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11. Defendants sent advertisements by facsimile to Plaintiff and a class of similarly-situated persons. Whether Defendants did so directly or with the assistance of a third party (yet unknown to Plaintiff), Defendants are directly liable for violating the TCPA. 12. Plaintiff has received at least one of Defendants’ advertisements by facsimile. A true and correct copy of the fax received in February 2016 is attached as Exhibit A. Plaintiff intends to discover the number of other Defendants’ advertisements sent to Plaintiff by fax. 13. Exhibit A is a one-page document Defendants sent by fax advertising the eVox system, a clinical tool used to measure cognitive impairment. The fax advertises the commercial availability or quality of property, goods, or services. The fax provides information about the eVox system purportedly offered for sale by Evoke, and methods for contacting Evoke to purchase one of these devices. 15. Exhibit A does not include the mandatory opt-out notice required by 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200 (a) (4). 16. Plaintiff did not expressly invite or give permission to anyone to send Exhibit A or any other advertisement from Evoke to Plaintiff’s fax machine. 17. On information and belief, Defendants sent advertisements by facsimile to Plaintiff and more than 39 other persons in violation of the TCPA. 18. Plaintiff and the other class members owe no obligation to protect their fax machines from Defendants. Their fax machines are ready to send and receive their urgent communications, or private communications about patients’ medical needs, not to receive Defendants’ unlawful advertisements. 19. Plaintiff brings this action as a class action on behalf of itself and all others similarly situated as members of a class, initially defined as follows: Each person that was sent one or more telephone facsimile messages promoting the commercial availability or quality of property, goods, or services offered by “Evoke,” but not stating on its first page that the recipient may make a request to the sender not to send any future ads and that failure to comply with such a request within 30 days is unlawful. Plaintiff expressly reserves the right to modify the proposed class definition or propose subclasses. 21. On information and belief, Defendants’ fax advertising campaigns involved other, substantially-similar advertisements also sent without the opt-out notice required by the TCPA. Plaintiff intends to locate those advertisements in discovery. 22. This action is brought and may properly be maintained as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. This action satisfies Rule 23 (a)’s numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy requirements. Additionally, prosecution of Plaintiff’s claims separately from the putative class’s claims would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications under Rule 23 (b) (1) (A). Furthermore, the questions of law or fact that are common in this action predominate over any individual questions of law or fact making class representation the superior method to adjudicate this controversy under Rule 23 (b) (3). 23. Numerosity/impracticality of joinder. On information and belief, the class consists of more than 39 persons and, thus, is so numerous that individual joinder of each member is impracticable. The precise number of class members and their identities are unknown to Plaintiff, but will be obtained from Defendants’ records or the records of third parties. 25. Typicality of claims. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the other class members, because Plaintiff and all class members were injured by the same wrongful practices. Plaintiff and the members of the class received Defendants’ advertisements by facsimile and those advertisements did not contain the opt-out notice required by the TCPA. Under the facts of this case, because the focus is upon Defendants’ conduct, if Plaintiff prevails on its claims, then the other putative class members will prevail as well. 26. Adequacy of representation. Plaintiff is an adequate representative of the class because its interests do not conflict with the interests of the class it seeks to represent. Plaintiff has retained counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and TCPA litigation in particular, and Plaintiff intends to vigorously prosecute this action. Plaintiff and its counsel will fairly and adequately protect the interest of members of the class. 27. Prosecution of separate claims would yield inconsistent results. Even though the questions of fact and law in this action are predominantly common to Plaintiff and the putative class members, separate adjudication of each class member’s claims would yield inconsistent and varying adjudications. Such inconsistent rulings would create incompatible standards for Defendants to operate under if/when class members bring additional lawsuits concerning the same unsolicited fax advertisements of if Defendants choose to advertise by fax again in the future. 29. Plaintiff incorporates the preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 3. Private right of action. A person may, if otherwise permitted by the laws or rules of court of a state, bring in an appropriate court of that state: (A) An action based on a violation of this subsection or the regulations prescribed under this subsection to enjoin such violation, (B) An action to recover for actual monetary loss from such a violation, or to receive $500 in damages for each such violation, whichever is greater, or (C) Both such actions. 47 U.S.C. § 227 (b) (3). 30. Plaintiff brings Count I on behalf of itself and a class of similarly situated persons against Defendants. 31. The TCPA prohibits the “use of any telephone facsimile machine, computer or other device to send an unsolicited advertisement to a telephone facsimile machine….” 47 U.S.C. § 227 (b) (1). 33. The TCPA provides a private right of action as follows: 34. The Court, in its discretion, may treble the statutory damages if it determines that a violation was knowing or willful. 47 U.S.C. § 227 (b) (3). 35. Here, Defendants violated 47 U.S.C. § 227 (b) (1) (C) by sending an advertisement by facsimile (such as Exhibit A) to Plaintiff and the other class members without their prior express invitation or permission. 36. The TCPA requires that every advertisement sent by facsimile must include an opt-out notice clearly and conspicuously displayed on the bottom of its first page. 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200 (a) (4). 37. Defendants failed to include a clear and conspicuous opt-out notice on Exhibit A. 39. Defendants violated the TCPA by failing to state on the first page of each fax advertisement that their failure to comply with an opt-out request within 30 days would be unlawful. Exhibit A. 40. Facsimile advertising imposes burdens on recipients that are distinct from the burdens imposed by other types of advertising. The required opt-out notice provides recipients the necessary information to opt-out of future fax transmissions, including a notice that the sender’s failure to comply with the opt-out request will be unlawful. 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200 (a) (4). 41. Defendants’ failure to include a compliant opt-out notice on their fax advertisements makes irrelevant any express consent or established business relationship (“EBR”) that otherwise might have justified Defendants’ fax advertising campaigns. 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200 (a) (4). 42. The TCPA is a strict liability statute and Defendants are liable to Plaintiff and the other class members even if their actions were negligent. 47 U.S.C. § 227 (b) (3). 44. If Defendants’ actions were knowing or purposeful, then the Court has the discretion to increase the statutory damages up to 3 times the amount. 47 U.S.C. § 227 (b) (3). 45. Evoke is liable for the fax advertisements at issue because it sent the faxes, caused the faxes to be sent, participated in the activity giving rise to or constituting the violation, the faxes were sent on its behalf, or under general principles of vicarious liability, including actual authority, apparent authority and ratification. 46. Defendants knew or should have known that Plaintiff and the other class members had not given express invitation or permission for Defendants or anybody else to fax advertisements about Defendants’ goods, products, or services, that Plaintiff and the other class members did not have an established business relationship with Defendants, that Exhibit A is an advertisement, and that Exhibit A did not display a compliant opt-out notices as required by the TCPA. 49. Plaintiff brings Count II on behalf of itself and a class of similarly situated persons and against Defendants. 50. By sending advertisements to their fax machines, Defendants improperly and unlawfully converted the class’s fax machines to Defendants’ own use. Where printed (as in Plaintiff’s case), Defendants also improperly and unlawfully converted the class members’ paper and toner to Defendants’ own use. Defendants also converted Plaintiff’s time to Defendants’ own use, as they did with the valuable time of the other class members. 51. Immediately prior to the sending of the unsolicited faxes, Plaintiff and the other class members each owned an unqualified and immediate right to possession of their fax machines, paper, toner, and employee time. 52. By sending them unsolicited faxes, Defendants permanently misappropriated the class members’ fax machines, toner, paper, and employee time to their own use. Such misappropriation was wrongful and without authorization. 53. Defendants knew or should have known that their misappropriation of paper, toner, and employee time was wrongful and without authorization. 54. Plaintiff and the other class members were deprived of the use of the fax machines, paper, toner, and employee time, which could no longer be used for any other purpose. Plaintiff and each class member thereby suffered damages as a result of their receipt of unsolicited fax advertisements from Defendants. CONVERSION TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT, 47 U.S.C. § 227

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10. FPR offers contract staffing for all facets of the energy industry; specializing in field personnel for exploration, appraisal and development drilling activities on US land. 11. FPR’s gross revenues exceeded $1,000,000 in 2014. 12. FPR’s gross revenues exceeded $1,000,000 in 2015. 13. FPR’s gross revenues exceeded $1,000,000 in 2016. 14. Since at least 2014, FPR has employed at least 2 employees who handle, sell, or otherwise work on goods or materials, such as tools, phones, computers, pens, and/or hard hats, that have moved in, or were produced for, commerce. 15. Since at least 2014, FPR has been an enterprise covered by the FLSA. 16. FPR is an employer of the personnel it provides to its clients. 17. FPR retains the right to terminate its personnel’s employment. 18. FPR’s clients often provide pay rates and guidelines that FPR must follow in paying the personnel. 19. FPR’s personnel are supervised by FPR’s clients. 20. FPR’s personnel regularly perform their job duties at locations controlled by FPR’s clients and act as an integral part of the clients’ workforces. 21. Thus, the personnel provided by FPR are often employees and/or joint employees of FPR’s clients as well. 22. Morgan is an MWD hand employed by FPR. 24. FPR originally classified Morgan as an “independent contractor” (despite the fact he was actually an employee). 25. During this period, FPR paid Morgan on a day-rate basis. 26. Morgan reported the hours he worked to FPR on a regular basis. 27. If Morgan worked fewer than 40 hours in a week, would be paid only for the hours he worked. 28. But Morgan normally worked more than 40 hours in a week. 29. In fact, Morgan often worked at least 84 hours in a week. 30. His hours are reflected, at least in part, in FPR’s records. 31. FPR’s records reflect Morgan worked far more than 40 hours a week. 32. However, during the period FPR paid Morgan a day-rate, FPR never paid Morgan overtime. 33. FPR later switched Morgan’s classification from “independent contractor” to employee. 34. FPR changed Morgan’s classification to “employee” at the direction of one of its clients. 35. Following the reclassification from independent contractor to employee, FPR paid Morgan by the hour, with overtime for hours worked in excess of 40 in a workweek. 36. Since at least 2015, FPR was aware of the overtime requirements of the FLSA. 37. In fact, on information and belief, FPR pays overtime to its in-house staff (such as secretaries and receptionists). 38. FPR nonetheless failed to pay certain employees, such as Morgan, overtime. 39. FPR’s failure to pay overtime to its day-rate personnel was, and is, a willful violation of the FLSA. 41. FPR paid dozens of workers according to the same unlawful day-rate scheme. 42. Like Morgan, FPR classified these workers as independent contractors. 43. Like Morgan, these workers performed their work in the oilfield. 44. If they were employed at the time of the reclassification in late 2016, FPR reclassified these workers from so-called “independent contractors” to admitted “employees.” 45. Any differences in job duties do not detract from the fact that the day-rate workers were entitled to overtime pay. 46. The workers impacted by FPR’s “day-rate” payment scheme should be notified of this action and given the chance to join pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 47. Therefore, the class is properly defined as: All oil field workers who worked for FPR during the past 3 years while being paid on a day-rate basis. 48. By failing to pay Morgan and those similarly situated to him overtime at one-and-one- half times their regular rates, FPR violated the FLSA’s overtime provisions. 49. FPR owes Morgan and those similarly situated to him the difference between the rate actually paid and the proper overtime rate. 50. Because FPR knew, or showed reckless disregard for whether, its pay practices violated the FLSA, FPR owes these wages for at least the past three years. 51. FPR is liable to Morgan and those similarly situated to him for an amount equal to all unpaid overtime wages as liquidated damages. 52. Morgan and those similarly situated to him are entitled to recover all reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in this action.

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2.1 guidelines; c. Regularly test user accessibility by blind or vision-impaired persons to ensure that Defendant’s Website complies under the WCAG 2.1 guidelines; and, d. Develop an accessibility policy that is clearly disclosed on Defendant’s Websites, with contact information for users to report accessibility-related problems. 21. Defendant is a security system retailer that owns and operates www.goabode.com (its “Website”), offering features which should allow all consumers to access the goods and services and which Defendant ensures the delivery of such goods throughout the United States, including New York State. 22. Defendant’s Website offers products and services for online sale and general delivery to the public. The Website offers features which ought to allow users to browse for items, access navigation bar descriptions and prices, and avail consumers of the ability to peruse the numerous items offered for sale. 23. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient NVDA screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using a screen-reader. 24. On multiple occasions, the last occurring in October of 2019, Plaintiff visited Defendant’s website, www.goabode.com, to make a purchase. Despite his efforts, however, Plaintiff was denied a shopping experience similar to that of a sighted individual due to the website’s lack of a variety of features and accommodations, which effectively barred Plaintiff from being able to determine what specific products were offered for sale. 26. Many features on the Website also fail to Add a label element or title attribute for each field. This is a problem for the visually impaired because the screen reader fails to communicate the purpose of the page element. It also leads to the user not being able to understand what he or she is expected to insert into the subject field. As a result, Plaintiff and similarly situated visually impaired users of Defendant’s Website are unable to enjoy the privileges and benefits of the Website equally to sighted users. 27. Many pages on the Website also contain the same title elements. This is a problem for the visually impaired because the screen reader fails to distinguish one page from another. In order to fix this problem, Defendant must change the title elements for each page. 28. The Website also contained a host of broken links, which is a hyperlink to a non- existent or empty webpage. For the visually impaired this is especially paralyzing due to the inability to navigate or otherwise determine where one is on the website once a broken link is encountered. For example, upon coming across a link of interest, Plaintiff was redirected to an error page. However, the screen-reader failed to communicate that the link was broken. As a result, Plaintiff could not get back to his original search. 30. These access barriers effectively denied Plaintiff the ability to use and enjoy Defendant’s website the same way sighted individuals do. 31. It is, upon information and belief, Defendant’s policy and practice to deny Plaintiff, along with other blind or visually-impaired users, access to Defendant’s website, and to therefore specifically deny the goods and services that are offered to the general public. Due to Defendant’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to its website, Plaintiff and visually-impaired persons have been and are still being denied equal access to Defendant’s Website, and the numerous goods and services and benefits offered to the public through the Website. 32. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s Website, blind and visually-impaired customers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, products, and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from equal access to the Website. 33. If the Website were equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 35. Because simple compliance with the WCAG 2.1 Guidelines would provide Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers with equal access to the Website, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including but not limited to the following policies or practices: a. Constructing and maintaining a website that is inaccessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; b. Failure to construct and maintain a website that is sufficiently intuitive so as to be equally accessible to visually impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; and, c. Failing to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind and visually-impaired consumers, such as Plaintiff, as a member of a protected class. 36. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 37. The ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks in this action. In relevant part, the ADA requires: In the case of violations of . . . this title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities . . . Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the . . . modification of a policy . . . 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 39. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 41. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 42. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services, during the relevant statutory period. 43. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered, during the relevant statutory period. 45. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class. The Class, similarly to the Plaintiff, are severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA or NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so either can be independently accessible to the Class. 46. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class Members because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the Class Members. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. 47. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 48. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 49. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 51. Defendant’s Website is a public accommodations within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). The Website is a service that is offered to the general public, and as such, must be equally accessible to all potential consumers. 52. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 53. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 55. The acts alleged herein constitute violations of Title III of the ADA, and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Plaintiff, who is a member of a protected class of persons under the ADA, has a physical disability that substantially limits the major life activity of sight within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1)(A)-(2)(A). Furthermore, Plaintiff has been denied full and equal access to the Website, has not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and has been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled persons. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 56. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 57. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 58. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 60. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates its Website, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 61. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with such Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, products, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 62. Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). 64. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 65. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of its Website under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 66. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 67. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 68. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 69. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 71. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies, that its Website contains access barriers denying blind customers the full and equal access to the products, services and facilities of its Website, which Defendant owns, operates and controls, fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182, et seq., and N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. 72. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq.

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(Against the City of El Cajon Under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)) 1. That Notice be given to present and former employees of the City informing them of their right to join -- without retaliation -- in that portion of this action brought pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §§ 215(a)(3) and 216(b); 10. “The ‘regular rate’ is defined as ‘all remuneration for employment paid to, or on behalf of, the employee . . . .” (Flores v. City of San Gabriel (9th Cir. 2016) 824 F.3d 890, 895, quoting 29 U.S.C., § 207(e).) 11. “The FLSA provides a private cause of action for employees to seek unpaid wages owed to them under the provisions of [29 U.S.C. section] 216(b).” (Flores v. City of San Gabriel (9th Cir. 2016) 824 F.3d 890, 895.) 12. Each of the plaintiffs worked more than 40 hours in many seven-day work weeks. Plaintiff Mike Murphy worked more than 40 hours in 80 or more work weeks since April 9, 2015. Plaintiff Joshua Pittsley worked more than 40 hours in at least 85 work weeks since April 9, 2015. The plaintiffs who have consented to join this case have also worked more than 40 hours in many seven-day work weeks during the three years preceding April 9, 2014. 13. During the work weeks that the plaintiffs worked overtime (i.e., more than 40 hours), the City failed to correctly pay overtime to the plaintiffs as required by the FLSA. Specifically, the City failed to correctly calculate the regular rate of pay of the plaintiffs, and those similarly situated, during those work weeks, because the City failed to include “all remuneration for employment paid to, or on behalf of, the [plaintiffs]” in the regular rate calculation. 14. The City’s failure to correctly calculate the regular rate during those work weeks was caused by, among other things, failing to include cash paid to the plaintiffs, and other similarly situated, in lieu of providing or paying medical and related insurance premiums under the City’s flexible benefits plan. (Flores v. City of San Gabriel (9th Cir. 2016) 824 F.3d 890 [requiring such payments to be included in the “regular rate”].) The City also failed to include other remuneration for employment paid to, or on behalf of, the plaintiffs, and those similarly situated, in the regular rate of pay of those plaintiffs and those similarly situated. 16. The City’s violation of the FLSA set forth herein was “willful” because, based on information and belief, the City took no affirmative action to assure compliance with the FLSA requirements. (Flores v. City of San Gabriel (9th Cir. 2016) 824 F.3d 890, 906-07.) WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for the following: 2. That judgment be entered against the City in the amounts respectively due the plaintiffs and other employees and former employees of the City similarly situated for unpaid overtime compensation, liquidated damages, and interest as the Court may determine pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §216(b); 3. That pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 217 a permanent injunction be entered against the City restraining further violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act, among others; 4. Attorney’s fees, costs and prejudgment interest pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b); 5. For such additional and further relief as this Court may deem just. Dated: April 9, 2018 s/Michael A. Conger Attorney for Plaintiffs E-Mail: [email protected]

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1. a statement that the recipient is legally entitled to opt-out of receiving future faxed advertisements – knowing that he or she has the legal right to request an opt-out gives impetus for recipients to make such a request, if desired; 19. On information and belief, on or about February 21, 2013, Defendants transmitted by telephone facsimile machine an unsolicited facsimile to Plaintiff. A copy of the facsimile is attached hereto as Exhibit A. 2. a statement that the sender must honor a recipient’s opt-out request within 30 days and the sender’s failure to do so is unlawful – thereby encouraging recipients to opt-out, if they did not want future faxes, by advising them that their opt-out requests will have legal “teeth”; 20. On information and belief, Defendants receive some or all of the revenues from the sale of the products, goods and services advertised on Exhibit A, and Defendants profit and benefit from the sale of the products, goods and services advertised on Exhibit A. 21. Plaintiff had not invited or given permission to Defendants to send the fax. 22. On information and belief, Defendants faxed the same and other unsolicited facsimiles without the required opt out language to Plaintiff and more than 25 other recipients or sent the same and other advertisements by fax with the required opt out language but without first receiving the recipients’ express permission or invitation. 23. There is no reasonable means for Plaintiff (or any other class member) to avoid receiving unauthorized faxes. Fax machines are left on and ready to receive the urgent communications their owners desire to receive. 25. Plaintiff, on behalf of itself and all others similarly situated, incorporates Paragraphs 1 through 17 as though fully set forth herein, as and for its paragraph 18. 26. In accordance with F. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1), (b)(2) and (b)(3), Plaintiff brings this Count I pursuant to the JFPA, on behalf of the following class of persons: All persons who (1) on or after four years prior to the filing of this action, (2) were sent telephone facsimile messages of material advertising the commercial availability or quality of any property, goods, or services by or on behalf of Defendants, and (3) which Defendants did not have prior express permission or invitation, or (4) which did not display a proper opt-out notice. Excluded from the Class are the Defendants, their employees, agents and members of the Judiciary. Plaintiff reserves the right to amend the class definition upon completion of class certification discovery. 27. Class Size (F. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1)): Plaintiff is informed and believes, and upon such information and belief avers, that the number of persons and entities of the Plaintiff Class is numerous and joinder of all members is impracticable. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and upon such information and belief avers, that the number of class members is at least forty. 30. Fair and Adequate Representation (F. R. Civ. P. 23 (a) (4)): The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the class. It is interested in this matter, has no conflicts and has retained experienced class counsel to represent the class. 31. Need for Consistent Standards and Practical Effect of Adjudication (F. R. Civ. P. 23 (b) (1)): Class certification is appropriate because the prosecution of individual actions by class members would: (a) create the risk of inconsistent adjudications that could establish incompatible standards of conduct for the Defendants, and/or (b) as a practical matter, adjudication of the Plaintiff's claims will be dispositive of the interests of class members who are not parties. 32. Common Conduct (F. R. Civ. P. 23 (b) (2)): Class certification is also appropriate because the Defendants have acted and refused to act in the same or similar manner with respect to all class members thereby making injunctive and declaratory relief appropriate. The Plaintiff demands such relief as authorized by 47 U.S.C. §227. 34. The JFPA makes it unlawful for any person to “use any telephone facsimile machine, computer or other device to send, to a telephone facsimile machine, an unsolicited advertisement . . . .” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C). 35. The JFPA defines “unsolicited advertisement” as “any material advertising the commercial availability or quality of any property, goods, or services which is transmitted to any person without that person's prior express invitation or permission, in writing or otherwise.” 47 U.S.C. § 227 (a) (5). 36. Opt-Out Notice Requirements. The JFPA strengthened the prohibitions against the sending of unsolicited advertisements by requiring, in § (b)(1)(C)(iii) of the Act, that senders of faxed advertisements place a clear and conspicuous notice on the first page of the transmission that contains the following among other things (hereinafter collectively the “Opt-Out Notice Requirements”): 39. Defendants’ Other Violations. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and upon such information and belief avers, that during the period preceding four years of the filing of this Complaint and repeatedly thereafter, Defendants have sent via facsimile transmission from telephone facsimile machines, computers, or other devices to telephone facsimile machines of members of the Plaintiff Class other faxes that constitute advertisements under the JFPA that were transmitted to persons or entities without their prior express permission or invitation (and/or that Defendants are precluded from asserting any prior express permission or invitation or that Defendants had an established business relationship because of the failure to comply with the Opt-Out Notice Requirements in connection with such transmissions). By virtue thereof, Defendants violated the JFPA and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and upon such information and belief avers, that Defendants may be continuing to send unsolicited advertisements via facsimile transmission in violation of the JFPA and the regulations promulgated thereunder, and absent intervention by this Court, will do so in the future. 40. The TCPA/JFPA provides a private right of action to bring this action on behalf of Plaintiff and the Plaintiff Class to redress Defendants’ violations of the Act, and provides for statutory damages. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3). The Act also provides that injunctive relief is appropriate. Id. 42. The Defendants knew or should have known that (a) the Plaintiff and the other class members had not given express invitation or permission for the Defendants or anybody else to fax advertisements about the Defendants’ goods or services; (b) the Plaintiff and the other class members did not have an established business relationship; (c) Defendants transmitted advertisements; (d) the Faxes did not contain the required Opt-Out Notice; and (e) Defendants’ transmission of advertisements that did not contain the required opt-out notice was unlawful. 43. The Defendants’ actions caused damages to the Plaintiff and the other class members. Receiving the Defendants’ junk faxes caused the recipients to lose paper and toner consumed in the printing of the Defendants’ faxes. Moreover, the Defendants’ faxes used the Plaintiff's and the other class members’ telephone lines and fax machine. The Defendants’ faxes cost the Plaintiff and the other class members time, as the Plaintiff and the other class members and their employees wasted their time receiving, reviewing and routing the Defendants’ unauthorized faxes. That time otherwise would have been spent on the Plaintiff's and the other class members’ business activities. The Defendants’ faxes unlawfully interrupted the Plaintiff's and other class members' privacy interests in being left alone. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, RUSSELL M. HOLSTEIN, PH.D., LLC, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, demands judgment in its favor and against Defendants, 44. Plaintiff, on behalf of itself and all others similarly situated, incorporates Paragraphs 1 through 43 as though fully set forth herein, as and for its paragraph 44. 45. In accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, Plaintiff brings Count II for violation of the New Jersey Junk Fax Statute (56:8-157, et seq.), which is part of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act (56:8-1 et seq.), on behalf of the following Class of persons: All New Jersey residents who (1) on or after four years prior to the filing of this action, (2) were sent telephone facsimile messages of material advertising the commercial availability or quality of any property, goods, or services by or on behalf of Defendants, and (3) which Defendants did not have prior express permission or invitation. 48. A class action is an appropriate method for adjudicating this controversy fairly and effectively. The interest of each individual Class member in controlling the prosecution of separate claims is small and individual actions are not economically feasible. 49. The New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act and the New Jersey Junk Fax Statute prohibit a person from using any telephone facsimile machine, computer or other device from sending an unsolicited advertisement to a telephone facsimile machine within this state. 50. The New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act which incorporates the New Jersey Junk Fax Statute defines “unsolicited advertisement” as “any material advertising the commercial availability or quality of any property, goods or services which is transmitted to any person without that person’s prior express invitation or permission.” 51. The court shall award actual damages sustained or $500 for each violation, whichever is greater, along with costs of the suit, reasonable attorneys’ fees and to enjoin future violations. If the court finds that Defendant was requested to cease and desist, the court shall award $1000 for each subsequent transmission along with costs of suit and reasonable attorneys’ fees. N.J.S.A. 56:8-159. 52. Defendant violated N.J.S.A. 56:8-157 et seq. and 56:8-1 et seq. by sending unsolicited advertisements (such as Exhibit A) to Plaintiff and other members of the Class without first obtaining their prior express permission or invitation and by not displaying clear and conspicuous notices on the first page of the unsolicited advertisements as required by 57. Plaintiff, on behalf of itself and all others similarly situated, incorporates Paragraphs 1 through 56 as though fully set forth herein, as and for its paragraph 57. 58. In accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, Plaintiff brings Count III for violation of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act (56:8-1 et seq.), on behalf of the following Class of persons: All New Jersey residents who (1) on or after four years prior to the filing of this action, (2) were sent telephone facsimile messages of material advertising the commercial availability or quality of any property, goods, or services by or on behalf of Defendants, and (3) which Defendants did not have prior express permission or invitation. 60. Plaintiff, and all those similarly situated are “persons” as defined by N.J.S.A. 56:8-1(d). 61. Defendant’s violation of the New Jersey Junk Fax Statute constitute a per se violation of the New Jersey CFA, as the New Jersey Junk Fax Statute was promulgated pursuant to the CFA. 62. Defendant’s practice of transmitting unauthorized advertisements that includes and/or excludes prohibited terms and/or information including, but not limited to per se violations of the CFA, constitutes an unlawful act and an unconscionable commercial practice under the CFA. 63. As a direct result of the above-referenced statutory violations, Plaintiff and all those similarly situated have suffered ascertainable losses and are entitled to statutory compensation as required under N.J.S.A. 56:8-157, et seq. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, RUSSELL M.HOLSTEIN, PH.D., LLC, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, demands judgment in its favor and against Defendants, JUNK FAX PREVENTION ACT OF 2005, 47 USC § 227 VIOLATION OF THE NEW JERSEY JUNK FAX STATUTE N.J.S.A 56: 8-157 et seq. VIOLATION OF THE NEW JERSEY CONSUMER FRAUD ACT 56: 8-1 et seq.

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34) This action is brought as a class action. Plaintiff brings this action individually, and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. -9- 35) The identities of all class members are readily ascertainable from the records of Peter T. Roach & Associates, P.C. and those business and governmental entities on whose behalf it attempts to collect debts. 36) Excluded from the Plaintiff’s Class are the Defendants and all officers, members, partners, managers, directors, and employees of Peter T. Roach & Associates, P.C., and all of their respective immediate families, and legal counsel for all parties to this action and all members of their immediate families. 37) There are questions of law and fact common to the Plaintiff’s Class, which common issues predominate over any issues involving only individual class members. The principal issues are whether the Defendant’s communications with the Plaintiff, such as the above stated claims, violate provisions of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. 38) The Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the class members, as all are based upon the same facts and legal theories. 39) The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Plaintiff’s Class defined in this complaint. The Plaintiff has retained counsel with experience in handling consumer lawsuits, complex legal issues, and class actions, and neither the Plaintiff nor his attorneys have any interests, which might cause him not to vigorously pursue this action. 40) This action has been brought, and may properly be maintained, as a class action pursuant to the provisions of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because there is a well-defined community interest in the litigation: -10- (a) Numerosity: The Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on that basis alleges, that the Plaintiff’s Class defined above is so numerous that joinder of all members would be impractical. (b) Common Questions Predominate: Common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the Plaintiff’s Class and those questions predominate over any questions or issues involving only individual class members. The principal issues are whether the Defendant’s communications with the Plaintiff, such as the above stated claims, violate provisions of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. (c) Typicality: The Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the class members. Plaintiff and all members of the Plaintiff’s Class defined in this complaint have claims arising out of the Defendant’s common uniform course of conduct complained of herein. (d) Adequacy: The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class members insofar as Plaintiff has no interests that are adverse to the absent class members. The Plaintiff is committed to vigorously litigating this matter. Plaintiff has also retained counsel experienced in handling consumer lawsuits, complex legal issues, and class actions. Neither the Plaintiff nor his counsel have any interests, which might cause them not to vigorously pursue the instant class action lawsuit. -11- (e) Superiority: A class action is superior to the other available means for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy because individual joinder of all members would be impracticable. Class action treatment will permit a large number of similarly situated persons to prosecute their common claims in a single forum efficiently and without unnecessary duplication of effort and expense that individual actions would engender Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(l)(A) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is appropriate because adjudications with respect to individual members create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications which could establish incompatible standards of conduct for Defendants who, on information and belief, collect debts throughout the United States of America. 41) Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is also appropriate in that a determination that Defendant’s communications with the Plaintiff, such as the above stated claims is tantamount to declaratory relief and any monetary relief under the FDCPA would be merely incidental to that determination. 42) Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is also appropriate in that the questions of law and fact common to members of the Plaintiff’s Class predominate over any questions affecting an individual member, and a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. -12- 43) Depending on the outcome of further investigation and discovery, Plaintiff may, at the time of class certification motion, seek to certify one or more classes only as to particular issues pursuant to Fed. R.Civ. P. 23(c)(4). AS THE PLACE OF TRlAL Consumer Credit Transaction took place in COUNTY OF KINGS FOURTH: Plaintiff duly performed all conditions on its part under the agreement. FJFTH: Upon information and belief, Defendant(s) defaulted in payment and pursuant to the tenns of the agreement now owes a balance of$27,703.78, together with attorney's fees of$5,540.76, no part of which has been paid despite due demand thereof. SECOND: Upon infom1ation and belief, the defendant(s) is an individual who resides or has an office in the county in which this action is brought. AS AND FOR A FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION SIXTH: Plaintiff repeals and real1eges each and every allegation contained in paragraphs FIRST through FIFTH with the same force and effect as if fully set forth herein. SEVENTH: That heretofore, Plaintiff rendered to Defendanl(s) monthly, full and true accounts of the indebtedness owing by Defendant as a result of the above agreement, in an amount as hereinabove set forth which account statements were delivered to and accepted without objection by the defendant(s) resulting in an account stated in the sum of$27,703.78, no part of which has been paid despite due den1and thereof. WHEREFORE, PJruntitr"demandsjudgment against Defendant(s) in the sum of$27,703.78, plus attorney's fees of $5,540. 76, together with costs and disbursements.

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24. According to the United States Government Accountability Office (GAO), the terms “identity theft” or “identity fraud” are broad terms encompassing various types of criminal activities, such as credit card fraud, phone or utilities fraud, bank fraud and government fraud (theft of government services). Identity theft occurs when a person’s PII/PHI is used without authorization to commit fraud or other crimes. See Federal Trade Commission, Fighting Back against Identity Theft.2 According to the FTC: Identity theft is serious. While some identity theft victims can resolve their problems quickly, others spend hundreds of dollars and many days repairing damage to their good name and credit record. Some consumers victimized by identity theft may lose out on job opportunities, or be denied loans for education, housing or cars because of negative information on their credit reports. In rare cases, they may even be arrested for crimes they did not commit. Id. 26. Moreover, “[o]nce identity thieves have your personal information, they can drain your bank account, run up charges on your credit cards, open new utility accounts, or get medical treatment on your health insurance. An identity thief can file a tax refund in your name and get your refund. In some extreme cases, a thief might even give your name to the police during an arrest.”5 27. Medical fraud (also known as medical identity theft) occurs when a person’s personal information is used without authorization to obtain, or receive payment for, medical treatment, services or goods.6 For example, as of 2010, more than 50 million people in the United States did not have health insurance according to the U.S. census. This, in turn has led to a surge in medical identity theft as a means of fraudulently obtaining medical care. “Victims of medical identity theft [also] may find that their medical records are inaccurate, which can have a serious impact on their ability to obtain proper medical care and insurance benefits.” Id.7 29. A fraudster can easily research the email address of a data breach victim. When a fraudster has access to PII/PHI from a large group of similarly situated victims, it is much more feasible to develop a believable phishing9 spoof email that appears realistic. The fraudsters can then convince the group of victims to reveal additional private financial account and payment card information. 31. "[H]ealth information is far more valuable than Social Security numbers" on the cyber black market according to Dr. Deborah Peel, founder and chairwoman of Patient Privacy Rights.12 An ABC News search uncovered one internet seller offering medical record database dumps for $14 to $25 per person. ABC News was then sent, unsolicited, 40 individuals’ private health information, including their names, addresses and body mass index. Another inquiry yielded an offer of more than 100 records including everything from Social Security numbers to whether someone suffered from anxiety, hypertension, and their HIV status. Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ PII/PHI could similarly be valued and traded on the cyber black market—and, on information and belief, probably have been. Medical records generally “hold an average black market value of $50 per record.”13 33. Identity thieves also use Social Security numbers to commit other types of fraud, such as obtaining false identification cards, obtaining government benefits in the victim’s name, committing crimes and/or filing fraudulent tax returns on the victim’s behalf to obtain fraudulent tax refunds. Identity thieves also obtain jobs using stolen Social Security numbers, rent houses and apartments and/or obtain medical services in the victim’s name. Identity thieves also have been known to give a victim’s personal information to police during an arrest, resulting in the issuance of an arrest warrant in the victim’s name and an unwarranted criminal record. The GAO states that victims of identity theft face “substantial costs and inconvenience repairing damage to their credit records,” as well the damage to their “good name.” 34. The unauthorized disclosure of a person’s Social Security number can be particularly damaging since Social Security numbers cannot be easily replaced like a credit card or debit card. In order to obtain a new Social Security number, a person must show evidence that someone is using the number fraudulently or is being disadvantaged by the misuse.14 Thus, a person whose PII/PHI has been stolen cannot obtain a new Social Security number until the damage has already been done. 36. As a condition to providing health care services, St. Joseph requires its patients to provide their detailed PII/PHI. Indeed, St. Joseph recognizes that maintaining the confidentiality of its patients’ PII/PHI is critical: Safeguarding patients' health information is not only a legal requirement but also an important ethical obligation. As a health care provider, St. Joseph and its staff are entrusted with clinical information regarding our patients. We recognize that medical and billing records are highly confidential and must be treated with great respect and care by all staff with access to this information. St. Joseph's policy regarding confidentiality of protected health care information reflects our strong commitment to protecting the confidentiality of our patients' medical records and clinical information.15 (emphasis added). 37. St. Joseph also makes certain representations, warranties and commitments to its patients regarding the privacy of their PII/PHI in its Privacy Notice (Exhibit B). The Privacy Notice is posted in each St. Joseph facility (id. at 1) and on the St. Joseph website.16 The Privacy Notice is also given to every St. Joseph patient—including Plaintiff and Class Members. Indeed, each St. Joseph patient must sign the Privacy Notice, acknowledging its existence and terms as a condition to receiving health care services. Id. at 3. Plaintiff signed the Privacy Notice. 39. St. Joseph further pledges: We understand that all information about you and your health is personal. We are committed to protecting this information. When you receive services at a St. Joseph Facility/Entity, a medical record is created. This record describes the services provided to you and is needed to provide you with quality care and to comply with certain legal requirements. This Notice applies to records of your care generated by St. Joseph, whether made by a St. Joseph employee or a physician involved in your care. Id. at 1 (emphasis added). 41. “For any purpose other than the ones described above, your PHI may be used or disclosed only when you provide your written authorization on an approved authorization form.” Privacy Notice at 2 (emphasis added). In other words, St. Joseph commits that “for any purpose other than the ones described above,” a patient’s PII/PHI will not be disclosed without authorization. Id. There are no exceptions. 42. Regarding its patients’ rights pertaining to their PHI, St. Joseph further represents and promises that “[i]n certain [undefined] instances, you have the right to be notified in the event that we, or one of our Business Associates, discover an inappropriate use or disclosure of your health information. Notice of any such use or disclosure will be made in accordance with state and federal requirements.” Privacy Notice at 3. 43. St. Joseph further represents and promises its patients that they also “have the right to request an ‘accounting of disclosures.’ This is a list of disclosures that we have made about you.” Id. 44. Finally, regarding the PII/PHI entrusted to it, St. Joseph represents and promises that it “safeguards customer information using various tools such as firewalls, passwords and data encryption” and “continually strive[s] to improve these tools to meet or exceed industry standards.” Id. Ironically, St. Joseph also promises to “limit access to [its patients’] information to protect against its unauthorized use.” Id. St. Joseph’s data security efforts, however, unfortunately failed across the board. 63. Pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff brings this action as a class action on behalf of herself and the following Class of similarly situated individuals: All Texas residents who were sent a letter or other communication by St. Joseph notifying them that their personally identifiable information and/or protected health information was maintained on a St. Joseph Health System computer system server that was breached by hackers between December 16, 2013 and December 18, 2013, inclusive. Excluded from the Class are (i) St. Joseph officers and directors, and (ii) the Court, Court personnel, and members of their immediate families. 64. The Class Members are so numerous that their joinder is impracticable. According to information provided by St. Joseph, there are over 400,000 Class Members. The precise identities of the Class Members and their addresses are currently unknown to Plaintiff, but can be easily derived from St. Joseph’s internal records that were used to send the Data Breach notification letters to Plaintiff and Class Members in early February 2014. 66. Questions of law and fact common to all Class Members predominate over any questions affecting only individual Class Members including, inter alia: (i) Whether St. Joseph’s failure to safeguard and protect Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ PII/PHI willfully or negligently violated FCRA; (ii) Whether St. Joseph’s failure to safeguard and protect Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ PII/PHI violated the Texas Medical Practice Act; (iii) Whether St. Joseph’s failure to safeguard and protect Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ PII/PHI violated the Texas Hospital Licensing Law; (iv) Whether St. Joseph’s failure to safeguard and protect Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ PII/PHI constitutes negligence and/or gross negligence; (v) Whether St. Joseph’s failure to safeguard and protect Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ PII/PHI constitutes negligence per se; (vi) Whether St. Joseph’s failure to safeguard and protect Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ PII/PHI constitutes breach of contract; (vii) Whether St. Joseph’s failure to safeguard and protect Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ PII/PHI constitutes breach of implied contract; (viii) Whether St. Joseph’s failure to safeguard and protect Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ PII/PHI violated the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act; (ix) Whether St. Joseph’s failure to safeguard and protect Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ PII/PHI invokes the equitable doctrines of money had and received/assumpsit; (x) Whether Plaintiff and Class Members sustained harm and damages as a direct and/or proximate result of St. Joseph’s failure to safeguard and protect their PII/PHI and, if so, the amount of such damages; (xi) Whether Plaintiff and Class Members are entitled to exemplary damages as a direct and/or proximate result of St. Joseph’s failure to safeguard and protect their PII/PHI and, if so, the amount of such damages; and (xii) Whether Plaintiff and Class Members are entitled to injunctive relief as a direct and/or proximate result of St. Joseph’s failure to safeguard and protect their 72. The preceding factual statements and allegations are incorporated by reference 73. In enacting FCRA, Congress made several findings, including that consumer reporting agencies have assumed a vital role in assembling and evaluating consumer credit information and other consumer information—such as PII/PHI (15 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(3))—and “[t]here is a need to insure that consumer reporting agencies exercise their grave responsibilities with fairness, impartiality, and a respect for the consumer's right to privacy.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(4) (emphasis added). 74. Under 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(f), a “consumer reporting agency” includes any person which, for monetary fees, dues, or on a cooperative nonprofit basis, regularly engages, in whole or in part, in the practice of assembling or evaluating consumer credit information or other information on consumers for the purpose of furnishing “consumer reports” to third parties, and which uses any means or facility of interstate commerce for the purpose of preparing or furnishing consumer reports. 76. “Consumer credit information” (PII) includes, inter alia, a person’s name, identification number (e.g., Social Security number), marital status, physical address and contact information, educational background, employment, professional or business history, financial accounts and financial account history (i.e., details of the management of the accounts), credit report inquiries (i.e., whenever consumer credit information is requested from a credit reporting agency), judgments, administration orders, defaults, and other notices. 77. Under 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(i), “medical information” (PHI) is information or data, whether oral or recorded, in any form or medium, created by or derived from a health care provider or the consumer, that relates to the (i) past, present, or future physical, mental, or behavioral health or condition of an individual, (ii) provision of health care to an individual, and (iii) payment for the provision of health care to an individual. 78. FCRA limits the dissemination of consumer credit information (PII) to certain well-defined circumstances and no other. 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(a). FCRA also specifically protects medical information (PHI). See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681a(d)(3) (“Restriction on sharing of medical information”); 1681b(g) (“protection of medical information”); 1681c(a)(6) (“Information excluded from consumer reports”). 84. The preceding factual statements and allegations are incorporated by reference. 85. In the alternative, by its above-described wrongful actions, inaction and/or omissions, St. Joseph negligently and/or in a grossly negligent manner violated FCRA; to wit, St. Joseph negligently and/or in a grossly negligent manner violated 15 U.S.C. § 1681(b), 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(a);(g), and/or 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(a)(6) (and the related applicable regulations) by failing to identify, implement, maintain and monitor the proper data security measures, policies, procedures, protocols, and software and hardware systems to safeguard and protect Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ PII/PHI which, in turn, directly and/or proximately caused the Data Breach which, in turn, directly and/or proximately resulted in the theft of Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ unencrypted PII/PHI and its wrongful dissemination into the public domain for no permissible purpose under FCRA. St. Joseph’s above-described negligent and/or grossly negligent FCRA violations also prevented it from being in a position to timely and immediately notify Plaintiff and Class Members about the Data Breach which, in turn, inflicted additional harm and damages on them. 87. Plaintiff and Class Members, therefore, are entitled to compensation for their actual damages including, inter alia, the (i) improper disclosure of their PII/PHI, (ii) lost benefit of their bargains, (iii) deprivation of the value of their PII/PHI, for which there is a well- established national and international market, (iv) diminished value of the medical services they paid St. Joseph to provide, (v) value of their lost time and out-of-pocket expenses incurred to mitigate the identity theft, identity fraud and/or medical fraud pressed upon them (and/or to be pressed upon them) by the Data Breach (including, inter alia, the value of their lost time and out- of-pocket expenses that St. Joseph advised and encouraged them to incur to place “freezes” and “alerts” with the credit reporting agencies, close or modify financial accounts, and closely review and monitoring their credit reports and accounts for unauthorized activity), (vi) emotional distress from the theft and compromise of their PII/PHI, the identity theft, identity fraud and/or medical fraud experienced to date and to be experienced in the future, and (vii) the credible threat of real and impending future harm and damages from identity theft, identity fraud and/or medical fraud, as evidenced by the identity theft, identity fraud and/or medical fraud Plaintiff has already experienced, and (viii) attorneys’ fees, litigation expenses and costs, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1681o(a). 88. The previous factual statements and allegations are incorporated by reference. 90. Under TEX. OCC. CODE § 159.002(c), a person, including a hospital, that receives information from a confidential communication or record as described above and acts on the patient's behalf, may not disclose such information except to the extent that disclosure is consistent with the authorized purposes for which the information was first obtained. 91. St. Joseph’s above-described wrongful actions, inaction and/or omissions that caused the Data Breach, caused the unauthorized disclosure of Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ PII/PHI, and caused Plaintiff and Class Members to suffer the resulting harm and damages collectively constitute the unauthorized release of confidential and privileged communications in violation of the Texas Medical Practice Act. Plaintiff and Class Members, therefore, are entitled to injunctive relief and/or to recover their damages under TEX. OCC. CODE § 159.009. 92. The previous factual statements and allegations are incorporated by reference. 93. Under TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 241.151(2), “health care information” is any information, including payment information, recorded in any form or medium that identifies a patient and relates to the history, diagnosis, treatment, or prognosis of a patient. 95. Under TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 241.155, a hospital shall adopt and implement reasonable safeguards for the security of all health care information it maintains. 96. St. Joseph’s above-described wrongful actions, inaction and/or omissions that caused the Data Breach, caused the unauthorized disclosure of Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ PII/PHI, and caused Plaintiff and Class Members to suffer the resulting harm and damages collectively constitute (i) the unauthorized disclosure of Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ health care information to unauthorized parties, and (ii) St. Joseph’s failure to adopt and implement reasonable safeguards for the security of Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ PHI entrusted to it— both of which are violations of the Texas Hospital Licensing Law. Plaintiff and Class Members, therefore, are entitled to injunctive relief and/or to recover their damages under TEX. HEALTH & 97. The previous factual statements and allegations are incorporated by reference. I. Data breaches lead to identity theft, identity fraud and/or medical fraud, and the resulting significant harm and economic damages. NEGLIGENCE/GROSS NEGLIGENCE NEGLIGENT VIOLATION OF THE FAIR CREDIT REPORTING ACT (15 U.S.C. § 1681, et seq.) VIOLATION OF THE TEXAS HOSPITAL LICENSING LAW (TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 241.001, et seq.) VIOLATION OF THE TEXAS MEDICAL PRACTICE ACT (TEX. OCC. CODE § 159.001, et seq.) WILLFUL VIOLATION OF THE FAIR CREDIT REPORTING ACT (15 U.S.C. § 1681, et seq.)

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18. ADT markets, advertises, and sells wireless home security and home automation equipment and services to consumers. These services can be purchased separately, but ADT advertises that “wireless home security systems are easily upgradable to ADT Pulse® service, one simple solution combining home security and home automation.” 20. ADT describes its home automation products and services as “Innovative technology lets you manage your home and lifestyle – anytime, anywhere.” 21. Furthermore, ADT markets and advertises its ADT Pulse® service as providing peace of mind as well, stating that “Smart home systems help you stay connected and protected with easy-to-use features that give you peace of mind – practically anywhere, any time.” ADT’s Deceptive and Misleading Marketing Statements 22. In marketing materials, including on its website, ADT misrepresents that its home security equipment and services are safe, reliable, and secure. ADT makes these misrepresentations to customers knowing that extra security is the main reason consumers and businesses purchase home security and automation systems. 23. For example, ADT makes the following representations on its website: a. Customers can “Get Security You Can Count On. Every Day of the Year”; b. “Your haven is armed with 24-hour-a-day protection, 365 days a year”; c. Customers can “Live worry-free with ADT Security for less than $1 a Day”; and d. “Fast. Reliable. Security Protection. ADT stays constantly alert with six Customer Monitoring Centers operating day and night across the country. Our Customer Monitoring Centers are nationally connected, equipped with secure communication links and backed by the latest technology so that our security team is always ready to act the moment an incident occurs.” 25. ADT also represents that it uses advanced and innovative technology. For example, on ADT’s website, there is a section entitled “Innovative Technology.” In that section, ADT states “Our six nationwide Customer Monitoring Centers are operated by state-of-the-art technology backed by powerful equipment and secure communication links. It is this nationwide connection and innovative security technology that gives ADT the ability to provide security protection during adverse conditions.” 26. ADT’s marketing materials further highlight ADT’s purported advanced technology. For example, ADT represents that: a. “ADT takes pride in using the most advanced technology….”; b. “Only ADT has the most security industry experience, is the leader in innovative security technology, and can provide you with the fastest response times”; c. “Our experience, technology and people make the difference in your security protection.” and d. “You invest in ADT home security and automation systems to help protect your loved ones. Your satisfaction is important to us, and is the reason we are committed to providing you with state-of-the-art equipment and service.” 28. Despite its representations in its marketing materials, ADT’s wireless systems are unencrypted and unauthenticated, and otherwise insecure. Therefore, ADT’s wireless systems are easily accessed and manipulated—or “hacked”—by unauthorized third parties. 29. By hacking ADT’s wireless systems, unauthorized third parties can, inter alia, remotely disconnect or turn off the security systems so that customers are unknowingly left unprotected by their systems. 30. Unauthorized third parties can also hack into ADT’s wireless systems and use customers’ own security cameras to unknowingly spy on them. 31. Moreover, unauthorized third parties can manipulate ADT’s wireless security systems to falsely report that the alarm was triggered. This causes ADT to call customers and ask if they want the police called. Troublingly, third parties can use this tactic to see if specific customers actually have the police summoned to their homes; if not, the third parties can use that information to target those customers for home invasions (or worse). 32. Upon information and belief, third parties can hack into ADT’s wireless systems with, inter alia, something as simple as a Software-Defined Radio (“SDR”), which sells on the open market with no restrictions for less than $10. 34. ADT knows that its systems are vulnerable to intrusion. In a statement, an ADT spokesperson said that “There are many experiments conducted each year by professional hackers in controlled environments who seek vulnerabilities within an array of different products and systems. Our customers should know that we take the outcome from any of these tests with the highest level of seriousness, and we continually invest significant resources in modifying and improving our systems accordingly.”2 35. Despite ADT’s knowledge and promise to modify and improve its systems, ADT has failed to modify or improve its systems to encrypt the wireless signals, or to otherwise make them more secure. 36. Moreover, ADT does not notify customers that their systems are unencrypted or insufficiently secure. Instead, ADT misrepresents the security of its wireless systems and its use of purportedly “advanced and innovative technology” in its marketing materials. 37. In its marketing materials, ADT does not warn customers to take precautions against hacking, or that these wireless systems can be hacked. 39. As a result of ADT’s misrepresentations and omissions and ADT’s failure to secure its wireless systems, customers are much less safe than they think that they are when ADT’s wireless systems are activated. 40. ADT’s misrepresentations and omissions regarding the security of its wireless systems was deliberate and intentional, as if potential customers knew the truth, they would not have purchased an ADT wireless system. 41. Based on the deceptive and misleading representations and omissions made by ADT as detailed above, Plaintiff and the Class members entered into an Alarm Services Contract (“Contract”) with ADT on May 8, 2013. The term of the Contract is three (3) years. Upon information and belief, the terms of Plaintiff’s Contract were the same or substantially similar to all Class members’ Contracts, as ADT uses standard, uniform Contracts for all of its customers. 42. Additionally, in connection with the Contract, Plaintiff and the Class members purchased the corresponding ADT wireless security equipment, such as sensors, a wireless device, and a control box. 43. None of the marketing materials that Plaintiff and the Class members saw prior to entering into the Contract disclosed that ADT’s wireless security equipment was unencrypted, unauthenticated, or otherwise insecure and easily hacked. 45. Had Plaintiff and the Class members known the truth about ADT’s misleading representations, or the insecurity of ADT’s wireless security equipment, they would not have entered into the Contract or purchased any of the associated equipment. 46. Plaintiff and the Class members continue to suffer harm as a result of ADT’s aforementioned acts and practices, as they remain bound by their Contract with ADT, and will have to pay a penalty if they cancel it. 47. Class Definition: Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a), (b)(2), and (b)(3), on behalf of himself and a putative Class of similarly situated individuals, defined as follows: All persons who entered into an ADT Alarm Services Contract and purchased ADT wireless security equipment (the “Class”). Plaintiff also brings this action on behalf of a putative Subclass of similarly situated individuals, defined as follows: All Illinois residents who entered into an ADT Alarm Services Contract and purchased ADT wireless security equipment (the “Subclass”). Excluded from the Class and Subclass are: (1) Defendants, Defendants’ agents, subsidiaries, parents, successors, predecessors, and any entity in which Defendants or their parents have a controlling interest, and those entities’ current and former employees, officers, and directors; (2) the Judge to whom this case is assigned and the Judge’s immediate family; (3) any person who executes and files a timely request for exclusion from the Class; (4) any persons who have had their claims in this matter finally adjudicated and/or otherwise released; and (5) the legal representatives, successors and assigns of any such excluded person. 50. Typicality: Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the Class and Subclass members. All are based on the same legal and factual issues. Plaintiff and each of the Class and Subclass members entered into ADT’s standard, uniform Contract, and purchased the same defective ADT wireless security equipment. Moreover, ADT’s aforementioned misrepresentations and omissions were uniformly made to Plaintiff and all Subclass members. 51. Adequacy of Representation: Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class and Subclass, and has retained counsel competent and experienced in complex class actions. Plaintiff has no interest antagonistic to those of the Class and Subclass, and ADT has no defenses unique to Plaintiff. 53. Unless a class is certified, ADT will retain monies received as a result of its conduct that was wrongfully taken from Plaintiff and Class and Subclass members. Unless an injunction is issued, ADT will continue to commit the violations alleged, and the members of the putative Class, Subclass and the general public will continue to be misled and continue to be less safe and secure in their homes and businesses. 54. By making the uniform misleading marketing statements detailed above, and by failing to adequately secure its wireless systems, ADT has acted and refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the proposed Class and Subclass, making appropriate final injunctive relief with respect to the proposed Class and Subclass as a whole. 55. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges paragraphs 1-54 as though fully set forth herein. 56. The FDUTPA, Fla. Stat. § 501.201, et. seq., protects consumers from “unfair methods of competition, or unconscionable, deceptive, or unfair acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce.” Fla. Stat. § 501.204. 57. Plaintiff and Class members are “consumers” as defined by § 501.203(7) of the FDUTPA, and the subject transactions with ADT are “trade or commerce” as defined by § 501.203(8). 58. ADT is a “person” within the meaning of the FUDTPA and, at all pertinent times, was subject to the requirements and proscriptions of the FUDTPA with respect to all of their business and trade practices described herein. 60. ADT has engaged in unfair methods of competition, unconscionable acts or practices, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of its trade and commerce by, inter alia, knowingly misrepresenting the security and advanced technology of its wireless services, failing to notify customers of the insecurity of their wireless systems, and failing to encrypt or otherwise secure their wireless systems, which was deceptive and misleading, and reasonably likely to deceive the public. 61. ADT’s deceptive and unfair marketing campaign detailed herein was uniform to consumers, including Plaintiff and Class members. Through this extensive and exhaustive marketing campaign, ADT has conveyed one uniform deceptive and misleading message: consumers and businesses who purchase ADT wireless security systems are more secure than they actually are. 62. ADT’s marketing campaign is intentionally designed to induce consumers to purchase its products and accompanying services as a result of its misrepresentations and omissions. 63. ADT knows about the insecurity and susceptibility to hacking of its wireless systems, yet continues to make the misrepresentations and omissions detailed herein, and continues to provide insecure wireless systems to customers. 65. Unless preliminary and permanent injunctive relief is granted and ADT is required to encrypt its wireless systems, Plaintiff and the Class will continue to suffer harm throughout the duration of their Contracts. Plaintiff and the Class do not have an adequate remedy at law for this continued harm, and the balance of the equities weighs in favor of Plaintiff and the Class. 66. Unless preliminary and permanent injunctive relief is granted and ADT is required to rectify its misleading marketing materials, consumers will continue to be harmed by purchasing ADT wireless systems as a result of ADT’s deceptive and misleading practices, and by being less secure than they otherwise would be. 67. Plaintiff and the Class have suffered ascertainable losses as a direct result of ADT’s employment of unconscionable acts or practices, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices. 68. The injuries to Plaintiff and the members of the Class were caused by ADT’s conduct in deceptive and misleading marketing that originated in Florida, including the marketing materials described above. All of the marketing and promotional activities and literature were coordinated at, emanate from, and are developed at ADT’s Florida headquarters. All critical decisions regarding ADT’s marketing were made in Florida. 69. Furthermore, most of the misrepresentations and omissions alleged herein were contained on ADT’s website, which is maintained in Florida. 71. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges paragraphs 1-54 as though fully set forth herein. 72. At all times relevant hereto, there was in full force and effect the ICFA, 815 ILCS 505/1, et seq. 73. Chapter 2 of the ICFA prohibits unfair or deceptive acts or practices used or employed in the conduct of any trade or commerce. See 815 ILCS 505/2. 74. ADT’s knowing and intentional misrepresentations and omissions set forth above are unfair and deceptive acts or practices prohibited by Chapter 2 of the ICFA. See 815 ILCS 505/2. 76. ADT’s affirmative misrepresentations, omissions, and practices described herein were designed to, and did in fact, deceive and mislead members of the public, including Plaintiff and Subclass members, to their detriment. 77. ADT’s conduct described herein created a likelihood of confusion or misunderstanding for Plaintiff and members of the Subclass by misrepresenting that ADT’s wireless systems were secure, reliable, trustworthy, and that ADT uses advanced and innovative technology. 78. ADT’s conduct described herein also constitutes prohibited unfair conduct under the ICFA because misrepresentations and failures to disclose in connection with an important safety issue offend public policy; are immoral, unethical, oppressive, and unscrupulous; and cause substantial injury to consumers. 79. ADT intended to deceive and be unfair to Plaintiff and members of the putative Subclass by engaging in the practices described herein so that ADT could begin collecting the contractual monies due from its customers. ADT’s intent is evidenced by, inter alia, its acknowledgement of the insecurity of its wireless systems by its spokesperson in its statement. 80. ADT intended that Plaintiff and members of the Subclass rely on ADT’s misrepresentations and omissions concerning the safety and security of its wireless systems. 81. Plaintiff and members of the Subclass relied on ADT’s misrepresentations and omissions to their detriment by purchasing ADT equipment and entering into ADT Contracts. 82. The above-described deceptive and unfair acts and practices were used or employed in the conduct of trade or commerce. 84. As a direct and proximate result of the foregoing, Plaintiff and members of the Subclass have been damaged in an amount to be determined at trial, and Plaintiff and members of the Subclass continue to be damaged as a result of the insecurity of ADT’s wireless systems. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for an Order as follows: A. Finding that this action satisfies the prerequisites for maintenance as a class action set forth in Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, and certifying the Subclass defined herein; B. Designating Plaintiff as representative of the Subclass Class, and his undersigned counsel as Class Counsel; C. Entering judgment in favor of Plaintiff and the Class and against ADT; D. Enjoining ADT’s illegal conduct alleged herein and ordering disgorgement of any of its ill-gotten gains; E. Mandatorily enjoining ADT to provide adequate warnings and notice to the Class concerning the vulnerability of ADT systems; F. Mandatorily enjoining ADT to secure its wireless systems; G. Awarding Plaintiff and the Subclass actual and punitive damages, attorney’s fees and costs, including interest thereon, as allowed or required by law; H. Granting all such further and other relief as the Court deems just and appropriate. 85. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges paragraphs 1 to 54 as though fully set forth herein. 87. ADT’s retention of this benefit violates the fundamental principles of justice, equity, and good conscience. 88. ADT accepted this unjust benefit, and it would be inequitable for ADT to retain the benefit of those monies, as ADT was paid the money as a result of ADT’s deceptive and unfair practices. 89. ADT has obtained money to which it is not entitled, and interest on that money, and under these circumstances equity and good conscience require that ADT return the money with interest to Plaintiff and the Class. 90. As a direct and proximate result of the foregoing, Plaintiff and the Class have been damaged in an amount to be determined at trial. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for an Order as follows: A. Finding that this action satisfies the prerequisites for maintenance as a class action set forth in Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, and certifying the Class defined herein; B. Designating Plaintiff as representative of the Class and his undersigned counsel as Class Counsel; C. Entering judgment in favor of Plaintiff and the Class and against ADT; D. Awarding Plaintiff and the Class restitution and any other equitable relief that may be appropriate; E. Awarding Plaintiff and the Class actual damages, attorney’s fees and costs, including interest thereon, as allowed or required by law; and F. Granting all such further and other relief as the Court deems just and appropriate. ADT’s Home Security and Home Automation Equipment and Services Unjust Enrichment (Plead in the alternative to Counts I and II) (On behalf of Plaintiff and the Class) Violation of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act (On behalf of Plaintiff and the Subclass) Violation of Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act (On behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)

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16. Defendant Securitas is in the business of providing facility security services throughout the United States. Duties Performed and Hours Worked1 18. Plaintiff was a full-time employee of Defendant for the duration of the statutory period, with the exception of in or around May 2017 until in or around June 2018. During this period, Plaintiff worked part-time for Defendant due to a lost contract by Defendant, and any overtime claim will exclude this time period. 19. Plaintiff, as a security guard, was responsible for patrolling assigned buildings, monitoring the sign-in desk, as well as other miscellaneous duties. Plaintiff’s specific job duties would vary based upon the job site to which he was assigned. 20. During his employment with Defendant, due to high turnover, upon information and belief, Plaintiff worked with at least between 40 and 50 other security guards. From personally observing and speaking with them, Plaintiff knows that his coworkers performed the same primary duties as him and were compensated in the same manner by Defendants. 21. Plaintiff is typically scheduled to work five shifts per week, Monday to Friday, and for eight hours each shift, either 4:00 p.m. until 12:00 a.m., or from 12:00 a.m. until 8:00 a.m. These shifts included a 1-hour meal break. This resulted in a 35-hour workweek during these weeks. 22. Plaintiff is frequently assigned extra shifts due to increased demand for Defendant’s services or another employee calling out of work, among other reasons. During these instances, Plaintiff would work a double shift, typically from 4:00 p.m. until 8:00 a.m. Plaintiff was often assigned 2 to 3 extra shifts, every other week. During these weeks, Plaintiff worked an average of 55 hours. 24. During his employment with Defendant, Plaintiff worked more than 40 hours approximately every other week. 25. From speaking with his coworkers and personal observations, Plaintiff knows that other security guards were, like him, regularly scheduled to work and did, in fact, work more than 40 hours in a week. Hourly Rate and Overtime 26. Defendant paid Plaintiff an hourly rate. 27. Plaintiff’s hourly rate was supposed to differ based upon his assigned worksite. However, Plaintiff was typically paid $15.50 per hour for every hour he worked up to 40 hours per week, making $23.25 his overtime rate. 28. Regardless of what hourly rate he was paid, Defendant never paid him overtime premium pay for hours he worked above 40. 29. As with Plaintiff’s hours worked, the wage statements Plaintiff was provided are again unclear regarding Plaintiff’s rates of pay. Plaintiff’s wage statements frequently list several varying rates of pay, none of which correspond to any discernible overtime rate based upon Plaintiff’s regular rate of pay. Such ambiguities are intentionally designed to mislead employees, including the Plaintiff, regarding their hours worked and pay rates. 31. Although Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees regularly worked more than 40 hours per week, Defendants did not pay them their proper overtime premium pay: 1.5 times their regular hourly rate. 32. From speaking with them, Plaintiff knows that security guards, like him, were not paid overtime premium pay. Labor Law Notice and Wage Statement Violations 33. Defendant failed to provide Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees with the Notice and Acknowledgment of Payrate and Payday under N.Y. Lab. Law § 195.1 when he was hired or at any point during his employment. 34. Likewise, Defendant did not provide Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees with accurate wage statements under N.Y. Lab. Law § 195.3 with any wage payment. 35. Defendant did not post at the restaurant a poster advising Plaintiff and other employees of their right to a minimum wage and overtime premium pay. 37. The Class Members identified above are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. Although the precise number of such persons is unknown, and the facts on which the calculation of that number are presently within Defendant’s sole control, upon information and belief, more than 50 Class Members exist. 38. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class Members’, and a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy, particularly in the context of wage and hour litigation where individual plaintiffs lack the financial resources to vigorously prosecute a lawsuit in federal court against a corporate defendant. 39. Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class Members, making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the Class Members. 40. Plaintiff is committed to pursuing this action and has retained competent counsel experienced in employment law, wage and hour law, and class action litigation. 41. Plaintiff has the same interest in this matter as all other Class Members and their claims are typical of Class Members’. 44. Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members are similarly situated on several legal and factual issues, including but not limited to: a. whether Defendant employed the Collective Action Members within the meaning of the FLSA; b. whether the Collective Action Members performed similar duties; c. whether Defendant failed to keep true and accurate time records for all hours Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members worked; d. what proof of hours worked is sufficient where the employer fails in its duty to maintain time records; e. whether Defendant willfully or recklessly violated the FLSA; f. whether Defendant failed to pay the Collective Action Members overtime compensation for hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek, violating the FLSA and the regulations promulgated thereunder; g. whether Defendant should be enjoined from such violations of the FLSA in the future; and h. whether the statute of limitations should be estopped or equitably tolled due to Defendants’ statutory violations. 46. Defendant was required to pay Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members no less than 1.5 times the regular rate at which they were paid for all hours worked in excess of 40 hours in a workweek under the overtime wage provisions set forth in the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq., including 29 U.S.C. §§ 207(a)(1) and 215(a). 47. At all relevant times, Defendant had a policy and practice of refusing to pay overtime compensation to their employees for their hours worked in excess of 40 hours per workweek. 48. Defendant was aware or should have been aware that the practices described in this Complaint were unlawful, making its violations willful or reckless. 49. Defendant has not made a good faith effort to comply with the FLSA with respect to Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members’ compensation. 50. Defendant has failed to make, keep and preserve records with respect to its employees sufficient to determine the wages, hours, and other conditions and practices of employment, violating the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201, 207(a)(1) and 215(a). 51. In failing to compensate Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members for all compensable hours worked, Defendant violated the FLSA and the regulations thereunder, including 29 C.F.R. §§ 785.13, 785.11. 53. Under the Labor Law and supporting New York Statement Department of Labor Regulations, Defendant was required to pay Plaintiff and the Class Members one and 1.5 times their regular rate of pay for all hours they worked in excess of 40 per workweek. 54. Defendant failed to pay the Class Members the overtime wages to which they were entitled, violating N.Y. Lab Law § 650 and Part 146, § 146-1.4of Title 12 of the Official Compilation of Codes, Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Commissioner of Labor pursuant to the Minimum Wage Act. 55. In failing to compensate Plaintiff and the Class Members for all compensable hours worked, Defendant violated the Labor Law and the regulations thereunder, 12 N.Y.C.R.R. §§ 146-1.2, 1.4. 56. Defendant willfully violated the Labor Law by knowingly and intentionally failing to pay the Class Members the correct amount of overtime wages. 57. Due to Defendant’s Labor Law violations, Plaintiff and the Class Members are entitled to recover from Defendant their unpaid wages, liquidated damages, reasonable attorneys’ fees, costs, pre and post-judgment interest, and such other legal and equitable relief as this Court deems just and proper. 59. Defendant has willfully failed to supply Plaintiff and the Class Members with the required Notice and Acknowledgement of Pay Rate and Payday under Labor Law § 195.1(a) within ten business days of their first employment date. 60. Due to Defendant’s violations of Labor Law § 195.1, Plaintiff and the Class Members are entitled to recover from Defendant $50.00 for each work day that the violations occurred or continue to occur, or a total of $5,000.00, reasonable attorneys’ fees, costs, injunctive and declaratory relief. New York. Lab. Law § 198(1)-b (2016). 61. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 62. Defendant has willfully failed to supply Plaintiff and the Class Members with the required statement with every payment of wages, violating Labor Law § 195.3. 63. Due to Defendant’s violations of Labor Law § 195.3, Plaintiff and the Rule 23 Class Members are entitled to recover from Defendant $100.00 for each work week that the violations occurred or continue to occur, or a total of $5,000.00, as provided for by Labor Law § 198(1)-d, reasonable attorneys’ fees, costs, injunctive and declaratory relief. FAILURE TO PAY THE OVERTIME PREMIUM PAY UNDER THE NEW YORK LABOR LAW (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class Action Members) FAILURE TO PROVIDE 195.3 WAGE STATEMENT UNDER THE NEW YORK LABOR LAW (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class Action Members) FAILURE TO PAY OVERTIME PREMIUM PAY UNDER THE FLSA (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members) FAILURE TO PROVIDE 195.1 NOTICE UNDER THE NEW YORK LABOR LAW (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class Action Members)

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12. Defendant SolarCity is the largest solar energy system installer in the United States. Since its founding in 2006, SolarCity has installed solar energy systems for over 230,000 customers. 13. Unfortunately for consumers, Defendant utilized (and continued to utilize) a sophisticated telephone dialing system to call homeowners en masse promoting its services. 14. That is, in Defendant’s overzealous attempts to market its services, it placed (and continues to place) phone calls to consumers that never provided consent to call and to consumers with whom it had no prior relationship. Worse yet, Defendant placed (and continues to place) repeated and unwanted calls to consumers whose phone numbers are listed on the National Do Not Call Registry. Consumers place their phone numbers on the Do Not Call Registry for the express purpose of avoiding unwanted telemarketing calls like those alleged here. 16. In making the calls to consumers cell phones without their prior written express consent, Defendant used an autodialer in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act. 17. Furthermore, Defendant calls these consumers who have no “established business relationship” with Defendant and who are registered on the Do Not Call list. 18. Finally, even when consumers try to opt out of future calls by requesting to never be called again, Defendant continues to call them. 19. In making the phone calls at issue in this Complaint, Defendant and/or its agent utilized an automatic telephone dialing system. Specifically, the hardware and software used by Defendant (or its agent) has the capacity to store, produce, and dial random or sequential numbers, and/or receive and store lists of telephone numbers, and to dial such numbers, en masse, in an automated fashion without human intervention. Defendant’s automated dialing equipment includes features substantially similar to a predictive dialer, inasmuch as it is capable of making numerous calls simultaneously (all without human intervention). 20. Defendant knowingly made (and continues to make) telemarketing calls without the prior express consent of the call recipients and knowingly continues to call them after it receives requests to stop. As such, Defendant not only invaded the personal privacy of Plaintiffs and members of the putative Class but also intentionally and repeatedly violated the TCPA. 22. Approximately two years ago, a salesman visited Plaintiff Gibbs offering SolarCity’s products and services. After some initial interest, Plaintiff Gibbs informed the salesman that she was not interested in doing business with SolarCity. 23. Since that visit, Plaintiff Gibbs has been receiving calls from Defendant offering her their services though she already told them she was not interested. On the initial calls two years ago, she informed Defendant that she was not interested and to stop calling her, yet they have been calling her regularly since then despite her stop call requests. 24. As recently as April 10, 2016 Plaintiff Gibbs received two phone calls from Defendant SolarCity from the phone number 877-373-7652 on her landline telephone. 25. On April 11, 2016, Plaintiff Gibbs received another call from Defendant SolarCity from the same phone number 877-373-7652. Plaintiff Gibbs informed the caller: (1) that she was not interested in Defendant’s products or services, (2) that she had never given Defendant permission to call her, and (3) that Defendant was not to call her again. 26. Plaintiff Gibbs does not have a current relationship with Defendant and had specifically requested that SolarCity not call her. 27. Defendant is and was aware that the above-described telephone calls were and are being made to consumers like Plaintiff who had not consented to receive them and whose telephone numbers were registered with the National Do Not Call Registry. 29. Approximately 6 months ago, Plaintiff Colby visited Defendant SolarCity’s website and requested a quote for solar panels to be installed at his house. 30. Thereafter, Defendant SolarCity performed a site visit to Plaintiff Colby’s house to assess the positioning of his house and to provide a quote for the installation of solar panels. Defendant SolarCity informed Plaintiff Colby that his house was not positioned well for a solar installation and that Defendant SolarCity would not be able to perform an installation. 31. Shortly after the in person visit, where Defendant SolarCity expressly told Plaintiff Colby that he would be unable to utilize their services, Defendant SolarCity began calling Plaintiff Colby’s cellular and landline telephones repeatedly. These calls were made regularly and lasted for approximately six months. 32. Plaintiff Colby repeatedly asked Defendant SolarCity to stop calling him, but after several months of fruitless requests, he simply stopped answering the calls from Defendant. 33. Colby received at least one call more than thirty (30) days after he requested for the calls to stop. 34. Defendant SolarCity’s calls to Plaintiff Colby were placed with an ATDS. Whenever Plaintiff Colby would answer one of Defendant SolarCity’s telephone calls there would be a pause before a live person would begin speaking—indicative of an ATDS or predictive dialer. 35. Plaintiff Colby does not have a current relationship with Defendant. Even if Plaintiff Colby ever provided consent to Defendant to call him or requested that Defendant place calls to him or offer him its services, such consent was repeatedly and expressly revoked by Plaintiff. 38. The following people are excluded from the Class: (1) any Judge or Magistrate presiding over this action and members of their families; (2) Defendant, Defendant’s subsidiaries, parents, successors, predecessors, and any entity in which the Defendant or its parents have a controlling interest and its current or former employees, officers and directors; (3) persons who properly execute and file a timely request for exclusion from the Class; (4) persons whose claims in this matter have been finally adjudicated on the merits or otherwise released; (5) Plaintiff’s counsel and Defendant’s counsel; and (6) the legal representatives, successors, and assigns of any such excluded persons. Plaintiffs anticipate the need to potentially amend the class definitions following discovery into the scope of the classes, the manner by which the Plaintiffs supposedly consented to receipt of the calls, and the identity of any other persons who should be included as party defendants. 40. Commonality and Predominance: There are many questions of law and fact common to the claims of Plaintiff and the Classes, and those questions predominate over any questions that may affect individual members of the Classes. Common questions for the Classes include, but are not necessarily limited to the following: a. Whether Defendant’s conduct violated the TCPA; b. Whether Defendant systematically made telephone calls to individuals who did not previously provide Defendant and/or its agents with their prior express consent to receive such phone calls; c. Whether Defendant made the calls with the use of an ATDS; d. Whether Defendant systematically made telephone calls to consumers whose telephone numbers were registered with the National Do Not Call Registry; e. Whether members of the Class are entitled to treble damages based on the willfulness of Defendant’s conduct; and f. Whether Defendant systematically made telephone calls to consumers after they explicitly asked not to be called from Defendant. 42. Adequate Representation: Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Classes and have retained counsel competent and experienced in complex class actions. Plaintiffs have no interest antagonistic to those of the Classes, and Defendant has no defenses unique to Plaintiffs. 43. Policies Generally Applicable to the Classes: This class action is appropriate for certification because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Classes as respective wholes, thereby requiring the Court’s imposition of uniform relief to ensure compatible standards of conduct toward the Class members and making final injunctive relief appropriate with respect to the Classes as respective wholes. Defendant’s practices challenged herein apply to and affect the Class members uniformly, and Plaintiffs’ challenge of those practices hinges on Defendant’s conduct with respect to the Classes as respective wholes, not on facts or law applicable only to Plaintiffs. 45. Defendant made unsolicited and unwanted telemarketing calls to cellphone numbers belonging to Plaintiff and the other members of the Class—without their prior express written consent—in an effort to sell its products and services. 46. Defendant failed to provide any of the language required to obtained prior express written consent under the TCPA, including a disclosure that the consumer was consenting to being called with an autodialer and/or that providing his or her cellphone number wasn’t a requirement (direct or indirect) of any purchase. 47. Defendant made the telephone calls using equipment that had the capacity to store or produce telephone numbers to be called using a random or sequential number generator, and/or receive and store lists of phone numbers, and to dial such numbers, en masse. 48. Defendant utilized equipment that made the telephone calls to Plaintiff and other members of the Class simultaneously and without human intervention. 49. By making unsolicited telephone calls to Plaintiff and members of the Class’s cellular telephones without prior express consent, and by utilizing an ATDS, Defendant violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). 51. Should the Court determine that Defendant’s conduct was willful and knowing, the Court may, pursuant to Section 227(b)(3), treble the amount of statutory damages recoverable by Plaintiff Colby and the other members of the Class. 52. Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 53. Defendant made unsolicited and unwanted telemarketing calls to telephone numbers belonging to Plaintiff Colby and the other members of the Class on their cellular telephone in an effort to sell its products and services after the person had informed SolarCity that s/he no longer wished to receive such calls from SolarCity. 54. Defendant made the telephone calls using equipment that had the capacity to store or produce telephone numbers to be called using a random or sequential number generator, and/or receive and store lists of phone numbers, and to dial such numbers, en masse. 55. Defendant utilized equipment that made the telephone calls to Plaintiff and other members of the Class simultaneously and without human intervention. 57. As a result of Defendant’s unlawful conduct, Plaintiff and the members of the Class suffered actual damages in the form of monies paid to receive the unsolicited telephone calls on their cellular phones and, under Section 227(b)(3)(B), are each entitled to, inter alia, a minimum of $500 in damages for each such violation of the TCPA. 58. Should the Court determine that Defendant’s conduct was willful and knowing, the Court may, pursuant to Section 227(b)(3), treble the amount of statutory damages recoverable by Plaintiff and the other members of the Class. 59. Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 60. The TCPA, specifically 47 U.S.C. § 227(c), provides that any “person who has received more than one telephone call within any 12-month period by or on behalf of the same entity in violation of the regulations prescribed under this subsection may” bring a private action based on a violation of said regulations, which were promulgated to protect telephone subscribers’ privacy rights to avoid receiving telephone solicitations to which they object. 61. The TCPA’s implementing regulation, 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c), provides that “[n]o person or entity shall initiate any telephone solicitation” to “[a] residential telephone subscriber who has registered his or her telephone number on the national do-not-call registry of persons who do not wish to receive telephone solicitations that is maintained by the federal government.” 63. The Report and Order, in turn, states as follows: The Commission’s rules provide that companies making telephone solicitations to residential telephone subscribers must comply with time of day restrictions and must institute procedures for maintaining do-not-call lists. For the reasons described above, we conclude that these rules apply to calls made to wireless telephone numbers. We believe that wireless subscribers should be afforded the same protections as wireline subscribers. 64.1200. 65. Defendant violated § 64.1200(c) by initiating, or causing to be initiated, telephone solicitations to wireless telephone subscribers such as Plaintiff and the Do Not Call Registry class members who registered their respective telephone numbers on the National Do Not Call Registry, a listing of persons who do not wish to receive telephone solicitations that is maintained by the federal government. These consumers requested to not receive calls from Defendant, as set forth in § 64.1200(d)(3). 66. Defendant made more than one unsolicited telephone call to Plaintiff Gibbs and members of the Do Not Call Registry class within a 12-month period without their prior express consent to receive such calls. Plaintiff and members of the Do Not Call Registry class never provided any form of consent to receive telephone calls from Defendant, and/or Defendant does not have a current record of consent to place telemarketing calls to them. 67. Defendant also violated § 64.1200(d) by initiating calls for telemarketing purposes to residential and wireless telephone subscribers, such as Plaintiff Gibbs and the Do Not Call Registry class, without instituting procedures that comply with the regulatory minimum standards for having a written policy, available on demand, for maintaining a list of persons who request not to receive telemarketing calls from them, without training its employees or personnel in the use of its do not call list, and in not recording and honoring do not call requests. 68. Defendant further violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5) because Plaintiff Gibbs and the Do Not Call Registry class received more than one telephone call in a 12-month period made by or on behalf of Defendant in violation of 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200, as described above. 70. To the extent Defendant’s misconduct is determined to be willful and knowing, the Court should, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5), treble the amount of statutory damages recoverable by the members of the Do Not Call Registry class. 71. Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 72. Plaintiffs and members of the Telemarketing Revocation Class expressly requested that Defendant no longer place calls to them, after which Defendant failed to place Plaintiffs and members of the Do Not Call Revocation Class on Defendant’s internal do-not-call list (or failed to do so within a reasonable time period). 73. More than thirty (30) days following Plaintiffs’ and the members of the Do Not Call Revocation Class’s express requests to not receive calls from Defendant, Defendant placed additional calls to them without their consent and in contradiction of their requests not to be called. 75. Defendants violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5) because Plaintiffs and the Telemarketing Call Revocation Class received more than one telephone call within a 12-month period made by or on behalf of the Defendant in violation of 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200, as described above. As a result of Defendant’s conduct as alleged herein, Plaintiffs and the Telemarketing Revocation Class suffered actual damages, an invasion of their privacy, and, under section 47 U.S.C. § 227(c), are each entitled to, inter alia, up to $500 in damages for such violations of § 76. As a result of Defendant’s conduct as alleged herein, Plaintiffs and the Telemarketing Revocation class suffered actual damages and, under section 47 U.S.C. § 227(c), are each entitled, inter alia, to receive up to $500 in damages for such violations of § 64.1200. 77. To the extent Defendant’s misconduct is determined to be willful and knowing, the Court should, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5), treble the amount of statutory damages recoverable by the members of the Do Not Call Revocation Class. Violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) et seq. (On behalf of Plaintiff Colby and the Autodialed Do Not Call Class) Violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. (On behalf of Plaintiffs Gibbs and Colby and Telemarketing Revocation Class) Violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227(c) et seq. (On behalf of Plaintiff Gibbs and the Do Not Call Registry Class) Violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) et seq. (On behalf of Plaintiff Colby and the Autodialed No Consent Class) Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein.

