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4. The applicant was born in 1928 and lives in Bratislava. 5. On 5 January 1983 the applicant and his wife purchased a house situated in Michalovce from the applicant's parents-in-law. The purchase contract was registered with the State Notary's Office in Michalovce. 6. On 5 March 1990 the applicant's mother-in-law filed an action with the Michalovce District Court claiming that the contract should be declared void. She alleged that the applicant and his wife had not paid the purchase price and that they had forced her and her late husband to conclude the contract. 7. On 21 November 1990 the Michalovce District Court declared the contract void. It found, with reference to witness statements and documentary evidence, that the vendors had concluded it under pressure. 8. On 14 January 1991 and on 8 May 1991 the applicant and his wife appealed. They challenged the conclusions of the District Court with reference to documentary evidence. 9. On 13 May 1991 the Košice Regional Court quashed the first instance judgment as it did not specify what kind of pressure the defendants had allegedly exercised on the vendors, and because it was not clear whether the contract corresponded to the genuine will of the parties. The Regional Court therefore instructed the District Court to hear the State Notary who had registered the contract and to establish whether the purchase price had been determined correctly. 10. On 6 December 1991 the Michalovce District Court again declared the contract void. After having taken further evidence, the District Court established that the applicant and his wife had exercised pressure on the vendors in that they had repeatedly pointed to their age and to their health problems, and that they had offered to take care of them subject to the transfer of the house. The court noted that there existed no evidence as to whether the applicant and his wife had paid the purchase price as alleged by them. It therefore relied on the argument of the applicant's mother-in-law according to which the purchase contract had been concluded formally with a view to reducing the costs of the transfer. The District Court concluded that the contract did not correspond to the genuine will of the parties and that it was therefore void within the meaning of Article 37 of the Civil Code. 11. On 19 December 1991 the applicant and his wife appealed. On 11 and 13 May 1992 they made further written submissions to the Regional Court. 12. On 31 June 1992 the Košice Regional Court quashed the District Court's judgment of 6 December 1991. The appellate court found that the evidence available did not suffice to conclude that the claimant and her late husband had been put under pressure by the defendants or that the contract in question was invalid. In its judgment the Regional Court instructed the District Court to hear the claimant thoroughly with a view to assessing the validity of the contract in the light of Article 37 of the Civil Code, that is whether the parties had concluded it of their own free will, with a serious intention to do so and in an unequivocal manner. 13. A hearing before the District Court was held on 17 November 1992. On 2 February 1992 the District Court appointed an expert in psychiatry. The latter submitted the opinion on 7 June 2003. 14. A hearing scheduled for 25 June 2003 was adjourned as the applicant's mother-in-law was ill. She died on 3 July 1993. On 31 August and on 3 September 1993 the defendants and the plaintiff's legal representative provided the court with the names of the plaintiff's heirs. 15. On 24 June 1994 the District Court decided on the expert's fees. On 27 December 1993 the defendants appealed against this decision. 16. On 3 May 1994 the District Court allowed two legal successors of the applicant's mother-in-law to join the proceedings as plaintiffs. On the same day it delivered its third judgment on the case concluding that the purchase contract was void. The judgment referred to detailed statements by the applicant's mother-in-law according to which the applicant's wife had insistently incited her parents to transfer the house to her and the applicant. The applicant's mother-in-law further stated before the court that she had accepted the proposal because she was an invalid and her health had deteriorated. She feared that she might not be properly looked after in the future. Her husband agreed to the transfer as he shared her anxiety. 17. The District Court had also regard to the opinion of a psychiatrist according to whom the applicant's mother-in-law had suffered from constant stress due to a lasting deterioration of her health. The expert expressed the view that, in 1983, her reaction to stress could have brought about a mental state which gave rise to great pressure on her to sign the contract. The District Court concluded that the vendors had not concluded the contract of their free will as required by Article 37 of the Civil Code. 18. On 3 August 1994 the applicant and his wife appealed. They also challenged the District Court judge on the ground that he had been the classmate of one of the claimants at the elementary school. One of the defendants submitted observations on the appeal on 2 September 1994. 19. The case-file was submitted to the Košice Regional Court on 13 October 1994. At the hearing held on 22 March 1995 the applicant and his wife reiterated that they considered the District Court judge to be biased. On 28 March 1995 the file was returned to the District Court and the judge was asked to comment on the applicant's objection to his person. On 8 May 1995 the Košice Regional Court dismissed the request for exclusion of the District Court judge. 20. On 28 November 1995 the Regional Court quashed the District Court's judgment of 3 May 1994. The decision was served on the applicant's lawyer on 12 March 1996. It stated that the District Court had repeatedly failed to establish the relevant facts of the case and that it had not followed the views expressed in the Regional Court's decision of 31 June 1992. The appellate court instructed the District Court to take further evidence. 21. On 17 April 1996 the applicant submitted further information at the District Court's request. On 1 August 1996 the District Court scheduled the next hearing for 3 September 1996. On the latter date it admitted a change of the plaintiffs. On 31 July 1997 the District Court scheduled the next hearing for 21 August 1997. 22. On 27 August 1997 the applicant challenged the District Court judge. On 29 October 1997 the Košice Regional Court found that the District Court judge was not biased. 23. On 18 December 1997 the Michalovce District Court delivered its fourth judgment declaring the contract void. The court held that the applicant's mother-in-law had agreed to transfer the property as she had feared not to be looked after in an appropriate manner in the future. The court also noted that the applicant's mother-in-law had alleged that the contract had been concluded formally and that she and her husband had not asked the applicant and his wife to pay the price. 24. On 23 February 1998 the applicant and his wife appealed. On 25 March 1998 the plaintiffs submitted their observations on the appeal. The file was transmitted to the Regional Court on 7 April 1998. On 4 May 1998 the applicant's lawyer submitted further reasons for the appeal. 25. On 8 December 1998 the Košice Regional Court upheld the first instance judgment. The judgment stated that the evidence available was not sufficient to conclude that the vendors had signed the contract under pressure. However, it indicated that the vendors had not expected the applicant and his wife to pay the price to them and that they had agreed to formally conclude a purchase contract with a view to reducing the transfer costs. 26. On 18 February 1999 the applicant and his wife filed an appeal on points of law. On 22 April 1999 they paid the court fees at the court's request of 7 April 1999. 27. In the meantime, on 24 February 1999 the District Court decided on expert's fees. On 15 March 1999 the defendants appealed. On 20 September 1999 the Regional Court quashed the decision on the expert's fees. 28. On 8 November 1999 the file was transferred to the Supreme Court. On 10 December 1999 it was returned to the District Court on the ground that the fees paid by the applicant and his wife had not been determined correctly. The supplementary fees were paid on 29 December 1999. On 10 March 2000 the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal on points of law.

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9. The applicant was born in 1966 and is currently detained in the Radom prison. 10. In July 1996 the applicant was released from prison. On 11 September 1996 the police arrested him. The police suspected that on 10 September 1996 the applicant had committed an armed robbery and rape. At the same time, the police enforced a warrant for the arrest of the applicant issued on 28 August 1996 by the Pruszków District Court (Sąd Rejonowy) in the criminal proceedings against the applicant pending before that court. 11. On 13 September 1996 the Warsaw District Court remanded the applicant in custody on charges of armed robbery and sexual assault. The court took into account the fact that the applicant was of no fixed abode and that his accomplices had not been arrested. 12. On 8 November 1996 the Warsaw Regional Court (Sąd Wojewódzki) dismissed the applicant's appeal against the District Court's decision to remand him in custody. The Regional Court considered that the applicant's detention was justified by the existence of serious evidence of his guilt, the gravity of charges against him, the risk of collusion, the fact that he was of no fixed abode and was unemployed. In addition, the court observed that the police failed to apprehend the applicant's accomplices and that there was a risk that he would go into hiding. Finally, the court was of the view that the applicant's case did not disclose any of the grounds for release provided by Article 218 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 13. On 10 December 1996 the Warsaw Regional Court extended the applicant's detention until 11 March 1997. 14. The applicant made an application for release but it was dismissed on 19 December 1996 by the Warsaw Regional Court. It referred to the gravity of the charges brought against the applicant and the existence of serious evidence of his guilt. 15. Between 20 January and 27 February 1997 the prosecution service decided that it would seek evidence from five expert witnesses and requested the applicant's medical file from a psychiatric hospital in which he had been treated. 16. On 4 March 1997 the Warsaw Regional Court appointed legal aid counsel to defend the applicant. 17. On 5 March 1997 the prosecution service received two expert opinions. On 7 March 1997 the District Prosecutor interviewed the victim of rape. 18. On 10 March 1997 the Warsaw Court of Appeal (Sąd Apelacyjny) allowed the request submitted by the prosecutor and extended the applicant's detention on remand until 11 May 1997. The court referred to the gravity of the charges against the applicant and the grounds for detention provided in Article 217 §§ 1 and 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Moreover, it noted that one of the co-accused was still in hiding and that immediately after the commission of the alleged crime “there had been an attempt to contact the victim [of the assault]”. The court also agreed with the submissions of the prosecutor that the investigation was not finished because certain forensic tests still had to be carried out, the applicant and another co-accused were still under psychiatric observation, whereas the police was trying to apprehend the third accused. The applicant appealed against that decision to the Supreme Court (Sąd Najwyższy). 19. Between 8 and 18 April 1997 the prosecution service received two expert opinions and decided to request DNA tests. 20. On 24 April 1997 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant's appeal against the Warsaw Court of Appeal's decision of 10 March 1997. It referred to the charges against the applicant and observed that there existed serious evidence of his guilt. 21. On 29 April 1997 the Warsaw-Ochota Deputy District Prosecutor (Zastępca Prokuratora Rejonowego) replied to the applicant's letter of 23 April 1997 in which he complained about the censorship of his correspondence with the European Commission of Human Rights. The prosecutor advised the applicant about domestic legislation, which allowed the authorities to censor his correspondence. 22. On 9 May 1997 the Warsaw Court of Appeal allowed the request submitted by the prosecutor and extended the applicant's detention on remand until 11 July 1997. The court relied on the existence of serious evidence of the applicant's guilt and the nature of charges against the applicant. It also considered that the applicant's case did not disclose any of the grounds for release provided by Article 218 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Finally, the court noted that the prosecution service was awaiting an expert opinion from a forensic expert and that one of co-accused was still in hiding. The applicant appealed against that decision. 23. On 16 May 1997 the prosecution service received the results of DNA tests. On 18 June 1997 the District Prosecutor interviewed the applicant and decided to modify charges against him. 24. On 27 June 1997 the prosecuting authorities filed with the Warsaw Regional Court a bill of indictment against the applicant. 25. On 7 July 1997 the Warsaw Regional Court extended the applicant's pre‑trial detention until 11 September 1998. 26. On 9 July 1997 the trial court dismissed the applicant's challenge to the prosecutor who worked on his case. During the two following days the applicant was consulting the case-file. 27. On 10 July 1997 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant's appeal against the Warsaw Court of Appeal's decision of 9 May 1997. The Supreme Court relied on the gravity of charges against the applicant, the existence of serious evidence of his guilt and the grounds for detention listed in Article 217 §§ 1 and 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It also pointed out that the Warsaw Regional Court's decision of 7 July 1997 extending the applicant's detention had been taken before the Supreme Court had the opportunity to decide his appeal against the Warsaw Court of Appeal's decision of 9 May 1997 and therefore constituted “an inappropriate practice”. 28. On 15 July 1997 the applicant's counsel appealed to the Warsaw Court of Appeal against the Regional Court's decision of 7 July 1997. On 25 July 1997 the appellate court rejected the appeal. It pointed out that at the time of his arrest the applicant had been of no fixed abode and had been the subject of the arrest warrant. 29. In the meantime, on 22 July 1997 the applicant lodged with the Warsaw Court of Appeal an appeal against the Regional Court's decision of 7 July 1997. On 5 September 1997 the Warsaw Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant's appeal. The court relied on a medical opinion confirming that the applicant's medical problems could be treated in prison. 30. In the meantime, on 20 August 1997 the applicant made an application for release. On 16 October 1997 the Warsaw Regional Court dismissed the application. It relied on a medical opinion. The applicant's appeal against that decision was rejected because it was not provided by law. 31. On 24 March 1998 the Warsaw Regional Court was informed that the applicant had tried to smuggle a message to his accomplices. However, it was seized by the prison service and included in the court's case-file. 32. Between 25 November 1997 and 19 May 1998 the applicant on six occasions attended hearings before the Pruszków District Court in the criminal proceedings against him pending before that court. 33. On 19 June 1998 the Warsaw Regional Court decided to stop the applicant's letter in which he made threats against one of the prisoners. The letter was included in the court's case-file. 34. On 22 July 1998 the Warsaw Regional Court requested the Supreme Court to extend the applicant's pre-trial detention under Article 222 § 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which empowered the Supreme Court to prolong detention beyond two years. The request was based, inter alia, on Articles 209 and 217 § 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and referred to the gravity of charges against the applicant, the existence of serious evidence of his guilt and the inability to schedule hearings because of holidays and workload of judges involved in the applicant's case. The request also referred to the fact that the next hearing could not be fixed before evidence is taken from an anonymous witness who could not testify before 3 November 1998. 35. On 22 July 1998 the first hearing was held before the Warsaw Regional Court. The applicant and his co-accused asked that the hearing be adjourned as they had not been able to prepare their defence. The court allowed the request and adjourned the hearing until 3 November 1998. The court took into account heavy workload of judges, the holiday period and the fact that an anonymous witness could not be heard before that date. 36. On 28 August 1998 the Supreme Court allowed the Regional Court's request of 22 July 1998 and extended the applicant's pre-trial detention until 15 December 1998. It pointed out that difficulties in fixing hearings caused by holidays and workload of judges could not be considered as grounds for extending pre-trial detention. Furthermore, the Supreme Court agreed with the Regional Court that the applicant's case disclosed the existence of grounds for detention provided in Articles 209 and 217 § 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Supreme Court concluded that the inability to take evidence from an anonymous witness before 3 November 1998 justified the extension of the applicant's detention under Article 222 § 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 37. On 3 November 1998 the Warsaw Regional Court held the second hearing in the applicant's case. It took evidence from the victim of sexual assault. The court also made arrangements for taking evidence from an anonymous witness. 38. On 17 November 1998 evidence was taken from an anonymous witness. 39. On 19 November 1998 the Warsaw Regional Court dismissed the applicant's challenge to the judges trying his case. The Regional Court considered that the fact that the judges were female did not deprive the applicant of a fair trial on charges of sexual assault. 40. On 23 November 1998 the hearing was adjourned because the prosecution service and witnesses had not been informed about it. 41. The applicant made a further application for release at the hearing held on 1 December 1998 but it was dismissed by the Warsaw Regional Court on 2 December 1998. The court considered that the applicant's detention was justified by the existence of serious evidence of his guilt, the gravity of charges against him and the fact that he had been of no fixed abode at the time of his arrest. Moreover, the court observed that it had not finished taking evidence from certain witnesses. The applicant's appeal against that decision was rejected because it was not provided by law. 42. On 2 December 1998 the Warsaw Regional Court requested the Supreme Court to further extend the applicant's pre-trial detention. On 4 December 1998 the Supreme Court allowed that request and prolonged the detention until 15 February 1999. The Supreme Court referred to its decision of 28 August 1998 and observed that the trial court still had to take evidence form certain witnesses. In addition, the trial court did not know the address of one of those witnesses, whereas another witness had to be transported to the court from the Łódź Prison. 43. On 17 December 1998 a hearing took place before the Warsaw Regional Court. 44. On 22 December 1998 evidence was taken from an anonymous witness. 45. The applicant made a fresh application for release but it was dismissed on 4 January 1999 by the Warsaw Regional Court. It referred to the nature and the gravity of charges against the applicant and noted that his trial was in the final stage. 46. On 7 January 1999 the Warsaw Regional Court dismissed the applicant's challenge to the judges trying his case. The applicant's appeal against that decision was rejected because it was not provided by law. 47. On 12 January 1999 the police informed the Warsaw Regional Court that one of the witnesses for the defence was dead. 48. On 21 January 1999 a hearing was held before the Warsaw Regional Court. It was adjourned until 3 February 1999 because one of the judges was ill. 49. On 25 January 1999 the Warsaw Regional Court requested the Supreme Court to further extend the applicant's pre-trial detention. On 10 February 1999 the Supreme Court allowed that request and prolonged the detention until 31 March 1999. It referred to the reasoning of its decision of 4 December 1998. The Supreme Court also noted the difficulties the trial court experienced in taking evidence from one of the witnesses. Moreover, the court considered that because the applicant had been of no fixed abode at the time of his arrest he could interfere with the proceedings if released from detention. 50. The hearing held on 3 February 1999 was adjourned because the applicant requested that evidence be taken from a new witness. 51. The next hearing was held on 19 February 1999. 52. During the hearing held on 15 March 1999 the applicant applied for release from detention but the court dismissed it. The applicant's appeal against that decision was rejected because it was not provided by law. 53. On 25 March 1999 the Supreme Court prolonged the applicant's detention until 31 May 1999. 54. During the hearing held on 7 April 1999 the Warsaw Regional Court dismissed the applicant's request that the case be remitted to the prosecution service for further investigation. 55. The last hearing before the trial court was held on 28 April 1999. 56. On 4 May 1999 the Warsaw Regional Court convicted the applicant of armed robbery and sexual assault and sentenced him to five years' imprisonment. The applicant appealed against that judgment to the Warsaw Court of Appeal. 57. On 9 November 1999 the Warsaw Court of Appeal held a hearing. The court dismissed the appeal except for the conviction for armed robbery, which it qualified as robbery without the use of arms. 58. The Court's case-file contains the following documents pointing to the monitoring of the applicant's correspondence: (i) the applicant's letters of 5, 22 and 31 January and 7 February 1997 addressed to the European Commission of Human Rights are marked with a hand‑written note: “Censored” (Ocenzurowano) and an illegible signature and also bear a stamp: “Assistant Warsaw-Ochota District Prosecutor Grażyna Garboś-Jędral” (Asesor Prokuratury Rejonowej Warszawa Ochota Grażyna Garboś-Jędral); (ii) the applicant's letters of 8, 21 and 24 April 1997 addressed to the European Commission of Human Rights are marked with a hand‑written note: “Censored” and an illegible signature; (iii) the applicant's letters of 5 March, 16 May and 3 September 1997 as well as an undated letter received on 19 March 1997 addressed to the European Commission of Human Rights are marked with an illegible signature; (iv) an envelope mailed by the applicant on 5 September 1997 to the European Commission of Human Rights is marked with a hand‑written note: “Censored” and an illegible signature; (v) a flap of an envelope with the logo of the Council of Europe bears on the inside a stamp: “Assistant Warsaw-Ochota District Prosecutor Grażyna Garboś-Jędral” and an illegible signature; (vi) an envelope mailed by the European Court of Human Rights on 23 February 1999 to the applicant bears a stamp: “Censored on, signature” (Ocenzurowano dn. podpis), a hand-written date: 5 March and an illegible signature.

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6. The applicant was born in 1934 and lives in Warsaw. 7. In 1986 the applicant lodged a motion with the court claiming the inheritance of her late mother's estate. On 30 January 1990 the Warsaw District Court issued a decision awarding to her one third of the estate. Consequently, she became the owner of one-sixth of the property, half of the estate having belonged to the applicant's late mother's second husband F.S. 8. On 2 May 1990 F.S. lodged a motion with the court, claiming physical division of the estate, which comprised certain plots of land in the municipality of Izabelin. 9. Expert reports as to the manner in which the estate could be divided were submitted to the court in April 1990, in July 1991, 20 March and December 1992, but no decision was given by the court. 10. In January 1993 one of the parties to the proceedings, J.G., lodged an objection to the proposal for division submitted in the last expert report. Apparently the court subsequently called a new expert and ordered him to submit a new proposal as to the division. 11. On 17 September 1993 a hearing was held. The parties unsuccessfully tried to reach a friendly settlement. The court ordered the preparation of a new expert opinion. 12. On 7 March 1994 the expert appointed by the court submitted his report. 13. On 21 September 1994 J.G. complained to the court that the proceedings were not progressing and that hearings were held only once or twice a year. 14. The next hearing was held on 2 December 1994. The applicant did not agree that the case be decided by establishing co-ownership of the estate, instead of its physical division. 15. On 25 February 1995 a new expert opinion was submitted to court. This report was subsequently submitted to the Izabelin Municipal Office for approval. 16. On 23 March 1995 the Izabelin Municipal Office informed the court that it had not approved the proposal of the division of the estate as submitted by the expert, since it was incompatible with the general land-use plan of the municipality in that it did not take into account the public road to be constructed on the property concerned. 17. On 25 April 1995 A.K., a new expert appointed by the court, submitted a new proposal for the division of the estate. 18. On 24 July 1995 the Office of the Municipality of Izabelin again refused its approval for the division plan submitted by A.K., considering that it was incompatible with the current land-use plan in that the proposed plots were smaller than 1,000 square metres. 19. On 20 September 1995 the expert submitted a supplementary report. 20. On 24 September 1995 a meeting of the parties to the proceedings and the expert with the local planning authority was held. The parties were informed that the latest division proposal was incompatible with the current land-use plan, and that a new plan was being prepared. The proposal devised by the expert had been transmitted for consideration by the authority working on the new land-use plan. The new plan was to be adopted by the end of 1996. 21. On 24 May 1996 the Izabelin Municipal Office requested the same expert, A.K., to submit a new division proposal. 22. On 20 September 1996 A.K. informed the court that after consultation with the parties to the proceedings he did not see any possibility of devising a new plan to take into account the interests and demands of all the parties. 23. On 7 November 1996 the Izabelin Municipal Office informed the court that the new proposal for the division of the property, which had apparently meanwhile been submitted by A.K., was incompatible with the current land-use plan. 24. On 18 March 1997 the Izabelin Municipal Office informed the Warsaw District Court that a new land use plan was being prepared. 25. On 19 March 1998 the Izabelin Municipal Office informed the court that the land-use plan of 1989 was still valid and legally binding. 26. By a decision of 30 March 1998 the Warsaw District Court stayed the division proceedings until the establishment of a new general land-use plan by the local authorities of Izabelin. The court considered that under the current land-use plan the proposals of division submitted so far by the experts could not be adopted, whereas a new plan was being prepared. 27. In December 1998 the municipal authorities informed the public that the outline of the new land-use plan was available for inspection and comments. 28. On 2 July 1999 the applicant complained to the local municipality that the new plan had yet not been adopted and that the proceedings remained stayed. She submitted that the property concerned was deteriorating as it was improperly used and poorly-maintained by its owners. On 6 July 1999 the municipality requested the applicant to submit to the local planning authorities a new proposal concerning the division of property. 29. On 20 July 1999 the applicant lodged a motion with the Warsaw District Court for the resumption of the proceedings. On 28 June 2000 the Warsaw District Court resumed the proceedings. A hearing was held on 29 November 2000. The parties requested the court to appoint a new expert in order to prepare a new proposal for the division of the property. 30. On 30 January 2001 a further hearing was held. 31. On 20 March 2001 A.K., the expert, submitted his opinion as to the division of the property. 32. The proceedings are pending.

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8. The applicant was born in 1932 and lives in Otepää. 9. On 2 September 1977 he married a woman with whom he already had a son, born in 1962. On 3 February 1993 their son died. 10. On 3 February 1994 the applicant's wife filed with the Valga County Court (Valga Maakohus) an action for divorce and division of marital property, which included agricultural assets. 11. On 23 February 1994 the applicant filed against her an action for division of the inheritance of their son. The inheritance consisted of a house with adjacent buildings and two cars. 12. On 12 April 1994 the claims were joined by the court. 13. On 21 April 1994 the County Court held a hearing in the case and scheduled a further hearing for 24 May 1994. 14. On 9 May 1994 the County Court ordered, at the request of the applicant's wife, attachment of the property in order to ensure its preservation pending the resolution of her civil action. The attachment was carried out by the court's bailiffs on 10 and 26 May 1994. 15. On 24 May 1994 the applicant was taken into custody in connection with the criminal proceedings instituted against him (see below). 16. Following his release from custody on 20 December 1994 the applicant filed, on 5 April 1995, an application with the County Court requesting that his civil case be transferred to another court alleging that the judge and the court were not impartial. 17. On 25 April 1995 the County Court imposed a fine on the applicant for having used insulting language in respect of the court both in his transfer application and at the hearings. 18. On 28 April 1995 the applicant requested that he be exempted from the fine. On 3 May 1995 the judge hearing the case withdrew. On 26 May 1995 the applicant informed the court that he had lost confidence in it and requested that all members of the court step down. 19. By a decision of 30 May 1995 the County Court dismissed both his requests. The decision was confirmed by the Tartu Court of Appeal (Tartu Ringkonnakohus) on 27 December 1995. Leave to appeal to the Supreme Court (Riigikohus) was refused on 13 March 1996. 20. On 3 June 1996 the applicant filed an action for divorce. 21. On 12 March 1997 and 30 September 1997 the judges of the Valga County Court withdrew from examining the applicant's and his wife's civil actions. In their decisions it was noted that that the applicant's written submissions, in particular that of April 1995, were disrespectful of the court and hampered an objective examination of the cases. 22. On 29 October 1997 the cases were transferred by a higher court to the Viljandi County Court (Viljandi Maakohus) which on 3 November 1997 scheduled a hearing for 10 February 1998. On that day the hearing was adjourned as the parties failed to appear before the court. The applicant had not informed the court of the reasons for his failure to attend. His wife could not attend as she was hospitalised from 19 January 1998 until 6 February 1998. 23. On 4 March 1998 the applicant asked the court to set a hearing date. 24. On 24 August 1998 the hearing was adjourned since, according to a medical certificate presented to the court, the state of health of the applicant's wife did not allow her to take part in it and it was not possible to decide on the divorce request without her presence. 25. On 29 September 1998 the applicant requested the court to hear the case without the presence his wife and to inquire whether she would agree to this. In response to its inquiry of 8 October 1998 about the condition of health of the applicant's wife, the court was informed that she had still to receive treatment. 26. On 30 November 1998 the applicant's lawyer requested that the court fix a hearing date. 27. On 16 February 1999 the applicant's wife asked for the adjournment of a hearing scheduled for 22 February 1999 as her state of health had deteriorated and she needed to be hospitalised. At the hearing on 22 February 1999, despite the applicant's request to proceed with the case, the court decided that the presence of the applicant's wife was necessary. Accordingly, it adjourned the hearing. 28. On 16 March 1999 the applicant's wife requested a higher court to transfer the case to the Tartu County Court, apparently because it was closer to her place of residence. Her request was refused in April 1999. 29. By a judgment of 1 December 1999 the Viljandi County Court dissolved the marriage between the applicant and his wife. At the applicant's request it allowed him additional time to modify and specify his property claim, which he submitted to the court on 21 January 2000. 30. In the continuing proceedings concerning division of property a hearing scheduled for 4 September 2000 was adjourned at the request of both parties who wanted to call certain witnesses. A hearing on 20 September 2000 was also adjourned as the parties requested that additional witnesses be heard. 31. On 14 November 2000 the applicant unsuccessfully requested the removal of the judge. 32. A hearing took place on 20 November 2000. 33. By a judgment of 4 December 2000 the Viljandi County Court rejected the applicant's ex-wife's action for division of marital property for lack of proof that such property existed and accepted part of the applicant's claim concerning the inheritance of their son. The inheritance was divided up so that the applicant was to receive one of the cars and his ex-wife the rest of the property. 34. On 20 December 2000 the applicant, being dissatisfied with the way the inheritance was divided by the court, filed an appeal against the judgment with the Tartu Court of Appeal which, on 30 April 2001, quashed in part the County Court judgment and remitted the claim concerning the division of inheritance to it for a new examination. On 4 December 2001 the applicant's former wife filed a counteraction claiming part ownership of the house left by their son. She also requested the County Court to take an interim measure ordering the applicant not to dispose of the property pending the outcome of the proceedings. By a decision of 18 March 2002 the County Court allowed the request. On 25 March 2002 the applicant replied in writing to his ex-wife's claim. 35. On 27 March 2002 the County Court held a preliminary hearing. It requested the parties to submit additional evidence by 20 May 2002 and scheduled a further hearing for 20 June 2002. As the applicant's former wife could not submit the requested evidence by the set date for health reasons, she requested an extension of the time-limit. On 23 and 28 May 2002 the applicant filed further observations. 36. On 19 June 2002 the applicant's ex-wife requested a postponement for one month of the hearing scheduled for the following day due to her illness. 37. On 20 June 2002 the County Court decided to adjourn the case for an indefinite period. 38. In September 2002 the applicant and his ex-wife filed further observations 39. On 2 December 2002 the County Court held another preliminary hearing where it heard 7 witnesses. As the parties requested that additional witnesses be heard the court scheduled a further hearing for 2 April 2003. 40. At the hearing on 2 April 2003 the County Court heard 3 more witnesses. Each party requested however the hearing of another witness from their side, who both lived in different towns and were of poor health and advanced age. The court allowed their request and adjourned the examination of the case until these witnesses were heard. 41. The applicant's former wife's witness was to be heard on 25 April 2003 in Otepää. However, the date did not suit the witness and her questioning was postponed. On 15 May 2003 the Viljandi County Court requested that the applicant's witness be examined by the City Court in Tallinn where the witness was living. In its request the County Court noted that a difficulty with the case was that it involved circumstances dating back several decades, complicating the collection of evidence. 42. On 20 May 1994 the Valga police, acting upon an application of the applicant's wife alleging ill-treatment by her husband, initiated criminal proceedings against the applicant for having caused his wife grievous bodily harm. 43. On 24 May 1994, pursuant to a court order, the applicant was taken into custody. On 1 June 1994 the applicant was additionally charged with assault in respect of two other persons as well as unlawful possession of a firearm. 44. On 2 July 1994 the applicant was ordered to undergo a psychiatric examination and to be committed to a hospital. The examination took place from 1 September 1994 until 2 November 1994 in the Tallinn Psychiatric Hospital which declared him mentally fit. 45. The applicant was released from custody on 20 December 1994 and on 15 May 1995 the criminal proceedings against him were discontinued on the ground that the acts committed by him did not amount to a criminal offence and that the assault victims did not wish to pursue the charges. 46. Upon his release from custody in December 1994 the applicant discovered that some of his property, which had been placed in his wife's care following the court order of 9 May 1994, had gone missing. On 30 November 1995 the applicant filed with the Tartu City Court (Tartu Linnakohus) a civil action against the Government claiming compensation for damage suffered as a result of his unlawful detention. In particular, he claimed moral damages for his arrest and placement in a psychiatric hospital as well as damages for lost property and for the loss of profit he would have made from his farming activities. 47. By judgment of 2 May 1997 the City Court allowed in part the applicant's lawsuit. It rejected the applicant's claim concerning the loss of property items on the grounds of lack of proof that the loss was due to the actions or omissions of the authorities. It noted that it was the applicant's wife who had been left in charge of the common property and that the proceedings for its division were still pending. It also rejected the claim concerning loss of profit. 48. On 27 January 1998 the Tartu Court of Appeal upheld the judgement of the first instance court concerning the loss of property items. It revoked the judgment with respect to the claim of loss of profit and remitted it to the City Court for a new consideration. It also reduced the amount of moral damages payable to the applicant. On 22 April 1998 the Supreme Court refused to grant the applicant leave to appeal. 49. Subsequently, the applicant filed new claims for damages against the Government in connection with his arrest and loss of property. Proceedings in respect of these claims were all terminated on the grounds that the matter had already been decided by a final judgment. 50. The applicant also brought civil proceedings against the judge who had authorised the attachment of property on 9 May 1994, the police investigator involved in his criminal case and his wife, claiming compensation for damage caused to the property by their unlawful acts. On 18 December 2000 the Võru County Court (Võru Maakohus), in order to establish a list of the applicant's property and the extent of possible damage, suspended the proceedings pending the entry into force of the judgment of the Viljandi County Court concerning the division of marital and inheritance property between the applicant and his wife.

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8. The applicant was born in 1968 and lives in Budapest. 9. On 12 June 1997 the applicant, a recidivist offender, was arrested after having been caught red-handed selling amphetamines in a bar. During his interrogation on the same day the applicant refused to testify and destroyed evidence by swallowing a piece of paper found in his possession at the time of his arrest. In the ensuing proceedings the applicant was assisted by a defence counsel of his choice. 10. On 14 June 1997 the Pest Central District Court ordered the applicant's detention on remand on charges of drug-trafficking. On the applicant's appeal, this decision was upheld by the Budapest Regional Court on 20 June 1997 on the ground of the danger of collusion. On 30 June 1997, during his second interrogation, the applicant again refused to testify. 11. On 8 July 1997 the Buda Central District Court, as confirmed by the Budapest Regional Court on 14 August 1997, prolonged the applicant's detention on remand on the ground of the danger of collusion. 12. On 29 August 1997 the applicant made his first statement. The scope of the investigation was subsequently extended in order to uncover the chain of supply of drugs to the applicant. 13. On 3 September 1997 the Budapest Regional Court further prolonged the applicant's detention on remand on the grounds of the danger of collusion and the risk that the applicant would abscond. This decision was upheld on 26 September 1997 by an appeal chamber of the Regional Court. 14. On 26 September and 13 October 1997 two persons, also suspected of having been involved in the offence, were arrested and detained on remand. On 13 October and 11 November 1997 the applicant was again interrogated. 15. On 8 January 1998 the Budapest Regional Court prolonged the applicant's detention on remand on the grounds that there was a risk of collusion and that he would abscond. This decision was upheld on 3 February 1998. 16. On 9 February 1998 the Attorney General's Office requested legal assistance from the Federal Ministry of Justice of Germany in order to obtain evidence from a witness who had been convicted of drugs offences in Germany and who was serving a prison sentence in Bayreuth. The information requested was made available by the German authorities in July 1998. 17. On 23 March 1998 the applicant was again interrogated. 18. On 9 June and 12 October 1998 the Supreme Court prolonged the applicant's detention on remand on the grounds of risk of collusion and the danger that he would abscond. 19. On 20 October 1998 the proceedings against a co-defendant were disjoined from the applicant's case since it appeared that further evidence needed to be obtained from abroad in the former's case. 20. On 27 October 1998 the investigations in the applicant's case were closed. The case file contained some 3,000 pages of documents. 21. On 23 December 1998 the applicant was heard by the public prosecutor who ordered the resumption of the investigation with a view to clarifying several matters raised by the applicant. 22. On 6 January 1999 the applicant was again interrogated by the police. 23. On 12 January 1999 the Budapest VI/VII District Public Prosecutor's Office preferred a bill of indictment against the applicant and two other defendants. The applicant was charged with the offence of abuse of narcotics. 24. On 18 January 1999 the Pest Central District Court confirmed the applicant's detention on remand. 25. On 7 April and 13 May 1999 the District Court held hearings. On the latter date it again prolonged the applicant's detention on remand. 26. The next hearing was held on 23 June 1999 at which the District Court again prolonged the applicant's detention. 27. On 19 July 1999 the District Court confirmed, in the course of a periodic review, the applicant's detention on remand on the grounds that there was a risk that he would abscond and re-offend. The applicant's appeal was turned down by the Budapest Regional Court on 25 August 1999. 28. Another hearing, resulting in a decision to prolong the detention, took place on 16 September 1999. The reasons invoked by the District Court were identical to those underlying the decision of 19 July 1999. 29. A hearing scheduled for 2 December 1999 was adjourned due to the illness of one of the lay judges. At a hearing on 13 January 2000, the applicant withdrew his defence counsel's power of attorney, with the result that the hearing had to be adjourned. 30. On 25 January 2000 the Supreme Court confirmed, in the course of a periodic review, the applicant's detention on the grounds that there was a danger that he would abscond and re-offend. On 3 February 2000 the applicant's new defence counsel submitted his power of attorney to the District Court. 31. The next hearing took place on 2 March 2000 at which the District Court, as confirmed by the Budapest Regional Court on 17 March 2000, decided to maintain the applicant's detention. 32. Further hearings were held on 30 March and 10 April 2000. On the latter date, the applicant was convicted of narcotics abuse and sentenced to nine years' imprisonment. The District Court relied on documentary evidence, the testimony of numerous witnesses, the opinions of medical and drugs experts and the reports and testimony of the members of a specialised anti-drugs plain-clothes police squad. The District Court considered that the cumulative nature of the offence constituted an aggravating factor. The duration of the applicant's pre-trial detention was credited against his sentence. 33. On appeal, on 6 December 2000 the Budapest Regional Court held a hearing and reduced the applicant's sentence to seven years' imprisonment. The Regional Court was satisfied that the offence committed by the applicant did not qualify as a cumulative offence. By way of mitigating circumstances, the Regional Court took note of the applicant's family situation and the more favourable court practice at the time of the commission of the offence. Concerning the factors to be taken into account when sentencing the applicant and his co-defendants, the Regional Court concluded as follows: “When sentencing the defendants, the court took into consideration the behaviour displayed on committing the offence, the type and quantity of the drugs involved, the defendants' prius as well as the long time that has elapsed since the commission of the offence.” 34. The applicant served his prison sentence in Vác Prison. On 18 January 2003 he was conditionally released.

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8. The applicant is a Polish national, who was born in 1940 and lives in Marysin, Poland. 9. On 14 September 1992 the applicant's former wife (“the petitioner”) filed with the Warsaw District Court (Sąd Rejonowy) an application for the division of their matrimonial property. 10. On 9 October 1992 the trial court ordered an expert opinion. On 4 December 1992 the opinion was submitted to the court. 11. The first hearing scheduled for 4 February 1993 was adjourned because of the absence of the applicant. 12. On 12 February 1993 the court dismissed the applicant's request for exemption from the court fees. 13. On 18 March 1993 the applicant applied again for the exemption from the court-fees. 14. Subsequently, the trial court held hearings on 16 March and 22 April 1993. 15. On 15 May 1993 the applicant requested that the court include in the case file certain documents allegedly stolen by the petitioner. 16. On 27 July 1993 the Warsaw Regional Court dismissed the applicant's second application of 18 March 1993 for exemption from the court-fees. 17. On 17 August 1993 the applicant requested the Warsaw District Court to re-open the proceedings concerning the exemption from the court-fees. On 7 September 1993 the Warsaw Regional Court (Sąd Wojewódzki) rejected his request on procedural grounds. 18. On 8 February 1994 the court held a hearing and heard an expert. 19. At the hearing held on 15 March 1994 the applicant asked the court to punish a witness who, in his opinion, had given a false testimony. He submits that the application was not examined. On the same day the court ordered a supplementary expert opinion. The applicant objected to this decision. 20. On 18 July 1994 the expert opinion was submitted to the court. 21. On 10 December 1994 the applicant lodged an objection against the allegedly unlawful appointment of an expert. 22. On 21 December 1994 the court held a hearing. On 23 December 1994 the applicant requested the court to admonish the petitioner for insulting him. 23. On 3 January 1995 the court delivered a partial decision. The applicant lodged an appeal against that decision. Subsequently, he was ordered to pay a fee therefor. He requested an exemption, but his request was on 24 March 1995 dismissed as unsubstantiated. The applicant appealed but on 6 June 1995 the Warsaw Regional Court dismissed his appeal. Since he had failed to pay the fee, on 6 July 1995 the Warsaw District Court rejected the applicant's appeal against the decision of 3 January 1995. The applicant appealed. On 5 January 1996 the Warsaw Regional Court dismissed his appeal. 24. On 22 March and 10 May 1996 the District Court held hearings. 25. On 5 July 1996 the court adjourned a hearing because the counsel of the petitioner was ill. 26. On 8 July 1996 the applicant challenged the presiding judge. On 15 July 1996 his challenge was dismissed. The applicant lodged an appeal against this decision but on 7 November 1996 the Warsaw Regional Court dismissed it. 27. In the meantime, a hearing scheduled for 8 August 1996 was adjourned. 28. On 6 January 1997 the applicant requested the court to reopen the proceedings terminated by the partial decision of 3 January 1995. 29. On 21 May 1997 the court held a hearing. 30. On 18 November 1997 the court rejected the applicant's request to reopen the proceedings. The applicant lodged an appeal against that decision. On 19 January 1998 the court ordered the applicant to pay a court fee for lodging the appeal. The applicant lodged an appeal against this decision but on 22 April 1998 the Warsaw Regional Court dismissed it. Accordingly, on 27 July 1998 the Warsaw Regional Court rejected the applicant's appeal against the decision of 18 November 1997. 31. On 26 January, 10 March, 30 March, 29 April, 10 May, 8 June and 14 June 1999 the District Court held hearings. On 14 June 1999 the applicant requested that the hearings be recorded on an audiocassette. 32. At the hearing held on 23 August 1999 the court appointed four experts and ordered new expert opinions. The applicant lodged an appeal against this decision, but it was rejected on 15 November 1999. The applicant appealed against this decision. On 17 January 2000 the court rejected his appeal as he failed to pay a fee for lodging it. The applicant appealed. On 22 May 2000 the Warsaw District Court ordered the applicant to pay a court fee due for lodging another appeal. On 20 July 2000 the court rejected his appeal as he failed to pay the fee. 33. One of the applications lodged by the applicant in December 1999 the court considered as a separate action for compensation against the State Treasury. This set of civil proceedings is pending. 34. On 3 November 2000 the court ordered the applicant to determine the value of one of his appeals. It appears that the applicant complied with this order. Subsequently, he was ordered by the court to pay a fee for the appeal. On 3 December 2000 the applicant appealed against this order, but it was apparently dismissed. 35. On 9 March 2001 the first expert submitted his opinion to the court. 36. Subsequently, other experts submitted their opinions to the court. 37. On 7 December 2001 the applicant requested the court to prepare new expert opinions. 38. On 11 January 2002 the court held a hearing. 39. On 18 November 2002 the applicant's former wife, who had initiated the impugned proceedings, died. 40. In December 2002 the applicant applied to stay the proceedings since the petitioner had died. 41. At the hearing held on 19 February 2003 the Warsaw District Court allowed his application and stayed the proceedings. 42. Subsequently, the applicant applied to discontinue the proceedings and lodged an appeal against the decision to stay the proceedings. 43. On 7 April 2003 the Warsaw District Court rejected his appeal against the decision of 19 February 2003. 44. The proceedings remain stayed.

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4. The applicant was born in 1956 and lives in Kecskemét, Hungary. 5. The applicant was dismissed from his employment. On 28 August 1995 the applicant brought an action before the Budapest Labour Court claiming severance pay. On 15 November 1995 the Labour Court held a hearing. On that occasion the applicant modified his action and also requested that his dismissal be annulled. 6. On 6 February 1996 the Labour Court dismissed the applicant's request to be reinstated in his employment, holding that his claim in this connection had been submitted outside the statutory time-limit. 7. On 19 June 1996 the Budapest Regional Court, sitting as a second instance, dismissed the applicant's appeal against the partial decision of 6 February 1996. On 12 November 1996 the Supreme Court dismissed his petition for review. 8. As regards the remainder of the action, the Budapest Labour Court held further hearings on 27 May and 1 July 1998. On the latter date it awarded the applicant in the region of 130,000 Hungarian forints plus accrued interest by way of severance pay and outstanding wages. 9. On appeal, the Budapest Regional Court held hearings on 15 January, 14 April and 23 June 1999. 10. On 2 July 1999 the Regional Court increased the award in a partial judgment. On 2 September 1999 the applicant filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court. On 7 October 1999 the Supreme Court ordered that the petition be completed. On 25 February 2000 it appointed a legal-aid lawyer for the applicant. On 3 January 2001 the Supreme Court dismissed, in a partial decision, the applicant's petition for review. This decision was served on the applicant on 7 February 2001. 11. Meanwhile, on 22 September 1999 the Regional Court suspended the proceedings conducted in respect of some claims still outstanding, pending the review proceedings. 12. Subsequent to the decision of 3 January 2001, the Regional Court resumed the proceedings. A hearing scheduled for June 2001 was adjourned as the notification sent to the applicant had been returned to the court undelivered. The Regional Court's further enquiry about the applicant's address was unsuccessful. Consequently, on 12 September 2001 the court suspended the proceedings. On 12 March 2002 the proceedings were discontinued, pursuant to section 137 § 1 (c) of the Code of Civil Procedure, as a six months' period had elapsed from the date of the order suspending the case.

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4. The applicant was born in 1929 and lives in Rome. 5. He is the owner of a flat in Rome, which he had let to F.S.A. 6. In a writ served on the tenant on 9 October 1984, the applicant informed the tenant of his intention to terminate the lease and summoned him to appear before the Rome Magistrate. 7. By a decision of 23 October 1984, which was made enforceable on 8 November 1984, the Rome Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 23 October 1985. 8. On 12 February 1986, the applicant served notice on the tenant requiring him to vacate the premises. 9. On 3 April 1986 he informed the tenant that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 9 May 1986. 10. Between 9 May 1986 and 29 January 1999, the bailiff made forty-three attempts to recover possession. Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as the applicant was not entitled to police assistance in enforcing the order for possession. 11. On 28 October 1998, the applicant instituted proceedings against the tenant in the Rome magistrate's court. Pursuant to Article 1591 of the Italian Civil Code, he sought the reimbursement of the damages caused by the tenant in terms of loss of rent. 12. On 21 September 1999, the applicant recovered possession of the flat. 13. On 26 November 1999, the applicant discontinued the civil proceedings instituted against the tenant. According to the applicant, he had had no prospects of obtaining adequate compensation in the light of the provisions of Law no. 421 of 9 December 1998 which limited the compensation claimable by the owner to a sum equal to the rent paid by the tenant at the time of the expiration of the lease, proportionally increased according to the cost of living, plus 20%, along the period of inability to dispose of the possession of the flat.

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4. The applicant was born in 1930 and lives in Rome. 5. He is the owner of a flat in Rome, which he had let to R.F. 6. In a registered letter of 22 June 1987, the applicant informed the tenant that he intended to terminate the lease on expiry of the term on 31 December 1987 and asked him to vacate the premises by that date. 7. The tenant told the applicant that he would not leave the premises. 8. In a writ served on the tenant on 18 January 1989, the applicant reiterated his intention to terminate the lease and summoned the tenant to appear before the Rome Magistrate. 9. By a decision of 8 June 1989, which was made enforceable on the same day, the Rome Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 30 June 1990. 10. On 5 July 1990, the applicant served notice on the tenant requiring him to vacate the premises. 11. On 30 July 1990, he informed the tenant that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 3 October 1990. 12. Between 3 October 1990 and 1 April 2000, the bailiff made forty-three attempts to recover possession. Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as the applicant was not entitled to police assistance in enforcing the order for possession. 13. On 4 May 2000, the applicant recovered possession of the flat.

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4. The applicant was born in 1933 and lives in Terni. 5. He is the owner of a flat in Scala (Salerno), which he had let to G.C. and R.F. 6. In a writ served on the tenants on 17 January 1991, the applicant informed them that he intended to terminate the lease on expiry of the term on 31 December 1991 and asked them to vacate the premises by that date. 7. He summoned the tenants to appear before the Salerno Magistrate. 8. By a decision of 14 June 1991, which was made enforceable on the same day, the Salerno Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 30 April 1993. 9. On 2 August 1993, the applicant served notice on the tenants requiring them to vacate the premises. 10. On 7 October 1993, he informed the tenants that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 21 October 1993. 11. On 21 October 1993, the bailiff made one attempt to recover possession, which proved unsuccessful, as the applicant was not granted the assistance of the police in enforcing the order for possession. After that date and until the 29 February 2000, the bailiff did not make any attempt to recover possession because the applicant was never granted the assistance of the police in enforcing the order for possession. 12. On 29 February 2000, the applicant, reaching a friendly agreement with the tenants, recovered possession of the flat.

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4. The applicant is the owner of a flat in Rome, which it had let to S.S. 5. In a registered letter of 31 May 1983, the applicant informed the tenant that it intended to terminate the lease on expiry of the term on 31 December 1983 and asked him to vacate the premises by that date. 6. The tenant told the applicant that he would not leave the premises. 7. In a writ served on the tenant on 18 June 1986, the applicant reiterated its intention to terminate the lease and summoned the tenant to appear before the Rome Magistrate. 8. By a decision of 28 November 1986, which was made enforceable on the same day, the Rome Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 28 November 1987. 9. On 4 December 1987, the applicant served notice on the tenant requiring him to vacate the premises. 10. On 24 December 1987, it informed the tenant that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 5 February 1988. 11. Between 5 February 1988 and 15 December 2000, the bailiff made sixty-five attempts to recover possession. Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as the applicant was not entitled to police assistance in enforcing the order for possession. 12. On 16 January 2001, the applicant recovered possession of the flat.

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4. The applicant was born in 1907 and lives in Piacenza. 5. He is the owner of a flat in Milan, which he had let to A.B. 6. In a registered letter of 18 April 1985, the applicant informed the tenant that he intended to terminate the lease on expiry of the term on 15 April 1986 and asked him to vacate the premises by that date. 7. In a writ served on the tenant on 17 March 1986, the applicant reiterated his intention to terminate the lease and summoned the tenant to appear before the Milan Magistrate. 8. By a decision of 8 April 1986, which was made enforceable on 16 September 1986, the Milan Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 15 April 1987. 9. On 1 April 1987, the applicant served notice on the tenant requiring him to vacate the premises. 10. On 18 May 1987, he informed the tenant that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 29 May 1987. 11. Between 29 May 1987 and 16 November 2000, the bailiff made fifty-four attempts to recover possession. Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as the applicant was not entitled to police assistance in enforcing the order for possession. 12. On 28 March 2001, the applicant sold the flat to the tenant.

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7. The applicant lives in Großbottwar, Germany. 8. He owned four shares in a company, the MotoMeter AG. 99 % of this company's shares were held by the company Robert Bosch GmbH. 9. On 6 July 1992, following a majority decision of the shareholders' meeting, the MotoMeter AG sold all its company assets to a newly founded company, the MotoMeter GmbH, and was subsequently liquidated. The majority shareholder offered to buy the minority shareholders' shares at a price of 615 DEM (314.44 EUR) per share. 10. On 22 July 1992, the applicant and other private shareholders challenged the decision of 6 July 1992 before the Stuttgart Regional Court. They submitted that the main shareholder had circumvented rules aiming at the protection of minority shareholders inherent in the German Act on Stock Companies (Aktiengesetz). They further complained that the price per share offered by the main shareholder was too low and that minority shareholders had not been able to buy parts of the assets. 11. On 22 January 1993, the Regional Court rejected the claim on the grounds that the decision in question was lawful and that there had been no violation of the applicant's and other shareholders' rights. 12. On 21 December 1993, the Stuttgart Court of Appeal rejected the appeals lodged by the applicant and the other minority shareholders. 13. On 5 December 1994, the Federal Court of Justice refused to entertain their appeals on points of law. 14. On 12 January 1995, the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint with the Federal Constitutional Court. 15. On 23 August 2000 (served on 13 September 2000), the Federal Constitutional Court refused to entertain the applicant's complaint, finding that the complaint was not of fundamental constitutional significance. Referring to an earlier decision of the same day dealing with a similar subject matter, which it attached, the Federal Constitutional Court noted that entertaining the complaint was not necessary in order to enforce the applicant's rights. Finally, as the applicant had only possessed four shares of the MotoMeter AG, his financial loss had not posed an existential burden for him.

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9. The applicant is a Bulgarian national who was born in 1980. 10. She alleged that she had been raped by two men on 31 July and 1 August 1995, when she was 14 years and 10 months old. The ensuing investigation came to the conclusion that there was insufficient proof of the applicant having been compelled to have sex. 11. On 31 July 1995 the applicant and a friend of hers had been waiting to enter a disco bar in the town of K., when three men, P. (21 years old at the time), A. (20 years old at the time) and V.A. (age not specified), arrived in a car owned by P. The applicant knew P. and A. She had met P. in the same disco bar and had danced with him once. A. was the older brother of a classmate of hers. 12. A. invited the applicant to go with him and his friends to a disco bar in a small town 17 km away. According to the applicant, she agreed on condition that she would be back home before 11 p.m. 13. In the bar, one or two of the group had drinks. The applicant saw some friends, with whom she had a short chat. According to the applicant, she repeatedly told the others it was time to leave, as it was getting late. 14. At some time late in the evening, the group left and headed back to K. On the way, they were briefly stopped and checked by traffic police. 15. A. then suggested stopping for a swim at a nearby reservoir. According to the applicant, they went there despite her objections. She submitted that she had not suspected the men's intentions. 16. At the reservoir, the applicant remained in the car, in the front passenger seat, saying that she was not interested in swimming. The three men headed towards the water. Soon afterwards, P. came back and sat in the front seat next to the applicant. 17. In her statements to the investigating authorities, the applicant submitted that P. had then pressed his body against hers, proposed that they “become friends” and started kissing her. The applicant had refused his advances and had asked him to leave. P. had persisted in kissing her while she had tried to push him back. He had then moved the car seat back to a horizontal position, grabbed her hands and pressed them against her back. The applicant had been scared and at the same time embarrassed by the fact that she had put herself in such a situation. She had not had the strength to resist violently or scream. Her efforts to push P. back had been unsuccessful, as he had been far stronger. P. had undressed her partially and had forced her to have sexual intercourse with him. 18. In her testimony, the applicant stated: “It was my first time and it hurt a lot. I felt sick and I wanted to throw up. I started crying.” 19. According to P.'s statements, he had had sex with the applicant in the car with her full consent. He had started kissing her, she had responded, and he had tried unsuccessfully to unbutton her jeans or loosen her belt, whereupon she had done so herself and had taken off her pants. 20. After P. had finished, he left the car and walked towards A. and V.A. In his submissions to the police, A. said that P. had told them that he had “shagged” the applicant. Shortly afterwards, the three men returned to the car and the group drove off. 21. In her submissions to the investigator, the applicant stated that she had later come to suspect that the three men had planned to have sex with her and had invented the pretext of swimming to drive to a deserted area. In particular, she did not remember A. and V.A. being wet when they had come back to the car, although they had insisted on going to the reservoir for a swim. 22. The applicant later testified that after the first rape she had been very disturbed and had cried most of the time. According to the version of events given by P. and A. when later questioned, the applicant had been in an excellent mood, had started caressing A., which had irritated P., and had asked to go to a bar or a restaurant. The group had gone to a restaurant, where the applicant had briefly talked with a Ms T., the singer performing there. Ms T. had been sitting at a table there with one Mr M. 23. Ms T., the singer, stated that on 1 August 1995 she had been in the restaurant with Mr M. Shortly after midnight the applicant, whom she knew vaguely, had approached her and asked whether her group would be performing in the next few days. Ms T. recalled having seen at that moment a man waiting at the door. Having heard the answer to her question, the applicant had left. Ms T. stated that the applicant had appeared cheerful and that there had been nothing unusual in her behaviour. 24. Mr M. was also questioned by the police. He stated that he knew the applicant very well and that he did not remember having seen her that night. 25. The applicant disputed the statements of P., A., V.A. and Ms T., maintaining that there had been no visit to a restaurant and that she did not know Ms T. The applicant and her mother later accused Ms T. of perjury (see paragraphs 66-68 below). 26. Instead of returning to K., at around 3 a.m. the group went to a neighbouring town, where V.A.'s relatives had a house. A., V.A. and the applicant got out of the car. P., who was the owner of the car, drove off. 27. The three men and a baker, Mr S., called by them as a witness, later maintained that in the meantime there had been a short stop at Mr S.'s bakery. Mr S. allegedly had the key to the house. Mr S., when interrogated, stated that at about 2 a.m. he had given the key to V.A. and had seen the applicant waiting in the car, apparently in a good mood. Loud music had been coming from the car. The applicant disputed that there had been any visit to a baker's shop and accused the baker of perjury. P., A. and V.A. submitted in their statements that they had decided to go to the house as the applicant had told them that she had quarrelled with her mother and did not want to go back home. 28. The applicant stated to the police that she had felt helpless and in need of protection. As A. was the brother of a classmate of hers, she had expected such protection from him and had followed him and V.A. into a room on the ground floor of the house. 29. There was one bed in the room and the applicant sat on it. The two men smoked and talked for a while. V.A. then left the room. 30. The applicant maintained that at that point A. had sat next to her, pushed her down onto the bed, undressed her and forced her to have sex with him. The applicant had not had the strength to resist violently. She had only begged the man to stop. She later related in her statement: “I started crying and asked him to stop ... He started caressing my breasts and sucking my neck ... At some point he took my jeans and my pants off with his feet. Then he spread my legs apart with his legs and forced his way into me ... [After he finished] I started crying and I continued crying until some time in the morning, when I fell asleep ... [V.A.] woke me up telling me that [A.] had gone to find a car to drive me back to K. I sat on the bed and started crying.” 31. A.'s position before the police was that he had had sex with the applicant with her full consent. 32. On the following morning at around 7 a.m., the applicant's mother found her daughter in the house of V.A.'s relatives. The applicant's mother stated that, having learned from neighbours that her daughter had been seen the previous evening with A., she had been on her way to A.'s house when she had met V.A. in the street. V.A. had allegedly tried to mislead the applicant's mother in an effort to gain time and warn A. However, she had insisted. 33. The applicant and her mother maintained in their submissions during the investigation that the applicant had told her mother right away that she had been raped. A. had also been there. He had told the applicant's mother that “a truck driver” had had sex with her daughter the previous night. 34. According to A.'s version of events, the applicant and her mother had quarrelled, the applicant allegedly refusing to go with her and telling her to go away. A neighbour, apparently named as a witness by A. or V.A., stated that he had heard the quarrel and, in particular, the refusal of the applicant to leave with her mother and her saying that nothing had happened to her. The applicant accused the witness of perjury. 35. The applicant and her mother went directly to the local hospital, where they were directed to see a forensic medical examiner. The applicant was examined at about 4 p.m. 36. The medical examiner found that the hymen had been freshly torn. He also noted grazing on the applicant's neck, measuring 35 mm by 4 mm, and four small oval-shaped bruises. As noted in the medical certificate, the applicant had reported only one rape, stating that it had occurred between 10.30 and 11 p.m. the previous day at the reservoir. 37. The applicant submitted that during the next few days she had refused to talk to her mother about the incident. She had given no details and had not mentioned the second rape at all. She explained that she lived in a conservative small-town environment where virginity was considered to be an asset for marriage. She felt ashamed of the fact that she had “failed to protect her virginity” and of “what people would say about it”. 38. On the first evening after the events, on 1 August 1995, P. visited the applicant's family. The applicant and her mother stated that that evening P. had begged for forgiveness and had claimed that he would marry the applicant when she came of age. The applicant's mother had considered that accepting the offer would be reasonable in the circumstances. This had influenced the initial behaviour of the applicant, who had accepted her mother's idea of minimising the damage. 39. On one of the following evenings, the applicant went out with P. and some of his friends. 40. P. and V.A., the latter claiming that he had been with P. during the visit to the applicant's house on the evening of 1 August 1995, stated that the applicant's mother had told them that “all pleasure must be paid for” and had tried to extort money from them. 41. P.'s grandmother also made a statement to the police. She asserted that on an unspecified date the applicant's mother had visited her, trying to extort money. 42. With regard to that visit and other relevant events, Mrs D., a neighbour and friend of the applicant's mother, stated that the applicant's mother had been very upset about the events and had agreed to her daughter going out with P. as he had maintained that he loved the applicant. The applicant's mother had nevertheless decided to talk to P.'s parents. On an unspecified date Mrs D. and another neighbour had approached the house of P.'s family, but his grandmother had told them to go away, stating that the applicant had slept not only with P. but also with A. At that moment A. had arrived. Mrs D. had asked him whether it was true that he had slept with the applicant. He had confirmed that it was true, adding that he had the money and power to do as he pleased. Until then, the applicant's mother had not known about the second rape. 43. The applicant submitted that a visit by A.'s father on 8 August 1995 had caused her to break down. She had then confided to her mother about the second rape. On 10 August 1995 the applicant's father returned home, after being absent for several days. The family discussed the matter and decided to file a complaint. The applicant's mother did so on 11 August 1995. 44. On 11 August 1995 the applicant made a written statement about the events of 31 July and 1 August. On the same day P. and A. were arrested and made written statements. They claimed that the applicant had had sexual intercourse with them of her own free will. The two men were released. Written statements were also made by V.A. and a person who lived next to the house where the second alleged rape had taken place. On 25 August 1995 a police officer drew up a report and forwarded the file to the competent prosecutor. 45. On 14 November 1995 the district prosecutor opened a criminal investigation into the alleged rape and referred the case to an investigator. No charges were brought. 46. No action was taken on the case between November 1995 and November 1996. 47. On 24 August 1995 P. and A. filed complaints with the district prosecutor's office, stating that the applicant and her mother had been harassing them by making false public accusations. 48. On the basis of these complaints, on 28 August 1995, the district prosecutor ordered a police inquiry. In September and October 1995 several persons were heard and made written statements. 49. On 25 October 1995 a police officer drew up a report apparently accrediting the allegations of P. and A. and disbelieving the version of the facts as submitted by the applicant and her mother. 50. On 27 October 1995 the file was transmitted to the district prosecutor's office with jurisdiction to decide whether or not to institute criminal proceedings against the applicant and her mother. It appears that the matter was left hanging and no decision was taken. 51. Between 2 November and 9 December 1996 the investigator questioned the applicant, her mother and other witnesses. P. and A. were heard as witnesses. 52. The applicant gave a detailed account of the facts, repeating that P. had overcome her resistance by pressing her against the car seat and twisting her hands, and that thereafter she had been in a state of shock and unable to resist A. 53. In his evidence, P. claimed that the applicant had actively responded to his advances. He also asserted that the applicant had spoken with Mr M. at the restaurant they had allegedly gone to after having sex. 54. Both A. and P. stated, inter alia, that shortly after having sex with P. at the reservoir, the applicant had started caressing A. in the car. 55. On 18 December 1996 the investigator completed his work on the case. He drew up a report stating that there was no evidence that P. and A. had used threats or violence, and proposed that the prosecutor close the case. 56. On 7 January 1997 the district prosecutor ordered an additional investigation. The order stated that the initial investigation had not been objective, thorough or complete. 57. On 16 January 1997 the investigator to whom the case had been referred appointed a psychiatrist and a psychologist to answer several questions. The experts were asked, inter alia, whether it was likely that the applicant would have spoken calmly with Ms T., the singer at the restaurant, and then listened to music in the car, if she had just been raped and whether it was likely that several days after the alleged rape the applicant would have gone out with the person who had raped her. 58. The experts considered that, owing to her naivety and inexperience, the applicant had apparently not considered the possibility that she might be sexually assaulted. There was no indication that she had been threatened or hurt, or that she had been in a state of shock during the events, as she had demonstrated a clear recollection of them. The experts considered that during the events she must have been suddenly overwhelmed by an internal conflict between a natural sexual interest and a sense that the act was reprehensible, which had “reduced her ability to resist and defend herself”. They further found that the applicant was psychologically sound and that she had understood the meaning of the events. In view of her age at the time, however, she “could not assert a stable set of convictions”. 59. The experts also found that, if there had indeed been a meeting between Ms T. and the applicant after the events at the reservoir – and this was disputed – it was still possible that the applicant could have had a short exchange with Ms T. after being raped. As to the applicant going out with P. several days after the events, this could be easily explained by her family's desire to lend a socially acceptable meaning to the incident. 60. On 28 February 1997 the investigator concluded his work on the case and drew up a report, again proposing that the case should be closed. He considered that the experts' opinion did not affect his earlier finding that there was no evidence demonstrating the use of force or threats. 61. On 17 March 1997 the district prosecutor ordered the closure of the criminal investigation. He found, inter alia, that the use of force or threats had not been established beyond reasonable doubt. In particular, no resistance on the applicant's part or attempts to seek help from others had been established. 62. The applicant lodged consecutive appeals with the regional prosecutor's office and the Chief Public Prosecutor's Office. The appeals were dismissed in decisions of 13 May and 24 June 1997 respectively. 63. The prosecutors relied, inter alia, on the statements of the alleged perpetrators and V.A. that the applicant had not shown any signs of distress after having sex with P. at the reservoir, and the evidence of the three men and Ms T. that the latter had met the applicant and had spoken with her that night. As regards the applicant's objections that those statements should be rejected as being untrue, the decision of 13 May 1997 stated that “prosecutors' decisions cannot be based on suppositions, and witnesses' statements cannot be rejected only on the basis of doubts, without other evidence ...”. 64. The decision of 13 May 1997 also stated: “It is true that, as can be seen from the report of the forensic psychiatric experts, the young age of the applicant and her lack of experience in life meant that she was unable to assert a stable set of convictions, namely to demonstrate firmly her unwillingness to engage in sexual contact. There can be no criminal act under Article 152 §§ 1 (2) and 3 of the Criminal Code, however, unless the applicant was coerced into having sexual intercourse by means of physical force or threats. This presupposes resistance, but there is no evidence of resistance in this particular case. P. and A. could be held criminally responsible only if they understood that they were having sexual intercourse without the applicant's consent and if they used force or made threats precisely with the aim of having sexual intercourse against the applicant's will. There is insufficient evidence to establish that the applicant demonstrated unwillingness to have sexual intercourse and that P. and A. used threats or force.” It was further noted that the applicant had explained that the bruises on her neck had been caused by sucking. 65. The decision of 24 June 1997 reiterated those findings, while noting that the statements of Ms T., the singer at the restaurant, were not decisive. It also stated: “What is decisive in the present case is that it has not been established beyond reasonable doubt that physical or psychological force was used against the applicant and that sexual intercourse took place against her will and despite her resistance. There are no traces of physical force such as bruises, torn clothing, etc. ... It is true that it is unusual for a girl who is under age and a virgin to have sexual intercourse twice within a short space of time with two different people, but this fact alone is not sufficient to establish that a criminal act took place, in the absence of other evidence and in view of the impossibility of collecting further evidence.” 66. In June or July 1997 the applicant and her mother requested the institution of criminal proceedings against Ms T. and other witnesses, including V.A., alleging that they had committed perjury in that their statements in connection with the investigation into the rape of the applicant had been false. 67. On 14 July 1997 the same prosecutor from the district prosecutor's office who had ordered the closure of the rape investigation refused the request, stating that it was unfounded and even abusive, as all the facts had been clarified in previous proceedings. 68. An ensuing appeal by the applicant was dismissed on 6 February 1998 by the regional prosecutor's office. 69. In June 2001 the applicant submitted a written opinion by two Bulgarian experts, Dr Svetlozar Vasilev, a psychiatrist, and Mr Valeri Ivanov, a psychologist, who had been asked by the applicant's lawyer to comment on the case. 70. The experts stated, with reference to scientific publications in several countries, that two patterns of response by rape victims to their attacker were known: violent physical resistance and “frozen fright” (also known as “traumatic psychological infantilism syndrome”). The latter was explained by the fact that any experience-based model of behaviour was inadequate when the victim was faced with the inevitability of rape. As a result the victim, terrorised, often adopted a passive-response model of submission, characteristic of childhood, or sought a psychological dissociation from the event, as if it were not happening to her. 71. The experts stated that all the scientific publications they had studied indicated that the “frozen-fright pattern” prevailed. Further, they had conducted their own research for the purposes of their written opinion in the present case. They had analysed all the cases of young women aged 14 to 20 who had contacted two specialised treatment programmes for victims of violence in Bulgaria during the period from 1996 to 2001, declaring that they had been raped. Cases that were too different from that of the applicant had been excluded. As a result, twenty-five cases had been identified, in twenty-four of which the victim had not resisted violently, but had reacted with passive submission.

