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⌀ | func_after
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CVE-2016-8666 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-8666/ | CWE-400 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/fac8e0f579695a3ecbc4d3cac369139d7f819971 | fac8e0f579695a3ecbc4d3cac369139d7f819971 | tunnels: Don't apply GRO to multiple layers of encapsulation.
When drivers express support for TSO of encapsulated packets, they
only mean that they can do it for one layer of encapsulation.
Supporting additional levels would mean updating, at a minimum,
more IP length fields and they are unaware of this.
No encapsulation device expresses support for handling offloaded
encapsulated packets, so we won't generate these types of frames
in the transmit path. However, GRO doesn't have a check for
multiple levels of encapsulation and will attempt to build them.
UDP tunnel GRO actually does prevent this situation but it only
handles multiple UDP tunnels stacked on top of each other. This
generalizes that solution to prevent any kind of tunnel stacking
that would cause problems.
Fixes: bf5a755f ("net-gre-gro: Add GRE support to the GRO stack")
Signed-off-by: Jesse Gross <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | static int sit_gro_complete(struct sk_buff *skb, int nhoff)
{
skb->encapsulation = 1;
skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type |= SKB_GSO_SIT;
return ipv6_gro_complete(skb, nhoff);
}
| static int sit_gro_complete(struct sk_buff *skb, int nhoff)
{
skb->encapsulation = 1;
skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type |= SKB_GSO_SIT;
return ipv6_gro_complete(skb, nhoff);
}
| C | linux | 0 |
CVE-2017-14170 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-14170/ | CWE-834 | https://github.com/FFmpeg/FFmpeg/commit/900f39692ca0337a98a7cf047e4e2611071810c2 | 900f39692ca0337a98a7cf047e4e2611071810c2 | avformat/mxfdec: Fix DoS issues in mxf_read_index_entry_array()
Fixes: 20170829A.mxf
Co-Author: 张洪亮(望初)" <[email protected]>
Found-by: Xiaohei and Wangchu from Alibaba Security Team
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]> | static int mxf_parse_physical_source_package(MXFContext *mxf, MXFTrack *source_track, AVStream *st)
{
MXFPackage *physical_package = NULL;
MXFTrack *physical_track = NULL;
MXFStructuralComponent *sourceclip = NULL;
MXFTimecodeComponent *mxf_tc = NULL;
int i, j, k;
AVTimecode tc;
int flags;
int64_t start_position;
for (i = 0; i < source_track->sequence->structural_components_count; i++) {
sourceclip = mxf_resolve_strong_ref(mxf, &source_track->sequence->structural_components_refs[i], SourceClip);
if (!sourceclip)
continue;
if (!(physical_package = mxf_resolve_source_package(mxf, sourceclip->source_package_uid)))
break;
mxf_add_umid_metadata(&st->metadata, "reel_umid", physical_package);
/* the name of physical source package is name of the reel or tape */
if (physical_package->name && physical_package->name[0])
av_dict_set(&st->metadata, "reel_name", physical_package->name, 0);
/* the source timecode is calculated by adding the start_position of the sourceclip from the file source package track
* to the start_frame of the timecode component located on one of the tracks of the physical source package.
*/
for (j = 0; j < physical_package->tracks_count; j++) {
if (!(physical_track = mxf_resolve_strong_ref(mxf, &physical_package->tracks_refs[j], Track))) {
av_log(mxf->fc, AV_LOG_ERROR, "could not resolve source track strong ref\n");
continue;
}
if (!(physical_track->sequence = mxf_resolve_strong_ref(mxf, &physical_track->sequence_ref, Sequence))) {
av_log(mxf->fc, AV_LOG_ERROR, "could not resolve source track sequence strong ref\n");
continue;
}
if (physical_track->edit_rate.num <= 0 ||
physical_track->edit_rate.den <= 0) {
av_log(mxf->fc, AV_LOG_WARNING,
"Invalid edit rate (%d/%d) found on structural"
" component #%d, defaulting to 25/1\n",
physical_track->edit_rate.num,
physical_track->edit_rate.den, i);
physical_track->edit_rate = (AVRational){25, 1};
}
for (k = 0; k < physical_track->sequence->structural_components_count; k++) {
if (!(mxf_tc = mxf_resolve_timecode_component(mxf, &physical_track->sequence->structural_components_refs[k])))
continue;
flags = mxf_tc->drop_frame == 1 ? AV_TIMECODE_FLAG_DROPFRAME : 0;
/* scale sourceclip start_position to match physical track edit rate */
start_position = av_rescale_q(sourceclip->start_position,
physical_track->edit_rate,
source_track->edit_rate);
if (av_timecode_init(&tc, mxf_tc->rate, flags, start_position + mxf_tc->start_frame, mxf->fc) == 0) {
mxf_add_timecode_metadata(&st->metadata, "timecode", &tc);
return 0;
}
}
}
}
return 0;
}
| static int mxf_parse_physical_source_package(MXFContext *mxf, MXFTrack *source_track, AVStream *st)
{
MXFPackage *physical_package = NULL;
MXFTrack *physical_track = NULL;
MXFStructuralComponent *sourceclip = NULL;
MXFTimecodeComponent *mxf_tc = NULL;
int i, j, k;
AVTimecode tc;
int flags;
int64_t start_position;
for (i = 0; i < source_track->sequence->structural_components_count; i++) {
sourceclip = mxf_resolve_strong_ref(mxf, &source_track->sequence->structural_components_refs[i], SourceClip);
if (!sourceclip)
continue;
if (!(physical_package = mxf_resolve_source_package(mxf, sourceclip->source_package_uid)))
break;
mxf_add_umid_metadata(&st->metadata, "reel_umid", physical_package);
/* the name of physical source package is name of the reel or tape */
if (physical_package->name && physical_package->name[0])
av_dict_set(&st->metadata, "reel_name", physical_package->name, 0);
/* the source timecode is calculated by adding the start_position of the sourceclip from the file source package track
* to the start_frame of the timecode component located on one of the tracks of the physical source package.
*/
for (j = 0; j < physical_package->tracks_count; j++) {
if (!(physical_track = mxf_resolve_strong_ref(mxf, &physical_package->tracks_refs[j], Track))) {
av_log(mxf->fc, AV_LOG_ERROR, "could not resolve source track strong ref\n");
continue;
}
if (!(physical_track->sequence = mxf_resolve_strong_ref(mxf, &physical_track->sequence_ref, Sequence))) {
av_log(mxf->fc, AV_LOG_ERROR, "could not resolve source track sequence strong ref\n");
continue;
}
if (physical_track->edit_rate.num <= 0 ||
physical_track->edit_rate.den <= 0) {
av_log(mxf->fc, AV_LOG_WARNING,
"Invalid edit rate (%d/%d) found on structural"
" component #%d, defaulting to 25/1\n",
physical_track->edit_rate.num,
physical_track->edit_rate.den, i);
physical_track->edit_rate = (AVRational){25, 1};
}
for (k = 0; k < physical_track->sequence->structural_components_count; k++) {
if (!(mxf_tc = mxf_resolve_timecode_component(mxf, &physical_track->sequence->structural_components_refs[k])))
continue;
flags = mxf_tc->drop_frame == 1 ? AV_TIMECODE_FLAG_DROPFRAME : 0;
/* scale sourceclip start_position to match physical track edit rate */
start_position = av_rescale_q(sourceclip->start_position,
physical_track->edit_rate,
source_track->edit_rate);
if (av_timecode_init(&tc, mxf_tc->rate, flags, start_position + mxf_tc->start_frame, mxf->fc) == 0) {
mxf_add_timecode_metadata(&st->metadata, "timecode", &tc);
return 0;
}
}
}
}
return 0;
}
| C | FFmpeg | 0 |
CVE-2012-5150 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-5150/ | CWE-399 | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/8ea3a5c06218fa42d25c3aa0a4ab57153e178523 | 8ea3a5c06218fa42d25c3aa0a4ab57153e178523 | Delete apparently unused geolocation declarations and include.
BUG=336263
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/139743014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@165601 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | ChromeClientImpl::~ChromeClientImpl()
{
}
| ChromeClientImpl::~ChromeClientImpl()
{
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2012-2816 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2816/ | null | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/cd0bd79d6ebdb72183e6f0833673464cc10b3600 | cd0bd79d6ebdb72183e6f0833673464cc10b3600 | Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | void BrowserGpuChannelHostFactory::CreateViewCommandBufferOnIO(
CreateRequest* request,
int32 surface_id,
const GPUCreateCommandBufferConfig& init_params) {
GpuProcessHost* host = GpuProcessHost::FromID(gpu_host_id_);
if (!host) {
request->event.Signal();
return;
}
gfx::GLSurfaceHandle surface =
GpuSurfaceTracker::Get()->GetSurfaceHandle(surface_id);
host->CreateViewCommandBuffer(
surface,
surface_id,
gpu_client_id_,
init_params,
base::Bind(&BrowserGpuChannelHostFactory::CommandBufferCreatedOnIO,
request));
}
| void BrowserGpuChannelHostFactory::CreateViewCommandBufferOnIO(
CreateRequest* request,
int32 surface_id,
const GPUCreateCommandBufferConfig& init_params) {
GpuProcessHost* host = GpuProcessHost::FromID(gpu_host_id_);
if (!host) {
request->event.Signal();
return;
}
gfx::GLSurfaceHandle surface =
GpuSurfaceTracker::Get()->GetSurfaceHandle(surface_id);
host->CreateViewCommandBuffer(
surface,
surface_id,
gpu_client_id_,
init_params,
base::Bind(&BrowserGpuChannelHostFactory::CommandBufferCreatedOnIO,
request));
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2013-6636 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-6636/ | CWE-20 | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/5cfe3023574666663d970ce48cdbc8ed15ce61d9 | 5cfe3023574666663d970ce48cdbc8ed15ce61d9 | Clear out some minor TODOs.
BUG=none
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1047063002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#322959} | void AutofillDialogViews::UpdateAccountChooser() {
account_chooser_->Update();
bool show_loading = delegate_->ShouldShowSpinner();
if (show_loading != loading_shield_->visible()) {
if (show_loading) {
loading_shield_height_ = std::max(kInitialLoadingShieldHeight,
GetContentsBounds().height());
ShowDialogInMode(LOADING);
} else {
bool show_sign_in = delegate_->ShouldShowSignInWebView();
ShowDialogInMode(show_sign_in ? SIGN_IN : DETAIL_INPUT);
}
InvalidateLayout();
ContentsPreferredSizeChanged();
}
if (footnote_view_) {
const base::string16 text = delegate_->LegalDocumentsText();
legal_document_view_->SetText(text);
if (!text.empty()) {
const std::vector<gfx::Range>& link_ranges =
delegate_->LegalDocumentLinks();
for (size_t i = 0; i < link_ranges.size(); ++i) {
views::StyledLabel::RangeStyleInfo link_range_info =
views::StyledLabel::RangeStyleInfo::CreateForLink();
link_range_info.disable_line_wrapping = false;
legal_document_view_->AddStyleRange(link_ranges[i], link_range_info);
}
}
footnote_view_->SetVisible(!text.empty());
ContentsPreferredSizeChanged();
}
if (GetWidget())
GetWidget()->UpdateWindowTitle();
}
| void AutofillDialogViews::UpdateAccountChooser() {
account_chooser_->Update();
bool show_loading = delegate_->ShouldShowSpinner();
if (show_loading != loading_shield_->visible()) {
if (show_loading) {
loading_shield_height_ = std::max(kInitialLoadingShieldHeight,
GetContentsBounds().height());
ShowDialogInMode(LOADING);
} else {
bool show_sign_in = delegate_->ShouldShowSignInWebView();
ShowDialogInMode(show_sign_in ? SIGN_IN : DETAIL_INPUT);
}
InvalidateLayout();
ContentsPreferredSizeChanged();
}
if (footnote_view_) {
const base::string16 text = delegate_->LegalDocumentsText();
legal_document_view_->SetText(text);
if (!text.empty()) {
const std::vector<gfx::Range>& link_ranges =
delegate_->LegalDocumentLinks();
for (size_t i = 0; i < link_ranges.size(); ++i) {
views::StyledLabel::RangeStyleInfo link_range_info =
views::StyledLabel::RangeStyleInfo::CreateForLink();
link_range_info.disable_line_wrapping = false;
legal_document_view_->AddStyleRange(link_ranges[i], link_range_info);
}
}
footnote_view_->SetVisible(!text.empty());
ContentsPreferredSizeChanged();
}
if (GetWidget())
GetWidget()->UpdateWindowTitle();
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2017-11664 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-11664/ | CWE-125 | https://github.com/Mindwerks/wildmidi/commit/660b513d99bced8783a4a5984ac2f742c74ebbdd | 660b513d99bced8783a4a5984ac2f742c74ebbdd | Add a new size parameter to _WM_SetupMidiEvent() so that it knows
where to stop reading, and adjust its users properly. Fixes bug #175
(CVE-2017-11661, CVE-2017-11662, CVE-2017-11663, CVE-2017-11664.) | void _WM_do_pitch(struct _mdi *mdi, struct _event_data *data) {
struct _note *note_data = mdi->note;
uint8_t ch = data->channel;
MIDI_EVENT_DEBUG(__FUNCTION__,ch, data->data.value);
mdi->channel[ch].pitch = data->data.value - 0x2000;
if (mdi->channel[ch].pitch < 0) {
mdi->channel[ch].pitch_adjust = mdi->channel[ch].pitch_range
* mdi->channel[ch].pitch / 8192;
} else {
mdi->channel[ch].pitch_adjust = mdi->channel[ch].pitch_range
* mdi->channel[ch].pitch / 8191;
}
if (note_data) {
do {
if ((note_data->noteid >> 8) == ch) {
note_data->sample_inc = get_inc(mdi, note_data);
}
note_data = note_data->next;
} while (note_data);
}
}
| void _WM_do_pitch(struct _mdi *mdi, struct _event_data *data) {
struct _note *note_data = mdi->note;
uint8_t ch = data->channel;
MIDI_EVENT_DEBUG(__FUNCTION__,ch, data->data.value);
mdi->channel[ch].pitch = data->data.value - 0x2000;
if (mdi->channel[ch].pitch < 0) {
mdi->channel[ch].pitch_adjust = mdi->channel[ch].pitch_range
* mdi->channel[ch].pitch / 8192;
} else {
mdi->channel[ch].pitch_adjust = mdi->channel[ch].pitch_range
* mdi->channel[ch].pitch / 8191;
}
if (note_data) {
do {
if ((note_data->noteid >> 8) == ch) {
note_data->sample_inc = get_inc(mdi, note_data);
}
note_data = note_data->next;
} while (note_data);
}
}
| C | wildmidi | 0 |
null | null | null | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/1a113d35a19c0ed6500fb5c0acdc35730617fb3f | 1a113d35a19c0ed6500fb5c0acdc35730617fb3f | Gracefully deal with clearing content settings for unregistered extensions.
BUG=128652
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10907093
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@155341 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | void ContentSettingsStore::ClearContentSettingsForExtension(
const std::string& ext_id,
ExtensionPrefsScope scope) {
bool notify = false;
{
base::AutoLock lock(lock_);
OriginIdentifierValueMap* map = GetValueMap(ext_id, scope);
// Fail gracefully in Release builds.
NOTREACHED();
return;
}
notify = !map->empty();
map->clear();
}
if (notify) {
NotifyOfContentSettingChanged(ext_id, scope != kExtensionPrefsScopeRegular);
}
}
| void ContentSettingsStore::ClearContentSettingsForExtension(
const std::string& ext_id,
ExtensionPrefsScope scope) {
bool notify = false;
{
base::AutoLock lock(lock_);
OriginIdentifierValueMap* map = GetValueMap(ext_id, scope);
char ext_id_buffer[33];
base::strlcpy(ext_id_buffer, ext_id.c_str(), sizeof(ext_id_buffer));
base::debug::Alias(ext_id_buffer);
CHECK(false);
}
notify = !map->empty();
map->clear();
}
if (notify) {
NotifyOfContentSettingChanged(ext_id, scope != kExtensionPrefsScopeRegular);
}
}
| C | Chrome | 1 |
CVE-2015-6775 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-6775/ | null | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/53f1c0f95e568d4b6b184904f98cfde2833c603c | 53f1c0f95e568d4b6b184904f98cfde2833c603c | Support negative timestamps of TextTrackCue
Ensure proper behaviour for negative timestamps of TextTrackCue.
1. Cues with negative startTime should become active from 0s.
2. Cues with negative startTime and endTime should never be active.
Bug: 314032
Change-Id: Ib53710e58be0be770c933ea8c3c4709a0e5dec0d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/863270
Commit-Queue: srirama chandra sekhar <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Söderquist <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#529012} | size_t TextTrackCueList::FindInsertionIndex(
const TextTrackCue* cue_to_insert) const {
auto it =
std::upper_bound(list_.begin(), list_.end(), cue_to_insert, CueIsBefore);
size_t index = SafeCast<size_t>(it - list_.begin());
SECURITY_DCHECK(index <= list_.size());
return index;
}
| size_t TextTrackCueList::FindInsertionIndex(
const TextTrackCue* cue_to_insert) const {
auto it =
std::upper_bound(list_.begin(), list_.end(), cue_to_insert, CueIsBefore);
size_t index = SafeCast<size_t>(it - list_.begin());
SECURITY_DCHECK(index <= list_.size());
return index;
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2012-2816 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2816/ | null | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/cd0bd79d6ebdb72183e6f0833673464cc10b3600 | cd0bd79d6ebdb72183e6f0833673464cc10b3600 | Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | WebKit::WebMediaStreamCenter* RenderThreadImpl::CreateMediaStreamCenter(
WebKit::WebMediaStreamCenterClient* client) {
#if defined(ENABLE_WEBRTC)
if (!CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
switches::kEnableMediaStream)) {
return NULL;
}
if (!media_stream_center_)
media_stream_center_ = new content::MediaStreamCenter(client);
#endif
return media_stream_center_;
}
| WebKit::WebMediaStreamCenter* RenderThreadImpl::CreateMediaStreamCenter(
WebKit::WebMediaStreamCenterClient* client) {
#if defined(ENABLE_WEBRTC)
if (!CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
switches::kEnableMediaStream)) {
return NULL;
}
if (!media_stream_center_)
media_stream_center_ = new content::MediaStreamCenter(client);
#endif
return media_stream_center_;
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2015-8543 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-8543/ | null | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/79462ad02e861803b3840cc782248c7359451cd9 | 79462ad02e861803b3840cc782248c7359451cd9 | net: add validation for the socket syscall protocol argument
郭永刚 reported that one could simply crash the kernel as root by
using a simple program:
int socket_fd;
struct sockaddr_in addr;
addr.sin_port = 0;
addr.sin_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY;
addr.sin_family = 10;
socket_fd = socket(10,3,0x40000000);
connect(socket_fd , &addr,16);
AF_INET, AF_INET6 sockets actually only support 8-bit protocol
identifiers. inet_sock's skc_protocol field thus is sized accordingly,
thus larger protocol identifiers simply cut off the higher bits and
store a zero in the protocol fields.
This could lead to e.g. NULL function pointer because as a result of
the cut off inet_num is zero and we call down to inet_autobind, which
is NULL for raw sockets.
kernel: Call Trace:
kernel: [<ffffffff816db90e>] ? inet_autobind+0x2e/0x70
kernel: [<ffffffff816db9a4>] inet_dgram_connect+0x54/0x80
kernel: [<ffffffff81645069>] SYSC_connect+0xd9/0x110
kernel: [<ffffffff810ac51b>] ? ptrace_notify+0x5b/0x80
kernel: [<ffffffff810236d8>] ? syscall_trace_enter_phase2+0x108/0x200
kernel: [<ffffffff81645e0e>] SyS_connect+0xe/0x10
kernel: [<ffffffff81779515>] tracesys_phase2+0x84/0x89
I found no particular commit which introduced this problem.
CVE: CVE-2015-8543
Cc: Cong Wang <[email protected]>
Reported-by: 郭永刚 <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | static int __dn_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,int optname, char __user *optval, unsigned int optlen, int flags)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct dn_scp *scp = DN_SK(sk);
long timeo;
union {
struct optdata_dn opt;
struct accessdata_dn acc;
int mode;
unsigned long win;
int val;
unsigned char services;
unsigned char info;
} u;
int err;
if (optlen && !optval)
return -EINVAL;
if (optlen > sizeof(u))
return -EINVAL;
if (copy_from_user(&u, optval, optlen))
return -EFAULT;
switch (optname) {
case DSO_CONDATA:
if (sock->state == SS_CONNECTED)
return -EISCONN;
if ((scp->state != DN_O) && (scp->state != DN_CR))
return -EINVAL;
if (optlen != sizeof(struct optdata_dn))
return -EINVAL;
if (le16_to_cpu(u.opt.opt_optl) > 16)
return -EINVAL;
memcpy(&scp->conndata_out, &u.opt, optlen);
break;
case DSO_DISDATA:
if (sock->state != SS_CONNECTED &&
scp->accept_mode == ACC_IMMED)
return -ENOTCONN;
if (optlen != sizeof(struct optdata_dn))
return -EINVAL;
if (le16_to_cpu(u.opt.opt_optl) > 16)
return -EINVAL;
memcpy(&scp->discdata_out, &u.opt, optlen);
break;
case DSO_CONACCESS:
if (sock->state == SS_CONNECTED)
return -EISCONN;
if (scp->state != DN_O)
return -EINVAL;
if (optlen != sizeof(struct accessdata_dn))
return -EINVAL;
if ((u.acc.acc_accl > DN_MAXACCL) ||
(u.acc.acc_passl > DN_MAXACCL) ||
(u.acc.acc_userl > DN_MAXACCL))
return -EINVAL;
memcpy(&scp->accessdata, &u.acc, optlen);
break;
case DSO_ACCEPTMODE:
if (sock->state == SS_CONNECTED)
return -EISCONN;
if (scp->state != DN_O)
return -EINVAL;
if (optlen != sizeof(int))
return -EINVAL;
if ((u.mode != ACC_IMMED) && (u.mode != ACC_DEFER))
return -EINVAL;
scp->accept_mode = (unsigned char)u.mode;
break;
case DSO_CONACCEPT:
if (scp->state != DN_CR)
return -EINVAL;
timeo = sock_rcvtimeo(sk, 0);
err = dn_confirm_accept(sk, &timeo, sk->sk_allocation);
return err;
case DSO_CONREJECT:
if (scp->state != DN_CR)
return -EINVAL;
scp->state = DN_DR;
sk->sk_shutdown = SHUTDOWN_MASK;
dn_nsp_send_disc(sk, 0x38, 0, sk->sk_allocation);
break;
default:
#ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
return nf_setsockopt(sk, PF_DECnet, optname, optval, optlen);
#endif
case DSO_LINKINFO:
case DSO_STREAM:
case DSO_SEQPACKET:
return -ENOPROTOOPT;
case DSO_MAXWINDOW:
if (optlen != sizeof(unsigned long))
return -EINVAL;
if (u.win > NSP_MAX_WINDOW)
u.win = NSP_MAX_WINDOW;
if (u.win == 0)
return -EINVAL;
scp->max_window = u.win;
if (scp->snd_window > u.win)
scp->snd_window = u.win;
break;
case DSO_NODELAY:
if (optlen != sizeof(int))
return -EINVAL;
if (scp->nonagle == 2)
return -EINVAL;
scp->nonagle = (u.val == 0) ? 0 : 1;
/* if (scp->nonagle == 1) { Push pending frames } */
break;
case DSO_CORK:
if (optlen != sizeof(int))
return -EINVAL;
if (scp->nonagle == 1)
return -EINVAL;
scp->nonagle = (u.val == 0) ? 0 : 2;
/* if (scp->nonagle == 0) { Push pending frames } */
break;
case DSO_SERVICES:
if (optlen != sizeof(unsigned char))
return -EINVAL;
if ((u.services & ~NSP_FC_MASK) != 0x01)
return -EINVAL;
if ((u.services & NSP_FC_MASK) == NSP_FC_MASK)
return -EINVAL;
scp->services_loc = u.services;
break;
case DSO_INFO:
if (optlen != sizeof(unsigned char))
return -EINVAL;
if (u.info & 0xfc)
return -EINVAL;
scp->info_loc = u.info;
break;
}
return 0;
}
| static int __dn_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,int optname, char __user *optval, unsigned int optlen, int flags)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct dn_scp *scp = DN_SK(sk);
long timeo;
union {
struct optdata_dn opt;
struct accessdata_dn acc;
int mode;
unsigned long win;
int val;
unsigned char services;
unsigned char info;
} u;
int err;
if (optlen && !optval)
return -EINVAL;
if (optlen > sizeof(u))
return -EINVAL;
if (copy_from_user(&u, optval, optlen))
return -EFAULT;
switch (optname) {
case DSO_CONDATA:
if (sock->state == SS_CONNECTED)
return -EISCONN;
if ((scp->state != DN_O) && (scp->state != DN_CR))
return -EINVAL;
if (optlen != sizeof(struct optdata_dn))
return -EINVAL;
if (le16_to_cpu(u.opt.opt_optl) > 16)
return -EINVAL;
memcpy(&scp->conndata_out, &u.opt, optlen);
break;
case DSO_DISDATA:
if (sock->state != SS_CONNECTED &&
scp->accept_mode == ACC_IMMED)
return -ENOTCONN;
if (optlen != sizeof(struct optdata_dn))
return -EINVAL;
if (le16_to_cpu(u.opt.opt_optl) > 16)
return -EINVAL;
memcpy(&scp->discdata_out, &u.opt, optlen);
break;
case DSO_CONACCESS:
if (sock->state == SS_CONNECTED)
return -EISCONN;
if (scp->state != DN_O)
return -EINVAL;
if (optlen != sizeof(struct accessdata_dn))
return -EINVAL;
if ((u.acc.acc_accl > DN_MAXACCL) ||
(u.acc.acc_passl > DN_MAXACCL) ||
(u.acc.acc_userl > DN_MAXACCL))
return -EINVAL;
memcpy(&scp->accessdata, &u.acc, optlen);
break;
case DSO_ACCEPTMODE:
if (sock->state == SS_CONNECTED)
return -EISCONN;
if (scp->state != DN_O)
return -EINVAL;
if (optlen != sizeof(int))
return -EINVAL;
if ((u.mode != ACC_IMMED) && (u.mode != ACC_DEFER))
return -EINVAL;
scp->accept_mode = (unsigned char)u.mode;
break;
case DSO_CONACCEPT:
if (scp->state != DN_CR)
return -EINVAL;
timeo = sock_rcvtimeo(sk, 0);
err = dn_confirm_accept(sk, &timeo, sk->sk_allocation);
return err;
case DSO_CONREJECT:
if (scp->state != DN_CR)
return -EINVAL;
scp->state = DN_DR;
sk->sk_shutdown = SHUTDOWN_MASK;
dn_nsp_send_disc(sk, 0x38, 0, sk->sk_allocation);
break;
default:
#ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
return nf_setsockopt(sk, PF_DECnet, optname, optval, optlen);
#endif
case DSO_LINKINFO:
case DSO_STREAM:
case DSO_SEQPACKET:
return -ENOPROTOOPT;
case DSO_MAXWINDOW:
if (optlen != sizeof(unsigned long))
return -EINVAL;
if (u.win > NSP_MAX_WINDOW)
u.win = NSP_MAX_WINDOW;
if (u.win == 0)
return -EINVAL;
scp->max_window = u.win;
if (scp->snd_window > u.win)
scp->snd_window = u.win;
break;
case DSO_NODELAY:
if (optlen != sizeof(int))
return -EINVAL;
if (scp->nonagle == 2)
return -EINVAL;
scp->nonagle = (u.val == 0) ? 0 : 1;
/* if (scp->nonagle == 1) { Push pending frames } */
break;
case DSO_CORK:
if (optlen != sizeof(int))
return -EINVAL;
if (scp->nonagle == 1)
return -EINVAL;
scp->nonagle = (u.val == 0) ? 0 : 2;
/* if (scp->nonagle == 0) { Push pending frames } */
break;
case DSO_SERVICES:
if (optlen != sizeof(unsigned char))
return -EINVAL;
if ((u.services & ~NSP_FC_MASK) != 0x01)
return -EINVAL;
if ((u.services & NSP_FC_MASK) == NSP_FC_MASK)
return -EINVAL;
scp->services_loc = u.services;
break;
case DSO_INFO:
if (optlen != sizeof(unsigned char))
return -EINVAL;
if (u.info & 0xfc)
return -EINVAL;
scp->info_loc = u.info;
break;
}
return 0;
}
| C | linux | 0 |
CVE-2013-2168 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2168/ | CWE-20 | https://cgit.freedesktop.org/dbus/dbus/commit/?id=954d75b2b64e4799f360d2a6bf9cff6d9fee37e7 | 954d75b2b64e4799f360d2a6bf9cff6d9fee37e7 | null | _dbus_get_install_root(char *prefix, int len)
{
DWORD pathLength;
char *lastSlash;
SetLastError( 0 );
pathLength = GetModuleFileNameA(_dbus_win_get_dll_hmodule(), prefix, len);
if ( pathLength == 0 || GetLastError() != 0 ) {
*prefix = '\0';
return FALSE;
}
lastSlash = _mbsrchr(prefix, '\\');
if (lastSlash == NULL) {
*prefix = '\0';
return FALSE;
}
lastSlash[1] = 0;
if (lastSlash - prefix >= 4 && strnicmp(lastSlash - 4, "\\bin", 4) == 0)
lastSlash[-3] = 0;
else if (lastSlash - prefix >= 10 && strnicmp(lastSlash - 10, "\\bin\\debug", 10) == 0)
lastSlash[-9] = 0;
else if (lastSlash - prefix >= 12 && strnicmp(lastSlash - 12, "\\bin\\release", 12) == 0)
lastSlash[-11] = 0;
return TRUE;
}
| _dbus_get_install_root(char *prefix, int len)
{
DWORD pathLength;
char *lastSlash;
SetLastError( 0 );
pathLength = GetModuleFileNameA(_dbus_win_get_dll_hmodule(), prefix, len);
if ( pathLength == 0 || GetLastError() != 0 ) {
*prefix = '\0';
return FALSE;
}
lastSlash = _mbsrchr(prefix, '\\');
if (lastSlash == NULL) {
*prefix = '\0';
return FALSE;
}
lastSlash[1] = 0;
if (lastSlash - prefix >= 4 && strnicmp(lastSlash - 4, "\\bin", 4) == 0)
lastSlash[-3] = 0;
else if (lastSlash - prefix >= 10 && strnicmp(lastSlash - 10, "\\bin\\debug", 10) == 0)
lastSlash[-9] = 0;
else if (lastSlash - prefix >= 12 && strnicmp(lastSlash - 12, "\\bin\\release", 12) == 0)
lastSlash[-11] = 0;
return TRUE;
}
| C | dbus | 0 |
CVE-2017-9993 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-9993/ | CWE-200 | https://github.com/FFmpeg/FFmpeg/commit/189ff4219644532bdfa7bab28dfedaee4d6d4021 | 189ff4219644532bdfa7bab28dfedaee4d6d4021 | avformat/hls: Check local file extensions
This reduces the attack surface of local file-system
information leaking.
It prevents the existing exploit leading to an information leak. As
well as similar hypothetical attacks.
Leaks of information from files and symlinks ending in common multimedia extensions
are still possible. But files with sensitive information like private keys and passwords
generally do not use common multimedia filename extensions.
It does not stop leaks via remote addresses in the LAN.
The existing exploit depends on a specific decoder as well.
It does appear though that the exploit should be possible with any decoder.
