses incurred in bringing this matter. 94. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all allegations made elsewhere in this Complaint. 95. Jones Motor unlawfully misclassified its employee drivers as independent contractors. 96. As a result of Jones Motor’s misclassification, fraud, and misdemeanor crimes, Jones Motor has been unjustly enriched. 97. Jones Motor has been unjustly enriched by, inter alia, avoiding FICA contributions, payroll taxes, and unemployment tax. 98. Jones Motor has been further unjustly enriched by, inter alia, unlawfully passing on certain business expenses to its employee drivers, including, inter alia, fuel costs. CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT COMES NOW the Plaintiff MICHAEL DALEY, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, by his undersigned attorney, and for this CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT brought pursuant to Federal Rule 23 against the defendants ZURICH AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY (“Zurich”) and JONES MOTOR CO. INC. (“Jones Motor”), states: The Parties, Jurisdiction and Venue vs Zurich Illinois Deceptive Business Practices Act vs. Jones Motor Unjust Enrichment vs. Jones Motor and Zurich Civil Conspiracy vs. Jones Motor Illinois Deceptive Business Practices Act

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1. Certification of this case as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, and appointing Plaintiff as a class representative and Fair Work, P.C. as class counsel; 2. An equitable award of all make-whole relief to which Plaintiff and the Class are entitled; 4. Attorneys’ fees, costs, and interest, as permitted by law; and BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) As set forth above, the University violated its fiduciary duty under ERISA. Among other things, a fiduciary is required to discharge its duties with respect to a plan (1) solely in the interest of the plan’s participants and beneficiaries, and (2) in accordance with the documents and instruments governing the plan. 29 U.S.C. § 1104. By failing to extend to Plaintiff and members of the Class the opportunity to participate in the Plans, the University violated its fiduciary duty with respect to the Plaintiff and members of the Class. As a result of this breach of fiduciary duty, the Plaintiff and the Class suffered harm, including the lost value of Plan benefits. As a further result of this breach of fiduciary duty, the University was unjustly enriched. This claim is brought pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3). WHEREFORE, Plaintiff requests that this Court enter the following relief:

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20. Apostelos solicited investors through his associated companies and in his individual capacity. He offered and sold investors promissory notes issued in his own name or in the name of one of his associated companies. He also offered and sold membership units in another of his associated companies. Sale of Unregistered Offerings of Midwest Green Membership Units 21. In September 2009, Apostelos, along with two other individuals, formed Midwest Green Resources, LLC (“Midwest Green”). Midwest Green purported to be in the business of investment and real estate asset management. Apostelos, through Midwest Green, marketed an offering of $10 million in equity securities. 22. Between July 2010 and August 2014, Apostelos raised money from investors by offering and selling membership units in Midwest Green (hereinafter the “Midwest Green Securities”). These Midwest Green Securities, which were purportedly equity interests in Case: 3:16-cv-00009-TMR Doc #: 1 Filed: 01/07/16 Page: 5 of 21 PAGEID #: 5 6 2275711.4 Midwest Green, were securities as the term is defined in the Ohio Securities Act, O.R.C. §1707.01. 23. Between July 2010 and August 2014, Apostelos and Midwest Green conducted two unregistered offerings of Midwest Green Securities, during which they raised approximately $9.8 million from at least 60 investors. These offerings were not registered and were not eligible for any exemption from registration. 24. The investor funds raised through the sale of Midwest Green Securities were initially deposited in Midwest Green bank accounts controlled by Apostelos. Ultimately the funds raised through the sale of Midwest Green Securities were funneled to other bank accounts Apostelos controlled. The investor funds were then used to pay earlier investors and promoters, finance Apostelos’ and his wife’s other businesses, and pay for their personal expenses. Sale of Unregistered Offerings of Promissory Notes 25. On October 19, 2009, only a month after he formed Midwest Green, Apostelos formed WMA Enterprises, LLC, an Ohio limited liability company purported to be in the business of investment and real estate asset management. 26. Between January 2010 and October 2014, Apostelos, through WMA, raised at least $56.9 million from approximately 330 investors, primarily by issuing promissory notes offering high, guaranteed rates of interest (hereinafter the “Promissory Note Securities”). These Promissory Note Securities were securities as the term is defined in the Ohio Securities Act, 65. Plaintiffs bring this action as a class action pursuant to Rules 23(B)(1) and (B)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The proposed Class is described as and consists of: All persons who, as of October 15, 2014, had self-directed IRAs for which Kingdom Trust Company, Pensco Trust Company, and/or John Does, 1-25, served as the IRA trustee or custodian and for which IRA funds were used by Kingdom Trust Company, Pensco Trust Company, and/or John Does, 1-25, to purchase Unregistered Securities on or after January 7, 2011. Excluded from this Class are the Defendants, subsidiaries and affiliates of the Defendants, the officers, directors and employees of Defendants, members of their immediate family and their legal representatives, heirs, successors or assigns and any entity in which any of the foregoing has a controlling interest. 66. Numerosity. The members of the proposed Class are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. While the exact number of the proposed Class is unknown to Plaintiffs at this time and can only be ascertained through appropriate discovery, Plaintiffs believe there are more than 100 members of the proposed Class. Members of the proposed Class can be identified from records maintained by the Defendants and/or their agents and can be Case: 3:16-cv-00009-TMR Doc #: 1 Filed: 01/07/16 Page: 15 of 21 PAGEID #: 15 16 2275711.4 notified of this action’s pendency by mail, using a form of notice customarily used in actions of this kind. 67. Common Questions of Law and Fact: Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of every member of the proposed Class because all members of the proposed Class were similarly affected by Apostelos’ Ponzi scheme in that Defendants, by, among other things, using the proposed Class members’ IRA accounts to purchase one or more of the Unregistered Securities, aided or otherwise participated in the sale of securities in violation of the Ohio Securities Act. The common legal and factual questions include, but are not limited to: a. Whether the Defendants aided or otherwise participated in the sale of securities in violation of O.R.C. §1707.43 of the Ohio Securities Act; b. Whether the members of the Class are entitled to void (rescind) the purchase of the Unregistered Securities pursuant to O.R.C. §1707.43; and c. Whether Defendants are liable for the full amount paid by the members of the Class for the Unregistered Securities and for all taxable costs pursuant to O.R.C. §1707.43. 68. Typicality. Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims of the members of the Class as they and members of the Class sustained damages arising out of Defendants’ aiding or otherwise participating in the sale of securities in violation of the Ohio Securities Act as complained of herein. 69. Adequacy of Representation. Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of all members of the Class as Plaintiffs are not antagonistic to the claims of the Class and there are no conflicts between Plaintiffs and the Class claims. Plaintiffs have retained counsel competent and experienced in class and complex litigation. Case: 3:16-cv-00009-TMR Doc #: 1 Filed: 01/07/16 Page: 16 of 21 PAGEID #: 16 17 2275711.4 70. Superiority. A class action is superior to all other available means for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. The damages or other financial detriment suffered by individual Class members may be relatively small compared to the burden and expense that would be incurred by individual litigation of claims against the Defendants. Thus, it would be impossible for each member of the Class, on an individual basis, to obtain effective redress. 71. Class certification is also appropriate because prosecuting separate actions against the Defendants would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual Class members. Further adjudications with respect to individual members of the putative class would be dispositive of other members not party to the adjudications or would substantially impair or impede the ability to protect their interests. 72. Plaintiffs reallege the foregoing paragraphs as if fully stated herein. 73. The Unregistered Securities (Promissory Note Securities and Midwest Green Securities) are securities as defined in O.R.C. §1707.01. These securities were not registered and were not subject to exemption of the registration requirements. 74. The transactions by which Defendants purchased one or more of the Unregistered Securities with assets from Plaintiffs’ and Putative Class Members’ IRA accounts constitutes a sale as the term is defined in O.R.C. §1707.01(C). 75. O.R.C. §1707.44 prohibits anyone from selling securities in Ohio without being licensed by the state pursuant to O.R.C. §1707.16. Furthermore, O.R.C. §1707.44 also prohibits investment advisors from employing any scheme to defraud investors. 76. Apostelos was not licensed by the State of Ohio to sell securities. Case: 3:16-cv-00009-TMR Doc #: 1 Filed: 01/07/16 Page: 17 of 21 PAGEID #: 17 18 2275711.4 77. Therefore, each sale by Apostelos of an Unregistered Security was the illegal sale in violation of the Ohio Securities Act. 78. Pursuant to O.R.C. §1707.43 (a), every sale or contract for sale made in violation of Chapter 1707 of the Revised Code is voidable at the election of the purchaser, and the person making such sale or contract for sale, and every person who has participated in or aided the seller in any way in making such sale or contract for sale, are jointly and severally liable to the purchaser. 79. Pursuant to O.R.C. §1707.43, Plaintiffs and each member of the Proposed Class are entitled to rescind the respective purchase of Unregistered Securities on behalf of their IRA accounts and to recover the purchase price from “every person who has participated in or aided the seller in any way in making such sale or contract for sale.” 80. Defendant Kingdom Trust participated and aided Apostelos in selling the Unregistered Securities to Ms. Boyd and other members of the proposed Class. Indeed, the purchases of Unregistered Securities by Kingdom Trust on behalf of Class Members (including Ms. Boyd) who had IRA accounts with Kingdom Trust could never have materialized without Kingdom Trust’s execution of the purchases with assets from those IRA accounts under Kingdom Trust’s control. 81. Defendant Pensco participated and aided Apostelos in selling the Unregistered Securities to Mr. Flanders and other members of the proposed Class. Indeed, the purchases of Unregistered Securities by Pensco on behalf of Class Members (including Mr. Flanders) who had IRA accounts with Pensco could never have materialized without Pensco’s execution of the purchases with assets from those IRA accounts under Pensco’s control. Case: 3:16-cv-00009-TMR Doc #: 1 Filed: 01/07/16 Page: 18 of 21 PAGEID #: 18 19 2275711.4 82. Defendant John Does, 1-25, participated and aided Apostelos in selling the Unregistered Securities to members of the proposed Class. Indeed, the purchases of Unregistered Securities by John Does, 1-25, on behalf of Class Members who had IRA accounts with John Does, 1-25, could never have materialized without John Does’, 1-25, execution of the purchases with assets from those IRA accounts under John Does’, 1-25, control. 83. No Plaintiff knew or had reason to know Apostelos was operating a Ponzi scheme until, at the earliest, when Apostelos was forced into bankruptcy in October 2014 and/or was subsequently investigated and indicted for his fraudulent behavior. 84. Pursuant to O.R.C. §1707.43, although the Unregistered Securities are already in the Defendants’ possession, Plaintiffs hereby tender to Defendants, or will tender in open court, their respective Unregistered Securities. 85. Pursuant to O.R.C §1707.43, Defendants are liable to each of their respective customers and former customers for the full amount paid by each for their respective purchases of Unregistered Securities. ILLEGAL SALE OF A SECURITY

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13. The debt was incurred by the plaintiff primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, and is a “debt” as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5). 14. On or about February 23, 2015, Midland sent the plaintiff a copy of the letter attached hereto, marked as Exhibit A, and incorporated herein by reference. 15. The letter was a form letter. 16. In the heading of the letter, Midland states that it is a “PRE-LEGAL 25. The plaintiff brings this action on behalf of a class of all other persons similarly situated. 26. The class consists of all persons who satisfy the following criteria: a. Massachusetts residents; b. from whom Midland threatened with legal action in the course of an attempt to collect a debt; c. for a debt that was, i. incurred for personal, family, or household purposes and ii. time-barred under applicable law; d. during the one-year period prior to the commencement of this action. 27. On information and belief, the class is sufficiently numerous that joinder of all members is impractical. 29. The plaintiff has the same claims as the members of the class. All claims are based on the same factual and legal theories. 30. The plaintiff and class counsel will fairly and adequately represent the interests of class members. There is no reason the plaintiff and her counsel will not vigorously pursue this matter. 31. Certification of this class pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) is appropriate. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy, in that: a. The individual class members are not aware that they have been wronged and are thus unable to prosecute individual actions; b. Concentration of the litigation concerning this matter in this Court is desirable; c. The claims of the representative plaintiff are typical of the claims of the class; d. A failure of justice will result from the absence of a class action; and e. The class is of moderate size and the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class action are not great. 32. Certification of this class pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) is also appropriate. The defendant has acted on grounds generally applicable to the class thereby making declaratory relief appropriate with respect to the class as a whole.

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12. Excluded from the Class is any person who is an executive, officer, employee, and/or director of the Defendant corporation. 13. The members of the Class are so numerous that joinder of all Class members is not practical. The precise size of the Class will be determined through discovery. 14. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of those of the entire Class. Plaintiff, along with every member of the Class, has suffered civil right violations because of Defendant’s continuing failure to comply with the ADA and ADAAG on its Website and/or other online reservation platforms. 15. Plaintiff can and will adequately protect the interests of all members of the Class and has retained competent counsel experienced in both ADA and class action litigation. Plaintiff has no interests that are contrary to the interests of the Class members in this case. 16. A class action is far superior to any other possible method for adjudicating this controversy. Each member of the Class is entitled to injunctive relief, as well as possible statutory damages under New York law. The expense and burden associated with individual litigation of each claim held by each member of the Class would be extraordinarily inefficient for Defendant, members of the Class, and the courts. 17. Common questions of law and fact prevail with respect to all members of the Class and predominate over questions applicable solely to individual Class members. Among such common questions of law and fact is whether Defendant has violated Federal and New York State statutory obligations by failing to comply with the ADA, ADAAG, NYCHRL, and NYSHRL, such that all physically disabled persons are afforded fair and equal access to any hotel owned or operated by Defendant, and their online reservation systems. 19. The names and addresses of disabled individuals who have encountered non-compliance as set forth herein, and who have been excluded from full and equal access to required accessibility information regarding the Hotel is obtainable through traditional channels used to identify members of any class; notice of this case, informing members of the Class that this case exists and that he/she may be a member of the Class, can be delivered by U.S. or electronic mail, using techniques and in a form of notice similar to those customarily used in class action litigation, and can additionally be advertised by television, internet, radio, and other means of transmission that are likely to reach members of the Class. 20. On July 26, 1990, Congress enacted the ADA, explaining that its purpose was to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities and to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing such discrimination, invoking the sweep of congressional authority in order to address the major areas of discrimination faced day-to-day by people with disabilities to ensure that the Federal government plays a central role in enforcing the standards set by the ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(l) - (4). 21. Pursuant to the mandates of 42 U.S.C. §12134(a), on September 15, 2010, the Department of Justice, Office of the Attorney General (“DOJ”), published revised regulations for Title III of the Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990. Public accommodations, including places of lodging were required to conform to these revised regulations on or before March 15, 2012. 23. In promulgating the new requirements, the Department of Justice made clear that individuals with disabilities should be able to reserve hotel rooms with the same efficiency, immediacy, and convenience as those who do not need accessible guestrooms. 28 C.F.R. Part 36, Appx. A. 25. In addition, hotel rooms that are in full compliance with current standards may differ, and individuals with disabilities must be able to ascertain which features – in new and existing facilities – are included in the hotel’s accessible guest rooms. For example, under certain circumstances, an accessible hotel bathroom may meet accessibility requirements with either a bathtub or a roll in shower. The presence or absence of particular accessible features such as these may mean the difference between a room that is usable by a particular person with a disability and one that is not. 28 C.F.R. Part 36, Appx. A. Accordingly, Defendant is required to set forth specific accessible features and not merely recite that a guestroom is “accessible” or “ADA” or list accessibility features that may (or may not) be offered within a particular room. 26. For hotels in buildings constructed after the effective date of the 1991 Standards, it is sufficient to advise that the hotel itself is fully ADA compliant, and for each accessible guestroom, to specify the room type, the type of accessible bathing facility in the room, and the communications features in the room. 28 C.F.R. Part 36, Appx. A. 28. The Hotel is a place of public accommodation that owns and/or leases and operates a place of lodging pursuant to the ADA. The Hotel is in a building constructed prior to the 1991 Standards. 29. The Website (and all other online reservation platforms used by the Hotel) allow reservations for the Hotel to be taken online. The Defendant has control over information provided to the public about the Hotel through the Website and/or other online platforms. 30. Prior to filing this lawsuit, Plaintiff visited the Website to learn about accessible features of the Hotel, and to independently assess whether the Hotel is accessible to her, and whether she could independently reserve an accessible room at the Hotel, in the same manner as those seeking to reserve non-accessible rooms. Upon her visit, Plaintiff discovered that the Website does not comply with the ADA and ADAAG. 33. The Website has a tab entitled “accessibility” at the bottom (strongly implying that Defendant is aware that the ADA exists) but when selected, this webpage contains none of the information (or lack of information) at issue in this case. 34. This is not intended to be an exclusive list, and Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the class, brings this action to remediate all violations of the ADAAG found to exist upon the Website, and upon all online reservation platforms used by the Hotel. 35. In addition to the list above, upon information and belief, Defendant may not effectively (i) ensure that accessible guest rooms are held for use by individuals with disabilities until all other guest rooms of that type have been rented and the accessible room requested is the only remaining room of that type; (ii) reserve, upon request, accessible guest rooms or specific types of guest rooms and ensure that the guest rooms requested are blocked and removed from all reservations systems; or (iii) guarantee that the specific accessible guest room reserved through its reservations service is held for the reserving customer, regardless of whether a specific room is held in response to reservations made by others. Discovery is required on these issues. 37. Defendant has discriminated against Plaintiff and all other mobility-impaired individuals, including the Class, by denying full and equal access to and enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages and accommodations offered on the Websites, due to the continuing ADA and ADAAG violations as set forth above. Defendant has had eight (8) years to bring the Website (and other online reservation platforms, as applicable) into compliance with the ADAAG revisions, but has failed or refused to do so. 38. Modifying the Website (and other online reservation platforms, as applicable) to comply with the ADA and ADAAG is accomplishable without undue burden or expense and is readily achievable. But in any event, upon information and belief, the Website has been altered, updated, and edited, after 2010, but not in a manner compliant with 2010 ADAAG standards. 39. Defendant will continue to discriminate against Plaintiff and all other disabled individuals who access the Website (and other online reservation platforms, as applicable) unless and until Defendant modifies the Website (and other online reservation platforms, as applicable) to set forth all required information, as set forth above. 40. Plaintiff and the Class are without an adequate remedy at law and are suffering irreparable harm, and Plaintiff reasonably anticipates that she and the Class will continue to suffer this harm unless and until Defendant is required to correct the ADA violations found upon the Websites (and other online reservation platforms, as applicable), and to maintain the Websites (and other online reservation platforms, as applicable), inclusive of the online reservation system, and accompanying policies and procedures, in a manner that is consistent with and compliant with ADA and ADAAG requirements. 42. Plaintiff re-avers the allegations set forth above as though fully set forth herein. 43. The New York State Human Rights Law provides: It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation…. because of the … disability … of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof … to the effect that any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of any such place shall be refused, withheld from or denied to any person on account of … disability … 3 44. The Website (and other online reservation platforms, as applicable) is a gateway to, and a part of, the Hotel, which is a place of public accommodation as defined by the New York State Human Rights Law. 45. Plaintiff and the Class have visited the Website (and other online reservation platforms, as applicable), and encountered barriers made illegal by the ADA and ADAAG, and thus by the New York State Human Rights Law. 47. Plaintiff and the Class have been damaged and will continue to be damaged by this discrimination as more fully set forth above and, in addition to injunctive relief, seek judgment pursuant to N.Y. Exec. Law §297, including damages pursuant to §297(9) thereof. 48. Plaintiff re-avers the allegations set forth above as though fully set forth herein. 49. The New York City Human Rights Law provides: It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation because of the actual or perceived…disability…of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof…to the effect that any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of any such place or provider shall be refused, withheld from or denied to any person on account of …disability…4 50. Defendant is in violation of the New York City Human Rights Law by denying the Plaintiff and the Class full access to all the accommodations, benefits, and services, available appurtenant to the Hotel, as described above. VIOLATION OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT VIOLATIONS OF THE NEW YORK CITY HUMAN RIGHTS LAW VIOLATIONS OF THE NEW YORK STATE HUMAN RIGHTS LAW

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22. Plaintiff brings this case as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated. 23. Plaintiff brings this case on behalf of the Class defined as follows: Do Not Call Registry Class: All persons in the United States who from four years prior to the filing of this action (1) were sent a text message by or on behalf of Defendant; (2) more than one time within any 12-month period; (3) where the person’s telephone number had been listed on the National Do Not Call Registry for at least thirty days; (4) for the purpose of selling Defendant’s products and services; and (5) for whom Defendant claims (a) it did not obtain prior express written consent, or (b) it obtained prior express written consent in the same manner as Defendant claims it supposedly obtained prior express written consent to call the Plaintiff. 24. Defendant and its employees or agents are excluded from the Class. Plaintiff does not know the number of members in the Class but believes the Class members number in the several thousands, if not more. 27. There are numerous questions of law and fact common to members of the Class which predominate over any questions affecting only individual members of the Class. Among the questions of law and fact common to the members of the Class are: a) Whether Defendant violated 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c); b) Whether Defendant’s conduct was knowing and willful; c) Whether Defendant violated the privacy rights of Plaintiff and members of the class; d) Whether Defendant is liable for damages, and the amount of such damages; and e) Whether Defendant should be enjoined from such conduct in the future. 28. The common questions in this case are capable of having common answers. If Plaintiff’s claim that Defendant routinely transmits text messages to telephone numbers assigned to cellular telephone services is accurate, Plaintiff and the Class members will have identical claims capable of being efficiently adjudicated and administered in this case. 33. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. PROPOSED CLASS Violation of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227 (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Do Not Call Registry Class)

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11. Plaintiff brings this action as a class action, pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (hereinafter “FRCP”), on behalf of himself and all New Jersey consumers and their successors in interest (the “Class”), who have received debt collection telephone communication from the Defendant, where Defendant never sent Plaintiff or the class members correspondence regarding the debt containing the required notices, in violation of the FDCPA, as described in this Complaint. 12. This Action is properly maintained as a statewide class action. The Class consists of: All New Jersey consumers who received initial communications from CRESTWOOD via telephone, concerning a debt owed to Byrom Medical Supplies, where CRESTWOOD did not send a written notice containing the required disclosures pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(3)(4)(5) , within five (5) days of such communication.  The Class period begins one year to the filing of this Action. 14. Plaintiff is at all times to this lawsuit, a "consumer" as that term is defined by 15 U.S.C. §1692a(3). 15. Sometime prior to December 6, 2014, Plaintiff allegedly incurred a financial obligation to Byrom Medical Supplies. 16. The Byrom obligation arose out of a transaction in which money, property, insurance or services, which are the subject of the transaction, are primarily for personal, family or household purposes 17. The alleged Byrom obligation is a "debt" as defined by 15 U.S.C.§ 1692a(5). 18. Byrom is a "creditor" as defined by 15 U.S.C.§ 1692a(4). 20. CRESTWOOD collects and attempts to collect debts incurred or alleged to have been incurred for personal, family or household purposes on behalf of creditors using the United States Postal Services, telephone and Internet. 21. At some time prior to December 6, 2014, CRESTWOOD contracted with Byrom to collect the Byrom debt. 22. On December 6, 2014 CRESTWOOD placed not one, not two but, incredibly, three separate phone calls to Plaintiff over the course of four hours during a Saturday morning/early afternoon in an attempt to collect the alleged Byrom debt. 23. Said phone calls were placed to Plaintiff by CRESTWOOD from the following telephone number belonging to CRESTWOOD: 800-242-4171. 24. The first phone call on December 6, 2014 from CRESTWOOD to Plaintiff occurred at 8:36a.m. 25. Plaintiff answered the 8:36a.m. telephone call. 26. The second phone call on December 6, 2014 from CRESTWOOD to Plaintiff occurred, barely a half hour later, at 9:08a.m. 27. Plaintiff also answered the 9:08a.m. telephone call. 28. The third phone call on December 6, 2014 from CRESTWOOD to Plaintiff occurred at 12:35p.m., merely fours after the first phone call. 29. Plaintiff also answered the 12:35p.m. telephone call 30. All of said telephone calls were made to Plaintiff by persons employed by CRESTWOOD as a “debt collector” as defined by 15 U.S.C. §1692a(6). 32. Said telephone calls were each a “communication” as defined by 15 U.S.C. §1692a(2). 33. Plaintiff never received any correspondence from CRESTWOOD regarding the alleged Byrom debt, which contained the required notices under the FDCPA. 37. Plaintiff repeats the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 36 as if the same were here set forth at length. 39. Section 1692g of the FDCPA requires the debt collector to give what is commonly referred to as a thirty-day (30) notice within five (5) days of its communication with the consumer. 40. Section 1692g(a)(3),(4),(5) of the FDCPA requires the debt collector: Within five days after the initial communication with a consumer in connection with the collection of any debt… send the consumer a written notice containing --- a statement that unless the consumer, within thirty days after receipt of the notice, disputes the validity of the debt, or any portion thereof, the debt will be assumed to be valid by the debt collector --- a statement that if the consumer notifies the debt collector in writing within the thirty-day period that the debt, or any portion thereof, is disputed, the debt collector will obtain verification of the debt or a copy of a judgment against the consumer and a copy of such verification or judgment will be mailed to the consumer by the debt collector; and --- a statement that, upon the consumer's written request within the thirty-day period, the debt collector will provide the consumer with the name and address of the original creditor, if different from the current creditor. (emphasis added) 42. Plaintiff never received any written correspondence or notice from CRESTWOOD containing the provisions pursuant 15 U.S.C §1692g(a)(3),(4)(5). 43. CRESTWOOD violated Section 1692g et seq. of the FDCPA by failing to provide written notice to Plaintiff regarding the Byrom debt which contained the required notices, which is confusing and makes the least sophisticated consumer uncertain as to what he must do to effectively dispute the alleged debt. 45. Plaintiff repeats the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 44 as if the same were here set forth at length. 46. Section 1692e(10) of the FDCPA prohibits the use of any false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt. 47. CRESTWOOD violated Section 1692e(10) of the FDCPA by deceptively telephoning Plaintiff on three occasions, on the same day, regarding the Byrom debt without ever sending Plaintiff correspondence regarding the debt, which should have included various notices and rights pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692g(a)(3)(4)(5).. 48. By reason thereof, CRESTWOOD is liable to Plaintiff for declaratory judgment that its conduct violated Section 1692e(10) of the FDCPA, statutory damages, costs and attorneys’ fees. FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. § 1692 VIOLATION OF 15 U.S.C. § 1692g et seq. FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. § 1692 VIOLATION OF 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10)

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25. Plaintiff seeks to bring this suit to recover from Defendants her full payment of all unpaid minimum wage and overtime compensation and liquidated damages under the applicable provisions of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), individually, on her own behalf, as well as on behalf of those in the following collective: Current and former employees of Defendants who, during the applicable FLSA limitations period, performed any work for Defendants as non-managerial employees who give consent to file a claim to recover damages for minimum wage compensation that is legally due to them and/or overtime compensation that is legally due to them for time worked in excess of forty hours per week (“FLSA Plaintiffs”). 26. Defendants treated Plaintiff and all FLSA Plaintiffs similarly in that Plaintiff and all FLSA Plaintiffs: (1) performed similar tasks, as described in the “Background Facts” section below; (2) were subject to the same laws and regulations; (3) were paid in the same or similar manner; (4) were not paid minimum wage; (5) were required to work in excess of forty hours each workweek; and (6) were not paid the required rate of one and one-half times their respective regular rates of pay for all hours worked over forty in a workweek. 7  27. At all relevant times, Defendants were aware of the requirement to pay Plaintiff and all FLSA Plaintiffs at an amount equal to one and one-half times their respective regular rates of pay for all hours worked each workweek above forty, yet Defendants purposefully chose not to do so. Thus, Plaintiff and all FLSA Plaintiffs are victims of Defendants’ pervasive practice of willfully refusing to pay their employees overtime compensation, in violation of the FLSA 28. In addition, Plaintiff seeks to maintain this action as a class action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("FRCP") 23(b)(3), on her own behalf, individually, as well on behalf of those who are similarly-situated who the Defendant subjected to violations of the NYLL and the NYCCRR during the applicable statutory period. 29. Under FRCP 23(b)(3), a plaintiff must plead that: a. The class is so numerous that joinder is impracticable; b. There are questions of law or fact common to the class that predominate over any individual questions of law or fact; c. Claims or defenses of the representative are typical of the class; d. The representative will fairly and adequately protect the class; and, e. A class action is superior to other methods of adjudication. 30. The Rule 23 Class that Plaintiffs seek to define includes: Current and former employees of Defendants who, during the applicable NYLL limitations period, performed any work for Defendants as non-managerial employees who: (1) were not paid at the minimum wage; and/or (2) worked in excess of forty hours per week without receiving overtime compensation; and/or (3) were not paid spread of hours; and/or (4) were not issued accurate or any pay stubs/wage statements on each payday containing the information that N.Y. Lab. Law § 195(3) requires; and/or (5) were not issued wage notices at the time of their 8  hire, or at any time thereafter as required by N.Y. Lab. Law § 195(1) ("Rule 23 Plaintiffs"). Numerosity 31. During the previous six years, Defendants have employed, in total, at least forty employees that are putative members of this class. Common Questions of Law and/or Fact 32. There are common questions of law and fact that govern the claims of each and every Rule 23 Plaintiff, including but not limited to the following: the duties that the Defendants required and require each Rule 23 Plaintiff to perform; whether the Defendants required and require each Rule 23 Plaintiff to work in excess of forty hours per week; whether the Defendants compensated and compensate the Rule 23 Plaintiffs at the minimum wage rate; whether the Defendants compensated and compensate the Rule 23 Plaintiffs at the legally-mandated rate of one and one half times their respective straight-time rates of pay for all hours worked per week over forty; whether the Defendants compensated or compensate each Rule 23 Plaintiff for spread of hours pay at the at the prevailing minimum wage for each day during which there was a split shift and/or the spread of hours exceeded 10 hours; whether the Defendants furnished and furnish the Rule 23 Plaintiffs with accurate wage statements on each payday containing the information required by N.Y. Lab. Law § 195(3); whether the Defendants kept and maintained records with respect to each hour that the Rule 23 Plaintiffs worked; whether the Defendants kept and maintained records with respect to the compensation that they paid to the Rule 23 Plaintiffs; whether the Defendants maintain any affirmative defenses with respect to the Rule 23 Plaintiffs' claims; whether the Defendants’ actions with respect to the Rule 23 Plaintiffs were in violation of 9  the NYLL and supporting regulations; if so, whether the Defendants’ violations were in willful violation of the NYLL and supporting regulations; and if so, what constitutes the proper measure of damages Typicality of Claims and/or Defenses 33. As described in the background facts section below, Defendants, despite the title that it assigned to Plaintiff, employed Plaintiffs as non-managerial, non-exempt employees. Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims of the Rule 23 Plaintiffs whom she seeks to represent, as the Rule 23 Plaintiffs work, and/or have worked for Defendants in excess of forty hours per week, as non-managerial employees, and Defendants failed to pay Plaintiff minimum wage, overtime, or spread of hours. Plaintiff and the Rule 23 Plaintiffs enjoy the same statutory rights under the NYLL to be paid at the statutory minimum wage rate, at a rate of one and one-half times their straight time rates for all hours worked per week in excess of forty, and spread of hours, and to be furnished with accurate wage statements and wage notices. Plaintiff and the Rule 23 Plaintiffs have all sustained similar types of damages as a result of Defendants’ failure to comply with the NYLL and supporting regulations. Plaintiff and the Rule 23 Plaintiffs have all suffered injury, including lack of compensation or under-compensation, due to Defendants’ common policies, practices, and patterns of conduct. Thus, Plaintiffs’ claims and/ or the Defendants’ defenses to those claims are typical of the Rule 23 Plaintiffs' claims and the Defendants’ defenses to those claims. 10  Adequacy 34. Plaintiff, as described below, worked the same or similar hours as the Rule 23 Plaintiffs throughout her employment with Defendants. The Defendants did not pay Plaintiff minimum wage, overtime pay for her hours worked over forty each week, or spread of hours, which is substantially-similar to how the Defendants paid the Rule 23 Plaintiffs. Plaintiff is no longer employed with the Defendant, and thus has no fear of retribution for her testimony. Plaintiff fully anticipates testifying under oath as to all of the matters raised in this Complaint and that will be raised in the Defendants’ Answer. Thus, Plaintiff would properly and adequately represent the current and former employees whom the Defendants have subjected to the treatment alleged herein. Superiority 35. Plaintiff has no, or few, material facts relating to the Rule 23 Plaintiffs' claims that are atypical of those of the putative class. Indeed, at all relevant times herein, Defendants treated Plaintiffs identically, or at the very least, substantially similarly, to the Rule 23 Plaintiffs. 36. Any lawsuit brought by an employee of the Defendants for the same violations alleged herein would be identical to a suit brought by any other employee for the same violations. Thus, separate litigation would risk inconsistent results. 37. Accordingly, this means of protecting the Rule 23 Plaintiffs' rights is superior to any other method, and this matter is properly maintainable as a Class Action under FRCP 23(b)(3). 11  38. Additionally, Plaintiff’s counsel has substantial experience in this field of law. 39. Defendants own and operate a restaurant in Queens. 40. At all relevant times, Defendants Musa and Galvis were the owners and day-to-day overseers of Delicias Tropical Restaurant who in that capacity were responsible for hiring and firing employees, determining their rates and methods of pay and the hours that employees were required to work. 41. Prior to the filing of this Collective and Class Action Complaint with Jury Demand, Defendants Delicias Tropical Restaurant and Galvis agreed to toll the statute of limitations for claims brought under the FLSA and NYLL from May 3, 2019 until and including June 30, 2019, for Named Plaintiff Franco as well as opt in Plaintiffs Alvarez and Lopez. 42. From on or about May 1, 2013 to on or about December 15, 2014, and on or about January 1, 2016 to on or about March 8, 2019, Plaintiff Franco worked for Defendants. 43. Throughout her employment, Plaintiff Franco’s job consisted of preparing food and pastries, washing and ironing table clothes and linens, taking inventory, disposing of trash and waitressing. 12  44. Defendants required Plaintiff Franco to work – and she did in fact work - from 8:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. Thursday through Tuesday from on or about May 1, 2013 until on or about December 31, 2016. 45. From on or about January 1, 2017 until on or about March 1, 2018 plaintiff worked Wednesday and Thursday 1:00 p.m. to 12:00 a.m. and Sunday 12:00 p.m. to 12:00 a.m. 46. From on or about March 2, 2018 until on or about July 1, 2018 plaintiff worked from 8:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. Thursday through Tuesday. 47. From on or about July 2, 2018 until on or about September 1, 2018 plaintiff worked from 8:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. Monday and Friday, 1:00 p.m. to 12:00 a.m. Saturday and 12:00 p.m. to 12:00 a.m. Sunday. 48. From on or about September 2, 2018 until on or about March 8, 2019 plaintiff worked from 8:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. Friday, 1:00 p.m. to 12:00 a.m. Saturday and 12:00 p.m. to 12:00 a.m. Sunday. 49. From on or about May 1, 2013 until on or about December 31, 2016, Defendants paid Plaintiff a fixed weekly salary of $240.00 which was intended to cover the first forty hours that she worked each week. 13  50. From on or about January 1, 2017 until June 1, 2017 Defendants paid Plaintiff a fixed weekly salary of $135.00, which was intended to cover the first forty hours that she worked each week. 51. From on or about June 2, 2017 until March 1, 2018 Defendants paid Plaintiff a fixed weekly salary of $150.00, which was intended to cover the first forty hours that she worked each week. 52. From on or about March 2, 2018 until on or about April 1, 2018, Defendants paid Plaintiff a fixed weekly salary of $300.00 which was intended to cover the first forty hours that she worked each week. 53. From on or about April 2, 2018 until on or about July 1, 2018, Defendants paid Plaintiff a fixed weekly salary of $360.00 which was intended to cover the first forty hours that she worked each week. 54. From on or about July 2, 2018 until on or about September 1, 2018, Defendants paid Plaintiff a fixed weekly salary of $240.00 which was intended to cover the first forty hours that she worked each week. 55. From on or about September 2, 2018 until March 8, 2019 Defendants paid Plaintiff a fixed weekly salary of $180.00, which was intended to cover the first forty hours per work week worked. 14  56. Defendants failed to notify Plaintiff Franco in writing of the tip credit provisions of the NYLL, or of their intent to apply a tip credit to her wages. 57. Defendants failed to notify Plaintiff either verbally or in writing of the tip credit provisions of the FLSA, or of their intent to apply a tip credit to her wages. 58. Defendants did not satisfy the requirements under the FLSA and NYLL by which they could apply a tip credit to Plaintiffs’ wages. 59. Throughout her entire employment, Defendants failed to compensate Plaintiff with the applicable minimum wage, as required under the FLSA and NYLL. 60. Through her entire employment, Defendants suffered or permitted Plaintiff to work over 10 hours per day. During such workdays, Defendants failed to compensate Plaintiff for any spread of hours pay at the at the prevailing minimum wage for each day during which there was a split shift, and/or the spread of hours exceeded 10 hours. 61. Throughout her entire employment, Defendants paid Plaintiff on a weekly basis, without providing her with any wage statements that reflected the amount of hours that she worked, her regular rate of pay or her overtime rate of pay for each hour she worked in excess of forty hours in a given workweek. 62. Defendants intentionally did not provide Plaintiff with a wage notice at the time of her hire, or at any time thereafter, containing any of the following information: her rates of pay 15  and basis thereof; whether Plaintiff was paid by the hour, shift, day, week, salary, piece, commission, or other; whether any allowances were claimed as part of the minimum wage, including tip, meal, or lodging allowances; the regular pay day designated by Defendants; the name and physical addresses of Defendants; any “doing business as” names used by Defendants; and Defendants’ mailing addresses and telephone numbers. 63. Defendants acted in the manner described herein so as to maximize their profits while minimizing her labor costs. 64. Every hour that Plaintiff worked was for Defendants’ benefit. 65. Defendants treated all FLSA Plaintiffs and Rule 23 Plaintiffs in the manner described above. 66. Plaintiff and the FLSA Plaintiffs hereby incorporate all the preceding paragraphs of this complaint with the same force and effect as if fully set forth at length. 67. The minimum wage provisions set forth in the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq., and the supporting federal regulations, apply to Defendants and protect the Plaintiff and the FLSA Plaintiffs. 68. Defendants have failed to pay the proper statutory minimum wage to which Plaintiff and the FLSA Plaintiffs have been entitled under the FLSA. 16  69. Defendants' unlawful conduct, as described in this Complaint, has been willful and intentional. Defendants were aware or should have been aware that the practices described in this Complaint were unlawful. Defendants have not made a good faith effort to comply with the FLSA with respect to the compensation of the Plaintiff and the FLSA Plaintiffs. 70. As Defendants' violations of the FLSA have been willful, a three-year statute of limitations applies, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 255. 71. As a result of Defendants' violations of the FLSA, the Plaintiff and the FLSA Plaintiffs has been deprived of the proper minimum wage compensation in amounts to be determined at trial, and is entitled to recovery of such amounts, liquidated damages, prejudgment interest, attorneys' fees, costs, and other compensation pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 72. The Plaintiff and the Rule 23 Plaintiffs hereby incorporate all preceding paragraphs of this complaint with the same force and effect as if fully set forth at length. 73. At all times herein pertinent, the Plaintiff and the Rule 23 Plaintiffs were employees of Defendants within the meaning of the New York Labor Law. 74. Defendants are employers of the Plaintiff and the Rule 23 Plaintiffs within the meaning of the New York Labor Law. 17  75. The minimum wage provisions of Article 19 of the New York Labor Law and its supporting regulations apply to Defendants. 76. Defendants have failed to pay the Plaintiff and the Rule 23 Plaintiffs the proper minimum wages to which they were entitled under the New York Labor Law. 77. By Defendants’ failure to pay the Plaintiff and the Rule 23 Plaintiffs proper minimum wages for hours worked up to the first 40 hours per week, they have willfully violated the New York Labor Law Article 19, §§ 650 et seq., and the supporting New York State Department of Labor Regulations. 78. Due to Defendants’ violations of the New York Labor Law, Plaintiff and the Rule 23 Plaintiffs are entitled to recover from Defendants their unpaid minimum wages, liquidated damages, reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs of the action, and pre-judgment and post-judgment interest. 79. Plaintiff and the FLSA Plaintiffs hereby incorporate all the preceding paragraphs of this complaint with the same force and effect as if fully set forth at length. 18  80. Defendants were required to directly pay the Plaintiff and the FLSA Plaintiffs an overtime premium of one and one-half times their regular rate of pay for all hours worked over forty (40) in a given workweek. 81. As described above, Defendants are employers within the meaning of the FLSA, while Plaintiff and the FLSA Plaintiffs are employees within the meaning of the FLSA. 82. As also described above, Plaintiff and the FLSA Plaintiffs worked in excess of forty (40) hours per week, yet Defendants failed to compensate them in accordance with the FLSA’s overtime provisions. 83. The Defendants willfully violated the FLSA. 84. As such, Plaintiff and the FLSA Plaintiffs are entitled to overtime pay for all hours worked per week in excess of forty (40) at the rate of one and one-half times their respective standard rate of pay. 85. Plaintiff and the FLSA Plaintiffs are also entitled to liquidated damages and attorneys’ fees for the Defendants’ violation of the FLSA’s overtime provisions. 86. All of the foregoing constituted willful and repeated violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act, so the applicable statute of limitations is three years pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 255(a). 19  Unpaid Minimum Wage under the FLSA Unpaid Minimum Wage under the NYLL Unpaid Overtime under the FLSA

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10. In or about September, 2014, DEFENDANT mailed PLAINTIFF a collection letter, attached hereto as Exhibit 1, in an attempt to collect a consumer debt from PLAINTIFF allegedly owed to another. 11. The letter states in pertinent part: Unless you notify this office within (30) thirty days after receiving this notice that you dispute the validity of this debt, or any portion thereof, “NORTH AMERICAN HOLDINGS” will assume this debt is valid. If you are disputing this debt, you must notify our office in writing within 30 days from the above mentioned date. Our office will provide to you any information supplied to us by our client in order to resolve this matter under a voluntary arrangement. We will also supply you with the name of the original creditor, if it is different from the current creditor. (emphasis not added) 12. DEFENDANT is not registered in Nevada as a debt collection company. 13. As a result of the acts and omissions of the DEFENDANT, PLAINTIFF has been forced to hire counsel to prosecute this action and to incur attorney fees and costs. 14. PLAINTIFF is informed and believes and therefore alleges that PLAINTIFF and the class members may have also suffered damages in other ways and to other extents not presently known to PLAINTIFF, and not specified herein. PLAINTIFF reserves the right to assert additional facts and damages not referenced herein, and/or to present evidence of the same at the time of trial. 15. PLAINTIFF repeats, re-alleges, and incorporates by reference, paragraphs 1 through 14 inclusive, above. 18. A class action is superior for the fair and efficient adjudication of the class members’ claims as Congress specifically envisioned class actions as a principal means of enforcing the FDCPA. See 15 U.S.C.§ 1692k. The members of the class are generally unsophisticated consumers, whose rights will not be vindicated in the absence of a class action. Prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the classes would also create the risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications resulting in the establishment of inconsistent or varying standards and would not be in the best interest of judicial economy. 19. If facts are discovered to be appropriate, PLAINTIFF will seek to certify the class under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 20. PLAINTIFF repeats, re-alleges, and incorporates by reference, paragraphs 1 through 19 inclusive, above. 22. DEFENDANT’S letter states in pertinent part: Unless you notify this office within (30) thirty days after receiving this notice that you dispute the validity of this debt, or any portion thereof, "NORTH AMERICAN HOLDINGS" will assume this debt is valid. If you are disputing this debt, you must notify our office in writing within 30 days from the above mentioned date. Our office will provide to you any information supplied to us by our client in order to resolve this matter under a voluntary arrangement. We will also supply you with the name of the original creditor, if it is different from the current creditor. (emphasis not added). 23. The collection letter improperly notifies the consumer that s/he must dispute the debt in writing. See Comacho vs. Bridgeport Financial, Inc. 430 F.3d 1078 (9th Cir. 2005). The letter specifically states “[i]f you are disputing this debt, you must notify our office in writing within 30 days from the above mentioned date.” 24. Further, the collection letter implies that DEFENDANT will only provide information from the creditor if the consumer enters into an agreement to resolve the debt, rather than automatically upon receipt of the dispute notice. 26. It has been necessary for PLAINTIFF to obtain the services of an attorney to pursue this claim, on behalf of himself and those similarly situated, and is entitled to recover reasonable attorneys’ fees therefor. 27. PLAINTIFF repeats, re-alleges, and incorporates by reference, paragraphs 1 through 26 inclusive, above. 28. PLAINTIFF’S Consumer Fraud claim is based on NRS 41.600 for violations of NRS Chapter 598. 29. At all times herein DEFENDANT was subject to the provisions of the Nevada Deceptive Trade Practices Act; NRS 598. 30. Pursuant to NRS 598.0923: “A person engages in a ‘deceptive trade practice’ when in the course of his business or occupation he knowingly: 1. Conducts the business or occupation without all required state, county or city licenses. …” 31. Pursuant to NRS 649.075, as a collection agency operating in Nevada, DEFENDANT was and is required to obtain a license to operate as a collection agency, issued by the Nevada Department of Financial Institutions. 33. DEFENDANT is not currently, and at all material times was not licensed as a collection agency in Nevada and has not registered as a foreign collection agency in Nevada and, as a result, DEFENDANT has violated the Nevada Deceptive Trade Practices Act. 34. DEFENDANT is subject to liability for damages, as well as PLAINTIFF’S attorney fees and costs pursuant to NRS 41.600 for violations of the Nevada Deceptive Trade Practices Act and PLAINTIFF and the class members are entitled to damages as set forth in the Prayer for Relief herein. 35. It has been necessary for PLAINTIFF to obtain the services of an attorney to pursue this claim, on behalf of himself and those similarly situated, and is entitled to recover reasonable attorneys’ fees therefor. 9. PLAINTIFF repeats, re-alleges, and incorporates by reference, paragraphs 1 through 8 inclusive, above. VIOLATIONS OF THE FDCPA 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a) BROUGHT BY PLAINTIFF INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF CLASS NUMBER ONE VIOLATION OF THE NEVADA DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES ACT AGAINST DEFENDANT BY PLAINTIFF INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF CLASS NUMBER TWO

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43. Plaintiffs bring this class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as representatives of the following class: All current or former residents of EPA’s designated Upper Columbia River waste contamination study site, who have suffered a personal injury as a direct result of Teck’s environmental contamination in this region. Excluded from the Class are all Canadian citizens. 44. The Class consists of potentially 100 or more class members, including current residents of the Upper Columbia River Region of the State of Washington and former residents, who may be geographically dispersed throughout the United States. Joinder of all class members is impracticable. An effective and practicable manner of notice to such members of the Class can be fashioned by the Court. 45. Plaintiff is a member of the Class and plaintiff’s claims are typical of those of the Class because all members of the Class have suffered a personal injury as a result of Teck’s wrongful conduct in violation of federal common law nuisance and Washington negligence and strict liability laws. Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment that Teck’s operation of the Trail Smelter is a public nuisance and an abnormally dangerous activity. Plaintiff also seeks a partial certification to resolve common issues of class members’ nuisance, strict liability and negligence claims. Plaintiff’s interests in the declaratory judgment and the resolution of the common issues are consistent with, and not antagonistic to, those of the members of the Class. Case 2:13-cv-00420-TOR Document 1 Filed 12/20/13 9. EPA is studying hazardous waste contamination in the Upper Columbia River from the U.S.-Canadian border to the Grand Coulee Dam and surrounding upland areas.1 A smelter in Trail, BC, about 10 miles north of the U.S.-Canadian border, is believed to be the principal source of the contamination.2 1 EPA, Upper Columbia River Investigation Frequently Asked Questions (Apr. 2005), available at www.epa.gov/region10/pdf/sites/ucr/fact_sheets/ucr_faq.pdf. 2 Id. Case 2:13-cv-00420-TOR Document 1 Filed 12/20/13 A. Teck has a Long History of Dumping Toxins into the Upper Columbia Region ................................................................................. 2 B. Teck has Repeatedly Leaked Toxins in the Upper Columbia River Region ........................................................................................ 9 C. The EPA Upper Columbia Region is Designated a Superfund Cleanup Site ..................................................................... 11 D. Northport Residents Report a Disproportionate Occurence of Diseases. ............................................................................................ 18 E. The Chemicals Teck’s Trail Smelter Emitted are Known to Cause Disease. ................................................................................... 20 V. A. Teck has a Long History of Dumping Toxins into the Upper Columbia Region VI. CLAIMS FOR RELIEF ............................................................................... 25 A. First Cause of Action: Strict liability/ abnormally dangerous activity ............................................................................................... 25 B. Second Cause of Action: Public nuisance ......................................... 25 C. Third Cause of Action: Negligence ................................................... 26

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1. Plaintiff Bearing Brokers, Inc., brings this action to secure redress for the actions of defendant Morgan & Curtis Associates, Inc., in sending or causing the sending of unsolicited advertisements to telephone facsimile machines in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. §227 (“TCPA”), the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act, 815 ILCS 505/2 (“ICFA”), and the common law. 10. On July 21, 2011, plaintiff Bearing Brokers, Inc., received the unsolicited fax advertisement attached as Exhibit A on its facsimile machine. 11. Discovery may reveal the transmission of additional faxes as well. 12. Defendant Morgan & Curtis Associates, Inc., is responsible for sending or causing the sending of the faxes. 13. Defendant Morgan & Curtis Associates, Inc., as the entity whose products or services were advertised in the faxes, derived economic benefit from the sending of the faxes. 3 14. Defendant Morgan & Curtis Associates, Inc., either negligently or wilfully violated the rights of plaintiff and other recipients in sending the faxes. 15. Each fax refers to a website registered to defendant Morgan & Curtis Associates, Inc. 16. Plaintiff had no prior relationship with defendant and had not authorized the sending of fax advertisements to plaintiff. 17. The faxes have a “remove” number at the bottom that is associated with the mass broadcasting of advertising faxes. 18. On information and belief, the faxes attached hereto were sent as part of a mass broadcasting of faxes. 19. On information and belief, defendants have transmitted similar unsolicited fax advertisements to at least 40 other persons in Illinois. 2. The TCPA expressly prohibits unsolicited fax advertising. Unsolicited fax advertising damages the recipients. The recipient is deprived of its paper and ink or toner and the use of its fax machine. The recipient also wastes valuable time it would have spent on something else. Unsolicited faxes prevent fax machines from receiving and sending authorized faxes, cause wear and tear on fax machines, and require labor to attempt to identify the source and purpose of the unsolicited faxes. 20. There is no reasonable means for plaintiff or other recipients of defendants’ unsolicited advertising faxes to avoid receiving illegal faxes. Fax machines must be left on and ready to receive the urgent communications authorized by their owners. 21. Furthermore, the “opt out notice” required by the TCPA even when faxes are sent with consent or pursuant to an established business relationship was not provided in the faxes at issue. 22. Plaintiff incorporates ¶¶ 1-21. 23. The TCPA makes unlawful the “use of any telephone facsimile machine, computer or other device to send an unsolicited advertisement to a telephone facsimile machine ...” 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(1)(C). 24. The TCPA, 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(3), provides: Private right of action. A person or entity may, if otherwise permitted by the laws or rules of court of a State, bring in an appropriate court of that State– 4 (A) an action based on a violation of this subsection or the regulations prescribed under this subsection to enjoin such violation, (B) an action to recover for actual monetary loss from such a violation, or to receive $500 in damages for each such violation, whichever is greater, or (C) both such actions. If the Court finds that the defendant willfully or knowingly violated this subsection or the regulations prescribed under this subsection, the court may, in its discretion, increase the amount of the award to an amount equal to not more than 3 times the amount available under the subparagraph (B) of this paragraph. 25. Plaintiff and each class member suffered damages as a result of receipt of the unsolicited faxes, in the form of paper and ink or toner consumed as a result. Furthermore, plaintiff’s statutory right of privacy was invaded. 26. Plaintiff and each class member is entitled to statutory damages. 27. Defendants violated the TCPA even if their actions were only negligent. 28. Defendants should be enjoined from committing similar violations in the future. 36. Plaintiff incorporates ¶¶ 1-21. 37. Defendants engaged in unfair acts and practices, in violation of ICFA § 2, 815 ILCS 505/2, by sending unsolicited fax advertising to plaintiff and others. 38. Unsolicited fax advertising is contrary to the TCPA and also Illinois law. 720 ILCS 5/26-3(b) makes it a petty offense to transmit unsolicited fax advertisements to Illinois residents. 39. Defendants engaged in an unfair practice by engaging in conduct that is contrary to public policy, unscrupulous, and caused injury to recipients of their advertising. 40. Plaintiff and each class member suffered damages as a result of receipt of the unsolicited faxes, in the form of paper and ink or toner consumed as a result. 41. Defendants engaged in such conduct in the course of trade and commerce. 42. Defendants’ conduct caused recipients of their advertising to bear the cost thereof. This gave defendants an unfair competitive advantage over businesses that advertise lawfully, such as by direct mail. For example, an advertising campaign targeting one million 7 recipients would cost $500,000 if sent by U.S. mail but only $20,000 if done by fax broadcasting. The reason is that instead of spending $480,000 on printing and mailing his ad, the fax broadcaster misappropriates the recipients’ paper and ink. “Receiving a junk fax is like getting junk mail with the postage due”. Remarks of Cong. Edward Markey, 135 Cong Rec E 2549, Tuesday, July 18, 1989, 101st Cong. 1st Sess. 43. Defendants’ shifting of advertising costs to plaintiff and the class members in this manner makes such practice unfair. In addition, defendants’ conduct was contrary to public policy, as established by the TCPA and Illinois statutory and common law. 44. Defendants should be enjoined from committing similar violations in the future. 52. Plaintiff incorporates ¶¶ 1-21. 53. By sending plaintiff and the class members unsolicited faxes, defendants converted to their own use ink or toner and paper belonging to plaintiff and the class members. 9 54. Immediately prior to the sending of the unsolicited faxes, plaintiff and the class members owned and had an unqualified and immediate right to the possession of the paper and ink or toner used to print the faxes. 55. By sending the unsolicited faxes, defendants appropriated to their own use the paper and ink or toner used to print the faxes and used them in such manner as to make them unusable. Such appropriation was wrongful and without authorization. 56. Defendants knew or should have known that such appropriation of the paper and ink or toner was wrongful and without authorization. 57. Plaintiff and the class members were deprived of the paper and ink or toner, which could no longer be used for any other purpose. Plaintiff and each class member thereby suffered damages as a result of receipt of the unsolicited faxes. 58. Defendants should be enjoined from committing similar violations in the future. 59. Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a) and (b)(3), plaintiff brings this claim on behalf of a class, consisting of (a) all persons and entities with Illinois fax numbers (b) who, on or after a date five years prior to the filing of this action, or such shorter period during which faxes were sent by or on behalf of defendant Morgan & Curtis Associates, Inc., and on or before a date 20 days following the filing of this action, (c) were sent faxes by or on behalf of defendant Morgan & Curtis Associates, Inc., promoting its goods or services for sale (d) and who were not provided an “opt out” notice as described in 47 U.S.C. §227. 60. The class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impractical. Plaintiff alleges on information and belief that there are more than 40 members of the class. 61. There are questions of law and fact common to the class that predominate over any questions affecting only individual class members. The predominant common questions include: 10 a. Whether defendants engaged in a pattern of sending unsolicited fax advertisements; b. Whether defendants thereby violated the TCPA; c. Whether defendants thereby committed the tort of conversion; d. Whether defendants thereby engaged in unfair acts and practices, in violation of the ICFA. e. Whether defendants thereby converted the property of plaintiff. 62. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in handling class actions and claims involving unlawful business practices. Neither plaintiff nor plaintiff’s counsel have any interests which might cause them not to vigorously pursue this action. 63. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the class members. All are based on the same factual and legal theories. 64. A class action is the superior method for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. The interest of class members in individually controlling the prosecution of separate claims against defendants is small because it is not economically feasible to bring individual actions. 65. Management of this class action is likely to present significantly fewer difficulties that those presented in many class actions, e.g. for securities fraud. WHEREFORE, plaintiff requests that the Court enter judgment in favor of plaintiff and the class and against defendants for: a. Appropriate damages; b. An injunction against the further transmission of unsolicited fax advertising; c. Costs of suit; d. Such other or further relief as the Court deems just and proper. 11 s/ Daniel A. Edelman Daniel A. Edelman Daniel A. Edelman Cathleen M. Combs James O. Latturner Heather A. Kolbus INTRODUCTION