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(Knowing and/or Willful Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)) (Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)) 25. Plaintiff is, and at all times mentioned herein was, a “person” as defined by 47 51. Numerosity. The Class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. On information and belief, Plaintiff alleges that the Class has more than 100 members. Moreover, the disposition of the claims of the Class in a single action will provide substantial benefits to all parties and the Court. 52. Commonality. There are numerous questions of law and fact common to Plaintiff and members of the Class. These common questions of law and fact include, but are not limited to, the following: a. Whether Defendants and/or their affiliates, agents, and/or other persons or entities acting on Defendants’ behalf violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A) by making any call, except for emergency purposes, to a cellular telephone number using an ATDS and/or artificial or prerecorded voice; b. Whether Defendants and/or their affiliates, agents, and/or other persons or entities acting on Defendants’ behalf knowingly and/or willfully violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A) by making any call, except for emergency purposes, to a cellular telephone number using an ATDS and/or artificial or prerecorded voice, thus entitling Plaintiff and the Class to treble damages; c. Whether Defendants are liable for ATDS generated and/or automated or prerecorded calls promoting USHealth’s products or services made by Defendants’ affiliates, agents, and/or other persons or entities acting on Defendants’ behalf; and d. Whether Defendants and/or their affiliates, agents, and/or other persons or entities acting on Defendants’ behalf should be enjoined from violating the TCPA in the future. 54. Adequacy. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class. Plaintiff has retained competent and capable attorneys with significant experience in complex and class action litigation, including consumer class actions and TCPA class actions. Plaintiff and its counsel are committed to prosecuting this action vigorously on behalf of the Class and have the financial resources to do so. Neither Plaintiff nor its counsel has interests that are contrary to or that conflict with those of the proposed Class. Additionally, Plaintiff is a member of the Class. 55. Predominance. Defendants have engaged in a common course of conduct toward Plaintiff and members of the Class. The common issues arising from this conduct that affect Plaintiff and members of the Class predominate over any individual issues. Adjudication of these common issues in a single action has important and desirable advantages of judicial economy. 56. Superiority. A class action is the superior method for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. Classwide relief is essential to compel Defendants to comply with the TCPA. The interest of individual members of the Class in individually controlling the prosecution of separate claims against Defendants is small because the damages in an individual action for violation of the TCPA are small. Management of these claims is likely to present significantly fewer difficulties than are presented in many class claims because the calls at issue are all automated. Class treatment is superior to multiple individual suits or piecemeal litigation because it conserves judicial resources, promotes consistency and efficiency of adjudication, provides a forum for small claimants, and deters illegal activities. There will be no significant difficulty in the management of this case as a class action. 58. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference each and every allegation set forth in the preceding paragraphs. 59. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendants and/or their affiliates, agents, and/or other persons or entities acting on Defendants’ behalf constitute numerous and multiple violations of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A), by making calls, except for emergency purposes, to the cellular telephone numbers of Plaintiff and members of the Class using an ATDS and/or artificial or prerecorded voice. 60. As a result of Defendants’ and/or their affiliates, agents, and/or other persons or entities acting on Defendants’ behalf’s violations of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A), Plaintiff and members of the Class presumptively are entitled to an award of $500 in damages for each and every call made to their cellular telephone numbers using an ATDS and/or artificial or prerecorded voice in violation of the statute, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). 61. Plaintiff and members of the Class are also entitled to and do seek injunctive relief prohibiting Defendants and/or their affiliates, agents, and/or other persons or entities acting on Defendants’ behalf from violating the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A), by making calls, except for emergency purposes, to any cellular telephone numbers using an ATDS and/or artificial or prerecorded voice in the future. I. 62. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference each and every allegation set forth in the preceding paragraphs. 64. As a result of Defendants’ and/or their affiliates, agents, and/or other persons or entities acting on Defendants’ behalf’s knowing and/or willful violations of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A), Plaintiff and members of the Class are entitled to treble damages of up to $1,500 for each and every call made to their cellular telephone numbers using an ATDS and/or artificial or prerecorded voice in violation of the statute, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3). A. Factual Allegations Regarding Plaintiff

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20. Sometime before July 10, 2010, Plaintiff is alleged to have incurred certain financial obligations with Defendant. 21. These alleged obligations were money, property, or their equivalent, which is due or owing, or alleged to be due or owing, from a natural person to another person and are therefore a “debt” as that term is defined by California Civil Code §1788.2(d), and a “consumer debt” as that term is defined by California Civil Code §1788.2(f). 22. Sometime before July 10, 2010, Plaintiff and Defendant entered into a written contract for the purposes of Plaintiff obtaining a line of credit with Defendant. 23. Sometime thereafter, Defendant sent, and Plaintiff received the terms and conditions underlying the parties 2010 contract. 24. Sometime thereafter, but before July 10, 2010, Plaintiff allegedly fell behind in the payments allegedly owed on the alleged debt. Plaintiff currently takes no position as to the validity of this alleged debt. 25. Defendant’s 2010 contract stated in part that Defendant may, (i) “contact you in any manner we choose,” including, “personal visit[s],”; (ii) “contact you in any manner we choose,” including, “contact[ing] you at your home and at your place of employment,”; (iii) “contact you at anytime, including weekends and holidays,”; (iv) “contact you with any frequency,”; (v) “leave prerecorded and other messages on your answering machine/service and with others,”; (vi) “identify ourselves, your relationships with us and our purpose for contacting you even if others might hear or read it.” 43. Plaintiff repeats, re-alleges, and incorporates by reference, all other paragraphs. 44. The foregoing acts and omissions constitute numerous and multiple violations of the Rosenthal Act, including but not limited to each and every one of the above-cited provisions of the Rosenthal Act, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1788-1788.32 ROSENTHAL FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT (ROSENTHAL ACT) CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1788-1788.32

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(BREACH OF IMPLIED WARRANTY) (BREACH OF EXPRESS WARRANTY) (DESIGN DEFECT) (FAILURE TO WARN) (MANUFACTURING DEFECT) (NEGLIGENCE) 13. On its website, Lands’ End describes itself as “a leading multi-channel international retailer of casual clothing, accessories . . . legendary for high-quality products at an exceptional value, plus a commitment to world-class customer service and an unconditional guarantee.” Business Outfitters by Lands’ End is described as a trusted brand partner providing “quality, high-value apparel and promotional products.” 14. In 2016, Delta selected Lands’ End to provide new employee uniforms designed by Zac Posen of Bravo’s Project Runway. This line of uniforms, which are bright purple, technically known as “Passport Plum,” consist of various articles of clothing, including a v-neck signature dress, a skirt and blouse, a mock turtleneck, vest and a sweater set (herein collectively referred to as the “Uniform”). 16. The official launch of the new Uniforms occurred on May 29, 2018, and Plaintiffs understand that Delta is planning a one- year anniversary party to celebrate the Uniforms. 17. Delta describes the Uniforms as high stretch, wrinkle- and stain-resistant, waterproof, anti-static and deodorizing. Various chemical additives and finishes are required to ensure these characteristics. 18. Once the Uniforms became available, flight attendants and gate agents had to go to a “fit clinic” to get measured for the new Uniforms. Delta offered a kit consisting of certain pieces which were “purchased” with Delta “points” provided by Delta, rather than cash. If an employee wanted additional pieces, such as the sweater set, it could be purchased by the employee directly from Lands’ End using the employee’s own funds. 20. Shortly after the Uniforms were introduced, some female flight attendants said that they started getting sick, reporting skin rashes, shortness of breath, heart palpitations and hair loss. 21. As reported in an article in The Guardian dated April 4, 2019: “On a private Facebook group used by over 2,000 flight attendants viewed by the Guardian, hundreds of flight attendants have complained of health problems as a result of wearing the new uniforms... The health concerns over the uniforms are serious enough that some doctors have instructed Delta flight attendants to bring EpiPens to work in case they break out in rashes.” See https://www.theguardian.com/business/2019/apr/03/delta-flight- attendants-uniforms-rash-claims 22. One flight attendant interviewed by the Guardian stated: “I noticed right away after I put the uniforms on that I had shortness of breath and I have been a runner my whole life . . .I don’t smoke or anything like that, so when I couldn’t get up the stairs without being extremely winded, I know there was some sort of problem.” Id. 24. According to the Guardian article, many doctors believe that formaldehyde and Teflon chemical finishing put on the uniforms to make them stain resistant and durable are likely the culprit. 25. In March 2019, Delta informed some flight attendants that if they did not want to wear the new Uniforms, they would need to request a disability job accommodation with the option of going on short-term disability leave. Under short-term disability leave, they would only make two-thirds of their pay and would have to either return to their jobs or quit after a year. 26. Because Delta flight attendants are non-union, many flight attendants are afraid to complain about the adverse health consequences they are experiencing from the new Uniforms. 27. It has been reported that the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), which is part of the Center for Disease Control (CDC), is expected start an official inquiry into the Passport Plum Uniforms in the near future. Plaintiffs’ Experiences 28. Plaintiff, Monica DeCrescentis, is a Delta flight attendant who has experienced skin reactions, headaches and a low white blood cell count during the past year when she has been required to wear the Uniform. 30. On January 30, 2019, Delta contacted Ms. DeCrescentis and asked her if she would agree to have her dress tested for chemicals, and she agreed to such testing. On February 1, 2019, Lands’ End and Delta jointly called Ms. DeCrescentis and told her to wash her Uniform pieces five times in a washer and dry them in a dryer, and that she cannot hand wash or line-dry them. Promptly thereafter, Lands’ End sent her a shipping kit to pack her dress, which included a plastic bag and tin foil, along with a UPS return label. She packed up the dress and shipped it to Lands’ End on February 5, 2019. She has followed up repeatedly with Lands’ End over the past 3 months, but has received no response. 31. In March 2019, Ms. DeCrescentis spoke about the Uniform and her concerns to Rob Wissell, Director IFS Communications, Employee Engagement & Uniforms. He responded that passengers love the purple Uniforms and that Delta was getting positive feedback. Delta wanted her to try the v-neck dress, blouse and sweater set, but she declined because these items are giving employees rashes, heart palpitations and respiratory flu like symptoms. 33. Plaintiff, Gwyneth Gilbert, is a Delta flight attendant who has experienced rashes and skin irritations from wearing the Uniforms. Ms. Gilbert’s kit included two dresses and a pant suit. Additionally, she purchased a sweater set directly from Lands’ End. 34. As early as June or July 2018, Ms. Gilbert found that wearing the mock turtleneck caused a rash on her skin. Then, in September and through the fall of 2018, she wore the pants and blouse part of the Uniform and she broke out in a rash. 35. The rash which caused irritation on the back of Ms. Gilbert’s neck, the collarbone area and chest was red and painful to the touch. She experienced a burning sensation, which made it difficult for her to complete her normal job duties due to the pain. 38. In late fall to December 2018, Ms. Gilbert wore the Plum dress, resulting in sore throats, headaches, body aches and fatigue. She had these symptoms each time she worked a flight wearing the Uniform. 40. On February 25, 2019, Ms. Gilbert was sent to a dermatology center in Atlanta for “patch” testing by Sedgwick, the worker’s compensation administrator, and she had to stay out of work for the whole week. She became sick after the patch test, developing a sore throat, headache and body aches, which lasted almost two weeks. A copy of a photo of Ms. Gilbert while the patch test was being administered is set forth below. 42. Ms. Gilbert was placed on short-term disability leave by Delta from March 5 through April 2, 2019. While on short-term disability leave, she was required to use her “certified time” in order to receive her pay. 43. Ms. Gilbert returned to work on April 3, 2019 and is now allowed to wear a black pants suit and white blouse, rather than the Passport Plum Uniform. Since then, she has experienced no physical symptoms. 45. Numerosity/Impracticability of Joinder/Ascertainability: The members of the Class are so numerous that joinder of all members would be impracticable. The Class is believed to include approximately 64,000 members. The Class is composed of an easily ascertainable, self-identifying set of individuals and entities that work or have worked for Delta and were or are required to wear the Passport Plum Uniforms. Lands’ End has the contact information for each class member, who were or are required to select among the several items manufactured by Defendant. The precise number of Class members can be ascertained by reviewing documents in Defendant’s possession, custody, and control. 47. Typicality: Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims of the members of the Class. Plaintiffs and the other members of the Class have suffered similar injury by the same wrongful practices by Lands’ End. The claims of Plaintiffs and the other members of the Class all arise from the same wrongful practices and course of conduct, and are based on the same legal and remedial theories. 48. Adequacy Of Representation: Plaintiffs will fully and adequately assert and protect the interests of the members of the Class, and have retained class counsel who are experienced and qualified in prosecuting class actions. Neither Plaintiffs nor their attorneys have any interests that are contrary to or conflicting with the members of the Class. 50. Plaintiffs on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, incorporate by reference the allegations contained in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint. 51. This claim is brought on behalf of Plaintiffs and the Class. 52. Defendant owes a duty to individuals, including Plaintiffs and the Class, to use reasonable care in designing, manufacturing, marketing, labeling and selling the Uniforms. 54. As a direct and proximate result of Lands’ End’s negligence, Plaintiffs and the Class have suffered and/or in the future will suffer personal injuries, pain and suffering, severe emotional distress, financial or economic loss, including but not limited to, medical services and expenses, lost income and other damages. WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs demand judgment against Defendant for compensatory and injunctive relief, together with interest, costs of suit, attorneys’ fees, and such other relief as the Court deems proper. 55. Plaintiffs on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, incorporate by reference the allegations contained in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint. 57. At all times material to this action, Defendant was responsible for designing, developing, manufacturing, testing, promoting, packaging, marketing, distributing and selling the Uniforms. 58. The Uniforms are defective and unreasonably dangerous to Plaintiffs and the members of the Class. 59. The Uniforms are defective in their design or formulation in that it they are not reasonably fit, suitable, or safe their intended purpose and/or its foreseeable risks exceed the benefits associated with their design and formulation. 60. At all times material to this action, the Uniforms were not safe and were not suited for the purposes for which Defendant, directly and indirectly, advertised, marketed, and promoted them at the time Defendant designed, manufactured, distributed, and sold the Uniforms and placed the Uniforms in the stream of commerce. 62. At the time the Uniforms left the control of Defendant, there were practical and feasible alternative designs that would have prevented and/or significantly reduced the risk to the Plaintiffs’ and the class members of injuries without impairing the reasonably anticipated or intended function of the Uniforms. These safer alternative designs were economically and technologically feasible, and would have prevented or significantly reduced the risk of injuries to Plaintiffs and the Class Members without substantially impairing the Uniforms’ utility. 63. As a direct and proximate result of the Uniforms’ defective design, the Plaintiffs and Class Members suffered severe adverse health reactions and physical injuries, as well as damage to personal property in the form of clothing and furniture permanently stained purple. 65. Plaintiffs on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, incorporate by reference the allegations contained in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint. 66. This claim is brought on behalf of Plaintiffs and the Class. 67. The Uniforms manufactured by Lands’ End, which Plaintiffs and the Members of the Class were required to wear during working hours, were not reasonably safe for their intended use and were defective as a matter of law with respect to their manufacture. 69. Defendant is strictly liable to Plaintiffs and the members of the class for designing, manufacturing, marketing, labeling, packaging and selling defective Uniforms. WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs demand judgment against Defendant for compensatory damages and injunctive relief, together with interest, costs of suit, attorneys’ fees, and such other relief as the Court deems proper. 70. Plaintiffs on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, incorporate by reference the allegations contained in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint. 71. This claim is brought on behalf of Plaintiffs and the Class. 72. The Uniforms manufactured by Lands’ End to be worn by Plaintiffs and all Delta Flight attendants and gate agents were not reasonably safe for their intended use and were defective as a matter of law due to their lack of appropriate and necessary warnings. 73. Defendant had a duty to warn Plaintiffs and the members of the Class of the risks and/or defects about which it knew or should have known. 75. At all times relevant hereto, Defendant intended the Delta flight attendant and gate agents, including Plaintiffs, to wear the Uniforms and knew or should have known that the Uniforms were defective and dangerous. 76. The Uniforms were used/worn by Plaintiffs and the Class members in a reasonably anticipated and foreseeable manner, and in the manner for which the Uniforms were intended. 77. At all relevant times hereto, Defendant was situated in the chain of commerce and transferred, sold, marketed, advertised, or distributed the Uniforms in the regular course of business. 78. At all times relevant hereto, the Uniforms were in the same or substantially the same, defective and unreasonably dangerous condition when put to its reasonably anticipated and foreseeable use. 80. Had Defendant adequately warned Plaintiffs and the Class members they would have been alerted to the problem and would have taken steps to avoid the adverse health consequences before they occurred. 81. As a direct and proximate consequence of Defendant’s defectively designed product, Plaintiffs and the members of the Class sustained serious personal injuries and injuries to property and losses as detailed more fully herein. WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs demand judgment against Defendants for compensatory damages and injunctive relief, together with interest, costs of suit, attorneys’ fees, and such other relief as the Court deems proper. 82. Plaintiffs on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, incorporate by reference the allegations contained in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint. 83. This claim is brought on behalf of Plaintiffs and the Class. 84. Defendant made assurances to Delta and Delta’s employees that the Uniforms would be safe and comfortable and reasonably fit for their intended purpose. 86. Accordingly, Lands’ End made express warranties under state law. 87. Plaintiffs and the Class reasonably relied upon Lands’ End’s express warranties and guarantees that the Uniforms were safe, merchantable, and reasonably fit for their intended purpose. 88. Defendant breached their express warranties by selling to Delta and the Plaintiffs and the Class unreasonably dangerous and defective Uniforms jeopardizing the health and safety of Plaintiffs and the Class and resulting in the permanent staining of their clothes and other products. 89. Plaintiffs notified Lands’ End of the breach. Lands’ End was on notice of the breach of warranty well before Plaintiffs began this litigation. 91. Plaintiffs on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, incorporate by reference the allegations contained in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint. 92. This claim is brought on behalf of Plaintiffs and the Class. 94. The Lands’ End Uniforms are “goods” under the Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”). 95. Lands’ End is a “merchant” under the UCC. 96. Lands’ End made numerous implied warranties to Delta and Plaintiffs and the members of the Class about the merchantable quality of the Uniforms and that they were fit for the ordinary purpose for which Uniforms are intended. 97. Plaintiffs and the Class relied upon Lands’ Ends’ implied warranties of merchantability in wearing and purchasing the Uniforms. 98. Defendant breached the implied warranties of merchantability because the Uniforms were neither merchantable nor suited for their intended use as warranted. A. Delta Decides to Provide New Employee Uniforms from Lands’ End

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(Minimum Wage Violation) (Quantum Meruit) (Retaliation Against Anderson) (Retaliation Against Silva) (Unjust Enrichment) (Violation of Massachusetts Independent Contractor Law) (Violation of Massachusetts Wage Law) 10. HDA requires such independent contractors to purchase or lease a truck with the Sears logo painted on it, to wear uniforms bearing the Sears logo, and to utilize a so-called “helper” in order to assist with the delivery and installation of Sears products. 12. The Plaintiffs do not have an independently established trade or business other than the work that they have performed for the Defendants. Further, during the time they have worked for the Defendants, they have not performed delivery services for anyone else, nor could they given that they work full time and drive a truck carrying the Sears logo. 13. Both the Defendants HDA and Sears Logistics are in the business of assuring the home delivery of furniture, large appliances, and products to customers’ homes upon purchase. 15. Both Defendants retain the right to terminate the Plaintiffs and other similarly situated individuals if either Defendant determines that the drivers are not performing their work up to the Defendants standards. 16. The Plaintiffs have no ability to negotiate regarding the amount of pay that they receive for each delivery, nor do they have the right to charge any extra for more complicated deliveries, multiple deliveries to the same location, or for complications resulting from assembly or installation. Indeed, the Plaintiffs have no say in the amounts charged to customers for the services they perform. 17. The Plaintiffs are responsible for all of their expenses associated with making these deliveries including maintenance of vehicles, gas, cell phones, insurances, and truck expenses. 18. The Plaintiffs frequently work 60 hour weeks or more, however, on many occasions, after deductions are taken from their pay and expenses are paid, the payment Plaintiffs receive for the week is less than the Massachusetts minimum wage. 19. In addition, the Defendants impose deductions on the Plaintiffs’ paychecks, for a variety of matters, including alleged damage or losses, in violation of the Massachusetts Wage Law, M.G.L. c. 149 §148. 20. Plaintiffs Calvin Anderson and Murilo Silva have worked as delivery drivers for the Defendants as set forth above. 22. The named Plaintiffs bring this action on behalf of a class of individuals similarly situated. Specifically, they seek to represent a class of individuals comprising all individuals who perform delivery for HDA and Sears Logistics Services, Inc. within the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, including delivery drivers and helpers. 23. The class is so numerous the joinder of all individuals would be impractical, and proceeding as a class action is a superior method to prosecute this action. 24. There are questions of both fact and law common to the class that make class certification appropriate, including, particularly, the question of whether the Plaintiffs have been misclassified under the Massachusetts Independent Contractor Statute, M.G.L. c. 149 §148B. 25. The claims of the named Plaintiffs are typical of the claims of the class members, and the named Plaintiffs and their legal counsel will adequately represent the interests of the class. 27. On or about December 31, 2010, Plaintiff Murilo Silva sent a letter to Defendant, HDA, asserting certain claims, including but not limited to the claim that he had been misclassified as an independent contractor when he was really an employee. 28. In a letter dated January 5, 2011, a vice president of HDA wrote a letter to Plaintiff Silva informing him that based upon his letter, and his desire to be reclassified as an employee, he was being terminated. 29. Following his termination, Defendant HDA refused to pay Mr. Silva the wages owed to him for his final weeks of work. Agents of HDA then requested that Mr. Silva sign a release of any claims against HDA and communicated that he would not be paid the wages owed if he did not sign the release. 30. On or about January 19, 2011, counsel for Plaintiffs sent a letter to Plaintiff Anderson’s supervisor at Home Delivery America, stating that Mr. Anderson was filing a complaint regarding his misclassification with the Massachusetts Attorney General’s Office. 31. On or about January 20, 2011, Mr. Anderson’s supervisor, Abe (last name unknown), inquired of Mr. Anderson as to why he was pursuing legal action. He stated that he knew that Mr. Silva and Mr. Anderson were using the same attorney and asked him what other employees were involved with any possible lawsuit. 32. Following this interaction on January 20, 2011, Mr. Anderson noticed an immediate and severe reduction in the amount of work he was receiving from HAD. Indeed, on four separate days he was called in for work and then sent home after being told there was no work to give him. On another day, he was not paid for work he performed. 34. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate paragraphs 1-34 above as if fully set forth herein, and for a cause of action by Plaintiffs allege as follows: 34. As a result of the severe reduction in work he was receiving and the intimidating interactions with managers, Mr. Anderson felt unable to continue working for HDA and was thus forced to resign his position. Since this resignation, HDA has refused to provide Mr. Anderson with his final paycheck and has not returned a $2,000 security deposit. 35. The Defendants violated M.G.L. c.149 §148, §150, and c. 151 §1 by not paying the named and class Plaintiffs the applicable minimum wage for all hours worked. 35. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate paragraphs 1-34 above as if fully set forth herein, and for a cause of action by Plaintiffs allege as follows: 36. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate paragraphs 1-34 above as if fully set forth herein, and for a cause of action by Plaintiffs allege as follows: 36. By misclassifying the named and class Plaintiffs as set forth herein, Defendants, as joint employers, have violated M.G.L. c. 149 §148B. This claim is brought pursuant to M.G.L. c. 149 §150. 37. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate paragraphs 1-34 above as if fully set forth herein, and for a cause of action by Plaintiffs allege as follows: 38. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate paragraphs 1-34 above as if fully set forth herein, and for a cause of action by Plaintiffs allege as follows: 39. The Plaintiffs and the class members have been deprived by the Defendants of the fair value of their services, as described above, and are therefore, entitled to recover in Quantum Meruit, the value of their services pursuant to the common law of Massachusetts. 40. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate paragraphs 1-34 above as if fully set forth herein, and for a cause of action by Plaintiffs allege as follows: 41. The Defendants unlawfully retaliated against Plaintiff Silva in violation of G.L. c.149 §148A by failing to pay him for his final weeks worked, refusing to return his security deposit, and terminating him in response to his assertion of his rights under the Massachusetts wage laws. 42. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate paragraphs 1-34 above as if fully set forth herein, and for a cause of action by Plaintiffs allege as follows: 7. Within the state of Massachusetts and other New England states, the Defendant Home Delivery America (“HDA”) provides home delivery and installation services for all Sears stores. When a customer goes to a Sears store and purchases furniture, large appliances, or home fitness equipment, etc., and such customer requests home delivery, the delivery is provided through an arrangement between the Defendant Sears Logistics Services, Inc. (“Sears Logistics”) and HDA. 8. In order to carry out this delivery service, Sears Logistics maintains certain warehouses throughout Massachusetts, including a large warehouse in Westwood, Massachusetts, where appliances, furniture, and equipment are kept. HDA maintains an office and supervisory personnel at these Sears Logistics warehouses for the purposes of effectuating this home delivery. 9. HDA purports to hire “independent contractors” not employees, to provide this home delivery and installation service for Sears.

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6. This action arises under the laws of the United States. This case is brought as a collective action under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). It is believed that the Defendants have employed other similarly situated employees like the Plaintiff who have not been paid overtime for work as mechanics performed in excess of 40 hours weekly from the filing of this complaint back at least three years. 7. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 as this case is brought pursuant to The Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (section 216 for jurisdictional placement). 8. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) states, in pertinent part, "if an employer employs an employee for more than forty hours in any work week, the employer must compensate the employee for hours in excess of forty at the rate of at least one and one half times the employee's regular rate…." 9. Plaintiff, VIRGILIO MARIANO, worked for Defendants as a mechanic during three separate time periods. First, from on or about January of 2011 through on or about October of 2012; second, from on or about January of 2014 through on or about April of 2014; and third, from on or about November 3, 2014 through on or about December 28, 2016.

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(Violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq. – Telephone Consumer Protection Act) (on behalf of Plaintiff and the Class) 10. Given the relatively low cost associated with sending bulk text messages, many marketers have turned to disseminating advertisements or promotions through mass text message campaigns. 11. Seeking to market its services to consumers throughout the United States and to grow its customer base, Ultimate Medical engages in this especially invasive form of advertising. 12. Ultimate Medical sent and continues to send unauthorized text messages to the phones of thousands of consumers across the country. 13. The nature of the text messages sent by Ultimate Medical indicates that it used an automatic telephone dialing system (“ATDS”). Specifically, the hardware and software used by Ultimate Medical has the capacity to store, produce, and dial random and sequential numbers, and/or receive and store lists of telephone numbers, and to dial such numbers, en masse, in an automated fashion without human intervention. Ultimate Medical's automated dialing equipment includes features substantially similar to a predictive dialer, in that it is capable of making numerous text message calls simultaneously (all without human intervention). 14. The promotional text message calls alleged herein were exclusively made and initiated by Ultimate Medical and not by any consumer. Ultimate Medical made, or had made on its behalf, the same (or substantially the same) text message calls en masse to thousands of cellular telephone numbers. 15. While Ultimate Medical sent these unauthorized text messages to consumers to market its services, it never obtained recipients' consent to do so. 17. Moreover, Plaintiff and members of the Class suffered injuries in the form of invasion of privacy and violations of their statutory rights, the monies paid to receive Ultimate Medical’s unsolicited text messages, the diminished value and utility of their telephone equipment and telephone subscription service (i.e. the value of such equipment and services is higher when unencumbered by repeated and harassing text messages), the amount of time lost answering and fielding unwanted telemarketing text messages, the wear and tear on their telephone equipment, the loss of battery (which becomes diminished with each incoming phone call), the loss of battery life (which has a finite number of charging cycles), and electricity costs required to recharge their cellular phones. 18. Ultimate Medical sent at least four text messages from its telephone number 95577 to Plaintiff’s telephone number similar to the following: 20. Defendant's intrusive text messages adversely affected Plaintiffs right to privacy. 21. Defendant was and is aware that the above-described text message calls were being made on a widespread basis, and that the text message calls were being made to consumers who had not consented to receive them. 22. Class Definition: Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and a class defined as follows: Class: All persons in the United States who received one or more unauthorized text messages from Ultimate Medical. Excluded from the Class are: (1) any Judge or Magistrate presiding over this action and members of their families; (2) Defendant, Defendant's subsidiaries, parents, successors, predecessors, and any entity in which the Defendant or its parents have a controlling interest and its current or former employees, officers and directors; (3) persons who properly execute and file a timely request for exclusion from the Class; (4) persons whose claims in this matter have been finally adjudicated on the merits or otherwise released; (5) Plaintiff’s counsel and Defendant's counsel; and (6) the legal representatives, successors, and assigns of any such excluded persons. 23. Numerosity: The exact number of Class members is unknown and not available to Plaintiff at this time, but it is clear that individual joinder is impracticable. On information and belief, Defendant has sent promotional text messages to thousands of consumers who fall into the definition of the Class. Class members can be identified through Defendant's records. 27. Typicality: Plaintiffs claims are typical of the claims of other members of the Class, in that Plaintiff and the Class members sustained damages arising out of Defendant's uniform wrongful conduct and unsolicited text message calls. 29. Appropriateness: This class action is also appropriate for certification because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class as a whole, thereby requiring the Court's imposition of uniform relief to ensure compatible standards of conduct toward the members of the Class and making final class-wide injunctive relief appropriate. Defendant's practices apply to and affect the members of the Class uniformly, and Plaintiff's challenge of those practices hinges on Defendant's conduct with respect to the Class as a whole, not on facts or law applicable only to Plaintiff. Additionally, the damages suffered by individual members of the Class will likely be small relative to the burden and expense of individual prosecution of the complex litigation necessitated by Defendant's actions. Thus, it would be virtually impossible for the members of the Class to obtain effective relief from Defendant's misconduct on an individual basis. A class action provides the benefits of single adjudication, economies of scale, and comprehensive supervision by a single court. Economies of time, effort, and expense will be fostered and uniformity of decisions will be ensured. 30. Plaintiff reserves the right to revise the foregoing "Class Allegations" and "Class Definition" based on facts learned through additional investigation and in discovery. 31. Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 32. In an effort to promote its services, Ultimate Medical made unsolicited and unwanted text message calls to Plaintiff and the Class's cellular telephones without their prior express consent. 34. Ultimate Medical utilized equipment that sent the promotional text messages to Plaintiff and other members of the putative Class simultaneously and without human intervention. 35. By sending the promotional text messages to Plaintiffs and members of the Class's cellular telephones without prior express consent, and by utilizing an ATDS, Ultimate Medical violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(I)(A)(iii). 36. As a result of Ultimate Medical's unlawful conduct, Plaintiff and the members of the putative Class suffered actual damages and have also had their rights to privacy adversely impacted. Plaintiff and the Class are therefore entitled to, among other things, a minimum of $500 in statutory damages for each such violation under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). 37. Because Ultimate Medical's misconduct was willful and knowing, the Court should, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3), treble the amount of statutory damages recoverable by the Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class. 38. Additionally, as a result of Ultimate Medical's unlawful conduct, Plaintiff and the other members of the Class are entitled to an injunction under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(A) to ensure that Ultimate Medical's violations of the TCPA do not continue into the future.

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(29 U.S.C. § 216(b) Collective Action) VIOLATION OF THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq. -- FAILURE TO PAY OVERTIME 22. The FLSA applies in this case on an enterprise basis. 23. Both Defendants’ annual sales exceed $500,000. 24. At all relevant times Defendants had more than two employees engaged in interstate commerce. 25. Defendants’ Drivers engage in interstate commerce and therefore they are also covered by the FLSA on an individual basis. 26. Defendants have employed Plaintiff John Honeycutt as a full-time Driver out of its distribution center in Southfield, Michigan within the last three years. 28. Defendants also employed Drivers out of other distribution centers across the country. 29. Regardless of the distribution center, Defendants paid each Driver on a day-rate or piece-rate basis and classified them as exempt from overtime. 30. Regardless of how many hours Plaintiff and other similarly situated Drivers worked, Defendants paid them on a flat day-rate or piece-rate. For Plaintiff, his most recent day rate was $155.00 per day. Whether paid on a day-rate or piece-rate, Defendants did not pay any of its Drivers overtime. 31. At all relevant times, Defendants (unlawfully) classified Plaintiff and other similarly situated Drivers as exempt from overtime (because they were deemed independent contractors), when, in fact, they were non-exempt employees and entitled to overtime. 32. Plaintiff and other similarly situated Drivers are non-exempted by Section 13(b)(1) of the FLSA. 33. The Highway Technical Corrections Act (“HTCA”) of 2007 states that the overtime protections of the FLSA “shall apply to a covered employee notwithstanding section 13(b)(1) of that Act (29 U.S.C. 213(b)(1)).” HIGHWAY TECHNICAL CORRECTIONS ACT OF 2007, 154 Cong Rec S 3106, 3134. 51. At all relevant times, Defendants were jointly Plaintiffs’ “employer” and Defendants directly benefited from the work performed by Plaintiffs and the other hourly employees. Defendants also jointly benefited, albeit illegally, from retaining gratuities/tips from the mandatory tip pool Plaintiffs and other similarly situated employees were required to participate in. 52. At all relevant times, Defendants controlled Plaintiffs’ and other similarly situated hourly employees’ schedule, duties, assignments, and employment conditions. 54. Defendants were “joint employers” of Plaintiffs as defined by the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) and 29 C.F.R. 791.2(a). 55. Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) of the FLSA on his own behalf and on behalf of: All current and former day-rate or piece-rate paid Drivers who worked for Worldpac, Inc. or National Delivery Solutions, LLC., and were not paid overtime, in the United States at any time from three years prior to the date the Court grants conditional certification through a date specified by the Court. (hereinafter referred to as the “Collective”). Plaintiff reserves the right to amend this definition as necessary. 56. Excluded from the proposed Collective are Defendants’ executives, administrative, and professional employees, including computer professionals and outside sales persons. 58. The employment relationships between Defendants and every Collective member are essentially the same and differ only by name, location, and rate of pay. The key issues do not vary substantially among the Collective members. 59. The key legal issues are also the same for every Collective member. These common legal and factual questions, include, but are not limited to, the following: a. Whether Defendants properly classified Plaintiff and the similarly situated Drivers as independent contractors; b. Whether Defendants properly classified Plaintiff and the similarly situated Drivers as exempt from overtime; and c. Whether Plaintiff and the similarly situated Drivers worked overtime hours (as defined by the FLSA) to which they are entitled to overtime premiums for. 60. Plaintiff estimates the Collective, including both current and former employees over the relevant period, will include several hundred members. The precise number of Collective members should be readily available from a review of Defendants’ personnel and payroll records. 61. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates all previous paragraphs herein. 63. Defendants are engaged in interstate commerce, or in the production of goods for commerce, as defined by the FLSA. 64. At all times relevant to this action, Plaintiff and other Collective members were “employees” of Defendants within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1) of the FLSA. 65. Plaintiff and other Collective members either (1) engaged in commerce; or (2) engaged in the production of goods for commerce; or (3) were employed in an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce. 66. Defendants have had, and continues to have, an annual gross business volume in excess of $500,000. 67. At all times relevant to this action, Defendants “suffered or permitted” Plaintiff and other Collective members to work and thus “employed” them within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 203(g) of the FLSA. 68. At all times relevant to this action, Defendants misclassified Plaintiff and other Collective member as independent contractors. 69. At all times relevant to this action, Defendants compensated Plaintiff and the other Collective members on a flat day-rate or piece-rate basis, regardless of the number of hours they actually spent working. 70. Defendants failed to pay Plaintiff and the other Collective members overtime premiums, as required by the Section 7 of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). 72. Defendants’ violations of the FLSA were knowing and willful. Defendants knew or could have easily determined whether Plaintiff and the Members of the Collective were exempt from overtime, and could have easily determined the number of overtime hours worked, but did not. 73. The FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), provides that as a remedy for a violation of the Act, an employee is entitled to his or her unpaid wages (and unpaid overtime if applicable) plus an additional equal amount in liquidated damages (double damages), plus costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees.

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) FLSA OPT-IN COLLECTIVE ACTION ) Defendant. ) 14. Mr. Whitlock began working for Defendant part time in 1987 and became a full time employee in 1991 as a Paramedic in its EMS Department. 1 Plaintiff reserves the right to modify or amend the "Paramedic/EMT" Class Description upon newly discovered information gathered through the discovery process. 5 15. Defendant’s EMS Department is almost entirely comprised of hourly paid paramedics and emergency medical technicians (“Paramedics/EMTs”) whose primary duties consist of responding to a variety of medical calls ranging from minor, non-emergency matters to calls of life- threatening medical conditions. 16. Paramedics/EMTs work in ambulance crews which consist of a mix of paramedics and EMTs and are typically stationed in their own facilities provided by Defendant. Likewise, they generally do not share equipment with other departments. Defendant's EMS Department is completely separate from Defendant’s Fire and Police departments. Paramedics/EMTs of Defendant’s EMS Department are treated separately from Defendant’s Fire and Police departments and serve completely separate and distinct functions, have a separate chain of command, have some separate facilities, have separate policies and procedures, have separate schedules, and have separate compensation terms. 17. The work and pay records of Plaintiff and the putative class are in the possession, custody, and/or control of Defendant, and Defendant is under a duty, pursuant to section 11(c) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 211(c), and the regulations of the United States Department of Labor, to maintain and preserve such payroll and other employment records from which the amount of Defendants’ liability can be ascertained. Plaintiff requests an order of this Court requiring Defendants to preserve such records during the pendency of this action. 18. Plaintiff and the Paramedic/EMT Class are not employees of Defendant’s Fire or Police departments. 19. Paramedics/EMTs typically work twenty-four hour shifts that begin at 8:00 am and end at 8:00 am the following day, followed by approximately two (2) days off duty. In other words, Paramedics/EMTs worked one (1) regular shift every third day, which produced a pattern of 6 work of forty-eight (48) hours or seventy-two (72) hours per week, depending on whether a particular week included two (2) or three (3) shifts of duty. Defendant's policy is to deduct Paramedics/EMTs’ pay two (2) hours of time per 24 hour shift, which is purportedly to represent time spent for meals and rest breaks (two (2) thirty (30) minute meal breaks and four (4) fifteen (15) minute rest breaks). This results in the Paramedics/EMTs only being compensated at their straight time rate for twenty-two (22) hours for every twenty-four (24) hour shift unless that shift results in work over twenty-four (24) hours (e.g., the shift lasts 26 hours). 20. Paramedics/EMTs in the EMS Department were not assigned to fire suppression duties, regularly worked in excess of forty (40) hours per week, generally working one full twenty-four (24) hour shift every third day, totaling either forty-eight (48) hours or seventy-two (72) hours per work week. 21. Paramedics/EMTs did not receive the correct over-time pay as required by the FLSA. Per Defendant's custom and policy, Paramedics/EMTs are only paid overtime (1.5 times their regular rate) for working past their standard twenty-four (24) hour shift. Even then, Paramedics/EMTs sometimes are only compensated with “comp time” to be used at a later date and only paid at the straight time rate. 22. Per Defendant's custom and policy, when Paramedics/EMTs pick up extra shifts they are only paid with “comp time.” 23. Mr. Whitlock and the other Paramedics/EMTs routinely work two (2) to three (3) 24- hour shifts during a workweek. 24. Despite working over forty (40) hours in a single workweek, neither Plaintiff Whitlock nor the other Paramedics/EMTs ever receive overtime compensation for hours worked over forty (40) unless they work over twenty-four (24) hours in a particular shift and the EMS 7 Department chooses to compensate them at 1.5 times their regular rate instead of “comp time.” Otherwise they only receive their regular rate of pay or “comp time.” 25. Defendant maintained a policy that required Plaintiff to regularly work “off the clock.” This caused Plaintiff and similarly situated employees to perform work without receiving their hourly rate of pay for all hours worked. In some workweeks, this caused Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees to work more than forty (40) hours without receiving the correct overtime compensation for the hours worked beyond forty (40) in that workweek. 26. In certain months throughout the year (typically months with 31 calendar days), Plaintiff Whitlock and the other Paramedics/EMTs regularly work eleven (11) shifts or four (4) shifts in a particular week, but are only paid for ten (10) shifts or three (3) for that week during said pay period(s), resulting in an entire shift being uncompensated. Defendant’s aforementioned unlawful “off the clock” policy is a result of Plaintiff Whitlock and putative class members being paid two (2) times per month rather than every two (2) weeks or biweekly. 27. At all times relevant to this Collective Action Complaint, Plaintiff and the members of the proposed class were not regularly engaged in fire protection or law enforcement activities during their employment with Defendant, nor were dispatched to perform fire suppression duties at fire suppression or law enforcement situations. 28. Plaintiff and putative class members did not have the legal authority and responsibility to engage in fire suppression during the relevant time period. 29. With regard to meal times, Defendant did not meet the strict requirements of 29 C.F.R. §§ 553.223, 785.19, and 785.22 to automatically deduct one (1) hour (consisting of two (2) thirty (30) minute meal breaks) from each shift as non-compensable time for “bona fide meal periods.” Plaintiff was not completely relieved from duty for the purpose of eating regular meals, but instead was required to perform his regular duties while eating. In addition, Defendant did not 8 monitor any shift to ensure that each employee actually received the full one-hour allotted time for meal periods as reflected in the deductions from their compensable time, nor were employees compensated for actual, emergency calls to duty that occurred while they were eating their meals. 30. With regard to rest periods, Defendant automatically deducted one (1) hour (consisting of four (4) fifteen (15) minute rest periods) from each shift as non-compensable time for “bona fide rest periods” in direct violation of 29 C.F.R. § 785.18. 31. County and EMS department officials are aware of the obligation to pay overtime compensation, as other hourly employees of the Defendant are paid overtime compensation. Those officials, however, have willfully chosen to deny the Paramedics and EMTs of the EMS Department the rights afforded them under the FLSA. This is despite these employees' complaints and Defendant's knowledge of the extremely long hours worked by these employees. 32. At all times relevant to this Collective Action Complaint, Plaintiff was a good and faithful employee of Defendant and consistently performed all of the essential functions of his job in an acceptable and competent manner. 33. Defendant’s violations of the FLSA were willful and were in complete disregard of the rights of Mr. Whitlock and his Paramedic/EMT colleagues. V. 34. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates paragraphs 1–33 as if fully set forth herein. 35. Plaintiff and Class Members were subjected to the same pay provisions and violations in that they were employed as hourly-paid Paramedics/EMTs and not compensated for all hours worked and not compensated at time-and-one-half for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours in a workweek. 36. Defendant’s failure to compensate EMS department employees for all hours worked and 9 hours worked in excess of forty (40) in a workweek as required by the FLSA results from a policy or practice of paying only regular time for overtime hours, paying only “comp time” for overtime hours worked and by automatically deducting 2 hours of compensable time from each twenty-four (24) hour shift worked by Plaintiff and Class Members. These policies or practices were applicable to Plaintiff and Class Members. Application of these policies or practices does not depend on the personal circumstances of Plaintiff or those joining this lawsuit. Rather, the same policies or practices, which resulted in the non-payment of overtime and all hours worked, that applied to Plaintiff applied to all Class Members. 37. Defendant was aware of its obligation to pay overtime to Plaintiff and Class Members and failed to do so. Defendant knowingly, willfully, or with reckless disregard carried out its illegal pattern or practice of failing to pay overtime compensation with respect to Plaintiff and Class Members. 38. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates paragraphs 1–37 as if fully set forth herein. 39. This action is maintainable as an opt-in collective action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) as to claims for unpaid overtime compensation, liquidated damages, interest, attorneys’ fees, and costs under the FLSA. 40. Pursuant to the FLSA “overtime must be compensated at a rate not less than one and one- half times the regular rate at which the employee is actually employed” during the first forty (40) hours of work. 29 C.F.R. § 778.107. 41. Mr. Whitlock is similarly situated to current and former Paramedics/EMTs in that they all had/have similar job duties (i.e. responding to medical calls, transporting medical patients via ambulance, and performing basic medical procedures), similar supervisors, similar 10 compensation terms, similar policies to which they are subject, and similar damages. 42. Mr. Whitlock is a representative of those other current and former Paramedics/EMTs and is acting on behalf of their interests as well as his own interest in bringing this action. 43. During the relevant period, Defendant has violated and is violating the provisions of Sections 6 and/or 7 of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 206, 207, and 215(a)(2), by employing employees in an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce within the meaning of the FLSA as aforesaid, for workweeks longer than forty (40) hours without compensating such employees for their work in excess of forty (40) hours per week at rates no less than one-and-a-half times the regular rates for which they were employed. Defendant has acted willfully in failing to pay Plaintiff and Class Members in accordance with the law. FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT

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11. On May 26, 2015, Defendant sent an unsolicited advertisement to Plaintiff’s ink-and-paper facsimile machine. The fax advertises “Be a Medical Assistant Online.” A copy of this facsimile is attached hereto and marked as Exhibit A. 12. Indeed, between July 13, 2015 and August 24, 2015, Defendant sent at least 3 additional unsolicited faxes to Plaintiff’s ink-and-paper facsimile machines. See attached Exhibit B, a completion of 3 faxes sent to Plaintiff by Defendant. Upon information and belief, Plaintiff has received hundreds, if not thousands, of additional fax advertisements from Defendant similar to Exhibit A. 13. Defendant did not have Plaintiff’s prior express invitation or permission to send advertisements to Plaintiff’s fax machine. 14. Defendant’s faxes do not contain opt-out notices that comply with the requirements of the TCPA. 16. Plaintiff reserves the right to modify or amend the definition of the proposed Class before the Court determines whether certification is proper, as more information is gleaned in discovery. 17. Excluded from the Class are Defendant, any parent, subsidiary, affiliate, or controlled person of Defendant, as well as the officers, directors, agents, servants, or employees of Defendant and the immediate family members of any such person. Also excluded are any judge who may preside over this case and any attorneys representing Plaintiff or the Class. 18. Numerosity [Fed R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1)]. The Members of the Class are so numerous that joinder is impractical. Upon information and belief, Defendant has sent illegal fax advertisements to hundreds if not thousands of other recipients. 21. Fair and Adequate Representation [Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4)]. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class. It is interested in this matter, has no conflicts, and has retained experienced class counsel to represent the Class.

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Failure to Pay Minimum Wages—C.R.S. 8-6-101, et seq. (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Rule 23 Class) 170. Plaintiff restates and incorporates the following allegations as if fully rewritten herein. 171. Each Defendant has at all times been an “employer” of Plaintiff and the Rule 23 Class members within the meaning of the Colorado minimum wage law. 172. Defendants failed to pay Plaintiff and the Rule 23 Class members all minimum wages owed. 173. Defendants conduct and practices, as described herein, were willful and intentional. 174. By reason of the unlawful acts alleged herein, Defendants are liable to Plaintiff the Rule 23 Class members for unpaid wages, costs, reasonable attorneys’ fees, and pre-judgment interest for all violations which occurred within the three years prior to the filing of the Complaint.

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1. Hepatitis C was first discovered in 1990 and is a contagious virus that attacks the liver. It spreads primarily through contact with the blood of an infected person. In 1992, the United States began screening blood utilized in transplants and transfusions for the presence of contagious diseases including Hepatitis C. Before 1992, Hepatitis C was commonly spread through blood transfusions or transplant surgeries. 41. This is a class action pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 23 on behalf of Plaintiff and all individuals: whose requests for Harvoni treatment have been denied (at any time under the applicable statute of limitations) under any ERISA-governed self-funded or fully-insured group health insurance plan issued or administered by Blue Shield. 42. Plaintiff and the Plaintiff Class reserve the right under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 23(c)(1)(C) to amend or modify the class to include greater specificity, by further division into subclasses, or by limitation to particular issues. 43. This action has been brought and may be properly maintained as a class action under the provisions of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 23 because there is a well-defined community of interest in the litigation and the proposed class is easily ascertainable. Numerosity 50. Plaintiff and the Plaintiff Class repeat and re-allege each and every allegation set forth in all of the foregoing paragraphs as is fully set forth herein. 51. Plaintiff and the Plaintiff Class are covered by insurance plans issued by Defendant. Under the terms and conditions of the insurance plans and applicable federal law, Blue Shield is required to pay for all medically necessary prescription medication benefits. 52. Defendant violated ERISA by wrongfully asserting that Harvoni treatment is not a covered benefit under the plans. 53. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s actions in denying claims for medically necessary Harvoni treatment, Plaintiff and the Plaintiff Class were forced financially to forego treatment altogether. Plaintiff and the Plaintiff Class are entitled to the reasonable value of the medically necessary Harvoni treatment and related expenses. 59. Plaintiff and the Plaintiff Class repeat and re-allege each and every allegation set forth in all of the foregoing paragraphs as is fully set forth herein. 60. Defendant acts as an ERISA fiduciary with respect to the administration and claims decisions of the group health plans it issues to employers, such as the Plan at issue, within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. §§ 1109(a) and 1002(21)(A). With respect to these plans, Defendant exercises discretionary authority or control respecting management of the plans, exercises authority or control respecting management or disposition of the plans’ assets. Defendant has the authority, and actually exercises the authority, to fund the plans, make decisions on claims for benefits and appeals thereof, and to write checks for benefits. 61. Defendant has categorically and improperly denied requests for Harvoni treatment, as alleged above. 62. In acting and failing to act as described above, Defendant has breached its fiduciary duties. FOR BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY UNDER AN ERISA PLAN [29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)] FOR DENIAL OF PLAN BENEFITS UNDER ERISA

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24. It is, upon information and belief, the Defendants' policy and practice to deny the plaintiff, along with other blind or visually-impaired users, access to the defendants' website, and to therefore specifically deny the goods and services that are offered and are heavily integrated with the defendants' locations. Due to the defendants' failure and refusal to remove access barriers to its website, the plaintiff and other visually-impaired persons have been and are still being denied equal access to the defendants' locations and the numerous goods, services, and benefits offered to the public through the website. 25. The plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. The plaintiff is, however, a proficient JAWS screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. The plaintiff has visited the website on separate occasions using the JAWS screen-reader. 26. During the plaintiff’s visits to the website, the last occurring in April 2018, the plaintiff encountered multiple access barriers that denied the plaintiff full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services offered to the public and made available to the public; and that denied the plaintiff the full enjoyment of the facilities, goods, and services of the website, as well as to the facilities, goods, and services of the defendants' locations in New York by being unable to learn more information about location addresses and hours, and Products available for purchase and delivery, among other things readily available to sighted individuals. 28. Due to the inaccessibility of the defendants' website, blind and visually-impaired customers such as the plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, goods, and services the defendant offers to the public on its website. The access barriers the plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of the plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter the plaintiff on a regular basis from accessing the website. 30. If the website was equally accessible to all, the plaintiff could independently navigate the website and complete a desired transaction, as sighted individuals do. 31. The plaintiff, through the plaintiff’s attempts to use the website, has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 32. Because simple compliance with WCAG 2.0 would provide the plaintiff and other visually- impaired consumers with equal access to the website, the plaintiff alleges that the defendants engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including, but not limited to, the following policies or practices: constructing and maintaining a website that is inaccessible to visually- impaired individuals, including the plaintiff; failing to construct and maintain a website that is sufficiently intuitive so as to be equally accessible to visually-impaired individuals, including the plaintiff; and failing to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind and visually-impaired consumers, such as the plaintiff, as a member of a protected class. 33. The Defendants therefore use standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination against others, as alleged herein. 35. Because the defendants' website has never been equally accessible, and because the defendants lack a corporate policy that is reasonably calculated to cause the defendants' website to become and remain accessible, the plaintiff invokes 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2) and seeks a permanent injunction requiring the defendants to retain a qualified consultant acceptable to the plaintiff to assist the defendants to comply with WCAG 2.0 guidelines for the defendants' website. The website must be accessible for individuals with disabilities who use desktop computers, laptops, tablets, and smartphones. The plaintiff seeks that this permanent injunction require the defendants to cooperate with the agreed-upon consultant to: train the defendants' employees and agents who develop the website on accessibility compliance under the WCAG 2.0 guidelines; regularly check the accessibility of the website under the WCAG 2.0 guidelines; regularly test user accessibility by blind or vision-impaired persons to ensure that the defendants' website complies under the WCAG 2.0 guidelines; and develop an accessibility policy that is clearly disclosed on the defendants' website, with contact information for users to report accessibility-related problems and require that any third-party vendors who participate on the defendants' website to be fully accessible to the disabled by conforming with 40. The plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access the defendants' website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in the defendants' physical locations, during the relevant statutory period. 41. The plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a New York State subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the State of New York who have attempted to access the defendants' website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in the defendants' physical locations, during the relevant statutory period. 43. Common questions of law and fact exist among the class, including: whether the defendants' website is a “public accommodation” under the ADA; whether the defendant’s website is a “place or provider of public accommodation” under the NYSHRL or NYCHRL; whether the defendants' website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the ADA; and whether the defendants' website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the NYSHRL or NYCHRL. 44. The plaintiff’s claims are typical of the class. The class, similarly to the plaintiff, are severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that the defendants violated the ADA, NYSHRL, and NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on the defendants' website so it can be independently accessible to the class. 45. The plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the class because the plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because the plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the class. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because the defendants has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to the plaintiff and the class as a whole. 47. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 48. The plaintiff, on behalf of the plaintiff and the class, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 49. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 50. The defendants' locations are public accommodations within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). the defendants' website is a service, privilege, or advantage of the defendants' locations. The defendants' website is a service that is heavily integrated with these locations and is a gateway thereto. 51. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 53. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 55. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, the plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 56. The plaintiff, on behalf of the plaintiff and the New York State sub-class, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 57. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation … because of the … disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof. 58. The defendants' physical locations are located in State of New York and throughout the United States and constitute sales establishments and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). The defendants' website is a service, privilege or advantage of the defendants. The defendants' website is a service that is heavily integrated with these physical locations and is a gateway thereto. 59. The defendants are subject to the NYSHRL because they own and operate their physical locations and website. The defendants are persons within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 61. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(i), unlawful discriminatory practice includes, among other things, a refusal to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless such person can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations being offered or would result in an undue burden. 62. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(ii), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 63. Readily available, well-established guidelines exist on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other large business entities and government agencies in making their website accessible, including but not limited to: adding alt-text to graphics and ensuring that all functions can be performed using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make its website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of the defendants' business nor result in an undue burden to the defendants. 65. The defendants have failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 66. The defendants discriminate, and will continue to discriminate against the plaintiff and the New York State sub-class on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of the defendants' website and its physical locations under § 296(2), et seq., and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins the defendants from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, the plaintiff and the New York State sub-class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 67. The defendants' actions were and are in violation of NYSHRL and therefore the plaintiff and the New York State sub-class invoke their right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 68. The plaintiff and the New York State sub-class are also entitled to compensatory damages, and civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c), et seq., for each and every offense. 70. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, the plaintiff and the New York State sub-class pray for judgment as set forth below. 71. The plaintiff, on behalf of the plaintiff and the New York State sub-class, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 72. The plaintiff served notice thereof upon the attorney general as required by N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41. 73. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40 provides that all persons within the jurisdiction of this state shall be entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of any places of public accommodations, resort or amusement, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons. No persons, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or employee of any such place shall directly or indirectly refuse, withhold from, or deny to any person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof …. 74. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) provides that no person because of … disability, as such term is defined in section two hundred ninety-two of executive law, be subjected to any discrimination in his or her civil rights, or to any harassment, as defined in section 240.25 of the penal law, in the exercise thereof, by any other person or by any firm, corporation or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision. 76. The defendants are subject to NYSCRL because it owns and operates the defendants' physical locations and website. The defendants are persons within the meaning of N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2). 77. The defendants are violating N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to the defendants' website, causing the defendants' website and the services integrated with the defendants' physical locations to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that the defendants make available to the non-disabled public. 78. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41 states any corporation which shall violate any of the provisions of sections forty, forty-a, forty-b or forty-two … shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby. 79. Under N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-d, any person who shall violate any of the provisions of the foregoing section, or subdivision three of section 240.30 or section 240.31 of the penal law, or who shall aid or incite the violation of any of said provisions shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby in any court of competent jurisdiction in the county in which the defendant shall reside. 81. The defendants discriminated, and will continue to discriminate, against the plaintiff and the New York State sub-class on the basis of disability and the plaintiff and the New York State sub-class are being directly or indirectly refused, withheld from, or denied the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof in § 40, et seq., and/or its implementing regulations. 82. The plaintiff and the New York State sub-class are entitled to compensatory damages of five hundred dollars per instance, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40, et seq., for each and every offense. 83. The plaintiff, on behalf of the plaintiff and the New York City sub-class, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 84. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that, It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of … disability … directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof. 85. The defendants' locations are sales establishments and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-102(9), and their website is a service that is heavily integrated with its establishments and is a gateway thereto. 87. The defendants are violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to website, causing its website and the services integrated with its physical locations to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods, and services that the defendants make available to the non-disabled public. 88. The defendants are required to make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities … any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107, et seq.,] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to … enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity. N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). 89. The defendants' actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the New York sub- class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a) in that the defendants have: constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 90. The defendants have failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 92. The defendants' actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore the plaintiff and the New York City subclass invokes their right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 93. The plaintiff and the New York City subclass are also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense. 94. The plaintiff and the New York City subclass are also entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees and costs. 95. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein the plaintiff and the New York City subclass pray for judgment as set forth below. 96. The plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the class, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 98. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. ADA DECLARATORY RELIEF Defendant’s Barriers on Its Website NYCHRL NYSHRL NYSCRL

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10. This telephone call by Defendant was in violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1). 11. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and on behalf of and all others similarly situated (“the Class”). 23. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 24. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant constitute numerous and multiple negligent violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. 25. As a result of Defendant’s negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq, Plaintiff and The Classes are entitled to an award of $500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). 26. Plaintiff and the The Classes are also entitled to and seek injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. 27. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 28. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant constitute numerous and multiple knowing and/or willful violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. 3. On or about November 2011 Plaintiff’s wife was offered a line of credit by Defendant. During the process of obtaining credit, Plaintiff’s wife at no point gave Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number to Defendant. 4. Sometime thereafter Plaintiff’s wife allegedly fell behind on her line of credit with Defendant. 5. On or about April 2012 Plaintiff received numerous telephone call/s on his cellular telephone from Defendant where Defendant used “an artificial or prerecorded voice” as prohibited by 47 U.S.C. § 227 (b)(1)(A). This conduct continued on almost a daily basis for approximately two months. 6. The telephone number Defendant called was assigned to a cellular telephone service for which Plaintiff incurs a charge for incoming calls pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227 (b)(1). 7. This telephone call constituted a call that was not for emergency purposes as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227 (b)(1)(A)(i). 8. Plaintiff did not provide express consent to Defendant to receive calls on Plaintiff’s cellular telephone, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227 (b)(1)(A). 9. Plaintiff did not provide “prior express consent” to Defendant to place telephone calls to Plaintiff’s cellular phone with an artificial or prerecorded voice as proscribed under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A). Cite the U.S. Civil Statute under which you are filing (Do not cite jurisdictional statutes unless diversity): Brief description of cause: VII. REQUESTED IN KNOWING AND/OR WILLFUL VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. NEGLIGENT VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. THE TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. • As a result of Defendant’s negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1), Plaintiff seeks for himself and each Class and Subclass member $500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). • Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(A), injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. • Any other relief the Court may deem just and proper.

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1. All store managers were instructed to cover up and conceal the Vendor Code "BBLF 3425" and the words "California 93120 Compliant for Formaldehyde Phase 2" on all product labels affixed to store inventory of the Formaldehyde Flooring, by affixing new labels that did not contain the identification of the mill or contain the CARB compliance language; 2. Managers were told FND would ship new labels to each of its stores throughout the United States, which were to be placed directly over the original labels concealing the vendor code and the CARB compliance language on the Formaldehyde Flooring; 21. On or about March 1, 2015, the CBS News television show "60 Minutes" aired an investigative report exposing that Lumber Liquidators had sold Chinese-made laminate to customers in the United States which contained formaldehyde levels which violated the CARB Regulations. 22. FND knew that its Formaldehyde Flooring was manufactured by the same mills in China exposed in the "60 Minutes" story as having manufactured and labeled laminate flooring for Lumber Liquidators as CARB compliant, when in fact such flooring contained dangerous levels of formaldehyde in excess of the CARB Regulations. 23. FND had sold Formaldehyde Flooring which violated the CARB Regulations for years, and FND feared its actions would be exposed if consumers learned the identity of the Chinese mills which manufactured its Formaldehyde Flooring. 25. As a result, FND devised a scheme to conceal the identity of the Chinese mills which manufactured its Formaldehyde Flooring and to quickly remove all product labels claiming its Formaldehyde Flooring was "California CARB Complaint." 26. Within days of the airing of the "60 Minutes" episode, FND management held a telephonic conference call with all of its store managers across the country and announced the following plan of action, which in fact was implemented: 27. This plan was carried out by FND to conceal the defective nature of its flooring from potential customers and prevent the customers who had previously purchased the flooring from discovering that it was made at the same factories used by Lumber Liquidators, as exposed in the "60 Minutes" television show. 28. Despite the fact that the Formaldehyde Flooring fails to meet CARB requirements for formaldehyde emissions, Defendant has made representations to the contrary on the product packaging for the Formaldehyde Flooring. 29. At all times relevant to this action, Defendant has knowingly misrepresented its laminate wood flooring products as CARB compliant and knowingly concealed, omitted or failed to disclose to Plaintiffs, Class Members and consumers the unlawful levels of formaldehyde emissions from its Formaldehyde Flooring. 3. Store managers were authorized to approve overtime for sales associates to re-label the Formaldehyde Flooring inventory in the stores after-hours; 32. This action may properly be maintained as a class action pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 23. 33. Class Definition: Plaintiffs seek to represent a class composed of all persons in the United States who purchased Formaldehyde Flooring from the time of its introduction in the marketplace through and including the date of class notice (the “national class”). The national class asserts claims under the common law and the Magnuson-Moss Act. Alternatively, if the national class is not certified, Plaintiffs request that classes asserting these claims be certified in California, Georgia, Nevada, Texas, and Tennessee (“the alternative state classes”). 34. In addition to the national and alternative state classes described in the preceding paragraph, Plaintiffs assert claims under state statutes on behalf of subclasses in California, Georgia, Nevada, Texas and Tennessee (the “state statutory subclasses”). The proposed national class, alternative state classes, and the state statutory subclasses are collectively referred to in this complaint as the “Class.” 36. Plaintiffs reserve the right to amend the Class definitions if discovery and further investigation reveal that any of the classes should be expanded, limited, or otherwise modified. 37. The proposed classes meets all of the requirements to be certified under Rule 23, including the four criteria of Rule 23(a) and the criteria of Rule 23(b)(3). Rule 23(a) 38. Numerosity: The Class is so numerous that the individual joinder of all members of the Class is impractical under the circumstances of this case. While the exact number of members of the Class is unknown to Plaintiffs at this time, Plaintiffs are informed and believe the national class has tens of thousands of members and each of the state classes and subclasses have thousands of members. 42. Predominance: The common issues of law and fact predominate over any individual issues. 44. There are no unusual management difficulties posed by this litigation that would preclude its maintenance as a class action. To the contrary, concentrating all of the claims in a single forum would provide substantial efficiencies and economies of scale. 45. Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, adopt and incorporate by reference all foregoing allegations as though fully set forth herein. 46. FND warranted that its flooring was free of defects when it sold those products to Plaintiffs and the members of the Class as described in this Complaint. 48. These representations became the basis of the bargain when Plaintiffs and the Class Members purchased the Formaldehyde Flooring. 49. Plaintiffs and Class Members relied on FND’s express warranties and representations and would not have purchased the Formaldehyde Flooring (or the homes in which they were installed) if it had been disclosed that the Formaldehyde Flooring did not conform to FND’s express representations and warranties. 5. Commencing on or about March 25, 2015, FND began adding the words "May not meet California air STNDs" in small print at the bottom of the store receipt of each customer who purchased the Formaldehyde Flooring with the new labels. 50. FND breached their warranties by: a. Manufacturing, selling and/or distributing flooring that exceeds the CARB formaldehyde standards; b. Manufacturing, importing, selling and/or distributing flooring that fails to comply with all applicable laws and regulations; and c. Refusing to honor the express warranty by refusing to properly repair or replace the defective flooring. 51. Plaintiffs and Class Members have complied with all conditions precedent and provided FND with adequate notice. 52. FND was also on notice regarding the excessively high levels of formaldehyde in its flooring from the complaints and requests for refund it received from Class Members, Internet message boards and from published product reviews. 54. As a direct and proximate result of FND’s misconduct, Plaintiffs and the other Class Members have suffered damages and continue to suffer damages, including economic damages at the point of sale. Additionally, Plaintiffs and the other Class Members have either incurred or will incur economic damages at the point of repair in the form of the cost of repair and/or the cost of purchasing non- defective flooring to replace the FND flooring. 55. Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, adopt and incorporate by reference all foregoing allegations as though fully set forth herein. 56. By placing its Formaldehyde Flooring in the stream of commerce, Defendant impliedly warranted that its Formaldehyde Flooring was reasonably safe for its intended use, i.e., to provide flooring without exposing consumers to excess levels of formaldehyde gas. 58. Defendant’s Formaldehyde Flooring was not reasonably safe for its intended use when it left Defendant’s control and entered the market. 59. The Formaldehyde Flooring defects were not open or obvious to consumers. 60. Privity of contract exists between FND and Plaintiffs and the Class. 61. Specifically, Plaintiffs and Class Members have had sufficient direct dealings with FND and/or its authorized dealers, franchisees, representatives, and agents to establish privity of contract. 62. Plaintiffs and Class Members are also intended third-party beneficiaries of contracts, including express warranties, between FND and its dealers, franchisees, representatives, and agents. 63. Furthermore, FND’s advertisements were directed at Plaintiffs and Class Members, and FND’s warranties were expressly written for the benefit of Plaintiffs and Class Members as end users. FND’s authorized dealers, franchisees, representatives, and agents, on the other hand, were not intended to be the ultimate consumers, and have no rights under the warranty agreements provided by FND. 65. FND manufactured and sold its Formaldehyde Flooring to Plaintiffs and the Class Members, and, in so doing, impliedly warranted to them that the product was of merchantable quality and fit for its intended use. 66. FND’s Formaldehyde Flooring was not of merchantable quality and not fit for intended use when it left the factory due to the defects in the flooring described in this Complaint. 67. FND’s Formaldehyde Flooring would not pass without objection in the trade under FND’s product description. 68. The numerous and serious defects described in this Complaint make the Formaldehyde Flooring unfit and inappropriate for its intended use. 69. As a result, FND breached its implied warranties to Plaintiffs and Class Members by producing, manufacturing, distributing and selling to them a defective product that was unfit for its intended use and for a particular purpose. 70. As a direct and proximate result of FND’s breach of its implied warranties, Plaintiffs and Class Members have suffered actual and consequential damages. 72. Defendant advertised and/or marketed its Formaldehyde Flooring to be safe and of good quality free from defects. Defendant also represented that the Formaldehyde Flooring would perform in its reasonably expected operation use for its full life and was CARB compliant. 73. In order to cut costs, Defendant did not ensure that the Formaldehyde Flooring was CARB compliant. 74. FND failed to disclose that its Formaldehyde Flooring was not CARB compliant and defective, as described above, and that the Design Defect posed a serious risk of personal injury. 75. These facts were not known or reasonably knowable to Plaintiffs and the Class. 76. Defendant knew of the Design Defect from its performance of standard testing prior to placing the Formaldehyde Flooring into the stream of commerce. 78. Defendant knew or should have known that Plaintiffs and the Class relied upon Defendant to sell laminate wood flooring that was not defective and did not pose an unreasonable risk of harm. 79. Defendant’s knowledge that its Formaldehyde Flooring was defective combined with Defendant’s knowledge that Plaintiffs and the Class relied or rely upon Defendant to communicate the true state of facts relating to its Formaldehyde Flooring creates a legal obligation on Defendant to disclose to Plaintiffs and the Class these facts. 80. Defendant is in a superior position to know the truth about, and the nature of, the Formaldehyde Flooring. 81. Defendant intended and intends to deceive Plaintiffs and the Class by failing to disclose that the Formaldehyde Flooring is defective and poses an unreasonable risk of harm to consumers. 83. Plaintiffs and the Class were harmed. As a proximate result of Defendant’s conduct, Plaintiffs and the Class will now be required to remedy the Design Defect, described above, so as to avoid the distinct likelihood that they may suffer personal injury. In addition, Plaintiffs and the Class Members have suffered damages, which include, but are not limited to, the cost to repair the Design Defect. 84. FND’s concealment was a substantial factor in causing that harm. 85. The wrongful conduct of Defendant was willful, oppressive, immoral, unethical, unscrupulous, substantially injurious, malicious, and/or in conscious disregard for the wellbeing of Plaintiffs and the Class along with other members of the public who may be personally injured by the excessive levels of formaldehyde gas emitted from the Formaldehyde Flooring. 86. Defendant caused injury to the Plaintiffs and the Class, placing profits over safety. In so doing, Defendant acted willfully and in conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others and subjected, and continues to subject, Plaintiffs and the Class to cruel and unjust hardship. 88. FND made representations about the Formaldehyde Flooring to Plaintiffs, Class Members, and their agents or predecessors, as set forth in this Complaint. 89. Those representations were false. 90. When FND made the representations, it knew or should have known the representations were untrue or it had a disregard for whether the representations were true. 91. FND knew that Plaintiffs, Class Members, and their agents or predecessors, were relying on the representations. 92. In reliance upon the representations, Plaintiffs and Class Members purchased the Formaldehyde Flooring and installed it in their homes. 93. As a direct and proximate result of FND’s negligent misrepresentations, Plaintiffs and Class Members have been damaged as set forth in this Complaint. 95. Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, adopt and incorporate by reference all foregoing allegations as though fully set forth herein. 96. FND owed a duty to Plaintiffs and Class Members to use reasonable care to ensure that its products did not pose an unreasonable risk of personal injury and, in particular, to ensure that its laminated flooring did not contain excessive levels of formaldehyde. FND’s duty arose under the common law and by virtue of regulations restricting the levels of formaldehyde in its laminated flooring. 97. FND breached its duty of care by distributing, marketing, and selling the Formaldehyde Flooring to Plaintiffs and Class Members without ensuring that the flooring did not contain excessive levels of formaldehyde and thus was negligent. FND’s negligent acts and omissions include, but are not limited to, failing to adequately test the flooring before its sale; failing to determine that the flooring coming from China was CARB compliant; and failing to adequately and appropriately supervise and monitor the manufacture of the flooring. BREACH OF IMPLIED WARRANTIES (Brought by the National and Alternative State Classes) BREACH OF EXPRESS WARRANTY (Brought by the National and Alternative State Classes) FRAUDULENT CONCEALMENT (Brought by the National and Alternative State Classes) NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION (Brought by the National and Alternative State Law Classes) NEGLIGENCE (Brought by the National and Alternative State Classes) UNJUST ENRICHMENT (Pleading in the Alternative) (Brought by the National and Alternative State Law Classes)

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15. Plaintiff seeks to bring this suit to recover from Defendants his full payment of all unpaid overtime compensation and liquidated damages under the applicable provisions of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), individually, on his own behalf, as well as on behalf of those in the following collective: Current and former employees of Defendants who, during the applicable FLSA limitations period, performed any work for Defendants as non-managerial construction laborers who give consent to file a claim to recover damages for overtime compensation that is legally due to them for time worked in excess of forty hours per week (“FLSA Plaintiffs”). 16. Defendants treated Plaintiff and all FLSA Plaintiffs similarly in that Plaintiff and all FLSA Plaintiffs: (1) performed similar tasks, as described in the “Background Facts” section below; (2) were subject to the same laws and regulations; (3) were paid in the same or similar manner; (4) were required to work in excess of forty hours each workweek; and (5) were not paid the required rate of one and one-half times their respective regular rates of pay for all hours worked over forty in a workweek. 5 17. At all relevant times, Defendants were aware of the requirement to pay Plaintiff and all FLSA Plaintiffs at an amount equal to one and one-half times their respective regular rates of pay for all hours worked each workweek above forty, yet Defendants purposefully chose not to do so. Thus, Plaintiff and all FLSA Plaintiffs are victims of Defendants’ pervasive practice of willfully refusing to pay their employees overtime compensation, in violation of the FLSA. 18. In addition, Plaintiff seeks to maintain this action as a class action pursuant to FRCP 23(b)(3), on his own behalf, as well as on behalf of those who are similarly-situated whom, during the applicable statutory period, Defendants also subjected to violations of the NYLL and the 31. From at least six years prior to the commencement of this action until on or about July 26, 2016, Defendant BSI was engaged in the construction business, and provided its services to customers in Long Island and New York City. 32. During at least that period of time, Defendant Messina was the principal shareholder and day-to-day overseer of BSI, who in that capacity was responsible for determining employees’ rates and methods of pay and the hours that employees were required to work. Furthermore, Defendant Messina personally hired Plaintiff and all other BSI employees. 33. On or about July 26, 2016, Defendant Messina sold Defendant BSI’s construction business to Defendant Villansaca, who reincorporated the business as BSBI. 9 34. Defendant BSBI, as the successor entity of Defendant BSI, assumed liability for all debts, legal obligations and claims against Defendant BSI. 35. The reincorporated business, BSBI, continued to employ Plaintiff and all other persons employed as construction laborers by BSI at the time of the sale of the business, and BSBI has continued and continues to provide its construction services to customers in Long Island and New York City. 36. Defendant Villansaca is the principal shareholder and day-to-day overseer of BSBI who in that capacity is responsible for determining employees’ rates and methods of pay and the hours that employees are required to work. Furthermore, Defendant Villansaca personally hired all BSBI employees after the date of sale, and personally fired Plaintiff and any other BSBI employees whose employment has been terminated since then. 37. Defendants employed Plaintiff to work as a construction worker at BSI and BSBI, collectively, from in or about September 2011 to February 16, 2017. Throughout his employment, Plaintiff’s duties mainly consisted of preparing and grading the sites of masonry work, laying cement, setting and mortaring bricks, stones, and similar materials, carrying materials and tools, and keeping work areas clean. Plaintiff primarily performed these tasks at different job sites in Long Island and in New York City. 38. Throughout the entirety of his employment, first for BSI and continuing for BSBI, Plaintiff worked from 6:30 a.m. to 5:30 p.m., five days per week, with a thirty-minute lunch break each day, for a total of fifty-two and one-half hours per week. 39. Throughout the entirety of his employment, first for BSI and continuing for BSBI, as reflected on his paystubs, Defendants paid Plaintiff an hourly rate of $17.00 for only the first forty hours that Plaintiff worked each week. 10 40. Throughout his entire employment, Defendants did not pay Plaintiff at any rate of pay, let alone his overtime rate of pay of $25.50 per hour, for any hours that he worked in excess of forty per week. 41. Plaintiff worked more than forty hours in all workweeks in which Defendants employed him. For example, during the workweek of June 12, 2016 to June 18, 2016, Plaintiff worked fifty-two and one-half hours and Defendants paid him $17.00 per hour for only his first forty hours of work. As a second example, during the workweek of February 5, 2017 to February 11, 2017, Plaintiff worked fifty-two and one-half hours and Defendants paid him $17.00 per hour for only his first forty hours of work. Defendants did not compensate Plaintiff at any rate of pay for any hours that he worked in excess of forty in either of those weeks. 42. Defendants paid Plaintiff on a weekly basis. 43. On each occasion when they paid Plaintiff, Defendants did not provide Plaintiff with a wage statement that accurately reflected, inter alia, the amount of hours that he worked each week, or his overtime rates of pay for each hour that he worked in excess of forty in a given workweek. 44. Defendants did not furnish Plaintiff at the time of his hire, or any time thereafter, with a wage notice that accurately stated, inter alia, his rate(s) of pay, including any overtime rate of pay. 45. Defendants treated Plaintiff, FLSA Plaintiffs, and Rule 23 Plaintiffs in the same manner described herein. 46. Defendants acted in the manner described herein so as to maximize their profits while minimizing their labor costs. 11 47. Every hour that Plaintiff, FLSA Plaintiffs, and Rule 23 Plaintiffs worked was for Defendants’ benefit. 48. On October 13, 2015, a prior legal action was commenced against Defendant BSI and Defendant Messina in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York in a case entitled “Juan Mayancela v. Bridgehampton Stone, Inc. and Daniel Messina,” under Docket Number 15-cv-05866 (SJF)(AYS). 49. Plaintiff and FLSA Plaintiffs repeat, reiterate, and re-allege each and every allegation set forth above with the same force and effect as if more fully set forth herein. 50. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a) requires employers to compensate their employees at a rate not less than one and one-half times their regular rates of pay for any hours worked exceeding forty in a workweek. 51. As described above, Defendants are employers within the meaning of the FLSA while Plaintiff and FLSA Plaintiffs are employees within the meaning of the FLSA. 52. As also described above, Plaintiff and FLSA Plaintiffs worked in excess of forty hours in a workweek, yet Defendants failed to compensate Plaintiff and FLSA Plaintiffs in accordance with the FLSA’s overtime provisions. 53. Defendants willfully violated the FLSA. 54. Plaintiff and FLSA Plaintiffs are entitled to overtime pay for all hours worked per week in excess of forty at the rate of one and one-half times their respective regular rates of pay. 55. Plaintiff and FLSA Plaintiffs are also entitled to liquidated damages and attorneys’ fees for Defendants’ violations of the FLSA’s overtime provisions. 12 56. Plaintiff, Rule 23 Plaintiffs, and any FLSA Plaintiff who opts-in to this action repeat, reiterate, and re-allege each and every allegation set forth above with the same force and effect as if more fully set forth herein. 57. NYLL § 160 and 12 NYCCRR § 142-2.2 require employers to compensate their employees at a rate not less than one and one-half times their regular rates of pay for any hours worked exceeding forty in a workweek. 58. As described above, Defendants are employers within the meaning of the NYLL and the NYCCRR, while Plaintiff, Rule 23 Plaintiffs, and any FLSA Plaintiff who opts-in to this action are employees within the meaning of the NYLL and the NYCCRR. 59. As also described above, Plaintiff, Rule 23 Plaintiffs, and any FLSA Plaintiff who opts-in to this action worked in excess of forty hours in a workweek, yet Defendants failed to compensate them in accordance with the NYLL’s and the NYCCRR’s overtime provisions. 60. Plaintiff, Rule 23 Plaintiffs, and any FLSA Plaintiff who opts-in to this action are entitled to their overtime pay for all hours worked per week in excess of forty at the rate of one and one-half times their respective regular rates of pay. 61. Plaintiff, Rule 23 Plaintiffs, and any FLSA Plaintiff who opts-in to this action are also entitled to liquidated damages, interest, and attorneys’ fees for Defendants’ violations of the NYLL’s and NYCCRR’s overtime provisions. 13 62. Plaintiff, Rule 23 Plaintiffs, and any FLSA Plaintiff who opts-in to this action repeat, reiterate, and re-allege each and every allegation set forth above with the same force and effect as if fully set forth herein. 63. NYLL § 195(1) requires that employers provide employees with a wage notice at the time of hire containing accurate, specifically enumerated criteria. 64. As described above, Defendants are employers within the meaning of the NYLL and the NYCCRR, while Plaintiff, Rule 23 Plaintiffs, and any FLSA Plaintiff who opts-in to this action are employees within the meaning of the NYLL and the NYCCRR. 65. As also described above, Defendants failed to furnish Plaintiff, Rule 23 Plaintiffs, and any FLSA Plaintiff who opts-in to this action with accurate wage notices upon hire, or at any time thereafter, containing the criteria required under the NYLL. 66. Prior to February 27, 2015, pursuant to NYLL § 198(1-b), Defendants are liable to Plaintiff, Rule 23 Plaintiffs, and any FLSA Plaintiff who opts-in to this action in the amount of $50 for each workweek after the violation occurred, up to the statutory cap of $2,500. 67. On or after February 27, 2015, pursuant to NYLL § 198(1-b), Defendants are liable to Plaintiff, Rule 23 Plaintiffs, and any FLSA Plaintiff who opts-in to this action in the amount of $50 for each day after the violation occurred, up to the statutory cap of $5,000. Failure to Furnish Proper Wage Notice in Violation of the NYLL Unpaid Overtime Under the NYLL and the NYCCRR Unpaid Overtime Under the FLSA

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(Unjust Enrichment) (Violation of Massachusetts Unfair Trade Practices Act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A) 18. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges the allegations contained in the paragraphs above as iffully set forth herein. 20. Restoration Hardware is a corporation that accepts credit cards for retail transactions. 21. When a consumer uses credit cards at Restoration Hardware's retail stores in Massachusetts, a Restoration Hardware employee requests that consumer's ZIP code. The Restoration Hardware employee then writes that ZIP code into the credit card transaction form, which is on the computerized check-out register used to process the point-of-sale transaction. Consumers typically provide this information in the mistaken beliefthat providing a ZIP code is necessary to complete the transaction. 22. The ZIP code is part ofa credit card holder's address, and is therefore personal identification information under Mass. Gen. Laws Ch. 93 § IOS(a). Restoration Hardware and other retailers are also able to use a customer's name and ZIP code to determine their address or telephone number using commercially available databases. 23. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93 § lOS(c) provides that the collection ofpersonal identification information is a per se violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A § 2: "Any violation ofthe provisions ofthis chapter shall be deemed to be an unfair and deceptive trade practice, as defined in section 2 of chapter 93A." 25. Plaintiff and the Class have been injured by Restoration Hardware's collection of ZIP codes and Defendant's subsequent use oftheir personal identification information. Mass. Gen. Laws. Ch. 93 § 105 creates a protected privacy interest held by consumers in not having to divulge personal identification information, including their ZIP codes, merely to use a credit card. In addition, Plaintiffand the Class were injured by Restoration Hardware appropriation and use oftheir economically valuable personal identification information without consideration, and the profit derived from Defendant's use of Plaintiffs and the Class's ZIP codes is a measure oftheir damages. Plaintiffand the Class were also injured by the receipt ofunwanted junk mail from Restoration Hardware. 26. In compliance with Mass. Gen. Laws. Ch. 93A § 9(3), on March 15,2013, Plaintiffs counsel sent Defendant a written demand for relief by Federal Express, identifying Ms. Monteferrante as a claimant and reasonably describing the unfair or deceptive act alleged herein and the injury she and other Class members suffered. 27. Plaintiffrepeats and re-alleges the allegations contained in the paragraphs above as if fully set forth herein. 28. Defendant knowingly and willingly accepted benefits from Plaintiff and the Class, to wit, their economically valuable personal identification information which Defendant used for its own profit, while providing Plaintiff and the Class nothing in return.

