clydeiii/cybersecurity · Datasets at Hugging Face

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were Israeli SCADA systems for power plants and other systems. Meanwhile,
Operation Save the Arctic
targeted
multiple oil companies around the globe in protest against drilling plans in the Arctic.
Disgruntled employees are also a source of attacks that should not be underestimated. With their knowhow about
internal critical processes and systems they often know how to inflict serious damage. They may be able to perform
system modifications that could go unnoticed for a long periods.
Page 16
Targeted Attacks Against the Energy Sector
Protection and mitigation
For all regular client computers, the well-established best practice guidelines apply. These computers are often
the first ones to be attacked. Once compromised, the attacker will use these computers and try to explore deeper
into internal networks. Securing and hardening of deployed operating systems with a working strategy for patch
deployment is important. Reoccurring security awareness training can help users to identify social engineering
attempts and prevent them from falling victim to them in the first place.
The company can perform penetration testing on Web and network applications but also on ICSs to identify and
remedy any vulnerability. For examples Web applications should be tested against SQL injection attacks. This can
also help confirm if applied polices are followed through, if the patch level is correct on all computers and if systems
are compliant.
Companies can monitor the Internet for information about attacks in the same vertical and apply lessons learned
where possible.
In addition, different layers of security products can help achieve better overall protection.

Security Information and Event Manager system (SIEM): Using a SIEM can help correlate all related alerts in
one place. This centralized view can be cross referenced with threat intelligence data to generate prioritization and
an action plan. Painting the bigger picture of the overall security state can reveal previously unnoticed attacks.
For example failed login attempts on internal servers could indicate a password breach. This includes logging of
critical systems and synchronization of time among multiple systems.

Ingress and egress filtering: Filtering the network traffic with firewalls, content filters and IPS allows the control
of data flows. This can prevent attackers from reaching internal systems. It is important to also monitor outbound
traffic, as data exfiltration is a key point for cyberespionage. It should be noted that with the increased use of
cloud services and mobile devices, some traffic might never pass through the company
s gateways. Where traffic
blocking is too disruptive at least monitoring should be implemented.

Data loss prevention (DLP): DLP solutions can track the access and flow of critical information and prevent it
from leaving the company or encrypt it automatically.

Endpoint protection: Depending on the usage pattern of the computer, different solutions are available to protect
the endpoint. Antivirus solution with proactive detection methods like behavioral analysis and reputation scanning
can prevent unknown malware from installing itself. HIPS (host based intrusion prevention systems), behavioral
lockdown or whitelisting can protect computers from any kind of unwanted tampering without the need of
constant updates.

System protection: For non-standard IT systems, hardening can increase the security. On industrial systems
which are not often updated or that cannot be updated, exploitation can be prevented with the help of lockdown
solutions like Symantec Critical System Protection (CSP). Through policies, only trusted system applications are
allowed to run. ICS should be regularly checked and upgraded if new firmware exists. Where this is not possible
HIPS and behavioral lockdown tools can be used to secure computers.

Email filtering: Proper email filtering can prevent many spear phishing attempts from reaching users. They can
help minimize the risk of an untrained user falling for social engineering tricks.

Authentication: Some of the ICS contain hardcoded passwords and, wherever possible, these should be changed.
ICS frequently use weakly authenticated protocols that allow for impersonation attacks. Where possible those
authentication methods should be upgraded or at least closely monitored. Strong authentication or PKI should be
used where applicable.
Industrial control systems (ICS) should be specially protected and monitored. The control system and control
network should be secured. Where possible, ICS should be separate from the Intranet. Isolating these networks alone
is often not enough to protect the control network, but it can make it more difficult for attackers to succeed. For
some systems it can make sense to have a plan to quickly disconnect or separate critical machines in the event of a
detected cyberattack.
Page 17
CONCLUSION
In the second
half of 2012, the
energy sector was
the second most
targeted with 16
percent of all the
targeted attacks.
Targeted Attacks Against the Energy Sector
Conclusion
Cyberespionage campaigns and sabotage attacks are becoming increasingly common, with countless threat
actors attempting to gain a foothold in some of the best protected organizations. At this stage, roughly
five targeted attacks per day are being mounted on firms in the energy sector. These attacks have become
increasingly sophisticated, although the capabilities and tactics used by these threat actors vary considerably.
In the second half of 2012, the energy sector was the second most targeted with 16 percent of all the targeted
attacks. This strong increase was mainly due to a large scale attack against one global oil company. In the first
half of 2013, the energy sector was ranked fifth with 7.6 percent of all attacks focused on this sector. In general
we have observed that attackers are becoming more efficient and focusing on smaller operations that attract
less attention.
The attackers tend to go after valuable information
such as maps of a new gas field
but the sector is also
a major target for sabotage attacks, which will not generate direct profit for the attacker. Such disruptive
attacks do already happen and may lead to large financial losses. State sponsored agents, competitors, internal
attackers or hacktivists are the most likely authors of such sabotage attacks.
Fortunately, there have not been many successful sabotage attacks against energy companies to date. However,
the increasing number of connected systems and centralized control for ICS systems means that the risk
of attacks in the future will increase. Energy and utility companies need to be aware of these risks and plan
accordingly to protect their valuable information as well as their ICS or SCADA networks.
Page 19
APPENDIX
Targeted Attacks Against the Energy Sector
Appendix
A. Spear phishing
Social engineering themes used
Social engineering is an essential part of spear phishing campaigns. A cleverly chosen, enticing message may prompt

were Israeli SCADA systems for power plants and other systems. Meanwhile,

Operation Save the Arctic

targeted

multiple oil companies around the globe in protest against drilling plans in the Arctic.