The problem is that as long as sensitive information gets into the decoder,
the output of the decoder becomes sensitive as well.
The only obvious solution is to prevent access to sensitive information. Or to
disable hls or possibly some of its feature. More complex solutions like
checking the path to limit access to only subdirectories of the hls path may
work as an alternative. But such solutions are fragile and tricky to implement
portably and would not stop every possible attack nor would they work with all
valid hls files.
Developers have expressed their dislike / objected to disabling hls by default as well
as disabling hls with local files. There also where objections against restricting
remote url file extensions. This here is a less robust but also lower
inconvenience solution.
It can be applied stand alone or together with other solutions.
limiting the check to local files was suggested by nevcairiel
This recommits the security fix without the author name joke which was
originally requested by Nicolas.
Found-by: Emil Lerner and Pavel Cheremushkin
Reported-by: Thierry Foucu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]> | static int open_url(AVFormatContext *s, AVIOContext **pb, const char *url,
AVDictionary *opts, AVDictionary *opts2, int *is_http)
{
HLSContext *c = s->priv_data;
AVDictionary *tmp = NULL;
const char *proto_name = NULL;
int ret;
av_dict_copy(&tmp, opts, 0);
av_dict_copy(&tmp, opts2, 0);
if (av_strstart(url, "crypto", NULL)) {
if (url[6] == '+' || url[6] == ':')
proto_name = avio_find_protocol_name(url + 7);
}
if (!proto_name)
proto_name = avio_find_protocol_name(url);
if (!proto_name)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
if (av_strstart(proto_name, "file", NULL)) {
if (strcmp(c->allowed_extensions, "ALL") && !av_match_ext(url, c->allowed_extensions)) {
av_log(s, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"Filename extension of \'%s\' is not a common multimedia extension, blocked for security reasons.\n"
"If you wish to override this adjust allowed_extensions, you can set it to \'ALL\' to allow all\n",
url);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
} else if (av_strstart(proto_name, "http", NULL)) {
;
} else
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
if (!strncmp(proto_name, url, strlen(proto_name)) && url[strlen(proto_name)] == ':')
;
else if (av_strstart(url, "crypto", NULL) && !strncmp(proto_name, url + 7, strlen(proto_name)) && url[7 + strlen(proto_name)] == ':')
;
else if (strcmp(proto_name, "file") || !strncmp(url, "file,", 5))
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
ret = s->io_open(s, pb, url, AVIO_FLAG_READ, &tmp);
if (ret >= 0) {
char *new_cookies = NULL;
if (!(s->flags & AVFMT_FLAG_CUSTOM_IO))
av_opt_get(*pb, "cookies", AV_OPT_SEARCH_CHILDREN, (uint8_t**)&new_cookies);
if (new_cookies) {
av_free(c->cookies);
c->cookies = new_cookies;
}
av_dict_set(&opts, "cookies", c->cookies, 0);
}
av_dict_free(&tmp);
if (is_http)
*is_http = av_strstart(proto_name, "http", NULL);
return ret;
}
| static int open_url(AVFormatContext *s, AVIOContext **pb, const char *url,
AVDictionary *opts, AVDictionary *opts2, int *is_http)
{
HLSContext *c = s->priv_data;
AVDictionary *tmp = NULL;
const char *proto_name = NULL;
int ret;
av_dict_copy(&tmp, opts, 0);
av_dict_copy(&tmp, opts2, 0);
if (av_strstart(url, "crypto", NULL)) {
if (url[6] == '+' || url[6] == ':')
proto_name = avio_find_protocol_name(url + 7);
}
if (!proto_name)
proto_name = avio_find_protocol_name(url);
if (!proto_name)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
if (!av_strstart(proto_name, "http", NULL) && !av_strstart(proto_name, "file", NULL))
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
if (!strncmp(proto_name, url, strlen(proto_name)) && url[strlen(proto_name)] == ':')
;
else if (av_strstart(url, "crypto", NULL) && !strncmp(proto_name, url + 7, strlen(proto_name)) && url[7 + strlen(proto_name)] == ':')
;
else if (strcmp(proto_name, "file") || !strncmp(url, "file,", 5))
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
ret = s->io_open(s, pb, url, AVIO_FLAG_READ, &tmp);
if (ret >= 0) {
char *new_cookies = NULL;
if (!(s->flags & AVFMT_FLAG_CUSTOM_IO))
av_opt_get(*pb, "cookies", AV_OPT_SEARCH_CHILDREN, (uint8_t**)&new_cookies);
if (new_cookies) {
av_free(c->cookies);
c->cookies = new_cookies;
}
av_dict_set(&opts, "cookies", c->cookies, 0);
}
av_dict_free(&tmp);
if (is_http)
*is_http = av_strstart(proto_name, "http", NULL);
return ret;
}
| C | FFmpeg | 1 |
CVE-2016-1908 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1908/ | CWE-254 | https://anongit.mindrot.org/openssh.git/commit/?id=ed4ce82dbfa8a3a3c8ea6fa0db113c71e234416c | ed4ce82dbfa8a3a3c8ea6fa0db113c71e234416c | null | process_mux_open_fwd(u_int rid, Channel *c, Buffer *m, Buffer *r)
{
struct Forward fwd;
char *fwd_desc = NULL;
char *listen_addr, *connect_addr;
u_int ftype;
u_int lport, cport;
int i, ret = 0, freefwd = 1;
memset(&fwd, 0, sizeof(fwd));
/* XXX - lport/cport check redundant */
if (buffer_get_int_ret(&ftype, m) != 0 ||
(listen_addr = buffer_get_string_ret(m, NULL)) == NULL ||
buffer_get_int_ret(&lport, m) != 0 ||
(connect_addr = buffer_get_string_ret(m, NULL)) == NULL ||
buffer_get_int_ret(&cport, m) != 0 ||
(lport != (u_int)PORT_STREAMLOCAL && lport > 65535) ||
(cport != (u_int)PORT_STREAMLOCAL && cport > 65535)) {
error("%s: malformed message", __func__);
ret = -1;
goto out;
}
if (*listen_addr == '\0') {
free(listen_addr);
listen_addr = NULL;
}
if (*connect_addr == '\0') {
free(connect_addr);
connect_addr = NULL;
}
memset(&fwd, 0, sizeof(fwd));
fwd.listen_port = lport;
if (fwd.listen_port == PORT_STREAMLOCAL)
fwd.listen_path = listen_addr;
else
fwd.listen_host = listen_addr;
fwd.connect_port = cport;
if (fwd.connect_port == PORT_STREAMLOCAL)
fwd.connect_path = connect_addr;
else
fwd.connect_host = connect_addr;
debug2("%s: channel %d: request %s", __func__, c->self,
(fwd_desc = format_forward(ftype, &fwd)));
if (ftype != MUX_FWD_LOCAL && ftype != MUX_FWD_REMOTE &&
ftype != MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC) {
logit("%s: invalid forwarding type %u", __func__, ftype);
invalid:
free(listen_addr);
free(connect_addr);
buffer_put_int(r, MUX_S_FAILURE);
buffer_put_int(r, rid);
buffer_put_cstring(r, "Invalid forwarding request");
return 0;
}
if (ftype == MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC && fwd.listen_path) {
logit("%s: streamlocal and dynamic forwards "
"are mutually exclusive", __func__);
goto invalid;
}
if (fwd.listen_port != PORT_STREAMLOCAL && fwd.listen_port >= 65536) {
logit("%s: invalid listen port %u", __func__,
fwd.listen_port);
goto invalid;
}
if ((fwd.connect_port != PORT_STREAMLOCAL && fwd.connect_port >= 65536)
|| (ftype != MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC && ftype != MUX_FWD_REMOTE && fwd.connect_port == 0)) {
logit("%s: invalid connect port %u", __func__,
fwd.connect_port);
goto invalid;
}
if (ftype != MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC && fwd.connect_host == NULL && fwd.connect_path == NULL) {
logit("%s: missing connect host", __func__);
goto invalid;
}
/* Skip forwards that have already been requested */
switch (ftype) {
case MUX_FWD_LOCAL:
case MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC:
for (i = 0; i < options.num_local_forwards; i++) {
if (compare_forward(&fwd,
options.local_forwards + i)) {
exists:
debug2("%s: found existing forwarding",
__func__);
buffer_put_int(r, MUX_S_OK);
buffer_put_int(r, rid);
goto out;
}
}
break;
case MUX_FWD_REMOTE:
for (i = 0; i < options.num_remote_forwards; i++) {
if (compare_forward(&fwd,
options.remote_forwards + i)) {
if (fwd.listen_port != 0)
goto exists;
debug2("%s: found allocated port",
__func__);
buffer_put_int(r, MUX_S_REMOTE_PORT);
buffer_put_int(r, rid);
buffer_put_int(r,
options.remote_forwards[i].allocated_port);
goto out;
}
}
break;
}
if (options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_ASK ||
options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO_ASK) {
if (!ask_permission("Open %s on %s?", fwd_desc, host)) {
debug2("%s: forwarding refused by user", __func__);
buffer_put_int(r, MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED);
buffer_put_int(r, rid);
buffer_put_cstring(r, "Permission denied");
goto out;
}
}
if (ftype == MUX_FWD_LOCAL || ftype == MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC) {
if (!channel_setup_local_fwd_listener(&fwd,
&options.fwd_opts)) {
fail:
logit("slave-requested %s failed", fwd_desc);
buffer_put_int(r, MUX_S_FAILURE);
buffer_put_int(r, rid);
buffer_put_cstring(r, "Port forwarding failed");
goto out;
}
add_local_forward(&options, &fwd);
freefwd = 0;
} else {
struct mux_channel_confirm_ctx *fctx;
fwd.handle = channel_request_remote_forwarding(&fwd);
if (fwd.handle < 0)
goto fail;
add_remote_forward(&options, &fwd);
fctx = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*fctx));
fctx->cid = c->self;
fctx->rid = rid;
fctx->fid = options.num_remote_forwards - 1;
client_register_global_confirm(mux_confirm_remote_forward,
fctx);
freefwd = 0;
c->mux_pause = 1; /* wait for mux_confirm_remote_forward */
/* delayed reply in mux_confirm_remote_forward */
goto out;
}
buffer_put_int(r, MUX_S_OK);
buffer_put_int(r, rid);
out:
free(fwd_desc);
if (freefwd) {
free(fwd.listen_host);
free(fwd.listen_path);
free(fwd.connect_host);
free(fwd.connect_path);
}
return ret;
}
| process_mux_open_fwd(u_int rid, Channel *c, Buffer *m, Buffer *r)
{
struct Forward fwd;
char *fwd_desc = NULL;
char *listen_addr, *connect_addr;
u_int ftype;
u_int lport, cport;
int i, ret = 0, freefwd = 1;
memset(&fwd, 0, sizeof(fwd));
/* XXX - lport/cport check redundant */
if (buffer_get_int_ret(&ftype, m) != 0 ||
(listen_addr = buffer_get_string_ret(m, NULL)) == NULL ||
buffer_get_int_ret(&lport, m) != 0 ||
(connect_addr = buffer_get_string_ret(m, NULL)) == NULL ||
buffer_get_int_ret(&cport, m) != 0 ||
(lport != (u_int)PORT_STREAMLOCAL && lport > 65535) ||
(cport != (u_int)PORT_STREAMLOCAL && cport > 65535)) {
error("%s: malformed message", __func__);
ret = -1;
goto out;
}
if (*listen_addr == '\0') {
free(listen_addr);
listen_addr = NULL;
}
if (*connect_addr == '\0') {
free(connect_addr);
connect_addr = NULL;
}
memset(&fwd, 0, sizeof(fwd));
fwd.listen_port = lport;
if (fwd.listen_port == PORT_STREAMLOCAL)
fwd.listen_path = listen_addr;
else
fwd.listen_host = listen_addr;
fwd.connect_port = cport;
if (fwd.connect_port == PORT_STREAMLOCAL)
fwd.connect_path = connect_addr;
else
fwd.connect_host = connect_addr;
debug2("%s: channel %d: request %s", __func__, c->self,
(fwd_desc = format_forward(ftype, &fwd)));
if (ftype != MUX_FWD_LOCAL && ftype != MUX_FWD_REMOTE &&
ftype != MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC) {
logit("%s: invalid forwarding type %u", __func__, ftype);
invalid:
free(listen_addr);
free(connect_addr);
buffer_put_int(r, MUX_S_FAILURE);
buffer_put_int(r, rid);
buffer_put_cstring(r, "Invalid forwarding request");
return 0;
}
if (ftype == MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC && fwd.listen_path) {
logit("%s: streamlocal and dynamic forwards "
"are mutually exclusive", __func__);
goto invalid;
}
if (fwd.listen_port != PORT_STREAMLOCAL && fwd.listen_port >= 65536) {
logit("%s: invalid listen port %u", __func__,
fwd.listen_port);
goto invalid;
}
if ((fwd.connect_port != PORT_STREAMLOCAL && fwd.connect_port >= 65536)
|| (ftype != MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC && ftype != MUX_FWD_REMOTE && fwd.connect_port == 0)) {
logit("%s: invalid connect port %u", __func__,
fwd.connect_port);
goto invalid;
}
if (ftype != MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC && fwd.connect_host == NULL && fwd.connect_path == NULL) {
logit("%s: missing connect host", __func__);
goto invalid;
}
/* Skip forwards that have already been requested */
switch (ftype) {
case MUX_FWD_LOCAL:
case MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC:
for (i = 0; i < options.num_local_forwards; i++) {
if (compare_forward(&fwd,
options.local_forwards + i)) {
exists:
debug2("%s: found existing forwarding",
__func__);
buffer_put_int(r, MUX_S_OK);
buffer_put_int(r, rid);
goto out;
}
}
break;
case MUX_FWD_REMOTE:
for (i = 0; i < options.num_remote_forwards; i++) {
if (compare_forward(&fwd,
options.remote_forwards + i)) {
if (fwd.listen_port != 0)
goto exists;
debug2("%s: found allocated port",
__func__);
buffer_put_int(r, MUX_S_REMOTE_PORT);
buffer_put_int(r, rid);
buffer_put_int(r,
options.remote_forwards[i].allocated_port);
goto out;
}
}
break;
}
if (options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_ASK ||
options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO_ASK) {
if (!ask_permission("Open %s on %s?", fwd_desc, host)) {
debug2("%s: forwarding refused by user", __func__);
buffer_put_int(r, MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED);
buffer_put_int(r, rid);
buffer_put_cstring(r, "Permission denied");
goto out;
}
}
if (ftype == MUX_FWD_LOCAL || ftype == MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC) {
if (!channel_setup_local_fwd_listener(&fwd,
&options.fwd_opts)) {
fail:
logit("slave-requested %s failed", fwd_desc);
buffer_put_int(r, MUX_S_FAILURE);
buffer_put_int(r, rid);
buffer_put_cstring(r, "Port forwarding failed");
goto out;
}
add_local_forward(&options, &fwd);
freefwd = 0;
} else {
struct mux_channel_confirm_ctx *fctx;
fwd.handle = channel_request_remote_forwarding(&fwd);
if (fwd.handle < 0)
goto fail;
add_remote_forward(&options, &fwd);
fctx = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*fctx));
fctx->cid = c->self;
fctx->rid = rid;
fctx->fid = options.num_remote_forwards - 1;
client_register_global_confirm(mux_confirm_remote_forward,
fctx);
freefwd = 0;
c->mux_pause = 1; /* wait for mux_confirm_remote_forward */
/* delayed reply in mux_confirm_remote_forward */
goto out;
}
buffer_put_int(r, MUX_S_OK);
buffer_put_int(r, rid);
out:
free(fwd_desc);
if (freefwd) {
free(fwd.listen_host);
free(fwd.listen_path);
free(fwd.connect_host);
free(fwd.connect_path);
}
return ret;
}
| C | mindrot | 0 |
CVE-2014-1700 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-1700/ | CWE-399 | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/d926098e2e2be270c80a5ba25ab8a611b80b8556 | d926098e2e2be270c80a5ba25ab8a611b80b8556 | Connect WebUSB client interface to the devices app
This provides a basic WebUSB client interface in
content/renderer. Most of the interface is unimplemented,
but this CL hooks up navigator.usb.getDevices() to the
browser's Mojo devices app to enumerate available USB
devices.
BUG=492204
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1293253002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#344881} | blink::WebBluetooth* RenderFrameImpl::bluetooth() {
if (!bluetooth_) {
bluetooth_.reset(new WebBluetoothImpl(
ChildThreadImpl::current()->thread_safe_sender(), routing_id_));
}
return bluetooth_.get();
}
| blink::WebBluetooth* RenderFrameImpl::bluetooth() {
if (!bluetooth_) {
bluetooth_.reset(new WebBluetoothImpl(
ChildThreadImpl::current()->thread_safe_sender(), routing_id_));
}
return bluetooth_.get();
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2017-9374 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-9374/ | CWE-772 | https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commit;h=d710e1e7bd3d5bfc26b631f02ae87901ebe646b0 | d710e1e7bd3d5bfc26b631f02ae87901ebe646b0 | null | static void ehci_queues_rip_unseen(EHCIState *ehci, int async)
{
EHCIQueueHead *head = async ? &ehci->aqueues : &ehci->pqueues;
EHCIQueue *q, *tmp;
QTAILQ_FOREACH_SAFE(q, head, next, tmp) {
if (!q->seen) {
ehci_free_queue(q, NULL);
}
}
}
| static void ehci_queues_rip_unseen(EHCIState *ehci, int async)
{
EHCIQueueHead *head = async ? &ehci->aqueues : &ehci->pqueues;
EHCIQueue *q, *tmp;
QTAILQ_FOREACH_SAFE(q, head, next, tmp) {
if (!q->seen) {
ehci_free_queue(q, NULL);
}
}
}
| C | qemu | 0 |
null | null | null | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/1161a49d663dd395bd639549c2dfe7324f847938 | 1161a49d663dd395bd639549c2dfe7324f847938 | Don't populate URL data in WebDropData when dragging files.
This is considered a potential security issue as well, since it leaks
filesystem paths.
BUG=332579
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/135633002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@244538 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | bool HomeButton::CanDrop(const OSExchangeData& data) {
return data.HasURL();
}
| bool HomeButton::CanDrop(const OSExchangeData& data) {
return data.HasURL();
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2014-7815 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-7815/ | CWE-264 | https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commit;h=e6908bfe8e07f2b452e78e677da1b45b1c0f6829 | e6908bfe8e07f2b452e78e677da1b45b1c0f6829 | null | static int vnc_update_client(VncState *vs, int has_dirty, bool sync)
{
vs->has_dirty += has_dirty;
if (vs->need_update && vs->csock != -1) {
VncDisplay *vd = vs->vd;
VncJob *job;
int y;
int height, width;
int n = 0;
if (vs->output.offset && !vs->audio_cap && !vs->force_update)
/* kernel send buffers are full -> drop frames to throttle */
return 0;
if (!vs->has_dirty && !vs->audio_cap && !vs->force_update)
return 0;
/*
* Send screen updates to the vnc client using the server
* surface and server dirty map. guest surface updates
* happening in parallel don't disturb us, the next pass will
* send them to the client.
*/
job = vnc_job_new(vs);
height = pixman_image_get_height(vd->server);
width = pixman_image_get_width(vd->server);
y = 0;
for (;;) {
int x, h;
unsigned long x2;
unsigned long offset = find_next_bit((unsigned long *) &vs->dirty,
height * VNC_DIRTY_BPL(vs),
y * VNC_DIRTY_BPL(vs));
if (offset == height * VNC_DIRTY_BPL(vs)) {
/* no more dirty bits */
break;
}
y = offset / VNC_DIRTY_BPL(vs);
x = offset % VNC_DIRTY_BPL(vs);
x2 = find_next_zero_bit((unsigned long *) &vs->dirty[y],
VNC_DIRTY_BPL(vs), x);
bitmap_clear(vs->dirty[y], x, x2 - x);
h = find_and_clear_dirty_height(vs, y, x, x2, height);
x2 = MIN(x2, width / VNC_DIRTY_PIXELS_PER_BIT);
if (x2 > x) {
n += vnc_job_add_rect(job, x * VNC_DIRTY_PIXELS_PER_BIT, y,
(x2 - x) * VNC_DIRTY_PIXELS_PER_BIT, h);
}
}
vnc_job_push(job);
if (sync) {
vnc_jobs_join(vs);
}
vs->force_update = 0;
vs->has_dirty = 0;
return n;
}
if (vs->csock == -1) {
vnc_disconnect_finish(vs);
} else if (sync) {
vnc_jobs_join(vs);
}
return 0;
}
| static int vnc_update_client(VncState *vs, int has_dirty, bool sync)
{
vs->has_dirty += has_dirty;
if (vs->need_update && vs->csock != -1) {
VncDisplay *vd = vs->vd;
VncJob *job;
int y;
int height, width;
int n = 0;
if (vs->output.offset && !vs->audio_cap && !vs->force_update)
/* kernel send buffers are full -> drop frames to throttle */
return 0;
if (!vs->has_dirty && !vs->audio_cap && !vs->force_update)
return 0;
/*
* Send screen updates to the vnc client using the server
* surface and server dirty map. guest surface updates
* happening in parallel don't disturb us, the next pass will
* send them to the client.
*/
job = vnc_job_new(vs);
height = pixman_image_get_height(vd->server);
width = pixman_image_get_width(vd->server);
y = 0;
for (;;) {
int x, h;
unsigned long x2;
unsigned long offset = find_next_bit((unsigned long *) &vs->dirty,
height * VNC_DIRTY_BPL(vs),
y * VNC_DIRTY_BPL(vs));
if (offset == height * VNC_DIRTY_BPL(vs)) {
/* no more dirty bits */
break;
}
y = offset / VNC_DIRTY_BPL(vs);
x = offset % VNC_DIRTY_BPL(vs);
x2 = find_next_zero_bit((unsigned long *) &vs->dirty[y],
VNC_DIRTY_BPL(vs), x);
bitmap_clear(vs->dirty[y], x, x2 - x);
h = find_and_clear_dirty_height(vs, y, x, x2, height);
x2 = MIN(x2, width / VNC_DIRTY_PIXELS_PER_BIT);
if (x2 > x) {
n += vnc_job_add_rect(job, x * VNC_DIRTY_PIXELS_PER_BIT, y,
(x2 - x) * VNC_DIRTY_PIXELS_PER_BIT, h);
}
}
vnc_job_push(job);
if (sync) {
vnc_jobs_join(vs);
}
vs->force_update = 0;
vs->has_dirty = 0;
return n;
}
if (vs->csock == -1) {
vnc_disconnect_finish(vs);
} else if (sync) {
vnc_jobs_join(vs);
}
return 0;
}
| C | qemu | 0 |
CVE-2014-2013 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-2013/ | CWE-119 | http://git.ghostscript.com/?p=mupdf.git;a=commitdiff;h=60dabde18d7fe12b19da8b509bdfee9cc886aafc | 60dabde18d7fe12b19da8b509bdfee9cc886aafc | null | xps_lookup_alternate_content(fz_xml *node)
{
for (node = fz_xml_down(node); node; node = fz_xml_next(node))
{
if (!strcmp(fz_xml_tag(node), "mc:Choice") && fz_xml_att(node, "Requires"))
{
char list[64];
char *next = list, *item;
fz_strlcpy(list, fz_xml_att(node, "Requires"), sizeof(list));
while ((item = fz_strsep(&next, " \t\r\n")) != NULL && (!*item || !strcmp(item, "xps")));
if (!item)
return fz_xml_down(node);
}
else if (!strcmp(fz_xml_tag(node), "mc:Fallback"))
return fz_xml_down(node);
}
return NULL;
}
| xps_lookup_alternate_content(fz_xml *node)
{
for (node = fz_xml_down(node); node; node = fz_xml_next(node))
{
if (!strcmp(fz_xml_tag(node), "mc:Choice") && fz_xml_att(node, "Requires"))
{
char list[64];
char *next = list, *item;
fz_strlcpy(list, fz_xml_att(node, "Requires"), sizeof(list));
while ((item = fz_strsep(&next, " \t\r\n")) != NULL && (!*item || !strcmp(item, "xps")));
if (!item)
return fz_xml_down(node);
}
else if (!strcmp(fz_xml_tag(node), "mc:Fallback"))
return fz_xml_down(node);
}
return NULL;
}
| C | ghostscript | 0 |
CVE-2011-3055 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-3055/ | null | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/e9372a1bfd3588a80fcf49aa07321f0971dd6091 | e9372a1bfd3588a80fcf49aa07321f0971dd6091 | [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | v8::Handle<v8::Value> V8WebGLRenderingContext::uniformMatrix4fvCallback(const v8::Arguments& args)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.WebGLRenderingContext.uniformMatrix4fv()");
return uniformMatrixHelper(args, 4);
}
| v8::Handle<v8::Value> V8WebGLRenderingContext::uniformMatrix4fvCallback(const v8::Arguments& args)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.WebGLRenderingContext.uniformMatrix4fv()");
return uniformMatrixHelper(args, 4);
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2013-1415 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-1415/ | null | https://github.com/krb5/krb5/commit/f249555301940c6df3a2cdda13b56b5674eebc2e | f249555301940c6df3a2cdda13b56b5674eebc2e | PKINIT null pointer deref [CVE-2013-1415]
Don't dereference a null pointer when cleaning up.
The KDC plugin for PKINIT can dereference a null pointer when a
malformed packet causes processing to terminate early, leading to
a crash of the KDC process. An attacker would need to have a valid
PKINIT certificate or have observed a successful PKINIT authentication,
or an unauthenticated attacker could execute the attack if anonymous
PKINIT is enabled.
CVSSv2 vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:P/RL:O/RC:C
This is a minimal commit for pullup; style fixes in a followup.
[[email protected]: reformat and edit commit message]
(cherry picked from commit c773d3c775e9b2d88bcdff5f8a8ba88d7ec4e8ed)
ticket: 7570
version_fixed: 1.11.1
status: resolved | cms_envelopeddata_verify(krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
krb5_preauthtype pa_type,
int require_crl_checking,
unsigned char *enveloped_data,
unsigned int enveloped_data_len,
unsigned char **data,
unsigned int *data_len)
{
krb5_error_code retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
PKCS7 *p7 = NULL;
BIO *out = NULL;
int i = 0;
unsigned int size = 0;
const unsigned char *p = enveloped_data;
unsigned int tmp_buf_len = 0, tmp_buf2_len = 0, vfy_buf_len = 0;
unsigned char *tmp_buf = NULL, *tmp_buf2 = NULL, *vfy_buf = NULL;
int msg_type = 0;
#ifdef DEBUG_ASN1
print_buffer_bin(enveloped_data, enveloped_data_len,
"/tmp/client_envelopeddata");
#endif
/* decode received PKCS7 message */
if ((p7 = d2i_PKCS7(NULL, &p, (int)enveloped_data_len)) == NULL) {
unsigned long err = ERR_peek_error();
pkiDebug("failed to decode pkcs7\n");
krb5_set_error_message(context, retval, "%s\n",
ERR_error_string(err, NULL));
goto cleanup;
}
/* verify that the received message is PKCS7 EnvelopedData message */
if (OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type) != NID_pkcs7_enveloped) {
pkiDebug("Expected id-enveloped PKCS7 msg (received type = %d)\n",
OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type));
krb5_set_error_message(context, retval, "wrong oid\n");
goto cleanup;
}
/* decrypt received PKCS7 message */
out = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
if (pkcs7_decrypt(context, id_cryptoctx, p7, out)) {
pkiDebug("PKCS7 decryption successful\n");
} else {
unsigned long err = ERR_peek_error();
if (err != 0)
krb5_set_error_message(context, retval, "%s\n",
ERR_error_string(err, NULL));
pkiDebug("PKCS7 decryption failed\n");
goto cleanup;
}
/* transfer the decoded PKCS7 SignedData message into a separate buffer */
for (;;) {
if ((tmp_buf = realloc(tmp_buf, size + 1024 * 10)) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
i = BIO_read(out, &(tmp_buf[size]), 1024 * 10);
if (i <= 0)
break;
else
size += i;
}
tmp_buf_len = size;
#ifdef DEBUG_ASN1
print_buffer_bin(tmp_buf, tmp_buf_len, "/tmp/client_enc_keypack");
#endif
/* verify PKCS7 SignedData message */
switch (pa_type) {
case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REP:
msg_type = CMS_ENVEL_SERVER;
break;
case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REP_OLD:
msg_type = CMS_SIGN_DRAFT9;
break;
default:
pkiDebug("%s: unrecognized pa_type = %d\n", __FUNCTION__, pa_type);
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
goto cleanup;
}
/*
* If this is the RFC style, wrap the signed data to make
* decoding easier in the verify routine.
* For draft9-compatible, we don't do anything because it
* is already wrapped.
*/
#ifdef LONGHORN_BETA_COMPAT
/*
* The Longhorn server returns the expected RFC-style data, but
* it is missing the sequence tag and length, so it requires
* special processing when wrapping.
* This will hopefully be fixed before the final release and
* this can all be removed.
*/
if (msg_type == CMS_ENVEL_SERVER || longhorn == 1) {
retval = wrap_signeddata(tmp_buf, tmp_buf_len,
&tmp_buf2, &tmp_buf2_len, longhorn);
if (retval) {
pkiDebug("failed to encode signeddata\n");
goto cleanup;
}
vfy_buf = tmp_buf2;
vfy_buf_len = tmp_buf2_len;
} else {
vfy_buf = tmp_buf;
vfy_buf_len = tmp_buf_len;
}
#else
if (msg_type == CMS_ENVEL_SERVER) {
retval = wrap_signeddata(tmp_buf, tmp_buf_len,
&tmp_buf2, &tmp_buf2_len);
if (retval) {
pkiDebug("failed to encode signeddata\n");
goto cleanup;
}
vfy_buf = tmp_buf2;
vfy_buf_len = tmp_buf2_len;
} else {
vfy_buf = tmp_buf;
vfy_buf_len = tmp_buf_len;
}
#endif
#ifdef DEBUG_ASN1
print_buffer_bin(vfy_buf, vfy_buf_len, "/tmp/client_enc_keypack2");
#endif
retval = cms_signeddata_verify(context, plg_cryptoctx, req_cryptoctx,
id_cryptoctx, msg_type,
require_crl_checking,
vfy_buf, vfy_buf_len,
data, data_len, NULL, NULL, NULL);
if (!retval)
pkiDebug("PKCS7 Verification Success\n");
else {
pkiDebug("PKCS7 Verification Failure\n");
goto cleanup;
}
retval = 0;
cleanup:
if (p7 != NULL)
PKCS7_free(p7);
if (out != NULL)
BIO_free(out);
free(tmp_buf);
free(tmp_buf2);
return retval;
}
| cms_envelopeddata_verify(krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
krb5_preauthtype pa_type,
int require_crl_checking,
unsigned char *enveloped_data,
unsigned int enveloped_data_len,
unsigned char **data,
unsigned int *data_len)
{
krb5_error_code retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
PKCS7 *p7 = NULL;
BIO *out = NULL;
int i = 0;
unsigned int size = 0;
const unsigned char *p = enveloped_data;
unsigned int tmp_buf_len = 0, tmp_buf2_len = 0, vfy_buf_len = 0;
unsigned char *tmp_buf = NULL, *tmp_buf2 = NULL, *vfy_buf = NULL;
int msg_type = 0;
#ifdef DEBUG_ASN1
print_buffer_bin(enveloped_data, enveloped_data_len,
"/tmp/client_envelopeddata");
#endif
/* decode received PKCS7 message */
if ((p7 = d2i_PKCS7(NULL, &p, (int)enveloped_data_len)) == NULL) {
unsigned long err = ERR_peek_error();
pkiDebug("failed to decode pkcs7\n");
krb5_set_error_message(context, retval, "%s\n",
ERR_error_string(err, NULL));
goto cleanup;
}
/* verify that the received message is PKCS7 EnvelopedData message */
if (OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type) != NID_pkcs7_enveloped) {
pkiDebug("Expected id-enveloped PKCS7 msg (received type = %d)\n",
OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type));
krb5_set_error_message(context, retval, "wrong oid\n");
goto cleanup;
}
/* decrypt received PKCS7 message */
out = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
if (pkcs7_decrypt(context, id_cryptoctx, p7, out)) {
pkiDebug("PKCS7 decryption successful\n");
} else {
unsigned long err = ERR_peek_error();
if (err != 0)
krb5_set_error_message(context, retval, "%s\n",
ERR_error_string(err, NULL));
pkiDebug("PKCS7 decryption failed\n");
goto cleanup;
}
/* transfer the decoded PKCS7 SignedData message into a separate buffer */
for (;;) {
if ((tmp_buf = realloc(tmp_buf, size + 1024 * 10)) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
i = BIO_read(out, &(tmp_buf[size]), 1024 * 10);
if (i <= 0)
break;
else
size += i;
}
tmp_buf_len = size;
#ifdef DEBUG_ASN1
print_buffer_bin(tmp_buf, tmp_buf_len, "/tmp/client_enc_keypack");
#endif
/* verify PKCS7 SignedData message */
switch (pa_type) {
case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REP:
msg_type = CMS_ENVEL_SERVER;
break;
case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REP_OLD:
msg_type = CMS_SIGN_DRAFT9;
break;
default:
pkiDebug("%s: unrecognized pa_type = %d\n", __FUNCTION__, pa_type);
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
goto cleanup;
}
/*
* If this is the RFC style, wrap the signed data to make
* decoding easier in the verify routine.