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9. The applicant was born in 1941. He is a retired labourer. 10. On 12 June 1995 the applicant took part in his capacity as the leader of Tarikat Aczmendi (a community describing itself as an Islamic sect) in a television programme, Ceviz Kabuğu (“Nutshell”), broadcast live on HBB, an independent channel. 11. It appears from the evidence before the Court that the programme started late in the evening of 12 June and lasted about four hours. Relevant excerpts from the programme are set out below. Hulki Cevizoğlu (presenter – “H.C.”): “Good evening ... There is a group that is grabbing public attention because of the black robes [cüppe] worn by its members, the sticks they carry and their habit of chanting [zikir]. How can this group be described – it is called a sect [tarikat], but is it really a community or group? We will be discussing the various characteristics of this group – the Aczmendis – with their leader, Mr Müslüm Gündüz, who will be talking to us live. We will also be phoning a number of guests to hear their views. On the subject of the black robes, we'll be talking on the phone to Ms N. Yargıcı, a stylist and expert on black clothing. We'll also be hearing the views of Mr T. Ateş and Mr B. Baykam on Kemalism[1]. As regards Nurculuk[2], we'll be calling one of its most important leaders. The Aczmendi group – or sect – has views on religious matters as well. We'll be discussing those with Mr Y. İşcan, of the Religious Affairs Department. And while we are on the subject, viewers may phone in with questions for the Aczmendis' leader, Mr Gündüz ...” Ms Yargıcı, a stylist taking part in the programme via a telephone link, asked Mr Gündüz a number of questions about women's clothing. They discussed religious apparel and whether the clothing worn by the sect's members was in keeping with fashion or with Islam. The presenter then discussed movements claiming to represent Islam and asked the applicant a number of questions on the subject. They also talked about methods of chanting. In this context Mr Gündüz stated: Mr Gündüz (“M.G.”): “Kemalism was born recently. It is a religion – that is, it is the name of a religion that has destroyed Islam and taken its place. Kemalism is a religion and secularism has no religion. Being a democrat also means having no religion ...” H.C.: “You have already expressed those views on a programme on the Star channel ... We are now going to have Bedri Baykam on the line to see what he thinks about your comments. We are going to ask him, as a proponent of Kemalism, if it can be regarded as a religion.” H.C.: “Do you agree with Mr Gündüz's views on Kemalism? You are one of Turkey's foremost Kemalists.” Bedri Baykam (“B.B.”): “I don't know where to begin after so many incorrect statements. For one thing, Kemalism is not a religion and secularism has nothing to do with having no religion. It is completely wrong to maintain that democracy has no religion.” Mr Baykam challenged Mr Gündüz's arguments and explained the concepts of democracy and secularism. He stated: B.B.: “A sect such as the one you belong to may observe a religion. But concepts such as democracy, philosophy and free thought do not observe a religion, because they are not creatures who can establish a moral relationship with God. In a democracy all people are free to choose their religion and may choose either to adhere to a religion or to call themselves atheists. Those who wish to manifest their religion in accordance with their belief may do so. Moreover, [democracy] encompasses pluralism, liberty, democratic thought and diversity. This means that the people's desire will be fulfilled, because the people may elect party A today and party B tomorrow and then ask for a coalition to be formed the day after tomorrow. All that is dictated by the people. That is why, in a democracy, everything is free, and secularism and democracy are two related concepts. Secularism in no way means having no religion.” B.B.: “Secularism is freedom of the people and the principle that religious affairs may not interfere with affairs of State.” ... M.G.: “My brother, I say that secularism means having no religion. A democrat is a man with no religion. A Kemalist adheres to the Kemalist religion ...” B.B.: “[Our ancestors were not without a religion.] True, our ancestors did not allow the establishment of a system based on sharia ... inspired by the Middle Ages, an undemocratic, totalitarian and despotic system that will not hesitate to cause bloodshed where necessary. And you call that 'having no religion' – that's your problem. But in a law-based, democratic, Kemalist and secular State all people are free to manifest their religion. Behind closed doors, they may practise their religion through chanting, worship or prayer; they may read what they like, the Koran, the Bible or philosophy – that is their choice. So I'm sorry, but your views are demagoguery. Kemalism has no connection with religion. It respects religion; all people are entitled to believe in a religion of their choice.” M.G.: “Yes. But what I am saying is that a person who has no connection with religion has no religion. Isn't that so? ... I'm not insulting anyone. I am just saying that anyone calling himself a democrat, secularist or Kemalist has no religion ... Democracy in Turkey is despotic, merciless and impious [dinsiz] ... Because two days ago, six or seven of our friends were taken away while on the sect's premises [dergah] ...” ... M.G.: “This secular democratic system is hypocritical [ikiyüzlü ve münafık] ...; it treats some people in one way and others in another way. In other words, we do not share democratic values. I swear that we are not appropriating democracy for ourselves. I am not taking refuge in its shadow. Don't be a hypocrite.” M.G.: “No, not at all. It is not thanks to democracy. We will secure our rights no matter what. What is democracy? It has nothing to do with that.” M.G.: “Why would I not have said it? I am saying these words while fully aware that they constitute a crime under the laws of tyranny. Why would I stop speaking? Is there any other way than death?” The participants then entered into a debate on Islam and democracy. M.G.: “According to Islam, no distinction can be made between the administration of a State and an individual's beliefs. For example, the running of a province by a governor in accordance with the rules of the Koran is equivalent to a prayer. In other words, manifesting your religion does not only mean joining in prayer or observing Ramadan ... Any assistance from one Muslim to another also amounts to a prayer. OK, we can separate the State and religion, but if [a] person has his wedding night after being married by a council official authorised by the Republic of Turkey, the child born of the union will be a piç [bastard].” B.B.: “... In Turkey people are killed for not observing Ramadan. People are beaten at university. [Mr Gündüz] claims he is innocent, but people like that oppress society because they interfere with the way of life of others. In Turkey people who say they support sharia misuse it for demagogic purposes. As Mr Gündüz said, they want to destroy democracy and set up a regime based on sharia.” 12. The programme continued, the participants including Mr T. Ateş, a professor, Mr Y. İşcan, a representative of the Religious Affairs Department, and Mr Mehmet Kırkıncı, a prominent figure from Erzurum. 13. In an indictment preferred on 5 October 1995, the public prosecutor at the Istanbul National Security Court instituted criminal proceedings against the applicant on the ground that he had breached Article 312 §§ 2 and 3 of the Criminal Code by making statements during the television programme that incited the people to hatred and hostility on the basis of a distinction founded on religion. 14. On 1 April 1996 the National Security Court, after ordering an expert opinion, found the applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to two years' imprisonment and a fine of 600,000 Turkish liras, pursuant to Article 312 §§ 2 and 3 of the Criminal Code. 15. The court held, in particular: “The defendant, Müslüm Gündüz, took part in his capacity as the leader of the Aczmendis in a television programme, Ceviz Kabuğu, broadcast live on the independent channel HBB. The purpose of the programme was to give a presentation of the community, whose followers had attracted public attention on account of the black robes they wore, the sticks they carried and their manner of chanting. Those taking part included the stylist Neslihan Yargıcı (via a telephone link), the artist Bedri Baykam, the scientist Toktamış Ateş, Mr Yaşar İşcan, an official from the Religious Affairs Department, and a certain Mehmet Kırkıncı, a prominent figure from Erzurum. The programme's introduction, which was chiefly intended to familiarise viewers with the Aczmendi community, focused on the origin of its members' special garments and on their habit of chanting. However, as the programme went on, the debate between Mr Baykam, Mr Ateş and the defendant turned to the concepts of secularism, democracy and Kemalism. During the debate, in which the participants had the opportunity to discuss the malfunctioning, usefulness and problems of institutions such as secularism and democracy in the context of social harmony, human rights and freedom of expression, the defendant Mr Gündüz made comments and used expressions contrary to that aim in stating (on page 21 of the transcript): 'anyone calling himself a democrat, secularist ... has no religion ... Democracy in Turkey is despotic, merciless and impious [dinsiz] ... This secular ... system is hypocritical [ikiyüzlü ve münafık] ...; it treats some people in one way and others in another way ... I am saying these words while fully aware that they constitute a crime under the laws of tyranny ... Why would I stop speaking? Is there any other way than death? ...' On page 27 [he states]: 'if [a] person has his wedding night after being married by a council official authorised by the Republic of Turkey, the child born of the union will be a piç ...' [In addition,] Mr Bedri Baykam told Mr Gündüz that the aim of the latter's supporters was to 'destroy democracy and set up a regime based on sharia', and the defendant replied: 'Of course, that will happen, that will happen.' [Furthermore,] the defendant acknowledged before this Court that he had made those comments, and stated that the regime based on sharia would be established not by duress, force or weapons but by convincing and persuading the people. Lastly, having regard to the fact that, in the passages quoted above and in his statements taken as a whole, the defendant, in the name of Islam, describes concepts such as democracy, secularism and Kemalism as impious [dinsiz], mixes religious and social affairs, and also uses the word 'impious' to describe democracy, the system regarded as the most suited to human nature, adopted by almost all States and supported by the overwhelming majority of the people making up our nation, the Court is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant intended openly to incite the people to hatred and hostility on the basis of a distinction founded on religion. Furthermore, seeing that the offence in question was committed by means of mass communication, the defendant should be sentenced in accordance with Article 312 § 2 of the Criminal Code ...” 16. On 15 May 1996 the applicant appealed on points of law to the Court of Cassation. In his notice of appeal, referring to Article 9 of the Convention and Articles 24 (freedom of religion) and 25 (freedom of expression) of the Constitution, he relied on the protection of his right to freedom of religion and freedom of expression. 17. On 25 September 1996 the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment at first instance.

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4. The applicant was born in 1926 and lives in Rome. 5. He is the owner of a flat in Rome, which he had let to A.M.A. 6. In a registered letter of 7 June 1983, the applicant informed the tenant that he intended to terminate the lease on expiry of the term on 31 December 1983 and asked her to vacate the premises by that date. 7. In a writ served on the tenant on 7 December 1983, the applicant reiterated his intention to terminate the lease and summoned the tenant to appear before the Rome Magistrate. 8. By a decision of 10 March 1984, which was made enforceable on 11 April 1984, the Rome Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 30 June 1984. 9. On 9 January 1986, the applicant served notice on the tenant requiring her to vacate the premises. 10. On 30 January 1986, he informed the tenant that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 20 February 1986. 11. Between 20 February 1986 and 23 January 1996, the bailiff made forty attempts to recover possession. Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as the applicant was not entitled to police assistance in enforcing the order for possession. 12. On 6 July 1999, the applicant served a second notice on the tenant requiring her to vacate the premises. 13. On 19 July 1999, he served notice on the tenant informing her that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 4 August 1999. 14. Between 4 August 1999 and 25 November 1999, the bailiff made five attempts to recover possession. Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as the applicant was not entitled to police assistance in enforcing the order for possession. 15. On 7 December 1999, the applicant recovered possession of the flat.

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4. The applicant was born in 1942 and lives in Naples. 5. He is the owner of a flat in Naples, which she had let to G.M. 6. In a registered letter of 8 April 1987, the applicant informed the tenant that she intended to terminate the lease on expiry of the term on 31 December 1987 and asked him to vacate the premises by that date. 7. In a writ served on the tenant on 23 March 1988, the applicant reiterated her intention to terminate the lease and summoned the tenant to appear before the Naples Magistrate. 8. By a decision of 17 June 1988, which was made enforceable on 5 July 1988, the Naples Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 4 May 1992. 9. On 16 December 1992, the applicant served notice on the tenant requiring him to vacate the premises. 10. On 13 January 1993, she informed the tenant that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 21 January 1993. 11. Between 21 January 1993 and 4 February 2000, the bailiff made fifteen attempts to recover possession. Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as the applicant was not entitled to police assistance in enforcing the order for possession. 12. On 30 November 2000, the applicant recovered possession of the flat.

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6. The applicants were born in 1936 and 1958 respectively and live in Brwinow, Poland. 7. On 11 May 1989 the applicants filed with the Pruszków District Court (Sąd Rejonowy) an action in which they claimed the payment by an enterprise Z.R.B. run by a local State authority of the agreed price for their transportation services. 8. On 5 November 1990 the court awarded them the amount claimed. The defendant's representative lodged an appeal. 9. On 27 March 1991 the Warsaw Regional Court (Sąd Wojewódzki) quashed the District Court's judgment and remitted the case for re-examination. 10. On 5 June 1991 the District Court summoned the Brwinów commune's board (zarząd miasta i gminy), the self-governmental successor of the local State authority that had run enterprise Z.R.B., to take part in the proceedings as the defendant. 11. On 2 August 1999 the court gave judgment. It awarded the applicants the amount claimed by them. They appealed. 12. On 7 April 2000 the Warsaw Regional Court dismissed their appeal.

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7. The applicant was born in 1943 and lives in Ostrów Wielkopolski, Poland. 8. On 21 August 1992 the applicant applied to the Poznań District Court (Sąd Rejonowy) for a payment order (nakaz zapłaty) against a certain Z.G. and his wife T.G. 9. On 3 November 1992 the Poznań District Court allowed the application and issued a payment order. Subsequently, the applicant obtained from the District Court a writ of execution (klauzulę wykonalności) necessary to start the enforcement of the payment order. 10. On 6 September 1993 the applicant requested the Bailiff of the Poznań District Court (Komornik Rewiru V Sądu Rejonowego w Poznaniu) to enforce the payment order. 11. Between 18 April and 13 June 1994 the enforcement proceedings were stayed by the Poznań Regional Court (Sąd Wojewódzki) at the request of Z.G. 12. On 23 September 1994 the bailiff announced an auction sale of a property owned by Z.G. 13. On 18 October 1994 the Poznań Regional Court again allowed a request submitted by Z.G. and stayed the enforcement proceedings. The applicant's appeal against that decision was dismissed by the Poznań Court of Appeal (Sąd Apelacyjny). 14. On an unspecified date in 1998 the enforcement proceedings were resumed. On 24 August 1998 the bailiff requested the applicant to pay a PLN 8,730 fee and PLN 1,000 for the valuation of a property belonging to Z.G. 15. On 1 September 1999 the bailiff stayed the enforcement proceedings because the applicant had not complied with the request of 24 August 1998. 16. On 14 December 1999, upon the applicant's appeal, the Poznań District Court upheld the impugned decision. 17. On 28 September 2001 the bailiff discontinued the enforcement proceedings. 18. On 13 January 1994 Z.G. filed with the Poznań Regional Court an application for annulment of the writ of execution obtained by the applicant in respect of the payment order issued on 3 November 1992 (see above). 19. On 18 April and 18 October 1994 the court applied interim measures and stayed enforcement proceedings against Z.G. based on the disputed writ of execution. 20. Subsequently, the court held hearings on 22 December 1994 and 25 January and 11 May 1995. 21. Between December 1995 and 10 March 1997 the court held seven hearings. 22. On 18 March 1997 the Poznań Regional Court gave judgment in which it annulled the writ of execution. The applicant appealed against it. 23. Two hearings scheduled in 1997 were adjourned. Subsequently, the court held hearings on 15 January and 11 March 1998. 24. On 8 April 1998 the court quashed the judgment of the first‑instance court and dismissed the application for annulment of the writ of execution. The plaintiffs lodged with the Supreme Court (Sąd Najwyższy) a cassation appeal against that judgment. 25. On 5 January 2001 the Supreme Court quashed the contested judgment and remitted the case for re‑examination. 26. On 8 May 2001 the Poznań Court of Appeal gave judgment. 27. It appears that the applicant did not lodge a cassation appeal against the judgment and it became final. 28. On 4 December 1993 the applicant filed with the Ostrów Wielkopolski District Court an action in which he claimed from a certain bank damages for negligence in arranging a loan facility. The case was transmitted to the Kalisz Regional Court where it was registered under no. I C 480/93. 29. On 11 February 1994 the Kalisz Regional Court requested the applicant to specify his claim. On 11 February 1994 the applicant complied with this order. 30. On 13 May 1994, upon the applicant's request, the court exempted him from the court fees. 31. On 13 September 1994 the applicant filed with the Ostrów Wielkopolski District Court a request to issue an interim measure annulling the writ of execution obtained by the bank against him. On 16 February 1995 the court dismissed the applicant's request. The case was transmitted to the Kalisz Regional Court where it was registered under no. I C 428/94. Subsequently, the Kalisz Regional Court stayed the proceedings. 32. On 19 January 1995 the applicant filed with the Kalisz Regional Court an application to annul the writ of execution obtained by the bank. 33. On 10 March 1995 the court issued an interim measure by annulling the writ of execution. The bank appealed. 34. On 29 May 1995 the Łódź Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. 35. On 7 June 1995 the Kalisz Regional Court held a hearing in the case no. I C 480/93. On the same day the court stayed the proceedings in this case. 36. On 17 September 1996 the Kalisz Regional Court resumed both sets of proceedings in the case. Subsequently, both cases were joined. 37. On 16 December 1996 the court stayed the proceedings. The applicant appealed. 38. On 7 December 1997 the Łódź Court of Appeal quashed the decision of 16 December 1996. 39. On 9 December 1997 the Kalisz Regional Court held hearing. On 19 December 1997 it gave judgment in which it rejected the applicant's claims. The applicant appealed against this decision. 40. On 16 March 1998 the Łódź Court of Appeal dismissed his appeal. 41. On 9 November 1995 the applicant lodged with the Ostrów Wielkopolski District Court an action in which he claimed from a certain R.P. and the Ostrów Wielkopolski Tax Office damages in the total amount of PLN 10,000. 42. On 9 February 1996 the court partially exempted the applicant from the court fees. 43. On 19 June 1996 and 10 April 1997 the Ostrów Wielkopolski District Court held hearings. 44. On 16 September 1997, upon the joint request of the parties, the court stayed the proceedings. 45. On 20 January 1999 the trial court held a hearing. 46. On 3 September 1999 the applicant challenged a judge. On 1 March 2000 the Ostrów Wielkopolski District Court dismissed it. 47. On 3 April 2000 the Ostrów Wielkopolski District Court resumed the proceedings. 48. On 21 July, 29 September and 18 October 2000 the trial court held hearings. 49. On 2 March 2001 the applicant extended his claim by requesting damages from five other persons. On 11 April 2001 the trial court rejected his extended claim as the applicant had not complied with the formal requirements for lodging such a claim. 50. It appears that the proceedings are pending.

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7. The applicant was born in 1948 and lives in Leverkusen (Germany). 8. He is the owner of a flat in Turin, which he had let to V.P. 9. On 2 December 1992, the applicant served a writ on the tenant that he intended to terminate the lease on expiry of the term on 31 July 1993 and asked him to vacate the premises by that date and summoned the tenant to appear before the Turin Magistrate. 10. By a decision of 16 December 1992, the Turin Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 31 July 1994. 11. On 7 July 1994, the applicant served notice on the tenant requiring him to vacate the premises. 12. On 17 December 1994 he informed the tenant that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 10 January 1995. 13. Between 10 January 1995 and 13 November 1998, the bailiff made eight attempts to recover possession. 14. On 12 May 1998, the applicant made a statutory declaration that he urgently required the premises as accommodation for his son. 15. On 20 July 1999, the tenant requested the Turin Magistrate (according to art. 6 L.431/98) to set a fresh date for the enforcement of the order. 16. On 13 January 2000, the Turin Magistrate decided to defer the date of eviction until the 14 February 2000. 17. On 14 February 2000, the applicant recovered possession of the flat.

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4. The applicant was born in 1976 and lives in Naples. 5. He is the owner of a flat in Naples, which he had let to G.S. 6. In a registered letter of 25 September 1989, the applicant informed the tenant that he intended to terminate the lease on expiry of the term on 30 June 1991 and asked him to vacate the premises by that date. 7. The tenant told the applicant that he would not leave the premises. 8. In a writ served on the tenant on 15 July 1991, the applicant reiterated his intention to terminate the lease and summoned the tenant to appear before the Naples Magistrate. 9. By a decision of 4 October 1991, which was made enforceable on the same day, the Naples Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 4 October 1992. 10. On 16 January 1993, the applicant served notice on the tenant requiring him to vacate the premises. 11. On 22 February 1993, he informed the tenant that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 2 March 1993. 12. Between 2 March 1993 and 29 June 2000, the bailiff made sixteen attempts to recover possession. Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as the applicant was not entitled to police assistance in enforcing the order for possession. 13. On 7 July 2000, the applicant recovered possession of the flat.

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9. The applicant was born in 1947 and lives in Milan. 10. He is the owner of a flat in Milan, which he had let to M.M.L. 11. In a writ served on the tenant on 25 October 1990, the applicant informed her that he intended to terminate the lease on expiry of the term on 30 June 1991 and summoned the tenant to appear before the Milan Magistrate. 12. By a decision of 12 November 1990, which was made enforceable on 7 January 1991, the Milan Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 1 July 1992. 13. On 22 July 1992, the applicant served notice on the tenant requiring her to vacate the premises. 14. On 17 September 1992, he informed the tenant that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 16 October 1992. 15. Between 16 October 1992 and 19 October 1993, the bailiff made 5 attempts to recover possession. 16. On 26 November 1993, the applicant made a statutory declaration that he urgently required the premises as accommodation for himself. 17. Between 11 January 1994 and 14 April 1997, the bailiff made 15 attempts to recover possession. Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as the applicant was never granted the assistance of the police in enforcing the order for possession. 18. On 26 June 1997, the tenant vacated the premises.

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4. The applicant was born in 1951 and lives in Vienna. She is the mother of M, L and R, born in wedlock in 1973, 1974 and 1976, respectively. The spouses separated in 1982. Custody of L and M was assigned to the applicant, the custody of R to the father. 5. In December 1989 M was admitted in a public girls' home as she refused to stay with her mother. She stayed there until January 1992. From December 1989 until September 1995 custody proceedings concerning the temporary transfer of M's custody to the Vienna Youth Welfare Office for the time M had spent at the girls' home were pending before the Austrian courts. 6. On 3 January 1990 the Vienna Youth Welfare Office, on behalf of M, filed a request with the Floridsdorf District Court that the applicant should pay a monthly contribution to the expenses incurred for M's stay in the girls' home. 7. The file was later on transferred to the competent Juvenile Court and, in January 1990, the court heard M's parents. 8. On 8 March 1991 the Youth Welfare Office reduced the amount of the requested monthly contribution. 9. On 10 April 1991 the President of the Juvenile Court granted the applicant's motion for bias against the competent court clerk (Rechtspfleger). 10. A hearing scheduled for 25 July 1991 was cancelled due to the applicant's illness. Further hearings scheduled for 2 September 1991 and 11 September 1991 had to be cancelled because the court's attempts to deliver the summons to the applicant were unsuccessful. 11. On 10 February 1992 the Juvenile Court ordered that the applicant had to pay ATS 2,500 in monthly maintenance for M. The applicant appealed, claiming that she was fit to work to an extent of 75% only. 12. On 4 March 1992 the case was assigned to another judge as the competent judge had declared himself biased. 13. On 13 May 1992 the Appeal Chamber quashed the decision and remitted the case back to the Juvenile Court, instructing the latter to take a new decision after having supplemented its proceedings. In particular, it stated that the first instance court ought to appoint a forensic medical expert in order to establish the applicant's fitness to work. 14. On 20 May 1998 the Juvenile Court ordered the applicant to pay ATS 1,550 in monthly maintenance for M. At that stage of the proceedings, no expert had been heard yet. 15. Referring to the Appeal Chamber's decision of 13 May 1992, the applicant appealed, again relying on her reduced fitness to work. 16. On 13 August 1998 the Juvenile Court appointed an expert in forensic medicine to file a report on the question as to which extent the applicant's capacities to earn her living were reduced. 17. The applicant appealed against this decision, claiming that it no longer made sense to appoint a medical expert, now that the court had already dismissed her request by a decision of 20 May 1998. Further, she claimed that there was no need for a further report as, in this respect, she had already submitted two reports of different medical officers (Amtsarzt). 18. On 17 and 20 August 1998 the applicant filed motions for bias against the court clerk (Rechtspfleger) I.S., who was dealing with her case, claiming that the appointment of a further medical expert was not justified, that I.S. was handling the case file in a negligent manner, namely that several documents were missing from the file, and that I.S. had been rude to her on the telephone. 19. On 25 August 1998 the President of the Vienna Juvenile Court (Präsident des Jugendgerichtshofs) dismissed her motion for bias, finding that the mere fact that she had appointed a medical expert was not sufficient to cast doubt upon I.S.' impartiality. He also noted that there were no documents missing from the file. 20. On 17 September 1998 the Appeal Chamber dismissed the applicant's appeal against the appointment of a medical expert, but granted her appeal against the decision of 20 May 1998. In this respect, it referred the case to the Juvenile Court for supplementing the taking of evidence, namely to comply with its decision of 13 May 1992. 21. On 21 and 23 March 1999 the applicant requested that, pursuant to Section 91 of the Courts Act (Gerichtsorganisationsgesetz), a time-limit be fixed for the decision on the Youth Welfare Office's application of 3 January 1990. 22. On 23 March 1999 the applicant filed a motion for bias against I.S., claiming that the latter had not been available to her during office hours and that she had refused to give her information requested over the telephone. 23. On 29 March 1999 the President of the Vienna Juvenile Court dismissed her motion as being unfounded. 24. On 30 March 1999 the President rejected her appeal against this decision, as the relevant provisions of the Court Clerks Act (Rechtspflegergesetz) did not provide for such remedy. 25. On 8 April 1999 the applicant was summoned by the appointed medical expert to undergo a medical examination at the Institute for Forensic Medicine (Institut für Gerichtsmedizin) on 22 April 1999. 26. It appears that the applicant filed numerous complaints with the President of the Juvenile Court, again claiming that documents were missing from the file and that I.S. as well as various judges of the Juvenile Court were biased. 27. On 4 May 1999 the President of the Juvenile Court decided to exclude I.S. from the proceedings. He noted that the latter had expressed that she considered herself biased following a telephone conversation in the course of which the applicant had said she would kill her daughter if I.S. continued to harass her. In these circumstances, the President found it advisable that the matter be re-assigned in accordance with the Juvenile Court's rules on the distribution of cases (Geschäftsverteilung). 28. On the same day, the Juvenile Court dismissed the applicant's requests for a time-limit to be set. Referring to the applicant's numerous requests, complaints and motions for bias filed with the court, it found that there was no indication of a lack of due diligence on behalf of the Juvenile Court, it being rather the applicant who prevented that a decision on the merits had been taken so far. 29. On 17 May 1999 the Vienna Youth Welfare Office withdrew its request dated of 3 January 1990. 30. Thereupon, the applicant, on 27 May 1999, withdrew all requests and complaints still pending before the Juvenile Court at that stage. 31. From 30 July 1990 to 3 September 1990 M stayed with her mother. The latter, on 4 September 1990 filed a request with the Juvenile Court, claiming reimbursement of her expenses incurred during this period. 32. In September 1990 the Vienna Youth Welfare Office reimbursed the applicant for M's stay with her from 30 July 1990 to 21 August 1990. 33. On 10 August 1993 the Juvenile Court dismissed the applicant's request for expenses incurred during the rest of the period. 34. On 30 August 1993 the President of the Vienna Juvenile Court dismissed the applicant's motion of bias against the competent judge. On 30 December 1993 the Vienna Court of Appeal granted the applicant's appeal against this decision and quashed the decision. 35. On 20 January 1994 the Appeal Chamber of the Juvenile Court again dismissed the applicant's motion for bias. On 6 May 1994 the Court of Appeal rejected the applicant's appeal. A further appeal to the Supreme Court was to no avail. A further motion for bias against the President of the Juvenile Court was to no avail either. 36. On 5 January 1995 the Appeal Chamber quashed the decision of 10 August 1993 and remitted the case back to the first instance court. 37. On 19 April 1998 the applicant requested that, pursuant to Section 91 of the Courts Act, a time-limit be fixed for the decision on her application of 4 September 1990. 38. On 8 June 1998 the President of the Vienna Juvenile Court ordered the Juvenile Court to decide on the applicant's request no later than on 31 July 1998. 39. On 5 August 1998 the Juvenile Court dismissed the applicant's request for maintenance payments of 4 September 1990. 40. The applicant appealed against this decision. 41. It appears from the documents submitted that the applicant filed several complaints with the Vienna Court of Appeal (Oberlandesgericht), claiming that I.S. had not complied with the time limit set by the President of the Juvenile Court because she had gone on holidays, that the competent judicial officer, I.S. was to be found at her office only twice a week and that she had been extraordinarily impolite to her. 42. Thereupon, the President of the Juvenile Court, on 31 August 1998, informed the applicant that both I.S.'s office hours as well as her right to vacation were in accordance with her assignment. He also expressed his regret that, if, in the course of one of the applicant's numerous telephone calls, I.S. might have acted in a slightly indignant way. However, he emphasised that the applicant's allegations had remained unproved. 43. On 17 September 1998 the Appeal Chamber dismissed her appeal against the Juvenile Court's decision of 5 August 1998 as being unfounded. Further, it stated that there was no further appeal on points of law in the applicant's case as it did not raise questions of law of fundamental importance (Ausspruch über die Unzulässigkeit der ordentlichen Revision). 44. Nevertheless, the applicant filed an extraordinary appeal on points of law (ausserordentliche Revision) with the Supreme Court. 45. Referring to an amendment of Section 14 a of the Non-Contentious Proceedings Act (Ausserstreitgesetz), the Supreme Court on 18 December 1998 remitted the case back to the Vienna Juvenile Appeal Court. According to that provision, instead of filing an extraordinary appeal on points of law with the Supreme Court, a party to non-contentious proceedings must now request the Court of Appeal to re-consider its opinion on the admissibility of an ordinary appeal on points of law. The Supreme Court found that, even if in her appeal the applicant had not explicitly requested the Juvenile Appeal Court to declare that a further appeal on points of law be allowed, her appeal should have been understood in such a way. 46. Thereupon, on 11 January 1999 the Juvenile Appeal Court requested the applicant to remedy procedural defects of her appeal, namely to request that an ordinary appeal in her case be allowed. 47. As the applicant did not comply with this request, the Juvenile Appeal Court, on 25 February 1999, rejected her appeal.

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6. The applicants were born in 1945 and live in Rome. 7. V.C. was the owner of a flat in Rome, which she had let to C.V. 8. In a writ served on the tenant on 9 June 1987, the owner informed the tenant of her intention to terminate the lease on expiry of the term on 4 February 1988 and summoned him to appear before the Rome Magistrate. 9. By a decision of 13 January 1988, which was made enforceable on the same day, the Rome Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 30 September 1989. 10. On 13 October 1989, the owner served notice on the tenant requiring him to vacate the premises. 11. On 4 February 1989, she informed the tenant that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 11 January 1990. 12. Between 11 January 1990 and 13 November 1991, the bailiff made twelve attempts to recover possession. Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as the owner was not entitled to police assistance in enforcing the order for possession. 13. On 12 November 1991, the applicants became the owners of the flat and pursued the enforcement proceedings. 14. On 2 March 1994, the applicants served notice on the tenant requiring him to vacate the premises. 15. On 31 March 1994, they informed the tenant that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 29 April 1994. 16. Between 29 April 1994 and 3 March 2000, the bailiff made twenty-six attempts to recover possession. Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as the applicants were never granted the assistance of the police in enforcing the order for possession. 17. In the meanwhile, on 24 January 1995, the applicants made a statutory declaration that they urgently required the premises as accommodation for themselves. 18. On 7 April 2000, the applicants recovered possession of the flat.

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4. The applicant was born in 1947 and lives in Kaunas. 5. The applicant was suspected of committing various financial irregularities. Criminal proceedings were instituted in this respect on 15 May 1995. On the same date the applicant was arrested. 6. On 18 May 1995 the applicant was released on bail. 7. On 13 May 1996 the applicant was charged with appropriating property of another and embezzlement. On the same date he was again arrested. 8. On 9 July 1996 the Kaunas City District Court committed the applicant for trial. 9. On 11 October 1996 the court remitted the case to the prosecution for further investigative measures to be carried out. 10. Upon the prosecutors' appeal, on 17 December 1996 the Kaunas Regional Court quashed the above decision, ordering that trial should recommence. 11. On 7 February 1997 the Kaunas City District Court adjourned the examination of the case in order to conduct an audit of an enterprise owned by the applicant. On the same date the applicant was released on bail. 12. During the period from 7 February 1997 until 13 December 2001 the investigative authorities conducted the audit of the applicant's company. 13. On 21 February 2001 the trial recommenced. 14. On 2 April 2002 the Kaunas City District Court convicted the applicant on two counts, obtaining property of another and improper operations with currency, sentencing him to two years' imprisonment. Civil damages in the amount of 811,560 Lithuanian litai (LTL) were also ordered against him. 15. Upon the applicant's appeal, on 10 October 2002 the Kaunas Regional Court quashed the conviction, referring the case back to the first instance court for a fresh trial. 16. On 25 February 2003 the Supreme Court quashed the appeal judgment, returning the case for a fresh examination at appellate instance. 17. On 17 April 2003 the Kaunas Regional Court acting as a court of appeal pronounced a new judgment, acquitting the applicant on one of the charges against him (obtaining property of another). However, his conviction for improper currency operations stayed. The sentence was reduced to one year' imprisonment. No civil damages were ordered against the applicant. 18. The applicant submitted a cassation appeal which is currently pending before the Supreme Court.

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9. Krone Verlag GmbH & Co. KG, a limited liability company with its registered office in Vienna, is the owner of the daily newspaper Neue Kronenzeitung published by Mediaprint Zeitungs- und Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH & Co. KG (“the publisher”). 10. On 9 and 11 December 1994 the Salzburg edition of the Neue Kronenzeitung published an advertisement for subscriptions to the newspaper in which it compared its monthly subscription rates with those of another regional newspaper, the Salzburger Nachrichten. According to the advertisement, the Neue Kronenzeitung was “the best” local newspaper. 11. On 13 December 1994 the Salzburger Nachrichten applied to the Salzburg Regional Court (Landesgericht) for a preliminary injunction (einstweilige Verfügung) under sections 1 and 2 of the Unfair Competition Act (Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb) against the applicant company and the publisher. It requested that the applicant company and the publisher be ordered to refrain from publishing the advertisement. 12. On 29 December 1994 the Salzburg Regional Court issued a preliminary injunction against the applicant company and the publisher to preserve the status quo during the proceedings. On appeal by the applicant company and the publisher, the Linz Court of Appeal (Oberlandesgericht) quashed the Regional Court's decision. The court stated, inter alia, that the two newspapers were competitors in the same market and for the same readership. On 23 May 1995 the Supreme Court (Oberster Gerichtshof), on appeal by the Salzburger Nachrichten, issued a preliminary injunction. The court found that the advertisement was misleading. It considered that the Salzburger Nachrichten was a “quality newspaper” and the Neue Kronenzeitung was not, and that this difference was not necessarily known to readers. Furthermore, in the particular circumstances of the case, calling the Neue Kronenzeitung “the best” local newspaper amounted to disparagement of the Salzburger Nachrichten. 13. In the main proceedings which followed, the Salzburg Regional Court ordered the applicant company and the publisher to refrain from publishing the advertisement as long as it did not provide at the same time information which made it possible to avoid any generally pejorative value statement or any other risk of misleading readers. Secondly, it ordered them not to refer to the sales price of the Salzburger Nachrichten as “expensive”. Thirdly, it ordered them to refrain from comparing the sales prices of the two newspapers unless they indicated at the same time the differences in their respective reporting styles, in particular as regards coverage of foreign or domestic politics, economy, culture, science, health, environmental issues and law, and referred also to the Neue Kronenzeitung as an entertainment-orientated communications medium and the Salzburger Nachrichten as a medium mainly geared to information. Lastly, it ordered them to publish the decision. 14. On 21 March 1997 the Linz Court of Appeal, allowing in part an appeal by the applicant company and the publisher, confined the third branch of the injunction to the order that the applicant company and the publisher refrain from comparing the sales prices of the two newspapers without indicating the differences in their reporting styles as regards coverage of foreign or domestic politics, economy, culture, science, health, environmental issues and law. It confirmed the lower court's decision as to the remaining branches of the injunction. The court considered that it was a matter of common knowledge that both newspapers were competing in the same market. As to the differences in quality between the newspapers and the argument that readers were not familiar with these differences, the Linz Court of Appeal referred to the Supreme Court's decision of 23 May 1995. 15. On 28 April 1997 the applicant company and the publisher lodged an appeal on points of law against this decision, relying on Article 10 of the Convention. 16. On 13 May 1997 the Supreme Court declared their appeal on points of law inadmissible. The decision was served on the parties on 16 June 1997.

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9. The applicant, Mr Todor Antimov Yankov, is a Bulgarian national who was born in 1943 and lives in Plovdiv. 10. The applicant was the executive director of an agricultural investment fund and a financial company. He also used to teach economics, an area in which he has a doctorate. 11. On 11 March 1996 a preliminary investigation (no. 300/96) was opened by the Plovdiv District Public Prosecutor against him and other persons in respect of a number of financial transactions. The applicant was charged under Article 282 §§ 2 and 3 of the Criminal Code of dereliction of his professional duties with a view to obtaining an unlawful gain for himself and others. 12. In the course of the investigation the charges were altered several times. In all, eight persons were charged. 13. During the investigation, which lasted one year and nearly two months, the investigator heard 47 witnesses, examined numerous financial and banking documents, commissioned reports, and undertook searches. 14. On 5 May 1997 the preliminary investigation was completed and the file was transmitted to the competent prosecutor. 15. On 1 July 1997 the prosecutor submitted a 32-page indictment to the Plovdiv District Court, accompanied by 20 binders of documents. 16. The first hearing took place from 17 to 30 September 1997. The District Court heard the accused persons, several witnesses and experts. Some witnesses did not appear. Both the prosecution and the defence requested an adjournment. 17. The trial resumed on 25 November 1997. The District Court heard several witnesses. Ten other witnesses had not been summoned properly and others, although summoned, did not appear. The trial was adjourned until 7 January 1998. 18. On 1 December 1997 the court, sitting in private, granted a request by one of the accused persons for additional questions to be put to the experts. The experts submitted their report on 5 January 1998. 19. The trial resumed on 7 and 8 January 1998. The court adjourned the hearing as some witnesses had not appeared and ordered an additional financial report. 20. The hearing scheduled for 9 April 1998 was put off until 6 July 1998 and then until 19 October 1998 due to the applicant's ill health. 21. On 19 October 1998 the District Court held its last hearing. It heard the final pleadings of the parties. 22. On 30 October 1998 the Plovdiv District Court found the applicant guilty of ordering money transfers abroad in breach of the relevant financial regulations. The transfers had been ordered without proof of a lawful purpose and on behalf of clients of the applicant's financial company whom he had not fully identified. The applicant was also found guilty of issuing a power of attorney conferring wide-ranging powers to another person in breach of his duties as the manager of the financial company. The applicant was acquitted on the remainder of the charges against him and sentenced to five years' imprisonment. 23. The reasoning of the District Court's judgment was served on the applicant on an unspecified date in February 1999. 24. Several times during the proceedings the case file was unavailable as it was repeatedly transmitted to the competent court for examination of appeals by the applicant and his co-accused against their pre-trial detention. In practice, whenever such an appeal was lodged, the case file was transmitted together with the appeal. 25. Throughout the proceedings the District Court and, later, the Regional Court (see below) had to seek police assistance to establish the addresses of witnesses and bring them before the court. 26. On 19 November 1998 the applicant appealed against his conviction and sentence. 27. On 6 December 1999 the Plovdiv Regional Court held its first hearing, which was adjourned to 13 March 2000, as one of the co-appellants had health problems. 28. On 5 June 2000 the Regional Court quashed the applicant's conviction and sentence and remitted the case to the preliminary investigation stage. 29. The Regional Public Prosecutor's Office in Plovdiv, considering that the Regional Court's judgment was unclear or erroneous, sought to appeal against it or request its interpretation. There ensued a dispute about the relevant time-limit, a question submitted by the prosecution authorities to the Supreme Court of Cassation. On 27 November 2000 that court dismissed the prosecution's request. 30. Nothing was done in the case thereafter, at least until November 2002, the time of the latest information from the parties. The preliminary investigation in the applicant's case was still pending before the prosecution authorities in Plovdiv. 31. On 12 March 1996 the applicant was arrested and detained pending trial in connection with investigation no. 300/96 by decision of an investigator, confirmed by a prosecutor. 32. On 18 March 1996 the applicant appealed against his pre-trial detention to the Plovdiv Regional Public Prosecutor. He alleged, inter alia, that the acts on account of which he had been charged did not constitute a criminal offence (under the banking and currency regulations in force at the relevant time) and that he had therefore been charged unlawfully. He also alleged that there had been no danger of his absconding or committing further offences. On 27 March 1996 the appeal was dismissed by the Regional Public Prosecutor who stated, inter alia: “Since Yankov has been charged under Article 282 § 2 of the Criminal Code, pre-trial detention is mandatory in accordance with Article 152 § 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The possibility of not imposing pre-trial detention is to be considered by the preliminary investigation bodies only if, regard being had to the nature of the case and the particular circumstances relating to the accused, there is no danger that he might abscond, commit further offences, or obstruct the course of justice. The material in the case indicates that if Yankov is released, there is a danger that he might abscond, commit further offences or obstruct the course of justice... The preliminary investigation bodies are not under any obligation to set out the facts on the basis of which the above conclusions have been made.” 33. On 18 April 1996 the applicant requested the District Court to order his release on the ground that the charges laid against him did not contain particulars of the alleged offence and that the provisions invoked were inapplicable as he was not an employee or an officer of the bank whose funds were at stake. The parties have not provided further information on the examination of this appeal. 34. On 29 April 1996 a prosecutor from the Chief Public Prosecutor's Office upheld the Regional Public Prosecutor's decision of 27 March 1996 while adding that the danger of absconding, committing offences or obstructing the course of justice stemmed from the fact that the applicant had financial and other relations with persons who had left the country. The arguments of the applicant, based on an analysis of the relevant banking and currency regulations, that he had not committed a crime, were to be assessed only by the investigator and then in the process of examination of the criminal case on the merits. 35. On 11 September 1996 a further appeal was dismissed by a higher ranking prosecutor at the Chief Public Prosecutor's Office on the ground that, as the preliminary investigation was still pending, there was a risk that the applicant would seek to obstruct the course of justice. Furthermore, arguments going to the substance of the charges could only be examined once the necessary evidence had been collected. 36. On 12 September 1996 the applicant submitted to the District Prosecutor's Office another request for release. He stated, inter alia, that he had been detained for a long period and that all the relevant evidence had been collected. 37. On 15 November 1996 the applicant asked to be examined by doctors as his health was deteriorating because of the long period of detention. 38. On 12 December 1996 the applicant lodged further applications for release with the District and Chief Public Prosecutors. 39. On 13 December 1996 the District Public Prosecutor dismissed the applications noting, inter alia, that the applicant had been charged with a serious intentional offence and that another preliminary investigation was also pending against him. This was investigation no. 929/96 which had been opened on an unspecified date in 1996 and was being dealt with by the authorities in separate criminal proceedings. 40. On 28 December 1996 the applicant complained to the Regional Public Prosecutor that his pre-trial detention was unlawful. 41. This complaint was dismissed on 30 January 1997 on the ground that under paragraph 3 of Article 152 of the Code of Criminal Procedure release was not possible since a second preliminary investigation (no. 929/96) was pending against the applicant. The detention of the accused person was thus mandatory. Moreover, the investigation in the case under examination, no. 300/96, was progressing and was soon to be completed. 42. On 13 February 1997 the applicant complained against his pre-trial detention to the District Court, on the ground that the statutory maximum period for the investigation had been exceeded and that, the accusation being based on documents already examined, there was no danger of him tampering with evidence. In addition, although he had been questioned on several occasions prior to his arrest, he had never attempted to abscond. 43. The application was submitted to the District Prosecutor's Office which, according to the established practice, had to transmit it to the District Court together with the case file. On 25 February 1997, when the applicant's lawyer complained to the District Prosecutor's Office, his appeal had not yet been transmitted to the court. 44. On an unspecified date the applicant complained to the prosecution authorities that his pre-trial detention ordered in connection with preliminary investigation no. 929/96, the second investigation pending against him, had been unlawful. On 11 March 1997 the Regional Public Prosecutor examined the above appeal and decided to terminate the applicant's pre-trial detention in connection with investigation file no. 929/96, as the applicant was detained pending trial in connection with the preliminary investigation no. 300/96. 45. The applicant's pre-trial detention ordered in connection with preliminary investigation no. 300/96 was extended by the District Public Prosecutor on 23 April 1997. 46. On 24 and 26 March 1997 the applicant's lawyer reiterated his request for a medical examination of his client. He stated that upon his visit on 21 March 1997 he had found the applicant in an apparently bad state of health. It appears that a medical examination was carried out on an unspecified date in the following weeks. 47. On 23 April 1997 the District Prosecutor refused to release the applicant. She took into consideration the medical report, which apparently concluded that the applicant suffered from high blood pressure, arterio-sclerosis, a kidney stone, diabetes, problems with his lungs and the prostate, problems with the blood vessels and depression. The prosecutor noted, after examining the treatment prescribed by the doctor, that the applicant could be treated in a pre-trial detention facility with a moderate risk for his health and that his state of health should be carefully followed. She also emphasised that the applicant had been charged with a serious offence which in her opinion made his release impossible. 48. On 1 July 1997 the applicant was committed for trial. On 23 July 1997 he appealed against his pre-trial detention to the District Court on the ground that the charges against him were weak. He further claimed that his detention had become unnecessary as all the evidence had been collected. He reiterated that he had a family and a permanent address, that he was a respected citizen, and that there had never been convincing evidence of a danger of absconding, committing offences or obstructing the course of justice. He further complained about his bad health and enclosed medical reports of 10 January and 19 and 27 June 1997. The applicant's lawyer also invoked the Convention and asked the court to give reasoned replies to each of his arguments. 49. After examining the applicant's case in private, the District Court dismissed the application for release on 28 July 1997. The court stated: “The defendant Todor Antimov Yankov is indicted under section 282 § 3 of the Criminal Code with an aggravated case of dereliction of his professional duties. In accordance with Article 152 § 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure pre-trial detention must be imposed when a person is accused of having committed a serious intentional offence. In the case of the defendant Todor Yankov, he is suspected of having committed a serious intentional offence. The grounds for the exception provided for under paragraph 2 [of Article 152] [allowing a detainee to be released from pre-trial detention] are not present in the [applicant's] case, since there exists a real danger of his obstructing the course of the proceedings or absconding. In addition, according to Article 152 § 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the exception laid down in its § 2 cannot avail a defendant in a case where preliminary investigations for another criminal offence are pending against him. It is apparent from the documents in the case that the Plovdiv Dictrict Public Prosecutor's Office had separated and transmitted to the Sofia Regional Public Prosecution material in relation to another offence. Therefore, there is no valid ground for the applicant's release.” 50. On 29 July 1997 the applicant appealed to the Regional Court. On 30 July 1997, before transmitting the appeal, the District Court sitting in private confirmed its refusal to release the applicant. On 4 August 1997 the file was transmitted to the Regional Court. On 11 August 1997 the Plovdiv Regional Court sitting in private dismissed the applicant's appeal on the same grounds. After examining the medical report, that court held that the conditions of detention were not damaging for his health. 51. At the first trial hearing before the Plovdiv District Court on 17 September 1997 the applicant appealed against his detention. The appeal was dismissed on the ground that the applicant had been charged with a serious intentional offence for which detention was mandatory and that the exception provided by Article 152 § 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure could not avail a defendant in a case where preliminary investigations for another criminal offence were pending against him. 52. On 25 November 1997, at the second hearing before the Plovdiv District Court, the applicant appealed against his detention on the ground that he could not obstruct the course of justice, as all the evidence and relevant testimony had already been examined by the court. He also stated that there was no danger of his absconding in view of his social status and family ties. The court dismissed his appeal on the same day, reasoning that the applicant had been charged with a serious intentional crime and that there were no new circumstances. On 1 December 1997 the applicant appealed to the Regional Court. On 15 December 1997 that appeal was dismissed by the Regional Court sitting in private on grounds that the applicant had been charged with a serious intentional crime and hence that his continued detention was justified, especially in view of the gravity of the alleged offence. 53. The applicant's renewed application for bail, in which he pleaded, inter alia, that there was no danger of him absconding, regard being had to his age, was dismissed by the District Court at its hearing on 8 January 1998 as he had been charged with a serious intentional crime and there was another case pending against him. 54. On 13 January 1998 the applicant appealed to the Regional Court. Before transmitting that appeal, on 14 January 1998 the District Court sitting in private re-examined and confirmed its refusal to release the applicant. On 19 January 1998 the Regional Court sitting in private dismissed the appeal. 55. On 9 February 1998 the applicant's lawyer requested a medical examination for the applicant as his health had deteriorated and he had to spend four days in hospital. On 27 February 1998 the applicant was examined by a doctor who recommended that he should be sent to a hospital specialising in cardiology and that he should undergo specialised medical treatment. 56. On 9 March 1998 the applicant requested his release on the basis of that medical report. He further complained that there was no evidence of any danger that he might abscond or commit further offences. 57. Between 10 and 17 March 1998 the applicant was detained in a disciplinary isolation cell (see below). 58. On 19 March 1998 the District Court examined the appeal of 9 March 1998 in the presence of the applicant. The court dismissed it holding that the health risk for the applicant was the same whether he was in prison or at home. On 24 March 1998 the applicant appealed to the Regional Court. On 25 March 1998, before transmitting the appeal, the District Court sitting in private re-examined the matter and confirmed its refusal to release the applicant. The appeal was dismissed on 30 March 1998 by the Regional Court sitting in private. It found that there had been no change of circumstances or facts capable of demonstrating that the applicant would not commit offences, obstruct the course of justice or abscond if released. 59. In the meantime, on 20 March 1998, the applicant was again examined by three doctors who found that he was suffering from thrombosis which might endanger his life and recommended rest and regular check-ups by a specialist. On 25 March 1998 the applicant was taken in hospital. 60. On 9 April 1998 the applicant submitted a renewed bail application mainly on the ground of his ill health. It was dismissed on 23 April 1998 by the District Court at a hearing at which the court heard evidence from three doctors and found that the applicant's health was adequately monitored and that he received medical treatment. 61. On 29 April 1998 the applicant appealed to the Regional Court. On 30 April 1998, before transmitting the appeal, the District Court sitting in private confirmed its refusal to release the applicant. The appeal was dismissed on 11 May 1998 by the Regional Court sitting in private. It held that there were no objective circumstances which could warrant the conclusion that the applicant would not interfere with the investigation. The court further found that “the length of the detention could not serve as an argument for a deviation from the strict provisions of Article 152 of the Code of Criminal Procedure” and that the applicant's medical problems could be adequately addressed by his transfer to Sofia Prison, where the medical service was presumably better. On 19 May 1998 the applicant was transferred to Sofia Prison. 62. On 30 June 1998 the applicant was admitted to hospital. 63. On 6 July 1998 the applicant asked again to be released on bail, pleading his ill health and the excessive length of his detention. 64. On 9 July 1998 the District Court held a hearing and decided to release the applicant on bail on health grounds. The applicant lodged a security and was released on 10 July 1998. 65. On 10 March 1998, during a search of the applicant before a meeting with his lawyers, the prison administration seized typewritten material. According to the applicant, it was the draft of a book he had been writing, describing events concerning his detention and the criminal proceedings against him. He had intended to read some passages to his lawyers. According to the prison officer who seized the material, the applicant had intended to transmit it to his lawyer. 66. The Government submitted several pages of the seized material. It transpires that the manuscript was in a rough form and was not ready for publication. Relevant passages read as follows: “The charges against me did not contain any facts or evidence indicating any criminal intention on my part or an offence committed by me... I can only regard the acts of the authorities against me as unjustified and unlawful... The ... door clicked ... we stood up, hands behind our backs and backs to the warders: they are afraid that we might attack them, with our plastic cups... I never understood why these well-fed idlers were afraid, always two or three of them being present when the food was distributed... I used to eat only two to three crusts of bread and as many spoonfuls of the slops they called soup. We used to hear how they diluted the soup ... How painful were these moments - to see the eyes of a hungry fellow prisoner ... to see how human beings are turned into beasts... It is true that the economic situation in Bulgaria was difficult... But giving so little and such bad food to detained people was inhuman ..., even more so when we smelt the aroma of roasted or fried meat coming from the warders' quarters. This is sadism... It was very difficult when they prohibited meetings with relatives and friends. That was not done everywhere: in Plovdiv magistrates had decided to break a record for the inhuman treatment of detainees... [In the beginning] I did not know and never suspected what the investigative and judicial organs of democratic Bulgaria were like. For a long time I hoped that there had been a misunderstanding... The search [in the apartment] was conducted by police officer [B.] His inexperience was betrayed by his behaviour; he was a provincial parvenu... Could I imagine, when I worked 15-16 hours per day ... that the time would come when everything that I had done ... would be rejected ... by several powerful unscrupulous people, 'servants of law and order' ? Toilet time is 1.5 - 2 minutes ... If someone stays longer, there follow shouting, cursing, clattering on the door, truncheon blows... You can't believe that? Well, I did not believe either that such conditions of life could exist in this country ... The warders, most of whom are simple villagers and are paid ... better than teachers, doctors and engineers, 'work' 24 hours and then have a 72-hour rest ...They are the authority in prison, they are everything, we depend on them. It is true that there are younger and more intelligent boys, but they are a minority... Whenever we complained about all these disgraceful matters, there was no effect ... Twice there were inspections ...., all the officers were running here and there, it was necessary to clean, to put the detention centre in a better shape; they were afraid of complaints by prisoners. But the inspectors came, made a formalistic visit and went away.” 67. On 10 March 1998, after having heard the applicant and the prison officers involved, the Governor of Plovdiv Prison issued order no. 99 which read as follows: “In accordance with section 76(k) of the Execution of Sentences Act, the detainee Todor Yankov shall be punished by seven days' confinement in an isolation cell ... for having made offensive and defamatory statements against officers, investigators, judges, prosecutors and state institutions.” 68. Order no. 99 was not served on the applicant. It was enforced immediately, on 10 March 1998. 69. It appears that before his transfer to the disciplinary isolation cell the applicant was examined by a doctor. 70. Also before being brought to the cell his hair was shaved off. 71. According to the applicant, the solitary-confinement facility had no toilet and he had to use a bucket which was not emptied regularly. Hygiene was poor and there was insufficient light. 72. On an unspecified date the applicant's lawyers, having learned about the punishment, telephoned the General Director of Prisons and Detention Facilities, in whom appropriate powers are vested to examine appeals against confinement in an isolation cell. 73. On 17 March 1998 the applicant left the isolation cell. 74. On 19 March 1998 he appeared at an open hearing of the District Court. The fact that his head had been shaved nine days earlier was noticeable. 75. On 20 March 1998 the applicant's lawyers complained against the prison governor to the Deputy Minister of Justice. They conveyed, inter alia, the applicant's concern that the prison governor had repeatedly demonstrated personal hostility towards him and had acted unlawfully. 76. On 29 April 1998 the Deputy Minister of Justice replied to the applicant's lawyers. She stated, inter alia: “An inquiry was conducted in connection with your appeal against the allegedly unlawful acts of the [prison governor]... By an order N/ 99 of 10 March 1998 ... the accused Yankov was condemned to seven days' confinement in an isolation cell. This disciplinary measure was imposed because the papers seized contained expressions and descriptions which were offensive for the Ministry of the Interior's employees, the investigation bodies, the judiciary, the prosecution, the prison authorities and state bodies and institutions (section 46 of the Regulations). He was not punished because he had written the paper in question and wanted to take it out from the prison, which is, indeed, his right. That paper was given back to the accused Yankov. The accused suffers from a chronic disease - thrombophlebitis. He has been constantly supervised and treated in the prison. He was twice sent for outside treatment and he will be sent again for outside treatment if the need arises”.

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4. The applicant was born in 1938 and lives in Lucca. 5. He is the owner of a flat in Florence, which he had let to A.D.L. 6. In a registered letter of 28 June 1983, the applicant informed the tenant that he intended to terminate the lease on expiry of the term on 30 December 1983 and asked him to vacate the premises by that date. 7. In a writ served on the tenant on 23 December 1986, the applicant reiterated his intention to terminate the lease and summoned the tenant to appear before the Florence Magistrate. 8. By a decision of 22 January 1987, which was made enforceable on 3 September 1987, the Florence Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 31 December 1988. 9. On 7 June 1989, the applicant served notice on the tenant requiring him to vacate the premises. 10. On 5 July 1989, he informed the tenant that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 26 July 1989. 11. Between 26 July 1989 and 20 March 1995, the bailiff made 13 attempts to recover possession. 12. On 20 July 1995, the applicant made a statutory declaration that he urgently required the premises as accommodation for his children. 13. Between 19 October 1995 and 17 April 2002, the bailiff made 11 attempts to recover possession. Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as the applicant was never granted the assistance of the police in enforcing the order for possession. 14. In October 2002, the applicant recovered possession of the flat.

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4. The applicant was born in 1959 and lives in Somlóvásárhely, Hungary. 5. On 6 May 1993 the applicant's wife requested the Ajka District Court to hold a preliminary hearing with a view to instituting divorce proceedings. In turn, on 7 July 1993 the applicant brought an action before the District Court claiming maintenance for the couple's son, who was at the time in the applicant's care. The District Court held hearings on the maintenance claim on 13 September and 3 November 1993. On the latter date the applicant's wife formally filed for divorce. The divorce proceedings were subsequently joined to the claim for maintenance. 6. In the joined proceedings, hearings took place on 27 April, 17 June, 16 September and 31 October 1994, 3 February and 5 April 1995. 7. On the latter date the District Court pronounced, in a partial decision, the couple's divorce. In line with the parties' agreement, it granted the mother custody of their son. The court ordered the applicant to pay maintenance, regulated his right of access to the boy and ordered the parties to share the use of their flat which was in common ownership. The court relied on the testimonies of numerous witnesses, including a social worker, the applicant's two step-children born out of the mother's previous marriage, and the couple's son. 8. On the applicant's appeal of 12 May 1995, the Veszprém County Regional Court held a hearing on 26 September 1995. At a hearing on 10 October 1995 the Regional Court allowed the applicant's appeal and amended the District Court's decision in the part concerning the amount of maintenance and the details of his access rights. 9. On 13 December 1995 the proceedings were resumed before the District Court in respect of the division of the matrimonial property. A hearing was held on 13 December 1995. A further hearing took place on 21 February 1996. On the latter date the District Court decided to obtain various expert opinions. 10. On 31 May and 23 July 1996, respectively, property and valuation experts submitted their opinions. 11. At a hearing on 18 October 1996 the District Court appointed a motor-vehicle expert to prepare an opinion. On 12 December 1996 the expert was urged to submit his opinion. On 31 December 1996 the expert informed the court that the applicant could not be located at the address notified to him. On 17 February 1997 the expert was requested to submit an opinion as soon as possible. On 27 February 1997 the expert submitted his opinion. 12. Further hearings were held on 28 April, 12 May and 17 November 1997. Meanwhile, on 6 June 1997 the applicant requested further expert evidence to be taken. Although it experienced difficulties in finding an expert jeweller, the District Court finally appointed one on 27 February 1998 and requested the parties to contact him. On 30 July 1998 the expert submitted his opinion. 13. On 28 September 1998 an expert psychologist submitted his opinion. A hearing scheduled for 28 October 1998 was adjourned at the applicant's request. 14. The next hearing took place on 20 January 1999. The District Court ordered the property expert to complete his opinion of 31 May 1996, taking into account any possible changes which might have occurred in the meantime. On 19 March 1999 the District Court requested the expert to proceed as a matter of urgency. On 24 March 1999 the expert submitted his opinion, which was based on an on-site inspection of the property. 15. Further hearings took place on 27 September and 25 October 1999. On the latter date both the applicant and his representative failed to appear before the court. Meanwhile, the District Court made enquiries with the parties' bank as regards the mortgage situation of their flat. On 29 October 1999 the court requested the parties to waive their rights to secrecy in respect of their bank details. The waivers were sent to the bank on 17 November 1999. On 28 December 1999 the District Court made a further enquiry with the bank as regards payments transferred from the parties' bank account to cover housing expenses. On 24 January 2000 the District Court ordered the applicant to submit his waiver in the form required by the bank. The bank submitted the requested banking details on 27 March 2000. 16. At the hearings of April and 22 May 2000 several witnesses were heard on the use of the parties' flat. On the latter date the District Court carried out an inspection of the flat. 17. On 13 December 2000 the District Court ruled on the division of the matrimonial property. On 20 and 27 December 2000, respectively, the applicant and the defendant appealed. 18. The Veszprém County Regional Court held hearings on 20 February, 1 and 20 March 2001. During this period the parties were involved in negotiations aimed at reaching an agreement on the sale of their flat. On the parties' joint request of 28 March 2001, the Regional Court discontinued the proceedings on 3 April 2001 and annulled the decision of 13 December 2000.

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10. The applicant was born in 1968 and lives in Devon. At the relevant time he was a serving member of the Royal Navy. 11. On 18 June 1998 he was convicted, pursuant to section 42 of the Naval Discipline Act 1957, by a naval court-martial of unlawfully and maliciously wounding with intent to do grievous bodily harm contrary to the Offences Against the Person Act 1861. He was sentenced to, inter alia, three years' imprisonment and to be dismissed from the service and reduced in rank. He was also ordered to pay GBP 700 compensation. 12. The court-martial comprised a President (a Captain of the Royal Navy), four naval officers (a Commander, 2 Lieutenant Commanders and a Lieutenant) and a Judge Advocate (Commander Flanagan). The Judge Advocate was a naval barrister who was working as the naval legal advisor to FLEET (the command responsible for the organisation and deployment of all ships at sea). His rank was lower than that of the President of the court-martial. The prosecution was conducted by a Lieutenant Commander of the staff of the Prosecuting Authority. The applicant chose to be represented by a naval barrister. The defending and prosecuting officers were junior in rank to the Judge Advocate and the defending officer was senior in rank to the prosecuting officer. 13. At the beginning of the court-martial the Judge Advocate directed the members of the court-martial as follows: “As Judge Advocate it's my role to ensure that the trial is conducted in accordance with the law and I am here to advise and guide you. I will have no role in the finding on the facts. You must accept what I say on matters of law and procedures [as] being correct. If you have any questions of me during the trial ... they must be asked of me in open Court in the presence of the accused, his friend and the prosecutor and any such questions should pass through you ... as President. That means ... that now that this trial has commenced, you and your court can have no direct communication with me except in open Court and therefore if I seem to avoid you outside the environs of the Court ... that's the reasoning behind that and please don't think I am being rude ... Now you and your colleagues may discuss the case when you are together and in private if you so wish, but my strong advice to you at this stage is to resist the temptation until you've heard all the evidence and indeed my own summing up. You must be particularly rigorous in not discussing the case at all during adjournments in the trial when you could be overheard by others such as during lunch in the Ward room where a room has been set aside for you and particularly overnight since you must not be influenced by anything said to you or which you observe which is not evidence in the trial. I will warn you of this ... each time we adjourn and particularly when we adjourn at the end of the days' proceedings.” 14. On 29 September 1998 the Navy Board decided not to vary the court-martial's verdict and sentence. In his advice to the Navy Board, the Judge Advocate of the Fleet commented that the trial had been “well conducted by all concerned”, that the main directions of law in the Judge Advocate's summing up were “impeccable” and that any errors were, in any event, favourable to the applicant. 15. On 30 June 1999 a single judge of the Courts-Martial Appeal Court rejected his appeal, as did the full court on 20 January 2000.

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9. The applicant was born in 1950 and lives in Bytom, Poland. 10. On 22 November 1991 the applicant lodged with the Człuchów District Court an action against the State Treasury. He claimed 570,000 old zlotys (PLZ) in compensation for his belongings which had been stolen in December 1989 while he had been detained in the Czarne prison. The applicant contended that the theft had been committed by the prison officers who had intervened in order to end the riots in the prison. 11. On 27 November 1991 the Człuchów District Court exempted the applicant from the court fees and rejected his request for legal aid considering that the case did not call for the participation of counsel. 12. On 25 February 1992 the District Court stayed the proceedings. It considered that, since the prosecution had initiated criminal proceedings against the prison officers involved in ending the riots in the Czarne prison and the applicant had been listed as one of the victims, the outcome of those proceedings might be relevant to the adjudication of the applicant's claim. 13. On 3 May 1993 the applicant increased his claim to PLZ 31,720,000. 14. On 26 July 1994 the District Court annulled its earlier decision to join the action concerning the compensation for stolen belongings with the action concerning compensation for injuries (see paragraphs 34‑36 below) and decided to resume the proceedings concerning the former action. 15. On an unspecified date the Człuchów District Court requested the Zabrze District Court to take evidence from the applicant who was detained in a prison located within the jurisdiction of that court. 16. On 19 January 1995 the Człuchów District Court requested the Łęczyca District Court to take evidence from several witnesses for the applicant who were detained in a prison situated within the jurisdiction of that court. However, the Łęczyca District Court was unable to comply with the request as the witnesses had already been released from the prison. 17. The first hearing was held by the Człuchów District Court on 3 February 1995. It was adjourned since the applicant had not been properly served with the summons. During the next hearing, which was held on 17 February 1995, the court heard the witnesses requested by the applicant. 18. In the meantime, the Człuchów District Court on several occasions requested other district courts to take evidence from the witnesses for the applicant, who were detained in prisons located within the jurisdiction of those courts. However, the requests were declined because the witnesses could not be heard since they had been transferred to other prisons. 19. During the hearing held on 7 March 1995 the Człuchów District Court heard a witness, who according to the applicant's submissions had taken from him his belongings during the riots in the Czarne prison. 20. On 21 April 1995 the Człuchów District Court received from the Słupsk District Court evidence taken from one of the witnesses. On the same date the Człuchów District Court also received a statement taken from the applicant by the Jastrzębie District Court. 21. No hearing was held in 1996. 22. During the hearing held on 25 February 1997 the Człuchów District Court decided to request the Warsaw District Court to take evidence from one of the witnesses, a certain S.W. As the Warsaw District Court was not responding to that request, the Człuchów District Court renewed it on several occasions. 23. On 16 May 1997 the President of the Człuchów District Court replied to the applicant's inquiry about the progress in the proceedings, informing him that immediately after the Warsaw District Court submitted evidence taken from S.W., a date for the next hearing would be fixed. He also expressed the opinion that although the conclusion of all the proceedings resulting from the riots in the Czarne prison would serve the proper administration of justice, it was not possible to state the date on which the proceedings in the applicant's case would end. 24. On 16 June 1997 the applicant complained to the Ombudsman about the unreasonable length of the proceedings in his case. On 14 August 1997 the Ombudsman transmitted the complaint to the President of the Człuchów District Court. In a letter of 18 August 1997 the President informed the applicant that the date for hearing S.W. had been fixed by the Warsaw District Court for 5 September 1997 and that the next hearing before the Człuchów District Court would be scheduled immediately after it received evidence taken from that witness. 25. In a letter of 3 February 1998 the President of the Civil Section of the Człuchów District Court informed the President of the Słupsk Regional Court, who had inquired about the length of the proceedings in the case, that the Warsaw District Court still had not taken evidence from S.W. 26. On 5 February 1998 the President of the Słupsk Regional Court responded to the applicant's complaint about the length of the proceedings submitted on 19 January 1998. In particular, he informed the applicant about the difficulties faced by the Człuchów District Court in taking evidence from the witnesses who were being transferred between different prisons and whose addresses were therefore difficult to establish. He also pointed out that the Człuchów District Court was not responsible for the delay in hearing one of the witnesses by the Warsaw District Court and promised that the latter court would be again requested to take evidence from that witness. 27. The hearing held on 26 June 1998 was adjourned. 28. In a letter of 25 August 1998 the applicant inquired of the President of the Człuchów District Court about the state of the proceedings in his case. On 31 August 1998 the President informed the applicant that the hearing held on 26 June 1998 had been adjourned because he had not been served with the summonses, since the court had not been informed about his transfer to another prison. Moreover, a hearing fixed for 4 September 1998 would also be adjourned for that reason. However, the applicant averred that he had remained in the same prison at the time when both hearings had been adjourned and he had not been served with the summonses. 29. On 18 September 1998 the Człuchów District Court delivered a judgment in which it dismissed the applicant's claim. 30. The applicant appealed but on 10 March 1999 the Człuchów District Court rejected his appeal. The court considered that the appeal did not comply with formal requirements for lodging it. The applicant filed with the District Court a complaint about the rejection of his appeal but the court dismissed it. 31. Subsequently, the applicant challenged before the Słupsk Regional Court (Sąd Okręgowy) the District Court's decision to reject his appeal. On 16 November 1999 the Regional Court quashed the District Court's decision rejecting the applicant's appeal and allowed him to lodge an appeal out of time. 32. On 18 November 1999 the case-file was returned to the first-instance court so that it could prepare reasons for its judgment. On 29 December 1999 the file was returned to the Regional Court. 33. The applicant lodged an appeal but on 28 January 2000 the Słupsk Regional Court delivered a judgment in which it dismissed it. 34. On 11 March 1992 the applicant filed before the Człuchów District Court another action against the State Treasury in which he claimed PLZ 10,000,000 in compensation for injuries he had sustained during the riots in the Czarne prison as a result of the assault by the prison officers. 35. On 14 April 1992 the court stayed the proceedings in this case for the same reasons which had led to the staying of the proceedings concerning compensation for stolen belongings. 36. The proceedings are still pending. 37. On 23 August 1999 the European Court of Human Rights sent to the applicant a letter enclosing a copy of the respondent Government's observations on the admissibility and merits of the application. On 6 October 1999 the applicant submitted to the Court a cutting of the Court's envelope sent to him on 23 August 1999. The envelope bears the following three stamps in Polish: “Racibórz Prison, received on 02.09.1999, no. 15814”; “Katowice Regional Court, 16/18 Andrzeja Street, received on 07.09.1999” and “ Censored” (Ocenzurowano). 38. On 30 November 1999 the Court received the applicant's letter of 23 November 1999. The envelope in which the letter was delivered bears the stamp “Censored” (Cenzurowano) and the following handwriting: “SO K-e XVI 207/99”.

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7. The applicant is a French citizen who was born in 1963 and lives in Alcira, near Valencia (Spain). 8. The applicant married in January 1983. She and her husband had two children, born in 1984 and 1989. 9. In August or September 1994 the applicant's husband left the matrimonial home and moved in with his mistress. In December 1994 the applicant petitioned for divorce. 10. By a judgment of 5 September 1996, the Nîmes tribunal de grande instance ruled on the divorce petition. It found, firstly, that a reading of the submitted documents had not established that the applicant's membership of the Jehovah's Witnesses had been the cause of the break-down in the couple's relationship, but that it had been attested that her husband had left the matrimonial home to live with his mistress, and had also prevented the applicant from working in the pizzeria they ran. Accordingly, it granted the divorce, attributing fault to the husband alone. 11. With regard to the children, the court decided that they would reside with their mother in Spain and that parental responsibility would be exercised jointly. The father was to have visiting and residence rights on an unrestricted basis and, in the absence of agreement, during the whole of the children's school holidays, provided that he collected them himself and escorted them back to their mother's home. It set the amount of the father's maintenance payments at 1,500 French francs (FRF) per month and per child. 12. On 21 November 1996 the applicant appealed against this judgment. She asked to be given access for one month during the children's summer holidays and one week during the Christmas and Easter holidays. She also renewed her request for a complementary allowance. In her pleadings in reply, the applicant complained that her ex-husband had not returned the children to her at the end of the 1997 summer holidays and had enrolled them in a school in Aigues-Mortes, where he lived with his new companion. She submitted that the father had influenced the children so that they would express a wish to live with him; she filed statements and photographs intended to show that she was bringing up her children with great care and that they were allowed to take part freely in any activity that interested them. She requested that a social inquiry report be drawn up. 13. The Nîmes Court of Appeal delivered judgment on 14 January 1998. It upheld the judgment with regard to the divorce pronouncement and awarded the applicant a complementary allowance of FRF 1,500 per month for three years. With regard to the children's place of residence, the court found as follows: “The two under-age children, C., aged 13, and M., aged 8, currently live with their father in Aigues-Mortes, where they attend school. This is a de facto situation which has been brought about by the father, who, contrary to the provisions of the appealed judgment, failed to return the children to their mother's home at the end of the summer holidays. In justifying his behaviour, R. claims that he has acted in the children's interests, in order to remove them from the detrimental influence of their mother and her circle, who oblige them to practice the religion known as 'the Jehovah's Witnesses'. Furthermore, R. has submitted a letter from child C., expressing the latter's wish to remain with his father, together with a medical certificate drawn up by Doctor D., a psychiatrist, on 7 January 1997, which states that child C. 'experiences his mother's prohibitions, via the Jehovah's Witnesses, as distressing and frustrating' and that 'child M. suffers from the religious constraints imposed on him and expressed a wish to live in Aigues-Mortes with his father as far back as the beginning of 1997'. Finally, numerous other witness statements testified to the children's expressed wish not to return to Spain. Séraphine Palau-Martinez does not deny that she is a Jehovah's Witness or that the two children were being brought up in accordance with the precepts of this religion. Admittedly, she has submitted numerous statements attesting to her affection for her children and showing that she provides for their well-being, and has filed group photographs in which her children appear happy. Taken together, however, the submitted documents are not inconsistent with the arguments of R., who does not wish to deny the mother's maternal attributes but restricts himself to criticising the strict upbringing received by the children on account of their mother's religious convictions. The rules regarding child-rearing imposed by the Jehovah's Witnesses on their followers' children are open to criticism mainly on account of their strictness and intolerance and the obligation on children to proselytise. It is in the children's interests to be free from the constraints and prohibitions imposed by a religion whose structure resembles that of a sect. There is no reason to order a social inquiry report which, in the present circumstances, would serve only to unsettle the children. In the light of the above analysis, the Court considers that, contrary to the lower court's decision, the two under-age children's place of residence should be their father's home, but that parental responsibility should continue to be exercised jointly. Should no agreement be reached [between the parents], Séraphine Palau-Martinez will enjoy free right of access and the right to have the children to stay: – for the whole of the February and All Saints holidays; – for one month during the summer holidays; – for half of the Easter and Christmas holidays, when it will be for the mother to collect the children from the father's home and for the latter to collect them from the mother's home; ...” 14. The applicant appealed on points of law. In particular, she complained that the Court of Appeal had reversed the first-instance judgment on the central ground that the rules regarding child-rearing imposed by the Jehovah's Witnesses on their followers' children were open to criticism mainly on account of their strictness and intolerance and the obligation on children to proselytise; in so deciding, it had done no more than apply a general and abstract ground and had failed to investigate whether, in reality, the children's upbringing was disrupted to an extent that justified changing their place of residence. She considered that this value judgment on the way in which she practised her religion, taken in abstracto, did not justify the court's decision. She added that the manner in which the court had asserted that it was in the children's interests to be free from the constraints and prohibitions imposed by a religion whose structure resembled a sect had been just as abstract. She also complained that the Court of Appeal had refused to grant her request for a social inquiry report. Referring to freedom of conscience and religion and to the rules of a fair hearing, she relied on Articles 9 and 6 of the Convention. 15. The Court of Cassation delivered its judgment on 13 July 2000. After summarising the grounds of the Court of Appeal's judgment, it ruled as follows: “It is apparent from these findings and considerations that the Court of Appeal, which replied to the submissions without inconsistency, was not obliged to order a social inquiry report and did not interfere with Ms Palau-Martinez's freedom of conscience, ruled, on the basis of the evidence which it alone is empowered to assess, that the children's interests required that their father's home be established as their habitual place of residence; ...”

