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Do Swiss banks have the right to demand seeing a visa for a foreign country? A friend who is a Swiss citizen and resident of Switzerland has a checking account with a Swiss bank. Because of a stay in the US, he was asked to file a "Status Declaration Form for Individuals" confirming that he is not a US resident. In addition to many more documents including tax returns, the bank asks to see his US visa. Does a Swiss bank have the legal right to request seeing a visa for a foreign country, and if so under which paragraph of which law?

Yes The relevant Swiss law is known as the FATCA Agreement and has been in force since 30/6/2014. FATCA stands for the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act, a unilateral set of US regulations that applies worldwide for all countries. It requires foreign financial institutions to disclose information on US accounts to the Internal Revenue Service or levy a high tax. At the moment, Switzerland uses the "Model 2" agreement with the USA, which requires the consent of the US taxpayer or an administrative request by the IRS. There are plans to move to the "Model 1" arrangement, which uses automatic data sharing, but the timeline is uncertain. The bank is required to verify that your friend is not a US tax resident, and the visa is one of the pieces of evidence they need. Your friend can, of course, refuse to produce it. The bank can then either refuse to do business with them, or treat them as though they are a US tax resident and withhold the required tax until such time as they prove they are not.

At the time of annexation of country X someone would have to decide the status of the countries citizens: If all citizens of X are now citizens of the USA, and whether they are legally citizens from the date of annexation or since they were citizens of X, and if they are considered residents in the USA since the day they became residents of X, and if they are retrospectively "born in the USA" if they were born in X. And other things, like whether non-citizen legal residents of X are now non-citizen legal residents of the USA. That has to be decided for many reasons, and the answer to your question follows naturally from this. Maybe you could check on a history site if anyone knows how this worked with Hawaii.

Isn’t this discrimination since nationals do not have to apply? Yes it is discrimination. But that does not make it illegal. In fact discrimination is in general legal unless it is based on some characteristic which is specifically forbidden as a basis for discrimination (e.g. race). And in general, all of the countries in the world allow and enforce discrimination based on nationality; for example non-nationals will not be able to run for Head of State (and additional restrictions may apply). The EU members allowing similar rights to the citizens of other EU countries is the exception, not the rule, and once the UK stops being bound by EU treaties it can impose its own legal system on non-nationals. And while EU treaties give lots of rights to EU member-countries citizens, they still allow for discrimination based on nationality (for example you cannot run for Prime Minister or MP of Spain as a foreign EU resident). Isn’t the UK Government breaking the law? This could go against EU treaties, but the point is that the UK will no longer need to comply with them. is the UK Government responsible for the harm and distress caused to the individual health and mental wellbeing? No, the UK Government is not responsible if you do not like its laws to the point that it affects your health. Is there any ground for challenging this scheme legality in court? Unlikely. In any case it will not be because you are frightened by it, any challenge would be in the grounds that the government actions act against some other UK law. For example, if the decision to make such a list was made by the Executive but it contradicts some law approved by the Parliament. If this list does not contradict any law, then there are no grounds for challenging it. Would there a breach of my human rights if I was not to apply for settle status and then subsequentially got deported (taken away from my children, home, business, etc.)? How about if I was refused, re-entry or access to public services (NHS for example)? If you do not apply you will not have any evidence that you were settled, and the government could legitimately believe that you are irregularly in the country and try to expel you; you probably would have an opportunity to prove that you were settled even if you were not in the list but that could be way slower, more expensive, riskier and stressful than just registering now. Get this clear: that settled person list is to help you to show that you were a UK resident before Brexit and to give you the protections that are being negotiated between the UK and the EU for expatriates. Probably you could choose not to enlist, but it would work against you.

Like many US legal questions, there is a Congressional Research Service report about this. It is not generally a violation of US law to do things in another country where the only connection with the US is that the offender is a US citizen. However, there are a number of general situations where the US has jurisdiction over federal crimes if either the victim or offender is a US citizen: if a place isn't within the jurisdiction of any country (e.g. Antarctica); a place used by a US government entity (like an embassy or airbase); crimes by American soldiers and those employed by or accompanying the military; etc. These are considered to be within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the US. Other laws apply if they say so. For instance, any US national committing war crimes inside or outside the US can be punished under US law; ditto for treason. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act makes it illegal for a US national to bribe a foreign official anywhere outside the US for business reasons (if it's inside the US, there are more requirements). For instance, you aren't allowed to pay kickbacks to a foreign government's acquisition officer to buy your product. The CRS report has more (it doesn't include the FCPA, but that appears to be an oversight). Note that extraterritorial jurisdiction doesn't just apply if the person is a US national. US laws can also confer it if the victim is a US national, if the offense has a significant US component, if it's directed towards the US, if it's in violation of international law and the offender later turns up in the US, etc. For your scenarios: Dual citizenship doesn't matter. A US citizen is a US citizen, and is required to obey all laws that apply to US citizens, unless those laws explicitly exempt dual citizens. A dual citizen isn't treated differently by the government; as far as the US government is concerned, their US citizenship is all that matters (except for certain specific purposes like security clearances). In Kawakita v. United States, a US-Japanese dual citizen was convicted of treason against the US for aiding Japan in WWII. Depends. Plenty of these laws have no requirement that anything related to the crime actually happen in the US; for sex tourism, the subsection about traveling in foreign commerce for the purposes of engaging in illicit sexual conduct is followed by a subsection about engaging in illicit sexual conduct in foreign places. "Travel with the purposes of X" or "with intent to X" means you must have intended to do X at the time you traveled, but most extraterritorial laws don't control travel with intent to X (they cover X directly). Depends on the law. Some laws (like child sex tourism) apply to any permanent resident of the US as well as any citizen. Some apply to anyone, because they're based on a conspiracy started in the US. Others apply just to US nationals; a noncitizen isn't bound by them (for instance, no one but a US national can be charged with treason against the US, for obvious reasons). Still others apply to anyone who later turns up in the US, even if that is literally the only connection between the US and the offense (this is basically reserved for crimes against international law, like genocide).

Defendants in the US would be charged with racketeering, not bribery, since government officials were not bribed. The DoJ indictment against Webb et al. is here: most of the defendants are not citizens of the US, though none are listed as being government officials. DoJ could certainly seek an indictment of ministers, senators or presidents of foreign countries. If said official were in the US on an ordinary passport, they could be arrested. They also might be arrested by e.g. Argentinian policy and extradited to the US, but whether that would be legal depends on the country (some countries don't extradite their own citizens; there would have to be an extradition treaty between that country and the US). It is inconceivable that any nation would hand over a sitting president because of an indictment by the US, and generally unlikely for any government official, but the official could be locally deposed first. But whether a government would do this is basically a political question, not a legal one.

There is no misrepresentation by the bank as you describe it, there is negligence by the account holder to comply with the terms of the account. The bank made no representation at all regarding a balance due. If you want the bank to be at fault, they the customer would have to demand a declaration as to the existence of a balance due (choose your words carefully), and the bank would have to have falsely asserted that there is no present or future obligation. This is not going to happen. All the bank can say is that they have no present record of charges. The customer's question might be something like "Do you guarantee that there will be no charges to this account as of now". Of course, the bank cannot know whether there is a forthcoming paper charge that was made at some mountain resort. If case they did make such a promise, you could disavow the debt, using your reliance on their assertion as the basis for denying the debt. There is no law requiring banks to warn people of their contractual obligations when they close an account. I've never encountered a credit card contract that includes such a clause, but I suppose some bank might include a mandatory-warning clause, in which case they could be in breach of contract.

Disclaimer: Links are in German. My German is quite rough. Quoted translations provided by Google Translate. Turns out the question "Do I need an Impressum?" is complicated. I'll start with examining the case for companies, then work down to the average private citizen. Impressum requirement The requirement for an online Impressum comes from the Telemediengesetz (TMG) § 5: 1) Service providers are obliged to keep the following information readily available, readily accessible and constantly available for commercial, usually paid telemedia: the name and address under which they are established [...] Applicability based on country of origin The applicability of the TMG is described in §§ 2a, 3. Thankfully, there is a 2013 court case focused on these sections, involving an Egyptian company marketing cruises and not having a proper Impressum on their website. Also thankful is that law firm mth Tieben & Partner summarized this decision, because as it turns out, I cannot read judicial German. Summarizing their summary, §§ 2a, 3 sets the standard that the required information is based on a country of origin principle (Herkunftslandprinzip), where if that country of origin is Germany, § 5 applies. However, this principle is rooted in EU directives, and as such is not applicable to non-EU countries. For these, the law falls back on the older principle of market location (Marktortprinzip). If the non-EU company advertises in Germany and thus participates in the German market, then it must have a valid Impressum. I'll note that, the TMG considers Germany to be the "country of origin" if the company is either registered in or has significant operations in Germany (see the given sections for specifics). This is not the same "country of origin" as is found in copyright law. Applicability to private website hosts As it turns out, an Impressum is not required for private non-commercial websites. However, as pointed out by this Anwalt article, the wording of the TMG makes it such that omitting an Impressum may often be illegal. In particular, the definitions section of the TMG provides very broad definitions of "Service provider" (Diensteanbieter): Service provider shall mean any natural or legal person who provides his own or third-party telemedia for use or provides access to use; in the case of audiovisual media services on demand, service providers shall mean any natural or legal person who effectively controls the selection and design of the content offered, and "commercial communication" (kommerzielle Kommunikation): Commercial communication means any form of communication which serves the direct or indirect promotion of the sale of goods, services or the appearance of an undertaking, other organization or a natural person engaged in trade, trades or crafts or a liberal professions; [...] Conclusion In terms of variables like the one you suggest, the proper "variable" for companies is the country of origin. For private web hosts, I would argue that residency is the closest analogue to country of origin as defined in TMG §§ 2a, 3. Location of server doesn't matter, and I don't think citizenship does either. With that in mind, the values would be: Germany: Required EU: Not required Rest of world: Required if advertised/directed in/towards Germany. with the caveat that truly private non-commercial websites never require an Impressum.

You can file a complaint with the CFPB regarding 12 CFR §1005.10(e)(2)-1. Your individual state Department of Labor may enforce similar state level regulations too. And, yes, this technically falls under the FDIC as well. You can also file a complaint with them, although it's very unlikely they would pursue any action against a non-bank employer. The FTC has also pursued cases in violation to this statute, however those have only targeted lenders forcing the use of certain banks, and were not aimed at employers.

when uploading videos to tiktok/youtube, as oringal content creators what copyright do we transfer to the platform, what is left to the creators? when uploading videos to tiktok/youtube, as original content creators what copyright do we transfer to the platform, what is left to the creators? where can we learn more those "laws" on their platforms? Do we have any laws that transfer ownership completely, meaning that as soon as we use the platforms to upload content we agree to transfer the owner?

when uploading videos to tiktok/youtube, as original content creators what copyright do we transfer to the platform, what is left to the creators? Most of these platforms provide that the creator retains all copyright but grants the platform a non-exclusive and irrevocable license to redistribute and reuse the content. Where can we learn more those "laws" on their platforms? They are found in the terms of service. Do we have any laws that transfer ownership completely, meaning that as soon as we use the platforms to upload content we agree to transfer the owner? Most platforms avoid this, probably because they do not want to alienate potential users. Most people would not upload their videos or other creations to a platform that would sue them for making subsequent use of the uploaded material. For example, from YouTube's terms of service: Rights you Grant You retain all of your ownership rights in your Content. In short, what belongs to you stays yours. However, we do require you to grant certain rights to YouTube and other users of the Service, as described below. Licence to YouTube By providing Content to the Service, you grant to YouTube a worldwide, non-exclusive, royalty-free, transferable, sublicensable licence to use that Content (including to reproduce, distribute, modify, display and perform it) for the purpose of operating, promoting, and improving the Service. Licence to Other Users You also grant each other user of the Service a worldwide, non-exclusive, royalty-free licence to access your Content through the Service, and to use that Content (including to reproduce, distribute, modify, display, and perform it) only as enabled by a feature of the Service. Duration of Licence The licences granted by you continue until the Content is removed as described below. Once removed, the licences will terminate, except where the operation of the Service, use of Content permitted before your removal, or the law requires otherwise. For example, removal of Content by you does not require YouTube to: (a) recall Content that is being used by other users within any limited offline viewing functionality of the Service; or (b) delete copies we reasonably need to keep for legal purposes.

Copyright is for original pieces of work. What you have made, is essentially a derivative work. Copyright is automatic for all things, unless the author has explicitly waived their rights, normally through a license. What this means, is that you have created a piece of art, that has been derived from that of the original author. You made modifications to the original artwork to produce a new one. Your creation could not, and would not have effectively existed without the original. Your image has the same shape, and the same colour tones as the original, and would likely be considered a derivative work. Since the right to derivative works is an exclusive right to the copyright holder, you would be infringing their copyright.

Probably not. There are potential problems on the levels of copyright, data protection, and the Youtube terms of service. You should assume that comments are typically covered by copyright. You do not have a license to these comments, only YouTube does. Therefore, YouTube can show the comments but you can't copy them – just like YouTube can stream your videos but others can't download them and host them on their own websites. To cover the copyright angle, you'd either need to obtain a license from the commenters, or get a sub-license from YouTube, or identify a suitable copyright exception. The comments are personal data within the meaning of the GDPR, so that your processing of these comments (including mere storage) would be subject to GDPR as well. You need a legal basis for processing personal data. Which legal basis is suitable would depend on the purpose of processing, and on your relationship with the commenters. Potentially applicable legal bases in this context: you have a contract with the commenters that requires you to show the comments on your website. For example, I could see such a contract if there were a “featured comment” perk for a Patreon subscription. But this is not going to fly with random commenters. you have a legitimate interest (LI) that allows the processing. A LI requires that you conduct a balancing test where you weigh this interest against the commenter's rights. This is very specific to the purposes for which you want to show the comments. However, a LI will generally only apply if you have an existing relationship with the commenters, making it possible for them to expect that this processing will occur – unlikely if you'll be scraping comments from YouTube. you have obtained consent from the data subject. Consent must be specific, informed, freely given, and unambiguous – you can't obtain consent by writing “by commenting under this video you consent to XXX” in the video description. Regardless of legal basis, you would have to inform the commenters under Art 14 GDPR when you scrape their comments from the platform. Finally, consider the platform terms of service. I have not read the YouTube ToS recently, so I don't know what their specific conditions are. But in general, such ToS will not allow you to scrape content from their platform in order to host it somewhere else. The ToS might allow certain actions like embedding a link/iframe to such videos on other sites, without allowing other actions such as copying other user's content to your site.

As usual with trademarks, the key question is "will reasonable people be confused about the source or affiliations of the product or service". Trademarks are, as you already know, limited to a particular industry or area of business, in general. Displaying user videos is not exactly the same thing as a particular popular song, but they just might be close enough for some consumer confusion tom occur. Whether reasonable people are in fact confused into thinking that the app is in some way sponsored by the makers of the song is a question of fact. A trademark suit would probably need to present some sort of evidence that confusion had occurred or was likely. It also may make a difference whether "Tik Tok" has been registered as a trademark. In the US, registration gets greater protection than mere use. (In some countries there is no protection without registration.) It is also possible that the app has already licensed the rights to the term from the trademark owner for the song. This would avoid a potential suit. It is also worth noting that the term "Tik Tok" is not original with the song. It dates back, in that spelling, to at least the "Oz" books by L. Frank Baum and others Tik-Tok of Oz dates from 1914, and the character of the Tik-Tok from the book Ozma of Oz (1907). Terms that are not original coinages are less strongly protected in trademark law, and the app could claim to be alluding to the Oz character, not the more recent song. A comment by ub3rst4r says that: the term "Tik Tok" is registered as a trademark in the USA by "Bytedance Ltd" (which is the company that operates the app). If that is correct, the US Patent and Trademark office (PTO) came to at least a preliminary conclusion that this trademark did not infringe anyone else's trademark. That doesn't meant that an infringement suit is doomed, but it would make any such suit harder and less likely. It seems that, as described in this news story a company selling watchs under the name "Tic Tok" was sent a cease and desist letter on behalf of the singer Kesha Sebert. The firm responded by filing a suit for a declaratory judgement. The case is Wimo Labs LLC v. Kesha Sebert, U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, No. 1:11-cv-02978. However, google does not show any resolution of this case, one way or the other. This was brought to my attention in a comment by StephanS. As this docket record shows, the case was dismissed by agreement without prejudice, apparently after a settlement (as stated in the comment by user muru). Thus there was no ruling on the merits of the case.

If you create a new work that is derived from or based on someone else's work, it is a derivative work, and you cannot do so without permission from the original copyright holder. If the original work is made available under a CC-BY_SA 4.0 license, you have permission, but it comes with conditions. One of those is that you must attribute the original work -- you must say what work yours is based on and who created it. Another is that you must license your own derived work under the same CC-BY-SA license (or a compatible one). This does not mean that your work is not copyrighted -- it is. But it does mean that you must grant to others the same rights that the creator of the work you used granted to you. That is what the "share alike" or SA part of the license means. if you don't like that, you should not use a work licensed under CC-BY-SA terms to create your own work. If you publish your work but fail to grant that license to others, you are infringing the copyright of the work you used, and could be sued. Note that if you had created a compilation rather than a derived work -- for example if you created an album of images from various sources, some of them under CC-BY-SA licenses, you would retain a copyright on the collection as a whole, and that would not have to be under CC-BY-SA. But in this case you say that you used the other person's image as a background for your own illustration. That is creating an "adapted" or derivative work, i am fairly sure, and invokes the share alike clause of the license. You might also want to consider the different case mentioned in If I include an unmodified CC-BY-SA work in a book, does the whole book have to be CC-BY-SA?

Elon Musk doesn't own Twitter He is part of a consortium of investors that own it. What he can and can't do with it will be constrained by any agreements that exist between those investors and, as CEO, a duty to all of the shareholders and to the company itself. However, that jus begs the question: can the "owners" of a company dissolve it? Yes. Or, more precisely, the directors acting for the shareholders can cease operating the company, collect all that it is owed, pay all that it owes and distribute wherever is left over to the shareholders. If there won't be anything left over, then the directors have a duty to point an administrator/liquidator to finalise the company. One of these two things is, ultimately, what happens to every company sooner or later.

It is legal, and good policy, because the later explanation could create conflicting policies and notions as to what the "agreement" is. The TOS is probably created by a lawyer who interviewed the website owner to figure out what they wanted, then wrote legal language to do that. If you ask tech support how to interpret the TOS, you probably are not getting a legally-correct statement (assuming that the tech support guy isn't also a lawyer). Rather than take a risk that a customer would defend their action in court by arguing "they said I could!", the website may elect to not make promises that they don't want to keep. Instead, if you want to understand the agreement, you hire your own lawyer, then propose a hypothetical action, to see how the law interprets the language of the agreement. For example "can I rent out my Netflix password so that other people can use it?". The lawyer would then read the TOS and relevant cases law, and would advise you whether this is allowed under the TOS (it is not). Alternatively, you could read up on relevant aspects of the law and figure it out yourself. Website TOS is basically driven by copyright law, the technical necessity of some kind of automatic copying in order to use a web page, and the legal requirement that you can't copy without permission of the copyright holder. The TOS is the set of conditions that you must satisfy in order to be permitted to use the site. So many questions reduce to issues of copyright law and permission to copy *can you legally "permit" the copying of materials you upload?).

Under US law, the use of the converter is irrelevant. The legal situation would be the same if they were posted in MP3 format, or downloaded and played in whatever format they are posted in. The point is making and distributing copies without permission. The first question is: Is the music protected by copyright at all? If the work is old enough, there is no copyright on the composition. For example, most works of classical music will be long out of copyright. However, the recording itself can be copyrighted, even if the composition is not. In general, if recording was published before 1972, it will not be protected by US copyright. There are some other edge cases where the the recording will not be protected. See This chart for details. Assuming the recording is protected, the second question is: is the posting legal? That is, was the music posted by or with the permission of the copyright holder? If not, any download or further use would be copyright infringement, although holders are unlikely to sue individuals who download for personal use only. If the posting of a protected work was legal, the key question is, did the user have permission or some other legal basis. It is generally considered that when music (or other content) is posted to the net, there is an implied permission to download it for personal use. Alternatively and to the same effect, this might be considered in US law to be a case of fair use. But this will stop at personal use. Any making of additional copies, redistribution of such copies, or public performance of the music will require permission from the copyright holder. In the absence of such permission, it will be infringement, and the holder could sue. Permission may be granted directly, by contract, or by a permissive license. But permission in some form is required for such use to be lawful. I should add that the creation and distribution of a new (cover) version of a copyrighted song or other music may be permitted under US law by a compulsory license, known as a "mechanical license". This is provided for under 17 USC 115. There is a specific procedure to follow, which involves notifying the copyright holder and paying royalties at a specified rate. Failure to follow this procedure, unless permission is obtained in some other way, means that making and distributing recordings (phonorecords) is copyright infringement.

Is there a good reason for the IRS to seize ATF 4473 Forms? I recently had someone angrily bring up on Facebook the IRS raid of Highwood Creek Outfitters on June 14th, 2023 where they apparently seized several years of ATF 4473 forms, forms used to document gun ownership transfer. I'm having difficulty finding many unbiased records of the situation, since the majority of posts are people who are front and center that they believe this was a massive overstep by the government and the first step to forcing a gun registry, particularly since said forms were not on the items to be seized in the warrant. Leaving aside such allegations, a recurring theme in articles has been people posting that there is no business need for the IRS to capture such forms. To me, a layman, it seems like it's relevant to tracking sales, particularly to determine if there might have been under-the-table sales (which, of course, would likely have tried to avoid official notice by not filing a transfer form), but I'm not an expert in the field. Is there a good reason for the IRS to have seized these forms? Reference for the Attorney General Austin Knudsen stating that the warrant did not include those records: “I spoke with the shop owner who told me that 20 heavily armed IRS agents from multiple states in our region served a warrant before his business opened. They took dozens of boxes full of 4473s — more than a decade’s worth. This is extremely concerning because it seemingly exceeds the search warrant which limited the scope of the search to financial records. These aren’t financial records, they’re records of lawful firearm purchases. What the hell does the IRS need with 4473s? We know the ATF in Washington, DC is trying to scoop up as many of these purchase records as possible, and that’s what it looks like they’re trying to do here.” And I've seen a few posted images of a tweet by Rep. Rosendale calling out the forms not being "financial data", although it looks like he's removed it from his profile, if the image wasn't fabricated to start: I met with Tom Vanhoose this morning after 20 armed IRS agents raided his store in Great Falls earlier this week. Tom informed me that these agents confiscated all the 4473 forms, none of which contain any financial information; instead, the IRS now has access to these forms… twitter.com/i/web/status/1…

There are several federal excise taxes on firearms. The main ones are (dispensing with the fine definitional details and Internal Revenue Code citations): A tax on transfers of firearms of $5 per concealable firearm and $200 per firearm on certain other firearms; a $500 per year firearm's dealers tax which is increased to $1000 if you import more than a certain number of firearms per year; a 10% of sales price excise tax on pistols and revolvers; and an 11% of sales price excise tax on other firearms and on ammunition. Of course, like any other business, firearm's dealers also have to file annual income tax returns on their revenues less their expenses on tax forms that depend upon the form of organization of the business (e.g. C-corporation, S-corporation, partnership/LLC, trust, etc.). The IRS has the right to examine the books and records of people who owe or are believed to owe taxes without going to a court to obtain permission to do so. Treas. Reg. § 1.601.105. Subject to certain exceptions, information obtained by the IRS in a review of a taxpayers records and their return information are confidential. 26 U.S.C. § 6103. There are criminal penalties for (slightly over simplifying) tax offenses including willfully failing to keep records necessary to file tax returns, willfully attempting to evade or defeat taxes, willfully failing to collect and pay taxes where required by law to do so, and willfully making false statements to IRS employees or on returns. 26 U.S.C. § 7201-7212. If the government provides probable cause to a federal judge or magistrate in connection with a possible criminal tax prosecution that there is probable cause to believe that a taxpayer has committed a criminal tax offense, then the government may obtain a search warrant to seize records without the advanced notice available in the usual civil record examination process. For example (not based on any facts I have been told about or read about in this particular case), suppose that a former employee of a firearm's dealer or an ex-spouse of one of the owners of the business, told the IRS that the dealer intentionally lied on their excise tax return by underreporting the number of firearms the dealer sold and that the dealer then kept the sales taxes collected from unreported buyers who completed Form 4473, and told the IRS criminal division investigators where the Form 4473s were kept at the dealer's offices. In that case, it would be routine for the IRS to obtain a federal search warrant to obtain those forms to seize and review in connection with an excise tax fraud investigation. If there was just an income tax audit, bank records and accounting records obtained by subpoena from banks and accountants would usually be sufficient. But this would cease to be the case if the inventory records obtained by subpoena from the dealer's suppliers, for example, and the accounting records, didn't match. If there was evidence of unreported firearm sales income, or of unreported excise taxable sales, the IRS would usually need to compare the the Form 4473s of the business to its income and excise tax returns filed with the IRS. It would be routine to obtain these records with a search warrant rather than a civil office record review with advanced notice if tax fraud was suspected. The Form 4473s due to IRS confidentiality requirements, wouldn't be publicly available to anyone by the IRS and criminal investigators (not even members of Congress or local law enforcement), and would probably only be presented in redacted or summary forms in a criminal tax fraud prosecution at trial. In all likelihood, the IRS doesn't care about the customers who filled out the Form 4473s at all, and isn't even bothering to investigate them (except possibly to spot check for fake social security numbers or names, which appear on the forms, to see if fake information was used to Form 4473s used to substantiate tax records). Instead, the IRS is probably simply tallying them up and noting dates of sale, putting them in a spreadsheet, and seeing if they are different from what was reported to the IRS on the dealer's tax returns. If the dealer, for example, paid the proper excise taxes on 800 guns in 2022, but had 1200 Form 4473s in banker's boxes at its offices, then the people involved in the tax fraud at the dealership are probably going to go to federal prison for a few years. Indeed, they would probably just plead guilty rather than going through a futile trial where documents with their own signatures on them from boxes seized in their shop clearly establish their guilt in that case. Federal firearm excise tax fraud prosecutions aren't terribly common, but they are about as plain vanilla as they come in the world of federal criminal prosecutions. This certainly doesn't portend any threat the Second Amendment rights or any crack down on the firearms industry. In terms of this message this sends, this is really no different that seizing the electronic records of a gas station that filed false gasoline excise tax returns to show how much gasoline was actually sold, and prosecuting the people who engaged in the tax fraud for that. The argument that a Form 4473 isn't a "financial record", when it provides documentation of all of the information except the price on all of the dealer's firearm sales (Manufacturer, Model, Serial Number, Type of Firearm, Caliber or Gauge, number of firearms sold, and check boxes for tax exemptions), and the fact the some of the federal firearm excise taxes due don't even depend upon the price of the firearm, isn't a very strong one. Even if the search warrant didn't single out Forms 4473s from other kinds of business records, this would probably just be harmless error, because the IRS absolutely has the right to ask for and seize Form 4473s in connection with the tax fraud investigation, just like any other business record of a firm suspected of not paying its taxes. These records aren't protected by any evidentiary privilege in a federal tax fraud prosecution. Also, combined with past sales fliers and catalogues and business records about sales pricing for different products from the dealer in its accounting records, it would be fairly trivial to use this information to recreate a very accurate forensic reconstruction of the gross firearm sales revenues of the dealer and the amount of excise taxes that should have been paid. It would be tedious work, but it would be extremely damning evidence of tax fraud if the estimated sales significantly exceeds the sales reported on the dealer's tax returns. Even if the some of the documents in a particular banker's box aren't within the scope of the search warrant (for example, perhaps someone put Christmas Cards and as well as accounting ledgers and cancelled checks in the same box), the IRS would not be beyond its rights to grab all of the banker's boxes of documents, review them at their leisure in a government office, and then return the contents of the boxes that turned out to be something other than what the IRS requested a search warrant to seize. A good faith belief that the boxes seized has some financial records in them would justify taking them away, reviewing their contents, and returning materials that were beyond the scope of what was sought. The IRS criminal division agents don't have to look through the many, many banker's boxes page by page at the dealer's place of business to screen them at that time at that level of detail. Similarly, the IRS agents are not required to assume that boxes actually contain what the label on the outside of the box says that the box contains. Of course, if the Form 4473s corroborate the tax returns filed by the dealer apart from minor clerical errors or uncertainties about the exact sales prices of sales reported on them due to irregular discounts provided by a dealer who sometimes haggled over the prices of used firearms, the dealer would be vindicated and the informant who triggered the investigation and prosecution (if there is evidence that this informant willfully lied to IRS investigators) might even be prosecuted for making an intentionally false report to a law enforcement officer. The dealer wouldn't be entitled to reimbursement for criminal defense expenses or harm to the dealer's reputation, but it would still be a huge PR coup and the criminal charges would go away, probably long before a trial was even held. Montana Attorney General Austin Knudsen absolutely knows all of the facts in the post above. His claimed fear of a crackdown on gun users is something he is doing to willfully mislead the people of Montana for political gain. He may also be throwing stones at federal prosecutions because he was irritated that the IRS and Justice Department didn't keep him in the loop on this tax investigation in his state which he sees as his turf, even though it was purely a matter of federal tax law violations which his office didn't have jurisdiction over. Indeed, the IRS may have kept him in the dark and out of the loop from this investigation, in part, in order to protect taxpayer and gun owner privacy by not sharing confidential IRS investigation information with state law enforcement officers, something that it is not allowed to do.

Note: I am not familiar with Washington law, but I can make an educated guess as to what is happening here. I am guessing that the couple in question are the joint registered owners of the motor vehicle. In many jurisdictions, motor vehicles are treated differently from "normal" things, they are treated as inherently dangerous and thus ownership carries a certain set of responsibilities. (Similar to e.g. owning a firearm, which carries with it certain restrictions on how it can be stored, for example.) One of those responsibilities is to keep track of who is operating the motor vehicle. Therefore, unless the operator of the motor vehicle can clearly be identified without incurring unreasonable cost, tickets for traffic violations are generally addressed to the registered owner, who can then forward them to the responsible operator. (Note that "unreasonable cost" does not have to be monetary. It could also be an invasion of privacy: it is less invasive to just ask the owner to identify the operator than to e.g. surveil the owner's property to find out who is using the vehicle or run facial recognition against the owner's family, friends, and colleagues.) In many jurisdictions, there is a form attached to the ticket (or downloadable from some website) which will look something like this: I accept the ticket: [ ] I do not accept the ticket [ ] because … I was operating the vehicle, but I did not run the red light [ ] I was not operating the vehicle [ ] … the vehicle was operated by: name ___, address ___ … I do not know who was operating the vehicle at that time [ ] If you claim not to know who was operating the vehicle at the time in question, that might have other consequences. In some jurisdictions, you can then be ordered to keep a logbook, for example. If the vehicle then gets caught again and you again claim to now know who was operating it, or you cannot produce the logbook, you might get fined for violating the court order to keep a logbook.

The United State doesn't have a national sales or value added tax, so the IRS would only care about the phone sale insofar as it might represent income to the seller. Insofar as it's income to the seller, it doesn't matter whether the transaction is cash, bitcoin or barter, the seller is supposed to account for it in their income taxes. If you are suggesting that bitcoin sales could be hidden, well, folks have been hiding cash transactions since taxes were invented. Worst case, the IRS discovers that the seller's spending is wildly out of line with their stated income and they begin a criminal investigation.

There is a slim chance that it is truish, depending on whose law you are asking about, and also depending on the facts (if the drug was in a baggie, it's unclear; it is was mixed with the soda, it's clear and it's true). As far as I know, the "baggie in can" theory has not been put to the appellate test (perhaps that is evidence that the can does not count). However, in the case Chapman v. US, 500 U.S. 453, defendant was convicted of the sale of LSD-laced blotter paper, and was sentenced accosting to the 5.7 gram weight of the blotter paper, not the 50 milligram weight of the LSD that it contained. SCOTUS upheld the sentencing based on the higher weight, holding that "The statute requires the weight of the carrier medium to be included when determining the appropriate sentencing for trafficking in LSD", because the statute is stated in terms of a "mixture or substance containing a detectable amount" (here, 21 USC 841, are some of the current laws, which repeated use the formula "mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of"). The question that would arise is whether a can containing a bag of something is a "substance" or "mixture". The ordinary meaning of "mixture" precludes that interpretation, but of course you also have to look at the legislative history to determine what Congress's intent was in writing these laws. Saying that a can with a bag is a "substance" is also counter-intuitive, but not as plainly unreasonable as calling a can and a bag a "mixture". In Chapman, the court observed that "Congress clearly intended the dilutant, cutting agent, or carrier medium to be included in the weight of those drugs for sentencing purposes", but again you might interpret "carrier medium" as referring to something other than "the means of carrying the drug" – "carrier medium" is not statutorily defined, and its "plain meaning" is broad (but also note that the statute doesn't mention "carrier medium"). In its ruling, the court appeals to "the history of Congress's attempts to control illegal drug distribution", and a careful study of all of the pertinent documents for this case might definitively rule in vs. out an interpretation that the weight of the container is to be included. An obvious ludicrous consequence of including container weight is that if you are arrested for possession of a trace amount of a drug, found in your car, the weight of the car is to be considered and you get life in prison. It is plausible that the officer has a vague acquaintance with the Chapman-type ruling, and has misapplied the law, thus he has a good-faith belief that his claim is legally correct (thus he did not lie, he was simply wrong). Perhaps some DA has pursued the "drug plus can-weight" theory, but I doubt that has happened.

In all likelihood, the judge's order related to data collection and reselling is not legally enforceable. They weren't parties to the expungement action, so the judge doesn't have jurisdiction over them. And, the First Amendment protects the right to say truthful things pretty absolutely. Arguably, if the sites provided the information without making clear that it might not be current because records were expunged or corrected, there might be a claim for negligent misrepresentation, false light, or even defamation, but I seriously doubt that even those claims would hold up. The language in the order might cause sites to comply out of not legally justified concern, or just a desire to be accurate, even if it is not enforceable. So, it doesn't hurt to bring that information to the attention of such sites and ask them to take down the information. But, when push comes to shove, I very much doubt that you would prevail in court enforcing that order against them. Certainly, if you do nothing, they will do nothing, because they are not psychic and have no idea that the court order related to those records has been entered. Even a valid and enforceable order directed at a party over whom a court has jurisdiction is not effective until the person ordered to comply with it has notice of the order. And, there is no system that gives sites like that notice without you taking action to inform them of an order.

Keep in mind that a warrant doesn't require proof that you stole the property or have the property. Instead, the warrant is just authorization to look for that proof. The standard for securing a warrant is probable cause, which is a much lower bar to clear than people seem to think. It just requires that given everything the officer knows, there's a "substantial probability" that a piece of evidence will be in a given place at a given time. If the officer swore to a judge that a reliable source had told him that the letter was stolen, then seen in your front yard, and not seen since, I wouldn't be at all surprised if the judge gave him a search warrant.

The standard for stopping someone and requesting their ID under the limitations in the U.S. Constitution is "reasonable suspicion." For example, if the officer has a reasonable suspicion that you are taking pictures for the purpose of a secure location for purposes of espionage, or to case the location for a future crime, reasonable suspicion is probably present and you can probably legitimately be asked for you ID. A creative and intelligent officer can almost always conjure up some reasonable suspicion in the situation that you identify to question you and demand ID. For example, she could state that no one else has taken a picture of that location in weeks and that is is very unusual behavior, that your demeanor or the time of day you were present doesn't seem to be that of someone taking a picture for artistic or journalistic purposes, that you seemed nervous, that a previous criminal engaged in similar behavior before committing a crime fourteen years ago, that a confidential informant (e.g. a nosy neighbor) advised him that there was someone engaged in suspicious behavior at that location, that she read in a police anti-terrorism bulletin that terrorist favor that model of camera, etc. The nature of the suspicion doesn't have to be shared with you until you challenge it in court. A dumb cop won't come up with any colorable reason, demands ID for a stated reason ("before you have to do whatever I say") that is inaccurate, admits he has no reason to stop you in a conversation captured by a body camera, and doesn't come up with pretext after the fact before going to the court. In that case, the stop is a de minimis violation of your civil rights justifying a nominal damages award of $1 to you and your attorneys' fees and costs and maybe a consent decree ordering the agency not to do that in the future.

Was the case Sealed? Or is it considered to be Private? Those are two different cases. I was not able to find any laws regarding sealing, or expunging records of Name Changes, but was able to find the Utah Law for Criminal Records. I can only assume they draw from one another. All that being said, assuming your whatever case is sealed, then Some records are sealed. In these kinds of cases, even information about the existence of the case is not publicly available. A person seeking access to a sealed record must petition the court for permission to unseal the records. Rule 4-202.03 states that, ....no one may access a sealed court record except by order of the court. A judge may review a sealed record when the circumstances warrant. From that I can assume that, The records are not public. The records will not show up in a routine check The records will be known only if a there is a court order. Comparing it with the Expungement Act, Continued Use of Sealed Records After sealing, BCI continues to index and maintain all expunged records of arrests and convictions, but the records will not be released to the public. BCI will not divulge any information contained in the expunged records to any person or agency without a court order, unless authorized by statute to do so. Upon request, the following organizations may receive information contained in expunged records: the Board of Pardons and Parole Peace Officer Standards and Training federal authorities, unless prohibited by federal law the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing and the State Office of Education Both cases above require a court order to get that seal record information. However, from what I gather only expunged criminal records can be access upon request by the Division of Occupational Licences. Bottom line, it sounds like you are safe to mark is no previous name, but you may lose your license in the future if something goes south. I will recommend you to get a professional look into the word of the law and provide you with a written statement of the actual law. Another thing you can try is write to the court who sealed your case, present them the situation and explain what you have found so far, and ask for guidance.

How is Midjourney's ToS Legal? I feel this is fairly straightforward, but I have seen no explanation as to why Midjourney is allowed to restrict the "copyright" or commercial use rights of their users, paid or otherwise, in their ToS. In their terms of service, it states that you only have the right to use generated images commercially if you have paid for a membership during the time the asset was made. This seems to directly contradict the idea that AI generated images have no copyright, and are therefore public domain (as my understanding goes, which could be way off-base). It doesn't seem like they have a leg to stand on if I created a free account and used generated images commercially, since my assumption is that they could only attempt a DMCA claim, which shouldn't work because the image has no copyright. So, I ask anyone here with knowledge on the subject to explain to me whether or not I am mistaken. I know it's all still fairly new, but I thought the ruling on AI-generated content was pretty clear. The only thing I could potentially see is that the images were generated by their machines, but I don't see how that changes things. The section in question: Copyright and Trademark In this section, Paid Member shall refer to a Customer who has subscribed to a paying plan. Rights You give to Midjourney By using the Services, You grant to Midjourney, its successors, and assigns a perpetual, worldwide, non-exclusive, sublicensable no-charge, royalty-free, irrevocable copyright license to reproduce, prepare Derivative Works of, publicly display, publicly perform, sublicense, and distribute text, and image prompts You input into the Services, or Assets produced by the service at Your direction. This license survives termination of this Agreement by any party, for any reason. Your Rights Subject to the above license, You own all Assets You create with the Services, provided they were created in accordance with this Agreement. This excludes upscaling the images of others, which images remain owned by the original Asset creators. Midjourney makes no representations or warranties with respect to the current law that might apply to You. Please consult Your own lawyer if You want more information about the state of current law in Your jurisdiction. Your ownership of the Assets you created persists even if in subsequent months You downgrade or cancel Your membership. However, You do not own the Assets if You fall under the exceptions below. If You are an employee or owner of a company with more than $1,000,000 USD a year in gross revenue and You are using the Services on behalf of Your employer, You must purchase a “Pro” membership for every individual accessing the Services on Your behalf in order to own Assets You create. If You are not sure whether Your use qualifies as on behalf of Your employer, please assume it does. If You are not a Paid Member, You don’t own the Assets You create. Instead, Midjourney grants You a license to the Assets under the Creative Commons Noncommercial 4.0 Attribution International License (the “Asset License”). The full text is accessible as of the Effective Date here: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/legalcode. Please note: Midjourney is an open community which allows others to use and remix Your images and prompts whenever they are posted in a public setting. By default, Your images are publically viewable and remixable. As described above, You grant Midjourney a license to allow this. If You purchase a "Pro" plan, You may bypass some of these public sharing defaults. If You purchased the Stealth feature as part of Your “Pro” subscription or through the previously available add-on, we agree to make best efforts not to publish any Assets You make in any situation where you have engaged stealth mode in the Services. Please be aware that any image You make in a shared or open space such as a Discord chatroom, is viewable by anyone in that chatroom, regardless of whether Stealth mode is engaged. Clearly, I'm not lawyer, and I could easily misunderstand what this trying to say. I understand companies typically needing to add broad language to protect themselves, and is usually innocuous, despite the claims made by others. I'm mostly here to try and gain an understanding of why they might have included this.

A TOS is not intrinsically illegal, but an interpretation of a TOS may or may not be supported by a court, that remains to be seen. It probably does not constitute a "deceptive practice" under FTC standards. The TOS is your permission to use the software, and there can be no question that they have the right to impose conditions on customer use of the software. E.g. Amazon cannot freely use software that is only licensed for free educational use. They speak of "ownership" of IP so created and explicitly disclaim any claims about Current Law in Your Jurisdiction. At the crucial point in the agreement, they switch to talking about the license (BY-NC) that they grant when you are not a paid member. The exact details of this ownership are not part of the free tier TOS, but they do seem to add certain protections to "owned" content created under the Pro plan – they are under no legal obligation to make all content universally visible and usable.

Probably not I think this question represents a misunderstanding of the linked article, and in any case of the specifically US doctrine of fair use. Fair use is always based on a part of a copyrighted work copied without authorization. If there was authorization, there would be no need to resort to the defense of fair use. The article discusses the commercial use of short sections of musical works used for commercial purposes. It points out that the idea that any use of an excerpt of less than 30 seconds is permitted is a myth. In this it is correct. While the amount of a copyrighted work used is one of the four factors to be considered in deciding wither a use is a fair use, it is not the only one, and no specific amount is always permitted. In Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539 (1985) The US Supreme Court held that quotes amounting to about 3-400 words from a 500-page book were an infringement, and were not a fair use, because they were the "heart of the book". The linked article says that one should ask "Was the work obtained from a legal source, in a lawful manner?" and asserts that "taking a copy from an unapproved source invalidates fair use." Nothing in 17 USC 107 says this, and I don't know of any authoritative source for such a statement. The article also says that "Commercial, for-profit use is not fair use, while commentary or criticism may be." This is simply incorrect. While a commercial purpose tends to weigh against fair use, it does not preclude it, and commercial use has been held to be fair use in some cases. Even in the case of Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises linked above, fair use was seriously considered, and was not denied simply because the use was commercial. No one o0f the four fair use factors is final taken alone. I do not think the linked article is a reliable guide to US copyright law. In the case described by the question, an unreleased game has been distributed without authorization over the internet, and reviews written based on that unauthorized copy. Whoever copied the game committed copyright infringement, but a suit might not provide substantial damages unless actual economic harm could be demonstrated. (And, of course, the identity of the infringer would need to be proved.) But a review based on such a leaked copy would not necessarily be an infringement. If the review described the game, but did not quote any of its dialog or other text, and did not reproduce any sounds or images from the game, there would be no infringement. If the review did quote from the unauthorized copy, the usual fair use analysis would apply. The fact that the copy had been unauthorized would not determine the outcome. Fair use is defined by 17 USC 107. This provides: Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include— (1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such finding is made upon consideration of all the above factors. Note that criticism is one of the specified purposes for which fair use is designed, and an unpublished work is still subject to fair use. If the review quoted so much of the game that the potential market for it was harmed, that would weigh against fair use, but it is hard for me to see how a mere review could do that to an interactive game. (17 USC 107(4)) is normally applied when an infringing copy serves as a replacement for the authorized version, and sales are lost as a result. I suppose it might be argued that a bad review that was a direct result of an infringement came under this provision, but it is a strech at best, and US First Amendment considerations would tend to prevent such a ruling. In short, it seems unlikely that any normal review would be an infringement, and that the game was leaked would not make it one.

It is legal, and good policy, because the later explanation could create conflicting policies and notions as to what the "agreement" is. The TOS is probably created by a lawyer who interviewed the website owner to figure out what they wanted, then wrote legal language to do that. If you ask tech support how to interpret the TOS, you probably are not getting a legally-correct statement (assuming that the tech support guy isn't also a lawyer). Rather than take a risk that a customer would defend their action in court by arguing "they said I could!", the website may elect to not make promises that they don't want to keep. Instead, if you want to understand the agreement, you hire your own lawyer, then propose a hypothetical action, to see how the law interprets the language of the agreement. For example "can I rent out my Netflix password so that other people can use it?". The lawyer would then read the TOS and relevant cases law, and would advise you whether this is allowed under the TOS (it is not). Alternatively, you could read up on relevant aspects of the law and figure it out yourself. Website TOS is basically driven by copyright law, the technical necessity of some kind of automatic copying in order to use a web page, and the legal requirement that you can't copy without permission of the copyright holder. The TOS is the set of conditions that you must satisfy in order to be permitted to use the site. So many questions reduce to issues of copyright law and permission to copy *can you legally "permit" the copying of materials you upload?).

First, the press release is copyrighted from its inception and may have been work for hire (a close call since you wrote them for an LLC and the LLC had a deal with them). There is a copyright in someone, although the absence of a copyright notice limits the remedies available for infringement. Second, a link is not a copyright violation. Third, copyright protects an exact manifestation of an idea or description of a fact, not the idea or fact itself. Fourth, there are two different doctrines that could protect an exact copy of a press release. One of two doctrines, which applies if the press release has been released to the public, is an implied license. Press releases are meant for the general public and reprinting them when that is their intended purpose is an implied grant of permission. In the same way, if you have an unfenced front yard to a concrete path leading to your front door, anyone who wishes to meet with you has an implied license to walk up to your door and knock. Whether this implied license can be revoked or not is a harder question. The other of the two doctrines, which is not limited to press releases that have been released, is "fair use". In this situation, when the work was short, has been released to others, has limited literary value, transmits unprotected facts relevant to you, relates facts that may also be a matter of public record (the sale anyway), and you aren't trying to profit from the text of the press releases themselves just from the facts that they convey, the case for fair use is pretty decent even though this is a business use. Ultimately, however, to be squeaky clean and avoid litigation, you can link rather than regurgitate the press releases, and can write your own statements about the facts in them from scratch. This information is not privileged or trademarked. If you didn't sign a non-disclosure agreement (NDA) or if they were released to the public, they aren't subject to trade secret protection either. If they were only released to the customer whose sale was involved and there is an NDA they could conceivably be trade secrets but even then the case would be very weak since the information doesn't create value by virtue of being kept secret.

"Plagiarism" is an academic concept, not a legal one Plagiarising the work of another without attribution is academic misconduct in every reputable academic facility and can lead to disciplinary action. But it's not against the law, and you can't be sued for doing it. Copyright violation is against the law You violate copyright when you copy or make a derivative work from the copyrighted work of another without permission or without an exemption under the law. In some jurisdictions, authors and artists have moral copyright, which operates alongside proprietary copyright and gives certain rights, including the right of attribution and the right for their work to be treated respectfully. In those jurisdictions, even if you have the copyright holder's permission, you must still respect the moral rights. Let's make some things explicit by considering a particular artwork. Say, this one: This particular piece is not subject to copyright because a) it was created before there was such a concept, and b) da Vinci died in 1519, so if there had been a copyright law, copyright in this work would have long expired. So, you can make as many copies of this as you like. Now, let's consider what the situation would be if Leonardo's alchemical pursuits had been more successful and instead of dying in 1519, he died last Tuesday. If you want to make a copy of this image, you must have Leonardo's heir(s) permission or be operating under an exemption under copyright law in your jurisdiction. When you train your AI, you will need to make a copy of the image. Do you have permission? Do you have a relevant exemption? If you obtained your images by scraping websites then the answers are no and (probably) no. Whether the image has metadata identifying the author is irrelevant to answering the questions. Whether there is any way of identifying the artist is also irrelevant - you still need their permission even if you don't know who to ask. If your AI, when prompted, generates an image that is strikingly similar to a copyrighted image it was trained on, that is a derivative work and you need permission for that. Under current law, the programer(s) are likely the copyright violators rather than the users of the AI.

In Germany, there is no concept that corresponds directly to public domain. You automatically hold the Urheberrecht (~ copyright) for all creative works that you make, and it can't be given up or transferred (§29 UrhG). The work only enters the Gemeinfreiheit (~public domain) 70 years after your death. You can however license Verwertungsrechte (economic usage rights). When you make creative works in the course of employment (see §43 UrhG), your employer automatically gets the Verwertungsrechte necessary in the context for the work, which is typically an exclusive right (no one else, not even you, can use the work). Your are not in an employment relationship with your school, so it has no rights to your works and cannot prevent you from publishing them on copyright grounds. When you see advice on the internet to check with your school first, that is U.S.-specific advice. Since you're still a minor (7–17), you only have limited capacity to enter contracts or legal transactions (bedingte Geschäftsfähigkeit). While you are able to make transactions involving your own means (e.g. buying something with your pocket money) or make transactions that are only to your benefit (such as accepting a gift), other transactions are schwebend unwirksam (~ pending ratification), until your parents agree. The relevant law is in §107 and §108 BGB. This is a problem with open source licenses. If you publish software under a license, this license is schwebend unwirksam. Someone might start using the software under the license. But then if your parents refuse ratification, the license would be invalid, and everyone would have to stop using your software and destroy any derivative works they made. This is a bit of a problem, especially since open source licenses are otherwise assumed to be irrevocable. So if you want to offer a license (including open source licenses), please give legal certainty to the recipients of the license and ask your parents for their consent first, possibly even in writing. Per §107 BGB, the license you offer with their consent will be valid.

Arguably, no one owns the copyright in the general case. This is a similar case to a previous question I've answered. In short, the US has a statutory provision which bars infringing derivatives from gaining copyright. In this particular case, it's helpful to take a look at what the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit had to say. While evaluating transformativeness, they did not declare Warhol's works to be derivatives, but left that possibility open and stated it was closer to being a derivative than transformative fair use: Nonetheless, although we do not conclude that the Prince Series works are necessarily derivative works as a matter of law, they are much closer to presenting the same work in a different form, that form being a high-contrast screenprint, than they are to being works that make a transformative use of the original. That Warhol's prints might have no copyright attached to them does not mean that anyone can use them though – they are still very much based on Goldsmith's photo and the underlying copyright to the original still belongs to Goldsmith. This could well mean that Goldsmith would be able to use the Warhol prints as if she owned its copyrights. Update: The Supreme Court has now affirmed, albeit on a narrow appeal from the Second Circuit Court of Appeal which dropped the issue that this question is about. Only the first fair use factor of transformativeness was challenged by the Andy Warhol Foundation (AWF). Additionally, and more important for this question is that only a single use was ruled on: the licensing of one of the prints by AWF for a 2016 magazine article reprint following Prince's death. This is because Goldsmith dropped the wider infringement claims. Here's where I realize I missed a key distinguishing fact in the case: There was indeed a narrow license for use of the photo for "artist reference" in relation to an article to be published in a 1984 Vanity Fair issue. In effect, due to the license, the (probable) derivative could be considered non-infringing1. Nevertheless, the court ruled that the use in the 2016 issue was not fair (given there was no license for use beyond the 1984 article, AWF had to rely on a fair use defense). In other words, the Warhol prints as a whole are not necessarily infringing derivatives2, rather, the specific use in the 2016 article was affirmed to be infringing. In particular, I'd like to highlight the following from court: The fair use provision, and the first factor in particular, requires an analysis of the specific “use” of a copyrighted work that is alleged to be “an infringement.” §107. The same copying may be fair when used for one purpose but not another. The full license text is not in any of the court decisions, so it's impossible for us to know for sure, but the portions that are quoted lead me to believe the license is vaguely worded. In particular, its in the realm of possibility that only the single derivative used on the 1984 article was licensed, but I would argue its reasonable to expect an artist to try multiple derivatives given a license for "artist reference." This could potentially have been of some consequence as the print used in the 2016 article is not the same as the one used in the 1984 article. But since this case was initiated in district court by the AWF seeking declaratory judgment of non-infringement, my understanding of the matter is that once the case is passed back to the district court, it will enter in that declaration given Goldsmith dropped the wider infringement claims. Take this with a grain of salt, I'm not very well-versed in trial procedure.

The notification that you saw is not useful legal information for you: stuff always belongs to whoever owns the stuff. It might be interpreted as saying "it doesn't belong to us", but you can't count on that (it's virtually guaranteed that at least some of the content there is owned by the website owner). A more informative statement would be "You will have to get permission from the content owner to copy their stuff", and "We're not going to spend time figuring out who owns what". You could read the terms of service (try this with Stack Exchange) to see what the site tells people. The TOS here says that if you contribute anything, it "is perpetually and irrevocably licensed to Stack Exchange under the Creative Commons Attribution Share Alike license". You can then look up what that license says and learn what that allows. Websites are kind of tricky, though, because it's not hard to change the wording of a TOS, and you need to know what specific TOS was promulgated at the time a particular contribution was unleashed. Usual practice is to think it through carefully and not frequently tweak the TOS, but it's not illegal to change the TOS. Note that copyright law does not prohibit you from using other people's stuff, it prohibits you from copying. The distinction is clearer when you see a post that explains an algorithm with actual code, you read and learn and make use of that, but write your own code. As a user out there, if there isn't a clear indication that stuff posted is there for the taking, under some public license (as is the case with SE), then getting specific permission to copy, from the owner of the content (possibly untraceable), would be necessary. Now assume that you're a moderator or site-owner of some forum: presumably (hopefully) you have a TOS that addresses that situation, which says that moderators have the right to edit or delete content at their sole discretion, and also you say what kinds of posts are prohibited. Such an statement is not absolutely mandatory for all things, but it may be necessary to avoid litigation over some acts. One one end of the spectrum, it would be illegal for a forum to host child porn, stolen credit card numbers, or protected digital content. If a user were to post such stuff, the site would need to eliminate that stuff, and the poster could not legally rely on an argument of the type "That's my stuff, you have no right to mess with it". On the other hand, if a forum actually requires paid membership, then there may be a strong contractual expectation that the user is getting something of value, so you would have to watch for statements that could be interpreted as broad permission to put stuff out there without any interference. (For instance, a file-hosting service would have only minimal restrictions on content, aimed at protecting their own legal interests; whereas a political-advocacy site would have maximal interest in prohibiting the expression of views counter to the cause). Thus the SE TOS has you "grant Stack Exchange the perpetual and irrevocable right and license to use, copy, cache, publish, display, distribute, modify, create derivative works", which allows moderators to correct typos, delete offensive wording, and obliterate entire posts. If a site fails to have any such clauses in their TOS, then it might be a matter that has to be settled in court, whether they have the right to eliminate "spam" (i.e. advertising for a service, especially if the reason for getting an account was to provide an advertising platform). In light of the limited use sanctioned by the TOS, per the below comment, legal copying will be quite limited. However, "fair use" a situation where copying is allowed, regardless of what the TOS may say. (You could be banned from the site, but you could not be sued for infringement). Fair use was invented precisely so that people could make comments like "Jones advocates an absurd law, saying '...[quote from Jones]...'". Thus you can comment on a post and quote the relevant part ("The lines '[... quoting the code ...]' results in an infinite loop"). See the Fair Use FAQ for more details.

Are there countries where vehicles involved in an accident must move if they're blocking the flow of traffic? When driving in Europe, one can often notice traffic jams caused by car accidents where there's very minor damage to both parties and they could easily move out of the way, however the law mandates them both to stay put and wait for the police/insurance to collect evidence about the accident. This is understandable from the perspective of people involved in an accident as no one wants to see increased insurance premiums if they're not responsible, however this is sub-optimal for all the other drivers as the time wasted in the traffic jam far surpasses the total monetary cost of any small car crash. Are there countries where this is different and drivers are obligated to move out of the way immediately if their car remains operable?

The Straßenverkehrsordnung(Translation) in Germany says this: § 34 Accidents (1) Any person involved in a traffic accident must: stop immediately; take the necessary steps to ensure traffic safety and, if there is only minor damage, move their vehicle to the edge of the carriageway; ascertain the consequences of the accident; assist injured persons (section 323c of the Penal Code); to other persons present at the scene of the accident who were involved and have suffered damage: a) state that they (i.e. the person referred to in the first clause) were involved in the accident; and b) if requested to do so, provide their own name and address, present their own driving licence and vehicle registration document and, to the best of their knowledge, provide details of their third-party insurance; a) remain at the scene of the accident until, by virtue of their own presence, it has been possible to identify their personal details, their vehicle and the nature of their involvement to the benefit of the other persons who were involved in and have suffered damage in the accident; or b) wait for a reasonable length of time and leave their own name and address at the scene of the accident if nobody was prepared to perform the identification; immediately facilitate subsequent identification if they have left the scene of the accident legitimately, after giving a plausible excuse or upon expiration of the waiting time (paragraph 6(b)). For this purpose, they must inform at least the persons referred to above (paragraph 6(a)) or a nearby police station that they were involved in the accident and must provide their own address, their present whereabouts as well as the registration number and location of the vehicle that was involved in the accident, which must be kept available for immediate investigation for a reasonable length of time. For minor accidents (no injuries, no suspected criminal offence, no major disagreements between involved parties, ...) you do not have to call and wait for police (you have a right to call them but they might try to discourage you from requesting that they come to the scene). For normal traffic accidents insurance doesn't come and collect evidence at the scene, instead an appraiser will document damage to your car and look at statements and witness reports and other documentation. You can just exchange all necessary information with the other party/ies and then leave with your car (possibly using a towing service). However, OP might refer to the specific case of an accident with a rented car. In that case, the contract with the rental service often mandates that you call police and request an official police documentation and report in case of an accident.

I feel that a person, not the subject of arrest, should be protected by the 4th amendment if they choose to remain in their vehicle, even if “ordered” to exit the vehicle by an officer. The intuition is fine, but is basically incorrect. I’m most interested to know: How would a driver (1) Politely (2) determine if a given instruction to exit the vehicle must be complied with, and (3) decline the instruction without giving the officer “cause” or otherwise damaging a potential case? From a practical perspective the only workable response is to comply. There are times when this is done without a reasonable suspicion (or in some cases probable cause) or other legal basis, but it is pretty much impossible for you to dispute this one the spot. Most of the time, the officer will have the legal authority to order you to leave the vehicle. If they order you to exit the vehicle despite not having the legal authority to do so, the right course of action is to comply and then to file a complaint with the agency employing the officer or to bring a civil lawsuit against the officer. There are good answers to a basically duplicate question at How can you tell if you have to follow a police officer's instructions?

It is certainly possible for the same action to break multiple laws, and be chargeable as multiple crimes. For example, shooting and killing someone may be assault, assault with a deadly weapon, and murder all at the same time. For a different example a person who simply omits to file an income tax return may be guilty of both failure to file a required return, and failure to pay tax due, and in some cases failure to par required estimated tax due as well. For yet another example, driving well above the speed limit may be a violation of the speed limit law, and also careless driving, and possibly also reckless driving. In the first case the assault etc may be lesser included offenses in the charge of murder. That means that they are automatically available to a jury (or judge) trying the accused, who can convict on one of the lesser included charges if they do not convict on the primary count. For the more general case, I don't know of any special term for the situation. It is not usual to have law A which says "do not do X", and also law B which says "you must follow law A". There is no general principle against having such redundant laws, nor is there, in the US, any Constitutional rule against such laws. But legislatures do not normally bother to enact such redundant laws. Laws which will sometimes overlap in their coverage, but in some cases do not overlap are common.

Although your question didn't ask about the criminal side of this, it's important to consider the offence of driving without insurance in the UK. Section 143 Road Traffic Act 1998 provides that— (1) Subject to the provisions of this Part of this Act— (a) a person must not use a motor vehicle on a road or other public place unless there is in force in relation to the use of the vehicle by that person such a policy of insurance or such a security in respect of third party risks as complies with the requirements of this Part of this Act ... (2) If a person acts in contravention of subsection (1) above he is guilty of an offence. (3) A person charged with using a motor vehicle in contravention of this section shall not be convicted if he proves— ... (c) that he neither knew nor had reason to believe that there was not in force in relation to the vehicle such a policy of insurance or security as is mentioned in subsection (1) above. If it's not too late, it may be worth challenging the matter in court on the basis of a s143(1)(c) defence (i.e. you didn't have reason to believe that your policy was not in force). You should speak to a solicitor immediately if you want to consider this. As mentioned in the previous answer, you may have a claim against the insurer if you can provide that you were misled into believing that your policy had been renewed automatically. You should read the terms and conditions carefully to discover whether they were entitled to communicate on matters of renewal solely by email. Again, you should speak to a solicitor to establish whether you have a realistic prospect of success. (in case you're curious, the 'security' mentioned in s143 refers to a sum of £500,000 which, if deposited with the Courts Funds Office, exempts an individual or corporation from the insurance requirement)

You are free to ask them to stop. If they do, great. If they don’t, you legal options depend on if they are legally able to make such noise at that time or not. I am not familiar with UK law but typical laws give wide powers to the owners of infrastructure to construct/repair it. Again, typically, permits may be required but exceptions exist for urgent work. If they have such a permit (or don’t need one) your legal options are nil. If they don’t you can go to court seeking an injunction to stop them until they do.

The NHTSA gives rules for the United States. Right of way goes to the first person to stop. So if a line of cars were at both stop signs, and all cars wanted to make the same conflicting turns, they would alternate. If the opposing cars stop at the same time then the one turning right has the right of way. (This is because a right turn falls under the "Straight Traffic Goes First" rule.)

I think it's important to keep in mind the essence of your actions. @Mowzer gave a great answer on the matter in hand, but I'd like to add a point of view. Is it illegal to eat while driving? Like pointed out by @Mowzer, if no law prohibits it, it's allowed by default (lots of countries have this premise). But what about the consequences of your actions? Maybe there's no law against eating in the car, but there sure is one in my country that specific says that you are not allowed to drive without using both hands in the wheel. The only exception to this rule is to take out your hand from the wheel to use the stick to change gears. Another point of view to add is the liability. Let's say you're minding your own business while driving and a lunatic trying to commit suicide jumps in front of your car. It's a pretty straight-forward case, you have no reason to be blamed. Now, let's add to the same scenario your snack; with a small change, you are now facing a accident that may have been caused by reckless driving (another thing commonly illegal). To sum up, the law is not really like math that have axioms that determine true or false statements without any distinguishment. That's why every case is single handled in the law by it's particularities.

No. The laws specify what you can and what you cannot do. If the intent of the authority was that you were allowed to drive at 45 mph, you would have a speed limit of 45 mph, not a speed limit of 40 mph. If you go at 41 mph, you are breaking a law and can be punished. That said, law enforcement officers usually have some leeway on how to enforce the law, and they could very well let it pass with just a warning (or even ignore it if they have more pressing issues); the circunstances of it are specific to every situation and officer. The only point that could be made would be if the difference was so small that it could be argued that it can invalidate the evidence on the basis of margin of errors. If the radar catches you driving at 41 mph but the error margin of the radar is 5%, you could argue that you were driving at 39 mph and that the reading is due to the error in the radar1. That would enable you to challenge the evidence (but here the point is not that you are allowed to drive at 41 mph but that there is no proof that you were driving at 41 mph). From what I know, most police forces will be aware of that and avoid issuing fines unless you are well above that margin of error2. 1In fact, in Spain word of the street is that radars are set to account to possible margin of error of the radar, plus possible margin of error of the vehicle speedometer -even if it is the vehicle owner's responsibility to ensure that it works correctly- and some leeway. 2Some people post on the internet the "magic formula" of how many % of speed you can go over the posted speed limit based on those calculations. Of course those magic formulas rely in the radar and the speedometer being 100% accurate and the driver never getting distracted a few seconds and passing it. So, even assuming that those magic formulas are correct, if either the radar or the speedometer are not accurate or the driver gets distracted for a few seconds, you are at risk of getting a ticket.

Does Trump have the right to waive a jury trial and request a bench trial in the classified documents case? In the Federal criminal case against Donald Trump in the Mar-a-Lago classified documents case, does former president Trump have the ability to waive a jury trial and request a bench trial? Given Aileen Cannon's history in cases involving the defendant, and potential bias towards the person who appointed her would this be a good legal strategy on his part?

While the right to a jury trial is waiveable, in order to have a bench trial in a federal district court, the court and prosecutor generally must agree. before any waiver can become effective, the consent of government counsel and the sanction of the court must be had (Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 312 (1930)) This is codified in Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. However, just because the waiver can be (and generally is) conditioned on governmental consent, some courts have nonetheless allowed the defendant's request for a bench trial despite the lack of consent from the government. See e.g. United States v. Panteleakis, 422 F. Supp. 247 (D.R.I. 1976) (a trial against multiple defendants that would require considering "approximately 1,000 exhibits," "over a three month period," with some evidence admissible against some defendants while inadmissible against others; and the government did not try to "rebut the inference that substantial prejudice [in a trial by jury] is practically impossible to avoid under these circumstances"). This possibility appears to have been left open by the Supreme Court in Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24 (1964): We need not determine in this case whether there might be some circumstances where a defendant's reasons for wanting to be tried by a judge alone are so compelling that the Government's insistence on trial by jury would result in the denial to a defendant of an impartial trial.

If the question asks, "did you do X" where X is or includes a crime that you could be criminally prosecuted for, you can invoke the 5th amendment in refusing to answer that. I have seen that done and seen that objection to the question sustained in court. However, if admitting to X would provide only civil liability, then the 5th would not apply. At trial, you may also have to take care not to give direct testimony on things that are so closely related that you "open the door" to being required to answer that question. For example, you can't say "I don't owe because I did X" and then expect to not have to answer "So just to be clear, did you do X?" Also, depending on context, invoking the 5th might cause a jury to view your testimony more skeptically (cpast points out that "For civil cases, adverse inferences based on pleading the fifth are totally okay"), and if that's going to come up you should ask your attorney about whether or not it'd be a good idea strategically.

Actually this is the only SCOTUS ruling on Impeachment because of what it legally means with respect to SCOTUS and impeachment. Namely, Impeachment is a congressional power and not a judicial one that has no punishment beyond the removal from office upon conviction and that therefor it is not a matter that is Judicial. That is a fancy way to say that SCOTUS or any lower court may not hear appeals rising from the outcome of Impeachment. Because of this, it's unlikely to hear any SCOTUS case as to the matter of impeachment and the only outstanding question they could likely hear is "Who can hear an Impeachment Trial for the Vice President?" but thus far none of the 19 impeachment trials have heard involved a vice president. Nixon v. United States basically held that in matters of impeachment it is the court's position that it is likely to respond to this hypothetical with the legal ruling of "not my monkeys, not my circus" (note: not legal jargon). With that said, this makes the U.S. senate the highest court in the land when it comes to precedents set by impeachment cases. The very first person ever impeached was a U.S. Senator, who was expelled by the Senate the same day the House voted on Articles of Impeachment. The decision not to have the trial did establish some notable precedents: first, Impeachment and conviction are all about removing an officer from office and if at anytime before conviction the officer is removed by other means, the process is stopped as it is moot. Second, and more important, is that members of Congress are not "impeachable" officers as both houses have methods that allow them to expel members by vote. This means that the only people who can be impeached are executive officers (the person who is currently president, vice president, and cabinet secretaries, any other office that is appointed by the president and confirmed by the senate, and federal judges) and that a conviction of impeachment does not bar one from holding another federal office unless the senate enacts an additional punishment after the conviction barring that person from federal office. They cannot bar one from state office. Finally, House and Senate Rules have instructions for procedures in their part in impeachment. The commonality between both is that impeachment takes precidents over all regular buisness so once articles are put to the floor, there speaker must hold the vote with in a certain window of time (three days, I think) and the Senate must hold the trial as soon as possible, though will honor reasonable delays as per the impeached officer's right to delay. As a final note, and because it wasn't clear in the question Nixon v. United States is often confused with another case (United States v. Nixon). The latter one did indirectly relate to impeachment in that it was related to President Nixon handing over evidence to the comittee investigating possible impeachment articles against Nixon, and because of that ruling, Nixon handed over the evidence and later resigned to avoid the Impeachment. The former one not only didn't involve anything related Watergate, it also wasn't related to President Nixon at all, but a (former) Federal Judge Walter Nixon, and specifically was heard because Judge Nixon happened to be the first Judge impeached by a Senate commitee as the jury rather than the full Senate, following a rule change that only held full senate as jury for the President and Vice President and a committee for anyone else. The final rule is that only the President is constitutionally mandated to have the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court act as the judge in an Impeachment trial, while the presiding officer for all other cases is either the Vice President (acting in his role as President of the Senate) or the President pro Tempore of the Senate (acting in his role of "Guy Keeping the Vice President's Seat in the Senate Rotunda Warm" (not technical Jargon)). Which is why the question of "who is the judge in impeachment of the Vice President?" a noodle baking question, and the answer differs from the Chief Justice to the Senate pr Tempore to the rarely serious argument of the Vice President himself. The best answer is that "It has never come up."

To start, for this hypothetical to happen, a whole bunch of decisions contrary to sanity have to happen: The Vice President and President Pro Tempore do not invoke the 25th Amendment to temporarily remove the President from office Congress does not issue Articles of Impeachment The President does not pardon himself The District Attorney decides to prosecute the sitting President rather than waiting for his term to be over There are probably more I'm missing. With that out of the way, in theory there's no law that says a President cannot serve while in prison, and simply being a felon does not disqualify him from the Presidency. The judge might order that while he was still serving as President, he serve his time under house arrest - he'd constantly be surrounded by police officers, so it would be pretty difficult for him to run, and it would keep him as as able as possible to keep performing the official functions of the office. The judge could also just defer his sentence. Putting him in regular prison would have serious national security implications, both in terms of protecting his person and in allowing him to effectively serve as Commander-in-Chief, so the government could probably make a compelling case against putting a sitting President in prison. According to this Senate Report, the President will also continue to receive Secret Service protection once he leaves office, so long as he is not removed by Impeachment. There doesn't seem to be a provision against that protection if the President is in prison, so the Secret Service would be obliged to find a way to protect him while he is in prison. Most likely this would mean he would be put in an isolated prison wing, possibly with Secret Service protecting his section.

In general they are not told. In fact, I am not aware of any jurisdiction where they are told by the judge officially. In fact judges will normally charge a jury that they must accept the law as stated by the judge, and ignore any other source of the law, whether they like it or not. But the Judge has no way to enforce such a charge. According to the Wikipedia article The 1895 decision in Sparf v. United States, written by Justice John Marshall Harlan held that a trial judge has no responsibility to inform the jury of the right to nullify laws. It was a 5–4 decision. This decision, often cited, has led to a common practice by United States judges to penalize anyone who attempts to present legal argument to jurors and to declare a mistrial if such argument has been presented to them. In some states, jurors are likely to be struck from the panel during voir dire if they will not agree to accept as correct the rulings and instructions of the law as provided by the judge. A 1969 Fourth Circuit decision, U.S. v. Moylan, affirmed the power of jury nullification, but also upheld the power of the court to refuse to permit an instruction to the jury to this effect. We recognize, as appellants urge, the undisputed power of the jury to acquit, even if its verdict is contrary to the law as given by the judge, and contrary to the evidence. This is a power that must exist as long as we adhere to the general verdict in criminal cases, for the courts cannot search the minds of the jurors to find the basis upon which they judge. If the jury feels that the law under which the defendant is accused, is unjust, or that exigent circumstances justified the actions of the accused, or for any reason which appeals to their logic or passion, the jury has the power to acquit, and the courts must abide by that decision. Nevertheless, in upholding the refusal to permit the jury to be so instructed, the Court held that: …by clearly stating to the jury that they may disregard the law, telling them that they may decide according to their prejudices or consciences (for there is no check to ensure that the judgment is based upon conscience rather than prejudice), we would indeed be negating the rule of law in favor of the rule of lawlessness. This should not be allowed. It is not so much that jury nullification is a right of the jury, as that there is very little right for the prosecutor or judge to inquire into why the jury acted however it did. If there is a suspicion that the jury was bribed, or influenced by prohibited communications, that can be looked into. But otherwise a jury is like an oracle, its actions have no specified reason or justification, they are whatever they are. The judge (or an appeals court) can set aside a jury verdict on the grounds that no rational jury could find in a particular way -- this is mostly used to overturn convictions based on insufficient evidence. But a jury has almost total freedom to believe of disbelieve any witnesses, so if it disbelieves, it could acquit, regardless of whether it rejects the law under which charges are brought. So there is no way to tell if a particular verdict was based on nullification, or on disbelief of the witnesses, or some other possible ground. In any case, there is no provision -- that I k now of -- to set aside a jury verdict on the grounds that it was an instance of nullification, so inquiring into whether it was would be of little point. This attitude toward jury verdicts goes back to the very early origins of trial by jury, when it was a replacement for Trial by Ordeal. The Ordeal had been considered a way of asking God to decide the issue, and there was no way to ask God to clarify the decision. When it was replaced by jury trial, no way to ask for clarification was considered possible there either -- the jury was said to voice the decision of the community at large: the formal term for jury trial was "to be tried by the country". See C. Rembar's The Law of the Land and H.C. Lea's The Duel and the oath for more on this history. This article reports on recent cases where juries have refused to convict in Marijuana cases.

Your ability to assert your Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination is not limited to cases where you are on trial or have been accused of a crime. Your ability to assert that right is also not an absolute bar against being ordered to testify: if you are given immunity, you can be forced to testify. Alice cannot hold Bob in contempt – only the judge can. Bob can explain to the judge why a simple truthful "yes" or "no" answer is not possible, if he knows how to do that (does he understand the notion of a false presupposition, or unclarity?). He could for example assert truthfully that he does not understand the question (pointing to the distinction between "Charlie's body falling on the vase, causing it to fall and break", and "Charlie acting with apparent intent to break the vase", since it's not patently obvious that the former scenario constitutes "breaking the vase"). However (changing the scenario a bit), he has to understand that if the question is "Did Charlie shoot Delilah?" and the fact is that Ethan forced Charlie to shoot Delilah, saying "No" based on a theory of blame is not reasonably interpreted as truthful testimony. Taking the 5th, without setting forth your basis (not understanding the question) runs the risk that the prosecution will grant immunity from prosecution, and therefore you don't get to avoid answering the question. Immunity covers various things except that it does not cover prosecution for perjurious testimony. See US v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115: the Fifth Amendment does not prevent the use of respondent's immunized testimony at his trial for false swearing because, at the time he was granted immunity, the privilege would not have protected him against false testimony that he later might decide to give. Immunity is conferred under the control of some applicable statutory law, such as 18 USC 6002 which says that no testimony or other information compelled under the order (or any information directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or other information) may be used against the witness in any criminal case, except a prosecution for perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to comply with the order.

E. Jean Carroll first sued Donald Trump in 2019 for defamation in connection with his statements in 2019 denying a prior assault upon her in the 1990s in response to her 2019 memoire asserted that he had done so in the 1990s. The statute of limitations in that case ran from the time that Trump made the statement. The first lawsuit is still pending because of issues over whether Presidential immunity from lawsuits applies to it: The Justice Department has argued Trump was acting as the president while responding to Carroll’s allegations and said the United States, rather than Trump himself, should be the defendant. If the courts agree, it would probably torpedo Carroll’s claim because the government cannot be sued for defamation. The issue remains unresolved. The D.C. Court of Appeals heard arguments on the case but essentially punted on the issue this month, sending it to another court. The criminal statute of limitations on this underlying conduct in the 1990s expired long before the lawsuit was filed. She did not press criminal charges at the time. Last year [i.e in 2022], Carroll filed a second lawsuit, this one accusing Trump of battery and defaming her again after he left office. That lawsuit, filed in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, is the one scheduled to go to trial on Tuesday [i.e. last week]. The suit was filed in November 2022 as a New York law known as the Adult Survivors Act took effect. That law allowed sexual assault victims to sue years later, which proponents said was necessary because it can take considerable time for survivors to feel ready to speak out. All of the factual statements in this answer, including all quotes material, are from an April 24, 2023 article in the Washington Post. As a practical matter, a final resolution of the second lawsuit will resolve essentially all issues in the first lawsuit except Presidential immunity (and arguably a slight amount of damages), under the doctrine of collateral estoppel (a.k.a. issue preclusion). A defense verdict from the jury in the pending case would render the Presidential immunity issue in the first case moot. Sources including this one have concluded that the Adult Survivors Act (ASA) is likely to withstand a constitutional challenge. This is because a similar law passed on 2019, the Child Victims Act (CVA), was upheld as constitutional. The ruling in the CVA cases, in turn, relied heavily on a 9-11 related statute of limitations revival act which was upheld by New York State's highest court in 2017: Shortly after the passage of the CVA, lawsuits were filed with the state and federal courts of New York arguing that the CVA was unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause. Decisions have been rendered in state and federal courts holding that the CVA was constitutional. Both courts relied on the legal standard enumerated by the In re World Trade Ctr. Lower Manhattan Disaster Site Litig., 30 N.Y.3d 377, 400 (2017). which established that for a revival statute to be deemed constitutional under the Due Process Clause, there must exist an identifiable injustice that moved the Legislature to act," and second, "in each case, the Legislature's revival of the plaintiff's claims for a limited period of time was reasonable in light of that injustice."

The trial at issue is a civil trial over the publication of his book Permanent Record and the non-disclosure agreement that he signed connected to his employment, see the DoJ announcement, which also notes that this is separate from a future espionage trial. The remedy sought involves no imprisonment. In the US, the constitutional right to a jury trial applies to criminal cases. See the Arpaio case, where cases involving imprisonment of less than 6 months are not subject to the jury trial requirement. The right to a jury trial in civil cases is much more complicated and fact-specific, see this answer. Not yet in evidence is the question of whether his employment agreement included a waiver of jury trial w.r.t. non-disclosure, but one should assume that the government anticipated the scenario that a person would breach the NDA. ......

Small claims court when the plaintif lives overseas (USA/Idaho) I live in Europe and my property manager in Idaho (USA) is not sending me the rents (which were paid by the renter). I was thinking about suing her in small claims court, but it looks like I have to appear in court. Which is hard living 10000km away! Is the physical court apearance a must, could it be virtual/teleconf? Thanks

Realistically, if your lawsuit is with the person who has been acting as your agent in the United States, small claims court is probably not the right way to go. If you are owed less than $10,000 (possibly including attorney fees), you probably need to hire a lawyer to pursue your case in the non-Small Claims Magistrate Division of the District Court. Lawyers are allowed in this forum, unlike the Small Claims division which is oriented towards pro se parties (i.e. people without lawyers). Small claims can consider only claims up to $4,000 against defendants in the county where the lawsuit is brought, and attorneys are now allowed in small claims court. (Source) Even if you can be in the Small Claims division of Magistrate's Court, the enforcement of a judgment if you win requires technical court documents which are essentially the same as those for collecting a judgment from any other court. Even when Zoom participation is allowed in a court, usually the main trial can't be conducted entirely remotely so someone needs to be in the courtroom representing you for the trial. (The only U.S. state where there is an actual right to participate in a civil court trial remotely is Alaska.) A lawyer will also often be more effective at negotiating a settlement, with or without a mediator, which would avoid the need for a trial at all, and mediations these days since COVID are routinely conducted remotely. Mediation is often required before a case goes to trial. If you are owed more than $10,000, you probably need to hire a lawyer to pursue your case in District Court (outside the Magistrate's Division). (Source) It is also possible in District Court (not the Magistrate's division) in some cases to resolve the case in "motion practice" based upon submitted papers, rather than in a hearing. This is not really a possibility in the Small Claims Court or the Magistrate's Division. Also, to be perfectly honest, the kind of case you describe is probably beyond the capacity of even a college educated person without legal training to do right and not screw up. Handling issues like service of process, the rules of evidence, and the collection of a judgment are all highly technical matters, and there may be legal claims related to possible misappropriation of funds that you might not know how to raise. Depending upon the language of your contract, the other side may even be able to demand a jury trial which is far beyond the capacity of an unrepresented person to manage, even if they are only doing it to force you to hire a lawyer. It could also be necessary to use the "discovery" process or subpoenas to obtain records needed to prove the case. For what it is worth, Idaho lawyers are less expensive than lawyers in much of the U.S., and Idaho is not known for having overcrowded courts the greatly delayed schedules, however.

First of all, the amount involved is probably a few hundred dollars, maybe a thousand: if you do not pay it is extremely unlikely that your roommate will attempt to recover. Even if they do, they will probably fail - 30 days notice is 30 days notice: unless last month was February, the 8th to the 8th is either 30 or 31 days, you have complied with the terms of the lease. If the lease had said "one named months notice" then your roommate may have a case; as it is, they don't. Is he right? No. Is there ever a case where I'm liable for pro-rated rent beyond the 30 day notice period? Only if it says so in the lease. Do I owe him rent for each day in November that the room is vacant beyond the 8th? No Would a judge make an exception in his favor since I didn't tell him I was looking for a new place to live? Judges don't make exceptions, particularly not in anybody's favour. The role of a judge is to enforce the law - not to make exceptions to it. A judge would give effect to the terms of the contract except where those terms are prohibited or against public policy.

No. A plaintiff may travel to the defendant's jurisdiction to file suit if desired. Nobody usually does this, though, due to travel and logistical considerations. The defendant is the one who decides whether to challenge jurisdiction. Good contacts will include a forum selection clause which would lay out what happens where in the event of a dispute. And this can be anywhere, it is not limited to the locations of the plaintiff and the defendant. N/A.

In general, a properly signed lease is binding. But there are exceptions, and they vary depending on the jurisdiction: country, state/province, and even city or county in many places. You mention a claim that the property should not be leased "because the owner needs it". In some jurisdictions, there is a special exception if the owner personally, or a member of the owner's immediate family, intended to live in the property. It is not clear form the question if such an exception would apply. it might well be that a person in the position described in the question has a valid and enforceable lease, and could simply remain in the property, paying rent, and the owner would have no valid grounds for eviction. But this kind of case will depend on the exact wording of the rental agreement, and on the exact provisions of the applicable laws, which vary widely depending on the location of the property. A person in this kind of situation would b wise to consult a local lawyer who will know local property law, and how the provisions of the agreement and other claims will be treated by local courts. There may also be local tenant assistance organizations, run by the government or by non-profit groups, who will know local law and can assist in such cases. A general answer cannot be gotten from a forum such as this which an individual should rely upon in such a case, particularly when the question does not even state what country, let alone what specific locality, is involved.

It isn't worth litigating a $60 fine for a non-moving violation that isn't likely to recur. You have a less than 50-50 chance of prevailing (something that is almost always true when you are appealing the decision of a judicial officer in a context like this one), you have no real long term harms as you would in the case of "points" for a moving violation, and you are even less likely to get costs of litigation or attorneys' fees if you prevail, so not having to pay a $60 fine would be a pyrrhic victory from an economic perspective. Even if it is free (and it probably isn't) it would easily take many hours to litigate that isn't worth you time. Any lawyer who would take the case would be cheating you because they would only leave you worse off than you are to start with due to their fees.

Is this something for small claims court Yes. The explicitness of your prior leases overrides the statutory variations that might exist among jurisdictions in this regard. And the total of 50$/month for six or seven years indicates that you would have to pursue recovery in small claims court (at least if the landlord refuses to reimburse you). In Wisconsin, the statute of limitations for breach of contract is six years. See 893.43. Statute of limitations means the lapse of time upon which claims of certain type are no longer actionable. Thus, you would only be able to recover the fees of the latest 6 years except for this year's lease, since your current lease no longer specifies that the landlord will cover that cost. For more information on small claims courts, see chapter 799 of the Wisconsin statutory law.

In the US, the laws that govern habitable residences and the related issues - such as land zoning, health regulations, sewer and water services, private and commercial building codes, etc. - are very localized at the city and county levels. So you need to check with the city and county where you want to place such a structure and determine the relevant laws. Commercial buildings are much more heavily regulated than private residences. (And some federal laws and codes could supersede local laws.) Many cities and counties have their zoning and building codes and requirements online, as well as permitting systems to apply for building and utility hookup permits. It's true that some counties in the US have minimal zoning or building codes, so yes, you could move a shed to land you own in that county and build your own road, haul your water, put up solar panels, dig an outhouse, and not deal with any - or very few - regulations. But cities and towns will be much more regulated, since zoning and building codes are used to insure public safety, and services such as water and sewer are supported by taxes and protect public health. In other words, you may not legally be able to live in a shed that does not have city sewer, water and electric service. There may also be building codes for minimum size of bedrooms, egress windows for fire, ventilation, heating systems, so even if a small house is sold as a complete residence in a package, it may not pass local building codes. Breaking zoning, building and health codes can result in the local inspectors visiting and determining if the residence is up to code; they will not typically need a warrant or your permission to enter. They can order you to bring the residence up to code, if possible; or condemn the structure and require you to move out.

At common law, a tenant is entitled to "quiet enjoyment" of the property. This means that the owner can only interact with the tenant as spelled out in the lease or in an emergency situation. First, calmly and quietly write down a list of your grievances. Then check your lease to see what the landlord is entitled to do. Cross off any grievances that are permitted by the lease. Take this and the lease to your solicitor and pay him to write a letter to your agent advising them of your grievances and asking that they stop. Without knowing where you are, we do not know what additional rights and dispute resolution procedures are available in your jurisdiction. Very few jurisdictions still rely entirely on common law as real estate is one of the most highly government regulated areas of life wherever you are. Your solicitor will know and, for less that a week's rent will give you solid advice.

Are US federal guidelines and statistics available for sentencing for "possession of a gun by an addict"? After 04:44 in CNN's June 22, 2023 Was Hunter Biden given a 'sweetheart deal'? Legal expert weighs in, the senior legal analyst for CNN, and former assistant United States Attorney Elie Honig says: If we look at the gun charge here, it is exceedingly rare for somebody to be charged with a federal gun crime and given pretrial diversion, as Hunter Biden has been given, meaning he doesn't even have to plead guilty as long as he behaves himself, the charge will go away. On the other hand, the vast majority of federal gun crimes involve somebody who either use the gun in some sort of violent crime or somebody who is a prior convicted felon. So it's rare to even see anyone prosecuted at all under the law that Hunter Biden was prosecuted for, which is possession of a gun by an addict. Rare or not, are US federal guidelines and statistics available for sentencing for "possession of a gun by an addict"? That would seem to be germane to a discussion of the level of "sweetheartness" associated with this particularly notable and visible case.

I can at least look at the federal sentencing guidelines. From the description of the offense I'm guessing he's charged under 18 USC §922(g)(3). In the guidelines, this offense would appear to fall under "§2K2.1. Unlawful Receipt, Possession, or Transportation of Firearms or Ammunition; Prohibited Transactions Involving Firearms or Ammunition". The notes here say: For purposes of subsections (a)(4)(B) and (a)(6), "prohibited person" means any person described in 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) or § 922(n). I therefore believe he meets the criteria of §2K2.1(a)(6) ("if the defendant was a prohibited person at the time the defendant committed the instant offense"), which would mean the base offense level was 14. Then the big question is whether he falls under §2K2.1(b)(2): If the defendant, other than a defendant subject to subsection (a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(3), (a)(4), or (a)(5), possessed all ammunition and firearms solely for lawful sporting purposes or collection, and did not unlawfully discharge or otherwise unlawfully use such firearms or ammunition, decrease the offense level determined above to level 6. I doubt the handgun was for sporting purposes or for collection; it was likely for self-defense. But I also don't think he is accused of unlawfully discharging or using it. I'm not sure exactly how this would be interpreted. If the offense level is 6, a sentence of probation would normally fall within the guidelines. If it was 14 (or even 12 after a possible 2-level decrease for taking responsibility), a sentence of probation would not be within the guidelines. This is, however, a pretrial diversion, not a conviction. I'm not sure how much the ordinary guidelines apply to that, or whether that's normally done for this sort of thing. It's also possible that I'm missing some factor which would change the offense level more.

In the US, it depends on the jurisdiction because each state has its own homicide statutes: but, the defining elements don't differ a lot. Drawing on Washington state law, the first question is whether you intended to kill a person (it doesn't have to be a specific person). If you did, you have committed first-degree murder. It is first-degree murder, because it requires a certain amount of advance planning to kill with a drone. It does not matter that the drone houses the gun that killed the person and a program determines when the gun fires (the "it was the drone, not me" defense gets you nowhere: otherwise, you could always claim "It wasn't me, it was my gun / knife / fist".) If instead this is a badly-designed pig-slaughtering drone, then it could be manslaughter in the first degree, if the act was reckless, or manslaughter in the second degree, if the act was with criminal negligence. To determine which it is, you look at the definitions: A person is reckless or acts recklessly when he or she knows of and disregards a substantial risk that a wrongful act may occur and his or her disregard of such substantial risk is a gross deviation from conduct that a reasonable person would exercise in the same situation. versus A person is criminally negligent or acts with criminal negligence when he or she fails to be aware of a substantial risk that a wrongful act may occur and his or her failure to be aware of such substantial risk constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would exercise in the same situation. So it would depend on whether you decided that safeguards which would prevent shooting people were too much bother (you know there is a risk and set aside that concern), or it didn't occur to you that a flying gun might hurt a person.

This is a good question, although it discusses crimes. This answer generalizes the question by giving a response for civil violations. In the united-states, where federal civil-procedure is followed and provided the tape isn't solely for impeachment purposes (i.e. it also documents other elements), there are certain disclosures required at the beginning of discovery governed by Rule 26(a)(1)(A)(ii). If a party withholds one of these disclosures, under Rule 37(c)(1), the court is able to take a number of actions, including throwing the evidence out. This could, of course, result in the withholder's conviction. Yet, if the court does not go to that extreme, it may impose the sanctions in Rule 37(b). So the withholder's attorney might try to make a case that the evidence is, indeed, solely for impeachment purposes.

This is a good question, which I am going to answer from a practical perspective, rather than a theoretical one, which would probably justify a law review article (applications of the takings clause to criminal justice fact patterns is actually one of my pet areas of legal scholarship, but a lot of it calls for dramatic changes in established practice and precedents reached from other perspectives, making it impractical to pursue in real life). I recently had a case along these lines in my office where my client's property was seized as evidence in a criminal case against a third-party. The crime involved a gun shop where all of the guns that were in the possession of the shop owner for repairs at the time of the bust (i.e. as bailments), including ours worth several thousand dollars in addition to having some sentimental value, were seized as evidence of charges against a shop owner who was fencing stolen goods, making sales to felons off the books, falsifying excise tax returns, etc. He seemed legitimate and had been in business for many years in what was not a fly by night operation. He had all of the proper licenses. Who knew we were dealing with a crook? In that case, we intervened on behalf of our client in the primary case to seek the physical return of the property (basically a replevin claim), as have others affected by the bust. It took a few months and some legal fees, but we prevailed without too much effort, as have the other intervenors. Generally speaking, to make a 5th Amendment claim, you would have to show a total taking and move into some legal gray areas in this context, while it is usually hard for authorities to show a continuing need for possession of third-party property in the face of a demand for its return, especially when photography and other scientific tools can document the evidence in great detail these days. In that case, showing that our client's particular gun was not involved in any illegitimate transaction also simultaneously made it less important as evidence, although that would not necessarily be true in general in these kinds of situations. There is a pending case in Colorado posing similar issues, where a suburban police department essentially destroyed a guy's home in order to catch a felon with no relation to the homeowner whatsoever, who had fled into it and taken refuge there. But, that case, as far as I know, has not yet been resolved on the merits.

Desuetude is the wrong concept. Desuetude relates to laws as a whole falling out of use; it doesn’t relate to individual cases. There is no question that the UK actively enforces their bail laws so they are not falling out of use. There is a statute of limitations that applies to non-major crimes within which the state must initiate prosecution. However, in this case the prosecution for bail violation has been initiated and Mr Assange is “on the run” so this is not relevant. Neither is the fact that the original charges that led to his arrest has been dropped- he is wanted for escaping lawful custody under English law for which the penalty is pretty stiff. I will also venture an opinion that the case against him is as open and shut as it comes. TL;DR When he dies.

Neither with or without a warrant, if the confession is all there is. For a felony, the question is whether there is probable cause (4th Amendment). This is true whether the police arrest you, or they get a warrant – the difference being that in the latter case the warrant is issued by a guy with much greater knowledge of what constitutes probable cause. The question then would be whether a confession alone constitutes probable cause. There is a venerable rule, the corpus delecti rule (300+ years old) that requires there to be independent evidence of a crime, the point of this rule being to to prevent mentally ill people from being convicted of a crime that never even happened. Under that rule, a confession alone would not be probable cause (but a confession and a bloody glove could be). This article reports that at the federal level and in 10 states, there is a lower bar of mere "corroboration" without the need to argue that there was an actual crime. Exemplifying this relaxing of the traditional rule, in Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84, the court held that "[a]n accused's extrajudicial admissions of essential facts or elements of the crime, made subsequent to the crime, are of the same character as confessions, and corroboration by independent evidence is required". However, "[t]he corroborative evidence need not be sufficient, independent of the statements, to establish the corpus delicti" and "[i]t is sufficient if the corroboration supports the essential facts admitted sufficiently to justify a jury inference of their truth; but those facts plus the other evidence must be sufficient to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt". In such jurisdictions, courts take a "totality of circumstances" approach focusing on whether the confession is trustworthy.

The question is oddly phrased: The law does not give allowances for its violation. Many laws have exceptions. E.g., the law against killing endangered animals contains an exception for defensive killings. Perhaps you are thinking of safe harbors? For example, there are general provisions in the law like "exigent circumstances" that allow police to proceed with actions that, absent those provisions, would constitute violations of law. "Permission" to violate a right can be granted explicitly in the form of a warrant, which allows law enforcement to "violate" specific property and freedom rights. Finally, one might consider an executive pardon or jury-nullification to be ex post "permission to break the law."

Its worth actually reading through the law again - they're meant for different categories of drugs - and its worth looking up the relevant laws as a whole. You can't cherrypick which law you charge them under in this case. It depends on what the suspect has in posession, and if you have more serious charges, they're probably going to be preferred unless the prosecution decides to throw the entire library at the suspect and charge them with everything they can, or a larger subset. A quick search on the internet - which shouldn't be taken as legal advice, brings up this link. Category 1 drugs are addictive and seen as therapeutically useless - you shouldn't have any realistic reason to have quantities of it in your posession. Category 3 is drugs with therapeutic use - stuff like codine. You could get a prescription for that, but there's potential for abuse. They're aimed at different classes of drugs - and the confusion is over a misinterpretation of what the law is about. As an aside, this is why you need to usually read more than just a specific statute or law to get what its about.

can i write in my portfolio about a critical security bug in my last job? I want to write about how i found a critical security bug when i was working at a company. Am going to stop working there in about a month and was just updating my portfolio with the things i did there over past three years. The thing is for me this was a very big achievement and i want to brag about it, but my boss told me i have to take it down immediately or i will get in trouble. It was no details about any system or programing language and just a paragraph about it on my portfolio page. What part of my contract or any contract can give employer right to do so? This just dont sound right that i cant tell other employer how good i am

The employee must, during and after employment, without limitation in time, observe a duty of confidentiality regarding [...] the Company's internal affairs such as business plans, profitability, pricing, employees, methods, processes, routines, code and the like as well as other information that the Company typically wants to keep secret The pure information that the company had at some time a security problem with their product is internal knowledge you only gained through working there. By what is written here, you are indeed prohibited from speaking about it. If it were public knowledge, you could point to a press release and say "I did that, that was me fixing the problem". That would work. Because it doesn't share anything that isn't public anyway. But you cannot share things the company wants to keep secret. Finding out whether that contract is legally enforcable in your country and juristiction is the job of a real lawyer, but just as written, they are right. You signed a contract to not do that, not talk about it an certainly not publish it on the internet. So you should not do that, unless a good lawyer you trust tells you otherwise. That said, "I found a security flaw" is about as impressive as "I found a dollar on the floor". Maybe you can talk about your knowledge to prevent something like it happening. That says nothing about whether or not it happened in your old company, and for me as an employer it is much more valuable to have you on board with structured knowledge you can apply, than with your memories of being lucky once.

Not very nice of the employer, actually quite cowardly. Being not nice and cowardly is not against the law. Being in the EU, and having been employed for ten years, the company will have duties to find a different position in the company at the same pay, and only when that fails, the employee can be laid off and will have a reasonable amount of notice, plus a reasonable amount of redundancy pay due to him. Unfortunately, he can expect only the legal minimum if the company behaved like this already. Good companies would provide a generous redundancy pay, plus pay for you to have any agreements checked by an employment lawyer of your choice - which means the employee can be sure they are not ripped off, and the employer is sure they cannot be sued for any reason. Obviously if they want him to quit, then the one single thing your relative mustn't do is to quit. Let them pay him. Plenty of time to look for a new job.

Every software is potentially vulnerable, unless it runs on an air-gapped computer with sealed data ports. How vulnerability fixes are prioritized against other goals is usually a business decision, legitimately made by the management. There are some jurisdictions and issues where the law requires them to act, but again there is usually a judgement call involved. For example, the GDPR talks about due regard to the state of the art. What you describe seems to be a difference in opinion about the importance of the fix. Ask about that at Workplace SE, not here. There are ways for software developers to influence their management, but ultimately the management is responsible for the outcomes and gets to decide. You can inform your superiors, in writing. If you are in a large company, there may be a legal or compliance department. Inform them if you have a reason to distrust your superiors. In most jurisdictions, you cannot simply talk to the press, either now or later. If you believe that your company is acting criminally, talk to a lawyer.

Sorry, what did I agree to? NDA means New Drug Application, right? Or is it Notre Dame Academy? Maybe it's Nebraska Dressage Association - don't want to cross those guys, their horses are mean. When you are trying to form a contract with someone, it's very important that you and they are talking about the same thing. What can't I disclose? That I had a phone call? What I said? What you said? Only the confidential bits? If so, what are they? Can I tell my business partner? My lawyer? My secretary? The IRS? Another important thing about making a contract is to agree on the terms. Post-facto contracts are not a thing After you paint my fence, you can't demand payment. We have to enter into a contract before the thing that happened happens. Elements of the call might be confidential anyway I am bound to respect confidences that were entrusted to me where a) the information is confidential b) it was imparted to me in a situation of confidence and c) disclosing it would cause harm. We don't need a Non-Destructive Analysis to document that.

I think haveibeenpwned would be legal in the EU because it carries out a task in the public interest (Art. 6(1)(e)), and it shares no more data then necessary, for example you can search for a password, but it would not show you the emailaddress which belongs to that password. It would also be legal for you to hold a copy of a leaked database, but only if you have a legitimate interest (Art. 6(1)(f)) to have it. Being a security company does not change that, but finding a legitimate interest might be easier. If you have a legitimate interest to hold a copy of a leaked database, it does not mean you can use it in any way you like. For example testing if the password still works, is very likely illegal everywhere in the EU. But I'm not familiar with the UK laws.

could they make a realistic claim that I had voluntarily terminated my contract before the year was over? The employer's act would forfeit its entitlement to reimbursement of bonus. The clause clearly indicates that the triggering event is termination, not the anticipatory notification thereof. Furthermore, the employer's act would be a breach of the [contract law] covenant of good faith and fair dealing. That would be in stark contrast with your compliance with, and/or kindness in, giving a two-week notice. The employer's termination of your employment seems improper in equity insofar as it was aware of your notice and thus took advantage thereof.

Liable, yes. How much liable, depends. There would be copyright infringement, and with copyright infringement the exact facts count. Like did you commit copyright infringement to make money, were you aware that you committed copyright infringement etc. With your contract, it seems clear you didn't set out to commit copyright infringement to make money (because you paid someone else telling them not to commit copyright infringement). Up to the point where you learned what happened, you didn't know it was copyright infringement. After this, you better remove all the infringing works, because now you know it's copyright infringement, and now you are saving money by not hiring a second developer. Obviously you can sue the employee for damages.

An agreement to agree is void There is a multitude of case law on this point. If the NDA was not available to you when you signed the employment contract and the term was couched as you describe; then the term would be unenforcable. That is, your employment contract would be binding except for that term i.e. you could not be compelled to sign the NDA. Now, there may be a requirement on you to negotiate in good faith in an attempt to find an NDA you can agree to but if you can't find one you can't find one. You cannot (legally) be fired for this reason. Now, if the NDA was available, and you were told where to find it, and irrespective of if you did or didn't find it, you would be bound to the NDA.

'Homicide by words' hypothetical - First Amendment and jurisdictional questions This hypothetical is based on the ongoing prosecution of Mandie Reusch. Mr Y lives in Nevada, and Ms X lives in Wyoming. Ms X also suffers from depression and PTSD. They still speak to each other, and they have joint custody of their children. Mr Y is the ex-partner of Ms X. Over the last few months since their breakup, which was caused by Mr Y's infidelity, Mr Y continues to have many arguments with his ex. Consequently, Mr Y sends Ms X messages of similar nature to those of Mandie Reusch's for a couple of weeks. One day, Ms X decides to fly to California. On the same day, Mr Y is flying back home from New Jersey. They both fly on private jets. The previous night, they had an extremely heated and personal altercation on the phone. Whilst Mr Y is in the air on his flight back, he once again sends many of these messages to Ms X, who is, at this point, still in Nevada, driving to the airfield. But she sees these messages, and this is around the point where her suicidal thoughts begin to be more active than passive. During her flight, Ms X receives more of those extremely mean-spirited messages from Mr Y (in which he uses secrets that she trusted him with against her, explains how he told others about her secrets and so on). Mr Y sends these messages while his flight is still in New Jersey airspace. After everything that's happened, Ms X considers it too much to bear, and she takes her own life during her flight. When she does this, she is exactly over the border between Wyoming and Nebraska. In none of the messages does Mr Y explicitly tell or direct Ms X to end her own life. I have two questions: With these facts, assuming Mr Y was charged with involuntary manslaughter (like in MA v. Carter) or aiding a suicide, based solely or almost solely on the messages, under which jurisdiction would he be charged? Is Mr Y's speech in this case protected by the First Amendment? Thank you for your answers.

With these facts, assuming Mr Y was charged with involuntary manslaughter (like in MA v. Carter) or aiding a suicide, based solely or almost solely on the messages, under which jurisdiction would he be charged? Applicable Law States have jurisdiction both over crimes that are committed in the state and over crimes that cause harm in a state. The classic law school example is a murder committed by shooting someone with a gun across a state line. Both the state where the gun is fired and the state where the person is shot have jurisdiction over the crime. Jurisdiction generally requires a purposeful act directed at someone or something in the state where the harm is suffered in most cases. But that isn't a hard and fast rule of constitutional law in other contexts, and there are few cases on point. I would consider this to be an open question. Certainly, however, the mere fact that the victim of a crime is transported to another state for medical treatment, where that victim then dies from causes relate to the crime, does not give the state where the death ultimately occurs in the hospital jurisdiction over the offense. Double Jeopardy Indeed, the constitutional protection against double jeopardy does not prohibit both states from independently convicting and punishing the same defendant for the same crime in this situation under the "dual sovereignty" doctrine. As background, the Colorado Supreme Court decided a dual sovereignty double jeopardy case today. Application To Facts (The application to the facts has been revised upon closer examination of them.) The line about "Ms X, who is, at this point, still in Nevada," is confusing because she was in California before and isn't described as ever being in Nevada. I presume that "still in California" was really meant. Mr. Y could be charged (at least) in Nevada or New Jersey from which the continuing course of communications was sent (undue emphasis on the final communication is probably inappropriate), and Wyoming, to which the bulk of the communications were directed and where the bulk of the harm was suffered. California and Nebraska do not seem to be places to which the communications were really directed or where the greatest harm was suffered. Momentary presence in Nebraska air space is probably insufficient. There are also a set of statutes that specifically address crimes committed during an airplane flight (see also here) that has been discussed in other answers at this website. To the extent that this is treated as a homicide committed while in flight, 49 USC § 46506, might also allow for a federal criminal prosecution. I'm not sure that this is really a crime committed in flight, however, as it involved a course of conduct. A single email or a single moment of death doesn't really capture it. It is more analogous to a poisoning taking place in many doses over a period of time. Is Mr Y's speech in this case protected by the First Amendment? No. First Amendment considerations do apply to crimes involving communications between people that are not false, but if there is sufficient intent to cause suicide or other harm, the First Amendment yields to other considerations. The freedom of speech is not absolute. The exact place that the line is drawn is a matter of ongoing litigation. This specific issue is explored in depth in Clay Calvert, "The First Amendment and Speech Urging Suicide: Lessons from the Case of Michelle Carter and the Need to Expand Brandenburg Application" 94 Tulane Law Review 79 (November 2019). This article is responsive to that case of Commonwealth v. Carter, 115 N.E.3d 559 (Mass. 2019). The article explains in its introduction that: In February 2019, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in Commonwealth v. Carter' affirmed Michelle Carter's conviction for involuntary manslaughter as a youthful offender based on her urging Conrad Roy to commit suicide.' In doing so, the court rejected Carter's claim that her conviction violated her First Amendment' right of free speech. Specifically, it reasoned that Carter's words with Roy immediately before and while he died were "integral to a course of criminal conduct and thus [did] not raise any constitutional problem." In brief, Massachusetts's high court concluded that Carter's speech caused Roy's death' and that the First Amendment provided her no refuge.'

So the most obvious is that the U.S. Miranda Rights specifically mention right to legal counsel and right to state provided legal counsel (Public Defenders) if you cannot afford legal counsel (Contrary to some opinions, these guys are very good at their job... it's just that they are also very over worked and private industry pays better). While the right exists in the U.K., the U.K. version of the required reading of rights only speaks to right against self-incrimination, which, if you want a difference is a good place to look. In the self-incrimination clauses, the U.K. and U.S. versions are very different. The U.K. right is a qualified right where as the U.S. is an absolute or unqualified right. This is a distinction which sounds silly upfront but is very serious in how things will transpire. Suppose that you are arrested for the murder of your spouse. You definitely did not do and the "one armed man" definitely did. Either way, you remain silent during interrogation. At trial, your defense is "It wasn't me it was the one armed man" and you intend to present evidence of this. In the U.S. this would be permitted, no further questions asked (or at the least, defeated by other means unrelated to you giving the cops the cold shoulder). In the U.K., this would be first be challenged by the prosecution with "Why didn't you say this when you were arrested?" and your silence on this matter will be used against you. In fact, asking that challenge in the U.S. is very inappropriate, as was recently seen in the Kyle Rittenhouse trial, where the Prosecution did ask that up front to Rittenhouse, prompting a scolding from the judge out of view from the jury. The reason for this is that in the UK there are more strict rules placed on cops during interrogation than there are in the U.S. (In the former, cops cannot lie to you about the facts of the case and they cannot interrupt your statements to them once you start to respond. This is par for the course in the U.S. for cops. In fact, in the U.S., shouting "It was the one armed man" on arrest can do more damage than just shutting up until you're before a judge and jury since that lets the prosecution use the implausibility of a one armed man against you (in both nations, statements that are against your interest do not violate hearsay rules, thus, the cops will only use such a statement against you... it's your job to prove it true or at least plausible enough to make a jury doubt the cops are right.). Also note that this is England and Wales jurisdictions only. Scotland, having its own legal system, retains the right against self-incrimination as an absolute right. Also a big obvious one but the read rights would not be called the "Miranda Rights" by the police or legal community (it may be, by the crooks they are arresting who have no clue that the TV version might be the U.S. one since it's more likely to get shown there than on U.K. TV.). In the U.K. they would be called "Standard Cautions" or "Reading the rights". The U.S. name derives from the SCOTUS case Miranda v. Arizona which was the ground-breaking case that made this required by all police when interrogating a suspect. Additionally, each state has their own version, which generally reads the same way (they explain your 5th and 6th Amendment rights to silence and an attorney) and may vary on asking if you choose to waive the rights upon receiving an affirmative answer that the rights were understood ("With these rights in mind, do you wish to speak to me?" is the proper phrasing). They also are read from cards (business card to index card sized) where the right is printed in English and Spanish and the suspect must sign it as part of acknowledging that their rights were read.

These are some thoughts about the state of affairs in the US, I do not know how it works in the UK. In the US it seems to be a legal gray area. Gray enough that I do not think any lawyer could say for certain that the use of the data is legal. The data is stolen. If possessing stolen property is illegal then possessing this data is also likely illegal. Of course experts disagree, Stuart Karle, an adjunct media professor at Columbia University and former general counsel for the Wall Street Journal says: ...the documents have been published by the hackers, they are now public by virtue of being put on the Internet. But Barrett Brown was charged with trafficking in stolen authentication when he forwarded a link to some stolen emails. He signed a plea for acting as an accessory after the fact. He spent more than a year in jail while they sorted it out. In the US there is no law banning the download of hacked documents. In fact Bartnicki v. Vopper 532 US 514 (2001) stands for the rule that journalists can report on illegally obtained information. But contrast that with the Barret Brown prosecution! And decide where a data scientist fits. Also there is the question of whether an illegally recorded conversation is of the same "illegal" nature as hacked personal information.

The district court judge, as reported in this news story has held that there was probable cause to arrest Daniel Robbins in this case, and that his rights were not violated. If this ruling stands, officers acted legally, although they might still be required to return the phone with the images. Whether there is probable cause for an arrest (or a search) is always a very fact-based issue. I have not found the judge's actual decision, only a news summary of it, which can often be misleading. Specific facts about exactly what Robbins did or said may be important in determining whether there was in fact probable cause. It appears that Robbins intends to appeal this decision. If he does there may be an opinion from a Circuit Court of Appeals expanding on whether there was probable cause or any violation of rights, and why. Previous cases have established that normally there is no reasonable expectation of privacy for acts performed in public; that one my photograph or video record such public acts legally from anywhere that one may legally be; that there is a right photograph or record police officers engaged in official actions or the use of police powers; and that laws attempting to forbid such recording are unconstitutional when so applied. However, it seems from the news story that here the police officers were off-duty and not engaging in any official acts or use of police powers. That might change the ruling. I rather expect the district court's decision to be overturned, but there is no case exact;ly on point that i know of, and one can never be absolutely sure what a court will do in a particular case. I can see why police officers may have felt threatened, and why the Judge may have been inclined to sympathize with them, although I think the decision was incorrect. But a Judge of the Appeals Court might possibly feel the same way. Until the Appeals Court rules, one cannot be sure what the law in this matter will finally be. (It is possibly, but statistically a bit unlikely, there there will eventually be a ruling from the US Supreme Court on this case.) This article from Nolo Press discusses the issue of recording police, primarily in the context of police who are performing their official duties. It says: Almost every court to consider the issue has determined that the First Amendment gives you the right to record (pictures, video, and audio) police officers in public while they are performing their duties. But that doesn’t mean you’re allowed to record if you’re doing so surreptitiously (secretly), interfering with the officer, or otherwise breaking the law. The courts' primary rationale for allowing police officer recording is that the First Amendment includes the right to freely discuss our government, and the right of freedom of the press and public access to information. Given the prevalence of personal filming devices, more and more “news” is being gathered and disseminated by members of the public. The courts have found that freedom of the press applies to citizen journalists and documentarians just as it does to formal members of the press. (See, for example, Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78 (1st Cir. 2011).) The Nolo article goes on to discuss whether a Section 1983 Federal suit against police officers who arrest someone recording their actions will succeed, indicating that this will depend on the specific facts of the case. The Nolo article mentions that one is not allowed to interfere with an officer during process of recording. What exactly constitutes "interference" is not fully clear, and will depend on the facts of a specific case. The Nolo article mentions other circumstances when recording an officer may not be legal.

I would just like to clarify, in addition to the other answers and what Dale M alluded to, one important detail: Unless you are carrying out the death penalty, no one under any circumstances is allowed to kill anyone else. What you are sometimes authorized to do, is to use deadly force. There is an important distinction between the two. When using deadly force, you are using extreme force to stop someone doing something, which may result in getting that person killed, but killing isn't the point, stopping whatever he is doing is. If instead of a knife you had a gun on the train, you shot the guy in the face, his crime spree came to and end, yet he was still alive but unconscious, and you decided to "finish the job" and shoot him some more, you'd be going to prison. The language is important. Even if in self defense situations, if you say that you were shooting to kill, you're going to be in serious trouble, but if you say you were shooting to stop, you're in the clear.

“Anything you say can be used against you in court.” Is what the police say in the USA. “You are not obliged to say or do anything unless you wish to do so, but whatever you say or do may be used in evidence. Do you understand?” is what they say in New South Wales. “You do not have to say anything, but it may harm your defence if you do not mention, when questioned, something which you later rely on in court. Anything you do say may be given in evidence.” is what they say in England and Wales. And so on. Whether Mark wants to mention that he was robbing a bank on the far side of town at the time is entirely up to him. If he does, and that can be verified it’s likely the murder charges will be dropped and armed robbery charges will be brought instead. Note that in many jurisdictions, if the defence intends to use an alibi defence, the prosecution must be told about it at a very early stage or it can’t be used at all.

I can't comment on what the legal situation would be in your home country, but as a matter of U.S. law, the hypothetical scenario you've described is not illegal. First, because you aren't a U.S. citizen and because you aren't operating in the United States, the U.S. government probably has no jurisdiction over you, your website, or your conduct. Even if it did, the most relevant statute, 18 U.S. Code § 1017, would not apply. The statute prohibits the "fraudulent or wrongful" use of the FBI's seal. But "fraudulent" and "wrongful" generally refer only to conduct where one uses deception or other means to obtain money, property, etc. to which they have no lawful entitlement. United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396, 399 (1973). Because you aren't using the seal to obtain anyone's property through deception, this use would not fall within the statute's proscriptions. Even if the government sought to prosecute you, you would have a valid First Amendment defense. The First Amendment protects the right to free speech, and it does not allow statements to be criminalized merely because they are false. United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012). This outcome should be unsurprising to most U.S. observers. I think most people would agree that the U.S. obviously cannot prosecute a Hollywood producer for making a movie dramatizing the FBI's efforts to shut down the Pirate Bay, even if it displayed the FBI's seizure message on a monitor in the course of the movie, and even if it showed the seal being used on a completely fictional website. The hypothetical you're describing is not materially different. In both cases, the seal is being used to falsely create the impression -- for entertainment purposes -- that the FBI has shut down a website. Saying false things for entertainment purposes is not a crime in the United States.

Regardless of the context of the first solicitation, Officer Jones' second solicitation was made in willful refusal to accept Betty's unambiguous "no" for an answer; this is sexually coercive behavior, specifically postrefusal sexual persistence. If this question is assessed from the perspective of the "average" woman, then after her initial declination, extraction of a "yes" cannot be considered uncoerced. Here's a question: how many times does she have to say no before it starts to count? Before it counts against her finally being exhausted, harassed, or intimidated into capitulating? Because by that logic, he never has to stop; he can continue to harass her until he finally accomplishes his objective (grounds to arrest her) - in which case, why bother with the pretense? If it takes 200 "no's" to wear her down to "whatever", then the first 200 "no's" just didn't matter as much as the first "whatever", so why bother with the formality of pretending like the first mattered when it clearly does not? To demonstrate the significance of her initial "no, thanks" and his subsequent refusal to accept it from another perspective: if Betty and Jones were coworkers in the same office, if he continued to solicit her after being told no the first time, that would be the definition of sexual harassment on his part and it would not matter how genial or friendly or casual he thinks he's being; furthermore, if her workplace failed to intervene on her behalf, they would be engaging in sexually discriminatory behavior by creating a hostile work environment, regardless of how genial / friendly / casual, etc. It's hard to see how this could act as evidence of her having committed a crime in one context while being grounds for termination of his employment in another context. HTH.

What does "credible" mean? Looking at the recently delivered findings and conclusions in Brandt et al. v. Rutledge et al., full text here. On pp. 56-57 of the PDF, one of the expert witnesses is discussed (emphasis added): Dr. Levine was the State’s only expert witness who has experience treating patients with gender dysphoria. In his practice, he has enabled minor patients with gender dysphoria to access hormone therapy on a case-by-case basis. (Tr. 785:3-6, ECF No. 246 (Levine)). Dr. Levine does not support banning gender-affirming medical care for adolescents with gender dysphoria. He has concerns about Act 626’s impact on youth who are currently receiving gender-affirming hormones. Dr. Levine testified that doctors who provide gender-affirming medical care to adolescents with gender dysphoria encourage patients to identify as transgender and provide hormones immediately without assessing patients and addressing other mental health conditions or informing patients and their parents of the risks and the limitations of the evidence regarding treatments. Id. at 809:18- 810:4; 811:21-812:10; 824:5-14 (Levine). He offered no evidence that treatment was being provided this way in Arkansas or anywhere in the United States. Dr. Levine conceded he has no knowledge of how most gender clinics provide care and, thus, does not know how common it is for care to be provided in the way he described. Id. at 887:19-888:25 (Levine). He further does not know how care is provided by doctors in Arkansas. Id. at 888:24-891:16 (Levine). The Court found Dr. Levine a very credible witness who struggles with the conflict between his scientific understanding for the need for transgender care and his faith. From p. 60: The legislative findings in Act 626 assert that there is insufficient evidence of the efficacy of gender-affirming medical care for minors. Some of the state’s expert witnesses—Dr. Levine and Dr. Hruz—offered opinions to that effect. (Tr. 833:12-16, ECF No. 246 (Levine); Tr. 1274:15-25, ECF No. 249 (Hruz)). The Court does not credit these opinions because it finds that the evidence showed that decades of clinical experience in addition to a body of scientific research demonstrate the effectiveness of these treatments. p. 71: The State argues that minors with gender dysphoria will desist with age. They contend that there is a significant risk of harm to a minor who elects to undergo gender hormone therapy or surgery because they will eventually identify with their sex assigned at birth and regret the treatment they sought as a minor. The State offered the testimony of Dr. Levine to support this argument. The Court found Dr. Levine’s testimony to be inconsistent and unreliable in this area. To the contrary, the evidence proved that there is broad consensus in the field that once adolescents reach the early stages of puberty and experience gender dysphoria, it is very unlikely they will subsequently identify as cisgender or desist. (Tr. 310:13-25, ECF No. 220 (Turban)). In this context, what does it mean to describe a witness as "very credible", and yet not to credit their evidence? The court clearly had significant doubts about the accuracy of his testimony, the findings note his lack of knowledge on key points, and that his testimony was in some areas "inconsistent and unreliable". How do those reconcile? Does "credible" here mean "comes with good credentials" (e.g. his experience treating trans children) rather than "gave evidence that should be credited"? Or is there some other nuance here? (I'm not looking for discussion on the merits of the case, only on how this description of a witness reconciles with the assessment of his evidence.)

Credible means "not lying". But someone who is telling the truth to the best of their ability may still lack the knowledge to be a strong witness on the matters that the court has to make a decision upon. For example, if a witness testifies that there was a fight involving a large man and a woman, but is legally blind and didn't get a good view of the people involved, the witness's testimony can be credible, while still not proving the case that a particular person was the large man in question. "Credited" means that the evidence provided by someone provided an important factual basis upon which to resolve a disputed issue of fact.

There is no specific statute in Missouri that prohibits a teacher from saying "ADHD". There is a specific federal statute that obligates the school district to make accommodations if a student is diagnosed with ADHD (also a state law). A teacher is not technically qualified to diagnose ADHD. Finally, the teacher is an employee of the school district and is required to follow the policies of the district. Those are the 4 legal cornerstones on which the teachers response must rest. The unquestionably weakest cornerstone is understanding the realities of district policy. There may be district-policy type reasons that motivate reticence to recommend testing, but such "abundance of caution" is not motivated by a legal mandate imposed on the teacher, it is more likely to be the result of a fear of reprisals (for triggering extra expenditures by the district). Such a fear is not legally warranted, except insofar as if you don't know what the law says (many people don't), fear is a kind of reasonable response. But ignorance of the law is no excuse. It might be useful to know that it is not required to get a doctors diagnosis of ADHD, so the teacher's evaluation might carry more weight that you would expect, were that a requirement.

It is not legal for an employer to discriminate on the basis of sex anywhere in the US (see http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/types/sex.cfm). Exemptions exist where the discrimination is for bona fide occupational qualifications and, irrelevantly, religious reasons. It is completely legal for a consumer to discriminate on the basis of anything they want to. It is also legal for a business to assist the consumer in that discrimination. Bona fide occupational qualifications generally only apply to instances in which the BFOQ is considered reasonably necessary to the normal operation of a particular business. Mere customer satisfaction, or lack thereof, is not enough to justify a BFOQ defence, as noted in the cases Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. and Wilson v. Southwest Airlines Co.. Therefore, customer preference for females does not make femininity a BFOQ for the occupation of flight attendant. However, there may be cases in which customer preference is a BFOQ—for example, femininity is reasonably necessary for Playboy Bunnies. Customer preference can "'be taken into account only when it is based on the company's inability to perform the primary function or service it offers,' that is, where sex or sex appeal is itself the dominant service provided." None of the occupations you mention would, on the face of it, meet the requirements to be BFOQ. Allowing their customers to express a preference for a specific gender may impact on the capacity for the business to deliver on that preference but it would not generally allow a BFOQ defence if this impacted their hiring policies. A possible exception is if the business catered to that preference exclusively, for example, an all female gym with all female staff but I am not aware that this has ever been tested and if a male personal trainer wanted to take them on he may very well win. As an aside, there is no BFOQ defence for racial discrimination except for artistic works where the first amendment rights overrule the anti-discrimination laws.

Most judges went to law school Therefore, my null hypothesis is that they have next to no knowledge of statistics and couldn’t tell a median from a mean on their best, let alone, their average day - mean, median, or mode. Courts turn to experts to fill in the gaps in their knowledge. If they are asking the wrong questions, then it is the expert’s job to, respectfully, tell them so and guide them to the right questions. However, you shouldn’t guess what the right question is. “Excuse me, your honour, the term “statistical significance” can’t be applied to a data set, only to the result of an a priori null-hypothesis tested against that data set.” Feel free to explain p hacking if necessary. Ask the judge to explain, in layman’s term, what they want from you. Feel free to admit that just like you don’t understand their legal jargon, you don’t expect them to understand your statistical jargon; if everyone speaks plain English, you can go and do your statistics thing and they can go and do their law-talking thing.

Yes. Making statements in a legally protected confidential context is not publishing them, and in most jurisdictions, defamation must be published to create a cause of action. In such a case the patient might well have a cause of action against the therapist for violation of patient confidentially, and a complaint to the relevant authority could get the therapist's license revoked, or perhaps a censure from the licensing authority, whatever it is the the jurisdiction. Note "published" does not have to mean putting them in print, but does mean making them in such a way that general circulation of them is plausible. In addition, such statements may be coered by a qualified privilege. In Marchesi v. Franchino, 283 Md. 131, 135, 387 A.2d 1129 (1978) the Maryland Supreme Court (reviewing a case from the Court of Special Appeals) held (at 135-136) that: ... the common law recognized that a person ought to be shielded against civil liability for defamation where, in good faith, he publishes a statement in furtherance of his own legitimate interests, or those shared in common with the recipient or third parties, ... The Maryland court went on to quote the Restatement (Second) of Torts, (Scope Note preceding § 593 (1977)) which states that if a privilege were not granted: information that should be given or received would not be communicated because of [the] fear of . . . persons capable of giving it that they would be held liable in an action of defamation if their statements were untrue. It would seem that a statement by a person to his or her own therapist, as a part of therapy, and intended to be held in confidence by the therapist, ought to fall under this definition of privilege, although I cannot find any actual case with this exact fact pattern. If the person knew or had reason to know that the therapist was likely to repeat the statement, that would be different. If the person and the therapist were not in a practitioner/patient relationship, with its normal expectations of confidentiality, that also would be different.

Maybe, but probably not, although this would be a question of fact to resolve on a case by case basis under broad legal standards by a jury, and would also depend upon the state where it took place, and upon the nature of the employer of the paramedic. The hypothetical facts in this case are rich enough and ambiguous enough that the case could go either way depending upon how it was presented and what could be proven at trial. This is a case it would be good to take to a medical malpractice/personal injury lawyer in the jurisdiction where it happened to be evaluated. Usually a PI lawyer would not charge you for doing so or would ask for only a nominal fee. Additional factual investigation would probably also be necessary regarding some of the key facts identified below. It's complicated and there are multiple issues presented in this case where the law is not uniform from state to state. The general rule is that a medical professional has to carry out the delivery of medical care to a patient with the reasonable care that would be taken by a medical professional of that type. If the medical professional fails to take reasonable care, and that negligence failure to do so causes injury, then there is civil liability for medical malpractice. A threshold issue would be whether a medical professional-patient relationship was established. This would be a question of fact for a jury and would be a question upon which various potentially applicable state and federal laws would often not be uniform. On these facts, it could easily go either way. In federal court and in a majority of state courts (although there is variation from state to state) you need to know the name of the paramedic you dealt with who provided the bad advice to bring a successful lawsuit before suing. In a minority of states, you could sue first and get the name of the paramedic in discovery through the court process from the hospital after the lawsuit was commenced. The standard of reasonable care liability in this case would be judged by the standard of a reasonable paramedic, not a reasonable doctor. But, often states would have statutes that would limit the liability of paramedics in these situations to liability for gross negligence (which the facts in the question would probably not suffice to show), but not for ordinary negligence (which a jury could come out either way upon and which would hinge heavily on expert testimony). These tort reform type laws differ considerably from state to state. Whether or not particular conduct was negligent or grossly negligent, is a question ultimately decided by a jury under very broad and general legal standards after the fact in a trial, based largely upon expert testimony, on a case by case basis, unless the facts are unequivocally clear one way or the other, which is rarely the case. With my layman's level of knowledge about what a reasonable paramedic should be able to diagnose, I could see this determination going either way. Two cases with identical facts in front of the same judge in separate trials, in which juries are presented with exactly the same evidence could come out differently. The resolution of one case of the question of whether a particular act constituted negligence giving rise to liability is not binding as precedent and is not admissible as evidence in another case (subject to a narrow exception called "collateral estoppel" which applies when the same individual is sued by multiple people for the same conduct in different lawsuits that have resulted in final orders resolving key questions of fact that the lawsuits have in common). Many states would require that someone suing the paramedic have a medical professional certify that the paramedic's actions constituted legal negligence before the suit could go forward in a court. If there is a medical professional-patient relationship, and if the medical professional was found to have negligently caused injury, the medical professional's employer would have vicarious liability in some (but not all) states under a respondiat superior doctrine. Usually, the paramedic at an ER would be an employee of a private EMS ambulance company or a municipal fire department, and not of the hospital that runs the ER. But, some hospitals have their own in house paramedics. Also, some hospitals are run by for profit or nonprofit private companies, some are state or local governmental agencies, and some a federal government agencies. Usually only a small minority of the medical professionals in a hospital are employed by that hospital, and most of them merely have "privileges" to provide medical services for which they bill patients separately while working for their own professional corporation through which they are self-employed. Legally, the hospital itself is more like a hotel or a WeWork office space than to being a firm that directly provides medical services, although it isn't quite that black and white. Holding the ER directly responsible for failing to have good triage policies, as opposed to holding the paramedic responsible and assigning vicarious liability to the employer of the paramedic, would be very difficult, although not necessarily impossible if the ER had official policies that fell far below the standard of care for emergency room triage. It would be very uncommon for an ER to have bad policies of this type. Typically, ERs are only held directly liable for bad triage policies when, for example, they have a policy of not evaluating at all someone who does not have health insurance, which is a practice expressly prohibited by federal law. If the paramedic's employer was a government entity such as a fire department or a government owned hospital, the paramedic would be entitled to absolute immunity from civil liability under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, unless an exception applied. Usually there is an express exception to absolute immunity for medical malpractice liability by a medical doctor who has established a doctor-patient relationship with a patient, when the medical doctor is employed by a state or local government, usually there isn't when the doctor is employed by the federal government. But these laws differ from state to state in fine details that matter in a case like this one regarding whether the exception to immunity from liability is limited to medical doctors or applies also to paramedics. Causation would also be an important factual issue for trial. There is liability only to the extent that taking a non-negligent action could have prevented the harm. If you are infected with COVID, one common consequence is a stroke, and if someone had a stroke while infected with COVID, the case that taking them to the ER would have prevented the stroke from doing serious damage in the long run is weaker. On the other hand, guessing that a stroke was really something else, might or might not be reasonable. The injured person would also have to prove that the EMS response occurred at a time within the roughly 1-2 hours after the start of a stroke when it is possible to take medical action that could do something about a stroke. If the stroke had already happened an hour and a half later and it was rush hour and would have taken half an hour to get to the nearest hospital, causation might be absent and there would be no liability. There would be a legitimate question of fact over whether there was an actual diagnosis and treatment, or whether there was a refusal to get treatment. The reasonable care test is a balancing test. It takes into consideration not just the potential benefits of taking action, but also the cost that would be incurred if action was taken, and the downside risks of a proposed action. The paramedic's concerns about getting a COVID infection at the ER when the person responded to didn't appear to have it at the time would make the cost of a false positive diagnosis higher and would thus influence what would constitute reasonable care in this situation as the jury applies the relevant legal test. Liability would be evaluated based upon what the paramedic reasonable understood he was being told. This would be a question of fact for the jury. It is likely that different people who were present understood what was being said differently. Even if bystanders understood what was being said and meant, what matters is what the paramedic reasonably understood was being said and meant. Given the communication difficulties involved, that question could go either way.

Even before the police have any idea who did it, Bob is guilty of whatever wrong he did. However, if you want this to be a legal question and not a moral one, we should assume that you really want to know "Can Bob be convicted of murder, if the evidence proves that he did do it?". Yes, he can. See Morris v. State, 214 S.W.3d 159. The critical question was whether the defendant understood the charges (he did) and whether he could assist in his defense (he could). The desideratum of being able to assist in your own defense only goes so far. On the other hand, maybe no, per Wilson v. US. A government expert witness "testified that appellant had permanent retrograde amnesia and would not be able to aid in his own defense in terms of remembering any of the acts alleged in the indictment". The crucial difference seems to be whether one just has loss of memory, vs. loss of memory connected with some other mental disorder. [Addendum] Per Dusky v. United States 362 U.S. 402, competence to stand trial depends on whether the accused has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding -- and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him. I am not aware of any exceptions e.g. whether this is not the case with strict liability crimes like statutory rape, and since it is generally held that "competency" is a requirement mandated by the due process clause, I don't think there could be an exception.

When it can be “reasonably read both to impart a defamatory inference and to affirmatively suggest that the author intended or endorsed that inference.” Which is the standard the New York appeals court endorsed in 2014 for “defamation by implication”. So, on the face of the statements, they have to imply fraud and they have to show that the speaker intended to imply fraud. Whether they did that is up to the jury.

Is it illegal to say somebody is crazy when it is obviously false in the US? One time I was walking quickly in a park trail for my exercise routine in California, and there were dog owners who didn't leash their dogs or use a 25 foot leash and let them go freely within the 25 feet radius. So because the trail was narrow and the grass land was limited, when the dogs confronted me and sometimes even bark, I had to stop and wait for the owner to react and pull back the dog, and then I can go forward. So when it was the 6 or 7 times that had happened, I said to that owner, "isn't he supposed to be on a leash?" She exclaimed: "NO THEY ARE NORRRROOOOOT (NOT)!" I was so surprised because I remembered there was some law that said all dogs need to be on leash in public parks in California or in our County. So I called the park ranger, and the park ranger said yes, that's the law. Upon hearing what the park ranger said on my phone through the speakerphone, the lady with the dog said, "even if it is the law, I am not going to do it" and that she and her husband live in a rich city nearby. And then she yelled with the top of her lung to the park ranger, "this CRAZY woman comes out of no where, and then...". So by yelling loudly "CRAZY woman" to the park ranger and to a few other people nearby, is it subject to possible fine and penalty for defamation? I know in some countries in Asia, that is a US$10,000 penalty to falsely claiming somebody is crazy when obviously they are not.

united-states Simply insulting someone without saying something false is not defamation in the U.S. (historically it was the subject of criminal defamation liability to might light of someone's disabilities or call them out in an insulting way, but later U.S. constitutional law jurisprudence interpreting the First Amendment in the late 20th century rendered these laws unconstitutional). If a statement might damage someone's reputation if taken literally, and the statement is false, it can be defamatory and give rise to civil liability (or criminal liability in the few states that still have criminal defamation statutes), if the people to whom the statement is "published" (i.e. the audience of the statement) could reasonably believe that the statement was intended to be taken literally. Whether a statement can be taken literally is an "all of the facts and circumstances" analysis. Statements meant only as hyperbole or parody or metaphorically, if a reasonable audience person would understand the statements in that sense, do not impose liability based upon what they would mean if taken literally. Other Countries As noted in the question itself, not all countries treat statements like this the same way. Germany imposes criminal liability for all manner of insults. England and Wales imposes defamation liability in many circumstances when U.S. law would not. And, many countries in Asia are closef to the German model of liability for insulting speech than they are to the U.S. model.

Law enforcement sometimes use "pacing" as a speed enforcement tool. The basic idea is that they consistently drive a certain speed - which is at or above the speed limit and notice that the "alleged speeder" is either keeping pace or exceeding the pace. The details are complicated and a police officer would know them much better than me. But basically They have to calibrate their speedometer - because if their speedometer is broken pacing is obviously worthless. They need to bring the calibration results to court. Not having those calibration records for your speedometer means that many police departments will be reluctant to issue a speeding ticket to the other motorists. They rely on the fact that most state laws allow law enforcement leeway to exceed the posted limit. Not being a lawyer or a police officer, I do not know the exact circumstances, but if they were not allowed to slightly exceed the limit for pacing then logically every pacing enforcement should result in 2 tickets - one being for the officer. If you can swear that your speedometer is good then they can use that evidence to write you a speeding ticket, because whatever allowances the law allows law enforcement for pacing are not granted to you. I am sure they can overcome the calibration issue with regard to a ticket issued to you by your certification that the speedometer is correct. If they issued a ticket to me based on your certification that your speedometer was correct, I would call bullshit. Talking to the police can only hurt you.

