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Dharmamitra 43

tadetad ayuktaṃ /

This however is not correct.

vyakter asiddhatvāt tathā hi vyaktiḥ svabhāvātiśayotpattir vā bhavet yad vā tadviṣayaṃ jñānaṃ tadupalambhāvaraṇāpagamo vā /

Because manifestation is not established - for manifestation would have to be either the production of a distinctive nature, or the cognition of that [nature], or the removal of what obstructs the apprehension of that [nature].

tatra tāvat svabhāvātiśayotpattiḥ /

[Let us consider] first the production of a peculiarity in [its] nature.

tathā hi asau svabhāvātiśayo niścayasvarūpādapṛthagbhūto vā pṛghagbhūtovā /

For this peculiarity in nature must either be non-distinct from the essential nature of the definite cognition or distinct [from it].

yadyapṛthagbhūtas tadā tasya niścayādavibhāgād apṛthaktvānniścayasvarūpavat sarvadaivāvasthiter notpattir yuktā /

If it is non-distinct, then due to [its] non-differentiation from the definite cognition [and] due to [its] non-distinctness, it would persist forever like the essential nature of the definite cognition [itself], [and thus] the production [of such a peculiarity] would not be logical.

atha pṛthagbhūtaḥ evam api tasyāsāvitī sambandhānupapattiḥ /

If, on the other hand, it is distinct, even then the relation [expressed as] "this [peculiarity] belongs to that" would not be possible.

tathā hi ādhārādheyalakṣaṇo vā sambandho bhavet janyajanakabhāvalakṣaṇo vā /

For such a relation would have to be either of the nature of container-contained or of the nature of producer-produced.

na tāvadādyāḥ parasparānupakāryopakārakayos tadasambhavāt /

The first [type of relation] is not [possible], because it cannot exist between two things that do not mutually help each other.

upakāre vā tasyāpyupakārasya vyatirekitve sambandhāsiddher anavasthāprasaṅgāt /

And if there were help, [and] if that help were distinct [from them], there would be an infinite regress because the relation would not be established.

avyatirekitve ca sādhanaprayogavaiyarthyaṃ /

And if [the help] were non-distinct, the application of the means [of proof] would be pointless.

niścayād evopakārāvyatiriktasyātiśayasyotpatteḥ /

Because the peculiarity, which is non-distinct from the help, would arise from the definite cognition itself.

amūrtatvāccātiśayasyādhaḥprasarpaṇāsambhavān na tasya kaścid ādhāro yuktaḥ adhogatipratibandhakatvenādhārasya vyavasthānāt /

And because the peculiarity is incorporeal, downward movement being impossible, no container is logical for it, since a container is established [only] as that which prevents downward movement.

nāpi janyajanakabhāvalakṣaṇaḥ sarvadaiva niścayākhyasya kāraṇasya sannihitatvān nityam atiśayotpattiprasaṅgāt /

Nor [is the relation] of the nature of producer-produced [possible], because since the cause called definite cognition is always present, the peculiarity would [absurdly] arise eternally.

na ca sādhanaprayogāpekṣayā niścayātiśayotpādakatvaṃ yuktaṃ /

Nor would it be logical [to say] that the production of the peculiarity by the definite cognition depends on the operation of the means [of proof].

anupakāriṇyapekṣānupapatteḥ /

Because dependence on what provides no help is not possible.

upakāritve vā pūrvavaddoṣo 'navasthā ca

If there is [a relation of] helping, then [there arise] the same defect and infinite regress [as] mentioned before.

apica yo 'sāvatiśayaḥ pṛthagbhūtaḥ kriyate sa kimasannāhosvitsannti vikalpadvayamatrāpyavataratyeva

Moreover, regarding this peculiarity which is produced as something distinct - is it non-existent or existent [prior to production]? These two alternatives present themselves here also.

tatrāsatve pūrvavat sādhanānām anaikāntikatāpattiḥ

In case of [its] non-existence, as [mentioned] before, there follows the inconclusiveness of [all] the proofs.

satve ca sādhanavaiyarthyaṃ

And in case of [its] existence, [there follows] the uselessness of the proofs.

tatrāpyabhivyaktāviṣyamāṇāyāṃ keyam abhivyaktirityanavasthāprasaṅgo durnirvāraḥ

Even regarding that manifestation, if another manifestation is desired, the unavoidable consequence of infinite regress [arises] as to what this [further] manifestation is.

tasmād vyatirekapakṣe 'pyasaṅgater asambandhān na rūpātiśayotpattir yujyate

Therefore, even in the case of the view of distinctness, due to non-connection and lack of relation, the production of a peculiarity in form is not possible.

na tadviṣayasaṃvittir nopalambhāvṛtikṣayaḥ

[Manifestation is] neither the cognition of that object nor the removal of the obstruction to perception.

nityatvād upalambhasya dvitīyasyāpyasambhavāt

Because perception is eternal and because a second [perception] is not possible.

nāpi tadviṣayajñānotpattilakṣaṇābhivyaktir yuktā nityatvāt tadviṣayāyāḥ saṃvitteḥ

Nor is manifestation characterized by the arising of knowledge of that object appropriate, because the cognition of that object is eternal.

tathā hi yāsau tadviṣayā saṃvittiḥ sā bhavataḥ satkāryavādino matena nityaiveti kiṃ tasya utpādyaṃ syāt / dvitīyasyopalambhasyāsambhavācca na tadviṣayajñānotpattilakṣaṇābhivyaktiryuktā

For indeed, this cognition of that object must be eternal according to the view of you who hold the satkāryavāda - so what of it could be produced? And because a second perception is impossible, manifestation characterized by the arising of knowledge of that object is not appropriate.

apiśabdaḥ samuccaye bhinnakramaś ca asambhavād ityasyānantaraṃ draṣṭavyaḥ /

The word "api" [indicating] accumulation should be viewed out of sequence [and] after [the word] "asambhavāt."

tenaitad uktaṃ bhavati / ekaiva bhavatāṃ matena saṃvit āsargapralayādekā buddhir iti siddhāntāt saiva ca niścayaḥ tatra ko 'paras tadupalambho 'bhivyāktyākhyo 'sti yaḥ sādhanaiḥ kriyeta /

Thus the meaning becomes this: According to your view, consciousness is single only, since [it is] your established doctrine that from creation to dissolution there is one single consciousness; and this same [consciousness] is determinate cognition; then what other apprehension called "manifestation" exists there which could be produced by means?

syād etat na buddhisvabhāvā tadviṣayasaṃvittiḥ kiṃ tarhi / manaḥsvabhāveti /

[One] might [argue] this: "The apprehension of an object is not of the nature of buddhi; rather, what then? [It is] of the nature of manas."

tadasamyak buddhirupalabdhir adhyavasāyo manaḥsaṃvittir ityādīnām arthāntaratvāt /

This is incorrect, because buddhi, upalabdhi, adhyavasāya, manas, saṃvitti and so forth are not different things [but synonymous].

etac ca paścānnivedayiṣyate /

And this will be explained later.

nāpi tadviṣayopalambhāvaraṇakṣayalakṣaṇābhivyaktiḥ ata eva kāraṇadvayāt /

Nor is manifestation characterized by the destruction of what obstructs the apprehension of that object, for these same two reasons.

tathā hi yattadupalambhāvaraṇaṃ tasya nityatvān na kṣayaḥ sambhavati /

For indeed, since that which obstructs this apprehension is eternal, its destruction is not possible.

nāpi tirobhāvalakṣaṇaḥ yuktaḥ atyaktapūrvarūpasya tirobhāvāsambhavāt /

Nor is [destruction] characterized by disappearance logical, because disappearance is impossible for that which has not abandoned its previous form.