Disgruntled employees are also a source of attacks that should not be underestimated. With their knowhow about

internal critical processes and systems they often know how to inflict serious damage. They may be able to perform

system modifications that could go unnoticed for a long periods.

Page 16

Targeted Attacks Against the Energy Sector

Protection and mitigation

For all regular client computers, the well-established best practice guidelines apply. These computers are often

the first ones to be attacked. Once compromised, the attacker will use these computers and try to explore deeper

into internal networks. Securing and hardening of deployed operating systems with a working strategy for patch

deployment is important. Reoccurring security awareness training can help users to identify social engineering

attempts and prevent them from falling victim to them in the first place.

The company can perform penetration testing on Web and network applications but also on ICSs to identify and

remedy any vulnerability. For examples Web applications should be tested against SQL injection attacks. This can

also help confirm if applied polices are followed through, if the patch level is correct on all computers and if systems

are compliant.

Companies can monitor the Internet for information about attacks in the same vertical and apply lessons learned

where possible.

In addition, different layers of security products can help achieve better overall protection.

Security Information and Event Manager system (SIEM): Using a SIEM can help correlate all related alerts in

one place. This centralized view can be cross referenced with threat intelligence data to generate prioritization and

an action plan. Painting the bigger picture of the overall security state can reveal previously unnoticed attacks.

For example failed login attempts on internal servers could indicate a password breach. This includes logging of

critical systems and synchronization of time among multiple systems.

Ingress and egress filtering: Filtering the network traffic with firewalls, content filters and IPS allows the control

of data flows. This can prevent attackers from reaching internal systems. It is important to also monitor outbound

traffic, as data exfiltration is a key point for cyberespionage. It should be noted that with the increased use of

cloud services and mobile devices, some traffic might never pass through the company

s gateways. Where traffic

blocking is too disruptive at least monitoring should be implemented.

Data loss prevention (DLP): DLP solutions can track the access and flow of critical information and prevent it

from leaving the company or encrypt it automatically.

Endpoint protection: Depending on the usage pattern of the computer, different solutions are available to protect

the endpoint. Antivirus solution with proactive detection methods like behavioral analysis and reputation scanning

can prevent unknown malware from installing itself. HIPS (host based intrusion prevention systems), behavioral

lockdown or whitelisting can protect computers from any kind of unwanted tampering without the need of

constant updates.

System protection: For non-standard IT systems, hardening can increase the security. On industrial systems

which are not often updated or that cannot be updated, exploitation can be prevented with the help of lockdown

solutions like Symantec Critical System Protection (CSP). Through policies, only trusted system applications are

allowed to run. ICS should be regularly checked and upgraded if new firmware exists. Where this is not possible

HIPS and behavioral lockdown tools can be used to secure computers.

Email filtering: Proper email filtering can prevent many spear phishing attempts from reaching users. They can

help minimize the risk of an untrained user falling for social engineering tricks.

Authentication: Some of the ICS contain hardcoded passwords and, wherever possible, these should be changed.

ICS frequently use weakly authenticated protocols that allow for impersonation attacks. Where possible those

authentication methods should be upgraded or at least closely monitored. Strong authentication or PKI should be

used where applicable.

Industrial control systems (ICS) should be specially protected and monitored. The control system and control

network should be secured. Where possible, ICS should be separate from the Intranet. Isolating these networks alone

is often not enough to protect the control network, but it can make it more difficult for attackers to succeed. For

some systems it can make sense to have a plan to quickly disconnect or separate critical machines in the event of a

detected cyberattack.

Page 17

CONCLUSION

In the second

half of 2012, the

energy sector was

the second most

targeted with 16

percent of all the

targeted attacks.

Targeted Attacks Against the Energy Sector

Conclusion

Cyberespionage campaigns and sabotage attacks are becoming increasingly common, with countless threat

actors attempting to gain a foothold in some of the best protected organizations. At this stage, roughly

five targeted attacks per day are being mounted on firms in the energy sector. These attacks have become

increasingly sophisticated, although the capabilities and tactics used by these threat actors vary considerably.

In the second half of 2012, the energy sector was the second most targeted with 16 percent of all the targeted

attacks. This strong increase was mainly due to a large scale attack against one global oil company. In the first

half of 2013, the energy sector was ranked fifth with 7.6 percent of all attacks focused on this sector. In general

we have observed that attackers are becoming more efficient and focusing on smaller operations that attract

less attention.

The attackers tend to go after valuable information

such as maps of a new gas field

but the sector is also

a major target for sabotage attacks, which will not generate direct profit for the attacker. Such disruptive

attacks do already happen and may lead to large financial losses. State sponsored agents, competitors, internal

attackers or hacktivists are the most likely authors of such sabotage attacks.

Fortunately, there have not been many successful sabotage attacks against energy companies to date. However,

the increasing number of connected systems and centralized control for ICS systems means that the risk

of attacks in the future will increase. Energy and utility companies need to be aware of these risks and plan

accordingly to protect their valuable information as well as their ICS or SCADA networks.

Page 19

APPENDIX

Targeted Attacks Against the Energy Sector

Appendix

A. Spear phishing

Social engineering themes used

Social engineering is an essential part of spear phishing campaigns. A cleverly chosen, enticing message may prompt