Private prosecution is allowed in New Zealand, so one possibility would be to conduct the prosecution yourself. You could either do that as a case of destruction of property, or under the Animal Welfare Act. It is not guaranteed that your charging document will be accepted (for example, if your document lacks the required content). An alternative would be to apply political pressure to the Crown Law Office, to persuade them to pursue the matter.

As far as I know, every jurisdiction in America limits perjury to cases of lying under oath. Because it seems unlikely that the driver would be under oath at this point, you would probably lack probable cause to make an arrest. At the same time, many states have separate laws addressing the making of false reports, lying to an officer, etc. I'd imagine most jurisdictions would have a law supporting an arrest for lying at the scene, even if not for perjury.

Defamation laws do not distinguish between charitable organizations and others: however, in the US there are special considerations for "public figures" (they are not afforded as much protection). The medium does not matter -- texting, blogging, letter-writing, whatever. The defamatory statement need not have been received by a wide audience – it suffices that the message was received by one person other than the person being defamed. A single defamatory act is all it takes: there is no requirement of there being an established and repeated practice of defaming. One way to defend against a charge of defamation is to show that the statement is true. An alternative is to show that the statement is incapable of being proven true or false (e.g. calling someone a "jerk" doesn't assert a factual proposition). A careful scrutiny of the actual statement, performed by an attorney specializing in such matters, is really the only way to know whether words like "may", "possibly" would make a statement an expression of opinion rather than a statement of fact. A person suing for defamation would have to have suffered a loss, but there is a category of false statements, per se defamation, considered to be so injurious that damage need not be proven. That included allegations of criminal activity and allegations of professional incompetence, either of which could be applicable in the context you are describing. The First Amendment provides much protection against such suits, which may not exist in other countries. Because of this, a law was recently passed in the US, 28 USC 111, which says that domestic courts will not enforce a foreign defamation judgment that is inconsistent with the First Amendment. [Addendum] This part is crucial: "The only people I've expressed my concerns to, aside from the organization itself, is my parents and my wife's parents. However, they have shared with a few friends...". If you alleged illegal behavior to your parents, that's a problem. If you only said e.g. "I have concerns", that's not a problem. It would also matter in what way you tried "to disclose to a U.S. based organization details of the foreign organization they are supporting that indicate it might not be on the up and up".

Police officers can lie to you He asked to search your car. He’s allowed to do this. You said no. You’re allowed to do this. He lied to you when he said he would get the K9 to search the car - this would not be legal. But he’s allowed to tell you lies. You made an admission of criminal activity. He now has probable cause to search. He legally searched, confirmed your admission and booked you. Seems legit to me.

When the LEO violently assaulted the citizen on the easement is he out of his jurisdiction? No. Federal law enforcement officers' jurisdiction generally* includes the entire US. Federal and state jurisdiction are said to be concurrent with one another. If the federal law enforcement officer has a lawful basis to effect an arrest, the arrest can be effected on a state† highway easement. Is there any immediate or long term consequence for an officer committing crimes or doing so egregiously (with or without qualified immunity) out of his jurisdiction as opposed to doing so in his jurisdiction? If the officer were outside his jurisdiction (which isn't the case here) then the officer is generally treated as any other private individual. In this case, "outside his jurisdiction" means "in another country," which brings up all sorts of additional complications that aren't really in scope here, largely because the laws and legal systems of other countries are different from those in the US. Are there any nuances to jurisdiction and law enforcement by LEOs that a first amendment auditor should be aware of? There are plenty, but perhaps the most prominent one, if the internet is any guide, is that an officer is not required to articulate the basis for reasonable suspicion or probable cause at the time of a Terry stop or an arrest. The time for this is much later, after a judge is involved. Arguing with an officer on this score is just going to make things worse. Instead, one should cooperate while stating one's objections clearly and calmly, especially making it clear that cooperation does not imply consent. * Some categories of officers do have more limited jurisdiction: thanks to cpast for the example of park rangers, whose jurisdiction is essentially restricted to national parks. The officers in this case are CBP field officers. There is a wide misconception that CBP officers' jurisdiction is limited to within 100 miles of the border, but that 100-mile limit only applies to their power to board and search vessels and vehicles without a warrant in order to prevent illegal entry into the US. Their power to make warrantless arrests "for any offence against the United States" committed in their presence is not geographically restricted. † The original video was filmed in South Portland, Maine, and the roadway is a municipal street, Gannett Drive, to be precise. The point remains, however, that it is a public right-of-way, and federal officers are not "out of their jurisdiction" simply because they've left a federal facility and entered a public place.

The question is oddly phrased: The law does not give allowances for its violation. Many laws have exceptions. E.g., the law against killing endangered animals contains an exception for defensive killings. Perhaps you are thinking of safe harbors? For example, there are general provisions in the law like "exigent circumstances" that allow police to proceed with actions that, absent those provisions, would constitute violations of law. "Permission" to violate a right can be granted explicitly in the form of a warrant, which allows law enforcement to "violate" specific property and freedom rights. Finally, one might consider an executive pardon or jury-nullification to be ex post "permission to break the law."

What legal conditions do I have to meet to open an open source website? I'm working on a website for a pretty long time and in the close future I want to open it into the public. The problem is, my website collects personal data and cookies which (in my country - Poland) must be documented in something called privacy policy because of GDPR, etc, etc. I've written some basic policy, but I'm stressed about locations. In every policy I saw, there were an address of a company working on the site. I don't want to share my private address. I'm scared about this.

Don't collect or process personal data Many (though of course not all) websites can easily be run without collecting or otherwise processing any personal data. The position of GDPR is that if you are not able to fulfil the basic, simplest core conditions for processing personal data (understanding what you're processing and why and why it's allowed, describing it in a privacy policy, having a non-underage person who's responsible for that) then you are not allowed to process personal data of other people. So don't. Build your website so that any personal data are not collected.

Does GDPR apply if my web app stores personal data on the user's phone only? No. If you are not processing Personally Identifiable Information (PII) then the GDPR does not apply to you. This is what a web browser does when it asks to remember your username and password for this web site. You are providing a tool, the user is using that tool to process their own data. I do offer to back up the user's personal data At this point you are processing the users PII, and the GDPR does apply to you. Even though you do not have enough information to identify an individual, as it can be used with other information to identify an individual it is PII. From the ICO: Can we identify an individual indirectly from the information we have (together with other available information)? Even if you may need additional information to be able to identify someone, they may still be identifiable. That additional information may be information you already hold, or it may be information that you need to obtain from another source. When considering whether individuals can be identified, you may have to assess the means that could be used by an interested and sufficiently determined person.

The employee must, during and after employment, without limitation in time, observe a duty of confidentiality regarding [...] the Company's internal affairs such as business plans, profitability, pricing, employees, methods, processes, routines, code and the like as well as other information that the Company typically wants to keep secret The pure information that the company had at some time a security problem with their product is internal knowledge you only gained through working there. By what is written here, you are indeed prohibited from speaking about it. If it were public knowledge, you could point to a press release and say "I did that, that was me fixing the problem". That would work. Because it doesn't share anything that isn't public anyway. But you cannot share things the company wants to keep secret. Finding out whether that contract is legally enforcable in your country and juristiction is the job of a real lawyer, but just as written, they are right. You signed a contract to not do that, not talk about it an certainly not publish it on the internet. So you should not do that, unless a good lawyer you trust tells you otherwise. That said, "I found a security flaw" is about as impressive as "I found a dollar on the floor". Maybe you can talk about your knowledge to prevent something like it happening. That says nothing about whether or not it happened in your old company, and for me as an employer it is much more valuable to have you on board with structured knowledge you can apply, than with your memories of being lucky once.

If you are not processing the personal information of EU citizens yourselves then you are unlikely to be classed as data processors under GDPR (check Article 3: Territorial Scope, p.32-33). If you were to operate a Software-as-a-Sevice (SaaS) solution then you would be a data controller/processor (or both) and GDPR would certainly apply if you have EU citizens as customers/users. While I can't see any reference to software vendors in the GDPR text, as a software vendor it would be in your interest to ensure your products meet the criteria set out in Article 25 (Data Protection by design and by default, p.48) in order to help your customers to comply, such as: Implement appropriate technical measures, such as pseudonymisation, which are designed to implement data-protection principles, such as data minimisation, in an effective manner and to integrate the necessary safeguards into the processing in order to meet the requirements of this Regulation and protect the rights of data subjects. Implement appropriate technical measures for ensuring that, by default, only personal data which are necessary for each specific purpose of the processing are processed. That obligation applies to the amount of personal data collected, the extent of their processing, the period of their storage and their accessibility. In particular, such measures shall ensure that by default personal data are not made accessible without the individual's intervention to an indefinite number of natural persons. These along with similar organisational measures are the responsibility of the data controller, but unless your software helps them to comply they may be forced to consider alternative solutions which reduce their overall risk. If your software already has a number of such controls in place it may be worth putting a white-paper or similar communication together which can inform your customers of how your software helps them to comply. There does not appear to be any direct liability to the software vendor through GDPR. If a data breach is the result of a design flaw or implementation bug in the software and your customer gets fined as a result, they may be likely to pursue you on grounds of the software not being fit-for-purpose and lacking the appropriate technical controls required to ensure data privacy. In this event, your defence will rely upon records of designing and implementing controls, records of software testing and remediation, and having in place suitable procedures to ensure security patches can be quickly deployed to your customers when required. Further clarification as requested: If your organisation doesn't process the personal data, doesn't have any third parties process it on your behalf (includes hosting companies) or have any access to it ever, then you're neither a controller or processor. However, if your customers ever send you personal data or grant you temporary access to personal data as part of troubleshooting issues with your software, then you would be a processor in this context and would need an appropriate contract in place and would need to ensure the appropriate technical and organisational controls are implemented to comply with GDPR and reduce risk of a personal data breach. Additionally, if international data transfers take place as part of this (e.g. sending/accessing files over the Internet) you would need to ensure your organisation is able to provide an equivalent level of protection for the rights of the data subjects - for example if you are in the U.S. you would likely need to voluntarily join up to the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield or use the EU's Model Contract Clauses within your contracts in order for it to be legal for EU-based businesses to use you as a data processor. For more information about international transfers read the EU's Data Transfers outside the EU page. Ref: GDPR

Contacting a business email about a business matter is usually fine, but in this case we have an unsolicited marketing communication (spam), not really a business matter. The client's jurisdiction likely has more specific rules about spam. Also, it is unusual (read: presumably illegitimate) to contact individual employees rather than the company's official address with the offering. From the GDPR perspective, every processing of personal data (such as email addresses that might identify natural persons) needs a legal basis (Art 6). Let's go through them: consent? No. necessary for performance of a contract involving the data subject? No. legal obligation? No. vital interests? No. public interest? No. legitimate interest? Perhaps. The client has a legitimate interest to conduct their business. However, this legitimate interest must not be overridden by the data subject's interests, rights, and freedoms. Such as the interest in not being disturbed by spam mails. It is the Data Controller's (your client's) responsibility to balance the legitimate interest themselves to determine whether they have a legal basis, but I really don't think that they do. In conclusion, your client's idea is a bad idea: They likely do not have a legal basis for this under the GDPR. They are likely violating more specific anti-spam laws in their jurisdiction. They are working hard to get their domain put on spam filter lists. Note that already the step of collecting employee email addresses is personal data processing and needs a legal basis. Of course, the GDPR does not apply when the client is not established in the EU and only processes the addresses of persons that are not in the EU.

GDPR does not cease to apply because of the location of data storage. It applies based on the location of the data processor, data controller, and data subject. If you are in the EU, you are a data subject covered by GDPR. It does not matter where the data are stored. Note that you are asked to confirm that you're aware that US laws may be less protective, but you're not asked to acknowledge that anything about the arrangement causes the "laws of your country/region" not to apply. The company also does not seem to be claiming that they don't apply, although it seems that they want you to think so, and it's not clear whether they think so. You are correct that GDPR doesn't allow its protections to be waived. A data subject may always consent to certain processing, and some processing may be performed without consent, but it's not possible to waive the right to withhold consent for processing that does require it.

Question 1. Are technical identifiers personal data? Yes. If they identify a person. For example an IP Address is considered personal data, because a person or household can be identified by an IP. Yes, I know that technically there are a lot of exceptions. But in general, if you have an IP, you can identify the subscriber given the right databases. So if your identifier, lets say a generated GUID, identifies a customer or something the customer can be linked to, it is personal data. Question 2. Can technical identifiers be stored in measurement devices? Just because something is personal data, does not mean you are forbidden from using it. As long as you need it to do your job, you can store it. The internet would not work, if everybody was forbidden from storing any IP address. So to summarize it: yes, it is personal data since it identifies a subscriber. However, it is needed for the job your subscriber asked you to do. So for as long as the job takes, it is legal to store it. Once your job is done, you would be required to delete it. But consent trumps everything. If your subscriber consents to you keeping all data of such incidents to improve your network and handle future incidents better, then it's legal. Just let them sign it with your other legal paperwork. Done. No problem. You could just periodically delete all records that have no consent for long term storage beyond the current incident. Lets say every 24h or 48h. You should get the details on the wording of the paperwork and the period that it is legal to keep the data as "current incedent related" from your data protection officer or legal department.

No, it's not legal. The General Data Protection Regulations (GDPR) apply given that you are in the UK (regardless of where the Data Processor is based). The UK GDPR is slightly modified due to Brexit, but the same principles apply. The only plausible legal basis for this actions would be that you consent to it, and you're entitled to withdraw that consent at any time. Some may claim that Article 6.1(b) applies, i.e. that it's necessary to send marketing email in order to fulfil the contract, but GDPR is clear that bundling such consent into a contract for service simply to permit the data processor additional actions isn't allowed, as I'll demonstrate. UK GDPR requires that consent to use your personal information (in this case, your email address) for the stated purpose be freely given. Consent to use your information for direct marketing is not freely given if it's inseparable from the consent to use it for some other service, as per para 43: Consent is presumed not to be freely given if it does not allow separate consent to be given to different personal data processing operations despite it being appropriate in the individual case, or if the performance of a contract, including the provision of a service, is dependent on the consent despite such consent not being necessary for such performance. And Article 7.4 backs this up with When assessing whether consent is freely given, utmost account shall be taken of whether, inter alia, the performance of a contract, including the provision of a service, is conditional on consent to the processing of personal data that is not necessary for the performance of that contract. The intent of Article 6.1(b) is that only the processing required for the service you have bought is allowed (e.g. if you supply your address for delivery of stuff you've bought, the data processor can use that address to send you the stuff, but is not allowed to add a contract term that allows them to send you unwanted stuff). Examples of emails that Article 6.1(b) would allow (in my assessment) include things such as notification of upcoming downtime, or a reminder that subscriptions are due, but not unsolicited advertisements for other products. There's a grey area that's open to interpretation, where adverts are piggybacked onto actual service messages.

Can I put "Original Motion Picture Soundtrack" on my album cover (which is not a soundtrack)? If I wrote an album with a soundtrack-"feel" to it, which (crucially) is not a real motion picture soundtrack, would I be allowed to put "Original Motion Picture Soundtrack" on the album cover for artistic purposes?

Yes. You could, assuming that you did not associate it with any real motion picture (which would be a trademark violation). You'd probably want to clarify in fine print somewhere, however, to avoid confusing your fans.

Copyright is hard. The movie has a copyright, and so has its ship model. This is the original copyright. The boardgame has a token. That thing has its own copyright, no matter if it's a parody of another thing or not. The copyright holder might not be the boardgame maker, but it is under copyright. In any way, parody is fair use, so no harm here. The model has a copyright, but also infringes on the film's copyright as it is a derivative of the film. If the film copyright holder wants, they can have it taken down and sue the maker. In any way, this model is available under a specific license. The model license is clearly Non Commercial. The CC-A-NC license can't be changed to one that is commercial. You can only add more No categories. The questions: 1 - No. Your work is a derivative work of both the model AND the boardgame. You don't parody the boardgame. 2 - You need a license from not one but at least two sources: the model author and the boardgame copyright holder. You might even need a license from the original film company. 3 - YES. He made the model, he can license it as he wants, but the license might be ineffective: He might have coverage under an explicit fan license with the movie company to make the model (allowing sharing under such other license) or not (when it might be silent acceptance of fan works, am implicit license or just plain lack of knowledge of the infringing model) - determining if the company wants to pursue is not your legal battle. Your battle is more likely with the copyright holder (of movie and boardgame) anyway because you lack a valid license from them. "I used this infringing model and breached the license I got it under" is... a very precarious point in court. 4 - No. You used the other work, you can't get out of the CC-A-NC license by altering the item. It'll always be a derivative work of the model you put in. You only get copyright in the changes. The resulting item has shared copyright with the original model maker. He gave you a license to do that, but the unbreakable condition unless you get a different license is: You can't ever sell this, you HAVE to tell them that I was part of this design.

Regardless of the license associated with a document, there is no copyright protection on information. Copyright protection prevents copying "expression", e.g. the wording, but not the facts / opinions expressed through those words. The non-legal academic concept of "plagiarism" is where the notion of attribution primarily comes into play. There is a special exception under 17 USC 106A that imposes an attribution requirement for works of visual art. CC and other license schemes may add in an attribution requirement for actual copying of the expression (the "BY" attribute in CC). If a work is licensed under CC-BY, you may copy the actual expression provided that you follow the terms of the license, which primarily means that you have to attribute the work in the prescribed manner. This does not apply to extracting information from a work, because information is not protected by copyright.

if I directly purchase this custom content... As a general rule, "intellectual property" is very different from tangible property - arguably, "intellectual property" is a misnomer. Trying to apply concepts from property law (such as "a thing has a single owner, who can do anything not illegal with it as they please") is fraught with danger. You would generally not "purchase content", but rather purchase a license for the content, allowing you to do various things. One of those things might be to "curate/edit this collection of recordings and present it publicly as an art project (probably just online)". Another might be to "to sell or otherwise profit from this". All that depends on what your contract says. In an ideal world(?), contracts would all be detailed enough to leave no uncertainty about what is allowed and what is not. In the real world, a bunch of SMS can form a contract. For instance, the following is a contract: A (version 1): Hey B, could you send me a clip of you waving at the camera? I will pay $10 for it. B: sure ...but it’s not clear what A and B agreed as to what the clip would be used for. Saving and viewing on A’s device, probably yes; putting it in fullscreen in the next blockbuster movie, probably no. Showing it to A’s friends, putting it in an art project? That’s getting dicey. You might have heard about "work for hire" granting full copyright control to whoever pays for the work to be created. In the united-states, the above exchange does not explicitly designate the content as work-for-hire, as would be required by 17 U.S.C. § 101 ("...if the parties expressly agree in a written instrument signed by them that the work shall be considered a work made for hire"). Here’s a better SMS contract: A (version 2): Hey B, could you send me a clip of you waving at the camera? I will use it to make an art project, collating many such clips, and publishing that on the internet. I will pay $10 for it. B: sure Here there’s no question that B agreed with the proposed use. On the other hand, it’s likely than a different use would be deemed a copyright violation - the contract was proposed by A and should be understood as limiting A’s right to use the clip to exactly what they said they would do. If they wanted it to say something else, they could have sent a different SMS (see contra proferentem).

Here's where you went wrong legally: Suppose I legally obtain some digital image created by somebody else (e.g., by downloading from a public website). That, right there, is copyright infringement- unless the copyright owner has granted permission or the image is public domain you cannot copy it - this breaches "the right to make reproductions". By posting it on the web (assuming that it isn't itself an infringing copy) they have given implied permission for you to look at it in a web browser but not to copy it into a presentation even if that presentation is never presented. If it is presented then that makes the infringement worse - it adds breaches of "the right to communicate to the public" and "the right to use the work as a basis for an audiovisual work". How is this different from the computer wallpaper? It isn't. If you are using the one of the defaults that shipped with the OS then the license gives you permission. If you are using someone else's copyright without permission then it's a breach. There are defenses to copyright infringement but these are quite nationally variable - search this or other sites for "fair dealing" and "fair use".

The quote in the question and the question text both imply that what is protected by copyright is "creative effort" or "creative value". In united-states law at least, the test is "originality". In many, probably most, cases these will be the same. But there can be things with "creative value" that are not considered original enough for copyright protection, or in some other way are not subject to copyright protection. Individual words or short phrases such as the titles of works are not protected by copyright, even if they have creative value, for example. An improvised song or dance that is not recorded is not protected, however creative it may have been, because it was not "fixed in a tangible form". However, a hash computed from a text is indeed a fact, just as a statement of the number of characters the text contains, and it would not be protected by copyright. The hash algorithm might or might not be protected by patent, and the code to a hash program might be protected by copyright. But the resulting hash value will not be protected by either.

You don't need to "publish" your song to obtain copyright protection. Original works are protected by copyright at the instant they are fixed in a tangible medium. This means that if you type the lyrics, write an arrangement of notes, or record yourself playing the song, the song is copyrighted.

The software is "work for hire" and the copyright is owned by the client, not you. This is the default rule when copyrightable work is done on this basis in the absence of an agreement to the contrary. To not be "work for hire" you would have had to have a written agreement to the contrary or would have had to written the software before you were engaged by the client and then sold it to the client as an off the shelf finished product. [After further research I have determined that the language above is not accurate.] While you didn't have a written agreement, you did have an agreement reached without committing it to a final written form signed by both parties that is sufficient to cover all of the material terms of the contract and that is a binding and fully performed agreement. UPDATE: The "work for hire" issue is a bit more complex than I initially stated. Here is an American Bar Association summary of the issue in the independent contractor context (there is also a plausible argument that while the parties characterized you as an independent contractor for tax purposes that you were in fact of de facto temporary employee in which case it would automatically be work for hire, but I'll put that issue aside and take it at face value): Under the Copyright Act (17 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq.), a work is a “work made for hire” only if: (1) it is prepared by an employee within the scope of his employment; or (2) it is specially ordered or commissioned from an independent contractor pursuant to a written agreement and the work falls within one of nine statutorily defined categories. . . . For works created by independent contractors, only the following types of works are eligible to be “works made for hire”: a contribution to a “collective work” (a work, such as a periodical issue, anthology, or encyclopedia, in which a number of contributions, constituting separate and independent works in themselves, are assembled into a collective whole); a part of a motion picture or other audiovisual work; a translation; a “supplementary work” (a work prepared for publication as a secondary adjunct to a work by another author for the purpose of introducing, concluding, illustrating, explaining, revising, commenting upon, or assisting in the use of the other work, such as forewords, afterwords, pictorial illustrations, maps, charts, tables, editorial notes, musical arrangements, answer material for tests, bibliographies, appendixes, and indexes); a “compilation” (a work formed by the collection and assembling of preexisting materials or of data that are selected, coordinated, or arranged in such a way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of authorship); an “instructional text” (a literary, pictorial, or graphic work prepared for publication and with the purpose of use in systematic instructional activities); a test; answer material for a test; or an atlas. This software is clearly specially ordered or commissioned from an independent contractor. I suspect that if you looked at the course of dealings including the client's specification of what work needed to be done (probably in part by email or in some other written form) that it would meet the requirement of a written agreement even though there wasn't a document called a contract signed by both parties. But, this still begs the question of whether it falls in one of the nine statutory categories. This American Bar Association source says that custom software doesn't qualify. The list above does not include many types of works that businesses frequently hire outside personnel to create, such as websites, logos, advertisements, photography, and custom software. For works that do fall within the defined categories, the business must have a written agreement from the author expressly stating that the work is made for hire for it to qualify as such. Although the agreement and course of dealings between a business and an independent contractor may give rise to an implied license for the business to use the works created by the contractor, it is highly preferable to avoid relying on an implied license. Any business that engages a non-employee to create a work and intends to own the copyright to such work should have a written agreement with the author expressly stating that the work is made for hire (if it falls within one of the eligible categories). If the work is not eligible to be a work made for hire, and for good measure even if it is, the written agreement should include a provision assigning the copyrights to the business. An example of such a provision is: “To the extent that the Work Product is not recognized as a ‘work made for hire’ as a matter of law, the Contractor hereby assigns to the Company any and all copyrights in and to the Work Product.” By including such a copyright assignment clause, a business will be able to obtain the copyrights it expects, even if the work does not qualify as a “work made for hire.” The copyright office's official publication on the subject provides a statutory citation (17 USC 101), and doesn't contradict the ABA presentation, although it is less detailed and specific on the legal issues. This section of the United States Code is a series of definitions. The relevant one states: A “work made for hire” is— (1) a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employment; or (2) a work specially ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution to a collective work, as a part of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, as a translation, as a supplementary work, as a compilation, as an instructional text, as a test, as answer material for a test, or as an atlas, if the parties expressly agree in a written instrument signed by them that the work shall be considered a work made for hire. For the purpose of the foregoing sentence, a “supplementary work” is a work prepared for publication as a secondary adjunct to a work by another author for the purpose of introducing, concluding, illustrating, explaining, revising, commenting upon, or assisting in the use of the other work, such as forewords, afterwords, pictorial illustrations, maps, charts, tables, editorial notes, musical arrangements, answer material for tests, bibliographies, appendixes, and indexes, and an “instructional text” is a literary, pictorial, or graphic work prepared for publication and with the purpose of use in systematic instructional activities. In determining whether any work is eligible to be considered a work made for hire under paragraph (2), neither the amendment contained in section 1011(d) of the Intellectual Property and Communications Omnibus Reform Act of 1999, as enacted by section 1000(a)(9) of Public Law 106-113, nor the deletion of the words added by that amendment— (A) shall be considered or otherwise given any legal significance, or (B) shall be interpreted to indicate congressional approval or disapproval of, or acquiescence in, any judicial determination, by the courts or the Copyright Office. Paragraph (2) shall be interpreted as if both section 2(a)(1) of the Work Made for Hire and Copyright Corrections Act of 2000 and section 1011(d) of the Intellectual Property and Communications Omnibus Reform Act of 1999, as enacted by section 1000(a)(9) of Public Law 106-113, were never enacted, and without regard to any inaction or awareness by the Congress at any time of any judicial determinations.

Is there an inherent legal obligation to repay a guarantor? So as I understand a guarantor is liable to pay rent arrears if the tenant is unable, unwilling, or just doesn't pay. I am wondering if such an occasion arose and the landlord contacted the guarantor to pay, and they did, would the tenant, without a written agreement specific to that occasion, have any inherent legal obligation to repay the guarantor for the arrears. Does the use of a guarantor give the tenant an automatic legal responsibility to repay them?

united-states Does the use of a guarantor give the tenant an automatic legal responsibility to repay them? Yes, unless a contract expressly says otherwise. A guarantor has the right to recover what the guarantor had to pay from the primary person obligated on a debt that are the same as the creditor who the guarantor pays unless a contract or statute says otherwise. This right is called the right to subrogation. The subrogation rights of a guarantor are a matter of equitable principles set forth in case law precedents (and in the case of promissory note, a statutory right under the Uniform Commercial Code, see, e.g., Colo. Rev. Statutes § 4-3-419(e)), even though best practice is to formally state that in a guarantee agreement. See, e.g., Behlen Mfg. Co. v. First Nat. Bank of Englewood, 28 Colo.App. 300, 472 P.2d 703 (1970). ("‘It is well settled that where one secondarily liable is called on to make good on his obligation and pays the debt, he steps into the shoes of the former creditor. He becomes subrogated to all the rights of the creditor against the principal debtor, including the security given to secure the debt.’"). The law as stated in an insurance context is that: When an insurer reimburses a victim for damages pursuant to a claim under the victim's insurance policy, the insurer enjoys a right to subrogation, under which he can stand in the victim's shoes and collect the reimbursed amount from the party responsible for the damages. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. DeWitt, 218 P.3d 318, 323 (Colo.2009). The right can arise pursuant to an express provision in the insurance policy—a “conventional” subrogation right—or under principals of equity—an “equitable” subrogation right. Id. Ferrellgas, Inc. v. Yeiser, 247 P.3d 1022, 1027 (Colo. 2011). But, the law of subrogation of guarantors is the same as that of insurers, who are both a subset of people who are called "sureties." Colorado's common law right is referenced obliquely in its statute governing contribution rights (see below) for sureties: Nothing in sections 13-50-102 to 13-50-104 affects or changes the right of a surety who has paid his proportionate share of an indebtedness of recovering the same from his principal debtor. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-50-104. Similarly, in the case of a release of some but not all joint debtors or guarantors, Colorado has a (widely adopted model) statute which states more affirmatively: In case one or more joint debtors are released, no one of the remaining debtors shall be liable for more than his proportionate share of the indebtedness, unless he is the principal debtor and the debtor released was his surety, in which case the principal debtor is liable for the whole of the remainder of the indebtedness. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-50-103. When there are multiple debtors, or multiple guarantors, the obligation is generally joint and several, so that the entire debt may be collected by the creditor from any one of them, not just their fair share of the debt. But, there is also a common law and statutory right for guarantors who pay more than their fair share of a guarantee obligation upon which there are multiple guarantors to recover the fair share of any guarantor who did not pay their fair share of the guaranteed debt from that other guarantor in an action for contribution. It is well established that guarantors paying more than their proportionate share of an obligation are entitled to contribution from other guarantors who are jointly and severally liable for the obligation. Taylor v. Hake, 92 Colo. 330, 20 P.2d 546[.] Stieben v. Korby, 533 P.2d 530, 531 (Colo. App. 1975). Incidentally, this is an area of law upon which United States law is generally very uniform, even though it is, as most things are in U.S. law, a matter of state law and not a matter of federal law, in most cases.

You could sue them for commercially exploiting your image without permission, so the waiver is necessary. It is entirely legal to require of tenants (even if weird) that they be part of an advertising campaign, in a specified way: it's also your right to refuse to sign. There is a minuscule chance that there is a local ordinance prohibiting such a clause.

There don't appear to be any Santa Clara-specific laws on the matter, so California law (including this) would govern this situation. A landlord generally has an obligation to maintain the premise in habitable condition (can't stick you with the bill for repairing the water main), and has to fulfill the obligations of the lease (if the lease says that a working washing machine is part of the premise, the landlord has to fix it if it breaks). An AC is not part of what makes a unit "habitable" in the legal sense. You should have to scrutinize exactly what the lease says about the AC, but saying that it is provided "as is" indicates that the landlord is disclaiming any obligation to fix it if it breaks. You are allowed to use it, but if it breaks, he won't fix it. The fact that he has no obligation to fix it does not relieve you of your duty to care for his property (irrespective of the fact that it was abandoned by a prior tenant – there's a notification procedure regarding abandoned real property, which I assume the landlord followed so it is his AC). Your obligation to compensate the landlord for damaging his property is not triggered by his legal obligation to maintain the property, it is triggered by the fact that it is his property. So you are legally on the hook: under §1929, "The hirer of a thing must repair all deteriorations or injuries thereto occasioned by his want of ordinary care". However, the size of the hook is not clear: the cost of replacement or repair could be vastly higher than the actual value of the unit. There is a legal concept of "unjust enrichment" that could be applicable, if the landlord plans to bill you $500 for a new AC which he got for free, but you'd probably need to hire a lawyer to make a solid legal argument in court.

Your question is not particularly clear, but it sounds like you're describing a situation where: The tenant doesn't pay the rent The landlord files an action to evict the tenant, and The tenant files a request for a jury trial. The act of filing for a jury trial doesn't guarantee that the tenant won't be evicted, but it will likely make the eviction process more time-consuming and expensive for the landlord. I'm assuming the tenant is entitled to a jury trial--otherwise this would be useless as a stalling tactic. In that case, the question you really want answered is, can the landlord force the tenant to waive any right to a jury trial by contract, for example in the lease? In California, the answer is no. The linked document suggests that you may be able to specify some form of ADR, which would avoid the expense of a jury trial, but the California courts won't let you get away with a straight jury trial waiver.

am I obligated to pay this fee? Yes. You entered the lease despite been aware of the existence of that fee. That meets the contract law tenet that an agreement be entered knowingly and willfully. Does it not invoke an issue where they can arbitrarily set the price? If the landlord requires a fee that is unreasonably high, that would violate the contract law covenant of good faith and fair dealing. As such, that part would be unenforceable, meaning that the landlord may only charge a reasonable fee. Likewise, unless the lease clearly entitles the landlord to decide the telecom fee arbitrarily, the lease would fail to meet that extent of the aforementioned tenet of a contract being entered knowingly. Does this fall under the category of lease addendum? The form (or format) in which the requirement of telecom fee was mentioned --and agreed upon-- does not matter. The landlord only would need to prove that the tenant was --or should have been-- aware of that fee. Usually the landlord can prove that by showing/producing in court the lease with tenant's signature.

Your father's probate estate is responsible for the repairs (assuming that your father owned the property outright and not through an entity, in which case the entity would be responsible). To the extent you accept rent, you are effectively acting as an agent of your father's estate in anticipation of being appointed to administer his estate. As his likely successor in the intestate estate, you have an interest in making the repairs, if urgent and if this mitigates the long term cost of the repairs and of the liability to the tenant for not making repairs promptly, that you would ultimately end up bearing. Often, it is possible to get appointed fairly quickly, at least on an emergency or temporary basis pending a formal permanent appointment to administer his estate. Doing so, if you could, would take you out of the shadows of acting in reliance on your future authority to act on behalf of your father's estate that you have not yet been granted. If you accept rents and make repairs and then someone else ends up being appointed to administer your father's estate (e.g. because a will you didn't know about is discovered and appoints someone else) and if the person ultimately appointed is displeased with the actions you took without formal authority to do so, rather than ratifying those actions, you are in a bit of a pickle and could incur some legal liability to your father's estate that could reduce your inheritance if there are also other heirs. You also have the option of simply walking away from his estate, not trying to be appointed to administer it, and not trying to claim an inheritance. If you do that, you have no personal liability to your father's tenants at all. If the situation that your father left behind is a truly troublesome mess and his estate is probably insolvent, it may even make rational sense for you to do that. You can't be held responsible for inaction in any way other than the depletion of your inheritance that arises naturally from your inaction. If this is the case, however, you should not accept rents from the tenants or have any other involvement in the management of your father's assets.

It is the tenant's responsibility to understand the written contract. Oral statements about the contract do have to be consistent with the written contract (that is, in the context where you ask the landlord what a particular clause means before signing -- not in the case where you are modifying an existing contract). If I were renting a room and the contract says "Du må betale $1000 hver dag", which I don't understand because my Norwegian is terrible, I would ask about this, and the landlord might say that it means "You must pay $1000 every month", which could be a decent deal. Actually, the clause says "You must pay $1000 every day". When the reality of the situation becomes clear, then it is obvious that we didn't have an agreement in the first place. Perhaps he mis-spoke, or his English is as bad as my Norwegian, but I would not be held to rate in the written contract, assuming that I could back up my claim that he gave me that interpretation: the lease would probably be voided, as not an actual agreement. The underlying principle is that there has to be a "meeting of the minds" where the parties understand what they will get and what they must give, and there was a demonstrable failure of understanding. On the other hand, if I sign a contract without really reading it carefully, and there is a clause in English (which I speak) saying that I have to pay $1000 a day, but I didn't really think about the clause so that in a sense I didn't understand what I had agreed to, well, I may still be on the hook. (On the third hand, a court would probably say that's a ridiculous rent and void the contract on policy grounds). In general, "not my first language" is not a get-out-of-contract card, though attempts to trick people into signing documents in languages that they really have no understanding of won't be successful. Virtually nobody but a lawyer actually understands contractual language, yet contracts are enforced all the time. A contract can be explicitly modified by verbal agreement, or can be entirely verbal, but oral agreements face evidence problems, namely, what exactly did A and B say? It's scientifically well established that parties can be morally certain that the conversation went "A" (for one person) and "Not A" (for the other person). Using "could" rather than "would" in speech makes a huge difference in interpretation. There is a rule, the parol evidence rule, which essentially says that unless there is a good reason to not do so, the contract as written is what is enforced. Even if the conversation had been written into the contract, there's no basis in the contract for objectively determining whether a thing is old and "just broke". So even as an additional clause in the contract, it doesn't afford you a clear escape hatch. You might be able to prove with expert testimony that indeed the pipes had been corroding for a hundred years, and you could not have caused the pipes to burst.

No they can't. The lease says the premises need to be cleaned without going into details how. You cleaned them yourself before moving out. If the landlord was not happy with that, they should have raised their concerns and discussed options. The security deposit that the landlord holds is only supposed to be used when something goes wrong. When something goes wrong, the landlord is supposed to talk, not to silently chop off a slice of the deposit as they please (unless the lease allows it, which it does not here). If the landlord refuses to refund, read the manual and go to small claims court to tell them where to get off.

If a moderator of an online forum edits my post to say something illegal, how could I prove I didn't write the incriminating message? Hypothetical situation. Several years ago, Reddit co-founder Steve Huffman caused some controversy by editing comments that criticized him. On most social media platforms, staff cannot edit users' messages without direct access to the database. However, this is often not the case for certain forum software, such as phpBB and vBulletin. In some cases, the forum does not even indicate that a moderator has edited a message. So if a moderator changes my post to say something illegal, then how could I prove in court that my post was tampered with? Let's say I go on a forum and say I wish to meet the president of the United States. Suppose a mod decides to pull a "prank" and edits the message to say I want to murder the president of the United States, and I end up getting a visit from the Secret Service. To complicate matters, the forum requires registration to view and is not accessible to the Wayback Machine or Google caches. In this case, how could I prove I didn't threaten the POTUS?

You do not have to. The burden of proof is on the prosecution to prove that you made the threat. Reasonable doubt exists in the circumstances that you describe, that there are no logs of who accessed what when and how. Your attorney may have to introduce expert witnesses who can explain how it is possible that text from your computer can end up on a web page, and they can testify that there are many ways that data can be entered into the database, only a few of which actually involve you.

(Assuming the jurisdiction is the US.) Your question I was wondering whether there are any limitations on using photos of private individuals on websites. is the least of your potential problems. Photos of the public taken in public are mostly legal to use and publish, and you own the copyright on the photo, and generally don't need a model release. But your plan of posting the photo with accompanying information about (alleged) fraud: There's a fraud conducting business in my state and I want to create a website that warns others of his fraudulent practices. is potentially legally problematic. As phoog indicates in his comment, you need to be aware of defamation, both at the federal level and among states, as some have criminalized defamation (Wikipedia). Libel is the publication of provably false facts by one person about another person. For a full outline of defamation (libel and slander, and including private and public figures), see Libel and Slander | Nolo.com. What you want to do is publish "facts" about this alleged fraud on the website with a photo of the individual, linking the fraud allegations to them. That is potentially libelous. The facts of the fraud may be provably true, or they may be provably false; that remains to be seen. But the facts don't matter when considering what actions the person can take against you if you publish such information on your website. If this business and the individual(s) feel they are not committing fraud, they can sue you for libel in civil court, alleging that you have damaged their reputation and impacted their business by publishing those facts on your website with the photo identifying the person and their business. If they take legal action, and you can prove the business and the individual(s) are committing fraud with provable facts - hard evidence of fraud, such as legal documents and court judgments - than you should (no guarantees) be able to successfully defend yourself in a libel suit brought against you by that person. Even if the business and the individual(s) are aware of facts that prove their fraud, and know they will probably not prevail in court, they can still take you to court, and it will cost you whatever time and money it takes to defend yourself. My responses above concern what legal actions the alleged could take against you if you published the website with the photo and information about the alleged fraud. No one here is advising you to put up the website with the photo and the "facts" as you see them, even if you have hard proof of the facts of the fraud; you should find legal representation before taking any action with the website. And, no one here is advising you to open any legal action against the person; that's your choice in terms of determining your case and if you can show actual harm that was caused by the alleged fraud by the individual, and you should find legal representation before taking any action.

The NYT article implies that she has used social media in the past to get her victims to believe her fake back story. She is being released from detention, and the restriction on her using social media is not tied to her expressing a particular viewpoint. Courts have repeatedly held that the Government can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest ( U.S. v. O'Brien, 391 US 367 - Supreme Court 1968). One such compelling interest is the effective administration of criminal justice (U.S. v. Spilotro, 786 F. 2d 808 - Court of Appeals, 8th Circuit 1986). For instance, speech restrictions can be tied to the purpose of preventing a defendant from committing further crimes while released.

I'm not a lawyer; I'm not your lawyer 1 For the avoidance of doubt, the thrust of this debate is: By placing a logo associated with a certain political movement near my user profile, does StackExchange violate Section 4(c) of the CC BY-SA 3.0? Subscriber Content is Content that is contributed by StackExchange users. The relevant sections of CC BY-SA 3.0 (emphasis added) are: c. ... The credit required by this Section 4(c) may be implemented in any reasonable manner; provided, however, that in the case of a Adaptation or Collection, at a minimum such credit will appear, if a credit for all contributing authors of the Adaptation or Collection appears, then as part of these credits and in a manner at least as prominent as the credits for the other contributing authors. For the avoidance of doubt, You may only use the credit required by this Section for the purpose of attribution in the manner set out above and, by exercising Your rights under this License, You may not implicitly or explicitly assert or imply any connection with, sponsorship or endorsement by the Original Author, Licensor and/or Attribution Parties, as appropriate, of You or Your use of the Work, without the separate, express prior written permission of the Original Author, Licensor and/or Attribution Parties. d. Except as otherwise agreed in writing by the Licensor or as may be otherwise permitted by applicable law, if You Reproduce, Distribute or Publicly Perform the Work either by itself or as part of any Adaptations or Collections, You must not distort, mutilate, modify or take other derogatory action in relation to the Work which would be prejudicial to the Original Author's honor or reputation... Does changing the logo on all pages imply an endorsement of the site/organisation by the user? It is likely, though not definite, that this positioning of the logo will imply that the user endorses the website. However, actions taken by the user - such as creating an account, accepting the Terms, contributing content - are likely to affirm this view. Does changing the logo imply that the site/organisation supports a particular political view? Again, it is likely, not definite, that changing the logo will imply that the site/organisation supports a particular political view. Does changing the logo impute support of a political view to the user? In this case, however, it is highly unlikely that the change of logo would impute to the user support of the political view. In a case such as this, onus of proof is on the plaintiff - were this claim brought in court, it would need to be proven on the balance of probability (or, less likely, on the preponderance of evidence) that a reasonable person would impute support of the marriage equality (and perhaps some other) agenda to the user. Reasonable person does not mean any particular person, nor does it mean, all people. Part of the imputation must come from the purpose that the user subscribes to the site. Perhaps if StackOverflow were a site that promoted marriage equality or judicial activism, this could support an opinion that the user supports this view. However, StackOverflow is about programming, and programming doesn't imply that kind of agenda. Perhaps if the icon had been changed to something that suggested support for object-oriented programming, the icon could be taken to suggest that the user supports this agenda. Neither does the user's content suggest support for this cause - if they constantly made off-hand remarks about it in their posts, then perhaps, again, a reasonable person may make that imputation. In any case, the damages awarded to the user would likely be compensatory rather than punitive - the user would need to therefore demonstrate actual suffering or loss as a result of the change of icon. If there were actual damages or loss, the way in which the user contributed to them - perhaps by posting a thread that would be likely to be inflammatory and attract attention to the user - may reduce an award of damages. In the case of no actual suffering or loss, the user could be awarded nominal damages. Injunctions that could be awarded would need to be proportionate to the breach of license - the court could require references to this user to be anonymised. This is easily done. It is unlikely that the court would require all contribution by the user to be removed - this is unlikely to pass a public interest test. In relation to placing a disclaimer in the footer, US courts have generally accepted disclaimers if they are positioned such that a reasonable user is likely to see it... In the footer? It's not a great place, and easily missed. It could be better than nothing, though, and may help with the likelihood of someone imputing such opinions to a user. Essentially - it's extremely unlikely that a reasonable person would impute support of the marriage equality agenda on a user based on a logo change, because the support is not sufficiently connected to the primary purpose of the site, or the user's activities on the site. Even if the user were successful in showing that this is the likely conclusion of a reasonable person, the remedies available to them would be limited to damages (which limited to actual losses, including suffering), and an injunction (which is likely to be anonymisation). A disclaimer may not, on its own, actually preserve the validity of the license, but it may be useful on determining the likelihood of a reasonable person imputing opinions to a user. 1. This is larger than normal, because I think it is more important than normal.

In the United States at least, the answer is clearly "Yes". Absent some restrictive agreement to which the would-be blogger is explicitly a party, a person has a protected right to comment or report on events and publish opinions of them. The question does not mention a location or jurisdiction, and I am not suren what the law on this point might be in non-US jurisdictions.

This could be a violation of 18 USC 1030 (and a crime). A number of things go into requirements for conviction under this law. First, it has to be a computer, which is defined as an electronic, magnetic, optical, electrochemical, or other high speed data processing device performing logical, arithmetic, or storage functions, and includes any data storage facility or communications facility directly related to or operating in conjunction with such device, but such term does not include an automated typewriter or typesetter, a portable hand held calculator, or other similar device Any printer that I have encountered in the past 40 years counts as "a computer". Second, (2) intentionally accesses a computer without authorization or exceeds authorized access, and thereby obtains—...(C) information from any protected computer; It is highly likely that the person printing has to receive some information from the printer, and respond accordingly so you have your "obtains information" element. Maybe not useful information, but information nevertheless. It also has to be a protected computer, (B) which is used in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce or communication, including a computer located outside the United States that is used in a manner that affects interstate or foreign commerce or communication of the United States Well, a computer connected to the internet is a protected computer, see US v. Trotter, 478 F.3d 918. Also, the access must be "without authorization or exceeds authorized access". The law doesn't explain with "without authorization" means, but the latter is defined as to access a computer with authorization and to use such access to obtain or alter information in the computer that the accesser is not entitled so to obtain or alter If the law were stated in terms of "prohibited access", meaning "express denial of permission", and if the computer owner had set the computer to "prohibited access" by default (password protected), there would be no issue -- accessing the computer is prohibited. "Unauthorized" can also mean "has not been explicitly authorized", i.e. lacking any indication one way or the other. Every computer access is initially unauthorized, until authorization is granted; and re-trying a login after mis-typing a user name (and being denied access) is not a violation of this law. There does not appear to be case law that addresses the status of computers just left open to the public, and whether using a computer that is so exposed constitutes "unauthorized access". Also, it is not clear that the defendant in this case has "obtained information", since with printing, information flows into the computer. There is also a clause about recklessly causing damage, but I don't see what damage would result ("damage" is defined as "any impairment to the integrity or availability of data, a program, a system, or information"), and how printing would be "reckless". It seems somewhat unlikely that this would be deemed to be a crime, though if you experiment, you could be on the cutting edge of new case law.

It's generally correct in the American system that everything not forbidden is permitted. But the law you're looking at isn't really an exception. You have the legal right to tamper with evidence if tampering is not illegal, but this statute makes it illegal. The language you've highlighted merely says that the law does not apply to those who have some other affirmative grant of authority to do so. So if you stab someone to death in your kitchen, you can't remove the body or other evidence, but the detectives investigating the case can, because they have the legal authority to process the scene and maintain the evidence for trial. So the law is similar to the "speaking in public" hypothetical, but that doesn't make it meaningless. Because of the First Amendment, that law doesn't actually outlaw anything, but the tampering law faces no such legal barriers. You had the right to tamper until the government said you didn't. Now that it says you don't, you can only do it on the government's terms, which require an affirmative grant of authority.

There are two scenarios to consider. One is that there is such a policy written down and duly communicated in some fashion. In that case, it is obviously "okay" in all senses to enforce that policy. (That does not preclude the possibility of suing the institution because they are abridging some right of yours in having this policy, but that's a separate matter). The alternative is that there is no such policy, and someone spoke incorrectly. If that is the case, then they "can't" enforce a non-existent policy. Actually, they can prevent you from using the facility, the question is, how could you correct their misunderstanding of their policy? The most protracted way to resolve this is to file a lawsuit against the university, for denying some right (constitutional or property). A more efficient way to do that is to bring the matter to the attention of a reasonably high-ranked official within the institution, perhaps the department chair, who may not be aware that subordinates are making up or misinterpreting rules. The fact that you were unable to locate a written statement of policy online really doesn't count for much. It is entirely reasonable to believe that the chair may have instituted such a policy, under his authority as chair, and communicated it verbally to subordinates: or, the subordinates simply do not know where to find the policies. An alternative approach is to raise the question with the Student Advocate's office, if discussion with the chair is unsatisfactory.

How should turn lane pavement markings be interpreted in Idaho? There's a certain intersection in Idaho, USA that's causing confusion for a lot of drivers. As you can see in the photo, the pavement widens near the intersection, as if there should be a right turn lane. But the widening area is marked with diagonal lines. The turn arrows show that the same lane should be used for traffic going straight and turning right. The only lane usage indicators are the pavement markings and traffic lights. There is no additional signage. Many drivers turn right from the area with the diagonal stripes, and many others turn right from the lane with the right and straight arrows. There's no clear consensus among drivers on how to make right turns here. I asked the highway department about it, and they said "...even though this area is not specifically striped as a right turn lane (there isn’t enough room to physically stripe a dedicated area for right turning vehicles), drivers who use it as such are acting lawfully." They cited Idaho Code 49-644, which says, "Both the approach for a right turn and the right turn shall be made as close as practicable to the right-hand curb or edge of the roadway." Their answer could be correct, but it doesn't feel right to me. I was taught to stay off diagonal lines, and to turn where the arrows are. I searched as many places as I could think of, including titles 40 and 49 of the Idaho code, and I couldn't find the specific meanings of turn arrows or diagonal stripes. What is the correct way to turn right at this intersection, and why?

The "definition" of diagonal crosshatches is given in the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices, under §3B.24, which says: Option: 01 Chevron and diagonal crosshatch markings may be used to discourage travel on certain paved areas, such as shoulders, gore areas, flush median areas between solid double yellow center line markings or between white channelizing lines approaching obstructions in the roadway (see Section 3B.10 and Figure 3B-15), between solid double yellow center line markings forming flush medians or channelized travel paths at intersections (see Figures 3B-2 and 3B-5), buffer spaces between preferential lanes and general-purpose lanes (see Figures 3D-2 and 3D-4), and at grade crossings (see Part 8). Standard: 02 When crosshatch markings are used in paved areas that separate traffic flows in the same general direction, they shall be white and they shall be shaped as chevron markings, with the point of each chevron facing toward approaching traffic, as shown in Figure 3B-8, Drawing A of Figure 3B-9, Figure 3B-10, and Drawing C of Figure 3B-15. 03 When crosshatch markings are used in paved areas that separate opposing directions of traffic, they shall be yellow diagonal markings that slant away from traffic in the adjacent travel lanes, as shown in Figures 3B-2 and 3B-5 and Drawings A and B of Figure 3B-15. 04 When crosshatch markings are used on paved shoulders, they shall be diagonal markings that slant away from traffic in the adjacent travel lane. The diagonal markings shall be yellow when used on the left- hand shoulders of the roadways of divided highways and on the left-hand shoulders of one-way streets or ramps. The diagonal markings shall be white when used on right-hand shoulders. Guidance: 05 The chevrons and diagonal lines used for crosshatch markings should be at least 12 inches wide for roadways having a posted or statutory speed limit of 45 mph or greater, and at least 8 inches wide for roadways having posted or statutory speed limit of less than 45 mph. The longitudinal spacing of the chevrons or diagonal lines should be determined by engineering judgment considering factors such as speeds and desired visual impacts. The chevrons and diagonal lines should form an angle of approximately 30 to 45 degrees with the longitudinal lines that they intersect. Idaho adopts this standard, and has not modified it in this area. Idaho statutes 49-801 commands you to "obey the instructions of any traffic-control device placed or held in accordance with the provisions of this title". The pertinent section of MUTCD does not command, is says that you are discouraged from traveling. §49-644 commands you to make the turn "as close as practicable to the right-hand curb or edge of the roadway". You should first obey commands, then I suppose you should take their suggestions.

In my State (Louisiana, USA), pedestrians may walk on the side of the road. No guidance is given on how fast they should walk. Pedestrians are not allowed to walk in the middle of the street. In the US, the laws for this will vary by state. Louisiana has statutes that say that pedestrians are bound by traffic laws, and obstruction of traffic is not legal on foot or in a vehicle. Basically, consult your local laws. §216. Pedestrians on highways or interstate highways A. Where sidewalks are provided, it shall be unlawful for any pedestrian to walk along and upon an adjacent highway. B. Where sidewalks are not provided, any pedestrian walking along and upon a highway shall, when practicable, walk only on the left side of the highway or its shoulder, facing traffic which may approach from the opposite direction. C. It shall be unlawful for any pedestrian to cross an interstate highway, except in the case of an emergency. D. Upon conviction of a violation of this Section, a court may order, in lieu of the penalty provisions provided in R.S. 32:57, that the offender perform three eight-hour days of court-approved community service activities, at least half of which shall consist of participation in a litter abatement or collection program. §213. Crossing at other than crosswalks A. Every pedestrian crossing a roadway at any point other than within a marked crosswalk or within an unmarked crosswalk at an intersection shall yield the right-of-way to all vehicles upon the roadway. B. Between adjacent intersections at which traffic-control signals are in operation pedestrians shall not cross at any place except in a marked crosswalk. "Highway" means the entire width between the boundary lines of every way or place of whatever nature publicly maintained and open to the use of the public for the purpose of vehicular travel, including bridges, causeways, tunnels and ferries; synonymous with the word "street".

Law does not have an all-encompassing syntax and structure that, if not followed, makes it null and void. If a reasonable person could determine that (in the example of the sign you have) you are required to get written permission from any or all of the Paulding County Commissioners, then the sign is enforceable. I honestly don't see anything wrong with the sign you are displaying, it is reasonably clear. If, for example the notice contains an ambiguity or unclear phrase, the "spirit" of the law or sign is upheld. If the sign had said something to the effect of "No trespassing without permission". It doesn't say who you need permission from, but you can reasonably ascertain that you must have permission from somebody in control of the land. There is no line in the sand here. Often when a dispute in a contract comes up where it could be interpreted more than one way, it is often interpreted in favor of the person who did not write the contract. "Offer ends October 30 or while supplies last" Isn't really "ill-phrased" either. I assure you that those statements are vetted by highly paid lawyers from many jurisdictions. I'm not sure what "nonsense" you would be referring to in there. If the vendor runs out of promotional materials the promotion ends... If they had said "free hats to the first 100 customers on December 31st", you can't show up as the 101st customer and demand a hat, nor could you show up on January 1st (even if there were not 100 customers the previous day) and demand one either.

For interstate and federal highways at least, there are regulations. For example, the billboards in Times Square are illegal. But it turns out this billboard, and others plastering Times Square, may actually be illegal. Under a federal highway beautification law, the billboards are too big – the law states that [billboards] should not be larger than 1200 square feet. Last week, the city’s transportation commissioner said the billboards may have to be taken down, or New York could risk losing ten percent of its federal highway funds. The Highway Beautification Act and various amendments can be referenced here.

No, she cannot 42-2-101(3), C.R.S. provides: “No person shall drive any motor vehicle upon a highway in this state unless such person has in his or her immediate possession a current driver’s or minor driver’s license or an instruction permit issued by the department under this article.” "(5) No person who has been issued a currently valid driver's or minor driver's license or an instruction permit shall operate a motor vehicle upon a highway in this state without having such license or permit in such person's immediate possession." The law requires you to carry your license. If your sister only has an instruction permit in her possession, she must operate under its rules until she is in possession of her permanent license. Just in case people think "highway" means a high-speed roadway, the CRS defines highway: "Highway" means the entire width between the boundary lines of every way publicly maintained when any part thereof is open to the use of the public for purposes of vehicular travel or the entire width of every way declared to be a public highway by any law of this state.

"Public space" is not a relevant criteria when considering trespass or other crimes/torts against property. The relevant criteria is who owns it and what they allow you to do on it. All land in the USA is owned by someone. That someone may be a government; that does not make it a public space - Camp David is owned by the US government; it is certainly not public. The owner of the land can decide (subject to the law) who has access to their land and in what circumstances. If they erect a fence then they are saying "You cannot access my land here" - if you ignore this then you are trespassing. This is true even if there are legitimate ways to access the land i.e. there is a place where there isn't a fence; to avoid trespass you would have to access the land from there. If you think of this in terms of a public building like a courthouse you are free to enter through the unlocked front doors but not by climbing through a window. The trespass is in the act of crossing the fence - that is the act that you have been implicitly denied permission to do. Being on one side or the other is not trespass. For the specific image that you show it is quite likely that those roads are owned by different people - the highway is probably owned by the state while the cul-de-sac is a local government road.

The situation in Texas is complicated. Driving faster than the posted maximum speed limit is not in and of itself a crime; rather, per Texas Transportation Code 545.352(a), it is prima facie evidence that the speed is a violation of 545.351(a): "An operator may not drive at a speed greater than is reasonable and prudent under the circumstances then existing". It is theoretically possible to defeat a speeding ticket by demonstrating that the speed was, in fact, reasonable and prudent. Texas also has a law regarding minimum speed, 545.363(a): "An operator may not drive so slowly as to impede the normal and reasonable movement of traffic, except when reduced speed is necessary for safe operation or in compliance with law". Since the speed limit is not a hard limit, the "compliance with law" clause does not protect you. If you get rear-ended while driving slower than the flow of traffic, your best defense is probably 545.351(b)(2): "An operator...shall control the speed of the vehicle as necessary to avoid colliding with another person or vehicle that is on or entering the highway in compliance with law and the duty of each person to use due care". The question in court becomes your claim that driving slowly constituted "due care" versus the other driver's claim that their speed was "reasonable and prudent". It's likely that you'll win, but it's not the slam-dunk case that it would be in a state where posted speed limits were hard restrictions.

In Ohio, a stop sign would be a traffic control device, but not a traffic control signal. From R.C. 4511.01: (QQ) "Traffic control device" means a flagger, sign, signal, marking, or other device used to regulate, warn, or guide traffic, placed on, over, or adjacent to a street, highway, private road open to public travel, pedestrian facility, or shared-use path by authority of a public agency or official having jurisdiction, or, in the case of a private road open to public travel, by authority of the private owner or private official having jurisdiction. (RR) "Traffic control signal" means any highway traffic signal by which traffic is alternately directed to stop and permitted to proceed.

Is it illegal to perform a song from sheet music that I transcribed? So I have been transcribing a copyrighted song (as a HOBBY) that I love and was thinking about using it as a graduation song for my music school, but I’ve had to make some tweaks because there are some instruments involved that my music school doesn’t have access to. Even if I give credit to the composer, and I will make no profit from the performance, will it still be illegal to use my transcription?

Even if I give credit to the composer, and I will make no profit from the performance, will it still be illegal to use my transcription? This definitely infringes the composer's performance and derivative work rights under the composer's copyright. There is a mandatory right to cover someone else's composition outside of a movie or TV show (roughly speaking) for a statutorily fixed royalty, but the bureaucracy is such that it would be impractical to do here. Whether or not the "fair use" defense applies in this case is a "colorable" argument, but really, when you perform the entire work as written except for transcription, winning a "fair use" defense in a infringement action would be a long shot. The fact that it is somehow connected to an educational activity would be the strongest argument in this case. Also, as noted in a comment, your school may have obtained express permission to cover the work: Your music school may have a license with a PRO (performing rights organization) that covers your song. You might make some inquiries with the administration as to whether this is the case. Radio stations obtain similar licenses to play a large catalog of music without individually obtaining licenses to use each work separately from the author. This said, this kind of activity is often done, despite the fact that it is a copyright infringement, and most of the time, if the performance isn't too widely broadcast, most copyright owners will never pursue copyright infringement claims over something like this and indeed often won't even consider doing so. Still, copyright is an absolute bar to infringing rights without permission, even if there is absolutely no money received for the work and even if there is full attribution of its author. I'm not a great fan of the law as it is, and it is often disregarded, but that is the law. Also, this answer is based upon U.S. law, but there isn't much international variation in this part of copyright law in countries that meaningfully enforce copyright laws in their courts. But, as another answer notes, in some countries the mandatory right to do a cover of songs in the U.S. is much easier bureaucratically, in some other countries: In several countries, there are organizations that deal with the copyright issue globally. That means you pay a certain (quite small) fee to be allowed to perform a piece of music publicly, and the organization deals with the individual right owners. That makes reusing works much simpler.

may require that you obtain license rights from third-party owners or licensors of content that you include in your text inputs (Emphasis mine). Based solely on the excerpt above, yes, you have the copyright on the audio files if you created the source material, as you are the creator, using Amazon Polly as/to generate a "tangible medium". One of the central rights granted by copyright is to control translation into a different medium (in this case, from text into audio), as is the right to control distribution, which is what this excerpt is talking about. "Third party" in this case means neither you nor Amazon. Basically, Amazon is informing you that using their software on someone else's copyrighted material does not grant you copyright on the audio recording.

Generally, it's illegal. You are creating a derivative work and you are not allowed to do that without the permission of the copyright holder. Some jurisdictions may have exceptions, such as fair use under US law. However, this generally protects uses that are intended to comment on or parody the work. It doesn't sound like that is the purpose of your image modification. NOT including: faceswaps, modifications that would shame or affect negatively the reputation of the actors on the image. That doesn't make it legal. I share it in a way that I don't make any economic profit out of it, and clearly stating that it is a modified image (not sure if inside the image, or in the caption under it) and state who is the legal owner of the original image. That doesn't make it legal, either.

If I draw something, having been inspired by looking at some other thing, you are not copying that thing. If you carefully copy something even if you are also deliberately changing features of the original, then you are copying. Copyright law gives the copyright holder the exclusive right to make copies. There is a difference between copying music and visual art in this respect, since music can be reduced to a small set of specific symbols, so "being inspired by" a musical work is often found to be infringement. The difficult part is legally distinguishing "making a copy" versus "being inspired by". The courts use a subjective test of "substantial similarity" to decide if there has been copying. the case of Mannion v. Coors. "Pose" is an element that is considered in assessing similarity: the question the court would ask (itself) is whether such a pose could ever have come from elsewhere (such as, your own creative efforts).

As the question says the "Fugue in A Major" by Shostakovich is not in the public domain. The work was published in 1950, and so would not be PD under US law, and Shostakovich died in 1975, and so his works would not be PD in countries using a life+50, life+70, or longer term. Therefore, simply "making some changes" would be the creation of a derivative work and would be copyright infringement in and of itself, even if that work was not published or distributed. If a relatively short segment of the fuge was used, it might be considered a "fair use" under US copyright law, or perhaps a "fair dealing " in the laws of those countries that recognize this exception to copyright. But that is a very fact-intensive determination; it depends on the amount used, the manner and purpose for which it is used, and the harm, if any, to the market for the original work. One can never be absolutely sure that a use is a fair use until a court rules that it is. A two minute excerpt is fairly substantial, and might well not be held to be a fair use. Of course, you could seek permission from the Shostakovich estate (or whoever owns the copyright on the fugue). They might or might not grant it, and might or might not demand a fee. (As another answers mentions, there may be some question if the works of Shostakovich are protected by copyright under US law.)

Legal unless you violate copyright. Screenshots will probably be fair use. The manuals/how-tos need to be your originals, not copies from anywhere.

I'm not a lawyer; I'm not your lawyer. I would interpret the Copyright Board's interpretation in relation to tariffs when musical works copied for private use only, as the document's scope does not appear to extend beyond that. However, in BMG Canada Inc. v. John Doe, [2004] 3 FCR 241, a consortium of record industry corporations attempted to request confidential ISP account holder information. Essentially, the plaintiffs failed to bring adequate evidence to prove the magnitude of copyright infringement; additionally, it is specifically stated at [24-5] that: Subsection 80(1) [as am. by S.C. 1997, c. 24, s.50] of the Copyright Act provides as follows: 80. (1) Subject to subsection (2), the act of reproducing all or any substantial part of (a) a musical work embodied in a sound recording, ... onto an audio recording medium for the private use of the person who makes the copy does not constitute an infringement of the copyright in the musical work, the performer's performance, or the sound recording. Although the Copyright Modernization Act, did, in fact, introduce a number of amendments, Subsection 80 still reads as it does when the BMG case was decided. Since this case, I can find no court that has found this ruling to be invalid, and no cases which have considered and not applied this subsection. There is also Subsection 29.22 (1) (which applies to all works): 29.22 (1) It is not an infringement of copyright for an individual to reproduce a work or other subject-matter or any substantial part of a work or other subject-matter if (a) the copy of the work or other subject-matter from which the reproduction is made is not an infringing copy; (b) the individual legally obtained the copy of the work or other subject-matter from which the reproduction is made, other than by borrowing it or renting it, and owns or is authorized to use the medium or device on which it is reproduced; (c) the individual, in order to make the reproduction, did not circumvent, as defined in section 41, a technological protection measure, as defined in that section, or cause one to be circumvented; (d) the individual does not give the reproduction away; and (e) the reproduction is used only for the individual’s private purposes. Subsection 80(1) creates a special exemption purely for musical works, and so the less restrictive conditions there should be found to apply to them instead. On the basis of the case above, and my consideration of the Copyright Act, I would find that reproduction of a musical work does not constitute copyright infringement, pursuant and subject to s 80(1) of the Act.

17 U.S. Code § 107, which governs fair use in the US, says (emphasis mine): Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include— (1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such finding is made upon consideration of all the above factors. Note that commercial/educational use is part of only one factor. Even if that factor is in your favor, it may not be fair use, and even if it isn't in your favor, it might be fair use. Because fair use is determined on a case-by-case basis, we can't really say whether your use is fair use, with or without the donations. That would be the sort of thing you'd ask a lawyer about to get real legal advice on your particular case.

Is there a statute requiring contractors to bill in a timely manner? Let’s say that Bob has work done to his home. Some payments are made per the contract, but the final payment requires some adjustments to be made to account for changes agreed to during the project, so the amount is unknown. However, following completion of the project the contractor goes quiet. For several months… Is there any period of time after which the contractor’s right to bill and expect timely payment will have expired? Ethically Bob should pay them for work done, but just in case there is a dispute over the adjustments Bob would seem to have greater leverage to negotiate the longer the contractor takes to submit an invoice. (i.e. if the contractor takes 6 months to submit a final invoice wouldn’t it be fair for Bob to have 6 months to negotiate or pay?) Is there any statute of limitations beyond which Bob is considered to be out from under the terms of the contract? (Presume that terms of the contract are not tied to the lifespan of any British royalty…)

The statute of limitations for a breach of contract applies. This is four years in Washington State. But, if a claim isn't made within a much shorter period of time after the last work is done (typically a few months at most), the contract waives the contractor's right to a mechanic's lien in the property to enforce those contract rights. This deadline in 90 days in most cases in Washington State (with quite a bit of case law spelling out when you start counting). The contract can, of course, provide for other deadlines and consequences for not meeting them, and frequently would, especially in a construction loan financed project.

am I obligated to pay this fee? Yes. You entered the lease despite been aware of the existence of that fee. That meets the contract law tenet that an agreement be entered knowingly and willfully. Does it not invoke an issue where they can arbitrarily set the price? If the landlord requires a fee that is unreasonably high, that would violate the contract law covenant of good faith and fair dealing. As such, that part would be unenforceable, meaning that the landlord may only charge a reasonable fee. Likewise, unless the lease clearly entitles the landlord to decide the telecom fee arbitrarily, the lease would fail to meet that extent of the aforementioned tenet of a contract being entered knowingly. Does this fall under the category of lease addendum? The form (or format) in which the requirement of telecom fee was mentioned --and agreed upon-- does not matter. The landlord only would need to prove that the tenant was --or should have been-- aware of that fee. Usually the landlord can prove that by showing/producing in court the lease with tenant's signature.

First of all, there is no breach - they said they would pay it "over the course of the first year"; in what way is the first week not part of the first year? Second, breaching a contract doesn't always allow the aggrieved party to terminate it: in fact, being able to terminate is only for the most egregious of breaches or ones that are specifically spelled out as giving a right to termination. For example, failure to deliver (or pay) on time or in full would not allow termination, only damages.

We don't give specific legal advice and one might VTC, but I think your phrasing is not quite right, and you are just curious about the possibility of binding the landlord to a term across leases. The first thing that a term in a contract has to so is say exactly what must be done by whom (or not done). You need to describe more precisely what it means for all future rent and rent increases to be commensurate with the current rent. You can think of conditions like "no more than 2% per annum" or "no more than 15% per annum", and then you can figure out what number is acceptable to the two of you. I would be surprised if you could come up with an agreeable number. Second, you'd have to make this limit "perpetual", which is pretty much impossible. You could negotiate the terms of the next lease today which would prevent an increase of rent by more thay you're happy with, but until governmental controls say exactly what a legal rent increase is, the property owner has the right to raise the rent by a million dollars, and you have the right to move elsewhere. It's as hard to permanently lock a landlord into an arrangement as it is to lock a tenant into renting a specific residence. Every year, you have the right to terminate the lease if the rent goes too high for you, and every year the landlord has the right to raise the rent if the current arrangement isn't sufficiently profitable. Incidentally, you might want to check with AHFC to see if you can actually do this. Your expectations don't determine what relief they provide, just make sure that you provided accurate answers to their questions and reported all income that you're required to report.

"There's no ... contract" - wrong! The emails are the contract, see What is a contract and what is required for them to be valid? If you didn't agree on which laws will apply then that is a matter for the court to determine. In general, they will tend to look at where the bulk of the work was done - since you are being charged I assume the work was done in the UK so probably UK law applies, noting that the UK is actually 3 different jurisdictions (England & Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland). That said, many jurisdictions have non-excludable laws around contracts, particularly consumer contracts that apply irrespective of the substantial law applying to the contract. It is therefore possible that you apply English contract law subject to, for example, Australian Consumer Law. Usually any consumer protection law in the vendor's jurisdiction will also apply. General contract law dictates that where a price was not agreed a reasonable price must be paid. If its reasonable that the editing should have been included in the original price charged then you don't have to pay more but if it isn't then you have to pay a reasonable amount for it. There is generally no requirement for estimates or any other method of determining the price - you just have to do what's reasonable. However, consumer protection law generally imposes more obligations on a business than general contract law. It is likely that your contract is ambiguous - courts will endeavor to fill in any ambiguities to make the contract work. techniques include read in implied terms to give "business efficiency", from custom or business usage (e.g. if particular industries typically deal with particular issues in particular ways), from previous dealings (i.e. what the parties have done in the past), from statutes, whatever works to resolve uncertain, meaningless or ambiguous terms, from the express words used or from the nature of the contract or from the common intention of the parties (i.e. the court might ask you what you meant). "Breach of contract" is a very broad term - it simply means that one of the parties hasn't done what they were required to do and allows the other party to sue for damages.

This practice is probably not illegal, but I think it is at best ethically dubious. The invoice specifies ""Advising in relation to employment agreement with X", but according to the question no advice about X was given or even asked for, and while advice about Y was discussed, no such advice was given. That suggests that the asker owes the solicitor nothing. However the asker was informed of the hourly charge and then continued to discuss the issue. it could be argued that the constitutes an implicit contract to pay that rate for those discussions. It seems that the asker never said "does that rate apply to this telephone call", nor did the solicitor say "that hourly clock starts now if you want to continue". This leaves the situation less clear than it could have been. The second email, as described, seems to imply that the work of giving advice had not yet commenced, and thus no fee was due for services to date. A person in this situation could reply with a letter (sent by email or postal mail or better both) saying that no advice was given, no useful service was performed, and there was no agreement to pay for any service, so no fee is due. If the solicitor takes this to a court case, the asker may well want to consider consulting a different legal professional. This is a case where the exact facts may well matter, so no more precise answer can, I think, be given here.

If it's not in the lease agreement, then you did not agree to it. Even in the absence of the law prohibiting the late fee, the landlord would not be able to impose it because it is not in the lease. It is of course up to you whether you want to test it. It may be more trouble than it is worth. Then again, it's probably not worth the landlord's trouble to begin eviction proceedings over a late fee. Paying late and refusing to pay the fee would probably sour your relationship with the landlord, which is usually something you want to avoid. If you do pay late at some point, you may want to point out to the landlord the relevant provision of Massachusetts law. The matter would probably end there: either the landlord doesn't know about it, or the landlord is hoping that you don't know about it. Pointing it out in a polite manner will inform the landlord of the law and that you are acquainted with the law. Unless the landlord is quite unreasonable, that should take care of it. Whether there is any law prohibiting landlords from announcing an intention to take a prohibited action is indeed a different question. Is there any legal reason for me to bring this up and get the landlord to formally acknowledge that they will not in fact charge illegal late fees? No. You have a contract with the landlord that already says you are going to move in. He cannot modify that contract simply by sending you a letter.

if a manager emailed an prospective employee a contract containing the pay rate of $20/hr, if the prospective employee crossed out $20/hr and replaced it with $25/hr, then went to work and gave the manager the contract which he failed to carefully read, continued working for a few months, would the employee be entitled to $20/hr? A party ought to timely alert or notify the other counterparty about any disagreements or proposed changes. This is especially recommendable when evidence suggests that the counterparty's expectation that the party only would sign the contract was reasonable. In the example you outline, the employee's unilateral alteration of the compensation/rate in the contract seems unlikely to favor the employee's position. That is because typically employer and employee negotiate compensation prior to formalizing their agreement. In that case, the employee would need stronger evidence with which to overcome the employer's credible argument that he did not knowingly accept the altered rate.

Why would a clause apply until 21 years after the death of the last descendant of King Charles III? Inspired by this question, why might any corporation draft a legal document containing provisions that are random, arbitrary, and completely beyond their control? In case the question is deleted, it had to do with Disney maintaining control over its districts "until twenty one (21) years after the death of the last survivor of the descendants of King Charles III, King of England living as of the date of this declaration." (I don't have access to the document quoted in the other question.) The rule against perpetuity makes some sense from an estate planning perspective, (a just-borne heir would reach the age of majority to be able inherit property 21 years following a death) but what rationale is there for preventing an on-going legal entity from tying any or all of its legal documents directly to the continued existence of the entity itself?

It’s a common law rule dating from the 17th to 19th centuries Known as the rule against perpetuities “that prevents people from using legal instruments (usually a deed or a will) to exert control over the ownership of private property for a time long beyond the lives of people living at the time the instrument was written.” The rule has its origin in the Duke of Norfolk's Case of 1682. That case concerned Henry, 22nd Earl of Arundel, who had tried to create a shifting executory limitation so that some of his property would pass to his eldest son (who was mentally deficient) and then to his second son, and other property would pass to his second son, but then to his fourth son. The estate plan also included provisions for shifting property many generations later if certain conditions should occur. When his second son, Henry, succeeded to his elder brother's property, he did not want to pass the other property to his younger brother, Charles. Charles sued to enforce his interest, and the court (in this instance, the House of Lords) held that such a shifting condition could not exist indefinitely. The judges believed that tying up property too long beyond the lives of people living at the time was wrong, although the exact period was not determined until another case, Cadell v. Palmer, 150 years later. Historically, the rule was no longer than 21 years from the death of some person alive at the time the trust or estate was created. However, that person(s) must be limited and identifiable. Which led to the creation of Royal lives clauses. The descendants of British monarchs became popular because it’s easy to find out who they are, even many years after the fact, and that family tends to live a long time. Other popular choices, particularly in the United States, are the descendants of John D. Rockefeller or Joseph P. Kennedy. This is often only one of the conditions for the end of the trust and becomes a “savings clause” to prevent violation of the rule if the other conditions are (or become) too far in the future. The period has been changed or abolished by statute in many jurisdictions. For example, England and Wales has adopted a flat 125 year limit. As a state-based law, the United States is hugely variable. Examples For example, one of the businesses I run operates under a trust deed that says: "The Vesting Date" means the first to occur of the following three dates namely:- (i) Sixty years after the date of this Deed. (ii) Twenty years after the date of the death of the last survivor of the lineal descendants of His late Majesty King George V born and living at the date hereof or, (iii) The date (if any) which the Trustee shall in his discretion appoint as the distribution date of this settlement. The deed was made in 1982, which partly explains its style and implicit sexism, but I suspect that the solicitor who drafted it has been using the clause about George V for a lot longer than that. As of today, there are 35 living people who fall into the definition, including Charles III (see if you can work out the others); since there are now less than 20 years to go until 60 years after the deed, the clause will never be relevant. Another business operates under a deed made in 2022: 14.1 Termination date The Trust shall be wound-up and terminate on the first to occur of: a) the date which The Trustee with the written consent of the Leading Member Appointer determines; or b) 80 years from the date of this deed unless a State law allows otherwise including South Australia. Note that the reference to living people is gone. Also, note the specific reference to South Australia, a jurisdiction that has abolished the rule against perpetuities. So long as they don't change their law back, this trust is effectively perpetual. Finally, not how much easier this is to read and skips the implicit sexism; progress. Why doesn’t it affect the property of ‘immortal’ entities like companies or governments? Because, in theory, it isn’t dead people telling living people what they can do with the property. While the organisation may be ‘eternal’ the people making decisions for that organisation aren’t - the directors and legislators/executives in charge today can decide what to do with the property. This includes having the capacity to rewrite the rules of the organisation. While it may be hard to change a company’s rules and very, very hard to change a country’s constitution, it isn’t impossible the way it is with a trust deed or a will. Changing a deed or will too much can result in resettlemet; creating a new trust and usually crystalising tax obligations the delaying of which was often one of the motivations for the trust in the first place.

Only if the company consents While some jurisdictions have by statute allowed corporations to be bound by pre-incorporation contracts, New York is not one of them and holds to the common law principle that a person cannot enter a contract before that person exists. In your circumstances the company is only bound by the second contract. So, who is bound by the first? Well, corporations can only act through agents and agency law tells us that an agent who purportedly acts for a non-existent principal is actually acting on their own behalf. So, the person(s) who signed for Company X on the first contract are personally bound to the contract. Unless they explicitly told Company Y that they wouldn’t be. It seems that they didn’t so Company Y can require performance of the first contract by them and of the second by Company X. Company Y must, of course, fulfil its obligations under both contracts - it needs to bear this in mind if it is actually impossible to do both, for example, transferring the same property to the signers of the first contract and Company X or becoming a full time employee of both. If so, it might be in Company Y’s best interests to let the first contract “die”.

Assuming, for purposes of argument, that such a change could be made by executive order, or indeed by legislation, rather than by amendment, yes, the change could and would have to have an effective date, and apply only to persons born after that date. Indeed that would still be true if such a change were made by constitutional amendment. Consider, people whose parents (or one of whose parents) are US citizens, but who are born outside of the US, are or may become citizens (by statute), but only if the citizen parent complies with certain rules specifying a minimum period of residence in the US, and other conditions. Those periods and conditions have changed over the years, and each such change had an effective date. If such a change could be made but could not be made with an effective date, then it would apply retroactively, and deprive people who are already citizens of their citizenship. There is no valid equal protection claim, because the same rules apply to both individuals, they merely give different results for the different birth dates. (See my answer to this question for why I do not think such a change would be valid except by Constitutional Amendment.) EDIT: I suppose such a changed interpretation, if made at all, might take the position that such births never did validly convey citizen ship, and all people whose parents were not validly in the country had never been citizens. That strikes me as even less likely to pass judicial review, but one cannot know what the Supreme Court will do when faced with a truly novel situation.

The GDPR has an exemption for purely personal or household activity. Creating a family tree seems purely personal as long as you don't publish it. You're also allowed to freely share the tree as long as it stays within that purely personal scope. Your proposed restriction of only showing data of blood relatives seems excessively strict. But assuming that this exemption wouldn't apply, there'd probably still be no problem. The GDPR does not require you to always obtain consent. It requires that the purposes for which you process personal data are covered by some legal basis. Consent is one such legal basis, but legitimate interest is another. You can likely argue that you have a legitimate interest to create a tree of your (extended) family. The legitimate interest must be weighed against the rights and freedoms of the affected persons. For example, contact information could be used for stalking. The balance of the legitimate interest check can be changed if you adopt suitable safeguards. Your idea of only sharing data with close relatives would be such a safeguard, but it might not be necessary. When you rely on legitimate interest, the affected person can object to further processing, furthermore they can request to be erased from your records. A request for erasure can be denied if there are overriding grounds to keep the data. E.g maybe only contact information has to be deleted but names, dates, and relations might be kept. You should notify persons when they are included into your records. It is your obligation as the data controller to make these decisions. If someone disagrees they can sue you or lodge a complaint with a supervision authority. Note that dead persons are not natural persons in the sense of the GDPR, and have no privacy. However, national laws may provide such protections.

The issue is discussed in quite a few cases, including an in depth discussion in Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003). The Official Syllabus of that decision summarizes its analysis: The Copyright and Patent Clause, U. S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 8, provides as to copyrights: "Congress shall have Power ... [t]o promote the Progress of Science ... by securing [to Authors] for limited Times ... the exclusive Right to their ... Writings." In the 1998 Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA), Congress enlarged the duration of copyrights by 20 years: Under the 1976 Copyright Act (1976 Act), copyright protection generally lasted from a work's creation until 50 years after the author's death; under the CTEA, most copyrights now run from creation until 70 years after the author's death, 17 U. S. C. § 302(a). As in the case of prior copyright extensions, principally in 1831, 1909, and 1976, Congress provided for application of the enlarged terms to existing and future copyrights alike. Petitioners, whose products or services build on copyrighted works that have gone into the public domain, brought this suit seeking a determination that the CTEA fails constitutional review under both the Copyright Clause's "limited Times" prescription and the First Amendment's free speech guarantee. Petitioners do not challenge the CTEA's "life-plus-70-years" timespan itself. They maintain that Congress went awry not with respect to newly created works, but in enlarging the term for published works with existing copyrights. The "limited Tim[e]" in effect when a copyright is secured, petitioners urge, becomes the constitutional boundary, a clear line beyond the power of Congress to extend. As to the First Amendment, petitioners contend that the CTEA is a content-neutral regulation of speech that fails inspection under the heightened judicial scrutiny appropriate for such regulations. The District Court entered judgment on the pleadings for the Attorney General (respondent here), holding that the CTEA does not violate the Copyright Clause's "limited Times" restriction because the CTEA's terms, though longer than the 1976 Act's terms, are still limited, not perpetual, and therefore fit within Congress' discretion. The court also held that there are no First Amendment rights to use the copyrighted works of others. The District of Columbia Circuit affirmed. In that court's unanimous view, Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U. S. 539, foreclosed petitioners' First Amendment challenge to the CTEA. The appeals court reasoned that copyright does not impermissibly restrict free speech, for it grants the author an exclusive right only to the specific form of expression; it does not shield any idea or fact contained in the copyrighted work, and it allows for "fair use" even of the expression itself. A majority of the court also rejected petitioners' Copyright Clause claim. The court ruled that Circuit precedent precluded petitioners' plea for interpretation of the "limited Times" prescription with a view to the Clause's preambular statement of purpose: "To promote the Progress of Science." The court found nothing in the constitutional text or history to suggest that a term of years for a copyright is not a "limited Tim[e]" if it may later be extended for another "limited Tim[e]." Recounting that the First Congress made the 1790 Copyright Act applicable to existing copyrights arising under state copyright laws, the court held that that construction by contemporaries of the Constitution's formation merited almost conclusive weight under Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U. S. 53, 57. As early as McClurg v. Kingsland, 1 How. 202, the Court of Appeals recognized, this Court made it plain that the Copyright Clause permits Congress to amplify an existing patent's terms. The court added that this Court has been similarly deferential to Congress' judgment regarding copyright. E. g., Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U. S. 417. Concerning petitioners' assertion that Congress could evade the limitation on its authority by stringing together an unlimited number of "limited Times," the court stated that such legislative misbehavior clearly was not before it. Rather, the court emphasized, the CTEA matched the baseline term for United States copyrights with the European Union term in order to meet contemporary circumstances. Held: In placing existing and future copyrights in parity in the CTEA, Congress acted within its authority and did not transgress constitutionallimitations. Pp. 199-222. The CTEA's extension of existing copyrights does not exceed Congress' power under the Copyright Clause. Pp. 199-218. (a) Guided by text, history, and precedent, this Court cannot agree with petitioners that extending the duration of existing copyrights is categorically beyond Congress' Copyright Clause authority. The case most squarely on point to your question held that a telephone book is not sufficiently original as a constitutional matter to be subject to copyright. It held that originality, for copyright purposes, is constitutionally mandated for all works. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340 (1991). See also: Under the Copyright and Patent Clause, Congress' copyright authority is tied to the progress of science; its patent authority, to the progress of the useful arts. Golan v. Holder, 565 U.S. 302 (2012). Under this clause, Congress, to encourage people to devote themselves to intellectual and artistic creation, may guarantee to authors and investors a reward in form of control over sale or commercial use of copies of their books. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973). This clause is both grant of power and limitation; this clause is limited to promotion of advances in useful arts. Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1 (1966). The economic philosophy behind this clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is best way to advance public welfare through talents of authors and inventors in Science and useful Arts. Mazer v. Stein , 347 U.S. 201 (1954). The Copyright Act of Congress, R.S. § 4952, as amended by the Act Mar. 3, 1891, c. 565, 26 Stat. 1106, giving to authors the exclusive right to dramatize any of their works, is valid as applied to pantomine dramatization by means of moving picture films. Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55 (1911). This section does not limit the useful to that which satisfies immediate bodily needs, and painting and engraving not intended for a mechanical end are among the useful arts, the progress of which Congress is empowered by this section to promote. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903). No authority exists for obtaining a copyright beyond the extent to which Congress has authorized it; a copyright cannot be sustained as a right existing at common law, but depends wholly on the legislation of Congress. Banks v. Manchester, 128 U.S. 244 (1888). Legislation concerning trademark protection is not authorized by this clause. In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879). A list of U.S. Supreme Court cases on the issue of copyright at Wikipedia includes many additional copyright cases that don't implicate the U.S. Constitutional language. It is also worth noting that while the U.S. Supreme Court is the final and most authoritative interpreter of the U.S. Constitution, that any court presented with an issue of constitutional interpretation can, and indeed, is duty bound, to interpret the constitutional in a legally authoritative way, which in the case of appellate courts (state and federal) serves as a legal precedent for other cases that "makes law" on the issue.

He has this phrased like it's the ability to decide which laws you follow, and that it's an ability being withheld from the general public (although I seriously doubt that at least the former is the case). This is yet another false claim made by "freemen" or those who claim "common law defences". Notice of Understanding has no legal meaning unless the context demands that it evidences a meeting of the minds for the purposes of contract formation. It is a well-settled principle of common law that in order to be bound by a contract, there must be an agreement. Put simply, I cannot bind someone simply by sending them a Notice unless it is a right conferred on me by some earlier statute or legislation, or legally binding agreement. I tried searching for a solid definition, but all I could find was people/organization's Notice of Understanding and Intent and Claim of Rights. The reason you've found nothing official about the terms Notice of Understanding and Intent and Claim of Rights is that there is nothing official or legal about those terms. They are ordinary terms with ordinary meaning being bastardised by deluded people who believe they can fine the government and refuse to be bound by the law of the land. Of course, none of this holds up. What is the purpose of declaring your Notice of Understanding and Intent and Claim of Rights? It might make you feel better, even though it has no legal, practical or other effect.

The doctrine of judicial estoppel could potentially be applied in the manner that you suggest. The doctrine is applied in a manner that involves considerable discretion (unlike the similar doctrine of collateral estoppel, which makes judicial determinations against a party on the merits in a litigated case binding against the party against whom it was decided in future cases, in which there is much less judicial discretion). So, it isn't a lock solid winning argument that can be convincingly relied upon. But, it is a legitimate argument that a party can make in a lawsuit that would sometimes win. Footnote Large corporations are unique, in that they (1) enter into adhesive contracts with millions of people, (2) get sued a lot, and (3) often use outside counsel. For what it is worth, most businesses and government agencies, large and small, enter into adhesive contracts, often with at least hundred or thousands of people, if not with millions of people, and many get into frequently lawsuits and sometimes use outside counsel. So, the uniqueness of large corporations is somewhat overstated in the question.

In principle, there is an original copyright and a copyright of the revised version, but this makes no difference in the duration of a copyright of a natural person which is 70 years from the death of the author. It also has no effect on the duration of the copyright of a corporate work where the legal author is not a natural person, which is 95 years from first publication or 120 years from creation, whichever is shorter. The main reason to update the notice is that giving a copyright notice is one factor necessary to obtain special remedies such as statutory damages and attorneys fees, rather than merely compensatory economic damages. If you don't update the copyright notice for a new version, then these special remedies won't be available when it is the new material that is copied in violation of the copyright law. Updating the copyright notice used to be a much bigger deal when the duration of a copyright was 26 years from publication, and renewable only once for an additional 26 years, as it was pre-1978. Under that regime, a claim of copyright was necessary for a copyright to be present and it was only available for published work, unlike current law under which a copyright with minimal protections arises automatically by operation of law upon the creation of the work.

To what extent does a factual mistake invalidate a legal document? Due to a “royal lives clause”, Disney retains power over its districts until twenty one (21) years after the death of the last survivor of the descendants of King Charles III, King of England living as of the date of this declaration. This is interesting and tricky, as there is no such person as King Charles III, King of England, the title “King of England” having been defunct since 1707 (many years before the USA was even established as an independent country). Does this in any way affect the legal power of the clause?

canada The language is clear in context Covenants and easements are interpreted using ordinary contractual interpretation: Connick v. Owners, Strata Plan VIS7092, 2022 BCCA 52. This means that interpretation should give the words "their ordinary and grammatical meaning, consistent with the surrounding circumstances known to the parties at the time of formation of the contract... The meaning of words is often derived from a number of contextual factors": Sattva Capital Corp. v. Creston Moly Corp., 2014 SCC 53. A court would have no difficulty determining who "King Charles III, King of England" refers to.

What Do England And Wales Share Legally? Why are they so closely associated with each other as to have just one tag on the site, but Northern Ireland and Scotland each seem to be their own worlds? Most laws of general applicability, such as criminal law, and private law (i.e. the law governing the interactions of private parties like property law, contract law, landlord-tenant law, employment law, etc.) are enacted by the National Parliament at Westminster (or effective as part of a shared English common law of case precedents) and shared by England and Wales which have a uniform integrated court system. In contrast, Scotland and Northern Ireland have greater autonomy to enact laws of general application because more authority has been devolved to those regional governments than to the National Assembly of Wales. They also have their own court systems. Historic Causes Wales was basically fully integrated into England starting in the 1200s and subsequently restored some autonomy. Scotland never lost its high level of autonomy and was initially joined to England only by virtue of having the same monarch, rather than being the same country. The United Kingdom was formed first by the personal union of monarchs from 1603 (under King James VI of Scotland a.k.a. King James I of England) followed by a federal style merger of governments approved by the Scottish and English parliaments in 1706-1707, rather than by conquest and it has much more government autonomy in generally applicable legislation and its judicial system than Wales does, and more than Ireland had when it was ruled by England. On the other hand, Scottish sentiment towards independence was not exactly unanimous in support of staying with the U.K. in the last referendum in 2014 when 44.7% of votes cast were for independence with 84.6% voter turnout (including voters as young as age 16). Northern Ireland's story is a bit more complicated as Ireland had a legal status similar to Wales from a similar medieval era, but this was complicated by the Irish independence struggle ultimately leading to the creation of the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland. The fine line and complexity of the situation in Northern Ireland is illustrated by this map, and strong autonomy was necessary to allow it to maintain the fragile Protestant-Roman Catholic balance in a divided society there: Each of the components of the United Kingdom has a separate and historically determined status that is not exactly parallel to any of the others. England has no national assembly of its own, sufficing to use the national parliament for its laws despite the fact that some seats in that parliament that govern it are selected in Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. Likewise, before the U.S. gained independence, different parts of the U.S. had distinct relationships to the U.K., as did the various colonial possessions of the U.K. (e.g. India, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Kenya, Tanzania, Hong Kong). The U.K. is an exemplary example of the philosophy that consistency is the hobgoblin of small minds. To pluck out just one more random example of the English tendency, "Scotland Yard", the national police force headquarters in the City of Westminster within the City of Greater London in England, has jurisdiction over England and Wales, but not over Scotland. Legal Distinctions Between England And Wales To provide a few other examples in addition to the example of language related laws noted by @WeatherVane (noted on my recent visit to England and Wales) and to embellish on that point a little further, the Welsh language is resurgent in Wales where it is a mandatory subject in public schools (often in the North with Welsh as the primary language of instruction) with about 30% of the population (more than 800,000 people) who either speak it as a first language (which is common among the very old and among young people in Northern Wales) by people who are mostly bilingual with English (but may reach for an English word or two now and then) or as a fluent second language. The Anglican Church is the established church in England, but not in Wales where it was disestablished in 1916. The legal implications of this are subtle, but not non-existent. Government agencies are not required to hoist the British flag with primacy over the Welsh flag, and indeed, the British flag is rarely seen there. Primary and secondary education are administered separately in England and Wales with attendant laws on issues like truancy, dress codes, financial arrangements, testing, and certain holidays. This distinction primarily exists to facilitate Welsh language instruction, which is the primary language of instruction in some schools, and a secondary language in others. More generally, the manner in which many government services (e.g. public housing) is administered, and in which tax dollars are expended is not precisely the same between England and Wales. Certain laws regulating immigrants (related to immigrant financial security and leases to immigrants, more or less) differ between England and Wales, although this is a temporary matter and the long term plan is for these laws to be integrated across the United Kingdom. The Welsh Senedd (a.k.a. National Assembly for Wales, i.e. the regional parliament) has some independent legislative power, although honestly, the scope of its legislation is typically closer to what you might see in a U.S. home rule city or a school board, than in a U.S. state government. In particular: The 20 areas of responsibility devolved to the National Assembly for Wales (and within which Welsh ministers exercise executive functions) are: Agriculture, fisheries, forestry and rural development Ancient monuments and historical buildings Culture Economic development Education and training Environment Fire and rescue services and promotion of fire safety Food Health and social services Highways and transport Housing Local government National Assembly for Wales Public administration Social welfare Sport and recreation Tourism Town and country planning Water and flood defences Welsh language I suspect, but do not know, that land use regulation and occupational and business licensing in Wales is less favorable to big businesses and franchises, based upon the fact that such businesses are far more common in England than in Wales, even controlling for places that are similar in population density. But this could be due to historic or economic factors.

Under Swedish copyright law, a work such as a movie is protected for 70 years after the death of the "creator". It is unclear who the copyright holder is, but it has not been 70 years since the film was made. Unless it was explicitly "released into the public domain", it is still protected, so you can get sued.

For the same reason you can’t ask the parties to a contract what they meant Legislation, once enacted, stands on its own independent of the people who drafted it, introduced it to Parliament and voted for or against it. These are not the same people in any event and since the legislation might have been passed anywhere between the 13th and 21st centuries, a lot of them will be dead. There’s a fundamental issue of fairness here. The people who are obliged to comply with the law (you and I) can’t ask the politicians so neither can the judges who have to decide if we did. Further, the judiciary cannot interact with the executive or the legislature in this way without violating the principle of separation of powers. Imagine you are charged with a crime and your guilt or innocence turns on the interpretation of the statute. Do you really want politicians who are looking at how the case plays out on Twitter telling the judge which interpretation to use i.e. effectively telling them whether you are guilty or not?

See Eldred v. Ashcroft 537 U.S. 186 (2003) and Golan v. Holder 565 U.S. ___ (2012), especially the first four pages of Eldred (the syllabus). How does extending the term for existing works "promote the progress"? This is a judgement that the courts have left in the hands of the legislature. The CTEA reflects judgments of a kind Congress typically makes, judgments we cannot dismiss as outside the Legislature's domain. (Eldred) if it is generally expected that the copyright term will be extended continually, then, effectively, the perception is that the copyright term is unlimited First, this isn't generally expected. Concerning petitioners' assertion that Congress might evade the limitation on its authority by stringing together "an unlimited number of 'limited Times,'" the Court of Appeals stated that such legislative misbehavior "clearly is not the situation before us." (Eldred) Second, in the situation that has actually been happening, Eldred says: Although conceding that the CTEA's baseline term of life plus 70 years qualifies as a "limited Tim[e]" as applied to future copyrights, petitioners contend that existing copyrights extended to endure for that same term are not "limited." In petitioners' view, a time prescription, once set, becomes forever "fixed" or "inalterable." The word "limited," however, does not convey a meaning so constricted. At the time of the Framing, "limited" meant what it means today: confined within certain bounds, restrained, or circumscribed. Thus understood, a timespan appropriately "limited" as applied to future copyrights does not automatically cease to be "limited" when applied to existing copyrights. This is Constitutional because the Copyright Clause gives Congress the power to make these extensions, and its legislative actions until now have not strayed beyond the scope of what the Constitution permits. Briefly, the court took a textualist approach to interpreting the "limited times" restriction. They found that "at the time of the Framing, limited meant what it means today: confined within certain bounds, restrained, or circumscribed," and that Congress has a long established practice of providing extensions to both patent and copyright holders. "Congress’ unbroken practice since the founding generation of applying new definitions or adjustments of the copyright term to both future works and existing works overwhelms petitioners’ argument." This weighs in favor of the view that "limited times" did not mean to the founders that extensions are unconstitutional.

The top courts in both Ontario and Quebec have heard challenges to the Succession to the Throne Act, 2013, both upholding the Act, but for different and somewhat contradicting reasons. For reference, here is the Act's only substantive provision: The alteration in the law touching the Succession to the Throne set out in the bill laid before the Parliament of the United Kingdom and entitled A Bill to Make succession to the Crown not depend on gender; to make provision about Royal Marriages; and for connected purposes is assented to. Quebec I'll start with Quebec, since it provides a clear direct answer to your question. In Motard v. Attorney General of Canada, 2019 QCCA 1826 (English translation linked) the court concludes in paragraph 95 that: [...] Canada does not have rules of succession to the throne save for the unwritten constitutional principles of symmetry and hereditary succession determined by the United Kingdom. [...] Note that the principle of symmetry means maintaining the same monarch and/or rules of succession as the United Kingdom. Effectively, Canada only assented to the British changes as required by the Preamble to the Statute of Westminster 1931. Since there exist no separate Canadian rules of succession, there was no effective change to Canadian law, let alone one requiring constitutional amendment. Leave for appeal to the Supreme Court was denied. Ontario The Ontario challenge was Teskey v. Canada (Attorney General), 2013 ONSC 5046 (lower court decision cited, the Court of Appeal summarily affirmed). It relies mainly on precedent set in O’Donohue v. Canada, 2003 ONSC 41404. I'll outline my opinion, but unfortunately there is no direct answer to your question as both cases revolved around an attempt to invalidate the previous rules of succession on the basis that they violated the Charter by barring people who married Catholics (which the new rules also removed). As such, there was no clearly articulated reason in Teskey as to why the 2013 Act followed proper constitutional amendment procedure or whether it was required to begin with. O'Donahue is in agreement with Motard that symmetry and rules of succession are constitutional (para. 28 & 36-37), but asserts that there exists separate Canadian and British rules in paragraph 34: The operation of this commitment to symmetry and union of Canada under the British Crown was demonstrated by the adoption in 1937 of the Succession to the Throne Act, 1 Geo. IV, c.16. This Canadian statute effected changes to the rules of succession in Canada to assure consistency with the changes in the rules then in place in Great Britain. The changes were necessary in light of the abdication of Edward VIII in 1936. Absent this Canadian statute, the statutory change in Great Britain to account for Edward VIII’s abdication would have been contrary to Great Britain’s commitment in the Statute of Westminster. Arguably, without this statute, Edwards [sic] VIII’s abdication would not have been effective in respect of the Crown of Canada. This results in a bit of a puzzle. If both symmetry and separate Canadian rules of succession are part of the constitution, then on a change in the British rules, Canada must either break symmetry (presumably a constitutional violation) or amend the rules of succession (presumably a constitutional amendment). This did not matter much for Edward VIII's abdication, as prior to patriation in 1982 this was all a bit moot since the Canadian constitution was effectively British, but it does matter for the 2013 Act. Here, Teskey paragraph 13 hints at a resolution: In the present case, the Applicant submitted in argument that Canada could and should adopt different succession rules from those which pertain in Great Britain with the possibility of recognizing a different monarch. I reject that argument on the same basis as Rouleau J. which is that this would change our present constitution in a fundamental manner and would involve the court changing, rather than protecting, our fundamental constitutional structure. and also paragraph 15: [...] the rules of succession and the requirement that they be the same as those of Great Britain, are necessary to the proper functioning of our constitutional monarchy [...] I believe that the most sensible reading is that Canada was constitutionally required to adopt the 2013 Act both to maintain symmetry and to respect the constitutional Statute of Westminster 1931. In light of this, it's my opinion that a constitutional amendment for modifying Canadian rules of succession was not required, since the constitution already foresaw this scenario.

The rule that all bills die when a Congress ends is an unwritten rule, based on precedent. It is part of a more general rule: All unfinished business dies when a Congress ends. The logic of this rule is simple: Because every member of the House is elected every term, every new Congress is considered a separate Congress. To require a new Congress to take up the unfinished business of the previous Congress would violate yet another, more general rule: “No Congress can bind its successors.” This rule came from England, where it was thought to be a direct implication of parliamentary supremacy. In the US, it is justified either as implied by the constitution, or by practical political realities. What the Congressional manuals say The rule “all business dies” is mentioned in several of the standard compilations of Congressional practice and precedent. These compilations, (available online from the GPO,) include House Practice: However, because past proceedings of one Congress do not bind its successor, business remaining at the end of one Congress does not carry over to the beginning of a new Congress (with the exception of impeachment). Precedents of the House, § 8. Legislative Business of a Prior Session: Each Congress is a separate parliamentary body that comes into being at assembly and terminates upon sine die adjournment. Thus, it is generally the case that business of one Congress does not continue as business of the next Congress. For example, bills and resolutions introduced in one Congress cannot be taken up in a subsequent Congress but must be formally reintroduced. Unfinished business pending at the close of one Congress does not remain unfinished business of a subsequent Congress. Decschler’s Precdents, Ch. 1 § 11, The vast majority of business remaining at the end of one Congress does not, however, carry over to the beginning of a new Congress, since Congress does not allow the past proceedings of one Congress to bind its successor. Few categories have carried over from one Congress to the next; impeachment proceedings pending on the last day of one Congress have been continued at the beginning of the succeeding one, and a Presidential veto message to the House was on one occasion read and received at the beginning of the next Congress. Legislative Entrenchment: Why Congress Can't Bind The idea that one legislature cannot bind a later legislature is known as the rule against ”legislative entrenchment.” This rule traces back to England, where it was first stated by Edward Coke, in his Institutes of the Laws of England, published in 1644. Acts against the power of the Parliament subsequent bind not. In England, the rule was seen as a direct implication of parliamentary sovereignty. Thus, in his Commentaries on the Laws of England, William Blackstone argued that to allow one parliament to bind another would be logically inconsistent with the idea of parliamentary supremacy: Because the legislature, being in truth the sovereign power, is always of equal…absolute authority: it acknowledges no superior upon earth, which the prior legislature must have been, if its ordinances could bind a subsequent parliament. Interestingly, during the Revolution, an American colonist, writing as Cassandra, used the rule against entrenchment to argue for independence. He quoted Coke to claim that because no Parliament could bind future Parliaments, any British promise to respect the rights of colonists was not, as the game theorists would say, credible. It is out of the power of the British Legislature to give us security for the future enjoyment of our rights and liberties…Is there safety in entering upon terms of accommodation with a power which cannot stipulate for the performance of its engagements? In reaction to such criticisms of the British system of Parliamentary supremacy, Americans decided to adopt a written constitution. The Americans argued that while a legislature might not be able to bind itself, the people, acting through the Constitution, could bind the legislature. Instead of invoking Parliamentary supremacy, Americans justified the “no Congress can bind” rule by appealing to the Constitution (ie, the electoral cycle + the vesting clause = every Congress is a new Congress, which alone is vested with the legislative power under Art. I, § 1), or to practical considerations (it is impossible for today’s Congress to enforce a binding clause on a later Congress, which could simply pass a new statute). (For fuller discussion of these arguments, see here.) Unwritten Rules in the House Here is what House Practice, Ch. 50. Rules and Precedents of the House, says about Rules Based on Precedent or Custom: Much of what is known as parliamentary law is not part of the formal written rules of the House but springs from precedent or long-standing custom. Such precedent may be invoked to resolve a procedural question in the absence of an express written rule on the subject. More frequently, the precedents of the House are used to show the scope and application of one of its formal rules… On the theory that a government of laws is preferable to a government of men, the House has repeatedly recognized the importance of following its precedents and obeying its well-established procedural rules. The House adheres to settled rulings, and will not lightly disturb procedures that have been established by prior decision of the Chair. However, the Speaker or Chairman may refuse to follow a precedent even though it is relevant to a pending question, where it is the only precedent on the point and was not carefully reasoned.

The invalidity of laws that are inconsistent with the Charter is by virtue of section 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, which came into force with the bulk of the Charter. It states that: The Constitution of Canada is the supreme law of Canada, and any law that is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution is, to the extent of the inconsistency, of no force or effect. This might be read as immediately applying by its own force to render laws inconsistent with the Charter to be void. And language to this effect has been even used by the Court, saying that a provision inconsistent with the Constitution is "invalid from the moment it is enacted" (e.g. Nova Scotia (Workers' Compensation Board) v. Martin; Nova Scotia (Workers' Compensation Board) v. Laseur, 2003 SCC 54). But for Section 52 to have effect "requires the exercise of judicial power to declare the law to be unconstitutional" (R. v. Sullivan, 2022 SCC 19 at para. 54). That a law is inconsistent with the Constitution is "revealed through litigation, specifically the judgment that declares the inoperability of the impugned law" (Sullivan at para. 55). Section 52 has no practical effect aside from Courts or other decision-makers declining to apply law that is inconsistent with the Constitution. Whether a law was void as soon as the Charter was enacted is not really a meaningful question nor even detectable until a Court declares the law to be invalid. The Court has also clarified that declarations of invalidity are not necessarily retroactive to the moment of enactment (internal citations removed): [60] ... Mr. Sullivan points to the idea that an unconstitutional law is invalid from the moment it is enacted. But the strict enforcement of such a principle “cannot easily be reconciled with modern constitutional law”. Instead, it is subject to a number of exceptions and s. 52(1) must be read “in light of all constitutional principles”. In Albashir, my colleague Karakatsanis J. explained that declarations of unconstitutionality are generally retrospective, consistent with the notion that a law is unconstitutional from its enactment. However, other constitutional principles may require a purely prospective declaration of unconstitutionality or a suspended declaration. Similarly, the legal effect of a s. 52(1) declaration by a superior court must be defined with reference to constitutional supremacy, the rule of law, and federalism. I'll say this one more way: while it's true that some laws were immediately inconsistent with the Charter, s. 52(1) did not have any observable effect until a court declared such laws to be invalid.

Notice period of tenant to terminate apartment I have a apartment with fixed term. (10 month). in Contract it mentioned that, tenant can live in current month if noticed landlort before 15th of each month. In this case no metter when tenant leave before 15 month, landlort should pay only half of the price back. (take payment of 15 day). So, my question is, if above information mentioned in contract does 3 month notice period applies to tenant ? or according to the contract he can leave if inform before 15th day of month?

There is nothing in that contract that says anything about 3 months notice period. The 3 months is the legal default for contracts that do not expire on their own, unlike yours, that has all properties of a limited time contract. I would personally see the detailed description of how you can end this contract as overriding any legal default. But as always, with this specific contract in the original language, you need to see a lawyer to know for sure. Your contract clearly states: you can leave your appartment whenever you want, even before the agreed upon time. If you leave between the 15th and the end of a month, you have to pay for that month in full. If you leave between the 1st and the 14th of the month, you have to pay the fair share of the rent for the days you where there. So for example, on a 30 day month if you lived there for 10 days, you still have to pay a third of the rent and the landlord will return the rest if you paid for the month in advance. If you live there for 16 days, you have to pay for the full month and nothing will be returned if you paid for the month in advance. Please note that you need to "hand over" the vacated rental object during normal business hours. So don't go in there on the evening of the 14th at 16:59. And don't try to "hand it over" when you haven't moved your stuff out yet. At the hand over, you give the keys to the landlord and that is it, it is the last thing you do. Very likely your landlord will want to have a look at the rental object while you are there, so they can make sure it is all in order, you did not damage it or did not leave any of your stuff. Generally speaking, there is nothing your landlord could do to you if you decide to leave early. They cannot make you leave even earlier or any other retaliatory shenanigans you may have heard of in other countries. In Germany, such contracts are not adversarial. You don't need to keep it a secret to the last second. If you know you want to leave on a certain date, inform your land lord, make an appointment for the "hand over" well in advance and save yourself (and them) all the stress from doing things last minute.

Is there a law requiring a landlord to respond to rental agencies request for information in regards to previous tenants? No. There is no such law.

I am an Ontario-licensed lawyer. The following is a general information about the law and not specific legal advice. You are not my client and I have not given you advice related to your circumstances. First, even when you ask a generic question, define the jurisdiction of interest. For the purpose of your question, Canada is a collection of different jurisdictions with different rules. My answer relates to Ontario, Canada. Other Canadian jurisdictions have different rules. The Law The applicable Section 109 of Ontario's Residential Tenancies Act http://canlii.ca/t/33p is reproduced below for your convenience. EMPHASES MINE. Receipt for payment 109 (1) A landlord shall provide FREE OF CHARGE to a tenant or former tenant, on request, a receipt for the payment of any rent, rent deposit, arrears of rent or any other amount paid to the landlord. 2006, c. 17, s. 109 (1). Former tenant (2) Subsection (1) applies to a request by a FORMER TENANT only if the request is made within 12 months after the tenancy terminated. 2006, c. 17, s. 109 (2). Regulation Ontario Regulation 516/06 http://canlii.ca/t/sjx dictates minimal form: Receipt A document constitutes a receipt for the purposes of section 109 of the Act if it includes, at a minimum, (a) the address of the rental unit to which the receipt applies; (b) the name of the tenants to whom the receipt applies; (c) the amount and date for each payment received for any rent, rent deposit, arrears of rent, or any other amount paid to the landlord and shall specify what the payment was for; (d) the name of the landlord of the rental unit; and (e) the signature of the landlord or the landlord’s authorized agent. O. Reg. 516/06, s. 9. Landlord Compliance A good landlord will provide receipts immediately upon payment, and keep a copy. An very good landlord will provide additionally a summary of payments for the year, in tabulated form, and keep a copy of the yearly receipt instead of the multiple receipts for each payment. An excellent landlord will keep the tabulated information in a computer system and will issue a receipt for the whole tenancy period on termination. Keep a copy. Tenant's Application If your Ontario landlord refuse to comply with the above, file a T2 http://www.sjto.gov.on.ca/documents/ltb/Tenant%20Applications%20&%20Instructions/T2.pdf *A T2 can also be filed online. Remember to ask for cost http://www.sjto.gov.on.ca/documents/ltb/Interpretation%20Guidelines/03%20-%20Costs.html

Assuming you have an assured shorthold tenancy, it's not the landlord himself that can evict you. The process is that he serves you notice, and if you don't move by the time the notice period ends, then he has to go to court in order to obtain a court order to end the tenancy. The landlord must demonstrate to the court that he has properly served notice to the tenant. This is a bit of a grey area, but this article suggests that, to avoid ambiguity, the landlord should either use recorded delivery (which would provide proof as to whether or not the tenant received it), or deliver it by hand with an independent witness present. In the case of a section 21 "no fault" eviction, the only defence a tenant has is that the correct procedure has not been followed. So it is in the landlord's interest to ensure that notice has been received beyond any doubt.

Absent any new agreement with the tenant, a purchase is normally subject to any existing lease, so you would be renting to the existing tenant until that lease expires, under its original terms, with you having all the rights and duties under it that the previous owner had. In effect, by signing the purchase agreement, you accepted a version of the original lease with your name in place of the former owner's, but with no other changes. You are entitled to the same rent that the previous owner was entitled to, and must make any repairs or perform any services that the previous owner was required to do.

Yes, they seem to have broken the law. In California, notice must be given for an eviction. This can be a 30/60/90 day notice with no reason needed (typically because the landlord wants the property for something else) or a 3 day notice with cause- the most typical being not paying the rent. Note that COVID exceptions exist, though I don't believe they apply to you. Even after that time, a landlord cannot physically remove a tenant or attempt to drive them out through the destruction/removal of property, locking them out, or cutting off utilities. They are liable for damages suffered as well as penalties. There are lawful procedures in place for this. The removal and destruction of your belongings could constitute either larceny or vandalism. Either way, by unlawfully removing your possessions, they are liable for the damages caused.

Non-residential tenancies are subject to Fla. Stat Ch. 83 Part I. This is statutorily a tenancy at-will unless a contrary agreement is in writing signed by the lessor: the duration of the lease is yearly, quarterly, monthly, weekly as determined by the periodicity of rent payments. There are various legal conditions related to rent default and causes for removing tenants, also conditions about premises that are wholly untenantable. Unlike residential leases, there are not any special statutory conditions surrounding the landlords presentation of leases. Florida law contemplates and allows the possibility that there are no written documents, and for non-residential tenancies has very little to say about it (only pertaining to the distinction between at-will vs not at-will leases). Therefore, the matter follows the general rules for contractual disputes: whoever makes the best case for their claims wins. If Bob has a scanned copy, that is excellent proof. If Alice alleges and proves that the scanned copy was modified, that disposes of Bob's evidence. If Alice presents a copy of the contract that says otherwise (I do mean copy), then this anomaly has to be explained. Bob can claim that they tore up Alice's original and renegotiated the deal, but he needs to prove that claim. If Alice presents the original contract, Bob's story becomes much less plausible. There are millions of variants of what might happen: the point is, there is no requirement to present the original signed document to support a claim in a contractual dispute.

Yes I would reach the same conclusion as DaleM, i.e. that the arbitration clause still applies to the dispute in the question, but for a different reason.<1> While the severability principle is indeed a concept in arbitration law, I don't believe that is the relevant doctrine here.<2> Termination Of Employment v. Termination Of An Employment Contract What terminates when a period of employment ends is the employment itself, not the contract of employment. The contract remains effective as to rights and obligations arising during the course of the employment covered by the contract. (This concept would also sometimes be described in terms along the lines of "the right to a remedy for the workplace injury and the right to have disputes related to that resolved in arbitration are vested rights" that are not modified when the contract term of employment ends.) This concept isn't particular to the arbitration obligation. For example, if contract of employment that did not contain an arbitration clause provided that the employee was paid $200 an hour for the first six months and $220 an hour for the second six months of a one year fixed term employment agreement, but the employer failed to adjust paychecks according after the first six months and continued paying the employee at $200 an hour instead (assume to avoid the issue of waiver that this wasn't readily apparent on the face of the paystubs provided to the employee), the employee could bring suit thirteen months after the employee's employment terminated for the $20 an hour not paid as agreed during the last six months of the contract even though the employment period had ended. The contract still remains in force to govern the rights and obligations of the parties arising during the period of employment. Examples Of Termination Of The Contract Itself In contrast, sometimes one contract is replaced, even retroactively, with another contract, in what is called a "novation" of the original contract. This truly does terminate the old contract, so that only the replacement contract remains. So, if, for example, the original employment contract contained an arbitration clause, but this was replaced by a new employment contract without an arbitration clause three months later (in the sample case, before the worker was injured<3>), then the arbitration clause would not apply because the contract, and not just the employment was terminated. Similarly, support that the workplace injury was the second dispute between the employer and employee that had come up. The first was a dispute over the rate of pay received which was resolved by a settlement agreement negotiated by lawyers for the parties before either arbitration or litigation in court was commenced, which expressly terminated all rights, known and unknown, of the parties arising under the contract, and the second was the workplace injury for which the relationship of the injury to work was only discovered later on. In this case, the contract and not just the employment had been expressly terminated, and so the arbitration clause would not apply to the workplace injury dispute (which would be barred by the settlement agreement and which may or may not have had an arbitration clause of its own). End Notes <1> At least assuming that the dispute would have been subject to arbitration if a dispute were litigated while the employee was still employed. There can be circumstances when a workplace injury is not subject to arbitration even if the employer and employee undoubtedly agreed to an arbitration clause that applies to the dispute in question. For example, workplace injuries arising from sexual assault are not subject to arbitration in the United States. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 401-402. <2> The severability principle usually concerns a determination of the enforceability of an arbitration clause in the face of certain kinds of arguments that the entire contract as a whole is voidable. It also does not apply in cases where there is a dispute over whether any contract of any kind was formed in the first place. For example, if someone presented the court with a contract containing an arbitration clause and sought to compel arbitration, and the defense to a motion to compel arbitration was that the defendant had never met or had any connection with or communication with the defendant or anyone related to the alleged contract. <3> The hard case, where the novation takes place after the injury, is complicated by legal doctrines regarding the conditions under which a vested legal right can be waived, which may or may not be met depending upon the circumstances under which the novation was entered into by the parties and presents conceptually distinct legal questions in addition to the legal questions already present in the simple case where the injury takes place after the novation.

To what extent will Artificial Intelligence affect criminal court proceedings with respect to digital evidence? These days (2023) AI can produce convincing images and even videos that realistically portray people saying or doing things that they did not actually do. Currently we can employ experts to detect whether such images are genuine or not. However as technology progresses, this will become less-and-less feasible. (Note, my background is in technology) For example, one established method of making such fakes more realistic is to pit another AI against them. The second AI attempts to distinguish between real and fabricated images. The first AI then learns from this and tries to fool the second AI more effectively, and so on. This purely machine-based co-evolution can happen very quickly and produces better and better fakes and better and better detectors. At some point, fakes will become so good that even other machines will not be able to detect the difference. I see two problems with respect to presenting digital evidence in court: The guilty can claim that any digital evidence is fake. The innocent will be unable to produce any convincing digital alibi and could be portrayed doing something that they did not (perhaps by digitally-altered CCTV footage). Assuming that there comes a time where digital fakes are completely indistinguishable from reality, how could this affect the working of current court proceedings? (Any justice system may be discussed) Note In case anyone thinks his cannot be answered objectively, I would counter that I am seeking specific information. I would like to gain an idea of the current usage and perceived importance of digital evidence in criminal proceedings as opposed to witness reports and other non-technological evidence. If technological evidence were no longer trustworthy, what would be left to rely on?

Chain of custody and testimony in this regard. Say there is a murder victim, with DNA of the suspect under the fingernails and a knife with the suspect's bloody fingerprints stuck in the chest. There would be testimony what happened to the knife. If a paramedic removed it to attempt first aid, the paramedic would testify. So would the officer who bagged it, and the forensic analyst who took the fingerprints. A pathologist would testify if the knife was consistent with the stab wound (a careful pathologist could never swear that the knife was the cause of death, just that it matches). The pathologist would also testify how DNA was collected under the fingernails, and how it was sent to the lab. The defense may claim that the suspect also tried first aid, or that a corrupt cop forced the suspect to hold the knife. The court or jury then draw their conclusions from this and other testimony. Same here. A lifelike picture found on the web proves nothing. A witness who takes the stand to testify that he or she took a certain picture would be more credible. So would a forensic officer who testifies how she or he removed the data from a surveillance camera, checked for common signs of tampering, and then signed a copy of the data with a private key. (The signing shows no third-party tampering after collection, it is not evidence of integrity before that.) Years ago, in germany, there was the case of a bank robber who claimed that a fleeing suspect had handed him a bag of money in the forest and then vanished. "Prove it wasn't so," he demanded. "You can't. So there is reasonable doubt." Well, the court found that the statement merely created unreasonable doubt, and the sentence was upheld on appeal.

When a complaint is first file, per case law, courts have a duty to believe each allegation you make on information and belief as long as they are each not contradicting any other statement or other evidence present at the time of filing. This isn't true. The court doesn't have to actually believe you. The court merely has to assume for sake of argument that the things said are true for the narrow purpose of evaluating whether they describe a legal wrong in a formal sense. Also, under modern federal pleading rules in the U.S., the judge doesn't have to believe you and can dismiss your complaint if it is not "plausible." Your attorney has a duty to not merely assume that everything that a client tells the lawyer is true. In federal court, the governing rule is Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, which states that when an attorney files and signs a document in court that the attorney: certifies that to the best of the person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances: (1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation; (2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law; (3) the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and (4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if specifically so identified, are reasonably based on belief or a lack of information. The California state law obligations is more or less identical in substance, although the procedural rules of California are codified differently than the federal rules. So, a lawyer is required to reasonably inquire into whether the client is telling the lawyer the truth about the client's motives and about the facts. It is a breach of the lawyer's duties to the court and the profession to simply take what a client tells the lawyer at face value, accepting it uncritically.

A motion to dismiss sets no precedent Whether it succeeds or not, it does not result in a judgement on the merits, it is simply an analysis on whether the case as pleaded shows the defendant has a case to answer. The case would have to go to trial, have a judgement issued (i.e. not settle), and await the result of final appeals (if any) before it would be considered precedent. As to your final question Is it considered intellectual property theft to capitalize on synthetic datasets produced by OpenAI's LLMs? No one knows. Hence the lawsuit.

What are the legal consequences of substantive factual errors in an opinion? None. I assume that this specific ruling is not affected in any way by the text of the opinion? Correct. I assume that even an opinion of the form "We got high and decided to rule wrongly for fun" wouldn't actually negate the ruling? Probably not, but it might precipitate a constitutional crisis or lead to an impeachment. How does this affect the precedent? It doesn't. Will courts in the future consider the true facts of the case (whatever they perceive them to be), No. will they accept as legal fiction that the facts were as the Court describes them? Yes. Could it be legal for the district to repeat exactly the same set of actions in exactly the same set of true circumstances as before, since those won't be the same circumstances that the Court claimed to rule on? In such a case, is the lower court bound by the Supreme Court's characterization of the facts of the case, Generally speaking the lower courts are bound by characterizations of the facts made by the appellate court. But, it depends to some extent on the procedural posture of the case. In most cases, the findings of fact made by the trial court following an evidentiary hearing are binding on appellate courts in the U.S. unless they are not supported by any admissible evidence presented at trial, but there are some exceptions to this rule and there is considerable art as well as science that goes into properly characterizing the evidence presented at trial. But, for example, many appellate cases are appeals from a dismissal of a case on a motion to dismiss at the outset of a case, in which all allegations of the Plaintiff's complaint in a civil matter are taken as true for sake of argument, and the legal issue presented is whether the Plaintiff can prevail if all of those facts are true. In a case in that procedural posture, assuming that the appellate court reversed the trial court and found that the facts alleged state a claim upon which relief can be granted, then the remand would be to move forward with discovery and other pre-trial procedures in the case and ultimately a trial, if necessary, to determine the actual facts of the case as opposed to the facts as alleged by the Plaintiff in the complaint or petition. Not infrequently, when appellate courts are divided over what happened in the trial court, one side of the debate, looking at the raw testimony and exhibits presented at trial, will conclude that the admissible evidence presented at trial did not support the findings of fact in a mixed question of fact and law made by a trial court judge, while another side of the debate will accept the trial court judge's findings of fact uncritically. It often isn't easy to know, from reading an appellate court opinion alone, which side is which in this regard. can it use the true facts of the case as long as it obeys the ruling itself? Usually not. Usually, facts relied upon by an appellate court are by definition the correct facts (apart from clerical errors - e.g., an appellate court once misspelled my name in a court opinion, and the lower court wasn't bound by that mistake). This said, as noted above, the precise procedural posture of the case, nature of the court's opinion, and scope of the remand order is highly relevant to what a court can do on remand.

There is virtually no chance this would be admissible. When a defendant argues that abuse at the hands of third party led to a mental defect that excuses her from culpability, the prosecution is free to rebut that argument. However, the prosecution's evidence must be relevant, i.e., it must have a tendency to make a fact of consequence more or less likely to be true. Here, none of the proffered evidence has any real bearing on any fact of consequence: The fact that the defendant is taller than the alleged abuser does not make it less likely that the defendant was abused. The fact that the defendant's "fake" voice (what does that even mean?) is deeper than the alleged abuser's does not make it less likely that the defendant was abused. The fact that young white women have more Tinder matches than middle-aged Indian men does not make it less likely that the defendant was abused. Even if you could find some thin reed on which to hang the relevance of these racial and gender stereotypes, the evidence would likely still be excluded under Rule 403, as the probative value would be so trivial that it would be outweighed by the likelihood of unfair prejudice or misleading the jury.

How does John protect himself from false claims (e.g. if the woman decides to roll down the stairs and blame him)? It would be very helpful if John has evidence of Oxana making false statements about him or others, and/or of Oxana threatening to make them. False accusations are common --and hardly ever prosecuted-- in a context of divorce. Examples of that are police reports (here and here) and excerpts of court proceedings that ensued during my father's (desisted) proceedings to divorce his 2nd wife (for additional excerpts, see also at 22:49-24:29). According to one of those police reports, my father's 2nd wife allegedly extorted him with "You'll have to pay me even until my ring!" (see page 15 of the pdf file) at the time they were going through the divorce proceedings he filed. Based on your description, it is not far-fetched that John could end up experiencing a similar mess as reflected in these police reports. Note: I don't know whether the poorly written quote from page 15 of the pdf was my father's translation of their interactions or whether he merely transcribed them to the police. Is there any downside to basically putting a camera in every room of the house except hers? John is strongly suggested to check Ohio law to avoid criminal charges. For instance, Michigan statute MCL 750.539d(1)(a) prohibits to "Install, place, or use in any private place, without the consent of the person or persons entitled to privacy in that place, any device for observing, recording, transmitting, photographing, or eavesdropping upon the sounds or events in that place.". As a wife, Oxana would be reasonably entitled to that privacy in rooms other than --and including-- her room. Moreover, placing cameras in every room will not preempt false accusations. For instance, Oxana could still calumniate John by falsely alleging that he and the daughter went to a hotel to have intercourse. How do you find a good divorce lawyer? Before you even decide to retain a lawyer, see this report about New Jersey Family Court, where judges and attorneys allegedly are in the habit of dragging divorce cases for as long as it is profitable to the lawyers (obviously, at the expense of the parties pursuing the divorce). I don't really follow --and have never litigated-- divorce matters, but the multi-year divorce & custody case of Tsimhoni --formerly presided by Michigan infamous judge Lisa Gorcyca-- illustrates that NJ is not the only state where parties fall prey of legal malpractice. John should search for Ohio court opinions related to divorce matters and get acquainted with the applicable concepts, laws, and doctrines. For that purpose, one free, very useful resource is http://www.leagle.com/leaglesearch . Court opinions usually cite relevant statutes, whence John can get an idea of what laws are decisive on divorce matters. Is it reasonable to ask for some sort of record of past outcomes (are there standards to provide full and complete records like for financial companies)? It is reasonable, but no, there are no such standards at all. An attorney will most likely allege grounds of attorney-client privilege, the extensive time that would be needed to redact court documents, and possibly other excuses to deny John's request. Instead, John should go to the court in his county and study as many files of divorce cases as he can. A number of courts display some information of cases in their website. For example, some Michigan trial courts have deployed Odyssey (see here and here), whence a party could search from home whether an attorney has litigated cases in that court and how long they've taken. To see the contents of complaints/motions/etc., John can read them only in the courthouse, unless the county court has configured Odyssey (or its equivalent) to allow the public to read the contents from elsewhere. I don't know what progress Ohio courts have made on this. Regardless of the attorney's transparency to share with John any redacted records about his performance, another important variable is the judge. In this regard, see the next item. Is it reasonable to ask to pay way less if the lawyer fails to get certain terms? Unfortunately, that is neither reaonsable nor realistic. Just from meeting with John, it is impossible for the attorney to know aspects such as: whether John is truthful and the meritorious party; how much trouble Oxana will cause during the divorce proceedings (see the aforementioned police reports); how vexatious the opposing counsel will be; whether John will weaken or sabotage his case during an unforeseen situation or lose control as a result of exasperation; whether the case will be presided by a judge who follows the law (instead of incurring personal bias or influence trafficking); if the judge engages in influence trafficking instead of following the law, whether the attorney is in cozy terms with that judge; whether the opposing counsel is in even cozier terms with that judge; in the event that the matter is appealed, any of the three previous items may apply; whether the parties settle (or John desists for whatever reason). Given the multitude of unknown/uncertain variables and possible outcomes, no person (attorney or otherwise) could establish beforehand the semi-contingent pricing that you have in mind. Do the lawyers even do anything other than fill out paperwork? Yes, they do, but that doesn't necessarily mean that what their work is any effective. Even if the lawyer is diligent, the court might negligently fail to enforce its own orders.

The district court judge, as reported in this news story has held that there was probable cause to arrest Daniel Robbins in this case, and that his rights were not violated. If this ruling stands, officers acted legally, although they might still be required to return the phone with the images. Whether there is probable cause for an arrest (or a search) is always a very fact-based issue. I have not found the judge's actual decision, only a news summary of it, which can often be misleading. Specific facts about exactly what Robbins did or said may be important in determining whether there was in fact probable cause. It appears that Robbins intends to appeal this decision. If he does there may be an opinion from a Circuit Court of Appeals expanding on whether there was probable cause or any violation of rights, and why. Previous cases have established that normally there is no reasonable expectation of privacy for acts performed in public; that one my photograph or video record such public acts legally from anywhere that one may legally be; that there is a right photograph or record police officers engaged in official actions or the use of police powers; and that laws attempting to forbid such recording are unconstitutional when so applied. However, it seems from the news story that here the police officers were off-duty and not engaging in any official acts or use of police powers. That might change the ruling. I rather expect the district court's decision to be overturned, but there is no case exact;ly on point that i know of, and one can never be absolutely sure what a court will do in a particular case. I can see why police officers may have felt threatened, and why the Judge may have been inclined to sympathize with them, although I think the decision was incorrect. But a Judge of the Appeals Court might possibly feel the same way. Until the Appeals Court rules, one cannot be sure what the law in this matter will finally be. (It is possibly, but statistically a bit unlikely, there there will eventually be a ruling from the US Supreme Court on this case.) This article from Nolo Press discusses the issue of recording police, primarily in the context of police who are performing their official duties. It says: Almost every court to consider the issue has determined that the First Amendment gives you the right to record (pictures, video, and audio) police officers in public while they are performing their duties. But that doesn’t mean you’re allowed to record if you’re doing so surreptitiously (secretly), interfering with the officer, or otherwise breaking the law. The courts' primary rationale for allowing police officer recording is that the First Amendment includes the right to freely discuss our government, and the right of freedom of the press and public access to information. Given the prevalence of personal filming devices, more and more “news” is being gathered and disseminated by members of the public. The courts have found that freedom of the press applies to citizen journalists and documentarians just as it does to formal members of the press. (See, for example, Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78 (1st Cir. 2011).) The Nolo article goes on to discuss whether a Section 1983 Federal suit against police officers who arrest someone recording their actions will succeed, indicating that this will depend on the specific facts of the case. The Nolo article mentions that one is not allowed to interfere with an officer during process of recording. What exactly constitutes "interference" is not fully clear, and will depend on the facts of a specific case. The Nolo article mentions other circumstances when recording an officer may not be legal.

This sounds like it would fall under the "extreme pornography" part of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008. Section 63: (7) An image falls within this subsection if it portrays, in an explicit and realistic way, any of the following— (b) an act which results, or is likely to result, in serious injury to a person's anus, breasts or genitals, and a reasonable person looking at the image would think that any such person or animal was real. (7A) An image falls within this subsection if it portrays, in an explicit and realistic way, either of the following— (b) an act which involves the non-consensual sexual penetration of a person's vagina or anus by another with a part of the other person's body or anything else, and a reasonable person looking at the image would think that the persons were real. What you describe would likely result in serious injury to the victim, and the video appears to be non-consensual. Note that the actual origin is not relevant; if the videos were actually a brilliant piece of special effects and no anuses were harmed that gets you nowhere. The only thing that matters is what a "reasonable person" looking at the videos would have thought. Context might make a difference; if the videos were made by an identifiable company then a reasonable person might assume the producers would have at least obtained consent and complied with their local laws about safety. OTOH if they look like they were filmed on someone's phone and downloaded from some sketchy file-sharing site then a jury is likely to see this as suggesting to the "reasonable person" that the acts shown were real and non-consensual. Edit in response to comment: The law in question says 'An image is “pornographic” if it is of such a nature that it must reasonably be assumed to have been produced solely or principally for the purpose of sexual arousal'. So it can still be porn even if it wasn't filmed consensually. If "pornography" could only refer to consensual images then the prosecution would need to obtain evidence of the consent or otherwise of the participants. This might be impossible if a participant is dead or cannot be identified. Also the definition above matches both the dictionary definition and most people's idea of what makes something "porn"; the point of porn is sexual arousal.