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10. Plaintiff was handcuffed and placed into the unmarked police car. Officer John then drove plaintiff’s car to the Harrison Street Police Station. Defendant Lopez followed in the unmarked car with the plaintiff handcuffed in the back seat. While on the way to the police 3 station, the plaintiff asked that his lawyer be contacted. 11. Upon arriving at the police station, the plaintiff was searched in the parking lot. Plaintiff was then brought into the Harrison Street Police Station through a back entrance, brought to a small room and handcuffed to a bar on the wall. 12. Defendant Lopez took the plaintiff’s cellular telephone and left the room leaving Officer John in the room with the plaintiff. Plaintiff was not free to leave the police station as he was handcuffed to the wall the entire time he was in the police station. 13. Defendant Lopez returned to the room and the two officers began assaulting the plaintiff with questions regarding robberies and drug dealers in the Taylor Street area. Plaintiff responded that he did not know anything about robberies or drug dealings in the Taylor Street area and again and repeatedly requested that the officers call his lawyer. Plaintiff’s lawyer was never contacted and the questioning continued. The officers were particularly interested in why the plaintiff had the telephone number of an individual by the name of “Dwayne” in his telephone. 14. The interrogation of the plaintiff continued for approximately one and a half to two hours. At the end of which the officers informed the plaintiff that they were going to harass him everyday on Taylor Street until they got what they wanted from him. Plaintiff was un- handcuffed, given his car keys and told he could leave. 15. On October 21, 2012, Defendant Lopez called plaintiff’s cell phone and told the plaintiff that what took place the night before was a mistake and that he needed the plaintiff to sign some papers so that his car would not be towed. Defendant Lopez instructed the plaintiff to meet him at Al’s Beef on Taylor Street at 3:00 p.m. that day. 4 16. The plaintiff went to Al’s Beef at 3:00 p.m. and Defendant Lopez arrived in a police squad with another officer that was tall, with red hair and a beard, whom the plaintiff believes was identified as a Sergeant (this individual is hereafter referred to as “ the Sergeant”). 17. The officers drove to the back of the parking lot and the plaintiff followed them to that location. The Sergeant exited the squad car grabbed the plaintiff and slammed his head on to the trunk of his car, searched plaintiff, handcuffed plaintiff with his hands behind his back and placed him in the squad car. 18. Plaintiff was then taken back to the Harrison Street Police station to a second floor room with chairs and a table. Again, plaintiff was handcuffed to a bar, and this time he was also placed in ankle shackles. 19. Plaintiff was held against his will in the room for several hours handcuffed and shackled, and not free to leave the custody of the defendants. While the in the room several other officers (approximately six officers) entered the room during the next several hours joining Defendant Lopez and the Sergeant threatening the plaintiff with sending him to the Cook County jail to be raped by gang members. Further, that the (the officers) could do whatever they wanted and that they would plant evidence on him and his family members if he continued to refuse to cooperate with them. Still, further that if he did not cooperate they would charge him a conspiracy to obstruct justice. One of the officers in the room identified himself as the “Commander.” 20. Plaintiff repeatedly requested his lawyer; that request was not acknowledged by the officers. 21. The officers wanted the plaintiff to call or text “Dwayne” and set-up a drug 5 purchase, but he refused to call or text Dwayne. 22. After a period of time refusing to call or text Dwayne, the officers began to pull and contort the plaintiff’s body while he was handcuffed to the wall and shackled at his ankles causing the plaintiff severe pain. At one point, the Sergeant sat on the plaintiff’s chest and placed his palms on the plaintiff’s eye sockets and pushed hard against them causing plaintiff severe pain. The Sergeant also drove his elbows into plaintiff’s back and head causing severe pain. Defendant Lopez was in the room at the time and did not intervene. 23. In an attempt to contact the outside world, plaintiff agreed to make the call and he attempted to call a friend of his to inform him what was transpiring at which time an officer took plaintiff’s telephone and hung-up the call. 24. After several hours of verbal and physical torture, Defendant Lopez and the Sergeant were alone in the room with the plaintiff. The officers told plaintiff that if he refused to cooperate with them that they were going to give him a “little taste” of what he would be getting at the Cook County jail. They put plaintiff over a chair and pulled down his pants, and Defendant Lopez said “I hear that a big black nigger dick feels like a gun up your ass.” 25. Then Defendant Lopez and/or the Sergeant, knowing their actions created a strong likelihood of great bodily harm and mental anguish, inserted a cold metal object, believed to be one of officer’s service revolvers, into the plaintiff’s rectum causing the plaintiff severe pain and humiliation. The two officers laughed hysterically while inserting the object into the plaintiff’s rectum. 26. The Sergeant then said “I almost blew your brains out.” The officers told the plaintiff that they would continue to insert the gun into his rectum until he cooperated with them. 6 27. Plaintiff began to cry and agreed to cooperate with the officers. 28. The officers then took the ankle shackles off the plaintiff and took him from the room to a car waiting outside. Plaintiff was still handcuffed at this time. Once in the car, the plaintiff was instructed, by the officers, to call Dwayne and set-up a purchase of either heroin or crack cocaine. Plaintiff called Dwayne but Dwayne did not answer the telephone. Plaintiff was then instructed to text Dwayne, which he did and Dwayne then called the plaintiff. 29. Plaintiff spoke to Dwayne about purchasing one gram of heroin and agreed to meet Dwayne at an agreed location and time. The police then brought plaintiff to his car, provided the plaintiff with money to purchase the heroin, a box believed to be a GPS device and an audio recording device to record the transaction. 30. Plaintiff completed the purchase from Dwayne for the Chicago Police and returned the drugs and equipment to the police. The officers then wanted plaintiff to sell drugs to Dwayne. Plaintiff told the officers that he would not be involved again with them. 31. Plaintiff was released from police custody at approximately 9:30 p.m. on October 21, 2012. Defendant Lopez subsequently repeatedly called plaintiff’s cellular telephone from his cellular telephone requesting additional meetings with the plaintiff. The Lopez calls stopped for a period after the plaintiff contacted the Independent Police Review Authority for the Chicago Police Department and complained about the events of October 20 and October 21, 2012.. 32. Defendant Lopez arrested, without probable cause, restrained and refused to release the plaintiff from custody on both October 20, 2012 and October 21, 2012. 33. At no time on either October 20, 2012 or October 21, 2012, prior to plaintiff’s seizure and torture, did the plaintiff commit a crime. 7 34. Plaintiff re-alleges and reincorporates paragraphs 1 through 33 as if fully set forth herein as his paragraph 34. 35. At all relevant times, Defendant Lopez had a legal duty to refrain from using unnecessary and reasonable force under the circumstances. 36. The acts of Defendant Lopez in a) by handcuffing and shackling the plaintiff’s ankles; b) by refusing to contact plaintiff’s attorney; c) refusing to allow the plaintiff to leave the police station/room; d) by physically torturing the plaintiff on October 21, 2012; e) by pulling the plaintiff’s pants down, and by inserting a metal object into the plaintiff’s rectum, or by assisting another officer in inserting a metal object into the plaintiff’s rectum; and f) by torturing the plaintiff until he agreed to commit a crime to stop the torture, constituted an unreasonable seizure, excessive force and deprived the plaintiff of his right to be free from such conduct as guaranteed by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. 37. At all relevant times, Defendant Lopez’s action and/or omissions as they pertained to the plaintiff were done maliciously, wilfully, wantonly, with deliberate indifference, and/or in reckless disregard for the plaintiff’s safety and constitutional rights. 38. The acts and/or omissions of Defendant Lopez proximately caused the plaintiff to suffer both physical and psychological injuries, pain, suffering, humiliation and fear in the past and in the future, some of the plaintiff’s injuries will be permanent. WHEREFORE, the plaintiff, Angel Perez, demands substantial compensatory damages 8 against Defendant Jorge L. Lopez, Star No. 17836, for the plaintiff’s physical and emotional trauma, pain, injury, suffering, fear and humiliation, and additionally, because the defendant acted maliciously, wilfully, wantonly, with deliberate indifference, and/or in reckless disregard for the plaintiff’s constitutional rights, plaintiff demands substantial punitive damages from this defendant, as well as costs, attorneys fees, and whatever additional relief this Court deems equitable and just. 39. Plaintiff re-alleges and reincorporates paragraphs 1 through 33 as if fully set forth herein as his paragraph 39. 4. On October 20, 2012 at approximately 5:00 p.m. plaintiff was working as a delivery driver for Castillo Delivery Service. 40. Defendant Lopez, failed to intervene and/or protect the plaintiff from the Sergeant and the other unidentified officers acts when they a) handcuffed and shackled the plaintiff’s ankles; b) allowed the Sergeant to physically attack the plaintiff and by twisting and contorting the plaintiff’s body; c) refusing to allow the plaintiff to leave the police station/room, or the control and/or custody of the police; d) by standing by and allowing another officer to insert a metal object into the plaintiff’s rectum, and e) by failing to stop any of the above until the plaintiff agreed to commit a crime, knowing said acts and his failure to protect Angel Perez, or intervene to protect him, from these acts created a substantial risk of great bodily harm and mental anguish depriving plaintiff of his constitutional rights without due process of law, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 41. Said acts and/or omissions of Defendant Lopez caused pain and suffering to the plaintiff of a physical and mental nature. 9 42. The acts and/or omissions of Defendant Lopez proximately caused the plaintiff to suffer both physical and psychological injuries, pain, suffering, humiliation and fear in the past and in the future, some of the plaintiff’s injuries will be permanent. WHEREFORE, the plaintiff, Angel Perez, demands substantial compensatory damages against Defendant Jorge L. Lopez, Star No. 17836, for the plaintiff’s physical and emotional trauma, pain, injury, suffering, fear and humiliation, and additionally, because the defendant acted maliciously, wilfully, wantonly, with deliberate indifference, and/or in reckless disregard for the plaintiff’s constitutional rights, plaintiff demands substantial punitive damages from this defendant, as well as costs, attorneys fees, and whatever additional relief this Court deems equitable and just. 43. Plaintiff re-alleges and reincorporates paragraphs 1 through 42 as if fully set forth herein as his paragraph 43. 44. The actions of the Defendant Lopez, as set forth above, placed the plaintiff in fear of his life and safety and in fear of receiving an assault and battery, as well as causing him the emotional distress of fearing for his life and being sodomized again. 45. The actions of Defendant Lopez, constituted extreme and outrageous conduct and were done deliberately and intentionally and in a wilful and wanton manner. 46. Defendant Lopez intended that his conduct to inflict severe emotional distress and/or knew there was a high probability that his conduct would cause severe emotional distress. 47. The conduct of Defendant Lopez did in fact cause Angel Perez to suffer severe 10 emotional distress. WHEREFORE, the plaintiff, Angel Perez, demands substantial compensatory damages against Defendant Jorge L. Lopez, Star No. 17836, for the plaintiff’s physical and emotional trauma, pain, injury, suffering, medical expenses, loss of a normal life, fear and humiliation, and additionally, because the defendant acted maliciously, wilfully, wantonly, with deliberate indifference, and/or in reckless disregard for the plaintiff’s constitutional rights, plaintiff demands substantial punitive damages from this defendant, as well as costs, attorneys fees, and whatever additional relief this Court deems equitable and just. 48. Plaintiff re-alleges and reincorporates paragraphs 1 through 47 as if fully set forth herein as his paragraph 48. 49. The actions of Defendant Lopez, as alleged above, were done pursuant to one or more de facto policies, practices and/or customs of the Chicago Police Department, and therefore, the City of Chicago. 5. At the aforementioned date and time, the plaintiff was returning to Desorak Restaurant at 1514 W. Taylor Street, Chicago, Illinois, following a delivery. 50. On and before October 20, 2012, Defendant City of Chicago and its Police Department had interrelated de facto policies, practices, and customs which included, inter alia, the failure to properly train, supervise, discipline, counsel and otherwise control its police officers, and thereby allowing them to engage in the excessive use of force, torture and other police abuses, particularly in case where officers were allowed to torture and sodomize the plaintiff within a police station. 51. In particular, Defendant Lopez, as well as several other police officers, were 11 allowed to handcuff and shackle an individual that had not committed a crime, and had not been charged with a crime. The officers were also allowed to verbally and physically torture the plaintiff without interruption, for several hours, inside the 11th District Police Station. Moreover, during the hours of torture, supervising officers came into the room to identify themselves as high ranking officers, thereby condoning the continued torture. The acceptance of the torture, sodomy, and the participation by Defendant Lopez, the Sergeant and several other Chicago Police officers, created a de facto policy throughout the 11th District of the Chicago Police Department of allowing and promoting the use of these technics on individuals innocent of any crime, like the plaintiff. 52. As a direct and proximate cause of these policies, Angel Perez’s constitutional protected rights under the Fourth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as applied by 42 U.S.C. section 1983, were violated and the defendant is liable to Angel Perez for his injuries, pain, suffering, mental anguish, and humiliation. WHEREFORE, the plaintiff, Angel Perez, demands compensation for his compensatory damages against the City of Chicago, including but not limited to, his physical injuries, pain, suffering, mental anguish, medical expenses, loss of a normal life, and humiliation, and such other relief as this Court deems just and equitable. 55. Plaintiff re-alleges and reincorporates paragraphs 1 through 54 as if fully set forth herein as his paragraph 55. 56. Illinois law provides that public entities are directed to pay any tort judgment for compensation damages for which its employees are liable for. Defendant Lopez, as well as the other unidentified Chicago Police Officers were, at all relevant times, acting in the scope and course of their employment as members and agents of the Chicago Police Department under the color of law. 57. Defendant City of Chicago is liable as principal for all torts committed by its employees. WHEREFORE, should defendant, Jorge Lopez or any other police officer be found liable on one or more of the claims set forth in above, Plaintiff hereby demands that, pursuant to 745 13 ILCS 10/9-102, the defendant City of Chicago be found liable for any judgment or settlement for damages obtained against said police officer defendants as well as for all attorneys' fees and costs awarded or otherwise obtained. 6. As the plaintiff traveled eastbound on Taylor Street near the intersection of Taylor and Ashland Streets, the plaintiff was pulled over by an unmarked police car by flashing headlights. 7. Two Chicago Police officers approached the plaintiff’s car, and did not identify themselves, but called each other George (Defendant Lopez) and John. 8. The officer that identified himself as John approached plaintiff’s driver’s side door, opened plaintiff’s car door and pulled the plaintiff out of his car. 9. Defendant Lopez opened the passenger door and began searching plaintiff’s car. EXCESSIVE FORCE IN VIOLATION OF 42 U.S.C. §1983 - DEFENDANT LOPEZ INDEMNIFICATION PURSUANT TO 745 ILCS 10/9-102 MONELL POLICY PRACTICE AND CUSTOMS VIOLATION DEFENDANT CITY OF CHICAGO STATE LAW - INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS DEFENDANT LOPEZ § 1983 DUE PROCESS CLAIM FOR FAILURE TO INTERVENE/PROTECT

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10. At all times relevant, Plaintiffs were citizens of the State of California. Plaintiffs are, and at all times mentioned herein were, “persons” as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 153 (10). 11. Defendant is, and at all times mentioned herein was, a corporation and a “person,” as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 153 (10). 12. At all times relevant Defendant conducted business in the State of California and in the County of San Diego, within this judicial district. 24. Plaintiffs bring this action on behalf of themselves and on behalf of and all others similarly situated (“the Class). 25. Plaintiffs represent, and are members of, the Class, consisting of all persons within the United States who received any unsolicited text messages from Defendant which text message was not made for emergency purposes or with the recipient’s prior express consent within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint. 26. Defendant and its employees or agents are excluded from the Class. Plaintiffs do not know the number of members in the Class, but believe the Class members number in the hundreds of thousands, if not more. Thus, this matter should be certified as a Class action to assist in the expeditious litigation of this matter. 36. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 37. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant constitute numerous and multiple negligent violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. 38. As a result of Defendant’s negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq, Plaintiffs and The Class are entitled to an award of $500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). 39. Plaintiffs and the Class are also entitled to and seek injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. 40. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 41. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant constitute numerous and multiple knowing and/or willful violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. KNOWING AND/OR WILLFUL VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. NEGLIGENT VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. THE TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. • As a result of Defendant’s negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1), Plaintiffs seek for themselves and each Class member $500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). • Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(A), injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. • Any other relief the Court may deem just and proper.

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17. Plaintiffs bring the second and third causes of action under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for themselves and on behalf of a class consisting of all persons who have worked for Defendants in Ohio from three years preceding the filing of this lawsuit through the culmination of this litigation in the position of bartender, or other tipped position, and were not paid the required minimum wage and/or overtime premium. 18. Class certification for the claims is appropriate under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a), and 23(b)(3) because all of the requirements of those Rules are met. 5 19. The class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. 20. There are questions of law and fact common to the class, including whether the putative class members were not compensated for all hours worked including proper minimum wage and/or overtime pay in violation of Ohio law. 21. The named Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of those of the class members. Plaintiffs’ claims encompass the challenged practices and course of conduct of Defendants. Furthermore, Plaintiffs’ legal claims are based on the same legal theories as the claims of the putative class members. The legal issues as to which laws are violated by such conduct apply equally to Plaintiffs and to the class. 22. The named Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. Plaintiffs’ claims are not antagonistic to those of the putative class and they have hired counsel skilled in the prosecution of class actions. 23. Common questions of law and fact predominate over questions affecting only individuals, and a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. This proposed class action under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 presents few management difficulties, conserves the resources of the parties and the court system, protects the rights of each class member and maximizes recovery to them. 37. Defendants have a policy and practice of refusing to pay Plaintiffs and other similarly situated employees for all hours worked in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act. 38. Defendants’ policy and practice resulted and continues to result in Plaintiffs and other similarly situated employees receiving compensation below the statutory minimum wage. 39. Defendants’ policy and practice denied and continues to deny Plaintiffs and other similarly situated employees from receiving payment of the overtime premium for all hours worked in excess of forty hours in a work week. 40. Defendants knew that they were supposed to pay Plaintiffs, and similarly situated individuals, at a minimum the base minimum hourly rate set by the FLSA for tipped employees regardless of the tips they received, but did not. 41. Based on the foregoing, Defendants’ conduct in this regard was a willful violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201, et seq. 8 42. Plaintiffs and all other similarly situated individuals who opt into this litigation are entitled to compensation for all hours worked, including minimum wages, overtime hours worked, interest, liquidated damages, attorneys’ fees and costs, and any other remedies available at law or in equity. 43. Plaintiffs and the members of the putative class are employees within the meaning of the Ohio Wage Act. 44. Defendants have failed to pay Plaintiffs and other tipped employees proper compensation for all hours worked in violation of the Ohio Wage Act. 45. Defendants’ policy and practice resulted and continues to result in Plaintiffs and other similarly situated employees receiving compensation below the statutory minimum wage. 46. Defendants’ policy and practice denied and continues to deny Plaintiffs and other similarly situated employees from receiving payment of the overtime premium for all hours worked in excess of forty hours in a work week. 47. Defendants knew that they were supposed to pay Plaintiffs, and similarly situated individuals, at a minimum the base minimum hourly rate set by the Ohio Wage Act for tipped employees regardless of the tips they received, but did not. 48. Defendants’ conduct in this regard is a willful violation of O.R.C. §§4111.01, 4111.03 and 4111.10. 49. Plaintiffs and other similarly situated tipped employees who worked in Ohio are 9 entitled to compensation for all hours worked, including minimum wages, overtime hours worked, interest, attorneys’ fees and costs, and any other remedies available at law or in equity. 50. Plaintiffs and the members of the putative class are employees within the meaning of the Ohio Prompt Pay Act (“OPPA”). 51. Defendants have violated and continues to violate the OPPA because of its willful failure to compensate Plaintiffs and other tipped employees at the time prescribed by the OPPA. 52. During all times relevant to this complaint, Plaintiffs and the members of the putative class are/were not paid wages within 30 days of performing the work. 53. Plaintiffs and similarly situated tipped employees who worked in Ohio are entitled to compensation including liquidated damages, six percent interest on all available compensatory damages, attorneys’ fees and costs, and any other remedies available at law or in equity. 10 VIOLATION OF THE OHIO WAGE ACT, O.R.C. §§ 4111.01, 4111.03, 4111.10 ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFFS INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHER SIMILARLY SITUATED INDIVIDUALS VIOLATION OF THE OHIO PROMPT PAY ACT, O.R.C. § 4113.15, FAILURE TO PAY WAGES WITHIN THIRTY DAYS OF PERFORMING THE WORK ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFFS INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF ALL VIOLATION OF THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFFS INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHER SIMILARLY SITUATED INDIVIDUALS

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(Against All Defendants For Violations of Section 10(b) And Rule 10b-5 Promulgated Thereunder) (Violations of Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act Against The Individual Defendants) 1. Cash Position: Cash and liabilities at December 31, 2014 of approximately $14.8 million and $4.5 million, respectively. (Subsequently, in March 2015, the Company closed a private placement transaction for total gross proceeds of approximately $20,000,000). 17. The Company focuses on monetizing the rapidly growing health care market in China by marketing and commercializing stem cell and immune cell therapeutics, related tools and products from CBMG patent-protected homegrown cell technology developed by the Company’s research and development team, as well as by utilizing exclusively in-licensed intellectual properties. 18. The purported treatment focal points are cancer, neurodegenerative and other degenerative diseases comprised of Knee Osteoarthritis ("KOA"), Spinal Muscular Atrophy ("SMA"), Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis ("ALS"), and Stroke. 19. Under the direction of the Company and the Individual Defendants, paid stock promoters touted the Company’s stock over the internet and other fora during the Class Period. 2. Net Cash Used in Operating Activities: Q4 and full-year 2014 net cash used in operating activities of $2.2 million and $10.3 million, respectively, compared to $1.3 million and $8.5 million for the same periods in 2013. Case3:15-cv-01795 Document1 Filed04/21/15 Page10 of 23 11 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 20. The purpose of the promotional campaign was to raise additional capital, artificially increase shareholder value, and raise the Company’s profile in the capital markets. This promotional campaign included dozens of published articles and/or news reports. The Company never disclosed this promotional campaign in its public filings. Securities Laws On Stock Promotion 21. Section 17(b) of the Securities Act of 1933 [15 U.S.C. 77q(b)] is commonly known as the “anti-touting” provision. It prohibits publicizing information about a security without “fully disclosing” any consideration received or to be received, directly or indirectly, from the issuer, and the Case3:15-cv-01795 Document1 Filed04/21/15 Page5 of 23 6 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 amount thereof. Id. Moreover, an of issuer securities is also required to disclose the details of its relationship with a stock promoter in its regulatory filings. Materially False and Misleading Statements Issued During the Period 22. On June 18, 2014, the first day of the Class Period, the Company commenced trading on the NASDAQ exchange. On June 18, 2014, the Company issued a press release, stating, in part: Cellular Biomedicine Group Inc. (NASDAQ: CBMG) (the “Company”), a biomedicine firm engaged in the development of new treatments for degenerative and cancerous diseases, announced today that its common stock commences trading on NASDAQ under the ticker symbol “CBMG” effective today, June 18, 2014. “We are extremely proud to be an early pure-play biotechnology company from China to be approved for listing on The NASDAQ Capital Market and are gratified to have reached this significant milestone in the Company’s history. We believe this achievement will provide greater visibility for our stock and that this accomplishment demonstrates to our shareholders our commitment to building shareholder value while improving the quality of life for countless patients,” stated Dr. Wei (William) Cao, Chief Executive Officer of Cellular Biomedicine Group. Mr. Bizuo (Tony) Liu, Chief Financial Officer of Cellular Biomedicine Group, commented, “Following a comprehensive evaluation of all U.S. exchanges, we determined that The NASDAQ Capital Market was the best fit for Cellular Biomedicine Group. CBMG has met and will remain subject to all the NASDAQ listing requirements.” 23. On August 14, 2014, the Company issued a press release announcing second quarter and first half 2014 financial results and provided business highlights. The press release stated, in part: PALO ALTO, Calif., Aug. 14, 2014 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Cellular Biomedicine Group Inc. (Nasdaq:CBMG) (the “Company”), a biomedicine firm engaged in the development of new treatments for degenerative and cancerous diseases, today reported financial results for the three and six months ended June 30, 2014 and provided business highlights including the six-month data from its Phase I/IIa clinical trial for ReJoinTM treatment for Knee Osteoarthritis (KOA). Dr. William (Wei) Cao, Chief Executive Officer of Cellular Biomedicine Group, commented, “We are very excited about the progress we have made so far this year with our lead product candidate ReJoinTM for Knee Osteoarthritis, especially with the Phase IIa six-month follow-up MRI data. The IIa twelve-month follow-up MRI test has been completed and final analysis will be available in the third quarter of this year. All patients in the Phase IIb trial completed treatment in July. We grew our Intellectual Case3:15-cv-01795 Document1 Filed04/21/15 Page6 of 23 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 Property portfolio to 41 patents in various stages of approval in China, U.S. and PCT, including 12 granted China patents. We are excited about our recent announcement to add new potential reduced time-to-commercialization TCR cancer immunotherapy to our technology platform.” Financial Results Cellular Biomedicine Group reported a net loss for the three and six months ended June 30, 2014 of $6.7 million, or $0.85 loss per share and $7.1 million, or $0.93 loss per share, respectively, compared to a net loss of $2.5 million, or $0.44 loss per share, and $7.9 million, or $1.52 loss per share, for the same periods a year ago. The increase in net loss of $4.2 million for the three months ended June 30, 2014 compared to the same period in 2013 is related to one-time costs incurred, including impairment of goodwill and employee severance, for the discontinuation of the Consulting segment. The decrease in net loss of $0.8 million for the six months ended June 30, 2014 compared to the same period in 2013 is due to one-time merger expenses incurred in 2013, partially offset by the costs of discontinuing the Consulting segment. General and administrative expenses for the three months ended June 30, 2014 increased $0.1 million compared to the same period in 2013. The six months ended June 30, 2014 decreased $2.7 million as compared to the same period in 2013, mainly from the costs related to merger activities incurred in 2013. Research and development expense, depreciation and amortization expense remained relatively unchanged for the three and six months ended June 30, 2014 and 2013. Other income changed minimally as compared to prior periods for rent subsidy. As of June 30, 2014, the Company had $13.6 million in cash and cash equivalents. For the six months ended June 30, 2014, cash used for operations was $4.7 million compared to $4.6 million for the same period in 2013. 24. That same day, the Company filed its quarterly report on Form 10-Q with the SEC reiterating the previously announced financial results, which was signed by defendants Cao and Liu. In addition, the Form 10-Q contained certifications signed pursuant to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“SOX”) by defendants Cao and Liu, stating that the financial information contained in the Form 10-Q was accurate, and disclosed any material changes to the Company’s internal control over financial reporting. 25. On November 19, 2014, the Company issued a press release announcing third quarter 2014 financial results and providing business highlights. The press release stated, in part: Case3:15-cv-01795 Document1 Filed04/21/15 Page7 of 23 8 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 PALO ALTO, Calif., Nov. 19, 2014 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Cellular Biomedicine Group Inc. (Nasdaq:CBMG) (the “Company”), a biomedicine firm engaged in the development of effective treatments for degenerative and cancerous diseases, today reported financial results and provided business highlights for the third quarter ended September 30, 2014. Dr. William (Wei) Cao, Chief Executive Officer of Cellular Biomedicine Group, commented, “In the third quarter we continued to execute our focus of acquiring advanced technologies and talents that position CBMG as a leader in both stem cell and cancer immune cell technologies in China. With completion of the acquisition of Agreen Biotech Co. Ltd. China (“AG”), we added a distinguished cancer immune cell therapy platform that we expect would provide consistent technical service revenue stream and pipeline to our technology platform.We grew our Intellectual Property portfolio to 45 patents in various stages of approval in China, U.S. and through the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT), including one granted US Patent and 13 granted China patents. Our lead regenerative medicine product candidate ReJoinTM for Knee Osteoarthritis (KOA) continues to make excellent progress. We look forward to announcing the KOA Phase I/IIa clinical trial twelve-month follow-up results at the World Stem Cell Summit in San Antonio, Texas on December 5th, and we expect to announce the interim data from the Phase IIb trial in the next few months.” Financial Results Cellular Biomedicine Group reported a net loss for the three months ended September 30, 2014 of approximately $2.8 million, or $0.31 loss per share, compared to a net gain of approximately $0.6 million, or $0.09 gain per share for the same period a year ago. The increase in net loss of approximately $3.4 million is related to the discontinuation of the consulting business in Q2 2014, which contributed a net profit of approximately $2.3 million for the three months ended September 2013. General and administrative expenses for the three months ended September 30, 2014 increased approximately $0.6 million compared to the same period in 2013, which mainly resulted from payroll increase of approximately $0.4 million and travel expense increase of approximately $0.2 million. For the three months ended September 30, 2014, research and development expense increased by approximately $0.5 million compared with same period last year, which mainly resulted from the increase in experiment fees of approximately $0.5 million. Other income changed minimally mainly due to the fluctuation of foreign currency gains and losses. As of September 30, 2014, the Company had approximately $9.8 million in cash and cash equivalents. 26. On November 19, 2014, the Company filed its quarterly report on Form 10-Q with the SEC reiterating the previously announced financial results, which was signed by defendants Cao and Case3:15-cv-01795 Document1 Filed04/21/15 Page8 of 23 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 Liu. In addition, the Form 10-Q contained certifications signed pursuant to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“SOX”) by defendants Cao and Liu, stating that the financial information contained in the Form 10-Q was accurate, and disclosed any material changes to the Company’s internal control over financial reporting. 27. Moreover, the Form 10-Q contained the following disclosure regarding stock promoters: Stockholders should be aware that, according to SEC Release No. 34-29093, the market for penny stocks has suffered in recent years from patterns of fraud and abuse. Such patterns include (1) control of the market for the security by one or a few broker-dealers that are often related to the promoter or issuer; (2) manipulation of prices through prearranged matching of purchases and sales and false and misleading press releases; (3) boiler room practices involving high-pressure sales tactics and unrealistic price projections by inexperienced sales persons; (4) excessive and undisclosed bid-ask differential and markups by selling broker-dealers; and (5) the wholesale dumping of the same securities by promoters and broker-dealers after prices have been manipulated to a desired level, along with the resulting inevitable collapse of those prices and with consequent investor losses. Our management is aware of the abuses that have occurred historically in the penny stock market. Although we do not expect to be in a position to dictate the behavior of the market or of broker-dealers who participate in the market, management will strive within the confines of practical limitations to prevent the described patterns from being established with respect to our securities. However, the occurrence of these patterns or practices could increase the volatility of our share price. 28. On February 2, 2015, “LifeTech Capital”, a purported research-focused biotechnology and medical technology investment bank, raised their target price to $32.50 on CBMG with a Strong Speculative Buy rating. The 26-page report, authored by Stephen M. Dunn, Senior Managing Director of Research at LifeTech Capital, discusses CBMG’s latest acquisitions and new market valuation. In the report Mr. Dunn states, “With 4 human clinical and 2 preclinical programs in immuno-oncology, CBMG is now the leader in China for this promising cancer technology. We expect CBMG to continue their aggressive acquisition strategy for immuno-oncology drugs in China as well as sign development partnerships with western pharma companies for the Chinese market.” 29. On March 31, 2015, the Company issued a press release announcing full-year and fourth quarter 2014 financial results. The press release stated, in part: Case3:15-cv-01795 Document1 Filed04/21/15 Page9 of 23 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 SHANGHAI, China and PALO ALTO, Calif., March 31, 2015 /GlobeNewswire/ — Cellular Biomedicine Group Inc. (NASDAQ: CBMG) (“CBMG” or the “Company”), a biomedicine firm engaged in the development of effective treatments for degenerative and cancerous diseases, today reported full-year and fourth quarter 2014 financial results for the period ended December 31, 2014. “2014 laid the foundation for building a world-class biotechnology enterprise that was marked by achieving notable corporate and clinical milestones and meaningful acquisitions that will drive our business momentum as we move into 2015,” said William (Wei) Cao, PhD, BM, Chief Executive Officer of Cellular Biomedicine Group. “In addition to our successful listing on NASDAQ, we accelerated the growth of our Immuno-Oncology platform through the acquisition of Agreen Biotech Co. Ltd. China (“AG”), the acquisition of third generation Chimeric Antigen Receptor T cell (CAR-T), anti-PD-1, CD19 and aAPC cancer immunotherapy technologies from Persongen Biotechnology Ltd., and the acquisition of four CAR-T therapies with corresponding Phase I clinical data and manufacturing knowledge from Chinese PLA General Hospital (“PLAGH”, Beijing, also known as “301 Hospital”). The Company’s lead product candidate from our Human Adipose-Derived Mesenchymal Progenitor Cell (haMPC) Platform, ReJoinTM for the treatment of Knee Osteoarthritis (KOA), reported positive 12 month results from its Phase IIa clinical trials in 2014 and we are encouraged by the interim Phase IIb clinical data released in the first quarter of 2015 which continues to show excellent progress. We look forward to 2015 as we continue to amalgamate novel cancer technology leaders, deliver promise from our clinical trials to serve several large unmet medical needs in China and seek to evolve into a leader in the biotechnology field.” Tony (Bizuo) Liu, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, commented, “I am pleased to also announce the successful completion of an $18 million private placement transaction in 2014 and $20 million in 2015 which fortified our cash position. We will continue to leverage our financial resources to expand our technology portfolio, strengthen our clinical pipeline, pursue strategic acquisitions, add world-class scientific talent and evaluate multi-national licensing opportunities. We believe these strategic initiatives will further validate our vision of becoming an innovative cell-therapy company that delivers value to our shareholders.” Fourth Quarter and 2014 Financial Performance 3. Revenue: Q4 and full-year 2014 revenue of $0.4 million and $0.6 million, respectively, compared to $0.1 million and $0.2 million for the same periods in 2013. 30. On March 31, 2015, the Company filed its annual report on Form 10-K with the SEC reiterating the previously announced financial results, which was signed by defendants Cao and Liu. In addition, the Form 10-K contained certifications signed pursuant to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“SOX”) by defendants Cao and Liu, stating that the financial information contained in the Form 10-K was accurate, and disclosed any material changes to the Company’s internal control over financial reporting. 31. Moreover, the Form 10-K stated the following regarding stock promotion: Stockholders should be aware that, according to SEC Release No. 34-29093, the market for penny stocks has suffered in recent years from patterns of fraud and abuse. Such patterns include (1) control of the market for the security by one or a few broker-dealers that are often related to the promoter or issuer; (2) manipulation of prices through prearranged matching of purchases and sales and false and misleading press releases; (3) boiler room practices involving high-pressure sales tactics and unrealistic price projections by inexperienced sales persons; (4) excessive and undisclosed bid-ask differential and markups by selling broker-dealers; and (5) the wholesale dumping of the same securities by promoters and broker-dealers after prices have been manipulated to a desired level, along with the resulting inevitable collapse of those prices and with consequent investor losses. Our management is aware of the abuses that have occurred Case3:15-cv-01795 Document1 Filed04/21/15 Page11 of 23 12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 historically in the penny stock market. Although we do not expect to be in a position to dictate the behavior of the market or of broker-dealers who participate in the market, management will strive within the confines of practical limitations to prevent the described patterns from being established with respect to our securities. However, the occurrence of these patterns or practices could increase the volatility of our share price 32. The statements in ¶¶ 22-31 above were materially false and/or misleading because they misrepresented and/or failed to disclose that: (i) the Company achieved an unsustainable $500m valuation by using paid stock promoters; (ii) its "Car-T" technology has experienced patient deaths and had no meaningful market value; (iii) its founders have been the target of multiple allegations of dishonesty; and (iv) as a result of the above, the Company’s financial statements were materially false and misleading at all relevant times. 36. Plaintiff brings this action as a class action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) and (b)(3) on behalf of a Class, consisting of all those who purchased or otherwise acquired CBMG securities during the Class Period (the “Class”); and were damaged upon the revelation of the alleged corrective disclosures. Excluded from the Class are defendants herein, the officers and directors of the Company, at all relevant times, members of their immediate families and their legal representatives, heirs, successors or assigns and any entity in which defendants have or had a controlling interest. 37. The members of the Class are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. Throughout the Class Period, CBMG securities were actively traded on the NASDAQ. While the exact number of Class members is unknown to Plaintiff at this time and can be ascertained only through appropriate discovery, Plaintiff believes that there are hundreds or thousands of members in the proposed Class. Record owners and other members of the Class may be identified from records maintained by CBMG or its transfer agent and may be notified of the pendency of this action by mail, using the form of notice similar to that customarily used in securities class actions. 38. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the members of the Class as all members of the Class are similarly affected by defendants’ wrongful conduct in violation of federal law that is complained of herein. 39. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the members of the Class and has retained counsel competent and experienced in class and securities litigation. Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to or in conflict with those of the Class. Case3:15-cv-01795 Document1 Filed04/21/15 Page13 of 23 14 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 4. G&A Expenses: Q4 and full-year 2014 general and administrative expenses of $3.3 million and $8.4 million, respectively, compared to $2.2 million and $9.3 million for the same periods in 2013. Excluding the stock-based compensation of $1.9 million and $1.5 million recorded in G&A expenses for full-year 2014 and 2013, the G&A expenses would have been $6.5 million and $7.8 respectively. 40. Common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the Class and predominate over any questions solely affecting individual members of the Class. Among the questions of law and fact common to the Class are:  whether the federal securities laws were violated by defendants’ acts as alleged herein;  whether statements made by defendants to the investing public during the Class Period misrepresented material facts about the business, operations and management of 45. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained above as if fully set forth herein. 46. This Count is asserted against defendants and is based upon Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder by the SEC. 47. During the Class Period, defendants engaged in a plan, scheme, conspiracy and course of conduct, pursuant to which they knowingly or recklessly engaged in acts, transactions, practices and courses of business which operated as a fraud and deceit upon Plaintiff and the other members of the Class; made various untrue statements of material facts and omitted to state material facts necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading; and employed devices, schemes and artifices to defraud in connection with the purchase Case3:15-cv-01795 Document1 Filed04/21/15 Page15 of 23 16 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 and sale of securities. Such scheme was intended to, and, throughout the Class Period, did: (i) deceive the investing public, including Plaintiff and other Class members, as alleged herein; (ii) artificially inflate and maintain the market price of CBMG securities; and (iii) cause Plaintiff and other members of the Class to purchase or otherwise acquire CBMG securities and options at artificially inflated prices. In furtherance of this unlawful scheme, plan and course of conduct, defendants, and each of them, took the actions set forth herein. 48. Pursuant to the above plan, scheme, conspiracy and course of conduct, each of the defendants participated directly or indirectly in the preparation and/or issuance of the quarterly and annual reports, SEC filings, press releases and other statements and documents described above, including statements made to securities analysts and the media that were designed to influence the market for CBMG securities. Such reports, filings, releases and statements were materially false and misleading in that they failed to disclose material adverse information and misrepresented the truth about CBMG’s finances and business prospects. 49. By virtue of their positions at CBMG, defendants had actual knowledge of the materially false and misleading statements and material omissions alleged herein and intended thereby to deceive Plaintiff and the other members of the Class, or, in the alternative, defendants acted with reckless disregard for the truth in that they failed or refused to ascertain and disclose such facts as would reveal the materially false and misleading nature of the statements made, although such facts were readily available to defendants. Said acts and omissions of defendants were committed willfully or with reckless disregard for the truth. In addition, each defendant knew or recklessly disregarded that material facts were being misrepresented or omitted as described above. 5. R&D Expenses: Q4 and full-year 2014 research and development expenses of $0.8 million and $2.7 million, respectively, compared to $0.6 million and $1.9 million for the same periods a year ago, the increase mainly attributable to significant activities surrounding the development of our biomedicine intellectual property, including the implementation of Phase IIb clinical trials for KOA and launch of the clinical trial for cartilage damage. 50. Defendants were personally motivated to make false statements and omit material information necessary to make the statements not misleading in order to personally benefit from the sale of CBMG securities from their personal portfolios. Case3:15-cv-01795 Document1 Filed04/21/15 Page16 of 23 17 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 51. Information showing that defendants acted knowingly or with reckless disregard for the truth is peculiarly within defendants’ knowledge and control. As the senior managers and/or directors of CBMG, the Individual Defendants had knowledge of the details of CBMG’s internal affairs. 52. The Individual Defendants are liable both directly and indirectly for the wrongs complained of herein. Because of their positions of control and authority, the Individual Defendants were able to and did, directly or indirectly, control the content of the statements of CBMG. As officers and/or directors of a publicly-held company, the Individual Defendants had a duty to disseminate timely, accurate, and truthful information with respect to CBMG’s businesses, operations, future financial condition and future prospects. As a result of the dissemination of the aforementioned false and misleading reports, releases and public statements, the market price of CBMG securities was artificially inflated throughout the Class Period. In ignorance of the adverse facts concerning CBMG’s business and financial condition which were concealed by defendants, Plaintiff and the other members of the Class purchased or otherwise acquired CBMG securities at artificially inflated prices and relied upon the price of the securities, the integrity of the market for the securities and/or upon statements disseminated by defendants, and were damaged thereby. 53. During the Class Period, CBMG securities were traded on an active and efficient market. Plaintiff and the other members of the Class, relying on the materially false and misleading statements described herein, which the defendants made, issued or caused to be disseminated, or relying upon the integrity of the market, purchased or otherwise acquired shares of CBMG securities at prices artificially inflated by defendants’ wrongful conduct. Had Plaintiff and the other members of the Class known the truth, they would not have purchased or otherwise acquired said securities, or would not have purchased or otherwise acquired them at the inflated prices that were paid. At the time of the purchases and/or acquisitions by Plaintiff and the Class, the true value of CBMG securities was substantially lower than the prices paid by Plaintiff and the other members of the Class. The market price of CBMG securities Case3:15-cv-01795 Document1 Filed04/21/15 Page17 of 23 18 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 declined sharply upon public disclosure of the facts alleged herein to the injury of Plaintiff and Class members. 54. By reason of the conduct alleged herein, defendants knowingly or recklessly, directly or indirectly, have violated Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder. 55. As a direct and proximate result of defendants’ wrongful conduct, Plaintiff and the other members of the Class suffered damages in connection with their respective purchases, acquisitions and sales of the Company’s securities during the Class Period, upon the disclosure that the Company had been disseminating misrepresented financial statements to the investing public. 56. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained in the foregoing paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 57. During the Class Period, the Individual Defendants participated in the operation and management of CBMG, and conducted and participated, directly and indirectly, in the conduct of CBMG’s business affairs. Because of their senior positions, they knew the adverse non-public information about CBMG’s false financial statements. 58. As officers and/or directors of a publicly owned company, the Individual Defendants had a duty to disseminate accurate and truthful information with respect to CBMG’s financial condition and results of operations, and to correct promptly any public statements issued by CBMG which had become materially false or misleading. 59. Because of their positions of control and authority as senior officers, the Individual Defendants were able to, and did, control the contents of the various reports, press releases and public filings which CBMG disseminated in the marketplace during the Class Period concerning CBMG’s Case3:15-cv-01795 Document1 Filed04/21/15 Page18 of 23 19 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 results of operations. Throughout the Class Period, the Individual Defendants exercised their power and authority to cause CBMG to engage in the wrongful acts complained of herein. The Individual Defendants therefore, were “controlling persons” of CBMG within the meaning of Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act. In this capacity, they participated in the unlawful conduct alleged which artificially inflated the market price of CBMG securities. 6. Net Loss: Q4 and full-year 2014 net loss allocable to common stock holders was $5.5 million and $15.5 million, respectively, compared to $6.5 million and $13.8 million for the same periods in 2013. Excluding the stock-based compensation of $1.9 million and $1.5 million recorded for full-year 2014 and 2013, the net loss would have been $13.6 million and $12.3 million respectively. 60. Each of the Individual Defendants, therefore, acted as a controlling person of CBMG. By reason of their senior management positions and/or being directors of CBMG, each of the Individual Defendants had the power to direct the actions of, and exercised the same to cause, CBMG to engage in the unlawful acts and conduct complained of herein. Each of the Individual Defendants exercised control over the general operations of CBMG and possessed the power to control the specific activities which comprise the primary violations about which Plaintiff and the other members of the Class complain. 61. By reason of the above conduct, the Individual Defendants are liable pursuant to Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act for the violations committed by CBMG. Background

lose

1. A statement that the recipient is legally entitled to opt-out of receiving future faxed advertisements – knowing that he or she has the legal right to request an opt- out gives impetus for recipients to make such a request, if desired; 11. On information and belief, on or about November 6, 2014, Defendants transmitted by telephone facsimile machine an unsolicited facsimile to Plaintiff. A copy of the facsimile is attached hereto as Exhibit A. 12. On information and belief, Defendant receives some or all of the revenues from the sale of the products, goods and services advertised on Exhibit A, and Defendant profits and benefits from the sale of the products, goods and services advertised on Exhibit A. 13. Plaintiff had not invited or given permission to Defendants to send the fax. 4 14. On information and belief, Defendants faxed the same and other unsolicited facsimiles without the required opt-out language to Plaintiff and more than 40 other recipients or sent the same and other advertisements by fax with the required opt-out language but without first receiving the recipients’ express invitation or permission and without having an established business relationship as defined by the TCPA and its regulations 15. There is no reasonable means for Plaintiff (or any other class member) to avoid receiving unauthorized faxes. Fax machines are left on and ready to receive the urgent communications their owners desire to receive. 16. Defendants’ facsimile attached as Exhibit A did not display a proper opt-out notice as required by 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200. 17. In accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1), (b)(2) and (b)(3), Plaintiff brings this class action pursuant to the JFPA, on behalf of the following class of persons: All persons who (1) on or after four years prior to the filing of this action, (2) were sent telephone facsimile messages of material advertising the commercial availability or quality of any property, goods, or services by or on behalf of Defendants, (3) from whom Defendants did not have “prior express invitation or permission” to send fax advertisements, and (4) with whom Defendants did not have an established business relationship, and/or (5) which did not display a proper opt-out notice. Excluded from the Class are the Defendants, their employees, agents and members of the Judiciary. Plaintiff seeks to certify a class which include but are not limited to the fax advertisements sent to Plaintiff. Plaintiff reserves the right to amend the class definition upon completion of class certification discovery. 18. Class Size (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1)): Plaintiff is informed and believes, and upon such information and belief, avers that the number of persons and entities of the Plaintiff Class is 5 numerous and joinder of all members is impracticable. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and upon such information and belief avers, that the number of class members is at least forty. 19. Commonality (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (a) (2)): Common questions of law and fact apply to the claims of all class members. Common material questions of fact and law include, but are not limited to, the following: (a) Whether the Defendants sent unsolicited fax advertisements; (b) Whether Defendants’ faxes sent to other persons, not the Plaintiff, constitute advertisements; (c) Whether the Defendants’ faxes advertised the commercial availability of property, goods, or services; (d) The manner and method the Defendants used to compile or obtain the list of fax numbers to which they sent Exhibit A, other unsolicited faxed advertisements or other advertisements without the required opt-out language; (e) Whether the Defendants faxed advertisements without first obtaining the recipient's prior invitation or permission; (f) Whether the Defendants sent the faxed advertisements knowingly; (g) Whether the Defendants violated the provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 and the regulations promulgated thereunder; (h) Whether the faxes contain an “opt-out notice” that complies with the requirements of § (b)(1)(C)(iii) of the Act, and the regulations promulgated thereunder, and the effect of the failure to comply with such requirements; (i) Whether the Defendants should be enjoined from faxing advertisements in the future; 6 (j) Whether the Plaintiff and the other members of the class are entitled to statutory damages; and (k) Whether the Court should award treble damages. 2. A statement that the sender must honor a recipient’s opt-out request within 30 days and the sender’s failure to do so is unlawful – thereby encouraging recipients to opt-out, if they did not want future faxes, by advising them that their opt-out requests will have legal “teeth”; 20. Typicality (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (a) (3)): The Plaintiff's claims are typical of the claims of all class members. The Plaintiff received the same or similar faxes as the faxes sent by or on behalf of the Defendants advertising products, goods and services of the Defendants during the Class Period. The Plaintiff is making the same claims and seeking the same relief for itself and all class members based upon the same federal statute. The Defendants have acted in the same or in a similar manner with respect to the Plaintiff and all the class members by sending Plaintiff and each member of the class the same faxes or faxes which did not contain the proper opt-out language or were sent without prior express permission or invitation. 21. Fair and Adequate Representation (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (a) (4)): The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the class. It is interested in this matter, has no conflicts and has retained experienced class counsel to represent the class. 22. Need for Consistent Standards and Practical Effect of Adjudication (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (b) (1)): Class certification is appropriate because the prosecution of individual actions by class members would: (a) create the risk of inconsistent adjudications that could establish incompatible standards of conduct for the Defendants, and/or (b) as a practical matter, adjudication of the Plaintiff's claims will be dispositive of the interests of class members who are not parties. 23. Common Conduct (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (b) (2)): Class certification is also appropriate because the Defendants have acted and refused to act in the same or similar manner 7 with respect to all class members thereby making injunctive and declaratory relief appropriate. The Plaintiff demands such relief as authorized by 47 U.S.C. §227. 24. Predominance and Superiority (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (b) (3)): Common questions of law and fact predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and a class action is superior to other methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy because: (a) Proof of the claims of the Plaintiff will also prove the claims of the class without the need for separate or individualized proceedings; (b) Evidence regarding defenses or any exceptions to liability that the Defendants may assert and attempt to prove will come from the Defendants’ records and will not require individualized or separate inquiries or proceedings; (c) The Defendants have acted and are continuing to act pursuant to common policies or practices in the same or similar manner with respect to all class members; (d) The amount likely to be recovered by individual class members does not support individual litigation. A class action will permit a large number of relatively small claims involving virtually identical facts and legal issues to be resolved efficiently in one (1) proceeding based upon common proofs; and (e) This case is inherently manageable as a class action in that: (i) The Defendants identified persons or entities to receive the fax transmissions and it is believed that the Defendants’ and/or Defendants’ agents’ computers and business records will enable the Plaintiff to readily identify class members and establish liability and damages; 8 (ii) Liability and damages can be established for the Plaintiff and the class with the same common proofs; (iii) Statutory damages are provided for in the statute and are the same for all class members and can be calculated in the same or a similar manner; (iv) A class action will result in an orderly and expeditious administration of claims and it will foster economics of time, effort and expense; (v) A class action will contribute to uniformity of decisions concerning the Defendants’ practices; and (vi) As a practical matter, the claims of the class are likely to go unaddressed absent class certification. Claim for Relief for Violation of the JFPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. 25. The JFPA makes it unlawful for any person to “use any telephone facsimile machine, computer or other device to send, to a telephone facsimile machine, an unsolicited advertisement . . . .” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C). 26. The JFPA defines “unsolicited advertisement” as “any material advertising the commercial availability or quality of any property, goods, or services which is transmitted to any person without that person's prior express invitation or permission, in writing or otherwise.” 47 U.S.C. § 227 (a) (5). 27. Opt-Out Notice Requirements. The JFPA strengthened the prohibitions against the sending of unsolicited advertisements by requiring, in § (b)(1)(C)(iii) of the Act, that senders of faxed advertisements place a clear and conspicuous notice on the first page of the transmission that contains the following among other things (hereinafter collectively the “Opt-Out Notice Requirements”): 9 28. 2006 FCC Report and Order. The JFPA, in § (b)(2) of the Act, directed the FCC to implement regulations regarding the JFPA, including the JFPA’s Opt-Out Notice Requirements and the FCC did so in its 2006 Report and Order, which in addition provides among other things: A. The definition of, and the requirements for, an established business relationship for purposes of the first of the three prongs of an exemption to liability under § (b)(1)(C)(i) of the Act and provides that the lack of an “established business relationship” precludes the ability to invoke the exemption contained in § (b)(1)(C) of the Act (See 2006 Report and Order ¶¶ 8-12 and 17-20); B. The required means by which a recipient’s facsimile telephone number must be obtained for purposes of the second of the three prongs of the exemption under § (b)(1)(C)(ii) of the Act and provides that the failure to comply with these requirements precludes the ability to invoke the exemption contained in § (b)(1)(C) of the Act (See 2006 Report and Order ¶¶ 13-16); C. The things that must be done in order to comply with the Opt-Out Notice Requirements for the purposes of the third of the three prongs of the exemption under § (b)(1)(C)(iii) of the Act and provides that the failure to comply with these requirements precludes the ability to invoke the exemption contained in § (b)(1)(C) of the Act (See 2006 Report and Order ¶¶ 24-34); D. The failure of a sender to comply with the Opt-Out Notice Requirements precludes the sender from claiming that a recipient gave “prior express invitation or permission” to receive the sender’s fax (See Report and Order ¶ 48); As a result thereof, a sender of a faxed advertisement who fails to comply with the Opt- 11 Out Notice Requirements has, by definition, transmitted an unsolicited advertisement under the JFPA. This is because such a sender can neither claim that the recipients of the faxed advertisement gave “prior express invitation or permission” to receive the fax nor can the sender claim the exemption from liability contained in § (b)(C)(1) of the Act. 29. The Fax. Defendants sent on or about November 6, 2014, advertisement and any other advertisements sent to Plaintiff and other members of the class via facsimile transmission from telephone facsimile machines, computers, or other devices to the telephone lines and facsimile machines of Plaintiff and members of the Plaintiff Class. The Fax constituted an advertisement under the Act. Defendants failed to comply with the Opt-Out Requirements in connection with the Fax. The Fax was transmitted to persons or entities without their prior express invitation or permission and/or Defendants are precluded from asserting any prior express invitation or permission or that Defendants had an established business relationship with Plaintiff and the other members of the Class because of the failure to comply with the Opt-Out Notice Requirements. By virtue thereof, Defendants violated the JFPA and the regulations promulgated thereunder by sending the Fax via facsimile transmission to Plaintiff and members of the Class. Plaintiff seeks to certify a class which includes this fax and others sent during the four years prior to the filing of this action through the present. 3. A statement advising the recipient that he or she may opt-out with respect to all of his or her facsimile telephone numbers and not just the ones that receive a faxed advertisement from the sender – thereby instructing a recipient on how to make a valid opt-out request for all of his or her fax machines; 30. Defendants’ Other Violations. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and upon such information and belief, avers that during the period preceding four years of the filing of this Complaint and repeatedly thereafter, Defendants have sent via facsimile transmission from telephone facsimile machines, computers, or other devices to telephone facsimile machines of members of the Plaintiff Class other faxes that constitute advertisements under the JFPA that were transmitted to persons or entities without their prior express invitation or permission 12 (and/or that Defendants are precluded from asserting any prior express invitation or permission or that Defendants had an established business relationship because of the failure to comply with the Opt-Out Notice Requirements in connection with such transmissions). By virtue thereof, Defendants violated the JFPA and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and upon such information and belief, avers that Defendants may be continuing to send unsolicited advertisements via facsimile transmission in violation of the JFPA and the regulations promulgated thereunder, and absent intervention by this Court, will do so in the future. 31. The TCPA/JFPA provides a private right of action to bring this action on behalf of Plaintiff and the Plaintiff Class to redress Defendants’ violations of the Act, and provides for statutory damages. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3). The Act also provides that injunctive relief is appropriate. Id. 32. The JFPA is a strict liability statute, so the Defendants are liable to the Plaintiff and the other class members even if their actions were only negligent. 33. The Defendants knew or should have known that (a) the Plaintiff and the other class members had not given express invitation or permission for the Defendants or anybody else to fax advertisements about the Defendants’ goods or services; (b) the Plaintiff and the other class members did not have an established business relationship; (c) Defendants transmitted advertisements; (d) the Faxes did not contain the required Opt-Out Notice; and (e) Defendants’ transmission of advertisements that did not contain the required opt-out notice or were sent without prior express invitation or permission was unlawful. 34. The Defendants’ actions caused damages to the Plaintiff and the other class members. Receiving the Defendants’ junk faxes caused the recipients to lose paper and toner 13 consumed in the printing of the Defendants’ faxes. Moreover, the Defendants’ faxes used the Plaintiff's and the other class members’ telephone lines and fax machine. The Defendants’ faxes cost the Plaintiff and the other class members time, as the Plaintiff and the other class members and their employees wasted their time receiving, reviewing and routing the Defendants’ unauthorized faxes. That time otherwise would have been spent on the Plaintiff's and the other class members’ business activities. The Defendants’ faxes unlawfully interrupted the Plaintiff's and other class members' privacy interests in being left alone. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, PROGRESSIVE HEALTH AND REHAB CORP., individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, demands judgment in its favor and against Defendants, O. E. MEYER CO. and JOHN DOES 1-5, jointly and severally, as follows: A. That the Court adjudge and decree that the present case may be properly maintained as a class action, appoint the Plaintiff as the representative of the class, and appoint the Plaintiff’s counsel as counsel for the class; B. That the Court award actual monetary loss from such violations or the sum of five hundred dollars ($500.00) for each violation, whichever is greater; C. That Court enjoin the Defendants from additional violations; and D. That the Court award pre-judgment interest, costs, and such further relief as the Court may deem just and proper. Respectfully submitted, 4. The opt-out language must be conspicuous. The requirement of (1) above is incorporated from § (b)(D)(ii) of the Act. The requirement of (2) above is incorporated from § (b)(D)(ii) of the Act and the rules and regulations of the Federal Communications Commission (the “FCC”) in ¶ 31 of its 2006 Report and Order (In the Matter of Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, Junk Prevention Act of 2005, 21 F.C.C.R. 3787, 2006 WL 901720, which rules and regulations took effect on August 1, 2006). The requirements of (3) above are contained in § (b)(2)(E) of the Act and incorporated into the Opt-Out Notice Requirements via § (b)(2)(D)(ii). Compliance with the Opt-Out Notice Requirements is neither difficult nor costly. The Opt-Out Notice Requirements are important consumer protections bestowed by Congress upon the owners of the telephone lines and fax machines giving them the right, and means, to stop unwanted faxed advertisements. 10

