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sadehasya manoyogo dharmādharmābhisatkṛtaḥ // | its ‘rebirth’ consists in becoming equipped with a body and mind, under the influence of merit and demerit. |
śarīracakṣurādīnāṃ vadhāddhiṃsāsya kalpyate / | it is assumed to be ‘hurt’ by the hurting of its body, eyes and the rest; |
itthaṃ nitye 'pi puṃsyeṣā prakriyā vimalekṣyate // | so that though it is eternal, the said process (of birth and rebirth) has been held to be unobjectionable. |
{sadādyaviśeṣaviṣayāviṣayobhayātmakajñeyapratyakṣānumānopamānaśabdasiddhadarśanaprātibhajñānārekaviparyaya} svapnasvapnāntikāḥ prajñānaviśeṣā madīyaśarīrādivyatiriktasaṃvedakasaṃvedyāḥ svakāraṇāyattajanmavattvabodhātmakatvāśutaravināśitvasaṃskārādhāyakatvapratyayatvebhyaḥ puruṣāntarapratyayavat vaidharmyeṇa praśastamitā ghaṭādaya iti / | The existence of the Soul as the cogniser has been asserted in the following words: “All particular cognitions of such cognisables as Substance, Quality and Action, which are comprised under ‘Being’, etc., and also of Generality, Specific Individuality and Inherence, which are not comprised under ‘Being, etc.’ all which cognitions are perceptional or inferential or analogical or verbal or occult (astrological, etc.) or intuitional (e.g. ‘my brother will come to-morrow’) or doubtful or wrong or dreamy or dream-cognition, are apprehended by a cogniser distinct from my body, etc., (a) because their origination is dependent upon their own causes, (b) because they are ‘general’ and ‘particular’, (c) because they are of the nature of Consciousness, (d) because they are very quickly destructible, (e) because they leave impressions, (f) because they are cognitions, just like the cognition of other persons; |
tatra sadādayaḥ ṣaḍaviśeṣāḥ pūrvaṃ vyākhyātāḥ / | The import of this comprehensive argument the Author sets forth (from the Nyāya-standpoint) in the following Text: [see verse 177 next] |
teṣāṃ sadādīnāṃ ṣaṇṇāṃ viṣayo dravyaguṇakarmāṇi / | it is the doer of good and bad acts and the enjoyer of the fruit of these; |
aviṣayaḥ sāmānyaviśeṣasamavāyāḥ / | it is ‘conscious’, not by itself, but through the presence of consciousness; |
tadetad ubhayātmakaṃ jñeyaṃ viṣayaḥ pratyakṣādīnāṃ jñānaviśeṣāṇāṃ te tathoktāḥ / | the presence of cognition, effort, etc. as also the character of being the ‘doer’ is attributed to it. its being the ‘enjoyer’ (experiencer) consists in the subsistence in it of the feelings of pleasure, pain and the like; |
pratyakṣānumānopamānetyādis tu dvandvanirdeśaḥ / | and dissociation from these same as taken up before is called its ‘death’; |
siddhadarśanaṃ jyotiḥśāstrādyupanibaddham / taddhi siddhānāṃ darśanaṃ siddhaṃ vā darśanam iti kṛtvā siddhadarśanam ucyate / | its ‘rebirth’ consists in becoming equipped with a body and mind, under the influence of merit and demerit. it is assumed to be ‘hurt’ by the hurting of its body, eyes and the rest; |
tad dhi prāyeṇarṣiṇāṃ bhavatīti kṛtvārṣamucyate / | so that though it is eternal, the said process (of birth and rebirth) has been held to be unobjectionable. |
ārekaḥ saṃśayaḥ / | (A) According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika School. |
viparyayo viparyāsaḥ / prathamasvapnāvasthābhāvī pratyayaḥ svapnaḥ / | as is clear from the following portions of Kamalaśīla’s Commentary, of which latter also, the earlier portions are wanting.] |