Coronavirus entry requirement change: flight refund (EU) The short story is that I (EU citizen) booked a flight, the government imposed an entry a policy change for me post-booking, and the flight company (Lufthansa) refuses to refund me (although re-booking has been suggested). This article [1] says that I should be entitled to a refund under force of circumstances, the flight company says I am not. Should I be entitled to a refund? In particular, I booked a flight from Lufthansa on the July 17th. The flight date is 22nd of August. On the 17th of July, according to the official rules, I could travel to Hong Kong. However, the government announced a policy change on the 16th of August, so some days ago [2]. Starting 20th of August, people from my country can travel to Hong Kong only if they are fully vaccinated at the time of the boarding. Due to this governmental change, I am barred from boarding the flight on the 22nd of August (I am vaccinated, but the time by which I am considered to have sufficient antibodies is on the 23rd, so two weeks after my 2nd vaccination). I have requested the company for refund on three occasions (two phone calls, one chat on the website). However, I've been told that there will be no refund because I can not board due to restrictions, whilst I have been trying to repeatedly say that I am not requesting for a refund due to not reading travel restrictions, but due to an abrupt travel entry requirement for me which I could not anticipate at the time of the booking. Quoting [1]: "According to the German travel law expert Prof. Dr. Ernst Führich, an officially imposed entry ban is a case of force of circumstances. As a result, package holidays and individually booked flights can be cancelled free of charge." Do you know if I should be entitled to a refund or not? Edit: To clarify, the question is more specifically: "Does a formally imposed travel entry requirement change that bars boarding of a passenger constitute unforeseeable extraordinary circumstances?" Lufthansa seemingly uses the argument that covid-related flight cancellations constitute unavoidable extraordinary circumstances in order not to have to compensate over covid-related cancellations (rightly so). However, Lufthansa seemingly simultaneously states that a passenger cancellation due to covid-related travel requirement change (same reason) constitutes avoidable extraordinary circumstances. However, both stem from the same cause. How can a covid-related travel travel requirement change be unavoidable only when it cancels a flight and thus works in the favor of the flight company? [1] https://www.evz.de/en/travelling-motor-vehicles/travel-law/coronavirus-travel-advice.html

You are not entitled to a refund Lufthansa stands ready, willing and able to fly you to Hong Kong - they have fulfilled their contractual obligation. The fact that you can't fly is due to your inability to comply with government requirements - it is no different than if you turned up at the airport with an expired passport. While German (and Dutch) law includes the doctrine of force majeure, which is what Prof. Dr. Ernst Führich is referring to, it doesn't apply here. Both parties are still able to fulfil their contractual obligations - Lufthansa can provide a seat on a plane and you can pay for it - there is no contractual obligation on either of you for that seat to be occupied. Notwithstanding, the default position can be modified by contract. Lufthansa's contract says: 10.2.1. We will give you a refund as set out below if we cancel a flight, fail to operate a flight according to the timetable ... and 10.3.1. If you request a refund for reasons other than those mentioned under paragraph 10.2.1. of this section, the amount of the refund will thus, provided the respective fare conditions stipulate as much, correspond to: Airlines sell (and are allowed to sell) tickets with different conditions, including whether they are refundable or not.

Is it legal to cross the channel in a private rowing boat or sailing boat? Yes. Can he land on any old beach, or does he have to go to a port to identify himself? It depends. Who is on board, where did they come from, what have they got in their pockets, etc. This may be helpful Notice 8: sailing your pleasure craft to and from the UK When arriving direct from a country outside the EU (the Channel Islands are regarded as outside the EU for this purpose), you must phone the National Yacht line on Telephone: 0845 723 1110. You will need to inform the Yachtline if any of the following apply: etc etc Since France is in the EU, whether you need to phone the NYL to report your departure from the UK depends on a complicated bunch of conditions you can read in the link above. Maybe the French have similar rules? The RYA say Some countries specify ports of entry (ports where one may lawfully enter a country), which should be used by a vessel arriving from abroad. It is often a requirement that you proceed directly to such a port of entry on entering territorial waters. A vessel arriving in a country from outside its customs territory should fly the Q flag until it has been given clearance from the authorities. Even once clearance has been given, some countries may ask to inspect the vessel’s papers periodically, for example at each port of call. and so on.

Unfortunately, your chances are nil. There are panels on every metro station where tickets and fares are listed, and on those a summary of the conditions is posted and a pointer to where to get the full conditions: not only the web but also at the customer centers. Nonetheless, the ATM ticket conditions are also published at the DOGC, short for Diari Oficial de la Generalitat de Catalunya. That's where all laws are published and, although in reality almost no one reads that, whatever gets published there is assumed to be known for all citizens. It's the basis for the "not knowing the law does not allow you to not obey it" principle. By the way, the T-10 usage condition (or any other ticket that allows shared use like T-70/30) state that, if used by more than one person at once, all of them have to make the same exact journey: enter all at the same station, exit all at the same station.

The law was changed several times, and different versions apply to different age groups because certain rules were not changed retroactively. The page you link describes the situation for children born after the year 2000. My advice: citizenship is such a serious matter that you should consult a specialized lawyer, not a random crowd on the web.

There is a legal requirement for US citizens to have a US passport when entering and leaving the US, though there are some exceptions. (The exceptions mostly concern other kinds of documents that are acceptable when traveling by land or sea to Canada, Mexico, or the Caribbean.) The law is 8 USC 1185(b): (b) Citizens Except as otherwise provided by the President and subject to such limitations and exceptions as the President may authorize and prescribe, it shall be unlawful for any citizen of the United States to depart from or enter, or attempt to depart from or enter, the United States unless he bears a valid United States passport. There is no penalty for violating this law. And, of course, US citizens have an inherent right to enter the US. In practice, therefore, if a border officer recognizes that you are a US citizen without the required documentation, they are supposed to inform you of the requirements and then waive the requirement of section 1185(b) so you can enter. For more discussion, see What is the penalty for US citizens entering/leaving the US on a foreign passport? on travel.stackexchange.com. There was formerly a regulation allowing US citizen children of foreign diplomats to travel to the US on their foreign passports. This was removed in connection with the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative. It was at 22 CFR 53.2, which read as follows in 2006: (e) When he is under 21 years of age and is a member of the household of an official or employee of a foreign government or of the United Nations and is in possession of or included in a foreign passport; However, in 2007, paragraph (e) concerned the NEXUS program, and the paragraph concerning children in the household of foreign officials and employees was absent. The change was published in the Federal Register on 24 November 2006. The Department of State's [Foreign Affairs Manual] indicates that they continue to follow this policy despite the change in regulations; at 9 FAM 202.1-2 VISA-RELATED ISSUES WTIH U.S. CITIZENS, item (c) appears to have been last modified in 2011: c. Applications for Visas for Certain Dual National Children: (1) You should advise parents who apply for visas for dual national children that regulations prohibit the issuance of a visa or other documentation to a U.S. citizen or national for entry into the United States as an alien. The children of foreign government officials, however, may use their foreign passport for entry into the United States. (2) After the U.S. citizenship of a child has been determined by a citizenship officer, the consular officer may, to avoid delay or difficulty, give a written statement to the parents for presentation to carriers or immigration officials. The statement should make clear that the bearer of the foreign passport is a dual national child of a foreign government official or employee who is traveling to the United States on official business and as such may enter the United States on the foreign passport as an exception to the provisions of INA 215(b) regarding valid passport requirement. (3) A child under 12 years of age who is included in the passport of an alien parent in an official capacity may be admitted if evidence of U.S. citizenship is presented at the time of entry. A determination of the childs citizenship should be made by citizenship officer prior to departure from a foreign country and the parent should be instructed to have evidence of such citizenship available for inspection by the admitting Department of Homeland Security Officer. If this is indeed how your daughter got her US visa then the State Department's willingness to issue the visa presumably implies that CBP should allow her to enter with her Israeli passport and that visa.

For a definite answer, Bob should ask his tax advisor. German freelance status ("Freiberufler") is a bit difficult to navigate, because legally speaking, this status can only be applied to contract work that requires a university degree, everything else is a regular business ("Gewerbe") that is taxed differently and requires you to join the chamber of commerce. This has become a bit murky as there are freelance software developers without a degree (who should be careful about using the word "engineer") and the tax office seems to accept that, but I'm not entirely sure they are as lenient towards entertainers (which YT would fall under). The way I understand the Blue Card FAQ, freelancing is not allowed for Blue Card holders, I'd consider that the bigger problem (but that's an immigration issue, not a tax issue).

The GDPR roughly applies in the following scenarios: Art 3(1): you have an establishment in Europe Art 3(2): you do not have an european establishment, but Art 3(2)(a): offer goods or services to persons in Europe Art 3(2)(b): monitor the behaviour of people who are in Europe (where Europe means EU/EEA/UK as appropriate). Art 3(1) does not seem to apply for you. Art 3(2)(a) does not apply, since you're not actively targeting people in Europe. At the point in time where you are offering the app to users, those users are in the US. Art 3(2)(b) could apply if you collect some kind of tracking data, in particular (but not limited to) location data. But if you temporarily shut down collection of new data for personalisation while the user is in Europe, that's probably going to be reasonably safe. It might not be necessary to disable ad personalisation if that personalisation is based on data collected outside of Europe. In practice, unless your app is specifically targeted at travellers, no one will care about what your app does outside of the US. For detailed guidelines on the territorial scope of the GDPR, consider reading EDPB guidelines 3/2018 (PDF). The document contains some relevant examples, but since it's official guidance they won't explicitly say that GDPR won't apply in a scenario like yours. The closest is Example 8: An Australian company offers a mobile news and video content service, based on users’ preferences and interest. Users can receive daily or weekly updates. The service is offered exclusively to users located in Australia, who must provide an Australian phone number when subscribing. An Australian subscriber of the service travels to Germany on holiday and continues using the service. Although the Australian subscriber will be using the service while in the EU, the service is not ‘targeting’ individuals in the Union, but targets only individuals in Australia, and so the processing of personal data by the Australian company does not fall within the scope of the GDPR. Also relevant is Example 10, which says that app downloads in the EU might not be subject to GDPR: A U.S. citizen is travelling through Europe during his holidays. While in Europe, he downloads and uses a news app that is offered by a U.S. company. The app is exclusively directed at the U.S. market, evident by the app terms of use and the indication of US Dollar as the sole currency available for payment. The collection of the U.S. tourist's personal data via the app by the U.S. company is not subject to the GDPR.

Congrats, you've done well to minimize your processing of personal data. But I think you're still processing personal data, and are subject to the GDPR. Serving a website necessarily involves processing an IP address. This IP address will typically be personal data. While you are not storing the IP address, the GDPR's definition of “processing” extends beyond storage and pretty much covers doing anything with that IP address. As far as I know this is not an entirely settled matter, but it's better to err on the side of caution and to assume that you are in fact performing a processing activity. Even a static web page can easily lead to additional relevant processing of personal data, for example if the HTML embeds resources from third party domains. Since your website is clearly targeted at the public, it does not fall under the GDPR's exception for “purely personal or household” purposes. So I think you do need a (minimal) privacy notice that contains at least the items mentioned in Art 13 GDPR. The main reason why some people try to avoid posting a privacy notice is because it must disclose your identity and contact details. But in Germany, that information has to be provided anyway due to the Impressumspflicht. As part of your GDPR compliance obligations, you must protect how data is processed by others on your behalf. A hosting provider will typically act as your data processor. For this to be legal, you need a contract / data processing agreement that fulfills the conditions in Art 28 GDPR. This contract binds the data processor to only use the data as instructed by you, and not for their own purposes. European hosting providers sometimes include the necessary terms in their terms of service / AGB, but you should check to make sure. Netcup expects you to accept their data processing amendment in your account settings. In the hypothetical case that you were not processing any personal data at all, the GDPR would not apply and it wouldn't require you to post a privacy notice. Other laws might still have information obligations, notably the German TMG and TTDSG.

Legal Recourse American Airlines Threw Me Off Flight I was recently thrown off an American Airlines Flight under the pretext that my suitcase had contained a laptop (information I had ill-advisedly volunteered to the lady at the desk right before boarding), leaving my pregnant wife and 2.5 year old to fly all by themselves. They sent me down to passenger check-in again to get my suitcase under the pretext that having a laptop in checked luggage is a hazard. When I got down there, they sent down the wrong suitcases, and left the suitcase that contained the laptop in the belly of the airplane, and took off anyway (shocker!). I was blue with anger. Either the pretext was complete bull (which of course it was, since the TSA says that it's completely OK to have laptops in checked luggage: https://www.tsa.gov/travel/security-screening/whatcanibring/items/laptops), or they are grossly incompletent, putting my pregnant wife and kid, and the rest of the airplane in danger. Is there legal recourse here?

AA "requests" that you remove batteries from checked laptops and put them in carry-on luggage. You must, per their contract of carriage, "comply with airline safety rules", and they say that they can deny you boarding if you do not comply, which includes "Are uncooperative, abusive, harassing, or show the potential to be while on board". You might then hope to sue them because you didn't violate any safety policy of theirs but they denied you your seat, but there's nothing in the contract that states "The following is a complete list of policies". You should discuss this in more detail with your lawyer, but on the face of it there is no legal recourse, except of course a refund.

I can't speak for the US but in Australia this would not be binding. You entered a contract for the vacuum cleaner the terms of conditions of which were made known to you at the time of purchase – the ticketed price, any store or website displayed terms and whatever was written on the outside of the box. Any alleged terms that were not made known when you entered the contract e.g. because they are inside the box are just that: alleged. In addition, the manufacturer would have committed an offence under Australian Consumer Law by misleading you that such terms were binding. This could lead to a fine in the multiple millions of dollars if the breach is widespread and egregious enough.

There is no clear legal answer, and in case the matter goes to court, the jury would compare actions of the parties. For example, shipper could say "mail it back to us" and recipient could refuse, saying "come pick it up in the next 10 minutes". Both parties are being unreasonable, imposing significant obligations on the other party (time and money, in the case of the shipper's demands). In the case where a shipper is responsible for the error, most of the burden is on the shipper, thus the shipper should arrange for someone to recover the package. The question is, what limitations can the recipient insist on – what is a reasonable level of inconvenience that the recipient should bear? For instance, it is not generally an unreasonable inconvenience to ask a person to leave the package in a corner on the porch, but it could be too much of an inconvenience to ask a person to interrupt their dinner in order to hand over the package, and it would clearly be an unreasonable inconvenience to require the recipient to wake up at 3am to hand it over. When jurors have to decide such matters, they think "what would I do in this situation, and people have different views of what constitutes a reasonable inconvenience.

The issue is more likely that there is no law or regulation allowing the use of dogs to sniff passengers in the US for matters not related to crime, whereas Dubai, a monarchy, has a different political system. In general, you have the constitutional right to move about in the U and the right not to be unreasonably seized, a right which may not exist in some other jurisdictions. That right can be restricted in accordance with law, but there has to be some such law. It is not a crime to have covid, or to travel while infected (it is a crime to carry bombs and drugs on a plane). One area where there is some restriction is where there always has been a restriction, namely entry into the US. There is (was) covid screening at certain airports for flights from certain countries. This directive indicates the airport restrictions, but does not explain what screening will take place. The above DHS site says that "the passenger will be asked about their medical history, current condition, and asked for contact information for local health authorities. Passengers will then be given written guidance about COVID-19 and directed to their final destination, and immediately home-quarantine in accordance with CDC best practices". It is not clear whether a mandatory temperature check without even reasonable suspicion of a crime would constitute an unreasonable search (body searches are subject to higher standards than property searches, it seems), and constitutional law surrounding searches has emphasized the primacy of privacy in search law, not the fact of physically entering property of the body. Some airlines and airports offer voluntary temperature checking, so it might be possible if someone has a covid-sniffing dog to offer voluntary sniff testing, especially if it is offered by a private concern and does not have the appearance of government mandate (which would require a law).

You can print a copy of the email, ideally with metadata showing, and testify that you received it and did not modify the email. The lawyer in the case against Mr. A can ask Mr. A if that is his email address, and can ask other people who have received email from him if that is his email address. Mr. A's computer and/or email provider can be subpoenaed. The computer can be forensically examined for evidence that the email was sent or deleted, and the email provider can be asked to provide evidence that the email was sent. Your email provider can be subpoenaed and asked to provide evidence that the email was received. In general, people who deny sending emails in court who are confronted with copies of those emails authenticated by the testimony of the person who allegedly received the email lose their cases and are not believed by the judge or the jury. This doesn't always happen, but it is by far the more common outcome.

Even before the police have any idea who did it, Bob is guilty of whatever wrong he did. However, if you want this to be a legal question and not a moral one, we should assume that you really want to know "Can Bob be convicted of murder, if the evidence proves that he did do it?". Yes, he can. See Morris v. State, 214 S.W.3d 159. The critical question was whether the defendant understood the charges (he did) and whether he could assist in his defense (he could). The desideratum of being able to assist in your own defense only goes so far. On the other hand, maybe no, per Wilson v. US. A government expert witness "testified that appellant had permanent retrograde amnesia and would not be able to aid in his own defense in terms of remembering any of the acts alleged in the indictment". The crucial difference seems to be whether one just has loss of memory, vs. loss of memory connected with some other mental disorder. [Addendum] Per Dusky v. United States 362 U.S. 402, competence to stand trial depends on whether the accused has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding -- and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him. I am not aware of any exceptions e.g. whether this is not the case with strict liability crimes like statutory rape, and since it is generally held that "competency" is a requirement mandated by the due process clause, I don't think there could be an exception.

This isn't about bullying at all, this is about Virginia being a "one-party" state. Virginia Law 19.2-62 outlines that: B.2 It shall not be a criminal offense under this chapter for a person to intercept a wire, electronic or oral communication, where such person is a party to the communication or one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to such interception. However what is not said in the article is that the daughter didn't know that the recording device was in the backpack. This means that the mother did not get consent from either party being recorded (it isn't clear that a minor could give consent anyway), and is therefore in violation of 19.2-62. The (US) law has been quite clear on "two wrongs don't make a right", the mother was not getting satisfaction through other channels, but that does not mean she is right in violating the law in pursuit of justice. This is still very much in the early stages of this particular case, but I'm willing to bet that the mother will see very little if any punishment in this matter. As for why the DA doesn't prosecute the children (or their parents) for the bullying, this really depends on what kind of bullying is subject here. If the children are verbally bullying, this may not be a crime (yes, it is morally wrong, but may not be a crime). It isn't to say though that the children in this case haven't been reprimanded according to State law, at least the subject of the bullying has been moved to a different class as a result. Unless the bullying reaches a physical level, most State laws require the schools to deal with the bullying directly (through moving children to different classes, suspensions, expelling, etc), so the DA doesn't typically get involved until physical injury occurs.

Laws against such actions are not stated in terms of popular and fluid concepts like "computer virus", they are stated in terms of clear concepts like "unauthorized access". There are federal and state laws against this. This web site lists and links to all of the state laws on the matter. There is also a federal law: a detailed legal analysis by DOJ is given here. There are some limits to federal jurisdiction, for example "protected computers" include "computers used in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce or communication". The term "affecting interstate or foreign commerce or communication" is widely used in federal law, and can be used to prohibit growing feed for your own animals. Anything that you "send" clearly affects interstate commerce (the internet is internationally connected). 18 USC 1030(a) says Whoever ... (2) intentionally accesses a computer without authorization or exceeds authorized access, and thereby obtains...(C) information from any protected computer Essentially, a computer connected to the outside world is protected. The key here is "without authorization". If you authorize MS to report back stuff about your computer, that is not unauthorized. It may not be possible to use their product without giving such authorization, in which case you can use a different product that doesn't require that you grant authorization. There is also the possibility that some software producer has technically violates the law because they think that it's okay for them to access the computer as long as they do no harm. Typically, people are not aware that they have granted software publishers access to their computer. The concept of "harm" is pretty much irrelevant to computer-crime criminal law. It would be relevant, though, if a plaintiff were to sue someone for sniffing around their computer: then you'd have to show that you were damaged.

Can a self-represented defendant call oneself as a witness? You see this occassionally in comedy films and I have to wonder how legal it is. If I act as my own lawyer at a trial, can I call myself to the stand as a witness? Can I refuse to answer my own questions and be a hostile witness to myself? Am I supposed to ask a question, then run and sit on the stand and answer, then dash back in front to ask my next question? Can the opposing counsel accuse me of "leading the witness" or "badgering the witness" or whatever?

The old saying: Being your own lawyer means you have a fool as the lawyer and a fool as the client. If one fool calls the other fool as a witness, that's even more foolish. And the worst crime is annoying the judge with your antics. Opposing council will just take note of every question you ask and your replies, and then call you as witness themself. And assuming they are a proper lawyer, everything they ask will be hurting you. No need to accuse you as "leading" or "badgering" the witness.

If the question is: "Did she call you and talk about two business contracts? " then this is not hearsay. We have a witness, standing in court, saying that exactly these things happened - that she called, and that she talked about those deals. If the question is: "Did the company sign two business deals that day? " then it is hearsay. We know that she said two deals were signed, because we have a witness for that, but that doesn't mean she said the truth. She could have lied about that. We don't have a witness standing in court saying that the deals were signed. We have a witness in court saying that he heard someone say the deals were signed. In a libel case where Jim sues Joe for libel, a witness says "Joe told me that Jim is a lying thief". That's absolutely not hearsay in a libel case about Joe spreading false rumours. The exact same statement by the exact same witness would be hearsay if someone tried to convict Jim for theft.

Yes. This is very common. A persnickety lawyer or judge could insist on an actual "yes," but generally speaking, everyone expects witnesses to talk like normal people.

Every state requires at least two witnesses to a will unless it is entirely written in your own handwriting. A lawyer as a witness is fine. A spouse as a witness is not ideal as she would be an interested party if there was a dispute over whether it was executed. It may not be prohibited, but I would never do that in my practice ever. I discontinued a will signing just last week because we only had a lawyer and a spouse and not other witnesses. I would be somewhat concerned.

First, while Law and Order should not be taken as an accurate depiction of a New York trial, it especially should not be taken as an accurate depiction of an Australian trial. Australian law, while it has some major similarities with US law (both ultimately derive from the law of England), is not US law. With procedural matters (such as "may jurors ask questions of witnesses"), it can potentially differ from court to court. In general, jurors may not simply ask a witness a question. The jury's job is not to investigate and figure out if the defendant was guilty or not; it's to evaluate the cases presented by each side. US (and Australian, as far as I know) courts use what's known as the adversarial model, where the prosecution and the defense both present the best cases they can and a neutral third party decides which case was stronger. In a US criminal trial, the state is expected to justify why someone should be in jail; the jury shouldn't be helping them justify it. This isn't how all jurisdictions around the world work, but it's how the US does. One concern with juror questions is that it has the risk that the juror will not be impartial. Jurors are not supposed to get into arguments with witnesses, or to go after them to try to prove a point. In your case, the juror might be introducing an entirely different line of reasoning from the one either side is presenting, and that's simply not their job. People have raised the concern that a juror thinking up questions might be deciding the case before they hear all the evidence, and might give too much weight to the answers to their own questions (or read a lot into it if a question is denied). There are also rules on what questions may be legally asked; lawyers know these and jurors generally don't, which is why jurors may almost never directly ask a question to a witness. Where they can ask questions, it's virtually always written questions, which the judge reviews, gives to both sides to see if anyone objects, and then reads to the witness in a neutral tone.

The citation could be written but it should be easy to beat. In the circumstance that you describe the accused could just say the he was not driving his car at the time. If the prosecution is a sham with all your friends saying you all saw this thing, then the defendant can bring all of his friends to say that he was at some other place. The benefit to having a cop on the scene is that the cop will get ID and positive identification. The other thing the cop has is expert judgment. If a cop sees unsafe lane movement and writes a ticket, his testimony in court carries more weight than the "it was not unsafe!" testimony of the accused. Keep in mind, getting all of your witnesses to court on the same day, after continuances and other delays, and getting them all to tell the same story to overcome the presumption of innocence is no small feat. All that to say, it's easier with police as witness. There are two mechanisms which could get you where you want to go. Private prosecution and citizen's arrest. Private prosecutions are a part of history but not strictly unavailable at the state level. You could write up some charging documents to see if you can get your target indicted. Citizen's arrest is interesting because the rules are fairly unclear unless governed by a specific statute. There are two necessary parts of citizens arrest and the first part gets the attention. The first part is the detention (arrest). The crimes for which a citizen can legally detain a suspect are likely defined by state statute. The second part is giving testimony about the witnessed crime. Let's assume that you see a felony happen and watch the perp walk into a gas station bathroom. You are prepared to arrest, do part number one, and then call the cops, to do part number two. But while you wait for the guy to come out of the bathroom a cop walks up. You explain the felony and the cop goes into the bathroom and arrests the guy. It's purely witness testimony that led to the arrest and the indictment (physical evidence - let's say there is none) and even the trial. You successfully get the guy indicted and when you show up to testify you tell the story as you witnessed it. Now the accused gets to take the stand. When he takes the stand he says, "it was the other guy." When asked, "what other guy?" He says, "I was in the bathroom and a guy ran in and went into the stall. Then a cop came in and arrested me." Reasonable doubt right there. How much more if it's a bunch of friends ratting on some lone driver? Police need evidence. Prosecutors need evidence. Judges need evidence.

Depositions must always be attended by a court reporter in every jurisdiction I have ever encountered (including Colorado, New York, California, Wyoming and Florida). Alaska may be an exception. Its state constitution creates a right to participate in many kinds of legal and legislative proceedings remotely because the distances involved are often so great. The court reporter administers an oath to the witness, keeps track of exhibits, impartially records what happens (usually stenographically and with an audiotape) and then reduces it to a transcript later, a process assisted by having been there when the testimony was given (and allowing for the court reporter, for example, to request spellings of words during breaks). A videotape can be used in addition to the court reporter and sometimes this is done when it would be helpful for understanding a highly visual topic (e.g. in a patent case where someone is explaining a 3D object) or when a witness is expected to behave badly or is known for problematic voice character or body language. Court proceedings in a courtroom are often audiotaped with a judge present but without a live court reporter present. Appellate court arguments are frequently live streamed over the Internet. There may be some jurisdictions where it is possible to have an oath administered by a notary and simply audiotape or videotape the deposition, but that would be very rare in every jurisdiction of which I am aware.

There is, of course, no way to tell how the Court would deal with such a case today. This is not a frequently litigated issue, with lots of case law. I note that in the case you link to, the court limited the statute to false claims made "with a fraudulent purpose". This normally means that the claimant is attempting to secure an improper financial or materiel advantage. In the United States v. Tandaric case, the person convicted had falsely claimed to be a US Citizen on an employment application for a company which did not hire non-citizens, and so gained a job through this false statement. He could have been convicted of ordinary Fraud. The court has not been as protective of Fraud under the First Amendment as it has been of speech generally, or even of false but non-fraudulent speech. I am not at all sure if the court would overturn this law in a similar case today. Edit: In the United States v. Achtner case, the court wrote: But we agree with the District Court that the representation of citizenship must still be made to a person having some right to inquire or adequate reason for ascertaining a defendant's citizenship; it is not to be assumed that so severe a penalty is intended for words spoken as a mere boast or jest or to stop the prying of some busybody, ... This seems to dispose of the example in the question of a neighbor who is merly inquiring as to the character of the area, or perhaps from simple curiosity, and a false speaker who seems to get no direct benefit or advantage from the falsehood. Both linked cases involved false statements made to employers or potential employees, during wartime at that, with the false speaker's employment apparently at stake.

Legal liability of websites for text produced by chat bots such as ChatGPT To what extent is a website hosted in the US legally liable for the output of an AI chat bot? For example, if ChatGPT produced the phrase: kill yourself and OpenAI distributed this phrase to me over the internet, and I did it, could relatives hold OpenAI liable for this? As far as I understand, websites are generally liable for any content posted there, and chat bot output is part of that, whether it's AI-generated content or manually curated content.

We do not really know, and relevant legislation is pending. The most relevant case for this, where the company that is hosting the service is being held responsible for the output of the chatbot, is MARK WALTERS vs. OpenAI, L.L.C.. This is described by The Verge: A radio host in Georgia, Mark Walters, is suing the company after ChatGPT stated that Walters had been accused of defrauding and embezzling funds from a non-profit organization. The system generated the information in response to a request from a third party, a journalist named Fred Riehl. It seems plausible that if Open AI are held responsible in this case then they may be in your hypothetical.

I would probably have a legal disclaimer out of an abundance of caution. That being said, you have a right to free speech via First Amendment guarantees. While that right is not absolute and some words “by their very utterance” cause injury or incite an immediate breach of peace, and do not receive constitutional protection, (there is the old adage you do not have the right to shout fire in a crowded movie theater). This (your blog) is not that. To take it to its logical (or illogical) extreme, there are many things on the internet, in magazines, scholarly articles, etc. that could injure someone or cause damage in the event that one who was not qualified or competent to perform the action described undertook to do so. A child could burn themselves following the directions on a mac and cheese box but they shouldn't be cooking in the first place. The same rings true for high voltage electricity - a non-licensed electrician should probably not create a high voltage power supply. But, will some? Yes. But you are not liable for printing a blog about the practice. On another but related note, if you are a licensed electrician your licensing authority may require that you take precautions to ensure you do not inadvertantly direct others to engage in practices of licensed professionals that could cause harm by giving them information. I doubt this but I don't know because I am not an electrician. As far as could you be liable for writing it....under our legal system you can be sued under a theory of negligence for just about any action someone thinks was unsafe or causes injury. And you never know what a jury will do. But I think that to sue someone for simply writing something would be fairly easily dismissed through a motion for summary judgment by a competent attorney in the event you got sued. If everything a person wrote, that if followed by an unqualified person resulted in injury, resulted in liability for damages than it would have a chilling effect on their First Amendment right to free speech. That said, I go back to my original statement that it couldn't hurt to have a simple liability waiver for extra protection. It could be something as simple as: "The information contained herein is not mean to be comprehensive and is for informational purposes only. You should not undertake to perform anything described herein without adequate training and/or supervision. The Author disclaims any responsibility for any injury, damage, or loss as a result of reliance upon the information found on this site/blog." If you do use a liability waiver, make sure it is bold and obvious. Otherwise, it can backfire!

You can always be sued, but truth is an absolute defense to libel. Your actions could be perceived in any way imaginable. What usually matters for legal purposes is how a "reasonable person" would perceive them. As an example, Pennsylvania's Megan's Law Website warns: Any person who uses the information contained herein to threaten, intimidate, or harass the registrant or their family, or who otherwise misuses this information, may be subject to criminal prosecution or civil liability. It further clarifies: Public access to information about registered sexual offenders is intended solely as a means of public protection, any other use prohibited.

Technically speaking, such emails are copyrighted by the sender. However, showing such an email to a third party, or posting it publicly in order to comment on it would almost surely be a fair use in the US. In any case, such an email would have no commercial value, and so there would be no financial damages possible. A lawsuit over such a technical copyright infringement would, in my view, be quite unlikely, and even less likely to be successful. Indeed, filing such a suit would be one of the best ways for the business to draw attention to the issue, in an example of the Streisand Effect.

The website owner brings in an expert programmer who testifies that the user cannot have gotten to a certain part of the site (or download, etc.) without having clicked to accept the terms of service, and that this document they're holding is a true and correct copy of the terms of service as of that date. That's evidence in favor of the site, and an adverse party has to have stronger evidence in order to overcome it. If the person didn't save a copy of the terms themselves, they'll have a hard time on this. Then the other party's attorney tries to discredit the programmer by asking questions like "how do you know there are no bugs in the software which could have allowed somebody to reach this without agreeing to the terms of service" etc. Apparently, some sites don't require users to click indicating agreement. If the company has significantly changed the site, terms of service, etc. since the time the user registered, and doesn't keep any copies of old versions around, and admits this, they'll have a hard time enforcing an agreement (as they can't produce a copy of it). If the user kept a copy, the user might be able to present that. It's up to the finder of fact to decide what to believe and how much weight to give the various witnesses' testimony.

All computer programs are not just copyrightable, they are protected by copyright as soon as they are put into fixed form (for example, as soon as I type it on my computer which will save it as a file on a disk). The copyright owner doesn't have to take any actions whatsoever to have a computer program protected by copyright. It’s not just computer programs, even many fonts are copyrighted because they are essentially computer programs. BTW. What I just wrote is also protected by copyright. There are some licenses involved that I agreed to when I submitted it to this website, and which allow the website to publish and you to read this text, but I'm the copyright holder. PS. There is a comment saying “computer programs are not literary works and therefore not copyrightable”. That may have been true or arguable in the 1980’s. It’s not true now. PS. No, stack exchange doesn’t own the copyright to my post, I do. Unless I was an employee of the company and posted on their behalf. Stack exchange needs and has a license to publish this post.

may require that you obtain license rights from third-party owners or licensors of content that you include in your text inputs (Emphasis mine). Based solely on the excerpt above, yes, you have the copyright on the audio files if you created the source material, as you are the creator, using Amazon Polly as/to generate a "tangible medium". One of the central rights granted by copyright is to control translation into a different medium (in this case, from text into audio), as is the right to control distribution, which is what this excerpt is talking about. "Third party" in this case means neither you nor Amazon. Basically, Amazon is informing you that using their software on someone else's copyrighted material does not grant you copyright on the audio recording.

Online file converters are legal: there is no law that prohibits a person from making a program available and executing online, including creating output in the form of a file. It is possible that some person may illegally copy copyright-protected material then use a website to modify that material, in which case the question of vicarious liability for copyright infringement could arise, so we appeal to the DMCA safe harbor provisions to see what the website must do. First, the owner of copyright must submit a properly constructed takedown notice to the website. Crucially, the notice must contain sufficient information that the website operator can find and take down the item(s) in question. Assuming that the complainant can supply the "where is it" information, then there is a notice and counter-notice routine where the uploader is informed and can deny the accusation – the website operator doesn't evaluate the merits of the claim, he only sees that the formalities were observed. If the operator follows the rules, he cannot be held vicariously liable. If the link does not expire and if it is somehow promulgated, the technical potential for being a contributor to copyright infringement becomes very real, but it puts the operator in no worse a legal position than Youtube. So the question is not just related to OCILLA, it is entirely covered by that law. Questions of how users or website owners are "supposed to" act don't figure into this. If the website owner does not comply with those provisions, they have no access to the safe harbor provisions, and they can be sued. However, the website itself remains legally "permitted" (there never was a prohibition of such a website).

Can a lawyer at trial keep shouting objection in order to fillibuster? Lets say that I'm at my own trial, representing myself pro se. I immediately object to something (anything at all - it doesn't matter what). If I understand correctly I can't be held in contempt - objecting to things is my right as a lawyer. The judge mumbles overruled (probably). I immediately object again with the same or similar objection, forcing the judge to again overrule. I keep on shouting objection ('tis my right as a lawyer that nobody can take away from me) - am I right in the assumption that the trial then cannot continue, since nobody else can be heard? I cant be stopped from objecting and the judge is lawbound to keep saying "overruled" (or "sustained") until the day is over?

I am guessing that the question is about the United States, since the "objection!" procedure is not the same in other places. The Supreme Court has held that even though you have the right to represent yourself, this is conditional on your maintenance of proper conduct. If you disrupt proceedings and disregard judicial directions, then the judge can find you in contempt of court, just as with anybody else who was doing that. In Illinois v Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970), a self-represented litigant "started to argue with the judge in a most abusive and disrespectful manner", threatened the judge's life, and made clear that he intended to filibuster the process, saying "There is going to be no proceeding. I'm going to start talking and I'm going to keep on talking all through the trial. There's not going to be no trial like this." The judge ordered him removed from the courtroom on several instances of this behavior, and also appointed professional counsel. Following a series of appeals against all this, the Supreme Court ultimately said: Although mindful that courts must indulge every reasonable presumption against the loss of constitutional rights, Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458, 304 U. S. 464 (1938), we explicitly hold today that a defendant can lose his right to be present at trial if, after he has been warned by the judge that he will be removed if he continues his disruptive behavior, he nevertheless insists on conducting himself in a manner so disorderly, disruptive, and disrespectful of the court that his trial cannot be carried on with him in the courtroom. Once lost, the right to be present can, of course. be reclaimed as soon as the defendant is willing to conduct himself consistently with the decorum and respect inherent in the concept of courts and judicial proceedings. It is essential to the proper administration of criminal justice that dignity, order, and decorum be the hallmarks of all court proceedings in our country. The flagrant disregard in the courtroom of elementary standards of proper conduct should not and cannot be tolerated. We believe trial judges confronted with disruptive, contumacious, stubbornly defiant defendants must be given sufficient discretion to meet the circumstances of each case. No one formula for maintaining the appropriate courtroom atmosphere will be best in all situations. We think there are at least three constitutionally permissible ways for a trial judge to handle an obstreperous defendant like Allen: (1) bind and gag him, thereby keeping him present; (2) cite him for contempt; (3) take him out of the courtroom until he promises to conduct himself properly.

Almost none of this is written down anywhere in official court rules but there are some widely adopted standards for this practice. Most courts require that only one lawyer be in charge of speaking at any given stage of the trial. But, it wouldn't be unusual, for example, for one lawyer to question most of the witnesses and for a different lawyer who is more familiar with the specialized subject matter in question (e.g. electrical specifications), usually a junior lawyer, to question the expert witnesses in a case. Also, if the usually designated lawyer is absent for some reason (stuck in traffic, sick, etc.), the "second chair" lawyer can (and is often required to) take over the case for the client until the "first chair" lawyer is available again. Mostly, second chair lawyers (I've spent plenty of time over the years in this role) do the following (a non-exclusive list): take notes, pay attention to how the judge and jury are reacting to testimony, provide input into jury selection decisions, reminds the primary lawyer of points that still need to be covered in the examination of a witness, reminds the primary lawyer of exhibits that still need to be formally offered into evidence, scrambles to find rebuttal or impeachment evidence for unanticipated testimony, prompts the primary lawyer to make objections if the primary lawyer was paying attention to something else, identifies and has at the ready exhibits needs to present (or to follow the other side's examination), looks up points of law that are relevant or will need to be referenced that come up during trial, handles logistics for witnesses who are not on the stand (keeping them in the hallway if the witness is sequestered, trying to obtain the appearance of no show witnesses or reshuffling their order, saying thank you to witnesses who are no longer on the stand, etc.), carries some of the litigation team's stuff into and out of the court room, provides informed commentary and suggestions during breaks and working lunches, etc. Also, in addition to the usual "first chair" and "second chair" roles, often supplemented by a paralegal or legal assistant, there is a different kind of arrangement in which different lawyers for the same person can fully participate. This far less common arrangement happens when the person showing up in court is wearing "more than one hat" and has a different lawyer in different capacities. For example, suppose that someone is the President of a corporation and both the corporation and the President individually are both sued. There might be one primary lawyer for the corporation and one for the President personally, and both lawyers might participate fully.

An appeal to ignorance asserts that a proposition is true because it has not yet been proven false. That is not in any way the situation here. The defendant knows if he/she has or has not so the only available answers under oath are "yes" or "no" - the jury knows this too so any other answer will be seen as disingenuous. However, this information (affirmative or negative) is off limits to the jury as it could prejudice their decision, hence the mistrial. A quick judge could instruct the defendant not to answer and instruct the jury to disregard the question but if a conviction results the defence team could use the fact that it was asked as grounds for appeal. A judge must decide if the interests of justice are better served by a retrial or a tainted conviction.

If I want to protest for or against President Trump and decide to wear a Trump mask, isn't that speech protected by the first amendment? Probably. The matter of intent, in any event, is for a court to decide (if the prosecutor determines that the question should even be presented to a court). For example, someone seeking to rob a bank in a mask would probably fall afoul of this law, and it's not likely that using a mask of a political figure would enable a successful first-amendment defense. For a political protestor, it could be easy to show that the intent was to make a political statement and not to conceal identity, in which case it would not be necessary to consider the constitutional question, for a critical element of the crime would be missing. That is, if you say "I wasn't trying to hide my identity," and the court believes you, then you haven't violated the statute. That is a separate question from whether the statute is constitutional. For the law itself to be unconstitutional, it would have to be unconstitutional in every application, generally. If some applications of the law are unconstitutional, the law could stand, but prosecutions for the unconstitutional application would not succeed.

Your main misunderstanding is that opposing counsel cannot testify. He can ask a question, such as "Did you say ...?", which provides Einstein an opportunity to answer in a way that maintains the credibility of his testimony, but consel cannot just enter his own testimony into the record. In addition, counsel on "his side" has the opportunity to pose appropriate clarifying questions, e.g. could ask "Did you repudiate that idea 88 years ago?", though there is a problem that the attorney may not have the technical expertise to recognize the subject-matter question that they should ask. Expert testimony does not attempt to determine the state of scholarship in an area, it attempts to resolve a specific factual matter. The two are not the same thing. Einstein would not testify as to what his general and special theories of relativity say, except in a bizarre universe where some person is accused of the crime of denying the theory of relativity. Instead, he might be testifying for the defense, where the defendant is accused of an act that (it turns out) is physically impossible in light of the theory of relativity. If Einstein had been in the habit of posing random mutually-contradictory conjectures on a weekly basis, opposing counsel's question could be relevant to establishing that the witness's testimony is not reliable. Theoretically, counsel could "hint" that the witness is scientifically flighty, so Einstein would have to have a credible explanation for changing his position. It is easy to demonstrate that scientists in general do change their positions as knowledge expands, so Einstein's burden would not be very substantial.

A summary is here: see for example Section 35 of the Judiciary Act of 1789: 'in all the courts of the United States, the parties may plead and manage their own causes personally or by the assistance of counsel'. In the same vein, Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U. S. 269 held that "an accused, in the exercise of a free and intelligent choice and with the considered approval of the court, may waive trial by jury, and so, likewise, may waive his constitutional right to the assistance of counsel". In Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 it is held that this extends (via the 14th) to state courts. As to the expression "practice law", maybe the meaning of this expression is taken to be self-evident, though clearly it is not. Statutes that prohibit that act for non-lawyers generally specify things such as "for another person" or "holds himself out as entitled to practice law".

Only in a civil case Yes, in a civil case, Alice generally can call Bob as a witness to take the stand. In many cases, this is done very early, locking in their testimony, before expert witnesses or other evidence by the plaintiff are presented to try and undermine the testimony. Alice may ask only questions that have relevance to the case. Let's take for example a dispute about a contract: Alice may ask Bob if he engaged in negotiations to form the contract, about the matter of the contract, if he signed the contract, or how he (or his employees) fulfilled (or not) the contract. Pretty much everything that pertains to the contract or the execution thereof. This does not extend to the settlement of the case or attempts thereof. Alice may not ask if Bob has an affair with Clarice unless that somehow is material to the contract at hand. Alice may not re-ask questions where an objection was sustained in the same way. However, Bob might not need to answer all questions (there are things that are banned from being asked), especially as Bob's attorney will object to questions. A few examples of competent questioning can be seen towards the end of My Cousin Vinnie, though this is a criminal trial. Never in a criminal trial In a criminal trial, not only can the prosecution not call Bob to the stand, he has to elect to go to the stand to even be questioned by the prosecution. That is because he can "plead the 5th". There is a tiny exception for civil cases, where they can do so there too.

In most jurisdictions, the lawyer would have two options: Resign from counsel and never talk about the confession. Take the counsel and defend the client as best they can without mentioning that they know the client is guilty. In most jurisdictions, there is something called "attorney client privilege". It means that whatever a client says to their attorney is confidential (there are usually exceptions to this, but usually none which are relevant for this question). The court can not force the attorney to testify against their client. The job of the defense counsel is to achieve the best possible outcome for their client. If the client pleads not guilty, then the attorney's duty is to do their best to convince the court that their client is not guilty, even when they know it to be false. There are a few limits, for example attorneys are usually not allowed to use underhanded strategies like falsify evidence or compel witnesses. But breaking attorney-client privilege by telling the court about a private confession without the consent of the client would be a major case of misconduct and would in many cases cost the attorney their legal license (at least!). And besides: A defense attorney who knows their non-guilty-pleading client is guilty can actually go through the process without ever explicitly claiming that the client is innocent. In order to convict someone for a crime, the prosecuter must prove the clients guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The defendant doesn't necessarily need to prove they are innocent, they just need to create doubt. The defense attorney can fulfill that duty by raising questions like "If my client had committed the crime, then how do you explain [...]", "What reason would my client have had to commit this crime?", "Does this piece of evidence really prove anything?" or "How can we be sure that the witness is telling the truth when she says [...]?". All very good questions which need to be answered by the prosecution, even if the defense already knows the answers. At no point does the defender have to claim "my client is innocent". The defender just needs to claim "You have not yet proven beyond reasonable doubt that my client is guilty".

Therapist violates confidentiality. Any laws applicable? A friend is doing counseling as a domestic violence victim at a domestic violence aid agency. The therapist recently disclosed her information, including what they have talked about in counseling sessions, to other people in the agency. Being confronted, the therapist pointed the finger back and accused her of false things and refused to see her again. We would like to know if there are laws and regulations applicable in this situation. Are there federal level regulations applicable in this situation? The agency is responding indifferently. We are considering filing a complaint with the state board of psychology. We found several possible names on the state's professional licensing website, but can't be sure which one is the therapist, since the therapist keeps her full name from us.

We're missing a lot of information that we'd need to offer a full answer. Here are some of the things that will probably drive the analysis: the type of counselor we're talking about; the types of information the counselor disclosed; the reason she disclosed it; the job functions of the people to whom she disclosed it; the reason the client is bothered by the disclosure. Generally speaking, a mental-health counselor has a fiduciary duty to maintain the confidentiality of patient information, but my understanding is that in most cases, the counselor would be allowed to discuss a case with colleagues for the purposes of advancing the patient's treatment. So discussing the facts of a tough case with a supervisor is not going to be as problematic as idly gossiping about clients with custodial staff. Beyond the permitted disclosures, there are also situations in which counselors are required to disclose confidential information, including cases where the counselor suspects child or elder abuse or where the counselor believes the client poses a danger to herself or others. If the disclosure was truly not permitted, then it may be that the client has a claim for breach of fiduciary duty. In Georgia, proving that case requires evidence that: That the counselor had information relating to the client that she knew or should have known was confidential; That the counselor communicated the client’s confidential information to third parties; That the client did not give informed consent to the counselor’s conduct; That the confidential information was not a matter of general knowledge; and That the disclosure harmed the client. As you noted, the client could also file a complaint with the state licensing board. I don't know of any federal laws or regulations that would come into play in the situation you've described.

The regulations known as HIPAA are here. A good place to start is with who the regulations apply to. §160.10 lays that out: a health plan, health care clearinghouse, care provider, their business associates, and the Inspector General. Family members are not regulated entities. Subpart E regulates individually identifiable health information (such as "person X has condition Y") – this is protected information. §164.502 states that A covered entity or business associate may not use or disclose protected health information except as permitted or required by this subpart or by subpart C of part 160 of this subchapter. The first permitted use / disclosure is that the information may be revealed to the individual (the individual). Under 164.502(a)(2)(1) they are required to reveal information to an individual "when requested under, and required by §164.524 or §164.528" (you have a right to see your own record; you have a right to know who knows). 164.502(g) requires the covered entity to treat the "Personal Representative" as the same as the individual, and then there is a list of conditions surrounding being a personal representative, reducing to being empowered under law to act on behalf of the individual in making health decisions (it gets complicated in dealing with minors). 164.510 covers disclosure in emergencies, and under (b)(2) allows disclosure to a family member with advance consent of the individual. And so on. There is no general rule "and the covered entity may / must reveal private information to an interested individual", even a spouse, without consent of the individual. In other words, the doctor has an obligation to not disclose this information, unless permitted by the individual.

This depends entirely on STATE law, and you need to list the state(s) you are interested in in the question. Thus, the usual legal statement "it depends." POLICE ARE NOT ATTORNEYS Don't accept legal advice from the police at face value. Police frequently don't actually know the minutiae of the law, and/or often misunderstand it. Their job is not to provide legal advice nor legal judgement, their job is to enforce the law based on certain priorities. Thus the area of enforcement is usually narrowed to specific categories so they can be experts in that area. (I.e vice cops, bunko squad, homicide division, etc.) But police are not lawyers, so don't expect them to understand the law. They did not attend 3 years of law school after attaining a college degree, which lawyers DO. Police get as little as 3 months training (in some states like Arkansas they can be put on duty without ANY training for up to a year (!) before attending the academy). THAT SAID, REGARDING CALL RECORDINGS: There are single and two party states. In single party states, any single person who is part of a call or communication can record it. In "two party" states, everyone that is part of the call must be informed. There are numerous exceptions and stipulations however. GREAT EXPECTATIONS First off, is there an "expectation of privacy." Again this varies by state and case law. Generally, if there is no expectation of privacy, then there is a clear exception to record. For instance, if you are in a busy restaurant, and people around you can hear or eavesdrop, you have no expectation of privacy. Courts have also ruled that if you are in the presence of a police officer performing official duties, there is also no expectation of privacy (not for either of you). IS IT LIVE OR IS IT MEMOREX Are you being recorded? If you are in a two/all party state, and you have an expectation of privacy (a phone call made in your home) then one of the following must occur: If the police are recording you without your knowledge, they must have a court order permitting them to do so as part of an investigation. Otherwise you must be notified with a statement at the beginning of the call that the call is being recorded. (Typically your option is to hang up or continue. Continuing the call implies your consent.) In some states the notification can be in the form of a "duck" or a beep every 15 seconds (time period varies, this is also different per state). OPINION NOT ADVICE BELOW I would think that being notified that a call is being recorded ends any expectation of privacy for any involved party. Assuming the state law and related case law supports recording when there is no expectation of privacy, this circumstance would seem to permit recording legally. Doubly so if your were talking to police in official capacity (did you notice a beep every xx seconds?) CAUTION: Because this varies so much by state, and because even the various Federal District Courts are not in unanimous agreement on the minutiae, there may be other factors to consider.

1. I want use a friend who has no legal training as my "counsel," do the police have any legal recourse from allowing me to talk to him prior to interrogation? E.g., can they insist that my counsel be a member of the bar in the state where I have been arrested? Yes. If they don't want you to, you cannot talk to a friend, only a lawyer. If you got an OUI, and you're not being a jerk, they will probably let you talk to whomever you want (within reason – it's not social hour). However, they can keep you from speaking to anyone but a lawyer as that person could gain information from you that can corrupt their investigation. (E.g., they arrest you with 10 lbs. of methamphetamine. They know it's "fresh" and likely came from a local lab that they suspect you of running. You cannot be allowed to talk to just anyone, as they could help get the lab broke down, moved, destroyed). In TV shows you see attorneys doing this type of illicit thing, but in reality that is very rare. When you enter the police station to speak with a client, you must present your bar card (license to practice). Friends are not allowed in, even if you value their counsel – they are not counselors! 2. I want to consult a "team" of qualified counselors. Are there legal grounds or regulations to limit the number of individuals I consult prior to interrogation, and who I have present during interrogation? No. You can have your entire legal team with you, while preparing for court, or while being questioned, within reason. They do not need to rent a conference room to fit your 30 person legal team, but if you want 3 or so lawyers in with you, and you can afford paying each $250-$500 per hour, then have at it. Most lawyers would counsel you against this, as it creates an undue impression of limitless (hence likely illegal) funds. (But if you're a hedge fund manager, and you can show your money is legally earned, it's really your choice.) I have had occasion to go in to meet a client with co-counsel numerous times (especially in early years of practice when there is a lead attorney and second chair, so to speak, even for interrogation (which means silence by the client). They can "impede" access to some extent, though they typically don't. They can play games with your lawyer and make them wait and make you wait, but not while they are in with you, and only for so long. Once your lawyer arrives they should leave you alone. (Some courts say once you ask for counsel they need to leave you alone, but this only really matters if they get a confession from you (or any evidence) before you've (and this is what they're hoping for) recant your request for counsel and your right to remain silent.) 3. Can my contact with counsel be proscribed in any way? E.g., can the police limit the duration or schedule of contact with counsel? Can they impede or delay access to me by someone who claims to be my counsel? Once you've called your lawyer, they need to to let him or her meet with you for a reasonable amount of time before questioning. This is typically a quick meeting, just long enough to make sure you will not say a word. Even completely innocent people should keep their mouth shut – innocent people do occasionally get arrested and convicted! No matter what the police say, there is no benefit, ever, from talking to them. Some police, who know it's their last shot to get a confession and know once your lawyer gets there will never talk to you again (and they have enough to go forward without your confession in the event you just start blabbing "you did it" before they can get you to invoke your rights) will keep talking to you and tell you not to comment, just to listen, even while your lawyer sits outside. They can say you're being processed, or there's a security issue, any number of reasons for short delays if they need it. They will then go on and on about "how they can maybe help you out if you talk now, but once your lawyer arrives all bets are off." These are just tricks to get you to recant/revoke your rights and to obtain your confession. You will usually see your lawyer shortly after arrival. Can they impede or delay access to me by someone who claims to be my counsel? Yes, if your lawyer doesn't have adequate ID or cannot verify he is licensed in that state, or in another state and with local counsel. The police do not have a duty to research your lawyer's credentials, and don't have to go online and look your attorney up in the bar directory to make it easier for him or her to get to you. However, if they know the attorney, and he or she forgot his bar card, they would probably lose the confession if you confessed while they make him go get it. Most lawyers carry their bar card in their wallet, so this is not a typical problem. 4. What do police have to do to facilitate my access to my desired counselor(s)? E.g., how long can I be held after requesting an attorney without being allowed to attempt to contact one? You have a right to contact a lawyer. There is no explicit right to a phone call, although some form of contact is implied. Hence, you can usually be held 3 hours before they have to let you "contact" someone, and this is after processing. You can be held until your lawyer gets there or until your arraignment, whatever comes first. If your lawyer doesn't show up, you will be given another opportunity by the court to get your lawyer of choice there for arraignment. If you can't, and you don't want to go forward, a public defender will move to waive your right to a speedy trial and seek a continuance until you can get your counsel of choice there. If this happens, consider getting a new lawyer. What means must I be granted to find and contact the counsel of my choice? This actually differs depending on where you are and what you did. Again, you have a right to counsel but they can determine how you get this done. Sometimes there are local laws that say you get any number, or 3, or 1 completed phone call to reach your counsel of choice. If there is an overriding risk that you will call someone to communicate information that could put the investigation in jeopardy or would be adversely impact their evidentiary value in some way, even when these laws exist the police can refuse you direct contact with anyone and may implement a strict "they call" policy, where they will call the lawyer and tell them, or call your family to let them know, and they can call the lawyer. They cannot hold you for a protracted amount of time without giving you some way to get word to a lawyer; it must be reasonable. There is not a lot of law out there about what is not reasonable, because the police know, and for the most part accept, that once right to counsel has been invoked they are done. There is case law saying that 3 hours is reasonable. What is not reasonable? That is fact dependent.

There are no such laws that are specific to rape, but there are general laws about false statements. In every state there is some law against making a false statement to a government official, e.g. Washington RCW 9A.76.175 which says that one who "knowingly makes a false or misleading material statement to a public servant is guilty of a gross misdemeanor". To shift context slightly, if you report to the police that Smith stole your lawn mower when in fact you gave it to him, that is a false statement. However, there would have to be clear proof that you lied in your report, and not that there was a misunderstanding. If Smith stole the mower but the evidence did not support a theft conviction, that does not mean that you can be prosecuted for making a false statement (whereas, if someone has a video of you telling Smith "Here's a mower, which I give to you because I like you", then you could almost be prosecuted for making a false statement, were it not for the fact that the video is illegal in Washington). Perjury is the other related crime: RCW 9A.72.020 "a materially false statement which he or she knows to be false under an oath required or authorized by law". [Addendum] About the video of the mower being given away... Washington is an all-party consent state, meaning that you can't just record people, you have to have their permission (everybody's permission). RCW 9.73.050 says that information obtained by illegal recording shall be inadmissible in any civil or criminal case in all courts of general or limited jurisdiction in this state, except with the permission of the person whose rights have been violated in an action brought for damages under the provisions of RCW 9.73.030 through 9.73.080 which is to say, "unless the person(s) who did not give permission to be recorded now give permission for the evidence to be admitted". Since "you" would be the one making a false statement, "you" would have an interest in suppressing the video, thus "you" could withhold permission for the video to be introduced.

Was the case Sealed? Or is it considered to be Private? Those are two different cases. I was not able to find any laws regarding sealing, or expunging records of Name Changes, but was able to find the Utah Law for Criminal Records. I can only assume they draw from one another. All that being said, assuming your whatever case is sealed, then Some records are sealed. In these kinds of cases, even information about the existence of the case is not publicly available. A person seeking access to a sealed record must petition the court for permission to unseal the records. Rule 4-202.03 states that, ....no one may access a sealed court record except by order of the court. A judge may review a sealed record when the circumstances warrant. From that I can assume that, The records are not public. The records will not show up in a routine check The records will be known only if a there is a court order. Comparing it with the Expungement Act, Continued Use of Sealed Records After sealing, BCI continues to index and maintain all expunged records of arrests and convictions, but the records will not be released to the public. BCI will not divulge any information contained in the expunged records to any person or agency without a court order, unless authorized by statute to do so. Upon request, the following organizations may receive information contained in expunged records: the Board of Pardons and Parole Peace Officer Standards and Training federal authorities, unless prohibited by federal law the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing and the State Office of Education Both cases above require a court order to get that seal record information. However, from what I gather only expunged criminal records can be access upon request by the Division of Occupational Licences. Bottom line, it sounds like you are safe to mark is no previous name, but you may lose your license in the future if something goes south. I will recommend you to get a professional look into the word of the law and provide you with a written statement of the actual law. Another thing you can try is write to the court who sealed your case, present them the situation and explain what you have found so far, and ask for guidance.

This isn't about bullying at all, this is about Virginia being a "one-party" state. Virginia Law 19.2-62 outlines that: B.2 It shall not be a criminal offense under this chapter for a person to intercept a wire, electronic or oral communication, where such person is a party to the communication or one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to such interception. However what is not said in the article is that the daughter didn't know that the recording device was in the backpack. This means that the mother did not get consent from either party being recorded (it isn't clear that a minor could give consent anyway), and is therefore in violation of 19.2-62. The (US) law has been quite clear on "two wrongs don't make a right", the mother was not getting satisfaction through other channels, but that does not mean she is right in violating the law in pursuit of justice. This is still very much in the early stages of this particular case, but I'm willing to bet that the mother will see very little if any punishment in this matter. As for why the DA doesn't prosecute the children (or their parents) for the bullying, this really depends on what kind of bullying is subject here. If the children are verbally bullying, this may not be a crime (yes, it is morally wrong, but may not be a crime). It isn't to say though that the children in this case haven't been reprimanded according to State law, at least the subject of the bullying has been moved to a different class as a result. Unless the bullying reaches a physical level, most State laws require the schools to deal with the bullying directly (through moving children to different classes, suspensions, expelling, etc), so the DA doesn't typically get involved until physical injury occurs.

The victim of domestic violence is referred to as the complaining witness. Domestic violence arrests will result in a criminal investigation. It is not up to the complaining witness to determine if charges are brought against the one who was arrested - this is up to the prosecutor. Here is a good article at Findlaw that discusses the process. If the complaining witness recants, the prosecutor may decide to drop the charges. The prosecutor may, though, decide to continue the charges and prosecute the case. The complaining witness in recanting may face charges as well - for example, for making a false police report. If the prosecutor presses the case and your husband is convicted then, yes, it will be on his record. Seeking the advice of a New York attorney who specializes in these matters is the best course of action. EDIT: Here is additional information regarding New York Criminal History Records: New York State law does specify that, unless the court orders otherwise, arrest records are sealed when criminal actions are terminated in favor of the accused - dismissed, found not guilty, etc. This is spelled out in Criminal Procedure Law 160.50. Arrest records are part of the public record until disposition of the case is completed. At New York State's Court web site, you can read about how to get criminal records of anyone - they are public record so anyone can make a request about anyone. There is a fee of $65. Records can be ordered online and the results can be emailed to you. Searches are processed by an exact match of name and date of birth. From their web site you will see that criminal cases transferred or removed to Family Court are not reported. Neither are records for people who had a single misdemeanor conviction over ten years ago or pending criminal cases categorized as Youthful Offender Eligible. Generally speaking, New York criminal cases are part of the public record and are available to anyone unless they meet certain criteria or have been sealed under New York State law. Note that sealing records doesn't mean the record goes away. It just means that the record is not available to the general public without a court order unsealing the record. Here is the link to on-line direct access to records requests: http://www.nycourts.gov/APPS/chrs/onlinedirectaccess.shtml

Why aren't post-mortem records protected by HIPAA? Looking at the question Why are toxicology reports made public? and the answer provided, I have to wonder why aren't such records (autopsy results, toxicology reports, etc.) covered by HIPAA? Looking at HHS.Gov it reads: The HIPAA Privacy Rule protects the individually identifiable health information about a decedent for 50 years following the date of death of the individual. and yet autopsy and toxicology reports are treated as 'public record'.

HIPAA applies only to specified entities(see https://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Administrative-Simplification/HIPAA-ACA/AreYouaCoveredEntity.html); including Health Plans, Health Care Providers, Clearinghouses, and "Business Associates". Autopsy and toxicology records are the output not of a medical practice but of the coroner's office. The coroner is not* a health care professional; rather they are a law-enforcement official, and law enforcement are not constrained by HIPAA. Law enforcement records are often part of the public record, especially when they are attached to a court case. The office of a coroner is empowered and charged with recording deaths in their jurisdictions, and determining cause of death for violent or suspicious deaths. In some jurisdictions, they have the power to instigate investigations. They often do this by overseeing (or, generally, in smaller jurisdictions, acting as) medical examiners and/or forensic pathologists. *It is more proper to say that the coroner is not inherently a health care professional. Often, coroners may hold medical degrees. In some small (and often poor) counties, a/the local doctor does double duty. In others, the office of the coroner is combined into the office of the sheriff, and the positions are sometimes even merged into one person. In larger (and often wealthy) counties, the coroner may be a purely organizational and administrative position.

Caution: I am not a lawyer. It depends on who is doing the collecting and storing. If it is done "by a natural person in the course of a purely personal or household activity", then it is exempt from the GDPR, as per Art. 2. Beware, however, that "purely personal activity" means that you do not share or publish them. In this court case, having the name or phone number of someone else on your "personal" website constitutes "processing of personal data wholly or partly by automatic means within the meaning of Article 3(1) of Directive 95/46".

Prove my work is not a trade secret violation Please don't. It's not your job to prove your innocence. The burden is on them to be specific, explain fully, and prove specific claims about your actions. In other words, don't justify, don't explain, and don't defend yourself to them. It's actually best you do not say anything to them, and just forward the letter to your legal counsel (Since you're selling software to be used in the medical field, I assume you already have some kind of legal counsel). For instance, even saying something as innocuous as "Managing patients, Exams, Bills etc are all public knowledge." could be used against you. Because it establishes the fact that you've been working on those features with them and that you've been working on those features with your new company (which doesn't necessarily follow, for all they know, you could have purchased a library module from someone else with those exact features). In other words, even if you were to reply with such an innocuous-sounding statement, you could be saving them months of cross-border discovery and litigation about some of their claims (even if you believed you were being entirely reasonable by defending yourself). But at the same time, don't take what I'm saying to mean that you should lie to them about which features you recently worked on. When I say that you shouldn't be talking to them. I mean that you should not be talking to them. You shouldn't be engaging with them and you shouldn't be giving them any shred of information whatsoever (implied or otherwise). It's not your job to make their job any easier. Do not reply to them. Don't even acknowledge the receipt of the letter (unless you already did by signing for it, which can't be helped). Use a legal intermediary. Give the letter to your own legal counsel (whether you signed for the letter, or not) and leave any reply to him or her (assuming he/she thinks this warning letter even warrants a response). And if this former employer gives you a phone call, kindly refer them to your legal counsel without saying another word.

That would require a change in the law. Names and salaries of public employees have been held to not be highly personal information exempt from the public records law. See Attorney General v. Collector of Lynn, 377 Mass. 151, Hastings & Sons Publishing Co. v. City Treasurer of Lynn, 374 Mass. 812. This is part of the "diminished expectation of privacy in matters relating to their public employment" attaching to public employment.

Please note that Google Analytics do not anonymize the data you collect on its behalf unless you configure it to do IP-anonymization. If you use Google Analytics and do not use this feature, you need to have a DPA (Data Processing Addendum) in place with Google in order to comply with the GDPR. This is a real hassle, so unless you absolutely need fine-grained demographic data, it is strongly recommended that you use IP-anonymization. According to our data protection supervisory authority, this is sufficient to comply with the GDPR vis-a-vis Google Analytics. Does data that is anonymized need to be collect in the event of a GDPR Subject Access Request? No. But as the controller, you need to make sure that is is anonymized.

Does GDPR prohibit reading unsolicited emails from people who have not explicitly opted in to a mailing list? tl;dr: No. I have never heard of this, and I don't see how this could follow from the GDPR. You should follow up with the Secretary to find out how she came to her conclusion. Detailed reasoning: The GDPR restricts the processing of personal data, so it does in principle cover reading email, since reading counts as "processing", and an email may contain personal data. However, Article 2 (emphasis mine) says that: This Regulation applies to the processing of personal data wholly or partly by automated means and to the processing other than by automated means of personal data which form part of a filing system or are intended to form part of a filing system. I would read this to mean that a human reading emails is only covered by GDPR if the emails are part of a "filing system" or intended to be. So reading the emails is ok, it's only problematic if you intend to systematically store them. Even filing them, while covered by GDPR, would presumably be allowed, because to actually act on the email, you would have to keep it, and Article 6 allows processing of personal data to "take steps at the request of the data subject prior to entering into a contract" and when "processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller". One caveat: If the email contains data that falls under special categories of personal data (Article 9) you may need explicit consent for storage. That covers things like racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious beliefs and health information. So if someone discloses a health problem or their religious belief in their mail, you may need to ask them for permission to keep it. In summary: At most, GDPR would require you to promptly delete the email once you no longer need it (which could be immediately if the email is irrelevant to you). If the email contains data you legitimately need (e.g. a complaint you need to follow up on), you are allowed to keep it as required (based on Article 6 (f)). Note that in both cases no explicit consent is required from the email sender, unless the email contains particularly sensitive data, such as political/religious beliefs or health data.

Publication after the author's death is still publication. As you can see in this excellent chart this work is copyrighted for 95 years after the publication date under US law. If it had never been published, it would be protected by copyright for 70 years after the death of Lovecraft, the author (a term which has now expired). However, statements of genealogy would be facts, and as such are not protected by copyright. limited quotes to support those facts would be appropriate in a work of non-fiction, and would normally be permitted as fair use under US law. Such quotes would probably not be appropriate in fiction in any case. The exact wording of the genealogy would probably be protected, but not the relationships (who is the parent of whom, etc).

Federal and state laws do protect a variety of different types of personal information in particular contexts, but there isn't really any information that is necessarily personal and protected from disclosure in all contexts. For instance, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act generally protects a person's health records from unnecessary disclosure, and the Federal Education Rights and Privacy Act generally protects a student's educational records from unneccessary disclosure. But that doesn't mean that all of an American's health information is protected, or that all of the information that a hospital holds about an American is protected. The hospital can typically disclose the fact that it is treating a specific person, and if that person provides his health records to a government employer, that employer may be required to produce them in response to a request under the Ohio Public Records Act. But Facebook isn't a health-care provider, so it isn't required to protect medical records, and it isn't a school, so it isn't required to protect educational records. At the federal level, I don't know of any privacy laws that require it to maintain the privacy of its users' information, though it may be required to do so under state laws, or as a contractual matter because of its privacy policy. But that doesn't mean it has nothing to worry about. Like any business in the United States, it is prohibited from engaging in deceptive trade practices, so it can't make broad promises to protect users' privacy when it has no intention of honoring them. That's why it ended up paying $5 billion for privacy violations in the past and remains under court orders requiring it to better protect users' data. Further, Facebook has users all over the world, so it is required to comply with the international privacy regulations like GDPR that can be far more stringent.

Can i create a software which can store doctor prescription? I have developed a software which can store doctors prescription digitally. wondering if there would any legal complications on it. Any laws preventing that sort of software/practice in united states. the user basically would manually re-enter what is in prescription into this app.

Your basic regulatory umbrella for anything that stores, transmits or interacts with any private health information or health IT systems is Health Information Privacy | HHS.gov, as well as state authorities. There are severe penalties at the federal and state level for non-compliance and privacy breaches, and many other agencies - such as the DEA, state health departments, insurance companies - would have to be involved in testing and certification of such a App. You will simply not be able to distribute the App on Google or iTunes without their approval, and those distributors will not approve a App that has not been strictly vetted for privacy and HIPAA compliance. In order to distribute such as App - with a TOS that assures personal privacy and shields you from liability (if possible) - you will need to spend hundreds of thousands of dollars on legal representation for compliance. As an example, see ohwilleke's answer to What kind of lawyer should I seek to understand compliance requirements for processing credit cards?

The use of the icon must be specific to the function of the icon within the Microsoft software. ... is pretty specific. What you have described isn't so it is not permitted by the licence.

Can you locate your license (generally not a trivial task)? It may appear under Help-About and a click to view EULA. The EULA specifically addresses redistribution of parts of the software and number of installations you can make with a single license. They do not say what uses you make make of the software, except that "You may not rent, lease, lend or provide commercial hosting services with the Software". There is no express prohibition against commercial or non-commercial political use of the product: anything not prohibited is allowed. The fact that they say nothing about the content that you create with Word means, they have declined to have a say in the matter. (I am not sure about the wording of the "Educational" versions of Office: those are somewhat negotiated between the institution and MS).

The words "proprietary format" are important. Are you sure the format is proprietary? If it is, then it's likely protected in which case they might have grounds to sue (but that does not mean they would definetly win). If the format is not proprietary, and so long as you don't share data which is proprietary then I believe you fine. I'm not a lawyer - but I cite GIF files as an example. They were still protected by the US and some other countries until at least the late 90s and there were various threats to open source linux companies who shared code that used the file format. I'm not aware of anything other than threats and never heard of any company being sued, let alone winning or losing. Another example that comes to mind is the RedHat ISO format. My understanding is RedHat could not stop anyone from sharing open source, but they could prevent folks from sharing the format they assembled and shared the open source. Again, I am not sure if it was ever tested in any court of law anywhere.

The idea for an app is not subject to copyright. Only the artifacts of the app itself (sourcecode, images, texts, sounds, etc.) can be. So if one only copies the idea and creates their own version of all the other assets, then they are not violating copyright. However, in some cases, ideas can be subject to patents. But patents on software are tricky. First of all, only new ideas can be patented. When a supposed new idea was already published before, then that's called "prior art" and you can not patent it. Then getting a patent means a lot of investment in money and time (which is very different from copyright which you get automatically the moment you make something copyright-worthy). So not everything that could theoretically be patented gets patented. And then, many jurisdictions do not recognize software patents at all, and those which do have different limits on what is and is not patentable when it comes to software. This means patents are rarely a concern when copying the app idea of someone else, but not never. And another possible concern is the third pillar of intellectual property: Trademarks. This protects the name of the app. Trademark law oversimplified forbids to create a competing product with a name which might confuse customers. So if you created StevesSuperCoolAppForCoolPeople and I create StevesSuperCoolAppForCoolPeople - Simplified Edition, then I would be violating your trademark, because my product name sounds as if it was your product, when it is in fact an unrelated product with a similar purpose.

You get a lab to test it You should clearly document the chain of custody (ideally with photos) from the unopened packaging to the lab. Any decent sized city will have several labs with the capability to tell you what’s in a pill and provide an expert report.

Depending on your jurisdiction, such lists may be protected, but not by copyright. For example, in Germany there was a court decision that scanning all the country’s phone books and selling them on CD constituted “unfair competition” and was illegal, while hiring 1000 typists who would manually type in all this information would not be. Databases are protected in many jurisdictions, and a list of the 1000 most commonly used English words could reasonably be called a database.

I cannot speak for civil law systems (Germany) but in Common Law (UK, USA) systems the law looks at substance rather than form. So: Am I allowed to undo the word-wrapping of all the texts and unindent them, as well as performing a new word-wrap on them? Yes Do I have to make sure that it is readable for everyone on every device, and do I have to make sure that accessibility interfaces are used (e.g. for blind persons, which aren't even the target group of my software)? If they are licences (rather than contracts) they must simply be available; this does not mean universally available. Do I have to make sure, that if my application wouldn't even start correctly on a device, that the user is able to start the application in an impossible, absurd, magic or religious way to ensure that he can read the legal texts or is it enough to state it on the website then? It depends if you want the licences to be enforceable by you on the users or if you are simply complying with your disclosure obligations. See What if the user disagreed with the Terms of Service, but still registered on a website?. Do I have to make sure that the rendering of the licenses/privacy policy/impressum is performant (e.g. text rendering and refresh after scrolling takes less than a second)? I already have to include two external libraries with my software to display the texts, otherwise it would not be possible to display texts at all. No - make them wait if you want.

Picture of a receipt from a Doctor I had to go several rounds with a doctor's office about them not taking my insurance and them assuring me that the copay would be a certain amount. They then charged me 20x the quoted amount. I didn't have documentation of the quote which is admittedly my fault. Lesson learned, not going back to that office and getting documented quotes in the future. My issue is that the only way I could pay the bill was to call them over the phone to provide credit card information. I asked for a receipt and the office emailed me a picture of an analog receipt that looked like it came from a cash register with my name scribbled on it. All infosec issues aside this doesn't seem like a legally binding document and it is making me very concerned especially since I am pretty sure I will want to file my taxes with this as a non reimbursed medical expense. Will the IRS take this as a legitimate receipt of medical services rendered? Are their reporting laws around this? The services were rendered in New York State.

Is It Legally Binding? While their customer service sucks, your oral authorization of the charge is legally binding (I take payments that way almost every day in my own business, it isn't an unusual business practice in small professional businesses). You authorize oral authorization of payments over the phone in the credit card agreement that your credit card company sends you every year that you don't read and throw away. The provider has to collect more information for a credit card payment over the phone than they do for an in person swipe in a credit card machine (e.g. your credit card billing address) and they are fully responsible for wrongful charges if they deal with an imposter. By regularly checking your credit card statements, you can confirm that no incorrect charges are present. Tax Issues If you want to take a tax deduction for non-reimbursed medical expenses, you simply need to tote up the amounts your are entitled to from your own records, and put it in the appropriate box on your tax forms. You don't have to attach documentation to your return. If the IRS disputes your payment, you can offer up your credit card statements and your photograph of the receipts, and if necessary, medical records to show that you received the services, to show that the payment really happened and are deductible. Your credit card company's records, reflected in your monthly credit card statements, are considered very reliable for tax purposes. You have the burden of proving that the expense was incurred and is of a type that qualifies for a deduction by a preponderance of the evidence in the event that there is a dispute that is litigated, which means that you must show that it is more likely than not that you incurred a deductible expense of that kind in that amount in that tax year. Privacy Issues While there are financial information privacy issues associated with this transaction, HIPAA, which covers medical records, normally wouldn't apply to a credit card payment that indicates the person paid, the person paying, the account, the amount and the date, but not a description of the medical services provided or to whom they were provided, which is what is normally on a credit card receipt. The financial privacy issues are also partially addressed by the provider's merchant agreement with the credit card company which contains terms requiring them to maintain certain kinds of security with respect to your financial information (which is not to say that the provider actually follows all of the requirements of their merchant agreement scrupulously, which is why data breaches happen all the time in businesses both large and small).

Yes in general Generally, almost all western jurisdictions (be they civil law or common law) have some way to get medical records into evidence, be that via subpoenaing, or by discovery requests or court orders. In most cases, the party that brings the suit is also the patient or their legal representative, and they give (or imply) consent to the use of the records. And in cases where the defendant's medical records are required, usually, the defense wants those in too to prove some condition. And then there are cases where the state or their representatives brings the charge. They usually can bring a warrant or court order to obtain the documents. Then there are Medical records that had been made specifically on the behest of the state. Here, the warrant is usually filed to obtain the samples or access to the body to be investigated, the record itself forms the basis for the investigators to proceed - and is not under client-doctor confidentially in the first place. It had been made specifically for the state and it is a state-owned medical record, be they made on request of the executive power (police) with a warrant signed by a judge or on behalf of the judicative after a court order to evaluate capacity (see below). However, medical records can generally only be obtained if the records are relevant to the case at hand and only to the degree necessary: You can't request the medical records about a person's fertility status in a case that discusses damages for his broken arm. As a result, the medical record available in court might be only an extract from the original, with irrelevant passages sealed or redacted. Unlike many people think, it's quite common to get some medical records into court in some way or another: As the basis of injury cases If you have a case of physical injury, the injuries themselves need to be proven in court. This is done generally by getting the medical records - thus they can be subpoenaed by a party, usually the injured party here. Then a medical expert can discuss them, be they a court-appointed one or paid by either of the parties. In this category also fall mandatory reports of certain types of wounds or situations. As such, the treating doctor has to provide a medical report with enumerated types of injuries, like bullet wounds or where child abuse might be the reason. Very necessarily in malpractice cases Malpractice is pretty much injury on steroids: the injuring party made the records and would never want to give them up to the one suing them - if they could. Alice shall remove Appendix. It goes haywire and the day after Charly needs to cut Bob open again. Now Bob sues Alice for malpractice. Bob needs medical records from both Alice, the doctor who botched it, and Charly, who was fixing Alice's error. Generally, both records are subpoena-able to the degree relevant and necessary, and indeed the opposing medical opinions on the operation and records form the very basis of the case for either side. Without the ability to subpoena the - in this case unmodified - records from the injuring doctor, proving - or defending - a case of malpractice would be impossible: the very truth of the allegation should be in the medical records. It's routine in cases around death What is the very last medical record a person can ever get? An autopsy record! That's a very sensitive medical record, but they routinely are used in homicide cases. Oftentimes, the investigators also subpoena the medical records of the victim from their doctors to corroborate the autopsy record, while the defense might subpoena them to try and disprove it. Even in civil cases, like the OJ-Simpson civil damages case, autopsy and medical records from an accompanying criminal case can and will be "pulled" (copied over) from the other trial's docket. Regularly in child protection cases Whenever child protection is on the line, be them protective orders or who a child will live with after the child protection service (whatever its name is) is in on a case, then medical records are often required to bolster one side. Those records could be medical records from quite many doctors, be they physicals or psychological evaluations... Sometimes the medical records required here are only created due to court-ordered medical or psychological evaluation by a doctor. Whenever incompetence defense is called When the lawyer claims temporary incompetence or insanity, courts generally order a psychological evaluation. These medical records are evidence, but usually don't need to be subpoenaed: they have a waiver form to be disclosed to the court almost built-in. Are they available to the public? Medical records are part of truth-finding, but they are also quite sensitive. As a result, most medical records can not be gotten from the court and enter the dockets under seal. Another option is, that they enter the docket partially or even mostly redacted, with passages blackened.

Sorry, what did I agree to? NDA means New Drug Application, right? Or is it Notre Dame Academy? Maybe it's Nebraska Dressage Association - don't want to cross those guys, their horses are mean. When you are trying to form a contract with someone, it's very important that you and they are talking about the same thing. What can't I disclose? That I had a phone call? What I said? What you said? Only the confidential bits? If so, what are they? Can I tell my business partner? My lawyer? My secretary? The IRS? Another important thing about making a contract is to agree on the terms. Post-facto contracts are not a thing After you paint my fence, you can't demand payment. We have to enter into a contract before the thing that happened happens. Elements of the call might be confidential anyway I am bound to respect confidences that were entrusted to me where a) the information is confidential b) it was imparted to me in a situation of confidence and c) disclosing it would cause harm. We don't need a Non-Destructive Analysis to document that.

I took my car to the mechanic to have a squeaky brake looked at. I was told it would cost $30. The mechanic fixed whatever the problem was. When I was checking out, they could not find a $30 brake-work item in their computer so they billed it as Tire Balancing $30. Or some such thing. Meh, accounting. This is not how the law works. The prosecution needs to prove every element of the crime you are charged with. They need to prove you did not signal. The way this usually works is the cop takes the stand and testifies, and you can cross examine him. Then you can testify if you want to, and can be cross-examined. There might be other evidence against you also, like a dash cam. Assuming there is no other evidence, and that the officer did not prove every element of failing to signal, you do not need to testify. You can tell the judge that the prosecution failed to make the case and ask to have the charge dismissed. Of course, if the judge thinks they did make their case, then you lose. On the other hand, you could take the stand and testify, and subject yourself to cross examination. Just a word of warning, if it's your word against a cop's word, you will lose. Your best bet is to get discovery, get the dash cam, and show that you did signal. Be aware, if you get too saucy, the prosecution can add charges. So they could add the speeding charge, but of course, (see above), they then need to prove it.

No, nor can I request a copy of your tax return. See 5 USC 552a. Record maintained on an individual are not subject to disclosure.

There is no general law making it illegal to lie about debts, or anything else. It is illegal to lie to a law enforcement officer in the course of an investigation. (And of course it is illegal to lie in court testimony or when otherwise under oath.) But it is in no way unlawful to decline to answer, unless a proper court order has been obtained, or other lawful means of compelling an answer. I would expect any law office to respond to such a question with something like "Am I/we being investigated? If so, send the appropriate notice and our lawyer will consider what we should tell you. If not, tell us what information you want, and we will consider and provide a written response in due course." If a taxpayer has been found to be delinquent in paying taxes, in some cases a court order may be obtained seizing assets, including unpaid debts. But no IRS agent can make such a claim on the spot, and indeed for a client to make such a payment without such a court order, or the order of an IRS tribunal (or the creditor's written consent) would itself be unlawful and would subject the lawyer to a suit by the PI (Private Investigator). When the lawyer pays a service provider, a 1099 must be filed with the IRS. If the PI is a corporation, a different form is used, but a record of payment is still required. As failure to timely file such a form is a violation of the tax code, an accusation of paying without filing would permit the lawyer to decline to answer under the Fifth amendment. If the lawyer did pay and did file a 1099 or other documentation, the IRS would know what had been payed, and would not need to confront the PI. Also, as the comment by Hilmar points out, a PI would be likely to use the cash accounting method, and so would own no tax on work performed but unpaid (as yet). So unless the IRS agent thinks the PI was paid "off-the books" and is intentionally failing to report the payment, there would be no point to such a question. And if that were he case, the lawyer would be very likely to decline to answer. I find the story quite implausible.

I think the officer is probably lying, not just mistaken, but they are not required to always be truthful. In addition to the law against possessing ID with intent to commit, or to aid or abet, any crime, it is also against the law to be knowingly in possession of a stolen credit card, or any other property. An example of a strict-liability possession crime, which the officer knows of, is that it is a crime to possess heroin, period. I am skeptical that the officer actually believes that there is a law making it a crime to be in possession of a credit card with permission, and suspect that he thinks it is stolen.

If they actually mean $0, then that is not "taking advantage". If they do not mean $0, it is most likely that they will tell you "Sorry, we made a mistake, we're not gonna send you that Rolex for $0 plus shipping". If this came with free shipping, then you would not actually have a contract, because there s no consideration on your part (no payola). Fortunately, there is shipping, so there is a contract. You could then attempt to force them to send you the goods, which they might do rather than irritate you, but not if it is a Rolex. One of the defenses against enforcing a contract is "mistake", and a $0 Rolex would be a great example of that. Things get a bit more tricky if you relied on their free Rolex. You would look up the doctrine of promissory estoppel, to see if the seller could be estopped from making the mistake argument. Let's say that you also bought a Rolex Display Case from someone else at a cost of $100 plus shipping. By relying on their promise to sent you a Rolex, you have suffered a loss. The most likely outcome is that they'd have to reimburse your Display Case expense. (Finding) mistake airfares is an industry: a common response for the airline is to say "Oops, sorry", though sometimes they honor the mistake fare. Rumor has it that rather than get trashed on Twitter, the airlines honor mistake fares. You may find disclaimer language pertaining to verification of prices and availability, which also gets them off the hook. At any rate, you certainly won't be sued or prosecuted for assuming that they mean it and buying the thing; you might be disappointed.

Can I be sued for failing to secure an email I didn't request? I work for a company that services schools across the US and we receive email communications from them all the time. On occasion I receive emails with blocks such as the following in their signatures: PRIVACY & CONFIDENTIALITY OF INFORMATION NOTICE: This communication may contain non-public, confidential, or legally privileged information intended for the sole use of the designated recipient (s). If you are not the intended recipient, or have received this communication in error, please notify the sender immediately by reply e-mail or by telephone and delete all copies of the communication, including attachments, without reading them or saving them to disk. If you are the intended recipient, you must secure the contents in accordance with all applicable state or federal requirements related to the privacy and confidentiality of information, including the FERPA and HIPAA Privacy guidelines. Under Florida law, e-mail addresses, and all forms of communications, including e-mail communications, made or received in connection with the transaction of School Board business are public records, which must be retained as required by law and must be disclosed upon receipt of a public records request, except as may be excluded by federal or state laws. If you do not want your e-mail address released in response to a public records request, do not send electronic mail to this entity. Instead, contact this office by phone. My question regards the tail ends of both paragraphs. In both cases is appears that I'd be subject to binding by law or reductions in my privacy due to an email I may never have requested. In particular the first paragraph suggests that a public entity could contact me(provided they intended to) and I can then become responsible for securing the contents of an email I may never have requested or anticipated. The second paragraph seems to suggest that my email address could become public record if I responded to a message sent in error(it lacks the clause about intended recipient). It seems backwards to make my information public based on interacting at all with the sender of an email I received. The precise question is this: Can this school cause me to come under the authority of Florida public records law or make me subject to disclosure agreement regarding the information simply by sending it to me? Is there any requirement for at least implied consent? (In case it matters, I don't have any great need to do so, I'm just curious at the presumptive language used in the notice). Edit: The linked answer provides information for one of the clauses and suggests a possible answer for the rest, but doesn't provide for the disclosure clause regarding my own email. I've edited the question to try to twine them together more clearly. The whole concern is the ability of another entity to essentially opt me into an agreement, wherein the only real consent is opening a communication I received to see what it might be.

The second paragraph actually says that your e-mail address will become public record if you send an e-mail message to them. That's because there's a Florida law that requires this. If you want to communicate with the school without your e-mail address appearing in the public record, you can call on the telephone, send postal mail, or visit in person. The notice is precisely there to inform you of the fact that sending e-mail to the school will have this effect, and it helpfully mentions one of the ways you can avoid that outcome: If you do not want your e-mail address released in response to a public records request, do not send electronic mail to this entity. Instead, contact this office by phone. If you think about the nature and purpose of public records laws, you will perhaps understand why the Florida law does not speak of consent or allow those corresponding with affected entities to opt out. If that were possible, then people who were conducting improper business with the public entities would withhold consent or otherwise opt out, making the public records law useless in the service of its goal of increasing transparency in government.

If law enforcement is actually requesting an encryption key, talk to a real lawyer. To answer your first question, the answer is "the government probably can't demand the password, but might be able to demand the data." Some courts have ruled that the Fifth Amendment can prevent courts from forcing someone to decrypt data for the government, because the act of decrypting the data conveys information (see United States v. Doe from the 11th Circuit). Other courts have ruled that there are situations where that is not the case (US v. Fricosu, In re Boucher). Boucher is particularly interesting because the government first asked for the password itself, and then (when that subpoena was quashed by the magistrate) narrowed its request to the decrypted data on appeal. In the magistrate's opinion, we see Also, the government concedes that it cannot compel Boucher to disclose the password to the grand jury because the disclosure would be testimonial. It is not generically a violation of the Fifth Amendment to compel production of documents (the 11th Circuit, quoting the Supreme Court, considered this a "settled proposition"). The issue is that the act of producing the documents can be considered testimony -- by producing the documents, the person is showing that they know the documents exist, where they are, how to read them, etc. Possession of the key to decrypt a file links you to that file, because keys are generally kept secret. In the 11th Circuit case, the court found that the government didn't know for a fact that a) Doe could decrypt the files, and b) what files existed on the encrypted drive. In the cases where forced decryption was allowed, the government had seen enough to independently show that the files existed, were authentic, and that the defendant had actual control/possession over them. The 11th Circuit asked for a bit more (the location), based on a standard that is in effect in some circuits but not others. In any event, courts seem to generally consider this to take a court order to force production of anything; the police can't just order you to do it.

Am I correct in arguing that the LHD never really had implied consent to begin with? In other words, does the failure to honour the express refusal inform us about the legitimacy of prior claims of implied consent? No. They had implied consent and had not intent at the outset to dishonor it. They have violated the patient's privacy right when consent was expressly withdrawn, and they discovered that they cannot easily comply and therefore did not comply. The fact that they have made it expensive for themselves to comply with their legal obligations going forward does not imply that they lacked implied consent at the outset, so they should have no liability for the time period from when the training materials started to be used until the time when implied consent ended. They are only responsible going forward for their failure to honor the patient's wishes. It is not at all exceptional for a legal obligation to turn out to be more difficult to comply with when it arises than was anticipated when the systems that make the legal obligation difficult to comply with were implemented. Health care companies aren't expected to be prophets who can foresee the complex confluence of factors that has painted them in a corner, particularly when a situation has never come up before the current one. It is likely that no one person was ever even simultaneously aware of all the facts necessary to know that this could happen. Someone in the IT department will often not be intimately familiar with what is going on in the training part of the operation and what the privacy rules that apply are and even if someone was, that someone may have been in no position to do anything about it at the time. Health care providers aren't supposed to be evaluated with 20-20 hindsight. Given that they almost surely did not and could not easily have known that they had made a future express withdrawal of consent very difficult to effectuate, scienter can't be attributed to it. And, honestly, they are in more than enough trouble simply trying to deal with the problem post-express withdrawal of consent when they did start to violate privacy laws.

If someone sends you something that you did not request, that is "unordered merchandise", and under US law, can be treated like a gift meaning that you do not have to return the goods or pay for it. Under the circumstances that you describe, this is not classic unordered merchandise. The vendor simply has to claim (and prove) that you did order the merchandise, which could be done in small claims court. What is unclear at present how any person could, out of the blue, decide to send you the same thing a week later. Innocent error is one possibility (slip-up by either party or some communication error by Ebay), as is fraudulent skullduggery (credit card fraud). The point is that the vendor would have to prove that you did indeed order the goods, so if they want to avoid paying for shipping (if we are still talking about a non-litigious response), they would need to provide compelling proof that you did indeed order the goods. This almost certainly will involve Ebay's tech staff (who would be in the best position to say where the order actually came from). So, yes, you could be sued in small claims court, and it really depends on how strong their proof is that you ordered the goods.

I drafted this answer many days ago but did not complete it. My intention is to define red flag notice. However, I'm hitting Submit because I think it's a good question and hope this will inspire other answers. It seems like your immediate question, regarding the DCMA notices which Google is forwarding, is not a legal question. It is a question that can only be answered by Google and is dependent on their practices. Frankly though, it seems to me that Google search results might not be important based on the purpose of your proxy service. However perhaps your user base has evolved. You are a service provider under 17 USC 512(k)(i). If you aren't we need to clear that up! As for the copyright holders, you haven't received notice complying with 17 USC 512 (c)(3)(A)(i-iv). As such you don't have notice. Even if these notices don't qualify then we argue about whether you have red flag notice - based on facts and circumstances. (See Grokster) EDIT TO ADD: 17 U.S. Code § 512 - Limitations on liability relating to material online is one of the sections created by the DMCA. It is sometimes referred to as the safe harbor. You can read about it on Wikipedia® page for the Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act. If you read that Wikipedia® page you will see a short section on Red Flags. They say it as well as I could: [In addition to notice from a copyright holder, the second way] that an OSP can be put on notice that its system contains infringing material, for purposes of section 512(d), is referred to the "red flag" test. The "red flag" test stems from the language in the statute that requires that an OSP not be “aware of facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent.” The "red flag" test contains both a subjective and an objective element. Subjectively, the OSP must have knowledge that the material resides on its system. Objectively, the "infringing activity would have been apparent to a reasonable person operating under the same or similar circumstances." The reason that notice is important is that the safe harbor provided is only available if you do not know that infringing is happening. Plaintiff's prove knowledge through the letter or through red flags. I am glad that you asked about Grokster, because that was the wrong case! The case to look at is Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. Youtube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, (2nd Cir., 2012). The difference between actual and red flag knowledge is thus not between specific and generalized knowledge, but instead between a subjective and an objective standard. In other words, the actual knowledge provision turns on whether the provider actually or “subjectively” knew of specific infringement, while the red flag provision turns on whether the provider was subjectively aware of facts that would have made the specific infringement “objectively” obvious to a reasonable person. The red flag provision, because it incorporates an objective standard, is not swallowed up by the actual knowledge provision under our construction of the § 512(c) safe harbor. Both provisions do independent work, and both apply only to specific instances of infringement. In other words, you lose your safe harbor protection if you know of facts and circumstances that would lead an ordinary person to know that infringement is happening. So the question for you is - do the letters forwarded by Google mean that you have knowledge and are outside of the safe harbor? Well that's the question that lawyers fight about! In fact Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Fung, 710 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir., 2013) is all about that fight. If you read that case you will see that Fung was doing a bunch of shit that totally made it completely obvious that he was infringing. And he was earning money directly from it. He was screwed from the start. Now again, this does not really help you with the google blacklist problem, but it should help you understand what you need to do as a service provider to not be complicit in copryright infringement. You really should read the Fung case and 17 U.S.C. § 512 - they will go a long way to help you understand the analysis a court will apply. EDIT Regarding your legal exposure, I always assume that a cease and desist letter will precede a lawsuit. With that said, only you know how much infringing is coming across your server. Fung made his money directly from the infringement. He attracted website visitors specifically because of the infringement. He had emails and other documents proving this. Diebold is interesting because they attempted to use copyright to control the spread of their emails. First the court said no commercial harm and no diminishment of value of the works. Then the court found that the stuff wasn't even subject to copyright. This is obviously not a typical case. But it sounds like you see yourself as OPG in this case. I don't see how you can become a plaintiff against bona fide copyright holders who follow the links as far as your server. As I understand it, you are a reasonable target of the the notices, that's the result of running the proxy. However, I might be getting out of my technical depth here. As I intimated earlier, you might need to seek out some strategic advice regarding dealing with Google and the specific steps you might take to stay in the right side of their enforcement.

This is not legal advice, It is not even primarily a legal opinion. It is a legal position. The lawyer, acting on behalf of the agency from which you requested information, is giving the reasons why that agency is declining your request. The lawyer is presumably either an employee of the agency, or has the agency as a client. In any case, this is notice of the position that the agency would be likely to adopt if you took further legal action, such as a suit to compel disclosure. Lawyers provide such position statements ion behalf of clients or employers all the time. Such statements indicate why certain action is taken, what basis the client or employer has for taking or not taking certain action, and often indicate the nature of the defenses or theories that will be used should a lawsuit follow, although the client or employer is free to change the theory at the pleading stage. Not only is it not unethical for the lawyer to respond in this way, the agency is, I am fairly sure, required by the law to provide a valid reason when a request is declined. That is what they have done, provide a reason that they claim is valid, with some legal reasoning about why it is valid. Note that I express no view on whether the reason given is in fact valid, or would be sustained in a suit. That would be a different question.

Option 1 is that this is a private school. The school can establish whatever rules they want. There might be a cause of action for breach of contract, but more likely there is some clause saying "You have to do what the principal tells you". Private organizations are allowed to completely suppress you freedom of expression. Option 2 is that this is a public school, in which case they are bound by the First Amendment (which is a limit on government action). Such a prohibition is legally untenable, but you may have to go to court to get an official ruling on the matter. If speech is objectively disruptive, it can be limited, but your examples are not objectively offensive or disruptive, they are simply somewhat provocative. Here is a summary from the ACLU of what public schools can't do w.r.t. student appearance.

California Penal Code 647f states that being intoxicated in public is prohibited. When the police arrived, they were confronted with probable cause for an arrest. They (presumably) became aware of the matter because the doctor called the police, since she believe that you would drive drunk. (We can inquire into whether that was a reasonable belief, but it doesn't matter, what matters is that she had the belief and acted on it). Now the question is whether the doctor acting on the belief (making the call) was legal. A negative answer does not affect the legality of the arrest. There is also a law imposing on medical professionals a duty to report, which is fairly wordy, but does not seem to directly require reporting the fact that a person is publicly intoxicated. However, attending circumstances could have suggested one of the triggering causes for mandatory reporting (wounds, for example). Again, it does not matter (to a point) if, in the light of close scrutiny, the doctor's conclusions were mistaken. When doctors are required to report facts to the police, reasonable over-reporting is not penalized. There is also no law against calling 911 to report a potential DUI (the usual public-campaign focus is on those actually driving). So calling the police under the circumstances falls between "allowed" and "required". The HIPAA privacy rule could be relevant because that theoretically could block the doctor from making the call. (Note that the doctor, and not the patient, is bound by the confidentiality requirements). §160.203 allows exceptions to the confidentiality requirement if "necessary... For purposes of serving a compelling need related to public health, safety, or welfare", so an exception may have been granted. If this was done within the scope of a mandatory reporting law, it is legal to disclose PHI; under §164.512 it is allowed, "to prevent or lessen a serious and imminent threat to the health or safety of a person or the public". A confidentiality agreement would not increase your chances of being arrested. If the doctor's confidentiality statement were less restrictive than HIPAA, HIPAA prevails (the law trumps contract terms). If it is the same as HIPAA, it has no effect (and simply states what HIPAA says – the normal case). If the agreement were more restrictive, it is possible that the doctor calling the police would be a breach of contract, unless the call was required by law. You would have to see what in the agreement would have prohibited calling the police. But that would not affect the validity of the arrest. To re-phrase the matter: the arrest was because you were found to be intoxicated in public. The police were there and could judge your state (probable cause). They were there by permission of the property owner, so the arrest was not unlawful for lack of a warrant. That is as far as one can go in searching for an illegality to the arrest itself. One might go further and ask whether the doctor has committed an actionable wrong by calling the police with her suspicions. This could go either way: it really depends on the full set of details, regarding your condition. If the doctor suspected that your actions fell under one of the mandatory reporting categories, she had to report, and otherwise it is not prohibited under HIPAA. If a person is intoxicated and answers the question "Would you normally proceed to drive home in this state?" in the affirmative, then it is a reasonable inference that the person will do so. An answer "No, absolutely not", on the other hand would work against the "public danger" inference: that has no effect on the arrest, but could have an effect in a suit against the doctor (violation of the privacy rule). In such a suit, the doctor's defense would presumably be that despite the answer, she still had a reasonable belief that you were a public danger. Then the matter would reduce to what other facts she knew of that would support a public danger conclusion.

Do parents have access to an adult child's childhood medical records After my child turns 18, I know I am blocked from seeing any new medical records, unless they give explicit permission. However, does that mean I am blocked from their pediatric medical records? Their pediatric provider sent me their complete vaccination record for our records, but they are now over 18. Is this a violation of HIPAA? I tried reading the rules and regulations, but I couldn't parse out this situation. If it is a violation, can you point at the regulation? If it is a violation, I'd like to inform the provider, so they don't continue this mistake. (To be clear, I have a release, and permission from our adult child, but the provider wouldn't know that.)

Late to the party, but I'll answer anyways. In general, providers have a lot of wiggle room when sharing information with parents, on condition that the patient hasn't explicitly objected despite having opportunity to do so. HIPAA allows the provider to make a judgment call on whether such information can be shared without explicit consent: Quoting Title 45 § 164.510 : (i) Obtains the individual's agreement; (ii) Provides the individual with the opportunity to object to the disclosure, and the individual does not express an objection; or (iii) Reasonably infers from the circumstances, based the exercise of professional judgment, that the individual does not object to the disclosure. HHS does discuss disclosure to family members in their FAQ : A covered entity is permitted to share information with a family member or other person involved in an individual’s care or payment for care as long as the individual does not object. A parent of a child who has just turned 18 is likely still somewhat involved in the child's care, so, absent either an objection or a reason to believe the child would object if asked, sharing is probably not a violation.

Certainly. A phone number is personal information (and on top of that, WhatsApp may provide some "profile info" from the people you contact). It is not difficult to identify a person by its phone number. So, sharing the phone number of the people affected should take into account the restrictions of GDPR. For instance, the Spanish Data Protection Agency (Agencia Española de Protección de Datos, AEPD) established in its Resolution R/03041/2017 that the Town Hall of Boecillo had violated the GDPR because it had created a WhatsApp group of citizens. Those citizens had provided their phone numbers to be informed about town hall activities, but they had not agreed to share their numbers with the other members of the group. And that was a very generic group. Doing a "patients recovering from cancer" or "drug abusers under treatment" or "people who need food assistence" group would involve sharing personal information that gets the maximum protection (in some specific instancies it could be that your information sharing that information is illegal even if the users gave you full consents). So yes, creating a WhatsApp group could very easily lead to a GDPR violation, and in fact it has been ruled at least once that it has. The fact that people cannot send messages is irrelevant. It would not make the issue any better or worse. After all, if I send a message through WhatsApp I am implicitly giving permission to everyone in the group to read it.

No. HIPAA places no limits on who you may share your medical records with - only on those with who your doctors (et al) can share. The HIV laws you refer to, place a positive obligation on you to share the information.

You can read about the obligation to access public records under Kentucky law here. This page is the Louisville PD' statement about what is available. They state that "Some items have been redacted, blurred or withheld for privacy or legal reasons", noting for example that the statute "exempts from disclosure under the Open Records Act information that, if disclosed, would create an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. Any further reference to redactions for personal privacy /concerns is also made pursuant to this law and/or HIPAA". The plaintiff's filing is not available and the police department has not commented, so we don't know exactly what is being demanded. However, the PD has not claimed that they are withholding the requested records for legal reasons, and the media alleges that the suit alleges that the PD lied about the existence of said records (note the double allegation). Body-worn cameras are specifically included here, and this part says that you can sue in county court. FOIA does not apply, because the Lousiville PD is not an agency of the US government.

The relevant legal requirement to have accurate records is 45 CFR 156.526, where An individual has the right to have a covered entity amend protected health information or a record about the individual in a designated record set for as long as the protected health information is maintained in the designated record set. The request can be denied if the record is accurate and complete. A simple and pointed solution is to print that page and circle the section, in a letter requesting an amendment. A somewhat more costly and much more effective solution would be to get a lawyer to write a letter in legalese. It is hard to imagine that the provider would not comply. You will notice that they have 60 days to comply (+30 days extension if requested). If for some reason they insist on leaving the record as is, you have the right to insert rebuttal statements into the record (basically, prove that the record is false). There is no realistic hope of compensation for annoyance, but you can hope for a correction.

This means that you have the right to make arrangements to do things like arrange for the child to travel to your home (possibly as an unaccompanied minor on a plane or train or bus), to enroll the child in a school of your choice near your home and to sign permission slips on behalf of the child as necessary for school activities, to arrange to have the child's possessions moved to your home, to locate a local pediatrician and dentist for the child and consent to the child's medical treatment by those health professionals, etc. Basically you have whatever parental authority you need to have that is incident to being able to do what is necessary to have the child live with you. You might not have parental authority in matters that are not related to something necessary to having the child live with you, for example, consenting to the child's marriage under the age of majority, or to the child enrolling in military service where parental permission is required, or to representing the child as guardian in connection with an inheritance case.

The rule applies to "A covered entity or business associate", who may not "use or disclose protected health information" except as permitted. The set of covered entities and business associates is pretty large, and certainly covers nurses, also secretaries working for the hospital or insurance company. It is not restricted to the doctor-patient relationship. However, the restriction is not absolute: a patient can consent to the disclosure of such information: but, the consent must be written. This raises an interpretive challenge, in case patient A reveals a medical fact to a friend B who happens to be a medical professional. Person B probably is a "covered entity", since they are undoubtedly A health care provider who transmits any health information in electronic form in connection with a transaction covered by this subchapter. The information also is "protected": Protected health information means individually identifiable health information: (1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this definition, that is: (i) Transmitted by electronic media; (ii) Maintained in electronic media; or (iii) Transmitted or maintained in any other form or medium. (2) Protected health information excludes individually identifiable health information: (i) In education records covered by the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act, as amended, 20 U.S.C. 1232g; (ii) In records described at 20 U.S.C. 1232g(a)(4)(B)(iv); (iii) In employment records held by a covered entity in its role as employer; and (iv) Regarding a person who has been deceased for more than 50 years. Para 5 on prohibited uses and disclosures explicitly lists the prohibited disclosures (genetic information for insurance underwriting, sale of PHI), so idle gossip is not explicitly prohibited. It is also not explicitly allowed. But again, the regulation says: may not use or disclose protected health information, except as permitted or required by this subpart Nothing in the rules limits the obligation of a "covered entity", in terms of how they came to be in possession of PHI. Given the definition of "covered entity", the fact of being a covered entity is a property does not depend on obtaining information electronically. So without written consent, B who is a covered entity cannot gossip about A's medical status.

The child does not have a legal right to determine how Iowa's compulsory education law is obeyed. The first section of the law says that the custodian of a child who is of compulsory attendance age shall cause the child to attend some public school or an accredited nonpublic school, or place the child under competent private instruction or independent private instruction and no other provision gives the child veto power. However, on the upper end, a child "under sixteen years of age by September 15 is of compulsory attendance age", with thus turning 16 during the school year being subject to compulsory education until the end of the school year". Let's say that the child turned 16 on Labor Day, then the compulsory education law does not apply. Still, until the age of majority, parents have the custodial right to make decisions in the best interests of the child. That right can be terminated, see Chapter 600a. Under certain circumstances, a child can petition the court for emancipation, which means that they will be treated as an adult under the law, and can therefore exercise their own judgment and live with the consequences. You would look at 600A.8 to see the grounds for termination – an objection "I don't like their choice of school" will not qualify.

How would members of a convention for amending the Constitution be chosen? Constitution of the United States, Article V: The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments How would the members of such a convention be chosen?

The method of proposing an amendment by way of Convention has never been used. Thus, procedural aspects such as how members of such a convention would be chosen have also not been settled: In the modern era, scholars have debated various issues, including: (1) how delegates to the convention should be chosen; (2) whether Congress, state legislatures, or the delegates should set rules of procedure for the convention; (3) the vote threshold would be required to propose an amendment in convention; and (4) how voting rights on a proposed amendment should be apportioned among the states. (Constitution Annotated, "ArtV.3.3 Proposals of Amendments by Convention")

As much as they like Most pieces of legislation have a “dictionary” detailing, for the purposes of that legislation (or generally) what specific words and phrases mean. This can broaden (or narrow) the definition compared to how they are used in normal English. The purpose of this is not to set a trap for the unwary, although this may happen, but to introduce precision and to allow a short defined term to be used in the drafting rather than having to explain what is meant verbosely every time it’s used. Of course, they can’t redefine terms so that they give themselves jurisdiction when they otherwise wouldn’t have it. For example, in australia, the Constitution gives the Federal Parliament the power to make laws about, among other things, “external affairs”. A law that tried to define “external affairs” more broadly than the Constitution does (which it doesn’t, so we fall back on what it means in English) would be invalid.

The language argument about the constitution is that the Constitution uses the pronoun "he" in referring to the president – they would not have used the construction "he or she", or "s/he". Article I also uses "he" to refer to qualifications of representatives and senators (residency, age). Then in creating the office of predident pro tempore of the Senate, it uses "he" to refer to a Vice President who is exercising the office of President of the United States. In Article IV Section II it states: A person charged in any state with treason, felony, or other crime, who shall flee from justice, and be found in another state, shall on demand of the executive authority of the state from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the state having jurisdiction of the crime. Thus women cannot be extradited, if the "'he' means male" theory prevails. In 1872, Victoria Woodhull ran for president, and while it is true there were questions about her eligibility, that was because of her age rather than sex. Belva Lockwood ran for president in 1884 and 1888. This is not strong enough to constitute proof that being female was not a bar to holding the office, but it is indicative of that conclusion. The strongest evidence that the use of "he" in the Constitution had no significance is the fact that Jeanette Rankin was elected US Representative from Montana in 1916, 2 years before Congress approved the 19th Amendment. Since the only way to impose any restrictions on the presidency is via the Constitution (i.e. Congress can't pass a law redefining the qualification for office), and since the use of "he" has never been strictly interpreted to preclude female senators and representatives, we have to conclude that there never has been a prohibition against a female president.

Your question: "How blatant the circumvention of the Constitution has to be for SCOTUS to act?" indicates some confusion about the big picture of how contesting the constitutionality of a law works. SCOTUS doesn't proactively do anything. The Supreme Court cannot simply review a law that has been enacted and say it is unconstitutional of its own accord, or at the request of someone involved in the political process (some countries allow this, the U.S. does not). The U.S. Supreme Court is not equivalent to the institution of a "Constitutional Court" found in many countries. It is just the last court of appeal for all U.S. Courts. It often ends up resolving constitutional questions, but only after other courts have already done so in cases where there are real tangible immediate consequences to the decision. A lawsuit must be brought by someone who is actually injured for the courts to act In your example, nothing would happen unless a home owner could show that soldiers had actually commandeered his home without consent or compensation, or places him in imminent fear of having this done. If someone can't show that, then no lawsuit to determine the constitutionality of the law is allowed even if it is blatantly unconstitutional and the question of the law's validity will remain unresolved by the courts. This limitation is called "standing" and requires that there be an actual case and controversy with a suit brought by someone who has suffered a legal injury before anyone can bring any lawsuit. In point of fact, there are all sorts of laws in the United States that are clearly unconstitutional, but which are never brought before the courts to declare unconstitutional, because the government agrees that those laws are unconstitutional and makes a point of not enforcing those laws. All cases (with exceptions not applicable here) start in trial courts Suppose soldiers do commandeer Bob's house at the express direction of the President without Bob's consent or following any procedure that amounts to due process. What does Bob do? Bob brings a lawsuit against the soldiers and their commanders up through the President and the United States in the U.S. District Court for the state where the house is located or where the defendants live. Suits against the U.S. and its employees must be brought in federal courts rather than state courts. SCOTUS can hear cases as a trial court, but only in cases involving a state or foreign country or a diplomat as a party (and in practice, even those cases are referred to a temporary judge called a special master for evaluation and SCOTUS only considers the case after receiving a recommendation from the special master). None of those circumstances apply in this case. A federal trial judge hears the case and decides if the law is constitutional or not, and if it is held to be unconstitutional may decide that Bob is entitled to a remedy. There will also be other separate issues to decide in the case. For example: Was the lawsuit brought within the statute of limitations? Are the soldiers immune to suit for damages against them personally, which depends upon how clear it was to the soldier that he was acting unconstitutionally? Were the soldiers violating orders or following orders? Did Bob meet other procedural requirements during the course of a lawsuit (like making the proper disclosures of information and showing up to hearing he is required to attend, and presenting evidence in accordance with the rules of evidence)? If the trial judge finds that the law is unconstitutional, the trial judge can issue an order saying so and that is the law of land that binds the parties (including the U.S. in any other case presenting the same issue under a principle called collateral estoppel) unless someone appeals the case. Every state and federal judge in the United States from small claims court judge to a U.S. Supreme Court justice has the power to declare laws unconstitutional if it comes up in a case properly heard in that judge's court, not just SCOTUS. SCOTUS (with exceptions that don't apply) doesn't hear direct appeals A handful of cases are directly appealed from a trial court to SCOTUS (mostly election law cases). But the vast majority of cases, including this one, would go to an intermediate court of appeals first. If someone does appeal the case, it goes to the U.S. Court of Appeals for whatever circuit the state of the District Court is located in. It reviews the judge's ruling in light of the evidence presented and can either reverse the trial judge's decision or affirm it. Only after the U.S. Court of Appeals has ruled (sometimes with one more layer of decision making within the U.S. Court of Appeals), any party can appeal the case by a writ of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court. SCOTUS often declines to reconsider Court of Appeals Rulings The U.S. Supreme Court doesn't have to take the case and 98% of the time that cases are appealed to it, it doesn't take the case. If it doesn't take the case, then the U.S. Court of Appeals ruling is the law and that ruling is binding on any other federal court in its jurisdiction in future case. The U.S. Supreme Court will usually only take the case if it feels the decision was wrong, or there are conflicting precedents that have to be resolved from different courts. Whichever judge decides constitutionality (a power not reserved to SCOTUS) that judge will try to follow the law to make the right decision whether the violation of the constitution is blatant or subtle. If the U.S. Supreme Court does decide to take the case, it can affirm that U.S. Court of Appeals ruling (which is then binding on all U.S. Courts as precedent), or it can reverse the U.S. Court of Appeals. In each case, at the trial court level, at the U.S. Court of Appeals level, and at the U.S. Supreme Court level, the only question is whether the law conflicts with the constitution as interpreted by the case law already decided over time. Only a handful of cases in the history of the United States have ever squarely addressed whether a law violates the 3rd Amendment so there isn't a lot of directly applicable precedent, but the judges would also consider how similar provisions of the constitution, like the 5th Amendment, have been treated and would consider law review articles and historical records about the intent of the Third Amendment as well. Judges have quite a bit of freedom in interpreting the law, but will try to rule in the way that most fairly represents what the total body of the law and interpretative information about the law says in the context of the facts before it. In this case the government would probably lose but you can never be sure In a case as clear as your example, the Government would very likely lose although no case is entirely certain, because it allows action at any time even though it is not a time of war, does not consider the home owner's consent, and does not create any meaningful procedure for exercising the right. But, it really doesn't matter if the violation is blatant or if it is subtle. The court even routinely rules that laws are unconstitutional not because they actually violate a provision of the constitution directly, but because they merely "burden" the exercise of a constitutional right. A law that effectively nullifies a constitutional provision would usually be invalidated. Sometimes lawyers informally and in private call an argument that is technically valid (for example, by creating a procedure albeit a meaningless one) "too cute." Arguments like that usually lose. The U.S. Supreme Court routinely invalidates laws that violate the constitution only in very subtle ways (e.g., requirements that have been interpreted to pose minor barriers to voting could be held unconstitutional), and the U.S. Supreme Court now and then refuses to invalidate laws that seemingly blatantly violate the constitution (e.g., "In God We Trust" on U.S. coins). Often a non-constitutional or settled constitutional law question is resolved purposely in a way that avoids the need to rule on an unresolved constitutional question Often, constitutional cases are resolved on the question of standing, or whether the right person has been sued, or by interpreting a law in a manner that is unnatural, in order to avoid having to address the question of the constitutionality of the law itself. For example, in your case, a judge might say that "at any time" in the statute, really means "at any time during a war", and that "regardless of the objections of the owner" really means "over the unreasonable objections of the owner", and that there is a duty to pay fair market value for the use of the house under the statute because the law is silent on that point, even if none of those things, in a cold plain reading of the statute would seem to be reasonable interpretations of its plain language. And then the judge might say that interpreted in this way, the law is constitutional, but the government violated the law and the court might then award a remedy to Bob, because the government violated the law so interpreted rather than because the government enforced an unconstitutional law. But, if it decides to take up a constitutional question because it isn't satisfied with how the U.S. Court of Appeals resolved the issue, it won't hesitate to do so.

The executive can only make laws within the scope of the powers granted to them by the constitution (of which there are very few) or delegated to them by congress. An executive order that oversteps those bounds is void as recent experience has shown.

Government FAQ on the Electoral College: If a winning Presidential candidate dies or becomes incapacitated between the counting of electoral votes in Congress and the inauguration, the Vice President elect will become President, according to Section 3 of the 20th Amendment. Section 3 of the 20th Amendment: If, at the time fixed for the beginning of the term of the President, the President elect shall have died, the Vice President elect shall become President. [...]

Nothing will happen. Wait for the 2030 census and January 3rd 2033. Representatives are only recalculated after each census. The last census and recalculation was 2020. So no ordinary recalculation will happen till 2030. It's unclear if there could be an extra census, which then might lead to redistricting - the only rules (in the constitution) I can find are, that a census has to happen every 10 years. Current laws are, that it happens every 10 years. It's up to politics to introduce laws to allow an extra census, but to make it that obvious that it is needed, there needs to be an exodus/death toll of the scale of the black death in Europe (one in 4 dies/moves) or a total depopulation of an area like New York City. Which has 8 million inhabitants, something like 10 districts, and is growing. Back in 1918 H1N1 killed between 2% and 10% of those that got it and in total about 675,000 (of 103.2 million) in the US, mainly in cities that did lag in their reaction to the fall/winter wave in 1918. As three (not fully) random examples: Philadelphia lost 16000 for something around 941 deaths per 100,000 inhabitants (the town had about 1.7 million inhabitants at the time), LA had a death toll of only 494 per 100,000, all of Nebraska lost between 2800 and 7500 people on a population of 1.3 million - for - for between 200 and 580 deaths per 100,000. Yet despite this very disparate impact it barely impacted the 1920 census. Not even the hurricane Katrina, which pretty much wiped out New Orleans, did not result in an extra census and restructuring - so it is very unlikely to happen. On the other hand, there is a formula for assigning representatives. We use the same setup since the 1940 census. Legal basis? 2 USC §2b dictates each state gets at least one: Each State shall be entitled, in the Seventy-eighth and in each Congress thereafter until the taking effect of a reapportionment under a subsequent statute or section 2a of this title, to the number of Representatives shown in the statement transmitted to the Congress on January 8, 1941, based upon the method known as the method of equal proportions, no State to receive less than one Member. 2 USC §2c dictates how many representative districts exist and how many representatives it will have: In each State entitled in the Ninety-first Congress [1969] or in any subsequent Congress thereafter to more than one Representative under an apportionment made pursuant to the provisions of section 2a(a) of this title, there shall be established by law a number of districts equal to the number of Representatives to which such State is so entitled, and Representatives shall be elected only from districts so established, no district to elect more than one Representative (except that a State which is entitled to more than one Representative and which has in all previous elections elected its Representatives at Large may elect its Representatives at Large to the Ninety-first Congress). The Redistricting is State-Law - and there are roughly 5 types how it's done. So, one representative per district. One district per representative. District borders are to be redrawn based on the decennial census as demanded in Art. 1 §2 - where it is called Enumeration: The actual Enumeration shall be made within three Years after the first Meeting of the Congress of the United States, and within every subsequent Term of ten Years, in such Manner as they shall by Law direct. The Number of Representatives shall not exceed one for every thirty Thousand, but each State shall have at Least one Representative; [provisional numbers] When will redistricting take effect? Redistricting lags one term behind, and it will not fire or remove a representative from office, whose district is scheduled to vanish - or elect new people. That's because redistricting on the state level can only happen after the reapportionment of the seats has been handed out by the clerk of the House of representatives. Reapportionment has a deadline of 25th January the year after the census. That's after the house term starts. Since at that moment the districts are still in existence, the term of the current holder first needs to run out before the new districts take effect. So the district ceases to exist the same day they leave office on January 3rd. A good example would be New York: The 45th district was redistricted from the 43rd District and elected first for in 1944, and was redistricted back into the 43rd District after the 1950 census. It was last voted for in 1950, well before the results of the census were handed out and redistricting happened. So the district ceased to be the same day Daniel A. Reed left the office on January 3rd of 1953. The 28th Congressional District was established in 1823 and eliminated on January 3rd 2013 as a result of the 2010 census. The last election for its seat was - obviously - in 2010. As a result, any changes to the district map stemming from the 2020 census will take effect only on January 3rd 2023, and a massive depopulation showing in the 2030 census will have an effect only in the elections for the house that begins its term on January 3rd 2033.

This clause was included in order to attract the Southern states to join the union. For general context, see Federalist 42,1 Federalist 38,2 and Paul Finkelman, "How the Proslavery Constitution Led to the Civil War" (2013) 43:3 Rutgers Law Journal 405.3 It originally appeared as if the "now existing caveat... empowered Congress to block slave traffic to and from any newly formed states" (James Pfander & Elena Joffroy, "Equal Footing and the States 'Now Existing' Slavery and State Equality Over Time" (2021) 89:5 Fordham Law Review). In 1819, John Jay wrote a letter saying: I understand the sense and meaning of this clause to be, that the power of the Congress, although competent to prohibit such migration and importation, was not to be exercised with respect to the then existing States (and only them) until the year 1808; but that Congress were at liberty to make such prohibition as to any new State, which might, in the mean time, be established, and further, that from that period, they were authorized to make such prohibition, as to all the States, whether new or old. However, in Dred Scott v. Sandford (1857), Chief Justice Roger Taney interpreted the clause such that it required new states to be admitted on "equal footing with the other states" (p. 447) thus rejecting the interpretation I presented above. He also discreted the Northwest Ordinance as being beyond the power of Congress (pp. 435-38, 490-91). Four states joined the union between the ratification of the Constitution in 1790 and 1808: Vermont (1791), Kentucky (1792), Tennessee (1796), and Ohio (1803). Vermont had already outlawed slavery before joining the union. Ohio was only allowed to join the union on the conditions established in the Northwest Ordinance, one of which was to prohibit slavery. Slavery and slave trade was allowed to continue in Tennessee and Kentucky after joining the union. 1. Note: the numbering on these has varied between the "Dawson" edition of the Federalist Papers and the now accepted numbering. In the Dawson edition, these were numbered 41 and 37. Federalist 42: "It were doubtless to be wished, that the power of prohibiting the importation of slaves had not been postponed until the year 1808, or rather that it had been suffered to have immediate operation. But it is not difficult to account, either for this restriction on the general government, or for the manner in which the whole clause is expressed. It ought to be considered as a great point gained in favor of humanity, that a period of twenty years may terminate forever, within these States, a traffic which has so long and so loudly upbraided the barbarism of modern policy; that within that period, it will receive a considerable discouragement from the federal government, and may be totally abolished, by a concurrence of the few States which continue the unnatural traffic, in the prohibitory example which has been given by so great a majority of the Union. Happy would it be for the unfortunate Africans, if an equal prospect lay before them of being redeemed from the oppressions of their European brethren! Attempts have been made to pervert this clause into an objection against the Constitution, by representing it on one side as a criminal toleration of an illicit practice, and on another as calculated to prevent voluntary and beneficial emigrations from Europe to America. I mention these misconstructions, not with a view to give them an answer, for they deserve none, but as specimens of the manner and spirit in which some have thought fit to conduct their opposition to the proposed government." 2. Federalist 38: "It is a matter, both of wonder and regret, that those who raise so many objections against the new Constitution should never call to mind the defects of that which is to be exchanged for it. It is not necessary that the former should be perfect: it is sufficient that the latter is more imperfect. ... Is the importation of Slaves permitted by the new Constitution for twenty years? By the old it is permitted forever." 3. "Given its economic importance and its vulnerabilities, it is not surprising that the Southerners at the Constitutional Convention demanded, and won, huge concessions to protect their 'peculiar institution,' as even they were beginning to call it. ... The clauses that Pinckney and other Southerners worked hard to create set the stage for a government that both protected slavery and was deeply influenced by it. ... In supporting a specific clause in the Constitution to prevent Congress from ending the African slave trade until 1800 (it was later amended to 1808), Sherman asserted that 'the public good did not require' an end to the trade."

What is Jurisprudence? I am a Law Student in Greece trying to understand what Law is a what Jurisprudence is and what the jurisprudential method of thinking is. What is Jurisprudence; what is its object of study, what are we analysing? Many people say that Jurisprudence is not the same as Law. Law is the system (not the agreggation of rules but the mental abstraction, their method) of rules and Jurisprudence is the analysis, the study. Analysis is the syllogistic method with which the individual elements of a phenomenon or a mental abstraction are isolated, to be studied separetely and interpreted. Study is the mental work, especially meticulous and systematic reading, with the aim of understanding or interpreting a determined object. Object is anything that is related to something else mainly as its cause or aim. Is Jurisprudence the study or the analysis of Law's interpretation (Law's interpretation being the aim of Jurisprudence)? How can we study and interpret a mental abstraction?

Legal Theory and Philosophy of Law There are two different meanings of the word Jurisprudence A heavy word for the study or knowledge of the law. If a judge or law lecturer were to refer to "the role of freedom of contract in our jurisprudence" for example, this is the sense intended (this is the sense @ohwilleke refers to in his answer). The second meaning - and the more usual meaning nowadays, particularly in in academic circles (I note you are studying law so this is probably the meaning you are asking about) - could be described as the philosophy of law. In Legal Philosophies (1997) J W Harris says (p.1) Jurisprudence is a ragbag. Into it are cast all kinds of general speculations about the law. What is it for? What does it achieve? Should we value it? How is it to be improved? Is it dispensable? Who makes it? Where do we find it? What is its relation to morality, to justice, to politics, to social practices, or to naked force? Should we obey it? Whom does it serve? These are the questions of which general jurisprudence is comprised. They can be ignored, but they will no go away... Jurisprudence has to entrench on [the disciplines of moral and political philosophers] at many points, as well as upon those of social and political theory. It is a scavenger, as well as a ragbag; having no perimeter to its field of enquiry, save that what is studied must have a bearing on some general speculation about law. If jurisprudence has a heartland all its own, it is legal theory Much discussion about moral claims of the law (and moral claims on the law) takes the concept of law itself for granted. Yet, answers to such questions may turn on what picture of law we have. Legal theory asks: What is the nature of law (everywhere, or just in the modern state)? In a three year English undergraduate law degree, Jurisprudence has traditionally been studied as a compulsory module in the third year which concentrates on legal theory. One thing students immediately notice is that the exact scope and definition of jurisprudence is disputed (which can be discomforting since all the other modules they have hitherto studied - Contract, Tort, Crime, etc- have clear definitions). This uncertainty is exacerbated by the fact that legal theories which come under the umbrella term of legal positivism have as one of their central themes the proposition that jurisprudence should only be concerned with positive law and that legal theory need not (and should not) look outside to ideas of morality or natural law. In other words not only do different legal theories have different explanations of the phenomenon of law, but they actually disagree about the scope of what it is they are supposed to be explaining! Traditionally jurists thought of God as the ultimate law-giver whose laws were written on human hearts (conscience). This is the "natural law" which human legislators add to by creating "positive law". For example murder is contrary to natural law but you need human laws to define the different categories of homicide, the prescribed penalties, and the procedure by which accusations are tried and decided. You also need human laws to define the circumstances in which a contract comes into being etc. Note: positive in used in its old original meaning of "laid down" as distinct from natural. It is nothing to do with the modern meaning of positive as being the opposite of negative. William Blackstone, in Vol. 1, Commentaries on the Laws of England (1765) Page 27, wrote: This will of his maker is called the law of nature. For as God, when he created matter, and endued it with a principle of mobility, established certain rules for the perpetual direction of that motion; so, when he created man, and endued him with freewill to conduct himself in all parts of life, he laid down certain immutable laws of human nature, whereby that freewill is in some degree regulated and restrained, and gave him also the faculty of reason to discover the purport of those laws. Considering the creator only as a being of infinite power, he was able unquestionably to have prescribed whatever laws he pleased to his creature, man, however unjust or severe. But as be is also a being of infinite wisdom, he has laid down only such laws as were founded in those relations of justice, that existed in the nature of things antecedent to any positive precept. These are the eternal, immutable laws of good and evil, to which the creator himself in all his dispensations conforms; and which he has enabled human reason to discover, so far as they are necessary for the conduct of human actions. Such among others are these principles: that we should live honestly, should hurt nobody, and should render to every one his due; to which three general precepts Justinian1 has reduced the whole doctrine of law. This will of his maker is called the law of nature. For as God, when he created matter, and endued it with a principle of mobility, established certain rules for the perpetual direction of that motion; so, when he created man, and endued him with freewill to conduct himself in all parts of life, he laid down certain immutable laws of human nature, whereby that freewill is in some degree regulated and restrained, and gave him also the faculty of reason to discover the purport of those laws. Considering the creator only as a being of infinite power, he was able unquestionably to have prescribed whatever laws he pleased to his creature, man, however unjust or severe. But as be is also a being of infinite wisdom, he has laid down only such laws as were founded in those relations of justice, that existed in the nature of things antecedent to any positive precept. These are the eternal, immutable laws of good and evil, to which the creator himself in all his dispensations conforms; and which he has enabled human reason to discover, so far as they are necessary for the conduct of human actions. Such among others are these principles: that we should live honestly, should hurt nobody, and should render to every one his due; to which three general precepts Justinian has reduced the whole doctrine of law.... Upon these two foundations, the law of nature and the law of revelation, depend all human laws; that is to say, no human laws should be suffered to contradict these. There are, it is true a great number of indifferent points, in which both the divine law and the natural leave a man at his own liberty; but which are found necessary for the benefit of society to be restrained within certain limits. And herein it is that human laws have their greatest force and efficacy; for, with regard to such points as are not indifferent, human laws are only declaratory of, and act in subordination to, the former. To instance in the case of murder; this is expressly forbidden by the divine, and demonstrably by the natural law; and from these prohibitions arises the true unlawfulness of this crime. Those human laws that annex a punishment to it, do not at all increase its moral guilt, or superadd any fresh obligation in foro conscientiae [in the court of conscience] to abstain from its perpetration. Nay, if any human law should allow or enjoin us to commit it, we are bound to transgress that human law, or else we must offend both the natural and the divine. But with regard to matters that are in themselves indifferent, and are not commanded or forbidden by those superior laws; such, for instance, as exporting of wool into foreign countries; here the inferior legislature has scope and opportunity to interpose, and to make that action unlawful which before was not so... In the Province of Jurisprudece Determined (1832) John Austin wrote at length about both natural law and positive law and sought to draw a line of distinction between them: AS one of the Law-Professors at the University of London, I planned and partly delivered a systematical Course of Lectures on General or Abstract Jurisprudence. In the ten lectures delivered at the beginning of my Course, I distinguished positive law (the appropriate matter of jurisprudence) from various objects with which it is connected by resemblance, and from various other objects to which it is allied by analogy. Out of those ten discourses, I have made the treatise which I now submit to the public, and which I venture to entitle “the province of jurisprudence determined.” Determining the characters of positive laws, I determine implicitly the notion of sovereignty, with the implied or correlative notion of independent political society. For the essential difference of a positive law (or the difference that severs it from a law which is not a positive law) may be stated generally in the following manner. Every positive law, or every law simply and strictly so called, is set by a sovereign person, or a sovereign body of persons to a member or members of the independent political society wherein that person or body > is sovereign or supreme. Or (changing the phrase) it is set by a monarch, or sovereign number, to a person or persons in a state of subjection to its author. To elucidate the nature of sovereignty, and of the independent political society that sovereignty implies, I examine various topics which I arrange under the following heads: First, the possible forms or shapes of supreme political government; second, the limits, real or imaginary, of supreme political power; thirdly, the origin or causes of political government and society. Examining those various topics, I complete my description of the limit or boundary by which positive law is severed from positive morality. For I distinguish them at certain points whereat they seemingly blend, or whereat the line which divides them is not easily perceptitible. Austin's account of positive law (essentially a command of a sovereign accompanied by a threat of sanction for non-compliance) has been criticised as being simplistic and of failing to provide an adequate explanation of law and legal systems, but to be fair to Austin he never claimed that his theory of positive law could alone explain what happens in legal systems. He recognised the influence of natural law/morality as part of an explanation. He simply wished to define the limits of Jurispudence as an academic subject, which he did narrowly. Some jurists, however, have subsequently sought to produce theories of law which seek to explain what the phenomenon of law is, and how it works, based only on positive law. Such theorists are called "positivists" and their school of thought is called legal positivism. In 1960 Hans Kelsen published Reine Rechtslehre which was translated into English in 1967 as The Pure Theory of Law. As the word pure in the title suggests Kelsen's theory is in the legal positivism school of thought - i.e. it seeks to explain law and legal systems by reference only to positive law. Kelsen himself was a moral relativist but not all legal positivists are necessarily atheists or moral relativists. Some may personally think that natural law/morality is important but nevertheless think that the discipline of law should be "self contained" and should be capable of being completely and satisfactorily explained without brining natural law/morality etc. into it. Natural lawyers critique the theories of legal positivism by saying that they are incomplete as they leave so much unexplained. Legal Positivists reply that their theories have a restricted scope precisely because everything outside the scope of the theory is not really law at all and so does not need to be explained by the theory. So you can see that the definition of Jurisprudence is rather woolly but philosophy of law with particular emphasis on competing theories of what the phenomenon of law actually is might be a short rough definition to convey the general idea of Jurisprudence as the word in generally used today.

