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rājīvakesarādīnāṃ vaicitryakaḥ karoti hi / mayūracandrakādir vā vicitraḥ kena nirmitaḥ // | “Who makes the diversity in the lotus and its filaments, eto.? by whom too have the variegated wings of the peacock and such things been created?” (111) |
rājīvam padmam tasya kesarādaya iti vigrahaḥ / | ‘Rājīva’ is Lotus; the ‘filaments, etc.’ of the Lotus. Such is the analysis of the compound; |
ādigrahaṇānnāladalakarṇikādīnāṃ kaṇṭakataikṣṇyādīnāṃ ca grahaṇam / | ‘Et cetera’ is meant to include the Stalk, the Petals, the Pericarp and other parts, also the sharpness of thorns and the like. |
vaicitryam iti / | ‘Diversity’; |
saṃsthānavarṇakārkaśyādibhedam / kaḥ karotīti / naiva kaścit / īśvarādeḥ kāraṇasyānupalabhyamānatvād iti bhāvaḥ // | such diversities as those of shape, colour, hardness and the like ‘Who makes?’ The sense is that no one makes it, since we do not find any such ‘cause’ as God and the like. |
syād etat yadi nāma bāhyānāṃ bhāvānāṃ kāraṇānupalabdher ahetutvaṃ siddham ādhyātmikānāṃ tu kathaṃ siddham ity āha yathaivetyādi / | The following might be urged “Even if it be regarded as proved that external things are without ‘cause’, because no such cause is perceived, how can it be taken as proved in regard to internal things?” |
yathaiva kaṇṭakādīnāṃ taikṣṇyādikamahetukam / | The answer to this is provided by the following Text: [see verse 112 above] |
[p.63] yadi nāma pratyakṣato nirhetukatvaṃ duḥkhādīnāṃ na siddhaṃ tathāpyanumānataḥ siddhameva / | “Even though the fact of Pain and other internal things being without muse is not proved by Perception, yet it is clearly proved by Inference. |
tathā hi yatkādācitkaṃ tadahetukaṃ niścitaṃ yathā kaṇṭakataikṣṇyādi kādācitkaṃ ca duḥkhādīnīti svabhāvahetuḥ / | For instance, what appears only at certain times is definitely known to be without cause, e.g. the Sharpness of the Thorn and such things; Pain and such internal things appear only at certain times; hence this is a Reason based upon the nature of things. |
na cāpi yasya bhāvābhāvayoryasya bhāvābhāvau niyamena bhavataḥ tat tasya kāraṇam iti yuktam vyabhicārāt / | Nor is it right to hold that when a certain thing is present or absent when another thing is present or absent, then the latter should be regarded as the ‘Cause’ of the former; as this is not found to be always true; |
tathā hi sati sparśe cakṣurvijñānaṃ bhavatyasati ca na bhavati / | for instance, Visual perception is present when there is Touch (in the object perceived), and is absent when there is no Touch; |
atha ca nāsau cakṣurvijñānakāraṇam / | and yet Touch is not the ‘Cause’ of Visual perception. |
tasmātkāryakāraṇabhāvalakṣaṇametadvyabhicārītyataḥ siddhaṃ sarvahetunirāśaṃsaṃ bhāvānāṃ janmeti // sarojakesarādīnām ityādinā pratividhatte / | Hence the said definition of the causal relation cannot be true. From all this it follows that ‘the origination of all things is independent of all causes’,” (112) The Author answers the above arguments of the upholder of the ‘Thing by Itself’ with the following Texts: [see verse 113 next] |
sarojakesarādīnām anvayavyatirekavat / avasthātiśayākrāntaṃ bījapaṅkajalādikam // pratyakṣānupalambhābhyāṃ niścitaṃ kāraṇaṃ yadā / | As regards the lotus and its filaments, etc., it is definitely ascertained through perception and non-apprehension that they have their ‘ cause ’ in the seed, clay, water and the rest under certain peculiar conditions, with which latter they are positively and negatively concomitant ; |
kimityanyas tadā heturamīṣāṃ paripṛcchyate // | such being the case, what other ‘ cause ’ can there be of those, which you are asking about ? (113-114) |
anena hetor asiddhiṃ pratyakṣavirodhaṃ ca pratijñārthasya darśayati / | By this Text, the Author shows that the Reason adduced by the other party is ‘unproven’ and ‘inadmissible’, and the conclusion put forward is contrary to perceived facts. |