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-13- 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 10. Defendant contacted or attempted to contact Plaintiff from the telephone number (858) 224-7373. 18. Plaintiff brings this action individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, as a member the two proposed classes (hereafter, jointly, “The Classes”). 51. Pursuant to the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America, Plaintiff is entitled to, and demands, a trial by jury. Respectfully Submitted this 22nd Day of September, 2016. 8. Beginning in or around May 27, 2016, Defendant contacted Plaintiff on Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number ending in -1554, in an attempt to solicit Plaintiff to purchase Defendant’s services. 9. Defendant used an “automatic telephone dialing system”, as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1) to place its call to Plaintiff seeking to solicit its services. Knowing and/or Willful Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)  As a result of Defendant’s willful and/or knowing violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1), Plaintiff and the ATDS Class members are entitled to and request treble damages, as provided by statute, up to $1,500, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(3)(C).  Any and all other relief that the Court deems just and proper. Negligent Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)  As a result of Defendant’s negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. §227(c)(5), Plaintiff and the DNC Class members are entitled to and request $500 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. 227(c)(5).  Any and all other relief that the Court deems just and proper.

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12. Plaintiff brings claims, pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (hereinafter “FRCP”) Rule 23, individually and on behalf of the following consumer class (the “Class”): • Plaintiff brings this action individually and as a class action on behalf of all persons similarly situated in the State of New York from whom Defendant attempted to collect a consumer debt using the same unlawful form letter herein, from one year before the date of this Complaint to the present. • The Class satisfies all the requirements of Rule 23 of the FRCP for maintaining a class action: 13. The Class satisfies all the requirements of Rule 23 of the FRCP for maintaining a class action: ● Upon information and belief, the Class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable because there are hundreds and/or thousands of persons who have received debt collection letters and/or notices from Defendant that violate specific provisions of the FDCPA. Plaintiff is complaining of a standard form letter and/or notice that is sent to hundreds of persons (See Exhibit A, except that the undersigned attorney has, in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.2 partially redacted the financial account numbers in an effort to protect Plaintiff’s privacy); ● There are questions of law and fact which are common to the Class and which predominate over questions affecting any individual Class member. These common questions of law and fact include, without limitation: a. Whether Defendant violated various provisions of the FDCPA; b. Whether Plaintiff and the Class have been injured by Defendant’s conduct; c. Whether Plaintiff and the Class have sustained damages and are entitled to restitution as a result of Defendant’s wrongdoing and if so, what is the proper measure and appropriate statutory formula to be applied in determining such damages and restitution; and d. Whether Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to declaratory and/or injunctive relief. ● Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class, which all arise from the same operative facts and are based on the same legal theories. ● Plaintiff has no interest adverse or antagonistic to the interest of the other members of the Class. ● Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interest of the Class and has retained experienced and competent attorneys to represent the Class. ● A Class Action is superior to other methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the claims herein asserted. Plaintiff anticipates that no unusual difficulties are likely to be encountered in the management of this class action. ● A Class Action will permit large numbers of similarly situated persons to prosecute their common claims in a single forum simultaneously and without the duplication of effort and expense that numerous individual actions would engender. Class treatment will also permit the adjudication of relatively small claims by many Class members who could not otherwise afford to seek legal redress for the wrongs complained of herein. Absent a Class Action, class members will continue to suffer losses of statutory protected rights as well as monetary damages. If Defendant’s conduct is allowed to proceed without remedy, it will continue to reap and retain the proceeds of its ill-gotten gains. ● Defendant has acted on grounds generally applicable to the entire Class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the Class as a whole. 14. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs numbered “1” through “13” herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 15. Defendant collects and attempts to collect debts incurred or alleged to have been incurred for personal, family or household purposes on behalf of creditors using the United States Postal Services, telephone, facsimile, and Internet. 16. Upon information and belief, within the last year Defendant commenced efforts to collect an alleged consumer “debt” as defined by 15 U.S.C. 1692a(5), when it mailed a Collection Letter to Plaintiff seeking to collect on an unpaid account allegedly owed to JTM Capital Management, LLC. 17. On or around April 3, 2017, Defendant sent Plaintiff a collection letter (hereinafter, the “Letter”). See Exhibit A. 18. The Letter was sent or caused to be sent by persons employed by Defendant as a “debt collector” as defined by 15 U.S.C. §1692a(6). 19. The Letter is a “communication” as defined by 15 U.S.C. §1692a(2). 20. The Letter states in pertinent part: “Northstar would like to offer you a payment arrangement on your account…should you wish to take advantage of this option, your first payment should be received no later than 04/18/17…” 21. As a result of the following Counts, Defendant violated the FDCPA. First Count Violation of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e, et seq. False or Misleading Representations as to the Rights of the Consumer 22. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs numbered “1” through “21” herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 23. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e prohibits a debt collector from using any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt. 24. While § 1692e specifically prohibits certain practices, the list is non-exhaustive, and does not preclude a claim of falsity or deception based on any non-enumerated practice. 25. Collection letters are deceptive if they can be reasonably read to have two or more different meanings, one of which is inaccurate. 26. Said offer falsely states or implies that the respective settlement offer is valid only if payment is received “no later than 04/18/17.” 27. Statements that a settlement offer is a “limited time offer,” or that the offer expires on a specific date, or that payments must be received by that date, are false and misleading because the same offer is, upon information and belief, available at any time. 28. Such false statements are materially false statements, as they impart in the unsophisticated consumer, a false belief that he or she must hurry to take advantage of a limited time opportunity, when in reality, there is no such time limit. 29. The Seventh Circuit has established “safe harbor” language regarding settlement offers in collection letters: As in previous cases in which we have created safe-harbor language for use in cases under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, we think the present concern can be adequately addressed yet the unsophisticated consumer still be protected against receiving a false impression of his options by the debt collector's including with the offer the following language: “We are not obligated to renew this offer.” The word “obligated” is strong and even the unsophisticated consumer will realize that there is a renewal possibility but that it is not assured. Evory v. RJM Acquisitions Funding L.L.C., 505 F.3d 769, 775-76 (7th Cir. 2007). 30. Defendant did not use the safe harbor language in its communication to Plaintiff. 31. Upon information and belief, the deadline in Exhibit A to respond to the settlement offer is a sham. There is no actual deadline. The sole purpose of the purported deadline is to impart in the consumer a false sense of urgency. 32. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e generally prohibits “any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt.” 33. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10) specifically prohibits the “use of any false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt.” 34. 15 U.S.C. § 1692f generally prohibits “unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt.” 35. The statement in Defendant’s April 3, 2017 Letter is false and misleading, in violation of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e, 1692e(2), and 1692e(10). 36. Defendant could have taken the steps necessary to bring its actions within compliance of the FDCPA, but neglected to do so and failed to adequately review its actions to ensure conformance to the law.

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11. E. The DeLeon Foreclosure 25. The Estates Defendants solicit investments from individuals and businesses across North Carolina to take part in a “system” that coordinates bidding on foreclosures in North Carolina. 27. Upon information and belief, the Estates Database provides a broad range of real estate and related information that is compiled from public information. The Estates Database includes real estate data along with the Estates Defendants’ opinions on the properties, such as the potential equity in the property and potential profits from a purchase at a foreclosure sale. 28. Pursuant to the Timbra Agreement, the Estates Defendants receive the following different types of fees or compensation involved with the acquisition of any property through the Estates Database: a. Monthly User Fee – a monthly user fee of $99.97 for the first county and $50.00 per month for each additional county; b. Acquisition Fee to Timbra – Timbra receives an acquisition fee for any properties acquired from the Estates Database; c. Profit Splits – There are several profit-sharing arrangements between the Estates Defendants and the members, with “simple” transactions – defined as a simple bid with no strategy and simple offer – having a profit split of 2/3 to the Member and 1/3 to the Estates Defendants. 29. Persons who have contracted with the Estates to obtain information about properties being sold at foreclosure and who agree to bid on those properties through the Estates are referred to in this Complaint as “Members” of the Estates. 31. Upon information and belief, Members are required to use real estate agents and/or brokers who are selected by the Estates. If Members want to use outside agents and/or brokers, then the Estates must approve them. 32. Upon information and belief, Members are required to use closing attorneys selected by the Estates. 33. Members of the Estates are required to establish separate companies to participate in each foreclosure sale. 34. In some cases there are companies established for the sole purpose of placing a bid and a second company to actually purchase the property. 35. Upon information and belief this fragmented structure is designed both to mask the involvement of the Estates in the transaction and to make it difficult to discovery the coordinated nature of the bidding at numerous foreclosures. 36. Carolyn Souther, a Member, has testified under oath in another proceeding that all Members enter into a non-compete agreement. A copy of relevant portions of Souther’s testimony quoted in this Complaint at Paragraphs 39 to 44 is attached as Exhibit 2. 37. Under the terms of the Timbra Agreement, the Members are given access to multiple properties facing foreclosure. 39. Souther, in testimony given under oath in another proceeding, described the bid-rigging process in some detail: Q. Does The Estates coordinate which properties get bidded on, is that done through the database? A. No, the database simply gives us properties. Q. What happens if three investors want to bid on a property? A. I don't know. If I want to bid on something, and someone else says, I want to bid, one of us needs to back down. Q. What do you mean back down? A. I don't want to bid -- if I know somebody -- even way back, if I knew that someone wanted to buy a property and I did as well, I'll say no, you take this one, I'll go work on another one. So, we're not bidding against, again, my friend.1 … Through The Estates -- I know what you're asking. You're saying through The Estates is it -- So, we know if one us is bidding on a property, then the others go back for another, or we find a different property. Souther Deposition 57:6-22, 58:7-11. 42. She also testified: Q. Do[es] [The Estates] have to approve, saying yes, no, you can go bid on this property because they cleared it in terms of the other investors? A. Again, we don't cross bids. If someone is interested in a property, I'm not going to bid against them, or will they bid against me. That's probably within the organization. Souther Deposition at 99:16-23. 43. Information regarding who is bidding can be entered into the Estates Database so that other members can track who has and has not bid. 45. For example, on October 4, 2017, Souther sent an email to Newell in which she expressed concern that she might not have properly indicated in the Estates database that she intended to purchase a 20307 Southshore Dr., Cornelius, NC: I have been working this property over a week, and just realized that I may not have hit BUY as I could not find my BUY IT email. So, I hit BUY to make sure I was in position, and it came up 2nd position. Am I in 1st AND 2nd, or is someone else ahead of me? A copy of Souther’s email is attached as Exhibit 3. 46. Newell responded: I looked on Huchens [a foreclosure law firm] website. They post there [sic] sales for 2 months out. It is not listed as active sale or coming up through end of NOV at this time. (emphasis added). 47. Souther’s email demonstrates that the Estates, through its database, permits members to indicate their desire to bid, and it ranks potential bidders. 49. After she investigated the sale, Souther emailed Newell to tell her “I bid 10K on jasmine thinking it was a tax sale, but will bid higher.” Souther’s email is attached as Exhibit 5. 50. Once it is determined which Member of the Estates will be the winning bidder on a particular piece of property, the bid deposit is paid to the Estates. 51. Defendant Tonya Newell is, upon information and belief, one of several “Acquisition Assistants.” Newell’s job is to attend foreclosure sales and place the sole bid for the Member who was chosen as the bidder for that particular property. 52. Upon information and belief, North and South Carolina are split between three “Acquisition Assistants” – Newell, Sharon Pompey and Lynn Pinder. 53. By having Newell and the other Acquisition Assistants place bids, the Estates ensures that its bid-rigging arrangement will be successful. 54. Upon information and belief, both Newell and the Estates receive commissions if the bid placed by Newell is successful. B. The Nature of the Conspiracy 55. All of the Defendants, including Does 1 – 100, have participated as co- conspirators of the Estates Defendants and have performed acts in furtherance of the conspiracy. All Defendants are jointly and severally liable for the acts of their co- conspirators whether or not they have been named in this Complaint. 57. Plaintiff Williams is the owner of a Townhome located at 344 Red Elm Drive, Durham, NC 27713, North Carolina (the “Williams Property”). 58. On or about August 8, 2015, the Elm Grove Townhome Association, Inc. (“Elm Grove”) filed a claim of lien in Durham County District Court at 15 M 1124. 59. On or about July 19, 2016, the substitute trustee, filed a Notice of Hearing to Foreclose Elm Grove’s Claim of Lien, in Durham County Case No. 16 SP 712. 60. After several continuances, Elm Grove sold the property in foreclosure on May 23, 2019. 61. Defendant Versa, which was formed on May 22, 2019, the day before the foreclosure sale, was the highest bidder at the sale. A copy of the bid is attached as Exhibit 6. 62. Upon information and belief, Versa is either a Member of the Estates or was formed by a Member at the direction of the Estates for the purpose of purchasing the Williams Property at foreclosure. 63. Upon information and belief, the Williams Property was listed in the Estates Database. 65. Upon information and belief, Versa or the members of that LLC entered into an agreement with the Estates and its other Members that only one Member could bid on the Williams Property. 66. Upon information and belief, Versa or the members of that LLC were determined to be the Member of the Estates who was permitted to bid on the Williams Property. 67. Upon information and belief, Versa or the members of that LLC paid the deposit for the purchase of the Williams Property to the Estates. 68. As is indicated on Exhibit 6, Defendant Newell placed the bid and paid the deposit on behalf of Versa. 69. On or about August 2, 2019 Versa purported to assign its bid to Red Tree. A copy of the assignment is attached as Exhibit 7. 70. Upon information and belief, the purchase of the Williams Property by Versa, the bid placed by Newell, and the assignment to Red Tree were all acts taken pursuant to a bid-rigging scheme propounded by the Estates. 71. Upon information and belief, Versa, Red Tree or the members of that LLC were required to pay money to Newell and the Estates for their role in the foreclosure. D. Effort to extort money from Williams. 73. Souther added a hand-written note to the bottom: “I represent the investor who recently won your home in the HOA foreclosure action. I may be able to help you stay in your home. Please call me ASAP to avoid legal proceedings.” 74. In her deposition, Souther testified that she had presented similar notices to other owners of homes that Estates Members had bid on, and that she had written “something similar” on each notice. A copy of the relevant portion of Souther’s deposition is attached as Exhibit 9. 75. Although she claims to “represent” the “investor,” Carolyn Souther is neither a North Carolina licensed real estate broker nor a North Carolina licensed attorney. From June 26, 2019 until August 2, 2019, Carolyn Souther made several attempts by both phone calls and text messages to Williams and his family demanding $50,000 in exchange for Versa walking away from its foresclosure bid. 76. On August 2, 2019, Red Tree Holdings LLC attached a similar document to Plaintiff Williams’ door called a “Notice to Vacate Property.” A copy of the Notice to Vacate is attached as Exhibit 10. 77. At the time this “Notice” was sent to Williams, Williams was the owner of the property and had every right to live there. The notice falsely claimed that Williams was required to vacate his own house within ten (10) days. 79. Upon information and belief, the purpose of this notice was to increase the pressure on Mr. Williams to pay Souther’s demands by falsely making him believe that he faced immanent eviction. 8. 80. Souther used this false notice to increase the pressure on Williams. She ultimately negotiated her “demand” to $35,000, which she would accept in exchange for Red Tree walking away from its bid. 81. Souther’s negotiations were done in coordination with the Estates and required Defendant Estates UT Manager Craig Brooksby’s approval. In the Williams negotiation, she contacted Craig Brooksby to get approval for accepting a counteroffer on $30,000. A copy of a text to Mbeja Lomotey, a principal of Defendant Maldives, discussing the negotiation and the need for the Estates’ approval is attached as Exhibit 82. Plaintiffs De Leon and Da Costa are the owners of a Townhome located at 3435 Archdale Dr. Raleigh, North Carolina (the “DeLeon Property”). 83. On or about January 31, 2017 the Edgewood Townhomes Association, Inc. (“Edgewood”) filed a claim of lien in Wake County District Court at 17 M 43. 85. Edgewood sold the property in foreclosure May 30, 2019. 86. Defendant Maldives was the high bidder at the sale. A copy of Maldives’ bid is attached as Exhibit 12. 87. Upon information and belief, Maldives is either a Member of the Estates or was formed by a Member at the Estates’ direction for the purpose of purchasing the Leon Property at foreclosure. 88. Upon information and belief, Maldives or the members of that LLC entered into an agreement with the Estates and its other Members that only one Member could bid on the De Leon Property. 89. Upon information and belief, Maldives or the members of that LLC were determined to be the Member of the Estates who was permitted to bid on the De Leon Property. 90. Upon information and belief, Maldives or the members of that LLC paid the deposit for the purchase of the De Leon Property to the Estates. 91. As is shown in Exhibit 12, Defendant Newell placed the bid and paid the deposit on behalf of Maldives. 92. Upon information and belief, the purchase of the De Leon Property by Maldives and the bid placed by Newell were all acts taken pursuant to a bid-rigging scheme propounded by the Estates. F. Effort to extort money from De Leon and Da Costa. 94. Souther added a hand-written note to the bottom: “I represent the investor who recently won your home in the HOA foreclosure action. I may be able to help you stay in your home. Please call me to avoid further legal proceedings.” 95. The language on the De Leon Notice to Respond is nearly identical to the language on the Williams Notice to Respond. And, as noted earlier, Souther admitted that she had presented similar notices to other owners of homes that Estates Members had bid on. 96. Souther made several attempts by both phone calls and text messages to De Leon and Da Costa. In a text to their daughter, Souther demanded $80,000 in exchange for which: “My investor will then walk away giving you clear rights to the home.” A copy of the text message is attached as Exhibit 14. 98. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege every allegation above as if fully set forth herein. A. The Estates and Bid-Rigging

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10. Defendant contacted or attempted to contact Plaintiff from telephone numbers; including but not limited to (984) 234-7045, (270) 201-5929, (334) 416- 9713, (609) 808-9141, (978) 881-0960, (678) 944-7770, (609) 623-1987, (910) 218-8007, (239) 900-1201, (206) 573-5236, (985) 200-9766, (925) 815-1480 confirmed to be Defendant’s numbers. 11. Defendant’s calls constituted calls that were not for emergency purposes as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A). 12. Defendant’s calls were placed to telephone number assigned to a cellular telephone service for which Plaintiff incurs a charge for incoming calls pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1). 20. Plaintiff brings this action individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, as a member the two proposed classes (hereafter, jointly, “The Classes”). 8. Beginning in or around December 2017, Defendant contacted Plaintiff on Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number ending in -1267 and -5502, in an attempt to solicit Plaintiff to purchase Defendant’s services. 9. Defendant used an “automatic telephone dialing system” as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1) to place its call to Plaintiff seeking to solicit its services. Knowing and/or Willful Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 47 U.S.C. §227(c) • As a result of Defendant’s willful and/or knowing violations of 47 U.S.C. §227(c)(5), Plaintiff and the DNC Class members are entitled to and request treble damages, as provided by statute, up to $1,500, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. §227(c)(5). • Any and all other relief that the Court deems just and proper. Negligent Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 47 U.S.C. §227(b) • As a result of Defendant’s negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(1), Plaintiff and the ATDS Class members are entitled to and request $500 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. 227(b)(3)(B). • Any and all other relief that the Court deems just and proper. Negligent Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 47 U.S.C. §227(c) • As a result of Defendant’s negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. §227(c)(5), Plaintiff and the DNC Class members are entitled to and request $500 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. 227(c)(5). • Any and all other relief that the Court deems just and proper.

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12. At all relevant times, Defendants employed Plaintiffs who engaged in interstate commerce or the production of goods for interstate commerce. 13. Defendants qualify as “employers” within the meaning of the FLSA 29 U.S.C. § 203(d). 14. Plaintiffs are “employees” within the meaning of the FLSA 29 U.S.C. § 203(e). 15. Defendant Just Brakes operates hundreds of stores throughout the United States. 17. Just Brakes operates a Just Brakes service center in Cumberland, Georgia, located at 2653 Cobb Pkwy., S.E., Atlanta, Georgia 30339 (the “Cumberland Service Center”). 18. Just Brakes employed Named Plaintiff at the Cumberland Service Center. 19. During his employment at the Cumberland Service Center, Named Plaintiff worked on goods or materials that have been moved in or produced for commerce. 20. For example, Named Plaintiff used Just Brakes’ computer systems, processed credit card transactions, used tools and sold brake pads. 21. Just Brakes is an enterprise whose annual gross volume of sales or business done is at least $500,000. 22. At all relevant times, Just Brakes has had one or more employees who handle goods that have traveled in interstate commerce within the meaning of the 33. Defendant Passaro is the District Manager for the Just Brakes Service Centers in the Greater Atlanta Area. 34. Plaintiffs are individuals who are, or have been, employed by Defendants as technicians in the greater Atlanta area within the last three years (“Technicians”). 35. Technicians inspect automobiles, perform diagnostic testing on automobiles, and repair automobiles, among other things. 36. Technicians typically work 65-70 hours a week at various Just Brakes service centers throughout the greater Atlanta area. 37. As compensation for their hours worked, Defendants pay Technicians at an hourly rate. 38. Defendants also pay Technicians non-discretionary bonuses. 39. The amount of the non-discretionary bonuses Defendants pay to Technicians is calculated based on a percentage of the sales made by Just Brakes. 40. Defendants require Technicians to log in at the beginning of each scheduled shift and to log out at the end of each scheduled shift. 42. For example, on one occasion, Named Plaintiff had a total of 136 hours worked in a two-week period. 43. However, Defendants only paid Named Plaintiff for 79 hours. 44. Defendants fail to record all hours worked by Technicians. 45. For example, Defendant Passaro instructed Technicians at the Cumberland Service Center (including Named Plaintiff) to work off the clock once they had worked 40 hours in a given week. 46. Technicians would then be required to work the remainder of the week off the clock. 47. Technicians were not paid for hours worked off the clock. 48. By way of further example, Named Plaintiff typically took a 30-minute lunch break. 49. However, Defendant Passaro would charge Named Plaintiff with taking a one-hour lunch break. 50. Defendants failed to maintain accurate records of the hours worked by Technicians, including Named Plaintiff. 52. Defendants failed to pay Technicians for all hours worked in excess of 40 per week at the required overtime premium rate. 53. Furthermore, Defendants failed to include non-discretionary bonuses in the regular rate when determining the applicable overtime premium rate for Technicians’ hours worked in excess of 40 per week as required by the FLSA. 54. Defendants paid Technicians an hourly wage and certain non- discretionary bonuses based on a percentage of sales made. 55. However, Defendants failed to pay Technicians for all hours worked in excess of 40 per week at 1.5 times the regular rate. 56. The FLSA’s overtime requirements apply to Defendants. 57. Technicians are non-exempt employees under the FLSA. 58. Because Defendants did not pay Technicians for hours worked in excess of 40 per week at 1.5 times their regular rate, Defendants violated the FLSA. 59. Defendants’ violation of the FLSA was willful. 60. Pursuant to the FLSA, Defendants are liable to Plaintiffs for all unpaid overtime hours, liquidated damages, attorney’s fees and costs. JOINT EMPLOYERS THE REQUIRED OVERTIME PREMIUM RATE

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34. During her employment with Defendants, Class Plaintiff Adams worked as a home health aide. Class Plaintiff Adams primary duties were providing companionship services, domestic services, home care, and other in-home services. 35. Class Plaintiff Adams regularly worked more than 40 hours per week, but was not paid one and one-half times her regular rate of pay for those hours worked over 40. 37. Defendants did/do not pay their employees one and one-half times their regular hourly rate for all hours worked over 40 in a workweek because they pay their employees through two entities and distribute the hours worked between the entities. 38. Each pay period Plaintiff Adams and other similarly situated employees worked for Defendants, they received one check from Defendant COEC for some, but not all, hours worked for Defendants during the pay period. A true and accurate copy of a check dated March 31, 2017 from Defendant COEC for pay period March 12, 2017 through March 25, 2017 is attached hereto as Exhibit B. 39. Each pay period Plaintiff Adams and other similarly situated employees worked for Defendants, they received a separate check from Defendant COEC PLUS for some, but not all, hours worked for Defendants during the pay period. A true and accurate copy of a check dated March 31, 2017 from Defendant COEC PLUS for pay period March 12, 2017 through March 25, 2017 is attached hereto as Exhibit C. 40. Defendants required Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees to track their time on separate timesheets and to split their compensable hours worked between the two (2) timesheets and/or time tracking systems1. 41. Some of the hours Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees worked for Defendants were recorded on one (1) timesheet and/or time tracking system and were later paid by Defendant COEC. See Exhibit B. 43. Defendants failed to properly compensate Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees for all overtime hours worked in excess of forty (40) per week by requiring Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees to divide their total hours worked for Defendants into two (2) separate timesheets and/or time tracking systems. 44. Defendants failed to account for the total number of compensable hours and overtime hours Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees worked for Defendants when both of Defendants’ timesheets and/or time tracking systems are considered. 45. Defendants failed to pay Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees any overtime wages owed when neither of the two (2) individual timesheets and/or time tracking systems showed Plaintiff’s and other similarly situated employees’ compensable hours as greater than forty (40) hours per week and/or eighty (80) per two weeks, even though the combined total of both timesheets and/or time tracking systems demonstrated Plaintiff’s and other similarly situated employees’ total compensable hours worked per week for Defendants consistently exceeded forty (40) per week. 46. By paying Plaintiff Adams and other similarly situated employees with two (2) separate paychecks each pay period and by requiring multiple timesheets and/or time tracking systems for work performed for Defendants, Defendants failed to compensate them for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) per week at one and one-half times Plaintiff’s and other similarly situated employees’ regular rate of pay. b. Defendants failed to properly pay Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees one and a half (1.5) times their regular rate of pay for all overtime hours by reducing their regular hourly rate and by paying overtime wages based upon the reduced hourly rate. 48. By September of 2016, Plaintiff’s regular rate of pay was $10.50 per hour. 49. As long as Plaintiff’s recorded hours for each of the two (2) separate timesheets and/or time tracking systems did not exceed forty (40) per week and/or eighty (80) per pay period, Defendants paid Plaintiff her regular rate of $10.50 per hour for all hours worked.2 50. However, if Plaintiff recorded more than forty (40) hours per week and/or eighty (80) per pay period on either of the dual time tracking systems, Defendants then reduced her regular rate of pay to a lower hourly rate. 51. Defendants then paid both Plaintiff’s regular wages at this lower hourly rate and some overtime wages at one and a half (1.5) times this reduced hourly rate. See Exhibit D and Exhibit E, paystubs from both Defendants COEC PLUS and COEC, respectively, dated November 23, 2016 for pay period November 6, 2016 through November 19, 2016. 53. Defendants did not reduce Plaintiff’s regular hourly rate on the paycheck from Defendant COEC for that same pay period where her recorded compensable hours for one time tracking system totaled sixty-three (63) hours. See Exhibit E. 54. For pay period March 12, 2017 through March 25, 2017, Defendants reduced Plaintiff’s regular rate of pay from $10.50 per hour to $9.95 per hour when her recorded compensable hours totaled ninety-one (91) hours on her paycheck from Defendant COEC. Defendants then paid her eleven (11) hours of overtime based on this reduced hourly rate at a rate of $14.925 per hour instead of $15.75 per hour as required3. See Exhibit B. 55. For the same pay period, Defendant did not reduce Plaintiff’s regular rate of pay of $10.50 per hour on her paycheck from Defendant COEC PLUS when her recorded compensable hours totaled sixty-six and a half (66.5) hours for that pay period. See Exhibit C. 56. By reducing Plaintiff’s and other similarly situated employees’ regular hourly rate of pay when they recorded more than forty (40) hours per week and/or eighty (80) per pay period on either of the dual time tracking systems, Defendants failed to compensate Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) per week at one and one-half times Plaintiff’s and other similarly situated employees’ respective regular rates of pay. c. Defendants failed to pay Plaintiff and similarly situated employees for travel time to and from worksites during their workdays resulting in unpaid overtime wages. 58. Plaintiff and other similarly situated hourly employees frequently traveled throughout their workdays attending to multiple patients at different locations each workday, often traveling to different cities and/or counties throughout the same workday. 59. Defendants were aware of the daily travel, but they failed to compensate Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees for their travel time. 60. As a result of failing to compensate Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees for their travel time, Defendants failed to pay their employees overtime wages for all compensable hours worked. IV. 61. The Class Plaintiff brings her FLSA claim pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §216(b) as a representative action on behalf of her and all other Similarly Situated Persons (“SSPs”) of the opt-in class, consisting of: All current and former employees of Defendants who worked over 40 hours in any workweek beginning three years immediately preceding the filing of this Complaint through the date of final disposition of this case, and were not paid one and one-half times their regular rate of pay for hours worked over 40 because (i) Defendants divided their hours worked between two entities and paid them with two (2) paychecks for the same pay periods; and/or (ii) Defendants reduced their employees’ regular rate of pay; and/or (iii) Defendants failed to pay for travel time (the “216(b) Class” or the “216(b) Class Members”). 63. This FLSA claim is brought as an "opt-in" collective action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §216(b) as to claims for overtime compensation, compensation withheld in violation of the FLSA, liquidated damages and attorneys' fees under the FLSA. In addition to the Class Plaintiff, numerous putative 216(b) Class Members have been denied proper overtime compensation due to Defendants’ joint company-wide payroll policies and practices. The Class Plaintiff is representative of those other similarly situated employees and is acting on behalf of her interests as well as their own in bringing this action. 64. The identity of the putative 216(b) Class Members are known to Defendants and are readily identifiable through Defendants’ payroll records. These individuals may readily be notified of this action, and allowed to opt into it pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §216(b), for the purpose of collectively adjudicating their claims for overtime compensation, liquidated damages, attorneys' fees and costs under the FLSA. 65. The Class Plaintiff brings her Ohio Wage Act claims pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 as a class action on behalf of herself and all other members of the following class: All current and former employees of Defendants who worked over 40 hours in any workweek beginning three years immediately preceding the filing of this Complaint through the date of final disposition of this case, and were not paid one and one-half times their regular rate of pay for hours worked over 40 because (i) Defendants divided their hours worked between two entities and paid them with two (2) paychecks for the same pay periods; and/or (ii) Defendants reduced their employees’ regular rate of pay; and/or (iii) Defendants failed to pay for travel time (the “Rule 23 Class” or the “Rule 23 Class Members”). 67. The Rule 23 Class, as defined above, is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. 68. The Class Plaintiff is a member of the Rule 23 Class and her claims for unpaid wages are typical of the claims of other members of the Rule 23 Class. 69. The Class Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent the Rule 23 Class and the interests of all members of the Rule 23 Class. 70. The Class Plaintiff has no interest that is antagonistic to or in conflict with those interests of the Rule 23 Class that she has undertaken to represent. 71. The Class Plaintiff has retained competent and experienced class action counsel who can ably represent the interests of the entire Rule 23 Class. 72. Questions of law and fact are common to the Rule 23 Class. 73. Class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1) because individual actions would create the risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications that would establish incompatible standards of conduct for Defendants with respect to their non-exempt employees. 74. Class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) as Defendants acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Rule 23 Class, making appropriate declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Rule 23 Class as a whole. 75. Class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) as the questions of law and facts common to the Rule 23 Class predominate over questions affecting individual members of the Rule 23 Class and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 77. A class action is superior to individual actions for the fair and efficient adjudication of Class Plaintiff’s claim and will prevent undue financial, administrative and procedural burdens on the parties and the Court. Class Plaintiff and counsel are not aware of any pending Ohio litigation on behalf of the Rule 23 Class, as defined herein, or on behalf of any individual alleging a similar claim. Because the damages sustained by individual members are modest compared to the costs of individual litigation, it would be impractical for class members to pursue individual litigation against the Defendants to vindicate their rights. Certification of this case as a class action will enable the issues to be adjudicated for all class members with the efficiencies of class litigation. V. 78. All of the preceding paragraphs are realleged as if fully rewritten herein. 80. The FLSA requires that employees receive overtime compensation for hours worked in excess of forty (40) per week. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). 81. During the three years preceding the filing of this Complaint, Defendants employed the Class Plaintiff and/or the 216(b) Class Members. 82. The Class Plaintiff and the 216(b) Class Members were paid on an hourly basis when working in non-exempt positions. 83. The Class Plaintiff and the 216(b) Class Members regularly worked in excess of 40 hours in a workweek. 84. Defendants jointly violated the FLSA with respect to Class Plaintiff and the 216(b) Class by, inter alia, failing to compensate them at one and one-half times their regular rates of pay for hours worked over forty (40) hours in a workweek as a result of their FLSA- violating policies explained more fully above. 85. The Class Plaintiff and the 216(b) Class Members were not exempt from receiving FLSA overtime benefits. 86. Defendants knew or should have known of the overtime payment requirements of the FLSA. Defendants were doubtlessly aware of the January 1, 2015 exemption elimination for third party employers, yet Defendants willfully withheld and failed to pay the overtime compensation to which Named Plaintiff and the 216(b) Collective Members are entitled. 87. Defendants knowingly, willfully and jointly failed to pay the Class Plaintiff and the 216(b) Class Members the overtime wages they were due. 89. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ joint conduct, the Class Plaintiff and the 216(b) Class Members have suffered and continue to suffer damages. The Class Plaintiff seeks unpaid overtime and other compensation, liquidated damages, interest and attorneys’ fees, and all other remedies available, on behalf of herself and the 216(b) Class Members. 90. All of the preceding paragraphs are realleged as if fully rewritten herein. 91. This claim is brought under Ohio law. 92. The Class Plaintiff and the Rule 23 Class Members have been jointly employed by Defendants, and Defendants are employers covered by the overtime requirements under Ohio law. 93. Ohio law requires that employees receive overtime compensation “not less than one and one-half times” (1.5) the employee’s regular rate of pay for all hours worked over forty (40) in one workweek, “in the manner and methods provided in and subject to the exemptions of section 7 and section 13 of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1937.” See O.R.C. § 4111.03(A); see also 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). 94. While jointly employed by Defendants, the Class Plaintiff and the Rule 23 Class Members worked in excess of the maximum weekly hours permitted under O.R.C. § 4111.03, but were not paid overtime wages for this time spent working. 96. Class Plaintiff and the Rule 23 Class were not exempt from the wage protections of Ohio law. 97. Defendants’ repeated, knowing and joint failure to pay overtime wages to the Class Plaintiff were violations of R.C. §4111.03, and as such, Defendants willfully withheld and failed to pay the overtime compensation to which Class Plaintiff and the Rule 23 Class Members are entitled. 98. For Defendants’ violations of R.C. §4111.03, the Class Plaintiff and the Rule 23 Class Members have suffered and continue to suffer damages. The Class Plaintiff seeks unpaid overtime and other compensation, liquidated damages, interest and attorneys’ fees, and all other remedies available, on behalf of herself and the Rule 23 Class Members. FLSA – COLLECTIVE ACTION FOR UNPAID OVERTIME R.C. 4113.15 — RULE 23 CLASS ACTION FOR OPPA VIOLATION R.C. 4111.03 — RULE 23 CLASS ACTION FOR UNPAID OVERTIME RECORDKEEPING VIOLATIONS OF THE OHIO WAGE ACT 106. All of the preceding paragraphs are realleged as if fully rewritten herein. 107. The Ohio Wage Act requires employers to maintain and preserve payroll or other records containing, among other things, the hours worked each workday and the total hours worked each workweek. See O.R.C. § 4111.08. See also, 29 C.F.R. §§ 516.2 et seq. 108. During times material to this complaint, Defendants were covered employers, and jointly and severally required to comply with the Ohio Wage Act’s mandates. 109. Class Plaintiff and the Rule 23 Class Members were covered employee entitled to the protection of the Ohio Wage Act. 110. During times material to this complaint, Defendants jointly violated the Ohio Wage Act with respect to Class Plaintiff and the Rule 23 Class Members by failing to properly maintain accurate records of all hours Class Plaintiff and the Rule 23 Class Members worked each workday and within each workweek. 111. In violating the Ohio Wage Act, Defendants jointly acted willfully and with reckless disregard of clearly applicable Ohio Wage Act provisions. VI.

win

19. Defendant is a party venue and night club that operates the HUDSON TERRACE Club as well as the HUDSON TERRACE website, offering features which should allow all consumers to access the services which Defendant offers in connection with their physical locations. 2.0 guidelines; c. Regularly test user accessibility by blind or vision-impaired persons to ensure that Defendant’s Website complies under the WCAG 2.0 guidelines; and, d. Develop an accessibility policy that is clearly disclosed on Defendant’s Websites, with contact information for users to report accessibility-related problems. 20. Defendant operates HUDSON TERRACE (its “Party Venue”) in New York City, at 621 W 46th Street, New York, NY 10036. 21. Its Party Venue constitutes a place of public accommodation. Defendant’s Party Venue provides to the public important services. Defendant’s Website provides consumers with access to an array of services including Party Venue locations and hours, access to extensive event calendars, information pertaining to booking its party venue services, and related services available both online and in its physical establishment. 22. Defendant offers the commercial website, www.hudsonterracenyc.com, to the public. The website offers features which should allow all consumers to access the services which Defendant offers in connection with their physical locations. The services offered by Defendant include, but are not limited to the following: Party Venue locations and hours, access to extensive event calendars, information pertaining to booking its party venue services, and related services available both online and in its physical establishment. 24. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient JAWS screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using the JAWS screen-reader. 25. During Plaintiff’s visits to the Website, the last occurring in August 2018, Plaintiff encountered multiple access barriers that denied Plaintiff full and equal access to the facilities, services offered to the public and made available to the public; and that denied Plaintiff the full enjoyment of the facilities, services of the Website, as well as to the facilities, services of Defendant’s physical locations in New York by being unable to learn more information about Party Venue locations and hours, access its extensive event calendar, information pertaining to booking its party venue services, and related services available both online and in its physical establishment. 28. These access barriers on Defendant’s Website have deterred Plaintiff from visiting Defendant’s physical locations and enjoying them equal to sighted individuals because: Plaintiff was unable to find the location and hours of operation of Defendant’s physical Party Venue on its Website and other important information, preventing Plaintiff from visiting the locations to take advantage of the services that it provides to the public. 29. If the Website was equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 30. Through his attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 32. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 33. The ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks in this action. In relevant part, the ADA requires: In the case of violations of . . . this title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities . . . Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the . . . modification of a policy . . . 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 35. If the Website was accessible, Plaintiff and similarly situated blind and visually- impaired people could independently view service items, locate Defendant’s physical locations and hours of operation, shop for and otherwise research related services available via the Website. 36. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 37. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining their Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making their Website equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 38. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 40. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks certify a New York State subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the State of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of services offered in Defendant’s physical locations, during the relevant statutory period. 41. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of services offered in Defendant’s physical locations, during the relevant statutory period. 43. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class. The Class, similarly to the Plaintiff, are severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA, NYSYRHL or NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so either can be independently accessible to the Class. 44. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class Members because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the Class Members. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. 45. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 47. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 48. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 49. Defendant’s Party Venue are public accommodations within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege, or advantage of Defendant’s Party Venue. The Website is a service that is integrated with these locations. 50. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 51. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 53. The acts alleged herein constitute violations of Title III of the ADA, and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Plaintiff, who is a member of a protected class of persons under the ADA, has a physical disability that substantially limits the major life activity of sight within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1)(A)-(2)(A). Furthermore, Plaintiff has been denied full and equal access to the Website, has not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and has been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled persons. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 54. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 55. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 57. Defendant’s physical locations are located in State of New York and throughout the United States and constitute sales establishments and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant. Defendant’s Website is a service that is by and integrated with these physical locations. 58. Defendant is subject to New York Human Rights Law because it owns and operates its physical locations and Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 59. Defendant is violating N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with Defendant’s physical locations to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 61. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(ii), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 62. Readily available, well-established guidelines exist on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other large business entities and government agencies in making their website accessible, including but not limited to: adding alt-text to graphics and ensuring that all functions can be performed using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make its Website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 64. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 65. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Defendant’s Website and its physical locations under § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the Sub-Class Members will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 66. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 67. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 68. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 69. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 70. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 72. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40 provides that “all persons within the jurisdiction of this state shall be entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of any places of public accommodations, resort or amusement, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons. No persons, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or employee of any such place shall directly or indirectly refuse, withhold from, or deny to any person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof . . .” 73. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) provides that “no person because of . . . disability, as such term is defined in section two hundred ninety-two of executive law, be subjected to any discrimination in his or her civil rights, or to any harassment, as defined in section 240.25 of the penal law, in the exercise thereof, by any other person or by any firm, corporation or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision.” 74. Defendant’s New York State physical locations are sales establishments and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant and its Website is a service that is by and integrated with these establishments. 75. Defendant is subject to New York Civil Rights Law because it owns and operates its physical locations and Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Civil Law § 40-c(2). 77. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41 states that “any corporation which shall violate any of the provisions of sections forty, forty-a, forty-b or forty-two . . . shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby . . .” 78. Under NY Civil Rights Law § 40-d, “any person who shall violate any of the provisions of the foregoing section, or subdivision three of section 240.30 or section 240.31 of the penal law, or who shall aid or incite the violation of any of said provisions shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby in any court of competent jurisdiction in the county in which the defendant shall reside ...” 79. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 80. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability are being directly or indirectly refused, withheld from, or denied the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof in § 40 et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. 82. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 83. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 84. Defendant’s locations are sales establishments and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9), and its Website is a service that is integrated with its establishments. 85. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates its physical locations in the City of New York and its Website, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 86. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with its physical locations to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, products, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 88. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the Sub- Class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 89. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 90. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of its Website and its establishments under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 92. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 93. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 94. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 95. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class and New York State and City Sub- Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 96. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies, that its Website contains access barriers denying blind customers the full and equal access to the products, services and facilities of its Website and by extension its physical locations, which Defendant owns, operations and controls, fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182, et seq., N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, et seq., and N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. DECLARATORY RELIEF Defendant’s Barriers on Its Website VIOLATION OF THE NEW YORK STATE CIVIL RIGHTS LAW VIOLATIONS OF THE NYSHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 1281 et seq.

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10. Defendant’s collection communications are to be interpreted under an unsophisticated or least sophisticated consumer standard, see, Goswami v. Am.Collections Enter., Inc., 377 F.3d 488, 495 (5th Cir. 2004); McMurray v. ProCollect, Inc., 687 F.3d 665, 669 (5th Cir. 2012). 11. Plaintiff adopts and realleges ¶¶ 1-10. 12. Section 1692e of the FDCPA prohibits a debt collector from using any false, deceptive or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt, see, 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. 13. Making a false statement as to the name of the original creditor is a materially misleading statement, which violates of § 1692e of the FDCPA, see, Tourgeman, 755 F.3d at 1120-1122. By stating that Second Round Sub, LLC was the original creditor when, in fact, it was not, Defendant’s letter violated § 1692e of the FDCPA. 14. Defendant’s violation of § 1692e of the FDCPA renders it liable for statutory damages, costs, and reasonable attorneys’ fees, see, 15 U.S.C. § 1692k. 15. Plaintiff adopts and realleges ¶¶ 1-10. 17. Defendant, by wrongly stating that Second Round Sub was the original creditor when, in fact, it was not the original creditor, used unfair or unconscionable means to collect a debt, in violation of § 1692f of the FDCPA. 18. Defendant’s violation of § 1692f of the FDCPA renders it liable for statutory damages, costs, and reasonable attorneys’ fees, see, 15 U.S.C. § 1692k. 19. Plaintiff, Vickie Kelly, brings this action individually and as a class action on behalf of all persons similarly situated in the State of Mississippi from whom Defendant attempted to collect a defaulted consumer debt, via the same form collection letter (Exhibit A), that Defendant sent to Plaintiff, from one year before the date of this Complaint to the present. This action seeks a finding that Defendant’s form letter violates the FDCPA and asks that the Court award damages as authorized by § 1692k(a)(2) of the FDCPA. 20. Defendant regularly engages in debt collection, using the same form collection letter it sent Ms. Kelly, in its attempts to collect defaulted consumer debts from other consumers. 21. The Class consists of more than 35 persons from whom Defendant attempted to collect defaulted consumer debts by sending other consumers the same form collection letter it sent Ms. Kelly. 23. The prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the Class would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to the individual members of the Class, and a risk that any adjudications with respect to individual members of the Class would, as a practical matter, either be dispositive of the interests of other members of the Class not party to the adjudication, or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests. Defendant has acted in a manner applicable to the Class as a whole, such that declaratory relief is warranted. 24. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect and represent the interests of the Class. The management of the class action proposed is not extraordinarily difficult, and the factual and legal issues raised by this class action complaint will not require extended contact with the members of the Class, because Defendant’s conduct was perpetrated on all members of the Class and will be established by common proof. Moreover, Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in class action litigation, including class actions brought under the FDCPA. 5. Defendant sent Ms. Kelly a form collection letter, dated February 1, 2019, which stated: Current Creditor: Second Round, LP Original Creditor: Second Round Sub, LLC A copy of Defendant’s letter is attached as Exhibit A. 6. In fact, Second Round Sub was never the “original” creditor to whom Ms. Kelly owed a debt. Ms. Kelly is informed and believes through her counsel that the original creditor for the account at issue was Comenity Bank for a Woman Within credit account. 7. Violations of the FDCPA which would lead a consumer to alter his or her course of action as to whether to pay a debt, or which would be a factor in the consumer's decision making process, are material, see, Lox v. CDA, 689 F.3d 818, 827 (7th Cir. 2012). Moreover, the mis-identification of creditor information is such a factor because, amongst other things, it is a factor for a consumer in determining whether an attempt to collect a debt is fraudulent, see, Tourgeman v. Collins Fin. Servs., 755 F.3d 1109, 1120-1122 (9th Cir. 2014), and Janetos v. Fulton, Friedman & Gullace, 825 F.3d 317, 324-325 (7th Cir. 2016). 9. Defendant’s collection actions complained of herein occurred within one year of the date of this Complaint. Violation Of § 1692f Of The FDCPA -- Unfair Or Unconscionable Collection Actions Violation Of § 1692e Of The FDCPA – False, Deceptive Or Misleading Collection Actions

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2.0 guidelines; c. Regularly test user accessibility by blind or vision-impaired persons to ensure that Defendant’s Website complies under the WCAG 2.0 guidelines; and, d. Develop an accessibility policy that is clearly disclosed on Defendant’s Websites, with contact information for users to report accessibility-related problems. 20. Defendant operates a commercial website, www.whatgoesaroundnyc.com which serves as an online retailer. The Defendant’s website offers features that should allow all individuals to access the goods and services that the Defendant offers. 21. The Defendant’s website is offered to the public and provides consumers and the general public with access to the finest authentic luxury vintage goods, handbags, jewelry and accessories for both men and women. As a retailer, Defendant offers products and goods such as apparel, bags, jewelry and watches from designer brands such as, Chloe, Chanel, Louis Vuitton, Fendi, Gucci, Goyard, Hermes, Rolex and more. Additionally, the Defendant’s website offers services which allow consumers and the general public the ability to sell goods to the Defendant for re- sale, authenticity guarantees, editorial publications and information about store hours and location. 22. It is, upon information and belief, Defendant’s policy and practice to deny Plaintiff, along with other blind or visually-impaired users, access to Defendant’s website, and to therefore specifically deny the goods and services that are offered to the general public. Due to Defendant’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to its website, Plaintiff and visually-impaired persons have been and are still being denied equal access to Defendant’s Website, and the numerous goods and services and benefits offered to the public through the Website. -8- 23. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient JAWS screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using the JAWS screen-reader. 24. During Plaintiff’s visits to the Website, the last occurring in November 2018, Plaintiff encountered multiple access barriers that denied Plaintiff full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services offered to the public and made available to the public; and that denied Plaintiff the full enjoyment of the facilities, goods and services of the Website, by being unable to learn more information, the ability to browse products available for delivery, find information on promotions and coupons, and related goods and services available online. 25. While attempting to navigate the Website, Plaintiff encountered multiple accessibility barriers for blind or visually-impaired people that include, but are not limited to, the following: a. Lack of Alternative Text (“alt-text”), or a text equivalent. Alt-text is an invisible code embedded beneath a graphical image on a website. Web accessibility requires that alt-text be coded with each picture so that screen- reading software can speak the alt-text where a sighted user sees pictures, which includes captcha prompts. Alt-text does not change the visual presentation, but instead a text box shows when the mouse moves over the picture. The lack of alt-text on these graphics prevents screen readers from accurately vocalizing a description of the graphics. As a result, visually- impaired prospective customers are unable to determine what is on the -9- website, browse, look for Store locations and hours, the ability to browse the products, find information on promotions and coupons, and related goods and services available both in Stores and online. b. Empty Links That Contain No Text causing the function or purpose of the link to not be presented to the user. This can introduce confusion for keyboard and screen-reader users; c. Redundant Links where adjacent links go to the same URL address which results in additional navigation and repetition for keyboard and screen-reader users; and d. Linked Images Missing Alt-text, which causes problems if an image within a link contains no text and that image does not provide alt-text. A screen reader then has no content to present the user as to the function of the link, including information contained in PDFs. 26. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s Website, blind and visually-impaired customers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, products, and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from visiting the Website, presently and in the future. 27. These access barriers on Defendant’s Website have deterred Plaintiff from learning about those specific goods and services available for purchase and delivery, because: Plaintiff was unable to determine and or purchase items from its Website, among other things. -10- 28. If the Website was equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 29. Through his attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 30. Because simple compliance with the WCAG 2.0 Guidelines would provide Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers with equal access to the Website, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including but not limited to the following policies or practices: a. Constructing and maintaining a website that is inaccessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; b. Failure to construct and maintain a website that is sufficiently intuitive so as to be equally accessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; and, c. Failing to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind and visually-impaired consumers, such as Plaintiff, as a member of a protected class. 31. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 32. The ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks in this action. In relevant part, the ADA requires: In the case of violations of . . . this title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities . . . Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the . . . modification of a policy . . .42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). -11- 33. Because Defendant’s Website have never been equally accessible, and because Defendant lacks a corporate policy that is reasonably calculated to cause its Website to become and remain accessible, Plaintiff invokes 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2) and seeks a permanent injunction requiring Defendant to retain a qualified consultant acceptable to Plaintiff (“Agreed Upon Consultant”) to assist Defendant to comply with WCAG 2.0 guidelines for Defendant’s Website. Plaintiff seeks that this permanent injunction requires Defendant to cooperate with the Agreed Upon Consultant to: a. Train Defendant’s employees and agents who develop the Website on accessibility compliance under the WCAG 2.0 guidelines; b. Regularly check the accessibility of the Website under the WCAG 34. If the Website was accessible, Plaintiff and similarly situated blind and visually- impaired people could independently view service items, shop for and otherwise research related goods and services available via the Website. 35. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated -12- to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 36. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining their Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making their Website equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 37. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 38. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services, during the relevant statutory period. 39. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks certify a New York State subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the State of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of those services, during the relevant statutory period. 40. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered, during the relevant statutory period. -13- 41. Common questions of law and fact exist amongst Class, including: a. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “public accommodation” under the ADA; b. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “place or provider of public accommodation” under the NYSHRL or NYCHRL; c. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the ADA; and d. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the NYSHRL or NYCHRL. 42. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class. The Class, similarly to the Plaintiff, are severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA, NYSYRHL or NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so either can be independently accessible to the Class. 43. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class Members because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the Class Members. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. -14- 44. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 45. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 46. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 47. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 48. Defendant’s Website is a public accommodations within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). The Website is a service that is offered to the general public, and as such, must be equally accessible to all potential consumers. 49. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). -15- 50. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 51. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 52. The acts alleged herein constitute violations of Title III of the ADA, and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Plaintiff, who is a member of a protected class of persons under the ADA, has a physical disability that substantially limits the major life activity of sight within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1)(A)-(2)(A). Furthermore, Plaintiff has been denied full and equal access to the Website, has not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and has been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled persons. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. -16- 53. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 54. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 55. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 56. Defendant’s Website and its’ sale of goods to the general public, constitute sales establishments and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant. 57. Defendant is subject to New York Human Rights Law because it owns and operates its Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 58. Defendant is violating N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 59. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(i), unlawful discriminatory practice includes, among other things, “a refusal to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless -17- such person can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 60. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(ii), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 61. Readily available, well-established guidelines exist on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other large business entities and government agencies in making their website accessible, including but not limited to: adding alt-text to graphics and ensuring that all functions can be performed using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make its Website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 62. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the class on the basis of a disability in violation of the NYSHRL, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or -18- c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 63. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 64. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Defendant’s Website under § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the Sub-Class Members will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 65. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 66. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 67. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 68. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 69. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. -19- 70. Plaintiff served notice thereof upon the attorney general as required by N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41. 71. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40 provides that “all persons within the jurisdiction of this state shall be entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of any places of public accommodations, resort or amusement, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons. No persons, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or employee of any such place shall directly or indirectly refuse, withhold from, or deny to any person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof . . .” 72. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) provides that “no person because of . . . disability, as such term is defined in section two hundred ninety-two of executive law, be subjected to any discrimination in his or her civil rights, or to any harassment, as defined in section 240.25 of the penal law, in the exercise thereof, by any other person or by any firm, corporation or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision.” 73. Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant and its Website which offers such goods and services to the general public is required to be equally accessible to all. 74. Defendant is subject to New York Civil Rights Law because it owns and operates their Website, and Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Civil Law § 40-c(2). 75. Defendant is violating N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website and the goods and -20- services integrated with such Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 76. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41 states that “any corporation which shall violate any of the provisions of sections forty, forty-a, forty-b or forty-two . . . shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby . . .” 77. Under NY Civil Rights Law § 40-d, “any person who shall violate any of the provisions of the foregoing section, or subdivision three of section 240.30 or section 240.31 of the penal law, or who shall aid or incite the violation of any of said provisions shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby in any court of competent jurisdiction in the county in which the defendant shall reside ...” 78. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 79. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability are being directly or indirectly refused, withheld from, or denied the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof in § 40 et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. -21- 80. Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages of five hundred dollars per instance, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Civil Law § 40 et seq. for each and every offense. 81. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 82. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 83. Defendant’s Website is a sales establishment and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9). 84. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates its Website, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 85. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with such Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, products, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 86. Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] -22- from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). 87. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the Sub- Class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 88. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 89. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of its Website under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. -23- 90. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 91. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 92. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 93. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 94. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class and New York State and City Sub- Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 95. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies, that its Website contains access barriers denying blind customers the full and equal access to the products, services and facilities of its Website, which Defendant owns, operations and controls, fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182, et seq., N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, et seq., and N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. 96. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. -24- DECLARATORY RELIEF VIOLATION OF THE NEW YORK STATE CIVIL RIGHTS LAW VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 1281 et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE NYSHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL

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(Violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq. – Telephone Consumer Protection Act) (on behalf of Plaintiff and the Class) 13. In an effort to solicit more customers, Defendant sent, or had sent on their behalf, unsolicited text message advertising calls, without prior express written consent, to cellular telephones while using automatic telephone dialing equipment having the capacity to store and dial telephone numbers, en masse. As a result, Defendant has repeatedly violated the TCPA. 14. Given the relatively low cost associated with sending bulk text messages, many businesses have turned to disseminating advertising calls or promotions through mass text message campaigns. 15. Seeking to market their services to consumers and, in turn, grow the customer base for affiliated night clubs, Defendant engaged in this especially invasive form of advertising. 17. The nature of the text message calls sent by Defendant indicates that it used an automatic telephone dialing system (“ATDS”). Specifically, the hardware and/or software used by Defendant has the capacity to store, produce, and dial random and sequential numbers, and/or receive and store lists of telephone numbers, and to dial such numbers, en masse, in an automated fashion without human intervention. Defendant’s automated dialing equipment includes features substantially similar to a predictive dialer, inasmuch as it is capable of making numerous text message calls simultaneously (all without human intervention). 18. The text message advertising calls alleged herein were exclusively made by Defendant. Defendant made, or had made on their behalf, the same (or substantially the same) text message calls en masse to thousands of cellular telephone numbers. 20. Moreover, Defendant violated the TCPA by failing to clearly state the legal name of the business responsible for initiating such calls and failing to provide an automated, interactive voice-and/or key press-activated opt-out mechanism for the called person to make a do-not-call request. 21. Through their conduct, Defendant caused consumers actual harm by sending the unsolicited text message calls at issue. Plaintiff and members of the Class were not only subjected to the aggravation that necessarily accompanies the receipt of unauthorized text messages, but also because consumers frequently have to pay their cell phone service providers for the receipt of such unauthorized text messages. 22. Moreover, Plaintiff and members of the Class suffered injuries in the form of invasion of privacy and violations of their statutory rights, the monies paid to receive Defendant’s unsolicited text messages, the diminished value and utility of their telephone equipment and telephone subscription service (i.e. the value of such equipment and services is higher when unencumbered by repeated and harassing text messages), the amount of time lost answering and fielding unwanted telemarketing text messages, the wear and tear on their telephone equipment, the loss of battery (which becomes diminished with each incoming phone call), the loss of battery life (which has a finite number of charging cycles), and electricity costs required to recharge their cellular phones. 24. The text message calls at issue did not include an automated mechanism for Plaintiff to opt out of receiving such calls. 25. The sender is identified in the text message call at issue as a person named “Luke.” 26. Upon information and belief, “Luke” did not personally initiate the calls at issue. 27. In fact, the software and/or hardware products or services used by Defendant to send the text message calls through a phone number also provided Defendant with the capacity to store, produce, and dial random and sequential numbers, and/or receive and store lists of telephone numbers, and to dial such numbers, en masse, in an automated fashion without human intervention. 28. Upon information or belief, Defendant created and/or controlled the content of the calls, initiated the calls, took steps necessary to physically place the calls and/or were so involved in placing the calls at issue that they could be considered to have initiated them. 29. The calls were advertisements because they were sent for the purpose of promoting Defendant’s services through its website, LasVegasGuestList.Com, which was linked in all the text message calls at issue. 30. The calls were not addressed to Plaintiff by name. 32. Defendant’s intrusive text messages adversely affected Plaintiff’s right to privacy. 33. Defendant was and is aware that the above-described text message calls were being made on a widespread basis, and that the text message calls were being made to consumers whom had not consented to receive them. 34. Class Definition: Plaintiff Magee brings this action on behalf of himself and a class defined as follows: Class: All individuals in the United States whose wireless telephone number Defendant, or someone on Defendant’s behalf, called using an automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice without prior express written consent of the called party. Excluded from the Class are: (1) any Judge or Magistrate presiding over this action and members of their families; (2) Defendant, Defendant's subsidiaries, parents, successors, predecessors, and any entity in which the Defendant or its parents have a controlling interest and its current or former employees, officers and directors; (3) persons who properly execute and file a timely request for exclusion from the Class; (4) persons whose claims in this matter have been finally adjudicated on the merits or otherwise released; (5) Plaintiff’s counsel and Defendant's counsel; and (6) the legal representatives, successors, and assigns of any such excluded persons. 36. Commonality and Predominance: There are many questions of law and fact common to the claims of Plaintiff and the putative Class, and those questions predominate over any questions that may affect individual members of the Class. Common questions for the Class include, but are not necessarily limited to the following: a. Whether Defendant's conduct violated the TCPA; b. Whether Defendant sent text messages using an automatic telephone dialing system ("ATDS"), as contemplated by the TCPA; c. Whether Defendant systematically sent text message advertisements to persons who did not previously provide it with prior express written consent to receive such text message calls; and d. Whether Plaintiff and the members of the Class are entitled to treble damages based on the willfulness of Defendant's conduct. 37. Typicality: Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of other members of the Class, in that Plaintiff and the Class members sustained damages arising out of Defendant's uniform wrongful conduct and unsolicited text message calls. 39. Appropriateness: This class action is also appropriate for certification because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class as a whole, thereby requiring the Court's imposition of uniform relief to ensure compatible standards of conduct toward the members of the Class and making final class-wide injunctive relief appropriate. Defendant's practices apply to and affect the members of the Class uniformly, and Plaintiff's challenge of those practices hinges on Defendant's conduct with respect to the Class as a whole, not on facts or law applicable only to Plaintiff. Additionally, the damages suffered by individual members of the Class will likely be small relative to the burden and expense of individual prosecution of the complex litigation necessitated by Defendant's actions. Thus, it would be virtually impossible for the members of the Class to obtain effective relief from Defendant's misconduct on an individual basis. A class action provides the benefits of single adjudication, economies of scale, and comprehensive supervision by a single court. Economies of time, effort, and expense will be fostered and uniformity of decisions will be ensured. 40. Plaintiff reserves the right to revise the foregoing "Class Allegations" and "Class Definition" based on facts learned through additional investigation and in discovery. 42. In an effort to promote itself and affiliated local night clubs, Defendant made unsolicited and unwanted text message advertising calls to the cellular telephones of Plaintiff and the Class without their prior express consent. 43. Defendant sent the text message advertising calls to Plaintiff and the Class's cellular telephone numbers using equipment that had the capacity to store or produce telephone numbers to be called using a random or sequential number generator, and/or receive and store lists of phone numbers, and to dial such numbers en masse. 44. Defendant utilized equipment that sent the text message advertising calls to Plaintiff and other members of the putative Class simultaneously and without human intervention. 45. By sending the text message advertising calls to Plaintiff and members of the Class's cellular telephones without prior express written consent, and by utilizing an ATDS, Defendant violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(I)(A)(iii). 46. By failing to clearly state the legal name of the business responsible for initiating such text message advertising calls or provide an automated, interactive voice-and/or key press- activated opt-out mechanism for the called person to make a do-not-call request, Defendant also violated 47 U.S.C.§ 64.1200(b)(1) and (3). 47. As a result of Defendant’s unlawful conduct, Plaintiff and the members of the putative Class suffered actual damages and also have had their rights to privacy adversely impacted. Plaintiff and the Class are therefore entitled to, among other things, a minimum of $500 in statutory damages for each such violation under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). 49. Additionally, as a result of Defendant’s unlawful conduct, Plaintiff and the other members of the Class are entitled to an injunction under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(A) to ensure that Defendant’s violations of the TCPA do not continue into the future.