Japan's justice system is sometimes called hostage justice In general, the Japanese justice system has a more than 99% conviction rate! In part, this is because the number of state attorneys is super low - on about half the population of the US, there were only 2000 State attorneys out of 35000 lawyers in Japan, whereas the USA has a five-to-six digit number of state/district/... attorneys and 1.5 million lawyers in total. Or in other words: each state-employed attorney is responsible for more than 10 times the people and the caseload they create, and lawyers are prohibitively expensive. This leads to a two-pronged result: on the one hand, only the best cases should be followed up on and brought to court. Depending on the statistics, about every other case (~50%) that the police investigators hand to the prosecution is not followed up on by the prosecution. The other result is, that the Japanese justice system relies heavily on confessions obtained from the defendants. As I elaborated when comparing the detention time without charges, the Japanese justice system is unlike almost any other modern justice system in the world in some regards, even though it is a civil law system and most of the same principles can be found. The Japanese prosecution can detain people for up to 23 days without bringing the case, you can't have your lawyer present when talking to the police, and by clever tactic, the prosecution can hold a person nigh-indefinitely without even filing a case. As a result, the prosecution can often get confessions, and with a confession, the actual court case can become super fast: charges are brought, the confession is read, a little extra evidence is presented, and to spare the victim a lengthy trial with the confession in the room, the judge comes down with a guilty verdict. This is compounded by how the rules of evidence are laid out: investigation and the court case are allowed to happen at the same time! As a result, the case of the prosecutor tends to become better the longer the case drags on, resulting in the defendant either settling or giving a (partial) confession to some of the charges just to get it over because lawyers are crazy expensive. By giving a confession, they throw themselves at the mercy of the court for a mild verdict. And it's very much stacked As shown above, the Japanese justice system is already stacked against the defendant. But it is even more stacked than what is shown up there. As ohwilke noted in excellent comments, I want to preserve them here: Also the vast majority of Japanese criminal cases are tried without lay judges, This is by the way a result of the Japanese legal system that was set up in the Meiji era being based on the Prussian branch of the german Civil Law school. That was one of the dominant systems of the Meiji era next to the French and Spanish schools of Civil Legal Systems - and after WW2 they did not swap to a Common Law system but stayed with their own take on this Prusso-German branch of the Civil Legal System. This means there are no juries like in the common law system, and since 2009 lay judges in japan are increasingly used, but not in every case. Those lay judges are very much akin to the Schöffen in Germany, being allowed to question the evidence and such - the German school is based on an inquisitorial system after all - but it is not used in every case. And the whole system is lived extremely differently from the inspiring Prussian system, such as this part of the comment shows: and from my experiences talking with several Japanese judges at length about the issue (back in the early 1990s, maybe it is different now), the institutional mindset is for judges to believe that all of the prosecution evidence is true and all of the defense evidence is lies unless the evidence to the contrary is overwhelming and unshakable. The level of judicial bias towards the prosecution is greater than in any other common law or civil law legal system, that is not in an authoritarian regime, in the world. This for example shows in the 23 days without charge. Technically, 23 days is not the initial time, but the police has 72 hours. But they can extend this time by 10 days with a judge's order, and then again by another 10 days on the same charge offered on the paperwork. According to a statistic, 99.8% of these requests are granted, meaning they are almost rubberstamped. Legally, people that are detained are not yet defendants, they are suspects and kept in Substitute Prisons which are located in police districts - which further helps to get confessions. And this plays directly into another factor that differentiates the Japanese system from other countries: There's a huge cultural factor, which is what makes the Japanese system so different from others. Additional factors are that police officers in Japan have much more authority to handle minor cases outside the court system and routinely do so, that a certain level of criminal conduct from organized crime and by authority figures is tolerated, that there is much less crime per capita in Japan than most places, and that Confucian values re deference to hierarchy and the Japanese specific high cultural obligation to apologize influences how Japanese people interact with the criminal justice system as defendants and as implementers of that system. This has its problems too: Because the prosecution is notoriously overworked, citizens with problems are often more reluctant to bring cases to their attention. Further, the shame culture works against not just the perpetrators, but also the victims and the people that report certain crimes - for example, a female police officer was groped on a train, and when she reported it, she became the target of shunning. Further reading & Research papers US Department of Justice: Toward a Balancing Approach: The Use of Apology in Japanese Society. US Department of Justice: Confession, Apology, Repentance and Settlement Out-of-Court in the Japanese Criminal Justice System -- is Japan a Model of Restortative Justice? (From Restorative Justice in Context: International Practice and Directions, P 173-196, 2003, Elmar G. M. Weitekamp and Hans-Jurgen Kerner, eds. -- See NCJ. Hiroshi Wagatsuma, Arthur Rosett: The Implications of Apology: Law and Culture in Japan and the United States, Law & Society Review, Vol. 20, No. 4 (1986), pp. 461-498 (38 pages). John O. Haley: Comment: The Implications of Apology, Law & Society Review, Vol. 20, No. 4 (1986), pp. 499-508 (9 pages). DAVID ALLEN CHIYOMI SUMIDA: Japanese tradition of apology, Western worry about admitting guilt can clash, (2002). HOSOI, YOKO AND HARUO NISHIMURA: The Role of Apology in the Japanese Criminal Justice System (1999). Ernils Larsson: Confucianism as a Religion in Japan’s Courts of Law (2022). Joseph I. Lieberman: CONFUCIUS'S LESSON TO LITIGANTS New York Times (1984). Lynn Berat: The Role of Conciliation in the Japanese Legal System American University International Law Review (1992). Nicholas Lassi: A Confucian Theory Of Crime, Dissertation, University of North Dakota (2018). Graham Mayeda: [Appreciate the Difference: The Role of Different Domestic Norms in Law and Development Reform; Lessons from China and Japan] (2006). Katrina Tran: How Japan How Japan’s Cultur s Cultural Norms Aff al Norms Affect Policing: A Side-By-Side olicing: A Side-By-Side Comparison with the United States Themis: Research Journal of Justice Studies and Forensic (2017). David Brooks: The Shame Culture New York Times (2016). podcast Dan Carlin: Hardcore History 62 – Supernova in the East I (2018).

Most judges went to law school Therefore, my null hypothesis is that they have next to no knowledge of statistics and couldn’t tell a median from a mean on their best, let alone, their average day - mean, median, or mode. Courts turn to experts to fill in the gaps in their knowledge. If they are asking the wrong questions, then it is the expert’s job to, respectfully, tell them so and guide them to the right questions. However, you shouldn’t guess what the right question is. “Excuse me, your honour, the term “statistical significance” can’t be applied to a data set, only to the result of an a priori null-hypothesis tested against that data set.” Feel free to explain p hacking if necessary. Ask the judge to explain, in layman’s term, what they want from you. Feel free to admit that just like you don’t understand their legal jargon, you don’t expect them to understand your statistical jargon; if everyone speaks plain English, you can go and do your statistics thing and they can go and do their law-talking thing.

In the example given, both elements must be established. This is the most common meaning of the word "and" in a statute or rule or contract or other writing, but there are times when "and" does not have that meaning. One must always determine the meaning from context on a case by case basis. Words do not have a single universal meaning in all contexts for legal purposes. This variation by context in the meaning of words for legal purposes is especially frequent in countries with common law legal systems based upon the English legal system such as the U.S., Canada, New Zealand, Australia, and India to have situations where a word often means one thing in one legal context and another thing in different legal contexts. This is because the governing statutes and case law are written on a piecemeal basis by many different people with no one in charge of maintaining stylistic uniformity, over a very long period of time (often centuries). In countries like those of Continental Europe, Latin America and much of Asia and Africa, which have what are called "civil law" systems, that are based on European civil codes, there are comprehensive codifications of the basic laws of the land that are drafted by experts all at the same time, and amended only with great deliberation and care, and these codes tend to use a word more consistently in most contexts than common law legislatures and judges do, although even then, this principle is not absolute.

Why do you want to know? I think that the reason this question seems so obscure is because it does not involve sufficient context and specificity. It can't be answered until one knows the reason that it matters to know if a rule is new or not. In a particular context, these questions usually have obvious and clear answers. The murkiness arises only when one tries to overgeneralize. The life of law is not reason, it is experience. In general, it is almost never fruitful to try to apply legal principles of any kind to their logical conclusion without grounding that logic in fact specific and context specific precedents and applications. That approach to legal reasoning is a classic rookie mistake that gets a lot of young associate attorneys doing legal research into trouble by overstating the confidence that they should have in their conclusions when there is no case right on point addressing a situation. For example, if a federal government agency publishes something in the federal register that does not exactly restate an existing regulation, then it is a rule change, in the narrow sense that is changes an existing published narrowly defined Code of Federal Regulations rule. The process by which one does so derives from the Administrative Procedures Act and other authorizing legislation passed by Congress and also custom and case law interpreting these, so it isn't self-referential. A completely different context in which the question of whether there is a "new rule" of law is when a court according to the principles of stare decisis makes a ruling interpreting the constitution in a manner different from or expanding upon previously rulings interpreting the constitution in a similar circumstance. In this context, this matters because a "new rule" of constitutional law is generally given only prospective effect, while an interpretation of an existing rule of law that merely expands upon existing precedents in a foreseeable way has retroactive effect. In this situation, as in any case in which one tries to determine the best definition to apply under the law, the best approach is to look for a definition that produces just results given the consequences of a particular definition v. another particular definition. In that context, the determination of whether a rule is a "new rule" should depend upon foreseeability and the amount of reliance that people put on the old rule as opposed to the new rule being in force. There is no good reason to have transsubstantive legal meta-rules that apply to both of these situations. The former mechanistic rule makes sense in its context and makes the status quo clear and the events that constitute a change in the rule clear, while the latter consequence oriented definition makes sense in the completely different context where it is used. Surely, there are other contexts in which the question of what constitutes a "new rule" could have different consequences still. For example, to determine what constitutes a new v. old rule of U.S. Senate procedure, or to determine which statute is newer or older for purposes of determining which statute of two that conflict should be given effect when there was a cosmetic recodification of the section numbers of one of the titles but not the other without changing the substantive meaning of the recodified statute. The determination should generally be made on a case by case basis as there is no important purpose served by having a uniform metarule to answer these questions. If you are getting paradoxes trying to apply your legal theory, you are probably doing it wrong. For what it is worth, I have a dim opinion of Hart as someone who uses lots of words to say nothing of consequence or use, and I am not familiar with Biagoli or Suber. In general, legal theorists are not terribly influential in how the law is applied and interpreted in practice, although, of course, there are always exceptions.

The question should not include France and Germany, and should be limited to common law jurisdictions that are similar to India, because the function of judges differs starkly between adversarial vs. inquisitorial systems. The adversarial model pits two parties against each other, with the judge serving as the decider (of law, and perhaps of fact). The parties can offer witnesses, who can be compelled to respond to questions, and the attorney asking the question gets to control the question asked (subject to a possible objection by the other party, to be ruled on by the judge). The judge can rule on requests (which are not questions) i.e. petitions by either party. Otherwise, the judge sits there more or less mute, soaking up the argumentation being presented. Appellate proceedings are somewhat special in that the justices may address questions to the attorney, in order to better understand the logic of the proffered argument. The burden is on the attorney to make the case. There is no direct burden on the justice to "make a case". The "court of public opinion" may be relevant in a jurisdiction where the justice is an elected office or is appointed for limited time. Or, the contrary opinion of a higher court may have some influence on a justice's rulings – this is not the case with a Supreme Court. In other words, it would be highly dysfunctional within the adversarial system for a party to be allowed to interrogate a judge. Formal petitions are allowed, as long as you follow proper form.

Legal Education Compared In the U.S., the customary way that one learns about the law for purposes of being admitted to practice as a lawyer is by completing three years of course (with no thesis or dissertation) at the graduate level, after completing a non-law related undergraduate degree (customarily four years but including non-legal studies), and then taking a several week bar exam preparation course and passing the bar exam. In many other common law countries, the customary way that one learns about the law for purposes of being admitted to practice as a lawyer is by completing a three or four year preprofessional undergraduate degree, with a primary concentration in law but also including other general education requirements, followed by preparation for and sitting for a bar exam, and sometimes a period of apprenticeship or internship. In most civil law countries, the customary way that one learns about the law for purposes of being admitted to practice as a lawyer is by completing a bachelor's level undergraduate degree which is taken by both people who want to become practicing lawyers and also by people who want to go into business with legal knowledge, followed by very extensive bar exam preparation in the context of an internship or apprenticeship somewhat similar to that of a U.K. barrister. This is complicated somewhat by the fact that the U.K. and most civil law countries have multiple different legal professionals rather than a unified legal profession like the U.S. The U.K. has barristers (trial advocates) who have more education through the "inns of court" and solicitors. Civil law systems typically have more kinds of legally trained professionals with legally trained notaries with transactional law practice infused with the keeping of public records, prosecutors, judges, trial advocates, sometimes specialist public law lawyers, and legally trained non-lawyers (typically in business) all belonging to separate professions with different roles in the legal system. No entry level lawyer who has been admitted to practice knows the whole of the law in the country where that student has studied, and generally, even very experienced lawyers will be experts in some parts of the law, and have only a vague notion of where to learn the law in other areas where the lawyer practices only infrequently or not at all. In common law countries, legal education focuses on "edge cases" and the way that edge cases are argued, and leaves instruction to many "black letter" rules of law to be learned in bar exam preparation and after entering the practice of law to learn on the job. In civil law countries, legal education focuses on providing students with a comprehensive outline of the "black letter" law rules of law in the area of private law and criminal law and a few bits of public law, and learning methods of argument, advocacy and edge cases is reserved for learning on the job in practice. In both systems, the primary way that one learns the law as a future lawyer in the first instance is from textbooks, rather than primary authorities, although common law country law school textbooks have a heavier mix of excerpts from court cases selected by a professor, while civil law country law school textbooks have a heavier mix of statutory language excerpts and exposition form the professor writing the textbook. Lay Understanding Of Particular Areas Of Law Please estimate: what is the difference in amount of work needed in these two systems to become familiar with an area of law? Please estimate for a well-educated person (with a college degree or higher) but is not a lawyer and does not plan to become one. A well-educated person with a college degree or higher but is not a lawyer and does not plan to become one faces a very steep learning curve in either system to become familiar at a functional level with an area of law. Most of what a lawyer learns in school is the larger context and method of analysis, research skills and an ability to identify legal issues. In common law countries, a lot of this is learning how the case law making system works and having an unwritten outline of key issues in areas of law that would be codified in civil law countries. In civil law countries, a lot of this is learning how general parts of civil law codes interact with more specific provisions, and being aware of the "gloss of interpretation" (often in scholarly work by law professors) that is given to a superficially very vague and short provision like the section of a civil code imposing tort liability, and also how to research legal issues in that system. You really need to know all of this general material to have a competent and comprehensive understanding of specific legal issues, whether you have one that you are investigating or twenty. So, it is extremely inefficient for a non-lawyer to master a single legal issue. The difference in the learning curve between civil law systems and common law systems from pure primary sources is greatly reduced because both are intermediated by secondary sources that explain them in a more efficient and pedagogically sound manner. Rather than largely being a difference between say, the French system and the Colorado system, for example, the biggest difference in the learning curve involved the nature of the particular legal issue that you want to know about within a particular system. For example, in both the U.S. and in France, the body of law that governs child custody and child support is very self-contained. If you master the legal principles and authorities in that area of law, you can fairly swiftly know all of the substantive law issues and research issues involved. On the other hand, in both the U.S. and in France, the body of law that governs a property division in a divorce is absolutely sprawling. This is not because the law of property division itself, in sensu stricto, is terribly vast, but because applying the relatively simple law of property division to any set of facts, presupposes and requires a comprehensive knowledge of the private laws of property, contracts and other legal obligations, and associated tax laws, which can be quite vast over the full range of legal and property rights the might need to be divided in some divorce, sometime. It is the opposite of being self-contained. Similarly, immigration law or patent law questions can often be resolved and understood almost entirely within the four corners of a small number of statutes and regulations, while tax law questions, like property divisions in divorces, interface with a vast expanse of property, contract and legal obligations that might arise. As a general rule, laws pertaining to personal status tend to be self-contained, while laws in areas implicated property ownership and legal rights more generally, tend to require an expansive knowledge of many areas of law. Starting From Scratch While codification v. case law doesn't make much of a difference in the amount of work needed to become a lawyer or to understand a particular legal issue, codification does provide a decisive advantage in the case of a country seeking to adopt a new legal system from scratch, and many former European colonies have done, which is why civil law systems are so much more common globally. From the perspective of a legislature and judiciary starting from a more or less clean slate, it is much easier to adopt a mildly edited set of civil codes as the starting point for the law of your country, than it is to incorporate centuries of case law from some other country into the law in a country that has never used a common law system case law system "organically" prior to adopting its own set of laws. Even then, it is much harder for legislators to be clear on precisely what laws it is that they are adopting at the outset in a common law case law based system where many legal rules are implicit in decisions that are only imperfectly indexed, rather than explicitly codified. And, from a legislator's perspective, adopting a comprehensive new legal system without any clear delineation of what laws you are actually adopting in your new country, is very undesirable, unless you are merely grafting onto a common law legal system that has already long been in force in your country prior to starting its new legal system, with which all prospective legal practitioners in your country are already intimately familiar.

You will note that the quoted definition says that person includes a corporation sole, a body corporate, and an unincorporated body What it doesn't say, but almost certainty intends, is that "person" also includes a natural person, that is an ordinary human being with a single body. What is happening here (I think) is that the law is specifying all the other things that will be treated in some way like a natural person, while it also assumes the "ordinary" or "plain English" meaning of person. Also, the law is assuming all the ordinary standard legal terminology, such as "corporation sole" and only giving definitions where the usage is in some way different from the standard meaning, or where there are multiple meanings in common use and it wants tom specify one. This makes the law shorter, but harder to understand for anyone not well-versed in that specific legal tradition (a non-lawyer, or say a lawyer from a civil-law country). So I am reasonably confident that you are, in fact, a person under this law. (Unless perhaps you are actually a robot or a space alien, after all on the net who knows. LOL)

What enforcement action can be taken against a small claims court respondent? I recently applied for Simple Procedure (Form 3A) against respondent X at Edinburgh Sheriff Court. (My claim was initiated prior to 31 May 2023.) X did not respond by the deadline. Then I submitted an Application for Decision (Form 7A). As a result the Sheriff Court issued a Decision Form (13A) in early April 2023, ordering X to pay me a sum of money. But X still has not responded. What are my options now? I looked through the guidelines (especially Part 15) but I'm not sure of the best way to proceed.

At this point, since it's been more than four weeks since the order was issued, you are able to enforce the order. The delay is just to allow appeals or corrections. It is up to you to arrange enforcement, so at a high level your choices are to do nothing, or to proceed. If you do nothing then you will not get any money. If you proceed then you will spend more money, which you may or may not get back, as with the original sum. The Scottish procedure is conceptually similar to the English one that is more normally described in online resources, but the words are different. To decode things a bit, You are now trying to proceed with "diligence", which means enforcing the court order. The court itself is not involved, having moved on to other things. There are several ways the money could come to you, such as "arrestment", "attachment" and "inhibition". Or, X might give you the money voluntarily. The next steps must be taken by a "sheriff officer" on your instruction. Despite the name being similar to "sheriff" as in "Sheriff Court", these officers are private practitioners who are licensed by the courts to pursue debtors. You can use https://smaso.org.uk to find a sheriff officer you like. Most likely you will be able to give them all the information online. Then, they will go ahead with the first step, formally serving a "charge for payment" on X. Then, X has 14 days to come up with the money; if they don't, then the sheriff officer can proceed with more drastic steps. They will be able to advise based on the particular circumstances, but some broad possibilities are "arrestment" of X's money directly from their bank, or "attachment", which is seizure of X's property to be auctioned off. If X is an employed person (rather than a business, say) then you might also arrange "arrestment of earnings" whereby the employer diverts a sum from X's pay to you, for whatever necessary period of time. All these come with their own rules and timescales, including processes if X's bank or employer does not comply. The sheriff officer will have to be paid for all this. The usual way is that you pay them up-front, and then that fee can be added to the diligence. All officers charge the same rates, but the fee schedule is a bit complicated depending on exactly which services are involved, how long it takes the officer to do the work, and their travel time. It is up to you to make the decisions about how much you want to spend in pursuit of the money, also taking into account the likelihood that you will actually get it. For the sheriff officer, since this is a completely routine part of the job, they will be able to give you their impression of the range of outcomes based on the specifics of X's situation.

When a judge decides a case there will be An order - e.g. "Smith shall pay Jones £100,000" Reasons for the decision - i.e. a description of the evidence, and the judge's findings of fact and legal reasoning. Sometimes a party, even though they have completely won, is nevertheless aggrieved by some things the judge has said in the Reasons (or in the way the judge has handled the trial - e.g. the judge's interventions). For example the judge may have said that the winning party was not a credible witness but they nevertheless won because of the evidence of other witnesses who were found to be credible. The rule in England and Wales is that you can only appeal orders. So if the order is completely in your favour you cannot appeal just because you don't like the reasons.

Someone has pulled a sample motion of this type off of PACER (the public access Internet portal to civil filings in federal court). The example is more formal and structured than a lot of state court motion practice would be, however (e.g. few state court's require or encourage motions with a table of contents and a table of authorities). This example is 36 pages long, and many states don't even allow motions to run for more than 10-15 pages without leave of the court to do so in advance. There is a New Jersey federal court example here which is also on the formal and fussy side (although, in part, because the motion isn't just an arbitration motion and is also raising several additional unrelated issues which if omitted would cut it in half). See also one here. Another example, from a California state court, is closer to the mark for a typical state court filing. A court that handles residential landlord-tenant matters is probably even more "casual" and probably expects motions to get to the point more quickly. The core content is probably solid, although it would have to be customized to reference the state law statutory and procedural rules rather than the federal rules of civil procedure, and to analyze and set forth the facts of your case rather than those of some random person whose pleading is linked. This would also have to be adopted to state court practice standard, which typically uses different formatting for captions, signature blocks, whether or not line numbering is required, etc., and is often subject to other requirements. Some require that a certificate of service be filed as a separate document, while others routinely incorporate it in the main document. Many state courts require that a proposed order be submitted with a motion as a matter of state or local court rules, a few states require a cover sheet to be filed with motions, many states require you to confer with the other side in the case and to recite their position opposing or supporting the motion, or something in between, before filing it, and some courts require you to notify them once the deadline for a response has passed, regarding whether an opposition has been filed to the motion's request for relief or not. Similarly, some states courts require that motions be "verified" (i.e. have their allegations confirmed under oath) or supported by an affidavit setting forth the factual matters alleged in them. New York State structures a lot of motions as "orders to show cause" in which the court preliminarily reviews the relief requested and issues an order telling the other side that it will do something if they don't file an objection showing good cause for the court not to rule in that way by a given day, which must be formally delivered (i.e. "served") upon the other side by a deadline. I don't know if New Jersey local motion practice is similar. Many court systems also charge a "new case" filing fee for motions to compel arbitration that does not apply to other kinds of motions. Ideally, you'd want to review some motions (about pretty much anything) to get a feel for how this is usually done in New Jersey.

This is explained at paragraphs 2-4 of the decision you link. There were two proceedings: a claim in the county court and an application to the Tribunal. The county court claim was transferred to the Tribunal to be consolidated with the application, and they were to be heard together. (Although, technically there should be no literal "transfer" or "consolidation"; the claim is always a county court claim, separate from the tribunal application. It is just that the matters are heard at the same occasion by inviting a tribunal judge to sit in their capacity as a county court judge. See commentary on City, University of London v. Vodafone Limited (2020).) In that circumstance, Judge Nicol was sitting as both a tribunal judge and as a county court judge. This is possible because: On 22 April 2014, the Crime and Courts Act 2013 Sch.9(1) para. 4 was brought into force, providing that judges of the First-tier Tribunal are judges of the county court and therefore able to exercise the jurisdiction of the county court, providing that a claim form has been issued and the matter has been listed for hearing by them. Stephen Jourdan, K.C., "FTT Judges sitting as judges of the county court" (January 2019) See also this previous Q&A where this was explained.

Any eviction order (for non-payment) will not be enforced by the sheriff (as ordered by the court), and that is how evictions would happen. This is also required under the governor's order of March 20. Foreclosure entails eviction – though the order prohibits the enforcement of an associated eviction order, and doesn't prohibit starting action against a property owner. Theoretically, you could file for eviction against your tenant and at some point the petition could be granted, and the sheriff would enforce it. Those are the current legal options. Current (optimistic) projections are that evictions could happen in the second half of May.

Depends on the context Statutory timeframes Certain documents, like a Statement of Claim or an Adjudication Application, set very strict timeframes in motion by their receipt and there are real legal consequences if they are not responded to within a statutorily mandated period. For the former, failure to respond may result in a default judgement and, for the latter, it prohibits the adjudicator from considering a response. In such circumstances, the statute will set out the notice period. Contractural timeframes The document may be initiating an action where there are timeframes spelled out in a pre-existing contract. For example, what’s commonly called a “show cause notice” is a notice from one party to the other that they are invoking a contractural term that requires them to give the other party the opportunity to respond, that is, to “show cause”, why they should’t do something the contract then allows - like terminating it. In such circumstances, the contract will set out the notice period or, if the contract is silent, then a reasonable notice period is required - see below. Reasonable notice It is inherent in contracts, but also a feature of the law more generally, that when a specific notice period is not given, reasonable notice is required. What is reasonable depends on all the circumstances including the ability of the recipient to respond, the severity of the consequence of not responding, and the urgency of the issue. For example, a reasonable time to respond to an eviction notice will be longer than that required to respond to remove your vehicle that is blocking a fire escape - particularly if the building is presently on fire. Date of the notice or date of receipt? When measuring all these times, the question might arise as to whether they are from the date printed on the notice, the date the notice is delivered (or, in legal speak, served), or the date that it comes to the attention of the recipient. Again, that will depend on the circumstances and a statute or contract may measure time from any of those things. They may also have deemed receipt, that is, receipt has legally occurred even if it hasn’t factually occurred. For example, receipt may be in the ordinary course of mail for a posted letter - so for a letter posted by Express Mail, the next business day after postage even if the Post Office loses it. Any or all of these may be subject to their own measures of reasonableness. For example, even if the time is measured from the date on the notice, this would not be reasonable if the sending party waited 2 weeks before sending it. Similarly, if the recipient can demonstrate that they spent the last 6 months in a coma, it might not be reasonable to sanction them for failing to respond. The legal art of service, deemed or otherwise, is a whole subsection of law in itself.

There isn't an automatic exclusion rule for all forms of improperly acquired evidence in the UK. I can't find the exact quote but there was a judgement from a senior court that said in terms: "it's not the court's job to discipline the police but to see that justice is done." However, judges have the discretion to disallow individual pieces of evidence if they think the interests of justice require it. Section 78 (1) of PACE (1984) has: In any proceedings the court may refuse to allow evidence on which the prosecution proposes to rely to be given if it appears to the court that, having regard to all the circumstances, including the circumstances in which the evidence was obtained, the admission of the evidence would have such an adverse effect on the fairness of the proceedings that the court ought not to admit it. Senior judges have been reluctant to lay down general guidelines, holding the trial judge best placed to make these decisions (although of course, subject to appeal). The foundational principle is the accused's right to a fair trial, so in principle one could appeal to the ECtHR under Article 6. However it generally takes a similar line to courts in the UK: It is not the role of the Court to determine, as a matter of principle, whether particular types of evidence - for example, unlawfully obtained evidence - may be admissible or, indeed, whether the applicant was guilty or not. The question which must be answered is whether the proceedings as a whole, including the way in which the evidence was obtained, were fair. PACE Section 78(2) is: Nothing in this section shall prejudice any rule of law requiring a court to exclude evidence. The general principle in 78 (1) does not override specific prohibitions: for instance, intercept evidence is never admissable under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000.

A warrant is never automatically issued. A warrant (I assume you mean arrest warrant) can be issued under court orders, if there is probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed. If a court orders A to pay money to B and A does not, A can be arrested. A court will not sua sponte make such an order without some petition by a harmed party. So B could sue A for the amount owed, and the burden is on B. There are criminal laws that pertain to check bouncing, for example in Washington under RCW 9a.56.060 it is a crime, but not every check-bouncing is a crime. You have to have "intent to defraud", "knowing at the time..that he or she has not sufficient funds". If convicted you will be fined, and may be imprisoned. Even in the case of a fraudulent intent, there is no automatic warrant (the police do not know what has come to pass). B does not "press charges", but they can complain to the police who may investigate and find that there is evidence of fraudulent intent (which can lead to an arrest warrant). They may also conclude that the evidence of fraud is insufficient.

What is the legal basis for judges being able to see classified material? Marcy Wheeler, in her emptywheel Twitter account, recently tweeted: I addressed this question in this post. No, Cannon does not need a clearance. Her access comes via dint of her responsibilities, just like Members of Congress who need to access classified information do. They ALSO do not get clearances. But what is the exact legal basis for this? Clearly it can't be the case that every federal judge has the right to see all classified material no matter what classification it has (eg Top Secret/SCI etc.)

united-states The simple answer is the procedures adopted under the Classified Information Procedures Act. Under Personnel Security, they say that: No person appointed by the court or designated for service therein will be given access to any classified information in the custody of the court, unless such person has received the appropriate security clearance and unless access to such information is necessary for the performance of an official function. A security clearance for justices and other Article III judges is not required. The true answer is a bit more involved. Article III judges (essentially meaning life-tenured federal judges) are constitutional officers. Their office and its basic role is laid out by the Constitution. On the other hand, security clearances are an administrative thing under the basically unreviewable control of the executive branch. It’s not appropriate to deny a constitutional officer access to information they need to carry out their constitutional role unless the executive branch agrees that they’re suitable.

Yes, why not? It happens all the time. Usually the witness will just say, "I am not sure" or "I don't remember, exactly". Also, if Bob is the only witness, how would anyone prove that he was committing "perjury"? In the case of an uncooperative or dissimulating witness, Judges sometimes can hold them in contempt of court, but it is pretty rare. In general, the court has to find "beyond a reasonable doubt" that the witness is refusing to testify honestly. (See "Federal Grand Jury Practice and Procedure" by Paul Diamond) It depends very much on the situation. Note that just trying to act "drunk" would not be a good idea, because that is contempt of court.

Yes and No See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967): What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected. The glass has clearly been "knowingly exposed" and if that glass was, on the normal methods of examination by the officer (sight, smell etc.), evidence of a crime then it would be able to be used as evidence. However, any DNA on that glass is not "knowingly exposed" - finding the DNA requires a laboratory, specialised equipment and trained technicians.

In your example, there is nothing that indicates to me that there is a "particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of . . . criminal activity". If you have described the totalilty of the circumstances, the officer does not have the right to arrest or detain the individual. To your broader question about how specific descriptions must be in order to provide a basis for a stop, the assessment is based on the "totality of the circumstances". For example, an anonymous tip that "a woman would drive from a particular apartment building to a particular motel in a brown Plymouth station wagon with a broken right tail light [carrying cocaine]" was enough to warrant a stop. Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325 (1990)1 In contrast, the court "determined that no reasonable suspicion arose from a bare-bones tip that a young black male in a plaid shirt standing at a bus stop was carrying a gun." Florida v. J. L., 529 U. S. 266 (2000) The “reasonable suspicion” necessary to justify such a stop “is dependent upon both the content of information possessed by police and its degree of reliability.” Navarette v. California 572 U.S. ___ (2014) In any case, a crime must be part of the particularized suspicion. 1. This case focused on the indicia of reliability necessary for an anonymous tip to support a reasonable suspicion, but it is also an example of a degree of non-specificity in identification of a suspect.

This is actually a very complicated question, about (1) the scope of "knowingly", (2) what kind of "intent" is required for conviction, (3) how does the jury understand and evaluate concepts of intent and (4) how does an attorney persuade the jury that the situation does or does not satisfy the particular intent requirement. One thing we can dispose of quickly is the possibility that the law says that the accused has to actually know that the act is against the law. It is a standard legal fiction (2,400 years old) that the accused knows the law, or should have known. As for the 4th element, persuasion, on the strong side we have statements of intent by the accused – "And I pulled out my rifle and blew his head off, and I laughed the whole time". What the jury has to decide is whether the accused had in mind a conscious purpose of doing some act (that is, it wasn't just an accident like butt-dialing, or an instant stimulus-response reaction to some event). "Intent" generally falls in the realm of acting "purposely", which the Model Penal Code §2.02 defines as: A person acts purposely with respect to a material element of an offense when: (i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or a result thereof, it is his conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a result; and (ii) if the element involves the attendant circumstances, he is aware of the existence of such circumstances or he believes or hopes that they exist. which more or less means what you think "with intent" means. That doesn't say what they intended to do, it just distinguishes intent from negligence and accident. The prosecutor would then present factual evidence that the accused had a bad intent, like showing that he actually made an attempt to access credit card account data (that such data had been accessed when he broke into the system), etc. We can sort of dispose of the other scope question about "knowingly", namely, what things would he have to know? The chunk accessing a protected computer without authorization can be interpreted in a number of ways, having to do with which elements of the clause are known to the accused. You might know that you were accessing but not know that you were unauthorized; you might know that you were accessing and unauthorized, but not know that the computer is protected. The only reliable way to know which is which is to study the case law on a statute and see if there is a controlling decision that say e.g. that you have to know that you are accessing and are unauthorized, but you don't have to know that the computer is protected. I haven't determined (yet) is there is decisive case law on this, but I'm betting that the outcome would be that not knowing of the protected status of a computer carries no weight. As for what kind of intent, there is a distinction between "specific intent" and "general intent". The distinction comes down to having some evil purpose like "make him suffer" (general intent) versus a specific evil purpose like "kill him". Finally, the people who actually decide, the jury, will be given instructions that say what they have to look for. Here is the tip of the tip of the iceberg, from California's criminal jury instructions. The judge will say... The People must prove not only that the defendant did the acts charged, but also that (he/she) acted with a particular (intent/ [and/or] mental state). The instruction for (the/each) crime [and allegation] explains the (intent/ [and/or] mental state) required. A[n] (intent/ [and/or] mental state) may be proved by circumstantial evidence. Before you may rely on circumstantial evidence to conclude that a fact necessary to find the defendant guilty has been proved, you must be convinced that the People have proved each fact essential to that conclusion beyond a reasonable doubt. Also, before you may rely on circumstantial evidence to conclude that the defendant had the required (intent/ [and/or] mental state), you must be convinced that the only reasonable conclusion supported by the circumstantial evidence is that the defendant had the required (intent/ [and/or] mental state). If you can draw two or more reasonable conclusions from the circumstantial evidence, and one of those reasonable conclusions supports a finding that the defendant did have the required (intent/ [and/or] mental state) and another reasonable conclusion supports a finding that the defendant did not, you must conclude that the required (intent/ [and/or] mental state) was not proved by the circumstantial evidence. However, when considering circumstantial evidence, you must accept only reasonable conclusions and reject any that are unreasonable. and then there will be some specific elaboration of whether they have to find that the accused just generally intended to do bad, versus intended to specifically defraud.

This is currently untested but the U.S. Supreme Court did leave the door open to allow someone to plead the 5th amendment in order to hide their identity. In Hiibel v. Nevada the U.S. Supreme Court held that the petitioner did not have a 5th amendment right to withhold his name from a questioning police officer. The Supreme Court held that Mr. Hiibel could be arrested for failing to identify himself because Nevada's statute requiring identification was narrowly tailored and was not vague. The police officer who stopped Mr. Hiibel had reasonable suspicion that a crime had occurred and Mr. Hiibel could have satisfied Nevada's statute by simply stating his name; there was no requirement to turn over any papers or other documentation. The final paragraph of the opinion speaks of the importance of the narrow scope of the disclosure requirement and then goes on and states: ...Answering a request to disclose a name is likely to be so insignificant in the scheme of things as to be incriminating only in unusual circumstances...Even witnesses who plan to invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege answer when their names are called to take the stand. Still, a case may arise where there is a substantial allegation that furnishing identity at the time of a stop would have given the police a link in the chain of evidence needed to convict the individual of a separate offense. In that case, the court can then consider whether the privilege applies, and, if the Fifth Amendment has been violated, what remedy must follow. We do not resolve those questions here. While the court is leaving unanswered the question of whether there are circumstances where one may refuse to identify themselves, they are making it quite clear that such a situation would be very different than the case decided in Hiibel. There is a strong hint that they would uphold Fifth Amendment privilege in the situation you posit.

U.S. answer only. Are there a few database-like resources that would allow me to easily search for such cases? It is balkanized. It also isn't entirely clear what information about the cases interests you. Almost all federal court filings (but not administrative law decisions) are in a database called PACER. Each state has its own system. Some are almost completely unified, and in others, there are many databases. In Colorado, for example, the Colorado E-Filing system has all filings in state courts, but courts outside the state court system, mostly the Denver County Court and municipal courts, as well as some major private arbitration firms, are on their own and most subcontract the job to a division of LexisNexis, a private firm. In both cases, access to these filings is not free except to parties, and has lots of data with access restricted to parties and the court. Published appellate court decisions are also available at an Internet based source. None of these covers administrative law decisions in Colorado, however. Administrative law decisions are usually kept by the agency and also often by a commercial firm that compiles them. Some of them do not give the public access to the decisions in the absence of a FOIA or open records act request. Commercial firms like Westlaw and LexisNexis and several less well known firms (including a free one run by Cornell University), keep databases of published decisions of appellate courts plus a somewhat random assortment of unpublished decisions, with federal court trial court decisions getting much more heavy coverage than state court trial decisions and unpublished state appellate court decisions. But, these are only key court orders, not all filings in the case, and are not the true source documents. There is also a non-profit consortium that maintains a database of court records from the 75 most populous counties in the United States, and there is a private firm that keeps selective track of jury verdicts to the fullest extent that it can obtain them. Some credit reporting agencies (both consumer credit and business credit agencies) maintain databases of judgments and liens.

@Dale M is basically correct, but fudges a bit on the process. The court issuing the order would issue an order to show cause to a government official who is alleged by the person who sought the order to have violated the order after having received legal notice (i.e. service) of the order. If that individual fails to appear at the appointed time and place in the order to show cause, a warrant issues for that individual's arrest. If that individual does appear, the allegedly contemptuous individual is read their rights and a hearing date is set. At the hearing, if the person appears, the person seeking the contempt finding (or some other attorney appointed by the court) prosecutes the case and if the person is found in contempt, then contempt sanctions issue. If they do not appear, a warrant issues for their arrest and a hearing is held on the merits promptly following that arrest. An individual can also be ordered to show cause in an official capacity in which case the contempt sanctions would be imposed against the organization rather than the individual. Usually, in federal court, the U.S. Marshal's office has primary responsibility for arresting people on contempt warrants. The U.S. Marshal's office primarily reports to the judicial branch, although strictly speaking, it is part of the Justice Department, and ultimately reports to the Attorney-General. There are actually two kinds of contempt - remedial and punitive. Remedial contempt sanction can include indefinite incarceration or a fine (often a per day fine) until the violation of the order of the court ceases and is allowed only when it is possible to comply with the order going forward. Punitive contempt has a sanction comparable to a misdemeanor conviction and applies in cases where the goal is to punish someone for a past violation of a court order whether or not it is possible to comply going forward. (Both of these are examples of "indirect contempt", i.e. violations of court orders that take place outside the courtroom. A different summary process called "direct contempt" applies when someone misbehaves in the presence of the court - this is summary incarceration or fine without a trial on the spot for disrespecting the dignity of the court in the courtroom.) Established practice is to direct a contempt order at the lowest level official necessary to remedy the violation of the order. There are a few examples in living memory of cabinet members being held in contempt, however (e.g. the Secretary of Interior, with regard to Indian Trust fund litigation), and keep in mind that in the case of remedial contempt an official can purge the contempt and be released from any sanction by resigning from office, after which the official no longer has the ability to comply. I am not aware of any instance in which the President of the United States has personally been held in contempt of court, but I am also not aware of any authority that specifically prohibits a court from holding the President in contempt of court. While contempt is the only "hard" remedy for a violation of a court order, the bureaucratic structure of the federal government is also set up in a manner that once a court order definitively resolves a legal issue, the higher ups in a federal agency are supposed to take all reasonable actions to insure that their subordinates follow that order (and they are themselves subject to contempt sanctions if they fail to do so). And, keep in mind that most of the people in the chain of command are civil servants with legal protections from unlawful employment actions hired on a merit basis, not political appointees, and that lots of the people in the chain of command are also members of unions that provide individual employees with the ability to fight wrongful employment action from a superior for violating a court order. In particular, the top lawyers in the executive branch would in ordinary times direct government employees to follow a clear court order and to cease and desist from explicitly disobeying one. Among other things, the courts could probably deny lawyers who refused to do so the right to practice law in federal court. But, usually things never reach this point. Then again, we are living in interesting times. There are about 670 political appointee positions in the executive branch, many of which are currently vacant and less than a dozen of which would be relevant to any given dispute in any case. There are about a million, civilian, non-defense department, non-postal service employees in the United States government, of which perhaps 100,000 or so are in the Department of Homeland Security and fewer are in the CBP. As far as I know, the CBP political appointees from the Obama administration have resigned and a replacement has not been confirmed by the U.S. Senate yet (there has been a Department of Homeland Security appointee confirmed if I recall correctly), and there are only a few people in the agency that political appointees can hire without either receiving Senate confirmation or using the merit based hiring process for civil servants (which takes a while, especially given an executive order imposing a hiring freeze). So, realistically, we have a case where the acting head of the CBP is probably a GS-15 or Senior Executive Service grade civil servant, rather than a political appointee, at the moment, who was hired as a civil servant many years ago, who is doing his (or her) best to follow the less than clear guidance he is receiving from his superiors and government lawyers (perhaps errantly). There could also be remedies in the form of declaratory judgment. The Court could declare as a matter of law on a case by case basis that, for example, Fatima Jones is not deportable and is lawfully within the United States and is entitled to be released from custody. This specific finding as to an individual would be very hard for the administration to escape sanction for. And, the Court could also declare that the entire executive order, at least as applied, is invalid (e.g. for failure to comply with the administrative procedures act, or for failing to include an exception for contrary court orders) or is unconstitutional.

Does one need to pay sales tax for the vehicle? This is a hypothetical situation. John owns a vehicle worth $5000. John gave this vehicle to his friend David for free and one week later, David gave John a $5000 monetary gift for John's birthday. In this scenario, is it lawful for David not to pay sales tax for this vehicle as they both agree that the selling price for the vehicle is $0?

If the situation described is accurate, then maybe First, let's deal with the implicit assumption that sales tax is not payable on gifts. Whether that is true or not depends on the law in your jurisdiction. For example, in australia there is no Goods and Services Tax (GST) payable on a gift because a gift is not a "supply" under the law. Technically, a value-added tax like the GST is not a sales tax but close enough. However, exchanging a "gift" for something of value (airline points, for example) is not a gift. Of course, Australian States and Territories levy Stamp Duty on the transfer of a vehicle's registration, and this is calculated on the sale price or the market price whichever is the greater. Also, technically, that's not a sales tax either. If it's a tax avoidance scheme, then no and it's a crime Assuming that there is no sales tax payable on a gift; if John and David entered into this arrangement (not a contract because of its illegal purpose) to avoid tax, then tax is payable and they are now criminals. If the relevant tax authority learns what happened and decides to investigate, then John and David might have some explaining to do. If David can show that he has routinely given John large cash gifts on John's birthday, then they may convince the authority not to prosecute. If they can't, then they get to try to convince a judge. It is not atypical for tax law to reverse the onus of proof: the government doesn't have to prove tax is payable, John and Dave have to prove it isn't.

Apparently an obscure business forced the California government to collect tax from amazon. No, this is not true. Mr. Grosz filed a lawsuit asking the court to force California to collect tax revenues. The lawsuit is still pending before the court without a decision on the merits. As the saying goes, anyone can sue for anything; their success is another matter. The apparent legal basis for standing is section 526a of the Code of Civil Procedure, which allows taxpayers to sue against wasteful or illegal government spending: 526a (a) An action to obtain a judgment, restraining and preventing any illegal expenditure of, waste of, or injury to, the estate, funds, or other property of a local agency, may be maintained against any officer thereof, or any agent, or other person, acting in its behalf, either by a resident therein, or by a corporation, who is assessed for and is liable to pay, or, within one year before the commencement of the action, has paid, a tax that funds the defendant local agency ... The Plaintiff has claimed that, allegedly, there is a mandatory duty to collect taxes and that failure to do so constitutes a waste. The court will decide if it will accept this argument and compel the collection.

In principle, a verbal contract is just as binding as a written contract. The catch is that it can be difficult to prove what was said. Unless you have witnesses, it would just be your word against his. As DStanley says in the comments, if you have proof that you paid half -- canceled checks or receipts or whatever -- that would be evidence that there was some sort of agreement. Whether your daughter is allowed to drive the car on a specific day depends not just on who owns the car but who has legal custody of your daughter. If a friend of hers said that it is okay with him for her to drive his car to a wild party where there will be drugs and an orgy, the fact that he has full title to the car does not mean that her parents have no right to tell her she can't go! You didn't say what the custody arrangements are, but if you have full custody or shared custody, this would give you certain rights to tell her what she is and is not allowed to do.

If the estate has not been settled, yes The executor is the legal owner of the house and does not need the beneficiaries' permission to sell it if they decide that is in the beneficiaries' best interests. They can consider their wishes, but they don't have to, and they don't have to follow them if they do.

I think you're working off some false premises here. Whatever FMV is in the context of a meeting with Warren Buffet purchased by investors, it's probably different in the context of the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations. Buffett has little to gain from a meeting with people whose job he's been doing more successfully for half a century. He has more to gain from meeting with high-ranking government officials; this is why political donors frequently drop thousands of dollars to attend a dinner where such officials are speaking, even when there's only an off chance of so much as a handshake. Assuming that a campaign-finance calculation of fair market value is roughly equivalent to that in the tax context, FMV for a lunch with Warren Buffett probably isn't $650,000. Because the Buffet lunch was purchased at a charitable auction, tax law would generally recognize that the price paid was not necessarily an accurate reflection of FMV. Instead, it would acknowledge that some portion of the price -- the amount in excess of FMV -- was actually a charitable gift. That of course still leaves the question of what FMV actually is for a lunch with Warren Buffet.

Depends on where you are, and likely also on what they knew when. It is entirely normal to order some goods (like perishable food, or custom-fitted furniture) before it is produced. The contract may or may not include advance payment. Most jurisdictions require some sort of intent for fraud, so the non-fulfillment would not be fraud if circumstances beyond the control of the supplier prevent delivery. The question of civil damages and repayment is distinct from criminal fraud charges.

In general, no. When the salesperson quoted the price and you accepted it you were each bound to that price by contract. Consideration under a contract must be sufficient (something of value for something of value) but it doesn't have to be fair: you can be obliged to pay $2 million for a cupcake or sell your Picasso for $1. You were and are under no obligation to pay and could successfully sue for the return of your money. To further clarify, it doesn't matter if the store has or has not provided the goods or services when they discover their error: they are obliged to perform their side of the contract without additional payment. Further, if this was a consumer contract then some sort of consumer protection law almost certainly applies. This would probably make what the store did not only a breach of contract but an offence against the state as well.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lien A lien is a form of security interest granted over an item of property to secure the payment of a debt or performance of some other obligation. So the garage might have held a lien on Wilson's car as a way to secure a debt that he owed them, such as payment owed for repairs. If so, it would have prevented Wilson from selling the car until the debt was paid. It would also have made it a little less clear who was truly in possession of the car if the garage had a security interest in the car. However, in this particular case, Wilson had a monthly credit account with the garage. I would assume that means he had come to some arrangement with the garage where they would do the work without demanding payment on the spot, and that he would pay what he owed at the end of the month, or something like that; perhaps on terms like net 30 days. They evidently trusted him enough to grant him unsecured credit, instead of demanding a lien on the car as security. So the issue of a lien did not come up in determining possession. This sort of arrangement would have been a lot more common in 1963, before credit cards were common, so I'm not surprised that your garage today doesn't offer it. Nowadays the garage is more likely to demand payment as soon as the work is done, but you can get much the same effect by paying them with a credit card; then you will have about a month before you have to pay your credit card bill (or begin paying interest on it).

Does double jeopardy apply if you commit the same crime twice? Suppose someone were to rob a convenience store, be charged with robbery, then be found not guilty in court. After they are found innocent, that same person robs the same convenience store again. Would that person be protected from a charge of the same law by rule of double jeopardy?

No. Double jeopardy would not apply. You can't be prosecuted twice for committing the same (or a lesser included crime) arising from the same incident twice. If you commit a new crime you can be prosecuted for that new offense, even if you were acquitted of committing a similar offense at a different time and place in the past.

Not generally. While double jeopardy considerations does not apply in Canada until the final verdict (i.e. all appeal processes have been exhausted by decision or failure to appeal within the time limit), the right to a jury trial for serious offences, both under the Constitution Act, 1982 (or the Charter, its bill of rights Part) and the Criminal Code (section 471, which not only makes the jury trial a right, but also the compulsory mode of trial unless both prosecutor and the accused consent), exist. Under common law principles, the jury's verdict, in the fact-finding role exclusive to the jury, is almost sacrosanct. Even if in Canada an appeal court can set aside a jury's verdict of acquittal or conviction, they may only do so if there is a reviewable legal error (for appeals from the Crown and the accused), or if the verdict of conviction is plainly unreasonable and cannot be supported by evidence (or otherwise may constitute a miscarriage of justice). In the first case, the reasoning is that the jury's verdict was defective due to e.g. insufficient or wrongful instructions, seeing evidences that should not have been admitted or failure to see evidences that should have been admitted. In the second case, the appeal court acts as a safeguard, much like in the U.S., for the accused to prevent wrongful convictions however it may occur. Even then, the appeal court cannot in essence conduct a new trial from the appeal records and substitute its own factual findings for those made by a jury, unless it finds that no properly instructed jury can reasonably convict the accused based on the evidences presented (R. v. W.H.). Now going back to what the trial judge can do after a jury's verdict. The proper course of action in case where the Crown's case cannot support a conviction is for the accused to seek a directed verdict before presenting any evidence. If the judge grants the motion, the judge (not the jury) enters a verdict of acquittal, which can be appealed for errors of law. Otherwise, the trial judge has no capacity to usurp the fact finding role of the jury. The judge can, however, in exceptional circumstances, declare a mistrial or stay of the proceedings (i.e. the proceeding is concluded without a verdict, due to e.g. abuse of process by the state or other considerations to preserve the integrity of the justice system) following the jury's verdict. All most all cases on this issue followed a verdict of conviction. In one unusual case (R. v. Burke), a verdict of "acquittal" was involved. The verdict is in quotes because in this case, the court recorded a verdict of acquittal apparently contrary to the jury's intention, as the jury foreman had coughed before pronouncing "guilty as charged" and the judge (along with the court reporter, the prosecutor and the defence lawyer) misheard "not guilty as charged". After seeing the accused in the parking lot, some jury members were confused and returned to the court and reported the error. However, not all jury members could be immediately contacted and the jury had only reconvened in the court with the accused a couple days after the original verdict, and after some newspapers had reported on the situation. The trial judge decided to enter the intended verdict of "guilty". The accused appealed and the Supreme Court decided in this particular case that: the trial judge can nonetheless exercise a limited jurisdiction after the jury's discharge; the judge could enter the intended verdict if it did not give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias; in this case, due to the media reports and relatively long delay between the original verdict and the reconvening of the jury, which may have improperly influenced the jury, a mistrial should have been the appropriate remedy instead of entering the intended verdict. On the appropriateness of a mistrial, the Supreme Court said In declaring a mistrial, the trial judge therefore turns his or her mind to the question of whether a mistrial is needed to prevent a miscarriage of justice. This determination will necessarily involve an examination of the surrounding circumstances. Injustice to the accused is of particular concern, given that the state with all its resources acts as the singular antagonist of the individual accused in a criminal case. This factor should be balanced against other relevant factors, such as the seriousness of the offence, protection of the public and bringing the guilty to justice. It may be fitting to allow the announced verdict to stand where the period the accused has been at liberty and under the mistaken impression that he or she had been acquitted has been lengthy, and where the charge is not so egregious as to bring the administration of justice into disrepute. As has already been stated, the trial judge is in the best position to assess the circumstances of each individual case and select the most appropriate remedy. This case does not directly apply to a case where the jury intended an acquittal, but the considerations may still be applied in extremely limited circumstances. While no one but the jury is privy to their deliberation process and no judge can overturn a jury's acquittal because they think the jury's verdict is unreasonable, it could be imagined that, for example, if a jury reports an acquittal and a member of jury before being discharged makes a claim of jury intimidation or the Crown presents clear evidence of jury manipulation, the trial judge might still have the authority to declare a mistrial. But this has not been clarified in jurisprudence.

I'm no expert, but I had assumed this clause was present in case of the following situation. Joe is arrested for a robbery of a London bank. Joe says nothing under questioning. At trial, Joe's defense is that at the time of the robbery, he was in Sheffield drinking beer with his brother. On the basis of common sense, a jury could think: "Surely if Joe were really innocent, he would have told the police of his alibi at the time he was questioned, and saved himself a lot of trouble. Since he didn't do that, maybe a more likely explanation is that he wasn't actually in Sheffield, but that sometime between arrest and trial, he came up with the idea of faking an alibi in Sheffield, and convinced people to testify falsely to that effect. Yes, that does seem more plausible. So we are not going to give much credence to Joe's supposed alibi." So it really would be the case that not mentioning the alibi during questioning would harm Joe's defense at trial. The warning, then, is intended to keep Joe from doing this inadvertently. If Joe's alibi is genuine, but out of a misguided desire to exercise his right to remain silent, he doesn't mention it during questioning, he may accidentally increase his chances of being wrongly convicted. Everybody has an interest in avoiding this.

The precise details (and citations) will vary with jurisdiction, so this answer deals only with principles. If you pick up and "take possession of" property belonging to somebody else, you are a thief. [Note that 'taking possession' rather than picking up to restore to the owner/correct place is what makes the difference, which is why in real life nobody who cannot prove your intention will take action; but your question explicitly concedes the point.] If the property does not belong to the supermarket, you are not stealing from them, but from the currently unidentified owner: this makes no legal difference. You might conceivably have a defence if you can prove that the owner has abandoned the property, whatever the definition of "abandoned" is in your jurisdiction (note that it is up to you to show this, and possibly that you knew it before you picked up the property). If it belongs to the supermarket, this cannot be true; if a box of matches has fallen out of someone's pocket, it might possibly be (whatever the laws are, it is very unlikely that they have ever been applied in such a trivial case, so there may be some uncertainty). in any case, the shop is undoubtedly allowed to throw you out, ban you from returning to their premises, and inform other shops and the police that they believe you to be a petty thief, based on their experience.

He cannot be given a higher sentence because he appealed. If the appeal is unsuccessful, he will be in exactly the same legal position as if he had not appealed, aside from any legal fees an costs he may incur for the appeal. The worst that could happen to Chauvin at the end of the appeals process, is that all three convictions are upheld, which leaves him no worse off than if there had been no appeal. However, if an appeal is successful, it will probably lead to a new trial. In general, when an accused person is retried after a successful appeal, there is the possibility of a worse outcome. In this case, however, Chauvin was convicted on all counts charged, so the outcome could not get worse. If Chauvin were to appeal and get a new trial, but be convicted in a new trial, he could in theory receive a larger sentence after the second trial. But since the charges would be the same, the range of possible sentences and the sentencing guidelines would be the same. Of course, no one yet knows what sentence the judge will impose after the current conviction.

In your example, there is nothing that indicates to me that there is a "particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of . . . criminal activity". If you have described the totalilty of the circumstances, the officer does not have the right to arrest or detain the individual. To your broader question about how specific descriptions must be in order to provide a basis for a stop, the assessment is based on the "totality of the circumstances". For example, an anonymous tip that "a woman would drive from a particular apartment building to a particular motel in a brown Plymouth station wagon with a broken right tail light [carrying cocaine]" was enough to warrant a stop. Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325 (1990)1 In contrast, the court "determined that no reasonable suspicion arose from a bare-bones tip that a young black male in a plaid shirt standing at a bus stop was carrying a gun." Florida v. J. L., 529 U. S. 266 (2000) The “reasonable suspicion” necessary to justify such a stop “is dependent upon both the content of information possessed by police and its degree of reliability.” Navarette v. California 572 U.S. ___ (2014) In any case, a crime must be part of the particularized suspicion. 1. This case focused on the indicia of reliability necessary for an anonymous tip to support a reasonable suspicion, but it is also an example of a degree of non-specificity in identification of a suspect.

Maybe I'm reading Walsh wrong, but it seems to me to be saying that Stout might apply in some cases, but it doesn't in that specific case. I think you are indeed reading it wrong. In the Walsh case, the court says: We have not had occasion to decide the question up to this time, but now that it is presented, we not only reiterate the doubt which we expressed in the McAlpin case (supra), but we think that the question of the defendant's negligence was erroneously submitted to the jury in the Stout case, and that we ought not to follow it as a precedent. It's clearly repudiating Stout here, and not just as it applies to that case. It literally says they think it should not be followed as precedent.

Exactly the same thing that stops the same rogue lawyer from putting on a mask and robbing a bank. One is the crime of fraud and the other the crime of armed robbery but they are both crimes. People commit crimes all the time; that is why nearly 1 million people in the U.S. are in jail right now - some of them may even be in there for crimes they actually committed! Were your lawyer to commit this crime he may get caught or he may not; if he does he's going away for a long time and can never work as a lawyer again. So it's simply a matter of risk assessment; oh, and ethics

When is a letter "mailed or delivered"? I am a PA resident and purchased the services of a career service company based in FL for 5k. The payments were deferred for the first month, so I have neither made any payments nor received any services from them. I decided to cancel on the second day after some unexpected news changed my financial situation. The contract had a part about recission: Customer may rescind this Agreement, without any penalty or obligation, within three (3) business days after the signing this Agreement. To do so, Customer must mail or deliver a signed and dated copy of the cancellation notice found at the end of the signed version of this Agreement, or any other written notice of cancellation, or send a telegram containing a notice of cancellation to XYZ no later than midnight of the date of this Agreement. The contract had a notice of cancellation attached and said You may cancel this transaction, without any penalty or obligation, within three business days from the above date. Later in the notice of cancellation, To cancel this transaction, mail or deliver a signed and dated copy of this cancellation notice or any other written notice, or send a telegram, to XYZ not later than midnight of 6/18/23 The above date mentioned was listed as 6/15. 6/16, I notified them via email, phone call, and sent a 1-day shipping printed, signed and dated copy of the notice of cancellation. However, the company uses a rented mailbox service which won't be open until Mon. 6/19 (which happens to be a new federal holiday). I have three questions: What is the correct date of "three business days?" Excluding weekends and federal holidays, it appears that three business days would be Wed. 6/21! What is the date the notice is "mailed or delivered?" Is it the postmark date or the date that it shows up in their mailbox? It will be delivered 6/17, but they wouldn't receive it until 6/19 at the earliest. Will I still be on the hook for payments due to a typo in their notice of cancellation stating 6/18 was three business days ahead?

The reason for the "mail or deliver" language is that it encompasses the possibility that you walk into the company's offices and hand an employee there the required notice letter, without using the postal system. The date "mailed or delivered" is the postmark date if you mail it, or the date the letter goes from your hands to the company's if you deliver it yourself. It isn't the date that the postal service makes their delivery.

Not for normal correspondence There are laws that require a specified channel of communication for specific purposes such as a physical address for the service of legal notices, but there is no general requirement. How, or if, a company communicates with its customers about complaints will either be specified in the contract or up to the company to determine and advertise. For example, this site specifies “ will be deemed to have been duly given when received, if personally delivered or sent by certified or registered mail, return receipt requested; when receipt is electronically confirmed, if transmitted by facsimile or e-mail; or the day after it is sent, if sent for next day delivery by recognized overnight delivery service” - any other method of delivery (Whatsapp, Facebook, even their own chatrooms etc.) is not a valid method of service, if you use those methods, then legally, you have not communicated. So, if the company requires complaints to deal with by online chat, they can safely ignore any letter or email you might send them.

There is no contract Specifically, an agreement to agree is void for uncertainty. If the total cost of shipping was an insignificant fraction of the value of the contract then there might be sufficient certainty - that is, it could be argued that the buyer (or seller) has agreed to pay a reasonable rate for shipping. However, in the context of most items on the site this is unlikely to be the case. As an aside, your use of the term "rescind" is incorrect. Rescission occurs when one party breaches a term of the contract and the other party elects to terminate (and optionally seek damages) in response. The correct term for both parties agreeing to release the other is "termination by agreement".

Clearly in this case the writing does not reflect your actual agreement. If you were to bill for 1.5x your normal rate for hours over 40/week, relying on the writing, and it came to court, you might win, based on the general rule that matters explicitly covered in the written agreement are treated as final, and evidence of contradictory oral agreements are often not accepted to contradict the contract document. This is known as the parole evidence rule. But you don't plan to issue such a bill, so that won't come up. I don't see that you are at any legal risk. But you could send the client a letter saying that you signed the contract document so as not to hold the job up, but you think there is a mistake in it (pointing out exactly where and what the error is). This would help establish your ethics and good faith, so that if somehow there was a problem over this later (although that seems unlikely) you can't be accused of any improper actions. Keep a copy of any such letter. By the way, if you are an independent contractor, the governmental standard for overtime does not normally apply (in the US). If you are an employee of a consulting company, it may or may not, depending on your salary level and the kind of work you do. An independent contractor can contract for a higher rate for overtime hours, if the client is willing to agree. Many clients will not be willing.

Is there any way I can defend myself against penalties when mistakes are made in my favor? Another option, in a similar vein to your suggestions, is to make a contemporaneous record of the conversations. Then send an email* to the public official detailing what was said and agreed, along with a request that they reply with any observations or amendments within a certain time frame. That way you have a date-stamped document properly addressed to the other party to use as evidence or leverage. *or a recorded delivery letter etc

Depends on where you are, and likely also on what they knew when. It is entirely normal to order some goods (like perishable food, or custom-fitted furniture) before it is produced. The contract may or may not include advance payment. Most jurisdictions require some sort of intent for fraud, so the non-fulfillment would not be fraud if circumstances beyond the control of the supplier prevent delivery. The question of civil damages and repayment is distinct from criminal fraud charges.

I am not a lawyer: If they sue you it will probably be for fraud, then the DA will investigate and can easily find out who you are. If they can prove that you signed the contract is another story. If the clause in the contract is valid yet another. Getting a lawyer might be wise, especially if your visa depends on a clean legal record. Have you talked to them yet? If you can afford it, you or your new company could pay off he months salary to the old company. In my opinion it's fair, they probably turned down a lot of other applicants an will either need to search again or find a good temp to replace you. Think there was something that you cannot quit a contract before it starts, but another option would be to start working for them and then realizing during the test period that it's a bad match. However, best lawyer up! Search for "Kündigung vor Beschäftigungsbeginn" (Cancellation before the start of employment) Quick google suggests that they might be right if they have it in the contract, but the lawyer will know for sure. Look for someone who does "Arbeitsrecht".

Do I give my letter 60 days from the end of the contract, or 60 days before September? My boss told me that it would be 60 days before the end of the contract, but I wanted a second opinion. Your boss is wrong. The contract requires a party to give a 60-day notice only if the party intends to override the default condition that "the contract shall run for the full term named above". Since your contract ends on June 30th and you plan on working there up to and including that date, you are abiding by the [contract] default condition. Therefore, you are not required to send a notice for something you are not intending to do (namely, to terminate the contract ahead of schedule). The information you provide here does not reflect any language in your current contract relating to subsequent contracts/renewals. The existence of such language might or might not change the assessment. That issue aside, you might want to ensure that the preliminary offer made to you verbally be somehow reflected in writing. It will not be more binding than the verbal offer, but that evidence could prove useful in the event that the new employer unexpectedly changes its mind at a time when your current employer has discarded you for contract renewal. Your prospective employer should become aware of how its request for a reference from your boss jeopardizes a renewal with your current employer.

Force allowed against pickpocket If a victim catches a pickpocket in the act, what degree of force is legally justified by the victim against the pickpocket, given that pickpockets do not usually pose a threat of violence, but the victim wants their property back? Can the victim grab, tackle, or punch the pickpocket? Can the victim say, "Give back my wallet or I will punch you"? Can the victim shoot the pickpocket and claim heat of passion as a defense? Does the answer vary depending on which of the two people would be at an advantage in a physical confrontation, based on size, age or gender?

colorado In the U.S., this is largely a question of state law and while similar from state to state, it is not identical. In Colorado, which basically follows the majority rule, there are a couple of justifications that could be available: (1) the use of force justified for defense of property, and (2) the use of force justified for a citizen's arrest. In the case of defense of property, the rule is as follows: Use of physical force in defense of property A person is justified in using reasonable and appropriate physical force upon another person when and to the extent that he reasonably believes it necessary to prevent what he reasonably believes to be an attempt by the other person to commit theft, criminal mischief, or criminal tampering involving property, but he may use deadly physical force under these circumstances only in defense of himself or another as described in section 18-1-704. Colo. Rev. Statutes § 18-1-706. In the case of a citizen's arrest, the rule is: A private person acting on his own account is justified in using reasonable and appropriate physical force upon another person when and to the extent that he reasonably believes it necessary to effect an arrest, or to prevent the escape from custody of an arrested person who has committed an offense in his presence; but he is justified in using deadly physical force for the purpose only when he reasonably believes it necessary to defend himself or a third person from what he reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of deadly physical force. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-707(7). Can the victim shoot the pickpocket and claim heat of passion as a defense? No. Deadly force is not authorized against a pickpocket, and shooting someone almost always counts (often by definition) as a use of deadly force. The "heat of passion" defense only downgrades a murder charge to manslaughter and probably wouldn't apply in any case in these circumstances. Can the victim grab, tackle, or punch the pickpocket? Can the victim say, "Give back my wallet or I will punch you"? Does the answer vary depending on which of the two people would be at an advantage in a physical confrontation, based on size, age or gender? The law doesn't answer these question at this level of specificity. Whether the force used was "reasonable and appropriate" and was "reasonably believed to be necessary" are determined after the fact on a case by case basis by the finder of fact (i.e. the judge in a bench trial, or the jury in a jury trial).

Is there a law against carrying items with an intent to use them in such a way? england-and-wales Yes The offence is possession of an offence weapon in a public place contrary s.1 of the Prevention of Crime Act 1953 (1) Any person who without lawful authority or reasonable excuse, the proof whereof shall lie on him, has with him in any public place any offensive weapon shall be guilty of an offence, and shall be liable— (a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or a fine not exceeding £200, or both; (b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding four years or a fine not exceeding one hundred pounds, or both. “offensive weapon” means any article made or adapted for use for causing injury to the person, or intended by the person having it with him for such use by him or by some other person. There are similar provisions (with subtle differences) in scotland and northern-ireland at s.47 of the Criminal Law (Consolidation) (Scotland) Act 1995 and s.93 of the Justice Act (Northern Ireland) 2011 respectively.

As a concrete example, consider Missouri v. Coleman, where Coleman handed a teller a plastic bag and said "I need you to do me a favor. Put the money in this bag", and later as the manager approached, said "Ma'am, stop where you are and don't move any farther". Coleman was convicted of second degree robbery: but the appeals court found that he had not acted forcibly, so his conviction was overturned. Instead, the court entered a conviction for the lesser offense of stealing which is when one Appropriates property or services of another with the purpose to deprive him or her thereof, either without his or her consent or by means of deceit or coercion The act may also be termed "theft", as in Washington state. The thief is acting deceptively and thereby gaining control over property.

I do not know the particular legal environment in France, but in general the shop is private property and the owner decides who may enter and who may not. You have no right as such to enter somebody else's property against their will. Doing so would at least be classified as trespassing, possibly more serious considering you mention using force to enter the premise.

Self-Defense is an active Defense for Homicide (note, this is the legal term for taking a life. Criminal Homicide and Justified Homicide are two subsets of Homicide and are denoted by illegal actions and legal actions. Homicide as a result of Self-Defense is a Justified Homicide, regardless of the weapon, so long as it was applied with the minimal amount of force required to stop the criminal harm to oneself). Suppose you use a taser and the current causes the attacker to go into cardiac arrest and die. Your intention in using the taser was to stop the criminal from injuring yourself, your property, or another person or their property (defense of others). Even though the Taser is non-leathal, it's more like less lethal. Death by Taser is uncommon, but not impossible or rare. It would be handled as a defensive use of a weapon (same as if the attacker was killed by a gun) and processed as such. Pennsylvania is a Stand Your Ground State, meaning that in a public place, you do not have a duty to flee if your attacker approaches you in a public place, you do not have to prove that you could not flee in order to claim self-defense. However, if you pull a weapon and your attacker decides to flee, you can not give chase and kill him upon capture. You also need to have a reasonable expectation that the attacker is about to use deadly force (this normally means having sight of the weapon or what would reasonably look like a weapon i.e. a realistic toy gun without the orange safety cap would be reasonable). You also cannot claim self-defense if you were engaged in another crime when the attacker approached you (i.e. If you rob the Krusty Krab and the Hash Slinging Slasher approaches you with a knife, sucks to be you cause you don't have a right to be in the Krusty Krab after closing.).

Since you don't say which country you're in, it's likely that you're interested in United States law. You are probably in the clear here, though you're getting close enough to the edge of breaking the law that I wouldn't be confident about not being prosecuted and/or convicted. The relevant laws in this case appear to be 18 USC 471, 18 USC 472, and perhaps 18 USC 514. All three of them begin "Whoever, with the intent to defraud...". It's questionable whether creating counterfeit money as a burglar decoy counts as defrauding the burglar.

Not all illegal things are crimes. Lack of evidence. They are asked to testify, and they say "what I said in my book was a lie". There is no general law against lying, except when under oath. Statute of limitations. Saying "10 years ago I did smoke drugs" means that any offence is no longer prosecutable. Lack of details. Which jurisdiction were they in? When did they commit the act, how many acts? You cannot be arrested for being a "bank robber" or a "murderer". You are charged with "robbing Bank X on 123 Fake Street the Thursday 25 April 2018" or "murdering Jim Thio in January 2017". Otherwise the defendant would have a hard time defending himself (how to prove that you have not killed anyone at any time?) All of the above combined with prosecutorial discretion in the form that any possible prosecutor will most likely determine that bringing charges would be just a waste of time and resources. UPDATE February 2018: Just for the sake of completeness, a reference to the situation of Jacques Cassandri, who did boast about a serious crime(a robbery in a Societe Generale vault in 1976) in a book. Unfortunately for him, he made some kind of mistake/miscalculation and the crime had not yet expired, so he has become an example of someone being prosecuted by confessing a crime in a book.

JeffUK has quoted the relevant law. However the question then becomes "what is an 'offensive weapon'", and "what is a lawful excuse?". Almost anything can be classified as an offensive weapon if you can use it as a weapon. See https://www.askthe.police.uk/content/Q338.htm A lawful excuse is something like "I am going to play baseball, which is why I have a baseball bat". It is emphatically not "I want it for self defence". Specifically, https://www.cps.gov.uk/legal-guidance/offensive-weapons-knives-bladed-and-pointed-articles cites Patterson v Block [1984] 81 LSG 2458 – carrying a weapon for defence can still amount to intent to cause injury So the answer to the OP's original question: Is it legal for a private citizen to carry any kind of weapon for self defence purposes in the UK? is "No".

Is it legal for employers to charge for training if you leave too soon? Apparently, some employers are requiring new employees to sign a contract that says, “We will provide training. You must work here for at least N months. If you leave before that, you will have to pay us back $XXXX for the training. Are these contracts enforceable? Some people claim that they are a form of indentured servitude and that this is illegal in the US.

There is a reason these are commonly called "TRAP"s (Training Repayment Agreement Provision). These agreements don't just protect the employer from paying for training that an employee can use elsewhere. These agreements frequently act to "trap" the employee in difficult employment circumstances where the employer can demand long hours and excessive dedication in difficult jobs for little pay, knowing that if the employee tries to leave, they could face a substantial financial burden. These agreements are generally legal, provided they are executed in good faith. However, certain circumstances have been used to void the agreements. In particular: If the cost or value of the the training is vastly overstated, so the training actually provides minimal value to the employee, but has a disproportionately large repayment cost that only benefit the employer. If the term of the agreement is excessively long (typically, more than 1 year). Training is unlikely to be so valuable and specialized that the employee would need years to repay the benefits. (Certain exceptions apply, such as for advanced engineering work or specialized skills like airline pilots) If the "training" doesn't actually have much value; if the training is just company propaganda and policies, rather than job specific skills, repayment costs are unlikely to hold up in a dispute. If the employee already has demonstrated skills before the training, then forcing them into unnecessary training just for a TRAP contract is unlikely to be supported. For example, someone with years of skilled electrical design work probably cannot be forced to repay thousands of dollars of "training" for a few weeks of basic electrical refresher courses. Basically, if the training isn't valuable to the employee and the cost isn't reasonable for the training, the TRAP line can frequently be voided. Yet doing so almost always requires mediation or a suit, which are also expensive, time consuming, and have uncertain outcomes. Its best for a prospective employee to call out a TRAP provision as a red flag before accepting an offer, and avoid it if at all possible unless they truly believe they'll benefit from the training, intend to stay the full term, and understand the employer might use the cost as a way to expect more from them or hold back their professional advancement.

An agreement to agree is void There is a multitude of case law on this point. If the NDA was not available to you when you signed the employment contract and the term was couched as you describe; then the term would be unenforcable. That is, your employment contract would be binding except for that term i.e. you could not be compelled to sign the NDA. Now, there may be a requirement on you to negotiate in good faith in an attempt to find an NDA you can agree to but if you can't find one you can't find one. You cannot (legally) be fired for this reason. Now, if the NDA was available, and you were told where to find it, and irrespective of if you did or didn't find it, you would be bound to the NDA.

I am not a lawyer: If they sue you it will probably be for fraud, then the DA will investigate and can easily find out who you are. If they can prove that you signed the contract is another story. If the clause in the contract is valid yet another. Getting a lawyer might be wise, especially if your visa depends on a clean legal record. Have you talked to them yet? If you can afford it, you or your new company could pay off he months salary to the old company. In my opinion it's fair, they probably turned down a lot of other applicants an will either need to search again or find a good temp to replace you. Think there was something that you cannot quit a contract before it starts, but another option would be to start working for them and then realizing during the test period that it's a bad match. However, best lawyer up! Search for "Kündigung vor Beschäftigungsbeginn" (Cancellation before the start of employment) Quick google suggests that they might be right if they have it in the contract, but the lawyer will know for sure. Look for someone who does "Arbeitsrecht".

am I right in my understanding of "payment in lieu" in the above scenario? No. You are not being “paid in lieu” of anything; you are being paid your accrued entitlement. Payment in lieu refers to payment instead of some other obligation. In employment it usually refers to an employer paying an employee instead of requiring the employee to work out the notice period which of the daily rates at the top of the post should I request? Neither. The correct rate is the one your employer used - your annual rate divided by the number of days you get paid for. Annual leave continues to accrue while you are on annual leave (or any other paid leave). is there a legal basis for such a request? No.

Unless your contract, whether individual or collective, has a clause requiring this compensation you are out of luck. Sometimes one of the “benefits” for a company’s move is to leave behind workers who are not 100% committed to the company in that they would not move or commute a long way to keep their job. 30 miles isn’t very unusual where I live. In the U.S. most employment is on an "at will" basis. That means you can quit anytime you like without notice and you can be fired at any time for almost any reason or no reason, as long as the reason is not one of the protected reasons.

I can answer for the U.S., if that's helpful. The general rule, in the United States, is that covenants not to compete are enforceable as long as they are reasonable. What constitutes "reasonable" varies from state to state. Factors considered generally include: What kind of actual harm will come to the business if you go to a competitor? In other words, is this rote language they include in every contract, or did they put it in yours because you know all the secret formulas and have the customer list memorized? Is it reasonable in time, location, and scope? Something preventing you from taking any job anywhere in the United States for ten years won't be enforceable; something preventing you from taking a job with the exact same title in the same industry in the same town for the next six months might be. The general rule at common law was that covenants not to compete were unenforceable restraints of trade; the fact that they're enforceable at all is later law created by each jurisdiction, and that means it's going to vary based on your specific jurisdiction. If you want to know whether it's okay to take a specific job based on a specific non-compete you signed, you will need to talk to a legal professional licensed in your jurisdiction--and even she may not be able to tell you for sure.

if a manager emailed an prospective employee a contract containing the pay rate of $20/hr, if the prospective employee crossed out $20/hr and replaced it with $25/hr, then went to work and gave the manager the contract which he failed to carefully read, continued working for a few months, would the employee be entitled to $20/hr? A party ought to timely alert or notify the other counterparty about any disagreements or proposed changes. This is especially recommendable when evidence suggests that the counterparty's expectation that the party only would sign the contract was reasonable. In the example you outline, the employee's unilateral alteration of the compensation/rate in the contract seems unlikely to favor the employee's position. That is because typically employer and employee negotiate compensation prior to formalizing their agreement. In that case, the employee would need stronger evidence with which to overcome the employer's credible argument that he did not knowingly accept the altered rate.

If you were in the office, and ready to take instructions what to do from your manager, then you were legally working and need to be paid. There's plenty of things you can do in an office without electricity unless it's too dark. If the manager didn't ask you to do anything, it's the company's problem, not yours. If you took the opportunity to leave for 90 minutes to do your weekly shopping, then you shouldn't get paid.

Copyright status of a letter on U.S. Senator's letterhead Under 17 USC 105, there is no copyright protection for a "work of the United States Government," which 17 USC 101 defines as "a work prepared by an officer or employee of the United States Government as part of that person’s official duties." What would be the copyright status of a letter written to a private individual by a U.S. senator on official letterhead? Assume that the subject matter is not any official act of government, but falls under the category of constituent relationship building and getting re-elected. I'm guessing the senator would hold copyright, but I wonder if anyone knows for sure.

The Copyright Office has determined, in chapter 300 of the Compendium of U.S. Copyright Office Practices, on page 36, that the copyright bar extends to works created by the President; Congress; the federal judiciary; federal departments, agencies, boards, bureaus, or commissions; or any other officer or employee of the U.S. federal government while acting within the course of his or her official duties. So the Senator is a US employee for copyright purposes, at least according to the US Copyright Office. Technically, this is interpretation rather than law, and in theory a court might disagree, but if anyone is qualified to speak on this issue, it's the Copyright Office. In my opinion, it is most reasonable to assume that the Copyright Office is correct in their interpretation unless there is case law directly contradicting them. The only question is whether the letter was created by the Senator "while acting within the course of his or her official duties." I'm not aware of any case law suggesting that constituent building is or is not an "official duty" of a US Senator, and there are reasonable arguments to be made in both directions. On the one hand, the letter is clearly beyond the scope of Congress's lawmaking and oversight Constitutional functions. On the other, the office of Senator is an inherently political office, and a case can be made that campaigning for reelection is part of the job. Perhaps surprisingly, that question was extensively litigated during E. Jean Carroll's first defamation lawsuit against Donald Trump, because Trump argued that his statements about Carroll were within the scope of his employment (and so a defamation claim would be effectively barred under the Westfall Act). To my understanding, the current disposition of that lawsuit is that this is considered a question of fact for a jury to decide (at least according to the Second Circuit). What can be said is who does not hold copyright: The US Senate and/or the US government as a whole. The only way the Senate could acquire copyright in this letter (short of the Senator directly granting it to them) would be as a work made for hire, but the work-for-hire doctrine requires that the work be prepared by an employee as part of their official duties, just like the federal copyright bar. So the Senate cannot acquire copyright in this manner. If anyone owns the copyright, it is most likely the Senator.

Ultimately whether one work is derivative of another is a question of fact, and there is no absolute rule beyond taking it to a court. Many cases are clear. A Full translation is obviously a derivative work, The definition in 17 USC 101 is: A “derivative work” is a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications, which, as a whole, represent an original work of authorship, is a “derivative work”. A mere description of a work, such as a one-paragraph summary, is probably not a derivative work, but as the summary gets longer and fuller, it starts to approach an "abridgment or condensation". One test is if the summery could reasonably replace the original, at least for some consumers. But there is no clear cut place to draw the line. By the way, If something is a derivative work, it is infringing provided only that the original is in copyright and the creator of the derivative did not have permission from, the copyright holder on the original. Fair use may prevent an adverse judgement, but is still an infringement. As the question referred to fair use, a strictly US legal concept, I am assuming US law here.

Anything that somebody writes is copyrighted, even if you call it a "press release". That means that nobody can copy it without permission. If you hand it out to a bunch of people and write "press release", the only reasonable interpretation of the designation "press release" is that you are granting permission to copy (as well as paraphrase).

In Bartnicki v. Vopper 532 U.S. 514, SCOTUS ruled in a manner applicable to this case. In that case they assumed (did not decide, but operated from that initial position) that the information was illegally obtained, respondent knew that, but did not play any role in obtaining the information. They say that In New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U. S. 713, this Court upheld the press' right to publish information of great public concern obtained from documents stolen by a third party and held that privacy concerns give way when balanced against the interest in publishing matters of public importance. One of the costs associated with participation in public affairs is an attendant loss of privacy. Florida Star v. B.J.F. 491 U. S. 524 in a similar vein cites a principle (from Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U. S. 97) that if a newspaper lawfully obtains truthful information about a matter of public significance, then state officials may not constitutionally punish publication of the information, absent a need to further a state interest of the highest order. In other words, this is a matter where any restriction would be subject to strict scrutiny. Similar results are found in Boehner v. McDermott 332 F. Supp.2d 149. However, in Peavy v. WFAA-TV Inc, the TV station had a more active role in violating the law, so they were not protected by the First Amendment. As for the initial source, it is said to be unknown (to NYT) where the documents came from, though they were verified by Jack Mitnick. There are federal laws that would prohibit government agents from disclosing a person's tax return, but there is no general law against disclosing a tax return. Without more information on the source, it is impossible to determine whether that act was legal.

united-states In the United States, information released through the federal Freedom of Information (FoI) process, or any of the various state-level versions of FoI, is considered public information. The person who receives it may share it at will, or publish it. Indeed many such inquiries are made by news reporters who intend to publish the information, and many others are routinely posted to various web sites. I suspect that the law on this point in the UK is similar, but I have not checked it.

At least in the United States (and I'm pretty sure this is true around the world), facts and information cannot be copyrighted. Just because a work is copyrighted, doesn't mean every part of that work is copyrighted, and factual information conveyed by the work is a part which is not subject to copyright. Copyright on a collection of facts is limited to the selection and arrangement of those facts, and only if that selection and arrangement has some bare minimum amount of originality. See Feist v. Rural, 499 U.S. 340. In this case, it looks at first glance like the person who made that site made their own selection of which materials and which sources would be included; the one place where they really seem to have copied their selection is from glass catalogs with datasheets from specific manufacturers, who would have a hard time arguing that "everything we manufacture in this widely-recognized class of substances" is an original selection. What the author of the website has done is relinquish his rights in his selection and arrangement of the data. In some places, there are other rights besides copyright that do apply to databases; for instance, the EU recognizes database rights to protect significant investment in compiling a database of stuff. But the US does not have that concept. For citing stuff, that's not really a legal question, and has more to do with academic standards. Ask your adviser or teacher if you have one.

Apparently Such Files May be Distributes or Sold Section 5.e of the Google APIs Terms of Service reads: e. Prohibitions on Content Unless expressly permitted by the content owner or by applicable law, you will not, and will not permit your end users or others acting on your behalf to, do the following with content returned from the APIs: Scrape, build databases, or otherwise create permanent copies of such content, or keep cached copies longer than permitted by the cache header; Copy, translate, modify, create a derivative work of, sell, lease, lend, convey, distribute, publicly display, or sublicense to any third party; Misrepresent the source or ownership; or Remove, obscure, or alter any copyright, trademark, or other proprietary rights notices; or falsify or delete any author attributions, legal notices, or other labels of the origin or source of material It might seem that 5.e.2 prohibits the suggested use. But if the text is in fact in the public domain,"applicable law" (that is, copyright law) permits you, or anyone, to "Copy, translate, modify, create a derivative work of" or otherwise use the content. Thus 5.e.2 does not apply. Points 3 and 4 would seem to indicate that the source, including title and author information, must be included or preserved in the output files, but seems to be the only relevant restriction that applies. Response to Comment A comment by user Brian Drake questions the theory of this answer, stating: The most you can say is that copyright law does not prohibit certain conduct (and even that is not clear: just because the text is in the public domain does not necessarily mean that the audio is in the public domain); this does not mean that copyright law expressly permits that conduct. US Copyright law does not define what constitutes the public domain. Rather it defines what is protected by copyright, and specifies some cases in whch a work is not protected. (For nexample, 17 USC 105 provides tht works of the US Federal Government are not protected.) Anything not included in the protection of copyright is in the public domain. This has been confirmed by many cour cases and legal writings. Law generally follows the rule "Anything not forbidden is allowed." Audio as Derivitive Work An audio recording of a person reading a text aloud would be a derivative work of that text, and would normally have its own copyright, if created lawfully. (If the recording was of a text protected by copyright, made without permission and outside of fair use, it was not made lawfully and the infringer has no copyright in the recording at all.) But US courts have held that a work created by a mechanical or automatic process, including many computer programs, is not an "original work of authorship" and thus is not protected by copyright at all, and is thus in the Public Domain. The case of the "Monkey Selfie" is on point. ("Compendium of U.S. Copyright Office Practices, § 313.2" (PDF). United States Copyright Office. 22 December 2014. p. 22. "To qualify as a work of 'authorship' a work must be created by a human being.... Works that do not satisfy this requirement are not copyrightable. The Office will not register works produced by nature, animals, or plants." Moreover, if the audio were protected by copyright, it would presumably be owned by the person who ran the program, and 17 USC 106 specifically grants the copyright owner permission to distribute copies. Sources The Wikipedia article "Public Domain" reads in relevant part (citations omitted): The public domain consists of all the creative work to which no exclusive intellectual property rights apply. Those rights may have expired,[1] been forfeited, expressly waived, or may be inapplicable. ... As rights vary by country and jurisdiction, a work may be subject to rights in one country and be in the public domain in another. Some rights depend on registrations on a country-by-country basis, and the absence of registration in a particular country, if required, gives rise to public-domain status for a work in that country. ... Definitions of the boundaries of the public domain in relation to copyright, or intellectual property more generally, regard the public domain as a negative space; that is, it consists of works that are no longer in copyright term or were never protected by copyright law. According to James Boyle this definition underlines common usage of the term public domain and equates the public domain to public property and works in copyright to private property. However, the usage of the term public domain can be more granular, including for example uses of works in copyright permitted by copyright exceptions. Such a definition regards work in copyright as private property subject to fair-use rights and limitation on ownership *"How Can I Use Copyright-Free Works (in the Public Domain)?" by Nolo Press reads: Copyright law gives creators certain exclusive rights. These rights include the exclusive ability to copy, distribute, and perform the copyrighted work. But copyright is not infinite. Rather, it provides copyright holders with protections for a limited duration. When a work becomes available for use without permission from a copyright owner, it is said to be "in the public domain." Most works enter the public domain because their copyrights have expired. The Legal Information Institute (LII) article "public domain" reads: The public domain includes every creative work that is no longer protected by a copyright, trademark, or patent. Creative works that are no longer protected are owned by the general public rather than the original creator. As such, the work is free to be copied, performed, or otherwise used by anyone. "Copyright and Scholarship: Public Domain" from Boston College Libraries reads in relevant part: "Public domain" works are not protected by copyright. The public owns these works, not an individual author or artist. Anyone can use a public domain work without obtaining permission, but no one can ever own it. An important caveat regarding public domain material is that collections, new editions, and derivative works of public domain material may all be protected by copyright. With collections, an author could collect public domain works in a book or display them on a website, and the collection as a whole could be protected by copyright, even though individual works within it are not. *"Welcome to the Public Domain" (Stanford libraries) reads in relevant part: The term “public domain” refers to creative materials that are not protected by intellectual property laws such as copyright, trademark, or patent laws. The public owns these works, not an individual author or artist. Anyone can use a public domain work without obtaining permission, but no one can ever own it. Wikipedia article "Monkey selfie copyright dispute" *"A macaque monkey who took now-famous selfie photographs cannot be declared the copyright owner of the photos" (AP) reads in relevant part: A macaque monkey who took now-famous selfie photographs cannot be declared the copyright owner of the photos, a federal judge said Wednesday. U.S. District Judge William Orrick said in federal court in San Francisco that "while Congress and the president can extend the protection of law to animals as well as humans, there is no indication that they did so in the Copyright Act." *NARUTO, a Crested Macaque, by and through his Next Friends, People forthe Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc., v. DAVID JOHN SLATER; BLURB, INC., ; WILDLIFE PERSONALITIES, LTD." (Ninth Circuit full opinion April 23, 2018 No. 16-15469, D.C. No. 3:15-cv-04324-WHO) reads in part: We must determine whether a monkey may sue humans, corporations, and companies for damages and injunctive relief arising from claims of copyright infringement. Our court’s precedent requires us to conclude that the monkey’s claim has standing under Article III of the United States Constitution. Nonetheless, we conclude that this monkey—and all animals, since they are not human—lacks statutory standing under the Copyright Act. We therefore affirm the judgment of the district court

While the argument you make is straight forward, it is hard to imagine who would ever have standing to challenge the law. Who can legitimately argue that they are harmed in any way by having to register with an agency housed in the legislative branch rather than in the executive branch? Also, there is a legitimate argument that the Library of Congress should be in the legislative branch as a research tool for Congress, and there is a legitimate argument that the Copyright office should be in the Library of Congress because that is how the Library of Congress gets its comprehensive collection of research resources, which Congress in turns uses to make policy. The Executive branch does not have a monopoly on implementing U.S. laws and indeed, before the copyright registrar function was placed in the U.S. Congress, it was vested in the judicial branch with the clerks of the U.S. District courts, and not in the executive branch. Furthermore, the agency's director is appointed by the Librarian of Congress, who in turn is appointed by the President with the consent of the Senate despite its location within Congress on the organizational chart of the U.S. Government, so it does not violate the Appointments Clause of Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 of the United States Constitution. In substance, the Copyright Registrar is in the direct chain of command from the President in terms of appointment authority, despite being located in the legislative branch for purposes of day to day management of the Library of Congress and budget categorization.

Security clearance of police officers My question is inspired by this one, but it’s not the same. It is my understanding that the federal law-enforcement officers who seized the boxes of documents held by “45” expected to find some papers that were confidential, secret, or top secret, eyes only, etc. So, I can understand that some form of security clearance was given to them, as explained in the answers to the above-mentioned question. But let’s imagine, for the sake of argument, that law-enforcement officers had been exerting a warrant for a different reason than looking for classified documents—let’s say they had been looking for illegal drugs—but then stumbled upon them while performing their search for said drugs. Let’s even say the drugs were hidden in the same boxes. Heck, for the sake of argument, let’s say a John Doe with some moral conscience had stumbled upon the documents, for example while using the washroom where they were hidden. My question is thus: Would these law-enforcement officers or John Doe be “forgiven” from seeing the classified documents? It’s not like they knew there were classified documents there, and they just stumbled upon them… What would happen to them, legally?

There is nothing to forgive. The question presupposes that it is a crime to lay eyes on classified information. Crimes related to classified information generally have an element of intent. For example, from 18 USC 793 (emphasis added): (a) Whoever, for the purpose of obtaining information respecting the national defense with intent or reason to believe that the information is to be used to the injury of the United States, or to the advantage of any foreign nation ... (b) Whoever, for the purpose aforesaid, and with like intent or reason to believe ... The other subsections are similar, but subsection (e) is most directly applicable to the present hypothetical, so here it is in full: (e) Whoever having unauthorized possession of, access to, or control over any document, writing, code book, signal book, sketch, photograph, photographic negative, blueprint, plan, map, model, instrument, appliance, or note relating to the national defense, or information relating to the national defense which information the possessor has reason to believe could be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation, willfully communicates, delivers, transmits or causes to be communicated, delivered, or transmitted, or attempts to communicate, deliver, transmit or cause to be communicated, delivered, or transmitted the same to any person not entitled to receive it, or willfully retains the same and fails to deliver it to the officer or employee of the United States entitled to receive it; Seeing the files is not per se a crime. Finding the files and failing to ensure that they are returned to the government (or retuning them to the government while transmitting the information to unauthorized parties) is a crime.

I do not know the exact circumstances for the alleged obstruction (and whether there was a political or diplomatic purpose to prompt the questioning would be off-topic here) so I have just focused on the relevant legislation in answer to: What is the law here? SHORT ANSWER It's not a crime to answer a police question with "I would like to speak to my lawyer"? But it is a(n alleged) crime to obstruct or otherwise fail to comply with an examination under the Terrorism Act 2000. This Act is one of a very small number of laws that makes it compulsory for someone to answer questions or provide information, but as they are not under arrest there is no statutory requirement for them to have independent legal advice. What they say or provide cannot be used against them (with some exemptions, below) and failure to comply is an offence. LONG ANSWER A police officer is an examining officer, and under paragraph 2 Schedule 7, Terrorism Act 2000: (1) An examining officer may question a person to whom this paragraph applies for the purpose of determining whether he appears to be a person falling within section 40(1)(b). section 40(1)(b) says: (b) is or has been concerned in the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism. Under Paragraph 5: A person who is questioned under paragraph 2 or 3 must— (a) give the examining officer any information in his possession which the officer requests; (b) give the examining officer on request either a valid passport which includes a photograph or another document which establishes his identity; (c) declare whether he has with him documents of a kind specified by the examining officer; (d) give the examining officer on request any document which he has with him and which is of a kind specified by the officer. BUT, under paragraph 5A (1) An answer or information given orally by a person in response to a question asked under paragraph 2 or 3 may not be used in evidence against the person in criminal proceedings. (2) Sub-paragraph (1) does not apply— (a) in the case of proceedings for an offence under paragraph 18 of this Schedule, (b) on a prosecution for perjury, or (c) on a prosecution for some other offence where, in giving evidence, the person makes a statement inconsistent with the answer or information mentioned in sub-paragraph (1). Failure to comply with paragraph 5 is an offence under paragraph 18 (1) A person commits an offence if he— (a) wilfully fails to comply with a duty imposed under or by virtue of this Schedule, (b) wilfully contravenes a prohibition imposed under or by virtue of this Schedule, or (c) wilfully obstructs, or seeks to frustrate, a search or examination under or by virtue of this Schedule. Once they're arrested on suspicion of this offence then they are entitled to free and independent legal advice under section 58 Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984.

united-states Under US law, any citizen may hold a person caught in the process of committing a felony (which kidnapping surely is) for the police. A soldier has no special authority. Indeed under the Posse Comitatus Act, the military has more restricted authority in such matters than citizens in general. However note that the book doesn't say the soldier was justified. I do not find it implausible that a soldier might have believed that the military had such authority.

This is going to depend on what you think or know is on the phone, why you want to keep it undisclosed, and why the officer says s/he wants it. If one knows or has good reason to think that there is evidence of a crime on the phone, then destroying or hiding that evidence may be criminal. If one gets a court order, such as a warrant or subpoena, to turn over evidence, destroying the evidence or otherwise failing to comply may well be criminal contempt of court, or another criminal offense. In most circumstances an officer must have probable cause, and usually a warrant, to conduct a lawful search. But border searches are different. That searches made at the border, pursuant to the longstanding right of the sovereign to protect itself by stopping and examining persons and property crossing into this country, are reasonable simply by virtue of the fact that they occur at the border, should, by now, require no extended demonstration. United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616 (1977) (sustaining search of incoming mail). See also Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765 (1983) (opening by customs inspector of locked container shipped from abroad). The Congressional Research Service wrote: in the March 2021 report "Searches and Seizures at the Border and the Fourth Amendment" (pdf): The Supreme Court has recognized that searches at the border are “qualitatively different” from those occurring in the interior of the United States, because persons entering the country have less robust expectations of privacy, given the federal government’s broad power to safeguard the nation by examining persons seeking to enter its territory. While law enforcement searches and seizures within the interior of the United States typically require a judicial warrant supported by probable cause, federal officers may conduct routine inspections and searches of persons attempting to cross the international border without a warrant or any particularized suspicion of unlawful activity. But a border search that extends beyond a routine search and inspection may require at least reasonable suspicion. ... Recent years have seen legal challenges to border searches of electronic devices such as cell phones and computers, which often contain more personal and sensitive information than other items frequently searched at the border, such as a wallet or briefcase. The Supreme Court has not yet addressed this issue. Lower courts have generally held that government officers may conduct relatively limited, manual searches of such devices without a warrant or any particularized suspicion. The courts, however, are split over whether more intrusive, forensic searches require at least reasonable suspicion. ... Federal statutes and implementing regulations confer designated law enforcement officers with broad authority to conduct searches and seizures at the border and surrounding areas without a warrant. These searches commonly occur at designated ports of entry along the border, such as border crossing points.[1] But searches may also occur in other places along or near the border.[2] To enforce U.S. customs laws, federal law enforcement officers may inspect and search individuals, merchandise, vehicles, and vessels arriving at the border, as well as further into the interior of the United States and within U.S. waters. Under 19 U.S.C. § 1496, a customs officer may examine “the baggage of any person arriving in the United States in order to ascertain what articles are contained therein” and whether those items are subject to taxes or otherwise prohibited. Similarly, 19 U.S.C. §1467 allows customs officers to inspect and search the persons, baggage, and merchandise arriving by vessel from a foreign port (including U.S. territories). If there is nothing that could be evidence on a phone, erasing it should not be criminal destruction of evidence, but this will be hard to prove after the fact, and border officials have authority to insist on a search with no warrant or particular suspicion. Notes [1]: See United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 961–62 (9th Cir. 2013) (describing a “border search” as one that occurs at ports of entry where there is an actual or attempted border crossing);see also U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, Border Security: At Ports of Entry (last modified Apr. 2, 2018), https://www.cbp.gov/bordersecurity/ports-entry (describing U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s functions at ports of entry). [2]: See United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579, 593 (1983) (recognizing the government’s interest in patrolling inland or coastal waters “where the need to deter or apprehend smugglers is great”); Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 268 (1973) (noting that the Border Patrol conducts inland surveillance activities “all in the asserted interest of detecting the illegal importation of aliens.”); See also U.S. Customs & Border Prot., "Border Security: Along U.S. Borders" (Jan. 17, 2018), https://www.cbp.gov/border-security/along-us-borders (describing the Border Patrol’s responsibilities along the border

There are two separate questions here, it seems to me. First: are law enforcement officers required to respect your house rules and avoid making a mess? At least in the United States, the answer is unequivocally no. If the only "damage" suffered is that you need to sweep the floor, or put your clothes back in drawers, that's not the police's problem. You have not suffered any damages that a court is going to reimburse, and your best case scenario, even if you win a suit against the police, is an award of one dollar as nominal damages. Second: are law enforcement officers required to reimburse you for any physical damage they caused while executing the search warrant? The answer here is tricker, and depends on the search warrant. If the warrant is invalid, then the answer is yes. But remember: just because, for example, the cops are looking for the guy you bought your house from, who moved out a month ago, that doesn't mean the warrant is "invalid." Just because the cops got a bad tip, or suspected you wrongly, or were in some other way wasting their time--as long as the warrant is technically proper and they were able to convince a judge it was reasonable, the warrant is valid. Even if the warrant is invalid, you may need to sue the police to get anything reimbursed. If the warrant is valid, in practical terms, you will almost certainly need to sue the police to recover anything, and you will have to show the Court that the police's actions that damaged your property were so extreme that they were outside the reasonable scope of the warrant. For instance: the warrant is for a large item, like a stolen car: the police cannot smash holes in your walls to make sure the car isn't hidden inside. If they're looking for drugs, they may be able to. If the officers' actions are consistent with the scope of the warrant, then you are not going to recover anything. The warrant is, basically, permission from a judge to enter your home and perform those actions, and they will not be liable for them. A number of relevant cases are discussed in this article: http://www.aele.org/law/2010all01/2010-1MLJ101.pdf

Law enforcement officers can obtain information with a search warrant, which is a document issued by a judge or magistrate that authorizes them to search for specific information or evidence based on "probable cause" to believe that it will inform the investigation or prosecution of a crime. A court can also issue a subpoena at the request of a party to a proceeding before it. Since in most cases only the state can bring criminal charges before a court, an individual would have to bring a civil complaint before a court in order to even request a subpoena related to his complaint. Also, it is up to the court to enforce its subpoenas: It's not like a warrant where you can then pursue the items subpoenaed through force. If the subject of a subpoena doesn't respond you have to ask the court to compel the party, which means you have to bring your complaint before a court that has jurisdiction over the party you wish to subpoena. This can be difficult when it involves a third party – especially a third party that would rather ignore or object to the subpoena than hand over the information. I.e., if you can't convince law enforcement to investigate the crime, and you can't convince the company in possession of the data that it's in its interest to help you, then you would most likely be facing a steep legal bill to get an attorney to successfully obtain the information through civil process.

It isn't clear that the example you give is illegal police action, but let's assume that it is for the sake of this question, since it doesn't affect the analysis. If possession is not compelled, then it is voluntary.

Are you required to comply with a police officer's order to put your baby down in an uncertain situation and allow yourself to be handcuffed? Of course. If holding a baby could immunize people against arrest, every criminal would have a baby around whenever possible. Similarly, suppose an officer legitimately fears for his or her life or safety, or the lives or safety of others, on the basis of a suspicion that someone carrying a baby is about to produce a weapon and use it against someone. Courts, at least in the US, give wide and explicit deference to police officers in stressful situations like that, and they recognize that even if, in hindsight, it is perfectly clear that there was no danger, the officer must be allowed the leeway to act on his or her suspicions in case they are correct. The officer will of course have some obligations to ensure the welfare of the child after separation from the adult, but the only immediate recourse the adult has is to appeal to the officer directly, or perhaps the officer's supervisor if he or she is available. Any other enforcement of the officer's obligation will have to take place in the courts after the fact.

Does banning someone require any formalities? For example, to be banned from a store that the public is allowed into, does a manager speaking the words "you're banned" count as enough? Is any sort of documentation required? Does it make a difference if there's a reason and if the person is already in the store?

No Once a person in control of a property has withdrawn your permission to be there, you must leave as soon as practicable or become a trespasser.

It is illegal to sell alcohol to a minor in Washington (RCW 66.44.270). The seller can get into various kinds of trouble, including losing their license, under liquor board regulations. However, as long as the establishment follows the rules for acceptable ID, they escape liability if in fact they sell alcohol to a minor: the license holder is legally allowed to accept an identification of the specific type. That is the sense in which this is required by law: the customer must have actually presented the identification, in order for the establishment to escape liability (RCW 66.20.210). Looking old enough is not the issue. It is legal to sell alcohol to a person who is over 21, and the law does not require presentation of identification as a condition for a sale. However, under RCW 66.20.180 a person is require to produce ID "upon request of any licensee, peace officer, or enforcement officer of the board". The legal risk attached to sales in an age-marginal situation is very high, and actual presentation of ID is required to escape liability by the establishment, so in that sense, it is "required by law". All requests to produce ID for liquor sales (at least in Washington, and leaving out deliveries which are governed by other laws) are driven by company policy. Typical policies are quite rational, being designed to protect the company's interest in not getting into a heap of trouble for an under-age sale. There is no law saying when you must ask, or when you are protected if you don't ask. Usually, store policy is to use "common sense" so that 90 year olds are not required to produce ID (they may be asked, jokingly). Non-compliance with RCW 66.20.180 carries no legal penalty, that is, there is nothing in the statute that says "if the customer doesn't...". The most obvious would be that the seller would refuse to sell, which the seller can arbitrarily do anyhow. There is no statutory penalty imposed on a licensee if they request ID of a person over 21 and the person fails / refuses to produce the ID. Obviously, the licensee cannot be punished if a customer fails to provide ID (and leaves), especially if they lost it. But the law "requires" them to provide an ID, with ne except "unless you leave / put the bottle back". Somewhat less obviously, if the legislature wants to, it can enact a provision that once a licensee requests ID, they are forbidden to sell alcohol to that customer until ID is provided. But there currently is no such law. "The law" also included regulations, such as WAC 314-17-105. This regulation is a chart, and the relevant entry is PERMIT: Failure to produce permit or identification upon request. See RCW 66.20.310 and 66.20.180. for which the 1st offense consequence is "5-day permit suspension OR $100 monetary option". This is a problematic regulation (potential lawsuit fodder), since it can be interpreted in a number of ways. The question is, of whom is the permit or identification predicated? Only the licensee has a permit, but customers and employees can both have identification. If we interpret this regulation as meaning "Failure by licensee or customer", then we arrive at the absurd conclusion that if a customer fails to produce ID on request, the establishment is fined. It is important to note that this regulation is under a chapter about server training, thus the regulation can only reasonably be interpreted as being about licensee providing identification.

It's possibe to cover auto-starting apps and cookies under the definition. I'm not convinced and could argue against that but I don't think it matters. The tiny extract you linked isn't a law. It is a definition. It does not say "these things are illegal". For that, we have to zoom out a little. Section 43 includes the offense in question (emphasis mine): If any person without permission of the owner or any other person who is incharge of a computer, computer system or computer network... introduces or causes to be introduced any computer contaminant or computer virus... So back to the question. Could Steam be considered a virus? Maybe. Is it illegal? No. On the other hand, if I were to gain access to your computer and download Steam, yes that could be an example of breaking that law.

Simply being in the store in these fake nametags and outfits is probably not illegal. At least it does not violate any law that I know of. There might be some specific law in a particular jurisdiction, and the question does not say where this is assumed to occur. If a person actively impersonates a store employee, say by "selling" an item to a would-be customer and keeping the money, that would be fraud, or perhaps "theft by deception". If a person pretending to be a store employee gives a patron advice as if from an employee, say on whether a product has a specific feature, that is IMO unethical, but probably not illegal. If a person pretending to be an employee runs down the store and advises a patron to go elsewhere to shop, that might be "interference with a commercial relationship" which is a cause for a civil action in some places, I understand. Certainly the management would object. If the management notices such a fake employee, I think they would tell that person to leave the store. Failing to do so, or returning later, would then be trespass. Copying the store logo might well be a technical infringement of copyright, but as long as there is no economic damage, a copyright suit is IMO quite unlikely. There would be no trademark case as long as the fake was not used to sell or advertise anything.

You have an agreement with the store that allows you to use scan and go technology. Part of that agreement a bit that says we may ask you to help us confirm that the service is working effectively by allowing us to check your goods against the scanner or to re-scan your shopping They also say that they are entitled to withdraw your right to use the Scan and Go service at any time if you do not comply with these Terms and Conditions. If we do that, the legal agreement created between ASDA and you under these Terms and Conditions will come to an end immediately, although any relevant statutory rights that you may have will not be affected. More generally, ASDA reserves the right to withdraw the Scan and Go Service at any time, at its sole discretion You have implicitly consented to a brief stop for a rescan. I don't see any implication that they assert a right to search your person. You can refuse a re-scan and they can process you like an ordinary customer. As for shoplifting, as this article summarizes, security can make a citizen's arrest if they suspect that you have committed a crime (theft). They have to have reasonable grounds for thinking that an arrest is necessary to prevent the loss. Hence they can detain you until the constable arrives.

The customer list is indeed a trade secret if the shop kept its customer list secret and has an advantage from having that customer list, while others don’t have it. And I would think that is the case, because a competitor laying their hands on the list could for example send special offers to the customers in the list. The question is whether your two hairdressers took that customer list and whether the store has reasonable evidence that they did. If customers find out where their favourite hairdresser moved to that’s no legal problem. Can’t understand why no attorney wants to take the case. To the attorney it doesn’t make a difference whether they took the list or not. If they took the list then his or her job is to end the case with the smallest possible amount of damages being paid. PS. Just read in the comments that there is an accusation of "intentional interference with economic relationship". I would want a lawyer who knows the difference between perfectly legal competition which includes trying to get customers to move their business, and "intentional interference with economic relationship". PS. Really make sure that these guys appear in court. With a lawyer. Not appearing means that if the plaintiff says "Judge, these guys did X, punish them!" and they are not there to say "We absolutely didn't do X, prove it if you can", the judge will assume that they did X.

It is legal, at least in the US, for a store (or other entity) to refuse to sell any item to any individual for any non-prohibited reason (prohibited reasons are typically things like race or religion). More over, in various US jurisdictions, it is prohibited to "furnish" alcohol to a "minor" (for example, under California's ABC law), which can be interpreted as prohibiting to an adult if they reasonably suspect that adult will pass the alcohol onto the "minor". This is to prevent "straw" sales. Additionally, larger chains generally prefer to have harmonized policies across branches, and where practical, across state lines, so will have policies that can accomodate multiple alcohol control regimes.

A website's Terms of Service can be or include either or both rules and terms of contract. Which part is what depends on the circumstances and whether there is a contract at all. Like in case of any physical venue where the owner is free to impose rules on anyone wishing to visit the venue, a website owner is free to impose rules on what the visitors can and cannot do while visiting the website. If you are the owner of a physical store, you may require the visitors to take off any helmets or sunglasses when they enter, and/or present their bags for inspection when they exit. These are rules, or conditions of entry. Similarly, you may require your website visitors to be over certain age, only use certain devices/software for accessing the website, not to engage any robots/scrappers etc. As soon as a contract between you and the visitor is formed, the relevant parts of the ToS may well be terms of the contract. For example, if visitors buy something in your store/on your website, the clauses re shipping, returns/refunds and warranty will be such terms.

What laws prohibit the importation of pornography into the US? I don't quite understand why in the San Francisco Airport, when people land, the sign says, "No pornography is allowed to be brought into the US", when you can leave the airport, drive 15 minutes to an adult video shop and put in coins and watch all you want, or go to a hotel 10 minutes away and also watch hundreds of pornography videos for $9.99 each. Also, people can go home, and order pornography subscriptions either from a US company or from a foreign company using the internet. What law does this sign refer to?

This refers to the prohibition found at 19 U.S. Code § 1305 (a) Prohibition of importation All persons are prohibited from importing into the United States from any foreign country [...] any obscene book, pamphlet, paper, writing, advertisement, circular, print, picture, drawing, or other representation, figure, or image on or of paper or other material, or any cast, instrument, or other article which is obscene or immoral... What constitutes "obscene or immoral" is subjective and determined on a case-by-case basis, for example by applying the Miller test, being: the United States Supreme Court's test for determining whether speech or expression can be labeled obscene, in which case it is not protected by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and can be prohibited. The Miller test has three "prongs" which have to be satisfied for the material to be considered obscene: 1 Whether "the average person, applying contemporary community standards", would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest, 2 Whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct or excretory functions specifically defined by applicable state law, 3 Whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.

Doesn't being recorded in your own home, or someone elses for that matter, require consent? That's not relevant here. Media outlets are generally not liable for reporting information that was or may have been obtained illegally, provided they are not the ones that did the illegal act, or directly incentivized its commission (e.g. if Gawker had paid someone to get them such a video). The person who filmed this act may or may not have committed a crime, but this was not relevant to the case at hand. In fact, Bollea (aka "Hulk Hogan") did sue those responsible for making the video; he settled with Bubba, but not with Clem. Bollea later added Gawker to the ongoing suit against Clem when publication of the tape was ruled to not be a copyright infringement. Isn't there a reasonable expectation of privacy when you're not in public like that? Also largely not relevant here, as Bollea's claims against Gawker were not about the production and existence of the tape, but of its publication. Bollea did allege invasion of privacy in his suit, but as concerns Gawker this was about publishing the video. Also keep in mind that Bollea had gone out of his way to convert his private life into a public spectacle by virtue of his reality tv program. Your reasonable expectation of privacy goes down when you have already set the bar so low that most every aspect of your private life is on public display. Some of Bollea's legal motions in his failed attempts to convict Gawker of copyright infringement were denied on the basis that publication of the video tape may actually constitute fair use. Celebrities in general have lower expectations of privacy than ordinary citizens. It's the well-known price you pay for fabulous amounts of wealth and fame: lots of people are paying attention to you and are interested in what happens to you, and you can't expect a lot of privacy when everyone's staring at you and hanging on your every word and action. Not that they have zero privacy rights, it's just harder for them to establish the "reasonable expectation". don't I have the right to not have that material distributed even if I were famous and it was "newsworthy"? Your question here is the embodiment of the controversy: where does freedom of the press end and personal privacy begin? Freedom of the press is constitutionally enshrined, and tends to be zealously protected in America as a prerequisite for true democracy and freedom. Personal privacy is not, and emerges more as the consequence of laws and the judiciary's application of certain Common Law sensibilities. There are some constitutional protections against governmental infringements (unreasonable search and seizure, that sort of thing), but the protections you have against non-governmental infringements only exist within laws. So the general expectation you can have is that if something is newsworthy, then it's fair game for the press to report on it. The issue falls to what qualifies as "newsworthy", and who gets to make that judgment? Part of Bollea's legal argument was that what Gawker published was not newsworthy, going to the extent of having the editor concede in court that a depiction of Bollea's genitalia was not newsworthy. And this "not newsworthy" angle seems to be the heart of what their case was getting at: what was reported was not done because it was "news", but because it would get Gawker attention and profits at Bollea's expense (including capitalizing on his famous Hulk Hogan persona). It's also the heart of why some people consider this a controversial and potentially problematic case. Those who have voiced 1st amendment concerns have done so primarily out of concern that this trial would allow courts and juries to decide what was "newsworthy" and what was not. Meaning that news outlets might now have to sweat bullets every time they published something because maybe a jury would assert it wasn't newsworthy, leading those outlets to be less likely to report certain aspects of news. Presumably these people feel that the only ones who should be deciding what is newsworthy is the press, and the public vis-à-vis their consumptions and demands thereof.

Everything is allowed unless the law says it isn’t Common law systems like the USA are ‘exceptions based’ - the law permits everything except what it prohibits. So, your question is backwards - rather than looking for laws that allow it, you need to look for laws that prohibit, restrict or regulate it. There are laws that regulate this but none that prohibit it.

In the United States, the U.S. Department of Transportation, by regulation sets uniform design and signage standards for federally funded highways, which most U.S. state and local governments incorporate, either by restating them or incorporating them by reference for non-federally funded roads. I imagine that most other countries have similar regulations. Nonetheless, this is extremely unlikely to prevail as a defense to the traffic violation of speeding which is usually a strict liability offense to which almost no affirmative defenses, excuses, or justifications may be considered.

It is likely that the law applying will be both that of the USA and your country. If you went to court this would be one of the things you argued over. For example, Australian Consumer Law applies to any goods or services sold to a customer in Australia irrespective of where the vendor is located. Your jurisdiction may have similar laws. At first blush you must comply with the term of the contract preventing reverse engineering. They would be within their rights to terminate the licence if you don't. However, they probably have an obligation under your equivalent to the ACL to supply a product that: is merchantable is fit for purpose does what it says it will do If it doesn't then you have a right to terminate and get your money back, sue for damages and your country's government may prosecute.

Answering my own question after some more research (which I should have done in the first place). Yes, it's illegal both in the US and in the EU Many airlines do it anyway because they are desperate for cash and hoping that no government agency will enforce it. A trade group is actually lobbying to change the laws Airlines will do what they can to make you accept a voucher. Some create an incentive, some make it just extremely difficult to get refund or they will simply deny it. If you accept a voucher, you waive the right for a refund. Only realistic option is a charge back through the credit card but I haven't found any successful examples yet. Good overview articles: https://onemileatatime.com/flight-cancelled-refund/ https://viewfromthewing.com/airlines-are-breaking-the-law-by-refusing-refunds-for-cancelled-flights/

There's a critical error in your argument but no transfer of goods or services will be present. Actually: No, there is a transfer of service made by booking: resources are put aside by the service provider to be available for the booking person once they arrive. That is a service. These resources are not available to be sold otherwise: a room is booked and thus blocked from being rented to someone else, or a seat on the plane is booked and not offered to others, and so on. As long as the booking person arrives, no damage happens. However, if they no-show, there is damage: the resources go to waste unused: the room stays empty, or the plane flies with one less person. And the cancellation/no-show fees that are contractually obligated to make the damaged party whole (to compensate for the wasted resources) are also not paid. Knowingly using a fake credit card number or empty debit card that can't pay the fees and planning not to show up would be clearly fraud. One such paragraph that might be used to hunt down could be 18 USC §1341 - aka "mail fraud" - or much more likely, 18 USC $1343 - wire fraud. The latter is because any fraud on the internet is wire fraud. Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud [including a scheme or artifice to deprive another of the intangible right of honest services], or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, transmits or causes to be transmitted by means of wire, radio, or television communication in interstate or foreign commerce, any writings, signs, signals, pictures, or sounds for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.

Yes, and this is very common - Cuba, North Korea and Iran are often excluded. Mind you, this is from a US perspective. The banned country may have other ideas about the legality of the ban under its laws. But if you weren't planning to do business with that country anyway, that's not exactly going to hurt you.

How can Patient get a compounded medication tested, to determine if it was negligently compounded? A physician prescribed his lay Patient a medication that must be compounded. After consuming this medication, Patient suffered atypical serious side effects. After examination, a physician reckons that the end product may not match his prescription, and the Compounding Pharmacy may be negligent. Here is one real life example. Incorrect dispensing. A key consideration is a pharmacy dispensing error. In Australia, a number of cases were reported in 2018 and 2019 where 1% atropine was dispensed to children where 0.01% atropine had been prescribed. In response, Optometry Australia recommended that atropine prescriptions include the specific note 'MUST BE COMPOUNDED' to avoid this dispensing error. But Pharmacy denies any wrongdoing, and insists that it dispensed the correct medication. Question How can Patient get his compounded medication audited and inspected, to determine if the pharmacy dispensed exactly what the doctor ordered? Would Patient submit a sample of this medication to a laboratory? What kind of laboratories can assist Patient? For example, presuppose a physician prescribed 0.01% Atropine. Then Pharmacy labelled the end product 0.01% Atropine. But it's impossible to distinguish 0.01% from 0.02%, 0.05%, etc. Atropine by eye. How can Patient determine if pharmacy truly dispensed 0.01% Atropine, or negligently dispensed some other wrong concentration?

You get a lab to test it You should clearly document the chain of custody (ideally with photos) from the unopened packaging to the lab. Any decent sized city will have several labs with the capability to tell you what’s in a pill and provide an expert report.

The US legal system deals with this by punishing you for the crimes of which you are convicted. That is, those where the evidence (whatever it is) convinces a jury that you are guilty beyond reasonable doubt. If there is insufficient evidence, for whatever reason then you would not be convicted. The prosecution can, subject to admissibility, put forward whatever evidence they like in order to convince the jury. This can include a pile of ash that they allege contained convincing and unambiguous evidence of guilt. Of course, if that's all they've got the prosecution would probably be censured by the judge for wasting everybody's time and money, more likely, a prosecutor wouldn't lay charges in the first place. As to punishment for an evidence tampering conviction: you have been convicted of evidence tampering, not drug production so you will be punished for evidence tampering, not drug production. The legislature sets different punishments for these for a reason, possibly a reason known only to them but a reason nevertheless. The judge has discretion to apply anything between the minimum and maximum sentence prescribed. A conviction for evidence tampering in a drug case rather than, say, a jaywalking case, is likely to get a more severe sentence all else being equal.

united-states This answer is based upon general principles of criminal procedure in the United States which are quite similar in most states, although not necessarily exactly identical. The answer is likely to be different in other jurisdictions. If inadmissible evidence is offered by the prosecution and admitted at trial, this is a ground upon which the defense can move for a mistrial (which due to double jeopardy amounts to an acquittal), or upon which the defendant can appeal the conviction of the jury, if convicted. Acquittals of a defendant at trial cannot be appealed by the prosecution. But, to appeal, the error in admitting inadmissible evidence must be contemporaneously objected to by the defendant's lawyer (or the defendant if the defendant is not represented by counsel), or the admission of the evidence must be "plain error" (which is very rarely met on evidentiary issues). If the defendant's lawyer doesn't promptly say "I object" that ground for contesting a conviction is usually lost. Even then, the standard of review on appeal is whether the judge abused the judge's discretion in admitting the evidence, not whether the appellate court would have ruled the same way if presented with that evidentiary question. Also, even if there is an error, a conviction on a particular count will not be overruled if the error was "harmless", which is to say that there is a reasonable possibility that admitting the inadmissible evidence caused the defendant to be convicted of that count. Often, if the evidence is overwhelming, or the inadmissible evidence wasn't that prejudicial, a conviction will be affirmed notwithstanding the admission of inadmissible evidence. Sometimes harmless error is evaluated considering all of the errors at trial as a whole, rather than individually, in addition to all of the other evidence admitted at trial. If an evidence issue can be foreseen and is central to the case (e.g. suppression of evidence of possession of drugs in a drug possession case), the issue of the admissibility of the evidence will often be resolved in a pre-trial hearing and subject to appeal then, prior to trial, rather than being resolved in the trial itself where the prosecution has no right to appeal, and the defendant risks conviction if the ruling goes against the defendant. If the conviction is overturned on appeal, the usual remedy is to remand the case to the same judge to conduct a new trial with a new jury, in a manner consistent with the appellate court's rulings.

We're missing a lot of facts that would help drive the analysis. The first question I'd ask was whether this was part of an actual or attempted sex offense. If that's the case, the suspect could be facing particularly serious charges. Other information is also missing, such as the drug involved, whether it's on the list of controlled substances, her knowledge of the drug, her relationship to the suspect, and so on. Still, based on the information we've got and the inferences we can make from them, I could reasonably see the following charges being filed: Sec. 12-3. Battery. (a) A person commits battery if he or she knowingly without legal justification by any means (1) causes bodily harm to an individual Sec. 12-3.05. Aggravated battery. (g) Offense based on certain conduct. A person commits aggravated battery when, other than by discharge of a firearm, he or she does any of the following: (1) Violates Section 401 of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act by unlawfully delivering a controlled substance to another and any user experiences great bodily harm or permanent disability as a result of the injection, inhalation, or ingestion of any amount of the controlled substance. (2) Knowingly administers to an individual or causes him or her to take, without his or her consent or by threat or deception, and for other than medical purposes, any intoxicating, poisonous, stupefying, narcotic, anesthetic, or controlled substance, or gives to another person any food containing any substance or object intended to cause physical injury if eaten. Sec. 12-4.5. Tampering with food, drugs or cosmetics. (a) A person who knowingly puts any substance capable of causing death or great bodily harm to a human being into any food, drug or cosmetic offered for sale or consumption commits tampering with food, drugs or cosmetics. Sec. 12-5. Reckless conduct. (a) A person commits reckless conduct when he or she, by any means lawful or unlawful, recklessly performs an act or acts that: (1) cause bodily harm to or endanger the safety of another person; or (2) cause great bodily harm or permanent disability or disfigurement to another person. Sec. 21-1. Criminal damage to property. (a) A person commits criminal damage to property when he or she: (1) knowingly damages any property of another Sec. 11-1.20. Criminal sexual assault. (a) A person commits criminal sexual assault if that person commits an act of sexual penetration and: (2) knows that the victim is unable to understand the nature of the act or is unable to give knowing consent; Sec. 11-1.30. Aggravated Criminal Sexual Assault. (a) A person commits aggravated criminal sexual assault if that person commits criminal sexual assault and any of the following aggravating circumstances exist during the commission of the offense or, for purposes of paragraph (7), occur as part of the same course of conduct as the commission of the offense: (2) the person causes bodily harm to the victim, except as provided in paragraph (10); (3) the person acts in a manner that threatens or endangers the life of the victim or any other person; (4) the person commits the criminal sexual assault during the course of committing or attempting to commit any other felony; (7) the person delivers (by injection, inhalation, ingestion, transfer of possession, or any other means) any controlled substance to the victim without the victim's consent or by threat or deception for other than medical purposes; Sec. 11-1.50. Criminal sexual abuse. (a) A person commits criminal sexual abuse if that person: (2) commits an act of sexual conduct and knows that the victim is unable to understand the nature of the act or is unable to give knowing consent. Sec. 11-1.60. Aggravated criminal sexual abuse. (a) A person commits aggravated criminal sexual abuse if that person commits criminal sexual abuse and any of the following aggravating circumstances exist (i) during the commission of the offense or (ii) for purposes of paragraph (7), as part of the same course of conduct as the commission of the offense: (2) the person causes bodily harm to the victim; (5) the person acts in a manner that threatens or endangers the life of the victim or any other person; (6) the person commits the criminal sexual abuse during the course of committing or attempting to commit any other felony; or (7) the person delivers (by injection, inhalation, ingestion, transfer of possession, or any other means) any controlled substance to the victim for other than medical purposes without the victim's consent or by threat or deception. Sec. 9-1. First degree Murder (a) A person who kills an individual without lawful justification commits first degree murder if, in performing the acts which cause the death: (2) he knows that such acts create a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to that individual or another; or (3) he is attempting or committing a forcible felony other than second degree murder. Sec. 9-3. Involuntary Manslaughter and Reckless Homicide. (a) A person who unintentionally kills an individual without lawful justification commits involuntary manslaughter if his acts whether lawful or unlawful which cause the death are such as are likely to cause death or great bodily harm to some individual, and he performs them recklessly Sec. 9-3.3. Drug-induced homicide. (a) A person commits drug-induced homicide when he or she violates Section 401 of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act or Section 55 of the Methamphetamine Control and Community Protection Act by unlawfully delivering a controlled substance to another, and any person's death is caused by the injection, inhalation, absorption, or ingestion of any amount of that controlled substance. Sec. 9-3.4. Concealment of homicidal death. (a) A person commits the offense of concealment of homicidal death when he or she knowingly conceals the death of any other person with knowledge that such other person has died by homicidal means. Sec. 9-3.5. Concealment of death. (b) A person commits the offense of concealment of death when he or she knowingly conceals the death of any other person who died by other than homicidal means.

What’s the problem? Most likely the situation is 100% sure that he or she wouldn’t have performed the operation without anaesthesia. Therefore anaesthesia was not something his brain needed to remember, therefore it didn’t. He gave a truthful answer. He has no memory of it. He doesn’t need a memory of it, he just needed to make sure it’s done. Do you have any reason to believe it was not done? Operating without anaesthesia would be negligent. Not remembering it is done is not. On the other hand, he would have remembered the patient screaming if he started cutting without anaesthesia.

Practicing medicine without a license or beyond the scope of your license (e.g. engaging in medical activities that your license does not authorize you to engage in, even though you have license to engage in some medical activities) is a criminal offense (e.g. Unlawful Conduct Of Practicing Medicine Without a License, Utah Code Ann. §58-1-501(1)(a) and 58-67-501) in most jurisdictions and is not protected by the privileges afforded to people practicing medically within the scope of their license (e.g. an exemption from laws criminalizing contact with intimate parts when done for medical purposes). Of course, fraudulently claiming to have licensure is also a crime over and above practicing without a license. Administering non-FDA approved medicines to cancer patients, for example, is a federal crime, even if this is done with full disclosure and good intentions. The approval process is described here by the Food and Drug Administration under the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act. (Similarly, a conviction was obtained in another case for distributing a hormonal weight-loss treatment without a license.) For example, in 2006, a naturopath in Wheat Ridge, Colorado was convicted of "theft, perjury, criminally negligent homicide, illegal practice of medicine and third-degree assault" for providing alternative holistic treatment to someone resulting in their death. Criminal negligence generally involves conduct sometimes also called "gross negligence" that is not just careless but is almost reckless given the serious potential harm that could foreseeable result (and in all cases that are prosecuted, actually did result) from the course of conduct taken. For example, while ordinary medical mistakes by a medical doctor such as confusing two drugs with similar names or putting the decimal point in a prescription dosage, causing harm to a patient, would not ordinarily result in criminal liability, coming into an operating room while too drunk to drive and without reviewing which limb of a patient needs to be amputated despite a clear indication in marker on the leg of a patient showing that fact, might constitute criminal negligence on the part of a medical doctor. Here, if the need for and possible benefits of conventional treatment for breast cancer with particularly clear, prescribing alternative diet based treatment and mental exercises while discouraging conventional medical treatment, might very well constitute criminal negligence on the part of the holistic practitioner. Similarly, a naturopath was criminally charged in Australia with "reckless grievous bodily harm and failure to provide for a child causing danger of death" for urging parents to discontinue medical treatments for a child in favor of a raw food diet, causing serious harm to that child almost causing the child's death. The naturopath admitted that she endangered the child with her medical advice and was ultimately convicted in that case. Liability would be fact specific. Does the person have a license of some kind? Are they within the scope of their license? Do they falsely convey the impression that they are licensed medical practitioners? Did their actions constitute the practice of medicine? But, often, in the fact pattern you describe, particularly if it is not "faith healing" protected by the freedom of religion, this would be a crime. Of course, this doesn't mean that a self-help remedy of murdering the holistic practitioner after the fact is legal. Civil liability for professional negligence and failing to meet the applicable standard of care for a person engaging in the kind of treatment conduct described is also possible. In other words, one can sue a naturopath of money damages for malpractice, just as one could sue a doctor for malpractice. As noted here: Alternative medicine providers can, of course, be guilty of malpractice if they perform their interventions below the commonly accepted standards of their own communities. They may also have liabilities for injuries caused by discouraging patients from seeking conventional care and, in some jurisdictions, for not recognizing when a patient’s condition is beyond the scope of their form of treatment and subsequently referring the patient for treatment by a medical doctor. The fact scenario in the Slate article would appear to implicate grounds for civil as well as potentially criminal liability.

Your lawyer must act in your best interests; not follow your directions Lawyers are professionals and they are supposed to use professional judgement in how they run a case. While a client can suggest a course of action, the lawyer is not only not obliged to follow it, they would be committing malpractice if they unquestioningly did so. Just like a doctor would be if they unthinkingly implemented a patient suggested treatment plan. A panel of lawyers I was watching commentate on the hearing said it was a critical error and may have blown the case. So, a group of Monday-morning quarterbacks who weren’t chosen and don’t know all the facts would have done it differently? Perhaps it was a mistake. Or, perhaps the lawyer judged that there was nothing he could say that would help and considered that sounding desperate about the video would elevate its import in the minds of the jury.

Where did California get authorization to receive my medical info from Walgreens? From HIPAA. Permitted Uses and Disclosures. A covered entity is permitted, but not required, to use and disclose protected health information, without an individual’s authorization, for the following purposes or situations: (1) To the Individual (unless required for access or accounting of disclosures); (2) Treatment, Payment, and Health Care Operations; (3) Opportunity to Agree or Object; (4) Incident to an otherwise permitted use and disclosure; (5) Public Interest and Benefit Activities; and (6) Limited Data Set for the purposes of research, public health or health care operations.18 Covered entities may rely on professional ethics and best judgments in deciding which of these permissive uses and disclosures to make. ... (5) Public Interest and Benefit Activities. The Privacy Rule permits use and disclosure of protected health information, without an individual’s authorization or permission, for 12 national priority purposes.28 These disclosures are permitted, although not required, by the Rule in recognition of the important uses made of health information outside of the health care context. Specific conditions or limitations apply to each public interest purpose, striking the balance between the individual privacy interest and the public interest need for this information. ... Public Health Activities. Covered entities may disclose protected health information to: (1) public health authorities authorized by law to collect or receive such information for preventing or controlling disease, injury, or disability and to public health or other government authorities authorized to receive reports of child abuse and neglect; (2) entities subject to FDA regulation regarding FDA regulated products or activities for purposes such as adverse event reporting, tracking of products, product recalls, and post-marketing surveillance; (3) individuals who may have contracted or been exposed to a communicable disease when notification is authorized by law; and (4) employers, regarding employees, when requested by employers, for information concerning a work-related illness or injury or workplace related medical surveillance, because such information is needed by the employer to comply with the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OHSA), the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MHSA), or similar state law. See: HIPAA Privacy Rule In plain English... A covered entity (Walgreens) is allowed to use and disclose your PHI without your authorization to public health authorities for controlling and preventing diseases. Additionally, they are allowed to receive this information for the purposes of adverse event recording (reactions to shots), tracking of products (tracking of shots), and notifying you of issues related to the product you were given. Is this legal, and can the State be indicted for breach of privacy? Yes, this is legal, and no, the State cannot be sued for it.

Can you host a version of Wikipedia on your own domain and charge for it? I am reading through these notes, trying to piece together a picture of what the rules/laws are regarding Wikipedia content: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Mirrors_and_forks https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Reusing_Wikipedia_content https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:FAQ/Copyright#Can_I_reuse_Wikipedia's_content_somewhere_else? I don't have any desire or intention of doing this myself, but I am wondering if I create a site like Wikipedia, which has "freely licensed/usable content", if someone else is going to go ahead and clone my project and slap it under a new domain, change some fonts and colors, slap on a subscription fee and maybe some ads, and try and rank higher on Google Search so they become the dominant provider of my underlying content. So Wikipedia is a parallel, how does Wikipedia prevent someone from downloading a bulk dump of the whole site, putting it under their own custom domain like freeknowledgefoo.com, slap some ads around in the pages, and add a subscription fee. Then they maybe redesign a few things slightly (changing fonts and colors), and then for whatever reason they end up ranking higher than Wikipedia itself on Google and end up being used by default instead of Wikipedia. That would be a horrible scenario, which would mean that all the work is put into Wikipedia, but all the money is made by some copycat site. How does Wikipedia prevent that? How could I prevent that if I am offering free data dumps of various kinds, but myself have a UI to view the data (like NYC's open data site). So you can download the dump and run the site yourself, or use my precomposed main website hosting and showing the data. How do I prevent users from just deploying my project on their own domain, slightly changing things, and then they run off with the future? Is this what the "ShareAlike" license is for? https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Text_of_Creative_Commons_Attribution-ShareAlike_3.0_Unported_License Creative Commons Deed This is a human-readable summary of the full license below. You are free: to Share—to copy, distribute and transmit the work, and to Remix—to adapt the work for any purpose, even commercially. Under the following conditions: Attribution—You must attribute the work in the manner specified by the author or licensor (but not in any way that suggests that they endorse you or your use of the work.) Share Alike—If you alter, transform, or build upon this work, you may distribute the resulting work only under the same, similar or a compatible license. With the understanding that: Waiver—Any of the above conditions can be waived if you get permission from the copyright holder. Other Rights—In no way are any of the following rights affected by the license: your fair dealing or fair use rights; the author's moral rights; and rights other persons may have either in the work itself or in how the work is used, such as publicity or privacy rights. Notice—For any reuse or distribution, you must make clear to others the license terms of this work. The best way to do that is with a link to https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/ I don't see anything saying you can't do what I describe. But maybe the fact that you have to have "attribution" is the key? I don't quite know how best to approach this situation. On one hand I would like to release data which is free and open source. On the other hand I don't want someone else to then run off with all of it and try and outcompete me with the same product I guess.

It's allowed by the Creative Commons Attribution -ShareAlike license, and intentionally so. The Wikimedia Foundation wants things like this to be possible; that is part of the goal of open content. (This license is also used on Stack Exchange content, so the same applies to e.g. this answer.) However, it is important to remember that this is not a public-domain equivalent license. If you copy from a Wikipedia article (or an SE post), you must comply with the "Attribution" and "ShareAlike" requirements. Attribution: You must give credit to the author. For Wikipedia articles, which typically have many authors, a link to the page is sufficient; editors agree to this in addition to the license when they save their edits. For Stack Exchange content, a link to the post itself should be enough. (To get a link to a post, click the "share" link below the post.) ShareAlike: If you modify the content, you must release your modified version under the same or a compatible license. You can't copy this answer, add more information (or translate it into another language, or make any other change), and keep an all-rights-reserved copyright on it, or release it into the public domain; your version must also be released under CC BY-SA. As long as you follow these requirements, copying is allowed and encouraged.