tad viṣayaṃ svapno 'pi yadaparaṃ jñānaṃ bhavati sa svapnāntikaḥ / eta eva prajñānaviśeṣāḥ / | The existence of the Soul as the cogniser has been asserted in the following words: “All particular cognitions of such cognisables as Substance, Quality and Action, which are comprised under ‘Being’, etc., and also of Generality, Specific Individuality and Inherence, which are not comprised under ‘Being, etc.’ all which cognitions are perceptional or inferential or analogical or verbal or occult (astrological, etc.) or intuitional (e.g. ‘my brother will come to-morrow’) or doubtful or wrong or dreamy or dream-cognition, are apprehended by a cogniser distinct from my body, etc., (a) because their origination is dependent upon their own causes, (b) because they are ‘general’ and ‘particular’, (c) because they are of the nature of Consciousness, (d) because they are very quickly destructible, (e) because they leave impressions, (f) because they are cognitions, just like the cognition of other persons; |
śeṣaṃ subodham / | the Jar and other things serving as. |
tadetat pramāṇyam arthato nirdiśann āha jñānāni cetyādi / | The import of this comprehensive argument the Author sets forth (from the Nyāya-standpoint) in the following Text: [see verse 177 next] |
jñānāni ca madīyāni tatvādivyatirekiṇā / | “My cognitions are apprehended by a gogniser distinct from my body, etc. |
saṃvedakena vedyāni pratyayatvāt tadanyavat // tatvādītyatrādiśabdena buddhīndriyavedanāḥ parigṛhyante / | because they are cognitions, like cognitions other than mine. In the phrase ‘body, etc.’ the ‘etc.’ includes the Intellect, Sense-organs-and Feelings. ‘Because they are cognitions’, this also is only illustrative; |
pratyayatvādityupalakṣaṇam / tadanye 'pi svakāraṇāyattajanmavattvādayo grāhyāḥ // | the other reasons also are meant, such as ‘having their origin dependent upon their own causes’ and the rest (mentioned in the aforesaid comprehensive statement). |
icchādayaś ca sarve 'pi kvacid ete samāśritāḥ / | “All such things as desire and the rest must subsist in something; |
vastutve sati kāryatvād rūpavat sa ca naḥ pumān // | because while being entities, they are effects, like colour. this something is the spirit (soul). |
vastutvagrahaṇādeṣa na nāśe vyabhicāravān / | the presence of the qualifying phrase ‘while being entities’ saves the argument from being ‘untrue’ (fallible), in regard to destruction; |
hetumattve 'pi nāśasya yasmānnaivāsti vastutā // | because though destruction is an effect (has a cause), yet it is not an ‘entity’.” (178-179) |
yadyotakaras tu pramāṇayati devadattasya rūparasagandhasparśapratyayā ekānekanimittāḥ mayeti pratyayena pratisandhīyamānatvāt / | Śaṅkarasvāmin (an old Nyāya-writer) proves the existence of the Soul in another manner: “Desire and the rest must subsist in something, because, while being entities, they are effects, like Colour, etc.”. |
yac ca tadekaṃ nimittaṃ sa ātmeti / | This argument is set forth in the following Text: [see verses 178-179 above] |
tadetat pramāṇaṃ darśayann āha rūpādipratyayā iti / | The words ‘the presence of the qualifying phrase, etc.’ serves to show the use of the phrase ‘while being an entity (178-179) |
rūpādipratyayāḥ sarve 'pyekānekanimittakāḥ / mayeti pratyayenaiṣāṃ pratisandhānabhāvataḥ // | “All cognitions of colour, etc. should be regarded as having one and also several causes, because they are recalled by the notion of ‘being cognised by me’; |
nartakībhrūlatābhaṅge bahūnāṃ pratyayā iva / | just like the cognitions of several men regarding the glances of the dancing girl. |
anyathā pratisandhānaṃ na jāyetānibandhanam // | if it were otherwise, there could be no ‘recalling’, as there would be no basis for it.” (180-181) |
subodham //180- | This is easily understood. |
ayam aparastadīyaḥ prayogaḥ ātmeti padaṃ śarīrendriyamanobuddhivedanāsaṃghātavyatiriktavacanaṃ prasiddhaparyāyavyatiriktatve satyekapadatvāt ghaṭādiśabdavat / | “The term ‘Ātman’ (soul) must be expressive of something distinct from the aggregate of intellect, sense-organs and the rest, because it is held to be a single term, while being different from the well-known synonyms of those terms; whatever is definitely known as fulfilling these conditions is always qualified by the said property; |