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25. Plaintiff worked as a Utilization Review Employee for Defendant within the last three years. 27. Utilization Review Employees’ job duties were routine and rote and did not include the exercise of discretion and independent judgment with respect to matters of significance. Utilization Review Employees’ duties and responsibilities did not involve the management of the enterprise or any particular department, and Plaintiff did not direct the work of other employees. Nor were any Utilization Review Employees involved in setting the management policies or general business operations of Defendant or its patients. 28. The minimum clinical certification required to perform the Utilization Review Work performed by Plaintiff is Licensed Practical Nurse (“LPN”) or Licensed Vocational Nurse (“LVN”) credentials. In fact, URAC Health Plan Accreditation Guidelines explicitly provide that an “LPN/LVN meets the URAC definition of health professional and this licensure category may conduct initial clinical review.”3 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) COLLECTIVE ACTION VIOLATION OF FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. FAILURE TO PAY OVERTIME WAGES 29. Although Plaintiff and other Utilization Review Employees were licensed nurses, they were not certified nurse midwives, nurse anesthetists, or nurse practitioners. Defendant employed Utilization Review Employees, including Plaintiff, who held LPN licensure, but no other clinical licensure such as a Registered Nurse license. 31. During Plaintiff’s employment with Defendant, Defendant required Plaintiff and other Utilization Review Employees to perform their job duties in accordance with its corporate policies, procedures, guidelines, and guidelines embedded in Defendant’s computer software. 32. The policies, procedures and guidelines followed by Plaintiff and other Utilization Review Employees in performing Utilization Review Work were designed to comply with the accreditation guidelines for a national accreditation organization, the NCQA.4 34. During Plaintiff’s employment with Defendant, Plaintiff’s and other Utilization Review Employees’ job duties did not involve creating or drafting corporate policies, procedures or guidelines pertaining to Utilization Review Work. In fact, during Plaintiff’s employment with Defendant, Plaintiff’s job duties did not involve creating or drafting any corporate policies, procedures or guidelines of any kind for Defendant or its employees. 35. Defendant misclassified Plaintiff and other Utilization Review Employees as exempt employees for the purposes of the FLSA. Defendant paid Plaintiff and other Utilization Review Employees a salary, at the same amount of compensation each week, regardless of the number of hours they worked each week during their employment. When Plaintiff worked over 40 hours in individual workweeks, Defendant did not pay Plaintiff overtime at one-and-one-half times the “regular rate” at which she was employed. 37. As non-exempt employees, Defendant’s Utilization Review Employees were entitled to full compensation for all overtime hours worked. Under the FLSA, employees are entitled to “not less than one and one-half times the regular rate” at which they are employed for work in excess of 40 hours in a workweek. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). The “regular rate” shall be deemed to include bonuses, commissions, nondiscretionary incentive compensation and other remuneration paid to the employee. 29 U.S.C. § 207(e). 39. When Plaintiff and Utilization Review Employees worked over 40 hours in one or more individual workweeks, Defendant did not pay them overtime at one-and-one-half times the “regular rate” at which they were employed. C. Defendant Benefited from the Uncompensated Overtime Work and Suffered and Permitted it to Happen 40. At all relevant times, Defendant directed and directly benefited from the Utilization Review Work performed by Plaintiff and the Utilization Review Employees. 41. At all relevant times, Defendant controlled the work schedules, duties, protocols, applications, assignments and employment conditions of Plaintiff and the Utilization Review Employees. 42. At all relevant times, Defendant was able to track the amount of time Plaintiff and the Utilization Review Employees spent in connection with the performance of their Utilization Review Work. However, Defendant failed to do so and failed to properly compensate Plaintiff and the Utilization Review Employees for the overtime work they performed. 44. Defendant expressly trained, instructed and permitted Plaintiff and the Utilization Review Employees to perform more than 40 hours of Utilization Review Work during numerous individual workweeks. 45. Because Plaintiff and the Utilization Review Employees typically worked more than 40 hours in a workweek, Defendant’s policies and practices deprived Plaintiff and the Utilization Review Employees of overtime wages for the Utilization Review Work they performed 46. Defendant knew or should have known that the Utilization Review Work performed by Plaintiff and the Utilization Review Employees did not qualify for the FLSA’s administrative, executive or professional exemption. Indeed, given the routine and rote nature of the Utilization Review Work, the lack of discretion and independent judgment with respect to matters of significance, and the strict guidelines the Utilization Review Employees were required to adhere to, there is no conceivable way for Defendant to establish that its classification scheme was enacted in good faith. 47. Despite knowing Plaintiff and the Utilization Review Employees performed more than 40 hours of Utilization Review Work in numerous individual workweeks, Defendant failed to make any effort to stop or disallow the overtime work and instead suffered and permitted it to happen. 49. Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) of the FLSA on her own behalf and on behalf of: All similarly situated current and former Utilization Review Employees who work or have worked for Defendant in the last three years and who were paid a salary and classified as exempt from overtime. (hereinafter referred to as the “FLSA Collective”). Plaintiff reserves the right to amend this definition if necessary. 50. Defendant is liable under the FLSA for, inter alia, failing to properly compensate Plaintiff and other similarly situated Utilization Review Employees. 51. Excluded from the FLSA Collective are Defendant’s executive, administrative and professional employees, including computer professionals and outside salespersons. 52. Consistent with Defendant’s policy and pattern or practice, Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective were not paid premium overtime compensation when they worked beyond 40 hours in a workweek. 54. As part of its regular business practices, Defendant intentionally, willfully and repeatedly engaged in a pattern, practice and/or policy of violating the FLSA with respect to Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective. This policy and pattern or practice includes, but is not limited to: a. Willfully misclassifying Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective as exempt employees under the FLSA; b. Willfully failing to pay Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective premium overtime wages for hours worked in excess of 40 hours per workweek; and c. Willfully failing to record all of the time that Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective worked for the benefit of Defendant. 55. Defendant is aware or should have been aware that Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective were non-exempt employees and that federal law required it to pay Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective overtime premiums for hours worked in excess of 40 per workweek. 56. Defendant’s unlawful conduct has been widespread, repeated and consistent. 58. The employment relationships between Defendant and every proposed FLSA Collective member are the same. The key issue – whether the Utilization Review Work performed by Utilization Review Employees qualifies for the professional, executive or administrative exemption – is identical among the proposed FLSA Collective members. 59. Many similarly situated current and former Utilization Review Employees have been underpaid in violation of the FLSA and would benefit from the issuance of a court-supervised notice of this lawsuit and the opportunity to join it. 60. Court-supervised notice of this lawsuit should be sent to the FLSA Collective pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 61. Those similarly situated employees are known to Defendant, are readily identifiable, and can be located through Defendant’s personnel and payroll records. 63. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates all previous paragraphs herein. 64. At all times relevant to this action, Defendant was engaged in interstate commerce, or in the production of goods for commerce, as defined by the FLSA. 65. At all times relevant to this action, Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective were “employees” of Defendant within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1) of the A. Defendant Misclassified Its Utilization Review Employees

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10. This action has been brought and may be maintained as a class action under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because the proposed class is easily ascertainable and there is a well-defined community of interest in the litigation, as described further below. 11. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and all other persons similarly situated pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Without prejudice to later revision, the class which Plaintiff seeks to represent are composed of: Class I (FCRA Applicant Class): All persons who applied for employment with Bank of America commencing from two (2) years immediately preceding the filing of this lawsuit who (i) applied for employment with Bank of America; (ii) were the subject of a consumer report used by Bank of America for employment purposes; (iii) had the consumer report contain information on convictions occurring more than seven years prior to the consumer report; and (iv) were the subject of an adverse employment action by Bank of America. Class II (ICRAA Applicant Class): All California citizens who applied for employment with Bank of America commencing from four (4) years immediately preceding the filing of this lawsuit who (i) applied for employment with Bank of America; (ii) were the subject of a consumer report used by Bank of America for employment purposes; (iii) had the consumer report contain information on convictions occurring more than seven years prior to the consumer report; and (iv) were the subject of an adverse employment action by Bank of America. 13. Numerosity: This action is properly maintainable as a class action. Although Plaintiff does not, as yet, know the exact size of each class and subclass, based upon the nature of the Defendants’ business, Plaintiff believes that there are numerous Class members, and that Class members are geographically dispersed throughout the United States of America. Thus, each class and subclass is sufficiently numerous to make joinder impracticable, if not completely impossible. The disposition of the claims of the members of each class and subclass through this class action will benefit both the parties and this Court. In addition, each class and subclass is readily identifiable from information and records in the possession of Bank of America, the members of each class and subclass, and third parties. 14. Commonality: There is a well-defined community of interest in the questions of law and fact involved affecting the parties to be represented. The questions of law and fact to each class and subclass predominate over questions which may affect individual class and subclass members, including the following: (a) Whether the investigative consumer reports contained information regarding misdemeanor convictions older than seven years, and/or information regarding arrests that did not lead to convictions; (b) Whether Defendants willfully violated the FCRA, requiring statutory damages pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a); (c) Whether Defendants’ conduct in violation of the FCRA, requiring statutory damages of $100 to $1,000 per Class Member pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a) (d) Whether Defendants’ conduct as described herein constitutes a violation of the UCL; (e) Whether Plaintiff is entitled to injunctive relief; and (f) Whether Defendants are liable for attorney fees and costs. 16. Adequacy: Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class. Plaintiff has no interest that is contrary to or in conflict with those members of the Class he seeks to represent. Furthermore, Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced and competent in the prosecution of complex class action litigation involving the statutory violations alleged herein to further ensure such protection and he intends to prosecute this action vigorously. 17. The prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the Class would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of the Class, which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the Class and would lead to repetitious trials of the numerous common questions of fact and law. Plaintiff knows of no difficulty that will be encountered in the management of this litigation that would preclude its maintenance as a class action. As a result, a class action is far superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. 19. Notice to the members of the Class may be made by first-class mail addressed to all persons who have been individually identified by Defendant through access to Defendant's records. Alternatively, if Defendant cannot produce a list of Class members' names and addresses, the members of the Class may be notified by publication in the appropriate media outlets, and by posting notices in Defendant's places of business. 20. Plaintiff and the Class have suffered irreparable harm and damages as a result of Defendants’ wrongful conduct as alleged herein. Absent a representative action, Plaintiff and the Class will continue to suffer losses, thereby allowing these violations of law to proceed without remedy, and allowing Defendants to retain the proceeds of their ill-gotten gains. 21. In addition, Defendants have acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief with respect to the Class as a whole. 28. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by this reference each and every preceding paragraph of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 29. The Federal Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1681 et seq. imposes limitations on the issuance of consumer reports. 30. The Act defines consumer reports as any written, oral, or other communication of any information by a consumer reporting agency bearing on a consumer’s credit worthiness, credit standing, credit capacity, character, general reputation, personal characteristics, or mode of living which is used or expected to be used or collected in whole or in part for the purpose of serving as a factor in establishing the consumer’s eligibility for--(A) credit or insurance to be used primarily for personal, family, or household purposes; (B) employment purposes; or (C) any other purpose authorized under section 1681b of this title. 31. Defendant is a person as defined by 15 U.S.C.A. § 1681a in that it furnished consumer reports to third parties bearing on a consumer’s credit worthiness, credit standing, credit capacity, character, general reputation, personal characteristics, or mode of living which is used or expected to be used or collected in whole or in part for the purpose of serving as a factor in establishing the consumer’s eligibility for credit or insurance to be used primarily for personal, family, or household purposes and for employment purposes. 32. On or about October 31, 2016 and on other dates currently unknown to Plaintiff, Defendant issued consumer reports about Plaintiff and issued consumer reports regarding the other members of the class during the class period defined above for the purpose of serving as a factor in establishing the consumer’s eligibility for or insurance to be used primarily for personal, family, or household purposes; or for employment purposes. 34. Defendant violated 15 U.S.C.A. § 1681c by furnishing consumer reports regarding the Plaintiff and the Class I Members that contained information of records of arrest and other adverse item of information including criminal charges that were dismissed, that, from date of entry, antedated the report by more than seven years. 35. Defendant furnished consumer reports regarding the Plaintiff on or about October 31, 2016 and on other dates currently unknown that included information about a 1993 arrest and charges for false impersonation and driving with a suspended license. Both charges were dismissed, pursuant to Cal. Penal Code section 1203.4A. 36. Defendant wilfully violated 15 U.S.C.A. § 1681c by instituting a policy and practice of identifying arrests and the filing of criminal charges that did not result in a conviction and reporting those events indefinitely even when they predated the reports by more than seven years. Defendant knew or was recklessly indifferent to the legal prohibitions on reporting certain arrests, charges and other adverse information but intentionally crafted and implemented a policy to report such information in violation of the 38. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by this reference each and every preceding paragraph of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 40. Bank of America violated California Civil Code §1786.18 on or about May 15, 2016 as to himself and on other dates currently unknown to Plaintiff as to the other members of the Class II, by issuing investigative consumer reports about Plaintiff and the Class II members containing records of arrest, indictment, information, misdemeanor complaint, or conviction of crimes that, from the date of disposition, release, or parole, antedated the report by more than seven years, including records from 1993 as to Plaintiff. 41. With respect to each of the aforementioned violations of the ICRAA provisions, Bank of America is liable to Plaintiff and the Class II members in the amount of the greater of the actual damages sustained as a result of the violations or $10,000 per violation pursuant to Civil Code § 1786.50 (a) (1). 42. Bank of America’s violations were willful or grossly negligent within the meaning of Civil Code § 1786.50 (b), in that Bank of America knowingly failed to fulfill obligations without a good faith, reasonable belief in the legality of their actions. 43. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all other Class II members, seeks all available remedies pursuant to Cal. Civ. Code § 1786.50, including statutory damages and/or actual damages, punitive damages, injunctive and equitable relief, and attorneys’ fees and costs. 44. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by this reference each and every preceding paragraph of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 45. California Business and Professions Code § 17200 et seq. prohibits unfair competition in the form of any “unlawful” and “unfair” business acts and practices. Defendants’ acts and practices described in this Complaint constitute “unlawful” and “unfair” business acts and practices within the meaning of Business and Professions Code § 17200 et seq. 47. The violations of these laws serve as “unlawful” business practices for purposes of Business and Professions Code § 17200 et seq. and remedies are provided therein under Business and Professions Code § 17203. 48. Defendants have also engaged in “unfair” business acts or practices in that the harm caused by Defendants’ wrongful conduct alleged above outweighs the utility of such conduct and such conduct offends public policy, is immoral, unscrupulous, unethical, deceitful and offensive, causes substantial injury to Plaintiff and Class members, and provides Defendants with an unfair competitive advantage over those employers and businesses that abide by the state and federal laws alleged to have been violated by Defendants herein. 49. As a result of the conduct described above, Plaintiff and the Class II have no other adequate remedy of law in that absent injunctive relief from the Court, Defendant is likely to continue to injure Plaintiff and Class II members, and thus engendering a multiplicity of judicial proceedings. 50. Pursuant to Business & Professions Code § 17203, Plaintiff and Class II members seek an order of this Court for equitable and/or injunctive relief in the form of requiring Defendants to correct their illegal conduct that is necessary and proper to prevent Defendants from repeating their illegal and wrongful practices as alleged above and to maintain the confidentiality of the information of Plaintiff and the Class II already obtained by Defendants way of their illegal and wrongful practices set forth above. Because this case is brought for the purposes of enforcing important rights affecting the public interest, Plaintiff and the Class II also seek the recovery of attorneys' fees and costs in prosecuting this action against Defendants under Code of Civil Procedure § 1021.5 and other applicable law. 6. This case arises out of Defendant’s unlawful policies and procedures by which it obtains and uses consumer reports of applicants seeking employment but fails to provide applicants with the statutorily required disclosures, conducts investigative consumer reports for an impermissible purpose, and does not lacks the privacy policy required by law. Further, the investigative consumer reports include convictions that occurred more than seven years prior to the investigative consumer report was generated. For these violations, Plaintiff and members of the Class are seeking statutory damages of $100 to $1,000 under the FCRA, actual damages under the ICRAA, and injunctive relief and restitutionary disgorgement under the UCL. 7. Defendant Bank of America is a “person” under the FCRA, as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(b). Plaintiff and all those similarly situated qualify as “consumers” as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(c). As a matter of policy and practice, Defendant obtains and uses consumer reports on applicants seeking employment with Bank of America. The consumer reports used by Defendants qualify as “consumer reports” under the FCRA, as defined by 15 U.S.C § 1681a(d) because the reports indicate the consumer’s credit worthiness, credit standing, credit capacity, character, general reputation, or mode of living, and are used to consider the consumer for employment. These reports also qualify as an “investigative consumer report” under Cal. Civil Code § 1786.2(c). 9. As a result of Defendant’s wrongful acts and omissions, Plaintiff and others similarly situated have been injured including, without limitation, having their privacy and statutory rights violated in violation of the FCRA and the ICRAA. Plaintiff seeks, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, statutory, actual, and compensatory damages, punitive damages, injunctive relief, and expenses of litigation including costs and attorney fees. FOR VIOLATION OF THE INVESTIGATIVE CONSUMER REPORTING AGENCIES ACT, CIVIL CODE § 1786.18 (On behalf of the Plaintiff and the Class II Members Against Defendant Bank of America) FOR VIOLATION OF CALIFORNIA BUSINESS & PROFESSIONS CODE § 17200, ET SEQ.) (On Behalf of the Plaintiff and Class II Members Against All Defendants) FOR VIOLATION OF THE FEDERAL CREDIT REPORTING ACT (Violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(B) and 15 U.S.C. § 1681m) (On Behalf of Plaintiff and Class I Against All Defendants)

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(Declaratory Relief) 113. Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 112 of this Complaint as though set forth at length herein. 114. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies, that Foco.com contains access barriers denying blind customers the full and equal access to the goods, services and facilities of Foco.com, which Team Beans owns, operates and/or controls, fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the American with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182, et seq., N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, et seq., and N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8- 107, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. 115. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. 26 (Violation of New York City Human Rights Law, N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-102, et seq.) 101. Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 100 of this Complaint as though set forth at length herein. 102. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “it shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 103. Foco.com is a sales establishment and public accommodation within the definition of N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-102(9). 104. Defendant is subject to City Law because it owns and operates Foco.com. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-102(1). 105. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Foco.com, causing Foco.com to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. Specifically, Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from 24 discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8- 107(15)(a). 106. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a) in that Defendant has: (a) constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or (b) constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or (c) failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 107. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 108. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Foco.com under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8- 107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 109. The actions of Defendant were and are in violation of City law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 25 110. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense. 111. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 112. Pursuant to N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. (Violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181 et seq. – Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act) (Violation of New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law Article 15 (Executive Law § 292 et seq.)) 21 (Violation of New York State Civil Rights Law, NY CLS Civ R, Article 4 (CLS Civ R § 40 et seq.)) 25. Defendant, Team Beans, L.L.C., controls and operates Foco.com. in New York State and throughout the United States. 26. Foco.com is a commercial website that offers products and services for online sale. The online store allows the user to browse sports and entertainment merchandise, make purchases, and perform a variety of other functions. 27. Among the features offered by Foco.com are the following: (a) Consumers may use the website to connect with Hale Groves on social media, using such sites as Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and Pinterest; (b) an online store, allowing customers to purchase sports and entertainment merchandise bearing the logo of professional sports teams and entertainment brands; and (c) learning about career opportunities, shipping and return policies, and about the company, amongst other features. 28. This case arises out of Team Beans’ policy and practice of denying the blind access to the goods and services offered by Foco.com. Due to Team Beans’ failure and refusal to remove access barriers to Foco.com, blind individuals have been and are being denied equal access to Team Beans, as well as to the numerous goods, services and benefits offered to the public through Foco.com. 29. Team Beans denies the blind access to goods, services and information made available through Foco.com by preventing them from freely navigating Foco.com. 30. Foco.com contains access barriers that prevent free and full use by Plaintiff and blind persons using keyboards and screen-reading software. These barriers are pervasive and include, but are not limited to: lack of alt-text on graphics, inaccessible drop-down menus, the lack of navigation links, the lack of adequate prompting and labeling, the denial of keyboard access, 9 empty links that contain no text, redundant links where adjacent links go to the same URL address, and the requirement that transactions be performed solely with a mouse. 31. Alternative text (“Alt-text”) is invisible code embedded beneath a graphical image on a website. Web accessibility requires that alt-text be coded with each picture so that a screen-reader can speak the alternative text while sighted users see the picture. Alt-text does not change the visual presentation except that it appears as a text pop-up when the mouse moves over the picture. There are many important pictures on Foco.com that lack a text equivalent. The lack of alt-text on these graphics prevents screen readers from accurately vocalizing a description of the graphics (screen-readers detect and vocalize alt-text to provide a description of the image to a blind computer user). As a result, Plaintiff and blind Foco.com customers are unable to determine what is on the website, browse the website or investigate and/or make purchases. 32. Foco.com also lacks prompting information and accommodations necessary to allow blind shoppers who use screen-readers to locate and accurately fill-out online forms. On a shopping site such as Foco.com, these forms include search fields to locate face masks products, fields to select size, and fields used to fill-out personal information, including address and credit card information. Due to lack of adequate labeling, Plaintiff and blind customers cannot make purchases or inquiries as to Defendant’s merchandise, nor can they enter their personal identification and financial information with confidence and security. 33. Similarly, on Foco.com, blind customers are not aware if the desired products, such as face masks, have been added to the shopping cart because the screen-reader does not indicate the type of product. Therefore, blind customers are essentially prevented from purchasing any items on Foco.com. 34. Specifically, Plaintiff and the class of users of screen-reading software, experienced the following problems on the Website: 10 Summary Plaintiff was unable to purchase a face mask with any team logo or find the “Add to Cart” button. In addition to missing many accessibility features, some of the ones that they do have are not implemented properly. For example, the skip navigation function is only announced after all of the menu items so it defeats the purpose. A user needs this feature to skip the repeated menu content. Homepage  Skip to Content link is announced after the menu items, which defeats the purpose. It must be announced in the first 1-3 tab presses but it takes 20 Tab presses to hear it on this site  The cart icon is announced as “zero link”  A visible focus is not available for many elements  The navigation menu is announced twice  Keyboard-only and screen-reader users are unable to access the submenu items Product Page  Users are not notified when they make a selection. Ex. Plaintiff could hear and select different MLB teams but was not notified that it worked. Multiple visual indicators are provided to show that the new team was successfully selected  All product images were unlabeled. Plaintiff heard a long sourcefile name for each instead of an accessible title or description  The chevon element that expands to show additional teams is not announced so blind users will not be aware of the 12 teams that are only available after you press this element  The Select Size element is not in the tabindex as required  The Size Chart link is announced but the new screen and content is not accessible. Instead, elements behind the Size Chart page are announced so it appears that the link does not work Therefore, Plaintiff and other blind customers are essentially prevented from purchasing any items on foco.com. 35. Furthermore, Foco.com lacks accessible image maps. An image map is a function that combines multiple words and links into one single image. Visual details on this single image highlight different “hot spots” which, when clicked on, allow the user to jump to many different destinations within the website. For an image map to be accessible, it must contain alt-text for the various “hot spots.” The image maps on Foco.com’s menu page do not contain adequate alt-text and are therefore inaccessible to Plaintiff and the other blind individuals 11 attempting to make a purchase. When Plaintiff tried to access the menu link in order to make a purchase, he was unable to access it completely. 36. Furthermore, Plaintiff is unable to locate the shopping cart because the shopping cart form does not specify the purpose of the shopping cart. As a result, blind customers are denied access to the shopping cart. Consequently, blind customers are unsuccessful in adding products into their shopping carts and cannot checkout and are essentially prevented from purchasing items on Foco.com. 37. Moreover, the lack of navigation links on Defendant’s website makes attempting to navigate through Foco.com even more time consuming and confusing for Plaintiff and blind consumers. 38. Foco.com requires the use of a mouse to complete a transaction. Yet, it is a fundamental tenet of web accessibility that for a web page to be accessible to Plaintiff and blind people, it must be possible for the user to interact with the page using only the keyboard. Indeed, Plaintiff and blind users cannot use a mouse because manipulating the mouse is a visual activity of moving the mouse pointer from one visual spot on the page to another. Thus, Foco.com’s inaccessible design, which requires the use of a mouse to complete a transaction, denies Plaintiff and blind customers the ability to independently navigate and/or make purchases on Foco.com. 39. Due to Foco.com’s inaccessibility, Plaintiff and blind customers must in turn spend time, energy, and/or money to make their purchases at traditional brick-and-mortar retailers. Some blind customers may require a driver to get to the stores or require assistance in navigating the stores. By contrast, if Foco.com was accessible, a blind person could independently investigate products and make purchases via the Internet as sighted individuals can and do. According to WCAG 2.1 Guideline 2.4.1, a mechanism is necessary to bypass blocks of content that are repeated on multiple webpages because requiring users to extensively 12 tab before reaching the main content is an unacceptable barrier to accessing the website. Plaintiff must tab through every navigation bar option and footer on Defendant’s website in an attempt to reach the desired service. Thus, Foco.com’s inaccessible design, which requires the use of a mouse to complete a transaction, denies Plaintiff and blind customers the ability to independently make purchases on Foco.com. 40. Foco.com thus contains access barriers which deny the full and equal access to Plaintiff, who would otherwise use Foco.com and who would otherwise be able to fully and equally enjoy the benefits and services of Foco.com in New York State and throughout the United States. 41. Plaintiff, Pedro Martinez, has made numerous attempts to complete a purchase on Foco.com, most recently on May 4, 2020, but was unable to do so independently because of the many access barriers on Defendant’s website. These access barriers have caused Foco.com to be inaccessible to, and not independently usable by, blind and visually-impaired persons. Amongst other access barriers experienced, Plaintiff was unable to purchase a New York Mets logo face mask. 42. As described above, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the fact that Defendant’s website, Foco.com, contains access barriers causing the website to be inaccessible, and not independently usable by, blind and visually-impaired persons. 43. These barriers to access have denied Plaintiff full and equal access to, and enjoyment of, the goods, benefits and services of Foco.com. 44. Defendant engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including but not limited to the following policies or practices: (a) constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or 13 (b) constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or (c) failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 45. Defendant utilizes standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others. 46. Because of Defendant’s denial of full and equal access to, and enjoyment of, the goods, benefits and services of Foco.com, Plaintiff and the class have suffered an injury-in- fact which is concrete and particularized and actual and is a direct result of defendant’s conduct. 47. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks certification of the following nationwide class pursuant to Rule 23(a) and 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: “all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Foco.com and as a result have been denied access to the enjoyment of goods and services offered by Foco.com, during the relevant statutory period.” 48. Plaintiff seeks certification of the following New York subclass pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a), 23(b)(2), and, alternatively, 23(b)(3): “all legally blind individuals in New York State who have attempted to access Foco.com and as a result have been denied access to the enjoyment of goods and services offered by Foco.com, during the relevant statutory period.” 49. There are hundreds of thousands of visually-impaired persons in New York State. There are approximately 8.1 million people in the United States who are visually- impaired. Id. Thus, the persons in the class are so numerous that joinder of all such persons is impractical and the disposition of their claims in a class action is a benefit to the parties and to the Court. 14 50. This case arises out of Defendant’s policy and practice of maintaining an inaccessible website denying blind persons access to the goods and services of Foco.com. Due to Defendant’s policy and practice of failing to remove access barriers, blind persons have been and are being denied full and equal access to independently browse, select and shop on Foco.com. 51. There are common questions of law and fact common to the class, including without limitation, the following: (a) Whether Foco.com is a “public accommodation” under the ADA; (b) Whether Foco.com is a “place or provider of public accommodation” under the laws of New York; (c) Whether Defendant, through its website, Foco.com, denies the full and equal enjoyment of its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities in violation of the ADA; and (d) Whether Defendant, through its website, Foco.com, denies the full and equal enjoyment of its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities in violation of the law of New York. 52. The claims of the named Plaintiff are typical of those of the class. The class, similar to the Plaintiff, is severely visually-impaired or otherwise blind, and claims Team Beans has violated the ADA, and/or the laws of New York by failing to update or remove access barriers on their website, Foco.com, so it can be independently accessible to the class of people who are legally blind. 53. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the members of the Class because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic 15 to the members of the class. Class certification of the claims is appropriate pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. 54. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because questions of law and fact common to Class members clearly predominate over questions affecting only individual class members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 55. Judicial economy will be served by maintenance of this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 56. References to Plaintiff shall be deemed to include the named Plaintiff and each member of the class, unless otherwise indicated. 57. Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 56 of this Complaint as though set forth at length herein. 58. Title III of the American with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) provides that “No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.” Title III also prohibits an entity from “[u]tilizing standards or 16 criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating on the basis of disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 12181(b)(2)(D)(I). 59. Foco.com is a sales establishment and public accommodation within the definition of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181(7). 60. Defendant is subject to Title III of the ADA because it owns and operates Foco.com. 61. Under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(I), it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities or a class of individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 62. Under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(II), it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities or a class of individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 63. Specifically, under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(II), unlawful discrimination includes, among other things, “a failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations.” 64. In addition, under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(III), unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things, “a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with disability is excluded, denied services, segregated 17 or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 65. There are readily available, well-established guidelines on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually-impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other business entities in making their websites accessible, including but not limited to ensuring adequate prompting and accessible alt-text. Incorporating the basic components to make their website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 66. The acts alleged herein constitute violations of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Patrons of Team Beans who are blind have been denied full and equal access to Foco.com, have not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and/or have been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled patrons. 67. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 68. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Foco.com in violation of Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181 et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. 18 69. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 70. The actions of Defendant were and are in violation of the ADA, and therefore Plaintiff invokes his statutory right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 71. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 72. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 73. Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 72 of this Complaint as though set forth at length herein. 74. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.”. 75. Foco.com is a sales establishment and public accommodation within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). 76. Defendant is subject to the New York Human Rights Law because it owns and operates Foco.com. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law. § 292(1). 77. Defendant is violating N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Foco.com, causing Foco.com to be completely inaccessible to the 19 blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons the full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 78. Specifically, under N.Y. Exec. Law § unlawful discriminatory practice includes, among other things, “a refusal to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless such person can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations.” 79. In addition, under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(II), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 8 80. There are readily available, well-established guidelines on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually-impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other business entities in making their website accessible, including but not limited to: adding alt-text to graphics and ensuring that all functions can be performed by using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make their website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 81. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the class on the basis of a disability in violation of the New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2) in that Defendant has: 20 (a) constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or (b) constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or (c) failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 82. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 83. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Foco.com under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 84. The actions of Defendant were and are in violation of the New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 85. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines pursuant to N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 86. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 87. Pursuant to N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 88. Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 87 of this Complaint as though set forth at length herein. 89. Plaintiff served notice thereof upon the attorney general as required by N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41. 90. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40 provides that “all persons within the jurisdiction of this state shall be entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of any places of public accommodations, resort or amusement, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons. No persons, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or employee of any such place shall directly or indirectly refuse, withhold from, or deny to any person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof . . .” 91. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) provides that “no person because of . . . disability, as such term is defined in section two hundred ninety-two of executive law, be subjected to any discrimination in his or her civil rights, or to any harassment, as defined in section 240.25 of the penal law, in the exercise thereof, by any other person or by any firm, corporation or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision.” 92. Foco.com is a sales establishment and public accommodation within the definition of N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2). 93. Defendant is subject to New York Civil Rights Law because it owns and operates Foco.com. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Civil Law § 40-c(2). 94. Defendant is violating N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Foco.com, causing Foco.com to be completely inaccessible to the 22 blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 95. There are readily available, well-established guidelines on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually-impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other business entities in making their website accessible, including but not limited to: adding alt-text to graphics and ensuring that all functions can be performed by using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make their website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 96. In addition, N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41 states that “any corporation which shall violate any of the provisions of sections forty, forty-a, forty-b or forty two . . . shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby . . .” 97. Specifically, under N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-d, “any person who shall violate any of the provisions of the foregoing section, or subdivision three of section 240.30 or section 240.31 of the penal law, or who shall aid or incite the violation of any of said provisions shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby in any court of competent jurisdiction in the county in which the defendant shall reside . . .” 98. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 99. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class on the basis of disability are 23 being directly indirectly refused, withheld from, or denied the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof in § 40 et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. 100. Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages of five hundred dollars per instance, as well as civil penalties and fines pursuant to N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40 et seq. for each and every offense.

lose

22. Defendant operates a technology services company that purportedly offers payment technology services and other services. Unfortunately for consumers, Defendant utilized (and continues to utilize) a sophisticated telephone dialing system to call individuals en masse promoting its goods and services. Defendant is believed to have obtained these telephone numbers (i.e., leads) by purchasing marketing lists containing consumers’ telephone numbers. 23. In Defendant’s overzealous attempt to market its services, it placed (and continues to place) phone calls to consumers who never provided consent to call and to consumers having no relationship with Defendant. Defendant knowingly made (and continues to make) these telemarketing calls without the prior express written consent of the call recipients, and continued to make calls after requests that the calls stop. As such, Defendant not only invaded the personal privacy of Plaintiff and members of the Classes, but also intentionally and repeatedly violated the 24. On June 30, 2003, Plaintiff registered on the NDNC his cellular telephone assigned a number ending in 8313. 25. During March and June of 2017, Defendant contacted Plaintiff on his cellular telephone number using an ATDS, as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1), multiple times without first obtaining Plaintiff’s written consent and in violation of the NDNC. 26. Plaintiff received all calls as described above on his cellular telephone assigned a number ending in 8313. 27. On March 10, 2017, Plaintiff received on his cellular telephone a telemarketing call made by or on behalf of Defendant. In making that call, the caller used an artificial or pre-recorded voice. Plaintiff’s caller ID showed “513-434-1902”; however, Plaintiff believes that the caller ID may have been “spoofed” to conceal the identification of the actual caller. 28. On March 13, 2017, Plaintiff received on his cellular telephone a telemarketing call made by or on behalf of Defendant. During that call, Plaintiff spoke with a live operator who identified the name of the company calling as TranzVia and who sought to market the goods and services of TranzVia. Plaintiff then disconnected the call. Plaintiff’s caller ID showed “202-818- 8629”; however, Plaintiff believes that the caller ID may have been “spoofed” to conceal the identification of the actual caller. 29. On June 6, 2017, Plaintiff received additional follow up telemarketing calls from TranzVia on his cellular telephone. During the first call, Plaintiff could not hear anything and hung up. A second call followed minutes later. During the second call, Plaintiff spoke with a live operator who identified himself as Preston Seaton and the company calling as TranzVia. At Plaintiff’s request, the caller also confirmed the name of TranzVia’s CEO as Paul Nee. Plaintiff then disconnected. 8 30. Several minutes after disconnecting the call from TranzVia, Plaintiff received an email from Preston Seaton, an Account Executive at TranzVia, purporting to thank Plaintiff for “considering opening up [a] new account.” 31. Several minutes after Plaintiff received that email, he received another call from TranzVia’s agent, Preston Seaton. Mr. Seaton seemed frustrated with Plaintiff. Mr. Seaton then made a cryptic reference to a real estate business in which Plaintiff is involved and stated, “You look like you have really good Google reviews ….” Plaintiff promptly disconnected the call. 32. For the calls received on June 6, 2017, Plaintiff’s caller ID showed “202-818- 8629”; however, Plaintiff believes that the caller ID may have been “spoofed” to conceal the identification of the actual caller. 33. On information and belief, and based on the circumstances of the calls as described above, Defendant called Plaintiff using an ATDS. 34. Plaintiff understood the purpose of Defendant’s calls was to market Defendant’s services and solicit business from him. 35. Plaintiff did not have a prior business relationship with Defendant, nor was Plaintiff interested in Defendant’s services. 36. Plaintiff did not consent to being called by Defendant for telemarketing purposes and the calls received from Defendant were an intrusion into Plaintiff’s privacy and caused Plaintiff annoyance and an unnecessary expenditure of his time and efforts. 37. Plaintiff is the exclusive user of the cellular telephone assigned the number ending in 8313 and the account holder of record for that Verizon account. 9 45. Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to Rule 23(a), Rule 23(b)(2), and Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure individually and on behalf of the Classes, which include: a. The “ATDS Class,” consisting of all individuals in the United States who received a call made by or on behalf of TranzVia LLC to the individual’s cellular telephone through the use of an automatic telephone dialing system, or pre-recorded or artificial voice, or any other device having the capacity to dial numbers without human intervention, from October 16, 2013 to the date that class notice is disseminated, where Defendant’s records fail to indicate prior express written consent from the recipient to make such call; and b. The “NDNC Class,” consisting of all persons in the United States who, within four years prior to the commencement of this litigation, received two or more calls during a twelve month period made by or on behalf of TranzVia LLC on their telephone number that had been registered on the National Do-Not-Call Registry. 46. Plaintiff reserves the right to modify the Class definitions as warranted as facts are learned in further investigation and discovery. 47. Plaintiff and the Class members were harmed by Defendant’s acts in at least the following ways: Defendant, either directly or through its agents, illegally contacted Plaintiff and the Class via their cellular telephones by using an ATDS, thereby causing Plaintiff and the Class to incur certain cellular telephone charges or reduce cellular telephone time for which Plaintiff and the Class members previously paid; and Plaintiff and Class members’ privacy was invaded. 48. The exact size of each of the Classes is presently unknown but can be ascertained through a review of Defendant’s records and the NDNC, and it is clear that individual joinder is impracticable. Defendant made telephone calls to thousands of consumers who fall into the definition of each of the Classes. 11 49. There are many questions of law and fact common to the claims of Plaintiff and the Classes, and those questions predominate over any questions that may affect individual members of the Classes. 50. Common questions for the Classes include, without limitation: a. Whether Defendant’s conduct violated the TCPA; b. Whether Defendant systematically made telephone calls to consumers who did not previously provide Defendant and/or its agents with prior express written consent to receive such phone calls after October 16, 2013, and/or continued to make calls after being requested to stop; c. Whether Class members are entitled to treble damages based on the willfulness of Defendant’s conduct; d. Whether Defendant systematically made telephone calls to consumers after October 16, 2013 (other than calls made for emergency purposes or made with the prior express written consent of the called party) using any automatic dialing system or pre-recorded voice to any telephone number assigned to a cellular phone service; e. Whether Defendant violated the TCPA by making telemarketing calls to telephone numbers that had been registered on the NDNC; and f. Whether Defendant and its agents should be enjoined from engaging in such conduct in the future. 51. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the other members of the Classes. Plaintiff and the Classes sustained damages as a result of Defendant’s uniform wrongful conduct during transactions with Plaintiff and the Classes. 12 52. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Classes, and has retained counsel competent and experienced in complex class actions. 53. Plaintiff has no interest antagonistic to those of the Classes, and Defendant has no defenses unique to Plaintiff. 54. This class action is appropriate for class certification because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Classes as a whole, thereby requiring the Court’s imposition of uniform relief to ensure compatible standards of conduct toward the Classes, and making final injunctive relief appropriate with respect to the Classes as a whole. 55. Defendant’s practices challenged herein apply to and affect the Class members uniformly, and Plaintiff’s challenge of those practices hinges on Defendant’s conduct with respect to the Classes as a whole, not on facts or law applicable only to Plaintiff. 56. This case is also appropriate for class certification because class proceedings are superior to all other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy given that joinder of all parties is impracticable. 57. The damages suffered by the individual members of the Classes will likely be relatively small, especially given the burden and expense of individual prosecution of the complex litigation necessitated by Defendant’s actions. 58. Thus, it would be virtually impossible for the individual members of the Classes to obtain effective relief from Defendant’s misconduct. 59. Even if members of the Classes could sustain such individual litigation, it would still not be preferable to a class action, because individual litigation would increase the delay and expense to all parties due to the complex legal and factual controversies presented in this Complaint. 13 60. By contrast, a class action presents far fewer management difficulties and provides the benefits of single adjudication, economy of scale, and comprehensive supervision by a single court. Economies of time, effort and expense will be fostered and uniformity of decisions ensured. 61. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference each preceding paragraph as though fully set forth herein. 62. Defendant, either directly or through its agents, made unsolicited and unauthorized calls using an ATDS or pre-recorded/artificial voice to Plaintiff’s and the ATDS Class members’ cellular telephones for the purpose of marketing Defendant’s products and/or services. 63. Defendant, either directly or through its agents, made the calls without obtaining prior express written consent from Plaintiff and the ATDS Class. 64. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant constitute numerous and multiple violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq. 65. Defendant’s conduct invaded the privacy and cause annoyance to Plaintiff and the ATDS Class. 66. As a result of Defendant’s violations of the TCPA, Plaintiff and the ATDS Class are entitled to an award of $500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). 67. Plaintiff and the ATDS Class are also entitled to and seek injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. 14 68. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference each preceding paragraph as though fully set forth herein. 69. As a result of knowing and/or willful violations of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A), by Defendant, Plaintiff and members of the ATDS Class are entitled to treble damages of up to $1,500 for each and every call made to their cellular telephone numbers using an ATDS and/or artificial or prerecorded voice in violation of the statute, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3). 70. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference each preceding paragraph as though fully set forth herein. 71. Defendant made telemarketing calls without obtaining prior express written consent and in violation of the NDNC. 72. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant constitute numerous and multiple violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq. 73. Defendant’s conduct invaded Plaintiff’s privacy. 74. As a result of Defendant’s violations of the TCPA, Plaintiff and the NDNC Class are entitled to an award of $500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5)(B). 75. Plaintiff and the NDNC Class are also entitled to and seek injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. 15 76. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference each preceding paragraph as though fully set forth herein. 77. As a result of knowing and/or willful violations of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(c), by Defendant, Plaintiff and members of the NDNC Class are entitled to treble damages of up to $1,500 for each and every call made to their cellular telephone numbers in violation of the statute, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5)(B). KNOWING AND/OR WILLFUL VIOLATIONS OF THE TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(c) KNOWING AND/OR WILLFUL VIOLATIONS OF THE TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A) VIOLATIONS OF THE TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(c) VIOLATIONS OF THE TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)

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15. As a leading healthcare information technology firm, PTP provides training and support to medical facilities in connection with the implementation of new electronic recordkeeping systems. PTP employs consultants, such as Plaintiffs, who perform such training and support services throughout the United States. 16. PTP’s financial results are significantly driven by the number of consultants performing training and support services for PTP’s customers, and the fees that PTP charges the customers for these services. 17. Between March 2015 and January 2016, Carey was assigned by PTP to provide educational and support services to healthcare staff at Lahey Hospital in Burlington, Massachusetts; Ohio Health in Columbus, Ohio; SouthCoast Medical Centers in Boston, Massachusetts; and St. Luke’s Hospital in Allentown, Pennsylvania. 18. Between July 2014 and 2015, Okakpu was assigned by PTP to provide educational and support services to healthcare staff at St. Francis Hospital in Tulsa, Oklahoma; University of North Carolina; CHI Franciscan Hospital in Seattle, Washington; and Ohio Health in Columbus, Ohio. 19. Between December 2014 and November 2015, Mathaun was assigned by PTP to provide educational and support services to healthcare staff at South Coast Hospital in Fall River, Massachusetts; St. Alexius Medical Center in Bismarck, North Dakota; Caro Mount 5 Regional Medical Center in Gastonia, North Carolina; Ohio Health in Columbus, Ohio; CHI Franciscan Hospital in Tacoma, Washington; and University of North Carolina. 20. Plaintiffs were paid solely on a straight hourly basis for hours over forty and were paid only for the time billed to PTP’s customers, NOT for all overtime hours actually worked. Plaintiffs and Members of the Classes Routinely Worked in Excess of 40 Hours a Week 21. Plaintiffs and Members of the Classes routinely worked in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek, but were not paid overtime compensation as required by the FLSA. 22. Plaintiffs and Members of the Classes were often required to work twelve (12) hours a day, seven (7) days a week. 23. For instance, while working for PTP in Tulsa, Oklahoma, in July 2014, Okakpu and the other consultants worked, on average, twelve (12) hours a day, seven (7) days a week. Okakpu was paid only a straight hourly rate during this time. 24. Although Plaintiffs and Members of the Classes frequently were required, permitted, or encouraged to work more than forty (40) hours per week, PTP failed to pay them one and one-half (1 ½) times their regular pay rate for hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours per week, as required by the FLSA and Pennsylvania and Massachusetts law. 25. Instead, Plaintiffs and Members of the Classes were paid a straight hourly rate for hours that they worked, regardless of whether they worked more than forty (40) hours in a week. Plaintiffs and Members of the Classes were not paid on a salary basis. Plaintiffs and Members of the Classes are not Exempt “Computer Employees” under the 32. Plaintiffs bring this lawsuit pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) as a collective action on behalf of the FLSA Class defined above. 33. Plaintiffs desire to pursue their FLSA claims on behalf of all individuals who opt- in to this action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 34. Plaintiffs and the FLSA Class Members are “similarly situated” as that term is used in 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) because, inter alia, all such individuals have been subject to PTP’s common business and compensation practices as described herein, and, as a result of such 9 practices, have not been paid the full and legally mandated overtime premium for hours worked over forty (40) during the workweek. Resolution of this action requires inquiry into common facts, including, inter alia, PTP’s common misclassification, compensation and payroll practices. 35. Specifically, PTP did not compensate Plaintiffs and the FLSA Class one-and-a- half (1 ½) times the regular rate for hours worked over forty (40) in a workweek. 36. The similarly situated employees are known to PTP, are readily identifiable, and can easily be located through PTP’s business and human resources records. 37. PTP employs many FLSA Class Members throughout the United States. These similarly situated employees may be readily notified of this action through U.S. Mail and/or other means, and allowed to opt in to this action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), for the purpose of collectively adjudicating their claims for overtime compensation, liquidated damages (or, alternatively, interest) and attorneys’ fees and costs under the FLSA. 38. The FLSA requires that covered employees be compensated for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours per week at a rate not less than one and one-half (1 ½) times the regular rate at which he is employed. See 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). 39. Plaintiff Carey brings Count II of this action as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 on behalf of herself and the Pennsylvania Class defined above. 40. The members of the Pennsylvania Class are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. Upon information and belief, there are more than forty (40) members of the Pennsylvania Class. 41. Plaintiff Carey will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Pennsylvania Class because there is no conflict between the claims of Plaintiff Carey and those 10 of the Pennsylvania Class, and Plaintiff Carey’s claims are typical of the claims of the Pennsylvania Class. Plaintiff Carey’s counsel are competent and experienced in litigating class actions and other complex litigation matters, including wage and hour cases like this one. 42. There are questions of law and fact common to the proposed Pennsylvania Class, which predominate over any questions affecting only individual Class Members, including, without limitation, whether PTP has violated and continues to violate Pennsylvania law through its policy or practice of not paying its hourly workers overtime compensation. 43. Plaintiff Carey’s claims are typical of the claims of the Pennsylvania Class Members in the following ways, without limitation: (a) Plaintiff Carey is a member of the Pennsylvania Class; (b) Plaintiff Carey’s claims arise out of the same policies, practices and course of conduct that form the basis of the claims of the Pennsylvania Class; (c) Plaintiff Carey’s claims are based on the same legal and remedial theories as those of the Pennsylvania Class and involve similar factual circumstances; (d) there are no conflicts between the interests of Plaintiff Carey and the Pennsylvania Class Members; and (e) the injuries suffered by Plaintiff Carey are similar to the injuries suffered by the Pennsylvania Class Members. 44. Class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because questions of law and fact common to the Pennsylvania Class predominate over any questions affecting only individual Class Members. 45. Class action treatment is superior to the alternatives for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy alleged herein. Such treatment will permit a large number of similarly situated persons to prosecute their common claims in a single forum simultaneously, efficiently, and without the duplication of effort and expense that numerous individual actions would entail. No difficulties are likely to be encountered in the management of this class action 11 that would preclude its maintenance as a class action, and no superior alternative exists for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. The Pennsylvania Class Members are readily identifiable from PTP’s own records. Prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the Pennsylvania Class would create the risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual Pennsylvania Class Members that would establish incompatible standards of conduct for PTP. 46. A class action is superior to other available methods for adjudication of this controversy because joinder of all members is impractical. Further, the amounts at stake for many of the Pennsylvania Class Members, while substantial, are not great enough to enable them to maintain separate suits against PTP. 47. Without a class action, PTP will retain the benefit of its wrongdoing, which will result in further damages to Plaintiff Carey and the Pennsylvania Class. Plaintiff Carey envisions no difficulty in the management of this action as a class action. 48. Plaintiffs Carey and Mathaun bring Count III of this action as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 on behalf of themselves and the Massachusetts Class defined above. 49. The members of the Massachusetts Class are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. Upon information and belief, there are more than forty (40) members of the Massachusetts Class. 50. Plaintiffs Carey and Mathaun will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Massachusetts Class because there is no conflict between the claims of Plaintiffs Carey and Mathaun and those of the Massachusetts Class, and Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the 12 claims of the Massachusetts Class. Plaintiffs’ counsel are competent and experienced in litigating class actions and other complex litigation matters, including wage and hour cases like this one. 51. There are questions of law and fact common to the proposed Massachusetts Class, which predominate over any questions affecting only individual Class Members, including, without limitation, whether PTP has violated and continues to violate Massachusetts law through its policy or practice of not paying its hourly workers overtime compensation. 52. Plaintiffs Carey and Mathaun’s claims are typical of the claims of the Massachusetts Class Members in the following ways, without limitation: (a) Plaintiffs Carey and Mathaun are members of the Massachusetts Class; (b) Plaintiffs Carey and Mathaun’s claims arise out of the same policies, practices and course of conduct that form the basis of the claims of the Massachusetts Class; (c) Plaintiffs Carey and Mathaun’s claims are based on the same legal and remedial theories as those of the Massachusetts Class and involve similar factual circumstances; (d) there are no conflicts between the interests of Plaintiffs Carey and Mathaun and the Massachusetts Class Members; and (e) the injuries suffered by Plaintiffs Carey and Mathaun are similar to the injuries suffered by the Massachusetts Class Members. 53. Class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because questions of law and fact common to the Massachusetts Class predominate over any questions affecting only individual Class Members. 54. Class action treatment is superior to the alternatives for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy alleged herein. Such treatment will permit a large number of similarly situated persons to prosecute their common claims in a single forum simultaneously, efficiently, and without the duplication of effort and expense that numerous individual actions would entail. No difficulties are likely to be encountered in the management of this class action 13 that would preclude its maintenance as a class action, and no superior alternative exists for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. The Massachusetts Class Members are readily identifiable from PTP’s own records. Prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the Massachusetts Class would create the risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual Massachusetts Class Members that would establish incompatible standards of conduct for PTP. 55. A class action is superior to other available methods for adjudication of this controversy because joinder of all members is impractical. Further, the amounts at stake for many of the Massachusetts Class Members, while substantial, are not great enough to enable them to maintain separate suits against PTP. 56. Without a class action, PTP will retain the benefit of its wrongdoing, which will result in further damages to Plaintiffs Carey and Mathaun and the Massachusetts Class. Plaintiffs Carey and Mathaun envision no difficulty in the management of this action as a class action. 57. All previous paragraphs are incorporated as though fully set forth herein. 58. The FLSA defines “employer” broadly to include “any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee...” 29 U.S.C. § 203(d). 59. PTP is subject to the wage requirements of the FLSA because PTP is an “employer” under 29 U.S.C. § 203(d). 60. At all relevant times, PTP has been an “employer” engaged in interstate commerce and/or in the production of goods for commerce, within the meaning of the FLSA, 29 68. All previous paragraphs are incorporated as though fully set forth herein. 69. The Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Act of 1968 (“PMWA”) requires that covered employees be compensated for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours per week at a rate not less than one and one-half (1 ½) times the regular rate at which he is employed. See 43 P.S. § 333.104(c) and 34 Pa. Code § 231.41. 15 70. PTP is subject to the overtime requirements of the PMWA because PTP is an employer under 43 P.S. § 333.103(g). 71. During all relevant times, Plaintiff Carey and the Pennsylvania Class members were covered employees entitled to the above-described PMWA’s protections. See 43 P.S. § 333.103(h). 72. PTP’s compensation scheme that is applicable to Plaintiff Carey and the Pennsylvania Class members failed to comply with either 43 P.S. § 333.104(c) or 34 Pa. Code § 231.41. 73. The PMWA does not contain an exemption from overtime pay for any type of computer employees. See 43 P.S. § 333.105. 74. PTP failed to compensate Plaintiff Carey and the Pennsylvania Class Members at a rate of one and one-half (1 ½) times their regular hourly wage for hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours per week, in violation of 43 P.S. § 333.104(c) and 34 Pa. Code § 231.41. 75. Pursuant 43 P.S. § 333.113, employers, such as PTP, who fail to pay an employee wages in conformance with the PMWA shall be liable to the employee for the wages or expenses that were not paid, court costs and attorneys’ fees incurred in recovering the unpaid wages. 76. All previous paragraphs are incorporated as though fully set forth herein. 77. The Massachusetts Overtime Law does not contain an exemption from overtime pay for any type of computer employees. See Mass. Gen. L. c. 151 § 1A. 78. Defendant’s conduct, as set forth above, in failing to pay Plaintiffs and class members overtime wages which they earned as a result of their employment violates the 16 Massachusetts overtime law, Mass. Gen. L. c. 151 §§ 1, 1A. This claim is brought pursuant to Mass. Gen. L. c. 151 § 1B. 79. Pursuant to the requirements of Mass. Gen. L. c. 149, § 150, Plaintiffs have filed administrative complaints with the office of the Massachusetts Attorney General. The Attorney General’s office issued a right to sue letter on June 5, 2017. FLSA – Overtime Wages (On Behalf of Plaintiffs and the FLSA Class) Violation of the Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Act (Brought on Behalf of Plaintiff Carey and the Pennsylvania Class) Violation of Massachusetts Wage Laws (Brought on Behalf of Plaintiffs Carey and Mathaun and the Massachusetts Class)

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13. These telemarketing practices are symptomatic of an industry where the culture is “to enroll students at any costs.”2 For-profit colleges “are basically marketing machines . . . [t]hey’re not really educational providers.” Id. 14. Keiser University is one of the higher education industry’s telemarketing success stories. Founded in 1977 by Arthur Keiser as a for-profit “career college,”3 Keiser has successfully marketed itself into an educational behemoth with more than 20 campuses and over 20,000 actively enrolled students, many of whom will pay tens of thousands of dollars before leaving without degrees. 16. In response, just three months later, Defendant Keiser University sold itself to Everglades College, Inc., a “nonprofit” entity created by the Keiser family, using a loan from Arthur Keiser himself. According to the Miami Herald: “Keiser’s nonprofit conversion was achieved by Arthur Keiser selling the for- profit Keiser University to a smaller nonprofit controlled by the Keiser family, Everglades College Inc. Essentially, Keiser sold the left hand of his empire to the right hand. To pay for it all, Keiser made a $300 million loan to himself, and he’s now paying it back with college revenue—with interest. Records show that Keiser’s 2012 compensation as college president for the combined Everglades/Keiser schools was $855,842. The records also show that 10 of the nonprofit’s campuses are paying rent to companies in which Arthur Keiser has an ownership interest. The combined rent for those properties: about $14.6 million.”5 25. Plaintiff registered his private cellphone number with the National Do Not Call Registry on March 9, 2014, for the specific purpose of avoiding unwanted telemarketing calls like those alleged in this Complaint. 26. Nonetheless, starting in 2014 and continuing for years, Defendant Keiser has called Plaintiff, without his consent, multiple times per week (and as many as three times per day), using the phone number (561) 471-6000. 27. Each time Plaintiff received one of Defendant’s calls, he would say “hello” multiple times before being connected with one of Defendant’s “admissions counselors.” 28. Defendant’s admission counselors would then attempt to entice Plaintiff to enroll at Keiser University. 29. Plaintiff was not then, nor is he now, interested in pursuing any secondary education, let alone pursuing such an education at Keiser University. 30. Plaintiff repeatedly told Defendant’s admissions counselors that he was 50 years old and not at all interested in enrolling in any school, let alone Keiser University, and repeatedly demanded that Defendant stop placing calls to his private cellular telephone. 31. Despite Plaintiff’s repeated demands, Defendant continued to place telephone calls to Plaintiff’s private cellular telephone. 32. As a result of Defendant’s intrusive calls, Plaintiff suffered harms, including the violation of his statutory rights as well as the aggravation, nuisance, and invasion of privacy that necessarily accompanies the receipt of unsolicited and harassing commercial telephone calls. 34. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and two classes defined as follows (the “Classes”), pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3): Autodialer Class: All individuals in the United States who (1) received a call placed by or on behalf of Defendant; (2) on his or his cellular telephone number; (3) that was placed using an automated or computerized dialing system; and (4) where Defendant had no record of express consent to place such call. Do-Not-Call Class: All individuals in the United States who (1) received a call placed by or on behalf of Defendant; (2) on his or his cellular telephone number; (3) that was placed using an automated or computerized dialing system; and (4) that was placed after Defendant created a record reflecting a do-not-call request for that called cellular telephone number. The following people are excluded from the Classes: (1) any Judge or Magistrate presiding over this action and members of their families; (2) Defendant, Defendant’s subsidiaries, parents, successors, predecessors, and any entity in which the Defendant or its parents have a controlling interest and its current or former employees, officers and directors; (3) persons who properly execute and file a timely request for exclusion from the Classes; (4) persons whose claims in this matter have been finally adjudicated on the merits or otherwise released; (5) Plaintiff’s counsel and Defendant’s counsel; and (6) the legal representatives, successors, and assigns of any such excluded persons. 36. Commonality and Predominance: There are many questions of law and fact common to the claims of Plaintiff and the Classes, and those questions predominate over any questions that may affect individual members of the Classes. Common questions for the Classes include, but are not necessarily limited to, the following: (a) Whether Defendant systematically made telephone calls to the cellular telephone numbers of the members of the Classes; (b) Whether Defendant systematically placed these calls through the use of an automatic telephone dialing system; (c) Whether Defendant had express consent to make these telephone calls at the times such calls were made; (d) Whether Defendant’s conduct violated TCPA; and (e) Whether the willfulness of Defendant’s conduct entitles members of the Classes to treble damages. 37. Typicality and Adequacy of Representation: Plaintiff’s claims are virtually identical to those of the other members of the Classes. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Classes, and has retained counsel competent and experienced in complex class actions. Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to those of the Classes, and Defendant has no defenses unique to Plaintiff. Plaintiff and his counsel are committed to vigorously prosecuting this action on behalf of the members of the Classes, and have the financial resources to do so. Neither Plaintiff nor his counsel have any interest adverse to the Classes. 39. Plaintiff restates the allegations of paragraphs 1 through 38. 40. Defendant and/or its agents, in efforts to promote Defendant’s institution, placed unsolicited and unwanted telemarketing calls to cellular telephone numbers belonging to Plaintiff and the other members of the Autodialer Class. 41. Defendant placed these calls using equipment that had the capacity to store or produce telephone numbers using a random or sequential number generator and/or the capacity to receive and store lists of phone numbers, and to dial such numbers, en masse, without any need for human intervention. 43. By placing such calls to the cellular telephone numbers of Plaintiff and the Autodialer Class members without first having prior express consent to do so, and by placing such calls while using equipment with the capacity to store or produce telephone numbers using a random or sequential number generator and/or with the capacity to receive and store lists of phone numbers, and to dial such numbers, en masse, Defendant violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). 44. As a result of Defendant’s unlawful conduct, Plaintiff and the members of the Autodialer Class suffered actual damages in the forms of invasions of their privacy and of monies paid or minutes lost to receive the unsolicited telephone calls on their cellular phones. Under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3), Plaintiff and the members of the Autodialer Class are each entitled to, inter alia, a minimum of $500 in damages for each such violation of the TCPA. 45. To the extent Defendant’s misconduct is determined to be willful and knowing, the Court should, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3), treble the amount of statutory damages recoverable by Plaintiff and the other members of the Autodialer Class. 46. Plaintiff restates the allegations of paragraphs 1 through 38. 47. Defendant and/or its agents, in efforts to promote Defendant’s institution, placed unsolicited and unwanted telemarketing calls to cellular telephone numbers belonging to Plaintiff and the other members of the Do-Not-Call Class. 49. Defendant placed these telemarketing calls despite having records showing do- not-call requests made by Plaintiff and the members of the Do-Not-Call Class. 50. By placing such calls to the cellular telephone numbers of Plaintiff and the Do- Not-Call Class members without having their express consent to do so, and by placing such calls while using equipment with the capacity to store or produce telephone numbers using a random or sequential number generator and/or with the capacity to receive and store lists of phone numbers, and to dial such numbers, en masse, Defendant violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). 51. As a result of Defendant’s unlawful conduct, Plaintiff and the members of the Do- Not-Call Class suffered actual damages in the forms of invasions of their privacy and of monies paid or minutes lost to receive the unsolicited telephone calls on their cellular phones. Under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3), Plaintiff and the members of the Do-Not-Call Class are each entitled to, inter alia, a minimum of $500 in damages for each such violation of the TCPA. 52. To the extent Defendant’s misconduct is determined to be willful and knowing, the Court should, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3), treble the amount of statutory damages recoverable by Plaintiff and the other members of the Do-Not-Call Class. Violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227 (On behalf of Plaintiff and the Do-Not-Call Class) Violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227 (On behalf of Plaintiff and the Autodialer Class)

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26. Plaintiff is, and at all times mentioned herein, was, a “person,” as defined by 47 49. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all other paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully stated herein. 50. Plaintiff brings this action individually and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated (hereinafter referred to as “the Class”) pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. 52. Excluded from the Class are Metlife, and any entities in which Metlife has a controlling interest; Metlife’s agents and/or employees; any Judge to whom this action is assigned and any member of such Judge’s staff and immediate family; claims for personal injury, wrongful death and/or emotional distress. 53. Plaintiff does not know the exact number of members in the Class, but Plaintiff reasonably believes Class members to number, at minimum, in the thousands. 54. Plaintiff and all members of the Class have been harmed by the acts of the Metlife, because their privacy has been violated, they were subject to annoying and harassing texts that constitute a nuisance, they temporarily lost legitimate use of their cell phones in having to deal with the texts, and they were charged for incoming texts. 55. This Class Action Complaint seeks injunctive relief and money damages. 56. The joinder of all Class members is impracticable due to the size and relatively modest value of each individual claim. 57. Additionally, the disposition of the claims in a class action will provide substantial benefit to the parties and the Court in avoiding a multiplicity of identical suits. 59. There are well defined, nearly identical, questions of law and fact affecting all parties. 60. The questions of law and fact, referred to above, involving the class claims predominate over questions which may affect individual Class members. 61. Such common questions of law and fact include, but are not limited to, the following: a. Whether the third-party texting services, acting on behalf of Metlife, used an automatic telephone dialing system in sending non-emergency text messages to Plaintiff and Class members; b. Whether Metlife can meet its burden of showing it obtained and possessed prior express written consent (i.e., written consent that is clearly and unmistakably stated), to make such texts before such texts were made; c. Whether Metlife’s conduct was knowing and/or willful; d. Whether Metlife is liable for statutory damages; and e. Whether Metlife should be enjoined from engaging in such conduct in the future. 62. As persons who received non-emergency texts from an automatic telephone dialing system, without their prior express written consent within the meaning of the TCPA, Plaintiff asserts claims that are typical of each Class member who also received such texts. 63. Further, Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class. 65. Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in handling class action claims involving violations of federal consumer protection statutes, including claims under the TCPA. 66. A class action is the superior method for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. 67. Classwide relief is essential to compel Metlife to comply with the TCPA. 68. The interest of the Class members in individually pursuing claims against Metlife is slight because the statutory damages for an individual action are relatively small, and are therefore not likely to deter Metlife from engaging in the same behavior in the future. 69. Management of these claims is likely to present significantly fewer difficulties than are presented in many class claims because the texts at issue are all automated and the Class members, by definition, did not provide the prior express written consent required under the statute to authorize such texts to their cellular telephones. 70. Metlife has acted on grounds generally applicable to the Class, thereby making final injunctive relief and corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the Class as a whole appropriate. 71. Moreover, on information and belief, Plaintiff alleges that the TCPA violations complained of herein are substantially likely to continue in the future if an injunction is not entered. 73. The foregoing acts and omissions of Metlife constitutes numerous and multiple violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each of the above cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. 74. As a result of Metlife’s violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq., Plaintiff and Class members are entitled to an award of $500 in statutory damages for each and every call in violation of the statute, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). 75. Plaintiff and Class members are also entitled to and do seek injunctive relief prohibiting Metlife’s violation of the TCPA in the future. 76. Plaintiff and Class members are also entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees and costs. 77. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all other paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully stated herein. 78. The foregoing acts and omissions of Metlife constitute numerous and multiple knowing and/or willful violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each of the above- cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. 79. As a result of the Metlife’s knowing and/or willful violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq., Plaintiff and each member of the Class is entitled to treble damages of up to $1,500 for each and every call in violation of the statute, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3). 81. Plaintiff and Class members are also entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees and costs. Facts Related to Plaintiff KNOWING AND/OR WILLFUL VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT, 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. STATUTORY VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ.

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23. On or about June 13, 2019, Defendant sent the following telemarketing text message to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number ending in 5783 (the “5783 Number”): 25. Defendant’s text message constitutes telemarketing because it encouraged the future purchase or investment in property, goods, or services, i.e., selling Plaintiff automobile services and repairs. 26. The information contained in the text message is intended to promote Defendant’s business by conveying to the recipient the following promotional language: “If you need anything simply reply to this text or give us a call at 2154829333.” 27. Plaintiff received the subject texts within this judicial district and, therefore, Defendant’s violation of the TCPA occurred within this district. Upon information and belief, Defendant caused other text messages to be sent to individuals residing within this judicial district. 28. At no point in time did Plaintiff provide Defendant with his express written consent to be contacted using an ATDS. 29. Plaintiff is the subscriber and sole user of the 5783 Number, and is financially responsible for phone service to the 5783 Number. 31. The text message originated from telephone number 856-644-5475, a number which upon information and belief is owned and operated by Defendant. 32. The number used by Defendant (856-644-5475) is known as a “long code,” a standard 10-digit phone number that enabled Defendant to send SMS text message en masse, while deceiving recipients into believing that the message was personalized and sent from a telephone number operated by an individual. 33. Long codes work as follows: Private companies known as SMS gateway providers have contractual arrangements with mobile carriers to transmit two-way SMS traffic. These SMS gateway providers send and receive SMS traffic to and from the mobile phone networks’ SMS centers, which are responsible for relaying those messages to the intended mobile phone. This allows for the transmission of a large number of SMS messages to and from a long code. 34. Specifically, upon information and belief, Defendant utilized a combination of hardware and software systems to send the text message at issue in this case. The systems utilized by Defendant have the capacity to store telephone numbers using a random or sequential generator, and to dial such numbers without human intervention. 35. To send the text message, Defendant used a messaging platform (the “Platform”) that permitted Defendant to transmit thousands of automated text messages without any human involvement. 37. The Platform has the capacity to generate sequential numbers, which capacity was in fact utilized by Defendant. 38. The Platform has the capacity to dial numbers in sequential order, which capacity was in fact utilized by Defendant. 39. The Platform has the capacity to dial numbers from a list of numbers, which capacity was in fact utilized by Defendant. 40. The Platform has the capacity to dial numbers without human intervention, which capacity was in fact utilized by Defendant. 41. The Platform has the capacity to schedule the time and date for future transmission of text messages, which occurs without any human involvement. 43. The above execution these instructions occurred seamlessly, with no human intervention, and almost instantaneously. Indeed, the Platform is capable of transmitting thousands of text messages following the above steps in minutes, if not less. 44. Further, the Platform “throttles” the transmission of the text message depending on feedback it receives from the mobile carrier networks. In other words, the platform controls how quickly messages are transmitted depending on network congestion. The platform performs this throttling function automatically and does not allow a human to control the function. 45. The following graphic summarizes the above steps and demonstrates that the dialing of the text message at issue was done by the Platform automatically and without any human intervention: 47. Plaintiff brings this case as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated. 48. Plaintiff brings this case on behalf of a Class defined as follows: All persons who from four years prior to the filing of this action (1) were sent a text message by or on behalf of Defendant, (2) using an automatic telephone dialing system, (3) for the purpose of soliciting Defendant’s goods and services, and (4) for whom Defendant claims (a) it did not obtain prior express written consent, or (b) it obtained prior express written consent in the same manner as Defendant claims it supposedly obtained prior express written consent to call the Plaintiff. 49. Defendant and its employees or agents are excluded from the Class. Plaintiff does not know the number of members in the Class but believes the Class members number in the several thousands, if not more. 52. There are numerous questions of law and fact common to the Class which predominate over any questions affecting only individual members of the Class. Among the questions of law and fact common to the Class are: (1) Whether Defendant made non-emergency calls to Plaintiff’s and Class members’ cellular telephones using an ATDS; (2) Whether Defendant can meet its burden of showing that it obtained prior express written consent to make such calls; (3) Whether Defendant’s conduct was knowing and willful; (4) Whether Defendant is liable for damages, and the amount of such damages; and (5) Whether Defendant should be enjoined from such conduct in the future. 53. The common questions in this case are capable of having common answers. If Plaintiff’s claim that Defendant routinely transmits text messages to telephone numbers assigned to cellular telephone services is accurate, Plaintiff and the Class members will have identical claims capable of being efficiently adjudicated and administered in this case. 58. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 60. Defendant – or third parties directed by Defendant – used equipment having the capacity to dial numbers without human intervention to make non-emergency telephone calls to the cellular telephones of Plaintiff and the other members of the Class defined below. 61. These calls were made without regard to whether or not Defendant had first obtained express permission from the called party to make such calls. In fact, Defendant did not have prior express consent to call the cell phones of Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class when its calls were made. 62. Defendant has, therefore, violated § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) of the TCPA by using an automatic telephone dialing system to make non-emergency telephone calls to the cell phones of Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class without their prior express written consent. 63. Defendant knew that it did not have prior express consent to make these calls, and knew or should have known that it was using equipment that at constituted an automatic telephone dialing system. The violations were therefore willful or knowing. 64. As a result of Defendant’s conduct and pursuant to § 227(b)(3) of the TCPA, Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class were harmed and are each entitled to a minimum of $500.00 in damages for each violation. Plaintiff and the class are also entitled to an injunction against future calls. Id. 65. Plaintiff re-allege and incorporate paragraphs 1-57 as if fully set forth herein. 67. Defendant knew that it did not have prior express consent to make these calls and knew or should have known that its conduct was a violation of the TCPA. 68. Because Defendant knew or should have known that Plaintiff and Class Members had not given prior express consent to receive its autodialed calls, the Court should treble the amount of statutory damages available to Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class pursuant to § 227(b)(3) of the TCPA. 69. As a result of Defendant’s violations, Plaintiff and the Class Members are entitled to an award of $1,500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C). Knowing and/or Willful Violation of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class) PROPOSED CLASS Violations of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)

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26. Plaintiff Hidenrick registered her cellular number on the National Do Not Call Registry on July 27, 2003 in order to avoid receiving unsolicited telemarketing calls. 35. Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) and Rule 23(b)(3) on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated and seeks certification of the following Classes: Autodialed No Consent Class: All persons in the United States who, from four years prior to the filing of this action through the present, (1) Defendants (or a third person acting on behalf of Defendants) called, (2) on the person’s cellular telephone, (3) using an autodialer, (4) for the purpose of selling Defendants’ products and/or services, and (5) for whom Defendants claims they obtained prior express written consent in the same manner as Defendants claims they supposedly obtained prior express written consent to call the Plaintiff or do not claim to have consent. Autodialed Stop Class: All persons in the United States who from, four years prior to the filing of this action to the present, (1) Defendants (or a third person acting on behalf of Defendants) called, (2) on the person’s cellular telephone, (3) using an automated telephone dialing system, (4) after the person informed Defendants that s/he no longer wished to receive phone calls from Defendants. Do Not Call Registry Class: All persons in the United States who, from four years prior to the filing of this action through the present, (1) received more than one call made by or on behalf of Defendants within a 12-month period, (2) for the purpose of selling Defendants’ products and/or services, (3) after his/her telephone number(s) was registered with the National Do Not Call registry for at least thirty days, and (4) for whom Defendants claims they obtained prior express written consent in the same manner as Defendants claims they supposedly obtained prior express written consent to call the Plaintiff or do not claim to have consent. 41. Plaintiff incorporates paragraphs 1 through 40 as if fully set forth herein. 42. Defendants made autodialed solicitation telephone calls to cellular telephone numbers belonging to Plaintiff and other members of the Autodialed No Consent Class without first obtaining prior express written consent to make such calls. 46. Plaintiff incorporates paragraphs 1 through 40 as if fully set forth herein. 47. Defendants placed unsolicited and unwanted calls to telephone numbers belonging to Plaintiff and the other members of the Autodialed Stop Class on their cellular telephones after they had informed Defendants by phone to stop contacting them. 48. Defendants placed the calls using equipment that had the capacity to store or produce telephone numbers to be called and/or texted using a random or sequential number generator, and/or receive and store lists of phone numbers, and to dial such numbers, en masse. 49. By placing unsolicited phone calls to Plaintiff and other members of the Autodialed Stop Class’s cellular telephones using an automated telephone dialing system after they requested to no longer receive such calls, Defendants violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(B) by doing so without prior express written consent. 52. Plaintiff incorporates paragraphs 1 through 40 as if fully set forth herein. 53. Defendants violated 47 C.F.R. §64.1200 by initiating calls for telemarketing purposes to cellular telephone subscribers such as Plaintiff and the Do Not Call Registry Class who were registered on the National Do Not Call Registry, and who received two or more additional calls within a 12-month period from Defendants without their consent. Defendants made these calls without instituting procedures that comply with the regulatory minimum standards for maintaining a list of persons who should not be called. 54. As a result of Defendants’ unlawful conduct, Plaintiff and the Do Not Call Registry Class suffered actual damages and, under section 47 U.S.C. § 227(c), Plaintiff and each member of the Do Not Call Registry Stop Class are each entitled to receive up to $500 in damages for each violation of 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200. 55. Should the Court determine that Defendants conduct was willful and knowing, the Court may, pursuant to Section 227(b)(3), treble the amount of statutory damages recoverable by Plaintiff and the other members of the Do Not Call Registry Stop Class. 7. Defendants contact consumers without their prior express written consent in an effort to solicit them to purchase alarm monitoring services. Telephone Consumer Protection Act (Violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227) (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Do Not Call Registry Stop Class) Telephone Consumer Protection Act (Violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227) (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Autodialed Stop Class) Telephone Consumer Protection Act (Violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq.) (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Autodialed No Consent Class)

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10. On August 24, 2014, Plaintiffs purchased Southwest tickets which they subsequently cancelled in exchange for credit for future travel through August 23, 2015. 11. On February 21, 2015, Plaintiffs purchased two new roundtrip tickets from with $784 in cash and $16 in Southwest credit from the prior cancelled tickets. 17. This class action is brought pursuant to Rules 23(a), (b)(2) and (b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by the individual named Plaintiffs on themselves and the following classes: National Class All Southwest customers who cancelled domestic tickets more than 10 minutes prior to their flight's scheduled departure time, but suffered forfeiture of the payments for such tickets less than 1 year from the date of payment. California Sub-Class All members of the National Class who resided in California as of the date the tickets were originally purchased. 18. Plaintiffs do not know the exact size or identities of the proposed classes because that information is in the control of Southwest. Plaintiffs believe and allege, however, that both classes encompasses thousands of Southwest customers in California and nationwide. 19. Common questions of fact and law predominate over any questions affecting only individual members because all customers are subject to the same terms and received the same forms of e-tickets. Determining whether Southwest breached its contract with Plaintiffs as alleged herein will determine whether Southwest breached its contract with all members of the classes alleged herein. 20. Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims of the class members and Plaintiffs do not have any conflicts with the interests of any other class members. 22. A class action is superior to other methods for the fast and efficient adjudication of this controversy and to avoid the risk of disparate and inconsistent rulings throughout the state and nation. The amounts of money at stake for individual the individual class members are too small to justify and support this litigation on an individual basis.

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15. At all times relevant herein, Plaintiff Jesse Prather was an individual residing in the State of California. Plaintiff Jesse Prather is, and at all times mentioned herein was, a "person" as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 153(39). 17. Plaintiff Jesse Prather applied for and obtained a number of educational loans during the 2003 - 2007 time period through American Education Services. On information and belief, one or more of those loans was purchased by Wells Fargo and / or WFEFS, and WFEFS has serviced those loans from at least September, 2010 to the present. 18. Plaintiff John W. Prather co-signed for each of those educational loans that Jesse Prather applied for and obtained during the 2003-2007 time period. Each of those contracts originated in and were performed in California. 19. "During the transaction that res· Jted in the debt owed," Plaintiff John W. Prather did not provide express consent to receive calls made by Wells Fargo or WFEFS on an "automatic telephone dialing system," as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(l), on his cellular telephone.6 In fact, Plaintiff John W. Prather never provided a cellphone number to Defendants during the process of acting as a co-signer on Jesse Prather's educational loans on any application relating to the debt for which Wells Fargo and / or WFEFS called him on his cellphone. In fact, Plaintiff John W. Prather did not own or use a cellphone at any time during the entire time period Jesse Prather applied for and obtained the educational loans for which John W. Prather was a co-signer. Defendants either obtained John W. Prather's cellphone number through skip tracing or by other means not related to the process of co-signing for the educational loans, and by Wells Fargo and WFEFS obtaining his cellphone number in that manner, that did not constitute the requisite prior express consent of John W. Prather to be contacted on his cellphone by an automatic telephone dialing system or by a prerecorded voice message for any purpose related to the collection or servicing of Jesse Prather's student loans. 21. Beginning no later than February, 2015, Plaintiff John W. Prather began receiving calls from Wells Fargo and WFEFS to his cellphone, approximately a dozen in just over a month, telling him to call Wells Fargo at 1- 800-416-8229, continuing to at least April 13, 2015, just prior to the filing of the Complaint. 22. Wells Fargo and WFEFS are, and at all times mentioned herein were, "persons", as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 153(39). 23. All telephone contact by Wells Fargo and WFEFS to Plaintiffs on their cellular telephones occurred via an "automatic telephone dialing system," as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1), and/or used "an artificial or prerecorded voice" as described in 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A). 24. The telephone numbers that Wells Fargo and WFEFES called in order to contact Plaintiffs, with an "artificial or prerecorded voice" and/or made by an "automatic telephone dialing system," were assigned to a cellular telephone service as specified in 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). 26. Wells Fargo's and WFEFS's telephone calls to Plaintiffs' cellular phones were not "for emergency purposes" as described in 47 U.S.C. § 227(b )(1)(A). 27. Wells Fargo's and WFEFS's telephone calls to Plaintiffs' cellular phones utilizing an "artificial or prerecorded voice" or placed by an "automatic telephone dialing system" for non-emergency purposes and in the absence of Plaintiffs' prior express consent violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A). 28. Under the TCPA and pursuant to the FCC's January 2008 Declaratory Ruling, the burden is on Wells Fargo and WFEFS to demonstrate that Plaintiffs provided express consent within the meaning of the statute. 7 29. Plaintiffs bring this action on behalf of themselves and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated (hereinafter referred to as "the Class"). 31. Plaintiffs do not know the exact number of members in the Class, but based upon the representations of Wells Fargo as to its market share, Plaintiffs reasonably believe that Class members number at minimum in the hundreds of thousands. 32. Plaintiffs and all members of the Class have been harmed by the acts of Wells Fargo and WFEFS. 33. This Class Action Complaint s<;>:;ks injunctive relief and money damages. 34. The joinder of all Class members is impracticable due to the size and relatively modest value of each individual claim. The disposition of the claims in a class action will provide substantial benefit to the parties and the Court in avoiding a multiplicity of identical suits. The Class can be identified easily through records maintained by Wells Fargo and WFEFS. 36. As persons who received numerous and repeated telephone calls 14 using an automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice, 15 without their prior express consent within the meaning of the TCP A and Rules, 16 Plaintiffs assert claims that are typical of each Class member. Plaintiffs will fairly 17 and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class, and have no interests 18 which are antagonistic to any member of the Class. 19 37. Plaintiffs have retained counsel experienced in handling class 20 action claims involving violations of federal and state consumer protection statutes, 21 including claims under the TCP A. 22 39. Wells Fargo and WFEFS have acted on grounds generally applicable to the Class, thereby making final injunctive relief and corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the Class as a wh01e appropriate. Moreover, on information and belief, Plaintiffs allege that the TCP A violations complained of herein are substantially likely to continue in the future if an injunction is not entered. 44. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the foregoing paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully stated herein. 45. The foregoing acts and omissions of Wells Fargo and WFEFS constitute numerous and multiple knowing and/or willful violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.c. § 227 et seq. 46. As a result of Wells Fargo's and WFEFS's knowing and/or willful violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq., Plaintiffs and each member of the Class are entitled to treble damages of up to $1,500.00 for each and every call in violation ofthe statute, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3). 48. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the paragraphs 1 through 43, inclusive, of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 49. The foregoing acts and omissions of Wells Fargo and WFEFS constitute numerous and multiple violations of the TCP A, including but not limited to each of the above cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. 50. As a result of Wells Fargo's and WFEFS's violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq., Plaintiffs and Class members are entitled to an award of $500.00 in statutory damages for each and every call in violation of the statute, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). 51. Plaintiffs and Class members are also entitled to and do seek injunctive relief prohibiting Wells Fargo's and WFEFS's violation of the TCPA in the future. 52. Plaintiffs and Class members are also entitled to an award of attorneys' fees and costs. 53. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the foregoing paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 55. Wells Fargo's and WFEFS's conduct using automated and predictive dialing techniques to harass Plaintiffs and members described herein is unlawful and violates Cal. Bus & Prof. Code § 17200 et seq. (the "UCL"). 56. Wells Fargo's and WFEFS's illegal practices outweigh the utility, if any, of those practices. 57. The illegal business practices of Wells Fargo and WFEFS are immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, and/or substantially injurious to Plaintiffs and members of the Class. 58. Unless restrained by this Court, Wells Fargo and WFEFS will continue to engage in the illegal acts and practices alleged above. KNOWING AND/OR WILLFUL VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT, 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 5 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 VIOLATIONS OF CALIFORNIA'S UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW, CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE SECTION 17200, ET SEQ.

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10. Plaintiff brings this claim on behalf of the following case, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(3). 11. The Class consists of: a) all individuals with addresses in the State of New York; b) to whom Defendant Zwicker sent an initial collection letter attempting to collect a consumer debt; c) that failed to properly itemize the alleged balance; d) and included “non-interest charges or fees” in the breakdown of the debt without any explanation of the other charges or fees; e) which letter was sent on or after one (1) year prior to the filing of this action and on or before a date twenty-one (21) days after the filing of this action. 12. The identities of all class members are readily ascertainable from the records of Defendant and those companies and entities on whose behalf they attempt to collect and/or have purchased debts. 4 13. Excluded from the Plaintiff Class are the Defendants and all officer, members, partners, managers, directors and employees of the Defendants and their respective immediate families, and legal counsel for all parties to this action, and all members of their immediate families. 14. There are questions of law and fact common to the Plaintiff Class, which common issues predominate over any issues involving only individual class members. The principal issue is whether the Defendant’s written communications to consumers, in the forms attached as Exhibit A, violate 15 U.S.C. §§ l692e and §1692g. 15. The Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the class members, as all are based upon the same facts and legal theories. The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Plaintiff Class defined in this complaint. The Plaintiff has retained counsel with experience in handling consumer lawsuits, complex legal issues, and class actions, and neither the Plaintiff nor his attorneys have any interests, which might cause them not to vigorously pursue this action. 16. This action has been brought, and may properly be maintained, as a class action pursuant to the provisions of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because there is a well-defined community interest in the litigation: a) Numerosity: The Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on that basis alleges, that the Plaintiff Class defined above is so numerous that joinder of all members would be impractical. b) Common Questions Predominate: Common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the Plaintiff Class and those questions predominance over any questions or issues involving only individual class members. The principal issue 5 is whether the Defendants' written communication to consumers, in the forms attached as Exhibit A violate 15 USC §l692e and §1692g. c) Typicality: The Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the class members. The Plaintiff and all members of the Plaintiff Class have claims arising out of the Defendants' common uniform course of conduct complained of herein. d) Adequacy: The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class members insofar as Plaintiff has no interests that are adverse to the absent class members. The Plaintiff is committed to vigorously litigating this matter. Plaintiff has also retained counsel experienced in handling consumer lawsuits, complex legal issues, and class actions. Neither the Plaintiff nor his counsel have any interests which might cause them not to vigorously pursue the instant class action lawsuit. e) Superiority: A class action is superior to the other available means for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy because individual joinder of all members would be impracticable. Class action treatment will permit a large number of similarly situated persons to prosecute their common claims in a single forum efficiently and without unnecessary duplication of effort and expense that individual actions would engender. 17. Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is also appropriate in that the questions of law and fact common to members of the Plaintiff Class predominate over any questions affecting an individual member, and a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. 6 18. Depending on the outcome of further investigation and discovery, Plaintiff may, at the time of class certification motion, seek to certify a class(es) only as to particular issues pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4). 19. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs numbered above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 20. Some time prior to December 31, 2019 an obligation was allegedly incurred to either U.S. Bank National Association. 21. The U.S. Bank National Association obligation arose out of transactions in which money, property, insurance or services, which are the subject of the transaction, were primarily for personal, family or household purposes. 22. The alleged U.S. Bank National Association obligation is a "debt" as defined by 15 U.S.C.§ 1692a(5). 23. U.S. Bank National Association is a “creditor” as defined by 15 U.S.C.§ 1692a(4). 24. U.S. Bank National Association contracted with Defendant Zwicker to collect the obligation. 25. Defendant Zwicker collects and attempts to collect debts incurred or alleged to have been incurred for personal, family or household purposes on behalf of creditors using the United States Postal Services, telephone and internet. Violation – December 31, 2019 Collection Letter 7 26. On or about December 31, 2019 the Defendant Zwicker sent the Plaintiff a collection letter (the “Letter”) regarding the alleged debt owed to U.S. Bank National Association. See Collection Letter – Attached hereto as Exhibit A. 27. When a debt collector solicits payment from a consumer, it must, within five days of an initial communication, provide the consumer with a written validation notice, known as a “G- Notice”, which must include the following information: a) the amount of the debt; b) the name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed; c) a statement that unless the consumer, within thirty days after receipt of the notice, disputes the validity of the debt, or any portion thereof, the debt will be assumed to be valid by the debt collector; d) a statement that if the consumer notifies the debt collector in writing within the thirty-day period that the debt, or any portion thereof, is disputed, the debt collector will obtain verification of the debt or a copy of the judgment against the consumer and a copy of such verification or judgment will be mailed to the consumer by the debt collector; and e) a statement that, upon the consumer’s written request within the thirty-day period, the debt collector will provide the consumer with the name and address of the original creditor, if different from the current creditor. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a). 28. The Defendant’s Letter did not contain all the requirements of the “G-Notice”. Specifically, this Letter deceptively fails to identify the exact amount of the debt owed. 29. In addition, the Letter contains a breakdown of the balance as follows: 8 30. Defendant’s breakdown contains non-interest charges or fees accrued since charge- off without any explanation as to these charges. 31. No explanation is given in the letter as to what would cause these charges or fees after the debt has been charged-off to occur and if these charges could re-occur and if it would re-occur at what frequency. 32. Plaintiff has no basis to determine what “charges or fees” could affect his balance day to day besides interest. 33. If Defendant is aware of the “charges or fees” that would lead to an increase of the balance, Defendant should clarify and explain them in the letter. 34. Furthermore, the Letter does not disclaim if the account would continue to accrue these charges. 35. The language is false and deceptive as Plaintiff was unable to determine what the charges or fees are and whether it would be recurring in the future. 36. As a result of Defendant’s deceptive, misleading and unfair debt collection practices, Plaintiff has been damaged. 37. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 9 38. Defendant Zwicker’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. 39. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692e, a debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt. 40. Defendant Zwicker violated said section by: a) Making a false and misleading representation in violation of § 1692e(10); b) Falsely representing the character amount or legal status of the debt in violation of §1692e(2). 41. By reason thereof, Defendant Zwicker is liable to Plaintiff for judgment that Defendant Zwicker’s conduct violated Section 1692e et seq. of the FDCPA, actual damages, statutory damages, costs and attorneys’ fees. 42. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 43. Defendant Zwicker’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692g. 44. When a debt collector solicits payment from a consumer, it must, within five days of an initial communication, provide the consumer with a written validation notice which must include a clear breakdown of the balance owed. §1692g(a)(1). 10 45. Defendant violated this section by unfairly failing to advise Plaintiff as to the basis for the additional charges or fees and therefore not properly identifying the amount of the debt. 46. By reason thereof, Defendant Zwicker is liable to Plaintiff for judgment that Defendants’ conduct violated Section 1692g et seq. of the FDCPA, actual damages, statutory damages, costs and attorneys’ fees. 47. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 48. Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed toward Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692f. 49. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692f, a debt collector may not use any unfair or unconscionable means in connection with the collection of any debt. 50. Defendant violated this section by a) Unfairly adding additional “charges or fees”, when no other charges or fees are allowed by contract or law. 51. By reason thereof, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for judgment that Defendant’s conduct violated Section 1692f, et seq. of the FDCPA and is entitled to actual damages, statutory damages, costs and attorneys’ fees. 11 VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692e et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692f et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692g et seq.