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4. The first applicant, Mr E. Záborský, was born in 1912 and died on 9 April 2000. Ms G. Strešnáková, his daughter, has acted in his stead in pursuing the case. The second applicant, Ms E. Šmáriková, was born in 1917 and lives in Bratislava. 5. On 10 February 1992 the applicants claimed, together with several other persons, restitution of real property pursuant to the Extra-Judicial Rehabilitations Act of 1991. They alleged that their legal predecessors had donated the property to the State under duress. On 27 February 1992 the applicants submitted further documents and on 18 March 1992 the defendant submitted observations on the action. 6. In two separate actions filed on 25 February 1992 further persons claimed restitution of a part of the same property. On 15 April 1992 the court decided to examine all actions in a single set of proceedings. On 22 May 1992 the defendant submitted an expert opinion concerning the property. 7. On 25 June 1992 the Banská Bystrica District Court adjourned the case as further documents were necessary. On 20 July 1992 it appointed an expert with a view to establishing whether or not the property in question had been re-built in a substantial manner as claimed by the defendant. The opinion was submitted on 7 September 1992. Hearings were held on 25 November 1992 and on 7 January 1993. 8. On 11 January 1993 the Banská Bystrica District Court decided the case in that it ordered the defendant to conclude with one of the plaintiffs an agreement on restitution of the property. The judgment was served in June 1993. The defendant and the unsuccessful plaintiffs appealed. On 16 September 1993 the Banská Bystrica Regional Court quashed the first instance judgment and instructed the District Court to take further evidence. The appellate court's decision was served on 5 November 1993, and the parties were invited to specify which evidence they proposed to take. The District Court also took further evidence of its own initiative. 9. A hearing was held on 21 February 1994. The plaintiffs were invited to submit further documents. 10. On 22 April 1994 the District Court appointed an expert with a view to establishing whether the property had been substantially rebuilt following its transfer to the State in 1962. On 5 May 1994 the institution concerned informed the court that it was not in a position to submit an expert opinion. 11. On 8 August 1994 the District Court appointed the Construction Faculty of the Slovak Technical University in Bratislava as expert and ordered that the opinion on the above issue be submitted within thirty days. On 23 November 1994 the court urged the expert to submit the opinion. It was submitted on 12 January 1995. In February and March 1995 the parties submitted their comments on the opinion. 12. Several plaintiffs and the representative of the defendant failed to appear at hearings held on 15 May 1995 and on 12 July 1995. The parties were instructed to submit further information. 13. Further hearings were held on 6 and 11 December 1995. On the latter date the Banská Bystrica District Court delivered a new judgment in which it ordered the defendant to restore the property in question to the plaintiffs. The judgment was served on the parties in the course of August 1996. On 6 and 17 September 1996 the defendant appealed. 14. On 8 October 1996 the president of the Banská Bystrica District Court admitted, in reply to the applicants' complaint, that there had been undue delays in drafting the judgment of 11 December 1995 with reasons. 15. On 25 October 1996 the District Court delivered a supplementary judgment in which it corrected certain errors in the judgment of 11 December 1995. On 13 and 18 November 1996 the plaintiffs appealed against the supplementary judgment. The case-file was transmitted to the Banská Bystrica Regional Court on 21 November 1996. 16. On 20 May 1997 the Banská Bystrica Regional Court quashed the District Court's judgment of 11 December 1995, as subsequently amended, as being erroneous. It instructed the District Court to have the scope of the claim specified by the plaintiffs and to take further evidence. The decision stated, inter alia, that the first instance court had not correctly specified the experts' task and that, as a result, their opinions were not sufficient. The appellate court's decision was served in June 1997. 17. On 20 June 1997 Mr E. Záborský requested that the case be transferred to a District Court in Bratislava. He objected, in particular, that the length of the proceedings was excessive. On 29 July 1997 the applicant withdrew his request. 18. On 13 October 1997 the court requested the plaintiffs to specify, within fifteen days, which share of the property each of them claimed and to provide further information concerning the property claimed. The legal representative of five plaintiffs replied on 3 November 1997. On 18 November 1997 the legal representative of the other plaintiffs asked for an extension of the time-limit on the ground that he had been ill and that the information requested was complex. 19. On 12 January 1998 the District Court discontinued the proceedings on the ground that the plaintiffs had not complied with its order of 13 October 1997. The parties appealed. The case-file was transferred to the Regional Court on 9 February 1999. On 3 March 1998 the Regional Court quashed the decision of 12 January 1998 on the ground that the District Court had not instructed the plaintiffs how the shortcomings in their actions should be remedied and that the time-limit set for that purpose had not been adequate, in particular in view of the fact that information from the land registry was required and that the plaintiffs were represented by several lawyers. 20. On 6 March 1998 the District Court instructed the plaintiffs to submit complementary information concerning their claims within thirty days. 21. On 17 June 1998 the District Court heard the parties and decided to obtain a second expert opinion. 22. On 2 July 1998 the representative of five plaintiffs specified the subject-matter of the claims. 23. By a decision of 26 October 1998 the District Court appointed the Construction Faculty of the Technical University in Košice as expert. It was instructed to establish which parts of the house had been re-built after 1962 and to submit the opinion within thirty days. On 24 November 1998 the Banská Bystrica District Court sent the case-file to the Košice II District Court which was to transmit it to the expert. The university appointed as expert received the file on 23 March 1999. 24. In June, July and October 1999 the Banská Bystrica District Court urged the expert to submit the opinion. It was submitted on 24 November 1999. Between 13 December 1999 and 1 February 2000 the parties submitted their comments on the opinion. 25. Hearings before the District Court were held on 21 February 2000 and on 6 March 2000. On the latter date the District Court dismissed the action with reference to the conclusions reached by an expert who had been earlier appointed and by the Construction Faculty of the Technical University in Košice. 26. At the judge's request the President of the District Court extended the time-limit for drafting the judgment in writing until 30 May 2000 on the ground that the judge had a heavy workload, that the case was complex and, later, that the judge had difficulties with his health. 27. On 22 May 2000 the lawyer representing several of the plaintiffs informed the District Court that Mr E. Záborský had died on 9 April 2000. The lawyer further requested the court to allow Mr. Záborský's wife and daughter to join the proceedings in his place. 28. The first instance judgment was served in the course of June 2000. The plaintiffs appealed. On 12 July 2000 the representative of six plaintiffs submitted reasons for the appeal at the court's request. On 3 August 2000 the case was submitted to the appellate court. 29. On 10 October 2000 the Banská Bystrica Regional Court upheld the first instance judgment. The Regional Court further quashed the first instance decision on the costs of the proceedings. On 6 April 2001 the Banská Bystrica District Court decided that the State was not entitled to have the costs of the proceedings reimbursed by the unsuccessful plaintiffs. Reference was made to the complex character of the point at issue and also to the length of the proceedings.

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10. The applicant was born in 1968 and lives in Birmingham. At the relevant time he was a member of the Royal Air Force (RAF). 11. On 18 February 1998 the applicant, along with a co-accused, was convicted by a district court-martial (pursuant to section 70(1) of the Air Force Act 1955) of theft contrary to the Theft Act 1968. He was sentenced to fifty-six days' imprisonment, to be dismissed from the service and to be reduced to the ranks. 12. The applicant's court-martial was composed of a permanent president (Wing Commander Rodgers), two other officers of lower rank (Squadron Leader Borthwick and Flight Lieutenant Winks) and a judge advocate. Wing Commander Rodgers' appointment to the post of permanent president was his last before retirement in September 1998. Although he had been the subject of appraisal reports prior to August 1997, he was not reported on thereafter. The two ordinary members had attended the junior officers' command course in 1993, which included training in disciplinary processes. 13. By a letter from the reviewing authority dated 3 April 1998, the applicant's representative was informed that neither the findings nor the sentence of the court-martial would be varied. The authority had received advice from the Judge Advocate General. 14. The applicant's appeal to the Courts-Martial Appeal Court against conviction and sentence was dismissed on 5 February 1999.

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8. The applicant was born in 1948 and lives in Budapest. 9. On 7 July 1993 Mr and Mrs N. brought an action against the applicant before the Pest Central District Court. The litigation concerned a contract of loan which had been concluded between the parties. The plaintiffs sought annulment of the acquisition by the applicant of their flat, which had been used as security in the event of their non-payment of the loan. On 15 July 1993 the applicant filed his counterclaims. 10. On 9 February, 21 March, 5 October 1994 and 8 March 1995 the District Court held hearings. 11. On 13 March 1995 the District Court adopted a judgment in which it annulled the applicant's acquisition of the flat. As to the loan contract, the court decided to reduce the amount owed by the plaintiffs' to the applicant. 12. On 22 March 1995 the plaintiffs appealed and, simultaneously, requested that the contract of loan should itself be annulled and that the judgment of 13 March 1995 should be supplemented to that effect. On 27 March 1995 the applicant filed his appeal. 13. On 29 March 1995 the applicant filed a motion for bias which was dismissed on 26 May 1995. 14. On 29 March 1995 the applicant filed a motion for bias which was dismissed on 26 May 1995. The Budapest Regional Court held hearings on 29 June and 14 November 1995. On the latter date the court suspended the appeal proceedings pending the first-instance completion of the judgment of 13 March 1995. 15. The hearings scheduled by the District Court for 7 February and 12 April 1996 were adjourned on account of unsuccessful attempts to summon one of the defendants. 16. By a supplementary decision of 9 October 1996, the District Court allowed the plaintiffs' claim for completion of the initial judgment and accordingly ruled that the contract of loan should be annulled. 17. On 21 November 1996 the applicant appealed. Subsequently, he challenged the second-instance court for bias. 18. On 17 February 1997 the Regional Court dismissed the applicant's motion for bias. It resumed the suspended proceedings and held a hearing on 8 July 1997. At that hearing the applicant reiterated his allegations of bias. 19. On 4 September 1997 the judges declared bias and withdrew from the case. 20. A hearing scheduled for 22 January 1998 was cancelled on account of the illness of a judge on the newly appointed bench. A hearing took place on 2 June 1998. 21. On 9 June 1998 the Regional Court adopted a second-instance judgment upholding in essence the decisions taken at first instance. 22. On 3 September 1998 the applicant submitted a petition for review. 23. On 23 February 1999 the Supreme Court ordered the completion of the petition and attempted to notify the plaintiffs thereof. Subsequently a guardian ad litem had to be appointed for the plaintiffs. The guardian submitted the plaintiffs' claims in reply on 22 December 1999. 24. On 4 April 2000 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant's petition for review. This decision was served on him on 17 July 2000. 25. On 11 October 1994 the applicant brought an action before the Pest Central District Court against Mr and Mrs S., guarantors of the above-mentioned contract of loan. On 26 October 1994 the court ordered the applicant to complete his action. He did so on 5 December 1994. 26. On 18 July 1995 the District Court held a hearing at which it allowed the applicant's claims and ordered the defendants to pay him 610,000 Hungarian forints. 27. On 21 August 1995 the defendants appealed. They were subsequently ordered to complete their appeal. On their request, the Regional Court gave them leave until 20 November 1995 to do so. 28. On 20 May 1996 the Regional Court held a hearing and dismissed the defendants' appeal. 29. On 16 December 1997 the Supreme Court, in review proceedings, quashed the second-instance decision holding that the validity of the loan contract had to be dealt with as a preliminary issue. 30. In the resumed proceedings, on 20 May 1998 the Regional Court suspended the proceedings pending the outcome of the appeal concerning the aforementioned action brought by Mr and Mrs N. against the applicant. 31. Following the Supreme Court's review decision of 4 April 2000 in the first proceedings, the Regional Court recommenced the examination of the second case and, on 31 January 2001, it dismissed the defendants' appeal. No petition for review was filed against this decision.

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8. The applicant was born in 1937 and lives in Halásztelek, Hungary. 9. In February 1991 the applicant's employment was terminated by mutual consent. She subsequently challenged the validity of this agreement and claimed damages before the Budapest Labour Court. Her action was filed with the court on 3 May 1991. The applicant alleged that her resignation was void on account of her temporary incapacity at the time of signing the agreement with her employer. 10. On 3 July and 30 September 1991, as well as on 25 March and 22 September 1992, hearings were held. On 10 June 1993 the Labour Court suspended the proceedings pending the preparation of a medical expert opinion on the applicant's mental capacity. This opinion was submitted on 26 October 1993. In view of certain inconsistencies between this opinion and earlier opinions, the applicant was subsequently ordered to undergo an examination by the National Council of Health Sciences (“the Council”). This examination was carried out on 11 November 1994. The Council's opinion was submitted to the court on 12 January 1995. 11. The proceedings were resumed and a hearing was held on 10 October 1995. At the hearing the applicant was requested to elaborate on and quantify her claims. 12. On 16 April 1996 the Labour Court requested the Council to update its opinion. The Council's revised opinion was submitted on 11 July 1996. 13. On 29 October 1996 the Labour Court reminded the applicant of its order of 10 October 1995 requiring her to quantify her claims. She did so on 26 November 1996. 14. On 4 December 1996, 29 January, 12 March and 28 May 1997 further hearings took place. On the latter date the Budapest Labour Court delivered its judgment in which it annulled the disputed agreement and dismissed the remainder of the action. 15. The applicant's appeal of 14 November 1997 was dismissed by the Budapest Regional Court on 15 April 1998. 16. On 31 March 1999 the Supreme Court dismissed her petition for review. This decision was served on 4 May 1999.

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8. The applicant was born in 1946 and lives in Budapest. 9. The applicant is a merchant with business premises at the Budapest Market Hall. On 22 December 1998 the police arrived at the Market Hall in response to a bomb alert and required everyone to evacuate the building so that it could be searched. The applicant and several other persons refused to comply with this instruction. Following an argument lasting from 4 p.m. until 5.45 p.m. between certain merchants, including the applicant, and the police, the officer in charge decided to detain the applicant, believing him to be responsible for the general disobedience to the order to evacuate. 10. The Government stated that when two police officers grabbed him by his arms and started to hustle him out, the applicant threw himself on the ground. 11. The applicant stated that he had not resisted the police officers and that he had been grabbed without warning and his legs kicked from under him. 12. Having immobilised the applicant, two police officers dragged him through the Market Hall to the exit. Outside the building he was handcuffed and forced into a police car and then driven to the Budapest IX District Police Department. 13. The applicant stated that, while in the car, he was hit repeatedly by a police officer. 14. On their arrival at the Police Department, police officers lifted the applicant out of the car, hauling him up by the handcuffs attached to his wrists. 15. As the applicant had suffered some bruises to his wrists and face, a doctor was called. The applicant did not indicate to the doctor that he had been ill-treated by the police. 16. The applicant maintained that at the police station he was taken to the basement where at least four police officers repeatedly beat and kicked him. One of them stepped on his belly with such violence that it caused bowel movements. Subsequently, he was placed in a cell for about three hours. During that time a police lieutenant entered the cell, shouted at him, abused him verbally and spat in his face. 17. Eventually two police officers fetched the applicant and escorted him to the exit at about 9 p.m. 18. On 22 and 23 December 1998 the applicant was examined at the National Institute of Traumatology and the Central Institute of Stomatology. 19. On 23 December 1998 the applicant laid charges of ill-treatment and unlawful detention against the police. In the ensuing criminal proceedings, the Budapest Investigation Office heard the applicant, his wife and son and five other witnesses who had been present in the Market Hall at the time of the incident. These witnesses, all from the applicant's side, confirmed that he had been dragged through the Market Hall but they remained inconclusive as to whether the applicant had been kicked off his feet or had thrown himself on the ground in resistance. The Investigation Office also heard Mr F., who was the commander of the bomb disposal squad in charge of the operation at the Market Hall, as well as the managers of the Market Hall. 20. The applicant alleged that in the course of his interrogation he identified two of the police officers who had assaulted him and that he selected their photographs from several shown to him. However, the photograph of a third officer involved was not among those shown to him. 21. The prosecutor in charge obtained and watched a video recording shot by a television cameraman outside the Market Hall at the time of the incident, but found nothing of relevance. 22. The opinion of Dr M., a forensic medical expert, dated 24 March 1999, which was prepared at the request of the Investigation Office, contained the following conclusions: “[...] According to the documents on the medical examination of [the applicant] carried out on 22 December 1998 at 9.58 p.m. at the National Institute of Traumatology, his right-side upper incisor no. 1 was loosened, he had concentrical bruises on the soft parts of both wrists and hyperaemia could be observed on a palm-sized surface on the left side of the belly wall. He complained of pain in the right side of his chest and the right ankle joint but no exterior signs of any injury could be observed. The X-ray examination did not display any traumatic deviation either. The diagnoses contained in the outpatient medical file, the medical report and the medical opinion read as follows: 'Dislocation of the right-side upper tooth. Bruises on both wrists. Bruises on the right side of the chest and on the left side of the belly wall. Bruises on the right hand.' [The applicant's] stomatological examination carried out at the Central Institute of Stomatology on 23 December 1998 at 10 p.m. established the traumatic loosening of the upper incisor no. 1 on the right side and that of both incisors on the left side. It also established that the bridgework between the upper teeth nos. 3 and 7 on the left side became loose in a non-traumatic way. As treatment, his pain was alleviated and 'rehabilitative dental treatment' was proposed for him on account of the loosening of the bridgework and of the incisors indicated above. The stomatological report contains the diagnosis of 'loosening of the upper incisors'. On the basis of the available medical files, it can be established from a forensic medical point of view that [the applicant] actually suffered loosening of the upper incisor no. 1 on the right side and of both incisors on the left side and, in addition, bruises on the soft parts of both wrists and circumscript hyperaemia on the left side of the belly wall. The bruises on the right side of the chest and on the right hand diagnosed in the traumatological medical files cannot be substantiated from a forensic medical point of view, given that those diagnoses were based exclusively on pain alleged by [the applicant] but no exterior signs of any injury could be observed. [...] 1. [The applicant's] injuries as described in the medical files jointly and severally healed within 8 days. No disability or serious deterioration of health may be expected as a consequence of the injuries suffered. 2. On the basis of the available medical findings, it can be substantiated that the body sustained three non-incisive knocks of maximally medium impact (közepesnél nem nagyobb erejű tompa erőhatás). One knock may have affected the area of the upper incisors, necessarily at a moment when the lips did not cover the teeth. The mouth was probably open since three incisors became loose whereas the upper lip was not injured. One knock may have affected the area of both wrists, almost certainly as a result of handcuffing. One knock may have affected the belly wall, most probably in the form of a blow effected with an open hand. It cannot be excluded that the injuries diagnosed in the medical files were occasioned at the time specified by [the applicant] in the course of the police action. It can be stated most definitely that the truth of [the applicant's] allegation as to the degree and severity of the ill-treatment he allegedly suffered can be excluded from a forensic medical point of view. This conclusion is supported by the consideration that if [the applicant] had really been seriously ill-treated by several persons for a longer period of time in the form of numerous blows and kicks to his body, he would also have suffered, all over his body, injuries such as bruises of the covered soft parts. In addition, as a result of the alleged fact that he had been dragged on the ground, he would also have had bruises on the epithelium of the lower limbs. On the basis of the medical files, however, only the fact of handcuffing can be established. In addition to the latter, the mouth and the belly wall areas may each have sustained a non-incisive knock of medium impact. A blow (ütés) or a bang (ütődés) could equally have caused these latter injuries, which means that they could easily be caused without ill-treatment, and simply result from an impact sustained in the course of the police action during which physical force was applied in order to effect the handcuffing. 23. On 27 July 1999 the Investigation Office discontinued the proceedings concerning the applicant's complaints against the police. Relying on the above medical report, the Investigation Office concluded that the applicant's allegations of ill-treatment were impossible to prove, whereas his police custody had been justified on account of his resistance to lawful police measures. 24. On 8 August 1999 the applicant complained to the Budapest Public Prosecutor's Office against the order to discontinue the investigations. 25. On 24 September 1999 the Public Prosecutor's Office dismissed the applicant's complaint. It noted that according to the medical documents in the case – and contrary to his statement of complaint – the applicant's injuries had healed within eight days. Furthermore, since his allegations were impossible to reconcile with some of the witness testimony, the Public Prosecutor's Office saw no reason to depart from the conclusions of the Investigation Office.

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6. The applicant was born in 1946 and lives in Gerasdorf-Seyring (Austria). 7. On 2 October 1992 the Vienna Customs Office (Zollamt) opened investigations against a number of suspects under the Tax Offences Act (Finanzstrafgesetz) concerning charges of smuggling. Subsequently, these investigations were also directed against the applicant. 8. On 30 September 1993 the Customs Office transmitted the final investigations report concerning the applicant and seven other suspects to the Vienna Public Prosecutor's Office (Staatsanwaltschaft). 9. On 1 July 1999, after the investigating judge conducted further investigations, the Public Prosecutor preferred the indictment on charges of smuggling against the applicant and two co-accused. 10. On 30 November 1999 the Vienna Regional Criminal Court acquitted the applicant. 11. On 12 September 2000 the Supreme Court dismissed the pleas of nullity and the appeal against sentence. The decision was served on the applicant on 5 October 2000.

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9. The applicants, Volkan Ükünç and Deniz Güneş, are Turkish nationals. They were both born in 1980 and live in Edirne, Turkey. 10. On 8 February 1996 the applicants were taken into custody by the Edirne Anti-Terror Branch on suspicion of being members of an illegal organisation, namely, the DHKP-C (Revolutionary People's Liberation Party-Front). The applicants were kept in custody until 12 February 1996. They were interrogated by the police on 10 February 1996 in the absence of their lawyers. 11. On 12 February 1996 the applicants were brought before the Public Prosecutor and then before a judge. On both occasions they repeated their statements of 10 February 1996. The applicants were released on the same day. They were not represented by lawyers. 12. On 11 March 1996 the public prosecutor at the Istanbul State Security Court filed an indictment with the court and accused the applicants and three other co-accused of aiding and abetting an illegal terrorist organisation and requested the court to apply Article 169 of the Turkish Criminal Code and section 5 of Law No. 3713 (the Prevention of Terrorism Act 1991 as amended). 13. On 17 April 1996 the Edirne Assize Court requested the applicants' observations on the charges against them for submission to the Istanbul State Security Court. According to the minutes of the hearing which took place before the Edirne Assize Court, the applicants did not want to be represented by lawyers. They challenged for the first time the authenticity of the statements which they gave to the police, to the public prosecutor and to the judge. 14. On 21 May 1996 the applicants requested the Istanbul State Security Court not to require them to appear at any of the hearings since they had to attend school. This request was upheld by the court and the applicants were legally represented by four lawyers in their absence in subsequent hearings. 15. On 8 April 1997 the Istanbul State Security Court found the applicants guilty of aiding and abetting the DHKP-C, and sentenced them to two years and six months' imprisonment. The court pointed out that the applicants' defence statement to the Edirne Assize Court alleging that they had been forced to repeat the prepared confession statements when brought before the public prosecutor and the judge on 12 February 1996 was unconvincing. The court concluded that the applicants aided and abetted the DHKP-C by painting a slogan on a wall, distributing publications supporting DHKP-C and putting up a placard in the entrance of a shop. 16. The applicants appealed on the ground that they were convicted on the basis of the statements they had given under duress and that there was, therefore, no concrete evidence on which they could be convicted. 17. On 9 December 1997 the Court of Cassation dismissed the appeal lodged by the applicants and upheld the State Security Court's decision. The Cassation Court noted in its decision that the applicants' lawyers, despite having requested the Cassation Court to hold an appeal hearing, did not attend the hearing. 18. In accordance with established practice, the judgment of the Court of Cassation of 9 December 1997 was sent to the Istanbul State Security Court and deposited with that court's Registry on 5 January 1998. 19. The applicants claim that they became aware of the decision on 4 March 1998. 20. On 9 March 1998 the applicants applied for rectification of the Court of Cassation's decision on the ground that the preliminary investigation was unlawful having been conducted without their lawyer being present and given that they were minors at the date of the offences. The applicants' rectification request was rejected on 22 May 1998.

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7. The applicants were born in 1966, 1975, 1934 and 1971 respectively and live in the town of Yüksekova, in south-east Turkey. 8. On 27 October 1995, soldiers belonging to the Yüksekova Commando Battalion under the command of Major Mehmet Emin Yurdakul came to Ağaçlı village to conduct a military operation. 9. Şemsettin Yurtseven, the father of the first and the second applicants, Mikdat Özeken, the son of the third applicant and Münür Sarıtaş, the younger brother of the fourth applicant, were singled out and put in a military vehicle and taken away by the soldiers. They were not released afterwards. Şemsettin Yurtseven was 73 years of age and was living in Ağaçlı village. Mikdat Özeken who was 18 years old and Münür Sarıtaş who was 13 years old, had come to Ağaçlı village that day to collect wood. 10. The applicants applied to the Yüksekova Commando Battalion and asked for information about their relatives. Major Yurdakul denied the arrest of the applicants' relatives. 11. Since the arrest of their relatives on 27 October 1995 the applicants have obtained no information about their relatives' whereabouts. 12. According to the Government, no security operation was conducted in Ağaçlı village on the day in question and that the applicants' relatives were not arrested. 13. On 13 June 1997 the Hakkari chief public prosecutor filed a bill of indictment with the Hakkari Assize Court (Hakkari Ağır Ceza Mahkemesi). The chief public prosecutor stated that the information obtained indicated that Şemsettin Yurtseven had been beaten to death by Major Mehmet Emin Yurdakul after he was taken into custody during an operation conducted in Ağaçlı village between 25 and 28 October 1995. Mikdat Özeken and Münür Sarıtaş, who had witnessed this killing, were themselves later shot dead by Kahraman Bilgiç and Nihat Yiğiter, a confessor [Note: Itirafçı (confessor): a term used to describe a defected member of an illegal organisation who provides the authorities with information about that organisation.] and an army captain respectively. 14. On 12 November 1999 the Hakkari Assize Court acquitted Mehmet Emin Yurdakul, Nihat Yiğiter and Kahraman Bilgiç for lack of sufficient evidence to prove that they had killed the applicants' relatives. 15. The Hakkari Assize Court reached, inter alia, the following findings in its reasoning: “In the light of the evidence set out above, and in particular the testimonies of the villagers in whose village the operation took place, there is corroborating evidence that an operation was conducted in Karlı village on 27 October 1995 by the Yüksekova Mountain Commando Battalion and that Şemsettin (Abdulkerim) Yurtseven, Mikdat Özeken and Münür Sarıtaş were taken away by the soldiers in a military vehicle. There is, however, no evidence in the file to show what happened to these persons subsequently. In other words, their fates are unknown. There is no evidence in the file other than the allegations made by Kahraman Bilgiç during the course of the preliminary investigation on 25 February 1997 -which he later repeated during the trial proceedings - to prove that the disappeared persons were taken to the Battalion after the operation, that Şemsettin died as a result of having been beaten up by the commander Mehmet Emin Yurdakul, or that the other two were killed because they had witnessed the killing of Şemsettin...Finally, the fact that the bodies were never recovered casts doubt on the accuracy of the claims that these persons did indeed die”. 16. The court also decided to request the prosecutor to open an investigation into the disappearance of the three persons as there was evidence in the file indicating that Mehmet Emin Yurdakul had exceeded his powers and detained these persons without authorisation. 17. An appeal lodged by the applicants' lawyer against the Hakkari Assize Court's judgment was rejected by the Court of Cassation (Yargıtay) on 2 April 2001.

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4. The applicant is the owner of a flat in Milan, which it had let to E.S. 5. In a writ served on the tenant on 24 April 1986, the applicant informed the tenant that it intended to terminate the lease on expiry of the term and summoned her to appear before the Milan Magistrate. 6. By a decision of 12 May 1986, which was made enforceable on 22 May 1986, the Milan Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 29 March 1987. 7. On 5 June 1987, the applicant served notice on the tenant requiring her to vacate the premises. 8. On 26 June 1987, the applicant informed the tenant that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 24 July 1987. 9. Between 24 July 1987 and 9 November 1999, the bailiff made forty attempts to recover possession. Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as the applicant was not entitled to police assistance in enforcing the order for possession. 10. On 14 January 2000, the applicant recovered possession of the flat.

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8. The applicant was born in 1965 and lives in Koszwały, Poland. 9. On 6 February 1992 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of murder, grievous bodily harm, and insulting and assaulting policemen. 10. On 8 February 1992 the Gdańsk District Prosecutor (Prokurator Rejonowy) brought criminal charges against him. 11. On 6 July 1992 prosecution authorities lodged with the Gdańsk Regional Court (Sąd Wojewódzki) a bill of indictment against him. 12. From 29 January 1993 to 30 April 1993 no hearing was held. 13. A hearing listed for 18 June 1993 was adjourned until 21 September 1993. A further hearing, listed for 21 September 1993, was adjourned because the judge rapporteur was ill. The next hearing, scheduled for 12 October 1993, was cancelled because the judge rapporteur was hospitalised. 14. On 10 January 1994 the case was assigned to another panel of judges as the presiding judge rapporteur resigned from his function. 15. On 15 March 1994 the hearing was re-opened. 16. The subsequent hearings were held on 22 March, 18 May, 12 July and 26 September 1994 and on 10 January 1995. 17. On 13 January 1995 the Gdańsk Regional Court pronounced its judgment. It convicted the applicant as indicted, except for the count of murder, of which he was acquitted. The court sentenced him to five years' imprisonment. On 3 July 1995 the prosecutor lodged an appeal against that judgment, contesting its part relating to the acquittal. 18. On 12 October 1995 the Gdańsk Court of Appeal (Sąd Apelacyjny) quashed the contested part of the first-instance court's judgment and remitted the case for re-examination. 19. The court held hearings on 13 March and 15 May 1996. A hearing scheduled for 8 July 1996 was adjourned until 14 October 1996. A further hearing, listed for 14 October 1996, was cancelled because the judge rapporteur was ill. The subsequent hearing was held on 6 November 1996. 20. On 13 December 1996 the Gdańsk Regional Court convicted the applicant of murder with an oblique intent (w zamiarze ewentualnym) and sentenced him to nine years' imprisonment. The applicant lodged an appeal against that judgment. 21. On 18 June 1997 the Gdańsk Court of Appeal modified the judgment in that it convicted the applicant of grievous bodily harm with deadly effect and sentenced him to seven years' imprisonment. 22. In the letter of 1 July 1997 the applicant's legal aid lawyer informed him that he refused to lodge a cassation appeal against that judgment, arguing that there was no indication of any breach of substantive or procedural law. He explained that lodging that appeal would only delay the proceedings concerning a cumulative penalty (kara łączna) and, afterwards, proceedings concerning the applicant's conditional release. 23. On 13 July 1998 the Gdańsk Regional Court delivered a judgment in which it sentenced the applicant to ten years' imprisonment as the cumulative penalty for the convictions included in the judgments of 13 January 1995, 13 December 1996 and 27 May 1992 (delivered in the course of other criminal proceedings).

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10. The applicants are Turkish citizens of Kurdish origin born in 1940, 1934, 1964, 1966 and 1963 respectively. At the time of the events giving rise to their application, the applicants and their families were living in the town of Lice in Diyarbakır province (south-east Turkey). The application concerns the applicants' allegation that the security forces deliberately destroyed the town of Lice, including their houses and other possessions, as an act of retaliation for the inhabitants' alleged sympathy for the PKK. 11. The facts of the case, particularly concerning events on or about 22 and 23 October 1993, are disputed by the parties. 12. The facts as presented by the applicants are set out in Section B below (paragraphs 16-23). The Government's submissions concerning the facts are summarised in Section C below (paragraphs 24-25). 13. The Commission, in order to establish the facts disputed by the parties, conducted an investigation with the assistance of the parties, pursuant to former Article 28 § 1 (a) of the Convention. Three delegates of the Commission heard the applicants in Ankara from 16 to 20 June 1997 as well as the following 15 witnesses: Leyla Ayder, daughter of the applicant Ahmet Ayder; Huri Biçer, sister of the applicant Şevket Biçer; Türkan, Tahir and Bedriye Ekmekçi, respectively the step-mother, father-in-law and mother-in-law of the applicant Zeydin Ekmekçi; Mustafa Öztan, chief constable of the Lice police; Mehmet Dabak and Özcan Küçüköz, public prosecutors; Ebedi Delidere, deputy mayor of Lice; Gürcan Acar, judge at the Lice Magistrates' Court; İbrahim Şahin, Governor of Diyarbakır province; Hasan Çakır, commander of Lice central gendarme station; Şahap Yaralı, commander of Lice district gendarmerie; Mustafa Küçük, commander of Lice gendarme commando unit; and Yunus Nebioğlu, gendarme investigator appointed by the Office of the Diyarbakır Provincial Governor. A further three witnesses, who had been involved in the damage assessments carried out in Lice, had been summoned but did not appear before the Commission's Delegates. 14. The Commission's evaluation of the evidence and its findings of fact are set out in its report of 21 October 1999 and are summarised in Section D below (paragraphs 26-61). The applicants accept the Commission's findings of fact. 15. Section E (paragraphs 62-63) contains excerpts of the summary of the evidence given to the Commission's Delegates by Gürcan Acar and İbrahim Şahin. Section F (paragraphs 64-66) sets out the documents submitted by the parties to the Commission and the Court relating to the assessment of damage. 16. Lice was a small town with a population of, very approximately, 5,000 people. Following an earthquake in 1975 many of the houses had been rebuilt in materials which, if set alight, burned easily. Many of the citizens had built stables close to their houses out of mud; these offered greater protection from fire. The official buildings were more substantial. Lice was built on a hillside, the northernmost part of the town being significantly higher than the southern side. 17. There had previously been considerable PKK activity both within and in the vicinity of Lice. Attacks within Lice were directed against State buildings and occurred at night. In the surrounding area, attacks were not confined to the hours of darkness. A short time before the events at issue there had been an operation outside Lice which resulted in the bodies of 15 dead terrorists being brought to Lice for the necessary administrative formalities to be carried out. 18. On 22 October 1993 a large scale, pre-planned operation was carried out in Lice by security forces, notably gendarmes, who opened fire indiscriminately. Before firing commenced, artillery had been placed across the Diyarbakır-Lice road, people in coffee shops had been instructed by gendarmes to go home and children whose parents were in the security forces had been collected from school. Soon after the firing started, helicopters arrived. Some of these were combat helicopters, rather than troop carriers, and machine guns operating out of them were used to fire into the town. Shots were also fired from, notably, the police headquarters, the gendarme commando unit compound, the gendarme station and the regional boarding school where military units were stationed. There was no PKK presence in the town and there was no incoming fire, which explains why these security buildings sustained little or no damage. 19. Any clashes between the PKK and the security forces that took place on 22 October 1993 occurred to the south and south-east of Lice. In the morning, a police vehicle had come under attack on the Lice-Kulp road as it made its way to a petrol station. Later that day, the Lice commando unit which had left town early in the morning to conduct an operation elsewhere was attacked as it attempted to re-enter Lice near the creek which runs from north to south to the east of Lice. 20. The residents of the north-westerly neighbourhood of Kalı, where the houses of all applicants except Yusuf Lalealp's were situated, heard the sounds of bullets impacting on the walls of their homes and stables. They saw members of the security forces driving round in armoured vehicles, firing randomly, and they also saw them on foot – the security forces were not being fired at. They saw and heard helicopters and heard explosions close by, just after the helicopters had passed overhead. 21. Yusuf Lalealp's house in the Şaar neighbourhood in the south-east of Lice was deliberately set alight by security forces on 22 October 1993. The houses of the other applicants were deliberately burned by security forces the following morning, after the shooting had stopped. At about 8 a.m. people were ordered out of their houses by security forces without being given the opportunity to gather their possessions. The first group, consisting of the households of the applicants Ahmet Ayder and Nadir Doman and their neighbours, was gathered in an open area opposite their homes. The security forces broke down doors and/or windows and set fire to the houses with the use of a weapon in the shape of a long tube. The houses situated lower down in the neighbourhood were already on fire by the time the households belonging to the family of the applicant Zeydin Ekmekçi were ordered out of their homes and taken to join the others. The family of the applicant Şevket Biçer were made to leave their home later and by that time the group gathered in the open area had already left for the square near the police headquarters. 22. A large number of people were made to wait in that square for three or four hours for the arrival of the Provincial Governor. The Governor, speaking in Turkish, told the people that the PKK was responsible for the destruction. A middle-aged man and a young woman protested that the soldiers had set fire to the houses; the man was taken away and beaten up, the woman was arrested. Following the Governor's speech a curfew was imposed. Upon returning to their houses the applicants found nothing but a pile of ashes. After the curfew was lifted they left Lice. 23. The applicants complained to the public prosecutor. He did not formally record their complaints but he did make arrangements for damage assessment reports to be drawn up. The applicants received no compensation. No investigation was launched into the actions of the security forces until the notification of the present application to the Government by the Commission, despite the applicants' complaints and allegations of a similar nature being widely reported in the media. 24. On 22 October 1993, at 8 a.m., the PKK launched an attack on Lice which continued until the evening. The security forces had to respond. Despite the precautions taken by the security forces, two of their members were killed and one was injured. Among the civilian population 13 people died and 74 were injured. In the course of the PKK attack and the defence by the security forces certain houses and shops were damaged. 25. The State acted immediately in support of the inhabitants of Lice. Tents were distributed. Buildings and shops that had been damaged were repaired after the damage had been assessed. Money was paid to shop owners whose merchandise had been damaged. Houses were repaired; however, no money was paid to house owners. 26. In the town of Lice a large part of the population lived in prefabricated housing, erected after an earthquake. These dwellings were made of materials which, if set alight, burned easily. 27. In late 1993 there was a sizeable security force presence based in Lice. There was a police force and a central gendarmerie. The district gendarmerie headquarters was also based in Lice, sharing a building with the central gendarmerie. There was also a commando unit, attached to the gendarmerie and stationed in its own compound. According to the commander of that unit, Hasan Çakır, that compound also housed a mechanised infantry company. In addition, there appeared to have been an infantry battalion billeted at or near the regional boarding school at the relevant time. 28. The evidence obtained concerning the frequency of attacks carried out on Lice by the PKK was contradictory. Most of the Government witnesses stated before the Delegates that official buildings were attacked by terrorists on a regular basis and they named a number of buildings which had been destroyed by terrorists. A number of the applicants and their witnesses, however, contended that no clashes had taken place in or around Lice, or that such clashes had been confined to the surrounding areas and the mountains. In their final observations to the Commission, the applicants, referring to newspaper cuttings, submitted that the PKK had avoided attacking Lice for two years in order to spare the civil population. Although this tallied with the testimony of Türkan Ekmekçi, who said that there had been clashes in the past but that they had stopped, Ebedi Delidere and Leyla Ayder told the Delegates that there had been clashes, tension and violence in Lice prior to 22 October 1993, Delidere adding that no one in Lice would go out after dark. 29. From other cases that the Commission had dealt with concerning events in south-east Turkey, it had become clear that PKK activity was rife in 1993. The evidence with which it was presented in the instant case did not persuade the Commission that this level of PKK activity would have been significantly different in Lice. The Commission further found credible the evidence – offered by both the applicants' and the Government's witnesses – that PKK attacks mainly took place at night. The Commission also found it established that about a fortnight prior to the events at issue there had been an incident outside Lice during which between 12 and 15 terrorists were killed and their bodies taken to Lice. 30. The Commission was prepared to accept, however, that those applicants and witnesses who professed to have no knowledge whatsoever of PKK activities in Lice or its vicinity may well have done so out of fear, and it considered that this did not necessarily affect the credibility of the rest of their testimony. It noted in this respect that police chief constable Öztan and the gendarme officers Yaralı and Nebioğlu indicated that the voicing of accusations against the PKK could well have adverse consequences for the individual concerned. 31. The Commission noted that according to the applicants, the town of Lice was not attacked by the PKK on 22 October 1993 but was deliberately destroyed by security forces in a pre-planned operation. In their view, the most likely motive for this action, given previous incidents in the town, was to terrorise the local population and to 'teach them a lesson' for their alleged sympathy for the PKK. 32. Also according to the applicants, there was no evidence, either in the form of casualties or damage to security buildings, of any PKK presence in the town on 22 October. They nevertheless conceded that the attacks on the police vehicle and subsequently on the returning commando unit which, they submitted, took place outside the town, to the south-east, could plausibly be attributed to terrorists. 33. The Commission noted that the position of the petrol station where the police vehicle was shot at was not indicated on the map provided by the Government (Appendix II to the Commission's report). On the map submitted by the applicants it featured (as “Garage”) just outside Lice (Appendix III to the Commission's report). Neither map containing an indication of scale, it was difficult to assess how far outside the town the petrol station was situated. Nevertheless, it did not appear to be in dispute that the shots fired came from the vineyards rather than the town. 34. The Commission was less inclined to accept, however, that the attack on the returning commando unit also occurred outside the town. It observed that according to the gendarmerie incident report of 22 October, the armoured vehicle which was to collect the commando unit was sent to an area in the vicinity of the Şaar neighbourhood, that Şahap Yaralı's report described this area as situated “in the south of the district and to the south of the commando unit compound” and that in his oral testimony Mr Yaralı stated that he had instructed the commando unit to enter Lice through the creek bed in the Şaar neighbourhood to the south of the commando unit compound. Again, in the absence of an indication of scale on the maps it was difficult to place this event with accuracy, but it would appear that the creek mentioned ran quite close to the inhabited area of the Şaar neighbourhood. More importantly, Mr Yaralı added that shots had been fired from houses facing the creek. The Commission found that the evidence before it thus pointed to a presence of PKK members or militiamen [Nota: Militiamen: term used to describe members of the civilian population who provide the PKK with food, shelter and/or information.] in at least some part of the town. 35. The applicants also argued that the availability of helicopters very soon after the shooting started served as a further indication of the planned nature of the operation. The Commission noted that a considerable number of witnesses, including members of the security forces, testified to the presence of helicopters. Both in his report and in his account to the Delegates, Şahap Yaralı related how helicopters had been used to transport injured persons, including General Aydın, to hospital in Diyarbakır and how armed Cobra helicopters had been deployed. It was only police chief constable Mustafa Öztan according to whom just two helicopters had briefly flown over Lice around midday: one a troop carrier and one with fire-power which had been sent in order to enable the first helicopter to land but which had returned to Diyarbakır upon learning that that first helicopter had been forced to put down at Hani. The Delegates found Mr Öztan an evasive and rather reluctant witness who was unwilling to acknowledge pieces of information unless these were directly put to him from the various incident reports. Although his ignorance of the actions of the various gendarmerie units appeared genuine and he might therefore not have had direct knowledge of the request for helicopters emanating from the gendarmerie, the Commission considered it scarcely credible that he would not have become aware of the presence of these helicopters as events unfolded. 36. As to the time of arrival of the various helicopters, Şevket Biçer told the Delegates that he had seen six helicopters arrive from the direction of Diyarbakır 10 to 15 minutes after the shooting had commenced. Huri Biçer stated that helicopters had been flying around throughout the day. The Commission observed that it appeared from Şahap Yaralı's account that one helicopter, with General Aydın on board, had landed at the commando unit compound early in the morning and also that the commando unit's single helicopter had been sent to Kulp early on in the day. Although there had, therefore, been helicopters flying over Lice at an early stage, the helicopters used to transport the wounded and the armed Cobra helicopters did not arrive until later. The Government denied that any orders had been given to the helicopter forces prior to the events. However, they failed to comply with the Commission's request to submit the operational orders for these forces. The Commission found this regrettable, given that the orders would presumably have been able to clarify at what time the helicopters had taken off. 37. Although Mustafa Öztan was adamant that no shots or bombs had been fired from helicopters, the Commission found it established that armed helicopters were deployed and that shots were fired from them. However, it remained in dispute whether this shooting was at all directed at populated areas or, as Mr Yaralı maintained, confined to the areas to the north of Lice. The Commission found some strength in the argument that indiscriminate gunfire from helicopters over the town would have endangered the security forces on the ground, especially if, as the applicants alleged, members of these forces were moving around on foot. 38. In spite of the above, the Commission considered that no clear picture of events emerged from the account, given both in writing and orally, by members of the security forces. In this context it noted in the first place the diverging recollections of the police on the one hand and the gendarmerie on the other. The differing accounts relating to the presence and number of helicopters had already been addressed. In addition, whereas police chief constable Öztan estimated that some 50 terrorists had been ensconced in the mosque, gendarme officer Yaralı put this number at between five and ten and reckoned that in the town as a whole a maximum of only 30 terrorists had been present. The Commission was struck by the apparent lack of communication and coordination between the police and gendarmerie which the oral testimony of Mr Öztan in particular brought to the fore: even after the events, this official, who was in charge of the local police force, appeared to be in the dark about many aspects of what had transpired on 22 October 1993. 39. The successful escape of all terrorists allegedly present in the town was also rather surprising, as this was said to have occurred at a time when the security forces would by far have outnumbered the terrorists. Even if the Commission accepted that the terrorists' escape route, northwards through the creek to the west of the Kalı neighbourhood, was impossible to secure, it was not clear how they would have reached that part of the town. This question was even more pertinent in respect of the terrorists allegedly hiding in the mosque and who only had two gates available to them to make their way out of an otherwise walled-in area. 40. The Commission further observed that no satisfactory explanation had been provided for the limited amount of damage sustained by buildings belonging to the security forces, despite the fact that these were said to be the terrorists' main targets. It noted that the police headquarters was not even included in the report of determination of damaged buildings. Given that these buildings were allegedly not only subjected to gunfire but also to rocket attacks, the Commission was not convinced that the mere fact that these buildings were made out of more solid materials than most of the houses could account for this. 41. Although the Commission was thus of the opinion that a disturbing amount of relevant questions remained unanswered, it considered this an insufficient basis for a conclusive finding that no clash whatsoever took place on 22 October 1993, particularly given that it had similarly not been able to rule out a terrorist presence in some part of the town. 42. Yusuf Lalealp submitted that on 22 October 1993 his house and his barn situated in the Şaar neighbourhood were deliberately set alight by soldiers. 43. It was not in dispute that his house was damaged and that an assessment of the damage was carried out. Mr Lalealp told the Delegates that he had not obtained a copy of the relevant documents relating to the assessment, but the Government provided the file number under which his request for an assessment had been registered. Moreover, Mr Lalealp's property was listed in the report on determination of damaged buildings as having sustained medium damage. While the foregoing allowed the Commission to find it established that Mr Lalealp's property was damaged, the parties did not agree on whether the security forces or the PKK caused the damage, and the Commission therefore had to assess the evidence relating to this issue. 44. The Commission noted that it had serious doubts about the accuracy of the record of the search of a house dated 23 October 1993 according to which a number of empty Kalashnikov cartridges were found in Mr Lalealp's house. In this respect, it noted in the first place that Mr Lalealp told the Delegates that it would have been impossible to find anything amongst the burned remains of his property. More importantly, it appeared that Mr Lalealp was at no stage questioned by the authorities about these cartridges: neither in the days following 22 October 1993 – despite the facts that a considerable number of people had been arrested, that Mr Lalealp had been staying near his home and that he had in fact remained in Lice longer than many other people –, nor on the occasion when he was asked to make a statement to a public prosecutor nearly one year after the event. Indeed, the assertions that cartridges were found in his house struck the Commission as implausible or at least very doubtful. 45. It was true that there were some discrepancies between Mr Lalealp's statement to the Diyarbakır branch of the Human Rights Association (“HRA”) and his testimony before the Delegates, notably with regard to the question whether he attended the speech given by the Provincial Governor on 23 October 1999. According to the statement to the HRA this had been the case, but before the Delegates Mr Lalealp said that he was not aware of any such speech having been made and he had not attended it. 46. The wording of the part of Mr Lalealp's statement to the HRA that related to the Governor's speech was very similar to the wording used in the statements of Ahmet Ayder and Nadir Doman and it seemed likely that parts of one statement were copied and used in respect of other applicants. The Commission, recalling that it had previously had occasion to remark critically on the accuracy of statements taken by the Diyarbakır branch of the HRA, stressed that it could not be expected to guess at possible explanations for inaccuracies encountered in such statements. 47. The Delegates' general assessment of Mr Lalealp's oral evidence was that it was somewhat confused but, nevertheless, frank and convincing. In their observation of Mr Lalealp's demeanour the Delegates obtained the impression that he was sincere in his testimony and that he was a credible witness. The Delegates were of the opinion that any discrepancies between Mr Lalealp's oral evidence and his statement to the HRA were due more to a lack of attention to particular detail than indicative of any untruthfulness in his account. The Commission was prepared to accept that this might explain why Mr Lalealp told the Delegates that his daughter Süryan had been in his house on 22 October 1993 whereas according to his statement to the HRA Süryan was married and living in Diyarbakır. It appeared in any event from his oral evidence that after the lifting of the curfew Mr Lalealp's family had left Lice and had moved in with his daughter in Diyarbakır so that, regardless of whether Süryan was in Lice or not on 22 October 1993, it did not appear in dispute that her home was in Diyarbakır. 48. While the Commission found that it could not be excluded that on 22 October 1993 a clash took place between the PKK and the security forces and that there could well have been a presence of either PKK or militiamen in the Şaar neighbourhood where Mr Lalealp's house was situated, it did not consider the possibility of such a clash having occurred to be sufficient to cast doubt on the veracity of Mr Lalealp's affirmations regarding the origin of the damage to his property. Moreover, his account was on this point entirely consistent with the allegations made by the other applicants in regard to the destruction of their property. 49. Making a global assessment, the Commission found it established that Mr Lalealp's property and possessions were deliberately burned by security forces on 22 October 1993. As a result of this destruction Mr Lalealp's family moved to Diyarbakır, followed some time later by Mr Lalealp himself. 4. Concerning the events in Lice on 23 October 1993 and the alleged burning of the houses of Ahmet Ayder, Nadir Doman, Şevket Biçer and Zeydin Ekmekçi 50. The Commission noted that it was not in dispute that on the morning of 23 October the shooting had come to an end. It was, moreover, not in dispute that the houses of the applicants Ahmet Ayder, Nadir Doman, Şevket Biçer and Zeydin Ekmekçi in the Kalı neighbourhood were destroyed – this was confirmed by the report on determination of damaged buildings. 51. According to the eye-witness accounts of events on 23 October given by the applicants Ahmet Ayder and Nadir Doman and the witnesses Türkan, Tahir and Bedriye Ekmekçi, Huri Biçer and Leyla Ayder, soldiers came to the Kalı neighbourhood that morning, ordered the people out of their homes and proceeded to set the houses alight. Most of these witnesses also described how the houses were set alight either by a pipe-shaped instrument or by something being thrown into the houses, Huri Biçer mentioning both methods. Ahmet Ayder saw his own house being set on fire by soldiers and Nadir Doman and Leyla Ayder had witnessed this as well. Moreover, Huri Biçer and Türkan, Tahir and Bedriye Ekmekçi saw Ahmet Ayder's house on fire. These witnesses, except for Bedriye Ekmekçi, also saw Nadir Doman's house burning. Türkan and Tahir Ekmekçi saw Şevket Biçer's house on fire. Moreover, Türkan Ekmekçi saw soldiers surrounding the house of Zeydin Ekmekçi the moment this caught fire. Tahir and Bedriye Ekmekçi saw that Zeydin Ekmekçi's house was on fire. 52. Several witnesses told the Delegates that the soldiers who burned the houses had operated in groups. The Commission observed in this respect that teams made up of members of various commando units were active inside the town on the morning of 23 October. According to the commando unit commander Mustafa Küçük these teams carried out searches. 53. Most of the applicants and witnesses concerned stated that before they were made to go to the square in front of the police headquarters, where they were to be addressed by the Provincial Governor, they had been gathered in an area near the school except for the Biçer family who were the last to leave the neighbourhood. Upon their return to the Kalı neighbourhood they found their houses burned down. 54. The Delegates found these applicants and witnesses convincing, even if the evidence of the more elderly ones was at times somewhat confused. The Commission considered that their accounts were detailed and on the whole consistent. 55. The Government's witnesses maintained, however, that no houses were set alight on 23 October but that houses had burned down the previous day as a result of fighting between the PKK and security forces. Yet those inhabitants of the Kalı neighbourhood who appeared before the Delegates and who had been in Lice on 22 and 23 October were adamant that their houses had still been intact at daybreak of that last day. In this respect the Commission found significant the assumption expressed by the police chief constable Mustafa Öztan that the people of Lice would have slept in their own homes in the night of 22 October or perhaps, because they were scared, in the house of a neighbour or of relatives. He appeared to discount the fact that if more than 400 houses had been destroyed in the course of that day it would have been impossible for people to stay in their own homes or those of most of their neighbours and relatives. This also led the Commission to make the observation that in all likelihood there would have been many more casualties and injured if all of the more than 400 houses that ended up damaged or destroyed had caught fire on 22 October since this implied that a very large number of people would have been out in the open, looking for shelter, perhaps attempting to put out the fires, amidst the heavy gunfire of that day. The testimonies of the afore-mentioned applicants and witnesses before the Delegates, on the contrary, contained convincing accounts of how they had spent the night of 22 October sheltering from gunfire rather than fire. At no stage had this evidence been disputed or any kind of suggestion made as to where these people would have spent the night if they were not where they said they were. 56. The Commission thus accepted that Huri Biçer, for instance, spent the night of 22 October in her brother Şevket's house. Tahir and Bedriye Ekmekçi took shelter in their barn on 22 October and spent the night either in that barn or, as Tahir Ekmekçi stated, in their house – Bedriye not specifically mentioning where she spent the night. Consequently, the destruction of Şevket Biçer's house and Tahir Ekmekçi's house and barn, as documented in the report on determination of damaged buildings must have taken place after 22 October. While this element deprived the account presented by the Government's witnesses of credibility, it rendered that of the four applicants concerned all the more probable. 57. Having regard to the evidence as a whole, the Commission found that the property and possessions in Lice of the applicants Ahmet Ayder, Nadir Doman, Şevket Biçer and Zeydin Ekmekçi were deliberately burned by security forces on 23 October 1993. This led to these applicants and their families leaving the town. 58. The Commission noted that no investigation was lodged into allegations of wrongdoing on the part of the security forces until the present application was referred to the respondent Government, despite the fact that a number of Government witnesses told the Delegates that, not long after the incident, they had become aware of the existence of allegations that houses had been burned deliberately by security forces. Police chief constable Mustafa Öztan had read reports to that effect in the newspapers and judge Gürcan Acar had heard women voice such accusations while he was carrying out damage assessments, but neither man appeared to have seen any cause to inform the public prosecutor. Şahap Yaralı had also been apprised of these allegations through newspaper- and television reports. In the light of this evidence, Mr Acar's statement that no newspapers were available appeared untrue. 59. The applicants Ahmet Ayder and Yusuf Lalealp stated that they went to the public prosecutor's office but that they did not receive any help. However, public prosecutor Mehmet Dabak told the Delegates that he had not received any complaints of security forces deliberately having burned down houses. Even though the Commission could not rule out the possibility, put forward by Mr Dabak, that people had in fact gone to the judge of the Magistrates' Court rather than to him, it found it nevertheless peculiar that Mr Dabak would not have read about allegations of wrongdoing by the security forces in the newspapers whereas Messrs Öztan and Yaralı had. It is clear that various newspapers reported the allegations and the Commission was less than impressed with Mr Dabak's statement that he would have made enquiries into the underlying facts of such reports had he read them. 60. The Commission further observed that the investigation launched after the present application was brought to the attention of the Government, and which ended with a decision of non-prosecution being taken by the Lice District Administrative Council, still did not address the complaints of four of the five applicants, namely that their houses had been burned on 23 rather than 22 October 1993. Finding that he lacked jurisdiction, Lice public prosecutor Mustafa Küçüköz referred the investigation to the District Administrative Council, after having obtained statements from four of the applicants. Yunus Nebioğlu, who was in charge of the subsequent investigation, requested the police to take statements from the applicants but it appeared that he drew up his report on the matter at a time when a statement from only one of the applicants, Zeydin Ekmekçi, had in fact been taken. The Commission noted that although this statement contains a very clear accusation of wrongdoing on the part of the security forces, Mr Nebioğlu did not judge it necessary to hear any security force personnel. From the text of his report and his testimony before the Delegates, it seemed to the Commission that his attitude towards the complaints brought by the applicants was seriously prejudiced and that these complaints did not receive serious consideration. 61. In conclusion, the Commission found that no effective investigation was carried out. 62. The following are excerpts from the summary of the oral evidence as set out in the Commission's report (§§ 278-290), given to the Commission's Delegates by Gürcan Acar, a judge in the Lice Magistrates' Court at the relevant time: “Some 300 or 400 applications for damage assessment had subsequently been filed. Such an assessment could only be carried out if a person requested it, and the findings of the on-site inspection would serve as the basis for any future law-suit. ... The owners of the property had received a copy of the damage assessment report. Such a report constituted evidence. A claim for compensation could subsequently be filed with the administrative courts. Not all the people had understood this. Some had thought that they were going to receive material assistance or money directly from him. Although he had not been obliged to do so, he had usually attempted to explain that they had to apply to the administrative courts. He did not know if any other teams had collected evidence as to the cause of the fires. He did, however, think that a team came from the office of the Provincial Governor to establish the extent of the destruction to property.” 63. The following are excerpts from the summary of the oral evidence as set out in the Commission's report (§§ 317-327), given to the Commission's Delegates by İbrahim Şahin, Governor of Diyarbakır province at the relevant time: “He had gone to Lice a little after midday on 23 October 1993. He had informed the security forces less than an hour beforehand that he wanted to find out about the problems of the citizens and determine in what way they could be helped. ... He had ... found a group of 200-300 people waiting for him in an open area near the police headquarters. He assumed that they had been told by the security forces that they could ask him for assistance. ... Using a car microphone he had then made a speech in which he had emphasised the harmfulness of terrorism. He had assured the people that the State would compensate all the damage they had suffered. All the people had asked for was for their damage to be repaired. He had sent two technical committees to Lice to have the damage suffered by each and every person determined. He had ordered for the shops to be repaired. In order to secure normal living conditions he had given priority to the shops. ... The damage assessment which he had ordered only concerned buildings and not the contents of those buildings. Within the limits of the budget of the province he had provided the necessary help. He had subsequently sent the assessments to Ankara and had asked the Government for assistance. ...” 64. In the proceedings before the Commission, the applicants submitted a “Report on Determination of Damaged Buildings”, which had been given to the HRA by the Lice public prosecutor. The third section of this report lists 402 owners of 436 private homes and/or stables and the extent of damage sustained by these properties (the preceding sections of the report concern commercial premises and public buildings). According to this section of the report, the houses of Ahmet Ayder (spelled Aydaş), Nadir Doman (spelled Duman) and Şevket Biçer were destroyed, the house and stable of Zeydin Ekmekçi were destroyed, and the house of Yusuf Lalealp sustained medium damage. 65. In the proceedings before the Commission the applicants, apart from Yusuf Lalealp, also submitted experts' reports relating to the inspections carried out at their request by a judge of the Lice Magistrates' Court and an independent expert. These inspections were aimed at establishing that the roof and walls of their houses had burned down and collapsed, that their possessions inside the houses had burned, as well as at the identification of the remains. 66. On 30 August 2000, and again on 5 January 2001, the Government submitted the documents of this damage assessment procedure “in relation to the properties of Yusuf Lalealp”.

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9. The applicant is born in 1969 and lives in Istanbul. 10. On 9 July 1994 the applicant with fourteen other people was taken into police custody by the Anti-Terror branch of the Istanbul Security Directorate on suspicion of being a member of the PKK. 11. The applicant alleges that he was ill-treated and tortured in the police car on the way to the Istanbul Security Directorate and during his detention there. He claims that during his interrogation, he was blindfolded and stripped naked. He was strung up by his arms in the form of torture known as “Palestinian hanging”. His head was hit against the wall and he was held parallel to the ground on his hands and feet. He was also electrocuted, threatened and insulted. 12. The applicant further claims that he was coerced into signing a statement in which it was stated that he had worked for and had been involved in the terrorist activities of the PKK. After having signed the statement prepared by the police, he was allegedly kept in custody for one more week so that the signs of the ill-treatment to which he had been subjected would disappear. During that week, he claims that a police officer came to his cell at regular intervals and applied a medicine on his wounds in order to cover up the signs of ill-treatment. He claims that due to this medicine his scars healed very quickly. 13. The Government submit that the applicant was questioned by the police on 15 July 1994. They have produced a copy of a statement signed by the applicant on this occasion. 14. On 22 July 1994 the applicant together with 14 other detainees was examined by Dr T. Taner Apaydın at the Istanbul Forensic Medical Department. According to the medical report prepared by Dr Apaydın, the applicant showed no signs of ill-treatment. 15. On 23 July 1994 the applicant was brought before the Public Prosecutor at the Istanbul State Security Court. According to the records of this hearing, the applicant admitted that he had been involved with PKK related activities in the past and had been convicted on that account by the Erzincan State Security Court in 1989. He denied having any current relation with the PKK. He stated that the police invented the statement taken in custody. 16. The applicant alleges that he was brought to the Public Prosecutor at the Istanbul State Security Court together with the other detainees on 22 July 1994 but that the Public Prosecutor did not take his statement because he had complained to the prosecutor that he had been tortured in police custody. He further stated that because he told to the prosecutor that he was subjected to torture, he was once again tortured by the police. The Government contested this argument and stated that the applicant was brought for the first time before the Public Prosecutor on 23 July 1994. 17. The applicant alleges that he told the prosecutor on 23 July 1994 of his subjection to torture but that his statement was not taken into consideration by the Public Prosecutor and was not written down on the hearing records. 18. The applicant further stated that he was not seen by a doctor before being questioned by the Prosecutor on 23 July 1994 and consequently he does not have any medical evidence concerning the torture he was subjected to on 22 July 1994. 19. On 23 July 1994 the applicant was also brought before the Judge at the State Security Court. He denied the allegations against him and stated that he was not a member of the PKK. He further declared that the statement he gave to the Public Prosecutor was true. The Judge ordered his detention on remand. 20. The applicant claims that he told the State Security Court Judge that he had been tortured in police custody and that he had explained this to the Public Prosecutor at the State Security Court. However the case files show that the applicant did not claim to have being subjected to ill-treatment neither before the Public Prosecutor nor the State Security Court. 21. While the applicant was held in detention in prison, he requested to see a doctor. The prison doctor prepared a provisional report for the applicant and he was sent to the Eyüp Forensic Medical Department for a medical examination. 22. On 22 August 1994 the medical report prepared by the institution and signed by the medical expert stated that the applicant complained of widespread pain on his back, right arm and on both of his legs but that he could not find any signs of traumatic lesions. The medical report further stated that the complaints were not life threatening but accorded him one day's sick leave. 23. On 15 June 1995 the Chamber of Medicine of Istanbul (Istanbul Tabib Odası), in the context of disciplinary proceedings following complaints, found that Dr T. Taner Apaydın had concealed signs of torture in the medical examinations conducted on several persons between 3 February and 7 October 1994 and he was, therefore, prohibited from practising as a doctor for six months. 24. On 12 December 1994 the Public Prosecutor at the Istanbul State Security Court filed an indictment with the court, requesting that the court to apply Articles 168 §§ 1 and 2 and 169 of the Criminal Code and Section 5 of the Prevention of Terrorism Act. 25. On 13 September 1994 the applicant filed a complaint with the Istanbul Public Prosecutor's Office. He alleged that he had been ill-treated while in police custody and requested that proceedings be instituted against the police officers. He submitted the medical report of 22 August 1994 as proof of his ill-treatment. 26. On 11 January 1995 the Istanbul Public Prosecutor, referring to the medical report of the Eyüp Forensic Medical Department, gave a decision of non-prosecution on account of lack of evidence. 27. On 8 February 1995 the applicant filed an objection with the Beyoglu Assize Court against the Public Prosecutor's decision. 28. On 7 March 1995 the Beyoğlu Assize Court dismissed the applicant's objections.

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9. The applicants were born in 1969 and 1964 respectively and live in Şanlı Urfa, Turkey. 10. Police officers from the anti-terrorist branch of the Istanbul Security Directorate arrested the applicants on suspicion of membership of an illegal organisation, the PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party), and placed them in custody on 28 and 29 April 1995 respectively. Both applicants alleged that they had been beaten and insulted by policemen on the way to the Security Directorate Building. 11. On 29 April 1995 the public prosecutor attached to the Istanbul State Security Court ordered the extension of the applicants' custody period until 9 May 1995. 12. The applicants alleged that during their interrogation by the police, they had been kept blindfolded and forced to give information about persons they did not know. They were allegedly subjected to various forms of ill-treatment by police officers. They claimed they were beaten, strung up by the arms, threatened with death and given electric shocks. 13. On 2 May 1995 the applicants were allegedly forced to sign police statements about their activities in the PKK and their connections with other PKK members. 14. On 5 May 1995 the applicants were examined by the Istanbul Forensic Medicine Institute's medical expert along with fourteen other detainees. In his report, the institute's doctor noted that there were no signs of beating, force or violence on the bodies of the applicants, whereas he had spotted certain signs of injury on the bodies of two other detainees. 15. On 22 May 1995 the first applicant underwent a second medical examination in prison. According to the prison doctor's report, the applicant had fading bruises on his body and ecchymoses on his left foot. The applicant was later transferred to Fatih Forensic Medicine Institute where another medical expert examined him. In a report dated 20 June 1996, it was concluded that the applicants' injuries, as cited in the report of the prison doctor, would prevent him from carrying out his work for two days. 16. On 18 May 1995 the prison doctor also examined the second applicant. In his report, the doctor noted the presence of abrasions on the penis, pain in the chest and ecchymoses under the left eye. He also noted that the applicant had described a feeling of pain while chewing and pain on both shoulders. 17. On 5 May 1995 the applicants were brought before the public prosecutor attached to the Istanbul State Security Court. In their questioning they denied their police statements and rejected the allegations against them. 18. On 6 May 1995 they were brought before the State Security Court, where they repeated their denials in relation to the statements taken by the public prosecutor. The court ordered the applicants' detention on remand on account of the nature of the accusations against them and of the evidence already available. 19. On 22 June 1995 the public prosecutor initiated criminal proceedings against the applicants in the Istanbul State Security Court and charged them with carrying out acts aimed at the separation of a part of the State territories. 20. On 1 June 1995 the applicants filed a complaint with the Fatih public prosecutor's office alleging that they had been subjected to various forms of ill-treatment during their detention in police custody. 21. By decisions of 19 and 21 September 1995 the Fatih public prosecutor declined to bring any criminal proceedings against the police officers, because of a lack of evidence against them. 22. On 13 October 1995 the applicants filed an appeal with the Istanbul Beyoğlu Assize Court against this decision. 23. On 14 December 1995 the Assize Court dismissed the appeal lodged by the second applicant on the ground that there was insufficient evidence to commit the police officers for trial. The court, however, upheld the appeal in respect of the first applicant. 24. On 8 June 1998 the Istanbul Chief Public Prosecutor filed an indictment with the Istanbul Assize Court accusing two police officers from the Istanbul Security Directorate of inflicting ill-treatment on the first applicant. 25. On 27 October 1999 the Istanbul Assize Court acquitted the two police officers on the ground that there was no sufficient and convincing evidence which would enable the court to convict the accused. The court reasoned that the complainant could not identify the police officers since he had allegedly been kept blindfolded while being tortured and that the Istanbul Forensic Medical Institute's report stated that no lesions had been seen on his body. It further noted that the Fatih Forensic Medicine Institute's report had been given fifteen days after the alleged incident and that the accused had denied the allegations.

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9. The applicant was born in 1950 and lives in Liverpool. 10. The applicant is a widower. His wife, whom he had married in 1977, died on 1 February 1997. They had two children, born in 1983 and 1989. Prior to her death the applicant’s wife had worked as a schoolteacher for approximately twenty one years and paid full social security contributions. 11. On 7 February 2000 the applicant applied to the Benefits Agency for the payment of social security benefits. He applied for benefits equivalent to those which a widow, whose husband had died in similar circumstances to those of his wife, would have been entitled, namely a Widowed Mother’s Allowance, payable under the Social Security and Benefits Act 1992. He was informed by the Benefits Agency on 2 March 2000 that the benefit was not payable to him because it was available only to widows. 12. The applicant appealed against this latter decision to a social security appeal tribunal, which dismissed his appeal on 12 May 2000. 13. The applicant worked as a schoolteacher, except for a period between September 2000 and March 2001 when he was in receipt of Jobseeker’s Allowance, a means tested benefit. He also received Child Benefit and Lone Parent Benefit. From the day after that on which the claim for benefits was made, that is to say from 8 February 2000, a widow in a similar situation would have received Widowed Mother’s Allowance, payable regardless of income and savings. A widow would also have received a Christmas bonus of 10 pounds sterling (GBP) for the year 2000. Since 10 April 2001, the applicant has been in receipt of Widowed Parent’s Allowance.