win

18. On or around February 17, 2019, Plaintiffs purchased food at a Buca di Beppo located at 705 6th Avenue, San Diego, California, one of the affected locations, using their joint credit card. 19. Plaintiffs continue to monitor their accounts in an effort to detected and prevent any further misuses. 20. Since the announcement, Plaintiffs put a hold on their account, cancelled their credit card, and as of the filing of this complaint, are awaiting the delivery of a new card. Consequently, Plaintiffs have had to forgo using the cancelled credit card, including accumulating credit card rewards points, and must now spend time and effort transferring over automatic payments to the new credit card number after the new card is received. 22. Consequently, Plaintiffs lost time dealing with the issues related to the Data Breach in cancelling their credit card, communicating with their financial institution, and in procuring credit freezes to mitigate potential future harm. 23. Plaintiffs would not have used their credit cards to make purchases at Defendant’s restaurants during the period of the Data Breach had Defendant disclosed that it lacked adequate computer systems and data security practices to safeguard customers’ SPI from theft. 24. Plaintiffs suffered actual injury from having their SPI stolen as a result of the Data Breach. 25. Plaintiffs suffered actual injury and damages in paying money to, and purchasing products from, Defendant’s restaurants during the Data Breach, expenditures which they would not have made had Defendant disclosed that it lacked computer systems and data security practices adequate to safeguard customers’ SPI from theft. 26. Plaintiffs suffered actual injury in the form of damages to and diminution in the value of their SPI—a form of intangible property that Plaintiffs entrusted to Defendant for the purpose of purchasing Defendant’s products and which was compromised in and as a result of the Data Breach. 27. Plaintiffs suffered lost time, annoyance, interference, and inconvenience as a result of the Data Breach, and have concerns for the loss of their privacy. 28. Plaintiffs have suffered imminent and impending injury arising from the substantially increased risk of fraud, identity theft, and misuse resulting from their SPI being placed in the hands of criminals. 30. Defendant is a for-profit corporation that owns several large restaurant chains, including Buca di Beppo, Planet Hollywood, Earl of Sandwich, as well as smaller restaurants, such as Chicken Guy! and Café Hollywood. 31. As part of the dining process, Defendant’s restaurants, like most restaurants, accept payment cards through point-of-sale (“POS”) terminals, which accept customer payment card data and process it for payment at the time for which a meal is paid. This data includes the cardholder name, the account number, expiration date, card verification value (“CVV”), and PIN data for debit cards . Defendant stores the SPI in its POS system and transmits this information to a third party for processing and completion of the payment. 32. At all relevant times, Defendant was well-aware, or reasonably should have been aware, that the SPI collected, maintained, and stored in the POS systems is highly sensitive, susceptible to attack, and could be used for wrongful purposes by third parties, such as identity theft and fraud. 33. POS systems and terminals, especially in the hospitality industry, are popular targets for cyberattacks, often involving remote attacks which install malware which can spread through an entire system. The frequency and prevalence of such attacks make it imperative that companies in the hospitality industry (such as Defendant) routinely monitor for malware and cyberattacks and regularly update their software and security procedures. 35. SPI is a valuable commodity because it contains not only payment card numbers, but also personally identifiable information (“PII”). A “cyber black market” exists in which criminals openly post stolen payment card numbers, social security numbers, and other personal, private information on multiple underground Internet websites. SPI is valuable to identity thieves because they can use victims’ personal data—including SPI and PII—to open new financial accounts and take out loans in another person’s name, incur charges on existing accounts, or clone ATM, debit, and credit cards. 36. Legitimate organizations and the criminal underground alike recognize the value of SPI and PII contained in a merchant’s data systems; otherwise, the latter would not aggressively seek or pay for it. For example, in “one of 2013’s largest breaches . . . not only did hackers compromise the [card holder data] of three million customers, they also took registration data [containing SPI and PII] from 38 million users.”5 38. The SPI and PII of consumers remains of high value to identity criminals, as evidenced by the prices criminals will pay through black-market sources, or what is often called the dark web. Numerous sources cite dark web pricing for stolen identity credentials. For example, a complete set of bank account credentials can fetch a thousand dollars or more (depending on the associated credit score or balance available to criminals).8 Experian reports that a stolen credit or debit card number can sell for $5–110 on the dark web. 9 39. At all relevant times, Defendant knew, or reasonably should have known, of the importance of safeguarding SPI and PII, and of the foreseeable consequences that would occur if its data security system was breached, including, specifically, the significant costs that would be imposed on its customers as a result of a breach. 40. Defendant was, or should have been, fully aware of the significant volume of daily credit and debit card transactions at its restaurants, amounting to tens of thousands of daily payment card transactions, and thus, the significant number of individuals who would be harmed by a breach of Defendant’s systems. 42. A wave of data breaches causing the theft of retail payment card information has hit the United States in the last several years.10 In 2016, the number of U.S. data breaches surpassed 1,000, a record high and a forty percent increase in the number of data breaches from the previous year.11 The amount of payment card data compromised by data breaches is massive. For example, it is estimated that over 100 million cards were compromised in 2013 and 2014.12 44. Before transmitting customer data over the merchant’s network, POS systems typically, and very briefly, store the data in plain text within the system’s memory.15 The stored information includes “Track 1” and “Track 2” data from the magnetic strip on the payment card, such as the cardholder’s first and last name, the expiration date of the card, and the CVV (three number security code on the card).16 This information is unencrypted on the card and, at least briefly, will be unencrypted in the POS terminal’s temporary memory as it processes the data. 17 46. A 2016 report by Verizon confirmed the vast majority of successful breaches leverage legitimate credentials to gain access to the POS environment. Once attackers gain access to the POS devices, they install malware, usually a RAM scraper, to capture payment card data.22 47. Intruders with access to unencrypted Track 1 and Track 2 payment card data can physically replicate the card or use it online. Unsurprisingly, theft of payment card information via POS systems is now “one of the biggest sources of stolen payment cards.”23 For example, in 2013, hackers infiltrated Target, Inc.’s POS system, stealing information from an estimated 40 million payment cards in the United States. In 2014, over 7,500 self-checkout POS terminals at Home Depots throughout the United States were hacked, compromising roughly 56 million debit and credit cards.24 Likewise, POS systems at more than 1,000 Wendy’s restaurants were infiltrated with malware, resulting in the theft of payment cards data for approximately six- months.25 The same is true of Brinker, Chipotle, and numerous other retail restaurants. 49. Despite the enumerated vulnerabilities of POS systems, available security measures, and reasonable business practices would have significantly reduced or even eliminated the likelihood that hackers could successfully infiltrate a business’ POS system. 50. The payment card networks (MasterCard, Visa, Discover, and American Express), data security organizations, state governments, and federal agencies have all implemented various standards and guidance on security measures designed to prevent these types of intrusions into POS systems. However, despite Defendant’s understanding of the risk of data theft via malware installed on POS systems, and the widely available resources to prevent intrusion into POS data systems, Defendant failed to adhere to these guidelines and failed to take reasonable and sufficient protective measures to prevent the Data Breach. 51. Security experts have recommended specific steps that retailers should take to protect their POS systems. For example, a few years ago, Symantec recommended “point to point encryption” implemented through secure card readers, which encrypt credit card information in the POS system, preventing malware that extracts card information through the POS memory while it processes the transaction.26 Moreover, Symantec emphasized the importance of adopting EMV chip technology. Datacap Systems, a developer of POS systems, recommended similar preventative measures.27 53. The Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (“PCI DSS”) is a set of requirements designed to ensure that companies maintain consumer credit and debit card information in a secure environment.28 54. The PCI DSS “was developed to encourage and enhance cardholder data security” by providing “a baseline of technical and operational requirements designed to protect account data.”29 PCI DSS sets the minimum level of what must be done, not the maximum. 55. PCI DSS 3.2, the version of the standards in effect at the time of the Data Breach, imposes the following requirements on Defendant: 30 57. PCI DSS also required Defendant not to store “the full contents of…the magnetic stripe located on the back of a card” or “the card verification code or value” after authorization.31 58. Despite Defendant’s awareness of its data security obligations, Defendant’s treatment of SPI and PII entrusted to it by its customers fell far short of satisfying Defendant’s legal duties and obligations, and included violations of the PCI DSS. Defendant failed to ensure that access to its data systems was reasonably safeguarded, failed to acknowledge and act upon industry warnings and failed to use proper security systems to detect and deter the type of attack that occurred and is at issue here. E. Defendant Failed to Comply with FTC Requirements 59. Federal and State governments have likewise established security standards and issued recommendations to temper data breaches and the resulting harm to consumers and financial institutions. The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) has issued numerous guides for business highlighting the importance of reasonable data security practices. According to the FTC, the need for data security should be factored into all business decision-making.32 61. The FTC recommends that companies not maintain cardholder information longer than is needed for authorization of a transaction; limit access to sensitive data; require complex passwords to be used on networks; use industry-tested methods for security; monitor for suspicious activity on the network; and verify that third-party service providers have implemented reasonable security measures.34 62. The FTC has brought enforcement actions against businesses for failing to adequately and reasonably protect customer data, treating the failure to employ reasonable and appropriate measures to protect against unauthorized access to confidential consumer data as an unfair act or practice prohibited by Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (“FTCA”), 15 U.S.C. § 45. Orders resulting from these actions further clarify the measures businesses must take to meet their data security obligations. 64. In this case, Defendant was at all times fully aware of its obligation to protect the financial data—including SPI and PII—of Defendant’s customers because of its participation in payment card processing networks. Defendant was also aware of the significant repercussions if it failed to do so because Defendant collected payment card data from tens of thousands of customers daily and they knew that this data, if hacked, would result in injury to consumers, including Plaintiffs and Class members. 65. Despite understanding the consequences of inadequate data security, Defendant failed to comply with PCI DSS requirements and failed to take additional protective measures beyond those required by PCI DSS. 66. Despite understanding the consequences of inadequate data security, Defendant operated POS systems with outdated operating systems and software; failed to enable point-to- point and end-to-end encryption; and, failed to take other measures necessary to protect its data network. F. The Earl Enterprises Data Breach 68. Joker’s Stash has been described as “the most notorious and well-known underground marketplace for selling stolen credit card dumps.”36 69. On March 29, 2019, Defendant publicly announced that a security breach had occurred, confirming Krebs’ notification.37 Defendant did not publicly state how many people it believed had been affected, merely stating that it believed a “limited number of guests” were affected.38 70. Further, the limited advice given to customers stated: You can carefully review credit and debit card account statements as soon as possible for suspicious charges or activity you do not recognize. As a best practice, we urge you to remain vigilant and continue to monitor statements for unusual activity going forward. If you see anything you do not recognize, you should immediately notify the issuer of the credit or debit card. In instances of payment card fraud, it is important to note that cardholders are typically not responsible for any fraudulent activity that is reported in a timely fashion. Guests can also review the “Information about Identity Theft Protection” reference guide, included below which describes additional steps that you can take to help protect yourself, including recommendations by the Federal Trade Commission regarding identity theft protection and details on placing a fraud alert or a security freeze on your credit file.39 72. The advertisement on “Joker’s Stash” for the payment card numbers specifically stated that it included both Track 1 and Track 2 data.40 While cloned credit cards can be made from Track 2 data, which is largely limited to account numbers and expiration dates, Track 1 data is more valuable because it also contains names and CVV or CVC codes (the three- or four- digit security codes commonly found on the signature stripe of a credit card). 73. This SPI and PII was compromised due to Defendant’s acts and omissions and its failure to properly protect the SPI and PII, despite being aware of recent data breaches impacting other national restaurant chains, including P.F. Chang’s, Arby’s, Chipotle, Wendy’s, Chili’s, and other prominent national restaurant chains. 74. In addition to Defendant’s failure to prevent the Data Breach, Defendant also failed to detect the breach for nearly ten months. 75. Intruders, therefore, had months to collect SPI and PII unabated. During this time, Defendant failed to recognize its systems had been breached and that intruders were stealing data on millions of payment cards. Timely action by Defendant likely would have significantly reduced the consequences of the breach. Instead, Defendant took more than ten months to realize its systems had been breached, and thus contributed to the scale of the Data Breach and the resulting damages to Plaintiffs and Class members. 77. While many merchants and vendors have responded to recent data breaches by adopting technology and security practices that help make transactions and stored data more secure, Defendant failed to do so. 78. The Data Breach was caused and enabled by Defendant’s knowing violation of its obligations to abide by best practices and industry standards in protecting SPI and PII. G. The Data Breach Caused Harm and Will Result in Additional Fraud 79. Without detailed disclosures to Defendant’s customers, Plaintiffs and Class members were unknowingly and unwittingly left exposed to continued misuse and ongoing risk of misuse of their SPI and PII for up to ten months without being able to take necessary precautions to prevent imminent harm. 80. Plaintiffs have employed extraordinary lengths to protect their identity and maintain their privacy. 81. Prior to the Data Breach, Plaintiffs routinely reviewed their financial statements, and the credit card at issue had not been compromised. 82. Plaintiffs routinely monitored their credit for unusual activity and had not received any indication that their credit card was breached or otherwise compromised. 83. Plaintiffs never transmit unencrypted SPI or PII over the internet or any other unsecured source. 85. Thus, given that before the Data Breach, Plaintiffs’ credit card had not experienced any prior form of breach or compromise, and they undertook substantial efforts to protect their financial information—including SPI and PII—Defendant’s Data Breach is the source of Plaintiffs’ damages and injuries described in this Complaint. 86. But for Defendant’s Data Breach, Plaintiffs’ credit cards would not have been breached or compromised, and their damages would not have occurred. 87. The ramifications of Defendant’s failure to keep Plaintiff’s and Class members’ data secure are severe and far reaching. 88. Consumer victims of data breaches are more likely to become victims of identity fraud. This conclusion is based on an analysis of four years of data that correlated each year’s data breach victims with those who also reported being victims of identity fraud.41 89. The FTC defines identity theft as “a fraud committed or attempted using the identifying information of another person without authority.”42 The FTC describes “identifying information” as “any name or number that may be used, alone or in conjunction with any other information, to identify a specific person.”43 90. SPI and PII are valuable commodities to identity thieves once the information has been compromised. As the FTC recognizes, once identity thieves have SPI and PII, “they can drain your bank account, run up your credit cards, open new utility accounts, or get medical treatment on your health insurance.”44 41 2014 LexisNexis True Cost of Fraud Study, https://www.lexisnexis.com/risk/downloads/assets/true-cost-fraud-2014.pdf. A. Plaintiffs’ Transactions

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2.0 guidelines; c. Regularly test user accessibility by blind or vision-impaired persons to ensure that Defendant’s Website complies under the WCAG 2.1 guidelines; and, d. Develop an accessibility policy that is clearly disclosed on Defendant’s Websites, with contact information for users to report accessibility-related problems. 20. Defendant is a Bitcoin investment company, and owns and operates the website, www.river.com (its “Website”), offering features which should allow all consumers to access the goods and services and which Defendant ensures the delivery of such goods throughout the United States, including New York State. 21. Defendant operates and distributes its products throughout the United States, including New York. 22. Defendant offers the commercial website, www.river.com, to the public. The website offers features which should allow all consumers to access the goods and services whereby Defendant allows for the delivery of those ordered goods to consumers throughout the United States, including New York State. The goods and services offered by Defendant include, but are not limited to the following: the ability to browse Bitcoin services for purchase, view careers, obtain defendant’s contact information, and related goods and services available online. 24. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient JAWS screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using the JAWS screen-reader. 25. During Plaintiff’s visits to the Website, the last occurring in May 2021, Plaintiff encountered multiple access barriers that denied Plaintiff full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services offered to the public and made available to the public; and that denied Plaintiff the full enjoyment of the facilities, goods and services of the Website. 26. While attempting to navigate the Website, Plaintiff encountered multiple accessibility barriers for blind or visually-impaired people that include, but are not limited to, the following: 28. Empty Links That Contain No Text causing the function or purpose of the link to not be presented to the user. This can introduce confusion for keyboard and screen- reader users; 29. Redundant Links where adjacent links go to the same URL address which results in additional navigation and repetition for keyboard and screen-reader users; and 30. Linked Images Missing Alt-text, which causes problems if an image within a link contains no text and that image does not provide alt-text. A screen reader then has no content to present the user as to the function of the link, including information contained in PDFs. 32. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s Website, blind and visually-impaired customers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, products, and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from visiting the Website, presently and in the future. 33. These access barriers on Defendant’s Website have deterred Plaintiff from learning about those various Bitcoin services for purchase, and enjoying them equal to sighted individuals because: Plaintiff was unable to determine and or purchase items from its Website, among other things. 34. If the Website was equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 36. Because simple compliance with the WCAG 2.1 Guidelines would provide Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers with equal access to the Website, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including but not limited to the following policies or practices: a. Constructing and maintaining a website that is inaccessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; b. Failure to construct and maintain a website that is sufficiently intuitive so as to be equally accessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; and, c. Failing to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind and visually-impaired consumers, such as Plaintiff, as a member of a protected class. 37. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 38. The ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks in this action. In relevant part, the ADA requires: In the case of violations of . . . this title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities . . . Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the . . . modification of a policy . . . 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 40. If the Website was accessible, Plaintiff and similarly situated blind and visually- impaired people could independently view service items, shop for and otherwise research related goods and services available via the Website. 41. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 43. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 44. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services, during the relevant statutory period. 45. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks certify a New York State subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the State of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of those services, during the relevant statutory period. 46. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered, during the relevant statutory period. 48. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class. The Class, similarly to the Plaintiff, are severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA, NYSYRHL or NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so either can be independently accessible to the Class. 49. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class Members because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the Class Members. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. 51. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 52. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 53. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 54. Defendant’s Website is a public accommodations within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). The Website is a service that is offered to the general public, and as such, must be equally accessible to all potential consumers. 55. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 57. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 58. The acts alleged herein constitute violations of Title III of the ADA, and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Plaintiff, who is a member of a protected class of persons under the ADA, has a physical disability that substantially limits the major life activity of sight within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1)(A)-(2)(A). Furthermore, Plaintiff has been denied full and equal access to the Website, has not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and has been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled persons. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 59. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 61. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 62. Defendant’s Website and its’ sale of goods to the general public, constitute sales establishments and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant. 63. Defendant is subject to New York Human Rights Law because it owns and operates its Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 64. Defendant is violating N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 65. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(i), unlawful discriminatory practice includes, among other things, “a refusal to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless such person can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations being offered or would result in an undue burden". 67. Readily available, well-established guidelines exist on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other large business entities and government agencies in making their website accessible, including but not limited to: adding alt-text to graphics and ensuring that all functions can be performed using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make its Website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 68. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the class on the basis of a disability in violation of the NYSHRL, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 70. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Defendant’s Website under § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the Sub-Class Members will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 71. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 72. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 73. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 74. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 75. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 76. Plaintiff served notice thereof upon the attorney general as required by N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41. 78. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) provides that “no person because of . . . disability, as such term is defined in section two hundred ninety-two of executive law, be subjected to any discrimination in his or her civil rights, or to any harassment, as defined in section 240.25 of the penal law, in the exercise thereof, by any other person or by any firm, corporation or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision.” 79. Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant and its Website which offers such goods and services to the general public is required to be equally accessible to all. 80. Defendant is subject to New York Civil Rights Law because it owns and operates their Website, and Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Civil Law § 40-c(2). 81. Defendant is violating N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website and the goods and services integrated with such Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 83. Under NY Civil Rights Law § 40-d, “any person who shall violate any of the provisions of the foregoing section, or subdivision three of section 240.30 or section 240.31 of the penal law, or who shall aid or incite the violation of any of said provisions shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby in any court of competent jurisdiction in the county in which the defendant shall reside ...” 84. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 85. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability are being directly or indirectly refused, withheld from, or denied the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof in § 40 et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. 86. Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages of five hundred dollars per instance, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Civil Law § 40 et seq. for each and every offense. 88. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 89. Defendant’s Website is a sales establishment and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9). 90. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates its Website, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 91. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with such Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, products, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 93. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the Sub- Class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 94. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 95. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of its Website under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 96. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 98. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 99. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. DECLARATORY RELIEF 100. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class and New York State and City Sub- Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 101. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies, that its Website contains access barriers denying blind customers the full and equal access to the products, services and facilities of its Website, which Defendant owns, operations and controls, fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182, et seq., N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, et seq., and N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. 102. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. Defendant’s Barriers on Its Website VIOLATION OF THE NEW YORK STATE CIVIL RIGHTS LAW VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE NYSHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL

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10. This matter is properly maintainable as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) in that: (a) The Putative Class, which potentially includes in excess of sixty persons, is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (b) There are substantial questions of law and fact common to the Putative Class; (c) The claims of the representative parties are typical of the claims of the Putative Class; and (d) The representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Putative Class. 12. The case is properly maintainable as a class action pursuant to Fed. R Civ. P. 23(b)(3), in that questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual class members, and a class action is superior to other methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy. 13. The relief sought in this action will effectively provide relief to all of the class members. 14. There are no unusual difficulties foreseen in the management of this class action. 18. Once Defendant had granted an application in the exercise of its discretion, its Streets Department was required to erect a sign at the location of the exclusive electric vehicle parking space, designating it as such. 19. After the adoption of Section 12-1131, and in reliance thereon, Plaintiffs and the members of the Putative Class each took a series of steps in order to apply for approval of a reserved electric vehicle parking space. 20. Plaintiffs and members of the Putative Class each applied to the Philadelphia Parking Authority ("PP A") for approval of a designated electric vehicle parking space, paid all fees associated with such applications, and submitted all materials in support of their respective applications as required by the PPA and Section 12-1131, including but not limited to proof that an electric vehicle had been purchased or leased and registered with the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation to a resident of each of their respective homes. 22. By installing the curbside electrical vehicle chargers, solely at their own cost and expense, Plaintiffs and the Putative Class made substantial improvements upon public property. 23. In response to the respective applications of the Plaintiffs and the Putative Class, the PPA granted its approval for the exclusively reserved, designated electric vehicle parking spaces, and Plaintiffs and the members of the Putative Class thus obtained such a parking space at their place of residence, all in conformity with Section 12-1131. 24. On or about April 6, 2017, the City, through City Council, and without due process to the Plaintiffs or members of the Putative Class, passed Bill No. 170093-A, which amended Section 12-1131 by imposing a "moratorium on new electric vehicle parking spaces, under certain terms and conditions." The amendment further changed Section 12-1131 ( c ), providing that instead of the Streets Department posting signs at the existing approved electric parking spaces that prohibited all parking in such spaces by non-electric vehicles, the signs to be posted at the spaces now only reserved those spaces for the use of electric vehicles during the hours from 6:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. Pursuant to the amendment, City Council further provided that the signs were to specifically indicate that non-electric vehicles were permitted to park in the previously exclusively-reserved spaces for two hours at a time during the hours from 6:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. 26. The City thus amended Section 12-1131, depriving each Plaintiff and member of the Putative Class of the exclusively-reserved electric vehicle parking spaces which they had previously obtained upon application and compliance \vith the City's ordinance, and upon expending substantial funds in furtherance of such applications. Instead, under the revised version of Section 12-1131, for twelve hours of every day, non-electric vehicles are now permitted to occupy the parking spaces that were previously exclusively designated for electric vehicles, thus depriving Plaintiffs and the Putative Class of access to their electrical vehicle chargers. 27. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate the above paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 28. Each Plaintiff and member of the Putative Class applied for a reserved electric vehicle parking space according to the process and standards established and required by the City, as articulated in Section 12-1131, before it was subsequently amended. 29. In so doing, each Plaintiff and Putati,,e Class member expended substantial sums of money so as to comply with the requirements of Section 12-1131, and made substantial improvements upon public property. 30. Pursuant to Section 12-1131, the City approved the application of each Plaintiff and Putative Class member and designated a reserved electric vehicle parking space in close proximity to their respective homes. 32. By unilaterally amending Section 12-1131 so as to allow non-electric vehicles to park in the parking spaces that previously were reserved exclusively for electric vehicles, Defendant has unlawfully deprived each Plaintiff and the Putative Class members of his or her protectable property interest without due process. 33. Defendant's amendment to Section 12-1131 reflects its policy, practice, procedure and/or custom, and exhibits deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of Plaintiffs and the Putative Class. 34. Defendant's actions violated Plaintiffs' and the Putative Class's constitutional due process rights and have caused them injury. 35. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate the above paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 36. Defendant's actions have operated to treat Plaintiffs and the Putative Class differently than other similarly situated persons. 37. There is no permissible basis for Defendant's arbitrary and capricious discrimination toward and against Plaintiffs and the Putative Class. 38. Defendant's actions violated the constitutional equal protection rights of Plaintiffs and the Putative Class, and caused injury to each of them. 40. Plaintiffs and the Putative Class have made substantial improvements upon public property. 41. Defendant appreciated or had knowledge of the benefit conferred upon it by Plaintiffs and the Putative Class. 42. By stripping Plaintiffs and the Putative Class of their exclusively reserved electric vehicle parking spaces after they had expended substantial funds installing the electrical charging stations servicing those spaces, Defendant has caused Plaintiffs and the Putative Class to lose the benefit and value of their respective investments in the charging stations, and the improvements they have made upon public property. 43. At the same time, Defendant unjustly has gained the value of and been enriched by these improvements. 44. Plaintiffs and the Putative Class have been injured by Defendant's actions in this regard.

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12. Plaintiff seeks to bring this suit to recover from Defendants unpaid overtime compensation, and liquidated damages, pursuant to the applicable provisions of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), individually, on his own behalf, as well as on behalf of those in the following collective: Current and former drivers, who during the applicable FLSA limitations period, performed any work for Defendants, and who consent to file a claim to recover damages for overtime compensation that is legally due to them (“FLSA Plaintiffs”). 13. Defendants treated Plaintiff and all FLSA Plaintiffs similarly in that Plaintiff and all FLSA Plaintiffs: (1) performed similar tasks, as described in the “Background Facts” section below; (2) were subject to the same laws and regulations; (3) were paid in the same or similar manner; (4) were required to work in excess of forty hours in a workweek; and (5) were not paid the required one and one-half times their respective regular rates of pay for all hours worked per workweek in excess of forty. 15. Thus, all FLSA Plaintiffs are victims of Defendants’ pervasive practice of willfully refusing to pay their employees overtime compensation for all hours worked per workweek above forty, in violation of the FLSA. 16. Defendant Settembre Limo is a New York-based transportation company, which shuttles passengers to and from Westchester Airport, Newark Liberty International Airport, LaGuardia Airport, and John F. Kennedy International Airport, and also provides transportation services between other non-airport destinations in various states, including New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut. 17. In September 2016, Defendant Settembre, on behalf of Defendant Settembre Limo, hired Plaintiff as a driver. Plaintiff commenced his employment with Defendants in that role at that time. 18. As a driver, Plaintiff’s primary duties consisted of driving Defendants’ clients in town cars with a maximum capacity of five passengers, and luxury four-door sedans also with a maximum capacity of five passengers, from and to various destinations throughout New York, Connecticut, and New Jersey, and occasionally other locations. Primarily, Plaintiff drove Defendants’ clients between airport and non-airport locations, and also on fixed routes that Defendants assigned. Plaintiff also drove Defendants’ clients in buses and stretch limousines when Defendants required him to do so. 20. By way of example only, during the week of October 7 through October 13, 2016, Defendants required Plaintiff to work, and Plaintiff did work, the following schedule, without scheduled or uninterrupted breaks: Friday, October 7, 2016: 8:00 a.m. until 12:30 a.m. the following day. Saturday, October 8, 2016: 11:30 a.m. until 3:30 a.m. the following day. Sunday, October 9, 2016: 3:30 p.m. until 1:30 a.m. the following day. Monday, October 10, 2016: Off Tuesday, October 11, 2016: 4:15 a.m. until 6:15 p.m. Wednesday, October 12, 2016: Off Thursday October 13, 2016: 9:00 a.m. until 8:30 p.m. Thus, adding up the hours for this representative workweek, Plaintiff worked sixty-eight hours. 22. For each workweek that Plaintiff worked, Defendants paid Plaintiff a varying rate based on the assignments given and their duration, but failed to pay Plaintiff at any rate whatsoever for the hours that Plaintiff worked each week beyond forty. Defendants determined the rate that they paid Plaintiff based upon the vehicle that Plaintiff drove and the number of hours that Plaintiff reported for each trip. 23. Additionally, Defendants permitted Plaintiff to keep tips received in cash from passengers, if passengers did in fact give him cash. Defendants, however, failed to provide Plaintiff with any tips that passengers paid directly to Defendants by credit card. 24. By way of example only, for the weekly pay period of October 7 through October 13, 2016, when Plaintiff worked a total of sixty-eight hours, Defendants paid Plaintiff $600.00 based on the twelve jobs that he performed that week, and Plaintiff received approximately $200.00 in cash tips from passengers. Accordingly, Defendants paid Plaintiff a total of $800, which was meant to cover only his first forty hours of work per week, and which amounts to a regular rate of $20.00. Defendants did not pay Plaintiff at any rate, let alone at the rate of time and one-half his regular rate of pay, or $30.00 per hour, for any hour that Plaintiff worked that week in excess of forty. 26. Defendants paid Plaintiff on a weekly basis. 27. On each occasion when they paid Plaintiff, Defendants failed to provide Plaintiff with a wage statement that accurately listed, inter alia, his actual hours worked for that week, or his straight and overtime rates of pay for all hours worked. 28. Additionally, Defendants did not provide Plaintiff with a wage notice at the time of his hire that accurately contained, inter alia, Plaintiff’s rates of pay as designated by the employer. 29. Defendants treated Plaintiff and all FLSA Plaintiffs in the manner described above. 30. Defendants acted in the manner described herein so as to maximize their profits while minimizing their labor costs and overhead. 31. Each hour that Plaintiff and FLSA Plaintiffs worked was for Defendants’ benefit. 32. Plaintiff and FLSA Plaintiffs repeat, reiterate, and re-allege each and every allegation set forth above with the same force and effect as if more fully set forth herein. 33. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a) requires employers to compensate their employees at a rate not less than one and one-half times their regular rate of pay for all hours worked exceeding forty in a workweek. 35. As also described above, Plaintiff and FLSA Plaintiffs worked in excess of forty hours per week, yet Defendants failed to compensate Plaintiff and FLSA Plaintiffs in accordance with the FLSA’s overtime provisions. 36. Defendants willfully violated the FLSA. 37. Plaintiff and FLSA Plaintiffs are entitled to overtime pay for all hours worked per week in excess of forty at the rate of one and one-half times their respective regular rates of pay. 38. Plaintiff and FLSA Plaintiffs are also entitled to liquidated damages and attorneys’ fees for Defendants’ violation of the FLSA’s overtime provisions. 39. Plaintiff, and any FLSA Plaintiff that opts in to this action, repeat, reiterate, and re-allege each and every allegation set forth above with the same force and effect as if more fully set forth herein. 40. NYLL § 160 and 12 NYCCRR § 142-2.2 require employers to compensate their employees at a rate not less than one and one-half times their regular rates of pay for all hours worked exceeding forty in a workweek. 41. As described above, Defendants are employers within the meaning of the NYLL and the NYCCRR, while Plaintiff, and any FLSA Plaintiff that opts in to this action, are employees within the meaning of the NYLL and the NYCCRR. 43. Plaintiff, and any FLSA Plaintiff that opts in to this action, are entitled to their overtime pay for all hours worked per week in excess of forty at the rate of one and one-half times their respective regular rates of pay. 44. Plaintiff, and any FLSA Plaintiff that opts in to this action, are also entitled to liquidated damages, interest, and attorneys’ fees for Defendants’ violations of the NYLL’s and NYCCRR’s overtime provisions. 45. Plaintiff, and any FLSA Plaintiff that opts in to this action, repeat, reiterate, and re-allege each and every allegation set forth above with the same force and effect as if more fully set forth herein. 46. NYLL §196-d requires employers to allow employees to retain all tips received by the employee, individually, or in a valid tip pooling arrangement limited to employees who customarily and regularly receive tips. 47. As described above, Defendants are employers within the meaning of the NYLL, while Plaintiff, and any FLSA Plaintiff that opts in to this action is an employee within the meaning of the NYLL. 48. As also described above, Defendants’ customers often charged gratuities by credit card that were intended for Plaintiff, and any FLSA Plaintiff that opts in to this action, yet Defendants retained these tips for their own use. 50. Plaintiff, and any FLSA Plaintiff that opts in to this action, are also entitled to liquidated damages, interest, and attorneys’ fees for Defendants’ violations of NYLL § 196-d. Failure to Distribute Tips in Violation of the NYLL Unpaid Overtime under the FLSA Unpaid Overtime Under the NYLL and the NYCCRR

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12. On January 17, 2014, Capital Funds transmitted a Junk Fax to Barron’s and to thousands of other entities throughout the United States (the “Junk Fax”). A copy of the Junk Fax is attached as Exhibit 1. 13. At no time did Barron’s give Capital Funds its express prior invitation or permission, or prior consent in any fashion, for the transmission of the Barron’s Junk Fax. 14. The Barron’s Junk Fax did not contain a Compliant Opt Out Notice. 16. Al Peters was an agent, employee or representative of Capital Funds at the time he sent the Junk Faxes at issue to Barron’s. Al Peters acted with actual, implied or apparent authority from Capital Funds to transmit the Junk Faxes to Barron’s. At all relevant times, Peters acted pursuant to Capital Funds’s control and instruction. In addition to its own direct liability, Capital Funds is liable for the actions of Al Peters based on the doctrines of vicarious liability, respondeat superior, agency, authority, ratification and other doctrines. 17. Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and on behalf of a class of all other persons or entities similarly situated throughout the United States. 18. Through the transmission of generic facsimile advertisements promoting their services, Capital Funds has engaged in widespread advertising via unsolicited facsimile transmission in violation of the TCPA. 19. Based on the generic style of the facsimile advertisement and the standard telemarketing reach of a Junk Fax campaign, Capital Funds has likely transmitted unsolicited facsimile advertisements to tens of thousands of recipients throughout the United States. In fact, the facsimile advertising campaign of Capital Funds has generated a number of internet complaints. See http://800notes.com/Phone.aspx/1-866-767-4447 (Last visited May 27, 2014). 20. Capital Funds did not obtain the consent of facsimile recipients prior to the transmission of facsimile advertisements. 22. To the extent facsimile advertisements were transmitted by Capital Funds to consumers who had given consent, or had an established business relationship with Capital Funds, of which there is no evidence at this time, the facsimile advertisements are still in violation of the TCPA as they did not contain the Compliant Opt Out Notice required by law. 23. The class of persons represented by Plaintiff is composed of all persons or entities within the United States to whom Capital Funds sent facsimile advertisements promoting Capital Funds and its services at any time within four years prior to the filing of the instant Complaint. 24. The class as defined above is identifiable by phone records, fax transmittal records, and fax number databases, used by Capital Funds or its agents, in transmitting its unsolicited facsimile advertisements. On information and belief, the potential class members number in the thousands and constitutes a class so numerous that joinder of all class members is impracticable. The Plaintiff is a member of the class. 25. There are questions of law and fact common to Plaintiff and to the proposed class, including but not limited to the following: a. Whether Capital Funds violated the TCPA, and FCC promulgating regulations, by engaging in illegal fax advertising; b. Whether the facsimiles sent by Capital Funds to class members constitute unsolicited advertisements; and c. Whether the Plaintiff and the members of the class are entitled to statutory damages as a result of Capital Funds’s actions. 27. Plaintiff is an adequate representative of the class because its interests do not conflict with the interests of the class, it will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class, and it is represented by counsel skilled and experienced in class actions. 28. Common questions of law and fact predominate over questions affecting only individual members of the class, and a class action is the superior method for fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. The only individual question concerns identification of class members, which will be ascertainable from records maintained by Capital Funds and/or its agents. 29. The likelihood that individual members of the class will prosecute separate actions is remote due to the time and expense necessary to conduct such litigation. 30. Plaintiff is not aware of any litigation concerning this controversy already commenced by others who meet the criteria for class membership described above. 31. Plaintiff is capable of and willing to represent the other members of the class. 32. Plaintiff incorporates the allegations from all previous paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 33. Capital Funds, or its agents, caused unsolicited facsimile advertisements to be sent to Plaintiff and to the facsimile machines of other members of the class, in violation of the TCPA and the FCC’s promulgating regulations. 35. By causing unsolicited facsimile advertisements to be sent to the Plaintiff and the class, Capital Funds caused Plaintiff and class members to sustain property damage and cost in the form of paper and toner. 36. By causing unsolicited facsimile advertisements to be sent to the Plaintiff and the class, Capital Funds interfered with Plaintiff’s and class members’ use of their property as Plaintiff’s and class members’ facsimile machines were encumbered by the transmission of Capital Funds’s unsolicited facsimile advertisements. 37. By causing unsolicited facsimile advertisements to be sent to the Plaintiff and the class, Capital Funds caused the facsimile machines of Plaintiff and class members to be encumbered by the transmission of unsolicited facsimiles. 38. Capital Funds failed to provide the requisite Opt Out Notice on its advertisements informing the recipient of their right to cease receiving such advertisements and a cost free mechanism to make such request. 39. Failure to provide Opt Out Notice on a facsimile advertisement is a separate and distinct violation of the TCPA. 40. The TCPA provides for statutory damages in the amount of a minimum of $500 for each separate violation of the TCPA. The damages suffered by the Plaintiff and the class it seeks to represent are negligent or willful. 41. Plaintiff incorporates the allegations from all previous paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 43. The Plaintiff, acting on behalf of the Class, respectfully petitions the Court to order Capital Funds to immediately cease engaging in unsolicited facsimile advertising in violation of the TCPA.

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19. Chartered in 1821, The George Washington University has a current enrollment of approximately 28,000 undergraduate and graduate students across 10 schools and colleges. 20. As of June 30, 2019, Defendant’s endowment totaled approximately $1.779 billion and the university ended the fiscal year with assets totaling more than $4.748 billion. Defendant collected $774.143 million in student tuition and fees (net of $333,821 university funded scholarships)—a $21.2 million increase from the year before—with Defendant’s total operating revenues totaling $1.546 billion. 21. In July 2017, Defendant announced the final results of its largest ever fundraising campaign—“Making History: The Campaign for GW”—through which nearly 67,000 donors contributed more than $1.02 billion to the university. During the campaign, GW raised: (1) more than $177 million to support students, including 128 new endowments for student financial aid; (2) more than $626 million to enhance academics, including 23 new endowed faculty positions; (3) more than $163 million for facilities; and (4) an additional $57 million in unrestricted funds to address other university needs. 52. Plaintiff sues under Rule 23(a), (b)(5), and Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, on behalf of himself and a Class defined as follows: All people paying Defendant, in whole or in part, personally and/or on behalf of others, for Spring 2020 tuition, fees, and/or room board for in-person instruction and use of campus facilities, but who were denied use of and/or access to in-person instruction and/or campus facilities by Defendant. Excluded from the Class is Defendant, any entity in which Defendant has a controlling interest, and Defendant’s legal representatives, predecessors, successors, assigns, and employees. Further excluded from the Class is this Court and its employees. Plaintiff reserves the right to modify or amend the Class definition including through the creation of sub-classes if necessary, as appropriate, during this litigation. 53. The definition of the Class is unambiguous. Plaintiff is a member of the Class Plaintiff seeks to represent. Class Members can be notified of the class action through contact information and/or address lists maintained in the usual course of business by Defendant. 54. Per Rule 23(a)(1), Class Members are so numerous and geographically dispersed that their individual joinder of all Class Members is impracticable. The precise number of Class members is unknown to Plaintiff but may be ascertained from Defendant’s records, however, given the thousands of students enrolled at Defendant in a given year, that number greatly exceeds the number to make joinder possible. Class Members may be notified of the pendency of this action by recognized, Court-approved notice dissemination methods, which may include U.S. Mail, electronic mail, Internet postings, and/or published notice. 65. Plaintiff restates and re-alleges, and incorporates herein by reference, the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 66. Plaintiff and the Class Members entered into identical, binding contracts with Defendant. 67. Under their contracts with Defendant, Plaintiff and the members of the Class paid Defendant tuition, fees, and/or room and board charges for Defendant to provide in-person instruction, access to Defendant’s facilities, and/or housing services. 68. Plaintiff and the Class Members have fulfilled all expectations, having paid Defendant for all Spring 2020 term financial assessments. 72. Plaintiff restates and re-alleges, and incorporates herein by reference, the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 73. At all times relevant hereto, Plaintiff and the Class Members directly conferred non-gratuitous benefits on Defendant, i.e., monetary payments for tuition, fees, and/or room and board, so that students could avail themselves of in-person educational opportunities and utilize campus facilities, including campus dormitories. 74. Defendant knowingly accepted the benefits conferred upon it by Plaintiff and the Class Members. 75. Defendant appreciated or knew of the non-gratuitous benefits conferred upon it by Plaintiff and members of the Class. 79. Plaintiff restates and re-alleges, and incorporates herein by reference, the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 80. Plaintiff and the other members of the Class have an undisputed right to receive educational services, activities, and access Defendant’s facilities for the Spring 2020 term. Plaintiff and the Class Members obtained such rights by paying Defendant tuition, fees, and/or room and board and by otherwise remaining in good standing with Defendant. 81. Defendant wrongfully exercised control over and/or intentionally interfered with the rights of Plaintiff and members of the Class by effectively closing its campus to in-person education and switching to an online-only format, discontinuing paid-for services, and evicting students from campus housing. All the while, Defendant has unlawfully retained the monies Plaintiff and the Class Members paid Defendant as well as barred Plaintiff from Defendant’s facilities. A. Background A.  Background ..............................................................................................................5  B.  The Novel Coronavirus Shutdowns And Defendant’s Campus Closure .................7  C.  Defendant’s Refusal To Issue Tuition And Fee Refunds ......................................12  V.  BREACH OF CONTRACT CONVERSION UNJUST ENRICHMENT VI.  CAUSES OF ACTION ......................................................................................................16  COUNT I BREACH OF CONTRACT.............................................................................16 

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15. Plaintiff’s telephone number, (985) 228-XXXX, is registered to a cellular telephone service. All calls to Plaintiff described herein were to that cellular telephone number. 16. Plaintiff’s telephone number, (985) 228-XXXX, has been on the National Do Not Call Registry since May 5, 2019. 17. The TCPA defines “automatic telephone dialing system,” or “ATDS,” as “equipment which has the capacity-(A) to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator; and (B) to dial such numbers.” 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1). 18. SLI initiated unauthorized telephone solicitations to the cellular phones of Plaintiff and other members of the Class using an ATDS and artificial or prerecorded voice messages to (1) advertise the availability of SLI’s loan products to Plaintiff and other members of the Class, (2) encourage Plaintiff and other members of the Class to apply for loan products offered by SLI, and (3) obtain applications for loan products offered by SLI from Plaintiff and other members of the Class. 20. Plaintiff did not give SLI his cellular telephone number or request information about a loan. 21. Plaintiff did not expressly consent in writing to receive SLI’s autodialed telemarketing calls to his cellular phone. A. November 19, 2019 Telemarketing Call 22. On November 19, 2019, at 3:45 p.m. (CST), Plaintiff received an unsolicited call on his cellular phone. 23. The November 19, 2019 call began with a distinctive pause and a “beep” or “click” after Plaintiff answered. Plaintiff said, “Hello?” and there was a pause and a “beep” or “click” before a pre-recorded voice message came on the line. 24. A pause followed by a “click” or “beep” is evidence of the caller’s use of a predictive dialer, which uses an algorithm to “predict” when telemarketing agents will be available to field the call. See 2003 Order, 18 FCC Rcd. at 14022, n. 31. (in 2003, the FCC expressed growing concern about the proliferation of predictive dialing systems that use “a complex set of algorithms to automatically dial consumers’ telephone numbers in a manner that predicts the time when a consumer will answer the phone and the telemarketer will be available to take the call.”). 26. Pursuant to the instructions outlined in the pre-recorded voice message, Plaintiff “pressed nine” to be placed on SLI’s internal do not call list and the call automatically disconnected. B. November 21, 2019 Telemarketing Call 27. On November 21, 2019, at 10:14 a.m. (CST), Plaintiff received another unsolicited call on his cellular phone. 28. The November 21, 2019 call began with a distinctive pause and a “beep” or “click” after Plaintiff answered. Plaintiff said, “Hello?” and there was a pause and a “beep” or “click” before a pre-recorded voice message came on the line. 29. This pause followed by the “click” or “beep” sound is evidence of the caller’s use of a predictive dialer. 30. The pre-recorded voice message identified the caller as a telemarketer calling on behalf of “Secure Lending Incorporated” and directed Plaintiff to “press one” to speak with an SLI representative or to “press nine” to be placed on SLI’s internal do not call list. 32. On November 25, 2019, at 10:10 a.m. (CST), Plaintiff received another unsolicited call on his cellular phone. 33. The November 25, 2019 call began with a distinctive pause and a “beep” or “click” after Plaintiff answered. Plaintiff said, “Hello?” and there was a pause and a “beep” or “click” before a pre-recorded voice message came on the line. 34. This pause followed by the “click” or “beep” sound is evidence of the caller’s use of a predictive dialer. 35. This pause followed by the “click” or “beep” sound is evidence of the caller’s use of a predictive dialer. 36. The pre-recorded voice message identified the caller as a telemarketer calling on behalf of “Secure Lending Incorporated” and directed Plaintiff to “press one” to speak with an SLI representative or to “press nine” to be placed on SLI’s internal do not call list. 38. On December 6, 2019, at 9:19 a.m. (CST), Plaintiff received another unsolicited call on his cellular phone. 39. The December 6, 2019 call began with a distinctive pause and a “beep” or “click” after Plaintiff answered. Plaintiff said, “Hello?” and there was a pause and a “beep” or “click” before a pre-recorded voice message came on the line. 40. This pause followed by the “click” or “beep” sound is evidence of the caller’s use of a predictive dialer. 41. The pre-recorded voice message identified the caller as a telemarketer calling on behalf of “Secure Lending Incorporated” and directed Plaintiff to “press one” to speak with an SLI representative or to “press nine” to be placed on SLI’s internal do not call list. 42. Pursuant to the instructions outlined in the pre-recorded voice message, Plaintiff “pressed nine” to be placed on SLI’s internal do not call list and the call automatically disconnected. E. January 2, 2020 Telemarketing Calls 44. The January 2, 2020 call began with a distinctive pause and a “beep” or “click” after Plaintiff answered. Plaintiff said, “Hello?” and there was a pause and a “beep” or “click” before a pre-recorded voice message came on the line. 45. This pause followed by the “click” or “beep” sound is evidence of the caller’s use of a predictive dialer. 46. The pre-recorded voice message identified the caller as a telemarketer calling on behalf of “Secure Lending Incorporated” and directed Plaintiff to “press one” to speak with an SLI representative or to “press nine” to be placed on SLI’s internal do not call list. 47. This time, however, eager to speak to an SLI representative regarding SLI’s refusal to honor his request to be placed on the internal do not call list , Plaintiff “pressed one” to speak with an SLI representative and was connected with an SLI employee named Rick Board. 48. During his telephone call with Mr. Board, Plaintiff stated that he never provided his consent to be contacted by SLI and expressly requested, for the fifth time, that he be placed on SLI’s do not call list. 50. Defendant’s purpose in making the calls was to sell its services to Plaintiff. 51. Plaintiff has never been a customer of Defendant. 52. Plaintiff did not provide prior express consent or prior express written consent to receive ATDS- generated calls and/or calls utilizing artificial or prerecorded voice messages from, or on behalf of, Defendant. 53. Defendant never disclosed to Plaintiff that it would use an ATDS-generated calls and/or calls utilizing artificial or prerecorded voice messages to contact him. 54. Defendant never disclosed to Plaintiff that he need not consent to receiving ATDS-generated calls and/or calls utilizing artificial or prerecorded voice messages in order to buy its products. 55. The calls from Defendant were not necessitated by an emergency. 56. All parties were in the United States during the calls. 58. SLI’s practice caused actual harm to Plaintiff and the other members of the Class in several ways, including temporarily using their cellular phones and tying up their phone lines, invading their privacy, causing wear and tear on their cellular phones, consuming battery life, and causing some of them to be charged for calls they did not want to receive. Moreover, these calls injured Plaintiff and the Class because they were frustrating, obnoxious, annoying, and a nuisance, and disturbed their solitude. 59. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and (b)(3), Plaintiff brings this action against SLI on behalf of himself and all other persons similarly situated, as members of two proposed classes or sub-classes. 60. For the first class, which concerns the receipt of pre-recorded voice message and ATDS telephone calls transmitted without prior express consent, Plaintiff proposes the following class definition: All persons in the United States (1) who received one or more advertising telephone calls, (2) to their mobile or cellular telephone number, (3) placed by or on behalf of SLI using an automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice, (4) on or after four years before the filing of the complaint, and (5) without their prior express written consent. 62. Excluded from the class are SLI, any entity in which SLI has a controlling interest, each of their respective officers or legal representatives, and any Judge assigned to this action, including his or her immediate family. 63. The Class is so numerous that joinder of all its members is impracticable. The automated technology SLI used to call Plaintiffs cell phone is capable of contacting thousands of people a day, which makes its very likely that the potential class members number in the hundreds or thousands, at least. Individual joinder of so many persons is impracticable and disposition of the claims of the Class in a single action will provide substantial benefits to all parties and the Court. 64. The proposed class members are identifiable through phone records, internal call logs, and phone number databases. 65. Plaintiff is a member of the proposed classes or sub-classes. 67. Plaintiff’s claims are based on the same facts and legal theories as the claims of all class members and therefore are typical of the claims of class members. Plaintiff and the other class members all received telephone calls to their cellular telephone lines through the same or similar dialing system, utilizing the same artificial or prerecorded voice message, and the same system for receiving, logging, and implementing requests to be placed on SLI’s internal do not call list. As such, Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the Class, because his claims and those of the Class arise out of the same course of conduct by Defendant and are based on the same legal and remedial theories. 69. Defendant has engaged in a common course of conduct toward Plaintiff and members of the Class. The common issues arising from this conduct that affect Plaintiff and members of the Class predominate over any individual issues. For example, the FCPA’s statutory damages obviate the need for mini-trials on actual damages. Adjudication of these common issues in a single action has important advantages, including judicial economy. 70. Common questions of fact and law predominate over questions affecting only individual class members, and a class action is the superior method for fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. The only individual questions concern identification of class members, which will be ascertainable from records maintained by SLI or their agents. 72. The likelihood that individual class members will prosecute separate actions is remote because individual litigation of the claims of all class members is economically unfeasible and procedurally impracticable given the expense involved and the small recoveries available through individual actions. Only one out of every seven million robocalls results in the filing of a federal TCPA lawsuit. Compare Herb Weisbaum, It’s Not Just You—Americans Received 30 Billion Robocalls Last Year, NBC News (Feb. 1, 2020), https://www.nbcnews.com/business/consumer/it-s-not-just-you-americans-received-30-billion- robocalls-n838406 (30.5 billion robocalls), with WebRecon, WebRecon Stats for December 2019 & Year in Review (last visited Feb. 1, 2020), https://webrecon.com/webrecon-stats-for-dec-2019-and-year-in- review-how-did-your-favorite-statutes-fare/ (3267 TCPA complaints). Except to the extent TCPA violations are remedied by class actions, the overwhelming majority of communications made in violation of the TCPA are done so with impunity. 73. Defendant has acted on grounds generally applicable to the Class, thereby making final injunctive relief and corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the Class appropriate on a classwide basis. 75. Plaintiff incorporates all preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein and brings Count I individually and on behalf of the class. 76. The foregoing acts and omissions of SLI constitute numerous and multiple violations of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227, by making non-emergency calls to the cellular telephone numbers of Plaintiff and members of the class using an ATDS and/or artificial or prerecorded voice without the prior express written consent of the call recipients. 77. As a result of SLI’s violations of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227, Plaintiff and members of the class are entitled to an award of $500 in damages for each and every call made to their cellular telephone numbers using an ATDS or artificial or prerecorded voice in violation of the TCPA, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). 78. Plaintiff and members of the class are also entitled to, and do seek, injunctive relief prohibiting SLI from violating the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227, by making calls, except for emergency purposes, to cellular telephone numbers using an ATDS or artificial or prerecorded voice. IX. 79. Plaintiff incorporates all preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein and brings Count II individually and on behalf of the class. 80. As a result of knowing and/or willful violations of the TCPA by Defendant, its affiliates or agents, and/or other persons or entities acting on its behalf, Plaintiff and members of the Class are entitled to treble damages of up to $1,500 for each and every call made to their cellular phone numbers using an ATDS and/or artificial or prerecorded voice message in violation of the TCPA. VIOLATION OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT (47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq.)