How do you know if the copyright claimant or owner of them material you are using is allowing their content on Youtube? You don't. ... does fair use automatically cover you for anything related to this? No Is it illegal to share the music experience of a legally purchased MP3 ... or to provide services that play songs ... but are not hosted by your website (in which case you just act as a pointer to other sites which are participating in illegal activities)? Yes What rights/privileges can cover you if you wish to participate in this? None I've heard (rumours probably with no legal standing), that as long as you are not monetizing their material, you will not have any legal action taken against you. You probably won't have action taken against you. That said, you probably won't get busted for smoking weed in your basement. Lack of enforcement makes it no less illegal. What copyright means Copyright is a legal right created by the law of a country that grants the creator of an original work exclusive rights to its use and distribution, usually for a limited time. The exclusive rights are not absolute; they are limited by limitations and exceptions to copyright law, including fair use. The copyright holder decides how, when and by whom their work can be used and copied. At some point this right expires and the work passes into the public domain. It is not trivial to determine what works are public domain and what are not as it depends on the copyright law in the country they were created in at the time of creation and how that law has changed subsequently. In most of the world, the default length of copyright is currently the life of the author plus either 50 or 70 years. Many jurisdictions also grant workers for hire moral copyright in their creative work even when the proprietorial copyright vests with their employer. Copyright comes into existence automatically; it doesn't need to be registered or denoted in any way. For example, I have copyright in this answer and you have copyright in your question. A few countries (the USA among them) have a copyright register but that only limits the remedies an unregistered copyright holder has; failing to register does not negate copyright. Further, a single work can have multiple copyright holders: a music video for example has (barring contractual arrangements): the composer(s) holds copyright in the music the lyricist(s) holds copyright in the lyrics the performer(s) hold copyright in the music performance the actor(s) (if any) holds copyright in the acting the producer(s)/director(s) holds copyright in the finished product. In practice, most of these people have contracts which give their copyright to someone else. Almost certainly, every MP3 of every song is covered by copyright; that is, someone, somewhere owns the copyright; that is at least one someone. How can you tell who that is? Often, in the absence of a claim of copyright, you can't. Obviously, if it is a song published by a record label than its pretty obvious that they hold copyright on it and you don't need to worry about the deals they have with the artist/composer etc. Remember, copyright violations are a civil matter; the state does not get involved. It is up to each individual copyright holder to take whatever action they wish under the law to protect their rights.

Although you aren't interested in the TOS, you should be. You are not allowed to make any copy of other people's stuff without permission. The TOS is how you get permission. First, the author uploads his material to You Tube, because he has an account and the TOS associated with the account specifies the license that he grants to You Tube and the world – same thing with Stack Exchange. The TOS says (roughly) "when you upload stuff, you give permission for others to access your stuff using the You Tube interface". Content-consumers likewise are allowed to stream content using their interface, but not generally download. (The license terms changes over time – previously there were more license types). Specifically, You are not allowed to: access, reproduce, download, distribute, transmit, broadcast, display, sell, license, alter, modify or otherwise use any part of the Service or any Content except: (a) as expressly authorized by the Service; or (b) with prior written permission from YouTube and, if applicable, the respective rights holders; and they don't expressly authorize ordinary download, you have to use their interface. You might also directly contact the author of the work in question and negotiate a deal where you can directly acquire a license from the rights-owner. But if you want to access the material via You Tube, you have to do it in a way that is permitted, and You Tube says that you're not permitted to download. Any "copying without permission" is infringement.

Not on its own, no Overview A ToS can be of some value, but will not fully protect the site operator (host). For one thing, a ToS is probably not binding on the user based on a contract of adhesion such as "by using this site you agree to...". A specific act, such as clicking a checkbox that defaults to clicked or activating an "I accept the terms" button is probably required to make a ToS binding on the user. But a host must do more that obtain an agreement to its ToS. Once it has actual knowledge of illegal content, a host must take action to remove or disable it, or else it may be liable as if it had posted the content itself. It also depends what kind of "something illegal" is involved. The most common form is perhaps content that allegedly infringes copyright. Safe Harbor In the EU Article 14 of the EU Directive on electronic commerce (Directive 2000/31/EC) will apply (note that being a directive, rather than a regulation, 2000/31/EC) depends on implementation in national law, which may vary from one country to another. Article 14 reads: Hosting Where an information society service is provided that consists of the storage of information provided by a recipient of the service, Member States shall ensure that the service provider is not liable for the information stored at the request of a recipient of the service, on condition that: (a) the provider does not have actual knowledge of illegal activity or information and, as regards claims for damages, is not aware of facts or circumstances from which the illegal activity or information is apparent; or (b) the provider, upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts expeditiously to remove or to disable access to the information. Paragraph 1 shall not apply when the recipient of the service is acting under the authority or the control of the provider. This Article shall not affect the possibility for a court or administrative authority, in accordance with Member States' legal systems, of requiring the service provider to terminate or prevent an infringement, nor does it affect the possibility for Member States of establishing procedures governing the removal or disabling of access to information. Article 14 means that when a host obtains actual knowledge of infringing or otherwise illegal content, the host must promptly delete that content or disable access to it. Such knowledge could come via a takedown notice. According to the page "Copyright infringement and remedies in Germany": One of the main situations refers to platform operators. Once they have been informed about a specific infringement on their platform, they are required to remove the specific infringing content and to implement measures in order to prevent future violations. See also the Wikipedia article "Notice and Take down" which discusses Article 14, and points out that it does not define a specific notice and take down procedure, unlike the US provisions of 17 USC 512 (which includes the DMCA notice and take down procedure, and the related Safe Harbor provisions). Since Article 14 clearly envisages some sort of notice procedure, but not specific procedure has been defined in the laws of most EU member states, including Germany, some people use the US DMCA notice format, as describesd in this article. Such a notice may serve to give a German host "actual knowledge" and impose liability if the host fails to respond promptly. There have been recent legal cases which affect the procedures in such cases, as reported in "Copyright 'safe harbours' for service providers need to be consistent" from Pinsent Masons and "Germany: Time To Hit Pause: Copyright Infringement On User Generated Platforms – When Is The Platform Provider Liable For Damages?" from Morrison & Foerster LLP. The Morrison & Foerster article reads: Previous rulings by the CJEU have addressed both the application of the safe harbor principle set out in the EU E-Commerce Directive1 that shields hosting providers from liability for hosted unlawful third-party content of which they have no actual knowledge and, separately, the extent of infringement of copyright by hosting of, or linking to, copyright infringing third-party content under the EU Copyright Directive. But it is still unclear under which conditions the providers of the various online platforms that store and make available user-generated content, can rely on the safe harbor privilege applying to hosting providers to avoid liability, or whether they must not only take down the infringing content when they obtain knowledge of such content but also compensate the rightsholders of such content for damages for copyright infringement. The Pinsent Masons article reads: [A] ruling last year by a German court has highlighted an anomaly in the way 'safe harbour' protections ISPs enjoy under EU law apply in the case of copyright enforcement. It has confirmed that applications for blocking orders and injunctive relief are treated differently, despite the economic effect of those measures being the same. The safe harbour protections stem from the EU's E-Commerce Directive. That legislation prohibits service providers from being put under any general obligation to monitor for illegal activity by users of their service. In addition, where the service providers are mere conduits to infringing activity by others, they cannot be held liable for that activity unless and until they obtain 'actual knowledge' of the activity. At that stage, a service provider must act expeditiously to remove or to disable access to the information if they are not to be held liable themselves for infringement. However, EU copyright law cuts into these 'safe harbour' protections. It makes clear that rights holders can apply for an injunction against intermediaries whose services are used by a third party to infringe copyright. In Germany, however, changes made to the Telemedia Act in October 2017 have spurred debate over the admissibility and the requirements of blocking injunctions. Other unlawful content Other sorts of illegal content are possible, such as neo-Nazi propaganda and Child Pornography, which are criminal under German law. In theory Article 14 applies to such content as well as to alleged copyright infringements. But since these are serious crimes, the degree of promptness expected from a host will probably be greater. Conclusion A hosting provider will need, at the least, to respond to notices alleging copyright infringement or other illegal content, and provide an address to which such notices can be sent. A host might do well to implement the full DMCA takedown procedure. ToS provisions will not provide a shield against liability after a notice is sent to the host. A host may be required to block future access by those whose previous uploads have been found to be unlawful. This may require soem sort of log-in procedure. Thus a simple ToS provision, as described in the question, particularly in the absence of any log-in mechanism, and of any enforcement of the ToS provisions, will not be enough to shield the host from liability for unlawful content posted by users.

More generally, can anyone just copy an existing website (without copying the code or images)? Yes. Could I make a website that lets people post pictures like Instagram but call it MyPics? Yes. In general, copyright protects particular expressions of ideas, not higher level ideas or concepts.

Basically, you cannot do it. You are required to include the MIT license in any derivative work. However, that holds only for the parts that you import from this other project. You can identify which parts of the final product are copied from the MIT-licensed program (and indicate "these parts are subject to the following MIT license"), and then you can do whatever you want with the remainder that you wrote. The downside of not licensing your material is that nobody can use it. To use it, people would need permission, which is what a license is. If you don't license it, you don't give permission, so people can't use it. You presumably want to subject your own contribution to different licensing conditions, so then you would state those conditions and clearly indicate what parts of the code you wrote.

Wikipedia has two kinds of pictures: Reusable pictures, most of them stored at http://commons.wikimedia.org Copyrighted pictures under fair-use, stored on the local Wikipedia (in your case, the Russian Wikipedia) but not on Commons. To know what case it is, just click on the Wikipedia picture, click on the blue "Description" button, and see whether it redirects you to Commons or not. Pictures on Commons are reusable if you include the author and license (see the full requirements). Commercial use is OK. Fair-use pictures can not be reused. Unfortunately, https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Файл:Tschedrovitsky.jpg is in the second case, so you can not reuse it, even in a non-commercial setting, unless you can justify that your usage qualifies as fair-use in your country. Hopefully one day someone will find a legally reusable picture of Shchedrovitski and upload it to Commons.

Can a system include such information? it is surely technically possible. Would it be a violation of copyright? That depends. First of all, any such information can be included if the copyright holder has granted permission, probably in the form of a license. But in that case this question would probably not have been asked. I therefore assume that no permission has been granted. (It doesn't matter if a request was made and the answer was "no", a request was made but ignored, or no request was ever made. No permission is still no permission.) The names of fictional locations are nor protected by copyright. Including, say, "Rivendell" or "Hobbiton" in the selection list for a timezone setting would not infringe the copyrights held by the Tolkien estate. But a map is a different thing. If the OS includes and can display a map of a fictional region, one that is copied from or based on a map published with the fiction, or by some third party, then that would almost surely be copyright infringement, and the copyright holder could choose to sue for infringement. S/he might choose not to sue, but that is a risky gamble to take. If this is in the US, statutory damages could be awarded, and could intheory go as high as $150,000, although they are not likely to be as high as that, that is just the maximum legal limit (per work infringed, not per copy). The standard is whatever amount the court thinks "just", up to the maximum. (If proof of willful infringement is not made, the upper limit is $30,000, still a sizable sum.) If the OS designer created the map independently, using names from the fiction, but not otherwise basing it on the fiction, and in particular not imitating any map created by anyone else, then it may well not be infringement, but it would still be wise to consult a copyright lawyer. The question would be more helpful if it made clear just what would be hypothetically included in the OS, and to what extent it would be based on someone else's work. There is also the question of why someone would want to include fictional places, but that really doesn't change the legal issue.

Why aren't the laws banning Nazi symbols in Australia unconstitutional? Recently, in Australia, a number of state governments have passed laws banning the display of Nazi symbols, and in the last few weeks, the federal government has been talking about passing a law about doing so as well. However, shouldn't these laws violate the implied right to political speech of the Australian constitution? If someone wanted to collect the signatures needed to found the Australian Nazi Party and run for parliament, shouldn't they have the right to do so, and to display the symbols of the party they intend to found as part of that effort? Shouldn't their supporters be able to display the symbols of their support for said party? Is it possible that these laws are unconstitutional, and simply haven't been struck down by the courts yet?

An Australian Constitutional Analysis These laws are not unconstitutional in Australia because Australia's constitution does not expressly protect the freedom of speech or political expression, and because its implied protections are weak and are not individual rights. The Australian Constitution is a document that sets forth the relative powers of the federal and state governments in Australia, and the organizational structure of the federal parliament, the cabinet, and the judiciary. But, unlike many national constitutions, the Australian Constitution is not an instrument protecting individual human and civil rights, such as the freedom of expression, except to provide a road map over whether certain kinds of legislation are a federal or state responsibility. Any protection of individual rights in Australia has a source different from the Australian Constitution. In Australia, most protections for individual rights arise under the common law and legislation. According to the Australian Attorney-General: The Australian Government is committed to protecting and promoting traditional rights and freedoms, including freedom of speech, opinion, religion, association and movement. These rights and freedoms are protected by the common law principle that legislation should not infringe fundamental rights and freedoms unless the legislation expresses a clear intention to do so and the infringement is reasonable. The Australian common law provides particularly strong protections for freedom of speech related to public affairs and political matters. The government believes these rights and freedoms underpin Australia’s democracy and should not be taken for granted, and has taken some key steps to ensure that these rights and freedoms are protected and promoted. But, basically, Australia, like the U.K., has a tradition of parliamentary sovereignty, in which a clearly expressed intent of legislation is not subject to judicial review on a substantive basis. As noted in the source cited in the question: It's not uncommon to hear people in Australia talk about their 'right to freedom of speech'. However, many people are surprised to learn that the Australian Constitution contains no such right. It goes on to explain that: As its name suggests, the implied freedom is not expressly contained in the Constitution.It is an implication drawn from the constitutional 'text and structure'. It originates from the sections of the Constitution that require that the Commonwealth Parliament be 'directly chosen' by the people, and that the people will change the Constitution by vote. The High Court regularly emphasises that the implied freedom is not a personal right, but operates as a restriction on legislative and executive power.This means that the Commonwealth and State governments cannot make laws or take action that would breach the implied freedom. The implied freedom is not absolute ­– it exists only to the extent necessary to protect the system of government reflected in the constitutional text. In practical terms, then, this means that a law can interfere with communication about government or politics without breaching the implied freedom, if the law does so for a legitimate aim, and is generally proportionate to that aim. . . . Under the current case law, three questions must be answered when deciding whether a law infringes the implied freedom: Does the law effectively burden the freedom in its terms, operation or its practical effect (the burden question)? If so, are the purpose of the law and the means adopted to achieve that purpose legitimate, in the sense that they are compatible with the maintenance of the constitutionally prescribed system of representative government (the legitimate end question)? If the answer to the second question is 'yes', is the law reasonably appropriate and adapted to advance that legitimate object (the reasonably appropriate and adapted question)? This question involves a proportionality test to determine whether the law is justified as suitable, necessary and adequate in its balance. If the first question is answered 'yes' and the second or third question is answered 'no', the law will be invalid. Essentially, this weak protection of political freedom under the implied freedom of political expression is legitimate if the state governments in question determine that fascism is inconsistent with a Western style political democracy and must be suppressed, and if the laws employed to suppress fascism are not too draconian. This is done in the context of a strong tradition of deference to political decision-making by state and federal parliaments. Put another way, so long as the law doesn't make Australia basically a less democratic political system that is depriving people of a meaningful ability to elect members of parliament at the state and federal level, it probably doesn't go too far given the justifications for the implied right. The scales are balanced at the institutional level in terms of whether democracy in Australia is impaired, rather than as an individual right of particular Nazis to express their views. A Human Rights Treaty Analysis Also, Australia, like the U.K., and many European countries, entrusts the protection of human rights primarily to international treaties which are superior to domestic legislation and are entrenched by the limitations in the treaties themselves upon leaving the treaties, as noted here: Australia is a party to the seven core international human rights treaties: the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD) the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD). It is against these treaties that human rights scrutiny processes under the Human Rights (Parliamentary Scrutiny) Act 2011 are undertaken. Australia also has periodic treaty body reporting obligations under these treaties. Australia is an active participant in the Universal Periodic Review process which provides an in-depth analysis of Australia’s compliance with our international human rights obligations. Australia is also a party to: the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights establishing an individual communication mechanism the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women establishing an individual communication mechanism the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities establishing an individual communication mechanism - the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. From a U.S.-centric view, the way that Australia protects human rights is similar to how the U.S. regulates itself with regard to preventing war crimes. In the Australian context, the core issue with respect to the legislation discussed in the question is whether it abridges an obligation of Australia under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Primarily, Articles 19 and 20 of that treaty are implicated by this legislation. These articles state: Article 19 Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice. The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries with it special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided by law and are necessary: (a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others; (b) For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public health or morals. Article 20 Any propaganda for war shall be prohibited by law. Any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law. In the treaty analysis, the argument would presumably be that section 3 of Article 19 is adequate to permit the law, because Nazism inherently disrespects the rights of others and present a threat to national security, public order, and public morals, particularly considered in light of Article 20, Section 2, as Nazi symbols can be considered incitements to discrimination, hostility, and violence. I'm not personally familiar with precisely how these rights are implemented under Australian law, nor am I personally familiar with the case law interpreting these Articles of the ICCPR. Application To Hypotheticals Is it possible that these laws are unconstitutional, and simply haven't been struck down by the courts yet? Yes. Indeed, I have no idea who would have standing to raise the issue, or by what procedural route this would be done. I could imagine, for example, that an individual prosecuted for using such symbols might not have standing to context a prosecution under the laws on these grounds, while the leader of a proposed political party with a petition for recognition pending might be able to make these legal arguments. However, shouldn't these laws violate the implied right to political speech of the Australian constitution? As discussed above, under Australia's political freedom jurisprudence, both as an implied constitutional right and under the ICCPR, it isn't an open and shut case. Notably, similar prohibitions in Germany have not held to violate the express protections for freedom of political speech of Germany's Basic Law. If someone wanted to collect the signatures needed to found the Australian Nazi Party and run for parliament, shouldn't they have the right to do so, and to display the symbols of the party they intend to found as part of that effort? Shouldn't their supporters be able to display the symbols of their support for said party? Australian courts can address that question when it arises. Presently, there isn't a ground swell of support for such a party. And, there is no legal prohibition on establishing a political party with particular political views that the neo-Nazi party might ascribe to itself, nor is there as prohibition on such a party establishing any other new logos and symbols for itself that it devises. Essentially, what a holding that the particular symbols cannot be used is saying is that these symbols are now so deeply and indelibly identified with genocide, and racial discrimination, religious discrimination, and political violence that the government may rightly declare that adopting those widely understood meanings of those symbols is outside the "Overton Window" of acceptable political thought within Australian democracy. In the U.S. free speech jurisprudence, the analogous case would be U.S. laws that prohibit cross-burning in front of unwilling people's homes and businesses because such symbols have developed in the context of U.S. history and culture the character of a "true threat". Australian states are basically saying that the symbols of the Nazi Germany regime amount to, in the current Australian context, a true threat to use violence against minorities in Australian society. If someone wants to espouse the non-genocidal, non-discriminatory policies of the Nazi Party in Germany, without advocating political violence, they are welcome to try to do so under a different name with symbols of their own that distance themselves from that violent, threatening, and anti-democratic Nazi German legacy. U.S. law protects people's right to use Nazi symbols. But, the U.S. has an express individual protection of freedom of speech without the same qualifications as Australia's implied constitutional right and treaty rights. And, one could imagine a rational U.S. Supreme Court resolving that narrow question differently without unraveling the whole of U.S. freedom of speech jurisprudence, just as it did in the case of cross-burning laws which are an uncontroversial part of modern U.S. constitutional free speech law. As another example, suppose that a Jewish Temple held the copyright and also trademark rights to those symbols in the context of political campaigns. A political party couldn't use those symbols then any more than they could use the McDonald's arches as its symbols without permission. But that isn't a major restriction on political freedom. The restriction on the use of the Nazi symbols isn't itself a restriction on particular political policies or ideas.

No. There are almost no constitutional lawyers (at least, that I have seen make pronunciations on the subject) who seem to think that this is a serious means of forcing a no deal Brexit; such an attempt would be obviously unconstitutional and would almost certainly be injuncted in court within hours of such an order being issued. Orders of council cannot stymie an Act of Parliament, this is a well established constitutional principle. See https://davidallengreen.com/2019/09/brexit-padfield-and-the-benn-act/

There is no federal prohibition against sexual discrimination in public accomodations. Colorado has an applicable state law, which covers "any place of business engaged in any sales to the public", where "It is a discriminatory practice and unlawful ...to refuse, withhold from, or deny to an individual or a group, because of ...sexual orientation...the full and equal enjoyment of the goods...". No provision exempts lemonade stands. Churches etc. are specifically exempted: "'Place of public accommodation' shall not include a church, synagogue, mosque, or other place that is principally used for religious purposes". Sex discrimination is allowed "if such restriction has a bona fide relationship to the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of such place of public accommodation", an argument that can't reasonably be made in the described case. It is also not obvious that running a lemonade stand is a business (the courts will not admit unsubstantiated Wiki assertions as evidence). It would be relevant to wonder what constitutes a "business" under Colorado law. E.g. is a business license required? In Colorado (US) law, it has not been definitively decided whether there can be a religious exception to the anti-discrimination law. Masterpiece Cakeshop was decided without answering that (the state showed clear religious intolerance in its handling of the case). We do not know how a similar case will be decided: Arlene's Flowers was handed back to the state court with the instruction "do it again" (with nothing more than a mention of Masterpiece Cakeshop). The court cannot establish certain beliefs and practices as "valid religions" (Establishment Clause); the proxy expression that is used is "deeply held belief", which includes atheism. The relationship of the issue to the First Amendment is uncertain.

Yes, such as this limitation on free speech. Initially, the limitation was "Clear and Present Danger" test (Schenk v. United States, 1919) which held that speech inciting lawless action was not protected speech and thus could be crimilized speech (i.e. Schenk publishing anti-draft fliers during World War I, which advocated draft dodging which at the time was a crime under the Espionage act of 1917). This was later over ruled to the "Bad Tendency" test which allowed for advocacy of criminal actions to be criminilized (Whitney v. United States, 1927. Whitney was accused of helping establish the American Communist Labor Party (ACLP), which held as a party platform the violent overthrow of the U.S. Government in favor of one advocated by the ACLP. This is standard to most Communist Parties at the time around the world. The difference between Schenk and Whitney was that Schenk actively called for a criminal action, where as Schenk was speaking of a future action following other party successes). This was overturned again by Brandenberg v. Ohio (1969) which introduced the "Imminent Lawless Action" test. This explicitly overturned Whitney in addition to other cases not mentioned such as Abrams v. United States (1915), Giltrow v. New York (1925), and Dennis v. United States (1951). It does not overrule Schenk, but it did cast doubt upon the decision made. In the case, KKK leader Brandenburg made a speech advocating for revenge against African Americans and Jews as well as expressing the belief that the United States government actively surpressed White Americans and needed to be opposed. He was charged as advocating the violent overthrow of the government. Imminent Lawless Action added the important componant that the violation must be advocacy of lawless action (revenge against racial minorities) must have a definite future date (like "tonight", "tomorrow", or specific time and date) and a vague future time will not count. And must show intent to break the law (Brandenburg did not specifically intend to break the law... he wanted it changed so it would not be legal before he took action). Additionaly, they found that the mere advocacy of resisting the government did not have any language componant that suggested violent resistance. Brandenburg, as discussed, overturned the reaffirmed B and put Schenk on some shaky ground as parts of Shenk were still relevant (Schenk first introduced that Free Speech was not without restrictions, but some of the case law was not relevent anymore, as Whitney used it as a basis in that decision, as did to a limited extent Dennis, which didn't work well with Whitney for other reasons. It should be pointed out that the Supreme Court does not typically take cases that wholly reaffirm past cases. Typically, their rulings are to clarify situations in a previous case that are not stated by the current extant rulings. For example, if the Supreme Court took a case that called Roe v. Wade into question, the case would more likely test whether Roe allows for a particular practice that isn't all that clear in Roe. It may affirm that Roe is still law, but the new case is not consistent with Roe, which will place a restriction on Roe, but not, figuratively, (pardon the pun) throw the baby out with the bath water.

Are political Flags ("Trump 2024") prohibited under the HOA's no signs rule? Why or why not? Probably. The Florida statute seems to imply that a flag is a type of sign and usually a political sign, even in the form of a flag, is still considered to be a sign. The Florida statute, in any case, only excludes the U.S. flag, not any other kind of flag. The First Amendment doesn't apply to an HOA declaration, although one could argue that FS 718 is a content based restriction of speech by exempting only the U.S. flag on particular days, and not other kinds of flags on other days, but that doesn't make a remedy clear. Allowing political signs isn't an obvious remedy for a 1st Amendment violation in FS 718.

18 U.S. Code § 700 was held to be unconstitutional in Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) and United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990). If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the Government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable. (Texas v Johnson) Mere flag burning is not illegal and is protected by the First Amendment. You may still be prosecuted for other crimes that happen while flag burning. For example, the flag may be somebody else's property. The Seattle appellees were also charged with causing willful injury to federal property in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1361 and 1362. This charge remains pending before the District Court, and nothing in today's decision affects the constitutionality of this prosecution. (US v Eichman)

In this specific case and location, the precise location of the incident was explicitly made a public space via state law not too long before this actual event. They therefore most certainly have no right to privacy. What is interesting to me though is the other side of this, does someone have the right to record others in public spaces, or is it simply not illegal? For instance if I non-destructively and non-violently "jam" your camera by shooting a low-power IR beam at your lens, have I abridged a legal right of yours? I don't think it would be illegal to do this. I am not even positive its against the 1st Amendment. The 1st Amendment relates only to the dissemination of information, not the collection of it. The Constitution doesn't seem to compel the gov't to make information available, or even to make things/events/spaces observable. The various "sunshine" laws after-all had to be enacted, it wasn't part of an interpretation of the 1st Amendment. To put a finer point on it, is recording events in public spaces legal or merely lawful?

Yes The Browne-Fitzpatrick Privilege Case in 1955 resulted in the two being gaoled for 90 days for breaching the privilege of the Australian Parliament. They were, respectively, the owner and editor of the Bankstown Observer and the breach was an article in that paper that alleged that a then sitting MP, Charles Morgan, had been involved in immigration malfeasance as a lawyer prior to being elected. The men were grilled by the Privileges Committee of Parliament during which they were denied legal representation. The Committee determined that they had infringed privilege and the House, on the motion of the Prime Minister Robert Menzies, voted to gaol them. The High Court of Australia refused to hear an appeal as did the UK Privy Council (which was the highest court with Australian jurisdiction at the time). So, for things printed 300km from Parliament, Parliament decided that these men had broken Parliamentary rules and should be imprisoned. There is doubt, both then and now, that this was a political hatchet job. There is also no doubt that what was done was legal then, however, given that the High Court has since discovered an implied right to political communication in the Constitution, it may not be possible today.

How many times had Trump been arraigned before his presidency? News articles today (such as this one) have been saying that the former president Trump has only been indicted and arraigned twice (4 April 2023 at the Manhattan state court of New York, and 13 June 2023 at a federal district court in Miami, Florida) despite the dozens of lawsuits that have been filed against him since he was elected president. Wikipedia says that before he was elected president Donald Trump and his businesses entities were involved in over 4,000 legal cases. I wonder how many of these were criminal charges against Mr. Trump personally (as opposed to his business entities), and how many among them resulted in arraignment? I came across this Huffpost blog article written before the 2016 election: Trump's Criminal History Should Be Front and Center. Although on quick reading it seems most of these charges were against Trump's business / non-profit entities, might there be among them criminal charges filed against him personally? There is also a CREW report listing 56 "credible" criminal offenses since Trump launched his campaign in 2015. My question is: If there were criminal charges against him personally but zero (0) arraignment, then these 2 arraignments (with a few in the works) will be new territory for him. It's a testament to his lawyers that he could have those previous cases settled / dismissed. It would be nice if the answer can list them. If he has been arraigned before, what were the charges and when?

Arraignments are only used for criminal matters. While Trump has been involved in many lawsuits, as have his businesses, only one prior case to his Presidency was criminal or quasi-criminal and might have involved an arraignment (although not necessarily): In 2006, the Town of Palm Beach began fining Trump $250 per day for ordinance violations related to his erection of an 80-foot-tall (24 m) flagpole flying a 15-by-25-foot (4.6 by 7.6 m) American flag on his property. Trump sued the town for $25 million, saying that they abridged his free speech, also disputing an ordinance that local businesses be "town-serving". The two parties settled as part of a court-ordered mediation, in which Trump was required to donate $100,000 to veterans' charities. At the same time, the town ordinance was modified allowing Trump to enroll out-of-town members in his Mar-a-Lago social club. Some municipal ordinance violations are treated procedurally like traffic tickets, and some are treated more like misdemeanor criminal offenses (which do generally involve arraignments). After his Presidency, one of his business entities was convicted of rare criminal charges against an organization: On December 6, 2022, Trump's company The Trump Organization was convicted on 17 criminal charges. Lawsuits do not give rise to arraignments. This isn't part of the civil lawsuit process. It is estimated that 70 to 100 million Americans have criminal records because they have been convicted of at least one criminal offense. This is about one in three or one in four American adults. The number of Americans who have even been arraigned for a crime, in a case that is not currently pending, who have never been convicted of a crime, is probably on the order of 1 million to 10 million. Probably tens of millions of Americans who have never been arraigned, however, have been arrested but never charged with any crime, in addition to those who have been arraigned and not convicted with no charges pending, those who have been arraigned only in cases that are still pending, and those who have been convicted of crimes. Lots Of Crimes That Are Committed Are Never Prosecuted There is also a CREW report listing 56 "credible" criminal offenses since Trump launched his campaign in 2015. These are cases in which there is there are credible allegations that Trump acted in ways that could have been the basis for committing a crime. But, CREW is not alleging that any of these circumstances (other than the 2022 Trump Organization conviction and the two felony cases upon which Trump has been arraigned in 2023) have resulted in any court action being taken to press criminal charges. It is possible that Trump or one of his businesses was the subject of criminal investigations that did not result in charges being brought, but there is really no way to know that this is the case. And, there is nothing terribly dishonorable about being investigated for a crime but not ultimately charged with any criminal offense. By analogy, if you are speeding, you are committing a traffic offense. The vast majority of the time, you are not ticketed for speeding even if a law enforcement office's radar gun tells the law enforcement officer that you were going slightly over the speed limit. Eventually, after the statute of limitations for traffic offenses (which is quite short) runs, you can't even be charged with those offenses. In the same way, while unlawful sexual contact or sexual assault is a crime, if charges are not brought within the statute of limitations (something we know empirically to be quite common) then it doesn't result in criminal charges even though the offender committed a crime. Likewise, most civil fraud lawsuits allege conduct that could have been prosecuted as a crime if authorities sought to do so. But, in practice, criminal prosecutors with limited resources most often chose not to bring criminal fraud prosecutions in cases where a civil fraud lawsuit could bring complete relief to the party who was harmed by it. Not All Illegal Conduct Is Criminal Many kinds of conduct that can give rise to civil lawsuits cannot generally give rise to criminal charges at all. These include breaches of contract, negligently but unintentionally causing a personal injury, disagreeing over the interpretation of the tax laws in a way that cause the government to allege that you failed to pay the full amount of the taxes that you owe, employment discrimination, and many kinds of housing discrimination. Big Businesses Are Usually Parties To Many Lawsuits Business entities, large and small, are routinely involved in lots of civil lawsuits, sometimes as plaintiffs and sometimes as defendants, and the number of lawsuits is, more or less, usually roughly proportional to the economic scale of the enterprise. For example, almost every landlord brings eviction and rent collection lawsuits from time to time, and sometimes is sued by tenants over security deposit issues and alleged defects in the maintenance of the rental property. Almost every significant property owner will sooner or later become involved in litigation over boundary discrepancies or easements or in eminent domain cases. Almost every developer will sooner or later be involved in construction defect and/or mechanic's lien litigation. Almost every bank brings foreclosure lawsuits and collection lawsuits when loans are allegedly not paid as agreed or loan covenants are not met. Almost every business with a great many employees with eventually be involved in some sort of lawsuit with an employee. A large business will typically litigate a significant tax dispute at least every few years. Most of the lawsuits filed in the United States are brought by banks alleging defaults on loans, landlords alleging unpaid rent, and governments collecting unpaid taxes. For example, in Colorado, in 2022, there were 62,996 tax collection cases, 29,836 evictions, 1,971 simple mortgage foreclosures, 66,875 debt collection cases, and 306 personal property repossession cases, for a total of 161,984 civil lawsuits out of 199,293 civil lawsuits in the state (about 81%), the lion's share of which are brought by financial institution lenders, landlords, and government tax collectors. Whether 4,000 lawsuits over several decades is a lot or a little for a large business enterprise, or is just par for the course, really comes down to the nature of, and scope of, the businesses involved. The character of the allegations in the lawsuit, and whether the allegations are atypical of lawsuit involving large business enterprises, is really more telling than the number of lawsuits.

Cohen plead guilty to a number of charges. If you plead guilty with any charges, then there is no need to go forward with a trial.

In short, no, that cant be a pardon for those police officers who would be now influenced to take more violent actions towards those they detain. Pardons are only applicable to past actions. You may be pardoned before charges are filed, but the actions must have already occured. Though I less certain about this, simply because Ive never heard such a thing proposed, I would also note that it is highly improbable that the actual statement he made - generic and during a speech - could everbe interpreted as an affirmative act intending to grant pardons to anyone who may act in that manner in the future.

If someone was charged with 15 counts of a crime but was only indicted on 2 counts, can the prosecutor introduce evidence at sentencing of charges that the person was not indicted on? In federal court, yes. This has been the case since Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949) which held that evidence such as counts and conduct upon which the defendant was not charged or indicted may still be considered in a sentencing hearing. Since U.S. v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148 (1997), the prosecutor can even introduce evidence at sentencing of charges upon which the person was acquitted by a jury. See generally here. This remains good law although it is controversial both in academic writing and in political discussions and among many sitting federal judges. Neither the Federal Rules of Evidence nor constitutional provisions related to evidentiary matters (e.g., the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment) apply at sentencing. Therefore, the court may consider hearsay and other types of information that would not be admissible during a trial. However, the [U.S. Sentencing] Commission has stated that information considered by a court at sentencing must have “sufficient indicia of reliability to support its probable accuracy.” Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32, the court “must — for any disputed portion of the presentence report or other controverted matter — rule on the dispute or determine that a ruling is unnecessary either because the matter will not affect sentencing, or because the court will not consider the matter in sentencing.” In resolving factual disputes, the court ordinarily applies the preponderance of the evidence standard. From here. The quote above cites the following authority: FED. R. EVID. 1101(d)(3). Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949). 18 U.S.C. § 3661; see also Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476, 480 (2011) (“This Court has long recognized that sentencing judges ‘exercise a wide discretion’ in the types of evidence they may consider when imposing sentence and that ‘[h]ighly relevant — if not essential — to [the] selection of an appropriate sentence is the possession of the fullest information possible concerning the defendant's life and characteristics.’ Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 246– 247 (1949). Congress codified this principle at 18 U.S.C. § 3661, which provides that ‘[n]o limitation shall be placed on the information’ a sentencing court may consider ‘concerning the [defendant's] background, character, and conduct,’ and at § 3553(a), which sets forth certain factors that sentencing courts must consider, including ‘the history and characteristics of the defendant,’ § 3553(a)(1).”). USSG §6A1.3(a). FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(i)(3)(B). USSG §6A1.3, comment.; see also McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 91-92 (1986) (holding that due process does not require sentencing factors to be proved by more than a preponderance of the evidence). Federal Rule of Evidence 1101 states (emphasis added): Rule 1101. Applicability of the Rules (a) To Courts and Judges. These rules apply to proceedings before: · United States district courts; · United States bankruptcy and magistrate judges; · United States courts of appeals; · the United States Court of Federal Claims; and · the district courts of Guam, the Virgin Islands, and the Northern Mariana Islands. (b) To Cases and Proceedings. These rules apply in: · civil cases and proceedings, including bankruptcy, admiralty, and maritime cases; · criminal cases and proceedings; and · contempt proceedings, except those in which the court may act summarily. (c) Rules on Privilege. The rules on privilege apply to all stages of a case or proceeding. (d) Exceptions. These rules — except for those on privilege — do not apply to the following: (1) the court’s determination, under Rule 104(a), on a preliminary question of fact governing admissibility; (2) grand-jury proceedings; and (3) miscellaneous proceedings such as: · extradition or rendition; · issuing an arrest warrant, criminal summons, or search warrant; · a preliminary examination in a criminal case; · sentencing; · granting or revoking probation or supervised release; and · considering whether to release on bail or otherwise. (e) Other Statutes and Rules. A federal statute or a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court may provide for admitting or excluding evidence independently from these rules. Given the immense personal importance of a sentencing hearing which can exercise discretion over a range of many decades of possible prison time, and which is frequently the only meaningful opportunity for a person who is easily proven guilty to distinguish himself or herself from other defendants, it is really very stunning and counterintuitive that this is the case. And if so isn't that denying the defendant his or her due process because that person was not indicted on those charges? Under current U.S. Constitutional law, the maximum sentence that can be imposed must be based upon convictions by a jury or judge based upon charges upon which indictments were brought, which were proved beyond a reasonable doubt based upon admissible evidence. The leading case in support of this proposition is Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). But, at sentencing, the judge's exercise of discretion up to the maximum sentence established at trial may be made based upon a preponderance of the evidence and that evidence is not subject to the same procedural safeguards.

You are correct that the existence of a lawsuit -- on First Amendment or Fifth Amendment grounds -- is not a strong basis for believing that Acosta will have his pass reinstated. People file losing lawsuits all the time. But that doesn't really tell us anything about the merits of his case, which I discuss below. Temporary restraining order: The standard for TROs is well-established: This court may issue a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction only when the movant demonstrates that: there is a substantial likelihood plaintiff will succeed on the merits; plaintiff will be irreparably injured if an injunction is not granted; an injunction will not substantially injure the other party; and the public interest will be furthered by an injunction. Morgan Stanley DW Inc. v. Rothe, 150 F. Supp. 2d 67, 72 (D.D.C. 2001). I'd normally expect the court to be pretty speech-protective in a First Amendment TRO case, but because this is the White House, they'll probably give a fair amount of extra weight when figuring out how to balance everything here. I would not, however, expect either of the factors that you mentioned -- that this is a Fifth Amendment case and that few people have press passes -- to do much to change the court's analysis. I suspect it's going to come down to who is more credible about what happened and why. Fifth Amendment: The Constitution does not promise us much at all in terms of outcomes. What it does promise is that the government will go through reasonable procedures to arrive at those outcomes. As you seem to have identified, that's exactly what Sherrill was about. Sherrill does not say that everyone has the First Amendment right to a White House press pass; it says that that everyone has the Fifth Amendment right to due process when the White House decides whether to grant or deny a press pass -- especially because of the First Amendment interests implicated in those decisions. The basics ingredients of due process are notice and an opportunity to be heard by a neutral decision-maker, and that's all that Sherrill calls for: a publicly disclosed procedure by which the journalists can apply for credentials and appeal adverse decisions. Here, it's unclear whether the White House has provided Acosta with any notice or any opportunity to appeal his decision. If that's the case, they've almost certainly run afoul of Sherrill. But again, you are correct that this does not mean he gets his press pass back. If they find that the White House violated the Fifth Amendment as explained in Sherrill, the remedy will simply be to force it to go through the prescribed procedure. First Amendment: If it turns out that they use that procedure as a pretext to punish Acosta for protected speech, we would be out of Fifth Amendment territory and into First Amendment territory. If a court found that the White House had revoked his pass because he was from CNN, because they didn't like the questions he was asking, or because he didn't provide fawning coverage of the president, it is virtually certain that the White House would be forced to restore his credentials. But if they determine in a fair way that Acosta should have his pass revoked because he was violent, because he was infringing on other people's ability to do their job, or because he was otherwise violating established rules, a court would probably say that any of those was an acceptable justification. In that case, CNN would need a new White House correspondent.

Bob should certainly expect to be impeached by whichever side his testimony injures. Their attorney will confront him with the transcript of his previous testimony, and likely read it out loud for the jury to hear, and force him to acknowledge that he said something different before. This is pretty standard trial tactics. Bob would not be treated as formally admitting that he committed perjury, though I think it's fair to say that he has effectively made that admission. One side will treat him as having lied the first time; the other will treat him as lying now. It's possible that he will have some explanation for the discrepancy -- he was high, he has memory problems, he misunderstood the question -- but in your hypothetical, the explanation would have to be pretty amazing to justify such a complete reversal.

I have not found a case directly on point, but there is a case in the right neighborhood. In Flordia v. Carter 364 So. 2d 1249, Carter was charged with perjury for making a false statement under oath. He recanted his testimony in a letter to the defense attorney the next day. Subsequently he was charged with perjury: the trial judge dismissed the case based on his having recanted (which is a defense to perjury). The judge said (quoted in the appeal below and citing a relevant precedent Brannen v. Florida 114 So. 429) It matters not whether Carter knew his original testimony was false or whether he was merely mistaken. "The law encourages the correction of erroneous and even intentionally false statements on the part of a witness, and perjury will not be predicated upon such statements when the witness, before the submission of the case, fully corrects his testimony." The lower appeals court rejected the trial court's dismissal, saying Recantation is a defense to an allegation of perjury only where there is an acknowledgement of the falsity of the original sworn statement, a voluntary retraction of that statement, and a new statement which discloses the true facts. It is not a viable defense where the perjured testimony has substantially affected the proceeding or it has become manifest that such falsity has been or will be exposed. Otherwise, one could rest on his lie, allowing it to substantially affect a proceeding, and never retract unless the falsity had been exposed. This would provide no inducement or encouragement to tell the truth. That court basically felt it was based on the threat of being discovered, and felt that a particular state statute had taken away the recantation defense, so they reinstated the charge. The appeal to the Florida Supreme Court, Carter v. Florida 384 So. 2d 1255 basically declared that the appeals court was wrong about the statute (they officially held that recantation is a defense to perjury). They concluded that Carter gained nothing by recanting (that was a distinguishing feature in a precedent that the lower court favored). The dissent in this decision opined that It may be that the false deposition testimony by Dr. Carter was inadvertent and without criminal intent.... These, however, are factual issues and should be resolved by a jury rather than by the trial court on a motion to dismiss. What unifies all opinions on the matter is that a false statement made under oath must be recanted. The reason why Carter was not convicted was that he (possibly) was unaware that his testimony was false and he did recant when he became aware of the facts.

This is technically an open question, but there is a general consensus that Consovoy's argument is unprecedented and unsupportable. If the president can be dragged into civil litigation over private matters in the middle of his presidency, Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997), it seems unlikely that the courts would give him a pass on prosecution for a midterm murderous rampage. If Consovoy is right, though, the answer would have to be that yes, Trump could avoid prosecution. Posing the question that way sort of helps to highlight the problem with Consovoy's theory. As I understand it, Consovoy's argument is that impeachment is the only remedy for crimes committed by a president. But if the president can just kill of Congress, there's no one left to impeach him, leaving the country with no way to remove him. So again, the answer is almost certainly no.

Does this require probate? Let's assume that Bob and Abby are a married couple. Bob's will leaves everything to Abby. Bob has a brokerage account solely in his name with no TOD on the account. Bob then dies. It is my understanding that for Abby to get the money, you have to go through probate. Am I right about that? I have been told that when you are leaving everything to a spouse you can skip probate. I am thinking that is wrong. Bob should have had a TOD on his account but he did not hence in this case, probate is required.

Bob's will leaves everything to Abby. Bob has a brokerage account solely in his name with no TOD on the account. Bob then dies. It is my understanding that for Abby to get the money, you have to go through probate. Am I right about that? Yes, this has to go through probate. I have been told that when you are leaving everything to a spouse you can skip probate. I am thinking that is wrong. You are correct. This said, in a very small dollar estate (e.g. $20,000, with the actual dollar amount varying state by state), some states allow you to transfer assets by affidavit rather than via the probate process, if the sold heir at all and will beneficiary are the same and there are no unpaid creditors with a claim against those funds. New Jersey has two sets of small estate procedures for estates under $50,000. The cutoff is sometimes $10,000, sometimes $20,000, and sometimes $50,000 depending upon the circumstances and the nature of the simplified process sought. It isn't clear to me that they apply in cases where the decedent has a will and therefore is not intestate. Small Estates General Summary: Small Estate laws were enacted in order to enable heirs to obtain property of the deceased without probate, or with shortened probate proceedings, provided certain conditions are met. Small estates can be administered with less time and cost. If the deceased had conveyed most property to a trust but there remains some property, small estate laws may also be available. Small Estate procedures may generally be used regardless of whether there was a Will. In general, the two forms of small estate procedures are recognized: Small Estate Affidavit -Some States allow an affidavit to be executed by the spouse and/or heirs of the deceased and present the affidavit to the holder of property such as a bank to obtain property of the deceased. Other states require that the affidavit be filed with the Court. The main requirement before you may use an affidavit is that the value of the personal and/or real property of the estate not exceed a certain value. Summary Administration -Some states allow a Summary administration. Some States recognize both the Small Estate affidavit and Summary Administration, basing the requirement of which one to use on the value of the estate. Example: If the estate value is 10,000 or less an affidavit is allowed but if the value is between 10,000 to 20,000 a summary administration is allowed. New Jersey Summary: Under New Jersey statute, where as estate is valued at less than $50,000, a surviving spouse, partner in a civil union, or domestic partner, may present an affidavit of a small estate before the Superior Court. Upon the execution and filing of the affidavit, the surviving spouse shall have all of the rights, powers and duties of an administrator duly appointed for the estate. New Jersey: New Jersey requirements are set forth in the statutes below. TITLE 3B ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATES–DECEDENTS AND OTHERS 3B:10-3. When spouse, partner in a civil union, or domestic partner entitled to assets without administration. Where the total value of the real and personal assets of the estate of an intestate will not exceed $50,000, the surviving spouse, partner in a civil union, or domestic partner upon the execution of an affidavit before the Surrogate of the county where the intestate resided at his death, or, if then nonresident in this State, where any of the assets are located, or before the Superior Court, shall be entitled absolutely to all the real and personal assets without administration, and the assets of the estate up to $10,000 shall be free from all debts of the intestate. Upon the execution and filing of the affidavit as provided in this section, the surviving spouse, partner in a civil union, or domestic partner shall have all of the rights, powers and duties of an administrator duly appointed for the estate. The surviving spouse, partner in a civil union, or domestic partner may be sued and required to account as if he had been appointed administrator by the Surrogate or the Superior Court. The affidavit shall state that the affiant is the surviving spouse, partner in a civil union, or domestic partner of the intestate and that the value of the intestate’s real and personal assets will not exceed $50,000, and shall set forth the residence of the intestate at his death, and specifically the nature, location and value of the intestate’s real and personal assets. The affidavit shall be filed and recorded in the office of such Surrogate or, if the proceeding is before the Superior Court, then in the office of the clerk of that court. Where the affiant is domiciled outside this State, the Surrogate may authorize in writing that the affidavit be executed in the affiant’s domicile before any of the officers authorized by R.S.46:14-6.1 to take acknowledgments or proofs. amended 1983, c.246, s.1; 2004, c.132, s.77; 2005, c.331, s.24; 2015, c.232, s.1. 3B:10-4. When heirs entitled to assets without administration Where the total value of the real and personal assets of the estate of an intestate will not exceed $20,000 and the intestate leaves no surviving spouse, partner in a civil union, or domestic partner, and one of his heirs shall have obtained the consent in writing of the remaining heirs, if any, and shall have executed before the Surrogate of the county where the intestate resided at his death, or, if then nonresident in this State, where any of the intestate’s assets are located, or before the Superior Court, the affidavit herein provided for, shall be entitled to receive the assets of the intestate of the benefit of all the heirs and creditors without administration or entering into a bond. Upon executing the affidavit, and upon filing it and the consent, he shall have all the rights, powers and duties of an administrator duly appointed for the estate and may be sued and required to account as if he had been appointed administrator by the Surrogate or the Superior Court. The affidavit shall set forth the residence of the intestate at his death, the names, residences and relationships of all of the heirs and specifically the nature, location and value of the real and personal assets and also a statement that the value of the intestate’s real and personal assets will not exceed $20,000. The consent and the affidavit shall be filed and recorded, in the office of the Surrogate or, if the proceeding is before the Superior Court, then in the office of the clerk of that court. Where the affiant is domiciled outside this State, the Surrogate may authorize in writing that the affidavit be executed in the affiant’s domicile before any of the officers authorized by R.S.46:14-6.1 to take acknowledgments or proofs. amended 1983, c.246, s.2; 2004, c.132, s.78; 2005, c.331, s.25; 2015, c.232, s.2. The consent and the affidavit shall be filed and recorded, in the office of the surrogate or, if the proceeding is before the Superior Court, then in the office of the clerk of that court. Where the affiant is domiciled outside this State, the surrogate may authorize in writing that the affidavit be executed in the affiant’s domicile before any of the officers authorized by R.S. 46:14-7 and R.S. 46:14-8 to take acknowledgments or proofs.

(I am not your lawyer. I am not here to help you. If you are reading this because someone has died, please stop and instead read the Scottish Courts and Tribunals guide to dealing with a deceased's estate in Scotland, or contact a solicitor.) Yes, in general. Section 1 of the Wills Act 1963, which is in force in Scotland, specifies that "[a] will shall be treated as properly executed if its execution conformed to the internal law in force in the territory where it was executed." Furthermore, Section 4 states that "[t]he construction of a will shall not be altered by reason of any change in the testator’s domicile after the execution of the will." "Construction" here refers to interpreting the language and effect of the will. So if the will was validly executed in England, it should also be in force in Scotland, and a Scottish court will give it the same meaning it would have had under English law. Furthermore, the same rule of validity seems to apply in both England and Scotland: Wills Act 1837 section 9. There may be other Scottish laws affecting the disposition of the estate that differ from English law. Relevant statutes include Succession (Scotland) Act 1964, section 21A, which seems consistent with Wills Act 1963. (I am trained in U.S. rather than English or Scottish law; I'm trusting the accuracy of the UK's excellent online legislation archive for the proposition that the statutes cited are in force in Scotland. I haven't checked the case law for contrary interpretations.)

If three people inherited a house in equal shares, then a new deed should have been prepared and filed with the appropriate governmental authority (the county in most US states) before probate is closed. When that is done the authority of the executors over the house as executors has ended. However, if I understand you correctly, the two former executors are also two of the three heirs to the house. Thus they own a 2/3rds interest in the house. At least they can sell their interests without your consent, leaving you a minority owner with the purchaser owner a majority. In some jurisdictions they may be able to force a sale, paying you your share of the purchase price. But this would be because of their majority ownership, not because of their former status as executors. Addition: In some states co-owners who are joint tenants may not sell their interests without the consent of the other co-owners, but this is jnot true in North Carolina According to the site of the Hutchens Law office: ownership as tenants in common provides each party with the right to sell, gift, devise, or otherwise convey their interest in the property without the permission of the other owners. This means that the ownership interest is freely alienable or transferable. As a result, an owner may sell or give their interest in the property to anyone they want, or they may willingly or by judgment use their interest in the property to secure or satisfy a debt with a creditor. Therefore, parties entering into an agreement to purchase property as tenants in common should be aware that they may ultimately end up owning the property with a stranger. If this were to happen, there is a way out, but it may be costly. At any time, if the parties can't agree, any owner may petition the court for a partition of the property. The court could require one owner to buy another out or force the sale of the property. The court will decide the ultimate outcome based on equity. ... [I]f the intent of co-owners holding interest as joint tenants is to automatically transfer their interest at death to the survivor, the language must be on the conveying instrument as right of survivorship is not automatic with joint tenancy in North Carolina and if the language in not included, the decedent's interest will pass to his heirs. ... However, any owner has the right to convey their ownership interest during their life; and if they do, the survivorship agreement ends, and owners simply become joint tenants by operation of law. In North Carolina there seems to be little practical difference between co-owners who are tenants in common, and those who are joint tenants without a right of survivorship. But whichever form of co-ownership is chosen: tenants in common, joint tenants without a right of survivorship, or joint tenants with a right of survivorship, each of the co-owners has a right during his or her lifetime to sell, give away, or use as collateral on a loan his or her share of the property, without consulting the other co-owners. They cannot force the other co-owner(s) to sell, except by starting an action of partition in a court, when a judge would decide. An unrelated buyer might be unwilling to purchase only a 1/3 or 2/3rds interest, because the remaining co-owner(s) would still have full rights to use and occupy the house, can could sell to a different buyer. All co-owners are responsible for their proportionate shares of all expenses, including mortgage payments, repairs, and taxes.

If I understand your question correctly, you have some clients who have paid you for services that you have not yet provided and, indeed, they have not yet requested. Is this correct? The accounting term for this is a "prepayment". The correct accounting treatment is to increase an asset account (your bank account) and create a liability account (Prepayments or something similar). You need to talk to your accountant about how to treat these for consumption and income taxes. Legally, these people are now creditors of your business - just like all of your suppliers and employees. There is no legal requirement to escrow or otherwise treat this as trust money. Basically, if your business goes bust they will lose their money. This is something that you should have dealt with in your contract with your customers - if you are running an online business then you should get a lawyer to revise your terms of service to cover things like how they can ask for a refund (and how long you have to get it to them) and how long (or if) they forfeit the funds. As it stands the money effectively becomes yours after whatever time under a statute of limitation applies to transactions of this type and size (under whatever law applies to the contract) since after that time they cannot sue to get it back.

However, he wants a new security deposit and a month's rent for the time we will use it in March, claiming that the sale process makes us new tenants. What are the legal rights and legal obligations of an estate in a month-to-month rental situation? The estate is just starting the probate process, and I am unclear on whether the landlord is a "traditional" creditor or in a unique situation since the money he is owed for rent continues to accrue after death. The decedent's security deposit, less valid deductions, is property of the estate, so if the landlord takes a second security deposit he is double dipping. Generally speaking, after someone dies, money judgments that have not been reduced to judgment liens, and unsecured debts (i.e. debts not supported by collateral) only have a right to be paid via submission of a claim to the probate estate in the probate process with claims made paid according to a priority schedule set forth in the probate code. But, generally speaking, death does not impair the property rights of third parties, so the fact that a debtor's estate is in probate is usually not a basis upon which a foreclosure or repossession of collateral for a default on a secured debt, or an eviction due to the termination of a lease, may be postponed while the probate case runs its course. Probate does not have the equivalent of the "automatic stay" in bankruptcy that prevents any creditors, secured or unsecured, from engaging in any collection activity against an estate, and probate estates are not allowed to file for bankruptcy either. If you really wanted to play hardball and only needed the apartment for a few days in March, the estate could simply continue to occupy it for that period of time and they pay the landlord the extra month's rent but not the additional security deposit when it was done. The landlord can't begin a foreclosure proceeding until there is a default which can't happen sooner than the last day of February. Even if the landlord is really on his toes, the landlord will be hard pressed to get a notice to vacate served on the estate and then to prepare and serve an eviction lawsuit on the estate and get that case in front of a judge before the estate will be ready to move out anyway. The estate might incur some attorneys' fees in the process if it did that, but the attorneys' fees would be an unsecured claim of the landlord that would have to be collected through the claims process in the probate proceeding which is usually a fairly favorable forum for the estate, instead of the usual court where small landlord-tenant disputes are handled. The probate estate could simply deny his claim for attorneys' fees and then, if the landlord wanted them after making a claim, the landlord would have to bring a lawsuit on fairly tight deadlines in the probate court to have the disallowance of the claim overturned. If you wanted to be even more aggressive, rather than paying the last month's rent, the estate could just holdover into March without paying rent or a new security deposit (vacating before the eviction process can run its course), effectively forcing the landlord to use the security deposit for March rent, and then forcing the landlord to use the probate claims process for both damages to the property claimed and for an attorneys' fees. If the estate is insolvent, or if the claim wasn't filed by the landlord (who may not even know that it is necessary to file a claim in probate) within the short deadline for probate claims arising after death, those expenses just wouldn't get paid at all.

Choice of Law The place where you get married is irrelevant to the question of whether or not you need a pre-nuptial agreement. What matters is where you intend to live once you get married. A pre-nuptial agreement exists to change the default rules of law upon death and divorce. These rules differ from state to state, so the default rules you might modify depend upon where you intend to live after you get married, and so does the extent to which you need to modify those rules. Generally, a divorce will be governed by the law of the place where the couple resides when the divorce is commenced, and generally inheritance is governed by the laws of the place where the decedent (i.e. the dead person) was domiciled (which means something close to, but not the same as where the decedent resided) at death. Why Get A Pre-Nuptial Agreement? If you and your bride are happy with the default rules of law regarding divorce and inheritance in the place that you intend to live, there is no need for a pre-nuptial agreement. If the two of you are not content with the default rules of law regarding divorce and inheritance in the place that you intend to live, then a pre-nuptial agreement can change some, but not all, of those rules. Generally, a pre-nuptial agreement can change rules regarding property division, alimony and attorneys' fees, but not matters related to children or related to the grounds upon which you can get divorced or related to whether fault can be considered in a property division or alimony determination. What the pre-nuptial agreement would say would depend upon your objectives for entering into it. To answer your question it is necessary to know "what harm are you afraid of that a pre-nuptial agreement could prevent?" This has more to do with your expectations and values than it does with the law. Some reasons that people enter into pre-nuptial agreements include: preventing a spouse from inheriting or receiving in a divorce wealth that you inherited or might inherit in the future, because the donors might decide not to leave you inheritances otherwise; preserving wealth acquired by the spouse's respectively during life for one's adult children in a late in life marriage (e.g. during retirement) that is unlikely to produce more children. The Formalities Any pre-nuptial agreement should be drafted with both spouses represented by lawyers, and any competent lawyer should know the details of executing the document that are necessary to make it valid. If the agreement is drafted in English, which would make sense if she was moving to the U.S. to join you, she would need to have an interpreter in addition to a lawyer to help her evaluate and negotiate it, unless she was already fully fluent in English enough to understand advanced legal concepts (which would be very uncommon unless, for example, she went to school for many years in the U.S.). Immigration Considerations In the immigration process, U.S. immigration officials are skeptical that international marriages are legitimate and have the power to determine that an international marriage was a sham. One factor among many that immigration officials use to determine that a marriage was a sham entered into for immigration purposes is the existence of a pre-nuptial agreement that favors the citizen spouse. The more strongly the agreement favors the citizen spouse relative to the default rules of law, the more likely it is that immigration officials will determine that the marriage is a sham. It is not necessarily a factor that will cause the marriage to be found to be a sham, in and of itself, but it is an important factor that would be considered. If you enter into a pre-nuptial agreement, you are making it harder for your bride to become a U.S. citizen, and the more it favors you, the harder it will be for her to become a U.S. citizen.

This will depend on the exact wording of the will. If the will is well-drawn, it will provide alternative recipients in case the primary recipient of a bequest dies before the testator (will-maker) does. But as a general rule, if A makes a will leaving particular property to B, but B dies before A does, that bequest is void. If the will specifies an alternate recipient, the property goes to the alternate. If not, or if all specified alternates die before the testator does, the property becomes part of the residual estate of the testator. (The residual estate is that part which is not subject to a specific bequest.) The testator can specify a line of descent for a bequest: "I leave my house to Joan and her heirs". In that case, if Joan died before the testator, the house would go to whatever person or persons inherit from Joan. This was once a somewhat common form of bequest, but now is much less common. A will normally includes language leaving the residual estate to some person (or several people) or some entity (it can be an organization, such as a church or a charity). This is often done with language such as "I leave all the rest of my estate to ..." OR "Everything not include above i leave to..." or "I give all the remainder and residue of my estate to...". The executor does not choose, but rather follows the directions of the will on who gets the residue of the estate. I am not sure what happens if the will does not name a residuary legatee, or if the person so named dies before the testator. That will depend on the specific law of the jurisdiction. In the US, this means state law, and will vary from state to state. The comment by Dale M says that assets not provided for in the will are inherited as if the person was intestate, that is, as if the person had no valid will. The law in each jurisdiction specifies exactly what rules are followed in the case of intestacy. In general this is that property goes first to the teatator's spouse and children, but if there are no living spouse and children, to more distant relatives. Eventually, if no relatives close enough can be found, property escheats, that is, goes to the government. The exact rule varies by jurisdiction -- in the US by state.

There is, in general, a rule that all matters connected with a single transaction or event should be included in a single legal case. Different jurisdictions apply this diffidently, and I haven't yet researched this in Maryland specifically. Also, if you agree to pay a part of what the landlord claims, you will quite likely be asked to sign a settlement agreement as part of the transaction. This is likely to include a release of all claims connected with your tenancy at the apartment. If it does, and you sign the agreement, you will be giving up any claim you might otherwise have because of the failure to properly notify you. You may want to consult a lawyer about this. A one-time consultation might not be very expensive. If you sued the landlord, you could do so in small claims court, where legal costs are significantly lower than in other courts.

Could they subpoena Mike Pence to testify whether he knew that Trump had taken classified documents out of the White House? In regards to the trial that will take place in the future regarding the issue of former U.S. President Donald Trump mishandling classified documents, I was just wondering if former Vice President Mike Pence could be subpoenaed to appear in court to testify whether he knew that Donald Trump had taken classified documents out of the White House. Could they subpoena Mike Pence to testify whether he knew that Donald Trump had taken classified documents out of the White House?

Yes... whether the judge will grant the subpoena is another matter and one that it is to premature to speculate on. With what I have seen of the indictment, Pence was not named as a witness in the investigation, which will call into question why he is being asked to testify to events that were not used to indict Trump (if he saw something, that should come out in the investigation prior to trial.). Without some show that the testimony was material to the investigations findings and the charge I doubt it would be granted... but there's nothing stopping the prosecution for requesting the subpoena.

Probably not There's a difference between knowing DeJoy is guilty, and proving he is guilty. The first is a matter of your personal views on epistemology; the second is a matter of law. The statute says an official cannot use "his official authority for the purpose of interfering with..." In other words, in order to charge DeJoy, the government needs evidence that he is making these changes for the purpose of interfering with the election. According to news reports, DeJoy claims his purpose is legitimate: To balance the USPS budgets. He claims the PO is losing so much money that drastic cuts are required unless Congress increases funding. Given that the USPS is running a deficit, it will very hard to prove that DeJoy's explanation is just a smokescreen, that his real purpose is to screw up the election. So, unless there is a smoking gun, it seems likely he would not be charged, let alone found guilty. Note: Edited for clarity in light of comments

If I want to protest for or against President Trump and decide to wear a Trump mask, isn't that speech protected by the first amendment? Probably. The matter of intent, in any event, is for a court to decide (if the prosecutor determines that the question should even be presented to a court). For example, someone seeking to rob a bank in a mask would probably fall afoul of this law, and it's not likely that using a mask of a political figure would enable a successful first-amendment defense. For a political protestor, it could be easy to show that the intent was to make a political statement and not to conceal identity, in which case it would not be necessary to consider the constitutional question, for a critical element of the crime would be missing. That is, if you say "I wasn't trying to hide my identity," and the court believes you, then you haven't violated the statute. That is a separate question from whether the statute is constitutional. For the law itself to be unconstitutional, it would have to be unconstitutional in every application, generally. If some applications of the law are unconstitutional, the law could stand, but prosecutions for the unconstitutional application would not succeed.

Yes The rule against prosecuting a sitting President is not a law, it is a Justice Department opinion and policy. The justification for it is that dealing with a criminal case would be severely distracting to the President, and thus harmful to the nation. Besides, the opinion goes on, any serious issue can be dealt with by impeachment. That reasoning obviously does not apply to a former President. Article I, section 3, paragraph 7 of the US constitution says: Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States: but the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to Law. (emphasis added) This clearly contemplates the criminal prosecution of a former office holder, after such a person was removed by an impeachment. There is no exception for a President. Therefor a President can be criminally charged and prosecuted for actions during the presidency, provided that the evidence to establish probable cause is there, and that a Grand Jury indicts said former President. So far as I know there has never been a case where such a thing was done. President Ford's pardon of President Nixon stopped any Federal prosecution of him. I think there have been cases were former US Judges, after impeachment, were criminally prosecuted. But that is not quite the same thing -- no one claims that sitting judges are immune to criminal charges. To be clear this would not apply just to issues that a President had been impeached for. A former President is no different from anyone else in this respect. Any such person can be prosecuted if there is probable cause, and convicted if there is proof beyond a reasonable doubt of criminal violation of some law, even if the violation occurred while the president was in office.

18 USC 1752: (a) Whoever— (1) knowingly enters or remains in any restricted building or grounds without lawful authority to do so; [...] shall be punished as provided in subsection (b). (b) The punishment for a violation of subsection (a) is— (1) a fine under this title or imprisonment for not more than 10 years, or both, if— (A) the person, during and in relation to the offense, uses or carries a deadly or dangerous weapon or firearm; or (B) the offense results in significant bodily injury as defined by section 2118(e)(3); and (2) a fine under this title or imprisonment for not more than one year, or both, in any other case. (c) In this section— (1) the term “restricted buildings or grounds” means any posted, cordoned off, or otherwise restricted area— (A) of the White House or its grounds, or the Vice President’s official residence or its grounds; [...] An ex-president does not have "lawful authority" to occupy the building. They may be not only removed, but also arrested and criminally prosecuted. "Squatter's rights" or other eviction protections would come from the District of Columbia's local laws, over which federal law takes precedence. So they would not apply here.

There is no definitive answer, which can only be determined by SCOTUS if faced with a case. DOJ has opined twice that "the indictment or criminal prosecution of a sitting President would impermissibly undermine the capacity of the executive branch to perform its constitutionally assigned functions". The Impeachment Clause (art.I, §3, cl.7) says Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States: but the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indict­ment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to Law The exegesis of this clause is that this means a sitting president cannot first be prosecuted for a crime, but must first be removed from office. The counter-argument is that "nevertheless" indicates that this clause only states that a president can be removed and then prosecuted, and that removal does not preclude further action. In other words, the law has yet to be determined on this matter.

In the US, they would not be automatically prosecuted. The prosecutor would have to find out about the testimony, decide to prosecute, and go through all the normal processes they otherwise would, but they have an additional piece of evidence. Per the 5th Amendment to the US Constitution, a witness cannot be forced to answer a question that would incriminate them. If the question was objected to on this ground and the objection overruled, the witness' answer would not be admissible against that witness at trial, and the prosecutor would have to prove the case using other evidence.

Even before the police have any idea who did it, Bob is guilty of whatever wrong he did. However, if you want this to be a legal question and not a moral one, we should assume that you really want to know "Can Bob be convicted of murder, if the evidence proves that he did do it?". Yes, he can. See Morris v. State, 214 S.W.3d 159. The critical question was whether the defendant understood the charges (he did) and whether he could assist in his defense (he could). The desideratum of being able to assist in your own defense only goes so far. On the other hand, maybe no, per Wilson v. US. A government expert witness "testified that appellant had permanent retrograde amnesia and would not be able to aid in his own defense in terms of remembering any of the acts alleged in the indictment". The crucial difference seems to be whether one just has loss of memory, vs. loss of memory connected with some other mental disorder. [Addendum] Per Dusky v. United States 362 U.S. 402, competence to stand trial depends on whether the accused has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding -- and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him. I am not aware of any exceptions e.g. whether this is not the case with strict liability crimes like statutory rape, and since it is generally held that "competency" is a requirement mandated by the due process clause, I don't think there could be an exception.

Is an umbrella school a "high school"? I am attempting to get my GED behind my parents back (let's not get into why I need to do that) and I am creating an account at the GED website. It is asking me whether I am "currently enrolled in high school" and I am not sure what that would entail. I am currently being homeschooled under an umbrella school called "Florida Unschoolers". Does this count as being enrolled in high school?

Without knowing the specifics on Florida Goverment's regulations, the term Umbrella School is used to designate school like organizations that over see multiple homeschoolers and that they are meeting state educational expectations. Often they will hold events which will allow homeschoolers to compete in school sports as well as set curriculums (sometimes), and field trips and social events (A stereotype of Home School Students is that they are poorly socialized compared to those who attend traditional public or private schools.). They should meet legal qualifications, but it's a bare minimum at best. I would recommend calling a local school administration office for best guidance, but saying Home School (Florida Unschoolers Umbrella School) would likely cover your bases. I'm sure you're not the first person to ask this question.

Following you around with the intent of harassing you is stalking. I don't know whether there's going to be a law actually requiring social distancing in Florida. In other states, I've seen laws set up to make it a crime to violate an order of the Director of Public Health or something like that. I don't know whether Florida actually has an order requiring social distancing by the general public.

Martinez v. Bynum 461 US 321 involves a US citizen child living with his parents in Mexico traveled to Texas in order to attend free public school. Under Texas Education Code 21.031(d), the district is allowed to deny tuition-free admission if the child lives apart from the parent or legal guardian and is present in the district "for the primary purpose of attending the public free schools". The court upheld such a residence requirement because it "furthers the substantial state interest in assuring that services provided for the State's residents are enjoyed only by residents", and "does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment nor burden the constitutional right of interstate travel". Plaintiffs argued various constitional violations, including Equal Protection, Due Process, and Privileges and Immunities, but not Full Faith and Credit. We may assume that if there were any hope of such an argument, it would have been made. In Vlandis v. Kline 412 US 441, it was held that a state cannot permanently relegate an applicant to non-resident status for having a legal address for any time within a year of applying for admission. But the court also explicitly states: Our holding today should in no wise be taken to mean that Connecticut must classify the students in its university system as residents, for purposes of tuition and fees, just because they go to school there. Nor should our decision be construed to deny a State the right to impose on a student, as one element in demonstrating bona fide residence, a reasonable durational residency requirement, which can be met while in student status. We fully recognize that a State has a legitimate interest in protecting and preserving the quality of its colleges and universities and the right of its own bona fide residents to attend such institutions on a preferential tuition basis. The Full Faith and Credit Clause states: Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof. This pertains to recognizing the status of evidence and rulings, between states. If New York finds that Smith is liable for a sum of money, that finding is a legal fact in all states, and Connecticut cannot say "We do not recognize the judgment of New York". The only connection between Full Faith and Credit and non-resident tuition is that both include the concept "other states".

The real question is do they have to refund the rest of the summer camp fees if Bob is expelled due to his own intentional misbehavior? Not if the contract was written by a good lawyer, or even by a merely competent lawyer. In that case, the contract will provide that there is to be no refund in the event of expulsion.

To be very straightforward, yes, a police department would very likely have records of their past interactions with you in the form of police reports. They cannot just throw them away because it's been scrubbed from your public record. They detail the interactions the police officer had with you. That being said, those records would not show up in a general inquiry into your record, because those records are meant to protect the officer and the department as a reference point they can go back to in case some dispute arose in the future. If a police officer really wanted to find them, they'd have to do a bit of digging for them. The difficulty in finding them would depend on what system the particular police department uses to store those records. Smaller departments may just file them in a cabinet somewhere, whereas larger ones may actually have their own searchable database. But a traffic cop out on the street is only gonna see what you're seeing at the DMV - nothing. There is also a formal NCIC database, but traffic violations would never end up in there. That is a national database that basically stores red flag persons of interest (think stolen vehicles, sex offenders, and gang members). Sometimes multiple departments within a state will share their information with each other, but a department's database is usually kept to that department only. Also keep in mind court records. The court case that had a violation removed under such and such conditions is still gonna be a public record. Those records would generally be available to a judge overseeing your case so if you repeatedly end up in court for the same thing, they're gonna know and they're gonna stop scrubbing it from your record or offerring certain options because you're clearly not learning your lesson. Many laws allow you to have one offense stricken per year and similar stuff like that, but that kind of stuff doesn't just permanently disappear. They have to keep record of it in order to know you've already had your once per year etc. Also a note about parking violations: not all of those are actually issued by police. If it was issued by a private firm then that is not something that would ever show up on your record. It would just be in a database somewhere with whatever private firm issued the fine. Those kind of tickets get sent to collections and hurt your credit score if you don't pay them, rather than affecting your driving record.

please explain the answer. i chose option c but the answer is option e Option C is wrong because it excludes the possibility that most students might have received exactly a B minus. The question permits dividing the group in two subsets. One is {students | grade < B_minus} and the other is its complement {students | grade >= B_minus}. Option C is in terms of the set {students | grade > B_minus} whereas option E is in terms of the set {students | grade >= B_minus}. Only the latter matches the description.

The Fifth and Sixth Amendments are about civil and criminal court proceedings. They do not apply to a university's internal disciplinary procedures, which are the subject of the Dear Colleague letter. Note for example the text of the Fifth Amendment: ... or be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. A university's disciplinary procedures do not deprive anyone of their life, liberty, or property. Typically, they only decide whether to suspend or expel the person as a student at the university, or apply other academic punishments (failing grades, marks on transcript, etc). I don't think there needs to be any law "affirming" this. Rather, there is simply no law that requires universities to use Fifth / Sixth amendment standards in their internal disciplinary procedures.

So I can block children under 13, but I can't tell them that? You can tell them after they fail, you cannot tell them on the asking screen. Then what is the correct way to block children under 13 to access my website and still comply with COPPA? I agree with you that it is odd that they recommend using a cookie but they do!* So you have a entry page with a simple question, "Please indicate your age" and then block based on the response. That's it. Note that the rule is neutral. This means that you do not need to disguise your purpose or try to trick people into entering their correct age. *I think that what is happening here is that any parent who wants to complain to their legislator can be met with the response, "If your kid is so sneaky that they are using different computers to lie about their age what do you want us to do about it?" The fact is, this scheme keeps innocent kids from seeing stuff they shouldn't; the sneaky ones are going to find a way.

How to protect an idea when you don't own the brand or the process? (UK) I have an idea I'd like to take to a company, but I don't know how to protect it. The best analogy I can think of is the following (I fully realise this example exists; it's an analogy): I want to approach a marketing company that has access to a drinks company, (or the company directly). My idea is: to take the drinks company logo and put it on a pint glass. So, I can't protect the logo (it's not mine). I can't protect the glass (it's not mine). I can't protect the process of putting the logo on the glass (I don't have the tech, and something similar has been done - I wouldn't be doing the processing). All I have is the idea. Is it possible to protect the idea, to stop the company just using it please?

Intellectual property is something unique that you physically create. An idea alone is not intellectual property. For example, an idea for a book doesn’t count, but the words you’ve written do (from the UK government website). This is a universal principle: having ideas is not protectable (are you quite sure that nobody else has had the same idea, or ever will?) So unless you have put some work into producing a specific implementation, your idea can be used by anybody who thinks of it.

On what grounds would you sue? Contract Well, I think that you would struggle to find the necessary elements (see What is a contract and what is required for them to be valid?) In particular, you would struggle to prove that there was intention to create legal relations on their part and possibly on yours. Are you able to identify in your "back & forth" a clear, unequivocal offer and acceptance? Without knowing the details of the "back & forth": I was hoping that someone at $organization might be willing to write an article explaining what you do, the history of the organization and how it works appears on the face of it to be a request for a gift; not an offer to treat. Promissory Estoppel If you don't have a contract then it is possible (IMO unlikely) that they induced you by your actions to commit resources (your time in writing) in anticipation of a reward (them publishing what you wrote). To be estopped they would have to have known that you were writing the article in the expectation that it would have your organisation's name in it, that they did not intend for that to happen and that they allowed you to invest those resources notwithstanding. If you can prove all of that then you can require them to do what they promised. The big difficulty I see in this is did you tell them that a) you were writing the article, b) it would have your name in it and c) you expected it to be published in that form. Copyright If they publish the work or a derivative work without your permission you can sue for breach of copyright. As it stands, they probably have an implied licence to publish and you would need to explicitly revoke that. Options There are two reasons to go to court: Money Principle If you are going to court for money then this is at best a risky investment and at worst a gamble: balance your risk and reward carefully. If you are going to court for a principle then I simultaneously admire your principles and think you're an idiot. Make a deal Explain that the reason that you wrote the article was a) to support their fine publication and the fantastic work it does (even if you don't) and b) to garner good publicity for your organisation. You understand and admire their strong editorial stance (especially if you don't) but the article involved a considerable amount of work and could they see their way clear to give you a significant discount (~80%) on a full page ad facing the article.

Software licenses are protected by copyright, meaning that you need the author's permission to copy them. One way to get permission is to buy a license, since many of them are for sale. Sometimes (e.g. CC licenses) a license to copy the license is granted. You can also read and understand what is in a license, and use that knowledge to write your own. This is different from copying the license, since what you are extracting from the existing licenses is the ideas, not the specific expression.

Inks for reproduction can be mixed to create very custom colors. It is entirely possible to trademark a special "recipe" of ink which results in the same color each time. So yes. In terms of branding -- colors, or specific color combinations, can be trademarked. Don't confuse "trademark" with "ownership" or "copyright". Trademark merely means in that particular industry the company has staked a claim on a specific color or color combination. Trademarks are more about preventing brand confusion within the same industry. You're free to use the same colors in a completely separate industry and even in some cases in a completely separate manner within the same industry. Freakonomics has an article about trademarking colors. It mostly alludes to fashion, but it's still a valid article. If you want to delve more into branding and color, Color Matters has some additional information.

The answer to the question "can so-and-so sue me?" is almost always "yes", regardless of context. Such a suit might be baseless, and it might get settled in your favor, but you still have to spend the time and money to defend yourself. This can be disastrous for a start-up that's trying to get off the ground, and it's how patent trolls make their money. (I'm not accusing SnapChat of engaging in such tactics as a rule, of course; I'm just pointing out that the legal system does allow for them.) Whether or not you are likely to be sued is a separate question, and one that can really only be effectively addressed by a trademark attorney with full knowledge of the particularities of your situation.

All your work is yours. They've made it very clear it wasn't a work for hire, so it's yours. They can't copyright any of their ideas. You can't copyright an idea. Only specific creative elements authored by them and present in your work could be covered by copyright. You didn't use their block diagrams. I don't see how references to other sites to look at would constitute a creative element they authored. That said, you probably want to talk to a lawyer and get a written legal opinion that you can rely on.

If I make a working prototype and upload it on youtube will it prevent others from getting a patent on the idea? Generally yes. If the core information is accessible to the public, it becomes "prior art" and cannot be patented anymore by someone else. That includes you. Depending on local legislation, you have a small time window to apply for a patent (after disclosure) but if you don't, it's public domain and everybody is free to use it. If it's mainly code, you may be able to upload to Github and attach a license to it but that offers only limited protection. Globally? That depends on local legislation which there are too many of, to answer this here.

Speaking from a U.S. perspective (which may or may not generalize elsewhere), trademarks can be used by different companies when they operate in different industries. An answer on Avvo by Kurt Van Thomme captures the important question when using an existing trade name in a new industry: The question in these kinds of circumstances is often whether the goods or services offered by the two companies are sufficiently related such that a consumer would be likely to think a company providing the first product or service would be reasonably likely to provide the second product or service also. Kurt's answer includes an example where the name "Pioneer" is used by a seed company and an electronics company. The two products are unlikely to be provided by the same company, so there is low risk of consumer confusion. In my layman opinion, it seems unlikely that J.K Rowling or Warner Brothers would use the trade name Voldemort to market a software development tool (as it seems unlikely they'd market a software development tool at all, unlike a complete video game, which would be a more likely product), so you could legally use the name insofar as it is not likely to cause customer confusion. Note that you still might attract negative legal attention if the trademark holder is particularly litigious, so when I say "you could legally use the name" I mean that you could probably win a lawsuit (at whatever legal fee costs) if one were filed against you. However, some marks are regarded as "famous" or "well-known" in some jurisdictions. In that case, the mark is afforded much broader protection, and your ability to use it in a different industry is greatly diminished: Famous marks are those that enjoy a high degree of consumer recognition in a particular jurisdiction or in a specific field of commerce or industry. However, few trademarks enjoy the status of “fame.” Examples of marks held to be famous in certain jurisdictions are COCA-COLA, KODAK, WIMBLEDON and VIAGRA. For example, you could not start a business selling automobiles under the brand name "Coca-Cola" even though it is tremendously unlikely that the Coca-Cola Company would branch out into selling cars. The mark's status as "famous" would still allow the Cola-Cola Company to succeed in stopping you from using that mark in commerce, even in a vastly different industry. If the trademark holder of the name Voldemort succeeded in persuading a court that the mark met the jurisdiction's standard for a famous mark, then you could not use the name even for your software development tool. Note also that because trademark is intended to reduce confusion over the source of a good or service, trademark holders can lose their trademark by failing to defend it from confusing uses. Therefore, some trademark holders aggressively pursue even borderline cases to ensure they don't endanger their trademark.

What rights does a German works council have with respect to a longterm unfilled position? Situation, a department head left the company. The company is looking for a replacement by advertising the position and hiring a head hunter. Unfortunately this didn't work out (so far) and the position is unfilled for more than two years. During that time the former deputy department head is acting as department head. If the deputy is on holidays or otherwise unavailable there is a temporary void in responsibility. The company is located in Germany and has a Betriebsrat or works council. This is an elected body from the employees tasked with representing the interests of the employees towards the company leadership. The Betriebsrat has various legal rights concerning the advertising of the position and can even refuse to agree to the hiring of a specific person if there are good reasons for that. The deputy department head has been doing the job of a department head for two years without getting the corresponding pay increase. If they were officially declared the new department head that would also entail that there is a new deputy department head which would also come with a pay raise. Question: Does the Betriebsrat has any rights in this situation or does the employer already do what they have to just by advertising the position even if that is unsuccessful?

I don't think so. When it comes to wages, there may be a Tarifvertrag (union-negotiated wage schedule), which may apply even if the employee in question is no union member. It is enough if the employer is member of the employer's association negotiating the schedule, or in certain other cases. (Clever, really, by extending union benefits to non-members they weaken the unions ...) The Tarifvertrag stipulates minimum wages for certain positions, and it may define those positions implement that. An employer could not underpay a skilled machinist by calling her a 'gadget specialist' or similar non-scheduled position. But the deputy department head is likely paid above the highest bracket of the wage schedule, called außertariflich (AT, beyond the schedule). At this level, it comes down to individual negotiations between the employee and employer.

This should probably be handled under TUPE — The Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 2006 as amended by The Collective Redundancies and Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) (Amendment) Regulations 2014. Those regulations apply to "a transfer of an undertaking, business or part of an undertaking or business situated immediately before the transfer in the United Kingdom to another person where there is a transfer of an economic entity which retains its identity" Broadly, there must be some consultation but you cannot be forced to change the terms of your contract to your material detriment (for example, the date of the month you are paid might change, but your work and salary would not). This consultation should establish that there is no material detriment (carry on reading here). Regulation 13 provides (2) Long enough before a relevant transfer to enable the employer of any affected employees to consult the appropriate representatives of any affected employees, the employer shall inform those representatives of— (a) the fact that the transfer is to take place, the date or proposed date of the transfer and the reasons for it; (b) the legal, economic and social implications of the transfer for any affected employees; (c) the measures which he envisages he will, in connection with the transfer, take in relation to any affected employees or, if he envisages that no measures will be so taken, that fact; and (d) if the employer is the transferor, the measures, in connection with the transfer, which he envisages the transferee will take in relation to any affected employees who will become employees of the transferee after the transfer by virtue of regulation 4 or, if he envisages that no measures will be so taken, that fact. (6) An employer of an affected employee who envisages that he will take measures in relation to an affected employee, in connection with the relevant transfer, shall consult the appropriate representatives of that employee with a view to seeking their agreement to the intended measures. If you refuse to accept the transfer you are deemed to have resigned (Regulation 4(8)), unless the "transfer involves or would involve a substantial change in working conditions to [your] material detriment", where you can be deemed to have been dismissed (Regulation 4(9)), and potentially unfairly dismissed. That would be for an Employment Tribunal to decide. But you cannot exit the successor company except in accord with your contract, including any notice period. The 2014 amended Regulations deal principally with the issue of redundancy after transfer, which is specifically allowed for "economic, technical or organisational reasons", such as the new company deciding to rationalise operations in a location 300 miles away from your normal base. In those circumstances you can be made redundant if you don't move with your job or accept redeployment. [This is what happened to me.] Note that every TUPE transfer is unique, and while yours will be subject to the Regulations, the wrinkles in your particular case (a) aren't present in your question and (b) will best be answered by a specialist employment lawyer, particularly as to whether any necessary changes to your contract are to your "material detriment".

In general property owners and employers can impose any rules on their property and employees (respectively) that are not prohibited by law. Granted, there are extensive statutes and regulations to protect "employee rights." I have not heard of protections that include "possession of prescribed medications," but that does not mean they don't exist in your jurisdiction. If you really want to know whether you have a legal right as an employee, and you can't find it in written law or regulation, you would have to consult regulators or employment law attorneys in your jurisdiction. (As a practical matter, of course, it might make sense to first find out whether one's employer wants to assert a policy infringing the right in question.)

(IANAL, of course) My employer tells me that EVERY professional activity belongs to the company and for EVERY activity I mentioned before I need to get written permission, That's true for software (and inventions) that may be relevant for them, but not for other professional activities. which could be withdrawn at any moment. No, not in that very general sense. they can give the permission to publish possibly relevant pieces of code on SX, and they can withdraw that permission for the future. But they cannot take it back for the past. Once they tell you they don't want your invention, there's no way back from that decision (and there are legal deadlines for claiming relevance). Even if they require written permission for you to take a side job, they must give it unless they can show a valid reason against you taking the side job in question. And that would be a per-side-job decision. And it doesn't matter if I do it on my free time on my computer at home or not. That is indeed the case for copyright of software and for inventions. clause is to protect your employer from you helping anyone who is their competitor/you being their competitor while the employment lasts. This is pretty standard and, I believe, not only legal but would be the case also if they had not spelled out this to you. The lines between what is and what is not competition are sometimes a bit complicated* So, if your employer specializes in subway station surveillance systems and you work on face recognition and then help out your local pigeon breeder's association by implementing automatic door opening by camera + automated face recognition of the [unwinged] members that's close enough to touching the interests of your employer that I'd consider it off-limits unless you had talked to your employer and they are happy with this project (after all, they could be preparing similar products unknown to you). OTOH, overhauling the crappy Excel macros for the regional annual breeder's competition would be fine. And in general, the lower your position there and the further from the actual focus of the company, the more normal it is to have another job (think janitors, canteen staff of a software company as opposed to a janitor in a hire-a-janitor-service company) The general duty not be in competition with your employer also in general prevents you from being involved in a competitor business to the extent that you have noticable influence over that competitor. So the second part of clause 1 shouldn't be too surprising, neither. (update) OTOH, what may make this particular clause invalid is the requirement also for publicly traded shares that they cannot come with voting rights. I somehow suspect that thus prohibiting you from "normal person small scale ownership" of publicly traded stocks (not all of them even have non-voting shares) is undue and invalid (too broad a restriction). However, if that clause is invalid the legal default of "no competition to employer" still applies. Here's a (German language) web site of a lawyer that discusses these questions See also here https://www.hensche.de/Rechtsanwalt_Arbeitsrecht_Handbuch_Wettbewerbsverbot.html Unlike the 1st clause, this is AFAIK not a spelled out default of German employment law, but it may be a spelled out version of a Tarifvertrag (unionized group contract). In any case it is probably legal to have this clause in the contract. The point is that the employer can only forbid the side job if it is against their reasonable interests, a general "no side jobs whatsoever" would be invalid. Side note: they may even be of the opinion that employment law forces them to have some such clause: the employer has a legal responsibility to ensure that you are not working more than the number of hours allowed by law. I've had such a permission that stated the constraint that the permission is valid only as long as I ensure that I stay within those legal limits and my working ability for employer is not compromised. https://www.hensche.de/Rechtsanwalt_Arbeitsrecht_Handbuch_Nebentaetigkeit.html https://www.fachanwalt.de/ratgeber/nebentaetigkeit-als-arbeitnehmer-anmelden-zustimmung-und-muster-antrag https://www.haufe.de/personal/arbeitsrecht/top-thema-nebenbeschaeftigung/nebentaetigkeit-und-arbeitsrecht-was-erlaubt-ist_76_418602.html Copyright law for employees in Germany is somewhat difficult. the one exception is copyright of software where §69b UrhG transfers the transferrable rights automatically to the employer. Whether the software is written out of office and outside working hours is irrelevant, as long as it is done in "fulfillment of the employee's role or the employer's orders" (famous court case) so again, if at work you code facial recognition systems and in the evening the pigeon breeders accounting system, the latter is not related to your work. Your open source game is also OK unless you are employed as game developer. Also that not all code is subject to copyright. An obvious explanation on SX explaining a typical pattern would not be a creative work (though the full answer may very well be) in the first place. But for creative works other than software such as plans how to implement features, technical drawings, etc. working hours or not seems to be more important for assigning the rights and the rules seem to be more similar to employee invention law ArbnErfG): if it is outside working hours and possibly relevant for the employer, the employee has to offer it to the employer before trying to sell to someone else. The clause that employer must give permission to publication of content that is possibly relevant for them seems to me to be in line with these general rules. https://www.zeit.de/karriere/beruf/2011-06/arbeitsrecht-urheberrecht https://eventfaq.de/25510-urheberrechte-im-arbeitsverhaeltnis/ http://www.urheberrecht-leipzig.de/urheberrecht-nutzungsrechte-des-arbeitgebers-an-kreativen-leistungen-der-mitarbeiter.html * I've been advised in a situation where I still believe I was not competing, and even had a written permission, that this is the stuff that makes lawyers rich, and both employee and employer poor.... Take home message: even if you believe to legally have the right to publish on SX/contribute to an open source project, think again whether you'd want this to be the source of a conflict with your employer - or whether there isn't a win-win possibility that makes everyone happy instead. What is the most legal way to participate in public activities in such situation? I'd advise to be open about what public activities you'd like follow. Whatever the contract says, your employer can always give your more permissions. In the past, I've found the majority of employers being happy to see me contributing (some had similar clauses to yours and just wanted to know, some was happy about an open source project I brought, some like to be able to say where their employees volounteer, etc.). Although there was one who wasn't (and that did contribute to my decision to leave there). From that experience, I'd personally discuss this early on now: in case the employer turns out to be too intrusive (speak to Betriebsrat or lawyer or your union if you have one to make sure they really overstep their rights) for my liking, for me that would be a reason to cancel the contract which is easier & faster during probation period.

They can ask, but there is nothing in law - that I can find - which obligates an answer. (There may be some exceptions that require a previous employer to provide a reference which might include this detail, but that does not appear relevant here.) As an aside, there is an ongoing #EndSalaryHistory campaign by the Fawcett Society which is focused on equal pay and sexual equality in the workplace, and they are calling on employers to: stop asking salary history questions...

The DAAD has published a summary of the legal constraints when working as a foreign student in Germany. While the document is only available in German, it is complete and rather authoritative. I summarize the main points here. On a student visa, you are eligible for 120 full days or 240 half days in accordance with §16b (3) AufenthG. This is a legal constraint. It is not up to interpretation. Only mandatory internships constitute a right to further work. In individual cases, the Ausländerbehörde (foreign registration office) can grant authorization for additional work. The authorization will only be granted if the extra work will not jeopardize the purpose of your stay in Germany, which is studying full-time. In particular, work in a study-related job such as a student assistant will generally be eligible for an extension. This is up to the judgement of the office. Thus, there can be differences between different cities. If you intend to surpass the 120/240 day limit, you must get prior authorization. You are otherwise violating the conditions of your visa, which can result in fines and deportation. Additionally, no upstanding employer wants to provide illegal work as they would be subject to penalties themselves. Links: DAAD guidance on working in Germany (German): https://static.daad.de/media/daad_de/pdfs_nicht_barrierefrei/in-deutschland-studieren-forschen-lehren/daad-infoblatt_erwerbstaetigkeit.pdf §16b AufenthG (English): https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_aufenthg/englisch_aufenthg.html#p0275

You certainly can claim whatever you want. Will you be granted it though? Time is money indeed, and replacing the damaged items requires some time not just items themselves. The question is how much time and at what rate? Your duty will be to mitigate the damages and so to minimise the time and its cost. Will your normal hourly rate be applicable? Only if you have to use your actual work time and miss out on earning for those hours. It will probably be unreasonable to use work time in the first place, let alone that you may not necessarily miss out any earnings in case it's a salaried job and your boss is fine to just let you go for a few hours to sort out personal issues. If the time you use for replacement is evenings/weekends then you would need to quantify how much you miss out on not doing what you would do otherwise.

As an interviewer and a hiring manager, I can safely say that you can be rejected for a position for many reasons, even if you meet all the criteria - there may simply be someone better than you that they have also interviewed. Being rejected when meeting the criteria does not necessarily mean you were discriminated against, and in order to successfully claim discrimination you would have to show that you were rejected for a discriminatory reason. Very few companies hire the first candidate that they interview who has the relevant skills and experience - I have interviewed probably 60 candidates in the past 12 months for several positions, and we generally interview at least 5 or 6 candidates per position before making a decision. We do not, and would never consider just hiring the first candidate who interviews that meets the criteria. Some of the people we reject are of protected classes and also met the criteria - but that doesn't mean we discriminated against them, they just weren't the best candidate we interviewed. Being of a protected group and having the relevant skills and experience does not guarantee you the job, it just "guarantees" (in quotes because thats the intention of the law, and reality may differ - hence why discrimination cases do happen) that you cannot be rejected on the basis of the protected group. If you were rejected because of the protected group, and you can show that (including obviously thin reasons such as withdrawing a position and then advertising it again the next week), then thats discrimination. If you were rejected for any other reason, then that does not necessarily constitute discrimination. You could easily meet all of the criteria, have excellent experience but still come across as a candidate who would be difficult to manage (argumentative, lack of self-motivation, lack of attention to detail etc etc etc) and thus be rejected. It's not all about simply meeting the criteria, which is why we interview rather than hire on the basis of someones CV and qualifications.

Is it legal to arrange music I don't have rights to if it is never performed? I had the idea to transcribe and arrange the music from the musical Ride the Cyclone for a wind ensemble for my school. I got in contact with the company that owns the license (Broadway Licensing) to ask about being able to do this, and they said I would have to buy rights to the entire musical to do this. However, I know that you can cover songs with a mechanical license that pays royalties to the original owner, however I'm not intending to perform it for profit (or perform it in general, that's still up in the air). Am I within my rights to arrange it as a cover for non-profit? EDIT: I got in contact with one of the creators, and they said for this specific project (arranging a medley), it's fine so long as it's non-profit.

Am I within my rights to arrange it as a cover for non-profit? I'm not sure about that, but I do know that Broadway Licensing isn't the right source for your license. They told you you'd have to license the whole show, but they seem to have forgotten to tell you that if you do that you also have to peform the whole show. From their FAQ: Can I change or cut language in the script? In order to change or remove any language, you must receive prior permission from Broadway Licensing. If you cannot perform the musical without such changes, you should not hold auditions until such permissions have been granted. Please send an email to [email protected] with the details of the changes you are interested in making. We will respond as quickly as possible. It sounds as though whoever you spoke with didn't really know what they were talking about. The folks over at Music Theatre International seem to have a much better handle on the situation. Their website describes the difference between the licensing model for a theatrical production and that for a single song: Grand Rights vs. Small Rights: The rights that MTI is able to grant under our contracts with the authors are limited to "Grand Rights." Grand Rights cover the right to present the show, in its entirety, on stage. These rights do not include performance of a single song or medleys ("Small Rights"), videotaping, use of a logo or merchandising. In some instances, MTI has separately negotiated representation of additional rights, but those are administered on a show-by-show basis. "Small Rights" is a term used to cover performances of individual songs in a concert or cabaret-type setting. There are three major agencies that control these rights in the U.S.: SESAC (Society of European Stage Authors and Composers), ASCAP (American Society of Composers, Author and Publishers) and BMI (Broadcast Music, Inc.) Depending upon the songs that are being performed, licenses may be required from one, two or all three of these organizations for a single presentation. Most schools, churches, restaurants and clubs pay an annual fee to obtain a "blanket license" from these licensing agencies that covers the "small rights" use of all music in their respective catalogues for the year. Note that these blanket licenses DO NOT permit dramatic performances of songs. The songs can be performed only in cabaret style. While it is sometimes difficult to draw a distinction between dramatic and non-dramatic performances, a dramatic performance usually involves using a song to tell a story or as part of a story or plot. A blanket license permits neither the use of dialogue from the show nor sets, costumes and/or choreography that invoke the original show. In general, you need permission to make an arrangement and you need permission to perform it. Whether you're making money or not may affect the likelihood of being given permission, and it may affect the amount of the license fee, or it may not. Copyright does not exist to prevent you from making money with other people's compositions; it exists to ensure that the composers get to make money -- or decide for themselves not to -- when you perform their music. Your school may already have a blanket license with for example ASCAP that would cover a public performance of the song. At least now you should have a better idea of where to look for it.

As the question says the "Fugue in A Major" by Shostakovich is not in the public domain. The work was published in 1950, and so would not be PD under US law, and Shostakovich died in 1975, and so his works would not be PD in countries using a life+50, life+70, or longer term. Therefore, simply "making some changes" would be the creation of a derivative work and would be copyright infringement in and of itself, even if that work was not published or distributed. If a relatively short segment of the fuge was used, it might be considered a "fair use" under US copyright law, or perhaps a "fair dealing " in the laws of those countries that recognize this exception to copyright. But that is a very fact-intensive determination; it depends on the amount used, the manner and purpose for which it is used, and the harm, if any, to the market for the original work. One can never be absolutely sure that a use is a fair use until a court rules that it is. A two minute excerpt is fairly substantial, and might well not be held to be a fair use. Of course, you could seek permission from the Shostakovich estate (or whoever owns the copyright on the fugue). They might or might not grant it, and might or might not demand a fee. (As another answers mentions, there may be some question if the works of Shostakovich are protected by copyright under US law.)

Alice has been developing her own enhancements, and they're pretty similar to Bob's. Neither Alice nor Bob has copied the other's enhancements, so neither has violated the other's copyright in the enhancements. Whether that could be proved in court is another matter, of course, but since the original work is licensed under creative commons the question unlikely to arise in court. Would Alice be prevented from coming up with enhancements to her own game if other people could prove they thought of and released the idea first? No. Copyright does not protect ideas. It only protects a particular expression of those ideas from being copied. Theoretically, if two authors come up with identical 500-word descriptions of something and can establish that each did so independently, neither has a claim against the other. The practical problem there, of course, is that it would be impossible to prove such a thing. Could Alice outright claim Bob's "Adapted Material" because he developed it on her original work? Assuming that in publishing his adaptations Bob followed the terms of the creative commons license with respect to the original work, Alice's only claim would be that he copied her adaptations without following the terms of the license. If Bob can show that he did not do so, her claim would fail. In a comment, you wrote: Suppose Alice went ahead and intentionally, somehow provably ripped off Bob's "Adapted Material" because she liked the content so much, does Bob reserve any rights on his adaptation, or is Alice able to commercialize the work that Bob did in extending her original work? If we assume that Bob complied with the license of the original material, we know that he licensed his adaptations under "the identical terms," so Alice would be able to use Bob's adaptations under those terms for non-commercial purposes. Since the assumption here is that Alice provably copied something of Bob's, I think it is fairly clear that she would be liable for damages if she exploited that material commercially without paying royalties.

No Copyright protects expressions of ideas but not ideas. A song with the words if a poem set to music would generally require the permission of the owner of the copyrighted poem. An instrumental score “inspired by a poem” would not remotely be using the same expression, or a derivative of, the poem. Titles are not subject to copyright and there are many books with identical titles. Try “The Gathering Storm” as a book title.

Their code, their rules A copyright holder is free to offer their work under none, one or many licences. They can, at the same time, use their own work however they see fit without regard to the licences they have given/sold to others (except, they can only give one person an exclusive licence). As an analogy, let’s say I own a fleet of cars. I can drive my cars anytime I want. I can let Jim drive my cars anytime he wants for free. I can let Mary drive a specific car on Thursdays and only within 10km of the depot. I can let Joe drive my cars providing he pays me $50 a day. And I’m not going to let Fred drive them at all because Fred’s a jerk. Each of those is a different licence.

The name can not be copyrighted, but they don't own the rights to the songs and they are telling you they will perform them. They don't want to put it in writing that they are performing songs they legally can't.

No If YT#1 gets a license from artist A, that permits YT#1 to do whatever copying and reuse is stated in the license. It might be narrow or very broad. Usually such a license will only grant permission to the person who asked. Unless the license also grants permission to YT#2, or to some broader group which includes YT#2, YT#2 cannot claim any rights under such a license. Assuming that the license does not include him or her, YT#2 has the same rights as any member of the public would, but no more. In general, pitch raising a piece of music is a way of creating a derivative work. In the US, under 17 USC 106 one needs permission from the copyright owner to create a derivative work. Otherwise doing so is copyright infringement. The laws of other countries, and the Berne Copyright Convention have similar provisions on this point. Creating a derivative work requires permission in all countries that I know about. "Piggybacking" is not a thing in copyright law. A copyright owner can give permission (usually called a license) to any person or group of persons that the owner pleases. The permission does not extend to anyone else. This is true in all countries. I should be clear that YT#2 needs permission from both YT#1, and from A. The way the question is worded I have been assuming that YT#2 had permission from YT#1, but a comment from grovkin made it clear that I needed to be more explicit about this. It is possible for a license to permit a person to pass on the license to others. For example, all CC licenses and all copyleft and most open source licenses do this, and others could. But the license must explicitly grant such permission. The one way in which a person might create a derivative work without permission and without it being infringement is if an exception to copyright applies. In the US the main exception to copyright is fair use. See Is this copyright infringement? Is it fair use? What if I don't make any money off it? for more detail on fair use. Fair use decisions are made on a case by case basis, and generally depend on the detailed facts of the ase. But based on the limited info in the question, this would not qualify. It seems to use the whole piece of music, which tends to weigh against fair use. The new work does not seem to be transformative, that is, it seems to serve the same general purpose as the original. The new work might harm the economic value of the original, or might if many people did this. The original is creative, not factual. All of those weigh against fair use. Different countries have very different exceptions to copyright, and I do not know all of them. But the use described in the question does not seem to fit any that I know of. In any case, an exception to copyright applies to anyone, and does not depend on another person's license. It is thus never a form of "piggybacking". By the way, the question describes pitch raising ads "illegal". Making an unauthorized derivative work gives the copyright owner grounds to sue. If the owner does sue, and wins, s/he might be awarded money damages, and the court might issue an injunction ordering the infringer not to infringe again. But it would not normally be treated as a crime, and law enforcement would not be involved. In the US, only bulk copyright infringement, carried out as a business, is usually prosecuted (for example a factory churning out unauthorized music CDs).

20th Century Fox have a trademark on "Simpsons." They have trademarks on "Bart Simpson", on "D'oh", on "Duff Beer". I would assume that they take their trademarks seriously. What you can't do is to use someone else's trademark to make people believe your commercial product is related to theirs. It's quite reasonable to assume that someone seeing your book in a store would think it is written by the makers of The Simpsons show and therefore buy it. Even if you say that isn't your intention, it is what would happen. I'd try coming up with some different titles, maybe "How to write animated TV shows" with "Example: The Simpsons" (well, you are the writer so you should come up with something better), and take them to a lawyer. And then contact the makers of the show (again asking the lawyer for advice how to do this) because even if your lawyer says the title is fine, that doesn't mean you can't be sued.

Does outfitting your vehicle with aftermarket equipment place your vehicle in violation of U.S. Motor Vehicle Safety Standards? Automotive enthusiasts like to outfit their motor vehicles with aftermarket accessories that increase the performance and capabilities for specific purposes. This could include high performance cars, work trucks, 4x4 vehicles, ect. Many of these aftermarket parts and accessories do not meet motor vehicle safety standards and are not approved by any authority for use on highways. These parts can either be manufactured and bought from various retailers. They could be custom ordered to fit. They could be designed, built, and installed by a local specialty auto shop or the owner of the vehicle. These aftermarket parts could include: Roll cage - A protective structure, usually built from chromoly or mild steel tubing, meant to protect all occupants of the vehicle during a roll-over accident. This could directly affect crumple zones required by motor vehicle safety standards that are meant to absorb energy during a collision. Custom bumpers - A common upgrade to vehicles that allows mounting of a winch for recovery purposes. Commonly constructed using cold rolled mild steel plate. This also could directly affect crumple zones required by motor vehicle safety standards that are meant to absorb energy during a collision. Steering and suspension - Common upgrade that increases stability, durability, and safety. Usually changed or modified to accommodate other upgrades, and can significantly change the characteristics of the vehicle and increase payload. Roof-top tent - A tent usually mounted to the roof of the vehicle, or on a rack mounted above the bed of a pickup truck, made of either hard plastic or vinyl. This could directly affect the stability of the vehicle and raise the center of gravity, therefore possibly exceeding motor vehicle safety standards. Some states have passed laws that make it a crime to operate a motor vehicle that is "in violation of state or federal motor vehicle safety standards." For the purpose of federal safety standards If an individual purchased a new vehicle, and outfitted it with aftermarket parts that are not certified under any motor vehicle safety standard, would their vehicle be in violation of U.S. Motor Vehicle Safety Standards? Would the driver be subject to criminal charges under state statute?

In Washington, there is no criminal sanction for installing an "aftermarket" product on your vehicle. If we are speaking of non-commercial vehicles, the penalties for violating the various safety regulations is a ticket. The federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards can be consulted here. The criminal penalty provisions are here, as authorized by 49 USC 30170 – basically, lying in a report to the government will get you in trouble. You would have to track down all of the provisions in the regulations, but here is the bumper prohibition. The rule prohibits manufacture or importation of a car or a part that doesn't meet the standard. Subsection (b) addresses the "then added later" question, generally saying that there is little prohibition against you tweaking your car. First, if you "had no reason to know, by exercising reasonable care, that the vehicle or equipment does not comply with the standard", you are not subject to penalty. Usually, people have absolutely no reason to know that some part is unsafe, which is not the same as non-compliant, but you might pick up a really cheap bumper having been told that it is cheap because it totally ignores the applicable standards: then you would have reason to know. Used cars and parts are not subject to any federal scrutiny. The concept of a "vehicle in violation" is a legal misconception. Certain acts violate, objects do not violate. The chokepoint that controls car parts is the "manufacture or sell" part of the law, which prevents Auto Zone from selling you a bumper made of clay (it does not prevent you from installing such a bumper – unless your state has a specific law to that effect). The shop is in violation, not the customer.

Is it legal in the US for a company that rents out car parking spaces, to bundle the renting of a parking space to buying insurance for the content of the parked car? Yes. Honestly, I'm a little surprised that I've never see this practice in real life. All things not prohibited are allowed, and there is nothing, per se illegal about bundling services and requiring them to be purchased as a package deal (there may be some licensing issues for insurance sales involved, but those would probably be easily overcome). Sometimes bundling gives rise to an anti-trust violation, but neither the parking lot operation business nor the car insurance business are so consolidated that this would fairly be viewed as some kind of anti-competitive practice.

See Chapter 90 Section 11: Every person operating a motor vehicle shall have the certificate of registration for the vehicle and for the trailer, if any, and his license to operate, upon his person or in the vehicle, in some easily accessible place [...] According to the state's "Schedule of Assessments for Civil Motor Vehicle Infractions", violation of the license or registration requirements of this section are each punishable by an assessment of $35, $75, or $150 for first, second, or third offenses; plus a $5 public safety surcharge in each case.

Texas and California are actually what are called Presumed Speeding states, unlike most others which are Absolute Speeding states. (There is a little known third category called Basic, but this is uncommon). In a presumed speeding state, a speed-limit violation offers someone in your shoes far more flexibility in building your defense than the more common absolute state. In states that use this presumed system, such as California and Texas, it is not illegal to drive over the posted limit as long as you are driving safely and this can be established. For example, if you are driving 50 mph in a 40-mph zone, you are "presumed" to be speeding, yes. However, despite this prima facie evidence (meaning "on its face") of speed in excess of the posted limit, if you can show you were driving safely you may be able to mount a pretty decent defense. Just because you got a ticket is not prima facie evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that you were speeding. You are presumed innocent. If they prove you were speeding this is all they need to make their case, unless you rebut it. But there is a lot of room to rebut this presumption – and that is if they prove it. They must (as with all criminal cases) prove you did what you are accused of beyond a reasonable doubt – the highest standard of proof in the U.S. So, if everyone was going 80 MPH in a 70MPH zone, you would argue that the road was (I'm assuming) dry, unmarred, you were traveling in heavy enough traffic that to slow your speed to the posted limit would actually be less safe than traveling with the flow of traffic. You can talk about the state of your vehicle (repair, handling, etc.), how you stayed in one lane, and you can describe your skill at driving – especially if you have no other tickets and you have been driving for a long time. If you were weaving in and out of traffic, riding someone's bumper, if it was pouring rain, the road was bumpy or under construction, or if you admitted speeding (if you did this you can still rebut with a showing of safe driving, but ignore all info regarding challenging radar or other means of determining speed), or if any other evidence exists that the officer would testify to that shows you were not driving safely, this will not be successful. A successful example of a speeding defense in Texas: on a clear, dry morning with no other cars on a wide, straight road, a man is pulled over for being clocked going 50 mph in a 40 MPH zone. He had a perfect record and had been driving 22 years. He was driving a 2-year-old car. He convinced a judge that this was driving safely given those conditions and was acquitted. That's because facts presented were sufficient to "rebut the presumption" that by going over the posted limit he was driving at an unsafe speed. NOTE: Never bring up your driving record unless it is spotless. Unless you are a habitual offender it cannot be used against you or be brought into evidence at all, unless you open the door. You can also mount a defense based on the radar detection device, if one was used. You can seek records as to when the calibration fork was last checked, when the last time it was professionally calibrated (rather than self calibrated). You can ask, in a leading way (only if you know) how close the car behind and in front of you were (you don't want to be too close to the car in front of you, however if the cars were tightly grouped it is more likely the radar detector could have read another vehicle): e.g., "Isn't it true that the car behind me was only 1.5 car lengths behind me?" Only do this if you know, but if you can get the officer to admit that the car behind you was close, that can be used to rebut the radar detection and goes to the argument that driving slower would have been dangerous and you were driving safely with the flow of traffic. You should be prepared to put on an entire trial if you fight the ticket. In Texas, I believe speeding is considered a Class C criminal offense (rather than a civil offense as in most absolute states); hence, they have to build the prima facie case against you and prove it beyond reasonable doubt. If you can afford one, get a good traffic violation attorney. Always choose a jury in this type of case. Everyone speeds a little and you are far more likely to be acquitted by a jury than a judge. You should also ask to have the case assigned to the county seat; request this in writing ASAP. If you are trying the case, be prepared to go after the officer. Note any distinguishing marks on your car (if any), recall what you wore, what time of day, the lighting, all that. Even go back to the scene at the same day and time and take video showing the flow of traffic, (hopefully) the straightness of the road, etc. Cross-examine him on all facts with confidence and in a leading manner. Always ask for the calibration reports and you will get all evidence against you in discovery. This thing about 10mph being the minimum they can give a ticket for: ignore that, it's rubbish! It's meant to get you to admit to him that "you were only going 8 or 9 over." Also, that whole percentile argument is not relevant and will not work at all. You must show that you were driving safely given all the facts and circumstances to rebut the presumption that you were driving unsafely by speeding. It is worth fighting as you will also incur surcharges, increased insurance rates, and points on your license that are cumulative and stay for 3 years – a certain amount of which gets you suspended if you get (or have) more violations.

An affirmative defense is a way of avoiding conviction by acknowledging you did the act claimed, but that such act was among the exceptions provided by the law which makes such acts otherwise an offence. That is, you affirm (acknowledge, admit) your action of using the device, but you are claiming that your use of the device (handsfree as a GPS guide) is okay, and therefore you should not be convicted. For all intents and purposes in this situation, your "2" and "3" are the same thing. The device is supported by something other than you holding it, and you are able to keep both hands on the wheel while using it in this way. Finally, a plain language reading of the definition for "hands-free accessory" suggests that using an object in the car to support the device where it can be seen, or using a feature of the device that speaks directions which you can hear, neither of which requires moving your hands off the wheel, will be considered such an accessory. It is also worth pointing out that such usage of a device (placed in a cradle or on the dashboard or turned up so it is heard) will be well-known to the legislators, and there is a reasonable interpretation of the law that would allow such usage. If this ever went to court, and somebody used this defence for this situation, they would probably be okay.

"Hit and run" isn't a precise legal term, but there are laws against what many people call "hit and run" in California. §20002 of the Vehicle code covers property damage without injury, and violation of the section is a misdemeanor possibly resulting in up to 6 months in prison and a $1000 fine. If you cause property damage either while driving or because it was parked and became a runaway vehicle, you are required to notify the property owner. If the owner cannot be located at the scene, you must leave your contact information and a description of the circumstances, and you must notify the police. It is irrelevant whether this was on the street or in a parking lot, because the law will "apply upon highways and elsewhere throughout the State, unless expressly provided otherwise".

depending on the Jurisdiction, you actually were in violation of law! In germany it is a misdemeanor to drive with the high beams on in such a fashion that it blinds or dazzles other road traffic, such as traffic from the front. It is also a traffic violation to drive with front lights that don't properly illuminate the street - such as a broken one. In the worst case, improper illumination voids the validity of the safety certificate (TÜV) and thus you may not drive the car at all on public streets until you have repaired the defect. Not having a valid TÜV can mean you are also not insured! In the US: YES, a stop is most likely legal In the united-states, Terry v Ohio is the governing case. It prescribes that, to initiate contact with a car and detain it on the street curb, reasonable suspicion is enough. What could be reasonable suspicion for the police? In the case presented, 'The high beams are on constantly to hide non-functioning/sufficient normal light' would be the very first thing that comes to my mind, so there very likely is reasonable suspicion to initiate the stop. Ot of course 'The high beams are suitable to dazzle me for a split second, and thus the driver endangered traffic'. Endangering traffic can actually be a felony in some cases. Or just 'They shone their brights into my eyes and violated the High Beam statute' - which is actually the most likely case. As a result, while a broken headlight is not reasonable suspicion to search a car, them and high beams might qualify to make a stop reasonable, especially if at first just a verbal warning not to dazzle oncoming drivers was intended by police. Only if the local law is worded in a peculiarity, that might invalidate a stop. And you might be in violation of law here too! california High Beams can be a traffic violation within 500 feet of oncoming traffic and 300 when trailing another car, if they are not so aimed that the glaring rays are not projected into the eyes of the oncoming driver. florida Under Florida Law, it is also a noncriminal traffic infraction to drive with the high lights on in such a way that it blinds traffic within 500 feet of them oncoming and 300 if you are behind them. Again, the test is that the beams are only ok if they are so aimed that the glaring rays are not projected into the eyes of the oncoming driver. new-jersey Here comes a possible source for your quote: New Jersey has a similar high beams law, but also a recent case. The judgment from the New Jersey Surpreme Court is only valid in New Jersey. According to it a high beam violation has to be witnessed by the officer themselves to justify a "terry stop". If you dazzle a moving police cruiser they may stop you. If you dazzle the moving car in front of them, they may stop you. But if you beam your high beams at a stopped car or no car at all, then the police can't stop you. HELD:The trial court and Appellate Division properly concluded that the motor-vehicle stop violated the Federal and State Constitutions. The language of the high-beam statute, N.J.S.A.39:3-60, is unambiguous; drivers are required to dim their high beams only when approaching an oncoming vehicle. Neither a car parked on a perpendicular street nor an on-foot police officer count as an oncoming vehicle. The judgment of the Appellate Division upholding the trial court s suppression of the evidence is affirmed. Had the officer, in that case, operated the car while being on the same road, the stop would have been constitutional. But he was on foot in a crossing street. texas Wait, actually the quote stems from Texas. However, it has nothing to do with high beams but additional lights such as "Angel Eyes". Texas too has a High Beam Statute, which just like other states, bans blinding oncoming traffic: (c) A person who operates a vehicle on a roadway or shoulder shall select a distribution of light or composite beam that is aimed and emits light sufficient to reveal a person or vehicle at a safe distance ahead of the vehicle, except that: (1) an operator approaching an oncoming vehicle within 500 feet shall select: (B) a distribution aimed so that no part of the high-intensity portion of the lamp projects into the eyes of an approaching vehicle operator; and Even in Texas, blinding the police cruiser would thus be enough to stop the car, at least for a verbal warning and lecture. Common courtesy While it might not be against the law to dazzle someone everywhere, it actually does impact the other drivers: there have been crashes induced by traffic running high beams and blinding oncoming traffic, which then ran off the road or into other cars. In some countries, if they catch you for causing a crash that way, you are in for negligence. As a result, it actually is common courtesy in Europe to dim off your high beams when you notice oncoming traffic, and, if you don't run high beams yourself but notice high beams oncoming to flash them up for a brief moment so you get noticed.

You (probably) did not commit a crime in Colorado. The answer to your question though is probably Driving an unsafe vehicle Colorado Revised Statutes Title 42. Vehicles and Traffic § 42-4-202 (1) It is unlawful for any person to drive...on any highway any vehicle...which is in such unsafe condition as to endanger any person, or which does not contain those parts or is not at all times equipped with such lamps and other equipment in proper condition and adjustment as required in this section and sections... The above is not a crime , it is (5) Any person who violates any provision of this section commits a class A traffic infraction. A class A traffic infraction is a civil violation. Note that some driving offenses are crimes: In Colorado, driving more than 25 mph over the posted limit is a class 2 misdemeanor, and doing so in a constriction zone is a class 1 misdemeanor. Also note that I say probably because it is possible that they charged you with something more extreme- reckless driving? violation of noise or pollution ordinances?- but for a fine small enough that you don't say, 2 points, and you did not have to go to court (you could have if you wanted for the ticket, but not required) it is very unlikely.

What kinds of formal logic have applications in law? There are different kinds of formal logic: propositional, first order, second order, modal, fuzzy, .... What kinds of formal logic have applications in law? Thanks.

The Life of the Law Has Not Been Logic; It Has Been Experience. -- Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. Basically none.

No. The law would be void for vagueness. Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926): [T]he terms of a penal statute [...] must be sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties… and a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates the first essential of due process of law. The example of the "well known but hidden stop sign" appears to allow for arbitrary prosecution and should also be void.

We can only guess at what argument he has in mind, but one possible argument is that the standard is unconstitutionally vague, similar to the argument by McDonnell in the recent McDonnell v US (admittedly about a different statute). The vagueness argument was developed in several of the briefs: http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/mcdonnell-v-united-states/ The unconstitutional vagueness argument has also been made specifically about 18 USC 793 (e). US v Hitselberger 1:12-cr-00231-RC D.D.C. (2014). The defendant made a motion to dismiss based on constitutional vagueness, but this motion was denied. Private Manning raised the same defence, also unsuccessfully: http://fas.org/sgp/jud/manning/051012-vague.pdf

Law (regardless of its type) supersedes contract, provided it has jurisdiction over the persons bound by that contract. Contract provisions that are counter to law are generally held to be void. State law has authority over an employer's policies or hand book. However, there may be exceptions in state law (so I would double check). A frequent exception (at least in California law, which I am most familiar with) is for very small businesses. Another exception, from C.R.S. § 8-4-101(5), is if you are considered a "contractor" rather than an employee, per the government's determination. It is possibly worth your time to let you employer know of this conflict before termination if possible, so that they can adjust their policies, rather than in an adversarial position after termination, if only to avoid the headache.

Is it legal to redefine a term against common sense in a contract? Generally speaking, yes. What matters is that the contract be clear enough for the parties to be aware of the terms and conditions to which they are committing. Both of the scenarios you outline seem lawful. They are binding to the extent that the definitions & language therein duly inform the parties of the substance of the contract. Definitions in a contract are most pertinent where the meaning of a term is intended to supersede and replace the commonplace meaning thereof. A contract would become null and void if the substance of that contract contravenes legislation. If legislation outlaws not only the effect of a clause but also its meaning, then the [un-]lawfulness of that clause is not altered simply by crafting definitions of terms. In other words, laws or legislative intent cannot be elluded by relabeling concepts in a contract. Whenever lawful, the attempt to trick a party with tactics (such as the use of uppercase you mention) is likely to be voidable by that party. The rationale is the same: The draftsman's attempt to confuse the user contravenes the contract law tenet that the parties knowingly enter the contract at issue. Notice that in the preceding paragraph I wrote "whenever lawful" rather than "although lawful". The reason for that choice is that, in some contexts, the draftsman's tricky attempts might constitute a deceptive practice and thus be in violation of the law (for instance, consumer protection laws).

In one sense, nothing. Absence of such language would not cancel any statutory rights. One purpose of such language is that the consumer cannot later claim that the company tried to hide those statutory rights. In some consumer protection statutes, attempting to decisive a consumer into thinking that s/he does not have the rights granted by statute may itself be unlawful and a ground for damages. Also a court may be less likely to void the contract as contrary to the statue, when the contract says that it should be read as subject to the statute and the consumer's rights under it. Also, once such language becomes common, drafters of corporate contract language often imitate it without thinking what actual purpose it serves.

"Ignorance of the law" refers to a (non)-defense for committing a crime ("I didn't know it was against the law"). In this case, the government hasn't passed a law saying that "the term 'simple majority' shall always be defined as..." – there is no law saying that "simple majority means more than half of the total number of votes". Instead, terms are generally given their "common meaning". A reasonable case can be made that the common meaning of "majority" is "more that any other choice", and one can point to ample evidence showing that, such as this. However, one can also argue that extra weight should be given to to specialized definitions appearing in The Standard Code of Parliamentary Procedure or Robert's Rules of Order (or other such document), in support of a competing definition of "simple majority". Both sides will need to provide evidence that supports their interpretation of the phrase, based on external sources (parliamentary handbooks, dictionaries, and so on), as arguments for a particular interpretation of the term. The courts will be most impressed by evidence pertaining to the behavior of the parties, so that if everybody agrees that they understood "simple majority" to be "the choice with the most votes", then that is how the term will be interpreted.

Clause (c) says that while schools cannot generally restrict otherwise legal expressions by students, a school run by a religious organization can restrict such speech in terms of its tenets. It then becomes a matter of fact to be proven in court that the church has a particular tenet. So if you are asking whether it is correct that the religion exception is narrowly limited to contradictions of the religion's tenets, that is correct.

Minecraft EULA for mods Word on the street is that it's against the EULA to sell Minecraft mods. I took a look at the actual EULA, which they use California/corporate/cutesy/condescending language to say that they don't want you making money off of Minecraft, but list a specific exclusion to that (ads on videos of Minecraft content), and then apparently have some other document that somehow says that you can accept donations but not do sales of mods, which a lot of people refer to, but I can't find a document explaining. There seems to be several details different in what I am reading vs what people are proselytizing about the EULA, so I have questions that are all interrelated. I came across the story of Physics mod, where a dev quit their job to work on the mod full time and it sounds like Microsoft pulled some strings to have their Patreon account banned. That's why I'm scratching my head about all this after doing some preliminary research. On what legal basis can Microsoft restrict the sale of mods that they even explain that they don't own in their EULA? This seems strange to begin with, and such a basis would have to be world-wide, which seems to make it even stranger. World-wise legal commonalities are very few and far between, since some people are slaves, some subjects, some citizens, and some a mix of all of those. Isn't their only course of remedy to ban your account? If your account is banned, then the EULA doesn't apply, so you can sell mods, right? How can you own a mod, but immediately, permanently, and irrevocably, give it away to the entirety of the internet? Logic would dedicate that whomever is telling you what to do with "your" mod actually owns it, in this case, Microsoft. Which would mean that you don't own it, Microsoft does. Given these points, a mod developer could have a public account that got banned, as a sort of honeypot, and then use 1 or more anonymous accounts, or borrow someone else's, if they want to play or test their code. That doesn't happen, or doesn't happen very often. Why not? Microsoft focuses heavily on "not sharing the game" when talking about mods, a distinction that I don't understand. Especially when mods by definition modify the game. The game binaries are available free of charge for anyone and everyone to download, and it's only after launching them that you can log in, so it seems there is 0 incentive to share a copy of the game. Yet they focus on this to the point it's occasionally part of the launcher screen. Why is this concept so intertwined with a completely different concept (making and distributing mods)?

Copyright is the reason Microsoft owns the copyright to the Minecraft code. That gives them exclusive rights to make copies and derivative works. A mod is a derivative work. Further, copyright is near universal because of the Berne Convention, the countries in blue all respect each other’s copyright: So, you can only make a derivative work if you are Microsoft, have Microsoft’s permission, or fall into one of the copyright exemptions which aren't relevant here. The EULA is the permission Microsoft gives and they set the terms on what you can and can’t do. If you make a mod without following the terms of the EULA then that is a copyright violation and gives Microsoft the ability to sue you and prevent you from distributions the mod. Copyright in an infringing derivative varies by jurisdiction but in the USA, there is no copyright in the work - so, yes, Microsoft do not own it (but they can prevent its distribution) but neither do you. Copyright laws allow Microsoft to not only prevent you from distributing the infringing mod, they can prevent anyone from distributing it - that’s how the get people like Patreon to shut down accounts.

I know that some of this may be covered by either the Creative Commons license or the OGL it was published under, but it's not clear to me how far those freedoms extend. It was all published as materials under copyright to the original authors, TSR, WotC, &c. and if things had been left like that hszmv's answer would've been completely correct: stay vague and allow users to enter those names and descriptions, talk to WotC's lawyers and sales department about license fees, or just keep it to yourself and your friends. You're right, though: WotC went whole-hog, dumped their partial OGL idea, and relicensed some things as Creative Commons. There are different Creative Commons licenses, though, some restricting commercial use that would still keep your app to yourself and friends without a specific licensing agreement. Go find out exactly what WotC put under CC. If it's only the Player's Handbook, then you can only use names and descriptions that are from the Player's Handbook and you're still facing a cease-&-desist if you start adding in Monster Manual info.If it's everything, it's everything they have but still won't include any older modules that they don't have the right to change the copyright status of. It'll still be under copyright, usually until 70 years after the death of the original creator. For Gary Gygax, that'll be 2078. Expect that length to extend during your lifetime though. US copyright usually extends every time Mickey & friends come close to entering the public domain. [Edit: The comments below suggest it might only have been the Systems Reference Document (I assume for 5e). It's 403 pages of not nothing but it's not much given the universe we're talking about. The spell and monster lists are generic. Bigby is nowhere to be found and the only mention of a beholder is a reminder not to use the name beholder without their written approval.] Go find out exactly which CC WotC used. The article above says "all use" but you need to find out the exact number of the Creative Commons license for each thing you're using and make sure all of your uses fall within its terms. Some are basically free use but still insist you mention the copyright holder prominently or in every use. Go ahead and do that if you have to. [Edit: The comments below say it is probably CC 4.0. The SRD download page says you can use CC 4.0 or their own OGL. In both cases, yes, you must acknowledge WotC by name in a way prominent enough to satisfy the license you choose.] And of course, Don't trust legal advice from internet randos or ChatGPT. If this is a serious thing you're going to be spending a good chunk of your life working on or expect to make significant money from, go talk to an actual lawyer. Bonus points for one specialized in IP with a knowledge of roleplaying and the way it's been (partially) opening up lately.If you start off just by talking to WotC's lawyers, just do that somewhere where you get their explanations and permissions in writing. Then keep that somewhere safe in electronic and hard copy. Then still take that with you when you go talk to your own lawyer.

Stack Exchange have already covered this in a couple of places, from MSE's A site (or scraper) is copying content from Stack Exchange. What should I do?: When should I not report these sites? They follow all the attribution requirements. As mentioned before, there is nothing wrong with copying our content elsewhere on the web, so long as they are following all the attribution requirements given. There is no action we can take against a scraper who follows all the rules. And the old Attribution Required blog post mentions that the actual requirements are: Visually indicate that the content is from Stack Overflow or the Stack Exchange network in some way. It doesn’t have to be obnoxious; a discreet text blurb is fine. Hyperlink directly to the original question on the source site (e.g., http://stackoverflow.com/questions/12345) Show the author names for every question and answer Hyperlink each author name directly back to their user profile page on the source site (e.g., http://stackoverflow.com/users/1234567890/username) By “directly”, I mean each hyperlink must point directly to our domain in standard HTML visible even with JavaScript disabled, and not use a tinyurl or any other form of obfuscation or redirection. Furthermore, the links must not be nofollowed

you can still have a free and open moderation-free internet in a post-Sec 230 world Sure, but remember what moderation-free means: no moderation whatsoever. That means no removal of offensive content like trolling, profanity-laden or racist rants, or even outright spam. Stack Exchange, for example, gets thousands of attempted spam posts a day, despite the fact that very few of them actually get through, and the ones that do are usually quickly removed. Section 230 protects Stack Exchange's ability to do this without incurring liability for what users post. Imagine a Stack Exchange in which spamming was allowed. So I would say that the EFF's statement is substantially accurate, in that the ability of sites to perform such moderation is fairly essential to their ability to function as communities. The fact that they could avoid liability by not moderating is not relevant if it would make the site unable to function properly.

In the UK it is an offence to cause a computer to gain unauthorised access to any program or data held in any computer (s1 Computer Misuse Act 1990). It seems likely that other European jurisdictions have similar laws. Certainly Germany does: Penal Code 202a data espionage (German text - English translation). (I mention Germany because the linked thread does.) It might constitute theft in the jurisdiction if the finder did not take reasonable steps to find the owner - which may include informing the police of the find. Depending on the jurisdiction it might count as 'treasure' or abandoned property such that the finder is obliged to inform the authorities (the jurisdiction has the presumption of ownership of abandoned or lost property - e.g. Scotland), which then decide what to do with it. Legally speaking it seems to me that, to declare it legal, we have to get over such hurdles. [edit] There seems to be some dispute in the comments that cryptocurrency is subject to any regulation, counts as property, is something of value or is something that is owned and can be stolen, such that the person in the questioner's scenario could be held to account under the law for his behaviour. Aren't they merely numbers? No - plainly they do have value because people trade them with currency and goods and services. The UK's tax authority, HMRC, "does not consider cryptoassets to be currency or money" but sees them as having economic value because "they can be 'turned to account' - for example, exchanging them for goods, services, fiat currency (that is money declared by a government to be legal tender) or other tokens". They are "a new type of intangible asset". Individuals are liable "to pay UK tax if they are a UK resident and carry out a transaction with their tokens which is subject to UK tax". They are liable for "Income Tax and National Insurance contributions on cryptoassets which they receive from their employer as a form of non-cash payment [or from] mining, transaction confirmation or airdrops." (HMRC cryptoassets for individuals) Are they property? Something that can be owned, something that can be dishonestly appropriate (i.e. stolen)? That's the interesting dispute. Recently, the High Court of England and Wales ruled in a bitcoin ransomware-related case that "for the purpose of granting an interim injunction in the form of an interim proprietary injunction ... crypto currencies are a form of property capable of being the subject of a proprietary injunction". In that judgment there is some discussion of the authorities for considering or deciding they are property. ([2019] EWHC 3556 (Comm)) read from para 50 if not the whole judgment. In at least two other cryptocurrency-related cases the High Court treated the cryptocurrency as property. Vorotyntseva v Money-4 Limited, trading as Nebeus.com [2018] EWHC 2598 (Ch) and Liam David Robertson v Persons Unknown 2019. There was also a suggestion in the comments that the police would not understand and would not be interested. But there are several jurisdictions where people have been investigated, arrested, prosecuted and convicted of crimes relating to cryptocurrencies. A simple internet search for bitcoin theft, fraud or money laundering will result in some reports. In any case their interest or lack of it is irrelevant to what the law may say.

It's possibe to cover auto-starting apps and cookies under the definition. I'm not convinced and could argue against that but I don't think it matters. The tiny extract you linked isn't a law. It is a definition. It does not say "these things are illegal". For that, we have to zoom out a little. Section 43 includes the offense in question (emphasis mine): If any person without permission of the owner or any other person who is incharge of a computer, computer system or computer network... introduces or causes to be introduced any computer contaminant or computer virus... So back to the question. Could Steam be considered a virus? Maybe. Is it illegal? No. On the other hand, if I were to gain access to your computer and download Steam, yes that could be an example of breaking that law.

Let’s work it through Is the work copyright? Yes. Are you making a copy or a derivative work? Yes. Do you have permission? No. At this point, it is prima facie copyright violation. However, various copyright laws have defences for breach. You don’t say where you are but as the USA is the most permissive in this regard we’ll use the USA. If it’s not legal there, it’s not legal anywhere. If it is legal there, it’s still likely to be not legal everywhere else. is it fair use? Almost certainly not. Wizards of the Coast (the copyright owner) already do this. While this service is free for creatures from the Monster Manual, it does drive traffic to their web site where they sell stuff. They also licence (presumably for money) others to do the same. Your usage would negatively affect the copyright owners market. This counts against fair use. Because it’s already being done, your work has virtually nil transformative value. This counts against fair use. You are copying a substantial part of the work. This counts against fair use. You are not using it commercially but neither is it for educational use. This is unlikely to matter. On balance: not fair use. TL;DR This is copyright violation.

Their code, their rules A copyright holder is free to offer their work under none, one or many licences. They can, at the same time, use their own work however they see fit without regard to the licences they have given/sold to others (except, they can only give one person an exclusive licence). As an analogy, let’s say I own a fleet of cars. I can drive my cars anytime I want. I can let Jim drive my cars anytime he wants for free. I can let Mary drive a specific car on Thursdays and only within 10km of the depot. I can let Joe drive my cars providing he pays me $50 a day. And I’m not going to let Fred drive them at all because Fred’s a jerk. Each of those is a different licence.

Original author of project that a company abandoned I'm the original author of a project that was made on company time and resources. While waiting for this project to come to life it just died without any support on marketing it and not using it at all. Now I'm wondering if I can use this as my own releasing it for proprietary purposes or as an open source project. Are there legal outcomes when in the case of the company taking it back as their own proprietary product? I'm no longer an employee on said company.

Using it without permission is copyright infringement and illegal. Legally, you can try offering money to the company for the copyright or for a suitable license. For example offer them $1000 for a copy of the code licensed under the GPL license. If they accept, you are fine.

Company B has created a derived work from company A's copyright-protected work, so yes, B has infringed on A's copyright. It might be difficult for A to prove it, however, so B might get away with it, but it's still infringement. On the other hand, if B creates software that behaves like A's through reverse engineering, that is, by examining the program's function without examining its code, then they will not have infringed the copyright in the code.