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4. The applicant was born in 1936 and lives in Zamość, Poland. 5. The applicant’s father and mother died in 1982 and 1983 respectively. On 2 March 1984 the Zamość District Court (Sąd Rejonowy) declared that the applicant and her three brothers were to inherit their estate. On 17 September 1985 the applicant filed an application for distribution of the estate with the Zamość District Court. From 30 October 1985 to 27 June 1991 the court held thirty six hearings. It also obtained five expert reports. 6. On 28 September 1993 the court held a hearing during which it heard evidence from the applicant and one of her brothers. The court held a further hearing on 25 October 1993. 7. On 8 November 1993 the court closed the examination of the case and informed the parties that a preliminary decision would be delivered on 22 November 1993. It later resumed the examination of the case and listed a hearing for 24 January 1994. At that hearing, the court again heard evidence from the applicant and one of her brothers. 8. In April 1994 the applicant personally went to the court’s registry and asked the President of the Zamość District Court to fix a date for a hearing as soon as possible; she also complained about the slow progress in the proceedings. 9. On 16 May 1994 the court held a hearing, heard five witnesses and ordered an expert to prepare a report. On 20 June 1994 the expert submitted his report to the court. On 12 December 1994 and 16 January 1995 the court held further hearings. 10. In the course of the proceedings several judge rapporteurs dealt with the case. 11. In February 1995 the applicant sent a letter to the Minister of Justice asking that the proceedings be expedited. In a letter of 30 March 1995 the President of the Zamość Regional Court (Sąd Wojewódzki) informed the applicant that he would personally supervise the conduct of the proceedings. He also admitted that the proceedings had been slowed down as a result of changes of rapporteurs. 12. On 22 January 1996 the court obtained an expert report. On 17 April 1996 the court held a hearing. Two further expert reports were submitted to the court on 25 May 1995 and 16 June 1996, respectively. 13. The court held hearings on 26 January and 9, 16 and 23 February 1999. On 20 April, 12 May and 24 October 1999, respectively, the experts submitted supplementary reports. 14. On 4 February, 3 March and 17 March 2000 the court held hearings and heard evidence from several witnesses. On 4 April 2000 the court informed the parties that the final decision would be delivered on 18 April 2000. 15. On 18 April 2000 the court decided that it would not deliver the final decision and resumed the proceedings. On the same date the court asked the applicant to submit an extract from the land register confirming that her late parents had owned a certain plot of land. On 4 May 2000 the applicant made submissions to the court. She maintained that she was not able to produce the documents required by the court because her parents did not have title to that property. 16. On 15 May 2000 the court stayed the proceedings. It held that the applicant had failed to comply with the order of 18 April 2000. Subsequently, on 20 September 2001 the applicant asked the court to resume the proceedings. On 23 January 2002 the Zamość Regional Court resumed the proceedings. 17. On 1 March 2002 the District Court held a hearing. On 15 March 2002 it gave a final decision. The applicant appealed. On 13 November and 4 December 2002 the Regional Court held hearings. On 14 December 2002 the Zamość Regional Court upheld the first-instance decision. It appears that this decision is final.

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9. The applicant, who was born in 1964, states that he was born from a relationship between his mother and a certain P., a civil law notary (notaris). Although his mother had wanted to marry, P. had not; neither had the two ever lived together. P. had not recognised (erkenning) the applicant. Nevertheless, he made regular payments towards the applicant's care and upbringing, gave the applicant presents for his birthday, visited him and, together with the applicant's mother, went on day trips with him. The applicant called P. “Daddy”. 10. P. died on 19 August 1992 without leaving a will. His body was cremated. A nephew, K., was identified as his sole heir. 11. The applicant brought civil proceedings against K., seeking an order that K. hand over P.'s estate. The applicant argued that he had had “family life” with P. within the meaning of Article 8 of the Convention, and that the Netherlands legal provisions relating to the position of “illegitimate” and unrecognised children infringed Article 14. 12. The Arnhem Regional Court (arrondissementsrechtbank) rejected the applicant's claim by a judgment of 23 December 1993. It considered that the difference contained in Netherlands legislation on succession between children with and children without legally recognised family relationships (familierechtelijke betrekkingen) did not constitute an unjustified interference in the “family life” of “illegitimate” unrecognised children. In view of the rights and interests of third parties in relation to an inheritance, legal certainty required that only persons with a demonstrable legal family connection with the deceased be able to inherit. An “interference” with any “family life” the applicant might have had with P. was thus “in accordance with the law” and “necessary in a democratic society”. In the light of these considerations, the Regional Court did not find it necessary to determine whether or not P. was the applicant's biological father. 13. The applicant appealed to the Arnhem Court of Appeal (gerechtshof), complaining of the Regional Court's interpretation of Articles 8 and 14 of the Convention, as well as of the fact that the Regional Court had declined to rule on the issue of paternity. 14. Four witnesses were heard before the Court of Appeal: the applicant, his mother, a friend of his mother and the person who had been the applicant's co-guardian (toeziend voogd). The latter two stated that they were convinced that P. was the applicant's biological father and that he had never denied this fact to them but had, on the contrary, assured them that the applicant would be well provided for. The applicant's mother stated that she had not known any man other than P. until nine years after the applicant's birth, and that P. had referred to the applicant in public as “my son” or “my little boy”. In reply to K.'s argument that he had not been aware of the applicant's existence, the applicant stated that K.'s mother, who was a sister of P., had been so aware and had met the applicant. 15. In the proceedings before the Court of Appeal the applicant also submitted a number of photographs showing himself in the company of P. and his mother. 16. On 20 June 1995 the Court of Appeal gave judgment, dismissing the appeal. While it acknowledged that a situation where a court was unable to determine a case like the present one led to an unsatisfactory outcome for the applicant, the Court of Appeal saw no possibility of departing from the recent case-law of the Supreme Court (Hoge Raad) to the effect that it went beyond the jurisprudential task of the judiciary to determine the consequences of the possible incompatibility of Netherlands law with Article 14 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 8 (judgment of 24 February 1995, reported in Nederlandse Jurisprudentie (Netherlands Law Reports – “NJ”) 1995, no. 468). 17. The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law (cassatie) with the Supreme Court, which was dismissed on 17 January 1997. The Supreme Court held that, although an inability to inherit based solely on the ground of illegitimacy would be contrary to Article 8 taken in conjunction with Article 14, objective and reasonable grounds could exist to justify other kinds of restrictions on the intestate succession of “illegitimate” children. It then noted that in 1982 a law had come into force aimed at bringing the position of “illegitimate” recognised children into line with the requirements enunciated by the Court in Marckx v. Belgium (judgment of 13 June 1979, Series A no. 31). During the debate on the bill in Parliament, the then Minister of Justice had declared that the question of the position of “illegitimate” unrecognised children in relation to their biological fathers was a valid one, but that it fell to be dealt with in the planned reform of the law of succession. 18. Since then a number of attempts had been made to bring about this reform and, at the time of the Supreme Court's examination of the present case, a bill was before Parliament. It thus appeared that the legislature was of the view that a reform of the law of succession required the making of important political choices and that the legislative process had not yet come to an end. From this, the Supreme Court concluded in the first place that the absence in Netherlands law at the time of a rule making “illegitimate” unrecognised children the heirs of their biological fathers was not based solely on illegitimacy but on the difficulty, inherent in a reform of legislation, of reaching a sound balance between all the interests involved in the law of succession. Secondly, it followed that the choices to be made fell beyond the scope of the judiciary's jurisprudential tasks and that it was not possible to anticipate legislative developments by judgment. The judgment of the Supreme Court was published in NJ 1997, no. 483, with a critical annotation by a learned author.

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4. The applicant was born in 1937 and lives in Baj, Hungary. 5. On 2 October 1992 the Komárom-Esztergom County Regional Police Department informed the applicant, the managing director of a limited liability company (“the company”), that a criminal investigation had been opened against him on charges of fraud. 6. On 6 October 1992 the Police Department requested the Tax Authority’s Komárom-Esztergom County Department to carry out a tax inspection of the company. Subsequently, on 13 October 1992 the criminal investigation against the applicant was suspended pending the outcome of the tax inspection. 7. On 4 January 1993 the Tax Authority informed the Police Department of its findings. Consequently, on 8 January 1993 the Police Department ordered that the criminal investigation against the applicant be continued. 8. During the period until 14 December 1993, the Police Department questioned several witnesses on altogether fifteen occasions and interrogated the applicant on 24 August and 16 December 1993. On the latter date he refused to give testimony. 9. On 17 December 1993 the Police Department appointed an expert graphologist. 10. On 23 December 1993 the Police Department informed the applicant’s lawyer and the Tata District Public Prosecutor’s Office of the results of the investigation. On 27 December 1993 the Police Department terminated the investigations and transferred the file to the Public Prosecutor’s Office. 11. On 7 February 1994 the Public Prosecutor’s Office preferred a bill of indictment. 12. The applicant’s request of 26 April 1995 to have the investigation re-opened was rejected by the Tata District Court. 13. The first trial hearing took place on 12 April 1996. On this occasion the District Court heard several witnesses. The applicant refused to testify and stated that he did not commit the crime with which he was charged. 14. On 15 April 1996 the District Court enquired of a witness who had failed to appear at the hearing of 12 April due to illness as to the expected date of his recovery. 15. On the applicant’s motion for bias of 10 June 1996, the presiding judge withdrew from the case. 16. On 30 October 1996 the President of the District Court appointed another judge. On 16 December 1996 the President of the District Court together with two other judges declared bias. 17. On 29 April 1997 the Komárom-Esztergom County Regional Court appointed the Tatabánya District Court to deal with the case. 18. On 27 April 1999 the Tatabánya District Court held a hearing and acquitted the applicant. 19. On the appeal of the Prosecutor’s Office, on 11 and 25 January and 22 February 2000 the Regional Court held hearings. 20. On 14 March 2000 the Regional Court upheld the first-instance judgment, which thereby became final.

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8. The applicant is a Turkish national of Kurdish origin, resident in Diyarbakır. She is the wife of Mr Ali Tekdağ (A.T.), who disappeared in Dağkapı (Turkey) on 13 November 1994. 9. The facts surrounding the disappearance of the applicant's husband are disputed. 10. The applicant's version of events is set out in Section 1 below. The Government's version is set out in Section 2. A list of the documents submitted by the parties and a summary of statements by the witnesses whose testimonies were heard by the Court's delegates at hearings conducted in Ankara are provided in Part B. 11. On 13 November 1994 at about 11.00 a.m. the applicant and her husband A.T. went shopping in the village of Küçükkadı, in Diyarbakır. When they got off the bus at Dağkapı A.T. told the applicant that he had to attend to something and that she should wait for him for about five minutes. He went off in the direction of the bus station. 12. A.T. returned less than two minutes later but, instead of coming to meet the applicant, he walked right past her without looking at her. When she called out to him, he said: “Don't come near me!”, made signs with his hands and walked into a street nearby. He was being followed by people with walkie-talkies and long-barrelled guns. 13. There was gunfire and everyone, the applicant included, threw themselves to the ground. When the firing stopped, plain-clothed policemen arrived on the scene. They took A.T. into a nearby building and a few minutes later took him away in a white minibus. A.T. was bleeding from a head wound received when he threw himself to the ground. There was a military vehicle parked in front of a bank near the scene, but the soldiers inside did not intervene. A salesman called Mr Necmettin was an eyewitness to the incident. 14. The applicant has not seen her husband since he was taken away by the police on that day. She alleges that a witness, Mr Seyfettin Demir, saw A.T. in custody at the Diyarbakır Headquarters of the Rapid Intervention Force while he himself was being held there and that in November 1994 other witnesses had seen A.T. in custody but were afraid to testify. 15. On 16 November 1994 the applicant petitioned the Principal Public Prosecutor at the Diyarbakır State Security Court for news of her husband, but was turned away by the police. She continued to submit petitions every day for thirty days until she was at last taken to see the Principal Public Prosecutor, Mr Bekir Selçuk. 16. The applicant reported her husband's disappearance to Mr Selçuk who said he would deal with the matter. When she returned a few days later, he said he had yet to obtain information. The applicant explained that, according to an article in Özgür Gündem newspaper, witnesses had seen her husband in prison but they were afraid to testify. She indicated that Seyfettin Demir was, however, willing to make a statement. Mr Selçuk replied that he wanted to know the names of the other witnesses, adding that the security forces could not have abducted her husband. 17. After forty days the applicant met the provincial governor Mr Doğan Hatipoğlu and explained the situation to him. Mr Hatipoğlu said he would make enquiries. When the applicant returned a few days later, he said he did not have the means to conduct an investigation. 18. Some time later the applicant, accompanied by her daughter Nuran (aged 21), went back to see Mr Selçuk, who denied that her husband had been taken into custody and said that A.T. was responsible for numerous illegal acts. Mr Selçuk said that if A.T. had been taken into detention he would bring charges against those responsible. 19. A.T. had previously been taken into custody by the Turkish security forces 19 times, on 17 of which he had been put in prison. He had changed his identity and assumed the name Mehmet Aslan to avoid being recognised, arguing that the police detained him whenever they saw the name “Tekdağ”. 20. About seven months after A.T.'s disappearance, policemen raided the applicant's house. 21. The first written request for an investigation into A.T.'s disappearance was signed by his mother and dated 5 January 1995. The request was addressed to the Provincial Governor of Diyarbakır, who forwarded it to the State of Emergency Bureau, which sent it to the Diyarbakır Police Headquarters. The latter issued a reply on 9 January 1995 denying that A.T. had been taken into custody. 22. A letter from the Public Prosecutor's Office at the Diyarbakır State Security Court to the Ministry of Justice indicated that the applicant had been told that A.T. had never been taken into custody and that she would have received a written reply if she had asked for one in writing. 23. A.T.'s illegal change of identity could indicate that he was still using a false identity and had joined the PKK terrorist organisation. 24. The applicant's daughter was arrested on 7 November 1995 on charges of aiding and abetting the PKK. An investigation into the death of the applicant's brother showed that he had been assassinated by the terrorist group Hizbullah. 25. On 21 January 1996 the Evrensel newspaper published some news, issued by an anonymous source, according to which A.T. had been allegedly murdered while in the custody of the Armoured Brigade barracks in Silvan. The editor of the newspaper, interrogated on this point by the Public Prosecutor of Silvan, refused to disclose the identity of the source. 26. The main investigation file concerning A.T.'s disappearance contains 108 documents, including instructions by the judicial authorities to the security forces to investigate, information provided by the security forces to the public prosecutors, and judicial decisions. 27. The parties submitted various documents concerning the investigation into A.T.'s alleged abduction. The main documents of relevance are as follows: (a) The applicant's further applications to the authorities 28. The applicant reiterated her allegations in two further documents: (i) A statement of 11 February 1995 regarding the disappearance of her husband; (ii) A statement of 22 March 1997 sent to the European Commission of Human Rights. (b) Documents from the domestic investigation 29. The main file on the investigation into A.T.'s disappearance is the Diyarbakır Public Prosecutor's preliminary investigation file no. 1998/130. It contains 108 documents. The six previous investigation files, which were finally incorporated into this file, are as follows: (i)the Diyarbakır Public Prosecutor's office file no. 1996/748 (this investigation ended with a decision of no jurisdiction ratione loci); (ii)the Silvan Public Prosecutor's office file no. 1996/70 (this investigation ended with a decision of no jurisdiction ratione loci); (iii) the Diyarbakır Public Prosecutor's office file no. 1996/6950 (this investigation ended with a decision of no jurisdiction ratione loci); (iv) the Silvan Public Prosecutor's office file no. 1996/685 (this investigation ended with a decision to discontinue the prosecution); (v)the Silvan Public Prosecutor's office file no. 1996/286 (this investigation began following the Ministry of Justice's intervention and ended with a decision of no jurisdiction ratione loci); (vi) the Diyarbakır Public Prosecutor's office file no. 1996/7840 (this investigation ended with a decision of no jurisdiction ratione loci); (vii) the Silvan Public Prosecutor's office file no. 1996/286 (the investigation was reopened and ended with a decision of no jurisdiction ratione loci). The main documents in the investigation file concerning A.T.'s disappearance are as follows: (i) the Diyarbakır Security Directorate's letter of 9 January 1995 to the Governor's office in Diyarbakır; (ii) the Diyarbakır Security Directorate's letter of 8 March 1995 to the Governor's office in Diyarbakır; (iii) the Diyarbakır Security Directorate's letter of 8 March 1995 to the Principal Public Prosecutor in Diyarbakır; (iv) the Diyarbakır Security Directorate's letter of 20 March 1996 to the Principal Public Prosecutor in Diyarbakır; (v) the Diyarbakır Provincial Gendarme Commanding Oficer's letter of 31 March 1996; (vi) the Diyarbakır Principal Public Prosecutor's decision of 11 April 1996 to discontinue the criminal proceedings; (vii) the Silvan Public Prosecutor's letter of 6 May 1996 to the public prosecutor in Diyarbakır, which states: “Further to the investigation conducted by our public prosecutor's office in connection with the person named Ali Tekdağ, who is alleged to have been taken into custody in Diyarbakır on 13.11.1994, then taken to the Silvan Armoured Brigade Base and killed in custody, and in connection with the allegations contained in Hatice Tekdağ's attached application to the European Commission of Human Rights, 1- please identify the police officers who were on guard duty at the Refah Party Diyarbakır Provincial Branch Office on the date of the incident and interview them about what they know or saw regarding the allegations; and 2- interview the person named Seyfettin Demir, who is in Diyarbakır E-Type Prison as a convict or remand prisoner, about what he knows or saw regarding the allegations, and send the reply to this request to the principal public prosecutor's office. 06.05.1996. Three enclosures.” (viii) the Silvan Public Prosecutor's letter of 21 June 1996 to the public prosecutor in Diyarbakır, which states: “We ask you again to please report further to our letter sent under the same number and dated 06.05.1996, requesting that the police officers on guard duty at the Refah Party Diyarbakır Provincial Branch Office be interviewed about what they know or saw in connection with the person named Ali Tekdağ, who is alleged to have been taken into custody in Diyarbakır on 13.11.1994, then taken to the Silvan Armoured Brigade Base and killed in custody, and that the person named Seyfettin Demir, who is in Diyarbakır E-Type Prison as a convict or remand prisoner, be interviewed about what he knows or saw regarding the allegations, and for the completed request to be returned to us.” (ix) the Diyarbakır Principal Public Prosecutor's decision declining jurisdiction and transferring the file to the Principal Public Prosecutor in Silvan; (x) Public Prosecutor no. 31618's letter of 6 September 1996 to the Diyarbakır Police, Public-Order Section, which states: “This is a letter requesting that (1) the complainant whose full identity is given below be summoned to your office and, in view of her allegation in the enclosed letter entitled “To the Human Rights Project” that her husband has disappeared and has been seen by persons in custody, asked the full names and addresses of those persons; (2) since in the same letter the complainant alleges that Seyfettin Demir, who saw the complainant's husband while in custody, is in Diyarbakır E-Type Prison, that this person be summoned as a witness and interviewed in connection with the enclosed petition. Complainant, Hatice Tekdağ. Address... Seyfettin Demir, in Diyarbakır E-Type Prison as a convict or remand prisoner.” (xi) the Diyarbakır Public Prosecutor's letter of 18 September 1996 to the E-type Prison in Diyarbakır which states: “To the E-Type Prison Warden's Office, Diyarbakır. Please arrange for Seyfettin Demir, who is on remand at the E-Type Prison of our province, to be produced in connection with the investigation.” (xii) Public prosecutor no. 36866's letter of 6 February 1998 to the Diyarbakır Police, Public-Order Section ; (xiii) Public Prosecutor no. 36866's letter of 13 April 1998 to the Diyarbakır Police, Public-Order Section; (xiv) Public Prosecutor no. 36866's letter of 27 September 1999 to the Diyarbakır Police, Public-Order Section; (xv) Public Prosecutor no. 29010's letter of 15 October 1999 to the Security Directorate in Diyarbakır; (xvi) Mr Rana Yılmaz's letter of 5 November 1999 to the Diyarbakır Public Prosecutor, Mr Hasan Şakrak; (xvii) Public Prosecutor no. 39945's letter of 9 November 1999 to the Principal Public Prosecutor at the Diyarbakır State Security Court; (xviii) Public Prosecutor no. 38172's letter of 10 February 2000 to the Diyarbakır Security Directorate; (xix) Public Prosecutor no. 39945's letter of 29 March 2000 to the Diyarbakır Public-Records Office; (xx) Public Prosecutor no. 39945's letter of 29 March 2000 to the Principal Public Prosecutor at the Diyarbakır State Security Court. 30. The Court held a hearing in Ankara on 13 and 14 October 2000 and took oral evidence from nine witnesses. 31. The applicant repeated her previous statements. As regards her allegation that she had been intimidated by State agents on account of her application, she said she could not identify or describe the persons who had raided her house at night. She thought they were plain-clothed police officers. 32. Mr Bekir Selçuk was the Principal Public Prosecutor at the Diyarbakır State Security Court at the time. He did not remember having met A.T. or having carried out an investigation into his disappearance. He said that no incident involving gunfire such as the one described by the applicant had been referred to him or to his office on the date of the alleged incident. He found it inconceivable that members of the security forces would detain someone without informing the public prosecutor. During his two meetings with the applicant, he had merely informed her that her husband had not been taken into police custody in connection with a case that was being dealt with by his office. 33. Mr Hasan Şakrak was the Public Prosecutor in Diyarbakır who had been in charge of the case since 1999. It was he who had conducted the investigation into the disappearance of A.T. and into the alleged intimidation of the applicant by police officers. His investigation file only contained testimonies from the applicant and her daughters, Yasemin and Remziye, in which they made no references to the other people who had allegedly witnessed both incidents. Mr Şakrak said that a large part of the documents concerning A.T. had never been handed over to him. He had never heard of Seyfettin Demir and the documents concerning Mr Demir were not in his investigation file. 34. Mr Ramazan Sürücü was the Director of the Anti-Terrorism Branch of the Diyarbakır Police Headquarters at the time. He had no idea what role Seyfettin Demir had played in A.T.'s disappearance. He denied that A.T. had been taken into custody by his unit. He also stated that A.T.'s brother had been abducted and killed by Hizbullah and that his team had caught the killers. 35. Mr Ahmet Duran Alp was the head of the Rapid Intervention Force at the time. There were approximately 400 uniformed officers in these units. He said he had never heard of A.T. 36. Mr Necmi Çakar was the head of the Interrogation Unit of the Anti-Terrorism Branch in Diyarbakır, under Mr Ramazan Sürücü's orders. He said that A.T. had been taken into custody on various occasions and interrogated in connection with his links to the PKK. Mr Çakar knew that members of Hizbullah had murdered A.T.'s brother. He said that officers from the Interrogation Unit could use ordinary police cars and vehicles, including minibuses, with civilian number plates. 37. Mr Hasan Şenay was the Deputy Director of the Police Headquarters in Diyarbakır. He had signed two letters to the applicant, indicating that A.T. had not been taken into police custody at the alleged time (the letters were not produced by the Government to the Court). The letters were consistent with the information contained in the police custody registers that were sent to the Headquarters by all the police departments. 38. Mr Kürşat Kılıçarslan was a sergeant and head of the Pirinçlik Gendarme Station at the time. His deputy's name was G. Alp. It was gendarme practice to take statements from persons connected with incidents that occurred in their area of jurisdiction. The witness had no idea who A.T. was and did not remember the name. 39. Mr Münir Büyükelçi was the Public Prosecutor in Silvan, and had for a certain period been responsible for the investigation into A.T.'s disappearance. He had taken a number of steps to elucidate the facts. He had taken statements from the complainants and from the editor of the Evrensel newspaper on A.T.'s alleged murder while in the custody of the Armoured Brigade barracks in Silvan. Mr Büyükelçi said that he had begun a serious in-depth investigation but, having received no replies to his queries, he had transferred the file to the Diyarbakır Public Prosecutor. By letters of 6 May 1996 and 21 June 1996, he had invited the Diyarbakır Public Prosecutor's Office to trace the police officers who had been on guard duty at the Refah Party office situated near the scene of the incident and the main witness, Seyfettin Demir. He had not received any notification that action had been taken further to his requests. It became clear from his statement that the information about Seyfettin Demir, who was recorded as being in prison in Diyarbakır in 1994, had never been transmitted to him. Furthermore, he had not taken any steps to hear testimony from possible witnesses to the event, such as residents of the district where the incident had occurred. Mr Büyükelçi was asked to examine the investigation file which was produced on the spot by the Government, and through his explanations, it became apparent that the Government had not submitted to the Court large parts of the investigation file.

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4. The applicant was born in 1945 and lives in Munich. 5. On 8 November 1993 the applicant brought an action against her brother before the Buda Central District Court claiming her statutory share of the inheritance of her deceased mother’s estate. 6. On 6 May 1994 the District Court held a hearing. On 20 September 1994 a further hearing took place, which lasted 30 minutes. The defendant failed to appear on both occasions. On the latter date, the defendant’s counsel requested that the applicant’s claim be rejected as it had been submitted outside the statutory time-limit. 7. On 18 November 1994 the District Court held a hearing, which lasted 30 minutes. It ordered the applicant to submit, within 30 days, any evidence that might prove that the period of the statutory limitation had been interrupted. The applicant complied with the order on 10 January 1995. 8. Meanwhile, on 21 September 1994 the applicant instituted inheritance proceedings before a public notary. A notarial notice was issued on 18 January 1995, in accordance with the Hungarian law on inheritance, requiring the estate to be divided up equally between the applicant and her brother. 9. On 25 January 1995 the applicant informed the District Court that her representative had withdrawn from the case. Hearings scheduled for 31 January and 4 April 1995 were adjourned by the District Court, as the applicant, having been hospitalised, was unable to attend. Meanwhile, on 24 March 1995 the applicant notified the court of the name of her new representative. 10. At the hearing of 20 June 1995 the applicant raised the amount of her claim and requested legal aid. The court ordered the applicant to submit within 30 days all necessary documents proving that she needed legal aid. The applicant complied with the order on 10 August 1995. At the same time, she extended her claim to include her deceased aunt’s estate. 11. On 18 August 1995 the District Court rejected the applicant’s request for legal aid and ordered her to pay court fees corresponding to the amount of the increased claim. On 2 November 1995 the Budapest Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal against this decision. 12. The applicant’s renewed request for exemption from court fees was granted by the District Court on 16 January 1996. The court also took measures to obtain the case-file concerning the estate of the applicant’s deceased aunt. 13. On 28 February 1996 the District Court held a hearing, which lasted for 35 minutes. On 13 March 1996 the applicant elaborated her claims. At the hearing held on 25 June 1996 the court ordered the defendant, who had repeatedly failed to appear before the court, to submit observations on the merits of the applicant’s claims before 5 September 1996. On 6 September 1996 the District Court imposed a fine on the defendant, who, despite a warning, failed to comply with the court’s order. This decision was later quashed as the defendant’s submissions were proved to have been posted on 5 September 1996. 14. On 19 November 1996 the District Court heard the defendant’s witnesses and ordered the parties to submit their observations within 30 days. At the hearing the applicant asked that witnesses be heard in support of her evidence and extended the scope of her action by requesting that a real estate contract of sale be nullified. The applicant’s observations were submitted on 22 January 1997. 15. On 12 March 1997 the District Court heard the defendant and a witness. On 7 April 1997 the applicant informed the court that she had given a power of attorney to a new lawyer. At the hearing on 24 September 1997 the District Court heard the applicant’s daughter as a witness and ordered the applicant to submit her observations within 15 days. The applicant requested that the time-limit be extended by 30 days as she had been in hospital. Her observations were submitted to the court on 25 February and 12 March 1998. 16. On 17 June 1998 the District Court held a hearing and requested the applicant to specify her claims in the event of the above-mentioned contract of sale being nullified. 17. In her submissions to the court of 19 November 1998, the applicant amended her action. She extended the scope of her action by claiming, from the defendant’s wife, her share of the inheritance of her deceased father. 18. On 20 January 1999 the court suspended the case and requested the parties to institute proceedings before a notary. On 2 March 1999 the Budapest Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s procedural appeal. 19. On 25 June 1999 the applicant’s representative requested the public notary to undertake inheritance proceedings. 20. On 28 July 1999 the notary requested the applicant’s representative to submit an authorisation certified by the consulate or a public notary practising in the applicant’s country of residence. 21. At a hearing on 6 December 1999, the notary set a 30-day time-limit for the parties to submit their claims in respect of any movable property that may have been part of the estate. 22. On 20 January 2000 the notary discontinued the proceedings as the estate contained no movable property. His decision of 18 January 1995 was therefore declared final. 23. Subsequently, on 31 March 2000 the applicant requested the court to continue the case, to record in the Land Registry that proceedings concerning the inheritance of her mother’s real estate were pending and to give priority to the next hearing. On 20 April 2000 the District Court ordered that the proceedings be noted in the Land Registry. Following the defendants’ unsuccessful appeal, the Land Registry registered the proceedings on 14 August 2000. 24. On 27 September 2000 the District Court heard witnesses. It also ordered the defendant to submit his counter-claim within 15 days. 25. On 17 January 2001 the District Court stated that it lacked jurisdiction as the increased value of the applicant’s amended claim required that the case be heard by the Budapest Regional Court at first instance. The case was therefore discontinued before the District Court and transferred to the Regional Court. 26. On 24 April 2001 the Budapest Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the order to transfer the case. 27. On 15 November 2001 and 28 February 2002 the Budapest Regional Court held hearings and ordered the applicant to submit the addresses of certain witnesses living in Germany. On 24 May 2002 the Regional Court heard witnesses. 28. At the next hearing held on 17 October 2002, the Regional Court heard several witnesses. On 20 May and 7 October 2003 the court heard the parties. 29. On 5 November 2003 the court appointed an expert to inspect the real estate in question. The applicant appealed. 30. The case is still pending at first instance.

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9. The applicant was born in 1965 and lives in Opole, Poland. 10. On 16 June 1995 the applicant was taken into custody by the police. On 17 June 1995 the Wrocław Regional Court (Sąd Wojewódzki) dismissed his complaint about placing him in police custody. 11. On 17 June 1995 the Wrocław Regional Prosecutor (Prokurator Wojewódzki) charged the applicant with aggravated fraud and remanded him in custody. The charges related to a period between 30 January and 3 March 1995 when the applicant, together with his accomplices, allegedly defrauded several individuals and businesses by obtaining from them under false pretences cash, automobiles, furniture, computers and other goods of a total value of PLN 1,050,000. In addition, the applicant was charged with possession of a forged passport. The Regional Prosecutor considered that the applicant’s detention on remand was warranted by the fact that he was charged with several criminal acts which caused a significant danger to society (stopień społecznego niebezpieczeństwa jest znaczny), as he had acted within a criminal organisation and had obtained valuable goods. In addition, the applicant’s criminal activity took place over a long time and it was probable that if released he would collude and try to destroy evidence. 12. On 10 July 1995 the applicant applied to the Wrocław Regional Prosecutor for release from detention. On 12 July 1995 the Regional Prosecutor rejected the application. He dismissed as unsubstantiated the applicant’s claims that poor health and the financial situation of his family required his release. Moreover, the applicant’s contention that his ill‑health called for release would be decided after a panel of medical experts had examined him. 13. On 24 and 26 July 1995 the applicant again made applications to the Wrocław Regional Prosecutor for release from detention. On 26 July 1995 his requests were dismissed. The Regional Prosecutor relied on a medical opinion issued by the Wrocław Prison Hospital, which stated that the applicant could remain in detention. In addition, he considered that since the applicant’s daughter and his cohabitee lived with the latter’s parents, there was no need for him to be released to care for them. 14. On 2 August 1995 the applicant made an application for release from detention. On 4 August 1995 the Wrocław Regional Prosecutor rejected his application. The prosecutor referred to the medical opinion of 19 July 1995, which confirmed that the applicant’s state of health allowed the continuation of his detention. Furthermore, he considered that the fact that the applicant’s daughter had recently received medical treatment in the infant pathology ward of the Wrocław Regional Hospital did not constitute a ground for the applicant’s release. The prosecutor also pointed out that the applicant’s cohabitee cared for his daughter. 15. On 9 August 1995 the Wrocław Appellate Prosecutor dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the Regional Prosecutor’s decision of 26 July 1995. The Appellate Prosecutor considered that the evidence showed that the applicant had committed the criminal offences with which he was charged. Moreover, the state of health of his daughter did not require that he be released. The prosecutor was also of a view that the applicant’s detention was necessary to ensure the proper course of the proceedings. 16. On 23 August 1995 the applicant lodged with the Wrocław Court of Appeal (Sąd Apelacyjny) a complaint about his detention. On 31 August 1995 the court transmitted it to the Wrocław Regional Prosecutor to consider it as a request to change the preventive measure applied to the applicant. On 1 September 1995 the prosecutor rejected the request. He dismissed as unsubstantiated the applicant’s claims that his own state of health as well as that of several members of his family required his release from detention. In this connection, the prosecutor referred to medical opinions, which stated that the applicant was neither mentally ill nor retarded and that his detention would not cause any risk to his health and life. Furthermore, he considered that the investigation of the applicant’s claim that his detention constituted a hardship for his family had showed that it was unsubstantiated. 17. On 6 September 1995 the Wrocław Regional Court allowed the request submitted by the prosecution service and extended the applicant’s detention on remand until 30 November 1995. The court considered that the evidence collected in the case sufficiently supported the charges laid against the applicant. It also relied on a significant danger to society caused by the criminal offences in question and the necessity to ensure the proper course of criminal proceedings. Furthermore, the court pointed out that the investigation of the case would have to be continued in order to clarify the applicant’s role in the commission of the criminal offences and to identify individuals who would be charged with receiving stolen goods from the applicant. Finally, the court considered that the applicant’s case did not disclose any of the grounds for release from detention listed in Article 218 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, i.e. danger to the detainee’s life or health and extreme hardship caused to either the detainee or his family. On 6 October 1995 the Wrocław Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the decision of the Regional Court. (b) The bill of indictment 18. On 30 December 1995 the Wrocław Regional Prosecutor filed with the Wrocław Regional Court a bill of indictment against the applicant. 19. On 31 January 1996 the applicant asked the Wrocław Regional Court to release him from detention. On 5 February 1996 the court dismissed his request. It relied on a significant danger to society caused by the criminal offences with which the applicant was charged and the evidence on which they were based. The court was also of the view that the applicant’s family did not suffer hardship which would justify his release. 20. On 15 February 1996 the applicant again filed an application for release but on 22 February 1996 the Wrocław Regional Court rejected it. On 29 February 1996 the Wrocław Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal against that decision. The court observed that the applicant could apply for bail. 21. On 7 March 1996 the Wrocław Regional Court rejected the application for release filed by the applicant on 26 February 1996. On 1 April 1996 the court rejected the application lodged on 19 March 1996. 22. On 19 April 1996 the applicant made a further application to the Wrocław Regional Court for release from detention. On 25 April 1996 the court dismissed his application. It referred to the previous court decisions refusing his requests for release. Moreover, the court considered that the claim that the applicant’s father suffered hardship was unsubstantiated. (c) The hearings 23. The date of the first hearing was fixed for 15 April 1996. However, it was cancelled because one of the defendants was ill and could not attend it. 24. On 16 May 1996 the applicant made an application to the Wrocław Regional Court for release from detention. On 30 May 1996 the court dismissed his request. It relied on a significant danger to society caused by the criminal offences with which the applicant was charged and the evidence on which they were based. The court further considered that the applicant’s detention was necessary to secure the proper conduct of criminal proceedings. In addition, it observed that the applicant’s failure to pay child support did not warrant his release, as one of his children was in receipt of child support payments from the Child Support Fund (Fundusz Alimentacyjny). 25. On 31 June 1996 the Regional Court held a hearing. It was adjourned because two defendants failed to attend it. 26. On 8 July 1996 the applicant made an application to the Wrocław Regional Court for release from detention. On 15 July 1996 the court rejected his request. It relied on the grounds for continuing the applicant’s detention listed in previous court decisions. 27. On 5 August 1996 the applicant asked the Wrocław Regional Court to release him from detention. On 8 August 1996 the court dismissed his request. It considered that the evidence collected in the case sufficiently supported the charges laid against the applicant. As the charges could lead to a severe prison sentence, there was a risk of absconding. Furthermore, the court was of the view that the applicant’s inability to provide care to his children over a long period of time did not result in exceptional hardship for his family. 28. On 12 August 1996 the Wrocław Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s application for release from detention filed on 6 August 1996. The court relied on the evidence collected in the case, which in its opinion supported the charges laid against the applicant. In addition, it considered that the prospect of a severe penalty, which could be imposed on the applicant, could prompt him to abscond. 29. On 19 August 1996 the Vice-President of the Wrocław Court of Appeal informed the Ministry of Justice and the applicant that the applicant’s case did not disclose that the proceedings had taken unreasonably long. In particular, he pointed out that thirteen individuals were accused in the case, the case file consisted of seventeen volumes and evidence had to be taken from fifty‑eight witnesses. Furthermore, the Vice‑President observed that the first hearing had been cancelled because one of the defendants had been ill. The second hearing had been adjourned until 30 August 1996 as two defendants had failed to attend it. Finally, he stated that “the judge rapporteur is dealing with twenty-five other cases and therefore is not able to decide this case sooner than is possible”. 30. On 30 August 1996 the Regional Court held a hearing. It was adjourned because some of the defendants failed to attend it. 31. On 3 September 1996 the Wrocław Court of Appeal allowed the applicant’s appeal against the Regional Court’s decision of 8 August 1996 rejecting his application for release from detention. The appellate court quashed the impugned decision and instructed the trial court to reconsider the applicant’s request. It acknowledged that “in the present case the detention on remand has lasted quite long”. In addition, the appellate court considered that the trial court’s statement on the applicant’s intention to abscond was not precise enough. As the applicant’s detention had already lasted sixteen months and as he was not charged with a serious offence, the mere reference to the possibility that the applicant could abscond because of the prospect of a severe penalty was not sufficient. The appellate court also observed that the trial court had not considered whether another preventive measure could replace the applicant’s detention on remand. 32. On 12 September 1996 the Wrocław Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s four applications for release submitted in August and September 1996. The court considered that the charges against the applicant were sufficiently supported by the evidence. Moreover, the difficulties in finding the applicant’s place of residence during the investigative stage of the proceedings and the prospect of a severe penalty showed that he could go into hiding if released from detention. The court further noted that the applicant could not be released on bail as he had stated that he had no funds to pay it. Finally, it considered that there was no evidence pointing towards the existence of any of the grounds for release provided for by Article 218 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 33. The hearing held on 13 September 1996 was adjourned until 27 September 1996 as some of the defendants failed to attend it because of ill health. 34. During the hearing held on 27 September 1996 the Wrocław Regional Court rejected the applicant’s application for release from detention. The hearing was adjourned because some of the defendants failed to attend it. 35. On 7 October 1996 the Wrocław Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the Regional Court’s decision of 12 September 1996. The appellate court observed that the applicant’s release would delay the proceedings, as his cohabitee lived in Opole. It also noted that the applicant had contributed to the delay in the proceedings because on numerous occasions he had submitted requests and appeals. In addition, on several occasions a case file had been transmitted from the trial court to the Wrocław Detention Centre after the applicant had asked to consult it. 36. On 17 October 1996 the Wrocław Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the Regional Court’s decision of 27 September 1996. The appellate court referred to previous court decisions rejecting his applications for release from detention. The court further noted that although the length of the applicant’s detention could be worrying (trwa już niepokojąco długo), it had not been caused by the inactivity of the trial court. Moreover, the appellate court recommended that “more energetic steps” be taken to expedite the proceedings. Finally, it acknowledged that the state of health of the applicant’s cohabitee and his daughter was not good. However, the court was of the view that the applicant’s release would not contribute to the improvement of their health. 37. In a letter of 23 October 1996 the President of the Wrocław Regional Court advised the applicant that the trial court could not be blamed for the delay in the proceedings. He pointed out that the court had fixed numerous hearings, which had been adjourned because of the absence of defendants who had been ill. 38. During the hearing held on 25 October 1996 the applicant applied for bail. He proposed that the bail be set at PLN 2,000. However, the Wrocław Regional Court rejected the application. It gave the following reasons for its decision: “The circumstances raised by the accused in his application have already been considered by both the Regional Court and the Court of Appeal. Therefore, taking into account the fact that no new circumstances have taken place, it should be assumed that the reasons for continuing detention on remand have not ceased to exist.” 39. During the hearing held on 12 December 1996 the Wrocław Regional Court rejected the applicant’s application for release from detention. The hearing was adjourned because some of the defendants failed to attend it. 40. On 31 December 1996 the Wrocław Regional Court decided to request the Supreme Court (Sąd Najwyższy) to extend the applicant’s detention on remand. 41. On 7 January 1997 the Wrocław Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the Regional Court’s decision of 12 December 1996. The appellate court recalled that during the preceding ten months it had been considering on a monthly basis the applicant’s appeals against the trial court’s refusals to release him. It considered that the factual and legal circumstances concerning the applicant’s detention had not changed. (d) The Supreme Court extends the applicant’s detention 42. On 24 January 1997 the Supreme Court allowed the Regional Court’s request and extended the applicant’s detention on remand until 24 July 1997. It considered that the prolongation of the applicant’s detention was justified by the evidence, the possibility that he could go into hiding and the complexity of the case. It also observed that the delay in the proceedings was caused by the behaviour of defendants who had failed to attend hearings. The Supreme Court further reflected on the legality of the applicant’s detention between 1 and 24 January 1997. The relevant part of the court’s reasoning may be summarised as follows: The Supreme Court, noting that the application was filed on 31 December 1996 but posted as late as 13 January 1997, first considered what was the proper date of ‘lodging’ such an application for the purposes of Article 222 § 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Supreme Court next observed that, depending on the answer to this question, it would have to determine the legal consequences of a potential failure on the part of the Wrocław Regional Court to respect the rule laid down in Article 10 (a) § 2 of the Interim Law of 1 December 1995, which stated that in cases where no request for a further prolongation of detention on remand had been ‘lodged’, the detention on remand had to be lifted and the person concerned released not later than on 1 January 1997. The Supreme Court considered that it should also deal with the question of whether it was competent to rule on the application if it had been ‘lodged’ after the expiry of the term referred to in Article 10 (a) of the Interim Law of 1 December 1995, i.e. after 1 January 1997. Referring to the first question, the Supreme Court held that the proper date of ‘lodging’ an application under Article 222 § 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure had to be deemed either the date of posting the request or the date of submitting it to the registry of the Supreme Court since to hold otherwise would mean leaving a detainee without any guarantee that the Supreme Court was properly supervising his detention. Moreover, if the requesting court was not bound by any time-limits for submitting its application, detention, the most severe among the preventive measures, might continue for an unspecified and unlimited time outside the Supreme Court’s supervision. In consequence, an application under Article 222 § 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, a mere ‘proposal’ to continue detention, would, for all practical purposes, transform into a basis for continuing detention. Clearly, that was not the intention of the legislator. The Supreme Court therefore concluded that since in the applicant’s case no application for a further prolongation of his detention was ‘lodged’ before 1 January 1997, the applicant’s (and his co-defendants’) detention from that date to the date of its present decision lacked any legal basis and was, accordingly, unlawful. It went on to find that it was, nevertheless, competent to deal with the application lodged outside the relevant date. It considered that a lower court’s obligation to release a detainee in case of its failure properly to lodge an application under Article 222 § 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was one thing, but its right to make such an application at any time was another. In the Supreme Court’s opinion, the application in question should be deemed a “fresh application” and be examined as such. 43. On 28 January 1997 the Wrocław Regional Court held a hearing. 44. On 10 February 1997 the President of the Wrocław Court of Appeal informed the applicant that his complaints about his unjustified detention on remand were unsubstantiated. The President also recalled that on 24 January 1997 the Supreme Court had prolonged the applicant’s detention and that no hearings could be held in his case at the time when the Supreme Court had been considering the request to extend his detention. In addition, he observed that the next hearing was scheduled for 17 March 1997. 45. On 24 February 1997 the Wrocław Regional Court dismissed as unsubstantiated the applicant’s challenge to one of the judges considering his case. 46. On 17 March 1997 the Wrocław Regional Court held a hearing. It was adjourned because some of the defendants failed to attend it. 47. During the hearings held on 17 April and 28 May 1997 the Wrocław Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s applications for release from detention. The latter hearing was adjourned because some of the defendants failed to attend it. 48. The hearing held on 8 July 1997 was adjourned because some of the defendants did not attend it. 49. During the hearing held on 8 September 1997 the Wrocław Regional Court decided to sever the charges laid against three co-defendants and to consider them in separate proceedings because the co-defendants’ numerous failures to attend hearings resulted in the delay in deciding the applicant’s case. Thereafter, the proceedings were continued against the applicant and eight co‑defendants. 50. The next hearings were held on 13, 28 October and 25 November 1997. The hearing scheduled for 18 November 1997 was cancelled. 51. On 19 December 1997 the hearing was held before the Regional Court. It decided to request the Supreme Court to prolong the applicant’s detention on remand. 52. On 15 January 1998 the Supreme Court extended the applicant’s detention on remand until 31 March 1998. 53. During the hearing held on 30 January 1998 the Regional Court rejected the applicant’s requests that the charges against him be decided in separate proceedings and that he be released from detention. 54. On 3 and 17 March 1998 hearings took place before the trial court. (e) The end of pre-trial detention 55. On 20 March 1998 the applicant was released from detention. 56. Subsequently, hearings were held on 17 April, 15 May, 5 June, 2 July, 3 September, 6 October, 30 November and 1 December 1998. 57. In the course of 1999 the Wrocław Regional Court held hearings on the following dates: 5 January, 4 February, 11 March, 14 April, 7 and 28 May, 9 June, 7 September, 29 October and 15 December. The hearings held on 7 September and 29 October 1999 were adjourned because a judge was ill. 58. On 14 January 2000 the court held a hearing. 59. During the hearings held between 25 November 1997 and 14 January 2000 the Wrocław Regional Court took evidence from more than fifty witnesses. (f) The conviction 60. On 21 January 2000 the Wrocław Regional Court convicted the applicant and sentenced him to five years and six months’ imprisonment and to a fine. On 14 April 2000 the applicant appealed against his conviction. 61. On 24 August 2000 the Wrocław Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal. 62. On 24 October 2000 the Court received the applicant’s letter of 9 October 2000. The front of the envelope in which the letter was delivered bears a stamp in Polish: “Opole Detention Centre, Ward III, Received on 09.10.2000.” On the back of the envelope there is a stamp in Polish: “Censored. Opole, 19.10.2000”. The top edge of the envelope is sealed with Sellotape. The envelope is postmarked 19 October 2000.

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9. The applicant was born in 1949 and lives in Lapua. 10. The applicant was a managing director in company X until it went into liquidation, on 8 May 1990, before the District Court (kihlakunnanoikeus, häradsrätt) of Isokyrö. The creditor withdrew the application later and the liquidation proceedings were terminated on 28 May 1990, only to be restarted on 15 August 1990. 11. In December 1990 the police started interrogating the applicant relating to the business activities and accounts of X. In 1991 the Central Criminal Police (keskusrikospoliisi, centralkriminalpolisen) conducted several searches of the applicant’s and X’s premises in Seinäjoki, Isokyrö and Nurmo. The police reports, resulting from the investigations, were dated 30 May 1991, 26 April 1993 and 7 July 1993. In respect of the third report the police carried out a further investigation which was terminated on 25 July 1994. The applicant was not taken into police custody during the criminal investigations or the subsequent criminal proceedings against him. 12. On 15 June 1994 the applicant was charged on eleven counts with offences, including, inter alia, aggravated tax fraud. The District Court held oral hearings on 7 September 1994, 8 December 1994, 22 February 1995, 20 April 1995 and 31 August 1995. The hearing was each time adjourned on the Prosecutor’s request. On 31 August 1995, the District Court convicted the applicant as charged and sentenced him to two years’ imprisonment. Two other persons were also accused and convicted of one offence each. 13. All the accused appealed to the Court of Appeal (hovioikeus, hovrätt) of Vaasa which, by a decision of 25 January 1996, referred the case back to the District Court for reconsideration, on the grounds that the District Court’s judgment had been inadequately reasoned. 14. The case was reconsidered by the District Court (käräjäoikeus, tingsrätt) of Kyrönmaa, which had replaced the District Court of Isokyrö. On 14 November 1996, the District Court convicted the applicant on ten counts and sentenced him to one year and ten months’ imprisonment. 15. In addition to the applicant, the prosecutor and the Tax Administration of Western Finland (Länsi-Suomen verovirasto, Västra Finlands skatteverk), which was also a party to the proceedings, appealed to the Court of Appeal. On 2 February 1998 the Court of Appeal granted the applicant a partly cost-free trial as from 1 June 1996 onwards. On 11 February 1998 the Court of Appeal acquitted the applicant of one of the charges and rejected the rest of the applicant’s appeal, upholding the prison sentence. The applicant was also obliged to pay the State of Finland a total of 3,460,000 Finnish Marks (equivalent to approximately EUR 582,000) with interest in compensation for unpaid taxes. 16. On 24 April 1998, the Supreme Court (korkein oikeus, högsta domstolen) refused the applicant leave to appeal. 17. The applicant twice requested the reopening of the proceedings before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court rejected the applicant’s requests on 25 August and 24 November 1998, respectively. 18. On 21 September 1998, the applicant complained to the Chancellor of Justice (oikeuskansleri, justitiekansler) about the delay in the proceedings, amongst other things. The Deputy Chancellor of Justice found, in his decision of 30 October 2000, that the length of the proceedings could not be regarded as excessive, taking into account the fact that the criminal investigation lasted about two years and a half, the prosecutor’s decision whether to prosecute or not took about a year, the District Court’s first judgment was issued in about one year, the Court of Appeal’s decision to refer the case back to the District Court was made in a few months, the District Court’s second judgment was issued in less than ten months, the Court of Appeal re-examined the District Court’s judgment in about a year and three months, and the Supreme Court refused the applicant leave to appeal in about two months. Thus, the court proceedings, including five different court decisions, lasted less than four years all together. Even though the proceedings were lengthy, it had to be noted that the case was complex and that it had proceeded at all times without any unnecessary delay at any stage. He emphasised that it was in the interests of the applicant that the criminal investigation was also carried out in a profound and appropriate manner. As the applicant’s application was still pending before the Strasbourg Court, the Deputy Chancellor of Justice found it unnecessary to take any measures in the case.

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8. The applicant was born in 1970. He is serving a sentence in the Ilava prison. 9. On 17 October 1995 the applicant was apprehended by the police as he was suspected of having murdered a taxi driver. Criminal proceedings were brought and the applicant was detained on remand in that context. 10. The main hearing before the Košice Regional Court was held on 24 February 1997. In his final speech the applicant requested, inter alia, that he should be released from detention. On the same day the Košice Regional Court convicted the applicant of murder and of the unauthorised carrying of a weapon and sentenced him to twelve and a half years’ imprisonment. Neither the judgment nor the minutes mentioned the applicant’s request for release. In terms of domestic law the applicant continued being detained on remand until the final effect of the judgment leading to his conviction. 11. On 25 April and on 14 June 1997 the applicant appealed against the Regional Court’s judgment. 12. In a letter dated 12 May 1997 the applicant informed the presiding judge of the Košice Regional Court that he maintained his request for release from detention on remand of 24 February 1997. 13. On 2 July 1997 the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. The judgment convicting the applicant became final on the same day. 14. On 29 October 1997 and on 25 March 1998 respectively the president of the Košice Regional Court and the Ministry of Justice admitted, in reply to the applicant’s complaint, that no decision had been taken on his application for release lodged at the hearing before the Regional Court on 24 February 1997.

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9. The applicant was born in 1967 and lives in Wrocław, Poland. 10. On an unknown date in 1995 the Wrocław District Prosecutor (Prokurator Rejonowy) issued a warrant to search for the applicant by “wanted” notice on suspicion of his having committed fraud. 11. On 3 March 1995 the police arrested the applicant under that warrant. 12. On 10 March 1995 the applicant was brought before the Wrocław Stare Miasto District Prosecutor (Prokurator Rejonowy). The prosecutor charged him with several counts of aggravated fraud and ordered that he be remanded in custody until 2 June 1995. The detention order was based on Articles 210 § 1 and 217 § 1(2) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. As to the grounds for the applicant’s detention, the prosecution first relied on the reasonable suspicion that he had committed the offence with which he had been charged. They also considered that the offence in question represented a serious danger to society (wysoki stopień społecznego niebezpieczeństwa czynu) and considered that there was a risk that the applicant might induce witnesses to give false testimony or obstruct the criminal proceedings against him by other unlawful means. 13. On 26 May 1995, on an application made by the Wrocław District Prosecutor, the Wrocław-Śródmieście District Court (Sąd Rejonowy) prolonged the applicant’s detention until 31 August 1995 in view of the reasonable suspicion that he had committed the offence with which he had been charged and the serious nature of that offence. The court also found that, in the light of the material collected in the investigation, there was a high risk that the applicant would obstruct the proper conduct of the proceedings. Finally, the court held that the interests of the investigation, such as the need to obtain and secure evidence, militated in favour of keeping him in custody. 14. Subsequently, the Wrocław Regional Prosecutor (Prokurator Wojewódzki) took over the investigation from the District Prosecutor. 15. On 24 August 1995 the Wrocław Regional Court (Sąd Wojewódzki), on an application made by the Wrocław Regional Prosecutor, prolonged the applicant’s detention until 30 November 1995, finding that it was necessary because there was a reasonable suspicion that the applicant had committed the serious offence. Furthermore, the court found that the need to secure the proper conduct of the proceedings militated against releasing him since, at the current stage of the investigation, it was necessary to hear evidence from all the injured parties, to carry out confrontations between witnesses and defendants and to lay further charges of dealing in stolen goods against several other persons who had not to date been involved in the proceedings. 16. On 24 November 1995, on the subsequent application from the Wrocław Regional Prosecutor, the Wrocław Regional Court prolonged the applicant’s detention until 31 December 1995, holding that there was a reasonable suspicion that he had committed the serious offence with which he had been charged. The court also stressed that the applicant should be kept in custody in order to secure the proper conduct of the proceedings, especially as the charges originally laid against the suspects needed to be supplemented. 17. On 27 December 1995 the Wrocław Regional Prosecutor completed the investigation and, on 30 December 1995, lodged a bill of indictment with the Wrocław Regional Court. The applicant was indicted on several counts of aggravated fraud. The bill of indictment comprised charges against 13 co-defendants. The prosecution asked the court to hear evidence from 9 expert witnesses and 104 lay witnesses, and to consider 400 pieces of documentary evidence. 18. The first hearing was to be held on 15 April 1996. Yet it was eventually cancelled because one of the applicant’s co-defendants, who had already been released under police supervision, was absent. 19. Subsequently, between 15 April 1996 and 28 August 1997, the Wrocław Regional Court listed 12 hearings for various dates but cancelled all of them because several of the applicant’s co-defendants who had already been released under police supervision had repeatedly failed to appear before it. They had submitted medical certificates to the effect that they could not participate in the trial because of their poor health and asked the court to adjourn the proceedings. 20. During that time the applicant made numerous unsuccessful applications for release on bail or under police supervision. He submitted that even though his detention pending trial had exceeded any reasonable limits, not a single hearing on the merits had so far been held. He also asked the Regional Court to order, under Article 24 § 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, that the charges against the released co-defendants be severed from the case so as to ensure that the trial proceeded without any further impediment. 21. In the meantime, on 31 December 1996, the Wrocław Regional Court had released A.A., one of the thirteen co-defendants, under police supervision. From then on, only the applicant and two other co-defendants (D.P. and W.K.) were still kept in detention pending trial. 22. On the same day the Regional Court held a session in camera at which the Regional Prosecutor was present. It made an application under Article 222 § 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to the Supreme Court (Sąd Najwyższy), asking it to prolong the applicant’s and his two co-defendants’ detention for six further months. That application was prepared in view of the fact that on 1 January 1997 the amendments to the Code of Criminal Procedure were to take effect. The new provisions set statutory time-limits for detention pending trial and, in consequence, in all cases where detention had already exceeded, or was about to exceed, the relevant terms, the courts had either to release the person concerned or to ask the Supreme Court to prolong his detention (see also “B. Relevant domestic law and practice” below). The reasons for the Regional Court’s application read, in so far as relevant: “[In respect of the applicant and two other co-accused] the [maximum] time-limits for detention on remand laid down in Article 222 § 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure have expired and 31 December 1996 is the deadline for lodging a request for further prolongation of their detention on remand. During the period following the date on which the bill of indictment was lodged with this court, it scheduled numerous hearings; however, the trial has not yet began as this court, for valid reasons [,such as the fact that the defendants, one after another, had failed to appear before us,] could not proceed with the trial. In this connection, this court has, in accordance with the suggestion of the Wrocław Court of Appeal, considered whether it would be sensible to sever the charges laid against the co-defendants concerned, pursuant to Article 24 § 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Yet, as all the charges in the present case are interrelated, this court finds that there is no just cause to proceed in this way. The detained defendants have repeatedly asked this court to lift or vary the preventive measure imposed on them. This court has dismissed their applications and in doing so it has had [particular] regard to the serious nature of the offences, the likelihood that a severe penalty would be imposed and, more particularly, to the conduct of the defendants during the investigation, that is to say [the fact that they had had to be] searched for by a “wanted” notice and that there had been problems in the course of their arrest [which had justified the risk that] they might go into hiding. The [Wrocław] Court of Appeal, which has dealt with the defendants’ appeals [against decisions refusing to release them], expressed the same opinion. That being so, and there being other serious obstacles [to the proper course of the trial] the present application for the defendants’ detention to be prolonged must be submitted to the Supreme Court.” 23. The application was posted to the Supreme Court on 13 January 1997. 24. On 24 January 1997, a panel of three judges, sitting in camera as the Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court, after obtaining oral comments from the State Prosecutor (Prokurator Krajowy), who had been summoned to the session and represented the prosecution, dealt with, and granted, the application. The Supreme Court prolonged the applicant’s and his co-defendants’ detention “from 24 January 1997 to 24 July 1997”. The defendants were not present. Nor were they legally represented since, under Polish law as it stood at that time, defendants or their counsel were not entitled to participate in court sessions held in camera (see also paragraphs 65-66 below). 25. The Supreme Court’s decision contained exhaustive reasons, the relevant part of which may be summarised as follows: The Supreme Court, noting that the application was filed on 31 December 1996 but posted as late as 13 January 1997, first considered what was the proper date of “lodging” such an application for the purposes of Article 222 § 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Supreme Court next observed that, depending on the answer to this question, it would have to determine the legal consequences of a potential failure on the part of the Wrocław Regional Court to respect the rule laid down in Article 10 (a) § 2 of the Interim Law of 1 December 1995, which stated that in cases where no request for a further prolongation of detention on remand had been “lodged”, the detention on remand had to be lifted and the person concerned released not later than on 1 January 1997. The Supreme Court considered that it should also deal with the question of whether it was competent to rule on the application if it had been “lodged” after the expiry of the term referred to in Article 10 (a) of the Interim Law of 1 December 1995, i.e. after 1 January 1997. Referring to the first question, the Supreme Court held that the proper date of “lodging” an application under Article 222 § 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure had to be deemed either the date of posting the request or the date of submitting it to the registry of the Supreme Court since to hold otherwise would mean leaving a detainee without any guarantee that the Supreme Court was properly supervising his detention. Moreover, if the requesting court was not bound by any time-limits for submitting its application, detention, the most severe among the preventive measures, might continue for an unspecified and unlimited time outside the Supreme Court’s supervision. In consequence, an application under Article 222 § 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, a mere “proposal” to continue detention, would, for all practical purposes, transform into a basis for continuing detention. Clearly, that was not the intention of the legislator. The Supreme Court therefore concluded that since in the applicant’s case no application for a further prolongation of his detention was “lodged” before 1 January 1997, the applicant’s (and his co-defendants’) detention from that date to the date of its present decision lacked any legal basis and was, accordingly, unlawful. It went on to find that it was, nevertheless, competent to deal with the application lodged outside the relevant date. It considered that a lower court’s obligation to release a detainee in case of its failure properly to lodge an application under Article 222 § 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was one thing, but its right to make such an application at any time was another. In the Supreme Court’s opinion, the application in question should be deemed a “fresh application” and be examined as such. It considered that further prolongation of the applicant’s detention was necessary. In essence, it repeated the arguments adduced by the Wrocław Regional Court and stressed the complexity of the case. 26. On 9 July 1997 the Wrocław Regional Court made another application under Article 222 § 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It asked the Supreme Court to prolong the applicant’s, W.K.’s and D.P.’s detention until 31 December 1997. The Regional Court submitted that regardless of its consistent efforts to proceed with the trial, it could not begin the main hearing because several released co-accused had repeatedly failed to appear before it. However, the applicant had to be kept in custody since there was still a risk that he might go into hiding because at the initial stage of the proceedings he had had to be searched for by a “wanted” notice and, likewise his two detained co-defendants, had obstructed his arrest. Finally, the court relied on the complexity of the case and the fact that evidence gathered in the investigation sufficiently supported the charges laid against him. 27. In the meantime, in July and August 1997, the applicant repeatedly complained to the Wrocław Regional Prosecutor, the Wrocław Regional Court, the Supreme Court, the Minister of Justice and the Ombudsman (Rzecznik Praw Obywatelskich) that, from 1 to 24 January 1997, he had been kept in detention without any legal basis. He also asked for release. 28. On 28 August 1997 a panel of three judges, sitting in camera as the Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court, after obtaining oral comments from the State Prosecutor, prolonged the applicant’s, W.K.’s and D.P.’s detention pending trial until 31 December 1997. The Supreme Court fully upheld the arguments adduced by the Wrocław Regional Court in its application. However, it expressed the opinion that, for the sake of the proper conduct of the trial, the charges against the released co-defendants should be severed from the case. 29. On 8 September 1997 the Wrocław Regional Court held the first hearing. It did not deal with the merits of the case but ordered that the charges against three of the released co-defendants be severed from the case and adjourned the trial until 13 October 1997. The applicant asked for release. The court refused, holding that the reasons for his continued detention, as cited in the Supreme Court’s decision of 28 August 1997, were still valid. 30. In August, September and October 1997 the applicant sent numerous petitions, letters and applications to, inter alia, the Minister of Justice, the Supreme Court, the Ombudsman, the Wrocław Regional Court, the Wrocław Regional Prosecutor and the Wrocław District Prosecutor. He complained about the unlawfulness and length of his detention, the slow conduct of his trial and asked the authorities to release him and to institute criminal proceedings against the persons who had kept him in unlawful custody. He invoked Article 5 § 4 of the Convention, submitting that he had no remedy whereby he could challenge the lawfulness of his detention from 1 to 24 January 1997 and obtain release. He also relied on Article 5 § 3 of the Convention and maintained that his right to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial was not respected. 31. On 15 September 1997 the applicant made an application for release to the Wrocław Regional Court. He asserted that there was no risk of his going into hiding. He admitted that it was true that, nearly three years previously and before he had been detained, he had used a false identity card. However that single fact could not justify holding him in custody for such a long time. At that point, he added, his detention had already exceeded thirty months. The applicant further complained that there had been an exceptional delay in the proceedings which, in his opinion, had resulted solely from the fact that the Regional Court had failed to ensure the presence of the released co-defendants at the trial. He also maintained that, following his arrest, there had been no single attempt on his part to obstruct the proper course of the proceedings. In his view, there was no evidence whatsoever to demonstrate that, had he been released, he would have evaded justice or any sentence that might be imposed. 32. That application was dismissed on 9 October 1997. The Regional Court repeated the reasons previously given to justify the applicant’s detention. It was stressed that he should be kept in detention to secure the proper conduct of the proceedings. Moreover, the court considered that the applicant had failed to adduce any arguments militating in favour of his release. On 13 October 1997 the court cancelled a hearing since one of the released co-defendants had failed to appear before it and submitted a medical certificate stating that he was ill. 33. On 28 October 1997 the Wrocław Regional Court held the first hearing on the merits. Since some of the co-defendants decided not to give any oral evidence at the trial stage, the court read out the record of evidence given by them in the investigation. 34. The next hearing was to be held on 18 November 1997 but was cancelled because one of the released co-defendants had submitted a medical certificate stating that he was ill. 35. On 20 November 1997 the Regional Court, at the Minister of Justice’s request, submitted to the Ministry a report on the progress of the proceedings. Further similar reports were submitted on 23 and 30 March, 25 May, 26 August and 9 December 1998. 36. On 25 November 1997 the court held a hearing and had the record of evidence taken from other five co-defendants in the investigation read out. The court then started to hear witnesses. After hearing evidence from two of them, it adjourned the trial in order to hear six other witnesses. 37. In the meantime, in November 1997, the applicant had again filed several petitions with the Ombudsman, the Minister of Justice and the Division of Judicial Supervision (Wydział Wizytacyjny) of the Wrocław Regional Court. He complained that the overall period of his detention had meanwhile amounted to nearly thirty-three months but the determination of the charges against him had merely begun. He asked the authorities concerned to react, in an appropriate manner, to the fact that he had been unlawfully detained in January 1997, a fact that had already been confirmed by the highest national court. 38. On 11 December 1997 the Wrocław Regional Court dismissed a further application for release which had been filed by the applicant on an unknown date. The court held that all the legal and factual grounds previously given for his detention were still valid. It also considered that since there were no circumstances justifying release, as listed in Article 218 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, his detention should continue to ensure the proper conduct of the proceedings. 39. On 19 December 1997 the court held a hearing. It heard evidence from three witnesses and adjourned the trial until 30 January 1998 because other witnesses had not appeared. 40. On the same day the Regional Court made a fresh, and third, application under Article 222 § 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to the Supreme Court, asking for the applicant’s, D.P.’s and W.K.’s detention to be prolonged until 31 March 1998. It stressed that it had eventually been able to begin the trial. It considered that, given that evidence had already been taken from all the co-defendants, it could not be said that the court had not handled the case efficiently. While it was true that the process of obtaining evidence had not come to an end, that was not due to any fault on the part of the trial court but had arisen out of other factors. There were still valid reasons justifying the defendants’ continued detention, notably the well-founded suspicion that they had committed the offences with which they had been charged and the risk that they might abscond or go into hiding. 41. From 19 December 1997 to the beginning of January 1998 the applicant filed numerous petitions with the Minister of Justice, the Supreme Court and the Wrocław Regional Court, submitting that his constitutional right to personal liberty, as well as his rights secured by Article 5 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention, had been violated. He maintained that he had spent nearly three years in detention because the trial court had – wrongly – concluded that there was a risk of his absconding even though, after his arrest, there had never been a single basis for such a finding. Whatever his arguments, the court had never believed him and never given him a chance to prove that his release would not have obstructed the course of the trial. In fact, the applicant claimed, the proper conduct of the proceedings had constantly been impeded by his seven released co-defendants. 42. On 15 January 1998 a panel of three judges, sitting in camera as the Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court, after obtaining oral comments from the State Prosecutor, prolonged the applicant’s, W.K.’s and D.P.’s detention until 31 March 1998. The Supreme Court fully upheld the reasons given by the Wrocław Regional Court to justify its application. 43. On 30 January 1998 the Wrocław Regional Court held a hearing but the trial was again adjourned since, in the applicant’s words, “one of the defence counsel [had] left the courtroom”. 44. On 20 March 1998 the court released the applicant, D.P. and W.K. under police supervision. In its decision, the court conceded that the period of nearly three years that the applicant had spent in detention had been nearly as long as the anticipated penalty and that, in consequence, his continued detention would amount to serving a sentence of imprisonment. 45. Between 20 March 1998 and 4 February 1999 the Regional Court held eleven hearings. At the hearings held on 30 November and 1 December 1998 the court heard evidence from thirty-one witnesses. On 5 January 1999 the court heard fifteen witnesses. The applicant twice failed to appear before the court. 46. Further hearings were held on 4 February, 11 March, 14 April, 7 and 28 May and 9 June 1999. During that time the court heard evidence from 8 witnesses and read out records of evidence taken from 11 witnesses. 47. At a hearing held on 15 December 1999 the court heard evidence from 3 witnesses and read out records of evidence taken from 5 witnesses. The trial continued on 14 and 21 January 2000. 48. On 21 January 2000 the Regional Court gave judgment. It convicted the applicant as charged and sentenced him to 4 years and 6 months’ imprisonment and a fine. The applicant did not appeal against his conviction. Accordingly, the judgment became final on 29 January 2000. 49. On 16 January 2001 the Court’s registry received the applicant’s declaration of means filed on 12 December 2000. It was delivered in an envelope bearing two stamps. The first of them read: “Wrocław Remand Centre – Department of Records and Employment. Received on [handwriting] 2000-12-13. No. 651/099” The second stamp read “cenzurowano” (censored). The envelope itself bore traces of opening after being sealed: its right side had been cut open and then resealed with six white self-sticking paper slips. It was postmarked 8 January 2001.

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8. The applicant was born in 1951 and lives in Balassagyarmat. 9. In 1974 the applicant married in former Czechoslovakia. Subsequently, the couple moved to Hungary. Their daughter was born in January 1980. 10. On 17 September 1996 the applicant’s wife, then a Slovak national, filed for divorce before the Balassagyarmat District Court. She also sought custody of their child and the division of the matrimonial property. 11. Shortly afterwards, the applicant challenged his paternity of their daughter before the District Court. On 24 January 1997 the District Court rejected this action as being incomplete. 12. Meanwhile, on 25 November 1996 and 11 February 1997 the District Court held hearings in the principal proceedings. 13. On 11 March 1997 the applicant filed a new paternity action. 14. At the hearing on 13 June 1997 the District Court suspended the proceedings in the divorce case pending a decision on the paternity dispute. 15. On 27 August 1997 the District Court again rejected the applicant’s paternity action as being incomplete. 16. On 9 September 1997 the applicant filed a new paternity action. On 25 March 1998 the District Court dismissed his claims. On 10 September 1998 the Nógrád County Regional Court dismissed his appeal. 17. Meanwhile, on 16 February 1998 the applicant’s wife requested that the principal proceedings be continued. She argued that their daughter had reached the age of 18 and for that reason it was no longer necessary to decide the question of custody; consequently, the outcome of the paternity proceedings was irrelevant to the determination of the divorce action. The proceedings were resumed soon afterwards. 18. Subsequently, the applicant brought a counter-action seeking the invalidation of the marriage. At the hearing on 23 April 1998 the District Court ordered that the relevant provisions of the Czechoslovakian Civil Code be obtained via the Ministry of Justice. 19. On 4 November 1998 the applicant’s daughter filed a rebuttal of the presumption of the applicant’s paternity. On 19 January 1999 the District Court appointed a medical expert to carry out a blood group examination of the parties. On 14 April 1999 the expert verified the applicant’s paternity. Subsequently, the plaintiff withdrew her claims and these proceedings were discontinued. 20. In the principal proceedings, the translation of the Czechoslovakian law reached the District Court on 19 October 1999. 21. On 26 October 1999 the District Court requested, via the Ministry of Justice, a copy of the parties’ marriage certificate from the archives of the Slovakian Nagykürtös District Registry. 22. On 9 December 1999 another hearing was held. On the same day, the District Court dismissed, in a partial decision, the applicant’s counter-claim for invalidation of the marriage. The District Court relied on documentary evidence received from Slovakia. On 16 May 2000 the Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal. 23. On 28 August 2000 the District Court held a further hearing and ordered a bank to submit information about the parties’ assets. 24. On 2 October 2000 the District Court pronounced the parties’ divorce and disjoined the remainder of the claims. In this latter respect, it ordered that the Land Registry be notified of the dispute concerning the division of the matrimonial property. 25. On 14 November 2000 the applicant appealed against the first-instance decision and challenged the Regional Court for bias. On 8 February 2001 the Supreme Court dismissed his motion. On 10 May 2001 the Regional Court dismissed his appeal. 26. On 18 December 2000 the District Court appointed experts to assess the value of the parties’ assets. 27. On 21 January 2001 the applicant challenged all of the judges of Nógrád County for bias. On 22 January 2001 the Regional Court transferred the case file to the Supreme Court. 28. On 20 March 2001 an inspection of the parties’ property holdings properties was carried out. 29. On 28 March 2001 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s motion for bias and sent the case file back to the Regional Court. Subsequently, on 22 May 2001 the Regional Court appointed the Salgótarján District Court to hear the case. 30. The case – in so far as it concerns the division of the matrimonial property – is still pending before the Salgótarján District Court.