yaduktaṃ rājīvakesarādīnāṃ kāraṇaṃ nopalabhyata iti tadasiddham pratyakṣānupalambhābhyāṃ bījapaṅkajalāder anvayavyatirekataḥ kāraṇatvena niścitatvāt / | It has been asserted (under Text 111) that “of such things as the Lotus, its Filaments and the like, no Cause is perceived This is ‘not admitted’; as through Perception and Non-apprehension, such ‘Cause’ is definitely cognised to consist in the Seed, Clay, Water and such things, with which the said things are positively and negatively concomitant. |
tathā hi yasminsatyeva yasya janma bhavati yasya ca vikārādyasya vikāras tat tasya kāraṇam ucyate / | when it is found that a certain thing is produced only when another thing is present, and it becomes modified by the modifications of this latter, then this latter thing is said to be the ‘Cause’ of the former thing. |
taccaivambhūtaṃ bījādikamucchūnādiviśiṣṭāvasthāprāptaṃ niścitamityasiddho hetuḥ / yaccāpyuktaṃ kāryakāraṇalakṣaṇaṃ vyabhicārīti tadasiddham / | that these are the ‘Cause’ of the Lotus, etc. is definitely ascertained through Perception and Non-apprehension. Thus the Reason (Premiss) put forward by the other party is ‘inadmissible’, not true. Then again, it has been urged that “the definition of ‘Causal Relation’ is not true (fallible) This Reason also is ‘unproven’, not admissible; |
sparśasyāpi rūpahetutayā cakṣurvijñāne 'pi nimittabhāvasyeṣṭatvāt / | as, in the instance cited, as Touch also is a cause of Colour, it is admitted to be the cause of Visual Cognition also. |
tathā hi sparśa iti bhūtānyucyante / | To explain, the term ‘touch’ (in this connection) stands for the material substance; |
tāni copādāyopādāya rūpaṃ vartate tataścakṣurvijñānaṃ prati sparśasya nimittabhāvo 'styeva / | and it is only by associating with these substances that Colour subsists; hence in regard to Visual Cognition, Touch does serve as a ‘Cause’; |
kevalaṃ sākṣātpāramparyakṛto viśeṣaḥ / | the only difference is that while one (Colour) is a direct cause, the other (Touch) is only an indirect one. |
na cāpi vyatirekamātramasmābhiḥ kāryakāraṇabhāvaniścayahetutvenābhyupagamāt / | Further, mere negation (Absence) is not regarded by us as determining the causal relation; |
kiṃ tarhi / viśiṣṭam eva / | “what then?” It is a particular kind of absence that is so regarded; |
tathā hi yeṣu satsu samartheṣu tadanyeṣu hetuṣu yasyaikasyābhāvād yan na bhavati tat tasya kāraṇam iti varṇyate / | for instance, when it is found that, even though other efficient agents are present, yet in the absence of some one agent, the thing in question is not produced, then this latter agent is regarded as the ‘Cause’ of that thing; |
na tu yasyābhāve yan na bhavatīti vyatirekamātram / anyathā mātṛvivāhocitadeśajanmanaḥ / piṇḍakharjūrasya mātṛvivāhābhāve satyabhāvaprasaṅgāt / | and not when there is simple negation in the form that ‘it is not produced while the other is absent’, Otherwise (if such mere negation were to determine the causal relation) the Date growing in the country where one’s mother may have been married would not be produced if the mother’s marriage had not been there [as ex hypothesi, by mere negation the ‘Mother’s Marriage’ would be the ‘Cause’ of the growth of the Date]. |
na caivambhūtasya vyatirekasya sparśena vyabhicāro 'sti / | The negative Premiss in the qualified form that we have shown is not ‘fallible’ (untrue) in regard to Touch. |
tathā hi yadi rūpādisannidhānaṃ pradarśya sparśasyaikasyābhāvāccakṣur vijñānaṃ na bhavatītyeva pradarśyeta tadā syādvyabhicāro na caitacchakyaṃ pradarśayitum / | For, if it could be shown that, even in the presence of Colour and other conditions (of visibility), there is no Visual Cognition on account of the absence of Touch alone, then there might be ‘fallibility’ in our premiss. Nothing like this however can be shown. |
[p.64] ato nāsti kāryakāraṇabhāvalakṣaṇasya vyabhicāraḥ //113- | Hence there can be no ‘fallibility’ in the definition of the ‘Causal Relation’ (as stated by us). |
niyatau deśakālau ca bhāvānāṃ bhavataḥ katham / | Particular points of place and time also are related (as cause) to things. |
yadi taddhetutā naiṣāṃ syus te sarvatra sarvadā // | “how so?” if the said points were not the cause of things, these would be produced everywhere and at all times. |
kvacit kadācitkasmiṃśidbhavanto niyatāḥ punaḥ / tatsāpekṣā bhavantyete tadanyaparihārataḥ // | As a matter of fact however things are found to be produced specifically at a certain place, at a certain time and in certain receptacles, being dependent upon these and independent of all others. |
yadi hi rājīvādīnāṃ taddhetutā pratiniyatadeśakālahetutā na syāt tadā yeyam upalādideśaparihāreṇa salilādāveva pratiniyatadeśe vṛttiḥ yā ca śiśirādisamayaparihāreṇa nidāghādisamaye vṛttiḥ sā na prāpnoti / | If the Lotus, etc. did not have them i.e. the particular points of place and time, for their ‘Cause’, then such phenomena as their production only in a particular Place, like Water and things like it, and not in other places like Stone, and only at the particular point of time like the Summer, and not at other points of time like the Winter, would not be possible; |
kiṃ tu sarvatra deśe kāle ca te rājīvādayo bhāvā bhaveyus tannirapekṣatvāt / | in fact, the Lotus and other things would come into existence at all places and at all times, as they would be independent of the peculiarities of place and time. |
tadanyadeśakālaparihārānniyamena pratiniyatadeśādau vartamānās tatsāpekṣā bhavantīti niścīyate //115- | It is clearly recognised therefore that they are dependent upon these latter, from the fact that they avoid certain places and times and appear only at special places and at special times. |
tadapekṣā tathāvṛttirapekṣā kāryatocyate / pratyakṣā ca tathā vṛttiḥ siddhās teneha hetavaḥ // | so that it is the character of ‘effect’ that is spoken of as ‘dependence that things come into existence in that manner is a perceptible fact; hence the said causes become duly established. |
tadanyadeśādiparihāreṇa niyate deśādau yā vṛttir iyamevāpekṣetyucyate / | What is meant by the Things being so ‘dependent’ is that they come into existence at particular places and times and not at others; |
natvabhiprāyātmikā / | it does not mean that they have any ‘wish’ or ‘desire’, |
syād etadyadi nāma tadapekṣā teṣām tathāpi tatkāryatā katham avasitetyāha apekṣā kāryatocyata iti / | Objection: “If such is their dependence on the particular points of time and place, even so, how does it follow that they are effects of these?” |
na hyanyā tatkāryatā kiṃ tarhi / yeyaṃ tathāvṛttilakṣaṇāpekṣā saiva tatkāryatocyate / | Answer: It is the character of ‘Effect’ that is spoken of as ‘dependence The character of the Effect is not anything else except the dependence involved in the fact that they come into existence in that particular manner. |
sā ca tathāvṛttir eṣāṃ kathaṃ siddheti cedāha pratyakṣetyādi // | Question: “How is it known that they come into existence in that particular manner?” Answer: It is a perceptible fact. |
tatsvābhāvikavādo 'yaṃ pratyakṣeṇa prabādhyate / | Thus the doctrine of the ‘thing by itself’ is discarded by perception; |
pratyakṣānupalambhābhyāṃ heturūpasya niścayāt // | specially as the exact nature of the ‘cause5 of things is duly ascertained through perception and non-apprehension. |
taditi / tasmāt / | ‘Tat’ Therefore, thus; |
teṣu vā rājīvādiṣu svābhāvikavāda iti samāsaḥ / | or the whole expression ‘Tatsvābhāvikavādaḥ’ may be taken as a compound, meaning ‘The doctrine of the Thing by Itself in regard to the Lotus and other things’; |
pratyakṣeṇa prabādhyata iti / | is discarded by Perception; |
anupalambhasyāpyanyopalambhanatayā pratyakṣātmakatvāt / yatpunaḥ sukhādīnām ahetukatvasādhanāya kādācitkatvād iti sādhanam uktaṃ tat sādhyaviparītasādhanād viruddham / | Perception alone is mentioned here, as the ‘non-apprehension’ also of a certain thing consists only in the ‘apprehension’ of something else, and as such, is of the nature of ‘Perception’. It has been sought (under Text 112, above) to prove that “Pleasure and such internal things can have no Cause because they appear only occasionally This reasoning however is ‘contradictory’, inasmuch as it proves only the contrary of what is desired to prove; |
aheturanapekṣasya kādācitkatvānupapatteḥ / | because what has no cause and what is not dependent upon anything else cannot be ‘occasional’, appearing only at certain times and places. |
dṛṣṭāntasya ca sādhyavikalateti bhāvaḥ // | What is meant is that the Corroborative Instance cited is devoid of the character desired to be proved. |
evaṃ tāvat pratyakṣaviruddhatvaṃ pratijñārthasya hetoścāsiddhatodbhāvitā / sāmpratamabhyupagamyahetoḥ siddhimanaikāntikatvaṃ pratipādayann āha mā vetyādi / | Thus it has been shown that the conclusion (of the other party) is contrary to facts of Perception and that their Reason is ‘unproven, Inadmissible’; now the Author takes for granted (for the sake of argument) the ‘admissibility’ of the Reason, and then proceeds to show its ‘Inconclusiveness’ in the following Text: [see verse 119 above] |
yadyanupalambhamātraṃ hetutvenopādīyate tadānaikāntikatā / yato mānābhāvena pramāṇābhāvamātreṇa hetunā naivārthasattāyā abhāvaniścayaḥ // | If mere ‘Non-apprehension’ is put forward as the reason for the nonexistence of the Cause, then it is ‘Inconclusive’; because mere absence of proof i.e. mere absence of a valid means of knowing, cannot serve as a reason for establishing the non-existence of the thing concerned. |
kasmān na bhavatīty āha yasmād ityādi / | Question: “Why cannot it be a proof?” The answer is provided in the following Text: [see verse 120 next] |
yasmād arthasya sattāyā vyāpakaṃ na ca kāraṇam / pramāṇaṃ bhedasadbhāvād vyabhicārāt tadudbhavāt // | Inasmuch as ‘proof’ (means of cognition) is not pervasive of the ‘existence of the thing’; nor is it its ‘cause’, (a) because there is difference, (b) because there is non-concomitance, and (c) because it proceeds from that, [mere absence of proof cannot prove the non-existence of a thing]. |
vyāpako hi svabhāvo nivartamānaḥ svaṃ vyāpyaṃ nivartayati kāraṇaṃ vā karyam / tatra tādātmyatadutpattibhyāṃ vyāpyakāryayoḥ pratibaddhatvāt / | similarly the absence of the Cause implies the absence of the effect; and the reason for this lies in the fact that the less extensive is invariably concomitant with the more extensive one, because of the two being of the same essence, and the effect is invariably concomitant with the Cause, being produced by this latter. |
na ca pramāṇārthasattayor abhedo bhinnābhāsatvāt / nāpi pramāṇam arthasya kāraṇaṃ vyabhicārāt / | In the case of ‘Proof’ and ‘non-existence of a Thing’ there can be no co-essentiality, as the two actually appear to be distinct; nor can Proof be the ‘cause’ of the Thing, as there is no concomitance between them; |
pramāṇam antareṇāpi bhāvāt / | the Thing existing even when the Proof is not there. |
tathā hi deśakālasvabhāvaviprakṛṣṭānam arthānāṃ pramāṇenāviṣayīkṛtānām api sattvamaviruddham eva / | For instance, there is nothing incongruous in admitting the existence of Things which are far removed in space and time and character and hence are not within reach of any Proof (Means of Cognition); |
na ca yena vināpi yadbhavati tat tasya kāraṇaṃ yuktam atiprasaṅgāt / | and when a thing can be there even during the absence of another thing, the latter cannot be regarded as the Cause of the former; |
kāraṇatvābhyupagame vā svapakṣaparityāgaḥ / | In fact, if the other party were to regard this as a ‘Cause’, he would renounce his own position. |
tadudbhavāc ca na pramāṇam arthasattākāraṇam / | Also because it proceeds from that, Proof cannot be the ‘Cause’ of the Existence of Things. |
tathā hi arthādeva viṣayabhūtātpramāṇamudbhavati / | That is, the Proof arises out of the Thing itself which forms its objective; |
na punaḥ pramāṇātprameyo 'rthaḥ // | and the cognisable Thing does not arise out of the Proof. |
yaśca naivaṃvidho bhāvas tasya naiva nivṛttitaḥ / | When a thing is neither the one nor the other, its absence does not conclusively preclude the other thing; |
naivaṃvidha iti / | because there is no connection. |
na kāraṇaṃ nāpi vyāpakam / | Neither the one nor the other, i.e. neither the Cause, nor pervasive; |
na hyapratibaddhasya nivṛttyānyasya niyamena nivṛttir yuktā atiprasaṅgāt / | the absence of what is not invariably concomitant cannot rightly be taken as necessarily precluding the other thing; |
evaṃ hyaśvanivṛttau gorapi nivṛttiḥ syāt // | for if it did, it would lead to an absurdity: the absence of the Horse might, in that case, imply the absence of the Cow also. |
sarvādṛṣṭiś ca sandigdhā svādṛṣṭir vyabhicāriṇī / | ‘Non-perception’ by all persons is doubtful; ‘non-perception’ by any one person himself is inconclusive; |
vindhyādrirandhradūrvāder adṛṣṭāvapi satvataḥ // | as it is found that the grass and other things growing in the caves of the vindhya mountain do exist, even though they are not perceived. |
api cānupalabdher hetutvenopādīyamānā sarvapuruṣopalambhanivṛttilakṣaṇā vopadīyate / svopalambhanivṛttilakṣaṇā vā / | Further, when ‘non-apprehension’ is put forward as the Reason (for non-existence), is it put forward in the form of the absence of perception by all men? Or of the absence of perception of any one person himself? It cannot be the former; |
na tāvadādyā tasyā arvāgdarśanena niścetumaśakyatayā saṃdigdhatvāt / [p.66] nahi sarvaiḥ puruṣair mayūracandrikādīnām adṛṣṭaṃ kāraṇaṃ nopalabhyata ityatrārvāgdarśinaḥ kiñcidasti pramāṇam / | because ordinary men with limited powers of perception can never be sure of any thing being not perceived, by all men; hence it must be always doubtful. People of limited vision have no means of knowing that no man has the perception of an unseen cause for such things as the marks on the wings of the Peacock. |
girikuharāntargatasya dūrvāpravalaśilāśakalāder anupalabdhasyāpi satvataḥ satvāvirodhādity arthaḥ / | As for any single man’s own non-perception, that can never be conclusive: why? because even though such things as the grass, the coral, the pebbles and the like growing in mountain-caves are not perceived, yet they do exist; |
tan na niścitamevāsattvaṃ saṃdehāt // | that is, there is nothing incongruous in regarding them as existent. |
ahetukatvasiddhyarthaṃ na ceddhetuḥ prayujyate / na cāpramāṇikī siddhirataḥ pakṣo na siddhyati // | If no reason is adduced to prove the fact of things having no cause, then, inasmuch nothing can be proved without reason, your theory is not proved. |
tatsiddhaye ca hetuścetprayujyeta tathāpi na / siddhes taddhetujanyatvāt pakṣas te samprasiddhyati // | if, on the other hand, you do adduce a reason proving it, then also your theory is not proved, as the proving itself would be produced by the proof adduced [which would therefore be the cause of the proving]. |
api caivaṃ bhavān paryanuyojyaḥ / kiṃ nirhetukā bhāvā ityasya svapakṣasya siddhaye bhavatā hetuḥ kaścid upādīyate āhosvin na / | Further, you have to be asked the following question: In support of your conclusion that “Things have no Cause”, do you adopt any Reason, or not? If you do not adopt it, then your view does not become proved; |
na hi pramāṇamantareṇārthasya siddhir asti / | as there can be no proving of anything without adequate proof (means of cognition). |
athopādīyate tathāpi na hi pakṣas te samprasiddhyatīti vakṣyamāṇena sambandhaḥ / | If, on the other hand, you do adopt a Reason, even then, your view cannot he proved; |
kasmāt / siddhes taddhetujanyatvāt prameyārthaviṣayāyāḥ siddher niścayasya tena hetunā janyamānatvāt / | [such is the construction of the words of the Text], “Why so?” Because the ‘proving’ itself would be produced by the Proof adduced. |
tathā coktamācāryasūripādaiḥ / na heturastīti vadan sahetukaṃ nanu pratijñāṃ svayam eva sādayet / | This is what has been thus declared by the revered Ācāryca Sūri ‘One who declares that there is no Cause would demolish his own conclusion if he adduced any reasons in support of his assertion; |
athāpi hetuḥ praṇayālaso bhavet pratijñayā kevalayāsya kiṃ bhavet iti //123- | on the other hand, if he were slow to adduce reasons, what could be gained by mere assertion?’ (123-124) |
syād etat jñāpako hetur mayā prayujyate na kārakaḥ / | The following might be urged: “The Reason that I adduce is indicative, not productive; |
tatkasmāt pakṣo me na sidhyatītyāha tathā hītyādi / | why then should my conclusion not be proved?” The answer to this is provided by the following text: [see verse 125 above] |
jñāpako hetur iti / trirūpaṃ liṅgaṃ svārthānumānakāle / | The indicative Probans i.e. the Probans fulfilling the three conditions, as conceived by the Reasoner for his own benefit; |
vaco veti / parārthānumānakāle / tatprakāśakam iti / | or in the form of words, when the same Probans is asserted for the benefit of some one else, expressive of that i.e. of the Probans. |
tasya hetoḥ prakāśakam / siddher iti / prameyārthaniścayasya / | Cause of the proving, i.e. of the bringing about of the definite cognition of the object to be cognised. |
anyathā yadi siddher api nimittabhāvaṃ na yāyāt tadā kathaṃ na jñāpakaṃ bhavet / | If it were otherwise, and the Probans or Reason did not serve as the ‘Cause’ of the said proving, then, how could it he regarded as an ‘indicative’? In fact, in this way, everything would be ‘indicative’ of every thing else. |
evaṃ hi sarvaṃ sarvasya jñāpakaṃ prasajyate // | Thus it is really the ‘productive’ cause which is spoken of as ‘indicative’; |
yadyevaṃ katham ayam ācāryair vibhāgaḥ kārakājjñāpakasya kriyate/ | Question “If this is so, then how do the Teachers make the distinction between the Indicative and the Productive?” |
atra ca jñānavaśād arthanirdeśo notpādakavadbhūtārthavaśād ity āha ataḥ kāraka evāyaṃ jñāpako hetur ucyate / | The answer given in the following text is that the ‘Indicative’ is so called because it makes the thing known, and what is called ‘productive’ is that which actually brings into existence the thing concerned: [see verse 126 above] |
sādhyānutpādakatvāt tu kārako na prakāśyate // sādhyānutpādakatvād asau jñāpaka ucyate na kāraka iti yastu sādhyasyāṅkurāder utpādakaḥ sa kāraka ucyata ityadoṣaḥ / | It is called ‘Indicative’, and not ‘Productive because it does not actually produce what is desired to be accomplished; while that which actually produces what is desired to be accomplished, such as the Sprout and the like, is called ‘Productive Hence there is nothing wrong in the distinction that has been made. |
[p.67] etena sarveṇa yadācāryasūryuktadūṣaṇasyoparicodyamāpatati tat prativihitaṃ bhavati / | This answers all the objections that may be urged against the declaration of Ācārya Sūri. |
na heturastīti sahetukaṃ vadannapi kimiti pratijñāṃ sādayet / sa hi jñāpakaṃ hetuṃ brūte kārakaṃ tu pratikṣipatīti / | For instance, the following is an objection that may be raised “Even when asserting with Reason that there is no Cause, why should one demolish his own conclusion? As what he asserts is an Indicative Reason, while what he denies is the Productive Cause”. |
tadatrottaram jñāpako 'pi kāraka eva jñānahetutvād iti / | The answer to this is as follows: The Indicative Reason also is a Productive Cause, because it produces the cognition of the thing. |
etena svavacanavirodha udbhāvyate / | This urges against the other party the fact of his assertions being self-contradictory. |
na tvahetutvasādhakaḥ kaściddheturasti vyāpteḥ pratyakṣādibādhitatvāt // tasmādityādinopasaṃhāravyājenānumānabādhitatvaṃ ca pratijñārthasya darśayati | In fact, there can be no Reason that could prove the absence of all Cause, because such a proposition would be clearly one that is contrary to, and set aside by, sense-perception and the rest. From all this it follows that other things also have their ‘causes’, as their production is restricted, just like your cognition of the probandum appearing when the probans is there. |
tasmāt sahetavo 'nyo 'pi bhāvā niyatajanmanaḥ / | As their production is restricted; i.e. they are produced only when certain particular things are there. |
sādhyārthaviṣayaṃ yadvajjñānaṃ sādhanabhāvi te // | The argument may be formulated as follows: Those things whose production is restricted to occasions when certain other things are there must be regarded as with Cause, as for instance, your own cognition of the Probandum (desired to be proved) which appears only when the Probans (Reason) is there; |
anye 'pīti / | the same is the case with the Lotus and otherngs; |
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