Using this answer on Open Source Stack Exchange, If a repository has no license, then all rights are reserved and it is not Open Source or Free. You cannot modify or redistribute this code without explicit permission from the copyright holder. If a project doesn't have a licence, then normal copyright rules apply - this means that the author reserves all rights. The way a project is obtained, nor (except in exceptional cases), does not alter the ownership of copyright of a project. Bob will always hold copyright, unless he releases a legal document, such as a licence, that grants others various rights to the project.

They have copyright in their additional text, and possibly in things like their visual design choices (fonts, layout etc). They may also have introduced a few deliberate typos to detect any literal copies from their version (rather as mapmakers add a few imaginary features to their maps). None of this creates any rights to the original text. You are still free to produce your own copies of the original text. Just get it from some other source so you can be sure not to include anything of theirs.

No Let’s assume the most generous interpretation: you came up with a fully fleshed-out idea for a television show - name, characters, plot, scene-setting - the lot. You told this idea over the phone to someone else who made this show incorporating every single part of your idea. Here’s the rub: nobody owns ideas. Unless you had them sign a non-disclosure agreement before you told them (which you didn’t), they are free to use your ideas however they like.

When a company stops existing for whatever reason, then its assets (physical, financial, intellectual or otherwise) don't stop existing. When the company dissolves voluntarily, those assets usually go to the owner(s) of the company. When the company got bought up and integrated into another company, the buying company will usually own them. When the company went bankrupt and got liquidated, then they will often get sold off to the highest bidder. And then there is the question of who actually owns the IP rights to a specific game asset. Often there is not just one legal person which worked on a game. In addition to the developer, there might also have been a separate publisher who might or might not own IP rights. There might have been investors in the background who financed the project and now own some copyrights. Sometimes there was more than one publisher. And sub-contractors might have been involved in the development who only licensed their assets but retained copyright. So unfortunately it is often not really clear what happened to IP assets of a defunct company. People who might have the rights will often not care much about them until something happens which gives new commercial value to those assets. So even if you are unable to determine who owns the assets to a game, as soon as you start using them, someone might show up with a plausible claim to the IP rights and demand money from you. Such lawsuits can get really messy and really expensive. For a good example for just how much of a goose chase you might be in for when you want to legally obtain the rights to a game from a defunct company, check out the story of the re-release of No One Lives Forever. tl;dr: multiple game companies said "Maybe we have the rights to the game according to some contract buried in some file cabinet, but we don't care enough to find out. But if you try to release it, we will find out and if we do we will sue you!"

My understanding is that here "derived from the program" means "created by modifying the source code of the program" and not "created by running the program". Certainly that is the way all users that I have heard of treat the matter. Note that a commercial program, such as a word processor, will be fully protected by copyright, but the maker does not claim to have any rights over documents written using it. "Derived" here seems pretty clearly to mean "derivative work" in the sense in which that term is used in copyright law. In copyright law "derived work" is a term of art with a definition specific to that field.

In Germany, there is no concept that corresponds directly to public domain. You automatically hold the Urheberrecht (~ copyright) for all creative works that you make, and it can't be given up or transferred (§29 UrhG). The work only enters the Gemeinfreiheit (~public domain) 70 years after your death. You can however license Verwertungsrechte (economic usage rights). When you make creative works in the course of employment (see §43 UrhG), your employer automatically gets the Verwertungsrechte necessary in the context for the work, which is typically an exclusive right (no one else, not even you, can use the work). Your are not in an employment relationship with your school, so it has no rights to your works and cannot prevent you from publishing them on copyright grounds. When you see advice on the internet to check with your school first, that is U.S.-specific advice. Since you're still a minor (7–17), you only have limited capacity to enter contracts or legal transactions (bedingte Geschäftsfähigkeit). While you are able to make transactions involving your own means (e.g. buying something with your pocket money) or make transactions that are only to your benefit (such as accepting a gift), other transactions are schwebend unwirksam (~ pending ratification), until your parents agree. The relevant law is in §107 and §108 BGB. This is a problem with open source licenses. If you publish software under a license, this license is schwebend unwirksam. Someone might start using the software under the license. But then if your parents refuse ratification, the license would be invalid, and everyone would have to stop using your software and destroy any derivative works they made. This is a bit of a problem, especially since open source licenses are otherwise assumed to be irrevocable. So if you want to offer a license (including open source licenses), please give legal certainty to the recipients of the license and ask your parents for their consent first, possibly even in writing. Per §107 BGB, the license you offer with their consent will be valid.

Hypothetically, in the U.S., is it legal for a parent to sell items inherited by their minor child? Let’s say that a minor child, who is very close to the age of majority, inherits a house in which that minor child had lived with only one of their parents, until that parent’s death. Now let’s say that the surviving parent was estranged from the deceased parent and did not live in that house before the other parent’s death. Let’s also imagine that, according to public records, the surviving parent had signed a quit claim on the house, and is not on the new mortgage. To make this more interesting, now let’s imagine that, since the death of the parent, the minor child has not lived in the house they inherited; however, the surviving parent is now living in that house. As a final twist, let’s say that the surviving parent (who is now living in the house inherited by the minor child) is neither the guardian nor the conservator of the minor child. In a hypothetical scenario like this, would it be legal for the surviving parent to sell any of the contents of the house that the minor child inherited, without the minor child’s consent?

Parents do not have the right to their child's property. See this question. The parent cannot sell the house as they don't own it. The minor does- there is no law that says they cannot own real estate. There are limits on what minors can and can't do with it but this simply means that the legal guardian would be involved in selling it. Even if the parent was the legal guardian they would be selling it on behalf of the child. Depending on the age of the child this would involve either their consent or this being in their best interests. The contents are more complicated. In theory, if they were also inherited by the child, no. In practice it would be difficult to prove ownership. The most reliable way to prevent this would be taking physical possession of any important items by removing either the item or the parent from the house.

If it looks like a gift and sounds like a gift and there is no evidence that it should not be considered a gift, well, what else could it be? Given the value of a house and depending on jurisdiction, there may be a gift tax involved. This is normally an obligation placed on the giver, not the receiver. It is unlikely to be a concern to you but a separate check would be wise for your own sake. If all ownership documents are clear that you and you alone own (and pay regular costs of, and maintain) the house, it is extremely unlikely that any private individual can take it away from you, regardless of their relationship to you. There doesn't appear to be any legal basis for their claims; they are hoping you will bow to social and emotional pressure. Your best course of action is to call their bluff. Request a written statement (ideally through their lawyer) that identifies the reason for their claims of ownership or otherwise why the property should be transferred to them (ideally checked by your lawyer) and proceed from your lawyer's advice.

That really sucks. I've had similar experiences when handling the probate proceedings of lawyers who were not good about returning original wills to clients. I am providing an answer under general principles without researching Oregon specific accounting, record retention and probate laws, to at least give you a start although I recognize that a better answer would research these questions. The accounts/clients from her business were sold to another woman. Is it legal for us to transfer everything to her possession? Probably yes. There should be a government agency in Oregon that regulates accountants that has rules regarding that question. The linked rule seems to govern this situation. It says in Rule 801-030-0015(d) that: (d) Custody and disposition of working papers. (A) A licensee may not sell, transfer or bequeath working papers described in this rule to anyone other than one or more surviving partners or stockholders, or new partners or stockholders of the licensee, or any combined or merged organization or successor in interest to the licensee, without the prior written consent of the client or the client’s personal representative or assignee. (B) A licensee is not prohibited from making a temporary transfer of working papers or other material necessary to the conduct of peer reviews or for the disclosure of information as provided by section (1)(b) of this rule. (C) A licensee shall implement reasonable procedures for the safe custody of working papers and shall retain working papers for a period sufficient to meet the needs of the licensee’s practice and to satisfy applicable professional standards and pertinent legal requirements for record retention. (D) A licensee shall retain working papers during the pendency of any Board investigation, disciplinary action, or other legal action involving the licensee. Licensees shall not dispose of such working papers until notified in writing by the Board of the closure of the investigation or until final disposition of the legal action or proceeding if no Board investigation is pending. So, a transfer to a successor firm appears to be permitted. What if she refuses to take the documents? Her probate estate could retain them and stay open, they could be returned to clients, or there could be a rule established by the Oregon body that regulates accountants that authorizes a central depository of such records. In Colorado, for example, in the case of law practices with no successors, original wills and estate planning documents can be deposited in the records of the court with probate jurisdiction that has jurisdiction over the territory where the decedent's practice was located. But, I could not locate any provision of this kind in Oregon law. Is it legal for us to destroy/shred/etc. the documents? In many cases, yes. Some states, by statute or regulation, and others by custom, allow business records to be destroyed as a matter of course, normally one year after the longest statute of limitations that could apply to a dispute where the records would be relevant (often seven years since the longest normally applicable tax statute of limitations is six years). Destroying tax returns is usually not a big concern because a transcript of the old tax returns can be ordered from the tax collection agency where they were filed. But, business records related to purchases of property and capital improvements and depreciation, and related to divorces, can be relevant for decades after they were created, so the more honorable course of action would be to make at least a cursory effort (such as a postcard sent to a last known address of each client with a deadline for requesting a return of their file) to return the files of clients that include original business records as opposed to mere copies of tax returns. Oregon has a seven year retention rule for most purposes pursuant to Rule 801-030-0015(e) which is linked above: (e) Retention of attest and audit working papers. (A) Licensees must maintain, for a period of at least seven years, the working papers for any attest or compilation services performed by the licensee together with any other supporting information, in sufficient detail to support the conclusions reached in such services. (B) The seven-year retention period described in paragraph (A) of this subsection is extended if a longer period is required for purposes of a Board investigation as provided in paragraph (d)(D) of this rule and OAR 801-010-0115(3). The referenced rule in that rule states: (3) Requirements upon resignation. Upon resignation, a former licensee is required to: (a) Surrender the CPA certificate or PA license to the Board; (b) Take all reasonable steps to avoid foreseeable harm to any client, including but not limited to providing written notice of resignation under this section to all clients and inform all clients of where client records and work papers will be stored and of the clients’ right to secure copies of all such records and work papers at no cost to the client; (c) Maintain client records for a period of at least six years, or return such records to the client; and (d) Continue to comply with the requirements of OAR Chapter 801 Division 030 pertaining to confidential information and client records. (e) For the purpose of subsection (b) above and unless otherwise required by the Board, a resigning licensee of a registered firm is required to give written notice to only those firm clients for which the resigning licensee was the sole or primary CPA on an engagement, an engagement leader, or the client relationship manager. In practice, the consequences of destroying a record that shouldn't have been destroyed are likely to be minimal, because any recovery would be limited to the assets of the estate and there is a time limit for making claims against estates which is quite strict, and your grandma has no license to revoke. But, again, the honorable thing to do in order to honor her legacy and do right by her former clients would be to either transfer the records to a successor firm or to attempt to return them, as she would be required to do if she had surrendered a license during life.

This could be a violation of the Fair Housing Act, but Fair Housing v. Roommate.com, 521 F.3d 1157 says that we find that the FHA doesn’t apply to the sharing of living units The crux of the argument is that a room in a house is not a "dwelling", since it is not a complete living unit. Whether or not courts outside the 9th Circuit follow suit remains to be seen. Florida state law (760.29) states exceptions to its anti-discrimination laws, covering for instance Any single-family house sold or rented by its owner, provided such private individual owner does not own more than three single-family houses at any one time. If that is the case, then the exemption exists if the rental a. Without the use in any manner of the sales or rental facilities or the sales or rental services of any real estate licensee or such facilities or services of any person in the business of selling or renting dwellings, or of any employee or agent of any such licensee or person; and b. Without the publication, posting, or mailing, after notice, of any advertisement or written notice in violation of s. 760.23(3) Another exemption exists if Rooms or units in dwellings containing living quarters occupied or intended to be occupied by no more than four families living independently of each other, if the owner actually maintains and occupies one of such living quarters as his or her residence. Your attorney (hint) will be able to interpret that complicated section of the law.

We can't give personal legal advice, but we can explain in general terms what the law is. Apparently, the mother, brother and estate are outside the US, in country X. The disposition of the estate follows the laws of X, so you would need an attorney who can practice law in country X. The primary issue is, (1) how are estates probated in X and (2) what provisions, if any, did the deceased(s) make for the disposition of the estate (was there a will; a trust; did one or more parents die intestate?). To simplify matters, we will assume that the laws of X are very similar to US law (which is not uniform – it is state-specific, but broadly similar). In the US, assets can be in a trust and can be directly transferred to a beneficiary. The disposition of the assets may be irrevocable, meaning that the person setting it up can decide who gets what, and then that cannot be changed. It is thus possible that a child could be excluded as a beneficiary of a trust. E.g. the father could set up a trust with just the mother and brother as beneficiaries. The mother may simply have been misinformed as to what the trust document said. Or, there could have been illegal misappropriation of funds, even something as heinous as providing fraudulent documents purporting that an actually living beneficiary is dead. In other words, even though you can't afford a (foreign) attorney, that is realistically the only way to get a clear answer, if the brother is being uncooperative or untruthful.

You can legally sell a house twenty minutes after you buy it, if you or the buyer can have the documents prepared that fast. You will not be eligible for certain tax benefits on any profits you make. The house was never really your "primary home" if you never lived in it, but a house does not need to be a primary home for you to sell it - that matters for some mortgages, and in some tax situations. People doing "house flipping" often sell a house a short time after buying it, indeed that is much of the point of "flipping". There is nothing criminal or unlawful about doing that, as long as you do not deceive anyone involved in the transaction about the length of your ownership of the house or the time you lived in it. (such deception might be fraud, if the matter is material to the transaction, which it might be.) Arizona law does require disclosing "material information about the property that the seller actually and personally knows of". The Arizona Association of Realtors has drafted a disclosure form, the Residential Seller's Property Disclosure Statement which is often used for this purpose, but is not specified by law. This does include a line on which the seller is asked to disclose the date that the seller purchased the property. But as long as this disclosure is made honestly, it does not block a sale. In fact, the date of previous purchase is normally a matter of public record, and is included in real estate listings, so disclosure should be redundant, but is nonetheless safer. (This was called to my attention in a comment by user Mindwin.) What made you think there might be a minimum stay?

Theoretically speaking, this is not theft. You are correct in that theft requires specific intent: to permanently deprive someone from the use and enjoyment of one of their lawful possessions. In real life, it is a matter of evidence of course. Saying you were only borrowing can be proven otherwise based on your actions. I should also mention that if you "borrow" something an there were obligations attached to that borroeing (e.g. "you can borrow it but you mustnt use it like this, or you must return it in a week") then failing to abide by those obligations can be sufficient to show intention to deprive. Furthermore "borrowing something" and consuming its entire usefulness for yourself counts as the permanent deprivation of the use of the possession from the owner. E.g. "borrowing" concert tickets and returning them after a concert (see s.6 Theft Act 1968) R v Lloyd, Bhuee & Ali [1985] QB 829 also tells us that the condition of something borrowed once returned may be indicative of whether there was an intention to permanently deprive someone of their rights to property.

IANAL. I am not your lawyer. Assuming that they bought the house together, and are both on the title, your step-father would, as a surviving owner, take sole possession of the house (and it wound not enter your mother's estate). If she bought the house before they married and he moved in, and he is not on the title, it would theoretically enter her estate, but there may be additional rules as it is his residence. As your mother lived in NY, NY law governs her estate. If the estate is worth less than $50,000, you would get nothing. If the estate is worth more than $50,000, he would get $50,000 plus half of the remainder, with the other half of the remainder being split between your mother's children. You don't mention any siblings, so I would assume you don't have any, in which case you should receive: (Estate_Value - $50,000)/2. Source: https://www.nycourts.gov/courthelp/WhenSomeoneDies/intestacy.shtml

What proportion of parenting time makes someone a "primary parent"? The terms "primary parent," "majority of parenting time," "shared parenting time," and "split parenting time" are used to describe the division of parenting. What do these mean?

canada Child support In Canada, under the Federal Child Support Guidelines (used when computing child support after a divorce, and in most or all provinces after a separation), the terms are defined as follows: majority of parenting time "means a period of time that is more than 60% of parenting time over the course of a year" (s. 2(1)); shared parenting time is when "each spouse exercises not less than 40% of parenting time with a child over the course of a year" (s. 9) split parenting time describes a situation where "there are two or more children, and each spouse has the majority of parenting time with one or more of those children" (s. 8). Which of these regimes a couple falls into is significant because it changes the approach to computing the amount owing for child support. "Primary parent" outside of child support Outside of the computation of child support, there is no concrete definition for what makes someone a "primary parent." Parenting arrangements or orders will just describe the division of parenting responsibilities, such as who has day-to-day care, control, and supervision of the child; decisions about residence, friends, activities, education, medical treatment, etc. Typically though, when the phrase "primary parent" is used, it describes the person with day-to-day care, control, and supervision of the child. But this isn't a descriptor that can be applied universally to the relationship. For example, a person might have "primary parenting of the children over the holiday" (Wilson v Wilson, 2023 ONSC 3387, at para 163). Some courts are careful to place the term in quotes to emphasize that it isn't a precise term (e.g. "she puts great stock in being the 'primary parent'": Begum v Klippenstein, 2023 ONSC 2970 at para 86).

Courts look to primary authority first, and then to secondary authority if ambiguity remains. Primary Authority providing definition for the legal use of a word would be previous case opinions that give meaning to a word in a given context, how the word is actually defined in the statutes for the state, or, in the case of federal law, the federal statutes or Code of Federal Regulations. Within primary sources, you also consider whether a prior definition is binding on the court (i.e., the court has to follow it) or whether it is merely persuasive authority (that the court can choose to follow, but is not required to follow based on precedent – sometimes call Stare Decisis). Primary authority is binding on a court if the definition comes from a higher court in the direct appellate chain of the deciding court, it is persuasive otherwise. Secondary Authority is everything else. For example, Black's Law Dictionary, Whigmore on Evidence, or any other legal treatise would also be a secondary source. (All secondary authority is persuasive authority.) Courts, in absence of either, will look to how a word is commonly used in the context in which it is applied. All seek to give the proper meaning to a word or phrase in light of how it is being used.

Is the question just whether a company can contact its customers to ensure that they're happy with the company's services? If so, the answer is generally yes. I can think of no reason why this would change based on the fact that someone saw her using the services of a competitor. Your mother seems to be treating the phone call as an accusation, but it appears to be standard customer-relationship maintenance. If she chooses to approach it differently, she can use it to improve her bargaining power with Gym 1.

Admissibility is one thing, enforcement is another. My observations, which are more detailed than casual, is that Family Courts are a different breed, and more than most any other court, "they do what they want." I have associates who had agreed to stipulations, detailing how a child might be handled, only to have a family court decide at some point to implement some completely different plan, and in doing so run against what both parents were interested in doing. Prenuptial agreements appear to be meaningless, as this is not about the assets of the couple, it is about the state's interest in the child. Even then, the courts seem to act in manners which appear to not be in the best interests of the child (and sometimes even say so.) Back to your question, would an agreement be admissible? Yes. Does it mean much? In my opinion, and based upon the preponderance of evidence, no. Do whatever you have to do to stay out of family court. Being married doesn't matter. Working together for 21 years does. In the future, you should state the jurisdiction you are in. It does change the answer, but in this case only subtlety.

You will have to litigate this issue anew in the divorce. When there has been a major change in circumstances, issues related to custody can be relitigated, even if there isn't a remarriage. In this case, both the marriage and the fact that nine years have passed since the original order constitute a substantial change in circumstances. At the time the order was entered, there was an 18 month old with parents who didn't live together. The child is now 10 years old and has lived with both parents without regard to any custody order for at least seven years. These are completely different circumstances so custody issues must be revisited. As @mkennedy notes in the comments, it is even likely that the court or someone acting on behalf of the court would consider the opinions of the child at this point, which obviously wasn't possible the first time around. Generally speaking, the way that the "best interests of the child" standard that applies in a case like this one is interpreted is to come as close to maintaining the pre-divorce status quo as possible in light of the separation of the parents. The most relevant section of the Missouri Revised Statutes to this issue is as follows: § 452.410. Custody, decree, modification of, when Except as provided in subsection 2 of this section, the court shall not modify a prior custody decree unless it has jurisdiction under the provisions of section 452.450 and it finds, upon the basis of facts that have arisen since the prior decree or that were unknown to the court at the time of the prior decree, that a change has occurred in the circumstances of the child or his custodian and that the modification is necessary to serve the best interests of the child. Notwithstanding any other provision of this section or sections 452.375 and 452.400, any custody order entered by any court in this state or any other state prior to August 13, 1984, may, subject to jurisdictional requirements, be modified to allow for joint custody in accordance with section 452.375, without any further showing. If either parent files a motion to modify an award of joint legal custody or joint physical custody, each party shall be entitled to a change of judge as provided by supreme court rule.

This is very, very weird. I've never heard of a case like this one. Is there some context that could explain why anyone would refile a divorce someplace new twelve years after getting divorced the first time around? The logical thing to do if Canadian civil procedure is at all analogous to U.S. civil procedure on this point, would be to have a Canadian lawyer file a motion in the Canadian divorce case to set aside the judgment on the extraordinary grounds that you were not married any longer at the time that the 2015 divorce was filed, seeking to set aside the 2015 case ruling. In most U.S. jurisdictions with civil procedural rules modeled on the federal rules of civil procedure (California's are not), this would be a motion under Rule of Civil Procedure 60, but obviously, the Canadian rule numbering would probably be different. Alternatively, if the home is in California, you could bring an action for declaratory judgment declaring that the Canadian judgment is invalid because it was brought in a divorce action between people who were already divorced and probably also lacked jurisdiction over you and the property. I'm not sure what you mean by CPL in this context. Normally, in a real estate context, a CPL would mean a "closing protection letter", but in the context you are using it, it sounds like you are referring to something akin to a lis pendens or a lien. Perhaps you mean a "certificate of pending litigation" which is another name of a lis pendens in at least some Canadian jurisdictions (but is terminology rarely used in the U.S.). This sounds like slander of title, or "abuse of process" or the filing of what is known as a spurious lien, any of which are actionable, but without knowing what a CPL actually is, it is hard to know.

The law was changed several times, and different versions apply to different age groups because certain rules were not changed retroactively. The page you link describes the situation for children born after the year 2000. My advice: citizenship is such a serious matter that you should consult a specialized lawyer, not a random crowd on the web.

Late to the party, but I'll answer anyways. In general, providers have a lot of wiggle room when sharing information with parents, on condition that the patient hasn't explicitly objected despite having opportunity to do so. HIPAA allows the provider to make a judgment call on whether such information can be shared without explicit consent: Quoting Title 45 § 164.510 : (i) Obtains the individual's agreement; (ii) Provides the individual with the opportunity to object to the disclosure, and the individual does not express an objection; or (iii) Reasonably infers from the circumstances, based the exercise of professional judgment, that the individual does not object to the disclosure. HHS does discuss disclosure to family members in their FAQ : A covered entity is permitted to share information with a family member or other person involved in an individual’s care or payment for care as long as the individual does not object. A parent of a child who has just turned 18 is likely still somewhat involved in the child's care, so, absent either an objection or a reason to believe the child would object if asked, sharing is probably not a violation.

Is it legal to profit from explaining a book's content? I was wondering if explaining a book's contents on a potentially monetized Youtube channel is similar to simply being a tutor or teacher if the book is freely available online via "pressbooks". The book is under the following terms: Attribution — You must give appropriate credit, provide a link to the license, and indicate if changes were made. You may do so in any reasonable manner, but not in any way that suggests the licensor endorses you or your use. NonCommercial — You may not use the material for commercial purposes. ShareAlike — If you remix, transform, or build upon the material, you must distribute your contributions under the same license as the original. I definitely plan to provide a link to the book, but it's the 'noncommercial' part I was concerned about. Also, would it be ok to also include the definitions mentioned in the book, or would I have to write it in my own words? [1]: https://i.stack.imgur.com/McBAb.png

That licence does not allow you to do what you want It’s a non-commercial licence and your usage is commercial (making money). You don’t need a licence to perform commentary or review of a book Providing that you use as little material as necessary from the original work, commentary and review is one of the exceptions to copyright carved out by fair dealing in most English speaking jurisdictions. In the USA, the fair use exemption is not so clear as it involves a four factor balancing test. Your planned use is in favour of being fair use, your commercialisation is against.

A proof can be protected by copyright. The underlying facts of math cannot. But if one has copied details of the order of the proof, or of the selection of theorems to use, and if several other choices would have been possible, then the new proof may constitute a trivially modified copy, or a derivative work, and in either case making of it might be copyright infringement. However, making and distributing a copy, even with no changes at all, for purposes of comment and criticism, might be fair use in the US, fair dealing in the UK or some other parts of the Commonwealth, or fall under an exception to copyright in other countries (these generally vary significantly by country). This is usually a very fact-driven question.

Under 17 USC 106 (3) one of the exclusive rights of a copyright owner is: to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending; Distributing an entire book cannot plausibly be considered to be fair use. Nor does the library exception apply. The exception in sec 109 (first sale doctrine) applies only to: the owner of a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this title, or any person authorized by such owner... 17 USC 501 (a) says: (a) Anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner as provided by sections 106 through 122 or of the author as provided in section 106A(a), or who imports copies or phonorecords into the United States in violation of section 602, is an infringer of the copyright or right of the author, as the case may be. Therefore both Bob and Sue have infringed the copyright, and could in theory be sued for doing so. However I cannot see anything in 17USC which makes receiving an unlawful copy an infringement, or any other crime or tort. It seems to me that Alice has no legal liability, whatever her moral position may be, unless perhaps she could be charged with conspiracy to infringe the copyright, which seems unlikely to me in practice, and perhaps not possible even in theory. If Bob has in fact done this only once, for one book, the chancre of the copyright owner learning of it, or filing suit even if the owner does learn, is perhaps not large. But that would be no defense if the owner chose to sue. Some copyright owners choose to explicitly permit actions similar to that of Bob (where e-books are involved), provided that Bob does not charge a fee, regarding it as good advertising. But that is the copyright owner's choice to make, and most commercial publishers do not take that position. Bob could have legally loaned his copy to Sue, and Sue could have legally passed it on to Alice, without anyone infringing the copyright. Making the copy without permission was infringing, and passing on the unlawful copy was also an act of infringement. Receiving one copy or many does not seem to be a violation, unless it is part of a plan to later distribute unlawful copies. Sue did not make a copy. She distributed an unlawful copy, which is also infringement, as the quoted part of Sec 106 says. While in theory the publisher could have authorized Bob to make the copy, this is not plausible and no reasonable person would believe this to be an authorized copy. So Sue has good reason to believe that the copy is unauthorized. So the distribution is infringement.

The "Standard Youtube License" or TOS reads You shall not copy, reproduce, distribute, transmit, broadcast, display, sell, license, or otherwise exploit any Content for any other purposes without the prior written consent of YouTube or the respective licensors of the Content. That stipulates no "free usage" and as such, you cannot use a screenshot ("Content") without permission or license from the copyright owner anywhere in your own work or on a platform such as Wikipedia that requires permissions from the copyright owner. You are legally OK with (preferably written) approval and license from the creator for use of a screenshot on Wikipedia, because such an written agreement will satisfy Wikipedia's requirement of owner approval for the use of another creator's work on Wikipedia and gives you written permission and license to use the work on Wikipedia. Simply contact the copyright owner and ask for permission. If you do not have the owner's permission and still use a screenshot, and are confronted with copyright infringement by the owner or Wikipedia, your use of a screenshot may fall under Fair use. The important qualifier is may. You being able to prevail with a Fair use defense - worst case, if taken to court, or at very least, Wikipedia taking down the screenshot under a DMCA request - is not guaranteed, because a judge would make that decision, based on the evidence of the usage and their determination if, in fact, a screenshot is Fair use. Fair use (Chapter 1 - Circular 92 | U.S. Copyright Office) stipulates that usage is legally permissible when (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole is not considered to be substantial enough is an infringement of copyright of the whole work. Who determines what is what is "substantial enough"? A court. The court could take into account (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. in determining your usage is Fair use, or damages if the court rules against you. You do risk copyright infringement without clear permission from the copyright owner, and you risk Wikipedia being send a DMCA takedown notice. Whether or not you are the subject of a copyright infringement lawsuit is up to the copyright owner, and if that happens, whether you prevail is up to the court.

This almost certainly falls under fair use. In fact, there are numerous examples of such books already. You are using a small portion of the work, and it is for a transformative purpose- teaching about it.

This appears to mean that the author, while retaining copyright, is allowing anyone to make copies without asking permission from the author. This would seem to be similar to a CC-BY license, or perhaps more exactly a CC-BY-ND license, as the author has apparently not granted the right to create modified versions or other derivative works. This does not require one who makes such copies to distribute them free of charge, unless there is another provision not mentioned in the question. Amazon, or anyone else, would be free to sell copies at any price they cared to ask. If the author wanted to limit the sales price, that would take another provision, and might not be enforceable.

Under your proposal, the author cannot effectively use the software at all, much less sell his creative efforts. The EULA clearly states that copyright is automatically transferred to the vendor when a document is created. The author gets started, writes "It was a dark and stormy night" then has a moment of writer's block, saves and closes, takes a walk, then tries again. The author has transferred copyright in the work to vendor, and needs vendor's permission to make revisions. So you have to tweak the EULA to grant automatic permission to author to create derivative works (revisions), and to distribute. A more effective strategy would be to impose a revenue-sharing formula on any commercially-exploited work created using the software, rather than attempt to directly seize the intellectual property. The CC "NC" license attribute is a distant version of what you are looking for - it prohibit any money-making use of the software. What you would add to that is a condition that the software can be used commercially, provided a certain compensation be rendered. You would of course have to be very clear in advance about what was actually agreed to.

are there any safeguards you could take to preemptively block such behavior, such as a disclaimer inside the book cover that reads something like The safeguard you outline would be overridden as soon as the author enters any contract that requires assignment of copyright. (I would not delve in the differences between licensing and copyright assignment because that hypothetical author is dealing with a contract of adhesion which readily requires assignment; the author has no option to change the ToS to allow for licensing only) Under contract law, one of the essential prerequisites is that the conditions of a contract be entered knowingly and willfully. By deliberately clicking on a ToS page to move forward with the uploading a copyrighted work, the author is signaling his awareness and acceptance of the ToS. The fact that the author chose not to read the ToS is irrelevant and very unlikely to strike whatever entitlements the website owner formulated in the accepted ToS. For the same reason, the author's safeguard disclaimer does not bind the website owner: It cannot be said that the website owner was aware of that disclaimer at the time of the formation of contract between the author and the website owner. That is, the website owner did not knowingly and willfully accepted the author's safeguard. The website owner is not even expected to know about any safeguards which one of its potential user intends to establish. The length of a ToS document is also irrelevant because the website owner has the valid argument that "the user-author could have skimmed through the ToS or do a search (via Control-Find) of keywords such as 'copyright' or 'property', whence any allegation of 'inadvertent' assignment of copyright is untenable". Is there a way to protect your IP from inadvertently being licensed/stolen/assigned via TOS "agreements", without having to waste your life reading huge one-sided online "contracts" that are "subject to change without notice" anyway? Yes. That consists of not uploading one's works in such platforms. In contract law that would be expressed as "declining an exchange of considerations". There are many other alternatives for an author to promote his work without being required to assign copyright.

"Murder laws are governed by the states, [not the federal government]." Is Vivek Ramaswamy right? United States presidential candidate Vivek Ramaswamy stated he doesn't support a federal ban on abortion, a practice which he understands to be murder, because the U.S. federal government doesn't regulate murder (emphasis added): For years, I was an opponent of Roe v. Wade. I think it was constitutionally wrongly decided. I think Dobbs was correct to overturn it because the federal government has no business here. Murder laws are governed by the states. So if abortion is a form of murder, which is the pro-life position, and I am pro-life, then it would make no sense for that to be the one law that was still governed at the federal level. However, isn't it true that murder is regulated by the federal government as well? Is Vivek Ramaswamy correct in claiming that murder is governed solely by the states?

It's a bit of an oversimplification. You're correct that there is a federal law against murder, 18 USC 1111. However it applies only to a murder committed in the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States. This covers situations like crimes committed on federal lands such as national parks or federal buildings, or crimes on US-flagged ships at sea, aircraft in flight, or in space. It does not apply to "ordinary" crimes committed at most locations within the US. 18 USC Chapter 51 covers a few other situations, such as murder of a federal officer, foreign diplomat, by incarcerated or escaped federal prisoners, US nationals murdering each other while abroad, and so forth. The idea is that these restrictions keep the laws within the enumerated powers of Congress as stated in Article I Section 8 of the US Constitution. A federal statute covering all murders throughout the US would probably be unconstitutional for this reason. So while what he says is not strictly correct, it is true that in the vast majority of cases, murders are covered by state laws and not by federal laws. Even if one was to agree with Ramaswamy that medical abortions are a form of murder, even still, no federal murder law currently on the books would apply to a typical abortion, except under very unusual circumstances.

Unequivocally yes. An Australian judgement asserted this by (happily) adopting the reasoning of the US courts: The matter also came up for discussion in the Communist Party case where Justice Dixon adopted the U.S. view that: ... it is within the necessary power of the Federal government to protect its own existence and the unhindered play of its legitimate activities. And to this end, it may provide for the punishment of treason, the suppression of insurrection or rebellion and for the putting-down of all individual or concerted attempts to obstruct or interfere with the discharge of the proper business of government ... A plane (or ship, or train etc.) that is not responding to hails and acting to put citizens at risk is a legitimate target of military force. It doesn't matter if it is acting that way because of a deliberate decision of its controllers (e.g. terrorists), because it's not under control or because it's controllers are idiots.

It's generally correct in the American system that everything not forbidden is permitted. But the law you're looking at isn't really an exception. You have the legal right to tamper with evidence if tampering is not illegal, but this statute makes it illegal. The language you've highlighted merely says that the law does not apply to those who have some other affirmative grant of authority to do so. So if you stab someone to death in your kitchen, you can't remove the body or other evidence, but the detectives investigating the case can, because they have the legal authority to process the scene and maintain the evidence for trial. So the law is similar to the "speaking in public" hypothetical, but that doesn't make it meaningless. Because of the First Amendment, that law doesn't actually outlaw anything, but the tampering law faces no such legal barriers. You had the right to tamper until the government said you didn't. Now that it says you don't, you can only do it on the government's terms, which require an affirmative grant of authority.

You'd be confessing to committing a crime. I'm not a lawyer, but I wouldn't recommend trying it. Sure, if this trick worked, you might be able to clear yourself of civil remedies, but there's a much bigger problem with this: with the repeal of Roe vs Wade, Texas once more criminalised abortion, and so this tactic would, by necessity, require confessing to a crime in a court of law. While that law expressly prohibited the levying of penalties against the pregnant woman, the law allowing for lawsuits against people who "aid and abet" abortions didn't seem to apply to them either. As such, you'd be opening yourself up to fines of tens of thousands of dollars and a maximum prison sentence of life in jail.

(I am not your lawyer. I am not here to help you. If you are reading this because someone has died, please stop and instead read the Scottish Courts and Tribunals guide to dealing with a deceased's estate in Scotland, or contact a solicitor.) Yes, in general. Section 1 of the Wills Act 1963, which is in force in Scotland, specifies that "[a] will shall be treated as properly executed if its execution conformed to the internal law in force in the territory where it was executed." Furthermore, Section 4 states that "[t]he construction of a will shall not be altered by reason of any change in the testator’s domicile after the execution of the will." "Construction" here refers to interpreting the language and effect of the will. So if the will was validly executed in England, it should also be in force in Scotland, and a Scottish court will give it the same meaning it would have had under English law. Furthermore, the same rule of validity seems to apply in both England and Scotland: Wills Act 1837 section 9. There may be other Scottish laws affecting the disposition of the estate that differ from English law. Relevant statutes include Succession (Scotland) Act 1964, section 21A, which seems consistent with Wills Act 1963. (I am trained in U.S. rather than English or Scottish law; I'm trusting the accuracy of the UK's excellent online legislation archive for the proposition that the statutes cited are in force in Scotland. I haven't checked the case law for contrary interpretations.)

No Always assuming that the government has operated within the limits of its powers or, at least, that if they have exceeded those powers the excess was in good faith. First, there is the issue of sovereign immunity. Basically, a government can be held liable only when it consents to be held liable. Most governments never waive this with respect to their lawmaking powers because they have to be able to make laws in what they see as the public interest without fear of litigation. See, for example, cases on plain paper packaging of cigarettes. Second, most governments have the power to regulate commerce and to deal with public emergencies. There is an issue which comes up in Federations about which government has the power but even if a law is invalid, it does not follow that compensation is payable. It certainly isn’t if the law is valid.

One can argue both ways. On one side, yes, zero representation in the Senate for all states is equal suffrage in the Senate. On the other side, no, depriving all states of all representation in the Senate deprives them of their suffrage in the Senate (without needing to consider the question of whether the suffrage is equal). Since this question has never been considered by a court, we can't do much more than speculate how one might rule. There has never been an amendment proposed to modify the composition of the Senate -- at least not one that was seriously considered. The spirit of the law works in favor of the second interpretation. Furthermore, a strict application of abstract logical reasoning was probably not the intention of the framers. A strategy that might seem more likely to succeed would be to introduce amendments reducing the Senate's power in the legislative process, similar to the evolution of the House of Lords in the UK. If the goal were to sideline one state, this might work, but if the goal is to address the complaint that the Senate is undemocratic because people in smaller states have proportionally more influence there, there's no way the amendment would pass 3/4 of the states' legislatures. The number of states with one or two representatives is 13, by itself a sufficient number to block the adoption of an amendment.

It is unlikely that Bob's conduct would constitute disorderly conduct or disturbing the peace in the fact pattern you described and the police and the Mayor who ordered to police to act have probably violated Bob's constitutional rights. While governments may adopt reasonable "time, place and manner" restrictions on free speech, and the inquiry as to whether a time, place and manner restriction is reasonable is a fact specific inquiry, the facts presented in this question are in the heartland of free speech protections and so an arrest is likely to violate a clearly established constitutional right. Bob believes the mayor to be corrupt. The mayor is an ex police officer. So Bob decides to protest in front of city hall at noon with a sign and speaking loudly about his dislike for the mayor while walking back and forth on a public sidewalk. Bob is in a public place that has a long tradition of being a symbolic public forum for expressing grievances. He is articulating statements that he holds in good faith about a matter of public concern relating to a public figure. Noon is not a time at which there is a need to maintain quiet. There is no indication in the question of any special facts that would modify the usual considerations in this fact pattern (i.e. the building is not on fire requiring fire departments to keep people clear, there isn't a Presidential motorcade nearby, there is no indication that there is an ordinance on the books in advance that attempts to reasonably accommodate protesters in the interest of some important interest (e.g. not interfering with security lines)). Realistically, absent negative facts which are not mentioned, this looks like a strong case for a constitutional violation and a weak one for criminal liability.

Is it illegal to alter your boarding pass? So the problem is my legal gender on my id is non-binary ("X"), but the airline (Frontier) only allows you to choose male or female. I went around in circles with their customer support and their supervisor on this for hours and got nowhere with them. As a result my boarding pass gender and my ID gender are not going to match. I'm worried that TSA either A) won't let me through or B) will demand a free grope patdown because my gender information won't match. Would it be illegal for me to simply pre-print my boarding pass to PDF, edit the gender to match my ID, and then print it out to bring with me?

I recognize your difficulty, and I'm not sure about the formal legality of it (which would go to the materiality of the alteration, which if material would probably be a presentation of a false document to a TSA officer). But more practically, when you present your boarding pass and ID to the TSA officer before going through security, their system checks your boarding pass against the boarding pass in the computer system. If those don't match, you are sent back to the ticketing desk. My wife and I had to do this on a recent trip simply because folding up our boarding passes to put them in my wallet caused smudging that was enough to cause the TSA system to conclude that our boarding passes weren't in the system. This also triggered heightened bag searches and pat down searches for both of us going through security the second time around. In your shoes, I'd try my chances with a TSA officer accepting the ID v. boarding pass mismatch with your brief explanation instead. Due to the limitations of airline software, discrepancies between IDs and boarding passes are common enough for reasons like the inability of airline software to handle two word surnames, very short surnames, hyphens, and apostrophes.

There are several plausible possibilities. This is a scam and isn't actually from the public transit authorities, in which case paying them hasn't helped you, and has contributed to this being a problem in the future for others. The payment information may have some subtle differences from the correct information and may actually go to the fraudster. The EBE number discrepancy makes this the most likely scenario in my opinion. There was a technical error. Maybe someone with a name similar to your was really cited, but due to a typo, your name was entered instead and the street address and corrected name were entered via some sort of autocorrect function. Somebody got lucky and avoided the ticket that should have gone to them. Maybe somebody went into the wrong field in the ticket entry system which could also explain the EBE number error. Someone has stolen your identity (perhaps a refugee) and is going around with a fake ID using your name and address. This doesn't explain the EBE number discrepancy, however. I've also heard of cases in some big cities where two people have the same name and birthdate and are constantly getting tickets meant for the other person but don't discover this fact for many years. Maybe someone like that recently moved into your town. This also doesn't explain the EBE number error. The bottom line is that even though it would perhaps be cheaper and less time consuming in the short run to just pay the fine, I would not recommend doing that in this case. In scenario 1, you really have a moral civic duty to take a little extra effort to identify a fraudster who is preying on lots of people in your community. In scenario 2, you again, have something of a moral civic duty to help the transit system get this problem fixed, and who knows, it might be a technical problem that is prone to recur and if you don't address it the first time, people will assume that your "confession" of fault by paying the first ticket undermines your credibility if it happens again. In scenarios 3 and 4, the problem is likely to recur and so you have an interest beyond this transaction in sorting out the situation. While your bare assertions that this didn't happen might fall on somewhat deaf ears as potentially self-serving, when corroborated by the fact that you have a monthly pass, I think that the likelihood that you would be found to be credible and beat the ticket is great in your case. Germany is less corrupt in bureaucratic matters like this than most countries on Earth. If this is a scenario 1 situation, the legitimate transit agency wouldn't even have a record of the existence of a ticket in the system, so you could be reassured that you would be at no risk if you didn't pay it. Given the EBE number problem, it is quite possible that even if you did try to pay it and it was simply a human data entry problem or something (or maybe your ex or a high school bully you defied and forgot about is now a transit cop and trying to inflict revenge) that you might not get proper credit for it anyway, so talking to a person at the agency is probably necessary anyway. So, my advice would be to talk to a human being in their office, ideally by telephone (without using the ticket to determine the proper telephone number as the number on the ticket would be a scam in scenario 1), but in person, if necessary, to get to the bottom of this. If this didn't work, I would write a letter or email with a copy of the ticket enclosed. If this falls on deaf ears, I would even consider making a police report of a suspected fraud, or even enlisting a local newspaper reporter or television news reporter in pursuing this situation because it is odd and would resonate with the general public. All of this will be a pain and won't necessary make narrow economic sense, but we don't always have a choice about when duty calls to fix a problem or what problem that will end up being.

Yes and No Selling your own body for sex is legal. Buying sex is illegal. Therefore the transaction as a whole is legal on the part of the seller and illegal on the part of the buyer. See Prostitution in Canada and Prostitution law in Canada. If you think this is odd, you are not alone '... one judge referring to the laws as "Alice-in-Wonderland" and the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court referred to the situation as "bizarre"'. In the circumstances, although I know of no case law on this, it would appear that any contract for prostitution would be void for illegality. Presumably, to enforce payment for services rendered the service provider would need to pursue a quantum meruit claim in equity.

It could be the passenger's problem or the taxi's problem When these sorts of breakdowns in communications happen in specifying contract terms then either or both parties can be at fault. If the passenger specified the wrong address then it is clearly the passenger at fault. Similarly, if the driver drove to a different address from what the passenger said, it would clearly be the driver at fault. However, if the passenger was imprecise and the driver made an assumption then who bears responsibility depends on whether that assumption is reasonable or not. For example, the main street in the Sydney, Australia CBD is George Street. Even though George Street is an extremely common name with literally dozens in the Greater Sydney area, a taxi driver would reasonably assume that a passenger at the airport asking for "George Street" means the one in the city, not any of the others. In such a circumstance, the onus is on the passenger to specify exactly where they want to go. Whether the driver is an employee or a contractor is irrelevant - they are the representative of the organisation with whom the passenger has a contract.

Can I refuse, turn around, and just not enter the USA ,get back on a plane, turn around and drive back, or do I have to give over my devices just because I showed up? In theory you can refuse and turn around. At a highway check point or in a private boat disembarking context, that is fairly feasible. If you turn around before you are searched and get back across the border, the border control officers can't pursue you. In a commercial airplane or commercial boat disembarking context, this is as a practical matter, not a very feasible thing to do, because you can't as a practical matter, turn around and even if you plan to return, the only way you can make it to a return trip without passing through customs is if the border control officer refuses to admit you. The law is that non-probable cause searches are permitted at border checkpoints (and indeed even near a border checkpoint on the in country side), but this isn't much clarity about when that authority ends (short of returning across an international boundary) when deciding not to enter at a border checkpoint. Also, there is also a split of authority over whether a cell phone search is allowed in the first place. The Second Circuit in the U.S. has held that it is not, but the law is unresolved in many U.S. states at this time.

First of all, to clarify some numbering, HR 4635 (107th Congress) was not actually passed. The language was passed as part of HR 5005, becoming Public Law 107-296, and this provision now appears at 49 USC 44921. The exact text of this provision is: A Federal flight deck officer shall not be liable for damages in any action brought in a Federal or State court arising out of the acts or omissions of the officer in defending the flight deck of an aircraft against acts of criminal violence or air piracy unless the officer is guilty of gross negligence or willful misconduct. The language makes it clear that this is only referring to civil liability. So, if the officer is defending the flight deck, and they are sued for damages resulting from their actions, the plaintiff will not win (assuming the law is correctly applied). But this law says nothing about whether or not they can be prosecuted for a crime. In any case, the officer in your example does not appear to have been defending the flight deck, so this law wouldn't apply at all. In your example, the officer's defense against a murder charge would probably be based on defense of others. There is a discussion on Justia. It seems that a key question would be whether shooting the unruly passenger was proportional - was there a reasonable fear that the passenger was actually going to kill someone?

As far as I know, airline crew members have to pass through US immigration on arrival, just like everyone else. So they'd need a visa. Airline crews are eligible for a D visa which is specifically for crew members on layovers. Under the current version of the travel ban, citizens of the designated countries are allowed to enter if they already have a valid visa, which current crew members presumably would. However, if they don't, or if it expires, they might be refused a new visa. This would effectively prevent them from working on flights to the US.

Might depend on where you are. I think it's illegal in North Korea. In the US, it is legally encouraged, by the Commercial Space Launch Act of 1984, especially the part that says "Congress declares that the general welfare of the United States requires that the Administration seek and encourage, to the maximum extent possible, the fullest commercial use of space". Previously, Congress passed the Communications Satellite Act of 1962, which first expressed an interest in allowing commercial flights, but there was substantial opposition to non-government entities in space. There are a number of legal private space adventures from numerous countries. As Nate Eldridge points out, you still need government (FAA) permission. So it's legal to blast yourself into space in the same sense that it's legal to drive or to open a business.

Legal to become president if U.S. adds new state/territories? If the U.S. adds a new territory, are the people currently living there able to become president? Or does the territory have to become a state in order for the people to be eligible to become president?

If the U.S. adds a new territory, are the people currently living there able to become president? No. Or does the territory have to become a state in order for the people to be eligible to become president? Not necessarily. What does "natural-born citizen" mean? The meaning of the natural born citizen clause of the constitution is unclear in many respects, but virtually all scholars agree that a person who was a US citizen at birth, and who has remained a US citizen until present, is a natural-born citizen. There is a small minority of scholars who insist that a US citizen at birth is only a natural-born citizen if they were born in the US (for example, Ted Cruz would not be considered a natural-born citizen). There is an even smaller minority who insist that a person must have at least one US citizen parent in order to be a natural-born citizen. But for all practical purposes, these minority viewpoints are irrelevant. The only thing that matters is whether someone was a US citizen when they were born. Citizenship of people living in US territories When a US territory is created, the people living there don't automatically become US citizens, and if Congress eventually gives them US citizenship, the canon of presumption against retroactivity applies: a statute should not be read to be retroactive unless there is evidence that it was intended to apply retroactively. That means the people who get US citizenship under the statute don't become natural-born citizens; they're considered to have been automatically naturalized when the statute went into effect. But if there's a statute saying that people born in the territory are US citizens at birth, then people born in the territory after the effective date of that statute are natural-born citizens, since they are citizens at birth. I will use Hawaii as an example. Hawaii became a territory in 1898. Citizenship was granted in 1900. Statehood was not granted until 1959. 8 USC §1405 governs the citizenship of people born in Hawaii: A person born in Hawaii on or after August 12, 1898, and before April 30, 1900, is declared to be a citizen of the United States as of April 30, 1900. A person born in Hawaii on or after April 30, 1900, is a citizen of the United States at birth. A person who was a citizen of the Republic of Hawaii on August 12, 1898, is declared to be a citizen of the United States as of April 30, 1900. So, Hawaiians didn't become US citizens when Hawaii was annexed. They were granted US citizenship 2 years later. A person born in Hawaii on or after April 30, 1900 is a natural born citizen. Applying the presumption against retroactivity, we see that a person who was born in Hawaii between August 12, 1898 and April 29, 1900, or who was a citizen of independent Hawaii when it was annexed by the United States, was not a natural born citizen and could not have become President. In addition to the presumption against retroactivity, there is also another canon of construction that applies here: Congress could have used the "is a citizen of the United States at birth" language for the other two categories of Hawaiians too, but chose to omit it. Presumably, Congress acted purposefully in doing so, with the intent of granting citizenship at birth to only one of the three categories. (I can't remember whether this canon has a name.) Can Congress grant natural-born citizen status retroactively? If the US were to acquire a new territory and saw fit to bestow citizenship retroactively to birth on some natives of that territory, would those people be eligible for the presidency? No one knows the answer to that question. As an example of when Congress has granted citizenship retroactively, the Immigration and Nationality Technical Corrections Act of 1994 created 8 USC §1401(h), which granted citizenship retroactively to birth to individuals who had been born outside the US to a US citizen mother and alien father prior to May 24, 1934. This act was necessary because, prior to that date, only US citizen fathers could transmit citizenship, not US citizen mothers. A person granted citizenship under this statute would be over the age of 89 now, so we're unlikely to see one run for president. It's an open question whether someone who obtained US citizenship through this statute would be considered eligible for the presidency. One could argue that "natural-born citizen" implies a person who actually was a citizen when they were born and that retroactive grants of citizenship are a mere legal fiction that cannot override the meaning of the constitution.

I suspect that US voting records would fall under Article 2(2)(a): Article 2 Material Scope ... This Regulation does not apply to the processing of personal data: (a) in the course of an activity which falls outside the scope of Union law; I doubt it would be possible to argue successfully that a foreign election is anything other than "an activity which falls outside the scope of Union law." Even the territorial scope could be questioned. This is set forth in the next article, on "territorial scope," the second item of which says: This Regulation applies to the processing of personal data of data subjects who are in the Union by a controller or processor not established in the Union, where the processing activities are related to: (a) the offering of goods or services, irrespective of whether a payment of the data subject is required, to such data subjects in the Union; or (b) the monitoring of their behaviour as far as their behaviour takes place within the Union. It is probably arguable whether processing absentee ballots from EU residents constitutes "offering services to data subjects in the Union," but in this case it's likely to be more difficult to resolve that question than to determine whether the activity falls outside the scope of Union law.

Both Congress and the state legislatures are expressly forbidden by the Constitution from passing bills of attainder. That means neither can ever pass a law that names an individual and says "they are suspended." It is so important that it's one of the very few restrictions on government that the original Constitution (before any amendments) prohibited in bot state and federal governments. (Also, a "bill" is not a law. It's what a legislature is considering making a law.)

No state can amend the US Constitution by itself. Technically, an amendment to the Constitution can be proposed a constitutional convention that is called for by two-thirds of the State legislatures (though this is has never happened; all 27 amendments have been proposed by the Federal Congress, which is the alternative path). This can be done without any kind of Federal approval what so ever. After proposal, an amendment must be ratified by three-fourths of state legislatures. EDIT: Regarding how to "get a convention started": This hasn't been tested, since a non-Congressional amendment has not, to my knowledge, been attempted, but I would imagine a Convention would be called if 2/3rds of the states submitted requests to Congress (which would probably either be a law or a joint-resolution, which is like a law without executive approval, but the form would probably be governed by each state's respective Constitution). Alternatively, it may be sufficient for state legislatures to designate delegates who meet up somewhere (as that is essentially what happened with the Constitutional Congress, i.e. the delegates who met and drafted the US Federal Constitution). A point has been raised in another answer that there may be an issue; however, I'm not convinced of this being a bar to a Convention. The delegates at the Constitutional Congress were original chosen to discuss changes to the Articles of Confederation, but wound up throwing the whole thing out and starting from scratch instead. Therefore, I do not see calls for a convention with differing but related objectives to be a problem; the whole point of a Convention in the Constitutional Amendment process is to discuss and compromise; otherwise, why require it before skipping to the 3/4ths of states ratifying, if the 2/3rds of states already have to agree on exactly what is being proposed before sending delegates.

If you are Donald Trump posting under an assumed name then it is illegal, because he is currently president of the USA and not supposed to run any businesses. If you are not Donald Trump, then be aware that Donald Trump owns a trademark for "Donald Trump" according to this site https://onlinetrademarkattorneys.com/donald-trump-trademarks/ so you will be infringing on his trademark.

Scenario 1. It doesn’t matter what it says. If it was not legally ratified, it is not legally in force. There is no absolutely no paradox at all. It is essentially just a draft amendment and would be thrown out if any attempt was made to enforce it and challenged.

In the US it is not a crime to be in the country illegally. As a general rule, it is not a crime for a removable alien to remain in the United States. Arizona v US So it's illegal, you get a state induced consequence (deportation) but it doesn't make you a criminal e.g. you don't go to jail for it. I have no idea if that's what's going on over there but it's a plausible explanation.

At time of answering, the question is: What's the most crucial issue when deciding Senator Cruz's citizenship? The 14th Amendment to the US Constitution, Section 1, states: All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States[.] Cruz did not go through a naturalization process. He was also not born within the territorial limits of the US. If either of those facts were different, those would be the crucial issue. Since they are not, we then look to the Naturalization Act of 1790, passed by the first Congress, which states that children born to citizen parents outside the United States are also citizens, specifically: The children of citizens of the United States, that may be born beyond sea, or out of the limits of the United States, shall be considered as natural born citizens[.] (emphasis added) According to the Wikipedia article and/or sources it cites, this is the only legislation to use the phrase "natural born citizens" and it seems clear this is intended to refer to Article II, Section 1 of the Constitution which states a requirement: No person except a natural born citizen, or a citizen of the United States, at the time of the adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the office of President; neither shall any person be eligible to that office who shall not have attained to the age of thirty five years, and been fourteen Years a resident within the United States. (emphasis added) The 1790 Act was repealed and replaced in 1795, but the new law also contained the language (lacking "natural born"): The children of citizens of the United States, born out of the limits and jurisdiction of the United States, shall be considered as citizens of the United States[.] The specific laws have been further changed, as the naturalization process has, reintroducing ambiguity about the "natural born" requirement, but birthright citizenship from parents is not in question and the "natural born" aspect is not in this question. So, to answer the question directly, the most crucial issue is: Were Cruz's parents citizens when Cruz was born? Cruz's Wikipedia page says his father was not naturalized until later, but his mother was born in Wilmington, DE, which is in the United States, and so unless she renounced her citizenship she would have been a US citizen at the time of Cruz's birth. This means there's a crucial issue: Did Cruz's mother renounce her US citizenship before Cruz was born? "Kaithar" commented on this answer with speculation that she voted in a Canadian election at a time (1947-1977) when Canada didn't recognize dual citizenship in that it required its own citizens to give that up if they acquired foreign citizenship; "user102008" refutes that. However, if we don't want to end this issue-identifying answer at that question, let's assume the answer is "no" and that Cruz's mother was a US citizen when Cruz was born. Then we have to see if birthright citizenship from parents extends to Cruz. For this, we can look to Public Law 414 (66 Stat. 236), passed June 27, 1952, especially section 301(a)(7): The following shall be nationals and citizens of the United States at birth: […] A person born outside the geographical limits of the United States and its outlying possessions of parents one of whom is an alien, and the other a citizen of the United States who, prior to the birth of such person, was physically present in the United States or its outlying possessions for a period or periods totaling not less than ten years, at least five of which were after attaining the age of fourteen years: Provided, That any periods of honorable service in the Armed Forces of the United States by such citizen parent may be included in computing the physical presence requirements of this paragraph. Side note: Section (4) (modern (d)) would matter if Cruz's father were considered a noncitizen national of the US, slightly relaxing the requirements so that the mother only had to spend only one continuous year in the US prior to the birth. The armed forces exemption was broadened Nov. 6, 1966 to cover the parent (or their parent's) nonmilitary employment by the US government or certain international organizations. If that's relevant, this answer can be edited to expand on this point. Section 309 of that law addresses children born out of wedlock, and says that section 301(a)(7) (quoted above) applies directly as if the parents were married, "if the paternity of such child is established while such child is under the age of twenty-one years by legitimation." To the best of my knowledge, section 301(a)(7) applies to Cruz. If I were wrong on that, we'd look to Section 309(c): A person born, after December 23, 1952, outside the United States and out of wedlock shall be held to have acquired at birth the nationality status of his mother, if the mother had the nationality of the United States at the time of such person’s birth, and if the mother had previously been physically present in the United States or one of its outlying possessions for a continuous period of one year. The equivalent of the first quote today is in 8 U.S. Code § 1401(g) if parents are married at the time of a child's birth, replacing "ten years, at least five" with "five years, at least two" (Nov. 14, 1986; see Section 12 in this law). The quote from 309(c) is now 8 U.S. Code § 1409(c). So then the crucial question is: Did Cruz's mother spent the requisite period of time in the US before Cruz was born? Apparently she did, regardless of marital status, and if that's true it means Ted Cruz is a US citizen and has been since at least birth*. Again, the "natural born" aspect is omitted from this now-answered question. The answer to the question you meant to ask (perhaps "What's the most crucial issue when deciding if Senator Cruz's citizenship makes him eligible for the Presidency?") is "What does the phrase 'natural born citizen' mean in context of Article II, Section 1 of the US Constitution?" (*) Which may mean that he hasn't been a citizen his whole life, using a Cruz definition for when life begins. That's a separate discussion, though, and not very relevant to this one.

Ousting an illegal sublet My situation is the following: I sublet my apartment to a previously homeless person (I did not know this while subletting). We filled out the sublet form, but never submitted it. He has been living in my room for two months. He has not paid the rent for this month, and has completely stopped all communication. I am currently traveling abroad, and am unable to talk to him in person. When I talked to my landlord, my landlord said that I am their tenant, they can change the lock codes for me, and then ask the guy to talk to me. My questions are the following: a) Is this illegal? Changing the lock codes, and then asking him to vacate the house? He has clearly violated all terms of the contract by being a month late on rent. b) The sublet form was never submitted. Does this protect me, if the guy decides to take me to court? c) I am an international student in the US, and will be starting a job soon. If I am taken to court, and lose, will this affect my record and immigration status?

It is generally illegal in all US states for a landlord to change the locks on a tenant. Given your description of the facts, this person (henceforth "squatter") is a tenant, lack of forms and lease notwithstanding. When a person violates the terms of a lease, the landlord's recourse is to sue the person for damages and to petition for eviction (where the sheriff removes the person from the premise). Penalties for illegal lockouts tend to be very severe, however the tenant on the lease is not the one at risk on that point. The squatter can't win in a court case against the former tenant, but he can still file paperwork which the tenant must respond to. If the tenant of record doesn't show up in court, summary judgment will be entered against him. The landlord can sue you for the rent owed.

The only avenue for tenant liability would be if the tenant is responsible for the damage. The courts have not assigned responsibility for damage resulting from other people's disagreement with a political expression to the person expressing the viewpoint. You are generally free to peacefully express yourself, and as a renter this would be part of your right of "quiet enjoyment of the premise". If there is a lease condition that says "no political signs", then maybe that's a violation of the contract, but that might also be an illegal term in your state or city (under landlord-tenant laws). Since you have the right to express your opinion, the courts must respect that right and not deem that engaging in political expression negates your other rights. In general, if someone commits a crime, the law does not say "but you take the blame if you express your political opinion".

Yes, they seem to have broken the law. In California, notice must be given for an eviction. This can be a 30/60/90 day notice with no reason needed (typically because the landlord wants the property for something else) or a 3 day notice with cause- the most typical being not paying the rent. Note that COVID exceptions exist, though I don't believe they apply to you. Even after that time, a landlord cannot physically remove a tenant or attempt to drive them out through the destruction/removal of property, locking them out, or cutting off utilities. They are liable for damages suffered as well as penalties. There are lawful procedures in place for this. The removal and destruction of your belongings could constitute either larceny or vandalism. Either way, by unlawfully removing your possessions, they are liable for the damages caused.

You can be held liable for rent after you are off a lease. Rewriting a lease only affects future obligations, and doesn't extinguish past obligations. However, you appear to have released X from all obligations via paragraph 2. If you plan to sue for past rent, the court will have to interpret the statement that "The landlord, Y, and Z agree to relinquish X from any obligation regarding the lease as mentioned above", which is non-standard English. It is extremely likely that the court will interpret this to mean "release". You might argue, using earlier emails, that all parties had a clear understanding that this means "from all future obligations, but not past obligations", but that is not what the written agreement says, and the parol evidence rule, which is codified as explicit law in California, says execution of a contract in writing... supersedes all the negotiations or stipulations concerning its matter which preceded or accompanied the execution of the instrument That clause lets X off the hook, in exchange for his claim on the security deposit and for relinquishing his tenant rights to the unit. You cannot sue X for any rent.

Inferring from the question, it appears that: The tenancy is an Assured Shorthold Tenancy. The tenancy agreement started on 16 December 2014. The initial fixed term was for 12 months. (Please comment below if any of this is incorrect). A Section 21 order gives notice that, unless the tenant leaves by the date given in the document, the landlord will begin legal proceedings against the tenant, in order to obtain a court order forcing the tenant to leave. To answer the OP's questions: Does it mean that she wants to use her right to cancel the contract after 2 months? It looks like that to me but I am not 100% sure. Yes - but if this is before the end of the fixed term (which I'm assuming is 15 December) there must be a clause in the tenancy agreement (normally called a "break clause") allowing the fixed term to be terminated early. If there is no break clause, then you cannot be asked to leave before the end of the fixed term. What does it mean "after 16/11/2015"? After can mean anything... even end of contract in December. Yes. The landlord would like you to leave before the date shown - but if you don't, the landlord can begin legal proceedings any time after that. Is this a legal document or just something she made up? It is a legal document. Section 21 of the Housing Act 1988 allows a landlord to ask a tenant to leave without having to give a reason. The landlord must meet certain conditions in order for the notice to be valid. What happens if I want to leave the house later because I don't find alternative? You'll need to discuss that with the landlord. However, if you don't leave by the end of the fixed term, you are entitled to stay (and pay rent!) until a court (not the landlord) orders your eviction. EDIT: This website goes into a lot more detail about the whole Section 21 procedure.

I gather that you either a) don't want the bike or b) are physically unable to retrieve it. You are acting like a spectator here. You ARE involved. By doing nothing, you are creating trouble for others, and failing to create a good. They must go through an extensive process to protect the rights of an owner they don't know who even is. What you should do, is to send a paper letter to the landlord at that complex. Dear landlord, You may have a bicycle at Location Here inside Apartment Complex Name Here. I am the owner of the bicycle. I had to leave the region, and I had to leave the bicycle behind. I cannot come back and claim it. Perhaps you know someone who could use a bicycle. Please give the bicycle to them, or dispose of it as you see fit. Here is the key to the lock. Signed, Your name Why a paper letter? Because you can't email a key! If you sent an email and key separately, they'd get confused. Plus, the signature on paper is legally binding, so they don't have to worry about it being a trick. Tape the physical key to a piece of paper, to keep it from rattling around and chewing a hole in the envelope. (it could be the paper the letter is written on, note that a printout of a Word document is fine). Paper letters have gone out of style, I know; you can work out how to send them, but an older person will help you do that faster, since well, we used to do everything that way. Now if you do want the bicycle, that gets harder. You will have to have one of your roommates give a key to someone who can retrieve it for you and store it for you. And you/they may need to coordinate with the landlord to even get access to it / find out if it's still there. This is probably a waste of your time.

Yes, they still have to go through the normal eviction process and must still provide the minimum number of days required by their local jurisdiction in order to vacate the property. By moving in and establishing residency, the tenant and landlord form an implied lease - the tenant does not need anything in writing in order to establish their legal rights to tenancy. More information: No written lease--Am I in trouble?

The official website of the french administration gives details under which conditions a landlord can end a lease in France. As a general rule, the landlord cannot end a lease unless meeting certain conditions. The landlord has to send a letter to all of the tenant (all of them if multiple) named on the lease, and the spouse of the tenant even if not named on the lease. The letter has to be sent at least 6 month before the end of the lease if the residence isn't furnished, or 3 months if the residence is furnished. The letter must contain the reason for the ending of the lease. There are 3 causes the landlord may use to end the lease: The landlord plans to make the residence the primary residence of them, their spouse / partner (of at least 1 year) / PACS partner, or an ascendant or descendant of the landlord or their spouse. The landlord plans to sell the residence. In this case, the tenant has the priority to buy the residence if they wish. If the tenant take the offer, the landlord is obliged to accept the offer. The landlord can also sell the residence with the lease, in which case the lease is transfered to the buyer. Under legitimate and serious cause, including but not limited to not paying rent / regularly paying the rent late, causing trouble to the neighborhood, subleasing the residence... If the tenant contests the cause, the landlord will have to justify to a judge the reason the cause of termination. In this case, the landlord can have ground to end the lease before its end date. Otherwise, the landlord cannot end the lease, and the lease is automatically renewed at the end date without the need of explicit communication. A tenant can be protected if they fall under certain conditions. I don't find anything protecting people with a child, but if the tenant is older than 65yo / taking care of someone older than 65yo and the tenant earns an income lower than a certain limit a given year Then the tenant can be protected from these causes, unless the landlord is also older than 65 or earns an income lower than the same limit as the tenant or offers to help relocate the tenant to another residence close to the first residence which also accomodates to the need of the tenant. Note that, if the ex-tenant found that the cause given by the landlord was fraudulent (for example saying they'll use it as a primary residence but lease it to another tenant), then the tenant can bring the case to court and get indemnized as indicated here.

Can you aid and abet a crime against yourself? Bob tells Bill, "I want to shoot someone, but I don't have a gun." Bill gives Bob a gun. Bob then shoots Bill. (Assume that Bill survives, both are legally allowed to possess the gun, the transfer of the gun would have been legal if Bob requested it for a legal reason, and Bob doesn't shoot anyone else.) Obviously, Bob has assaulted Bill, but has Bill committed a crime?

united-kingdom In the notorious Spanner Case in the UK in 1987, several gay men were prosecuted for aiding and abetting consensual sadomasochistic assaults upon themselves. So the answer to your question is yes, at least in the UK.

It looks like this is covered by article 34 of the criminal code you linked: ARTICULO 34. - No son punibles: [...] El que obrare en defensa propia o de sus derechos, siempre que concurrieren las siguientes circunstancias: a) Agresión ilegítima; b) Necesidad racional del medio empleado para impedirla o repelerla; c) Falta de provocación suficiente por parte del que se defiende. Se entenderá que concurren estas circunstancias respecto de aquel que durante la noche rechazare el escalamiento o fractura de los cercados, paredes o entradas de su casa, o departamento habitado o de sus dependencias, cualquiera que sea el daño ocasionado al agresor. Igualmente respecto de aquel que encontrare a un extraño dentro de su hogar, siempre que haya resistencia; English (my translation, no guarantees): ARTICLE 34 - Not punished are: [...] Someone who acts in self-defense or in defense of their rights, as long as the following circumstances apply: a) illegitimate aggression b) a rational need for the means used for preventing or repelling the aggression c) a lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the defender It is understood that these circumstances apply with respect to someone who during the night defends from a housebreaking or a breach of the enclosure, the walls or entrances to their home, or the home of their dependents, no matter what damage is caused to the attacker. Reading these rules, which look quite similar to the law in most other countries, I'd say shooting an armed intruder would be covered. It would probably already be covered under the general rules ( a) to c) ): There is an illegitimate aggression, and shooting is necessary for stopping the agressor, because no milder means is practical in the situation. Additionally, the last paragraph would apply, which provides additional protection to someone defending their home, so even if a judge decided that normally shooting someone attacking with a knife is not necessary for protection, it would still be ok for home defence.

We don't have enough facts to know. What Bob said about having violated the injunction, which could expose him to criminal contempt of court liability, was not true. But, the precise details of what he said, to whom he said it, and his relationship to the case, are not clear. Saying something that isn't true isn't always against the law, and even when it is against the law, the consequences depend upon the context. An intentionally false statement of fact to a police officer or to the court under oath would probably be a crime (but, unlike U.S. practice, criminal defendants who testify are not generally required to testify under oath). An unintentionally false statement of fact to the same persons (e.g. because Bob misheard the question or was drunk at the time and assumed that the statement of fact he was making was true or had dementia) would probably not have legal consequences for him. A mere confession - I am guilty of violating the civil injunction - would probably not be perjury or fraud because guilt of a civil injunction includes opinions and legal conclusions which are not actionable, as well as implied statements of fact, which might be actionable. But, if he confessed in the form of a plea, there probably wouldn't have been a trial at all. Once he made his plea, his factual guilty or innocence might be irrelevant in the face of a judicial admission. Courts can sometimes sanction parties to lawsuits for wasting everyone's time under quite specific circumstances, but we don't know precisely what relationship Bob has to the case in which the injunction was entered.

No If she has probable cause, yes. The question is whether "a reasonable amount of suspicion, supported by circumstances sufficiently strong to justify a prudent and cautious person's belief that certain facts [Bob is a thief] are probably true"? Its likely that the answer to this question is yes. None No Charlotte listens to Alice, Charlotte asks Bob questions which Bob may or may not answer. Charlotte can ask Bob to produce the receipt, Bob doesn't have to. Charlotte can ask to search Bob, Bob doesn't have to consent. If Bob tries to leave, if Charlotte has reasonable suspicion the Bob has committed a crime (which she could certainly justify) she may detain him temporarily without arrest. If Charlotte has probable cause to believe that Bob has committed a crime (which she could probably justify) then she can arrest him.

Assuming that the above can be established by admissible evidence, that sounds like a case for first degree murder, and probably various other crimes as well. In some jurisdictions there is a specific crime of "Murder for hire" which might also apply if available on the jurisdiction where this occurred. A comment mentions a possible insanity defense. That is going to depend on detailed facts not included in the question, but might be possible.

The answer provided by Dale M is half right, but there are a few things that I think are wrong. Firstly, the actual reality of the situation doesn't matter. What matters is that you act in a reasonable manner, performing assessments of the situation as a reasonable person would do. If you misread the situation, and end up killing a police officer that was acting in a lawful manner, it doesn't necessarily mean you were acting unlawfully yourself. Because police officers are generally exposed to situations where they would be forced to use their firearm, that obviously would impact how a reasonable person would see the situation, but the test for reasonableness would not go out the window. In addition, even if you were found to not be acting in a reasonable manner, there is certainly a question if you would be found guilty of a lesser charge of manslaughter rather than murder. It's possible the self-defence claim would be upheld as an imperfect defence.

"If it were not assize-time, I would not take such language from you." (said while grabbing the handle of sword) This is a famous conditional threat where the speaker/actor was not found to express intent to do harm; perhaps better called a negative condition. This probably confuses matters but if you are to search for more answers this could be a good place to start. One of the elements of common law assault is that the threat must be able to be carried out immediately; it must be imminent. I do not have a cite for this but I recall that this means that conditional threats are excluded from assault. So calling a politician on the phone and telling them that if they do not drop out of a race you will hurt them is not assault. So, "You cut that out now or you’ll go home in an ambulance" sounds a lot like, "stop or you will get hurt." The victim has the opportunity to avoid the danger; the threat is not imminent. But the facts here are interesting because the speaker touched the victim while speaking which might mean fear of imminent was real. But they were in a crowded room in front of cameras - could the victim really feel that threat was imminent? Plus, the "you will go home" implies a future harm. Oh, and the speaker does not say "I will hurt you," maybe she was actually trying to protect the victim from someone else's actions. Like when my teacher knew someone was waiting outside the classroom to fight me and she told me, "if you go out there you will get hurt!" I would hope that a jury would consider this hard bargaining.

All Four of them! Double Jeopardy is not in play if a jurisdiction can lay claim to your criminal action, so if you stand on the Four Corners and shoot a man in any of the four states, each state has a right to charge murder. In addition, the Federal Government can have a go at you because you crossed state lines while in comission of a crime. Plus the Navajo Nation, which controls the reservation land the border is on. So that six separate charges. That said, the state the dead body occupied at time of Murder would have the best case for action and the other three would likely let that state try you first. The Feds would only step in if each of the four states failed to convict, though they can step in whenever they want (they are just watching to see if you'll serve time first). Not sure at which point Tribal jurisdiction applies, but given that this is a fairly common Jurisdiction issue, I'm sure it's been worked out.

California non-compete laws: where do they come from? I once read that California non-compete laws come from the gold rush era, and yet I was not able to find any more information about the subject. It would be interesting to understand what historical circumstances led California to have these non-compete laws which many of the other US states don't have. (and why those states don't have such laws) Thank you in advance for any answer whatsoever.

Overview California's prohibition on non-competition clauses was part of the Civil Code it adopted in 1872 which was written predominantly by David Dudley Field II, whose first major accomplishment was drafting a significant overhaul and codification of civil procedure rules for New York State a couple of decades earlier that was widely emulated and became the standard framework for civil procedure until the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted in the 1930s. He was heavily influenced by European civil codes and by criticism of the common law system. He was an anti-slavery Democrat who later became a Republican and represented (unsuccessfully) the leader of the Tammany Hall's leader Boss Tweed who was the epitome of corrupt machine politics in a trial of the century class criminal case. Another reference that can be reviewed is David S. Clark, "The Civil Law Influence on David Dudley Field's Code of Civil Procedure", in Mathias Reimann (ed), The Reception of Continental Ideas in the Common Law World: 1820–1920 (1993) 63–87. Long Answer Only three states ban employee noncompetes: California (since 1872, see Edwards v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 44 Cal. 4th 937, 945 (2008)); North Dakota (since 1865—before North Dakota was even a state, see Werlinger v. Mut. Serv. Cas. Ins. Co., 496 N.W.2d 26 (N.D. 1993)); and Oklahoma (since 1890—before Oklahoma was a state, see Brandon Kemp, “Noncompetes in Oklahoma Mergers and Acquisitions,” 88 Okla. B.J. 128, 128 (2017)). (Source) The cited California case at the page cited states: Under the common law, as is still true in many states today, contractual restraints on the practice of a profession, business, or trade, were considered valid, as long as they were reasonably imposed. (Bosley Medical Group v. Abramson (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 284, 288.) This was true even in California. (Wright v. Ryder (1868) 36 Cal. 342, 357 [relaxing original common law rule that all restraints on trade were invalid in recognition of increasing population and competition in trade].) However, in 1872 California settled public policy in favor of open competition, and rejected the common law “rule of reasonableness,” when the Legislature enacted the Civil Code. (Former Civ. Code, § 1673, repealed by Stats. 1941, ch. 526, § 2, p. 1847, and enacted as Bus. & Prof. Code, § 16600, Stats. 1941, ch. 526, § 1, p. 1834; Bosley, supra, 161 Cal.App.3d at p. 288.)Footnote 3. Today in California, covenants not to compete are void, subject to several exceptions discussed briefly below. Footnote 3: "Prior to oral argument, we granted Andersen’s request that we take judicial notice of various documents providing information on the history of section 16600 and its predecessor statutes. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, 453, 459.)" Wikipedia summarizes the 1872 adoption of the Civil Code in California as follows: The Civil Code of California is a collection of statutes for the State of California. The code is made up of statutes which govern the general obligations and rights of persons within the jurisdiction of California. It was based on a civil code originally prepared by David Dudley Field II for the state of New York (but which was never enacted in that state). It is one of the 29 California Codes and was among the first four enacted in 1872. Though the Code is organized in a manner similar to the inherited Colonial Spanish and Mexican Civil Law civil codes, many of its provisions are codifications of well-established American common law principles. For example, it contains a definition of consideration, a principle in the common law of contracts which has no direct equivalent in civil law systems. Similarly, it codifies the mailbox rule that communication of acceptance is effective when dropped in the mail, which is a feature unique to the common law. First adopted in 1872 and signed into law by then Governor Newton Booth, the Civil Code is divided – similarly to its civil law analogues – into four divisions: "the first relating to persons"; "the second to property"; "the third to obligations"; "the fourth contains general provisions relating to the three preceding divisions." Division One contains laws which govern personal rights while Division Two contains laws which govern property rights. Division Three codifies the substantive contract law of the State of California as well as various regulations relating to agency, mortgages, unsecured loans, extensions of credit, and other areas of California law. Division Four defines remedies available in lawsuits, what constitutes a nuisance, various maxims of jurisprudence, and other miscellaneous provisions which relate "to the three preceding divisions." Although revolutionary for its time, the California Civil Code was actually the third successfully enacted codification of the substance of the common law. The first was the Code of Georgia of 1861 (largely based on the work of Thomas Reade Rootes Cobb independent of Field), which is the ancestor of today's Official Code of Georgia Annotated. Then Dakota Territory beat California to the punch by becoming the first jurisdiction to enact Field's civil code in 1866. David Dudley Field II's audacity in trying to codify all of the general principles of the common law (including the law of property, domestic relations, contracts, and torts) into general statutory law in the form of a civil code was extremely controversial in the American legal community, both in his time and ever since. Most U.S. states (as well as most other common law jurisdictions) declined to pursue such an aggressive codification. The Restatements of the Law were developed in the 20th century as a compromise between those who felt the common law was a disorganized mess and those who valued the flexibility and richness of the common law. Only California, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Montana enacted virtually all of Field's civil code, while Idaho partially enacted the contract sections but omitted the tort sections. Later, Guam borrowed much of the California Civil Code for its own legal system. Justice Stephen Johnson Field (who was David Field's brother and was largely responsible for introducing his work to California), praised the California Codes (including the Civil Code) as "perfect in their analysis, admirable in their arrangement, and furnishing a complete code of laws," while English jurist Sir Frederick Pollock attacked the Civil Code as "about the worst piece of codification ever produced" and called it "the New York abortion" (since it was never enacted in that state). What was David Dudley Field II's agenda? According to this Wikipedia article: After having practiced law for several years, Field became convinced that the common law in America, and particularly in New York state, needed radical changes to unify and simplify its procedure. 1836 was particularly devastating for Field: his first wife, youngest child, and one of his brothers all died in the same year. To cope with his grief, he paused his law practice, traveled to Europe for over a year and focused on investigating the courts, procedure, and codes of England, France and other countries. He then returned to the United States and labored to bring about a codification of its common law procedure. Upon returning, he also established his own law firm, in which he was joined by his brothers Stephen and Jonathan. Much of Field's ideas on codification and the civil procedure rules were based on the 1825 Louisiana Code of Procedure. The Louisiana code was drafted by jurists including Edward Livingston, Louis Lislet (1762–1832), and Pierre Derbigny. In turn, the Louisiana code was inspired by French (including the French Code of Civil Procedure of 1806), Spanish, and Roman law, the common law tradition, and Livingston's Louisiana Practice Act of 1805. European civil law thus influenced American civil procedure, partially through the intermediary of Louisiana. Livingston helped to prepare criminal and civil codes for Louisiana, and Field's personal papers at Duke University Libraries reveal that he had read Livingston's 1825 report on the Louisiana Civil Code. Field was also influenced by criticism of the common law by his law partner Henry Sedgwick, as well as lawyer William Sampson. Field devoted more than 40 years to this codification project. He began by outlining his proposed reforms in pamphlets, professional journal articles, and legislative testimony, but met with a discouraging lack of interest. In 1846, Field's ideas gained wider notice with publication of a pamphlet, "The Reorganization of the Judiciary", which influenced that year's New York State Constitutional Convention to report in favor of a codification of the laws. In 1847 he finally had a chance to put his ideas into official form when he was appointed head of a state commission to revise court procedure and practice. . . . In 1857, Field became chair of another state commission, this time for the systematic codification of all of New York state law except for those portions already reported upon by the Commissioner of Practice and Pleadings. In this work he personally prepared almost the whole of the political and civil codes. . . . The codification, which was completed in February 1865, was adopted only in small part by the state of New York, but it served as a model upon which many statutory codes throughout the United States were constructed. For example, although Field's civil code was repeatedly rejected by his home state of New York, it was later adopted in large part by California, Idaho, Montana, North Dakota, and South Dakota, as well as the territory of Guam many years later. (Notably, Idaho largely enacted the contract sections of Field's civil code but declined to enact the tort sections) . . . Thanks to Field's brother, Stephen (who served in the California State Assembly and as California's fifth Chief Justice before being appointed to the U.S. Supreme Court), California bought into Field's codification project more than any other state. California first enacted a Practice Act in 1851 influenced by the Field Code, then in 1872 enacted Field's civil procedure, criminal procedure, civil, penal, and political codes as the first four California Codes (California merged Field's penal and criminal procedure codes into a single code). . . . Field was originally an anti-slavery Democrat, and he supported Martin Van Buren in the Free Soil campaign of 1848. He gave his support to the Republican Party in 1856 and to the Lincoln Administration throughout the American Civil War. Field was part of the team of defense counsel that William M. Tweed [a.k.a. "Boss Tweed"] assembled to defend himself during the first criminal prosecution of Tweed in 1873. Other members of the defense team included John Graham and Elihu Root. This first trial ended when the jury could not agree on a verdict. In a second trial in November 1873, Tweed received a sentence of twelve years in prison and a $12,750 fine from judge Noah Davis.

I have a really good pizza place near my home but the bastards won't deliver when I go interstate! Now, that's discrimination! Yes, it's discrimination. However, it's not unlawful discrimination. Discrimination is not unlawful unless it is on the basis of a protected class. Geography isn't a protected class of itself. It can be if it's used as a proxy for a protected class, such as excluding certain neighbourhoods which correspond with racial or religious groups, but that's not the case here.

Countries, and supranational governments like the EU, have jurisdiction over companies that do business in their jurisdictions. Oracle is technically not a U.S. corporation; it's a closely related group of California and Delaware corporations. Very few companies incorporate under U.S. federal law (I believe some banking corporations are required to, but don't quote me on that). Almost all companies are incorporated under state law. However, if Oracle does business in Texas, it still has to obey Texas law. And if it does business in the EU, it still has to obey EU law. Some laws make distinctions in some corporate matters between domestic corporations (incorporated under that state's laws) and foreign corporations (incorporated under another state's laws). But if you do business in a state, including an EU member state, you still need to obey that state's general laws, including antitrust law. Short version: if you visit another country, you can't go around shooting people, then say, "your laws don't apply to me, I'm an American." Neither can a company, no matter where it's incorporated. As for stopping the merger...any country where the merging companies do business can stop the merged company from doing business there if the merger violates local law. If this is a major, commercially important region like the EU, then failure to get EU approval will stop the merger. If it's a minor territory, the company will sometimes enter into an agreement to divest itself of local assets or entities. For example, if merging Oracle and Sun would create an antitrust problem in the minicomputer repair market in Laos, the merged entities would sell off either Oracle's or Sun's Laotian minicomputer repair division.

This is largely a matter of state law. In California, for example, this would be plainly unlawful (my emphasis): All persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and equal, and no matter what their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, disability, medical condition, genetic information, marital status, or sexual orientation are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments of every kind whatsoever. (Unruh Civil Rights Act, California Civil Code section 51) Other states may define "business" more narrowly, or exclude professional services. Also, there is the question of professional ethics. Discriminating against a racial group will likely run afoul of the rules of the licensing board, the AMA, the APA, and other organizations. Finally, remind your friend that every racist has what they regard as good reasons for their racism, and your friend is not special in that regard.

In england-and-wales there is no legal requirement, in the private sector, to advertise vacancies and employers can recruit whoever they choose as long as they do not commit unlawful direct or indirect discrimination and follow their own internal HR policies. Re: In the western hemisphere is it quite legal for employers to do things like... Exclude close family/marital relations of existing employees? YES Exclude internal applicants from consideration for jobs for which they have relevant qualifications? YES Hire non-local (here defined as those who can commute to work from their existing home) candidates in preference to local ones similarly qualified? YES Hire foreigners where they have suitable work permits? YES Summarily hire members of the business owner's family? YES as long as they are not "phantom" employees only put on the books soley to evade tax liabilities by, for example, paying a salary when they don't do any actual work.

Some jurisdictions tend to favor non-compete agreements, others hold most of them to be unenforceable. From a very quick search, BC is a little reluctant to enforce them, but they can be valid if sensibly drawn. However, the text you included in the question is not a non-compete agreement at all, it is a non-solicitation agreement, a much less restrictive agreement, which is significantly more likely to be upheld. The agreement quoted in the question does not mandate the employee continuing to work for the employer for any minimum time, not two years, and not six months. (Another provision might specify a required notice period, but that was not quoted and may not be in the agreement.) The agreement quoted does not prohibit the employee, after s/he leaves the job, from working for a competitor of the former employer, not even for a brief period. What the agreement quoted does do, is prohibit the employee from asking individuals and businesses who were customers of the former employer for orders for the same products as are sold by the former employer. This applies to orders on behalf of the employee personally, on behalf of a new employer, or on behalf of a business in which the employee has some sort of ownership stake (such as partner or shareholder). That is all that the quoted language prohibits. This means that the employee cannot ask those who were customers of the old employer, to buy from or through him, the same products that the old employer sells. It does not mean that the former employee cannot sell such products, if the inquiry comes from the customer. This sort of agreement is primarily aimed at preventing a salesperson from taking a client list with him or her to a new employer, and trying to get them to move their business from the salesperson's old employer to his or her new employer or business. If the employee is primarily an instructor and does not also act as a salesperson, this agreement will have almost no effect on him or her. This site discusses such agreement an myths about them in BC, Canada. It says: Non-competition clauses can be enforced by courts in BC. It is true that employers face an uphill battle in getting a judge to agree to enforce a non-compete, but it can and does happen. If you are wondering whether your non-compete will stick, ask an employment lawyer. Enforceability of a non-compete depends on the specifics of the wording of the clause itself and the overall employment contract. Some key considerations are whether the clause is clearly worded, and whether it is limited in time, geography and scope of what is covered. If a non-competition clause is enforced by a judge, it will only be applied to prevent the employee from the specific activities listed. If the employer has missed something from the clause, or there is a “loop-hole,” that is generally fair game. Many contracts include non-solicitation (aka non-solicit) clauses, which are meant to prevent the employee from contacting clients. Non-solicitation clauses are still an uphill battle to enforce, but slightly easier than a non-competition clauses. This is because non-solicits don’t dictate where an employee can work, just what business they can seek out. Even if there is no contract, obligations to respect confidential information, and fiduciary duties (in the case of key employees) last beyond the end of employment and can limit competition. An online paper on "Is my Employee’s Non-Compete Agreement Enforceable?" by Lisa Stam says: In Canada, courts have generally been reluctant to uphold agreements that have the effect of restricting an individual’s ability to earn a living or pursue the job of their choice. Indeed, courts take the initial position that restrictive covenants in employment agreements are unenforceable, unless the employer can demonstrate otherwise. A restrictive covenant must jump through several hoops to be deemed enforceable. ... A non-solicitation agreement will allow a former employee to work for a competitor, but prevent them from soliciting the clients (and possibly the employees) of their former employer for a specific period of time. Former employees may have close relationships with clients. Allowing them to solicit these clients may give them an unfair advantage against the former employer in the marketplace. If the employee does not solicit the client, but the client leaves to follow them anyway, there is little an employer can do. ... If a court finds a restrictive covenant clause unreasonable, for example it restricts solicitation for 12 months when 6 would have been reasonable, they will not read it down to fix it. Canadian courts require the employer to get it right the first time and a flawed clause will therefore normally be unenforceable. In short, the above quoted agreement may not be enforceable. But if it is, it only restricts solicitation, not competition, and does not require the employee to work for the employer for a period of two years, or any other minimum time.

The real question isn't whether there is a law, but whether you want to keep your job. If you want to do something that you believe will affect your company negatively, and you ask whether it's legal or not, the question alone should show you it's a bad idea. And another question is whether you can be sued, and what it will cost you even if you can win a case, and the answers to that are "yes" and "a lot".

This is an amusing idea, but ultimately it seems frivolous: How does one establish the physical presence of a corporation in a car? Yes, corporations have some of the legal rights and liabilities of people, but they are not people. And there are plenty of rights a person has that a corporation does not. For example (at present) a corporation can't be a party to a marriage. The closest a corporation comes to any corporal presence is the address listed of their agents.

Where would I find information about Sales Tax in New Jersey about tutoring? Is there a document or New Jersey official page where I could find information about sales tax pertaining to conducting tutoring services in New Jersey? I am using a Stripe Payment system and it doesn't take out Sales Tax and it concerns me because I can't seem to find anything or simply don't know where to search to find such information.

This document explains what is taxable vs. exempt, and also explains how to get more definitive answers (email, call, office visit).

A lot, but let's be practical. Or nothing, depending on how it is taught. I experienced the joy of obligatory 4th grade Spanish instruction, where there were virtually no Spanish-speaking teachers (they relied on a edu-tv show): it was not at all effective and didn't last a year. Teacher training on the subject matter is a big problem: so it should be taught like chemistry or high school health, and not mathematics or literature (focused class taught by an expert, for juniors or seniors). There used to be "high school civics" which taught a little bit of this, but primarily focused on politics and not the consequences of politics. Before constructing a curriculum, you need a goal (well-articulated and reasoned, not just an emotional position like "it would be good to know this"). History and literature are more on the side of "that's what it means to be educated", whereas mathematics and grouse-trapping is more on the side of "survival basics". Elementary legal education is more on the side of survival skills, which means, given a choice of an hour on voir dire versus an hour on 4th Amendment search and seizure, the hour should be spent on search and seizure. Although it is a bit abstract, elementary jurisprudence is one of those mixed survival-skill + abstract fundamentals that is so important that everybody should understand (some of) it. The reason is that it goes to the question "what is the law?". Most people believe incorrectly that "the law" is only that which was passed by Congress / the legislature, and there is very little appreciation for the necessity of interpreting the words of the law-givers. The concrete target of elementary jurisprudential education should be an understanding of why we have appellate courts. Contract-reading would be rather high on the list of priorities, at least as long as attorneys are allowed to charge for their services and free legal advice is not deemed to be a fundamental constitutional entitlement. It is easy to say "you should have your attorney read that contract", but very few people do. The goal is to improve people's ability to understand the consequence of contracts so that they don't mindlessly agree to everything, given the reality that people are not going to take all of their contracts to a lawyer and ask if it's okay to sign. Every citizen should know when they are in over their heads and should hire a lawyer. Also high on the list would be a solid understanding of "my rights as a citizen". People tend to intuit what the law is in terms of their feelings about "my rights", so if you feel that you have a right to barbecue a hamburger, then you will tend to think that it is legal to do so. It is therefore very important that every citizen have a solid understanding of what "your rights" are, and ways in which your feelings can be mistaken. Basic education on the Commerce Clause (and state relatives) is very important, given that the Commerce Clause is a major source of counterexamples to people's intuitions about their rights.

Your tax advisor was legally correct, but perhaps not very savvy. Unfortunately, the best way to resolve this sort of situation is to avoid it: You should have insisted your employer stop withholding for PA as soon as you moved out of state. Once someone else has possession of your money the burden is on you to get it back, and the burden can be (practically) quite high before it runs afoul of any serious laws. The fact is that your filings are correct, and the PA Department of Revenue is being ridiculous. If they can't be satisfied with reasonable and adequate evidence backing your return you can file administrative appeals at little cost in hopes of reaching a more reasonable agent. However, if I were in this situation, since NC's tax rate is higher, I would just amend my NC return to claim a credit for taxes paid (even though erroneously) to another state. (This takes advantage of our federalist system and your state citizenship and puts the burden on NC to collect the "correct" difference from PA if they care enough. You also don't have to fight for the actual return of money with your new state because presumably you will owe them taxes again this year, and if they haven't returned what you claim you're owed then you just deduct it from what you owe this year.)

If you are given a paid job, and you do the work, then "consideration has been provided", and 1682 will not apply. As to "referral fees" those sound more like kickbacks, but it depends on what, if anything, the person gets for the fee.

The state has wide discretion on what to require that a school teach to children, particularly in the K-12 grade range. There is little case law where a parent or private school has challenged such requirements. However, for a state to forbid that certain things be taught would probably run into a first amendment problem, because the school has free speech rights. In addition, if the school is a religious one, forbidding teaching its dogmas and views might also impact the free exercise clause. Note that a state need not permit homeschooling at all, and some states do not. When a state requires that a school teach something that it disagrees with, it can often follow a line such as "Many people think X {Standard state supported concept} but we believe Y instead. Then it has taught X, but not endorsed it. Some religious schools have handles the teaching of evolution in this sort of way. If a state mandated teaching matters of opinion as fact, such as "CARTER WAS THE MOST HANDSOME president EVER" there might well be a challenge, and I am not at all sure how it would be resolved.

When the buyer hears "to avoid sales tax" and hears the seller describing as a gift something that s/he knows was nothing of the sort, a reasonable buyer would know that this was at best suspicious, and would find out if this was legal. But assuming that the buyer accepted the seller's suggestion ignorantly and in good faith, the buyer can file a report of the transaction and pay any tax that should have been paid. The exact way of doing this will vary based on the laws of the buyer's jurisdiction (state-level if in the US) which is not given in the question. Such a report and payment might not prevent the local tax authorities from assessing an additional penalty. Criminal charges seem unlikely, but would be possible. If the seller was a used car dealer, the authorities might want the buyer to testify against the seller. They buyer might be wise to consult a lawyer with expertise in sales tax issues in the buyer's jurisdiction. Such a lawyer could advise on exactly what the buyer's legal obligation was, and how to avoid or minimize penalties or other consequences.

Probably Not In general, the law gives a school significant discretion on how to run its courses and grade its exams. And it is unlikely that getting into a lawsuit over a grade will be a good way to proceed. You could explain more fully to your instructor why you feel unfairly treated, and if not satisfied by the response, go to the department chair or other higher authority as the structure of the school may provide. I would suppose that the instructor had permission to require the 3rd party software, or that school policy gives an instructor that option. It might be worth confirming that, however. For future tests you might be able to shutdown or suspend all popups to avoid the problem happening again. A "game mode" sometimes will do that.

Bill and Jane are free to enter into a contract where, among other things, each provides valuable consideration; in this case Bill provides valuable lawn mowing services and Jane provides valuable money. In week No 1 they have negotiated the terms and the contract is complete when Bill mows the lawn and Jane pays the money. If Bill turns up next week without Jane's instruction then there is no contract and Jane does not have to pay anything; I don't think this is what you are asking but I include it for completeness. If it is understood that this arrangement continue week after week then either there is an ongoing contract or, more likely, a series of independent contracts. If there is an ongoing contract, then it can be renegotiated but it cannot be changed unilaterally by Bill. That is, he cannot unilaterally increase the price to $2. If there is a series of contracts then the terms of each of those contracts will be the same based on the course of dealing. Basically, the parties have accepted over a long period of time that the rate for a mow is $1 and Bill would have to get Jane to accept the revised rate before he mows the lawn. For your example, Jane owes Bill $1 but if she wants him back next week she will have to agree to Bill's rate.

Could a trial be held against a sitting President? During the Mueller investigation, it came out that the Justice Department has a policy against indicting a sitting President, so nothing he found would result in bringing charges against Trump. However, Trump is now out of office, and this week they indicted him for offenses related to the classified documents that were found at Mar-A-Lago after he left office. I can easily imagine lots of delays in taking this to trial. Suppose he wins the election next year, and the trial doesn't get started until 2025. As I understand it, the reasons for not indicting POTUS are due to the way a trial would interfere with their ability to do their job (or vice versa: they can't participate in their defense adequately if they're busy running the country). Wouldn't these reasons also apply if the indictment were prior to their taking office? Would the trial have to be delayed until after they leave office again?

That remains to be determined. This article (100 Tex. L. Rev. 56 (2021)) discusses the possibility. To start, the Constitution does not directly say that a sitting president cannot be prosecuted. The lack of an express presidential immunity and the fact that an attempt by Madison to create such an immunity is an indication of "original intent". The view that an incumbent president cannot be indicted, prosecuted, convicted or punished is a policy stance set forth by the Dept. of justice, but is not constitutional law. Alito in Trump v. Vance points to some apparently negative consequences of allowing indictment of a sitting president, but this was in a dissenting opinion. Practical considerations of policy might argue for not prosecuting a sitting president, but the Constitution itself does not expressly forbid it. As we know from numerous SCOTUS rulings, the court is also capable of finding implicit support for a rule in the Constitution. For example theimpeachment provisions do not demand or even hint that impeachment must precede trial and punishment. An argument that prosecution would "incapacitate" the president is met with the fact that there is a provision for replacing an incapacitated POTUS with VPOTUS as acting president. The idea that a trial interferes with a person's ability to do their job (or that they can't adequately participate in their defense if they are doing their job) has not actually prevented ordinary people with jobs from being prosecuted for their crimes.

First of all, as noted in the comments, Babylon Bee is SATIRE. It's not intended to be news, just entertainment. But the real question is whether or not a President COULD do such a thing. Or perhaps better, could a President attempt to do something like this. If a President did attempt to do this, it would be totally without precedent and also without any constitutional authority. Since the US Constitution enumerates the powers between the branches and gives the President only the authority to appoint, with the advice of the Senate, a SCOTUS justice, trying to change things by giving an existing justice 2 votes would almost certainly be immediately challenged by the Senate. It also seems unlikely that such an action would be upheld as constitutional. Of course this is all speculative since nothing of this nature has happened.

Actually this is the only SCOTUS ruling on Impeachment because of what it legally means with respect to SCOTUS and impeachment. Namely, Impeachment is a congressional power and not a judicial one that has no punishment beyond the removal from office upon conviction and that therefor it is not a matter that is Judicial. That is a fancy way to say that SCOTUS or any lower court may not hear appeals rising from the outcome of Impeachment. Because of this, it's unlikely to hear any SCOTUS case as to the matter of impeachment and the only outstanding question they could likely hear is "Who can hear an Impeachment Trial for the Vice President?" but thus far none of the 19 impeachment trials have heard involved a vice president. Nixon v. United States basically held that in matters of impeachment it is the court's position that it is likely to respond to this hypothetical with the legal ruling of "not my monkeys, not my circus" (note: not legal jargon). With that said, this makes the U.S. senate the highest court in the land when it comes to precedents set by impeachment cases. The very first person ever impeached was a U.S. Senator, who was expelled by the Senate the same day the House voted on Articles of Impeachment. The decision not to have the trial did establish some notable precedents: first, Impeachment and conviction are all about removing an officer from office and if at anytime before conviction the officer is removed by other means, the process is stopped as it is moot. Second, and more important, is that members of Congress are not "impeachable" officers as both houses have methods that allow them to expel members by vote. This means that the only people who can be impeached are executive officers (the person who is currently president, vice president, and cabinet secretaries, any other office that is appointed by the president and confirmed by the senate, and federal judges) and that a conviction of impeachment does not bar one from holding another federal office unless the senate enacts an additional punishment after the conviction barring that person from federal office. They cannot bar one from state office. Finally, House and Senate Rules have instructions for procedures in their part in impeachment. The commonality between both is that impeachment takes precidents over all regular buisness so once articles are put to the floor, there speaker must hold the vote with in a certain window of time (three days, I think) and the Senate must hold the trial as soon as possible, though will honor reasonable delays as per the impeached officer's right to delay. As a final note, and because it wasn't clear in the question Nixon v. United States is often confused with another case (United States v. Nixon). The latter one did indirectly relate to impeachment in that it was related to President Nixon handing over evidence to the comittee investigating possible impeachment articles against Nixon, and because of that ruling, Nixon handed over the evidence and later resigned to avoid the Impeachment. The former one not only didn't involve anything related Watergate, it also wasn't related to President Nixon at all, but a (former) Federal Judge Walter Nixon, and specifically was heard because Judge Nixon happened to be the first Judge impeached by a Senate commitee as the jury rather than the full Senate, following a rule change that only held full senate as jury for the President and Vice President and a committee for anyone else. The final rule is that only the President is constitutionally mandated to have the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court act as the judge in an Impeachment trial, while the presiding officer for all other cases is either the Vice President (acting in his role as President of the Senate) or the President pro Tempore of the Senate (acting in his role of "Guy Keeping the Vice President's Seat in the Senate Rotunda Warm" (not technical Jargon)). Which is why the question of "who is the judge in impeachment of the Vice President?" a noodle baking question, and the answer differs from the Chief Justice to the Senate pr Tempore to the rarely serious argument of the Vice President himself. The best answer is that "It has never come up."

A party can ask a judge to recuse at the outset of a case for bias or other reasons (e.g. a family connection to a party). Generally, a judge rules on that motion personally and it is an interlocutory motion not subject to appeal except by extraordinary writ (or the equivalent) to the state supreme court. It is not generally proper to do so during a trial. Moreover, one jeopardy has attached in a criminal trial (which happens when the jury is sworn) if the trial ends prior to a jury verdict for reasons other than those attributable to the defendant, the defendant cannot be tried again on those charges and is functionally acquitted. There are probably some arguable exceptions to this rule in extraordinary circumstances that are not the fault of either party (e.g. if a meteor hits courthouse and kills the judge and some jurors mid-trial, or if it is revealed that the judge committed the crime for which the defendant is being tried). But the threshold for exceptions to the general rule is very high.

The 1975 ban by the attorney general prohibited prosecutors from offering to reduce charges, dismiss counts, or request a particular sentence in exchange for a guilty plea. (Ad hoc exceptions were allowed, initially only by the AG, later by the head of each local office. For a while, there was also judicial bargaining). The AG's ban was on quid pro quo arrangements by his office, and the AG has absolutely no power over the plea by an accused, so that is how an accused could still plead guilty. The following quote is from the first page of Rubenstein & White: On July 3, 1975, the Attorney General of Alaska, Avrum Gross, issued written instructions forbidding all district attorneys and their assistants from engaging in plea bargaining. This prohibition extended to all felony and all misdemeanor prosecutions filed as of August 15. They could not offer to reduce charges or dismiss counts in multiple-count complaints, informations, or indictments as a quid pro quo for guilty pleas. Nor could they request the court to impose any stated sentence; they could only recite the facts. I can't locate a copy of the actual memo, but also see this quote, esp. "...negotiations with defendants designed to arrive at an agreement for entry of a plea of guilty in return for a particular sentence...". A guilty plea is much cheaper for a defendant than paying an attorney and getting convicted, so if you're actually guilty and the evidence is good, it could be a wiser move to plead guilty. There is little reason to engage in a futile act. It apparently also caused a change in the prosecutorial standard for charging, from probable cause to beyond a reasonable doubt – consequently, the chances that the accused is actually guilty goes up. The re-evaluation study also found evidence some evidence that sentencing was lighter in the case of a guilty plea, and it would be sufficient for the accused to believe that he could get a lighter sentence as a reward for a guilty plea to nudge a person in the direction of a guilty plea.

Part of the problem you'll find is that there are so few impeachments in U.S. History (Only 21 articles of Impeachment have ever been drafted, of which only 8 resulted in convictions) and SCOTUS is so selective on cases it chooses to hear, that only one case has ever been heard and that was upheld (Nixon v. United States). In that case, SCOTUS ruled that it did not have jurisdiction to rule on the legal question before it (was the new trial format a proper trial by the senate), but did not have an opinion one way or another to suggest that SCOTUS could not review other cases that come before it. One of the reasons they also haven't is in order to have a legal case in the U.S., the plaintiff must suffer actual harm. More impeachments ended without a conviction than with either acquittal (8), resignation before trial conclusion (4), and expulsion from senate (1, and will never occur again as Congressional office holders are not impeachable following this particular case). Since no harm was caused and courts do not rule on hypotheticals, a case with actual harm (conviction) must occur in order for SCOTUS to even consider hearing the case. Nixon does not bar SCOTUS from hearing more appeals resulting from Impeachment, it only bars those relating to the manner in which the senate chooses to hold the trial.

Art. 1 Sec. 9(8) says two different things. The first says that "No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States". That means that the US cannot grant a title (hereditary or otherwise) like "Duke of Detroit", "Prince of Princeton". It does not prohibit the practice of speaking of POTUS as "His Highness, the President of the United States", likewise "His Elective Majesty" or "His Excellency", but early discussions in the Senate put paid to even calling a president this, and instead he is just called "Mr. President" (just as judges are called "your honor"). An appellation such as "Chief Justice" is not a title of nobility, it is a job description. We don't have titles of nobility granted by the government. There is a constitutional amendment, the Titles of Nobility Amendment, which was considered but not ratified, which is stricter on the anti-nobility statce. Then there is second thing, that prohibits officials from "accept[ing] of any present, emolument, office, or title, of any kind whatever, from any king, prince, or foreign state", without Congressional approval. Accordingly, the president, sec'y of state or a congressman cannot accept a gift, such as a car, from a foreign power, unless it is approved by Congress. Every congressional "exception" was approved by Congress; moreover, such benefits are not from a foreign power. The Speech or Debate Clause Art. I, Sec.6(1) in fact gives congressmen a privilege (immunity from arrest) which ordinary citizens do not have. So there is no connection between titles of nobility and free bean soup or whatever legal exemptions Congress may give itself.

This would be a violation of 18 USC 1361, which prohibits destruction of federal property. See also the DoJ legal notes on this crime. The act does have to be willful, so dropping a cup accidentally is not a crime. If for example the act is mustaching Obama's portrait, the damage would probably rise to the quarter-million dollar fine and 10 years in prison level. It would of course be at the discretion of the (new) DoJ whether to press charges.

Does owning a house before the marriage exempt it from divorce asset division? If someone owns a house before marriage, would that house be exempt from asset division in divorce? For simplicity, assume that otherwise, asset picture is fairly simple and even (2 working spouses with similar income, no children, a shared savings/checking account, similarly sized retirements accounts, no other properties or investments). Would the answer depend on any factors other than whether the state is Equitable Distribution vs community property? Jurisdiction: USA, but for example let's use California and New York for two types, if that's needed to narrow things down. Obviously, assume that there's no negotiated settlement between spouses, and divorce goes to family court judge.

united-states Overview If someone owns a house before marriage, would that house be exempt from asset division in divorce? For simplicity, assume that otherwise, asset picture is fairly simple and even (2 working spouses with similar income, no children, a shared savings/checking account, similarly sized retirements accounts, no other properties or investments). This seemingly simple question doesn't have a simple answer. This is in part because state law on the subject varies so much. Would the answer depend on any factors other than whether the state is Equitable Distribution vs community property? Yes. The other reason that this is a difficult question to answer is that there are many other potentially relevant factors. This answer will provide some examples of some of the relevant facts that were not provided in the question. State Law Varies Greatly It is necessary to look to particular states, such as the New York and California, as suggested in the question, regarding this matter, as there is no uniformity or even guidance in federal law (there is even a common law exception to federal court jurisdiction that actually specifically prohibits federal courts from handling divorces and other domestic relations matters). There are two extreme starting points in terms of how this question is handled under state law, but many states are hybrid systems that borrow from each of these systems. Also, there are very practically important differences in detail with respect to how final outcomes are determined, even in states that have the same basic systems. Once critical details are considered, there are probably at least half a dozen basic sets of rules among the fifty U.S. states concerning the question of how a house acquired prior to marrying by one spouse before marriage is treated in a property division during a divorce, and each of those basic sets of rules has some state specific variations. This also sets aside the ubiquitous possibility in every U.S. state that these rules have been modified by a marital agreement between the spouses (such as a prenuptial agreement). There are also significant differences between states, beyond the scope of this question, regarding the inheritance rights of a spouse in a house acquired by the other spouse before the marriage began in that spouse's sole name, at death. Equitable Division One of the two extremes in U.S. law is the pure traditional equitable division rule, in which all property of each spouse (regardless of whose name it is titled in) may be distributed in a manner that the judge finds to be equitable, rather than equal, and the concepts of separate and marital or community property does not exist. In the traditional equitable division regime, and in some states, but not others, a divorce court may consider marital fault in some (but not all) divorces, in deciding what is equitable in divorces commenced on fault based grounds. Each of these states has both fault based and no-fault divorces, a marital fault in not considered in property divisions in no-fault divorces in these states. New York State, for example, has a mixed fault and no-fault based divorce system. In equitable division states, often a business or a pension will be allocated entirely to a spouse who is active in the business or occupation associated with that asset, and a house will be allocated to a spouse who is not involved with the business or the occupation that gave rise to the pension. Community Property Another of the extremes in U.S. law is the community property regime, in which property acquired before the marriage and by a gift or inheritance are separate property not subject to division in a divorce, and everything acquired during the marriage is owned 50-59 by the spouses. In a community property state, property acquired by either spouse during the marriage automatically becomes property that is owned 50-50 by the spouses immediate and often some kinds of property formally titled in only one spouse's name can't be transferred without the consent of both spouses. For example, in California, which is a community property state, a house purchased in the name of one spouse before the couple marries is initially, at least, on the day of the wedding, entirely the separate property of the spouse who owns it. But, considerations discussed below regarding appreciation and the source of payments to related to the house will sometimes muddy the waters of this analysis. New York State: A Hybrid System New York State is strictly speaking an equitable distribution state and a spouse does not have a present ownership interest in property titled in their spouse's name which is acquired during the marriage. But, New York State does make a distinction between separate property and marital property at the time of a divorce, so it is really a hybrid of a traditional equitable division regime and a community property regime, unlike some other states that are more pure examples of the traditional equitable division system. During the divorce both spouses have to tell the judge about their income and any debts they owe. When the court grants a divorce, property will be divided equitably (though not always equally) between the spouses. New York's Equitable Distribution Law recognizes marriage as an economic as well as a social partnership. The law requires that a judge divide property as fairly as possible. The Equitable Distribution Law talks about two types of property for purposes of divorce: marital property and separate property. Marital property will be divided between the two spouses. Marital Property: all property either spouse bought during the marriage, regardless of whose name is on the property. Pension plans and other retirement plans are considered marital property. The portion of marital property earned during the marriage will be divided by the court. Separate Property: property a spouse owned before the marriage, or any inheritance or personal injury payments or gifts from someone other than the spouse during the marriage. To see the factors a court should consider in making an equitable distribution award, see Domestic Relations Law § 236(B)(5)(d). (Source) In New York State, separate property and marital property is defined as follows: c. The term "marital property" shall mean all property acquired by either or both spouses during the marriage and before the execution of a separation agreement or the commencement of a matrimonial action, regardless of the form in which title is held, except as otherwise provided in agreement pursuant to subdivision three of this part. Marital property shall not include separate property as hereinafter defined. d. The term separate property shall mean: (1) property acquired before marriage or property acquired by bequest, devise, or descent, or gift from a party other than the spouse; (2) compensation for personal injuries; (3) property acquired in exchange for or the increase in value of separate property, except to the extent that such appreciation is due in part to the contributions or efforts of the other spouse; (4) property described as separate property by written agreement of the parties pursuant to subdivision three of this part. (Source) The factors to be considered in the equitable property division in New York State, per the same source, are as follows: Disposition of property in certain matrimonial actions. a. Except where the parties have provided in an agreement for the disposition of their property pursuant to subdivision three of this part, the court, in an action wherein all or part of the relief granted is divorce, or the dissolution, annulment or declaration of the nullity of a marriage, and in proceedings to obtain a distribution of marital property following a foreign judgment of divorce, shall determine the respective rights of the parties in their separate or marital property, and shall provide for the disposition thereof in the final judgment. b. Separate property shall remain such. c. Marital property shall be distributed equitably between the parties, considering the circumstances of the case and of the respective parties. d. In determining an equitable disposition of property under paragraph c, the court shall consider: (1) the income and property of each party at the time of marriage, and at the time of the commencement of the action; (2) the duration of the marriage and the age and health of both parties; (3) the need of a custodial parent to occupy or own the marital residence and to use or own its household effects; (4) the loss of inheritance and pension rights upon dissolution of the marriage as of the date of dissolution; (5) the loss of health insurance benefits upon dissolution of the marriage; (6) any award of maintenance under subdivision six of this part; (7) any equitable claim to, interest in, or direct or indirect contribution made to the acquisition of such marital property by the party not having title, including joint efforts or expenditures and contributions and services as a spouse, parent, wage earner and homemaker, and to the career or career potential of the other party. The court shall not consider as marital property subject to distribution the value of a spouse's enhanced earning capacity arising from a license, degree, celebrity goodwill, or career enhancement. **However, in arriving at an equitable division of marital property, the court shall consider the direct or indirect contributions to the development during the marriage of the enhanced earning capacity of the other spouse; (8) the liquid or non-liquid character of all marital property; (9) the probable future financial circumstances of each party; (10) the impossibility or difficulty of evaluating any component asset or any interest in a business, corporation or profession, and the economic desirability of retaining such asset or interest intact and free from any claim or interference by the other party; (11) the tax consequences to each party; (12) the wasteful dissipation of assets by either spouse; (13) any transfer or encumbrance made in contemplation of a matrimonial action without fair consideration; (14) whether either party has committed an act or acts of domestic violence, as described in subdivision one of section four hundred fifty-nine-a of the social services law, against the other party and the nature, extent, duration and impact of such act or acts; (15) in awarding the possession of a companion animal, the court shall consider the best interest of such animal. "Companion animal", as used in this subparagraph, shall have the same meaning as in subdivision five of section three hundred fifty of the agriculture and markets law; and (16) any other factor which the court shall expressly find to be just and proper. e. In any action in which the court shall determine that an equitable distribution is appropriate but would be impractical or burdensome or where the distribution of an interest in a business, corporation or profession would be contrary to law, the court in lieu of such equitable distribution shall make a distributive award in order to achieve equity between the parties. The court in its discretion, also may make a distributive award to supplement, facilitate or effectuate a distribution of marital property. f. In addition to the disposition of property as set forth above, the court may make such order regarding the use and occupancy of the marital home and its household effects as provided in section two hundred thirty-four of this chapter, without regard to the form of ownership of such property. g. In any decision made pursuant to this subdivision, the court shall set forth the factors it considered and the reasons for its decision and such may not be waived by either party or counsel. h. In any decision made pursuant to this subdivision the court shall, where appropriate, consider the effect of a barrier to remarriage, as defined in subdivision six of section two hundred fifty-three of this article, on the factors enumerated in paragraph d of this subdivision. Thus, in New York State, unlike Colorado (discussed below), appreciation in the value of separate property during the marriage is separate property and not marital property. Section 234 of the New York Domestic Relations Law referenced in the bolded language above states: § 234. Title to or occupancy and possession of property. In any action for divorce, for a separation, for an annulment or to declare the nullity of a void marriage, the court may (1) determine any question as to the title to property arising between the parties, and (2) make such direction, between the parties, concerning the possession of property, as in the court's discretion justice requires having regard to the circumstances of the case and of the respective parties. Such direction may be made in the final judgment, or by one or more orders from time to time before or subsequent to final judgment, or by both such order or orders and final judgment. Where the title to real property is affected, a copy of such judgment, order or decree, duly certified by the clerk of the court wherein said judgement was rendered, shall be recorded in the office of the recording officer of the county in which such property is situated, as provided by section two hundred ninety-seven-b of the real property law. Usually, the authority granted by Section 234 is used to enter temporary orders granting a spouse possession and use of a residence titled in the name of the other spouse until the case is concluded, although it could be applied to a post-decree decision as well. Also, while New York State now finally has "no fault" divorces (it was the last state in the U.S. to make this option available), it also allows spouses to commence a fault based divorce. In a fault based divorce, marital fault (e.g. having an affair) can be considered as a factor by the court in equitably dividing the couple's property in the divorce if fault is successfully established. Fun Fact: In New York State, family court judges don't have jurisdiction over divorces, which are instead handled by the general jurisdiction trial court in the state known as the "Supreme Court". New York State's apex court is called the "Court of Appeals". Complicating Factors The reality, however, is more complicated than these extremes in most cases. Many states adopt parts of each regime, develop their own special rules, or implement the same basic system of marital property ownership and property division upon divorce in different ways. Appreciation And Payment Of Carrying Costs During The Marriage For example, Colorado is not technically a community property state, and community property rights of a spouse in marital property are not recognized during the marriage. But in Colorado, upon divorce, there is a distinction between separate property and marital property that is very similar to that found in community property states. And, in Colorado, while property owned before a marriage is not marital property, appreciation in the value of separate property during the marriage, and income from separate property, is marital property. Another issue is what payment of mortgages and other costs of maintain real estate that is separate property from funds earned from wages or investments of either spouse during the marriage, will often muddy the waters. California's rule in this situation is non-obvious from general community property principles ands is quite tricky and technical. California allocates some appreciation of separate property which has had mortgage principal paid for in part from income earned during the marriage or marital property to community property and some of the appreciation to separate property, on a pro-rated basis determined at the time that the property is valued for divorce purposes. For example, in California, if the home was worth $100,000 net of a $100,000 mortgage at the time of the marriage, and then is then sold free and clear net of costs of sale for $400,000, then $100,000 of the proceeds are separate property, $100,000 of the proceeds are community property, and $200,000 of the proceeds are appreciation is is pro-rated between the two, in this case, evenly. so $200,000 of the proceeds is separate property and $200,000 of the proceeds is marital property. But, taxes, insurance payments, and interest payments as opposed to principal payments, do not add to the community property value of the house, as they are current expenses that don't change the value of the property under California law, even though money is fungible. In general, some states that distinguish between separate and marital property, or separate and community property, at the time of a divorce, treat appreciation in separate property and payment of carrying costs for separate property as giving rise to some marital or community property interest in that property that is traceable to appreciation during the marriage or income acquired during the marriage, while other states continue to treat property acquired before the marriage entirely as separate property even if it appreciates, and/or even if carrying costs for the property are paid for from income acquired during the marriage. In states where appreciation in the property and/or payment of carrying costs with income earned during a marriage, gives separate property a partial marital property status, these two factors often convert a house that was originally separate property almost entirely into marital property after a long marriage, while modifying its separate property status only slightly after a short marriage. In the same vein, different states that distinguish between separate property on one hand, and marital or community property on the other, treat income from separate property earned during a marriage such as rent, interest, and dividends, differently than other states do and sometimes differently than appreciation in the asset itself. Quasi-Community Property A third complicating issue is the question of "quasi-community property." If property is acquired as separate property or community property in a community property state, many states which are not community property states will treaty property acquired or owned by one or more members of the couple while they lived in that community property state as if it were governed by the community property laws of the place where the property is located, or the laws of the place where it was located before it was sold and reinvested in property in the state where the divorce case is being litigated. Other jurisdictions recognize property acquired while a couple lived in a community property state and its proceeds to retain its community property v. separate property status with a "quasi-community property" doctrine. But, these jurisdictions, rather than applying the community property laws of the state where particular property was acquired, applies a generic set of community property laws to property acquired in any community property state during the marriage. Sanctions For Economic Waste Also, in both traditional equitable division regimes that make a separate v. marital property distinction, and in community property regimes, sometimes if the owner of the house that would otherwise be classified as separate property commits "economic waste" that destroys the value of marital property out of spite, or without good cause. When that happens, a court may order that the harm to the marital or community property caused by the economic waste of a spouse be remedied with a contributions from the guilty spouse's separate property. Marital Agreements Finally, almost every state allows married couples to modify the property division rules of the state as applied to that couple, in a prenuptial agreement or a postnuptial agreement (collectively, "marital agreements") if it is prepared with the proper disclosures and formalities, and informed consent is given to the agreement. For example, one of the common terms of a marital agreement (especially for late in life remarriages of widows and widowers, but also in many other cases) states that upon a divorce, legal title to property will be followed strictly when making a property division, with the value of any jointly owned property split exactly equally. In other words, a marital agreement will often provide that property will be divided upon a divorce in the same way that it would be divided if the couple had never married. This is sometimes called a "your's is your's, and mine is mine" prenup. Marital agreements like this also often waive any right to alimony to the full extent permitted by law (which economically is almost equivalent to treating the members of the couple as if they had never married) and often waive any inheritance rights of a surviving spouse upon their spouse's death.

Short Answer I was wondering if it exists the possibility of signing a legal agreement before impregnation that states legally that both parents compromise into offering shared physical custody of the child to each other in case of divorce or separation. Do theses types of contract exists? are they legal? I currently live in Switzerland, but the question is meant generally. Agreements of this type are not valid in Switzerland, the U.S., Australia, or any other jurisdiction of which I am aware. There are some fine nuances to this general rule, however, that are explored below. Obviously, of course, there are many countries in the world, and there could be an outlier out there somewhere. Exceptions For Choice of Family Religion Agreements In particular, in some countries, such as Israel and India, the substantive family law rules that apply to a married couple and their children are governed by the religion of that family as determined by law. Thus, Muslims families and Hindu families in India, for example, are governed by different laws related to child custody. In these countries, there is a legislatively approved set of family laws for each faith, but the laws for members of one religion are not the same as the laws for members of another religion, and there are typically rules to determine which sets of family law to apply in cases where the parents of a child belong to different religions. Pre-nuptial agreements in these countries may govern, to some extent, how a married couple's religion is determined for intra-national choice of law purposes, although they cannot specifically resolve custody issues on a pre-dispute basis. U.S. Law In General This would not be enforceable in most U.S. states. Agreements between parents in matters involving children (even post-dispute) are generally not legally binding, because the court has an independent duty to evaluate the best interests of the child under the circumstances as they actually present themselves. Courts can and do appoint third-party guardians ad litem to evaluate the best interests of the children when they have any reason to doubt the judgment of the parents. Put another way, pre-nuptial agreements and post-nuptial agreements, may govern property division and maintenance and restoration of name and inheritance rights and enforcement of economic provision rules, in the event of death or divorce, but may not govern parental responsibilities or child support or the circumstances under which the marriage may be terminated. Post-Dispute Agreements In practice, if parents come to a post-dispute agreement that happens to track the outlines of a non-binding pre-dispute agreement regarding parenting time and parental responsibilities, and the agreed resolution seems reasonable after perfunctory due diligence, a Court would usually ratify that agreement without much second guessing. But, the pre-dispute agreement would be only marginally relevant in the event of a dispute and would not have legal validity. It might be considered by a court as one factor among many in addressing the parenting dispute, as a source of ideas for a resolution and to ascertain the expectations and perspectives of the parents, but would not be given much weight in most cases. Exceptions For Dispute Resolution Method Agreements The exception would be that in some jurisdictions, a mediation or arbitration clause for parenting disputes in a material agreement would be honored, although the same substantive law would apply, in theory. Exceptions For Assisted Contraception And Surrogacy Agreements Note, however, that most jurisdictions in the U.S., do honor and give legal effect to a contract regarding the intended parent in a medically assisted conception or surrogacy contract, in which a pregnancy arises through some means other than intercourse between a man and a woman which of the source of the sperm and egg from that man and that woman that gives rise to a fertilized egg (e.g. cases of sperm donation, artificial insemination, in vitro fertilization, etc.). In those cases, the default rule is generally that the legal parents of the resulting child are the intended parents under the contract. But, this is purely an agreement governing paternity, and not parenting once a child is born. Swiss Law While I do not have first hand knowledge of Swiss law, a digest of Swiss law prepared by Westlaw (a major law book publisher and online legal research provider) does state the rule of Swiss law clearly, however: The areas a pre-nuptial agreement can cover are fairly limited. The following cannot be determined in advance: The preconditions for a divorce, nullification or separation of a marriage are ultimately governed by law. Any agreements that are not compliant with the law are invalid. Agreements on arrangements for children, in particular about parental responsibility, visiting rights or maintenance, made in advance, are not binding. Any amounts saved in pension funds during a marriage are divided in the event of a divorce. Waiving such a division is only possible under very restrictive conditions. Agreements in a marital contract that are not compliant with the law are invalid. This source also identifies the precise statutes and treaties that apply to resolve these questions of Swiss law. Choice of Law and Forum Related Issues There is also an implicit choice of law issue presented. Choice Of Law and Forum Agreements Are Usually Void Generally speaking, under U.S. law, these issues are governed in domestic cases by the state that is the "home state" of a particular child under a statutory test and the parents may not contractually agree to a choice of venue. In international cases by the state and country that are the home state and country of the child under a test established by treaty which may not be contractually agreed to in advance. Since the applicable statutory tests in the U.S. usually direct a court to apply the laws of the state with which the child has the strongest residential connection (except for Native American children whose family law disputes are subject to tribal law), and since laws relating to divorce and parenting are matters of state and not federal law for the most part (except as to choice of law and choice of forum issues, and certain federal welfare program guidelines for child support that states have economic incentives to comply with and all do), the law governing parental rights and responsibilities (and over the circumstances when a couple may get divorced) may change over time as the family (and each particular child) moves over the course of their lives. In international cases where there is not treaty in place between the potentially relevant countries (and in which diplomatic personnel or members of foreign royal families or families of heads of state are not involved), a U.S. court will generally apply the law of its own state in all cases where it has jurisdiction over the child, or of both parents. Jurisdictional disputes and inconsistent decrees are resolved in part through diplomatic channels at the national level in these cases. There Is Little Variation In U.S. Substantive Custody Law In practice, this isn't a very important observation in domestic cases, however, because almost every U.S. state gives judges extremely broad discretion to handle custody disputes on a case by case basis under a "best interests of the child" standard during the last several decades (even though this isn't constitutionally required), subject only to the barest U.S. constitutional limitations prohibiting decisions that amount to a termination of a legal parental relationship without certain forms of due process, and there aren't huge differences in the case law applying that standard in practice between states. The differences between particular judges in a particular county would typically be as great or greater than the difference between different states, when it comes to final outcomes in disputed and litigated cases. Before the best interests of the child standard was adopted more or less universally, many states had a sex specific "tender years doctrine" that presumptively gave custody of younger children to mothers and older children to fathers. But that standard was held to be unconstitutional because it discriminated based upon sex. In each state where the tender years doctrine or similar sex specific custody doctrines were held to be unconstitutional, the "best interests of the child" standard was adopted rather than a gender neutral standard that provided more guidance to judges such as a dictate to maintain the status quo as much as possible such as a "primary caretaker presumption" (which many judges applying the "best interests of the child" standard actually apply in practice). Most European countries also follow the "best interests of the child" rule for child custody. One of the big differences between jurisdictions in their laws typically involve issues like the standing of people other than parents to intervene in parenting litigation, such as grandparents, stepparents and social workers, and the rights of these third-parties vis-a-vis the legally recognized fathers and mothers of a child, and the circumstances under which an adoption and related relinquishment of parental rights is valid. The procedures that apply in family law cases also often differ significantly between jurisdictions. Exception For Post-Dispute Choice of Law and Forum Agreements However, once there has been a litigated dispute in the first instance, that jurisdiction will generally retain authority over the parenting of the child set forth in a decree. But if there is an agreement of the parents which has been ratified by a court regarding choice of law and venue that will be honored in a post-dispute settlement agreement. Also, there are typically statutory circumstances that cause the original jurisdiction to address a parenting dispute to lose authority over the child. For example, suppose that a couple divorces in England with a separation agreement approved by a court that states that the divorce court in London shall have continuing jurisdiction over future custody and child support disputes and the London divorce court approves that agreement. A U.S. or Swiss court would usually defer to the London divorce court for these matters at that point, unless some emergency or change of circumstances undermined the relevance of London to future disputes involving the child.

There are exemptions, and "justifications", in 24 CFR 100. The exemption is 100.10: (c) Nothing in this part, other than the prohibitions against discriminatory advertising, applies to: (1) The sale or rental of any single family house by an owner, provided the following conditions are met: (i) The owner does not own or have any interest in more than three single family houses at any one time. (ii) The house is sold or rented without the use of a real estate broker, agent or salesperson or the facilities of any person in the business of selling or renting dwellings. So such a restriction could be allowed if e.g. you live in the house and rent only a few rooms, or a single family home marketed and managed in the right way. There is also an exemption for religious organizations and private clubs allowing rental to members only. 100.500 lays the groundwork for disparate impact hot water. It says: (a) A practice has a discriminatory effect where it actually or predictably results in a disparate impact on a group of persons or creates, increases, reinforces, or perpetuates segregated housing patterns because of race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin. So only renting to students in a particular seminary would most likely have a disparate impact. There is, however, the possibility of justifying the policy, following 100.500: (b) (1) A legally sufficient justification exists where the challenged practice: (i) Is necessary to achieve one or more substantial, legitimate, nondiscriminatory interests of the respondent, with respect to claims brought under 42 U.S.C. 3612, or defendant, with respect to claims brought under 42 U.S.C. 3613 or 3614; and (ii) Those interests could not be served by another practice that has a less discriminatory effect. (2) A legally sufficient justification must be supported by evidence and may not be hypothetical or speculative. The burdens of proof for establishing each of the two elements of a legally sufficient justification are set forth in paragraphs (c)(2) and (c)(3) of this section. So let's say that the offended party has made the case that the practice will have a discriminatory effect, then the accused can set forth the aforementioned justification: (c)(2) Once the charging party or plaintiff satisfies the burden of proof set forth in paragraph (c)(1) of this section, the respondent or defendant has the burden of proving that the challenged practice is necessary to achieve one or more substantial, legitimate, nondiscriminatory interests of the respondent or defendant. (c3)(3) If the respondent or defendant satisfies the burden of proof set forth in paragraph (c)(2) of this section, the charging party or plaintiff may still prevail upon proving that the substantial, legitimate, nondiscriminatory interests supporting the challenged practice could be served by another practice that has a less discriminatory effect. The crux of the matter is having a "substantial, legitimate nondiscriminatory interest", i.e. why would you want to rent to only seminary students.

It's not theft, but the donee (recipient) generally is not entitled to keep the ring. A number of states - not all - have so-called "Heart Balm" Laws, which abolish the ability to sue for a breach of a promise to marry. New York State is one of them. However, this does not bar actions for recovery of a chattel, money, or securities transferred in contemplation of marriage - including wedding rings. Consider Mancuso v Russo, 132 AD2d 533 [2nd Dept 1987]. In this case, the plaintiff entered a claim to recover a gift of real property conditional upon subsequent marriage. The Court, and the appeals court, entered judgement in favor of the plaintiff. The relevant law is found in N.Y. CVR. LAW § 80-b: NY Code - Section 80-B: Nothing in this article contained shall be construed to bar a right of action for the recovery of a chattel, the return of money or securities, or the value thereof at the time of such transfer, or the rescission of a deed to real property when the sole consideration for the transfer of the chattel, money or securities or real property was a contemplated marriage which has not occurred, and the court may, if in its discretion justice so requires, (1) award the defendant a lien upon the chattel, securities or real property for monies expended in connection therewith or improvements made thereto, (2) deny judgment for the recovery of the chattel or securities or for rescission of the deed and award money damages in lieu thereof A search for Civil Rights Law § 80-b returns many more cases where claims for (primarily) engagement rings are disputed.

The IRS summarizes the rule as follows: Generally, you cannot deduct personal, living, or family expenses. However, if you have an expense for something that is used partly for business and partly for personal purposes, divide the total cost between the business and personal parts. You can deduct the business part. For example, if you borrow money and use 70% of it for business and the other 30% for a family vacation, you can deduct 70% of the interest as a business expense. The remaining 30% is personal interest and is not deductible. Refer to chapter 4 of Publication 535, Business Expenses, for information on deducting interest and the allocation rules. Business Use of Your Home If you use part of your home for business, you may be able to deduct expenses for the business use of your home. These expenses may include mortgage interest, insurance, utilities, repairs, and depreciation. Refer to Home Office Deduction and Publication 587, Business Use of Your Home, for more information. Business Use of Your Car If you use your car in your business, you can deduct car expenses. If you use your car for both business and personal purposes, you must divide your expenses based on actual mileage. Refer to Publication 463, Travel, Entertainment, Gift, and Car Expenses. For a list of current and prior year mileage rates see the Standard Mileage Rates. In practice, a mixed use expense will often be disallowed unless you can document in some way the percentage of use that was business related (e.g. with some kind of log). For inexpensive items, it is often cheaper and easier from a bookkeeping perspective to have dedicated business and dedicated personal items, even if it means that there is some duplication of purchases. Also, if property is owned by the LLC, but used for personal purposes by the owner of the LLC, this will very likely destroy the limited liability protection associated with the LLC. Comingling of business and personal property is a leading reason to pierce the company veil.

If I need to pay property tax on the house, are there any exemptions, based on the fact that I have no income? No. There may be property tax exemptions for other reasons, but there is not a property tax exemption for lack of income. The most common property tax exemptions in New York are listed here. They are: STAR (School Tax Relief) Senior citizens exemption Veterans exemption Exemption for persons with disabilities Exemptions for agricultural properties The stunningly long full list of property tax exemptions can be found here. The long list mostly reflects, however, a variety of property exemptions for non-profits and governmental entities, enacted in a piecemeal fashion. Given that you are relying upon a home search website, rather than official records, I suspect that the gaps are simply due to incomplete data for the website.

Marriages are controlled by state law, immigration is governed by federal law. In no state is a marriage automatically "cancelled" for committing a crime, much less for violating an immigration regulation. So you will remain married until you or he changes that.

The overwhelming majority flats in England are leasehold, not freehold; older buildings typically have 80 or 100-year leases, newer buildings usually have 999-year leases. Therefore you are dealing with the freeholder as a landlord for the matters that a HOA would deal with in the US. Depending on your landlord you may want to reconsider your statement that HOAs "are pure hell". It is possible for the leaseholders to collectively buy the freehold although it is time-consuming and expensive and happens very rarely. If they do they set up a body similar to a HOA.