* For draft9-compatible, we don't do anything because it
* is already wrapped.
*/
#ifdef LONGHORN_BETA_COMPAT
/*
* The Longhorn server returns the expected RFC-style data, but
* it is missing the sequence tag and length, so it requires
* special processing when wrapping.
* This will hopefully be fixed before the final release and
* this can all be removed.
*/
if (msg_type == CMS_ENVEL_SERVER || longhorn == 1) {
retval = wrap_signeddata(tmp_buf, tmp_buf_len,
&tmp_buf2, &tmp_buf2_len, longhorn);
if (retval) {
pkiDebug("failed to encode signeddata\n");
goto cleanup;
}
vfy_buf = tmp_buf2;
vfy_buf_len = tmp_buf2_len;
} else {
vfy_buf = tmp_buf;
vfy_buf_len = tmp_buf_len;
}
#else
if (msg_type == CMS_ENVEL_SERVER) {
retval = wrap_signeddata(tmp_buf, tmp_buf_len,
&tmp_buf2, &tmp_buf2_len);
if (retval) {
pkiDebug("failed to encode signeddata\n");
goto cleanup;
}
vfy_buf = tmp_buf2;
vfy_buf_len = tmp_buf2_len;
} else {
vfy_buf = tmp_buf;
vfy_buf_len = tmp_buf_len;
}
#endif
#ifdef DEBUG_ASN1
print_buffer_bin(vfy_buf, vfy_buf_len, "/tmp/client_enc_keypack2");
#endif
retval = cms_signeddata_verify(context, plg_cryptoctx, req_cryptoctx,
id_cryptoctx, msg_type,
require_crl_checking,
vfy_buf, vfy_buf_len,
data, data_len, NULL, NULL, NULL);
if (!retval)
pkiDebug("PKCS7 Verification Success\n");
else {
pkiDebug("PKCS7 Verification Failure\n");
goto cleanup;
}
retval = 0;
cleanup:
if (p7 != NULL)
PKCS7_free(p7);
if (out != NULL)
BIO_free(out);
free(tmp_buf);
free(tmp_buf2);
return retval;
}
| C | krb5 | 0 |
CVE-2015-1285 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1285/ | CWE-200 | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/39595f8d4dffcb644d438106dcb64a30c139ff0e | 39595f8d4dffcb644d438106dcb64a30c139ff0e | [reland] Do not set default wallpaper unless it should do so.
[email protected], [email protected]
Bug: 751382
Change-Id: Id0793dfe467f737526a95b1e66ed01fbb8860bda
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/619754
Commit-Queue: Xiaoqian Dai <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Alekseev <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Biao She <[email protected]>
Cr-Original-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498325}
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/646430
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498982} | rescaled_small_exists() const {
return rescaled_small_exists_;
}
| rescaled_small_exists() const {
return rescaled_small_exists_;
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2014-9710 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-9710/ | CWE-362 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/5f5bc6b1e2d5a6f827bc860ef2dc5b6f365d1339 | 5f5bc6b1e2d5a6f827bc860ef2dc5b6f365d1339 | Btrfs: make xattr replace operations atomic
Replacing a xattr consists of doing a lookup for its existing value, delete
the current value from the respective leaf, release the search path and then
finally insert the new value. This leaves a time window where readers (getxattr,
listxattrs) won't see any value for the xattr. Xattrs are used to store ACLs,
so this has security implications.
This change also fixes 2 other existing issues which were:
*) Deleting the old xattr value without verifying first if the new xattr will
fit in the existing leaf item (in case multiple xattrs are packed in the
same item due to name hash collision);
*) Returning -EEXIST when the flag XATTR_CREATE is given and the xattr doesn't
exist but we have have an existing item that packs muliple xattrs with
the same name hash as the input xattr. In this case we should return ENOSPC.
A test case for xfstests follows soon.
Thanks to Alexandre Oliva for reporting the non-atomicity of the xattr replace
implementation.
Reported-by: Alexandre Oliva <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <[email protected]> | static int close_blocks(u64 blocknr, u64 other, u32 blocksize)
{
if (blocknr < other && other - (blocknr + blocksize) < 32768)
return 1;
if (blocknr > other && blocknr - (other + blocksize) < 32768)
return 1;
return 0;
}
| static int close_blocks(u64 blocknr, u64 other, u32 blocksize)
{
if (blocknr < other && other - (blocknr + blocksize) < 32768)
return 1;
if (blocknr > other && blocknr - (other + blocksize) < 32768)
return 1;
return 0;
}
| C | linux | 0 |
null | null | null | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/7f9cb4b09dee69d7ea5391650b6f68a39e3c5874 | 7f9cb4b09dee69d7ea5391650b6f68a39e3c5874 | DevTools: enable two sanity tests (fixed upstream)
BUG=53406
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/3305023
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@59081 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | void CloseDevToolsWindow() {
DevToolsManager* devtools_manager = DevToolsManager::GetInstance();
Browser* browser = window_->browser();
devtools_manager->UnregisterDevToolsClientHostFor(inspected_rvh_);
if (browser)
BrowserClosedObserver close_observer(browser);
}
| void CloseDevToolsWindow() {
DevToolsManager* devtools_manager = DevToolsManager::GetInstance();
Browser* browser = window_->browser();
devtools_manager->UnregisterDevToolsClientHostFor(inspected_rvh_);
if (browser)
BrowserClosedObserver close_observer(browser);
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2015-6787 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-6787/ | null | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f911e11e7f6b5c0d6f5ee694a9871de6619889f7 | f911e11e7f6b5c0d6f5ee694a9871de6619889f7 | Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <[email protected]>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> [email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
[email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930} | DisplayItemClient& TestPaintArtifact::Client(size_t i) const {
return *dummy_clients_[i];
}
| DisplayItemClient& TestPaintArtifact::Client(size_t i) const {
return *dummy_clients_[i];
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2017-5130 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5130/ | CWE-787 | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/ce1446c00f0fd8f5a3b00727421be2124cb7370f | ce1446c00f0fd8f5a3b00727421be2124cb7370f | Roll libxml to 3939178e4cb797417ff033b1e04ab4b038e224d9
Removes a few patches fixed upstream:
https://git.gnome.org/browse/libxml2/commit/?id=e26630548e7d138d2c560844c43820b6767251e3
https://git.gnome.org/browse/libxml2/commit/?id=94691dc884d1a8ada39f073408b4bb92fe7fe882
Stops using the NOXXE flag which was reverted upstream:
https://git.gnome.org/browse/libxml2/commit/?id=030b1f7a27c22f9237eddca49ec5e620b6258d7d
Changes the patch to uri.c to not add limits.h, which is included
upstream.
Bug: 722079
Change-Id: I4b8449ed33f95de23c54c2cde99970c2df2781ac
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/535233
Reviewed-by: Scott Graham <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Dominic Cooney <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480755} | htmlNodeInfoPop(htmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt)
{
if (ctxt->nodeInfoNr <= 0)
return (NULL);
ctxt->nodeInfoNr--;
if (ctxt->nodeInfoNr < 0)
return (NULL);
if (ctxt->nodeInfoNr > 0)
ctxt->nodeInfo = &ctxt->nodeInfoTab[ctxt->nodeInfoNr - 1];
else
ctxt->nodeInfo = NULL;
return &ctxt->nodeInfoTab[ctxt->nodeInfoNr];
}
| htmlNodeInfoPop(htmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt)
{
if (ctxt->nodeInfoNr <= 0)
return (NULL);
ctxt->nodeInfoNr--;
if (ctxt->nodeInfoNr < 0)
return (NULL);
if (ctxt->nodeInfoNr > 0)
ctxt->nodeInfo = &ctxt->nodeInfoTab[ctxt->nodeInfoNr - 1];
else
ctxt->nodeInfo = NULL;
return &ctxt->nodeInfoTab[ctxt->nodeInfoNr];
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2013-4119 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-4119/ | CWE-476 | https://github.com/FreeRDP/FreeRDP/commit/0773bb9303d24473fe1185d85a424dfe159aff53 | 0773bb9303d24473fe1185d85a424dfe159aff53 | nla: invalidate sec handle after creation
If sec pointer isn't invalidated after creation it is not possible
to check if the upper and lower pointers are valid.
This fixes a segfault in the server part if the client disconnects before
the authentication was finished. | BOOL transport_connect_tls(rdpTransport* transport)
{
if (transport->layer == TRANSPORT_LAYER_TSG)
return TRUE;
if (transport->TlsIn == NULL)
transport->TlsIn = tls_new(transport->settings);
if (transport->TlsOut == NULL)
transport->TlsOut = transport->TlsIn;
transport->layer = TRANSPORT_LAYER_TLS;
transport->TlsIn->sockfd = transport->TcpIn->sockfd;
if (tls_connect(transport->TlsIn) != TRUE)
{
if (!connectErrorCode)
connectErrorCode = TLSCONNECTERROR;
tls_free(transport->TlsIn);
if (transport->TlsIn == transport->TlsOut)
transport->TlsIn = transport->TlsOut = NULL;
else
transport->TlsIn = NULL;
return FALSE;
}
return TRUE;
}
| BOOL transport_connect_tls(rdpTransport* transport)
{
if (transport->layer == TRANSPORT_LAYER_TSG)
return TRUE;
if (transport->TlsIn == NULL)
transport->TlsIn = tls_new(transport->settings);
if (transport->TlsOut == NULL)
transport->TlsOut = transport->TlsIn;
transport->layer = TRANSPORT_LAYER_TLS;
transport->TlsIn->sockfd = transport->TcpIn->sockfd;
if (tls_connect(transport->TlsIn) != TRUE)
{
if (!connectErrorCode)
connectErrorCode = TLSCONNECTERROR;
tls_free(transport->TlsIn);
if (transport->TlsIn == transport->TlsOut)
transport->TlsIn = transport->TlsOut = NULL;
else
transport->TlsIn = NULL;
return FALSE;
}
return TRUE;
}
| C | FreeRDP | 0 |
CVE-2019-11222 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-11222/ | CWE-119 | https://github.com/gpac/gpac/commit/f36525c5beafb78959c3a07d6622c9028de348da | f36525c5beafb78959c3a07d6622c9028de348da | fix buffer overrun in gf_bin128_parse
closes #1204
closes #1205 | Bool gf_sys_get_rti_os(u32 refresh_time_ms, GF_SystemRTInfo *rti, u32 flags)
{
size_t length;
u32 entry_time, i, percent;
int mib[6];
u64 result;
int pagesize;
u64 process_u_k_time;
double utime, stime;
vm_statistics_data_t vmstat;
task_t task;
kern_return_t error;
thread_array_t thread_table;
unsigned table_size;
thread_basic_info_t thi;
thread_basic_info_data_t thi_data;
struct task_basic_info ti;
mach_msg_type_number_t count = HOST_VM_INFO_COUNT, size = sizeof(ti);
entry_time = gf_sys_clock();
if (last_update_time && (entry_time - last_update_time < refresh_time_ms)) {
memcpy(rti, &the_rti, sizeof(GF_SystemRTInfo));
return 0;
}
mib[0] = CTL_HW;
mib[1] = HW_PAGESIZE;
length = sizeof(pagesize);
if (sysctl(mib, 2, &pagesize, &length, NULL, 0) < 0) {
return 0;
}
if (host_statistics(mach_host_self(), HOST_VM_INFO, (host_info_t)&vmstat, &count) != KERN_SUCCESS) {
return 0;
}
the_rti.physical_memory = (vmstat.wire_count + vmstat.active_count + vmstat.inactive_count + vmstat.free_count)* pagesize;
the_rti.physical_memory_avail = vmstat.free_count * pagesize;
if (!total_physical_memory) {
mib[0] = CTL_HW;
mib[1] = HW_MEMSIZE;
length = sizeof(u64);
if (sysctl(mib, 2, &result, &length, NULL, 0) >= 0) {
total_physical_memory = result;
}
}
the_rti.physical_memory = total_physical_memory;
error = task_for_pid(mach_task_self(), the_rti.pid, &task);
if (error) {
GF_LOG(GF_LOG_ERROR, GF_LOG_CORE, ("[RTI] Cannot get process task for PID %d: error %d\n", the_rti.pid, error));
return 0;
}
error = task_info(mach_task_self(), TASK_BASIC_INFO, (task_info_t)&ti, &size);
if (error) {
GF_LOG(GF_LOG_ERROR, GF_LOG_CORE, ("[RTI] Cannot get process task info (PID %d): error %d\n", the_rti.pid, error));
return 0;
}
percent = 0;
utime = ti.user_time.seconds + ti.user_time.microseconds * 1e-6;
stime = ti.system_time.seconds + ti.system_time.microseconds * 1e-6;
error = task_threads(task, &thread_table, &table_size);
if (error != KERN_SUCCESS) {
GF_LOG(GF_LOG_ERROR, GF_LOG_CORE, ("[RTI] Cannot get threads task for PID %d: error %d\n", the_rti.pid, error));
return 0;
}
thi = &thi_data;
for (i = 0; i != table_size; ++i) {
count = THREAD_BASIC_INFO_COUNT;
error = thread_info(thread_table[i], THREAD_BASIC_INFO, (thread_info_t)thi, &count);
if (error != KERN_SUCCESS) {
mach_error("[RTI] Unexpected thread_info() call return", error);
GF_LOG(GF_LOG_WARNING, GF_LOG_CORE, ("[RTI] Unexpected thread info for PID %d\n", the_rti.pid));
break;
}
if ((thi->flags & TH_FLAGS_IDLE) == 0) {
utime += thi->user_time.seconds + thi->user_time.microseconds * 1e-6;
stime += thi->system_time.seconds + thi->system_time.microseconds * 1e-6;
percent += (u32) (100 * (double)thi->cpu_usage / TH_USAGE_SCALE);
}
}
vm_deallocate(mach_task_self(), (vm_offset_t)thread_table, table_size * sizeof(thread_array_t));
mach_port_deallocate(mach_task_self(), task);
process_u_k_time = utime + stime;
the_rti.sampling_instant = last_update_time;
if (last_update_time) {
the_rti.sampling_period_duration = (entry_time - last_update_time);
the_rti.process_cpu_time_diff = (process_u_k_time - last_process_k_u_time) * 10;
the_rti.total_cpu_time_diff = the_rti.sampling_period_duration;
/*TODO*/
the_rti.cpu_idle_time = 0;
the_rti.total_cpu_usage = 0;
if (!the_rti.process_cpu_time_diff) the_rti.process_cpu_time_diff = the_rti.total_cpu_time_diff;
the_rti.process_cpu_usage = percent;
} else {
mem_at_startup = the_rti.physical_memory_avail;
}
the_rti.process_memory = mem_at_startup - the_rti.physical_memory_avail;
#ifdef GPAC_MEMORY_TRACKING
the_rti.gpac_memory = gpac_allocated_memory;
#endif
last_process_k_u_time = process_u_k_time;
last_cpu_idle_time = 0;
last_update_time = entry_time;
memcpy(rti, &the_rti, sizeof(GF_SystemRTInfo));
return 1;
}
| Bool gf_sys_get_rti_os(u32 refresh_time_ms, GF_SystemRTInfo *rti, u32 flags)
{
size_t length;
u32 entry_time, i, percent;
int mib[6];
u64 result;
int pagesize;
u64 process_u_k_time;
double utime, stime;
vm_statistics_data_t vmstat;
task_t task;
kern_return_t error;
thread_array_t thread_table;
unsigned table_size;
thread_basic_info_t thi;
thread_basic_info_data_t thi_data;
struct task_basic_info ti;
mach_msg_type_number_t count = HOST_VM_INFO_COUNT, size = sizeof(ti);
entry_time = gf_sys_clock();
if (last_update_time && (entry_time - last_update_time < refresh_time_ms)) {
memcpy(rti, &the_rti, sizeof(GF_SystemRTInfo));
return 0;
}
mib[0] = CTL_HW;
mib[1] = HW_PAGESIZE;
length = sizeof(pagesize);
if (sysctl(mib, 2, &pagesize, &length, NULL, 0) < 0) {
return 0;
}
if (host_statistics(mach_host_self(), HOST_VM_INFO, (host_info_t)&vmstat, &count) != KERN_SUCCESS) {
return 0;
}
the_rti.physical_memory = (vmstat.wire_count + vmstat.active_count + vmstat.inactive_count + vmstat.free_count)* pagesize;
the_rti.physical_memory_avail = vmstat.free_count * pagesize;
if (!total_physical_memory) {
mib[0] = CTL_HW;
mib[1] = HW_MEMSIZE;
length = sizeof(u64);
if (sysctl(mib, 2, &result, &length, NULL, 0) >= 0) {
total_physical_memory = result;
}
}
the_rti.physical_memory = total_physical_memory;
error = task_for_pid(mach_task_self(), the_rti.pid, &task);
if (error) {
GF_LOG(GF_LOG_ERROR, GF_LOG_CORE, ("[RTI] Cannot get process task for PID %d: error %d\n", the_rti.pid, error));
return 0;
}
error = task_info(mach_task_self(), TASK_BASIC_INFO, (task_info_t)&ti, &size);
if (error) {
GF_LOG(GF_LOG_ERROR, GF_LOG_CORE, ("[RTI] Cannot get process task info (PID %d): error %d\n", the_rti.pid, error));
return 0;
}
percent = 0;
utime = ti.user_time.seconds + ti.user_time.microseconds * 1e-6;
stime = ti.system_time.seconds + ti.system_time.microseconds * 1e-6;
error = task_threads(task, &thread_table, &table_size);
if (error != KERN_SUCCESS) {
GF_LOG(GF_LOG_ERROR, GF_LOG_CORE, ("[RTI] Cannot get threads task for PID %d: error %d\n", the_rti.pid, error));
return 0;
}
thi = &thi_data;
for (i = 0; i != table_size; ++i) {
count = THREAD_BASIC_INFO_COUNT;
error = thread_info(thread_table[i], THREAD_BASIC_INFO, (thread_info_t)thi, &count);
if (error != KERN_SUCCESS) {
mach_error("[RTI] Unexpected thread_info() call return", error);
GF_LOG(GF_LOG_WARNING, GF_LOG_CORE, ("[RTI] Unexpected thread info for PID %d\n", the_rti.pid));
break;
}
if ((thi->flags & TH_FLAGS_IDLE) == 0) {
utime += thi->user_time.seconds + thi->user_time.microseconds * 1e-6;
stime += thi->system_time.seconds + thi->system_time.microseconds * 1e-6;
percent += (u32) (100 * (double)thi->cpu_usage / TH_USAGE_SCALE);
}
}
vm_deallocate(mach_task_self(), (vm_offset_t)thread_table, table_size * sizeof(thread_array_t));
mach_port_deallocate(mach_task_self(), task);
process_u_k_time = utime + stime;
the_rti.sampling_instant = last_update_time;
if (last_update_time) {
the_rti.sampling_period_duration = (entry_time - last_update_time);
the_rti.process_cpu_time_diff = (process_u_k_time - last_process_k_u_time) * 10;
the_rti.total_cpu_time_diff = the_rti.sampling_period_duration;
/*TODO*/
the_rti.cpu_idle_time = 0;
the_rti.total_cpu_usage = 0;
if (!the_rti.process_cpu_time_diff) the_rti.process_cpu_time_diff = the_rti.total_cpu_time_diff;
the_rti.process_cpu_usage = percent;
} else {
mem_at_startup = the_rti.physical_memory_avail;
}
the_rti.process_memory = mem_at_startup - the_rti.physical_memory_avail;
#ifdef GPAC_MEMORY_TRACKING
the_rti.gpac_memory = gpac_allocated_memory;
#endif
last_process_k_u_time = process_u_k_time;
last_cpu_idle_time = 0;
last_update_time = entry_time;
memcpy(rti, &the_rti, sizeof(GF_SystemRTInfo));
return 1;
}
| C | gpac | 0 |
CVE-2014-1713 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-1713/ | CWE-399 | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f85a87ec670ad0fce9d98d90c9a705b72a288154 | f85a87ec670ad0fce9d98d90c9a705b72a288154 | document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | static void urlStringAttributeAttributeSetterCallback(v8::Local<v8::String>, v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMSetter");
CustomElementCallbackDispatcher::CallbackDeliveryScope deliveryScope;
TestObjectPythonV8Internal::urlStringAttributeAttributeSetter(jsValue, info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
| static void urlStringAttributeAttributeSetterCallback(v8::Local<v8::String>, v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMSetter");
CustomElementCallbackDispatcher::CallbackDeliveryScope deliveryScope;
TestObjectPythonV8Internal::urlStringAttributeAttributeSetter(jsValue, info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2017-9059 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-9059/ | CWE-404 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/c70422f760c120480fee4de6c38804c72aa26bc1 | c70422f760c120480fee4de6c38804c72aa26bc1 | Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
... | static void destroy_delegation(struct nfs4_delegation *dp)
{
bool unhashed;
spin_lock(&state_lock);
unhashed = unhash_delegation_locked(dp);
spin_unlock(&state_lock);
if (unhashed) {
put_clnt_odstate(dp->dl_clnt_odstate);
nfs4_put_deleg_lease(dp->dl_stid.sc_file);
nfs4_put_stid(&dp->dl_stid);
}
}
| static void destroy_delegation(struct nfs4_delegation *dp)
{
bool unhashed;
spin_lock(&state_lock);
unhashed = unhash_delegation_locked(dp);
spin_unlock(&state_lock);
if (unhashed) {
put_clnt_odstate(dp->dl_clnt_odstate);
nfs4_put_deleg_lease(dp->dl_stid.sc_file);
nfs4_put_stid(&dp->dl_stid);
}
}
| C | linux | 0 |
CVE-2016-10190 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-10190/ | CWE-119 | https://github.com/FFmpeg/FFmpeg/commit/2a05c8f813de6f2278827734bf8102291e7484aa | 2a05c8f813de6f2278827734bf8102291e7484aa | http: make length/offset-related variables unsigned.
Fixes #5992, reported and found by Paul Cher <[email protected]>. | static int64_t http_seek(URLContext *h, int64_t off, int whence)
{
return http_seek_internal(h, off, whence, 0);
}
| static int64_t http_seek(URLContext *h, int64_t off, int whence)
{
return http_seek_internal(h, off, whence, 0);
}
| C | FFmpeg | 0 |
CVE-2017-0814 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-0814/ | CWE-200 | https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/tremolo/+/eeb4e45d5683f88488c083ecf142dc89bc3f0b47 | eeb4e45d5683f88488c083ecf142dc89bc3f0b47 | Fix out of bounds access in codebook processing
Bug: 62800140
Test: ran poc, CTS
Change-Id: I9960d507be62ee0a3b0aa991240951d5a0784f37
(cherry picked from commit 2c4c4bd895f01fdecb90ebdd0412b60608a9ccf0)
| static int _determine_node_bytes(long used, int leafwidth){
/* special case small books to size 4 to avoid multiple special
cases in repack */
if(used<2)
return 4;
if(leafwidth==3)leafwidth=4;
if(_ilog(3*used-6)+1 <= leafwidth*4)
return leafwidth/2?leafwidth/2:1;
return leafwidth;
}
| static int _determine_node_bytes(long used, int leafwidth){
/* special case small books to size 4 to avoid multiple special
cases in repack */
if(used<2)
return 4;
if(leafwidth==3)leafwidth=4;
if(_ilog(3*used-6)+1 <= leafwidth*4)
return leafwidth/2?leafwidth/2:1;
return leafwidth;
}
| C | Android | 0 |
CVE-2015-8539 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-8539/ | CWE-264 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/096fe9eaea40a17e125569f9e657e34cdb6d73bd | 096fe9eaea40a17e125569f9e657e34cdb6d73bd | KEYS: Fix handling of stored error in a negatively instantiated user key
If a user key gets negatively instantiated, an error code is cached in the
payload area. A negatively instantiated key may be then be positively
instantiated by updating it with valid data. However, the ->update key
type method must be aware that the error code may be there.
The following may be used to trigger the bug in the user key type:
keyctl request2 user user "" @u
keyctl add user user "a" @u
which manifests itself as:
BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 00000000ffffff8a
IP: [<ffffffff810a376f>] __call_rcu.constprop.76+0x1f/0x280 kernel/rcu/tree.c:3046
PGD 7cc30067 PUD 0
Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 3 PID: 2644 Comm: a.out Not tainted 4.3.0+ #49
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
task: ffff88003ddea700 ti: ffff88003dd88000 task.ti: ffff88003dd88000
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff810a376f>] [<ffffffff810a376f>] __call_rcu.constprop.76+0x1f/0x280
[<ffffffff810a376f>] __call_rcu.constprop.76+0x1f/0x280 kernel/rcu/tree.c:3046
RSP: 0018:ffff88003dd8bdb0 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 00000000ffffff82 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000001
RDX: ffffffff81e3fe40 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 00000000ffffff82
RBP: ffff88003dd8bde0 R08: ffff88007d2d2da0 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff88003e8073c0 R12: 00000000ffffff82
R13: ffff88003dd8be68 R14: ffff88007d027600 R15: ffff88003ddea700
FS: 0000000000b92880(0063) GS:ffff88007fd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
CR2: 00000000ffffff8a CR3: 000000007cc5f000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
Stack:
ffff88003dd8bdf0 ffffffff81160a8a 0000000000000000 00000000ffffff82
ffff88003dd8be68 ffff88007d027600 ffff88003dd8bdf0 ffffffff810a39e5
ffff88003dd8be20 ffffffff812a31ab ffff88007d027600 ffff88007d027620
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff810a39e5>] kfree_call_rcu+0x15/0x20 kernel/rcu/tree.c:3136
[<ffffffff812a31ab>] user_update+0x8b/0xb0 security/keys/user_defined.c:129
[< inline >] __key_update security/keys/key.c:730
[<ffffffff8129e5c1>] key_create_or_update+0x291/0x440 security/keys/key.c:908
[< inline >] SYSC_add_key security/keys/keyctl.c:125
[<ffffffff8129fc21>] SyS_add_key+0x101/0x1e0 security/keys/keyctl.c:60
[<ffffffff8185f617>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6a arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:185
Note the error code (-ENOKEY) in EDX.
A similar bug can be tripped by:
keyctl request2 trusted user "" @u
keyctl add trusted user "a" @u
This should also affect encrypted keys - but that has to be correctly
parameterised or it will fail with EINVAL before getting to the bit that
will crashes.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <[email protected]> | void user_describe(const struct key *key, struct seq_file *m)
{
seq_puts(m, key->description);
if (key_is_instantiated(key))
seq_printf(m, ": %u", key->datalen);
}
| void user_describe(const struct key *key, struct seq_file *m)
{
seq_puts(m, key->description);
if (key_is_instantiated(key))
seq_printf(m, ": %u", key->datalen);
}
| C | linux | 0 |
CVE-2010-1166 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2010-1166/ | CWE-189 | https://cgit.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/commit/?id=d2f813f7db | d2f813f7db157fc83abc4b3726821c36ee7e40b1 | null | fbStore_x1r5g5b5 (FbBits *bits, const CARD32 *values, int x, int width, miIndexedPtr indexed)
{
int i;
CARD16 *pixel = ((CARD16 *) bits) + x;
for (i = 0; i < width; ++i) {
Split(READ(values + i));
WRITE(pixel++, ((r << 7) & 0x7c00) |
((g << 2) & 0x03e0) |
((b >> 3) ));
}
}
| fbStore_x1r5g5b5 (FbBits *bits, const CARD32 *values, int x, int width, miIndexedPtr indexed)
{
int i;
CARD16 *pixel = ((CARD16 *) bits) + x;
for (i = 0; i < width; ++i) {
Split(READ(values + i));
WRITE(pixel++, ((r << 7) & 0x7c00) |
((g << 2) & 0x03e0) |
((b >> 3) ));
}
}
| C | xserver | 0 |
CVE-2015-2922 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-2922/ | CWE-17 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/6fd99094de2b83d1d4c8457f2c83483b2828e75a | 6fd99094de2b83d1d4c8457f2c83483b2828e75a | ipv6: Don't reduce hop limit for an interface
A local route may have a lower hop_limit set than global routes do.
RFC 3756, Section 4.2.7, "Parameter Spoofing"
> 1. The attacker includes a Current Hop Limit of one or another small
> number which the attacker knows will cause legitimate packets to
> be dropped before they reach their destination.
> As an example, one possible approach to mitigate this threat is to
> ignore very small hop limits. The nodes could implement a
> configurable minimum hop limit, and ignore attempts to set it below
> said limit.
Signed-off-by: D.S. Ljungmark <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | struct ndisc_options *ndisc_parse_options(u8 *opt, int opt_len,
struct ndisc_options *ndopts)
{
struct nd_opt_hdr *nd_opt = (struct nd_opt_hdr *)opt;
if (!nd_opt || opt_len < 0 || !ndopts)
return NULL;
memset(ndopts, 0, sizeof(*ndopts));
while (opt_len) {
int l;
if (opt_len < sizeof(struct nd_opt_hdr))
return NULL;
l = nd_opt->nd_opt_len << 3;
if (opt_len < l || l == 0)
return NULL;
switch (nd_opt->nd_opt_type) {
case ND_OPT_SOURCE_LL_ADDR:
case ND_OPT_TARGET_LL_ADDR:
case ND_OPT_MTU:
case ND_OPT_REDIRECT_HDR:
if (ndopts->nd_opt_array[nd_opt->nd_opt_type]) {
ND_PRINTK(2, warn,
"%s: duplicated ND6 option found: type=%d\n",
__func__, nd_opt->nd_opt_type);
} else {
ndopts->nd_opt_array[nd_opt->nd_opt_type] = nd_opt;
}
break;
case ND_OPT_PREFIX_INFO:
ndopts->nd_opts_pi_end = nd_opt;
if (!ndopts->nd_opt_array[nd_opt->nd_opt_type])
ndopts->nd_opt_array[nd_opt->nd_opt_type] = nd_opt;
break;
#ifdef CONFIG_IPV6_ROUTE_INFO
case ND_OPT_ROUTE_INFO:
ndopts->nd_opts_ri_end = nd_opt;
if (!ndopts->nd_opts_ri)
ndopts->nd_opts_ri = nd_opt;
break;
#endif
default:
if (ndisc_is_useropt(nd_opt)) {
ndopts->nd_useropts_end = nd_opt;
if (!ndopts->nd_useropts)
ndopts->nd_useropts = nd_opt;
} else {
/*
* Unknown options must be silently ignored,
* to accommodate future extension to the
* protocol.