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11. On May 11, 2015, Defendant sent an unsolicited advertisement to Plaintiffs ink- and-paper facsimile machine. The fax advertises services offered by Healthcare Data Solutions- which is owned completely by IMS Health Incorporated. A copy of this facsimile is attached hereto and marked as Exhibit A. 12. Exhibit A is exemplary of the junk faxes Defendant sends. 13. Upon information and belief, Plaintiff has received multiple fax advertisements from Defendant similar to Exhibit A. Indeed, between March 21, 2016 and June 15, 2016, Defendant sent at least 5 additional unsolicited faxes to Plaintiffs ink-and-paper facsimile machines. See attached Exhibit B, a compilation of 5 faxes sent to Plaintiff by Defendant. Upon information and belief, Plaintiff has received hundreds of additional fax advertisements from Defendant similar to Exhibit A. 14. Defendant did not have Plaintiffs prior express invitation or permission to send advertisements to Plaintiffs fax machine. 15. Defendant's faxes do not contain opt-out notices that comply with the requirements of the TCP A. 17. Plaintiff reserves the right to modify or amend the definition of the proposed Class before the Court determines whether certification is proper, as more information is gleaned in discovery. 18. Excluded from the Class are Defendant, any parent, subsidiary, affiliate, or controlled person of Defendant, as well as the officers, directors, agents, servants, or employees of Defendant and the immediate family members of any such person. Also excluded are any judge who may preside over this case and any attorneys representing Plaintiff or the Class. 19. Numerosity [Fed R. Civ. P. 23(a)(l)]. The Members of the Class are so numerous that joinder is impractical. Upon information and belief, Defendant has sent illegal fax advertisements to hundreds if not thousands of other recipients. 21. Typicality [Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3)]. Plaintiffs claims are typical of the claims of all Class Members. Plaintiff received an unsolicited fax advertisement from Defendant during the Class Period. Plaintiff makes the same claims that it makes for the Class Members and seeks the same relief that it seeks for the Class Members. Defendant has acted in the same manner toward Plaintiff and all Class Members. 22. Fair and Adequate Representation [Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4)]. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class. It is interested in this matter, has no conflicts, and has retained experienced class counsel to represent the Class.

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(Class Action Alleging Violations of the Kansas Wage Protection Act) A. KANSAS COVERAGE (Collective Action Alleging FLSA Violations) A. FLSA COVERAGE 21. ADT employs non-exempt workers in its call centers to provide assistance to ADT’s clients. 22. ADT is headquartered in Boca Raton, Florida, and has additional call centers in New Jersey, Kansas, New York, and Texas. 23. ADT provides home and business security services, such as surveillance systems, and alarm systems throughout the United States.2 25. Plaintiff Drowatzky was employed by ADT in Wichita, Kansas from approximately January 2018 until April 2018. 26. Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members are non-exempt call-center employees who were (and are) paid by the hour. 27. Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members worked approximately forty (40) “on-the- clock” hours per week. 28. In addition to their forty (40) “on-the-clock” hours, Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members often worked up to six hours “off-the-clock” per week and have not been compensated for that time. 29. Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members have not been compensated for all the hours they worked for ADT as a result of ADT’s uniform corporate policy and practice of paying its employees only during regularly scheduled shift time, and only when their computers were fully booted up and operational. 30. Specifically, Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members are required to start up and log in to their computers before their shift officially starts, and then log in to each ADT program, and ensure that each ADT program is running correctly—all of which can take up to twenty minutes— before they are able to take their first phone call, which comes in as soon as their computers are fully operational. 31. In addition, Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members were required to arrive at work early, well in advance in of their scheduled shifts, in order to perform work for ADT. 33. Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members were not compensated for work they performed for ADT prior to their scheduled shifts, including their computer start-up time, although they were expected to have completed their computer start up in advance of their official start time. 34. Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members were also not compensated for the time they worked for ADT rebooting ADT’s computers after they crashed. 35. As a result of ADT’s corporate policy and practice of requiring Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members to perform work for ADT, including their start-up and rebooting tasks, while off-the-clock before the beginning of their shifts, Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members were not compensated for all hours worked, including all worked in excess of forty (40) in a workweek at the rates required by the FLSA. 36. ADT has employed other individuals who perform(ed) the same or similar job duties under the same pay provisions as Plaintiff. 37. ADT is aware of its obligation to pay overtime for all hours worked and the proper amount of overtime for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) each week to Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members, but has failed to do so. 38. Because ADT did not pay Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members time and a half for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) in a workweek, ADT’s pay policies and practices violate the FLSA. 40. All previous paragraphs are incorporated as though fully set forth herein. 41. The FLSA Collective is defined as: 58. All previous paragraphs are incorporated as though fully set forth herein. 59. Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), this is a collective action filed on behalf of all of ADT’s employees throughout the United States who have been similarly situated to Plaintiff with regard to the work they performed and the manner in which they were paid. 60. Other similarly situated employees of ADT have been victimized by ADT’s patterns, practices, and policies, which are in willful violation of the FLSA. 61. The FLSA Collective Members are defined in Paragraph 41. 63. Thus, Plaintiff’s experiences are typical of the experiences of the FLSA Collective Members. 64. The specific job titles or precise job requirements of the various FLSA Collective Members do not prevent collective treatment. 65. All of the FLSA Collective Members—regardless of their specific job titles, precise job requirements, rates of pay, or job locations—are entitled to be paid for all hours worked and at the proper overtime rate for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek. 66. Although the issues of damages may be individual in character, there is no detraction from the common nucleus of liability facts. 67. Absent a collective action, many members of the proposed FLSA collective likely will not obtain redress of their injuries and ADT will retain the proceeds of its violations. 68. Moreover, individual litigation would be unduly burdensome to the judicial system. Concentrating the litigation in one forum will promote judicial economy and parity among the claims of the individual members of the classes and provide for judicial consistency. 69. Accordingly, the FLSA collective of similarly situated plaintiffs should be certified as defined as in Paragraph 41 and notice should be promptly sent. 70. All previous paragraphs are incorporated as though fully set forth herein. 71. The Kansas Class is defined as: 83. Plaintiff Drowatzky brings his KWPA claims as a class action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 on behalf of all similarly situated individuals employed by ADT to work in Kansas since March 4, 2017. 84. Class action treatment of Plaintiff Drowatzky’s KWPA claim is appropriate because, as alleged below, all of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23’s class action requisites are satisfied. 85. The number of Kansas Class Members is so numerous that joinder of all class members is impracticable. 86. Plaintiff Drowatzky is a member of the Kansas Class, his claims are typical of the claims of other Kansas Class Members, and he has no interests that are antagonistic to or in conflict with the interests of other Kansas Class Members. 87. Plaintiff Drowatzky and his counsel will fairly and adequately represent the Kansas Class Members and their interests. 88. Class certification is appropriate under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) because common questions of law and fact predominate over questions affecting only individual class members and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation.

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23. Plaintiff brings this action individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, as a member the two proposed classes (hereafter, jointly, “The Classes”). Knowing and/or Willful Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)  As a result of Defendant’s willful and/or knowing violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5), Plaintiff and the DNC Class members are entitled to and request treble damages, as provided by statute, up to $1,500, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5).  Any and all other relief that the Court deems just and proper. Negligent Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)  As a result of Defendant’s negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5), Plaintiff and the DNC Class members are entitled to and request $500 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5).  Any and all other relief that the Court deems just and proper. Negligent Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)  As a result of Defendant’s negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1), Plaintiff and the ATDS Class members are entitled to and request $500 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B).  Any and all other relief that the Court deems just and proper.

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2.1 guidelines; c. Regularly test user accessibility by blind or vision-impaired persons to ensure that Defendant’s Website complies under the WCAG 2.1 guidelines; and, d. Develop an accessibility policy that is clearly disclosed on Defendant’s Websites, with contact information for users to report accessibility-related problems. 21. Defendant is a dog apparel and accessories company that owns and operates www.fabdog.com (its “Website”), offering features which should allow all consumers to access the goods and services and which Defendant ensures the delivery of such goods throughout the United States, including New York State. 22. Defendant’s Website offers products and services for online sale and general delivery to the public. The Website offers features which ought to allow users to browse for items, access navigation bar descriptions, inquire about pricing, and avail consumers of the ability to peruse the numerous items offered for sale. 23. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient NVDA screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using a screen-reader. 24. On multiple occasions, the last occurring in March of 2020, Plaintiff visited Defendant’s website, www.fabdog.com, to make a purchase. Despite her efforts, however, Plaintiff was denied a shopping experience similar to that of a sighted individual due to the website’s lack of a variety of features and accommodations, which effectively barred Plaintiff from being able to determine what specific products were offered for sale. 26. Many features on the Website also fail to Add a label element or title attribute for each field. This is a problem for the visually impaired because the screen reader fails to communicate the purpose of the page element. It also leads to the user not being able to understand what he or she is expected to insert into the subject field. As a result, Plaintiff and similarly situated visually impaired users of Defendant’s Website are unable to enjoy the privileges and benefits of the Website equally to sighted users. 27. Many pages on the Website also contain the same title elements. This is a problem for the visually impaired because the screen reader fails to distinguish one page from another. In order to fix this problem, Defendant must change the title elements for each page. 28. The Website also contained a host of broken links, which is a hyperlink to a non- existent or empty webpage. For the visually impaired this is especially paralyzing due to the inability to navigate or otherwise determine where one is on the website once a broken link is encountered. For example, upon coming across a link of interest, Plaintiff was redirected to an error page. However, the screen-reader failed to communicate that the link was broken. As a result, Plaintiff could not get back to her original search. 29. These access barriers effectively denied Plaintiff the ability to use and enjoy Defendant’s website the same way sighted individuals do. 31. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s Website, blind and visually-impaired customers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, products, and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from equal access to the Website. 32. If the Website were equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 33. Through her attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 35. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 36. The ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks in this action. In relevant part, the ADA requires: In the case of violations of . . . this title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities . . . Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the . . . modification of a policy . . . 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 38. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 39. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining their Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making their Website equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 40. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 42. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered, during the relevant statutory period. 43. Common questions of law and fact exist amongst the Class, including: a. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “public accommodation” under the ADA; b. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “place or provider of public accommodation” under the NYCHRL; c. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the ADA; and d. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the NYCHRL. 44. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class. The Class, similarly to the Plaintiff, are severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA or NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so either can be independently accessible to the Class. 46. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 47. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 48. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 49. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 51. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 52. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 53. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 55. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 56. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 57. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 58. Defendant’s Website is a sales establishment and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9). 59. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates its Website, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 61. Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). 62. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the Sub- Class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 63. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 65. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes her right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 66. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 67. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 68. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 69. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the Class and New York City Sub-Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 71. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq.

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20. The Merger was authorized and approved by a shareholder vote on March 30, 2016 during an extraordinary general meeting and became effective on July 15, 2016. Defendants’ Materially False and Misleading Statements 22. The Preliminary Proxy Statement emphasized that to the Company’s Board of Directors, as “a privately held entity, the Company’s management may have greater flexibility to focus on improving the Company’s long-term financial performance without the pressure created by the public equity market’s emphasis on short-term period-to-period financial performance.” It further added that “[t]he Buyer Group decided to undertake the going-private transaction at this time because it wants to take advantage of the benefits of the Company being a privately held company as described above and because the Buyer Group was able to obtain debt financing in connection with the Merger.” 25. On March 3, 2016, the Company filed Amendment No. 3 to the Preliminary Proxy Statement on Form SC 13-E 3/A with the SEC, which again reiterated that it would continue on as a “private company,” following the Merger, stating in relevant part: The Company’s ADSs, every two representing three Class A ordinary shares, are currently listed on the NYSE under the symbol “QIHU.” It is expected that, following the consummation of the Merger, the Company will cease to be a publicly traded company and will instead become a private company beneficially owned solely by the Buyer Group. Following the consummation of the Merger, ADSs will no longer be listed on any securities exchange or quotation system, including the NYSE, and price quotations with respect to sales of ADSs in the public market will no longer be available. *** The Buyer Group has advised the Company that, except as set forth in this proxy statement, the Buyer Group does not have any current plans, proposals or negotiations that relate to or would result in an extraordinary corporate transaction involving the Company’s corporate structure, business, or management, such as a merger, reorganization, liquidation, relocation of any material operations, or sale or transfer of a material amount of the Company’s assets. 27. On July 15, 2016, the Company filed Amendment No. 4 to the Preliminary Proxy Statement on Form SC 13-E 3/A with the SEC, to report the results of the Merger, stating in relevant part: As a result of the Merger, the ADSs will no longer be listed on any securities exchange or quotation system, including the New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”), and the Company will cease to be a publicly traded company. The Company has requested NYSE to file an application on Form 25 with the SEC to remove the ADSs from listing on NYSE and withdraw registration of the ordinary shares under the Exchange Act. The deregistration will become effective in 90 days after the filing of Form 25 or such shorter period as may be determined by the SEC. In addition, the Company will suspend its reporting obligations under the Exchange Act by filing a certification and notice on Form 15 with the SEC. The Company’s reporting obligations under the Exchange Act will be suspended immediately as of the filing date of the Form 15 and will terminate once the deregistration becomes effective. 29. Contrary to the Company’s repeated reassurances about no substantial changes to its structures or relisting following the Merger, shortly after the going-private deal was closed, media news outlets reported on the Company’s relisting plans. For example, the Financial Times reported on February 28, 2017, that materials used in fundraising “for the privitisation of Qihoo 360” also discussed the “return to the A Shares” market in China. This article described the “return to investors” upon an “exit” (i.e., a transaction allowing those taking Qihoo 360 private to “exit” their position through a relisting), stating that the return “may be as high as 5 [times]” the going-private price. 30. The proposed relisting was later confirmed on November 6, 2017, when Shanghai-listed elevator-maker SJEC agreed to buy Qihoo 360 through an asset swap and cash injection. 32. The Defendants permitted Qihoo 360 to release these false and misleading statements and failed to file the necessary corrective disclosures, which artificially affected the value of the Company’s stock and ADS. 33. As set forth herein, Defendants, by virtue of their receipt of information reflecting the true facts regarding Qihoo 360, their control over, receipt, and/or modification of Qihoo 360’s allegedly materially misleading statements and omissions, and/or their positions with the Company that made them privy to confidential information concerning Qihoo 360, participated in the fraudulent scheme alleged herein. 34. The Defendants are liable as participants in a fraudulent scheme and course of conduct that operated as a fraud or deceit on sellers of Qihoo 360 stock and ADS by disseminating materially false and misleading statements and/or concealing material adverse facts. The scheme deceived the investing public regarding Qihoo 360’s business, operations, and management and the intrinsic value of Qihoo 360 stock and ADS and caused Plaintiff and members of the Class to sell Qihoo 360 stock and ADS at artificially deflated prices. 41. Plaintiff brings this action as a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of all former owners of Qihoo 360 stock and ADS who sold shares, and were damaged thereby, during the period between January 11, 2016 and July 15, 2016, inclusive (the “Class”). Excluded from the Class are Defendants, members of the immediate family of Individual Defendants, any subsidiary or affiliate of Qihoo 360, and the directors and officers of Qihoo 360 and their families and affiliates at all relevant times, and anyone who filed a petition or pursued appraisal rights of their Qihoo 360 stock pursuant to Cayman Law. 42. The members of the Class are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. The disposition of their claims in a class action will provide substantial benefits to the parties and the Court. 44. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of those of the Class because Plaintiff and the Class sustained damages from Defendants’ wrongful conduct. 45. Plaintiff will adequately protect the interests of the Class and has retained counsel experienced in securities class action litigation. Plaintiff has no interests that conflict with those of the Class. 46. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. 47. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained in the foregoing paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 48. During the Class Period, Defendants disseminated or approved the false statements specified above, which they knew or recklessly disregarded were misleading in that they contained misrepresentations and failed to disclose material facts necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading. 50. Plaintiff and the Class have suffered damages in that, in reliance on the integrity of the market, they sold Qihoo 360 stock and ADS at artificially deflated prices. Plaintiff and the Class would not have sold Qihoo 360 stock and ADS at the prices they did, or at all, if they had been aware that the market prices had been artificially and falsely deflated by Defendants’ misleading statements. 51. As a direct and proximate result of these Defendants’ wrongful conduct, Plaintiff and the other members of the Class suffered damages in connection with their sale of Qihoo 360 stock and ADS during the Class Period. 52. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained in the foregoing paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. Background of the Merger For Violation of Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act Against Individual Defendants For Violation of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 Against All Defendants

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19. At various times in 2014, Plaintiff placed an ad on the Miami/Dade Craigslist in an attempt to sell a motor vehicle. Plaintiff listed his cellular telephone number 786-XXX-0174 as a contact number. 20. Plaintiff’s Craigslist ads, without exception, stated “do NOT contact me with unsolicited services or offers.” More specifically, the text of the Craigslist ads stated, “Please don’t text me,” or “please be serious before calling.” 21. At some point thereafter, Defendant ICO, using some type of Lead Generating software and in complete disregard of Plaintiff’s instructions, “scraped” Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number from one or more of Plaintiff’s Craigslist ads and sent the following text message to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone twice: “We are cash buyers for local vehicles. Get a cash offer 24/7 - http://bit.ly/p9z972L – Off Lease Only Miami” 23. Both of the aforementioned text messages were received on Plaintiff’s cellular telephone within a 12-month period, and within the time frame relevant to this complaint. 24. Upon information and belief, the text message was sent using an automatic telephone dialing system within the meaning of 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1). 25. At no point in time did Plaintiff provide Defendants with his express written consent to be contacted on his cellular telephone using automatic telephone dialing equipment. 26. Defendants’ violations of the TCPA were knowing and willful. ICO intentionally “scraped” cellular telephone numbers from Craigslist ads, with the intent to send mass text messages to the scraped numbers, without first obtaining the requisite consent to do so. 27. Moreover, Plaintiff’s telephone number is listed on the national Do Not Call Registry3 since 2008, reinforcing the proposition that Defendants knew or should have known not to call Plaintiff for the purpose of marketing their services, but did so anyway. 28. Plaintiff brings this case as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated. 30. Defendants and its employees or agents are excluded from the Class. Plaintiff does not know the number of members in the Class, but believes the Class members number in the several thousands, if not more. Numerosity 32. The exact number and identities of the Class members are unknown at this time and can only be ascertained through discovery. Identification of the Class members is a matter capable of ministerial determination from Defendants’ call records. Common Questions of Law and Fact 33. There are numerous questions of law and fact common to the Class which predominate over any questions affecting only individual members of the Class. Among the questions of law and fact common to the Class are: a. Whether Defendants made non-emergency calls to Plaintiff’s and Class members’ cellular telephones using an autodialer and/or prerecorded message; b. Whether Defendants can meet its burden of showing that they obtained prior express consent to make such calls; c. Whether Defendants’ conduct was knowing and willful; d. Whether Defendants are liable for damages, and the amount of such damages; and e. Whether Defendants should be enjoined from such conduct in the future. 34. The common questions in this case are capable of having common answers. If Plaintiff’s claim that Defendants routinely places automated calls, prerecorded calls, and/or text messages to telephone numbers assigned to cellular telephone services is accurate, Plaintiff and the Class members will have identical claims capable of being efficiently adjudicated and administered in this case. Typicality 36. Plaintiff is a representative who will fully and adequately assert and protect the interests of the Class, and has retained counsel who is experienced in prosecuting class actions. Accordingly, Plaintiff is an adequate representative and will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class. Proceeding Via Class Action is Superior and Advisable 37. A class action is superior to all other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this lawsuit, because individual litigation of the claims of all members of the Class is economically unfeasible and procedurally impracticable. While the aggregate damages sustained by the Class are in the millions of dollars, the individual damages incurred by each member of the Class resulting from Defendant’s wrongful conduct are too small to warrant the expense of individual lawsuits. The likelihood of individual Class members prosecuting their own separate claims is remote, and, even if every member of the Class could afford individual litigation, the court system would be unduly burdened by individual litigation of such cases. 38. The prosecution of separate actions by members of the Class would create a risk of establishing inconsistent rulings and/or incompatible standards of conduct for Defendants. For example, one court might enjoin Defendants from performing the challenged acts, whereas another may not. Additionally, individual actions may be dispositive of the interests of the Class, although certain class members are not parties to such actions. 39. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 40. ICO placed multiple automated calls, prerecorded calls, and/or text messages to cellular numbers belonging to Plaintiff and the other members of the Class without their prior express consent. 41. Each of the aforementioned calls and text messages by ICO constitute a violation of the TCPA. 42. As a result of ICO’s violations of the TCPA, Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to an award of $500.00 in statutory damages for each call in violation of the TCPA pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). 43. Additionally, Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to and seek injunctive relief prohibiting such future conduct by ICO. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff and members of the Class demand a jury trial on all claims so triable, and judgment against Defendant seeking the following: a. Injunctive relief prohibiting violations of the TCPA by Defendants in the future; b. Statutory damages of $500.00 for each and every call made in violation of the TCPA pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § (b)(3)(B); and c. Such other relief as this Court deems just and proper. 45. ICO knowingly and willfully placed multiple automated calls, prerecorded calls, and/or text messages to cellular numbers belonging to Plaintiff and the other members of the Class without their prior express consent. 46. Each of the aforementioned calls by ICO constitute a knowing and willful violation of the TCPA. 47. As a result of ICO’s knowing and willful violations of the TCPA, Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to an award of treble damages up to $1,500.00 for each call in violation of the TCPA pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C). 48. Additionally, Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to and seek injunctive relief prohibiting such future conduct by ICO. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff and members of the Class demand a jury trial on all claims so triable, and judgment against Defendant seeking the following: a. Injunctive relief prohibiting violations of the TCPA by Defendants in the future; b. Statutory damages of $1500.00 for each and every call made in violation of the TCPA pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § (b)(3)(B); and c. Such other relief as this Court deems just and proper. 49. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 50. Plaintiff and the other members of the Class received more than one telephone call within any 12-month period, by or on behalf of the same entity, without their prior express consent and to which they object. 52. As a result of ICO’s violations of the TCPA, Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to an award of up to $1,500.00 for each call in violation of the TCPA pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5). 53. Additionally, Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to and seek injunctive relief prohibiting such future conduct by ICO. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff and members of the Class demand a jury trial on all claims so triable, and judgment against Defendant seeking the following: a. Injunctive relief prohibiting violations of the TCPA by Defendants in the future; b. Statutory damages of $1500.00 for each and every call made in violation of the TCPA pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § (b)(3)(B); and c. Such other relief as this Court deems just and proper. 54. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 55. OLO, through its agent, ICO, placed multiple automated calls, prerecorded calls, and/or text messages to cellular numbers belonging to Plaintiff and the other members of the Class without their prior express consent. 56. Each of the aforementioned calls by OLO constitute a violation of the TCPA. 57. As a result of OLO’s violations of the TCPA, Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to an award of $500.00 in statutory damages for each call in violation of the TCPA pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). 59. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 60. OLO, through its agent, ICO, knowingly and willfully placed multiple automated calls, prerecorded calls, and/or text messages to cellular numbers belonging to Plaintiff and the other members of the Class without their prior express consent. 61. Each of the aforementioned calls by OLO constitute a knowing and willful violation of the TCPA. 62. As a result of OLO’s knowing and willful violations of the TCPA, Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to an award of treble damages up to $1,500.00 for each call in violation of the TCPA pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C). 64. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 65. Plaintiff and the other members of the Class received more than one telephone call within any 12-month period, by or on behalf of the same entity, without their prior express consent and to which they object. 66. The telephone numbers to which the unwanted calls were made were listed on the national Do No Call Registry. 67. As a result of OLO’s violations of the TCPA, Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to an award of up to $1,500.00 for each call in violation of the TCPA pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5). ICO’S WILLFUL OR KNOWING VIOLATION OF 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(a)(iii) ICO’s VIOLATION OF 47 U.S.C. § 227(c) OLO’s VIOLATION OF 47 U.S.C. § 227(c) OLO’S WILLFUL OR KNOWING VIOLATION OF 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(a)(iii) OLO’S VIOLATION OF 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(a)(iii) The Proposed Classes

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10. Published reports indicate that Defendant is working to have four business locations in Washington within a short period of time, and that Defendant will open at least four to six new business locations every few years. 19.190.060. This violation, per statute, is a per se violation of Washington’s Consumer Protection Act, RCW 19.86.010, et seq. 23. Representative Plaintiff brings this class action on behalf of herself and as a representative of the following class of persons (the “National Class”) entitled to remedies under federal law including, but not limited to, injunctive relief and damages: All persons in the United States of America and its territories who were sent, to their cellular telephone numbers, at least one unsolicited text message by Defendant, or someone acting on behalf of Defendant. 24. Representative Plaintiff also brings this class action on behalf of herself and as a representative of the following persons (the “Washington Subclass”) who are entitled to remedies under Washington State law including, but not limited to, damages: All persons in Washington State who were sent, to their cellular telephone numbers, at least one unsolicited text message by Defendant, or someone acting on behalf of Defendant. 25. Plaintiffs’ class claims satisfy all of the requirements for class action certification pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedures, Rules 23(a) and 23(b)(1), 23(b)(2), and 23(b)(3). 26. Satisfying all requisite numerosity requirements, numerous consumers in Washington State and numerous consumers throughout the United States are believed to be members of this class. Joinder of so many class members in to a single action is impracticable. In fact, given the number of class members, the only way to deliver substantial justice to all members of the class is by means of a single class action. 35. Plaintiffs reassert and re-allege the allegations set forth in the above paragraphs as if the same were alleged herein this count. 36. At all times material herein, Plaintiffs have been entitled to the rights, protections, and benefits provided under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227. 37. Negligently, recklessly, willfully, and/or intentionally, Defendant directly and/or vicariously engaged in acts, omissions, and/or other conduct as referenced herein this complaint that violates the Telephone Consumer Protection Act. Defendant directly and/or vicariously created, designed, deployed, and otherwise used an ATDS which initiated numerous telephone calls to Plaintiffs’ cellular telephone numbers. These telephone calls transmitted unsolicited commercial text messages to the cellular telephones of Representative Plaintiff and the other Plaintiffs as referenced in this complaint. 38. Plaintiffs are entitled to recover $500 in damages from the Defendant for each violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act. 39. Additionally, Plaintiffs are entitled to all damages referenced herein and in accord with proof, attorneys’ fees, costs, treble damages, and other remedies allowed by the Telephone Consumer Protection Act or else otherwise permitted by law. 41. Plaintiffs reassert and re-allege the allegations set forth in the above paragraphs. 42. At all times material herein, Plaintiffs have been entitled to the rights, protections, and benefits provided under the Washington Consumer Protection Act and related Washington statutes. 43. Defendant’s practice of transmitting and/or assisting in the transmission of electronic commercial text messages to Plaintiffs’ cellular phones is a violation of RCW 44. Defendant’s practice of transmitting and/or assisting in the transmission of electronic commercial text messages to Plaintiffs’ cellular phones is conduct that vitally affects the public interest and is an unfair or deceptive act in trade or commerce and an unfair method of competition for the purpose of applying the Consumer Protection Act, RCW 19.86.010, et seq. 45. Defendant conducted these practices in the scope of its trade and in furtherance of the development and preservation of such business services. 46. Defendant’s violations of the Consumer Protection Act are intentional, willful, and subject to treble damages under RCW 19.86.010, et seq. 47. Plaintiffs have suffered injuries to their persons and property as a direct result of Defendant’s numerous violations of RCW 19.86.010, et seq. 48. Defendant’s practices are emblematic of organizational policies and agreements which have caused and, if unabated, will continue to cause incidents, occurrences, and conduct which violate RCW 19.86.010, et seq., and RCW 19.190.010, et seq. 49. Plaintiffs are entitled to recover damages for each of the violations of RCW 8. Defendant and others acting on its behalf operate and market a profit-making enterprise known as “Universal Men’s Clinic.” Defendant advertises the business as a clinic specializing in medication for erectile dysfunction and low testosterone. 9. Defendant previously conducted business as Hawaii Male Medical Clinic, from multiple locations in Hawaii. In early 2013, Defendant changed the business name in connection with an aggressive growth business strategy. Defendant re-branded the business “Universal Men’s Clinic” and began working to generate revenue on the mainland United States. Violations of the Washington Consumer Protection Act (Representative Plaintiff and the Washington Subclass vs. Defendant) Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (Representative Plaintiff and the National Class vs. Defendant)

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(Plaintiff’s individual claim for unpaid wages In violation of the Texas Labor Code, Chapter 61) (Unpaid overtime compensation under the FLSA) 18. Plaintiff JUAN VANZZINI files this case as an “opt in” collective action, as it is specifically allowed by 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 23. At all times relevant to this action, Defendant has been subject to the requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act 29 U.S.C. 201 et.seq. 24. For purposes of this action, the “relevant period” is defined as such period commencing on the date that is three years prior to the filing of this action, and continuing thereafter. 25. Defendants employed Plaintiff JUAN VANZZINI from June, 2005 until December,, 2010 at various locations of Defendant’s facilities in Houston, Texas. 26. During the period of employment that, Plaintiff worked for Defendant, Plaintiff was classified as a “Puller”. 46. Each and every allegation contained in the foregoing paragraph is re-alleged as if fully written herein. 47. Other employees have been victimized by this pattern, practice, and policy of the Defendants that is in violation of the FLSA. 48. Thus, from personal knowledge, Plaintiff is aware that the illegal practices and policies of Defendants have been imposed on other workers. 49. Other, similarly situated employees are being denied their lawful wages. 50. Accordingly, each Defendant’s pattern and practice of failing to pay the overtime pay (at time and one-half) of employees as required by the FLSA results from the Defendants’ general application of policies and practices, and does not depend on the personal circumstances of the members class. 51. Plaintiff JUAN VANZZINI’S experience is typical of the experience of the member’s class as it pertains to compensation. 52. The specific job titles or job requirements of the various members of the class do not prevent collective treatment. 53. All employees, regardless of their job requirements or rates of pay, who are denied overtime compensation for hour worked in excess of 40 per week, are similarly situated. 56. Each and every allegation contained in the foregoing paragraph is re-alleged as if fully written herein. 57. By withholding Plaintiff JUAN VANZZINI’S overtime wages earned during the period of his employment until the present, Defendant’s have violated the Texas Labor Code, Chapter 61, et seq., which specifically requires the employer to pay its employees all of their wages earned. 58. Plaintiff therefore sues for his unpaid wages and all additional damages allowed under the Texas Labor Code, Chapter 61, and et seq.

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22. Defendant’s Website offers its products and services for online sale and general delivery to the public. The Website offers features which ought to allow users to browse for items, access navigation bar descriptions and prices, and avail consumers of the ability to peruse the numerous items offered for sale. 23. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient NVDA screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website using a screen-reader. 24. Plaintiff most recently visited Defendant’s website in June of 2020 to potentially make a purchase. Despite his efforts, however, Plaintiff was denied a user experience similar to that of a sighted individual due to the website’s lack of a variety of features and accommodations, which effectively barred Plaintiff from being able to enjoy the privileges and benefits of Defendant’s public accommodation. 25. For example, many features on the Website lacks alt. text, which is the invisible code embedded beneath a graphical image. As a result, Plaintiff was unable to differentiate what products were on the screen due to the failure of the Website to adequately describe its content. 27. Many pages on the Website also contain the same title elements. This was a problem for Plaintiff because in certain instances the screen reader failed to distinguish one page from another. In order to fix this problem, Defendant must change the title elements for each page. 28. The Website also contains a host of broken links, which is a hyperlink to a non- existent or empty webpage. For the visually impaired this is especially paralyzing due to the inability to navigate or otherwise determine where one is on the website once a broken link is encountered. For example, upon coming across a link of interest, Plaintiff was redirected to an error page. However, the screen-reader failed to communicate that the link was broken. As a result, Plaintiff could not get back to his original search. 30. It is, upon information and belief, Defendant’s policy and practice to deny Plaintiff, along with other blind or visually-impaired users, access to Defendant’s website, and to therefore specifically deny the goods and services that are offered to the general public. Due to Defendant’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to its website, Plaintiff and visually-impaired persons have been and are still being denied equal access to Defendant’s Website, and the numerous goods and services and benefits offered to the public through the Website. 32. If the Website were equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 33. Through his attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 34. Because simple compliance with the WCAG 2.1 Guidelines would provide Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers with equal access to the Website, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including but not limited to the following policies or practices: a. Constructing and maintaining a website that is inaccessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; b. Failure to construct and maintain a website that is sufficiently intuitive so as to be equally accessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; and, c. Failing to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind and visually-impaired consumers, such as Plaintiff, as a member of a protected class. 35. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 38. Web-based technologies have features and content that are modified on a daily, and in some instances, an hourly, basis, and a one time “fix” to an inaccessible website will not cause the website to remain accessible without a corresponding change in corporate policies related to those web-based technologies. To evaluate whether an inaccessible website has been rendered accessible, and whether corporate policies related to web-based technologies have been changed in a meaningful manner that will cause the website to remain accessible, the website must be reviewed on a periodic basis using both automated accessibility screening tools and end user testing by disabled individuals. 39. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 40. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining their Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making their Website equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 41. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 43. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered, during the relevant statutory period. 44. Common questions of law and fact exist amongst Class, including: a. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “public accommodation” under the ADA; b. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “place or provider of public accommodation” under the NYCHRL; c. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the ADA; and d. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the NYCHRL. 46. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class Members because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the Class Members. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. 47. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 48. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 49. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 51. Defendant’s Website is a public accommodations within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). The Website is a service that is offered to the general public, and as such, must be equally accessible to all potential consumers. 52. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 53. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 54. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 56. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 57. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 58. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 59. Defendant’s Website is a sales establishment and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9). 61. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with such Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, products, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 62. Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). 63. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the Sub- Class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 65. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of its Website under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 66. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 67. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 68. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 69. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 70. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class and New York City Sub-Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 72. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq.

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16. HukariAscendent is a technical consulting and engineering company specializing in engineering and technical services associated with the nuclear industry and power generation facilities.1 17. McClure was an hourly employee of HukariAscendent. 18. McClure was hired around November 2016. 19. McClure left HukariAscendent’s employment near the end of February 2017. 20. HukariAscendent paid McClure by the hour. 21. HukariAscendent paid McClure $70 per hour. 22. McClure reported the hours he worked to HukariAscendent on a regular basis. 23. If McClure worked fewer than 40 hours in a week, would be paid only for the hours he worked. 1 www.hukari.com/about-us/ Case: 1:18-cv-00873-SJD-SKB Doc #: 1 Filed: 12/11/18 Page: 3 of 9 PAGEID #: 3 4 24. But McClure normally worked more than 40 hours in a week. 25. The hours McClure worked are reflected in HukariAscendent’s records. 26. HukariAscendent paid McClure at the same hourly rate for all hours worked, including those in excess of 40 in a workweek. 27. Rather than receiving time and half as required by the FLSA, McClure did not receive any pay for overtime hours worked. 28. This payment scheme violates the FLSA. 29. HukariAscendent was aware of the overtime requirements of the FLSA. 30. HukariAscendent nonetheless failed to pay certain hourly employees, such as McClure, overtime. 31. HukariAscendent’s failure to pay overtime to these hourly workers was, and is, a willful violation of the FLSA.

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16. Defendants own several convenience stores under a 7-Eleven® franchise and license in Tarrant, Denton, and Dallas Counties. Defendants are well aware of the FLSA’s requirements. 17. During the relevant time period, the Cashiers and the Members of the Class worked or work on average over forty (40) hours per week. 40. Section 7(a)(1) of FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 207(a), provides: “[N]o employer shall employ any of his employees who in any workweek is engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, or is employed in an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, for a workweek longer than forty hours unless such employee receives compensation for his employment in excess of the hours above specified at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate at which he is employed.” 41. During the relevant period, Plaintiffs regularly worked more than forty hours in a workweek. They were entitled to be paid overtime compensation as provided under Section 7(a) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C § 207(a), for all hours worked in excess of forty hours in a workweek. 42. No exemption excused Defendants from paying Plaintiffs overtime compensation and Defendants have not made a good faith effort to comply with the FLSA. Defendants instead knowingly, willfully, or with reckless disregard carried out an illegal pattern or practice regarding the amounts Plaintiffs were paid. Defendants’ failure to pay Plaintiffs for all overtime worked is and was a clear violation of the FLSA. 43. The Members of the Class had similar schedules and responsibilities as Plaintiffs. The Members of the Class were subjected to the same pay practices and policies as the Plaintiffs. The Members of the Class are similarly situated cashiers. 44. Although the amount of damages may vary from individual to individual, the damages can be calculated by using a single mathematical formula that is individually applicable to each Member of the Class. The Members of the Class are similarly situated in terms of pay provisions. 46. No justification exists for Defendants’ failure to pay the Members of the Class for all hours worked. Likewise, no exemption exists to excuse Defendants’ failure to pay overtime pay for all hours worked over forty (40) hours per workweek. Defendants have not made a good faith effort to comply with the FLSA with respect to the Members of the Class. The Members of the Class are not independent contractors. Instead, Defendants knowingly, willfully, with intent or with reckless disregard carried out an illegal pattern or practice regarding the amount the Members of the Class were paid. Defendants’ failure to pay the Members of the Class for all overtime worked is and was a clear, willful, and intentional violation of the FLSA. 47. Plaintiffs and the Members of the Class have consistently worked more than forty (40) hours in most workweeks. 48. Plaintiffs and the Members of the Class have not been paid for overtime at one and one-half times the regular rate of pay for hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours in most workweeks since at least summer of 2014. 49. Plaintiffs and the Members of the Class are entitled to payment of overtime at the rate of an additional one and one-half times their regular rate of pay for the time period of approximately early 2014 to the present. 51. Defendants have violated Section 207 of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 207 by failing to pay the Plaintiffs, and the Members of the Class, overtime compensation required by the FLSA in workweeks in which they worked in excess of forty (40) hours. 52. Defendants’ violations have been willful. 53. There are questions of law and fact common to the class/collective. 54. The claims or defenses of the representatives, Plaintiffs Foote and McCall, are typical of the claims or defenses of the class/collective. 55. The representatives, Plaintiffs Foote and McCall, will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class/collective. 56. Prosecuting this case as a class/collective action for similarly situated employees who have been unlawfully denied overtime wages will promote judicial efficiency and will best protect the interest of the class/collective members. 57. There are no conflicts of interest among the class/collective members. 58. Plaintiffs incorporate the allegations in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth in their entirety. 60. Plaintiffs and the Members of the Class are therefore entitled to their unpaid wages at one and one-half times their regular pay for all hours worked in excess of forty hours in a workweek. 61. Plaintiffs and the Members of the Class are entitled to an additional amount equal to all of their unpaid overtime compensation as liquidated damages. 62. Plaintiffs and the Members of the Class also are entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees, costs and expenses, and pre- and post-judgment interest. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). FAILURE TO PAY OVERTIME (COLLECTIVE ACTION)

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(Violation of the Overtime Provisions of the New York Labor Law) 53) Plaintiff repeat and realleges all paragraphs above as though fully set forth herein. 54) Defendants, in violation of the NYLL § 190 et seq.and associated rules and regulations, failed to pay Plaintiff (and the FLSA class members) overtime compensation at rates of one and one-half times the regular rate of pay for each hour worked in excess of forty hours in a workweek. 55) Defendants’ failure to pay Plaintiff (and the FLSA class members) overtime compensation was willful within the meaning of N.Y.Lab.Law § 663. 56) Plaintiff (and the FLSA class members) have been damaged in an amount to be determined at trial. Defendants Constitute Joint Employers 15) Defendants operate a Pizzeria establishment in Queens, New York. 16) Defendants maintain as their principal place of business a centralized office, located at at 3767 Junction Boulevard, Corona NY. Individual Mohammed Abrahim possess or possessed operational control over Defendant Corporation, possess or possessed an ownership interest in Defendant Corporations, and control or controlled significant functions of Defendant Corporations. 17) Upon information and belief, Defendant Mohammed Abrahim serve or served as Chairperson and/or as Chief Executive Officer of Defendant Corporation. 18) Defendants are associated and joint employers, act in the interest of each other with respect to employees, pay employees by the same method, and share control over the employees. 19) Defendants possess or possessed substantial control over the Plaintiff (and other similarly situated employees’) working conditions, and over the policies and practices with respect to the employment and compensation of the Plaintiff, and all similarly situated individuals, referred to herein. 20) Defendants jointly employed the Plaintiff, and all similarly situated individuals, and are Plaintiff (and all similarly situated individuals’) employers within the meaning of 29 U.S.C.201 et seq.and the New York Labor Law. 21) In the alternative, the Defendants constitute a single employer of the Plaintiff and/or similarly situated individuals. 22) At all relevant times, Defendants were the Plaintiff employers within the meaning of the FLSA and New York Labor Law. Defendants had the power to hire and fire Plaintiff, control the terms and conditions of his employment and determine the rate and method of any compensation in exchange for Plaintiff services. 23) In each year from 2014 to the present, the Defendants, both separately and jointly, had gross annual volume of sales of not less than $500,000 (exclusive of excise taxes at the retail level that are separately stated). 24) In addition, upon information and belief, the Defendants and/or their enterprise were directly engaged in interstate commerce. As example, numerous items, such as soap, brushes and cleaning materials that were used in the Pizzeria on a daily basis were produced outside of the state of New York. Individual Plaintiff 25) The Plaintiff was an employee of the Defendants, and was primarily employed as a Pizza Maker. 26) He seeks to represent a class of similarly situated individuals under 29 U.S.C.216(b). Plaintiff JOSE ACERO 27) Plaintiff Acero worked for Defendants from approximately June 2019 until February 2020. 28) Plaintiff Acero’ duties included making pizza ten (10) hours per day, (7) seven days per Week. Plaintiff was paid $11 per hour the entire time he worked for Defendants. 29) Plaintiff Acero regularly handled goods in interstate commerce, such as food, vegetables and other items produced outside of the State of New York. 30) Plaintiff Acero’ work duties required neither discretion nor independent judgment. 31) Plaintiff Acero worked in excess of 40 hours per week without appropriate overtime compensation from June 2019 until February 2020. 32) From June 2013 until June 2019, Defendants did not provide Plaintiff Acero with any document or other statement accounting for his actual hours worked or setting forth the rate of pay for all of his hours. 33) No notification, either in the form of posted notices, or other means, was ever given to Plaintiff Acero regarding overtime and wages as required under the FLSA and NYLL. 34) Defendants did not provide Plaintiff Acero with each payment of wages an accurate statement of wages, as required by NYLL 195(3). 35) Defendants never provided Plaintiff with a written notice, in English and in Spanish (Plaintiff Acero primary language), of his rate of pay, employer’s regular payday, and such other information as required by NYLL §195(1). Defendants’ General Employment Practices 36) At all times, relevant to this complaint, Defendants maintained a policy and practice of requiring Plaintiff and all similarly situated employees to work in excess of 40 hours per week without paying them appropriate minimum wage, overtime, and spread of hours’ compensation, as required by federal and state laws. Defendants’ pay practices resulted in Plaintiff not receiving payments for all their hours worked, resulting in Plaintiff effective rate of pay falling below the required minimum and overtime wage rate. 37) Plaintiff has been victim of Defendants’ common policy and practices violating his rights under the FLSA and New York Labor Law by not paying them the wages they were owed for the hours they had worked. a. As part of their regular business practice, Defendants intentionally, willfully, and repeatedly harmed Plaintiff by engaging in a pattern, practice, and/or policy of violating the FLSA and the NYLL. b. Defendants failed to provide Plaintiff with statutorily required wage and hour records or statements of her pay received, in part so as to hide Defendants’ violations of the wage and hour laws, and to take advantage of Plaintiff relative lack of sophistication in wage and hour laws. c. Defendants willfully disregarded and purposefully evaded recordkeeping requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act and New York Labor Law by failing to maintain accurate and complete timesheets and payroll records. d. Upon information and belief, this was done to disguise the actual number of hours Plaintiff worked, and to avoid paying Plaintiff properly for (i) her full hours worked, (ii) for overtime due, and (iii) for spread of hours pay. e. Defendants did not provide Plaintiff with any document or other statement accurately accounting for their actual hours worked and setting forth rate of minimum wage and overtime wage. f. Defendants did not provide Plaintiff with any break periods. (Violation of the FLSA and New York Minimum Wage Act) 44) Plaintiff repeats and realleges all paragraphs above as though fully set forth herein. 45) At all times relevant to this action, Defendants were Plaintiff’ employers within the meaning of the N.Y. Lab. Law §§ 2 and 651. 46) Defendants, in violation of the NYLL, paid Plaintiff than the minimum wage in violation of NYLL § 652(1) and the supporting regulations of the New York State Department of Labor. 47) Defendants’ failure to pay Plaintiff minimum wage was willful within the meaning of N.Y. Lab. Law § 663. 48) Plaintiff was damaged in an amount to be determined at trial. (Violation of the Overtime Provisions of the FLSA) 49) Plaintiff repeat and reallegess all paragraphs above as though fully set forth herein. 50) Defendants, in violation of the FLSA, failed to pay Plaintiff (and the FLSA class members) overtime compensation at rates of one and one-half times the regular rate of pay for each hour worked in excess of forty hours in a workweek, in violation of 29 U.S.C.§ 207 (a)(1). 51) Defendants’ failure to pay Plaintiff (and the FLSA class members) overtime compensation was willful within the meaning of 29 U.S.C.§ 255(a) 52) Plaintiff (and the FLSA class members) were damaged in an amount to be determined at trial. New York Labor Law – Failure to Provide Accurate Wage Statements 60) Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all allegations in all preceding paragraphs. 61) Defendants have failed to provide Plaintiff with complete and accurate wage statements throughout his employment listing, inter alia, all his regular and overtime hours of work, his rate of pay, and the basis of pay, in violation of NYLL § 195(3). 62) Due to Defendants’ violations of the NYLL, Plaintiff is entitled to recover from Defendants’ statutory damages of Two Hundred and Fifty dollars ($250) per workday that the violation occurred, up to a maximum of Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000), pursuant to NYLL § 198 (1-d). New York Labor Law – Failure to Provide Notice at Time of Hiring 57) Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all allegations in all preceding paragraphs. 58) Defendants failed to provide Plaintiff at the time of hiring or at any point thereafter, a notice containing the rate of pay and basis thereof, whether paid by the hour, shift, day, week, salary, piece, commission, or other; the regular pay day designated by the employer; the physical address of the employer's main office or principal place of business; the telephone number of the employer, and anything otherwise required by law, in violation of NYLL § 195(1). 59) Due to Defendants' violations of the NYLL § 195(1), Plaintiff is entitled to recover from Defendants statutory damages of Fifty dollars ($50) per workday that the violation occurred, up to a maximum of Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000) pursuant to NYLL § 198 (1-b).

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10. Discovery may reveal the transmission of additional faxes as well. 11. Defendant Robert H. Wang, MD, doing business as Coder Publisher is responsible for sending or causing the sending of the fax. 12. Defendant Robert H. Wang, MD, doing business as Coder Publisher as the entity whose products or services were advertised in the fax, derived economic benefit from the sending of the fax. 13. Defendant Robert H. Wang, MD, doing business as Coder Publisher either negligently or wilfully violated the rights of Plaintiff and other recipients in sending the fax. 14. The fax has a “remove” number at the bottom that is associated with the mass broadcasting of advertising faxes. 16. On information and belief, the fax attached hereto was sent as part of a mass broadcasting of faxes. 17. On information and belief, Defendant has transmitted similar unsolicited fax advertisements to at least 40 other persons in Michigan. 18. There is no reasonable means for Plaintiff or other recipients of Defendant’s unsolicited advertising fax to avoid receiving illegal faxes. Fax machines must be left on and ready to receive the urgent communications authorized by their owners. 19. Plaintiff incorporates ¶¶ 1-18. 20. The TCPA makes unlawful the “use of any telephone facsimile machine, computer or other device to send an unsolicited advertisement to a telephone facsimile machine ...” 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(1)(C). 21. The TCPA, 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(3), provides: Private right of action. A person or entity may, if otherwise permitted by the laws or rules of court of a State, bring in an appropriate court of that State– (A) an action based on a violation of this subsection or the regulations prescribed under this subsection to enjoin such violation, (B) an action to recover for actual monetary loss from such a violation, or to receive $500 in damages for each such violation, whichever is greater, or (C) both such actions. If the Court finds that the defendant willfully or knowingly violated this subsection or the regulations prescribed under this subsection, the court may, in its discretion, increase the amount of the award to an amount equal to not more than 3 times the amount available under the subparagraph (B) of this paragraph. 22. Plaintiff and each class member suffered damages as a result of receipt of the unsolicited faxes, in the form of paper and ink or toner consumed as a result. Furthermore, Plaintiff’s statutory right of privacy was invaded. 24. Defendant violated the TCPA even if its actions were only negligent. 25. Defendant should be enjoined from committing similar violations in the future. 26. Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a) and (b)(3), Plaintiff brings this claim on behalf of a class, consisting of (a) all persons (b) who, on or after a date four years prior to the filing of this action (28 U.S.C. §1658), (c) were sent faxes by or on behalf of Defendant Robert H. Wang, MD, doing business as Coder Publisher promoting its goods or services for sale (d) and with respect to whom Defendant cannot provide evidence of express consent or an established business relationship prior to the faxing. 27. The class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impractical. Plaintiff alleges on information and belief that there are more than 40 members of the class. 28. There are questions of law and fact common to the class that predominate over any questions affecting only individual class members. The predominant common questions include: a. Whether Defendant engaged in a pattern of sending unsolicited fax advertisements; b. The manner in which Defendant compiled or obtained its list of fax numbers; c. Whether Defendant thereby violated the TCPA. 29. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in handling class actions and claims involving unlawful business practices. Neither Plaintiff nor Plaintiff's counsel have any interests which might cause them not to vigorously pursue this action. 30. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the class members. All are based on the same factual and legal theories. 32. Several courts have certified class actions under the TCPA. Holtzman v. Turza, 08 C 2014, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95620 (N.D.Ill., Oct. 14, 2009), aff’d in relevant part, 728 F.3d 682 (7 Cir. 2013); Sadowski v. Med1 Online, LLC, 07 C 2973, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41766 th (N.D.Ill., May 27, 2008); CE Design Ltd. v Cy's Crabhouse North, Inc., 259 F.R.D. 135 (N.D.Ill. 2009); Targin Sign Sys. v Preferred Chiropractic Ctr., Ltd., 679 F. Supp. 2d 894 (N.D.Ill. 2010); Garrett v. Ragle Dental Lab, Inc., 10 C 1315, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108339, 2010 WL 4074379 (N.D.Ill., Oct. 12, 2010); Hinman v. M & M Rental Ctr., 545 F.Supp. 2d 802 (N.D.Ill. 2008); Clearbrook v. Rooflifters, LLC, 08 C 3276, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72902 (N.D. Ill. July 20, 2010) (Cox, M.J.); G.M. Sign, Inc. v. Group C Communs., Inc., 08 C 4521, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17843 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 25, 2010); Kavu, Inc. v. Omnipak Corp., 246 F.R.D. 642 (W.D.Wash. 2007); Display South, Inc. v. Express Computer Supply, Inc., 961 So.2d 451, 455 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2007); Display South, Inc. v. Graphics House Sports Promotions, Inc., 992 So. 2d 510 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2008); Lampkin v. GGH, Inc., 146 P.3d 847 (Ok. App. 2006); ESI Ergonomic Solutions, LLC v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc., 203 Ariz. (App.) 94, 50 P.3d 844 (2002); Core Funding Group, LLC v. Young, 792 N.E.2d 547 (Ind.App. 2003); Critchfield Physical Therapy v. Taranto Group, Inc., 293 Kan. 285; 263 P.3d 767 (2011); Karen S. Little, L.L.C. v. Drury Inns. Inc., 306 S.W.3d 577 (Mo. App. 2010). 9. On August 1, 2014, Plaintiff Michigan Urgent Care & Primary Care Physicians, P.C. received the unsolicited fax advertisement attached as Exhibit A on its facsimile machine.

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1. Because of any person’s actual or perceived … disability …, directly or indirectly: (a) to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person the full and equal enjoyment, on equal terms and conditions, of any of the accommodations, advantages, services, facilities or privileges of the place or provider of public accommodation; NYC Admin. Code §8-107(4) 157. The Defendants have not reasonably accommodated the Plaintiff, and other disabled individuals, in violation of New York City’s Administrative Code §8-102(4), (16), (17), (18), §8-107(4) and §8-107(15). 158. In violation of the New York City Administrative Code, the Defendants have unlawfully discriminated against the Plaintiff and all others similarly situated. 159. Reasonable accommodations and modifications are necessary to enable the Plaintiff, and all others similarly situated, the ability to enjoy non-restricted access and use of the Defendants’ Subject Facility. 160. In violation of the New York City Administrative Code the owners, operators, lessees, proprietors, managers, agents and/or employees of the Defendants’ Subject Facility have, because of the actual, or perceived, disability of the Plaintiff directly, or indirectly, refused, withheld from, and denied him the accommodations, advantages, facilities, or privileges thereof. 30 161. In violation of the New York City Administrative Code, on the basis of the Plaintiff’s disability, the Defendants have demonstrated that the patronage, or custom, of the Plaintiff, and all others similarly situated, is unwelcome, objectionable and not acceptable. 162. The Defendants are in violation of the New York City Human Rights Law by denying the Plaintiff full and safe access to all of the benefits, accommodations and services of the Subject Facility. 163. Pursuant to New York City Human Rights Law §8-502(c), notice of this action is being served upon the New York City Commission on Human Rights in accordance with the statute. 164. As a direct and proximate result of the Defendants’ disability discrimination, in violation of the New York City Human Rights Laws, the Plaintiff has suffered, and continues to suffer, personal injuries, including mental anguish and emotional distress, including, but not limited to, depression, humiliation, stress, embarrassment, anxiety, loss of self-esteem and self-confidence, emotional pain and suffering. 165. The Plaintiff requests compensatory damages in the amount of $1,000 from each Defendant under the New York City Human Rights Law, NYC Admin. Code §8-125. 56. The Plaintiff, who was born in 1949, is an elderly man aged beyond his 70 years. He suffers from debilitating diseases and was diagnosed with a neurological condition, which affects his walking. The Plaintiff’s treating neurologist determined that he has gait dysfunction, the causes of which include peripheral neuropathy due to diabetes mellitus, chronic right basilar ganglia lacunar infarct and cerebellar ataxia. The Plaintiff’s treating neurologist also determined that he has essential tremor. Furthermore, the Plaintiff has decreased vision due to glaucoma and is blind in the right eye. The Plaintiff’s gait is unsteady and he falls when he walks short distances. His treating neurologist prescribed him a wheelchair and a handicapped parking placard. The Plaintiff obtained the wheelchair and uses it regularly. The New Jersey Motor Vehicle Commission issued him a disabled person parking placard together with a handicapped identification card. The handicapped placard can be used in any car, in which the Plaintiff is travelling. The 15 Plaintiff relies on his wheelchair and parks appropriately in handicapped accessible parking spaces. He also needs appropriate and statutorily mandated space next to that car, so that he may transfer from the car to the wheelchair. The Plaintiff is disabled under the statute, which in pertinent part states that Disability means, with respect to an individual, a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual… . The phrase major life activities means functions such as caring for one’s self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning and working. Violations of the New York City Human Rights Laws 155. The Plaintiff re-alleges, and incorporates by this reference, all the allegations set forth in this complaint, as if fully set forth herein. 29 156. The New York City Human Rights Law, in relevant part, provides the below. It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person who is the owner, franchisor, franchisee, lessor, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation: Violations of the ADA Violations of the New York State Civil Rights Laws 150. The Plaintiff re-alleges, and incorporates by this reference, all the allegations set forth in this complaint, as if fully set forth herein. 151. The Defendants have violated the Plaintiff’s civil rights on the basis of his disability. 152. Consequently, the Plaintiff is entitled to recover the penalty prescribed by Civil Rights Law §40-c and §40-d, in the amount of $500 for each violation from each Defendant. 153. Pursuant to the New York Civil Rights law, §40-d, the Defendants are guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 154. Notice of this action is being served upon the attorney general, as required by New York Civil Rights Law, §40-d, in accordance with the statute. Violations of the New York State Human Rights Laws 135. The Plaintiff re-alleges, and incorporates, by this reference, all the allegations set forth in this complaint, as if fully set forth herein. 136. The New York State Human Rights Law, in relevant part, provides the following: It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation … because of the … disability … of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof … to the effect that any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of any such place shall be refused, withheld from or denied to any person on account of … disability … . NYS Executive Law §296(2)(a) 137. The Defendants’ Subject Facility is a place of public accommodation, as defined in New York State Human Rights Law §292(9). 138. The Defendants have further violated the New York State Human Rights Law by being in violation of the rights provided under the ADA. 139. The Defendants are in violation of the New York State Human Rights Law by denying the Plaintiff, and others similarly situated, full and safe access to all of the benefits, accommodations and services of the Subject Facility. 140. The Defendants do not provide the Plaintiff, and others similarly situated, with equal opportunity to use their public accommodation. 27 141. The Defendants have failed to make all readily achievable accommodations and modifications to remove barriers to access in violation of Executive Law §296(2)(c)(iii). 142. As a direct and proximate result of the Defendants’ unlawful discrimination, which is in violation of the Executive Law, the Plaintiff has suffered, and continues to suffer, personal injuries, which include emotional distress, including, but not limited to, humiliation, embarrassment, stress and anxiety. 143. The Defendants have not provided the Plaintiff, and others similarly situated, with evenhanded treatment in violation of New York State Human Rights Law §296. 144. The Defendants’ direct, or indirect, unequal treatment of the Plaintiff, and others similarly situated, was demonstrated when he was discriminated against. 145. The Defendants have, because of the Plaintiff’s disability, directly, or indirectly, refused, withheld from, or denied him the accommodations, advantages, facilities, or privileges of their public accommodation. 146. The Defendants have demonstrated that the patronage, or custom, of the Plaintiff, and other similarly situated individuals, is unwelcome, unwanted, undesirable, unacceptable and objectionable. 147. In violation of the New York State Human Rights Laws the Defendants and their agents discriminated against the Plaintiff. 148. As a direct and proximate result of the Defendants’ unlawful discrimination, which was, and is, in violation of the New York State Human Rights laws, the Plaintiff has suffered, and continues to suffer, personal injuries, such as mental anguish and emotional distress, including, but not limited to, depression, humiliation, stress, 28 embarrassment, anxiety, loss of self-esteem and self-confidence, together with emotional pain and suffering. 149. The Plaintiff requests compensatory damages from each Defendant in the amount of $1,000 under the New York State Human Rights Law, NY CLS Exec §297(9).

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- 2 - 12. This Action is properly maintained as a statewide class action. The Class consists of:  All New York consumers who were sent letters and/or notices from RFS, attempting to collect a debt, which contain at least one the violations alleged herein.  The Class period begins one year to the filing of this Action. 14. Plaintiff is at all times to this lawsuit, a "consumer" as that term is defined by 15 U.S.C. §1692a(3). 15. RFS collects and attempts to collect debts incurred or alleged to have been incurred for personal, family or household purposes on behalf of creditors using the United States Postal Services, telephone and Internet. 16. RFS is a “debt collector” as defined by 15 U.S.C. §1692a(6). 17. On or about November 9, 2014, Plaintiff had his prescription filled at Duane Reade Pharmacy. 18. On or about November 24, 2014, Plaintiff had a second prescription filled at Duane Reade Pharmacy. 19. On the date each prescription was filled, Plaintiff was covered by Horizon Blue Cross Blue Shield of New Jersey. - 5 - 21. For some reason unknown to Plaintiff, Oxford paid the claim submitted by Duane Reade Pharmacy, directed to Duane Reade Pharmacy. 22. At the time Oxford paid the claim submitted by Duane Reade Pharmacy, Oxford knew or could have reasonable known that Plaintiff was not insured by Oxford. 23. Sometime prior to February 6, 2015 Plaintiff allegedly incurred a financial obligation to Oxford. 24. Sometime prior to February 6, 2015, the alleged Oxford obligation became due. 25. Oxford is a "creditor" as defined by 15. U.S.C. §1692a(4). 26. At sometime prior to February 6, 2015, Oxford, either directly or through intermediate transactions assigned, placed with, transferred or the Oxford obligation to RFS for the purpose of collection. 27. At the time the Oxford obligation was assigned, placed with, transferred to RFS, such obligation was overdue. 28. On or about February 6, 2015, RFS caused to be delivered to Plaintiff a letter in an attempt to collect the alleged Oxford obligation. A copy of said letter is annexed hereto as Exhibit A except that the undersigned attorney has, in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.2 partially redacted the financial account numbers in an effort to protect Plaintiff’s privacy. 29. The February 6, 2015 letter was sent or caused to be sent by persons employed by RFS as a “debt collector” as defined by 15 U.S.C. §1692a(6). 30. The February 6, 2015 letter is a “communication” as defined by 15 U.S.C. §1692a(2). 31. The February 6, 2015 letter stated at the top in large bold face: - 6 - 32. The February 6, 2015 letter also states in the first paragraph, also in bold face: "Since you were note eligible for prescription plan benefits on these fill dates, "Oxford is due full reimbursement of the amounts paid." 33. As of February 6, 2015, no court has determined that, Oxford is due full reimbursement of the amounts paid. 34. The February 6, 2015 letter provided instructions to follow in the event Plaintiff disputed the alleged debt because he believed there was a billing error, and was coverage by another health plan. 35. Such instructions stated: Method #1 - Contact the pharmacy that filled the prescription to correct the billing:  Notify your pharmacist of this billing error and request to have the claims reversed to Oxford and billed to the insurance carrier that provided coverage on these dates of fill.  Obtain a printout from the pharmacy indicating the claims were reversed, and return this with the payment stub below and write "billing corrected by pharmacy" on the payment stub. Method # 2- Make payment to Oxford using the payment stub below and submit the claims to your new insurance carrier for reimbursement:  Contact your new insurance carrier that should have paid for these prescription claims and obtain a member reimbursement prescription claim form. Submit these claims to your new carrier for reimbursement. 36. The February 6, 2015 letter stated near the bottom and above the payment coupon the following: 44. Plaintiff repeats the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 44 as if the same were set forth at length. 45. Collection letters and/or notices such as those sent by Defendant, are to be evaluated by the objective standard of the hypothetical “least sophisticated consumer.” 46. Section 1692g(a) of the FDCPA requires the debt collector to give what is commonly referred to as a thirty-day (30) notice within five (5) days of its initial communication with the consumer and send the consumer a written notice containing: a statement that unless the consumer, within thirty days after receipt of the notice, disputes the validity of the debt, or any portion thereof, the debt will be assumed to be valid by the debt collector. 47. Upon reading the February 6, 2015 letter and the document included in the same envelope, annexed hereto as Exhibit B, the least sophisticated consumer would be confused as to what he must do to effectively dispute the alleged debt. 48. The least sophisticated consumer, who wanted to dispute the alleged debt or any portion thereof, would be confused and unsure as to whether he should choose Method #1, as stated in the letter February 6, 2015 letter, or Method #2, as also stated in the February 6, 2015 letter, or the instructions on the separate document also included in the same envelope as the February 6, 2015 letter, or whether he was required to follow all 3 methods. 50. Plaintiff repeats the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 50 as if the same were set forth at length. 51. 15 U.S.C. §1692e prohibits a debt collector from using "false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt." FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT VIOLATION OF 15 U.S.C. §1692g(a)(3) VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. § 1692e et seq.

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2.0 guidelines; c. Regularly test user accessibility by blind or vision-impaired persons to ensure that Defendant’s Website complies under the WCAG 2.0 guidelines; and, d. Develop an accessibility policy that is clearly disclosed on Defendant’s Websites, with contact information for users to report accessibility-related problems. 20. Defendant operates INTERIM HEALTHCARE Care Offices as well as the INTERIM HEALTHCARE website, and offers it to the public and offers features that should allow all consumers to access the facilities and services that Defendant offers regarding its Home Care Offices. 21. Defendant operates INTERIM HEALTHCARE Care Offices (hereinafter its “Offices”) across the United States, with one of its New York City location at 845 3rd Avenue, New York, NY 10022. 22. These Offices constitute places of public accommodation. Defendant’s Offices provide to the public important services. Defendant’s Website provides consumers with access to an array of information and services including Office locations and hours, access to details regarding its many programs and services, including information related to its Home Care Services, Special Care Situations, transitioning tips, promotional information, and other services available online and in Offices. 24. It is, upon information and belief, Defendant’s policy and practice to deny Plaintiff, along with other blind or visually-impaired users, access to Defendant’s website, and to therefore specifically deny the facilities and services that are offered and integrated with Defendant’s Offices. Due to Defendant’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to its website, Plaintiff and visually-impaired persons have been and are still being denied equal access to Defendant’s Offices and the numerous facilities, services, and benefits offered to the public through its Website. 25. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient JAWS screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using the JAWS screen-reader. 28. These access barriers have deterred Plaintiff from revisiting Defendant’s website and/or visiting its physical locations, despite an intention to do so. Defendant Must Remove Barriers To Its Website 29. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s Website, blind and visually-impaired consumers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, goods, and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from accessing the Website, despite his intention to do so. 31. If the Website was equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and learn about Defendant’s operations as sighted individuals do. 32. Through his attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 33. Because simple compliance with the WCAG 2.0 Guidelines would provide Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers with equal access to the Website, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including but not limited to the following policies or practices: a. Constructing and maintaining a website that is inaccessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; b. Failure to construct and maintain a website that is sufficiently intuitive so as to be equally accessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; and, c. Failing to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind and visually-impaired consumers, such as Plaintiff, as a member of a protected class. 34. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 36. Because Defendant’s Website have never been equally accessible, and because Defendant lacks a corporate policy that is reasonably calculated to cause its Website to become and remain accessible, Plaintiff invokes 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2) and seeks a permanent injunction requiring Defendant to retain a qualified consultant acceptable to Plaintiff (“Agreed Upon Consultant”) to assist Defendant to comply with WCAG 2.0 guidelines for Defendant’s Website. Plaintiff seeks that this permanent injunction requires Defendant to cooperate with the Agreed Upon Consultant to: a. Train Defendant’s employees and agents who develop the Website on accessibility compliance under the WCAG 2.0 guidelines; b. Regularly check the accessibility of the Website under the WCAG 38. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 39. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining their Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making their Website equally accessible to visually impaired consumers. 40. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 41. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of facilities and services offered in Defendant’s physical locations, during the relevant statutory period. 43. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of facilities and services offered in Defendant’s physical locations, during the relevant statutory period. 44. Common questions of law and fact exist amongst Class, including: a. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “public accommodation” under the ADA; b. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “place or provider of public accommodation” under the NYSHRL or NYCHRL; c. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the ADA; d. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the NYSHRL or NYCHRL. 45. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class. The Class, similarly to the Plaintiff, are severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA, NYSYRHL or NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so either can be independently accessible to the Class. 47. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 48. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 49. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 50. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 52. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 53. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 54. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 56. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 57. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 58. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 59. Defendant’s physical locations are located in State of New York and throughout the United States and constitute establishments and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant. Defendant’s Website is a service that is by and integrated with these physical locations. 61. Defendant is violating N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with Defendant’s physical locations to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, facilities and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 62. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(i), unlawful discriminatory practice includes, among other things, “a refusal to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless such person can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations being offered or would result in an undue burden". 63. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(ii), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 65. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the class on the basis of a disability in violation of the NYSHRL, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 66. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 67. Defendant discriminates and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Defendant’s Website and its physical locations under § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the Sub-Class Members will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 69. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 70. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 71. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 72. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 73. Plaintiff served notice thereof upon the attorney general as required by N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41. 74. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40 provides that “all persons within the jurisdiction of this state shall be entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of any places of public accommodations, resort or amusement, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons. No persons, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or employee of any such place shall directly or indirectly refuse, withhold from, or deny to any person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof . . .” 76. Defendant’s New York State physical locations are sales establishments and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant and its Website is a service that is by and integrated with these establishments. 77. Defendant is subject to New York Civil Rights Law because it owns and operates its physical locations and Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Civil Law § 40-c(2). 78. Defendant is violating N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with Defendant’s physical locations to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, facilities and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 79. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41 states that “any corporation which shall violate any of the provisions of sections forty, forty-a, forty-b or forty two . . . shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby . . .” 81. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 82. Defendant discriminates and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability are being directly or indirectly refused, withheld from, or denied the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof in § 40 et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. 83. Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages of five hundred dollars per instance, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Civil Law § 40 et seq. for each and every offense. 84. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 85. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 87. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates its physical locations in the City of New York and its Website, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 88. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with its physical locations to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 89. Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). 91. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 92. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of its Website and its establishments under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 93. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 94. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 95. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 96. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 98. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies, that its Website contains access barriers denying blind consumers the full and equal access to the goods, services and facilities of its Website and by extension its physical locations, which Defendant owns, operations and controls, fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12182, et seq., N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, et seq., and N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. 99. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF Defendant’s Barriers on Its Website VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 1281 et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE NYSHRL VIOLATION OF THE NEW YORK STATE CIVIL RIGHTS LAW

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2. This Complaint challenges systemic illegal employment practices resulting in violations of the California Labor Code against employees of Defendants. 33. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 32 as though fully set for herein. 37. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 36 as though fully set for herein. 38. Defendants failed in its affirmative obligation to provide accurate itemized wage statements. Defendants, as a matter of policy and practice, did not provide accurate records in violation of Labor Code § 226(a). Specifically, as a result of Defendants’ rounding policy, the wage statements failed to accurately identify the correct number of hours worked, as well as the accurate gross/net wages earned. Further, whenever employees were paid overtime wages, the wage statements failed to accurately identify the applicable a single overtime rates of pay. 45. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 44 as though fully set for herein. 46. At all times relevant herein, DEFENDANTS were required to pay Plaintiff all earned wages in a timely fashion at the end of employment pursuant to California Labor Code §§ 201 to 203. 47. As a pattern and practice, DEFENDANTS intentionally failed to pay Plaintiff her final wages pursuant to Labor Code §§ 201 to 203 and accordingly owe waiting time penalties pursuant to Labor Code § 203. 48. The conduct of DEFENDANTS and their agents and employees as described herein was willfully done in violation of Plaintiff’s rights, and done by managerial employees of DEFENDANTS. 49. Therefore, Plaintiff is entitled to compensation pursuant to Labor Code § 203. 50. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 49 as though fully set for herein. 51. This cause of action is brought pursuant to California Labor Code § 2802 which provides that employees are entitled to be indemnified for expenses and losses in discharging the duties of their employers. FOR VIOLATIONS OF THE UNFAIR PRACTICES ACT, B&P § 17200 ET SEQ. (AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS BY PLAINTIFF AND ON BEHALF OF FOR VIOLATION OF LABOR CODE §§ 201-203 (AGAINST DEFENDANTS AND DOES 1-100 BY PLAINTIFF [NON- CLASS CLAIM]) VIOLATION OF LABOR CODE §§ 510, 558, 1194, 1197 AND 1197.1 (AGAINST DEFENDANTS AND DOES 1-100 BY PLAINTIFF AND THE ROUNDING CLASS) VIOLATION OF LABOR CODE § 2802 (AGAINST DEFENDANTS AND DOES 1-100 BY PLAINTIFF [NON- CLASS CLAIM]) VIOLATION OF LABOR CODE § 226 (AGAINST DEFENDANTS AND DOES 1-100 BY PLAINTIFF AND THE ROUNDING AND WAGE STATEMENT CLASSES) a mailing address in the State of California. Thus, for citizenship purposes, THC- ORANGE COUNTY, INC. is a citizen of Kentucky.