How do you check the legality of a new business model? How do you check the legality of a new business model to make sure it will be legal, and you won't be running afoul of some law you have no idea of?

Hire a lawyer, who is licensed and trained in law and who is obligated to be honest with you and advocate for your interests, and get him/her to review your business plan. He/she will point out real or potential problems with your ideas and plans, show you legal gray areas of the law and advise you on what you can and can't do. Some lawyers offer a free initial consultation. As an example, you can browse and read specialties and qualifications for legal help in New Jersey: https://www.justia.com/lawyers/business-law/new-jersey There's no substitute for real legal advice; not consulting with an attorney before signing contracts or starting a business can put in in real legal jeopardy. Don't ask legal advice from randos on the Internet, as they are not trained or licensed, and it is illegal to act or work as a lawyer without being licensed. As ohwilleke points out, you may want or need to consult several different lawyers.

Law SE is not for direct legal advice. You're in the middle of a contract dispute that has turned acrimonious and need to find legal help. Google for free or low cost legal aid in your area. If this "point person" has mentioned a lawyer or made legal threats, you do need legal help.

This would be entirely dependant on the jurisdiction. The things that would need to be legal to make this transaction legal are: Is the sexual act legal? Is gambling legal? Ongoing consent by both parties To make this an enforceable contract, in addition you would need: Sexual acts to be valuable consideration, basically, is prostitution legal? The fundamentals of a binding contract: intention, legality of objects etc.

Dale has the right answer, but I'd like to elaborate on why it isn't lawful (as compared to why it would be unlawful). I know it doesn't work that way on line, but it's simpler to think of a credit card as a physical piece of plastic. The bank will have issued this to their customer. It will have a number and an expiry date. You have no way of knowing whether a replacement card has been issued. Even if one has, the customer has authorised you to charge a specific card - you do not have the customer's authorisation to charge a different card with a different expiry date. By guessing the expiry date, you would be making a representation to the bank that the customer has authorised you to charge that card (if it exists), when they have not.

It is certainly possible to incorporate companies with the same name in two different states. If neither company does business in the other person's state under that name, it isn't actionable for either company. If one company was already doing business under its name in a state where another company is formed under that name, it would usually be possible to force the new company to cease and desist from using that name, either with an action directed at the infringer and the Secretary of State (or other official charged with business incorporations in a state) of that state, or in an action directly against the infringer alone. Also, even if a trademark isn't formally registered, it can arise at common law simply through use of a name in a particular market in a particular place. This is harder to prove and the remedies for violating a common law trademark a more limited, but it is not entirely unenforceable.

The general rule is that you must comply with all laws. The first thing that means is that you are required to know what the law is, thus ignorance of the law is not a defense for not complying. There are some special circumstances regarding notice, so a law must have been published. Second, whatever the law requires you to do, you have to do it, regardless of any difficulty you might encounter (e.g. you have to pay your taxes even if you don't have enough money). Suppose that a law is so onerous that it is literally impossible to obey it: you still have to obey the law. You have to file a lawsuit against the government challenging the constitutionality of the law, to get the law overturned. Frequently, more requirements are imposed on businesses than on individuals, but there is no legal difference between impositions on individuals and impositions on businesses in terms of laws being difficult to comply with.

While German law indeed requires providing correct contact information it does not require the recipient to answer queries. It is there so that you can submit legal notifications. In your case I wouldn't be so sure that the information is not correct. However, even if the contact information is incorrect, there is not much you can do about it. This is reserved to the following groups by § 8 Abs. 3 UWG: every competitor; associations with legal personality which exist for the promotion of commercial or of independent professional interests, so far as a considerable number of entrepreneurs belong thereto, and which distribute goods or services of the same or similar type on the same market, provided such associations are actually in a position, particularly in terms of their personnel, material and financial resources, to pursue the tasks, under their memoranda of association, of promoting commercial or independent professional interests, and so far as the contravention affects the interests of their members; qualified entities that prove that they are entered on the list of qualified entities pursuant to section 4 of the Injunctions Act or on the list of the Commission of the European Communities pursuant to Article 4 of Directive 98/27/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 May 1998 on injunctions for the protection of consumer interests (OJ Number L 166 page 51); Chambers of Industry and Commerce or Craft Chambers. Unless you are a competitor you are out of luck. The hoster or other providers can't do anything and don't need to, as they are not required to check legality of their user's websites. It doesn't really matter where you are by the way for these laws.

You can make a derivative work if: the original is not under copyright, you are the copyright owner, you hold a licence from the copyright owner that says you can, or your usage is fair use or fair dealing as applicable. For your proposal, the image is copyright, you don’t own it, you don’t have a licence and what you propose is neither fair use nor fair dealing. You can’t do it and you can be sued if you do.

How (and how come) are US state/federal prosecutors allowed to seal indictments? I have recently heard Tara Reade (who had accused US president Joseph Biden of sexual attack several decades ago) say, that there has been a sealed indictment against her, for the past 3 years (2020-2023), following some kind of grand jury procedure. Assuming that is possible (regardless of whether it's actually true or not) - what is the legal basis of doing this? That is, what legislation allows for prosecutors or juries to avoid publication indictments of individuals for significant periods of time? And has this power even been challenged constitutionally? More specifically, has such process been recognized as "due" in context of the Fifth amendment to the US constitution?: No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.

An indictment is not the deprivation of liberty. An indictment is actually part of the due process of law that is guaranteed in the Constitution. Deprivation of liberty means incarceration. The processes that are generally part of incarceration are the initial court hearings after arrest and the trials to gain conviction for offenses.

The Constitution does not define any crimes (except for an explicit limit on what can be considered 'treason.') It places limits on what penalties the government may apply for crimes and how crimes are tried in court, but it does not itself actually create any criminal offenses. Rather, state and federal law do that. Having said that, if a state government creates a crime of murder (which, obviously, they all do,) the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment does require that that law protect all people within the jurisdiction of that state. That is, a state cannot make a law criminalizing the murder of a white person, but not of a black person, for example. States can't just pick and choose who is protected by their laws. It would not violate the U.S. Constitution if a state completely decriminalized murder, though. It's exceptionally unlikely to happen, but it would not be a violation of the Constitution. Depending on exactly what you mean by 'murder,' it could be argued that murder by the government is unconstitutional, though. The 14th Amendment bans states from depriving anyone of life without due process of law: No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. Similarly, the 5th Amendment provides an equivalent protection from the federal government: No person... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law

This is actually a very complicated question, about (1) the scope of "knowingly", (2) what kind of "intent" is required for conviction, (3) how does the jury understand and evaluate concepts of intent and (4) how does an attorney persuade the jury that the situation does or does not satisfy the particular intent requirement. One thing we can dispose of quickly is the possibility that the law says that the accused has to actually know that the act is against the law. It is a standard legal fiction (2,400 years old) that the accused knows the law, or should have known. As for the 4th element, persuasion, on the strong side we have statements of intent by the accused – "And I pulled out my rifle and blew his head off, and I laughed the whole time". What the jury has to decide is whether the accused had in mind a conscious purpose of doing some act (that is, it wasn't just an accident like butt-dialing, or an instant stimulus-response reaction to some event). "Intent" generally falls in the realm of acting "purposely", which the Model Penal Code §2.02 defines as: A person acts purposely with respect to a material element of an offense when: (i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or a result thereof, it is his conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a result; and (ii) if the element involves the attendant circumstances, he is aware of the existence of such circumstances or he believes or hopes that they exist. which more or less means what you think "with intent" means. That doesn't say what they intended to do, it just distinguishes intent from negligence and accident. The prosecutor would then present factual evidence that the accused had a bad intent, like showing that he actually made an attempt to access credit card account data (that such data had been accessed when he broke into the system), etc. We can sort of dispose of the other scope question about "knowingly", namely, what things would he have to know? The chunk accessing a protected computer without authorization can be interpreted in a number of ways, having to do with which elements of the clause are known to the accused. You might know that you were accessing but not know that you were unauthorized; you might know that you were accessing and unauthorized, but not know that the computer is protected. The only reliable way to know which is which is to study the case law on a statute and see if there is a controlling decision that say e.g. that you have to know that you are accessing and are unauthorized, but you don't have to know that the computer is protected. I haven't determined (yet) is there is decisive case law on this, but I'm betting that the outcome would be that not knowing of the protected status of a computer carries no weight. As for what kind of intent, there is a distinction between "specific intent" and "general intent". The distinction comes down to having some evil purpose like "make him suffer" (general intent) versus a specific evil purpose like "kill him". Finally, the people who actually decide, the jury, will be given instructions that say what they have to look for. Here is the tip of the tip of the iceberg, from California's criminal jury instructions. The judge will say... The People must prove not only that the defendant did the acts charged, but also that (he/she) acted with a particular (intent/ [and/or] mental state). The instruction for (the/each) crime [and allegation] explains the (intent/ [and/or] mental state) required. A[n] (intent/ [and/or] mental state) may be proved by circumstantial evidence. Before you may rely on circumstantial evidence to conclude that a fact necessary to find the defendant guilty has been proved, you must be convinced that the People have proved each fact essential to that conclusion beyond a reasonable doubt. Also, before you may rely on circumstantial evidence to conclude that the defendant had the required (intent/ [and/or] mental state), you must be convinced that the only reasonable conclusion supported by the circumstantial evidence is that the defendant had the required (intent/ [and/or] mental state). If you can draw two or more reasonable conclusions from the circumstantial evidence, and one of those reasonable conclusions supports a finding that the defendant did have the required (intent/ [and/or] mental state) and another reasonable conclusion supports a finding that the defendant did not, you must conclude that the required (intent/ [and/or] mental state) was not proved by the circumstantial evidence. However, when considering circumstantial evidence, you must accept only reasonable conclusions and reject any that are unreasonable. and then there will be some specific elaboration of whether they have to find that the accused just generally intended to do bad, versus intended to specifically defraud.

I have not found a case directly on point, but there is a case in the right neighborhood. In Flordia v. Carter 364 So. 2d 1249, Carter was charged with perjury for making a false statement under oath. He recanted his testimony in a letter to the defense attorney the next day. Subsequently he was charged with perjury: the trial judge dismissed the case based on his having recanted (which is a defense to perjury). The judge said (quoted in the appeal below and citing a relevant precedent Brannen v. Florida 114 So. 429) It matters not whether Carter knew his original testimony was false or whether he was merely mistaken. "The law encourages the correction of erroneous and even intentionally false statements on the part of a witness, and perjury will not be predicated upon such statements when the witness, before the submission of the case, fully corrects his testimony." The lower appeals court rejected the trial court's dismissal, saying Recantation is a defense to an allegation of perjury only where there is an acknowledgement of the falsity of the original sworn statement, a voluntary retraction of that statement, and a new statement which discloses the true facts. It is not a viable defense where the perjured testimony has substantially affected the proceeding or it has become manifest that such falsity has been or will be exposed. Otherwise, one could rest on his lie, allowing it to substantially affect a proceeding, and never retract unless the falsity had been exposed. This would provide no inducement or encouragement to tell the truth. That court basically felt it was based on the threat of being discovered, and felt that a particular state statute had taken away the recantation defense, so they reinstated the charge. The appeal to the Florida Supreme Court, Carter v. Florida 384 So. 2d 1255 basically declared that the appeals court was wrong about the statute (they officially held that recantation is a defense to perjury). They concluded that Carter gained nothing by recanting (that was a distinguishing feature in a precedent that the lower court favored). The dissent in this decision opined that It may be that the false deposition testimony by Dr. Carter was inadvertent and without criminal intent.... These, however, are factual issues and should be resolved by a jury rather than by the trial court on a motion to dismiss. What unifies all opinions on the matter is that a false statement made under oath must be recanted. The reason why Carter was not convicted was that he (possibly) was unaware that his testimony was false and he did recant when he became aware of the facts.

Absent newly enacted law in response to the end of the separate sovereigns doctrine, the first case to which jeopardy attaches (generally speaking when a jury is sworn and the first item of evidence is presented to it) would bar subsequent prosecutions, without regard to whether it arose in state or federal court. It would be a race to the court house rule. This is how it works if there are multiple prosecutions within a state, for example, one commenced in a municipal court that is not part of a state court system, and another commenced in a state court of general jurisdiction.

I will assume that your question pertains to the United States. In other jurisdictions, different rules could apply. Context matters. The usual penalty for spoliation of evidence (the technical term for what you describe) in a civil case is a judicial determination or jury instruction that the evidence destroyed would have established the relevant part of the other side's case had it not been destroyed. In all of these cases, your failure to take affirmative action to preserve the evidence once you knew that there was a bona fide likelihood that you would be sued could be held against you by making an adverse determination that the evidence would have been unfavorable to you and possibly also money sanctions. You could not be held in contempt of court for this if these events happened before a case was commenced. In a criminal case, where you are a defendant, you have an absolute right to not incriminate yourself and do not have to take affirmative action to preserve evidence, although this right is limited to criminal cases and your failure to preserve evidence can still be held against you in a civil case. Certainly, in situation 4 you are a potential criminal defendant, so the 5th Amendment protection would apply. In situations 1 and 2, where the precautions were not put in place to facilitate a crime, the 5th Amendment would protect you if you were a potential criminal defendant, but suppose that you are a bystander like a third party ISP representative. If you were a third party, at a minimum you would have to be put on notice of the police need for the evidence, would probably have had to have had the police ask you for the evidence, and of course, would have to be aware that the destruction was imminent and have the power to prevent that destruction. If all those conditions were present, you might be guilty of obstruction of justice (there are precedents for inaction knowing of the consequences in the fact of a police question amounting to obstruction of justice). In situation 3, this kind of action pretty much amounts to being an accessory to some crime before the fact (unless someone was successfully deceived by a very elaborate story) and would likely make anyone involved part of a conspiracy to commit the crime that the destruction of the papers would facilitate. While the papers themselves might have been evidence of a crime or civil wrong, the destruction of the papers might itself be considered part of the crime, regardless of what could be established regarding the actual content of the papers.

As I read the hypothetical facts in the linked question Bob has not filed a suit against Big Co, because no law firm is willing and able to handle such a suit (which I find unlikely). BigCo has not filed a suit against Bob, perhaps because it does not want to draw attention to Bob's claims. So there is no suit in progress. If this is true, no court has jurisdiction of the case, indeed there is no case in a legal sense. No US Court will reach out to take a case that no one has filed, and if one attempted to do so, I strongly suspect this would be a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth amendments, depending on whether it was a Federal or State court. If it were a Federal court, this would also violate the "Case or controversy" provision. I can't find any report of any US court that has tried to do anything of the sort, so there is no case law to cite about the outcome of such an attempt. If i have misunderstood the question, and either Bob or BigCo has in fact filed a suit, and some court has jurisdiction of it, then the situation is quite different. In that case a court can restrict publication of statements that might be likely to result in jury prejudice and deny one party's right to a fair trial. However such orders are strongly disfavored. A court must demonstrate by findings of fact in the gag order that impairment to a fair trial is likely, and that he proposed order is the narrowest possible means of ensuring a fair trial, and that less restrictive methods, such as change of venue, a sequestered jury, or careful examination of potential jurors, cannot achieve this goal. It must also show that the order is the least restrictive order that will achieve the goal. If such findings are not included with the order, they order may be overturned promptly by a higher court on motion of either party, or of any third party (such as a news organization) affected by it. The situation as described seems implausible.

"Fraud" is a broad term. In the first 9 months of Fiscal Year 2015, the US Government prosecuted 5173 white collar crimes, according to Syracuse University's Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse. This includes mail fraud, bank fraud, conspiracy to defraud the US, identity theft, health care fraud, wire fraud, and others (listed in the link). Federal prosecutors have a large amount of discretion in when to bring charges. See The Department of Justice Policy on Charging and Sentencing and Title 9 of US Attorney's Manual, Section 27 (Principles of Federal Prosecution). These are not laws, but internal department guidance to prosecutors that outline the factors they should consider when making charging decisions. There is quite a lot of detail in these guidelines, but at the highest level, they are summed up by this paragraph from the Attorney General's memo: Accordingly, decisions regarding charging, plea agreements, and advocacy at sentencing must be made on the merits of each case, taking into account an individualized assessment of the defendant's conduct and criminal history and the circumstances relating to commission of the offense (including the impact of the crime on victims), the needs of the communities we serve, and federal resources and priorities. The US Attorney's Manual gives very specific guidance regarding the prosecution of various forms of fraud. For example, Title 9, Section 43 covers mail and wire fraud. Here is an excerpt: Prosecutions of fraud ordinarily should not be undertaken if the scheme employed consists of some isolated transactions between individuals, involving minor loss to the victims, in which case the parties should be left to settle their differences by civil or criminal litigation in the state courts.

Is it bigamy to marry someone to whom you are already married? The goal is to obtain legal proof of marriage with the least amount of effort, such as travelling overseas and hiring translators and notaries. This is not a "renew vows" situation. Answers for New York preferred, but answers pertaining to other jurisdictions welcome. Statute: A person is guilty of bigamy when he contracts or purports to contract a marriage with another person at a time when he has a living spouse, or the other person has a living spouse. Bigamy is a class E felony.

No, you would be guilty of perjury. In order to go through the legal formality, you have to obtain a license, Washington example (King County) seen here. You must swear that you are single, divorced, or widowed. If you leave the box unchecked, you won't get a license. If you are married and check any box, you have committed perjury.

It's happened before in real life. Here is a 1994 article describing an Illinois criminal trial where defense counsel pulled the old switcheroo and sat a different person with him at the defense table instead of the defendant. The defendant, instead, sat somewhere else in the courtroom. After a witness misidentified the perp as the person at the defense table (not the defendant), the judge directed a not-guilty verdict to settle the case but sanctioned the defense attorney instead. The appellate and state supreme courts upheld the sanction (by a one-vote margin in both cases) but dissenting opinions noted counsel and defendant technically broke no rules. From the article: The dissent said Mr. Sotomayor's intent was only to show the unreliability of the prosecution's witness. Moreover, seating a client at counsel's table is customary but not required. Nor is a lawyer obliged [...] to help a witness make an identification. Also, here is a similar but not duplicate question.

It is not a crime in the US. It may be a firing offense depending on the nature of the appointment (that is, what exactly do you mean by "diplomat"?) or at least cause for demotion / reassignment. A diplomat from another country could be declared persona non grata, but again it is not a crime to act contrary to a governmental boycott call, in the US. This follows from the First Amendment.

No Such a contract would be an attempt to evade the court order mandating a given level of support, and would not be enforceable. However it is not the case that no contract can deal with Child Custody or Child Support. A couple could surely make a contract to pay more than a court had ordered, that in no way violates the order. A contract could specify a default or initial amount of support, to be paid until and unless a court orders a different amount. Similarly a contract could specify initial custody, pending any court decision to the contrary, but it cannot preclude the court from making an order in accordance with the best interests of the child.

If you had an agreement that amounts to a contract, it is binding even if it was informal. However, if your agreement was not in writing, it might be hard to prove. You can easily prove that you transferred money to the other party. But can you prove that it was a loan an not a gift? And even if it is agreed to be a loan, if no repayment time was specified, what says that the debt is due now? Was the agreement really for a loan repayable on demand? The court would have to determine what your real contract was, or what contract can be implied from the actions of the parties. Also, if you are in a common-law jurisdiction, there could be a question of what consideration there was for the loan. Without consideration, there is no valid contract in such a jurisdiction. Perhaps a promise to repay could be treated as sufficient consideration. Small-claims courts do deal with unclear verbal contracts on a regular basis, but the outcome will depend on the facts of the case, and on the details of local law. It might be wise to consult a local lawyer with small-claims experience. A single consultation should not be too expensive. In response to comment If the "written binding agreements" include a statement from the other person that this is a loan, and a promise to repay it, you are in a stronger position than I had thought from the original question. The question for the court would be, since there was no due date agreed, what is a reasonable date to impose. The court might treat it as a loan repayable on demand, or specify some particular date for repayment.

Choice of Law The place where you get married is irrelevant to the question of whether or not you need a pre-nuptial agreement. What matters is where you intend to live once you get married. A pre-nuptial agreement exists to change the default rules of law upon death and divorce. These rules differ from state to state, so the default rules you might modify depend upon where you intend to live after you get married, and so does the extent to which you need to modify those rules. Generally, a divorce will be governed by the law of the place where the couple resides when the divorce is commenced, and generally inheritance is governed by the laws of the place where the decedent (i.e. the dead person) was domiciled (which means something close to, but not the same as where the decedent resided) at death. Why Get A Pre-Nuptial Agreement? If you and your bride are happy with the default rules of law regarding divorce and inheritance in the place that you intend to live, there is no need for a pre-nuptial agreement. If the two of you are not content with the default rules of law regarding divorce and inheritance in the place that you intend to live, then a pre-nuptial agreement can change some, but not all, of those rules. Generally, a pre-nuptial agreement can change rules regarding property division, alimony and attorneys' fees, but not matters related to children or related to the grounds upon which you can get divorced or related to whether fault can be considered in a property division or alimony determination. What the pre-nuptial agreement would say would depend upon your objectives for entering into it. To answer your question it is necessary to know "what harm are you afraid of that a pre-nuptial agreement could prevent?" This has more to do with your expectations and values than it does with the law. Some reasons that people enter into pre-nuptial agreements include: preventing a spouse from inheriting or receiving in a divorce wealth that you inherited or might inherit in the future, because the donors might decide not to leave you inheritances otherwise; preserving wealth acquired by the spouse's respectively during life for one's adult children in a late in life marriage (e.g. during retirement) that is unlikely to produce more children. The Formalities Any pre-nuptial agreement should be drafted with both spouses represented by lawyers, and any competent lawyer should know the details of executing the document that are necessary to make it valid. If the agreement is drafted in English, which would make sense if she was moving to the U.S. to join you, she would need to have an interpreter in addition to a lawyer to help her evaluate and negotiate it, unless she was already fully fluent in English enough to understand advanced legal concepts (which would be very uncommon unless, for example, she went to school for many years in the U.S.). Immigration Considerations In the immigration process, U.S. immigration officials are skeptical that international marriages are legitimate and have the power to determine that an international marriage was a sham. One factor among many that immigration officials use to determine that a marriage was a sham entered into for immigration purposes is the existence of a pre-nuptial agreement that favors the citizen spouse. The more strongly the agreement favors the citizen spouse relative to the default rules of law, the more likely it is that immigration officials will determine that the marriage is a sham. It is not necessarily a factor that will cause the marriage to be found to be a sham, in and of itself, but it is an important factor that would be considered. If you enter into a pre-nuptial agreement, you are making it harder for your bride to become a U.S. citizen, and the more it favors you, the harder it will be for her to become a U.S. citizen.

Here's what would likely happen in general: the plaintiff would seek a prejudgment attachment before they even get to trial (here's an example of Civil Procedure Rules outlining prejudgment attachment). Note: there must be a state statute existent in your jurisdiction to even seek this remedy. Generally, prejudgment attachments start in the form of a writ from the requesting plaintiff. That document must confirm (usually) that there is a suit for damages, ID the property to be attached, etc. Usually they are approved specifically in cases where the defendant is moving property out of the state or is fraudulently getting rid of property or hiding property in order to avoid paying a debt. Some states have different laws respecting if and how much notice a defendant is entitled to receive. Also, the enforcement of such writs must be in line with Due Process requirements - here, that in order to issue a prejudgment attachment while the defendant is unaware of the prejudgment attachment is only constitutional when there are "exigent circumstances." You tagged Massachusetts, so check here for the relevant Mass. Gen. Laws. Even better, check Mass. R. Civ. P. 4.1 (Attachment) and 4.2 (Trustee Process).

The non-citizen is responsible for themselves. If you do not marry within 90 days, the visa expires, and the non-citizen is no longer legally present, thus will have to leave the country.

Is it true that the Chief Justice granted royal assent to the Online Streaming Act? Within the first minute of this video it is asserted that, although the royal assent to Canadian legislation is normally granted by the governor general, in this case of the Online Streaming Act it was somehow done by the chief justice, Richard Wagner. In a quick search with search engines, I find no corroboration of this assertion. I know that normally the governor general does this, and obviously the king can do it if he wants to (and on a few occasions that's been done), but I'd never heard of the chief justice doing such a thing. What's the story here? Have there been previous cases of the chief justice rather than the governor general granting royal assent to legislation? Under what circumstances is such a thing done? How is this authorized by the constitution?

Royal Assent can be signified by one of two modes: (1) "in Parliament assembled"; or (2) "by written declaration." It was the latter mode by which Assent was signified on April 27, 2023: On Thursday, April 27, 2023, the Right Honourable Richard Wagner, acting in his capacity as Deputy of the Governor General, signified assent in His Majesty’s name to the bills listed below. Assent was signified by written declaration, pursuant to the Royal Assent Act, S.C. 2002, c. 15.... Several justices of the Supreme Court of Canada, as well as the Secretary and Deputy Secretary to the Governor General are deputies of the Governor General: see their commissions in The Journals of the Senate, 44th Parl, 1st Sess., November 25, 2021. (Note that their commissions currently exclude from them the power of "signifying Royal Assent in Parliament assembled," the first of the two listed modes of Royal Assent above.) The power to appoint deputies comes from the Constitution Act, 1867, s. 14 and the Letters Patent constituting the office of the Governor General. Section 14: It shall be lawful for the Queen, if Her Majesty thinks fit, to authorize the Governor General from Time to Time to appoint any Person or any Persons jointly or severally to be his Deputy or Deputies within any Part or Parts of Canada, and in that Capacity to exercise during the Pleasure of the Governor General such of the Powers, Authorities, and Functions of the Governor General as the Governor General deems it necessary or expedient to assign to him or them, subject to any Limitations or Directions expressed or given by the Queen; but the Appointment of such a Deputy or Deputies shall not affect the Exercise by the Governor General himself of any Power, Authority, or Function. Letters Patent, s. VII: And Whereas by The British North America Acts 1867 [Constitution Act, 1867] to 1946, it is amongst other things enacted that it shall be lawful for Us, if We think fit, to authorize Our Governor General to appoint any person or persons, jointly or severally, to be his Deputy or Deputies... Now We do hearby authorize and empower Our Governor General... to appoint any person or persons... to be his Deputy or Deputies... This is also mirrored in the provinces, where the Deputy Lieutenant Governor is typically the Chief Justice of the province. Royal Assent is reported in the Canada Gazette, the official newspaper of the Government of Canada. There are many other examples of Royal Assent being signified by the Chief Justice, acting in his or her capacity as Deputy of the Governor General.

Before getting into the technical answer to this question it is worth noting that when matters of a constitutional nature are involved then in practice it is not just a matter of a technical "legal" answer. Students and academics like to pose hypothetical questions such as "What would happen if the Queen refused assent to a Bill?" or "If Parliament is supreme, could it abolish the courts?" etc. The practical reality is that a liberal democracy, such as ours, ultimately relies on those in positions of power to respect the democratic conventions and preserve the constitution. When there is a legal angle to some constitutional issue the courts will play their part but, whatever legal analysis their judgments may contain, they will always have in mind the importance of maintaining our democratic system. It is also worth noting that where an Act contains an "ouster" clause (saying that a certificate of X shall not be questioned in any court of law) the courts always find a way to interpret that so that it does not apply in any case where the courts think they should adjudicate! Those preliminaries out of the way, I think the technical legal answer to your question is that first of all the Speaker decides and provides a certificate under s.2(2). You will see that s.2(1) deals with "any other bill" (your third bullet point) and s.2(2) requires a certificate from the Speaker that "the provisions of this section have been duly complied with" (i.e. that it is indeed in the "any other bill" category). Of course there is a further question of whether, if the Speaker gets it wrong, the courts could intervene and exactly how that might happen (the so-called "John Bercow question" of what if a Speaker goes rogue), but the initial technical answer to you question is "the Speaker of the House of Commons".

Yes An American would spell it as “your honor,” but yes, this is how we refer to all judges. This is simply a custom that shows respect. There is no law or concrete fact I could cite that requires this; it is more of a “tradition.” But I have seen plenty of court proceedings (mostly on TV), and I can confirm that all judges, ranging from small claims court to the Supreme Court, are called “Your honor.” (The chief justice of the Supreme Court is sometimes addressed as “Chief Justice.”) Googling articles about courtroom etiquette also mostly leads to people who agree with this. Apparently, there are some countries where it is customary to say “my honor,” or even something else altogether. Sometimes people from these countries immigrate to the US and continue using their local terminology in a US court. Although every judge is different, my perception is that most judges try to be inclusive of other cultures, and if whatever term they use is intended as a sign of respect, most judges will usually just interpret it as it was intended.

In Canada, copyright means "the sole right to produce or reproduce the work or any substantial part thereof in any material form whatever, to perform the work or any substantial part thereof in public..." (Copyright Act §3(1)). This question asks whether the work or any substantial part of the work is reproduced when an individual torrent chunk (typically approximately 1/1500th of a file) is downloaded to volatile RAM and immediately discarded.1 If not, is a substantial part of the work reproduced if the downloader-and-discarder repeats the activity on more of the torrent's chunks (each being discarded before downloading another torrent chunk)? Substantiality As quoted above from the Copyright Act, when reproducing only a portion of a work, the statute only prohibits reproduction of a "substantial part" of the work. "[T]he Act does not protect every “particle” of an original work" (Cinar Corporation v. Robinson, 2013 SCC 73). Substantiality is not measured by quantity. "Whether a part is substantial must be decided by its quality rather than its quantity" (Ladbroke (Football), Ltd. v. William Hill (Football), Ltd., [1964]). Copyright Board's substantiality decisions Is a small chunk of a torrent a substantial part? The Copyright Board has looked to several signals in judging substantiality, one of which is whether "[the part] may be so closely identified to the work as to allow the reader to recognize the work" (License Application by Pointe-à-Callière, Montreal Museum of Archeology and History for the Reproduction of Quotations, Copyright Board of Canada [2004]). In some video codecs, possessing 1/1500th of the encoded file would not allow playback such that the result would be recognizable as a portion of the original. The Copyright Board has also held that in the case of XM satellite receivers, which hold "4 to 6 seconds of the Satellite Services' multiplex signal at all times in its random access memory (RAM)", that "the 4 to 6 second buffer fails to satisfy the substantiality requirement. It is not a substantial part of the protected work." (Collective Administration of Performing Rights and of Communication Rights (Re) [2009]). If downloading and discarding one torrent chunk is not reproduction of a substantial part, does downloading and discarding multiple (even all) chunks become a reproduction of a substantial part of the work? The Copyright Board has said, regarding the 4-6 second buffer in the XM satellite receiver (ibid.): "The rolling 4 to 6 seconds of a musical work is not an aggregate of an entire work. At no time does a subscriber possess a series of 4 to 6 second clips which when taken together would constitute a substantial part of the work. It matters not that over time the totality of all works transmitted are reproduced. We are dealing with a rolling buffer and at no time can we line up all of the fragmented copies amounting to one complete copy of a musical work." Discussion In my opinion, downloading a chunk of a torrent file to RAM and immediately discarding it is not reproduction of a work or a substantial part thereof. It is not copyright infringement. Repeating this activity for several torrent chunks of the same torrent file is likewise not copyright infringement. The above analysis is dependent on assumptions regarding the type of file (a media file, encoded using a format that doesn't produce recognizable sub-portions2, split into approximately 1500 chunks). Other types of files and torrents would not fall under this analysis and thus the hypothetical download-and-discard activity could still be infringement. Consider a 5 minute .wav file, split into a torrent having only 2 chunks. A 2.5 minute .wav chunk would be recognizable as a portion of the 5 minute original, and 2.5 minutes of a 5 minute work would be much more likely to be considered a substantial part. Notes 1. I know of no torrent client that behaves this way. It would have to be a custom-written torrent client designed specifically for this ostensibly useless task. 2. Although, I don't think the assumption of unrecognizable subportions is necessary, since the 4-6 second buffer in the XM Satellite receiver was recognizable.

Such an order, like all other orders and decisions, is voted on at a conference of justices. Normally all 9 are present and vote, unless one or more is recused. But if one or more happens to be absent, those present vote. A majority of those present an voting is enough for such an order. Dissents from such orders are quite unusual, but any justice may file one if s/he so elects. Reasons for such orders are not normally provided. The usual standard is that such relief is only granted if A) one party will be irreparably harmed by delay, and B) that party has a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on the merits when the matter is finally decided. Presumably a majority of the Justices did not feel that this standard was met. Beyond that, no one can say.

It is certainly true that different states who share a Head of State can have different succession rules. Thus William IV of the United Kingdom was also King of Hannover. The UK allowed female succession, so Victoria was Queen of the United Kingdom; Hannover didn't, so he was succeeded by Ernest Augustus there. At the moment, all the Commonwealth Realms of which Elizabeth is Head of State have the same rules of succession. They all changed the rules regarding whether a first-born girl would be heir apparent together. They could decide to have different rules of succession, but they probably won't.

No rights are absolute. In particular, Charter s. 1 specifies rights are "subject only to reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society." Generally speaking, when rights are infringed the courts will consider it a justifiable infringement if it serves a substantial purpose while proportionate, rational and minimally infringing (Oakes test, though there's a heap of subsequent case law refining the test). While the exact order text isn't yet available, determining constitutionality would typically be a detailed analysis a judge would have to perform after hearing arguments from parties to a case (I assume the order will eventually be published here). In my own opinion, I would imagine such an order without appropriate medical exemption would be unconstitutional. It would seem to be disproportionate to deny freedom of movement to a presumably very small number of persons who could do little to remedy their medical condition. As a similar example from another province, a Quebec court ruled that a Covid-19 curfew requiring people to remain inside at night would not apply to homeless people due to discriminatory and disproportionate effect. Assuming the order to be similar in nature to existing BC orders on gatherings and mask-wearing, I would imagine lack of religious exceptions to be constitutional, as those orders have already been challenged and upheld against religious objections (though I believe appeals are still possible). The nature of the identified infringements against religious groups was considered reasonably proportionate, rational and minimal enough when weighed against the legitimate governmental need to contain the spread of Covid-19. P.S. The Canadian Bill of Rights has in practice been largely superseded by the Charter. Furthermore, it is completely inapplicable here as it is a federal statute with no effect on provincial matters.

Questions about "why a law is ..." are political questions not legal questions and you may get better traction on politics. However, I will address the legal issues and offer some speculation on the politics. The states named in the preamble to the Constitution (an Act of British Parliament) as original states were New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland, South Australia and Tasmania. Western Australia was not named at the time of the passing of the Act or Royal Assent because the people of that colony had not vet made their mind up. Legal Issues WA decided to join in a vote held on 31 December 1900 and Australia came into being on 1 January 1901. Therefore, even though not named as such, WA was an "original state". Since all 6 states in the Federation are "original states" the clauses have no practical effect at present. However, there have been a number of proposals to add new states, either by subdividing existing states or by granting statehood to the territories of Northern Territory and/or the Australian Capital Territory. If such were to come to pass, the clauses would have practical effect. In 1998, Norther Territorials rejected an offer of statehood that would have given them 3 senators as a state and 2 representatives based on population (currently they have 2 senators and 2 representatives). Clearly, they were not being given the same privileges as an "original state". In 2015 all Australian governments agreed in principle that the NT should become a state by 2018, however, as it is now 2017 and no action has been taken this seems unlikely. Political Issues Politics is complicated: just as much in the late 19th century as it is in the early 21st. Negotiations between the colonies were fraught and federation was by no means a certain outcome. New Zealand and Fiji dropped out early and each forged its own path to nationhood. However, by the late 1890s it was clear that the 5 eastern colonies would federate with or without Western Australia. It seems likely that this provision served multiple purposes including: putting pressure on WA to join at the outset - the deal they got as a "Johnny come lately" may not have been as good. protecting "white" Australia - the drafters of the Constitution were men of their times, that is to say: racist, misogynist bigots. Any non-original states were likely to be former British colonies in the Pacific or South-East Asia, this clause would allow the nation to reduce the influence these non-white states might have.

Can the victim drop charges? In this example, pretend Alex stabs Bob using cutlery (a knife) at a restaurant, who subsequently presses charges as it was an unprovoked attack. Bob later decides to drop the charge, he has survived but it left with reduced hand movement to the extent he can no longer write, or hold a mobile phone. In this narrow scenario, that assumes there were no other factors at play (for example the knife style was not banned), since Bob has dropped the charge are the police still allowed to pursue the attacker Alex? This question is for the United Kingdom, England and Wales only.

england-and-wales In England and Wales, with the exception of private prosecutions, complainants don't 'press' (or drop) charges. There are several public authorities that can prosecute criminal offences but generally we talk about circumstances that involve the police and the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS). When a crime is reported to the police the police investigate. When the police complete their investigation they refer the case and send the evidence to the CPS. (A minor offence such as low value shoplifting can be handled by the police, although if the case goes to court it must be reviewed by the CPS before the first hearing.) Generally the CPS decides whether to prosecute based on 'the Full Code Test'. In short: "Is there enough evidence against the suspect to provide a realistic prospect of conviction?" "Is it in the public interest to prosecute?" (In urgent situations the CPS might decide it's necessary to decide based on 'the Threshold Test'.) The CPS prosecutes on behalf of the Crown, not the complainant. A criminal case is named along the lines of Rex/Regina or R. v Alex, not Bob v Alex. Sometimes it may be difficult to proceed with prosecution if a complainant (or witness) decides not to cooperate or sometimes the CPS might decide not to prosecute because of the complainant's circumstances. But the CPS is allowed to prosecute without the complainant's approval or cooperation. Under the Victims' Right to Review Scheme, in some circumstances a complainant can seek a review of a CPS decision not to prosecute or decision to stop a prosecution.

Only Parliament has the power to define crimes in law (well, also in the UK there are common law crimes, where ages ago the courts defined punishable wrongs). The police have the power to enforce existing law, but not the power to create new crimes. Part of police power is the power to use force to enforce laws. If a person is trying to kill another (which is a crime), the police can use force to stop the person from committing this crime. Police power can be statutorily encoded (Parliament passes a law saying what police can and cannot do), or it could be part of common law. As for laws regulating a suspect, there may be a specific statutory prohibition – "you may not reach into your pocket" – or there is a common law inference to be made, that if the police have the power to order you to not reach into your pocket you may be forced to comply. The subtle distinction here is that if it is a crime to reach into your pocket when told not to, you can be prosecuted and imprisoned. If there is no such crime, you just have the consequence that you can be roughed up to some extent for disobeying the police order. One act of Parliament is the Offences against the Person Act 1861 §38 which says Whosoever . . . shall assault any person with intent to resist or prevent the lawful apprehension or detainer of himself or of any other person for any offence, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and being convicted thereof shall be liable, at the discretion of the court, to be imprisoned for any term not exceeding two years, NB "assault" does not require physical contact: creating apprehension suffices. Another law is the Police Act 1996 §89 which says Any person who resists or wilfully obstructs a constable in the execution of his duty, or a person assisting a constable in the execution of his duty, shall be guilty of an offence and liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding one month or to a fine not exceeding level 3 on the standard scale, or to both These laws do not exhaustively list all of the things that are forbidden (e.g. they do not say "may not bite. nor scratch, nor kick..."), instead, the prohibitions fall under the general rubric of assault and resisting. Under the circumstances, it is possible that the person could be criminally prosecuted, but even in lieu of a prosecution, it is strongly probable that the police use of force in this instance was lawful. One would have to await the outcome of investigations and litigation to know for sure.

There is no requirement to interview the victim and/or the suspect prior to filing charges. Often statements are taken from the parties involved/witnesses by police and presented to the District Attorney's office as evidence. However charges can be filed without either party being interviewed, especially by the DA. This can often be the case in things like domestic violence cases, where the victim refuses to cooperate and the perpetrator refuses to talk ("lawyer up" or invoke 5th amendment rights). Charges can be filed based on circumstantial evidence of the crime (in the example, marks on the fist of the perpetrator and injuries to the victim, along with proximity). The police will try to interview the suspect and/or victim, but usually the prosecutor does not get involved at this point until charges are filed and the defendant has retained a lawyer (or declined one).

In the United States, you can always choose to (try to) flee police. If the police subsequently assert that they tried to detain you, then they can choose to charge you with a number of crimes (which vary by jurisdiction). The assertion that you did not (or could not) in fact hear or perceive a lawful order to stop is a defense that you could raise in response to such charges. It is up to the triers of fact to determine whether, given the specifics of the case, they accept that defense.

In the US, police do not put a person under house arrest, instead, the courts do, as an alternative to standard imprisonment (either awaiting trial, or serving their sentence). The police are not involved at all; the courts cannot be sued for lenient sentencing. If a person leaves their house (even to buy a bottle of milk), they will have violated the terms of their more lenient sentence, and will be arrested and sent to regular jail. Generally, police are not liable for damages, especially when they fail to be omnipotent in their efforts to prevent others from doing wrong.

No. As the defendant's lawyer, they will have been privy to privileged communications. As such, it would be unfair to the defendant if they now started prosecuting. Also note that a victim very rarely has their own lawyer in a criminal case. The prosecution lawyer is acting for "the Crown" (essentially, "society as a whole"). (There are exceptions, if the victim is bringing a private prosecution - but this is very rare for serious cases such as rape).

It obviously varies by jurisdiction, but most jurisdictions I am familiar with have something like a "Statute of Limitations" where crimes cannot be prosecuted after a certain length of time because it was "too long ago". The logic is firstly that if you prosecute a pensioner for stealing a bottle of beer from a shop when they were 18, the person you are prosecuting is very different from the person that committed the crime. Secondly, it is very hard to obtain a fair trial after the passing of a long period of time. As far as I know, all jurisdictions vary the length of time depending on the severity of the crime, and the most serious crimes are never time-limited. Rape usually falls into the category of "never time-limited". Of course, although murder and rape can be prosecuted after 15+ years, the difficulty of obtaining a fair trial, and of producing evidence from that long ago, means that they may not be. Finally note that "prosecution" of the accused is often not the primary aim of accusers. They just want to say "this was wrong". Abused individuals often find it very hard to speak out about the abuse; the current scandals have made it that bit easier, by reassuring them that it isn't just them (see the #metoo campaign for example).

Claim is irrelevant. Specific to Maryland Law, Assault occurs when one makes or attempts to make physical contact with another OR intentionally frightens another. Alice saying she helped to steal the car and your definition of the theft as "accosted Carol" implies one of the three forms of Assault took place. Alice just admitted to commiting the crime she thought was wrongly charged to her. The crime she was trying to get out of is called "Assault and Battery" which is where Assault leads to actual injury or physical harm to the victim OR attempts to actually injure or harm another OR puts them in fear of such action. In Maryland Law, the Battery portion almost always is paired with assault while in other states, it might be possible to commit Battery without Assault (though in these states, normally a separate assault charge to Battery is usually added.). As a helpful tip, the two words general break down as follows: Assault: The act of threatening harm or making unwanted non-injurious contact with another person. Battery: Causing Injurious Harm to another person. In Maryland, Alice was rightly charged with assault. Upon capture, Bob will recieve an "Assault and Battery" charge for hitting Carol with the stolen card and may get an addition simple Assault charge for the threats before he drove away.

Does being a student in the EU allow one to do internships anywhere in the EU? Can a student, studying in the EU with a student visa take on a summer internship? Could they take an internship anywhere in the EU? I tried asking my student office but they haven't replied.

No, as a non-EU/EEA/CH citizen, you don't benefit from the freedom of movement and work given to EU citizens by Union law. Depending on the national law of the country you're doing your masters in, you may be able to do an internship in that country If you wish to do an internship in other EU countries, you must follow the appropriate rules as a non-EU citizen in the country you wish to do one

There are circumstances in Australia where it is legal to work unpaid. Unpaid Trials A work trial is okay when: it involves no more than a demonstration of the person’s skills, where they are directly relevant to a vacant position it's only for as long as needed to demonstrate the skills required for the job. This will be dependent on the nature and complexity of the work, but could range from an hour to one shift the person is under direct supervision for the entire trial. Any period beyond what is reasonably required to demonstrate the skills required for the job must be paid at the appropriate minimum rate of pay. If an employer wants to further assess a candidate's suitability, they could employ the person as a casual employee and/or for a probationary period and pay them accordingly for all hours worked. Student Placements Under the FW Act, a vocational placement is lawfully unpaid if it meets all the following criteria: There must be a placement There must be no entitlement to pay for the work the student undertakes The placement must be done as a requirement of an education or training course The placement must be one that is approved by the training institution When all of the above criteria are satisfied, hosts are not required to pay students entitlements under the FW Act. However, a host can choose to pay the student at their own discretion if they wish. If the placement doesn't meet all of the above criteria, it won’t be a vocational placement under the FW Act. However, this doesn't automatically mean that the person is an employee and entitled to payment. The relationship may be a ... Work Experience & Internships A work experience placement is an unpaid internship only if it meets a number of criteria; if it doesn't it is an employment relationship and the worker is required to be paid. The criteria are: the person must not be doing “productive” work the main benefit of the arrangement should be to the person doing the placement, and it must be clear that the person is receiving a meaningful learning experience, training or skill development. Volunteering Key characteristics of a genuine volunteering arrangement include: the parties did not intend to create a legally binding employment relationship the volunteer is under no obligation to attend the workplace or perform work the volunteer doesn't expect to be paid for their work. The more formalised that volunteer work arrangements become (for instance if the volunteer is expected to work according to a regular roster) the greater the possibility that an employment relationship will be found. It is less likely that an employment relationship will be found to exist where the volunteer work is undertaken for selfless purposes or for furthering a particular belief in the not-for-profit sector. Large not-for-profits (e.g. Red Cross) consist of a mix of paid employees and volunteers; smaller not-for-profits (e.g. a local rugby league club) may consist entirely of volunteers. In this context it is important to note that if there is an expectation of payment (other then reimbursement of expenses) like a stipend for officials then the arrangement is an employment arrangement and all relevant employment law (e.g. minimum wage, workers compensation etc.) kicks in. As an aside a not-for-profit that has even a single employee loses its exemption under Work Health and Safety laws for all their workers; both employees and volunteers.

Questions about being barred from entry into the UK 10 years down the road need to be asked some number of years in the future. Current practice is that the Home Secretary does not bar entry because of an unpaid debt, instead you have to do something egregiously bad or antisocial. Given Brexit, future matters of immigration are not set in stone. One consequence of walking away from a lease is that you are likely to be sued (in UK courts) for breach of contract, and the court may find that you owe the rest of the lease money. If that happens, you need to be concerned with whether the judgment can be enforced against you, even when you are in the US. The general answer is, yes, the landlord can petition the US courts to enforce a UK judgment against you. The specific details depend on the law of your state, but most states have a version of the Uniform Foreign Money Judgments Recognition Act. In addition, the landlord could sue you in US courts (maybe not as convenient for him). There is no requirement that you have to be a US citizen to sue a US person, and a landlord can (would almost certainly) sue you via a US attorney who would represent him. An alternative to fleeing your obligation and saying "Go ahead and sue me!" is to negotiate a termination of the lease. The landlord would have a duty to mitigate his losses, so if the remainder of the lease has a value of $2,000 a month for 8 months, the landlord can't just do nothing -- he has to try to rent the unit out, so perhaps his actual losses would be only $4,000. Suing a person is expensive especially when you you are dealing in trans-national disputes, so he may be willing to accept some figure in exchange for terminating the lease. Your (UK) lawyer will give you good advice on how to proceed, if you opt to not get sued.

I assume this refers to the case covered here: https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2023/may/22/facebook-fined-mishandling-user-information-ireland-eu-meta The gist is: Under GDPR you can only transfer personal data from inside the European Union to the outside if you have procedures in place that ensures it is still protected to European standards. Facebook was found to have failed in that regards, specifically when it came to access by US spy agencies. It seems indeed quite plausible that it is not possible to transfer personal data from the EU to the US in a way that is compatible with both EU and US law. The EU and the US are in negotiations to find a way to make this legally possible. But until then, it seems that if you do have a European subsidary and want to keep all of your account data in the same place, it needs to be a place with robust privacy protections. That doesn't require it to be in the EU, but something like US, Russia or China would be illegal.

This is more a political question than a legal one, so the answer is more political than legal. Countries are sovereign, and thus can decide which treaties affect them. The UK does not need to agree to any treaty with the EU. It can just refuse to sign the agreement, and just go on its own. Of course, this works both ways. In the same way the EU cannot impose a treaty on the UK about movement of people or the North Ireland borders, the UK cannot impose a treaty on the EU allowing it trade without tariffs. If the UK does not want the deal, the path is straightforward: the Parliament1 rejects the treaty proposal. Of course, then probably the EU will be way less amenable to a free trade pact. Someone being free to do something does not exempt that someone from the consequences of doing that something. If the treaty is put into effect, then at any moment the UK (either from action by the Executive1 or the Parliament1, that is to be internally decided by the UK) can just decide that EU trade is not worth following EU regulations and just withdraw from the treaty. Happens all the time. That the UK cannot unilaterally withdraw from the treaty means is that, should the UK unilaterally decide to leave the "backstop", the UK will be in breach of the treaty and so the EU can ask in international courts for compensation3. In contrast, in many treaties there are explicit clauses explaining the conditions (e.g. notification in advance to the other parties) that allow for a signatory to "lawfully" withdraw from the treaty. But certainly the EU cannot impose its laws on the UK against the decision of the Parliament (again, this is pretty much what "the UK is a sovereign country" means). 1 Elected by British citizens2. So much for "political discrimination". 2Actually it is something more complicated but not because of the EU but of the Empire, as there are some rules allowing citizens of British Overseas Territories or Commonwealth to vote. But that is a question completely internal to the UK. 3And of course, cancel the tariff-free part of the treaty and the agreements for after the backstop ends.

Any country is free to decide what actions are considered to be crimes, and what crimes are prosecuted depending on whether you perform the action in the country, outside the country, and depending on whether you are a citizen, a resident, both, or neither. They can also decide what are accepted defences in court and which are not. Any other country is free to decide under which circumstances they will ever extradite someone to that first country. Now you have to check the laws of the individual countries.

What are our possibilities here? You could be sued for damages in Mexico, the country of origin of the copyright or any of the other signatories of the Berne Convention. You could also be charged with a criminal offence but that is less likely. how much can we get away with? Not a legal question. What you are proposing is illegal - how likely your getaway plan is to work is not for me to say. Is there any advantage on us being on México? No Is there any advantage on picking any either Dragon Ball or League of legends because of the country they are in? No Can they stop us from doing it? Yes

You can always get in trouble. Copyright is always protected by the laws of a particular nation, by the courts of that nation. Because of the Berne Convention and the Universal Copyright Convention, I can sue you outside of my country, and will be treated as a person of that country. The conventions don't say who has jurisdiction, that is where you have to sue, so you have to resort to conventional jurisdictional principles. If you are in Europe, under the Brussels Convention, that means I have to sue you in your country of domicile (if you reside in multiple European nations, I get to decide which country to sue you in). The English courts are slightly different in that they generally hold that you sue in the country where the act took place, but (Lucasfilm v Ainsworth) you can sue in UK courts for infringement that occurs in the US. As you can see, this can get complicated. I can't sue you in Mongolian courts (assuming neither of us has any connection at all to Mongolia), but I could sue you (being a hypothetical UK citizen) in UK courts if you did the infringing deed while in Mongolia. Mongolian courts enforce Mongolian copyright law, US courts enforce US copyright law. Therefore you first have to decide what country you plan to sue in (from the plaintiff's perspective).

Legal consequences of not tipping in the US In the US, there is an expectation of almost always tipping certain service providers like waiters and bartenders. Generally, it is expected that customers tip 15% for ordinary service, 20% or more for great service (or when in a large group), and even poor service is supposed to merit 10%. Tipping nothing is considered appropriate only for extremely bad behavior from the service provider. Whenever the topic comes up, many people are enraged at the suggestion of not tipping. It's not unheard of for service providers to harass the customer or even throw them out for refusing to tip, and it is easy to find people claiming that they go further and sabotage the customer by spitting in their food, deliberately serving them very poorly, trashing their car, etc. My question is 2 part: Is there any legal obligation whatsoever for the customer to tip? I know some businesses have a mandatory minimum tip or service charge which is clearly shown in writing, I am excluding these from my question. Is it legal for the employee to retaliate against a bad tipper? Even if the customer tipped nothing, they still paid the price of the service, part of which covers the employee's paycheck as well. What minimum level of service is a customer reasonably entitled to expect, legally speaking, even if they do not tip?

You are perfectly within your rights not to tip. Unless you start your dining experience with "I'm not going to be tipping you tonight, just to let you know." you will get the same service as anyone else. Most businesses are within their rights to ask you to leave for any reason except those explicitly prohibited by law. So conceivably if you started off with the preceding sentence, the manager could ask you to leave. Not tipping wait staff at most restaurants is still an awful thing to do. No customers like tipping. Unfortunately, tipped staff can and usually are paid well below the conventional minimum wage. That they can be, is codified into law and would take a substantial amount of effort to change. Business owners are able to push the cost of paying their employees a livable wage onto their customers, and we are forced to accept it. It's a hideously flawed system that is ever so slowly changing, but it doesn't change the fact that if everyone decided not to tip, the wait staff in 95% of restaurants wouldn't be able to survive on their 'wages'. So you are within your rights not to tip, you probably won't suffer anything negative unless you are aggressively up front about the fact that you aren't going to tip, and you will be punishing the person with the least power in the equation for the fact that you don't like how the system works over here. Tipping a bartender is different and usually less necessary, and more likely to be drink is four bucks and a bit, here's a fiver keep the change. Tipping less or more than that may change the speed at which you get refills or attention.

Generally, what you say you will do in a contract is what you must do - there is no "the dog ate my homework" excuse. For your examples: Employment contracts have so much government regulation that the common law contract is lost in the mists of time. It is unlikely that a court would interpret an employment contract as requiring exact timekeeping; it is also unlikely that the person would have worked exactly 38 hours on every week except the one where they worked 37.5. However, if it were proved that the employee owed 0.5 hours to the employer they could be required to provide it or refund the pay they had received, barring a law that changed this. The dog must be walked. Alice must find a substitute walker if she is unable to provide it. Falling sick is something foreseeable that Alice should have provided for either in the contract ("if I am sick I won't walk the dog") or by arranging for someone else to do it. For purely personal services, falling sick may frustrate the contract, however, dog-walking is probably not personal enough. There is a doctrine which allows termination by frustration where neither party is at fault, however, it is not clear that this would apply. The building burning down is foreseeable and could (should?) have been addressed in the contract. If the destruction of the building was without fault on the owner then the contract is frustrated. If there was some fault on the owner (smoking in bed, inoperative fire alarm etc.) and the cleaner stands willing, ready and able (that is able except for the absence of a building) to perform their obligations, the owner would probably be obliged to pay, at the least for unrecoverable costs (e.g. wages) and loss of profits - if they pay for the cleaning products the cleaner would be obliged to deliver them up. One of the main reasons for the length of contracts for non-trivial transactions is they deal with these contingencies.

If I may paraphrase the scenario: The customer has a contract with the insurer The customer is contemplating undergoing a certain procedure and is unsure if it is covered under the contract The customer calls the insurer to ask this specific question The insurer says "yes" The customer undergoes the procedure The insurer refuses to pay on the ground that it is not covered under the contract. Let's put aside issues of evidence and what can be proved and assume these facts are not in dispute. There is no question that the contract has been renegotiated; it hasn't. This avoids the necessity of considering if the insurer's employee has the authority to do this or it the customer can rely that they do even if they don't. There are two possibilities: The procedure is covered and the insurer must pay under contract The procedure isn't covered and the insurer must pay under the tort of negligent misstatement. The insurer is vicariously liable for the actions of its employee. The insurer owes a duty of care to a customer who asks such a question to answer it correctly. It is foreseeable that the customer would act on the insurer's advice and incur costs that they may have avoided if the correct advice had been given. Nothing is ever certain in the law but this is as close as you can get.

I think it's important to keep in mind the essence of your actions. @Mowzer gave a great answer on the matter in hand, but I'd like to add a point of view. Is it illegal to eat while driving? Like pointed out by @Mowzer, if no law prohibits it, it's allowed by default (lots of countries have this premise). But what about the consequences of your actions? Maybe there's no law against eating in the car, but there sure is one in my country that specific says that you are not allowed to drive without using both hands in the wheel. The only exception to this rule is to take out your hand from the wheel to use the stick to change gears. Another point of view to add is the liability. Let's say you're minding your own business while driving and a lunatic trying to commit suicide jumps in front of your car. It's a pretty straight-forward case, you have no reason to be blamed. Now, let's add to the same scenario your snack; with a small change, you are now facing a accident that may have been caused by reckless driving (another thing commonly illegal). To sum up, the law is not really like math that have axioms that determine true or false statements without any distinguishment. That's why every case is single handled in the law by it's particularities.

The only excuse would be if you didn't know that your actions were a crime (not ignorance of the law, that's not an excuse, but ignorance of facts). For example, if your boss doesn't want you to serve a customer because that customer is gay, and your boss tells you "don't serve that customer, he was here last week and didn't pay the bill", you would be fine. Or if the boss of a demolition company sends a crew out to demolish the house of a personal enemy (surely a crime), the crew would have no idea that their action is a crime, so they should be fine. But if the boss of a bar or club orders a bouncer to beat up a customer, then the bouncer would know that he's committing a crime, and there is no excuse possible.

if a manager emailed an prospective employee a contract containing the pay rate of $20/hr, if the prospective employee crossed out $20/hr and replaced it with $25/hr, then went to work and gave the manager the contract which he failed to carefully read, continued working for a few months, would the employee be entitled to $20/hr? A party ought to timely alert or notify the other counterparty about any disagreements or proposed changes. This is especially recommendable when evidence suggests that the counterparty's expectation that the party only would sign the contract was reasonable. In the example you outline, the employee's unilateral alteration of the compensation/rate in the contract seems unlikely to favor the employee's position. That is because typically employer and employee negotiate compensation prior to formalizing their agreement. In that case, the employee would need stronger evidence with which to overcome the employer's credible argument that he did not knowingly accept the altered rate.

If correctly structured, probably First, there is no issue with escorts in Canada. If you are in Toronto and need a plus one for the big gala dinner, you can hire a date provided sexual gratification is not part of the deal. An NDA as part of that sort of contract would be fine. Similarly, in jurisdictions where sex work is legal, there’s also no problem. So, we will just focus on contracts where one of the fundamental obligations involves an illegality. This doesn’t have to be prostitution, it could be a contract for murder, or the supply of illicit drugs, or the supply of unpasteurised milk. One of the requirements for a valid contract is legality of objects. A contract for an illegal purpose is void. See What is a contract and what is required for them to be valid? Therefore, an NDA that was a term of such a contract is also void. However, an NDA that was a separate contract, even a collateral contract, would be enforceable because NDAs do not have illegal objects. This can probably best be illustrated by an example. Let's imagine there is an establishment where people can go for food, drink, entertainment, and socialise - we'll call it the club. As part of the contract for using the club or being an employee or supplier to the club or its patrons, there is an NDA not to reveal anything that happens in or is associated with the club. There is no reason to believe that this NDA would not be a valid and enforceable contract - subject to the normal laws that limit such agreements. Now, if visitors entered other agreements that were void, with each other or with the club - such as for the supply of sex or illegal drugs - this would not, on its own invalidate the NDA contained in the other contract. If a court decided that the whole operation was a sham and that the club was merely a front for a brothel, they may find the original contract is void as being against public policy or, it quite likely may be an irrelevancy, because people engaged in a joint criminal enterprise have very few rights against one another anyway. However, if the club is primarily a legitimate business, then there would be no reason to impugn the original contract.

No A debt is created by a contract (among other ways not relevant here). A contract for a restaurant does not contemplate the creation of a debt, payment is to be contemporaneous with the service. Presuming that the customer was made aware that cash payment was not acceptable and that they chose to enter the contract, by ordering, then they accepted that term. Not abiding by it is a breach of the contract. Now, if the customer did not pay and the restaurant sued for the amount (plus damages) and won, that would be a debt for which cash must be accepted.

What award can an unpaid independent contractor expect? What are the legal incentives to pay contractors? I (Washington State, USA) worked, under contract, for an LLC (Los Angeles, California, USA) and never received payment. I was considered an independent contractor; contract specifies Californian jurisdiction. I have limited legal counsel and anticipate legal action in small claims court. I anticipate that no representative of that LLC will come to court, and expect a default judgment. For purposes of this question, let's say that the contract specified US$500 for my services, and I have received none of this. What awards can I expect? In what ways would a judge's decisions about awards be legally limited? $500? Interest? Time spent pursuing collections? Filing fee? Anything else? My research so far suggests $500 plus reasonable (less than credit card) interest. I am primarily interested in this because it doesn't seem that there are any legal incentives for LLCs to actually pay their contractors; if only a fraction of contractors seek justice, and the award never exceeds the originally agreed upon amount, then the rational decision would seem to be, don't pay the contractor. Are there any other legal disincentives for this behavior? I'm aware that Los Angeles has recently passed a Freelancer Protection Act, but to my knowledge, I am not covered by this act-- I am located outside of LA and the contract was entered into prior to the passage of this act.

What awards can I expect? In what ways would a judge's decisions about awards be legally limited? $500? Interest? Time spent pursuing collections? Filing fee? Anything else? My research so far suggests $500 plus reasonable (less than credit card) interest. Your lawsuit would be for breach of contract, probably filed in California small claims court for this small dollar amount. An award for breach of contract includes: the amount not paid pursuant to the contract, pre-judgment interest from the date that payment was due at the statutory rate in California (the legal rate specified in the contract applies until the contract is superseded by the verdict, but if the prejudgment interest rate is not specified in the contract, the rate is ten percent per annum from the date of the breach, California Civil Code § 3289), post-judgment interest at the statutory rate in California (10% per annum in a contract if not otherwise specified), and out of pocket costs incurred in filing the lawsuit (typically, the filing fee, the service of process fee, postage, copying costs incurred for trial exhibits, and any court fees incurred to collect the judgment if it is entered). Attorney fees are not available unless the contract says so. You are not entitled to any recovery for time spent pursuing collections. Often you have have a collections agency collect it for a percentage of the amount recovered (probably 50% in a claim of this size) plus a small fee, although they might not accept such a small dollar amount debt to collect. The main virtue of this is that it hurts the credit of the person who owes the money, a harm to the non-paying customer that is often far worse than not paying the amount owed on time. Are there any other legal disincentives for this behavior? A well drafted contract can provide for an award of attorney fees incurred in collecting the debt, can set a non-usurious interest rate and late fees for non-payment, and can take steps like requiring a deposit up front, or consenting to service of process by mail, to make collection more likely and to create stronger incentives to pay. Also, if the non-payment rate is low enough and the value of your time doing what you normally get paid to do is high, it may not make economic sense to pursue bad debt which takes some time and some money to get a small potential recovery, as opposed to letting it slide and doing more work that does pay. A small claims lawsuit is probably ten to thirty hours of work for which you will not be compensated even if you win. Depending upon your average hourly rate for your labor, and the percentage of your billings that go uncollected, it may not make economic sense to collect the unpaid bill, or you may want to delegate the job to someone else whose effective hourly rate of labor value is lower. Courts are cost effective places to collect large debts, and can be cost effective if many people owe you money and you can mass produce your collections process (as, for example, credit card companies do). But courts are often not cost effective for collecting one off small dollar amount debts, despite the streamlined process and reduced filing fees that are available in small claims court. if only a fraction of contractors seek justice, and the award never exceeds the originally agreed upon amount, then the rational decision would seem to be, don't pay the contractor. Consumers are not purely rational actors on a transaction by transaction basis in these matters. The vast majority of the time, people pay as agreed even though they could get away with paying less by forcing the person who did business with them to sue them to get paid. On a case by case basis, this is often not rational, but as a long term strategy for all transactions that a consumer enters into, it often does make rational sense. In small dollar transactions, blacklisting people from future business and harming their credit records is usually enough of an incentive to make uncollectible invoices an acceptable cost of doing business. But a good business person does evaluate every customer to whom trade credit is extended for creditworthiness if the customer does not pay in advance. On the other hand, as a business person, you may have a strategic interest in pursuing every unpaid invoice even if it isn't cost effective to do so when considering that unpaid invoice in isolation, in order to instill in your customers the knowledge that when you say you will sue them if you aren't paid, that you are making a credible threat. This may discourage people from not paying you in the first place.

Don’t ignore the debt collects In most jurisdictions, your failure to pay can and will be recorded on your credit history. This may affect your ability to obtain finance or the rate you pay for it. For credit reporting, there is no need for the creditor to prove the debt before doing this. For example. In general, you are not legally allowed to default on a contractual obligation (i.e. not pay the bill) even if the other party has defaulted on theirs (i.e. failed to complete the work). It is not clear that you have explained to the contractor that you are withholding the remaining payment until they have fixed the alleged defects or if you have just not paid the money. When you have a contract dispute you need to be clear and take active steps to resolve it. Perhaps head office thinks all these items have been resolved. Perhaps you think they are defects or omissions but they are actually within normal tolerances or are exactly what you contracted for. Unless you talk to them, you can’t resolve it. When you have set out the disputed items, given them a time to fix them, told them you will pay when they are fixed, and possibly set out an alternative method of resolution (like you accepting the defects for a 5% discount) then you have a bona fide dispute. At that point you can tell the debt collector this and they must stop pressing you and remove your name from the credit reports.

The software is "work for hire" and the copyright is owned by the client, not you. This is the default rule when copyrightable work is done on this basis in the absence of an agreement to the contrary. To not be "work for hire" you would have had to have a written agreement to the contrary or would have had to written the software before you were engaged by the client and then sold it to the client as an off the shelf finished product. [After further research I have determined that the language above is not accurate.] While you didn't have a written agreement, you did have an agreement reached without committing it to a final written form signed by both parties that is sufficient to cover all of the material terms of the contract and that is a binding and fully performed agreement. UPDATE: The "work for hire" issue is a bit more complex than I initially stated. Here is an American Bar Association summary of the issue in the independent contractor context (there is also a plausible argument that while the parties characterized you as an independent contractor for tax purposes that you were in fact of de facto temporary employee in which case it would automatically be work for hire, but I'll put that issue aside and take it at face value): Under the Copyright Act (17 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq.), a work is a “work made for hire” only if: (1) it is prepared by an employee within the scope of his employment; or (2) it is specially ordered or commissioned from an independent contractor pursuant to a written agreement and the work falls within one of nine statutorily defined categories. . . . For works created by independent contractors, only the following types of works are eligible to be “works made for hire”: a contribution to a “collective work” (a work, such as a periodical issue, anthology, or encyclopedia, in which a number of contributions, constituting separate and independent works in themselves, are assembled into a collective whole); a part of a motion picture or other audiovisual work; a translation; a “supplementary work” (a work prepared for publication as a secondary adjunct to a work by another author for the purpose of introducing, concluding, illustrating, explaining, revising, commenting upon, or assisting in the use of the other work, such as forewords, afterwords, pictorial illustrations, maps, charts, tables, editorial notes, musical arrangements, answer material for tests, bibliographies, appendixes, and indexes); a “compilation” (a work formed by the collection and assembling of preexisting materials or of data that are selected, coordinated, or arranged in such a way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of authorship); an “instructional text” (a literary, pictorial, or graphic work prepared for publication and with the purpose of use in systematic instructional activities); a test; answer material for a test; or an atlas. This software is clearly specially ordered or commissioned from an independent contractor. I suspect that if you looked at the course of dealings including the client's specification of what work needed to be done (probably in part by email or in some other written form) that it would meet the requirement of a written agreement even though there wasn't a document called a contract signed by both parties. But, this still begs the question of whether it falls in one of the nine statutory categories. This American Bar Association source says that custom software doesn't qualify. The list above does not include many types of works that businesses frequently hire outside personnel to create, such as websites, logos, advertisements, photography, and custom software. For works that do fall within the defined categories, the business must have a written agreement from the author expressly stating that the work is made for hire for it to qualify as such. Although the agreement and course of dealings between a business and an independent contractor may give rise to an implied license for the business to use the works created by the contractor, it is highly preferable to avoid relying on an implied license. Any business that engages a non-employee to create a work and intends to own the copyright to such work should have a written agreement with the author expressly stating that the work is made for hire (if it falls within one of the eligible categories). If the work is not eligible to be a work made for hire, and for good measure even if it is, the written agreement should include a provision assigning the copyrights to the business. An example of such a provision is: “To the extent that the Work Product is not recognized as a ‘work made for hire’ as a matter of law, the Contractor hereby assigns to the Company any and all copyrights in and to the Work Product.” By including such a copyright assignment clause, a business will be able to obtain the copyrights it expects, even if the work does not qualify as a “work made for hire.” The copyright office's official publication on the subject provides a statutory citation (17 USC 101), and doesn't contradict the ABA presentation, although it is less detailed and specific on the legal issues. This section of the United States Code is a series of definitions. The relevant one states: A “work made for hire” is— (1) a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employment; or (2) a work specially ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution to a collective work, as a part of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, as a translation, as a supplementary work, as a compilation, as an instructional text, as a test, as answer material for a test, or as an atlas, if the parties expressly agree in a written instrument signed by them that the work shall be considered a work made for hire. For the purpose of the foregoing sentence, a “supplementary work” is a work prepared for publication as a secondary adjunct to a work by another author for the purpose of introducing, concluding, illustrating, explaining, revising, commenting upon, or assisting in the use of the other work, such as forewords, afterwords, pictorial illustrations, maps, charts, tables, editorial notes, musical arrangements, answer material for tests, bibliographies, appendixes, and indexes, and an “instructional text” is a literary, pictorial, or graphic work prepared for publication and with the purpose of use in systematic instructional activities. In determining whether any work is eligible to be considered a work made for hire under paragraph (2), neither the amendment contained in section 1011(d) of the Intellectual Property and Communications Omnibus Reform Act of 1999, as enacted by section 1000(a)(9) of Public Law 106-113, nor the deletion of the words added by that amendment— (A) shall be considered or otherwise given any legal significance, or (B) shall be interpreted to indicate congressional approval or disapproval of, or acquiescence in, any judicial determination, by the courts or the Copyright Office. Paragraph (2) shall be interpreted as if both section 2(a)(1) of the Work Made for Hire and Copyright Corrections Act of 2000 and section 1011(d) of the Intellectual Property and Communications Omnibus Reform Act of 1999, as enacted by section 1000(a)(9) of Public Law 106-113, were never enacted, and without regard to any inaction or awareness by the Congress at any time of any judicial determinations.

When a platform has the right to kick you out as they deem fit, without any evidence why they did it, does that change if you have a paid? It depends on the purpose of payment and the terms & conditions it triggers. Your description reflects that payment entitles the user to have no ads "and stuff" (?). Payment does not necessarily entitle the user to continued access, diligence from customer service, or other features. Without fully knowing the platform's terms & conditions regarding payment it is impossible to identify what obligations (other than not displaying advertisements) your payment creates on the platform. The information you provide here is insufficient for assessing whether you have a viable claim such as fraud or breach of contract. On the other hand, the platform's apparent arbitrariness and lack of response might support a finding of unfair or deceptive practices if the platform does not honor or proportionally reimburse your payment. Many jurisdictions have legislation prohibiting practices which are unfair, deceptive, or unconscionable (example: MCL 445.903). Oftentimes statutory law establishes an agency in charge of addressing customers' complaints.

It is not required that you sue each defendant in their own courts. Two of the defendants are natural persons living in the US (Utah, Florida), one is a US company (Utah and California), one is a Norwegian company, and one is a Norwegian natural person. This is one case, not five unrelated cases. If the court find against Carlsen, the plaintiff would need to go to Norwegian courts to enforce the claim. This is helped by the Norwegian Enforcement Act of 26 June 1992, the Dispute Act of 17 June 2005 and the Arbitration Act of 14 May 2004, which basically say that if you're found liable for a tort in US courts, you can collect via the Norwegian courts. Here is a more detailed analysis of the Norwegian legal situation. It is possible that under Norwegian law the US judgment against Carlsen would be reduced, depending on how big the award is. The suit involves, in part 15 USC Ch. 1 (antitrust law) where the US has asserted jurisdiction if there is a nexus to the United States (not just American companies), and under 28 USC 1367, plaintiff asserts that federal courts have supplementary jurisdiction over the state claims.

Unfortunately your employer is right. The rule says that in order for FMLA to apply to you, you must work at a location with 50 or more employees within 75 miles. Your client is not your employer, even if your employer considers it a place of business. This is outlined in 29 USC 2611 (2)(B)(ii): (1) Commerce The terms “commerce” and “industry or activity affecting commerce” mean any activity, business, or industry in commerce or in which a labor dispute would hinder or obstruct commerce or the free flow of commerce, and include “commerce” and any “industry affecting commerce”, as defined in paragraphs (1) and (3) of section 142 of this title. (2) Eligible employee   (A) In general The term “eligible employee” means an employee who has been employed—      (i) for at least 12 months by the employer with respect to whom leave is requested under section 2612 of this title; and      (ii) for at least 1,250 hours of service with such employer during the previous 12-month period. (B) Exclusions The term “eligible employee” does not include—      (i) any Federal officer or employee covered under subchapter V of chapter 63 of title 5; or      (ii) any employee of an employer who is employed at a worksite at which such employer employs less than 50 employees if the total number of employees employed by that employer within 75 miles of that worksite is less than 50. So if you had 50 workers within 75 miles of you (regardless of state borders), then you would be eligible, unfortunately since you do not have that, you are not eligible for FMLA. The number of workers at the office that are not employed by your employer do not count. You are right that the reason for the 50 employee rule is to lessen an undue burden on an employer without adequate resources to cover your absence, but you don't have a case since you are not defined as an "eligible employee" by law.

The Commonwealth of Virginia defines a worker as an employee if his or her employer: Furnishes, tools, materials and equipment needed to do the work; Sets the hours of work; Withholds payroll federal and state income taxes and Social Security taxes Receives direction and training from the employer about how to do the work; and Is paid by the hour, week, or month instead of being paid at the completion of a job Virginia also lists the 20 IRS factors and Virginia exemptions for Employee Classification on their web site. One of the factors in determining if a worker is an employee states, "If the employer furnishes significant tools, materials and other equipment by an employer, the worker is generally an employee." Other factors include whether or not the employer can discharge a worker or if the worker can quit work at any time without incurring liability. There are many factors that will be unique to your particular situation that will determine if you were an employee or a contractor. If you were an employee and not a contractor then, in Virginia, the employer would have had to pay you at least minimum wage for your efforts. Generally speaking, an employers recourse for dealing with a non-negligent employee who performs their work incorrectly is to terminate the employment relationship. It is generally not acceptable to dun the worker for damages that occur during the normal course of business. If, on the other hand, you were an actual contractor then your contract with your client will be the guide in how you were paid and would also define the damages for which you are responsible for work not performed to contractual specifications. It is still possible to pay an employee for piece work. This is often done in construction and could make sense for the type of work you were performing. However, the Fair Labor Standards Act requires that the employer maintain records regarding hours worked so that there is an assurance that minimum wage and overtime rules are followed. There is a good article related to the construction industry that provides a good explanation of the details. Most state employment commissions, including Virginia's, provide assistance to workers to help them determine if they were properly classified. Virginia's website does this as well allowing you to call or send an email.

Anyone who is an employee as defined in the federal Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA), 29 USC 201 et seq.(or parallel state minimum wage laws) and is not within the scope of an exemption to the minimum wage law, must be paid minimum wage. The relevant question is whether or not the person is an employee who is not exempt from the minimum wage requirement as defined in the FLSA. The question is a mixed issue of fact and law in which the characterization given to the relationship by the company and the person doing the work is one factor, but not the only or the controlling factor, in determining employee status. The exact nature of the work governs whether the FLSA's minimum wage requirement applies or not. For example, "employee" is defined for puroses of the FLSA at 29 USC 203(e) to exclude "any individual employed by an employer engaged in agriculture if such individual is the parent, spouse, child, or other member of the employer’s immediate family" and certain kinds of volunteers. Piecework pay is allows under certain limited circumstances by 29 USC 207(g) when the usual result is that reasonable workers earn the minimum wage. Tipped employees (which is a form of revenue sharing) also receive special treatment. Most of the exemptions are found at 29 USC 213. Most relevant to your question is 29 USC 213(a)(1) which includes an exception for an "outside saleman" who is paid on a straight commission basis, and 29 USC 213(a)(5) and (a)(6) which contain exclusions for certain farming and fishing occupations. Straight commission compensation without regard to the minimum wage is generally not permitted with regard to an employee who is an "inside salesman" (e.g. someone who works at a retail store in a mall or at a phone bank for a telemarketing company), or for anyone other than an outside saleman in non-agricultural jobs. Independent contractor status generally depends upon the degree of control that the company has over the manner in which the work is performed, the assignability of the contract to do the work, and the extent to which the worker does work for many different companies on a contract basis while complying with employment related laws for the contactor's own employees (e.g. worker's compensation). The working for many different companies on a contract basis prong of the test is frequently controlling in practice. Six of the main factors considered by the Labor Department in determining independent contractor status are discussed in Fact Sheet #13. A true independent contractor may be paid on a revenue sharing basis without regard to minimum wage, although in practice, if this results in the independent contractor earning less than minimum wage, there will be strict scrutiny of the practice. Typical independent contractor arrangements that would be allowed would include an attorney working on a contingent fee basis, or an independent broker or realtor working on a straight commission bais. More often than not, a true independent contractor is someone you couldn't even imagine being an employee subject to minimum wage laws of the company in light of the overall relationship and often this will involve a business to business contract, rather than a business to a non-professional individual contract with only personal services involved. There are some safe harbor provisions that if met can insure independent contract status, but it is very common for someone who legally is an employee to be misclassified as an independent contractor in an attempt (often futile if the matter is pressed by regulatory or tax officials) to avoid compliance with laws incident to the employment relationship.

Legality of using book covers from Google Books API on a website Under US copyright law, is it legal to download images of book covers from the Google Books API and display them on my website? The purpose pertains to obtaining product images for an online store that specializes in second-hand book sales.

Not necessarily, but also possibly. Google Books may (or may not) have a license to distribute images of the book covers in question. This license would be between Google and the owner of the copyright of the book cover. Just because Google has a license to distribute the image of the book cover to you does not mean that you have a license to distribute the image of the book cover to your customers. However, depending on jurisdiction, using the book cover to identify a book might also be legal under relevant fair use statutes. It is also possible that the particular book cover is not protected by copyright. For example, a particular book cover might have entered public domain. If this question is not a hypothetical, you should probably consult a lawyer.

You cannot create derivative works without permission of the copyright holder (even if you create it and keep it to yourself). Further, you cannot distribute derivative works without permission of the copyright holder. That's a general principle that always applies. Since there is a license, you need to read that license carefully and determine under which conditions you have permission to create derivative works, and to distribute them. Your book would be considered a derivative work. In some situations, like commenting on a work, parody and some others, you would have a defense if you are quoting tiny parts of the work. But generally, if you find it unfair that your 200 page needs to be licensed because you used two pages from an open source source, you either do without those two pages, or you find the author and ask for permission under a different license. Note that facts are not copyrightable. So if the wikipedia page contains facts and isn't just made up, you can read it ten times, memorise all the facts, and maybe tell the facts to someone who you pay to write a similar article.

THE FOLLOWING OPINION IS NOT LEGAL ADVICE Based on your screenshot and description, I don't see anything infringing. If the data you are using is from your own sources, and what you show is not a scan or photo of their guide, and your layout is thus unique in specifics (not a direct copy), it wouldn't be an "infringement" as far as copyright law is concerned. Things you cannot copyright: A font (except as a computer font file but not as used in a document). A concept (a main issue here). A idea for a "way" or "order" to display data. Mere data or facts can not be copyrighted nor can ideas. Anything sourced from the US government (trail data, topos, etc.) Something not in printed, physical, or recorded form. That is, the copyright only extends to those things as they are realized in print, or as a recording for audio or video, or a physical statute, etc. A live performance is not copyrightable for instance, nor are ideas. The Law: In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work. For instance, an icon of a TENT is the common form (like a font) of indicating a camp ground. They may be able to copyright the specific instance of their tent icon, but they cannot prevent you from using some other triangle to represent a tent for a campground. And in facts yours is completely different. Displaying data a particular "way" like 1e for 1 mile east is not copyrightable when it is common for the type of guide. It's just data. CONCEPTS AND DATA ARE NOT COPYRIGHTABLE, only the ACTUAL specific page or work in total as rendered. More below, but your page seems totally different. OTHER FORMS OF IP PROTECTION Now, just because some intellectual property can't be protected by copyright, does not mean it is a free-for-all. For instance, a "way" of doing something can be PATENTED (process patent). And "ornamental design" can be given a design patent. A logo or brand name can be given a trademark. Here's an interesting court ruling on the subject of data display. Basically it can't be an abstraction/concept. It has to be in a definable, physical, novel form. NOTE: it has been possible to copyright a "look and feel" but that applies to software, not static printed media. And the courts have been reversing on that a lot as time goes on. BUT WAIT...THERE'S MORE So, I am going to GUESS that you are talking about AT Guide by David Miller? It's pretty rich of him to claim copyright over the "manner of the display of data" when APPARENTLY he is using concepts of data display as described by EDWARD TUFT So, LOL. Is this the guide they claim you are "copying"?? THESE AREN'T THE ICONS YOU'RE LOOKING FOR Okay, so let's go one by one and their claims against you: 1. The way of representing distances between shelters "The Way" of presenting something is not copyrightable, only an expressive or final form. Some forms of "organization or selection" that may make a work in total copyrightable, but not on their own in isolation. 2. The sideways orientation of the elevation profile Presenting some elements "sideways" is not copyrightable (WTF LOL OMG RUS) the same as number 1. Turning an element sideways does not, on it's own, rise to the level of "creative or non-obvious." 3. The icons Your icons are completely different. If you copied and used his ACTUAL icons, you might have had some issue, but your icons are not even remotely the same. Using icons to indicate services or features is COMMON. Not copyrightable. http://www.dmlp.org/legal-guide/works-not-covered-copyright In general, copyright does not protect individual words, short phrases, and slogans; familiar symbols or designs; or mere variations of typographic ornamentation, lettering, or coloring; mere listings of ingredients or contents. (However, copyright protection may be available, if the artwork of the symbol or design contains sufficient creativity.) 4. The convention of representing direction/distance for waypoints. Again, "The Way" of doing something is not copyrightable, nor is data or facts. 1.1E or 2.3NW are common are they not? I've seen similar treatments elsewhere. It's "obvious and not novel." FINAL FORM, EXPRESSIVE FORM is copyrightable NOT FORMATTING CONCEPTS. Basically, he is saying something along the lines of "I'm formatting paragraphs with a double space, so you can't." The "actual" icon drawings he used are copyrightable. Your icons are clearly different. I assume your mountain-top profile line is taken from some publicly available survey source? So long as you never used a scan of the actual line he uses (and even then?), because he cannot copyright the mountain top profiles themselves! DOES HE EVEN HAVE A VALID COPYRIGHT? For that question, I'd say yes with limitations. His work is a compilation of data. Data can not be copyrighted, but the unique arrangement can in context of the work in total. These three conditions must ALL be present (from http://www.rbs2.com/ccompile.pdf): The collection and assembly of pre-existing material, facts, or data. The selection, coordination, or arrangement of those materials The creation, by virtue of the particular selection, coordination, or arrangement of an original work of authorship. So It seem to be that his guide meets these, but his copyright is for his work in total. You are NOT using his data. You are using your OWN data. Based on my reading of Key vs Chinatown Today you are not even close to infringing. You are doing your OWN selection, and your OWN arrangement. It does not matter that you may be using some similar typographic or charting conventions. Those cannot be copyrighted. You are doing your own thing, and "similarity is not infringement." SEARCH AND YOU WILL FIND On the subject of the copyright, here's the copyright on AT guide: https://cocatalog.loc.gov/cgi-bin/Pwebrecon.cgi?Search_Arg=A.T.+Guide&Search_Code=TALL&PID=FgMjtJ244OxoFULrVoob_CEI8bc_M&SEQ=20190506230418&CNT=25&HIST=1 If the link doesn't work due to expiration or a cookie, it should look like this: It's a matter of using the USPTO search engine "its way" — it's not Google and requires specific search strings. Looks like the assignee or owner is https://antigravitygear.com ? Did THEY contact you or David Miller? Or did they claim to be an attorney? I'd love to see the email. Attorneys don't email dunning letters, by the way (though they may if it was a DMCA takedown request I suppose, but I still doubt it.) If it was an attorney it would be via US mail on attorney letterhead. To the best of my knowledge, you can't file proof of service on an email, it has to be USPS or trackable. This means the guy that made the other PDF is annoyed or whatever. If he claimed to be an attorney, that's VERY illegal if he's not. And one final note: Just being non-profit does not absolve you of copyright infringement. But as I said, I see no infringement here. The other answer that asserted these are covered under "works of art" is not withstanding. There is nothing "expressive" about Miller's guide. Also that other answer cited a source for AUSTRALIAN law, not US. Mere typographic elements do not rise to "an expressive work of art". A mountain profile that is nothing but a illustrative line based on data also does not.

A translation is a devivative work - the copyright owner has the exclusive right to these So, yes, translation is prima facie copyright infringement. Strictly speaking, if you translate it, it's a derivative work because you exercised creativity in making the translation; what Google translate does is not a derivative work, it's a copy because there is no creativity. Either way, only the copyright owner can do (or authorise) this. Whether it's legal or not depends on if what you are doing falls within one of the exceptions to the applicable copyright law such as fair use or fair dealing. Attributing the original author does not, of itself, allow translation. Additionally, I'm not able to find the copyright documentation for the site link I provided above. What is "copyright documentation"? Copyright exists the moment a work is created and no further documentation is required. Essentially, I could translate the whole documentation by myself to avoid this problem. No, you can't - see above. If copy-pasting the google translate is illegal, then exactly how much must I edit, move around sentences, change words, and such until the text is no longer plagiarized? All of it. If you were, based on your own knowledge of the software, to write a manual without any copying o the existing manual, that would not be copyright infringement. Is this plagiarism or copyright infringement? It's copyright infringement - plagiarism is an academic misconduct issue not a legal one. where can I check the copyright for the above link? The site you linked has "Copyright © 2020 Acquia, Inc. All Rights Reserved" in the bottom left corner which identifies the copyright holder, the date and prohibits all copying ("all rights reserved"). This isn't necessary but it is helpful. If you really want to do this, contact Acquia, Inc and ask for permission.

You cannot safely rely on the US doctrine of Fair Use, except if the rights-holder sues you in US courts. In France, there are limited exceptions to the authors proprietary rights. Under Art. L-122-5, there are some relevant potential exceptions: 3ºa) analyses and short quotations justified by the critical, polemic, educational, scientific or informatory nature of the work in which they are incorporated... 4º. parody, pastiche and caricature, observing the rules of the genre. Your description of the intended use does not fit these criteria. Consulting with a copyright attorney is advised, if you don't want to obtain a license.

You seem to assume that copyrights require paperwork such as registration. This is wrong, copyright is automatic. And it prevents the downloader from making the sort of change that you suggest. In fact, it prevents the downloader from using your template at all. The only reason the downloader can use that template is because you've granted him a specific license to ignore some copyright rules, but the default remains. And you did not grant the right to alter the template to free users.

The book teaches you how to draw horses. Once you learned how to do it, and you draw a really nice horse, you have drawn it yourself. You have the copyright. You use it any way you like. Of course it's different if instead of drawing the horse yourself you just make a copy of an image in the book. That would be the author's copyrighted drawing. Added since the question reappeared: One way to learn drawing horses is to start by making copies by hand of others' good drawings, practicing, practicing more, until eventually you can draw your own horses, which was the purpose of the book. So these copies made as part of the learning process might be treated differently. And the might not actually be copies, just your best attempt at making a copy. On the other hand, taking this book, making ten copies using a scanner, framing and selling them, is obvious copyright infringement.

YES, if you can get an image of it, you can use it A work that old is not under copyright protection in any country in the world. Under US law any work published in 1924 or before (as of 2019) is in the public domain. Unpublished works may be protected for up to 120 years after creation under US law. But no work that is over 600 years old has any copyright protection. In any case, merely owning the physical work does not mean owning the copyright. In the case of a work sufficiently recent that it is under copyright, say from the 1970s, the copyright initially belongs to the artist. If the artist sells or gives the painting to a museum (or anyone else), the artist retains the copyright unless that is explicitly included in the deal, in a written agreement. If the artist dies, the copyright is inherited, just as any other property that the artist leaves, as directed by will or law. If a museum owns a painting that is out of copyright, it can restrict access to it and prevent people from photographing or copying it, because it can restrict what people do on its property. But if an exact copy (known as a "slavish copy") gets out, the museum has no copyright in it, because making a slavish copy does not create an original, copyrightable work under US law. See the case of Bridgeman Art Library v. Corel Corp., 36 F. Supp. 2d 191 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) and Feist Publications, Inc., v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991) The law may be different in non-US countries, but the reasoning of the Bridgeman case has bene followed elsewhere. A "slavish" copy is one that attempts to reproduce the original as exactly as possible, without adding or removing or changing anything. A photo of a painting in a frame on a stand with people standing beside it is not a slavish copy. The images of art one sees in books on art are usually slavish copies. So are the images one sees on museum web sites, as a rule. The term implies that the copyist had no more freedom than a slave in making the copy. At least that is the metaphor. Slavish copies do not get separate copyrights because they are not original works. Photos of 3D works such as sculptures require choice of angle, lighting, etc, sufficient t make them original works -- no two photographers will produce quite the same image of a sculpture. But some courts have ruled that wire-frame models of 3D works of art are slavish copies and not protected by copyright.

How can I tell if a court case exists? As someone without access to pricy legal search engines, how can I tell if a given case exists? For context, a lawyer was recently found to have cited a number of cases hallucinated by ChatGPT. The transcript of his ChatGPT session is now online. ChatGPT cited 39 cases in response to queries by the lawyer; I'd like to see how many of them are real. Some, such as Bell Atlantic v. Twombly are easy "yes"s: they've got Wikipedia articles. Six of them, such as Varghese v. China Southern Airlines, are easy "no"s: they were called out as fake in the court filings. But what about the remaining cases?

A properly cited case will include a reference to a case reporter, online database, or neutral citation. To confirm that the case exists, you would have to track down the purported reporter/journal/database and query whether the case exists at that location. There is a meta post that presents online legal research tools. Many universities and courts have public law libraries that have access to printed reporters and/or online databases.

There isn't to the best of my knowledge, any single document that tells courts to follow precedant or when and how to do so. Each State, and the Federal government, has a set of court rules of procedure. These will indicate, among many other things, the form that should be used in citing previous cases, but that is about form, not content -- about how to cite a case, not about when a court should or should not cite one. Some precedents are what are called persuasive. These are from other court systems: say a different state, or even another country. These also include rulings from other courts at the same level, say from a different district, or even from lower courts. Other precedents are binding. These are from a superior court to the one where the case is cited. In a state's lower court, rulings of that state's supream court are binding. In Federal district courts, rulings of the Court of Appeals for the same Circuit, and of the US Supreme Court are binding. In Federal appeals courts, rulings of the US Supreme Court are binding. They are also binding in state courts on matters where the US constitution is involved, or where Federal law supersedes state law. Prior rulings of the same court are strongly persuasive, but not strictly binding -- a court can overrule its own precedents when it thinks the law or justice requires this, although most courts are reluctant to do so. Or more often it can distinguish a previous ruling, saying, in effect: "that previous ruling is still valid, but this is a different case in such and such a specific way, so the result is different". Students in law school spend a good deal of time learning how precedents are cited, and how they should be used, learning what sorts of things are controlled by precedents, and how to find the precedents that apply to a particular case. When they become lawyers and then judges, they taken this body of learning with them, and use it in writing decisions, and opinions that explain those decisions. New law from the legislature can reverse previous court decisions, except in the case of decisions interpreting the constitution (federal or state). Amendments can change the constitution. Judges must adapt to such changes in the law. To a significant extent our system of precedent is a matter of tradition, going back largely to the common-law courts of England, although it has been modified by specific legislation in many ways, as well as by more recent court decision and practice. It is passed on in law schools, in legal apprenticeships of various kinds, and in individual court decisions.

The law is known to everyone in theory. But as various people are said to have said, In theory, theory and practice are the same. In practice, they are not. Starting from zero and actually finding out what law is applicable to your circumstances is not a trivial matter. To have an answer you can rely on you need to do the following: Find out what law calls it. Sometimes this is obvious, but not always. Go and find the law in question. Over the last 10 years this has got much easier. It used to mean going to your city library and looking up the relevant law. These days we have Google (other search engines are available). Find any other laws which might have bearing on the matter. This can be a long way from obvious (see below). Find any relevant appeal court cases in which something like your circumstances have arisen, and figure out how they relate to your actual situation. You may find that some of the laws which you read in Stage 3 have been ruled unconstitutional, or that the standard of evidence required to prove or disprove something about it has been set impossibly high, or that the penalties or damages have been set absurdly high or absurdly low. If you are in the US then maybe some of those precedents were set in other circuits, in which case you need to figure out what your local circuit is likely to do about it should the occasion arise. Make a calm, dispassionate decision about what to do about your situation. Many people find this extremely difficult. The answer might be life-changing. Under these circumstances making a good decision is very hard. Just to give you an idea about (3), suppose you are planning on importing something for your business. Here is a list of areas of the law you might fall foul of, off the top of my head and I've probably missed some: Tax. Trade in endangered species. Drug prohibition. Environmental protection. Biosecurity. Health and safety. Consumer protection. And that is just the criminal laws. Theories of civil liability can get really complicated. But OK, lets suppose you figure out the law, but despite your best efforts you find yourself in court (criminal or civil). Now in addition to all the law you find yourself enmeshed in a complicated bureaucratic set of rules, depending on the type of court and where you are (e.g. US rules of civil procedure). At this point you need to learn not just the rules but how to play the game they describe. Think of it like playing chess; learning how the pieces move is only the first step on the long road to becoming a competent chess player. And the legal system is like chess in another way; there are no do-overs if you make the wrong move. (Incidentally, anyone who says "Well lets just get rid of all the complicated rules and laws" is committing the fallacy of Chesterton's Fence. Just because you can't see why the rules are there doesn't mean there isn't a good reason). Or you could just hire a lawyer.

To determine whether an attorney is licensed to practice in a specific jurisdiction, you need to look up that attorney in the bar that applies to that jurisdiction. Some attorneys do not allow their information to be posted on the online lookup, in that case you would have to call the bar to confirm that s/he is licensed. I assumed you meant more than "case" in the legal sense above. For instance, if you want a Patent, you would need someone licensed to the Pat Bar. Cases they have worked on: You can use Google Scholar and select Case Law / the Jurisdiction you are concerned with and search for their name exactly (I would also limit the time frame.) The attorneys for each side are listed at the top. Some of the large cases have multiple pages of attorneys with their name on the case. Alternatively, if you have a subscription service to WestLaw Next, Bloomberg Law, or LexisNexis you can lookup the attorney and see case information as well, as well as court documents they have submitted in various cases - this allows you to get a glimpse of their writing style. Alternatively, you can visit your local law school's law library and, if they have public access, use the public terminals (at least my law school has these.).

The order of operations is important I assume that plaintiff filed for a Protective Order. To get this granted, the plaintiff has to allege some kind of wrongdoing and evidence of that. If the defendant responds, then the plaintiff can amend their filing. Then the defendant once more can respond to the allegations. If the plaintiff wants to amend the filing once more, they need to ask the court to be allowed to do so, and that opens the door for the defendant to answer once more. That's all history for the case presented: The court apparently found the evidence lacking and dismissed the application for a PO. Plaintiff can only file for reconsideration or appeal but not bring in new evidence at this point. Dismissed Cases are not automatically evidence A case that did not establish its burden of proof and was dismissed - especially with prejudice - has not established that the evidence in it is good. You have to ask each item to be admitted separately and re-establish that it is good evidence. A bulk filing "I want to bring this case as evidence" is generally denied unless you prevailed in that case. A dismissed case is one you didn't prevail in. Get a Lawyer! It seems like you are in serious need of legal counsel to clear up the situation. Contact a lawyer for at least a free consultation if you even have a case.

Special regimes For some kinds of questions there are special presumptions or forms of evidence that are specified by statute. For example, in Canada and the United States, registering a copyright creates presumptive proof that the copyright exists and is owned by the registrant. In Canada, breathalyzer results are conclusive proof of the blood alcohol concentration if certain conditions are met. Some of these regimes are not subject to challenge: they are legal facts even if they are not objectively true (e.g. the breathalyser results). Others create presumptions that can be overcome by contrary evidence (e.g. copyright ownership). The default: present relevant evidence, including testimonial evidence But outside of special regimes, you prove a fact by introducing evidence. The default is that all relevant evidence that bears on a material fact is admissible. Evidence is relevant when, if is were to be accepted, it would make the fact in issue more or less likely to be true. Evidence comes in many forms: testimony of the parties or witnesses, documentary evidence, physical evidence, expert opinion evidence. If you are wondering, "How do I prove X?" Ask yourself, why do you believe X? Or, how do you know X? Or, how has the event X left its mark on the world? Whatever has led you to believe X probably is the evidence that you would want to introduce to the court to help prove X. Perhaps you saw X: you can tell the court you saw X. Perhaps you took a photo of X: you can present that photo in court. Perhaps you have a receipt for X: you can show that receipt in court. Perhaps X is a proposition about your own actions: you can tell the court about those. Obtaining the evidence Evidence can be obtained from the other party during the discovery process, or from third-parties using subpoenas, subject to objections relating to relevance or privilege. Not all (potentially) relevant evidence is admissible However, some evidence will be inadmissible despite it being potentially relevant. I will only present a few categories, some very general and some more specific: hearsay (unless it falls within an exception to the hearsay exclusion), privileged material (unless it is a case-by-case privilege or a discretionary privilege and the person seeking to admit the evidence demonstrates to the judge that it should be admitted), sexual history evidence of a sexual assault complainant when it will be used to support an inference that the complainant is more likely to have consented to the sexual activity that forms the subject-matter of the charge or is less worthy of belief (this is because it has been recognized as not relevant for this purpose), material that was obtained in contravention of the Charter and where the court has decided that the remedy for the Charter violation is exclusion of the evidence (in the United States, there is stricter, exclusionary rule), there are many more. There are also some meta-rules about the evidence that may be used to impugn a witness's credibility, themselves at trial to provide evidence, but for now I am leaving those out of this fairly summary answer. Weighing the evidence The trier of fact (the judge or a jury) then is to weigh all the admissible evidence, including by weighing the witness and party testimony according to its credibility and reliability after testing through cross-examination, to come to a conclusion on the ultimate question(s) at issue.

Unless you are an ambassador or one of the US states, SCOTUS doesn't have original jurisdiction over your lawsuit, so they can't hear it either. If you've named all the judges of all the courts that do have jurisdiction, then one of them will handle it anyway, under the doctrine of necessity noted before. For cases that do fall within the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction, a jury trial is theoretically possible, but it appears it has not occurred since the 1790s, and only one has surviving records: Georgia v. Brailsford in 1794. See "Special Juries in the Supreme Court" by Lochlan F. Shelfer, Yale Law Journal 123:1, 2013-2014. Otherwise, non-jury original jurisdiction cases are usually delegated to a special master, a sort of "contract judge" who hears all the evidence and recommends a judgment that the full court typically rubber-stamps.

A case can be "dismissed" at (most) any time (however, the further along in the process a case is, the less likely a judge will allow a case to be dismissed without very good reason). A case can be dismissed with or without "prejudice", which in this legal context means essentially "finality". A case dismissed with prejudice cannot be brought again, while a case dismissed without prejudice can be refiled. (Compare the criminal law concept of "double jeopardy", though as phoog correctly notes, "double jeopardy" only applies in criminal trials, while prejudice can be applied in both civil and criminal courts). Many cases are dismissed without looking at the evidence (or even having the evidence admitted to the record); this is called "summary judgement" or "judgement as a matter of law". There are generally three cases when this happens: First, if the prosecution or plaintiff (i.e. the party bringing accusations) has "failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted", i.e. asked for something the court cannot grant. Second, is if the defendant can show, that even if everything alledged by the plaintiff is true, that the necessarily elements of the crime or offense have not been proven. Third, is if there are no facts in dispute, and only a disagreement on interpreting the law.

When flatmates get an AVO against each other, who has to move out? If one flatmate trespasses in another’s room after an extended period of hostile verbal and nonverbal communication, can the flatmate who was trespassed against get an AVO? If so, who has to move out?

Usually, an order would specify what happens. There is no hard and fast rule in this situation.

In Texas, if the lease states that the landlord can inter for some purpose, the landlord can enter for that purpose. I assume there is no statement in the lease. Then the landlord has no right to enter except in emergencies and for routine inspections or repair. This right, however, stems from the courts and not statutes, and you could theoretically sue the landlord to prevent such an inspection (you would need a good attorney, to overcome the presumption that reasonable routine inspections with notice are allowed).

Summary: More information needed, but I have listed out some legal claims available to homeowners when they have similar concerns. There are several issues here which need elaboration before deciding if you can take legal action. The first is: "the destroyed some vegetation on my street." If the by "my street" you mean that the street is part of your property, you may sue the builders for trespass and/or damage to property. If the street isn't your property, but the vegetation is your property, you may sue them for destruction of your property. What you are probably looking for, however, is a prohibitive injunction. This is a court order forcing the builders to avoid doing something, e.g. An order forcing them to avoid using roads adjacent to your property. To obtain such an injunction you will have to prove that what they are doing is violating your rights, is somehow harmful to you or your property, or inevitably will do either of those things. One way to demonstrate this is if you can show that you have a claim under nuisance, or damage to property, or trespass. On the description you have given us, there isn't enough to say your rights are being violated, or that your property has come to harm or will come to harm because of their actions. You should also be aware of claims under nuisance. Nuisance is when someone is doing something that prevents you from "peaceful enjoyment of your land". It appears from your question that the actions of these builders have, in your mind, done this. However there are several aspects that have to be satisfied for this to amount to private nuisance: What the builder are doing must be a "continuing state of affairs." They may have annoyed you by trampling over vegetation, but if this is a "one-off" event, it is unlikely to amount to nuisance. A reasonable person must find the conduct to interfere with the enjoyment of their land. That is to say: it isn't enough that their conduct is making you unable to enjoy your land peacefully, you have to show that any reasonable person in the same situation would find this conduct unacceptable. Finally, the context of your neighbourhood matters: if the behaviour is something expected in a residential area, then it will not amount to a nuisance. For example, heavy drilling in an industrial location will not amount to a nuisance, while the same may do so in a normally quiet neighbourhood.

on behalf means that the party of the agreement is the landlord, not the property manager. The contract both entitles and obliges the landlord, not the property manager. The property manager is not a party of the contract. So the fact that the property manager is fired completely unrelated to the existing contract. Additionally, in most jurisdictions that I know of, even if the property changed ownership (the landlord sold or gifted it, or the landlord died and it was inherited by someone) the contract would still be in force, as the change of situations would not invalidated the rights and obligations of the other parties.

No The tenant is liable if they break a contract: there is no contract here. One of the tests for a contract is that there is an offer that if accepted will create a clear, unambiguous contract. Looking at the enumerated facts: Alan advertises a room to rent in a joint tenancy property in which they are lead tenant - not an offer, this is an invitation to treat Zoe views the room and verbally expresses an interest in renting it - not an offer, this is the opening of negotiations Alan passes on Zoe's contact details to the estate agent - not an offer, this is communication between one party and their agent The estate agent contacts Zoe by email, providing a draft contract and asking for further information in order to complete her details - not an offer, the contract is a "draft" Zoe provides the requested details, again by email - not an offer, just a transfer of information The contract is drawn up and the estate agents inform both Alan and Zoe that it is ready to be signed - this is an offer A week later (having not yet signed), Zoe informs the estate agent that she no longer wants to take the room - ... that was not accepted Further, the tenant is liable if they are promissory estopped - they have withdrawn a promise made to a second party if the latter has reasonably relied on that promise. Zoe has made no promises other than one to negotiate - she has negotiated.

You would need to know the landlord's reasons for refusal in order to determine their reasonableness or otherwise. If there is a dispute about this (i.e. They think they are reasonable and you don't) you can seek a court order requiring the landlord to accept the sublease or alternatively, that since the landlord has breached the contract, you are entitled to terminate it. Hire a lawyer before you do this.

This all depends upon where you are. I am a landlord and I am answering based upon the laws of the U.S. and the states that I operate in. First things first. You are not the property owner. While this does not limit the answer, it is a factor. You do not have the right to the property even if you have a key and the permission of the tenant. You are not the property owner, do not represent the property owner nor the tenant, and by contract do not have legal rights to the apartment. It does put you in a different situation. As a landlord, it is against the law for me to provide access to a tenants apartment to anyone without authorization. This, of course, precludes emergencies such as welfare checks. In the case of the police, a warrant is required or a form that the police fill out that allows the police to gain access. This would be used in cases such as when a spouse requires the recovery of personal property during a domestic dispute. A judges order is not always possible in these cases. These are often limited cases and the form absolves the landlord of liability even in cases where the police act incorrectly. So without a warrant or a form that certifies any lawful request, anyone including the landlord can be arrested for a crime. For your situation, a quick call to the landlord would have been appropriate. Without a warrant or certification, the police still had options including waiting for the person in question to either leave or return to the apartment or even request a warrant by phone. Often, the warrant, once signed by the judge, can be read over the phone. Any landlord should always have a paper copy provided within minutes since some cruisers will have a printer and can print the warrant. Your refusal appears to be legal. However, in the future, you can ask for a copy of the warrant that you provide the landlord. I do not wish to paint a negative image of the police who do the hard work that most people will never take on, they are after all heros, however, some do not know the law perfectly well especially tenant landlord law. As well, some will try and get away with skirting the law trying to get an important job done. It does happen. I hired a lawyer just last week for an illegal request unrelated to the question here. Addressing the OPs comment: Hello, I believe I misstated the situation a bit in that the locked door in question was for the apartment building and not a tenet's apartment itself. I have edited my question. Does this change anything? Technically, this does not change much of anything, however, the request by the police can be seen as a reasonable one. They just may want to talk to the individual which is reasonable. In this case, I might have let them in if the access I was giving them was to a common space such as a hallway. In this case, the outer door locks are only to keep Intruders from entering the building and not meant to restrict access for valid purposes. Are you in trouble? I would say no. If anyone asks, you can give reasonable arguments for your situation. However, the next time, consider what I have written here. The police have a tough enough time doing their jobs. If you can help and stay within the proper boundaries of what the law allows, that would be best.

The phrase in question is clarifying that if the wall (excluding the support) is on one person's property, and the support crosses into another person's property, then it is not a party fence wall. Why make this clarification, given that if a wall doesn't stand "on lands of different owners", it can't be a party wall anyway? Architect's Legal Handbook: The Law for Architects suggests that this is because there is a different rule for walls which separate buildings, hence the need to highlight the difference (emphasis mine): ...rights of adjoining owners do not arise where only the foundations project on the to the adjoining land if the wall concerned is a boundary wall, not being part of a building, but they do arise if such a wall separates buildings belonging to different owners.

Can this statement be considered a threat? If you write in an email, "Enter at your own risk. Anyone trying to enter a home without permission or consent will be treated as a trespasser or intruder.". Is that considered at threat? For country specific or local laws, United States / Florida.

In the U.S. it does not. U.S. has strong Castle Law doctrines and self-defense laws that allow the use of firearms for self-defense within the home. The sign is that the homeowner is armed and will defend himself if there is an intruder. Florida is also a stand your ground state which means that in public, self-defense is valid use of force for civilians even if they have the ability to flee the would be criminal. As anecdotal evidence, when I was living in the state, my boss was telling me the story of how he got a gun and went to do some paperwork at the sheriff's office. When the deputy received the paperwork, he saw that the gun was going to be used for home defense and told my boss, "In the case of home defense, if, God forbid someone enters your home looking to do harm to you and yours, remember: Shoot to kill. It's less paperwork for us."

So for your first question, yelling "Stop Thief" loudly at the thief is perfectly legal (Like Yelling "Fire" in a crowded theater, it's legal if the theater is infact, on fire... the quote implied that it was a prankster who drew amusement from the reaction of the people who took him seriously). This may alert store employees, who have a specific kind of Citizens Arrest Power known as "Shopkeeper's Privilege" and is a reduced liability compared to Citizens Arrest. This is also pretty basic self defense agains people who are not engaged in any physical action against you but are starting to scare you. Suddenly shouting draws attention to you and discourages them from their behavior "I SAID DON'T TOUCH ME" being suddenly shouted in a Wal Mart is going to get notices from the immediate crowd drawn to you, and by poximate location, the person who is making you uneasy. For your second question, maybe, it depends... since the cop is clearly chasing the guy, you meet the qualification to use non-deadly force in stopping the criminal (i.e. you are witnessing a person committing a crime, in this case, resisting arrest or persuit) and it would certainly be reasonably non-deadly force if you were to trip, grab, or push the fleeing suspect. Citizens Arrest doesn't specify a minimum time to qualify, so if the officer is seconds behind, and you detain the criminal in this action until the gap is closed, it still counts.

It is any law protecting me from the people that distrubute a video of me falling the stairs and shared without my permision? No. Your permission is not necessary for distributing or watching that video. The recording was from your workplace, where your entitlement to privacy is quite limited unlike few settings such as (1) your attorney's office in the course of obtaining legal advice for which the disclosure was needed, or (2) your home. Even if such an entitlement existed, your decision to share that recording with the person who was with you generally constitutes a waiver of your right to privacy regarding that incident. The waiver would apply even if California had some legislation akin to the EU's GDPR. Your description nowhere indicates that that person had a statutory or equitable duty of confidentiality. It is also highly doubtful that you would wish to block the distribution of the video if people instead of mocking you expressed something pleasant or encouraging to you. people who I don't even know their names come to me to comment about the video and joke about not falling again. That is not unlawful in and of itself. Since the matter does not involve a protected category such as sex, race, religion, or disability, pursuing a claim of hostile work environment would be quite a stretch. It would also be futile because any relief would not cover outsiders who watch the video and feel like joking about it. The notion of harassment entails a pattern of conduct (meaning that a person engages twice or more in that conduct) that causes a reasonable person to feel annoyed or concerned for his safety. Even if someone engages makes a few jokes that cause you to get annoyed, any petition for restraining orders seems unlikely to succeed. Sooner rather than later, the jokes will get old and people will move on.

A threat is not a threat if its lawful Let's look at a particular statute s249K of the Crimes Act 1900 [NSW]: (1) A person who makes any unwarranted demand with menaces: (a) with the intention of obtaining a gain or of causing a loss, or (b) with the intention of influencing the exercise of a public duty, is guilty of an offence. s249I defines "unwarranted": (1) For the purposes of this Part, a demand with menaces is "unwarranted" unless the person believes that he or she has reasonable grounds for making the demand and reasonably believes that the use of the menaces is a proper means of reinforcing the demand. If you genuinely believe that you have reasonable grounds for your demand and that a lawsuit is a proper means of enforcing that demand, then threatening to initiate one is not blackmail.

I intend to close on the house as I've already signed all the loan paper work, but is there anything that can be done about a Realtor that breaks contract? You have probably waived your claim if you proceed with the deal knowing about the Realtor's conduct. What would your damages be? Could you have mitigated them by not agreeing to the deal? Also second question would it be better to seek a personal or Real estate attorney in such situations as this? Lawyers aren't that specialized. I would not recognize a "personal" attorney as something necessarily different from a "Real estate attorney" and the questions involved are not so complex that a general practice attorney couldn't handle them. Familiarity with real estate issues would be desirable (e.g. you wouldn't want to hire someone whose practice was exclusively as a criminal defense attorney or a personal injury lawyer, or a patent lawyer, for this task), but a great many lawyers who describe their practices differently would have the relevant experience and knowledge.

I don't think there is any way to determine the magnitude of the risk. It is certainly a federal crime – 18 USC 875(c). The FBI doesn't publicly disavow the possibility of an investigation in cases that you might think are hyperbolic speech. There is the case of Elonis v. US, who was investigated and prosecuted for "making threats" – focusing on the statutory language transmits in interstate or foreign commerce any communication containing any threat Defendant argued that threat "conveys the notion of an intent to inflict harm", but the court disagreed with both prosecution and defense w.r.t. a mental state requirement in the statute. The court explores various scienter requirements, and concludes that there is a mens rea component to the crime (this is not a strict liability crime). The basis for the appeal is that defendant wanted an jury instruction read saying that "the government must prove that he intended to communicate a true threat", and what the jury was told was that A statement is a true threat when a defendant intentionally makes a statement in a context or under such circumstances wherein a reasonable person would foresee that the statement would be interpreted by those to whom the maker communicates the statement as a serious expression of an intention to inflict bodily injury or take the life of an individual The court rejected importation of the negligence-law "reasonable person" standard, when the question for criminal law should be "awareness". The standard for conviction is that "wrongdoing must be conscious to be criminal". As for investigations, law enforcement can investigate the possibility that a literal threat corresponds to an awareness in the utterer's mind that this is a real threat. When the prosecution makes the case in court, they would have to prove beyond reasonable doubt that in the defendant's mind, he intended to make a true threat. Based on the snippet that you posted, there is reasonable doubt as to there being a true threat.

A creative prosecutor could probably come up with a raft of charges. But you could start with the federal wiretapping statute, 18 USC 2511, and the anti-hacking statute, 18 USC 1030. Here is an indictment brought in 2012 under the anti-hacking statute against someone who distributed and used this kind of software. Depending on the facts and the jurisdiction, this may also constitute the tort of intrusion on privacy or seclusion, a tort recognized by the Restatement (Second) and actionable in many jurisdictions. The most common test is whether the invasion would be "offensive to a reasonable person." And no, contrary to the commenter's view, a "click to accept" license is not a get out of (literal) jail free card here. Courts interpret adhesion contracts liberally to favor the signer, and outrageous terms hidden in small print are not guaranteed to be enforceable, especially if the software is clearly designed to trick people into installing it. The license terms might even hurt you, by providing evidence of your intent to use the software for perving rather than its ostensible use. This is not an exhaustive list, and there may be additional state-level statutes that apply. Bottom line: yes, this is clearly illegal, and the courts will be reluctant to let you trick people into getting away with it.

I would agree with @DaleM that it is probably legal to install such a camera, however I think that you may have recourse - Apparently, California has Civil Stalking Laws and you may be able to get a restraining order prohibiting him from monitoring your front door. (You may also look into harassment, which would be related)

Can you be fired for refusing to lie? If your employer asks you to lie about something, and telling the lie is legal, but you refuse on moral grounds, can they fire you? Does it matter if religious beliefs are involved? (For example, if a Christian saying "I believe the Bible says lying is wrong" is protected, is an atheist saying "I believe the world would be a better place if people didn't lie" also protected?)

united-states Since "lying" is not a clearly-defined legal concept, we need to look at a specific kind of (non)statement. Some lies are plainly illegal, for instance saying in the context of a sale that "this column is made of pressure-treated lumber" when in fact it is make of sand and Elmer's glue is fraud. A receptionist being told to say "Mr. Smith is at a conference in New York" when he is actually drunk in Chicago is a legal lie. Now the question is, who can refuse to tell this lie (without suffering employment consequences), and on what grounds? Generally, in the US you can be ordered to tell such a legal lie as part of your employment duties. If I refuse, I can be fired. If you refuse, you can request a reasonable accommodation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, since you proffer that your religion requires you to tell the truth / forbids you from telling a falsehood. If you make a claim for a religious accommodation, then the issue becomes whether there is a reasonable alternative. Such an accommodation might be that you instead say "Mr. Smith is not available"; or perhaps someone else who does not have a religious objection will be forced to act as receptionist for the day. This is specifically about religion. "I don't want to" or any similar idea does not provide protection against being fired. However, bear in mind that there is no official list of approved religions and their beliefs which the courts will refer to in determining whether your refusal was protected. If you claim "As a Pastafarian, I can't lie", the courts will not accept the premise that declaring yourself to be Pastafarian (a parody "religion") is valid. The available governmental resources on the fine line between general moral code and religious beliefs are quite sparse.

This particular statement ("Person A lacks professionalism and integrity") may be protected because it isn't sufficiently factual to be susceptible of being proved true or false. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co. established that the test is whether "a reasonable factfinder could conclude that the statements [...] imply [a defamatory assertion]". The court mentioned that "loose, figurative, or hyperbolic language" would negate the impression that "[the speaker] was seriously maintaining [the defamatory claim]. The court also considered "the article's general tenor". It also emphasized that the statement was "sufficiently factual that it is susceptible of being proved true or false". Said in other ways: Is the statement "sufficiently factual to be susceptible of being proved true or false"? Can the statement "reasonably be interpreted as stating actual facts about an individual"?

At Will Employment - In General An "at will" employee in the U.S. can be fired at any time for any reason without any prior notice or warning. Outside a union shop or a civil service employment situation, even an illegal reason for firing does not give you the right to be reinstated in your job - instead it gives you a right to sue for money damages. Unemployment Benefits and Employment References If you are fired for good cause (or you quit in a situation that is not a constructive termination), you are not entitled to unemployment benefits. If you are fired without cause particular to your conduct (e.g. you are laid off in the employer's reduction in the size of the employer's labor force), or your are fired for a reason that is not good cause (e.g. you are fire because the boss is annoyed because you are such a goody two shoes that you always show up to work on time), you may be entitled to unemployment benefits based upon your term of service and earnings (short time employees are often not entitled to unemployment benefits no matter what). If you apply for unemployment benefits because you assert that you were fired without good cause, and the employer believes you were fired for good cause, the employer can dispute that finding in a summary administrative hearing. Employers fight awards of unemployment benefits for employees who are fired rather than laid off, because it affects the employer's unemployment insurance rates (and because they care, for non-economic reasons, if the integrity of their stated reasons for firing someone are not believed, or if their reasons for firing someone are not considered to be legitimate grounds for termination by a government agency). Even if you are entitled to unemployment benefits, these benefits are much smaller than your regular pay, and generally last less long than the period for which you were employed. A formula or calculator should appear on the Texas Workforce Commission Website. I assume when you say that "They put a few fake tags on me" that this means that they stated reasons that would be valid "for cause" reasons for termination and you dispute those reasons apply to you, but please clarify if I am mistaken. If that is the case, it is likely that you would have to fight for any unemployment benefits you are otherwise entitled to in an administrative hearing as the company is likely to contest your claim that you were not fired for good cause. This also means that if you seek new employment that they will give you a bad reference to someone who inquires about your employment (although many HR departments are afraid to do that for fear of defamation liability and will only confirm the dates of your employment and your position). Wrongful Termination Lawsuits Separate and apart from unemployment benefits, if you are fired, not just without cause, but for an illegal reasons (e.g. race, sex, and select statutory prohibited reasons), you may bring a wrongful termination lawsuit. Some of those reasons (firings related to discrimination by a private sector employer) require you to file an EEOC complaint and have it investigated by them first, other of those reasons (mostly whistle blowing statutes and breaches of written employment contracts that don't allow for termination of employment without cause) allow you to immediately bring suit for wrongful termination. The legal status of firing someone because you complained about another employee's ethical violation depends upon the exact nature of the ethical violation. For example, a U.S. Supreme Court case decided this month (i.e. February/March 2018) held that whistle blower protections under U.S. securities laws apply to people who report securities fraud to the SEC, but not to people who report securities fraud to a supervisor in the company. "My fellow employee was a lying asshole who acted unprofessionally (in non-technical sense of the word), and I complained about this conduct to my supervisor and the employer didn't care" standing alone, would not normally constitute conduct that is covered by a whistle blowing statute that could allow you to bring a lawsuit for wrongful termination of employment, although it might constitute a constructive termination for bad cause by an employer (if you quit) or termination for bad cause by an employer (if you were fired) for unemployment insurance purposes. The legal theory behind the amount of damages that can be awarded in a wrongful termination lawsuit is a bit obscure. As a rule of thumb, six months wages is a pretty typical settlement amount in a wrongful termination case prior to a determination by a court of employer liability. At trial, there is wide variation in what juries award in wrongful termination lawsuits involving similar facts. Sometimes the award is minimal even when the jury finds that the employer wrongfully fired you, and sometimes the award is very substantial, amounting to many years of lost income in amount. Contractual Payment Obligations Generally speaking, unless a written contract provides otherwise, you have no obligation to return a hiring bonus and the employer has a contractual duty (and probably a statutory one as well) to pay you through the date of termination without deduction for a hiring bonus paid. This includes any amounts, including bonuses, that the employer was obligated to pay you, although proving an entitlement to a bonus can be difficult unless that standard for receiving one is clearly defined and you clearly met those standards as a factual matter. Sometimes, you can even win a breach of contract award for a bonus that was not yet fully earned if the only reason that the bonus was not awarded was the employer's bad faith conduct. You could sue to collect unpaid wages in a Justice Court (the limited jurisdiction court for small claims in Texas) if necessary, if the amount you are claiming is under $10,000. If you have a claim for unpaid wages in a larger amount or also have other damages, you would need to bring suit in the appropriate county court or district court, depending upon the amount claimed.

The term "racism" is a political one, not a legal one, which refers to a belief. It is not illegal in the US, and it is a belief that is protected under the First Amendment. There is a legal construct, "discrimination on the basis of race", which enters into laws. For example, you may not discriminate in employment on the basis of race: but those law don't distinguish discrimination in favor and discrimination against. Hate crimes are crimes which additionally discriminate on the basis of some protected class (see "discrimination"). Assaulting a person because they are white, black, Catholic, atheist, male or female is a hate crime. Everybody falls into one or more protected categories (everybody has some race, religion including lack, and sex) – hate crime laws add "because of", for those extra penalties. Assalting a white, black, male or female person is not a hate crime, by itself. The government is not the only source of reigning in of speech that you don't like, in fact, it isn't way of suppressing speech that you don't like at all, at least as long as we have the First Amendment. An employer has the right to hire a racist, or to fire a racist, at least until the law changes.

Partial answer (other parts of an answer would be jurisdiction specific): Would this constitute a slander lawsuit against the group of employees and outside agency? The employee falsely alleged to be mentally ill would be the plaintiff who would be the only person who would have standing to bring suit. The person allegedly making a false statement to someone other than the employee alleged to be mentally ill (an action which is called "publication" of a false statement) would be the defendant(s). Listening to an allegedly false statement about someone is not slander, nor is believing it to be true. In the U.S., in most cases, knowledge of the truth or reckless disregard for the truth (or at least negligence in getting the facts wrong in private persons cases not involving a public interest) is necessary to establish liability. Someone who doesn't know that a statement is false and has some basis to believe it is true, can't be guilty of slander. In many non-U.S. jurisdictions, slander liability is possible without knowledge that the statement made is false (and without reckless disregard for the truth or falsity of the statement). Also, it matter who the "outside agency" is in this case. Governmental agencies are typically immune from liability for slander for statements made in the course of their official duties. Without a fuller understanding of who is saying something and why, it is hard to evaluate the claim appropriately.

A witness is not evidence, but what a witness says (their testimony) may be evidence. Or, the body of a person who happened to be a witness is evidence. I suspect that there is a translation problem. It is always physically possible to try pay a person to lie and AFAIK never legal: the person who lies and the person who induces the lie will be punished by law. The witness who testifies will have to swear that their testimony is the truth.

if these questions and answers are found to be legally binding ... They aren’t. Therefore the premise of your question is flawed. It’s like asking “If my dog was a cat ...”. Well, since your dog isn’t a cat we don’t need to hear the rest of the question.

Yes and no. While there are no general laws that ban the display of offensive symbols, they are prohibited in certain circumstances. Significantly, this is in the workplace. It is illegal to discriminate on the following bases in the workplace: Race Sex Pregnancy Religion National origin Disability (physical or mental, including HIV status) Age (for workers over 40) Military service or affiliation Bankruptcy or bad debts Genetic information Citizenship status (for citizens, permanent residents, temporary residents, refugees, and asylees) For instance, in Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 US 742 (1998), the majority found: a plaintiff claiming employment discrimination based upon race could assert a claim for a racially hostile work environment, in addition to the classic claim of so-called "disparate treatment." Since you haven't been specific about the nature of the offensive symbol, some examples might be: displaying a swastika displaying sexually offensive material displaying racially offensive material These are likely only to apply if the employer ought to have known, or did in fact know, that an employee (or in some cases, the customers) of a business would be offended, or it would amount to discrimination. Of course, a single display of only the symbol is not likely, on its own, to create a hostile work environment - it would need to be considered with the rest of the facts - but it can certainly be a contributing factor. It's a bit difficult to list all the situations where similar laws might apply, but this is one of the most prominent (and, to be honest, one of the ones that I'm personally interested in).

How can a lawyer represent a guilty client? This is specifically referring to the circumstance where a lawyer knows for a fact that their client is guilty through whatever means, and the client is pleading not guilty. So I have often heard that a lawyers justification for representing a client that they know is guilty by ensuring the trial is fair, but the only way a trial can be fair for a known guilty party is if that person is convicted of a crime, no? I fully understand the right of everyone to have a fair trial and adequate representation. I also understand that even if found guilty the person should be protected from unfair convictions/punishments. However in the event that the lawyer knows the client is guilty, and by some set of circumstances through the trial the client is found not guilty, wouldn't that be just as immoral as an unfair trial? Is this sort of circumstance justified in some written/legal way? Lawyers obviously have an obligation to ensure a fair process, but do they have no obligation for justice? Also if allowed I would be interested to hear if the laws on this vary from country to country.

canada A person is deemed to not be guilty unless convicted In Canada, by s. 6 of the Criminal Code, "a person shall be deemed to not be guilty of the offence until he is convicted." This is also bolstered by s. 11(d) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms which guarantees the right "to be presumed innocent until proven guilty according to law in a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal." There is always a chance that the tier of fact is not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt The accused (and therefore their lawyer) cannot be sure that the evidence will leave the trier of fact (judge or jury) with no reasonable doubt that the accused committed the crime. Thus, the accused and their lawyer can only "know" the accused is guilty in the colloquial sense (in that they did the things that could be found to be a crime). However, they cannot know that they will be guilty in law. There is always a chance that the trier of fact is not convinced. Ways that the Crown's case can fall apart at trial: what appeared to be convincing to the parties just isn't convincing to the trier of fact a key witness or evidence becomes unavailable it turns out critical evidence was obtained contrary to constitutional principles a key witness's credibility or reliability crumbles on cross examination the prosecution is complacent in diligently moving the trial forward and the trial drags on to the point that a stay of proceedings is warranted (e.g. in jurisdictions with strict rights to timely trials) The interest in truth-seeking is not the only component of a fair trial Fair trials should seek the truth, but they should also be timely (Jordan), and they should also not rely on evidence obtained contrary to the Charter (Grant). Fair trials are not only about securing convictions when a person did the things that could constitute an offence if proven. At base, a fair trial is a trial that appears fair, both from the perspective of the accused and the perspective of the community. A fair trial must not be confused with the most advantageous trial possible from the accused's point of view. Nor must it be conflated with the perfect trial; in the real world, perfection is seldom attained. A fair trial is one which satisfies the public interest in getting at the truth, while preserving basic procedural fairness to the accused. R. v. Harrer, [1995] 3 SCR 562, at para 45 The lawyer's duty Tuckiar v. R [1934] HCA 49: He had a plain duty, both to his client and to the Court, to press such rational considerations as the evidence fairly gave rise to in favour of complete acquittal or conviction of manslaughter only. No doubt he was satisfied that through [an interpreter] he obtained the uncoloured product of his client's mind, although misgiving on this point would have been pardonable; but, even if the result was that the correctness of [another witness]'s version was conceded, it was by no means a hopeless contention of fact that the homicide should be found to amount only to manslaughter. Whether he be in fact guilty or not, a prisoner is, in point of law, entitled to acquittal from any charge which the evidence fails to establish that he committed, and it is not incumbent on his counsel by abandoning his defence to deprive him of the benefit of such rational arguments as fairly arise on the proofs submitted. The subsequent action of the prisoner's counsel in openly disclosing the privileged communication of his client and acknowledging the correctness of the more serious testimony against him is wholly indefensible. It was his paramount duty to respect the privilege attaching to the communication made to him as counsel, a duty the obligation of which was by no means weakened by the character of his client, or the moment at which he chose to make the disclosure. No doubt he was actuated by a desire to remove any imputation on Constable McColl. But he was not entitled to divulge what he had learnt from the prisoner as his counsel. Our system of administering justice necessarily imposes upon those who practice advocacy duties which have no analogies, and the system cannot dispense with their strict observance. A laywer's obligation is to put forward on behalf of their client their best efforts. Whether they "know" their client is guilty of the offence charged or not, to do otherwise amounts to a dereliction of duty and weakens the protections afforded all of us who believe in the rule of law: Arthur Maloney, Q.C., "The Role of the Lawyer in Society" (1979) 9 Manitoba Law Journal 351.

My impression, and the plausible explanation in the absence of the actual facts, is that this was something that the attorney agreed to, in order to allow a skittish client to reveal information pursuant to a favorable plea agreement. The police probably insisted that the client be handcuffed to someone while doing this to prevent the client from fleeing. The attorney probably offered to do the job instead of a police officer, to be able to provide advice to his client and keep his client calm enough to do it, which might not have happened (sacrificing the favorable plea deal that the attorney negotiated) if someone else were in that role.

An appeal may be made by a plaintiff, prosecutor, defendant or other interested party, so the term 'defendant' is not very useful; the party opposed to the Appellant (and served with the appeal) is usually called the Respondent. A contested appeal just means that the Respondent wishes to be represented at the appeal, presumably to fight it; most appeals are contested, but not all. Unlike a first-order case which may go by default, an uncontested appeal will still have to have some sort of a hearing; you are, after all, saying that a court decision should be set aside, and the Respondent's views are not necessarily relevant. It is, though, fair to say that an uncontested appeal will have a greater chance of success.

united-states I am answering this in the case of a criminal jury trial (given the context of the previous question). It is my understanding that the judge must accept (almost?) all evidence admitted into court. So, this leaves me with three questions: What happens if an official shows evidence that the judge hadn't agreed to feature in the trial? . . . What happens if the evidence happens to be inadmissible? A trial in a criminal case takes place in a courtroom at a predetermined date and time, with the prosecutor physically sitting at one table in front of a judge and the defendant and the defendant's lawyer physically sitting at another table in front of the judge, and a jury physically sitting in a seating area to the side of the judge, and a witness (usually) physically sitting in a chair on the other side of the judge (in rare circumstances, for minor witnesses, testimony is provided by telephone with the phone put on speaker in the courtroom for all to hear), and a court reporter or tape recorder keeping track of what happens verbatim. In a trial, essentially all evidence comes in through witnesses sitting on a special the chair in front of the judge designated for witnesses (called the witness stand) at the request of either the prosecuting attorney, or the defense attorney. This is the only way the evidence is introduced (other than by stipulations of both side's lawyers). Prosecutors and defense attorneys don't testify or provide evidence themselves. The judge is usually not told what evidence will be offered at trial in advance, although sometimes a pre-trial hearing is held to consider a particularly important piece of evidence's admissibility prior to trial, in a hearing on what is called a "motion in limine" or a "motion to suppress". If that happens, the judge's decision made in advance will be honored by the judge when anyone tries to introduce the evidence at trial. But those are the exception and not the rule. Usually, any witnesses can be asked any questions at trial and the judge does not consider the admissibility of the answer to the question until it is asked and objected to by the other side's lawyer at trial. A defendant can choose to be, but is not required to be, a witness in his or her own case. In a trial, when it is their turn, the prosecution and defense, respectively, ask witnesses to sit at the witness stand one by one and ask them questions, which the witness answers under oath, absent an evidence objection from the other side's attorney. While a witness is on the stand, exhibits such as documents or physical objects can also be introduced into evidence in connection with the authenticating testimony of the witness (except in cases where both sides stipulate to the admission of the documents or other non-testimonial evidence). As the lawyers try to introduce evidence by asking a question to a witness on the stand, or by asking the judge for permission to introduce non-testimonial evidence, the other side's attorney can say, "I object". If that happens, the witness on the stand is not allowed to answer the question and the non-testimonial evidence (e.g. documents, or a knife allegedly used in a crime) is not made available to the jury until the judge rules on whether it is admissible or not in accordance with the rules of evidence. Usually, the judge rules on the evidence objection immediately in the moment, although in rare cases, the judge will let the jury have a break for a few minutes while hearing arguments from the lawyers for both sides on about the relevant evidence rules and/or researching the legal issue, before ruling on the evidence issue. Once the judge rules on the evidence issue, the trial continues immediately. If the judge "sustains" the objection to the evidence, then the question doesn't get asked and/or the jury doesn't get to see the non-testimonial evidence. The lawyer whose question or offer to introduce evidence was successfully objected to moves on to their next question (if any) for the witness instead. If the judge "overrules" the objection to the evidence, then the witness answer the question and/or the jury gets to see the non-testimonial evidence which is "received" into evidence by the judge. This process continues continuously, for as many business days as it takes, until all witness testimony and all non-testimonial evidence has been presented to the court and both sides have told the court that they have presented all of their evidence. Then each side makes closing arguments to the jury, the judge reads the jury instructions of law on how to resolve the case, and the jury is sent to closed room to discuss the case and decide whether to say "guilty" or "not guilty" with respect to each charge brought by the prosecution in the trial. This decision is called a "verdict" and when the jury has made up its mind on all charges present to it, the jury lets the judge know that it has made up its mind, and the judge calls everyone back to the courtroom, and the jury tells the judge what they decided in open court. If the verdict is "not guilty" on all criminal charges in the case, then the case is over, with no post-trial motions and no appeals. If the verdict is "guilty" the defendant is convicted, subject to post-trial motions to declare a mistrial and appeals by the convicted defendant. If the convicted defendant appeals the case, and the judge abused his discretion in overruling an objection to the evidence that is made by the lawyer for the defendant (or the defendant personally if the defendant is not represented by a lawyer), because no reasonable judge could have found that the evidence was admissible under the circumstances, then the appellate court rules that the judge has made an "error". The appellate court will not find that the judge's ruling is an "error" if the judge made the correct decision for the wrong reason. If it is reasonably possible that "error" possibly in combination with other errors made by the trial court judge could have caused a convicted criminal defendant to have been acquitted by the jury if the errors weren't made by the judge, then the defendant gets a new trial. The new trial usually before the same judge with a new jury. But the new trial is before a different judge and a new jury if the judge is no longer a judge on the court for any reason, or if the judge has been so defiant of the appellate court (typically ignoring its instructions in a retrial after a first appeal) that the appellate court decides it must remove the judge from the case. A criminal defendant is only acquitted by an appellate court if the appellate court finds that it would be impossible under any circumstances for the defendant to be convicted in a new trial, possibly with different evidence presented by the prosecution. What happens if a private citizen does the above? This doesn't make sense. Private citizens don't rule on the admissibility of evidence in a criminal trial, and can't introduce evidence in a criminal trial except at the request of a prosecuting attorney or defendant's attorney by being called as a witness and asking the questions that the lawyers (and sometimes the judge as well) asks the witness. Witnesses are not allowed to volunteer testimony or provide documents to a jury unless asked to do so by a lawyer in the case. What happens if someone provides evidence in court without the knowledge of the judge? As the process described above should make clear, this is basically impossible absent some extremely irregular event on the same level of irregularity as someone bribing a jury or threatening a jury with harm if he votes the wrong way.