*/
ND_PRINTK(2, notice,
"%s: ignored unsupported option; type=%d, len=%d\n",
__func__,
nd_opt->nd_opt_type,
nd_opt->nd_opt_len);
}
}
opt_len -= l;
nd_opt = ((void *)nd_opt) + l;
}
return ndopts;
}
| struct ndisc_options *ndisc_parse_options(u8 *opt, int opt_len,
struct ndisc_options *ndopts)
{
struct nd_opt_hdr *nd_opt = (struct nd_opt_hdr *)opt;
if (!nd_opt || opt_len < 0 || !ndopts)
return NULL;
memset(ndopts, 0, sizeof(*ndopts));
while (opt_len) {
int l;
if (opt_len < sizeof(struct nd_opt_hdr))
return NULL;
l = nd_opt->nd_opt_len << 3;
if (opt_len < l || l == 0)
return NULL;
switch (nd_opt->nd_opt_type) {
case ND_OPT_SOURCE_LL_ADDR:
case ND_OPT_TARGET_LL_ADDR:
case ND_OPT_MTU:
case ND_OPT_REDIRECT_HDR:
if (ndopts->nd_opt_array[nd_opt->nd_opt_type]) {
ND_PRINTK(2, warn,
"%s: duplicated ND6 option found: type=%d\n",
__func__, nd_opt->nd_opt_type);
} else {
ndopts->nd_opt_array[nd_opt->nd_opt_type] = nd_opt;
}
break;
case ND_OPT_PREFIX_INFO:
ndopts->nd_opts_pi_end = nd_opt;
if (!ndopts->nd_opt_array[nd_opt->nd_opt_type])
ndopts->nd_opt_array[nd_opt->nd_opt_type] = nd_opt;
break;
#ifdef CONFIG_IPV6_ROUTE_INFO
case ND_OPT_ROUTE_INFO:
ndopts->nd_opts_ri_end = nd_opt;
if (!ndopts->nd_opts_ri)
ndopts->nd_opts_ri = nd_opt;
break;
#endif
default:
if (ndisc_is_useropt(nd_opt)) {
ndopts->nd_useropts_end = nd_opt;
if (!ndopts->nd_useropts)
ndopts->nd_useropts = nd_opt;
} else {
/*
* Unknown options must be silently ignored,
* to accommodate future extension to the
* protocol.
*/
ND_PRINTK(2, notice,
"%s: ignored unsupported option; type=%d, len=%d\n",
__func__,
nd_opt->nd_opt_type,
nd_opt->nd_opt_len);
}
}
opt_len -= l;
nd_opt = ((void *)nd_opt) + l;
}
return ndopts;
}
| C | linux | 0 |
CVE-2013-2906 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2906/ | CWE-362 | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/bcc265132e3d9b62c6c49facbf849575c615d1e3 | bcc265132e3d9b62c6c49facbf849575c615d1e3 | Cleanups in ScreenOrientationDispatcherHost.
BUG=None
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/408213003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@284786 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | void ScreenOrientationDispatcherHost::OnOrientationChange() {
if (provider_)
provider_->OnOrientationChange();
}
| void ScreenOrientationDispatcherHost::OnOrientationChange() {
if (provider_)
provider_->OnOrientationChange();
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2016-3698 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3698/ | CWE-284 | https://github.com/jpirko/libndp/commit/a4892df306e0532487f1634ba6d4c6d4bb381c7f | a4892df306e0532487f1634ba6d4c6d4bb381c7f | libndp: validate the IPv6 hop limit
None of the NDP messages should ever come from a non-local network; as
stated in RFC4861's 6.1.1 (RS), 6.1.2 (RA), 7.1.1 (NS), 7.1.2 (NA),
and 8.1. (redirect):
- The IP Hop Limit field has a value of 255, i.e., the packet
could not possibly have been forwarded by a router.
This fixes CVE-2016-3698.
Reported by: Julien BERNARD <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Lubomir Rintel <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko <[email protected]> | struct ndp_msgna *ndp_msgna(struct ndp_msg *msg)
{
if (ndp_msg_type(msg) != NDP_MSG_NA)
return NULL;
return &msg->nd_msg.na;
}
| struct ndp_msgna *ndp_msgna(struct ndp_msg *msg)
{
if (ndp_msg_type(msg) != NDP_MSG_NA)
return NULL;
return &msg->nd_msg.na;
}
| C | libndp | 0 |
CVE-2012-6548 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-6548/ | CWE-200 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/0143fc5e9f6f5aad4764801015bc8d4b4a278200 | 0143fc5e9f6f5aad4764801015bc8d4b4a278200 | udf: avoid info leak on export
For type 0x51 the udf.parent_partref member in struct fid gets copied
uninitialized to userland. Fix this by initializing it to 0.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]> | static int empty_dir(struct inode *dir)
{
struct fileIdentDesc *fi, cfi;
struct udf_fileident_bh fibh;
loff_t f_pos;
loff_t size = udf_ext0_offset(dir) + dir->i_size;
int block;
struct kernel_lb_addr eloc;
uint32_t elen;
sector_t offset;
struct extent_position epos = {};
struct udf_inode_info *dinfo = UDF_I(dir);
f_pos = udf_ext0_offset(dir);
fibh.soffset = fibh.eoffset = f_pos & (dir->i_sb->s_blocksize - 1);
if (dinfo->i_alloc_type == ICBTAG_FLAG_AD_IN_ICB)
fibh.sbh = fibh.ebh = NULL;
else if (inode_bmap(dir, f_pos >> dir->i_sb->s_blocksize_bits,
&epos, &eloc, &elen, &offset) ==
(EXT_RECORDED_ALLOCATED >> 30)) {
block = udf_get_lb_pblock(dir->i_sb, &eloc, offset);
if ((++offset << dir->i_sb->s_blocksize_bits) < elen) {
if (dinfo->i_alloc_type == ICBTAG_FLAG_AD_SHORT)
epos.offset -= sizeof(struct short_ad);
else if (dinfo->i_alloc_type == ICBTAG_FLAG_AD_LONG)
epos.offset -= sizeof(struct long_ad);
} else
offset = 0;
fibh.sbh = fibh.ebh = udf_tread(dir->i_sb, block);
if (!fibh.sbh) {
brelse(epos.bh);
return 0;
}
} else {
brelse(epos.bh);
return 0;
}
while (f_pos < size) {
fi = udf_fileident_read(dir, &f_pos, &fibh, &cfi, &epos, &eloc,
&elen, &offset);
if (!fi) {
if (fibh.sbh != fibh.ebh)
brelse(fibh.ebh);
brelse(fibh.sbh);
brelse(epos.bh);
return 0;
}
if (cfi.lengthFileIdent &&
(cfi.fileCharacteristics & FID_FILE_CHAR_DELETED) == 0) {
if (fibh.sbh != fibh.ebh)
brelse(fibh.ebh);
brelse(fibh.sbh);
brelse(epos.bh);
return 0;
}
}
if (fibh.sbh != fibh.ebh)
brelse(fibh.ebh);
brelse(fibh.sbh);
brelse(epos.bh);
return 1;
}
| static int empty_dir(struct inode *dir)
{
struct fileIdentDesc *fi, cfi;
struct udf_fileident_bh fibh;
loff_t f_pos;
loff_t size = udf_ext0_offset(dir) + dir->i_size;
int block;
struct kernel_lb_addr eloc;
uint32_t elen;
sector_t offset;
struct extent_position epos = {};
struct udf_inode_info *dinfo = UDF_I(dir);
f_pos = udf_ext0_offset(dir);
fibh.soffset = fibh.eoffset = f_pos & (dir->i_sb->s_blocksize - 1);
if (dinfo->i_alloc_type == ICBTAG_FLAG_AD_IN_ICB)
fibh.sbh = fibh.ebh = NULL;
else if (inode_bmap(dir, f_pos >> dir->i_sb->s_blocksize_bits,
&epos, &eloc, &elen, &offset) ==
(EXT_RECORDED_ALLOCATED >> 30)) {
block = udf_get_lb_pblock(dir->i_sb, &eloc, offset);
if ((++offset << dir->i_sb->s_blocksize_bits) < elen) {
if (dinfo->i_alloc_type == ICBTAG_FLAG_AD_SHORT)
epos.offset -= sizeof(struct short_ad);
else if (dinfo->i_alloc_type == ICBTAG_FLAG_AD_LONG)
epos.offset -= sizeof(struct long_ad);
} else
offset = 0;
fibh.sbh = fibh.ebh = udf_tread(dir->i_sb, block);
if (!fibh.sbh) {
brelse(epos.bh);
return 0;
}
} else {
brelse(epos.bh);
return 0;
}
while (f_pos < size) {
fi = udf_fileident_read(dir, &f_pos, &fibh, &cfi, &epos, &eloc,
&elen, &offset);
if (!fi) {
if (fibh.sbh != fibh.ebh)
brelse(fibh.ebh);
brelse(fibh.sbh);
brelse(epos.bh);
return 0;
}
if (cfi.lengthFileIdent &&
(cfi.fileCharacteristics & FID_FILE_CHAR_DELETED) == 0) {
if (fibh.sbh != fibh.ebh)
brelse(fibh.ebh);
brelse(fibh.sbh);
brelse(epos.bh);
return 0;
}
}
if (fibh.sbh != fibh.ebh)
brelse(fibh.ebh);
brelse(fibh.sbh);
brelse(epos.bh);
return 1;
}
| C | linux | 0 |
CVE-2016-1621 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1621/ | CWE-119 | https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/libvpx/+/5a9753fca56f0eeb9f61e342b2fccffc364f9426 | 5a9753fca56f0eeb9f61e342b2fccffc364f9426 | Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
| static void write_ivf_file_header(const vpx_codec_enc_cfg_t *const cfg,
int frame_cnt, FILE *const outfile) {
char header[32];
header[0] = 'D';
header[1] = 'K';
header[2] = 'I';
header[3] = 'F';
mem_put_le16(header + 4, 0); /* version */
mem_put_le16(header + 6, 32); /* headersize */
mem_put_le32(header + 8, 0x30395056); /* fourcc (vp9) */
mem_put_le16(header + 12, cfg->g_w); /* width */
mem_put_le16(header + 14, cfg->g_h); /* height */
mem_put_le32(header + 16, cfg->g_timebase.den); /* rate */
mem_put_le32(header + 20, cfg->g_timebase.num); /* scale */
mem_put_le32(header + 24, frame_cnt); /* length */
mem_put_le32(header + 28, 0); /* unused */
(void)fwrite(header, 1, 32, outfile);
}
| static void write_ivf_file_header(const vpx_codec_enc_cfg_t *const cfg,
int frame_cnt, FILE *const outfile) {
char header[32];
header[0] = 'D';
header[1] = 'K';
header[2] = 'I';
header[3] = 'F';
mem_put_le16(header + 4, 0); /* version */
mem_put_le16(header + 6, 32); /* headersize */
mem_put_le32(header + 8, 0x30395056); /* fourcc (vp9) */
mem_put_le16(header + 12, cfg->g_w); /* width */
mem_put_le16(header + 14, cfg->g_h); /* height */
mem_put_le32(header + 16, cfg->g_timebase.den); /* rate */
mem_put_le32(header + 20, cfg->g_timebase.num); /* scale */
mem_put_le32(header + 24, frame_cnt); /* length */
mem_put_le32(header + 28, 0); /* unused */
(void)fwrite(header, 1, 32, outfile);
}
| C | Android | 0 |
CVE-2011-2493 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2493/ | null | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/0449641130f5652b344ef6fa39fa019d7e94660a | 0449641130f5652b344ef6fa39fa019d7e94660a | ext4: init timer earlier to avoid a kernel panic in __save_error_info
During mount, when we fail to open journal inode or root inode, the
__save_error_info will mod_timer. But actually s_err_report isn't
initialized yet and the kernel oops. The detailed information can
be found https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=32082.
The best way is to check whether the timer s_err_report is initialized
or not. But it seems that in include/linux/timer.h, we can't find a
good function to check the status of this timer, so this patch just
move the initializtion of s_err_report earlier so that we can avoid
the kernel panic. The corresponding del_timer is also added in the
error path.
Reported-by: Sami Liedes <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Tao Ma <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <[email protected]> | static int ext4_commit_super(struct super_block *sb, int sync)
{
struct ext4_super_block *es = EXT4_SB(sb)->s_es;
struct buffer_head *sbh = EXT4_SB(sb)->s_sbh;
int error = 0;
if (!sbh)
return error;
if (buffer_write_io_error(sbh)) {
/*
* Oh, dear. A previous attempt to write the
* superblock failed. This could happen because the
* USB device was yanked out. Or it could happen to
* be a transient write error and maybe the block will
* be remapped. Nothing we can do but to retry the
* write and hope for the best.
*/
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "previous I/O error to "
"superblock detected");
clear_buffer_write_io_error(sbh);
set_buffer_uptodate(sbh);
}
/*
* If the file system is mounted read-only, don't update the
* superblock write time. This avoids updating the superblock
* write time when we are mounting the root file system
* read/only but we need to replay the journal; at that point,
* for people who are east of GMT and who make their clock
* tick in localtime for Windows bug-for-bug compatibility,
* the clock is set in the future, and this will cause e2fsck
* to complain and force a full file system check.
*/
if (!(sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY))
es->s_wtime = cpu_to_le32(get_seconds());
if (sb->s_bdev->bd_part)
es->s_kbytes_written =
cpu_to_le64(EXT4_SB(sb)->s_kbytes_written +
((part_stat_read(sb->s_bdev->bd_part, sectors[1]) -
EXT4_SB(sb)->s_sectors_written_start) >> 1));
else
es->s_kbytes_written =
cpu_to_le64(EXT4_SB(sb)->s_kbytes_written);
ext4_free_blocks_count_set(es, percpu_counter_sum_positive(
&EXT4_SB(sb)->s_freeblocks_counter));
es->s_free_inodes_count =
cpu_to_le32(percpu_counter_sum_positive(
&EXT4_SB(sb)->s_freeinodes_counter));
sb->s_dirt = 0;
BUFFER_TRACE(sbh, "marking dirty");
mark_buffer_dirty(sbh);
if (sync) {
error = sync_dirty_buffer(sbh);
if (error)
return error;
error = buffer_write_io_error(sbh);
if (error) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "I/O error while writing "
"superblock");
clear_buffer_write_io_error(sbh);
set_buffer_uptodate(sbh);
}
}
return error;
}
| static int ext4_commit_super(struct super_block *sb, int sync)
{
struct ext4_super_block *es = EXT4_SB(sb)->s_es;
struct buffer_head *sbh = EXT4_SB(sb)->s_sbh;
int error = 0;
if (!sbh)
return error;
if (buffer_write_io_error(sbh)) {
/*
* Oh, dear. A previous attempt to write the
* superblock failed. This could happen because the
* USB device was yanked out. Or it could happen to
* be a transient write error and maybe the block will
* be remapped. Nothing we can do but to retry the
* write and hope for the best.
*/
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "previous I/O error to "
"superblock detected");
clear_buffer_write_io_error(sbh);
set_buffer_uptodate(sbh);
}
/*
* If the file system is mounted read-only, don't update the
* superblock write time. This avoids updating the superblock
* write time when we are mounting the root file system
* read/only but we need to replay the journal; at that point,
* for people who are east of GMT and who make their clock
* tick in localtime for Windows bug-for-bug compatibility,
* the clock is set in the future, and this will cause e2fsck
* to complain and force a full file system check.
*/
if (!(sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY))
es->s_wtime = cpu_to_le32(get_seconds());
if (sb->s_bdev->bd_part)
es->s_kbytes_written =
cpu_to_le64(EXT4_SB(sb)->s_kbytes_written +
((part_stat_read(sb->s_bdev->bd_part, sectors[1]) -
EXT4_SB(sb)->s_sectors_written_start) >> 1));
else
es->s_kbytes_written =
cpu_to_le64(EXT4_SB(sb)->s_kbytes_written);
ext4_free_blocks_count_set(es, percpu_counter_sum_positive(
&EXT4_SB(sb)->s_freeblocks_counter));
es->s_free_inodes_count =
cpu_to_le32(percpu_counter_sum_positive(
&EXT4_SB(sb)->s_freeinodes_counter));
sb->s_dirt = 0;
BUFFER_TRACE(sbh, "marking dirty");
mark_buffer_dirty(sbh);
if (sync) {
error = sync_dirty_buffer(sbh);
if (error)
return error;
error = buffer_write_io_error(sbh);
if (error) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "I/O error while writing "
"superblock");
clear_buffer_write_io_error(sbh);
set_buffer_uptodate(sbh);
}
}
return error;
}
| C | linux | 0 |
CVE-2017-16803 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-16803/ | CWE-119 | https://github.com/libav/libav/commit/cd4663dc80323ba64989d0c103d51ad3ee0e9c2f | cd4663dc80323ba64989d0c103d51ad3ee0e9c2f | smacker: add sanity check for length in smacker_decode_tree()
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]>
Bug-Id: 1098
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Sean McGovern <[email protected]> | static int decode_header_trees(SmackVContext *smk) {
BitstreamContext bc;
int mmap_size, mclr_size, full_size, type_size, ret;
mmap_size = AV_RL32(smk->avctx->extradata);
mclr_size = AV_RL32(smk->avctx->extradata + 4);
full_size = AV_RL32(smk->avctx->extradata + 8);
type_size = AV_RL32(smk->avctx->extradata + 12);
bitstream_init8(&bc, smk->avctx->extradata + 16, smk->avctx->extradata_size - 16);
if (!bitstream_read_bit(&bc)) {
av_log(smk->avctx, AV_LOG_INFO, "Skipping MMAP tree\n");
smk->mmap_tbl = av_malloc(sizeof(int) * 2);
if (!smk->mmap_tbl)
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
smk->mmap_tbl[0] = 0;
smk->mmap_last[0] = smk->mmap_last[1] = smk->mmap_last[2] = 1;
} else {
if ((ret = smacker_decode_header_tree(smk, &bc, &smk->mmap_tbl, smk->mmap_last, mmap_size)) < 0)
return ret;
}
if (!bitstream_read_bit(&bc)) {
av_log(smk->avctx, AV_LOG_INFO, "Skipping MCLR tree\n");
smk->mclr_tbl = av_malloc(sizeof(int) * 2);
if (!smk->mclr_tbl)
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
smk->mclr_tbl[0] = 0;
smk->mclr_last[0] = smk->mclr_last[1] = smk->mclr_last[2] = 1;
} else {
if ((ret = smacker_decode_header_tree(smk, &bc, &smk->mclr_tbl, smk->mclr_last, mclr_size)) < 0)
return ret;
}
if (!bitstream_read_bit(&bc)) {
av_log(smk->avctx, AV_LOG_INFO, "Skipping FULL tree\n");
smk->full_tbl = av_malloc(sizeof(int) * 2);
if (!smk->full_tbl)
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
smk->full_tbl[0] = 0;
smk->full_last[0] = smk->full_last[1] = smk->full_last[2] = 1;
} else {
if ((ret = smacker_decode_header_tree(smk, &bc, &smk->full_tbl, smk->full_last, full_size)) < 0)
return ret;
}
if (!bitstream_read_bit(&bc)) {
av_log(smk->avctx, AV_LOG_INFO, "Skipping TYPE tree\n");
smk->type_tbl = av_malloc(sizeof(int) * 2);
if (!smk->type_tbl)
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
smk->type_tbl[0] = 0;
smk->type_last[0] = smk->type_last[1] = smk->type_last[2] = 1;
} else {
if ((ret = smacker_decode_header_tree(smk, &bc, &smk->type_tbl, smk->type_last, type_size)) < 0)
return ret;
}
return 0;
}
| static int decode_header_trees(SmackVContext *smk) {
BitstreamContext bc;
int mmap_size, mclr_size, full_size, type_size, ret;
mmap_size = AV_RL32(smk->avctx->extradata);
mclr_size = AV_RL32(smk->avctx->extradata + 4);
full_size = AV_RL32(smk->avctx->extradata + 8);
type_size = AV_RL32(smk->avctx->extradata + 12);
bitstream_init8(&bc, smk->avctx->extradata + 16, smk->avctx->extradata_size - 16);
if (!bitstream_read_bit(&bc)) {
av_log(smk->avctx, AV_LOG_INFO, "Skipping MMAP tree\n");
smk->mmap_tbl = av_malloc(sizeof(int) * 2);
if (!smk->mmap_tbl)
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
smk->mmap_tbl[0] = 0;
smk->mmap_last[0] = smk->mmap_last[1] = smk->mmap_last[2] = 1;
} else {
if ((ret = smacker_decode_header_tree(smk, &bc, &smk->mmap_tbl, smk->mmap_last, mmap_size)) < 0)
return ret;
}
if (!bitstream_read_bit(&bc)) {
av_log(smk->avctx, AV_LOG_INFO, "Skipping MCLR tree\n");
smk->mclr_tbl = av_malloc(sizeof(int) * 2);
if (!smk->mclr_tbl)
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
smk->mclr_tbl[0] = 0;
smk->mclr_last[0] = smk->mclr_last[1] = smk->mclr_last[2] = 1;
} else {
if ((ret = smacker_decode_header_tree(smk, &bc, &smk->mclr_tbl, smk->mclr_last, mclr_size)) < 0)
return ret;
}
if (!bitstream_read_bit(&bc)) {
av_log(smk->avctx, AV_LOG_INFO, "Skipping FULL tree\n");
smk->full_tbl = av_malloc(sizeof(int) * 2);
if (!smk->full_tbl)
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
smk->full_tbl[0] = 0;
smk->full_last[0] = smk->full_last[1] = smk->full_last[2] = 1;
} else {
if ((ret = smacker_decode_header_tree(smk, &bc, &smk->full_tbl, smk->full_last, full_size)) < 0)
return ret;
}
if (!bitstream_read_bit(&bc)) {
av_log(smk->avctx, AV_LOG_INFO, "Skipping TYPE tree\n");
smk->type_tbl = av_malloc(sizeof(int) * 2);
if (!smk->type_tbl)
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
smk->type_tbl[0] = 0;
smk->type_last[0] = smk->type_last[1] = smk->type_last[2] = 1;
} else {
if ((ret = smacker_decode_header_tree(smk, &bc, &smk->type_tbl, smk->type_last, type_size)) < 0)
return ret;
}
return 0;
}
| C | libav | 0 |
null | null | null | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/27c68f543e5eba779902447445dfb05ec3f5bf75 | 27c68f543e5eba779902447445dfb05ec3f5bf75 | Revert of Add accelerated VP9 decode infrastructure and an implementation for VA-API. (patchset #7 id:260001 of https://codereview.chromium.org/1318863003/ )
Reason for revert:
I think this patch broke compile step for Chromium Linux ChromeOS MSan Builder.
First failing build:
http://build.chromium.org/p/chromium.memory.fyi/builders/Chromium%20Linux%20ChromeOS%20MSan%20Builder/builds/8310
All recent builds:
http://build.chromium.org/p/chromium.memory.fyi/builders/Chromium%20Linux%20ChromeOS%20MSan%20Builder?numbuilds=200
Sorry for the revert. I'll re-revert if I'm wrong.
Cheers,
Tommy
Original issue's description:
> Add accelerated VP9 decode infrastructure and an implementation for VA-API.
>
> - Add a hardware/platform-independent VP9Decoder class and related
> infrastructure, implementing AcceleratedVideoDecoder interface. VP9Decoder
> performs the initial stages of the decode process, which are to be done
> on host/in software, such as stream parsing and reference frame management.
>
> - Add a VP9Accelerator interface, used by the VP9Decoder to offload the
> remaining stages of the decode process to hardware. VP9Accelerator
> implementations are platform-specific.
>
> - Add the first implementation of VP9Accelerator - VaapiVP9Accelerator - and
> integrate it with VaapiVideoDecodeAccelerator, for devices which provide
> hardware VP9 acceleration through VA-API. Hook it up to the new
> infrastructure and VP9Decoder.
>
> - Extend Vp9Parser to provide functionality required by VP9Decoder and
> VP9Accelerator, including superframe parsing, handling of loop filter
> and segmentation initialization, state persistence across frames and
> resetting when needed. Also add code calculating segmentation dequants
> and loop filter levels.
>
> - Update vp9_parser_unittest to the new Vp9Parser interface and flow.
>
> TEST=vp9_parser_unittest,vda_unittest,Chrome VP9 playback
> BUG=chrome-os-partner:41469,chrome-os-partner:41470,chromium:525331
> [email protected]
>
> Committed: https://crrev.com/e3cc0a661b8abfdc74f569940949bc1f336ece40
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#349312}
[email protected],[email protected],[email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
NOPRESUBMIT=true
NOTREECHECKS=true
NOTRY=true
BUG=chrome-os-partner:41469,chrome-os-partner:41470,chromium:525331
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1357513002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#349443} | void VaapiVideoDecodeAccelerator::InitiateSurfaceSetChange(size_t num_pics,
gfx::Size size) {
DCHECK_EQ(message_loop_, base::MessageLoop::current());
DCHECK(!awaiting_va_surfaces_recycle_);
DVLOG(1) << "Initiating surface set change";
awaiting_va_surfaces_recycle_ = true;
requested_num_pics_ = num_pics;
requested_pic_size_ = size;
TryFinishSurfaceSetChange();
}
| void VaapiVideoDecodeAccelerator::InitiateSurfaceSetChange(size_t num_pics,
gfx::Size size) {
DCHECK_EQ(message_loop_, base::MessageLoop::current());
DCHECK(!awaiting_va_surfaces_recycle_);
DVLOG(1) << "Initiating surface set change";
awaiting_va_surfaces_recycle_ = true;
requested_num_pics_ = num_pics;
requested_pic_size_ = size;
TryFinishSurfaceSetChange();
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2011-2860 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2860/ | CWE-399 | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/6c390601f9ee3436bb32f84772977570265982ea | 6c390601f9ee3436bb32f84772977570265982ea | https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=93587
Node::replaceChild() can create bad DOM topology with MutationEvent, Part 2
Reviewed by Kent Tamura.
Source/WebCore:
This is a followup of r124156. replaceChild() has yet another hidden
MutationEvent trigger. This change added a guard for it.
Test: fast/events/mutation-during-replace-child-2.html
* dom/ContainerNode.cpp:
(WebCore::ContainerNode::replaceChild):
LayoutTests:
* fast/events/mutation-during-replace-child-2-expected.txt: Added.
* fast/events/mutation-during-replace-child-2.html: Added.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@125237 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | void ContainerNode::dispatchPostAttachCallbacks()
{
for (size_t i = 0; i < s_postAttachCallbackQueue->size(); ++i) {
const CallbackInfo& info = (*s_postAttachCallbackQueue)[i];
NodeCallback callback = info.first;
CallbackParameters params = info.second;
callback(params.first.get(), params.second);
}
s_postAttachCallbackQueue->clear();
}
| void ContainerNode::dispatchPostAttachCallbacks()
{
for (size_t i = 0; i < s_postAttachCallbackQueue->size(); ++i) {
const CallbackInfo& info = (*s_postAttachCallbackQueue)[i];
NodeCallback callback = info.first;
CallbackParameters params = info.second;
callback(params.first.get(), params.second);
}
s_postAttachCallbackQueue->clear();
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
null | null | null | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/dde871628c04863cf5992cb17e3e40f2ba576279 | dde871628c04863cf5992cb17e3e40f2ba576279 | Add a setDebugDirtyRegion() feature to the client.
Calling remoting.clientSession.setDebugDirtyRegion(true) enables
rendering of each frame's dirty region with an purple, translucent
overlay.
Currently the dirty region is re-rendered immediately for each frame,
with no linger nor fade-out behaviour.
BUG=427659
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/932013002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#317496} | void ChromotingInstance::DidChangeFocus(bool has_focus) {
DCHECK(plugin_task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
if (!IsConnected())
return;
input_handler_.DidChangeFocus(has_focus);
if (mouse_locker_)
mouse_locker_->DidChangeFocus(has_focus);
}
| void ChromotingInstance::DidChangeFocus(bool has_focus) {
DCHECK(plugin_task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
if (!IsConnected())
return;
input_handler_.DidChangeFocus(has_focus);
if (mouse_locker_)
mouse_locker_->DidChangeFocus(has_focus);
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2014-4344 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-4344/ | CWE-476 | https://github.com/krb5/krb5/commit/a7886f0ed1277c69142b14a2c6629175a6331edc | a7886f0ed1277c69142b14a2c6629175a6331edc | Fix null deref in SPNEGO acceptor [CVE-2014-4344]
When processing a continuation token, acc_ctx_cont was dereferencing
the initial byte of the token without checking the length. This could
result in a null dereference.
CVE-2014-4344:
In MIT krb5 1.5 and newer, an unauthenticated or partially
authenticated remote attacker can cause a NULL dereference and
application crash during a SPNEGO negotiation by sending an empty
token as the second or later context token from initiator to acceptor.
The attacker must provide at least one valid context token in the
security context negotiation before sending the empty token. This can
be done by an unauthenticated attacker by forcing SPNEGO to
renegotiate the underlying mechanism, or by using IAKERB to wrap an
unauthenticated AS-REQ as the first token.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
[[email protected]: CVE summary, CVSSv2 vector]
(cherry picked from commit 524688ce87a15fc75f87efc8c039ba4c7d5c197b)
ticket: 7970
version_fixed: 1.12.2
status: resolved | get_req_flags(unsigned char **buff_in, OM_uint32 bodysize,
OM_uint32 *req_flags)
{
unsigned int len;
if (**buff_in != (CONTEXT | 0x01))
return (0);
if (g_get_tag_and_length(buff_in, (CONTEXT | 0x01),
bodysize, &len) < 0)
return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
if (*(*buff_in)++ != BIT_STRING)
return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
if (*(*buff_in)++ != BIT_STRING_LENGTH)
return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
if (*(*buff_in)++ != BIT_STRING_PADDING)
return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
*req_flags = (OM_uint32) (*(*buff_in)++ >> 1);
return (0);
}
| get_req_flags(unsigned char **buff_in, OM_uint32 bodysize,
OM_uint32 *req_flags)
{
unsigned int len;
if (**buff_in != (CONTEXT | 0x01))
return (0);
if (g_get_tag_and_length(buff_in, (CONTEXT | 0x01),
bodysize, &len) < 0)
return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
if (*(*buff_in)++ != BIT_STRING)
return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
if (*(*buff_in)++ != BIT_STRING_LENGTH)
return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
if (*(*buff_in)++ != BIT_STRING_PADDING)
return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
*req_flags = (OM_uint32) (*(*buff_in)++ >> 1);
return (0);
}
| C | krb5 | 0 |
CVE-2012-2875 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2875/ | null | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/1266ba494530a267ec8a21442ea1b5cae94da4fb | 1266ba494530a267ec8a21442ea1b5cae94da4fb | Introduce XGetImage() for GrabWindowSnapshot() in ChromeOS.