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17. On April 9, 2018, Attorney Brian Shrive filed a state court lawsuit against the City of Cincinnati and five city council members alleging, in essence, that the council members violated the Case: 1:19-cv-00475-MRB Doc #: 1 Filed: 06/24/19 Page: 5 of 13 PAGEID #: 5 6 Ohio Open Meetings Act by conducting city business via a group text message chain. See State ex rel. Miller v. Sittenfeld, Ham. Cty. Com. Pl. No. A1801834. 18. After the lawsuit was filed, the City instructed the five council members to provide their cell phones to an outside digital forensics firm, Binary Intelligence, for copying. These cell phones were all the private property of the council members and were not provided to them by the City. The council members all purchased their cell phones out of their own pockets and paid for their monthly cell plans on their own not using any City funds. 19. Acting upon advice from their attorneys, the council members provided their cell phones to Binary Intelligence, which created full digital copies of all of the content on the phones for the period from January 1, 2018 to October 23, 2018. 20. Binary Intelligence downloaded all of the content from the council members’ phones, including all of their text messages, emails, social media content, pictures, voicemails, call logs, contacts, and apps for the period from January 1, 2018 to October 23, 2018. 21. Upon information and belief, Binary Intelligence provided the City law department with a digital copy of the cell phone downloads, but did not provide the council members themselves with copies of the content from their private cell phones. As a result, the council members do not have specific knowledge as to what content was taken from their phones. 22. Upon information and belief, the City law department maintains the digital copy of the council members’ private cell phones. 23. As part of the state court lawsuit, the City was instructed to provide text messages and emails to Mr. Shrive that were between the council members, but not other private people. The City in fact provided those messages. Case: 1:19-cv-00475-MRB Doc #: 1 Filed: 06/24/19 Page: 6 of 13 PAGEID #: 6 7 24. After the state court lawsuit was resolved, Mr. Shrive issued a new public records request to the City seeking additional content from the council members’ phones. This new, expanded request included communication from a whole host of private individuals to and with the council members and was not limited to communication about City business. Ironically, Mr. Shrive’s public records request was for the exact dates of the content downloaded by Binary Intelligence: January 1, 2018 through October 23, 2018. 25. Upon information and belief, the City law department reviewed the contents of the cell phones provided to it by Binary Intelligence. This review included text messages and emails sent to and by the council members on topics having nothing to do with City business. 26. Upon information and belief, the City law department provided text messages, emails, social media messages, and other communication to Mr. Shrive in response to his public records request that included John Doe 1, John Doe 2, and other private individuals’ private communication. No one from the City sought John Doe 1 or John Doe 2’s consent before providing their private communication to Mr. Shrive, nor did the City even provide notice to the John Does that it was in possession of their communication. 27. Upon information and belief, Mr. Shrive remains in possession of this communication. 28. Upon information and belief, Binary Intelligence also remains in possession of this communication. 29. John Doe 1 and John Doe 2 both communicated with council members during that time period about a range of topics having nothing to do with official City business. These topics included purely social and friendly matters like parties, sporting events, and neighborhood Case: 1:19-cv-00475-MRB Doc #: 1 Filed: 06/24/19 Page: 7 of 13 PAGEID #: 7 8 gatherings; matters of campaign strategy and political organizing protected by the First Amendment right of association; and political commentary about other governmental entities and officials outside the City of Cincinnati. 30. John Doe 1 and John Doe 2 communicated with the council members using the council members’ private cell phone numbers, private email accounts, and private, nongovernmental social media accounts. There was nothing about the manner in which John Doe 1 and John Doe 2 communicated that would have suggested to them or to anyone else that they were creating a public record subject to seizure, review, and dissemination to the public by the City. 31. Upon information and belief, hundreds of individuals’ private communication with the council members remains in the possession of the City. These people include doctors, lawyers, teachers, spouses, parents, children, family members, neighbors, friends, and members of the community at large, all of whom communicated with the council members not in their capacity as government officials, but in their capacity as private citizens. 32. The City had no probable cause to believe that John Doe 1, John Doe 2, and the class’s communication with the council members constituted a crime or was evidence of any crime. As such, the City had no basis for seizing the communication and has no basis for continuing to maintain and review it. 33. The fact that the City created and maintains digital copies of the council members’ phones is a matter of public record in the state court lawsuit. As a result, the City is likely to face additional public records requests for disclosure of communication from the phones, and each time they do so they will review the private communication of John Doe 1, John Doe 2, and the class to respond to the public records request. The invasion of the class privacy rights is therefore ongoing Case: 1:19-cv-00475-MRB Doc #: 1 Filed: 06/24/19 Page: 8 of 13 PAGEID #: 8 9 and potentially limitless. So long as the City maintains the cell phone content, John Doe 1, John Doe 2, and the class is subject to privacy invasions and violations of their First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment civil rights. 34. John Doe 1 and John Doe 2 are chilled in their ability to communicate with the council members and other public officials for fear that their private expression will be seized, cataloged, read, and released by the government. 35. Plaintiffs reallege each of the foregoing paragraphs as if fully rewritten here. 36. Plaintiffs have a protected right to communicate anonymously, to communicate privately, and to form political associations without interference by the government. These rights are protected by the First Amendment free expression and free association provisions. 37. The City of Cincinnati, acting in concert with Mr. Shrive and Binary Intelligence, have violated Plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights by collecting their private communication without cause or suspicion, maintaining their communication in the possession of the City law department, reviewing their communication without consent, and spying on their political associations, all without so much as providing notice or an opportunity to be heard. 38. To remedy these First Amendment violations, Plaintiffs seek monetary damages for this ongoing violation of their First Amendment rights, a declaration of unconstitutionality, and injunctive relief prohibiting the City of Cincinnati, Mr. Shrive, and Binary Intelligence from maintaining Plaintiffs’ private communication. Case: 1:19-cv-00475-MRB Doc #: 1 Filed: 06/24/19 Page: 9 of 13 PAGEID #: 9 10 Claim Two: Violation of Fourth Amendment Rights (against the City of Cincinnati) 39. Plaintiffs reallege each of the foregoing paragraphs as if fully rewritten here. 40. The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from warrantless searches and seizures by the government that are not supported by probable cause. 41. Here, the City of Cincinnati seized Plaintiffs’ private communication without probable cause to believe that communication was evidence of or connected to a crime. Even if the council members violated the law by meeting outside the constraints of the Open Meetings Act or by negligently deleting or destroying their communication with other council members, those activities by necessity do not and did not involve private citizens like Plaintiffs. 42. The City’s ongoing possession of Plaintiffs’ communication constitutes a daily, renewing violation of Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights. 43. To remedy these Fourth Amendment violations, Plaintiffs seek monetary damages for this ongoing violation of their Fourth Amendment rights, a declaration of unconstitutionality, and injunctive relief prohibiting the City of Cincinnati from maintaining Plaintiffs’ private communication. Claim Three: Violation of Fourteenth Amendment Rights (against the City of Cincinnati) 44. Plaintiffs reallege each of the foregoing paragraphs as if fully rewritten here. 45. Plaintiffs maintain a property interest in their private communication. 46. The City collected, copied, maintained, reviewed, and provided to the public Plaintiffs’ private communication without providing notice to Plaintiffs or an opportunity to be Case: 1:19-cv-00475-MRB Doc #: 1 Filed: 06/24/19 Page: 10 of 13 PAGEID #: 10 11 heard. The City in essence made decisions about Plaintiffs’ protected expression without even so much as consulting with Plaintiffs, much less providing them an opportunity to object, to seek legal counsel, or to participate in the public records process. 47. The City’s actions violate Plaintiffs’ procedural due process rights. 48. In addition, the Fourteenth Amendment protects Plaintiffs’ substantive due process rights, including the right of privacy and autonomy. Plaintiffs have a protected substantive due process rights in forming private relationships and in communicating privately within those relationships. 49. The City’s actions violate Plaintiffs’ substantive due process rights. 50. To remedy these Fourteenth Amendment violations, Plaintiffs seek monetary damages for this ongoing violation of their Fourteenth Amendment rights, a declaration of unconstitutionality, and injunctive relief prohibiting the City of Cincinnati from maintaining Plaintiffs’ private communication. Claim Four: Violation of the Ohio Constitution (against the City of Cincinnati) 51. Plaintiffs reallege each of the foregoing paragraphs as if fully rewritten here. 52. Plaintiffs plead each of the foregoing violations of the federal constitutional rights under the analogous provisions of the Ohio Constitution. Claim Five: Invasion of Privacy (against all Defendants) 53. Plaintiffs reallege each of the foregoing paragraphs as if fully rewritten here. Case: 1:19-cv-00475-MRB Doc #: 1 Filed: 06/24/19 Page: 11 of 13 PAGEID #: 11 12 54. Defendants are in possession of private communication and information about and belonging to Plaintiffs. This information relates entirely to Plaintiffs’ private lives, including their political associations, their friendships and relationships, their attitudes and beliefs, and their private activities. 55. Defendants disclosed this information publicly to their agents, employees, officials, and to one another. Upon information and belief, Defendant Shrive disclosed this information to members of the news media. 56. The seizure, downloading, review, recording, possession, and public dissemination of Plaintiffs’ private information by the government and its cohorts would shock the sensibilities of and would be highly objectionable to the average person. 57. The public dissemination of Plaintiffs’ private information was intentional, not accidental. 58. Plaintiffs’ private communication is not a matter of legitimate public concern. 59. To remedy the invasion of their privacy, Plaintiffs seek monetary damages and injunctive relief prohibiting all Defendants from disseminating Plaintiffs’ private communication. Claim One: Violation of First Amendment Rights (against the City of Cincinnati)

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40. Plaintiff brings this action individually and as a class action on behalf of all persons similarly situated and proximately damaged by Defendants’ conduct, including, but not necessarily limited to, the following Plaintiff Classes: FLSA Class: 41. The FLSA Class refers to all persons who are, or have been, employed as Salon Assistants at the Salons (to wit, salons known as “Jeffrey Stein” located at 1498 2nd Avenue, 2345 Broadway, 495 Columbus Avenue, and 250 Columbus Avenue, in New York County) who elect to opt-in to this action (the “FLSA Collective Plaintiffs”) from three (3) years prior to this action’s filing through the date of the final disposition. 43. At all relevant times, Defendants are aware and have been aware of the requirements to pay Plaintiff and FLSA Collective Plaintiffs minimum wage and, with respect to overtime, at an amount equal to the rate of one and one-half times their regular rates of pay for all hours worked each workweek above forty, yet they purposely chose not to do so. 44. Because Defendants unlawfully treated Plaintiff and FLSA Collective Plaintiffs as salaried employees, they failed to pay Plaintiff and FLSA Collective Plaintiffs federal minimum wage and refused to pay compensation for all hours worked per workweek above forty in violation of the FLSA. 45. The bi-weekly weekly sums paid to Plaintiff and FLSA Collective Plaintiffs were so low that they fell below federal minimum wage. 46. The FLSA Collective Plaintiffs are readily ascertainable. For purpose of notice and other purposes related to this action, their names and addresses are readily available from Defendants. 47. Plaintiffs and all similarly situated employees who elect to participate in this action seek unpaid compensation, unpaid overtime, an equal amount of liquidated damages and/or prejudgment interest, attorneys’ fees, and costs pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). The New York Class – Rule 23 Class Allegations: 48. The New York Class refers to all persons who are, or have been, employed as Salon Assistants at the Salons after the date that is six years before the filing of the Complaint in this case and the date of final judgment in this matter as defined herein (the “Class Period”). 50. The Defendants, their officers, and directors are excluded from the Classes, as well as all persons who will submit timely and otherwise proper requests for exclusion from the Rule 23 Class. 52. Upon information and belief, Defendants and other employers throughout the state violate the New York Labor Law. Current employees are often afraid to assert their rights out of fear of direct retaliation or indirect retaliation. Former employees are fearful of bringing claims because doing so can harm their employment, future employment and future efforts to secure employment. Class actions provide Rule 23 Class Members who are not named in the complaint a degree of anonymity which allows for the vindication of their rights while eliminating or reducing these risks. The foregoing factors and concerns are particularly applicable to immigrant low-wage workers in the beauty salon industry in New York City. 54. From July 24, 2009 to December 31, 2013, the New York minimum wage was $7.25 per hour. From January 1, 2014 to December 31, 2015, the New York minimum wage has been $8.00 per hour. From January 1, 2015 to present, the New York minimum wage has been $9.00. 55. At all relevant times, Defendants were not permitted to claim any tips or gratuities as part of Cabezas’ minimum wage because the amount of tips or gratuities received by Cabezas never exceeded the minimum amounts provided for under the New York State Department of Labor’s Minimum Wage Order for Miscellaneous Industries and Occupations (12 NYCRR § 142) required for an employer to claim a tip credit, and also because Defendants never provided Cabezas with written notice that Defendants would apply a tip credit or allowance toward minimum wage. 56. Defendants unlawfully and willfully misclassified Cabezas as an exempt salaried employee, and they provided her with no notice regarding her hourly rate of pay, despite the clear mandate of the New York Labor Law. 58. Upon information and belief, Defendants have been and continue to be employers engaged in interstate commerce and/or the production of goods for commerce, within the meaning of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(a) and 207(a). 59. At all relevant times, Defendants employed, and/or continue to employ, Plaintiffs and each of the FLSA Class members within the meaning of the FLSA. 60. At all relevant times, Defendants employed, and/or continue to employ, Plaintiff and each of the New York Class members within the meaning of the NYLL, §§ 2 and 651. 61. At all relevant times, Defendants have been Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ employers within the meaning of the FLSA and NYLL. 62. Defendants employ employees at their places of business in the activities of an enterprise engaged in commerce, including employees handling, selling or otherwise working on goods or materials that have been moved or produced for commerce. The enterprise has an annual gross volume of sales made or business done in an amount not less than $500,000. Therefore, the employees are employed in an enterprise engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section (3)(s)(1)(A) of the FLSA. 63. At all relevant times, the Jeffrey Stein Enterprise, and its constituent entities, were and continue to be an “enterprise engaged in commerce” within the meaning of the FLSA, operating a group of salons under different corporate names. 65. Plaintiff is informed and believes that the Jeffrey Stein Enterprise has remained constant over a period of years, continuing to the present, namely: (a) Ultimate control of the Salons is exercised by Mermelstein; (b) Though the Salons are titled in different corporate names, Mermelstein has a substantial ownership interest in each such entity; (c) All the Salons have the same name, website and logo; (d) Family members of Mermelstein have been active in the Jeffrey Stein Enterprise; (e) Each of the Defendants acted directly or indirectly in the interest of one another in relation to Plaintiffs. 66. Defendants each had either functional and/or formal control over terms and conditions of work and over the policies and practices with respect to the employment and compensation of Plaintiff. 67. Defendants employ or employed Plaintiff, and are or were Plaintiff’s employers and/or Class Members’ employers within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. 201 et seq. and the NYLL. 69. Upon information and belief, Defendants run the business of all of the Jeffrey Stein Enterprise as one operation, and Defendants’ operations were interrelated and united. 70. Defendants had the power to hire and fire Plaintiff, controlled the terms and conditions of employment, and determined the rate and method of any compensation in exchange for Plaintiff’s services. 71. Upon information and belief, Defendants knew or should have known of, and had the authority to exercise control over, the accuracy of records concerning the hours and wages of the Plaintiff and similarly situated employees. 82. The Representative Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the FLSA Class members, incorporate in this cause of action each and every allegation of the preceding paragraphs, with the same force and effect as though fully set forth herein. 84. As a result of the foregoing, the Representative Plaintiff demands judgment against Defendants on her own behalf, and on behalf of those FLSA Class Members similarly situated who file written consents to joinder in this action, for all unpaid wages, including minimum wage and overtime wages owed by Defendants to the Representative Plaintiff and the FLSA Class, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §§ 206 and 207, together with an award of an additional equal amount as liquidated damages, costs, interest, and reasonable attorneys’ fees, as provided for under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 85. Defendants’ violations of the FLSA were willful, thus the three year statute of limitations of 29 U.S.C. § 255 applies. 86. The Representative Plaintiff incorporates in this cause of action each and every allegation of the preceding paragraphs, with the same force and effect as though fully set forth herein. 87. At all relevant times hereto, the Defendants have been employers engaged in commerce, as defined under 29 U.S.C. § 203(b) and (d). Defendants employed members of the FLSA Class as Salon Assistants, employment positions which engaged the employees in commerce, as defined under 29 U.S.C. §§ 203(b), (e), (g) and 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). At all times relevant hereto, Defendants have been an “enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce,” as defined under 29 U.S.C. § 203(s)(1). 89. Indeed, in the performance of their duties for Defendants, members of the FLSA Class routinely worked substantially more than forty (40) hours per week, yet did not receive overtime compensation for the work, labor and services they provided to Defendants, as required by the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 206 and 207. The precise number of unpaid overtime hours will be proven at trial. 90. The Representative Plaintiff proposes to undertake appropriate proceedings to have such FLSA Class Members aggrieved by Defendants’ unlawful conduct notified of the pendency of this action and join this action as plaintiffs, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), by filing written consents to joinder with the Court. 91. Defendants’ violations of the FLSA were willful violations of the FLSA, within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 255(a). 93. Plaintiff, for herself and on behalf of the FLSA Class and New York Class, repeat, re-allege and incorporate by reference the prior allegations of this complaint as if fully alleged herein. 94. This action provides a ripe and justiciable case or controversy. 95. It is just and equitable that the Court declares the rights and other legal relationships of the parties. 96. Plaintiff, the FLSA Class and New York Class are entitled to a declaration that Defendants acts are in violation of the FLSA and NYLL. 97. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the New York Class members, repeat and re- allege and incorporate each and every allegation of the preceding paragraphs, with the same force and effect as though fully set forth herein. 98. The NYLL and Wage Theft Prevention Act (“WTPA”) require employers to provide employees with an accurate wage statement each time they are paid. 99. Throughout Plaintiff’s employment with Defendants, Defendants willfully failed to provide Plaintiff and the New York Class with wage statements at the end of every pay period that correctly identified the name of the employer; address of employer; rates of pay or basis thereof; regular hourly rate; whether paid by the hour, shift, day, week, salary, piece, commission, or other; number of overtime hours worked; gross wages; deductions; allowances, if any, claimed as part of the minimum wage; net wages; and such other information as required by Declaratory Judgment (FLSA Class and New York Class) FLSA Minimum Wage Violations, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq. (FLSA Class) FLSA Overtime Wage Violations, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq. (FLSA Class) NYLL Wage Theft Prevention Act – Failure to Provide Wage Statements (New York Class)

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10. TransUnion routinely reports information about tax liens on consumer reports and continues to report tax liens for a specified number of years after they have been paid, satisfied or released. 11. On or about May 5, 2016, a Massachusetts state tax lien in the amount of $500 was entered against the property where Plaintiff lives in Worcester County, Northern District, Massachusetts. 12. On or about June 28, 2016, Plaintiff caused payment in full to be sent to the proper authority, and on July 18, 2016, the lien was released. 14. The “Status Date” for the lien record listed on the August 2017 report was “06/16,” which indicates that TransUnion had made no effort to check for updated public records on Plaintiff for over a year. 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b) 15. Despite the satisfaction of the tax lien, as reflected on Massachusetts public records, and pursuant to its usual and systemic practice, TransUnion did not remove the tax lien public record from Plaintiff’s credit reports, nor update it to show it as satisfied, released or paid. 16. Massachusetts maintains online registries per county that are searchable by name or address. (See www.masslandrecords.com.) These records can be searched for free. 17. Worcester County, Northern District maintains its online searchable records at www.fitchburgdeeds.com, which is also accessible through the site www.masslandrecords.com, once “North Worcester” is selected as the County to search. These records can be searched for free. 19. Both from the face of the search results and from the underlying records, it is clear that Plaintiff’s tax lien has been paid and released. It is also clear that this release occurred in July 2016. 20. The FCRA provides: “Whenever a consumer reporting agency prepares a consumer report it shall follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of the information concerning the individual about whom the report relates.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b). 21. TransUnion is well aware that it has problems with failing to accurately report public record information. In fact, it has been sued multiple times for reporting out-of-date tax lien information in particular. See Matthews v. Trans Union, LLC, No. 17-cv-01825 (E.D. Penn.); Dennis v. Trans Union, LLC, No. 14-cv-2865 (E.D. Penn.); Anderson v. Trans Union, LLC, No. 16-cv-558 (W.D. Va.); Clark v. Trans Union, LLC, No. 15-cv-391 (E.D. Va.). These suits were filed well in advance of the reporting of Plaintiff’s lien here. 22. TransUnion receives its public record information that it includes on its reports from a third party. TransUnion knows that the tax lien information it obtains from this third party are often inaccurate, out of date, and/or stale. Yet, TransUnion does not take any action to ensure that the information it receives is accurate before reporting it. 24. These rules were supposed to be in effect as of July 1, 2017, a month prior to TransUnion’s inaccurate reporting of Plaintiff’s lien status, and a year after the date of the release of the lien public record. However, the rules were clearly not in effect, because Plaintiff’s lien was more than a year out of date, and the face of the report indicated the record had not been updated since June of 2016. 25. TransUnion’s failure to accurately report Plaintiff’s tax lien occurred because it failed to follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy in the preparation of reports. Specifically, TransUnion does not obtain up to date information on the status of tax lien releases, even though such information is freely available online. 26. Indeed, TransUnion has no systematic procedure to assure that, when tax liens are paid, satisfied or released, the updated status is promptly obtained and reflected upon a consumer’s credit report. 27. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs as alleged above. 28. Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a) and 23(b)(3) on behalf of the following Class: All consumers who: (i) had a tax lien recorded in the State of Massachusetts; (ii) the tax lien appeared on a TransUnion consumer report dated within two years prior to the filing of this Complaint and continuing through the resolution of this case; (iii) the State of Massachusetts public record indicated that the tax lien had been paid, satisfied, or released on a date prior to the date of the TransUnion consumer report, and (iv) the TransUnion consumer report incorrectly identified the tax lien as not released, unpaid, or with an unpaid balance. 30. TransUnion likely possesses data for consumers that include name, address, date of birth, Social Security Number, case numbers/lien identifiers, lien amounts, jurisdiction of liens, disposition of the liens, date of file in public record, date of disposition in public record, and dates consumers had credit inquiries where such information was reported. TransUnion is likely able to produce this data in standardized spreadsheet form. 31. Massachusetts, in turn, maintains electronic records of liens, easily accessible and reviewable, that are searchable by name, and include record descriptions, file dates, disposition dates, lien identifiers, and other identifying information. 32. The Massachusetts data can be easily compared to TransUnion’s data to ascertain which consumers would meet the definition of the Class above. 33. Existence and Predominance of Common Questions of Law and Fact. Common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the Class, and predominate over the questions affecting only individual members. The common legal and factual questions include, among others: a. Whether TransUnion willfully violated the FCRA by reporting tax liens which, according to Massachusetts public records, were paid; and b. Whether TransUnion willfully violated the FCRA by failing to follow reasonable procedures to assure the maximum possible accuracy of the Massachusetts tax lien information it reported. 35. Adequacy. Plaintiff is an adequate representative of the Class. Her interests are aligned with, and are not antagonistic to, the interests of the members of the Class she seeks to represent. She has retained counsel competent and experienced in such litigation, and intends to prosecute this action vigorously. Plaintiff and her counsel will fairly and adequately protect the interests of members of the Class. 36. Predominance and Superiority. Questions of law and fact common to the class members predominate over questions affecting only individual class members, and a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. TransUnion’s conduct described in this Complaint stems from common and uniform practices, resulting in common violations of the FCRA. Members of the Class do not have an interest in pursuing separate actions against TransUnion, as the amount of each class member’s individual claim is small compared to the expense and burden of individual prosecution. Class certification also will obviate the need for unduly duplicative litigation that might result in inconsistent judgments concerning TransUnion’s practices. Moreover, management of this action as a class action will not likely present any difficulties. In the interests of justice and judicial efficiency, it would be desirable to concentrate the litigation of all class members’ claims in a single forum. 38. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs as alleged above. 39. TransUnion failed to comply with 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b) by failing to follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of the tax lien information in the consumer reports it prepared regarding Plaintiff and the other class members. 40. The foregoing violations were negligent. 41. The foregoing violations were willful. 43. TransUnion’s inaccurate reporting of Plaintiff and class members’ lien information harmed, and/or created a risk of real harm to, their concrete interests under the FCRA. 7. TransUnion is one of the “big three” credit reporting agencies in the United States. 8. TransUnion sells consumer reports (commonly called “credit reports”) about millions of consumers annually. 9. TransUnion is regulated by the FCRA.

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(Breach of Contract) (On Behalf of Plaintiff and all Class Members Against Defendant) 19. A record label such as Sony Music executes contracts with its artistic talent, which includes the ability of the label to license and distribute the works. In exchange for its licensing and marketing of the artistic works, a label such as Sony Music is paid a significant share of the artists’ earnings. As set forth herein, not content to simply collect its contractually mandated share of the revenues, Sony Music also wrongfully keeps additional sums that are clearly attributable to artists. 20. Although Sony Music purports to support artists and their royalties, it has decided to retain monies improperly in violation of the Agreements, impermissibly taking a percentage off the top of the international revenue earned from streaming sales of the works and basing the artist’s royalty rate solely on the remainder of such earned revenue. 21. As authors of works distributed worldwide, Plaintiff and members of the Class are entitled to their complete share of royalties due to them under their Agreements. 22. Plaintiff brings this class action on his own behalf and on behalf of a Class defined as follows: All persons and entities in the United States, their agents, successors in interest, assigns, heirs, executors, trustees, and administrators who are or were parties to compensation agreements with Sony Music and its predecessors and subsidiaries whose music was streamed in a foreign country pursuant to such agreements. 23. Plaintiff reserves the right to redefine the Class as the facts and or evidence may warrant. 25. The Class for whose benefit this action is brought is so numerous that joinder of all Class members is impracticable. While Plaintiff does not presently know the exact number of Class members, due to the extent of Defendant’s catalog there are hundreds, if not thousands, of Class members, and those Class members can be determined and identified through Defendant’s records and, if necessary, other appropriate discovery. 26. The Class is so numerous that joinder of all Class members is impracticable. 28. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the Class. Sony Music’s common course of conduct in violation of law as alleged herein has caused Plaintiff and Class members to sustain the same or similar injuries and damages. Plaintiff’s claims are thereby representative of and coextensive with the claims of the Class. 29. Plaintiff is a member of the Class, does not have any conflicts of interest with other proposed Class members, and will prosecute the case vigorously on behalf of the Class. Counsel representing Plaintiff is competent and experienced in litigating complex class actions, including those involving the entertainment industry. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of Class members. 31. Defendant has acted and refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the entire Class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the Class as a whole. 32. Plaintiff anticipates no unusual difficulties in the management of this litigation as a class action. 33. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in the preceding paragraphs, as though fully set forth herein. 34. Plaintiff and Class members entered into the standard and uniform Compensation Agreements with Defendant. 35. These Compensation Agreements contain provisions for Plaintiff and Class members to be paid on all monies received by Defendant from its distribution of the artistic works. 36. Plaintiff and other Class members have performed their obligations under their respective Compensation Agreements by providing services called for under the Agreements, and at no time did Defendant advise them that their performance was inadequate. As a result, all conditions required for Defendant’s performance under the Compensation Agreements – namely, the payment of money to Plaintiff and Class members sought herein – have occurred. 38. By reason of the foregoing breaches, Plaintiff and other Class members have been damaged in an amount to be determined at trial. 39. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in the preceding paragraphs, as though fully set forth herein. 40. As a result of Defendant’s acts, as set forth in this Complaint, that have deprived and continue to deprive Plaintiff and Class members of the revenue to which they are entitled, Defendant has and continues to be unjustly enriched. 41. As a result, Plaintiff and Class members request restitution of all monies improperly obtained and interest thereon. 42. Defendant’s infringing conduct is continuing and ongoing. Plaintiff and Class members have suffered, and will continue to suffer, irreparable injury for which there is no adequate remedy at law, unless Defendant is enjoined by the Court from continuing to collect such monies without paying them out. UNJUST ENRICHMENT (On Behalf of Plaintiff and All Class Members Against Defendant)

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15. At all times relevant, the principal purpose of MCS was the collection of debts using the mails and telephone. 16. At all times relevant, MCS regularly attempted to collect debts alleged to be due to another. 17. At all times relevant, MCS regularly collected or attempted to collect debts due or alleged to be due another. 18. At all times relevant, MCS regularly collected or attempted to collect debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another, which debts were incurred primarily for personal, family or household purposes. 19. At all times relevant, MCS used the mail, telephone or other instruments of interstate commerce in its attempts to collect debts due or alleged to be due another. 21. At all times relevant, the principal business engaged in by MCS was the collection of debts, which debts were incurred primarily for personal, family or household purposes. 22. MCS is a “debt collector” within the scope of the definition contained in 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6) and interpretations thereof. 23. Plaintiff is a “consumer” as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(3) of the FDCPA. 24. Plaintiff and others similarly situated are consumers as they are natural persons allegedly obligated to pay a debt, in, which the money, property, insurance, or services, which was the subject of the transaction, was primarily for personal, family and/or household purposes. 25. On or about February 10, 2015, Plaintiff incurred a financial obligation to 39. Plaintiff brings this action as a state wide class action, pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (hereinafter “FRCP”), on behalf of himself and all New York consumers and their successors in interest (the “Class”), who were sent debt collection letters and/or notices from the Defendants which are in violation of the FDCPA, as described in this Complaint. 40. This Action is properly maintained as a class action. The Class is initially defined as follows: All New York consumers who were sent letters and/or notices from MCS, concerning a debt owed to MAIMONIDES MEDICAL CENTER which contained at least one of the alleged violations of 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. herein. The Class period begins one year to the filing of this Action. The class may be subsequently refined. Specifically excluded from this class is any Judge presiding over this Action and members of their immediate families. 41. Plaintiff seeks to recover statutory damages, attorney’s fees and costs on behalf of all class members under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. 43. There are questions of law and fact common to the members of the Class that predominate over questions affecting only individuals. These common questions include, but are not limited to: a. Whether Defendant violated various provisions of the FDCPA; b. Whether Plaintiff and the Class have been injured by Defendants’ conduct; c. Whether Plaintiff and the Class have sustained damages and are entitled to restitution as a result of Defendants’ wrongdoing and if so, what is the proper measure and appropriate statutory formula to be applied in determining such damages and restitution; and d. Whether Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to declaratory and/or injunctive relief. 44. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy since joinder of all members is impracticable. While the economic damages suffered by the individual class members are significant, the amount may be modest compared to the expense and burden of individual litigation. Additionally, the FDCPA statutory scheme provides for statutory damages payable to each class member. A class action will cause an orderly and expeditious administration of the claims of the Class and will foster economies of time, effort and expense. 45. The claims of the Plaintiff are typical of the claims of the members of the Class. 46. The questions of law and/or fact common to the members of the Class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members. 47. Plaintiff does not have interests antagonistic to those of the Class. 49. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class, and has retained competent counsel experienced in the prosecution of consumer litigation. Proposed Class Counsel has investigated and identified potential claims in the action; has a great deal of experience in handling class actions, other complex litigation, and claims of the type asserted in this action. 50. The prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the Class would run the risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications, which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for MCS in this action or the prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the class would create the risk that adjudications with respect to individual members of the class would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests. Prosecution as a class action will eliminate the possibility of repetitious litigation. 51. MCS has acted or refuse to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole. 52. Plaintiff does not anticipate any difficulty in the management of this litigation. 54. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and others similarly situated, repeats and realleges all prior allegations as if set forth at length herein. 55. MCS violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. of the FDCPA in connection with its communications to Plaintiff and others similarly situated. 56. MCS violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692g of the FDCPA by using a false, deceptive or misleading representation or means in connection with its attempts to collect the alleged debts from Plaintiff and others similarly situated. 57. Section 1692g of the FDCPA requires the debt collector to give what is commonly referred to as a thirty-day (30) notice within five (5) days of its communication with the consumer. 59. The September 11, 2015 stated in the second paragraph: 60. The information request section at the bottom of the letters states: MCS CLAIM SERVICES DEBTOR #: xxxxxxxxxx REFERRAL DATE: 09-02-15 99851 71. Plaintiff repeats the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 70 as if the same were here set forth at length. 72. Section 1692e(10) of the FDCPA prohibits the use of any false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt. 73. MCS violated Section 1692e(10) of the FDCPA providing language that misrepresents to the least sophisticated consumer what she must do effectively dispute the alleged debt. 74. The September 11, 2015 letter misleads the least sophisticated consumer that she can only dispute by completing a form and provided personal information such as her social security number, home telephone number and date of birth. 75. Upon reading paragraph two of the September 11, 2015 letter from MCS, the least sophisticated consumer would believe that she did not owe the alleged because she had already paid it, that in order to effectively the debt, she would be require to provide the information requested by MCS at the bottom of the letter, when in fact all she has to so is simply call MCS and state that she dispute the alleged debt. 76. Plaintiff and the class members have been accorded a procedural right to protect their concrete interest in receiving certain information relating to their right to dispute an alleged debt and to invoke the consumer protections provided for by such dispute. 78. The deprivation of certain information relating to the consumers' right to dispute and alleged debt creates a cognizable injury-in-fact to Plaintiff and the class members. 79. Plaintiff suffered an informational injury due to MCS' violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10) of the FDCPA in connection with its communications of September 11, 2015 to Plaintiff. 80. Plaintiff suffered a risk of economic injury due to MCS' violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10) of the FDCPA in connection with its communications of September 11, 2015 to Plaintiff. FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. § 1692 VIOLATION OF 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(3) FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. § 1692 VIOLATION OF 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10)

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1. This is a class action lawsuit on behalf of all people who paid tuition and fees for the Spring 2020 academic semester at FDU, and who, because of Defendant’s response to the Novel Coronavirus Disease 2019 (“COVID-19”) pandemic, lost the benefit of the education for which they paid, and/or the services for which their fees paid, without having their tuition and fees refunded to them. 14. Plaintiff and Class members are individuals who paid the cost of tuition and other mandatory fees for the Spring 2020 Semester at FDU. 15. Spring Semester 2020 classes at FDU began on or about January 21, 2020. Classes and final exams for the semester are scheduled for end on or around May 13, 2020. 16. Plaintiff and Class members paid the cost of tuition for the Spring Semester 2020. They also paid other mandatory fees associated with the Spring Semester 2020, including but not limited to a Technology Fee and a University Wellness Fee. 17. Undergraduate tuition for the Spring 2020 semester at FDU is approximately $21,827. Mandatory undergraduate fees include a $924 yearly Technology Fee and a $140 yearly University Wellness Fee. 19. FDU also charges mandatory graduate fees such as Technology Fee and University Wellness Fee, as well as other fees that vary depending on the program and year. 2. FDU is one of New Jersey’s largest private universities with an enrollment of over 11,000 students. FDU has four campuses: two in New Jersey (Madison/Florham Park and Teaneck/Hackensack), one in Vancouver, British Columbia, and one in South East England, as well as an online platform. FDU offers over 100 different degree programs to its students. 20. The tuition and fees described in the paragraph above is provided by way of example; total damage amounts – which may include other fees that are not listed herein but that were not refunded – will be proven at trial. In Response To COVID-19, FDU Closed Campuses And Cancelled All In-Person Classes 21. On March 10, 2020, FDU announced that because of the global COVID-19 classes would be held only in online format as of March 16, 2020, the first day back from Spring Break. On March 20, 2020, FDU announced that all classes would continue in online format through the end of the Spring 2020 semester. 22. Since March 6, 2020, FDU has not held any in-person classes. Classes that have continued have only been offered in an online format, with no in-person instruction. Even classes for students with concentrations in areas where in-person instruction is especially crucial (such as music, theatre, nursing, and the sciences) have only had access to minimum online education options. 23. As a result of the closure of Defendant’s facilities, Defendant has not delivered the educational services, facilities, access and/or opportunities that Plaintiff and the putative class contracted and paid for. Plaintiff and the putative class are therefore entitled to a refund of all tuition and fees for services, facilities, access and/or opportunities that Defendant has not provided. Even if Defendant did not have a choice in cancelling in-person classes, it nevertheless has improperly retained funds for services it is not providing. 25. Defendant markets the FDU on-campus experience as a benefit of enrollment on FDU’s website: 26. 27. The online learning options being offered to FDU students are subpar in practically every aspect and a shadow of what they once were, from the lack of facilities, materials, and access to faculty. Students have been deprived of the opportunity for collaborative learning and in-person dialogue, feedback, and critique. 29. Indeed, FDU offers an “AA Liberal Arts” online degree. FDU’s own website confirms that “[t]uition for the AA program is 50 percent less than standard FDU tuition.” 30. Through this lawsuit Plaintiff seeks, for himself and Class members, Defendant’s disgorgement of the pro-rated portion of tuition and fees, proportionate to the amount of time that remained in the Spring Semester 2020 when classes moved online and campus services ceased being provided. Plaintiff seeks return of these amounts on behalf of himself and the Class as defined below. 31. Plaintiff seeks to represent a class defined as all people who paid FDU Spring Semester 2020 tuition and/or fees for in-person educational services that FDU failed to provide, and whose tuition and fees have not been refunded (the “Class”). Specifically excluded from the Class are Defendant, Defendant’s officers, directors, agents, trustees, parents, children, corporations, trusts, representatives, employees, principals, servants, partners, joint ventures, or entities controlled by Defendant, and their heirs, successors, assigns, or other persons or entities related to or affiliated with Defendant and/or Defendant’s officers and/or directors, the judge assigned to this action, and any member of the judge’s immediate family. 33. Subject to additional information obtained through further investigation and discovery, the foregoing definition of the Class and Subclass may be expanded or narrowed by amendment or amended complaint. 34. Numerosity. The members of the Class and Subclass are geographically dispersed throughout the United States and are so numerous that individual joinder is impracticable. Upon information and belief, Plaintiff reasonably estimates that there are tens of thousands of members in the Class and Subclass. Although the precise number of Class members is unknown to Plaintiff, the true number of Class members is known by Defendant and may be determined through discovery. Class members may be notified of the pendency of this action by mail and/or publication through the distribution records of Defendant and third-party retailers and vendors. 36. Typicality. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the other members of the Class in that, among other things, all Class and Subclass members were similarly situated and were comparably injured through Defendant’s wrongful conduct as set forth herein. Further, there are no defenses available to Defendants that are unique to Plaintiff. 37. Adequacy of Representation. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class and Subclass. Plaintiff has retained counsel that is highly experienced in complex consumer class action litigation, and Plaintiff intends to vigorously prosecute this action on behalf of the Class and Subclass. Furthermore, Plaintiff has no interests that are antagonistic to those of the Class or Subclass. 39. In the alternative, the Class and Subclass may also be certified because: (a) the prosecution of separate actions by individual Class and Subclass members would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual Class members that would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the Defendant; (b) the prosecution of separate actions by individual Class and Subclass members would create a risk of adjudications with respect to them that would, as a practical matter, be dispositive of the interests of other Class members not parties to the adjudications, or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests; and/or (c) Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class as a whole, thereby making appropriate final declaratory and/or injunctive relief with respect to the members of the Class as a whole. 4. Thus, FDU has not held any in-person classes since March 6, 2020. Classes that have continued have only been offered in an online format, with no in-person instruction. 40. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference the allegations contained in all preceding paragraphs of this complaint. 41. Plaintiff brings this claim individually and on behalf of the members of the Class and Subclass against Defendants. 43. As part of the contract, and in exchange for the aforementioned consideration, Defendant promised to provide certain services, all as set forth above. Plaintiff, Class, and Subclass members fulfilled their end of the bargain when they paid monies due for Spring Semester 2020 tuition. Tuition for Spring Semester 2020 was intended to cover in-person educational services from January through May 2020. In exchange for tuition monies paid, Class and Subclass members were entitled to in-person educational services through the end of the Spring Semester. 44. Defendant has failed to provide the contracted for services and has otherwise not performed under the contract as set forth above. Defendant has retained monies paid by Plaintiff and the Class for their Spring Semester 2020 tuition and fees, without providing them the benefit of their bargain. 45. Plaintiff and members of the Class and Subclass have suffered damage as a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s breach, including but not limited to being deprived of the education, experience, and services to which they were promised and for which they have already paid. 46. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s breach, Plaintiff, the Class, and Subclass are entitled to damages, to be decided by the trier of fact in this action, to include but no be limited to reimbursement of certain tuition, fees, and other expenses that were collected by Defendant for services that Defendant has failed to deliver. Defendant should return the pro- rated portion of any Spring Semester 2020 tuition and fees for education services not provided since FDU has not held in-person classes since March 6, 2020. 48. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference the allegations contained in all preceding paragraphs of this complaint. 49. Plaintiff brings this claim individually and on behalf of the members of the Class and Subclass against Defendant. 5. As a result of the closure of Defendant’s facilities, Defendant has not delivered the educational services, facilities, access and/or opportunities that Mr. Doval and the putative class contracted and paid for. The online learning options being offered to FDU students are subpar in practically every aspect, from the lack of facilities, materials, and access to faculty. Students have been deprived of the opportunity for collaborative learning and in-person dialogue, feedback, and critique. The remote learning options are in no way the equivalent of the in-person education that Plaintiff and the putative class members contracted and paid for. 50. Plaintiff and members of the Class and Subclass conferred a benefit on Defendant in the form of monies paid for Spring Semester 2020 tuition and other fees in exchange for certain service and promises. Tuition for Spring Semester 2020 was intended to cover in-person educational services from January through May 2020. In exchange for tuition monies paid, Class members were entitled to in-person educational services through the end of the Spring Semester. 51. Defendant voluntarily accepted and retained this benefit by accepting payment. 52. Defendant has retained this benefit, even though Defendant has failed to provide the education, experience, and services for which the tuition and fees were collected, making Defendant’s retention unjust under the circumstances. Accordingly, Defendant should return the pro-rated portion of any Spring Semester 2020 tuition and fees for education services not provided since FDU has not held in-person classes since March 6, 2020. 54. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference the allegations contained in all preceding paragraphs of this complaint. 55. Plaintiff brings this claim individually and on behalf of the members of the Class and Subclass against Defendant. 56. Plaintiff and members of the Class and Subclass have an ownership right to the in-person educational services they were supposed to be provided in exchange for their Spring Semester 2020 tuition and fee payments to Defendant. 57. Defendant intentionally interfered with the rights of Plaintiff, the Class, and Subclass when it moved all classes to an online format and discontinued in-person educational services for which tuition and fees were intended to pay. 58. Plaintiff and members of the Class and Subclass demand the return of the pro- rated portion of any Spring Semester 2020 tuition and fees for education services not provided since FDU shut down on March 11, 2020. 59. Defendant’s retention of the fees paid by Plaintiff and members of the Class and Subclass without providing the educational services for which they paid, deprived Plaintiff, Class and Subclass members of the benefits for which the tuition and fees paid. 6. Nonetheless, FDU has not refunded any tuition or fees for the Spring 2020 Semester. 60. This interference with the services for which Plaintiff and members of the Class and Subclass paid damaged Plaintiff and Class members in that they paid tuition and fees for services that will not be provided. 7. Plaintiff and the putative class are therefore entitled to a refund of tuition and fees for in-person educational services, facilities, access and/or opportunities that Defendant has not provided. Even if Defendant did not have a choice in cancelling in-person classes, it nevertheless has improperly retained funds for services it is not providing. Breach Of Contract (On Behalf Of The Class And Subclass) Conversion (On Behalf Of The Class And Subclass) Plaintiff And Class Members Paid Tuition And Fees For Spring Semester 2020 Unjust Enrichment (On Behalf Of The Class And Subclass)

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2.0 guidelines; c. Regularly test user accessibility by blind or vision-impaired persons to ensure that Defendant’s Website complies under the WCAG 2.1 guidelines; and, d. Develop an accessibility policy that is clearly disclosed on Defendant’s Websites, with contact information for users to report accessibility-related problems. 20. Defendant is a coffee company, and owns and operates the website, www.ronnoco.com (its “Website”), offering features which should allow all consumers to access the goods and services and which Defendant ensures the delivery of such goods throughout the United States, including New York State. 21. Defendant operates and distributes its products throughout the United States, including New York. 22. Defendant offers the commercial website, www.ronnoco.com, to the public. The website offers features which should allow all consumers to access the goods and services whereby Defendant allows for the delivery of those ordered goods to consumers throughout the United States, including New York State. The goods and services offered by Defendant include, but are not limited to the following: the ability to browse coffees for purchase and delivery, view careers, obtain defendant’s contact information, and related goods and services available online. 24. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient JAWS screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using the JAWS screen-reader. 25. During Plaintiff’s visits to the Website, the last occurring in March 2021, Plaintiff encountered multiple access barriers that denied Plaintiff full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services offered to the public and made available to the public; and that denied Plaintiff the full enjoyment of the facilities, goods and services of the Website. 26. While attempting to navigate the Website, Plaintiff encountered multiple accessibility barriers for blind or visually-impaired people that include, but are not limited to, the following: 28. Empty Links That Contain No Text causing the function or purpose of the link to not be presented to the user. This can introduce confusion for keyboard and screen- reader users; 29. Redundant Links where adjacent links go to the same URL address which results in additional navigation and repetition for keyboard and screen-reader users; and 30. Linked Images Missing Alt-text, which causes problems if an image within a link contains no text and that image does not provide alt-text. A screen reader then has no content to present the user as to the function of the link, including information contained in PDFs. 32. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s Website, blind and visually-impaired customers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, products, and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from visiting the Website, presently and in the future. 33. These access barriers on Defendant’s Website have deterred Plaintiff from learning about those various coffees for purchase and delivery, and enjoying them equal to sighted individuals because: Plaintiff was unable to determine and or purchase items from its Website, among other things. 35. Through his attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 36. Because simple compliance with the WCAG 2.1 Guidelines would provide Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers with equal access to the Website, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including but not limited to the following policies or practices: a. Constructing and maintaining a website that is inaccessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; b. Failure to construct and maintain a website that is sufficiently intuitive so as to be equally accessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; and, c. Failing to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind and visually-impaired consumers, such as Plaintiff, as a member of a protected class. 37. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 39. Because Defendant’s Website have never been equally accessible, and because Defendant lacks a corporate policy that is reasonably calculated to cause its Website to become and remain accessible, Plaintiff invokes 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2) and seeks a permanent injunction requiring Defendant to retain a qualified consultant acceptable to Plaintiff (“Agreed Upon Consultant”) to assist Defendant to comply with WCAG 2.1 guidelines for Defendant’s Website. Plaintiff seeks that this permanent injunction requires Defendant to cooperate with the Agreed Upon Consultant to: a. Train Defendant’s employees and agents who develop the Website on accessibility compliance under the WCAG 2.1 guidelines; b. Regularly check the accessibility of the Website under the WCAG 40. If the Website was accessible, Plaintiff and similarly situated blind and visually- impaired people could independently view service items, shop for and otherwise research related goods and services available via the Website. 42. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining their Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making their Website equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 43. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 44. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services, during the relevant statutory period. 45. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks certify a New York State subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the State of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of those services, during the relevant statutory period. 47. Common questions of law and fact exist amongst Class, including: a. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “public accommodation” under the ADA; b. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “place or provider of public accommodation” under the NYSHRL or NYCHRL; c. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the ADA; and d. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the NYSHRL or NYCHRL. 48. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class. The Class, similarly to the Plaintiff, are severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA, NYSYRHL or NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so either can be independently accessible to the Class. 50. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 51. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 52. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 53. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 54. Defendant’s Website is a public accommodations within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). The Website is a service that is offered to the general public, and as such, must be equally accessible to all potential consumers. 56. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 57. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 59. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 60. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 61. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 62. Defendant’s Website and its’ sale of goods to the general public, constitute sales establishments and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant. 63. Defendant is subject to New York Human Rights Law because it owns and operates its Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 64. Defendant is violating N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 66. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(ii), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 67. Readily available, well-established guidelines exist on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other large business entities and government agencies in making their website accessible, including but not limited to: adding alt-text to graphics and ensuring that all functions can be performed using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make its Website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 69. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 70. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Defendant’s Website under § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the Sub-Class Members will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 71. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 72. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 73. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 74. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 76. Plaintiff served notice thereof upon the attorney general as required by N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41. 77. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40 provides that “all persons within the jurisdiction of this state shall be entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of any places of public accommodations, resort or amusement, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons. No persons, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or employee of any such place shall directly or indirectly refuse, withhold from, or deny to any person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof . . .” 78. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) provides that “no person because of . . . disability, as such term is defined in section two hundred ninety-two of executive law, be subjected to any discrimination in his or her civil rights, or to any harassment, as defined in section 240.25 of the penal law, in the exercise thereof, by any other person or by any firm, corporation or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision.” 79. Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant and its Website which offers such goods and services to the general public is required to be equally accessible to all. 80. Defendant is subject to New York Civil Rights Law because it owns and operates their Website, and Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Civil Law § 40-c(2). 82. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41 states that “any corporation which shall violate any of the provisions of sections forty, forty-a, forty-b or forty-two . . . shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby . . .” 83. Under NY Civil Rights Law § 40-d, “any person who shall violate any of the provisions of the foregoing section, or subdivision three of section 240.30 or section 240.31 of the penal law, or who shall aid or incite the violation of any of said provisions shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby in any court of competent jurisdiction in the county in which the defendant shall reside ...” 84. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 86. Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages of five hundred dollars per instance, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Civil Law § 40 et seq. for each and every offense. 87. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 88. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 89. Defendant’s Website is a sales establishment and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9). 90. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates its Website, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 91. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with such Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, products, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 93. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the Sub- Class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 94. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 96. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 97. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 98. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 99. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. Defendant’s Barriers on Its Website VIOLATIONS OF THE NYSHRL VIOLATION OF THE NEW YORK STATE CIVIL RIGHTS LAW VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL

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16. The Plans are “employee pension benefit plans” within the meaning of ERISA 2019 PLAN ASSETS 2019 FEE THE PLANS

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11. At all times relevant, Plaintiff was a citizen of the State of California. Plaintiff is, and at all times mentioned herein was, “persons” as defined by 47 36. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and on behalf of all others similarly situated (“the Class”). 38. IE and its employees or agents are excluded from the Class. Plaintiff does not know the number of members in the Class, but believes the Class members number in the thousands, if not more. Thus, this matter should be certified as a Class action to assist in the expeditious litigation of this matter. 39. Plaintiff and members of the Class were harmed by the acts of Defendant in at least the following ways: Defendant illegally contacted Plaintiff and the Class members via their cellular telephones thereby causing Plaintiff and the Class members to incur certain cellular telephone charges or reduce cellular telephone time for which Plaintiff and the Class members previously paid, by having to retrieve or administer messages left by Defendant or their agents, during those illegal calls, and invading the privacy of said Plaintiff and the Class members. Plaintiff and the Class members were damaged thereby. 40. This suit seeks only damages and injunctive relief for recovery of economic injury on behalf of the Class and it expressly is not intended to request any recovery for personal injury and claims related thereto. Plaintiff reserves the right to expand the Class definition to seek recovery on behalf of additional persons as warranted as facts are learned in further investigation and discovery. 42. There is a well-defined community of interest in the questions of law and fact involved affecting the parties to be represented. The questions of law and fact to the Class predominate over questions which may affect individual Class members, including the following: i. Whether, within the four years prior to the filing of the Complaint, IE made any call(s) (other than a call made for emergency purposes or made with the prior express consent of the called party) to the Class members using any ATDS or an artificial or prerecorded voice to any telephone number assigned to a cellular telephone service; ii. Whether IE called non-customers of IE for marketing purposes; iii.Whether Plaintiff and the Class members were damaged thereby, and the extent of damages for such violation(s); and iv. Whether IE should be enjoined from engaging in such conduct in the future. 43. As a person that received numerous calls from Defendant in which Defendant used an ATDS or an artificial or prerecorded voice, without Plaintiff’s prior express consent, Plaintiff is asserting claims that are typical of the Class. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class in that Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to any member of the Class. 45. Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in handling class action claims and claims involving violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act. 46. A class action is a superior method for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. Class-wide damages are essential to induce Defendant to comply with federal and California law. The interest of Class members in individually controlling the prosecution of separate claims against Defendant is small because the maximum statutory damages in an individual action for violation of privacy are minimal. Management of these claims is likely to present significantly fewer difficulties than those that would be presented in numerous individual claims. 47. Defendant has acted on grounds generally applicable to the Class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief and corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the Class as a whole. 48. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 49. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant constitutes numerous and multiple negligent violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. 50. As a result of Defendant’s negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq., Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to an award of $500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). 52. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 53. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant constitute numerous and multiple knowing and/or willful violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. 54. As a result of Defendant’s knowing and/or willful violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq., Plaintiff and each of the Class are entitled to treble damages, as provided by statute, up to $1,500.00, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C). 55. Plaintiff and the Class are also entitled to and seek injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. 57. As a result of Defendant’s negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1), Plaintiff seeks for himself and each Class member $500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). 58. Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(A), injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. 60. As a result of Defendant’s willful and/or knowing violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1), Plaintiff seeks for himself and each Class member treble damages, as provided by statute, up to $1,500.00 for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C). 61. Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(A), injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. 62. Any other relief the Court may deem just and proper. KNOWING AND/OR WILLFUL VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. NEGLIGENT VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. THE TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. VIOLATION OF THE TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ.

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32. Plaintiffs have worked as call center employees for Defendants, along with thousands of other call center employees employed by Defendants, during the relevant limitations period prior to the filing of this action. 33. Plaintiffs’ job duties while employed included speaking via telephone with customers, former customers, and potential customers of Defendants’ internet, television, telephone, and related services. 34. Plaintiffs are typically scheduled to work for forty (40) hours per week. 35. Plaintiffs and their coworkers arrive for work in the morning and typically begin the process of logging on to various computer programs they use in their duties, which can take several minutes. 80. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate herein the allegations in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth in this Count. 95. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate herein the allegations in the preceding paragraphs 1- 87 as if fully set forth in this Count. 96. This Count arises from Defendants’ failure to pay Plaintiffs for all their earned wages at the rates and in the manner that Defendants agreed, under the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement between the parties. 97. Plaintiffs have been employees of Defendants whom Defendants offered to and agreed to pay, and are due, but who have not been paid their wages earned for all time worked by them. 98. Plaintiffs bring this Count II to recover from Defendants unpaid wages and overtime compensation. Respectfully submitted, /s/ Glen J. Dunn, Jr. GLEN J. DUNN, JR.

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44. Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing paragraphs as if fully stated herein. 45. The FLSA requires employers to pay non-exempt employees at least the minimum wage for all hours worked, and an overtime premium of one and one half times their regular hourly rate for hours worked in excess of 40 hours in any one workweek. 29 U.S.C. §207(a)(1). 46. Defendants violated the FLSA by knowingly failing to pay plaintiffs and similarly situated individuals for all hours worked and one and one half times their regular hourly rate for hours worked in excess of 40 hours in any one workweek. 48. For their willful violations of the FLSA, defendants are liable to the plaintiff and similarly situated individuals for unpaid wages, unpaid overtime compensation, an equal amount as liquidated damages, court costs, reasonable attorneys’ fees and expenses, and any other relief deemed appropriate by the Court. 49. Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing paragraphs as if set forth in their entirety herein. 50. The DCMWRA requires employers to pay non-exempt employees for all hours worked and one and one-half times their regular hourly. 51. Defendants violated the DCMWRA by knowingly failing to pay plaintiffs and similarly situated individuals one and one-half times their regular hourly rate for hours worked in excess of 40 hours in any one workweek. 52. Defendants’ violations of the DCMWRA were willful. 53. For their violations of the DCMWRA, defendants are liable to plaintiff and similarly situated individuals for unpaid wages and unpaid overtime compensation, and an equal amount as liquidated damages, court costs, reasonable attorneys’ fees and expenses, interest, and any other relief deemed appropriate by the Court. 54. Plaintiffs incorporate the foregoing paragraphs as if set forth in their entirety herein. 56. Defendants violated the DCWPCL by knowingly failing to pay plaintiff and similarly situated individuals all wages earned, including the overtime premium and promised wages for all hours worked. 57. Defendants’ violations of the DCWPCL were willful. 58. For their violations of the DCWPCL, defendants are liable to plaintiffs and similarly situated individuals for unpaid wages, an amount equal to three times the amount of unpaid wages as liquidated damages, court costs, reasonable attorneys’ fees and expenses, interest, and any other relief deemed appropriate by the Court. 59. Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing paragraphs as if fully stated herein. 60. The DC Wage Theft Prevention Amendment Act D.C. Code §§ 32-1001-15, 32-1301-11 states that the general contractor and subcontractor are jointly and severally liable for violations of the DCMWRA. 61. The Defendant Grunley is liable as general contractor for the wage payment violations of Calderon and Garcias.