tadāha buddhīndriyādītyādi / | as is found in the case of the term ‘cloth’.” (182-183) |
buddhīndriyādisaṃghātavyatiriktābhidhāyakam / ātmeti vacanaṃ yasmād idam ekapadaṃ matam // | The following is another argument put forward by the same writer (Uddyotakara): [This argument is found set forth, in different words, in the Nyāyavārtika, under 3.1.19, page 368, Bib. Ind. |
[p.82] | Edition; |
yathānirdiṣṭadharmeṇa tadyuktaṃ paṭaśabdavat // | This argument is set forth in the following Text: [see verses 182-183 above] |
siddhaparyāyabhinnatva iti / | Being different from the well-known synonyms; |
buddhīndriyādīnāṃ ye siddhāḥ paryāyā dhīprabhṛtayastebhyo bhinnatve satītyarthaḥ / | i.e. such terms as ‘dhī’ (which is a synonym of ‘buddhi’) and the rest, which are well-known synonyms of the term ‘Buddhi’; |
yaccaivaṃ pariniścitam iti / | the term ‘Soul’ is distinct from all these syonyms. |
yathānirdiṣṭadharmeṇeti / | Whatever is definitely known, etc. |
buddhyādivyatiriktārthābhidhāyitvena //182- punaḥ sa eva vyatirekiṇaṃ hetumātmasiddhaye prayuktavān / | i.e. which is different from well-known synonyms and is yet a single word, is always qualified by the said properly, i.e. is always characterised by the quality of being expressive of something distinct from Intellect and the rest. |
nedaṃ nirātmakaṃ jīvaccharīramaprāṇādimattvaprasaṅgād ghaṭādivad iti / taddarśayati prāṇādibhir ity āha | The same writer has also adduced a negative Reasoning in proof of the Soul “This living body is not Soul-less, because if it were so, it would have to be regarded as devoid of the functions of Breathing, etc., like the Jar and such things”. |
prāṇādibhir viyuktaś ca jīvaddeho bhavedayam / | “This living body would be devoid of breathing and other functions, because it would be soul-less, like the jar. |
nairātmyād ghaṭavat tasmān naivāstyasya nirātmatā // | hence it cannot be soul-less.” (184) Or the meaning of the Text may be that ‘the Soul cannot be nonexistent’, devoid of existence; |
asya nirātmateti / | that is, its existence is established. |
yadvā asyātmano nirātmatā niḥsvabhāvatā nāsti api tu sattvaṃ siddham ity arthaḥ // atha nityatvavibhutve katham asya pratipattavye ityatrāviddhakarṇastāvat pramāṇayati mātur udaraniṣkramaṇottarakālaṃ madīyādyaprajñānasaṃvedakasaṃvedyānyatatkālāni madīyāni prajñānāni madīyaprajñānatvāt ādyamadīyaprajñānavat / | “All subsequent cognitions are apprehended by that same cogniser who apprehended the first cognition immediately on birth, because they are my cognitions, like that first forerunner of those cognitions.” (185) As regards the question as to how the eternality and omnipresence of the Soul are to be proved, Aviddhakarṇa has propounded the following argument: “The cognitions that I have had since my birth must have had the same cogniser who had the first cognition immediately after my coming out of my mother’s womb, because they are my cognitions, like my first cognition. |
evaṃ duḥkhādayo 'pi pakṣīkartavyāḥ / | The same reasoning may be stated in regard to Pain and other experiences also. |
etac ca nityatve 'numānam tadetaddarśayati sadyojātādyetyādi / | This is the inferential reasoning that proves the eternality of the Soul.” This argument is set forth in the following Text: [see verse 185 above] |
sarvamuttaravijñānaṃ majjñānatvāt tadādyavat // | Like the first forerunner, etc. i.e. the first forerunner of all subsequent cognitions. |
vibhutvasiddhaye pramāṇayati / avanijalānilamanāṃsi vipratipattiviṣayabhāvāpannāni dūrataravartīni madīyenātmanā saha sambandhyante / mūrtatvavegavattvaparatvamithaḥsaṃyogavibhāgavattvebhyo madīyaśarīrādivad iti / | In proof of the omnipresence of the Soul, the same writer sets forth the following argument: “The Earth, Water, Air and Mind which are things under dispute, are at a distance from my Soul, and yet they are in contact with that Soul, (a) because they have material form, (b) because they have velocity, (c) because they have priority and posteriority, (d) because they are associated with, and dissociated from, each other, just like my own body”. |