BUG=119492
TEST=manually done
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10386124
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137556 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | void RootWindowHostLinux::SetCursorInternal(gfx::NativeCursor cursor) {
::Cursor xcursor =
image_cursors_->IsImageCursor(cursor) ?
image_cursors_->ImageCursorFromNative(cursor) :
cursor == ui::kCursorNone ?
invisible_cursor_ :
cursor == ui::kCursorCustom ?
cursor.platform() :
ui::GetXCursor(CursorShapeFromNative(cursor));
XDefineCursor(xdisplay_, xwindow_, xcursor);
}
| void RootWindowHostLinux::SetCursorInternal(gfx::NativeCursor cursor) {
::Cursor xcursor =
image_cursors_->IsImageCursor(cursor) ?
image_cursors_->ImageCursorFromNative(cursor) :
cursor == ui::kCursorNone ?
invisible_cursor_ :
cursor == ui::kCursorCustom ?
cursor.platform() :
ui::GetXCursor(CursorShapeFromNative(cursor));
XDefineCursor(xdisplay_, xwindow_, xcursor);
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2016-10144 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-10144/ | CWE-284 | https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/97566cf2806c0a5a86e884c96831a0c3b1ec6c20 | 97566cf2806c0a5a86e884c96831a0c3b1ec6c20 | ... | static void SetHeaderFromIPL(Image *image, IPLInfo *ipl){
image->columns = ipl->width;
image->rows = ipl->height;
image->depth = ipl->depth;
image->x_resolution = 1;
image->y_resolution = 1;
}
| static void SetHeaderFromIPL(Image *image, IPLInfo *ipl){
image->columns = ipl->width;
image->rows = ipl->height;
image->depth = ipl->depth;
image->x_resolution = 1;
image->y_resolution = 1;
}
| C | ImageMagick | 0 |
CVE-2017-5546 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5546/ | null | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/c4e490cf148e85ead0d1b1c2caaba833f1d5b29f | c4e490cf148e85ead0d1b1c2caaba833f1d5b29f | mm/slab.c: fix SLAB freelist randomization duplicate entries
This patch fixes a bug in the freelist randomization code. When a high
random number is used, the freelist will contain duplicate entries. It
will result in different allocations sharing the same chunk.
It will result in odd behaviours and crashes. It should be uncommon but
it depends on the machines. We saw it happening more often on some
machines (every few hours of running tests).
Fixes: c7ce4f60ac19 ("mm: SLAB freelist randomization")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: John Sperbeck <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <[email protected]>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <[email protected]>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <[email protected]>
Cc: David Rientjes <[email protected]>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> | static bool is_debug_pagealloc_cache(struct kmem_cache *cachep)
{
if (debug_pagealloc_enabled() && OFF_SLAB(cachep) &&
(cachep->size % PAGE_SIZE) == 0)
return true;
return false;
}
| static bool is_debug_pagealloc_cache(struct kmem_cache *cachep)
{
if (debug_pagealloc_enabled() && OFF_SLAB(cachep) &&
(cachep->size % PAGE_SIZE) == 0)
return true;
return false;
}
| C | linux | 0 |
CVE-2016-9557 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-9557/ | CWE-190 | https://github.com/mdadams/jasper/commit/d42b2388f7f8e0332c846675133acea151fc557a | d42b2388f7f8e0332c846675133acea151fc557a | The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now. | static int jas_icclut16_output(jas_iccattrval_t *attrval, jas_stream_t *out)
{
jas_icclut16_t *lut16 = &attrval->data.lut16;
int i;
int j;
int n;
if (jas_stream_putc(out, lut16->numinchans) == EOF ||
jas_stream_putc(out, lut16->numoutchans) == EOF ||
jas_stream_putc(out, lut16->clutlen) == EOF ||
jas_stream_putc(out, 0) == EOF)
goto error;
for (i = 0; i < 3; ++i) {
for (j = 0; j < 3; ++j) {
if (jas_iccputsint32(out, lut16->e[i][j]))
goto error;
}
}
if (jas_iccputuint16(out, lut16->numintabents) ||
jas_iccputuint16(out, lut16->numouttabents))
goto error;
n = lut16->numinchans * lut16->numintabents;
for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
if (jas_iccputuint16(out, lut16->intabsbuf[i]))
goto error;
}
n = lut16->numoutchans * lut16->numouttabents;
for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
if (jas_iccputuint16(out, lut16->outtabsbuf[i]))
goto error;
}
n = jas_iccpowi(lut16->clutlen, lut16->numinchans) * lut16->numoutchans;
for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
if (jas_iccputuint16(out, lut16->clut[i]))
goto error;
}
return 0;
error:
return -1;
}
| static int jas_icclut16_output(jas_iccattrval_t *attrval, jas_stream_t *out)
{
jas_icclut16_t *lut16 = &attrval->data.lut16;
int i;
int j;
int n;
if (jas_stream_putc(out, lut16->numinchans) == EOF ||
jas_stream_putc(out, lut16->numoutchans) == EOF ||
jas_stream_putc(out, lut16->clutlen) == EOF ||
jas_stream_putc(out, 0) == EOF)
goto error;
for (i = 0; i < 3; ++i) {
for (j = 0; j < 3; ++j) {
if (jas_iccputsint32(out, lut16->e[i][j]))
goto error;
}
}
if (jas_iccputuint16(out, lut16->numintabents) ||
jas_iccputuint16(out, lut16->numouttabents))
goto error;
n = lut16->numinchans * lut16->numintabents;
for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
if (jas_iccputuint16(out, lut16->intabsbuf[i]))
goto error;
}
n = lut16->numoutchans * lut16->numouttabents;
for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
if (jas_iccputuint16(out, lut16->outtabsbuf[i]))
goto error;
}
n = jas_iccpowi(lut16->clutlen, lut16->numinchans) * lut16->numoutchans;
for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
if (jas_iccputuint16(out, lut16->clut[i]))
goto error;
}
return 0;
error:
return -1;
}
| C | jasper | 0 |
CVE-2018-18839 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-18839/ | CWE-200 | https://github.com/netdata/netdata/commit/92327c9ec211bd1616315abcb255861b130b97ca | 92327c9ec211bd1616315abcb255861b130b97ca | fixed vulnerabilities identified by red4sec.com (#4521) | inline int web_client_api_request_v1_alarms(RRDHOST *host, struct web_client *w, char *url) {
int all = 0;
while(url) {
char *value = mystrsep(&url, "?&");
if (!value || !*value) continue;
if(!strcmp(value, "all")) all = 1;
else if(!strcmp(value, "active")) all = 0;
}
buffer_flush(w->response.data);
w->response.data->contenttype = CT_APPLICATION_JSON;
health_alarms2json(host, w->response.data, all);
return 200;
}
| inline int web_client_api_request_v1_alarms(RRDHOST *host, struct web_client *w, char *url) {
int all = 0;
while(url) {
char *value = mystrsep(&url, "?&");
if (!value || !*value) continue;
if(!strcmp(value, "all")) all = 1;
else if(!strcmp(value, "active")) all = 0;
}
buffer_flush(w->response.data);
w->response.data->contenttype = CT_APPLICATION_JSON;
health_alarms2json(host, w->response.data, all);
return 200;
}
| C | netdata | 0 |
CVE-2015-9004 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-9004/ | CWE-264 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/c3c87e770458aa004bd7ed3f29945ff436fd6511 | c3c87e770458aa004bd7ed3f29945ff436fd6511 | perf: Tighten (and fix) the grouping condition
The fix from 9fc81d87420d ("perf: Fix events installation during
moving group") was incomplete in that it failed to recognise that
creating a group with events for different CPUs is semantically
broken -- they cannot be co-scheduled.
Furthermore, it leads to real breakage where, when we create an event
for CPU Y and then migrate it to form a group on CPU X, the code gets
confused where the counter is programmed -- triggered in practice
as well by me via the perf fuzzer.
Fix this by tightening the rules for creating groups. Only allow
grouping of counters that can be co-scheduled in the same context.
This means for the same task and/or the same cpu.
Fixes: 9fc81d87420d ("perf: Fix events installation during moving group")
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <[email protected]>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> | perf_event_set_output(struct perf_event *event, struct perf_event *output_event)
{
struct ring_buffer *rb = NULL;
int ret = -EINVAL;
if (!output_event)
goto set;
/* don't allow circular references */
if (event == output_event)
goto out;
/*
* Don't allow cross-cpu buffers
*/
if (output_event->cpu != event->cpu)
goto out;
/*
* If its not a per-cpu rb, it must be the same task.
*/
if (output_event->cpu == -1 && output_event->ctx != event->ctx)
goto out;
set:
mutex_lock(&event->mmap_mutex);
/* Can't redirect output if we've got an active mmap() */
if (atomic_read(&event->mmap_count))
goto unlock;
if (output_event) {
/* get the rb we want to redirect to */
rb = ring_buffer_get(output_event);
if (!rb)
goto unlock;
}
ring_buffer_attach(event, rb);
ret = 0;
unlock:
mutex_unlock(&event->mmap_mutex);
out:
return ret;
}
| perf_event_set_output(struct perf_event *event, struct perf_event *output_event)
{
struct ring_buffer *rb = NULL;
int ret = -EINVAL;
if (!output_event)
goto set;
/* don't allow circular references */
if (event == output_event)
goto out;
/*
* Don't allow cross-cpu buffers
*/
if (output_event->cpu != event->cpu)
goto out;
/*
* If its not a per-cpu rb, it must be the same task.
*/
if (output_event->cpu == -1 && output_event->ctx != event->ctx)
goto out;
set:
mutex_lock(&event->mmap_mutex);
/* Can't redirect output if we've got an active mmap() */
if (atomic_read(&event->mmap_count))
goto unlock;
if (output_event) {
/* get the rb we want to redirect to */
rb = ring_buffer_get(output_event);
if (!rb)
goto unlock;
}
ring_buffer_attach(event, rb);
ret = 0;
unlock:
mutex_unlock(&event->mmap_mutex);
out:
return ret;
}
| C | linux | 0 |
CVE-2014-7822 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-7822/ | CWE-264 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/8d0207652cbe27d1f962050737848e5ad4671958 | 8d0207652cbe27d1f962050737848e5ad4671958 | ->splice_write() via ->write_iter()
iter_file_splice_write() - a ->splice_write() instance that gathers the
pipe buffers, builds a bio_vec-based iov_iter covering those and feeds
it to ->write_iter(). A bunch of simple cases coverted to that...
[AV: fixed the braino spotted by Cyrill]
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]> | void invalidate_bdev(struct block_device *bdev)
{
struct address_space *mapping = bdev->bd_inode->i_mapping;
if (mapping->nrpages == 0)
return;
invalidate_bh_lrus();
lru_add_drain_all(); /* make sure all lru add caches are flushed */
invalidate_mapping_pages(mapping, 0, -1);
/* 99% of the time, we don't need to flush the cleancache on the bdev.
* But, for the strange corners, lets be cautious
*/
cleancache_invalidate_inode(mapping);
}
| void invalidate_bdev(struct block_device *bdev)
{
struct address_space *mapping = bdev->bd_inode->i_mapping;
if (mapping->nrpages == 0)
return;
invalidate_bh_lrus();
lru_add_drain_all(); /* make sure all lru add caches are flushed */
invalidate_mapping_pages(mapping, 0, -1);
/* 99% of the time, we don't need to flush the cleancache on the bdev.
* But, for the strange corners, lets be cautious
*/
cleancache_invalidate_inode(mapping);
}
| C | linux | 0 |
CVE-2011-3188 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-3188/ | null | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/6e5714eaf77d79ae1c8b47e3e040ff5411b717ec | 6e5714eaf77d79ae1c8b47e3e040ff5411b717ec | net: Compute protocol sequence numbers and fragment IDs using MD5.
Computers have become a lot faster since we compromised on the
partial MD4 hash which we use currently for performance reasons.
MD5 is a much safer choice, and is inline with both RFC1948 and
other ISS generators (OpenBSD, Solaris, etc.)
Furthermore, only having 24-bits of the sequence number be truly
unpredictable is a very serious limitation. So the periodic
regeneration and 8-bit counter have been removed. We compute and
use a full 32-bit sequence number.
For ipv6, DCCP was found to use a 32-bit truncated initial sequence
number (it needs 43-bits) and that is fixed here as well.
Reported-by: Dan Kaminsky <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Willy Tarreau <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | static int rt_garbage_collect(struct dst_ops *ops)
{
static unsigned long expire = RT_GC_TIMEOUT;
static unsigned long last_gc;
static int rover;
static int equilibrium;
struct rtable *rth;
struct rtable __rcu **rthp;
unsigned long now = jiffies;
int goal;
int entries = dst_entries_get_fast(&ipv4_dst_ops);
/*
* Garbage collection is pretty expensive,
* do not make it too frequently.
*/
RT_CACHE_STAT_INC(gc_total);
if (now - last_gc < ip_rt_gc_min_interval &&
entries < ip_rt_max_size) {
RT_CACHE_STAT_INC(gc_ignored);
goto out;
}
entries = dst_entries_get_slow(&ipv4_dst_ops);
/* Calculate number of entries, which we want to expire now. */
goal = entries - (ip_rt_gc_elasticity << rt_hash_log);
if (goal <= 0) {
if (equilibrium < ipv4_dst_ops.gc_thresh)
equilibrium = ipv4_dst_ops.gc_thresh;
goal = entries - equilibrium;
if (goal > 0) {
equilibrium += min_t(unsigned int, goal >> 1, rt_hash_mask + 1);
goal = entries - equilibrium;
}
} else {
/* We are in dangerous area. Try to reduce cache really
* aggressively.
*/
goal = max_t(unsigned int, goal >> 1, rt_hash_mask + 1);
equilibrium = entries - goal;
}
if (now - last_gc >= ip_rt_gc_min_interval)
last_gc = now;
if (goal <= 0) {
equilibrium += goal;
goto work_done;
}
do {
int i, k;
for (i = rt_hash_mask, k = rover; i >= 0; i--) {
unsigned long tmo = expire;
k = (k + 1) & rt_hash_mask;
rthp = &rt_hash_table[k].chain;
spin_lock_bh(rt_hash_lock_addr(k));
while ((rth = rcu_dereference_protected(*rthp,
lockdep_is_held(rt_hash_lock_addr(k)))) != NULL) {
if (!rt_is_expired(rth) &&
!rt_may_expire(rth, tmo, expire)) {
tmo >>= 1;
rthp = &rth->dst.rt_next;
continue;
}
*rthp = rth->dst.rt_next;
rt_free(rth);
goal--;
}
spin_unlock_bh(rt_hash_lock_addr(k));
if (goal <= 0)
break;
}
rover = k;
if (goal <= 0)
goto work_done;
/* Goal is not achieved. We stop process if:
- if expire reduced to zero. Otherwise, expire is halfed.
- if table is not full.
- if we are called from interrupt.
- jiffies check is just fallback/debug loop breaker.
We will not spin here for long time in any case.
*/
RT_CACHE_STAT_INC(gc_goal_miss);
if (expire == 0)
break;
expire >>= 1;
if (dst_entries_get_fast(&ipv4_dst_ops) < ip_rt_max_size)
goto out;
} while (!in_softirq() && time_before_eq(jiffies, now));
if (dst_entries_get_fast(&ipv4_dst_ops) < ip_rt_max_size)
goto out;
if (dst_entries_get_slow(&ipv4_dst_ops) < ip_rt_max_size)
goto out;
if (net_ratelimit())
printk(KERN_WARNING "dst cache overflow\n");
RT_CACHE_STAT_INC(gc_dst_overflow);
return 1;
work_done:
expire += ip_rt_gc_min_interval;
if (expire > ip_rt_gc_timeout ||
dst_entries_get_fast(&ipv4_dst_ops) < ipv4_dst_ops.gc_thresh ||
dst_entries_get_slow(&ipv4_dst_ops) < ipv4_dst_ops.gc_thresh)
expire = ip_rt_gc_timeout;
out: return 0;
}
| static int rt_garbage_collect(struct dst_ops *ops)
{
static unsigned long expire = RT_GC_TIMEOUT;
static unsigned long last_gc;
static int rover;
static int equilibrium;
struct rtable *rth;
struct rtable __rcu **rthp;
unsigned long now = jiffies;
int goal;
int entries = dst_entries_get_fast(&ipv4_dst_ops);
/*
* Garbage collection is pretty expensive,
* do not make it too frequently.
*/
RT_CACHE_STAT_INC(gc_total);
if (now - last_gc < ip_rt_gc_min_interval &&
entries < ip_rt_max_size) {
RT_CACHE_STAT_INC(gc_ignored);
goto out;
}
entries = dst_entries_get_slow(&ipv4_dst_ops);
/* Calculate number of entries, which we want to expire now. */
goal = entries - (ip_rt_gc_elasticity << rt_hash_log);
if (goal <= 0) {
if (equilibrium < ipv4_dst_ops.gc_thresh)
equilibrium = ipv4_dst_ops.gc_thresh;
goal = entries - equilibrium;
if (goal > 0) {
equilibrium += min_t(unsigned int, goal >> 1, rt_hash_mask + 1);
goal = entries - equilibrium;
}
} else {
/* We are in dangerous area. Try to reduce cache really
* aggressively.
*/
goal = max_t(unsigned int, goal >> 1, rt_hash_mask + 1);
equilibrium = entries - goal;
}
if (now - last_gc >= ip_rt_gc_min_interval)
last_gc = now;
if (goal <= 0) {
equilibrium += goal;
goto work_done;
}
do {
int i, k;
for (i = rt_hash_mask, k = rover; i >= 0; i--) {
unsigned long tmo = expire;
k = (k + 1) & rt_hash_mask;
rthp = &rt_hash_table[k].chain;
spin_lock_bh(rt_hash_lock_addr(k));
while ((rth = rcu_dereference_protected(*rthp,
lockdep_is_held(rt_hash_lock_addr(k)))) != NULL) {
if (!rt_is_expired(rth) &&
!rt_may_expire(rth, tmo, expire)) {
tmo >>= 1;
rthp = &rth->dst.rt_next;
continue;
}
*rthp = rth->dst.rt_next;
rt_free(rth);
goal--;
}
spin_unlock_bh(rt_hash_lock_addr(k));
if (goal <= 0)
break;
}
rover = k;
if (goal <= 0)
goto work_done;
/* Goal is not achieved. We stop process if:
- if expire reduced to zero. Otherwise, expire is halfed.
- if table is not full.
- if we are called from interrupt.
- jiffies check is just fallback/debug loop breaker.
We will not spin here for long time in any case.
*/
RT_CACHE_STAT_INC(gc_goal_miss);
if (expire == 0)
break;
expire >>= 1;
if (dst_entries_get_fast(&ipv4_dst_ops) < ip_rt_max_size)
goto out;
} while (!in_softirq() && time_before_eq(jiffies, now));
if (dst_entries_get_fast(&ipv4_dst_ops) < ip_rt_max_size)
goto out;
if (dst_entries_get_slow(&ipv4_dst_ops) < ip_rt_max_size)
goto out;
if (net_ratelimit())
printk(KERN_WARNING "dst cache overflow\n");
RT_CACHE_STAT_INC(gc_dst_overflow);
return 1;
work_done:
expire += ip_rt_gc_min_interval;
if (expire > ip_rt_gc_timeout ||
dst_entries_get_fast(&ipv4_dst_ops) < ipv4_dst_ops.gc_thresh ||
dst_entries_get_slow(&ipv4_dst_ops) < ipv4_dst_ops.gc_thresh)
expire = ip_rt_gc_timeout;
out: return 0;
}
| C | linux | 0 |
CVE-2018-13093 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-13093/ | CWE-476 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/afca6c5b2595fc44383919fba740c194b0b76aff | afca6c5b2595fc44383919fba740c194b0b76aff | xfs: validate cached inodes are free when allocated
A recent fuzzed filesystem image cached random dcache corruption
when the reproducer was run. This often showed up as panics in
lookup_slow() on a null inode->i_ops pointer when doing pathwalks.
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000000
....
Call Trace:
lookup_slow+0x44/0x60
walk_component+0x3dd/0x9f0
link_path_walk+0x4a7/0x830
path_lookupat+0xc1/0x470
filename_lookup+0x129/0x270
user_path_at_empty+0x36/0x40
path_listxattr+0x98/0x110
SyS_listxattr+0x13/0x20
do_syscall_64+0xf5/0x280
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7
but had many different failure modes including deadlocks trying to
lock the inode that was just allocated or KASAN reports of
use-after-free violations.
The cause of the problem was a corrupt INOBT on a v4 fs where the
root inode was marked as free in the inobt record. Hence when we
allocated an inode, it chose the root inode to allocate, found it in
the cache and re-initialised it.
We recently fixed a similar inode allocation issue caused by inobt
record corruption problem in xfs_iget_cache_miss() in commit
ee457001ed6c ("xfs: catch inode allocation state mismatch
corruption"). This change adds similar checks to the cache-hit path
to catch it, and turns the reproducer into a corruption shutdown
situation.
Reported-by: Wen Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-Off-By: Dave Chinner <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Carlos Maiolino <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <[email protected]>
[darrick: fix typos in comment]
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <[email protected]> | __xfs_inode_free(
struct xfs_inode *ip)
{
/* asserts to verify all state is correct here */
ASSERT(atomic_read(&ip->i_pincount) == 0);
XFS_STATS_DEC(ip->i_mount, vn_active);
call_rcu(&VFS_I(ip)->i_rcu, xfs_inode_free_callback);
}
| __xfs_inode_free(
struct xfs_inode *ip)
{
/* asserts to verify all state is correct here */
ASSERT(atomic_read(&ip->i_pincount) == 0);
XFS_STATS_DEC(ip->i_mount, vn_active);
call_rcu(&VFS_I(ip)->i_rcu, xfs_inode_free_callback);
}
| C | linux | 0 |
CVE-2016-8654 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-8654/ | CWE-119 | https://github.com/mdadams/jasper/commit/4a59cfaf9ab3d48fca4a15c0d2674bf7138e3d1a | 4a59cfaf9ab3d48fca4a15c0d2674bf7138e3d1a | Fixed a buffer overrun problem in the QMFB code in the JPC codec
that was caused by a buffer being allocated with a size that was too small
in some cases.
Added a new regression test case. | int jpc_ns_analyze(jpc_fix_t *a, int xstart, int ystart, int width, int height,
int stride)
{
int numrows = height;
int numcols = width;
int rowparity = ystart & 1;
int colparity = xstart & 1;
int i;
jpc_fix_t *startptr;
int maxcols;
maxcols = (numcols / JPC_QMFB_COLGRPSIZE) * JPC_QMFB_COLGRPSIZE;
startptr = &a[0];
for (i = 0; i < maxcols; i += JPC_QMFB_COLGRPSIZE) {
jpc_qmfb_split_colgrp(startptr, numrows, stride, rowparity);
jpc_ns_fwdlift_colgrp(startptr, numrows, stride, rowparity);
startptr += JPC_QMFB_COLGRPSIZE;
}
if (maxcols < numcols) {
jpc_qmfb_split_colres(startptr, numrows, numcols - maxcols, stride,
rowparity);
jpc_ns_fwdlift_colres(startptr, numrows, numcols - maxcols, stride,
rowparity);
}
startptr = &a[0];
for (i = 0; i < numrows; ++i) {
jpc_qmfb_split_row(startptr, numcols, colparity);
jpc_ns_fwdlift_row(startptr, numcols, colparity);
startptr += stride;
}
return 0;
}
| int jpc_ns_analyze(jpc_fix_t *a, int xstart, int ystart, int width, int height,
int stride)
{
int numrows = height;
int numcols = width;
int rowparity = ystart & 1;
int colparity = xstart & 1;
int i;
jpc_fix_t *startptr;
int maxcols;
maxcols = (numcols / JPC_QMFB_COLGRPSIZE) * JPC_QMFB_COLGRPSIZE;
startptr = &a[0];
for (i = 0; i < maxcols; i += JPC_QMFB_COLGRPSIZE) {
jpc_qmfb_split_colgrp(startptr, numrows, stride, rowparity);
jpc_ns_fwdlift_colgrp(startptr, numrows, stride, rowparity);
startptr += JPC_QMFB_COLGRPSIZE;
}
if (maxcols < numcols) {
jpc_qmfb_split_colres(startptr, numrows, numcols - maxcols, stride,
rowparity);
jpc_ns_fwdlift_colres(startptr, numrows, numcols - maxcols, stride,
rowparity);
}
startptr = &a[0];
for (i = 0; i < numrows; ++i) {
jpc_qmfb_split_row(startptr, numcols, colparity);
jpc_ns_fwdlift_row(startptr, numcols, colparity);
startptr += stride;
}
return 0;
}
| C | jasper | 0 |
CVE-2016-1613 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1613/ | null | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/7394cf6f43d7a86630d3eb1c728fd63c621b5530 | 7394cf6f43d7a86630d3eb1c728fd63c621b5530 | Connect the LocalDB to TabManager.
Bug: 773382
Change-Id: Iec8fe5226ee175105d51f300f30b4865478ac099
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1118611
Commit-Queue: Sébastien Marchand <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: François Doray <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#572871} | void DiscardAndAttachTabHelpers(LifecycleUnit* lifecycle_unit) {}
| void DiscardAndAttachTabHelpers(LifecycleUnit* lifecycle_unit) {}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2018-11381 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-11381/ | CWE-125 | https://github.com/radare/radare2/commit/3fcf41ed96ffa25b38029449520c8d0a198745f3 | 3fcf41ed96ffa25b38029449520c8d0a198745f3 | Fix #9902 - Fix oobread in RBin.string_scan_range | R_API RBinFile *r_bin_file_find_by_object_id(RBin *bin, ut32 binobj_id) {
RListIter *iter;
RBinFile *binfile;
r_list_foreach (bin->binfiles, iter, binfile) {
if (r_bin_file_object_find_by_id (binfile, binobj_id)) {
return binfile;
}
}
return NULL;
}
| R_API RBinFile *r_bin_file_find_by_object_id(RBin *bin, ut32 binobj_id) {
RListIter *iter;
RBinFile *binfile;
r_list_foreach (bin->binfiles, iter, binfile) {
if (r_bin_file_object_find_by_id (binfile, binobj_id)) {
return binfile;
}
}
return NULL;
}
| C | radare2 | 0 |
CVE-2016-5219 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5219/ | CWE-416 | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a4150b688a754d3d10d2ca385155b1c95d77d6ae | a4150b688a754d3d10d2ca385155b1c95d77d6ae | Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568} | void GLES2DecoderImpl::SetLevelInfo(uint32_t client_id,
int level,
unsigned internal_format,
unsigned width,
unsigned height,
unsigned depth,
unsigned format,
unsigned type,
const gfx::Rect& cleared_rect) {
TextureRef* texture_ref = texture_manager()->GetTexture(client_id);
texture_manager()->SetLevelInfo(texture_ref, texture_ref->texture()->target(),
level, internal_format, width, height, depth,
0 /* border */, format, type, cleared_rect);
}
| void GLES2DecoderImpl::SetLevelInfo(uint32_t client_id,
int level,
unsigned internal_format,
unsigned width,
unsigned height,
unsigned depth,
unsigned format,
unsigned type,
const gfx::Rect& cleared_rect) {
TextureRef* texture_ref = texture_manager()->GetTexture(client_id);
texture_manager()->SetLevelInfo(texture_ref, texture_ref->texture()->target(),
level, internal_format, width, height, depth,
0 /* border */, format, type, cleared_rect);
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2018-6560 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6560/ | CWE-436 | https://github.com/flatpak/flatpak/commit/52346bf187b5a7f1c0fe9075b328b7ad6abe78f6 | 52346bf187b5a7f1c0fe9075b328b7ad6abe78f6 | Fix vulnerability in dbus proxy
During the authentication all client data is directly forwarded
to the dbus daemon as is, until we detect the BEGIN command after
which we start filtering the binary dbus protocol.
Unfortunately the detection of the BEGIN command in the proxy
did not exactly match the detection in the dbus daemon. A BEGIN
followed by a space or tab was considered ok in the daemon but
not by the proxy. This could be exploited to send arbitrary
dbus messages to the host, which can be used to break out of
the sandbox.
This was noticed by Gabriel Campana of The Google Security Team.