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7. The applicant, a farmer living in Lustenau (Austria), owns, inter alia, parcels of land which, by an ordinance (Verordnung) issued by the Vorarlberg Regional Government (Landesregierung), were registered as protected wetland in 1990 (Ordinance No. 1990/40 of the Regional Law Gazette). 8. On 24 July 1991 the applicant filed a request with the Vorarlberg Regional Government for an exemption permit (Ausnahmebewilligung) from the above ordinance in order to install a drainage system as he intended to cultivate and exploit his land. 9. On 2 August 1991 the Landscape Protection Officer (Landschaftsschutzanwalt), on 5 August 1991 the Landscape Protection Board (Naturschau) and on 29 August 1991 the Agricultural Chamber (Landwirtschaftskammer) all submitted comments on the applicant's request which were communicated to him on 6 September 1991. Only the opinion of the Agricultural Chamber was in favour of the applicant's request. 10. On 17 September, 1 and 31 October 1991 the applicant filed observations with the Vorarlberg Regional Government. On 20 November 1991 the opinion of an official expert for landscape protection (Amtssachverständiger für Natur- und Landschaftsschutz) was communicated to the applicant who, on 4 December 1991, filed his comments. 11. On 10 April 1992 the Vorarlberg Regional Government refused to grant an exemption permit. 12. On 27 May 1992 the applicant filed a complaint with the Constitutional Court (Verfassungsgerichtshof). The applicant complained, inter alia, that the ordinance on which the refusal of the exemption permit was based was unlawful. 13. On 14 June 1993 the Constitutional Court refused to deal with the case as it lacked any prospects of success, and transferred it to the Administrative Court (Verwaltungsgerichtshof). 14. On 29 November 1993 the applicant supplemented his complaint and requested the Administrative Court to hold a hearing and an on-site inspection, in the presence of a further expert to be appointed by the Administrative Court. As reason for his request he stated that such a hearing would show that the arguments given by the Regional Government in its decision were not correct. 15. On 4 January 1994 the Vorarlberg Regional Government submitted their comments on the applicant's complaint (Gegenschrift). 16. On 17 March 1997 the Administrative Court dismissed the applicant's complaint. It found that it had not been in dispute between the parties that the parcels of land at issue were subject to Ordinance No 1990/40. Accordingly, this land could only be used in the traditional manner. Cultivating, grazing, draining or using chemical fertilisers was prohibited. An exemption from these limitations could be granted if the interests of landscape protection were not seriously and permanently harmed and other interests, in particular agricultural ones, prevailed. Thus, if the interests of landscape protection were seriously and permanently harmed, it was no longer necessary to consider the interests of agriculture. In refusing the request the authority had essentially relied on the report by the expert on landscape protection. This expert had explained in detail which animals and plants would have been endangered by the measures envisaged by the applicant. The report had been communicated to the applicant who had been given the opportunity to react. The applicant, however, merely disputed the findings of the expert and failed to submit any scientifically valid argument. In such circumstances, the Administrative Court concluded, the authority's decision had neither been unreasonable, nor the proceedings defective. As regards the complaint that the ordinance had been unlawful, the Administrative Court found that in view of the fact that the Constitutional Court had declined to deal with the applicant's case for lack of prospect of success and that the applicant has not submitted any fresh arguments as regards the alleged unlawfulness of that ordinance, it did not see any reason to apply to the Constitutional Court for the opening of proceedings for the review of the lawfulness of the ordinance. The Administrative Court had neither held the requested hearing nor appointed the requested expert. It did not give any reasons why it considered that neither the hearing nor the appointment of a further expert was necessary. 17. On 1 April 1997 the decision was served upon the applicant's counsel.

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7. The first applicant was born in 1927 and lived in Naples. The second applicant was born in 1928 and lives in Naples. 8. They were the owners of four flats in Arzano (Naples), which they had let respectively to L.U., L.C., C.S., G.R. and G.F. 1) Application no. 40672/98 9. In a writ served on the tenant on 24 November 1986, the applicants informed the tenant of their intention to terminate the lease on expiry of the term on 31 December 1987 and summoned him to appear before the Casoria (Naples) Magistrate. 10. By a decision of 20 February 1987, which was made enforceable on the same day, the Casoria Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 31 December 1989. 11. On 28 January 1994, the applicants served notice on the tenant requiring him to vacate the premises. On 23 April 1994, they informed the tenant that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 28 April 1994. 12. Between 28 April 1994 and 8 March 1999, the bailiff made twelve attempts to recover possession. Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as the applicants were not entitled to police assistance in enforcing the order for possession. 13. On 3 June 2001, the tenant spontaneously left the premises and the applicants recovered possession of their flat. 2) Application no. 40680/98 14. In a writ served on the tenant on 24 November 1986, the applicants informed the tenant of their intention to terminate the lease on expiry of the term on 31 December 1987 and summoned him to appear before the Casoria (Naples) Magistrate. 15. By a decision of 13 February 1987, which was made enforceable on the same day, the Casoria Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 31 December 1989. 16. On 28 January 1994, the applicants served notice on the tenant requiring him to vacate the premises. 17. On 23 April 1994, they informed the tenant that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 28 April 1994. 18. Between 28 April 1994 and 8 March 1999, the bailiff made thirteen attempts to recover possession. Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as the applicants were not entitled to police assistance in enforcing the order for possession. 19. On 4 September 1999, the tenant entered into a new lease. 3) Application no. 40681/98 20. In a writ served on the tenant on 24 November 1986, the applicants informed the tenant of their intention to terminate the lease on expiry of the term on 31 December 1987 and summoned him to appear before the Casoria (Naples) Magistrate. 21. By a decision of 13 February 1987, which was made enforceable on the same day, the Casoria Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 31 December 1989. 22. On 28 January 1994, the applicants served notice on the tenant requiring him to vacate the premises. 23. On 23 April 1994, they informed the tenant that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 28 April 1994. 24. Between 28 April 1994 and 8 March 1999, the bailiff made thirteen attempts to recover possession. Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as the applicants were not entitled to police assistance in enforcing the order for possession. 25. On an unspecified date of May 2000, the applicants recovered possession of the flat. 4) Application no. 40884/98 26. In a writ served on the tenant on 24 November 1986, the applicants informed the tenant of their intention to terminate the lease on expiry of the term on 31 December 1987 and summoned her to appear before the Casoria (Naples) Magistrate. 27. By a decision of 6 February 1987, which was made enforceable on the same day, the Casoria Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 31 December 1988. 28. On 31 January 1994, the applicants served notice on the tenant requiring her to vacate the premises. 29. On 23 April 1994, they informed the tenant that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 28 April 1994. 30. Between 28 April 1994 and 8 March 1999, the bailiff made thirteen attempts to recover possession. Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as the applicants were not entitled to police assistance in enforcing the order for possession. 31. On an unspecified date of February 2001, the applicants recovered possession of the flat.

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9. The applicant was born in 1953 and lives in Helsinki. 10. On 4 October 1995 the local office of the Social Insurance Institution (kansaneläkelaitos, folkpensionsanstalten) granted the applicant a daily sickness allowance on account of his incapacity for work from 11 September 1995 onwards. On 16 October 1995 his allowance was extended until 31 October 1995. 11. On 16 October 1995 Dr M.M., a psychiatrist treating the applicant, considered him incapacitated for work from 11 September 1995 until 31 March 1996 on account of his depression and anxiety. On the strength of that opinion the applicant requested that he be granted a daily sickness allowance for the period 1 November 1995-31 March 1996. 12. The medical expert consulted by the local office of the Social Insurance Institution, Dr U.L., found in his opinion of 24 October 1995 that the applicant’s alleged incapacity for work was principally of a subjective nature, although the criteria for serious mental distress were not met. While not considering the applicant incapable for work, Dr U.L. recommended that an opinion be obtained from an expert in psychiatry before a new decision was reached on the applicant’s request. 13. In his opinion of 27 October 1995 Dr K.K., a psychiatrist, found on the basis of the information available that the applicant had been capable of working as of 1 January 1995. 14. Neither Dr U.L. nor Dr K.K. examined the applicant in person. Their identities and opinions were not known to the applicant until they were indicated by the Government in the course of the Convention proceedings. 15. On 15 November 1995 the Social Insurance Commission (sosiaali-vakuutustoimikunta, socialförsäkringskommissionen) of Helsinki refused the applicant’s request to have his allowance extended until 31 March 1996. The Commission, relying on section 14 of the Sickness Insurance Act (sairasvakuutuslaki, sjukförsäkringslag 364/1963), reasoned as follows: “A person who is incapacitated for work shall be entitled to a daily allowance. Incapacity for work is defined as a condition caused by an illness and during which the person is unable to perform his or her ordinary, or closely comparable, work. Your function as a tourist secretary has been regarded as your ordinary work. On the basis of the material adduced you cannot be considered unable to perform this work or a closely comparable one. For this reason, you are not entitled to a daily allowance.” 16. The applicant appealed to the Social Insurance Board (sosiaalivakuutuslautakunta, socialförsäkringsnämnden) for Southern Finland, adducing a report of 24 November 1995 in which his treating physician, Dr K.R., agreed with Dr M.M. that the applicant was incapacitated for work during the period in question, on account of his depression, panic feelings and neurosis. In its opinion to the Board dated 2 January 1996, but not forwarded to the applicant for his possible comments, the Social Insurance Commission explained the challenged decision as follows: “On the basis of medical certificates of the A category, [the applicant] was granted a daily allowance until 31 October 1995 on the basis of his incapacity for work which had commenced on 11 September 1995. Subsequently he adduced a certificate of the B category in which a psychiatrist considered him incapacitated for work until 31 March 1996 on account of his depression and undefined anxiety. In the opinion of the medical expert, a psychiatrist, the insured had to be considered fit for work. A further certificate of the B category, issued by a different doctor, has been appended to the appeal. The medical expert is of the opinion that there is no reason to amend the previous decision. Since the appellant has not adduced any new information which was not known to the [Social Insurance] Commission at the time of its decision, it is proposed that the appeal be rejected.” 17. On 29 March 1996 Dr M.M. considered that the applicant remained incapacitated for work until 30 June 1996 on account of his depression. Relying on this opinion, the applicant sought a daily allowance for the period 1 April-30 June 1996. 18. On 10 April 1996 the Social Insurance Commission refused the request for exactly the same reasons as in its decision of 15 November 1995 and again relying on section 14 of the Sickness Insurance Act. 19. The applicant appealed. In its opinion to the Social Insurance Board dated 18 April 1996, and again not forwarded to the applicant for possible comments, the Social Insurance Commission stated as follows: “[The applicant’s] earlier request for a daily allowance for the period 1 November 1995-31 March 1996 was refused and that decision has been appealed against as well. The insured sought to have his daily allowance granted for a further period, relying on a certificate of the B category issued by a psychiatrist. According to the opinion of the medical expert, the insured has to be considered fit to work. Since nothing new has been adduced in the [applicant’s current] appeal, it is proposed that it be rejected.” 20. In a further opinion of 30 May 1996 Dr M.M., without taking a position in regard to the applicant’s incapacity for work, maintained his diagnosis that the applicant was suffering from undefined anxiety. Relying on this opinion and on all previous evidence, the applicant sought a daily allowance from 1 July 1996 onwards. 21. On 4 July 1996 the Social Insurance Board rejected the applicant’s appeals against the Social Insurance Commission’s decisions of 15 November 1995 and 10 April 1996, relying on the reasons and the legal provision invoked in those decisions. According to the Board’s decision, it had taken note of the Social Insurance Commission’s opinions to the effect that no new material had been adduced which would have justified a change in the challenged decisions. The Board’s decision did not mention the existence of any opinions issued by the consulting medical experts. The applicant appealed to the Appellate Board for Social Insurance (tarkastuslautakunta, prövningsnämnden). 22. On 17 July 1996 the Social Insurance Commission refused the applicant a daily allowance from 1 July 1996 onwards, with the following reasoning: “A person who is incapacitated for work shall be entitled to a daily allowance. Incapacity for work is defined as a condition caused by an illness and during which the person is unable to perform his or her ordinary, or closely comparable, work. On the basis of the material adduced you cannot be considered unable to perform this work or a closely comparable one. For this reason, you are not entitled to a daily allowance.” 23. On 16 September 1996 the Social Insurance Board rejected the applicant’s appeal against the aforementioned decision, to which he had appended Dr K.R.’s opinion of 3 July 1996. The Board took note of the Social Insurance Commission’s opinion to the effect that no new material had been adduced which would justify a change in the challenged decision. The Board then relied on the reasons and the legal provision invoked by the Social Insurance Commission. The Board’s decision did not mention the existence of any opinion issued by the consulting medical experts. 24. The applicant again appealed to the Appellate Board for Social Insurance, inter alia adducing a fresh medical opinion of 15 October 1996 in which Dr K.R., maintaining his previous diagnosis, had considered that the applicant remained incapacitated for work until 30 May 1997. 25. On 25 March 1997 the Appellate Board for Social Insurance rejected the applicant’s appeals against the Social Insurance Board’s decisions of 4 July and 16 September 1996 by relying on the reasons given by the Social Insurance Commission in its decisions of 15 November 1995 and 10 April 1996. The Appellate Board’s decisions were dispatched to the applicant on 8 April 1997. No further appeal lay open. 26. On 13 October 1997 the Social Insurance Institution refused the applicant’s request to undergo an examination of his capacity for work by a specialist of the Social Insurance Institution’s own choosing. It recalled that the applicant’s capacity for work had been assessed on the basis of written documentation on three separate occasions and each time by different persons. The decisions refusing him an extended daily sickness allowance had been upheld by all appellate instances and concerned the years 1995-96. The applicant’s capacity for work at that point in time could no longer be assessed by a doctor who had not been treating him at the time. The applicant’s capacity for work at that time had already been assessed by doctors who knew him then, and his requests for a further allowance had been decided on the basis of their opinions.

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6. The applicant was born in 1948 and lives in Florence. 7. T.P.N. was the owner of a flat in Florence, which she had let to M.G. 8. In a registered letter of 20 June 1987, the owner informed the tenant that she intended to terminate the lease on expiry of the term on 31 December 1987 and asked him to vacate the premises by that date. 9. In a writ served on the tenant on 21 January 1988, the owner reiterated her intention to terminate the lease and summoned the tenant to appear before the Florence Magistrate. 10. By a decision of 10 February 1988, which was made enforceable on 22 February 1988, the Florence Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 10 February 1989. 11. On 19 May 1989, the owner served notice on the tenant requiring him to vacate the premises. 12. On 15 June 1989, she informed the tenant that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 13 July 1989. 13. On 20 November 1989, the applicant became the owner of the flat. 14. Between 13 July 1989 and 1 September 2000, the bailiff made twenty attempts to recover possession. Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as the applicant was never granted the assistance of the police in enforcing the order for possession. 15. On 11 February 1991, the applicant made a statutory declaration that she urgently required the premises as accommodation for herself. 16. On 1 September 2000, the applicant recovered possession of the flat.

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5. The applicant was born in 1926 and lived in Florence. 6. He was the owner of a flat in Florence, which he had let to A.T. 7. In a registered letter of 14 June 1983, the applicant informed the tenant that he intended to terminate the lease on expiry of the term on 31 December 1983 and asked him to vacate the premises by that date. 8. In a writ served on the tenant on 22 March 1984, the applicant reiterated his intention to terminate the lease and summoned the tenant to appear before the Florence Magistrate. 9. By a decision of 30 April 1984, which was made enforceable on 9 June 1984, the Florence Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 30 April 1985. 10. On 19 September 1987, the applicant served notice on the tenant requiring him to vacate the premises. 11. On 23 October 1987, he informed the tenant that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 15 December 1987. 12. Between 15 December 1987 and 15 March 1999, the bailiff made thirty-two attempts to recover possession. Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as the applicant was not entitled to police assistance in enforcing the order for possession. 13. Pursuant to section 6 of Law no. 431/98, the enforcement proceedings were suspended until 10 September 1999. 14. On 30 January 2001, the applicant reached a friendly agreement with the tenant who was supposed to leave the premises on 1 February 2002. 15. On 31 April 2002, the applicant recovered possession of the flat.

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5. The applicant was born in 1953 and lives in Positano. 6. She is the owner of five flats in Castellammare di Stabia (Naples), that she had let to different tenants. 7. In a registered letter of 24 May 1991, the applicant informed the tenant that she intended to terminate the lease on expiry of the term on 31 December 1991 and asked him to vacate the premises by that date. 8. In a writ served on the tenant on 14 May 1992, the applicant reiterated her intention to terminate the lease and summoned the tenant to appear before the Naples Magistrate. 9. By a decision of 20 May 1992, which was made enforceable on 27 May 1992, the Naples Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 20 May 1993. 10. On 11 September 1995, the applicant served notice on the tenant requiring him to vacate the premises. 11. On 23 October 1995, she informed the tenant that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 4 November 1995. 12. Between 4 November 1995 and 3 December 1998, the bailiff made seven attempts to recover possession. Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as the applicant was not entitled to police assistance in enforcing the order for possession. 13. On an unspecified date in 1999, the applicant recovered possession of the flat. 14. In a registered letter of 24 June 1991, the applicant informed the tenant that she intended to terminate the lease on expiry of the term on 31 December 1991 and asked him to vacate the premises by that date. 15. In a writ served on the tenant on 17 April 1992, the applicant reiterated her intention to terminate the lease and summoned the tenant to appear before the Naples Magistrate. 16. By a decision of 22 June 1992, which was made enforceable on 17 July 1992, the Naples Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 22 June 1993. 17. On 11 September 1995, the applicant served notice on the tenant requiring him to vacate the premises. 18. On 23 October 1995, she informed the tenant that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 4 November 1995. 19. Between 4 November 1995 and 28 October 1997, the bailiff made five attempts to recover possession. Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as the applicant the applicant was not entitled to police assistance in enforcing the order for possession. 20. Following the entry into force of Law 431/98, the enforcement of the evictions proceedings was suspended until 31 January 2000. 21. In March 2000, the tenant entered into a new lease. 22. In a writ served on the tenant on 11 May 1992, the applicant informed the tenant of her intention to terminate the lease on expiry of the term on 8 December 1992 and summoned him to appear before the Naples Magistrate. 23. By a decision of 20 May 1992, which was made enforceable on 25 September 1992, the Naples Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 20 May 1993. 24. On 11 September 1995, the applicant served notice on the tenant requiring him to vacate the premises. 25. On 23 October 1995, she informed the tenant that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 4 November 1995. 26. Between 4 November 1995 and 25 November 1999, the bailiff made twelve attempts to recover possession. Each attempt proved unsuccessful as the applicant was not entitled to police assistance in enforcing the order for possession. 27. On 24 March 2000, the applicant recovered possession of the flat. 28. In a registered letter of 24 May 1991, the applicant informed the tenant that she intended to terminate the lease on expiry of the term on 31 December 1991 and asked him to vacate the premises by that date. 29. In a writ served on the tenant on 7 May 1992, the applicant reiterated her intention to terminate the lease and summoned the tenant to appear before the Naples Magistrate. 30. By a decision of 20 May 1992, which was made enforceable on 27 May 1992, the Naples Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 20 May 1993. 31. On 1 October 1992, I.R. died, F.E. succeeded in the lease. 32. On 23 October 1995, the applicant served notice on the tenant requiring him to vacate the premises. 33. On 10 October 1995, she informed the tenant that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 2 December 1995. 34. Between 2 December 1995 and 27 October 1997, the bailiff made five attempts to recover possession. Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as the applicant was not entitled to police assistance in enforcing the order for possession. 35. Following the entry into force of Law 431/98, the enforcement of the evictions proceedings was suspended until 31 January 2000. 36. On 24 March 2000, the applicant recovered possession of the flat. 37. In a registered letter of 24 May 1991, the applicant informed the tenants that she intended to terminate the lease on expiry of the term on 8 February 1992 and asked them to vacate the premises by that date. 38. In a writ served on the tenants on 8 May 1992, the applicant reiterated her intention to terminate the lease and summoned the tenants to appear before the Naples Magistrate. 39. By a decision of 20 May 1992, which was made enforceable on 27 May 1992, the Naples Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 20 March 1993. On 23 October 1995, the applicant served notice on the tenants requiring them to vacate the premises. 40. On 10 November 1995, she informed the tenants that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 2 December 1995. 41. Between 2 December 1995 and 28 October 1997, the bailiff made five attempts to recover possession. Each attempt proved unsuccessful as, the applicant was not entitled to police assistance in enforcing the order for possession. Following the entry into force of Law 431/98, the enforcement of the evictions proceedings was suspended until 31 January 2000. 42. On 17 March 2000, the applicant recovered possession of the flat.

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8. The applicant was born in 1952 and lives in Gus Khrustalnyi, a town in the Vladimir Region. 9. Before her removal to Gus Khrustalnyi the applicant lived and worked in Mys Shmidta, a town located in Chukotka, a far-eastern territory adjacent to Alaska. 10. On 31 October 1996 the applicant filed with the Shmidtovskiy District Court of the Chukotka Autonomous Region (the “Shmidtovskiy Court”) an action against her former employer, a local trading office. She wanted the defendant to pay outstanding emoluments, discharge and leave allowances, and to properly formalise her discharge. 11. As the proceedings did not progress, in 1997-1999 the applicant complained several times about the Shmidtovskiy Court to a number of higher judicial and other authorities. 12. On 18 April 1997 the President of the Judicial Qualifications Board, of the Chukotka Autonomous Region (the “Regional Qualifications Board”, “Board”) asked the President of the Shmidtovskiy Court to inform him why it took the court so long to deal with the applicant's case and when the case would be heard. 13. On 24 July 1997 the President of the Chukotka Regional Court (the “Regional Court”) asked the President of the Shmidtovskiy Court to start the proceedings, to fix a hearing and to inform the applicant about the date of the hearing before 20 August 1997. 14. On 1 August 1997 the President of the Civil Section of the Regional Court forwarded the applicant's complaint to the President of the Shmidtovskiy Court. He asked to inform him and the applicant about the state of the proceedings before 25 August 1997. 15. On 13 March 1998 the President of the Regional Court asked the President of the Shmidtovskiy Court to inform the applicant before 15 April 1998 of the date when her case would be heard. He also informed the applicant that the Regional Court could not deal with her case itself because it was understaffed. The President noted that his earlier requests to the Shmidtovskiy Court had remained unanswered. 16. On 30 March 1998 the President of the Supreme Judicial Qualifications Board asked the President of the Regional Court to investigate the applicant's complaint and take measures, if need be. 17. On 20 April 1998 the President of the Regional Court asked the President of the Shmidtovskiy Court to inform him before 20 May 1998 about the state of the proceedings. He noted that the President had not responded to the Regional Court's earlier requests to speed up the proceedings. He also warned the President that he would have to apply to a judicial qualifications board if the procrastination continued. 18. On 18 May 1998 the Shmidtovskiy Court issued a letter rogatory by which it asked a Moscow court to question the applicant. The Moscow court could not execute the request because the applicant had not informed the courts that her address had changed. 19. On 7 July 1998 the President of the Regional Court informed the applicant that her case could not be examined because the Shmidtovskiy Court was understaffed and overloaded with work. 20. On 4 August 1998 the new President of the Regional Qualifications Board asked the President of the Shmidtovskiy Court to forward to the Board before 1 October 1998 copies of procedural documents concerning the case. She noted with displeasure that the Shmidtovskiy Court had been ignoring the applicant's earlier complaints and the Board's requests. She also informed the applicant that the Shmidtovskiy Court had been understaffed since July 1997, and that it was impossible under the law to sue the court or an individual judge for damage caused by delays in proceedings. 21. On 13 January 1999 the President of the Regional Qualifications Board asked the President of the Shmidtovskiy Court to inform the Board and the applicant before 10 February 1999 about the progress of the case. She also asked the President of the Shmidtovskiy Court to submit copies of procedural documents which would prove that the judge responsible for the applicant's case had prepared the case for a hearing. She also informed the applicant that it was impossible to summon the President of the Shmidtovskiy Court to the regional capital for explanations, because Mys Shmidta was located too far away from the capital and because the Board did not receive any financing for such purposes. 22. On 15 February 1999 the Deputy President of the Regional Qualifications Board noted that the President of the Shmidtovskiy Court had still not informed the applicant about the progress of her case despite the earlier orders. He asked the President of the Shmidtovskiy Court to provide this information to the applicant immediately. 23. On 12 April 1999 the President of the Regional Qualifications Board informed the applicant that the Board was going to visit the Shmidtovskiy Court because there had been numerous complaints about its inactivity. The visit was fixed for May-June 1999, provided that the Board would have sufficient funds for it. 24. On 26 April 1999 the President of the Supreme Judicial Qualifications Board asked the President of the Regional Court to verify the applicant's complaints and to pass them to the Regional Board if they proved to be well-founded. 25. On 3 June 1999 the Shmidtovskiy District Court passed a first judgment in the applicant's case by which her claims were granted. The defendant appealed against this judgment. 26. On 12 July 1999 the President of the Supreme Qualifications Board asked the President of the Regional Court to investigate the activity of the President of the Shmidtovskiy Court before 1 September 1999. 27. On 18 August 1999 the President of the Regional Qualifications Board informed the applicant that the Board would investigate the activity of the President of the Shmidtovskiy Court. 28. On 23 December 1999 the Regional Court granted the defendant's appeal and remitted the case to the Shmidtovskiy Court for a fresh examination. 29. On 3 April 2000 the Regional Qualifications Board officially reprimanded the judge of the Shmidtovskiy Court responsible for the applicant's case for breaches of procedural rules. The Board warned the judge that she may be dismissed from service if the breaches re-occurred. 30. On 16 March 2001 the Shmidtovskiy Court granted the applicant's claims in part. 31. On 21 May 2001 a public prosecutor of the Shmidtovskiy District appealed on behalf of the defendant. 32. On 11 October 2001 the Regional Court quashed the judgment and ordered a re-hearing of the case. 33. Meanwhile, on 23 October 2002, the applicant claimed from the Shmidtovskiy Court 200,000 roubles as compensation for the delays in the proceedings. On 10 November 2002 the Shmidtovskiy Court severed this claim from the main proceedings. 34. On 14 November 2002 the Shmidtovskiy Court granted the applicant's main claims in part. 35. On 2 April 2003 the applicant lodged an appeal against the judgment. 36. On 15 May 2003 the Regional Court quashed the judgment in part and passed a new judgment by which the applicant's claims were partly satisfied. 37. On 27 June 2003 the Shmidtovskiy Court closed the proceedings concerning the damage caused by the delays. The court found that there existed no law specifying how such actions should be entertained. 38. On 2 October 2003 the Regional Court quashed this decision on the ground that the Shmidtovskiy Court should not have considered an action directed against itself. The Regional Court decided that it will itself determine the court to deal with the action. These proceedings appear to be still pending. 39. During the proceedings the applicant also made a number of complaints to the Federal Ombudsman, the Ministry of Justice, the Government, the Parliament and the Constitutional Court. These authorities either referred her complaints to the judicial authorities of the Chukotka Autonomous Region or advised the applicant to do it herself.

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8. The applicants were born in 1953 and 1955 respectively and live in Riihimäki and Lahti, respectively. 9. The applicants were charged before the District Court (käräjäoikeus, tingsrätt) of Lahti; the first applicant with unauthorised use of a motor vehicle and driving without a licence and the second applicant with unauthorised use of a motor vehicle, among other offences. The applicants were represented before the District Court by legal counsel. 10. At the hearing before the District Court, on 10 September 1997, the public prosecutor called an eyewitness, N., a police officer. He had recognised the applicants and had seen them enter a car that was later reported stolen. When the witness gave evidence it appeared that there might have been other police officers in the area. The witness refused to answer some questions about his whereabouts when observing the applicants and also declined to confirm whether there had been other officers in the area, since he had been assigned to another operation not related to the applicants’ actions. The witness testified that he had recognised the applicants since he had met them before during pre-trial investigations. He had seen the first applicant enter the car by opening the door from the driver’s side. The second applicant had arrived a little later and had entered the car, and the car had left. The witness had seen its registration plate and remembered that it had contained the same digit three times. 11. The applicants denied the charges against them, explaining they did not know anything about the incident they were accused of. They also stated to the District Court that they wished to be informed of the identity of the police officers witness N. had mentioned in order to be able to call them as witnesses. 12. The District Court convicted the applicants on 10 September 1997 of unauthorised use of a motor vehicle, among other offences, and sentenced the first applicant to sixty days’ and the second applicant to six months’ imprisonment. In so far as the judgment concerned the offences referred to above, the court based itself on the testimony of the eyewitness. There was no other evidence. 13. The applicants appealed to the Court of Appeal (hovioikeus, hovrätt) of Kouvola, arguing that they should not have been convicted on the basis of the testimony of one eyewitness, since it would have been possible to hear the police officers who had been in the area at the same time. The applicants demanded a chance to hear those police officers as witnesses, requesting an oral hearing to be held before the Court of Appeal or that the case be referred back to the District Court for a re-hearing. They stressed that the names of those police officers had not been known until the public prosecutor gave his answer to the applicants’ appeal to the Court of Appeal. After the hearing at the District Court the public prosecutor had established that the two police officers had been in the area but had not observed the incident. 14. The public prosecutor submitted his observations on the applicants’ appeal to the Court of Appeal on 16 January 1998. In his observations he revealed the identity of the proposed witnesses in question. He objected to the hearing of those witnesses and to the applicants’ request to refer the case back to the District Court. He stated that he had, on 15 January 1998, discussed the case with both officers who had told him that they had seen the applicants in the area but had not made any observations concerning the unauthorised use of the vehicle. The public prosecutor stated that the applicants had been able to question witness N., whereas the two other officers could not be considered as witnesses who would give evidence on the applicants’ behalf within the meaning of Article 6 § 3 (d) of the Convention. 15. The applicants were provided with an opportunity to submit written comments on the prosecutor’s observations. The first applicant asserted, inter alia, that he must be afforded a right to obtain answers from N. to the questions he had put to him, and a right to hear the above-mentioned two police officers as witnesses. The second applicant argued that the public prosecutor’s statement about his conversations with the police officers in question was not comparable to their being heard as witnesses before a court. He noted that the applicants could have had other questions put to them than those put by the prosecutor. 16. On 29 September 1998 the Court of Appeal upheld the District Court’s judgment, rejecting the applicants’ request for an oral hearing and the request to refer the case back to the District Court. It found, in accordance with the Code of Judicial Procedure Act (Chapter 25, section 14, subsection 3), that the applicants had failed to state what they intended to prove by the witness evidence proposed. It also recalled, according to the same Act (Chapter 17, section 7), that a court must not allow irrelevant evidence to be presented. The Court of Appeal also rejected the request to hear N. again as, in its view, additional questions would not bring any further clarification to the case. 17. On 1 February 1999, the Supreme Court refused the applicants leave to appeal.

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9. The applicant, born in 1936, lives in Vienna (Austria). 10. At the relevant time the applicant was the owner of several firms, whose business was trading in fowl and game as well as the processing, importation and exportation of meat. From 1975 onwards, one of the firms imported meat, processed it and re-exported it without putting it on the domestic market. Such an activity is exempted from restrictions to which the ordinary importation of meat is subject and the applicant was accordingly issued a permit for inward processing (aktiver Veredelungsverkehr) setting out the conditions for import and export. 11. On 25 June 1981 the Investigating Judge at the Vienna Regional Court (Landesgericht) instituted preliminary investigations against the applicant who was suspected of having breached the conditions of the inward processing permit by having exported a different quality of meat than he had imported and by having put the imported meat onto the domestic market without having paid the customs duties. These acts constituted offences under the Act on Fiscal Offences (Finanzstrafgesetz), the Trade in Animals Act (Viehwirtschaftsgesetz) and the Export Act (Aussenhandelsgesetz). Subsequently, the Investigating Judge ordered searches at the offices of the applicant's firms and at the cold storage depots where the meat had been kept. The applicant's stock of meat was seized. 12. On 24 June 1982 bankruptcy proceedings (Konkursverfahren) were opened against the applicant and, at an unspecified date, he was declared bankrupt. On 12 October 1983 the applicant was arrested and remanded in custody on suspicion of fraud. In 1984 he was convicted of that offence and sentenced to two and a half years' imprisonment. Subsequently, he was convicted of other criminal offences on two occasions and sentenced to further terms of imprisonment. In 1992 he was eventually released. 13. Meanwhile, on 25 February 1987 the Vienna Customs Office submitted a report on the charges in respect of which the proceedings had been opened on 25 June 1981 to the Public Prosecutor's Office and supplemented this report on 23 October 1987. 14. The Animals and Meat Commission (Vieh- und Fleischkommission), which is the authority competent under the Trade in Animals Act to decide on the relevant amount for the assessment of the fine, gave its decision on 30 December 1987. On 15 February 1988 the applicant appealed against this decision and on 31 October 1990 the competent Federal Minister dismissed the appeal. On 25 September 1991 the Administrative Court dismissed a complaint by the applicant against the Animals and Meat Commission's decision. 15. In the meantime, on 26 February 1990, the Vienna Customs Office (Zollamt) issued tax orders claiming outstanding customs duty and importation turnover tax (Einfuhrumsatzsteuer). It considered that the customs privileges linked to the inward processing permit were no longer applicable to certain quantities of meat imported in 1980. On 7 May 1990 the applicant appealed. 16. On 28 January 1994 the Vienna Public Prosecutor's Office indicted the applicant of the offences in respect of which preliminary investigations had been opened on 25 June 1981. Subsequently an ex officio defence counsel was appointed for the applicant, who filed objections to the indictment. On 24 June 1994 the Regional Court dismissed these objections as unfounded. 17. On 31 May 1994 the applicant was summoned to attend trial before the Regional Court on 12 and 13 July 1994. Since the applicant was in hospital, the trial could not take place and was postponed until 14 and 15 July 1994. Again, the applicant did not appear. The trial was adjourned and a warrant of arrest issued. 18. On 13 February 1995 the Regional Court interrupted the proceedings as the applicant's address was unknown. 19. On 31 Mai 1995 the Vienna Public Prosecutor requested the Regional Court to discontinue the proceedings in accordance with the 1995 Amnesty Act in respect of all criminal offences committed before 27 April 1980. According to Section 1 § 3 of this Act, criminal proceedings may be discontinued if they concern charges with offences which had been committed before 27 April 1980 and where the maximum sanction did not exceed three years' imprisonment. 20. On 19 December 1996 the applicant was served with a new summons for trial on 22 April 1997. 21. On 27 December 1996 the competent Regional Tax Authority (Finanzlandesdirektion) quashed the Customs Office's orders of 26 February 1990. If found that, in part, the customs and tax assessment proceedings had become time-barred and, in respect of the remaining charges, it accepted the applicant's argument that, under the permit for inward processing, he had exported the same meat as he had previously imported but, as a favour to his clients, he had mentioned a different quality of meat in the export declaration. 22. On 16 April 1997 the Regional Court discontinued the criminal proceedings.

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7. The applicant was born in 1952 and lives in Weiler (Austria). 8. On 7 January 1994 the applicant applied for a planning permission as he wished to construct a storehouse and production facilities to produce wood chips on his plot of land acquired in 1989. 9. On 24 May 1994 the Feldkirch District Authority (Bezirkshaupt-mannschaft) dismissed this request, finding that there was no adequate access to the applicant's plot of land. On 9 June 1994 the applicant filed an appeal against this decision. 10. On 29 September 1994 the Weiler Municipality issued a building prohibition for the area within which the applicant's plot of land was situated, as it was planning to open re-allocation proceedings (Umlegungs-verfahren) to ensure a more efficient use of the area. The Vorarlberg Regional Government (Landesregierung), which had to decide on the applicant's appeal of 9 June 1994, requested the applicant to comment on the building prohibition. 11. On 9 November 1994 the Weiler Municipality issued a new building prohibition as the previous one had been quashed by the District Authority ex officio. The Vorarlberg Regional Government requested the applicant to comment on the new building prohibition. 12. On 29 December 1994 the Vorarlberg Regional Government, referring to the building prohibition, dismissed the applicant's appeal against the District Authority's decision of 24 May 1994. The decision was served on 15 February 1995. 13. Meanwhile, on 2 February 1995 the applicant had lodged an application against the administration's failure to decide (Säumnisbeschwerde) with the Administrative Court (Verwaltungs-gerichtshof), as the Regional Government had not decided on his appeal of 9 June 1994 within the statutory six-month time-limit. On 18 May 1995 the Administrative Court discontinued the proceedings for failure to decide, as the Regional Government had already issued its decision on 29 December 1994 but ordered the Regional Government to reimburse the applicant's legal costs. 14. On 29 March 1995 the applicant filed a complaint with the Constitutional Court (Verfassungsgerichtshof) against the Regional Government's decision of 29 December 1994. He complained that the building prohibition and consequently the refusal of the planning permission were unlawful. 15. On 25 September 1995 the Constitutional Court rejected the complaint for lack of prospects of success. Subsequently, the applicant requested the case to be transferred to the Administrative Court. 16. On 19 December 1995 the Administrative Court ordered the applicant to supplement his complaint. On 9 February 1996 he complied with this order, and on 3 May 1996 the Regional Government submitted its observations. 17. On 29 August 1996 the Administrative Court allowed the complaint and quashed the Regional Government's decision. It found that there was no indication that the applicant's project interfered with the objective of the intended re-allocation proceedings for which reason the refusal of the planning permission was unlawful. 18. On 15 January 1997 the Regional Government remitted the case to the District Authority. 19. In January 1997 the Weiler Municipality opened the re-allocation proceedings and the District Authority asked the applicant to comment thereupon, as a planning permission could only be issued under the Vorarlberg Regional Planning Act (Raumplanungsgesetz) if the project did not interfere with the objective of the re-allocation proceedings and if the Regional Government authorised the project. On 27 March 1997 the District Authority held a hearing. 20. On 2 May 1997 the applicant filed a request with the Regional Government for the authorisation of his project, as required under the Regional Planning Act. 21. On 5 March 1998, after the applicant had filed a number of comments and requests, he lodged an application for a transfer of jurisdiction (Devolutionsantrag) with the Regional Government, as the District Authority had not decided within the statutory six-month time-limit. 22. On the same day, the applicant lodged an application against the administration's failure to decide with the Administrative Court, on the ground that the Regional Government has failed to give the authorisation as requested under the Regional Planning Act. 23. On 23 March 1998 the Administrative Court ordered the Regional Government to give a decision. 24. On 29 April 1998 the Regional Government refused the authorisation required under the Regional Planning Act. 25. On 14 Mai 1998 the Regional Government allowed the application for a transfer of jurisdiction, but dismissed the request for the planning permission on the ground that the applicant's project would interfere with the objective of the re-allocation proceedings. 26. On 20 May 1998 the Administrative Court discontinued the proceedings concerning the applicant's application against the administration's failure to decide of 5 March 1998 as, meanwhile, the Regional Government had given the relevant decision on 29 April 1998. Further it ordered the Regional Government to reimburse the applicant's legal costs. 27. On 17 June 1998 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Administrative Court against the Regional Government's decisions of 29 April and 14 Mai 1998. 28. On 5 June 1999 the Regional Government discontinued the re-allocation proceedings ex officio, as the Municipality had not issued a re-allocation plan within two years as required under the applicable law. Since at this stage there was no building prohibition in force, the applicant requested the Regional Government to grant a planning permission on 26 August 1999. 29. On 1 October 1999 the Regional Government rejected the application on the ground that new re-allocation proceedings had meanwhile been opened for which reason the District Authority would have been the competent authority. 30. On 14 October 1999 the applicant applied for a planning permission with the District Authority. 31. On 14 June 2000 the District Authority dismissed the new application. On 16 June 2000 the applicant filed an appeal against this decision with the Regional Government. 32. On 27 April 2000 the Administrative Court again quashed the decisions of the Regional Government of 29 April 1998 and of 14 May 1998, finding that there was no indication that the applicant's project interfered with the objective of the re-allocation proceedings. This decision was served on 13 June 2000. 33. On 28 August 2000 the Regional Government granted both the authorisation which was required under the Regional Planning Act and the planning permission. This decision was served on 30 August 2000.

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8. The applicant was born in 1965 and lives in Athens. 9. On 25 April 1987 she got married and on 23 January 1988 gave birth to a daughter. 10. On 19 November 1996 the applicant left the matrimonial home and went to England, leaving her daughter with her husband. 11. On 6 February 1997 the applicant's husband lodged an interlocutory application with the Athens Court of First Instance for an interim-custody order. On 1 March 1997 the applicant filed a cross-application for interim custody. 12. On 2 May 1997 the Court of First Instance made an interim order granting custody of the child to the father (judgment no. 11208/1997). 13. On 12 January 1998 it made a final order granting the father custody (judgment no. 1/1998). An appeal by the applicant against that judgment was dismissed by the Athens Court of Appeal on 29 February 2000 (judgment no. 1559/2000). The applicant did not appeal on points of law against that judgment. 14. In the meantime, on 9 and 23 May 1997 the applicant and her ex-husband each applied to the Athens Court of First Instance for interim orders concerning access. The hearing of the applicant's application, which was initially scheduled for 28 May 1997, was adjourned to 9 July 1997 so that it could be examined with the father's application. 15. On 6 June 1997 the applicant made a further application, seeking an order requiring her ex-husband to bring the child to her house. On the same day the judge issued an order granting the applicant interim access every Saturday from 10 a.m. to 2 p.m. On Saturday 7 June 1997 the applicant's former husband failed to comply with that order. On 9 June 1997 he asked the court to set aside the judge's interim order, which it did on 10 June 1997 (judgment no. 15142/1997). 16. In a medical report dated 26 June 1997, three psychologists who had examined the child and her father but not the applicant stated that the child was suffering from “physical negligence and abandonment by her mother, a denial of love and affection, and indifference to her achievements and the activities she was involved in”. They concluded that keeping “a distance from her mother temporarily would contribute to suppressing the child's negative feelings”. 17. After the hearing on 9 July 1997, the Court of First Instance delivered its judgment on 30 July 1997. In particular, it held: “On 19 November 1996, after the breakdown of the marital relationship between the parties, [the applicant] left the matrimonial home...and settled temporarily in Bristol, England, without giving any sign of life until 17 December 1996. She did not contact her daughter, who was constantly in tears and desperate to find her mother, being unable to understand her long absence. When the child visited her mother on 17 December 1996 at the hotel where she was staying in Bristol, [the applicant] left her alone in the room and went away, leaving the child with feelings of intense fear and insecurity ...It should also be noted that in early May 1997 the applicant, who had already returned to Greece and was accompanied by her mother, visited her daughter's school in order to meet her teachers; when her daughter saw her in the playground she ran away terrified, calling out for her teachers to help her and protect her from her mother. On the other hand, the applicant has a university education, moral principles and a high standard of living; for the whole period when they lived together as a family until the moment she left the matrimonial home, [the applicant] showed an interest in and took care of her daughter, whom she undoubtedly loves excessively.” Taking into account the above circumstances and the interest of the child, the court decided that the child should stay with her mother once a week and for some days during the school holidays (judgment no. 21171/1997). 18. On 2 August 1997 the applicant spent the day with her daughter. 19. On 6 August 1997 the applicant's former husband asked the court to review its decision in judgment no. 21171/1997. The hearing took place on 8 August 1997. On 9 August 1997 the child was brought to her mother's house, but refused to stay with her. On 11 August 1997 the court confirmed the previous arrangement for visiting rights but reduced the number of days the child could spend with her mother during the summer holidays, so as to take into account holiday plans that had been made by the child's father and her paternal grandparents. The court found that the applicant was a highly educated person “with moral principles” and that “she loved her daughter” (judgment no. 22372/1997). 20. On 23 August the child was brought to the applicant's house but again refused to stay with her. The applicant and her daughter were then taken to the Syntagma Square Police Station, where, under unspecified circumstances, the applicant kicked her daughter and tore out clumps of her hair. 21. On 27 August and 23 September 1997 the applicant's former husband sought a review of judgments nos. 21171/1997 and 22372/1997. He also asked for the applicant's visiting rights to be provisionally suspended. The judge granted his applications and suspended the applicant's visiting rights without hearing prior representations from the applicant. 22. On 24 September 1997 the applicant appealed against the order suspending her visiting rights. On 29 September 1997 the judge dismissed her appeal (judgment no. 26451/1997). 23. On 11 December 1997 the Court of First Instance stated that it was essential for the child to have contact with her mother and that the father was under a duty to facilitate such contact. It found that the child's reluctance to see her mother was due to the behaviour of her father, who had involved the child in his own disputes and problems with the applicant (judgment no. 34780/1997). 24. On 16 December 1997 the applicant issued a summons against her former husband requiring him to comply with judgment no. 34780/1997, but to no avail. 25. In the meantime, the applicant asked the juvenile-court public prosecutor to intervene in order to facilitate communications with her daughter. On 30 December 1997 the Public Prosecutor referred the matter to the Psychiatric Department of the Athens Children's Hospital, where a psychiatrist examined both parents and the child. In her report dated 25 June 1998, the psychiatrist noted: “It has been difficult to see the mother who has been cancelling the appointments” and stated: “If [the child's] psychological problems are to be alleviated, it is necessary for her to be reunited with her mother and to have regular contact with her”. The psychiatrist also proposed specific measures in order to ensure the child's well-being (such as a psychological assessment of both parents and individual psychotherapy of the child at least once a week). The psychiatrist's report was sent to the public prosecutor, who took no further action. The authorities refused to give the applicant a copy of the report on the ground that it was confidential. The applicant obtained a copy only on 22 February 2002. 26. On 3 January 1998 the applicant's former husband brought his daughter to the applicant's house, but she refused to stay with her mother. 27. On 12 May 1998 the applicant asked the court to take formal note that her former husband had deliberately prevented her from having contact with the child from 9 August 1997 to 19 April 1998. On 26 February 1999 the court dismissed the applicant's request on the ground that the child did not want to see her mother and that the father was not responsible for the lack of contact (judgment no. 493/1999). 28. On 3 May 1999 the applicant appealed. On 12 February 2001 the court of appeal dismissed her appeal. It found that the applicant was not able to have access to her daughter owing to the latter's absolute refusal to see her mother, which in turn was the result of the child's feelings of distress after the applicant's departure from the family home. The child's father was doing all he could to reunite the family. Moreover, the applicant lived almost permanently abroad and it was therefore in any event impossible for her to visit her daughter once a week. The interest of the child should prevail and further strain on her mental health should be avoided at all costs (judgment no. 971/2001). 29. On 25 June 2001 the applicant appealed on points of law. The hearing took place on 15 January 2002. On 7 March 2002 the Court of Cassation dismissed the applicant's appeal as ill-founded (judgment no. 429/2002). 30. On 16 February 1998 the applicant lodged a criminal complaint against her former husband alleging that he had obstructed her contact with her daughter. On 10 May 1999 the Athens Criminal Court, sitting with a single judge, found the applicant's former husband not guilty (judgment no. 55770/1999), holding in particular: “The child reacts to any contact with her mother, after the latter abandoned her in Bristol in December 1996 after the child had travelled there to see her. The situation is typified by an incident on 23 August 1997, when [the applicant] assaulted her daughter at the Syntagma Square Police Station, kicking her and tearing out her hair (see the certificate from the police incident book). The [applicant's former husband] has never prevented his daughter from seeing her mother, nor has he ever urged her to avoid her mother.” 31. Following that judgment the applicant lodged criminal complaints against her former husband every time he failed to comply with the court's rulings. The father also brought various criminal charges against the applicant. Currently, more than thirty-five sets of criminal proceedings are pending.

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6. The applicant was born in 1938 and lives in Mödling (Austria). 7. As from 1977 the applicant was the director of the Central Mint Office (Hauptmünzamt). On 10 May 1988 the Federal Ministry of Finance (Bundesministerium für Finanzen) dismissed the applicant without notice (fristlose Entlassung) and ordered him to return to his former working place at the Ministry of Finance as a civil servant. 8. On 21 June 1988 the applicant instituted civil proceedings against the Ministry of Finance and the Münze Austria AG, the legal successor of the Central Mint Office which had to enter as a party into all work contracts of the latter. 9. On 3 September 1992 the Vienna Labour and Social Court (Arbeits- und Sozialgericht) partly allowed the applicant's claim. On 28 May 1993 the Vienna Court of Appeal (Oberlandesgericht) dismissed the applicant's appeal and allowed the defendants' appeal. On 10 December 1993 the Supreme Court allowed the applicant's further appeal. It considered that the applicant qualified as a favoured disabled person (begünstigter Behinderter) since 1 February 1988. Such employees may not be dismissed without the consent of the Federal Social Office. However, the Ministry of Finance had not requested such an authorisation. 10. Subsequently, the applicant instituted civil proceedings, claiming the remuneration resulting from these valid work contracts. However, these proceedings were suspended and finally not reopened due to the following administrative proceedings. 11. On 30 April 1994 the Ministry of Finance filed an application with the Disabled Persons Committee at the Federal Social Office (Behindertenausschuss beim Bundessozialamt) to grant a retroactive authorisation in respect of the applicant's dismissal as provided under the Disabled Persons Employment Act. 12. On 12 December 1994 the Federal Social Office, after having held a hearing on 31 May 1994, dismissed the Ministry of Finance's application. On 20 April 1995 the Appeals Commission at the Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (Berufungskommission beim Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Soziales) allowed the appeal and granted the retroactive authorisation for the applicant's dismissal. On 23 September 1996 the Constitutional Court refused to deal with the applicant's complaint of 20 July 1995 for lack of prospects of success. On 21 September 1999 the Administrative Court dismissed the applicant's complaint. It considered that the authorisation for the applicant's dismissal given by the Appeals Commission was lawful.

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8. The applicant was born in 1970 and lives in Tartu. At the material time he was the owner and manager of the company AS Maarja. 9. On 10 August 1995 the Tartu police instituted criminal proceedings against the applicant on charges of tax offences under Article 148-1 § 7 of the Criminal Code. In the course of the preliminary investigation the applicant was further charged with the offence of inadequate accounting under Article 148-4 of the Criminal Code as well as with falsification of documents. 10. On 6 October 1997 the Tartu prosecutor approved the bill of indictment, and the case was sent to the Tartu City Court (Tartu Linnakohus) for trial. The charges set out in the indictment related to acts and omissions of the applicant in the period from April 1993 to October 1995. In particular, under Article 148-1 § 7 of the Criminal Code the acts which were the subject of the charges against the applicant concerned his failures to pay the required taxes, to file by the set deadline revenue statements for the year 1993, to inform the Tax Board of the change of his company's location, and to comply with the order of the Tax Board of 26 October 1995 to pay the required taxes. Under Article 148-4 of the Criminal Code the applicant was accused of having unsatisfactorily arranged his company's bookkeeping, in breach of the legal requirements. The existing records were incomplete and a number of documents had not been preserved, which made it impossible to determine the company's performance. 11. By a judgment of 17 February 1999 the Tartu City Court convicted the applicant of the offences under Article 148-1 § 7 of the Criminal Code and sentenced him to 4 years' imprisonment. It also found the applicant guilty of the offence under Article 148-4 of the Code and sentenced him to 4 months' imprisonment. As the latter sentence was absorbed by the former, the aggregate sentence imposed on the applicant was 4 years' imprisonment, which was suspended for 3 years. The City Court found that the application of Article 148-1 § 7 of the Criminal Code, which had been in force as from 13 January 1995, was justified in the case on the grounds that the applicant's failure to pay the required taxes had been intentional and continuous and his criminal activity had lasted until October 1995. It ordered the applicant to pay the city tax authorities 1,596,618.42 Estonian kroons in outstanding taxes. No fine or tax surcharge was imposed apart from the requirement to pay the taxes which were due under the relevant tax laws. As regards the offence of inadequate accounting under Article 148-4 of the Criminal Code, which was in force as from 20 July 1993, the City Court noted that the applicant's company had operated from 5 May 1993 until 1 October 1993. During that period there had been no recording of its economic activity and it was impossible correctly to determine the company's performance, income, expenditure, profit, loss, debts, solvency or amount of its assets. The applicant had failed to comply with the obligations imposed on him by the Law on personal responsibility for the organisation of accounting. The law came into effect on 20 July 1993, i.e. at the time of the operation of the company, and the applicant, being its owner and manager, had to comply with the provisions of the law. The applicant also failed to adopt rules and procedures for bookkeeping and to secure the preservation of the relevant documents, as required under the Government decree of 6 July 1990 concerning the organisation of accounting. 12. On 26 February 1999 the applicant filed an appeal against the judgment to the Tartu Court of Appeal (Tartu Ringkonnakohus). He argued that in convicting him under Article 148-1 § 7 of the Criminal Code of acts committed prior to its entry into force on 13 January 1995, the City Court had applied the criminal law retrospectively. Before that date a conviction of the offences defined in Article 148-1 could follow only if the person concerned had been previously subjected to an administrative sanction for a similar offence. The applicant further submitted that, in making him responsible for the inadequate bookkeeping in his company during the whole period from 5 May 1993 until 1 October 1993, the City Court had also applied retroactively Article 148-4 of the Criminal Code which had only been in force as from 20 July 1993. 13. On 3 May 1999 the Court of Appeal upheld the judgment of the City Court. It found that the acts with which the applicant was charged under Article 148‑1 § 7 of the Criminal Code amounted to ongoing crimes. After his first criminal act on 16 April 1993 the applicant had embarked upon a criminal enterprise which had lasted until 26 October 1995, the day on which the Tax Board discovered the abuses and issued its order. Therefore, the City Court had correctly qualified his acts as falling under that law. It also considered that the ongoing nature of the applicant's acts relating to inadequate accounting justified his conviction under Article 148-4 of the Criminal Code. 14. On 1 June 1999 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law to the Supreme Court (Riigikohus) raising the same arguments as in his appeal to the Court of Appeal. 15. By a judgment of 7 September 1999 the Supreme Court dismissed his appeal. It held that, according to the principles of Estonian criminal law, the law to be applied to a criminal act was the law which had entered into force before the end of a criminal activity. As the applicant's criminal activity ended on 26 October 1995, his actions fell under the law in force at that time, i.e. Article 148-1 § 7 of the Criminal Code. The same reasons applied to the applicant's conviction of inadequate accounting under Article 148-4 of the Criminal Code.

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9. The applicant was born in 1957 and lives in London. 10. The relevant facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. The events described below took place between January 1998 and February 1999. 11. The applicant contacted the police after he was attacked by a young man with whom he had had homosexual relations. He was arrested for allegedly engaging in buggery with a young man aged 16 years of age contrary to section 12(1) and schedule 2 of the Sexual Offences Act 1956. The applicant underwent a medical examination with his consent during which samples were taken and his residence was searched by police. He was released on police bail the following day and was subsequently formally charged. 12. The applicant attended before the Magistrates' Court on four occasions and each time he was bailed to re-appear. During this period, the applicant wrote to the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) and other government officials stating that the criminal proceedings against him violated his human rights, citing the case of Sutherland v. the United Kingdom (no. 25186/94, Commission's report of 1 July 1997, unpublished). 13. The applicant subsequently requested leave to apply for judicial review of the CPS decision to prosecute him but this application was refused. His renewed application was later rejected by the High Court. Following a hearing at the Magistrates' Court, the applicant was committed for trial at the Central Criminal Court. He appeared before the Central Criminal Court for a plea and directions hearing and for a hearing on various matters including his request for the trial to be postponed in order to allow him more time to prepare. 14. The CPS later advised the applicant by letter that it had decided not to proceed with the case against him and that he should accordingly attend the Central Criminal Court on a particular date. On that date he was formally acquitted by that court. The trial judge asked the applicant if he would like to make a claim for costs but, following a brief discussion, the applicant decided not to make any claim on the grounds that, in his view, the CPS were “quibbling” over the amount to be awarded.

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8. The applicant was born in 1951 and is currently detained in Eysses Prison, Villeneuve-sur-Lot. 9. He was held in police custody from 25 to 27 September 1994, on suspicion of having sexually assaulted his stepdaughters. He made a full confession and, at the end of the period in police custody, he was charged with rape and aggravated sexual assault. He was detained on remand. 10. On 21 April 1995, under questioning by the investigating judge, the applicant retracted his confession; on 5 May 1995 he denied all the accusations made against him. He said that he had taken valium while in police custody and claimed that this drug could have impaired his mental faculties. 11. On 7 September 1995 the investigating judge extended the detention order. By an order of 22 December 1995, he rejected an application by the applicant for release. In a judgment of 9 January 1996, the Indictment Division of the Bordeaux Court of Appeal upheld the order. On 30 April 1996 the Court of Cassation dismissed an appeal on points of law lodged by the applicant. The Criminal Division of the Court of Cassation which ruled in that judgment was composed of Mr Le Gunehec, President, a reporting judge and six other judges, including Mr Guilloux and Mr Le Gall. 12. On 9 February 1996 the parties were informed that the investigation was complete. By a judgment of 2 July 1996 the Indictment Division committed the applicant to stand trial at the Gironde Assize Court. 13. The applicant appealed on points of law and put forward two grounds in support of his appeal: the first alleged that the Indictment Division had failed to comply with the procedural rules necessary for the effective exercise of the rights of the defence, as set out in Article 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, concerning the parties' access to the case file before the hearing; the second concerned a lack of sufficient reasoning in the order committing him for trial, and noted that it did not set out the facts on which the charges were based or explain why the alleged offences were classified as they were. 14. The Criminal Division of the Court of Cassation delivered a judgment dismissing the appeal on 12 February 1997. The Division which ruled on the appeal was composed of Mr Guilloux, acting as president in the absence of the incumbent president who was unable to attend, Mr Le Gall as reporting judge, and six other judges. 15. In a judgment of 3 April 1998, the Gironde Assize Court convicted the applicant and sentenced him to nineteen years' imprisonment and suspended his civic, civil and family rights for ten years. 16. On that same date the applicant lodged an appeal with the Court of Cassation, in which he raised six points of law. The first alleged a violation of Article 362 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, on the ground that the Assize Court had not stated by what majority of votes the sentence had been imposed; the second concerned a failure to comply with the principle that hearings must be oral and, in particular, with Article 347 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which in principle prevented the court proper and the jury from deliberating with the case file before them; in his third point, the applicant complained of a violation of Article 379 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which prohibited the content of statements being mentioned in the official record, unless the presiding judge decided otherwise; the fourth and fifth points concerned the wording of the questions put to the jury; the final point alleged a breach of the rights of the defence, on the ground that the accused had not spoken last on the question of the withdrawal of parental responsibility. 17. The applicant was provisionally granted legal aid but, in a decision of 8 April 1999, the Legal Aid Office refused his request on the ground that “no arguable ground” of appeal on points of law could be made out against the judgment of 3 April 1998. 18. In a judgment of 9 June 1999, the Criminal Division of the Court of Cassation dismissed the applicant's appeal on points of law. The Division was composed of Mr Gomez, President, Mr Guilloux, reporting judge, and Mr Le Gall, judge. 19. On 7 July 1999 the President of the Court of Cassation dismissed an appeal on points of law lodged by the applicant against the Legal Aid Office's decision.

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8. The applicant was born in 1933 and lives in La Plaine des Cafres (Réunion, France). 9. On 31 July 1995 she went to the gendarmerie in La Plaine des Cafres to file a complaint of having been assaulted by her two children. She said that her children had come to see her about a lawsuit between them concerning the non-payment of maintenance to which she was entitled because of her ill-health. While the applicant was in the front passenger seat of a motor car driven by her daughter, her son, who was in the back, had allegedly immobilised her and used a syringe to inject her twice with an unknown substance. She said she had quickly got out of the car and gone to hospital. 10. The applicant was found to have marks of injections. Moreover, after a witness had come forward, the gendarmes found a syringe which when tested was found to bear traces of diazepam and benzoic acid, both of which also form part of the chemical make-up of valium. 11. An investigation was begun on the grounds of assault with an offensive weapon resulting in total unfitness for work for more than eight days (reduced to less than that during the investigation). 12. During the investigation, the applicant joined the proceedings as a civil party. 13. On 14 March 1997 the Saint-Pierre investigating judge ruled that there was no case to answer on the ground that there was insufficient evidence that anyone had committed the offence. He found that the applicant's son, “who had allegedly given her the injection, had left the département to return to his dental practice abroad, in Gabon”, that “he had given his mother an injection of a substance which was medically harmless at that dosage...” and “that, in the absence of precise information as to his address, it did not [seem] practicable to interview [the son] given the difficulty of enforcing any request for evidence to be taken on oath in Gabon”. The decision was apparently served on the applicant on the same day by registered post with acknowledgment of receipt. 14. On 7 April 1997 the applicant went to the investigating judge's registry and, claiming that she had not received a copy of the decision, refused to sign the notice of appeal drafted by the registrar. She asserted that she had drafted a personal notice of appeal and lodged it at the registry on that same day. In her written observations to the court of appeal, the applicant requested, inter alia, that the investigating judge be made to stand down, that the investigation be resumed, that it be formally recorded that “her complaint [related to] premeditated assault with an offensive weapon resulting in thirty days' total unfitness for work and, given the results of the tests on the syringe, with criminal intent”, and that her children be “brought to the département by force in order to explain themselves”. 15. By a judgment of 8 July 1997, the Indictment Division of the Court of Appeal of Saint-Denis-de-la-Réunion found that the applicant had appealed “by letter addressed to and received on 7 April 1997 by the investigating judge's registry”, and that she had gone to the registry on the same day and refused to sign the notice of appeal. The Indictment Division therefore ruled that her appeal was inadmissible on the grounds that she had missed the legal deadline and had failed to sign the notice of appeal. 16. On 11 July 1997 the applicant appealed on points of law. On 21 July 1997 she filed personal observations in which she submitted that the Court of Appeal had, in its judgment of 8 July 1997, disregarded certain provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure: firstly, “the judgment did not meet the essential conditions required for it to be lawful”, having been given by “judges who had not attended all the hearings in the case” and, secondly, the grounds set out in the impugned judgment relating to service of the decision that there was no case to answer were “insufficient” because they did not address the arguments she had put forward at the hearing. She alleged that there had been a breach of Articles 592, 575-6, 593 and 646 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 17. In a judgment of 21 April 1998, the Criminal Division of the Court of Cassation dismissed her appeal in the following terms: “ ... Given the personal written observations filed; On the sole ground of appeal, based on a breach of Articles 485 and 183 of the Code of Criminal Procedure; Whereas, firstly, the particulars of the judgment under appeal establish that it was given in the conditions prescribed by Article 485, third paragraph, of the Code of Criminal Procedure; Whereas, secondly, the Court of Appeal was correct in finding that the appeal of 7 April 1997 against the decision that there was no case to answer served on 14 March 1997 was out of time in accordance with the conditions laid down in Article 183 of the Code of Criminal Procedure; ...”

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9. The applicant was born in 1973 and currently resides in Oosterbeek. 10. On 9 January 1995 the applicant arrived in the Netherlands, where, on 10 January 1995, he applied for asylum or, alternatively, a residence permit for compelling reasons of a humanitarian nature (klemmende redenen van humanitaire aard). In support of his claim for asylum he submitted the following. 11. He belonged to the Tamil population group and came from a farming family in the town of Vavuniya in the north of Sri Lanka, bordering on the area controlled by the Tamil Tigers (the “LTTE”), a Tamil terrorist organisation, engaged in an armed struggle for independence. LTTE members would often visit Tamils living in the area in order to obtain food. The Sri Lankan army was therefore quick to suspect local farmers of supporting the LTTE. 12. In August 1990 the applicant's father was shot dead on his land by the Sri Lankan army because they suspected him of providing material assistance to the LTTE. The day after his father's killing, the applicant's mother sent him to the town of Jaffna, which was under LTTE control at the time, where he stayed for two months with his uncle. Following the death of his father, the applicant's brother became a fighter with the LTTE and neither the applicant nor his mother have heard from him since. 13. On 12 January 1991 the applicant was arrested in his home by the Sri Lankan army and detained in the Joseph military camp for two weeks. Every other day he was questioned about the whereabouts of his brother. The soldiers told him that his father had been an LTTE member and that the applicant must know other LTTE members. During these interrogations soldiers beat him with their fists and sticks. He was also hung from the ceiling by his thumbs. Upon the arrival of new detainees, the applicant had to identify LTTE members among them. 14. After two weeks, he was released on condition that he report to the camp daily. The ill-treatment to which he had been subjected had resulted in internal injuries requiring hospital treatment for two weeks. 15. Every time he reported to the camp he was ill-treated, and often questioned. Sometimes he was made to accompany soldiers driving through Vavuniya so that he could point out LTTE members. After a month of reporting to the camp daily, he was told to report on a weekly basis. However, a daily reporting duty was once again imposed on him from May 1993 when a large number of LTTE members was said to have arrived in Vavuniya; the soldiers said that the applicant's brother might be among them and the applicant was to point him out to them. According to the soldiers, his brother was an important LTTE member who was responsible for many bomb attacks. 16. Because the applicant could no longer cope either physically or mentally with the daily reporting duty, the interrogations, the ill-treatment and having to identify LTTE members, he decided to leave the country. In addition, he knew of other persons who had a similar reporting duty who had disappeared. He feared the same thing could happen to him. 17. On 19 May 1994 the applicant travelled to Colombo by train with his mother. During this trip, he was in possession of an identity card which his mother subsequently took back with her to Vavuniya. On 20 May 1994 the applicant, using a passport bearing his name, flew to Singapore and then, the next day, on to Moscow. He travelled from Moscow to the Netherlands in a van on 5 January 1995. His passport had been taken from him by an intermediary in Moscow. 18. Whilst in Moscow he received two letters from his mother stating that she had been arrested and detained for two days by the army, and that the army were searching for him because he had failed to report. The applicant did not keep these letters. 19. On 11 May 1995 the Deputy Minister of Justice (Staatssecretaris van Justitie) rejected the applicant's requests, considering that it had not been established that the applicant had shown himself to be an opponent of the regime in Sri Lanka or that he was known as such by the authorities. Given that his arrest in 1991 had obviously not constituted a reason for him to leave the country immediately, and that he had been able to leave Sri Lanka unhindered through the normal channels, it could not be said that at the time of departure he had been in such a dangerous situation that he could not have been expected to remain in his country of origin. The applicant was also notified that he would not be allowed to remain in the Netherlands when any objection (bezwaar) he might submit was being considered. 20. The applicant lodged an objection on 9 June 1995 and also requested an interim measure (voorlopige voorziening) from the Regional Court (arrondissementsrechtbank) of The Hague sitting in Zwolle. The request for an interim measure was declared inadmissible by the President of the Regional Court on 16 August 1995 because no grounds had been submitted for the objection. The objection itself was rejected by the Deputy Minister for Justice on 8 August 1996 for the same reason. The Deputy Minister held in addition that, even if grounds for the objection had been submitted, merely invoking the general situation in Sri Lanka was insufficient to justify the conclusion that the applicant would be subjected to either persecution or treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention if returned to that country. 21. On 18 September 1996 the applicant appealed to the Regional Court of The Hague sitting in Amsterdam. Finding that the Deputy Minister had been correct in rejecting the applicant's objection, the Regional Court dismissed the appeal by a final decision of 27 June 1997. 22. The applicant did not, however, leave the Netherlands and neither was he forcibly expelled. On 29 September 1997 he lodged a new request for a residence permit for compelling reasons of a humanitarian nature. This request was rejected by the Deputy Minister for Justice on 30 October 1997 who considered that, even though recent developments in Sri Lanka continued to give cause for concern, the general situation there had not changed to such an extent that it required the Netherlands Government to amend their policy relating to Tamil asylum seekers. The applicant had failed to show that concrete reasons, related to facts and circumstances affecting him personally, existed which could justify the conclusion that he would be exposed to a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention if returned to Sri Lanka. The Deputy Minister further informed the applicant that he would not be allowed to remain in the Netherlands pending the examination of any objection he might wish to lodge. 23. On 27 November 1997 the applicant submitted an objection to the decision of the Deputy Minister, and on 26 January 1998 he requested an interim measure from the Regional Court of The Hague sitting in Amsterdam in order to prevent his expulsion. On 4 March 1998 the President of the Regional Court granted the interim measure, considering that the applicant belonged to one or more of the so-called “categories at risk”: categories of people who ran the risk of being detained in Colombo for more than 48 hours pursuant to the Emergency Regulations in force. 24. The applicant was given the opportunity to comment on his application for a residence permit before an official committee (ambtelijke commissie) on 13 May 1998. 25. The applicant's objection was rejected by the Deputy Minister for Justice on 2 December 1998. Given that the applicant's claim for asylum had already been finally and conclusively rejected, and that he had failed to adduce any new facts or circumstances but had only made references to the general situation in Sri Lanka, the Deputy Minister considered that the request for a residence permit was no more than an attempt to frustrate his departure from the Netherlands. In any event, the fact that the applicant had not left Sri Lanka until 1994, even though the problems he had allegedly suffered stemmed from alleged events in 1991 and 1992, militated against the assumption that he would currently run a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention. 26. The Deputy Minister further informed the applicant that any appeal lodged by him would be dealt with expeditiously, and the applicant's departure from the Netherlands would be deferred pending such an appeal. 27. The applicant lodged an appeal with the Regional Court of The Hague sitting in Amsterdam on 23 December 1998. He argued that the information from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, used by the Deputy Minister for the determination of asylum claims of Tamils from Sri Lanka, was seriously lacking. Referring to information from Amnesty International, the applicant submitted that the group of persons who ran the risk of being detained for more than a week and tortured during that time was far greater than assumed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Moreover, the Ministry's official report (ambtsbericht) of 6 November 1998 itself stated that, if a detainee was held for more than one week, during which time he was questioned about LTTE involvement, there was a great likelihood that the detainee would be ill-treated. In addition, according to the same official report, a Tamil with a relative known to be an LTTE member ran the risk of being detained for more than a week. 28. At the hearing of his appeal before the Regional Court on 11 January 2000, the applicant further submitted that he ran an extra risk of detention now that an amendment to the Immigrants and Emigrants Act had entered into force, given that he had left Sri Lanka on an unofficial passport. 29. The Regional Court rejected the appeal by judgment of 22 February 2000. It considered that where Sri Lankan Tamils belonging to one of the categories at risk were concerned, it should in general be readily accepted that a real risk of treatment in breach of Article 3 existed. Nevertheless, not every Tamil belonging to one of the categories ran a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3. The likelihood of such Tamils being apprehended for checks on a more or less regular basis upon their return to Colombo as a result of the security situation in Sri Lanka was in itself insufficient to conclude that unacceptable risks existed, even if the persons concerned encountered a certain heavy-handedness in the process. As regards the applicant, the Regional Court saw no reason to come to a different assessment from that made on the applicant's request for asylum. The applicant's argument that the Sri Lankan authorities held a file on him was only an assumption and had not been shown to be plausible. Even though the Regional Court considered it likely that persons returning would be interviewed by the Sri Lankan authorities at Colombo airport in order to establish whether or not they had left the country through illegal channels, this did not lead to a considerably increased risk of treatment in breach of Article 3. Neither was it contrary to Article 3 to prosecute and sentence persons who had contravened the Immigrants and Emigrants Act. In any event, the applicant had stated that his uncle had obtained a passport for him from the Immigration Office in Colombo, and it was therefore unlikely that the applicant had left Sri Lanka on a passport which the authorities of that country knew to be forged. 30. On 12 September 2000, i.e. following the introduction of the present application to the Court, the applicant lodged a new request for asylum. This was refused on 16 September 2000. His objection against that decision, as well as his request for an interim measure, was rejected by the President of the Regional Court of The Hague sitting in Zwolle on 4 October 2000. In this decision the President based himself on information contained in official reports from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 28 July and 22 August 2000, the accuracy of which, according to the President, had not been sufficiently disproved by the applicant. The President concluded that the security situation in Colombo for rejected Tamil asylum seekers was not such that they had to fear treatment contrary to Article 3. The President further referred to a letter of the UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) of 22 June 2000 in which the latter organisation stated its opinion that the expulsion of rejected Tamil asylum seekers was acceptable as long as they were in possession of identity documents issued by the Sri Lankan authorities. The President noted that the applicant would be provided with an identity document by the Sri Lankan Embassy in the Netherlands which he could use, even after its expiry, until such time as a new national identity card was issued to him.