evam ityādinopasaṃharati / | This argument is set forth in the following Text: [see verse 186 above] |
evaṃ ca sattvanityatvavibhutvānāṃ viniścaye / ātmano na nirātmānaḥ sarvadharmā iti sthitam // tadatyetyādinā pratividhatte / | “Thus the existence, eternality and omnipresence of the soul being definitely proved, it becomes established that nothing is soul-less.” (187) The next Text sums up the arguments of the protagonists of the Soul: [see verse 187 above] |
tadatra prathame tāvat sādhane siddhasādhyatā / | As regards the first argument that has been put forward, it is open to the charge of ‘proving what is already admitted’ (futile); |
sarvajñādiprabedyatvaṃ tvajjñānasyeṣyate yataḥ // | as the apprehensibility of your cognition by the omniscient person and others is already admitted (by us). |
prathame sādhana iti / jñānāni ca madīyānītyādau / | The first argument, i.e. the one set forth in Text 177 “My cognitions are apprehended by a Cogniser, etc.”. |
tatra siddhasādhyatā bhavadīyapratyayānāmasmābhir bhavaccharīrādivyatirekiṇā sarvavidā śrāvakapratyekabuddhais tadanyaiś ca parivittavedibhir vedanābhyupagamāt // | inasmuch as we already admit the fact that your cognitions are apprehended by a Cogniser other than your body, etc., in the person of the Omniscient Being, as also by the Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas and other thought-readers. Whenever consciousness appears, it appears in its own form, independently of any other ‘illuminator’; |
yaścāpi puruṣāntarapratyayavad iti sādharmyadṛṣṭāntaḥ sa sādhyavikala iti darśayann āha prakāśakānapekṣaṃ cetyādi / | As regards the instance per similarity cited in the same argument “like the cognitions of other persons”, it is one that is ‘devoid of the Probandum’ (i.e. the character meant to be proved is not present in it). |
anyavijñānamapyevaṃ sādhyaśūnyaṃ nidarśanam // yataḥ puruṣāntarīyakam api jñānaṃ prakāśakāntarānapekṣaṃ svasaṃvidrūpamevopajāyate / | Inasmuch as the ‘cognition of other persons’ also appears in its own form, independently of any other ‘illuminator’, this instance that you have cited is devoid of the Probandum, i.e. devoid of the character that is sought to be proved, viz. |
athāpi syānnānyadīyaṃ cittamātram udāharaṇatvenābhipretaṃ kintu yasmin viṣaye vijñānamāgṛhītatadākāramupajāyate tadihodāharaṇam ity āha tadākāroparaktenetyādi / | Even if the instance meant be that cognition which is cognised as tinged by the form of the thing concerned, it would be doubtful in regard to another cognition. It might be argued that “it is not mere Cognition of another person that is meant to be the Corroborative Instance, but that particular cognition which appears in the form of the thing concerned”. |
tadākāroparaktena yadanyena pravedyate / | The answer to this is supplied in the following Text: [see verse 190 above] |
evam api yatsvasaṃvidrūpameva jñānaṃ jñānāntarasaṃvedanarahitam utpadyate tena saṃśayo bhavedanaikāntiko hetur iti yāvat / atha tadapi svavyatiriktasaṃvedakasaṃvedyamudayavyayadharmakatvaprameyatvasmaryamāṇapramāṇatvebhyo viṣayavad iti matam / | Even so, with reference to that cognition which does appear in its own form, without any ‘cognition of another person’, there would be doubts regarding the Probans cited, which, therefore, would remain ‘inconclusive’. It might be urged that “the said Cognition also must be apprehended by a Cogniser different from itself, (a) because it is prone to appearance and disappearance, (b) because it is cognisable, (c) because it is capable of being remembered as a means of cognition, like the objects (of cognition) |