This fix makes the detection of the authentication phase end
match the dbus code. In addition we duplicate the authentication
line validation from dbus, which includes ensuring all data is
ASCII, and limiting the size of a line to 16k. In fact, we add
some extra stringent checks, disallowing ASCII control chars and
requiring that auth lines start with a capital letter. | flatpak_proxy_init (FlatpakProxy *proxy)
{
proxy->policy = g_hash_table_new_full (g_str_hash, g_str_equal, g_free, NULL);
proxy->filters = g_hash_table_new_full (g_str_hash, g_str_equal, g_free, (GDestroyNotify)filter_list_free);
proxy->wildcard_policy = g_hash_table_new_full (g_str_hash, g_str_equal, g_free, NULL);
flatpak_proxy_add_policy (proxy, "org.freedesktop.DBus", FLATPAK_POLICY_TALK);
}
| flatpak_proxy_init (FlatpakProxy *proxy)
{
proxy->policy = g_hash_table_new_full (g_str_hash, g_str_equal, g_free, NULL);
proxy->filters = g_hash_table_new_full (g_str_hash, g_str_equal, g_free, (GDestroyNotify)filter_list_free);
proxy->wildcard_policy = g_hash_table_new_full (g_str_hash, g_str_equal, g_free, NULL);
flatpak_proxy_add_policy (proxy, "org.freedesktop.DBus", FLATPAK_POLICY_TALK);
}
| C | flatpak | 0 |
CVE-2017-14151 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-14151/ | CWE-119 | https://github.com/uclouvain/openjpeg/commit/afb308b9ccbe129608c9205cf3bb39bbefad90b9 | afb308b9ccbe129608c9205cf3bb39bbefad90b9 | Encoder: grow buffer size in opj_tcd_code_block_enc_allocate_data() to avoid write heap buffer overflow in opj_mqc_flush (#982) | static OPJ_BOOL opj_tcd_code_block_dec_allocate(opj_tcd_cblk_dec_t *
p_code_block)
{
if (! p_code_block->segs) {
p_code_block->segs = (opj_tcd_seg_t *) opj_calloc(OPJ_J2K_DEFAULT_NB_SEGS,
sizeof(opj_tcd_seg_t));
if (! p_code_block->segs) {
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
/*fprintf(stderr, "Allocate %d elements of code_block->data\n", OPJ_J2K_DEFAULT_NB_SEGS * sizeof(opj_tcd_seg_t));*/
p_code_block->m_current_max_segs = OPJ_J2K_DEFAULT_NB_SEGS;
/*fprintf(stderr, "m_current_max_segs of code_block->data = %d\n", p_code_block->m_current_max_segs);*/
} else {
/* sanitize */
opj_tcd_seg_t * l_segs = p_code_block->segs;
OPJ_UINT32 l_current_max_segs = p_code_block->m_current_max_segs;
opj_tcd_seg_data_chunk_t* l_chunks = p_code_block->chunks;
OPJ_UINT32 l_numchunksalloc = p_code_block->numchunksalloc;
OPJ_UINT32 i;
memset(p_code_block, 0, sizeof(opj_tcd_cblk_dec_t));
p_code_block->segs = l_segs;
p_code_block->m_current_max_segs = l_current_max_segs;
for (i = 0; i < l_current_max_segs; ++i) {
opj_tcd_reinit_segment(&l_segs[i]);
}
p_code_block->chunks = l_chunks;
p_code_block->numchunksalloc = l_numchunksalloc;
}
return OPJ_TRUE;
}
| static OPJ_BOOL opj_tcd_code_block_dec_allocate(opj_tcd_cblk_dec_t *
p_code_block)
{
if (! p_code_block->segs) {
p_code_block->segs = (opj_tcd_seg_t *) opj_calloc(OPJ_J2K_DEFAULT_NB_SEGS,
sizeof(opj_tcd_seg_t));
if (! p_code_block->segs) {
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
/*fprintf(stderr, "Allocate %d elements of code_block->data\n", OPJ_J2K_DEFAULT_NB_SEGS * sizeof(opj_tcd_seg_t));*/
p_code_block->m_current_max_segs = OPJ_J2K_DEFAULT_NB_SEGS;
/*fprintf(stderr, "m_current_max_segs of code_block->data = %d\n", p_code_block->m_current_max_segs);*/
} else {
/* sanitize */
opj_tcd_seg_t * l_segs = p_code_block->segs;
OPJ_UINT32 l_current_max_segs = p_code_block->m_current_max_segs;
opj_tcd_seg_data_chunk_t* l_chunks = p_code_block->chunks;
OPJ_UINT32 l_numchunksalloc = p_code_block->numchunksalloc;
OPJ_UINT32 i;
memset(p_code_block, 0, sizeof(opj_tcd_cblk_dec_t));
p_code_block->segs = l_segs;
p_code_block->m_current_max_segs = l_current_max_segs;
for (i = 0; i < l_current_max_segs; ++i) {
opj_tcd_reinit_segment(&l_segs[i]);
}
p_code_block->chunks = l_chunks;
p_code_block->numchunksalloc = l_numchunksalloc;
}
return OPJ_TRUE;
}
| C | openjpeg | 0 |
CVE-2015-5289 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-5289/ | CWE-119 | https://git.postgresql.org/gitweb/?p=postgresql.git;a=commit;h=08fa47c4850cea32c3116665975bca219fbf2fe6 | 08fa47c4850cea32c3116665975bca219fbf2fe6 | null | elements_worker_jsonb(FunctionCallInfo fcinfo, const char *funcname,
bool as_text)
{
Jsonb *jb = PG_GETARG_JSONB(0);
ReturnSetInfo *rsi;
Tuplestorestate *tuple_store;
TupleDesc tupdesc;
TupleDesc ret_tdesc;
MemoryContext old_cxt,
tmp_cxt;
bool skipNested = false;
JsonbIterator *it;
JsonbValue v;
int r;
if (JB_ROOT_IS_SCALAR(jb))
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_PARAMETER_VALUE),
errmsg("cannot extract elements from a scalar")));
else if (!JB_ROOT_IS_ARRAY(jb))
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_PARAMETER_VALUE),
errmsg("cannot extract elements from an object")));
rsi = (ReturnSetInfo *) fcinfo->resultinfo;
if (!rsi || !IsA(rsi, ReturnSetInfo) ||
(rsi->allowedModes & SFRM_Materialize) == 0 ||
rsi->expectedDesc == NULL)
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_FEATURE_NOT_SUPPORTED),
errmsg("set-valued function called in context that "
"cannot accept a set")));
rsi->returnMode = SFRM_Materialize;
/* it's a simple type, so don't use get_call_result_type() */
tupdesc = rsi->expectedDesc;
old_cxt = MemoryContextSwitchTo(rsi->econtext->ecxt_per_query_memory);
ret_tdesc = CreateTupleDescCopy(tupdesc);
BlessTupleDesc(ret_tdesc);
tuple_store =
tuplestore_begin_heap(rsi->allowedModes & SFRM_Materialize_Random,
false, work_mem);
MemoryContextSwitchTo(old_cxt);
tmp_cxt = AllocSetContextCreate(CurrentMemoryContext,
"jsonb_array_elements temporary cxt",
ALLOCSET_DEFAULT_MINSIZE,
ALLOCSET_DEFAULT_INITSIZE,
ALLOCSET_DEFAULT_MAXSIZE);
it = JsonbIteratorInit(&jb->root);
while ((r = JsonbIteratorNext(&it, &v, skipNested)) != WJB_DONE)
{
skipNested = true;
if (r == WJB_ELEM)
{
HeapTuple tuple;
Datum values[1];
bool nulls[1] = {false};
/* use the tmp context so we can clean up after each tuple is done */
old_cxt = MemoryContextSwitchTo(tmp_cxt);
if (!as_text)
{
Jsonb *val = JsonbValueToJsonb(&v);
values[0] = PointerGetDatum(val);
}
else
{
if (v.type == jbvNull)
{
/* a json null is an sql null in text mode */
nulls[0] = true;
values[0] = (Datum) NULL;
}
else
{
text *sv;
if (v.type == jbvString)
{
/* in text mode scalar strings should be dequoted */
sv = cstring_to_text_with_len(v.val.string.val, v.val.string.len);
}
else
{
/* turn anything else into a json string */
StringInfo jtext = makeStringInfo();
Jsonb *jb = JsonbValueToJsonb(&v);
(void) JsonbToCString(jtext, &jb->root, 0);
sv = cstring_to_text_with_len(jtext->data, jtext->len);
}
values[0] = PointerGetDatum(sv);
}
}
tuple = heap_form_tuple(ret_tdesc, values, nulls);
tuplestore_puttuple(tuple_store, tuple);
/* clean up and switch back */
MemoryContextSwitchTo(old_cxt);
MemoryContextReset(tmp_cxt);
}
}
MemoryContextDelete(tmp_cxt);
rsi->setResult = tuple_store;
rsi->setDesc = ret_tdesc;
PG_RETURN_NULL();
}
| elements_worker_jsonb(FunctionCallInfo fcinfo, const char *funcname,
bool as_text)
{
Jsonb *jb = PG_GETARG_JSONB(0);
ReturnSetInfo *rsi;
Tuplestorestate *tuple_store;
TupleDesc tupdesc;
TupleDesc ret_tdesc;
MemoryContext old_cxt,
tmp_cxt;
bool skipNested = false;
JsonbIterator *it;
JsonbValue v;
int r;
if (JB_ROOT_IS_SCALAR(jb))
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_PARAMETER_VALUE),
errmsg("cannot extract elements from a scalar")));
else if (!JB_ROOT_IS_ARRAY(jb))
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_PARAMETER_VALUE),
errmsg("cannot extract elements from an object")));
rsi = (ReturnSetInfo *) fcinfo->resultinfo;
if (!rsi || !IsA(rsi, ReturnSetInfo) ||
(rsi->allowedModes & SFRM_Materialize) == 0 ||
rsi->expectedDesc == NULL)
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_FEATURE_NOT_SUPPORTED),
errmsg("set-valued function called in context that "
"cannot accept a set")));
rsi->returnMode = SFRM_Materialize;
/* it's a simple type, so don't use get_call_result_type() */
tupdesc = rsi->expectedDesc;
old_cxt = MemoryContextSwitchTo(rsi->econtext->ecxt_per_query_memory);
ret_tdesc = CreateTupleDescCopy(tupdesc);
BlessTupleDesc(ret_tdesc);
tuple_store =
tuplestore_begin_heap(rsi->allowedModes & SFRM_Materialize_Random,
false, work_mem);
MemoryContextSwitchTo(old_cxt);
tmp_cxt = AllocSetContextCreate(CurrentMemoryContext,
"jsonb_array_elements temporary cxt",
ALLOCSET_DEFAULT_MINSIZE,
ALLOCSET_DEFAULT_INITSIZE,
ALLOCSET_DEFAULT_MAXSIZE);
it = JsonbIteratorInit(&jb->root);
while ((r = JsonbIteratorNext(&it, &v, skipNested)) != WJB_DONE)
{
skipNested = true;
if (r == WJB_ELEM)
{
HeapTuple tuple;
Datum values[1];
bool nulls[1] = {false};
/* use the tmp context so we can clean up after each tuple is done */
old_cxt = MemoryContextSwitchTo(tmp_cxt);
if (!as_text)
{
Jsonb *val = JsonbValueToJsonb(&v);
values[0] = PointerGetDatum(val);
}
else
{
if (v.type == jbvNull)
{
/* a json null is an sql null in text mode */
nulls[0] = true;
values[0] = (Datum) NULL;
}
else
{
text *sv;
if (v.type == jbvString)
{
/* in text mode scalar strings should be dequoted */
sv = cstring_to_text_with_len(v.val.string.val, v.val.string.len);
}
else
{
/* turn anything else into a json string */
StringInfo jtext = makeStringInfo();
Jsonb *jb = JsonbValueToJsonb(&v);
(void) JsonbToCString(jtext, &jb->root, 0);
sv = cstring_to_text_with_len(jtext->data, jtext->len);
}
values[0] = PointerGetDatum(sv);
}
}
tuple = heap_form_tuple(ret_tdesc, values, nulls);
tuplestore_puttuple(tuple_store, tuple);
/* clean up and switch back */
MemoryContextSwitchTo(old_cxt);
MemoryContextReset(tmp_cxt);
}
}
MemoryContextDelete(tmp_cxt);
rsi->setResult = tuple_store;
rsi->setDesc = ret_tdesc;
PG_RETURN_NULL();
}
| C | postgresql | 0 |
null | null | null | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/1161a49d663dd395bd639549c2dfe7324f847938 | 1161a49d663dd395bd639549c2dfe7324f847938 | Don't populate URL data in WebDropData when dragging files.
This is considered a potential security issue as well, since it leaks
filesystem paths.
BUG=332579
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/135633002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@244538 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | const gfx::Vector2d& OSExchangeDataProviderAuraX11::GetDragImageOffset() const {
return drag_image_offset_;
}
| const gfx::Vector2d& OSExchangeDataProviderAuraX11::GetDragImageOffset() const {
return drag_image_offset_;
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2013-2871 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2871/ | CWE-20 | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/bb9cfb0aba25f4b13e57bdd4a9fac80ba071e7b9 | bb9cfb0aba25f4b13e57bdd4a9fac80ba071e7b9 | Setting input.x-webkit-speech should not cause focus change
In r150866, we introduced element()->focus() in destroyShadowSubtree()
to retain focus on <input> when its type attribute gets changed.
But when x-webkit-speech attribute is changed, the element is detached
before calling destroyShadowSubtree() and element()->focus() failed
This patch moves detach() after destroyShadowSubtree() to fix the
problem.
BUG=243818
TEST=fast/forms/input-type-change-focusout.html
NOTRY=true
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/16084005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@151444 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | bool HTMLInputElement::supportLabels() const
{
return m_inputType->supportLabels();
}
| bool HTMLInputElement::supportLabels() const
{
return m_inputType->supportLabels();
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2012-2844 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2844/ | null | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/46afbe7f7f55280947e9c06c429a68983ba9d8dd | 46afbe7f7f55280947e9c06c429a68983ba9d8dd | [EFL][WK2] Add --window-size command line option to EFL MiniBrowser
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=100942
Patch by Mikhail Pozdnyakov <[email protected]> on 2012-11-05
Reviewed by Kenneth Rohde Christiansen.
Added window-size (-s) command line option to EFL MiniBrowser.
* MiniBrowser/efl/main.c:
(window_create):
(parse_window_size):
(elm_main):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@133450 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | on_new_window(void *user_data, Evas_Object *webview, void *event_info)
{
Evas_Object **new_view = (Evas_Object **)event_info;
Browser_Window *window = window_create(NULL);
*new_view = window->webview;
windows = eina_list_append(windows, window);
}
| on_new_window(void *user_data, Evas_Object *webview, void *event_info)
{
Evas_Object **new_view = (Evas_Object **)event_info;
Browser_Window *window = window_create(NULL);
*new_view = window->webview;
windows = eina_list_append(windows, window);
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2013-7421 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-7421/ | CWE-264 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/5d26a105b5a73e5635eae0629b42fa0a90e07b7b | 5d26a105b5a73e5635eae0629b42fa0a90e07b7b | crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]> | static int cbc_decrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
struct scatterlist *dst, struct scatterlist *src,
unsigned int nbytes)
{
struct crypto_sparc64_aes_ctx *ctx = crypto_blkcipher_ctx(desc->tfm);
struct blkcipher_walk walk;
u64 *key_end;
int err;
blkcipher_walk_init(&walk, dst, src, nbytes);
err = blkcipher_walk_virt(desc, &walk);
desc->flags &= ~CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP;
ctx->ops->load_decrypt_keys(&ctx->key[0]);
key_end = &ctx->key[ctx->expanded_key_length / sizeof(u64)];
while ((nbytes = walk.nbytes)) {
unsigned int block_len = nbytes & AES_BLOCK_MASK;
if (likely(block_len)) {
ctx->ops->cbc_decrypt(key_end,
(const u64 *) walk.src.virt.addr,
(u64 *) walk.dst.virt.addr,
block_len, (u64 *) walk.iv);
}
nbytes &= AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1;
err = blkcipher_walk_done(desc, &walk, nbytes);
}
fprs_write(0);
return err;
}
| static int cbc_decrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
struct scatterlist *dst, struct scatterlist *src,
unsigned int nbytes)
{
struct crypto_sparc64_aes_ctx *ctx = crypto_blkcipher_ctx(desc->tfm);
struct blkcipher_walk walk;
u64 *key_end;
int err;
blkcipher_walk_init(&walk, dst, src, nbytes);
err = blkcipher_walk_virt(desc, &walk);
desc->flags &= ~CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP;
ctx->ops->load_decrypt_keys(&ctx->key[0]);
key_end = &ctx->key[ctx->expanded_key_length / sizeof(u64)];
while ((nbytes = walk.nbytes)) {
unsigned int block_len = nbytes & AES_BLOCK_MASK;
if (likely(block_len)) {
ctx->ops->cbc_decrypt(key_end,
(const u64 *) walk.src.virt.addr,
(u64 *) walk.dst.virt.addr,
block_len, (u64 *) walk.iv);
}
nbytes &= AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1;
err = blkcipher_walk_done(desc, &walk, nbytes);
}
fprs_write(0);
return err;
}
| C | linux | 0 |
null | null | null | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/74c1ec481b33194dc7a428f2d58fc89640b313ae | 74c1ec481b33194dc7a428f2d58fc89640b313ae | Fix glGetFramebufferAttachmentParameteriv so it returns
current names for buffers.
TEST=unit_tests and conformance tests
BUG=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/3135003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@55831 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoBindTexture(GLenum target, GLuint client_id) {
TextureManager::TextureInfo* info = NULL;
GLuint service_id = 0;
if (client_id != 0) {
info = GetTextureInfo(client_id);
if (!info) {
glGenTextures(1, &service_id);
CreateTextureInfo(client_id, service_id);
info = GetTextureInfo(client_id);
IdAllocator* id_allocator =
group_->GetIdAllocator(id_namespaces::kTextures);
id_allocator->MarkAsUsed(client_id);
}
} else {
info = texture_manager()->GetDefaultTextureInfo(target);
}
if (info->target() != 0 && info->target() != target) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION,
"glBindTexture: texture bound to more than 1 target.");
return;
}
if (info->target() == 0) {
texture_manager()->SetInfoTarget(info, target);
}
glBindTexture(target, info->service_id());
TextureUnit& unit = texture_units_[active_texture_unit_];
unit.bind_target = target;
switch (target) {
case GL_TEXTURE_2D:
unit.bound_texture_2d = info;
break;
case GL_TEXTURE_CUBE_MAP:
unit.bound_texture_cube_map = info;
break;
default:
NOTREACHED(); // Validation should prevent us getting here.
break;
}
}
| void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoBindTexture(GLenum target, GLuint client_id) {
TextureManager::TextureInfo* info = NULL;
GLuint service_id = 0;
if (client_id != 0) {
info = GetTextureInfo(client_id);
if (!info) {
glGenTextures(1, &service_id);
CreateTextureInfo(client_id, service_id);
info = GetTextureInfo(client_id);
IdAllocator* id_allocator =
group_->GetIdAllocator(id_namespaces::kTextures);
id_allocator->MarkAsUsed(client_id);
}
} else {
info = texture_manager()->GetDefaultTextureInfo(target);
}
if (info->target() != 0 && info->target() != target) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION,
"glBindTexture: texture bound to more than 1 target.");
return;
}
if (info->target() == 0) {
texture_manager()->SetInfoTarget(info, target);
}
glBindTexture(target, info->service_id());
TextureUnit& unit = texture_units_[active_texture_unit_];
unit.bind_target = target;
switch (target) {
case GL_TEXTURE_2D:
unit.bound_texture_2d = info;
break;
case GL_TEXTURE_CUBE_MAP:
unit.bound_texture_cube_map = info;
break;
default:
NOTREACHED(); // Validation should prevent us getting here.
break;
}
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2015-4644 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-4644/ | null | https://git.php.net/?p=php-src.git;a=commit;h=2cc4e69cc6d8dbc4b3568ad3dd583324a7c11d64 | 2cc4e69cc6d8dbc4b3568ad3dd583324a7c11d64 | null | PHP_FUNCTION(pg_query_params)
{
zval *pgsql_link = NULL;
zval *pv_param_arr, **tmp;
char *query;
int query_len, id = -1, argc = ZEND_NUM_ARGS();
int leftover = 0;
int num_params = 0;
char **params = NULL;
PGconn *pgsql;
PGresult *pgsql_result;
ExecStatusType status;
pgsql_result_handle *pg_result;
if (argc == 2) {
if (zend_parse_parameters(argc TSRMLS_CC, "sa", &query, &query_len, &pv_param_arr) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
id = PGG(default_link);
CHECK_DEFAULT_LINK(id);
} else {
if (zend_parse_parameters(argc TSRMLS_CC, "rsa", &pgsql_link, &query, &query_len, &pv_param_arr) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
}
if (pgsql_link == NULL && id == -1) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE2(pgsql, PGconn *, &pgsql_link, id, "PostgreSQL link", le_link, le_plink);
if (PQ_SETNONBLOCKING(pgsql, 0)) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_NOTICE,"Cannot set connection to blocking mode");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
while ((pgsql_result = PQgetResult(pgsql))) {
PQclear(pgsql_result);
leftover = 1;
}
if (leftover) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_NOTICE, "Found results on this connection. Use pg_get_result() to get these results first");
}
zend_hash_internal_pointer_reset(Z_ARRVAL_P(pv_param_arr));
num_params = zend_hash_num_elements(Z_ARRVAL_P(pv_param_arr));
if (num_params > 0) {
int i = 0;
params = (char **)safe_emalloc(sizeof(char *), num_params, 0);
for(i = 0; i < num_params; i++) {
if (zend_hash_get_current_data(Z_ARRVAL_P(pv_param_arr), (void **) &tmp) == FAILURE) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING,"Error getting parameter");
_php_pgsql_free_params(params, num_params);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (Z_TYPE_PP(tmp) == IS_NULL) {
params[i] = NULL;
} else {
zval tmp_val = **tmp;
zval_copy_ctor(&tmp_val);
convert_to_cstring(&tmp_val);
if (Z_TYPE(tmp_val) != IS_STRING) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING,"Error converting parameter");
zval_dtor(&tmp_val);
_php_pgsql_free_params(params, num_params);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
params[i] = estrndup(Z_STRVAL(tmp_val), Z_STRLEN(tmp_val));
zval_dtor(&tmp_val);
}
zend_hash_move_forward(Z_ARRVAL_P(pv_param_arr));
}
}
pgsql_result = PQexecParams(pgsql, query, num_params,
NULL, (const char * const *)params, NULL, NULL, 0);
if ((PGG(auto_reset_persistent) & 2) && PQstatus(pgsql) != CONNECTION_OK) {
PQclear(pgsql_result);
PQreset(pgsql);
pgsql_result = PQexecParams(pgsql, query, num_params,
NULL, (const char * const *)params, NULL, NULL, 0);
}
if (pgsql_result) {
status = PQresultStatus(pgsql_result);
} else {
status = (ExecStatusType) PQstatus(pgsql);
}
_php_pgsql_free_params(params, num_params);
switch (status) {
case PGRES_EMPTY_QUERY:
case PGRES_BAD_RESPONSE:
case PGRES_NONFATAL_ERROR:
case PGRES_FATAL_ERROR:
PHP_PQ_ERROR("Query failed: %s", pgsql);
PQclear(pgsql_result);
RETURN_FALSE;
break;
case PGRES_COMMAND_OK: /* successful command that did not return rows */
default:
if (pgsql_result) {
pg_result = (pgsql_result_handle *) emalloc(sizeof(pgsql_result_handle));
pg_result->conn = pgsql;
pg_result->result = pgsql_result;
pg_result->row = 0;
ZEND_REGISTER_RESOURCE(return_value, pg_result, le_result);
} else {
PQclear(pgsql_result);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
break;
}
}
| PHP_FUNCTION(pg_query_params)
{
zval *pgsql_link = NULL;
zval *pv_param_arr, **tmp;
char *query;
int query_len, id = -1, argc = ZEND_NUM_ARGS();
int leftover = 0;
int num_params = 0;
char **params = NULL;
PGconn *pgsql;
PGresult *pgsql_result;
ExecStatusType status;
pgsql_result_handle *pg_result;
if (argc == 2) {
if (zend_parse_parameters(argc TSRMLS_CC, "sa", &query, &query_len, &pv_param_arr) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
id = PGG(default_link);
CHECK_DEFAULT_LINK(id);
} else {
if (zend_parse_parameters(argc TSRMLS_CC, "rsa", &pgsql_link, &query, &query_len, &pv_param_arr) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
}
if (pgsql_link == NULL && id == -1) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE2(pgsql, PGconn *, &pgsql_link, id, "PostgreSQL link", le_link, le_plink);
if (PQ_SETNONBLOCKING(pgsql, 0)) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_NOTICE,"Cannot set connection to blocking mode");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
while ((pgsql_result = PQgetResult(pgsql))) {
PQclear(pgsql_result);
leftover = 1;
}
if (leftover) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_NOTICE, "Found results on this connection. Use pg_get_result() to get these results first");
}
zend_hash_internal_pointer_reset(Z_ARRVAL_P(pv_param_arr));
num_params = zend_hash_num_elements(Z_ARRVAL_P(pv_param_arr));
if (num_params > 0) {
int i = 0;
params = (char **)safe_emalloc(sizeof(char *), num_params, 0);
for(i = 0; i < num_params; i++) {
if (zend_hash_get_current_data(Z_ARRVAL_P(pv_param_arr), (void **) &tmp) == FAILURE) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING,"Error getting parameter");
_php_pgsql_free_params(params, num_params);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (Z_TYPE_PP(tmp) == IS_NULL) {
params[i] = NULL;
} else {
zval tmp_val = **tmp;
zval_copy_ctor(&tmp_val);
convert_to_cstring(&tmp_val);
if (Z_TYPE(tmp_val) != IS_STRING) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING,"Error converting parameter");
zval_dtor(&tmp_val);
_php_pgsql_free_params(params, num_params);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
params[i] = estrndup(Z_STRVAL(tmp_val), Z_STRLEN(tmp_val));
zval_dtor(&tmp_val);
}
zend_hash_move_forward(Z_ARRVAL_P(pv_param_arr));
}
}
pgsql_result = PQexecParams(pgsql, query, num_params,
NULL, (const char * const *)params, NULL, NULL, 0);
if ((PGG(auto_reset_persistent) & 2) && PQstatus(pgsql) != CONNECTION_OK) {
PQclear(pgsql_result);
PQreset(pgsql);
pgsql_result = PQexecParams(pgsql, query, num_params,
NULL, (const char * const *)params, NULL, NULL, 0);
}
if (pgsql_result) {
status = PQresultStatus(pgsql_result);
} else {
status = (ExecStatusType) PQstatus(pgsql);
}
_php_pgsql_free_params(params, num_params);
switch (status) {
case PGRES_EMPTY_QUERY:
case PGRES_BAD_RESPONSE:
case PGRES_NONFATAL_ERROR:
case PGRES_FATAL_ERROR:
PHP_PQ_ERROR("Query failed: %s", pgsql);
PQclear(pgsql_result);
RETURN_FALSE;
break;
case PGRES_COMMAND_OK: /* successful command that did not return rows */
default:
if (pgsql_result) {
pg_result = (pgsql_result_handle *) emalloc(sizeof(pgsql_result_handle));
pg_result->conn = pgsql;
pg_result->result = pgsql_result;
pg_result->row = 0;
ZEND_REGISTER_RESOURCE(return_value, pg_result, le_result);
} else {
PQclear(pgsql_result);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
break;
}
}
| C | php | 0 |
CVE-2018-5388 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-5388/ | CWE-787 | https://git.strongswan.org/?p=strongswan.git;a=commitdiff;h=0acd1ab4 | 0acd1ab4d08d53d80393b1a37b8781f6e7b2b996 | null | static void stroke_add_ca(private_stroke_socket_t *this,
stroke_msg_t *msg, FILE *out)
{
pop_string(msg, &msg->add_ca.name);
DBG1(DBG_CFG, "received stroke: add ca '%s'", msg->add_ca.name);
pop_string(msg, &msg->add_ca.cacert);
pop_string(msg, &msg->add_ca.crluri);
pop_string(msg, &msg->add_ca.crluri2);
pop_string(msg, &msg->add_ca.ocspuri);
pop_string(msg, &msg->add_ca.ocspuri2);
pop_string(msg, &msg->add_ca.certuribase);
DBG2(DBG_CFG, "ca %s", msg->add_ca.name);
DBG_OPT(" cacert=%s", msg->add_ca.cacert);
DBG_OPT(" crluri=%s", msg->add_ca.crluri);
DBG_OPT(" crluri2=%s", msg->add_ca.crluri2);
DBG_OPT(" ocspuri=%s", msg->add_ca.ocspuri);
DBG_OPT(" ocspuri2=%s", msg->add_ca.ocspuri2);
DBG_OPT(" certuribase=%s", msg->add_ca.certuribase);
this->ca->add(this->ca, msg);
}
| static void stroke_add_ca(private_stroke_socket_t *this,
stroke_msg_t *msg, FILE *out)
{
pop_string(msg, &msg->add_ca.name);
DBG1(DBG_CFG, "received stroke: add ca '%s'", msg->add_ca.name);
pop_string(msg, &msg->add_ca.cacert);
pop_string(msg, &msg->add_ca.crluri);
pop_string(msg, &msg->add_ca.crluri2);
pop_string(msg, &msg->add_ca.ocspuri);
pop_string(msg, &msg->add_ca.ocspuri2);
pop_string(msg, &msg->add_ca.certuribase);
DBG2(DBG_CFG, "ca %s", msg->add_ca.name);
DBG_OPT(" cacert=%s", msg->add_ca.cacert);
DBG_OPT(" crluri=%s", msg->add_ca.crluri);
DBG_OPT(" crluri2=%s", msg->add_ca.crluri2);
DBG_OPT(" ocspuri=%s", msg->add_ca.ocspuri);
DBG_OPT(" ocspuri2=%s", msg->add_ca.ocspuri2);
DBG_OPT(" certuribase=%s", msg->add_ca.certuribase);
this->ca->add(this->ca, msg);
}
| C | strongswan | 0 |
CVE-2016-6213 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-6213/ | CWE-400 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/d29216842a85c7970c536108e093963f02714498 | d29216842a85c7970c536108e093963f02714498 | mnt: Add a per mount namespace limit on the number of mounts
CAI Qian <[email protected]> pointed out that the semantics
of shared subtrees make it possible to create an exponentially
increasing number of mounts in a mount namespace.
mkdir /tmp/1 /tmp/2
mount --make-rshared /
for i in $(seq 1 20) ; do mount --bind /tmp/1 /tmp/2 ; done
Will create create 2^20 or 1048576 mounts, which is a practical problem
as some people have managed to hit this by accident.
As such CVE-2016-6213 was assigned.
Ian Kent <[email protected]> described the situation for autofs users
as follows:
> The number of mounts for direct mount maps is usually not very large because of
> the way they are implemented, large direct mount maps can have performance
> problems. There can be anywhere from a few (likely case a few hundred) to less
> than 10000, plus mounts that have been triggered and not yet expired.
>
> Indirect mounts have one autofs mount at the root plus the number of mounts that
> have been triggered and not yet expired.
>
> The number of autofs indirect map entries can range from a few to the common
> case of several thousand and in rare cases up to between 30000 and 50000. I've
> not heard of people with maps larger than 50000 entries.
>
> The larger the number of map entries the greater the possibility for a large
> number of active mounts so it's not hard to expect cases of a 1000 or somewhat
> more active mounts.
So I am setting the default number of mounts allowed per mount
namespace at 100,000. This is more than enough for any use case I
know of, but small enough to quickly stop an exponential increase
in mounts. Which should be perfect to catch misconfigurations and
malfunctioning programs.
For anyone who needs a higher limit this can be changed by writing
to the new /proc/sys/fs/mount-max sysctl.
Tested-by: CAI Qian <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]> | static bool mnt_ns_loop(struct dentry *dentry)
{
/* Could bind mounting the mount namespace inode cause a
* mount namespace loop?
*/
struct mnt_namespace *mnt_ns;
if (!is_mnt_ns_file(dentry))
return false;
mnt_ns = to_mnt_ns(get_proc_ns(dentry->d_inode));
return current->nsproxy->mnt_ns->seq >= mnt_ns->seq;
}
| static bool mnt_ns_loop(struct dentry *dentry)
{
/* Could bind mounting the mount namespace inode cause a
* mount namespace loop?
*/
struct mnt_namespace *mnt_ns;
if (!is_mnt_ns_file(dentry))
return false;
mnt_ns = to_mnt_ns(get_proc_ns(dentry->d_inode));
return current->nsproxy->mnt_ns->seq >= mnt_ns->seq;
}
| C | linux | 0 |
CVE-2014-9423 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-9423/ | CWE-200 | https://github.com/krb5/krb5/commit/5bb8a6b9c9eb8dd22bc9526751610aaa255ead9c | 5bb8a6b9c9eb8dd22bc9526751610aaa255ead9c | Fix gssrpc data leakage [CVE-2014-9423]
[MITKRB5-SA-2015-001] In svcauth_gss_accept_sec_context(), do not copy
bytes from the union context into the handle field we send to the
client. We do not use this handle field, so just supply a fixed
string of "xxxx".
In gss_union_ctx_id_struct, remove the unused "interposer" field which
was causing part of the union context to remain uninitialized.
ticket: 8058 (new)
target_version: 1.13.1
tags: pullup | svcauth_gss_destroy(SVCAUTH *auth)
{
struct svc_rpc_gss_data *gd;
OM_uint32 min_stat;
log_debug("in svcauth_gss_destroy()");
gd = SVCAUTH_PRIVATE(auth);
gss_delete_sec_context(&min_stat, &gd->ctx, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER);
gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &gd->cname);
gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &gd->checksum);
if (gd->client_name)
gss_release_name(&min_stat, &gd->client_name);
mem_free(gd, sizeof(*gd));
mem_free(auth, sizeof(*auth));
return (TRUE);
}
| svcauth_gss_destroy(SVCAUTH *auth)
{
struct svc_rpc_gss_data *gd;
OM_uint32 min_stat;
log_debug("in svcauth_gss_destroy()");
gd = SVCAUTH_PRIVATE(auth);
gss_delete_sec_context(&min_stat, &gd->ctx, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER);
gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &gd->cname);
gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &gd->checksum);
if (gd->client_name)
gss_release_name(&min_stat, &gd->client_name);
mem_free(gd, sizeof(*gd));
mem_free(auth, sizeof(*auth));
return (TRUE);
}
| C | krb5 | 0 |
CVE-2018-9336 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-9336/ | CWE-415 | https://github.com/OpenVPN/openvpn/commit/1394192b210cb3c6624a7419bcf3ff966742e79b | 1394192b210cb3c6624a7419bcf3ff966742e79b | Fix potential double-free() in Interactive Service (CVE-2018-9336)
Malformed input data on the service pipe towards the OpenVPN interactive
service (normally used by the OpenVPN GUI to request openvpn instances
from the service) can result in a double free() in the error handling code.