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) CARE CONSULTANTS, INC., ) and JOHN DOES 1-10, ) ) Defendants. ) 1. Plaintiff Able Home Health, LLC brings this action to secure redress for the actions of defendant Twenty First Century Health Care Consultants, Inc., in sending or causing the sending of unsolicited advertisements to telephone facsimile machines in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. §227 (“TCPA”), the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act, 815 ILCS 505/2 (“ICFA”), and the common law. 10. On November 9, 2016, Able Home Health, LLC received the unsolicited fax advertisement attached as Exhibit B on its facsimile machine. 11. Discovery may reveal the transmission of additional faxes as well. 12. Defendant Twenty First Century Health Care Consultants, Inc. is responsible for sending or causing the sending of the faxes. 13. Defendant Twenty First Century Health Care Consultants, Inc., as the entity whose products or services were advertised in the faxes, derived economic benefit from the sending of the faxes. 14. Defendant Twenty First Century Health Care Consultants, Inc. either negligently or wilfully violated the rights of plaintiff and other recipients in sending the faxes. 15. One of the faxes refers to a website registered to defendant Twenty First Century Health Care Consultants, Inc. 16. Plaintiff had no prior relationship with defendant and had not authorized the sending of fax advertisements to plaintiff. 17. On information and belief, the faxes attached hereto were sent as part of a mass broadcasting of faxes. 18. The faxes does not contain an “opt out” notice that complies with 47 U.S.C. §227. 19. The TCPA provides for affirmative defenses of consent or an established business relationship. Both defenses are conditioned on the provision of an opt out notice that complies with the TCPA. Holtzman v. Turza, 728 F.3d 682 (7th Cir. 2013); Nack v. Walburg, 715 F.3d 680 (8th Cir. 2013). 2. The TCPA expressly prohibits unsolicited fax advertising. Unsolicited fax advertising damages the recipients. The recipient is deprived of its paper and ink or toner and the use of its fax machine. The recipient also wastes valuable time it would have spent on something else. Unsolicited faxes prevent fax machines from receiving and sending authorized faxes, cause wear and tear on fax machines, and require labor to attempt to identify the source 1 and purpose of the unsolicited faxes. 20. On information and belief, defendant has transmitted similar unsolicited fax 3 advertisements to at least 40 other persons in Illinois. 21. There is no reasonable means for plaintiff or other recipients of defendant’s unsolicited advertising faxes to avoid receiving illegal faxes. Fax machines must be left on and ready to receive the urgent communications authorized by their owners. 22. Plaintiff incorporates ¶¶ 1-21. 23. The TCPA makes unlawful the “use of any telephone facsimile machine, computer or other device to send an unsolicited advertisement to a telephone facsimile machine ...” 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(1)(C). 24. The TCPA, 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(3), provides: Private right of action. A person or entity may, if otherwise permitted by the laws or rules of court of a State, bring in an appropriate court of that State– (A) an action based on a violation of this subsection or the regulations prescribed under this subsection to enjoin such violation, (B) an action to recover for actual monetary loss from such a violation, or to receive $500 in damages for each such violation, whichever is greater, or (C) both such actions. If the Court finds that the defendant willfully or knowingly violated this subsection or the regulations prescribed under this subsection, the court may, in its discretion, increase the amount of the award to an amount equal to not more than 3 times the amount available under the subparagraph (B) of this paragraph. 25. Plaintiff and each class member suffered damages as a result of receipt of the unsolicited faxes, in the form of paper and ink or toner consumed as a result. Furthermore, 4 plaintiff’s statutory right of privacy was invaded. 26. Plaintiff and each class member is entitled to statutory damages. 27. Defendants violated the TCPA even if its actions were only negligent. 28. Defendants should be enjoined from committing similar violations in the future. 37. Plaintiff incorporates ¶¶ 1-21. 38. Defendants engaged in unfair acts and practices, in violation of ICFA § 2, 815 ILCS 505/2, by sending unsolicited fax advertising to plaintiff and others. 39. Unsolicited fax advertising is contrary to the TCPA and also Illinois law. 720 ILCS 5/26-3(b) makes it a petty offense to transmit unsolicited fax advertisements to Illinois residents. 40. Defendants engaged in an unfair practice and an unfair method of competition by engaging in conduct that is contrary to public policy, unscrupulous, and caused injury to recipients of their advertising. 41. Plaintiff and each class member suffered damages as a result of receipt of the unsolicited faxes, in the form of paper and ink or toner consumed as a result. 42. Defendants engaged in such conduct in the course of trade and commerce. 43. Defendants’ conduct caused recipients of their advertising to bear the cost thereof. This gave defendant an unfair competitive advantage over businesses that advertise lawfully, such as by direct mail. For example, an advertising campaign targeting one million recipients would cost $500,000 if sent by U.S. mail but only $20,000 if done by fax broadcasting. The reason is that instead of spending $480,000 on printing and mailing his ad, the fax broadcaster misappropriates the recipients’ paper and ink. “Receiving a junk fax is like getting junk mail 8 with the postage due”. Remarks of Cong. Edward Markey, 135 Cong Rec E 2549, Tuesday, July 18, 1989, 101st Cong. 1st Sess. 44. Defendants’ shifting of advertising costs to plaintiff and the class members in this manner makes such practice unfair. In addition, defendant’s conduct was contrary to public policy, as established by the TCPA and Illinois statutory and common law. 45. Defendants should be enjoined from committing similar violations in the future. 53. Plaintiff incorporates ¶¶ 1-21. 54. By sending plaintiff and the class members unsolicited faxes, defendant converted to its own use ink or toner and paper belonging to plaintiff and the class members. 55. Immediately prior to the sending of the unsolicited faxes, plaintiff and the class members owned and had an unqualified and immediate right to the possession of the paper and ink or toner used to print the faxes. 56. By sending the unsolicited faxes, defendants appropriated to their own use the paper and ink or toner used to print the faxes and used them in such manner as to make them unusable. Such appropriation was wrongful and without authorization. 57. Defendants knew or should have known that such appropriation of the paper and ink or toner was wrongful and without authorization. 58. Plaintiff and the class members were deprived of the paper and ink or toner, which could no longer be used for any other purpose. Plaintiff and each class member thereby suffered damages as a result of receipt of the unsolicited faxes. 59. Defendants should be enjoined from committing similar violations in the future. 67. Plaintiff incorporates ¶¶ 1-21. 68. Plaintiff and the class members were entitled to possession of the equipment they used to receive faxes. 69. Defendant’s sending plaintiff and the class members unsolicited faxes interfered with their use of the receiving equipment and constitutes a trespass to such equipment. Chair 13 King v. Houston Cellular, 95cv1066, 1995 WL 1693093 at *2 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 7, 1995) (denying a motion to dismiss with respect to plaintiff's trespass to chattels claim for unsolicited faxes), vacated on jurisdictional grounds 131 F.3d 507 (5th Cir. 1997). 70. Defendants acted either intentionally or negligently in engaging in such conduct. 71. Plaintiff and each class member suffered damages as a result of receipt of the unsolicited faxes. 72. Defendants should be enjoined from continuing trespasses. 73. Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a) and (b)(3), plaintiff brings this claim on behalf of a class, consisting of (a) all persons with Illinois fax numbers (b) who, on or after a date five years prior to the filing of this action, (c) were sent faxes by or on behalf of defendant Twenty First Century Health Care Consultants, Inc., promoting its goods or services for sale (d) which did not contain a compliant opt out notice. By “compliant opt out notice” is meant one (i) on the first page of the fax (ii) that states that the recipient may make a request to the sender not to send any future unsolicited advertisements to a telephone facsimile machine (iii) that states that failure to comply, within the shortest reasonable time, as determined by the Federal Communications Commission, is unlawful; (iv) that provides instructions on how to submit an opt out request and (v) that includes a domestic contact telephone and facsimile machine number and a cost-free mechanism for the recipient to transmit such a request to the sender that permit a request to be made at any time on any day of the week. 74. The class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impractical. Plaintiff alleges on information and belief that there are more than 40 members of the class. 14 75. There are questions of law and fact common to the class that predominate over any questions affecting only individual class members. The predominant common questions include: a. Whether defendants engaged in a pattern of sending unsolicited fax advertisements; and b. Whether defendants thereby committed a trespass to chattels. 76. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in handling class actions and claims involving unlawful business practices. Neither plaintiff nor plaintiff’s counsel have any interests which might cause them not to vigorously pursue this action. 77. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the class members. All are based on the same factual and legal theories. 78. A class action is the superior method for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. The interest of class members in individually controlling the prosecution of separate claims against defendant is small because it is not economically feasible to bring individual actions. 79. Management of this class action is likely to present significantly fewer difficulties that those presented in many class actions, e.g. for securities fraud. WHEREFORE, plaintiff requests that the Court enter judgment in favor of plaintiff and the class and against defendanst for: a. Appropriate damages; b. An injunction against the further transmission of unsolicited fax 15 advertising; c. Costs of suit; d. Such other or further relief as the Court deems just and proper. s/ Daniel A. Edelman Daniel A. Edelman Daniel A. Edelman Cathleen M. Combs James O. Latturner Heather Kolbus 9. On October 18, 2016, Able Home Health, LLC received the unsolicited fax advertisement attached as Exhibit A on its facsimile machine. 2 INTRODUCTION

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(Against Defendant Home Depot U.S.A., Inc.) (Against the Administrative Committee Home Depot U.S.A., Inc.) 23. The COBRA amendments to ERISA included certain provisions relating to continuation of health coverage upon termination of employment or another “qualifying event” as defined by the statute. 24. Among other things, COBRA requires the plan sponsor of each group health plan normally employing more than 20 employees on a typical business day during the preceding year to provide “each qualified beneficiary who would lose coverage under the plan as a result of a qualifying event … to elect, within the election period, continuation coverage under the plan.” 29 U.S.C. § 1161. 26. Moreover, existing case law makes it ostensibly clear that notice is not only required to be delivered to covered employees but to qualifying beneficiaries, as well. 27. COBRA further requires the administrator of such a group health plan to provide notice to any qualified beneficiary of their continuation of coverage rights under COBRA upon the occurrence of a qualifying event. 29 U.S.C. § 1166(a)(4). 28. This notice must be “[i]n accordance with the regulations prescribed by the Secretary” of Labor. 29 U.S.C. § 1166(a). 29. To facilitate compliance with notice obligations, the United States Department of Labor (“DOL”) has issued a Model COBRA Continuation Coverage Election Notice (“Model Notice”), which is included in the Appendix to 29 C.F.R. § 2590.606-4. The DOL website states that the DOL “will consider use of the model election notice, appropriately completed, good faith compliance with the election notice content requirements of COBRA.” 31. Home Depot partially adhered to the Model Notice provided by the Secretary of Labor, but only to the extent that served Home Depot’s best interests, as critical parts are omitted or altered in violation of 29 C.F.R. § 2590.606-4. Among other things: a. Home Depot’s COBRA notice violates 29 C.F.R. § 2590.606- 4(b)(4)(v) because the notice itself never actually explains how to enroll in COBRA, nor does it bother including a physical election form (both of which the model Department of Labor form includes); b. Home Depot’s COBRA notice violates 29 C.F.R. § 2590.606- 4(b)(4)(i) because they fail to provide the name, address and telephone number of the party responsible under the plan for administration of continuation coverage benefits, including as to both the Plan Administrator and COBRA Administrator; c. Home Depot’s COBRA notice violates 29 C.F.R. § 2590.606- 4(b)(4)(i) because they fail to provide the name of the plan; d. Home Depot’s COBRA forms violate 29 C.F.R. § 2590.606-4(b)(4) because Home Depot has failed to provide a notice written in a manner calculated to be understood by the average plan participant. 32. Home Depot’s COBRA notice confused Plaintiff and resulted in his inability to make an informed decision as to electing COBRA continuation coverage. In fact, Plaintiff did not understand the notice and, further, Plaintiff was unable to elect COBRA because of the confusing and incomplete Home Depot’s COBRA notice. 34. Named Plaintiff Travis Mendiola is a former long-time employee of Home Depot, where he worked for approximately nineteen (19) years until his abrupt termination on or about July 15, 2019. 35. Plaintiff was not fired for gross misconduct. 36. As a result of his termination, Plaintiff experienced a qualifying event as defined by 29 U.S.C. § 1163(2). 37. Following this qualifying event, Home Depot caused its COBRA Administrator, Alight Solutions, to mail Plaintiff the deficient COBRA enrollment notice at issue in this lawsuit. 38. The deficient COBRA notice that Plaintiff received was violative of COBRA’s mandates for the reasons set forth herein. 39. Home Depot has in place no administrative remedies Plaintiff was required to exhaust prior to bringing suit as this is not a claim for benefits. 40. Additionally, even if such administrative remedies exist as to Plaintiff’ statutory damages claims, any attempt to exhaust the same would have been futile as this is not an ERISA benefits case. In fact, exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required because Plaintiff was not provided with proper notice of his rights in the first instance. 41. Plaintiff suffered a tangible injury in the form of economic loss, specifically the loss of insurance coverage, due to Home Depot’s deficient COBRA election notice. 43. And, when Plaintiff was forced to finally seek medical treatment, he incurred out-of-pocket medical expenses due to lacking insurance coverage. 44. Finally, Plaintiff suffered an informational injury as a result of Home Depot’s COBRA notice because he was never provided all information to which she was entitled by 29 C.F.R. § 2590.606-4(b). Violation of 29 C.F.R. 29 C.F.R. § 2590.606-4(b)(4)(v) Failure to explain how to enroll in COBRA 45. The governing statute clearly requires that “[t]he notice … shall be written in a manner calculated to be understood by the average plan participant and shall contain the following information:…(v) [a]n explanation of the plan's procedures for electing continuation coverage, including an explanation of the time period during which the election must be made, and the date by which the election must be made.” 29 C.F.R. § 2590.606- 4(b)(4)(v). 46. As a threshold matter, Home Depot’s COBRA enrollment notices fail to adequately explain the procedures for electing coverage. By failing to including explain the procedures for electing coverage, Home Depot interfered with Plaintiff‘s ability to elect COBRA continuation coverage. And, furthermore, by failing to adequately explain the procedures for electing coverage, Home Depot prevented Plaintiff from understanding his rights under COBRA and how to make an informed decision about continuation coverage. 48. This “catch-all” number is actually a phone number to a third-party administrator, Alight Solutions (an entity never identified in the COBRA notice), as is the website. 49. A “catch-all” number provided by Home Depot and then routed to a third-party call center designed to answer anything HR-related simply cannot meet the strict informational statutory requirements of 29 C.F.R. § 2590.606-4(b)(4)(v) required of all COBRA notices as to enrollment. The same is true as to the generic website link provided. Merely directing individuals to a website link and assuming he/she will be able to figure out how to enroll in COBRA once the website is visited simply is very different than actually explaining how to enroll in COBRA. 50. Unlike the Home Depot COBRA notice, the Model DOL notice provides a near fool-proof way to elect COBRA coverage by providing a physical election form to mail in, the date it is due, the name and address to where election forms should be sent, spaces for the names, social security numbers, and type of coverage elected by each plan participant or beneficiary. 52. Plaintiff was unable – based on the content of Home Depot’s COBRA notice – to ascertain the name, address and telephone number of the party responsible under the plan for the administration of continuation coverage benefits. 53. Home Depot was required to provide “in a manner calculated to be understood by the average plan participant ... the name, address and telephone number of the party responsible under the plan for administration of continuation coverage benefits.” 29 C.F.R. § 2590.606- 4(b)(4)(i). Also, the name of the plan, the Home Depot Medical and Dental Plan, must be included, but it is not. 29 C.F.R. § 2590.606- 4(b)(4)(i). 54. Home Depot’s Notice fails to comply with this straightforward requirement. 56. By failing to adequately explain the procedures for electing coverage, as required by 29 C.F.R. § 2590.606-4(b)(4)(v), coupled with the complete omission from Home Depot’s COBRA notice of how to actually enroll in COBRA, and even who the Plan Administrator is/was, Home Depot cumulatively violated 29 C.F.R. § 2590.606- 4(b)(4). This particular section mandates that employers, like Home Depot, must provide a notice of continuation coverage written in a manner calculated “to be understood by the average plan participant.” Without the aforementioned critical pieces of, Home Depot’s COBRA notice cannot be said to be written in a manner calculated “to be understood by the average plan participant.” Thus, Home Depot violated 29 C.F.R. § 2590.6064(b)(4)(v). 57. Plaintiff bring this action as a class action pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of the following persons: All participants and beneficiaries in the Home Depot’s Health and Dental Plan who were sent a COBRA notice, as a result of a qualifying event, during the applicable statute of limitations period, as determined by Home Depot’s records, and did not elect continuation coverage. 59. Numerosity: The Class is so numerous that joinder of all Class members is impracticable. On information and belief thousands of individuals satisfy the definition of the Class. 60. Typicality: Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class. The COBRA notice that Home Depot sent to Plaintiff was a form notice that was uniformly provided to all Class members. As such, the COBRA notice that Plaintiff received were typical of the COBRA notices that other Class Members received and suffered from the same deficiencies. 61. Adequacy: Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class members, he has no interests antagonistic to the class, and has retained counsel experienced in complex class action litigation. 63. Class Members do not have an interest in pursuing separate individual actions against Home Depot, as the amount of each Class Member’s individual claims is relatively small compared to the expense and burden of individual prosecution. Class certification also will obviate the need for unduly duplicative litigation that might result in inconsistent judgments concerning Home Depot’s practices and the adequacy of its COBRA notice. Moreover, management of this action as a class action will not present any likely difficulties. In the interests of justice and judicial efficiency, it would be desirable to concentrate the litigation of all Class Members’ claims in a single action. 64. Plaintiff intends to send notice to all Class Members to the extent required the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The names and addresses of the Class Members are available from Home Depot’s records, as well as from Home Depot’s third-party administrator, Alight Solutions. 65. The Plan is a group health plan within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 1167(1). 66. The Corporate Home Depot Defendant is the plan sponsor and plan administrator of the Plan and was subject to the continuation of coverage and notice requirements of COBRA. 68. On account of such qualifying event, the Corporate Home Depot Defendant sent Plaintiff and the Class Members a deficient COBRA notice. 69. The COBRA notice that the Corporate Home Depot Defendant sent to Plaintiff and other Class Members violated 29 U.S.C. § 1166(a), 29 C.F.R. § 2590.606-4, and § 502(c) for the reasons set forth above. 70. These violations were material and willful. 71. The Corporate Home Depot Defendant knew that its notice was inconsistent with the Secretary of Labor’s Model Notice and failed to comply with 29 U.S.C. § 1166(a) and 29 C.F.R. § 2590.606-4, but chose to use a non-compliant notice in deliberate or reckless disregard of the rights of Plaintiff and other Class Members. 72. Here, to the extent the Corporate Home Depot Defendant denies it has liability to Plaintiffs, in the alternative Plaintiff pleads this count against the Administrative Committee Home Depot Defendant. 73. Plaintiff repeats and incorporates the allegations contained in the foregoing paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 74. The Plan is a group health plan within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 1167(1). 76. There is no Plan Administrator named in the COBRA notice. 77. This is particularly problematic, and confusing, because Home Depot’s Summary Plan Description identifies the Plan Administrator as, “The Administrative Committee Home Depot U.S.A., Inc.,” while Home Depot reported in its Department of Labor filings that the plan administrator is actually “Home Depot U.S.A., Inc.” 78. In fact, the confusion created by Home Depot’s naming of two separate entities as both serving as plan administrator forced Plaintiff to name both entities as defendants to this lawsuit, as pled in the alternative here. 79. Thus, Plaintiff brings this claim against the Administrative Committee Home Depot Defendant to ensure there is an entity with liability named in this lawsuit. 80. The potential penalty that Plaintiff seeks under ERISA § 502(c)(1) for the alleged notice deficiency likewise is imposed upon the “administrator” of a plan. 81. Under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c), “Any administrator (A) who fails to meet the requirements of paragraph (1) or (4) of section 1166 of this title, section 1021(e)(1) of this title, section 1021(f) of this title, or section 1025(a) of this title with respect to a participant or beneficiary 83. On account of such qualifying event, the Administrative Committee Home Depot Defendant caused to be sent Plaintiffs and the Class Members a deficient COBRA notice. 84. The COBRA notice that the Administrative Committee Home Depot Defendant sent to Plaintiff and other Class Members violated 29 U.S.C. § 1166(a), 29 C.F.R. § 2590.606-4, and § 502(c) for the reasons set forth in above. 85. These violations were material and willful. 86. The Administrative Committee Home Depot Defendant knew that its notice was inconsistent with the Secretary of Labor’s Model Notice and failed to comply with 29 U.S.C. § 1166(a) and 29 C.F.R. § 2590.606-4, but chose to use a non-compliant notice in deliberate or reckless disregard of the rights of Plaintiff and other Class Members. COBRA Notice Requirements

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2.0 guidelines; c. Regularly test user accessibility by blind or vision-impaired persons to ensure that Defendant’s Website complies under the WCAG 2.0 guidelines; and, d. Develop an accessibility policy that is clearly disclosed on Defendant’s Website, with contact information for users to report accessibility-related problems and require that any third party vendors who participate on its Website to be fully accessible to the disabled by conforming with WCAG 2.0 criteria. 28. Defendant offers the commercial website, WWW.ALFRED.EDU, to the public. The website offers features which should allow all consumers to access the services which Defendant offers in connection with their physical locations. The services offered by Defendant include, but are not limited to the following, which allow consumers to find information about: school location and hours, curriculum and programs of instruction, academic calendars, course and admission prerequisites, cost of tuition, available financial aid, career services, accreditation, faculty, campus security, transfer credits, textbooks, and other vital information needed by prospective students in order to make an informed decision about the Defendant’s school. 30. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient JAWS screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using the JAWS screen-reader. 31. Plaintiff, Jason Camacho, attended the NACAC college fair at Javits on Nov. 5, 2018 in order to obtain information from the college exhibitors presenting and marketing at the fair including the Defendant’s school. 32. Soon after attending the Javits fair, Mr. Camacho attempted to access the Defendant’s website in order to obtain additional information about the Defendant’s school but was thwarted in his efforts to do so due to the inaccessibility of the Defendant’s website as set forth herein. 35. The stated principles of NACAC members include “They strive to eliminate bias within the educational system based on …disability.”1 36. By its failure to provide a website that is accessible to the blind or vision impaired, Defendant, that is a member of NACAC, intentionally violated NACAC’s basic principles to eliminate bias toward the disabled as well as federal, state and city statutes and regulations designed to protect those members of society who are in need of protection by those various laws. 37. NACAC maintains a business relationship with the New York Daily News newspaper which publishes full page advertisements for the NACAC college fairs at Javits and an onsite guide to the exhibitors which is distributed free of charge to attendees at the college fairs. Exhibitors, such as the Defendant, may participate in the New York Daily News advertisements and/or advertise in the onsite guide. 39. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s Website, blind and visually- impaired customers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from accessing the Website. 40. These access barriers on Defendant’s Website have deterred Plaintiff from visiting Defendant’s school and enjoying the services offered by the Defendant equal to sighted individuals because: Plaintiff was unable to find information about: school location and hours, curriculum and programs of instruction, academic calendars, course and admission prerequisites, cost of tuition, available financial aid, career services, accreditation, faculty, campus security, transfer credits, textbooks, and other vital information needed by prospective students in order to make an informed decision about the Defendant’s school. Plaintiff intends to visit Defendant's school in the near future if he could access their website. 41. If the Website was equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 42. Through his attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 44. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 45. The ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks in this action. In relevant part, the ADA requires: In the case of violations of . . . this title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities . . . Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the . . . modification of a policy . . . 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 47. If the Website was accessible, Plaintiff and similarly situated blind and visually-impaired people could independently view service items, locate Defendant’s school, shop for and otherwise research related services available via the Website such as curriculum, financial aids, campus tours and other vital information. 49. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining its Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making their Website equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 50. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 51. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of services offered in Defendant’s physical locations and on its website, during the relevant statutory period. 52. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a New York State subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the State of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of services offered in Defendant’s physical locations and on its website, during the relevant statutory period. 54. Common questions of law and fact exist amongst Class, including: a. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “public accommodation” under the ADA; b. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “place or provider of public accommodation” under the NYSHRL or NYCHRL; c. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the ADA and the RA; and d. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the NYSHRL and the NYCHRL. 55. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class. The Class, similarly to the Plaintiff, are severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA, RA, NYSHRL and NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so it can be independently accessible to the Class. 57. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 58. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 59. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 60. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 62. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 63. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 64. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 66. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 67. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 68. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 69. Defendant’s physical exhibit locations are located in the State of New York and constitutes a public accommodation within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant. Defendant’s Website is a service that is heavily integrated with these physical locations and is a gateway thereto. 71. Defendant is violating N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with Defendant’s physical locations to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 72. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(i), unlawful discriminatory practice includes, among other things, “a refusal to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless such person can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations being offered or would result in an undue burden". 73. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(ii), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 75. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the State Sub-class on the basis of a disability in violation of the NYSHRL, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 76. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 77. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Defendant’s Website and its physical locations under § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the State Sub-Class Members will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 79. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 80. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 81. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 82. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 83. Plaintiff served notice thereof upon the attorney general as required by N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41. 84. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40 provides that “all persons within the jurisdiction of this state shall be entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of any places of public accommodations, resort or amusement, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons. No persons, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or employee of any such place shall directly or indirectly refuse, withhold from, or deny to any person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof . . .” 86. Defendant’s New York physical locations are public accommodations within the definition of N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant and its Website is a service that is heavily integrated with these establishments and is a gateway thereto. 87. Defendant is subject to New York Civil Rights Law because it owns and operates its physical locations and Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Civil Law § 40-c(2). 88. Defendant is violating N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with Defendant’s physical locations to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 89. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41 states that “any corporation which shall violate any of the provisions of sections forty, forty-a, forty-b or forty two . . . shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby . . .” 91. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 92. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability are being directly or indirectly refused, withheld from, or denied the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof in § 40 et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. 93. Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages of five hundred dollars per instance, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Civil Law § 40 et seq. for each and every offense. 94. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 95. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) provides “No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States … shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance….” 97. Defendant receives Federal financial assistance. 98. Defendant’s operations, including its website, is a program or activity within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 794. Defendant’s Barriers on Its Website VIOLATIONS OF THE NYSHRL VIOLATION OF THE NEW YORK STATE CIVIL RIGHTS LAW VIOLATIONS OF THE REHABILITATION ACT of 1973, §504 VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq.

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10. Under the terms of the plan, Anthem is required to authorize coverage for “covered services.” The plan’s definition of “covered services” is services, supplies or treatment as described in this Benefit Booklet which are performed, prescribed, directed or authorized by a Provider. To be a Covered Service, the service, supply or treatment must be: Medically Necessary or otherwise specifically included as a benefit under the Plan. Within the scope of the license of the Provider performing the service. Rendered while coverage under the Plan is in force. Not Experimental/Investigative or otherwise excluded or limited by this Benefit Booklet, or any amendment or rider thereto. (Att. A, p. M-94). 11. Medically necessary and medical necessity are, in turn, defined as “[a]n intervention that is or will be provided for the diagnosis, evaluation and treatment of a condition, illness, disease or injury and that is determined by [Anthem] to be: Medically appropriate for and consistent with the symptoms and proper diagnosis or treatment of the Member’s condition, illness, disease or injury; Obtained from a Provider; Provided in accordance with applicable medical and/or professional standards; Known to be effective, as proven by scientific evidence, in materially improving health outcomes; 4 The most appropriate supply, setting or level of service that can safely be provided to the Member and which cannot be omitted consistent with recognized professional standards of care (which, in the case of hospitalization, also means that safe and adequate care could not be obtained in a less comprehensive setting); Cost-effective compared to alternative interventions, including no intervention. Cost Effective does not always mean lowest cost. It does mean that as to the diagnosis or treatment of the Member’s illness, injury or disease, the service is: (1) not more costly than an alternative service or sequence of services that is medically appropriate, or (2) the service is performed in the least costly setting that is medically appropriate; Not Experimental/Investigative; Not primarily for the convenience of the Member, the Member’s family or the Provider. Not otherwise subject to an exclusion under this Benefit Booklet. (Id., M-96). 12. A Provider, in turn, is “[a] duly licensed person or facility that provides services within the scope of an applicable license and is a person or facility that the Plan approves.” This includes certified nurse midwives, home health care agencies, alcoholism treatment facilities, home infusion facilities, licensed professional counselors, occupational therapists, independent social workers, professional counselors, retail health clinics, skilled nursing facilities, and social workers. (Id., M- 98-101). 13. The plan specifically covers behavioral health benefits. (Id. at M-9, M- 11). 14. The plan specifically excludes “[c]are provided or billed by residential treatment centers or facilities, unless those centers or facilities are required to be covered under state law.” (Id. at M-46). 15. Plaintiff’s daughter, who is covered under her mother’s plan and is thus entitled to receive health insurance coverage based on the same plan language as her 5 mother’s, has struggled for years with mental health issues such as eating disorder, borderline personality and attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder. In July 2014, at the recommendation of her therapist, plaintiff’s daughter was sent to Vista Sage, a Utah- based licensed residential treatment center that specializes in the therapeutic treatment of adolescent women with comparable diagnoses. 16. While at Vista, T.N. received medically necessary mental health services, including psychiatric evaluation, individual therapy, group therapy and family therapy, all of which would have been authorized for coverage by Anthem if they had been delivered in another type of mental health setting. 17. Plaintiff paid $58,220 for services rendered at Vista from July through December 2014 and sought coverage. Her claims were denied by Anthem originally and on the first and second level appeals. In all cases, Anthem relied on the residential treatment exclusion discussed above. In no case did Anthem challenge the medical necessity of the services. The final denial was dated September 21, 2016. 18. Anthem’s residential treatment center exclusion violates the federal Parity Act. The Parity Act was “designed to end discrimination in the provision of coverage for mental health and substance use disorders as compared to medical and surgical conditions in employer-sponsored group health plans and health insurance coverage offered in connection with group health plans.” American Psychiatric Ass’n v. Anthem Health Plans, 50 F. Supp.3d 157, 160 (D. Conn. 2014). In relevant part, the Parity Act states: In the case of a group health plan (or health insurance coverage offered in connection with such a plan) that provides both medical and surgical benefits and mental health or substance use disorder benefits, such plan or coverage shall ensure that— 6 (ii) the treatment limitations applicable to such mental health or substance use disorder benefits are no more restrictive than the predominant treatment limitations applied to substantially all medical and surgical benefits covered by the plan (or coverage) and there are no separate treatment limitations that are applicable only with respect to mental health or substance use disorder benefits. 29 U.S.C. § 1185a(a)(3)(A)(ii). 19. The issue as to whether an insurer may lawfully deny all mental health treatment rendered at a residential treatment center was considered in Joseph & Gail F. v. Sinclair Servs. Co., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8644 (D. Utah Jan. 22, 2016). There the court found that such a blanket exclusion violated the Act: To be sure, the Parity Act does not require plans to provide mental health or substance use disorder benefits at all. But once a plan does provide such benefits, the plan must do so on a level that is on par with the benefits it provides for medical and surgical benefits. And once provided, the Parity Act prohibits imposing treatment limitations applicable only to mental health benefits. Further, although the Administrator argues that the exclusion applies across the board, there is no evidence to suggest that coverage for residential treatment would have been available for medical or surgical conditions but for the exclusion. Without evidence to that effect, the Administrator's argument that it would have also denied residential treatment benefits for medical or surgical conditions under the exclusion is illusory. The court concludes that the Plus Plan's residential treatment exclusion violates the Parity Act because the exclusion is a "separate treatment limitation[] that [is] applicable only with respect to mental health . . . benefits." Id. at *51. 20. Anthem’s plan violates the Parity Act in exactly the same manner. Its blanket exclusion for services rendered at wilderness treatment programs is a separate treatment limitation applicable only to mental health benefits and thus violative of the Parity Act. 21. Plaintiff’s ERISA-governed health plan incorporates the protection of the Parity Act through 29 U.S.C. § 1185a(a)(3)(A). 7 22. Plaintiff brings this lawsuit under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) on her own behalf and on behalf of the following class: All persons who are covered under any ERISA-governed contract or plan of health benefits administered, underwritten or insured by Anthem that provides coverage for behavioral or mental health care but that categorically excludes coverage for behavioral health services rendered at residential treatment centers. 23. Plaintiff brings this lawsuit under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) on her own behalf and on behalf of the following subclass: All persons who are covered under any ERISA-governed contract or plan of health benefits administered, underwritten or insured by Anthem that provides coverage for behavioral or mental health care and whose claims for coverage for behavioral health services rendered at residential treatment centers were denied because the contract or plan excluded such coverage. 24. Membership in the proposed class and subclass is so numerous that individual joinder of all class members is impracticable except by means of a class action. The disposition of the claims in a class action will benefit both the parties and the Court. The exact number of class members can be readily determined through discovery of Anthem’s business records. 25. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of all other class members. All class members’ claims are unified, as all are subject to Anthem’s residential treatment center exclusion, which violates the protections of the federal Parity Act. 26. Plaintiff’s interests are coincident with, and not antagonistic to, those of the other members of the class and the sub-class. Plaintiff is a member of both the class and the subclass. 8 27. Plaintiff will adequately represent both the class and the subclass because she has interests in common with the proposed class members and plaintiff has retained attorneys who are experienced in class action litigation. 28. There is a well-defined community of interest in the questions of law and fact involving and affecting the class and the sub-class to be represented by plaintiff. Common questions of law and/or fact predominate over any questions affecting only individual members of the class. Common questions include, but are not limited to, the following: a. Whether Anthem’s blanket exclusion of coverage for services at residential treatment centers violate the Parity Act? b. If Anthem’s acts violate the Parity Act, what is the appropriate remedy? c. What is the appropriate measure of relief? 29. The prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the class and the sub-class would create a risk of: a. Inconsistent or varying adjudications concerning individual members of the class and/or subclass that would establish incompatible standards of conduct for Anthem opposing the class; and b. Adjudication with respect to individual members of the class and sub-class that would, as a practical matter, be dispositive of the interests of other members not parties to such adjudications, and/or substantially impair or impede the ability of other non-party class members to protect such individual interests. 30. The class action method is appropriate for the fair and efficient prosecution of this action. 31. Individual litigation of all claims that might be asserted by all members of the class and the sub-class would produce such a multiplicity of cases that the judicial system, having jurisdiction of the claims, would remain congested for years. Class 9 treatment, by contrast, provides manageable judicial treatment calculated to bring a rapid conclusion to all litigation of all claims arising out of the conduct of Anthem. 32. The certification of the above class and subclass would allow litigation of claims that, in view of the expense of the litigation, may be an insufficient amount to support separate actions. A. Coverage

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(42 U.S.C. § 1983 – Wrongful Incarceration) (Plaintiff against defendants Riverside County, RCSD and Does) (42 U.S.C. § 1983 – Wrongful Incarceration/Fourth Amendment) (Plaintiff, individually and as class representative, against defendants LASD, LA County, Baca and Does) (42 U.S.C. § 1983 – Damages – Fourth Amendment Particularity) (Plaintiff, individually and as class representative, against defendants LASD, LA County, Baca and Does) (42 U.S.C. § 1983 – Wrongful Incarceration/Fourteenth Amendment) (Plaintiff, individually and as class representative, against defendants LASD, LA County, Baca and Does) (Cal. Const., Art. I § 13 – Wrongful Incarceration) (Plaintiff, individually and as class representative, against defendants LASD and LA County) (Cal. Const., Art. I § 13 – Wrongful Incarceration) (Plaintiff as against defendants Riverside County and RCSD) (False Imprisonment) (Plaintiff, individually and as class representative, against defendants Riverside County and RCSD) (False Imprisonment) (Plaintiff, individually and as class representative, against defendants LA County and LASD) ) DEPT.; COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES; LOS � ) ANGELES CO. SHERIFF’S DEPT.; LEE BACA, in � ) both his personal and individual capacit 5 0’44 � ) yccJ � c4v � C cpC/X\Si 34. Plaintiff brings this action on his own behalf, and on behalf of the class of all other persons similarly situated, pursuant to Rule 23, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 35. There is a “Particularity Class” under F.R.Cv.Proc. 23(b)(3), defined as follows: A. Booked into an LASD jail at any time on or after November 26, 2010, through the present, based on one or more Los Angeles court bench warrants entered in CWS; and B. Was released because it was determined that the person was not the subject of the CWS warrant(s); and C. The CWS warrant information did not include the warrant subject’s CII number even though at the time of creation of the CWS warrant entry, LA County personnel had actual knowledge of the warrant subject’s CII number. 36.Thereisa“WrongfulIncarcerationClass”underF.R.Cv.Proc.23(b)(3),defined as follows: A. Booked into an LASD jail at any time on or after November 26, 2010, through the present, based on one or more Los Angeles court bench warrants entered in CWS; and B. Was released because it was determined that the person was not the subject of the CWS warrant(s); and C. LASD personnel had actual knowledge that the warrant subject’s CII number did not match to the CII number of the person booked on the warrant or LASDpersonnel had actual knowledge that the warrant subject’s LAMainnumber did not match to the LA Main number of the person booked on the warrant 44. On November 18, 1994, in People v. Mario Loya Garcia, LA Superior Court No. BA096224-01, the court issued a no-bail felony bench warrant for the arrest of one Mario Loya Garcia (“suspect Garcia”) who is not the Plaintiff. The warrant charged violations of Cal. Health & Safety Code § 11351 (possession for sale) and Cal. Penal Code § 1203.2 (violation of probation). Per the procedure described above, LA County personnel created a bench warrant record in CWS. LA County personnel also created an entry in WPS alerting agencies outside of Los Angeles County to the existence of the suspect Garcia warrant. 59. Plaintiff restates and incorporates by reference the foregoing paragraphs as if each paragraph was fully set forth herein. 60. Plaintiff brings this cause of action on his own behalf and in his representative capacity for the Particularity Class. 61. The conduct complained occurred because of policies, practices and customs of LA County and LASD, approved and/or ratified by Baca, by which Plaintiff means these defendants do not require that even thoughactuallyknowntoLACountypersonnel, CII numbers and other unique identifiers are not inputted into WPS and CWS. Had the unique fingerprint-matched identifiers CII and LA Main numbers of which defendants’ personnel had knowledge been inputted into CWS and WPS, Plaintiff and the members of the Particularity Class would not have been booked and incarcerated in the LA County jail. 62. The imprisonments of Plaintiff and class members onwarrants meant for others were proximately caused by the violation of the particularity clause of the Fourth Amendment, thereby entitling Plaintiff and the Particularity Class members to recover compensatory damages for their respective wrongful imprisonments. 64. Plaintiff restates and incorporates by reference the foregoing paragraphs as if each paragraph was fully set forth herein. 65. Plaintiff brings this cause of action on his own behalf and in his representative capacity for the Wrongful Incarceration Class. 66. The imprisonments of Plaintiff and Wrongful Incarceration Class members on warrants meant for others, violated their Fourth Amendment rights in that as alleged above, official and reliable law enforcement information, including reliable fingerprint- matched identifiers and other information to which had or which they had easy access with virtually no appreciable effort or cost, excluded Plaintiff and class members as the subjects of the warrants on which they were incarcerated. Therefore, Plaintiff and the class he represents, are entitled to recover damages for the wrongful imprisonments. 67. Defendants LA County, LASD and Baca are liable because the wrongful acts were pursuant to policies, practices and/or customs described above, approved and/or ratified by Baca. 68. Plaintiff restates and incorporates by reference the foregoing paragraphs as if each paragraph was fully set forth herein. 72. Plaintiff restates and incorporates by reference the foregoing paragraphs as if each paragraph was fully set forth herein. 73. Plaintiff brings this cause of action on his own behalf and in his representative capacity for the Particularity and Wrongful Incarceration Classes. 76. Plaintiff restates and incorporates by reference the foregoing paragraphs as if each paragraph was fully set forth herein. 77. Plaintiff brings this cause of action on his own behalf and in his representative capacity for the Particularity and Wrongful Incarceration Classes. 78. The wrongful imprisonments of Plaintiff and the Classes on warrants meant for another,constituted falseimprisonment,therebyentitlingPlaintiffandtheClassmembers to recover compensatory damages for their wrongful imprisonments. Sullivan v. County of Los Angeles, 12 Cal.3d 710 (1974). 79. Plaintiff restates and incorporates by reference the foregoing paragraphs as if each paragraph was fully set forth herein. 82. Plaintiff restates and incorporates by reference the foregoing paragraphs as if each paragraph was fully set forth herein. 83. The booking and imprisonment of Plaintiff in the Riverside County jail on the suspect Garcia no-bail felony warrant violated Plaintiff’s rights protected under Art. I § 13 of the California constitution, in that as alleged above, official and reliable law enforcement information, including reliable fingerprint-matched identifiers and other information to which had or which they had easy access with virtually no appreciable effort or cost, excluded Plaintiff as the subject of the warrant. Therefore, Plaintiff is entitled to recover damages from defendants Riverside County and RCSD for the wrongful imprisonment, including compensation for the time incarcerated in the LA County jail since that incarceration was proximately caused by the booking on the felony warrant in the Riverside County jail. 85. Plaintiff restates and incorporates by reference the foregoing paragraphs as if each paragraph was fully set forth herein. 86. The wrongful imprisonment of Plaintiff on the suspect Garcia no-bail felony warrant, constituted false imprisonment, thereby entitling Plaintiff to recover compensatory damages from defendants Riverside County and RCSD for the wrongful imprisonments in both the LA County and Riverside County jails. Sullivan v. County of Los Angeles, 12 Cal.3d 710 (1974). A. Biometric Identifiers Matched To Fingerprints. A. Biometric Identifiers Matched To Fingerprints. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 CII numbers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 FBI numbers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 LA Main numbers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 B. Livescan. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 C. Warrant Databases. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 D. CWS (County Warrant System). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 E. WPS (Wanted Person System). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 F. Criminal Histories. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 V. VI. FACTS RE PLAINTIFF’S ARREST/INCARCERATION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION (42 U.S.C. § 1983 – Damages – Fourth Amendment Particularity) . . . . . . . . . 20

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15. In or around March 2014, Defendant began placing calls to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number, 514-xxx-2718. 16. Defendant placed the calls to Plaintiff from number 800-355-5443. 17. When answering Defendant’s calls, Plaintiff heard a prerecorded message indicating that Defendant was attempting to reach a person other than Plaintiff (the “Debtor”). Plaintiff does not know the Debtor. 18. Defendant obtained Plaintiff’s telephone number by buying it from third party sources. 19. At no time did Plaintiff ever provide her cellular phone number to Defendant. 20. At no time did Plaintiff ever enter into a business relationship with Defendant. 21. At no time did Plaintiff provide Defendant with prior written consent allowing it to call her cellular phone. 23. Defendant employs an ATDS which meets the definition set forth in 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1), and used its ATDS to make each of the aforementioned calls to Plaintiff on her cellular phone. 24. Defendant’s calls to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone were not for “emergency purposes.” 25. 26. Plaintiff brings this case as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated. 27. Plaintiff represents, and is a member of the following class: All persons within the United States who received any telephone calls from Defendant or their agent(s) and/or employee(s) to said person’s cellular telephone made through the use of any automatic telephone dialing system and/or using an artificial or prerecorded voice within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint where the Defendant obtained the cellular telephone number from a source other than the called party. 28. Defendant and its employees or agents are excluded from the Class. Plaintiff does not know the number of members in the Class, but believes the Class members number in the several thousands, if not more. Thus, this matter should be certified as a class action to assist in the expeditious litigation of this matter. 30. Upon information and belief, Defendant has placed automated calls to cellular telephone numbers belonging to thousands of consumers throughout the United States without their prior express consent. The members of the Class, therefore, are believed to be so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. 31. The exact number and identities of the Class members are unknown at this time and can only be ascertained through discovery. Identification of the Class members is a matter capable of ministerial determination from Defendant’s call records. C. Common Questions of Law and Fact 32. There are questions of law and fact common to the Class that predominate over any questions affecting only individual Class members. These questions include: a. Whether Defendant made non-emergency calls to Plaintiff and Class members’ cellular telephones using an ATDS; b. Whether Defendant can meet its burden of showing it obtained prior express consent to make each call; c. Whether Defendant’s conduct was knowing willful, and/or negligent; d. Whether Defendant is liable for damages, and the amount of such damages; and e. Whether Defendant should be enjoined from such conduct in the future. 34. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the Class members, as they are all based on the same factual and legal theories. E. Protecting the Interests of the Class Members 35. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class and has retained counsel experienced in handling class actions and claims involving unlawful business practices. Neither Plaintiff nor her counsel has any interests which might cause them not to vigorously pursue this action. F. Proceeding Via Class Action is Superior and Advisable 36. A class action is the superior method for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. The interest of Class members in individually controlling the prosecutions of separate claims against GE is small because it is not economically feasible for Class members to bring individual actions. 38. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the above paragraphs of this Complaint and incorporates them herein by reference. 39. Defendant negligently placed multiple automated calls to cellular numbers belonging to Plaintiff and the other members of the Class without their prior express consent. 40. Each of the aforementioned calls by Defendant constitutes a negligent violation of the TCPA. 41. As a result of Defendant’s negligent violations of the TCPA, Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to an award of $500.00 in statutory damages for each call in violation of the TCPA pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). 42. Additionally, Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to and seek injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct by Defendant in the future. 43. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the above paragraphs of this Complaint and incorporates them herein by reference. 44. Defendant knowingly and/or willfully placed multiple automated calls to cellular numbers belonging to Plaintiff and the other members of the Class without their prior express consent. 45. Each of the aforementioned calls by Defendant constitutes a knowing and/or willful violation of the TCPA. 47. Additionally, Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to and seek injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct by Defendant in the future. A. The Class Dated: May �, 2014 JODIE GOWAN, By /s/ Sergei Lemberg Sergei Lemberg, Esq. Knowing and/or Willful Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq. Negligent Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq.

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14. Plaintiff brings this action as a class action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) and (b)(3) on behalf of a Class, consisting of all those who purchased or otherwise acquired securities of Royal Caribbean between January 27, 2011 and July 28, 2011, inclusive (the “Class”) and who were damaged thereby. Excluded from the Class are defendants, the officers and directors of the Company, at all relevant times, members of their immediate families and their legal representatives, heirs, successors or assigns and any entity in which defendants have or had a controlling interest. 16. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the members of the Class as all members of the Class are similarly affected by defendants’ wrongful conduct in violation of federal law that is complained of herein. 17. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the members of the Class and has retained counsel competent and experienced in class and securities litigation. 19. A class action is superior to all other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy since joinder of all members is impracticable. Furthermore, as the damages suffered by individual Class members may be relatively small, the expense and burden of individual litigation make it impossible for members of the Class to individually redress the wrongs done to them. There will be no difficulty in the management of this action as a class action. 22. In addition to the foregoing, the January 27, 2011 release also quoted defendant Fain, in part, as follows: "These improved results reflect the strong reception our new ships have received along with the solid branding our different cruise brands have enjoyed," said Richard D. Fain, chairman and chief executive officer. Fain continued, "WAVE is off to a solid start and supports our earlier confidence in meaningful pricing recovery and record financial performance in 2011." [Emphasis added.] 23. Following the publication of the January 27, 2011 release, shares of the Company traded at prices artificially inflated by defendants’ false and misleading statements. Taking advantage of this artificial inflation in the price of Company shares, defendant Fain immediately liquidated over $9 million of his personally held Royal Caribbean shares. 25. Certifications. In addition to the foregoing, the Company’s 2010 Form 10-K also contained certifications by defendants Rice and Fain, that attested to the purported accuracy and completeness of the Company’s financial and operational reports, as follows: 56. Defendants were motivated to materially misrepresent to the SEC and investors the true financial condition of the Company because: (i) it deceived the investing public regarding Royal Caribbean ’s business, operations, management and the intrinsic value of Royal Caribbean securities; (ii) it enabled defendants to artificially inflate the price of Royal Caribbean shares; (iii) it enabled Royal Caribbean insiders to sell tens of millions of dollars of their privately held Royal Caribbean shares while in possession of material adverse non-public information about the Company; and (iv) it caused plaintiff and other members of the Class to purchase Royal Caribbean securities at artificially inflated prices. Applicability Of Presumption Of Reliance: Fraud-On-The-Market Doctrine 58. As a result of the foregoing, the market for Royal Caribbean securities promptly digested current information regarding Royal Caribbean from all publicly available sources and reflected such information in Royal Caribbean stock price. Under these circumstances, all purchasers of Royal Caribbean securities during the Class Period suffered similar injury through their purchase of Royal Caribbean securities at artificially inflated prices and a presumption of reliance applies. 60. Plaintiff has alleged the following based upon the investigation of plaintiff’s counsel, which included a review of SEC filings by Royal Caribbean, as well as regulatory filings and reports, securities analysts’ reports and advisories about the Company, press releases and other public statements issued by the Company, and media reports about the Company, and plaintiff believes that substantial additional evidentiary support will exist for the allegations set forth herein after a reasonable opportunity for discovery. 61. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained above as if fully set forth herein. 63. Defendants (a) employed devices, schemes, and artifices to defraud; (b) made untrue statements of material fact and/or omitted to state material facts necessary to make the statements not misleading; and (c) engaged in acts, practices, and a course of business which operated as a fraud and deceit upon the purchasers of the Company’s securities in an effort to maintain artificially high market prices for Royal Caribbean ’s securities in violation of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5. All defendants are sued either as primary participants in the wrongful and illegal conduct charged herein or as controlling persons as alleged below. 64. Defendants, individually and in concert, directly and indirectly, by the use, means or instrumentalities of interstate commerce and/or of the mails, engaged and participated in a continuous course of conduct to conceal adverse material information about the business, operations and future prospects of Royal Caribbean as specified herein. 66. Each of the Individual Defendants’ primary liability, and controlling person liability, arises from the following facts: (i) the Individual Defendants were high-level executives and/or directors at the Company during the Class Period and members of the Company’s management team or had control thereof; (ii) each of these defendants, by virtue of his responsibilities and activities as a senior officer and/or director of the Company was privy to and participated in the creation, development and reporting of the Company’s internal budgets, plans, projections and/or reports; (iii) each of these defendants enjoyed significant personal contact and familiarity with the other defendants and was advised of and had access to other members of the Company’s management team, internal reports and other data and information about the Company’s finances, operations, and sales at all relevant times; and (iv) each of these defendants was aware of the Company’s dissemination of information to the investing public which they knew or recklessly disregarded was materially false and misleading. 68. As a result of the dissemination of the materially false and misleading information and failure to disclose material facts, as set forth above, the market price of Royal Caribbean securities was artificially inflated during the Class Period. In ignorance of the fact that market prices of Royal Caribbean ’s publicly-traded securities were artificially inflated, and relying directly or indirectly on the false and misleading statements made by defendants, or upon the integrity of the market in which the securities trade, and/or on the absence of material adverse information that was known to or recklessly disregarded by defendants but not disclosed in public statements by defendants during the Class Period, plaintiff and the other members of the Class acquired Royal Caribbean securities during the Class Period at artificially high prices and were damaged thereby. 69. At the time of said misrepresentations and omissions, plaintiff and other members of the Class were ignorant of their falsity, and believed them to be true. Had plaintiff and the other members of the Class and the marketplace known the truth regarding the problems that Royal Caribbean was experiencing, which were not disclosed by defendants, plaintiff and other members of the Class would not have purchased or otherwise acquired their Royal Caribbean securities, or, if they had acquired such securities during the Class Period, they would not have done so at the artificially inflated prices which they paid. 70. By virtue of the foregoing, defendants have violated Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder. 72. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained above as if fully set forth herein. 73. The Individual Defendants acted as controlling persons of Royal Caribbean within the meaning of Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act as alleged herein. By virtue of their high-level positions, and their ownership and contractual rights, participation in and/or awareness of the Company’s operations and/or intimate knowledge of the false financial statements filed by the Company with the SEC and disseminated to the investing public, the Individual Defendants had the power to influence and control and did influence and control, directly or indirectly, the decision-making of the Company, including the content and dissemination of the various statements which plaintiff contends are false and misleading. The Individual Defendants were provided with or had unlimited access to copies of the Company’s reports, press releases, public filings and other statements alleged by plaintiff to be misleading prior to and/or shortly after these statements were issued and had the ability to prevent the issuance of the statements or cause the statements to be corrected. 74. In particular, each of these defendants had direct and supervisory involvement in the day-to-day operations of the Company and, therefore, is presumed to have had the power to control or influence the particular transactions giving rise to the securities violations as alleged herein, and exercised the same. Defendants’ Materially False and Misleading Statements Made During the Class Period Violation Of Section 20(a) Of The Exchange Act Against Individual Defendants Violation Of Section 10(b) Of The Exchange Act And Rule 10b-5 Promulgated Thereunder Against All Defendants

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13. The front labels of the Products represent that the product has “No preservatives when it actually contains the preservative citric acid. 14. Citric acid is a preservative as the term is defined by the FDA in 21 C.F.R. § 101.22(a)(5): “The term chemical preservative means any chemical that, when added to food, tends to prevent or retard deterioration thereof, but does not include common salt, sugars, vinegars, spices, oils extracted from spices, substances added to food by direct exposure thereof to wood smoke, or chemicals applied for their insecticidal or herbicidal properties.” 15. The MacMillan Dictionary defines “tends” as “to usually do a particular thing,” as in “He tends to exaggerate” or “The gym tends to get very busy at around six o’clock.”1 The scientific evidence and FDA statements cited below establish that citric acid tends to prevent or retard the deterioration of food. This remains the case regardless of the subjective purpose for 1 http://www.macmillandictionary.com/us/dictionary/american/tend (last accessed 07/05/2017)2 http://www.fbcindustries.com/Citric_Acid.aspx (last accessed 07/05/2017) 8 which this substance is added to the Product. Citric acid does not fall into any of the regulatory exemptions from the definition of a preservative. 16. The FDA expressly classifies citric acid as a preservative in its Overview of Food Ingredients, Additives, and Colors, on the FDA website: Types of Ingredients What They Do Examples of Uses Names Found on Product Labels Preservatives Prevent food spoilage from bacteria, molds, fungi, or yeast (antimicrobials); slow or prevent changes in color, flavor, or texture and delay rancidity (antioxidants); maintain freshness Fruit sauces and jellies, beverages, baked goods, cured meats, oils and margarines, cereals, dressings, snack foods, fruits and vegetables Ascorbic acid, citric acid, sodium benzoate, calcium propionate, sodium erythorbate, sodium nitrite, calcium sorbate, potassium sorbate, BHA, BHT, EDTA, tocopherols (Vitamin E) http://www.fda.gov/Food/IngredientsPackagingLabeling/FoodAdditivesIngredients/ucm094211.htm. (last accessed 07/05/2017) 17. The FDA’s classification of citric acid as a preservative is further confirmed by its Warning Letter, dated October 6, 2010, to the manufacturer of the Chiquita brand "Pineapple Bites with Coconut" and "Pineapple Bites": “The ‘Pineapple Bites’ and ‘Pineapple Bites with Coconut’ products are further misbranded within the meaning of section 403(k) of the Act [21 U.S.C. 343(k)] in that they contain the chemical preservative ascorbic acid and citric acid but their labels fail to declare these preservatives with a description of their functions. 21 CFR 101.22.” See EXHIBIT A, FDA Warning Letter dated October 6, 2010 (emphasis added). 18. Citric acid’s status as a preservative is also acknowledged by insiders in the preservative manufacturing and distribution industries. FBC Industries, Inc., a manufacturer and 9 supplier of FCC grade citric acid additives, acidulants, buffering agents and preservatives for the food and beverage industry describes citric acid’s function: “Citric acid is the most commonly used acidulant in the industry. As a food additive or food grade product, citric acid is used as a flavoring and preservative. The buffering properties of citrates are used to control pH and flavor.”2 Plaintiff’s Claims Are Not Preempted By The FDCA 19. Plaintiff’s claims are not preempted by the FDCA because the definition of “preservative” as used herein is identical with that of the FDA (see above). Moreover, FDA regulations specifically note that claims like “contains no preservatives” are non-nutritive claims that are not governed by 21 C.F.R. § 101.13. See 21 C.F.R. § 101.65(b)(2). Since the FDA has not issued specific standards governing when “No Preservative” claims are either true or false, such representations fall outside the ambit of FDA regulations. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claim cannot possibly be preempted. See Bimont v. Unilever U.S., Inc., No. 14-CV-7749 (JPO), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119908, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 9, 2015) (“preemption does not preclude a state- law claim if the state requirement is outside the scope of the relevant federal requirements”). Defendant’s Misrepresentations Are Material To A Reasonable Consumer And Relied Upon By Plaintiff And The Class 20. Plaintiff and Class members reasonably relied on Defendant’s representations that the Product is free of preservatives. 21. Defendant’s “No Preservatives” misrepresentation would deceive a reasonable consumer. 22. At the point of sale, Plaintiff and Class members did not know, and had no reason to know, that the Product is misbranded as set forth herein, and would not have bought the Product 2 http://www.fbcindustries.com/Citric_Acid.aspx (last accessed 07/05/2017) 10 had they known the truth about it. “Misleading” is judged in reference to “the ignorant, the unthinking and the credulous who, when making a purchase, do not stop to analyze.” United States v. El-O-Pathic Pharmacy, 192 F.2d 62, 75 (9th Cir. 1951). A representation that a product has “No Preservatives” is material to a reasonable consumer when deciding to purchase it. Plaintiff did, and a reasonable consumer would, attach importance to whether Defendant’s Product has “No Preservatives” because it is common knowledge that consumers prefer to avoid foods with potentially unhealthy additives (see consumer behavior research below). Defendant Has An Intent To Mislead 23. Defendant would not have included the representation on the front label of the Product if it was not going to influence consumer behavior. 24. By representing that the Product has “No Preservatives”, Defendant seeks to capitalize on consumers’ preference for less processed foods with fewer additives and the association between such products and a wholesome way of life. Consumers are willing to pay more for less processed products with no additives because of this association, as well as the perceived higher quality, health, and safety benefits associated with products labeled as being free of preservatives. 25. The marketing research firm Mintel reports that more and more Americans are concerned to avoid food containing preservatives: Foods bearing “free-from” claims are increasingly relevant to Americans, as they perceive the products as closely tied to health. New research from Mintel reveals that 84 percent of American free-from consumers buy free-from foods because they are seeking out more natural or less processed foods. In fact, 43 percent of consumers agree that free-from foods are healthier than foods without a free-from claim, while another three in five believe the fewer ingredients a product has, the healthier it is (59 percent). 11 Among the top claims free-from consumers deem most important are trans-fat-free (78 percent) and preservative-free (71 percent).3 26. And alternet.org reports research showing that most Americans are prepared to pay a premium price for such healthier options: Not only are consumers increasingly seeking out wholesome foods, they are willing to pay a premium for them. According to Nielsen’s 2015 Global Health & Wellness Survey that polled over 30,000 people online, 88 percent of Americans are willing to pay more for healthier foods. Global sales of healthy food products are estimated to reach $1 trillion by 2017, according to Euromonitor. When it comes to what consumers will be seeking out more of over the coming year, it may amount to single word. “Just think of the word no," Seifer said. "No preservatives, no additives, no growth hormones."4 27. Given these trends, Defendant has a natural interest in misrepresenting its’ Product as free of preservatives despite the presence of citric acid. The Product’s misrepresentation provides a clear marketing advantage over competitors that do not engage in such deceptive conduct. 28. Defendant’s intent to mislead is proven by the labeling of its’ very own 8 oz. Inglehoffer® Original Stone Ground Mustard in the glass jar (herein “comparison mustard”), shown below. The comparison mustard is the exact same mustard as the Product, with the exact same name and the exact same ingredients: 3 http://www.mintel.com/press-centre/food-and-drink/84-of-americans-buy-free-from-foods- because-they-believe-them-to-be-more-natural-or-less-processed (last accessed 07/05/2017) 4 http://www.alternet.org/food/8-food-trends-watch-2016 (last accessed 07/05/2017) 12 13 29. Defendant’s comparison mustard rightfully does not bare the “No Preservatives” misrepresentation given that it contains citric acid. The comparison mustard shows that Defendant knows how to properly label its other Product, and therefore intends to mislead consumers with the Product in order to boost sales. 30. Defendant knows that its’ “No Preservatives” representation is false, and intends that they be relied upon by Plaintiff and the Class. Upon information and belief, Defendant employs food scientists who are familiar with the basic properties of citric acid. 14 Plaintiff and the Class Were Injured As The Result Of Defendant’s Deceptive Practices 31. Plaintiff and the Class were injured when Defendant denied them the full benefit of their bargain. They paid money for a Product that was represented to them as preservative-free, and then received a Product that was preservative-laden, which has significantly less value. Plaintiff and the Class were thus deprived of the benefit of their bargain. They would not have purchased the Product, or would only have been willing to pay less for it, had they known the truth. They were injured in an amount up to the purchase price, the difference between the actual value of the Product and the value of the Product as misrepresented to them by Defendant, to be determined by expert testimony at trial. Defendant’s very inclusion of “No Preservatives” on the Product’s front labels is an acknowledgment that this increases the Products’ perceived value. See Orlander v. Staples, Inc., 802 F.3d 289, 302 (2d Cir. 2015) (“the issue of ‘price premium’ was relevant because it showed that plaintiffs paid more than they would have for the good but for the deceptive practices of the defendant-sellers”); Kacocha v. Nestle Purina Petcare Co., No. 15-CV- 5489 (KMK), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107097, at *51-52 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 2016) (“[I]n his Complaint, Plaintiff seeks monetary damages on the grounds that he ‘would not have paid the premium price he paid’ to buy the Products had he ‘known the truth.’…Case law makes clear that this is sufficient at the motion-to-dismiss phase for a § 349 claim to survive.”); Koenig v. Boulder Brands, Inc., 995 FSupp. 2d 274, 288-89 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (Plaintiffs claim that, but for Defendants' "unfair and deceptive practices," they—and the putative class—would not have purchased, or paid a price premium for, Smart Balance. Compl. ¶¶ 7, 81. Indeed, Plaintiffs claim that they paid price premiums specifically ‘based on Defendants' misrepresentations,’ and allege that they deserve damages in the amount of either the purchase prices, or the price premiums, that 15 they paid for Smart Balance. Id. ¶ 81. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have adequately alleged injury under GBL § 349…”) 32. Plaintiff QUIROZ brings this action as a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of the following class (the “Nationwide Class”): All persons or entities in the United States who made retail purchases of the Products in the United States during the applicable limitations period for personal consumption and not resale, and/or such subclasses as the Court may deem appropriate. (the “Nationwide Class”) In the alternative, Plaintiff QUIROZ seeks to represent a class consisting of the following subclass: All persons or entities in New York who made retail purchases of the Products in New York during the applicable limitations period for personal consumption and not resale, and/or such subclasses as the Court may deem appropriate. (the “New York Class”) 33. The proposed Classes exclude current and former officers and directors of Defendant, members of the immediate families of the officers and directors of Defendant, Defendant’s legal representatives, heirs, successors, assigns, and any entity in which they have or have had a controlling interest, and the judicial officer to whom this lawsuit is assigned. 34. Plaintiff reserves the right to revise the Class definition based on facts learned in the course of litigating this matter. 35. This action is proper for class treatment under Rules 23(b)(1)(B) and 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. While the exact number and identities of other Class members are unknown to Plaintiff at this time, Plaintiff is informed and believes that there are thousands of Class members. The Classes are so numerous that individual joinder of all Class members is impracticable. 16 36. Common questions of law and fact arise from Defendant’s conduct described herein. Such questions are common to all Class members and predominate over any questions affecting only individual Class members. These include: a. whether labeling “No Preservatives” on Products containing citric acid is false and misleading; b. whether Defendant engages in a marketing practice intended to deceive consumers by labeling “No Preservatives” on a Product containing citric acid; c. whether Defendant deprived Plaintiff and the Classes of the benefit of their bargain because the Product purchased is different than what Defendant warranted; d. whether Defendant deprived Plaintiff and the Classes of the benefit of their bargain because the Product they purchased had less value than what was represented by Defendant; e. whether Defendant caused Plaintiff and the Classes to purchase a substance that was other than what was represented by Defendant; f. whether Defendant has been unjustly enriched at the expense of the Plaintiff and other Class members by its misconduct; g. whether Defendant must disgorge any and all profits they have made as a result of its misconduct; and h. whether Defendant should be barred from marketing the Product as having “No Preservatives.” 37. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of those of the Class members because Plaintiff and the other Class members sustained damages arising out of the same wrongful conduct, as detailed herein. Plaintiff purchased Defendant’s Products and sustained similar injuries arising out of 17 Defendant’s conduct in violation of the law. Defendant’s unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent actions concern the same business practices described herein irrespective of where they occurred or were experienced. The injuries of the Classes are caused directly by Defendant’s wrongful misconduct. In addition, the factual underpinning of Defendant’s misconduct is common to all Class members, and represents a common thread of misconduct resulting in injury to all members of the Classes. Plaintiff’s claims arise from the same practices and course of conduct that give rise to the claims of the members of the Classes and are based on the same legal theories. 38. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and pursue the interests of the Classes. Plaintiff understands the nature of her claims herein, has no disqualifying conditions, and will vigorously represent the interests of the Classes. Neither Plaintiff nor Plaintiff’s counsel have any interests that conflict with or are antagonistic to the interests of the Classes. Plaintiff has retained highly competent and experienced class action attorneys to represent her interests and those of the Classes. Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s counsel have the necessary financial resources to adequately and vigorously litigate this class action, and Plaintiff and counsel are aware of their fiduciary responsibilities to the Classes and will diligently discharge those duties by vigorously seeking the maximum possible recovery for the Classes. 39. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. The damages suffered by any individual class member are too small to make it economically feasible for an individual class member to prosecute a separate action, and it is desirable for judicial efficiency to concentrate the litigation of the claims in this forum. Furthermore, the adjudication of this controversy through a class action will avoid the potentially inconsistent and conflicting adjudications of the claims asserted herein. There will be no difficulty in the management of this action as a class action. 18 40. The prerequisites to maintaining a class action for injunctive relief or equitable relief pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2) are met, as Defendant has acted or refuses to act on grounds generally applicable to the Classes, thereby making appropriate final injunctive or equitable relief with respect to the Classes as a whole. 41. The prerequisites to maintaining a class action for injunctive relief or equitable relief pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3) are met, as questions of law or fact common to the Classes predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy. 42. The prosecution of separate actions by members of the Classes would create a risk of establishing inconsistent rulings and/or incompatible standards of conduct for Defendant. Additionally, individual actions may be dispositive of the interest of all members of the Classes, although certain Class members are not parties to such actions. 43. Defendant’s conduct is generally applicable to the Classes as a whole and Plaintiff seeks, inter alia, equitable remedies with respect to the Classes as a whole. As such, Defendant’s systematic policies and practices make declaratory relief with respect to the Classes as a whole appropriate. 19 44. Plaintiff QUIROZ realleges and incorporates herein by reference the allegations contained in all preceding paragraphs, and further alleges as follows: 45. Plaintiff QUIROZ brings this claim on behalf of herself and the other members of the Nationwide Class for an injunction for violations of New York’s Deceptive Acts or Practices Law (“NY GBL§ 349”). 46. Alternatively, should the Court not certify Plaintiff’s proposed Nationwide Class, Plaintiff QUIROZ brings this claim individually and on behalf of the members of the New York Class for an injunction for violations of New York’s Deceptive Acts or Practices Law (“NY GBL § 349”). 47. NY GBL § 349 provides that “deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any business, trade or commerce or in the furnishing of any service in this state are . . . unlawful.” 48. Under the NY GBL § 349, it is not necessary to prove justifiable reliance. (“To the extent that the Appellate Division order imposed a reliance requirement on General Business Law [§] 349 … claims, it was error. Justifiable reliance by the plaintiff is not an element of the statutory claim.” Koch v. Acker, Merrall & Condit Co., 18 N.Y.3d 940, 941 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012) (internal citations omitted)). 20 49. Any person who has been injured by reason of any violation of the NY GBL § 349 may bring an action in their own name to enjoin such unlawful act or practice, an action to recover their actual damages or fifty dollars, whichever is greater, or both such actions. The court may, in its discretion, increase the award of damages to an amount not to exceed three times the actual damages up to one thousand dollars, if the court finds the Defendant willfully or knowingly violated this section. The court may award reasonable attorney's fees to a prevailing plaintiff. 50. The practices employed by Defendant, whereby Defendant advertises, promotes, and markets that its Product contains “No Preservatives” are unfair, deceptive, and misleading and are in violation of the NY GBL § 349. 51. The foregoing deceptive acts and practices are directed at consumers. 52. Defendant should be enjoined from marketing its products as containing “No Preservatives” as described above pursuant to NY GBL § 349. 53. Plaintiff QUIROZ, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, respectfully demands a judgment enjoining Defendant’s conduct, awarding costs of this proceeding and attorneys’ fees, as provided by NY GBL, and such other relief as this Court deems just and proper. 54. Plaintiff QUIROZ realleges and incorporates herein by reference the allegations contained in all preceding paragraphs, and further alleges as follows: 21 55. Plaintiff QUIROZ brings this claim individually and on behalf of the other members of the Nationwide Class for violations of NY GBL § 349. 56. Alternatively, should the Court not certify Plaintiff’s proposed Nationwide Class, Plaintiff QUIROZ brings this claim individually and on behalf of the other members of the New York Class for Defendant’s violations of NY GBL § 349. 57. Defendant’s business act and practices and/or omissions alleged herein constitute deceptive acts or practices under NY GBL § 349, which were enacted to protect the consuming public from those who engage in unconscionable, deceptive or unfair acts or practices in the conduct of any business, trade or commerce. 58. The practices of Defendant described throughout this Complaint, were specifically directed to consumers and violate the NY GBL § 349 for, inter alia, the following reasons: a. Defendant knowingly and falsely represents and advertises that the Product contains “No Preservatives” with an intent to cause Plaintiff and members of the Classes to believe that it does not contain preservatives, when it actually contains citric acid; b. Defendant caused Plaintiff and the Classes to suffer a probability of confusion and a misunderstanding of legal rights, obligations and/or remedies by and through its conduct; c. Defendant made material representations and statements of fact to Plaintiff and the Classes that resulted in Plaintiff and the Classes reasonably believing the represented or suggested state of affairs are what they actually were; and the practices employed by Defendant, whereby Defendant advertises, promotes, and 22 markets that its Product contains “No Preservatives” is unfair, deceptive, and misleading and are in violation of NY GBL § 349. 59. Under the circumstances, Defendant’s conduct in employing these unfair and deceptive trade practices was malicious, willful, wanton and outrageous such as to shock the conscience of the community and warrant the imposition of punitive damages. 59. Plaintiff QUIROZ and members of the Classes have suffered an injury as a result of Defendant’s false and misleading advertising. 24 60. Defendant’s actions impact the public interest because Plaintiff and members of the Classes were injured in exactly the same way as thousands of others purchasing the Products as a result of and pursuant to Defendant’s generalized course of deception. 61. The foregoing deceptive acts, and practices were directed at consumers. 62. The foregoing deceptive acts, and practices caused Plaintiff and other Class members to suffer actual damages in the form of, inter alia, monies spent to purchase the Product. Plaintiff and other Class members are entitled to recover compensatory damages, statutory damages, punitive damages, attorneys' fees and costs, and any other relief the Court deems appropriate. Damages can be calculated through expert testimony at trial. 63. Plaintiff QUIROZ realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in all preceding paragraphs, and further alleges as follows: 64. Plaintiff QUIROZ brings this claim individually, as well as on behalf of members of the Nationwide class, for violations of NY GBL § 350. 23 65. Alternatively, should the Court not certify Plaintiff’s proposed Nationwide Class, Plaintiff QUIROZ brings this claim individually and on behalf of the members of the New York Class for violations of NY GBL § 350. 66. Alternatively, should the Court not certify Plaintiff’s proposed Nationwide Class, Plaintiff QUIROZ brings this claim individually and on behalf of the other members of the New York Class for Defendant’s violations of NY GBL § 350. 67. Defendant has been and/or is engaged in the “conduct of … business, trade or commerce” within the meaning of N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 350. 68. New York Gen. Bus. Law § 350 makes unlawful “[f]alse advertising in the conduct of any business, trade or commerce.” False advertising includes “advertising, including labeling, of a commodity … if such advertising is misleading in a material respect,” taking into account “the extent to which the advertising fails to reveal facts material in light of … representations [made] with respect to the commodity …” N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 350-a(1). 69. Defendant caused to be disseminated throughout New York, through advertising, marketing and other publications, statements that are untrue or misleading. 70. Defendant’s affirmative misrepresentation that the Product contain “No Preservatives” is material and substantially uniform in content, presentation, and impact upon consumers at large. Consumers purchasing the Product were, and continue to be, exposed to Defendant’s material misrepresentations. 71. Defendant has violated NY. Gen. Bus. Law § 350 because its’ “No Preservatives” misrepresentations were material and likely to deceive a reasonable consumer. 72. 73. Pursuant but not limited to N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 350-e, Plaintiff QUIROZ and members of the Class seek monetary damages (including actual damages, and minimum, punitive, or treble and/or statutory damages pursuant to GBL § 350-a(1)), injunctive relief, restitution and disgorgement of all monies obtained by means of Defendants' unlawful conduct, any interest and attorneys' fees and costs. 74. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates herein by reference the allegations contained in all preceding paragraphs, and further alleges as follows: 75. Defendant intentionally makes materially false and misleading representations regarding the composition of the Product. 76. Plaintiff and members of the Classes reasonably relied on Defendant’s false and misleading representations. They did not know, and had no reason to know, that the Product contain a preservative, and they would not have purchased the Product had they known. 77. Defendant intended that Plaintiff and the Classes rely on its misrepresentations. 78. Plaintiff and members of the Classes have been injured as a result of Defendant’s fraudulent conduct. 79. Defendant is liable to Plaintiff and members of the Classes for damages sustained as a result of Defendant’s fraud. 25 COMMON LAW FRAUD (brought on behalf of the Nationwide Class, in conjunction with the substantively similar common law of other states and the District of Columbia to the extent New York common law is inapplicable to out-of-state Class members, or, in the alternative, on behalf of the New York Class) DAMAGES FOR VIOLATIONS OF NEW YORK GENERAL BUSINESS LAW § 349 (DECEPTIVE AND UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES ACT) (brought on behalf of the Nationwide Class, in conjunction with the substantively similar consumer protection laws of other states and the District of Columbia to the extent New York consumer protection laws are inapplicable to out-of-state Class members, or, in the alternative, on behalf of the New York Class) DAMAGES FOR VIOLATIONS OF NEW YORK GENERAL BUSINESS LAW § 350 (FALSE ADVERTISING LAW) (brought on behalf of the Nationwide Class, in conjunction with the substantively similar consumer protection laws of other states and the District of Columbia to the extent New York consumer protection laws are inapplicable to out-of-state Class members, or, in the alternative, on behalf of the New York Class) Defendant Markets Their Product As Free of Preservatives Even Though It Contains The Preservative Citric Acid INJUNCTION FOR VIOLATIONS OF NEW YORK GENERAL BUSINESS LAW § 349 (DECEPTIVE AND UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES ACT) (brought on behalf of the Nationwide Class, in conjunction with the substantively similar consumer protection laws of other states and the District of Columbia to the extent New York consumer protection laws are inapplicable to out-of-state Class members, or, in the alternative, on behalf of the New York Class)