tadatrāpi sādhyaviparyaye bādhakābhāvād vyatireko na niścitaḥ / | But here also: (1) as there would be nothing to preclude the contrary of the Probandum, the negative concomitance would remain doubtful; |
uttarottarajñānānubhāve cānavasthā / | (2) as it would involve cognition after cognition, there would be an infinite regress; |
na hyavyaktavyaktiko viṣayaḥ siddhyet / | (3) there would be no ‘object’ whose appearance had not become manifested; |
tataścaikaviṣayasiddhyarthaṃ jñānaparamparāmanusarataḥ sakalam eva puruṣāyuṣamupayujyeta / | hence, for the establishing of one ‘object’, it would be necessary to carry on a series of Cognitions, which would take up the entire life of a man. |
athāpi kiñcijjñānamanavasthābhayāt saṃviditarūpam evotpadyata iti / tathā tenaivodayavyayadharmakatvādīnāṃ hetūnām anaikāntikatā / | If for fear of the ‘infinite regress’, some one cognition were accepted as appearing by itself, then that one case would render doubtful and inconclusive the whole set of Reasons cited, in the form ‘being liable to appearance and disappearance’ and the rest. |
tadvadevānyeṣām api jñānāṃ svasaṃvedanatvābhyupagame kaḥ pradveṣaḥ / atha tadasaṃviditarūpameveṣyate / | Further, in that case, why should there be any aversion to the acceptance of the ‘self-eognisability’ of other cognitions also, on the basis of that said one cognition? If (in order to avoid this difficulty) it be held that the said one cognition is one whose form is not cognised at all; |
evam api tadasiddhau sarveṣāṃ pūrvajñānānām aprasiddhiranabhivyaktavyaktikatvāt / | even so, that cognition not being ‘un-proven’, the entire set of cognitions preceding it would be ‘not proven’, having their appearance not manifested; |
tataś ca viṣayo 'pi na prasiddhyet / | and as a consequence of this, the object (of cognition) also would be ‘not proven’. |
yeṣāṃ tu vijñānavādināṃ mataṃ sarvam eva jñānaṃ grāhyagrāhakavaidhuryāt svayam eva prakāśate na tu jñānāntareṇa vedyata iti tān prati sādhyavikalatā doṣo 'kampya eva / | Further, as regards the opinion of the Idealists, under which all Cognitions are self-manifested, on account of their being no ‘Cogniser’ of Cognisable things, and are not manifested by any other Cognition, the defect in the Opponent’s reasoning, of ‘being devoid of the Probandum’ would remain absolutely unshaken. |
evam anyeṣvapi kāraṇāyattajanmavattvādiṣu sādhaneṣu siddhasādhyatādidoṣā vācyāḥ yaccāpi sadādītyādi dharmiviśeṣaṇaṃ kṛtaṃ tatpūrvavadanarthakaṃ nahyasya prastutasādhyasiddhāvaṅgabhāvo 'sti / | In the same manner it may be pointed out that the other reasons ‘having its birth dependent upon Causes’ and the rest, are open to the objection of being ‘Futile’ and so forth. [In the opening lines of the Commentary on 171-176, above, it has been asserted by the Naiyāyika that “all particular cognitions of such cognisables as are the objects of Being, etc. etc.”]; herein the qualification that has been added to the subject of the Reasoning, is, as before, absolutely useless; |
[p.84] tathā hi etāvata kiṃ na gatam madīyāḥ pratyakṣādipratyayā madīyaśarīrādivyatiriktasaṃvedakasaṃvedyā iti / | Because what is there that does not become included under the subject thus qualified? since all my perceptional and other cognitions are declared to be apprehended by a cogniser other than the Body, sense-organs and the rest. |
pratyakṣānumānādipravibhāgenāpi dharmiprabhedo 'narthaka eva madīyāḥ pratyayā ityetāvataiva gatatvāt / na cāpi prativādino yathoktaviśeṣaṇaviśiṣṭo dharmī siddha ityāśrayāsiddhatā ca hetūnām / | Even if a distinction were made on the basis of some cognitions being ‘perceptional’ and some ‘inferential’ and so on, any distinction in regard to the Subject itself would be useless; as all cognitions would have become included under the term ‘my cognitions’, Nor even for the opposite party is any such qualified Subject known; hence the Reasons put forward are devoid of a substratum. |