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12. Plaintiff is a natural person obligated, or allegedly obligated, to pay a debt owed or due, or asserted to be owed or due, a creditor other than Defendant. 13. Plaintiff’s obligation, or alleged obligation, owed or due, or asserted to be owed or due, a creditor other than Defendant, arises from a transaction in which the money, property, insurance, or services that are the subject of the transaction were incurred primarily for personal, family, or household purposes—namely, a personal credit card (the “Debt”). 15. On November 10, 2014, Defendant sent Plaintiff an initial written communication requesting payment of an $18,083.99 balance (the “Letter”). 16. A true and exact copy of Defendant’s Letter is attached as Exhibit A. 17. The Letter states, in relevant part: If you notify this firm within thirty (30) days after your receipt of this letter, that the debt or any portion thereof, is disputed, we will obtain verification of the debt or a copy of the judgment, if any, and mail such verification or judgment to you. Upon your written request within the same thirty (30) day period mentioned above, we will provide you with the name and address of the original creditor, if different from the current creditor. Exhibit A. 18. Defendant’s Letter failed to disclose that Defendant would only be required to obtain verification of the debt or a copy of the judgment, if any, and mail a copy of such verification or judgment to the consumer if the consumer disputed the debt in writing. Exhibit A; see 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(4). 19. Defendant did not send a written communication that contained the proper notice of Plaintiff’s rights under § 1692g(a)(4) within five days of the initial communication. 20. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges all factual allegations above. 22. Upon information and belief, Defendant has used the same form or template that was used to create the Letter to send substantially similar or materially identical letters in an attempt to collect a debt from 50 or more individuals. 23. Plaintiff brings this class action on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated. Specifically, Plaintiff seeks to represent a class of individuals defined as: All consumers in the State of Arizona to whom Defendant, in the year prior to the filing of this complaint and in connection with the collection of any debt, sent an initial communication that failed to convey to the consumer that a dispute of the debt, or any portion thereof, had to be made in writing in order to obtain from Defendant verification of the alleged debt or a copy of the judgment against the consumer; and where Defendant did not send the disclosures required by § 1692g in a subsequent communication within 5 days of the initial communication. 24. The proposed class specifically excludes the United States of America, the State of Arizona, counsel for the parties, the presiding United States District Court Judge, the Judges of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and the Justices of the United States Supreme Court, all officers and agents of Defendant, and all persons related to within the third degree of consanguinity or affection to any of the foregoing persons. 25. The class is averred to be so numerous that joinder of members is impracticable. 27. The class is ascertainable in that the names and addresses of all class members can be identified in business records maintained by Defendant. 28. There exists a well-defined community of interest in the questions of law and fact involved that affect the parties to be represented. These common questions of law and fact predominate over questions that may affect individual class members. Such issues include, but are not limited to: (a) the existence of Defendant’s identical conduct particular to the matters at issue; (b) Defendant’s violations of the FDCPA; (c) the availability of statutory penalties; and (d) attorneys’ fees and costs. 29. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of those of the class she seeks to represent. 30. The claims of Plaintiff and of the class originate from the same conduct, practice, and procedure on the part of Defendant. Thus, if brought and prosecuted individually, the claims of the members of each subclass would require proof of the same material and substantive facts. 31. Plaintiff possesses the same interests and has suffered the same injuries as each class member. Plaintiff asserts identical claims and seeks identical relief on behalf of the unnamed class members. 32. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class and has no interests adverse to or which directly and irrevocably conflict with the interests of other members of the class. 33. Plaintiff is willing and prepared to serve this Court and the proposed class. 35. Plaintiff has retained the services of counsel who are experienced in consumer protection claims, as well as complex class action litigation, will adequately prosecute this action, and will assert, protect and otherwise represent Plaintiff and all absent class members. 36. Class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(A) and 23(b)(1)(B). The prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the class would, as a practical matter, be dispositive of the interests of other members of the class who are not parties to the action or could substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests. 37. The prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the class would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of the class, which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the parties opposing the class. Such incompatible standards of conduct and varying adjudications, on what would necessarily be the same essential facts, proof and legal theories, would also create and allow the existence of inconsistent and incompatible rights within the class. 38. Class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) in that Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, making final declaratory or injunctive relief appropriate. 40. Moreover, a class action is superior to other methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversies raised in this Complaint in that: (a) individual claims by the class members will be impracticable as the costs of pursuit would far exceed what any one plaintiff or class member has at stake; (b) as a result, very little litigation has been commenced over the controversies alleged in this Complaint and individual members are unlikely to have an interest in prosecuting and controlling separate individual actions; and (c) the concentration of litigation of these claims in one forum will achieve efficiency and promote judicial economy. 41. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges each and every factual allegation above. 42. The FDCPA requires a debt collector to send a consumer, either in the initial communication with the consumer or within five days thereafter, a written notice containing, among other requirements, “a statement that if the consumer notifies the debt collector in writing within the thirty-day period that the debt, or any portion thereof, is disputed, the debt collector will obtain verification of the debt or a copy of a judgment against the consumer and a copy of such verification or judgment will be mailed to the consumer by the debt collector.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(4) (emphasis added). VIOLATION OF 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(4)

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17. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of herself and on behalf of and all others similarly situated (“The Class and Subclass One”). 18. Plaintiff represents, and is a member of, The Class, consisting “of all persons within the United States who received any telephone call from Defendant to said person’s cellular telephone made through the use of any automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice, within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint regarding the collections of alleged debt/s for Wells Fargo credit card accounts”. 19. Defendant, its employees and agents are excluded from The Class. Plaintiff does not know the number of members in The Class, but believes The Class number in the tens of thousands, if not more. Thus, this matter should be certified as a Class action to assist in the expeditious litigation of this matter. 20. Plaintiff and members of The Class were harmed by the acts of Defendant in at least the following ways: Defendant illegally contacted Plaintiff and Class members via their cellular telephones thereby causing Plaintiff and Class members to incur certain cellular telephone charges or reduce cellular telephone time for which Plaintiff and Class members previously paid, by having to retrieve or administer messages left by Defendant during those illegal calls, and invading the privacy of said Plaintiff and Class members. Plaintiff and The Class were damaged thereby. 22. The joinder of the Class members is impractical and the disposition of their claims in the Class action will provide substantial benefits both to the parties and to the court. The Class can be identified through Defendant’s records. 23. There is a well-defined community of interest in the questions of law and fact involved affecting the parties to be represented. The questions of law and fact to the Class predominate over questions which may affect individual Class members, including the following: a. Whether, within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint, Defendant made any call (other than a call made for emergency purposes or made with the prior express consent of the called party) to a Class member using any automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice to any telephone number assigned to a cellular telephone service. b. Whether Plaintiff and the Class were damaged thereby, and the extent of damages for such violation; and c. Whether Defendant should be enjoined from engaging in such conduct in the future. 24. As people that received numerous calls using an automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice, without Plaintiff’s express prior consent, Plaintiff is asserting claims that are typical of the Class. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class in that Plaintiff has no interest antagonistic to any member of the Class. 26. Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in handling class action claims and claims involving violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act. 27. A class action is a superior method for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. Class-wide damages are essential to induce Defendant to comply with federal and California law. The interest of Class members in individually controlling the prosecution of separate claims against Defendant is small because the maximum statutory damages in an individual action for violation of privacy are minimal. Management of these claims is likely to present significantly fewer difficulties than those presented in many class claims. 28. Defendant has acted on grounds generally applicable to the Class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief and corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the Class as a whole. 29. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 30. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant constitute numerous and multiple negligent violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. 31. As a result of Defendant’s negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq, Plaintiff and The Class are entitled to an award of $500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). 33. Plaintiff incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 30 of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 34. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant constitute numerous and multiple knowing and/or willful violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. 35. As a result of Defendant’s knowing and/or willful violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq., Plaintiff and the The Class are entitled to treble damages, as provided by statute, up to $1,500.00, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C). 36. Plaintiff and The Class are also entitled to and seek injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. 8. At all times relevant, Plaintiff Lillian Franklin was an individual residing within the County of San Diego in the State of California. Plaintiff Lillian Franklin is, and at all times mentioned herein was, a “person” as defined by KNOWING AND/OR WILLFUL VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. NEGLIGENT VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. OF THE TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. • As a result of Defendant’s willful and/or knowing violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1), Plaintiff seeks for herself and each Class member treble damages, as provided by statute, up to $1,500.00 for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C). • Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(A), injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. • Any other relief the Court may deem just and proper. �������������������������������������������������������(Do not cite jurisdictional statutes unless diversity)� � ���������������������������

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10. Defendant sought to collect a consumer debt from Plaintiff arising from a medical debt. The debt was incurred primarily for personal, household or family use. The debt was not incurred for any commercial purpose. 11. On or about June 16, 2016, Defendant mailed Plaintiff a demand letter seeking payment of an alleged debt. (The “Demand Letter” is attached hereto as “Exhibit 1”). 12. The Demand Letter states in part: Nuestra empresa es MFMI Collection Service, Inc. xxxx A menos que usted cuestione la validez de la deuda o cualquier parte de la misma, dentro de treinta días a partir de la fecha en que recibe este aviso, MFMI Collection Service, Inc. supondrá que la deuda es válida. Usted debe informarnos por escrito dentro de ese período de 30 días si va a cuestionar esta deuda. Obtendremos la verificación de la deuda o una copia de una sentencia en su contra y le enviaremos una copia de dicha verificación o sentencia. (emphasis added). 14. The reverse side of page 1 of the Demand Letter states in part: Por favor, envíe su pago entre 21 días. 15. Translated to English the reverse side of page 1 of the Demand Letter states in part: Please send your payment within 21 days. 16. The Demand Letter is on the letter head of MFMI, Inc. The Demand Letter is addressed from MFMI, Inc. 17. The Demand Letter states that the Demand Letter is from “MFMI Collection Service, Inc.” and that it is from “MFMI Collection Service.” 18. MFMI, Inc. is not an existing corporation. 19. MFMI, Inc. does not have a consumer debt collection license as mandated by Florida Statutes § 559.553. 20. MFMI Collection Service is not an existing business entity. 21. MFMI Collection Service was registered as a fictitious name in Florida in 1992. The owner of the fictitious name was Defendant, Medical & Financial Management, Inc. 22. The registration of the fictitious name MFMI Collection Service expired in 2007. 23. MFMI Collection Service does not have a consumer debt collection license as mandated by Florida Statutes § 559.553. 25. MFMI Collection Service, Inc. does not have a consumer debt collection license as mandated by Florida Statutes § 559.553. 26. The name of the debt collector Defendant, Medical & Financial Management, Inc., does not appear anywhere on the Demand Letter. 27. The Demand Letter was Defendant’s initial communication with Plaintiff with respect to the debt alleged therein. 29. Defendant’s failure to obtain a consumer debt collection license as mandated by Florida Statutes § 559.553, for MFMI, Inc., MFMI Collection Service and/or MFMI Collection Service, Inc., while actively engaging in debt collection while using the names MFMI, Inc., MFMI Collection Service, and/or MFMI Collection Service, Inc., violates the FDCPA. 30. Defendant’s demand for payment within 21 days overshadows Plaintiff’s 30 day dispute period and therefore violates the FDCPA. 31. Defendant’s statement that Plaintiff “must” (“debe”) notify the Defendant in writing is false and misleading and therefore a violation of the FDCPA as 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(3) contains no writing requirement in order for the Plaintiff to dispute the debt. 32. Defendant’s omission of the phrase that Plaintiff may dispute “any portion thereof” of the debt, as stated in 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(4) is a violation of the FDCPA. 33. Defendant’s statement “Obtendremos la verificación de la deuda o una copia de una sentencia en su contra y le enviaremos una copia de dicha verificación o sentencia.” (We obtain verification of the debt or a copy of a judgment against you and send you a copy of such verification or judgment.) is false and misleading and therefore a violation of the FDPCA as 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(4) requires Plaintiff to request verification of the debt in writing. 35. The Defendant’s Demand Letter fails to disclose that the Defendant is a debt collector, that the letter is an attempt to collect a debt, and that any information obtained will be used to that purpose as required by 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(11), and is therefore a violation of the 39. Plaintiff alleges on information and belief that Defendant’s practice of sending initial communication letters that were purported to be sent by MFMI, Inc. and did not contain the disclosures required by 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a) and 15 U.S.C. § 1692e served upon the Class is so numerous that joinder of all members of the Class is impractical. 40. There are questions of law or fact common to the Class. The common issues predominate over any issues involving only individual Class members. The common legal and factual issue to each Class member is that each was mailed or delivered an initial communication letter by Defendant that purported to be sent by MFMI, Inc. and did not contain the disclosures required by 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a) and 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. 41. Plaintiff’s claim is typical of those of the Class members. All are based on the same facts and legal theories. 43. Certification of the Class under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is also appropriate in that: (1) The questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting an individual member. (2) A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. 44. Plaintiff requests certification of a Class under Rule 23(b)(3), of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for monetary damages; her appointment as Class Representative; and that her attorney Leo W. Desmond be appointed Class Counsel. 45. Plaintiff re-alleges Paragraphs 1 through 37. 47. Pursuant to the FDCPA, the Demand Letter was an initial communication between Defendant and Plaintiff. 48. Defendant’s Demand Letter did not contain the disclosures required by the 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a) and 15 U.S.C. § 1692e of FDCPA. Defendant has attempted to mislead the Plaintiff and the Class into believing that the Demand Letter contained the proper notice required under the FDCPA. 49. Defendant’s Demand Letter would be misleading to the least sophisticated consumer with regard to his/her legal rights as it incorrectly omits that the consumer may dispute any portion of the debt, despite the clear wording of 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(4). 50. Defendant’s statement that Plaintiff “debe” (must) notify the Defendant in writing is false and misleading and therefore a violation of the FDCPA as 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(3) contains no writing requirement in order for the consumer to dispute the debt or any portion thereof. 52. Defendant’s Demand Letter requests payment of the debt within 21 days. 53. Defendant’s demand for payment within 21 days overshadows Plaintiff’s 30 day dispute period and therefore violates 15 U.S.C. § 1692g. 54. As a result of Defendant’s conduct, Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to an award of statutory damages pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692k. 55. As a result of Defendant’s conduct, Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to an award of costs and attorney’s fees pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692k. 56. Plaintiff re-alleges Paragraphs 1 through 37 and 46 through 53. 58. Defendant sent a Demand Letter to Plaintiff that was an initial communication used in the collection of a debt between Defendant and Plaintiff. 59. The Demand Letter is on the letter head of MFMI, Inc. The Demand Letter is addressed from MFMI, Inc. 60. The Demand Letter also claims to be from MFMI Collection Service and MFMI Collection Service, Inc. 61. MFMI, Inc. is not an existing corporation. 62. MFMI, Inc. does not have a consumer debt collection license as mandated by Florida Statutes § 559.553. 63. MFMI Collection Service is not an existing business entity. 64. MFMI Collection Service does not have a consumer debt collection license as mandated by Florida Statutes § 559.553. 66. MFMI Collection Service, Inc. does not have a consumer debt collection license as mandated by Florida Statutes § 559.553. 67. The name of the debt collector Defendant, Medical & Financial Management, Inc., does not appear anywhere on the Demand Letter. 68. The Defendant’s Demand Letter purports to be from MFMI, Inc., MFMI Collection Service, Inc. and/or MFMI Collection Service, none of which is the true name of Defendant Medical & Financial Management, Inc., and is therefore a violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(14). 69. Defendant’s failure to obtain a consumer debt collection license as mandated by Florida Statutes § 559.553, for MFMI, Inc., MFMI Collection Service and/or MFMI Collection Service, Inc., while actively engaging in debt collection while using the names MFMI, Inc. and MFMI Collection Service and/or MFMI Collection Service, Inc., violates 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. 70. Defendant’s statement that Plaintiff “debe” (must) notify the Defendant in writing is misleading and confusing as 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(3) contains no writing requirement to dispute the debt, and therefore violates 15 U.S.C. § 1692e 71. Defendant’s omission of the phrase that Plaintiff may dispute “any portion thereof” of the debt, as stated in 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(4) is misleading and confusing and therefore violates 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. 73. Defendant’s Demand Letter would be deceptive to the least sophisticated consumer with regard to his/her legal rights. 74. As a result of Defendant’s conduct, Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to an award of statutory damages pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692k. 75. As a result of Defendant’s conduct, Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to an award of costs and attorney’s fees pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692k. VIOLATION OF 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a) VIOLATION OF 15 U.S.C. § 1692e

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(Unjust Enrichment) (Violation of Massachusetts Unfair Trade Practices Act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A) 19. Plaintiff repeats and re-allege the allegations contained in the paragraphs above as if fully set forth herein. 20. Mass. Gen. Laws Ch. 93 § 105(a) provides that: No person, firm, partnership, corporation or other business entity that accepts a credit card for a business transaction shall write, cause to be written or require that a credit card holder write personal identification information, not required by the credit card issuer, on the credit card transaction form. Personal identification information shall include, but shall not be limited to, a credit card holder's address or telephone number. The provisions of this section shall apply to all credit card transactions. 21. Williams-Sonoma is a corporation that accepts credit cards for retail transactions. 22. When a consumer used a credit card at Williams-Sonoma’s retail stores in Massachusetts, a Williams-Sonoma employee requested that consumer’s ZIP code. The Williams- Sonoma employee then wrote that ZIP code into the credit card transaction form, which is on the computerized check-out register used to process the point-of-sale transaction. Consumers typically provide this information in the mistaken belief that providing a ZIP code is necessary to complete the transaction. 23. The ZIP code is part of a credit card holder’s address, and is therefore personal identification information under Mass. Gen. Laws Ch. 93 § 105(a). Williams-Sonoma and other retailers are also able to use a customer’s name and ZIP code to determine their address or telephone number by using commercially available databases. 25. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A § 9 provides that: Any person . . . who has been injured by another person’s use or employment of any method, act or practice declared to be unlawful by section two . . . may bring an action in the superior court . . . for damages and such equitable relief, including an injunction, as the court deems to be necessary and proper . . . Any persons entitled to bring such action may, if the use or employment of the unfair or deceptive act or practice has caused similar injury to numerous other persons similarly situated and if the court finds in a preliminary hearing that he adequately and fairly represents such other persons, bring the action on behalf of himself and such other similarly injured and situated persons. 26. Plaintiff and the Class have been injured by Williams-Sonoma's collection of ZIP codes and Defendant’s subsequent use of their personal identification information. Mass. Gen. Laws. Ch. 93 § 105 creates a protected privacy interest held by consumers in not having to divulge personal identification information, including their ZIP codes, merely to use a credit card. In addition, Plaintiff and the Class were injured by Williams-Sonoma appropriation and use of their economically valuable PII without consideration, and the profit derived from Defendant’s use of Plaintiff and the Class’s ZIP codes is a measure of their damages. Plaintiff and the Class were also injured by the receipt of unwanted junk mail from Williams-Sonoma. 28. Plaintiff repeats and re-allege the allegations contained in the paragraphs above as fully set forth herein. 29. Defendant knowingly and willingly accepted benefits from Plaintiff and the Class, to wit, their economically valuable personal identification information which Defendant used for its own profit, while providing Plaintiff and the Class nothing in return. 30. Under the circumstances described herein, it is inequitable for Defendant to retain the full monetary benefit of that information at the expense of Plaintiff and the Class. 31. By engaging in the conduct described above, Defendant has unjustly enriched itself at the expense of Plaintiff and the Class and is required, in equity and good conscience, to compensate Plaintiff and the Class for the appropriation of their PII, the amount of such compensation to be determined at trial. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court enter judgment against Defendant as follows:

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19. Zipcar operates a car rental service in the State of California. Zipcar provides its customers with self-service vehicles located in both suburban and urban locales that may be 1 In California, Zipcar services are available in Arcata, Atherton, Camarillo, Chico, Claremont, Davis, Hayward, Irvine, La Verne, Long Beach, Los Angeles, Northridge, Orange, Pasadena, Point Loma, Riverside, Sacramento, San Diego, San Francisco Bay Area, San Luis Obispo, Santa Barbara, Santa Clara, Santa Cruz, Stanford, and Stockton. See http://www.zipcar.com/cities (last accessed May 8, 2014). Case3:14-cv-02483 Document1 Filed05/29/14 Page5 of 17 27. Bayol brings this action on her own behalf and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated pursuant to the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure § 382 and Civil Code § 1781. Bayol seeks certification of the following class (the “Class”): All California residents who subscribed to and/or are subscribing to Zipcar’s car rental services pursuant to the Membership Agreement, or any successor agreement thereto, and who paid one or more Late Fees imposed by Defendant pursuant to the Membership Agreement. Any judicial officer to whom the Action is assigned is excluded from the Class. 28. Numerosity of the Class: The Class is composed of at least thousands of individuals who are or were subscribers to Zipcar’s Membership Agreement, the joinder of which in one action would be impracticable. The disposition of their claims through this class action will benefit both the parties and the Court. The identities of individual members of the Class is ascertainable through Zipcar’s billing records. 29. Existence and Predominance of Common Questions of Fact and Law: There is a well-defined community of interest in the questions of law and fact involved affecting the members of the proposed Class. The questions of law and fact common to the proposed Class predominate over questions affecting only individual class members. 30. Such questions include, but are not limited to, the following: a. Whether the Zipcar’s Late Fees are illegal, void and unenforceable contractual penalties pursuant to Civil Code § 1671(d); b. Whether damages are extremely difficult or impracticable to determine; c. Whether Zipcar conducted a reasonable endeavor, prior to imposing the Late Fees or including them in the Member Agreement, to fix fair average compensation for Case3:14-cv-02483 Document1 Filed05/29/14 Page7 of 17 34. Bayol incorporates herein by reference the allegations contained in all preceding paragraphs of this complaint. 35. Bayol brings this claim individually and on behalf of the members of the Class against Zipcar. 36. The Late Fees are impermissible liquidated damages provisions under California law. The Late Fees themselves, the contractual provisions that provide for them and their imposition and collection by Zipcar violate Civil Code § 1671(d) and are unlawful, void and unenforceable under that statute. 37. Civil Code § 1671(d) states that a contractual provision, in a contract for the retail purchase or rental of personal property or services primarily for the party’s personal, family, or household purposes, liquidating damages for the breach of the contract, is void except that the parties to such a contract may agree therein on an amount that shall be presumed to be the amount of the damage sustained by a breach thereof, when, from the nature of the cause, it would be impracticable or extremely difficult to fix that actual damage. The Membership Agreement is a contract for the purchase of services primarily for personal, family or household use of Bayol and the members of the Class. 38. If and to the extent that Zipcar suffers, would suffer or has suffered any damages due to late returns by Bayol or members of the Class, it would not be impracticable, nor would it be extremely difficult, to determine them with certainty. Furthermore, the liquidated damages in the Membership Agreement do not reflect a reasonable endeavor by Zipcar to fix fair average compensation for any harm that Zipcar would suffer, may suffer or have suffered, if any, from the late returns. The Membership Agreement is a contract of adhesion drafted by Zipcar and/or its parents, subsidiaries or affiliates and presented to prospective members on a “take it or leave it” basis with no opportunity for any prospective member to negotiate any of its terms and conditions. The Late Fees provision in the Membership Agreement is a liquidated damages provision that fails to comply with the standards set forth in Civil Code § 1671(d), and therefore Case3:14-cv-02483 Document1 Filed05/29/14 Page9 of 17 40. Bayol incorporates herein by reference the allegations contained in all preceding paragraphs of this complaint. 41. Bayol brings this claim individually and on behalf of the members of the Class against Zipcar. 42. Zipcar has engaged in deceptive practices, unlawful methods of competition and/or unfair acts as defined by Civil Code § 1750, et seq., to the detriment of Bayol and the members of the Class. Bayol and the members of the Class have suffered harm as a proximate result of the violations of law and wrongful conduct of Zipcar alleged herein. Case3:14-cv-02483 Document1 Filed05/29/14 Page10 of 17 47. Bayol incorporates herein by reference the allegations contained in all preceding paragraphs of this complaint. 48. Bayol brings this claim individually and on behalf of the members of the Class against Zipcar. Case3:14-cv-02483 Document1 Filed05/29/14 Page11 of 17 57. Bayol incorporates herein by reference the allegations contained in all preceding paragraphs of this complaint. 58. Bayol brings this claim individually and on behalf of the members of the Class against Zipcar. 59. The conduct of Zipcar, as herein alleged, constitutes an unfair business practice within the meaning of Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200, et seq. 60. Zipcar violated the “unfair” prong of the UCL by requiring members to enter into contracts of adhesion that include the Late Fees provision, by enforcing the contractual Case3:14-cv-02483 Document1 Filed05/29/14 Page13 of 17 Unfair Business Practices in Violation of Business and Professions Code §§ 17200 et seq. Unlawful Business Practices in Violation of the Unfair Competition Law California Business and Professions Code §§ 17200 et seq. Violation of the Consumers Legal Remedies Act, California Civil Code §§ 1750 et seq. (Injunctive relief only) Violation of California Civil Code § 1671(d)

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10. According to data from the Federal Trade Commission's 2012 Consumer Sentinel Network report, Florida ranks No. 1 for identity theft among the 50 states, with 361.3 complaints per 100,000 people. That's 86 percent more than Georgia, which ranks a distant second. Also, nine of the top 10 metro areas for identity theft are in Florida, according to the report. First is the Miami area with 645.4 complaints per 100,000 people.1 11. So problematic is the crime of identity theft that the three main credit reporting agencies, Experian, Equifax, and Transunion, joined to set-up a free website (<http://www.annualcreditreport.com>) in order to comply with FACTA requirements and to provide the citizens of this country with a means of monitoring their credit reports for possible identity theft. B. Plaintiff’s Factual Allegations 13. At all times relevant herein, Defendant was acting by and though its agents, servants and/or employees, each of which were acting within the course and scope of their agency or employment, and under the direct supervision and control of the Defendant. 14. At all times relevant herein, the conduct of the Defendant, as well as that of its agents, servants and/or employees, was in willful and reckless disregard for federal law and the rights of the Plaintiff. 15. It is Defendant’s policy and procedure to issue an electronically printed receipt to individuals at the point of sale – i.e., immediately upon receipt of credit card payment. 16. Consistent with Defendant’s policy and procedure, Defendant knowingly and intentionally includes credit and debit card expiration dates on its electronically printed receipts. 17. Along with the expiration date, the receipt generated at the point of sale also displays certain other sensitive information, including the consumer’s name, address, telephone number, type of credit card, and date of service. 19. The fact that Defendant chose to comply with the credit card number redaction requirement is highly suggestive of the fact that LabCorp had knowledge of the statute’s requirements. Moreover, unlike some more nebulous FACTA- related issues (e.g., whether the statute covers “membership cards” – See Hammer v. Sam’s East, Inc., No. 13-3724 (8th Cir., June 5, 2014)), the requirement to redact expiration dates could not be any more straightforward - the statute expressly prohibits display of a credit card’s expiration date, supra. 20. Upon information and belief, the FTC specifically alerted businesses about the truncation requirement; major credit card issuers (e.g., American Express) also explicitly instructed merchants on the requirements of FACTA, and; Defendant therefore would have received multiple notices regarding the truncation requirement and the importance of identity theft. 22. Notwithstanding the fact that it has had years to comply, Defendant continues to issue receipts at points of sale transaction, which contain the expiration date of credit or debit cards, in direct violation of the Receipt Provision of the FCRA. 23. Notwithstanding the Receipt Provision, Defendant continues to deliberately, willfully, intentionally, and/or recklessly violate FACTA by issuing receipts which to not comply with the FCRA. 24. Notwithstanding the Receipt Provision and the fact that it had years to comply, Defendant continues to act in conscious disregard for the rights of others. 25. In sum, Defendant knowingly and intentionally violated the Receipt Provision of FACTA, in conscious disregard for the rights and privacy concerns of others, and in doing so, committed willful violation of the FACTA provision of the FCRA. See Reynolds v. Hartford Financial Services Grp., 435 F.3d 1081, 1098 (9th Cir. 2006). V. 27. The named Plaintiff falls within the Class definition and is a member of the class. Excluded from the Class are Defendant and any entities in which Defendant has a controlling interest, Defendant’s agents and employees, Plaintiff’s attorneys and their employees, the Judge to whom this action is assigned and any member of the Judge’s staff and immediate family, and claims for personal injury, wrongful death, and/or emotional distress. A. Certification Under Either Rule 23(b)(2) or (b)(3) is Proper. 28. The members of the class are capable of being described without managerial or administrative problems. The members of the class are readily ascertainable from the information and records in the possession, custody or control of Defendant. 30. There are common questions of law and fact which predominate over any questions affecting only the individual members of the classes. The wrongs alleged against Defendants are statutory in nature and common to each and every member of the respective classes. 31. This suit seeks only statutory damages and injunctive relief on behalf of the Class and it expressly is not intended to request any recovery for personal injury and claims related thereto. Plaintiff reserves the right to expand the Class definition to seek recovery on behalf of additional persons as warranted as facts are learned in further investigation and discovery. 33. As a person that utilized Defendant’s laboratory services and received a receipt upon which the expiration date of his card was printed, Plaintiff is asserting claims that are typical of the proposed Class. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class in that Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to any member of the Class. 34. The principal question is whether the Defendant violated section 1681c(g) of the FCRA by providing class members with electronically printed receipts in violation of the Receipt Provision. The secondary question is whether it is Defendant's policy and practice to provide such electronically printed receipts to consumers that make payment using a credit or debit card, despite the advice of one of the nation’s largest law firms, and whether this policy and practice constitutes willful noncompliance of the FCRA. 36. Defendant’s defenses are and will be typical of and the same or identical for each of the members of the class and will be based on the same legal and factual theories. There are no unique defenses to any of the class members’ claims. 37. A class action is a superior method for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. Class-wide damages are essential to induce Defendant to comply with federal and California law. The interest of Class members in individually controlling the prosecution of separate claims against Defendant is small. The maximum statutory damages in an individual action for a violation of this statute is minimal. Management of these claims is likely to present significantly fewer difficulties than those presented in many class claims. Defendant has acted on grounds generally applicable to the Class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief and corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the Class as a whole. 39. This section applies to any “device that electronically prints receipts” (hereafter “Devices”) for point of sale transactions. 15 U.S.C. §1681c(g)(3). 40. Defendant employs the use of said Devices for point of sale transactions at the various locations of Defendant. 41. On or before the date on which this complaint was filed, Plaintiff and members of the Class were provided receipt(s) by Defendant that failed to comply with the Receipt Provision. 42. At all times relevant to this action, Defendant was aware, or should have been aware, of both the Receipt Provision as well as the need to comply with said provision. 43. Notwithstanding the three year period to prepare for FACTA and its accompanying provisions, including but not limited to the Receipt Provision; knowledge of the Receipt Provision and FACTA as a whole; and the actions of Defendant’s peers and competitors, Defendant knowingly, willfully, intentionally, and/or recklessly violated and continues to violate the FCRA and the Receipt Provision. 6. In 2003, FACTA was enacted by Congress, and signed into law by President George W. Bush. One of FACTA’s primary purposes was to amend the FCRA through the addition of identity theft protections for consumers. 7. One such FACTA provision was specifically designed to thwart identity thieves’ ability to gain sensitive information regarding a consumer’s credit or bank account from a receipt provided to the consumer during a point of sale transaction, which, through any number of ways, could fall into the hands of someone other than the consumer. 9. After enactment, FACTA provided three years in which to comply with its requirements, mandating full compliance with its provisions no later than December 4, 2006. A. Statutory Background

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(Violations of the FDCPA) 11. The debt collection notices and/or letters/communications from Defendant, received by the Class, are to be evaluated by the objective standard of the hypothetical “least sophisticated consumer.” 12. There are questions of law and fact which are common to the Class and which predominate over questions affecting any individual Class member. These common questions of law and fact include, without limitation: (i) Whether Defendant violated various provisions of the FDCPA; (ii) Whether Plaintiff and the Class have been injured by Defendant’s conduct; (c) Whether Plaintiff and the Class have sustained damages and are entitled to restitution as a result of Defendant’s wrongdoing and, if so, what is the proper measure and appropriate statutory formula to be applied in determining such damages and restitution; and, (iv) Whether Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to declaratory and/or injunctive relief. 13. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the Class, and Plaintiff has no interests adverse or antagonistic to the interests of other members of the Class. 14. A class action is superior to other methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the claims herein asserted, this being specifically envisioned by Congress as a principal means of enforcing the FDCPA, as codified by 15 U.S.C. § 1692(k). 15. The members of the Class are generally unsophisticated individuals, whose rights will not be vindicated in the absence of a class action. 17. A class action will permit a large number of similarly situated persons to prosecute their common claims in a single forum simultaneously, efficiently, and without the duplication of effort and expense that numerous individual actions would engender. Class treatment also will permit the adjudication of relatively small claims by many Class members who could not otherwise afford to seek legal redress for the wrongs complained of herein. 18. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent the Class members’ interests, in that the Plaintiff’s counsel is experienced and, further, anticipates no impediments in the pursuit and maintenance of the class action as sought herein. 19. Absent a class action, the Class members will continue to suffer losses borne from Defendant’s breaches of Class members' statutorily protected rights as well as monetary damages, thus allowing and enabling: (a) Defendant’s conduct to proceed and; (b) Defendant to further enjoy the benefit of its ill-gotten gains. 20. Defendant has acted, and will act, on grounds generally applicable to the entire Class, thereby making appropriate a final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the Class as a whole. 21. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs numbered “1” through “20” herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 22. Upon information and belief, Defendant, on behalf of a third-party, began efforts to collect an alleged consumer debt from the Plaintiff. 24. Defendant’s aforementioned letter bore a “Re” of: “Ng Guide To Brain Health Dix.” 25. Defendant’s aforementioned letter contained the following language: “Apparently someone has led you to believe that creditors like National Geographic Society will eventually forget about the money you owe them. Please let us correct that mistaken idea. Our client has employed us to make sure you know this account will not be forgotten. In fact, we have been specifically requested to pursue additional collections. Consider your position in this matter. 1) You requested and received merchandise or services from our client. 2) You were properly billed for this purchase. 3) Despite numerous requests, you have not paid this legitimate debt. These are facts, and they leave no justification for your lack of response. So, it only makes good sense to settle this matter at once by sending in your payment along with the bottom portion of this letter.” 26. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs numbered “1” through “25” herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 29. 15 USC §1692 e – preface prohibits a debt collector from using any false, deceptive or misleading representation or means in the connection with the collection of any debt. 31. 15 USC §1692 e (7) prohibits a debt collector from any false representation or implication that the consumer is guilty of disreputable conduct in order to disgrace the consumer while attempting to collect a debt. 32. Defendant violated 15 USC §1692 e (7) by indicating that Plaintiff has “apparently” been “led to believe” that creditors will forget debts and it is Defendant’s express job to disabuse them of this fantasy and “make sure you know this account will not be forgotten,” followed by a claim that the “facts” indicate that the consumer has refused to pay a “legitimate” debt and has “no justification” for not paying. Defendant’s language is deliberately and purposefully designed to embarrass, disgrace and shame consumers and to disparage the consumer’s character by stating that it has been unequivocally determined, without a doubt, that the consumer has behaved in a disgraceful, disrespectable and dishonorable manner and essentially, is guilty of what amounts to attempting to steal merchandise. 33. 15 USC §1692 f – preface prohibits a debt collector from using any unfair or unconscionable means in connection with the collection of a debt. 8. Plaintiff brings this action as a class action, pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) Rule 23, on behalf of herself and all persons/consumers, along with their successors-in-interest, who have received similar debt collection notices and/or letters/communications from Defendant which, as alleged herein, are in violation of the FDCPA, as of the date of Plaintiff’s Complaint (the “Class”). Excluded from the Class is Defendant herein, and any person, firm, trust, corporation, or other entity related to or affiliated with the defendant, including, without limitation, persons who are officers, directors, employees, associates or partners of Defendant. Upon information and belief, hundreds of persons have received debt collection notices and/or letters/communications from Defendant, which violate various provisions of the FDCPA. 9. This Class satisfies all the requirements of FRCP Rule 23 for maintaining a class action.

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PLAINTIFF DEFENDANT (EXCEPT IN U.S. PLAINTIFF CASES) 1. Unusually large number of parties. 10. Existence of highly technical issues and proof. 2. Unusually large number of claims or defenses. 3. Factual issues are exceptionally complex 3. VALIDITY OR INFRINGEMENT OF THE SAME PATENT, COPYRIGHT OR TRADEMARK INCLUDED IN AN EARLIER NUMBERED PENDING SUIT. 4. APPEALS ARISING OUT OF THE SAME BANKRUPTCY CASE AND ANY CASE RELATED THERETO WHICH HAVE BEEN DECIDED BY THE SAME BANKRUPTCY JUDGE. 4. Greater than normal volume of evidence. 5. Extended discovery period is needed. 6. Problems locating or preserving evidence 7. Pending parallel investigations or actions by government. 8. Multiple use of experts. 9. Need for discovery outside United States boundaries. IV. ORIGIN (PLACE AN “X “IN ONE BOX ONLY) TRANSFERRED FROM MULTIDISTRICT APPEAL TO DISTRICT JUDGE 1 ORIGINAL JURISDICTIONAL STATUTES UNLESS DIVERSITY) (IF COMPLEX, CHECK REASON BELOW) OTHER STATUTES - "4" MONTHS DISCOVERY TRACK 375 FALSE CLAIMS ACT 376 Qui Tam 31 USC 3729(a)

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11. Defendant owns and operates an oilfield services company that operates in this District and throughout Texas and does more than $500,000.00 in business per year. 12. Plaintiffs and Class Members worked as “field supervisors” for Defendant at various job sites in this District and throughout Texas. 13. Despite being called “supervisors,” Plaintiffs and Class Members did not have any hiring or firing authority nor were their suggestions or recommendations as to the hiring, firing, advancement, promotion, or any other change of status of other employees given particular weight. 18. Plaintiffs and Class Members were subjected to the same pay provisions in that they were paid under the same pay plan and were not paid at time-and-one-half their regular rates of pay for hours worked in excess of 40 hours in a workweek. Specifically, Plaintiffs and Class Members were all paid a set salary and not paid for their overtime hours worked. Accordingly, Class Members who were victimized by Defendant’s unlawful pattern and practices are similarly situated to Plaintiffs. 19. In addition to Plaintiffs, Accel employed several other field supervisors within the past three years. These other field supervisors performed job duties similar to the field supervisor duties performed by Plaintiffs. Accel paid all its field supervisors a salary with no overtime pay, the same pay system that Accel applied to Plaintiffs. Therefore, the Class Members are similarly situated to Plaintiffs.

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2.1 guidelines; c. Regularly test user accessibility by blind or vision-impaired persons to ensure that Defendant’s Website complies under the WCAG 2.1 guidelines; and, d. Develop an accessibility policy that is clearly disclosed on Defendant’s Websites, with contact information for users to report accessibility-related problems. 21. Defendant is a kitchen appliance company that owns and operates www.thermomix.com (its “Website”), offering features which should allow all consumers to access the goods and services and which Defendant ensures the delivery of such goods throughout the United States, including New York State. 22. Defendant’s Website offers products and services for online sale and general delivery to the public. The Website offers features which ought to allow users to browse for items, access navigation bar descriptions, inquire about pricing, and avail consumers of the ability to peruse the numerous items offered for sale. 23. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient NVDA screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using a screen-reader. 24. On multiple occasions, the last occurring in January of 2020, Plaintiff visited Defendant’s website, www.thermomix.com, to make a purchase. Despite her efforts, however, Plaintiff was denied a shopping experience similar to that of a sighted individual due to the website’s lack of a variety of features and accommodations, which effectively barred Plaintiff from being able to determine what specific products were offered for sale. 26. Many features on the Website also fail to Add a label element or title attribute for each field. This is a problem for the visually impaired because the screen reader fails to communicate the purpose of the page element. It also leads to the user not being able to understand what he or she is expected to insert into the subject field. As a result, Plaintiff and similarly situated visually impaired users of Defendant’s Website are unable to enjoy the privileges and benefits of the Website equally to sighted users. 27. Many pages on the Website also contain the same title elements. This is a problem for the visually impaired because the screen reader fails to distinguish one page from another. In order to fix this problem, Defendant must change the title elements for each page. 28. The Website also contained a host of broken links, which is a hyperlink to a non- existent or empty webpage. For the visually impaired this is especially paralyzing due to the inability to navigate or otherwise determine where one is on the website once a broken link is encountered. For example, upon coming across a link of interest, Plaintiff was redirected to an error page. However, the screen-reader failed to communicate that the link was broken. As a result, Plaintiff could not get back to her original search. 29. These access barriers effectively denied Plaintiff the ability to use and enjoy Defendant’s website the same way sighted individuals do. 31. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s Website, blind and visually-impaired customers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, products, and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from equal access to the Website. 32. If the Website were equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 33. Through her attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 35. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 36. The ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks in this action. In relevant part, the ADA requires: In the case of violations of . . . this title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities . . . Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the . . . modification of a policy . . . 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 38. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 39. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining their Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making their Website equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 40. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 42. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered, during the relevant statutory period. 43. Common questions of law and fact exist amongst the Class, including: a. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “public accommodation” under the ADA; b. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “place or provider of public accommodation” under the NYCHRL; c. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the ADA; and d. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the NYCHRL. 44. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class. The Class, similarly to the Plaintiff, are severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA or NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so either can be independently accessible to the Class. 46. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 47. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 48. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 49. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 51. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 52. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 53. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 55. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 56. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 57. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 58. Defendant’s Website is a sales establishment and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9). 59. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates its Website, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 61. Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). 62. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the Sub- Class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 63. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 65. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes her right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 66. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 67. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 68. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 69. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the Class and New York City Sub-Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 71. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq.

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26. Defendant’s text messages were transmitted to Plaintiffs’ cellular telephone, and within the time frame relevant to this action. 27. Defendant’s text messages constitute telemarketing because they encouraged the future purchase or investment in property, goods, or services, i.e., selling Plaintiffs insurance services. 28. The information contained in the text message advertises Defendant’s various insurance plans, which Defendant sends to promote its business. 29. Plaintiffs received the subject texts within this judicial district and, therefore, Defendant’s violation of the TCPA occurred within this district. Upon information and belief, Defendant caused other text messages to be sent to individuals residing within this judicial district. 30. At no point in time did Plaintiffs provide Defendant with their express written consent to be contacted using an ATDS. 31. Plaintiff Catalina Atehortua is the subscriber and sole user of the 6585 Number and is financially responsible for phone service to the 6585 Number. 32. Plaintiff Catalina Atehortua has been registered with the national do-not-call registry since September 12, 2009. 33. Plaintiff Randal Murallo is the subscriber and sole user of the 6249 Number and is financially responsible for phone service to the 6249 Number. 35. The text messages originated from telephone number 974-18, a number which upon information and belief is owned and operated by Defendant. 36. The number used by Defendant (974-18) is known as a “short code,” a standard 5-digit code that enables Defendant to send SMS text messages en masse, while deceiving recipients into believing that the message was personalized and sent from a telephone number operated by an individual. 37. Short codes work as follows: Private companies known as SMS gateway providers have contractual arrangements with mobile carriers to transmit two-way SMS traffic. These SMS gateway providers send and receive SMS traffic to and from the mobile phone networks' SMS centers, which are responsible for relaying those messages to the intended mobile phone. This allows for the transmission of a large number of SMS messages to and from a short code. 38. Specifically, upon information and belief, Defendant utilized a combination of hardware and software systems to send the text messages at issue in this case. The systems utilized by Defendant have the capacity to store telephone numbers using a random or sequential generator, and to dial such numbers from a list without human intervention. 40. Plaintiffs bring this case as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated. 41. Plaintiffs bring this case on behalf of a Class defined as follows: No Consent Class: All persons who from four years prior to the filing of this action (1) were sent a text message by or on behalf of Defendant, (2) using an automatic telephone dialing system, (3) for the purpose of soliciting their purchase of a Defendant membership, and (4) for whom Defendant claims (a) it did not obtain prior express written consent, or (b) it obtained prior express written consent in the same manner as Defendant claims it supposedly obtained prior express written consent to call the Plaintiff. Do Not Call Registry Class: All persons in the United States who from four years prior to the filing of this action (1) were sent a text message by or on behalf of Defendant; (2) more than one time within any 12-month period; (3) where the person’s telephone number had been listed on the National Do Not Call Registry for at least thirty days; (4) for the purpose of selling Defendant’s products and services; and (5) for whom Defendant claims (a) it did not obtain prior express written consent, or (b) it obtained prior express written consent in the same manner as Defendant claims it supposedly obtained prior express written consent to call the Plaintiff. 42. Defendant and its employees or agents are excluded from the Class. Plaintiffs do not know the number of members in the Class but believes the Class members number in the several thousands, if not more. 45. There are numerous questions of law and fact common to the Class which predominate over any questions affecting only individual members of the Class. Among the questions of law and fact common to the Class are: (1) Whether Defendant made non-emergency calls to Plaintiffs’ and Class members’ cellular telephones using an ATDS; (2) Whether Defendant can meet its burden of showing that it obtained prior express written consent to make such calls; (3) Whether Defendant’s conduct was knowing and willful; (4) Whether Defendant is liable for damages, and the amount of such damages; and (5) Whether Defendant should be enjoined from such conduct in the future. 46. The common questions in this case are capable of having common answers. If Plaintiffs’ claim that Defendant routinely transmits text messages to telephone numbers assigned to cellular telephone services is accurate, Plaintiffs and the Class members will have identical claims capable of being efficiently adjudicated and administered in this case. 51. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 52. It is a violation of the TCPA to make “any call (other than a call made for emergency purposes or made with the prior express consent of the called party) using any automatic telephone dialing system … to any telephone number assigned to a … cellular telephone service ….” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). 54. These calls were made without regard to whether or not Defendant had first obtained express permission from the called party to make such calls. In fact, Defendant did not have prior express consent to call the cell phones of Plaintiffs and the other members of the putative Class when its calls were made. 55. Defendant has, therefore, violated § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) of the TCPA by using an automatic telephone dialing system to make non-emergency telephone calls to the cell phones of Plaintiffs and the other members of the putative Class without their prior express written consent. 56. Defendant knew that it did not have prior express consent to make these calls and knew or should have known that it was using equipment that at constituted an automatic telephone dialing system. The violations were therefore willful or knowing. 57. As a result of Defendant’s conduct and pursuant to § 227(b)(3) of the TCPA, Plaintiffs and the other members of the putative Class were harmed and are each entitled to a minimum of $500.00 in damages for each violation. Plaintiffs and the class are also entitled to an injunction against future calls. Id. 58. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate paragraphs 1-50 as if fully set forth herein. 59. At all times relevant, Defendant knew or should have known that its conduct as alleged herein violated the TCPA. 60. Defendant knew that it did not have prior express consent to make these calls and knew or should have known that its conduct was a violation of the TCPA. 62. As a result of Defendant’s violations, Plaintiffs and the Class Members are entitled to an award of $1,500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C). 63. Plaintiff Catalina Atehortua repeats and realleges the paragraphs 1 through 50 of this Complaint and incorporates them by reference herein. 64. The TCPA’s implementing regulation, 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c), provides that “[n]o person or entity shall initiate any telephone solicitation” to “[a] residential telephone subscriber who has registered his or her telephone number on the national do-not-call registry of persons who do not wish to receive telephone solicitations that is maintained by the federal government.” 65. 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(e), provides that § 64.1200(c) and (d) “are applicable to any person or entity making telephone solicitations or telemarketing calls to wireless telephone numbers.”1 66. 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(d) further provides that “[n]o person or entity shall initiate any call for telemarketing purposes to a residential telephone subscriber unless such person or entity has instituted procedures for maintaining a list of persons who request not to receive telemarketing calls made by or on behalf of that person or entity.” 68. Defendant violated 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c) by initiating, or causing to be initiated, telephone solicitations to telephone subscribers such as Plaintiff Catalina Atehortua and the Do Not Call Registry Class members who registered their respective telephone numbers on the National Do Not Call Registry, a listing of persons who do not wish to receive telephone solicitations that is maintained by the federal government. 69. Defendant violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5) because Plaintiff Catalina Atehortua and the Do Not Call Registry Class received more than one telephone call in a 12-month period made by or on behalf of Defendant in violation of 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200, as described above. As a result of Defendant’s conduct as alleged herein, Plaintiff Catalina Atehortua and the Do Not Call Registry Class suffered actual damages and, under section 47 U.S.C. § 227(c), are entitled, inter alia, to receive up to $500 in damages for such violations of 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200. 70. To the extent Defendant’s misconduct is determined to be willful and knowing, the Court should, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5), treble the amount of statutory damages recoverable by the members of the Do Not Call Registry Class. WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs, Catalina Atehortua and Randal Murallo, on behalf of themselves and the other members of the Class, pray for the following relief: a. A declaration that Defendant’s practices described herein violate the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227; b. An injunction prohibiting Defendant from using an automatic telephone dialing system to call and text message telephone numbers assigned to cellular telephones without the prior express permission of the called party; c. An award of actual and statutory damages; and d. Such further and other relief the Court deems reasonable and just. Knowing and/or Willful Violation of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) (On Behalf of Plaintiffs and the Class) PROPOSED CLASS Violation of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227 (On Behalf of Plaintiff Catalina Atehortua and the Do Not Call Registry Class) Violations of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) (On Behalf of Plaintiffs and the Class)

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10. After approximately 90 days of placement with Yanfeng Automotive, Defendant informed Plaintiff that Yanfeng intended to proceed with hiring Plaintiff on a full time basis. 11. As part of its employment application process, Defendant requires full time employees such as Plaintiff to submit to a background check wherein information pertaining to character, general reputation, personal characteristics and/or mode of living are reviewed and used to determine, together with other factors, whether to hire an applicant. 12. In or around June 2017, Defendant advised Plaintiff it would be performing a background check on Plaintiff. 14. Said consumer report was to be used by Defendant to assist in determining Plaintiff’s fitness for the full time position, and to assist in determining whether to continue to hire Plaintiff for a position of employment. 15. After receiving and reviewing the consumer report obtained regarding Plaintiff, Defendant intended to deny Plaintiff the employment opportunity based in whole or in part on the aforesaid consumer report. 16. On or about June 28, 2017, Defendant made a determination not to hire Plaintiff. 17. At no time after making the determination not to hire Plaintiff did Defendant provide any oral, written, or electronic notice to Plaintiff of the name, address and telephone number of the consumer reporting agency that furnished the consumer report to Defendant that was used in whole or in part to deny Plaintiff employment. 18. At no time after making the determination not to hire Plaintiff did Defendant provide Plaintiff oral, written, or electronic notice of the Plaintiff’s right to obtain a free copy of the report on Plaintiff from the consumer reporting agency that furnished the consumer report to Defendant that was used in whole or in part to deny Plaintiff employment. 19. Prior to taking any action on Plaintiff’s employment application to deny Plaintiff the employment opportunity, Defendant failed to provide Plaintiff a copy of the consumer report to Plaintiff. 20. Prior to taking any action on Plaintiff’s employment application to deny Plaintiff the employment opportunity, Defendant failed to provide to Plaintiff a description in writing of the rights of Plaintiff under the FCRA. 22. As a result of Defendant’s conduct, as delineated above, Plaintiff has suffered actual damages in the form of financial and dignitary harm arising from the Defendant’s review of his personal information and an injury to his reputation, and Defendant’s failure to provide Plaintiff the requisite disclosures and an opportunity to spare his good name and obtain meaningful employment. Furthermore, Plaintiff will continue to suffer the same harm for an indefinite time in the future, all to Plaintiff’s great detriment and loss. 23. In conducting a background check and obtaining a consumer report on Plaintiff for purposes of employment, Defendant violated the FCRA in one or more of the following ways: a. Failed to provide the Plaintiff with a copy of the report procured for employment purposes prior to taking any adverse action against the Plaintiff in violation of 15 U.S.C. §1681b(b)(3)(A)(i); b. Failed to provide the Plaintiff, prior to taking any adverse action against the Plaintiff, with a description in writing of the rights of Plaintiff under the Fair Credit Reporting Act in violation of 15 U.S.C. §1681b(b)(3)(A)(ii); c. Otherwise negligently and willfully violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act. V. 24. Plaintiff brings this action individually and on behalf of a class of individuals pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 26. The class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impractical. Upon information and belief, Defendant has used consumer reports in order to screen hundreds, possibly thousands, of potential employees. 27. There are questions of law and fact common the Class that predominate over any questions affecting only individual Class members. The principal question at issue is whether Defendant violated the FCRA by failing to provide proper pre-adverse action notice, to Class members during the applicable time period as alleged. 28. Plaintiff’s claim is typical of the claims for the Class, which arise from the same operative facts and are predicated on the same legal theories. 29. There are no individual questions of fact, other than whether a Class member did not receive pre-adverse action notice, which can be determined by a ministerial inspection of Defendant’s records. 30. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class. Plaintiff is committed to vigorously prosecuting this matter and has retained counsel experience in handling class actions and claims involving unlawful business practices. Neither Plaintiff nor counsel for Plaintiff have any interests that might cause them to not vigorously pursue this claim. 32. A class action is a superior method for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. The identities of individual Class members may be easily obtained from Defendant’s records. VI. 8. Defendant is a recruitment agency, providing recruitment services for its clients by seeking candidates for temporary and full time employment. 9. In or around March 2017, Plaintiff was employed by Defendant and placed with Yanfeng Automotive.

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(Breach of Implied Contract) (Negligence) (State Consumer Protection Laws) (State Data Breach Notification Statutes) 16. Based on a public notice announcing the breach Trump published on September 29, 2015, and upon information and belief, from at least May 19, 2014 to June 2, 2015, unauthorized malware had access to payment card information as it was inputted into payment card systems at the Properties. This resulted in the compromise of payment card data (including payment card account number, card expiration date, and security code) of individuals who used a payment card at the Properties. For transactions at certain Properties, cardholder name and other PII may also have been compromised. 17. According to Trump, months elapsed between the time Consumer Plaintiffs’ and Class members’ PII was improperly accessed and the time Defendants disseminated notice of the unauthorized PII access. Defendants’ unwarranted delay in notifying Consumer Plaintiffs and Class members about the unauthorized PII disclosure deprived them of the opportunity to take effective remedial action to reduce the short and long term risk of further fraudulent activity. II. The Breach Was Entirely Avoidable and Foreseeable by Defendants. 19. These security flaws and other infirmities were explicitly outlined by Visa, as early as 2009, when it issued a Data Security Alert outlining the threat of RAM scraper malware.2 The report instructs companies to “[s]ecure remote access connectivity,” “[i]mplement a secure network configuration, including egress and ingress filtering to only allow the ports/services necessary to conduct business” (i.e., segregate networks), “actively monitor logs of network components, including IDS [intrusion detection systems] and firewalls for suspicious traffic, particularly outbound traffic to unknown addresses,” “[e]ncrypt cardholder data anywhere it is being stored and [] implement[] a data field encryption solution to directly address cardholder data in transit” and “[w]ork with your payment application vendor to ensure security controls are in place to prevent unauthorized modification to the payment application configuration.” 20. Despite the simplicity of these security flaws and Visa’s warning about their existence and potential danger, Defendants failed to take any corrective action and instead neglected their network security and failed to protect Consumer Plaintiffs and the Class. 22. All merchants that accept customer payments via payment cards, including Defendants, are obligated and required to comply with the Payment Card Industry Data Security Standards (the “PCI DSS”). How to Be Compliant: Getting Started with PCI Data Security Standard Compliance, PCI SSC, available at. pcisecuritystandards.org/merchants/how_to_be_compliant.php (last visited June 24, 2015) (stating “[i]f you are a merchant that accepts payment cards, you are required to be complaint with the PCI [DSS].”). Compliance with the PCI DSS is common practice in the retail industry. 23. The PCI DSS, among other things, mandates merchants to protect cardholder data, PCI DSS v. 3.0 at 34 (Nov. 2013),3 requires merchants to install and maintain firewalls, id. at 19, forbids merchants from using default settings and passwords for applications and devices, id. at 28, requires merchants to segment cardholder data, id. at 61, and requires merchants to identify and authenticate their system users. Id. at 64. 24. To adhere to the PCI DSS, a merchant must, inter alia: First, Assess -- identify cardholder data, take an inventory of your IT assets and business processes for payment card processing, and analyze them for vulnerabilities that could expose cardholder data. Second, Remediate -- fix vulnerabilities and do not store cardholder data unless you need it. Third, Report -- compile and submit required remediation validation records (if applicable), and submit compliance reports to the acquiring bank and card brands you do business with. (emphasis in original). How to Be Compliant: Getting Started with PCI Data Security Standard Compliance, PCI 51. Certification of Consumer Plaintiffs’ claims for class-wide treatment is appropriate because Consumer Plaintiffs can prove the elements of their claims on class-wide bases using the same evidence as would be used to prove those elements in individual actions alleging the same claims. 52. The members of the Classes are so numerous that joinder of all members of the Classes is impracticable. Consumer Plaintiffs are informed and believe that the proposed Classes contain thousands of purchasers who used payment cards to complete purchases at Defendants’ Properties who have been damaged by Defendants’ conduct as alleged herein. The precise number of Class members is unknown to Consumer Plaintiffs, but may be ascertained from Defendants’ records. 54. Defendants engaged in a common course of conduct giving rise to the claims asserted by Consumer Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and the other Class members. Individual questions, if any, pale by comparison, in both quality and quantity, to the numerous common questions that dominate this action. 56. Consumer Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the members of the Classes, have retained counsel experienced in complex consumer class action litigation, and intend to prosecute this action vigorously. Consumer Plaintiffs have no adverse or antagonistic interests to those of the Classes. 57. A class action is superior to all other available means for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. The damages or other financial detriment suffered by individual Class members are relatively small compared to the burden and expense that would be entailed by individual litigation of their claims against Defendants. It would thus be virtually impossible for the Class members, on an individual basis, to obtain effective redress for the wrongs done to them. Individualized litigation would create the danger of inconsistent or contradictory judgments arising from the same set of facts and would also increase the delay and expense to all parties and the courts. By contrast, the class action device provides the benefits of adjudication of these issues in a single proceeding, ensures economies of scale and comprehensive supervision by a single court, and presents no unusual management difficulties under the circumstances here. 58. Consumer Plaintiffs seek preliminary and permanent injunctive and equitable relief on behalf of the Classes, preventing Defendants from further engaging in the acts described and requiring Defendants to provide full restitution to Consumer Plaintiffs and the other Class members. 59. Unless the Classes are certified, Defendants will retain monies received as a result of their conduct that were taken from Consumer Plaintiffs and the other Class members. Unless Class-wide injunctions are issued, Defendants will continue to commit the violations alleged, and the members of the Classes and the general public will continue to be deceived and injured. 61. Consumer Plaintiffs incorporate by reference and reassert all previous paragraphs. 62. Consumer Plaintiffs and members of the Classes are consumers who used their credit and/or debit cards to purchase products from Defendants, primarily for personal, family or household purposes. 63. Defendants engaged in the conduct alleged above in transactions intended to result, and which did result, in the sale of goods and services to consumers, including Consumer Plaintiffs and the Class. 64. This course of conduct also affects trade and commerce, nationally and in Illinois. Defendants’ actions and/or inactions regarding their failure to adequately protect the PII of Consumer Plaintiffs and the Class constitute deceptive acts and unfair practices and have a direct and substantial affect in Illinois and throughout the United States. 65. Defendants’ conduct as alleged herein, including without limitation, Defendants’ failure to maintain reasonable and adequate computer systems and data security practices, Defendants’ fraudulent and deceptive omissions and/or misrepresentations regarding the security measures put in place to protect the PII of Consumer Plaintiffs and the Class and the lack of efficacy of these security measures, Defendants’ failure to timely and accurately disclose the Breach to Consumer Plaintiffs and the Class, and Defendants’ continued acceptance of credit and debit card information as payment for goods and services after Defendants knew or should have known of the Breach’s occurrence and before Defendants fixed the problems that allowed for the Breach and purged their systems of the malicious hacker software, constitute unfair methods of competition and unfair, deceptive, fraudulent, unconscionable and/or unlawful acts or practices in violation of The Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Trade Practices Act, 815 Ill. Stat. § 505/2, et seq., and the Illinois Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act, 815 Ill. Stat. § 510/2(a)(5), (7) and (12), et seq., as well as the similar laws of the various other states as they may appear. 67. As a result, Defendants’ conduct damaged Consumer Plaintiffs and the other members of the Class, who would not have otherwise completed credit and/or debit card purchases/transactions at Defendants’ Properties, by exposing their information to third-party hackers. 68. Consumer Plaintiffs bring this action on behalf of themselves and all similarly situated persons for the requested relief and for the public benefit at large in order to promote truthful, honest and non-deceptive business practices, which will allow consumers to make informed purchasing decisions and to protect, Consumer Plaintiffs, members of the Class and the public from Defendants’ unfair, deceptive, fraudulent, unconscionable and/or unlawful practices and methods of competition. Defendants’ conduct as alleged herein has had widespread negative consequences and has affected consumers throughout the nation. 69. Consumer Plaintiffs incorporate by reference and reasserts all previous paragraphs. 70. The Data Breach constitutes a breach of Defendants’ computer security systems within the meaning of the state data breach notifications statutes of several states as they may appear, and the data accessed in the Data Breach was protected and covered by the same. 72. Defendants unreasonably delayed notification of the Data Breach, including the unauthorized access and theft of the PII of their customers, including Consumer Plaintiffs and the Classes, after Defendants knew or should have known that the Data Breach had occurred. 73. When the Data Breach began on or about May 19, 2014, Defendants did not disclose or notify the public of the data breach. Defendants knew or should have known that the Data Breach was occurring as early as May 19, 2014, but failed to disclose its existence to the public, including Consumer Plaintiffs and the Class, at this time. 74. From June 2, 2015, until around September 29, 2015, for a period of about four months, Defendants took inadequate action to remedy the Data Breach. Defendants failed to inform the public of the Data Breach during this time even though Defendants knew or should have known of the Data Breach’s occurrence and the attendant unauthorized access, theft and dissemination of Consumer Plaintiffs’ and the other Class members’ PII. 75. On or around June 2, 2015, when Defendants finally reacted to the Data Breach and began purging its systems of the malicious hacker software and fixing the unreasonable security holes that led to the Data Breach, Defendants still failed to disclose or provide notice to the public that the Data Breach had occurred. 76. Defendants waited until around September 29, 2015, almost four months after discovery, to disclose the Data Breach and notify their customers. Defendants downplayed the significance of the Data Breach and claimed that they did not know whether Personal Information was stolen and that there was no evidence of misuse of any customer Personal Information. 77. Defendants failed to disclose to Consumer Plaintiffs and the other Class members, without unreasonable delay and in the most expedient time possible, the Data Breach and the unauthorized access and theft of the PII of Consumer Plaintiffs and the other Class members when Defendants knew, should have known, or reasonably believed that such information had been compromised. 79. As a result of Defendants’ failure to notify in the statutorily prescribed time periods, Consumer Plaintiffs and the other Class members suffered the direct harm as alleged above. 80. Had Defendants provided timely and accurate notice, Consumer Plaintiffs and members of the Class could have taken steps to mitigate the direct harm suffered as a result of Defendant’s unreasonable and untimely delay in providing notice. Consumer Plaintiffs and the other members of the Class could have used cash instead of credit and debit cards in closing commercial transactions at Defendants’ Properties, avoided shopping at the Properties altogether, contacted their financial institutions to cancel cards and accounts, or taken other steps in efforts to avoid the direct harm caused by Defendants’ failure to notify. 81. Defendants’ failure to notify Consumer Plaintiffs and the other Class members violated Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 530/10(a), et seq., and the data breach notification statutes of other states as they may appear. 82. Consumer Plaintiffs and the other members of the Class seek all remedies available under the applicable state data breach notification statutes, including but not limited to damages as alleged above, equitable relief and reasonable attorneys’ fees, and costs, as provided by law. 83. Consumer Plaintiffs incorporate by reference and reassert all previous paragraphs. 85. Upon gaining access to the PII of Consumer Plaintiffs and members of the Class, Defendants owed to Consumer Plaintiffs and the Class a duty of reasonable care in handling and using this information and securing and protecting the information from being stolen, accessed and misused by unauthorized parties. Pursuant to this duty, Defendants were required to design, maintain and test their security systems to ensure that these systems were reasonably secure and capable of protecting the PII of Consumer Plaintiffs and the Class. Defendants further owed to Consumer Plaintiffs and the Class a duty to implement systems and procedures that would detect a breach of their security systems in a timely manner and to timely act upon security alerts from such systems. 86. Defendants owed this duty to Consumer Plaintiffs and the other Class members because Consumer Plaintiffs and the other Class members compose a well-defined, foreseeable and probable class of individuals whom Defendants should have been aware could be injured by Defendants’ inadequate security protocols. Defendants actively solicited Consumer Plaintiffs and the other Class members to use their PII in sales transactions at Defendants’ Properties. To facilitate and close these sales transactions, Defendants used, handled, gathered and stored the PII of Consumer Plaintiffs and the other Class members. Attendant to Defendants’ solicitation, use and storage, Defendants knew of their inadequate and unreasonable security practices with regard to their computer systems and also knew that hackers routinely attempt to access, steal and misuse the PII that Defendants actively solicited, used and/or stored from Consumer Plaintiffs and the other Class members. As such, Defendants knew a breach of their systems would cause damage to their customers, including Consumer Plaintiffs and the other Class members. Thus, Defendants had a duty to act reasonably in protecting the sensitive information of their consumers. 88. Defendants also owed a duty to timely and accurately disclose to Consumer Plaintiffs and the other Class members the scope, nature and occurrence of the Breach. This duty was required and necessary in order for Consumer Plaintiffs and the other Class members to take appropriate measures to avoid unauthorized charges to their credit-and/or debit-card accounts, cancel and/or change usernames and passwords on compromised accounts, monitor their accounts to prevent fraudulent activity, contact their financial institutions about compromise or possible compromise, obtain credit monitoring services and/or take other steps in an effort to mitigate the harm caused by the Data Breach and Defendants’ unreasonable misconduct. 89. Defendants breached their duties to Consumer Plaintiffs and the other Class members by failing to implement and maintain security systems and controls that were capable of adequately protecting the PII of Consumer Plaintiffs and the other Class members. More specifically, Defendants breached their duties to Consumer Plaintiffs and the other Class members by failing to remedy the deficiencies found in the remote access points to their servers and corporate networks and by storing Consumer Plaintiffs’ and the other Class members’ data on their servers. 90. Defendants further breached their duties to Consumer Plaintiffs and the other Class members when they failed to fix the deficiencies associated with their security and storage policies despite the fact that they knew or, at the very least, should have known, that these deficiencies were the leading cause of data breaches and theft of sensitive consumer information. 91. Defendants also breached their duties to timely and accurately disclose to the Consumer Plaintiffs and the other Class members that their PII had been or was reasonably believed to have been improperly accessed or stolen. 93. The injuries to Consumer Plaintiffs and the other Class members were reasonably foreseeable to Defendants because laws, statutes, and industry standards, such as the PCI DSS, require Defendants to safeguard and protect their computer systems and employ procedures and controls to ensure that unauthorized third parties did not gain access to Consumer Plaintiffs’ and the other Class members’ PII. 94. The injuries to Consumer Plaintiffs and the other Class members also were reasonably foreseeable because Defendants knew or should have known that their computer systems used for processing consumer sales transactions were inadequate and unable to protect solicited consumer PII from being breached, accessed and stolen by hackers and unauthorized third parties. As such, Defendants’ own misconduct created a foreseeable risk of harm to Consumer Plaintiffs and the other Class members. 95. Defendants’ failure to take reasonable steps to protect the PII of Consumer Plaintiffs and the other members of the Class was a proximate cause of their injuries because it directly allowed hackers easy access to Consumer Plaintiffs’ and the other Class members’ PII. This ease of access allowed hackers to implement unsophisticated attacks and thereafter steal PII of Consumer Plaintiffs and the other members of the Class and disseminate it over black markets. 96. As a direct proximate result of Defendants’ conduct, Consumer Plaintiffs and the other Class members have suffered theft of their PII. Defendants allowed cybercriminals access to Class members’ PII, thereby decreasing the security of Class members’ bank accounts, making Class members’ identities less secure and reliable, and subjecting Class members to the imminent threat of identity theft. Not only will Consumer Plaintiffs and the other members of the Class have to incur time and money to re-secure their bank accounts and identities, but they will also have to protect against the specter of identity theft for years to come. 98. Holding Defendants accountable under negligence law will further the policies embodied in such law by incentivizing larger property and/or hotel chains to properly secure sensitive consumer information and thereby protect the consumers who rely on these companies every day. I. The Breach.