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18. “Epsom salt” is a popular term for magnesium sulfate heptahydrate. It is named for the English town where it was discovered in 1618 bubbling up in the water from an underground spring by Henry Wicker, a local cowherd. 20. Wicker also claimed that animals who had waded in the Epsom-salted waters seemed to heal more quickly from wounds. Out of this there developed numerous folktales attributing numerous healing properties to Epsom salt, at which point Epsom became visited as a spa town for a time, with visitors expecting all kinds of relief from various painful symptoms. 21. However, these folk stories are just that, and no more. Whether or not Epsom salt functions as a laxative, it cannot deliver the pain relief promised by Defendant. Defendant exploits the mythology that grew out of the discovery of Epsom salt four hundred years ago, in the scientifically ignorant early 17th Century, in order to peddle a snake-oil solution to muscle pain that adds nothing to the benefits of an ordinary hot bath. The Products Cannot Detoxify Because “Detoxification” as Used to Market Health and Wellness Products is a Pseudo-Scientific Concept 22. Consumers today are increasingly exposed to a wide range of products promising extraordinary health benefits, including promises to detoxify various organs or the human body as a whole. However, while the concept of detoxification as used by medical professionals is certainly legitimate, “detoxification” as now used to sell health and wellness products is a marketing concept, not a scientific one. 24. Citing the opinions of numerous medical professionals, The Guardian confirms that the very concept of detoxification as now marketed by purveyors of detox products is pseudo- medicine that hijacks medical terminology for a quick profit: “Let’s be clear,” says Edzard Ernst, emeritus professor of complementary medicine at Exeter University, “there are two types of detox: one is respectable and the other isn’t.” The respectable one, he says, is the medical treatment of people with life- threatening drug addictions. “The other is the word being hijacked by entrepreneurs, quacks and charlatans to sell a bogus treatment that allegedly detoxifies your body of toxins you’re supposed to have accumulated.” If toxins did build up in a way your body couldn’t excrete, he says, you’d likely be dead or in need of serious medical intervention. “The healthy body has kidneys, a liver, skin, even lungs that are detoxifying as we speak,” he says. “There is no known way – certainly not through detox treatments – to make something that works perfectly well in a healthy body work better.” “It’s a scandal,” fumes Ernst. “It’s criminal exploitation of the gullible man on the street and it sort of keys into something that we all would love to have – a simple remedy that frees us of our sins, so to speak. It’s nice to think that it could exist but unfortunately it doesn’t.”3 The Products Cannot Relieve Pain from Muscle Soreness Because Magnesium Cannot Penetrate the Skin to a Meaningful Degree 26. In a comprehensive literature review of the available research, Ingraham concludes: The case for the healing powers of Epsom salt is mostly made by people selling the stuff, or recommending it as carelessly as an old wives’ tale. If relatively dilute home salt baths were actually medicinal, then far more concentrated sources like The Dead Sea would have clear health effects, which they definitely do not.5 27. This is to be expected given both the general resistance of the human skin to permeation by ions and molecules dissolved in water and the special properties of magnesium ions in particular: Furthermore, the stratum corneum is generally an effective barrier to diffusion: ions and molecules dissolved in water mostly cannot pass through the stratum corneum, again because there is minimal water in the outer layers of skin for them to diffuse through. This is not to say that nothing gets past the skin, just not much, and definitely not water. Magnesium ions have some special properties. Like tapioca, they may swell when wet. In fact, this has been the conventional wisdom for some time, and one of the main reasons that many experts have dismissed the possibility of magnesium absorption.6 28. If magnesium cannot penetrate the human skin, then it cannot deliver whatever health benefits it would otherwise offer. 30. Similar conclusions were reached in a number of experiments surveyed in a literature review by Uwe Gröber and his colleagues in the journal Nutrients. In one experiment, for example, Eight normal subjects were immersed in Bath spa water for two hours and the renal, haematological, and cardiovascular responses were compared with those in the control periods before and after immersion… As a sign that an uptake of magnesium by the healthy human skin while bathing is not possible or if so, only very limited no change occurred in the plasma concentrations of electrolytes, calcium, phosphate, or magnesium after 2 h bathing (35 °C).8 32. Moreover, Defendant’s explanation for how the Products work is physiologically incoherent. Defendant’s website explains: Dr .Teal’s Epsom Salt Soaks combine pure Epsom Salt (Magnesium Sulfate U.S.P.) with rejuvenating essential oils to naturally reduce inflammation, revitalize tired, achy muscles, and soothe the senses, which provides relief from stress.10 33. However, Ingraham explains why Epsom Salt cannot possibly both reduce inflammation and “revitalize tired, achy muscles”: [T]he primary source of injury pain is inflammation — a complex and painful physiological process intended to … wait for it … speed healing. Indeed, the only known mechanism by which you could recover faster from an injury would be to increase inflammation. If bathing in Epsom salts did that, it would make you hurt more, not less. Of course, there could be other ways to speed up healing — in an “anything’s possible” kind of way — but it’s still pretty far-fetched that a single molecule could pull off both that miracle and reduce pain at the same time. 34. To the extent Epsom Salt baths relieve muscle pain, they are merely doing what all hot baths do, providing temporary relief without actually accelerating the healing process. To the extent they actually reduce inflammation, they are impeding, not furthering, the muscles’ natural healing process, which is something the reasonable consumer has not bargained for. Defendant’s Misrepresentations Would Deceive A Reasonable Consumer 35. A reasonable consumer would be deceived by Defendant’s misrepresentation that the Products detoxify and/or relieve pain from muscle soreness. 37. Interviewing psychology professor Peter Ayton, The Guardian explains the appeal of claims like Defendant’s to ordinary consumers: Peter Ayton, a professor of psychology at City University London, agrees. He says that we’re susceptible to such gimmicks because we live in a world with so much information we’re happy to defer responsibility to others who might understand things better. “To understand even shampoo you need to have PhD in biochemistry,” he says, “but a lot of people don’t have that. If it seems reasonable and plausible and invokes a familiar concept, like detoxing, then we’re happy to go with it.” Many of our consumer decisions, he adds, are made in ignorance and supposition, which is rarely challenged or informed. “People assume that the world is carefully regulated and that there are benign institutions guarding them from making any kind of errors. A lot of marketing drip-feeds that idea, surreptitiously. So if people see somebody with apparently the right credentials, they think they’re listening to a respectable medic and trust their advice.”11 38. Reasonable consumers lack the scientific training to understand why the Products cannot deliver what they promise. 39. Science-Based Medicine explains why our susceptibility to detox claims in particular may be hard-wired: There’s a reason we fall for the marketing of detoxification – we seem hardwired to believe we need it, perhaps related to our susceptibility to ideas of sympathetic magic. Purification rituals date back to the earliest reaches of recorded history. The idea that we’re somehow poisoning ourselves and we need to atone for our sins seems to be a part of human nature, which may explain why it’s still part of the world’s religions.12 Defendant’s Misrepresentations Were Material To A Reasonable Consumer And Were Relied Upon By Plaintiff And The Class 41. For this reason, Plaintiff and the Class reasonably relied upon Defendant’s misrepresentations in purchasing the Products. They did not know, that Defendant’s claims were false, and they would not have purchased the Products had they known the truth about them. 42. Defendant intended that Plaintiff and the Class rely on its misrepresentations, which are placed prominently on the Products’ front label and repeated wherever the Products are sold online. Defendant Knew that Its Representations are Deceptive and Misleading 43. Defendant knew and continues to know that its representations are false and misleading. 44. As the manufacturer of the Products, Defendant possesses specialized knowledge regarding the content and effects of the Products and could easily access the scientific consensus regarding detoxification and transdermal magnesium absorption. Thus, it also knows that the Products are of no benefit to anyone. Plaintiff And The Class Were Injured By Defendant’s Deceptive Conduct 45. Plaintiff and the Class were injured by Defendant when Defendant failed to deliver to them the benefit of their bargain. 46. Plaintiff and the Class paid money for the Products because they promised to detoxify and/or alleviate pain from muscle soreness. Defendant fails to deliver on this promise, causing Plaintiff and the Class to pay money for something that had no value whatsoever. 48. Pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff OKOE seeks to represent the following class: All persons or entities who made retail purchases of the Products in the United States for personal use and not resale within the applicable limitations period, and/or such subclasses as the Court may deem appropriate (“the Nationwide Class”). In the alternative, Plaintiff OKOE seeks to represent All persons or entities who made retail purchases of the Products in New York for personal use and not resale within the applicable limitations period and/or such subclasses as the Court deems appropriate (“the New York Class”) 49. Plaintiff reserves the right to revise the Class definition based upon facts learned in the course of litigating this matter. 50. Excluded from this Class are Defendant’s current and former officers, directors, and employees, and the judicial officer to whom this case is assigned. 51. Numerosity. While the exact number and identities of purchasers of the Products are unknown to Plaintiff at this time, Plaintiff is informed and believes that the Class contains thousands of purchasers and is so numerous that individual joinder of all Class members is impracticable. 53. Typicality. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of those of the Class members because, inter alia, Plaintiff and the other Class members were all injured by same uniform conduct, as detailed herein. 54. Adequacy of Representation. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class and has retained competent counsel experienced in prosecuting nationwide class actions. Plaintiff understands the nature of his claims herein, has no disqualifying conditions, and will vigorously represent the interests of the Class. Neither Plaintiff nor Plaintiff's counsel have any interests that conflict with or are antagonistic to the interests of the Class. 56. The prerequisites to maintaining a class action for equitable relief pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2) are also met, as Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, thereby making appropriate final equitable relief with respect to the Class as a whole. 57. Plaintiff OKOE realleges and incorporates herein by reference all allegations contained above as if fully set forth herein and further alleges as follows: 58. Plaintiff OKOE brings this claim individually and on behalf of the other members of the Nationwide Class for violations of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (“CUTPA”). 59. CUTPA provides that “[n]o person shall engage in unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce.” CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-110g(a). 61. CUTPA provides relief for “[a]ny person who suffers any ascertainable loss of money or property, real or personal, as a result of the use or employment of a method, act or practice prohibited by § 42-110b.” Id. § 42-110g(a). 62. A Plaintiff is not required to prove specific or actual damages but need only show that such damages are “capable of being discovered, observed, or established.” Lentini v. Fidelity Nat. Title Ins. Co. of New York, 479 F. Supp. 2d 292, 302 (D. Conn. 2007). 63. A deception will be found when “(1) [a] representation, omission or other practice likely to mislead consumers; (2) [c]onsumers . . . interpret the message reasonably under the circumstances; and (3) [t]he misleading representation, omission or practice must be material–that is, likely to affect consumer decisions or conduct.” Caldor, Inc. v. Heslin, 577 A.2d 1009, 1013 (Conn. 1990). 64. CUTPA also allows the court in its discretion to award punitive damages. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-110g(a). These damages are more likely to apply “if the evidence reveals a reckless indifference to the rights of others or an intentional and wanton violation of those rights.” Fabri v. United Tech. Int’l, Inc., 387 F.3d 109, 124 (2d Cir. 2004). 65. CUTPA permits courts to award, in their discretion, injunctive or equitable relief. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-110g(d) (West 2007). 66. As a result of its violations of the CUTPA detailed above, Defendant caused actual damage to Plaintiffs and the other members of the Nationwide Class, who were reasonable deceived that the Products would detoxify and relieve pain from muscle soreness. 68. Plaintiffs also seek court costs and attorneys’ fees as a result of Defendant’s violation of the CUTPA as provided in CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-110g(d). 69. A copy of this Complaint has been mailed to the Attorney General and the Commissioner of Consumer Protection of the State of Connecticut in accordance with CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-110g(c). 70. Because Defendant’s deceptive scheme originated in Connecticut, its principal place of business, CUTPA extends to injuries which may have transpired outside Connecticut. See H & D Wireless Limited P'ship v. Sunspot, Civil No. H-86-1026 (D. Conn. Feb. 24, 1987) (13 Conn. L. Trib. No. 17, 22) ("CUTPA does not necessarily require that the violation occur within the state, only that it be tied to a form of trade or commerce intimately associated with Connecticut."); Metro. Enter. Corp. v. United Techs. Int'l, Corp., No. 3:03cv1685 (JBA), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12274, at *21-22 (D. Conn. June 28, 2004) (“Examination of the statutory language and interpretive case law reveals no reason why a straightforward application of the phrase ‘in this State’ would exclude the conduct alleged here: a Connecticut seller, in connection with the sale or the offering for sale of its jet engines, hatching and implementing a plan inside the borders of Connecticut the deceptive or unfair effect of which is felt outside those borders.”) 71. Plaintiff OKOE realleges and incorporates herein by reference all allegations contained above as if fully set forth herein and further alleges as follows: 72. Plaintiff OKOE brings this claim individually and on behalf of the other members of the New York Class for violations of NY GBL § 349. 74. NY GBL § 349 provides that “deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any business, trade or commerce or in the furnishing of any service in this state are . . . unlawful.” 75. Under GBL § 349, it is not necessary to prove justifiable reliance. (“To the extent that the Appellate Division order imposed a reliance requirement on General Business Law [§] 349 … claims, it was error. Justifiable reliance by the plaintiff is not an element of the statutory claim.” Koch v. Acker, Merrall & Condit Co., 18 N.Y.3d 940, 941 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012) (internal citations omitted)). 76. Any person who has been injured by reason of any violation of the NY GBL § 349 may bring an action in their own name to enjoin such unlawful act or practice, an action to recover their actual damages or fifty dollars, whichever is greater, or both such actions. The court may, in its discretion, increase the award of damages to an amount not to exceed three times the actual damages up to one thousand dollars, if the court finds the Defendant willfully or knowingly violated this section. The court may award reasonable attorney's fees to a prevailing plaintiff. 78. Under the circumstances, Defendant’s conduct in employing these unfair and deceptive trade practices is malicious, willful, wanton and outrageous such as to shock the conscience of the community and warrant the imposition of punitive damages. 79. Defendant’s actions impact the public interest because Plaintiff and members of the Class were injured in exactly the same way as thousands of others purchasing the Products, as a result of Defendant’s generalized course of deception. 80. By committing the acts alleged in this Complaint, Defendant has misled Plaintiff and the Class into purchasing the Products on the basis of an erroneous belief that the Products detoxify and/or relieve pain from muscle soreness. This is a deceptive business practice that violates NY 84. Plaintiff OKOE realleges and incorporates herein by reference the allegations contained in all preceding paragraphs, and further alleges as follows: 85. Plaintiff OKOE brings this claim individually and on behalf of the other members of the Class for violations of NY GBL § 349. 86. Defendant’s business act and practices and/or omissions alleged herein constitute deceptive acts or practices under NY GBL § 349, which were enacted to protect the consuming public from those who engage in unconscionable, deceptive or unfair acts or practices in the conduct of any business, trade or commerce. 87. Under the circumstances, Defendant’s conduct in employing these unfair and deceptive trade practices are malicious, willful, wanton and outrageous such as to shock the conscience of the community and warrant the imposition of punitive damages. 88. Defendant’s actions impact the public interest because Plaintiff and members of the Class were injured in exactly the same way as thousands of others purchasing the Products as a result of Defendant’s generalized course of deception. 89. The foregoing deceptive acts and practices are directed at consumers. 91. Plaintiff OKOE realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in all preceding paragraphs and further alleges as follows: 92. Plaintiff OKOE brings this claim individually, as well as on behalf of members of the class, for violations of NY GBL § 350. 93. Defendant has been and/or is engaged in the “conduct of … business, trade or commerce” within the meaning of N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 350. 94. New York Gen. Bus. Law § 350 makes unlawful “[f]alse advertising in the conduct of any business, trade or commerce.” False advertising includes “advertising, including labeling, of a commodity … if such advertising is misleading in a material respect,” taking into account “the extent to which the advertising fails to reveal facts material in light of … representations [made] with respect to the commodity …” N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 350-a(1). 95. Defendant caused to be made or disseminated throughout New York and the United States, through advertising, marketing and other publications, statements that were untrue or misleading. 96. Defendant’s affirmative misrepresentations as alleged herein are material and substantially uniform in content, presentation, and impact upon consumers at large. Consumers purchasing the Products were, and continue to be, exposed to Defendant’s material misrepresentations. 98. Pursuant to N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 350-e, Plaintiff and members of the Class seek monetary damages (including actual damages and minimum, punitive, or treble and/or statutory damages pursuant to GBL § 350-a (1)), injunctive relief, restitution and disgorgement of all monies obtained by means of Defendants' unlawful conduct, interest, and attorneys' fees and costs. Background on Epsom Salt COMMON LAW FRAUD (Brought on behalf of the Nationwide Class under Connecticut law or, alternatively, the New York Class under New York law) DAMAGES FOR VIOLATIONS OF NEW YORK GENERAL BUSINESS LAW § 349 (DECEPTIVE AND UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES ACT) (Brought on behalf of the New York Class) DAMAGES FOR VIOLATIONS OF NEW YORK GENERAL BUSINESS LAW § 350 (FALSE ADVERTISING LAW) (Brought on behalf of the New York Class) INJUNCTION FOR VIOLATIONS OF NEW YORK GENERAL BUSINESS LAW § 349 (DECEPTIVE AND UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES ACT) (Brought on behalf of the New York Class) VIOLATIONS OF THE CONNECTICUT UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES ACT (CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 42-110g, et seq.) (Brought on behalf of the Nationwide Class)

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10. When Plaintiff answered calls from Defendant, he was greeted with a pre- recorded voice message stating “This is an important message from Progressive Leasing . . . .” There was no live person to speak with on these calls, just a prerecorded voice playing a message. 11. On other calls, Plaintiff would have to wait on the line through several seconds of silence before a live representative came on the line. 12. When Plaintiff did not answer Defendant’s calls, Defendant left pre- recorded voicemail stating “This is an important message from Progressive Leasing . . . .” The voicemail were not delivered by a live person , but by a pre-recorded voice. 13. On one call from Defendant, Plaintiff waited on the line to speak with a live representative. The representative indicated it was calling to reach someone other than Plaintiff. Plaintiff advised he was not that person and instructed Progressive to stop calling. 14. Defendant continued to place its autodialed calls to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone. 15. Plaintiff does not have business with Defendant and never provided Defendant his cellular telephone number or prior express consent to call or autodial it. 17. Plaintiff was annoyed, frustrated, and inconvenienced by Progressive’s calls. 18. Defendant’s calls distracted Plaintiff while he was driving. 19. Defendant’s unwanted calls have invaded Plaintiff’s cellular telephone. Plaintiff has had to turn his phone on ‘silent mode’ to prevent being distracted. 20. The calls from Defendant to Plaintiff were not placed for “emergency purposes” as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(i). 21. Plaintiff brings this case as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated. 22. Plaintiff represents, and is a member of the following classes: The “TCPA Class”: (1) All persons within the United States (2) to whose cellular telephone number (3) Defendant placed a non- emergency telephone call (4) using an autodialer or prerecorded voice (5) within four years of the complaint. The “Revoke Class”: (1) All persons within the United States (2) to whose cellular telephone number (3) Defendant placed a non- emergency telephone call (4) using an autodialer or prerecorded voice (5) within four years of the complaint, (6) after said person instructed Defendant to cease calling. 23. Defendant and its employees or agents are excluded from the Classes. Plaintiff does not know the number of members in the Classes, but believes the Class members number in the several thousands, if not more. Thus, this matter should be certified as a Class action to assist in the expeditious litigation of this matter. B. Numerosity 25. The exact number and identities of the Class members are unknown at this time and can only be ascertained through discovery. Identification of the Class members is a matter capable of ministerial determination from Defendant’s call records. C. Common Questions of Law and Fact 26. There are questions of law and fact common to the Classes that predominate over any questions affecting only individual Class members. These questions include: a. Whether Defendant made non-emergency calls to Plaintiff and Class members’ cellular telephones using an artificial or prerecorded voice; b. Whether Defendant made non-emergency calls to Plaintiff and the Class members’ cellular telephones using an autodialer; c. Whether Defendant can meet its burden of showing it obtained prior express consent to make each call; d. Whether Defendant ignored Plaintiff and the Revoke Class’s valid requests to cease calling; e. Whether Defendant’s conduct was knowing and/or willful; f. Whether Defendant is liable for damages, and the amount of such damages; and g. Whether Defendant should be enjoined from such conduct in the future. 28. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the Class members, as they are all based on the same factual and legal theories. E. Protecting the Interests of the Class Members 29. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Classes and has retained counsel experienced in handling class actions and claims involving unlawful business practices. Neither Plaintiff nor his counsel has any interests which might cause them not to vigorously pursue this action. F. Proceeding Via Class Action is Superior and Advisable 30. A class action is the superior method for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. The interest of Class members in individually controlling the prosecutions of separate claims against Defendant is small because it is not economically feasible for Class members to bring individual actions. 31. Management of this class action is unlikely to present any difficulties. Several courts have certified classes in TCPA actions. These cases include, but are not limited to: Mitchem v. Ill. Collection Serv., 271 F.R.D. 617 (N.D. Ill. 2011); Sadowski v. Med1 Online, LLC, 2008 WL 2224892 (N.D. Ill., May 27, 2008); CE Design Ltd. V. Cy’s Crabhouse North, Inc., 259 F.R.D. 135 (N.D. Ill. 2009); Lo v. Oxnard European Motors, LLC, 2012 WL 1932283 (S.D. Cal., May 29, 2012). 33. Defendant placed multiple prerecorded or artificial calls to cellular numbers belonging to Plaintiff and the other members of the Classes without their prior express consent. 34. Each of the aforementioned calls by Defendant constitutes a negligent violation of the TCPA. 35. Plaintiff and the Classes are entitled to an award of $500.00 in statutory damages for each call in violation of the TCPA pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). 36. Additionally, Plaintiff and the Classes are entitled to and seek injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct by Defendant in the future. 37. Plaintiff and Class members are also entitled to and do seek a declaration that: • Defendant violated the TCPA; • Defendant used prerecorded voices and/or artificial voices on its calls to Plaintiff and the Classes; and Defendant placed calls to the Plaintiff and the Classes without prior express consent. 38. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the above paragraphs of this Complaint and incorporates them herein by reference. 39. Defendant knowingly and/or willfully placed multiple prerecorded or artificial calls to cellular numbers belonging to Plaintiff and the other members of the Classes without their prior express consent. 40. Each of the aforementioned calls by Defendant constitutes a knowing and/or willful violation of the TCPA. 42. Additionally, Plaintiff and the Classes are entitled to and seek injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct by Defendant in the future. 43. Plaintiff and Class members are also entitled to and do seek a declaration that: • Defendant knowingly and/or willfully violated the TCPA; • Defendant knowingly and/or willfully used prerecorded voices and/or artificial voices on calls to Plaintiff and the Classes; • Defendant willfully ignored Plaintiff and the Revoke Class’s valid requests to cease calling; • Defendant willfully placed automated calls to the Plaintiff and the Classes at the numbers received from those third parties, knowing it did not have prior express consent to do so; and • It is Defendant’s practice and history to place automated telephone calls to consumers without their prior express consent. 7. In the last four years, Defendant placed calls to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number, 480-xxx-5754. 8. Defendant placed calls to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number from several different numbers, including 701-989-7920, 207-480-3985, 312-525-9091, 208-497- 3612, 703-574-9800, and 520-635-2120. 9. Defendant placed its calls using an ‘automatic telephone dialing system’ (“autodialer”) and a ‘prerecorded voice,’ within the meaning of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1). A. The Class Knowing and/or Willful Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq. Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq.

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28. It is, upon information and belief, Defendant’s policy and practice to deny Plaintiff, along with other blind or visually-impaired users, access to Defendant’s website, and to therefore specifically deny the goods and services that are offered thereby. Due to Defendant’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to its website, Plaintiff and visually-impaired persons have been and are still being denied equal access to Defendant’s numerous goods, services and benefits offered to the public through the Website. 29. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient JAWS screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using the JAWS screen-reader. 32. Many pages on the Website also contain the same title elements. This is a problem for the visually-impaired because the screen reader fails to distinguish one page from another. In order to fix this problem, Defendant must change the title elements for each page. 33. The Website also contained a host of broken links, which is a hyperlink to a non-existent or empty webpage. For the visually-impaired this is especially paralyzing due to the inability to navigate or otherwise determine where one is on the website once a broken link is encountered. For example, upon coming across a link of interest, Plaintiff was redirected to an error page. However, the screen-reader failed to communicate that the link was broken. As a result, Plaintiff could not get back to his original search. Defendant Must Remove Barriers To Its Website 35. These access barriers on Defendant’s Website have deterred Plaintiff from visiting Defendant’s Website and enjoying it equal to sighted individuals because: Plaintiff was unable to use and enjoy the Website in the same manner as sighted individuals do, preventing Plaintiff from using the Website to purchase items and to view the items. 36. If the Website was equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 37. Through his attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired persons. 39. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 40. The ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks in this action. In relevant part, the ADA requires: In the case of violations of . . . this title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities . . . Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the . . . modification of a policy . . . 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 42. Web-based technologies have features and content that are modified on a daily, and in some instances an hourly, basis, and a one time “fix” to an inaccessible website will not cause the website to remain accessible without a corresponding change in corporate policies related to those web-based technologies. To evaluate whether an inaccessible website has been rendered accessible, and whether corporate policies related to web-based technologies have been changed in a meaningful manner that will cause the website to remain accessible, the website must be reviewed on a periodic basis using both automated accessibility screening tools and end user testing by visually-impaired persons. 43. If the Website was accessible, Plaintiff and similarly situated blind and visually-impaired persons could independently shop for and otherwise research the Defendant’s products via the Website. 44. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 46. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 47. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered by Defendant’s Website, during the relevant statutory period. 48. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a New York State Sub-Class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the State of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered by Defendant’s Website, during the relevant statutory period. 49. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a New York City Sub-Class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered by Defendant’s Website, during the relevant statutory period. 51. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class and Sub-Classes. The Class, and Sub-Classes, similarly to the Plaintiff, are severely visually-impaired or otherwise blind persons, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA, NYSHRL or NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so it can be independently accessible to the Class and/or the Sub-Classes. 52. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class Members because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, including ADA litigation and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the Class Members. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. 54. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by visually-impaired persons throughout the United States. 55. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 56. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 57. Defendant’s online retail store is a place of public accommodation within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege, or advantage of Defendant’s online retail store 59. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 60. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 62. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 63. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 64. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 65. Defendant’s Website operates in the State of New York and constitutes an online sales establishment and a place of public accommodation within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant’s online retail establishment. 66. Defendant is subject to New York Human Rights Law because it owns and/or operates its Website in the State of New York. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 68. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(i), unlawful discriminatory practice includes, among other things, “a refusal to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless such person can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations being offered or would result in an undue burden". 69. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(ii), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 70. Readily available, well-established guidelines exist on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually-impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other large business entities and government agencies in making their website accessible, including but not limited to: adding alt-text to graphics and ensuring that all functions can be performed using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make its Website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 72. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 73. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate, against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Defendant’s Website under § 296(2) ​et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the Sub-Class Members will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 74. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 75. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) ​et seq​. for each and every offense. 76. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 78. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 79. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 80. Defendant’s website is an online sales establishment and a place of public accommodation within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9), and its Website is a service that is integrated with its online sales establishment. 81. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and/or operates its Website in the City of New York, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 82. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website and the services integrated therewith to be completely inaccessible to the blind. The inaccessibility denies blind consumers full and equal access to the facilities, goods, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 84. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the Sub-Class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is not sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that it is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 85. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 87. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 88. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 89. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 90. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 91. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class and New York State and City Sub-Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 92. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies, that its Website contains access barriers denying blind customers the full and equal access to the goods and services of its Website, which Defendant owns, operates and controls, fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182, ​et seq.​, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, ​et seq.​, and N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107, ​et seq​. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. 93. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF Defendant’s Barriers on Its Website VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 ​et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE NYSHRL

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(Claim for Failure to Establish a Trust Meeting the Requirements of ERISA § 403 Against Defendant HSHS) ........................................... 42 COUNT VII .................................................................................................................... 43 (Claim for Clarification of Future Benefits Under ERISA §§ 502(a)(1)(B) and 502(a)(3) Against Defendant HSHS).......................... 43 (Claim for Failure to Establish the Plans Pursuant to Written Instruments Meeting the Requirements of ERISA § 402 Against Defendant HSHS) 169. Plaintiffs incorporate and re-allege by reference the foregoing paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 170. ERISA section 402, 29 U.S.C. § 1102, provides that every plan will be established pursuant to a written instrument which will provide, among other things, “for one or more named fiduciaries who jointly or severally shall have authority to control and manage the operation and administration of the plan” and will “provide a procedure for establishing and carrying out a funding policy and method constituent with the objectives of the plan and the requirements of [Title I of ERISA].” 171. Although the benefits provided by the HSHS Plans were described to the employees and retirees of HSHS (and/or its affiliates and subsidiaries) in various written communications, the HSHS Plans have never been established pursuant to written instruments meeting the requirements of ERISA section 402, 29 U.S.C. § 1102. 172. Defendant HSHS violated section 402 by failing to promulgate written instruments in compliance with ERISA section 402 to govern the HSHS Plans’ operations and administration. 29 U.S.C. § 1102. (Claim for Declaratory Relief That the Church Plan Exemption Violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment of the Constitution, and Is Therefore Void and Ineffective) ................... 52 (Claim for Failure to Establish the Plans Pursuant to Written Instruments Meeting the Requirements of ERISA § 402 Against Defendant HSHS) ...................................................................... 42 (Claim for Violation of ERISA sections 203(e), 204(c)(3) and 205(g) for Equitable Relief Pursuant to ERISA section 502(a)(3) Against Defendant HSHS, and Pursuant to ERISA section 502(a)(2) Against Defendants HSHS, the HSHS Retirement Committee, and John and Jane Does 1- 20, Members of the Retirement Committee) .......................................... 38 (Claim for Civil Money Penalty Pursuant to ERISA § 502(a)(1)(A) Against Defendant HSHS) ...................................................................... 44 COUNT IX...................................................................................................................... 45 (Claim for Breach of Fiduciary Duty Against All Defendants) .......................... 45 (Claim for Equitable Relief Pursuant to ERISA §§ 502(a)(2) and 502(a)(3) Against All Defendants) ......................................................... 34 COUNT II ....................................................................................................................... 35 (Claim for Violation of Reporting and Disclosure Provisions Against Defendant HSHS) ...................................................................... 35 A. Numerosity .......................................................................................................... 30 B. Commonality....................................................................................................... 31 C. Typicality ............................................................................................................ 31 D. Adequacy ............................................................................................................ 32 E. Rule 23(b)(1) Requirements ............................................................................... 32 F. Rule 23(b)(2) Requirements ............................................................................... 32 G. Rule 23(b)(3) Requirements ............................................................................... 33

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(Compulsory financial support of SEIU 925 is a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the United States Constitution) (Exclusive representation in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the United States Constitution) (Limited to Count II) 11. Washington's family child care providers care for a child or children in the home of the provider or in the home of the child or children throughout all hours of the day, and in certain circumstances overnight and on weekends. Providers may receive child care subsidies for their care of children. Providers are either licensed by the state under RCW 74.15.030 or are exempt from licensing under chapter 74.15 RCW. RCW 41.56.030. 12. Reimbursements to family child care providers are funded through public programs such as Working Connections Child Care ("WCCC"), Washington's largest-such program, that subsidize child care for qualified low-income working families.1 WAC 170-290-0001; WAC 170-290-0240. 32. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference the paragraphs set forth above. 36. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference the paragraphs set forth above. 37. By and through RCW 41.56.113(1)(b)(i), along with Article 5 of the CBA prior to the September 18, 2014, MOU, and related acts, as well as the automatic seizure of dues equivalent fees from Plaintiffs and class members, unless they specifically opted out and requested the deductions to cease, Defendants have compelled Plaintiffs, and on information and belief, continue to compel other family child care providers to financially support SEIU 925 as their mandatory representative for petitioning and contracting with the State. By so doing, Defendants have violated, and continue to violate, the First Amendment rights of Plaintiffs and other child care providers, as secured by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, not to associate with a mandatory representative and not to support, financially or otherwise, petitioning and speech. 40. Plaintiffs bring this case as a class action pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3), for themselves and for all others similarly situated. The class for Count II consists of all family child care providers who are not members of the union but from whom the State deducted dues equivalent fees from their payments and remitted to SEIU Local 925 and its affiliates. The class includes everyone who comes within the class definition at any time from March 5, 2012, until the conclusion of this action. 41. According to Local 925’s 2013 LM-2 Annual Report filed with the United States Department of Labor, there are more than 3,000 class members. Their number is so numerous in varying locations and jurisdictions across Washington that joinder is impractical. 42. There are questions of law and fact common to all class members, including Plaintiffs. Factually, all class members were, or may still be, compelled financially to support SEIU Local 925 as their state-designated representative for the purposes of speaking to, petitioning, and otherwise lobbying the State and its officials with respect to limited aspects of the child care subsidy programs. The question of law is the same for all class members: does this violate the First Amendment’s least restrictive means test and constitute a prior restraint on class members’ speech. I. Family Child Care Providers and the State of Washington.

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15. Defendants’ standardized policy language as to comprehensive and collision coverage for ACV of total loss vehicles is present in every Progressive auto policies issued by Defendants in Florida.   16. Defendants’ standardized policy language as to comprehensive and collision coverage for ACV of total loss vehicles is present in Progressive auto policies issued by subsidiary insurance companies under control of Defendant Progressive Corporation and issuing auto coverage in Florida.  17. Defendants’ standardized policy language as to comprehensive and collision coverage for ACV of total loss vehicles is present in Progressive auto policies issued by Defendants and is present in policies of subsidiary insurance companies under control of Defendants.  18. Defendant Progressive Corporation sets the policy language and the claims process handling, including payment of ACV in the event of total losses.  19. S​ubsidiaries of Progressive Corporation are required to use the practices, policies, and procedures​ ​set by and enforced by Progressive Corporation.  20. Progressive Corporation governs and has full control over all policy, practices and procedures issued and/or enacted by its subsidiaries. Such subsidiaries operation only with Progressive Corporation’s complete and full knowledge, authority and control.  21. Progressive Corporation’s subsidiaries enact the policies, practices and procedures set and enforced by Progressive Corporation, and operate as its agents and alter-ego’s in all operations and actions.  23. At all times material hereto, Plaintiffs Henry Paris, Jr. and Patricia Paris owned a 2004 Jaguar XJ8, VIN # SAJWA71C64SG26787 (“Insured Vehicle”).  24. At all times material hereto, Plaintiff insured the 2004 Jaguar XJ8 under an insurance policy issued by Defendant. ​Ex. D​ (composite Policy-related documents) at 2 (Dec sheet).   25. On or about December 1, 2017, Henry Paris, Jr. and Patricia Paris were involved in an fatal accident while operating the Insured Vehicle. As a result of said accident, Plaintiffs’ Estate filed a claim for property damage with Defendants, claim number 17-1354847-01.   26. Following the filing of said claim, Defendants determined that the Insured Vehicle was a total loss with a base value of $6,324.94.  27. The base value was calculated by a third-party vendor (“CCC”), which bases vehicles valuations on the cost to purchase similar vehicles with similar conditions and mileage. CCC included in its Valuation Report the fact that sales tax was calculated at $421.86. No amount for title transfer fee, tag transfer fee, or any other mandatory fee was included.  28. Defendants’ paid $6,746.70 as the ACV payment.   29. Defendants’ payment of $6,746.70 - and not the FTLP (full total loss payment) including mandatory transfer fees - constituted a breach of its insurance policy.   30. Title transfer fees and tag transfer fees are both mandatory applicable fees that must be paid to replace any vehicle in the State of Florida.   32. Florida law requires that all vehicles have proper license plate (or tag) in order to be legally driven on Florida roadways. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 320.0609. The fee to transfer license plate or tag is $4.60.   33. Plaintiff was owed, at minimum, title transfer fees of $75.25 and tag transfer fees of $4.60.   34. In breach of its contract with Plaintiff, Defendants did not include transfer fees in making the ACV payment for Plaintiff’s total loss and did not make the FTLP.   35. Plaintiff paid all premiums owed and otherwise satisfied all conditions precedent such that their insurance policy was in effect and operational at the time of the accident.  48. Plaintiff brings this action seeking representation of a class pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.   49. Plaintiff’s claims are typical to those of all class member because members of the class are similarly affected by Defendants’ failure to make the FTLP upon the total loss of insured vehicles. The material and relevant policy terms for each class member are substantially identical to the terms of Plaintiff’s policy.   50. Plaintiff’s interests are coincident with and not antagonistic to those of other class members, nor is the Plaintiff subject to any unique defenses.   52. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of all other members of the class because all such claims arise from the allegedly improper failure by Defendants to make a FTLP upon the total loss of insured vehicles.   53. Plaintiff and his counsel will fairly and adequately protect and represent the interests of each member of the class.   54. Plaintiff is committed to the vigorous prosecution of this action and has retained competent counsel experienced in prosecuting and defending class actions. Plaintiff’s counsel has successfully litigated other class action cases similar to that here, where insurers breached contracts with insureds by failing to include sales tax and/or total loss fees after total losses.  55. Class action is necessary, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(a), because the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual Class Members would create the risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual Class Members that would establish incompatible standards of conduct for Defendants.   57. Pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3), a class action is superior to the other available methods for a fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy because, among other reasons, it is desirable to concentrate the litigation of the Class Members’ claims in one forum, as it will conserve party and judicial resources and facilitate the consistency of adjudications. Furthermore, because the damages suffered by individual Class Members is relatively small, their interests in maintaining separate actions is questionable and the expense and burden of individual litigation makes it impracticable for Class Members to seek individual redress for the wrongs done to them. Plaintiff knows of no difficulty that would be encountered in the management of this case that would preclude its maintenance as a class action.   58. Any argument that class treatment is not viable or productive in the present action is undercut by the fact that the Middle District very recently treated as a class action a case that is substantially identical in fact and in law to the present action. See ​Bastian v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n​, 150 F. Supp. 3d 1284 (M.D. Fla. December 10, 2015). ​Bastian ​is in the process of being successfully settled as a class, and stands as incontrovertible evidence demonstrating the efficacy and viability of class treatment in the present action. Similarly, ​Roth v. Geico General Insurance Co​., Case No. 16-62942-CIV-Dimitrouleas (S.D. Fla. June 14, 2018) is a substantially similar case recently certified as a class action with judgment entered in favor of the class. 

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34. Plaintiff alleges as follows, on information and belief, formed after a reasonable inquiry under the circumstances. 35. Due to the side effects of her battle with cancer, Mrs. Solorio found that her hair was lacking the volume and health that it once had. 36. Within the last few years, while watching television, Mrs. Solorio saw an infomercial about a product that was advertised to help treat hair loss and increased circulation in her scalp, which product was made by a company called Keranique. 37. As a result of the infomercial, Mrs. Solorio learned that she could receive hair care products through the mail for a set monthly payment. 38. In or around March of 2017, Mrs. Solorio called “1-800” telephone number advertised on the infomerical. 39. Upon information and belief, Keranique hired two telemarketing firms in both Colorado and Maine to field calls that come in through its advertised number. 40. Upon information and belief, Sempris has contracted with these telemarketing calling centers to “upsell” the Keranique product. 41. By calling the phone number, Mrs. Solorio was connected with one of these two calling centers. 42. During the call, Mrs. Solorio notified the salesman on the line (“Salesman”) that she was interested in purchasing one of Keranique’s haircare products. 43. After describing the product that she wished to purchase, Salesman offered Mrs. Solorio the chance to also purchase a membership in Taste for Savings. Mrs. Solorio declined the offer and stated that she was only interested in the hair products. 69. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of herself and on behalf of all others similarly situated (“the Class and Subclass”). 70. Plaintiff represents and is a member of the Class, consisting of: All persons within the United States who were charged by Defendant/s and/or their employees and/or agents on a monthly basis for any membership, without consent, in the four years prior to the filing of the Complaint. CONVERSION 193. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 194. Plaintiff and Class and Subclass members held lawful rights in the personal property that Defendants’ withdrew from their accounts through its autorenewal program. 195. Defendant engaged in an unlawful act when it exercised dominion over Plaintiff and Class members’ and Subclass members’ property when they charged Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ credit and debit cards without their consent or knowledge. 196. Defendant acted with malice, oppression or fraud in obtaining these funds it was not entitled to. 197. As a result of the control over Plaintiff and Class members’ and Subclass members’ personal property, Plaintiff and Class members and Subclass members suffered monetary damages. VIOLATIONS OF CALIFORNIA’S UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW (“UCL”) CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 17200, ET SEQ. • An award of actual damages, in an amount to be determined at trial, pursuant to Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17206(b), for Plaintiff; • An order requiring Defendants to pay restitution to Plaintiff and class members due to Defendants’ UCL violations, pursuant to Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200-17205, in the amount of their subscription agreement payments; • That Defendants be enjoined from continuing the wrongful conduct alleged herein and required to comply with all applicable laws; • An award of costs of litigation and reasonable attorney’s fees, pursuant to Cal. Civ. Code § 1021.5 for Plaintiff; and • Any and all other relief as this Court may deem necessary or appropriate. VIOLATIONS OF RICO AND CONSPIRACY TO VIOLATE RICO 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962, ET SEQ. • compensatory damages, for a sum trebled, plus interest to the Class pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c); • an award of attorneys’ fees, together with all costs and expenses, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c); and • any and all other relief that this Court deems just and proper.

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28. Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of himself and all other shareholders of the Company (except the Defendants herein and any persons, firm, trust, corporation, or other entity related to or affiliated with them and their successors in interest), who are, or will be, threatened with injury arising from Defendants’ actions, as more fully described herein. 29. This action is properly maintainable as a class action for the following reasons: (a) The Class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. As of October 30, 2015, there were approximately 153,418,988 million shares of ITC common stock issued and outstanding, likely owned by thousands of shareholders. (b) Plaintiff is committed to prosecuting this action and has retained competent counsel experienced in litigation of this nature. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the other members of the Class and Plaintiff has the same interests as the other members of the Class. Plaintiff is an adequate representative of the Class and will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class. (c) The prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the Class would create the risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members 2:16-cv-10914-GCS-DRG Doc # 3 Filed 03/25/16 Pg 8 of 48 Pg ID 57 9 of the Class, which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for defendants, or adjudications with respect to individual members of the Class that would, as a practical matter, be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the adjudications or substantially members or impede their ability to protect their interests. (d) To the extent Defendants take further steps to effectuate the Proposed Transaction, preliminary and final injunctive relief on behalf of the Class as a whole will be entirely appropriate because Defendants have acted, or refused to act, on grounds generally applicable and causing injury to the Class. 30. There are questions of law and fact that are common to the Class and that predominate over questions affecting any individual class member. The common questions include, inter alia, the following: (a) Whether Defendants have violated Section 14(a) of the Exchange act and Rule 14a-9 promulgated thereunder; (b) Whether the Individual Defendants have violated Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act; and (c) Whether Plaintiff and the other members of the Class would suffer irreparable injury were they required to vote on the Merger without receiving the material information referenced above and the Proposed Transaction is consummated as presently anticipated. 31. Whether Plaintiff and the other members of the Class would suffer irreparable injury where the transaction complained of herein consummated. 2:16-cv-10914-GCS-DRG Doc # 3 Filed 03/25/16 Pg 9 of 48 Pg ID 58 10 32. According to ITC’s SEC filings, its business consists primarily of the electric transmission operations through its “Regulated Operating Subsidiaries.”2 In 2002, ITC was incorporated in the State of Michigan for the purpose of acquiring ITCTransmission. ITCTransmission was originally formed in 2001 as a subsidiary of DTE Electric, an electric utility subsidiary of DTE Energy, and was acquired in 2003 by ITC Holdings. METC was originally formed in 2001 as a subsidiary of Consumers Energy, an electric and gas utility subsidiary of CMS Energy Corporation, and was acquired in 2006 by ITC Holdings. ITC Midwest was formed in 2007 by ITC to acquire the transmission assets of IP&L in December 2007. ITC Great Plains was formed in 2006 by ITC and became a FERC-jurisdictional3 entity in 2009. The Company operates high-voltage systems in Michigan’s Lower Peninsula and portions of Iowa, Minnesota, Illinois, Missouri, Kansas and Oklahoma that transmits electricity from generating stations to local distribution facilities connected to our systems. 33. The Company’s strategy is to “operate, maintain and invest in transmission infrastructure in order to enhance system integrity and reliability, to reduce transmission constraints and to allow new generating resources to interconnect to our transmission systems.” The Company also pursues development projects not within its existing systems, which are also intended to improve overall grid reliability, reduce transmission constraints and facilitate interconnections of new generating resources, as well as to enhance competitive wholesale electricity markets. 34. ITC’s Regulated Operating Subsidiaries earn revenues through tariff rates charged 2 Form 10-k, filed February 26, 2015. 3 FERC refers to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. 2:16-cv-10914-GCS-DRG Doc # 3 Filed 03/25/16 Pg 10 of 48 Pg ID 59 11 for the use of their electric transmission systems by customers, which include investor-owned utilities, municipalities, cooperatives, power marketers and alternative energy suppliers. As independent transmission companies, its Regulated Operating Subsidiaries are subject to rate regulation only by the FERC.4 The rates charged by its Regulated Operating Subsidiaries are established using cost-based formula rate templates. 35. The Company reported at the beginning of 2015 that its long-term growth plan included continued investment in current transmission systems, generator interconnections and our ongoing development projects. Its Development Projections included the investment of approximately $1.1 billion from 2014 through 2018 to construct various development projects, or portions thereof, that are expected to result from the competitive process established pursuant to FERC Order No. 1000 (“Order 1000”) and through other initiatives to upgrade the existing transmission grid and regional transmission facilities, primarily to improve overall grid reliability, reduce transmission constraints, enhance competitive markets and facilitate interconnections of new generating resources, including wind generation and other renewable resources necessary to achieve state and federal policy goals. B. The Proposed Transaction is Announced 36. On February 9, 2016, ITC and Fortis issued a joint press release announcing the Proposed Transaction, which provided in relevant part: St. John’s, NL and Novi, Michigan (February 9, 2016): 4 This generally equates to rates higher than those permitted by state regulatory bodies. Indeed, as provided in the joint press release announcing the Merger Agreement, “ITC’s tariff rates are regulated by FERC, which has been one of the most consistently supportive utility regulators in North America providing reasonable returns and equity ratios. Rates are set using a forward-looking rate-setting mechanism with an annual true-up, which provides timely cost recovery and reduces regulatory lag.” 2:16-cv-10914-GCS-DRG Doc # 3 Filed 03/25/16 Pg 11 of 48 Pg ID 60 12 A. Background Claim For Breach of Fiduciary Duties Against the Individual Defendants 135. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation set forth herein. 136. The Individual Defendants have violated fiduciary duties of care, loyalty, and good faith owed to public shareholders of ITC. 137. By the acts, transactions and courses of conduct alleged herein, the Individual Defendants, individually and acting as a part of a common plan, are attempting to unfairly deprive Plaintiff and other members of the Class of the true value of their investment in ITC. 138. As demonstrated by the allegations above, the Individual Defendants failed to exercise the care required, and breached their duties of loyalty, good faith, and independence owed to the shareholders of ITC because, among other reasons, they failed to take steps to maximize the value of ITC to its public shareholders. 139. The Individual Defendants dominate and control the business and corporate affairs of ITC, and are in possession of private corporate information concerning ITC assets, business and future prospects. Thus, there exists an imbalance and disparity of knowledge and economic power between them and the public shareholders of ITC which makes it inherently unfair for them to benefit their own interests to the exclusion of maximizing shareholder value. 140. By reason of the foregoing acts, practices and course of conduct, the Individual Defendants have failed to exercise due care and diligence in the exercise of their fiduciary obligations toward Plaintiff and the other members of the Class. 2:16-cv-10914-GCS-DRG Doc # 3 Filed 03/25/16 Pg 46 of 48 Pg ID 95 47 141. As a result of the actions of the Individual Defendants, Plaintiff and the Class will suffer irreparable injury in that they have not and will not receive their fair portion of the value of ITC assets and businesses and have been and will be prevented from obtaining a fair price for their common stock. 142. Unless the Individual Defendants are enjoined by the Court, they will continue to breach their fiduciary duties owed to Plaintiff and the members of the Class, all to the irreparable harm of the members of the Class. 143. Plaintiff and the Class have no adequate remedy at law. Only through the exercise of this Court’s equitable powers can Plaintiff and the Class be fully protected from the immediate and irreparable injury which the Individual Defendants’ actions threaten to inflict. Claim For Violating Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act Against the Individual Defendants 127. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation set forth herein. 128. The Individual Defendants acted as controlling persons of ITC within the meaning of Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act as alleged herein. By virtue of their positions as officers and/or directors of the ITC, and participation in and/or awareness of the Company’s operations and/or intimate knowledge of the false statements contained in the F-4 filed with the SEC, they had the power to influence and control and did influence and control, directly or indirectly, the decision making of the Company, including the content and dissemination of the 2:16-cv-10914-GCS-DRG Doc # 3 Filed 03/25/16 Pg 44 of 48 Pg ID 93 45 various statements which Plaintiff contends were false and/or materially incomplete and therefore misleading. 129. Each of the Individual Defendants were provided with or had unlimited access to copies of the F-4 and other statements alleged by Plaintiff to be misleading prior to and/or shortly after these statements were issued and had the ability to prevent the issuance of the statements or cause the statements to be corrected. 130. In particular, each of the Individual Defendants had direct and supervisory involvement in the day-to-day operations of the Company, and, therefore, is presumed to have had the power to control or influence the particular transactions giving rise to the securities violations alleged herein, and exercised the same. The F-4 at issue contains the unanimous recommendation of each of the Individual Defendants to approve the Merger. Thus, the Individual Defendants were intimately connected with and directly involved in the making of this document. 131. In addition, as the F-4 sets forth at length, and as described herein, the Individual Defendants were each involved in negotiating, reviewing, and approving the Merger. The F-4 purports to describe the various issues and information that the Individual Defendants reviewed and considered. The Individual Defendants participated in drafting and/or gave their input on the content of those descriptions. 132. By virtue of the foregoing, the Individual Defendants have violated Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act. 133. As set forth above, the Individual Defendants had the ability to exercise control over and did control a person or persons who have each violated Section 14(a) and SEC Rule 14a-9, by their acts and omissions as alleged herein. By virtue of their positions as controlling 2:16-cv-10914-GCS-DRG Doc # 3 Filed 03/25/16 Pg 45 of 48 Pg ID 94 46 persons, these Defendants are liable pursuant to Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act. As a direct and proximate result of Individual Defendants’ conduct, Plaintiff will be irreparably harmed. 134. Plaintiff and the Class have no adequate remedy at law. Claim for Violations of Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act Against the Company and the Individual Defendants 121. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation set forth herein. 122. The Defendants issued the F-4 with the intention of soliciting ITC shareholder support for the Proposed Transaction. 123. Rule 14a-9, promulgated by the SEC pursuant to Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act, provides that such communications with shareholders shall not contain “any statement which, at the time an in the light of the circumstances under which it is made, is false or 2:16-cv-10914-GCS-DRG Doc # 3 Filed 03/25/16 Pg 43 of 48 Pg ID 92 44 misleading with respect to any material fact, or which omits to state any material fact necessary in order to make the statements therein not false or misleading.” 17 C.F.R. §240.14a-9. 124. Specifically, the F-4 violates Section 14(a) and Rule 14a-9 because it omits material facts as set forth above. Moreover, in the exercise of reasonable care, Defendants should have known that the F-4 is materially misleading and omits material facts that are necessary to render it non-misleading. 125. The misrepresentations and omissions in the F-4 are material to Class Members who will be deprived of their right to cast a fully informed vote if such misrepresentations and omissions are not corrected prior to the vote on the Proposed Transaction. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ conduct, Plaintiff and the other Class Members will be irreparably harmed. 126. Relief for the claims asserted in this Count I should be granted as there is no adequate remedy at law for these claims.

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10. Defendants used an “automatic telephone dialing system” as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1) to place its calls to Plaintiff seeking to solicit its services. 21. Plaintiff brings this action individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, as a member the two proposed classes (hereafter, jointly, “The Classes”). The class concerning the ATDS claim for no prior express consent (hereafter “The ATDS Class”) is defined as follows: All persons within the United States who received any solicitation/telemarketing telephone calls from Defendant to said person’s cellular telephone made through the use of any automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice and such person had not previously consented to receiving such calls within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint 22. The class concerning the ATDS claim for revocation of consent, to the extent prior consent existed (hereafter “The ATDS Revocation Class”) is defined as follows: All persons within the United States who received any solicitation/telemarketing telephone calls from Defendant to said person’s cellular telephone made through the use of any automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice and such person had revoked any prior express consent to receive such calls prior to the calls within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint. 8. Beginning in or around February of 2016 and continuing through March of 2016, Defendant contacted Plaintiff on Plaintiff’s cellular telephone numbers ending in -3803 in an attempt to solicit Plaintiff to purchase Defendants’ services. 9. Defendants contacted or attempted to contact Plaintiff from telephone numbers belonging to Defendants, including without limitation (725) 333-9706 and (720) 445-7324. Knowing and/or Willful Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 47 U.S.C. §227(b)  As a result of Defendant’ willful and/or knowing violations of 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(1), Plaintiff and the ATDS Class and ATDS Revocation Class members are entitled to and request treble damages, as provided by statute, up to $1,500, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(3)(C).  Any and all other relief that the Court deems just and proper.

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19. At all times relevant, Plaintiff Lanteri was an individual residing in the State of Indiana. Lanteri is, and at all times mentioned herein was, a “person” as defined by 47 33. Plaintiff adopts and realleges ¶¶ 1-32. 34. The telephone calls and texts from Defendants to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number were made using a pre-recorded voice or an ATDS, as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227 (a)(1), as it had the capacity to store or produce numbers randomly or sequentially, and to dial such numbers, to place telephone calls and/or SMS or text messages to Plaintiff's cellular telephone. 35. Over the course of the putative class period, Defendants and its agents directed the mass transmission of pre-recorded messages and text messages to cell phones nationwide. 36. The telephone number that Defendants, or their agents, sent the text messages to were assigned to cellular telephone services for which Plaintiff incurred a charge for incoming calls or text messages, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1). 37. These telephone text messages constituted "calls" under the TCPA that were not for emergency purposes, as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227 (b)(1)(A)(i). 38. Defendants made unsolicited telephone calls to the wireless telephone number of plaintiff and the other members of the class with pre-recorded voices and or using equipment that had the capacity to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator. 39. These phone calls were made without the prior express consent of plaintiff or the class or were made after any such consent had been revoked. 40. Defendants have therefore violated the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii), 9 which makes it unlawful for any person within the United States “... to make any call (other than a call made for emergency purposes or made with the prior express consent of the called party) using any automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice ... ”. As a result of Defendants’ illegal conduct, the members of the class suffered actual damages and, under § 227(b)(3)(B), are each entitled to, inter alia, a minimum of $500.00 in damages for each such violation of the TCPA. 41. Plaintiff and class members are also entitled to, and do, seek injunctive relief prohibiting Defendants’ violations of the TCPA in the future. 42. Plaintiff adopts and realleges ¶¶ 1-32. 43. Section 1692e of the FDCPA prohibits a debt collector from using any false and/or any deceptive or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of a debt, including, but not limited to, the false representation of the character, amount or legal status of any debt, see 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A). Demanding payment of a debt that is no longer owed, due to a bankruptcy, constitutes the use of false and/or deceptive or misleading representations or means in connection with the collection of a debt, in violation of § 1692e of the FDCPA, see, Randolph, 368 F3d at 728-730. 44. Defendants, by continuing to attempt to collect a debt from Plaintiff which was subject to her bankruptcy, via telephone calls and text messages to her cell phone, used false and/or deceptive or misleading means to attempt to collect a debt, in violation of § 1692e of the FDCPA. 45. Moreover, § 1692c(c) of the FDCPA prohibits a debt collector from 10 communicating with a consumer after a direction to cease communications, and from continuing to demand payment of a debt that the consumer has indicated that they refuse to pay. See, 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(c). 46. Here, the bankruptcy and the notice issued by that court (Exhibit D) told Defendants to cease communications and cease collections. By continuing to communicate regarding this debt and demanding payment, Defendants violated § 1692c(c) of the FDCPA. 47. Additionally, § 1692c(a)(2) of the FDCPA prohibits a debt collector from communicating with a consumer if the debt collector knows the consumer is represented by an attorney with respect to such debt and has knowledge of, or can readily ascertain, such attorney’s name and address, see, 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(a)(2). 48. Defendants were given direct, written notice, through Plaintiff’s bankruptcy, that Plaintiff was represented by an attorney in connection with her debts. Accordingly, Defendants were aware of Plaintiff’s bankruptcy before it made the collection phone calls and texts. By continuing to call and text Plaintiff directly, despite direct, written notice that she was represented by counsel, Defendants violated § 1692c(a)(2) of the FDCPA. 49. Defendants’ violations of the FDCPA render them liable for statutory damages, costs, and reasonable attorneys’ fees. See, 15 U.S.C. § 1692k. 50. Plaintiff Lanteri, individually and on behalf of all other similarly situated, brings, the above claim on behalf of a Class and four Sub-Classes. The TCPA Class consists of: (1) All persons in the United States (2) to whose cellular telephone number (3) Defendants placed a non-emergency telephone call (4) using an automatic 11 telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice (5) within 4 years of the complaint (6) where Defendants did not have express consent to call said cellular telephone number OR where consent had been revoked for any such calls. The TCPA Stop Text Sub-Class consists of: (1) All persons in the United States (2) to whose cellular telephone number (3) Defendants placed a non-emergency telephone call via text message (4) using an automatic telephone dialing system (5) within 4 years of the complaint (6) where the person previously replied to a text from Defendants with the message Stop. The TCPA Bankruptcy Stay Sub-Class consists of: (1) All persons in the United States (2) to whose cellular telephone number (3) Defendants placed a non-emergency telephone call (4) using an automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice (5) within 4 years of the complaint (6) during the period of an automatic stay from a Bankruptcy Court. The TCPA Cease Communication Represented By Attorney Sub-Class consists of: (1) All persons in the United States (2) to whose cellular telephone number (3) Defendants placed a non-emergency telephone call (4) using an automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice (5) within 4 years of the complaint (6) where Defendants received written notice that the person was represented by an attorney and to cease communication. The FDCPA Sub-Class consists of: (1) All persons in the United States (2) to whose cellular telephone number (3) Defendants placed a non-emergency telephone call (4) using an automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice (5) within 1 year of the complaint (6) while that person’s debt was subject to or discharged in a bankruptcy or was subject to a notice of attorney representation, or was subject to a cease communication request. 51. Plaintiff represents and is a member of the Class and the Sub-Classes. Excluded from the Class and Sub-Classes are Defendants and any entities in which Defendants have a controlling interest, Defendants’ agents and employees, the Judge to whom this action is assigned and any member of the Judge’s staff and immediate family, and claims for personal injury, wrongful death and/or emotional distress. 12 52. Plaintiff does not know the exact number of members in the Class and Sub-Classes, but based upon the size and national scope of Defendants’ business, as well as its creditor client, along with the nature of the message campaign to plaintiff, plaintiff reasonably believes that class members number at minimum in the hundreds if not thousands. 53. Plaintiff and all members of the class and sub-class have been harmed by the acts of Defendants. 54. This Class Action Complaint seeks money damages and injunctive relief. 55. The joinder of all class members is impracticable due to the size and relatively modest value of each individual claim. The disposition of the claims in a class action will provide substantial benefit to the parties and the Court in avoiding a multiplicity of identical suits. The class can be identified easily through records maintained by Defendants. 56. There are questions of law and fact common to the members of the class and sub-class, which common questions predominate over any questions that affect only individual class members. Those common questions of law and fact include, but are not limited to: a. Whether the Defendants engaged in a pattern of using automated equipment or pre-recorded voices to place calls to cellular telephones; b. Whether the Bankruptcy Court’s Automatic Stay and/or the Discharge Injunction revoked consent for any calls to be placed to cellular telephone numbers; c. Whether Defendants ignored stop texting messages that revoked 13 consent; d. Whether the Defendants thereby violated the TCPA; e. Whether Defendants ignored notices of consumer’s bankruptcy filings or attorney representation and/or cease communications and instead kept calling and texting those consumers; and, f. Whether Defendants thereby violated the FDCPA. 57. As a person who received numerous and repeated telephone calls using an automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice, without her prior express consent within the meaning of the TCPA, and during the period of the Automatic Bankruptcy stay, plaintiff asserts claims that are typical of the members of the class member and each sub-class. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the class and sub-classes, and has no interests which are antagonistic to any member of the class or sub-classes. 58. Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in handling class action claims involving violations of federal and state consumer protection statutes such as the TCPA and the FDCPA. 59. A class action is the superior method for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. Class-wide relief is essential to compel Defendants to comply with the TCPA and FDCPA. The interest of class members in individually controlling the prosecution of separate claims against Defendants is small because the statutory damages in an individual action for violation of the TCPA and FDCPA are small. Management of these claims is likely to present significantly fewer difficulties than are presented in many class claims because the calls at issue are all automated and the class 14 members, by definition, did not provide the prior express consent required under the statute to authorize calls to their cellular telephones. 60. Defendants have acted on grounds generally applicable to the class and sub-classes, thereby making final injunctive relief and corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole appropriate. Moreover, Plaintiff alleges that the TCPA violations complained of herein are substantially likely to continue in the future if an injunction is not entered. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff requests that the Court enter judgment in favor of Plaintiff, the Class and sub-classes and against Defendants for: A. Statutory damages pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1); B. Injunctive relief prohibiting such violations of the TCPA by Defendants in the future; C. An award of attorneys’ fees and costs to counsel for Plaintiff and the Class; D. Statutory damages pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692k, along with reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs; E. Such other relief as the Court deems just and proper. Violations Of The FDCPA Via Improper Collection Calls And Text Messages, Attempting To Collect A Debt Included In A Bankruptcy From A Consumer Represented By Counsel Violation Of The TCPA Via Improper Phone Calls And Text Messages To Cellular Phones

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2.0 guidelines; c. Regularly test user accessibility by blind or vision-impaired persons to ensure that Defendant’s Website complies under the WCAG 2.0 guidelines; and, d. Develop an accessibility policy that is clearly disclosed on Defendant’s Websites, with contact information for users to report accessibility-related problems. 24. Defendant offers the commercial website, WWW.VOYA.COM, to the public. The website offers features which should allow all consumers to access the services which Defendant offers in connection with their physical locations. The services offered by Defendant include, but are not limited to the following, which allow consumers to find out about office locations and hours and information about insurance, financial and related services and other services available online and in retail offices. 25. It is, upon information and belief, Defendant’s policy and practice to deny Plaintiff, along with other blind or visually-impaired users, access to Defendant’s website, and to therefore specifically deny the services that are offered and integrated with Defendant’s offices. Due to Defendant’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to its website, Plaintiff and visually-impaired persons have been and are still being denied equal access to Defendant’s offices and the numerous services and benefits offered to the public through the Website. 26. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient JAWS screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using the JAWS screen-reader. 29. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s Website, blind and visually- impaired customers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from accessing the Website. 30. These access barriers on Defendant’s Website have deterred Plaintiff from visiting Defendant’s physical office locations, and enjoying them equal to sighted individuals because: Plaintiff was unable to find the location and hours of operation of Defendant’s physical offices on its Website as well as other important information, preventing Plaintiff from visiting the locations to purchase services, and to obtain quotes for insurance and related policies such as annuities or to access his account. 31. If the Website was equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 32. Through his attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 34. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 35. The ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks in this action. In relevant part, the ADA requires: In the case of violations of . . . this title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities . . . Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the . . . modification of a policy . . . 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 37. If the Website was accessible, Plaintiff and similarly situated blind and visually-impaired people could independently view service items, locate Defendant’s office locations and hours of operation, shop for and otherwise research related services available via the Website. 38. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 40. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 41. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of services offered in Defendant’s physical locations, during the relevant statutory period. 42. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks certify a New York State subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the State of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of services offered in Defendant’s physical locations, during the relevant statutory period. 43. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of services offered in Defendant’s physical locations, during the relevant statutory period. 45. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class and the Subclasses. The Class, and the Subclasses, similarly to the Plaintiff, are severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA, NYSHRL or NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so either can be independently accessible to the Class. 47. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 48. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 49. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 50. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 51. Defendant’s offices are public accommodations within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege, or advantage of Defendant’s offices. The Website is a service that is heavily integrated with these locations and is a gateway thereto. 53. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 54. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 56. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 57. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Subclass Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 58. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 59. Defendant’s physical locations are located in State of New York and throughout the United States and constitute sales establishments and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant. Defendant’s Website is a service that is by and heavily integrated with these physical locations and is a gateway thereto. 60. Defendant is subject to New York Human Rights Law because it owns and operates its physical locations and Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 62. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(i), unlawful discriminatory practice includes, among other things, “a refusal to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless such person can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations being offered or would result in an undue burden". 63. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(ii), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 65. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the class on the basis of a disability in violation of the NYSHRL, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 66. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 67. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Subclass Members on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Defendant’s Website and its physical locations under § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the State Subclass Members will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 68. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 70. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 71. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 72. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Subclass Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 73. Plaintiff served notice thereof upon the attorney general as required by N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41. 74. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40 provides that “all persons within the jurisdiction of this state shall be entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of any places of public accommodations, resort or amusement, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons. No persons, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or employee of any such place shall directly or indirectly refuse, withhold from, or deny to any person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof . . .” 76. Defendant’s New York State physical locations are sales establishments and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant and its Website is a service that is by and heavily integrated with these establishments and is a gateway thereto. 77. Defendant is subject to New York Civil Rights Law because it owns and operates its physical locations and Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Civil Law § 40-c(2). 78. Defendant is violating N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with Defendant’s physical locations to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 79. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41 states that “any corporation which shall violate any of the provisions of sections forty, forty-a, forty-b or forty two . . . shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby . . .” 81. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 82. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Subclass Members on the basis of disability are being directly or indirectly refused, withheld from, or denied the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof in § 40 et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. 83. Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages of five hundred dollars per instance, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Civil Law § 40 et seq. for each and every offense. 84. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York City Subclass Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 86. Defendant’s locations are sales establishments and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9), and its Website is a service that is integrated with its establishments. 87. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates its physical locations in the City of New York and its Website, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 88. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with its physical locations to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 89. Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). 91. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 92. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclasses on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of its Website and its establishments under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the subclass will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 93. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 94. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to sec. 8-502(a). 95. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 96. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 97. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class and New York State and City Subclasses Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 98. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies, that its Website contains access barriers denying blind customers the full and equal access to the goods, services and facilities of its Website and by extension its physical locations, which Defendant owns, operations and controls, fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182, et seq., N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, et seq., and N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. 99. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. Defendant’s Barriers on Its Website VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE NYSHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. VIOLATION OF THE NEW YORK STATE CIVIL RIGHTS LAW

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10. In 1974, Congress enacted the ECOA “to eradicate credit discrimination waged against women, especially married women whom creditors traditionally refused to consider for individual credit.” Mays v. Buckeye Rural Elec. Coop., 277 F.3d 873, 876 (6th Cir. 2002) (quotation marks omitted). 11. After hearing concerns from racial minorities, the elderly, and other groups, Congress expanded the ECOA’s protection in 1976 to encompass discrimination for other characteristics—such as race, religion, national origin, and age—to ensure the availability of credit to all applicants who were routinely discriminated against by lenders. RL BB Acquisition, LLC v. Bridgemill Commons Dev. Grp., LLC, 754 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing S. Rep. 94-589, at 3). 4 12. With the amendments, Congress not only expanded the scope of those protected by the ECOA, but it also enhanced the strength of those protections through the enactment of the ECOA’s notice requirements. 13. In doing so, Congress expressly identified the notice requirements as one of the bill’s “most important provisions” because it established “for the first time in federal legislation” the right of applicants “to obtain a statement of reasons for the action taken against them.” S. Rep. 94-589, at 2. 14. In particular, the ECOA requires creditors to provide “a statement of reasons” to each applicant whenever the creditor takes an “adverse action,” which is defined in relevant part as a “refusal to grant credit in substantially the amount or on substantially the terms requested in an application unless the creditor makes a counteroffer . . . .” 15 U.S.C. § 1691(6). 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(f) Individual Claim 15 U.S.C. § 1691(d) Class Claim 15. A creditor satisfies the notice requirements by either “providing a statement of reasons as a matter of course,” or giving the applicant written notice of the advese action which discloses the applicant’s right to a statement of reasons and who to contact so the statement may be obtained. 15 U.S.C. § 1691(d)(2). 16. A statement of reasons meets the requirements of the ECOA “only if it contains the specific reasons for the adverse action taken.” 15 U.S.C. § 1691(d)(3). B. McLean Mortgage Misrepresented the Reasons for the Adverse Action Taken Against Van Dyke. 17. On or around August 29, 2016, Van Dyke spoke with John Masci (“Masci”), a mortgage advisor employed by McLean Mortgage, who advised her to take her house off the market and to refinance her loan so she could keep the home and save money. 18. On or around August 31, 2016, Van Dyke applied for refinancing with McLean Mortgage, who then obtained a copy of her credit report from Credit Plus—a company 5 specializing in the assembly of information in the databases of Equifax, Experian, and Trans Union for the purpose of reselling the information to mortgage companies. 19. After Masci reviewed Van Dyke’s credit reports, he instructed Van Dyke to pay off several accounts to reduce her debt-to-credit ratio, which would increase her credit score and, thus, make her eligible for a lower interest rate. 20. Acting on the advice of Masci, Van Dyke withdrew $23,663 from a retirement account on September 13, 2016, and used it to pay off a credit card with a balance of $16,533. Van Dyke used the remaning funds to pay federal and state taxes arising from the withdrawl. 21. On October 10, 2016, Masci e-mailed Van Dyke a copy of the appraisal for her home. Masci wrote that the appraisal “came in lower than the 465k we were looking for.” To that end, Masci continued, “I’m not sure at this point how I can make this work for you.” 22. In response, Van Dyke sent an e-mail asking if she would receive the $927 paid to McLean Mortgage to process the loan “since it [was] not going to work.” Van Dyke further disputed some of the information in the appraisal regarding “comps” used for the appraisal. 23. In response, Masci indicated, “Yes, we will refund you the $927 ASAP.” 24. Over the next several weeks, Van Dyke attempted to convince Masci that the appraisal undervalued her property. 25. On October 25, 2016, Masci wrote Van Dyke an e-mail indicating, “I think it’s best that we part ways on the refinance. . . . The bottom line is we cannot make this refinance work under the terms originally agreed upon based on the current value of the property.” (Oct. 25, 2016 E-mail, attached as Exhibit. 1). 6 26. On or around December 12, 2016, Van Dyke received a Statement of Credit Denial, Termination or Change (“Adverse Action Notice”) indicating that her loan was being denied. (Dec. 12, 2016 Adverse Action Notice, attached as Exhibit 2). 27. The Adverse Action Notice indicated that the sole reason for the credit denial was that Van Dyke withdrew her application. 28. Defendant’s Adverse Action Notice violated § 1691(d)(3) of the ECOA because it misrepresented and failed to accurately provide the specific reasons for the adverse action taken. 29. Upon information and belief, the Adverse Action Notice is a form letter used by McLean Mortgage when it takes adverse action against consumers who applied for financing with McLean Mortgage. C. McLean Mortgage Misrepresented the Reasons for the Adverse Action Taken Against Alvarado. 30. On or around April 21, 2016, Alvarado applied for a home loan with McLean Mortgage. Plaintiff sought a loan of approximately $180,000. 31. After reviewing his credit reports, an employee of McLean Mortgage, Jeremy Johnson, informed Plaintiff that he needed a down payment of $10,000 in order to qualify for the $180,000 loan. 32. On or around August 17, 2016, Alvarado received a Statement of Credit Denial, Termination or Change (“Adverse Action Notice”) indicating that his loan was being denied. (Apr. 17, 2016 Adverse Action Notice, attached as Exhibit 3). 33. The Adverse Action Notice indicated that the sole reason for the credit denial was that Alvarado withdrew his application. 34. This was false—Alvarado never withdrew his application nor suggested an intent to do so to McLean Mortgage. 7 35. Defendant’s Adverse Action Notice violated § 1691(d)(3) of the ECOA because it misrepresented and failed to accurately provide the specific reasons for the adverse action taken. D. McLean Mortgage Impermissibly Obtained Van Dyke’s Consumer Reports. 36. On December 4, 2016, Van Dyke obtained a copy of her credit report from Equifax, which showed that McLean Mortgage obtained her credit report from Equifax on November 10, 2016—more than two weeks after Masci informed Van Dyke that she could not qualify for the refinancing. 37. As of November 10, 2016, Van Dyke did not have a credit relationship with McLean Mortgage, nor did she authorize McLean Mortgage to pull her report. 38. Because it denied her application for financing, McLean Mortgage knew or should have known that it did not have a permissible purpose to obtain Van Dykes’s credit reports. 39. As a result of its impermissible acquisition of Van Dyke’s reports, McLean Mortgage willfully violated § 1681b(f) of the FCRA. 40. Plaintiffs restate each of the allegations in the preceding paragraphs as if set forth at length herein. 41. The ECOA Class. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, Plaintiffs bring this action individually and on behalf of a class initially defined as follows: All natural persons who: (1) applied for credit to McLean Mortgage within the preceding five years; (2) were not offered credit by McLean Mortgage; and (3) were provided with an ECOA adverse action notice by McLean Mortgage that indicated that the principal reason for the denial was a withdrawn application. 8 42. Numerosity, Fed. R. Civ. P 23(a)(1). Upon information and belief, Plaintiffs allege that the class is so numerous that joinder of all is impractical. The names and addresses of the class members are identifiable through the internal business records maintained by Defendant, and the class members may be notified of the pendency of this action by published and/or mailed notice. The Fourth Circuit has held that classes consisting of as few as 18 members will satisfy the numerosity requirement. Defendant’s procedure for generation of the subject form letter appears to be automated and systemic, evidencing a likelihood that Defendant sent at least 100 such letters during the last five years. 43. Common Questions of Law and Fact, Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2). Common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the putative class. These questions predominate over the questions affecting only individual members. These include, by example only and without limitation: a. Whether McLean Mortgage violated the ECOA when it misrepresented that the reason for its adverse action was a withdrawn application; and b. Whether McLean Mortgage’s violation of the ECOA was willful. 44. Typicality, Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3). Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims of each putative class member. Plaintiffs are entitled to relief under the same causes of action as other members of the putative class. 45. Adequacy of Representation, Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4). Plaintiffs are adequate representatives of the putative class because: their interests coincide with, and are not antagonistic to, the interests of the members of the putative class they seek to represent; they have retained counsel competent and experienced in such litigation; and they intend to prosecute this action vigorously. The interests of the members of the putative class will be fairly and adequately protected by Plaintiffs and their counsel. 9 46. Superiority, Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). Questions of law and fact common to the putative class members predominate over questions affecting only individual members, and a class action is superior to other available methods for fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. The damages suffered by each member are such that individual prosecution would prove burdensome and expensive give the number of individuals affected by McLean Mortgage’s actions. Even if the members of the class themselves could individually afford such litigation, it would be an unnecessary burden on the Courts. Furthermore, individualized litigation presents a potential for inconsistent or contradictory judgments and increases the delay and expense to all parties and to the court system presented by the legal and factual issues raised by McLean Mortgage’s conduct. By contrast, the class action device will result in substantial benefits to the litigants and the Court by allowing the Court to resolve numerous individual claims based on a single set of proof in a case. 47. Injunctive and Declaratory Relief Appropriate for the Class, Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). Class certification is appropriate because Mclean Mortgage acted on grounds generally applicable to the class, making appropriate equitable declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiffs and the putative class members. 48. As alleged above, Defendant failed to provide each Plaintiff with an adequate and truthful statement of its reasons for taking the adverse action in violation of the ECOA, 15 U.S.C. §1691(d). 49. As a result of Defendant’s conduct, Plaintiffs and the class members suffered concrete and particularized injuries, including informational injuries, deprivation of the opportunity to meaningfully challenge Defendant’s adverse actions, and increased risk that they were denied for discriminatory purposes. 10 50. Based on Defendant’s failure to provide a notice appropriate under the ECOA, Plaintiffs and the putative class members are further entitled to declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2) requiring that McLean Mortgage provide an appropriate notice with the reason for denial of credit to Plaintiffs and the putative class members; that McLean Mortgage be ordered to comply with the ECOA notice provisions in all future similar transactions; and a declaration that Defendant violated the ECOA for each class member. 51. Plaintiffs incorporate the paragraphs above as if fully set out herein. 52. The Virginia ECOA Class. Pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiffs bring this claim for themselves and on behalf of a subclass within the putative ECOA class (“the Virginia ECOA class”) of similarly situated individuals initially defined as follows: All natural persons who: (1) applied for credit to McLean Mortgage within the preceding four years; (2) had their mailing address within the Commonwealth of Virginia at the time; and (3) were provided with an adverse action notice by Mclean Mortgage that indicated that the principal reason for the denial was a withdrawn application by the borrower. 53. Numerosity, Fed. R. Civ. P 23(a)(1). Upon information and belief, Plaintiffs allege that the class members are so numerous that joinder of all is impractical. The names and addresses of the class members are identifiable through the internal business records maintained by McLean Mortgage, and the class members may be notified of the pendency of this action by published and/or mailed notice. 54. Predominance of Common Questions of Law and Fact, Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2). Common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the putative class. These 11 questions predominate over the questions affecting only individual members and include those alleged in Count One. 55. Typicality, Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3). Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims of each putative class member. Plaintiffs are entitled to relief under the same causes of action as other members of the putative class. 56. Adequacy of Representation, Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4). Plaintiffs are adequate representatives of the putative class because: their interests coincide with, and are not antagonistic to, the interests of the members of the putative class they seek to represent; they have retained counsel competent and experienced in such litigation; and they intend to prosecute this action vigorously. The interests of the members of the putative class will be fairly and adequately protected by Plaintiffs and their counsel. 57. Superiority, Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). Questions of law and fact common to the putative class members predominate over questions affecting only individual members, and a class action is superior to other available methods for fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. The damages suffered by each member are such that individual prosecution would prove burdensome and expensive give the number of individuals affected by McLean Mortgage’s actions. Even if the members of the class themselves could individually afford such litigation, it would be an unnecessary burden on the Courts. Furthermore, individualized litigation presents a potential for inconsistent or contradictory judgments and increases the delay and expense to all parties and to the court system presented by the legal and factual issues raised by McLean Mortgage’s conduct. By contrast, the class action device will result in substantial benefits to the litigants and the Court by allowing the Court to resolve numerous individual claims based on a single set of proof in a case. 12 58. Relief Appropriate for the Class, Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). Class certification is appropriate, because McLean Mortgage acted on grounds generally applicable to the class, making appropriate equitable declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the putative class members. 59. Defendant willfully and intentionally violated Va. Code § 59.1-21.21:1(D) by taking an adverse action against Plaintiff and the class members’ applications for credit without providing each of them with a written statement of the reasons for the action. 60. As a result of Defendant’s conduct, Plaintiffs and the class members suffered concrete and particularized injuries, including informational injuries and deprivation of the opportunity to meaningfully challenge Defendant’s adverse actions. 61. Based on Defendant’s failure to provide a notice appropriate under VECOA to members of the putative class and for its failure to identify the reasons for denial of credit to the members of the putative class, Defendant is liable to Plaintiffs and each of the putative class members for statutory punitive damages of $10,000.00, attorneys’ fees, and costs. 62. Van Dyke restates each of the allegations in the preceding paragraphs as if set forth at length herein. 63. McLean Mortgage violated the FCRA, 15 U.S.C. §1681b(f) by obtaining and using Van Dyke’s consumer reports without a permissible purpose to do so. 64. As a result of McLean Mortgage’s conduct, Van Dyke suffered actual damages, including without limitation: credit damage, invasion of her privacy, and emotional distress. 13 65. McLean Mortgage’s conduct was willful, rendering it liable for punitive damages in an amount to be determined pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1681n. In the alternative, it was negligent, entitling Van Dyke to recover under 15 U.S.C. §1681o. 66. Van Dyke is also entitled to recover actual damages, statutory damages, costs and attorneys’ fees in an amount to be determined pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681n and 1681o. WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs move for judgment against Defendant for themselves and on behalf of the defined classes for statutory and punitive damages; equitable and injunctive relief; attorneys’ fees; costs; and such other specific or general relief the Court finds just and appropriate. Plaintiff Van Dyke further moves for judgment against Defendant as to her individual claims for her actual, statutory, and punitive damages, as well as for her attorneys’ fees and costs. A. Purpose and Requirements of the ECOA. Code of Virginia §59.1-21.21:1(D) Class Claim

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19. MGT and its subsidiaries were historically engaged in the business of acquiring, developing, and monetizing assets in the online and mobile gaming space as well as the social casino industry. Materially False and Misleading Statements Issued During the Class Period 35. Plaintiff brings this action as a class action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) and (b)(3) on behalf of a class, consisting of all persons and entities that acquired MGT’s securities between May 9, 2016, and September 20, 2016, inclusive, and who were damaged thereby (the “Class”). Excluded from the Class are Defendants, the officers and directors of the Company, at all relevant times, members of their immediate families and their legal representatives, heirs, successors, or assigns, and any entity in which Defendants have or had a controlling interest. 46. As alleged herein, Defendants acted with scienter since Defendants knew that the public documents and statements issued or disseminated in the name of the Company were materially false and/or misleading; knew that such statements or documents would be issued or disseminated to the investing public; and knowingly and substantially participated or acquiesced in the issuance or dissemination of such statements or documents as primary violations of the federal securities laws. As set forth elsewhere herein in detail, Ladd, by virtue of his receipt of information reflecting the true facts regarding MGT, his control over, and/or receipt and/or modification of MGT’s allegedly materially misleading misstatements and/or their associations with the Company which made him privy to confidential proprietary information concerning MGT, participated in the fraudulent scheme alleged herein. 53. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained above as if fully set forth herein. 54. During the Class Period, Defendants carried out a plan, scheme and course of conduct which was intended to and, throughout the Class Period, did: (i) deceive the investing public, including Plaintiff and other Class members, as alleged herein; and (ii) cause Plaintiff and other members of the Class to purchase MGT’s securities at artificially inflated prices. In furtherance of this unlawful scheme, plan and course of conduct, Defendants, and each defendant, took the actions set forth herein. 55. Defendants (i) employed devices, schemes, and artifices to defraud; (ii) made untrue statements of material fact and/or omitted to state material facts necessary to make the statements not misleading; and (iii) engaged in acts, practices, and a course of business which operated as a fraud and deceit upon the purchasers of the Company’s securities in an effort to maintain artificially high market prices for MGT’s securities in violation of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5. All Defendants are sued either as primary participants in the wrongful and illegal conduct charged herein or as controlling persons as alleged below. 56. Defendants, individually and in concert, directly and indirectly, by the use, means or instrumentalities of interstate commerce and/or of the mails, engaged and participated in a continuous course of conduct to conceal adverse material information about MGT’s financial well-being and prospects, as specified herein. 64. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained above as if fully set forth herein. Background Violation of Section 10(b) of The Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 Promulgated Thereunder Against All Defendants Violation of Section 20(a) of The Exchange Act Against Defendant Ladd

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23. This lawsuit is brought on behalf of an ascertainable statewide class, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, consisting of: All Ikea customers who were requested or required to provide, and did provide and had recorded, their personal identification information (which includes, but is not limited to, a customer’s address, ZIP code, telephone number, and/or email address), during a credit card transaction at an Ikea store in California [during the Class Period], and who took all of their purchases with them at the conclusion of the transaction. 24. The members of the class are so numerous that joinder of all members is impractical. While the exact number of class members is unknown to Plaintiff at this time, such information can be ascertained through appropriate discovery, from records maintained by IKEA and its agents.