athāpi viphalaṃ viśeṣaṇamupādāya tat sādhanārtham anyadeva sādhanam ucyate / tathā sati prakṛtādarthād aprakṛtsambaddhārthamarthāntaraṃ nigrahasthānaṃ bhavet // | If it is the case that by setting up a useless qualification, another reason is put forward for the proving of the said substratum, then the reasoner becomes subject to the ‘Clincher’ of ‘Arthāntara’, ‘Irrelevancy’ by reason of setting up something entirely unconnected with the thing under consideration. |
kvacitsamāśritatvaṃ ca yadīcchādeḥ prasādhyate / tatra kāraṇamātraṃ cedāśrayaḥ parikalpyate // | If (by the argument set forth under text 178), it is sought to be proved that desire and the rest must subsist somewhere, and that the ‘cause’ only can be such a substratum, you seek to prove what is already accepted by us. |
iṣṭasiddhis tadādhārastvāśrayaścen matastava / tathāpi gatiśūnyasya niṣphalādhārakalpanā // | if however it is the receptacle (or container) that is meant by you to be the ‘substratum’ (of desire, etc.), then also the assuming of a ‘receptacle’ for what is immobile is absolutely useless. |
yaccoktam icchādayaścetyādi tatra yadi kāraṇamātramāśraya icchādīnāṃ sādhyate tadā siddhasādhyatā na hi niṣkāraṇā icchādayo 'smābhiriṣyante / | if, by this, all that is meant to be proved is that only the Cause is the substratum of Desire, etc., then the effort is futile; because we also do not regard Desire, etc. to be without cause; |
caturbhiścittacaittā hīti vacanāt / parikalpyata iti / varṇyata ity arthaḥ / | as is clear from our declaration that ‘the mind and the mental phenomena are brought about by four etc.’, ‘Parihalpyate’ asserted, meant. |
athādhāralakṣaṇa āśrayaḥ sādhyate tadāpi pratijñārthasyānumānabādhitatvān na tena hetor vyāptiḥ siddhyatīti darśayati tadādhāra ityādi / | If the ‘substratum’ you seek to prove is in the form of a ‘container’ (Receptacle), then what is asserted being annulled by Inference, there can be no invariable concomitance between that and the Probans put forward. |
teṣām icchādīnām ādhārastadādhāraḥ / mūrtānāṃ hi bhāvānāṃ prasarpaṇadharmāṇāṃ syād adhaḥpātapratibandhādādhārakalpanā / | This is what is shown by the words ‘If however it is the Receptacle, etc.,’ i.e. the receptacle of the Desire, etc. It might be possible to postulate such a ‘Receptacle’ for things with material forms, which are capable of moving about, for whom the ‘Receptacle’ would save them from falling down; |
ye tu sukhādayo gatiśūnyās teṣām adhaḥpatanāsambhavāt kiṃkurvannātmādirādhāraḥ syāt //191- | those things however which, like Pleasure and the rest, are immobile (and immaterial) can never fall down, and under the circumstances, what would any such thing as the ‘Soul’do for them, whereby it would be their ‘receptacle’? (191-192) |
nanu yathā ghaṭādayo badarādīnām akiñcitkarā apyādhārās tadvadātmā sukhādīnām ādhāro bhaviṣyatītyāha āśraya ityādi / | Objection “When the Jujube-fruit and other things are placed in such receptacles as the jar and the like, even though these latter do not do anything for the fruits, yet they serve as their ‘receptacle’ (container); in the same manner the Soul would be the ‘receptacle’ of Pleasure, etc.” |
āśrayo badarādīnāṃ kuṇḍādirupapadyate / gater vibandhakaraṇād viśeṣotpādanena vā // | The pit and other things can be the ‘receptacle’ of the jujube fruit and other things, because they serve to obstruct their movement, or because they bring about specific changes. |
gater bandhakaraṇād ityakṣaṇikapakṣe / | ‘Because they serve to obstruct their movement’; this is in accordance with the view that things are not momentary; |