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10. Likewise, the TCPA prohibits the placement of calls to a recipient’s cell phone using an artificial or prerecorded voice and without the recipient’s prior express written consent. 11. According to findings by the Federal Communication Commission (“FCC”), the agency Congress vested with authority to issue regulations implementing the TCPA, such calls are prohibited because, as Congress found, these calls can be costly and inconvenient. The FCC also recognized that wireless customers are charged for incoming calls whether they pay in advance or after the minutes are used. 13. Thus, telephone calls made to wireless phone numbers placed using equipment with the capacity to meet the definition of an ATDS or made with an artificial or prerecorded voice are expressly prohibited in the absence of the prior express consent of the subscriber. 14. Under the TCPA and pursuant to the FCC’s January 2008 Declaratory Ruling, the burden is on DirecTV to demonstrate that Plaintiff provided express consent within the meaning of the statute. Placing and Receipt of the Calls 15. At all relevant times Plaintiff was an individual residing in the state of Louisiana. Plaintiff is, and at all times mentioned herein was, a “person” as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 153(32). 16. In early 2014, Plaintiff orally agreed to purchase television services from DirecTV. At that time, Plaintiff provided DirecTV with his contact information, including his cellular telephone number. At no time did Plaintiff give his consent for Defendant to use his phone number for the purpose of making telephonic solicitations. 18. All telephone calls made by Defendant to Plaintiff on his cellular telephone occurred with the use of an ATDS, as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1), and all calls included in this suit occurred within four years of the filing of this Complaint. 19. The telephone number that Defendant used to contact Plaintiff, made by an ATDS, was assigned to a cellular telephone service as specified in 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). 20. The subject telephone calls were not made for an emergency purpose as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(i). 22. Identical telephone calls made by an ATDS from telephone number 800-531-500 were similarly placed on repeated occasions to other cellular phone numbers belonging to the other members of the class over the past four years. None of those subscribers gave Defendant their prior express consent to receive the calls and they were not made for emergency purposes. Upon information and belief, Defendant placed these phone calls multiple times a week to the members of the Class. 23. Upon information and belief, Defendant placed numerous calls to Plaintiff and the class members weekly. As a result, thousands of telephone calls were placed by Defendant on a weekly basis to the class members, resulting in thousands of calls made by Defendant to the Plaintiff and the class members over the past four years. These telephone calls were placed for the commercial purpose of selling Defendant’s cable television services. 25. Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b) on behalf of himself and the following class (“The Class”): All persons or legal entities domiciled within the United States who, within the last four years, received a telephone call on their cellular telephone (or to a telephone number assigned to a service for which the called party is charged for the call) from phone number 800-531-5000 placed by or on behalf of DirecTV with an automatic telephone dialing system without the subscriber’s prior express consent. Excluded from the Class are all judges and Court personnel employed by the United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana and all officers, directors and employees of Defendant. 26. The Class consists of thousands of individuals and legal entities who are geographically dispensed making joinder impractical, in satisfaction of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(1). The exact size of the respective classes and identities of the individual members thereof are ascertainable through Defendant’s records, or the records of its representatives, including but not limited to the transmission logs. 28. The class members have a well-defined community of interest. The Defendant acted and failed to act on grounds generally applicable to the Plaintiff and the respective class members, requiring the Court’s imposition of uniform relief to ensure compatible standards of conduct toward the respective class members. 29. There are numerous questions of law and fact common to the claims of Plaintiff and the class, and those questions predominate over any questions that may affect only individual class members within the meaning of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(2) and 23(b)(3). 30. Absent a class action, most of the respective class members would find the cost of litigating their claims to be prohibitive, and will have no effective remedy. The class treatment of common questions of law and fact is also superior to multiple individual actions or piecemeal litigation in that it conserves the resources of the courts and the litigants, and promotes consistency and efficiency of adjudication. 33. This action is brought and may properly be maintained as a class action pursuant to the provisions of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b). This action satisfies the numerosity, commonality, typicality, adequacy, predominance, and superiority requirements of these statutory provisions and the jurisprudence of the courts. 34. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference the allegations set forth in each of the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint. 36. These calls were made en masse without the prior express consent of Plaintiff and the other members of the Class. 37. Thus, Defendant violated the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii), which makes it “unlawful for any person within the United States...to make any call (other than a call made for emergency purposes or made with the prior express consent of the called party) using any automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice...to any telephone number assigned to a...cellular telephone.” 38. Plaintiff received, on May 28, 2014 at 3:58 PM CST, a call transmitted and/or placed by or on behalf of DirecTV on his cellular telephone. 39. This call was sent without Plaintiff’s prior express consent and in violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. 41. Plaintiff is entitled to recovery of statutory damages as provided for by 47 U.S.C.A. § 227 et seq., specifically including 47 U.S.C. 227(b)(3)(A). 42. Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3), a person or entity may bring a private action to recover for actual monetary loss from a violation of the TCPA, or to receive $500 in damages for each such violation, whichever is greater. 43. Accordingly, as a proximate result of the Defendant’s conduct, the plaintiff Class has incurred actual damages associated with the cost of the receipt of the phone calls, usage of cellular phone minutes and plan allowances, inconvenience, and the invasion of the recipient’s privacy. 44. Further, in the alternative, the plaintiff Class is entitled to recover statutory damages under the Act, as set forth above, based on the placing of the phone calls by Defendant. 46. In this regard, the United States of America filed suit against DirecTV twice in 2005 and 2009 in connection with its failure to comply with the requirements of the TCPA. In both instances, DirecTV entered into a Stipulated Judgment and Order for Permanent Injunction and DirecTV agreed to pay multi-million dollar penalties. 47. Additionally, the Class seeks injunctive relief requiring that Defendant be enjoined from placing or transmitting additional phone calls in violation of the TCPA pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(A). 48. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference the allegations set forth in each of the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint. 49. By sending Plaintiff and the class members unsolicited phone calls, Defendant deprived plaintiffs and class members of the use of, and converted to their own use, the cellular telephones belonging to plaintiff and the class members. 51. By sending the unsolicited calls, Defendant appropriated to its own use, and deprived plaintiff and the class members of the use of, the cellular telephones used to receive the calls, such that they could not be used for the receipt of any other data or calls. Such appropriation was wrongful and without authorization. 52. Defendant knew or should have known that such appropriation of the cellular telephones was wrongful and without authorization. 53. Plaintiff and the class members were deprived of their cellular telephones, which could no longer be used for any other purpose. Plaintiff and each class member thereby suffered damages as a result of receipt of the unsolicited calls. 54. Defendant should be enjoined from committing similar violations in the future. 56. Among other duties, Defendant owed a duty not to damage plaintiffs. However, Defendant and/or its agents, by error and neglect, permitted, suffered, required, ratified, directed, and/or otherwise proximately caused the acts and omissions that have damaged plaintiffs as referenced herein. 57. If Defendant and/or its agents had not been negligent in their acts or omissions, or their supervision, management, direction, instruction, training, guidance, assistance, and/or control of each other, their agents, or themselves, then the marketing practices and/or phone calls referenced herein would have comported with all applicable law, and none of the inherently injurious calls referenced herein would have been transmitted to the telephonic devices of plaintiffs. 58. In this regard, by transmitting the unsolicited calls to plaintiffs, the Defendant violated its duty or duties to plaintiffs. 60. Defendant should be enjoined from committing similar violations in the future. 61. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference the allegations set forth in each of the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint. 62. Defendant, by its acts and omissions described herein, has invaded plaintiff and the class members’ privacy and/or committed an unauthorized intrusion for prying into plaintiff and the class members’ seclusion. 63. The invasion of privacy and/or intrusion committed by the Defendant has been highly offensive and/or objectionable to plaintiff and the class members. 64. The invasion of privacy and/or intrusion committed by the Defendant would be highly offensive and/or objectionable to any reasonable person. 66. The invasions of privacy and/or intrusion committed by Defendant has caused plaintiff and the class members anguish and suffering, as well as additional damages as described herein. 67. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference the allegations set forth in each of the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint. 68. Defendant, by its acts and omissions described herein, has invaded the plaintiff and the class members’ interest in the use and enjoyment of their property. 69. Defendant’s invasions have been substantial, negligent and unreasonable, and have constituted a nuisance with respect to plaintiff and the class members. 70. Defendant’s invasions would constitute a nuisance with respect to any reasonable person. 72. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference the allegations set forth in each of the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint. 73. Plaintiff, the class members, and the rest of the public, have a right to be free from the inconvenience and annoyance of unsolicited calls placed to their cellular telephones. 74. Defendant, by its acts and omissions as described herein, has substantially and unreasonably interfered with these rights. 75. Defendant, by its acts and omissions as described herein, has proximately caused plaintiff and the class members, in particular, actual damages as described herein. 76. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference the allegations set forth in each of the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint. 78. The consumer protection and/or unfair trade laws of the state in which each of the plaintiffs resides and received an unsolicited phone call from Defendant declares that unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of trade or commerce are unlawful. 79. The states where these plaintiffs reside, including the state of Louisiana, have enacted statutes designed to protect consumers against unfair, deceptive, fraudulent, and unconscionable trade and business practices and false advertising that further allow consumers to bring private and/or class actions. 8. In 1991, Congress enacted the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227 (TCPA), in response to a growing number of consumer complaints regarding certain telemarketing practices. 80. Plaintiff and the class members have suffered an ascertainable loss of money or property, real or personal, as a result of another person's willful use or employment of a method, act or practice declared unlawful. In particular, Defendant has placed phone calls without the consent of the recipients and in violation of these various consumer protection and/or unfair trade laws. 82. The plaintiff and members of the class are entitled to actual compensatory and/or statutory damages, as well as attorneys’ fees and costs of suit, to the fullest extent permitted pursuant to the various state laws implicated by this claim. General Overview of the TCPA UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES LAWS

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2.0 guidelines; regularly check the accessibility of the website under the WCAG 2.0 guidelines; regularly test user accessibility by blind or vision-impaired persons to ensure that the defendant’s website complies under the WCAG 2.0 guidelines; and develop an accessibility policy that is clearly disclosed on the defendant’s website, with contact information for users to report accessibility-related problems and require that any third-party vendors who participate on the defendant’s website to be fully accessible to the disabled by conforming with 23. The defendant’s website is offered to the public. The website offers features that should allow all consumers to access the goods and services that the defendant offers through their physical locations, including, but not limited to, features that allow consumers to find information about location addresses and hours, services offered and services available for online purchase. 25. The plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. The plaintiff is, however, a proficient JAWS screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. The plaintiff has visited the website on separate occasions using the JAWS screen-reader. 26. During the plaintiff’s visits to the website, the last occurring in November 2017, the plaintiff encountered multiple access barriers that denied the plaintiff full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services offered to the public and made available to the public; and that denied the plaintiff the full enjoyment of the facilities, goods, and services of the website, as well as to the facilities, goods, and services of the defendant’s locations in New York by being unable to learn more information about location addresses and hours, services offered and services available for online purchase. 28. Due to the inaccessibility of the defendant’s website, blind and visually-impaired customers such as the plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities and services the defendant offers to the public on its website. The access barriers the plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of the plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter the plaintiff on a regular basis from accessing the website. 29. These access barriers on the defendant’s website have deterred the plaintiff from visiting the defendant’s physical locations, and enjoying them equal to sighted individuals because: the plaintiff was unable to find the location and hours of operation of the defendant’s locations on its website, preventing the plaintiff from visiting the locations to view and purchase products and/or services. The plaintiff intends to visit the Defendant’s locations in the near future if the plaintiff could access the defendant’s website. 31. The plaintiff, through the plaintiff’s attempts to use the website, has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 32. Because simple compliance with WCAG 2.0 would provide the plaintiff and other visually- impaired consumers with equal access to the website, the plaintiff alleges that the defendant engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including, but not limited to, the following policies or practices: constructing and maintaining a website that is inaccessible to visually- impaired individuals, including the plaintiff; failing to construct and maintain a website that is sufficiently intuitive so as to be equally accessible to visually-impaired individuals, including the plaintiff; and failing to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind and visually-impaired consumers, such as the plaintiff, as a member of a protected class. 33. The Defendant therefore use standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination against others, as alleged herein. 34. The ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that the plaintiff seeks in this action. In relevant part, the ADA requires: In the case of violations of … this title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities …. Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the … modification of a policy …. 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 40. The plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access the defendant’s website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in the defendant’s physical locations, during the relevant statutory period. 41. The plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a New York State subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the State of New York who have attempted to access the defendant’s website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in the defendant’s physical locations, during the relevant statutory period. 42. The plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access the defendant’s website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in the defendant’s physical locations, during the relevant statutory period. 44. The plaintiff’s claims are typical of the class. The class, similarly to the plaintiff, are severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that the defendant violated the ADA, NYSHRL, and NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on the defendant’s website so it can be independently accessible to the class. 45. The plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the class because the plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because the plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the class. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because the defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to the plaintiff and the class as a whole. 46. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to the class predominate over questions affecting only individual class members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 48. The plaintiff, on behalf of the plaintiff and the class, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 49. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 50. The defendant’s locations are public accommodations within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). the defendant’s website is a service, privilege, or advantage of the defendant’s locations. The defendant’s website is a service that is heavily integrated with these locations and is a gateway thereto. 51. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 52. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 54. The acts alleged herein constitute violations of Title III of the ADA, and the regulations promulgated thereunder. The plaintiff, who is a member of a protected class of persons under the ADA, has a physical disability that substantially limits the major life activity of sight within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1)(A)–(2)(A). Furthermore, the plaintiff has been denied full and equal access to the website, has not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and has been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled persons. The defendant failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 56. The plaintiff, on behalf of the plaintiff and the New York State sub-class, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 57. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation … because of the … disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof. 58. The defendant’s physical locations are located in State of New York and throughout the United States and constitute sales establishments and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). The defendant’s website is a service, privilege or advantage of the defendant. The defendant’s website is a service that is heavily integrated with these physical locations and is a gateway thereto. 59. The defendant is subject to the NYSHRL because they own and operate their physical locations and website. The defendant is persons within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 60. The defendant is violating N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its website, causing its website and the services integrated with the defendant’s physical locations to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that the defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 62. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(ii), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 63. Readily available, well-established guidelines exist on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other large business entities and government agencies in making their website accessible, including but not limited to: adding alt-text to graphics and ensuring that all functions can be performed using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make its website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of the defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to the defendant. 65. The defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 66. The defendant discriminates, and will continue to discriminate against the plaintiff and the New York State sub-class on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of the defendant’s website and its physical locations under § 296(2), et seq., and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins the defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, the plaintiff and the New York State sub-class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 67. The defendant’s actions were and are in violation of NYSHRL and therefore the plaintiff and the New York State sub-class invoke their right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 68. The plaintiff and the New York State sub-class are also entitled to compensatory damages, and civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c), et seq., for each and every offense. 69. The plaintiff and the New York State sub-class are also entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees and costs. 70. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, the plaintiff and the New York State sub-class pray for judgment as set forth below. 71. The plaintiff, on behalf of the plaintiff and the New York State sub-class, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 73. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40 provides that all persons within the jurisdiction of this state shall be entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of any places of public accommodations, resort or amusement, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons. No persons, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or employee of any such place shall directly or indirectly refuse, withhold from, or deny to any person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof …. 74. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) provides that no person because of … disability, as such term is defined in section two hundred ninety-two of executive law, be subjected to any discrimination in his or her civil rights, or to any harassment, as defined in section 240.25 of the penal law, in the exercise thereof, by any other person or by any firm, corporation or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision. 75. The defendant’s New York physical locations are sales establishments and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2). The defendant’s website is a service, privilege or advantage of the defendant and the defendant’s website is a service that is heavily integrated with these establishments and is a gateway thereto. 76. The defendant is subject to NYSCRL because it owns and operates the defendant’s physical locations and website. The defendant is persons within the meaning of N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2). 78. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41 states any corporation which shall violate any of the provisions of sections forty, forty-a, forty-b or forty-two … shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby. 79. Under N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-d, any person who shall violate any of the provisions of the foregoing section, or subdivision three of section 240.30 or section 240.31 of the penal law, or who shall aid or incite the violation of any of said provisions shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby in any court of competent jurisdiction in the county in which the defendant shall reside. 80. The defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 81. The defendant discriminated, and will continue to discriminate, against the plaintiff and the New York State sub-class on the basis of disability and the plaintiff and the New York State sub-class are being directly or indirectly refused, withheld from, or denied the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof in § 40, et seq., and/or its implementing regulations. 83. The plaintiff, on behalf of the plaintiff and the New York City sub-class, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 84. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that, It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of … disability … directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof. 85. The defendant’s locations are sales establishments and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-102(9), and their website is a service that is heavily integrated with its establishments and is a gateway thereto. 86. The defendant is subject to NYCHRL because they own and operate its physical locations in the City of New York and their website, making them persons within the meaning of N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-102(1). 87. The defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to website, causing its website and the services integrated with its physical locations to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods, and services that the defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 89. The defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the New York sub- class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a) in that the defendant has: constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 90. The defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 91. As such, the defendant discriminated, and will continue to discriminate, against the plaintiff and the New York City subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of the defendant’s website and establishments under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins the defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, the plaintiff and the New York City subclass will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 93. The plaintiff and the New York City subclass are also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense. 94. The plaintiff and the New York City subclass are also entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees and costs. 95. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein the plaintiff and the New York City subclass pray for judgment as set forth below. 96. The plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the class, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 97. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that the plaintiff contends, and is informed and believes that the defendant denies, that the defendant’s website contains access barriers denying blind customers the full and equal access to the goods, services, and facilities of its website and by extension its physical locations, which the defendant own(s), operate(s) and control(s), and fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182, et seq., N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, et seq., and N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107, et seq., prohibiting discrimination against the blind. ADA DECLARATORY RELIEF Defendant’s Barriers on Its Website NYCHRL NYSCRL NYSHRL

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21. Precision is a manufacturer of complex metal components primarily marketed to industrial and aerospace customers. The Company produces large structural investment castings, airfoil castings, forged components, aerostructures, and highly engineered fasteners for aerospace applications. The Company operates in three segments: (1) Forged Products; (2) Investment Cast Products; and (3) Airframe Products, all of which produce parts for aerospace customers. 23. The Class Period begins on May 9, 2013. On that day, Precision issued a press release announcing its fourth-quarter fiscal 2013 financial results. The Company stated as follows in that press release: Precision Castparts Corp. (NYSE:PCP) continued to effectively leverage sales in its major markets in the fourth quarter of 2013, driven by year-over-year growth in commercial OEM aerospace demand, steady improvement in industrial gas turbine (IGT) spares, and accelerating oil and gas downhole casing production, along with a full quarter of strong Timet performance. Fourth Quarter Fiscal 2013 Financial Highlights Sales totaled $2.44 billion in the fourth quarter of fiscal 2013, growing 25 percent over sales of $1.95 billion in the same period last year. Consolidated segment operating income improved by approximately 26 percent year over year, rising to $627.3 million, or 25.7 percent of sales in the quarter, versus consolidated segment operating income of $497.5 million, or 25.6 percent of sales a year ago. Net income from continuing operations (attributable to PCC) in the fourth quarter was $415.1 million, an increase of 23 percent over net income of $338.2 million in the fourth quarter of fiscal 2012. In the quarter, the Company delivered earnings per share (EPS) from continuing operations (attributable to PCC) of $2.82 (diluted, based on 147.1 million shares outstanding), compared to $2.31 (diluted, based on 146.2 million shares outstanding) last year. Including discontinued operations, PCC's net income (attributable to PCC) for the fourth quarter of fiscal 2013 totaled $414.2 million, or $2.82 per share (diluted). 24. On May 30, 2013, the Company filed its Annual Report with the SEC on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended March 31, 2013. The Company’s Form 10-K reaffirmed the Company’s financial statements and reports announced in the May 9, 2013 press release. 26. On August 8, 2013, the Company filed its Quarterly Report with the SEC on Form 10-Q for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2013. The Company’s Form 10-Q reaffirmed the Company’s financial statements and reports announced in the July 25, 2013 press release. 27. On October 24, 2013, Precision issued a press release announcing its second- quarter fiscal 2014 financial results. The Company stated as follows in that press release: Precision Castparts Corp. (NYSE:PCP) delivered continued strong sales and earnings in the second quarter of fiscal 2014, driven by solid commercial aerospace demand, steady recovery in power markets, further top- and bottom- line contributions from TIMET, and unrelenting focus on operational improvements in each of the Company’s facilities. 28.0 percent of sales, compared to $518 million, or 25.5 percent of sales, in the same period last year. PCC reported a 27 percent improvement in net income from continuing operations (attributable to PCC) in the third quarter, generating $432 million, versus net income of $339 million a year ago. For the quarter, earnings per share (EPS) from continuing operations (attributable to PCC) were $2.95 (diluted, based on 146.5 million shares of stock outstanding), compared to $2.31 (diluted, based on 146.8 million shares of stock outstanding.) A full quarter of TIMET, Texas Honing, and Synchronous, along with the benefit from several smaller acquisitions in the Forged Products and Airframe Products segments, contributed to the growth in year-over-year sales. Including discontinued operations, the Company’s total net income (attributable to PCC) for the third quarter of fiscal 2014 was $433 million, or $2.96 per share (diluted). 28. On November 7, 2013, the Company filed its Quarterly Report with the SEC on Form 10-Q for the quarterly period ended September 29, 2013. The Company’s Form 10-Q reaffirmed the Company’s financial statements and reports announced in the October 24, 2013 press release. 29. On January 23, 2014, Precision issued a press release announcing its third-quarter fiscal 2014 financial results. The Company stated as follows in that press release: Continuing to ship into healthy end markets and to effectively leverage operational throughput, Precision Castparts (NYSE:PCP) reported solid sales and earnings per share in the third quarter of fiscal 2014, tempered by late-quarter customer schedule shifts and fewer shipping days in the quarter. Third Quarter Fiscal 2014 Financial Highlights Precision Castparts (PCC) sales in the third quarter of fiscal 2014 were $2.36 billion, a 16 percent increase over sales of $2.03 billion a year ago, reflecting approximately 1 percent organic growth excluding the impact of contractual pass- through pricing and other changes in metal/revert pricing. Consolidated segment operating income grew by 27 percent year over year, rising to $659 million, or 31. On May 8, 2014, precision issued a press release announcing its fourth-quarter fiscal 2014 financial results. The Company stated as follows in that press release: Precision Castparts Corp. (NYSE:PCP) delivered strong sales and earnings per share in the fourth quarter of fiscal 2014, effectively leveraging demand from robust end markets. Fourth Quarter Fiscal 2014 Financial Highlights Precision Castparts Corp. (PCC) sales in the fourth quarter of fiscal 2014 totaled $2.53 billion, increasing 4 percent over sales of $2.43 billion last year. Year-over- year organic growth was approximately 3 percent, excluding the impact of metal/revert pricing. Consolidated segment operating income improved by 15 percent year over year, growing to $720 million, or 28.5 percent of sales, compared to $626 million, or 25.7 percent of sales, a year ago. Net income from continuing operations (attributable to PCC) in the fourth quarter rose to $479 million, versus net income of $415 million in the fourth quarter of fiscal 2013. Earnings per share (EPS) from continuing operations (attributable to PCC) were $3.27 in the quarter (diluted, based on 146.4 million shares of stock outstanding), compared to $2.82 (diluted, based on 147.1 million shares of stock outstanding) in the same period last year. Including discontinued operations, total net income (attributable to PCC) for the fourth quarter of fiscal 2014 was $484 million, or $3.31 per share (diluted). 32. On May 29, 2014, the Company filed its Annual Report with the SEC on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended March 30, 2014. The Company’s Form 10-K reaffirmed the Company’s financial statements and reports announced in the May 8, 2014 press release. 34. On July 24, 2014, Precision issued a press release announcing its first-quarter fiscal 2015 financial results, which missed consensus estimates. The Company stated as follows in that press release: In the first quarter of fiscal 2015, Precision Castparts Corp. (NYSE:PCP) showed steady sales growth year over year in its key end markets and continued to strongly leverage increasing production volumes. First Quarter Fiscal 2015 Financial Highlights Precision Castparts Corp. (PCC) sales in the first quarter of fiscal 2015 were $2.53 billion, a 7 percent improvement over sales of $2.37 billion last year. Year over year, organic sales growth was approximately 4 percent, excluding the impact of metal/revert pricing. Consolidated segment operating income showed a 14 percent increase year over year, climbing to $736 million, or 29.1 percent of sales, versus $644 million, or 27.2 percent of sales, a year ago. Net income from continuing operations (attributable to PCC) in the first quarter rose to $484 million, compared to net income of $424 million in the first quarter of fiscal 2014. Earnings per share (EPS) from continuing operations (attributable to PCC) were $3.32 in the quarter (diluted, based on 145.9 million shares of stock outstanding), versus $2.88 (diluted, based on 147.1 million shares of stock outstanding) in the same period last year. First quarter sales were also positively impacted by a full quarter of Permaswage and two months of Aerospace Dynamics International. Including discontinued operations, total net income (attributable to PCC) for the first quarter of fiscal 2015 was $483 million, or $3.31 per share (diluted). 35. While the truth began to leak into the market through the Company’s disappointing quarterly results, on the earnings call discussing these results, Precision mischaracterized its loss of business as a temporary decline in sales that would reappear in the near future. 37. On August 7, 2014, the Company filed its Quarterly Report with the SEC on Form 10-Q for the quarterly period ended June 29, 2014. The Company’s Form 10-Q reaffirmed the Company’s financial statements and reports announced in the July 24, 2014 press release. 38. On October 23, 2014, Precision issued a press release announcing its second-quarter fiscal 2015 financial results, which missed consensus estimates. The Company stated as follows in that press release: Precision Castparts Corp. (NYSE:PCP) continued to grow total year-over-year sales and earnings in the second quarter of fiscal 2015, demonstrating solid leverage of its strong market share position in its primary end markets. Second Quarter Fiscal 2015 Financial Highlights Second quarter sales for Precision Castparts Corp. (PCC) totaled $2.52 billion, increasing 8 percent relative to sales of $2.34 billion in the same period a year ago. Organic sales growth was approximately 4 percent compared to last year, excluding the impact of metal/revert pricing. The company's consolidated segment operating income was $706 million, or 28.0 percent of sales, growing by 9 percent from $645 million, or 27.6 percent of sales, in the second quarter of fiscal 2014. Net income from continuing operations (attributable to PCC) in the second quarter rose to $468 million, compared to net income of $422 million in the second quarter of fiscal 2014. Earnings per share (EPS) from continuing operations (attributable to PCC) were $3.24 in the quarter (diluted, based on 144.3 million shares of stock outstanding), versus EPS of $2.88 (diluted, based on 146.5 million shares of stock outstanding) last year. A full quarter of results from recent acquisitions, Permaswage and Aerospace Dynamics International, had a positive impact on second quarter sales and earnings, compared to the same period a year ago. Including discontinued operations, total net income (attributable to PCC) for the second quarter of fiscal 2015 was $467 million, or $3.24 per share (diluted). 40. On this news, shares of Precision fell 2.1 percent, from a prior close of $230.94 per share to close at $226.20 per share. 41. On November 6, 2014, the Company filed its Quarterly Report with the SEC on Form 10-Q for the quarterly period ended September 28, 2014. The Company’s Form 10-Q reaffirmed the Company’s financial statements and reports announced in the October 23, 2014 press release. 42. The statements contained in ¶¶34-35, 37-39, and 41 were materially false and/or misleading when made because defendants failed to disclose or indicate the following: (1) that the Company was losing significant market share to its competitors; (2) that this loss of business to competitors was not a temporary decline in sales that would reappear in the near future; and (3) that, as a result, the Company’s positive statements about its business, operations, and prospects lacked a reasonable basis. The Full Truth is Revealed 44. On this news, shares of Precision declined from prior close of $219.72 per share to $199.63 per share at close on January 16, 2014, or 9.1 percent. 45. As a result of Defendants’ wrongful acts and omissions, and the precipitous decline in the market value of the Company’s securities, Plaintiff and other Class members have suffered significant losses and damages. 46. Plaintiff brings this action as a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of all persons or entities who purchased or otherwise acquired the securities of Precision between May 9, 2013 and January 15, 2015, inclusive (the “Class”). Excluded from the Class are Defendants, members of the immediate family of each of the Individual Defendants, any subsidiary or affiliate of Precision, and the directors and officers of Precision and their families and affiliates at all relevant times. 48. There is a well-defined community of interest in the questions of law and fact involved in this case. Questions of law and fact common to the members of the Class which predominate over questions which may affect individual Class members include: (a) Whether the Exchange Act was violated by Defendants; (b) Whether Defendants omitted and/or misrepresented material facts; (c) Whether Defendants’ statements omitted material facts necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading; (d) Whether Defendants knew or recklessly disregarded that their statements were false and misleading; (e) Whether the price of Precision securities was artificially inflated; and (f) The extent of damage sustained by Class members and the appropriate measure of damages. 49. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of those of the Class because Plaintiff and the Class sustained damages from Defendants’ wrongful conduct. 50. Plaintiff will adequately protect the interests of the Class and has retained counsel experienced in securities class action litigation. Plaintiff has no interests that conflict with those of the Class. 51. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. 53. During the Class Period, Defendants materially misled the investing public, thereby inflating the price of Precision’s securities, by publicly issuing false and/or misleading statements and/or omitting to disclose material facts necessary to make Defendants’ statements, as set forth herein, not false and/or misleading. These statements and omissions were materially false and/or misleading in that they failed to disclose material adverse information and/or misrepresented the truth about Precision’s business, operations, and prospects as alleged herein. 54. At all relevant times, the material misrepresentations and omissions particularized in this Complaint directly or proximately caused or were a substantial contributing cause of the damages sustained by Plaintiff and other members of the Class. As described herein, during the Class Period, Defendants made or caused to be made a series of materially false and/or misleading statements about Precision’s financial well-being and prospects. These material misstatements and/or omissions had the cause and effect of creating in the market an unrealistically positive assessment of the Company and its financial well-being and prospects, thus causing the Company’s securities to be overvalued and artificially inflated at all relevant times. Defendants’ materially false and/or misleading statements during the Class Period resulted in Plaintiff and other members of the Class purchasing the Company’s securities at artificially inflated prices, thus causing the damages complained of herein. 56. During the Class Period, as alleged herein, the Individual Defendants acted with scienter in that the Individual Defendants knew or were reckless as to whether the public documents and statements issued or disseminated in the name of the Company during the Class Period were materially false and misleading; knew or were reckless as to whether such statements or documents would be issued or disseminated to the investing public; and knowingly and substantially participated or acquiesced in the issuance or dissemination of such statements or documents as primary violations of the federal securities laws. 57. The Individual Defendants permitted Precision to release these false and misleading statements and failed to file the necessary corrective disclosures, which artificially inflated the value of the Company’s stock. 59. The Individual Defendants are liable as participants in a fraudulent scheme and course of conduct that operated as a fraud or deceit on purchasers of Precision common stock by disseminating materially false and misleading statements and/or concealing material adverse facts. The scheme deceived the investing public regarding Precision’s business, operations, and management and the intrinsic value of Precision securities and caused Plaintiff and members of the Class to purchase Precision securities at artificially inflated prices. 65. Plaintiff repeats, incorporates, and realleges paragraphs 1 through 64 by reference. 66. During the Class Period, Defendants disseminated or approved the false statements specified above, which they knew or recklessly disregarded were misleading in that they contained misrepresentations and failed to disclose material facts necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading. 68. Plaintiff and the Class have suffered damages in that, in reliance on the integrity of the market, they paid artificially inflated prices for Precision securities. Plaintiff and the Class would not have purchased Precision securities at the prices they paid, or at all, if they had been aware that the market prices had been artificially and falsely inflated by Defendants’ misleading statements. 69. As a direct and proximate result of these Defendants’ wrongful conduct, Plaintiff and the other members of the Class suffered damages in connection with their purchases of Precision securities during the Class Period. 70. Plaintiff repeats, incorporates, and realleges paragraphs 1 through 64 by reference. Background For Violation of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 Against All Defendants For Violation of Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act Against the Individual Defendants

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21. Starting in 2016, Plaintiff began receiving text messages on his cellular telephone from short-code telephone number 310-44 which stated they were from “Lexington Law.” 22. The messages were sent to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number xxx-xxx-5199. 23. Plaintiff is not a Lexington Law client or customer. Lexington Law obtained Plaintiff’s name and cellular telephone number through means unknown to Plaintiff. 25. Defendant did not place the text messages for an emergency purpose. B. Defendant’s Messages are Triggered by Inquiries on Plaintiff’s Credit Report 26. Plaintiff subscribes to a credit monitoring program through Experian and thus remains up-to-date on all activity on his credit report. 27. On each occasion, Plaintiff’s receipt of a text message from Lexington Law coincided with a ‘hard’ inquiry on Plaintiff’s credit report or the negative reporting of an account on Plaintiff’s credit report. 28. For instance, on February 9, 2017, Deville Asset Management reported the existence of an alleged outstanding debt on Plaintiff’s credit report. Two days later, on February 11, 2017, Lexington Law sent a text message to Plaintiff advertising its credit report services. 29. In addition, on more than one occasion, Plaintiff applied for a line of credit, was denied, and then received a text message from Lexington Law shortly thereafter. 30. On information and belief, Lexington Law received information from Plaintiff’s credit report regarding inquiries or reporting thereon, which triggered a text message being sent by Defendant’s system to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone to market Defendant’s credit repair services. 31. On information and belief, Lexington Law put this automated system in place to deliver such automated text messages to thousands of consumers, not just Plaintiff. 33. 15 U.S.C. § 1681b permits access to consumer reports for several specific, enumerated permissible purposes. “Collection of an account of [a] consumer” is one of them. Marketing of credit repair services is not. 34. Upon information and belief, Lexington Law obtained such notifications from Experian, or elsewhere, for an impermissible purpose, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(f). 35. As a result of Defendant’s violation of § 1681b(f), Plaintiffs are entitled to damages, costs and attorney’s fees pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a). C. Allegations Regarding the Capacity of Defendant’s System 36. The text messages sent to Plaintiff’s cellular phone by Defendant were made with an ATDS as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1) and the FCC. The text messages were sent automatically, without any human intervention in the actual drafting or directing of the message to Plaintiff. 37. Lexington Law’s website provides terms and conditions for receipt of Lexington Law’s “automated texts about credit repair or credit repair marketing.” See https://www.lexingtonlaw.com/info/sms-terms (last visited Mar. 3, 2017).1 38. The text messages sent by Defendant to Plaintiff’s cell phone were sent with an ATDS, in that Defendant acquired Plaintiff’s number, stored it in a database connected to its telephonic or computer system, and then used its system to send text messages to Plaintiff’s cell phone automatically and without human intervention. 40. Plaintiff’s name and telephone number are stored on a list or database at Lexington Law. The database is connected to a computer system capable of sending text messages to cellular telephones from short-code 310-44. 41. The messages received by Plaintiff were composed of pre-written templates of text that were then automatically filled from Lexington Law’s database. Using computer programming code, and replacing values, Defendant’s computer programs converted the template text into messages like those received by Plaintiff. Thus, what may have appeared to be customized messages were, in fact, created through a computer algorithm with no human involvement. 42. Indeed, the name “Alycia” was a fictitious name not attributable to any actual human at Lexington Law. Plaintiff placed a call to Lexington Law as indicated in “Alycia’s” message and received a man who (1) was not Alycia, (2) did not know anything about the text messages Plaintiff was receiving, and (3) was not able to locate Plaintiff in Lexington Law’s customer files by name, telephone number, or social security number. 43. No human was involved in the sending of Defendant’s text messages to Plaintiff. 44. Moreover, like any computer system, Defendant’s computer-based text messaging system, which involves many computer servers equipped with multiple software applications, has the capacity to generate random numbers. See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pseudorandom_number_generator (last visited March 20, 2017). 45. Defendant’s computer-based system likewise has the capacity to generate sequential numbers. 47. Defendant’s system has the capacity to store and dial the random or sequential numbers it generates just like it stored and dialed Plaintiff’s number. 48. In the unlikely event that Defendant’s system does not already have the capacity to generate random or sequential numbers, that capacity can be trivially added. 49. The following computer programming ‘PHP’-language code could be added to Defendant’s system to generate random numbers: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 <?php for ($randomNumber = mt_rand(1, 9), $i = 1; $i < 10; $i++) { $randomNumber .= mt_rand(0, 9); } var_dump($randomNumber); 50. This simplified PHP code would generate random numbers in Defendant’s ATDS system. 51. The Code would generate random numbers as follows: 1 string(10) "3446780111" 52. The ability to generate sequential numbers could also easily be added to Defendant’s system if it does not have it currently. 55. Lexington Law’s messages violated Plaintiff’s substantive consumer right to be free from receipt of telemarketing text messages to which he had not clearly and conspicuously consented in writing. 56. Lexington Law’s messages came at inconvenient times for Plaintiff and interrupted his activities. For example, one message on February 11, 2017 was received while Plaintiff was at the mall with his wife. 57. Plaintiff found receipt of the messages alarming and disconcerting in that they referred to “repairing his credit” and because he did not know why he was receiving them and did not want to receive them. 58. Receipt of Defendant’s unauthorized messages drained Plaintiff’s phone battery and caused Plaintiff additional electricity expenses and wear and tear on his phone and battery. 59. Plaintiff brings this case as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated. 60. Plaintiff represents, and is a member of the following class (the “Class”): All persons within the United States who, within four years of this Complaint, received on their cellular telephone at least one unauthorized text message from Defendant in which Defendant marketed its credit repair services. 62. Upon information and belief, Defendant sent text messages to cellular telephone numbers of thousands of consumers throughout the United States without their prior express consent. The members of the Class, therefore, are believed to be so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. 63. The exact number and identities of the Class members are unknown at this time and can only be ascertained through discovery. Identification of the Class members is a matter capable of ministerial determination from Defendant’s records. C. Common Questions of Law and Fact 65. The common questions in this case are capable of having common answers. If Plaintiff’s claims that Defendant routinely obtains credit report information for an impermissible purpose and sends automated telemarketing text messages to telephone numbers assigned to cellular telephone services without prior express written consent are accurate, Plaintiff and the Class members will have identical claims capable of being efficiently adjudicated and administered in this case. D. Typicality 66. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the Class members, as they are all based on the same factual and legal theories. E. Protecting the Interests of the Class Members 67. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class and has retained counsel experienced in handling class actions and claims involving unlawful business practices. Neither Plaintiff nor his counsel has any interests which might cause them not to vigorously pursue this action. F. Proceeding Via Class Action is Superior and Advisable 68. A class action is the superior method for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. The interest of Class members in individually controlling the prosecutions of separate claims against Defendant is small because it is not economically feasible for Class members to bring individual actions. 70. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the above paragraphs of this Complaint and incorporates them herein by reference. 71. Defendant sent multiple automated text messages to cellular numbers belonging to Plaintiff and the other members of the Class without their prior express consent. 72. Each of the aforementioned messages by Defendant constitutes a violation of the 76. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the above paragraphs of this Complaint and incorporates them herein by reference. 77. Defendant knowingly and/or willfully sent multiple automated text messages to cellular numbers belonging to Plaintiff and the other members of the Class without their prior express written consent. 78. Each of the aforementioned messages by Defendant constitutes a knowing and/or willful violation of the TCPA. 79. As a result of Defendant’s knowing and/or willful violations of the TCPA, Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to an award of treble damages up to $1,500.00 for each call in violation of the TCPA pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C). 80. Additionally, Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to and seek injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct by Defendant in the future. 82. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the above paragraphs of this Complaint and incorporates them herein by reference. 83. The Fair Credit reporting Act limits access to consumer credit reports to several specific, enumerated permissible purposes. 15 U.S.C. § 1681b. 84. Defendant obtained Plaintiff and the Class members’ credit reports without a permissible purpose as set forth in 15 U.S.C. § 1681b. 85. As a result of Defendant’s violations of the FCRA, Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to an award of statutory damages pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a)(1); 86. Plaintiff and the Class are also entitled to punitive damages pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a)(2) and reasonable attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a)(3). 87. Additionally, Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to and seek injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct by Defendant in the future. A. The Class A. Text Messages Sent to Plaintiff Dated: March 20, 2017 Respectfully submitted, By: /s/ Sergei Lemberg Sergei Lemberg Knowing and/or Willful Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq. Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq. Willful Violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681, et seq.

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24. Plaintiffs bring this action on behalf of themselves and on behalf of all others similarly situated (“the Class”). 35. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 40. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the above paragraphs 1 through 34 inclusive, of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 41. Each such text message call was made using equipment that, upon information and belief, had the capacity to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator. By using such equipment, Defendant was able to effectively send thousands of text messages simultaneously to lists of thousands of wireless phone numbers of consumers without human intervention. These text messages were made en masse through the use of a short code and without the prior express consent of the Plaintiffs and the other members of the Class to receive such text messages. 45. As a result of Defendant’s, and Defendant’s agents’, negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1), Plaintiffs seek for themselves and each Class member $500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). 46. Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(A), Plaintiffs seek injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. 47. Any other relief the Court may deem just and proper. 9. One of the newest types of bulk marketing is to advertise through Short Message Services. The term “Short Message Service” or “SMS” is a messaging system that allows cellular telephone subscribers to use their cellular telephones to send and receive short text messages, usually limited to 160 characters. Cite the U.S. Civil Statute under which you are filing (Do not cite jurisdictional statutes unless diversity): Brief description of cause: VII. REQUESTED IN KNOWING AND/OR WILLFUL VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. NEGLIGENT VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. THE TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. VIOLATION OF THE TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ.

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22. Plaintiff brings this action as a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of all persons and entities that own ShoreTel common stock (the “Class”). Excluded from the Class are defendants and their affiliates, immediate families, legal representatives, heirs, successors or assigns and any entity in which defendants have or had a controlling interest. 23. Plaintiff’s claims are properly maintainable as a class action under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 90. Plaintiff repeats all previous allegations as if set forth in full. 91. Defendants have caused the Recommendation Statement to be issued with the intention of soliciting ShoreTel stockholders to tender their shares in the Tender Offer. 92. Section 14(d)(4) of the Exchange Act and SEC Rule 14d-9 promulgated thereunder require full and complete disclosure in connection with tender offers. 93. The Recommendation Statement violates Section 14(d)(4) and Rule 14d-9 because it omits material facts, including those set forth above, which omission renders the Recommendation Statement false and/or misleading. 96. Plaintiff repeats all previous allegations as if set forth in full. 97. Defendants violated Section 14(e) of the Exchange Act by issuing the Recommendation Statement in which they made untrue statements of material facts or failed to state all material facts necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading, or engaged in deceptive or manipulative acts or practices, in connection with the Tender Offer. 98. Defendants knew that Plaintiff would rely upon their statements in the Recommendation Statement in determining whether to tender her shares pursuant to the Tender Offer. Class Claims Against All Defendants for Violations of Section 14(e) of the Exchange Act Class Claims Against All Defendants for Violations of Section 14(d) of the Exchange Act And SEC Rule 14d-9 Company Background

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12. Samsung is one of the largest manufacturers of “Smart TVs,” which offer built-in internet connectivity, allow for web browsing, the installation of applications, and other advanced features. Samsung’s Smart TVs command a premium price of up to $200 over TVs without any “smart” capabilities.2 13. In step with their added features, Samsung’s Smart TVs became harder to control with traditional television remotes. In response, Samsung developed an advanced remote control for its line of Smart TVs. But in Samsung’s haste to design a new remote, it developed a product plagued with a potentially hazardous defect. 14. Starting in at least 2011, Samsung began selling the BN59-01134B remote (“Qwerty Remote”) with some of its Smart TVs, such as the $3,799.99 Samsung UN60D7000 60-inch Smart TV.3 Samsung increased the price of its Smart TVs that included the Qwerty Remote, meaning consumers paid a premium over other televisions to obtain the Remote.4 2 Smart TVs: Not Such A Smart Idea | Techdirt, https://www.techdirt.com/blog/ innovation/articles/20120221/03352017827/smart-tvs-not-such-smart-idea.shtml (last visited Feb. 26, 2015) (stating that “the ‘smart’ factor” of Smart TVs “runs between $70 and $200.”). 3 Amazon.com: Samsung UN60D7000 60-Inch 1080p 240Hz 3D LED HDTV (Silver): Electronics, http://web.archive.org/web/20111029165746/http://www.amazon.com/ Samsung-UN60D7000-60-Inch-1080p-Silver/dp/B004QFGGTY (last visited Feb. 26, 2015). 4 For example, Samsung’s UN60D6400 60-inch Smart TV did not include the Qwerty remote and had a price of $2,697.99 in January 2012—$300 less than the Samsung UN60D7000 that included the remote at a price of $2,997. See UN60D6500 - Samsung 60” Series 6 LED Black Flat Panel LCD HDTV at Abt, http://web.archive.org/web/ 20120113111612/http://www.abt.com/product/55144/Samsung-UN60D6500.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2015); UN60D7000 - Samsung 60” 3D Series 7 LED Silver Flat Panel HDTV at Abt, http://web.archive.org/web/20120116131349/http://www.abt.com/product /53498/Samsung-UN60D7000.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2015). Some time later, Samsung Case3:15-cv-00885 Document1 Filed02/26/15 Page4 of 25 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 45. Class Definition: Plaintiff Bravo brings this action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) and Rule 23(b)(3) on behalf of himself and a Class and Subclass of similarly situated individuals defined as follows: Class: All individuals and entities in the United States who purchased a BN59- 01134B remote control or who purchased a Samsung television packaged with a BN59-01134B remote control. Case3:15-cv-00885 Document1 Filed02/26/15 Page12 of 25 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 53. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 54. The Qwerty Remotes are consumer products as defined in 15 U.S.C. § 2301(1) because they are tangible personal property distributed in commerce and are normally used for personal or household purposes. 55. Plaintiff and members of the Class are consumers as defined in 15 U.S.C. § 2301(3). 56. Defendant is a supplier and warrantor as defined in 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301(4) and (5) because it is in the business of making consumer products (e.g., its Qwerty Remotes and Smart TVs) directly or indirectly available to consumers, and because it has issued written Case3:15-cv-00885 Document1 Filed02/26/15 Page15 of 25 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 63. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 64. The Consumers Legal Remedies Act (“CLRA”) applies to Defendant’s actions and conduct as described herein because it extends to transactions that are intended to result, or which have resulted, in the sale of goods or services to consumers. 65. Defendant is a “person” as defined by Cal. Civ. Code § 1761(c). 66. Plaintiff and each member of the Subclass are “consumers” as defined by Cal. Civ. Code § 1761(a). 67. Defendant’s Qwerty Remotes are “goods” within the meaning of Cal. Civ. Code § 1761(a). 68. As described herein, Defendant failed to disclosed the Qwerty Remote’s Battery Defect to Plaintiff and the members of the Subclass in violation of Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1750, et seq. 69. Defendant, acting with knowledge, intentionally and unlawfully brought harm upon Plaintiff and the Subclass by omitting from its advertisements, marketing, and documentation any statement that it designed and/or manufactured the Qwerty Remotes with the Battery Defect that created a safety risk by creating excessive heat which then caused batteries to leak hazardous substances. 70. Defendant knew that its Qwerty Remotes suffered from an inherent defect, were defectively designed and manufactured, would fail prematurely, and were not suitable for their intended use. 71. Further, Plaintiff’s Qwerty Remote began exhibiting symptoms resulting from the Battery Defect within Samsung’s one-year warranty. 72. Defendant was in a superior position to know the true state of facts about and the existence of the safety defect found in the Qwerty Remotes (i.e., the Battery Defect), Case3:15-cv-00885 Document1 Filed02/26/15 Page17 of 25 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 83. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 84. California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”), Cal Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200, et seq., protects both consumers and competitors by promoting fair competition in commercial markets for goods and services. 85. The UCL prohibits any unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business act or practice, including the employment of any deception, fraud, false pretense, false promise, misrepresentation, or the concealment, suppression, or omission of any material fact. A business practice need only meet one of the three criteria to be considered unfair competition. 86. The existence of a safety defect in a product is a material term of any transaction because it directly affects a consumer’s choice of, or conduct regarding, whether to purchase a product. 87. As described herein, Defendant has engaged in deceptive business practices, as defined by the UCL, by failing disclose that the Qwerty Remote contains a material defect that causes a safety hazard (by creating excessive heat which then causes batteries to leak hazardous substances) and premature failure despite knowing that the Qwerty Remotes Case3:15-cv-00885 Document1 Filed02/26/15 Page19 of 25 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Breach of Express Warranty Cal. Com. Code § 2313 (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Subclass) 113. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 114. Samsung included an express warranty with every Samsung Smart TV that included a Qwerty Remote, warranting the Smart TV and Qwerty Remote against manufacturing defects in workmanship and materials for a period of one year. 115. Samsung breached the express warranty by selling Qwerty Remotes with the Battery Defect (a safety hazard stemming from the remotes creating excessive heat which then causes batteries to leak hazardous substances) that required repair or replacement within the warranty period and by refusing to honor the express warranty by repairing or replacing, free of charge, the defective Qwerty Remotes. 116. Plaintiff notified Samsung of the breach within a reasonable time by calling Samsung’s within the Qwerty Remote’s warranty period. Samsung was also on notice of the Battery Defect from the complaints and/or repair or replacement requests from members of the Subclass that it received or reviewed, and from its testing, diagnostic, maintenance, repair, and/or replacement records. 117. Nevertheless, Plaintiff and the Subclass were not required to notify Samsung of the breach because affording Samsung a reasonable opportunity to cure its breach of written warranty would have been futile. Indeed, even after Plaintiff notified Samsung of the breach, it refused to acknowledge the safety defect and would not repair or replace the remote. Case3:15-cv-00885 Document1 Filed02/26/15 Page23 of 25 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Breach of Implied Warranty of Merchantability Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1792, 1792.1, (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Subclass) 102. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations. 103. As the designer, manufacturer, marketer, and/or distributor of the Qwerty Remotes, Defendant impliedly warranted that the Qwerty Remotes were fit for their intended and ordinary purpose. 104. The intended and ordinary purpose of the Qwerty Remote was to operate as a television remote control with a QWERTY keyboard (e.g., allowing purchasers to control Case3:15-cv-00885 Document1 Filed02/26/15 Page21 of 25 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 I. A Brief Overview of Samsung and its Qwerty Remotes. Violation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301, et seq. (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class) Violation of California’s Consumer Legal Remedies Act Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1750, et seq. (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Subclass) Violations of California’s Unfair Competition Law Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200, et seq. (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Subclass)