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10. Defendant’s calls constituted calls that were not for emergency purposes as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A). 11. Defendant’s calls were placed to telephone number assigned to a cellular telephone service for which Plaintiff incurs a charge for incoming calls pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1). 13. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, as a member of the proposed class (hereafter “The Class”) defined as follows: All persons within the United States who received any telephone calls from Defendant to said person’s cellular telephone made through the use of any automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice and such person had not previously consented to receiving such calls within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint through the date of class certification. 14. Plaintiff represents, and is a member of, The Class, consisting of All persons within the United States who received any telephone calls from Defendant to said person’s cellular telephone made through the use of any automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice and such person had not previously not provided their cellular telephone number to Defendant within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint. 15. Defendant, its employees and agents are excluded from The Class. Plaintiff does not know the number of members in The Class, but believes the Class members number in the thousands, if not more. Thus, this matter should be certified as a Class Action to assist in the expeditious litigation of the matter. 8. Beginning on or around November 20, 2019, Defendant contacted Plaintiff on her cellular telephone, (760) 689-2784, in an effort to sell or solicit its services. 9. Defendant used an “automatic telephone dialing system”, as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1) to place multiple calls to Plaintiff seeking to sell or solicit its business services. At one or more instance during these calls, Defendant utilized an “artificial or prerecorded voice” as prohibited by 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A). Knowing and/or Willful Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 47 U.S.C. §227 et seq. • As a result of Defendant’s willful and/or knowing violations of 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(1), Plaintiff and the Class members are entitled to and request treble damages, as provided by statute, up to $1,500, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(3)(C); and • Any and all other relief that the Court deems just and proper. Respectfully Submitted this 27th day of March, 2020.

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1. Whether Plaintiff and Class Members registered a phone number on the National Do Not Call Registry; 10. Whether Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to any other relief. 2. Whether, during the class period Defendants or their agents called (other than a phone call made for emergency purposes or made with the prior consent of the called party) to a Class member using any automatic dialing to any telephone number assigned to a cellular phone service; 20. Defendants are companies that engage in the marketing, sale, and finance of vehicle service contracts to consumers across the country. 21. Defendant, HARD TACK, is a sales agent, vendor, and/or dealer for the product and services promoted by Defendants through the use of the unlawful telemarketing campaign. 23. Defendant ROYAL is the administrator and is the party responsible for administering the benefits of the product and services promoted by Defendants. 24. To increase the sales volume and profits of their vehicle service contracts, Defendants and/or their authorized sales agents repeatedly called thousands of consumers using an automatic telephone dialing system in violation of the TCPA. 25. When Plaintiff and the Class members answered their phones, they heard silence for several seconds, followed by a distinct “click” sound before being transferred to a live agent, evidencing that the use of an automatic telephone dialing system was used to place the unwanted calls. 26. Defendants and/or their authorized sales agents used an ATDS to conceal or “spoof” their actual phone number to trick Plaintiffs into answering a familiar number. 27. During all times relevant hereto, Plaintiff was a “person” as that term is defined under the TCPA. 28. Plaintiff registered her personal cell phone number ending in 7548 on the National Do- Not-Call Registry on or about April 28, 2005. 29. On January 17, 2020, at 5:09 p.m. Plaintiff received a call on her personal cell phone from a number ending in 6702. 3. How Defendants obtained the phone numbers of Plaintiff and Class members; 31. On January 22, 2020, at 5:24 p.m. Plaintiff received a call from the same phone number ending in 6702 that called her on January 17, 2020, at 5:09 p.m. 32. On January 27, 2020, at 11:18 a.m. Plaintiff received another call on her cell phone from the same phone number ending in 6702 that had called her on January 17, 2020, and January 22, 2020. 33. When Plaintiff answered her phone, Plaintiff again heard silence for several seconds followed by the same distinct “click” sound before being transferred to a live agent. 34. The live agent advised Plaintiff that she was eligible for a warranty for her 2012 Dodge Challenger. 35. Plaintiff advised the live agent that she was in the middle of working and the live agent terminated the call. 36. On February 5, 2020, at 4:40 p.m. Plaintiff received another call on her phone from the same phone number ending in 6702. 37. On February 7, 2020, at 1:50 p.m. Plaintiff received another call on her phone, this time from a number ending in “6701” – one digit off from the numbers that had previously called her. This evidences Defendants’ efforts to “spoof” or conceal their identity in order to increase the likelihood that Plaintiff would again answer the phone. The same distinct pause and click was heard before being transferred to a live agent. 39. Through the above unsolicited phone calls, Defendants contacted Plaintiff on Plaintiff’s cellular telephone regarding an unsolicited service via an “automatic telephone dialing system” (“ATDS”), as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1) and prohibited by 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A). 4. Whether the dialing system used to call is an Automatic Telephone Dialing System; 40. At the beginning of each call Plaintiff heard silence, followed by audible clicks that are associated with and indicate that an auto-dialer was used, and then after several seconds, the call was transferred to a live person. Upon information and belief, these facts demonstrate that the calls were made using an ATDS. 41. Upon information and belief, this ATDS has the capacity to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator. 42. Upon information and belief, this ATDS has the capacity to store numbers and to dial numbers without human intervention. 43. Upon information and belief, Defendant used a combination of hardware and software systems which have the capacity to generate or store random or sequential numbers or to dial sequentially or randomly in an automated fashion without human intervention. 44. Defendants utilized the ATDS to send the subject phone calls en masse to Plaintiff and Class Members using an autodial function regardless of whether these individuals had provided express written consent or had registered their phone numbers on the National Do Not Call Registry. 46. The telephone number Defendants called was assigned to a cellular telephone service for which Plaintiff incurs a charge for incoming calls pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1). 47. These calls were not for emergency purposes as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(i). 48. Plaintiff did not provide Defendants or its agents prior consent to receive these calls to her cellular telephone; therefore, the unsolicited messages violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1). 49. Defendants are and were aware that they were placing unsolicited calls to Plaintiff and other consumers without their prior consent. Defendants have previously been sued for the same unlawful conduct alleged in this Complaint. 5. Whether Defendants engaged in telemarketing content when it made the calls which are the subject of this lawsuit; 50. Plaintiff was damaged by Defendants’ calls. In addition to using Plaintiff’s cellular data, phone storage, and battery life, her privacy was wrongfully invaded, her seclusion was intruded upon, and Plaintiff has become understandably aggravated with having to deal with the frustration of repeated, unwanted phone calls, forcing her to divert attention away from her personal time and homelife, and causing disruption to her work and other activities. Not only did the receipt of the phone calls distract and take time away from Plaintiff’s personal activities, Plaintiff was forced to spend time investigating the calls. See Muransky v. Godiva Chocolatier, Inc., 905 F.3d 1200, 1211 (11th Cir. 2018). (“[T]ime wasting is an injury in fact”…. “[A] small injury… is enough for standing purposes”). 52. Plaintiff had no relationship with Defendants prior to these illegal phone calls. 53. To the extent Defendants outsourced their illegal robocalling, they are still liable for calls that violate the TCPA. 54. On May 9, 2013, the FCC determined that this was not a basis for avoiding liability within a Declaratory Ruling that held that sellers may not avoid liability by outsourcing telemarketing: [A]llowing the seller to avoid potential liability by outsourcing its telemarketing activities to unsupervised third parties would leave consumers in many cases without an effective remedy for telemarketing intrusions. This would particularly be so if the telemarketers were judgment proof, unidentifiable, or located outside of the United States, as is often the case. Even where third-party telemarketers are identifiable, solvent, and amenable to judgment limiting liability to the telemarketer that physically places the call would make enforcement in many cases substantially more expensive and less efficient, since consumers (or law enforcement agencies) would be required to sue each marketer separately in order to obtain relief. As the FTC noted, because “[s]ellers may have thousands of “independent” marketers, suing one or a few of them is unlikely to make a substantive difference for consumer privacy. May 2013 FCC Ruling, 28 FCC Rcd at 6588 (¶37) (internal citations omitted). 55. Moreover, the May 2013 FCC Ruling rejected a narrow view of TCPA liability, including the assertion that a seller’s liability requires a finding of formal actual agency and immediate direction and control over third parties who place a telemarketing call. Id. at 6587 n. 107. 57. Even if Defendants did not personally place the TCPA-violating calls, Defendants are still liable for the telemarketers’ actions if they took steps to cause or approve the calls to be made, or if the calls were made pursuant to the Defendants’ actual authority, apparent authority and/or ratification of the calls, and because they were acting as a joint enterprise or in concert with each other. 58. Defendants authorized their telemarketers to generate prospective customers. Defendants’ utilized a systematic telemarketing campaign whereby robocalls were placed in a seamless process to make it appear to Plaintiff and Class Members that Defendants were calling them directly from Defendants’ the telemarketing department. 59. Defendants hired, permitted, and enjoyed the benefits of the mass robocalling. 6. Whether the calls made to Plaintiff and Class Members violate the TCPA and its regulations; 60. The FCC has explained that its “rules generally establish that the party on whose behalf a solicitation is made bears ultimate responsibility for any violations.” See In re Rules & Regulations Implementing the TCPA, CC Docket No. 92-90, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 10 FCC Rcd 12391, 12397 (13) (1995). 61. The FCC stated within their January 4, 2008 ruling, that a company on whose behalf a telephone call is made bears the ultimate responsibility for any violations. 63. Defendants requested and sought from its telemarketers to solicit particular target customer profiles on a mass scale. 64. Defendants specified the criteria of potential customers that would be most profitable for Defendants to sell to after they had been robocalled. 65. Defendants integrated their systems with their marketers so they could access the records of people with whom they executed contracts. 66. On information and belief, Defendants had access to the sales and customers generated by the illegal robocalling at issue in this case. 67. The May 2013 FCC Ruling also clarifies circumstances under which a telemarketer has apparent authority. 68. Defendants authorized their marketers to generate prospective customers for them. 69. Plaintiff reasonably believed that telemarketers who called her had received permission and instructions to conduct activity on behalf of Defendants. 7. Whether Defendants willfully or knowingly violated the TCPA or the rules prescribed under it; 70. Further, Defendants ratified the unlawful calls by knowingly accepting business that originated through illegal robocalls. 72. By accepting these contacts and relying on them to execute contracts, Defendants “manifest[ed] assent or otherwise consent[ed]… to act” on behalf of its telemarketers , as described in the Restatement (Third) of Agency. 73. Defendants further ratified the TCPA violations by knowingly accepting the benefit of large volume of sales, despite that these sales were generated illegally. 74. Defendants took advantage of the violations by having their salespeople solicit the prospective customers while turning a blind eye to the way the potential customer was identified. 76. Excluded from the Classes are Defendants, and any subsidiary or affiliate of Defendants, and the directors, officers and employees of Defendant or their subsidiaries or affiliates, and members of the federal judiciary. 77. This action has been brought and may properly be maintained as a class action against Defendants pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because there is a well- defined community of interest in the litigation and the proposed Class is easily ascertainable. Plaintiff reserves the right to amend the Class definition if discovery and further investigation reveal that any Class should be expanded or otherwise modified. 78. Numerosity: At this time, Plaintiff does not know the exact number of Class Members, but among other things, given the nature of the claims and that Defendant’s conduct consisted of standardized marketing phone calls placed to cellular telephone numbers, Plaintiff believes, at a minimum, there are greater than forty (40) Class Members. Plaintiff believes that the Class is so numerous that joinder of all members of the Class is impracticable and the disposition of their claims in a class action rather than incremental individual actions will benefit the Parties and the Court by eliminating the possibility of inconsistent or varying adjudications of individual actions. 79. Upon information and belief, a more precise Class size and the identities of the individual members thereof are ascertainable through Defendant’s records, including, but not limited to Defendant’s calls and personnel records. 81. Existence and Predominance of Common Questions of Fact and Law: There is a well-defined community of common questions of fact and law affecting the Plaintiff and members of the Class. Common questions of law and/or fact exist as to all members of the Class and predominate over the questions affecting individual Class members. These common legal and/or factual questions include, but are not limited to, the following: 82. One or more questions or issues of law and/or fact regarding Defendants’ liability are common to all Class Members and predominate over any individual issues that may exist and may serve as a basis for class certification under Rule 23(c)(4). 83. Typicality: Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the members of the Classes. The claims of the Plaintiff and members of the Classes are based on the same legal theories and arise from the same course of conduct that violates the TCPA. 84. Plaintiff and members of the Do-Not-Call-Registry Class each received more than one phone call within a 12-month time period, which Defendant placed or caused to be placed to Plaintiff and the members of the Class. 85. Adequacy of Representation: Plaintiff is an adequate representative of the Class because Plaintiff’s interests do not conflict with the interests of the members of the Class. Plaintiff will fairly, adequately and vigorously represent and protect the interests of the members of the Class and has no interests antagonistic to the members of the Class. Plaintiff has retained counsel competent and experienced in litigation in the federal courts, TCPA litigation, and class action litigation. 87. Class-Wide Injunctive Relief and Rule 23(b)(2): Moreover, as an alternative to or in addition to certification of the Class under Rule 23(b)(3), class certification is warranted under Rule 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted on grounds generally applicable to Plaintiff and members of Class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and Class Members as a whole. Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief on behalf of Class Members on grounds generally applicable to the entire Class in order to enjoin and prevent Defendant’s ongoing violations of the TCPA, and to order Defendant to provide notice to them of their rights under the TCPA to statutory damages and to be free from unwanted calls. 88. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 88 above as though fully stated herein. 89. It is a violation of the TCPA to make “any call (other than a call made for emergency purposes or made with the prior express consent of the called party) using any automatic telephone dialing system. . .to any telephone number assigned to a . . . cellular telephone service . . .” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). 9. Whether Plaintiff and members of the Class are entitled to a permanent injunction enjoining Defendants from continuing to engage in its unlawful conduct; and 90. Automatic telephone dialing system refers to “equipment which has the capacity-- -(A) to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator; and (B) to dial such numbers.” 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1). 91. Defendant, DRS – or third parties directed by Defendant – used equipment having the capacity to randomly or sequentially generate telephone numbers and to dial such numbers without human intervention to make non-emergency telephone calls to the cellular telephones of Plaintiff and the other members of the Class defined above. 92. These calls were made without regard to whether or not Defendant had first obtained express permission from the called party to make such calls. In fact, Defendant did not have prior express consent to call the cellular phones of Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class when its calls were made. 93. Defendant has, therefore, violated Sec. 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) of the TCPA by using an automatic telephone dialing system to make non-emergency telephone calls to the cellular phones of Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class without their prior express written consent. 95. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant constitutes numerous and multiple violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. 96. As a result of Defendant’s negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq., Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to an award of $500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). 97. At all relevant times, Defendant knew or should have known that its conduct as alleged herein violated the TCPA. 98. Defendant knew that it did not have prior express consent to make these calls, and knew or should have known that its conduct was a violation of the TCPA.

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2.1 guidelines; c. Regularly test user accessibility by blind or vision-impaired persons to ensure that Defendant’s Website complies under the WCAG 2.1 guidelines; and, d. Develop an accessibility policy that is clearly disclosed on Defendant’s Websites, with contact information for users to report accessibility-related problems. 21. Defendant is a motorcycle, ATV, and snowmobile parts and accessories retailer that owns and operates www.denniskirk.com (its “Website”), offering features which should allow all consumers to access the goods and services and which Defendant ensures the delivery of such goods throughout the United States, including New York State. 22. Defendant’s Website offers products and services for online sale and general delivery to the public. The Website offers features which ought to allow users to browse for items, access navigation bar descriptions, inquire about pricing, and avail consumers of the ability to peruse the numerous items offered for sale. 23. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient NVDA screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using a screen-reader. 24. On multiple occasions, the last occurring in May of 2020, Plaintiff visited Defendant’s website, www.denniskirk.com, to make a purchase. Despite her efforts, however, Plaintiff was denied a shopping experience similar to that of a sighted individual due to the website’s lack of a variety of features and accommodations, which effectively barred Plaintiff from being able to determine what specific products were offered for sale. 26. Many features on the Website also fail to Add a label element or title attribute for each field. This is a problem for the visually impaired because the screen reader fails to communicate the purpose of the page element. It also leads to the user not being able to understand what he or she is expected to insert into the subject field. As a result, Plaintiff and similarly situated visually impaired users of Defendant’s Website are unable to enjoy the privileges and benefits of the Website equally to sighted users. 27. Many pages on the Website also contain the same title elements. This is a problem for the visually impaired because the screen reader fails to distinguish one page from another. In order to fix this problem, Defendant must change the title elements for each page. 28. The Website also contained a host of broken links, which is a hyperlink to a non- existent or empty webpage. For the visually impaired this is especially paralyzing due to the inability to navigate or otherwise determine where one is on the website once a broken link is encountered. For example, upon coming across a link of interest, Plaintiff was redirected to an error page. However, the screen-reader failed to communicate that the link was broken. As a result, Plaintiff could not get back to her original search. 30. It is, upon information and belief, Defendant’s policy and practice to deny Plaintiff, along with other blind or visually-impaired users, access to Defendant’s website, and to therefore specifically deny the goods and services that are offered to the general public. Due to Defendant’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to its website, Plaintiff and visually-impaired persons have been and are still being denied equal access to Defendant’s Website, and the numerous goods and services and benefits offered to the public through the Website. 31. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s Website, blind and visually-impaired customers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, products, and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from equal access to the Website. 32. If the Website were equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 33. Through her attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 35. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 36. The ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks in this action. In relevant part, the ADA requires: In the case of violations of . . . this title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities . . . Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the . . . modification of a policy . . . 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 38. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 39. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining their Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making their Website equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 40. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 42. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered, during the relevant statutory period. 43. Common questions of law and fact exist amongst the Class, including: a. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “public accommodation” under the ADA; b. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “place or provider of public accommodation” under the NYCHRL; c. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the ADA; and d. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the NYCHRL. 45. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class Members because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the Class Members. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. 46. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 47. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 48. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 50. Defendant’s Website is a public accommodations within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). The Website is a service that is offered to the general public, and as such, must be equally accessible to all potential consumers. 51. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 52. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 53. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 55. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 56. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 57. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 58. Defendant’s Website is a sales establishment and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9). 60. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with such Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, products, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 61. Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). 62. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the Sub- Class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 64. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of its Website under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 65. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes her right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 66. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 67. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 68. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 69. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the Class and New York City Sub-Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 71. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq.

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(Against All Defendants for Violations of Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act and Rule 14a-9 Promulgated Thereunder) (Against the Individual Defendants for Violations of Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act) (Against All Defendants for Violations of Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act and 17 C.F.R. § 244.100 Promulgated Thereunder) 1.pdf. See also The Spectranetics Corp., SEC Staff Comment Letter 1 (July 18, 2017) (“Item 4. The Solicitation or Recommendation Certain Spectranetics Forecasts, page 39 . . . [P]rovide the reconciliation required under Rule 100(a) of Regulation 23. Plaintiff brings this class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 on behalf of himself and the other public shareholders of Willis Towers (the “Class”). Excluded from the Class are Defendants herein and any person, firm, trust, corporation, or other entity related to or affiliated with any Defendant. 25. Willis Towers is a global advisory, broking and solutions company that serves clients in more than 140 countries. The Company designs and delivers solutions that manage risk, optimize benefits, cultivate talent and expand the power of capital to protect and strengthen institutions and individuals. 27. Willis Towers is well-positioned for financial growth and the Merger Consideration fails to adequately compensate the Company’s shareholders. It is imperative that Defendants disclose the material information they have omitted from the Proxy, discussed in detail below, so that the Company’s shareholders can properly assess the fairness of the Merger Consideration for themselves and make an informed decision concerning whether or not to vote in favor of the Proposed Transaction. 28. If the false and/or misleading Proxy is not remedied and the Proposed Transaction is consummated, Defendants will directly and proximately have caused damages and actual economic loss (i.e. the difference between the value to be received as a result of the Proposed Transaction and the true value of their shares prior to the merger), in an amount to be determined at trial, to Plaintiff and the Class. II. The Materially Incomplete and Misleading Proxy 30. A company’s financial forecasts are material information a board relies on to determine whether to approve a merger transaction and recommend that shareholders vote to approve the transaction. Here, the Proxy discloses that “[t]he WTW Standalone Projections were prepared for internal use and to assist WTW’s financial advisor, Goldman Sachs, with its financial analyses and opinion and the WTW Board with its consideration and evaluation of the transaction. The WTW Standalone Projections were also shared with Aon.” Proxy 107. 31. When soliciting proxies from shareholders, a company must furnish the information found in Schedule 14A (codified as 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101). Item 14 of Schedule 14A sets forth the information a company must disclose when soliciting proxies regarding mergers and acquisitions. In regard to financial information, companies are required to disclose “financial information required by Article 11 of Regulation S-X[,]” which includes Item 10 of Regulation S- K. See Item 14(7)(b)(11) of 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101. 32. Under Item 10 of Regulation S-K, companies are encouraged to disclose “management’s projections of future economic performance that have a reasonable basis and are presented in an appropriate format.” 17 C.F.R. § 229.10(b). Although the SEC recognizes the usefulness of disclosing projected financial metrics, the SEC cautions companies to “take care to assure that the choice of items projected is not susceptible of misleading inferences through selective projection of only favorable items.” 17 C.F.R. § 229.10(b)(2). 34. Here, Willis Towers’ shareholders would clearly find complete and non-misleading financial projections material in deciding how to vote, considering that the Board specifically relied on the financial forecasts in reaching its decision to, among other things, approve the Merger Agreement and the transactions contemplated by it. Proxy 84. 35. As discussed further below, the non-GAAP financial projections used do not provide Willis Towers’ shareholders with a materially complete understanding of the assumptions and key factors considered in developing the financial projections, which assumptions, factors and other inputs the Board reviewed. The Financial Projections Relied on by the Board 36. The Proxy discloses that “[t]he WTW Standalone Projections were prepared for internal use and to assist WTW’s financial advisor, Goldman Sachs, with its financial analyses and opinion and the WTW Board with its consideration and evaluation of the transaction. The WTW Standalone Projections were also shared with Aon.” Id. at 107. 38. The Proxy defines Adjusted EBITDA as “net income adjusted for provision for income taxes, interest expense, depreciation and amortization, restructuring costs, transaction and integration expenses, (gain)/loss on disposal of operations and non-recurring items that, in the judgement of WTW management, significantly affect the period-over-period assessment of operating results.” Id. at 108 n.1. Nevertheless, the Proxy fails to reconcile Adjusted EBITDA to its most comparable GAAP measure or disclose the line items used to calculate Adjusted EBITDA, rendering the Proxy materially false and/or misleading. Id. at 108. 40. The Proxy defines Unlevered Free Cash Flow as “(i) Adjusted EBITDA minus (ii) cash taxes, capital expenditures, increases in net working capital, and other non-recurring cash income/(expense).” Id. at 108 n.4. Nevertheless, the Proxy fails to reconcile Unlevered Free Cash Flow to its most comparable GAAP measure or disclose the line items used to calculate Unlevered Free Cash Flow, rendering the Proxy materially false and/or misleading. Id. at 108. 41. The Proxy defines Levered Free Cash Flow as “(i) Unlevered Free Cash Flow minus (ii) tax-affected interest expense.” Id. at 108 n.5. Nevertheless, the Proxy fails to reconcile Levered Free Cash Flow to its most comparable GAAP measure or disclose the line items used to calculate Levered Free Cash Flow, rendering the Proxy materially false and/or misleading. Id. at 108. 43. Thus, the Proxy’s disclosure of these non-GAAP financial forecasts provides an incomplete and materially misleading understanding of the Company’s future financial prospects and the inputs and assumptions for which those prospects are based upon. It is clear that those inputs and assumptions were in fact forecasted and utilized in calculating the non-GAAP measures disclosed and relied on by the Board to recommend the Proposed Transaction in violation of Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act. 44. The non-GAAP financial projections disclosed on page 108 of the Proxy violate Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act because: (i) the use of such forecasted non-GAAP financial measures alone violates SEC Regulation G as a result of Defendants’ failure to reconcile those non-GAAP measures to their closest GAAP equivalent or otherwise disclose the specific financial assumptions and inputs used to calculate the non-GAAP measures; and (ii) they violate SEC Regulation 14a-9 because they are materially misleading as without any correlation with their GAAP equivalent financial metrics, shareholders are unable to discern the veracity of the financial projections. 45. As such, this information must be disclosed in order to cure the materially misleading disclosures regarding both the financial projections developed by the Company as well as the projections relied upon by the Company’s financial advisors. The Financial Projections Violate Regulation G 47. Defendants must comply with Regulation G. More specifically, the company must disclose the most directly comparable GAAP financial measure and a reconciliation (by schedule or other clearly understandable method) of the differences between the non-GAAP financial measure disclosed or released with the most comparable financial measure or measures calculated and presented in accordance with GAAP. 17 C.F.R. § 244.100. This is because the SEC believes “this reconciliation will help investors . . . to better evaluate the non-GAAP financial measures . . . . [and] more accurately evaluate companies’ securities and, in turn, result in a more accurate pricing of securities.”4 50. Compliance with Regulation G is mandatory under Section 14(a), and non- compliance constitutes a violation of Section 14(a). Thus, in order to bring the Proxy into compliance with Regulation G, Defendants must provide a reconciliation of the non-GAAP financial measures to their respective most comparable GAAP financial measures. The Financial Projections are Materially Misleading and Violate SEC Rule 14a-9 51. In addition to the Proxy’s violation of Regulation G, the lack of reconciliation or, at the very least, the line items utilized in calculating the non-GAAP measures render the financial forecasts disclosed materially misleading as shareholders are unable to understand the differences between the non-GAAP financial measures and their respective most comparable GAAP financial measures. Nor can shareholders compare the Company’s financial prospects with similarly situated companies. 52. Such projections are necessary to make the non-GAAP projections included in the Proxy not misleading for the reasons discussed above. 9 Available at https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1266719/000114420411046281/ filename1.htm. See also Actel Corporation, SEC Staff Comment Letter 2 (Oct. 13, 2010) (“Opinion of Actel’s Financial Advisor, page 24 . . . This section includes non-GAAP financial measures. Please revise to provide the disclosure required by Rule 100 of Regulation G.”), available at https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/907687/000000000010060087/filename 72. Plaintiff incorporates each and every allegation set forth above as if fully set forth herein. 74. As set forth above, the Proxy omits information required by SEC Regulation G, 17 C.F.R. § 244.100, which independently violates Section 14(a). SEC Regulation G, among other things, requires an issuer that chooses to disclose a non-GAAP measure to provide a presentation of the “most directly comparable” GAAP measure and a reconciliation “by schedule or other clearly understandable method” of the non-GAAP measure to the “most comparable” GAAP measure. 17 C.F.R. § 244.100(a). 75. The failure to reconcile the non-GAAP financial measures included in the Proxy violates Regulation G and constitutes a violation of Section 14(a). 76. As a direct and proximate result of the dissemination of the false and/or misleading Proxy Defendants used to recommend that shareholders approve the Proposed Transaction, Plaintiff and the Class will suffer damages and actual economic losses (i.e. the difference between the value they will receive as a result of the Proposed Transaction and the true value of their shares prior to the merger) in an amount to be determined at trial and are entitled to such equitable relief as the Court deems appropriate, including rescissory damages. 77. Plaintiff incorporates each and every allegation set forth above as if fully set forth herein. 79. Regulation G similarly prohibits the solicitation of shareholder votes by “mak[ing] public a non-GAAP financial measure that, taken together with the information accompanying that measure . . . contains an untrue statement of a material fact or omits to state a material fact necessary in order to make the presentation of the non-GAAP financial measure . . . not misleading.” 17 C.F.R. § 244.100(b) (emphasis added). 80. Defendants have issued the Proxy with the intention of soliciting shareholder support for the Proposed Transaction. Each of the Defendants reviewed and authorized the dissemination of the Proxy, which fails to provide critical information regarding, amongst other things, the financial projections for the Company. 81. In so doing, Defendants made untrue statements of fact and/or omitted material facts necessary to make the statements made not misleading. Each of the Individual Defendants, by virtue of their roles as directors and/or officers, were aware of the omitted information but failed to disclose such information, in violation of Section 14(a). The Individual Defendants were therefore negligent, as they had reasonable grounds to believe material facts existed that were misstated or omitted from the Proxy but nonetheless failed to obtain and disclose such information to shareholders although they could have done so without extraordinary effort. 83. The Individual Defendants knew or were negligent in not knowing that the material information identified above has been omitted from the Proxy, rendering the sections of the Proxy identified above to be materially incomplete and misleading. 84. The Individual Defendants were, at the very least, negligent in preparing and reviewing the Proxy. The preparation of a registration statement by corporate insiders containing materially false or misleading statements or omitting a material fact constitutes negligence. The Individual Defendants were negligent in choosing to omit material information from the Proxy or failing to notice the material omissions in the Proxy upon reviewing it, which they were required to do carefully as the Company’s directors. Indeed, the Individual Defendants were intricately involved in the process leading up to the signing of the Merger Agreement and the preparation of the Company’s financial projections. 85. Willis Towers is also deemed negligent as a result of the Individual Defendants’ negligence in preparing and reviewing the Proxy. 86. The misrepresentations and omissions in the Proxy are material to Plaintiff and the Class, who will be deprived of their right to cast an informed vote if such misrepresentations and omissions are not corrected prior to the vote on the Proposed Transaction. 88. Plaintiff incorporates each and every allegation set forth above as if fully set forth herein. 89. The Individual Defendants acted as controlling persons of Willis Towers within the meaning of Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act as alleged herein. By virtue of their positions as directors and/or officers of Willis Towers, and participation in and/or awareness of the Company’s operations and/or intimate knowledge of the incomplete and misleading statements contained in the Proxy filed with the SEC, they had the power to influence and control and did influence and control, directly or indirectly, the decision making of the Company, including the content and dissemination of the various statements that Plaintiff contends are materially incomplete and misleading. 90. Each of the Individual Defendants was provided with or had unlimited access to copies of the Proxy and other statements alleged by Plaintiff to be misleading prior to and/or shortly after these statements were issued and had the ability to prevent the issuance of the statements or cause the statements to be corrected. 92. In addition, as the Proxy sets forth at length, and as described herein, the Individual Defendants were involved in negotiating, reviewing, and approving the Merger Agreement. The Proxy purports to describe the various issues and information that the Individual Defendants reviewed and considered. The Individual Defendants participated in drafting and/or gave their input on the content of those descriptions. 93. By virtue of the foregoing, the Individual Defendants have violated Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act. 94. As set forth above, the Individual Defendants had the ability to exercise control over and did control a person or persons who have each violated Section 14(a) and Rule 14a-9 by their acts and omissions as alleged herein. By virtue of their positions as controlling persons, these Defendants are liable pursuant to Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act. As a direct and proximate result of Individual Defendants’ conduct, Plaintiff and the Class will be irreparably harmed. I. The Proposed Transaction

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10. Defendant used an “automatic telephone dialing system” as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1) to place its call to Plaintiff seeking to solicit its services. 11. Defendant contacted or attempted to contact Plaintiff from telephone numbers 925-828-4049 and 813-489-9986, confirmed to be Defendant’s numbers. 12. Defendant’s calls constituted calls that were not for emergency purposes as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A). 13. During all relevant times, Defendant did not possess Plaintiff’s “prior express consent” to receive calls using an automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice on its cellular telephone pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A). 14. These calls by Defendant, or its agents, violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1). 15. Plaintiff brings this action individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, as a member the proposed class (“The Class”). 8. Beginning on or about September 6, 2017, Defendant contacted Plaintiff on Plaintiff’s cellular telephone numbers ending in -0106 and -5154, in an attempt to solicit Plaintiff to purchase Defendant’s services. 9. When Plaintiff answered the phone, it heard a long pause followed by a clicking noise indicative of an automated telephone dialing system. Knowing and/or Willful Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 47 U.S.C. §227(b) • As a result of Defendant’s willful and/or knowing violations of 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(1), Plaintiff and The Class members are entitled to and request treble damages, as provided by statute, up to $1,500, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(3)(C). • Any and all other relief that the Court deems just and proper. Respectfully Submitted this 16th Day of October, 2020.

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10. The TCPA prohibits companies, such as Liberty Power, from placing calls using an artificial or prerecorded voice (“prerecorded calls”) when making calls to cellular telephones without first obtaining consent. 11. Liberty Power has violated, and continues to violate, the TCPA and its implementing regulations by placing, or having placed on its behalf, prerecorded calls to cellular telephone subscribers (a) who have not expressly consented to receiving such calls and/or (b) who have expressly requested not to receive such calls. 12. As Congress recognized: Many customers are outraged over the proliferation of intrusive, nuisance calls to their homes from telemarketers…. Banning such automated or prerecorded telephone calls to the home, except when the receiving party consents to receiving the call or when such calls are necessary in an emergency situation affecting the health and safety of the consumer, is the only effective means of protecting telephone consumers from this nuisance and privacy invasion.1 1 Pub. L. No. 102-243 § 2(6, 12) (1991), codified at 47 U.S.C. § 227. 4 13. Senator Larry Pressler, one of the original drafters of the TCPA, explained the need for the TCPA by observing that “[u]nlike other communications media, the telephone commands our instan[t] attention. Junk mail can be thrown away. Television commercials can be turned off. The telephone demands to be answered.” 137 Cong. Rec. S18785 (daily ed. Nov. 27, 1991) (statement of Sen. Pressler). 14. As explained by the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”)2, the TCPA requires “prior express written consent for all autodialed or prerecorded telemarketing calls to wireless numbers and residential lines.” In the Matter of Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, CG No. 02- 278, FCC 12-21, 27 FCC Rcd. 1830 ¶ 2 (Feb. 15, 2012). 15. Yet, in violation of this rule, Defendants fail to obtain any prior express written consent to place prerecorded calls to consumers’ cellular telephone numbers. 16. In response to the liability risk associated with the TCPA, numerous commercially available services exist to help companies, such as Defendants, that call others using prerecorded voices, identify cellular subscribers and otherwise ensure that calls are only made to consenting consumers. For instance, companies such as Infutor, Nextmark List, and Contact Center Compliance advertise their ability to instantly identify and flag disconnected telephone numbers from cellular telephone number data lists on a recurring basis (such as weekly or monthly). This type of service can identify disconnected numbers before they are recycled, thereby alerting mobile marketers that any consent associated with those telephone numbers has been terminated. 2 The FCC is the federal agency given the administrative authority to interpret and enforce the TCPA. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(2). 5 17. Despite the FCC’s ruling, the industry guidelines, and the commercial availability of programs that help callers filter out non-consenting numbers, Defendants fail to take the necessary steps to ensure that their prerecorded calls are placed only to consenting recipients. 18. Rather, in an effort to increase revenue and skirt additional costs, Defendants simply ignore the law when contacting individuals via prerecorded calls to their cellular telephones. 19. Indeed, Liberty Power has already been sued at least ten times over the last seven years for alleged TCPA violations,3 and has entered into a number of settlements with state regulators regarding allegedly misleading or deceptive marketing practices.4 20. Liberty Power’s marketing practices have long been under scrutiny. In 2013, the New York Public Service Commission suspended Liberty Power’s 3 See Todd v. Liberty Power Corp, L.L.C. No. 1:12-cv-04986 (N.D. Ill. filed June 22, 2012): Sanchez v. Liberty Power Illinois LLC, No. 1:13-cv-02962 (N.D. Ill. filed April 19, 2013); Dolemba v. Liberty Power Corp., No. 1:13-cv-05429 (N.D. Ill. filed July 30, 2013); Marine v. Liberty Power Corp, LLC, No. 1:15-cv-03172 (D. Md. filed Oct. 19, 2015); Moore v. Liberty Power Holdings, No. 1:16-cv-07553 (N.D. Ill. filed July 26, 2016); Kreke v. Liberty Power Holdings, No. 3:17-cv-00808 (S.D. Ill. filed July 28, 2017); McDermet v. Liberty Power Corp., No. 1:18-cv-10043 (D. Mass. filed Oct. 11, 2017); Katz v. Liberty Power Corp., No. 1:18-cv-10506, (D. Mass. filed Mar. 16, 2018); Perrong v. Liberty Power Corp., 1:18-cv-00712 (D. Del. filed May 11,2018; Zelma v. Liberty Power Corp., No. 2:19-cv-08961 (D.N.J. filed Mar. 5, 2019) 4 See e.g. “A.G. Schneiderman Announces $550,000 Settlement With Energy Service Company That Illegally Deceived New York Consumers” available at https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/ag-schneiderman-announces-550000-settlement-energy- service-company-illegally-deceived; “PUC Seeks Comments on Proposed Settlement with Liberty Power Holdings, LLC Concerning Company’s Sales and Marketing Practices” available at http://www.puc.state.pa.us/about_puc/press_releases.aspx?ShowPR=4244 6 authorization to conduct door-to-door marketing in New York, the first time such an enforcement action was taken against an energy service company in New York.5 21. When reviewing Liberty Power’s renewal application to serve as an electricity supplier, the Connecticut Public Utilities Regulatory Authority found that Liberty Power’s affiliate violated a laundry list of consumer protection statutes, and employed unfair and deceptive marketing practices. It fined the affiliate $1.5 million and prohibited the affiliate from accepting new residential customers and/or marketing to residential customers via any means other than online enrollments for six months.6 22. Liberty Power has the distinct honor of having the largest number of complaints filed against it by Massachusetts consumers during a two-year period, including complaints surrounding Liberty Power’s telemarketing solicitation: 7 5 New York Public Service Commission, Case 13-E-0062 – Proceeding on Motion of the Commission to Investigate the Marketing Practices of Liberty Power Holdings LLC. 6 Connecticut Public Utilities Regulatory Authority, Docket No. 06-12-07RE07, Application of Liberty Power Holdings, LLC for an Electric Supplier License – Review of Allegations of Consumer Protection Violations 7 Competing to Overcharge Consumers: The Competitive Electric Supplier Market in Massachusetts, By Jenifer Bosco, published by the National Consumer Law Center, April 7 23. Defendants know or should know that their prerecorded calls are placed to non-consenting cellular telephone subscribers. Ultimately, Defendants are responsible for verifying telephone number ownership and obtaining consent before placing prerecorded calls to cellular telephone subscribers. 24. Defendants were, and are, aware that their unsolicited prerecorded calls were, and are, unauthorized as they fail to obtain prior express written consent before placing those calls to consumers. Ultimately, consumers are forced to bear the costs of receiving these unsolicited prerecorded calls. 25. By placing the unsolicited prerecorded calls at issue in this Complaint, Defendants caused Plaintiff and the other members of the Class actual harm and cognizable legal injury. This includes the aggravation, nuisance, and invasions of privacy that result from the sending and receipt of such prerecorded calls, a loss of value realized for the monies consumers paid to their carriers for the receipt of such prerecorded calls, and a loss of the use and enjoyment of their phones, including wear and tear to the related data, memory, software, hardware, and battery components, among other harms. 26. In response to Defendants’ unlawful conduct, Plaintiff filed this action seeking (a) an injunction requiring Defendants to cease all unsolicited prerecorded calling activities and, (b) an award of actual or statutory damages to the members of the Class under the TCPA, together with costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees. 2018. Available at https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/pr-reports/competitive-energy- supply-report.pdf 8 27. Plaintiff Lindenbaum is the registered account owner and regular user of a cellular telephone number 216-xxx-2902. 28. On September 9, 2019 at 7:12 pm, Plaintiff received an unsolicited, pre- recorded phone call on her cellular telephone from, or on behalf, of Defendants. 29. The September 9, 2019 call used a pre-recorded voice and stated that John Doe Corporation was calling to offer Plaintiff discounted electricity. 30. Plaintiff pressed “1” to speak with a live person and was connected with one of John Doe Corporation’s telephone representatives. 31. John Doe Corporation’s phone representative asked Plaintiff for her electricity billing account number and asked if Plaintiff received any government assistance with her electric bill and confirmed that Defendant Liberty Power would be the electricity supplier. 32. On September 12, 2019 at 2:15 pm, Plaintiff received a second unsolicited, pre-recorded phone call on her cellular telephone from, or on behalf of, Defendants. 33. The September 12, 2019 call used a pre-recorded voice and stated that John Doe Corporation was calling to offer Plaintiff discounted electricity. 34. Plaintiff pressed “1” to speak with a live person and was connected with one of John Doe Corporation’s telephone representatives. 35. John Doe Corporation’s phone representative asked Plaintiff for her electricity billing account number and asked if Plaintiff received any government 9 assistance with her electric bill and confirmed that Defendant Liberty Power would be the electricity supplier. 36. On September 13, 2019 at 11:09 am, Plaintiff received a third unsolicited, pre-recorded phone call on her cellular telephone from, or on behalf of, Defendants. 37. The September 13, 2019 call used a pre-recorded voice and stated that John Doe Corporation was calling to offer Plaintiff discounted electricity. 38. Plaintiff pressed “1” to speak with a live person and was connected with one of John Doe Corporation’s telephone representatives. 39. John Doe Corporation’s phone representative asked Plaintiff for her electricity billing account number and asked if Plaintiff received any government assistance with her electric bill and confirmed that Defendant Liberty Power would be the electricity supplier, even providing Liberty Power’s website to Plaintiff. 40. On September 14, 2019 at 12:26 pm, Plaintiff received a fourth unsolicited, pre-recorded phone call on her cellular telephone from, or on behalf of, Defendants. 41. The September 14, 2019 call used a pre-recorded voice and stated that John Doe Corporation was calling to offer Plaintiff discounted electricity. 42. Plaintiff pressed “1” to speak with a live person and was connected with one of John Doe Corporation’s telephone representatives. 43. John Doe Corporation’s phone representative asked Plaintiff for her electricity billing account number and asked if Plaintiff received any government assistance with her electric bill and confirmed that Defendant Liberty Power would be the electricity supplier. 10 44. On September 18, 2019 at 4:53 pm, Plaintiff received a fifth unsolicited, pre-recorded phone call on her cellular telephone from, or on behalf of, Defendants. 45. The September 18, 2019 call used a pre-recorded voice and stated that John Doe Corporation was calling to offer Plaintiff discounted electricity. 46. Plaintiff pressed “1” to speak with a live person and was connected with one of John Doe Corporation’s telephone representatives. 47. John Doe Corporation’s phone representative asked Plaintiff for her electricity billing account number and asked if Plaintiff received any government assistance with her electric bill and confirmed that Defendant Liberty Power would be the electricity supplier. 48. On September 23, 2019 at 7:30 pm, Plaintiff received a sixth unsolicited, pre-recorded phone call on her cellular telephone from, or on behalf of, Defendants. 49. The September 23, 2019 call used a pre-recorded voice and stated that John Doe Corporation was calling to offer Plaintiff discounted electricity. 50. Plaintiff pressed “1” to speak with a live person and was connected with one of John Doe Corporation’s telephone representatives. 51. John Doe Corporation’s phone representative asked Plaintiff for her electricity billing account number and asked if Plaintiff received any government assistance with her electric bill and confirmed that Defendant Liberty Power would be the electricity supplier. 52. Plaintiff has never provided prior express written consent to Defendants to receive prerecorded calls to her on the 216-xxx-2902 number. 11 53. Defendants failed to obtain prior express written consent that included, as required by 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(f)(8)(i) a “clear and conspicuous” disclosure informing the person signing that: (A) By executing the agreement, such person authorizes the seller to deliver or cause to be delivered to the signatory telemarketing calls using an automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice; and (B) The person is not required to sign the agreement (directly or indirectly), or agree to enter into such an agreement as a condition of purchasing any property, goods, or services. 54. By placing the prerecorded calls as alleged herein, Defendants have caused consumers actual harm in the form of annoyance, nuisance, and invasion of privacy. In addition, the prerecorded call disturbed Plaintiff’s use and enjoyment of her phone, in addition to the wear and tear on the phone’s hardware (including the phone’s battery) and the consumption of memory on Plaintiff’s phone. 55. In order to redress these injuries, Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the other members of the Class, brings suit under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq., which prohibits unsolicited prerecorded calls to cellular telephones. 56. On behalf of the Class, Plaintiff seeks an injunction requiring Defendants to cease all unsolicited pre-recorded calling activities and an award of actual or statutory damages to the class members, together with costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees. 7. Liberty Power is a certified supplier in the Ohio Energy Choice Program, offering electricity to consumers in Ohio. 78. Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3) on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated and seeks certification of the following Class: Robocall No Consent Class: All persons in the United States who from a date four years prior to the filing of the initial complaint to the present: (1) Defendants (or a third person acting on behalf of Defendants) called; (2) on the person’s cellular telephone number using an artificial or prerecorded voice; and (3) for whom Defendants lacked prior express consent to call that cellular telephone number at the time the call was made. 79. The following people are excluded from the Class: (1) any Judge or Magistrate presiding over this action and members of their families; (2) Defendants, Defendants’ subsidiaries, parents, successors, predecessors, and any entity in which the Defendants or their parents have a controlling interest, and its current or former employees, officers and directors; (3) persons who properly execute and file a timely request for exclusion from the Class; (4) persons whose claims in this matter have been 16 finally adjudicated on the merits or otherwise released; (5) Plaintiff’s counsel and Defendants’ counsel; and (6) the legal representatives, successors, and assigns of any such excluded persons. 8. In recent years, energy suppliers such as Liberty Power have turned to unsolicited telemarketing as a way to increase its customer base. Widespread telemarketing is a primary method by which Liberty Power solicits new customers. 80. Plaintiff anticipates the need to amend the definition of the Class following class discovery, including discovery revealing the manner by which Defendants claim they obtained prior express consent to place autodialed and/or pre- recorded calls to the Plaintiff. 81. Numerosity: The exact number of members within the Class is unknown and not available to Plaintiff at this time, but it is clear that individual joinder is impracticable. On information and belief, Defendants have placed unsolicited calls to hundreds or thousands of consumers who fall into the definition of the Class. Members of the Class can be identified through Defendants’ records. 82. Typicality: Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of other members of the Class in that Plaintiff and the members of the Class sustained damages arising out of Defendants’ uniform wrongful conduct, namely their unauthorized telemarketing calls. Plaintiff is a member of the Class defined herein, and if Plaintiff is able to recover for the claims set forth in this Complaint, then the other members of the Class will have a right to recover as well. 83. Adequate Representation: Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class and has retained counsel competent and experienced in complex class actions, including class actions under the TCPA and related statutes. Plaintiff has no conflicts with, or interests antagonistic to, those of the Class, and Defendants have no defenses unique to Plaintiff. 17 84. Commonality and Predominance: There are many questions of law and fact common to the claims of Plaintiff and the Class, and those questions predominate over any questions that may affect individual members of the Class. Common questions for the Class include, but are not necessarily limited to the following: a) Whether Liberty Power is liable for the conduct of their third-party vendor; b) Whether John Doe Corporation made calls with a prerecorded message; c) Whether Defendants’ conduct constitutes a violation of the TCPA; d) Whether Defendants utilized an artificial or prerecorded voice to place calls to members of the Class; e) Whether members of the Class are entitled to statutory and treble damages based on the willfulness of Defendants’ conduct; f) Whether Defendants obtained prior express consent to contact any class members; g) Whether Defendants’ calls constitute telemarketing or were dual purpose messages; and h) To the extent Defendants’ conduct does not constitute telemarketing, whether Defendants obtained prior express oral consent to contact any class members. 85. Superiority: This case is also appropriate for class certification because class proceedings are superior to all other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. Joinder of all parties is impracticable, and the damages suffered by the individual members of the Class will likely be relatively small, especially given the burden and expense of individual prosecution of the complex litigation necessitated by Defendants’ actions. Thus, it would be virtually impossible for the individual members of the Class to obtain effective relief from Defendants’ misconduct. 18 Even if members of the Class could sustain such individual litigation, it would still not be preferable to a class action. Individual litigation would increase the delay and expense to all parties due to the complex legal and factual controversies presented in this Complaint. By contrast, a class action presents far fewer management difficulties and provides the benefits of single adjudication, economy of scale, and comprehensive supervision by a single Court. Economies of time, effort and expense will be fostered and uniformity of decisions ensured. 86. Adequate notice can be given to the members of the Class directly using information maintained in Defendants’ records or through notice by publication. 87. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 88. Defendants and/or their agents placed unsolicited calls to cellular telephone numbers belonging to Plaintiff and the other members of the Robocall No Consent Class. 89. These calls were made without the prior express written consent of the Plaintiff and the other members of the Robocall No Consent Class to receive such calls. 9. John Doe Corporation initiated a prerecorded telemarketing call to the cellular telephone numbers of Plaintiff and the Class to promote Liberty Power in violation of the TCPA. Liberty Power hired John Doe Corporation to originate new customers and is vicariously liable for its illegal telemarketing conduct. 90. These calls, including those to Plaintiff, utilized an artificial or prerecorded voice. 91. To the extent prior written express consent was required, Defendants failed to obtain prior written express consent that disclosed to the consumer that agreeing 19 to receive pre-recorded calls was not a condition of purchase or use of any goods or service. Neither was oral consent provided. 92. To the extent Liberty Power’s agent, John Doe Corporation, placed the calls at issue, Liberty Power’s agent acted with actual or apparent authority and/or in accordance with a contract between Liberty Power and its agent, John Doe Corporation. Liberty Power’s agent acted under Liberty Power’s control and for Liberty Power’s benefit and/or with Liberty Power’s knowledge and approval. Liberty Power controlled its agent and knew about, and received the benefits of, the agent’s calling activities. Liberty Power ratified the agent’s conduct with respect to the placing of such calls. 93. Defendants have, therefore, violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(B). As a result of Defendants’ conduct, Plaintiff and the other members of the Robocall No Consent Class are each entitled to, under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B), a minimum of $500.00 in damages for each violation of such act. 94. In the event that the Court determines that Defendants’ conduct was willfull and knowing, it may, under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C), treble the amount of statutory damages recoverable by Plaintiff and the other members of the Robocall No Consent Class. Telephone Consumer Protection Act (Violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227) (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Robocall No Consent Class)

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13. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 14. Some time prior to September 16, 2019, an obligation was allegedly incurred to CAPITAL 30. The identities of all class members are readily ascertainable from the records of Defendant and those companies and entities on whose behalf they attempt to collect and/or have purchased debts. 31. Excluded from the Plaintiff Class are the Defendant and all officers, members, partners, managers, directors, and employees of the Defendant and their respective immediate families, and legal counsel for all parties to this action and all members of their immediate families. 32. There are questions of law and fact common to the Plaintiff Class, which common issues predominate over any issues involving only individual class members. The principal issue is whether the Defendant’s written communications to consumers, in the forms attached as Exhibit A, violate 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. 33. The Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the class members, as all are based upon the same facts and legal theories. 36. Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is also appropriate in that the questions of law and fact common to members of the Plaintiff Class predominate over any questions affecting an individual member, and a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. 37. Depending on the outcome of further investigation and discovery, Plaintiff may, at the time of class certification motion, seek to certify a class(es) only as to particular issues pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4). 38. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 39. Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. 41. The Defendant violated said section by: a. Falsely representing the character, amount, and legal status of the alleged debt in violation of 1692e(2); b. Making false or deceptive representation in connection with the collection of a debt in violation of 1692e(10). 42. By reason thereof, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for judgment that Defendant's conduct violated Section 1692e et seq. of the FDCPA, actual damages, statutory damages, costs and attorneys’ fees. VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692e et seq.

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20. As alleged more fully herein, Ally’s Account Documents allow it to take certain steps when an accountholder attempts a transaction, but does not have sufficient funds to cover it. Specifically, Ally may (a) authorize the transaction and charge a single $25 OD Fee; or (b) reject the transaction and charge a single $25 NSF Fee. 21. In contrast to its Account Documents, however, Ally regularly assesses two or more NSF Fees on the same item or transaction. 23. Ally’s Account Documents never disclose this practice. To the contrary, Ally’s Account Documents indicate it will only charge a single NSF Fee on an item or per transaction. A. Examples of Ally’s Imposition of Multiple NSF Fees on a Single Overdraft Item 24. There are numerous instances in which Ally charged NSF Fees on Plaintiff’s Overdraft Items that it returned unpaid, and in which Ally charged multiple NSF Fees on a single Overdraft Item. 25. On December 19, 2018, Mr. Coleman attempted a $28.02 payment via an Automated Clearing House (“ACH”) payment. 26. Ally rejected payment of the item due to insufficient funds and charged Mr. Coleman a $25 NSF Fee for doing so. 27. Eight days later, on December 27, 2018, the same item was reprocessed for payment, and again Ally rejected the item due to insufficient funds, and again charged Mr. Coleman a $25 NSF Fee. 28. Yet again, on January 3, 2019, the same item was reprocessed for payment, and again Ally rejected the item due to insufficient funds, and again charged Mr. Coleman a $25 NSF Fee. 29. In sum, Ally charged Mr. Coleman $75 in NSF Fees to attempt to process a single payment that was roughly a third of that amount. 30. Mr. Coleman took no affirmative action to reinitiate or resubmit the payment. 32. Ally’s “Fee Schedules” for both savings and checking accounts indicate that only a single NSF Fee will be assessed per “Overdraft Item returned” due to insufficient funds: Fee for Overdraft Item Returned $25 • Maximum one fee per day • The fee is charged when you don’t have enough money in your checking account to cover a transaction(s). •The fee isn’t charged for a one-time debit card transaction or ATM withdrawal • We won’t charge an additional fee even if you have a negative account balance over an extended period Checking Fee Schedule, Ex. A; Savings Fee Schedule, Ex. B (emphasis added). 33. Ally’s Deposit Agreement and Disclosures (Deposit Agreement”) similarly states: Fee for Overdraft Item Returned Fee assessed when a presented transaction(s) is returned, other than a one-time debit card transaction or ATM withdrawal, and such return causes or could cause your account to not have sufficient funds available […] When a transaction is presented against your account, and your account either does not have sufficient funds or the transaction would cause your account to not have sufficient funds, and you have…transacted by…an ACH transaction….[you] will be charged an overdraft fee (one (1) fee maximum per day) unless the transaction will result in your account being overdrawn by less than $10. Deposit Agreement, at 30. 34. In none of the documents is the phrase “Overdraft Item” defined. 36. Ally’s purportedly “Straight Talk” Fee Schedules compound the common sense understanding by misrepresenting to consumers that “We won’t charge an additional fee even if you have a negative account balance over an extended period.” Ex. A; Ex. B. 37. In sum, the same instruction for payment on an account cannot conceivably become a new “Overdraft Item” each time it is rejected for payment then reprocessed, especially when— as here—Plaintiff did not ask Ally to resubmit it. 38. There is no indication in the Account Documents that the same item is eligible to incur multiple NSF Fees. 39. Consistent with express representations in the Account Documents, reasonable consumers understand any given authorization for payment to be one, singular “Overdraft Item,” as that term is used in Ally’s Account Documents. 40. The Account Documents bar Ally from assessing multiple NSF Fees on the same Overdraft Item. 41. Customers reasonably understand, based on the language of the Account Documents, that Ally’s reprocessing of checks or ACH items are simply additional attempts to complete the original order or instruction for payment, and as such, will not trigger NSF Fees. In other words, it is always the same item or transaction. 43. For example, First Citizens Bank, a major institution in the Carolinas, engages in the same abusive practice as Ally, but at least expressly states: Because we may charge a service fee for an NSF item each time it is presented, we may charge you more than one service fee for any given item. All fees are charged during evening posting. When we charge a fee for NSF items, the charge reduces the available balance in your account and may put your account into (or further into) overdraft. (emphasis added). 44. First Hawaiian Bank engages in the same abusive practices as Ally, but at least currently discloses it in its online banking agreement, in all capital letters, as follows: 51. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. This action satisfies the numerosity, commonality, typicality, adequacy, predominance and superiority requirements of Rule 23. 52. The proposed class is defined as: All Ally savings and checking account holders in the United States who, during the applicable statute of limitations, were charged more than one NSF Fee on the same item (the “Class”). 53. Plaintiff reserves the right to modify or amend the definition of the proposed Class before the Court determines whether certification is appropriate. 54. Excluded from the Class are Ally, its parents, subsidiaries, affiliates, officers and directors, any entity in which Ally has a controlling interest, all customers who make a timely election to be excluded, governmental entities, and all judges assigned to hear any aspect of this litigation, as well as their immediate family members. 55. The members of the Class are so numerous that joinder is impractical. The Class consists of thousands of members, the identity of whom is within the knowledge of and can be ascertained only by resort to Ally’s records. 56. Notice to class members can be accomplished after obtaining the identity of class members, which can be ascertained only by resort to Ally’s records. 58. There are numerous questions of law and fact common to the Class and those common questions predominate over any questions affecting only individual Class members. 59. Among the questions of law and fact common to the Class are whether Ally: a. Charged multiple NSF Fees on a single Overdraft Item; b. Breached its contract with consumers by charging multiple NSF Fees on a single Overdraft Item; c. Breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing by charging multiple NSF Fees on a single Overdraft Item; and d. Whether Plaintiff and the Class were damaged by Ally’s conduct and if so, the proper measure of damages. 60. Plaintiff is committed to the vigorous prosecution of this action and has retained competent counsel experienced in the prosecution of class actions and, in particular, class actions on behalf of consumers and against financial institutions. Accordingly, Plaintiff is an adequate representative and will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class. 62. Even if Class members themselves could afford such individual litigation, the court system could not. Given the complex legal and factual issues involved, individualized litigation would significantly increase the delay and expense to all parties and to the Court. Individualized litigation would also create the potential for inconsistent or contradictory rulings. By contrast, a class action presents far fewer management difficulties, allows claims to be heard which might otherwise go unheard because of the relative expense of bringing individual lawsuits, and provides the benefits of adjudication, economies of scale and comprehensive supervision by a single court. 63. The preceding allegations are incorporated by reference and re-alleged as if fully set forth herein. 64. Plaintiff and Ally have contracted for bank account services. That contract does not permit Ally to charge multiple NSF Fees for a single Overdraft Item. 65. Ally has breached its account agreement with customers by charging multiple NSF Fees for a single Overdraft Item. 66. Plaintiff and members of the Class have performed all, or substantially all, of the obligations imposed on them under the contract unless otherwise excused. 68. The preceding allegations are incorporated by reference and re-alleged as if fully set forth herein. 69. Plaintiff and Ally have contracted for bank account services as alleged herein. 70. Under the laws of Utah, good faith is an element of every contract pertaining to the assessment of overdraft fees. Whether by common law or statute, all such contracts impose upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing. Good faith and fair dealing, in connection with executing contracts and discharging performance and other duties according to their terms, means preserving the spirit – not merely the letter – of the bargain. Put differently, the parties to a contract are mutually obligated to comply with the substance of their contract in addition to its form. Evading the spirit of the bargain and abusing the power to specify terms constitute examples of bad faith in the performance of contracts. 71. Subterfuge and evasion violate the obligation of good faith in performance even when an actor believes his conduct to be justified. A failure to act in good faith may be overt or may consist of inaction, and fair dealing may require more than honesty. Examples of violations of good faith and fair dealing include evasion of the spirit of the bargain, willful rendering of imperfect performance, abuse of a power to specify terms, and interference with or failure to cooperate in the other party’s performance. 73. Instead of exercising that discretion in good faith and consistent with Plaintiff’s reasonable expectations, Ally abuses that discretion to take money out of Plaintiff’s account without his permission and contrary to his reasonable expectations that he will not be charged multiple NSF Fees for the same transaction. Specifically, Ally regularly charges NSF Fees upon reprocessing of previously declined transactions. 74. Plaintiff and members of the Class have performed all, or substantially all, of the obligations imposed on them under the contract. 75. Plaintiff and members of the Class have sustained damages because of Ally’s breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Breach of Contract (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class) Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class) I. ALLY CHARGES TWO OR MORE NSF FEES ON THE SAME ITEM

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11. Defendant is the distributor of Acura automobiles throughout the United States. 13. As an ordinary business practice, Defendant then makes automated telephone calls to such customers to conduct surveys, solicit feedback and for other commercial purposes. 14. However, Defendant’s dealer network and administration processes lack the procedures necessary to confirm that the telephone numbers Defendant calls belong to consumers who have actually provided their consent to receive Defendant’s automated telephone calls soliciting information. 15. As a consequence, many of the telephone numbers in Defendant’s automated calling database do not belong there, resulting in Defendant routinely placing automated information solicitation calls to consumers who have never provided their consent to receive such calls from Defendant. 16. Defendant’s practice of making unauthorized robocalls to consumers who did not consent to receive such calls is widespread and well- documented, as seen from just a few samples of the many complaints involving robocalls placed by Defendant that have been publicly posted online:  “They keep calling. It shows [A]cura, but no one answers. I wait 15 seconds & hang up. This is very annoying.”  “I do not own an Acura, but my boyfriend does and my phone number is not associated with his car or account. We just received the call at the exact same time and don't understand why.”  “I also had my Acura serviced last week and a hang up call came today. Very unprofessional for Acura.”  “I believe I have had more than 10 calls from this number on my CELL phone! Fortunately, I figured out how to block this caller. I answered once, a young woman said she was from Acura.........and I hung up. I don't own an Acura. I really hate these robo-calls.” 18. Beginning in or about March 2015, Defendant began placing unsolicited robocalls to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone after Plaintiff took his Acura vehicle to a dealership for service. 19. Indeed, on March 17, 2015 Plaintiff’s cell phone rang and indicated that he was receiving a phone call from 410-774-8480, a phone number Defendant routinely utilizes to place automated calls to consumers soliciting information. 20. Plaintiff received these unwanted and unsolicited robocalls several more times over the following weeks. 21. Upon information and belief, Defendant places calls, including the calls made to Plaintiff, en masse using a “predictive” dialer, which automatically places calls without human intervention until the called party answers the call, at which time the automatic dialer attempts to connect the called party with a human representative or an automated prompt. 22. At no time did Plaintiff provide Defendant with consent to place such robocalls to his cellular telephone number. 23. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and a nationwide class defined as follows: All persons in the United States and its Territories to whom, within four years prior to the commencement of this litigation, Defendant placed through an automated telephone dialing system one or more unauthorized calls soliciting information to their cellular telephones. 25. Absent a class action, most members of the Class would find the cost of litigating their claims to be prohibitive and would have no effective remedy. The class treatment of common questions of law and fact is superior to multiple individual actions or piecemeal litigation in that it conserves the resources of the courts and the litigants, and promotes consistency and efficiency of adjudication. 26. Defendant has acted and failed to act on grounds generally applicable to the Plaintiff and the other members of the Class, requiring the Court’s imposition of uniform relief to ensure compatible standards of conduct toward the members of the Class, and making injunctive or corresponding declaratory relief appropriate for the Class as a whole. 27. The factual and legal bases of Defendant’s liability to Plaintiff and to the other members of the Class are the same, resulting in injury to Plaintiff and to all of the other members of the Class. Plaintiff and the other members of the Class have all suffered harm and damages as a result of Defendant’s unlawful and wrongful conduct. 28. Upon information and belief, there are hundreds, if not thousands, of members of the Class such that joinder of all members is impracticable. 30. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 31. Defendant made unsolicited telephone survey calls without prior express consent using an automatic telephone dialing system to the cellular telephone numbers of Plaintiff and the other members of the Class. Each such automated call was made using a predictive dialer, equipment that had the capacity at the time the calls were placed to store or produce telephone numbers to be called using a random or sequential number generator and to dial such numbers without human intervention. 32. Defendant’s conduct violated the Violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (47 U.S.C. § 227) on behalf of the Class

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11. Plaintiff does now, and at all times relevant to this Complaint, use internet service from Defendant at his residence. 12. As part of its internet service, Defendant provides to customers and hosts email accounts ending in “@cox.net.” 13. Plaintiff created an email account hosted by Defendant more than a decade ago (the “Cox Email Account”). 14. Plaintiff began using Gmail, preferred it to Cox’s email service, and set his Cox Email Account to forward all emails to his Gmail account. 15. In or around May 2017, Plaintiff noticed that emails sent to his Cox Email Account were no longer being forwarded to his Gmail account. 16. Plaintiff discovered that Defendant had locked him out of his Cox Email Account. 17. Plaintiff had not received any advance warning from Defendant that it would lock his Cox Email Account. 18. On or about May 17, 2017, Plaintiff called Defendant’s customer service number to inquire about the Cox Email Account. 19. During that call, Defendant’s representative, Sarah West, unlocked the Cox Email Account and Plaintiff successfully logged in. Plaintiff told Ms. West that he had successfully logged in. 29. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and a class (the “Class”), of which he is a member. 30. The Class is defined as follows: “All persons in California whose cellular or cordless telephone conversations were monitored, recorded and/or eavesdropped upon without disclosure at the outset of the conversation by Defendants within one year before the filing of the original Complaint in this action.” 31. Defendant, its employees and its agents are excluded from the Class. Plaintiff does not know the number of members in the Class but believes it to be in the thousands. Defendant bills itself as the “third-largest U.S. cable company,” providing service to approximately 6 million residences and businesses across the country, including in this District and elsewhere in California. 32. This suit seeks only damages and injunctive relief for recovery of economic injury on behalf of the Class. It does not seek recovery for personal injury and claims related thereto. 33. Plaintiff reserves the right to expand the Class definition to seek recovery on behalf of additional persons as warranted by facts learned from further investigation and discovery. 41. Plaintiff incorporates by reference each of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 42. California Penal Code section 632.7 prohibits intentionally monitoring or recording a cellular or cordless telephone conversation without the consent of all parties to the call. 43. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereupon alleges, that Defendant employed and/or caused to be employed certain eavesdropping, recording and listening equipment on the telephone lines of all employees, officers, directors and managers of Defendant. VIOLATION OF PENAL CODE § 632.7

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13. Plaintiff brings this claim on behalf of the following class, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(3). 15. The identities of all class members are readily ascertainable from the records of Defendants and those companies and entities on whose behalf they attempt to collect and/or have purchased debts. 16. Excluded from the Plaintiff Class are the Defendants and all officer, members, partners, managers, directors and employees of the Defendants and their respective immediate families, and legal counsel for all parties to this action, and all members of their immediate families. 17. There are questions of law and fact common to the Plaintiff Class, which common issues predominate over any issues involving only individual class members. The principal issue is whether the Defendants’ written communications to consumers, in the forms attached as Exhibit A, violate 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e & 1692g. 18. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the class members, as all are based upon the same facts and legal theories. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Plaintiff Class defined in this complaint. Plaintiff has retained counsel with experience in handling consumer lawsuits, complex legal issues, and class actions, and neither Plaintiff nor her attorneys have any interests, which might cause them not to vigorously pursue this action. 20. Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is also appropriate in that the questions of law and fact common to members of the Plaintiff Class predominate over any questions affecting an individual member, and a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. 21. Depending on the outcome of further investigation and discovery, Plaintiff may, at the time of class certification motion, seek to certify a class(es) only as to particular issues pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4). 22. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs numbered above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 23. Some time prior to February 10, 2021, an obligation was allegedly incurred to HSBC Bank Nevada, N.A. 24. The HSBC Bank Nevada, N.A. obligation arose out of a transaction in which involved the transaction of money, property, insurance or services primarily for personal, family or household purposes. 25. The alleged HSBC Bank Nevada, N.A. obligation is a "debt" as defined by 15 U.S.C.§ 1692a(5). 26. HSBC Bank Nevada, N.A. is a "creditor" as defined by 15 U.S.C.§ 1692a(4). 27. Defendant LVNV, a debt collector and subsequent owner of the HSBC Bank Nevada, N.A. debt, contracted with Defendant TrueAccord to collect the alleged debt. 29. On or about February 10, 2021, Defendant TrueAccord sent Plaintiff a collection letter (the “Letter”) regarding the alleged debt owed. A true and accurate copy of the Letter is attached as Exhibit A. 30. The Letter states a balance of $731.92. 31. The Letter further states: “The law limits how long you can be sued on a debt. Because of the age of your debt, LVNV Funding LLC cannot report it to any credit reporting agency.” 32. The Letter is materially deceptive as it fails to disclose that the previously-lapsed statute of limitations to file a lawsuit to collect the debt will recommence upon payment by Plaintiff. 33. Therefore, the Letter puts the Plaintiff at material risk of making a partial payment and thereby unknowingly recommencing the lapsed statute of limitations. 34. Plaintiff sustained an informational injury in that she was deceptively misled about the true legal nature of the alleged debt and was not advised that making payment on the debt would restart the statute of limitations. 35. As a result of Defendants’ deceptive, misleading and unfair debt collection practices, Plaintiff has been damaged. 36. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 38. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692e, a debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt. 39. Defendants violated §1692e: a. by omitting material information creating a false and misleading representation of the status of the debt in violation of §1692e(10); and b. by falsely representing the character, amount or legal status of the debt in violation of §1692e(2)(A). 40. By reason thereof, Defendants are liable to Plaintiff for judgment that Defendants conduct violated Section 1692e et seq. of the FDCPA, actual damages, statutory damages, costs and attorneys’ fees. VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692e et seq.

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(Breach of Express Warranty) [Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act; Cal. Civil Code §1790, et seq.)] (Declaratory Relief) 16 116. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference the allegations contained in the 17 preceding paragraphs of this Complaint. 18 117. An actual controversy has arisen and exists between Plaintiff, individually 19 and on behalf of the class members on the one hand, and Defendant on the other hand 20 concerning their respective rights and duties with regard to the Leaking Sunroof defect and 21 the rights and duties under Defendant's express warranty as herein alleged. 22 118. Defendant's express warranty constitutes a contract of adhesion, drafted by 23 Defendant and presented in its entirety to Plaintiff and the class members. Defendant is 24 one of the largest automobile manufacturing companies in the world and a large 25 international corporation. Plaintiff and the members of the class by contrast are 26 individuals. Plaintiff and the class members do not possess anywhere near the economic 27 power Defendant possesses and there is no opportunity for Plaintiff or the class members 28 to negotiate the terms of Defendant's express warranty, or Defendant's refusal to honor Gaines v. General Motors Company; (Unlawful, Unfair and/or Fraudulent Business Practices) [Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §17200, et seq.] Plaintiff hereby incorporate by reference the allegations contained in the 6 preceding paragraphs of this Complaint. 7 (Unjust Enrichment) 24 112. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference the allegations contained in the 25 preceding paragraphs of this Complaint. 26 113. To the detriment of Plaintiff and the class members Defendant has been and 27 continues to be unjustly enriched as a result of its unlawful, unfair, wrongful acts and 28 breaches of express warranty as herein alleged. Defendant has been unjustly enriched by Gaines v. General Motors Company; (Violation of California's Consumer Legal Remedies Act ("CLRA") [Cal. Civ. Code §1750, et seq.] Plaintiff hereby incorporate by reference the allegations contained in the 6 preceding paragraphs of this Complaint. 7 48. Plaintiff brings this lawsuit as a class action on behalf of herself and all others 7 similarly situated as members of the proposed class/ sub-classes pursuant to Federal Rules 8 of Civil Procedure 23(a) and (b)(3) and/ or (b)(2). This action satisfies the numerosity, 9 commonality, typicality, adequacy, predominance, and superiority requirements of those I 0 provisions. 11 A. Numerosity & Ascertainability 12 49. Although precise numbers are not available at the time of the filing of this 13 Class Action Complaint, Plaintiff alleges Defendant delivered and sold or leased 14 approximately 222,260 of the Cadillac SRX vehicles model years 2010-2013 ("Class 15 Vehicles"). While not all these vehicles were located in California and the other states 16 excluded specifically from Defendant's Document ID No. 4060832, entitled "#14225: 17 Customer Satisfaction - Sunroof Drain Hose Leaks (Jan. 14, 2015)" the subject of which is 18 "14225 - Sunroof Drain Hose Leaks; Models" 2010-2012 Cadillac SRX Equipped with 19 Sunroof (RPO C3U), based on the 222,260 total number of vehicles delivered Plaintiff 20 alleges there are thousands, tens of thousands, if not hundreds of thousands of Class 21 Vehicles. Therefore, the potential members of the class as defined are so numerous and are 22 dispersed throughout California and the United States such that joinder of all class 23 members is impracticable. Disposition of the claims of the class members in a single action 24 will provide substantial benefits to all parties and to the Court. 25 50. Based on information presently available the proposed class and/ or sub- 26 classes is/ are currently defined as: 27 All current and former owners or lessees of 2010-2013 model year Cadillac SRX vehicles located in California and who paid for repair/replacement of 28 their vehicles because of the Leaking Sunroof defect. Gaines v. General Motors Company; 6 60. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference the allegations contained in the 13 preceding paragraphs of this Complaint. 14 61. According to Defendant's express warranty for the 2010-2013 Cadillac SRX 15 model year vehicles ("Class Vehicles") the vehicles are subject to a 48-month (4-year), 16 50,000 mile Bumper-to-Bumper Limited Warranty with no deductible. Plaintiff alleges the 17 "Bumper-to-Bumper Limited Warranty" covers vehicles registered in the U.S. and Canada 18 from the date the vehicle is first delivered until it reaches 4 years or 50,000 miles 19 (whichever occurs first). It covers the vehicle from bumper to bumper on any vehicle defect 20 related to materials or workmanship. 21 22 62. 63. Defendant's stated warranty is an" express warranty" under California law. Defendant provided all purchasers and/ or leasees of Class Vehicles with the 23 express warranty described herein which became a part of the basis of the bargain and a 24 part of the purchase or lease contract between the class members and Defendant. 25 64. The seals, hoses and all other parts, components, materials, and/ or 26 workmanship associated with the manufacture, installation and/ or design of the Leaking 27 Sunroof defect were originally supplied by Defendant. 28 Gaines v. General Motors Campany; 75. Plaintiff brings this cause of action on behalf of herself individually and on 8 behalf of the proposed class members pursuant to Cal. Civil Code §1780 ("Any consumer 9 entitled to bring an action under Section 1780 may, if the unlawful method, act, or practice 1 O has caused damage to other consumers similarly situated, bring an action on behalf of 11 himself and such other consumers to recover damages or obtain other relief as provided 12 for in Section 1780."). 13 76. Defendant is a "person" as defined by and within the meaning of the 14 California Consumer Legal Remedies Act ("CLRA"), Cal. Civ. Code§ 1761(c). 15 77. Plaintiff and class members are "consumers" as defined by and within the 16 meaning of the CLRA, Cal. Civ. Code§ 1761(d). 17 78. The Class Vehicles are" goods" as defined by and within the meaning of the 18 CLRA, Cal. Civil Code §1761(a). 19 79. Plaintiff purchased and/ or leased her 2010 Cadillax SRX vehicle primarily 20 for personal and/ or household use. 21 80. Defendant's acts and practices, as alleged in this complaint, violated and 22 continue to violate the California CLRA in at least the following respects: 23 24 25 26 27 28 a. b. Representing the Class Vehicles have characteristics, uses, benefits, or qualities which they do not have, to wit: the Class Vehicles have a sumoof that will keep water out while allowing light in [Cal. Civil Code §1770(a)(5)]; Representing the Class Vehicles are of a particular standard, quality or grade when they are of another, to wit: the Class Vehicles a sumoof that will keep water out while allowing light in [Cal. Civil Code §1770(a)(7)]; and Gaines v. General Motors Company; 88. By engaging in the acts, conduct and business practices as alleged herein, 8 Defendant has violated California's Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 9 §17200, et seq. More specifically, Defendant engaged in an unlawful, unfair and/ or I 0 fraudulent business acts or practices by failing and/ or refusing to repair, correct or 11 otherwise remedy pursuant to Defendant's express warranty the Leaking Sunroof defect 12 on the Class Vehicles and by requiring Plaintiff and the class members to pay from their 13 own pockets the costs to repair, correct or otherwise remedy the Leaking Sunroof defect. 14 89. Defendant engaged in an unlawful business practice by refusing to honor and 15 abide by, and expressly excluding the Class Vehicles from the benefits and privileges of 16 Defendant's express warranty in violation of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act 17 [Cal. Civil Code §1790, et seq.], as herein alleged. 18 90. Defendant further engaged in a unlawful business practice by violating the 19 provisions of the California Consumer Legal Remedies Act [Cal. Civil Code §1750, et seq.], 20 as herein alleged. 21 91. Defendant further engaged in a unlawful business practice by violating the 22 provisions of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §17500, et seq, as herein alleged. 23 92. Defendant engaged in an unfair business practice by refusing to honor and 24 abide by its express warranty covering the Class Vehicles and by expressly excluding the 25 Class Vehicles from warranty coverage for the Leaking Sunroof defect as herein alleged 26 despite Defendant's actual and/ or constructive knowledge during the express warranty 27 period of the Leaking Sunroof defect. 28 Gaines v. General Motors Company;

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14. Sometime prior to December of 2016, Plaintiff allegedly incurred a debt to Bank of America, which was later sold, transferred or assigned to Defendant. As it is irrelevant to this action, Plaintiff currently takes no position as to whether or not this alleged debt was actually owed. 15. Plaintiff was one of thousands of consumers harassed by Defendant to pay an alleged debt. 16. On December 16, 2016, the Law Office of Daniel Shay (“Shay”) with Plaintiff’s authorization and on Plaintiff’s behalf, faxed and mailed cease and desist letters to Bank of America informing it and by proxy Defendant of the following: [Plaintiff] hereby revokes any prior express consent that may have been given to receive telephone calls, expressively to [Plaintiff’s] cellular telephone, from an Automated Telephone Dialing System or an artificial or pre-recorded voice, as outlined in the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. and [Plaintiff] also revokes any applicable business relationship. [Plaintiff] has retained [Shay] to stop creditor harassment and to discharge your claim(s) through bankruptcy. Whether you are an original creditor, or a collector, you must cease and desist all communication with [Plaintiff] as required by Cal. Civ. Code § 1788.17 via 15 U.S.C. 1692… 34. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of herself and on behalf of all others similarly situated (the “Class”). 46. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 47. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant constitute numerous and multiple negligent violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq. 48. As a result of Defendant’s negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq., Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to an award of $500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). 50. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 51. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant constitute numerous and multiple knowing and/or willful violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq. 52. As a result of Defendant’s knowing and/or willful violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq., Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to an award of $1,500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C). 53. Plaintiff and the Class are also entitled to and seek injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. KNOWING AND/OR WILLFUL VIOLATIONS OF THE TCPA 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. NEGLIGENT VIOLATIONS OF THE TCPA 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ.

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