The title question is overly-ambitious: it is not guaranteed, and nobody thinks that it is. The law does what is practical to achieve the desired result. Actual failure one way or the other is mostly irrelevant until a clear pattern to the failure is found, then there might be a legal resolution, but it might also require a political resolution. One consideration is whether it is possible for a defendant to receive a fair trial in a certain jurisdiction. Generally, you are tried in the jurisdiction where the offense occurred, sometimes (rarely) the venue can be changed to a more neutral location. This consideration is significant in high-profile cases. For example, the trials of Lee Boyd Malvo and John Allen Muhammad took place relatively far away from the scene of the crime. The trial judge must weigh the arguments for an inconvenient trial location, and in this trial the judge refused a petition for a change of venue. The judge stated that "As far as change of venue, I do not think that that would give the defendant any kind of a fair trial beyond what we are doing here today. I don’t think there’s any place in the state of Minnesota that has not been subjected to extreme amounts of publicity on this case" A second layer of protection is that prospective jurors may be excused. If a juror declares in advance (during voir dire or elsewhere) that the defendant is guilty, they will be excused for cause. The defense (or prosecution) also has some number of peremptory challenges – in this case, the defense has 5 and the prosecution has 3. In this category, a seated juror can be excused for cause (this happened), when a juror admits that some news e.g. about the city's settlement had prejudiced the juror. Also related to juror selection is that juror must swear to follow the law in reaching a decision. The third layer of protection is limiting testimony, for instance if the prosecution were to ask a witness something like "Won't there be major riots if Chauvin isn't convicted?", the defense would presumably object and prevent such testimony from getting uttered in the first place, or getting officially stricken if it somehow gets out. The fourth layer of protection is that jurors are meticulously instructed as to the logic of decision-making. If you can find a copy, there are here (MN does not make the instructions freely publicly available). Here are the California instructions. Additionally, a judge might attempt to limit what can be said by the media, or might sequester the jury so that they cannot hear any such publicity during the trial (but that's impossible for pre-trial publicity). Another layer is that a mistrial can be declared. However, what goes on in the jury room is in a black box that the legal system cannot generally touch. If a juror was paid off, that could be touched by the legal system, but there is nothing that can be done if it turns out that a juror has a bias in favor of the prosecution, despite the premise of neutrality. Finally, if the facts are so clear, a judge might overturn a conviction on the grounds that a reasonable jury could not reach that conclusion, based on the facts and the law. By "final" I ignore the possibility of an appeal.

Most advice that a lawyer gives is subjective; facts are objective but opinions are always subjective. What a lawyer does when they advise a client is typically called a "legal opinion". The reason it is subjective is that, as Dale M said, there are numerous variants that go into an opinion, and reasonably trained professionals (attorneys) can disagree as to the outcome of a specific factual predicate. Often times, case outcomes will differ based on the application of the facts to the law, so much so that the case outcome can differ based on the choice of words a witness uses, or even the way a judge interprets the law. This is why unlike truly objective discipline such as mathematics, where there is a right and wrong answer, no lawyer can ever say a case will definitely go one way or another. It will always be dependent on perception, which is the very definition of subjective. So, whoever indicated that lawyers don't give subjective advice was simply misinformed. They do. What they try not to do is make value-judgments, saying that things are good or bad; rather, they are trained to indicate whether something is illegal or not, or likely to get you sued or not. However, these are all legal opinions.

Your lawyer must act in your best interests; not follow your directions Lawyers are professionals and they are supposed to use professional judgement in how they run a case. While a client can suggest a course of action, the lawyer is not only not obliged to follow it, they would be committing malpractice if they unquestioningly did so. Just like a doctor would be if they unthinkingly implemented a patient suggested treatment plan. A panel of lawyers I was watching commentate on the hearing said it was a critical error and may have blown the case. So, a group of Monday-morning quarterbacks who weren’t chosen and don’t know all the facts would have done it differently? Perhaps it was a mistake. Or, perhaps the lawyer judged that there was nothing he could say that would help and considered that sounding desperate about the video would elevate its import in the minds of the jury.

Short Answer The concern raised is a real one, but it is much less serious than one might naively expect. Long Answer Precedents Apply Only To Resolve The Legal Arguments Presented On The Facts Found To Exist At Trial A Bad Lawyer's Failure To Develop Facts At Trial Isn't A Serious Problem A precedent determines the law as applied to a particular set of facts found by the trial court and confirmed as properly in the trial court record by the appellate court, as to a particular legal issue. Failure to prove facts at trial due to the fault of counsel for a party in the trial court changes the scope of the precedent. Failure to establish facts in one case that sets a precedent, doesn't prevent a similarly situated party, in a case with essentially the same actual facts, from doing a better job and thus presenting a set of facts that are not governed by the same precedent. The precedent from the ill argued case would not apply because the facts as found by the trial court would be different. A Bad Lawyer's Failure To Present Legal Arguments Isn't A Serious Problem if a someone lost a case merely because they did not come up with an argument which, should they have come up with, would convince the judge to rule in their favour, and that case has become a precedent, the fate of any following cases in lower courts with comparable facts will be decided by that unluckily slow-thinking litigant/lawyer. Likewise, suppose that due to incompetence of counsel, a key legal argument isn't made. When a trial court lawyer makes that mistake, the precedent will merely resolve the legal arguments that were resolved by the trial court. This won't preclude a future litigant from making different legal arguments that are stronger in the same circumstances since the precedent won't resolve those legal arguments. For example, suppose that a trial, a lawyer for one side fails to argue that the statute of frauds (which requires certain contracts to be in writing) bars the claim, and the judgment in favor of other other side on an oral agreement is upheld on appeal. A lawyer in a new case with the same facts can move to dismiss the other side's claim based upon the statute of frauds, because the precedent upholding the oral agreement didn't resolve the question of whether the statute of frauds could be used to dismiss the claim arising under that agreement. There Aren't Better Alternatives To Sift Through Legal Arguments No lawyer can make every argument. The incentives of the system and the professional regulation of lawyers, however, increases the likelihood that the strongest arguments will be made to the court setting the precedent and in the trial court before an appellate court considers the issue, relative to pretty much any other means of clarifying ambiguous issues in the law, where the advocates for different legal rules usually don't have the same strong incentives to argue their cases as well as they possibly can. The Risk Posed By Ineffectual Rhetoric In Favor Of Good Rules Of Law Is Real But Limited This doesn't mean that bad lawyering doesn't give rise to bad precedents. But when this happens it is usually because for a given argument and set of facts, the lawyer for one side is so much more rhetorically effective in making a legal argument than the lawyer for the other side which is proposing a "better rule" of law. But the exclusion of people who can't finish law school and pass the bar exam from the process makes a truly decisive advantage for one party over another in rhetorical effectiveness fairly rare. To the extent that rhetorical failure in appellate briefing is the cause of a bad precedent, the long term systemic effect of this problem (some would call it a feature of the system rather than a flaw) is that the side with more resources that can afford to hire better lawyers will tend to produce legal results that favor similarly situated parties going forward. Thus, it produces a sort of diluted "natural selection" effect (a bias that is equally, if not more concerning, in the duel of lobbyists for all sides of an issue in the legislative process). The other safeguards discussed below, limit this risk, although not completely. Other Safeguards Subject-Matter Jurisdiction The requirement of an actual "case and controversy" for subject-matter jurisdiction, and the requirement of "standing" for subject-matter jurisdiction are designed to prevent someone from intentionally making straw man arguments on appeal that produce precedents that are bad law. Thoughtful Appellate Judges When Opinions Are Published Also, appellate court precedents are made by a panel of multiple (usually three at the first direct appeal level) experienced and esteemed judges who are acutely aware that the decisions that they are making in precedent setting cases influence the law in other cases which causes them to look beyond the arguments of the parties to resolve the dispute. It isn't at all uncommon in such cases for an appellate court to resolve a case on appeal on the basis of arguments not made by either party in their briefs, or precedents or statutes not mentioned by either party. Furthermore, most appellate court decisions are unpublished opinions that expressly determined by the panel making the decision not to make a binding precedent, which allows panels of judges in these cases to take less care to run afoul of the risk of making a bad decision due to bad lawyering by a party. So, in the minority of cases that are published and create binding precedents, judges are especially careful to consider this risk. Five More Safeguards The other main safeguards in the case law system against bad precedents due to poor lawyering by a party are: (1) the ability of uninvolved third-parties to file amicus briefs in connection with an appeal presenting perspectives on legal issues not presented by a party, (2) the ability of a state supreme court or the U.S. Supreme Court (or both) as the case may be, to overrule intermediate appellate court precedents that were wrongly decided, (3) the ability of legislatures to change non-constitutional legal rulings by statute, (4) the procedural requirement that the relevant state or federal attorney general be given notice and an opportunity to intervene in cases challenging the constitutionality of a law, and (5) the ability of the political process to amend the relevant constitution to address a bad binding precedent by a highest court on a constitutional issue that the legislature cannot fix. Collectively These Safeguards Help Somewhat None of these safeguards are fool proof. But, collectively, these safeguards reduce the risk of a bad precedent being established due to bad lawyering in an adversary system, that the inherent limitation of a precedent being limited to particular facts and particular legal arguments provides as a primary means of preventing. Other Causes Of Bad Precedents Are More Of A Problem In general, once all of the considerations above are taken together, the risk of a bad precedent being made due to bad lawyering, while it is real, is significantly smaller than the risk that a bad precedent will be made because the appellate judges rendering the precedent making opinion are bad judges. Bad judges usually end up as judges with appellate precedent making power because they were selected more based upon political considerations, as they are in many states, and in the federal system, rather than primarily based upon the soundness of their legal judgment. When one risk factor that can lead to a bad decision is much larger than another risk factor that can lead to a bad decision, further improvements in the smaller risk factor will rarely make all that much of a difference in the overall likelihood that the system will produce a bad precedent. So, the adversary system, is, on balance, good enough make the risk of bad precedents arising from bad lawyering a not very troubling problem with the system, even though it is a real risk that sometimes does produce bad precedents.

What powers do the police have to stop a car in Oklahoma? Can a police officer in Oklahoma pull you over because they think your ID is suspended, despite not committing any traffic violations? Also is it lawful for the officer to write a police report before arresting a suspect in this situation?

Stop: possibly The standard for initiating a traffic stop is named after Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968): Terry stop. The standard is rather simple: Initiating the stop only requires reasonable suspicion. If their computer claims that the driver's license of the car owner is expired or suspended, that is reasonable suspicion to at least stop the car to check if the owner is driving it and if the license really is expired. Arrest: possibly To facilitate an arrest, the next level of scrutiny is needed: probable cause. Generally, there is little requirement on when a police report is to be written, but contemporary reports (at the same time or close to) are typical. Example of rising through the ranks Alice, 16 years old, dent in the fender from a fenderbender. That is not even a warning's worth and does not rise reasonable suspicion. Bob cop's computer still reads the license plate and Bob gets a flashing light: the car owner's license is expired. That is reasonable suspicion that there is an offense if the owner and Alice are the same person. But Bob needs to verify that. The reasonable suspicion can go away if for example the car was owned by Charles, a 60-year-old gentleman, then the suspicion that Alice's license is expired goes away. But the stop in itself was reasonable! Bob starts the ticket after stopping Alice, then passes the car to get to Alice. Looking in he sees that behind Alice lies a box stamped "Top Secret - US President's Eyes Only" all over. Bob arrests Alice for the probable cause of possibly possessing those documents illegally. The documents were in plain sight, so no search was needed btw.

Brief detentions and reasonable suspicion You can be briefly detained by police if they have reasonable suspicion that you committed a crime. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) What reasonable suspicion "means" can only be fully understood by reference to subsequent case law (which I will expand this answer to do), but as a basis, the court said in Terry that: the police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion This standard has been reiterated as recently as in Heien v. North Carolina 574 U. S. ____ (2014), where they say "All parties agree that to justify this type of seizure [a traffic stop, in the case of Heien], officers need only reasonable suspicion — that is, a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of breaking the law" (internal quotation marks omitted). The reasonable suspicion standard was also used recently in Navarette v. California 572 U. S. ____ (2014). They reiterated that reasonable suspicion is dependent upon both the content of information possessed by police and its degree of reliability, quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U. S. 325, 330 (1990). A mere "hunch" does not create reasonable suspicion, but the level of suspicion required by the reasonable suspicion standard is "obviously less than is necessary for probable cause". Arrests and probable cause To be arrested, police require probable cause. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949) In more detail, probable cause exists (from Brinegar v. U.S.): where the facts and circumstances within the officers' knowledge, and of which they have reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient in themselves to warrant a belief by a man of reasonable caution that a crime is being committed Also: The rule of probable cause is a practical, nontechnical conception affording the best compromise that has been found for accommodating these often opposing interests. Requiring more would unduly hamper law enforcement. To allow less would be to leave law-abiding citizens at the mercy of the officers' whim or caprice. As in the case of reasonable suspicion, the probable cause analysis is case-by-case and fact-intensive, so to understand the contours of probable cause will require reference to much subsequent case law. In Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964) the question before the court was entirely "whether or not the record in the case before us can support a finding of probable cause for the petitioner's arrest". In that case, it turned out that the information they had received about the arrestee was not sufficient for probable cause, but regardless, the test the court applied was whether the police had probable cause for the arrest. Notes While I am confident in the correctness of this answer, what each of these standards means will take hours of work to flesh out, which I plan to do. The courts have repeatedly reiterated and referred to these decisions/standards, but the analysis is very fact-intensive and is done case-by-case. Also, I realize the presentation is a little scattershot, as I'm first just looking to include relevant cases and statements the court has made about these standards, but I'll re-make it into a coherent story every once in a while.

There is a state law that requires you to obey the police: ORC 2917.13, which says you may not Fail to obey the lawful order of any law enforcement officer engaged in the law enforcement officer's duties at the scene of or in connection with a fire, accident, disaster, riot, or emergency of any kind. If you do, misconduct at an emergency is a misdemeanor of the fourth degree. If a violation of this section creates a risk of physical harm to persons or property, misconduct at an emergency is a misdemeanor of the first degree. You also cannot Hamper the lawful operations of any law enforcement officer, firefighter, rescuer, medical person, emergency medical services person, or other authorized person, engaged in the person's duties at the scene of a fire, accident, disaster, riot, or emergency of any kind "Hamper" is not defined statutorily, but the plain meaning of "hamper" is not the same as "fail to assist". We have not established that the order is lawful, however, which is crucial. The police cannot just freely search a residence without permission. If they have permission from the occupant, they can search and seize. If they have probable cause to believe that a crime exists and the circumstances make a warrant impractical, they can search and seize. I don't know what you mean by "wellness check", but that seems plainly to be unlawful entry. However, if the resident calls 911 and reports that he is having an issue, that is sufficient consent for entry. In the case of a fire alarm, the fire code authorizes a fire department official in charge of an actual emergency response incident to order the evacuation of a building, and occupants are required to comply. If we suppose that the smoke detector in a room has gone off, the fire department is authorized to inspect for fire, and there is a provision under the law about failure to obey a lawful command (to open the door so that they can look for fire). Problem: you cannot know whether the order is lawful. The officer doesn't decide what is lawful, the courts do (after the fact), and typically a command is found to be lawful unless it is clearly unlawful. The order from your supervisor is not "enforceable" in the sense that you cannot be arrested, imprisoned, or fined for disobeying your boss. However, there is a potential club they can use against you, namely firing you for disobeying the order. Normally, you can be fired for wearing the wrong shirt. But there are laws about employers doing illegal things, such as ORC 4113.52, which provides recourse when the employee reasonably believes that the violation is a criminal offense that is likely to cause an imminent risk of physical harm to persons or a hazard to public health or safety etc. In which case you report this to the supervisor, they have 24 hours after getting the report to correct the situation, and after that you would report the situation to the county prosecutor. (Read all of the details in the linked law, don't just skip steps: this is an executive summary). Having done this, you are protected from being fired, demoted. reassigned etc. The employer will be strongly motivated to not incur the penalties for violating the whistle blower statute. Additionally, you can sue the employer if they fire you for refusing to violate the law (termination in violation of public policy).

You are allowed to ask the police whatever questions you like. There is an upper limit that you can't refuse to obey a lawful order on the premise that you want to ask a bunch of questions, but they don't seem to have ordered you to do anything, so you can ask away. They have no obligation to tell you anything or to be truthful, except for certain questions like "am I free to go" when you want to leave and are testing whether you are under arrest. Even then they don't have to answer your questions right away. The police can therefore ignore you, especially if you are asking curiosity questions. It might be that they are restricted from giving information in certain circumstances (pertaining to the privacy of others). If there is an issue of legitimate concern (e.g. Little Billy has been beating up on cats again) and you feel that you need to know this, then you can request the police record on the matter. Certain information will probably be redacted under state law, but you could get a report that states that some [redacted] juvenile was beating up on animals. The Florida records law is one of the first in he nation, dating back to 1909. You can read this, to see if you think the circumstances match one of the exemptions, though all you have to do is make the request and be told that the record is exempt, then you will have some idea what was going on.

I couldn't find any decisions on CanLII where someone was punished for a fictitious or out-of-province front plate in Alberta, however the Traffic Safety Act states the following: 1(1)(s) “licence plate” means a licence plate that is issued under this Act and includes an object that is recognized under this Act as a licence plate; (9) For the purposes of sections 1(1)(rr) and 11.1 and Part 8, licence plate includes a licence plate issued in another jurisdiction. 53(1) Except as otherwise permitted under this Act, a person shall not do any of the following: (b) display on a motor vehicle or trailer a licence plate other than a licence plate issued or authorized for use on that vehicle; (c) operate or park a motor vehicle or trailer on a highway with an expired licence plate displayed on it; (Part 8) 168(1) If a peace officer has reasonable grounds to believe (a) that a vehicle is displaying licence plates that (i) were not issued for that vehicle . . . the peace officer may seize and take possession of the licence plates displayed on that vehicle. 169(1) A peace officer may arrest a person without warrant if the peace officer, on reasonable grounds, believes . . . (2) For the purposes of subsection (1), the following are the provisions for which a person may be arrested without a warrant: (c) section 53(1)(b) relating to the displaying of a licence plate other than one authorized under this Act; While the connection of the extended definition in s.9 to s.53(1) is a little vague, the connection to Part 8 is not, and therefore I can confidently say that the Act clearly states it is a violation to use out-of-province plates on the front of a vehicle. The plates can be seized and you may be arrested. It may further be a violation of the BC Motor Vehicle Act if/when you travel there.

Yes, your best bet for immediate relief is to call 911 and ask for a supervisor. Generally speaking the police are not legally obliged to explain themselves to you on the spot. They are obliged to explain themselves to the courts and their supervisors.

This is an excellent explanation. All Australian jurisdictions have (in general) common road rules. In NSW these are enacted by Road Rules 2014 regulation under the Road Transport Act 2013. The relevant provision is Clause 306: 306 Exemption for drivers of emergency vehicles A provision of these Rules does not apply to the driver of an emergency vehicle if: (a) in the circumstances: (i) the driver is taking reasonable care, and (ii) it is reasonable that the rule should not apply, and (b) if the vehicle is a motor vehicle that is moving-the vehicle is displaying a blue or red flashing light or sounding an alarm. From your statement (a)(i) and (b) would seem to apply so it becomes a question if (a)(ii) does. Well, you don't know the circumstances so you can't judge if it is reasonable that the rule not apply: if the police car were involved in a collision, caught on a red light camera or booked then the driver would have to show that it was. It is worth noting that some road offences like drink or dangerous driving are not in the Road Rules, they are in the Crimes Act and so the exemption doesn't apply to them. It is also not a shield from civil liability although the difficulty of proving negligence goes up because disobeying the road rules is no longer enough.

You are completely in the wrong. It is against the law to operate a motor vehicle without a license. It is against the law to have a motor vehicle that is not insured. It is against the law to violate the conditions of your probation which almost certainly provide that you are not allowed to operate a motor vehicle until your license is reinstated and you have insurance in force. Your personal belief that you didn't break the law is not a valid reason not to pay a fine on a ticket that is ratified by a court. The cop was right when he told you that you were crazy.

gdpr: classification of a psychiatric report I'm following a job-related course regarding data protection and the GDPR (European Union, I'm located in Italy). My background is not in law. I was puzzled whether a psychiatric report ("perizia psichiatrica", a document with legal purposes) falls in the sensitive data category. The course says it does not [edit: I double-checked, and the question was intentionally unclear, so probably that was the reason of the confusion], but I also read that "Health data" is indeed sensitive (https://www.gdpreu.org/the-regulation/key-concepts/special-categories-personal-data/). What is the reason behind this apparent paradox?

Its special personal information The GDPR uses “special” not “sensitive”. Processing of personal data revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, or trade union membership, and the processing of genetic data, biometric data for the purpose of uniquely identifying a natural person, data concerning health or data concerning a natural person’s sex life or sexual orientation shall be prohibited.

First of all, although the GDPR is stated to apply to any site which processes the data of any person who is in the EU, it is not clear how a site not located in the EU, does not business in the EU, and does not primarily target EU residents as its audience can be required to comply with the GDPR. To the best of my knowledge, no such case has yet been brought, much less decided. There has also been some debate on whether an IP address constitutes Personal Data under the GDPR, and if it always does so, or only under particular conditions. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) held that (under the predecessor Directive 95/46/EC) that a dynamic IP address was personal data. But in that case the web site was run by the German Federal Government, which surely has wider scope for getting info from a German ISP than a small private US web activist does. There is not yet any case law that I know of on the applicability of the GDPR to IP addresses in any case at all similar to the one in the question. Joe would in my view be wise to at least learn that logs are being kept, and post a disclosure of this on the site. Whether Joe needs to do more than that is less than clear at this time.

Great question - I work for a London based company who use a large amount of location data. The process for deletion of data is not as simple as it first sounds. We recently had a deep dive with our legal team and as a result actually created a product to process deletions. Personal data from users/customer is carried for lots of reasons, not just marketing. What if you're asked to delete data that is needed to bill customers, information that may be relevant to a legal case or information that needs by law to be retained for the purposes of audit? GDPR does not make it illegal to carry personal information, it simply needs you to justify why you are keeping the information - inform the named person about this and provide them with a timescale for deletion. For example if you are required by law to store a record of emails to document the work done, but the user asks you to delete that information. You would be entitled to keep that information but only for the purposes of maintaining that audit trail. You would delete all associated customer data that was unnecessary such as CRM info, payment details etc.. but could keep the audit trail. The proper way to respond to the user's deletion request would be "your data will be kept in a secure server for the purposes of maintaining an audit trail for x amount of time. Once this time has elapsed it will be deleted. If you are unhappy with our use of this data please contact our data officer". GDPR isn't designed to catch you out - if you have a legitimate reason to keep that information then you are entitled to. The law was designed to stop marketers and advertisers hoarding huge amounts of information, as well as undermine Google/Facebook's duopoly on our personal information.

No. Art. 17(1) GDPR lists conditions when erasure can be requested. None of the listed grounds would apply in this case. However, you might have to explain why you process the data (for moderation purposes as you explained above), and why that is lawfully. In particular Art. 5 and Art. 6 need to be taken into account. In your case, processing will be based on Art. 6(1)(f): (f) processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party, except where such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require protection of personal data, in particular where the data subject is a child. Even if the data subject would be a 9 year old child, the legitimate interests of you and other forum users outweigh the objection of the data subject. Based on Art. 5, there will be a moment when the data has to be deleted. For example 1 year after the last login attempt.

In my opinion, this should be enough. The GDPR regulation is general - it does not attempt to address these issues directly, precisely for the reasons we see here: You can never predict how the technology will develop. When interpreting the GDPR, we must keep the intended goal in mind. What is the purpose of the "right to erasure"? To prevent anyone from further processing the personal data. If you "crypto-shred" it, it can't be processed anymore, not even theoretically. The encryptec file cannot be used to identify the subject, therefore it is not even personal data anymore. In case it can be decrypted in the future... Well, that is just a speculation. The courts can go to great lengths in interpreting what personal data is (dynamic IP address is considered personal data, since it can be linked to a person by the police with a court order), but i am pretty sure that "it can be theoretically possible in some distant future" is beyond the limit. As for the second question, I am not aware of any applicable case-law, but I guess that current security and technological standards will be used to assess the delay. You have a right to protect your data, the subject has a right to erase them. Those rights must be balanced, neither fully overrules the other. The delay should be short enough so the right to erasure is effective, and it should not extremely long compared to other (economically viable) backup solutions available, in line with current industrial standards.

The GDPR does not have specific rules on passwords. Instead, the GDPR imposes a more general requirement to ensure data protection by implementing “appropriate” technical and organizational measures, “[t]aking into account the state of the art, the costs of implementation and the nature, scope, context and purposes of processing as well as the risk of varying likelihood and severity for the rights and freedoms of natural persons” (c.f. Art 24, 25, 32 GDPR). As of 2021, the state of the art for password storage is a special password hashing function such as Argon2, bcrypt, or scrypt. However, the nature and context of processing could reasonably lead to the conclusion that the usual hashed password storage is not appropriate, for example because the ability to find links between user accounts is more important. There is a trade-off between different aspects of security, and the data controller could reasonably arrive at an unusual conclusion. However: The data controller would still have to implement appropriate measures to protect these plaintext passwords, for example by storing them in an encrypted manner, keeping unforgeable access logs, and limiting access to plaintext passwords to specially trained staff. Encryption is one of the few things that are explicitly required whenever appropriate. The data controller better have a good analysis that shows that this unusual approach to security is appropriate. Even if not explicitly required, an Art 35 data protection impact assessment could be useful. The data controller has the burden of proof to show that these processing activities are GDPR-compliant. So is this data controller breaking the law or doing morally dubious stuff? Not necessarily! It is possible to find a scenario where they are doing the right thing. However, such a scenario is far-fetched and rather unlikely. Without further background, the most likely explanation is that the presented password handling scheme does not comply with GDPR.

According to my knowledge I am not allowed to share other people's full name nor phone number nor email address without their permission. That is not correct. According to GDPR Article 2: This Regulation applies to the processing of personal data wholly or partly by automated means and to the processing other than by automated means of personal data which form part of a filing system or are intended to form part of a filing system. This Regulation does not apply to the processing of personal data ... ... (c) by a natural person in the course of a purely personal or household activity; GDPR Recital 18 states in relevant part: (2) Personal or household activities could include correspondence and the holding of addresses, or social networking and online activity undertaken within the context of such activities. Personal data that is not processed by "automated means", for example data which is transmitted verbally, by hand writing, or by manually sent email, is not covered by the GDPR. Data which is used by a natural person for "personal activities" is also not covered. Consulting one's personal lawyer might well be a personal activity unless it is a business matter. Even if such a transfer of data were in scope for the GDPR, consent of the data subject (DS) is not the only available lawful basis. GDPR article 6 permits any of several possible lawful bases to be used, particularly paragraph 1 point (f) which reads: (f) processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party, except where such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require protection of personal data, in particular where the data subject is a child. Also possibly relevant is point (c) which reads: processing is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to which the controller is subject; In short, providing one's personal lawyer with the names and addresses of relevant people in connection with a legal issue is not at all likely to be prohibited by the GDPR, nor to require the consent of the people whose names and contact info are provided. However, a comment by user PMF reads: The Data Protection laws are mostly for companies, not for individuals. This is an overstatement. The laws do apply to natural persons as DCs, although enforcement is largely targeted at businesses, particularly large, for-profit businesses.

If I have correctly untangled the law, Schedule 2 of the Data Protection Act part 3 identifies as a condition where you are not prohibited from revealing personal data: The processing is necessary for compliance with any legal obligation to which the data controller is subject, other than an obligation imposed by contract. The Animal Welfare Act 25(1) says An inspector may require the holder of a licence to produce for inspection any records which he is required to keep by a condition of the licence I can't tell if you are required to keep customer names, but if you are, it looks like the pieces fit together and you would have to provide the records. Call a solicitor to be sure, though.

Claiming against eBay sellers: mechanics and practicality It seems clear that in principle eBay sellers are subject to either the consumer rights or sale of goods act respectively, depending on whether the seller is a company or individual. But how does one claim against just the user name? I doubt that eBay would willingly be so cooperative, so is it purely a matter of filing a legal claim, perhaps performing pre action protocol or even serving claim form by eBay messages and then probably seeking an ex parts or default judgment if they don't engage and then ultimately asking the court to compel eBay to disclose the user's name and address?

You subpoena eBay You file your claim against username. You then subpoena eBay to provide all relevant information about username (name, address etc.). You then update your filing. Of course, you have to complete any dispute resolution clauses that may exist first.

One can certainly remove a trademark from an item that one owns, whether it be a car, cell phone, blender, or computer. Using some other firm's mark would not be trademark infringement if one did not try to sell the item. If the logo was complex enough to be protectable by copyright, copying it might be copyright infringement, but for such personal use it might fall under an exception to copyright, depending on the country. In any case a copyright infringement suit in such a case seems unlikely. For a car, registration is generally required, and must accurately specify the make and model. The same is true for insurance coverage, a falsely stated make or model would be fraud. If one were to sell the "rebranded" item, one would have to make the situation clear to any potential buyer, otherwise this might be some form of fraud.

Do you have a contract? It depends on the website’s terms but almost certainly not. It is standard practice in e-commerce terms and conditions that your selecting “buy” and giving the vendor money does not create a contract; you are merely making an offer that the vendor can accept or reject. For example, Amazon’s terms are clear that the contract only comes into existence when they dispatch the goods, until then they are free to cancel your order and return your money. Here the vendor rejected the offer. Is this false advertising? Maybe. It would depend on the specifics of the ad and whether, overall, a reasonable person would be mislead or deceived. It’s possible you misunderstood but that doesn’t necessarily make it misleading or deceptive. I misunderstand a lot of things; that doesn’t mean they were objectively misleading or deceptive. Notwithstanding, a business does not have to make good on false advertising. An incorrect advertised price does not force the business to anccept offers of that price. It may force a correction and may require the item to not be sold until the price is corrected and it may expose the business to fines, but it does not give anyone the right to buy at that price.

Short Answer You are legally entitled to the cost of an adequate replacement (possibly a lightly used previously owned computer) reduced by the amount refunded. This is sometimes called a "benefit of the bargain" measure of the relief to which you are entitled. But as a practical matter, there is no cost effective way of enforcing your legal rights under these facts, that doesn't deeply compromise you chances of success. But, trying to litigate the case on the cheap, because it is unlikely to succeed, makes the effort to enforce your rights even less worthwhile. Your best options are those you could take outside the formal legal process (such as social media gripes, or complaining to "the manager" of the person you dealt with first if they refuse to give you what you want or are entitled to under the law). Long Answer Applicable Law The default rules of law, absent an express contractual term to the contrary, are as follows: In every U.S. jurisdiction in an intra-U.S. transaction, this is governed by the following section of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, which apart from section and subsection numbering conventions is substantially identical in all of these jurisdictions. It states: § 2-713. Buyer's Damages for Non-delivery or Repudiation. (1) Subject to the provisions of this Article with respect to proof of market price (Section 2-723), the measure of damages for non-delivery or repudiation by the seller is the difference between the market price at the time when the buyer learned of the breach and the contract price together with any incidental and consequential damages provided in this Article (Section 2-715), but less expenses saved in consequence of the seller's breach. (2)Market price is to be determined as of the place for tender or, in cases of rejection after arrival or revocation of acceptance, as of the place of arrival. In international transactions between signatory countries, the relevant body of law of the Convention on the International Sale of Goods (CISG) (1980). The primary applicable provisions of that Convention (to which the U.S. is a party) are: Article 45 (1) If the seller fails to perform any of his obligations under the contract or this Convention, the buyer may: (a) exercise the rights provided in articles 46 to 52; (b) claim damages as provided in articles 74 to 77. (2) The buyer is not deprived of any right he may have to claim damages by exercising his right to other remedies. (3) No period of grace may be granted to the seller by a court or arbitral tribunal when the buyer resorts to a remedy for breach of contract. Article 46 (1) The buyer may require performance by the seller of his obligations unless the buyer has resorted to a remedy which is inconsistent with this requirement. . . . Article 47 (1) The buyer may fix an additional period of time of reasonable length for performance by the seller of his obligations. (2) Unless the buyer has received notice from the seller that he will not perform within the period so fixed, the buyer may not, during that period, resort to any remedy for breach of contract. However, the buyer is not ­deprived thereby of any right he may have to claim damages for delay in performance. Article 48 (1) Subject to article 49, the seller may, even after the date for delivery, remedy at his own expense any failure to perform his obligations, if he can do so without unreasonable delay and without causing the buyer ­unreasonable inconvenience or uncertainty of reimbursement by the seller of expenses advanced by the buyer. However, the buyer retains any right to claim ­damages as provided for in this Convention. (2) If the seller requests the buyer to make known whether he will accept performance and the buyer does not comply with the request within a reasonable time, the seller may perform within the time indicated in his request. The buyer may not, during that period of time, resort to any remedy which is inconsistent with performance by the seller. (3) A notice by the seller that he will perform within a specified period of time is assumed to include a request, under the preceding paragraph, that the buyer make known his decision. (4) A request or notice by the seller under paragraph (2) or (3) of this article is not effective unless received by the buyer. Article 49 (1) The buyer may declare the contract avoided: (a) if the failure by the seller to perform any of his obligations under the contract or this Convention amounts to a fundamental breach of contract; or (b) in case of non-delivery, if the seller does not deliver the goods within the additional period of time fixed by the buyer in accordance with paragraph (1) of article 47 or declares that he will not deliver within the period so fixed. . . . Article 74 Damages for breach of contract by one party consist of a sum equal to the loss, including loss of profit, suffered by the other party as a consequence of the breach. Such damages may not exceed the loss which the party in breach foresaw or ought to have foreseen at the time of the conclusion of the contract, in the light of the facts and matters of which he then knew or ought to have known, as a possible consequence of the breach of contract. Article 75 If the contract is avoided and if, in a reasonable manner and within a reasonable time after avoidance, the buyer has bought goods in replacement or the seller has resold the goods, the party claiming damages may recover the difference between the contract price and the price in the substitute transaction as well as any further damages recoverable under article 74. Article 76 (1) If the contract is avoided and there is a current price for the goods, the party claiming damages may, if he has not made a purchase or resale under article 75, recover the difference between the price fixed by the ­contract and the current price at the time of avoidance as well as any further damages recoverable under article 74. If, however, the party claiming ­damages has avoided the contract after taking over the goods, the current price at the time of such taking over shall be applied instead of the current price at the time of avoidance. (2) For the purposes of the preceding paragraph, the current price is the price prevailing at the place where delivery of the goods should have been made or, if there is no current price at that place, the price at such other place as serves as a reasonable substitute, making due allowance for differences in the cost of transporting the goods. Article 77 A party who relies on a breach of contract must take such measures as are reasonable in the circumstances to mitigate the loss, including loss of profit, resulting from the breach. If he fails to take such measures, the party in breach may claim a reduction in the damages in the amount by which the loss should have been mitigated. Your Legal Rights This brings us to the question: What buyer protections are there for this? Will I be able to easily sue the manufacturer for monetary losses if the manufacturer refunds me anyway instead of letting me wait for the item to come back in stock? The buyer is legally entitled to the fair market value of obtaining a replacement (perhaps in the secondary market for used laptops) that is equivalent to what was ordered reduced by the amount of money refunded. Practical Vindication Of Your Legal Rights But it is much easier to get the refund than it is to prevail in a lawsuit for the additional damages to which the buyer is legally entitled, a prevailing buyer will probably not get their attorney fees if they prevail, and there is a good chance that the dispute will be sent to arbitration which is, generally speaking (according to strong empirical evidence) a forum with a strong anti-consumer bias (although consumer arbitration can be fairly inexpensive to litigate in, is somewhat more tolerant of lack of legal expertise by a self-represented party, and sometimes despite everything, you win, or can even get an unfair result that works in your favor rather than that of the seller). If you are fighting over $1,500 to $2,500, and you have a fairly complex case to prove that will require expert testimony (and expert witness fees and court costs would be awarded to a prevailing party in addition to the actual damages to which they are legally entitled even though attorney fees are not recoverable in most cases), it will be very hard to find a lawyer willing to take the case. This is because it will take far more than 5-12 hours of attorney work to take the case to its conclusion, which is your maximum cost effective litigation budget, even if everything you win goes to the attorney and you receive no actual benefit. To get even a 50% recovery, your lawyer needs to get the job done ins 2-6 hours depending on your lawyer's hourly rate, which is close to impossible when your legal argument is as difficult to prove as it is in this case. So, basically, the only cost effective way to litigate the case is without a lawyer in small claims court or consumer arbitration, even though representing yourself without a lawyer greatly reduces your chances of success on the merits. On balance, you would usually be better off accepting a refund and acknowledging that you have been damaged in a manner for which the law provides no reliable and cost effective remedy, because the harm is too small. Bad mouthing the offending company on social media (which sometimes results in a PR driven instead of lawyer driven, favorable resolution) would probably be a more fruitful strategy. Complaining to a manager or writing a letter to the President of the company might also be a more fruitful strategy. Sometimes small disputes can be resolved with class action lawsuits, but this isn't a case where this is an option, since it involves just a single individual or a handful of individuals who are harmed. This is also not the sort of case where a state consumer protection agency or attorney general's office or federal consumer protection agency is likely to get involved, since it doesn't involve a systemic deceptive trade practice, just an unfair to you bad situation. Why have these laws if they are so hard to enforce in consumer cases? As my commercial transactions professor in law school (James J. White, the author of the leading legal treatise on the subject) was fond of saying: all legal issues become more interesting if you add more zeros to the amount in controversy. If the computer system you bought had a price of $150,000 that had since gone up to $300,000, this dispute would absolutely be worth litigating. Furthermore, since you could litigate it adequately on the litigation budget that this amount in controversy would make possible, your prospects of successfully vindicating your rights as a buyer, at only a modest discount for unrecoverable litigation costs, would be much greater. Essentially, our system is designed to get close to justice in the most important disputes, as measured by the amount in controversy, while it tolerates small injustices that are not as damaging (in raw absolute dollar terms) as big disputes. This is unfair, but the source of this unfairness is intrinsic to the nature of the problem (rather than simply being a matter of artificial bias created by the people who designed the civil justice system). Also, this unfair bias comes close to maximizing the aggregate improvement in economic value that the legal system as a whole can provide for a given legal of expenditure on this system. Basically, at a fundamental economic level, the economic costs of justly resolving small wrongs can be greater due to the deadweight loss of litigation expenses for the economy as a whole, than the economic benefits of resolving the wrongs fairly (which provides not only justice to those involved but also provides an incentive to act justly in future transactions before one knows whether a problem or dispute will arise).

Your question lacks some details. So you registered a domain name, and later find someone else used that domain name (in the past) for a hobby website? Then no, you don't need to worry about it. If that person has a current trademark on the name used in the domain name, and your website provides/sells products or services in the same area, then you could have a problem. But that doesn't sound like it's the issue.

Of course another applicant can use that language. What they can't do is register the same trademark for the same goods or services. If the goods or services protected by a trademark were required to be unique, there'd be no point in having trademarks. Instead, we would have state-sanctioned monopolies. To put it another way, the point of a trademark is to identify the commercial source of particular goods or services. Suppose you sell oranges under the trademark-protected name "Jerzy's oranges," with a goods and services description reading "the sale of oranges." Your registration does not prohibit others from selling oranges; it prohibits them from selling oranges using your name. Any competitor can register a unique trademark to use in the sale of oranges, however, with an identical goods and services description of "the sale of oranges."

The precise details (and citations) will vary with jurisdiction, so this answer deals only with principles. If you pick up and "take possession of" property belonging to somebody else, you are a thief. [Note that 'taking possession' rather than picking up to restore to the owner/correct place is what makes the difference, which is why in real life nobody who cannot prove your intention will take action; but your question explicitly concedes the point.] If the property does not belong to the supermarket, you are not stealing from them, but from the currently unidentified owner: this makes no legal difference. You might conceivably have a defence if you can prove that the owner has abandoned the property, whatever the definition of "abandoned" is in your jurisdiction (note that it is up to you to show this, and possibly that you knew it before you picked up the property). If it belongs to the supermarket, this cannot be true; if a box of matches has fallen out of someone's pocket, it might possibly be (whatever the laws are, it is very unlikely that they have ever been applied in such a trivial case, so there may be some uncertainty). in any case, the shop is undoubtedly allowed to throw you out, ban you from returning to their premises, and inform other shops and the police that they believe you to be a petty thief, based on their experience.

My thinking is that there was no meeting of the minds, thus no acceptance. ( I can see that shipping the goods implies acceptance, however I understand that acceptance implies a meeting of the minds - and there would have been subterfuge to modify the return page with the lower amount - thus at the moment of apparent acceptance there was no actual acceptance) I doubt you would have a case against the other party criminally, but quite possibly in a civil court.

Breach of contract between eBay users Breach of contract between eBay users Bob bids on an item on eBay. He wins the auction. The seller, perhaps disappointed at the price the item had fetched, promptly"cancels the order" on spurious grounds of "issues with the buyer's delivery address", when the auction was for collection from the seller's address by the buyer. The seller immediately relists the item with identical description and a rare enough item as it is with a higher starting price, thus breaking the contract. Bob hadn't yet had a chance to pay for the item before the seller cancelled it so there is no question of seeking a refund but does the contract of winning the auction not bind the seller as well as the buyer? Bob hadn't paid so have lost any money but he stole wants the item he won. How can he compel the seller to cancel the new auction and sell him the item as they contracted to do? Related: Lost merchandise: Replacement or refund

How can he compel the seller to cancel the new auction and sell him the item as they contracted to do? Expectation damages are the typical remedy for breach of contract The general measure of damages for breach of contract is expectation damages: "the plaintiff will be entitled to the value of the promised performance" (Bank of America Canada v. Mutual Trust Co., 2002 SCC 43 at paragraph 26); "the purpose of expectation damages is to put the plaintiff in the same position it would have been if the contract had been performed (Grandeur Homes Inc. v. Zeng, 2021 ONSC 4005 at paragraph 19). This is a general principle of common-law contract law rooted in English jurisprudence. See Robinson v. Harman (1848) 1 Ex. 850, p. 855: The rule of the common law is, that where a party sustains a loss by reason of a breach of contract, he is, so far as money can do it, to be placed in the same situation, with respect to damages, as if the contract had been performed. This was recently confirmed by the U.K. Supreme Court in Morris-Garner v. One Step (Support) Ltd., [2018] UKSC 20: Damage for breach of contract are ... a substitute for performance. That is why they are generally regarded as an adequate remedy. The courts will not prevent self-interested breaches of contract where the interests of the innocent party can be adequately protected by an award of damages. Specific performance is not usual Specific performance (cancelling the new auction and forcing the first sale) is an exceptional remedy for breach of contract. Specific performance is an equitable remedy. As an equitable remedy, it is always discretionary; the wronged party does not have a right to specific performance. Specific performance may be ordered when: expectation damages are inadequate as a remedy where the contract was for a sale of a particular piece of land (but even this has been limited in some jurisdictions to circumstances where the property is particularly unique) difficulty in quantifying damages Specific performance is typically not ordered when a substitute is available by which expectation damages would be demonstrated. See generally Chitty on Contracts, §30-015–30-025.

It is cl;early not legal to charge for an optional warranty without ever having gotten approval for it. The customer could simply ask for a refund on teh ground that this was an error, and take it to small claims if that was refused. I am sure it is legal to offer such an optional warranty and point out its (alleged) benefits. I do not know if consumer law forbids making this pitch multiple times in the same selling encounter.

Am I able to extraordinary terminate this contract due to missing equipment, although I technically should have know that it was missing before I signed? No (I'll assume that your jurisdiction is somewhere in the U.S., although many other countries apply contract law similarly). First, your statement that technically you should have known about the flaws [before signing] reflects that the contract does not misrepresent what equipment the gym has. Second, using the gym for six months evidences your satisfaction with the contractual relation. The parties' conduct reinforces the validity of a contract, whence a party's subsequent change of mind does not entitle him or her to breach that contract. You might be entitled to terminate the contract prematurely if (1) the flaws pose a realistic risk of injury, and (2) the gym disregards any [reasonable] safety concerns you report to the gym. In this regard, [gym's] gross negligence might suffice insofar as it touches on the covenant of fair dealing that is presumed in contract law. You may want to discuss with the gym your concern about the barbell/rack issue. However, it would fall short of entitlement-to-breach if you readily know --or should have known-- that maneuvering with the barbell(s) off the ground is hazardous given the progress you have attained so far.

So you entered a contract that was a bad deal. The law says: tough People are legally allowed to make bad deals. The law will hold you to the bad deal you made. If it only worked for good deals, no one would ever use the law because you don’t want to break a good deal. Providing it has all the required elements of a contract, it will be enforceable. Put up with him or pay him out.

He may be entitled to (part) of the deposit or he may owe you more money When you and he agreed you both entered a legally binding contract - you are obliged to sell the vehicle to him, he is obliged to buy the vehicle from you. The deposit is merely the first instalment of the payment for the vehicle with the balance being due on delivery. They are not refundable by default. He now wants to repudiate the contract and you have several options: you can refuse his repudiation and require him to complete the contract within a reasonable time. He probably won’t do this so when he doesn’t we move on to one of the other options. In essence, this is simply a warning shot that if he doesn’t complete the contract you will move on to item 2. you can accept the repudiation and sue for damages, these would include your lost rent, pro-rata of registration, insurance etc. from the time you would have sold to the time you do sell, any additional advertising, any difference in the price you ultimately get if it is lower than his offer etc. you can accept the repudiation in return for keeping the deposit in lieu of the actual damages. This in makes the deposit a liquidated damages amount and it must follow all the same rules, basically it must be a genuine pre-estimate of the damage you would suffer and not be so high that it amounts to a penalty. You can accept the repudiation and, as a gesture of goodwill, return some or all of the deposit.

My friend should have taken his property with him, but presumably the host can't just keep it, especially after reaching out to them? Correct. However, the host does not have to do anything to facilitate its return i.e. they don’t have to post it to you. So long as they keep it for your friend to collect and don’t appropriate it for their own use, they are not breaking the law. If they do appropriate it, that is called theft or its tort equivalent, conversion. As my contract was with Airbnb and the host works from them, is there any responsibility on their part, e.g. Could I hypothetically open a small claims case against them? Or would any small claims case be directly against the host themselves? This is not true. You and the host each have a contract with Airbnb for the use of the platform. The contract for the accommodation is between you two and doesn’t involve Airbnb at all. In any event, there is no contractural issue here.

I think the law there is quite clear - you have 14 days to return the goods for a full refund, except for digital content, which you can't return once you started downloading it. That's what it says. The arguments that you try to give were quite obvious to the law makers. I think you can assume they were aware that "digital content does not have a physical form". Now if you purchased, but haven't downloaded or started downloading yet, then obviously you can get your money back. You came up with some theory that this is a "visual vanity item". You can't see it unless you download it. Once you download it, that's it. If you don't download it, you can return it. Let me repeat this: Your fancy analogies mean nothing. There are in the EU laws about being allowed to return goods for a refund. There's the general rule for buying in a store (no right other what the store offers voluntarily), online purchases (some days to return), and online purchases of digital goods (no return once you started downloading). That's the law. Your attempts at redefining the situation are totally pointless. The law says what it says. What you try to redefine doesn't mean one thing. The law clearly distinguishes several situations, and analogies don't count. What happens counts. You bought from a digital item from an online store that needs to be downloaded. And as soon as you start downloading, there is your right to return it gone. And your reasons for wanting to return the goods are completely irrelevant. You don't need any reasons, and having reasons doesn't help you.

In the case of McKee v. Isle of Capri Casinos, we can tell because that case has been legally decided. As the court says, there was a contract and "the patron was not entitled to the bonus under those rules", and plaintiff "failed to prove the necessary elements of either promissory or equitable estoppel". They did not "represent to her that a bonus would be available if she played the game", and did not "promise to pay the $41 million after the notice was displayed". The (very complex) rules of the game are easily available on the machine, and there is a prominent disclaimer that "MALFUNCTION VOIDS ALL PAYS AND PLAYS". Under the rules, the winning configuration stated that she was entitled to $1.85. The problem was that it also announced "Bonus Award - $41797550.16". This was due to an inexplicable software error which in communicating with the central computer awarded a "legacy bonus", which is no part of the game in question. The maximum legacy bonus is $99999.99; the manufacturer knows of the possibility of this kind of error and has implemented a fix that is thought to eliminate the problem. The first point then is that the casino didn't just claim there was a malfunction, they proved that there was one. Second, the terms of the contract hold: she was entitled to $1.85, and the extraneous message was not part of the contract. That is, she did not actually win the large payout, the malfunction was in saying that she received a bonus. If a patron could likewise prove that they had actually won but the machine malfunctioned to represent the situation as a loss, they would of course be entitled to the appropriate winnings. The problem simply resides in the difficulty of a patron proving that.

In which jurisdictions is publishing false statements a codified crime? Whereas publishing false statements can often be a civil wrong (e.g. libel/defamation), I am seeking examples of where it has been criminalised and codified. Limitations: Reasonably genuinely democratic jurisdictions. Not interested in authoritarian/dictatorship states where "fake news" or "discrediting" crimes exist "Publishing" excludes perjury, fraud, hate speech, false police reporting etc.

Several countries have laws against Holocaust denial. Such laws typically punish people who seriously minimise the scale of Nazi crimes, or entirely deny that generally accepted Nazi atrocities took place. The Wikipedia page lists several examples. In Austria, National Socialism Prohibition Law (1947, amendments of 1992) section 3h criminalizes "whoever denies, grossly plays down, approves or tries to excuse the National Socialist genocide or other National Socialist crimes against humanity in a print publication, in broadcast or other media." Belgium also has a 1995 law against those who "grossly minimise, attempts to justify, or approves the genocide committed by the German National Socialist Regime during the Second World War", punishable by "a prison sentence of eight days to one year, and by a fine of twenty six francs to five thousand francs". In Czechia it is forbidden not only to deny Nazi genocide and crimes against humanity, but also similar crimes by Communist regimes (presumably primarily aimed at the Communist rulers in Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union, and elsewhere in Eastern Europe). The Law Against Support and Dissemination of Movements Oppressing Human Rights and Freedoms (2001) § 405 says "Anyone who publicly denies, disputes, approves or attempts to justify a Nazi, Communist or other genocide or Nazi, Communist or other crimes against humanity or war crimes or crimes against peace will be punished by imprisonment for six months to three years".

There are two common defenses to defamation (there are others): That what you said is true. That what you said cannot be reasonably interpreted as a factual claim. If after examining the totality of the circumstances, a fact-finder (judge or jury) sees your statement to be an expression of opinion rather than a factual claim about the subject, you would not be found to have defamed the subject. The opinion defence doesn't have a bright line rule. In your example, I think it is clearly on the side of opinion. However, if you were to say something like "Douglas Dunce, Apple's Chief Engineer, has an IQ of 76", that would be almost certainly be deemed a factual claim. The leading case here is Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co. The court held that "statements that cannot reasonably be interpreted as stating actual facts about an individual are protected". Other summaries of this defence: http://www.defamationlawblog.com/2009/01/fact-vs-opinion-setting-the-record-straight/ http://www.rcfp.org/browse-media-law-resources/news-media-law/news-media-and-law-summer-2011/opinion-defense-remains-str

Art. 15(4) GDPR says: (4) The right to obtain a copy referred to in paragraph 3 shall not adversely affect the rights and freedoms of others. If I was the controller in this situation, and I believed that this would endanger the students that have criticised the professor, I would base my argument for not complying on this. In addition, Art. 85 GDPR requires member states to: [...] reconcile the right to the protection of personal data pursuant to this Regulation with the right to freedom of expression and information [...] So you may be able to argue that the students posting messages are engaging in "processing for journalistic purposes and the purposes of academic, artistic or literary expression", depending on the laws of the particular member state. (edit: this could be difficult since you mention it is a private database). The second case seems just like the first in terms of GDPR, but may constitute defamation. Defamation (or libel) laws differ wildly in each country; he Wikipedia article on Defamation explains the situation in each member state in more detail. In the third case: if the professor submits a request based on the rights of a data subject other than himself, they don't need to comply. These requests need to come from the data subjects themselves, not just a random person assuming authority. (although I suppose it's possible for them to give power of attorney to the department head if they wanted to) Personal data and the rights that GDPR provides to data subjects always relate to a natural person, not an institution or a company.

I believe there are courts that have affirmed convictions for obstructing official business or something along those lines, but the general consensus seems to be that conduct like this is not a crime, or that it cannot be criminalized without violating the First Amendment. The most recent decision on point came just a few weeks ago. In Friend v. Gasparino, No. 20-3644 (2d Cir. Feb. 27, 2023), a man sued police for arresting him because he had set up a sign saying "Cops Ahead" two blocks away from where they were running an operation to enforce distracted-driving laws. The trial court dismissed the case, holding (1) that the sign was not protected by the First Amendment because it was "of little, if any, public concern"; and (2) that even if it was protected, the officer's conduct in arresting him satisfied strict scrutiny because if police wanted to prevent distracted driving, there was no less restrictive alternative to arresting the plaintiff. But the Second Circuit reversed, holding (1) that speech remains protected even if it is not a matter of public concern; and (2) that there was no evidence that limiting the plaintiff's speech was necessary to permit the state to write citations and enforce the law, even if it would have been helpful.

australia It's dishonest. Dishonesty is not, in general, illegal. Dishonesty is illegal when it is used to obtain someone else's property or financial advantage through fraud. It's also illegal if it's part of a statement made when applying for an authorisation or benefit. It's potentially misleading. Misleading people is not, in general, illegal. Misleading is illegal when it takes place in trade or commerce. It gives you a title you don't hold. Claiming a title you don't hold is not, in general, illegal Claiming a title you don't hold is illegal if it is a protected title under Australian law. For example, there are protected titles under the National Health Practionioners Registration Scheme: "medical practitioner" is a protected title; "doctor" isn't. Further, holding yourself out to be able to practice in certain professions when you are not (e.g. law, engineering in some states etc.) is illegal. Context matters Putting on a white gown, wearing a stethoscope and calling yourself "doctor" when attending a fancy dress party is not illegal. Doing it to angle for a free upgrade on your airline ticket is.

Let me give you a simple, even if rather silly example: You take me to a civil court. You tell the judge "gnasher regularly parks his blue car in front of my home, and the color blue violates my sense of beauty. Judge, make him stop it. " A question of fact would be: Is my car actually blue? Not green, or red? And do I actually park my car in front of your home, and do so regularly? A question of law would be: Am I allowed by law to park my car in front of your home, even when my car has a color that you don't like? If this goes to a civil court, the judge would look at it and probably say: "Even if all the facts that 'Gimme the 401' claimed are true, as a matter of law there would be no case for gnasher to answer, since these actions would be permitted by law". If the judge decided that it is illegal to park cars in offensive colours in front of someone else's home as a matter of law, the court would then have to decide the facts: Whether what you claimed is actually the truth. (And while this example is silly, there have been people claiming that the neighbour's use of WiFi interfered with their health. And by law it is illegal to interfere with someone's health, so the facts would have to be examined).

Civil law instead of criminal law Not all things that we commonly refer to as "illegal" are actually crimes - many of them refer to violations of contracts or other obligations where the harmed party may (or may not) use the civil system to obtain some satisfaction, but the government and prosecutors will not do it for them. In general (with some exceptions, depends on jurisdiction and circumstances), most low scale copyright violations are treated as a civil matter - it allows the harmed party (i.e. the copyright owner) to sue you for damages in a civil court, if they wish and are able to do so. However, it generally is not a crime (again, with some exceptions - e.g. large scale distribution often is) so the government and police on their own cannot, should not and does not investigate and prosecute violations of software licence terms.

From http://grammarist.com/usage/libel-slander/: (emphasis mine) Libel is the use of false, defamatory claims about someone in written or printed form. Slander likewise denotes false statements that damage a person’s reputation, but it is committed orally or in any other transient form So a false claim satisfying the definition of defamation would be libel if written (including on the Internet, per Varian Medical Systems, Inc. v. Delfino), and slander if made in a transient form.

Is there a legal reason that organizations often refuse to comment on an issue citing "ongoing litigation"? In news articles, I often read that some organization refused to comment on an issue because it is the subject of "ongoing litigation". This is also mentioned in many guides on public relations, for example this article, How to Control Your Message During a Media Interview, says: If there are legal reasons why you can’t respond, explain that you are unable to answer the question because it involves ongoing litigation or personal information about a patient. But what is that legal reason? Why would an organization not be able to state their position with respect to the issue, such as "We believe we acted correctly, but this will be decided in court"? Is there a law saying that commenting a court case is illegal? Who does this apply to? Or is this just some guideline or established advice to avoid problems (which ones)? I'm most interested in answers about the US or Germany, but other jurisdictions are fine.

united-states But what is that legal reason? Why would an organization not be able to state their position with respect to the issue, such as "We believe we acted correctly, but this will be decided in court"? Is there a law saying that commenting a court case is illegal? Who does this apply to? Or is this just some guideline or established advice to avoid problems (which ones)? Legal Ethics Considerations There are circumstances when commenting publicly on litigation violates the ethical rules for lawyers related to trial publicity See Rule of Professional Conduct 3.6 (the numbering system for professional conduct rules for lawyers is uniform nationally in the U.S. although the substance of the rules can differ in detail from state to state - Colorado's rule is fairly typical). Mostly this rule calls for avoiding statements that could prejudice a jury unless the other side has already done so and those statements need to be rebutted. This rule states (in its Colorado version): (a) A lawyer who is participating or has participated in the investigation or litigation of a matter shall not make an extrajudicial statement that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know will be disseminated by means of public communication and will have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding in the matter. (b) Notwithstanding paragraph (a) and Rule 3.8(f), a lawyer may state: (1) the claim, offense or defense involved and, except when prohibited by law, the identity of the persons involved; (2) information contained in a public record; (3) that an investigation of a matter is in progress; (4) the scheduling or result of any step in litigation; (5) a request for assistance in obtaining evidence and information necessary thereto; (6) a warning of danger concerning the behavior of a person involved, when there is reason to believe that there exists the likelihood of substantial harm to an individual or to the public interest; and (7) in a criminal case, in addition to subparagraphs (1) through (6): (i) the identity, residence, occupation and family status of the accused; (ii) if the accused has not been apprehended, information necessary to aid in apprehension of that person;(iii) the fact, time and place of arrest; and (iv) the identity of investigating and arresting officers or agencies and the length of the investigation. (c) Notwithstanding paragraph (a) and Rule 3.8(f), a lawyer may make a statement that a reasonable lawyer would believe is required to protect a client from the substantial undue prejudicial effect of recent publicity not initiated by the lawyer or the lawyer's client. A statement made pursuant to this paragraph shall be limited to such information as is necessary to mitigate the recent adverse publicity. (d) No lawyer associated in a firm or government agency with a lawyer subject to paragraph (a) shall make a statement prohibited by paragraph (a). Statements such as "We believe we acted correctly, but this will be decided in court" are allowed and are not terribly uncommon. But, making a comment about something that can be easily inferred from the publicly available documents filed in court provides little or no positive advantage for a litigant. Also, one doesn't have to say much to create at least a colorable Rule of Professional Conduct 3.6 issue that a mediator can raise in settlement talks, or that a judge can be forced to analyze. Even if the claim of unethical trial publicity ultimately doesn't hold water, it still muddies the waters and distracts lawyers and litigants from dealing with the substance of the dispute. The Risk That A Statement Will Be Used Against You Usually, the main concern is similar to the concern about talking to police: Anything you say can and will be used against you at trial. For example, this week former President Trump's public statement about his knowledge of classified documents, which are the subject of an ongoing federal criminal investigation of him, seriously harmed his position legally. (His statement was made quite a while ago in a semi-private forum, but at a time when the possibility of a criminal investigation still should have been on his radar screen.) In the civil rape-defamation case against him (as noted, for example, in this Law.SE answer), Trump's decision to continue to speak publicly about matters that were the subject of active litigation against him in an earlier case resulted in an extended statute of limitations and an opportunity to refile the case without having to worry about Presidential immunity from liability for statements he made while in office. It isn't just former President Trump that does things like this, but his conduct provides good textbook examples of what lawyers worry about when their clients talk about cases that are being litigated. Social media statements about pending cases by litigants routinely provide powerful evidence against them in trials. Some clients (particularly politicians and many senior executives of big and medium sized businesses, but also more ordinary people with big egos) are "forces of nature" who can't resist running their mouths, usually to their detriment, when given the least leave to do so. It is easier to teach them to say "no comment" across the board about pending litigation, than to transmit the depth of understanding necessary to comment without saying something potentially harmful. Lawyers spend many hours and sometimes days preparing their clients for depositions for a reason. Avoiding Annoyance To Opposing Counsel, Parties, And Judges Making a comment about pending litigation has the potential to aggravate opposing counsel and can emotionally influence non-lawyer opposing parties with whom a negotiated settlement will be reached 90%+ of the time (only about 1-2% of civil cases go to trial, but some are resolved by default judgments or on motion practice as opposed to by settlement). It can also irritate a judge who frequently prefers to be out of the public spotlight when necessary, even when the statements made aren't prohibited, and judges in the U.S. have lots of discretionary authority.

Your belief in the truth of a statement is of only limited value in a defamation suit. Saying that a person is incompetent in that person's profession can certainly be defamation, and may even be defamation per se, depending on the jurisdiction. If the person sues and the speaker asserts truth as a defense, the speaker may have to prove that the statement is true. Why would one need to say anything at all in such a situation? Whether such a statement was a factual statement or a statement of opinion would depend very much on the detailed circumstances. But it is at least possible that a suit might be filed and won on this fact pattern. See this answer for more on defamation under US law.

If the lawyer has legitimate concerns, his first port of call would be the ICO https://ico.org.uk/. Before the ICO will take his complaint further he'll have had write to you expressing his concerns and received a written response that presumably he is unhappy with, and wants to take the issue further. Most companies have a data compliance team who will have policies and procedures to log breaches like this and decide what course of action to take in response. Not every breach needs to be brought to the attention of the ICO, and they have a handy self assessment tool to see if you should report the breach. https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/report-a-breach/ In your situation, I don't think this constitutes a serious breach which will require investigating. It's simply an admin error. If it is unlikely to pose a risk to any of the individuals they will say something like: You should keep an internal record of the breach as detailed in Article 33 (5) of the GDPR, including what happened, the effects of the breach and remedial actions taken. The definition of risk according to the ICO is: "This risk exists when the breach may lead to physical, material or non-material damage for the individuals whose data have been breached". So in this case I'd assume a simple apology (Bcc'd :) ) and a record of what happened, how it happened, and the action taken to prevent it happening again should suffice.

united-states Generally, a witness cannot object to a question on the grounds that it fails to conform to a rule of evidence (e.g. hearsay). A witness can refuse to testify on a matter either due to the 5th Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, or on the grounds that some other privilege (e.g. attorney-client, clergy confession, spousal) applies. A witness can also say that they don't understand the question as phrased (either because it is complicated or because it contains terminology or concepts that the witness doesn't understand), or that the witness didn't hear the question, or that the witness forgot what the question was while the lawyers and judges were discussing whether it could be asked. This often results in the question being restated or rephrased. A witness may also answer a question by stating that there is no answer to the question as it is based upon a false premise (e.g. "on which day of the week did you beat your wife?"). And, if true, a witness can properly answer that they don't know the answer, either because they never knew or because they don't currently recall the answer.

If I may paraphrase the scenario: The customer has a contract with the insurer The customer is contemplating undergoing a certain procedure and is unsure if it is covered under the contract The customer calls the insurer to ask this specific question The insurer says "yes" The customer undergoes the procedure The insurer refuses to pay on the ground that it is not covered under the contract. Let's put aside issues of evidence and what can be proved and assume these facts are not in dispute. There is no question that the contract has been renegotiated; it hasn't. This avoids the necessity of considering if the insurer's employee has the authority to do this or it the customer can rely that they do even if they don't. There are two possibilities: The procedure is covered and the insurer must pay under contract The procedure isn't covered and the insurer must pay under the tort of negligent misstatement. The insurer is vicariously liable for the actions of its employee. The insurer owes a duty of care to a customer who asks such a question to answer it correctly. It is foreseeable that the customer would act on the insurer's advice and incur costs that they may have avoided if the correct advice had been given. Nothing is ever certain in the law but this is as close as you can get.

What's the use of contracts if you can't take a contract violator to court? A clear, thoughtful contract can be a deterrent to misconduct, and Australia is one of many jurisdictions where pro se litigation is allowed. Self-represented litigants certainly have to undergo a steep learning curve and are expected to comply with a code of conduct, procedural law, and so forth, but my point is that hiring a lawyer is not compulsory. Even if for some reason the defrauded party declines to sue the tortfeasor (thereby forfeiting the recovery of the losses), there is a societal obligation to alert others about the tortfeasor's misconduct. Making the contract available to others facilitates alerting them on objective grounds so they don't become the tortfeasor's next victim, and it simultaneously helps for setting the record straight that the damages/losses were not one's own fault. Without a contract, it would be more difficult for others get a sense of whether misconduct occurred at all. Or worst, halfway down the line, you don't have any money left to pay your lawyers, and they leave the case. Hence the importance to litigate in pro per from the start. It is easy for a person retaining a lawyer to postpone (be it due to family obligations, workload, and so forth) his learning of the law. But that postponement only makes the client more vulnerable to his lawyer's subsequent withdrawal when court proceedings are midway: the client would have the dilemma of either finding another lawyer to resume the case --predictably at a higher cost--, or cram the learning curve in trying to keep up with the proceedings.

Is truth the ultimate defense to a defamation lawsuit in the USA? Truth is an absolute defense to defamation lawsuits in modern U.S. law (this was not always the case historically) as a matter of constitutional law in every state. In some kinds of defamation lawsuits (but not all kinds of defamation lawsuits), "actual malice" which means knowing falsity or reckless disregard for the truth, must be shown, so even a negligently stated falsehood is not actionable in those special kinds of defamation cases (mostly cases with public figure plaintiffs, media defendants, and/or case involving matters of public concern). Does a defamation defense vary between states? While most aspects of defamation law are mandated by the U.S. Constitution and a shared common law tradition, there are some slight and subtle differences between the states in defamation law, mostly concerning defamation suits by non-public figures against non-media defendants concerning matters that are not a matter of public concern. This impacts whether "actual malice" must be shown and can influence the burden of proof in defamation cases. Statutes of limitation for defamation suits also vary significantly between states. Even if the release of truthful information results in permanent career damage (i.e. loss of job, reputation, etc.) to someone, the truth would protect the author from a defamation lawsuit, correct? Yes. Keep in mind, however, that a defamation lawsuit is a suit for damage to one's reputation caused by a false statement. Sometimes disclosures of truthful information constitute an actionable tort other than defamation, however. For example, there would potentially be a civil action against someone who had signed a non-disclosure agreement for revealing truthfully information that the person sued contractually agreed not to disclose (e.g. the terms of the settlement agreement in a court case with a non-disclosure/confidentiality term, or the recipe for a restaurant's secret sauce that is a trade secret). Similarly, a doctor who revealed confidential patient medical information that was true could be sued. But, usually, in the absence of a particularlized confidentiality duty, truth is an absolute defense.

What interests me, is if the company that will be fulfilling the "abracadabra" request is able to not provide "hocus pocus" emails (internally — or later in the litigation, if the truth is uncovered — justifying it that the team fulfilling the request does not speak the language and was unaware of the existence of these communications in a foreign language)? Are there legal mechanisms that prevent such defense using "foreign language"? The legal obligation in discovery is to produce compliant documents without regard to their language. Good faith efforts need to be used. Generally speaking, a mere single language boolean or key word search of a database is not a sufficient effort to meet that obligation. Somebody was involved in writing the relevant emails and the lawyer and client representative needs to talk to the people who were involved, not just search a database, to make sure that all relevant materials are disclosed by whatever means are necessary to do so. This is why discovery is often the most expensive part of litigation. This doesn't mean that every good faith mistaken omission from discovery responses results in a court sanction if it is promptly remedied if later discovered. But, compliance requires engagement of the universe of possible documents with much more knowing and intelligent understanding that the question seems to assume. For what it is worth, I have litigated a case in a U.S. court where none of the parties (nor the judge) was fluent in the relevant language (Italian) of most of the documents, but both parties understood and agreed on the meaning of the relevant Italian business documents (invoices and bank statements mostly running to hundreds of pages), and they testified to the judge regarding what those documents meant in English, without the relevant documents ever being actually translated in full by anyone. Language never became a meaningful issue, in part, because the more important issue was understanding the context of how the Italian banking system and commercial transactions were structured and once that was understood, the documents themselves were easily enough understood from context.

Is Scamming Extortion in New York? Welcome to the Internet, where people are the worst and want money for nothing: Alice is a normal citizen of New York with an e-mail address. She receives an E-mail from Bob, a New York State Citizen, in which he claims to have sexually incriminating material collected by tapping into Alice's webcam. Bob demands money via Bitcoin to not share the material with the public. Alice does not own a Webcam so knows that such material doesn't exist, but feels annoyed and informs the police, and does also not pay. Now, in real life, we know that it is nigh impossible to trace the e-mail back to Bob, but for the exercise, assume that somehow the police manage to identify Bob based on his Bitcoin wallet into which some person they can not identify has paid. Still, they bring it to the prosecution. Bob is found to never had the material they claimed to own for any of the people he sent such mail to. New York State Prosecutor Charles wants to bring suit but then pauses: The behavior of Bob appears to be extortion, but does this fit the letter of the law? It is clearly not NYPC § 135.60, as no physical force is there, but maybe NYPC § 155.05(2)(e) could work. So Charles brings the suit under NYPC $ 155.05(2)(e)(v), because he believes that the unidentified person has been acting out of fear to be publically humiliated... Now, the question is: Is that actually the right section or might the whole case be in the wrong venue (e.g. belonging to federal court as wire fraud)?

Bob appears to have committed "attempted larceny" by extortion, contrary to § 155.05(2)(e)(v): (e) By extortion. A person obtains property by extortion when he compels or induces another person to deliver such property to himself or to a third person by means of instilling in him a fear that, if the property is not so delivered, the actor or another will: ... (v) Expose a secret or publicize an asserted fact, whether true or false, tending to subject some person to hatred, contempt or ridicule; See § 110.00: Attempt to commit a crime. A person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime when, with intent to commit a crime, he engages in conduct which tends to effect the commission of such crime. And see § 110.10 which covers the "impossibility" that Bob actually had compromising images from Alice's non-existent webcam: Attempt to commit a crime; no defense. If the conduct in which a person engages otherwise constitutes an attempt to commit a crime pursuant to section 110.00, it is no defense to a prosecution for such attempt that the crime charged to have been attempted was, under the attendant circumstances, factually or legally impossible of commission, if such crime could have been committed had the attendant circumstances been as such person believed them to be. (NB Bob's sentence, if found guilty, would depend the value of his attempted extortion)

There's no privilege. Under N.M. Evid. R. 11-503., New Mexico's attorney-client privilege protects communications that are: confidential; and made for the purpose of facilitating or providing professional legal services to that client; and between a client and his lawyer. The test doesn't ask if money changed hands, so paying a lawyer does not mean your communications are privileged. There are many services a lawyer can provide for money that are not shrouded behind privilege, and courts will routinely compel the disclosure of communications they deem to be "business advice" rather than "legal advice." Bhandari v. Artesia General Hosp., 317 P.3d, 856 (2013) ("Butler provided the memorandum as a mixture of legal and business advice in his capacity as both in-house counsel and a senior vice president of the Corporation. We hold that the memorandum is business advice and thus unprivileged."). And if money were required, defendants with public defenders or pro bono counsel wouldn't have privilege. Under Rule 11-503, there's no privilege for Saul's conversation with Walt and Jesse. Saul is representing Badger, who is adverse to Walt and Jesse, so there isn't an attorney-client relationship. Further, Saul isn't providing legal assistance to Walt or Jesse; he's providing them advice on how to evade detection. You could try to interpret that as a request for legal advice, but the argument would be self-defeating. Because the advice to procure a stand-in defendant would amount to concealing identity, aiding a felon, and compounding a crime, it would fall within the crime-fraud exception, which says that the privilege does not apply to communications made "to enable or assist anyone in committing or planning to commit what the client knew or reasonably should have known to be a crime or fraud." Rule 11-503(D).

Yes, but that doesn't make the theft not theft At the time of the crime, Joe committed theft. The state can prosecute Joe for that theft. Alice's subsequent gift does not change this although it would prevent her from suing for recovery. As a practical matter, if Alice was willing to lie and say that the gift preceded the theft or she had given permission for the item to be taken, this would almost surely create reasonable doubt in any prosecution. However, on a pure "these are the facts" basis, the theft is a theft.

Under the assumption stated, the lecherous millionaire is soliciting an act of prostitution, albeit with an unusually high price. His proposal would be just as illegal (or legal) as an offer of $100 for a sexual encounter. In most jurisdictions it would be a crime. George Bernard Shaw famously asked a woman if she would have sex with him (sleep with him, I think was the wording) for a million pounds, and she hesitated and eventually said "well yes, in that case". He then asked if she would for five pounds. Her reported answer was "Mr Shaw! What do you think I am?!" to which he rejoined "We have settled that, Madam. Now we are haggling about the price." This is much the same case -- legally the amount or nature of the price does not matter. Whether this would also constitute sexual harassment would depend on the specific laws of the local jurisdiction.

The law of Washington is probably typical. Under RCW 9A.56.110, "Extortion" means knowingly to obtain or attempt to obtain by threat property or services of the owner, and specifically includes sexual favors. By RCW 9A.56.130(1), A person is guilty of extortion in the second degree if he or she commits extortion by means of a wrongful threat as defined in *RCW 9A.04.110(25) (d) through (j). Then looking at the relevant definition of threat (please note that there is a numbering error in the statute, that should be (28), I don't know if they will fix it), it says (28) "Threat" means to communicate, directly or indirectly the intent:... (e) To expose a secret or publicize an asserted fact, whether true or false, tending to subject any person to hatred, contempt, or ridicule; or (f) To reveal any information sought to be concealed by the person threatened; Second degree extortion is a class C felony. It is not first degree extortion, since that requires the threat to be (a) To cause bodily injury in the future to the person threatened or to any other person; or (b) To cause physical damage to the property of a person other than the actor; or (c) To subject the person threatened or any other person to physical confinement or restraint; Washington does not include a category of rape by extortion, though I've heard rumors that there is such a crime in some states. (It is not rape by forcible compulsion, second degree rape, because forcible compulsion is defined as "physical force which overcomes resistance, or a threat, express or implied, that places a person in fear of death or physical injury to herself or himself or another person, or in fear that she or he or another person will be kidnapped": that is, there has to be actual or threatened physical force)

Selling online is unclear. However, selling in the mail, the court has held that, based on 18 U.S.C.A. S1341 (Frauds and swindles): Therein the weight of authority is that astrologers, conjurers, fakirs, magicians, mediums, and all variety of pretenders to supernatural power, and who assume to sell the same for money, are amenable to the criminal law of false pretenses. United States v. Calwer, 282 F. 1007 (D. Minn. 1923). In prosecution for devising a scheme and artifice to defraud and using the mails in connection therewith, which scheme consisted of representations by defendant that he was gifted with supernatural powers, evidence was sufficient to sustain a conviction. Crane v. U.S., C.C.A.9 (Cal.) 1919, 259 F. 480, 170 C.C.A. 456 Notwithstanding constitutional provision as to religious freedom, it was an offense to pretend to believe in supernatural powers for the purpose of procuring money and to use the mails in pursuance of such purpose. New v. U.S., C.C.A.9 (Cal.) 1917, 245 F. 710, 158 C.C.A. 112, certiorari denied 38 S.Ct. 334, 246 U.S. 665, 62 L.Ed. 928. These are mostly lower court cases (the last has a cert. denial from the Supreme Court, meaning the Supreme Court effectively upheld the lower court's decision without making it the law of the land), and both were from nearly 100 years ago. It is reasonable to assume that one would still incur liability for facilitating "Frauds and swindles" over the internet.

It has been investigated, it simply has not been prosecuted. The investigation started when someone reported suspicious activity in Hastert's accounts. The investigation proceeded from a belief that he was being blackmailed. After listening to a wire of a conversation between Hastert and the alleged blackmailer, the officers investigating decided it was not a simple case of him being blackmailed--they or the prosecutors' office used their discretion to go after Hastert for illegally structuring his payments to avoid anti-money-laundering reporting laws, and to my knowledge have not yet pursued any blackmail charge. Police and Prosecutors have very wide discretion regarding what charges they bring. In addition, it is very common to have a civil lawsuit brought that implicates criminal laws, but not have the criminal violations be charged. For example, if you steal a purse you go to jail, but if you steal a building you are rarely charged with a criminal offense. It is rarely to a civil litigant's advantage to bring up criminal matters and there are ethical rules limiting the interaction between the two.

IMHO, your questions reflect several misunderstandings of how the process works. So, with your permission, I will avoid directly answering your questions and instead focus on suggestions how to best help you plot a path forward. Your counterparty has the burden of proof. If your counterparty forged your signature on a contract, then they must prove you signed it or they can not enforce it. In order to enforce the contract, they will need to sue you civilly. Then you can introduce evidence of their forgery at that time. Inform your counterparty you did not sign the contract. Then act accordingly. If your counterparty forged your signature on an extension contract then you should inform them immediately after it has come to your attention. Advise them you have no intention of complying with a contract you never signed. And that if they try to enforce the forged agreement, you will defend yourself "vigorously." Never threaten criminal charges to advance your position in a civil case. This behavior is a crime in itself. It's called extortion. If you want to pursue criminal charges at some point then do it without relating it to the civil case. The police are not your only means of pursuing criminal charges. You can also schedule a meeting with your District Attorney, State's Attorney (whatever that position is called in your state) or your state's Attorney General. In other words, you might want to approach the government's attorney responsible for prosecuting crimes in your jurisdiction. Forget about involving the police. They have given you their position on the matter. Approach the DA or AG office instead. If the DA/AG decides to use the police, she we will make that decision then inform the police how she needs to use their services. Police are wary of being used as leverage in civil disputes. That's probably the reason for their policy decision regardless of whether it's technically justified by the law or not. Your counterparty can't "fix" anything. If they claim you signed a document you did not, they will have to produce that document with your signature on it. This will presumably be your Exhibit A evidence they forged it. Disclaimer: I am a lay person and not an attorney. This writing is no substitute for proper legal advice. If you need help with a specific legal situation please hire an attorney and do not rely on anything I have written here.

A witness (former gov't agent) knows top secret USA information. Can a court compel them to reveal the informaton? A former US federal government employee knows information that was classified as top secret by the federal government. This information is relevant to a case. They were called to testify before the court. This person is not a defendant. I believe the 5th amendment would be a valid defense since the witness would be violating the Espionage Act, but claiming the 5th on the witness bench would probably ruin the witness' credibility before the jury. Therefore, we may safely exclude "pleading the 5th" on the answers. Can a court compel the witness to disclose the information? Is there any lawful recourse for the witness (to keep confidentiality) other than the 5th amendment?

The court should not compel the witness to disclose the information because there is a state secrets privilege which bars disclosure of governmental secrets in litigation. An interlocutory appeal of some sort would generally be permitted in cases where the privilege is not honored, and typically, the federal government would become an intervenor in the litigation with respect to that issue. Not infrequently, the state secrets privilege will prevent a matter from being litigated at all, rather than merely preventing the admission of evidence, or requiring that the matter be resolved in a sealed secret bench trial. For example, spies cannot sue the government for not being paid for spying as a result of the state secrets privilege. Similarly, someone who suffers a personal injury arising from a covert operation can not sue the government for that injury.

united-states Generally, a witness cannot object to a question on the grounds that it fails to conform to a rule of evidence (e.g. hearsay). A witness can refuse to testify on a matter either due to the 5th Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, or on the grounds that some other privilege (e.g. attorney-client, clergy confession, spousal) applies. A witness can also say that they don't understand the question as phrased (either because it is complicated or because it contains terminology or concepts that the witness doesn't understand), or that the witness didn't hear the question, or that the witness forgot what the question was while the lawyers and judges were discussing whether it could be asked. This often results in the question being restated or rephrased. A witness may also answer a question by stating that there is no answer to the question as it is based upon a false premise (e.g. "on which day of the week did you beat your wife?"). And, if true, a witness can properly answer that they don't know the answer, either because they never knew or because they don't currently recall the answer.

The Sixth Amendment to the US Constitution guarantees assistance of counsel for the accused in all criminal prosecutions. The Fifth Amendment protects a person from being forced to self-incriminate. Taken together, in Miranda v. Arizona, the Supreme Court interpreted this to mean that police cannot continue interrogation after you have requested an attorney. Laughter is actually not a violation of your rights, the violation would come from continuing to interrogate you, or in prohibiting you from contacting your attorney or not providing an attorney if you cannot afford one (via the public defender's office).

The Miranda warning only has to be given to a person being interrogated in custody, and on the premise that the wife is not in custody, the police do not need to read her the warning. Therefore, anything she says can be used against her, or somebody else, unless there is a separate reason why the statement could not be used. The wife may invoke the spousal testimony privilege, in which case she cannot be compelled to testify against the husband. The officer could theoretically testify that the wife said "I washed blood out of his clothing", but this is an assertion made by an out-of-court declarant to prove the truth of the question at hand, i.e. hearsay. There are numerous exceptions to the definition so that in some cases, the statement would not be hearsay. If the wife refuses to testify, that cuts out half of the exceptions, but maybe the wife is a co-conspirator.

This sort of thing is very common. Particularly in the tax context, the IRS seeks to compel lawyers to reveal their clients all the time, and the courts are pretty much all in agreement that attorney-client privilege generally does not protect the identity of a client. For example: United States v. Goldberger & Dubin, P.C., 935 F.2d 501, 505 (2d Cir. 1991) United States v. Servin, No. 17-1371 (3d Cir. Feb. 1, 2018) Matter of Grand Jury Empanelled Feb. 14, 1978, 603 F.2d 469 (3d Cir. 1979) In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 680 F.2d 1026 (5th Cir. 1982) In re Grand Jury Investigation No. 83-2-35, 723 F.2d 447 (6th Cir. 1983) In re Grand Jury Witness (Salas), 695 F.2d 359, 361 (9th Cir.1982) More typically, the disclosure happens in front of the grand jury or in response to a subpoena, but it also can happen in open court like it did with Cohen. That happened in the second Third Circuit case above, where federal officials were investigating the source of 42,000 pounds of pot they'd found on a boat off the coast of New Jersey. There were disputes as to who owned the ship -- and might therefore be liable for the drugs -- so the DOJ needed to nail that down. There was some reason to believe that Attorney Markowitz was involved in transactions that would shed light on the ownership, so they subpoenaed Markowitz to appear before the grand jury. He showed up and refused to answer basically anything or produce any records, so the prosecutors asked a judge for a ruling on whether he was permitted to withhold his clients' identities based on attorney-client privilege. This is where the case starts to look sort of like the Cohen situation. The attorney was asserting privilege, and the judge said he would need to review the records in camera to see if the privilege applied. But he couldn't say if attorney-client privilege applies if he didn't know who the clients were, so he ordered him to identify his clients. He refused, so the judge told him to take a moment and think about it before he held him in contempt. Unlike Cohen's attorneys, the guy still refused, so the judge held him in contempt and ordered him to jail. On appeal, the Third Circuit agreed that attorney-client privilege generally does not protect the identity of a client. There are exceptions when there's already enough information known about the client that revealing the identity would expose them to criminal prosecution, but that was not the case here. The court still reversed the contempt finding, holding that Markowitz had a Fifth Amendment right not to identify the clients because doing so might expose him to criminal prosecution, but that element doesn't seem to exist in the Cohen situation. (Interesting side-note: The government was represented in this case by a 29-year-old Samuel Alito.) The weird thing about this, to me, is that the courts have a procedure to avoid making the disclosure public: "A well recognized means for an attorney to demonstrate the existence of an exception to the general rule, while simultaneously preserving confidentiality of the identity of his client, is to move the court for an in camera ex parte hearing." In re Grand Jury Investigation No. 83-2-35, 723 F.2d 447, 454 (6th Cir. 1983). Why Cohen's guys didn't go that route is beyond me.

There is, of course, no way to tell how the Court would deal with such a case today. This is not a frequently litigated issue, with lots of case law. I note that in the case you link to, the court limited the statute to false claims made "with a fraudulent purpose". This normally means that the claimant is attempting to secure an improper financial or materiel advantage. In the United States v. Tandaric case, the person convicted had falsely claimed to be a US Citizen on an employment application for a company which did not hire non-citizens, and so gained a job through this false statement. He could have been convicted of ordinary Fraud. The court has not been as protective of Fraud under the First Amendment as it has been of speech generally, or even of false but non-fraudulent speech. I am not at all sure if the court would overturn this law in a similar case today. Edit: In the United States v. Achtner case, the court wrote: But we agree with the District Court that the representation of citizenship must still be made to a person having some right to inquire or adequate reason for ascertaining a defendant's citizenship; it is not to be assumed that so severe a penalty is intended for words spoken as a mere boast or jest or to stop the prying of some busybody, ... This seems to dispose of the example in the question of a neighbor who is merly inquiring as to the character of the area, or perhaps from simple curiosity, and a false speaker who seems to get no direct benefit or advantage from the falsehood. Both linked cases involved false statements made to employers or potential employees, during wartime at that, with the false speaker's employment apparently at stake.

It is like an affidavit of sort, sworn out without the jurat and not before a notary. The swearing out of a complaint or rebutting evidence in all Federal civil matters (some states allow for the same) must contain an affidavit or an "unsworn declaration" that swears out the facts to be true and accurate, even though not notarized, and is based on fact and not supposition. It is subject to the same penalties of perjury if one lies as if you swear on a bible and testify in court or on a "sworn" affidavit. Affidavits need not be sworn before God, or on a bible. You have a right to just "affirm" that you will tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth....and not "so help me God". Many courts don't use a bible at all anymore. 28 U.S.C. 1746 relates to these "Unsworn Declarations Under Penalty Of Perjury" It is not b/c you don't believe in God that you'd use this...you always have the option of swearing out even a declared affidavit or testifying without swearing on a bible if you're an atheist. They just leave out the "before God" part. Affidavits are the norm, however, in Federal Courts that have an expedited docket this is typically used when it could take a while to get a notary and the evidence is due. (In some states lawyers are automatically notaries but in others they aren't). The ability to swear out a complaint or contest a deposition without having to wait on a notary can be the difference between making your deadline or not. It's commonly used when records custodians are called to certify the authenticity of documents produced pursuant to subpoena or other formal request. Under F.R.Civ.P 56 declarations usually are not within the type of evidentiary categories that can be used at the summary judgment phase. If it's a small misstatement you would probably be faced with a fine. If it's a total lie, outright, you'd be looking at jail time (say a records custodian removed evidence and swore out it was the complete business record in a fraud case). 18 U.S. Code § 1621 discusses perjury generally (in federal actions).

In U.S. practice, double jeopardy protections attach once the jury is seated and this scenario contemplates the change in position arising at trial. A mistrial could be called, or a continuance obtained, if the defendant suddenly claimed an alibi defense, since that amounts of a defendant waiver of double jeopardy protections. But without proof that the witness was tampered with, obtained at the last moment, it can be difficult or impossible to get proof of tampering or to contradict the story with other evidence to undermine the credibility of the witness. The prosecution would probably request a recess in the trial to regroup and try to admit evidence that the testimony changing witness made a prior inconsistent statement to impeach the testimony of that witness, from whomever that witness told the first time (probably a law enforcement officer). But this is still far less convincing to a jury than an affirmative statement from a witnesses about a key fact. If the prosecution could find evidence of defense side tampering and present it to the judge in the hours or small number of days before the trial ends, it might be able to get a mistrial declared. But it is much harder to get a mistrial for witness tampering when the witness shows up and testifies contrary to prosecution expectations than it is when the witness is, for example, killed or kidnapped and doesn't appear to testify at trial at all. But if evidence of neither type could be obtained before the jury was sent to deliberate and evidence was closed, and the jury then acquitted the defendant, it would be very hard for the prosecution to change this result. Perhaps not completely impossible, but very nearly so. The witness could be (and in this circumstance, despite the extreme rarity of perjury prosecutions, probably would be) prosecuted for perjury, but that wouldn't change the acquittal. If a link to the defendant could be found, the defendant could also be prosecuted for witness tampering or obstruction of justice or something similar. But that is hard to prove (and the witness would probably have to be convicted or provided with use immunity for his testimony) to do so. In English criminal law practice, in contrast, the likelihood of having the verdict of acquittal set aside and getting a new trial would be much greater (and the likelihood of getting a recess mid-trial would be greater in far more common bench trials in lower level criminal cases), but it would still be a serious burden for the prosecution that it might not be able to overcome. Lawyers aren't entitled to expect that witnesses will testify exactly the way that they discussed things with the lawyers before trial, and this can be explained away with a variety of excuses that are usually true ("after thinking it over after meeting with you, I realized that I was confused and getting it wrong"), but are sometimes a cover for a change of story that is not sincere. I've had similar things happen a few times in civil litigation and there is only so much you can do about it.

Why don't people who are untruthful during jury selection get held in contempt of court? This question is U.S. based. I ask this because recently I was summoned for jury duty. When we were in the courtroom, the judge asked each of the jurors in the box a list of questions. One of them was their command/understanding of the English language. One person said he didn't understand English and ignored the judge's questions. If I recall, some of the follow up questions asked were: Do you understand English? (The guy answered "no") If you don't know English, how did you know to come here today? (ignored the judge) How old are you? (ignored the judge) What do you do? Do you work or go to school? (ignored the judge) It was clear he understood English because once the judge dismissed him, he immediately jumped out of his chair to leave. Everyone laughed because they knew the guy was lying. Even the judge remarked that even though he claimed he didn't understand English, he understood enough English to know "you're dismissed" meant he could leave and couldn't get out of his chair fast enough. My question is why don't the courts charge people with contempt of court when it's clear they are untruthful? This is total disrespect of the judge and the court and is insulting everyone, especially the honorable judge's intelligence. We can't charge him with perjury because he didn't take an oath but if people were charged with arrest or contempt of court for this, there would hopefully be less of this. EDIT: Sorry, I didn't mean to make this question into a debate about knowledge of English. I just wanted to ask about holding people in contempt or some other punishment to prevent people from being untruthful when questioned during the jury selection process. I understand and sympathize with those who don't have a strong understanding of English to be on the jury and don't mind them being excused. Yes, maybe if this guy was a better actor and wasn't so blatant about him "not knowing English", I wouldn't be as outraged and he may have still gotten dismissed. He might not fool the judge since the judge probably sees this (acting) from others every day though.

Why don't people who are untruthful during jury selection get held in contempt of court? The premise of the title question is incorrect. Jurors are regularly held in contempt of court for being untruthful during jury selection. I suspect that the number of prospective jurors held in contempt by courts on any given day that courts are open in the United States would be in the hundreds nationwide every day (about 1-3 per day on a typical day in the entire State of Colorado), and in the tens of thousands nationwide every year, although usually the punishments would be at the mild end of what is allowed by law. But, this isn't applied blindly in a zero tolerance fashion because the court's primary goal is to get cases tried not to punish dishonest prospective jurors and it doesn't have unlimited resources. Also, the court handling jury selection doesn't want to scare off jurors and have them try to formulate truthful excuses that the jurors wouldn't insist upon because they are afraid of being punished for slight missteps in the jury selection process. Also, in the example mentioned, the question about an ability to speak English is really about an ability to be fluent enough to understand what is going on and be a fruitful deliberator in hearing a court case and deciding with other jurors who won. This is different from the ability to have the rudimentary understanding of some English language basics which is implicated in the conduct described. The judge would not be abusing his or her discretion to assume that the prospective juror was truthfully indicating that he was not sufficiently fluent to serve appropriately as a juror despite having some limited ability to speak and understand English.

Not generally. While double jeopardy considerations does not apply in Canada until the final verdict (i.e. all appeal processes have been exhausted by decision or failure to appeal within the time limit), the right to a jury trial for serious offences, both under the Constitution Act, 1982 (or the Charter, its bill of rights Part) and the Criminal Code (section 471, which not only makes the jury trial a right, but also the compulsory mode of trial unless both prosecutor and the accused consent), exist. Under common law principles, the jury's verdict, in the fact-finding role exclusive to the jury, is almost sacrosanct. Even if in Canada an appeal court can set aside a jury's verdict of acquittal or conviction, they may only do so if there is a reviewable legal error (for appeals from the Crown and the accused), or if the verdict of conviction is plainly unreasonable and cannot be supported by evidence (or otherwise may constitute a miscarriage of justice). In the first case, the reasoning is that the jury's verdict was defective due to e.g. insufficient or wrongful instructions, seeing evidences that should not have been admitted or failure to see evidences that should have been admitted. In the second case, the appeal court acts as a safeguard, much like in the U.S., for the accused to prevent wrongful convictions however it may occur. Even then, the appeal court cannot in essence conduct a new trial from the appeal records and substitute its own factual findings for those made by a jury, unless it finds that no properly instructed jury can reasonably convict the accused based on the evidences presented (R. v. W.H.). Now going back to what the trial judge can do after a jury's verdict. The proper course of action in case where the Crown's case cannot support a conviction is for the accused to seek a directed verdict before presenting any evidence. If the judge grants the motion, the judge (not the jury) enters a verdict of acquittal, which can be appealed for errors of law. Otherwise, the trial judge has no capacity to usurp the fact finding role of the jury. The judge can, however, in exceptional circumstances, declare a mistrial or stay of the proceedings (i.e. the proceeding is concluded without a verdict, due to e.g. abuse of process by the state or other considerations to preserve the integrity of the justice system) following the jury's verdict. All most all cases on this issue followed a verdict of conviction. In one unusual case (R. v. Burke), a verdict of "acquittal" was involved. The verdict is in quotes because in this case, the court recorded a verdict of acquittal apparently contrary to the jury's intention, as the jury foreman had coughed before pronouncing "guilty as charged" and the judge (along with the court reporter, the prosecutor and the defence lawyer) misheard "not guilty as charged". After seeing the accused in the parking lot, some jury members were confused and returned to the court and reported the error. However, not all jury members could be immediately contacted and the jury had only reconvened in the court with the accused a couple days after the original verdict, and after some newspapers had reported on the situation. The trial judge decided to enter the intended verdict of "guilty". The accused appealed and the Supreme Court decided in this particular case that: the trial judge can nonetheless exercise a limited jurisdiction after the jury's discharge; the judge could enter the intended verdict if it did not give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias; in this case, due to the media reports and relatively long delay between the original verdict and the reconvening of the jury, which may have improperly influenced the jury, a mistrial should have been the appropriate remedy instead of entering the intended verdict. On the appropriateness of a mistrial, the Supreme Court said In declaring a mistrial, the trial judge therefore turns his or her mind to the question of whether a mistrial is needed to prevent a miscarriage of justice. This determination will necessarily involve an examination of the surrounding circumstances. Injustice to the accused is of particular concern, given that the state with all its resources acts as the singular antagonist of the individual accused in a criminal case. This factor should be balanced against other relevant factors, such as the seriousness of the offence, protection of the public and bringing the guilty to justice. It may be fitting to allow the announced verdict to stand where the period the accused has been at liberty and under the mistaken impression that he or she had been acquitted has been lengthy, and where the charge is not so egregious as to bring the administration of justice into disrepute. As has already been stated, the trial judge is in the best position to assess the circumstances of each individual case and select the most appropriate remedy. This case does not directly apply to a case where the jury intended an acquittal, but the considerations may still be applied in extremely limited circumstances. While no one but the jury is privy to their deliberation process and no judge can overturn a jury's acquittal because they think the jury's verdict is unreasonable, it could be imagined that, for example, if a jury reports an acquittal and a member of jury before being discharged makes a claim of jury intimidation or the Crown presents clear evidence of jury manipulation, the trial judge might still have the authority to declare a mistrial. But this has not been clarified in jurisprudence.

You can't guarantee a juror's disregard, and some attorneys might utilize the "once it's said, it can't be unsaid" strategy because they know that the jury will still keep it in the back of their mind even though they've been told to ignore it. But there are checks and balances to prevent a remark having an impact on the final decision: Jury deliberation. Chances are, not all jurors will keep the thought in their mind. The jury gets a chance to deliberate after the case has been presented, and it's very easy for other jurors in the deliberation room to point out they're ignoring that piece of information and not let it influence the final decision. Declaring a mistrial. A mistrial is fully at the judge's discretion, but generally anything that affects the jury's ability to remain impartial can result in a mistrial being declared (for example, if an attorney deliberately said something outrageous to influence the jury when they knew it would be withdrawn, the judge will likely declare a mistrial without much thought). Once a mistrial is declared, the case will be postponed and a brand new jury will be selected that hasn't heard the previous remarks - easiest way to erase it from their minds is to not use their minds.

In the US, if a person enters a guilty plea, a judge may proceed to convict and sentence the accused without any form of trial. In the case of minor offenses with possible penalties of less than six months in jail, there is no US constitutional right to a jury trial. and the accused may be convicted and sentenced after a bench trial with no jury. In the case of infractions that are not criminal, such as many traffic offenses, a judge or magistrate may make a judgment and impose a penalty after a brief and often informal hearing. In some non-US jurisdictions, there is no right to a jury trial even in serious cases. In most such jurisdictions some form of due process and some hearing or trial is required for conviction. However, in various authoritarian regimes, people may be "convicted" of "crimes" without anything like a trial before an independent tribunal. In short, this depends on the nature of the case, and the laws of the jurisdiction involved.

Misstating the truth is not perjury Perjury is deliberately lying under oath to gain a material advantage. For the situation you describe: You might be wrong and they actually do live where they say they do they might be wring and they genuinely think they live where they say they do, being wrong is not perjury it’s unlikely to administrate info in the form actually carries the penalty of perjury, it probably isn’t testimony unless it will positively and substantially affect the outcome of the case in their favour, it isn’t material You lack standing to interfere in the case in any event If this were brought to the attention of the court the most likely outcome would that it would just be corrected.

Almost none of this is written down anywhere in official court rules but there are some widely adopted standards for this practice. Most courts require that only one lawyer be in charge of speaking at any given stage of the trial. But, it wouldn't be unusual, for example, for one lawyer to question most of the witnesses and for a different lawyer who is more familiar with the specialized subject matter in question (e.g. electrical specifications), usually a junior lawyer, to question the expert witnesses in a case. Also, if the usually designated lawyer is absent for some reason (stuck in traffic, sick, etc.), the "second chair" lawyer can (and is often required to) take over the case for the client until the "first chair" lawyer is available again. Mostly, second chair lawyers (I've spent plenty of time over the years in this role) do the following (a non-exclusive list): take notes, pay attention to how the judge and jury are reacting to testimony, provide input into jury selection decisions, reminds the primary lawyer of points that still need to be covered in the examination of a witness, reminds the primary lawyer of exhibits that still need to be formally offered into evidence, scrambles to find rebuttal or impeachment evidence for unanticipated testimony, prompts the primary lawyer to make objections if the primary lawyer was paying attention to something else, identifies and has at the ready exhibits needs to present (or to follow the other side's examination), looks up points of law that are relevant or will need to be referenced that come up during trial, handles logistics for witnesses who are not on the stand (keeping them in the hallway if the witness is sequestered, trying to obtain the appearance of no show witnesses or reshuffling their order, saying thank you to witnesses who are no longer on the stand, etc.), carries some of the litigation team's stuff into and out of the court room, provides informed commentary and suggestions during breaks and working lunches, etc. Also, in addition to the usual "first chair" and "second chair" roles, often supplemented by a paralegal or legal assistant, there is a different kind of arrangement in which different lawyers for the same person can fully participate. This far less common arrangement happens when the person showing up in court is wearing "more than one hat" and has a different lawyer in different capacities. For example, suppose that someone is the President of a corporation and both the corporation and the President individually are both sued. There might be one primary lawyer for the corporation and one for the President personally, and both lawyers might participate fully.

Some of the documents are here. As document 61 of the trial, the government motion for bench trial, argues, There is no constitutional right to a jury trial for criminal contempt charges resulting in a sentence of imprisonment of six months or less. Arpaio responds in document 62 that Defendant Arpaio acknowledges that there is no constitutional right to a jury trial for defendants charged with “petty” offenses where the maximum sentence does not exceed six months imprisonment, but continues the argument (the point being that there is no question that there is no absolute right to a jury trial, esp. in the instant case). He argues Many of the actions of the referring judge will become an issue in the case, calling into question the objectives and motives of Judge Snow. A public official’s actions and motives should and must be decided by an impartial jury of the elected official’s peers. The court order is document 83. There, The Court finds that this case is appropriate for a bench trial. This case focuses on the application of facts to the law to determine if Defendant intentionally violated a court order. Essentially, since there is no right to a jury trial and no compelling reason to grant a jury trial (e.g. the court found no merit to his argument that there would be the appearance of impropriety), the motion for a bench trial was granted. The order cites case law regarding the "not longer that 6 months" rule from Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454; United States v. Rylander, 714 F.2d 996; Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488; United States v. Aldridge, 995 F.2d 233; United States v. Berry, 232 F.3d 897.

The English language does not have the equivalent of the French Academy to officially regulate questions of spelling, grammar, punctuation and word meaning. Jurists don't control how the language is used and for the most point don't bother to try to do so. Also, context almost always clarifies this particular ambiguity.

What 'specific legal meaning' does the word "strike" have? Over on main meta, on the post containing a statement from Stack Overflow about the current moderator action, there was a brief edit war over the inclusion (or not) of the word "strike" in the title. An SO staff member said : While we recognize that the community is referring to this event as a "strike", that term has a specific legal meaning and we have been advised not to refer to it as such. For that reason, we ask that future editors of this post do not edit it to use that language. What 'specific legal meaning' might be being referred to here? Why might a corporation want the act of refusing to perform duties to not be referred to as a strike? Is it relevant that those withholding effort are unpaid volunteers? I'm guessing at the jurisdiction and hence the appropriate tag.

united-states Under US law, unions and employees enjoy a set of protections codified under the National Labor Relations Act. Some of those rights specifically pertain to strikes, and in particular, employees engaged in "lawful" strikes cannot be fired merely for striking (but they can be replaced). Stack Exchange, Inc. takes the position that moderators are not employees and are not subject to the NLRA. Their reluctance to use the word "strike" likely stems from this position. If the moderation strike were a "strike" within the meaning of the NLRA, that would imply a large and complex set of restrictions on how Stack Exchange may respond to the strike. It would also suggest that moderators, as employees, have a right to discuss their "workplace conditions" with each other or the public - which might be construed to include some or all of the moderation policies that Stack Exchange has distributed in private (but I'm somewhat doubtful of that). Of course, it would also raise serious problems under the Fair Labor Standards Act (moderators are unpaid and the FLSA sets a minimum wage), but that is a different law, and it is theoretically possible that a court would rule that moderators are employees for NLRA purposes but not for FLSA purposes. I have never heard of such a ruling actually happening, and it is far more likely that moderators are not employees for either purpose. Still, it might be unwise to refer to the strike as a "strike," just in case the issue gets litigated.

The CEO, with his lawyer have tried to convince me that this only apply to current client and any past clients that I have work on. Is this true? No. It will be true only if they make that clarification in the clause or a properly added amendment. The clause currently has no indication that it is limited to "current client and any past clients that [you] have work[ed] on". The CEO's & lawyer's refusal to amend the clause so as to make it consistent with their attempts [to persuade you] would be a red flag. Their inconsistent representations to you suggest that they are not planning to honor the covenant of good faith on which all contracts are premised. Should I expect the CEO to offer a fair contract or is this something you read and negotiate? You should require a contract that seems fair to you. And by "to you" I mean that it has to be in line with your expectations regardless of the average conditions in the labor market. Negotiations are not binding. They are merely a preamble to a contract, and that contract is binding. This is why you should reject a contract that falls short of your requirements. Some clauses are unlawful and/or void and unenforceable as unconscionable or for contravening legislation (unlawful clauses can and do arise even if drafted by attorneys). Thus, although you might not have to worry about those clauses in particular, the company's mere attempt to include them in a contract should alert you of the high risk of ending up with other abusive terms & conditions which are binding and enforceable nonetheless.

That statute, which was struck down by the Supreme Court in US v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, does not define desecration. Case law on point is not forthcoming since there is no enforceable law on the topic and as long as the First Amendment holds, we can't test laws prohibiting flag desecration. The general meaning of the word is to treat disrespectfully, irreverently, or profanely, and that clearly is not the case in the present usage. A different statute yet to be written might outlaw "any modifications of the flag" (and would suffer the same fate as 18 USC 700), which could be technically violated in the application of a thin blue line to a flag.

The fact that something is illegal does not imply that it is illegal to post pictures of it happening. In general, under U.S. law, free speech protects almost all forms of communications subject to a handful of narrow exceptions and this is not one of them. There are many legitimate reasons one might want to post video of a fight (e.g. to identify crime perpetrators for purposes of prosecuting them), but no legitimate purpose is legally necessary. Surely as a platform Reddit cant hide against it being a platform of free speech in this case? They most definitely can. Reddit is also not responsible for user posted content under Section 230 of the Communication Decency Act, even if it were illegal for the person posting it to post the content

The COVID restrictions are new enough that there are few court decisions on how to interpret them. There are frequent requests for court injunctions seeking temporary relief. Some pass, some are denied. The website might accuse locations listed there of breaking the restrictions. Making such an accusation in public sounds like a very bad idea, especially if there is no solid documentation. But the aggrieved party would be any location falsely listed. The site may or may not be hosted in Germany. If it is not, it becomes a really interesting question which law applies. You might inform the authorities, but beyond that, forget it.

Very few terms have a single "legal" definition or meaning that applies to all laws, and can be looked up as if in a dictionary. Rather, when a specific meaning is needed in connection with a particular law, that law will include a definition. But that definition will often not apply to the use of the same term in other laws or other contexts. Here I suspect that the OP has found the definition section of a US Federal law regulating commercial transport in interstate commerce. Obviously in such a law, those terms would be defined in the context of commercial transport. That does not mean that the same meanings will be applied in other laws. Driver's licenses and other traffic and motor vehicle regulations are largely matters of state law in the US. Definitions from a federal law, or indeed any law but that state's Motor Vehicle Code (or whatever a given state calls such a body of law) will simply not be relevant. The argument sketched in the question simply does not follow.

Maybe I'm reading Walsh wrong, but it seems to me to be saying that Stout might apply in some cases, but it doesn't in that specific case. I think you are indeed reading it wrong. In the Walsh case, the court says: We have not had occasion to decide the question up to this time, but now that it is presented, we not only reiterate the doubt which we expressed in the McAlpin case (supra), but we think that the question of the defendant's negligence was erroneously submitted to the jury in the Stout case, and that we ought not to follow it as a precedent. It's clearly repudiating Stout here, and not just as it applies to that case. It literally says they think it should not be followed as precedent.

First, read the definitions of defamation and libel be sure you understand them: Defamation | Wex Legal Dictionary | Cornell. Yes, posting to Twitter and Reddit is publishing, and people can post provably false facts on those services and defame someone in a civil law sense. But Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (Electronic Frontier Foundation) mostly protects those services from defamation claims based on statements made by users of such a service. (Things are different if the case is criminal as a result of clear threats of violence, terrorism, etc.) ...what are the steps for them to exact damages in a civil court case? Find a lawyer, convince him/her to take the case, and file suit. if you don't know the person's real name, your lawyer will have to sue "John Doe" and point that out in the suit (and subpoenas) with the alleged Twitter handle or Reddit user name. How would a person compel Twitter/Reddit/etc to disclose the ISP information on their account? Read the various legal aspects of each service, i.e. Twitter Legal FAQs and User Agreement - Reddit and others. Your lawyer can explain that you can only try to compel them to disclose the IP and the ISP used with a subpoena during your lawsuit. How would a person compel an ISP to disclose the subscriber information (address, name) on the IP address? Since most ISPs protect their customer data, you will probably have to subpoena the ISP during your lawsuit. But your ability to do this can depend on if the ISP is a private company or a government entity, such as a university. State laws may come into play. Is obtaining the ISP subscriber's information enough to bring a lawsuit against them? Would they able to argue they didn't post the messages and bear no liability, even if it originated from their network? If it originated from an open wifi hotspot, would the proprietor bear responsibility at this point? Yes, you can sue an individual with such information; but there's no guarantee you'd win. Sure, because they can claim anything, such as someone else was using their computer or IP. No, owners of hotspots are generally not liable, and they protect themselves with TOS you agree to when you use the hotspot. Can the extensive legal costs of pursuing the case to it's conclusion be added to the damages sought easily? Legal costs can possibly be added, depending on jurisdiction. But seeking damages and actually winning them through a jury verdict are completely different things.

How is internet archiving legal, when it appears to violate many websites terms of use? Internet archiving services like the internet wayback machine work by rehosting content from other website. However, many websites in their term explicitly disallow people to frame their website or rehost their content. So my question is, how are internet archive websites allowed to work? As a cursory search, I've found that a lot of websites have the phrase (or variants): Under no circumstances may you “frame” the websites or any of their content or copy portions of the websites to a server, except as part of an Internet service provider’s incidental caching of pages. Yet, many of the sites that have this phrase are archived on archive.org My initial thoughts are that these websites don't have a problem with what archive.org is doing, so they don't pursue any legal action. However, it seems that archive.org is blatantly violating a huge number of websites terms. Although I have not legal experience, it seems that this could easily open themselves up to a class action lawsuit. Does anybody have any thoughts on this? Relevant Questions Rehosting website - This question mentions that rehosting websites violates copyright unless explicitly allowed.

Most of the major archiving platforms are nonprofit ventures with purposes that could fall within the fair-use exception to the Copyright Act. Archive.org, for instance, is for educational and archival purposes. Perma.cc, meanwhile, is for preserving legal history. I don't know about Perma.cc, but Archive.org will take down pages just because you asked, so that also cuts in its favor.

The notice has a lot to do with legacy requirements in the United States to claim the copyright to a work. Up until 1989, the copyright notice was required. Today, the statements are mainly maintained to protect against "innocent infringement" which might reduce what a content owner can get in court. What exactly do those terms entail? That the owner stated owns all rights and you may do nothing with the content. My biggest concern is this: by writing that, is the company claiming to own everything on the website, even potentially copyrighted user-submitted material? That's exactly what they are doing. Depending on the terms of the specific site, content contributors generally either assign copyright to the site owner or license the content in a way that allows the site owner to do exactly what they want with it. Site creators with the smarts or money to do it right/get someone to do it right usually state something like: Copyright [Site Owner] and contributors. Other sites (like this one) state specifically what they hold the copyright to: site design / logo © 2015 Stack Exchange Inc THIS IS NOT LEGAL ADVICE. CONSULT AN ATTORNEY REGARDING YOUR SPECIFIC SITUATION.

It Depends If the person reusing the image (lets call that person R for reuser) is not complying with the terms of the Creative commons license, which include a requirement to provide attribution of the source work, then R cannot rely on the license, and the granting of the license ad the presence of a license declaration is legally irrelevant. R must have some other basis to reuse the image. This could be an exception to copyright, such as fair use or fair dealing. Or possibly the image is not protected by copyright, for example because its copyright has expired, or because it is a work of the US Federal Government being used in the US. In the absence of such a basis, R is infringing copyright. In much of the world copyright now lasts for 70 years after the death of the author (or of all co-authors). In some different terms apply, ranging from life+50 to life+100. Sound recordings and photos get shorter terms in some countries. In the US the term is life+70 for recent works, but for work created and published before 1978 more complex rules apply, depending on the date of publication, and whether laws on notice and renewal were complied with. See the well-known chart Copyright Term and the Public Domain for the various cases and when copyright expires in each case. The question asks about fair use. This is a US-specific legal concept. It is designed to be flexible, an is highly fact-dependent. As a result it is rarely possible to say if a use will qualify as a fair use with certainty until a court passes on it. See Is this copyright infringement? Is it fair use? What if I don't make any money off it? for more on fair use. Not providing attribution is itself often considered to weigh against fair use. The question does not give enough detail to make even a good guess as to whether such a use is likely to be held to be fair use. Identifying the kind of eagle has some educational value, which might favor fair use to some extent, but must be considered in light of the overall purpose of the use, which is not described. There is no indication as to whether the original work is creative or factual, or whether the reuse would be likely to harm the market for the original. Much use of images on social media does not stand up under a fair use analysis. Providing proper attribution might well help any fair use claim. See also Do you have to give attribution if an image falls under Creative Commons?

Probably not, because you should be in a position to rely on the Safe Harbor provision of the DMCA. Safe Harbor protects service providers who provide open, non-moderated spaces for users to directly contribute content. Safe Harbor means you do not need an army of moderators to inspect every message posted to the site or system. It is essential for sites like Twitter, Youtube or StackExchange to exist. You are not liable for that content if you provide a means for IP owners to report copyright violations, and promptly take down any content which an IP owner reports as violating. You don't need to get in the middle of whether that's really true; there's a mechanism for the user and IP owner to "duke it out" directly at no risk to you. However you must take the required steps. For instance you must register an agent, and respond timely to DMCA takedown notices, which means you must be reachable as per the law. Your designated agent address must be staffed 9-5. Note that the "Designated Agent" can be the same person as the "Registered Agent" that you already must have when you are an LLC or corporation. And you'll want to be an LLC or corporation by the time you get big enough to worry about copyright lawsuits.

Use of SE is subject to the terms and conditions specified here. Section 3 says "You agree that all Subscriber Content that You contribute to the Network is perpetually and irrevocably licensed to Stack Exchange under the Creative Commons Attribution Share Alike license." That means that your contributions can be used forever. That means the stuff is there, end of story. Section 11 on Termination says "Stack Exchange may also terminate, block, or suspend any and all Services and access to the Network immediately, without prior notice or liability, in its sole discretion, for any reason or no reason at all, including but not limited to any Subscriber breaches of any of the terms or conditions of this Agreement". That means you can be banned. So, yes, what they did is legal.

It is hard to say: this article sketches the legal landscape. So-called deep linking that bypasses the main page for a site is not believed to be infringement, following the reasoning of Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146. The URL itself does not have the bare minimum of creativity required for copyright protection, and storing a URL on a computer is not storing the contents that it refers to, so no copy was made in violation of copyright law. It is unlikely that competing theories would develop in other US districts (there don't appear to be any at the present). However, such a link could create secondary liability for infringement, see Erickson Productions, Inc. v. Kast, where a party "has knowledge of another’s infringement and (2) either (a) materially contributes to or (b) induces that infringement". If I link to a file on a pirate website, I am secondarily liable for that infringement. However, if I link to a legally-uploaded file which the author did not intend to make public, there is no infringement. Copyright law requires permission of the copyright owner, which is more than just "explicit denial". The problem is that a person can put a file out there and not say one way or the other whether you have permission to copy the file. The US Copyright office says that "A copyright owner must have expressly or implicitly authorized users to make retainable copies of a work by downloading, printing, or other means for the work to be considered published" (let's not care at the moment whether it is important to be "published"). The court may infer implicit permission from a copyright owner's conduct, but there is no rule "if it's on the internet, you've granted permission". A rights-owner may make a valiant but insufficient effort to block access to the work (except via a password), so in that context, the courts would infer that the rights-owner had not given permission, therefore the copying is infringing and you have secondary liability for your direct link to the material.

Can you unambiguously, legally, and conclusively determine what is and is not a "porn site"? I'm sure many are easy... but what about that "Swimsuit modeling" site, or the "Artistic Nudes" site featuring classic French Renaissance paintings? There will always be a grey area. What makes a "site" in a legal sense? Consider all the blog sites filled with user generated content: If just a few pages out of tens-of-thousands are hardcore, indisputable porn, would you require the entire domain to be classified XXX, even if 99% of its content is completely innocent? Who would enforce this? Are you proposing an "Internet Police" force to review all new domain names and their content before they get approved? That is called "Prior Restraint on Free Speech", and is established law. Suppose a site does get approved, then immediately changes the content of their pages from Cooking Recipes to hard-core porn. Who is going to review and approve every update to every website, when sites are updated constantly?! Maybe you're proposing that any individual who finds porn on a .ORG site has the right to sue for damages? This would likely clog the courts with endless vigilante lawsuits about what content belongs on which domain. This is a flat out horrible, poorly thought out idea.

Both the displayed site (including all text and images) and the html, css, javascript and other code that generates the display are protected by copyright. This is true in pretty much every country. You would not be able to reuse them lawfully without permission, unless an exception to copyright applies. If no exception applies, and you have not obtained permission, this is copyright infringement. In most cases copyright infringement is treated as a tort (a civil matter), not as a crime. This means that law enforcement generally will take no action and have no interest in such a situation. The copyright owner could sue for infringement, and possibly collect money damages. In the US, statutory damages can be as high as $30,000, or up to $150,000 for "wilful" infringement, or as low as $750 (per work infringed). Or actual damages can be collected instead. In other countries, actual damages plus costs of suit are more likely, but the rule can be different in each country. The possible exceptions to copyright vary significantly in different countries. In the US the major exception is Fair use. See Is this copyright infringement? Is it fair use? What if I don't make any money off it? and I have a question about copyright. What should I read before I ask it? for more information In general short snippets of code can probably be used under fair use, but substantial parts of the code or the displayed site are less likely to qualify as fair use. And if it is illegal then why are there so many legal open source or paid software and applications for cloning of website like httrack, cyotek, webcopy etc? Most of these tools have legitimate uses, including learning how a site is constructed without distributing copied content; and cloning or partial cloning of a site with permission. Even if the tools were mostly used for unlawful copying, that might well not be a high priority for law enforcement, and cross-border law enforcement (which this in many cases would involve) is often much harder for the police and other authorities.

To what is the judge in the Lina E. trial referring to by "deplorable deficiencies in recent trials of far-right extremists"? It is in the news that there have been protests after the sentencing of Lina E for attacks on neo-Nazis. Wikipedia quoting this German language news article says: Hans Schlüter-Staats, the Higher Regional Court of Dresden judge overseeing the trial, stated that "opposing right-wing extremists is a respectable motive" and that there had been "deplorable" deficiencies in recent trials of far-right extremists To what cases is the judge referring to here?

To what cases is the judge referring to here? None: neither the quoted article (2023-06-02 05:57: Prozess gegen Lina E.: Stadt Leipzig verbietet Solidaritäts-Demonstration) given in the english version of Wikipedia nor the german Wikipedia version (Dresdner Linksextremismusprozess – Wikipedia uses the quote given in the english version. In the article itself, the name 'Hans Schlueter-Staats' is used only once: The arrest warrant against them will be suspended against conditions, said Hans Schlueter-Staats, presiding judge of the State Protection Chamber at the Dresden Higher Regional Court, on Wednesday evening at the end of the verdict. She only has to serve the remainder of the sentence if the verdict becomes final. Assume that, for whatever reason, someone added a fabricated quote, in the Wikipedia page, that is not contained in the given source hoping that nobody would notice (either because the reader can't read German or simply wouldn't look). It would be very strange for a judge whos primary duty, in a civil law system, is to read the law as written, to give a personal opinion about previous rulings (which was the reason I looked: to read the exact German text). Whoever fabricated that quote was obviously unaware of this or didn't care hoping that others would simply assume it to be correct due the given source of a newspaper that has a reputation as being a reliable source.

For the record, factual impossibility is rarely a defense to a crime. In United States v. Thomas the court decided that men who believed they were raping a drunken unconscious women were guilty of attempted rape, even though the woman was dead at the time. In this case there is no facts that made the offense impossible to commit. The suspect clearly submitted a false prescription and obtained the drugs he or she wished to obtain. There is no impossibility. Instead the police officer, as the saying goes, has the suspect "dead to rights". This is not legal advice. Consult an attorney for that.

Harassment, alarm and distress are for the trier of fact to define That is, whether particular behaviour in a particular case amounts to harassment, alarm or distress is a question of fact, not law. That is, it is for the trier of fact (jury or judge as applicable) to consider the evidence and decide if the prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt (another term they must define for themselves) the actions of the defendant amounted to harassment, alarm or distress within the context of the crime charged. The Crown Prosecution Service has this guide to help decide if charges should be brought. With reference to s5 of the Public Order Act (s4A is a more severe version of this crime): Disorderly behaviour does not require any element of violence, actual or threatened; and it includes conduct that is not necessarily threatening or abusive. It is not necessary to prove any feeling of insecurity, in an apprehensive sense, on the part of a member of the public (Chambers and Edwards v DPP [1995] Crim LR 896). There is a defence of reasonableness to these crimes and that, too, is for the trier of fact to determine using the legally objective test: Hammond v DPP [2004] EWHC 69 (Admin): It was open to justices to find that signs referring to homosexuality and lesbianism as immoral were “insulting” and, having taken into account the defendant’s rights under Articles 9 and 10, to find that his behaviour in displaying them was not reasonable Gough v DPP [2013] EWHC 3267 (The naked rambler case) The District Judge had been entitled to find that the defendant’s conduct in walking through a crowded street was “disorderly” and that prosecution was a proportionate response which did not violate his rights under Article 10. NB both the above cases were decided before the amendment to the Act which removed the “insulting” limb under section 5.

Is it true that there has never been a single case It is tough to prove a negative. I am not going to completely parse the quote but please notice that the quote states "we couldn't find" and concludes that "it doesn't happen." Given these two pieces of information I do not conclude that there has never been a single case. Rather I conclude that the speaker in your quote could not find a case therefore he concluded that there has never been a single case. It's largely impossible to determine that there has never been a single such case. We can search published opinions but that barely scratches the surface of lawsuits that are filed. It is entirely possible that someone filed a suit which was quickly dismissed. The Act provides a defense, it does not bar lawsuits. Someone might get sick from food and not know where the food came from so they sue the provider. If this happens the provider may raise the Emerson Act as a defense and escape liability to the extent applicable. But again, we will never know because it's impossible to examine every lawsuit filed in this country.

Specifically, the threatened action is about stalking and implicit threats to his family. I'm not suggesting that there is a lot of merit to the claim, but that is how he is presenting the argument. The question would be where there is an intentional, repeated following of a person for the purpose of harassing the person with express or implied threats of violence or death. The jury would have to decide whether the implicit threat is credible (somebody plans to blow him or his family out of the sky), a decision would probably turn on the number of death threats he receives.

You've got four cases there with four different reasons for substantial delays: In the case of the Aurora theater shooting, the shooter pled not guilty by reason of insanity. There's no doubt about who did it, but doubt was raised about the mental status of the shooter. Murder is not a strict liability crime, so the ability of the defendant to form the intent to commit the crime is relevant. In the case of the Charleston church shooting, the defendant was twice evaluated for competence to stand trial. Again, no doubt about who did it, but most if not all jurisdictions require a defendant to be sufficiently sane to participate in their defense. In the case of the Parkland shooting, the initial delay was confusion over who the defense lawyer would be. Florida will only provide a public defender to someone who cannot afford their own defense lawyer, and it took nearly a year to determine that the defendant had inherited enough money to afford a private lawyer. Due to this delay, the trial was initially scheduled for mid-2020, which caused it to be delayed by the COVID-19 outbreak. In the case of the Tree of Life shooting, it appears to be straight-up delaying tactics by the defense. There are a great many motions, appeals of motions, requests for delay, and other things a lawyer can do to slow things down. Since the defendant is currently being held without bail, the prosecution probably isn't strongly motivated to speed things up.

No They look like pretty standard jury instructions to me. The only odd bit is “sure he is guilty” - that’s not what “beyond reasonable doubt means” and, at least in Australia, judges don’t tell jurors what it means, that’s one of the things they have to decide for themselves. However, in context, where the term “reasonable doubt” is clearly used latter, it’s probably ok.

canada You have tagged this 'criminal law', so I will stick to that, and avoid non-criminal anti-discrimination regimes. Criminal Code, s. 319 makes it an offence to wilfully incite or promote hatred against an identifiable group. It does not matter whether the person that is being communicated to is a member of the identifiable group (meaning "any section of the public distinguished by colour, race, religion or ethnic origin"). What matters is a strict mens rea requirement that the communication was done with the intent of promoting or inciting hatred against such a group. If the accused holds such intent, it is no defence that they mistook the person they were communicating with as not being a member of such a group. See generally, R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 SCR 697. Hypothetical laws If instead you are asking about what a hypothetical law could require (since you ask, "If a law for example criminalises intimidating or assaulting someone who suffers from dwarfism..."), then as a matter of statutory interpretation, the law could be written in a way that makes the mistake you describe a defence or it could be written in a way that does not allow that defence. E.g. "Any person who assaults another, knowing that the other person is X, commits an offence..." This phrasing of the law clearly would require the accused to know that the person they have assaulted is in the category X in order for the assault to fall within this specific variant of assault. E.g. "Any person who assaults a person that is X, regardless of whether they know the other person to be X, commits an offence..." Under this phrasing of the law, knowledge of the status of the target of the assault clearly does not matter. However, Canadian law has constitutional minimum mens rea requirements for elements of crimes that bring risk of imprisonment. If the offence is punishable by imprisonment, then the variant that essentially removes the mens rea from the element relating to the target's status would be unconstitutional.

Can I use code from a computergame that is owned by a company A in order to develop my own game at company B? I want to develop a game with my own company, lets call it Indiantruckaimulator, that is very similiar to the already existing game, Eurotruck simulator. I would greatly benefit if I could use their Code/Software and simply add some changes. Is there a way for me to get access to that code, preferably through colaboration :), to be able to build upon that? Thank you for your time and answers!

You ask permission, preferably with legal counsel to handle the details. It really is that simple. Unsurprisingly, most companies don't want to give their code away- especially to a competitor. If you even get a response, they will expect something in return i.e. money. Realistically though, it's unlikely they will respond, much less deal with you.

I don't think the issue is that it is a violation of a law, but rather that it is a violation of the terms of service you agree to when you sign up for the site - which is a breach of contract. You can be sued for breach of contract, if the site can prove any damages based on your breach. So if you use a bot to make money on a site, in violation of the site's license agreement, then I believe the site could indeed sue you to get the money back. Also, the phrasing of your question ("creating a robot") raises a separate issue. It is not actually creating the bot that is illegal, but using it where not allowed can be a violation of contract. Suppose person A makes a poker bot, just as a programming exercise, and doesn't use it. But then suppose person B uses the robot created by person A on a site that forbids it. Although this could be a gray area, I do not believe the site would have any recourse against person A (even though they probably would against person B).

The "Beholder" was originally invented as part of AD&D (2nd edition IIRC) and copyrighted by TSR (Gary Gygax and associates, essentially). WotC bought TSR and all its assets, including copyrights. There were at least two other RPGs that tried to use Beholders and other original creatures from the Monster Manual of D&D and dropped them after a cease and desist order from the copyright holders. I believe one was from TSR, and one from WotC after they purchased TSR. To the best of my knowledge there was no actual copyright suit, so the validity of the copyright was never tested in court, but it is probably valid. Merely calling a creature a "Beholder" is not enough to violate the copyright, there would need to be actual copying of the description, or a sufficiently detailed similarity to make the use an infringement. That is always a matter of judgement, ultimately for a court in a copyright suit (or an appeals court). So, while all the possibilities mentioned in the answer by @Dale M are valid, it is additional possible that the version used by HOMM3 is not sufficiently close to the one copyrighted as part of AD&D for a copyright claim to prevail, or the WotC fears that it would not prevail, and so does not spend the money to try.

Yes. The AusPat database is an excellent source for looking for Australian patents. I did a quick search for "card game" and came across 276 results fitting those keywords. Not all involve the classic generic-52-card-deck format, but some do. A good example - and one that seems similar to your idea - is "Modified blackjack game using non-standard blackjack card values", by Davinder Signh Sandhu. There's no direct link to it from AusPat.1 So yes, you can patent a card game in Australia. At the moment, I don't have enough information to answer your other two questions. 1 I found a similar American patent with more information, though I have no proof that the two are in similar formats.

You mean like Unilever, and countless others do? Yes. Many, many companies control a stable of brands, often of competing products. This is particularly prevalent in grocery lines (cleaning, food, beauty products) and motor vehicles (there are dozens of brands of motor vehicle but only a handful of automotive companies). Clearly, these products have different features (improvements) – you are entitled to segment your market anyway you like. If they are actually produced by the same company, keeping that secret would be virtually impossible. If they were separate companies (even with licencing agreements etc.), well, they are not the same company even if they have common ownership. As for having a monopoly: if you hold a patent you are allowed to have a monopoly, if you don't, expect to see knock-off rocket boots on the shelf in a week.

Yes and no. [note, the following is all written about US law. In other jurisdictions laws are, of course, different (though usually not drastically so.)] In the US there are (at least) three different bodies of law that might apply to code: copyright, patents, trade secrets. Copyright covers original expression. Anything you write is automatically, immediately protected under copyright. The copyright applies to the code itself, and anything "derived" from that code. It's up to the courts to decide exactly what "derived" means. One case that's long been viewed as a landmark in this area is Gates Rubber v. Bando Chemicals. The Court of Appeals for the tenth Circuit decision includes a section titled: "The Test for Determining Whether the Copyright of a Computer Program Has Been Infringed." Note that you can register a copyright, and that can be worthwhile, such as helping recover some damages you can't otherwise. Patents are quite different from copyrights. Where a copyright covers expression of an idea, a patent covers a specific invention. Rather than being awarded automatically, a patent has to be applied for, and awarded only after the patent office has determined that there's no relevant prior art to prevent it from being awarded. A patent, however, covers things like somebody else independently discovering/inventing what's covered by the patent. A trade secret could (at least theoretically) apply to some process or procedure embodied in the code. A trade secret mostly applies to a situation where (for example) you're trying to form an alliance with some other company, and in the process tell them things you don't tell the general public. If you've identified the fact that what you're telling them is a trade secret, and they then tell a competitor (or the general public, etc.) or more generally use that information in any way other than the originally intended purpose, it could constitute a trade secret violation. As a side-note: patents and copyright fall under federal law, so they're basically uniform nation-wide. Trade secrets mostly fall under state law, so the exact details vary by state. Absent a reason to believe otherwise, I'd guess your interest here is primarily in copyright infringement. The key here would be showing that one piece of code was derived from the other. That is, it specifically would not apply in a case where there were only a limited number of ways of doing something, so anybody who wanted to do that had to use one of those ways. Since this would not indicate actual derivation, it would not indicate copyright violation.

It does mean that you cannot reuse any parts of the source code, even small simple ones. You would have to rebuild the code from scratch. There is a significant chance that the code would be "substantially similar" to the code that you were hired to build, also that if anybody else were to write a bubble sort or 24-to-am/pm conversion routine, it would look the same, where even variable names (which should describe function) are the same or very similar. In case of an infringement lawsuit, you would have to defend yourself by showing that there are only a few ways to code a given function. Copyright protects only the "expression", not the abstract idea. A linked list is an idea, which can't be protected by copyright; same with recursion, pointers, stacks, object-oriented programming... Anything that involves copy and paste is infringement. If you re-read the copyrighted code and then try to reconstruct it, you probably crossed the infringement line. If you remember the problems and solutions and accidentally write somewhat similar code, that is probably on the safe side. From the perspective of the programmer not wanting to always reinvent the wheel, it would be most useful to make a distinction in the contract between "the essentials of the customer's program" versus "incidental utility work". The difficulty will arise in saying specifically what is essential vs. incidental. For instance, I know that if I were to hire you to develop a speech-recognition system, low-level audio-acquisition and encoding would not be essential to my purpose, whereas DSP parsing routines would be the center of my interest. The programmer would then want to retain recycling rights to all non-essential code.

The Google terms of service do not prohibit using their translate programs to create something that you sell. TOS for using their API would be irrelevant, since that isn't what you're doing. There is no clear copyright issue: as far as I can tell, there is not yet any case law suggesting that the output of a program can be owned by the copyright-holder of the program. (Copyright must be held by a legal person, i.e. an actual person or a corporation, and a program cannot yet be a legal person). A human-performed translation is subject to copyright protection since what is protected is that which is created by the (translating) author, and a program lacks that creative element. A translation owes its existence to the program-user using a particular tool to create the work, be it a pen or a translation program. What is unclear at present is whether a person using machine translation in a permitted fashion to create a derivative work thereby gains copyright to that derived work.