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30. Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), Plaintiff seeks to prosecute his FLSA claims individually and as a collective action on behalf of all persons who are or were formerly employed by Defendant as AMs at any time during the relevant period (the “Collective Action Members”). 31. Defendants are liable under the FLSA for, inter alia, failing to properly compensate Plaintiff and other AMs. 33. The similarly situated Collective Action Members are known to Defendant JDSA I, are readily-identifiable, and can be located through its records. 34. Defendant JDSA I employed Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members as AMs during the relevant period. 35. Defendants maintained control, oversight, and discretion over the operation of all of its franchised Jason’s Deli restaurants, including its employment practices with respect to the AMs. 36. Plaintiff’s and the AMs’ work was performed in the normal course of Defendant’s business and was integrated into it. 37. Consistent with the Defendant JDSA I’s policy, pattern and practice, Plaintiff and the AMs worked over 40 hours in one or more workweeks, but Plaintiff and the AMs did not receive overtime premiums on one or more regularly scheduled pay dates within the relevant period for hours worked as AMs in excess of 40 in those workweeks. One such week in which Plaintiff worked more than 40 hours, but did not receive overtime premiums is the week of September 20, 2015. 38. All of the work that the Plaintiff and the AMs performed was assigned by Defendant JDSA I, or Defendant JDSA I was aware of all of the work that they have performed. 40. The work that Plaintiff and the AMs performed as part of their primary duty did not include managerial responsibilities or the exercise of meaningful independent judgment and discretion. 41. Regardless of the store at which they worked, Plaintiff’s and the AMs’ primary job duties included: a. preparing food; b. helping customers; c. bussing tables; d. cleaning the restaurant; e. checking to make sure that supplies were properly shelved; and f. checking inventory. 42. Regardless of the store at which they worked, Plaintiff’s and the AMs’ primary job duties did not include: a. hiring; b. firing; c. disciplining other employees; d. scheduling; e. supervising and delegating; or f. exercising meaningful independent judgment and discretion. 43. Plaintiff’s and the AMs’ primary duties were manual in nature. 44. The performance of manual labor duties occupied the majority of Plaintiff’s and the AMs’ working hours. 46. Upon information and belief, Defendants did not perform a person-by-person analysis of the AMs’ job duties when making the decision to classify the AMs (and other similarly-situated current and former employees holding comparable positions but different titles) as exempt from the overtime provisions of the FLSA. 47. Plaintiff and the AMs were paid by salary throughout their entire period of training to become an Assistant Manager for Defendant, but were not paid overtime premiums when they worked over 40 hours in a work week during their training periods, at all times throughout the relevant period. 48. Defendants knew or should have known that under 29 C.F.R. § 541.705, none of the bona fide exemptions under the FLSA could apply to Plaintiff’s and the AMs’ work during their period of training for employment as an Assistant Manager. 49. Defendants’ conduct alleged herein was willful or in reckless disregard of the applicable wage and hour laws and was undertaken pursuant to Defendant’s centralized, company-wide policy, pattern, and practice of attempting to minimize labor costs by not paying overtime premiums to its AMs. Defendants knew that AMs were not performing work that complied with any FLSA exemption and it acted willfully or recklessly in failing to classify Plaintiff in his AM position and other AMs as non-exempt employees. 51. During the relevant period, Defendants knew or recklessly disregarded the fact that the FLSA required it to pay employees primarily performing non-exempt duties an overtime premium for hours worked in excess of 40 per workweek. 52. Accordingly, Defendants’ unlawful conduct was willful or in reckless disregard of the applicable wage and hour laws and undertaken pursuant to Defendants’ centralized, company-wide policy, pattern, and practice of attempting to minimize labor costs by not paying overtime premiums to AMs. 53. As part of its regular business practice, Defendants have intentionally, willfully, and repeatedly engaged in a pattern, practice and policy of violating the FLSA with respect to AMs. This policy and pattern or practice includes but it is not limited to: a. willfully misclassifying Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members as exempt from the requirements of the FLSA; b. willfully failing to pay Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members overtime wages for hours that they worked in excess of 40 hours per week; c. requiring Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members to perform primarily non-exempt tasks; and d. willfully failing to provide enough money in its restaurant-level labor budgets for its non-exempt employees to perform their duties and responsibilities, forcing its AMs who were classified by Defendant as exempt to perform additional non-exempt tasks. 55. Defendants acted recklessly or in willful disregard of the FLSA by instituting a policy and/or practice that did not record all hours worked by Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members during the relevant period. 56. At all relevant times, Defendant JDSA I has been, and continues to be, an employer enterprise engaged in interstate commerce and the production of goods for commerce, within the meaning of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(a) and 207(a). 57. Defendants are subject to the coverage of the maximum hours and overtime compensation provisions of the FLSA. 58. Defendants engaged in a widespread pattern and practice of violating the FLSA, as detailed above in this Complaint. 59. Plaintiff consented in writing to be a party to this action, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), as reflected in the attached consent filed contemporaneously herewith. 60. The overtime wage provisions set forth in 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq., apply to Defendants. 61. During the relevant period and continuing to the present time, Defendants had a policy and practice of not paying overtime premiums to Plaintiff and its AMs, for hours worked in excess of 40 hours per workweek. 63. As a result of Defendants’ willful failure to record, report, credit and compensate its employees, including Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members, Defendants have failed to make, keep and preserve records with respect to each of its AMs sufficient to determine the wages, hours, and other conditions and practices of employment, in violation of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq., including 29 U.S.C. §§ 211(c) and 215(a). 64. As a result of Defendants’ policy and practice of minimizing labor costs by underfunding the labor budgets for its restaurants, Defendants knew or recklessly disregarded the fact that Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members were primarily performing manual labor and non-exempt tasks. 66. As a result of Defendants’ FLSA violations, Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Collective Action Members, is entitled (a) to recover from Defendants unpaid overtime wages, (b) to recover an additional, equal amount as liquidated damages, and (c) to recover their unreasonably delayed payment of wages, reasonable attorneys’ fees, costs and disbursements of this action, and all allowable interest, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) and the federal rules. 67. Because Defendants’ violations of the FLSA have been willful, a three-year statute of limitations applies pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 255. Fair Labor Standard Act – Unpaid Overtime Wages On Behalf of Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective

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66. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if set forth fully herein. 67. Plaintiffs have a right against wealth-based detention. In the pretrial detention context, courts have regularly found that setting arbitrary monetary release conditions that exceed an individual’s ability to pay violates the equal protection clause. The Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses prohibit jailing a person because of her inability to make a monetary payment. Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1983). Because Plaintiffs are detained based solely on their inability to pay, heightened scrutiny is implicated. ODonnell v. Harris Cty., 892 F.3d 147, 161 (5th Cir. 2018) ( “[T]he Supreme Court has found that heightened scrutiny is required when criminal laws detain poor defendants because of their indigence.”); Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 397-99 (1971); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 241- 42 (1970). 68. Defendants violate Plaintiffs’ substantive rights by enforcing against them a system of wealth-based detention that keeps them in jail solely because they cannot afford to make a monetary payment. 23 69. Defendants do not inquire into an individual’s ability to afford monetary release conditions or consider less restrictive alternatives before recommending or setting unaffordable monetary bail. 70. Defendants’ actions fail any form of scrutiny, as empirical research indicates no correlation between monetary release conditions and an individual’s likelihood to appear in court. 71. Here, Defendants’ policies and practice result in poor arrestees being detained when similarly situated wealthy arrestees are not, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Commissioner of Corrections and Sheriff enforce these unconstitutional detention orders. Thus Defendants deny individuals their equal protection and due process rights. 72. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if set forth fully herein. 73. Defendants, acting under color of law, deny pretrial detainees their constitutionally protected right to liberty without any compelling state interest. 74. It is well settled that freedom from imprisonment “lies at the heart of the liberty that [the Due Process] Clause protects.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 679, 690 (2001); Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 117, 80 (1992) (“Freedom from bodily restraint has always been at the core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause from arbitrary governmental action.”). Pretrial detention infringes upon this right and may only be applied if it is “narrowly focuse[d]” to serve “compelling” interests. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 750 (1987). 24 75. The state’s interest at the pretrial bond stage is limited to ensuring the accused will appear for trial and protecting the public from danger associated specifically with that individual’s release. Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 452-54 (2013). 76. Here, the City’s Bond Commissioner and individual judges fail to consider a particular detainee’s likelihood to appear or whether that individual poses any danger to the community, and make no findings regarding the necessity of detention, before setting de facto detention orders through imposition of unaffordable monetary conditions of release. The Commissioner of Corrections and Sheriff enforce these unconstitutional detention orders. Thus Defendants deny pretrial detainees their fundamental right to liberty in the absence of any compelling government interest and in violation of their substantive due process rights. 77. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if set forth fully herein. 78. Defendants provide absolutely no process before detaining individuals for weeks on unaffordable monetary release conditions. No hearing occurs, much less a hearing with sufficient process. Since no hearing occurs, no determination is made that any government interests require detention, in violation of Plaintiffs’ procedural due process rights. 79. Before an individual may be detained pretrial, procedural due process requires an individual be given the opportunity to be heard “at a meaningful time and in a meaningful 25 manner” before being deprived of liberty. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (citing Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965); Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914)). 80. Defendants’ total lack of procedures—including no notice that a hearing will occur, no notice that the issue at the hearing will be whether the individual arrested is a flight risk or poses a danger to the community, no hearing with the opportunity to present evidence and cross-examine witnesses, and no hearing with counsel present—flagrantly violates the Fourteenth Amendment. 81. Individuals who qualify for public defenders remain incarcerated an average of 4- 5 weeks before they are given any hearing to challenge or modify their release conditions. Individuals who do not qualify for the public defender, but cannot afford to hire a private attorney, fair even worse—often being denied an opportunity to address their release conditions or discuss their financial status even longer. Conversely, wealthier individuals can obtain almost immediate release or obtain counsel to immediately challenge release conditions. Defendants Violate Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment Rights to Equal Protection and Due Process through a Policy or Practice that Jails Individuals Based on their Poverty under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 By Named Plaintiffs on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, against all Defendants Defendants Violate Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment Substantive Due Process Right to Liberty under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 By Named Plaintiffs on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, against all Defendants Defendants Violate Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment Right to Procedural Due Process 42 U.S.C. § 1983 By Named Plaintiffs on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, against all Defendants

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38. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the aforementioned allegations as if restated fully herein word for word. 39. The foregoing acts and omissions of the Defendant and its’ agents constituted numerous and multiple violations of the FDCPA including, but not limited to, each and every one of the cited provisions of the FDCPA, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq., with respect to the Plaintiff. 40. The Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692e by using a false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means as set forth above factually and through the Exhibits. 41. The Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A) by using a false representation of the amount of the debt and/or 15 U.S.C. 1692e(2)(B) by using a false, deceptive, and misleading representation concerning a service it rendered for which it was not legally entitled to receive compensation for the foregoing reasons. 43. Each violation of the RCPA by the Defendant as outlined in this Complaint is likewise a violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692f as an “unfair or unconscionable means to attempt to collect a debt.” 44. This jurisdiction is reliant upon the “least sophisticated debtor” standard to determine whether a communication might effectively deceive an unsophisticated consumer under 15 U.S.C. 1692. Smith v Computer Credit, 167 F.3d 1052 (6th Cir. 1999). More specifically, “the fact that a false statement may be obviously false to those who are trained and experienced does not change its character, nor take away its power to deceive others less experienced.” Federal Trade Commission v Standard Education Society, 302 U.S. 112, 116, 50 S.Ct. 113, 115, 82 L.Ed. 141 (1937). It seems sensible to suggest that attempts such as those by the Defendant in this case to collect a “convenience” fee from the Plaintiff which it was not permitted by contract or law to collect from the Plaintiff would have the effect of confusing a less sophisticated debtor such as the Plaintiff, which it in fact did. 45. For a communication to be in connection with the collection of a debt, an animating purpose of the communication must be to induce payment by the debtor.” Grden v Leikin Ingber & Winters PC, 643 F.3d 169, 173 (6th Cir. 2011). All communications from the Defendant, their agents, and representatives to the Plaintiff, both orally and in writing, shared the same animating purpose- to coerce the Plaintiff into ultimately paying them amounts she should not have been legally required to pay. 47. The Plaintiff incorporates by reference the aforementioned allegations as if restated fully herein word for word. 48. The Defendant is a “Regulated Person” as that term is defined in the Michigan Collection Practices Act (“RCPA”), at MCL § 445.251. 49. The Plaintiff is a “Consumer” as that term is defined at MCL § 445.251. 50. The foregoing acts and omissions of the Defendant and its’ agents constituted numerous violations of the RCPA. 51. The Defendant violated M.C.L. § 445.252(a) by communicating with the Plaintiff and class members in a misleading or deceptive manner by forwarding the Plaintiff a collection letter and on their website outlining a mandatory “convenience fee” assessed to the Plaintiff or class members for the processing of electronic transactions which the Defendant possessed no legal or contractual right to pursue. 52. The Defendant violated M.C.L. § 445.252(e) for the foregoing reasons. 53. The Defendant violated M.C.L. 445.252(n) by using a harassing, oppressive, and/or abusive method(s) to collect the debt at issue. 54. The Defendant violated M.C.L. 445.252(q) by failing to implement a procedure designed to prevent each of the above-listed RCPA violations by the Defendant’s agents and/or employees. 56. The Defendant’s foregoing acts in attempting to collect this alleged debt violated MCL §445.252f, which prohibits a Regulated Person from “misrepresenting in a communication with a debt any of the following: (i) the legal status of a legal action being taken or threatened and/or (ii) the legal rights of the creditor or debtor.” 57. The Defendant, specifically by way of the communications between its’ agents and representatives and the Plaintiffs and class members, clearly misrepresented to the Plaintiff and class members at a minimum whether they had provided sufficient verification of their legal right to collect upon the underlying debt at issue. 58. The Plaintiff and class members have suffered damages as a result of these violations of the Michigan Collection Practices Act. 59. These violations of the RCPA were willful, and as a result the Plaintiff is entitled to actual damages above $50.00 pursuant to M.C.L. § 445.257; statutory damages in an amount up to $150.00 pursuant to M.C.L. § 445.257; and reasonable attorney’s fees and court costs pursuant to M.C.L. § 445.257. 60. This action is brought as a class action. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of herself and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 61. The Plaintiff seeks to certify a single class as set forth below. 63. With respect to the Second (RCPA) Plaintiff Class, this claim is brought on behalf of a class of (a) all persons with addresses in the State of Michigan; (b) to whom the Defendant charged a “$5.00 convenience fee” for the processing of payments made to the Defendant through its website payment portal on www.bayareacredit.com; without any contractual or legal authorization;(c) in an attempt to collect a debt that purportedly was incurred for personal, family, or household; (d) during the period beginning six years prior to the filing of this action and ending 21 days after the filing of this action. 64. The identities of all class members are readily ascertainable from the business records of the Defendant and its payment portal of its website. 65. Excluded from the Plaintiff Classes are the Defendant and all officers, members, partners, managers, directors, and employees of the Defendant and each of their respective immediate families, and legal counsel for all parties to this action and all members of their respective immediate families. 66. There are questions of law and fact common to the First Plaintiff Class, which common issues predominate over any issues involving only individual class members. The principal issue is whether the Defendant’s mandatory requirement that a debtor pay a “$5.00 convenience fee” through the collection portal on the Defendant’s website violated the foregoing sections of the FDCPA and RCPA. 68. The Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Plaintiff Class defined in this complaint. Plaintiff has retained counsel with experience in handling consumer lawsuits, complex legal issues, and class actions, and neither the Plaintiffs nor their attorney have any interests which might cause them to not vigorously pursue this action. 70. Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(1)(A) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is appropriate because adjudications with respect to individual members create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications which could establish incompatible standards of conduct for the Defendant, who collects debt throughout the United States of America. 71. Certification of a class(es) under Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is appropriate for: “a determination regarding the Defendant’s collection of a mandatory convenience fee of “$5.00 convenience fee” through its payment portal on its website forced on class members such as the Plaintiffs would violate both the RCPA and FDCPA and permit the Plaintiff Class to obtain injunctive relief pursuant to MCL 445.257(1).” 72. Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is also appropriate in that the questions of law and fact common to members of the Plaintiff Class predominate over any questions affecting an individual member, and a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.

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17. Specifically, Plaintiff made a cash withdrawal from Defendant’s ATM at the following locations: (a) On or about September 1, 2012, Plaintiff made an electronic fund transfer at Defendant’s ATM located at 761 Highway 68, Sweetwater, Tennessee. Defendant charged Plaintiff a fee of $3.00 in connection with the above- described transaction. 18. At the time of the above-described electronic transaction, Plaintiff did not maintain any accounts with Defendant. 19. At the time of the above-described transaction, Defendant was acting as an “automated teller machine operator” that operated the automated teller machine at which Plaintiff initiated an electronic fund transfer or a balance inquiry. 20. However, at the time of the above-described transaction, there was no notice posted “on or at” the ATM operated by Defendant apprising consumers that a fee would be charged for use of the ATM. 21. Because Defendant did not post the required notice, it was not permitted to charge a usage fee to Plaintiff and other class members. 22. Plaintiff brings this class action on behalf of himself and all other similarly situated pursuant to Rules 23(a) and 23(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 23. Plaintiff seeks to represent a class of persons to be defined as follows: All persons who during the year preceding the filing of Plaintiff’s complaint: 1) where charged a “terminal fee” at Defendant’s ATM located at 761 Highway 68, Sweetwater, Tennessee, which was operated by Defendant when such persons made an electronic fund transfer and/or balance inquiry where, 2) no notice indicating that such fee was to be charged was posted on or at the outside of the ATM machine. 24. Congress expressly intended that the EFTA would be enforced, in part, through private class actions. 15 U.S.C. § 1693m(a). 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Plaintiff Don Anderson’s Class Action Complaint - 6 - 25. The EFTA’s class action enforcement provisions are identical, in relevant part, to the class action enforcement provisions of other consumer protection statutes and housed within the Consumer Credit Protection Act. (15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq.) There is abundant authority interpreting and applying these statutory class action provisions, throughout the federal judiciary. Federal courts have routinely certified classes relating to consumer claims for statutory damages, generally, and for violation of the EFTA’s ATM fee disclosure provisions, specifically. See, e.g., Hammer v. JP’s Southwestern Foods, LLC, No. 08-cv-0339 (W.D. Mo.)(Gaitan, J.); Flores, supra 2008 WL 4861511 at 3-5; Burns, supra., 2006 WL 3754820 at *11-12; Jackman v. Global Cash Access Holdings, 09-cv-897 (W.D. Pa.)(McVerry, J.)(class certified and final settlement approval granted); Nolf v. Allegheny Bank of Pittsburgh, 09-cv-645 (W.D.Pa.)(Bissoon, J.)(class certified and final settlement approval granted); Dragotta v. Northwest Bancorp, Inc. d/b/a Northwest Savings Bank, 09-cv-632 (W.D. Pa.)(Fischer, J.) .)(class certified and final settlement approval granted); Parker v. First-Citizen Bank & Trust Company, 09-cv-0588 (M.D. Tenn.)(Campbell, J.) .)(class certified and final settlement approval granted); Polevoy v. Devon Bank, 08-cv-4822 (N.D. Ill.)(Kennelly, J.) (class certified and final settlement approval granted);Ochart v. Broadway Bank, 08-cv-4893, (N.D. Ill.)(Castillo, J.)(class certified and final settlement approval granted);Anthony v. Fifth Third Bank (Chicago), 08-cv-4359, (N.D. Ill)(Schenkier, J.)(class certified and final settlement approval granted); Zintel v. Financial Partners Credit Union, (C.D. CA), SACV 09-0868. (class certified and final settlement approval granted). 26. Numerosity: The class described above is so numerous that joinder of all individual members in one action would be impracticable. The disposition of the individual claims of the respective class members through this class action will benefit both the parties and this Court. 27. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that there are at minimum, thousands of members of the class described above. 28. The exact size of the class and the identities of the individual members thereof are ascertainable through Defendant’s records. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Plaintiff Don Anderson’s Class Action Complaint - 7 - 29. Members of the class may be notified of the pendency of this action by techniques and forms commonly used in class actions, such as by published notice, e-mail notice, website notices, first class mail, or combinations thereof, or by other methods suitable to this class and deemed necessary and/or appropriate by this Court. 30. Typicality: Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the members of the class. The claims of the Plaintiff and members of the class are based on the same legal theories and arise from the same unlawful and willful conduct. 31. Plaintiff and members of the class were each consumers who used an ATM machine operated by Defendant to make an electronic fund transfer or balance inquiry and were charged a terminal owner fee, notwithstanding that the posting providing notice of the fee required by EFTA “on or at” Defendant’s terminals was not present. 32. Common Questions of Fact and Law: There is a well-defined community of interest and common questions of fact and law affecting members of the class. 33. The questions of fact and law common to the class predominate over questions which may affect individual members and include the following: a. Whether, under 15 U.S.C. § 1693b(d)(3)(A) and 12 C.F.R. 205.16, Defendant was, at all relevant times, an automated teller machine operator that imposed a fee on consumers for providing host electronic fund transfer services to those consumers; b. Whether Defendant complied with the notice requirements of 15 U.S.C. § 1693(d)(3)(B) and 12 C.F.R. 205.16; and, c. Whether Plaintiff and members of the class are entitled to statutory damages, costs and/or attorneys’ fees for Defendant’s acts and conduct. 34. Adequacy of Representations: Plaintiff is an adequate representative of the class because his interests do not conflict with the interests of the members of the class. Plaintiff will fairly, adequately, and vigorously represent and protect the interests of the members of the class and has no interests antagonistic to the members of the class. Plaintiff has retained counsel who is competent and experienced in the prosecution of class action litigation. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Plaintiff Don Anderson’s Class Action Complaint - 8 - 35. Superiority: A class action is superior to other available means for the fair and efficient adjudication of the claims of the class. While the aggregate damages which may be awarded to the members of the class are likely to be substantial, the damages suffered by the individual members of the class are relatively small. As a result, the expense and burden of individual litigation makes it economically infeasible and procedurally impracticable for each member of the class to individually seek redress for the wrongs done to them. Plaintiff does not know of any other litigation concerning this controversy already commenced by or against any member of the class. The likelihood of the individual members of the class prosecuting separate claims is remote. Individualized litigation would also present the potential for varying, inconsistent, or contradictory judgments, and would increase the delay and expense to all parties and the court system resulting from multiple trials of the same factual issues. In contrast, the conduct of this matter as a class action presents fewer management difficulties, conserves the resources of the parties and the court system, and would protect the rights of each member of the class. Plaintiff knows of no difficulty to be encountered in the management of this action that would preclude its maintenance as a class action.

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14. The named Plaintiff is the subscriber and regular user of cellular telephone service for telephone number (404) 749-8857. 15. AIC has initiated telephone calls to Plaintiffs cellular telephone number. 16. Plaintiffhas never provided AIC with his cellular telephone number. 17. Plaintiffhas never provided AIC with permission to make or initiate calls to his cellular telephone number. 18-A-3010 NOV 13, 2018 05:18 PK (ML J. dm)� VatwIb T. CI** SlaSu Cobb Courtly. flktocip* 20. The fact that voice used on the telephone messages is artificial and/or prerecorded is clear to the listener. The voice is choppy from word to word, indicating a computer is reading a 21. script rather than a live person, 22. During the artificial or prerecorded voice script message, a short pause occurs which is followed by an interjected computer generated voice which attempts to read the name ofan individual person. 23. The name ofsuch individual is unintelligible from the artificial, computer generated voice. 24, Plaintiff has received at least 14 such messages which each sounded identical to the others. 25. Plaintiff also received at least 3 calls which consisted of dead air. 26. AIC used an artificial or prerecorded voice message when it initiated calls to Plaintiff and the class. 27. The use ofan artificial voice and abandoned dead air calls is also indicative ofthe use of an automatic telephone dialing system. 29. AIC uploads contact information, including cellular telephone numbers, into TCN's secure contact manager to be stored. 30. AIC then has the option of mapping the contact information with more data in order for the TCN system to better prioritize and sequence calls to the cellular telephone numbers for a calling campaign. 31. The calls are launched automatically by the TCN system when a dialing campaign is set to occur. 32. AIC agents can log into an agent gateway, and the dialer will route calls to the agent once the dialer receives a live connection. 33. The dialer can also play artificial or prerecorded voice messages, such as the ones played in telephone calls to Plaintiff. 34, The TCN dialer provides for conditional and sequential dialing. 35 . The TCN dialer stores telephone numbers in its secure contact manager. 36. The TCN dialer uses a sequential number generator to automatically generate a sequence oftelephone numbers to be called from the database stored in the secure contact manager. 37. The TCN dialer dials such numbers. 39. The TCN dialer can dial without human intervention at the time the call is initiated. 40. The TCN dialer is an automatic telephone dialing system. 41 . The telephone calls to Plaintiffs cellular telephone number, and to the class, were initiated using an automatic telephone dialing system. 42. The TCN dialer provides for cellular scrubbing to prevent calling ceilutar telephone numbers, ifthe caller chooses to utilize this feature. 43. Plaintiffhas never given AIC permission to call his cellular telephone number. 44. Plaintiff dtd not wish to be contacted by AIC for any purpose. 45. On multiple occasions, Plaintiff requested the AIC to cease calling. 46. Despite Plaintiffs demand that AIC cease calling his cellular telephone, AIC continued to initiate calls to Plaintiffs cellular telephone number using artificial or prerecorded voice messages and an automatic telephone dialing system, at times initiating multiple calls during the same day. 49. In the alternative, AIC could have conducted a simple cellular telephone number scrub using the TCN dialer to determine that (404) 749-8857 was a cellular telephone number. 50. Continuing to initiate calls to cellular telephone numbers without conducting a cellular scrub, particularly after a request to cease doing so, was in reckless disregard ofAlC's obligations under the TCPA. 51. It was the intent of AIC to initiate the telephone call campaigns. 52. The telephone calls made by AIC to Plaintiffs and to die class members' cellular telephone numbers were knowingly and willfully initiated. 53. Manufacturers and vendors of dialing software, hardware and equipment, such as that employed by AIC, routinely provide their clients manuals and other media concerning TCPA compliance, m particular scrubbing or flagging ofcellular telephone numbers. 56. The legally protected rights under the TCPA closely relate to rights enforceable at common law, including without limitation to the torts of intrusion upon seclusion, nuisance, harassment, tortuous infliction of emotional distress, and unreasonable collection practices. 57. All conditions precedent to bringing this action have been complied with. 59. Plaintiff alleges a subclass ofsuch persons from which A1C obtained the cellular telephone number from the same source from which it obtained telephone number (404) 749-8857. 60. The claims ofthe Plaintiff are typical of those ofthe class members. All are based on the same facts and legal theories. 60. The exact size ofthe class is information within the exclusive knowledge of the Defendant. 61. The class is so numerous that joinder ofat! members is Impractical. 62. The allegation of the previous paragraph is likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery. This allegation is based upon the following information; 1) Plaintiff himself received many calls to his cellular telephone from AIC, indicating Defendant did not scrub to remove cellular telephone numbers; 2) Many ofthe received calls to Plaintiff included an artificial or prerecorded voice message; 3) the very purpose of automated dialers is to call numerous persons in a short amount of time, and Plaintiff received multiple calls to his cellular telephone; and 4) the sheer size and scope of AIC's collection campaigns. 63. for his claims of monetary damages. 64.1200(a)(lXiii). 64. Defendant has acted on grounds that apply generally to the class making final injunctive relief appropriate to the class as a whole. Plaintiff requests certification of a class pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(bX2) 65. Based on Defendant's pattern and practice of violating the TCPA, future violations will continue. 65. for his claims for injunctive relief. 66. The only way to prevent the Defendant from continuing to violate the TCPA is to enjoin the defendant from further use of automatic telephone dialing system. 67. Accordingly, Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of the Class, seeks injunctive relief pursuant to 47 U.S.C. §227(bX3)(A) to enjoin and prohibit Defendant from use ofan automatic telephone dialing system in the future, 68. In the alternative, Plaintiff individually and on behalfofthe class, seeks injunctive reliefpursuant to 47 U.S.C, § 227(b)(3)(A) to enjoin and prohibit Defendant from continuing use of an automatic telephone dialing system without the prior express consent ofthe called party in the future. 70. Based on Defendant's pattern and practice of violating the TCPA, future violations will continue. 71. The only way to prevent the Defendant from continuing to violate the TCPA is to enjoin the defendant from further use of artificial or prerecorded voice calls. 72. Accordingly, Plaintiff, individually and on behalfofthe Class, seeks injunctive reliefpursuant to 47 U.S.C. §227{bX3)(A) to enjoin and prohibit Defendant from use ofartificial or prerecorded voice calls in the future. 74. The acts ofDefendant constitute violations ofthe Telephone Consumer Protection Act's prohibitions on the use of automatic telephone dialing systems and the regulations promulgated thereunder. 75. Defendant used an automatic telephone dialing system when it made and/or initiated calls to plaintiffs cellular telephone number. 76. Defendant's violations of the TCPA include, but are not limited to, the following: Making and/or initiating telephone calls using an 77. automatic telephone dialing system to any telephone number assigned to a cellular telephone service, in violation of 47 U.S.C. § 22?(b)(lXA)(ui) and 47 CFR § 78. As a result ofDefendant's actions, Plaintiff and the members ofthe class are entitled to an award of damages of$500.00 for each such violation. 79. Defendant's violations were committed willfully and knowingly. 81. Defendant used an artificial or prerecorded voice when it made and/or 82. initiated calls to plaintiffs cellular telephone number. Defendant's violations of the TCPA include, but are not limited to, the 83. following: Making and/or initiating telephone calls using an 84, artificial or prerecorded voiced message to any telephone number assigned to a cellular telephone service, in violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(l)(A)(iii) and 47 CFR § 64,120D(a)(l)(iii). As a result ofDefendant's actions, Plaintiff and the members of the class are 85. entitled to an award of damages of $500.00 for each such violation. Defendant's violations were committed willfully and knowingly. 88. Defendant willingly, knowingly, and intentionally violated the TCPA in making autodialed telephone calls and/or using an artificial or prerecorded voice message to Plaintiff's and class member's cellular telephone numbers without the parties' prior express consent 89. "Every intentional tort invokes a species ofbad faith that entitles a person wronged to recover the expenses of litigation including attorney fees." Tyler v. Lincoln, 272 Ga. 1 18, 527 S.E.2d 180 (Ga. 2000). 90. "There is no requirement that a viable state law claim exist in order for the jury to award litigation expenses pursuant to OCGA § 13-6-1 1 . Rather, 'OCGA § 13-6-1 1 constitutes a vehicle for the collection of attorney fees even when only a federal law claim for damages is submitted to the finder of fact." Fulton County v. Legacy Inv, Group, LLC, 296 Ga.App. 822, 827 (2009). General Civil and Domestic Relations Case Filing Information Form 1 8-A-301 0 Superior or 0 State Court of Cobb County STATE OF GEORGIA DEVONTE MITCHELL, on behalf ofhimself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, Civil Action File No. v. STATE OF GEORGIA CIVIL ACTION NUMBER 18-A-30I0 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) FOR IMPROPER USE OF AN AUTOMATIC TELEPHONE DIALING SYSTEM § 227(b)(3)(B) FOR IMPROPER USE OF AN ARTIFICIAL OR PRERECORDED VOICE MESSAGE The acts ofDefendant constitute violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act's prohibitions on the use of artificial or prerecorded voice calls and the regulations promulgated thereunder. §227(b)(3)(A) TO REQUIRE DEFENDANT CEASE UNLAWFUL USE OF ARTIFICIAL OR PRERECORDED VOICE MESSAGES §227(b)(3)(A) TO REQUIRE DEFENDANT CEASE UNLAWFUL USE OF AUTOMATIC TELEPHONE DIALING SYSTEMS

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22. XOMA is a biotech drug company that purports to discover and develop innovative antibody-based therapeutics. Its lead product candidate is gevokizumab, which the Company describes as “a proprietary potent, humanized allosteric-modulating monoclonal antibody that binds to the inflammatory cytokine interleukin-1 beta (“IL-1 beta”).” The Company has asserted that it believed that gevokizumab “has the potential to address the underlying inflammatory causes of a wide range of diseases that have been identified as having unmet medical needs.” 23. The Company describes gevokizumab as “a proprietary potent, humanized allosteric- modulating monoclonal antibody that binds to the inflammatory cytokine interleukin-1 beta (“IL-1 beta”).” The Company has asserted that it believed that gevokizumab “has the potential to address the underlying inflammatory causes of a wide range of diseases that have been identified as having unmet medical needs.” Case3:15-cv-03425-HSG Document1 Filed07/24/15 Page5 of 23 - 5 - 41. Plaintiff brings this action as a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of all persons who purchased or otherwise acquired XOMA securities during the Class Period (the “Class”). Excluded from the Class are Defendants and their families, the officers and directors of the Company, at all relevant times, members of their immediate families and their legal representatives, heirs, successors, or assigns, and any entity in which Defendants have or had a controlling interest. 42. The members of the Class are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, since XOMA has millions of shares of stock outstanding and because the Company’s shares were actively traded on NASDAQ. According to XOMA’s Form 10-Q filed with the SEC on May 7, 2015, as of May 5, 2015, XOMA had approximately 117.8 million shares issued and outstanding. While the exact number of Class members in unknown to Plaintiff at this time and can only be ascertained through appropriate discovery, Plaintiff believes that there are thousands of members in the proposed Class and that they are geographically dispersed. 43. There is a well-defined community of interest in the questions of law and fact involved in this case. Questions of law and fact common to the members of the Class which predominate over questions which may affect individual Class and Private Placement Class members include: (a) whether the Exchange Act was violated by Defendants; Case3:15-cv-03425-HSG Document1 Filed07/24/15 Page15 of 23 - 15 - 47. Plaintiff incorporates by reference each and every preceding paragraph as though fully set forth herein. Case3:15-cv-03425-HSG Document1 Filed07/24/15 Page16 of 23 - 16 - 58. Plaintiff incorporates by reference and realleges each and every allegation above as though fully set forth herein. 59. During the Class Period, each of the Individual Defendants, as senior executive officers and/or directors of XOMA, were privy to non-public information concerning the Company and its business and operations via access to internal corporate documents, conversations and connections with other corporate officers and employees, attendance at management and Board of Directors meetings and committees thereof and via reports and other information provided to them in connection therewith. Because of their possession of such information, the Individual Defendants knew or recklessly disregarded the fact that adverse facts specified herein had not been disclosed to, and were being concealed from, the investing public. Plaintiff and other members of the Class had no access to such information, which was, and remains solely under the control of the Defendants. 60. The Individual Defendants were involved in drafting, producing, reviewing and/or disseminating the materially false and misleading statements complained of herein. The Individual Defendants were aware (or recklessly disregarded) that materially false and misleading statements were being issued by the Company and nevertheless approved, ratified and/or failed to correct those statements, in violation of federal securities laws. Throughout the Class Period, the Individual Defendants were able to, and did, control the contents of the Company’s SEC filings, reports, press releases, and other public statements. The Individual Defendants were provided with copies of, reviewed and approved, and/or signed such filings, reports, releases and other statements prior to or shortly after their issuance and had the ability or opportunity to prevent their issuance or to cause them to be corrected. 61. The Individual Defendants also were able to, and did, directly or indirectly, control the conduct of XOMA’s business, the information contained in its filings with the SEC, and its public statements. Moreover, the Individual Defendants made or directed the making of affirmative statements to securities analysts and the investing public at large, and participated in meetings and discussions concerning such statements. Because of their positions and access to material non- Case3:15-cv-03425-HSG Document1 Filed07/24/15 Page19 of 23 - 19 - A. Background Against Individual Defendants for Violation of Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act (on behalf of the Class) Against XOMA for Violation of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and SEC Rule 10b-5 (on behalf of the Class)

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16. These calls were all in an effort to sell Defendant’s energy services to Plaintiff, making them advertisements and/or telemarketing. 17. Accordingly, Defendant was required to obtain prior express written consent prior to making these autodialed telemarketing calls. 18. Plaintiff never gave Defendant such consent. 19. Furthermore, because Plaintiff never agreed to the calls and did not want the calls, Plaintiff asked Defendant on numerous occasions to stop calling her. 20. All of these calls were placed using an “automatic telephone dialing system” as defined at 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1) and as explained in subsequent FCC regulations and orders. The system(s) used by Defendant has/have the capacity to store number and to dial those numbers, or to produce telephone numbers to be called using a random or sequential number generator. 21. This is evidenced by: • The inability to stop the calls; • The frequency of the calls; • A brief and unnatural pause from the time Plaintiff answered the calls until the time Defendant’s agent comes on the line (for example, Defendant would not appear on the line until Plaintiff’s second “hello”); • That none of the calls were initiated using human intervention. • That several of the calls used a prerecorded or artificial voice. 23. Plaintiff knew that these calls used a prerecorded voice because she is familiar with normal human interaction, and could tell that the voice on the other line was a recording rather than a live person with whom she could interact. She was unable to interrupt the voice or get the voice to deviate from the prerecorded message, as is the case with prerecorded messages. 24. These calls were not made for any emergency purpose. 25. Plaintiff has suffered actual injury as a result of Defendant’s telephone calls, including, but not limited to: • Device storage; • Data usage; • Lost time tending to and responding to the unsolicited calls; • Depleted battery and cost in charging her phone; • Tying up of her telephone line; • Invasion of Privacy; • Nuisance. 26. These forms of actual injury are sufficient for Article III standing purposes. 27. Plaintiff is entitled to statutory damages, actual damages, and injunctive relief. 28. Specifically, Plaintiff is entitled to at least $500 for each call placed to her cellular telephone in violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b). 29. Plaintiff is also entitled to treble damages for each call made willfully or knowingly and in violation of the TCPA. 31. Defendant’s actions were knowing violations of § 227(b) because Defendant knew it was placing calls to cellular telephones, knew it was using an automatic telephone dialing system, and knew or should have known it did not have consent. 32. Accordingly, Plaintiff is entitled to $1,500 per call for violations of § 227(b). 33. Plaintiff brings this action under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 on behalf of a proposed class, defined as follows: Plaintiff and all persons within the United States to whose cellular telephone number Defendant Direct Energy, L.P. placed, since October 16, 2013, a telemarketing telephone call using an automatic telephone dialing system when Defendant’s records show that it obtained those cellular telephone numbers through the same method in which it obtained Plaintiff’s telephone number, or Defendant’s records show a request to stop calling that telephone number. 34. Excluded from the class are Defendant and any entities in which Defendant has a controlling interest; Defendant’s agents and employees; any Judge and Magistrate Judge to whom this action is assigned and any member of their staffs and immediate families, and any claims for personal injury, wrongful death, and/or emotional distress. 35. The Class members for whose benefit this action are brought are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. 37. The Class is comprised of hundreds, if not thousands, of individuals nationwide. 38. There are common questions of law and fact affecting the rights of the Class members, including, inter alia, the following: a. Whether Defendant used an automatic telephone dialing system; b. Whether Defendant took adequate steps to acquire and/or track consent; c. The purpose(s) of Defendant’s calls; d. Whether Plaintiff and the Classes were damaged thereby, and the extent of damages for such violations; and e. Whether Defendant should be enjoined from engaging in such conduct in the future. 39. Plaintiff is a member of the class in that Defendant placed a telemarketing call to her cellular telephone using an automatic telephone dialing system, including calls placed after Plaintiff asked Defendant to stop calling. 40. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class members’ claims in that they arise from Defendant’s uniform conduct and are based on the same legal theories as Class members’ claims. 41. Plaintiff and all putative Class members have also necessarily suffered actual damages in addition to statutory damages, as all Class members spent time tending to Defendant’s unwanted calls, suffered depleted battery, and suffered a nuisance and an invasion of their privacy. 43. Plaintiff will thoroughly and adequately protect the interests of the Class, having retained qualified and competent legal counsel to represent herself and the Class. 44. Defendant has acted and refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, thereby making injunctive and declaratory relief appropriate for the Class as a whole. 45. The prosecution of separate actions by individual class members would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications. 46. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy since, inter alia, the damages suffered by each class member make individual actions uneconomical. 47. Common questions will predominate, and there will be no unusual manageability issues. 48. Plaintiff and the proposed Class incorporate the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 49. Defendant placed numerous telephone calls to Plaintiff and Class members. 50. These calls all used an automatic telephone dialing system. 51. The calls were not made for “emergency purposes” as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(i). 52. All of the calls were telemarketing, in that the calls were meant to sell Defendant’s services to Plaintiff and putative Class Members. 54. Furthermore, calls made after the called party asked Defendant to “stop calling” were made without any form of consent. 55. Plaintiff and Class members are entitled to an award of $500 in statutory damages for each call, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). 56. Plaintiff and Class members are entitled to an award of treble damages in an amount up to $1,500 for each telephone call, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3). Violations of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)

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(Deceptive Acts Or Practices, New York Gen. Bus. Law § 349) (False Advertising, New York Gen. Bus. Law § 350) 18. Plaintiff seeks to represent a class defined as all persons in the who purchased Pampers “natural clean” Wipes in the state of New York. 19. Members of the Class are so numerous that their individual joinder herein is impracticable. The precise number of Class members and their identities are unknown to Plaintiff at this time but may be determined through discovery. Class members may be notified of the pendency of this action by mail and/or publication through the distribution records of Defendant and third-party retailers and vendors. 20. Common questions of law and fact exist as to all Class members and predominate over questions affecting only individual Class members. Common legal and factual questions include, but are not limited to: (a) whether Defendant misrepresented and/or failed to disclose material facts concerning the Wipes; and (b) Whether Defendant’s conduct was unfair and/or deceptive. 21. The claims of the named Plaintiff are typical of the claims of the Class in that the named Plaintiff purchased one or more containers of Wipes. 23. The class mechanism is superior to other available means for the fair and efficient adjudication of the claims of Class members. Each individual Class member may lack the resources to undergo the burden and expense of individual prosecution of the complex and extensive litigation necessary to establish Defendant’s liability. Individualized litigation increases the delay and expense to all parties and multiplies the burden on the judicial system presented by the complex legal and factual issues of this case. Individualized litigation also presents a potential for inconsistent or contradictory judgments. In contrast, the class action device presents far fewer management difficulties and provides the benefits of single adjudication, economy of scale, and comprehensive supervision by a single court on the issue of Defendant’s liability. Class treatment of the liability issues will ensure that all claims and claimants are before this Court for consistent adjudication of the liability issues. 24. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference the allegations contained in all preceding paragraphs of this Complaint. 25. Plaintiff brings this claim individually and on behalf of the members of the proposed Class against Defendant. 26. By the acts and conduct alleged herein, Defendant committed unfair or deceptive acts and practices by misrepresenting that the Wipes were natural when they contained unnatural and potentially harmful chemicals. 27. The foregoing deceptive acts and practices were directed at consumers. 29. Plaintiff and Class members were injured as a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s violation because (a) they would not have purchased the Wipes had they known that the “natural clean” representation was false and misleading,” (b) they overpaid for the Wipes because it is sold at a price premium when compared to similar products that do not contain this misrepresentation, and (c) the Wipes did not have the characteristics, uses, or benefits as promised. 30. On behalf of herself and other members of the Class, Plaintiff seeks to enjoin the unlawful acts and practices described herein, to recover her actual damages or fifty dollars, whichever is greater, three times actual damages, and reasonable attorneys’ fees. 31. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference the allegations contained in all preceding paragraphs of this Complaint. 32. Plaintiff brings this claim individually and on behalf of the members of the proposed Class against Defendant. 33. Based on the foregoing, Defendant has engaged in consumer-oriented conduct that is deceptive or misleading in a material way which constitutes false advertising in violation of Section 350 of the New York General Business Law by misrepresenting the nature of the Wipes. 34. The foregoing advertising was directed at consumers and was likely to mislead a reasonable consumer acting reasonably under the circumstances. 36. Plaintiff and Class members were injured as a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s violation because (a) they would not have purchased the Wipes had they known that the “natural clean” representation was false and misleading,” (b) they overpaid for the Wipes because it is sold at a price premium when compared to similar products that do not contain this misrepresentation, and (c) the Wipes did not have the characteristics, uses, or benefits as promised. 37. On behalf of herself and other members of the Class, Plaintiff seeks to enjoin the unlawful acts and practices described herein, to recover actual damages or five hundred dollars per violation, whichever is greater, three times actual damages and reasonable attorneys’ fees.

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10. Defendant alleges Plaintiff owes a debt (“the Debt”). 11. The Debt was primarily for personal, family or household purposes and is therefore a “debt” as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5). 12. Sometime after the incurrence of the Debt, Plaintiff fell behind on payments owed. 13. Thereafter, at an exact time known only to Defendant, the Debt was assigned or otherwise transferred to Defendant for collection. 14. In its efforts to collect the debt, Defendant contacted Plaintiff by letter (“the Letter”) dated December 19, 2016. (“Exhibit 1.”) 15. The Letter was the initial communication Plaintiff received from Defendant. 16. The Letter is a “communication” as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2). 17. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g provides that within five days after the initial communication with a consumer in connection with the collection of any debt, a debt collector shall, unless the information is contained in the initial communication or the consumer has paid the debt, send the consumer a written notice containing certain enumerated information. 18. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e prohibits a debt collector from using any false, deceptive, or misleading representations or means in connection with the collection of any debt. 19. § 1692e(2)(A) prohibits the false representation of the character, amount, or legal status of any debt. 20. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10) specifically prohibits the “use of any false representation 3 33. Plaintiff brings this action individually and as a class action on behalf of all persons similarly situated in the State of New York from whom Defendant attempted to collect a consumer debt using a collection letter claiming such was the “Second Notice” even though it was the first notice from Defendant, from one year before the date of this Complaint to the present. 34. This action seeks a finding that Defendant’s conduct violates the FDCPA, and asks that the Court award damages as authorized by 15 U.S.C. § 1692k. 35. Defendant regularly engages in debt collection. 36. The Class consists of more than 35 persons from whom Defendant attempted to 4

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24. At all times relevant, Plaintiff is an individual residing within the State of California. 25. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that at all time relevant, Defendant conducted business in the State of California. 26. On or about April 2015, Plaintiff allegedly incurred financial obligations to the Defendant that were money, property, or their equivalent, which is due or owing, or alleged to be due or owing, from a natural person to another person and were therefore “debt(s)” as that term is defined by California Civil Code §1788.2(d), and a “consumer debt” as that term is defined by California Civil Code §1788.2(f). 37. Plaintiff brings this action on his own behalf, and on behalf of all others similarly situated (“The Class”) and (“The Sub-Class”) who have suffered injury in fact as a result of Defendant’s unlawful and misleading conduct. 38. Plaintiff represents, and is a member of, “The Class” defined as follows: (i) all persons with addresses within the State of California; (ii) who were charged a late fee by Defendant; (iii) made pursuant to a residential lease agreement; (iv) at any time four years prior to the date of the filing of this Action. 39. Plaintiff represents, and is a member of, “The Sub-Class” defined as follows: (i) all persons with addresses within the State of California; (ii) who were charged a late fee by Defendant; (iii) made pursuant to a residential lease agreement; (iv) from whom Defendant attempted to collect a rental debt; (v) at any time one year prior to the date of the filing of this Action. 40. Defendant and their employees or agents are excluded from the Class. 55. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 56. The foregoing acts and omissions constitute numerous and multiple violations of the RFDCPA. 57. As a result of each and every violation of the RFDCPA, Plaintiff, and the members of The Class, are entitled to any actual damages pursuant to Cal. Civ. Code § 1788.30(a); statutory damages for a knowing or willful violation in the amount up to $1,000.00 pursuant to Cal. Civ. Code § 1788.30(b); and reasonable attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to Cal. Civ. Code § 1788.30(c) from Defendant. 58. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. VIOLATION OF THE ROSENTHAL FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1788-1788.32 (RFDCPA) VIOLATION OF BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONS CODE § 17200

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14. Defendant alleges Plaintiff owes a debt (“the alleged Debt”). 15. The alleged Debt is an alleged obligation of Plaintiff to pay money arising out of a transaction in which the money, property, insurance, or services which are the subject of the transaction are primarily for personal, family, or household purposes. 16. The alleged Debt does not arise from any business enterprise of Plaintiff. 17. The alleged Debt is a “debt” as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5). 18. At an exact time known only to Defendant, the alleged Debt was assigned or otherwise transferred to Defendant for collection. 19. At the time the alleged Debt was assigned or otherwise transferred to Defendant for collection, the alleged Debt was in default. 20. In its efforts to collect the alleged Debt, Defendant contacted Plaintiff by calls to Plaintiff's telephone. 3 21. In its efforts to collect the alleged Debt, Defendant contacted Plaintiff by letters including the letter dated January 16, 2020 (“the Letter”). (A true and accurate copy is annexed hereto as “Exhibit 1.”) 22. The Letter conveyed information regarding the alleged Debt. 23. The Letter is a “communication” as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2). 24. The Letter was the initial written communication Plaintiff received from Defendant concerning the alleged Debt. 25. The Letter was received and read by Plaintiff. 26. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g protects Plaintiff's concrete interests. Plaintiff has the interest and right to receive a clear, accurate and unambiguous validation notice, which allows a consumer to confirm that he or she owes the debt sought to be collected by the debt collector. As set forth herein, Defendant deprived Plaintiff of this right. 27. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e protects Plaintiff's concrete interests. Plaintiff has the interest and right to be free from deceptive and/or misleading communications from Defendant. As set forth herein, Defendant deprived Plaintiff of this right. 28. The deprivation of Plaintiff's rights will be redressed by a favorable decision herein. 29. As relevant here, 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(1) requires the written notice provide “the amount of the debt.” 30. To comply with 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(1), a statement of “the amount of the debt” must clearly convey, from the perspective of the least sophisticated consumer, the actual amount of the debt. 31. To comply with 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(1), a statement of “the amount of the debt” must accurately convey, from the perspective of the least sophisticated consumer, the actual amount of the debt. 32. To comply with 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(1), a statement of “the amount of the debt” must convey without ambiguity, from the perspective of the least sophisticated consumer, the actual amount of the debt. 33. The failure to include the foregoing information renders an otherwise accurate statement of the “amount of the debt” violative of 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(1). 34. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e prohibits a debt collector from using any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt. 4 35. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A) prohibits the false representation of the character, amount, or legal status of any debt. 36. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10) prohibits the use of any false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt. 37. A debt collection practice can be a “false, deceptive, or misleading” practice in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e even if it does not fall within any of the subsections of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. 38. A collection letter violates 15 U.S.C. § 1692e if, in the eyes of the least sophisticated consumer it is open to more than one reasonable interpretation, at least one of which is inaccurate. 39. A collection letter also violates 15 U.S.C. § 1692e if, it is reasonably susceptible to an inaccurate reading by the least sophisticated consumer. 40. The Letter states in a tabular column, “AMOUNT DUE AT CHARGEOFF: $178.20.” 41. The Letter additionally states in the same tabular column, “TOTAL PAYMENTS 53. Plaintiff brings this action individually and as a class action on behalf of all persons similarly situated in the State of New York. 54. Plaintiff seeks to certify a class of: All consumers to whom Defendant sent a collection letter substantially and materially similar to the letter sent to Plaintiff, which letter was sent on or after a date one year prior to the filing of this action to the present. 55. This action seeks a finding that Defendant's conduct violates the FDCPA and asks that the Court award damages as authorized by 15 U.S.C. § 1692k. 56. The Class consists of more than thirty-five persons. 57. Plaintiff's claims are typical of the claims of the Class. Common questions of law or fact raised by this action affect all members of the Class and predominate over any individual issues. Common relief is therefore sought on behalf of all members of the Class. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. 58. The prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the Class would 6 create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to the individual members of the Class, and a risk that any adjudications with respect to individual members of the Class would, as a practical matter, either be dispositive of the interests of other members of the Class not party to the adjudication, or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests. Defendant has acted in a manner applicable to the Class as a whole such that declaratory relief is warranted. 59. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect and represent the interests of the Class. The management of the class is not extraordinarily difficult, and the factual and legal issues raised by this action will not require extended contact with the members of the Class, because Defendant's conduct was perpetrated on all members of the Class and will be established by common proof. Moreover, Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in actions brought under consumer protection laws.