This usually only leads to a process crash (DoS by an unprivileged local
account) but since it could possibly lead to memory corruption if
happening while multiple other threads are active at the same time,
CVE-2018-9336 has been assigned to acknowledge this risk.
Fix by ensuring that sud->directory is set to NULL in GetStartUpData()
for all error cases (thus not being free()ed in FreeStartupData()).
Rewrite control flow to use explicit error label for error exit.
Discovered and reported by Jacob Baines <[email protected]>.
CVE: 2018-9336
Signed-off-by: Gert Doering <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Selva Nair <[email protected]>
Message-Id: <[email protected]>
URL: https://www.mail-archive.com/search?l=mid&[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Gert Doering <[email protected]> | sockaddr_inet(short family, inet_address_t *addr)
{
SOCKADDR_INET sa_inet;
ZeroMemory(&sa_inet, sizeof(sa_inet));
sa_inet.si_family = family;
if (family == AF_INET)
{
sa_inet.Ipv4.sin_addr = addr->ipv4;
}
else if (family == AF_INET6)
{
sa_inet.Ipv6.sin6_addr = addr->ipv6;
}
return sa_inet;
}
| sockaddr_inet(short family, inet_address_t *addr)
{
SOCKADDR_INET sa_inet;
ZeroMemory(&sa_inet, sizeof(sa_inet));
sa_inet.si_family = family;
if (family == AF_INET)
{
sa_inet.Ipv4.sin_addr = addr->ipv4;
}
else if (family == AF_INET6)
{
sa_inet.Ipv6.sin6_addr = addr->ipv6;
}
return sa_inet;
}
| C | openvpn | 0 |
CVE-2018-8099 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-8099/ | CWE-415 | https://github.com/libgit2/libgit2/commit/58a6fe94cb851f71214dbefac3f9bffee437d6fe | 58a6fe94cb851f71214dbefac3f9bffee437d6fe | index: convert `read_entry` to return entry size via an out-param
The function `read_entry` does not conform to our usual coding style of
returning stuff via the out parameter and to use the return value for
reporting errors. Due to most of our code conforming to that pattern, it
has become quite natural for us to actually return `-1` in case there is
any error, which has also slipped in with commit 5625d86b9 (index:
support index v4, 2016-05-17). As the function returns an `size_t` only,
though, the return value is wrapped around, causing the caller of
`read_tree` to continue with an invalid index entry. Ultimately, this
can lead to a double-free.
Improve code and fix the bug by converting the function to return the
index entry size via an out parameter and only using the return value to
indicate errors.
Reported-by: Krishna Ram Prakash R <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Vivek Parikh <[email protected]> | static int reuc_cmp(const void *a, const void *b)
{
const git_index_reuc_entry *info_a = a;
const git_index_reuc_entry *info_b = b;
return strcmp(info_a->path, info_b->path);
}
| static int reuc_cmp(const void *a, const void *b)
{
const git_index_reuc_entry *info_a = a;
const git_index_reuc_entry *info_b = b;
return strcmp(info_a->path, info_b->path);
}
| C | libgit2 | 0 |
CVE-2019-12107 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-12107/ | CWE-200 | https://github.com/miniupnp/miniupnp/commit/bec6ccec63cadc95655721bc0e1dd49dac759d94 | bec6ccec63cadc95655721bc0e1dd49dac759d94 | upnp_event_prepare(): check the return value of snprintf() | void upnpevents_processfds(fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
{
struct upnp_event_notify * obj;
struct upnp_event_notify * next;
struct subscriber * sub;
struct subscriber * subnext;
time_t curtime;
for(obj = notifylist.lh_first; obj != NULL; obj = obj->entries.le_next) {
syslog(LOG_DEBUG, "%s: %p %d %d %d %d",
"upnpevents_processfds", obj, obj->state, obj->s,
FD_ISSET(obj->s, readset), FD_ISSET(obj->s, writeset));
if(obj->s >= 0) {
if(FD_ISSET(obj->s, readset) || FD_ISSET(obj->s, writeset))
upnp_event_process_notify(obj);
}
}
obj = notifylist.lh_first;
while(obj != NULL) {
next = obj->entries.le_next;
if(obj->state == EError || obj->state == EFinished) {
if(obj->s >= 0) {
close(obj->s);
}
if(obj->sub)
obj->sub->notify = NULL;
/* remove also the subscriber from the list if there was an error */
if(obj->state == EError && obj->sub) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "%s: %p, remove subscriber %s after an ERROR cb: %s",
"upnpevents_processfds", obj, obj->sub->uuid, obj->sub->callback);
LIST_REMOVE(obj->sub, entries);
free(obj->sub);
}
if(obj->buffer) {
free(obj->buffer);
}
LIST_REMOVE(obj, entries);
free(obj);
}
obj = next;
}
/* remove timeouted subscribers */
curtime = upnp_time();
for(sub = subscriberlist.lh_first; sub != NULL; ) {
subnext = sub->entries.le_next;
if(sub->timeout && curtime > sub->timeout && sub->notify == NULL) {
syslog(LOG_INFO, "subscriber timeouted : %u > %u SID=%s",
(unsigned)curtime, (unsigned)sub->timeout, sub->uuid);
LIST_REMOVE(sub, entries);
free(sub);
}
sub = subnext;
}
}
| void upnpevents_processfds(fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
{
struct upnp_event_notify * obj;
struct upnp_event_notify * next;
struct subscriber * sub;
struct subscriber * subnext;
time_t curtime;
for(obj = notifylist.lh_first; obj != NULL; obj = obj->entries.le_next) {
syslog(LOG_DEBUG, "%s: %p %d %d %d %d",
"upnpevents_processfds", obj, obj->state, obj->s,
FD_ISSET(obj->s, readset), FD_ISSET(obj->s, writeset));
if(obj->s >= 0) {
if(FD_ISSET(obj->s, readset) || FD_ISSET(obj->s, writeset))
upnp_event_process_notify(obj);
}
}
obj = notifylist.lh_first;
while(obj != NULL) {
next = obj->entries.le_next;
if(obj->state == EError || obj->state == EFinished) {
if(obj->s >= 0) {
close(obj->s);
}
if(obj->sub)
obj->sub->notify = NULL;
/* remove also the subscriber from the list if there was an error */
if(obj->state == EError && obj->sub) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "%s: %p, remove subscriber %s after an ERROR cb: %s",
"upnpevents_processfds", obj, obj->sub->uuid, obj->sub->callback);
LIST_REMOVE(obj->sub, entries);
free(obj->sub);
}
if(obj->buffer) {
free(obj->buffer);
}
LIST_REMOVE(obj, entries);
free(obj);
}
obj = next;
}
/* remove timeouted subscribers */
curtime = upnp_time();
for(sub = subscriberlist.lh_first; sub != NULL; ) {
subnext = sub->entries.le_next;
if(sub->timeout && curtime > sub->timeout && sub->notify == NULL) {
syslog(LOG_INFO, "subscriber timeouted : %u > %u SID=%s",
(unsigned)curtime, (unsigned)sub->timeout, sub->uuid);
LIST_REMOVE(sub, entries);
free(sub);
}
sub = subnext;
}
}
| C | miniupnp | 0 |
CVE-2016-10248 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-10248/ | CWE-476 | https://github.com/mdadams/jasper/commit/2e82fa00466ae525339754bb3ab0a0474a31d4bd | 2e82fa00466ae525339754bb3ab0a0474a31d4bd | Fixed an integral type promotion problem by adding a JAS_CAST.
Modified the jpc_tsfb_synthesize function so that it will be a noop for
an empty sequence (in order to avoid dereferencing a null pointer). | void jpc_seglist_remove(jpc_dec_seglist_t *list, jpc_dec_seg_t *seg)
{
jpc_dec_seg_t *prev;
jpc_dec_seg_t *next;
prev = seg->prev;
next = seg->next;
if (prev) {
prev->next = next;
} else {
list->head = next;
}
if (next) {
next->prev = prev;
} else {
list->tail = prev;
}
seg->prev = 0;
seg->next = 0;
}
| void jpc_seglist_remove(jpc_dec_seglist_t *list, jpc_dec_seg_t *seg)
{
jpc_dec_seg_t *prev;
jpc_dec_seg_t *next;
prev = seg->prev;
next = seg->next;
if (prev) {
prev->next = next;
} else {
list->head = next;
}
if (next) {
next->prev = prev;
} else {
list->tail = prev;
}
seg->prev = 0;
seg->next = 0;
}
| C | jasper | 0 |
CVE-2017-6209 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-6209/ | CWE-119 | https://cgit.freedesktop.org/virglrenderer/commit/?id=e534b51ca3c3cd25f3990589932a9ed711c59b27 | e534b51ca3c3cd25f3990589932a9ed711c59b27 | null | static boolean is_alpha_underscore( const char *cur )
{
return
(*cur >= 'a' && *cur <= 'z') ||
(*cur >= 'A' && *cur <= 'Z') ||
*cur == '_';
}
| static boolean is_alpha_underscore( const char *cur )
{
return
(*cur >= 'a' && *cur <= 'z') ||
(*cur >= 'A' && *cur <= 'Z') ||
*cur == '_';
}
| C | virglrenderer | 0 |
CVE-2015-9016 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-9016/ | CWE-362 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/0048b4837affd153897ed1222283492070027aa9 | 0048b4837affd153897ed1222283492070027aa9 | blk-mq: fix race between timeout and freeing request
Inside timeout handler, blk_mq_tag_to_rq() is called
to retrieve the request from one tag. This way is obviously
wrong because the request can be freed any time and some
fiedds of the request can't be trusted, then kernel oops
might be triggered[1].
Currently wrt. blk_mq_tag_to_rq(), the only special case is
that the flush request can share same tag with the request
cloned from, and the two requests can't be active at the same
time, so this patch fixes the above issue by updating tags->rqs[tag]
with the active request(either flush rq or the request cloned
from) of the tag.
Also blk_mq_tag_to_rq() gets much simplified with this patch.
Given blk_mq_tag_to_rq() is mainly for drivers and the caller must
make sure the request can't be freed, so in bt_for_each() this
helper is replaced with tags->rqs[tag].
[1] kernel oops log
[ 439.696220] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000158^M
[ 439.697162] IP: [<ffffffff812d89ba>] blk_mq_tag_to_rq+0x21/0x6e^M
[ 439.700653] PGD 7ef765067 PUD 7ef764067 PMD 0 ^M
[ 439.700653] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC ^M
[ 439.700653] Dumping ftrace buffer:^M
[ 439.700653] (ftrace buffer empty)^M
[ 439.700653] Modules linked in: nbd ipv6 kvm_intel kvm serio_raw^M
[ 439.700653] CPU: 6 PID: 2779 Comm: stress-ng-sigfd Not tainted 4.2.0-rc5-next-20150805+ #265^M
[ 439.730500] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011^M
[ 439.730500] task: ffff880605308000 ti: ffff88060530c000 task.ti: ffff88060530c000^M
[ 439.730500] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff812d89ba>] [<ffffffff812d89ba>] blk_mq_tag_to_rq+0x21/0x6e^M
[ 439.730500] RSP: 0018:ffff880819203da0 EFLAGS: 00010283^M
[ 439.730500] RAX: ffff880811b0e000 RBX: ffff8800bb465f00 RCX: 0000000000000002^M
[ 439.730500] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000202 RDI: 0000000000000000^M
[ 439.730500] RBP: ffff880819203db0 R08: 0000000000000002 R09: 0000000000000000^M
[ 439.730500] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000202^M
[ 439.730500] R13: ffff880814104800 R14: 0000000000000002 R15: ffff880811a2ea00^M
[ 439.730500] FS: 00007f165b3f5740(0000) GS:ffff880819200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000^M
[ 439.730500] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b^M
[ 439.730500] CR2: 0000000000000158 CR3: 00000007ef766000 CR4: 00000000000006e0^M
[ 439.730500] Stack:^M
[ 439.730500] 0000000000000008 ffff8808114eed90 ffff880819203e00 ffffffff812dc104^M
[ 439.755663] ffff880819203e40 ffffffff812d9f5e 0000020000000000 ffff8808114eed80^M
[ 439.755663] Call Trace:^M
[ 439.755663] <IRQ> ^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812dc104>] bt_for_each+0x6e/0xc8^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d9f5e>] ? blk_mq_rq_timed_out+0x6a/0x6a^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d9f5e>] ? blk_mq_rq_timed_out+0x6a/0x6a^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812dc1b3>] blk_mq_tag_busy_iter+0x55/0x5e^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d88b4>] ? blk_mq_bio_to_request+0x38/0x38^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d8911>] blk_mq_rq_timer+0x5d/0xd4^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff810a3e10>] call_timer_fn+0xf7/0x284^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff810a3d1e>] ? call_timer_fn+0x5/0x284^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d88b4>] ? blk_mq_bio_to_request+0x38/0x38^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff810a46d6>] run_timer_softirq+0x1ce/0x1f8^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8104c367>] __do_softirq+0x181/0x3a4^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8104c76e>] irq_exit+0x40/0x94^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff81031482>] smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x33/0x3e^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff815559a4>] apic_timer_interrupt+0x84/0x90^M
[ 439.755663] <EOI> ^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff81554350>] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x32/0x4a^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8106a98b>] finish_task_switch+0xe0/0x163^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8106a94d>] ? finish_task_switch+0xa2/0x163^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff81550066>] __schedule+0x469/0x6cd^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8155039b>] schedule+0x82/0x9a^M
[ 439.789267] [<ffffffff8119b28b>] signalfd_read+0x186/0x49a^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff8106d86a>] ? wake_up_q+0x47/0x47^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff811618c2>] __vfs_read+0x28/0x9f^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff8117a289>] ? __fget_light+0x4d/0x74^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff811620a7>] vfs_read+0x7a/0xc6^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff8116292b>] SyS_read+0x49/0x7f^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff81554c17>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6f^M
[ 439.790911] Code: 48 89 e5 e8 a9 b8 e7 ff 5d c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 89
f2 48 89 e5 41 54 41 89 f4 53 48 8b 47 60 48 8b 1c d0 48 8b 7b 30 48 8b
53 38 <48> 8b 87 58 01 00 00 48 85 c0 75 09 48 8b 97 88 0c 00 00 eb 10
^M
[ 439.790911] RIP [<ffffffff812d89ba>] blk_mq_tag_to_rq+0x21/0x6e^M
[ 439.790911] RSP <ffff880819203da0>^M
[ 439.790911] CR2: 0000000000000158^M
[ 439.790911] ---[ end trace d40af58949325661 ]---^M
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ming Lei <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]> | void blk_mq_run_hw_queues(struct request_queue *q, bool async)
{
struct blk_mq_hw_ctx *hctx;
int i;
queue_for_each_hw_ctx(q, hctx, i) {
if ((!blk_mq_hctx_has_pending(hctx) &&
list_empty_careful(&hctx->dispatch)) ||
test_bit(BLK_MQ_S_STOPPED, &hctx->state))
continue;
blk_mq_run_hw_queue(hctx, async);
}
}
| void blk_mq_run_hw_queues(struct request_queue *q, bool async)
{
struct blk_mq_hw_ctx *hctx;
int i;
queue_for_each_hw_ctx(q, hctx, i) {
if ((!blk_mq_hctx_has_pending(hctx) &&
list_empty_careful(&hctx->dispatch)) ||
test_bit(BLK_MQ_S_STOPPED, &hctx->state))
continue;
blk_mq_run_hw_queue(hctx, async);
}
}
| C | linux | 0 |
CVE-2017-16612 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-16612/ | CWE-190 | https://cgit.freedesktop.org/wayland/wayland/commit/?id=5d201df72f3d4f4cb8b8f75f980169b03507da38 | 5d201df72f3d4f4cb8b8f75f980169b03507da38 | null | XcursorImageDestroy (XcursorImage *image)
{
free (image);
}
| XcursorImageDestroy (XcursorImage *image)
{
free (image);
}
| C | wayland | 0 |
CVE-2011-2829 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2829/ | CWE-189 | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a4b20ed4917f1f6fc83b6375a48e2c3895d43a8a | a4b20ed4917f1f6fc83b6375a48e2c3895d43a8a | Add chromium_code: 1 to surface.gyp and gl.gyp to pick up -Werror.
It looks like this was dropped accidentally in http://codereview.chromium.org/6718027 (surface.gyp) and http://codereview.chromium.org/6722026 (gl.gyp)
Remove now-redudant code that's implied by chromium_code: 1.
Fix the warnings that have crept in since chromium_code: 1 was removed.
BUG=none
TEST=none
Committed: http://src.chromium.org/viewvc/chrome?view=rev&revision=91598
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7227009
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91813 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | GLvoid StubGLReadPixels(GLint x, GLint y, GLsizei width, GLsizei height,
GLenum format, GLenum type, void* pixels) {
glReadPixels(x, y, width, height, format, type, pixels);
}
| GLvoid StubGLReadPixels(GLint x, GLint y, GLsizei width, GLsizei height,
GLenum format, GLenum type, void* pixels) {
glReadPixels(x, y, width, height, format, type, pixels);
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2012-6541 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-6541/ | CWE-200 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/7b07f8eb75aa3097cdfd4f6eac3da49db787381d | 7b07f8eb75aa3097cdfd4f6eac3da49db787381d | dccp: fix info leak via getsockopt(DCCP_SOCKOPT_CCID_TX_INFO)
The CCID3 code fails to initialize the trailing padding bytes of struct
tfrc_tx_info added for alignment on 64 bit architectures. It that for
potentially leaks four bytes kernel stack via the getsockopt() syscall.
Add an explicit memset(0) before filling the structure to avoid the
info leak.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Cc: Gerrit Renker <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | static u32 ccid3_hc_tx_idle_rtt(struct ccid3_hc_tx_sock *hc, ktime_t now)
{
u32 delta = ktime_us_delta(now, hc->tx_t_last_win_count);
return delta / hc->tx_rtt;
}
| static u32 ccid3_hc_tx_idle_rtt(struct ccid3_hc_tx_sock *hc, ktime_t now)
{
u32 delta = ktime_us_delta(now, hc->tx_t_last_win_count);
return delta / hc->tx_rtt;
}
| C | linux | 0 |
CVE-2015-1335 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1335/ | CWE-59 | https://github.com/lxc/lxc/commit/592fd47a6245508b79fe6ac819fe6d3b2c1289be | 592fd47a6245508b79fe6ac819fe6d3b2c1289be | CVE-2015-1335: Protect container mounts against symlinks
When a container starts up, lxc sets up the container's inital fstree
by doing a bunch of mounting, guided by the container configuration
file. The container config is owned by the admin or user on the host,
so we do not try to guard against bad entries. However, since the
mount target is in the container, it's possible that the container admin
could divert the mount with symbolic links. This could bypass proper
container startup (i.e. confinement of a root-owned container by the
restrictive apparmor policy, by diverting the required write to
/proc/self/attr/current), or bypass the (path-based) apparmor policy
by diverting, say, /proc to /mnt in the container.
To prevent this,
1. do not allow mounts to paths containing symbolic links
2. do not allow bind mounts from relative paths containing symbolic
links.
Details:
Define safe_mount which ensures that the container has not inserted any
symbolic links into any mount targets for mounts to be done during
container setup.
The host's mount path may contain symbolic links. As it is under the
control of the administrator, that's ok. So safe_mount begins the check
for symbolic links after the rootfs->mount, by opening that directory.
It opens each directory along the path using openat() relative to the
parent directory using O_NOFOLLOW. When the target is reached, it
mounts onto /proc/self/fd/<targetfd>.
Use safe_mount() in mount_entry(), when mounting container proc,
and when needed. In particular, safe_mount() need not be used in
any case where:
1. the mount is done in the container's namespace
2. the mount is for the container's rootfs
3. the mount is relative to a tmpfs or proc/sysfs which we have
just safe_mount()ed ourselves
Since we were using proc/net as a temporary placeholder for /proc/sys/net
during container startup, and proc/net is a symbolic link, use proc/tty
instead.
Update the lxc.container.conf manpage with details about the new
restrictions.
Finally, add a testcase to test some symbolic link possibilities.
Reported-by: Roman Fiedler
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Stéphane Graber <[email protected]> | static void lxc_remove_nic(struct lxc_list *it)
{
struct lxc_netdev *netdev = it->elem;
struct lxc_list *it2,*next;
lxc_list_del(it);
free(netdev->link);
free(netdev->name);
if (netdev->type == LXC_NET_VETH)
free(netdev->priv.veth_attr.pair);
free(netdev->upscript);
free(netdev->hwaddr);
free(netdev->mtu);
free(netdev->ipv4_gateway);
free(netdev->ipv6_gateway);
lxc_list_for_each_safe(it2, &netdev->ipv4, next) {
lxc_list_del(it2);
free(it2->elem);
free(it2);
}
lxc_list_for_each_safe(it2, &netdev->ipv6, next) {
lxc_list_del(it2);
free(it2->elem);
free(it2);
}
free(netdev);
free(it);
}
| static void lxc_remove_nic(struct lxc_list *it)
{
struct lxc_netdev *netdev = it->elem;
struct lxc_list *it2,*next;
lxc_list_del(it);
free(netdev->link);
free(netdev->name);
if (netdev->type == LXC_NET_VETH)
free(netdev->priv.veth_attr.pair);
free(netdev->upscript);
free(netdev->hwaddr);
free(netdev->mtu);
free(netdev->ipv4_gateway);
free(netdev->ipv6_gateway);
lxc_list_for_each_safe(it2, &netdev->ipv4, next) {
lxc_list_del(it2);
free(it2->elem);
free(it2);
}
lxc_list_for_each_safe(it2, &netdev->ipv6, next) {
lxc_list_del(it2);
free(it2->elem);
free(it2);
}
free(netdev);
free(it);
}
| C | lxc | 0 |
CVE-2012-5108 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-5108/ | CWE-362 | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/6d2aef28cb0b677af468ebf3e32a176a7c37086e | 6d2aef28cb0b677af468ebf3e32a176a7c37086e | Revert r157378 as it caused WebRTC to dereference null pointers when restarting a call.
I've kept my unit test changes intact but disabled until I get a proper fix.
BUG=147499,150805
TBR=henrika
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/10946040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@157626 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | void AudioOutputDevice::OnIPCClosed() {
ipc_ = NULL;
}
| void AudioOutputDevice::OnIPCClosed() {
ipc_ = NULL;
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2018-12714 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-12714/ | CWE-787 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/81f9c4e4177d31ced6f52a89bb70e93bfb77ca03 | 81f9c4e4177d31ced6f52a89bb70e93bfb77ca03 | Merge tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace
Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:
"This contains a few fixes and a clean up.
- a bad merge caused an "endif" to go in the wrong place in
scripts/Makefile.build
- softirq tracing fix for tracing that corrupts lockdep and causes a
false splat
- histogram documentation typo fixes
- fix a bad memory reference when passing in no filter to the filter
code
- simplify code by using the swap macro instead of open coding the
swap"
* tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace:
tracing: Fix SKIP_STACK_VALIDATION=1 build due to bad merge with -mrecord-mcount
tracing: Fix some errors in histogram documentation
tracing: Use swap macro in update_max_tr
softirq: Reorder trace_softirqs_on to prevent lockdep splat
tracing: Check for no filter when processing event filters | ftrace_snapshot_print(struct seq_file *m, unsigned long ip,
struct ftrace_probe_ops *ops, void *data)
{
struct ftrace_func_mapper *mapper = data;
long *count = NULL;
seq_printf(m, "%ps:", (void *)ip);
seq_puts(m, "snapshot");
if (mapper)
count = (long *)ftrace_func_mapper_find_ip(mapper, ip);
if (count)
seq_printf(m, ":count=%ld\n", *count);
else
seq_puts(m, ":unlimited\n");
return 0;
}
| ftrace_snapshot_print(struct seq_file *m, unsigned long ip,
struct ftrace_probe_ops *ops, void *data)
{
struct ftrace_func_mapper *mapper = data;
long *count = NULL;
seq_printf(m, "%ps:", (void *)ip);
seq_puts(m, "snapshot");
if (mapper)
count = (long *)ftrace_func_mapper_find_ip(mapper, ip);
if (count)
seq_printf(m, ":count=%ld\n", *count);
else
seq_puts(m, ":unlimited\n");
return 0;
}
| C | linux | 0 |
CVE-2018-6096 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6096/ | null | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/36f801fdbec07d116a6f4f07bb363f10897d6a51 | 36f801fdbec07d116a6f4f07bb363f10897d6a51 | If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790} | bool WebContentsImpl::CreateRenderViewForRenderManager(
RenderViewHost* render_view_host,
int opener_frame_routing_id,
int proxy_routing_id,
const base::UnguessableToken& devtools_frame_token,
const FrameReplicationState& replicated_frame_state) {
TRACE_EVENT0("browser,navigation",
"WebContentsImpl::CreateRenderViewForRenderManager");
if (proxy_routing_id == MSG_ROUTING_NONE)
CreateRenderWidgetHostViewForRenderManager(render_view_host);
if (!static_cast<RenderViewHostImpl*>(render_view_host)
->CreateRenderView(opener_frame_routing_id, proxy_routing_id,
devtools_frame_token, replicated_frame_state,
created_with_opener_)) {
return false;
}
if (proxy_routing_id == MSG_ROUTING_NONE && node_.outer_web_contents())
ReattachToOuterWebContentsFrame();
SetHistoryOffsetAndLengthForView(render_view_host,
controller_.GetLastCommittedEntryIndex(),
controller_.GetEntryCount());
#if defined(OS_POSIX) && !defined(OS_MACOSX) && !defined(OS_ANDROID)
RenderWidgetHostView* rwh_view = render_view_host->GetWidget()->GetView();
if (rwh_view) {
if (RenderWidgetHost* render_widget_host = rwh_view->GetRenderWidgetHost())
render_widget_host->WasResized();
}
#endif
return true;
}
| bool WebContentsImpl::CreateRenderViewForRenderManager(
RenderViewHost* render_view_host,
int opener_frame_routing_id,
int proxy_routing_id,
const base::UnguessableToken& devtools_frame_token,
const FrameReplicationState& replicated_frame_state) {
TRACE_EVENT0("browser,navigation",
"WebContentsImpl::CreateRenderViewForRenderManager");
if (proxy_routing_id == MSG_ROUTING_NONE)
CreateRenderWidgetHostViewForRenderManager(render_view_host);
if (!static_cast<RenderViewHostImpl*>(render_view_host)
->CreateRenderView(opener_frame_routing_id, proxy_routing_id,
devtools_frame_token, replicated_frame_state,
created_with_opener_)) {
return false;
}
if (proxy_routing_id == MSG_ROUTING_NONE && node_.outer_web_contents())
ReattachToOuterWebContentsFrame();
SetHistoryOffsetAndLengthForView(render_view_host,
controller_.GetLastCommittedEntryIndex(),
controller_.GetEntryCount());
#if defined(OS_POSIX) && !defined(OS_MACOSX) && !defined(OS_ANDROID)
RenderWidgetHostView* rwh_view = render_view_host->GetWidget()->GetView();
if (rwh_view) {
if (RenderWidgetHost* render_widget_host = rwh_view->GetRenderWidgetHost())
render_widget_host->WasResized();
}
#endif
return true;
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2018-6927 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6927/ | CWE-190 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/fbe0e839d1e22d88810f3ee3e2f1479be4c0aa4a | fbe0e839d1e22d88810f3ee3e2f1479be4c0aa4a | futex: Prevent overflow by strengthen input validation
UBSAN reports signed integer overflow in kernel/futex.c:
UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in kernel/futex.c:2041:18
signed integer overflow:
0 - -2147483648 cannot be represented in type 'int'
Add a sanity check to catch negative values of nr_wake and nr_requeue.
Signed-off-by: Li Jinyue <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] | static int futex_proxy_trylock_atomic(u32 __user *pifutex,
struct futex_hash_bucket *hb1,
struct futex_hash_bucket *hb2,
union futex_key *key1, union futex_key *key2,
struct futex_pi_state **ps, int set_waiters)
{
struct futex_q *top_waiter = NULL;
u32 curval;
int ret, vpid;
if (get_futex_value_locked(&curval, pifutex))
return -EFAULT;
if (unlikely(should_fail_futex(true)))
return -EFAULT;
/*
* Find the top_waiter and determine if there are additional waiters.
* If the caller intends to requeue more than 1 waiter to pifutex,
* force futex_lock_pi_atomic() to set the FUTEX_WAITERS bit now,
* as we have means to handle the possible fault. If not, don't set
* the bit unecessarily as it will force the subsequent unlock to enter
* the kernel.
*/
top_waiter = futex_top_waiter(hb1, key1);
/* There are no waiters, nothing for us to do. */
if (!top_waiter)
return 0;
/* Ensure we requeue to the expected futex. */
if (!match_futex(top_waiter->requeue_pi_key, key2))
return -EINVAL;
/*
* Try to take the lock for top_waiter. Set the FUTEX_WAITERS bit in
* the contended case or if set_waiters is 1. The pi_state is returned
* in ps in contended cases.
*/
vpid = task_pid_vnr(top_waiter->task);
ret = futex_lock_pi_atomic(pifutex, hb2, key2, ps, top_waiter->task,
set_waiters);
if (ret == 1) {
requeue_pi_wake_futex(top_waiter, key2, hb2);
return vpid;
}
return ret;
}
| static int futex_proxy_trylock_atomic(u32 __user *pifutex,
struct futex_hash_bucket *hb1,
struct futex_hash_bucket *hb2,
union futex_key *key1, union futex_key *key2,
struct futex_pi_state **ps, int set_waiters)
{
struct futex_q *top_waiter = NULL;
u32 curval;
int ret, vpid;
if (get_futex_value_locked(&curval, pifutex))
return -EFAULT;
if (unlikely(should_fail_futex(true)))
return -EFAULT;
/*
* Find the top_waiter and determine if there are additional waiters.
* If the caller intends to requeue more than 1 waiter to pifutex,
* force futex_lock_pi_atomic() to set the FUTEX_WAITERS bit now,
* as we have means to handle the possible fault. If not, don't set
* the bit unecessarily as it will force the subsequent unlock to enter
* the kernel.
*/
top_waiter = futex_top_waiter(hb1, key1);
/* There are no waiters, nothing for us to do. */
if (!top_waiter)
return 0;
/* Ensure we requeue to the expected futex. */
if (!match_futex(top_waiter->requeue_pi_key, key2))
return -EINVAL;
/*
* Try to take the lock for top_waiter. Set the FUTEX_WAITERS bit in
* the contended case or if set_waiters is 1. The pi_state is returned
* in ps in contended cases.
*/
vpid = task_pid_vnr(top_waiter->task);
ret = futex_lock_pi_atomic(pifutex, hb2, key2, ps, top_waiter->task,
set_waiters);
if (ret == 1) {
requeue_pi_wake_futex(top_waiter, key2, hb2);
return vpid;
}
return ret;
}
| C | linux | 0 |
CVE-2012-2875 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2875/ | null | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/d345af9ed62ee5f431be327967f41c3cc3fe936a | d345af9ed62ee5f431be327967f41c3cc3fe936a | [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | bool WebPage::setBatchEditingActive(bool active)
{
return d->m_inputHandler->setBatchEditingActive(active);
}
| bool WebPage::setBatchEditingActive(bool active)
{
return d->m_inputHandler->setBatchEditingActive(active);
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
null | null | null | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/2bcaf4649c1d495072967ea454e8c16dce044705 | 2bcaf4649c1d495072967ea454e8c16dce044705 | Don't interpret embeded NULLs in a response header line as a line terminator.