dvitīyasya copalambhasyāsambhavānnopalambhāvaraṇam asti /

And because a second apprehension is impossible, there is no obstruction to apprehension.

nahyasata āvaraṇam yuktaṃ vastusadviṣayatvāt tasya /

For indeed, obstruction of what is non-existent is not logical, since obstruction has an existent thing as its object.

tasmān na tatkṣayo yuktaḥ /

Therefore the removal of that [obstruction] is not logically possible.

athavā nityatvādīt tadviṣayāyāḥ saṃvitter nityatvannāvaraṇaṃ sambhavati tadasambhavān na kṣayo yukta ity arthaḥ /

Alternatively, because of the word "nityatvāt" [in the text], since the cognition of that object is eternal, no obstruction is possible, and because such [obstruction] is impossible, [its] removal is not logical - this is the meaning.

na cāpyāvaraṇakṣayaḥ kenacit kriyate / tasya niḥsvabhāvatvāt /

And moreover, the removal of the obstruction cannot be brought about by anything, because it [i.e., removal] is without intrinsic nature.

na kevalaṃ satkāryavādapakṣe sādhanaprayogavaiyarthyaṃ bandhamokṣābhāvaprasaṅgaḥ sarvalokavyavahārocchedaprasaṅgācānivāryaḥ /

In the doctrine of satkāryavāda, not only [would there be] the futility of employing means, [but] the undesirable consequence of the non-existence of bondage and liberation and the unavoidable consequence of the cessation of all worldly activity [would follow].

tathā hi pradhānapuruṣayoḥ kaivalyopalambhalakṣaṇasya tattvajñānasyotpattausatyāṃ mokṣo bhavadbhiriṣyate /

For you maintain that liberation occurs upon the arising of true knowledge, which is characterized by the realization of the isolation of prakṛti and puruṣa.

tac ca tattvajñānaṃ sarvadāvasthitameveti muktāḥ sarva eva dehinaḥ syuḥ ato na bandhaḥ /

And since that true knowledge is eternally present, all embodied beings would be liberated, hence there [could be] no bondage.

mithyājñānavaśāc ca bandha iṣyate tasya ca sarvadāvasthitatvena sarvadā sarveṣāṃ baddhatvāt kuto mokṣaḥ lokaś ca hitāhitaprāptiparihārārthaṃ pravartate /

And bondage is held to be due to the power of false knowledge, and since that [false knowledge] is eternally present, all [beings] would always be bound, so how [could there be] liberation? And people engage in activity for the purpose of obtaining what is beneficial and avoiding what is harmful.

satkāryavādapakṣe ca na kiñcid aprāpyamaheyaṃ vāstīti nirīham eva jagatsyāt /

And in the doctrine of satkāryavāda, since nothing would exist that cannot be obtained or cannot be avoided, the world would be completely without desire.

antatas sarvavyavahārocchedaprasaṅgaḥ //

Finally, [this would lead to] the undesirable consequence of the cessation of all worldly activity.

traiguṇyasyāvibhede 'pi na sarvaṃ sarvakārakaṃ / yadvattadvadasattve 'pi na sarvaṃ sarvakārakaṃ //

Just as even though there is no differentiation due to [everything having] the three guṇas, not everything produces everything, similarly, even though [the effect] is non-existent [before its production], not everything produces everything.

satkāryaniṣedhādeva sāmarthyād asatkāryam iti siddham eva sadasatoranyonyaparihārasthitalakṣaṇatvena prakārāntarāsambhavāt /

From the very denial of [the theory of] satkārya [it] follows logically that [the effect is] asatkārya, since "existent" and "non-existent" are mutually exclusive characteristics and thus no other alternative is possible.

tathāpi paropanyas tasya dūṣaṇasya dūṣaṇābhāsatāpratipādanāyocyate /

Nevertheless, [the author] now speaks to demonstrate the seeming fallacy of the objection raised by the opponent.

tatra yattāvaduktaṃ kartuṃ tannaiva śakyeta nairūpyād iti /

In this regard, what was first stated [by the opponent] was: "That [effect] could not be produced due to [its] formlessness."

tadasiddhaṃ vastusvabhāvasyaiva kriyamāṇatvābhyupagamāt / tasya ca vastusvabhāvasya nīrūpatvāsiddheḥ /

This is unproven because it is accepted that the very nature of the thing itself is what is being produced, and because the formlessness of this nature of the thing is not established.

prāgutpattes tanniḥsvabhāvameveti cen na /

If [you say] "before production it is indeed without nature," [we say] no.

nahi svabhāva eva niḥsvabhāvo yuktaḥ vastusvabhāvapratiṣedhalakṣaṇatvānniḥsvabhāvatvasya /

Indeed, it is not logical for nature itself to be natureless, since being natureless means the negation of the thing's nature.

nacāpyutpādātprāk tadasti /

And that [nature] is not [there] even before production.

kriyamāṇaṃ vastu yena tadeva niḥsvabhāvaṃ siddhyet /

That by which a thing is produced would itself become natureless [under your view].

atha vastuvirahalakṣaṇameva nīrūpaṃ dharmiṇaṃ pakṣīkṛtya nairūpyāditi hetuḥkriyate tadā siddhasādhyatā /

If the reason "because of formlessness" is put forward taking as the subject the formless substrate characterized by the absence of the thing, then [this results in] proving what is [already] proven.

nahi vastuvirahaḥ kenacit kriyamāṇatayābhyupagataḥ /

For the absence of a thing is not accepted by anyone as something that is produced.

api ca anikāntiko 'pi hetuḥ /

Moreover, the reason is also inconclusive.

vipakṣe bādhakapramāṇānupadarśanāt /

Because no sublating evidence regarding the contrary has been shown.

yataḥ kāraṇaśaktipratiniyamātkiñcidevāsatkriyate yasyotpādakaṃ kāraṇamasti yasya tu viyadabjāder nāsti kāraṇaṃ tan na kriyata ityanekānta eva /

Since due to the restriction of causal power, only some non-existent [thing] is produced—[namely] that for which there is a productive cause; but that for which there is no cause, like a sky-lotus, is not produced—thus [the reason] is indeed inconclusive.

nahi sarvaṃ sarvasya kāraṇamiṣṭaṃ /

[It is] not accepted that everything [can be] the cause of everything.

nāpi yadyadasattat tatkriyata eveti vyāptiriṣṭā /

Nor is the universal proposition accepted that "whatever is non-existent must necessarily be produced."

kiṃtarhi yatkriyate tatprāgutpatter asadeveti /

Rather, [what is accepted is] that "whatever is produced was non-existent before its production."

syād etat tulyepyasatkāritve kāraṇānāṃ kimiti sarvaṃ sarvasyāsataḥ kāraṇaṃ na bhavatīti /

[One] might ask this: "Even if causes are equally [capable of] producing the non-existent, why is not everything the cause of everything non-existent?"

tadetadbhavato 'pi samānam codyaṃ tulye hi satkāritve kimiti sarvam sarvasya sataḥ kāraṇaṃ na bhavatīti / na ca bhavatāṃ matena kiñcid asadasti yena tan na kriyeta /

This same objection applies to you also: "If [causes are] equally [capable of] producing the existent, why is not everything the cause of everything existent?" And according to your view, there is nothing non-existent which could not be produced.

kāraṇaśaktipratiniyamāt sadapi śaśaviṣāṇādi na kriyata iti cet /

If [you say] that "due to the restriction of causal powers, even though things like a hare's horn are existent, they are not produced"—

taditaratrāpi samānaṃ /

The same [applies] to the other [view] also.

api ca yathā bhavatāṃ traiguṇyasya sarvatrāviśeṣe 'pi na sarvaṃ sarvakārakaṃ bhavati śaktipratiniyamāt /

Moreover, just as in your [view], even though the three guṇas are present everywhere without distinction, not everything produces everything due to restriction of powers—

sarvasya kārakaṃ sarvaṃ vā kārakamasyeti vigrahaḥ /

[Where] the compound "sarvakāraka" [may be analyzed as either] "producer of everything" or "that which has everything as its producer"—

tadvad asatvepi kāryasyānvayino vā kasyacid rūpasya na sarvaṃ sarvakārakaṃ bhaviṣyati /

Similarly, even though effects [or] some inherent form are non-existent, not everything will be productive of everything.

etaccābhyupagamyoktaṃ yadvat tadvaditi /

What has been asserted [in the text] "As in your case, so in mine also" has been stated after having admitted [the opponent's contention] for the sake of argument.

na punaḥ sāmyam iti /

There is, however, no equality [between the two theories].

tathā hi satyapi bhede kasyacit kaścideva hetur bhavati /

For even though there is diversity [among things], some single cause produces some single effect.

svahetuparamparāsamāyātatvāt tathābhūtasvabhāvabhedapratiniyamasyetyaviruddhaṃ /

[This is] not contradictory, since the fixed differentiation of such natures comes from their respective causal series.

abhede tv ekasyaikasminn eva kāle hetutvam ahetutvaṃ ca parasparaviruddhaṃ kathaṃ sambhāvyate /

But in [the case of] non-differentiation, how could one conceive of something being both a cause and a non-cause at the same time, [which would be] mutually contradictory?

tathācāha bhede hi kāraṇaṃ kiñcit vastudharmatayā bhavet /

And thus he says: "For in [the case of] differentiation, something could be a cause by virtue of its nature as a real thing;

abhede tu nirudhyete tasyaikasya kriyākriye //

but in [the case of] non-differentiation, both activity and non-activity of that single [thing] would be impossible."

avadhīnām aniṣpatter niyatās te na śaktayaḥ /

"Since limits cannot be produced [in your view], those potencies cannot be restricted;

satve tu niyamas tāsāṃ sāvadhiko na tu //

but if [they are] existent, their restriction would be proper as pertaining to limits."

ta iti tava bauddhasyāsatkāryavādinaḥ na kāraṇānāṃ niyatāḥ śaktayo ghaṭante /

For you, that is, for the Buddhist who holds the effect to be non-existent, restricted causal potencies are not possible.

kasmāt / avadhīnāṃ kāryabhūtānām aniṣpatteḥ /

Why? Because limits, in the form of effects, cannot be produced.

nahyavadhimantareṇāvadhimato 'sti sadbhāvaḥ prayogaḥ /

For without a limit, that which is limited cannot have existence [or] application.

ye sadbhūtakāryāvadhiśūnyā na te niyataśaktayo yathā śaśaviṣāṇādayaḥ sadbhūtakāryāvadhiśūnyāś ca śālibījādayo bhāvā iti vyāpakānupalabdhiḥ /

Those things which are devoid of limits in the form of existent effects cannot have restricted potencies - like hare's horns; and [according to you] entities like rice seeds are devoid of limits in the form of existent effects - [this is] the non-perception of the pervader.

svapakṣasya sausthityaṃ darśayannāha satva iti /

Showing the soundness of his own position, he says "[on the view of their] existence."

kāryāṇāṃ sadbhāve satītyarthaḥ /

The meaning is: "When effects are [considered as] existent."

tāsām iti śaktīnāṃ //

"Their" means "of the potencies."

naivam ityādinā hetor anaikāntikatām āha naivaṃ teṣām aniṣpattyā mābhūcchabdas tathāparaṃ /

Through [the words] "not so" etc., he states the inconclusive nature of the reason: "It may not be so - due to their non-production, such subsequent verbal designation may not occur."

sarvopādhiviviktasya vasturūpasya na kṣatiḥ //

[But] there is no harm to the nature of an entity that is completely free from all limiting conditions.

tathā hi teṣām avadhīnām aniṣpattau yadi paraṃ kṣīrasya dadhyutpādane śaktirityeṣa vyapadeśo mābhūt yatpunas tathāvidhaṃ sarvopādhiśūnyamadhyāropitaṃ vastu yadanantaram adṛṣṭapūrvaṃ vastvantaramudeti tasyāpratiṣedha eva //

For thus: even if, due to the non-production of those limits, this designation "the milk has the power to produce curd" may not occur, nevertheless that entity which is free from all limiting conditions [and] which is not superimposed, after which arises another previously unseen entity - of that there can indeed be no denial.

syād etadyatra śabdavikalpānām apravṛttis tatra vastusvabhāve 'pi nivartata evetyāha na nāmarūpamityādi / na nāma rūpaṃ vastūnāṃ vikalpā vācakāś ca yat /

One might think: "Where verbal expressions and conceptual constructs do not operate, there the very nature of the entity must also cease" - [responding to this] he says "name and form are not..." etc.: "Name and form are not [the essence] of entities, since conceptual constructs and verbal expressions..."

viśvakalpāḥ pravartante yathābhyāsamabhedini //

"...all conceptual constructs operate according to convention with reference to the undifferentiated."

svabhāva eva hi vyāpako nivartamānaḥ svaṃ vyāpyaṃ nivartayati kāraṇaṃ vā kāryaṃ pratibandhasadbhāvāt /

For indeed the nature [of a thing], being pervasive, when negated negates what it pervades - whether cause or effect - due to the existence of necessary connection.

natvanyo 'tiprasaṅgāt /

[But] not anything else [can set this aside], as [that would lead to] an unwanted consequence.

naca kṣīrasya dadhni śaktirityevamādināmavyapadeśo vastūnāṃ rūpaṃ svabhāvo bhavati /

The verbal designation (vyapadeśa) such as "milk has the power [to transform] into curd" does not constitute the essential nature (svabhāva) of things.

yena tannivartamānaṃ tathāvidhaṃ vastu nivartayet /

By which [if it were so], upon its removal, it would remove such a thing [itself].

nāmagrahaṇamupalakṣaṇaṃ /

The mention of "name" is [merely] illustrative.

vikalpo 'pi tatsaṃsṛṣṭo gṛhyate /

[Mental] construction (vikalpa) also, as connected with that [thing], is [meant to be] included.

kāraṇam api vastūnāṃ nāma na bhavatyeva tadantareṇāpi vastusambhavāt /

The name is certainly not the cause of things, since things can come into being even without it.

atra kāraṇam āha vikalpā ityādi / yat yasmāt nāmasaṃsargabhājo vikalpā vācakāś ca śabdā viśvakalpāḥ nānāprakārāḥ abhedini niraṃśaikasvabhāvavastuni yathābhyāsaṃ vartante /

Here [the author] states the reason [by saying] "vikalpāḥ" etc.: because conceptual constructs that are associated with names and expressive words of various kinds operate through habituation with reference to an undifferentiated entity (vastu) which is partless and of singular nature.

tathā hi eka eva śabdādir bhāvo nityādirūpeṇa bhinnasamayasthāyibhiḥ pravādibhir vikalpyate vyapadiśyate ca /

Thus indeed, a single entity like sound is conceptualized and designated by speakers existing at different times as having the form of [being] permanent and so forth.

teṣāṃ ca śabdavikalpānāṃ tādātmye tadviṣayatve vā vastunaścitratvaṃ prāpnoti / vastusvarūpavadeva vā śabdavikalpānama ekarūpatvaprasaṅgaḥ /

And if these verbal constructs were identical with [the entity] or had it as their object, the entity would become diversified; or alternatively, like the essential nature of the entity, the verbal constructs would [absurdly] become uniform in nature.

nahyekaṃ citram iti yuktam atiprasaṅgāt /

For it is not reasonable [to say that] one [thing] is diverse, as [that would lead to] an unwanted consequence.