viśeṣotpādanena veti kṣaṇikapakṣe / upādānakāraṇasamānadeśotpādanaṃ tat / | ‘because they bring about specific changes’, this is in accordance with the view that things are momentary; as the ‘changes’ meant here are those that are brought about on the same spot where the constituent cause existed. |
ayaṃ dvividho 'pi prakāra icchādīnāṃ na sambhavatīti na teṣāṃ kaścidādhāro yuktaḥ // | Both these kinds of ‘receptacle’ are impossible in the case of Desire and the rest; hence there can be no ‘receptacle’ for these. |
yaccāpi vastutve satīti viśeṣaṇaṃ tadanarthakameva vyavacchedyābhāvād iti darśayannāha nīrūpasyetyādi / | hence the qualification mentioned in the reasoning of the other party is entirely useless. Under the argument urged above (in Text 178) the phrase ‘while being entities’ has been introduced as a qualification; |
nīrūpasya ca nāśasya kāryatvaṃ naiva yuktimat / | this qualification is absolutely useless; as there is nothing that it can serve to exclude. |
ato viśeṣaṇaṃ vyarthaṃ hetāvuktaṃ parair iha // | This is what is pointed -out in the following Text: [see verse 194 above] |
[p.85] yadi hi vināśasya kāryatvaṃ sambhavet tadā tadvyavacchedāya vastutve satītiviśeṣaṇaṃ sārthakaṃ bhavet / | If Destruction could be of the nature of a ‘Product’, then the qualification ‘being an entity’ would serve the purpose of excluding that; |
yāvatā tasyāvastutayā hetubhir na kiñcitkriyata iti kathaṃ hetumattā bhavet / prayogaḥ yadavastu na tat kasyacitkāryam yathā śaśaviṣāṇam / | as a matter of fact however, as it is a non-entity, causes cannot do anything to it; how then could it have a Cause? This reasoning may be formulated as follows: That which is a non-entity cannot be the product of anything, e.g, the ‘Hare’s Horns’, Destruction is a non-entity; |
kāryatve sati vastutvaprasaṅgaḥ sukhādivad itīdamatra bādhakaṃ pramāṇam / | hence to speak of it as having a cause would be contrary to the said universal proposition If it were a ‘product’, it would be an ‘entity’, like Pleasure, etc. |
kiñcābhyupagamavirodho bhavatām / | This would be an argument against the reasoning of the other party. |
tathā hi kāryamityātmalābhākhyātsvakāraṇasamavāyāt sattāsamavāyād bābhidhānapratyayau bhavataḥ / | For instance, the name and the idea of ‘Product’ is due (a) to its acquiring its character, or (b) to its subsistence (manifestation) in its Material Cause, or (c) to the subsistence therein of ‘Being’ (existence); |
na ca vināśasya dravyādisvabhāvarahitasya svakāraṇe samavāyo 'sti / | Destruction is not possessed of the character of Substance, etc., hence it cannot subsist in its Material Cause; |
tasya nīrūpatvāt / | nor, for the same reason, can ‘Being’ (Existence) subsist in it (Destruction), for the simple reason that it has no form (wherein the Existence could subsist). |
anyathā hyasau dravyādividāśrito 'pi syād vastu ceti na hetuviśeṣaṇena vyavacchedyo bhavet / | If it were otherwise, then, like Substance, etc., it would also be ‘contained’ in a receptacle, and be an ‘Entity’ also; and as such, it could not be excluded by the qualification in question; |
ato vastutve satīti viśeṣaṇaṃ vyartham // | hence this qualification ‘being entities’ is absolutely useless. |
rūpādipratyayā ityādāvāha mayetyādi / mayeti pratisandhānamavidyopaplavādidam / | The ‘recalling’ of such notions as ‘by me (seen, heard)’, etc. must be due to perturbations of ignorance; |
kṣaṇikeṣvapi sarveṣu kartrekatvādibhāsataḥ // | as such notions of the one-ness of the agent (perceiver) are found to appear also in connection with all momentary things. |
mithyāvikalpataścāsmān na yuktā tattvasaṃsthitiḥ / | from this false assumption, it cannot be right to deduce any conclusion regarding the true state of things; |
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