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11. The applicant was born in 1944 and lives in Viareggio (in the province of Lucca). He is a judge. 12. At the time he lodged the application, he was acting president of the La Spezia District Court. On 23 November 1993, following an inquiry by the General Inspectorate for the Ministry of Justice, the Minister of Justice instituted disciplinary proceedings against the applicant on account of his membership of a Masonic lodge affiliated to the Grande Oriente d'Italia di Palazzo Giustiniani. The Minister accused him of having been a Freemason from 1981 until March 1993 and of having thereby breached Article 18 of Royal Legislative Decree no. 511 of 31 May 1946 (see paragraph 18 below). 13. In a decision of 10 October 1995, the disciplinary section of the National Council of the Judiciary (Consiglio Superiore della Magistratura) found that the applicant had committed the offences of which he was accused and gave him a reprimand (censura). It stated that from 1982 onwards it should have been possible to “have a clear idea of the loss of integrity resulting from membership of the Freemasons ... because of the degeneration brought about when a number of people came together within the P2 lodge with plans to take control of the public authorities and subvert democratic institutions, and because of the collusion of certain Masonic lodges with the Mafia and organised crime”. The disciplinary section added that the directives issued by the National Council of the Judiciary on 22 March 1990 and 14 July 1993 (see paragraphs 21 and 22 below), which emphasised – the second one in particular – the substantial conflict between membership of the Freemasons and membership of the judiciary, were to be seen in the context of such developments. The decision also stated that it was contrary to disciplinary rules for a judge to be a Freemason, for the following reasons: the incompatibility between the Masonic and judicial oaths, the hierarchical relationship between Freemasons, the “rejection” of State justice in favour of Masonic “justice” and, lastly, the indissoluble nature of the bond between Freemasons, even in the case of a member who wished to leave the organisation. The disciplinary section of the National Council of the Judiciary stated, lastly, that the applicant's alleged ignorance of the institutional debate on Freemasonry merely served to confirm the existence of conduct punishable under Article 18 of the 1946 Legislative Decree. In its opinion, such conduct was characterised by a lack of diligence, caution and wisdom in dealing with a situation that posed a threat to the values protected by that Article. 14. On 5 January 1996 the applicant appealed on points of law to the Court of Cassation. In the three grounds of his appeal he alleged a breach of Article 18 of the Constitution, challenged the arguments used in support of the finding that judicial office was incompatible with membership of the Freemasons, and complained that no reasons had been given for the conclusion that a judge would be discredited by belonging to the Freemasons. 15. On 2 February 1996 the Ministry of Justice lodged a cross-appeal. The Court of Cassation, sitting as a full court, examined the case on 19 September 1996 and, in a judgment of 20 December 1996, dismissed the applicant's appeal. It held, firstly, that the application of Article 18 of the Constitution was limited by the constitutional principles of the impartiality and independence of the judiciary, principles which should be taken to prevail over the right to freedom of association. The Court of Cassation further held that the disciplinary section of the National Council of the Judiciary had based its decision mainly on the directive of 14 July 1993 in which the Council had emphasised that judicial office was incompatible with membership of the Freemasons. 16. The applicant maintains that his career has been at a standstill since the disciplinary section's decision: he was declared unsuitable for a post as judge of the Court of Cassation; furthermore, the judicial council for his district stated that, because of the reprimand, it was unable to give an opinion on his suitability for a post as president of a district court. Lastly, the applicant states that he has been transferred to Sicily; however, he has not produced any evidence that that decision was linked to the sanction imposed on him.

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12. The applicants were born in 1971, 1940 and 1944 respectively. All three live in Poland; Mr Gorzelik and Mr Sowa in Katowice, and Mr Kołodziejczyk in Rybnik. 13. Silesia (Śląsk) is a historic region that is now in south-western Poland. It was originally a Polish province that became a possession of the Bohemian Crown in 1335. It passed with that Crown to the House of Habsburg in 1526, and was taken over by Prussia in 1742 under the Treaty of Berlin. After the First World War, the 1919 Treaty of Versailles provided for a plebiscite to be held to determine if Upper Silesia should remain German or pass over to Poland. The results of the plebiscite in 1921 were favourable to Germany except in the easternmost part of Upper Silesia. After an armed uprising of the Poles in 1922, the League of Nations agreed to a partition of the territory; the larger part of the industrial area, including Katowice, passed over to Poland. In the aftermath of the Munich Pact of 1938, most of Czech Silesia was divided between Germany and Poland. After the German conquest of Poland in 1939, the whole of Polish Silesia was annexed by Germany. After the Second World War, the pre-1938 boundary between Poland and Czechoslovakia was restored. The western boundary of Poland was moved to the Oder and Lusatian Neisse rivers. In effect, all of former German Silesia east of the Lusatian Neisse was incorporated into Poland, while only a small sector of Lower Silesia west of the Neisse remained within the former East German Land of Saxony. 14. According to some linguists, although the Polish language is relatively unaffected by regional variations, it is possible to identify at least two regional varieties: Kashubian and Silesian[1]. At the hearing, one of the applicants, Mr Gorzelik, described Silesian as a still uncodified language that was a mixture of Czech, German and Polish. 15. From 2 May to 8 June 2002 a census – the National Population and Housing Census – was carried out in Poland. Its purpose was to gather data relating to the distribution of the population, demographic and social factors, employment, standards of living and housing. It also addressed issues relating to citizenship and nationality. One of the questions relating to nationality gave the following definition: “Nationality is a declared (based on a subjective feeling) individual feature of every human being, expressing his or her emotional, cultural or genealogical (relating to parents' origin) link with a specific nation.” According to the census report prepared by the Central Statistical Office (Główny Urząd Statystyczny), 36,983,700 people (96.74% of the population) declared themselves Polish nationals. 471,500 persons (1.23% of the population) declared a non-Polish nationality, including 173,200 persons who declared that they were “Silesians”. 16. On an unspecified date the applicants, who describe themselves as “Silesians”, decided together with 190 other persons to form an association (stowarzyszenie) called “Union of People of Silesian Nationality” (Związek Ludności Narodowości Śląskiej). The founders subsequently adopted a memorandum of association. The applicants were elected to the provisional management committee (Komitet Założycielski) and were authorised to proceed with the registration of the association. 17. On 11 December 1996 the applicants, acting on behalf of the provisional management committee of the “Union of People of Silesian Nationality”, applied to the Katowice Regional Court (Sąd Wojewódzki) for their association to be registered. They relied on, inter alia, section 8(2) of the Law on associations (Prawo o stowarzyszeniach) of 7 April 1989. They produced the memorandum of association along with the other documents required by that Law. 18. The relevant general provisions of the memorandum of association read as follows: “1. The present association shall be called the “Union of People of Silesian Nationality” (hereafter referred to as “the Union”). 6. (1) The Union may join other domestic or international organisations if the aims pursued by [the latter] correspond to the aims pursued by the Union.” 19. The aims of the association and the means of achieving them were described as follows: “7. The aims of the Union are: (1) to awaken and strengthen the national consciousness of Silesians; (2) to restore Silesian culture; (3) to promote knowledge of Silesia; (4) to protect the ethnic rights of persons of Silesian nationality; [and] (5) to provide social care for members of the Union. 8. The Union shall accomplish its aims by the following means: (1) organising lectures, seminars, training courses and meetings, establishing libraries and clubs, and carrying out scientific research; (2) organising cultural and educational activities for members of the Union and other persons; (3) carrying out promotional and publishing activities; (4) promoting the emblems and colours of Silesia and Upper Silesia; (5) organising demonstrations or [other] protest actions; (6) organising sporting events ... and other forms of leisure activities; (7) setting up schools and other educational establishments; (8) cooperating with other organisations; (9) conducting business activities for the purpose of financing the aims of the Union – this may include establishing commercial entities and cooperating with other [commercial] entities; (10) establishing other entities or [legal] persons with a view to achieving the aims of the Union; and (11) conducting any other activities.” 20. Paragraphs 9 and 10 dealt with membership. They read as follows: 21. The relevant part of paragraph 15 of the memorandum of association read as follows: “A person shall cease to be a member of the Union if: ... (2) (a) on a reasoned motion by the Board, the Management Committee decides to deprive him of his membership; (b) the relevant motion of the Board may be based on such reasons as the fact that the member in question has not fulfilled the requirements set out in the memorandum of association for becoming a member or has failed to perform the duties of members as specified in paragraph 14.” 22. Paragraph 30 provided: “The Union is an organisation of the Silesian national minority.” 23. Subsequently the Katowice Regional Court, pursuant to section 13(2) of the Law on associations (see paragraph 39 below), served a copy of the applicants' application, together with copies of the relevant enclosures, on the Governor (Wojewoda) of Katowice. 24. On 27 January 1997 the Governor of Katowice, acting through the Department of Civic Affairs (Wydział Obywatelski), submitted his comments on the application to the court. Those comments contained lengthy arguments against allowing the association to be registered, the main thrust of which was as follows: “(i) It cannot be said that there are 'Silesians' [Ślązak], in the sense of representatives of a distinct 'Silesian nationality'. 'Silesian' is a word denoting a representative of a local ethnic group, not a nation. This is confirmed by paragraph 7 (1) of the memorandum of association, which aims merely to 'awaken and strengthen the national consciousness of Silesians'. ... (ii) The social research relied on by the applicants to demonstrate the existence of a 'Silesian nationality' does not accord with numerous other scientific publications. Polish sociology distinguishes between two concepts of 'homeland', namely a 'local homeland' and an 'ideological homeland'. In German, this distinction is expressed by the terms Heimat (local homeland) and Vaterland (ideological homeland). The research relied on by the applicants merely refers to the self-identification of the inhabitants of Silesia, indicating that their local self-identification takes precedence over their national self-identification. ... (iii) Paragraph 10 of the memorandum of association states that any person of Silesian nationality may become an ordinary member of the association, but does not clearly specify the criteria for establishing whether or not a given person fulfils this requirement. This absence of unambiguous criteria is contrary to section 10(1) (i) and (iv) of the Law on associations. Moreover, it renders paragraph 15 (2) (b) of the memorandum unlawful, for that provision allows the Management Committee to deprive a person of his membership in the event of failure to satisfy the conditions set out in the memorandum of association. ... (iv) Paragraph 30 of the memorandum of association, which calls the Union an 'organisation of the Silesian national minority', is misleading and does not correspond to the facts. There is no basis for regarding the Silesians as a national minority. Recognising them as such would be in breach of Articles 67 § 2 and 81 § 1 of the [former] Constitution, which guarantee Polish citizens equal rights. In particular, under the relevant provisions of the Law on elections to the Sejm[[2]] of 28 May 1993 [Ordynacja wyborcza do Sejmu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej – 'the 1993 Elections Act'], registration of the Union would give it a privileged position in terms of distribution of seats in Parliament. The Union would obtain rights and privileges guaranteed to national minorities in respect of education in their native language and access to the media. Registration of the association would be to the detriment of other ethnic groups in Poland, such as Cracovians [Krakowiacy], Highlanders [Górale] and Mazurians [Mazurzy]; this would amount to a return to the tribalism [podziały plemienne] which existed prior to the formation of the Polish State. ... (v) We therefore propose that the memorandum of association should be amended so as to reflect the above observations. In particular, the misleading name of the association should be changed, the criteria for membership should be set out in an unambiguous manner and paragraph 30 should be deleted. In our opinion, these are the conditions for registration of the association.” 25. On 13 March 1997 the applicants filed a pleading in reply to those arguments. They asserted that the fact that the majority of Poles failed to recognise the existence of a Silesian nation did not mean that there was no such nation. They cited various scientific publications and went on to explain that the fact that the Silesians formed a distinct group had already been acknowledged at the end of the First World War; moreover, the Silesians had always sought to preserve their identity and had always formed a distinct group, regardless of whether Upper Silesia had belonged to Germany or to Poland. Consequently, any comparison between them and the Cracovians or Highlanders was totally unjustified, because the latter groups neither regarded themselves as national minorities, nor had they ever been perceived as such in the past. Finally, the applicants cited certain letters of the Ministry of the Interior that had been published by the press and which explained that the National and Ethnic Minorities Bill[3] had explicitly stated that a “declaration that a person belongs to a minority shall not be questioned or verified by the public authorities”. 26. On 9 April 1997 the Governor of Katowice filed a pleading with the court. He maintained his previous position. On 14 April 1997 he produced two letters from the Ministry of the Interior (dated 4 February and 10 April 1997 respectively, and addressed to the Department of Civic Affairs of the Office of the Governor of Katowice). The relevant parts of the letter of 4 February 1997 read: “We share your doubts as to whether certain inhabitants of Silesia should be deemed to be a national minority. We therefore suggest that you submit your observations to the court, indicating those doubts, and that you ask the court to grant you leave to join the proceedings as a party. We suggest that you rely on the fact that the [Council of Europe] Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities [('the Framework Convention')] has not been ratified by Poland, so that its provisions [do not apply in the domestic legal system]. ... In our view, neither historical nor ethnographical circumstances justify the opinion that the inhabitants of Silesia can be recognised as a national minority.” The relevant parts of the letter of 10 April 1997 read as follows: “... The arguments advanced by the provisional management committee of the association [in their pleading of 13 March 1997] do not contain any new elements; [in particular] ... the [Framework Convention] does not constitute the law applicable in Poland. Likewise, the letters of the Ministry of the Interior [on the interpretation of the National and Ethnic Minorities Bill] do not change the situation. The sense of belonging to a nation falls within the realm of personal liberties; it does not in itself entail any legal consequences. [By contrast,] the formation of an organisation of a national minority is a legal fact which entails legal consequences such as, for instance, those referred to in the 1993 Elections Act. In the circumstances, the registration of the association called 'Union of People of Silesian Nationality' could be allowed provided that the existence of such a nation had been established.” 27. On 28 April 1997 the applicants submitted a further pleading to the court. They criticised the arguments of the Ministry of the Interior, pointing out that the latter had failed to indicate any legal basis for rejecting their application. In particular, the authorities had not shown that any provision of the memorandum of association was contrary to the law, whereas, under section 1(2) of the Law on associations, “the [exercise of the] right of association may be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary for ensuring the interests of national security or public order and for the protection of health and morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others”. Lastly, the applicants stated that they would not amend the memorandum of association in the manner proposed by the authorities, in particular in respect of the name of the association and the content of paragraph 30. They agreed, however, to amend paragraph 10 of the memorandum and rephrased it as follows: “Everyone who is a Polish citizen and who has submitted a written declaration stating that he is of Silesian nationality may become an ordinary member [of the Union].” 28. On 23 May 1997 the Katowice Regional Court held an “explanatory hearing” (posiedzenie wyjaśniające) aimed at obtaining comments and clarifications from the parties and settling the matters in dispute. The relevant parts of the minutes of that hearing read as follows: “The representatives of the [Governor] declared that the deletion of paragraph 30 from the memorandum of association would not be sufficient, and that they also required a change in the name of the association. They referred to the arguments set out in the pleadings filed in the case. The representatives of the applicants declared that paragraph 30 was modelled on a similar provision to be found in the statutes of the Socio-Cultural Society of Germans of the province of Katowice. ... The President urged the representatives of the [parties] to make certain concessions in their positions. He proposed to the provisional management committee that, for example, they delete paragraph 30 of the memorandum. However, the representatives of the committee absolutely refused to do away with this provision. The representatives of the [Governor] also adopted a harder position, in that they demanded not only the deletion of paragraph 30, but also a change of the name of the association. The two sides engaged in a polemic as to whether or not Silesians should be recognised as a nation or nationality. ... The representatives of the [Governor] argued with the applicants, claiming there were no grounds for ascribing Silesian nationality to people. [The hearing was adjourned and subsequently resumed] At this point the representative of the [Governor] declared that, if the applicants were to delete paragraph 30 from the memorandum, the [Governor] would not object to registration of the association. 29. On 27 May 1997 the applicants lodged a pleading with the court, maintaining that in the course of the above-mentioned hearing the authorities had “de facto acknowledged that a Silesian nation exists”, in particular by accepting the name of the association and certain provisions of the memorandum (namely paragraph 7 (1) and (4) and paragraph 10). They stressed, however, that the authorities' insistence on the removal of paragraph 30 was “unjustified and illogical” and, consequently, refused to alter or delete that provision. Later, on 16 June 1997, the Governor of Katowice submitted his final pleading to the court, opposing the registration of the association. 30. On 24 June 1997 the Katowice Regional Court, sitting with a single judge and in camera, granted the applicants' application and registered their association under the name “Union of People of Silesian Nationality”. The relevant reasons for that decision read as follows: “... There was a dispute between [the parties] over the concepts 'nation' and 'national minority'. Finally [the authorities concerned] pleaded that the application for registration of the association should be rejected. This Court has found that the application is well-founded [and as such should be granted]. In the preamble to the Law on associations, the legislature guarantees [everyone] a cardinal right – the right to freedom of association – which enables citizens, regardless of their convictions, to participate actively in public life and express different opinions, and to pursue individual interests. Freedom of association is one of the natural rights of a human being. [For this reason,] section 1(1) of the Law on associations does not establish the right to freedom of association but merely sets out the manner and limits of its exercise, thus reflecting Poland's international obligations. Under section 1(2) of the Law on associations, the right to form an association may be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law either in the interests of national security or public safety, or in the interests of public order, or for the protection of health and morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. No other restrictions may be placed on the exercise of the right to associate with others. As recently as 16 June 1997, in their pleading, the authorities advanced the argument that the registration of the present association would infringe the rights and freedoms of others because it would result in an unequal treatment of other local communities and would diminish their rights. This argument is unconvincing, since it does not emerge from the content of the memorandum of association that the future activities of the association are aimed at [diminishing] the rights and freedoms of others. Under paragraph 7 of the memorandum of association, the aims of the association are[, for example,] to awaken and strengthen the national consciousness of Silesians, to restore Silesian culture, to promote knowledge of Silesia and to provide social care for members of the association. None whatsoever of these aims is directed against the rights and freedoms of others. The means to be used for accomplishing these aims are not directed against the rights and freedoms of others either. Those means include organising lectures and seminars, carrying out scientific research, establishing libraries, organising cultural and educational activities for members and other persons, carrying out promotional and publishing activities, promoting the emblems and colours of Silesia and Upper Silesia, organising demonstrations and protest actions, organising sporting events, setting up schools and other educational establishments, conducting business activities and cooperating with other organisations. In sum, the argument that the association would infringe the rights and freedoms of others must definitely be rejected. Moreover, it should be noted that this argument refers to [a mere possibility] because only practical action taken by the association could possibly demonstrate whether, and if so to what extent, the [future] activities of the association would require taking measures aimed at protecting the rights of others. As regards the terms 'Silesian nationality' or 'Silesian national minority', the problems involved in the determination of their proper meaning cannot be examined by this Court in detail. This Court must, pursuant to section 13(1) of the Law on associations, rule on the present application within a period not exceeding three months from the date on which it was lodged. It is therefore not possible [in the course of the present proceedings] to determine such complicated issues (which involve problems falling within the sphere of international relations). It is, however, possible to assume, for the purposes of making a ruling in these proceedings, that the nationality of an individual is a matter of personal choice; moreover, it is a matter of common knowledge that the original inhabitants of Silesia constitute a minority in Upper Silesia – at least for anyone who has ever spent some time in this region and has been willing to perceive this fact. After all, the authorities, although they 'rend their garments' [sic] complaining that the applicants dare establish an association, do not contest the fact that [the Silesians] are an ethnic minority. In view of the foregoing, this Court, finding that the provisional management committee has complied with the requirements of sections 8(4), 12 and 16 read in conjunction with section 13(2) of the Law on associations and Article 516 of the Code of Civil Procedure, holds as in the operative part of the decision.” 31. On 2 July 1997 the Governor of Katowice lodged an appeal with the Katowice Court of Appeal (Sąd Apelacyjny), asking that the first-instance decision be quashed, that the case be remitted to the court of first instance, and that expert evidence be obtained in order to determine the meaning of the terms “nation” and “national minority”. In his appeal, he alleged that the court of first instance had violated sections 1(1) and 2 of the Law on associations and unspecified provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. The relevant grounds of the appeal read as follows: “[The court of first instance] formally recognised and legally sanctioned the existence of a distinct Silesian nation constituting a 'Silesian national minority'. In our opinion, such an important and unprecedented ruling, which is of international significance, could not and should not be given without defining the concepts of 'nation' and 'national minority'. The Regional Court, leaving this issue aside – merely because of certain statutory time-limits – simplified the proceedings in an unacceptable manner. This led, in itself, to a failure on the part of the court to establish all the circumstances relevant to the outcome of the case and, furthermore, provided a sufficient basis for this appeal. The appellant admits that Polish law does not define the terms 'nation' and 'national minority'. This, however, does not justify the conclusion of the Regional Court that 'the nationality of an individual is a matter of personal choice'. The appellant does not contest the right of a person to decide freely to belong to a national minority; however, a precondition for making such a choice is the existence of a 'nation' with which that person identifies himself. The decision appealed against proclaims the opinion that the subjective feelings of the person concerned suffice for the purposes of creating a 'nation' or a 'nationality'. Having regard to the potential social repercussions of such an approach, it is not possible to agree with it. In these circumstances, prior to making any decision on the registration of the 'Union of People of Silesian Nationality', it is necessary to determine whether a 'Silesian nation' exists – a distinct, non-Polish nation – and whether it is admissible in law to create a 'Silesian national minority'. In the appellant's opinion, there are no objective arguments in favour of the finding that a distinct Silesian nation exists. In case of doubt, ... this question should be resolved by obtaining evidence from experts. In the contested decision, the lower court focused in principle on determining whether the aims of the association and the means of accomplishing those aims were lawful. ... The appellant does not contest the majority of these aims; it must be said that such activities as restoring Silesian culture, promoting knowledge of Silesia or providing social care for members of the association are worthy of respect and support. However, these aims can be fully accomplished without the contested provision of the memorandum of association, namely paragraph 30 ... In addition, the applicants were not prevented from incorporating the above-mentioned aims into the memorandum of an existing association called 'Movement for the Autonomy of Silesia' [Ruch Autonomii Śląska], the more so as the applicants belong to influential circles of the latter organisation. The fact that the applicants have failed to do so but [instead] are creating a new association, and are describing themselves as a 'Silesian national minority', clearly demonstrates what their real objective is. In fact, their objective is to circumvent the provisions of the 1993 Elections Act, under which parties or other organisations standing in elections must reach a threshold of 5% or 7% of votes in order to obtain seats in Parliament. ... Legal acts – including the act of adopting a memorandum of association – are null and void under Article 58 § 1 of the Civil Code if they aim at evading or circumventing the law. According to legal theory, defects in legal acts, as defined in Article 58 of the Civil Code, may constitute a basis for refusing to register an association. Sanctioning the rights of the 'Silesian national minority' amounts to discrimination against other regional and ethnic groups or societies. This will be the case at least as regards electoral law and will be contrary to Article 67 § 2 of the Constitution. ...” 32. The Katowice Court of Appeal heard the appeal on 24 September 1997. The prosecutor at the Court of Appeal (Prokurator Apelacyjny) appeared at the hearing and asked the court to grant him leave to join the proceedings as a party intervening on behalf of the Governor of Katowice. Leave was granted. The court next heard addresses by the appellant, the prosecutor (who requested the court to set aside the first-instance decision and reject the applicants' application) and the representative of the applicants. On the same day the court set aside the first-instance decision and rejected the applicants' application for their association to be registered. The reasons for that decision included the following: “... The lower court, by registering the association under the name 'Union of People of Silesian Nationality', approved paragraph 30 of the memorandum of association, which states that the Union is an organisation of the Silesian national minority. We therefore agree with the appellant that the Union, on the basis of the above-mentioned paragraph, would have the right to benefit from the statutory privileges laid down in section 5 of the 1993 Elections Act. ... Furthermore, recognising the Silesians as a national minority may also result in further claims on their part [for privileges] granted to national minorities by other statutes. ... Contrary to the opinion expressed by the lower court, it is possible to determine whether or not the Silesians constitute a national minority in Poland; it is not necessary to obtain expert evidence in that connection. Under Article 228 § 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, facts that are common knowledge, that is, those which every sensible and experienced citizen should know, do not need to be proved. Common knowledge includes historical, economic, political and social phenomena and events. It is therefore clear that at present no legal definition of 'nation' or 'national minority' is commonly accepted in international relations. ... On the other hand, an 'ethnic group' is understood as a group which has a distinct language, a specific culture and a sense of social ties, is aware of the fact that it differs from other groups, and has its own name. Polish ethnographic science of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries describes 'Silesians' as an autochthonous population of Polish origin residing in Silesia – a geographical and historical region. At present, as a result of political and social changes, the term 'Silesians' refers equally to immigrants who have been living in this territory for several generations and who identify themselves with their new region of residence. It also refers to the German-speaking population, linked with Silesia by [such factors as] birth, residence and tradition (see the encyclopaedia published by the Polish Scientific Publishers in 1996). ... The applicants derive the rights they claim from the principles set out in the [Framework Convention], stating that every person belonging to a national minority has the right freely to choose to belong or not to belong to such a minority. ... In relying on European standards, they fail, however, to remember that a national minority with which a given person identifies himself must exist. There must be a society, established on the basis of objective criteria, with which this person wishes to identify. No one can determine his national identity independently of a fundamental element, which is the existence of a specific nation. It emerges from the above-mentioned definition of a 'nation' that a nation is formed in a historical process which may last for centuries and that the crucial element which forms a nation is its self-identification, that is to say its national awareness established on the basis of the existing culture by a society residing on a specific territory. Certainly, the Silesians belong to a regional group with a very deep sense of identity, including their cultural identity; no one can deny that they are distinct. This does not, however, suffice for them to be considered a distinct nation. They have never commonly been perceived as a distinct nation and they have never tried to determine their identity in terms of [the criteria for a 'nation']. On the contrary, the history of Silesia unequivocally demonstrates that the autochthonous inhabitants [of this region] have preserved their distinct culture and language (the latter having Polish roots from an ethnic point of view), even though their territories were not within the borders of the Polish State and even though they were under strong German influence. They are therefore Silesians – in the sense of [inhabitants of the] region, not in the sense of [their] nationality. Thus, Upper Silesia, in its ethnic roots [sic], remained Polish; that was, without a doubt, demonstrated by three uprisings. The role played by the Silesians in building and preserving the Polish character of Silesia, even though they remained isolated from their homeland, is unquestionable. However, a given nation exists where a group of individuals, considering itself a 'nation', is in addition accepted and perceived as such by others. In the common opinion of Polish citizens, both the Silesians and other regional groups or communities [for example, the Highlanders or the Mazurians] are perceived merely as local communities. In the international sphere, Poland and, similarly, France and Germany are perceived as single-nation States, regardless of the fact that there exist distinct ethnic groups (for example, the inhabitants of Alsace or Lorraine in France, or the inhabitants of Bavaria in Germany). On the whole, sociologists agree that the Silesians constitute an ethnic group and that the autochthonous inhabitants [of Silesia] do have some features of a nation but that those features are not fully developed. That ... means that the awakening of their national identity is still at a very early stage. A nation exists only when there are no doubts as to its right to exist. ... In Poland, national minorities constitute only a small part of society, that is to say about 3 to 4%. They include – and this has never been denied – Germans, Ukrainians, Belarusians, Lithuanians, Slovaks, Czechs, Jews, Roma, Armenians and Tatars. In the Polish tradition, national minorities are perceived as groups linked to a majority outside Poland; in other words, a minority is an ethnic group that has support amongst a majority [residing] abroad. Moreover, traditionally, our society has not considered that groups which preserve a distinct culture but which do not belong to any State can be deemed to be national minorities. Accordingly, for a long time the Roma people were regarded as an ethnic, not a national group. ... The applicants' opinion that the mere choice of the individual concerned is decisive for his nationality is reflected in paragraph 10 of the memorandum of association. Acceptance of this opinion would consequently lead to a situation in which the aims pursued by the association could be accomplished by groups of members who did not have any connection or links with Silesia and who had become members of the Union solely to gain an advantage for themselves. Undoubtedly, such groups of members cannot [be allowed] to accomplish the aims of an association of a national minority. ... The applicants have relied on the results of sociological research carried out in 1994 in the province of Katowice. Indeed, the research demonstrates that 25% of persons requested to declare their ethnic and regional identity replied that they were Silesians. However, it transpires from [the material collected in the course of another piece of sociological research of 1996 which was submitted by the applicants during the appeal hearing] that two years later the number of persons who considered themselves to be Silesians had decreased to 12.4% and that, moreover, the majority of inhabitants of the province of Katowice considered themselves to be Poles (that is, 81.9%, including 18.1% who stated that they were 'Polish Silesians'; only 3.5% of inhabitants considered themselves to be Germans, including 2.4 % who stated that they were 'German Silesians'). In the light of the above research, it cannot be said that such a poorly established self-identity of a small (and decreasing) group of Silesians, as demonstrated by their refusal to declare that they belong to the [Polish] nation, provides a basis for recognising that all Silesians (who have lived in Silesia for generations and state that they belong to the Polish nation) constitute a separate nation. This would be contrary to the will of the majority, a will well known to the applicants. We therefore find that the appellant is right in submitting that granting the applicants' application for their association to be registered is unjustified because the memorandum of association is contrary to the law, namely Article 5 of the Civil Code. Indeed, the application is aimed at registering an organisation of a minority which cannot be regarded as a national minority and at circumventing the provisions of the 1993 Elections Act and other statutes conferring particular privileges on national minorities. Granting such a request could lead to granting unwarranted rights to the association in question. This would, moreover, give it an advantage in relation to other regional or ethnic organisations. In these circumstances, in accordance with section 14 of the Law on associations and Article 58 of the Civil Code, read in conjunction with Articles 386 § 1 and 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure and section 8 of the Law on associations, the appeal must be allowed.” 33. On 3 November 1997 the applicants lodged an appeal on points of law (kasacja) with the Supreme Court (Sąd Najwyższy). They alleged that the Katowice Court of Appeal had wrongly interpreted the relevant provisions of the Law on associations and that the impugned decision had contravened Article 84 of the Constitution, Article 22 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Article 11 of the Convention. Their arguments are summarised as follows: “Since a refusal to register an association could be justified only if an activity specified in the memorandum of association was banned by the law, the principal issue to be determined by the Court of Appeal was whether the memorandum of the applicants' association complied with the statutory requirements. That was clearly not the case and the court's fear that the registration of the applicants' association would in future lead to discrimination against other national or ethnic minorities was based on mere speculation. In any event, the Law on associations [in sections 8(2), 25 et seq.] provided for various means whereby the activity of an association could be supervised by the competent State authorities or, in the event that its activity was unlawful, the association could be dissolved. However, the Court of Appeal, instead of assessing the formal requirements of the registration, decided at the outset that the core issue in the proceedings was to establish whether a Silesian nation existed. It consequently went on to lay down its own arbitrary and controversial definition of 'nation' and 'national minority', and finally concluded that there was no 'Silesian nation'. It did so without any effort to obtain expert evidence in respect of such an important matter.” 34. On 27 November 1997 the Governor of Katowice filed a pleading in reply to the applicants' appeal on points of law. The relevant arguments are summarised as follows: “The refusal to register the applicants' association was fully justified. In the course of the proceedings at first instance, the Governor eventually proposed that the applicants amend paragraph 30 of the memorandum of association and alter the name of their association by deleting the word 'nationality'. Those arguments were based on section 10(1) (i) of the Law on associations, which provides that a memorandum of association should enable the association in question to be differentiated from other associations. This means that the name of an association should not be misleading. Since the requirement set out in the above-mentioned section was not complied with, the refusal to register the applicants' association was justified under section 14(1). It must be stressed that even in the explanatory report to the [Framework Convention] it is clearly stated that the individual's subjective choice to belong to a national minority is inseparably linked to objective criteria relevant to the person's identity. That means that a given nation must exist prior to the individual making a decision to belong to this nation. That being so, the applicants' application for their association to be registered must be seen as a thoughtless and incomprehensible attempt to exploit the distinct characteristics [of the Silesians] with a view to achieving political aims.” 35. On 28 November 1997 the prosecutor at the Katowice Court of Appeal filed a pleading in reply to the applicants' appeal on points of law. He submitted, among other things, that it was clear that the content of the memorandum of association was contrary to the law since it explicitly stated that the Union was an association of a national minority, and thus ignored the fact that the Silesians could not be regarded as a minority of that kind. The Silesians, being merely an ethnic group, could not exercise the rights conferred on national minorities, in particular those referred to in the 1993 Elections Act. 36. On 18 March 1998 the Administrative, Labour and Social Security Division of the Supreme Court, sitting as a panel of three judges, dismissed the applicants' appeal on points of law. The relevant parts of the reasons for this decision read as follows: “... [A] necessary prerequisite for the registration of an association is the conformity of its memorandum of association with the entire domestic legal order, including conformity with [the provisions of ] international treaties ratified by Poland. In the present case the Court of Appeal had no doubts as to the lawfulness of the aims pursued by [the applicants'] association, but refused to register the association for the sole reason that [the applicants], in the memorandum of association, used such terms as 'Silesian nation' and 'Silesian national minority'. We agree with the opinion [of the Court of Appeal]. 'National minority' is a legal term (see Article 35 of the Constitution of 2 February 1997), although it is not defined either in Polish law or in the conventions relied on in the appeal on points of law. However, the explanatory report to the [Framework Convention] states plainly that the individual's subjective choice of a nation is inseparably linked to objective criteria relevant to his or her national identity. That means that a subjective declaration of belonging to a specific national group implies prior social acceptance of the existence of the national group in question. ... An individual has the right to choose his or her nation but this, as the Court of Appeal rightly pointed out, does not in itself lead to the establishment of a new, distinct nation or national minority. There was, and still is, a common perception that a Silesian ethnic group does exist; however, this group has never been regarded as a national group and has not claimed to be regarded as such. ... Registration of the association, which in paragraph 30 of its memorandum of association states that it is an organisation of a [specific] national minority, would be in breach of the law because it would result in a non-existent 'national minority' taking advantage of privileges conferred on [genuine] national minorities. This concerns, in particular, the privileges granted by the 1993 Elections Act ... such as an exemption from the requirement that a party or other organisation standing in elections should get at least 5% of the votes, which is a prerequisite for obtaining seats in Parliament ... [or] ... privileges in respect of the registration of electoral lists; thus, it suffices for an organisation of a national minority to have its electoral lists registered in at least five constituencies [whereas the general requirement is to register an electoral list in at least half of the constituencies in the whole of Poland]. Pursuant to the relevant ruling of the Constitutional Court [Trybunał Konstytucyjny][4] on the interpretation of the 1993 Elections Act, ... the privileges [referred to above] are conferred on electoral committees of registered national minorities and, in case of doubt [as to whether or not an electoral committee represents a national minority], the State Electoral College may request evidence. The simplest means of proving the existence of a specific national minority is to present a memorandum of association confirming that fact. It is true that, under the new Constitution, resolutions of the Constitutional Court on the interpretation of statutes no longer have universally binding force; however, in view of the persuasiveness of the reasons given by the Constitutional Court and the requirements of practice, [we consider that] a memorandum of association still remains basic evidence demonstrating the existence of a national minority. Conferring on the Silesians, an ethnic group, the rights of a national minority would be contrary to Article 32 of the Constitution, stating that all persons are equal before the law, [because] other ethnic minorities would not enjoy the same rights. The memorandum of association is contrary to section 10(1) (iv) of the Law on associations, which stipulates that a memorandum of association must set out rules concerning acquisition and loss of membership, and the rights and duties of members. Paragraph 10 of the memorandum provides that everyone who is a Polish citizen and has submitted a written declaration stating that he is of Silesian nationality may become a member of the Union, whereas paragraph 15 states that a person ceases to be a member of the Union if, inter alia, he has not fulfilled the membership requirements set out in the memorandum of association. Since no Silesian nation exists, no one would lawfully be able to become a member of the Union, because his declaration of Silesian nationality would be untrue. ... Furthermore, it must be pointed out that the refusal to register the association does not contravene Poland's international obligations. Both the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ... and the Convention allow [the State] to place restrictions on the freedom of association, [in particular such as] are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety or for the protection of health and morals or for the protection of the rights of others. It is contrary to public order to create a non-existent nation that would be able to benefit from the privileges conferred solely on national minorities. Such a situation would also lead to the infringement of the rights of others, not only national minorities but also all other citizens of Poland. Granting privileges to a [specific] group of citizens means that the situation of the other members of society becomes correspondingly less favourable. This is particularly so in the sphere of election law: if certain persons may become members of Parliament [because of their privileged position], it means that other candidates must obtain a higher number of votes than what would be required in the absence of privileges [in that respect]. It also has to be noted that the essential aims of the association can be accomplished without the contested provisions of the memorandum and without the [specific] name of the association. Under the provisions of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland, national and ethnic minorities have equal rights as regards their freedom to preserve and develop their own language, to maintain their customs and traditions, to develop their culture, to establish educational institutions or institutions designed to protect their religious identity and to participate in the resolution of matters relating to their cultural identity (see Article 35). ...” 37. Article 12 of the Constitution, which was adopted by the National Assembly on 2 April 1997 and came into force on 17 October 1997, states: “The Republic of Poland shall ensure freedom for the creation and functioning of trade unions, socio-occupational farmers' organisations, societies, citizens' movements, other voluntary associations and foundations.” Article 13 of the Constitution reads: “Political parties and other organisations whose programmes are based on totalitarian methods or the models of naziism, fascism or communism, or whose programmes or activities foster racial or national hatred, recourse to violence for the purposes of obtaining power or to influence State policy, or which provide for their structure or membership to be secret, shall be forbidden.” Article 32 of the Constitution provides: “1. All persons shall be equal before the law. All persons shall have the right to equal treatment by public authorities. 2. No one shall be discriminated against in political, social or economic life for any reason whatsoever.” Article 35 of the Constitution provides: “1. The Republic of Poland shall ensure that Polish citizens belonging to national or ethnic minorities have the freedom to preserve and develop their own language, to maintain customs and traditions, and to develop their own culture. 2. National or ethnic minorities shall have the right to establish educational and cultural institutions and institutions designed to protect religious identity, as well as to participate in the resolution of matters relating to their cultural identity.” Article 58 of the Constitution, proclaiming the right to freedom of association, reads: “1. The freedom of association shall be guaranteed to everyone. 2. Associations whose purposes or activities are contrary to the Constitution or statute shall be prohibited. The courts shall decide whether to register an association and/or whether to prohibit an [activity of] an association. 3. Categories of associations requiring court registration, the procedure for such registration and the manner in which activities of associations may be monitored shall be specified by law.” 38. Chapter III of the Constitution, entitled “Sources of law”, refers to the relationship between domestic law and international treaties. Article 87 § 1 provides: “The sources of universally binding law of the Republic of Poland shall be the Constitution, statutes, ratified international treaties and ordinances.” Article 91 states: “1. As soon as a ratified international treaty has been promulgated in the Journal of Laws of the Republic of Poland, it shall become part of the domestic legal order and shall be applied directly, unless its application depends on the enactment of a statute. 2. An international treaty ratified after prior consent has been given in the form of a statute shall have precedence over statutes where the provisions of such a treaty cannot be reconciled with their provisions. 3. Where a treaty ratified by the Republic of Poland establishing an international organisation so provides, the rules it lays down shall be applied directly and have precedence in the event of a conflict of laws.” 39. The relevant part of section 1 of the Law on associations reads: “(1) Polish citizens shall exercise the right of association in accordance with the Constitution ... and the legal order as specified by law. (2) The [exercise of the] right of association may be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary for ensuring the interests of national security or public order and for the protection of health and morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. (3) Associations shall have the right to express their opinion on public matters.” The relevant part of section 2 provides: “(1) An association is a voluntary, self-governing, stable union pursuing non profit- making aims. (2) An association shall freely determine its objectives, its programmes of activity and organisational structures, and shall adopt internal resolutions concerning its activity.” The relevant part of section 8, in the version applicable at the material time, read as follows: “(1) An association shall register, unless otherwise provided by law. (2) Registration of an association shall be effected by the registering regional court (hereafter referred to as 'the registering court') within whose territorial jurisdiction that association has its headquarters. (3) The regional court within whose territorial jurisdiction an association has its headquarters (hereafter referred to as 'the court') shall be competent to take the measures that are prescribed by this Law in respect of an association [for example, those listed in sections 25, 26, 28 and 29]. (4) In proceedings before it, the registering court or the court shall apply the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure relating to non-contentious proceedings, unless otherwise provided by this Law. (5) The activities of associations shall be supervised by [the governor of the relevant province] (referred to hereafter as 'the supervisory authority').” Section 10, in its relevant part, provides: “(1) An association's memorandum shall in particular specify: (i) the name of the association which shall differentiate it from other associations, organisations or institutions; ... (iv) the conditions for the admission of members, the procedure and grounds for the loss of membership, and the rights and obligations of members. ... (2) An association that intends to set up regional branches shall specify in its memorandum of association the structure of the organisation and the principles on which such branches shall be formed.” Section 12 reads as follows: “The management committee of an association shall lodge with the relevant court an application for the registration of their association, together with a memorandum of association, a list of the founders containing their first names, surnames, dates and places of birth, their places of residence and signatures, a record of the election of the management committee and the address of their provisional headquarters.” Section 13 stipulates: “(1) A court dealing with an application for registration of an association shall rule on such an application promptly; a ruling should be given within three months from the date on which the application was lodged with the court. (2) The court shall serve a copy of the application for the registration, together with the accompanying documents specified in section 12 on [the relevant] supervisory authority. The supervisory authority shall have the right to comment on the application within fourteen days from the date of service and, with the court's leave, to join the proceedings as a party.” Section 14 reads: “The court shall refuse to register an association if it does not fulfil the conditions laid down in [this] Law.” Section 16 provides: “The court shall allow an application for registration of an association if it is satisfied that the latter's memorandum of association is in conformity with the law and its members comply with the requirements laid down in [this] Law.” 40. Chapter 3 of the Law, entitled “Supervision of associations”, provides in sections 25 and following for various means of monitoring the activities of associations and lays down the conditions for the dissolution of an association. Under section 25, the relevant supervisory authority may request the management committee of an association to submit, within a specified time-limit, copies of resolutions passed by the general meeting of the association or to ask the officers of an association to provide it with “necessary explanations”. In the event that such requests are not complied with, the court, under section 26 and a motion from the supervisory authority, may impose a fine on the association concerned. Under section 28, a supervisory authority, if it finds that activities of an association are contrary to the law or infringe the provisions of the memorandum of association in respect of matters referred to in section 10(1) and (2), may request that such breaches cease, or issue a reprimand, or request the competent court to take measures under section 29. The relevant part of section 29 provides: “(1) The court, at the request of a supervisory authority or a prosecutor, may: (i) reprimand the authorities of the association concerned; (ii) annul [any] resolution passed by the association if such a resolution is contrary to the law or the provisions of the memorandum of association; (iii) dissolve the association if its activities have demonstrated a flagrant or repeated failure to comply with the law or with the provisions of the memorandum of association and if there is no prospect of the association reforming its activities so as to comply with the law and the provisions of the memorandum of association.” 41. Section 3 of the 1993 Elections Act provided: “(1) In the distribution of [seats in the Sejm] account shall be taken only of those regional electoral lists of electoral committees which have obtained at least 5% of the valid votes cast in the whole [of Poland]. (2) The regional electoral lists of electoral committees referred to in section 77(2) (electoral coalitions) shall be taken into account in the distribution of [seats in the Sejm], provided that they have obtained at least 8% of the valid votes cast in the whole [of Poland].” Section 4 read: “In the distribution of seats among national electoral lists, account shall be taken only of those lists of electoral committees which have obtained at least 7% of the valid votes cast in the whole [of Poland].” Section 5 stipulated: “(1) Electoral committees of registered organisations of national minorities may be exempted from one of the conditions referred to in section 3(1) or section 4, provided that, not later than the fifth day before the date of the election, they submit to the State Electoral College a declaration to that effect[[6]]. (2) The State Electoral College shall promptly acknowledge receipt of the declaration referred to in subsection (1). This declaration shall be binding on electoral colleges.” The relevant part of section 91 provided: “... (2) An electoral committee which has registered its regional electoral lists in at least half of the constituencies [in the whole of Poland] ... shall be entitled to register a national electoral list. (3) The electoral committee[s] of organisations of national minorities shall be entitled to register a national electoral list, provided [they] ha[ve] registered their regional electoral lists in at least five constituencies. ...” 42. On 23, 29 and 30 April 1997 the Constitutional Court dealt with an application by the President of the Supreme Administrative Court (Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny) seeking a universally binding interpretation of sections 5, 91(3), 79(3) and 87(4) of the 1993 Elections Act. In its ruling, the Constitutional Court addressed, among other things, the following question: “... whether it is implicit in the expression 'shall promptly acknowledge receipt of the declaration', as used in section 5(2) of the 1993 Elections Act, that, in order to issue such acknowledgment, the State Electoral College must verify whether an electoral committee that has submitted the declaration referred to in section 5(1) of the Act is in fact the electoral committee of a registered national minority organisation and may, for the purposes of such verification, require the committee to produce documents other than those listed in section 81(5) (i) of the 1993 Elections Act, such as the memorandum of association of the organisation ...” 43. The Constitutional Court held as follows: “... the State Electoral College, in performing its duties as set out in section 5(2) of the 1993 Elections Act shall verify whether the declaration referred to in section 5(1) of that Act was submitted by the authorised electoral committee of one or more registered national minority organisations, and may, in case of doubt, require documentary evidence of such authorisation.” It further explained that: “It must be stressed at the outset that the basis for section 5(1) of the 1993 Elections Act is to give Polish citizens belonging to national minorities an equal opportunity to participate in representative bodies. However, the possibility provided by this provision for electoral committees of registered national minority organisations to take advantage of exemptions from electoral thresholds is an exception to the principle of equality of electoral rights in a material sense. In practice, the electoral committee that has submitted a given national minority list [of candidates] will participate [in the distribution of seats in Parliament] ..., despite the fact that its list has not attained the corresponding threshold. This solution reflects a certain understanding of the equality principle that involves entities participating in elections being given equal opportunities ... This amounts to discrimination in favour of electoral committees of registered national minority organisations in comparison with other electoral committees. Since they constitute an exception to the equality principle, provisions governing such discrimination cannot be interpreted extensively. Secondly, section 5(1) reserves the privilege of exemption from electoral thresholds to lists of candidates supplied by the electoral committees of one or more registered national minority organisations, and only committees of that type may submit corresponding declarations to the State Electoral College. The emphasis should be placed on both the reference to 'registered organisations of national minorities' and to electoral committees acting in their name, for this privilege is available to 'national minority' organisations that are organised and act as such. [A] ... condition of the validity, and hence of effectiveness of a declaration seeking to take advantage of the exemption is that it must be submitted by an entity entitled to do so. It is therefore the responsibility of that entity to provide documentary evidence of its entitlement to submit the declaration. In practice, this amounts to a responsibility to submit to the State Electoral College documents unambiguously demonstrating that the electoral committee submitting the declaration is an entity entitled to do so, that is to say, the electoral committee of not just any organisation, but of one or more registered national minority organisations. In accordance with section 5(2), the State Electoral College is required to acknowledge, without delay, receipt of the declaration referred to in subsection (1), in other words, a declaration that has been submitted by an entity entitled to do so. In that connection, the College has a duty to verify whether the declaration was submitted by such an entity, and if in doubt, may require documentation unambiguously confirming the entity's right to submit the declaration, as the declaration gives rise to legal consequences, so justifying the need for specific verification. ... If such documents are not submitted, the State Electoral College is precluded from acknowledging receipt of the declaration referred to in section 5(1), since, apart from the requirement that it be made at the prescribed time to the appropriate electoral college, a vital condition for the validity of the declaration is that it be made by an entitled entity. On the other hand, the State Electoral College does not verify the content of the declaration, for which the electoral committee takes full responsibility. Determining which documents are to be accepted by the State Electoral College as confirmation of the electoral committee's entitlement to submit the declaration referred to in section 5(1) is a separate issue. ... [I]t can be assumed that the State Electoral College may require the presentation of appropriate documents, such as a memorandum of association, that will allow it unambiguously to ascertain that the entity submitting the declaration is the electoral committee of one or more registered national minority organisations.” 44. Article 5 of the Civil Code reads: “No one shall exercise any right held by him or her in a manner contrary to its socio-economic purpose or to the principles of co-existence with others [zasady współżycia społecznego]. No act or omission [matching this description] on the part of the holder of the right shall be deemed to be the exercise of the right and be protected [by law].” The relevant part of Article 58 provides: “1. A[ny] act which is contrary to the law or aimed at evading the law shall be null and void, unless a statutory provision provides for other legal effects, such as the replacement of the void elements of such an act by elements provided for by statute. 45. At the material time Poland was a signatory to the Council of Europe Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (European Treaty Series no. 157); the date of signature was 1 February 1995. Poland ratified the Framework Convention on 20 December 2000. It came into force in respect of Poland on 1 April 2001. 46. The Framework Convention contains no definition of the notion of “national minority”. Its explanatory report mentions that it was decided to adopt a pragmatic approach, based on the recognition that at that stage it was impossible to arrive at a definition capable of mustering the general support of all Council of Europe member States. 47. Poland, at the time of the deposit of the instrument of ratification, made the following declaration: “Taking into consideration the fact that the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities contains no definition of the national minorities notion, the Republic of Poland declares that it understands this term as national minorities residing within the territory of the Republic of Poland at the same time whose members are Polish citizens.”

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10. The applicant was born in 1942 and is at present living in Diyarbakır, Turkey. At the time of the events giving rise to his application, the applicant was living in the Çaylarbaşı (Dahlezeri in Kurdish) hamlet attached to Türeli village in the Lice district of the province of Diyarbakır. The application concerns the alleged unacknowledged detention and subsequent disappearance of the applicant's two sons, Servet and İkram İpek, in the course of an operation conducted by security forces in his village on 18 May 1994. It further pertains to the alleged destruction of his family home and property by the security forces during the same operation. 11. The facts surrounding the disappearance of the applicant's two sons and the alleged destruction of his family home and property are disputed between the parties. 12. The facts as presented by the applicant are set out in Section 1 below. The facts presented by the Government are contained in Section 2. 13. A summary of the documents submitted by the parties is to be found in Part B. The witness evidence taken by the Court's Delegates at hearings conducted in Ankara is summarised in Part C. 14. On 17 May 1994 the applicant and his son İkram İpek were tending their sheep away from the village of Türeli when soldiers approached them and asked them for identification. After being shown identification, the soldiers went on their way. The applicant's other son, Servet İpek, had good relations with soldiers from Lice and had even made tea for them on occasions. 15. On 18 May 1994 at about 10 a.m. the applicant, together with his son İkram İpek, was bringing his sheep back to their hamlet near Türeli village, when a group of about 100 soldiers in uniform raided the village. The soldiers left their vehicles outside the hamlet and entered it on foot. They were armed with G-3 rifles and other weapons. A military helicopter circled above the hamlet. The applicant has since learned that the soldiers were not from Lice, but from around Bolu. The Lice soldiers had told the applicant previously to be wary of the soldiers from Bolu. 16. The soldiers told the applicant and İkram İpek to gather with the other villagers, that is, men, women and boys –the young girls were told to remain in the hamlet – by the local school, which is located outside the hamlet. The houses in the hamlet cannot be seen from the school. One group of soldiers remained by the school; the other group went into the hamlet. 17. The applicant saw flames rising from the village and his hamlet, and the women and children began to weep. The soldiers who were with them threatened them, saying: “If you start crying, we will burn you just like your houses”. All the villagers then fell quiet. 18. Both the applicant's and his brother's houses were completely destroyed by fire. After most of the houses had been destroyed, the soldiers released the villagers. But they did not release the applicant's sons İkram İpek and Servet İpek, or Seyithan, Abdülkerim, Nuri and Sait Yolur. These men went with the soldiers in order to carry the latter's equipment to their vehicles. 19. When the applicant returned to the hamlet, he saw that the houses were in flames. The young girls told him and the other villagers that the soldiers had thrown some white powder into the houses and had set them alight. The fires were so far advanced that there was nothing the applicant could do. 20. Since a few of the houses had not caught fire, the applicant and the other villagers thought they could shelter in them. 21. At about 3.30 p.m., the same soldiers raided the hamlet again. They asked why some of the houses had not been burned. When the applicant and the other villagers replied: “we did not put them out, you could not have lit them properly”, the soldiers said: “we shall burn them now”, and they burned the remaining houses. The applicant has since learned that the villages of Türeli and Makmu Kirami were also burned down that day. 22. The applicant's wife Fatma then asked the soldiers, in Kurdish, about what had happened to her sons İkram İpek and Servet İpek. The soldiers could not understand Kurdish, and asked what she had said. When the applicant explained that she was asking about her sons, the soldiers replied that they were in Lice and that they would be released soon. 23. After this second burning, the soldiers waited in the village, and only left in the direction of Lice in the evening. 24. Since his own house had been burned, the applicant with his wife Fatma, his son Hakim, and Sevgol, the wife of his son İkram İpek, moved to a house which had been evacuated two years previously in the hamlet of Kalenderesi, also attached to Türeli village. All they had left were the clothes they were wearing. Neighbours gave them a few more clothes. They remained there, in abject poverty, for some four months. The applicant has since moved to Diyarbakır. The Government have provided no aid or assistance to the applicant or his family ever since the time when his house was burned. 25. Abdülkerim, Nuri and Sait Yolur, who had been taken into custody together with İkram and Servet İpek, were released the next day. They themselves did not speak to the applicant afterwards but informed him through a third person that they had been held together until 10 p.m. the first night with their eyes bound. At 10 p.m. they were separated from İkram and Servet İpek and they never saw the two brothers again. Seyithan Yolur remained with İkram and Servet İpek. All three have been missing ever since. 26. About 15 days after İkram and Servet İpek were taken into custody, and having heard nothing about their whereabouts, the applicant travelled to Diyarbakır. With the help of a relative, he applied to the office of the Diyarbakır State Security Court (Diyarbakır Devlet Güvenlik Mahkemesi, hereafter DGM) chief public prosecutor. He also applied to the Lice public prosecutor's office and the Lice gendarmerie command. The applicant was unable to obtain any information about his sons from any of these State authorities. 27. In the meantime, in a letter dated 15 September 1994, Mr İbrahim Erge, a senior colonel at the Chief of Staff in Ankara, informed Mr Şakir Yolur that the security forces had not conducted any operation on 18 May 1994 in the Çağlarbaşı hamlet of Türeli village attached to the Lice district and that his son Seyithan Yolur had not been apprehended. 28. On 27 October 1994 the applicant filed another petition with the DGM chief prosecutor in Diyarbakır, asking him to investigate what had happened to his sons. The applicant was not permitted to meet the prosecutor, but a plain-clothes policeman who was there looked at the records and told the applicant verbally that the individuals in question were not there. 29. The applicant's other son, Hakim İpek, sent two or three petitions to the Governor of the State of Emergency. He received two replies consisting of denials that his brothers had ever been detained. He was so angry that he tore the letters up and disposed of the pieces. 30. On 23 December 1999 the applicant went to the Kulp Gendarmerie Commander's Office at the request of the latter. He was asked where his sons were. The applicant stated that they had been taken away by the State. The gendarmes accused him of lying, insisted that his sons had in fact been taken by the PKK, yelled at him, and asked him why he was complaining about the Turkish State. Under duress the applicant was obliged to apply his thumbprint to documents prepared by the gendarmes, the contents of which were not made known to him. 31. No security operation was conducted in Türeli village or in Dahlezeri hamlet on 18 May 1994. Neither the applicant's sons nor any other persons had been taken into custody. 32. The applicant did file a petition with the DGM chief public prosecutor in Diyarbakır on 27 October 1994, stating that his sons Servet and İkram İpek had been taken into custody and requesting the prosecutor to investigate his sons' fate. The chief public prosecutor asked the security forces whether the applicant's sons had been taken into custody for an offence falling within the jurisdiction of DGMs. The security forces informed the prosecutor that this was not the case and the applicant was informed of this outcome. 33. The applicant made no applications about the alleged disappearance of his sons to the offices of the Lice public prosecutor or to the Lice District Gendarmerie Commander. However, following the communication of the application to the Government, an ex officio investigation into the allegations was conducted by the Lice public prosecutor. However, it was not possible to locate the applicant at the address given by the applicant in his application form as submitted to the Commission. Moreover, the applicant was not known by the people living in the neighbourhood. His name was not registered in the registry of the head (muhtar) of the neighbourhood. 34. The Government further stated that no evidence has been found during the investigation to prove that the alleged offences had been committed by the security forces and that the Lice District Administrative Council (Lice İlçe İdare Kurulu) had rendered a decision not to prosecute members of the security forces. It had not been possible to communicate this decision to the applicant as his address was not known to the authorities and the Lice Governor had therefore ordered the publication of the outcome of the investigation in a newspaper. 35. The Government finally stated that the applicant had been invited to the Kulp Gendarmerie Commander's Office in order to make a statement as part of the administrative investigation in which the Kulp Gendarmerie Commander had been appointed as investigator. 36. On 26 December 1999 the Gendarmerie Commander questioned the applicant in relation to his allegations and the applications he had filed with various authorities, including a certain “European Human Rights Diyarbakır branch”. The applicant repeated his allegations that his two sons, İkram and Servet, along with the Yolur brothers had been taken away and that all the houses in his hamlet had been burned down by soldiers. The applicant further deposed that he had not applied to the “European Human Rights Diyarbakır branch”. Nor had he given any statement to the latter body or signed any document in respect of his allegations. 37. The following information appears from documents pertaining to the investigation carried out following the communication of the application to the respondent Government on 7 March 1995. 38. On 3 March 1995 Mr Sefa Özmen, a deputy to the Diyarbakır Governor, informed Mr Hakim İpek, in response to the allegations contained in his petition of 23 January 1995, that the security forces had not conducted any operation in the region on the dates mentioned in his petition, that his brothers were not on the list of persons wanted by the security forces and that the whereabouts of his brothers were not known to the authorities. 39. On 25 April 1995 the Diyarbakır chief public prosecutor instructed the Diyarbakır police headquarters to summon the applicant to his office so that a statement could be taken from him. The address of the applicant recorded in this letter is the same as the one given in the application form with the exception of the name of the block of flats. According to the application form, the name of the block of flats was 'Varol', but in the prosecutor's letter the name was recorded as 'Baro'. 40. On 2 May 1995 the Diyarbakır police informed the public prosecutor that there were no blocks of flats called Baro in the street indicated by him. This letter went on to say that the applicant was not known by the people living in the neighbourhood and that his name was not registered in the registry of the head (muhtar) of the neighbourhood. 41. On 18 May 1995 the commander of the Tepe gendarmerie station, in whose jurisdiction Türeli village was located, recorded in a report that Abdülrezzak İpek and his family had left the village and had gone to the town of Dörtyol near Hatay to work. 42. On 24 May 1995 the Diyarbakır chief public prosecutor sent a copy of the letter he had received from the International Law and Foreign Relations Directorate of the Ministry of Justice on 20 April 1995 to the Lice chief public prosecutor and asked him to investigate the applicant's allegations that his house had been burned down and that his sons had been taken away by the security forces. 43. On 7 June 1995 the Lice chief public prosecutor sent a letter to the gendarmerie commander of Lice and instructed the latter to confirm whether or not an operation had been conducted in Turalı village on 18 May 1995 and whether Servet and İkram İpek had been detained. He also asked the commander to find out the applicant's address and to summon the applicant to his, i.e. the prosecutor's, office. 44. On 13 June 1995 the Lice prosecutor sent another letter to the Lice gendarmerie commander's office and informed the latter that the name of the village was incorrectly recorded as 'Turalı' which was within the jurisdiction of the town of Hani. The prosecutor repeated his requests in his letter of 7 June 1995 and asked the gendarmerie commander to look for the applicant in the village of 'Türeli'. 45. On 20 June 1995 the Lice gendarmerie commander replied to the prosecutor's requests. The commander stated that the said persons had never been detained by his soldiers and that no operation had been conducted in the vicinity of Türeli village at that time. The commander finally stated that the applicant had moved to the town of Dörtyol in the province of Hatay to work. 46. On 21 June 1995 the Lice prosecutor took a decision of non-jurisdiction and sent the file to the office of the Lice district governor. This action was taken pursuant to the Law on the Prosecution of Civil Servants Memurin Muhakematı Kanunu) according to which authorisation must be sought in order to investigate the actions of members of the security forces. 47. On 2 February 1996 the gendarmerie commander of Diyarbakır, in an apparent response to a request from the Lice governor's office, appointed Turgut Alpı, a gendarmerie lieutenant-colonel, to investigate the applicant's allegations. 48. On 28 February 1996 the newly appointed Lieutenant- Colonel Alpı instructed the Lice gendarmerie commander to forward copies of the names and addresses of the military personnel who had been working in the area at the time of the incident. He further requested copies of all operation reports, operation logbooks, custody ledgers and any other relevant documents. 49. Also on 28 February 1996 Lieutenant-Colonel Alpı instructed the Diyarbakır police headquarters to take a statement from one Abdurrezzak İpek in respect of allegations of village destruction and disappearances. According to this letter, Abdurrezzak İpek was born in 1959 and living in Diyarbakır. 50. The Diyarbakır police headquarters forwarded a copy of the statement taken from Abdulrezak İpek on 8 March 1996 and a copy of his identity card to Lieutenant-Colonel Alpı. 51. Abdulrezak İpek stated in his statement that he did not even know where Türeli village was and that his children had not been taken away by soldiers. In fact, he did not have any children with those names. According to the copy of his identity card, this Abdulrezak İpek was born on 1 January 1959. 52. On 12 March 1996 the Lice gendarmerie commander replied to Lieutenant-Colonel Alpı's requests and enclosed copies of two pages of custody ledgers and copies of two pages of operation logbooks in which the day-to-day activities of the Lice gendarmerie were recorded. The Lice commander further stated in his letter that his soldiers had not conducted an operation in Türeli village on 18 May 1994 and that Servet and İkram İpek had not been detained. The letter further states that Major Şahap Yaralı had been Lice gendarmerie commander on 18 May 1994 but he had since been posted to another town in central Anatolia. Sergeant-Major Şükrü Günlükçü had been commander of the Tepe gendarmerie station in whose jurisdiction Türeli village was located. He had since been posted to a town in the west of the country. 53. Copies of the custody ledgers, which were enclosed with this letter, have been submitted to the Court. They do not contain the names of İkram or Servet İpek. A copy of the daily activities logbook kept at the Lice gendarmerie station does not mention any operation planned, or conducted, at the relevant time. 54. On 25 March 1996 Lieutenant-Colonel Alpı concluded his investigation report. He came to the conclusion that no operation had been conducted by security forces in Türeli village on 18 May 1994 and that the security forces had not even gone to that village on that day. Lieutenant‑Colonel Alpı further considered that the statement taken from Abdurrezzak İpek in which the latter stated that he was not from Türeli village and that his house had never been burned down or that his children had not been taken away, also proved that no operation had taken place. He recommended that authorisation to prosecute members of the security forces should not be granted as there was no evidence to prove that the alleged events had taken place. This report was forwarded to the Lice governor's office on 1 April 1996. 55. On 16 May 1996 the Lice District Administrative Council, under the presidency of the Lice Governor, decided on the basis of the information submitted by Lieutenant-Colonel Alpı not to grant authorisation for the prosecution of members of the security forces. This decision was appealed against ex officio pursuant to domestic law. 56. On 18 October 1996 the Diyarbakır Regional Administrative Court (Diyarbakır Bölge İdare Mahkemesi), sitting as an appeal court, rejected the appeal and upheld the decision not to grant authorisation for the prosecution of members of the security forces. It had not been possible to communicate this decision to Abdurrezzak İpek since his address was unknown to the authorities. Thus, the Lice Governor ordered the publication of this decision in a newspaper. 57. Finally, the applicant has submitted a letter dated 21 January 2000 and signed by Şakir Yolur, the father of Seyithan Yolur and the uncle of Sait and Nuri Yolur who were allegedly taken from the village by soldiers and detained together with the applicant's sons. 58. Mr Yolur, who also lived in the same village as the applicant, confirmed the applicant's version of events and added that Sait and Nuri had been released but that his son Seyithan had not been released. He has not heard from his son Seyithan since the incident. 59. Mr Yolur made inquiries at various military establishments in the region and sent a telegram to the Chief of Staff of the Turkish Armed Forces in Ankara (Genel Kurmay Başkanlığı) complaining about the disappearances in the course of the impugned events. 60. The Chief of Staff stated in his reply that no operation had taken place and that the persons referred to had not been detained. 61. The facts of the case being in dispute between the parties, the Court conducted an investigation with the assistance of the parties. In this respect, three delegates of the Court took oral evidence between 18 and 20 November 2002 from eight witnesses. A further three witnesses had been summoned but did not appear for various reasons. The evidence given by the witnesses may be summarised as follows. 62. The witness told the delegates that he had lived in the hamlet of Dahlezeri outside Türeli village between 1969 and May 1994 when the “Government destroyed the hamlet.” About twenty families lived in the hamlet. The inhabitants were all in some way related. The applicant kept livestock and grew crops for his living. 63. The applicant stated that two military raids had taken place on the hamlet on 18 May 1994. The first raid began around noon, at the time of the midday prayer. The soldiers gathered all the inhabitants (about a hundred) in front of the school, including the children. The village muhtar, with whom he enjoyed a good relationship, was not present. The men were separated from the women and children. When questioned by the Delegates, the applicant stated that the soldiers had collected the inhabitants' identity documents. No names were called out. Six persons, including his sons, İkram and Servet, were led away by the soldiers. These persons were chosen at random (“You, you and you.”) and were made to carry the soldiers' rucksacks. The soldiers returned the identity documents to the other inhabitants and then released them. During this time, the applicant could see that the hamlet had been set on fire. When he returned to the hamlet, he found that the houses, including his own house, belongings and livestock, had been burned. 64. The inhabitants started to salvage their property and belongings. However, at 6 p.m., the soldiers returned and ordered everyone to evacuate the village. According to the applicant, an order was given to shoot the inhabitants if they tried to put out the flames. They were made to walk for a long time. During this time he could hear messages coming through on the soldiers' walkie-talkies to halt the operation. They were threatened that they would be killed if they tried again to put the fires out. On being questioned at the hearing, the applicant affirmed that he could understand Turkish. The applicant later mentioned in his evidence that other villages had been burned that day, including Türeli. 65. The applicant confirmed his belief during questioning that the raids were conducted by soldiers. He related that they were dressed as such, carried G-3 or G-1 rifles and used military vehicles and helicopters during the raids. The applicant stated that he had never seen any members of the PKK in the hamlet. While there may have been clashes between the PKK and the security forces away from the area, there had never been any clashes in his neighbourhood. He maintained that there had been no PKK members in the hamlet. When questioned, the applicant stated that PKK members may have come to the hamlet and may have been given food since the inhabitants were afraid of them. According to the applicant, there were no village guards in the hamlet, although the authorities had proposed that inhabitants set up a village-guard system. 66. The applicant further testified that the soldiers who carried out the raids were from Bolu. They were accompanied by soldiers from Lice. Soldiers from Lice had come to the area in the past to carry out checks. The applicant also affirmed that his sons İkram and Servet had never been arrested by the security forces before the operation on 18 May 1994, and he could offer no explanation as to why they had been taken away. His son, İkram, had returned home from Ankara two days before the military operation to enjoy a rest. His other son, Servet, worked as a shepherd. 67. As to his own enquiries concerning the whereabouts of his sons, the applicant stated that he had applied to the authorities in Kulp, Lice, Istanbul and Ankara, as well as to the Human Rights Association in Diyarbakır. He deposed that, following the events of 18 May 1994, he had obtained from a soldier the name of the commander in charge of the operation, a Major Osman Duman. He had never disclosed that information to anyone before. 68. The witness had been married to İkram İpek for six months at the relevant time. She stated that her husband had just returned to the hamlet from Ankara where he had spent three months. On the morning of 18 May 1994 her brother-in-law, Servet İpek, informed the family that the hamlet was full of soldiers. Everyone was forcibly made to assemble at the school outside the hamlet. In the meantime, the houses were set alight. The witness stated that the raid occurred at 11 a.m. and that the burning took place at noon. 69. When the inhabitants were outside the school, the soldiers took their identity cards. Six people, including her husband İkram and her brother-in-law Servet, were picked out, apparently on account of their youth, and told to carry the soldiers' gear to the military vehicles. 70. The remaining inhabitants were allowed to return to their houses at 1 p.m. However, with the exception of a few houses, everything had been burned down, including their family home and belongings. The soldiers returned to the hamlet again at around 6 p.m. with orders to kill the inhabitants. Houses which had only partly been burned or where the flames had been extinguished were again set on fire. The inhabitants were all led away from the hamlet. The witness stated that she could make out from the radio communications between the soldiers that the order to kill them had been revoked. They were released at 7 p.m. but ordered not to stay in the hamlet. The witness went to live with her parents in Diyarbakır. 71. The witness had no doubts that the operation was carried out by Turkish soldiers. She was unable to assess how many soldiers were involved. She testified that there were no members of the PKK living in the hamlet and that she had no recollection of PKK members ever having come to the hamlet for assistance. When questioned by the Delegates, the witness affirmed that neither her husband nor her brother-in-law had ever been in trouble with the authorities. The witness stated that she was never requested by the authorities to give a statement about the above events. 72. The witness is the applicant's son and the brother of İkram and Servet İpek. He stated that the events under investigation had taken place on 18 May 1994 when soldiers arrived in the village. He estimated that five thousand soldiers were involved in what he referred to as the “general operation.” The soldiers approached the hamlet on foot from Pilgrimage Hill where they had left their military vehicles. They rounded up the inhabitants at the local school where they separated the men from the women. Everyone's identity cards were taken. The soldiers picked out six of the villagers including his brothers İkram and Servet İpek and the three Yolur brothers to carry their rucksacks back to the vehicles. The witness affirmed that he saw these individuals being led away on foot towards the military vehicles and getting into the vehicles. The soldiers handed back the identity cards to the remaining villagers who went back to the hamlet only to find that the houses had been set alight. The witness stated that his family's livestock and belongings had been destroyed. According to the witness, these events took place at noon. 73. Some villagers attempted to extinguish the flames. However, the soldiers returned around 4 or 5 p.m. with orders to kill them. The villagers were rounded up and taken away. However, an order came over the military radio not to fire on the villagers. They were allowed to return but were threatened with death if they tried to put out the fires. 74. When questioned by the Delegates the witness stated that there were no PKK members living in the hamlet or in the neighbouring village, and if any members visited they would be denied assistance since the inhabitants were afraid of reprisals from the authorities. Moreover, there were no guards in the hamlet - although the authorities had proposed the setting up of a village-guard system. The witness had no explanation as to why the hamlet had been destroyed and his brothers taken away. He did however refer to an incident in Türeli village about a half an hour away in which a number of soldiers were killed. The witness informed the Delegates that all the villages in the neighbouring region had been burned. 75. The witness stated that he and his father (the applicant) had made many attempts in writing to find out from the authorities about the fate of his missing brothers. They were consistently informed that İkram and Servet were not in detention. The witness stated that, out of anger, he tore up and threw away the replies which he had received from the regional governor. The witness told the Delegates that his father had been told the name of the commander of the operation by a soldier whom he had met in the Kiran neighbourhood. His father had written down the name. 76. The witness stated that he had been born in Dahlezeri hamlet. However, at the beginning of 1994 he was living in Diyarbakır. There were twenty households in the hamlet and all the families were in some way related. He knew both İkram and Servet İpek. The witness had returned to the hamlet two days before the start of the military operation. He related to the Delegates that troops from Bolu and other areas had arrived in the vicinity on 17 May 1994 and that there may have been thousands of them involved in the operation. On the following day, all the villagers were made to assemble in a group in front of the local school while the soldiers, who had arrived in the hamlet on foot, burned down the houses. When questioned by the Delegates, the witness stated that five or six soldiers stood guard around the inhabitants outside the school, and he estimated that there may have been sixty to seventy, maybe even a hundred, soldiers involved in the operation in the hamlet. 77. According to the witness, the school where everyone was grouped was ten metres away from the hamlet. He could see the fires burning in the hamlet. The villagers' identity documents were taken by the soldiers and six of them (himself, Abdülkerim Yolur, Sait Yolur, Seyithan Yolur, İkram İpek and Servet İpek) were requested to carry the soldiers' rucksacks up to their vehicles which had been parked on the hilly area around the village. When questioned, the witnessed stated that the military vehicles were not visible from the school. The witness told the Delegates that the soldiers commented that Seyithan Yolur would be taken to Lice and conscripted into the army since he had evaded his military service. The witness estimated that the six of them left with the soldiers around 9 to 10 a.m. On their way to the military vehicles, he could see from a hill that smoke was rising again from the village. By the time they reached their destination, it was late afternoon. However, rather than being released, they were then taken in an open-top military vehicle to Lice along with fifty or sixty soldiers. He could see smoke rising from the villages along the route to Lice. It was dark when they arrived there. They were made to get out of the vehicle and to lie face down. The witness remarked that many other persons arrived around this time. He estimated that about one hundred and fifty persons were lying down in front of the establishment. Their identity cards were collected. The witness stated that he and two others (his brothers Sait and Abdülkerim Yolur) were taken to a custody room where they spent the night. They were never ill-treated during this time. In the morning their identity documents were returned and they were told to leave. The last time that he saw İkram and Servet İpek was when they were lying down after being taken from the military vehicle. The witness stated that when he arrived back in the hamlet, the houses had been burned. 78. The witness had no explanation as to why he and his two brothers were released whereas the İpek brothers and Seyithan Yolur were kept in custody. When questioned, the witness deposed that the place to which they had all been taken was “a large military place in Lice”. 79. The witness had no doubt that the people who raided the hamlet were soldiers carrying G-3s. He had never heard of any PKK activity in or around the hamlet, and had no explanation as to why the hamlet had been burned; nor had he ever heard of a Major Osman Duman. 80. The witness stated that he was from the same hamlet as the İpek family. All the families living there were related. He had returned to the hamlet on 17 May 1994 from Aydın for a visit. Soldiers on foot raided the village between 11 a.m. and noon on 18 May 1994. He was certain that they were soldiers since they were carrying G-3s. A helicopter flew above the area. The soldiers arrived in the hamlet on foot. The inhabitants were all made to assemble at the school on the edge of the hamlet, men on one side, women on the other. The soldiers took everyone's identity documents. He could see the hamlet being burned. Six of them (himself, Mehmet Nuri Yolur, Sait Yolur, Seyithan Yolur, İkram İpek and Servet İpek) were requested to carry the soldiers' bags up to Türeli village. The soldiers kept their identity documents, but returned the identity documents of the persons who remained behind. They set off around noon with the soldiers for Türeli village, which was burning. They reached the outskirts around 2 p.m. Rather than being released as promised, they were made to await the arrival of military vehicles from Lice to take the soldiers back. The witness stated that Türeli village was burning at the time, although they did no go into the village and they did not see any villagers. The six of them got into one of the vehicles and set off towards sunset for Lice. According to the witness there were about one hundred soldiers in the truck. When they arrived in Lice, at the “Regiment”, they were made to lie on the ground and were divided into two groups of three. The witness was unable to confirm whether, apart from the six, there were other persons lying on the ground. One group comprised İkram and Servet İpek and Seyithan Yolur. The witness stated that this was the last occasion on which he saw them. Their names were read out. He and his brothers, Mehmet Nuri and Sait, were taken inside the “Regiment” and spent the night in a cell-like room as the soldiers' guests since by that stage it was dark. They were well-treated. There were two other persons in the room whom they did not know. When questioned, the witness was unable to provide any precise description of the building where he spent the night. He confirmed that the cell door was locked and guarded. The following morning they were handed their identity documents and released. He returned to the hamlet where he remained for one or two nights, sleeping in the open. When questioned, the witness stated that he had no explanation as to why İkram and Servet İpek and Seyithan Yolur had been detained. He had no knowledge of any PKK activity in the area and had never heard of a Major Durmuş. 81. The witness stated that seventeen or eighteen villages might have been burned on 18 May 1994. 82. The witness stated that he had been serving in Diyarbakır when he was appointed on 2 February 1996 to investigate the applicant's complaints. He found no records at the Lice District Gendarmes Headquarters to indicate that İkram and Servet İpek had been taken into custody or that an operation had been conducted on 18 May 1994 by the gendarmes or military units. The commander at Lice was interviewed and he confirmed that neither of these persons had been taken into custody. The investigation was closed on the basis of the absence of documentary evidence that the İpek brothers had been detained. According to the witness there was no need to obtain the operational records of the military, given that the Lice District Gendarmes Commander at the time had responsibility for the whole area. When asked about the possibility that the Bolu brigade may have been in the area at the time of the incident, the witness observed that the Lice District Gendarmes Commander would have been aware of this. The witness reaffirmed that he had established through the Lice District Gendarmes Headquarters that no operation had been conducted in or around 18 May 1994. When questioned, the witness stated that he did not find it necessary to ascertain from the Bolu brigade whether it had records of operations which it had conducted in 1994. He repeated that the district gendarmerie commander would have had any such information since he had overall responsibility for the area. It had been established that he did not have any information. 83. The witness told the Delegates that he did not personally visit Dahlezeri hamlet or Türeli village since he knew that the inhabitants had all left. He knew the area, having served there and knew that the villages had been abandoned at some stage. The witness could not confirm whether Dahlezeri hamlet or Türeli village had actually been destroyed by burning. When questioned on this point, the witness observed that the terms of reference of his investigation also extended to the allegation that the hamlet had been burnt down. The Lice District Gendarmerie Headquarters informed him that this matter had been investigated and it was found that the hamlet had not been destroyed as alleged. The witness conceded that the report which was sent to him by the commander of the Lice District Gendarmes Headquarters only mentioned that no military operation had been carried out. The witness further stated that no villages in the area had been destroyed by military units. On the other hand, he had personally witnessed the burning of villages by the PKK. 84. The witness declared that, with the exception of the first name and family name, he had no personal identification details of the applicant Abdürrezzak İpek at the time of his investigation. Thus, when someone of the same name was located and questioned by the Diyarbakır police, there was no reason to believe that the wrong man had been interviewed. No attempts were made to question other members of the applicant's family or inhabitants of the hamlet since they had no addresses for them. Moreover, there had been intense terrorist activity in the area at that time. The witness deposed that Captain Şahap Yaralı had not been questioned since it could not be established that the İpek brothers had been taken into custody and, in addition, Captain Şahap Yaralı had been posted out of the area by the time he undertook his investigation. 85. The witness confirmed that he had been the Lice District Gendarmerie Commander in 1994 and that his responsibilities included overall command of the Tepe gendarme station. His responsibilities had included Türeli village. He deposed that no military operations had been carried out in the area under his jurisdiction on 18 May 1994. Had any such operation been conducted on that day, either by the gendarmes or by the military or jointly, it would have been recorded in the log book of the district gendarmerie headquarters. The witness affirmed that the armed forces, including the Bolu commando brigade, would have notified his command of any operation which was to be undertaken, including on 18 May 1994. Notification of planned military operations was established practice. 86. The witness stated that no purpose would have been served by visiting the Dahlezeri hamlet or Türeli village in the course of his investigation. The area had been the scene of intense terrorist activity and the villagers had been forced to leave by the PKK. The witness observed that there must exist a minute recording that an officer had questioned former inhabitants of the Dahlezeri hamlet. He stressed that the security forces had never engaged in village burning or forcible evacuation of villagers. 87. When questioned, the witness reiterated that the names of all persons who were taken into custody were entered in the custody register. There was no reference in the register to the detention of the İpek brothers. The witness noted that no entries were made in respect of persons who were in the gendarme station under observation, for example for the purposes of simple investigations. 88. The witness, when asked if he had heard of a Major Osman Durmuş, stated that there had been a Major Osman in the region at the time of his service there. He recollected that Major Osman was in the area in an advisory capacity to one of the battalions which was responsible for overseeing the local elections. 89. The witness was the commander of the Tepe gendarme station between October 1993 and July 1994. He was responsible, inter alia, for ensuring the security of Türeli village and its inhabitants. He stated, however, that he had never been to Türeli or Dahlezeri during his term of service at the Tepe gendarme station. He explained that at the relevant time they were unable to get to the remote villages since they did not have a vehicle at their disposal. The witness did observe that the soldiers under his command would have visited Türeli village for the purposes of carrying out investigations. The witness deposed that no military operation had been conducted on 18 May 1994 in the region, either by the soldiers under his command or by the armed forces, including the Bolu commando brigade. If any such operation were to be conducted by forces not under his command, he would have been informed twenty-four hours in advance. 90. According to the witness, there had been intense terrorist activity in the area, which forced many people to leave their villages and to move to safer places, such as Diyarbakır. He tried in vain to convince the villagers not to leave their villages. The villagers told him that they were sick of terrorists coming to their villages and forcibly taking their food provisions or abducting their sons. The witness rejected any suggestion that the authorities could have ordered the villagers to leave their villages or that they could have been responsible for the immigration from the region. 91. When questioned about the allegations that Dahlezeri hamlet had been destroyed and that the applicant's two sons had been taken away by soldiers, the witness averred that he had never received any such information during his term of service. Had he ever been informed of such an incident he would have carried out an investigation into the allegations and would have reported the situation to the district gendarmerie command to which his station was attached. No application was ever filed about missing persons either by Abdurrezak İpek or any other person. The witness further deposed that he had never been questioned by the Turkish authorities in relation to the applicant's allegations before the Court. The witness never heard of a Major Osman Duman serving in the area in question. However, he might have served in another division or at the Lice infantry battalion, which was stationed in an unused school.

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4. The applicant was born in 1919 and lives in Bydgoszcz, Poland. 5. On 19 July 1966 the applicant and his wife obtained a divorce decree. On 5 November 1975 the applicant's ex-wife filed with the Bydgoszcz District Court (Sąd Rejonowy) a petition for division of the matrimonial property. On 16 October 1978 the Bydgoszcz District Court gave a decision. Both parties appealed. On 30 May 1979 the Bydgoszcz Regional Court (Sąd Wojewódzki) quashed the first-instance decision and remitted the case. In 1982 the applicant's ex-wife donated her share in the disputed property to A.H. and E.H., who became parties to the proceedings. 6. On 2 December 1990 the applicant sent a letter to the Minister of Justice, complaining about the slow progress of the proceedings. On 15 February 1991, in reply to his complaints, the President of the Bydgoszcz Regional Court acknowledged that the proceedings were indeed lengthy. Prior to 1 May 1993, the Bydgoszcz District Court held a number of hearings and obtained several expert reports. 7. On 19 July 1993 the District Court held a hearing. On 5 January 1994 the applicant challenged the impartiality of the presiding judge. 8. On 29 May 1995 the District Court ordered that expert evidence be obtained. On 23 October 1995 the expert informed the court that he had been unable to prepare a report due to the applicant's conduct. 9. On 6 September and 23 October 1995 the trial court held inspections of the site. 10. On 2 October 1996 the Bydgoszcz District Court gave a decision. The court granted ownership of the entire property (plot of land and the house) to A.H. and E.H. The court also ordered them to pay off the applicant's share in the estate. 11. On 5 June 1997, on the applicant's appeal, the Bydgoszcz Regional Court partly amended the first-instance decision. On 19 September 1997 the applicant lodged a cassation appeal. 12. On 4 February 1998 A.H. and E.H. sold their share in the property to a certain J.S. On 28 April 1999 the Supreme Court (Sąd Najwyższy) quashed the decision of 5 June 1997 and remitted the case to the Bydgoszcz Regional Court (Sąd Okręgowy). 13. On 27 January 2000 the Bydgoszcz Regional Court gave a decision and remitted the case to the District Court. 14. On 20 December 2000 the Bydgoszcz District Court issued an interim order allowing the applicant to install central heating in his part of the house. On 25 June 2001, upon an appeal by J.S., the Bydgoszcz Regional Court quashed this decision. 15. On 21 January 2001 the District Court held a hearing. 16. The proceedings are pending before the Bydgoszcz District Court.

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8. The applicant was born in 1958 and currently resides in Heerlen. 9. On 2 November 1995 the applicant arrived in the Netherlands, where, on 3 November 1995, he applied for asylum or, alternatively, a residence permit for compelling reasons of a humanitarian nature (klemmende redenen van humanitaire aard). In support of his claim for asylum he submitted the following. 10. He belonged to the Tamil population group, was married with two children and lived in the town of Jaffna on the Jaffna peninsula. This area was controlled by the Tamil Tigers (the “LTTE”), a Tamil terrorist organisation, engaged in an armed struggle for independence. 11. The applicant owned a minibus which was his livelihood. From January 1994 the LTTE forced him to transport foodstuffs as well as its members two or three times a month. The LTTE would pay for his petrol. In March 1995 the LTTE confiscated his minibus because he had refused to transport bombs for them. They subsequently forced him to work in their kitchens and to help dig trenches. On 21 September 1995 some LTTE members came to his house and told his wife that the applicant had to report to their camp, which meant that he was expected to fight alongside them and to transport their weapons. Upon hearing this, the applicant immediately went into hiding. Since two friends of his, who had also driven his minibus, had recently been shot dead by the LTTE when they had refused to join the LTTE's ranks, the applicant decided to flee to the national capital Colombo. 12. On 1 October 1995 he went to the army camp at Vavuniya to apply for the required travel pass. He was apprehended and held until 3 October 1995 as he was suspected of being an LTTE supporter. He was taken to a mill where he was undressed and beaten with a small iron rod. This left a horizontal scar of about five centimetres in length on the heel of his right foot. He was also stabbed with a knife, leaving a number of scars on the underside of his forearms, and a cigarette was put out on his left arm, leaving a round scar. His hands were tied and he was strung up and beaten. After two days he was made to stand in a line. A man wearing a black mask walked past the people in the line, indicating the moment he recognised somebody. This man was an informant. The applicant was not recognised. He was released and issued with a travel pass on condition that he return from Colombo within one week. 13. He travelled to Colombo by train. In Colombo he stayed at the house of an acquaintance for one month without leaving the house as he feared arrest by the army. A doctor came to the house to see to his injuries. As he was not allowed to settle in Colombo, and he could not go back to Jaffna because of his problems with the LTTE, he decided to leave the country. An acquaintance of his father's arranged for his flight to Amsterdam via Bombay. He left the country using his own passport, but the “travel agent” kept his passport in Bombay. 14. After his arrival in the Netherlands on 2 November 1995, he was interviewed by an official of the Immigration and Naturalisation Service (Immigratie- en Naturalisatiedienst) on 6 December 1995. According to this official, the scars which the applicant showed him were much more than two months' old, and the round scar on the applicant's left forearm was bigger than the diameter of a cigarette. 15. On 5 January 1996 the Deputy Minister of Justice (Staatssecretaris van Justitie) rejected the applicant's requests. It was noted that it had not appeared that the Sri Lankan authorities had such grave presumptions against the applicant that he could be said to have a well-founded fear of persecution. Although he had once been detained for a short period, there had been no evidence against him of any LTTE involvement. The fact that the applicant had been able to leave his country using his own passport also did not suggest that the applicant had to fear persecution. Finally, according to a country report (ambtsbericht) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 15 December 1995, Tamils coming from the Jaffna peninsula were able to find safety in the centre, south and west of Sri Lanka. 16. The Deputy Minister further informed the applicant that he would not be allowed to remain in the Netherlands pending the consideration of any objection (bezwaar) he might wish to submit against the decision to refuse his requests. 17. The applicant filed on objection on 10 January 1996 and, on the same date, also applied for an interim measure (voorlopige voorziening) to the President of the Regional Court (arrondissementsrechtbank) of The Hague. By letter of 10 May 1996, the applicant was informed that his expulsion would in fact be suspended while his objection was being considered. The applicant withdrew his request for an interim measure. 18. The applicant's objection was rejected by the Deputy Minister of Justice on 5 November 1996. He was also informed that he would not be allowed to remain in the Netherlands pending the examination of any appeal he might lodge. On 11 December 1997 the applicant lodged an appeal with the Regional Court of The Hague and at the same time requested an interim measure from the President of that court. By final decision of 9 July 1997, the acting President of the Regional Court of The Hague rejected the applicant's appeal against the Deputy Minister's decision as well as his request for an interim measure. 19. Following this decision, an expulsion order was issued to the Aliens Police (vreemdelingendienst) in the applicant's place of residence on 16 July 1997. However, the applicant did not leave the country and neither was he forcibly expelled. 20. On 5 September 1997 he lodged a new request for a residence permit based on compelling reasons of a humanitarian nature. Finding that the applicant had not submitted any new facts or circumstances which invalidated the decision of the Regional Court of 9 July 1997, the Deputy Minister of Justice rejected this request on 24 April 1998. In his objection to this decision, the applicant argued that, according to information that had recently become available, some groups of Tamils in Colombo ran an increased risk of persecution or treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention. The applicant submitted that he belonged to one of these identified “risk categories”, given that he came from Jaffna, spoke no Sinhalese, was suspected of LTTE membership, had already been detained for more than 48 hours on the basis of that suspicion and had been seriously ill-treated on that occasion. 21. The Deputy Minister rejected the objection on 8 December 1998. Referring to domestic case-law, the Deputy Minister held that merely belonging to one of the “risk categories” was an insufficient basis on which to accept that Article 3 of the Convention might be violated if the applicant was expelled. Since it had not appeared that, in addition to belonging to one of the “risk categories”, any other special circumstances existed which could give rise to the assumption that the Sri Lankan authorities wished to apprehend the applicant, he was not eligible for residence in the Netherlands. As regards the applicant's argument that the Deputy Minister of Justice ought to have sought the advice of the Ministry's Medical Adviser to have his scars examined, it was held that such a step would only have been called for if doubts existed as to the truthfulness of the applicant's account, which was not the case. The Deputy Minister also informed the applicant that he would not be allowed to remain in the Netherlands pending the examination of any appeal he might lodge against this decision. 22. By letter of 5 January 1999, the applicant appealed to the Regional Court of The Hague against the decision of 8 December 1998. In order to prevent his expulsion, he also requested an interim measure from the President of that court. 23. In his appeal, the applicant argued that he did run an increased risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 if expelled, because he had given practical assistance to the LTTE. His chances of being apprehended were also increased, given that he had no identity card, no fixed address and no accommodation. If he was arrested and detained for a second time, he would certainly not be treated well or released after only a few days. There would, on the contrary, be a great likelihood that he would be killed. Moreover, arrested Tamils ran a real risk of being tortured if their bodies bore signs of military training or deployment, such as grazes or scars. 24. In addition, the applicant lodged a request for revision (herziening) of the Deputy Minister's decision of 8 December 1998, submitting that the fact that he bore scars increased the risk of being subjected to torture, and informing the Deputy Minister that a member of Amnesty International's Medical Examination Group was going to conduct an examination of his scars. In the applicant's submission, this development required the Deputy Minister to review the decision of 8 December 1998. 25. On 16 September 1999 the Regional Court of The Hague rejected the applicant's appeal of 5 January 1999 in a judgment delivered orally. The Regional Court found that the applicant had failed to adduce new facts or changed circumstances, and added that the matter of the applicant's scars had already been taken into account in the determination of his first requests. In view of this decision, the applicant's request for an interim measure was declared inadmissible. 26. Following the Regional Court's judgment, an expulsion order was issued to the Aliens Police on 28 October 1999. 27. By decision of 4 January 2000, the application for revision of the Deputy Minister's decision of 8 December 1998 was dismissed by that authority. 28. On 11 January 2000 the applicant was examined by a physician belonging to Amnesty International's Medical Examination Group. The applicant's lawyer had put the following questions to the physician: - could the applicant's scars be linked to the torture he had undergone? - was the applicant traumatised as a result of his experiences in Sri Lanka? 29. In his report, the physician described, inter alia, the scars he had noted on the applicant's body. There were a number of horizontal scars, three to six centimetres in length and differing in width, on the underside of the forearms (four on the left and one on the right), consistent with unsutured, open wounds, possibly caused by knives. There were also two round scars on the right forearm and one round scar on the left forearm, with a diameter of 10 millimetres, consistent with burns, possibly caused by the putting out of a cigarette. Finally, there was a round scar, sensitive to pressure, 15 millimetres in diameter, and level with the Achilles tendon of the right foot, from which ran a three-centimetre scar outwardly with clear traces of sutures. In the conclusion to his report, the physician answered the questions put by the applicant's lawyer in the affirmative.

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6. The applicant was born in 1959 and lives in Nottingham, England. 7. In 1998 the applicant's local council received complaints about the behaviour of the applicant, and that of her children, from her neighbours, the Davies'. 8. Following the institution of proceedings against the applicant by the local council for the possession of her home in July 1999 as a result of an alleged assault by her upon Mrs Davies, the applicant agreed to be bound by an undertaking, until 17 April 2000, that she would not harass or cause a nuisance to anyone in her road. 9. The Davies' made further allegations about the behaviour of the applicant and her family between 9 November 1999 and 18 April 2000, including assertions that eggs had been thrown at their property, excrement had been placed on the door handle of their front door and bleach had been poured into their letterbox. 10. On 18 April 2000 the local council attached a hidden video camera to the wall to the right of the Davies' front door, which pointed towards the front door of the applicant's home and monitored the space directly in front of her home. 11. In May 2000 the applicant first became aware of the presence, and location, of the video camera. The local council issued further proceedings against the applicant seeking possession of her home on the grounds, inter alia, that she had broken an obligation of her tenancy and/or was causing a nuisance. The applicant either denied or did not admit the incidents alleged against her. 12. On 31 May 2000 the applicant gave an undertaking to the court promising not to assault or cause a nuisance to the Davies', and neither to trespass upon their land, nor to permit her children and/or visitors to her home to do so. As a result of the applicant complying with that undertaking, the possession proceedings were adjourned generally in or after September 2000. No possession of the applicant's home ever, in fact, took place. 13. By letter of 4 September 2000 the local council confirmed to the applicant that no further covert surveillance would be undertaken on her property and that the tapes of the surveillance undertaken to date had already been destroyed and disposed of. No surveillance took place thereafter. 14. No video surveillance was ever directed at the Davies' home.

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4. The applicant was born in 1963 and lives in Bregenz. She complains about six sets of administrative criminal proceedings against her. 5. On 12 July 1994 the Bregenz District Administrative Authority (Bezirkshauptmannschaft) issued a penal order against the applicant for prostitution contrary to sections 4 and 18 of the Vorarlberg Morals Act (Sittenpolizeigesetz) and sentenced her to twenty days' imprisonment. In addition, it imposed a fine of ATS 10,000. 6. On 21 November 1994 the District Authority issued another penal order against the applicant for having committed such offences on another occasion and sentenced her to thirty days' imprisonment. In addition, it imposed a fine of ATS 20,000. 7. The applicant appealed against the decisions. Subsequently, the proceedings were joined. 8. On 4 October 1995, after having held an oral hearing, the Vorarlberg Independent Administrative Panel (Unabhängiger Verwaltungssenat) upheld both penal orders but reduced the prison sentence of the one dated 21 November 1994 to twenty days. 9. On 19 June 1996 the Constitutional Court (Verfassungsgerichtshof) refused to deal with the applicant's complaint for lack of prospects of success. Upon the applicant's request of 23 July 1996, it referred the case to the Administrative Court (Verwaltungsgerichtshof) by decision of 24 July 1996. 10. On 23 September 1996, upon the Administrative Court's request, the applicant filed supplementary submissions. Subsequently, on 31 October 1996 the Administrative Court refused the applicant's request that her complaint be given suspensive effect. 11. On 27 November 1996 the Independent Administrative Panel submitted its comments on the applicant's appeal. 12. On 3 July 2000 the Administrative Court dismissed the applicant's appeal as being unfounded. The decision was served on 19 July 2000. 13. On 27 October 1993 the Bregenz District Administrative Authority issued a penal order against the applicant for prostitution contrary to sections 4 and 18 of the Vorarlberg Morals Act and sentenced her to twenty days' imprisonment. In addition it imposed a fine of ATS 10,000. 14. On 1 February 1994 the District Authority issued another penal order against her for having committed such offences, sentencing her to twenty days' imprisonment. In addition it imposed a fine of ATS 10,000. 15. The applicant appealed against both decisions. 16. After having held an oral hearing in each case, the Vorarlberg Independent Administrative Panel, on 17 January and 21 March 1994, respectively, confirmed the decisions. 17. On 9 March and 3 August 1994, respectively, the applicant lodged complaints against both decisions with the Constitutional Court. 18. On 6 March 1995 the Constitutional Court, in joined proceedings, refused to deal with the applicant's complaint for lack of prospects of success. Upon the applicant's request of 1 June 1995, it referred the case to the Administrative Court by decision of 3 July 1995. 19. On 27 November 1995 the Administrative Court quashed both decisions and referred the matter to the Independent Administrative Panel. It found that, when fixing the sentence, the authority had failed duly to establish the aggravating circumstances it had taken into account. 20. On 30 April 1996 the Independent Administrative Panel upheld the penal orders, but reduced the prison sentences to eighteen days' each and lifted the fines. On 2 October 1996 the applicant submitted a complaint to the Constitutional Court. 21. On 9 October 1996 the Constitutional Court again refused to deal with the applicant's complaint for lack of prospects of success. Upon the applicant's request of 30 October 1996, it referred the case to the Administrative Court by decision of 5 November 1996. 22. On 19 February 1997, upon the latter's request, the applicant filed supplementary submissions. 23. On 7 April 1997 the Vorarlberg Independent Administrative Panel filed its comments. 24. On 13 November 2000 the Administrative Court dismissed the complaint as being unfounded. The decision was served on 29 November 2000. 25. On 30 October 1995 the Bregenz District Administrative Authority issued a penal order against the applicant for having breached sections 4 and 9 of the Aids Act (Aidsgesetz) and imposed a fine of ATS 10,000. 26. After having held an oral hearing, the Vorarlberg Independent Administrative Panel, on 10 September 1996, upheld the decision. On 30 October 1996 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Constitutional Court. 27. Meanwhile, on 2 September 1996 the Bregenz District Administrative Authority issued a penal order against the applicant for prostitution contrary to section 4 and 18 of the Vorarlberg Morals Act and sentenced her to eighteen days' imprisonment. 28. After having held an oral hearing, the Vorarlberg Independent Administrative Panel, on 20 January 1997, confirmed the decision. On 10 March 1997 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Constitutional Court. 29. On 27 November 1997 the Constitutional Court, having joined the two sets of proceedings, declined to deal with the applicant's case for lack of prospects of success. Upon the applicant's request of 25 February 1998, it referred the case to the Administrative Court by decision of 9 March 1998. 30. The Administrative Court dealt with each set of proceedings separately. 31. On 18 June 1998 the applicant filed supplementary submissions in respect of both cases. 32. On 5 and 19 October 1998, respectively, the Independent Administrative Panel submitted its comments. 33. On 18 December 2000 the Administrative Court, in two separate decisions, dismissed the applicant's complaints as being unfounded. The decisions were served on 24 January 2001 (as regards the proceedings under the Aids Act) and on 29 January 2001 (as regards the proceedings under the Vorarlberg Morals Act).

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8. The applicant was born in 1922 and lives in Komárno. 9. The applicant lodged a claim under the Land Ownership Act no. 229/1991 Coll. (Zákon o úprave vlastníckych vzťahov k pôde a inému poľnohospodárskemu majetku – “Act 229/91”) for the restitution of an ownership interest of 1/6 in an undivided plot of agricultural land which had belonged to her family before it was taken away during the communist regime. 10. On 15 September 1992 the applicant and the agricultural co‑operative that was using the plot concluded a restitution agreement (dohoda o vydaní) concerning the modalities of the ownership interest transfer to her. 11. On 19 October 1992 the Komárno Land Office (Okresný úrad, odbor pozemkový, poľnohospodárstva a lesného hospodárstva) approved the restitution agreement in accordance with Act 229/91. 12. On 22 November 1992 the Land Office informed the applicant that a third person (G.N.) had filed an appeal with the Ministry of Agriculture (Ministerstvo pôdohospodárstva) against the approval of 19 October 1992. G.N. was an heir of a person to whom the plot was assigned (prídelový vlastník – “the assigned owner”) by the State after it had been taken away from the applicant’s family. In her appeal, she claimed ownership of the plot. On 2 December 1992 the applicant submitted her observations in reply to the appeal. 13. On 22 December 1992 G.N. died. 14. On 21 October 1993 the Ministry annulled the approval of the Land Office of 19 October 1992. 15. On 3 November 1994 the Land Office ordered the accelerated consolidation of the plot in accordance with the Act on Land Consolidation no. 330/1991 Coll. (Zákon o pozemkových úpravách, usporiadaní pozemkového vlastníctva, pozemkových úradoch, pozemkovom fonde a o pozemkových spoločenstvách – “Act 330/91”). Pursuant to Section 15 § 2 of the Act, the accelerated land consolidation was ordered for an interim period, namely until the completion of the ongoing general land consolidation proceedings in the area concerned or, alternatively, until the co-operative was dissolved without a legal successor; whichever would occur earlier. 16. On 1 December 1995 the applicant requested that the Land Office should deal with her case expeditiously. 17. On 6 December 1995 the co‑operative rescinded the restitution agreement of 15 September 1992. 18. On 12 April 1996 the Land Office requested G.N.’s heir, P.N., to submit a decision on her estate. 19. On 27 September 1996, on a motion of the co‑operative, the Komárno District Prosecutor asked the Land Office to submit to him the case‑file concerning the applicant’s case. In his decision of 31 October 1996, the Prosecutor found that there had been undue delays in the proceedings in that the Land Office had failed to rule on the restitution agreement within the prescribed time‑limit and that since 4 November 1993 it had failed to take any procedural steps. The Prosecutor instructed the Land Office to deal with the case without undue delays. 20. In its decision of 25 November 1996 the Land Office withheld its approval of the restitution agreement of 15 September 1992. 21. On 23 December 1996 the applicant petitioned for a judicial review of this decision. On 27 December 1996 she supplemented her petition. 22. On 3 September 1997 a notary public determined G.N.’s estate. 23. On 30 November 1998 the Nitra Regional Court (Krajský súd) upheld the decision of the Land Office of 25 November 1996. As a result, under Act 229/91, it became incumbent upon the Land Office to determine ex officio the applicant’s restitution claim. 24. The applicant requested the Land Office repeatedly, inter alia by letters of 19 April, 3 May, 18 May and 11 December 1999, to determine her restitution case expeditiously. 25. On 21 February 2000 the Land Office ordered preparatory measures to be taken with a view to opening land consolidation proceedings under Act 330/91 in respect of the plot in issue. 26. On 15 August 2000 the Land Office opened the land consolidation proceedings. It noted that “heirs of the assigned owners had submitted competing ownership claims to the plot” and that the rival claims had to be determined before it could be decided whether any part of the plot was to be restored to the applicant and, if so, which part. The applicant and another party to the proceedings filed appeals with the Nitra Regional Office (Krajský úrad). 27. On 8 September 2000 the Land Office decided to stay the proceedings on the applicant’s restitution claim pending the outcome of the consolidation proceedings opened on 15 August 2000. 28. On 17 October 2000 the Land Office asked the parties to the consolidation proceedings for their observations on the appeals filed by the applicant and by the other party. 29. In its decision of 2 January 2001, the Regional Office found factual inaccuracies and inconsistencies in the reasoning of the Land Office’s decision of 15 August 2000 to open the consolidation proceedings in respect of the plot. It quashed this decision and sent the case‑file back to the Land Office for reconsideration. The decision of 8 September 2000 to stay the restitution proceedings was not affected by this decision. 30. On 13 February 2001 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Head of the Land Office (Prednosta okresného úradu) about the delays in her restitution proceedings. She demanded that the proceedings be resumed and her claim considered on the merits. On 28 February 2001 the Head of the Land Office informed the applicant that the Land Office would determine the applicant’s claim following the determination of the preliminary question in the consolidation proceedings, i.e. the competing ownership claims filed by the third parties. 31. On 13 March 2001 the applicant requested that the Land Office inform her about the state of her restitution proceedings. 32. On 19 March 2001 the Land Office informed the applicant that the restitution proceedings were still stayed pending the determination of the preliminary question that was being dealt with in the consolidation proceedings. 33. On 25 May 2001 the Land Office held a hearing on the applicant’s restitution claim. 34. On 18 September 2001 the Land Office allowed the applicant’s restitution claim. It noted that the allocation of the plot to the assigned owners had occurred prior to the formal confiscation of the ownership interest she was claiming. It concluded therefore that the allocation did not constitute an obstacle to the restitution of this share to the applicant. This decision became final on 26 October 2001. 35. The applicant’s title to the 1/6 ownership interest in the plot has not yet been recorded in the Land Register (kataster nehnuteľností). 36. To date, no new decision to open the land consolidation proceedings has been taken.

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8. The applicant was born in 1948 and lives in Pobiedziska, Poland. 9. On 11 October 1978 the applicant and the Pobiedziska Municipal Cooperative, “Samopomoc Chłopska”, entered into a contract under which the cooperative was to install central heating, electrical, water and sewage systems in the applicant’s house. Under the terms of the contract, the contractor was to complete these works by 30 May 1979, but it failed to meet that deadline. The applicant on two occasions sued the cooperative seeking payment of damages for the defects in the works carried out under the contract. The proceedings were terminated on 1 June 1993 and 5 December 1994, respectively. 10. On 4 November 1995 the applicant, for the third time, sued the cooperative in the Gniezno District Court (Sąd Rejonowy) seeking 10,000 PLN in damages. The applicant asked the court to exempt him from the court fees and grant him legal assistance. On 24 November 1995 he asked the court to order the defendant to secure the claim by an unspecified guarantee. 11. On 13 December 1995 the Gniezno District Court refused to exempt the applicant from the court fees. On 29 January 1996, on the applicant’s further appeal, the Gniezno District Court exempted him from the court fees and appointed a legal aid counsel for him. 12. On 1 April 1996 the Gniezno District Court dismissed the applicant’s motion to secure the claim, as he had failed to submit the required information (numbers of land and mortgage registers). 13. At the hearing on 18 July 1996 the court obliged the applicant’s lawyer to specify within a time-limit of 20 days the damages sought on pain of staying the proceedings. As the applicant’s lawyer failed to comply with this order, the court stayed the proceedings on 12 August 1996. The applicant appealed. On 15 November 1996 the Poznań Regional Court (Sąd Wojewódzki) quashed the decision of 12 August 1996 and resumed the proceedings. 14. Subsequently, the applicant submitted the required information. On 28 April 1997 the Gniezno District Court secured the applicant’s claim. On 22 September 1997, upon the defendant’s further appeal, the Poznań Regional Court quashed that decision and remitted the case. On 18 December 1997 the Gniezno District Court dismissed the applicant’s motion to secure the claim. 15. On 19 December 1997 the applicant increased the amount of damages claimed (to 100,000 PLN). Consequently, the Gniezno District Court no longer had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the case was referred to the Poznań Regional Court. 16. On 29 January 1998 the Minister of Justice informed the applicant that the proceedings would be supervised by the President of the Poznań Regional Court. 17. On 2 September 1998 the applicant lodged a further application for his claim to be secured. On 3 September 1998 the Poznań Regional Court dismissed his application and stayed the proceedings. The applicant appealed on 14 September 1998. On 13 November 1998 the Poznań Court of Appeal dismissed his appeal. On 29 December 1998, the applicant again asked the court to secure the claim. On 22 January 1999 the Regional Court dismissed his appeal on the ground that the applicant had not yet substantiated his claim. 18. On 5 March 1999 the trial court resumed the proceedings. Subsequently, on 2 April 1999 the applicant was exempted from court fees. On 10 May 1999 he was granted legal aid. 19. In his letter of 28 May 2003 the applicant informed the Court that the proceedings were still pending before the Poznań Regional Court. 20. On 10 September 2003 the Poznań Regional Court gave judgment. 21. On 3 December 2003 the applicant lodged an appeal against this judgment. It appears that the proceedings are pending before the Poznań Court of Appeal.

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7. The applicant was born in 1950 and lives in Split, Croatia. 8. The applicant and her husband were holders of a specially protected tenancy on a flat in Split where they lived. On 23 December 1993 they divorced and the husband left. 9. On 5 February 1994 I.Š. threw the applicant out of the flat and moved in. 10. On 9 February 1994 the applicant filed an action against I.Š. for disturbance of her possessions with the Split Municipal Court (Općinski sud u Splitu). 11. In separate proceedings before the same court, on 7 March 1994, the applicant obtained a judgment declaring her the sole holder of the specially protected tenancy on the flat. 12. In the proceedings against I.Š. on 11 November 1994 the applicant's claim was granted and the court ordered I.Š. to vacate the flat within eight days from the date when the decision became final. It was established that I.Š. had forcefully broken into the applicant's flat and had been living there without any legal ground. The decision became final on 27 February 1995. 13. Given that I.Š. did not comply with the court's order to vacate the flat, on 1 March 1995 the applicant applied for the execution of the decision to the Split Municipal Court. The execution order was issued on 8 March 1995. 14. On 10 August 1995 the Split Municipal Court invited the applicant to pay an advance for the costs of eviction. On 31 August 1995 the applicant informed the court that she had paid the costs. 15. The court ordered the eviction for 26 November 1996. However, on that date the execution officer of the court established that the family B.B. occupied the flat. 16. On 29 November 1996 the applicant again asked the court to enforce the eviction order. The court scheduled eviction for 15 October 1997. However, the eviction was adjourned because the applicant did not appear. 17. On 30 November 1998 the applicant again asked the court to enforce the eviction order. 18. On 5 February 1999 the court invited the applicant to pay an advance for the costs of eviction. 19. On 1 February 2000 the applicant bought the flat and became its owner. 20. On 2 March 2000 the applicant informed the court that she had paid the costs. 21. On 16 May 2000 the applicant asked the court to speed up the proceedings. 22. The court scheduled eviction for 23 October 2000. 23. However, on 21 September and 8 October 2000, respectively the Association of the Homeland War Invalids (Hrvatska udruga vojnih invalida domovinskog rata) and the Ministry of the Homeland War Veterans (Ministarstvo hrvatskih branitelja Domovinskog rata) asked the court to adjourn the eviction. 24. When on 23 October 2000 an eviction officer of the Split Municipal Court attempted to carry out the eviction order he found a number of war veterans obstructing his attempt. Despite the presence of the police the eviction order was not carried out. 25. On 8 May 2001 the court invited the applicant to once more pay an advance for the costs for eviction. 26. On 18 May 2001 the applicant informed the court that she had paid the costs. 27. The next attempt to carry out the eviction order was scheduled for 8 June 2001, but it failed because a physician invited to assist did not appear. 28. On 26 October 2001 the court scheduled the date for eviction for 20 November 2001. However, the parties agreed that the family B.B. vacate the premises before 20 March 2002. 29. On 21 March 2002 the family B.B. left the flat and the applicant moved in.

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8. The applicant was born in 1969 and lives in Krostitz, Germany. 9. He is the father of the child Christofer, born out of wedlock on 25 August 1999 in Leipzig. 10. The applicant met the child's mother, (Ms M.) in 1997. In 1998, they planned to get married, but Ms M. cancelled the wedding. Nevertheless, their relationship continued until the beginning of 1999. The applicant found out about Ms M.'s pregnancy in May 1999. According to the applicant, he and Ms M. agreed at that time that the applicant would take care of the child. Subsequently, the applicant inquired after Ms M. and her unborn child on a weekly basis, but was not able to contact her as from July 1999. 11. Directly after birth on 25 August 1999, Ms M. gave Christofer for adoption. The Wittenberg Youth Office (Jugendamt), as Christofer's curator (Amtsvormund), immediately informed Mr and Ms B., who were registered as prospective adoptive parents and who had previously adopted a child, that Christofer had been given for adoption. They fetched Christofer from hospital four days later and took him home. 12. In October 1999 the applicant heard about Christofer's birth and Ms M.'s giving the child for adoption. In November 1999, he went to the Leipzig Youth Office with the intention of adopting Christofer himself. Since Ms M. had not given any details regarding the paternity, the Youth Office refused to give the applicant any information regarding Christofer. 13. On 30 November 1999 Ms M. accompanied the applicant to the Youth Office and confirmed that he was Christofer's father, whereupon the applicant obtained his son's birth certificate. 14. On 12 January 2000 following an official acknowledgement of paternity and a request for custody rights on 10 January 2000, the applicant initiated paternity proceedings before the Wittenberg District Court. 15. On 20 June 2000 after the applicant had acknowledged paternity a second time on 2 May 2000 and submitted to a medical blood analysis, the Wittenberg District Court confirmed that he was Christofer's father. 16. Since December 1999 the applicant has been married under Islamic law to Ms C, a German national. He lives with his wife and one of her two children. 17. On 10 January 2000 the applicant requested the Wittenberg District Court to transfer custody of Christofer to him. 18. On 30 August 2000 the Wittenberg District Court appointed Ms F. as curator ad litem (Verfahrenspfleger) to represent Christofer's interests in the custody proceedings. 19. During a hearing held on 25 September 2000 the District Court decided that a meeting between the applicant and Ms C. and Mr and Ms B. should be arranged and that first contacts between the applicant and Christofer should be planned and implemented. On 13 October 2000 the applicant and Ms C. met Mr and Ms B. Up to December, four meetings took place between the applicant and his son in the presence of Christofer's foster parents. Since December 2000 no more meetings have taken place since Christofer was ill and his foster parents considered such meetings to be too much of a burden for a young child. 20. On 11 January 2001 the applicant lodged an application with the Wittenberg District Court in order to obtain access to his son. Ms F. was also appointed curator ad litem for the purposes of the access proceedings. 21. On 8 February 2001 the Wittenberg District Court, by way of an interim measure, ordered that the applicant should have access to Christofer on six consecutive Saturdays for first one, later two, then three, and then eight hours. 22. On 16 February 2001, following the Youth Office's appeal, the Naumburg Court of Appeal suspended the execution of the District Court's interim decision pending proceedings before it. The applicant was permitted to see Christofer once a month for two hours in the presence of Mr and Ms B. or a third person. 23. On 9 March 2001 the Wittenberg District Court decided to transfer the sole custody of Christofer to the applicant pursuant to section 1672 (1) of the Civil Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch). Based on Ms F.'s observations, on written submissions by and interviews with the parties as well as on a psychological report submitted by a certified pedagogue (pedagogic psychology) of the Sachsen-Anhalt Regional Youth Office (Landesjugendamt) dated 30 January 2001, the District Court was convinced that the applicant was willing and able to give Christofer a home and family and that granting the applicant sole custody was in the child's best interest. The District Court recalled that during the meetings between the applicant and Christofer, the child had shown no aversion towards the applicant and had not suffered any harm. Contacts between the applicant and Christofer in general therefore did not pose a threat to the child's well‑being. The District Court stated that such contacts could already have taken place much earlier if the competent authorities had not obstinately pursued the adoption proceedings, thereby preventing any contact between father and child. The District Court found that, should Christofer stay with his foster parents and later find out about his background, he risked being subjected to an identity conflict. Such a conflict would pose a greater threat to the child's well-being than separating him from his foster family after what might eventually amount to two years, in particular with regard to Christofer's stable state of mind. While noting that this decision on custody would not have any instant practical effects, in particular not on the rights of the foster parents, the District Court found it important to adapt Christofer quickly to the new situation. It considered it imperative that the meetings and contacts that had begun to take place in September 2000 should continue, in order to prevent a change of residence from becoming a sudden, incisive break in Christofer's life. It also found that if the child should move in with his father, he should continue to pay frequent visits to his foster family. In similar cases, such visits had led to positive results. The District Court furthermore mentioned that the Youth Office was represented by the same lawyer who represented Christofer's foster parents in parallel proceedings. 24. On 10 April 2001 the Naumburg Court of Appeal, upon the Youth Office's appeal and a second appeal lodged by Mr and Ms B., revoked the interim decision on access of 8 February 2001. It found that following the Wittenberg District Court's decision granting the applicant custody of Christofer, which included unlimited access, the object of the dispute had disappeared. 25. On 27 April 2001 the Naumburg Court of Appeal, upon the Youth Office's appeal against the District Court's custody decision, decided to suspend the execution of the custody decision until it had decided on the appeal. It also discharged Ms F., Christofer's curator ad litem, finding that she had exceeded her authority and was no longer impartial. Ms E., a social worker, was appointed new curator ad litem. 26. On 19 June 2001 the Wittenberg District Court, by way of an interim measure, granted the applicant access to his son on three days for two hours respectively and starting the end of June[1] 2001, on every Saturday for eight hours. It ordered Mr and Ms B. to co-operate and obliged them to find substitute dates for any cancelled meeting. As in the custody proceedings, Ms F. was discharged and Ms E. was appointed as new curator ad litem. 27. On 20 June1 2001 the Naumburg Court of Appeal revoked the District Court's decision of 9 March 2001 and rejected the applicant's request for custody of Christofer. It also suspended the applicant's access to his son until 30 June 2002. In its decision, the Court of Appeal found that transferring custody to him was not only not in the child's best interest, but even detrimental to his well-being. In this respect it had regard to the psychological report of the Sachsen-Anhalt Regional Youth Office, a medical report of a paediatrician dated 19 January 2001 and a report of Ms E. dated 6 June 2001 that it had previously ordered to examine the child's well-being and the housing facilities of both the applicant and the foster parents. It also relied on its own experience in such matters and on its knowledge of the facts. The Court of Appeal considered that the applicant was in a position to care for Christofer. It noted that he was married to Ms C., a German national, who had already raised two children herself and who would support him. The applicant could also offer other objective assets for raising a child, i.e. a house with a separate room for Christofer. The Court of Appeal was also convinced that although he had never gone to school himself nor completed any higher education, the applicant was, with the assistance of Ms C., able to further Christofer's education. However, separating the child from his foster family was not in Christofer's best interest, as a deep social and emotional bond had evolved between the child and his foster family. Christofer had lived with Mr and Ms B. for one year and ten months which, in the court's view, constituted an “infinite amount of time” (“einen unendlichen Zeitraum”) for a child of Christofer's age. In this situation, a separation from Mr and Ms B. would lead to severe and irreparable psychological damage for the child, especially as he had already experienced the separation from his natural mother, which in itself had been a traumatic event. It would be impossible to convey the necessity of a separation to such a young child, especially as the applicant was a stranger to Christofer. The Court of Appeal regarded the above reports as sufficient to assess the case before it and therefore found that there was no need for further expert opinions, as there was no reason to expect that they would come to different conclusions in favour of the applicant. It found that any remaining doubts as to this point were to the applicant's detriment (“zu Lasten des Kindesvaters”). Moreover, the Court of Appeal, based on the above-mentioned psychological report and the report of the curator, found that the suspension of access was in Christofer's best interest. Having regard to the unrest and insecurity occasioned by the unresolved legal dispute, any contact with his natural father would be a physical and psychological strain for the child. Suspending access for a certain time would allow Christofer to regain the necessary inner repose and emotional balance. 28. On 31 July 2001 the Federal Constitutional Court, sitting as a panel of three judges, refused to entertain the applicant's constitutional complaint. 29. Since then, the applicant has initiated new proceedings before the District Court requesting custody and access. On seven different occasions, the applicant attempted to contact Christofer, but these attempts remained unsuccessful due to the refusal to cooperate or absence of Mr and Ms B. Two hearings scheduled for February and July 2003 were cancelled. On 22 July 2003, the District Court appointed Ms E. as curator ad litem for both custody and access proceedings. On 28 October 2003 the Naumburg Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant's appeal. On 30 September 2003 it rejected the applicant's request for an interim decision regarding the right to access due to the tense relationship between the applicant and the foster parents and the unclear legal situation. On 27 November 2003 a first hearing took place before the District Court. 30. On 19 January 2001 the Wittenberg District Court received Mr and Ms B.'s request for permission to adopt Christofer. The Wittenberg Youth Office, acting as Christofers legal representative, had previously given its consent to the adoption. On 28 December 2001, following the applicant's refusal to consent to the adoption of Christofer, the District Court decided to replace his missing consent by court order. On 30 October 2002 the Dessau Regional Court dismissed the applicant's request to stay the adoption proceedings pending the outcome of the custody and access proceedings. On 24 July 2003 the Naumburg Court of Appeal granted the applicant's appeal and revoked the Regional Court's decision. Although the Court of Appeal refused to suspend the adoption proceedings pending the proceedings before this Court, it noted that the competent domestic courts were bound to take into account a possible judgment of this Court.

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4. The applicants were born respectively in 1949, 1934, 1953 and live in Altopascio (Lucca), Lastra a Signa and Florence. 5. They are the owners of four flats in Florence. 6. On 10 January 2001, the whole property was transferred to the first applicant, Mr Enrico Fossi. 1) Proceedings against G.I. 7. In a registered letter of 29 April 1987, the applicants informed the tenant that they intended to terminate the lease on expiry of the term on 31 December 1987 and asked her to vacate the premises by that date. 8. In a writ served on the tenant on 11 June 1987, the applicants reiterated their intention to terminate the lease and summoned the tenant to appear before the Florence Magistrate. 9. By a decision of 14 July 1987, which was made enforceable on 4 January 1990, the Florence Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 30 November 1990. 10. On 19 October 1993, the applicants served notice on the tenant requiring her to vacate the premises. 11. On 11 November 1993, they informed the tenant that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 9 December 1993. 12. Between 9 December 1993 and 16 November 1998, the bailiff made twelve attempts to recover possession. Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as the applicants were not entitled to police assistance in enforcing the order for possession. 13. At the end of 1998, the applicants recovered possession of the flat. 2) Proceedings against G.C. 14. In a registered letter of 29 April 1987, the applicants informed the tenant that they intended to terminate the lease on expiry of the term on 31 December 1987 and asked him to vacate the premises by that date. 15. In a writ served on the tenant on 11 June 1987, the applicants reiterated their intention to terminate the lease and summoned the tenant to appear before the Florence Magistrate. 16. By a decision of 14 July 1987, which was made enforceable on 31 July 1991, the Florence Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 31 May 1992. 17. On 19 October 1993, the applicants served notice on the tenant requiring him to vacate the premises. 18. On 11 November 1993, they informed the tenant that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 9 December 1993. 19. Between 9 December 1993 and 17 March 1999, the bailiff made thirteen attempts to recover possession. Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as the applicants were not entitled to police assistance in enforcing the order for possession. 20. On 1 August 2000, the applicants entered into a new lease with the tenant's wife. 21. On an unspecified date at the end of 2001, Mr Enrico Fossi recovered possession of the flat. 3) Proceedings against T.C. 22. In a registered letter of 29 April 1987, the applicants informed the tenant that they intended to terminate the lease on expiry of the term on 31 December 1987 and asked her to vacate the premises by that date. 23. In a writ served on the tenant on 11 June 1987, the applicants reiterated their intention to terminate the lease and summoned the tenant to appear before the Florence Magistrate. 24. By a decision of 14 July 1987, which was made enforceable on 31 July 1991, the Florence Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 31 May 1992. 25. On 19 October 1993, the applicants served notice on the tenant requiring her to vacate the premises. 26. On 11 November 1993, they informed the tenant that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 9 December 1993. 27. Between 9 December 1993 and 17 March 1999, the bailiff made thirteen attempts to recover possession. Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as the applicants were not entitled to police assistance in enforcing the order for possession. 28. On 13 July 2003, Mr Enrico Fossi recovered possession of the flat. 4) Proceedings against G.S. 29. In a registered letter of 29 April 1987, the applicants informed the tenant that they intended to terminate the lease on expiry of the term on 31 December 1987 and asked him to vacate the premises by that date. 30. In a writ served on the tenant on 11 June 1987, the applicants reiterated their intention to terminate the lease and summoned the tenant to appear before the Florence Magistrate. 31. By a decision of 14 July 1987, which was made enforceable on 31 July 1991, the Florence Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 31 May 1992. 32. On 19 October 1993, the applicants served notice on the tenant requiring him to vacate the premises. 33. On 11 November 1993, they informed the tenant that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 9 December 1993. 34. Between 9 December 1993 and 17 March 1999, the bailiff made thirteen attempts to recover possession. Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as the applicants were not entitled to police assistance in enforcing the order for possession. 35. On an unspecified date of 1999, the applicants recovered possession of the flat.

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7. The applicant was born in 1942 and lives in Suhopolje, Croatia. 8. On 1 July 1993 the applicant filed a civil action before the Virovitica Municipal Court (Opcinski sud u Virovitici) against the insurance company C. seeking compensation for injuries that he had sustained in a road accident. He claimed both pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage and asked for the compensation to include payment of a monthly sum. 9. Prior to 5 November 1997 when the Convention entered into force in respect of Croatia the Court of first instance held a number of hearings, ordered a medical report and on 22 February 1994 gave a partial judgment granting most of the applicant's claim for non-pecuniary damage. 10. The applicant's appeal was partially granted by the Bjelovar County Court (Zupanijski sud u Bjelovaru) which revised the first instance judgment on 5 May 1994. 11. The applicant then filed a request for revision and on 21 November 1996 the Supreme Court (Vrhovni sud Republike Hrvatske) increased the amount of compensation for non-pecuniary damage. 12. On 21 April 1998 the Virovitica Municipal Court held a hearing, thus continuing the proceedings concerning the applicant's claim for a monthly sum. The applicant quantified his claim, seeking an amount of 450,00 Croatian Kunas (HRK) monthly from 10 August 1992 to 30 September 1993; HRK 600,00 from 1 October 1993 to 31 December 1994; HRK 800,00 from 1 January 1995 to 31 December 1995; HRK 900,00 from 1 January 1996 to 28 February 1997 and HRK 825,00 from 1 March 1997 onwards. 13. At the hearing on 11 November 1998 the court heard the applicant so as to establish his income for the relevant periods, including the unemployment and sick leave benefits and his income during temporary employment. The Court asked one of the applicant's former employers and the Croatian Pension and Invalidity Fund for documentation concerning the applicant's income for January and March 1997. 14. At the hearing on 21 April 1999 it was established that the court had not received the requested documentation. 15. On 30 April 1999 the applicant's counsel submitted the requested documentation. 16. On 26 May 1999 the case was transferred to another judge because the previous judge had been temporarily transferred to another court. 17. At the hearing on 15 June 1999 the court again heard the applicant and partially granted the applicant's claim for a monthly sum. 18. The defendant appealed against the judgment and on 30 September 1999 the Bjelovar County Court quashed the judgment and remitted the case for re-trial. It instructed the Virovitica Municipal Court to establish the exact amount of the monthly payments because it was not clear what income the applicant had received from different sources in the relevant periods. 19. At the hearing on 7 December 1999 the Virovitica Municipal Court asked the Employment Board (Hrvatski zavod za zaposljavanje) for documentation concerning the applicant's income during various periods. 20. The case was then transferred back to the previous judge who had returned to the Virovitica Municipal Court. 21. On an unspecified date the Employment Board submitted the requested documentation. 22. On 2 March 2000 the court asked the Pension Fund (Zavod za mirovinsko osiguranje) for documentation concerning the applicant's invalidity pension. It also asked the County Statistics Office (Zupanijski ured za statistiku) for the amount of an average salary in Croatia. 23. The relevant documentation was submitted on 8 and 13 March 2000 respectively. 24. On 19 April 2000 the applicant again specified his claim. 25. At the hearing on 23 May 2000 the court concluded the proceedings. 26. However, on 21 June 2000 the court re-opened the proceedings and ordered that an expertise be carried out so as to establish the applicant's possible income as a temporary seasonal worker. 27. At the next hearing on 7 September 2000 the court ordered the applicant to pay an advance for the cost of the expertise. 28. On 21 September 2000 the applicant paid the advance. 29. On 10 October 2000 the court appointed an expert. 30. On 3 November 2000 the appointed expert submitted his report. 31. In January 2001 the case was transferred to another judge because the previous judge was again transferred to another court. 32. On 2 February 2001 the applicant's counsel asked the court to speed up the proceedings. 33. At the hearing on 29 March 2001 the court heard the expert and asked the P.S. firm to inform it whether they had employed unqualified workers after 10 August 1992 and what was their salary. 34. On 11 April and 2 May 2001 the requested information was submitted. 35. The court then asked the Pension Fund for documentation concerning all payments to the applicant from that Fund. 36. On 11 June 2001 the requested documentation was submitted. 37. At the hearing on 11 September 2001 the court again heard the applicant and concluded the proceedings. 38. On 2 October 2001 the court gave judgment partially awarding the applicant's claim. It found that the applicant had suffered grave bodily injuries which resulted in permanent invalidity in a degree of 50 %. 39. The defendant appealed against the judgment. 40. On 1 February 2002 the Bjelovar County Court upheld the judgment and thus the proceedings ended.

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4. The applicant was born in 1944 and lives in Linz. 5. On 10 April 1986 the Linz Regional Court instituted preliminary investigations on the suspicion of murder against the applicant and remanded him in custody. On 31 March 1987 a Court of Assizes (Geschworenengericht) at the Linz Regional Court (Landesgericht) convicted the applicant of murder and sentenced him to eighteen years' imprisonment. On 15 September 1987 the Supreme Court (Oberster Gerichtshof) dismissed the applicant's plea of nullity and appeal against sentence. 6. On 6 September 1990 the applicant requested the re-opening of the criminal proceedings against him. On an unspecified date the Linz Regional Court dismissed this request. On 15 June 1992 the Linz Court of Appeal (Oberlandesgericht) granted the applicant's appeal and reopened the criminal proceedings against him. On 23 June 1992 the applicant was released. New preliminary investigations were instituted against him. 7. On 10 May 1993[1] the applicant instituted official liability proceedings (Amtshaftung) against the Republic of Austria. He claimed compensation for damages caused by his conviction, which had been annulled, and his detention which lasted approximately six years and two months. He further filed a request for legal aid. 8. On 6 June 1993 the case was transferred to the Steyr Regional Court. The Republic of Austria subsequently filed an appeal against the decision ordering the delegation. On 12 July 1993 the Republic of Austria withdrew their appeal. 9. On 19 August 1993 the Republic of Austria filed a statement of defence. 10. On 6 September 1993 the Presiding Judge (Vorsitzender) of the Steyr Regional Court dismissed the applicant's request for legal aid. 11. Upon the applicant's appeal, the Linz Court of Appeal quashed this decision. 12. On 12 October 1993 the Steyr Regional Court granted the applicant's request for legal aid. 13. In the meantime, on 27 September 1993, the Regional Court had rejected submissions filed by the applicant. The applicant's appeal was to no avail. 14. A hearing scheduled for 13 December 1993 had to be cancelled due to illness of the Presiding Judge. 15. On 15 March 1994 the Steyr Regional Court held a hearing and suspended the official liability proceedings, as the criminal proceedings against the applicant were still pending. The applicant appealed against this decision. On 10 August 1994 the Court of Appeal dismissed this appeal. 16. On 29 August 1996 the Assize Court acquitted the applicant of the charge of murder, but dismissed his application for compensation for detention (Haftentschädigung) under the Criminal Proceedings Compensation Act (Strafrechtliches Entschädigungsgesetz). 17. On 6 November 1996 the Court of Appeal allowed the applicant's appeal and stated that the applicant was entitled to a compensation under Section 2 § 1(b) and 1(c) of the Criminal Proceedings Compensation Act. 18. On 4 September 1996 the Steyr Regional Court decided to continue the official liability proceedings. 19. In the meantime, on 11 March 1996[2] the applicant instituted further official liability proceedings. On 28 June 1996 the Linz Court of Appeal transferred the case to the Steyr Regional Court. On 3 October 1996 the Supreme Court dismissed the Republic of Austria's appeal. 20. On 7 December 1996 the Steyr Regional Court decided to join the official liability proceedings. 21. On 11 March 1997 the Steyr Regional Court found that the competent presiding judge was biased and allocated the case to another judge. 22. On 25 June, 8 October 1997 and 15 October 1998 the Steyr Regional Civil Court held hearings. At the hearing of 25 June 1997 the applicant submitted that his claim was also based on the Criminal Proceedings Compensation Act. 23. On 14 September 1998 the applicant extended his claim. 24. On 11 March 1999 the Steyr Regional Court partly allowed the applicant's claim and granted him compensation of ATS 42,912. The applicant and the Republic of Austria appealed against this decision. 25. On 9 July 1999 the Supreme Court delegated the case to the Vienna Court of Appeal. 26. On 18 October 1999 the Vienna Court of Appeal allowed the applicant's appeal for procedural deficiencies and remitted the case to the court of first instance. 27. On 18 November 1999 the Supreme Court transferred the case to the Vienna Regional Court. 28. On 28 February 2000 the applicant requested the Supreme Court to transfer the case back to the Steyr Regional Court. On 10 March 2000 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant's request. 29. On 24 May 2000 the Vienna Regional Court held a hearing and decided to appoint an expert in order to assess the applicant's loss of earnings. It further ordered the applicant to submit the relevant documents concerning his loss of earnings. The applicant submitted the documents on 15 June 2000. 30. On 1 October 2000 the Vienna Regional Court appointed an expert to assess the applicant's loss of earnings and ordered her to submit the expert opinion within three months. 31. On 22 February 2001 the expert requested the Regional Court for an extension of the time-limit. The Regional Court granted the request on the same day. 32. On 25 May 2001 the applicant filed a request under Section 91 of the Court Act (Gerichtsorganisationsgesetz) for a time-limit to be fixed for the delivery of the expert opinion and a hearing to be held. 33. On 29 May 2001 the expert submitted her opinion. 34. On 25 June 2001 the Vienna Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant's request under Section 91 of the Court Act. 35. On 11 December 2001 the Regional Court held a hearing. Upon the applicant's request it ordered the expert to supplement the expert opinion within three months. 36. On 20 March 2002 the applicant filed again a request under Section 91 of the Court Act for a time-limit to be fixed for the delivery of the expert opinion. 37. On 29 March and on 4 April 2002 the Regional Court requested the expert to submit her opinion. On 10 April 2002 the expert filed her opinion. 38. On 5 June 2002 the Vienna Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant's application under Section 91 of the Court Act. 39. Upon the applicant's request the Regional Court, on 10 July 2002, appointed another expert to assess the applicant's loss of earnings within three months. On 10 December 2002 the new expert submitted her opinion. 40. On 10 March 2003 the Regional Court held a hearing. 41. On 29 July 2003 the Regional Court gave a partial decision (Teilurteil) and granted the applicant compensation in the amount of approximately 236 000 € as well as a monthly annuity. On an unspecified date it decided upon the applicant's further claims. 42. Appeal proceedings before the Vienna Court of Appeal are still pending.

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7. The applicant was born in 1965 and lives in Zagreb. 8. The applicant lived with her parents in a flat in Zagreb. Her father had a protected tenancy of the flat. The flat was owned by the Ministry of Defence. In 1991 the parents left Croatia and the applicant stayed in the flat with her husband and children. 9. On 25 September 1995 S.Ž. broke into and occupied the flat. 10. On 4 October 1995 the applicant filed an action in the Zagreb Municipal Court (Općinski sud u Zagrebu) against S.Ž. for disturbance of her possession of the flat. 11. On 11 October 1997 the Zagreb Municipal Court allowed the applicant's claim and ordered S.Ž. to vacate the flat finding that he was living there without any legal ground. 12. Upon S.Ž.'s appeal the Zagreb County Court (Županijski sud u Zagrebu) upheld the first instance decision on 26 January 1999. 13. On 6 April 1999 the applicant requested the Zagreb Municipal Court to issue an eviction order. 14. On 18 May 1999 the court requested the applicant to submit the decision on which she based her request together with a stamped endorsement certifying final adjudication (hereinafter “the endorsement”). 15. On 21 June 1999 the applicant's counsel informed the court that the presiding judge in the civil proceedings refused to endorse the decision and that he had asked the Zagreb Municipal Court's Enforcement Department to request the civil case-file from the Civil Department of the same court. 16. On 2 November 1999 the applicant's counsel asked the court to speed up the proceedings. 17. On 3 February 2000 the court issued the eviction order. 18. On 16 February 2000 the defendant filed an appeal against the eviction order with a request that the order should not be executed. 19. On 17 February 2000 the Ministry of Defence (Ministrastvo obrane Republike Hrvatske), as the third party in the proceedings, also appealed against the eviction order. 20. On 2 March 2000 the court invited the applicant's counsel to reply to the above appeals. 21. On 13 March 2000 the Ministry of the Homeland War Veterans (Ministarstvo hrvatskih branitelja Domovinskog rata) asked the court to postpone the eviction of the defendant until he had found alternative accommodation. 22. On 20 March 2000 the applicant's counsel filed his reply to the defendant's appeal. 23. On 19 May 2000 the court invited the applicant's counsel to reply to the third party's appeal. The court renewed its request on 28 June 2000. 24. On 29 June 2000 the applicant's counsel submitted a reply. 25. On 3 July 2000 the court rejected the request to postpone the eviction. 26. On 4 July 2000 the court instructed the third party to institute separate proceedings to have the eviction order cancelled. 27. On 18 July 2000 the applicant was granted a protected tenancy on the flat at issue by the Zagreb City Administration, Trnje Office (Gradska uprava Zagreb, Područni ured Trnje). 28. On 27 September 2000 the Ministry of Defence again asked the court to postpone the eviction because it had instituted proceedings for the cancellation of the eviction order. 29. On 28 September 2000 the Ministry of the Homeland War Veterans asked the court to postpone the eviction. 30. On 3 October 2000 S.Ž. asked the court to postpone the eviction alleging that both he and his wife were in bad health. 31. On 6 October 2000, when the execution officer of the court attempted to carry out the eviction order, S.Ž. asked that the eviction be postponed because of both his and his wife's bad health and as he was to be shortly provided with another flat. The applicant's counsel agreed to the postponement of the eviction until the end of 2000. 32. On 15 January 2001 the applicant's counsel asked the court to continue the enforcement proceedings. 33. On 18 January 2001 the court invited the applicant to pay an advance on the costs of the eviction. On 13 February 2001 the applicant's counsel informed the court that she had paid the costs. 34. On 25 May 2001 the applicant's counsel asked the court to speed up the proceedings. 35. On 13 November 2001 the Ministry of the Homeland War Veterans asked the court to postpone the eviction. 36. According to the Government, when the execution officer of the court attempted to carry out the eviction order on 14 November 2001, S.Ž. asked that the eviction be postponed until 1 February 2002 since he was supposed to be given another flat on that date. The applicant's counsel, who was also present, agreed to that request. 37. According to the applicant the eviction order was not carried out because S.Ž. and a number of war veterans who were in the flat at the time obstructed the eviction. 38. On 1 February 2002, when the execution officer of the court attempted to carry out the eviction order, S.Ž. again asked that the eviction be postponed until 15 April 2002 since he would be moving into another flat sometime before that date. The applicant's counsel, who was also present, agreed to that request. 39. On 18 March 2002 S.Ž. submitted to the court a written request for the postponement of the eviction. On 25 March 2002 the court asked the applicant to reply to that request. On 5 April 2002 the applicant's counsel opposed the request. 40. On 25 April 2002 the execution officer of the court attempted to carry out the eviction order. The Government submit that it was not carried out because neither the applicant nor her counsel were present. The applicant submits that the eviction order was not executed because the assistance of the police had not been ensured and because of the presence in the flat of a number of war veterans who had obstructed the eviction. 41. On 23 July 2002 the court scheduled the eviction for 17 October 2002. 42. On 10 September 2002 the applicant asked the court to ensure the availability of at least two execution officers and to block the passage to the flat in order to prevent persons from obstructing the eviction. 43. The Government submit that the eviction scheduled for 17 October 2002 was not carried out because the applicant and her representative were not present. 44. The applicant submits that she and her representative were not present because the court did not comply with her request of 10 September 2002. 45. The eviction scheduled for 25 February 2003 was not carried out. 46. The eviction was carried out on 21 March 2003.

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8. The applicant was born in 1948 and lives in Ankara. 9. The applicant, a journalist, published an article entitled “State of Emergency and Provide Comfort Forces” (“OHAL ve Çekiç Güç”) in the 30 June 1995 issue of “Evrensel” (“Universal”), a daily newspaper published in Turkey. 10. On 30 June 1995, at the request of the public prosecutor, a single judge of the Istanbul State Security Court made an interim order for the seizure of copies of the issue of Evrensel newspaper published on 30 June 1995. 11. On 3 July 1995 the public prosecutor attached to the Istanbul State Security Court charged the applicant and the editor-in-chief of the newspaper with incitement to hatred and hostility by making distinctions on the basis of race and region under Article 312 §§ 2 and 3 of the Criminal Code. 12. On 23 September 1995 the applicant was released from prison after having served his sentence of one year and eight months’ imprisonment, stemming from another conviction by the Ankara State Security Court in connection with an earlier charge of incitement to hatred. 13. On 17 November 1995 the Ankara State Security Court commuted the applicant’s prison sentence to a fine in accordance with Law no. 4126, which came into force on 27 October 1995. The sentence was subsequently suspended. 14. On 15 May 1996 the Istanbul State Security Court, composed of three judges including a military judge, found the applicant guilty as charged. The court sentenced the applicant to one year and eight months’ imprisonment and a fine of 500,000 Turkish liras. The applicant was sentenced in absentia. 15. On 18 November 1996 the Court of Cassation quashed the judgment of the Istanbul State Security Court stating that the lower court should not have convicted the applicant without hearing his defence. 16. The case was remitted to the Istanbul State Security Court. 17. On 29 December 1997 the Istanbul State Security Court convicted the applicant once again under Article 312 §§ 2 and 3 of the Criminal Code. It ruled that the impugned article, taken as a whole, amounted to incitement to hatred and hostility on the basis of distinctions between races and regions. The court sentenced the applicant under Article 312 §§ 2 and 3 of Criminal Code to one year and eight months’ imprisonment and a fine of 500,000 Turkish liras. 18. On 12 January 1998 the applicant appealed to the Court of Cassation. 19. On 16 March 1998 the Court of Cassation upheld the Istanbul State Security Court’s judgment of 29 December 1997. 20. On 17 August 1998 the applicant lodged a petition with the Istanbul State Security Court. He requested that the period that he had been imprisoned due to his conviction by the Ankara State Security Court be deducted from the prison sentence ordered by the Istanbul State Security Court. 21. On 11 September 1998 the Istanbul State Security Court accepted the applicant’s request and, therefore, the applicant was not imprisoned.

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7. The applicant, Mária Jablonská, is a Slovak national of Polish origin. She was born in 1921 in Warsaw and lives in Senec, Slovakia. 8. Before the Second World War the applicant’s parents had title to a house in Warsaw. By virtue of an edict of 26 October 1945, all land in Warsaw was nationalised and they were allocated a flat in Warsaw. Later, they requested the administrative authorities to grant them a right of perpetual lease (prawo wieczystej dzierżawy) of their house. On 10 July 1951 the Warsaw National Council (Rada Narodowa) refused their request. After the death of the applicant’s parents, she, being the sole heir to the property, sought restitution of, or compensation for, loss of property. 9. By a notarial deed of 4 December 1989 the Warsaw-Mokotów District Office (Urząd Dzielnicowy) granted a married couple, Mr S. and Mrs G.-S. the so-called “right of perpetual use” (prawo użytkowania wieczystego) of the property that had once belonged to the applicant’s parents. Mr S. and Mrs G.-S. claimed to have been legal successors of the applicant’s parents under a contract transferring title to the estate, a contract which had been allegedly concluded in 1967. 10. On 17 February 1992 the Warsaw Regional Prosecutor (Prokurator Wojewódzki) filed an action with the Warsaw Regional Court (Sąd Wojewódzki) against Mr S. and Mrs G.-S. and the Warsaw-Mokotów District Office, seeking to have the notarial deed of 4 December 1989 declared null and void. 11. By a notarial deed of 30 March 1992 Mr S. and Mrs G.-S. sold the property to a certain Ms J.P. 12. On 3 April 1992 the applicant filed an action with the Warsaw Regional Court against Mr S. and Mrs G.-S., seeking the annulment of the notarial deed of 4 December 1989. 13. On 23 June 1992 the court ordered that the action brought by the Regional Prosecutor and the one brought by the applicant be joined. On 7 May 1997 the proceedings were terminated by the judgment of the Warsaw Court of Appeal declaring the notarial deed of 4 December 1989 null and void. 14. On 5 November 1992 the applicant sued Ms J.P., Mr S. and Mrs G.‑S. before the Warsaw Regional Court. She asked that the notarial deed of 30 March 1992 concluded between Ms J.P. and two other defendants be declared null and void (see paragraph 11 above). 15. On 13 November 1992 the court exempted the applicant from court fees. 16. On 18 November 1992 the court secured the applicant’s claim and listed the first hearing for 18 January 1993. 17. On 13 May 1993 the Regional Court stayed the proceedings under Article 177 § 1 (1) of the Code of Civil Procedure. It considered that the determination of the case depended on the outcome of the proceedings brought against Mr S. and Mrs G.-S. (see paragraphs 10-13 above and paragraph 27 below). 18. On 19 September 1997 the applicant asked the trial court to resume the proceedings. On the same day she complained to the Minister of Justice about their excessive length. 19. The proceedings were resumed on 30 September 1997. A hearing listed for 5 February 1998 was, however, adjourned, as the defendants were not present. The court ordered them to present a justification for their absence. A further hearing, which was to be held on 2 June 1998, was adjourned at the request of the applicant’s lawyer. On the same day the court asked the Warsaw District Court to supply a file of a criminal case pending before that court and ordered the defendants to produce further documentary evidence. 20. On 30 July 1998 the applicant’s counsel asked the court not to fix any hearings between 3 and 12 August 1998 and between 7 and 19 September 1998 because she would be on holiday on those dates. 21. On 25 November 1998 the court asked the Warsaw District Court to supply an extract from the mortgage register kept for the property in question. 22. Two further hearings listed, respectively, for 23 June 1999 and 27 March 2000 were adjourned; the first due to the defendants’ absence, the second one at the defendants’ request. 23. On 10 April 2000 the applicant again complained to the Minister of Justice about the delay in the proceedings. On 15 June 2000 the Minister acknowledged that that the proceedings were indeed lengthy and apologised to the applicant. He also stated that all the measures so far taken to counteract the unreasonable delay in the proceedings were ineffective and instructed the President of the Warsaw Court of Appeal to supervise the conduct of the trial. 24. On 12 July 2000 the Warsaw Regional Court held a hearing and heard evidence from the defendants. On 26 July 2000 it gave judgment declaring the contested notarial deed null and void. The defendants appealed. Subsequently, they asked the court to exempt them from court fees. 25. On 10 July 2001 the Warsaw Court of Appeal held a hearing. On 24 July 2001 it quashed the first-instance judgment and dismissed the applicant’s claim. 26. The applicant lodged a cassation appeal with the Supreme Court (Sąd Najwyższy) on 30 October 2001. The Prosecutor of Appeal (Prokurator Apelacyjny) filed a cassation appeal on her behalf on 31 October 2001. The appeals were dismissed on 23 October 2002.

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7. The applicants, David (the first applicant) and Carol (the second applicant) Glass, are United Kingdom nationals. The first applicant, born in 1986, is a severely mentally and physically disabled child who requires twenty-four hour attention. The second applicant is his mother. 8. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 9. The first applicant had been particularly unwell since July 1998 when he was admitted to St Mary's Hospital, one of two hospitals belonging to the Portsmouth Hospitals National Health Service (NHS) Trust (“the Trust”). He was operated on in order to alleviate an upper respiratory tract obstruction. The first applicant suffered post-operative complications, including infections, and had to be put on a ventilator since he had become critically ill. 10. During the period of the first applicant's treatment, discussions took place at the hospital between the second applicant and intensive-care staff and paediatricians. Among the views expressed was that, despite the best care, the first applicant was dying and that further intensive care would be inappropriate. The second applicant and other family members were not happy with this opinion, although a note drawn up on 30 July 1998 by Dr Smith mentioned that the family had appeared to accept the situation “without distress or significant surprise”. However, on 31 July 1998, following an “unconstructive and confrontational” meeting with family members, the hospital offered to arrange for an outside opinion on David's condition and the suitability of further active intensive-care therapy. This offer was made twice and on both occasions was refused. The Trust consulted its solicitors and advised the applicants to consult their solicitors. 11. However, the first applicant's condition improved and on 31 July 1998 he was able to be returned from intensive care to the paediatric ward. The applicants draw attention to the fact that the first applicant's notes on being discharged from intensive care made reference to a “demanding family”. They also observe that a note of Dr Wozniak drawn up on 3 August 1998 stated: “I think [the first applicant] would not survive this illness despite our efforts, but our efforts continue and we will continue his antibiotics, physio' and attempt to find feeds that he will tolerate ... We may need to consider measures to relieve distress e.g. hyoscine for the secretions, morphine and the risk of those measures and mum felt that this was not appropriate at present.” 12. The first applicant was eventually able to return home on 2 September 1998. However, he had to be readmitted to the hospital on several occasions thereafter on account of respiratory tract infections. On one such occasion, on 8 September 1998, the doctors discussed with the second applicant the use of morphine to alleviate distress. The second applicant expressed her opposition to the use of morphine or other drugs to relieve distress. She told the doctors that in the event that the first applicant's heart stopped she would expect resuscitation, including intubation. Dr Walker considered that this would not be in the first applicant's best interests, and stated that if death were inevitable all that was on offer was “morphine and TLC [tender loving care]”. Dr Walker's case notes recorded that: “These replies [of the second applicant] are contrary to decisions particularly previously made and I do not believe that further intensive care is in [the first applicant's] best interest. This needs to be resolved before it becomes necessary and I have therefore said that we need a second opinion – if necessary appointed by the courts to ensure an impartial decision by which we would all comply.” That same day the applicants' general practitioner informed the hospital that he had been contacted by the applicants' solicitor about the family's concern that the first applicant would be “helped on his way” with morphine. 13. Dr Walker reported as follows on a discussion which she had with the second applicant on 8 September 1998: “If [the first applicant] deteriorates rapidly he should receive bag and mask positive pressure respiration, but no cardiac massage and no intravenous or other drugs to resuscitate him.” 14. As to the use of morphine, Dr Walker stressed at the meeting that the doctors would never prescribe it or other sedatives without first discussing this with the second applicant. Dr Walker stated in her notes: “I have told [the second applicant] that we can give morphine to alleviate distress even vs. their wishes (and we can – I am assured by the Official Solicitor that no judge has ever overturned a doctor's decision to withdraw treatment/alleviate symptoms) but we wouldn't without telling them.” 15. According to the Government, the agreement as regards non-resuscitation was confirmed with the second applicant on 9 September 1998 by Dr Hallet. Dr Hallet's contemporaneous notes on the matter state: “The position appears to me to be precarious. He may recover with the antibiotics but the inability to cough secretions makes it possible that he will deteriorate and die. I have discussed the latter scenario. Mother says that she would like bag and mask but understands that it would not be appropriate to go on to full intubation and ITU treatment. This is as discussed with Dr Walker.” 16. Dr Hallet and the second applicant also discussed on that occasion the use of morphine in therapeutic doses. The applicants point out that Dr Hallet recognised that: “In the event of total disagreement we should be obliged to go to the courts to provide support for decision. Mother says she does not understand this.” 17. Dr Hallet's notes record the following: “Mother said that she would not contemplate euthanasia and I said that we would not either. The question of morphine came up and she agrees with the use of morphine in therapeutic doses to overcome pain if necessary. ... in view of today's and yesterday's discussions with mother which appear to have achieved a common ground, involvement of the court may not be necessary.” 18. The first applicant's condition deteriorated. He was admitted to St Mary's Hospital on 15 October 1998, and then again on 18 October 1998 following respiratory failure. 19. The first applicant was treated over the course of 19 October 1998. His condition was reviewed on separate occasions by two doctors, both of whom expressed serious concern about his prospects of surviving. Dr Walker observed that the first applicant looked “ghastly” and “exhausted”. 20. At 1.30 p.m. on 20 October 1998, the medical opinion was that the first applicant “was going into the terminal phase of respiratory failure”. 21. At 5.45 p.m. on 20 October 1998, Dr Hallet noted that the first applicant was “dying from his lung disease”. 22. The doctors treating the first applicant advised that diamorphine should be administered to him, believing that he had entered a terminal phase and required pain relief. The second applicant and other members of the family did not agree with the doctors' view that her son was dying and were very concerned that the administration of diamorphine (previously morphine had been mentioned) would compromise his chances of recovery. The second applicant voiced her concerns at a meeting with Drs Walker and Hallet and the Chief Executive of the Trust. A woman police officer was also present. The hospital persisted in its wish to give the first applicant diamorphine, while the second applicant was given an assurance that he would only be given “the smallest possible dose”. According to the applicants, the Chief Executive of the Trust had an influential role at the meeting and made it clear to the second applicant that diamorphine would be given to the first applicant. They refer in this connection to a letter written by the Chief Executive to the applicants' MP on 23 November 1998, in which he stated that he had instructed the doctors to administer diamorphine to the first applicant at the minimum dosage over a twenty-four hour period. The Government assert that the Chief Executive had no role to play whatsoever in the exercise of clinical judgment in the first applicant's case. 23. The notes of Drs Walker, Ashton and Hallet all stressed that the administration of morphine was not intended to kill the first applicant but to relieve his distress. Dr Hallet observed in his notes that the doctors who had met with the second applicant had stressed that the “use of morphine is NOT euthanasia – it is to relieve [the first applicant's] distress ...”. 24. The second applicant subsequently expressed the wish to take the first applicant home if the doctors were correct in their view that he was dying. A police officer in attendance advised her that if she attempted to remove him, she would be arrested. The hospital also indicated that unless the family members present allowed the doctors to commence diamorphine the police would remove them also. The second applicant tried without success to contact her solicitor, including at the latter's home. 25. A diamorphine infusion was commenced at 7 p.m. on 20 October 1998. The applicants maintain that the dose administered, namely 1 mg per hour, was in reality an adult dose and excessive for a child of the first applicant's age. The Government deny this and point to the first applicant's weight and to the fact that previous treatment with opiates had rendered the first applicant more tolerant to them. 26. A dispute broke out in the hospital involving the family members (but not the second applicant) and the doctors. The family members believed that the first applicant was being covertly euthanased and attempted to prevent the doctors from entering the first applicant's room. The hospital authorities called the security staff and threatened to remove the family from the hospital by force. 27. A do-not-resuscitate order (DNR) was put in the first applicant's medical notes without consulting the second applicant. 28. The dosage was reduced by half at 10 a.m. on 21 October 1998 in response to the family's continuing objections. The Government draw attention to the views of the doctors that the dose administered to the first applicant had improved his condition. Dr Walker found that it was: “a real relief and pleasant to see [the first applicant] peaceful and settled ... and his overall condition including agitation and distress had markedly improved”. 29. The following day the second applicant found that her son's condition had deteriorated alarmingly and was worried that this was due to the effect which the diamorphine was having on him. The family became extremely agitated and demanded that diamorphine be stopped. Dr Walker stated that this was only possible if the family agreed not to resuscitate or stimulate the first applicant. The Government contend that Dr Walker's objective was to prevent the family from disturbing the first applicant by creating undue noise and touching him, since at that time he was peaceful, breathing deeply and was not in distress. 30. The family tried to revive the first applicant and a fight broke out between certain members of the family and Drs Walker and Ashton. 31. The second applicant successfully resuscitated her son while the fight was going on. At some stage the police were summoned to the hospital in response to the assaults on Drs Walker and Ashton. Several police officers were injured and the mother of another patient on the ward was pushed against a wall. All but one of the children on the ward had to be evacuated. The injuries sustained by Drs Walker and Ashton were such that they were unable to perform their normal duties for a time. 32. The first applicant's condition improved and he was able to respond to stimuli from his relatives. He was able to be discharged on 21 October 1998. 33. The second applicant states that the Trust made no arrangements for any alternative care on discharge for the first applicant. They mention that the Trust did not arrange for him to be given an antidote for diamorphine and that the second applicant had to acquire equipment for measuring his oxygen saturation. In this connection, the Government draw attention to a report by Dr Hallet, which states: “It was felt that further care within the hospital setting was impossible and that he would be better managed at home, provided that we could obtain oxygen for the home. Arrangements were made to obtain oxygen and I discussed with his general practitioner to take on the responsibility of caring for his major chest problems at home. I then telephoned the Clinical Director at Southampton General Hospital to enquire whether they would accept him if he had to be readmitted in view of the severe disturbances to the hospital staff. I discussed going home with his mother who agreed to this and we then made telephone calls to community nurses and made arrangements for home oxygen. Following this transport was arranged to take the patient home.” 34. On 23 June 2000 some of the family members involved in the fracas with the doctors were convicted of assault and ordered to be excluded from the hospital. On 28 July 2000 their sentences were reduced on appeal. On 26 October 1999 the Trust had dropped its civil action for trespass against the second applicant for want of a legal basis. On 5 November 1998 the Medical Director of the Trust notified the second applicant in a letter that the paediatric staff at the hospital were anxious about a repetition of the problems which arose when her son was last admitted and were no longer confident of being able to give him the treatment he required. The letter continued: “Unfortunately [Portsmouth Hospital] believe that all we could offer [the first applicant] would be to make his remaining life as comfortable as possible and take no active steps to prolong life. This obviously means withholding or giving treatment with which you may not agree. As there seems no easy way to resolve these differences it would be sensible, if [the first applicant] required further inpatient care, for this to be provided at another hospital.” 35. The second applicant was informed that Southampton General Hospital, about twenty-five miles from her home, was willing to admit and treat her son should he suffer a further attack. 36. The family's general practitioner subsequently contacted Southampton General Hospital with a view to discussing arrangements for the first applicant's admission in the event of a future emergency. 37. The second applicant applied for judicial review of the decisions made by the Trust with regard to the medical treatment of her son. The matter came before Mr Justice Scott Baker. 38. On 21 April 1998 Mr Justice Scott Baker ruled that the Trust's decision was not susceptible to review because the situation had passed and would not arise again at the hospitals managed by it or, it was to be hoped, at any other hospital. He added: “If there is serious disagreement, the best interests procedure can be involved at short notice and the court will resolve it on the basis of the facts as they are then. They will almost inevitably be different from the facts as they were in October 1998. ... In any event it is unclear precisely what the facts were in October 1998 on the evidence that is before this court. ... Furthermore, if there is a crisis in the future, I am confident that if the matter is brought before the court the Official Solicitor will again provide assistance.” 39. In Mr Justice Scott Baker's view, judicial review was too blunt an instrument for the sensitive and on-going problems of the type raised by the case. In particular, he considered that it would be very difficult to frame any declaration in meaningful terms in a hypothetical situation so as not to restrict unnecessarily proper treatment by the doctors in an on-going and developing matter. He stressed in conclusion: “Nothing, I would finally say, should be read into this judgment to infer that it is my view that [Portsmouth Hospital] in this case acted either lawfully or unlawfully.” 40. The second applicant applied for permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal. The application was refused on 21 July 1999. Giving judgment, Lord Woolf, Master of the Rolls, was of the view that the considerations which might arise in relation to the first applicant and other children who suffered from similar disabilities were almost infinite and for the courts to try and produce clarity would be a task fraught with danger. He stated: “There are questions of judgment involved. There can be no doubt that the best course is for a parent of a child to agree on the course which the doctors are proposing to take, having fully consulted the parent and for the parent to fully understand what is involved. That is the course which should always be adopted in a case of this nature. If that is not possible and there is a conflict, and if the conflict is of a grave nature, the matter must then be brought before the court so the court can decide what is in the best interests of the child concerned. Faced with a particular problem, the courts will answer that problem. ... ... The difficulty in this area is that there are conflicting principles involved. The principles of law are clearly established, but how you apply those principles to particular facts is often very difficult to anticipate. It is only when the court is faced with that task that it gives an answer which reflects the view of the court as to what is in the best interests of the child. In doing so it takes into account the natural concerns and the responsibilities of the parent. It also takes into account the views of the doctors, and considers what is the most desirable answer taking the best advice it can obtain from, among others, the Official Solicitor. That is the way, in my judgment, that the courts must react in this very sensitive and difficult area.” 41. Lord Woolf disagreed with Mr Justice Scott Baker's view that the applicants had used the wrong legal procedure. In his opinion, “particularly in cases regarding children, the last thing the court should be concerned about is whether the right procedure has been used in the particular case”. 42. The second applicant complained to the General Medical Council about the conduct of the doctors involved in her son's care, in particular that they had assaulted him by administering heroin to him against her wishes and without a court authorisation. 43. On 7 January 2000 the General Medical Council concluded that its investigation revealed that the doctors involved had not been guilty of serious professional misconduct or seriously deficient performance and that the treatment complained of had been justified in the light of the emergency situation which confronted the doctors at the material time. According to the General Medical Council, the test for bringing disciplinary proceedings against the doctors was not satisfied on the evidence. It had asked itself in this connection whether the doctors put themselves in a reasonable position from which to arrive at the decision they did and whether the decision reached was so “outrageous” that no reasonably competent doctor could have reached it. 44. The second applicant also complained to the Hampshire police about the conduct of the doctors who had treated her son. An investigation was opened. The doctors were interviewed and a report sent to the Crown Prosecution Service. On 8 May 2000 the second applicant's solicitors informed her that the Crown Prosecution Service had decided not to bring charges against the doctors involved for lack of evidence. In a letter dated 16 June 2000 to her solicitors, the Crown Prosecution Service indicated the reasons which led to this finding as well as the various materials relied on in reaching its conclusion on the advisability of bringing charges against the doctors in relation to the offences of attempted murder and conspiracy to murder and offences under the Offences against the Person Act 1861.

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8. The applicant was born in 1947 and lives in Szabadbattyán, Hungary. 9. On 20 April 1995 the applicant was driving his car and had a collision with a bus. Some passengers suffered injuries. The Székesfehérvár Police inspected the scene of the accident. Subsequently the applicant’s blood alcohol level was tested. 10. On 6 May 1995 criminal investigations were instituted in which the applicant was accused of having negligently caused a traffic accident. On 12 May 1995 a motor-vehicle expert presented his opinion in the case. 11. On 22 December 1995 the Fejér County Public Prosecutor’s Office preferred charges. In view of the conclusions of a medical expert, on 29 May 1996 the Public Prosecutor’s Office completed the indictment charging the applicant with having caused permanent disability. 12. On 15 January 1997 the Székesfehérvár District Court held its first hearing. Subsequently experts were appointed, who presented their opinions on 30 June 1997. 13. A hearing scheduled for 15 April 1998 was adjourned on account of the applicant’s motion for bias, which was dismissed by the Supreme Court on 6 July 1998. 14. On 26 November 1998 the District Court held a hearing. On 10 December 1998 and 28 January 1999, respectively, the applicant and the Prosecutor’s Office proposed that an on-site experiment be carried out. 15. On 10 February 1999 the District Court adjourned the hearing scheduled for 25 February and ordered an expert institute to reconcile the earlier expert opinions. On 23 February 1999 the applicant submitted his further proposals concerning the taking of evidence. 16. A hearing scheduled for 20 May 1999 was adjourned on account of the applicant’s illness. On 26 July 1999 the expert institute presented its report. 17. On 24 November 1999 the District Court adjourned a hearing scheduled for 9 December 1999, since the applicant could not be summoned. 18. On 13 February 2000 the applicant submitted his further proposals concerning the taking of evidence and provided information on his new address. On 9 June 2000 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s further motion for bias, introduced on 21 February 2000. 19. On 17 January 2001 the applicant proposed that the investigations be completed and an inspection of the accident scene be held. 20. A hearing scheduled for 25 January 2001 was adjourned on account of the applicant’s illness. 21. On 17 May 2001 a hearing took place. The District Court held that, on account of the lapse of time since the accident, the taking of evidence needed to be repeated completely. It decided not to make an on-site inspection until certain witnesses could be heard. 22. On 16 July 2001 an examination of the applicant’s fitness to drive was ordered. On 13 September 2001 a hearing at the scene of the accident was re-scheduled for 3 October 2001. 23. On 27 September 2001 the Fejér County Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s further motion for bias. 24. On 3 October 2001 the District Court held a hearing and heard witnesses and experts. On the same day, the scene of the accident was also inspected. 25. The proceedings are still pending before the District Court.

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9. The applicant leased premises in a house owned by Kovospracujúci podnik, a State owned company with registered office in Prešov. He ran his business there. In April and May 1991 the applicant claimed that the relevant provisions of the State Property Transfer Act of 1990 (Act No. 427/1990) entitled him to purchase the part of the house which he leased. 10. On 12 June 1991 the Prešov District Commission for Denationalisation of State-Owned Property decided that the applicant was not entitled, under the State Property Transfer Act of 1990, to be given priority in purchasing the premises leased by him. 11. On 6 June 1991 the applicant filed an arbitration request claiming tht Kovospracujúci podnik should be ordered to conclude a purchase contract with him under Act No. 427/1990 in respect of the two premises leased by him and having the surface of 47.7 and 34.9 square metres respectively. The applicant further claimed that the purchase contract was to be determined pursuant to Section 8 of Act No. 427/1990. 12. On 16 July 1991 the Regional Arbitration Court (Krajská štátna arbitráž) in Košice delivered a decision the operative part of which reads: “The defendant – Kovospracujúci podnik, a State owned enterprise in Prešov is obliged to conclude a purchase contract with [the applicant] who has leased two premises situated ... in the building located in Prešov, Hlavná ulica 79 and having a surface area of 47.7 and 34.9 square metres respectively. The purchase contract shall concern the above premises and is to be concluded under Section 16(2) of Act No. 427/1990 within ten days from the final effect of this decision, it being understood that the purchase price will be determined pursuant to Section 8 of Act No. 427/1990.” The decision acquired final binding effect on 8 August 1991. 13. On 9 October 1991 the applicant concluded a purchase contract with Kovospracujúci podnik and paid the purchase price. The contract comprised several premises the total surface area of which was 145 square metres and also real estate with a surface area of 883 square metres. Subsequently Kovospracujúci podnik was placed in liquidation. 14. On 23 July 1992 the liquidator claimed that the proceedings leading to the decision of the Regional Arbitration Court of 16 July 1991 be re-opened. The liquidator argued that the requirements of the State Property Transfer Act of 1990 had not been met. On 25 February 1994 the Košice Regional Court dismissed the request. The decision stated that the liquidator had submitted no new relevant facts which could not have been invoked in the original proceedings and that, accordingly, the statutory requirements for re-opening the proceedings had not been met. 15. On 31 January 1995 the Prešov District Court declared the purchase contract of 9 October 1991 void ex tunc at the initiative of the Prešov District Prosecutor. The District Court found that in the contract the parties had not explicitly agreed on the date of transfer of the ownership as required by the relevant law and that the lawyer of Kovospracujúci podnik had exceeded his power in that he had also included in the contract premises which had not been leased by the applicant. 16. On 20 December 1995 the Košice Regional Court upheld the District Court’s judgment. The Regional Court found that the contract did not specify the property in question with sufficient certainty and that this resulted in conflicts between the applicant and another person who had purchased the remaining part of the house from Kovospracujúci podnik. With the consent of the parties the Košice Regional Court discontinued the proceedings in respect of the claim that Kovospracujúci podnik and the applicant should restore to each other everything which had been the subject of the contract of 9 October 1991. 17. On 19 December 1995 the applicant requested the Prešov District Court to enforce the decision delivered by the Regional Arbitration Court in Košice on 16 July 1991. He relied on Article III (7)(a) of Act No. 519/1991, Section 763(1) of the Business Code and Section 42a(6) of the Arbitration Act. 18. In December 1995 and in March 1996 the applicant submitted a new draft purchase contract for signature to the liquidator of Kovospracujúci podnik with reference to the arbitration court’s decision of 1991. On 22 April 1996 the liquidator asked the applicant in writing to submit a supplement to the draft contract as well as an expert opinion. 19. On 9 April 1996 the person who had purchased the other part of the house claimed that the co-ownership of the house be dissolved and that the share owned by Kovospracujúci podnik be transferred to his ownership. On 22 April 1996 the Prešov District Court granted the claim with reference to Article 142(1) of the Civil Code and ordered the plaintiff to pay 188,496.61 Slovakian korunas (SKK) to Kovospracujúci podnik. The liquidator of the latter waived his right to appeal and the judgment became final on 2 May 1996. It was not served on the applicant as he was not a party to the proceedings. 20. On 17 May 1996 the applicant requested the grant of an interim measure prohibiting Kovospracujúci podnik from concluding any contracts for the transfer of the property in question. On the same day the Prešov District Court granted the request. On 7 February 1997 the Košice Regional Court reversed the first instance decision as, at the time of its delivery, Kovospracujúci podnik no longer owned the property. 21. On 23 May 1997 the applicant complained about a violation of his property rights to the Constitutional Court. On 1 July 1997 the latter rejected the petition for lack of jurisdiction. 22. On 26 May 1997 the applicant requested the Prešov District Court to consider the new owner of the house as defendant in the enforcement proceedings brought on 19 December 1995. 23. On 4 June 1997 the Prešov District Court, responding to the applicant’s above request of 19 December 1995, ordered the enforcement of the decision of the Regional Arbitration Court of 16 July 1991 in that it imposed a fine of SKK 5,000 on the owner of the house with reference to Article 351 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The District Court expressed the view that the obligation to conclude a purchase contract had passed ex lege to the new owner of the house following the transfer of ownership to him. The proceedings were discontinued so far as they concerned Kovospracujúci podnik, as the latter no longer owned the property. The owner of the house appealed. 24. On 15 August 1997 the Prešov Regional Court quashed the District Court’s decision of 4 June 1997. The Regional Court did not find it established that the obligation imposed by the arbitration court in 1991 had been transferred to the new owner of the house. It therefore instructed the first instance court to ask the applicant and the liquidator of Kovospracujúci podnik whether they agreed to a change of defendant. Failing such an agreement, there could be no change of defendant. 25. As to the merits of the applicant’s claim for enforcement, the Regional Court’s decision stated: “... it is not possible to proceed pursuant to Article 351 of the Code of Civil Procedure or by any other means of enforcement of a decision where the decision to be executed imposes an obligation to make a certain declaration of intent [prejav vôle] within the meaning of Article 80(b) of the Code of Civil Procedure (for example to conclude a purchase contract). In such a case Section 161(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure is not applicable ... but Article 161(3) is to be applied, according to which final judgments imposing the declaration of intent replace such a declaration of intent. Accordingly, on the basis of such a judgment it is not possible to claim its judicial enforcement where the person concerned fails to comply with the obligation imposed, and it is not possible to have recourse to Article 351 of the Code of Civil Procedure...” 26. On 6 November 1997 the Prešov District Court dismissed the applicant’s request for change of defendant as the liquidator of Kovospracujúci podnik disagreed with the proposal. The statutory requirements for granting the applicant’s request had thus not been met. 27. In a separate decision delivered on 6 November 1997 the Prešov District Court dismissed the applicant’s request for enforcement of the Košice Regional Arbitration Court’s decision of 16 July 1991. In particular, the District Court’s decision stated: “...a decision relating to a declaration of intent may be relied on by the person at whose request it is made and is given effect to as a document reflecting a legal act, in accordance with the legal rules in force. The decision is submitted to the competent legal authority, where necessary, with a view to registering or making public the intent of the person against whom the proceedings have been brought. Such a decision may not be the subject either of judicial enforcement or of execution by an execution officer. The Košice Arbitration Court’s decision of 16 July 1991 ... cannot be enforced as it lacks a material element of enforceability. Where proceedings concern a declaration of intent in respect of a contract, the operative part of the decision on the merits of the case must contain all essential elements of such a contract ... Where one of such elements is omitted, the decision on the merits cannot be enforced pursuant to Article 161(3) and such a shortcoming cannot be remedied by any other means of enforcement. In the present case [the dispute concerns] a purchase contract. The definition of the purchase price is, along with its object, one of the essential elements of such a contract. Reference [in the Arbitration Court’s decision of 16 July 1991] to Section 16 of Act No. 427/1990 does not mean that the [vendor’s] declaration of intent which was to be replaced was sufficiently certain as required by Section 37 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In the case under consideration it is Article 161(3) and not Article 161(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure which is applicable... This means that on the basis of a judgment [replacing the declaration of intent of a party] ... it is not possible to claim judicial enforcement and it is not possible to proceed pursuant to Section 351 of the Code of Civil Procedure.” 28. The applicant appealed. He argued, inter alia, that the arbitration court’s decision of 16 July 1991 had not replaced the declaration of intent of the defendant company but had obliged its representatives to conclude a contract with the applicant. 29. On 18 December 1997 the Prešov Regional Court upheld the District Court’s decisions of 6 November 1997. The Regional Court noted that it was not possible to change defendants in the context of enforcement proceedings as a decision could be enforced only in respect of the person against whom it was delivered. The new owner of the house did not become the general successor to Kovospracujúci podnik which still existed. By purchasing the house the new owner was not, therefore, liable for the original owner’s contractual obligations. 30. As regards the applicant’s request for enforcement of the arbitration court’s decision of 16 July 1991, the Prešov Regional Court fully subscribed to the views expressed by the first instance court. In particular, the Regional Court’s decision stated that a decision ordering a party to conclude a purchase contract replaced the intent of the vendor to do so. In respect of such decisions, Article 161(3) was relevant, according to which, once they were of binding and final effect, such decisions replaced the intent of the party concerned. Enforcement of such decisions under Articles 161(1) and 351 of the Code of Civil Procedure was excluded. 31. In 1998 the applicant was ordered to move his business out of the premises in question. On 26 April 1999 the Prešov District Court ordered the applicant to pay SKK 513,187 plus default interest to the owner of the premises as compensation for their prior use.

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9. The applicants are a married Finnish couple, born in 1957 and 1955 respectively and resident in Helsinki. In 1987 they bought a real property from the owner of a neighbouring property, L., who had undertaken to tear down a lean-to which the latter had constructed partly on the land purchased by the applicants before splitting it up into a separate property. The applicants and L. allegedly reached a further agreement to the effect that the latter consented to the applicants’ construction of a car shelter which would be connected to a new sauna building which L. agreed to construct on his own property so as to replace the sauna in his lean-to. 10. On 26 January 1988 the Helsinki Building Inspection (rakennus-valvontavirasto, byggnadsinspektionen) granted permission to demolish the lean-to. Following that demolition, the Helsinki Building Board (rakennuslautakunta, byggnadsnämnden), on 23 February 1988, granted the applicants permission to construct a dwelling-house and a car shelter on their property. L. did not appeal but refused to demolish the whole of his lean-to and to construct the new sauna building to be connected to the applicants’ dwelling. 11. In August 1988 L. was prohibited from using his existing sauna as its chimney top was found to be partly under the roof level of the applicants’ car shelter. The applicants’ offer to have the chimney top extended was refused by L. 12. On 2 October 1990 representatives of the Building Board inspected the applicants’ car shelter and found that it complied with the building permit. L. lodged an objection with the Building Board against this finding. 13. In November 1990 L. brought a civil action against the applicants, demanding, inter alia, that they be ordered to tear down the car shelter which they had allegedly built in violation of the fire regulations. The Helsinki City Court (raastuvanoikeus, rådstuvurätten) held its first hearing in January 1991 but adjourned the case at L.’s request in anticipation of the Building Board’s forthcoming decision. 14. On 29 January 1991 the Building Board dismissed L.’s objection against the outcome of the inspection on 2 October 1990 and confirmed that the applicants had constructed their buildings in accordance with the permit delivered in 1988. The Board found that L. had contributed to the fact that he had been prohibited from using his sauna, having refused to carry out his own construction works as agreed with the applicants. Had he fulfilled his part of their joint agreement in accordance with the building permission granted to that effect, the roof of his and the applicants’ respective buildings would have been at the same height. The Board considered that the dispute between the parties was to be resolved by the civil courts. 15. L. appealed to the County Administrative Court (lääninoikeus, länsrätten) of Uusimaa, arguing that while he had consented to the applicants’ constructing up to the boundary line, he had not agreed to any construction on their part preventing him from using his existing sauna and requiring him to take construction measures of his own. Although he had informed the applicants that his consent did not cover those aspects, they had not informed the Building Board accordingly. As a result the building permit and the approval of the applicants’ construction works had been based on false premises. 16. In February 1991 the applicants filed a counter claim against L., demanding that he be ordered to carry out his part of their alleged agreement. The two suits were joined at the applicants’ request. The City Court’s second hearing was held on 7 March 1991 but the case was again adjourned at L.’s request. 17. On 17 September 1991 the County Administrative Court upheld the Building Board’s decision of 29 January 1991. L. appealed further to the Supreme Administrative Court (korkein hallinto-oikeus, högsta förvaltningsdomstolen) and also requested the annulment of the Building Board’s decision of 1988, whereby it had granted the applicants a building permit. 18. The City Court’s third hearing was held on 19 September 1991. The case was again adjourned at L.’s request, as he had not yet received the County Administrative Court’s decision of 17 September 1991. 19. On 10 October 1991 the Land Court (maaoikeus, jorddomstolen) of Southern Finland dismissed L.’s appeal against a refusal to move a marker indicating his and the applicants’ joint boundary line. 20. The civil case was again heard on 16 January 1992 but was now adjourned at the request of both parties in anticipation of the Supreme Administrative Court’s decision in respect of L.’s annulment request. 21. The City Court’s fifth hearing was held on 24 September 1992 but the case was again adjourned at L.’s request. Following a sixth hearing on 28 January 1993 the City Court adjourned the case for the summoning of witnesses. 22. On 19 February 1993 the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed L.’s request for annulment of the Building Board’s decision of 23 February 1988. The court held that an error had indeed been committed during the Building Board’s examination of the applicants’ request for a building permit. The court noted however the nature of L.’s written undertakings towards the applicants which had led to the error, the manner in which their car shelter had been built as well as the fact that it would be easy to arrange for the smoke from L.’s sauna to be evacuated in a manner acceptable from the point of view of fire safety. The court therefore considered that the Building Board’s decision of 23 February 1988 did not violate L.’s rights, nor was it necessary in the general interest to annul that decision. The court furthermore dismissed L.’s appeal against the County Administrative Court’s decision of 17 September 1991. 23. In April 1993 L. extended his civil action against the applicants by bringing further claims partly based on different legislation. At the City Court’s seventh hearing on 11 May 1993 it took evidence from the applicants’ witnesses K. and P. The case was again adjourned at L.’s request. 24. At the eighth hearing on 31 August 1993 witnesses A. and V. were heard at L.’s request and witness H. was heard at the request of the applicants. A. furthermore handed in reports of his inspections in situ dated 2 August 1989 and 8 August 1990. According to the applicants, the City Court had by then already refused their request that the court conduct its own inspection. The case was adjourned at both parties’ request so as to enable them to lodge further submissions in writing. 25. At the City Court’s ninth hearing on 23 November 1993 one further witness was heard at the applicants’ request and another witness at L.’s request. The parties requested permission to make their final pleadings in writing and the case was adjourned for judgment at a later date. 26. Each of the nine hearings was presided over by a different judge. 27. Due to a national reorganisation of the courts of first instance the case was transferred to the Helsinki District Court (käräjäoikeus, tingsrätten; formerly the City Court). In its judgment of 3 March 1994 it found that the Supreme Administrative Court’s decision of 1993 had not given rise to res judicata. The District Court, moreover, accepted L.’s extended action for consideration. It considered that whereas P. was the only witness who could have testified regarding the true character of the alleged agreement between the applicants and L., P.’s testimony had not been so detailed and certain that it could be regarded as decisive evidence that L. had agreed to tear down the whole of his lean-to. The court therefore found it established that the applicants had understood all along that L. had not intended to tear down the whole of his lean-to. By constructing the car shelter in the manner established they had effectively prevented L. from using his sauna. The applicants were therefore ordered to demolish their shelter and to restore L.’s lean-to into its original state. It followed that the applicants’ counter suit had to be dismissed. 28. The applicants were ordered to pay L. FIM 2,850 (about EUR 480) in compensation for the damage which the construction of their shelter had caused to his lean-to. They were ordered to pay a further FIM 3,000 (some EUR 500) a year (as from 1990) in compensation for the impossibility for L. to use his sauna. They also had to reimburse L.’s costs in the amount of FIM 32,668,50 (about EUR 5,500). 29. As regards the extent of the damages suffered by L., the District Court based itself exclusively on A.’s testimony. After the District Court’s judgment the applicants filed a criminal complaint against him, suspecting that he had committed perjury. 30. The applicants appealed against the District Court’s judgment and later supplemented their appeal with a copy of the record of the pre-trial investigation into the suspected perjury which in their view showed that A.’s testimony had not been truthful. 31. On 9 February 1995 the Helsinki Court of Appeal (hovioikeus, hovrätten) dismissed the applicants’ appeal and upheld the District Court’s judgment, including its reasons. The Court of Appeal refused to take into account the pre-trial investigation record concerning A., as it had been submitted out of time and no special reasons militated in favour of accepting it as evidence. The applicants were ordered to pay L.’s costs in the amount of FIM 2,500 (about EUR 420). 32. On 7 September 1995 the Supreme Court (korkein oikeus, högsta domstolen) refused the applicants leave to appeal. 33. In order to tear down their car shelter and restore L.’s lean-to the applicants were to obtain permission from the Building Inspection. In an opinion to the Supreme Court dated 22 February 1995 the Building Inspection nevertheless considered that the District Court’s demolition order was “not an equitable solution”, since the only change needed from the point of view of fire safety would be to extend L.’s chimney top to a point 80 centimetres above the applicants’ car shelter. The Building Inspection would therefore not permit the car shelter to be torn down and such demolition would be contrary to the general interest by spoiling the appearance of the neighbourhood and violate both local planning regulations and general regulations on fire safety. 34. On 20 August 1997 the Helsinki District Court convicted A. of perjury and sentenced him to nine months’ conditional imprisonment. It found it established that he had deliberately omitted various relevant information from his testimony in L.’s civil case against the applicants. In the light of this judgment the applicants requested the Supreme Court to reopen the proceedings. 35. L. died in November 1997, having sold his property. 36. On 8 March 2000 the Supreme Court granted the applicants’ request for a reopening of the proceedings in so far as they had been ordered to compensate L. for the damage which the construction of their car shelter had caused to his lean-to as well as to pay him the costs incurred in the proceedings before the lower courts. The Supreme Court referred to A.’s conviction of perjury. 37. Referring to its decision of 16 May 1997, the Supreme Court declined to examine anew the applicant’s request for a re-opening of the case in respect of the order requiring them to demolish the car shelter, to restore L.’s lean-to into its state prior to the construction of the shelter as well as to pay L. annual compensation for the fact that he had been prevented from using his sauna. 38. As of November 2002 the current owners of L.’s house had not requested, and the authorities had not enforced, the aforementioned three orders. 39. In re-opening part of the case the Supreme Court instructed the applicants to file, within three months, a new action against L. before the District Court. They initiated such proceedings against L.’s successors on 30 May 2000 and supplemented their statement of claim on 28 May 2001 in light of the defendants’ written observations. The court’s preparatory hearing was held on 5 June 2002. 40. On 13 August 2002 the parties reached a settlement whereby L.’s successors undertook to reimburse the applicants the amount of FIM 2,850 (i.e. the compensation which the applicants had paid to L.) as well as a further sum of EUR 5,045.64. L.’s insurance company undertook to reimburse EUR 3,363.76 of the costs paid by the applicants. The sums were to be divided between the applicants and their insurance company as later agreed. The applicants and L.’s successors declared that they had no further claims against one another whether in relation to the proceedings initiated in May 2000 or to any previous court proceedings or related events. 41. The settlement was approved by the District Court on 23 August 2002.

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4. The applicant was born in 1942 and lives in Rome. 5. He is the owner of a flat in Rome, which he had let to I.M. 6. In a registered letter of 30 April 1987, the applicant informed the tenant that he intended to terminate the lease on expiry of the term on 31 December 1987 and asked her to vacate the premises by that date. 7. In a writ served on the tenant on 6 October 1987, the applicant reiterated his intention to terminate the lease and summoned the tenant to appear before the Rome Magistrate. 8. By a decision of 10 February 1988, which was made enforceable on 26 February 1988, the Rome Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 31 December 1988. 9. On 22 March 1991, the applicant served notice on the tenant requiring her to vacate the premises. 10. On 30 April 1991, he informed the tenant that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 14 June 1991. 11. On 14 May 1991, the applicant made a statutory declaration that he urgently required the premises as accommodation for himself. 12. Between 14 June 1991 and 21 September 1999, the bailiff made thirty-seven attempts to recover possession. Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as the applicant was never granted the assistance of the police in enforcing the order for possession. 13. Pursuant to Section 6 of Law no. 431/98, the tenant asked the Rome District Court to set a new date for the enforcement of the order for possession. The date was set for 19 July 2000. 14. On 10 July 2001, the tenant spontaneously left the premises and the applicant recovered possession of the flat.

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4. The applicant were respectively born in 1949, 1941, 1943, 1946 and 1956 and live in Rome. 5. They are the owners of a flat in Rome, which they had let to M.P., S.P. and L.P. 6. In a registered letter of 19 June 1991, the applicants informed the tenants that they intended to terminate the lease on expiry of the term on 31 December 1991 and asked them to vacate the premises by that date. 7. In a writ served on the tenants on 5 July 1991, the applicants reiterated their intention to terminate the lease and summoned the tenants to appear before the Rome Magistrate. 8. By a decision of 18 December 1991, which was made enforceable on the same day, the Rome Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 30 November 1992. 9. On 19 December 1992, the applicants served notice on the tenants requiring them to vacate the premises. 10. On 20 January 1993, they informed the tenants that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 5 March 1993. 11. Between 5 March 1993 and 2 February 2000, the bailiff made twenty-seven attempts to recover possession. Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as the applicants were never granted the assistance of the police in enforcing the order for possession. 12. In the meantime, on 6 October 1998, one of the applicants, P.C., had made a statutory declaration that he urgently required the premises as accommodation for his son. 13. On 3 February 2000, the tenants left spontaneously the premises and the applicants recovered possession of the flat.

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4. The applicant was born in 1962 and lives in Livorno. 5. Her grandmother was the owner of a flat in Livorno, which she had let to I.B.C. 6. In a registered letter of 6 May 1987, the applicant's grandmother informed the tenant that she intended to terminate the lease on expiry of the term on 1 January 1988 and asked her to vacate the premises by that date. 7. The tenant told the applicant's grandmother that she would not leave the premises and she fell in rent arrears. 8. In a writ served on the tenant on 11 July 1989, the applicant's grandmother reiterated her intention to terminate the lease and summoned the tenant to appear before the Livorno Magistrate. 9. By a decision of 31 July 1989, which was made enforceable on the same day, the Livorno Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 1 January 1991. 10. On 9 August 1991, the applicant's grandmother died and the applicant inherited the apartment. 11. On 6 November 1991, the applicant served notice on the tenant requiring her to vacate the premises. 12. On 22 January 1992, she informed the tenant that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 19 February 1992. 13. On 12 November 1992, the applicant made a statutory declaration that she urgently required the premises as accommodation for herself. 14. Between 19 February 1992 and 3 October 2000, the bailiff made fourteen attempts to recover possession. Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as the applicant was never granted the assistance of the police in enforcing the order for possession. 15. In the meanwhile, on 10 July 1997, the applicant made a second statutory declaration that she urgently required the premises as accommodation for herself. 16. On an unspecified date of June 2001, the applicant recovered possession of the flat.

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4. The applicant was born in 1928 and lives in Rome. 5. He is the owner of a flat in Rome, which he had let to C.D.C. 6. In a writ served on the tenant on 7 January 1992, the applicant informed the tenant that he intended to terminate the lease on expiry of the term and summoned him to appear before the Rome Magistrate. 7. By a decision of 14 April 1992, which was made enforceable on 24 June 1992, the Rome Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 30 June 1995. 8. On 25 July 1995, the applicant served notice on the tenant requiring him to vacate the premises. 9. On 4 September 1995 he informed the tenant that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 5 October 1995. 10. On 13 October 1996, the applicant made a statutory declaration that he urgently required the premises as accommodation for his spouse. 11. Between 5 October 1995 and 21 July 2000, the bailiff made thirteen attempts to recover possession. Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as the applicant was never granted the assistance of the police in enforcing the order for possession. 12. On 20 October 2000 the tenant left the premises spontaneously and the applicant recovered possession of the flat.

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4. The applicant was born in 1931 and lives in Naples. 5. The applicant is the owner of a flat in Naples, which he had let to M. D'A. 6. In a registered letter of 12 April 1984, the applicant informed the tenant that he intended to terminate the lease on expiry of the term and asked her to vacate the premises. 7. In a writ served on the tenant on 28 April 1984, the applicant reiterated his intention to terminate the lease and summoned the tenant to appear before the Naples Magistrate. 8. By a decision of 16 July 1984, which was made enforceable on 17 October 1984, the Naples Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 30 June 1986. 9. The tenant objected to the Naples Magistrate decision and informed the applicant that she would not leave the premises. 10. On 16 July 1990, the applicant served notice on the tenant requiring her to vacate the premises. 11. On 17 September 1990, he informed the tenant that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 4 October 1990. 12. Between 4 October 1990 and 25 November 1991, the bailiff made three attempts to recover possession. Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as the applicant was not entitled to police assistance in enforcing the order for possession. 13. On 13 November 1992, the applicant served a second notice on the tenant requiring her to vacate the premises. 14. On 24 December 1992, he informed the tenant that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 8 January 1993. 15. Between 8 January 1993 and 16 September 1993, the bailiff made two unsuccessful attempts to recover possession. 16. On 16 September 1993 the tenant asked for a suspension of the enforcement proceedings. 17. On 16 July 1996, the applicant served a third notice on the tenant requiring her to vacate the premises. 18. On 2 October 1996, he informed the tenant that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 10 October 1996. 19. Between 10 October 1996 and 4 December 1998, the bailiff made eight unsuccessful attempts to recover possession. 20. Pursuant to section 6 of Law no. 431/98, the tenant asked for a suspension of the enforcement proceedings. The Naples Court of Appeal decided to suspend it until 15 October 1999. 21. On 9 November 1999, the applicant informed the tenant that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 19 November 1999. 22. Between 19 November 1999 and 10 March 2000, the bailiff made four unsuccessful attempts to recover possession. 23. On 28 February 2002, the applicant served a fourth notice on the tenant requiring her to vacate the premises. 24. On 17 April 2002, the applicant informed the tenant that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 6 May 2002. 25. On 2 May 2002, pursuant to section 80 of Law no. 388/00, the tenant asked for a suspension of the enforcement proceedings. 26. On 20 June 2002, the law-decree no. 122 postponed the enforcement of the eviction proceedings until 30 June 2003. 27. According to the last information submitted by the applicant on 12 September 2003, he had not yet recovered possession of the flat.

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7. The applicant was born in 1945. He is currently in prison. 8. In 1973 the applicant was convicted of the murder of his wife and sentenced to twenty years imprisonment. He was released in 1984. 9. On 8 December 1989 the applicant was convicted of the murder of his second wife, committed in a cruel manner, the case having been qualified as a “dangerous recidivism” within the meaning of Article 116 § 11 of the Penal Code. The applicant was sentenced to the death penalty. By judgment of 28 July 1990 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant's ensuing appeal and upheld the death sentence. 10. On 20 July 1992 the applicant filed a petition for review to a five-member chamber of the Supreme Court. Following a hearing on 23 November 1992, the petition was refused on 11 January 1993. 11. Article 375 § 5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure as in force at the time, provided that no execution could be carried out prior to the President's decision whether or not to exercise his power of pardon. 12. The last executions of persons sentenced to the capital punishment were carried out in Bulgaria in November 1989. 13. Following a period of a de facto moratorium on executions, on 20 July 1990 the Parliament adopted a decision “on deferral of the execution of death sentences” which read: “The execution of death sentences which have entered into force shall be deferred until the resolution of the question regarding the application of the capital punishment in Bulgaria.” 14. Since the capital punishment remained in the Penal Code, the courts continued sentencing convicted persons to death or - as in the applicant's case - upholding on appeal death sentences delivered before 20 July 1990. 15. Although no explicit undertaking by Bulgaria to abolish the death penalty was made at the moment of Bulgaria's accession to the Council of Europe on 7 May 1992, such a requirement was regarded as implied in the general undertaking to comply with Article 3 of the Statute of the Council of Europe (see the reports of the Parliamentary Assembly's commission on Bulgaria's compliance with its obligations and undertakings (report of 2 September 1998, Doc. 8180, §§ 5 and 125‑29 (urging the abolition as an implied obligation), and report of 17 January 2000, Doc. 8616, § 110 (noting with satisfaction the abolition of the death penalty)). 16. On 8 March 1993 the President of the Supreme Court submitted the applicant's case to the President of the Republic for a decision whether or not to pardon him. In the accompanying letter the President of the Supreme Court expressed his opinion that the applicant should be pardoned and his death sentence replaced by a term of imprisonment. He argued that due consideration should be given to the fact that the applicant was a person of limited self-control abilities and had acted under distress when murdering his wife. The President of the Republic did not make a decision, leaving the question of pardon pending. 17. In 1997 the applicant wrote to the President of the Republic requesting to be pardoned and to the prosecution authorities seeking reopening of the criminal case. He stated, inter alia, that his continued detention under threat of execution was inhuman and degrading and violated the Convention. 18. On 10 December 1998 Parliament abolished the death penalty replacing it by life imprisonment without parole eligibility. 19. By decision of 25 January 1999 the applicant's death sentence was commuted to life imprisonment without parole eligibility. 20. On 29 September 1999 Bulgaria ratified Protocol No. 6 to the Convention. 21. The death penalty was an issue often debated between 1990 and 1998. A number of members of Parliament expressed views in support of reintroducing executions whereas others sought the abolition of the death penalty. The media periodically discussed the topic. It was widely known that the abolition of the death penalty was urged by the Council of Europe and other international organisations and was a step towards Bulgaria's European integration. 22. During the relevant period the Penal Code was amended several times. Some amendments expanded the scope of the death penalty. At the same time, work started on a draft Penal Code which excluded the death penalty. In 1995 an amendment to the Penal Code introduced for the first time life imprisonment. 23. The following attempts to reintroduce executions were made by supporters of the death penalty: 24. On 27 May 1992 the Chair of the Parliamentary Legislative Committee and another member of Parliament introduced a motion proposing the annulment of the Parliament's decision of 20 July 1990. 25. On 22 November 1993 a similar proposal was introduced in Parliament by a minority parliamentary group, the New Democracy Alliance. Two parliamentary committees discussed the issue and voted against reintroducing executions. On 1 February 1994 the Legislative Committee held a hearing on both proposals which were defeated. 26. The issue of reintroducing executions was discussed several times in the Parliament elected at the end of 1994. There were four motions: two for a parliamentary vote on restarting executions and two for calling a referendum. 27. The first proposal was discussed by the Parliamentary Committee on Government Institutions, which supported the idea of reintroducing executions by a majority of seven votes to six. Thereafter, a member of Parliament on several occasions unsuccessfully sought to have the motion discussed by a plenary session of the Parliament. On one occasion the motion gathered the required number of votes to be entered on the weekly agenda, but eventually was not discussed. Most proposals to include the issue on the agenda of the Parliament's plenary session were defeated through abstention votes. 28. The first motion for a referendum was defeated on a procedural ground as the proposed date in 1995 did not allow sufficient organisation time. The second proposal for a referendum, filed on 5 December 1995, was considered by the Human Rights and Religions Committee on 6 March 1996 and was defeated by eight votes to two, with two abstentions. 29. On 29 January 1996 a proposal for restarting executions was introduced by opposition deputies. It was discussed by the Human Rights and Religions Committee and was defeated on 13 March 1996 by eight votes to three. 30. According to section 130 of the Execution of Sentences Act, as in force at the time of the moratorium on executions, persons awaiting execution were to be detained in complete isolation, correspondence and visits being only possible if permitted by the competent prosecutor. 31. On 2 August 1990 the Deputy Director of the Central Prisons Board instructed prisons administrations that the Parliament's decision suspending executions also suspended by implication this restrictive regime of detention. 32. The instruction stated, in so far as relevant, that persons sentenced to death should be held in individual cells or together with other persons sentenced to death or detained under a “special regime” (the regime of detention of recidivists and, after 1995, persons sentenced to life imprisonment: sections 43 and 127b of the Execution of Sentences Act as in force at the time). Inmates should have a bed, bedcover, a bed-side piece of furniture and a centrally operated radio loudspeaker. They should be allowed unlimited correspondence, newspapers and books, one visit per month, one hour of daily outdoor walk without contact with other categories of prisoners and the receipt of one food parcel every six months and a small amount of money. If possible, they could work in the cell. 33. On 26 July 1996, the Director of the Central Prisons Board and a prosecutor of the Chief Public Prosecutor's Office issued an instruction which stated that, “in view of the continuing moratorium on executions”, persons sentenced to death should be allowed unlimited correspondence, one hour daily outdoor walk, one visit per month and the receipt of two food parcels and 30 packs of cigarettes per month and small amounts of money. 34. The applicant was detained in the Sofia prison, in a wing for prisoners under the “special regime” provided for by section 56 of the Regulations on the Application of the Execution of Sentences Act, approximately twenty inmates. He was moved several times, but was always in cells measuring 4 by 2.5 metres. 35. It appears that during most of the above period the applicant was alone in a cell. Other prisoners sentenced to death and detained in the same prison as the applicant were allowed to share a cell between 1990 and June 1995. It is unclear whether it was possible for the applicant to request to share a cell with another prisoner. 36. The applicant's cell invariably had one bed with a mattress, two blankets, a metal chamber pot and a centrally operated radio loudspeaker. There was no chair or a table. Until October 1998, when all cell windows were replaced by larger ones, the window in the applicant's cell was very small, covering 0.6 square metres, and did not allow sufficient light and fresh air. 37. There was one 60‑Watts electric bulb in the cell. As it was installed on the wall above the door, its light was insufficient. 38. The central heating pipes in cells for special regime prisoners were covered by a layer of bricks. According to the applicant that impeded the normal heating and as a result it was often cold in winter. According to the Government the bricks accumulated heat and released it normally. 39. Inmates were given one hour out-of-cell time in the morning in an open yard. There they could walk together with other inmates from the special regime wing. 40. The cells of special regime prisoners had no electrical sockets. Despite an amendment of the relevant instructions in 1996 which authorised the use of radio and television receivers by special regime prisoners, such devices could therefore only be used on batteries. 41. As they were considered to be high risk prisoners, inmates sentenced to death were not eligible for outside work assignment. As a result, the applicant used to spend almost twenty three hours a day on his own in his cell. Food was delivered three times a day in the cell. The applicant was permitted to leave his cell during the one-hour morning walk, again in the evening for several minutes for use of the sanitary facilities, and when receiving visits or for medical consultations. Also, inmates could have a shower once per week, for several minutes. 42. One or two visits of one-half hour were allowed per month. Visits by lawyers were not limited. At least on one occasion the applicant was visited by journalists. 43. During the relevant period there has been no limitation on correspondence. The applicant could also receive food parcels and money. He could buy small food and toilet items from the prison shop, if he had the money to do so. He could borrow books from the prison library. 44. The applicant received the same medical service as all other prison inmates. Between 1992 and 1998 he was seen fourteen times by a dentist and many times by other medical doctors. There is an infirmary opened eight hours per day. 45. Ever since his imprisonment in 1989 the applicant has been monitored by the prison psychological service. An assessment written by one of its employees on 4 December 1998 and submitted by the Government stated, inter alia: “[I]n crucial moments, such as the moratorium on executions and the ensuing period of debates about the abolition of the death penalty ... [the applicant] was unable to cope on his own with the fear and anxiety that had gripped him: his neurotic and depressive complaints reappeared, as well as his ... defence reactions ( ... denial of any guilt ...). During that period a number of psychological consultations and examinations were carried out with the [applicant] ... [These] brought about a temporary improvement: his neurotic and depressive reactions and his fright phased out but may reappear if the situation changes... [The applicant]'s personality is characterised by contradictions, domineering tendencies and aspirations... He ... seeks justifications [in respect of the murder] and aspires to preserve his self-respect, adopting the pose of a victim... The [applicant's] current need of self assertion - which on a behavioural level is manifested by an aspiration for increased physical and psychological activity and a pursuit of positive social reactions - may, in the situation where there are no changes in his legal status, provoke negative psychological developments by reactivating his pessimistic attitude and the feeling of lack of prospects... ” 46. The applicant has also been seen several times by psychiatrists at the prison hospital and by outside psychiatrists. They were unanimous that the applicant did not have a mental disorder but displayed signs of “psychopathy and emotional and volitional instability [typical of] a primitive personality”. 47. In June 1991, June-July 1993, January-February 1995 and again in April‑May 1997 the applicant was admitted to the prison hospital and treated against neurosis, sleeplessness and loss of appetite. The applicant also complained that he was hearing voices and suffered from feelings of fear. He was treated with sedatives and other medicaments. The examinations revealed his good general condition. The doctors recommended frequent visits to the psychologist. 48. On an unspecified date he was examined as a matter of emergency as he had stated that he would hang himself. The psychiatrist at the prison hospital directed the applicant to a psychiatric hospital for treatment while noting that his behaviour disclosed a demonstrative element. On several occasions the doctors who examined the applicant noted that he simulated sensory disorders. II. THE REPORT OF THE EUROPEAN COMMITTEE FOR THE PREVENTION OF TORTURE AND INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT (“THE CPT”) ON THEIR VISIT TO BULGARIA IN 1995 49. The CPT has not visited the Sofia prison where the applicant was detained. 50. In 1995 it visited, however, two inmates sentenced to death and detained in the Stara Zagora prison facilities and described the conditions of detention as follows: “The material conditions in the cells left a great deal to be desired: mediocre access to natural light and weak artificial lighting; inadequate heating; cell furnishings in a poor state of repair; dirty bed linen, etc. As regards out-of-cell activities, they were limited to 15 minutes per day for use of the sanitary facilities, one hour outdoor exercise (which the prisoners alleged was not guaranteed every day) and one visit per month. The two prisoners were not allowed to work (not even inside their cells), nor to go to the library, the cinema room or the refectory (their food was brought to the cell). In short, they were subject to an impoverished regime and, more particularly, were offered very little human contact. The latter consisted essentially of the possibility to talk to each other during outdoor exercise (which they took together), and occasional dealings with prison officers. Practically the only forms of useful occupation at their disposal were reading newspapers and books, and writing letters. The above-described situation is in accordance with the rules concerning prisoners sentenced to death, adopted after the moratorium on the execution of the death penalty... Nevertheless, in the CPT's view it is not acceptable. It is generally acknowledged that all forms of solitary confinement without appropriate mental and physical stimulation are likely, in the long term, to have damaging effects, resulting in deterioration of mental faculties and social abilities. The delegation found that the regime applied to prisoners sentenced to death in Stara Zagora Prison did not provide such stimulation. The CPT recommends that the regime applied to prisoners sentenced to death held in Stara Zagora Prison, as well as in other prisons in Bulgaria, be revised in order to ensure that they are offered purposeful activities and appropriate human contact. Further, the CPT recommends that steps be taken to improve the material conditions in the cells occupied at Stara Zagora Prison by prisoners sentenced to death.” 51. Historically, most Member States of the Council of Europe approached the question of the abolition of the death penalty by suspending executions pending debate on a final abolition. States which became members of the Council of Europe during the 1990s were urged by the Parliamentary Assembly to introduce moratoria on executions as a first step towards the abolition of the death penalty (see, Report on the abolition of the death penalty in Europe, PA Doc. 7589 (25 June 1996)). 52. The Committee has held that “in the absence of further compelling circumstances” prolonged detention on death row per se does not constitute a violation of Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (prohibition of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment) (see Hylton v. Jamaica, Views of 16 July 1996, communication no. 600/1994, Errol Johnson v. Jamaica, Views of 22 March 1996, communication no. 588/1994; and Michael Wanza v. Trinidad and Tobago, Views of 26 March 2002, communication no. 683/1996). 53. The Commission, when examining complaints by persons on death row, has found violations of Article XXVI of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (prohibiting cruel, infamous or unusual punishment of persons accused of offences) and Article 5 §§ 1 and 2 of the American Convention on Human Rights (right to humane treatment and prohibition of torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment or treatment) mainly on the strength of facts concerning irregularities in the sentencing process, the material conditions and regime of detention and ill-treatment in prison, while also taking into account the length of the period spent on death row (Andrews v. the United States of America, Case No. 11.139, Report No. 57/96, OEA/Ser/L/V/II.98, §§ 178‑83; Joseph Thomas v. Jamaica, Case No. 12.183, Report 127/01). 54. The Privy Council, examining cases from Caribbean Commonwealth States, had to decide whether the execution of a person following long delay after his sentence to death could amount to inhuman punishment or treatment contrary to those States' Constitutions. Initially, the Privy Council considered that a condemned person could not complain about delay of his execution caused by his resort to appellate proceedings (de Freitas v. Benny [1976] A.C. 239, Abbott v. Attorney-General of Trinidad and Tobago [1979] 1 W.L.R. 1342), or indeed about any delay, “whatever the reasons”, including a temporary moratorium on executions which had been lifted (Riley v. Attorney-General of Jamaica [1983] 1 A.C. 719). 55. In 1993, departing from its earlier decisions, the Privy Council held that to execute the appellants, who had spent almost fourteen years on death row and had on three occasions lived through last minutes stays of execution, would be unlawful as being inhuman punishment and therefore advised that their death sentences should be commuted to life imprisonment (Pratt and Morgan v. The Attorney General for Jamaica and another [1994] 2 A.C. 1). 56. In Pratt and Morgan, part of the relevant period was taken up by a temporary moratorium on executions. “[P]olitical debate on the desirability of retaining the death sentence in Jamaica ... resulted in a resolution of the Senate on 9th February 1979 to suspend all executions for a period of eighteen months pending the report of a Committee of inquiry. The Committee of Inquiry was appointed in June 1979. Before the Committee reported, an execution took place on 27th August 1980 which drew a protest to the Jamaican Privy Council from the Chairman of the Committee. No further executions took place before the Committee reported in March 1981. On 12th May 1981 executions were resumed” (Pratt, § 16). 57. The judgment in Pratt and Morgan stated, inter alia: “There is an instinctive revulsion against the prospect of hanging a man after he has been held under sentence of death for many years. What gives rise to this instinctive revulsion? The answer can only be our humanity; we regard it as an inhuman act to keep a man facing the agony of execution over a long extended period of time. But before their Lordships condemn the act of execution as 'inhuman or degrading punishment or other treatment' within the meaning of section 17(1) [of the Jamaican Constitution] there are a number of factors that have to be balanced in weighing the delay. If delay is due entirely to the fault of the accused such as an escape from custody or frivolous and time wasting resort to legal procedures which amount to an abuse of process the accused cannot be allowed to take advantage of that delay for to do so would be to permit the accused to use illegitimate means to escape the punishment inflicted upon him in the interest of protecting society against crime... In their Lordships' view a State that wishes to retain capital punishment must accept the responsibility of ensuring that execution follows as swiftly as practicable after sentence, allowing a reasonable time for appeal and consideration of reprieve. It is part of the human condition that a condemned man will take every opportunity to save his life through use of the appellate procedure. If the appellate procedure enables the prisoner to prolong the appellate hearings over a period of years, the fault is to be attributed to the appellate system that permits such delay and not to the prisoner who takes advantage of it. Appellate procedures that echo down the years are not compatible with capital punishment. The death row phenomenon must not become established as a part of our jurisprudence... There may of course be circumstances which will lead the Jamaican Privy Council to recommend a respite in the carrying out of a death sentence, such as a political moratorium on the death sentence, or a petition on behalf of the appellants to [international human rights bodies] or a constitutional appeal to the Supreme Court. But if these respites cumulatively result in delay running into several years an execution will be likely to infringe section 17(1) and call for commutation of the death sentence to life imprisonment.” 58. Further, calculating the normal length of relevant appellate proceedings in Jamaica and taking into consideration the time necessary for examination of applications to the Inter American Commission of Human Rights and the UN Human Rights Committee, the Privy Council held that: “in any case in which execution is to take place more than five years after sentence there will be strong grounds for believing that the delay is such as to constitute inhuman or degrading punishment or ... treatment”. 59. In cases which followed the Privy Council accepted a claim that a period of four years and ten months also warranted a finding in favour of the appellant (Guerra v. Baptiste and Others [1996] 1 A.C. 397) but dismissed appeals concerning shorter periods (Henfield v. The Attorney General of the Commonwealth of The Bahamas [1997] A.C. 413; Fischer (No. 1) v. The Minister of Public Safety and Immigration and Others (Bahamas) [1998] A.C. 673; and Higgs and David Mitchell v. The Minister of National Security and Others (Bahamas) [1999] UKPC 55) and held that save in exceptional circumstances, periods of pre-sentence detention should not be taken into account since, inter alia, “the state of mind of the person ... during this earlier period is not the agony of mind of a man facing execution, but ... anxiety and concern of the accused”(Fisher, § 14). In Higgs and David Mitchell, the Privy Council stated, inter alia: “If a man has been sentenced to death, it is wrong to add other cruelties to the manner of his death... In Pratt ... the [Privy Council] held that the execution after excessive delay was an inhuman punishment because it added to the penalty of death the additional torture of a long period of alternating hope and despair. It is not the delay in itself which is a cruel and unusual punishment..., 'it is the act of hanging the man that is rendered cruel and unusual by the lapse of time”. 60. The Supreme Court of India found that execution following inordinate delay after sentence of death violated Article 21 of the Indian Constitution which provides that “no one shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law” and that the reasons for the delay were immaterial (Vatheeswaran v. State of Tamil Nadu [1983] 2 S.C.R. 348, Sher Singh and Others v. the State of Punjab [1983] 2 S.C.R. 582 and Smt. Treveniben v. State of Gujarat [1989] 1 S.C.J. 383) . 61. The United States' Supreme Court has refused to accept claims that lengthy detention on death row violated the prohibition, contained in the Eight Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America, of cruel and unusual punishment, emphasising that the delay is due to the convicted person's own decision to make use of all possibilities to appeal (Knight v. Florida, 528 US 990). 62. The Supreme Court of Canada has held that Canadian constitutional standards did not bar extradition to the United States of America of a defendant facing the death penalty (Kindler v. Canada (Minister of Justice), [1991] 2 S.C.R. 779). However, in 2001 it changed its approach and held that if the person being extradited could face the death penalty, constitutional standards required that in all but exceptional cases assurances must be sought from the United States of America that the death penalty would not be imposed or, if imposed, would not be carried out (United States v. Burns, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 283).

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