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27. Defendant offers the commercial website, www.chicagoknifeworks.com, to the public. The website offers features which should allow all consumers to access the -10- goods and services offered by the Defendant and which Defendant ensures delivery of such goods throughout the United States including New York State. The goods and services offered by Defendant include, but are not limited to, kitchen knives, survival knives, eyewear, firearm accessories, and other products available online for purchase, and to ascertain information relating to pricing, shipping, ordering merchandise and return and privacy policies. 28. It is, upon information and belief, Defendant’s policy and practice to deny Plaintiff, along with other blind or visually-impaired users, access to Defendant’s website, and to therefore specifically deny the goods and services that are offered thereby. Due to Defendant’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to its website, Plaintiff and visually-impaired persons have been and are still being denied equal access to Defendant’s numerous goods, services and benefits offered to the public through the Website. 29. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient JAWS screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using the JAWS screen-reader. 30. During Plaintiff’s visits to the Website, the last occurring in November, 2020, in an attempt to purchase a product from the Defendant, the Plaintiff encountered multiple access barriers that denied Plaintiff a shopping experience similar to that of a sighted person and full and equal access to the goods and services offered to the public and made available to the public; and that denied Plaintiff the full enjoyment of the goods, and services of the Website by being unable to purchase kitchen knives, survival knives, and -11- other products available online for purchase, and to ascertain information relating to pricing, shipping, ordering merchandise and return and privacy policies. 31. While attempting to navigate the Website, Plaintiff encountered multiple accessibility barriers for blind or visually-impaired persons that include, but are not limited to, the following: a. Lack of Alternative Text (“alt-text”), or a text equivalent. Alt-text is an invisible code embedded beneath a graphical image on a website. Web accessibility requires that alt-text be coded with each picture so that screen-reading software can speak the alt-text where a sighted user sees pictures, which includes captcha prompts. Alt-text does not change the visual presentation, but instead a text box shows when the keyboard moves over the picture. The lack of alt-text on these graphics prevents screen readers from accurately vocalizing a description of the graphics. As a result, Defendant’s visually- impaired customers are unable to determine what is on the website, browse, or make any purchases; b. Empty Links That Contain No Text causing the function or purpose of the link to not be presented to the user. They can introduce confusion for keyboard and screen-reader users; c. Redundant Links where adjacent links go to the same URL address which results in additional navigation and repetition for keyboard and screen-reader users; and d. Linked Images Missing Alt-text, which causes problems if an image within a link contains no text and that image does not provide alt-text. A screen reader then -12- has no content to present the user as to the function of the link, including information contained in PDFs. 32. Many pages on the Website also contain the same title elements. This is a problem for the visually-impaired because the screen reader fails to distinguish one page from another. In order to fix this problem, Defendant must change the title elements for each page. 33. The Website also contained a host of broken links, which is a hyperlink to a non-existent or empty webpage. For the visually-impaired this is especially paralyzing due to the inability to navigate or otherwise determine where one is on the website once a broken link is encountered. For example, upon coming across a link of interest, Plaintiff was redirected to an error page. However, the screen-reader failed to communicate that the link was broken. As a result, Plaintiff could not get back to his original search. Defendant Must Remove Barriers To Its Website 34. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s Website, blind and visually- impaired customers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the goods, and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from accessing the Website. 35. These access barriers on Defendant’s Website have deterred Plaintiff from visiting Defendant’s Website and enjoying it equal to sighted individuals because: Plaintiff was unable to use and enjoy the Website in the same manner as sighted individuals do, preventing Plaintiff from using the Website to purchase items and to view the items. -13- 36. If the Website was equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 37. Through his attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired persons. 38. Because simple compliance with the WCAG 2.0 Guidelines would provide Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers with equal access to the Website, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including but not limited to the following policies or practices: a. Constructing and maintaining a website that is inaccessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; b. Failure to construct and maintain a website that is not sufficiently intuitive so as to be equally accessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; and, c. Failing to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind and visually-impaired consumers, such as Plaintiff, as a member of a protected class. 39. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 40. The ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks in this action. In relevant part, the ADA requires: In the case of violations of . . . this title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals -14- with disabilities . . . Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the . . . modification of a policy . . . 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 41. Because Defendant’s Website is not and has never been fully accessible, and because, upon information and belief, Defendant does not have, and has never had, adequate corporate policies that are reasonably calculated to cause its Website to become and remain accessible, Plaintiff invokes 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2) and seek a permanent injunction requiring Defendant to: a) Retain a qualified consultant acceptable to Plaintiff (“Web Accessibility Consultant”) who shall assist in improving the accessibility of its Website, including all third-party content and plug-ins, so the goods and services on the Website may be equally accessed and enjoyed by visually-impaired persons; b) Work with the Web Accessibility Consultant to ensure all employees involved in Website and content development be given web accessibility training on a biennial basis, including onsite training to create accessible content at the design and development stages; c) Work with the Web Accessibility Consultant to perform an automated accessibility audit on a periodic basis to evaluate whether Defendant’s Website may be equally accessed and enjoyed by visually-impaired persons on an ongoing basis; d) Work with the Web Accessibility Consultant to perform end-user accessibility/usability testing on at least a quarterly basis with said testing to be performed by humans who are blind or have low vision, or who have training and experience in the manner in which persons who are blind use a screen reader to navigate, browse, and conduct business on websites, in addition to the testing, if applicable, that is performed using semi-automated tools; e) Incorporate all of the Web Accessibility Consultant’s recommendations within sixty (60) days of receiving the recommendations; f) Work with the Web Accessibility Consultant to create a Web Accessibility Policy that will be posted on its Website, along with an e-mail address, instant messenger, and toll-free phone number to report accessibility-related problems; g) Directly link from the footer on each page of its Website, a statement that indicates that Defendant is making efforts to maintain and increase the accessibility of its Website to ensure that visually-impaired persons have full and equal -15- enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of the Defendant’s Website; h) Accompany the public policy statement with an accessible means of submitting accessibility questions and problems, including an accessible form to submit feedback or an email address to contact representatives knowledgeable about the Web Accessibility Policy; i) Provide a notice, prominently and directly linked from the footer on each page of its Website, soliciting feedback from visitors to the Website on how the accessibility of the Website can be improved. The link shall provide a method to provide feedback, including an accessible form to submit feedback or an email address to contact representatives knowledgeable about the Web Accessibility Policy; j) Provide a copy of the Web Accessibility Policy to all web content personnel, contractors responsible for web content, and Client Service Operations call center agents (“CSO Personnel”) for the Website; k) Train no fewer than three of its CSO Personnel to automatically escalate calls from users with disabilities who encounter difficulties using the Website. Defendant shall have trained no fewer than 3 of its CSO personnel to timely assist such users with disabilities within CSO published hours of operation. Defendant shall establish procedures for promptly directing requests for assistance to such personnel including notifying the public that customer assistance is available to users with disabilities and describing the process to obtain that assistance; l) Modify existing bug fix policies, practices, and procedures to include the elimination of bugs that cause the Website to be inaccessible to users of screen reader technology; and m) Plaintiff, his counsel, and their experts monitor the Website for up to two years after the Mutually Agreed Upon Consultant validates the Website are free of accessibility errors/violations to ensure Defendant has adopted and implemented adequate accessibility policies. To this end, Plaintiff, through his counsel and their experts, shall be entitled to consult with the Web Accessibility Consultant at their discretion, and to review any written material, including but not limited to any recommendations the Website Accessibility Consultant provides Defendant. 42. Web-based technologies have features and content that are modified on a daily, and in some instances an hourly, basis, and a one time “fix” to an inaccessible website will not cause the website to remain accessible without a corresponding change in corporate policies related to those web-based technologies. To evaluate whether an -16- inaccessible website has been rendered accessible, and whether corporate policies related to web-based technologies have been changed in a meaningful manner that will cause the website to remain accessible, the website must be reviewed on a periodic basis using both automated accessibility screening tools and end user testing by visually-impaired persons. 43. If the Website was accessible, Plaintiff and similarly situated blind and visually-impaired persons could independently shop for and otherwise research the Defendant’s products via the Website. 44. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 45. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining their Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making their Website equally accessible to visually-impaired consumers. 46. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 47. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered by Defendant’s Website, during the relevant statutory period. -17- 48. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a New York State Sub-Class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the State of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered by Defendant’s Website, during the relevant statutory period. 49. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a New York City Sub-Class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered by Defendant’s Website, during the relevant statutory period. 50. Common questions of law and fact exist amongst the Class and Sub- Classes, including: a. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “public accommodation” under the ADA; b. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “place or provider of public accommodation” under the NYSHRL or NYCHRL; c. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to visually- impaired persons, violating the ADA; and d. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to visually- impaired persons, violating the NYSHRL or NYCHRL. -18- 51. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class and Sub-Classes. The Class, and Sub-Classes, similarly to the Plaintiff, are severely visually-impaired or otherwise blind persons, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA, NYSHRL or NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so it can be independently accessible to the Class and/or the Sub-Classes. 52. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class Members because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, including ADA litigation and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the Class Members. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. 53. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions are common to Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of their litigation. 54. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by visually-impaired persons throughout the United States. 55. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. -19- 56. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 57. Defendant’s online retail store is a place of public accommodation within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege, or advantage of Defendant’s online retail store 58. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 59. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 60. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids -20- and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 61. The acts alleged herein constitute violations of Title III of the ADA, and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Plaintiff, who is a member of a protected class of persons under the ADA, has a physical disability that substantially limits the major life activity of sight within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1)(A)-(2)(A). Furthermore, Plaintiff has been denied full and equal access to the Website, has not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and has been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled persons. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 62. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 63. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 64. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” -21- 65. Defendant’s Website operates in the State of New York and constitutes an online sales establishment and a place of public accommodation within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant’s online retail establishment. 66. Defendant is subject to New York Human Rights Law because it owns and/or operates its Website in the State of New York. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 67. Defendant is violating N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website and the services integrated therewith to be completely inaccessible to the blind. Their inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 68. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(i), unlawful discriminatory practice includes, among other things, “a refusal to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless such person can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations being offered or would result in an undue burden". 69. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(ii), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally -22- alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 70. Readily available, well-established guidelines exist on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually-impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other large business entities and government agencies in making their website accessible, including but not limited to: adding alt-text to graphics and ensuring that all functions can be performed using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make its Website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 71. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the class on the basis of a disability in violation of the NYSHRL, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is not sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that it is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 72. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 73. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate, against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, -23- accommodations and/or opportunities of Defendant’s Website under § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the Sub-Class Members will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 74. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 75. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 76. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 77. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 78. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 79. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” -24- 80. Defendant’s website is an online sales establishment and a place of public accommodation within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9), and its Website is a service that is integrated with its online sales establishment. 81. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and/or operates its Website in the City of New York, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 82. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website and the services integrated therewith to be completely inaccessible to the blind. The inaccessibility denies blind consumers full and equal access to the facilities, goods, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 83. Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). 84. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the Sub-Class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8- 107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or -25- b. constructed and maintained a website that is not sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that it is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 85. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 86. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate, against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and Sub-Class on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of its Website under § 8- 107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the Sub-Class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 87. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 88. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 89. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 90. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 91. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class and New York State and City Sub-Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 92. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies, that its Website contains access barriers denying blind customers the full and equal access to the goods and services of its Website, which Defendant owns, operates and controls, fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182, et seq., N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, et seq., and N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. 93. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF -26- Defendant’s Barriers on Its Website VIOLATIONS OF THE NYSHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL

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2.0 guidelines; c. Regularly test user accessibility by blind or vision-impaired persons to ensure that Defendant’s Website complies under the WCAG 2.0 guidelines; and, d. Develop an accessibility policy that is clearly disclosed on Defendant’s Websites, with contact information for users to report accessibility-related problems. 21. Defendant is a Hotelier that operates the 1 HOTEL as well as the 1 HOTEL website, offering features which should allow all consumers to access the goods and services which Defendant offers in connection with its Hotel. 22. Defendant operates 1 HOTEL (its “Hotel”) in New York City, at 1414 6th Avenue, New York, NY 10019. 23. Its Hotel constitutes a place of public accommodation. Defendant’s Hotel provides to the public important goods and services. Defendant’s Website provides consumers with access to an array of goods and services including Hotel locations, information pertaining to room availability and room rates, information about hotel amenities, including hours of operation, and related goods and services. 25. It is, upon information and belief, Defendant’s policy and practice to deny Plaintiff, along with other blind or visually-impaired users, access to Defendant’s website, and to therefore specifically deny the goods and services that are offered and integrated with Defendant’s Hotels. Due to Defendant’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to its website, Plaintiff and visually-impaired persons have been and are still being denied equal access to Defendant’s Hotels and the numerous goods and services and benefits offered to the public through the Website. 26. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient JAWS screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using the JAWS screen-reader. 27. During Plaintiff’s visits to the Website, the last occurring in August 2018, Plaintiff encountered multiple access barriers that denied Plaintiff full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services offered to the public and made available to the public; and that denied Plaintiff the full enjoyment of the facilities, goods and services of the Website, as well as to the facilities, goods and services of Defendant’s physical locations in New York by being unable to learn more information about Hotel locations, information pertaining to room availability and room rates, information about hotel amenities, including hours of operation, and related goods and services. 29. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s Website, blind and visually-impaired customers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, products, and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from accessing the Website. 30. These access barriers on Defendant’s Website have deterred Plaintiff from visiting Defendant’s physical locations and enjoying them equal to sighted individuals because: Plaintiff was unable to find the location and hours of operation of Defendant’s physical Hotels on its Website and other important information, preventing Plaintiff from visiting the locations to take advantage of the goods and services that it provides to the public. 31. If the Website was equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 32. Through his attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 34. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 35. The ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks in this action. In relevant part, the ADA requires: In the case of violations of . . . this title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities . . . Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the . . . modification of a policy . . . 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 37. If the Website was accessible, Plaintiff and similarly situated blind and visually- impaired people could independently view service items, locate Defendant’s physical locations and hours of operation, shop for and otherwise research related goods and services available via the Website. 38. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 39. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining their Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making their Website equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 41. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in Defendant’s physical locations, during the relevant statutory period. 42. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks certify a New York State subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the State of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in Defendant’s physical locations, during the relevant statutory period. 43. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in Defendant’s physical locations, during the relevant statutory period. 45. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class. The Class, similarly to the Plaintiff, are severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA, NYSYRHL or NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so either can be independently accessible to the Class. 46. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class Members because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the Class Members. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. 47. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 49. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 50. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 51. Defendant’s Hotels are public accommodations within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege, or advantage of Defendant’s Hotels. The Website is a service that is integrated with these locations. 52. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 53. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 55. The acts alleged herein constitute violations of Title III of the ADA, and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Plaintiff, who is a member of a protected class of persons under the ADA, has a physical disability that substantially limits the major life activity of sight within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1)(A)-(2)(A). Furthermore, Plaintiff has been denied full and equal access to the Website, has not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and has been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled persons. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 56. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 57. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 59. Defendant’s physical locations are located in State of New York and throughout the United States and constitute sales establishments and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant. Defendant’s Website is a service that is by and integrated with these physical locations. 60. Defendant is subject to New York Human Rights Law because it owns and operates its physical locations and Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 61. Defendant is violating N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with Defendant’s physical locations to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 63. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(ii), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 64. Readily available, well-established guidelines exist on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other large business entities and government agencies in making their website accessible, including but not limited to: adding alt-text to graphics and ensuring that all functions can be performed using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make its Website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 66. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 67. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Defendant’s Website and its physical locations under § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the Sub-Class Members will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 68. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 69. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 70. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 71. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 72. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 74. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40 provides that “all persons within the jurisdiction of this state shall be entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of any places of public accommodations, resort or amusement, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons. No persons, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or employee of any such place shall directly or indirectly refuse, withhold from, or deny to any person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof . . .” 75. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) provides that “no person because of . . . disability, as such term is defined in section two hundred ninety-two of executive law, be subjected to any discrimination in his or her civil rights, or to any harassment, as defined in section 240.25 of the penal law, in the exercise thereof, by any other person or by any firm, corporation or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision.” 76. Defendant’s New York State physical locations are sales establishments and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant and its Website is a service that is by and integrated with these establishments. 77. Defendant is subject to New York Civil Rights Law because it owns and operates its physical locations and Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Civil Law § 40-c(2). 79. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41 states that “any corporation which shall violate any of the provisions of sections forty, forty-a, forty-b or forty-two . . . shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby . . .” 80. Under NY Civil Rights Law § 40-d, “any person who shall violate any of the provisions of the foregoing section, or subdivision three of section 240.30 or section 240.31 of the penal law, or who shall aid or incite the violation of any of said provisions shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby in any court of competent jurisdiction in the county in which the defendant shall reside ...” 81. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 83. Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages of five hundred dollars per instance, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Civil Law § 40 et seq. for each and every offense. 84. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 85. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 86. Defendant’s locations are sales establishments and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9), and its Website is a service that is integrated with its establishments. 87. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates its physical locations in the City of New York and its Website, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 89. Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). 90. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the Sub- Class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 91. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 93. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 94. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 95. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 96. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 97. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class and New York State and City Sub- Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 99. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF Defendant’s Barriers on Its Website VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE NYSHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 1281 et seq. VIOLATION OF THE NEW YORK STATE CIVIL RIGHTS LAW

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51. Plaintiffs bring this action individually, and on behalf of all persons with mobility disabilities who use or will use the pedestrian right of way in the City of Seattle, as a class action under Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 61. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the foregoing paragraphs. 62. Title II of the ADA provides in pertinent part: “[N]o qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. 63. At all times relevant to this action, the City was and is a “public entity” within the meaning of Title II of the ADA and provides a pedestrian right of way program, service, or activity to the general public. 77. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the foregoing paragraphs. 78. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 provides in pertinent part: “[N]o otherwise qualified individual with a disability . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving federal financial assistance . . .” 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). 79. Plaintiffs are otherwise qualified to participate in the services, programs, or activities that are provided to individuals in the City. See 29 U.S.C. § 794(b). 80. The City is a direct recipient of federal financial assistance sufficient to invoke the coverage of Section 504, and has received such federal financial assistance at all times relevant to the claims asserted in this Complaint. 81. Defendant and its agents and employees have violated and continue to violate the Rehabilitation Act and the regulations promulgated thereunder by excluding Plaintiffs from participation in, denying Plaintiffs the benefits of, and subjecting Plaintiffs based solely by reason of their disability to, discrimination in the benefits and services of the City’s pedestrian right of way and for the reasons set forth above. 86. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the foregoing paragraphs. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 29 U.S.C. § 794 et seq. Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. Washington Law Against Discrimination Revised Code of Washington §§ 49.60.010-49.60.505

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27. Plaintiff, for himself and on behalf of others similarly situated, seeks class action certification pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 23(a) and 23 (b)(2) of all deaf and hard of hearing individuals in the United States who have been denied equal access to goods and services of the Defendant’s Websites. 28. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and on behalf of all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a New York State subclass under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 23(a) and 23 (b)(2) of all deaf and hard of hearing individuals in the State of New York who have been denied equal access to goods and services of the Defendant’s Websites. 29. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and on behalf of all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a New York City subclass under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 23(a) and 23(b)(2) of all deaf and hard of hearing individuals in the City of New York who have been denied equal access to goods and services of the Defendant’s Websites. 30. The Class is so numerous, being composed of millions of deaf and hard of hearing individuals, that joinder of all members is impracticable. Additionally, there are questions of law and/or fact common to the Class and the claims of the Plaintiff are typical of the Class claims. 31. Common questions of law and fact exist amongst the Class including: a. Whether the Website is a "public accommodations" under the ADA and New York laws; b. Whether there was a violation under the ADA due to the barriers that exist on the Defendant’s Website and whether the Plaintiff and the Class were denied full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations; and c. Whether there was a violation under New York law due to the barriers that exist on the Defendant’s Website and whether the Plaintiff and the Class were denied full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations. 32. The Plaintiff’s claims are typical of those of the Class as they both claim that the Defendant violated the ADA, and/or the laws of New York by failing to have its Websites accessible. 33. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class members as the Plaintiff and the Class are both deaf or hard of hearing individuals having the same claims. 34. Class certification under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) is proper because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds applicable to the Class as a whole, making declaratory and injunctive relief appropriate. 35. Questions of law or fact which affected Class members predominate questions which affected individual Class members and a class action will fairly and efficiently determine this litigation. 36. Counsel for the Plaintiff is experienced representing both Plaintiffs and Defendant in class actions. As such the Class will be properly represented. 37. Judicial economy requires this action be certified as a class action as it will prevent a voluminous amount of individual lawsuits filed by deaf or hard of hearing individuals throughout the United States. 38. Defendant owns, operates, controls and maintains the Websites, which provide vehicle information and video content on instructions and owner tutorials, walkaround and vehicle overview, and other video content, all of which is content on the Websites. The Defendant designs, manufactures, markets, and distributes vehicles, vehicle parts, and sells financial services. The Defendant also owns and leases numerous physical places of public accommodations and offices which operates in conjunction with its Websites. 39. The Websites can be viewed by individuals located in New York State in addition to individuals from all states throughout the United States and can be reached from computers, tablets and cellphones which can access the internet. 40. In order for the deaf and hard of hearing to access video content, Websites, including the Defendant’s Websites, must have the ability to turn voice content into readable content. Closed captioning is the process by which this is done. Without the use of closed captioning, a deaf or hard of hearing individual would have to have someone present while they are watching a video to interpret and explain the audio content for them. 41. Various recommendations and guidelines exist in order to make websites, including the Defendant’s Websites, compliant with the ADA. Web Content Accessibility Guidelines (“WCAG”) is one of those guidelines. WCAG 2.1 Section 1.2.2 states that “Captions are provided for all prerecorded audio content in synchronized media, except when the media is a media alternative for text and is clearly labeled as such”. Additionally, Section 508, an amendment to the United States Workforce Rehabilitation Act of 1973, requires all electronic and information technology be accessible to individuals with disabilities and requires closed captioning for video content. 42. The Websites’ numerous videos, which cannot be accessed by deaf and hard of hearing individuals, are in violation of the ADA and New York laws. Videos include most of the Websites videos in addition to the videos the Plaintiff tried to access mentioned herein. 43. The Plaintiff in this matter was on the Defendant’s Websites in order to watch videos on the days of May 18, 2020, May 22, 2020 in addition to subsequent days. The Plaintiff attempted to watch various videos to learn vehicle instructions and owner tutorials, walkaround and vehicle overview, and other video content on www.cadillac.com including but not limited to “Cadillac LYRIQ | Any EV can move - Only one can move you”, “Bluetooth Connectivity”, “Infotainment”, “Memory Seats”, “Wireless Charging”, “Liftgate & Powertrunk”, and “Climate controls” and on www.chevrolet.com including but not limited to “2021 Chevrolet Tahoe and Suburban Walkaround”, “Corvette Academy Driver Modes”, “Corvette Academy Walkaround” and “Revolution - The Mid-Engine Corvette Story”, but was unable to do so due to their lack of closed captioning. Plaintiff and Class members cannot watch videos on the Websites and have been prevented from accessing the Websites although they would like to and intend to visit the Websites in the future and enjoy video content as non-deaf individuals can and do and learn instructions and owner tutorials, walkaround, and vehicle overview and other video content. Currently they cannot. The Websites is non-accessible. There is no closed captioning on the videos. There are additional videos on the Defendant’s Websites which have no closed captioning. The Defendant’s access barriers prevent the Plaintiff from enjoying the goods, services and benefits offered by the Websites in conjunction with their physical locations and as such denied the Plaintiff equal access. 44. This lack of closed captioning by the Defendant on its Websites prevent not only the Plaintiff but also the deaf and hard of hearing located in New York State and nationally from having equal access as non-deaf and non-hard of hearing individuals have, preventing deaf and hard of hearing individuals from enjoying the goods, services and benefits offered by the Websites. 45. Defendant has intentionally failed and refused to remove the Websites’ barriers of access by failing to use closed captioning thereby denying equal access to the Plaintiff and the Class and discriminates against the Plaintiff and the Class in violation of the ADA and New York laws. 46. The Plaintiff realleges and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs “1” to “45” as if fully set forth herein. 47. The Plaintiff is deaf and requires closed captioning to have full and equal access to audio and audiovisual content and has an impairment that substantially limits one or more of his major life activities and is therefore an individual with a disability as defined under the 62. The Plaintiff realleges and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs “1” to “61” as if fully set forth herein. 63. At all times relevant to this action, the New York Human Rights Law (“NYHRL”), Article 15 of the N.Y. Executive Law §§ 290 et. seq. covers the actions of the Defendant. 64. Defendant qualifies as a person within the meaning of Article 15 of the N.Y. Executive Law § 292(1). 65. The Plaintiff, at all times relevant to this action, has a substantial impairment to a major life activity of hearing and is an individual with a disability under Article 15 of the N.Y. Executive Law § 292(21). The Defendant, at all relevant times to this action, owns and operates a place of accommodation, the Website, within the meaning of Article 15 of the N.Y. Executive Law § 292(9) along with its physical locations which include Defendant’s world- wide dealership network, service facilities, vehicle parts sales centers, automobile displays at various public locations, live events, financial services offices, manufacturing plants and corporate offices are all public accommodations which operate in conjunction with its Websites. 66. Pursuant to Article 15 N.Y. Executive Law § 296(2)(a) “it shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation ... because of the ... disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof." 67. Discrimination includes the refusal to adopt and implement reasonable modifications in policies, practices or procedures when they are necessary to afford, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities. Article 15 of the N.Y. Executive Law§ 296(2)(a), § 296(2)(c)(i). 68. Defendant’s actions violate Article 15 of the N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) by discriminating against the Plaintiff and the Class, including the Subclass by (i) owning and operating the Websites that are inaccessible to deaf and hard of hearing persons; and (ii) by not removing access barriers to its Websites in order to make its videos accessible to the deaf and hard of hearing when such modifications are necessary to afford facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities. This inaccessibility denies the deaf and hard-of-hearing full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that the Defendant makes available to individuals who are not deaf or hard of hearing. Article 15 of the N.Y. Exec. Law§ 296(2)(c). 69. The Defendant’s discriminatory practice also include "a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” Article 15 of the N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(ii). 70. Well established guidelines exist for making a Websites accessible to the deaf and hard of hearing and are easily obtainable. The guidelines have been used and followed by government and businesses in making their websites accessible to the deaf and hard of hearing, including but not limited to the use of closed captioning. Incorporating this component by Defendant in its Websites would not fundamentally alter the Defendant’s Websites or business and would not result in an undue burden. 71. Defendant has intentionally and willfully discriminated against the Plaintiff, the Class and Subclass in violation of the New York State Human Rights Law, Article 15 of the N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2) and this discrimination continues to date. 72. Absent relief, Defendant’s discrimination will continue against the Plaintiff, the Class and Subclass causing irreparable harm. 73. Plaintiff is therefore entitled to compensatory damages, civil penalties and fines for each and every discriminatory act in addition to reasonable attorney fees and the costs and disbursements of this action. Article 15 of the N.Y. Exe. Law §§ 297(9), 297(4)(c) et seq. 74. The Plaintiff realleges and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs “1” to “73” as if fully set forth herein. 75. Plaintiff served notice of this lawsuit upon the attorney general as required by N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41. 76. Persons within N.Y.S. are entitled to full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of places of public accommodations, resort or amusement, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons. No persons, being the owner of a place of public accommodation, shall directly or indirectly refuse, withhold from, or deny to any person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof. N.Y. Civ. Rights Law § 40. 77. No person because of disability, as defined in § 292 (21) of the Executive Law, shall be subjected to any discrimination in his or her civil rights by person or by any firm, corporation or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision. N.Y. Civ. Rights Law (“CVR”) § 40-c. 78. § 292 of Article 15 of the N.Y. Executive Law deems a disability a physical, mental or medical impairment resulting from anatomical, physiological, genetic or neurological conditions which prevents the exercise of a normal bodily function. As such the Plaintiff is disabled under the N.Y. Civil Rights Law. 79. Defendant discriminates against the Plaintiff and Subclass under CVR § 40 as Defendant’s Websites are a public accommodation that does not provide full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges to all persons and discriminates against the deaf and hard of hearing due to its lack of closed captioning for the death and hard of hearing. 80. Defendant intentionally and willfully failed to remove the barriers on their Websites discriminating against the Plaintiff and Sub-Class preventing access in violation of CVR §40. 81. Defendant has failed to take any steps to halt and corrects its discriminatory conduct and discriminates against and will continue to discriminates against the Plaintiff and the Sub-Class members. 82. Under N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41 a corporation which violates any of the provisions of §§ 40, 40-a, 40-b or 42 shall be liable for a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby… in any court of competent jurisdiction in the county in which the plaintiff or defendant shall reside. 83. Plaintiff hereby demands compensatory damages of five hundred dollars for the Defendant’s acts of discrimination including civil penalties and fines pursuant to N.Y. Civil Law § 40 et seq. 84. The Plaintiff realleges and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs “1” to “83” as if fully set forth herein. 85. At all times, the New York City Human Rights Law (“NYCHRL”), New York City Administrative Code §§ 8-101 et. seq. applied to the conduct of the Defendant as the Defendant owns and operates the Websites and are persons under the law. 86. At all times concerning this action the Plaintiff has had a substantial impairment to a major life activity of hearing and is an individual with a disability under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-102(16). 87. At all times concerning this action the Defendant’s Websites are a place of public accommodation as defined in N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-102(9). 88. “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of the actual or perceived ……. disability …. of any person to withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations required to make reasonable accommodations to a disabled individual and may not “refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(4)(a). 89. The willful and intentional non-removal of the Websites’ barriers of access for the Plaintiff, the Class and the Subclass by the Defendant discriminates against the deaf and hard of hearing by denying them full and equal access to the facilities, goods, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-deaf and hard of hearing individuals. 90. It is discriminatory for the Defendant “not to provide a reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to …. enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity." N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(15)(a). 91. Defendant’s actions will continue to prevent the Plaintiff, the Class and Subclass from accessing the Websites as the remaining public can and the Plaintiff requests injunctive relief. 92. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages for the injuries and loss sustained as a result of the Defendant’s discriminatory conduct in addition to punitive damages and civil penalties and fines for each offense, attorney fees, costs and disbursements of this action. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8), § 8-126(a) and § 8-502(a). 93. The Plaintiff realleges and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs “1” to “92” as if fully set forth herein. 94. The Plaintiff claims that the Websites contains barriers denying deaf and hard-of-hearing individuals full and equal access to the goods and services of the Websites. 95. Defendant’s Websites fails to comply with applicable laws and the Defendant discriminates against the Plaintiff and Sub-Class under Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12182, et seq., N.Y. Exec. Law§ 296, et seq., and N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107, et seq. 96. The Defendant denies these claims. 97. The Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment such that the parties understand and know their respective rights and obligations. CLASS AND SUB-CLASS FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF THE PLAINTIFF AND THE SUBCLASS Violation of New York State Civil Rights Law THE PLAINTIFF AND THE SUBCLASS Violation of New York City Human Rights Law THE PLAINTIFF, THE CLASS AND THE SUBCLASS Violation of Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act THE PLAINTIFF AND THE SUBCLASS Violation of New York State Human Rights Law

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(12 NYCRR § 142-2.4: Spread of Hours Pay) (FLSA: Failure to Pay Overtime Compensation) (FLSA: Failure to Pay Overtime Compensation) (NYLL & NYCRR: Failure to Pay Overtime Compensation) (NYLL: Failure to Furnish Wage Notices) (NYLL: Failure to Furnish Wage Statements) (NYLL & NYCRR: Unpaid Minimum Wage) 10. Plaintiff Lazo brings this action individually and on behalf of all other employees similarly situated, as authorized under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). The employees similarly situated are: FLSA Collective: All persons who are or have been employed by Defendants as non-exempt employees, including but not limited to Sewists and/or other similar non-exempt jobs, at any location operated by Defendants from three (3) years prior to this action’s filing date through the date of the final disposition of this action. 30. As outlined above, Defendants employed Plaintiff Lazo from approximately 2015 until June or July 2019. Defendants paid Plaintiff a range of hourly wages from $9.50 an hour to $11.00 an hour at different times during her employment. 31. As a Sewist, Plaintiff Lazo was primarily responsible for sewing pants and jackets. 32. At all times during Plaintiff Lazo’s employment, Plaintiff Lazo was a non-exempt employee entitled to the protections of the FLSA, NYLL, and NYCRR. 33. During most weeks of employment, Defendants required Plaintiff Lazo to work in excess of 40 hours per week. By way of example, a typical work week was: a. Monday, from 9:00 AM to 6:00 PM; (i.e., over 8 hours); b. Tuesday, from 9:00 AM to 6:00 PM; (i.e., over 8 hours); c. Wednesday, from 9:00 AM to 6:00 PM; (i.e., over 8 hours); d. Thursday, from 9:00 AM to 6:00 PM; (i.e., over 8 hours); e. Friday, from 9:00 AM to 6:00 PM; (i.e., over 8 hours); f. Saturday, from 9:00 AM to 6:00 PM; (i.e., over 8 hours); and g. Sunday, N/A; (i.e., “Day Off”). 39. Plaintiffs allege and incorporate herein by reference all of the foregoing allegations in the preceding paragraphs. 40. As outlined above, during the relevant time period, Defendants’ policies and practices violated the provisions of the FLSA regarding the payment of minimum wage to Plaintiff Lazo and the members of the FLSA Collective by, among other things, failing to pay them the applicable minimum wage for all hours worked. 41. Accordingly, Plaintiff Lazo and the members of the FLSA Collective are entitled to the difference between the wages paid (if any) by Defendants for every hour worked and the FLSA minimum wage, plus any applicable statutory penalties and/or liquidated damages, as damages for Defendants' violations of the FLSA’s minimum wage provisions. 42. The foregoing conduct, as alleged, constitutes a willful violation of the FLSA, within the meaning of all relevant statuary sections, including but not limited 29 U.S.C §§ 216(b) and 255(a). 44. Plaintiffs allege and incorporate herein by reference all of the foregoing allegations in the preceding paragraphs. 45. During the relevant time period, Plaintiff Lazo and the members of the FLSA Collective worked in excess of 40 hours per workweek. Because of Defendants' above-outlined violations of the FLSA, Plaintiff Lazo and the members of the FLSA Collective were not paid appropriate overtime compensation for every hour worked in excess of 40 hours in any given workweek. 46. Despite the hours worked by Plaintiff Lazo and the members of the FLSA Collective, Defendants willfully, in bad faith, and in knowing violation of the FLSA, failed and/or refused to pay Plaintiffs and the members of the FLSA Collective all appropriate overtime compensation. 47. The foregoing conduct, as alleged, constitutes a willful violation of the FLSA, within the meaning of all relevant statuary sections, including but not limited 29 U.S.C §§ 216(b) and 255(a). 48. Accordingly, Plaintiff Lazo and the members of the FLSA Collective are entitled to the difference between the wages paid (if any) by Defendants and the applicable overtime rate of pay, plus any applicable statutory penalties and/or liquidated damages, as damages for Defendants' violations of the FLSA’s overtime provisions. 50. Plaintiffs allege and incorporate herein by reference all of the foregoing allegations in the preceding paragraphs. 51. As outlined above, Defendants' pay practices failed to pay Plaintiff Lazo and the members of the New York Class the applicable minimum wage for every hour worked as required by the NYLL and the NYCRR. 52. Accordingly, Plaintiff Lazo and the members of the New York Class are entitled to the difference between the applicable minimum wage and the wages (if any) paid by Defendants, plus any applicable statutory penalties and/or liquidated damages, as damages for Defendants' violations of, inter alia, the NYLL and the NYCRR. 53. The foregoing conduct, as alleged, constitutes a willful violation of the NYLL without a good faith basis within the meaning of, inter alia, NYLL § 198, and as a result Plaintiff Lazo and the members of the New York Class are entitled to the applicable statutory penalties and/or liquidated damages and such other legal and equitable relief as the Court deems just and proper. 54. Plaintiff Lazo and the members of the New York Class also seek to have their reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs paid by Defendants, as provided for by the NYLL and 60. Plaintiffs allege and incorporate herein by reference all of the foregoing allegations in the preceding paragraphs. 61. At all relevant times, all Defendants were “employers” as defined by 12 NYCRR § 142 et seq. 62. At all relevant times, Plaintiff Lazo and the members of the New York Class are or were “employees” as defined by 12 NYCRR § 142 et seq. 69. Plaintiffs allege and incorporate herein by reference all of the foregoing allegations in the preceding paragraphs. 70. During the relevant time period, Defendants failed to furnish Plaintiff Lazo and the members of the New York Class with accurate wage notices that specifically enumerated certain criteria, as required by NYLL § 195(1). 73. Plaintiffs allege and incorporate herein by reference all of the foregoing allegations in the preceding paragraphs. 74. During the relevant time period, Defendants failed to furnish Plaintiff Lazo and the members of the New York Class with accurate wage statements that specifically enumerated certain criteria, as required by NYLL § 195(3). 75. Defendants' violation of the NYLL was willful and, as a result, Defendants are liable to Plaintiff Lazo and the members of the New York Class for the applicable statutory penalty and/or liquidated damage applicable at the time the violation occurred, which may be $250 per violation up to a maximum of $5,000 per class member. 76. In addition to statutory penalties, Plaintiff Lazo and the members of the New York Class are entitled to recover from Defendants’ their costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees, pre- judgment and post-judgment interest, and all other remedies this Court deems just and proper.

win

10. Defendant employed Plaintiffs at all relevant times within the meaning of the FLSA. 29 U.S.C. § 203(g). 11. Plaintiffs were employed in an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce. Defendant is a call center that takes calls from customers around the nation to troubleshoot difficulties and answer queries regarding their cellular phone services. Defendant employs over 46,000 people in over 175 “Customer Care Centers” globally including multiple centers within the United States. 12. In performing their duties for Defendant, Plaintiffs were engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce. Plaintiffs were employed as Customer Care Specialists and were responsible for handling account and/or technical support inquiries over the telephone from Sprint customers located throughout the United States. 13. Until on or about January 2012, Defendant utilized a payment scheme known as “ABC” in which employees were only paid for time spent handling customer calls. Under the ABC system, the employees were paid a flat rate per call plus premium pay, which was calculated based on whether the Customer Care Specialists met certain targets for average call handling time and positive customer survey responses. 15. From on or about January 2012, Defendant utilized a payment scheme known as “RBC” in which employees were supposed to be paid an hourly rate of $9.00 per hour plus premium pay based on meeting certain criteria up to a maximum of $14.00 per hour. The employees were also promised overtime pay. 16. Under both the ABC and RBC payment schemes Defendant only paid employees based on the time recorded when they were logged into the time-keeping system, and Plaintiffs were frequently logged out of the time-keeping system by supervisors and others resulting in unpaid working time. For example, Plaintiffs were repeatedly logged out of the time-keeping system while they were attending a mandatory 3-month training course or when they were taking short breaks of less than 15 minutes. 17. Plaintiffs Seth Feinhandler and George W Ivery, IV were moved into “performance coach” positions where they were required to be away from their work stations to assist other Customer Care Specialists with customer calls. Mr. Feinhandler and Mr. Ivery state that they were frequently logged out of the time-keeping system while they were away from their work stations. 18. Plaintiffs would often not be aware that they had been logged out of the system and would continue to work without the time-system recording their working time. 20. Plaintiffs customarily and regularly worked many hours in excess of forty (40) hours per week up to seventy (70) hours in some weeks. 21. Plaintiffs were not paid for all of the hours they worked, and, as a result, were not paid minimum wages of $7.25 per hour and overtime of one and one half times their regular rates of pay. 22. Upon information and belief, other similarly situated employees also customarily and regularly worked many hours in excess of forty (40) hours per week and were paid in a fashion similar to Plaintiffs. 23. The work performed by Plaintiffs and other similarly situated employees was with Defendants’ knowledge. Defendants set Plaintiffs’ and similarly situated employees’ schedules, assigned work, and supervised the work. 24. Plaintiff and similarly situated employees were entitled to overtime at one-and-one-half times their regular rates of pay for all hours worked in excess of forty in a workweek. Defendants did not pay Plaintiffs and similarly situated employees one and one half times their regular rates of pay for hours worked in excess of forty per week. 25. Plaintiffs complained on numerous occasions regarding Defendant’s failure to pay for all of their working time. 26. Plaintiffs’ employment was terminated by Defendant after the Plaintiffs complained about, among other things, Defendant’s failure to pay regular and overtime wages. 27. Defendants’ failed to keep and maintain records of Plaintiff’s working time as required by the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 211. V. 29. Plaintiffs were engaged in nonexempt hourly work, as set forth above. 30. As non-exempt employees, Plaintiffs were legally entitled to be paid the minimum wage of $7.25 per hour. 31. Defendant failed to pay Plaintiffs the minimum wage for all hours worked in violation of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 206. 32. Plaintiffs were legally entitled to be paid overtime wages of one-and-one-half times their regular rates of pay for hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours per each seven (7) day workweek. 33. Defendant failed to pay Plaintiffs at one-and-one-half times their regular rates of pay for hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours per each seven (7) day workweek in violation of the 37. Plaintiffs reassert and incorporate by reference all of the above numbered paragraphs. 39. As set forth above, Plaintiffs are aware of other employees who perform similar work for Defendant. 40. These employees should be notified of this action and given the chance to join pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216 (b). The class is properly identified as: All persons who, at any time during the three (3) years immediately preceding the filing of this lawsuit, worked at any business that was owned, operated, and/or acquired by Defendants, who were not paid minimum wages and overtime at a rate of one and one-half times their regular rate for hours worked in excess of forty (40) per week. 41. Defendant’s practice of not paying employees similarly situated to Plaintiffs for all of the hours they worked and one-and-one-half times the regular rate of pay for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours per each seven (7) day workweek is in direct violation of the FLSA. 42. As a result of Defendant’s willful violations of the FLSA, the similarly situated employees are entitled to reimbursement of unpaid minimum wages, unpaid overtime wages, an additional equal amount as liquidated damages, and reasonable attorneys fees, costs and disbursements incurred in this action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 43. Plaintiffs reassert and incorporate by reference all of the above numbered paragraphs. 44. Defendant willfully violated the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3), by discharging Plaintiffs in retaliation for complaining about the Defendant’s failure to pay regular and overtime wages. Defendants’ retaliatory conduct was intended to chill the exercise of statutory rights under the 46. Plaintiffs reassert and incorporate by reference all of the above-numbered paragraphs. 47. At the time their employment commenced, Plaintiffs and Defendant entered into valid and enforceable contracts regarding the terms of their pay. The contracts provided that in exchange for performing the duties of the job, Defendant would pay Plaintiffs as follows: a. During an initial three (3) month training period, an hourly rate of $9.50 per hour for each hour worked, plus overtime pay; b. After the training period and before January 2012, $1.09 per call plus premium pay based on average call handling time and customer responses to quality surveys under the ABC payment scheme; and c. After January 2012, under the RBC payment scheme, $9.00 per hour plus premium pay and overtime pay. 48. Due to the fact that Plaintiffs were regularly and repeatedly logged out of the time- keeping system, Defendants did not pay Plaintiffs in accordance with the terms of their contracts. 49. Defendant’s breach proximately caused injury to Plaintiffs. As a result of Defendant’s breach, Plaintiffs have suffered direct and consequential damages, plus interest, expenses, court costs, and attorney’s fees. 50. Plaintiffs reassert and incorporate by reference all of the above-numbered paragraphs.. 51. In the alternative to other counts, Defendant accepted services from Plaintiffs without fully compensating Plaintiffs. 53. Defendant had actual and constructive knowledge that Plaintiffs expected to be compensated when Defendant accepted Plaintiffs’ services. 54. Defendant has not fully paid Plaintiffs. 55. Plaintiffs are entitled to recover the reasonable value of the services rendered. 56. Plaintiffs reassert and incorporate by reference all of the facts set forth in the foregoing paragraphs of this Complaint. 57. In the alternative to other counts, Defendant made a promise to Plaintiffs that Defendant did not keep. Defendant promised Plaintiffs that Defendant would pay Plaintiffs as follows: a. During an initial three (3) month training period, an hourly rate of $9.50 per hour for each hour worked, plus overtime pay; b. After the training period and before January 2012, $1.09 per call plus premium pay based on average call handling time and customer responses to quality surveys under the ABC payment scheme; and c. After January 2012, under the RBC payment scheme, $9.00 per hour plus premium pay and overtime pay. 58. Plaintiffs reasonably and substantially relied on Defendant’s promise in return for the work that they performed for Defendant. Defendant knew, or reasonably should have known that Plaintiff would rely on Defendants promise. 60. Plaintiffs’ reliance on Defendant’s promise resulted in injury to Plaintiffs in the amount promised rate of pay plus premium pay and overtime for all hours worked. 8. Defendant owns and operates a call center or “Customer Care Center” in Houston, Texas where employees, Customer Care Specialists, answer telephone calls from the customers of Defendant’s corporate clients, such as Sprint. Said customers call in from various states. 9. Defendant’s annual revenues exceeded $500,000 in each of the last five years.

lose

(Collective Action Claim for Violations of the FLSA) (Individual Claim for Violations of the FLSA) 15. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges all previous paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully incorporated in this section. 16. Space Age had at all relevant times at least two employees that handle, sell, or otherwise work on goods or materials that have been moved in or produced for interstate commerce, including, but not limited to, cables, fiber optics, VOIP equipment and materials, office equipment, and telecommunications equipment. 17. Space Age’s annual gross volume of sales for each of the three calendar years preceding the filing of the Original Complaint in this case is not less than $500,000.00. 18. Creative Broadband had at all relevant times at least two employees that handle, sell, or otherwise work on goods or materials that have been moved in or produced for interstate commerce, including, but not limited to, satellite dishes, cables, fiber optics, VOIP equipment and materials, office equipment, and telecommunications equipment. 19. Creative Broadband’s annual gross volume of sales for each of the three calendar years preceding the filing of the Original Complaint in this case is not less than $500,000.00. 21. At least one of Creative Broadband’s primary business purposes is to provide telecommunications installation services. 22. To carry out their purpose to provide telecommunications installation services, Defendants engage “cable installers.” 23. Defendants treats all of their cable installers as “independent contractors” for purposes of the FLSA. 24. Defendants required at least some training be provided to each and every cable installer. 25. Defendants’ cable installer training programs, at least in part, were designed to familiarize cable installers with Defendants’ policies and procedures to better serve Defendants’ customers. 26. Defendants had a dress code policy that it required its cable installers to adhere to. 27. Defendants assigned cable installers to Defendants’ customers as needed. 28. Defendants required cable installers to start their installations at a certain time each morning. 29. Defendants set cable installers’ schedules and informed cable installers where and when they would perform installation services. 30. Defendants maintained and owned warehouses in which cable installers picked up equipment for installations and attended meetings. 31. Cable installers had no opportunity to share in Defendants’ profits. 33. Defendants were supposed to pay cable installers according to piece rates per installation. 34. Defendants determined the cable installers’ pay scale for services without input from or negotiation with cable installers. 35. Defendants set prices to its customers for services without cable installer input or negotiation. 36. Defendants determined where to locate Defendants’ branches and offices without cable installer input. 37. Defendants made decisions on advertising Defendants’ business without cable installer input. 38. Defendants made decisions on what new business to pursue or take without cable installer input. 39. Cable installers did not negotiate contracts or prices with Defendants’ customers. 40. Defendants’ managers or other individuals under authority of Defendants directed Defendants’ cable installers. 41. Defendants required cable installers to follow the directions of Defendants’ managers or other authorized individuals with respect to performing and scheduling installations. 43. In other words, if any cable installer worked more than forty hours per week, Defendants’ policy was not to pay that cable installer an overtime premium of one and one half times the cable installer’s regular rate for the hours over forty. 44. Defendants had a general practice keeping no contemporaneous records of time that cable installers spent performing services on Defendants’ behalf. 45. For some time during the three years preceding the filing of the Original Complaint, Plaintiff performed the duties of a cable installer on Defendants’ behalf. 46. Plaintiff was a “cable installer” for Defendants for at least some time after three years preceding the filing of the Original Complaint. 47. Defendants classified, or otherwise treated, Plaintiff as an “independent contractor” for purposes of the FLSA. 48. Plaintiff performed cable installation services on Defendants’ behalf as many as seventy-two hours per week. 49. Plaintiff drove her own vehicle while performing cable installation services on Defendants’ behalf. 50. While using her vehicle on Defendants’ behalf, Plaintiff’s vehicle had signs advertising Space Age attached to it. 51. After deducting for expenses related to the operation of Plaintiff’s vehicle in the course of performing job duties for Defendants, upon information and belief, Plaintiff’s pay regularly fell below the minimum wages required by the FLSA and AMWA. 53. Defendants never paid Plaintiff any overtime premium for hours that Plaintiff worked over forty hours per week. 54. Defendants knew or should have known that the job duties of Plaintiff required Plaintiff to work hours in excess of forty per week, yet Defendants failed and refused to compensate Plaintiff for her work as required by the FLSA and AMWA. 55. At all times relevant hereto, Defendants were aware of the minimum wage and overtime requirements of the FLSA and AMWA. 56. Defendants purposefully and knowingly classified cable installers as “independent contractors.” V. 57. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges all previous paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully incorporated in this section. 59. The proposed class of opt-in Plaintiffs in this case is preliminarily defined as follows: Each person who performed cable installation services within the three years preceding the filing of the Original Complaint. 60. The proposed FLSA class members are similarly situated in that they share these traits: i. They performed the same or similar job duties; ii. They were required to provide their own vehicles for use in performing their job duties for Defendants; and iii. They were subject to Defendants’ common policy of classifying them as “independent contractors;” iv. They were subject to numerous other common policies and practices as described in the Factual Allegations section. VI. 61. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges all previous paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully incorporated in this section. 62. 29 U.S.C. §§ 206 and 207 require any enterprise engaged in commerce to pay all employees a minimum wage for all hours worked up to forty (40) in one week and to pay one and one-half times regular wages for all hours worked over forty (40) hours in a week, unless an employee meets certain exemption requirements of 29 U.S.C. § 213 and all accompanying Department of Labor regulations. 64. The costs that Plaintiff incurred, including, but not limited to, use of their own vehicles, for the benefit of Defendants, caused Plaintiff’s free and clear pay to fall below minimum wages. 65. Defendants unlawfully refrained from paying Plaintiff an overtime premium for hours worked over forty per week. 66. Defendants’ failure to pay Plaintiff all minimum and overtime wages owed and to reimburse Plaintiff’s work-related vehicle expenses was willful. 67. By reason of the unlawful acts alleged herein, Defendants are liable to each Plaintiff for monetary damages, liquidated damages, and costs, including reasonable attorneys’ fees, for all violations that occurred within the three (3) years prior to the filing of this Complaint. 68. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges all previous paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully incorporated in this section. 69. Plaintiffs, on behalf of all others similarly situated, assert this claim for damages and declaratory relief pursuant to the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq. 70. Defendants misclassified all cable installers as independent contractors. 71. The costs that cable installers incurred, including, but not limited to, use of their own vehicles, for the benefit of Defendants, caused cable installers’ free and clear pay to fall below minimum wages. 73. Defendants’ failure to pay cable installers all minimum and overtime wages owed and to reimburse cable installers’ work-related vehicle expenses was willful. 74. By reason of the unlawful acts alleged herein, Defendants are liable to members of the Section 216 class for monetary damages, liquidated damages, and costs, including reasonable attorneys’ fees, for all violations that occurred within the three (3) years prior to the filing of this Complaint.

win

(Declaratory Relief) 112. Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 111 of this Complaint as though set forth at length herein. 113. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies, that Katesomerville.com contains access barriers denying blind customers the full and equal access to the goods, services and facilities of Katesomerville.com, which Kate Somerville owns, operates and/or controls, fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the American with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182, et seq., N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, et seq., and N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. 114. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. 26 (Violation of New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law Article 15 (Executive Law § 292 et seq.)) (Violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181 et seq. – Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act) (Violation of New York City Human Rights Law, N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-102, et seq.) 100. Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 99 of this Complaint as though set forth at length herein. 101. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “it shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 102. Katesomerville.com is a sales establishment and public accommodation within the definition of N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-102(9). 103. Defendant is subject to City Law because it owns and operates Katesomerville.com. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-102(1). 104. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Katesomerville.com, causing Katesomerville.com to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal 24 access to the facilities, goods, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. Specifically, Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8- 107(15)(a). 105. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a) in that Defendant has: (a) constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or (b) constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or (c) failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 106. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 107. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Katesomerville.com under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from 25 continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 108. The actions of Defendant were and are in violation of City law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 109. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense. 110. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 111. Pursuant to N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 21 (Violation of New York State Civil Rights Law, NY CLS Civ R, Article 4 (CLS Civ R § 40 et seq.)) 25. Defendant, Kate Somerville Skincare, LLC, controls and operates Katesomerville.com. in New York State and throughout the United States and the world. 26. Katesomerville.com is a commercial website that offers products and services for online sale. The online store allows the user to browse skincare, anti-aging, and acne treatment products, make purchases, and perform a variety of other functions. 27. Among the features offered by Katesomerville.com are the following: (a) Consumers may use the website to connect with Kate Somerville on social media, using such sites as Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and Pinterest; (b) an online store, allowing customers to purchase the various lines of skincare, anti-aging, and acne treatment products; and (c) learning about shipping and return policies, promotions, where to find a retailer, and about the company. 28. This case arises out of Kate Somerville’s policy and practice of denying the blind access to the goods and services offered by Katesomerville.com. Due to Kate Somerville’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to Katesomerville.com, blind individuals have been and are being denied equal access to Kate Somerville, as well as to the numerous goods, services and benefits offered to the public through Katesomerville.com. 29. Kate Somerville denies the blind access to goods, services and information made available through Katesomerville.com by preventing them from freely navigating Katesomerville.com. 9 30. Katesomerville.com contains access barriers that prevent free and full use by Plaintiff and blind persons using keyboards and screen-reading software. These barriers are pervasive and include, but are not limited to: lack of alt-text on graphics, inaccessible drop-down menus, the lack of navigation links, the lack of adequate prompting and labeling, the denial of keyboard access, empty links that contain no text, redundant links where adjacent links go to the same URL address, and the requirement that transactions be performed solely with a mouse. 31. Alternative text (“Alt-text”) is invisible code embedded beneath a graphical image on a website. Web accessibility requires that alt-text be coded with each picture so that a screen-reader can speak the alternative text while sighted users see the picture. Alt-text does not change the visual presentation except that it appears as a text pop-up when the mouse moves over the picture. There are many important pictures on Katesomerville.com that lack a text equivalent. The lack of alt-text on these graphics prevents screen readers from accurately vocalizing a description of the graphics (screen-readers detect and vocalize alt-text to provide a description of the image to a blind computer user). As a result, Plaintiff and blind Katesomerville.com customers are unable to determine what is on the website, browse the website or investigate and/or make purchases. 32. Katesomerville.com also lacks prompting information and accommodations necessary to allow blind shoppers who use screen-readers to locate and accurately fill-out online forms. On a shopping site such as Katesomerville.com, these forms include search fields to locate skincare, anti-aging, and acne treatment products and fields used to fill-out personal information, including address and credit card information. Due to lack of adequate labeling, Plaintiff and blind customers cannot make purchases or inquiries as to Defendant’s merchandise, nor can they enter their personal identification and financial information with confidence and security. In fact, Plaintiff could not determine the price of a specific product and when Plaintiff 10 attempted to click on “add to bag,” her screen-reader could not recognize the button. Consequently, she was unable to proceed to checkout and unable to complete a transaction. 33. Similarly, Katesomerville.com lacks accessible drop-down menus. Drop- down menus allow customers to locate and choose products as well as specify the quantity of certain items. On Katesomerville.com, blind customers are not aware if the desired products, such as skincare, anti-aging, and acne treatment, have been added to the shopping bag because the screen-reader does not indicate the type of product. Moreover, blind customers are unable to select the quantity of the product they desire. Therefore, blind customers are essentially prevented from purchasing any items on Katesomerville.com. 34. Furthermore, Katesomerville.com lacks accessible image maps. An image map is a function that combines multiple words and links into one single image. Visual details on this single image highlight different “hot spots” which, when clicked on, allow the user to jump to many different destinations within the website. For an image map to be accessible, it must contain alt-text for the various “hot spots.” The image maps on Katesomerville.com’s menu page do not contain adequate alt-text and are therefore inaccessible to Plaintiff and the other blind individuals attempting to make a purchase. When Plaintiff tried to access the menu link in order to make a purchase, she was unable to access it completely. 35. Katesomerville.com also lacks accessible forms. Quantity boxes allow customers to specify the quantity of certain items. On Katesomerville.com, blind customers are unable to select specific quantity because the screen-reader does not indicate the function of the box. As a result, blind customers are denied access to the quantity box. Furthermore, Plaintiff is unable to locate the shopping bag because the shopping bag form does not specify the purpose of the shopping bag. As a result, blind customers are denied access to the shopping bag. 11 Consequently, blind customers are unsuccessful in adding products into their shopping bags and are essentially prevented from purchasing items on Katesomerville.com. 36. Moreover, the lack of navigation links on Defendant’s website makes attempting to navigate through Katesomerville.com even more time consuming and confusing for Plaintiff and blind consumers. 37. Katesomerville.com requires the use of a mouse to complete a transaction. Yet, it is a fundamental tenet of web accessibility that for a web page to be accessible to Plaintiff and blind people, it must be possible for the user to interact with the page using only the keyboard. Indeed, Plaintiff and blind users cannot use a mouse because manipulating the mouse is a visual activity of moving the mouse pointer from one visual spot on the page to another. Thus, Katesomerville.com’s inaccessible design, which requires the use of a mouse to complete a transaction, denies Plaintiff and blind customers the ability to independently navigate and/or make purchases on Katesomerville.com. 38. Due to Katesomerville.com’s inaccessibility, Plaintiff and blind customers must in turn spend time, energy, and/or money to make their purchases at traditional brick-and- mortar retailers. Some blind customers may require a driver to get to the stores or require assistance in navigating the stores. By contrast, if Katesomerville.com was accessible, a blind person could independently investigate products and make purchases via the Internet as sighted individuals can and do. According to WCAG 2.1 Guideline 2.4.1, a mechanism is necessary to bypass blocks of content that are repeated on multiple webpages because requiring users to extensively tab before reaching the main content is an unacceptable barrier to accessing the website. Plaintiff must tab through every navigation bar option and footer on Defendant’s website in an attempt to reach the desired service. Thus, Katesomerville.com’s inaccessible 12 design, which requires the use of a mouse to complete a transaction, denies Plaintiff and blind customers the ability to independently make purchases on Katesomerville.com. 39. Katesomerville.com thus contains access barriers which deny the full and equal access to Plaintiff, who would otherwise use Katesomerville.com and who would otherwise be able to fully and equally enjoy the benefits and services of Katesomerville.com in New York State and throughout the United States. 40. Plaintiff, Marion Kiler, has made numerous attempts to complete a purchase on Katesomerville.com, most recently in August 2018, but was unable to do so independently because of the many access barriers on Defendant’s website. These access barriers have caused Katesomerville.com to be inaccessible to, and not independently usable by, blind and visually- impaired persons. Amongst other access barriers experienced, Plaintiff was unable to purchase Anti-Aging Cream. 41. As described above, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the fact that Defendant’s website, Katesomerville.com, contains access barriers causing the website to be inaccessible, and not independently usable by, blind and visually-impaired persons. 42. These barriers to access have denied Plaintiff full and equal access to, and enjoyment of, the goods, benefits and services of Katesomerville.com. 43. Defendant engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including but not limited to the following policies or practices: (a) constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or (b) constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or 13 (c) failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 44. Defendant utilizes standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others. 45. Because of Defendant’s denial of full and equal access to, and enjoyment of, the goods, benefits and services of Katesomerville.com, Plaintiff and the class have suffered an injury-in-fact which is concrete and particularized and actual and is a direct result of defendant’s conduct. 46. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, seeks certification of the following nationwide class pursuant to Rule 23(a) and 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: “all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Katesomerville.com and as a result have been denied access to the enjoyment of goods and services offered by Katesomerville.com, during the relevant statutory period.” 47. Plaintiff seeks certification of the following New York subclass pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a), 23(b)(2), and, alternatively, 23(b)(3): “all legally blind individuals in New York State who have attempted to access Katesomerville.com and as a result have been denied access to the enjoyment of goods and services offered by Katesomerville.com, during the relevant statutory period.” 48. There are hundreds of thousands of visually-impaired persons in New York State. There are approximately 8.1 million people in the United States who are visually- impaired. Id. Thus, the persons in the class are so numerous that joinder of all such persons is impractical and the disposition of their claims in a class action is a benefit to the parties and to the Court. 14 49. This case arises out of Defendant’s policy and practice of maintaining an inaccessible website denying blind persons access to the goods and services of Katesomerville.com. Due to Defendant’s policy and practice of failing to remove access barriers, blind persons have been and are being denied full and equal access to independently browse, select and shop on Katesomerville.com. 50. There are common questions of law and fact common to the class, including without limitation, the following: (a) Whether Katesomerville.com is a “public accommodation” under the ADA; (b) Whether Katesomerville.com is a “place or provider of public accommodation” under the laws of New York; (c) Whether Defendant, through its website, Katesomerville.com, denies the full and equal enjoyment of its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities in violation of the ADA; and (d) Whether Defendant, through its website, Katesomerville.com, denies the full and equal enjoyment of its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities in violation of the law of New York. 51. The claims of the named Plaintiff are typical of those of the class. The class, similar to the Plaintiff, is severely visually-impaired or otherwise blind, and claims Kate Somerville has violated the ADA, and/or the laws of New York by failing to update or remove access barriers on their website, Katesomerville.com, so it can be independently accessible to the class of people who are legally blind. 52. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the members of the Class because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic 15 to the members of the class. Class certification of the claims is appropriate pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. 53. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because questions of law and fact common to Class members clearly predominate over questions affecting only individual class members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 54. Judicial economy will be served by maintenance of this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 55. References to Plaintiff shall be deemed to include the named Plaintiff and each member of the class, unless otherwise indicated. 56. Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 55 of this Complaint as though set forth at length herein. 57. Title III of the American with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) provides that “No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.” Title III also prohibits an entity from “[u]tilizing standards or 16 criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating on the basis of disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 12181(b)(2)(D)(I). 58. Katesomerville.com is a sales establishment and public accommodation within the definition of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181(7). 59. Defendant is subject to Title III of the ADA because it owns and operates Katesomerville.com. 60. Under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(I), it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities or a class of individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 61. Under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(II), it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities or a class of individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 62. Specifically, under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(II), unlawful discrimination includes, among other things, “a failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations.” 63. In addition, under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(III), unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things, “a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with disability is excluded, denied services, segregated 17 or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 64. There are readily available, well-established guidelines on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually-impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other business entities in making their websites accessible, including but not limited to ensuring adequate prompting and accessible alt-text. Incorporating the basic components to make their website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 65. The acts alleged herein constitute violations of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Patrons of Kate Somerville who are blind have been denied full and equal access to Katesomerville.com, have not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and/or have been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled patrons. 66. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 67. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Katesomerville.com in violation of Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181 et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. 18 68. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 69. The actions of Defendant were and are in violation of the ADA, and therefore Plaintiff invokes his statutory right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 70. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 71. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 72. Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 71 of this Complaint as though set forth at length herein. 73. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.”. 74. Katesomerville.com is a sales establishment and public accommodation within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). 75. Defendant is subject to the New York Human Rights Law because it owns and operates Katesomerville.com. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law. § 292(1). 76. Defendant is violating N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Katesomerville.com, causing Katesomerville.com to be completely 19 inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons the full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 77. Specifically, under N.Y. Exec. Law § unlawful discriminatory practice includes, among other things, “a refusal to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless such person can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations.” 78. In addition, under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(II), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 79. There are readily available, well-established guidelines on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually-impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other business entities in making their website accessible, including but not limited to: adding alt-text to graphics and ensuring that all functions can be performed by using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make their website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 80. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the class on the basis of a disability in violation of the New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2) in that Defendant has: 20 (a) constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or (b) constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or (c) failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 81. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 82. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Katesomerville.com under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 83. The actions of Defendant were and are in violation of the New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 84. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines pursuant to N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 85. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 86. Pursuant to N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 87. Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 86 of this Complaint as though set forth at length herein. 88. Plaintiff served notice thereof upon the attorney general as required by N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41. 89. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40 provides that “all persons within the jurisdiction of this state shall be entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of any places of public accommodations, resort or amusement, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons. No persons, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or employee of any such place shall directly or indirectly refuse, withhold from, or deny to any person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof . . .” 90. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) provides that “no person because of . . . disability, as such term is defined in section two hundred ninety-two of executive law, be subjected to any discrimination in his or her civil rights, or to any harassment, as defined in section 240.25 of the penal law, in the exercise thereof, by any other person or by any firm, corporation or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision.” 91. Katesomerville.com is a sales establishment and public accommodation within the definition of N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2). 92. Defendant is subject to New York Civil Rights Law because it owns and operates Katesomerville.com. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Civil Law § 40- c(2). 22 93. Defendant is violating N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Katesomerville.com, causing Katesomerville.com to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 94. There are readily available, well-established guidelines on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually-impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other business entities in making their website accessible, including but not limited to: adding alt-text to graphics and ensuring that all functions can be performed by using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make their website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 95. In addition, N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41 states that “any corporation which shall violate any of the provisions of sections forty, forty-a, forty-b or forty two . . . shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby . . .” 96. Specifically, under N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-d, “any person who shall violate any of the provisions of the foregoing section, or subdivision three of section 240.30 or section 240.31 of the penal law, or who shall aid or incite the violation of any of said provisions shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby in any court of competent jurisdiction in the county in which the defendant shall reside . . .” 97. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 23 98. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class on the basis of disability are being directly indirectly refused, withheld from, or denied the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof in § 40 et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. 99. Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages of five hundred dollars per instance, as well as civil penalties and fines pursuant to N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40 et seq. for each and every offense.

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