BUG=95992
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7796025
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@100863 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | void HttpUtil::ParseContentType(const string& content_type_str,
string* mime_type, string* charset,
bool *had_charset) {
size_t type_val = content_type_str.find_first_not_of(HTTP_LWS);
type_val = std::min(type_val, content_type_str.length());
size_t type_end = content_type_str.find_first_of(HTTP_LWS ";(", type_val);
if (string::npos == type_end)
type_end = content_type_str.length();
size_t charset_val = 0;
size_t charset_end = 0;
bool type_has_charset = false;
size_t param_start = content_type_str.find_first_of(';', type_end);
if (param_start != string::npos) {
size_t cur_param_start = param_start + 1;
do {
size_t cur_param_end =
FindDelimiter(content_type_str, cur_param_start, ';');
size_t param_name_start = content_type_str.find_first_not_of(
HTTP_LWS, cur_param_start);
param_name_start = std::min(param_name_start, cur_param_end);
static const char charset_str[] = "charset=";
size_t charset_end_offset = std::min(
param_name_start + sizeof(charset_str) - 1, cur_param_end);
if (LowerCaseEqualsASCII(
content_type_str.begin() + param_name_start,
content_type_str.begin() + charset_end_offset, charset_str)) {
charset_val = param_name_start + sizeof(charset_str) - 1;
charset_end = cur_param_end;
type_has_charset = true;
}
cur_param_start = cur_param_end + 1;
} while (cur_param_start < content_type_str.length());
}
if (type_has_charset) {
charset_val = content_type_str.find_first_not_of(HTTP_LWS, charset_val);
charset_val = std::min(charset_val, charset_end);
char first_char = content_type_str[charset_val];
if (first_char == '"' || first_char == '\'') {
charset_end = FindStringEnd(content_type_str, charset_val, first_char);
++charset_val;
DCHECK(charset_end >= charset_val);
} else {
charset_end = std::min(content_type_str.find_first_of(HTTP_LWS ";(",
charset_val),
charset_end);
}
}
if (content_type_str.length() != 0 &&
content_type_str != "*/*" &&
content_type_str.find_first_of('/') != string::npos) {
bool eq = !mime_type->empty() &&
LowerCaseEqualsASCII(content_type_str.begin() + type_val,
content_type_str.begin() + type_end,
mime_type->data());
if (!eq) {
mime_type->assign(content_type_str.begin() + type_val,
content_type_str.begin() + type_end);
StringToLowerASCII(mime_type);
}
if ((!eq && *had_charset) || type_has_charset) {
*had_charset = true;
charset->assign(content_type_str.begin() + charset_val,
content_type_str.begin() + charset_end);
StringToLowerASCII(charset);
}
}
}
| void HttpUtil::ParseContentType(const string& content_type_str,
string* mime_type, string* charset,
bool *had_charset) {
size_t type_val = content_type_str.find_first_not_of(HTTP_LWS);
type_val = std::min(type_val, content_type_str.length());
size_t type_end = content_type_str.find_first_of(HTTP_LWS ";(", type_val);
if (string::npos == type_end)
type_end = content_type_str.length();
size_t charset_val = 0;
size_t charset_end = 0;
bool type_has_charset = false;
size_t param_start = content_type_str.find_first_of(';', type_end);
if (param_start != string::npos) {
size_t cur_param_start = param_start + 1;
do {
size_t cur_param_end =
FindDelimiter(content_type_str, cur_param_start, ';');
size_t param_name_start = content_type_str.find_first_not_of(
HTTP_LWS, cur_param_start);
param_name_start = std::min(param_name_start, cur_param_end);
static const char charset_str[] = "charset=";
size_t charset_end_offset = std::min(
param_name_start + sizeof(charset_str) - 1, cur_param_end);
if (LowerCaseEqualsASCII(
content_type_str.begin() + param_name_start,
content_type_str.begin() + charset_end_offset, charset_str)) {
charset_val = param_name_start + sizeof(charset_str) - 1;
charset_end = cur_param_end;
type_has_charset = true;
}
cur_param_start = cur_param_end + 1;
} while (cur_param_start < content_type_str.length());
}
if (type_has_charset) {
charset_val = content_type_str.find_first_not_of(HTTP_LWS, charset_val);
charset_val = std::min(charset_val, charset_end);
char first_char = content_type_str[charset_val];
if (first_char == '"' || first_char == '\'') {
charset_end = FindStringEnd(content_type_str, charset_val, first_char);
++charset_val;
DCHECK(charset_end >= charset_val);
} else {
charset_end = std::min(content_type_str.find_first_of(HTTP_LWS ";(",
charset_val),
charset_end);
}
}
if (content_type_str.length() != 0 &&
content_type_str != "*/*" &&
content_type_str.find_first_of('/') != string::npos) {
bool eq = !mime_type->empty() &&
LowerCaseEqualsASCII(content_type_str.begin() + type_val,
content_type_str.begin() + type_end,
mime_type->data());
if (!eq) {
mime_type->assign(content_type_str.begin() + type_val,
content_type_str.begin() + type_end);
StringToLowerASCII(mime_type);
}
if ((!eq && *had_charset) || type_has_charset) {
*had_charset = true;
charset->assign(content_type_str.begin() + charset_val,
content_type_str.begin() + charset_end);
StringToLowerASCII(charset);
}
}
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2013-0886 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0886/ | null | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/18d67244984a574ba2dd8779faabc0e3e34f4b76 | 18d67244984a574ba2dd8779faabc0e3e34f4b76 | Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | int BrowserPluginGuest::embedder_routing_id() const {
return embedder_web_contents_->GetRoutingID();
}
| int BrowserPluginGuest::embedder_routing_id() const {
return embedder_web_contents_->GetRoutingID();
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2014-3171 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-3171/ | null | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/d10a8dac48d3a9467e81c62cb45208344f4542db | d10a8dac48d3a9467e81c62cb45208344f4542db | Replace further questionable HashMap::add usages in bindings
BUG=390928
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/411273002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@178823 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | static uint32_t decode(uint32_t value)
{
if (value & 1)
value = ~(value >> 1);
else
value >>= 1;
return value;
}
| static uint32_t decode(uint32_t value)
{
if (value & 1)
value = ~(value >> 1);
else
value >>= 1;
return value;
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2016-1683 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1683/ | CWE-119 | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/96dbafe288dbe2f0cc45fa3c39daf6d0c37acbab | 96dbafe288dbe2f0cc45fa3c39daf6d0c37acbab | Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338} | xsltFreeAttrElemList(xsltAttrElemPtr list) {
xsltAttrElemPtr next;
while (list != NULL) {
next = list->next;
xsltFreeAttrElem(list);
list = next;
}
}
| xsltFreeAttrElemList(xsltAttrElemPtr list) {
xsltAttrElemPtr next;
while (list != NULL) {
next = list->next;
xsltFreeAttrElem(list);
list = next;
}
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2018-13006 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-13006/ | CWE-125 | https://github.com/gpac/gpac/commit/bceb03fd2be95097a7b409ea59914f332fb6bc86 | bceb03fd2be95097a7b409ea59914f332fb6bc86 | fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088) | GF_Err co64_Write(GF_Box *s, GF_BitStream *bs)
{
GF_Err e;
u32 i;
GF_ChunkLargeOffsetBox *ptr = (GF_ChunkLargeOffsetBox *) s;
e = gf_isom_full_box_write(s, bs);
if (e) return e;
gf_bs_write_u32(bs, ptr->nb_entries);
for (i = 0; i < ptr->nb_entries; i++ ) {
gf_bs_write_u64(bs, ptr->offsets[i]);
}
return GF_OK;
}
| GF_Err co64_Write(GF_Box *s, GF_BitStream *bs)
{
GF_Err e;
u32 i;
GF_ChunkLargeOffsetBox *ptr = (GF_ChunkLargeOffsetBox *) s;
e = gf_isom_full_box_write(s, bs);
if (e) return e;
gf_bs_write_u32(bs, ptr->nb_entries);
for (i = 0; i < ptr->nb_entries; i++ ) {
gf_bs_write_u64(bs, ptr->offsets[i]);
}
return GF_OK;
}
| C | gpac | 0 |
CVE-2016-2494 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-2494/ | CWE-264 | https://android.googlesource.com/platform/system/core/+/864e2e22fcd0cba3f5e67680ccabd0302dfda45d | 864e2e22fcd0cba3f5e67680ccabd0302dfda45d | Fix overflow in path building
An incorrect size was causing an unsigned value
to wrap, causing it to write past the end of
the buffer.
Bug: 28085658
Change-Id: Ie9625c729cca024d514ba2880ff97209d435a165
| static struct node* lookup_node_and_path_by_id_locked(struct fuse* fuse, __u64 nid,
char* buf, size_t bufsize)
{
struct node* node = lookup_node_by_id_locked(fuse, nid);
if (node && get_node_path_locked(node, buf, bufsize) < 0) {
node = NULL;
}
return node;
}
| static struct node* lookup_node_and_path_by_id_locked(struct fuse* fuse, __u64 nid,
char* buf, size_t bufsize)
{
struct node* node = lookup_node_by_id_locked(fuse, nid);
if (node && get_node_path_locked(node, buf, bufsize) < 0) {
node = NULL;
}
return node;
}
| C | Android | 0 |
CVE-2015-6763 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-6763/ | null | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f1574f25e1402e748bf2bd7e28ce3dd96ceb1ca4 | f1574f25e1402e748bf2bd7e28ce3dd96ceb1ca4 | MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517} | void SendKeyEvent(ui::KeyboardCode key_code,
bool shift,
bool control_or_command) {
SendKeyEvent(key_code, false, shift, control_or_command, false);
}
| void SendKeyEvent(ui::KeyboardCode key_code,
bool shift,
bool control_or_command) {
SendKeyEvent(key_code, false, shift, control_or_command, false);
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2013-2061 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2061/ | CWE-200 | https://github.com/OpenVPN/openvpn/commit/11d21349a4e7e38a025849479b36ace7c2eec2ee | 11d21349a4e7e38a025849479b36ace7c2eec2ee | Use constant time memcmp when comparing HMACs in openvpn_decrypt.
Signed-off-by: Steffan Karger <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Gert Doering <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Gert Doering <[email protected]> | verify_fix_key2 (struct key2 *key2, const struct key_type *kt, const char *shared_secret_file)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < key2->n; ++i)
{
/* Fix parity for DES keys and make sure not a weak key */
fixup_key (&key2->keys[i], kt);
/* This should be a very improbable failure */
if (!check_key (&key2->keys[i], kt))
msg (M_FATAL, "Key #%d in '%s' is bad. Try making a new key with --genkey.",
i+1, shared_secret_file);
}
}
| verify_fix_key2 (struct key2 *key2, const struct key_type *kt, const char *shared_secret_file)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < key2->n; ++i)
{
/* Fix parity for DES keys and make sure not a weak key */
fixup_key (&key2->keys[i], kt);
/* This should be a very improbable failure */
if (!check_key (&key2->keys[i], kt))
msg (M_FATAL, "Key #%d in '%s' is bad. Try making a new key with --genkey.",
i+1, shared_secret_file);
}
}
| C | openvpn | 0 |
CVE-2015-3412 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-3412/ | CWE-254 | https://git.php.net/?p=php-src.git;a=commit;h=4435b9142ff9813845d5c97ab29a5d637bedb257 | 4435b9142ff9813845d5c97ab29a5d637bedb257 | null | PHP_FUNCTION(stream_context_set_params)
{
zval *params, *zcontext;
php_stream_context *context;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "ra", &zcontext, ¶ms) == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
context = decode_context_param(zcontext TSRMLS_CC);
if (!context) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Invalid stream/context parameter");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
RETVAL_BOOL(parse_context_params(context, params TSRMLS_CC) == SUCCESS);
}
| PHP_FUNCTION(stream_context_set_params)
{
zval *params, *zcontext;
php_stream_context *context;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "ra", &zcontext, ¶ms) == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
context = decode_context_param(zcontext TSRMLS_CC);
if (!context) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Invalid stream/context parameter");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
RETVAL_BOOL(parse_context_params(context, params TSRMLS_CC) == SUCCESS);
}
| C | php | 0 |
CVE-2016-1621 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1621/ | CWE-119 | https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/libvpx/+/04839626ed859623901ebd3a5fd483982186b59d | 04839626ed859623901ebd3a5fd483982186b59d | libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039 | long Cluster::GetIndex() const
Cluster::Cluster(Segment* pSegment, long idx, long long element_start
/* long long element_size */)
: m_pSegment(pSegment),
m_element_start(element_start),
m_index(idx),
m_pos(element_start),
m_element_size(-1 /* element_size */),
m_timecode(-1),
m_entries(NULL),
m_entries_size(0),
m_entries_count(-1) // means "has not been parsed yet"
{}
Cluster::~Cluster() {
if (m_entries_count <= 0)
return;
BlockEntry** i = m_entries;
BlockEntry** const j = m_entries + m_entries_count;
while (i != j) {
BlockEntry* p = *i++;
assert(p);
delete p;
}
delete[] m_entries;
}
| long Cluster::GetIndex() const
{
return m_index;
}
| C | Android | 1 |
CVE-2019-5809 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-5809/ | CWE-416 | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/4a3482693491ac6bb3dd27d591efa3de1d1f1fcf | 4a3482693491ac6bb3dd27d591efa3de1d1f1fcf | Fix a crash on FileChooserImpl
If a renderer process is compromised, and it calls both of
FileChooserImpl::OpenFileChooser() and EnumerateChosenDirectory() via
Mojo, the browser process could crash because ResetOwner() for
the first FileChooserImpl::proxy_ instance was not called. We
should check nullness of proxy_ before updating it.
Bug: 941008
Change-Id: Ie0c1895ec46ce78d40594b543e49e43b420af675
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1520509
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Kent Tamura <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#640580} | bool RenderFrameHostImpl::OnMessageReceived(const IPC::Message &msg) {
if (!render_frame_created_)
return false;
ScopedActiveURL scoped_active_url(this);
bool handled = true;
IPC_BEGIN_MESSAGE_MAP(RenderFrameHostImpl, msg)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_RenderProcessGone, OnRenderProcessGone)
IPC_MESSAGE_UNHANDLED(handled = false)
IPC_END_MESSAGE_MAP()
if (handled)
return true;
if (delegate_->OnMessageReceived(this, msg))
return true;
RenderFrameProxyHost* proxy =
frame_tree_node_->render_manager()->GetProxyToParent();
if (proxy && proxy->cross_process_frame_connector() &&
proxy->cross_process_frame_connector()->OnMessageReceived(msg))
return true;
handled = true;
IPC_BEGIN_MESSAGE_MAP(RenderFrameHostImpl, msg)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole,
OnDidAddMessageToConsole)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_Detach, OnDetach)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_FrameFocused, OnFrameFocused)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_DidFailProvisionalLoadWithError,
OnDidFailProvisionalLoadWithError)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_DidFailLoadWithError,
OnDidFailLoadWithError)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_UpdateState, OnUpdateState)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_OpenURL, OnOpenURL)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_BeforeUnload_ACK, OnBeforeUnloadACK)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_SwapOut_ACK, OnSwapOutACK)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_ContextMenu, OnContextMenu)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_VisualStateResponse,
OnVisualStateResponse)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER_DELAY_REPLY(FrameHostMsg_RunJavaScriptDialog,
OnRunJavaScriptDialog)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER_DELAY_REPLY(FrameHostMsg_RunBeforeUnloadConfirm,
OnRunBeforeUnloadConfirm)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_DidAccessInitialDocument,
OnDidAccessInitialDocument)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_DidChangeOpener, OnDidChangeOpener)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_DidAddContentSecurityPolicies,
OnDidAddContentSecurityPolicies)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_DidChangeFramePolicy,
OnDidChangeFramePolicy)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_DidChangeFrameOwnerProperties,
OnDidChangeFrameOwnerProperties)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_UpdateTitle, OnUpdateTitle)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_DidBlockFramebust, OnDidBlockFramebust)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_AbortNavigation, OnAbortNavigation)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_DispatchLoad, OnDispatchLoad)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_ForwardResourceTimingToParent,
OnForwardResourceTimingToParent)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_TextSurroundingSelectionResponse,
OnTextSurroundingSelectionResponse)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(AccessibilityHostMsg_EventBundle, OnAccessibilityEvents)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(AccessibilityHostMsg_LocationChanges,
OnAccessibilityLocationChanges)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(AccessibilityHostMsg_FindInPageResult,
OnAccessibilityFindInPageResult)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(AccessibilityHostMsg_ChildFrameHitTestResult,
OnAccessibilityChildFrameHitTestResult)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(AccessibilityHostMsg_SnapshotResponse,
OnAccessibilitySnapshotResponse)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_EnterFullscreen, OnEnterFullscreen)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_ExitFullscreen, OnExitFullscreen)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_SuddenTerminationDisablerChanged,
OnSuddenTerminationDisablerChanged)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_DidStopLoading, OnDidStopLoading)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_DidChangeLoadProgress,
OnDidChangeLoadProgress)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_SelectionChanged, OnSelectionChanged)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_FocusedNodeChanged, OnFocusedNodeChanged)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_UpdateUserActivationState,
OnUpdateUserActivationState)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_SetHasReceivedUserGestureBeforeNavigation,
OnSetHasReceivedUserGestureBeforeNavigation)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_SetNeedsOcclusionTracking,
OnSetNeedsOcclusionTracking);
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_ScrollRectToVisibleInParentFrame,
OnScrollRectToVisibleInParentFrame)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_BubbleLogicalScrollInParentFrame,
OnBubbleLogicalScrollInParentFrame)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_FrameDidCallFocus, OnFrameDidCallFocus)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_RenderFallbackContentInParentProcess,
OnRenderFallbackContentInParentProcess)
#if BUILDFLAG(USE_EXTERNAL_POPUP_MENU)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_ShowPopup, OnShowPopup)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_HidePopup, OnHidePopup)
#endif
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_RequestOverlayRoutingToken,
OnRequestOverlayRoutingToken)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_ShowCreatedWindow, OnShowCreatedWindow)
IPC_END_MESSAGE_MAP()
return handled;
}
| bool RenderFrameHostImpl::OnMessageReceived(const IPC::Message &msg) {
if (!render_frame_created_)
return false;
ScopedActiveURL scoped_active_url(this);
bool handled = true;
IPC_BEGIN_MESSAGE_MAP(RenderFrameHostImpl, msg)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_RenderProcessGone, OnRenderProcessGone)
IPC_MESSAGE_UNHANDLED(handled = false)
IPC_END_MESSAGE_MAP()
if (handled)
return true;
if (delegate_->OnMessageReceived(this, msg))
return true;
RenderFrameProxyHost* proxy =
frame_tree_node_->render_manager()->GetProxyToParent();
if (proxy && proxy->cross_process_frame_connector() &&
proxy->cross_process_frame_connector()->OnMessageReceived(msg))
return true;
handled = true;
IPC_BEGIN_MESSAGE_MAP(RenderFrameHostImpl, msg)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole,
OnDidAddMessageToConsole)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_Detach, OnDetach)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_FrameFocused, OnFrameFocused)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_DidFailProvisionalLoadWithError,
OnDidFailProvisionalLoadWithError)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_DidFailLoadWithError,
OnDidFailLoadWithError)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_UpdateState, OnUpdateState)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_OpenURL, OnOpenURL)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_BeforeUnload_ACK, OnBeforeUnloadACK)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_SwapOut_ACK, OnSwapOutACK)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_ContextMenu, OnContextMenu)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_VisualStateResponse,
OnVisualStateResponse)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER_DELAY_REPLY(FrameHostMsg_RunJavaScriptDialog,
OnRunJavaScriptDialog)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER_DELAY_REPLY(FrameHostMsg_RunBeforeUnloadConfirm,
OnRunBeforeUnloadConfirm)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_DidAccessInitialDocument,
OnDidAccessInitialDocument)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_DidChangeOpener, OnDidChangeOpener)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_DidAddContentSecurityPolicies,
OnDidAddContentSecurityPolicies)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_DidChangeFramePolicy,
OnDidChangeFramePolicy)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_DidChangeFrameOwnerProperties,
OnDidChangeFrameOwnerProperties)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_UpdateTitle, OnUpdateTitle)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_DidBlockFramebust, OnDidBlockFramebust)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_AbortNavigation, OnAbortNavigation)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_DispatchLoad, OnDispatchLoad)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_ForwardResourceTimingToParent,
OnForwardResourceTimingToParent)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_TextSurroundingSelectionResponse,
OnTextSurroundingSelectionResponse)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(AccessibilityHostMsg_EventBundle, OnAccessibilityEvents)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(AccessibilityHostMsg_LocationChanges,
OnAccessibilityLocationChanges)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(AccessibilityHostMsg_FindInPageResult,
OnAccessibilityFindInPageResult)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(AccessibilityHostMsg_ChildFrameHitTestResult,
OnAccessibilityChildFrameHitTestResult)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(AccessibilityHostMsg_SnapshotResponse,
OnAccessibilitySnapshotResponse)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_EnterFullscreen, OnEnterFullscreen)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_ExitFullscreen, OnExitFullscreen)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_SuddenTerminationDisablerChanged,
OnSuddenTerminationDisablerChanged)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_DidStopLoading, OnDidStopLoading)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_DidChangeLoadProgress,
OnDidChangeLoadProgress)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_SelectionChanged, OnSelectionChanged)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_FocusedNodeChanged, OnFocusedNodeChanged)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_UpdateUserActivationState,
OnUpdateUserActivationState)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_SetHasReceivedUserGestureBeforeNavigation,
OnSetHasReceivedUserGestureBeforeNavigation)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_SetNeedsOcclusionTracking,
OnSetNeedsOcclusionTracking);
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_ScrollRectToVisibleInParentFrame,
OnScrollRectToVisibleInParentFrame)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_BubbleLogicalScrollInParentFrame,
OnBubbleLogicalScrollInParentFrame)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_FrameDidCallFocus, OnFrameDidCallFocus)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_RenderFallbackContentInParentProcess,
OnRenderFallbackContentInParentProcess)
#if BUILDFLAG(USE_EXTERNAL_POPUP_MENU)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_ShowPopup, OnShowPopup)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_HidePopup, OnHidePopup)
#endif
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_RequestOverlayRoutingToken,
OnRequestOverlayRoutingToken)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_ShowCreatedWindow, OnShowCreatedWindow)
IPC_END_MESSAGE_MAP()
return handled;
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2016-9913 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-9913/ | CWE-400 | https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commit;h=4774718e5c194026ba5ee7a28d9be49be3080e42 | 4774718e5c194026ba5ee7a28d9be49be3080e42 | null | static void coroutine_fn v9fs_xattrwalk(void *opaque)
{
int64_t size;
V9fsString name;
ssize_t err = 0;
size_t offset = 7;
int32_t fid, newfid;
V9fsFidState *file_fidp;
V9fsFidState *xattr_fidp = NULL;
V9fsPDU *pdu = opaque;
V9fsState *s = pdu->s;
v9fs_string_init(&name);
err = pdu_unmarshal(pdu, offset, "dds", &fid, &newfid, &name);
if (err < 0) {
goto out_nofid;
}
trace_v9fs_xattrwalk(pdu->tag, pdu->id, fid, newfid, name.data);
file_fidp = get_fid(pdu, fid);
if (file_fidp == NULL) {
err = -ENOENT;
goto out_nofid;
}
xattr_fidp = alloc_fid(s, newfid);
if (xattr_fidp == NULL) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
v9fs_path_copy(&xattr_fidp->path, &file_fidp->path);
if (!v9fs_string_size(&name)) {
/*
* listxattr request. Get the size first
*/
size = v9fs_co_llistxattr(pdu, &xattr_fidp->path, NULL, 0);
if (size < 0) {
err = size;
clunk_fid(s, xattr_fidp->fid);
goto out;
}
/*
* Read the xattr value
*/
xattr_fidp->fs.xattr.len = size;
xattr_fidp->fid_type = P9_FID_XATTR;
xattr_fidp->fs.xattr.xattrwalk_fid = true;
if (size) {
xattr_fidp->fs.xattr.value = g_malloc(size);
err = v9fs_co_llistxattr(pdu, &xattr_fidp->path,
xattr_fidp->fs.xattr.value,
xattr_fidp->fs.xattr.len);
if (err < 0) {
clunk_fid(s, xattr_fidp->fid);
goto out;
}
}
err = pdu_marshal(pdu, offset, "q", size);
if (err < 0) {
goto out;
}
err += offset;
} else {
/*
* specific xattr fid. We check for xattr
* presence also collect the xattr size
*/
size = v9fs_co_lgetxattr(pdu, &xattr_fidp->path,
&name, NULL, 0);
if (size < 0) {
err = size;
clunk_fid(s, xattr_fidp->fid);
goto out;
}
/*
* Read the xattr value
*/
xattr_fidp->fs.xattr.len = size;
xattr_fidp->fid_type = P9_FID_XATTR;
xattr_fidp->fs.xattr.xattrwalk_fid = true;
if (size) {
xattr_fidp->fs.xattr.value = g_malloc(size);
err = v9fs_co_lgetxattr(pdu, &xattr_fidp->path,
&name, xattr_fidp->fs.xattr.value,
xattr_fidp->fs.xattr.len);
if (err < 0) {
clunk_fid(s, xattr_fidp->fid);
goto out;
}
}
err = pdu_marshal(pdu, offset, "q", size);
if (err < 0) {
goto out;
}
err += offset;
}
trace_v9fs_xattrwalk_return(pdu->tag, pdu->id, size);
out:
put_fid(pdu, file_fidp);
if (xattr_fidp) {
put_fid(pdu, xattr_fidp);
}
out_nofid:
pdu_complete(pdu, err);
v9fs_string_free(&name);
}
| static void coroutine_fn v9fs_xattrwalk(void *opaque)
{
int64_t size;
V9fsString name;
ssize_t err = 0;
size_t offset = 7;
int32_t fid, newfid;
V9fsFidState *file_fidp;
V9fsFidState *xattr_fidp = NULL;
V9fsPDU *pdu = opaque;
V9fsState *s = pdu->s;
v9fs_string_init(&name);
err = pdu_unmarshal(pdu, offset, "dds", &fid, &newfid, &name);
if (err < 0) {
goto out_nofid;
}
trace_v9fs_xattrwalk(pdu->tag, pdu->id, fid, newfid, name.data);
file_fidp = get_fid(pdu, fid);
if (file_fidp == NULL) {
err = -ENOENT;
goto out_nofid;
}
xattr_fidp = alloc_fid(s, newfid);
if (xattr_fidp == NULL) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
v9fs_path_copy(&xattr_fidp->path, &file_fidp->path);
if (!v9fs_string_size(&name)) {
/*
* listxattr request. Get the size first
*/
size = v9fs_co_llistxattr(pdu, &xattr_fidp->path, NULL, 0);
if (size < 0) {
err = size;
clunk_fid(s, xattr_fidp->fid);
goto out;
}
/*
* Read the xattr value
*/
xattr_fidp->fs.xattr.len = size;
xattr_fidp->fid_type = P9_FID_XATTR;
xattr_fidp->fs.xattr.xattrwalk_fid = true;
if (size) {
xattr_fidp->fs.xattr.value = g_malloc(size);
err = v9fs_co_llistxattr(pdu, &xattr_fidp->path,
xattr_fidp->fs.xattr.value,
xattr_fidp->fs.xattr.len);
if (err < 0) {
clunk_fid(s, xattr_fidp->fid);
goto out;
}
}
err = pdu_marshal(pdu, offset, "q", size);
if (err < 0) {
goto out;
}
err += offset;
} else {
/*
* specific xattr fid. We check for xattr
* presence also collect the xattr size
*/
size = v9fs_co_lgetxattr(pdu, &xattr_fidp->path,
&name, NULL, 0);
if (size < 0) {
err = size;
clunk_fid(s, xattr_fidp->fid);
goto out;
}
/*
* Read the xattr value
*/
xattr_fidp->fs.xattr.len = size;
xattr_fidp->fid_type = P9_FID_XATTR;
xattr_fidp->fs.xattr.xattrwalk_fid = true;
if (size) {
xattr_fidp->fs.xattr.value = g_malloc(size);
err = v9fs_co_lgetxattr(pdu, &xattr_fidp->path,
&name, xattr_fidp->fs.xattr.value,
xattr_fidp->fs.xattr.len);
if (err < 0) {
clunk_fid(s, xattr_fidp->fid);
goto out;
}
}
err = pdu_marshal(pdu, offset, "q", size);
if (err < 0) {
goto out;
}
err += offset;
}
trace_v9fs_xattrwalk_return(pdu->tag, pdu->id, size);
out:
put_fid(pdu, file_fidp);
if (xattr_fidp) {
put_fid(pdu, xattr_fidp);
}
out_nofid:
pdu_complete(pdu, err);
v9fs_string_free(&name);
}
| C | qemu | 0 |
CVE-2018-18352 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-18352/ | CWE-732 | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a9cbaa7a40e2b2723cfc2f266c42f4980038a949 | a9cbaa7a40e2b2723cfc2f266c42f4980038a949 | Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258} | void FinishLoading() {
EXPECT_TRUE(active_loader());
data_provider()->DidFinishLoading();
base::RunLoop().RunUntilIdle();
}
| void FinishLoading() {
EXPECT_TRUE(active_loader());
data_provider()->DidFinishLoading();
base::RunLoop().RunUntilIdle();
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2014-1713 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-1713/ | CWE-399 | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f85a87ec670ad0fce9d98d90c9a705b72a288154 | f85a87ec670ad0fce9d98d90c9a705b72a288154 | document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | static void perWorldBindingsVoidMethodTestInterfaceEmptyArgMethodCallbackForMainWorld(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMMethod");
TestObjectPythonV8Internal::perWorldBindingsVoidMethodTestInterfaceEmptyArgMethodForMainWorld(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
| static void perWorldBindingsVoidMethodTestInterfaceEmptyArgMethodCallbackForMainWorld(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMMethod");
TestObjectPythonV8Internal::perWorldBindingsVoidMethodTestInterfaceEmptyArgMethodForMainWorld(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2015-6765 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-6765/ | null | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/e5c298b780737c53fa9aae44d6fef522931d88b0 | e5c298b780737c53fa9aae44d6fef522931d88b0 | AppCache: fix a browser crashing bug that can happen during updates.
BUG=558589
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1463463003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#360967} | void AppCacheUpdateJob::URLFetcher::OnWriteComplete(int result) {
if (result < 0) {
request_->Cancel();
result_ = DISKCACHE_ERROR;
OnResponseCompleted();
return;
}
ReadResponseData();
}
| void AppCacheUpdateJob::URLFetcher::OnWriteComplete(int result) {
if (result < 0) {
request_->Cancel();
result_ = DISKCACHE_ERROR;
OnResponseCompleted();
return;
}
ReadResponseData();
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2013-0920 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0920/ | CWE-399 | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/12baa2097220e33c12b60aa5e6da6701637761bf | 12baa2097220e33c12b60aa5e6da6701637761bf | Fix heap-use-after-free in BookmarksIOFunction::ShowSelectFileDialog.
BUG=177410
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12326086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@184586 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Bucket* GetBucket(const BucketIdType& id) {
Bucket* b = buckets_[id];
if (b == NULL) {
b = new Bucket();
buckets_[id] = b;
}
return b;
}
| Bucket* GetBucket(const BucketIdType& id) {
Bucket* b = buckets_[id];
if (b == NULL) {
b = new Bucket();
buckets_[id] = b;
}
return b;
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |